CAR_Public/180423.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Monday, April 23, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 81



                            Headlines


ADP TOTALSOURCE: Fails to Pay Wages Timely, Samon et al. Claim
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: "Brasher" Suit Moved to N.D. Alabama
AMAZON.COM.DEDC LLC: "King" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
ANDY FRAIN: Smith Sues over Collection of Biometric Information
APPLE INC: Webb Sues over Slowing Down Performance of iPhones

ASSET RECOVERY: Vaughn Sues over Debt Collection Practices
BAHCHE INC: "Settecasi" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
AUSTRALIA: Castlereagh Freeway Residents Mull Class Action
BANK OF HAWAII: Court Narrows Claims in "Smith" Suit
BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI: July 12 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set

BARTELL HOTELS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Duran Says
BLUE MAX TRUCKING: "Hagan" Suit Moved to Fed. District Court
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM: July 19 Aggrenox(R) Settlement Hearing Set
BRF SA: Faces Class Action, May 11 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
BROOKS ENVIRONMENTAL: Yates Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY: Some Claims in "Rogers" Must Be Dismissed
CANCER GENETICS: Faces "Zhang" Suit over Plunge in Stock Price
CARTER HOLT: Hundreds of Property Owners to Join Class Action
CASEY'S RETAIL: Judge Rejects Motion to Dismiss ADA Class Action
CHASE BANK: Tucker Seeks to Recoup Charges over Crypto Purchases

CHEROKEE, NC: "Hogan" Suit vs Social Services Moved to Fed. Court
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Bid to Remand "Nichols" to State Ct. Denied
CHINA AGRITECH: Shearman & Sterling Discusses Tolling Issue
CITIBANK N.A.: Kulauzovic Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
CITIGROUP INC: N.Y. Court Partially Denies Class Certification

COMMUNITYONE BANCORP: "Pendleton" Settlement Has Final Approval
CONTRA COSTA, FL: "Gonzalez" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
CREDIT SUISSE: Seeks Dismissal of Broker's Class Action
CREDIT ONE: Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Anderson" Affirmed
D.R. HORTON: "Winnie" Suit Moved to South Carolina District Court

DAVIDSON SURFACE: Averts Class Action Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Denies Renewed Bid to Amend "Lewis"
DOUGHERTY COUNTY, GA: Judgment on Pleadings in "Calhoun" OK'd
EMBRAER SA: Ruling Highlights Securities Class Action Challenges
EPIC LANDSCAPE: Albelo Seeks to Certify Landscape Laborers Class

EQUIFAX INC: Judge Explores Ways to Combine Data Breach Cases
FRITO-LAY NORTH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Allred" Suit
GALLIANO MARINE: Court Grants Class Certification in "Halle"
GC SERVICES: Court Shelves "Beaufrand" Class Certification Bid
GLENDALE ADVENTIST: Fails to Pay Wages, Mayorga Says

GOOD SON: Ornelas Seeks Unpaid Wages & OT under Labor Code
GOOGLE INC: Judge Allows Pay-Equity Class Action to Proceed
GOOGLE INC: Court Dismisses "Sweet" AdSense Algorithm Suit
GOOGLE LLC: Bid to Seal Exhibit B to Free Range Suit Deal Granted
GREGORYS COFFEE: Fails to Pay Uniform Maintenance, Griffin Says

HARTFORD, CT: 2d Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Outlaw" Suit
HAVERHILL RETIREMENT: Bid to Quash Subpoenas Transferred
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Younge Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
ILLINOIS: Yates et al. Sue over Law Enforcement Training
ILLINOIS: Judge Certifies Class in Medicaid Delay Lawsuit

INSTORE GROUP: "Cherelli" Suit Moved to District of Massachusetts
IZEA INC: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Potential Securities Claims
JACK IN THE BOX: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Cisneros Says
JC PENNY: Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Cavlovic" Affirmed
KRAFT HEINZ: Faces Another All Natural Labeling Class Action

LAND'S END: Blankenship Sues over Defective FCRA Disclosure
LOGITECH INC: Court Dismisses "Anderson" Class Suit
LONGFIN CORP: Scott+Scott Attorneys Files Securities Class Action
MARTIN TRANSPORT: Doesn't Pay Dispatchers Overtime, Wingo Claims
MARYLAND MARKETSOURCE: Esparza Sues over Background Checks

MASTERCARD INT'L: Averts Merchants' Antitrust Class Action
MDL 1264: Securities Suit Deal Audit Must be Complete by June 27
MDL 2586: Court Grants SuperValu's Bid to Dismiss Suit
MICRO FOCUS: Cardella Sues over Hewlett Packard Deal
MINNESOTA: State Supreme Ct. Partly Affirms Ruling in "Hall"

NEW MEXICO: Court Dismisses All Federal Claims in "Martin" Suit
NEW MILLENNIUM: Fails to Pay for OT, Camarillo & Sandoval Claim
NEW YORK, NY: Housing Authority Sued over Heat and Water Services
NMN FOOD: Montenegro Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime under FLSA
NORTEL NETWORKS: Class Action Against Former Execs Dismissed

NORTHEAST CREDIT: Court Narrows Claims in "Walbridge" EFTA Suit
NORTHWOOD DESIGN: Violates Wage and Hour Laws, Henderson Says
ODEBRECHT CONSTRUCTION: "Angel" Suit Seeks OT Wages under FLSA
PENNSYLVANIA: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Turnpike Tolls
PERLOFF PROVIDENCE: Gym Membership Deceptive, Robertson Alleges

PIRON LLC: Court Denies Aero's Bid to Dismiss "Ali" FLSA Suit
PLY GEM: June 29 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
PRIVATE MINI: "Young" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
PROPER HOSPITALITY: Barajas Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
PROTOCALL COMMUNICATIONS: Fails to Pay Wages, Sterne Claims

PURDUE PHARMA: Plaintiff Lauds Judge's Move to Block Settlement
REMINGTON: Wants to Temporarily Halt Rifle Class Action
RENEW FINANCIAL: Ocana et al. Sue over Clean Energy Program
RENO, NV: Lemon Valley Residents File Flooding Class Action
RETAIL SERVICES: Stores Not Accessible to Disabled, Bell Says

RITE AID: Court Stays "Kalajian" Pending "Beardsall" Ruling
RJ REYNOLDS: $2.5MM Compensatory Damages in "Burkhart" Affirmed
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE: Rushing Sues over Meal & Rest Breaks
SWEET BAR: "Sac" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
SEEK CAPITAL: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages & Overtime, Mosele Says

SERVICE OF PROCESS: Jurisdictional Discovery in TCPA Suit Nixed
TD AMERITRADE: Bid to Exclude Experts Testimony in "Klein" Denied
TD AUTO: Shields Sues over Repossession of Vehicle
TEXAS: Steward, et al. Suit Moved to Western District of Texas
TEXTILE VISION: "Reyes" Suit Seeks Minimum Wage

THREE SONS: Fails to Pay Wages & Overtime, Marquez Says
TRANSAM TRUCKING: Averts $100-Million Class Action
TRANSDEV SERVICES: Bid to Amend 1st Amended "Berry" Suit Granted
TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CA: Further Briefing in "Kerzich" Deal Needed
TRUEBLUE INC: Fails to Pay All Wages Due, Gates Says

TOMRA METRO: "Lawson" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under Labor Law
TOW INC: Faces "Coleman-House" Wage-and-Hour Suit
UA 1270: Shalahin, et al. Sue over Cancellation of Flight
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Amend "O'Connor" PAGA Claim Denied
UNIVERSAL PROTECTION: Fails to Pay OT Wages, Collick et al. Say

VISTA PAINT: Parking Lot Not Accessible to Disabled, Pizzaro Says
WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Quash Subpoena in "Phipps" OK'd
WAL-MART STORES: Must Provide Docs in "Phipps" Suit
WILSON SPORTING: Baseball Bat Non-Compliant, Sheeley & WalKer Say
YALE UNIVERSITY: Loses Bid to Dismiss ERISA Class Action

* New Wisconsin Legislation Expected to Modify Class-Action Rules



                            *********


ADP TOTALSOURCE: Fails to Pay Wages Timely, Samon et al. Claim
--------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA SAMON, RUDY RAMIREZ and LAURA WEISS in their individual
and representative capacities, the Plaintiff, v. ADP TOTALSOURCE
SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation; DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive the Defendant, Case No. BC701421 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
April 10, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages under the
California Labor Code.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to reimburse
necessary expenses, failed to pay wages timely when due, and
failed to pay all wages due upon termination in violation of
California Labor Code Sections 201, 202 and 203.

ADP TotalSource provides small and medium-size businesses with
traditional and Internet-based outsourcing solutions to reduce
the complexities and costs related to employment and human
resources.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Corbett H. Williams, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CORBETT H. WILLIAMS
          24422 Avenida de la Carlota, Suite 370
          Laguna Hills, CA 92653
          Telephone: 949 679 9909
          Facsimile: 949 535 1031
          E-mail: cwilliams@chwilliamslaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew A. Berliner, Esq.
          FORTIS LLP
          650 Town Center Dr., Ste. 1530
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          E-mail: mberliner@fortislaw.com


ALLSTATE INDEMNITY: "Brasher" Suit Moved to N.D. Alabama
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Donald Brasher, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Allstate Indemnity Company, the Defendant, Case No. 75-cv-18-
900053, was removed from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
(Middle) on April 10, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 4:18-cv-00576-SGC to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Magistrate Judge Staci G. Cornelius.

Allstate Indemnity provides property and casualty insurance
services. The company was incorporated in 1960 and is based in
Northbrook, Illinois. Allstate Indemnity Company operates as a
subsidiary of The Allstate Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew England Brashier, Esq.
          Archibald I Grubb, II, Esq.
          Paul Wesley Evans, Esq.
          Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES PC
          P.O. Box 4160
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 269 2343
          Facsimile: (334) 954 7555
          E-mail: Andrew.Brashier@beasleyallen.com
                  archie.grubb@beasleyallen.com
                  paul.evans@beasleyallen.com
                  dee.miles@beasleyallen.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Kermit L Kendrick, Esq.
          BURR & FORMAN LLP
          420 North 20th Street, Suite 3400
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 251 3000
          Facsimile: (205) 458 5100
          E-mail: kkendric@burr.com

               - and -

          Mark Lynn Clark, Esq.
          THOMPSON COE COUSINS AND IRONS LLP
          One Riverway, Suite 1400
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 403 8286
          Facsimile: (713) 403 8299
          E-mail: mlclark@thompsoncoe.com

               - and -

          Scott T Winstead, Esq.
          BURLESON, LLP
          650 Poydras Street, Suite 2750
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 526 4350
          Facsimile: (504) 526 4310
          E-mail: swinstead@thompsoncoe.com


AMAZON.COM.DEDC LLC: "King" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Michael Josiah King and other
similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v.
Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, a Foreign Limited Liability Company, the
Defendant, Case No. 18-04344 CA 01, was removed from the 11th
Judicial Circuit of Florida, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (Miami) on April 13, 2018. The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-21464-JAL to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Joan A.
Lenard.

Amazon.com.dedc, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Amazon.com
Inc.[BN]

Attorneys for Michael Josiah King and other similarly situated
individuals:

          Brody Max Shulman, Esq.
          Jason Saul Remer, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          Courthouse Tower
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416 5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416 5005
          E-mail: bshulman@rgpattorneys.com
                  jremer@rgpattorneys.com

Attorneys for Amazon.com.dedc, LLC:

          Joseph Daniel Magrisso, Esq.
          Mark Edward Zelek, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKIUS, LLP
          690 SW 1st Ct., Apt. 2703
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (786) 255 8875
          E-mail: jmagrisso@morganlewis.com
                  mzelek@morganlewis.com


ANDY FRAIN: Smith Sues over Collection of Biometric Information
---------------------------------------------------------------
JACQUETTE SMITH, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. ANDY FRAIN
SERVICES, INC., an Illinois corporation, and ANDY FRAIN SECURITY,
INC., an Illinois corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
2018CH04719 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, April 11, 2018), seeks
to stop Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storage, and
dissemination of individuals' biometric identifiers and/or
biometric information in violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act and to obtain redress for all persons
injured by their conduct.

This case concerns the misuse of individuals' biometric
identifiers and/or biometric information by professional security
services companies which are capturing, converting, using,
storing and disseminating their workers' biometric information
without lawful consent. Andy Frain does this through the use of
biometric scanning devices and associated software technology
which capture a person's fingerprint information derived from
their fingerprints to authenticate the identity of such persons
in the future. New technology now allows consumers to pay their
bills, secure financial accounts, and purchase physical goods,
all with their biometric information, which is often a
fingerprint. Unfortunately, along with the increased utility of
biometric technology, so too has come grave privacy risks
associated with the dissemination and unregulated collection of
biometric information, with the risk of such harms greatly
magnified by the unregulated collection of biometric information.
Indeed, the permanent and irreplaceable nature of one's
biometrics makes the illegal collection of the same a significant
public problem with far-reaching consequences, including
irreversible identify theft and potential financial ruin. So
substantial is the risk from the wide collection of biometric
information by private companies that numerous state
legislatures, including Alaska, Connecticut, Montana, Michigan,
Texas, New Hampshire, and Washington, have introduced legislation
to regulate the collection and use of such sensitive information
in an effort to stem the unique problems created by the
irreplaceable nature and unique identifying characteristics of
biometrics.

Andy Frain provides integrated solutions to security and events.
The company provides security services for political conventions,
fairs and trade shows, sports arenas, venues, universities,
commercial businesses, and people, and cargo screening and
auditing services at domestic airports.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          William P. Kingston, Esq.
          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Tel: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: mmewguire@mcgpc.com
                  wkingston@mcgpc.com
                  jsheikali@mcgpc.com


APPLE INC: Webb Sues over Slowing Down Performance of iPhones
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN P. WEBB, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC., a California
Corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-02167 (N.D. Cal.,
April 11, 2018), seeks to recover compensation for expenses
incurred as a result of Apple's actions in slowing iPhone models,
including the cost of unnecessary replacement iPhones purchased
by class members.

Apple markets the iPhone line of phones as premium phones that
are designed to offer fast performance and ease of use for
consumers. Apple has been successful in this endeavor, with over
a billion units sold worldwide and consumers paying hundreds of
dollars for each iPhone. Rather than address a known issue with
several iPhone models head-on, Apple released an iOS update that
purported to "improve power management." Unknown to consumers,
this iOS update slowed the performance of their iPhones,
negatively impacting the performance of the iPhones in question
and causing some consumers to believe that their iPhones were now
obsolete and needed to be replaced. Consumers did not know of or
consent to this slowing of their iPhones.

Apple Inc. is an American multinational technology company
headquartered in Cupertino, California, that designs, develops,
and sells consumer electronics, computer software, and online
services.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          R. Alexander Saveri, Esq.
          Cadio Zirpoli, Esq.
          Sarah Van Culin, Esq.
          SAVERI & SAVERI, INC.
          706 Sansome Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 217 6810
          Facsimile: (415) 217 6813
          E-mail: rick@saveri.com
                  cadio@saveri.com
                  sarah@saveri.com

               - and -

          Randall Robinson Renick, Esq.
          HADSELL STORMER RICHARDSON & RENICK, LLP
          128 N. Fair Oaks Ave.
          Pasadena, CA 91103
          Telephone: (626) 585 9600
          Facsimile: (626) 577 7079
          E-mail: rrr@hadsellstormer.com


ASSET RECOVERY: Vaughn Sues over Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------
Trischa Vaughn aka Trischa H. Johnson, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Asset
Recovery Solutions, LLC and John Does 1-25, the Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00124 (W.D. Tex., April 13, 2018), seeks to recover
damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief under the Fair
Debt Collections Practices Act.

Some time prior to August 10, 2017, an obligation was allegedly
incurred to First Premier Bank.  The obligation arose out of
transactions in which money, property, insurance or services,
which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for
personal, family or household purposes. The alleged First Premier
Bank obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. section
1692a(5).

First Premier Bank is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.
section 1692a(4). First Premier Bank or a subsequent owner of the
First Premier Bank debt contracted the Defendant to collect the
alleged debt. The Defendant collects and attempts to collect
debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal,
family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the
United States Postal Services, telephone and internet.

On or about August 10, 2017, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an
initial contact notice regarding the alleged debt owed to First
Premier Bank. When a debt collector solicits payment from a
consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom
the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer,
within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be
assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that
if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the
30-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed,
the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy
of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such
verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the
debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's
written request within the 30-day period, the debt collector will
provide the consumer with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current creditor.

Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC is a full service asset recovery
management company that is committed to establishing unmatched
standards of performance. ARS is a strategic partner to many of
the largest credit issuers in the country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          RC Law Group, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282 6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282 6501


BAHCHE INC: "Settecasi" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
SILVIYA SETTECASI and AMINATA FADERA, individually and on behalf
of other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. THE
BAHCHE INC. d/b/a BISON & BOURBON; MEHMET VURGUN; ERDAM SAHIN;
YEHOSHUA SHAGALOV; ARIEL MANGAMI; MENACHEM WOLF; and/or any other
related entities, the Defendants, Case No. 507200/2018 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., April 10, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages, minimum
wages, overtime compensation, and unlawfully retained gratuities,
pursuant to the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, beginning in approximately April 2016
and continuing through the present, the Defendants have engaged
in a policy and practice of failing to provide overtime
compensation at the time and one-half rate for the hours worked
in excess of 40 hours each week.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class:

          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Suzanne Leeds Klein, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873 9550
          E-mail: sleeds@leedsbrownlaw.com


AUSTRALIA: Castlereagh Freeway Residents Mull Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Daily Telegraph reports that residents living in the path of the
proposed freeway from Kurrajong Heights to Colebee claim they are
considering a class action against the State Government.

The 1951 Castlereagh freeway corridor went through dense bushland
to the south of Londonderry before following the new route from
Llandilo to the M7. [GN]


BANK OF HAWAII: Court Narrows Claims in "Smith" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, RODNEY SMITH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF HAWAII,
Defendant, Civ. No. 16-00513 JMS-RLP (D. Haw.), Judge J. Michael
Seabright of the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii
granted in part and denied in part BOH's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and denied BOH's Motion to Strike the Demand for Jury
Trial.

In this putative class action, Smith challenged BOH's imposition
of overdraft fees -- specifically its use of an "available-
balance method" rather than a "ledger-balance method" for
assessing the sufficiency of funds in customer accounts to cover
transactions. Smith contends that BOH's practice violates its
Agreements with members, including the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.  And he asserts claims based on "unjust
enrichment," "Money Had and Received," and violations of the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act ("EFTA") and Hawaii Revised
Statutes Chapter 480.

Smith filed his original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in
state court on Sept. 9, 2016, and a First Amended Complaint
("FAC") on Sept. 13, 2016.  On Sept. 19, 2016, BOH filed a Notice
of Removal.

On Nov. 2, 2016, BOH filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAC, arguing
that its Agreement and Opt-in form for its overdraft program
unambiguously disclose that it uses the available-balance method
to determine overdrafts.  The Court disagreed and denied the
Motion, finding that even construed together, the Agreements'
terms are ambiguous as to BOH's choice of balance method.

BOH also argued in the Motion to Dismiss that Smith's EFTA claim
should be dismissed based on the EFTA's one-year statute of
limitations.  It contended that the statutory period for the
claim began to run at the time of the first overdraft charge, and
it asked the Court to take judicial notice of Smith's April 2015
bank statement showing an overdraft fee.  The Court declined to
take judicial notice of the statement, however, and as a result,
found that there was nothing to indicate, even assuming the
statute of limitations for all overdraft fees begins with the
first overdraft fee, that Smith's first overdraft fee was charged
more than a year before the suit was filed.  The Court found,
therefore, that on the present record, the claims are timely.

BOH now asks the Court to determine as a matter of law what it
assumed merely for argument's sake on the Motion to Dismiss, that
an EFTA claim accrues when the first unauthorized transfer
occurs.  It contends, therefore, that Smith's EFTA claim is
barred in its entirety by the EFTA's limitation period.  It also
contends that Smith's remaining claims are governed by the
contractual limitation period in the Agreement.  It therefore
requests judgment on all of Smith's claims to the extent they
accrued more than one year before this action was filed.

BOH filed the Summary Judgment Motion on Dec. 11, 2017.  Smith
filed his Opposition on Feb. 1, 2018.  BOH replied on Feb. 8,
2018.  BOH filed the Motion to Strike (based on the contractual
Jury Trial Waiver) on Dec. 11, 2017.  Smith filed an Opposition
on Jan. 30, 2018. And BOH filed its Reply on Feb. 6, 2018.  The
Oral argument was held on Feb. 20, 2018.

As to BOH's Summary Judgment Motion, Judge Seabright finds that
because Smith has asserted an improper overdraft fee was charged
within one year of the day he filed his Complaint, BOH is not
entitled to summary judgment on Smith's EFTA claim.  Claims based
on overdraft fees imposed outside the one-year limit, however,
are barred.  Also, construing the Agreement's one-year limitation
period as incorporating Hawaii's discovery rule, the provision is
not substantively unconscionable.  The Agreement's provision
limiting actions to within one year from the date a claim accrues
is thus applicable to Smith's state-law claims.

The record shows that at least one overdraft fee was charged
(despite a positive ledger balance) within one year of the filing
of the original complaint.  Therefore, BOH is not entitled to
summary judgment on the FAC in its entirety, and the Judge denied
summary judgment as to any overdraft fees charged on or after
Sept. 9, 2016.  But he granted summary judgment in favor of BOH
as to any fees charged before that date.

As to BOH's Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiff did not "knowingly and voluntarily"
waive his Seventh Amendment right.  The record is clear --
regardless of which side has the burden -- that the waiver or
references to it were non-negotiable terms in standard forms
(both in the Agreements and in one of the Consumer Signature
Cards).  As BOH necessarily concedes (in arguing that the
Plaintiff could "negotiate" by taking his business elsewhere),
the standard jury-waiver term was a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition.  In this situation, the Judge says a "gross
disparity in bargaining power" exists between BOH and its
individual customers.

In short, considering all the relevant factors applied in
caselaw, he concludes that the Plaintiff did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Therefore, Judge Seabright denied BOH's Motion to Strike Jury
Demand.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/IibTPh from Leagle.com.

Rodney Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Margery S. Bronster --
mbronster@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster Fujichaku Robbins, Melinda M.
Weaver -- mweaver@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster Fujichaku Robbins,
Richard D. McCune -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright, LLP,
pro hac vice, Robert M. Hatch -- rhatch@bfrhawaii.com -- Bronster
Fujichaku Robbins & Taras Kick, The Kick Law Firm, APC, pro hac
vice.

Bank of Hawaii, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Demko, Katten
Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice, Kristin L. Holland --
KHolland@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing., Nickolas A.
Kacprowski -- NKacprowski@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.,
Paul Alston -- PAlston@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing. &
Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -- Katten
Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice.


BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI: July 12 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. announced a settlement for those who have
transacted in Euroyen-based derivatives between January 1, 2006
through June 30, 2011.

If you transacted in Euroyen-Based Derivatives1 from January 1,
2006 through June 30, 2011, inclusive, then your rights will be
affected and you may be entitled to a benefit.

This Notice is only a summary of the Settlement and is subject to
the terms of the Settlement Agreement2and other relevant
documents (available as set forth below).

The purpose of this Notice is to inform you of your rights in
connection with a proposed settlement with Settling Defendants
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, UFJ, Ltd. ("BTMU") and Mitsubishi
UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation ("MUTB") in the actions titled
Laydon v. Mizuho Bank Ltd., et al., 12-cv-3419 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y.)
and Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd., et al. v. UBS AG, et al.,
15-cv-5844 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y.).  The settlement with BTMU and MUTB
("Settlement") is not a settlement with any other Defendant and
thus is not dispositive of any of Plaintiffs' claims against the
remaining Defendants.

The Settlement has been proposed in two class action lawsuits
concerning the alleged manipulation of the London Interbank
Offered Rate for Japanese Yen ("Yen LIBOR") and the Euroyen Tokyo
Interbank Offered Rate ("Euroyen TIBOR") from January 1, 2006
through June 30, 2011, inclusive.  The Settlement will provide
$30 million to pay claims from persons who transacted in Euroyen-
Based Derivatives from January 1, 2006 through June 30, 2011,
inclusive. If you qualify, you may send in a Proof of Claim and
Release form to potentially get benefits, or you can exclude
yourself from the Settlement, or object to it.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (500 Pearl St., New York, NY 10007-1312) authorized this
Notice.  Before any money is paid, the Court will hold a Fairness
Hearing to decide whether to approve the Settlement.

Who Is Included?
You are a member of the "Settlement Class" if you purchased,
sold, held, traded, or otherwise had any interest in Euroyen-
Based Derivatives at any time from January 1, 2006 through June
30, 2011, inclusive.  Excluded from the Settlement Class are (i)
the Defendants and any parent, subsidiary, affiliate or agent of
any Defendant or any co-conspirator whether or not named as a
defendant; and (ii) the United States Government.  Contact your
brokerage firm to see if you purchased, sold, held, traded, or
otherwise had any interest in Euroyen-Based Derivatives.  If you
are not sure you are included, you can get more information,
including the Settlement Agreement, Mailed Notice, Plan of
Allocation, Proof of Claim and Release, and other important
documents, at www.EuroyenSettlement.com ("Settlement Website") or
by calling toll free 1-866-217-4453.

What Is This Litigation About?
Plaintiffs allege that each Defendant, from January 1, 2006
through June 30, 2011, inclusive, manipulated or aided and
abetted the manipulation of Yen LIBOR, Euroyen TIBOR, and the
prices of Euroyen-Based Derivatives. Defendants allegedly did so
by using several means of manipulation.  For example, panel banks
that made the daily Yen LIBOR and/or Euroyen TIBOR submissions to
the British Bankers' Association and Japanese Bankers'
Association respectively (collectively, "Contributor Bank
Defendants"), such as BTMU and MUTB, allegedly falsely reported
their cost of borrowing in order to financially benefit their
Euroyen-Based Derivatives positions. Contributor Bank Defendants
also allegedly requested that other Contributor Bank Defendants
make false Yen LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR submissions on their
behalf to benefit their Euroyen-Based Derivatives positions.

Plaintiffs further allege that inter-dealer brokers,
intermediaries between buyers and sellers in the money markets
and derivatives markets (the "Broker Defendants"), had knowledge
of, and provided substantial assistance to, the Contributor Bank
Defendants' foregoing alleged manipulations of Euroyen-Based
Derivatives in violation of Section 22(a)(1) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 25(a)(1).  For example, Contributor
Bank Defendants allegedly used the Broker Defendants to
manipulate Yen LIBOR, Euroyen TIBOR, and the prices of
EuroyenBased
Derivatives by disseminating false "Suggested LIBORs," publishing
false market rates on broker screens, and publishing false bids
and offers into the market.

Plaintiffs have asserted legal claims under various theories,
including federal antitrust law, the Commodity Exchange Act, the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and common
law.

BTMU and MUTB have consistently and vigorously denied Plaintiffs'
allegations.

BTMU and MUTB entered into a Settlement Agreement with
Plaintiffs, despite each believing that it is not liable for the
claims asserted against it, to avoid the further expense,
inconvenience,
and distraction of burdensome and protracted litigation, thereby
putting this controversy to rest and avoiding the risks inherent
in complex litigation.

What Does the Settlement Provide?
Under the Settlement, BTMU and MUTB agreed to pay $30 million
into a Settlement Fund.  If the Court approves the Settlement,
potential members of the Settlement Class who qualify and send in
valid Proof of Claim and Release forms may receive a share of the
Settlement Fund after they are reduced by the payment of certain
expenses.  The Settlement Agreement, available at the Settlement
Website, describes all of the details about the proposed
Settlement.  The exact amount each qualifying Settling Class
Member will receive from the Settlement Fund cannot be calculated
until (1) the Court approves the Settlement; (2) certain amounts
identified in the full Settlement Agreement are deducted from the
Settlement Fund; and (3) the number of participating Class
Members and the amount of their claims are determined.  In
addition, each Settling Class Member's share of the Settlement
Fund will vary depending on the information the Settling Class
Member provides on their Proof of Claim and Release form.

The number of claimants who send in claims varies widely from
case to case.  If less than 100% of the Settlement Class sends in
a Proof of Claim and Release form, you could get more money.

How Do You Ask For a Payment?
If you are a member of the Settlement Class, you may seek to
participate in the Settlement by submitting a Proof of Claim and
Release to the Settlement Administrator at the address provided
on the Settlement Website postmarked no later than September 25,
2018.  You may obtain a Proof of Claim and Release on the
Settlement Website or by calling the toll-free number referenced
above.  If you are a member of the Settlement Class but do not
timely file a Proof of Claim and Release, you will still be bound
by the releases set forth in the Settlement Agreement if the
Court enters an order approving the Settlement Agreement.

If you timely submitted a Proof of Claim and Release pursuant to
the class notice dated June 22, 2016 ("2016 Notice") related to
the $58 million settlements with Defendants R.P. Martin Holdings
Limited, Martin Brokers (UK) Ltd., Citigroup Inc., Citibank,
N.A., Citibank Japan Ltd., Citigroup Global Markets Japan Inc.,
HSBC Holdings plc, and HSBC Bank plc or pursuant to the August 3,
2017 Notice, amended September 14, 2017 (the "2017 Notice")
related to the $148 million settlements with Defendants Deutsche
Bank AG, DB Group Services (UK) Ltd., JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc, you do not have to submit a new Proof of Claim
and Release to participate in this Settlement with BTMU and MUTB.
Any member of the Settlement Class who previously submitted a
Proof of Claim and Release in connection with the 2016 Notice or
2017 Notice will be subject to and bound by the releases set
forth in the Settlement Agreement with BTMU and MUTB, unless such
member submits a timely and valid request for exclusion,
explained below.

What Are Your Other Options?
All requests to be excluded from the Settlement must be made in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Settlement
Notice and must be postmarked to the Settlement Administrator no
later than June 7, 2018.  The Settlement Notice, available at the
Settlement Website, explains how to exclude yourself or object.
All requests for exclusion must comply with the requirements set
forth in the Settlement Notice to be honored.  If you exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you will not be bound by the
Settlement Agreement and can independently pursue claims at your
own expense.  However, if you exclude yourself, you will not be
eligible to share in the Net Settlement Fund or otherwise
participate in the Settlement.

The Court will hold a Fairness Hearing in these cases on July 12,
2018, to consider whether to approve the Settlement and a request
by the lawyers representing all members of the Settlement Class
(Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.) for an award of attorneys' fees of no
more than twenty-three percent (23%) of the Settlement Fund for
investigating the facts, litigating the case, and negotiating the
settlement, and for replenishment of the litigation fund created
to reimburse their costs and expenses in the amount of no more
than $500,000.  The lawyers for the Settlement Class may also
seek additional reimbursement of fees, costs, and expenses in
connection with services provided after the Fairness Hearing.
These payments will also be deducted from the Settlement Fund
before any distributions are made to the Settlement Class.
You may ask to appear at the Fairness Hearing, but you do not
have to.  For more information, call toll free 1-866-217-4453 or
visit the website www.EuroyenSettlement.com.


1 "Euroyen-Based Derivatives" means (i) a Euroyen TIBOR futures
contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME"); (ii) a
Euroyen TIBOR futures contract on the Tokyo Financial Exchange,
Inc. ("TFX"), Singapore Exchange ("SGX"), or London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange ("LIFFE") entered into by
a U.S. Person, or by a Person from or through a location within
the U.S.; (iii) a Japanese Yen currency futures contract on the
CME; (iv) a Yen LIBOR- and/or Euroyen TIBOR-based interest rate
swap entered into by a U.S. Person, or by a Person from or
through a location within the U.S.; (v) an option on a Yen LIBOR
and/or Euroyen TIBOR based interest rate swap ("swaption")
entered into by a U.S. Person, or by a Person from or through a
location within the U.S.; (vi) a Japanese Yen currency forward
agreement entered into by a U.S. Person, or by a Person from or
through a location within the U.S.; and/or (vii) a Yen LIBOR
and/or Euroyen TIBOR-based forward rate agreement entered into by
a U.S. Person, or by a Person from or through a location within
the U.S.

2 The "Settlement Agreement" means the Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement with The Bank of TokyoMitsubishi, UFJ, Ltd.
("BTMU") and Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation
("MUTB") entered into on January 23, 2018.

The Court will hold a hearing on July 19, 2018 at 1:00 p.m.


BARTELL HOTELS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Duran Says
-------------------------------------------------------
JOSE DURAN, an individual, on behalf of himself and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BARTELL HOTELS
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a California Corporation; and Does 1 through
50, Inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. 37-2018-00018400-CU-0E-CTL
(Cal. Super. Ct., April 13, 2018), seeks to recover overtime pay
under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff brings this Class Action on behalf of himself and a
California Class in order to fully compensate the California
Class for their losses incurred during the California Class
Period caused by Defendant's uniform policy and practice which
failed to lawfully compensate these employees for all their
overtime worked.

Bartell Hotels operates a chain of hotels in the San Diego
area.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP
          Website: www.bamlawca.com
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551 1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551 1232


BLUE MAX TRUCKING: "Hagan" Suit Moved to Fed. District Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Trace Hagan and Michael
McCutchen, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Blue Max Trucking Inc., now known as
Blue Max Transport Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2018-CP-08-
00388, was removed from the Berkeley County Court of Common
Pleas, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina (Charleston) on April 12, 2018. The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01004-DCN to the proceeding. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge David C Norton.

Blue Max Trucking provides hauling and transportation
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bruce E Miller, Esq.
          Elisabeth Anne Germain, Esq.
          BRUCE E MILLER LAW OFFICE
          147 Wappoo Creek Drive, Suite 603
          Charleston, SC 29412
          Telephone: (843) 579 7373
          E-mail: bmiller@brucemillerlaw.com
                  bgermain@brucemillerlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          James Andrew Byars, Esq.
          Nikole Setzler Mergo, Esq.
          NEXSEN PRUET
          PO Drawer 2426
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 540 2051
          E-mail: jbyars@nexsenpruet.com
                  nmergo@nexsenpruet.com


BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM: July 19 Aggrenox(R) Settlement Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
If You Purchased Aggrenox(R) or Generic Aggrenox(R) A Class
Action Settlement Could Affect You

A proposed $54 million settlement has been reached in a class
action lawsuit regarding the prescription drug Aggrenox(R)
(aspirin/extended-release dipyridamole).  The lawsuit claims that
Defendants Boehringer Ingelheim and Teva Pharmaceutical hurt
competition and violated state laws by delaying the availability
of allegedly less-expensive generic versions of Aggrenox(R).
Defendants deny any wrongdoing.

No one is claiming that Aggrenox(R) or its generic equivalent is
unsafe or ineffective.

Who is included?

You are a Consumer Class Member if you:

   -- Purchased and/or paid for Aggrenox(R) or generic versions
of Aggrenox(R),

   -- In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Arizona, California,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon (2010 or after), Rhode
Island (purchases after July 15, 2013), South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin,

   -- For consumption by yourself or your family,
   -- From November 30, 2009 through December 22, 2017.

You are NOT a Class Member if you paid a flat co-pay (consumers
who paid the same co-payment amount for brand and generic drugs),
if you pay a flat co-pay for generic prescriptions and did not
purchase Aggrenox(R) before July 1, 2015, or if you purchased or
received branded or generic Aggrenox(R) through a Medicaid
program only.

What do the settlements provide?

The Defendants will pay a total of $54 million into a Settlement
Fund to settle all claims in the lawsuit brought on behalf of
consumer and health insurers known as third-party payors.

Class Counsel will ask the Court to award attorneys' fees in an
amount not to exceed one-third of the Settlement Fund, plus
interest, litigation expenses and incentive payments to the Class
Representatives.  After these deductions, the remainder of the
Settlement Fund will be distributed pro rata to Class Members who
file a valid claim form. The amount of money you are eligible to
receive will depend on how much you (and other consumers) paid
for Aggrenox(R) or generic versions of Aggrenox(R).

How do I get a payment?

You must submit a Claim Form by September 14, 2018 to be eligible
for a payment. See below.

What are my other rights?

If you do not want to be legally bound by the Settlement, you
must exclude yourself.  The exclusions deadline is May 11, 2018.
If you do not exclude yourself, you will not be able to sue the
Defendants for any claim relating to the lawsuit.  If you stay in
the Settlement, you may object to the Settlement by May 11, 2018.
The Court will hold a hearing on July 19, 2018 at 1:00 p.m.
Eastern time to consider whether to approve the Settlement, a
request for attorneys' fees, expenses and incentive awards.  The
Court has appointed Miller Law LLC, Hilliard & Shadowen LLP, and
Heins Mills & Olson, P.L.C. to represent the Class.  You or your
own lawyer may ask to appear and speak at the hearing at your own
expense.  These deadlines may be amended by Court Order, so check
the litigation website noted below.

For more information and a Claim Form:
Visit www.InReAggrenoxAntitrustLitigation.com or call 1-800-494-
2165


BRF SA: Faces Class Action, May 11 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., on April 3
disclosed that a securities class action lawsuit has been filed
on behalf of investors who purchased BRF S.A. ("BRF" or the
"Company") (NYSE: BRFS) securities between April 4, 2013 and
March 2, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's compliance with anti-corruption laws.  As
detailed in the complaint, on March 17, 2017, media outlets
revealed that Brazilian police had raided BRF facilities and
arrested Company employees in a bribery crackdown known as
"Operation Weak Flesh."  The probe had reportedly found evidence
that BRF had been "bribing inspectors and politicians to overlook
unsanitary practices such as processing rotten meat and shipping
exports with traces of salmonella."  On this news, the price of
BRF American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") representing common
stock declined $0.99 per ADR, or nearly 8%, to close at $11.81
per ADR on March 17, 2017.

Nearly one year later, on February 23, 2018, BRF announced that
Operation Weak Flesh had resulted in "very serious problems" for
the Company, stating that disruptions in productivity caused by
the probe had made it more difficult for BRF to distribute its
products in 2017 and contributed to the Company's weak financial
performance.  On this news, the price of Company ADRs declined
$0.76 per ADR, or approximately 8%, to close at $8.73 per ADR on
February 23, 2018.

Then, on March 5, 2018, Reuters reported that Brazilian police
had arrested Pedro Faria, BRF's former Chief Executive Officer,
on charges that Faria knew that the Company had used illicit
means to pass food inspections.  On this news, the price of
Company ADRs declined $18.32 per ADR, or more than 19%, to close
at $7.59 per ADR on March 5, 2018.

If you purchased BRF securities during the Class Period, you may,
no later than May 11, 2018, move to be appointed as a Lead
Plaintiff in this action.  A Lead Plaintiff is a representative
chosen by the Court that acts on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.

If you have sustained substantial losses in BRF securities during
the Class Period and wish to move to be appointed as Lead
Plaintiff, please contact Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, P.C. toll-
free at 888-844-5862 or via e-mail at
classaction@srkattorneys.com. For more detailed information about
the firm please visit http://srkattorneys.com

Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, concentrates its practice in complex litigation
including actions dealing with securities laws, antitrust,
contract, and commercial claims.  The firm's reputation for
excellence has been recognized by courts which have appointed the
firm as lead counsel in numerous major class actions. The firm
has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars through judgments
and settlements on behalf of thousands of defrauded shareholders
and companies. [GN]


BROOKS ENVIRONMENTAL: Yates Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
DENNIS YATES, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C.
section 216(b), the Plaintiff, v. BROOKS ENVIRONMENTAL CARE,
INC., SHAWN BAIN, and LEAH BAIN, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-
cv-00885-C (N.D. Tex., April 10, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the action arises under the laws of
the United States. This case is brought as a collective action
under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b). It is believed that the
Defendants have employed multiple other similarly situated
employees like the Plaintiff who have not been paid overtime
wages for work performed in excess of 40 hours weekly from the
filing of this complaint back three years.

Brooks Environmental Care, Inc. has been in business since 2002.
Its main lines of business include landscape construction.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          Robert L. Manteuffel, Esq.
          Joshua A. Petersen, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.C.
          6310 LBJ Freeway, Ste. 112
          Dallas, TX 75240
          Telephone: (972) 233 2264
          Facsimile: (972) 386 7610
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com
                  rlmanteuffel@sbcglobal.net
                  josh.a.petersen@gmail.com


CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY: Some Claims in "Rogers" Must Be Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California, has issued his Findings
and Recommendations in the case, KIM EDWARD ROGERS, Plaintiff, v.
M. RICHARD, CHP Captain Commander, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-00149-JAM-GGH (E.D. Cal.).

A hearing was held on the first motion to dismiss on Oct. 5,
2017.  The Magistrate Judge advised the parties that Findings and
Recommendations would be issued expeditiously, and they were
filed four business days later.

He recommended that (i) the case proceeds only on the 42 U.S.C.
2000d (Title VI) claims and the 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims
recommended for retention; all other federal and state claims
should be dismissed; (ii) the Motion to Dismiss the Section 2000d
and Section 1983 claims pertinent to the Sept. 11, 2013 incident,
be granted based upon the statute of limitations; (iii) the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Section 2000d and Section 1983
claims, as relating to the Nov. 14, 2015 incident, should be
denied as brought within the statute of limitations by tolling
provisions found in California Government Code 945.3; the same
Denial should be applied to the Feb. 5, 2016 claims even without
tolling consideration; (iv) the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff's state law claims, should be granted for failure to
file state administrative claims as required by the California
Tort Claims Act; (v) the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
California Highway Patrol from the action as a state agency with
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suit be denied with
respect to section 2000d claims, and granted with respect to
Section 1983 claims.

He further recommended that (i) the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the individual California Highway Patrol Defendants be denied
insofar as they are sued in their individual capacity for section
2000d and 1983 claims whereas insofar as they are sued in their
official capacity, only the present Commissioner of the
California Highway Patrol should be named for section 1983
purposes; (ii) the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the entire First
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 should
be granted as the Plaintiff must plead the specific involvement
of each individual defendant with respect to the Section 2000d
and Section 1983 claims, and the Plaintiff should be granted
leave to amend in this respect; and (iii) the class action
allegations of First Amended Complaint should be stricken without
prejudice due to no attorney representation of the alleged class
members.

Unfortunately, the Plaintiff did not even await these Findings
and Recommendations, much less a district judge adoption order,
but on the same day the Findings etc. were issued, the Plaintiff
filed his Second Amended Complaint.  While the Plaintiff
understood from the hearing the gist of what the Findings etc.
would encompass, some miscues were repeated in the Second Amended
Complaint.  On Dec. 20, 2017, the District Judge adopted in full
those Findings.  Thus, these Findings will repeat the rulings on
the Plaintiff's repeated mistakes and the law of the case will be
enforced.

The Defendants responded with another motion to dismiss filed on
Jan. 8, 2018 which it set for hearing on Feb. 15, 2018.  On Feb.
7, 2018 the Court vacated the calendar and took the matter under
submission.  With respect to the statute of limitations, the
Defendants have essentially repeated their first Motion to
Dismiss with respect to the Second Amended Complaint, except that
they have limited it to the Section 2000d claim.  However, they
have also properly noted that there are insufficient charging
allegations brought against most of the individual Defendants.

The Magistarte Judge notes that his Findings and Recommendations
will hopefully resolve the pleading stage once and for all, and
law of the case will play a primary role in this adjudication.
If these Findings are adopted, there will be no further
amendments to the pleadings permitted, and it will be recommended
that an answer be filed.  The Plaintiff's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction will be adjudicated separately.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Hollows recommended that (i) any
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act claim should be
finally dismissed; (ii) any claim based on the alleged 2013
racial profiling stop should be finally dismissed; (iii) Joseph
Farrow and Michael Richard, sued only in their official capacity,
should be finally dismissed; (iv) Defendants Kent, Thompson,
Nichols, Williams, Vasilou investigator), Koon and Bertola should
be finally dismissed; (v) deceased Defendant Matthews should be
dismissed; (vi) the Motion to Dismiss the 2000d allegations based
on the statute of limitations should be denied; and (vii)
Defendants Stanley, official capacity, and Fish, individual
capacity, should remain as the Defendants in the case.

The Magistrate Judge directed that no further amendments should
be permitted; an answer to the surviving allegations and claims
should be filed by the remaining Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Findings and
Recommendations Order is available at https://is.gd/Xv4uRl from
Leagle.com.

Kim Edward Rogers, Plaintiff, pro se.

M. Richard, CHP Captain Commander, Wesley J. Fish, Sean D. Kent,
Justin A. Thompson, Jeffrey A. Nichols, Phillip A. Williams, C.
Vasiliou & California Highway Patrol, Defendants, represented by
Catherine Woodbridge, Attorney General's Office of the State of
California Department of Justice.


CANCER GENETICS: Faces "Zhang" Suit over Plunge in Stock Price
--------------------------------------------------------------
RUO FEN ZHANG, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CANCER GENETICS, INC., PANNA L.
SHARMA, JOHN A. ROBERTS, and IGOR GITELMAN, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-06353 (D.N.J., April 12, 2018), seeks to recover
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a
class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired Cancer Genetics securities
between March 23, 2017, and April 2, 2018. On October 12, 2015,
Cancer Genetics issued a press release entitled, "Cancer
Genetics, Inc. Finalizes Purchase of Los Angeles-based Molecular
Profiling Laboratory, Response Genetics, Inc., Adding $10-$12M in
Annual Revenue and Establishing a National Clinical Sales
Footprint|" which announced that Cancer Genetics closed its
acquisition of Response Genetics, Inc., a molecular profiling
laboratory, on October 9, 2012.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) Cancer Genetics had ineffective disclosure controls and
internal controls over financial reporting; and (ii) as a result
of the foregoing, Cancer Genetics' public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On April 2, 2018, after the market closed, Cancer Genetics filed
its Annual Report on Form 10-K with the SEC, announcing the
Company's financial and operating results for the quarter and
year ended December 31, 2017. The 2017 10-K discussed the
Company's controls over financial reporting. On this news, Cancer
Genetics' share price fell $0.55, or over 33.3%, to close at
$1.10 per share on April 3, 2018, damaging investors. As a result
of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities, the
Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant
losses and damages.

Cancer Genetics is a diagnostics company focused on the
development and commercialization of proprietary genomic tests
and services to improve the diagnosis, prognosis and response to
treatment of cancer. Founded in 1999, the Company is
headquartered in Rutherford, New Jersey. Cancer Genetics'
securities trade on the NASDAQ Capital Market under the ticker
symbol "CGIX."[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623 3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623 0858
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com


CARTER HOLT: Hundreds of Property Owners to Join Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Litigation Finance Journal reports that hundreds of property
owners from around rural and urban New Zealand have already
signed up to join the proposed Shadowclad Class Action.  Home
owners and those with commercial buildings, concerned about
failures of the plywood-based Shadowclad should act now if they
wish to join the proposed funded class action against the makers
of the cladding product, Carter Holt Harvey.

The lawyers leading the funded class action, Adina Thorn, of
Adina Thorn Lawyers, says the firm has now received registrations
of more than $40 million.

"Many of those who have registered with us are very grateful for
the fact that they can be part of the claim while facing no out
of pocket expenses.

"That is because the significant cost in legal and other fees it
requires to mount an action of this scale will be met by a third
party funder in return for them retaining a share of any damages
awarded.

"In this case the independent funder is a fund managed by Harbour
Litigation Funding, based in London.

"Harbour work on behalf of sophisticated investors, and use a
team of legal experts to evaluate the merits of a particular case
before agreeing to provide the level of funding it needs to
proceed and be successful.

"They know that if a case is unsuccessful, they will get nothing.
If it succeeds they take a percentage of recovery typically in
the order of 30%.

"This means building owners can join the proposed action secure
in the knowledge they will not be incurring legal and other fees
as the funder will cover these in return for taking a share of
any judgment or settlement sum awarded."

Adina Thorn says the high level of interest in the claim also
reflects the fact that Carter Holt Harvey has been selling the
plywood-based cladding product in New Zealand for some 20 odd
years and its widespread use in homes, sheds and coastal
properties.

"Many claimants have been encouraged by knowing that Shadowclad
is already subject to court proceedings brought by the Ministry
of Education in relation to approximately 880 leaky school
buildings.

Adina says anyone who has a property with Shadowclad installed
should register their interest online at www.adinathorn.co.nz
[GN]


CASEY'S RETAIL: Judge Rejects Motion to Dismiss ADA Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Thomas, writing for Madison-St. Clair Record, reports that
a federal judge has rejected a bid by a convenience-store chain
to dismiss a claim that the company violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).

In a Feb. 21 decision, District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel
denied Casey's Retail Company's partial motion to dismiss claims
the company, which owns a chain of Casey's General Stores, wasn't
easily accessible for people with disabilities.

The case stems from a January 2018 complaint brought by
Daniel Mellenthin, who is confined to a wheelchair, and Access
Now, Inc., a civil rights organization whose members have various
mobility disabilities.  According to the court order,
Mr. Mellenthin claims he visited four of the company's facilities
in Illinois and "experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due
to excessive slopes in the parking facilities, and a lack of
accessible signage."

According to the complaint, "investigators" who examined 15 other
locations in Idaho and Illinois, noticed the same barriers.

The investigators cited excessive slopes in the parking lot
and/or "accessible" signs mounted less than 60 inches above the
finished surface or parking area, in violation of the ADA.

In response, the company argued the case should be dismissed
because the claims are based on speculation and the plaintiffs
can't meet their burden of establishing that a nationwide class
is appropriate.

Plaintiffs countered that the motion was premature, saying the
appropriateness of their allegations should be determined at the
class certification stage.

Judge Rosenstengel agreed, saying the court will consider Casey's
arguments "on a motion for class certification, once they have
been properly developed."

The company also argued that the plaintiff's claims are barred by
a prior settlement and an amended consent decree that is still in
force and must be deemed to include this case.

In Mikesic et al. v. Casey's General Stores, the company was
accused of violating ADA laws by failing to remove "architectural
barriers," which included issues with aisle width, entrance door
thresholds, parking spaces, payphone height, restrooms, signage
and visual emergency alarms.  In a settlement, Casey's agreed to
conduct surveys of pre-ADA stores and make modifications to
address those issues.

But the plaintiffs in the Mellenthin case argued the consent
decree "is no longer in effect because the settlement has been
fully implemented."

In her opinion, Judge Rosenstengel determined that the Mikesic
case doesn't include future class members.

"Casey's has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing the
Plaintiffs are included in such a class," she wrote. [GN]


CHASE BANK: Tucker Seeks to Recoup Charges over Crypto Purchases
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRADY TUCKER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-03155 (S.D.N.Y., April 10, 2018), seeks complete
refund of all cash advance-related charges levied against them by
Chase in connection with their recent crypto purchases.

In recent years, so-called "cryptocurrencies" such as Bitcoin,
Litecoin, and Ethereum have gained public attention for their
potential technological applications to the future of business
and finance. Many consumers view cryptocurrencies as a technology
that could eventually help replace conventional, government-
issued money. As of today, however, cryptos are not money at all;
they are a technology, mere computer programs stored on
computers. Cryptos are not created or issued by the U.S.
government or any other government. They are not issued or
created by any regulated financial institution, nor are they
recognized as legal tender in any foreign or domestic
jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, many consumers have come to view cryptos as the
future of money, or at the very least, the future of financial
technology. For that reason, some consumers have come to ascribe
tremendous economic value to owning cryptos. When and if cryptos
become money in the conventional sense, some consumers want to be
found owning them, largely because cryptos differ from
conventional currency in one important respect. Every type of
cryptocurrency is programmed to be finite in number and
ultimately fixed in supply.

Bitcoin, the first ever cryptocurrency, was released as open-
source software in 2009 by an anonymous person, or group of
persons, under the pseudonym "Satoshi Nakamoto." Since
2009, several other cryptocurrencies have been invented by
various tech experts seeking to improve upon and/or offer
alternatives to the Bitcoin concept. Some of the more popular
cryptos available for public purchase include Litecoin, Ethereum,
and Ripple. All have grown in notoriety and value over the last
several years, as the concept of cryptos has spread from a fringe
group of tech experts into the general public consciousness.

As the cryptocurrency wave began to propagate from a small
segment of computer science gurus, into the media, and then to
consumers at large, tech-savvy entrepreneurs saw an opportunity.
On a largely ad hoc basis, entrepreneurs began to develop new
technological and economic infrastructures to support the buying,
selling and exchange of cryptos nationwide. Among such
"infrastructure" businesses was a now-prominent website called
"Coinbase" (www.coinbase.com). Coinbase today serves as one of
the largest cryptocurrency exchanges in the United States.
Coinbase.com is owned and operated by San Francisco-based
Coinbase, Inc., a privately held company that allows consumers to
buy and sell cryptocurrencies using an intuitive, user-friendly
online interface.

For the last several years, Coinbase has allowed consumers to
purchase cryptos online using their personal credit cards.
Throughout these years, Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A., and other
major banks, likewise permitted their credit card customers to
purchase cryptos online. Whenever Chase's credit cardholders did
so, Chase processed their crypto purchases from Coinbase and
other merchants as ordinary credit card "Purchases."

But beginning in January 2018, Chase decided to do something very
different. Chase began treating all its customers' crypto
purchases not as ordinary credit card "Purchases" -- as Chase had
for years -- but instead as "Cash Advances" from Chase to the
credit cardholder. When Chase implemented this change in late
January 2018, Chase did so in total silence. Chase provided no
prior notice to its cardholders that their crypto "Purchases"
would be treated as "Cash Advances" on a going forward basis. All
of this occurred unbeknownst to Chase's cardholders.

Plaintiff and other Class members began using their Chase-issued
credit cards to purchase cryptos in and before early January
2018, when their crypto purchases had always been treated as
"Purchases." Plaintiff and other Class members had been using
their credit cards to buy cryptos, not because they needed to
borrow money in the first place, but instead because it was the
only way to acquire cryptos instantly via Coinbase and other
merchants. Purchasing cryptos with a bank account number would
typically require several days of processing time. Consequently,
consumers had long been using their credit cards to purchase
cryptos simply to avoid unnecessary delays in delivery. For
years, Chase consistently treated cardholders' crypto purchases
as ordinary "Purchases" under Chase's card member agreements.

As a result, in and after late January 2018, Plaintiff and the
Class simply continued to do what they had been doing for years:
making routine crypto purchases via Coinbase and other merchants
using their Chase credit cards. Unbeknownst to Class members,
however, they were now taking out personal cash loans from Chase,
complete with new fees and sky-high interest rates (up to 30%
annually). Those ultra-high finance charges began accruing
immediately on the transaction date, rather than after the end of
a billing period, as with an ordinary purchase.

Based on Plaintiff's and the Class's longstanding experiences
with Chase under their cardholder agreements, Plaintiff and the
Class believed they could pay off their crypto purchases before
their credit card due-dates without incurring any finance
charges. But Plaintiff and the Class were duped. Chase silently
smacked them with instant cash advance fees, plus much higher
interest rates than normal, and left them without any
recourse.[BN]

Chase Bank provides financial services, which includes consumer
and commercial banking. The company serves consumers and small
businesses through bank branches, ATMs, mortgage offices, and
online and mobile banking as well as through relationships with
auto dealerships and schools and universities.

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          David J. Harris, Jr., Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
          550 West C Street, Suite 1760
          San Diego, CA 92101-3579
          Telephone: (619) 238 1333
          Facsimile: (619) 238 5425
          E-mail: djh@classactionlaw.com


CHEROKEE, NC: "Hogan" Suit vs Social Services Moved to Fed. Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Brian Hogan, both on his own
behalf and as representative of all unnamed class members who are
similarly situated, and as parent and next friend of H.H., both
her own behalf and as representative of all unnamed class members
who are similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Cherokee County,
NC; Cherokee County Department of Social Services; and Scott
Lindsay, both in his individual capacity and official capacity as
attorney for Cherokee County Department of Social Services; Cindy
Palmer, in both her individual capacity and her official capacity
as Director of Cherokee County Department of Social Services; DSS
Supervisor Doe No. 1, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 18 CVS
118, was removed from the Cherokee County, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina (Asheville) on
April 13, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-
cv-00096 to the proceeding.

Cherokee County is a county located in the US state of Georgia.
As of the 2010 census, the population was 214,346. The county
seat is Canton. The county Board of Commissioners is the
governing body, with members elected to office.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Sean F. Perrin, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
          301 South College St., Suite 3500
          Charlotte, NC 28202
          Telephone: (704) 331 4992
          Facsimile: (704) 338 7814
          E-mail: sean.perrin@wbd-us.com


CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Bid to Remand "Nichols" to State Ct. Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BILL G. NICHOLS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE OPERATING,
LLC; CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, Case No.
18-6006 (10th Cir.), Judge Carlos F. Lucero of the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the district court's order
denying his motion to abstain, and remand the caseto state court.

Nichols is a royalty owner in Oklahoma natural gas wells owned in
part or operated by Chesapeake.  In August 2016, he sued
Chesapeake in Oklahoma state court for underpayment or non-
payment of royalties.

He sought class certification of certain "Oklahoma Residents,"
which he defined using a four-part test: Persons to whom, from
Jan. 1, 2015 to the date suit was filed, (a) Chesapeake mailed or
sent each monthly royalty check on an Oklahoma well to an
Oklahoma address (including direct deposit); (b) Chesapeake
mailed or sent a 1099 for both 2014 and 2015 to an Oklahoma
address; (c) the Settlement Administrator in Fitzgerald Farms,
LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., Case No. CJ-10-38, Beaver
County, Oklahoma mailed or sent a distribution check and 1099 to
an Oklahoma address; and (d) except for charitable institutions,
were not subject to the Oklahoma Withholding Tax for Nonresidents
on royalties paid in 2014 to the date suit was filed.

Chesapeake removed the case to federal court based on the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  Nichols soon filed a motion
arguing that CAFA's home-state exception required the district
court to remand the case to state court.

Nichols proffered evidence to show that at least two-thirds of
the proposed class members shared Chesapeake's Oklahoma
citizenship, including the declaration of statistician Joseph
Kadane, Ph.D., who randomly selected 100 royalty owners from a
spreadsheet containing 28,929 unique records of royalty owners
paid from Oklahoma wells and who have an Oklahoma address.  Of
the 100 royalty owners comprising Kadane's sample, there were 13
trusts, 7 entities, and 80 individuals.

The district court was not persuaded, finding three significant
flaws in the evidence.  First the district court noted that
neither the survey data nor the skip-trace investigation provided
information as to the citizenship of trust beneficiaries or
trustees -- important components of a trust's citizenship.
Second, the district court found that a number of individuals
identified as Oklahoma citizens were actually deceased, with no
information provided as to heirs' citizenship.  Finally, the
district court found that Nichols' counsel had an "insufficient
basis" for determining that some members of the random sample
were Oklahoma citizens.  Accordingly, the district court denied
Nichols' motion to abstain and remand, finding he had not shown
the applicability of CAFA's home-state exception by a
preponderance of the evidence.

Nichols now appeals.  He contends that a rebuttable presumption
of citizenship arises from his allegation that the proposed class
members are Oklahoma residents.  And because Chesapeake did not
offer evidence that more than one-third of the proposed class
members are not Oklahoma residents, Nichols says, the district
court was required to abstain.

Judge Lucero finds that the Court's non-precedential decision in
Reece, and the other circuits that reject the applicability of a
rebuttable presumption of citizenship in the context of a CAFA
exception invoked based on the mere allegation of residence.
There is a strong preference that interstate class actions should
be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant.
Further, an individual's residence is not equivalent to his
domicile and it is domicile that is relevant for determining
citizenship.  Congress no doubt meant to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms, into the CAFA exceptions
premised on "citizenship."  He therefore turns to the evidence
Nichols submitted to show that two-thirds or more of the proposed
Plaintiff class members were Oklahoma citizens.

The Judge acknowledges the significant effort Nichols employed to
show that at least two-thirds of the class members shared
Chesapeake's Oklahoma citizenship.  But he notes that the need
for this evidence was of Nichols' own making: he chose to define
the class in terms of residence rather than citizenship.  By
defining the class in terms of residence, Nichols saddled himself
with an evidentiary burden, one which he sought to meet through
admittedly imperfect evidence.  In particular, Kadane reached his
conclusion that two-thirds or more of the class members are
Oklahoma citizens by extrapolating from a flawed sample.

Given the clear-error standard of review, the Judge says he must
affirm the district court's conclusion that Nichols failed to
prove at least two-thirds of the proposed Plaintiff class members
were Oklahoma citizens by a preponderance of the evidence.  The
district court, therefore, properly determined that CAFA's home-
state exception to exercising jurisdiction did not apply.
Accordingly, Judge Lucero affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order and Judgment
is available at https://is.gd/PDxWWW from Leagle.com.


CHINA AGRITECH: Shearman & Sterling Discusses Tolling Issue
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that
on March 26, 2018, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument in an appeal that presents the question whether American
Pipe tolling -- which provides that the pendency of a class
action generally tolls the statute of limitations for claims of
individual members of the putative class -- applies not just to
subsequent individual actions but also to subsequent class
actions.  Transcript, China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, No. 17-432
(U.S. argued Mar. 26, 2018).  Plaintiffs, alleged owners of
shares in China Agritech, filed a putative securities fraud class
action following the filing of two other similar class actions
for which class certification had been denied.  There was no
dispute that the claims of the individual named plaintiffs were
timely under the tolling rule of American Pipe & Construction Co.
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).  The district court, however,
dismissed the class claims as time-barred, only to be later
reversed by the Ninth Circuit.  The Circuit Courts of Appeals
have reached varying conclusions regarding whether, or the
circumstances in which, the filing of a putative but ultimately
not certified class action will operate to toll subsequently-
asserted class claims, thereby allowing for the seriatim filing
of otherwise time-barred class actions in the hope that a class
may eventually be certified.  The China Agritech case provides an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.

The questioning from the Justices highlighted some of the
competing policy and other concerns at issue.  It appeared to be
an accepted premise that the underlying rationale for the tolling
rule of American Pipe included avoiding the need for absent class
members to file a multiplicity of individual actions to avoid
having their claims be barred under the statute of limitations,
so long as they acted diligently (in other words, within the
statute of limitations, as tolled during the pendency of the
class action) after denial of class certification to assert their
individual claims.  A key dispute centered on whether it
furthered the objectives of American Pipe to allow absent class
members who continued to "sleep" on their rights after the
initial denial of class certification -- by failing to file an
individual action -- to nevertheless benefit from American Pipe
tolling by having their claims asserted on their behalf in a
subsequent class action.  For example, Justice Gorsuch wondered
whether it was appropriate to "stack [class action cases] forever
[when assessing the statute of limitations], so that try, try
again, and the statute of limitations never really has any force
in these cases" and what the Court should "do about the
congressional judgment that there should be a statute of
limitations."  On the other hand, questions were raised
suggesting that, especially in cases in which certification was
denied for reasons unrelated to the merits of maintaining the
case as a class action (e.g., an atypical or inadequate class
representative), it would contravene the efficiency and fairness
objectives of American Pipe to require absent class members to
file individual actions to pursue their claims.  Thus, Justice
Sotomayor repeatedly challenged counsel for the petitioner as to
why the Court should adopt a rule that would encourage the filing
of a multitude of individual claims when a class action could be
used as an efficient litigation tool.  Relatedly, Justice Gorsuch
inquired whether it would be appropriate to give an individual
plaintiff who timely filed suit after a denial of class
certification the benefit of equitable tolling, yet deny him or
her the ability to invoke Rule 23.

It is always difficult to discern how the Court might rule based
on questioning during oral argument.  However, a general
impression from the transcript is that neither insisting that
only individual actions are tolled nor concluding that class
action rights are always tolled is likely to satisfy a broad
swath of the Court.  The Court should have some flexibility given
that American Pipe is a judge-made rule emanating not from
statute but rather the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  One can
also question how consequential this issue ultimately will be
given the Supreme Court's 2017 ruling in the ANZ case that no
plaintiff -- whether individually or on behalf of a class --
benefits from American Pipe tolling once the Securities Act's
three-year statute of repose has expired. [GN]


CITIBANK N.A.: Kulauzovic Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------
LATIFA KULAUZOVIC, ZAHED SARWAR, JESSICA CARRIG, LIANA GUKASYAN,
and MARGARET BALTAYAN, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CITIBANK, N.A., the
Defendant, Case No. 507538/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April 13, 2018),
seeks to recover overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, the New York Labor Law, and the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

To serve its customers and meet its budgetary requirements, Citi
utilizes ABMs as essentially "floaters," who spend the vast
majority of their time performing the same duties as non-exempt
employees. Specifically, ABMs' primary duties that occupy the
majority of their time are working on the teller line or selling
Citi consumer products.

Throughout the relevant period, it has been Citi's nationwide
policy to uniformly classify ABMs as exempt from federal and
state overtime provisions and not to pay ABMs any overtime wages.
In order to serve its customers' needs, Citi regularly requires
ABMs to work in excess of 40 hours per week.

Citibank, N.A. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc.
that has almost $1.8 trillion in total assets and operates 700
consumer branches throughout the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Classes and Collective:

          Justin M. Swartz, Esq.
          JOUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245 1000

               - and -

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          1515 S. Federal Highway, Suite 404
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 447 8888

               - and -

          Joseph A. Fitapelli, Esq.
          Armando A. Ortiz, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300 0375


CITIGROUP INC: N.Y. Court Partially Denies Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for JDSupra, wrote that on
March 22, 2018, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part class certification in a putative class
action alleging breach of contract claims against Citibank, N.A.
Merryman et al. v. Citigroup Inc. et al., 15 Civ. 9185 (CM)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018).  Plaintiffs, former holders of American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") in three separate companies, brought
this putative class action on behalf of a proposed class who
currently or previously held any of 35 separate ADRs for which
defendant served as depositary bank.  Plaintiffs alleged that
defendant breached the contracts governing these ADRs by
converting cash distributions received from foreign issuers at
one foreign exchange rate and then supposedly using a less
favorable rate when remitting the proceeds to ADR holders and
retaining the difference (the "spread").  The Court granted class
certification with respect to the securities previously owned by
plaintiffs, but held that plaintiffs lacked class standing to
bring claims on behalf of holders of other securities.

The Court noted that the standing issue turned on whether the
case was more similar to NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2012) ("NECA"), than
to Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Ben. Fund of the City of
Chicago v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 775 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2014)
("Retirement Board").  In NECA, the Second Circuit held the named
plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he "personally has suffered
some actual . . . injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant," and (2) "such conduct implicates 'the
same set of concerns' as the conduct alleged to have caused
injury to other members of the putative class by the same
defendants."  NECA, 693 F.3d at 162.  In Retirement Board, the
Second Circuit determined that, applying NECA, the named
plaintiff lacked class standing to pursue breach-of-duty claims
against a trustee for hundreds of residential mortgage-backed
securities trusts in which the named plaintiff did not invest,
which the Second Circuit held would have required proof on a
loan-by-loan and trust-by-trust basis.

The Court concluded that plaintiffs could satisfy the first part
of the NECA test for class standing, based on plaintiffs'
allegations that they had suffered actual injury as a result of
defendant's alleged retention of the "spread."  Slip op. at 16.
As to the second NECA factor, the Court noted that this case was
"somewhere on the spectrum between" NECA and Retirement Board.
For instance, it was more similar to NECA in that the agreements
for 34 of the ADRs (excluding one with materially different
language) provided ADR holders with "largely identical rights"
respecting cash distributions.  The Court contrasted this
situation with the hundreds of trusts with different terms in
Retirement Board.  Id. at 17-18.  The Court also noted that
plaintiffs met NECA's second prong in that they alleged that the
class members had been injured in exactly the same way, to the
extent that, were they to succeed in a trial limited to just the
three ADRs they held, the doctrine of offensive collateral
estoppel would likely apply in favor of investors in the other 31
ADRs.  Id. at 18.

However, the Court found that the case differed from NECA in key
ways.  As in Retirement Board, the claims were based on
contracts, and plaintiffs "cannot point to a single document
containing a single set of misrepresentations applicable to all
thirty-four ADRs."  Id. at 18-19.  While the burden was likely
less than that involved in trying to prove the terms of hundreds
of thousands of mortgage loans in Retirement Board, the Court
nevertheless noted that this was an additional burden that the
named plaintiffs would not have to undertake to prove claims
based on their own holdings.  More critically, the Court
highlighted that plaintiffs alleged that defendant had a spread
retention "policy" applicable to all ADRs, requiring plaintiffs
to prove that defendant had such a policy and adhered to it on a
case-by-case basis -- including by offering evidence of the
actual exchange rate used in converting a cash distribution to
dollars and the actual exchange rate used in remitting the
proceeds to plaintiffs -- which the named plaintiffs had less of
an incentive to do for ADRs on which they had no prospect of
personal recovery.  Id. at 19.  While "closer than it appears at
first blush," the Court held that this case was closer to
Retirement Board than to NECA and that the named plaintiffs'
claims failed to implicate the "same set of concerns" as those of
class members who owned different ADRs.  Id. at 20.

This case serves as a reminder that, in addition to the
requirements for class certification contained in Rule 23, named
plaintiffs seeking class certification may face additional
Constitutional obstacles to establishing standing to pursue
claims involving securities they did not own. [GN]


COMMUNITYONE BANCORP: "Pendleton" Settlement Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CURTIS PENDLETON and FLOYD SCROGHAM, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
ROBERT L. REID, SCOTT B. KAUFFMAN, JERRY R. LICARI, J. CHANDLER
MARTIN, T. GRAY MCCASKILL, H. RAY MCKENNEY, JR., JOHN C. REDETT,
BOYD C. WILSON, JR., COMMUNITYONE BANCORP, and CAPITAL BANK
FINANCIAL CORP., Defendants, Case No. 05:16-CV-00037 (W.D. N.C),
Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina, Statesville Division, granted
Pendleton's (i) Unopposed Motion for Settlement and (ii) Joint
Motion for All Parties for Entry of Final Judgment.

Previously, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement for final
approval of the terms of a Stipulation of Settlement dated as of
Jan. 31, 2017.  The Court held a hearing on July 31, 2017 to
consider the proposed settlement as embodied in the Stipulation.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Judge Conrad certifies, for
settlement purposes only, a non-opt-out class consisting of any
and all record holders and beneficial owners of common stock of
CommunityOne who held or owned such stock at any time during the
period beginning on and including Nov. 23, 2015, through and
including the date of consummation of the Merger on Oct. 26,
2016, including any and all of their respective successors-in-
interest, successors, predecessors-in-interest, predecessors,
representatives, trustees, executors, administrators, estates,
heirs, beneficiaries, legatees, devisees, assigns and
transferees, immediate and remote, and any other person or entity
acting for or on behalf of, or claiming under, any of the
foregoing.

He approved the Stipulation and the terms of the Settlement as
described in the Stipulation in their entirety and incorporated
into the Order and Final Judgment.  He directed the parties to
the Settlement to consummate the Settlement in accordance with
the terms and provisions of the Stipulation.

The Judge dismissed the Action as against all the Defendants on
the merits and with prejudice and without costs to any party as
against any other party, except as otherwise agreed to in the
Stipulation and as set forth in the Order and Final Judgment.

He ordered that CommunityOne or its successor(s) will pay, on
behalf of all the Defendants, the sum of $500,000 in attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses to the Plaintiffs' Counsel in accordance
with, and subject to the terms and conditions of the Stipulation.

There being no just reason for delay, Judge Conrad directed that
the Order and Final Judgment be entered by the Clerk of the
Court.  The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MZqIeR from Leagle.com.

Curtis Pendleton, Plaintiff, represented by Guri Ademi --
gademi@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, pro hac vice, James
M. Wilson, Jr. -- jwilson@faruqilaw.co -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP,
pro hac vice, Shane T. Rowley, Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice
& Janet Ward Black, Ward Black, P.A.

Floyd Scrogham, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Guri Ademi,
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, pro hac vice, James M. Wilson, Jr., Faruqi
& Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Janet Ward Black, Ward Black, P.A. &
Shane T. Rowley, Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice.

Robert L. Reid, Scott B. Kauffman, Jerry R. Licari, J. Chandler
Martin, T. Gray McCaskill, H. Ray McKenney, Jr., John C. Redett,
Boyd C. Wilson, Jr. & CommunityOne Bancorp, Defendants,
represented by Arthur Luk -- arthur.luk@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac vice, H. Landis Wade, Jr. --
lwade@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP, John C. Massaro --
john.massaro@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac
vice & T. Richmond McPherson, III -- rmcpherson@mcguirewoods.com
-- McGuire Woods, LLP.

Capital Bank Financial Corp., Defendant, represented by Brent F.
Powell -- brent.powell@wbd-us.com -- Womble Bond Dickinson (US)
LLP, Ronald Redd Davis -- ronald.davis@wbd-us.com -- Womble Bond
Dickinson (US) LLP & S. Christopher Szczerban -- SCS@wlrk.com --
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, pro hac vice.


CONTRA COSTA, FL: "Gonzalez" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Esteban ALEMAN GONZALEZ; Jose Eduardo
GUTIERREZ SANCHEZ, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. Jefferson B.
SESSIONS, Attorney General, Department of Justice; Kirstjen
NIELSEN, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; James
McHENRY, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review,
Department of Justice; MaryBeth KELLER, Chief immigration Judge,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice;
David W. JENNINGS, Field Office Director for the San Francisco
Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security; David O. LIVINGSTON, Sheriff,
Contra Costa County; Kristi BUTTERFIELD, Facility Commander,
West County Detention Facility, Contra Costa County, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01869-JSC (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiffs will ask the Court on May 31, 2018, to certify a class
of:

     "all individuals who are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
     section 1231(a)(6) in the Ninth Circuit by, or pursuant to
     the authority of, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
     Enforcement, and who have reached or will reach six months
     in detention, and have been or will be denied a prolonged
     detention bond hearing before an Immigration Judge."

The Plaintiffs will also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives; and Van Der Hout, Brigagliano & Nightingale,
LLP, Centro Legal De La Raza, Matthew Green, ACLU Foundation of
Southern California, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, and
ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties as class
counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PgXx3O39

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Petitioners and the Proposed Class:

          Marc Van Der Hout, Esq.
          Judah Lakin, Esq.
          Amalia Wille, Esq.
          VAN DER HOUT, BRIGAGLIANO & NIGHTINGALE LLP
          180 Sutter Street, Suite 500
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 981 3000
          Facsimile: (415) 981 3003
          E-mail: ndca@vblaw.com

               - and -

          Alison Pennington, Esq.
          Lisa Knox, Esq.
          Julia Rabinovich, Esq.
          Jesse Newmark, Esq.
          CENTRO LEGAL DE LA RAZA
          3400 E. 12th Street
          Oakland, CA 94601
          Telephone: (510) 679 1608
          Facsimile: (510) 427 9164
          E-mail: apennington@centrolegal.org

               - and -

          Matthew H. Green, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW H. GREEN
          130 West Cushing Street
          Tucson, AZ 85701
          Telephone: (520) 882 8852
          Facsimile: (520) 882 8843
          E-mail: matt@arizonaimmigration.net

               - and -

          Vasudha Talla, Esq.
          Julia Mass, Esq.
          Michael Kaufman, Esq.
          Bardis Vakili, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
          FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
          39 Drumm Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 621 2493
          Facsimile: (415) 255 8437
          E-mail: jmass@aclunc.org
                  vtalla@aclunc.org
                  mkaufman@aclusocal.org
                  bvakili@aclusandiego.org


CREDIT SUISSE: Seeks Dismissal of Broker's Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Welsch, writing for On Wall Street, reports that
Credit Suisse asked a federal judge to dismiss a broker's class
action lawsuit seeking up to $300 million in back pay that is
allegedly owed to more than a hundred former Credit Suisse
advisors.

It's the latest flare-up in a lengthy dispute between Credit
Suisse and its former U.S.-based brokers, stemming from the
manner in which the Swiss bank exited the U.S. marketplace in
2015.

Instead of selling its American wealth management unit to another
firm, Credit Suisse announced it was shutting the business and
entered into an exclusive recruiting arrangement with Wells
Fargo.  Credit Suisse advisors were permitted to move to Wells
Fargo unhindered and offered recruiting deals by Wells Fargo to
do so.  Those who opted to join other firms were restricted from
receiving deferred compensation they had earned at Credit Suisse.
Fewer than half of the bank's roughly 250 brokers ultimately
joined Wells Fargo.

Christopher Laver, who brought the class action lawsuit against
Credit Suisse, went to work for UBS.  He had been employed by
Credit Suisse for 13 years.

In his lawsuit filed in federal court in California's Northern
District in February, Mr. Laver says the firm's contracts
stipulate that brokers are owed deferred compensation unless they
are fired or voluntarily resign.

Credit Suisse maintains that advisors such as Mr. Laver who did
not join Wells Fargo voluntarily resigned from the firm and
thereby gave up their deferred compensation.

Mr. Laver contends that he and other brokers did no such thing:
By shuttering its U.S. brokerage unit, Credit Suisse forced the
advisors to find work elsewhere.  Moreover, he claims Credit
Suisse benefited from years of revenue produced by its U.S.-based
brokers.

"The deferred compensation at issue here was earned and is owed.
Credit Suisse should not be able to avoid its obligation to
compensate the advisors fully and fairly by claiming they
'resigned' when, in fact, Credit Suisse simply ceased operating
this business," Mr. Laver says in his lawsuit.

Mr. Laver's attorney could not be reached for additional comment.

In its request for dismissal of the lawsuit, Credit Suisse argues
that Mr. Laver's employment contract mandates any disputes be
arbitrated and, furthermore, that he annually waived his right to
file a class action lawsuit.

"Even if the [firm's Employment Dispute Resolution Program] were
deemed to be invalid (which it is not), plaintiff would still be
required to arbitrate his claims against [Credit Suisse] under
FINRA's rules and regulations," the firm argues.

A spokeswoman for Credit Suisse says allegations that the firm is
wrongfully withholding deferred pay have no merit and that
advisors who decided not to join Wells Fargo and instead went to
other firms received recruiting bonuses to do so.  "Simply put,
the plaintiff here is looking to be paid the same money twice.
Credit Suisse will vigorously defend the action," the spokeswoman
says in an emailed statement.

Credit Suisse is also seeking to change the venue for hearing the
dispute from California to New York, arguing that Mr. Laver's
employment contract specifies that any dispute arising from his
employment at the firm is to be mediated there.

Credit Suisse is in fact involved in a number of arbitration
disputes as other former brokers attempt to win back deferred
compensation the firm is withholding from them.  The bank tried
to compel these advisors to arbitrate those disputes in a private
forum, but FINRA sent a notice to the industry asserting all
advisors have a right to take any dispute between themselves and
a member firm to FINRA's arbitration forums.

Class action claims cannot be arbitrated under FINRA rules,
meaning advisors will have to have their cases heard one by one.
[GN]


CREDIT ONE: Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Anderson" Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Rosemary S. Pooler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Credit
One's motion to compel arbitration in the case, IN RE: ORRIN S.
ANDERSON, AKA ORRIN S. ANDERSON, AKA ORINN SCOTT ANDERSON,
Debtor. ORRIN S. ANDERSON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, AKA ORINN SCOTT ANDERSON Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellant, Docket No. 16-2496
(2d Cir.).

In October 2002, Anderson opened a credit card account with First
National Bank of Marin, a predecessor in interest to Credit One.
Anderson's cardholder agreement contained an arbitration clause.

In September 2011, Anderson's Credit One credit card account
became delinquent and it remained so until March 2012, when
Credit One "charged off" Anderson's account, reclassifying
Anderson's debt from a receivable to a loss.  In May 2012, Credit
One sold Anderson's account to a third-party debt buyer.  Credit
One then reported the charge-off and the sale of the debt to the
three major consumer credit reporting agencies Equifax, Experian,
and TransUnion.

On Jan. 31, 2014, Anderson filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York.  On May 6, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an
order discharging all of Anderson's dischargeable debts and
closing his Chapter 7 case.

In September 2014, Anderson contacted Credit One and asked it to
remove the charge-off from his credit reports since the Credit
One debt had been discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding.
Credit One refused to contact the credit reporting agencies to
correct the alleged error on Anderson's credit report.  In
October 2014, Anderson moved the bankruptcy court to reopen his
case in order to pursue Credit One's alleged violations of his
discharge injunction.  In December 2014, the bankruptcy court
granted Anderson's motion to reopen.

Anderson thereafter filed an amended class action complaint in
the bankruptcy court alleging that Credit One violated 11 U.S.C.
Section 524(a)(2) by knowingly and willfully failing to update
the credit reports of the class members to signify the debts
owing to Credit One have been discharged in bankruptcy.  In
essence, Anderson alleged that Credit One refused to update the
credit reporting agencies regarding the discharged debt in an
effort to coerce payment on the discharged debt in violation of
the Section 524 discharge injunction.

In March 2015, Credit One moved to compel arbitration pursuant to
the terms of the cardholder agreement and to stay the bankruptcy
proceeding.  The bankruptcy court held a hearing on May 5 and
denied the motion nine days later.  Less than a month later, in
June 2015, Credit One filed an interlocutory appeal of the
bankruptcy court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration.
The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court
a year later in June 2016.  Credit One timely filed its notice of
appeal on July 13, 2016 and amended it on July 26, 2016.

Oral argument was held in the case on Oct. 11, 2017, and
thereafter the Appellate Court asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on the issue of mootness, given Credit One's
stipulation that it would update the credit reports of Anderson
and other consumers.  The parties submitted supplemental briefs
on Oct. 23, 2017.  The Appellate Court agrees with both parties
that the stipulation does not moot the appeal because the
question presented and the relief sought both remain unsettled,
such that it retains jurisdiction under Article III's "case" or
"controversy" requirement.  It thus proceed to consider the
merits of the appeal.

Judge Pooler finds that arbitration of a claim based on an
alleged violation of Section 524(a)(2) would seriously jeopardize
a particular core bankruptcy proceeding.  She come to this
conclusion because 1) the discharge injunction is integral to the
bankruptcy court's ability to provide debtors with the fresh
start that is the very purpose of the Code; 2) the claim regards
an ongoing bankruptcy matter that requires continuing court
supervision; and 3) the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court
to enforce its own injunctions are central to the structure of
the Code.  The fact that Anderson's claim comes in the form of a
putative class action does not undermine this conclusion.

Because she determines there is an inherent conflict between
arbitration of Anderson's claim and the Bankruptcy Code, the
Judge must also assess whether the bankruptcy court abused its
discretion in declining to enforce the arbitration agreement.
She finds that the bankruptcy court properly considered the
conflicting policies in accordance with law.  Accordingly, she
acknowledges its exercise of discretion and show due deference to
its determination that arbitration will seriously jeopardize a
particular core bankruptcy proceeding.  She holds that the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Credit
One's motion to compel arbitration in the case.

For these reasons, Judge Pooler affirmed the order of the
district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with her Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/CtJ7xE from Leagle.com.

GEORGE F. CARPINELLO -- gcarpinello@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller
& Flexner LLP, (Adam R. Shaw -- ashaw@bsfllp.com -- Anne M.
Nardacci -- anardacci@bsfllp.com -- and Jenna C. Smith --
jsmith@bsfllp.com --on the brief), Albany, NY, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Charles Juntikka, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee (on the
brief).

NOAH A. LEVINE -- noah.levine@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP (Alan E. Schoenfeld --
alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com -- on the brief), New York, NY,
for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael David Slodov, Chagrin Falls, OH, for Defendant-Appellant.

Evan M. Tager -- etager@mayerbrown.com -- Charles E. Harris, II -
- charris@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C. and
Kate Comerford Todd, Warren Postman, U.S. Chamber Litigation
Center, for amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America in support of Defendant-Appellant Credit One
Bank, N.A.

Tara Twomey, National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center, San
Jose, CA for amici curiae Professors Ralph Brubaker, Robert M.
Lawless, and Bruce A. Markell in support of Plaintiff-Appellee
Orrin S. Anderson.


D.R. HORTON: "Winnie" Suit Moved to South Carolina District Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Hyland Winnie, Jr., on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. D.R.
Horton Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2018-CP-26- 01728, was
removed from the Horry County Court of Common Pleas, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina (Florence) on
April 13, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-
cv-01023-RBH to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
R. Bryan Harwell.

D. R. Horton, Inc. is a home construction company incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Arlington, Texas. In 2017, the
company was the largest home builder in the United States based
on the number of homes closed.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles Harry McDonald, Esq.
          BELSER AND BELSER
          PO Box 96
          Columbia, SC 29202
          Telephone: (803) 929 0096
          Facsimile: (803) 929 0196
          E-mail: chuck@belserpa.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          James E. Weatherholtz, Esq.
          Kathryn Susan Mansfield, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON US LLP
          5 Exchange Street, PO Box 999
          Charleston, SC 29402
          Telephone: (843) 722 3400
          Facsimile: (843) 723 7398
          E-mail: james.weatherholtz@wbd-us.com
                  kathryn.mansfield@wbd-us.com


DAVIDSON SURFACE: Averts Class Action Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kristin Emery, writing for Madison - St. Clair Record, reports
that the Fifth District Appellate Court has dismissed a class
action lawsuit filed in Jefferson County Circuit Court against a
Missouri company over overtime pay, holding that the company does
business primarily in Missouri, not in Illinois.

Represented by Wood River attorney Tom Maag, plaintiff
Romeo Torio filed the original lawsuit in 2013 when he worked for
Davidson Surface/Air Inc. making pickups and deliveries in
Illinois.

Mr. Torio, a Missouri resident, claimed Davidson did substantial
business in Illinois even though its offices are in Missouri and
that he worked more than 40 hours per week at various times from
2011-13, according to background information in the ruling.

His suit claimed the defendant owed him 185.05 hours of overtime
and that under "applicable law" was required to pay him time and
a half for each hour totaling $5,551.50 plus interest and
attorney fees, according to the ruling.  Mr. Torio's lawsuit went
on to allege that Davidson employs yet fails to pay numerous
employees for legally required overtime and that the court should
grant class status to the case.

The original suit was dismissed in 2015, with the trial court
finding the plaintiff had failed to show the defendant was doing
business in Illinois and that it lacked personal jurisdiction.
Last year, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and argued that
the company used Illinois roads and highways enough to subject it
to Illinois jurisdiction and that this constituted an
"exceptional circumstance."  The defendant argued its contacts
are too sporadic to prove that it does business as an Illinois
company.

In its ruling, the appellate court held that the only contact
Davidson has with Illinois is the sporadic pickup and delivery of
goods and that it does not maintain offices in the state.  The
court ruled that this falls below the standards of an exceptional
circumstance and that Davidson's principal place of business is
Missouri.

Judge Thomas M. Welch delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Judge John B. Barberis, Jr. and Judge James R. Moore
concurred in the judgment. [GN]


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Court Denies Renewed Bid to Amend "Lewis"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KAYLA DIONNE LEWIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 15-352 (RBW) (DC), Judge Reggie B. Walton denied the
Plaintiffs' (i) Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54, (ii) Motion for Leave to Amend the
Second Amended Complaint and to File Third Amended Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and (iii) Motion
to Sever Claims Two and Three into Two Separate Actions pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.

The Name Plaintiffs in the civil suit, bring the putative class
action against the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 (2012), alleging constitutional violations arising from
their arrests and subsequent detentions by the District in 2014.

In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted three
claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: (1) Fourth Amendment
violations resulting from the District's policy of holding
individuals after their presentments and after the administrative
steps incident to their arrests had been completed  without an
affirmative finding of probable cause so that the District could
perfect the Gerstein affidavits required to legally authorize
their detentions; (2) Fourth Amendment violations resulting from
the District's practice of holding individuals for more than 48
hours after their arrest without a finding of probable cause by a
judicial officer" ("Riverside claim"); and (3) Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations resulting from the District's policy of
subjecting individuals to blanket strip-searches at the District
of Columbia Jail after presentment without an affirmative finding
of probable cause so that the District could perfect the Gerstein
affidavits ("strip search claim").  The Plaintiffs sought through
their Second Amended Complaint, which they now seek to amend,
both declaratory relief and money damages.

In its May 15, 2017 Order, the Court held that the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia is a required party to the
litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1) for two
reasons.  First, the Court concluded that the U.S. Attorney is a
required party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) because Assistant U.S.
Attorneys are supposed to review the Gerstein statements prepared
by police officers to ensure that they satisfy the probable cause
requirement necessary to merit the filing of charges against
arrestees, and any ruling the Court makes in this case will
necessarily impact the operations of the U.S. Attorney's office
because it will impact the papering, i.e., processing, of
arrestees charged with offenses prosecuted by that office.

Second, the Court concluded that the U.S. Attorney is also a
required party under Rule 19 (a)(1)(A) because the Court could
not `accord complete relief among existing parties' without the
inclusion of the U.S. Attorney given that any relief it may grant
on behalf of the Plaintiffs could not bind the U.S. Attorney if
she is not a party in the case.

The Court, however, declined to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(7) at that time because (1) dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(7) is warranted only when the defect is serious and cannot
be cured; (2) Rule 19 requires the Court to join a required party
that has not been joined; and (3) the District had made no
argument that the U.S. Attorney's absence cannot be cured.
Accordingly, the Court ordered the Plaintiffs to file a third
amended complaint including the U.S. Attorney as a Defendant.

Instead of including the U.S. Attorney as a party as directed by
the Court, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a
third amended complaint that omits their Gerstein claim and
amends the allegations and proposed class definitions in order to
obviate the need to join the U.S. Attorney.

After their motion for leave to file their third amended
complaint was fully briefed, the Plaintiffs filed their motion to
sever their strip search claim, proposing that the Court grants
their motion for leave to amend, grant their motion to sever, and
then, if the Court concludes that the U.S. Attorney is a required
party, orders Lewis to file a Fourth Amended Complaint naming the
U.S. Attorney as a party to the Riverside claim but not the
severed strip search claim.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for
reconsideration, requesting that the Court reconsiders its ruling
in the May 15, 2017 Order that the U.S. Attorney is a required
party to the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A) and
(a)(1)(B)(i).

As to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Walton
finds that their argument that the Court should reconsider its
May 15, 2017 Order because they lacked an opportunity to respond
to the Court's sua sponte holding that the U.S. Attorney is a
required party lacks merit because its premise is simply false.
And because the U.S. Attorney prosecutes nearly all local crimes
committed by adults within the District, it is inconceivable to
think that a determination that the Superior Court Gerstein
probable cause procedures are unconstitutional would not, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the U.S. Attorney's ability to
protect her interest in regards to those procedures.  For all of
these reasons, he will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider
its holding that the U.S. Attorney is a required party to the
case under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i).

With respect to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend their
Complaint, the Judge finds that because the basis for seeking to
file the proposed third amended complaint is to exclude the U.S.
Attorney as a required party, and because he concludes that the
U.S. Attorney would remain a required party in the case under
Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) even if the Court granted the Plaintiffs
leave to file their proposed third amended complaint, the Judge
concludes that he must deny the motion for leave to further amend
the complaint because the proposed third amended complaint's
attempt to exclude the U.S. Attorney as a required party is
futile.

Finally, as to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Sever, Judge Walton
finds that given the current procedural posture of the case, as
well as the fact that the Rules encourage courts to join claims,
parties and remedies in order to entertain the broadest possible
scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties, he will
deny without prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion to sever at this
time.  He concludes that severance was premature because the
parties had not yet engaged in discovery, which could reveal
whether the claims involved common legal or factual issues.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that it must deny the
Plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration and for leave to amend
their complaint, and deny without prejudice their motion to
sever. The Court reiterates its prior determination that the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia is a required
party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i), and therefore, in order to
proceed with their claims, the Plaintiffs must file a third
amended complaint joining her as a Defendant.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/ocKuQ2 from Leagle.com.

KAYLA DIONNE LEWIS, On behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael P.
Bruckheim -- bruckhei@american.edu -- BRUCKHEIM & PATEL, LLC &
William Charles Cole Claiborne, III, CLAIBORNELAW.

FELTON HILL, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, CLAIBORNELAW.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant, represented by
Fernando Amarillas, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Michael A. Tilghman, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


DOUGHERTY COUNTY, GA: Judgment on Pleadings in "Calhoun" OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Leslie J. Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia, Albany Division, granted the Defendants'
Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case, APRIL D.
CALHOUN, Plaintiff, v. WILLIE E. LOCKETTE, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-CV-153(LJA) (M.D. Ga.).

The action was originally filed against the Defendants in their
official and individual capacities in the Superior Court of
Dougherty County and was removed to the Court by the Defendants.
The Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2017, she was
incarcerated as a pretrial detainee in the custody of Defendant
Sheriff Sproul, the Sheriff of Dougherty County.  On Nov. 28,
2017, the Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Certification of Class Action, and the Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and stayed the case pending the Court's
ruling on the Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983
and 1988 and Georgia law, alleges that her Fourth and Sixth
Amendment and due process rights under the federal Constitution
and her rights under the Georgia Constitution were violated
because: (1) from the date of her arrest through the date of
filing the action, she had no bond set nor was she afforded a
bond hearing; (2) other than a first appearance before a
magistrate judge, the Plaintiff has had no court appearance since
the date of her arrest, including any court of inquiry (also
referred to as a 'preliminary hearing' or a 'probably cause
hearing') pursuant to O.C.G.A. Sections 17-7-20, et seq.; (3) the
Plaintiff applied for appointed counsel but has not had any
visits from or communications from any attorney; (4) the
Plaintiff requested a bond hearing or other court hearing since
her arrest by asking employees of Defendant Sproul, but was
informed that they cannot do so, but that any request for a bond
hearing or other hearing must come from an attorney; (5) the
magistrates of Dougherty County follow the policy of Defendant
State Court Judge Darrisaw in regards to setting bonds and
setting hearings for a court of inquiry (committal hearings); (6)
Defendant Darrisaw has a policy of refusing to set bonds for
pretrial detainees on warrants which charge certain felonies, as
in the case, even though they are authorized by law, O.C.G.A.
Section 17-6-1, to do so (7) Defendant Darrisaw has a policy of
refusing to set dates for courts of inquiry, also known as
committal hearings or probable cause hearings, pursuant to
O.C.G.A. Section 17-7-20, et seq., unless requested to do so by
an attorney at law, resulting in the jailing for weeks and
sometimes months of persons who are wholly innocent of the
offense, or against him there is no evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to detain them pending a grand jury
presentment; and (8) there is no procedure to obtain a hearing
for either setting a bond, reducing a bond, or setting a court of
inquiry without an attorney request.

The Plaintiff seeks a "writ of prohibition," a "writ of
mandamus," an "order supervising inferior court," declaratory
relief, attorney's fees, and her release from jail.

Before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

As to the Plaintiff's federal claims, Judge Abrams finds that the
Plaintiff does not state what specific relief is sought or why
Lockette and Sherriff Sproul are necessary to obtain it.  As the
Plaintiff has not stated a federal claim against Lockette and
Sproul, either in their individual or official capacities, those
Defendants will be dismissed from the action.  The Plaintiff has
not also stated a claim for injunctive relief against Darrisaw in
her official capacity.  Thus, the Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under federal law.

As the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted against the Defendants under federal law, the
Judge declines to exercise jurisdiction over her state law
claims.  She says the Plaintiff is not without a remedy, however.
She may re-file her state claims or pursue available legal
remedies in state court where appropriate.  Furthermore, federal
courts are precluded from enjoining state officials for
violations of state law.  Thus, the Plaintiff is not entitled to
the relief she seeks for these claims in this forum.

Accordingly, Judge Abrams granted the Defendants' Motions for
Judgment on the Pleadings, and dismissed the Plaintiff's
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OSIMID from Leagle.com.

APRIL D CALHOUN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, present and future, Plaintiff, represented by
JAMES NORMAN FINKELSTEIN.

WILLIE E LOCKETTE, individually and in his official capacity as
Chief Judge of the Superior Court, Dougherty Judicial Circuit,
Defendant, represented by MICHELLE J. HIRSCH --
mhirsch@law.ga.gov.

VICTORIA S DARRISAW, individually and in her official capacity as
Judge of the Dougherty County State Court & KEVIN SPROUL,
individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Dougherty
County, Defendants, represented by MARY M. KATZ.


EMBRAER SA: Ruling Highlights Securities Class Action Challenges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Colby Hamilton, writing for Law.com, reports that a recent win by
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in defeating a class action
suit against Brazilian aerospace conglomerate Embraer, which
acknowledged global bribery allegations as part of a deferred
prosecution agreement with U.S. investigators in October 2016,
served as a good snapshot of the recently evolved set of
challenges faced by those seeking to bring a federal class
securities action in the Southern District of New York.

In Employees Retirement System of the City of Providence v.
Embraer, 16-cv-06277, the plaintiffs, represented by Pomerantz,
alleged the company and its top officers violated a number of
securities laws and rules.  The source of the violations during
the class period from early January 2012 to late November 2016
centered on Embraer's violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.

The company would admit in October 2016 that, between 2007 and
2011, several high-level executives helped bribe government
officials in the Dominican Republic, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique and
India to the tune of $11.5 million.  In exchange, the company
received contracts worth more than $83 million in profits,
according to court papers.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged a number of ways in
which Embraer failed to adhere to securities rules.  In each,
U.S. District Judge Richard Berman of the Southern District of
New York pointed to the state of securities pleadings to nullify
the arguments.

To begin with, the plaintiffs argued that the company was "duty
bound" of the "certainty of the fraud" once the government's
investigations began -- a premise, as the defendants called it,
that the company admit to wrongdoing "before it had even been
charged and before the investigations were even complete."

Judge Berman agreed, pointing to two recent cases.  In the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 2014 decision in City
of Pontiac Policemen's System v. UBS, the court held that
"disclosure is not a rite of confession, and companies do not
have a duty to disclose uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoing."
Likewise, in a suit as part of the long-standing securities
litigation tied to the Petrobras public corruption scandal, the
district court in September 2017 found in In re Banco Bradesco
S.A. Securities Litigation that the bank had disclosed enough
when it acknowledged that investigations were happening and a
negative outcome could happen -- just as Embraer had.

The plaintiffs' argument that the company was obligated to
disclose that some of its money was received because of bribes
was also unavailing.  In In re Sanofi Securities Litigation, the
pharmaceutical company was sued for not flagging the financial
benefits of its illegal marketing and kickback scheme.  Citing
the district court's September 2016 decision, Judge Berman found
that, absent an allegation that the financial statements were
actually false, it's not a securities violation.

An attempt to hold Embraer liable for its own internal codes of
ethics similarly failed. Another district case tied to the
Petrobras scandal, In re Braskem SA Securities Litigation,
involved a company that had rules that forbade bribery, yet it
was accused of doing just that. Quoting from the Ninth Circuit's
January 2017 decision in Retail Wholesale v. Hewlett-Packard, the
district court held that "a code of ethics is inherently
aspirational," adding that, absent more than an "undisclosed
breach of this standard of conduct," breaking your own rules is
"not actionable under securities laws."

The plaintiffs also challenged Embraer's stated belief that it
didn't need to estimate reserves for the investigation into its
conduct -- even as the company ended up paying $945.3 million in
fines and disgorgement.  Judge Berman turned to the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark 2015 decision in Omnicare v. Laborers District
Council Construction Industry Pension Fund.  A claim cannot be
stated simply because an opinion is wrong, Judge Berman noted,
and here Embraer's opinion about reserves was based on advice
from outside counsel.

"Plaintiff does not plead that this statement was (insincerely)
not truthful or that management (and its outside counsel) did not
believe what they were stating publicly," the judge wrote.

Lastly, Embraer was accused of not maintaining adequate internal
controls, namely because even after the DPA went into effect, at
least one senior executive with oversight responsibility for the
employees engaged in illegal activity remained employed and
undisciplined.  Two relevant district decisions from 2015 were
noted -- In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, which found less
particularized claims sufficient to proceed, and In re PetroChina
Securities Litigation, in which the lack of particularity doomed
the claim.

Berman found that the PetroChina case was the more similar of the
two.

"Plaintiff, in the instant case, relies exclusively upon general
assertions about Embraer's internal controls -- and tortuously
(and unpersuasively) tries to relate them to the fact that some
current Embraer employees knew about or participated in (publicly
disclosed) pre-class period bribery at various points between
2004 to 2011," he wrote.

Judge Berman granted, then, the defendant's motion to dismiss
with prejudice.

Pomerantz partner Jeremy Lieberman, who led the plaintiffs' legal
team, agreed that "the courts are struggling" with many of these
securities-related issues.  But from his perspective, there's
just as much good law that sides with his clients as not.  He
pointed to the recent revival of the lawsuit against Alibaba
Group Holding Ltd. by the Second Circuit last year, and the 2014
dismissal by the same circuit of the securities suit against
JinkoSolar, as offering different views on company's liabilities
when it comes to disclosing wrongdoing.

"Yet somehow the district courts, and even sometimes the court of
appeals, are coming up with divergent points of view," he said,
adding that he respectfully disagreed with Berman's decision and
is considering appeal with his client.

Embraer's defense team from Skadden included partners Jay Kasner
-- jay.kasner@skadden.com -- Christopher Malloy --
christopher.malloy@skadden.com -- and Scott Musoff --
scott.musoff@skadden.com

The firm did not return a request for comment. [GN]


EPIC LANDSCAPE: Albelo Seeks to Certify Landscape Laborers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RADAMES MOLINA ALBELO, On behalf of himself
and all other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EPIC
LANDSCAPE PRODUCTIONS, L.C. the Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-
00454-ODS (W.D. Mo.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a
class of:

   "all current and former Landscape Laborers who worked for the
   Defendants at any time from March 25, 2013 to the
   Present."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=7kqPqSvi

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Hodgson, Esq.
          THE HODGSON LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
          6 NW Main St.
          Lee's Summit, MO 64063
          Telephone: (913) 890 3529
          E-mail: mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Paul H. Mose, Esq.
          MOSE LAW LLC
          3111 Strong Avenue
          Kansas City, KS 66106
          Telephone: (913) 432 4484
          Facsimile: (913) 432 4464
          E-mail: Pablo@moselaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Judge Explores Ways to Combine Data Breach Cases
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tasnim Shamma, writing for WABE, reports that a federal judge
considered how best to combine hundreds of lawsuits against
Atlanta-based credit agency Equifax in the first hearing about
class-action complaints against the company on April 3.

Banks, consumers and small businesses are suing the credit agency
after a massive data breach exposed personal information like
social security numbers and birthdates of 147.9 million people in
2017.

A federal courtroom in Atlanta was packed on April 3 with more
than two dozen attorneys.  Chief United States District Judge of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia Thomas W. Thrash assigned a leadership team of 26
attorneys earlier this year to represent more than 371 class-
action complaints across the U.S. that have been filed against
Equifax.

Status Conferences

At the hearing, Judge Thrash asked if attorneys had any issues
working with attorneys on similar class-action complaints in
Fulton County Superior Court being heard by Judge Melvin
Westmoreland. Equifax filed a motion to dismiss those cases.

"My inclination is to pick up the phone and call Judge
Westmoreland," Judge Thrash said.  "I'll go attend his status
conferences or he'll come to mine."

Judge Thrash is also the judge presiding over the SEC complaints
against former Equifax chief information officer Jun Ying.
Mr. Ying was charged with insider trading.

Professor Elizabeth Burch specializes in class-action lawsuits at
the University of Georgia.

"Essentially what he's doing is trying to coordinate between
different governments and different state lawsuits," Ms. Burch
said.

Judge Thrash said he would confer with the judge in the Fulton
County court cases, but would keep status conference meetings in
the civil case against Jun Ying separate.

Settlement Option

Ms. Burch said that class-action allegations can take five to six
years before they are decided or settled.

"It depends on how Equifax responds to this. If they respond by
saying you know we're sorry it's our fault, let's just sort of
focus on damages and getting this put behind us, then it might
not take nearly as long," Ms. Burch said.  "If Equifax takes the
tack that we want to fight this tooth and nail, then they can
really drag the proceedings on."

However, Ms. Burch said most clients consider settlements
seriously.

"I would imagine that they're thinking pretty seriously about
settlement because lawyers aren't cheap and one would hope that
they would want that money to go to consumers or financial
institutions who are harmed rather than their own attorneys,"
Ms. Burch said.

A document filed by plaintiff's attorneys on April 2 states
settlement after discovery is a possibility.

Incorrect Notification Letters

On April 3, Atlanta-based credit agency Equifax also said it
recently sent out notification letters to incorrect mailing
addresses.

The letters were to notify additional consumers that some of
their information may have been exposed.

A spokesperson for Equifax said in a statement, it was "a very
small percentage" and that no credit data or sensitive
information were in those letters. [GN]


FRITO-LAY NORTH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Allred" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denied the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the case, BARRY ALLRED and MANDY C. ALLRED, on behalf of
themselves, all others similarly situated, and the general
public, Plaintiffs, v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. and FRITO-
LAY, INC., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-1345 JLS (BGS) (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in state court.
The Defendants removed the case to federal court.  The Plaintiffs
bring causes of action under: (1) the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act; (2) Unfair Competition Law (unlawful prong); (3) Unfair
Competition Law (unfair prong); (4) False Advertising Law; (5)
Breach of Express Warranties; and (6) Breach of Implied
Warranties.

In broad summary, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendants
manufacture and sell "Salt and Vinegar Flavored Potato Chips."
They seek to litigate on behalf of all consumers who purchased
the Product in California during the period six years prior to
the filing of the Complaint and continuing until the class is
certified.  They allege the label of the Product violates
California law in various ways.  They argue the Product is
labeled as only containing natural ingredients, but is in fact
flavored with a chemical called malic acid.

Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
They argue the Plaintiffs' claims (i) are preempted by the
federal Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") because the
Product's labels are in compliance with FDCA regulations; (ii)
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (iii) are
in part barred by the statute of limitations.

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs Barry Allred and Mandy C.
Allred's Opposition to the Motion, and the Defendants' Reply in
Support of the Motion.

Judge Sammartino cannot find at this stage that the Plaintiffs'
claims that (i) the Defendant must refer to "malic acid" by its
specific name and (ii) the Product must be labeled as
"artificially flavored," are preempted.  He says the factual
determinations of whether the ingredients are used as a sweetener
and/or a flavoring agent in a particular product, and whether a
reasonable consumer would have thus been misled by the 'no
artificial sweeteners or preservatives' label, are inappropriate
for determination on a motion to dismiss.  Hence, he will deny
the Motion to Dismiss as to these claims.

As to the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Judge
cannot also determine at this stage whether the Product's
advertising was false or misleading.  And if it is determined
that the Product should have disclosed an "artificial flavor,"
then a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the Product's
packaging, which clearly states "No artificial flavors."  He
cannot conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable consumer
would not be deceived by the packaging and ingredient list.

Because he has found it is plausible that malic acid is an
artificial ingredient, the Judge finds that there is plausible
consumer injury that would have not have been avoided by reading
the Product label.  He will deny the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the "unfair" claim under the UCL.  And because he finds
that the Plaintiffs have pled a violation of FDA flavor
regulations, he will deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
"unlawful" claim under the UCL.

Since the Plaintiffs have pled the elements of their claim for
breach of express warranty because they have alleged the
statements made on the Product packaging promised there were "no
artificial flavors;" they have alleged they reasonably relied on
these statements; and they have alleged that the Product did not
provide what was promised, the Judge will deny the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the claim of express warranty.  As to breach of
implied warranty claim, the Defendants have not shown that the
Plaintiffs' claim fails, so he will deny the Motion to Dismiss
it.

Finally, as to the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiffs
claims are in part barred by the statute of limitations, Judge
Sammartino finds among other things, that the Plaintiffs have not
adequately pled fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of
limitation, and the Plaintiffs have provided no allegations
detailing how they discovered the alleged unlawful labeling.
Assuming the allegation of misbranding to be true, it would be
inequitable to allow Defendants to "obtain immunity" from this
violation even for recent and ongoing malfeasance.  Thus, because
this exception applies to the statute of limitations, he will
deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claims on this ground.

For these reasons, Judge Sammartino denied the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/0STaYa from Leagle.com.

Barry Allred, on behalf of themselves, and all other similarly
situated, and the general public & Mandy C Allred, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated, and the general
public, Plaintiffs, represented by David Elliot --
davidelliot@elliotlawfirm.com -- The Elliott Law Firm, Ronald
Marron -- ron@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Office of Ronald
Marron & Michael Houchin, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron.

Frito-Lay North America, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Frito-
Lay, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Andrew S. Tulumello -- atulumello@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP & Christopher Chorba -- cchorba@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.


GALLIANO MARINE: Court Grants Class Certification in "Halle"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KYLE HALLE, the Plaintiff, v. GALLIANO
MARINE SERVICE, LLC and C-INNOVATION, LLC, Case No. 2:15-cv-
05648-EEF-MBN (E.D. La.), the Court entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion to certify class; and

   2. granting Plaintiff's motion for Equitable Tolling, and
      giving Plaintiff equitable tolling from February 25, 2016
      to October 17, 2017.

The Court, in exercising its discretion, finds that it is fair to
provide some equitable tolling to Plaintiff. During the time that
Defendants' summary judgment motion was on appeal, the case was
effectively stayed and Plaintiff had no opportunity to move
forward with the case, including filing a motion for
certification of a class. During that period, Plaintiff was
prevented from doing so because this Court did not have
jurisdiction. It would be inequitable for Plaintiff to be
punished and Defendant to be rewarded for the time spent on this
motion, particularly given the outcome. Additionally, Defendants
will not be prejudiced by this tolling because Defendants have
been on notice of Plaintiff's claims regarding employees paid
using a day rate since the time Plaintiff filed his complaint.
Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff equitable tolling from the
time the Court decided Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
February 25, 2016, to the time the Fifth Circuit remanded the
case, October 17, 2017.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=KeuM3X4L


GC SERVICES: Court Shelves "Beaufrand" Class Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CARLOS BEAUFRAND, the Plaintiff, v. GC
SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-
00242-LA (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge Lynn Adelman entered an
order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motions to stay class certification
      motion and for relief from the local rules; and

   2. staying Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff brings this putative class action, alleging
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. To prevent
defendant from mooting the action, plaintiff moves for class
certification and to stay that motion. See Damasco v. Clearwire
Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other
grounds by Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir.
2015); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672
(2016). The Plaintiff also moves for relief from local rules
requiring every motion to be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum and imposing a briefing schedule. Civil L. R. 7 (E.D.
Wis.). I will grant the requested relief.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fQj6ZNg9


GLENDALE ADVENTIST: Fails to Pay Wages, Mayorga Says
----------------------------------------------------
MARJOURIE MAYORGA and MOHAMAD ALINEJAD, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GLENDALE
ADVENTIST MEDICAL CENTER d/b/a ADVENTIST HEALTH GLENDALE, a
California nonprofit corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. (S.D. Fla., April 13, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid wages under the California Labor Code and
declaratory, injunctive, and equitable monetary relief from
California Fair Employment and Housing Act violations,
compensatory and punitive damages; equitable remedies of
accounting, restitution and disgorgement; and an award of costs,
expenses, and attorneys' fees.

This action alleges that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and
those similarly situated, wages for all time worked; and failed
to provide accurate wage statements to Plaintiffs, and those
similarly situated, as required by California Labor Code Section
226, in that the wage statements did not include all wages
earned.

This is also an employment discrimination case brought pursuant
to the provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act. The Plaintiffs allege that GAMC has engaged in, and
continues to engage in, a companywide pattern and practice of
employment discrimination, both intentional and systemic, on the
basis of sexual orientation, against themselves and a class of
similarly situated lesbian and gay employees and former employees
as alleged in this Complaint. GAMC's discriminatory practices
include, but are not limited to, discrimination in compensation
on a class-wide basis.[BN]

Glendale Adventist Medical Center is a non-profit organization
located in the Los Angeles suburb of Glendale, California, USA.
GAMC is one of the city's oldest businesses, founded in 1905, a
year before Glendale was incorporated as a city.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Justin P. Karczag, Esq.
          Muhammed T. Hussain, Esq.
          ENCORE LAW GROUP LLP
          1100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 3305
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 559 7395
          Facsimile: (213) 559 7396

               - and -

          Robert A. Hennig, Esq.
          Sereena J. Singh, Esq.
          HENNIG RUIZ & SINGH
          3600 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1908
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 310 8301
          Facsimile: (213) 310 8302


GOOD SON: Ornelas Seeks Unpaid Wages & OT under Labor Code
----------------------------------------------------------
YMELDA ORNELAS, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. GOOD SON SM, LLC, dba SUBARU SANTA
MONICA, a Delaware limited liability company; GOOD SON, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; MICHAEL D. SULLIVAN, an
individual; and DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. BC701420
(Cal. Super. Ct., April 10, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid rest period
premiums, and unpaid minimum wages under the California Labor
Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the other class
members worked more than eight hours in a day, and/or 40 hours in
a week during their employment with Defendants. The Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants engaged in a uniform policy and
systematic scheme of wage abuse against their hourly-paid of non-
exempt employees. This scheme involved, inter alia, requiring
them to work off the clock and failing to pay them at the
required minimum wage, straight time rate or overtime rate,
thereby failing to pay them for all hours worked, missed meal
periods and rest breaks in violation of California law. In
addition, Defendants did not permit Plaintiff and other class
members to take their required rest breaks or meal breaks in
violation of California law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Heather Davis, Esq.
          Amirnayebdadash, Esq.
          Cody Payne, Esq.
          Kim N. Nguyen, Esq.
          Priscilla Gamino, Esq.
          PROTECTION LAW GROUP, LLP
          136 Main Street, Suite A
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 290 3095
          Facsimile: (866) 264 7880


GOOGLE INC: Judge Allows Pay-Equity Class Action to Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Max Mitchell, writing for Law.com's Critical Mass, reports that
Google received some bad news recently as a California judge
determined that a pay-equity class action can move forward
against the tech giant.  And the first case to go to trial over
allegedly defective Bard IVC blood filters ended with a $4
million verdict for the plaintiffs in Arizona.

Could a Pay Equity Class Action Against Google Be a Road Map for
Change?

A class action over gender pay equity at Google has cleared a
hurdle.  And according to Law.com's Erin Mulvaney, the ruling
could reverberate throughout Silicon Valley and the tech world.

A San Francisco Superior Court judge ruled that as many as 5,000
female Google employees may sue the company over a policy that
considers new hires' previous salaries to determine a starting
salary level.  According to some attorneys, the ruling could
serve as a road map for suits targeting pay inequality in big
tech companies.

Issues about whether salary history can be used in the hiring
process has been a sticking point in equal pay litigation.  The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently took up the
issue in a case where the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has argued policies allowing prospective employers to
base salaries on previous earnings institutionalize pay
disparities.

Altshuler Berzon and Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Berstein filed the
suit against Google.  Altshuler Berzon attorney James Fineberg --
jfinberg@altshulerberzon.com -- said the March 30 ruling "lays
out a road map for how to certify a gender pay equity case."

Meanwhile, management-side law firm Seyfarth Shaw said in a
client advisory that the ruling was "a worrying development for
employers."  The decision "could provide a 'blueprint' for how
other plaintiffs may attempt to cobble together broad classes
that encompass widely disparate job positions, seemingly without
regard for the individual job duties or qualifications associated
with those positions."

Plaintiffs Draw First Blood in Trial Over Filter Defect

The first case to go to trial over Bard IVC blood filters has
ended with a verdict for the plaintiffs.  A jury in Arizona
federal court awarded plaintiff Sherr-Una Booker $4 million,
finding she was entitled to $2 million in compensatory damages
and $2 million in punitive damages.  The verdict, however, was
reduced to $3.6 million after finding that a non-party doctor was
liable for 20 percent of the compensatory damages.

The case alleged that a filter meant to prevent blood clots --
which was implanted in a large artery leading to the heart --
broke apart, sending one fragment into the plaintiffs heart and
leaving another piece lodged in a vein.  The plaintiffs contended
that the manufacturer knew the devices were defective, but
continued to make them.

The case is one of more than 3,000 involving similar complaints
that have been consolidated before Judge David Campbell in
Arizona.  The next trial is slated for May.  A member of the
trial team told Law.com's Greg Land that the jury's decision to
award punitive damages showcases the litigation's potential.

"Arizona's a very conservative jurisdiction, so punitives are
very rare out here," Atlanta attorney Robin Lourie said.
Ms. Lourie helped try the case along with Robert Roll of Watkins,
Lourie, Roll & Chance; Mark O'Connor of Phoenix's Gallagher &
Kennedy; Ramon Lopez of Newport Beach, California's Lopez McHugh,
and Julia Reed Zaic of Heaviside Reed Zaic.

Bard has already announced it would challenge the verdict as
being inconsistent.

Who Got the Work?

A political data firm that worked for President Donald Trump's
campaign in the 2016 election is facing a new lawsuit in New York
federal court over claims that it improperly harvested Facebook
user information.

Law.com's Colby Hamilton reports that the latest suit against
Cambridge Analytica was filed on April 2 in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.  It joins four other
class action suits that have been brought in California and New
Jersey, and also marks Manhattan law firm Gardy & Notis' entry
into the growing litigation.  Meagan Farmer is lead counsel for
the plaintiffs, who say their data was used to unwillingly target
them with political messages during the 2016 presidential
campaign.

Here's what else you need to know:

Drywall MDL Crumbles: The federal judge overseeing thousands of
cases claiming that Chinese drywall damages homes has announced
he plans to return cases back to the courts where they were
originally filed.  The Associated Press reported that U.S.
District Judge Eldon Fallon of the Eastern District of Louisiana,
who in 2009 was tasked with handling the consolidated caseload,
told the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that he
wants to transfer all remaining Chinese drywall cases that were
sent to him.  The panel said it would return the first 1,700
cases to Florida's federal courts if no objections were filed by
March 29.  At least three objection notices, however, have been
filed by attorney representing 750 clients.  "We're sort of
confused as to why only these particular claims are being
transferred back for trial," said Ann Saucer of Baron & Budd,
which joined others in an objection for 418 clients.

Round Two Over Xarelto: The second state court trial over claims
that Johnson & Johnson's blood thinner Xarelto cases
uncontrollable bleeding began begin April 5, in Pennsylvania
state court.  After three losses in federal court, a Philadelphia
jury late last year awarded a nearly $28 million verdict in the
first case to be tried in state court.  That verdict was later
reversed by Philadelphia Judge Michael Erdos, who is set to
preside over the upcoming trial.

Federal Pharma Filings Fall: Medical device and pharmaceutical
liability lawsuits may be the leading category of product
liability complaints in federal court, but according to a new
report, the filings have been decreasing over the past few years.
Read my colleague Andrew Denney's review of the report issued on
April 2 by legal analytics firm Lex Machina.

PACER Fees Misused?: A D.C. judge ruled on March 31 that the
federal judiciary misused millions of dollars in fees derived
from the public web portal known as PACER. [GN]


GOOGLE INC: Court Dismisses "Sweet" AdSense Algorithm Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
district of California granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the case, JAMES SWEET, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOOGLE INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-03953-EMC (N.D. Cal.).

Mr. Sweet and Chuck Mere Mere are the owners of Zombie Go Boom,
LLC, which operates a channel -- Zombiegoboom -- on YouTube.
Zombie has been able to "monetize" the content it displays on its
YouTube channel because Defendants Google, LLC and/or YouTube,
LLC have a program under which content providers can get a cut of
the revenue that YouTube makes from third-party advertisements.

YouTube uses a program called AdSense to control placement of
advertisements, depending on content provided and audience.  In
or about March 2017, YouTube changed the algorithm used in
AdSense.  The change to the AdSense algorithm was an attempt to
automatically weed out inappropriate content, without the use of
human oversight.  As it turns out, the algorithm was not
effective: (1) It under-inclusively failed to capture and
demonetize content that was sexually explicit, racist or
otherwise not in compliance with the spirit of YouTube's
guidelines"; and (2) it over-inclusively demonetized content that
did not violate the spirit of the guidelines and was not
objectionable to advertisers.

Zombie fell into the latter category.  It claims that there are
thousands of other examples although it identifies only one other
example in its FAC.  Zombie and other content providers have
dubbed the date that the algorithm was changed "Adpocalypse."  As
a result of the algorithm change, Zombie's advertising revenue
fell.

Zombie has filed a class action lawsuit against YouTube,
asserting that its revenues and the revenues of other content
providers have significantly fallen after YouTube put
restrictions on the placement of advertisements that did not meet
YouTube guidelines.  From approximately 2011, when the
Zombiegoboom channel was founded, until the time of the alleged
YouTube misconduct, Zombie made approximately $10,000 to $15,000
per month.

YouTube now challenges Zombie's FAC in a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.  Although YouTube's motion is a 12(b)(6) motion, it has
filed a declaration in support of the motion and attached to the
declaration are several pieces of evidence.

Judge Chen agrees with YouTube that all of Zombie's claims (the
Section 17200 claim; the claims for breach of contract, the
implied covenant, and quasi-contract; and the claim for tortious
interference) are subject to dismissal given the explicit terms
of the agreement.  Moreover, the dismissal is with prejudice.
YouTube challenged Zombie's original complaint on the same
ground, which led to Zombie filing an amended complaint.  Because
Zombie's amended complaint failed to cure the deficiency, and
because the terms of the agreement are clear, any further
amendment to the complaint would be futile.

For these reasons, Judge Chen granted YouTube's motion to
dismiss.  The dismissal is with prejudice.  Accordingly, the
Clerk of the Court will enter judgment in accordance with the
Opinion and close the file in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/oYHQvg from Leagle.com.

James Sweet, Chuck Mere & Zombie Go Boom, LLC dba ZombieGoBoom,
Plaintiffs, represented by Todd Michael Friedman, Law Offices of
Todd M. Friedman, P.C. & Adrian Bacon, Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C.

Google Inc., doing business as, Defendant, represented by Anthony
J. Weibell -- aweibell@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, Lena Ting Yi Wong -- lwong@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich and Rosati, Maura Lea Rees -- MRees@wsgr.com -- Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Eli Bard Richlin -- erichlin@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati PC, pro hac vice.

YouTube, LLC & Google LLC, Defendants, represented by Anthony J.
Weibell, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A Professional
Corporation.


GOOGLE LLC: Bid to Seal Exhibit B to Free Range Suit Deal Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREE RANGE CONTENT, INC., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
GOOGLE, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 14-cv-02329-BLF (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to seal Exhibit B to the Declaration of Robert
F. Lopez.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' administrative motion to file
under seal an Exhibit attached to their motion for preliminary
approval of settlement.  The sealing motion is unopposed.
Exhibit B contains confidential settlement information regarding
the conditions triggering the Defendant's right to terminate and
withdraw from the Settlement Agreement.  The Plaintiffs are not
clear as to which standard applies to their administrative
motion, arguing that the Courts frequently find good cause to
seal confidential settlement information.  However, the
Plaintiffs also cite to relevant authority from the District
where the court found compelling reasons to seal similar
confidential information in a settlement agreement to discourage
manipulation of the settlement.

Judge Freeman finds that in Thomas v. Magnachip Semiconductor
Corp., Judge Tigar granted the parties' motion to file under seal
the conditions under which the defendant may terminate the
settlement, finding that compelling reasons existed to keep the
information confidential in order to prevent third parties from
utilizing it for the improper purpose of obstructing the
settlement and obtaining higher payouts.  Judge Freeman has
reviewed Exhibit B to the Lopez Declaration in the case, and
agrees with the reasoning in Thomas that compelling reasons exist
to seal this information.  He also finds that the Plaintiffs'
proposed redactions are narrowly tailored.

For these reasons, Judge Freeman granted the Plaintiffs' motion
to seal.  The redacted version of Exhibit B filed into the public
record by the Plaintiffs in connection with their motion for
preliminary approval of settlement is consistent with the Order,
so no further documents need to be filed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/LMK7jl from Leagle.com.

Free Range Content, Inc., Coconut Island Software, Inc., a Hawaii
corporation, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Taylor Chose, a Minnesota resident, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated & Matthew Simpson, a
British Columbia, Canada resident, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Craig
Ripley Spiegel -- craigs@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, Patrick Howard -- phoward@smbb.com -- Saltz
Mongeluzzi Barrett & Bendesky, pro hac vice, Robert F. Lopez --
robl@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Simon Bahne
Paris -- sparis@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett and
Bendesky, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Jeff D. Friedman --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Google, LLC, Defendant, represented by Abigail E. Pringle, Cooley
LLP, Jeffrey Gutkin, Cooley LLP, Kyle Christopher Wong --
kwong@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Michael Graham Rhodes --
rhodesmg@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Super Cray Inc., Interested Party, represented by Randolph Gaw --
rgaw@gawpoe.com -- Gaw & Poe LLP.



GREGORYS COFFEE: Fails to Pay Uniform Maintenance, Griffin Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE GRIFFIN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. GREGORYS COFFEE MANAGEMEN LLC, f/k/a
GREGORYS COFFEE MANAGEMENT INC., f/k/a GREGORYS COFFEE INC.,
d/b/a GREGORYS COFFEE, and GREGORY ZAMFOTIS, individually, the
Defendant, Case No. 153397/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April 13, 2018),
seeks to recover damages and other legal and equitable relief
against Defendants under the New York State Labor Law.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated nonexempt hourly paid employees of
Defendants in the State of New York at any time during the period
commencing six years prior to the filing of this action and
continuing until such further date as the practices complained of
are discontinued.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff's duties were to
perform labor in furtherance of Defendants' business. The
Plaintiff had no authority to hire employees, fire employees,
suspend employees, discipline employees, and/or discretion or
independent judgment regarding matters of significance. At her
time of hire, the Plaintiff was given only one uniform despite
working 4-6 days per week. The uniform consisted of a one shirt,
one apron, and one hat, each emblazoned with Defendants' logo. At
no time was Plaintiff ever given additional articles of the
uniform. The Plaintiff was required by Defendants to wear this
uniform every shift. This uniform does not fall under the wash
and wear exception.

The Defendants failed to supply sufficient articles of uniform
clothing consistent with the average number of days per week
worked by Plaintiff. The Defendants did not launder Plaintiff's
required uniforms, nor did Defendants offer to launder the
required uniforms. The Plaintiff's uniform was issued by
Defendants to her for the express benefit of Defendants and it
was a condition of her employment to wear them in a clean
condition during each shift. The Plaintiff's uniform required
daily washing. The Defendants never paid any uniform maintenance
pay or reimbursement for the cost of maintaining uniforms. The
Plaintiff routinely spent time off-the-clock and money to clean
and maintain her uniform consistent with the uniform appearance
standards Defendants require. The Plaintiff was entitled to
reimbursement or additional pay for time spent off the clock and
money spent in laundering and maintained Defendants' uniform.

In the event that an article of the uniform became unwearable,
the Plaintiff had to purchase a replacement from the Defendants
at her own expense. Defendants never reimbursed the Plaintiff any
amount for additional uniforms. Defendants' unlawful conduct has
been widespread, repeated, and consistent.

Defendants operate restaurants that prepare and offer food and
beverage for customer consumption.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          400 Jericho Turnpike Suite 226
          Jericho, NY 11753
          Telephone: (516) 742 4949
          Facsimile: (516) 742 1977


HARTFORD, CT: 2d Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Outlaw" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TYLON C. OUTLAW, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
v. CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Appellee, OFFICER MICHAEL ALLEN,
in his individual capacity, Defendant-Cross-Appellant, DETECTIVE
TROY GORDON, in his individual capacity, Defendant, Docket No.
16-480(L), 16-635(XAP)(2d Cir.), Judge Amalya Lyle Kearse of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment (i) summarily dismissing Outlaw's
against, and (ii) ordering Allen to pay Outlaw $454,197 in
damages.

On the night of Dec. 17, 2004, Allen and HPD Detective Gordon
confronted and arrested 30-year-old Outlaw on a downtown street
in Hartford, Connecticut.  Outlaw was charged with breach of
peace, being intoxicated in the roadway, threatening a police
officer, and assault on a police officer.  The charges were
resolved in 2005 by Outlaw's entry of an Alford plea to the
offense of creating a public disturbance.  The arrest occurred
after Allen had repeatedly struck Outlaw with a police baton,
bloodying his head in several places and breaking his knee.

Outlaw brought the present Section 1983 action in 2007 against
Allen, Gordon, and the City, alleging principally that Allen and
Gordon had caused his injuries by using excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the City was liable
for their conduct because it had a policy or custom of deliberate
indifference in failing to train and supervise its police
officers as to appropriate use of force during an arrest.  Outlaw
also asserted claims under the Connecticut Constitution and
Connecticut common law.

Following years of discovery, the Defendants moved for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint.  The district court granted
the motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim and similar
state-law claims against the City, ruling, to the extent
pertinent to Outlaw's appeal, that the evidence Outlaw proffered
was insufficient to establish that the City had a policy or
custom of indifference that caused Outlaw's injuries.

The district court denied the individual Defendants' motions for
summary judgment dismissing the Fourth Amendment and Connecticut
constitutional claims of excessive force and the state-law claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, ruling that
there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried.  The
court granted the motions to dismiss Outlaw's other
constitutional and state-law claims; however, following a motion
by Outlaw for reconsideration, it reinstated the state-law claims
against Gordon and Allen for assault and battery.

In 2016, Outlaw's surviving constitutional and common-law tort
claims against Allen and Gordon were tried to a jury, which heard
two versions of the December 2004 incident: one from Outlaw and
several bystanders, the other from Allen and Gordon.  The jury
found that Outlaw had not proven any of his claims against
Gordon.  As to Allen, the jury found that Outlaw had proven that
Allen used excessive force, had done so intentionally or
recklessly, and had thereby caused Outlaw injury.  Having found
against Allen on the excessive force claims, the jury awarded
Outlaw $408,197 for pain, suffering, emotional distress, and loss
of enjoyment of life.  Although the jury awarded Outlaw $111,803
for past and future medical expenses, the parties stipulated that
that sum should be reduced to $46,000.

Outlaw appeals from so much of a judgment of the district court's
judgement granting summary judgment to the City, dismissing his
claims on the ground that Outlaw proffered insufficient evidence
to permit an inference that the City had a policy or custom of
failing to supervise its police officers in the use of force or
that the City's customs or policies caused Outlaw's injuries.
Outlaw contends that summary judgment was inappropriate, given
the evidence he proffered to show that the City had exhibited
deliberate indifference to numerous civilian complaints of
excessive force by its police officers.

Allen cross-appeals from so much of the district court's judgment
as orders him to pay Outlaw $454,197 in damages following express
jury findings that Allen injured Outlaw by intentionally or
recklessly using excessive force, in violation of the United
States and Connecticut Constitutions.  Allen contends that he is
entitled to qualified immunity on those claims in light of the
jury's verdict against Outlaw on Outlaw's claim for assault and
battery in violation of state law, and that post-trial factual
findings by the district court, made in ruling that Allen is not
entitled to qualified immunity for the constitutional violations,
should be set aside as inconsistent with findings that Allen
imputes to the jury.

On appeal, Judge Kearse concludes that the district court did not
err in ruling that the evidence proffered by Outlaw in support of
his municipal liability claims was insufficient to permit an
inference of deliberate indifference on the part of the City to
the use of excessive force by HPD officers.

On the cross-appeal, the Judge  concludes that Allen's
contentions are without merit given that, as qualified immunity
is an affirmative defense, the burden was on Allen to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence any factual predicates necessary to
establish that defense; that in order to avoid having the court
instruct the jury that he had that burden, Allen chose not to
have submitted to the jury the fact questions as to which he now
wants favorable answers presumed; that the jury's answers to the
interrogatories accompanying its verdict did not imply the
factual findings that Allen imputes to the jury; and that the
pertinent factual findings by the district court are not
inconsistent with the jury's answers to questions that were
posed.

Judge Kearse has considered all of the arguments by the parties
in support of their respective appeals and, for the reasons she
stated, she found them to be without merit.  Accordingly, she
affirmed the judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/jHqGT5 from Leagle.com.

RAYMOND J. RIGAT -- Raymondjrigat@gmail.com -- Clinton,
Connecticut, for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

NATHALIE FEOLA-GUERRIERI, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel,
Hartford, Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellee.

WILLIAM J. MELLEY III, Hartford, Connecticut, for Defendant-
Cross-Appellant.


HAVERHILL RETIREMENT: Bid to Quash Subpoenas Transferred
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KORNELL, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. HAVERHILL
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-MC-25 (N.D. Ohio),
Judge Dan Aaron Polster of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, transferred the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas to the Southern
District of New York for Judge Lorna G. Schofield's
consideration.

On March 5, 2018, Plaintiffs Kornell and Galan initiated the
instant action by filing a Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas.
The underlying litigation is a class action currently pending in
the Southern District of New York before Judge Schofield.  The
Plaintiffs are unnamed class members in that litigation.

Judge Schofield preliminarily approved a settlement in the
underlying class action on Sept. 29, 2017, and set a fairness
hearing for May 23, 2018.  The Class filed a Motion for Attorneys
Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses on Jan. 12, 2018.
The Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion on Feb. 6, 2018.
The Class issued subpoenas on Feb. 20, 2018, requiring
depositions and discovery production from the Plaintiffs.  The
depositions are to take place on March 30, 2018 in Cleveland,
Ohio.

Judge Polster explains that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(f), a court may transfer a subpoena-related motion, such as
the instant motion, back to the issuing court.  In this case, he
says, the Southern District of New York is both the issuing court
and the court that will conduct the fairness hearing.  The court
conducting the final approval hearing is best situated to
determine what pre-fairness hearing discovery of unnamed
plaintiffs is appropriate.

Accordingly, Judge Polster transferred the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Quash for Judge Schofield's consideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/m0e223 from Leagle.com.

Keith Kornell & Gregory Galan, Plaintiffs, represented by Edward
W. Cochran -- edwardcochran@wowway.com.

Haverhill Retirement System, Defendant, represented by Walter W.
Noss -- WNOSS@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott & Scott.


HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Younge Seeks OT Compensation under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT YOUNGE, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED,
d/b/a The Huntington National Bank, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-
cv-00314-MHW-CMV (S.D. Ohio, April 10, 2018), seeks to recover
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The case is a collective action instituted by Plaintiff as a
result of Defendant's practices and policies of not paying its
hourly, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees, for all hours worked, in violation
of the FLSA. The Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees
were required by Defendant to perform unpaid work before clocking
in each day, including, but not limited to, starting, booting up,
and logging into Defendant's computer systems, numerous software
applications, and phone systems. Booting up and logging into the
computer systems and numerous software applications required
entering unique and frequently changing passwords for each of the
numerous programs.

By common policy and practice, Plaintiff and other similarly-
situated employees were required to have their computers booted
up and have several applications running before the start of
their shifts so that they could take their first call promptly
upon commencing work at their scheduled start times. The
Defendant arbitrarily failed to count this work performed by the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees as "hours
worked." The Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees
performed this unpaid work every workday, and it constituted a
part of their fixed and regular working time.

The Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and
other similarly-situated inbound call-center representatives for
starting and logging into Defendant's computer systems, numerous
software applications, and phone systems, during which they
performed work that managers and/or other agents and/or
representatives observed. As a result of Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees not being paid for all hours worked,
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid
overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40
each workweek.

Huntington Bancshares, Inc. is an American bank holding company
headquartered in Columbus, Ohio. As of June 2016, the company had
$74 billion in assets, making it the 32nd largest bank holding
company in the country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Telephone: (330) 470 4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754 1430
          E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com
                  hans@ohlaborlaw.com


ILLINOIS: Yates et al. Sue over Law Enforcement Training
--------------------------------------------------------
KEIA YATES, LEONARDO RODRIQUEZ, and JOHNNY JIMMERSON, as
representatives of that class of individuals working as AVIATION
SECURITY OFFICERS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION,
the Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, BRENT FISCHER, as Executive
Direction of the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards
Board; the CITY OF CHICAGO; and GINGER EVANS, as Commissioner of
the City of Chicago Department of Aviation, the Defendants, case
No. 1:18-cv-02613 (N.D. Ill., April 11, 2018), seeks to recover
actual and compensatory damages for injuries Plaintiffs have
suffered as a consequence of Defendants' unlawful conduct.

For nearly three decades, the City of Chicago's Department of
Aviation and the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards
Board have recognized the members of the Chicago Aviation Police
as bona fide law enforcement officers. As the CDA has publicly
stated for decades, these men and women -- sworn graduates of the
Chicago Police Academy and Cook County Sherriff's Training
Academy -- are necessary to, among other things: (1) "patrol
airport grounds, terminals, and facilities," (2) "provide a law
enforcement presence," (3) "deter criminal activity," (4)
"prevent unauthorized airport access," and (5) "enforce security
rules."

Until recent events, Plaintiffs were required to annually qualify
with firearms. Indeed, as far back as 1993 the ILETSB elected to
formally recognize the CDA as a law enforcement agency and, as
such, Plaintiffs qualified as "law enforcement officers" under
Illinois law.

To discharge their duties, the Plaintiffs were historically
equipped with police vehicles, non-lethal weapons, and handcuffs
that allowed them to patrol and protect airport property,
terminals, and facilities. Although Plaintiffs are not authorized
to carry firearms while working, much like LEOs working in
prisons or on other assignments where agencies have determined
that the regular presence of firearms poses too great a risk,
Chicago Aviation Police were permitted to possess and register
their weapons and carry them concealed off-duty like other LEOs.

In the course of discharging their duties, Plaintiffs have issued
tens of thousands of citations for myriad violations of state
statutes and city and county ordinances, and they are routinely
sworn in and testify in open court on behalf of the City of
Chicago in those cases where citations issued by the Chicago
Aviation Police are disputed. Many of the Plaintiffs work part-
time as police officers in other jurisdictions. Moreover, many
former members of the Chicago Aviation Police have leveraged
their years credited as law enforcement officers to lateral into
other police departments and law enforcement positions within the
State of Illinois and elsewhere.

Nonetheless, in the face of, and in response to, intense
political pressure following the April 9, 2017 incident on United
Airlines Flight 3411, the City of Chicago and the ILETSB, in an
arbitrary and capricious decision, elected to retroactively strip
Plaintiffs of all time served as LEOs, unilaterally altering
their employment history, rendering them ineligible for lateral
employment by other police departments and law enforcement
organizations, and damaging their employment prospects in the
process. The damages these officers have suffered are both real
and catastrophic. For Plaintiffs, decades of otherwise legitimate
law enforcement experience have been effectively erased from
their work history, severely curtailing their job prospects and
significantly impacting their future earning potential. By and
through their conduct, the State of Illinois and the City of
Chicago have wrongfully and improperly taken and deprived
Plaintiffs -- the members of the Chicago Aviation Police -- of
their rights and property without due process of law in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

          Robert D. Sweeney, Esq.
          John J. Scharkey, Esq.
          SWEENEY & SCHARKEY LLC
          111 West Washington Street
          Burnham Center, Suite 1160
          Chicago, IL 60602-2734
          Telephone: (312) 384 1200


ILLINOIS: Judge Certifies Class in Medicaid Delay Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Kimberly Marselas, writing for McKnight's, reports that seniors
in Illinois who have faced considerable delays in receiving their
Medicaid coverage -- including one woman who claims she went
blind waiting for eye care -- can sue the state, a judge ruled.

U.S. District Judge Joan B. Gottschall certified the class to
include all individuals who applied for Medicaid since
February 1, 2015, and had been determined eligible for long-term
care benefits by Illinois but had not yet received a final
eligibility determination or a hearing notice within 45 days in
non-disability cases or 90 days in disability cases.

"The declarations of (nursing facility) operators here show that
each has had several applicants who died or were discharged while
awaiting decisions on their applications," the judge noted,
adding that those involved in the case should be presumed
eligible because of the state's alleged failure to comply with
the Medicaid Act's time requirements.

The case originated with four women ages 68 to 90, all residents
of nursing homes and supportive living facilities, who sought
Medicaid coverage through the state in 2015 and 2016. After
submitting additional paperwork as requested and, in at least one
case, applying repeatedly, the women argued that they were not
receiving benefits after the required period.

Part of the case revolves around a technical oversight or backlog
by the state, which must both deem the applicants eligible and
enter that eligibility into a computer system to initiate
coverage and payments.

The women claimed they were unable to pay for certain types of
care without coverage, including their nursing home bills,
optometrists' costs and prescriptions.  One has withdrawn from
the case, and another has since died.

But in a decision rendered on March 29, Judge Gottschall said
others could join in the remaining plaintiffs' case. [GN]


INSTORE GROUP: "Cherelli" Suit Moved to District of Massachusetts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Karen Cherelli, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. The
InStore Group, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1881cv0556, was
removed from the Middlesex Superior Court, to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts (Boston) on April 13,
2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-10717-
DPW to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Douglas P. Woodlock.

The InStore Group was born out of an acquisition of a small
regional retail merchandising company in 2013. Since that date,
the company has been on an epic growth ride. Today, The InStore
Group under the leadership of its' founder Tom Palombo, is a full
service nationwide retail merchandising organization.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Brook S. Lane, Esq.
          Hillary A. Schwab, Esq.
          FAIR WORK P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607 3260
          Facsimile: (617) 488 2261
          E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com
                  hillary@fairworklaw.com

               - and -

          Christopher B Kaczmarek, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON
          One International Place, Suite 2700
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 378 6016
          Facsimile: (617) 507 8046
          E-mail: ckaczmarek@littler.com


IZEA INC: Rosen Law Firm Investigates Potential Securities Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on April 3
disclosed that it is investigating potential securities claims on
behalf of shareholders of IZEA, Inc. (NASDAQ:IZEA) resulting from
allegations that IZEA may have issued materially misleading
business information to the investing public.

On April 2, 2018, IZEA announced it would reschedule its fourth
quarter and full year 2017 earnings release and conference call
after its Audit Committee determined there was an error in
accounting for revenue and cost of sales related to the self-
service Content Workflow portion of the Company's revenue.
According to IZEA, the amount it previously reported as gross
profit on Content Workflow should be reported as revenue. On this
news, shares of IZEA fell $0.66 per share or over 18% to close at
$3.00 per share on April 2, 2018.

Then, in a Form 8-K filed with the SEC, IZEA announced that its
previously issued financial statements included in its annual
reports for the years ended December 31, 2015 and 2016, and
quarterly reports for each quarter for the years ended
December 31, 2015 and 2016 and the first three quarters for the
year ended December 31, 2017 should no longer be relied upon. On
this news, shares of IZEA have fallen sharply during intraday
trading on April 3, 2018.

Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action lawsuit to recover
losses suffered by IZEA investors.  If you purchased shares of
IZEA please visit the firm's website at
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1313.htmlto join the class
action.  You may also contact Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of
Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-767-3653 or via email at
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Since 2014, Rosen Law Firm has
been ranked #2 in the nation by Institutional Shareholder
Services for the number of securities class action settlements
annually obtained for investors. [GN]


JACK IN THE BOX: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Cisneros Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARIA C. CISNEROS on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. JACK IN THE BOX, INC.; and DOES 1 to
100, Inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC702018 (Cal. Super.
Ct., April 12, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime for all
overtime worked, wages for workdays Defendants failed to provide
all legally required and legally compliant meal periods; wages
for workdays Defendants failed to provide all legally required
and legally compliant rest periods; unpaid vacation pay;
statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate and complete
wage statements; waiting time penalties in the form of
continuation wages for failure to timely pay former employees all
earned and unpaid wages; applicable civil penalties; injunctive
relief and other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees
pursuant to the California Labor Code.

The case is a wage and hour class action lawsuit on behalf of
Plaintiff and other current and former non-exempt employees of
Defendants in California. As a result of Defendants unlawful
conduct, the Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered
injury in that the wage statements inaccurately stated and/or
failed to state the aforementioned items of information and the
Plaintiff and the members of the class could not promptly and
easily determine from the wage statement alone an accurate
statement of: the gross wages earned and the net wages earned.

Jack in the Box is an American fast-food restaurant chain founded
February 21, 1951, by Robert O. Peterson in San Diego,
California, where it is headquartered.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          Jordan D. Bello, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 432 0000
          Facsimile: (310) 432 0001
          E-mail: jlavi@lelawfirm.com
                  jbello@lelawfirm.com


JC PENNY: Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Cavlovic" Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary Beck Briscoe of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the Magistrate Judge's order denying J.C.
Penney's motion to compel arbitration in the case, ANN CAVLOVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION, INC., Defendant-
Appellant, Case No. 17-3174 (10th Cir.).

On Dec. 16, 2016, Cavlovic filed a class action complaint in
Kansas state court, alleging J.C. Penney used a "False Former
Price Advertising Scheme."  Penney allegedly would mark up its
private-branded and exclusive-branded apparel and accessories by
a significant margin and then immediately offer those products at
what it represented to be steep discounts.

She sought to represent a group of more than 100 people who,
between December 2013 and December 2016, purchased from J.C.
Penney in Kansas one or more private and/or exclusive branded
items at a discount of at least 30% off of the stated 'original'
or 'regular' price, and who have not received a refund or credit
for their purchase(s).

Cavlovic alleged she was part of the class because of a purchase
she made on Sept. 23, 2014.  On that date, Cavlovic visited a
J.C. Penney store in Kansas and purchased 14-carat gold hoop
earrings for $171.66.  The tag on the earrings advertised that
the previous price was $524.98, but that J.C. Penney was now
selling the earrings for $209.99.  J.C. Penney had an additional
sale that day, so Cavlovic received an extra 25% off the already
marked-down price.  Cavlovic paid for the earrings with a credit
card that had J.C. Penney's logo on it.  In a separate contract -
- the 2014 Rewards Program agreement -- J.C. Penney promised
Cavlovic it would issue J.C. Penney Rewards Points for purchases
at J.C. Penney using the J.C. Penney-branded card.

After Cavlovic returned home from the store, she inspected the
earrings.  For the first time, she noticed the original price tag
of $225 on her earrings had been blacked out.  After researching
the matter, she believed she should have been charged $73.58,
instead of $171.66 because her discount should have been pegged
to the original price of $225, and not to the advertised inflated
price of $524.98.  And she believed the price discrepancy was the
result of J.C. Penney's False Former Price Advertising Scheme to
fraudulently inflate prices.

In her complaint, she alleges J.C. Penney's purported scheme
caused her "emotional distress," and the scheme "continues" to
the present day.  Given these factual allegations, Cavlovic -- as
the lead Plaintiff of the class -- set out three remedies: (1) a
finding that J.C. Penney violated the Kansas Consumer Protection
Act; (2) injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to the Kansas
Consumer Protection Act; and (3) a finding of unjust enrichment.

J.C. Penney removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas.  It then moved to dismiss the case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  A month later, though,
J.C. Penney moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration
based on two documents: (1) the 2008 credit card agreement
between Cavlovic and GE Money Bank for the J.C. Penney-branded
credit card; and (2) the 2014 Rewards Program agreement between
Cavlovic and J.C. Penney.  After the Magistrate judge stayed the
proceedings, Cavlovic responded to the motion to compel.

The magistrate judge then ruled on the motion to compel
arbitration.  She first concluded the 2012 credit card agreement
controls the litigation, and that it is "identical in all
respects relevant" to the 2016 credit card agreement.  On the
merits of the claims regarding the 2012 credit card agreement,
the magistrate judge concluded: (1) the 2012 credit card
agreement was narrower in scope than the 2008 credit card
agreement; (2) the allegations in Cavlovic's complaint fell
outside the scope of the 2012 credit card agreement; and (3) the
2012 credit card agreement did not provide J.C. Penney with the
ability to enforce its arbitration provision.

The Defendant appeals the denial of its motion to compel
arbitration.  The district court denied review of the Magistrate
Judge's order denying J.C. Penney's motion to compel arbitration,
agreeing that J.C. Penney was not a party to one of the two
contracts at issue, and that Cavlovic's allegations fall outside
the scope of the other contract.

Judge Briscoe finds that the agreement between Cavlovic and GE
Capital Money Bank does not evidence a clear intent to provide
J.C. Penney -- a third party -- with the right to demand
arbitration under the 2012 credit card agreement.  Rather, the
intent of the parties is clear from their agreement -- only "you"
(Cavlovic) or "we" (GE Capital Retail Bank) can demand
arbitration of the other.  Since there is no indication the
parties intended to give J.C. Penney or any other third party the
right to demand arbitration, J.C. Penney cannot invoke the
arbitration clause of the 2012 credit card agreement.  The
district court did not err in coming to the same conclusion.

She also finds that unlike the credit card agreement, there is no
dispute that J.C. Penney was a party to the 2014 Rewards Program
agreement, and has the power to enforce all of its provisions.
There is, however, a dispute regarding venue, and whether
Cavlovic's allegations are within the scope of the 2014 Rewards
Program agreement's arbitration clause.  The Judge concludes that
J.C. Penney waived any argument regarding venue, and that
Cavlovic's allegations are outside the scope of the 2014 Rewards
Program agreement.

Finally, she holds that the mere existence of the Rewards Program
agreement is not itself sufficient to conclude that Cavlovic's
allegations of deceptive advertising arise from or relate to that
contract.  She concludes the district court did not err.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Briscoe affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order and Judgment
is available at https://is.gd/3eDtEZ from Leagle.com.


KRAFT HEINZ: Faces Another All Natural Labeling Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo, writing for Madison - St. Clair Record, reports
that Belleville attorney David C. Nelson filed another lawsuit in
the St. Clair County Circuit Court alleging false all natural
labeling in Kraft Heinz marinades and sauces.

In the most recent proposed class action against Kraft Heinz
Foods Co., plaintiff Sara Morgan Francis alleges the all natural
bold steak sauce under the defendant's Lea & Perrins brand
contains synthetic ingredients.

According to the complaint, Ms. Francis alleges she purchased the
steak sauce on several occasions in 2017 for $3.99 at the
Dierbergs in Shiloh.  The sauce was labeled as all natural.
Francis claims she was damaged for paying a premium price for a
product that allegedly contains xantham gum, a synthetic
substance.

The suit also includes the All Natural Original Marinade, All
Natural Garlic & Herb Marinade and the All Natural Teriyaki
Marinade.

The plaintiff alleges the defendants violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

The plaintiff seeks an order certifying this case as a class
action, disgorgement of profits, plus interest, litigations costs
and further relief as the court deems just and proper.

She is represented by David C. Nelson of Nelson & Nelson,
Attorneys at Law in Belleville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 18-L-159 [GN]


LAND'S END: Blankenship Sues over Defective FCRA Disclosure
-----------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEY BLANKENSHIP, individually and/or behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LAND's END DIRECT
MERCHANTS, INC., d/b/a LAND's END INC., a foreign Wisconsin
corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-00865-SDM-TGW (Fla.
13th Cir. Ct in an for Hillsborough County, April 11, 2018),
seeks to recover damages for Defendants' violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.

The FCRA imposes several requirements onto employers that use a
background check, which are designed to protect consumers like
the Plaintiff and putative Class Members.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff brings this class claim
against Defendant under 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(b)2 because the
disclosure from it provided Plaintiff and Class Members was
defective in that it contained additional, extraneous information
and therefore does not consist "solely of the disclosure".

Lands' End is a classic American lifestyle brand with a passion
for quality, legendary service & real value.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL, FENTON, CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 N. Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224 0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229 8712
          E-mail: bhill@fclaw.com
                  twells@fclaw.com


LOGITECH INC: Court Dismisses "Anderson" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES ANDERSON, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. LOGITECH, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17 C 6104 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Harry D.
Leinenweber of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) dismissed with prejudice the
Alleged Nationwide Class excluding California claim; (ii)
dismissed without prejudice the Unfair Competition and Consumer
remedies claim under California law; (ii) denied the Breach of
Express Warranty claim; (iv) denied the Breach of Implied
Warranty claim; (v) dismissed without prejudice the Unjust
Enrichment claim; and (vi) dismissed without prejudice the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim.

The Plaintiff has filed the nationwide class action (excluding
California) with an Illinois subclass, alleging consumer fraud,
breach of warranty, and unjust enrichment arising from his
purchase of a digital home video surveillance system known as the
"Alert" system manufactured and sold by the Defendant.

Apparently, there is another lawsuit currently pending in the
District Court for the District of New Jersey, which was filed
prior to the case.  The Defendant attempts to invoke the first
filing rule and asks the Court to stay the proceeding until the
District Court of New Jersey has a chance to rule on a pending
Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff, as expected, strongly opposes
a stay.  Judge Leinenweber denied the stay for the reason that
will become he is dismissing the nationwide class allegations.

The Defendant has also moved to dismiss the nationwide class
action aspect of the case on the basis of Bristol-Myers Squibb v.
Superior Court.  The Plaintiff disputes the applicability of
Bristol-Myers because that case was not a class action but a
series of individual claims filed together in state court.  He
cites a number of California district court cases in which his
argument prevailed.  However, the Court is not writing on a clean
slate.  It has already applied Bristol-Myers to a nationwide
class action in DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., which followed
McDonnell v. Nature's Way Products, which also applied Bristol-
Myers to a nationwide class action.  In sum it still appears to
the Court that a nationwide class action is not significantly
different from a mass tort suit involving a multitude of
individual claims.  Judge Leinenweber struck the putative
nationwide class action claims.

The Defendant also seeks dismissal of the Illinois sub-class
based on an unpublished decision of a California State trial
court.  It has not supplied the Court with any of the
documentation as to the why and wherefore that moved that court
to deny class status.  It seems to the Judge that it is too
premature for him to decide class status based on such a flimsy
record.  He therefore denied the Motion to Dismiss the claim of
the Plaintiff and that of the Illinois sub-class.  The Defendant
also argues that California law applies to the case rather than
Illinois.  However, the fact that his case will proceed on the
allegations of an Illinois only sub-class, it appears to be, as
the Plaintiff argues, premature to make the decision as to what
law applies to the case.

Next, the Defendant takes aim at the claim under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA") for failure to meet Rule 9(b)'s
standard of specificity.  The Judge finds that while the
Plaintiff does not present a failure rate, he does allege the
high cost of repairs and the inability to repair.  The most
credible allegation of fraud however is that Logitech concealed
its decision to discontinue the specific alert system due to
product failure, and its decision not to disclose this to the
purchasers.  The one problem the Plaintiff presents is that he
does not disclose the date he purchased his system.  The Judge
says this is a significant failure when considering Rule 9(b).
If the Plaintiff purchased his system prior to the 2012 decision
to discontinue, the decision itself could not be an act of fraud.
The Judge will dismiss the ICFA claim with leave to amend.

Next, the Defendant seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's breach of
warranty claims implied and express.  Judge Leinenweber finds
that the Plaintiff has clearly alleged that the system he
purchased from the Defendant did not perform as it was supposed
to.  He therefore has alleged that the product was not
merchantable at the time of sale, he suffered damages, and he
gave Logitech notice.  This is enough as it was in the Sears case
to withstand a motion to dismiss.

The Defendant also seeks to dismiss the Express Warranty claim.
Since the warranty is not set forth in haec verba it was
difficult for the Judge to determine the extent of its coverage.
The Complaint does allege that the warranty was "illusory"
because the product was so problem ridden and defective that the
product would not work.  He says this is sufficient to withstand
a motion to dismiss at this stage of the litigation.

Finally, the Defendant moves for dismissal of the unjust
enrichment claim and the claim for declaratory judgment.  The
unjust enrichment claim, says the Defendant, is duplicative of
the underlying fraud claim.  They are both based on Logitech's
deceptive advertising.  Therefore disposition of the fraud claim
will dispose of the unjust enrichment claim.  The Judge dismissed
this count without prejudice.  The claim for declaratory judgment
is likewise duplicative.  This count is dismissed without
prejudice.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Leinenweber (i) dismissed with
prejudice the Alleged Nationwide Class excluding California
claim; (ii) dismissed without prejudice the Unfair Competition
and Consumer remedies claim under California law; (ii) denied the
Breach of Express Warranty claim; (iv) denied the Breach of
Implied Warranty claim; (v) dismissed without prejudice the
Unjust Enrichment claim; and (vi) dismissed without prejudice the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/pSJEbz from Leagle.com.

James Anderson, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence D. King --
lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Linda M. Fong
-- lfong@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew B.
George -- mgeorge@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
pro hac vice & Gary L. Specks -- gspecks@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan
Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Logitech Inc., Defendant, represented by David M. Holmes --
david.holmes@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman
& Dicker, Alexander Lee Reich -- alexander.reich@wilsonelser.com
-- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Bret David Franco
-- bret.franco@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman
& Dicker LLP, David Michael Goldhaber --
david.goldhaber@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker LLP & Patrick M. Kelly --
patrick.kelly@wilsonelser.com -- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman &
Dicker LLP, pro hac vice.


LONGFIN CORP: Scott+Scott Attorneys Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP ("Scott+Scott"), a national
securities and consumer rights litigation firm, on April 3
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit against
Longfin Corp. ("Longfin" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: LFIN) and its
Chief Executive Officer, Venkat Meenavalli (collectively,
"Defendants").

The action, which was filed on April 3 in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, asserts claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. Secs. 78j(b) and 78t(a), and SEC Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.10b-5, on behalf
of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Longfin common
stock between December 15, 2017 and April 2, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

Longfin is a finance and technology company that provides trade
and physical commodities solutions for finance businesses and
trading platforms.  Longfin recently began using blockchain
technology to enable global trade finance solutions.

The complaint alleges that Defendants violated provisions of the
Exchange Act by issuing false and misleading statements to
investors, including in filings with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").  Specifically, Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Longfin had material weaknesses in its operations and internal
controls that hindered the Company's profitability; (ii) Longfin
did not meet the requirements for inclusion in the Russell 2000
and 3000 indices; and (iii) as a result of the foregoing, the
Defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On March 26, 2018, Citron Research ("Citron") posted a tweet on
Twitter.com questioning the veracity of Longfin's operations.
The same day, Russell issued a statement announcing Longfin would
be removed from its indices after market close on March 28, 2018,
only approximately 12 days after being added.

These events caused the price of the Company's stock to decline
from $71.10 per share on March 23, 2018, to close at $14.31 per
share on April 2, 2018, a decline of 79.9%, damaging investors.

On April 2, 2018, after the market closed, Longfin filed its 2017
annual report with the SEC.  The annual report confirmed that
Longfin had material weakness in its internal control over
financial reporting, was not profitable, and was the subject of
an SEC investigation.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later 60 days from the date of this notice.  Any member of the
proposed class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain a member of the proposed class.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please
contact plaintiff's counsel, Rhiana Swartz of Scott+Scott at
(844) 818-6980, or via email at rswartz@scott-scott.com

            About Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP

Scott+Scott has significant experience in prosecuting major
securities, antitrust, and employee retirement plan actions
throughout the United States.  The firm represents pension funds,
foundations, individuals, and other entities worldwide with
offices in New York, London, Connecticut, California, and Ohio.
[GN]


MARTIN TRANSPORT: Doesn't Pay Dispatchers Overtime, Wingo Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
William Wingo, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Martin Transport, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00141-JRG (E.D. Tex., April 11, 2018), seeks to
recover overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendant as
a Dispatcher. The Plaintiff and a group of similarly situated
former and current employees of Defendant routinely worked in
excess of 40 hours per week, but were not paid for all overtime
hours worked. Pursuant to a decision, policy, or plan/practice,
the Defendant unlawfully classified the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated individuals as exempt from laws requiring
overtime pay, although they actually were and are non-exempt and
entitled to overtime pay. Defendant's actions were and are
willful and had the effect of denying the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated individuals their overtime wages.

Martin Transport operates a fleet of tank trucks providing
transportation of petroleum products, LP gas, molten sulfur,
sulfuric acid, paper mill liquids, chemicals, dry bulk, and
numerous other bulk liquid commodities.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          J. Derek Braziel, Esq.
          Travis Gasper, Esq.
          LEE & BRAZIEL, L.L.P.
          1801 N. Lamar Street, Suite 325
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 749 1400
          Facsimile: (214) 749 1010
          E-mail: jdbraziel@l-b-law.com
                  gasper@l-b-law.com

               - and -

          Gregory S. Porter, Esq.
          PORTER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          3311 Woods Blvd.
          Tyler, TX 75707
          Telephone: (903) 561 5144
          Facsimile: (903) 705 6253
          E-mail: greg@gregporterlaw.com


MARYLAND MARKETSOURCE: Esparza Sues over Background Checks
----------------------------------------------------------
JOHNNY ESPARZA, on behalf of himself and a11 others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND MARKETSOURCE, INC., a
Ma1yland corporation; ALLEGIS GROUP, INC., a Maryland
corporation, ALLEGIS GROUP HOLDINGS INC., Maryland corporation;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 18CIV01821 (Cal.
Super. Ct., April 12, 2018), seeks compensatory and punitive
damages due to Defendants' systematic and willful violations of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the California Investigative
Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, and the California Consumer
Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants routinely acquire
consumer, investigative consumer and/or consumer credit reports
to conduct background checks on Plaintiff and other prospective,
current and former employees and use information from credit and
background reports in Connection with their hiring process
without providing proper disclosures and obtaining proper
authorization in compliance with the law. The Plaintiff,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
current, former and prospective employees.

The Plaintiff also brings this class action against Defendants
for alleged violations of the Labor Code and Business and
Professions Code. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have:
failed to provide him and all other similarly situated
individuals with meal periods; failed to provide them with rest
periods; failed to pay them premium wages for missed meal and/or
rest periods; failed to pay them premium wages for missed meal
and/or rest periods at the regular rate of pay; failed to pay
them at least minimum wage for all hours worked; failed to pay
them overtime wages at the correct rate; failed to pay them
double time wages at the correct rate; failed to pay them
overtime and/or double time wages by failing to include all
applicable remuneration in "calculating the regular rate of pay;
failed to provide them with accurate written wage statements; and
failed to pay them all of their final wages following separation
employment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 WilShire Boulevard, Suite 907
          Telephone (310) 888 7771
          Facsimile (310) 888 0109
          E-mail: Shaun@setarel1law.com
                  scott@setarel1law.com


MASTERCARD INT'L: Averts Merchants' Antitrust Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
D. Matthew Allen, Esq. -- mallen@carltonfields.com -- and
Thaddeus Ewald, Esq. -- tewald@carltonfields.com -- of Carlton
Fields, in an article for JDSupra, wrote that the Eastern
District of New York recently declined to certify a putative
class action filed by merchants against the four major credit
card providers alleging antitrust violations.  The complaint
alleges that MasterCard, Visa, Discover, and American Express
("Amex") conspired by adopting the same liability policy for
fraudulent charges with chip-enabled credit cards by shifting
liability from banks to merchants and implementing the policy on
the same day to reduce competition.  Plaintiffs moved to certify
a damages class of merchants subjected to the liability shift
beginning with the policies' effective date and continuing "until
the anticompetitive conduct ceases."  The court denied the
motion, but based its decision on a technicality that can be
corrected on a new motion.

The court's analysis focused on two challenges to class
certification: one raised by Amex regarding adequacy of class
representation and another by all defendants regarding
ascertainability.

First, Amex argued that plaintiffs' attempt to hold all
defendants jointly and severally liable failed because there were
two groups of plaintiffs: (1) those merchants who accept Amex
cards asserting joint and several liability against MasterCard,
Visa, and Discover (but whose claims against Amex were severed
and transferred to another court); and (2) those merchants who do
not accept Amex cards asserting joint and several liability
against all four credit card companies.  Amex contended the first
group was overbroad by encompassing claims that could not be
heard in the Eastern District of New York because of a forum
selection clause.  The court swiftly rejected this argument
because Amex failed to cite any provision of its agreement (or
legal authority) that prevented bringing claims based on joint
and several liability against non-parties to the agreement
outside of the selected forum.  Amex also argued the second
group's representative merchant did not accept Amex and therefore
could not adequately represent merchants that do.  The court
rejected this argument as well, holding that there was no
"fundamental" conflict of interest between the two groups. The
relevant claims depended on the "same finding of liability"
against all defendants.

Second, all defendants contested certification on
ascertainability grounds because the class definition identified
the class period as continuing "until the anticompetitive conduct
ceases."  The court compared plaintiffs' liability theory -- but-
for the conspiracy, each defendant would have set its own
effective date for the liability shift -- with the potential
dates on which plaintiffs proposed to cap the class period. While
"[a]ny" of the dates "could be acceptable to make the class
ascertainable," at this point in the litigation the plaintiffs
"lack[ed] the necessary information" to satisfy the
ascertainability requirement.  Therefore, the court denied
plaintiffs' motion for class certification but noted its
authority to revisit or entertain a renewed motion.

B & R Supermarket, Inc. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., Case No. 17-
2738 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2018). [GN]


MDL 1264: Securities Suit Deal Audit Must be Complete by June 27
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE BANK OF AMERICA CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION,
Case No. 4:99 MD 1264 CDP (E.D. Mo.), Judge Catherine D. Perry of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
Eastern Division, denied Oetting's Motion for Turnover Order of
NationsBank Settlement Funds, and ordered that the audit in the
case be complete by June 27, 2018.

The litigation began as a class action under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").  The
Plaintiffs alleged losses from misrepresentations in the
prospectus and proxy materials provided to shareholders during
the 1998 merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica.  The cases were
transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to
the Eastern District of Missouri.

Four plaintiff classes were certified: two classes of NationsBank
shareholders and two classes of BankAmerica shareholders.  The
cases were resolved with a global settlement agreement for $490
million which was approved by the district court in 2002 and
affirmed by the court of appeals in 2003.  Two settlement funds
were established -- one for each of the two sets of classes --
with the NationsBank Classes receiving approximately $333.2
million ("Settlement Fund").  As part of the settlement, Bank of
America disclaimed any interest in the Settlement Fund such that
any remaining money after distribution to class members would not
revert back to it.

In 2008, the government discovered that an employee of the claims
administrator in the case, Heffler, Radetich, & Saitta, LLP, had
stolen more than $5 million dollars from the Settlement Fund.
The resulting fraud proceedings delayed distribution of further
funds in this matter; however, two rounds of distributions to the
class members were finally completed. After those distributions,
this court ordered a cy pres distribution of the remaining
Settlement Fund in 2013.  The cy pres distribution was vacated on
appeal by the Eighth Circuit in 2015, and the cy pres recipient
returned the money by depositing it into the Court Registry.

When the Eighth Circuit overturned the cy pres distribution, it
also vacated an award by the district court of more than $98,000
in attorneys' fees to class counsel, Green Jacobson.  Between the
district court's award of fees and the appellate court reversal,
Green Jacobson filed bankruptcy.  The appointed bankruptcy
trustee, David Sosne, currently controls Green Jacobson's trust
account, where the attorneys' award monies were deposited
following the Eighth Circuit's ruling. Green Jacobson has since
been replaced as class counsel by Frank H. Tomlinson.

Following the cy pres reversal in 2015, the Court approved the
hiring of Anders Minkler Huber & Helm LLP to conduct an audit of
the NationsBank class settlement fund.  It was determined that an
audit was necessary due to the lack of current status reports and
the evidence of missing funds.  This audit is currently ongoing.

When the Court initially ordered the audit in 2015, it also
ordered that on the first business day of each month following
retention of the auditors, the counsel for the NationsBank
classes will submit to the Court a report describing the work
performed and the costs incurred in connection with the audit.
It appears from the record that these monthly status reports were
filed for a couple of months following the order; however, they
were discontinued in June of 2016.

The Court again ordered a report on the audit in July 2017,
specifically requesting a proposal detailing the remaining audit
work to be performed and the number of hours reasonably expected
to be expended. The August 2017 response to the Court order
estimated that the total fee for the remaining scope of work will
not exceed $125,000, or 416 hours.  The case was transferred to
Judge Perry in August of 2017.

Class representative Oetting now requests an order from the Court
directing the partners-members-shareholders of previous class
counsel (Green Jacobson, P.C., Debtor in Bankruptcy Case No. 15-
41404, E.D. Mo.), Martin M. Green, Joe D. Jacobson, and Jonathan
F. Andres, to turnover funds belonging to the NationsBank
Settlement Classes, presently being held in their names.  Oetting
provided an account statement from a US Bank Account Number
ending 1500, entitled "NationsBank Notice & Administration Fund
Settlement Distribution Account, Advisory Agency Martin M. Green,
Joe D. Jacobson and Jonathan F. Andres Co-Actors," showing a
balance of $34,067.30 as of Aug. 31, 2017.  No responses or
objections to the motion have been filed.

Judge Perry explains that the purpose of the ongoing audit is to
locate and account for all the remaining NationsBank settlement
funds.  As previous reports to the Court have indicated, the US
Bank Account 1500 is known by the auditors.  Rather than granting
the motion for turnover of funds during the pendency of the audit
and creating the possibility of piecemeal collection of all
NationsBank settlement funds, she would rather have the audit
concluded and then issue any orders necessary to consolidate
funds.  Based on the auditors' Aug. 29, 2017, report to the Court
estimating the need for approximately 416 more hours of audit
work, she will order that the audit in the case be complete by
June 27, 2018.

The Judge also finds that Oetting's motion also raises an issue
that needs resolution in order for the case to proceed.  On July
31, 2017, the Court ordered that Heffler reissue three
distribution checks to Oetting.  According to Oetting, there is
presently no mechanism for Heffler to issue the checks to Mr.
Oetting, presumably because the Clerk of Court holds the majority
of the settlement funds in the Court Registry.  Heffler has not
filed anything with the Court indicating an inability to proceed
as ordered by the Court; however, the Court is concerned about
this potential discrepancy.  Therefore, Heffler will file a
report updating the Court on its compliance with the July 31,
2017, Order.  If Heffler has not been able to reissue the
distribution checks because of lack of access to settlement funds
or for any other reason, Heffler will calculate the total amount
needed to reissue these checks and file a motion with the Court
requesting that amount from the settlement funds held in the
Court Registry.

Accordingly, Judge Perry denied the Motion for Turnover Order of
NationsBank Settlement Funds at this time, but a motion seeking
similar relief may be filed, if appropriate, after the completion
of the audit.  She directed that the audit in the case will be
completed by June 27, 2018, and a final report from the auditors
will be filed by June 27, 2018.  Any motions based on the final
audit report will be filed by July 13, 2018.  She further
directed that Heffler will file a report with the court by April
13, 2018, updating the Court on its progress in complying with
the July 31, 2017.  Any motions for funds from the Court Registry
required to comply with that Order will be filed by April 13,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/554Eit from Leagle.com.

BankAmerica Corporation, In Re, represented by Brian E. McGovern
-- bmcgovern@mlklaw.com -- MCCARTHY AND LEONARD, James H.
Ferrick, III -- jhf@greensfelder.com -- GREENSFELDER AND HEMKER,
PC, Marie Seth Weiner, COTCHETT AND PITRE, Richard M. Donaldson,
GRANT AND EISENHOFER, P.A. & Stuart M. Grant -- sgrant@gelaw.com
-- GRANT AND EISENHOFER, P.A.

Joseph Hempen, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron L. Brody --
abrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Andrew J. Entwistle --
aentwistle@entwistle-law.com -- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI, Donald H.
Clooney, CLOONEY AND ANDERSON, Harold F. McGuire, Jr., ENTWISTLE
AND CAPPUCCI, Joe D. Jacobson -- Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com --
JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Jonathan F. Andres, JONATHAN F. ANDRES,
P.C., Jules Brody -- jbrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Martin
D. Chitwood, CHITWOOD AND HARLEY, Martin M. Green, LAW OFFICES OF
MARTIN GREEN P.C., Robert Abrams -- abrams@whafh.com -- WOLF AND
HALDENSTEIN & Vincent R. Cappucci -- vcappucci@entwistle-law.com
-- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI.

John M. Koehler, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron L. Brody, STULL
AND STULL, Andrew J. Entwistle, ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI, Daniel W.
Krasner, WOLF AND HALDENSTEIN LLC, Donald H. Clooney, CLOONEY AND
ANDERSON, Joe D. Jacobson, JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Jonathan F.
Andres, JONATHAN F. ANDRES, P.C., Jules Brody, STULL AND STULL,
Martin D. Chitwood, CHITWOOD AND HARLEY, Martin M. Green, LAW
OFFICES OF MARTIN GREEN P.C., Mitchell A. Margo, CURTIS AND
HEINZ, P.C., Nicole Tuman, MURTHA CULLINA, LLP, Robert Abrams,
WOLF AND HALDENSTEIN, Vincent R. Cappucci, ENTWISTLE AND
CAPPUCCI, James R. Mendillo, FREEARK AND HARVEY & W. Jeffrey
Muskopf, SMITHAMUNDSEN LLC.

David P. Oetting, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron L. Brody --
abrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Andrew J. Entwistle --
aentwistle@entwistle-law.com -- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI, Donald H.
Clooney, CLOONEY AND ANDERSON, Harold F. McGuire, Jr., ENTWISTLE
AND CAPPUCCI, Joe D. Jacobson -- Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com --
JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Jonathan F. Andres, JONATHAN F. ANDRES,
P.C., Jules Brody -- jbrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Martin
D. Chitwood, CHITWOOD AND HARLEY, Martin M. Green, LAW OFFICES OF
MARTIN GREEN P.C., Robert Abrams -- abrams@whafh.com -- WOLF AND
HALDENSTEIN & Vincent R. Cappucci -- vcappucci@entwistle-law.com
-- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI.

David P. Oetting, Plaintiff, pro se.

Selma Kaiser, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur N. Abbey --
aabbey@abbeyspanier.com -- ABBEY AND GARDY, Clinton A. Krislov --
clint@krislovlaw.com -- KRISLOV AND ASSOCIATES, LTD., Daniel W.
Krasner, WOLF AND HALDENSTEIN LLC, James S. Notis --
jnotis@gardylaw.com --  ABBEY AND GARDY, Michael R. Karnuth,
KRISLOV AND ASSOCIATES, LTD. & Stephen T. Rodd --
srodd@abbeyspanier.com -- ABBEY AND GARDY.

Brian Markee & Walter E. Ryan, Jr., Plaintiffs, represented by
Arthur N. Abbey, ABBEY AND GARDY, Clinton A. Krislov, KRISLOV AND
ASSOCIATES, LTD., James S. Notis, ABBEY AND GARDY, Michael R.
Karnuth, KRISLOV AND ASSOCIATES, LTD. & Stephen T. Rodd, ABBEY
AND GARDY.

Kevin Kloster, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron L. Brody --
abrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Andrew J. Entwistle --
aentwistle@entwistle-law.com -- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI, Donald H.
Clooney, CLOONEY AND ANDERSON, Harold F. McGuire, Jr., ENTWISTLE
AND CAPPUCCI, Joe D. Jacobson -- Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com --
JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Jonathan F. Andres, JONATHAN F. ANDRES,
P.C., Jules Brody -- jbrody@ssbny.com -- STULL AND STULL, Martin
D. Chitwood, CHITWOOD AND HARLEY, Martin M. Green, LAW OFFICES OF
MARTIN GREEN P.C., Robert Abrams -- abrams@whafh.com -- WOLF AND
HALDENSTEIN & Vincent R. Cappucci -- vcappucci@entwistle-law.com
-- ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI.

Heffler Radetich & Saitta, LLP, Plaintiff, represented by Howard
D. Scher -- howard.scher@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL, P.C.,
Scott J. Dickenson -- sdickenson@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER FANE
LLP & Thomas P. Manning -- thomas.manning@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN
INGERSOLL, P.C.

NationsBank Classes, Consolidated Filer Plaintiff, represented by
David P. Oetting, DAVID P. OETTING, Frank H. Tomlinson, FRANK H.
TOMLINSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, pro hac vice, Joe D. Jacobson,
JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Martin M. Green, LAW OFFICES OF MARTIN
GREEN P.C. & Jonathan F. Andres, JONATHAN F. ANDRES, P.C.

BankAmerica Classes, Consolidated Filer Plaintiff, represented by
Joe D. Jacobson, JACOBSON PRESS, P.C., Stephen T. Rodd, ABBEY AND
GARDY & Andrew J. Entwistle, ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI.

Hugh L. McColl, Jr., James H. Hance, Jr., Marc D. Oken & Bank of
America, Defendants, represented by Jeffrey S. Russell --
jsrussell@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, John Michael Clear --
jmclear@bryancave.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, Jonathan M. Moses --
JMMoses@wlrk.com -- WACHTELL AND LIPTON, Robert B. Mazur --
RBMazur@wlrk.com -- WACHTELL AND LIPTON & Warren R. Stern --
WRStern@wlrk.com -- WACHTELL AND LIPTON.

David A. Coulter, Michael E. O'Neill & John J. Higgins,
Defendants, represented by Barry A. Short -- bshort@lewisrice.com
-- LEWIS RICE, LLC, David H. Fry -- David.Fry@mto.com-- MUNGER
AND TOLLES, LLP, Jeffrey S. Russell, BRYAN CAVE LLP, John Michael
Clear, BRYAN CAVE LLP, Jonathan M. Moses, WACHTELL AND LIPTON,
Mark H. Epstein, MUNGER AND TOLLES, Robert B. Mazur, WACHTELL AND
LIPTON, Ronald L. Olson, -- Ron.Olson@mto.com -- MUNGER AND
TOLLES & Warren R. Stern, WACHTELL AND LIPTON.

Ernesto Gumapas, Sydney Sorkin & Herman Shyken, Intervenors,
represented by Christopher P. Seefer -- chriss@rgrdlaw.com --
MILBERG AND WEISS.

Carol Mackay, Executrix of the estate of, Intervenor, represented
by Jeffrey S. Kessinger.

Joe D. Jacobson, Intervenor, pro se.

David A. Sosne, Intervenor, represented by Daniel J. Welsh --
dwelsh@summerscomptonwells.com -- SUMMERS AND COMPTON, LLC, Jill
R. Rembusch -- jrembusch@summerscomptonwells.com -- SUMMERS AND
COMPTON, LLC & Stephen C. Hiotis --
shiotis@summerscomptonwells.com -- SUMMERS AND COMPTON, LLC.

JAS Securities, LLC, Movant, represented by Andrew J. Entwistle,
ENTWISTLE AND CAPPUCCI & Vincent R. Cappucci, ENTWISTLE AND
CAPPUCCI.

Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, Movant, represented
by Christopher P. Seefer, MILBERG AND WEISS.

Wachovia Bank, N. A., Movant, represented by Mark H. Levison --
mlevison@lashlybaer.com -- LASHLY AND BAER, P.C.

Donald H. Clooney, Movant, represented by Timothy R. Anderson,
CLOONEY AND ANDERSON.

Chitwood and Harley, LLC, Movant, represented by Martin D.
Chitwood, CHITWOOD AND HARLEY.


MDL 2586: Court Grants SuperValu's Bid to Dismiss Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation This Document Relates to All Actions, Court
File No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL (D. Minn.), Judge Ann D. Montgomery
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted
SuperValu and Albertson's Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Amended Class Action, and denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to Amend Their Amended Complaint.

In this multi-district litigation case, 16 named Plaintiffs
alleged they were harmed after computer hackers breached the
payment-processing network owned by SuperValu.  Both SuperValu
and Albertson's used the network to process payment card
transactions at more than 1,000 of their retail grocery stores.

The hackers gained access to and installed malicious software on
the payment-processing network in June 2014 and again in late
July or early September 2014.  The malicious software released
and disclosed the Personal Identifying Information ("PII") of the
Plaintiffs and Class Members who used their payment cards at the
affected stores.  The PII included cardholder names, account
numbers, expiration dates, card verification value codes, and
personal identification numbers.  The Plaintiffs alleged the
malware allowed hackers to harvest customers' PII from cash
registers and other payment processing terminals at the time
customers swiped their cards.  Hackers were also able to access
customers' PII that had been improperly stored on the Defendants'
network after customers made purchases at the Defendants' stores.

Of the 16 named Plaintiffs whose data was allegedly stolen in the
breach, only one Plaintiff, David Holmes ("Holmes"), alleged that
his PII was misused.  The other 15 named Plaintiffs did not
allege that their PII was misused.  Rather, they alleged that the
theft of their PII subjects them to an imminent risk that they
will suffer identity theft in the future.

Following the breach, four putative class actions were filed in
federal courts in Illinois, Minnesota, and Idaho.  In December
2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized
the four complaints to the Court for coordinated pre-trial
proceedings.  On June 26, 2015, pursuant to the Court's first
Pretrial Order, the Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint with
16 named Plaintiffs bringing claims on behalf of a putative class
of persons affected by the data breach.

On Aug. 10, 2015, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  On
Jan. 7, 2016, the Court granted the motion pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), finding that none of the Plaintiffs had alleged facts
sufficient to establish Article III standing.  Finding that the
Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III, the Court concluded
that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to address the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) argument that the Amended Complaint
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.  The
Amended Complaint was dismissed without prejudice and final
judgment was entered.

On Feb. 4, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a post-judgment motion
under Rule 59(e), seeking to vacate the judgment and dismissal of
the Amended Complaint.  Alternatively, they requested leave to
amend the Amended Complaint but did not submit a proposed Second
Amended Complaint.  The Court denied the Rule 59(e) motion.

The Plaintiffs then appealed the Court's Dismissal Order to the
Eighth Circuit, but did not appeal the denial of the Rule 59(e)
motion.  On Aug. 30, 2017, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of Plaintiff Holmes for lack of
Article III standing, affirmd the dismissal as to the remaining
Plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings.
  The Court of Appeals expressly declined to consider the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) arguments on appeal and remanded them
to the Court.

Following the Eighth Circuit's remand for consideration of the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, SuperValu filed a renewed
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim.  SuperValu argues that the Amended Complaint must be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the only remaining
Plaintiff, Holmes, fails to state a claim for relief under any of
the Amended Complaint's six causes of action.  Albertson's also
filed a renewed motion to dismiss, arguing that Holmes' claims
against Albertson's should be dismissed under 12(b)(1) for
failure to allege Article III standing.

Approximately one week after the Defendants filed their renewed
motions to dismiss, the Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend the
Amended Complaint.  They contend that the Proposed Second Amended
Complaint adds allegations related to the increased risk of harm
for their previously dismissed for lack of standing, in addition
to including additional allegations related to liability for
Defendants.

Judge Montgomery holds that it is futile for the Plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to allege Article III standing based on
facts that the Court has already ruled are not sufficient to
confer standing.  The new allegations drawn from the three
research reports are similarly futile because the reports do not
plausibly demonstrate a substantial risk that the Plaintiffs will
suffer from future identity theft or credit card fraud.  Because
the Plaintiffs' proposed new allegations do not cure the Article
III standing deficiencies identified by the Eighth Circuit, the
Proposed Second Amended Complaint is futile.

The Proposed Second Amended Complaint is futile for the
additional reason that it cannot withstand Defendants' renewed
motions under Rule 12(b)(6).  The Judge says that the Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and the new allegations in the Proposed Second Amended
Complaint do not alter this result.  Therefore, the Proposed
Second Amended Complaint is futile and the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend the Amended Complaint will be denied on this
basis.

As to SuperValu's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Judge finds that
whether Holmes suffered monetary loss as a result of the
fraudulent charge is entirely within his knowledge and requires
no discovery from the Defendants, yet Holmes has failed to allege
this fact in the Amended Complaint and does not attempt to
include it in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint.  In the
absence of this allegation, he fails to plead a cognizable
injury.  Because the Amended Complaint does not include
sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim for
relief on any of the counts asserted, SuperValu's motion to
dismiss the action with prejudice will be granted.

With respect to Albertson's Motion to Dismiss, the Judge finds
that Holmes does not allege he had any interaction with an
Albertson's store. Thus, he does not allege any injury that can
be causally connected to Albertson's.  Holmes does not allege he
had any interaction with an Albertson's store.  Thus, he does not
allege any injury that can be causally connected to Albertson's.
Even if Holmes had standing to bring a claim against Albertson's,
he has failed to state a plausible claim against Albertson's
because his allegations and claims do not relate to Albertson's.
Holmes' claims also fail for the reasons set forth in Section
II.B.1..  Thus, dismissal is also warranted under Rule 12(b)(6).

Based upon the foregoing, Judge Montgomery granted the
Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint; denied the Class Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to Amend Their Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); and dismissed with prejudice the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/ymsC4D from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs' Interim Co-Lead Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by
Ben Barnow -- b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow & Associates PC,
pro hac vice & Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr. -- ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com
-- Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs' Interim Executive Committee, Plaintiff, represented
by Aron D. Robinson, Law Office of Aron D. Robinson, John J.
Driscoll, The Driscoll Firm, John S. Steward -- Glaw123@aol.com -
- Steward Law Firm, LLC, Karen Hanson Riebel --
khriebel@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP & Richard L.
Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm.

Plaintiffs' Interim Liaison Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by
David M. Langevin -- dave@WeStrikeBack.com -- McSweeney /
Langevin & Rhett A. McSweeney -- ram@westrikeback.com --
McSweeney / Langevin LLC.

Supervalu, Inc., Defendant, represented by David T. Cohen --
David.Cohen@ropesgray.com -- Ropes and Gray LLP, Douglas Harlan
Meal, Ropes & Gray LLP, Katherine S. Barrett Wiik --
KBarrettWiik@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Kathryn E.
Wilhelm -- Kathryn.Wilhelm@ropesgray.com -- Ropes and Gray LLP,
Stephen P. Safranski -- SSafranski@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins
Kaplan LLP & Sunil Shenoi -- Sunil.Shenoi@ropesgray.com -- Ropes
& Gray LLP.

AB Acquisition, LLC & New Albertsons Inc, Defendants, represented
by Christopher L. Ingram -- clingram@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater,
Seymour and Pease LLP, John L. Landolfi -- jllandolfi@vorys.com -
- Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP & Marc A. Al, Stoel Rives
LLP.


MICRO FOCUS: Cardella Sues over Hewlett Packard Deal
----------------------------------------------------
AUGUST CARDELLA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL
PLC, CHRISTOPHER HSU, STEPHEN MURDOCH, MIKE PHILLIPS, KEVIN
LOOSEMORE, NIL'S BRAUCKMANN, KAREN SLATFORD, RICHARD ATKINS,
AMANDA BROWN, SILKE SCHEIBER, DARREN ROOS, and JOHN SCHULTZ, the
Defendants, Case No. 18CIV01827 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 12,
2018), seeks to recover damages that the Plaintiff and the Class
have suffered as a result of Defendants' violations of the
Securities Act of 1933.

The Plaintiff brings this action under the Securities Act,
against Micro Focus and certain of the Company's directors,
senior executives, and authorized representatives, on behalf of
Plaintiff and all other persons or entities, except for
Defendants, who purchased or otherwise acquired American
Depositary Shares of Micro Focus, pursuant and/or traceable to
the Company's Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in
connection with the merger of Micro Focus with Hewlett Packard
Enterprise Company and their subsidiaries, pursuant to which
Micro Focus combined with the software business segment of HPE.

Micro Focus is a multinational software and information
technology business based in Newbury, Berkshire, England. The
firm provides software and consultancy.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John T. Jasnoch, Esq.
          Joseph Pettigrew, Esq.
          Thomas L. Laughlin, Esq.
          Rhiana Swartz, Esq.
          SCOTT + SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233 4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233 0508
          E-mail: jjasnoch@scott--scott.com
                  jpettigrew@scott--scott.com
                  tlaughlin@scott--scott.com
                  rswartz@scott--scott.com


MINNESOTA: State Supreme Ct. Partly Affirms Ruling in "Hall"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Timothy Hall, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. State of
Minnesota et al., Respondents, Case No. A16-0874 (Minn.), Judge
Lorie Skjerven Gildea of the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed
in part and reversed in part the court of appeals' decision
denying the Appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint, and
certifying the Takings and Due Process Clause questions, and
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with her opinion.

The case involves the constitutionality of the Minnesota
Unclaimed Property Act, which provides that unclaimed property is
presumed abandoned and remitted to and held by the State in its
general fund until the owners seek to reclaim the property.  The
Appellants are four property owners whose property was presumed
abandoned under the Act and transferred to the State.

The Appellants allege that their unclaimed property was
transferred to the Commissioner of Commerce and held by the State
under the Act, and they contend that the State's failure to pay
interest accrued on the property while it was in the State's
custody violates the Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Minnesota Constitution.  They
also assert that the State fails to provide adequate notice to
property owners that it takes custody of their presumably
abandoned property, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the Minnesota Constitution.

The Respondents moved to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(a),
(e), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The district court
denied the motion to dismiss the due process and unconstitutional
taking claims.  It determined that the Appellants sufficiently
alleged a due process claim because they asserted that the notice
provided under the Act is not reasonably certain to inform those
affected that their property is being remitted to the State.  The
court determined that they also sufficiently alleged a takings
claim because the Respondents took the Appellants' property and
put it in a fund for public use, for which the Appellants are
entitled to just compensation.

The Respondents then made a motion, which the district court
granted in part, to certify the constitutional questions to the
court of appeals as important and doubtful.  The court of appeals
answered the certified questions.  Regarding the takings
question, the court determined that no taking occurs when the Act
specifies the disposition of unclaimed property.  With respect to
the due process issue, the court determined that no process was
due under the Act because it does not deprive unclaimed property
owners of a protected property interest.  In the alternative, the
court determined that, even if the Act does deprive property
owners of a protected interest, the notice required under the
statute is sufficient.

The Appellants challenge the constitutionality of the Act.  They
contend that the Act violates the Takings Clauses and the Due
Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
They specifically contend that the Act effects a taking because
the State does not compensate the property owner for the loss of
use of the property during the time that the State holds the
property and for the actual or constructive interest that the
property may have earned.  Regarding their due process claim,
they argue that the Act does not provide notice sufficient to
satisfy their procedural due process rights.

Judge Gildea concludes that Hall, Undlin, and Herron were not
deprived of a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment
when the State refused to pay them interest on their presumably
abandoned, previously non-interest-bearing property.  For them,
whose property was not interest bearing when it was transferred
to the State, and who (so far as the complaint alleges) were not
even aware of the existence of that property, much less able to
use it for their own purposes, the Judge is unable to conclude
that the failure of the State to pay interest on the property is
a loss for which these Appellants must be compensated.  Thus,
even if they had a property interest, they would not have
suffered a taking.

Appellant Wingfield, however, has a different type of property
than the other Appellants.  The Judge finds that Wingfield's
property was in an interest-bearing bank account before it was
transferred to the State.  The transfer of the principal in
Wingfield's bank account to the State cut off the accrual of
interest.  The right to earn interest was part of Wingfield's
unclaimed property, and she therefore has the right to receive
that interest from the State if she is to be made whole.  In
other words, Wingfield, unlike Hall, Undlin, and Herron, has
suffered an actual loss of interest that she reasonably expected
her principal to earn.  And she suffered that loss because of the
transfer of her property into the custody of the State, as the
Act required.

The Judge also concludes that although the Appellants contend
that their property right has been adversely affected and they
are therefore entitled to due process, the Supreme Court has
clarified that no deprivation occurs in this context.  In
Anderson, the Supreme Court held that the law did not violate
procedural due process by simply placing funds in the state's
custody, because the statute deprives the owners of none of their
rights as creditors, preserving their right to demand from the
state payment of the funds, and their right to resort to the
courts if payment is refused.

But as she discussed, Wingfield has demonstrated that she has
suffered a deprivation of a protected property interest --
namely, the monetary interest her interest-bearing account would
otherwise have earned had the bank continued to hold her
unclaimed property.  She therefore is entitled to due process
protection.  The notice provided under the Act provides not only
what is constitutionally required by due process, but it also
provided actual notice because Wingfield did in fact learn that
her property was held by the State.  The Judge therefore holds
that the notice provided under the Act meets the requirements of
procedural due process.

Because she concludes that owners of interest-bearing bank
accounts -- but not the owners of the other property at issue in
the case -- have a constitutionally protected property right that
is taken when the State does not compensate the owners for the
lost interest, and that the notice provided under the Act to
owners of such property valued over $100 is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of due process, Judge Gildea affirmed the court
of appeals' decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with her
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/bpG9C4 from Leagle.com.

Daniel E. Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Daniel C.
Hedlund -- dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Joseph C. Bourne --
jbourne@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and Vildan A. Teske -- teske@tkkrlaw.com -- Marisa C.
Katz -- katz@tkkrlaw.com -- Teske, Micko, Katz, Kizter, & Rochel,
PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and J. Gordon Rudd, Jr. --
gordon.rudd@zimmreed.com -- David Cialkowski --
david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Patrick W. Michenfelder, Throndset
Michenfelder, LLC, Saint Michael, Minnesota; and Garret D.
Blanchfield -- g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com -- Brant D. Penney --
b.penney@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt, Wendorf & Blanchfield,
Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellants.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Sarah L. Krans, Angela Behrens,
Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
respondents.

Todd Murray -- tmurray@tamurraylaw.com -- Friedman Iverson,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Daniel M. Eaton -- dan@clawoffice.com
--Christensen Law Office PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus
curiae National Association of Consumer Advocates.

Julie Nepveu -- jnepveu@aarp.org. -- AARP Foundation Litigation,
Washington, D.C.; and Janet C. Evans -- jan.evans@gpmlaw.com --
Neil S. Goldsmith -- neil.goldsmith@gpmlaw.com -- Gray, Plant,
Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for amici curiae AARP and AARP Foundation.

Jarod Bona -- jarod.bona@bonalawpc.com -- Aaron R. Gott --
aaron.gott@bonalawpc.com -- Bona Law PC, La Jolla, California;
and Luke A. Wake, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Sacramento,
California, for amicus curiae National Federation of Independent
Business, Small Business Legal Center.


NEW MEXICO: Court Dismisses All Federal Claims in "Martin" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES S. MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. NEW MEXICO
CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT (N.M.C.D.), CENTURION INCORPORATED, and
OTERO COUNTY PRISON FACILITY (O.C.P.F.) MEDICAL SCHEDULING
COORDINATOR-NURSE HERNANDEZ, Defendants, Case No. CV 17-00771
MCA/SMV (D. N.M.), Judge M. Christina Armijo of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico (i) granted in part and
denied in part Centurion's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim on Which Relief Can Be Granted; (i) denied Martin's
Motion to Certify Cause as a Class Action; and (iii) denied as
moot the Plaintiffs' Motion to Sever and Remand, and the
Defendants' Motion to Amend and Correct Plaintiff's Address.

At the time he filed his Complaint, Martin was an inmate
incarcerated at the Otero County Prison Facility ("OCPF") in
Chaparral, New Mexico.  He filed his Complaint (Tort) in the
State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial District
Court on May 24, 2017.  In his Complaint, Martin states that it
is a tort suit authorized by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, and
asserts jurisdiction under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.

Martin's Complaint alleges violation of his rights under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
Two Section Thirteen and Article Eight of the New Mexico
Constitution.  He also sets out a claim that he is being denied
hygiene items that the New Mexico Corrections Department ("NMCD")
is contractually obligated to provide.  Martin names, as the
Defendants, NMCD, Centurion, and OCPF Medical Scheduling
Coordinator, Nurse Hernandez.

Defendant Centurion removed the case to the Court on July 26,
2017, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on Martin's
allegations of violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.  Centurion then filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on Aug. 2, 2017.  It seeks dismissal on the
grounds that the Complaint fails to state an Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment claim against it.  Although Plaintiff Martin received
an extension of time to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss,
Martin did not file any response to the Motion.

Instead, Plaintiff Martin filed two motions.  First, he filed a
Motion to Certify Cause as a Class Action Case.  The Defendant
Centurion responded in opposition to the Motion to Certify on
Aug. 22, 2017.  Defendant Hernandez joined in Centurion's
Response on Aug. 25, 2017.  Second, Martin filed a Motion to
Sever and Remand.  In his Motion to Sever and Remand, Martin
argues that he is asserting claims under the New Mexico
Constitution and laws, and that his New Mexico state law claims
should be severed and remanded back to the First Judicial
District Court.  Defendant Centurion opposes the Motion to Sever
and Remand, and Defendant Hernandez joins in that opposition.

Defendant New Mexico Corrections Department has also filed a
Motion seeking to correct the Plaintiff's address of record to
reflect that Martin is currently incarcerated at the Roswell
Correctional Center in Hagerman, New Mexico.  On Dec. 29, 2017,
Plaintiff Martin filed a Notice of Change of Address, changing
his address of record to the Roswell Correctional Center in
Hagerman, mooting the Defendant's Motion.

Judge Armijo finds that Plaintiff Martin has filed a pro se
Motion to Certify Cause as a Class Action Case.  A plaintiff may
not, acting pro se, maintain claims on behalf of a class.  She
will deny Martin's Motion to Certify Cause as a Class Action
Case.

The Judge also finds that the Complaint fails to state any
federal claim for relief against the New Mexico Corrections
Department, Nurse Hernandez, or Centurion.  The Complaint also
does not allege a factually plausible Section 1983 claim against
Defendant Hernandez.  The Complaint does not allege any
individualized conduct by Defendant Martinez in violation of
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.  Lastly, the allegations of
the Complaint fail to show the requisite affirmative link between
Centurion and the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. Although
Martin asserts that Centurion has a custom of delaying community
medical care, he does not allege any facts to support this
assertion.  Nor does he specify any policy of Centurion that he
claims caused an Eighth Amendment violation.

She concludes that the Complaint does not state a plausible
Section 1983 claim for relief against the New Mexico Corrections
Department, Nurse Hernandez, or Centurion.  The Judge will
therefore grant Defendant Centurion's Motion to Dismiss, to the
extent it seeks dismissal of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims in the case, and will dismiss all federal claims.

Finally, Judge Armijo is dismissing all federal claims in the
case.  She declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff Martin's remaining state law claims, and will remand
the proceeding to state court for adjudication of those state law
claims.

For these reasons, Judge Armijo (i) granted in part and denied in
part Centurion's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
on Which Relief Can Be Granted; (i) denied Martin's Motion to
Certify Cause as a Class Action; and (iii) denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Sever and Remand, and the Defendants'
Motion to Amend and Correct Plaintiff's Address.

She dismissed all federal claims in Martin's Complaint for
failure to state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
any state law claims.  She remanded the case to the State of New
Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial District Court for
adjudication of Plaintiff Martin's state law claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/sVg4Ch from Leagle.com.

James S. Martin, Plaintiff, pro se.

New Mexico Corrections Department, (N.M.C.D.), Defendant,
represented by Paula E. Ganz, New Mexico Corrections Office.

Centurion Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Lawrence M.
Marcus, Park & Associates, LLC, Alfred A. Park, Park &
Associates, LLC & Geoffrey D. White, Park & Associates, LLC.

FNU Hernandez, Nurse, Medical Scheduling Coordinator, Otero
County Prison Facility, Defendant, represented by Kurt Wihl --
kw@keleher-law.com -- Keleher & McLeod PA & Zachary R. Cormier --
rc@keleher-law.com -- Keleher and McLeod P.A.


NEW MILLENNIUM: Fails to Pay for OT, Camarillo & Sandoval Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARLENE E. CAMARILLO and SAUL AMARO SANDOVAL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated and the California
general public, the Plaintiffs, v. NEW MILLENNIUM PRIVATE
LIMITED, a California corporation; SUMER SURI; ARCHANA SURI; DOES
1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC702002 (Cal.
Super. Ct., April 12, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid warned wages
and overtime pay under the California Labor Code and Industrial
Welfare Commission Order.

The Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as employees paid by
the hour to work at Subway sandwich franchise. Marlene E.
Camarillo was employed as a sandwich artist. Saul Amaro Sandoval
was employed as a manager. At all times relevant, the Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class the overtime rate required
by Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 5-2001 and
Labor Code section 510 by, among other things, only paying the
Plaintiffs and the Class their regular hourly rate (straight
time) for the overtime hours Plaintiffs and the Class worked-
Defendants only paid overtime pay for hours worked in excess of
80 hours during a 2-week pay period; the Defendants failed to
have a meal and rest period policy and/or had an illegal meal and
rest period policy, failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class
with meal and rest periods required by law, and failed to pay
Plaintiffs and the Class the additional hour of wages (premium
wages) they are owed under Labor Code section 226.7 for each meal
and rest period that was not provided; Defendants failed to pay
the Plaintiffs and the CLASS all overtime and premium wages after
their separation from their employment with Defendants; and
Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class with
accurate wage statements.

New Millennium engages in the mining and exploration of diamond
properties in Angola, in southern Africa.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen Glick, Esq.
          M. Anthony Jenkins, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN GLICK
          1055 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1480
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 387 3400
          Facsimile: (213) 387 7872


NEW YORK, NY: Housing Authority Sued over Heat and Water Services
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A'SEELAH DIAMOND and RUTH BRITT, on behalf of themselves and a
class of those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK
CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY and OYESHOLA OLATOYE, in her official
capacity as Chairperson of the New York City Housing Authority,
the Defendants, Case No. 153312/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April 12,
2018), seeks full rent abatement for heat and/or hot water
outages, reflecting the diminution in the value of Plaintiffs'
homes in an amount to be determined at trial, along with
consequential and punitive damages.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have failed to
maintain Plaintiffs' residences in accordance with the uses
reasonably intended by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants had notice
of heat and/or hot water outages, but either failed to correct
them, or allowed them to remain uncorrected for days or even
weeks at a time. By reason of their failure to make timely
repairs and maintain heat and/or hot water services, the
Defendants have breached the warranty of habitability under New
York Real Property. As a result of this breach, Defendants have
caused the value of the Plaintiffs' apartments to be diminished.

The New York City Housing Authority provides housing for low and
moderate income residents throughout the five boroughs of New
York City. NYCHA also administers a citywide Section 8 Leased
Housing Program in rental apartments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Wesley Powell, Esq.
          Martin Seidel, Esq.
          Mary Eaton, Esq.
          WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
          787 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 728 8000

               - and -

          Judith Goldiner, Esq.
          Lucy Newman, Esq.
          Jennifer Levy, Esq.
          THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
          199 Water Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 577 3300


NMN FOOD: Montenegro Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
NEIL SANCHEZ MONTENEGRO, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NMN FOOD LLC (D/B/A HUMMUS
KITCHEN), SHARON HOOTA, PFER COHEN, ODET DOE and ASHLEY DOE, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03153 (S.D.N.Y., April 10, 2018),
seeks to recover minimum wage and overtime pay under the New York
Labor Law and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants. The Defendants
own, operate, or control a Mediterranean Restaurant, located at
768 9th Ave, New York, New York 10019 under the name "Hummus
Kitchen". The Plaintiff was ostensibly employed as a delivery
worker. However, he was required to spend a considerable part of
his work day performing non-tipped duties, including but not
limited to cleaning the basement, taking out the trash, bringing
products from the basement to the restaurant, folding card boxes
and stocking deliveries ("non-tipped duties"). The Plaintiff
worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked. Rather, the Defendants
failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked,
failed to pay Plaintiff Sanchez appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium. Further, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff
Sanchez the required "spread of hours" pay for any day in which
he had to work over 10 hours a day. Furthermore, Defendants
repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff Sanchez wages on a timely
basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, New York 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317 1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317 1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


NORTEL NETWORKS: Class Action Against Former Execs Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------
Almost ten years after former top executives of bankrupt telecom
giant Nortel were hit with a proposed shareholder class action,
the case recently concluded -- with the dismissal of all claims
against the defendants.

Global law firm Morrison & Foerster represented the defendants,
former Nortel CEO Mike Zafirovski and CFO Pavi Binning, in the
significant securities case in the Southern District of New York.

Joel Haims, Esq. -- jhaims@mofo.com -- the co-chair of MoFo's
Securities Litigation, Enforcement, and White-Collar Defense
Group, was a member of the MoFo team on the case.

The ruling by US District Judge Denise Cote dismissed all claims
against the defendants, finding no material misstatements or
omissions and no intent to defraud.

The proposed class action had been filed in 2009 against
Mr. Zafirovski and Binning shortly after Nortel's bankruptcy
during the financial crisis; the complaint alleged claims
relating to financial projections and goodwill impairment under
federal securities law. (Nortel was not a defendant in the case.)

With Nortel headquartered in Canada, the case involved cross-
border issues related to the Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy
proceedings of the company, formerly a well-known name in the
technology industry.  The case had been stayed due to Nortel's
bankruptcy proceedings, but the Canadian bankruptcy court
recently issued an order to lift the stay, permitting litigation
to continue in the Southern District of New York, and its
dismissal.

The MoFo team on the matter included Joel C. Haims, Jamie A.
Levitt, Esq. -- jlevitt@mofo.com -- James J. Beha II, Esq. --
jbeha@mofo.com -- Steven T. Rappoport, Esq. --
srappoport@mofo.com -- Christina L. Golden, Esq. --
cgolden@mofo.com -- and Lauren M. Gambier, Esq. --
lgambier@mofo.com

A full-text copy of Judge Cote's Decision is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydawpgcn from Leagle.com.

NORTHEAST CREDIT: Court Narrows Claims in "Walbridge" EFTA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Hampshire granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the case, Joseph Walbridge,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
Northeast Credit Union and Does 1 through 100, Civil No. 17-cv-
434-JD (D. N.H.).

Walbridge brings a putative class action to challenge the
practices of Northeast Credit Union to charge overdraft fees when
customers' accounts held funds to cover the transactions.  He
alleges claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, money had and
received, and violation of Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Section
1005.17, of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act ("EFTA").

Walbridge had a checking account and a debit card with Northeast
Credit Union that was originated by the Share Account Agreement.
He also completed the Opt In Form for overdraft transactions.
His claims in the case arise from overdraft fees charged by
Northeast based on the "available balance" in his account rather
than the balance shown on the account, called the "ledger
balance" or "actual balance."

The difference between the available balance and the actual
balance results from the way Northeast credits deposits made to
an account and reduces the balance by debits that are pending but
not yet paid.  As a result, the available balance can be less,
and even considerably less, than the actual balance, depending on
the delay in crediting deposits and the anticipatory deductions
of pending debits.  Northeast then assesses an overdraft fee when
the available balance is insufficient to cover a transaction,
even though the actual balance shows enough money to cover the
transaction.

Walbridge alleges that on March 15, 2016, he had an actual
balance in his Northeast checking account of $111.09.  He made a
debit card payment of $32.43, which left a balance of $78.66.
Northeast, however, determined that he had insufficient funds and
charged an overdraft fee of $32.  Northeast then assessed
additional overdraft fees of $320 on March 29 and March 30, 2016.
Walbridge believes that subsequent improper overdraft fees were
charged but provides no allegations in support.

Walbridge alleges that Northeast breached the Account and Opt In
Agreements and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by
charging him overdraft fees when the actual balance showed there
was money in his account to cover the transactions.  He also
brings equitable claims for unjust enrichment and money had and
received.  In addition, Walbridge alleges that Northeast violated
Regulation E of EFTA by failing to disclose its overdraft policy.

Northeast moves to dismiss all claims.  It moves to dismiss
Walbridge's breach of contract claims and EFTA claim on the
grounds that it did not promise to use the actual balance for its
overdraft service and instead properly explained its overdraft
policy based on the available balance.  It moves to dismiss the
EFTA claim on the merits and asserts that the claim is barred by
the statute of limitations and the "safe harbor" provision.
Northeast moves to dismiss the equitable claims because valid
contracts control the issues raised.  Walbridge objects to the
motion to dismiss.

Judge DiClerico granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.  It is granted as to Claim 4
(unjust enrichment and restitution), Claim 5 (money had and
received), and Claim 6 (violation of EFTA).  The motion is
otherwise denied.

The Judge, finds among other things, that Northeast has not shown
that the only reasonable meaning of "enough money," "insufficient
funds," and "nonsufficient funds" is the available balance.  The
Account Agreement and the Opt In Agreement could be reasonably
understood to promise that overdraft fees would be charged only
if a customer overdrew the actual balance in the account.
Therefore, Walbridge states claims for breach of the Opt In and
the Account Agreements.

He also finds that Northeast has not shown that the Agreements
promised to charge overdrafts based on the available balance.
For that reason, Northeast has also not shown that Walbridge
fails to state a claim for breach of the implied duty.

He further finds that the safe harbor provided by Section
1693m(d)(2) does not apply to Walbridge's claim that Northeast
violated EFTA by inaccurately describing its overdraft service.
The reasoning in Tims v. LGE Community Credit Union is strained
at best and, therefore, not persuasive.  The safe harbor does not
apply to Walbridge's claim in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/AAgUus from Leagle.com.

Joseph Walbridge, Plaintiff, represented by Sean T. O'Connell,
Shaheen & Gordon PA, Jae K. Kim -- jkk@mccunewright.com -- McCune
Wright Arevalo LLP, pro hac vice, Richard D. McCune --
rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP, pro hac vice,
Taras Kick, Kick Law Firm APC, pro hac vice & Christine M. Craig,
Shaheen & Gordon PA.

Northeast Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Demko, Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice, Russell F.
Hilliard, Upton & Hatfield LLP, Stuart M. Richter --
stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro
hac vice & Brooke Lois Lovett Shilo, Upton & Hatfield LLP.


NORTHWOOD DESIGN: Violates Wage and Hour Laws, Henderson Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
DE' ANTE L. HENDERSON, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NORTHWOOD DESIGN
PARTNERS, INC.; and DOES 1 thru 50, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. RG18900287 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 10, 2018), seeks to
recover damages and penalties as a result of Defendant's failure
to provide meal breaks pursuant to the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has had a consistent
policy of failing to inform Proposed Class Members of their right
to take meal periods by way of a lawful policy and requiring
Proposed Class Members within the State of California, including
Plaintiff, to work at least five hours without a timely meal
period and failing to pay such employees one hour of pay at the
employees' regular rate of compensation for each workday that the
meal period is not provided or provided after five hours, as
required by California state wage and hour laws.

Northwood Design, founded in 1980, is a custom furniture
manufacturer that specializes in designing and manufacturing
finely crafted wood furniture and architectural case work for
business and institutional communities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Kelsey M. Szamet, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
                  kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com


ODEBRECHT CONSTRUCTION: "Angel" Suit Seeks OT Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERICO VILLEGAS-RIVAS, RYAN EHRLICHER, FERNANDO ANGEL, LUIS
GALVAN, DANIEL CARDENAS, AND GERARDO HERNANDEZ, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
ODEBRECHT CONSTRUCTION, INC., AND ZACHRY CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01181 (S.D. Tex.,
April 13, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants, individually and jointly, employed Plaintiffs and
other similarly situated employees at all relevant times within
the meaning of the FLSA. The Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated employees were employed as working Foreman. Their
primarily duties included, but were not limited to, working side-
by-side with other laborers while performing manual tasks -- for
example, laying concrete foundation, driving concrete trucks and
performing all task as instructed and necessary for the
construction of the freeway project, known as "SH99 Grand
Parkway" segments F-1, F-2 and G. The Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated employees did not have any formal training,
did not interview employees, were not in charge of the hiring and
firing of employees, did not set or adjust employees' rate of pay
and were not engaged in office and/or non-manual work.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked many hours in excess of 40 hours
per week for Defendants. In performing their duties, the
Plaintiffs routinely worked up to, and in excess of, 12-16 hours
per day, six days per week. Other similarly situated employees
also customarily and regularly worked many hours in excess of 40
hours per week and were paid in a fashion similar to Plaintiffs.
The work performed by Plaintiffs and other similarly situated
employees was within Defendants' knowledge and control.

The Defendants set Plaintiffs and similarly situated employee's
schedules, assigned work, and supervised their work. The
Defendants required Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees
to manually record their time daily, then would pay them a "fixed
salary" for the first 40 hours of work.  To "incentivize"
Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees to work over 50 hours
a week, Plaintiffs received no pay for hours worked between forty
40 hours and 50 hours.

Zachry Construction is a Texas-based corporation providing
construction and transportation services from highway and runway
construction to maintenance of bridges and tunnels.  Its annual
revenues far exceeded $500,000 in each of the last five
years.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alfonso Kennard, Jr., Esq.
          Keenya Harrold, Esq.
          KENNARD RICHARD PC
          2603 Augusta Drive, Suite 1450
          Houston, TX 77057
          Telephone No.: (713) 742 0900
          Facsimile No.: (713) 742 0951
          E-mail: Alfonso.Kennard@kennardlaw.com


PENNSYLVANIA: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Turnpike Tolls
--------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Hall, writing for The Morning Call, reports that groups
representing truckers and other motorists asked a federal judge
on April 2 to halt the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission's
payments to PennDOT for transportation projects around the state
while the court decides their claims that turnpike tolls are
unconstitutionally excessive.

The organizations sued in March, alleging the commission collects
in tolls more than twice what it costs to operate the 550-mile
highway system.  Because the tolls bear little relationship to
the use of the Turnpike or the benefit they receive, they violate
the U.S. Constitution's protection of the right to travel and
limitation on state laws that affect interstate commerce, the
proposed class action lawsuit claims.

In the 2017 fiscal year, the Turnpike's toll revenue of more than
$1.1 billion was more than double its operating expenses of $517
million, according to the commission's annual financial report.
The commission has increased tolls for the last 10 years and has
projected additional increases until 2044 to pay for obligations
to pay for transportation elsewhere in the state.

Under a 2007 transportation funding plan, the Turnpike commission
pays PennDOT for aviation, freight and passenger rail and marine
transportation projects across Pennsylvania to the tune of $450
million a year.  Under a 2013 amendment, the Turnpike's payments
will drop to $50 million a year, but not until 2023.  The
programs, which include projects such as a transportation
facility with bicycle parking and kayak storage, and the
restoration of stone bridges on a Philadelphia-area commuter rail
line, should not be paid for with Turnpike tolls, the suit says.

Truckers sue Pennsylvania Turnpike over "excessive" tolls
"The excess money is being spent on things that provide no
benefit to you as Turnpike users," said Washington, D.C.,
attorney Paul D. Cullen Sr., whose firm represents the truckers
and other motorists.

Turnpike spokesman Carl DeFebo did not return a call. A spokesman
for Gov. Tom Wolf, who is also named as a defendant, declined
comment.

In its filing on April 2, the Owner Operator Independent Drivers
Association, which represents truckers, and the National
Motorists Association, which advocates for drivers' rights,
argued the court must ensure the Turnpike commission will be able
to repay Turnpike users if the suit is successful.  To do that,
the court must halt its payments to PennDOT.  The commission's
next quarterly payment to PennDOT is due April 30, the filing
notes, arguing that the need for an injunction is immediate.

The filing also argues that the Turnpike commission has issued
$5.8 billion in bonds on which it pays principal and interest to
private bondholders.  Once the commission uses toll revenue to
repay its debt, the plaintiffs will not have a realistic chance
of recovering the money, the filing says.  The plaintiffs would
also be unable to recover the toll money if the Turnpike
commission uses it to issue additional bonds or PennDOT uses it
to fund projects unrelated to the Turnpike, the filing states.

Arguing that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail in their claims
that the tolls are unconstitutionally excessive, the filing
highlights a similar case in New York, where truckers challenged
the use of New York Thruway tolls to pay for the restoration and
upkeep of the state's historic canal system.  The court found
that the 9 to 14 percent of thruway users' tolls that supported
the canal system made them unconstitutionally excessive.

"The truckers may wish to enjoy bike paths, hiking trails, and
museums while on vacation, but they are irrelevant when sitting
in the cab of an eighteen wheeler," the court said.  The decision
was later overturned when an appeals court found that Congress
explicitly authorized the use of excess tolls to fund the canal
system.

The same conclusions apply to Pennsylvania Turnpike tolls, the
truckers and motorists associations argue.  Tolls are being
diverted to projects unrelated to the Turnpike, a fact which
officials touted in 2008 after the passage of the funding plan
and just before a 25 percent increase in tolls took effect, the
suit notes.

"Turnpike tolls should be spent on operations, maintenance,
reconstruction, and improvements on the Turnpike itself,
including rest stops and service plazas, law enforcement to
patrol the Turnpike, and other costs that are functionally
related to and benefit Turnpike travelers," the filing says. [GN]


PERLOFF PROVIDENCE: Gym Membership Deceptive, Robertson Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
STUART ROBERTSON, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. PERLOFF PROVIDENCE STUDIO
2, LLC, D/B/A ORANGETHEORY FITNESS CHICAGO LAKEVIEW, IL and
ULTIMATE FITNESS GROUP, LLC, D/B/A ORANGETHEORY FITNESS, the
Defendants, Case No. 2018CH04753 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., April
12, 2018), seeks to recover compensatory damages, costs of suit,
and such other or further relief as the Court deems proper under
the Illinois Physical Fitness Services Act, the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and common law.

According to the complaint, on March 14, 2018, the Plaintiff
visited Orangetheory Fitness-Lakeview, IL in response to an offer
to attend a free session. After attending the free session, the
Plaintiff signed up for an Elite Membership. Orangetheory Fitness
charged plaintiff the $129 monthly membership amount on March 15,
2018, after initially overcharging him for a higher priced plan.
The Plaintiff was not provided a written copy of the contract he
signed on that date. Prior to visiting Orangetheory Fitness, the
Plaintiff had seen promotional materials from Orangetheory
Fitness which indicated that their policy was to allow
cancellation of their contracts with 30 days notice. The
Orangetheory Fitness web page associated with the offer of one
free class contains an icon which suggests there is a "Money Back
30 Day Guarantee".

On March 16, 2018, after attending the one free class, and two
classes under his contract, the Plaintiff contacted the Lakeview
studio manager at Orangetheory Fitness by email and indicated he
might want to look for another gym due to issues with the
workouts. The studio manager responded on March 19, with an email
stating that it he did chose to cancel, he would be billed one
more time in April -- on April 15 -- and that he would need to
fill out documents in order to do so. The Plaintiff responded by
asking: "Do I understand correctly that there is a 2 month
minimum signup. As in the day I signed up I was charged, and I
would have had to cancel that day to avoid the next month's
payment?"  The studio manager responded by emailing: "When you
sign up for your membership it is essentially a 2 month min
agreement if you were to sign up for a membership and cancel on
the same day. You would still have to be billed for April if you
canceled on the same day as you signed up."  After receiving that
email, on March 19, the plaintiff notified the studio manager by
email that he was canceling his membership, and that he would
request that his credit card company block the next Orangetheory
Fitness charge.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Edelman
          Tara L. Goodwin
          EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
          20 S. Clar St. Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL: 60603
          Telephone: (312) 739 4200
          Facsimile: (312) 419 0379


PIRON LLC: Court Denies Aero's Bid to Dismiss "Ali" FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Linda V. Parker of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied Aero's Motion to
Dismiss the case, SUHAIL ALI, SHALAN ALMANSOOB, QASEM SALEH, and
KASSEM DUBAISHI, on behalf of themselves and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PIRON, LLC, STEVE HANNAH,
CRAIG MONROE, REYNOLDS QUALITY INSTALLATIONS, LLC, RODERICK
REYNOLDS JR., AERO COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and COMCAST CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants, Civil Case No. 17-cv-
11012 (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action lawsuit against
the Defendants on March 30, 2017, alleging minimum wage and
overtime wage violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants are joint
employers who misclassified them as independent contractors in
order to circumvent the protections of FLSA.

Comcast is a global media and technology provider of video, high-
speed Internet, and phone services.  To expand its services and
enlarge its Michigan customer base, it subcontracted its cable
installation and repair services to Aero.  To meet Comcast's
business demands, Aero contracted with Piron, owned and operated
by Hannah, and Reynolds Quality, which is owned and operated by
Reynolds, who provided cable technicians for Comcast's repair and
installation services.

The Plaintiffs learned of the cable technician positions from
Monroe, one of Piron's corporate officers, and submitted
applications for employment.  According to them, both Piron and
Reynold's Quality paid them.  They allege the pay was
inconsistent and varied in the form of cash, personal checks and
money orders.  They stated that they never received time records
and were charged for unsatisfactory services, including charges
for faulty equipment and unhappy customers.  They allege they
worked 12-hour shifts six days a week but were not paid minimum
wage and did not receive overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs eventually ended their employment with the
Defendants and initiated the putative class action lawsuit on
March 30, 2017.  They allege the Defendants are joint employers
who misclassified Plaintiffs as independent contractors.
According to them, the Defendants owe them minimum wage and
overtime wage benefits for willfully violating FLSA.

In response to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, on May 26, 2017, Aero
filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the Plaintiffs failed to
allege sufficient facts establishing that Aero was a joint
employer pursuant to FLSA.  The Plaintiff filed a response on
June 15, 2017, and Aero filed a reply on June 29, 2017.

On May 9, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for conditional
class certification, which remains pending before the Court.  On
Sept. 28, 2017 and Oct. 9, 2017, the summons for Reynolds
Installations and Reynolds was returned unexecuted.  On Oct. 12,
2017, the clerk entered default against Monroe for failing to
respond to the Complaint.  On Oct. 27, 2017, the Plaintiffs
requested the Court reserve on default judgment against Monroe
until damages are proven.

Judge Parker finds that the Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient
factual allegations for the Court to draw reasonable inferences
that Aero was a joint employer. Contrary to Aero's position, the
Plaintiffs do not need to plead detailed factual allegations
about the Defendants' employment arrangements.  She says the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Aero contracted with
Reynolds Quality Installations and Piron for the cable
installation and repair work.  The Judge can make a reasonable
inference that through this arrangement, Aero indirectly
controlled or supervised the Plaintiffs.  It is reasonable that
Aero had the ability to control the terms and conditions of
employment, especially in light of the requirement that the
Plaintiffs reported to Aero's warehouse at 7a.m. each workday and
wore badges that contained Aero's logo.  Also, Aero provided the
tools the Plaintiffs needed to perform their work.

Although it is unclear as to the degree of Aero's control, the
Judge finds that the Complaint allows the Court to make
reasonable inferences that Aero was involved in the employment
relationship with the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.  The parties
have not had the benefit of discovery to review documents, such
as internal communications, disciplinary records, payroll and
other documents that could shed light on the employment
relationship between Aero and the other the Defendants.  Simply
put, she finds the motion to dismiss premature.

Because the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to survive
Aero's motion to dismiss, Judge Parker denied Aero's motion to
dismiss.  She directed Aero to file an Answer to the Plaintiffs'
Complaint, no later than 14-days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/NFw9cJ from Leagle.com.

Suhail Ali, Shalan Almansoob, Qasem Saleh, Kassem Dubaishi &
Larry Davis, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan Yaldou --
bryan@yaldoulaw.com -- Yaldou Law.

Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Eric J. Pelton -- epelton@kohp.com -- Kienbaum,
Opperwall & Julia T. Baumhart -- jbaumhart@kohp.com -- Kienbaum,
Opperwall.

Piron, LLC, Defendant, Pro Se.

Aero Communications, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel J.
Bretz, Clark Hill & Ellen E. Hoeppner, Clark Hill PLC.

Steve Hannah, Defendant, Pro Se.


PLY GEM: June 29 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP regarding the In re PLY GEM Holdings, Inc., Securities
Litigation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re PLY GEM HOLDINGS, INC., SECURITIES LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

ALL ACTIONS.

Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-03577-JPO

CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE

TO: ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED THE COMMON STOCK OF PLY
GEM HOLDINGS, INC. ("PLY GEM") DURING THE PERIOD FROM MAY 23,
2013 TO DECEMBER 15, 2014, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, that
a hearing will be held on June 29, 2018, at 10:30 a.m., before
the Honorable J. Paul Oetken, United States District Judge, at
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, New York, NY 10007, for the purpose of determining: (1)
whether the proposed Settlement of the above-captioned Action, as
set forth in the settlement agreement reached between the
parties, consisting of Twenty-Five Million, Nine Hundred Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($25,950,000.00) in cash, should be approved as
fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Members of the Class; (2)
whether the release by Class Members of claims as set forth in
the settlement agreement should be authorized; (3) whether the
proposed plan to distribute the settlement proceeds (the "Plan of
Allocation") is fair, reasonable, and adequate; (4) whether the
application by Lead Plaintiff's counsel for an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses and the expenses of Lead Plaintiff
should be approved; and (5) whether the Judgment, in the form
attached to the settlement agreement, should be entered.

Please note that the date, time and location of the settlement
hearing are subject to change without further notice.  If you
plan to attend the hearing, you should check the docket or
contact Lead Counsel (identified below) to be sure that no change
to the date, time or location of the hearing has been made.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED ANY OF THE COMMON STOCK OF PLY GEM
DURING THE PERIOD FROM MAY 23, 2013 THROUGH DECEMBER 15, 2014,
INCLUSIVE, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS
LITIGATION.

If you have not received a detailed Notice of Pendency and
Proposed Settlement of Class Action ("Notice") and a copy of the
Proof of Claim and Release form ("Proof of Claim"), you may
obtain copies by writing to Ply Gem Securities Litigation, Claims
Administrator, c/o GCG, P.O. Box 10552, Dublin, OH 43017-7252, or
on the internet at www.plygemsecuritiessettlement.com.

If you are a Class Member, in order to share in the distribution
of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim by
mail (postmarked no later than June 29, 2018) or submitted
electronically no later than June 29, 2018, establishing that you
are entitled to recovery.  Unless the deadline is extended, your
failure to submit your Proof of Claim by the above deadlines will
preclude you from receiving any payment from the Settlement.

If you are a Class Member and you desire to be excluded from the
Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such that it is
received no later than June 8, 2018, in the manner and form
explained in the detailed Notice, referred to above.  All Members
of the Class who do not timely and validly request exclusion from
the Class will be bound by any judgment entered in the Action
pursuant to the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.

Any objection to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation of
settlement proceeds, or the fee and expense application must be
mailed to each of the following recipients, postmarked no later
than June 8, 2018:

          CLERK OF THE COURT
          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
          SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
          DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN
          UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
          500 Pearl Street
          New York, NY 10007

Lead Counsel:

          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          ROBERT M. ROTHMAN
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747

Counsel for Certain Defendants:

         PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
         GREGORY F. LAUFER
         1285 Avenue of the Americas
         New York, NY 10019-6064

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE OR DEFENDANTS
REGARDING THIS NOTICE. If you have any questions about the
Settlement, you may contact Lead Counsel at the address listed
above.

DATED: March 20, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


PRIVATE MINI: "Young" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
SHERI YOUNG, the Plaintiff, v. PRIVATE MINI STORAGE MANAGER,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01193 (S.D. Tex., April 13,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime from past pay periods,
additional equal amount as liquidated damages under section the
Fair Labor Standards Act, attorneys' fees, post-judgment
interest, and all costs of court.

According to the complaint, PMSM paid Ms. Young $125.00 per day.
PMSM purported to pay her overtime when she worked more than five
days per week, but in fact PMSM used a formula that no one could
explain and that did not give Ms. Young time and a half for her
overtime. PMSM violated the FLSA by failing to pay Ms. Young
overtime in accordance with the FLSA. Ms. Young, seeks
compensation individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated.

Private Mini is in the warehousing, self-storage business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David C. Holmes. Esq.
          13201 Northwest Freeway, Suite 800
          Houston, TX 77040
          Telephone: (713) 586 8862
          Facsimile: (713) 586 8863


PROPER HOSPITALITY: Barajas Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
--------------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL ALEJANDRO BARAJAS, an individual, on behalf of the State
of CA and all aggrieved employ Attorney General, the Plaintiff,
v. PROPER HOSPITALITY, LLC, AVALON PS HM, LLC dba AVALON PALM
SPRINGS, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
BC702238 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 13, 2018), seeks unpaid wages,
injunctive relief and restitution under the California Labor
Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide all
required 30-minute minimum meal breaks, failure to provide all
required rest breaks, failed to furnish and maintain accurate
wage statements and payroll records, and failed to pay all wages
owed and other violations of the California Labor Code and
Business and Professions Code.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          UL LAW FIRM
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 761 5484
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Blvd.
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609 0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609 0892


PROTOCALL COMMUNICATIONS: Fails to Pay Wages, Sterne Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANDREW STERNE c/o 519 H Street NW Washington, DC 20001
(Out of State); ERIN CALLEN c/o 519 H Street NW Washington, DC
20001 (Prince George's County); NICOLE DAVIS c/o 519 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20001 (Baltimore County); and SHERMIA JACKSON c/o
519 H Street NW Washington, DC 20001 (Prince George's), the
Plaintiffs, v. PROTOCALL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a PROTOCALL 204
Main Street Laurel, MD 20707 (Prince George's County);
CONSTELLATION NEWENERGY, INC. 1310 Point Street, 8th Floor
Baltimore, MD 21231 (Baltimore City); and DEBORAH LIEBEL 2821
Grier Nursery Road Forest Hill, MD 21050 (Harford County), the
Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01083-PX (D. Md., April 13, 2018),
seeks to recover damages for Defendants willful failure to pay
all wages due, in violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law.

The Plaintiffs worked at Defendants' call center in Maryland
selling utility contracts to customers across the United States.
The Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated
employees all the commissions they had earned. The Plaintiffs and
similarly situated employees typically and customarily sold
contracts up and through the last day of their employment.
However, Defendants typically and customarily did not "book" the
sales employees made during their final days of employment until
after Plaintiffs had stopped working. The Defendants never paid
commissions for these sales to Plaintiffs and similarly situated
individuals. In some cases, Defendants did not pay employees
commissions on any sales made during their final month of
employment. Additionally, without prior authorization, the
Defendants made an unlawful automatic deduction for a "seat cost"
from the commissions paid to Plaintiffs and similarly situated
employees. The Plaintiffs bring their claims as a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 on behalf of all individuals who worked as
telephone sales representatives for Protocall Communications,
Inc. at any point since March 15, 2015, and who were not paid all
the commissions that they were due.

Protocall Communications operates as a provider of outbound
business-to-business telesales for Fortune 1000 companies.
Outbound applications include sales and lead generation for high-
speed Internet access providers, local and long distance telecom,
wireless and video conferencing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:
          Justin Zelikovitz, Esq.
          DCWAGELAW
          519 H Street NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 803 6083
          Facsimile: (202) 683 6102
          E-mail: justin@dcwagelaw.com


PURDUE PHARMA: Plaintiff Lauds Judge's Move to Block Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
CBC Radio reports that a judge's decision to block a $20 million
lawsuit settlement has been applauded -- by one of the plaintiffs
in line for the payout.

Stephen MacGillivray is one of hundreds of Canadian patients who
took the class action lawsuit against the drugmaker Purdue Pharma
(Canada), over how the company marketed the painkiller Oxycontin.

"Purdue Pharma knew this drug was addictive, and they blatantly
told people that it was not," he told The Current's Anna Maria
Tremonti.

"They were basically lying to the doctors."

Mr. MacGillivray was prescribed the painkiller after a workplace
accident in 1997.  He said he became addicted within two months,
and over the next decade of dependence he lost his job, his
family, and ended up with a criminal record.

The $20 million settlement had already been signed off by judges
in three provinces.

But Justice Brian Barrington-Foote of Regina's Court of Queen's
Bench rejected the offer on March 15.

Part of the judge's reasoning was that "the proposed settlement
was not fair, reasonable or in the best interests of the class as
a whole," according to Matthew Herder, director of the Health Law
Institute at Dalhousie University.

Once $2 million of the $20 million sum had been set aside for the
provinces, plaintiffs would have received $11,000 to $13,000
each.

"Purdue Pharma (Canada) has always marketed its products in line
with the Health Canada-approved product monograph and in
compliance with all relevant rules, regulations and codes,
including the Food and Drugs Act," the company told The Current
in a statement.  Purdue Pharma have never made an admission of
liability in the case.

The rejection now creates an opportunity to review the options
available to both patients and provincial governments, said
Herder.

"I think part of the real value of this moment in the middle of
this class action is to have a more public conversation about the
different legal mechanisms that might be available."

He added that if provincial governments decide to follow Justice
Barrington-Foote's move away from supporting the class action,
they could "try and recover a greater measure of money to deal
with the public health crisis."

For Mr. MacGillivray, there's more at stake than a cash
settlement.

"It was really never about the money for me . . . . I would like
to see them say that they did wrong," he said.

"That's the big thing, and I don't think we're ever going to see
that or hear that." [GN]


REMINGTON: Wants to Temporarily Halt Rifle Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Scott Cohn, writing for CNBC, reports that the Chapter 11
bankruptcy of gun manufacturer Remington filed late last month
has thrown yet another wrench into a landmark class-action
settlement involving allegedly defective rifles that were the
subject of a 2010 CNBC investigation.

A federal appeals panel in Kansas City is considering the
settlement, in which Remington agreed to replace the triggers on
millions of guns, including the iconic Model 700 rifle and a
dozen other firearms with similar designs.  While Remington
continues to maintain the guns are safe, class-action plaintiffs
claimed the guns are prone to firing without the trigger being
pulled.  With the case bogged down in court, the trigger
replacement program, first announced in 2014, has been on hold.

Now, Remington is seeking to halt the class-action case entirely,
at least temporarily, under a provision in federal bankruptcy law
that automatically stays outside litigation while a bankruptcy
case is pending.

"As a result of the bankruptcy filing, this appeal is subject to
the automatic stay," wrote Remington attorney John Sherk in a
filing with the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Kansas City.

The court has given the parties two weeks to weigh in on the
issue.

A federal judge in Kansas City approved the class-action
settlement last year, but a pair of Remington rifle owners
immediately appealed the ruling.  Richard Denney and Lewis Frost
accused the company of deliberately downplaying the risks from
the guns and failing to properly notify the public of the
settlement in order to keep the number of claims low.  Remington
has denied the allegations, and plaintiffs' attorneys -- who
stand to collect $12.5 million in fees -- have defended the
settlement as fair.

An attorney for Denney and Frost, J. Robert Ates, told CNBC in an
e-mail that the Court of Appeals should reject the stay, so that
it can reject what he calls a "bogus" settlement and send it back
to the District Judge who approved it, Ortrie Smith.

"In the final analysis, the best outcome for the class, for the
legitimacy of class action settlements, and for the legitimacy of
proper notice guaranteed under due process would be for the 8th
Circuit to maintain jurisdiction by denying the stay in order to
reject the settlement and remand it back to District Judge
Smith," Mr. Ates said.

Attorneys for Remington and the class action plaintiffs did not
respond to multiple requests by CNBC for a comment.

Even if the company is successful in its efforts at the Court of
Appeals, the stay might not last long.  Remington's Chapter 11
bankruptcy, filed on March 25, is "pre-packaged."  That means the
company has already reached agreement with its major creditors on
a restructuring plan.

In court filings with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware,
Remington has said that if creditors and the court approve, it
could emerge from bankruptcy protection by this summer.

Under the restructuring plan, which allows the company to
eliminate more than $600 million in debt, Remington's primary
lenders would assume control of the company, while the equity
interest of Remington's current owner, Cerberus Capital
Management, would be wiped out.  Most creditors, including class-
action plaintiffs if the settlement is approved, would be paid in
full.

Creditors have until April 26 to vote on the restructuring plan.
[GN]


RENEW FINANCIAL: Ocana et al. Sue over Clean Energy Program
-----------------------------------------------------------
ZENIA OCANA, an individual; JUAN OCANA LAU, an individual;
VIOLETA SENAC, an individual; MARIA ALVAREZ, an individual; and
NEPTALI SICAL, an individual, as TRUSTEE OF THE SICAL
FAMILYTRUST, the Plaintiffs, v. RENEW FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware corporation; RENEW FINANCIAL CORP. II, a Pennsylvania
corporation; the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and DOES 1 through 10,
the Defendants, Case No. BC701809 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 12,
2018), seeks to enjoin Renew Financial from continuing to engage
in deceptive acts and practices, and to recover all monies paid
to Defendants in connection with the Property Assessed Clean
Energy program, including PACE program and loan fees and all
assessments Plaintiffs have paid.

According to the complaint, for the last three years, Renew
Financial and the County of Los Angeles have spread a plague on
thousands of low-income, elderly, and non-native English-speaking
homeowners throughout the County. They have done so through a
program known as Property Assessed Clean Energy that the
California Legislature authorized local governments to implement.
The County enacted the program in 2012 and delegated
administrative responsibility to Renew Financial and Renovate
America in 2015. The conduct of Renovate America is addressed in
a separate complaint. Although the County's stated goal was
laudable -- to enable homeowners to install energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and water-saving improvements to their
properties without putting any money down.

Incompetent and unscrupulous contractors have mauled their homes,
after having sold them unnecessary, overpriced, and defective
goods and services. Homeowners have taken on debt beyond their
means to repay. The PACE program has depressed the value of their
homes, made the homes more difficult to sell, and put them on the
edge of foreclosure. Many PACE participants are living hand-to-
mouth to hold onto their homes, fearful of what is yet to come.

The County's PACE program has many serious flaws. First, Renew
Financial approves PACE loans based on the equity in the
homeowner's property, not on his or her ability to repay the
loan. But no matter how much equity an owner may have in the
home, he or she can still lack the income to repay a loan of even
a small fraction of that equity. Second, by classifying
PACE financing as a tax assessment rather than a loan, the County
and Renew Financial have attempted to sidestep traditional
regulations and consumer protections that govern loans secured.

As a result of Renew Financial's business acts and practices,
Plaintiffs and the Class Members have incurred actual financial
losses and injuries including first-priority PACE Liens on their
homes that require payment and may trigger foreclosure by the
County or by preexisting conventional and reverse mortgage
lenders.

Renew Financial, a clean energy finance company, provides
financing products for home improvements in California, Florida,
and New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert M. Schwartz, Esq.
          Jason D. Linder, Esq.
          Grace E. Chuchla, Esq.
          Todd J. Densen, Esq.
          IRELL & MANELLA LLP
          1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-4276
          Telephone: (310) 277 1010
          Facsimile: (310) 203 7199
          E-mail: rschwartz@irell.com
                  jlinder@irell.com
                  gchuchla@irell.com
                  tdensen@irell.com

               - and -

          Anne Richardson, Esq.
          Charles Evans, Esq.
          Adelaide Anderson, Esq.
          610 South Ardmore Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90005
          Telephone: (213) 385 2977
          Facsimile: (213) 201 4722
          E-mail: arichardson@publiccounsel.org
                  cevans@publiccounsel.org
                  aanderson@publiccounsel.org

               - and -

          Jenna L. Miara, Esq.
          Jennifer H. Sperling, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Levenhagen, Esq.
          BET TZEDEK LEGAL SERVICES
          3250 Wilshire Blvd., 13th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010-1509
          Telephone: (323) 549 5867
          Facsimile: (213) 471 4569
          E-mail: jmiara@bettzedek.org
                  jsperling@bettzedek.org
                  nlevenhagen@bettzedek.org


RENO, NV: Lemon Valley Residents File Flooding Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bridget Chavez, writing for kolotv.com, reports that people
affected by the flooding that took place in Lemmon Valley in 2017
have filed a class action law suit against the city of Reno.
Now, more residents have the option to opt in by May 1, 2018.

"We want to include as many people as possible so that people
really get the opportunity to stand up for what is right and what
the city should have done in this case," Kerry Doyle, one of the
attorneys representing the plaintiffs, says.

About 100 people attended the informational meeting at a local
church in Lemmon Valley on April 3.  Ms. Doyle says those who
choose to opt in are not responsible for paying any legal fees.

As for damages sought, the plaintiffs are "seeking damages for
just compensation for the substantial interference and impact to
use of the potential class members' real and personal property."

Don Ross has lived in the area since 2004 and says he is now
opting in to the suit because of damages to his property.

"My concrete is raising and I have cracks in my walls," Mr. Ross
says.

Ms. Doyle says they will go trial for liability in February 2019
and try to prove that the city did not take all steps to mitigate
the flooding.

"Our goal is to recover money for the people who have been
injured and we're hoping to exert pressure on the city and the
county and on developers to make sure proper steps are followed
in the future," Ms. Doyle says.

Anyone who has been affected by the flooding or who is wanting to
opt in should contact the Doyle Law Office at (775)-525-0889.
[GN]


RETAIL SERVICES: Stores Not Accessible to Disabled, Bell Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD BELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. RETAIL SERVICES & SYSTEMS, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. RG18900192 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 10,
2018), seeks to recover statutory damages and reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's violation of
California's anti-discrimination state statutes, the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, California Code, and the California Disabled Persons
Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated California
state law by violating the ADA and Title 24 by failing to make
its stores accessible to individuals with disabilities and by
excluding the Plaintiff, and other similarly situated persons,
from full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, programs,
facilities, privileges, advantages and/or accommodations of
Defendant's stores, and subjecting Plaintiff to discrimination by
failing to provide its facilities and other goods, services,
programs, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or
accommodations to Plaintiff, as well as other similarly situated
persons.

Retail Services & Systems, Inc., doing business as Total Wine &
More, owns and operates wine, beer, and spirit retail stores in
Maryland and internationally. The company also offers wine
accessories, mixers, soda, and water, as well as cigars and its
accessories. It serves customers through its stores, as well as
online.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          119595 Wilshire Blvd.
          Ste. 900 Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 534 2590
          Facsimile: (310) 2470160


RITE AID: Court Stays "Kalajian" Pending "Beardsall" Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright, II, of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted the parties' Joint Motion
to Stay the case, TINA KALAJIAN, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. RITE AID
CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-06777-ODW-AGR (C.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, filed a suit against the Defendant on Sept. 14, 2017,
for improperly advertising, marketing, and selling an "aloe vera
gel" without a detectable level of aloe vera.  The Plaintiff
alleges that Rite Aid Renewal After Sun Gel purports and
advertises itself as containing aloe vera, but independent
laboratory tests show the Defendant's product contains no actual
aloe vera.

The Plaintiff alleges claims for Breach of Express Warranty;
Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act; Violations of the
False Advertising Act; and Unlawful, Unfair and Fraudulent
Business Acts and Practices.

Another case is currently pending in the Northern District of
Illinois and involves similar issues.  Beardsall is a class
action against CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Walgreen Co., Target Corp.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Fruit of the Earth, Inc.  Like Rite
Aid, the retailer Defendants in the Beardsall action are also
alleged to have sold aloe vera products that do not have a
detectable amount of aloe vera.

In both actions, the Plaintiffs rely on independent laboratory
testing that revealed an absence of acemannan, the key compound
in aloe vera.  The parties here contend that the discovery
conducted in Beardsall, especially the expert opinions gathered,
will affect the outcome of the litigation, which they maintain
involves complex scientific issues.  The Beardsall court has
ordered that class certification, Daubert, and dispositive
motions be filed with the court by May 11, 2018.  In contrast the
Defendant has not yet filed a response to the initial complaint
in the case.

Recognizing that the Beardsall action is further progressed and
addresses many of the same "complex scientific issues present in
the instant action," the parties jointly move the Court to stay
the action for six months in order to allow the Beardsall court
to rule class certification and the Beardsall parties to complete
fact and expert discovery.

Judge Wright explains that to determine whether a stay should be
granted, the Court considers (1) the possible damage resulting
from a stay; (2) the hardship or inequity which a party may
suffer if required to go forward; and (3) the orderly course of
justice, as measured by whether the stay will simplify or
complicate issues, proof, and questions of law.   In the case, he
finds the balance of interests supports staying the proceeding
since all three of these factors weigh in favor of granting a
stay.

Accordingly, Judge Wright granted the parties' Motion, and stayed
the case in its entirety until Sept. 7, 2018.  He ordered the
parties to file joint status reports as to the progress of
Beardsall, explaining to the Court the need to maintain the stay
in the action every 60 days, until such time as the Beardsall
matter concludes, or a stay no longer serves the interests of
justice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/QveCGe from Leagle.com.

Tina Kalajian, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Gerald Bennett
Malanga -- gmalanga@lmllaw.com -- Lattie Malanga Libertino LLP.

Rite Aid Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Andrew John Peterson -- apeterson@hunton.com --
Hunton and Williams LLP.


RJ REYNOLDS: $2.5MM Compensatory Damages in "Burkhart" Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAULINE BURKHART, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R.J.
REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, individually and as successor by merger
to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American
Tobacco Company, PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants-Appellants,
Case No. 14-14708 (11 Cir.), Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
District Court's judgment against the Appellants and in favor of
Burkhart for compensatory and punitive damages.

The case, which is one of thousands of Engle progeny lawsuits
initiated by smokers in the state of Florida against the
country's major tobacco companies, has remained pending on appeal
for several years while awaiting resolution of other appeals in
the Court and the Florida Supreme Court.

In the instant case, Burkhart sued R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris,
and Lorillard for negligence, strict products liability,
fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to fraudulently conceal.
Burkhart, who began smoking in the 1950s and continued to do so
until the 1990s, alleged that smoking caused her chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).  She sought compensatory
and punitive damages.

After extensive discovery and pretrial motions, the trial began
on May 5, 2014.  The District Court divided the trial into two
phases.  In the first phase, the Court asked the jury to consider
whether the Appellants were liable to Burkhart for compensatory
and punitive damages, to determine whether Burkhart was
contributorily negligent, and, if so, to apportion fault among
Burkhart and the three tobacco companies.  The Court also
instructed the jury to establish a compensatory damages award if
it did find the Appellants were liable to Burkhart, and that the
Court would thereafter apportion and reduce the award based on
the jury's comparative-fault finding.  The Court instructed the
jury to give preclusive effect to the Engle jury's findings as to
Appellants' conduct for purposes of establishing the conduct
elements of Burkhart's negligence, strict-liability, and
intentional-tort claims.

In the second phase, the existence of which depended upon the
jury's finding of liability for punitive damages in the first
phase, the Court instructed the jury to determine the proper
punitive damages award.

Two days into the trial's first phase, Burkhart suffered a
medical incident in the presence of the jury and was taken to the
hospital.  Burkhart recovered, and the trial continued after the
District Court questioned the jurors individually about the
incident's effects on their impartiality and thereafter denied
Appellants' motion for a mistrial.

The first phase of the trial lasted eight days.  The District
Court then sent the jury to deliberate on the question of the
Appellants' liability to Burkhart.  The jury instructions stated
that the jury must treat as established that the Appellants were
negligent in bringing their products to the market, that the
products were unreasonably dangerous, that they concealed
information about the risks of smoking that was not otherwise
available to the public, and that they conspired amongst
themselves to do so.

The instructions did, however, explain to the jury that it must
determine whether (1) Burkhart was a member of the Engle class;
(2) whether she filed her claim within the applicable limitations
period; (3) for purposes of her negligence and strict-liability
claims, whether her smoking addiction caused her COPD; (4) for
purposes of her fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims,
whether she relied on the Appellants' concealment in continuing
to smoke; and (5) for purposes of establishing the Appellants'
liability for punitive damages, whether Burkhart proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the Appellants' concealed
information about the risks of smoking with knowledge of the
wrongfulness of their conduct and the risks such concealment
presented to the public.

The jury returned its verdict in favor of Burkhart on all of her
claims.  It found the Appellants liable to Burkhart for
compensatory damages and that the Appellants' intentional conduct
met the statutory standard to justify an award of punitive
damages.  The jury assessed Burkhart's compensatory damages at $5
million, and found that R.J. Reynolds' conduct caused 25% of the
damages, Philip Morris' 14%, and Lorillard's 10%.

Next, the trial proceeded to its second phase, which was
conducted solely for the purpose of fixing a punitive damages
amount.  After less than two hours of deliberating, the jury sent
the Court a note saying that it could not "come to a unanimous
decision."  The Appellants asked the Court to deliver an Allen
charge to the jury, but the Court refused to do so at that point
and instead delivered a written response instructing the jurors
to continue deliberating and encouraging them to "re-examine"
their positions if they were to "become convinced" their
positions were wrong.  About 40 minutes later, the jury sent a
second note saying that it still could not reach a unanimous
decision "without giving up honest beliefs."

The Court then summoned the jury, delivered this Circuit's
pattern Allen charge, and sent the jury back to deliberations.
Fifty minutes later, the jury returned a unanimous verdict
awarding punitive damages as follows: $1,250,000 against R.J.
Reynolds, $750,000 against Philip Morris, and $500,000 against
Lorillard.

After trial concluded and the District Court issued its judgment,
the Appellants moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new
trial.  The District Court denied those motions.  The Appellants
timely appealed.  The Appellants argue that Burkhart's medical
event in the courtroom infected the jury with prejudice.  They
also challenge two aspects of the District Court's handling of
the punitive damages phase of the trial.  He also argues that the
trial court erred in refusing to reduce the compensatory award
against them to reflect the jury's allocation of comparative
fault. Finally, the Appellants argue that the District Court
erred in denying Appellants' motion for judgment as matter of
law, which was raised on the basis of federal law.

Judge Tjoflat concludes that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Appellants' motion for a mistrial.  He
acknowledges that some events could be so incurably prejudicial
that no instruction by the District Court could possibly remedy
them.  But based upon the jurors' unanimous and unequivocal
responses and our deference to the District Court's sound
discretion as a first-hand witness to the events in question, he
is not persuaded that Burkhart's brief, isolated medical incident
was such an event.  He thus find no abuse of discretion.

The Judge finds no abuse of discretion in the District Court's
careful explanation to the jury of the various legal standards in
response to the Appellants' ambiguous comments during closing
argument, and abuse of discretion with respect to the Court's
instructions to the jury during Phase II deliberations.

He also concludes that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Burkhart did not waive her right to
avoid apportionment on account of the jury's intentional tort
findings.  He says, although the counsel made remarks during
closing argument that compared her negligent conduct with the
Appellants' intentional conduct, the Judge finds that these
comments did not amount to a waiver of her right to avoid
apportionment, given that her counsel and the District Court made
clear to the jury at numerous times that comparative fault should
only be considered as to Burkhart's negligence and strict-
liability claims.

Finally, Judge Tjoflat he concludes the Court's shared rationale
in Graham and Walker controls the issue.  Both of those cases
make clear that treating as preclusive the Engle jury's findings
as to the conduct elements of Engle progeny plaintiffs'
fraudulent concealment and conspiracy claims does not violate due
process.

For these reasons, the Judge affirmed the judgment of the
District Court in all respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/RT2mMI from Leagle.com.

Dana G. Bradford, II -- dgbradford@sgrlaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Lorence Jon Bielby -- bielbyl@gtlaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Emily C. Baker -- ecbaker@jonesday.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Mark Jurgen Heise -- mheise@bsfllp.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Stephen N. Zack -- szack@bsfllp.com -- for Defendant-Appellant.

James B. Murphy, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.

William R. Stein -- william.stein@hugheshubbard.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Charles Richard Allan Morse -- cramorse@jonesday.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Lance V. Oliver -- loliver@motleyrice.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Joseph W. Prichard, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert B. Parrish -- bparrish@mppkj.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Norwood Wilner -- nwilner@wilnerfirm.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Stephanie J. Hartley, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Vincent I. Parrett -- vparrett@be-law.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Robert Turner Haefele -- rhaefele@motleyrice.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elizabeth Joan Cabraser -- ecabraser@lchb.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Richard Lantinberg, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles Easa Farah, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kathryn E. Barnett, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kenneth S. Byrd -- kbyrd@lchb.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.


SECURITY INTELLIGENCE: Rushing Sues over Meal & Rest Breaks
-----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES RUSHING, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST
CORPORATION and DOES 1 to 100, the Defendant, Case No. 18CIV01808
(Cal. Super. Ct., April 11, 2018), seeks to recover damages
resulting from Defendant's failure to provide meal breaks and
rest breaks.

The Plaintiff and the class members worked for Defendants as
security guards. The Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and
the class members with accurate itemized wage statements as
required by Labor Code section 226. The Defendants required
Plaintiff and the class members to work in excess of four hours
in each day without being provided statutorily prescribed rest
breaks, and in excess of five hours per day without being
provided a statutorily prescribed 30-minute meal period. The
Defendants did not timely pay Plaintiff's final wages, in
violation of Labor Code sections 201 and 202.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emanuel Starr, Esq.
          Adam M. Rose, Esq.
          Theodore R. Tang, Esq.
          FRONTIER LAW CENTER
          23901 Calabasas Road, STE 2074
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 914 3433
          Facsimile: (818) 914 3433
          E-mail: mannv@frontierlawcenter.com
                  adam@frontierlawcenter.com
                  theodore@frontierlawoenter.com


SWEET BAR: "Sac" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL GUACHIAC SAC, Individually and On Behalf of All Similarly
Situated Persons, the Plaintiff, v. SWEET BAR, INC., TOUT SUITE,
LLC, TOUT SUITE MEMORIAL, LLC, and TOUT SUITE EADO, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01161 (S.D. Tex., April 12, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, and attorney's fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was paid on an hourly
basis and was not paid an overtime premium for hours worked over
40 hours per workweek. The Defendants knew of, approved of, and
benefited from Plaintiff's regular and overtime work. The
Plaintiff is entitled to be paid his regular wages and to be paid
an overtime premium for all work performed during the hours
worked over 40 hours in each workweek.

The Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff the required overtime
premium in many such workweeks that the Plaintiff was employed by
Defendants, as the Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours in most
weeks. No exemption excuses the Defendants from paying Plaintiff
for all time spent and work performed during the hours they
worked, and the Defendants have not made a good faith effort to
comply with the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
          Vijay Pattisapu, Esq.
          THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
          2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
          Houston, TX 77018
          Telephone: (713) 868 3388
          Facsimile: (713) 683 9940
          E-mail: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com
                  vijay@buenkerlaw.com


SEEK CAPITAL: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages & Overtime, Mosele Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
CAROLINE MOSELE and AARON FISHER, individually, on behalf of
others similarly situated, and on behalf of other aggrieved
employees, the Plaintiff, v. SEEK CAPITAL, LLC, a California LLC;
ROY FERMAN, an Individual; and DOES 1 through 25 the Defendant,
Case No. BC701113 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 10, 2018), seeks to
recover unpaid earned wages, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime premiums, unpaid rest breaks, and unpaid all wages upon
Termination pursuant to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004.

This lawsuit arises out of Defendants' misclassification of their
sales personnel as exempt employees, thereby denying Plaintiffs
and all aggrieved employees rightfully earned wages, overtime
premiums, paid rest periods, and compliant meal periods. The
misclassification also resulted in Defendants' failure to provide
compliant wage statements and all wages owing upon separation
from employment.

Seek Capital, LLC is a principal investment firm and is based in
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kenneth A. Goldman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KENNETH A. GOLDMAN, PC
          15303 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1650
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 287 7689
          E-mail: ken@kengoldmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan M. Lebe, Esq.
          LEBE LAW, APLC
          5723 Melrose Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90038-3889
          Telephone: (310) 921 7056
          E-mail: jon@lebelaw.com


SERVICE OF PROCESS: Jurisdictional Discovery in TCPA Suit Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SWINTER GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. SERVICE OF
PROCESS AGENTS, INC., and DOUGLAS SCOTT KAISER, Defendants, Case
No. 4: 17-CV-2759 RLW (E.D. Mo.), Judge Ronnie L. White of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern
Division, denied Swinter's motion for jurisdictional discovery
and for stay of a ruling on Kaiser's motion to dismiss.

This is a putative class action filed by Swinter, seeking relief
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), for an
allegedly unsolicited fax it received.  Swinter alleges in its
amended complaint that Kaiser and Service of Process Agents, Inc.
("SPA") sent an unsolicited advertisement to the Plaintiffs
telephone facsimile machine in August 2015.  The faxed
advertisement does not include a clear and conspicuous opt-out
notice, in violation of the TCPA and 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(a)(4)(iii).

Kaiser has moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  In his
motion to dismiss, Kaiser argues that he does not have the
requisite minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process.
Specifically, he avers that he is a resident of Virginia; has
never conducted business in, or travelled to, Missouri; does not
own, rent, or have an interest in property in Missouri and has
not done so; does not hold a professional license issued by
Missouri and has not done so; and is not employed by a company
incorporated or doing business in Missouri.  Also, he is not an
employee, owner, officer, director, manager, supervisor, or team
leader for SPA; he is not an investor, creditor, partner, or
joint venture with SPA; and he has never drafted or sent any
advertising faxes by or on behalf of SPA, nor has he participated
in doing so.  He is an independent contractor working part-time
for SPA.  He answers SPA's phone lines.

In turn, Swinter has moved for jurisdictional discovery and for a
stay of a ruling on the motion to dismiss.  It seeks discovery
relating to Kaiser's averments and to uncover evidence not
addressed in Kaiser's declaration.

Judge White finds that Swinter alleges only that Kaiser works for
SPA and his first name is given on the complained-of fax as
someone to call.  The first name of "Nancy" is also given on that
fax.  And, on the copy of the website attached to the amended
complaint, only a phone number is given as a contact if there are
any questions.  He says the allegations cited in Swinter's
supporting memorandum are in its original complaint and simply
refer to "Defendants."  The "Defendants" then included the 10
"John Does."  The allegations are not, as referenced in that
memorandum, of "Defendant Doug Kaiser, together with other
defendants."  For the foregoing reasons, the Judge finds Swinter
has failed to present any assertion against Kaiser that supports
its request for broad jurisdictional discovery.

Judge White dismissed without prejudice the claims against "John
Does 1-10".  He denied Swinter's motion for jurisdictional
discovery and for stay.  He granted Swinter up to and including
March 21, 2018 to file its response to Kaiser's motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/WhMxln from Leagle.com.

Swinter Group, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Mary B. Schultz --
mschultz@sl-lawyers.com -- SCHULTZ AND ASSOCIATES, L.L.P. &
Ronald J. Eisenberg -- reisenberg@sl-lawyers.com -- SCHULTZ AND
ASSOCIATES, L.L.P.

Service of Process Agents, Inc. & Douglas Scott Kaiser,
Defendants, represented by Don V. Kelly-- dkelly@evans-dixon.com
-- EVANS AND DIXON & Brian R. Shank -- bshank@evans-dixon.com --
EVANS AND DIXON.


TD AMERITRADE: Bid to Exclude Experts Testimony in "Klein" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD J. KLEIN, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. TD AMERITRADE HOLDING
CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and FREDRIC TOMCZYK,
Defendants, Case No. 8:14CV396 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph F.
Bataillon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska
denied the Defendants' motion in limine to exclude the opinions
and testimony of the Plaintiff's experts Haim Bodek and Shane
Corwin, without prejudice to reassertion as merits discovery
progresses.

The case is a purported class action alleging wrongdoing in
connection with stock trades.  In the action, the Lead Plaintiff
alleges violations of federal securities laws in TD Ameritrade's
alleged failure to route its clients' equity orders for "best
execution."

The Defendants seek an order precluding consideration of the
opinions of the Plaintiff's experts Bodek, a securities
consultant and former trader, and Corwin, a finance professor, in
connection with the Defendants' pending motion for class
certification, and barring the experts from testifying at the
class certification hearing which is presently scheduled for
March 27, 2018, before United States Magistrate Judge Susan
Bazis.

Bodek was retained to perform a data analysis of the trading
history of two representative TD Ameritrade clients and to
identify issues of economic harm.  He will testify to a method of
proving economic loss by common proof that does not vary by class
member. He has created an algorithm and refined it to provide a
method to be applied across the class.  Corwin was retained to
opine on whether Mr. Bodek's analysis is capable of identifying
economic harm arising from a failure of best execution in line
with academic and regulatory standards.

The Defendants argue that Bodek's methodology is novel and
untested and fails to meet the "peer review" and "general
acceptance" factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert.
They next argue that Professor Corwin's opinions should be
excluded because he did not conduct his own analyses, his
opinions are duplicative, and he is nothing more than a
"mouthpiece" for Bodek.  Further, the Defendants attempt to
exclude any opinions proffered by the two experts that go to the
merits of the Plaintiff's case -- that is, the best execution
issue.  They also argue that Corwin offers improper legal
opinions.

In opposition, the Plaintiff argues that Bodek uses industry-
standard metrics that have been used by the Securities Exchange
Commission to identify economic harm, the metrics are simple
equations with discrete data as input, are generally accepted in
the industry, and have been used in peer reviewed papers.
Further, he argues that Bodek uses an order book analysis to
analyze depth of available liquidity and has proposed exclusion
of certain categories to avoid any doubt concerning the harm
attributable to Defendant TD Ameritrade.  The Plaintiff also
disputes the defendants' argument that Bodek has "changed" his
methodology in his rebuttal report, stating that Bodek employed a
limited order book analysis with certain exclusions in his
initial report and expanded on the analysis in his rebuttal
report.

Judge Bataillon finds that the Defendants' motion in limine to
exclude the reports and testimony of the Plaintiff's experts
Bodek and Corwin should be denied at this time.  Both experts
appear to be qualified to testify.  The testimony and opinions
are based on methodology that appears reliable relevant --
similar methods have been used in other securities cases.

He says the Defendants have not shown that the experts' methods
are so lacking in reliability as to require exclusion at this
point in the litigation.  Their challenge goes more to the weight
of the experts' testimony than to its admissibility.  He finds
the reports and testimony may be admitted for the limited purpose
of determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.
The Court should be allowed to weigh the credibility of the
experts on Rule 23 issues.

The Judge rejects the Defendants' contention that the evidence
should be excluded because Bodek allegedly altered the methods
and conclusions in his original report in response to Dr.
Kleidon's report.  To the extent they wish to respond to any
purportedly "new" conclusions, they are free to seek leave to do
so.  He further rejects their contention that Corwin's testimony
should be excluded because he depends, to some extent, on Bodek's
finding. An expert may extrapolate from data supplied by other
experts.  He says their criticisms of the experts' testimony are
properly the subject of cross-examination.

Accordingly, Judge Bataillon denied the Defendants' motion in
limine to exclude the opinions and testimony of the Plaintiff's
experts Bodek and Corwin, without prejudice to reassertion as
merits discovery progresses.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/DMg4Xi from Leagle.com.

Gerald J. Klein, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Kupka -- ckupka@zlk.com
-- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Eduard Korsinsky --
ek@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Gregory C.
Scaglione  -- Greg.scaglione@koleyjessen.com -- KOLEY, JESSEN LAW
FIRM, Joseph J. DePalma -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE,
DEPALMA LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nancy A. Kulesa --
nkulesa@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Nicholas Porritt, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Patrice
D. Ott -- Patrice.ott@koleyjessen.com -- KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM &
Sebastiano Tornatore -- stornatore@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice.

TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation, TD Ameritrade, Inc. & Fredric
Tomczyk, Defendants, represented by A. Robert Pietrzak --
rpietrzak@sidley.com -- SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Alex J. Kaplan -- ajkaplan@sidley.com -- SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Daniel A. McLaughlin, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Jon Muenz, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Thomas H. Dahlk -- tom.dahlk@kutakrock.com -- KUTAK, ROCK LAW
FIRM & Victoria H. Buter -- vicki.buter@kutakrock.com -- KUTAK,
ROCK LAW FIRM.

Roderick Ford, Movant, represented by Christopher J. Kupka, LEVI,
KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Eduard Korsinsky, LEVI,
KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Gregory C. Scaglione, KOLEY,
JESSEN LAW FIRM, Joseph J. DePalma, LITE, DEPALMA LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Nancy A. Kulesa, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice
& Sebastiano Tornatore, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

PSLRA Class, Interested Party, represented by Gregory C.
Scaglione, KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM.


TD AUTO: Shields Sues over Repossession of Vehicle
--------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH SHIELDS, 800 Kenilworth Ave. NE, Washington D.C, 20019,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. TD AUTO FINANCIAL LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2018CA002470B (D.C. Super. Ct., April 13, 2018), alleges
violations by Defendant of District of Columbia laws related to
the repossession of Plaintiff's TD Bank-financed personal
automobile.

TD Bank provided Plaintiff with loan for the financing of used
automobile, when Plaintiff fell behind on loan payments, the
Defendant, or its agents, repossessed her vehicle without
providing any pre-repossession notice and failed to comply with
notice requirements after repossession, including by failing to
communicate where the vehicle has been taken, all in clear
violation of District of Columbia law.

The Plaintiff alleges that TD Bank violated the District of
Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, and the District of
Columbia Municipal Regulations regarding the sale and
repossession of motor vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          Esfand Nafisi, Esq.
          Migliaccio & RATHOD LLP
          412 H St. N.E.
          302 Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470 3520


TEXAS: Steward, et al. Suit Moved to Western District of Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Eric Steward, et al., on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated; ARC OF TEXAS,
INC.; Coalition of Texans with Disabilities, Inc.; Texas Atty.
General Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas; Charles Smith, Executive
Commissioner of Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Jon
Weizenbaum, Commissioner of the Texas Department of Aging and
Disability Services; State of Texas, the Plaintiffs, and United
States of America, the Intervenor Plaintiff, v. Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Movant, Case No. 1:18-mc-
00037, was removed from the District of Columbia, to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas (San Antonio) on
April 10, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:18-
mc-00317 to the proceeding.

The Arc of Texas promotes, protects, and advocates for the human
rights and self-determination of Texans with intellectual and
developmental disabilities.[BN]

Attorneys for Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS):

          Daniel Patrick Schaefer, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          555 Fourth Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20530
          Telephone: (202) 252 2531
          Facsimile: (202) 252 2599


TEXTILE VISION: "Reyes" Suit Seeks Minimum Wage
-----------------------------------------------
HENDRICKS REYES, on behalf of himself and all persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALAN MOSKOWITZ and TEXTILE VISION,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 651785/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April
13, 2018), seeks to recover minimum wage under the New York Labor
Law.

According to the complaint, approximately in or about September
2016, the Defendants employed Hendricks Reyes to work on every
aspect of the company's operations. Mr. Reyes performed a host of
duties, including heavy manual labor such as wheeling a laundry
cart filled with 80-plus pounds of fabric up and down 8th avenue
to transport fabric between the company and its suppliers and
customers. Mr. Reyes performed such manual labor in all weather
conditions, including rain, snow and extreme cold. Mr. Reyes was
a loyal and dedicated employee, working long hours, five days a
week, and, on occasion, six days a week for the entire time he
was employed by the Defendants.

When they hired Mr. Reyes, the Defendants informed him his work
schedule was from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. A few days after he worked
that schedule, Defendants began to require him to come in earlier
than 9am and stay past 5pm. The Defendants instructed Mr. Reyes
that he was required to be in the office for work early or later
depending on the delivery schedule for the company's ingoing and
outgoing deliveries. In other words, if a delivery or pickup was
scheduled outside the 9am-5pm window, Mr. Reyes has to be there.
The Defendants also assigned Mr. Reyes several other job
responsibilities, including sales and preparing orders for
deliveries or processing incoming deliveries. The Defendants
would instruct him when each task needed to be completed and
required that he work the hours necessary to complete the task
within the instructed timeframe.

As compensation, Defendants promised Plaintiff a payment of $100
per day and later (after one year) promised an increase to $120.
However, Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff as promised,
and in fact actually paid less than promised every week. When Mr.
Reyes complained that he was being paid less than promised,
Moskowitz said the company did not have enough money to pay the
promised wages. A comparison of the wages Defendants paid to the
Plaintiff against the wages that were due under federal and state
wage-and-hour laws, specifically, the New York State mandated
minimum wage; the New York State mandated overtime wage; and the
New York State required spread of hours laws, reveals that this
Plaintiff has been grossly underpaid.

The Defendant is a company in New York City that deals in the
resale of fabric and other textile and fashion goods. The company
is owned by defendant Alan Moskowitz.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mohammed Gangat, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED GANGAT
          675 3rd Avenue Suite 1810
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (718) 669 0714
          E-mail: mgangat@gangatpllc.com


THREE SONS: Fails to Pay Wages & Overtime, Marquez Says
-------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO MARQUEZ, an individual, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. THREE SONS, INC. DBA
AMERICAN MEAT COMPANIES, A professional corporation, and DOES 1-
50, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC701526 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
April 11, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages, including
overtime wages and reimbursements, missed meal and rest period,
penalty pay, statutory and waiting time penalties, injunctive and
other equitable relief, interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees
under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay overtime,
failed to pay wages for required donning and doffing, failed to
reimburse for required footwear, unlawfully rounded and altered
timecards, failed to authorize and/or permit employees to take
all required meal and rest breaks, failed to pay wages timely
upon discharge, paystub violations, and unlawful and unfair
business practices.

Three Sons, Inc. is in the meats, cured or smoked business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nazo Koulloukian, Esq.
          KOUL LAW FIRM
          A Professional Law Corporation
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 761 5484
          E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com

               - and -

          Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
          18250 Ventura Blvd.,
          Tarzana, CA 91356
          Telephone: (818) 609 0807
          Facsimile: (818) 609 0892


TRANSAM TRUCKING: Averts $100-Million Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
James Dornbrook, writing for Kansas City Business Journal,
reports that attorneys from Kansas City-based Seigfreid Bingham
PC earned a big victory in a case filed against client TransAm
Trucking Inc. of Olathe when a federal judge ruled that the case
did not qualify for class-action status. [GN]


TRANSDEV SERVICES: Bid to Amend 1st Amended "Berry" Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HOWARD BERRY and DAVID BERRY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRANSDEV
SERVICES, INC. d/b/a VEOLIA TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC.;
TRANSDEV NORTH AMERICA, INC., f/k/a/VEOLIA SERVICES, INC.; and
FIRST TRANSIT, INC., Defendants, Case No. 15-01299-RAJ (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Richard A. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiffs'
(i) Motion for Leave to File an Amended Class Action Complaint
and (ii)  Motion to Continue Class Certification Briefing
Deadlines.

The Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint in the Superior
Court of Washington on July 14, 2015.  The Defendants removed the
case to the Court on Aug. 14, 2015.  The Plaintiffs moved for
remand on Sept. 10, 2015.  Their motion for remand was denied.

On July 27, 2016, the Court entered an order pursuant to the
parties' stipulation to allow the Plaintiffs to file their First
Amended Complaint and to add First Transit, Inc. as a Defendant.
Defendant First Transit filed motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint and Transdev Services, Inc.'s cross-
claim.  On April 14, 2017, the Court denied First Transit's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, and
granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss Transdev
Services's cross-claim.

The Plaintiffs now request leave to amend their First Amended
Complaint to clarify that their state law claims include meal
breaks, and argue that such claims have already been a part of
the litigation and ongoing discovery.

After review of the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, the
balance of the record, and the parties' submissions, Judge Jones
finds that the Defendants would not be prejudiced by the
Plaintiffs' proposed amendments.  The Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint contains numerous references to meal breaks.  Although
these references refer to contracts between King County and the
Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege that these contracts govern the
Defendants' joint operations.  While the Plaintiffs did not
specifically state that they intended to amend their First
Amended Complaint to assert meal period violations, this
reference is more than sufficient to put the Defendants on notice
that meal breaks were at issue.

Further, the Judge finds no evidence of bad faith and declines to
determine whether the Plaintiffs' assertions are futile at this
stage in the litigation.  While the Plaintiffs request to amend
their First Amended Complaint a full year after filing it, he
finds that the Defendants will not be prejudiced by this delay.
Because the underlying purpose of Rule 15 is to facilitate a
decision on the merits, the Plaintiffs should be permitted an
opportunity to allege every relevant fact and argument in support
of their claims.

For these reasons, Judge Jones granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to amend their First Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiffs
will file their proposed amended complaint, filed as Exhibit A to
Docket No. 57, within one week of the date of the Order.

Pursuant to the Court's Order on July 27, 2016, case scheduling
deadlines will not be set under after the Court rules on the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  Other than the
deadline set for the filing of that Motion, which is the subject
of the Plaintiffs' pending motion for an extension of time, no
other deadlines have been set.

As he is granting the Plaintiffs leave to further amend their
complaint, Judge Jones also granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Continue Class Certification Briefing Deadlines.  He ordered the
parties to submit proposed deadlines related to class
certification briefing within one week.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/CWj5kF from Leagle.com.

Howard Berry & David Berry, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey
Lowell Needle, Jennifer Rust Murray --
jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
Toby James Marshall -- tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Erika L. Nusser --
enusser@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Transdev Services, Inc., formerly known as & Transdev North
America, Inc., formerly known as, Defendants, represented by
Anthony Todaro -- anthony.todaro@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US
LLP, Austin M. Rainwater -- austin.rainwater@dlapiper.com -- DLA
PIPER US LLP & Stellman Keehnel -- stellman.keehnel@dlapiper.com
-- DLA PIPER US LLP.

First Transit, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel L. Thieme -
- dthieme@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz
Martell -- bsmartell@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON & William
J. Kim -- wkim@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON.

Transdev Services, Inc. & Transdev North America, Inc., Cross
Claimants, represented by Anthony Todaro, DLA PIPER US LLP,
Austin M. Rainwater, DLA PIPER US LLP & Stellman Keehnel, DLA
PIPER US LLP.

First Transit, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel L.
Thieme, LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell, LITTLER
MENDELSON & William J. Kim, LITTLER MENDELSON.

First Transit, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Daniel L.
Thieme, LITTLER MENDELSON, Breanne Sheetz Martell, LITTLER
MENDELSON & William J. Kim, LITTLER MENDELSON.

Transdev Services, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Anthony
Todaro, DLA PIPER US LLP, Austin M. Rainwater, DLA PIPER US LLP &
Stellman Keehnel, DLA PIPER US LLP.


TUOLUMNE COUNTY, CA: Further Briefing in "Kerzich" Deal Needed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK KERZICH and TIMOTHY WERTZ, Plaintiffs, v.
COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE, Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-01116-DAD-SAB (),
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California has issued an order directing further
briefing on Plaintiffs' a motion for approval of a settlement.

On Feb. 2, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for approval of a
settlement under the Fair Labor Standards Act, requesting that
the settlement be approved, the matter be dismissed with
prejudice, and that attorneys' fees be awarded in the manner
agreed to by the parties.  The Court heard argument on the motion
on March 6, 2018.

During the hearing on the matter, the Plaintiffs requested that
they be allowed to supplement their motion, in response to the
Court's questions posed at the hearing.  The Defendant did not
object to this request, and Judge Drozd therefore granted the
Plaintiffs 28 days from the date of service of the order to file
and serve a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for
approval addressing the following questions as well as any other
matters that may aid the Court in resolution of the pending
motion:

     1. At Docket Number 58-4, the Plaintiffs provided what
appear to be calculations concerning the value of their various
claims and which were relied upon in reaching the settlement.
The Plaintiffs must address: (i) who generated this document and
performed the calculations set forth therein; (ii) whether the
numbers in columns three and four of the sheet at Docket Number
58-4 depict the maximum value of any unpaid overtime wages for
the class member indicated; (iii) whether the numbers in column
three and four of the sheet at Docket Number 58-4 include any
liquidated damages which might have been available, or if they
simply reflect the unpaid wages; (iv) whether the figures in
columns three and four of the sheet at Docket Number 58-4 were
calculated using a two-year or three-year statute of limitations;
and (v) why the cash-in-lieu claim was discounted by 25%, as
appears to be reflected in column six of the document.

     2. The motion for approval of the settlement indicates that
$25,000 of the settlement amount will be allocated to officers
who were underpaid overtime wages because payment enhancements
for their service as canine officers were not included in their
base rate of pay (referred to by the parties as the canine
claim).  A declaration supplied by the Plaintiff's counsel
explains that the damages for this class were calculated by
paying a half-hour at the overtime rate for each day in each pay
period in which the employee performed canine-related duties and
received canine pay, during the two years prior to Jan. 8, 2017,
when canine pay began to be included by the County in the base
rate of pay.  The Plaintiffs must address: (i) why the damages
for the canine claim were calculated in this manner, and (ii)
whether the figures included at Docket Number 58-5 reflect the
full amount of damages calculated for the canine claim, using the
metric.

     3. The settlement agreement calls for the award of $150,000
in attorneys' fees and costs, as well as an additional 20% of the
settlement amount allocated to the Plaintiffs' damages.

         (i) The settlement agreement indicates that $195,000 of
the settlement will be allocated to the Flores claim and that
amount will be reduced by 20% due to the additional attorneys'
fees. Twenty percent of $195,000 is $39,000.  The settlement
agreement also indicates that $25,000 of the settlement will be
allocated to the canine claim. (Id.) Twenty percent of $25,000 is
$5,000.  Combining these two, it would seem that the Plaintiffs'
counsel seeks an additional award of $44,000 in attorneys' fees
from the allocated damages under the settlement agreement.
However, other documents provided by counsel indicate they may be
seeking $45,000 in additional attorneys' fees to be awarded from
the allocated as damages.  The Plaintiffs are to clarify which
amount of additional attorneys' fees is sought.

         (ii) The total amount of attorneys' fees the Plaintiffs'
counsel seeks in this matter is $195,000, which includes $150,000
designated as attorneys' fees and costs by the settlement
agreement, plus approximately 20% of the allocated for damages
under the settlement agreement.  A $195,000 award of attorneys'
fees from a $375,000 settlement would mean that 52% of the total
settlement fund will be paid out as attorneys' fees.  The
Plaintiffs must explain why such an award of attorneys' fees is
reasonable, and why the settlement here remains fair and
reasonable despite the high percentage of the total settlement to
be awarded as attorneys' fees.

     4. The motion for attorneys' fees indicates that $2,500 is
sought as incentive payments to be awarded to each of the named
Plaintiffs in the action.  However, no explanation regarding why
incentive payments should be awarded in the case has been
provided to the court.  The Plaintiffs must provide evidence in
support of and an explanation as to why $2,500 incentive payments
are warranted for each of the named Plaintiffs in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/GsohoI from Leagle.com.

Mark Kerzich, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated
individuals & Timothy Wertz, on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Gary
Marc Messing -- gary@majlabor.com -- Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP,
Jason H. Jasmine -- jason@majlabor.com -- Messing Adam & Jasmine
LLP & Donald Paul Bird, II -- Paul@MAJLabor.com -- Messing Adam &
Jasmine LLP.

County of Tuolumne, Defendant, represented by Arthur A. Hartinger
-- ahartinger@publiclawgroup.com -- Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai,
LLC & Kevin P. McLaughlin, Renne Sloan Holtzman Sakai LLP.


TRUEBLUE INC: Fails to Pay All Wages Due, Gates Says
----------------------------------------------------
OTIS GATES, On behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. TRUBLUE, INC.; and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. RG18900539 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
April 11, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid Wages under the
California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that during the Class Period, Employers
employed thousands of Laborers in California whom it classified
as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis. During the Class
Period, Employers' Laborers have regularly worked in excess of
three and one-half hours in a day without being afforded a rest
period of at least ten minutes for every four hours worked, or
major fraction thereof. The Plaintiff has been subject to these
policies and practices. Employers' policy is not to pay Laborers
one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of
compensation for each workday that an earned off-duty meal period
is not provided. Under this policy, Plaintiff and Class Members
have been denied meal period payments required by the California
Labor Code. Employers' policy is also not to pay Laborers one
additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of
compensation for each workday that a rest period is not
authorized and permitted. Under this policy, the Plaintiff and
Class Members have been denied rest break payments required by
the California Labor Code. Employers have failed to record the
accurate gross wages earned by the Plaintiff and Class Members.
As a result, Employers have failed properly to itemize the gross
wages earned on wage statements furnished to Plaintiff and Class
Members.

TrueBlue, Inc., incorporated on March 18, 1985, is a provider of
specialized workforce solutions. The Company is engaged in
providing staffing, on-site workforce management and recruitment
process outsourcing services.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff, the putative class and all persons
similarly situated:

          Arthur W. Lazear, Esq.
          Morgan M. Mack, Esq.
          LAZEAR MACK LLP 411 435-14TH Street, No. 1117
          Oakland, CA 94612 511
          Telephone: (510) 735 6316
          Facsimile: (510) 545 4226
          E-mail: arthur@lazearmack.com
                  morgan@lazearmack.com


TOMRA METRO: "Lawson" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under Labor Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
JUMA LAWSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. TOMRA METRO, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 705470/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., April 10, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages, attorneys' fees, costs, pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest, and liquidated damages under New York
Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has failed to pay
Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages to which they are
entitled under the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York
State Department of Labor Regulations. By Defendant's knowing
and/or intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members
overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a
week, the Defendant has willfully violated New York Labor
Law.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the putative New York Class:

          Louis Ginsberg, Esq.
          THE LAW FIRM OF LOUIS GINSBERG, P.C.
          1613 Northern Boulevard
          Roslyn, N.Y. 11576
          Telephone: (516) 625 0105


TOW INC: Faces "Coleman-House" Wage-and-Hour Suit
-------------------------------------------------
THEODORE COLEMAN-HOUSE, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. AN TOW, INC., a California
corporation dba LA TOWING; ALI REZA ARYAN, an individual; and
DOES 1 to 100, Inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC702029 (Cal.
Super. Ct., April 13, 2018), seeks to recover civil penalties
permitted by the California Labor Code Section 2699.

The Plaintiff seeks only to recover Private Attorneys General Act
civil penalties for himself, and on behalf of all aggrieved
employees that worked for Defendants. The Plaintiff does not seek
to recover anything other than penalties as permitted by
California Labor Code Section 2699. To the extent that statutory
violations are mentioned for wage violations, Plaintiff does not
seek underlying general and/or special damages for those
violations, but simply the civil penalties permitted by
California Labor Code Section 2699.

Penalties sought for the underlying violations are for the
following statutory violations: its failure to provide mandated
timely meal periods and rest periods; failure to pay all wages
due and owing; (ii) failure to issue accurate itemized wage
statements to employees; failure to pay waiting time penalties;
(v) and failure to pay all minimum/overtime wages, amongst other
violations of the California Labor Code, Wage Orders and PAGA.
These actions led to a culture of employees not being fully paid
for all their work as required under the California Labor Code.
The Defendant's time records and policies will confirm these
violations, including other numerous violations of various laws
including but not necessarily limited to PAGA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
          Alfredo Nava, Esq.
          Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, PC
          433 N. Camden Dr., Ste. 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496 4818
          Facsimile: (310) 510 6429
          E-mail: mike@crosnerlegal.com
                  zach@crosnerlegal.com
                  alfredo@crosnerlegal.com


UA 1270: Shalahin, et al. Sue over Cancellation of Flight
---------------------------------------------------------
DMYTRO SHALAHIN, ANNA SHALAHIN-PASECHKO, YAROSLAV BOBILYAK,
NATALIIA BOBILIAK, SERGII TYMOFTEI, TETIANA TYMOFTEI,
OLEXANDER SHALAHIN, STAS TYMOFTEI 5143 N. East River Rd
Unit 160F Chicago, Illinois 60656, the Plaintiffs, v. UNITED
AIRLINES INC., 1600 Smith ST HQSTX Houston TX 77002 a foreign
corporations, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-0257 (N.D. Ill.,
April 10, 2018), seeks to recover actual, general and special
damages for cancellation of flight from Tampa to Chicago, as well
as under other legal theories incorporated under the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction.

According the complaint, on or about September 10, 2017 the
Plaintiffs were scheduled to fly from Tampa to Chicago, on the
board of defendant's flight UA 1270, which was subsequently
cancelled.  United Airlines refused to re-book the Plaintiffs to
another flight from Tampa to Chicago.

United Airlines, commonly referred to as United, is a major U.S.
airline headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. It is the world's
third-largest airline when measured by revenue, after American
Airlines and Delta Air Lines.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky, Esq.
          GOROKHOVSKY LAW OFFICE, LLC
          10919 N. Hedgewood Ln.,
          Mequon, WI 53092
          Telephone: (414) 581 1582
          E-mail: gorlawoffice@yahoo.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Amend "O'Connor" PAGA Claim Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOUGLAS O'CONNOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-03826-EMC
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion amend a claim under California's Private
Attorney General Act ("PAGA").

The Plaintiffs have sought to amend a claim under PAGA into the
case since March 2015; the Court has deferred resolution of the
request on several occasions because, inter alia, an identical
PAGA claim was pending in Los Angeles Superior Court in Price v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. BC554512 (Cal. Sup. Ct.).  On
Jan. 18, 2018, the Superior Court in Price approved a settlement
of a PAGA claim covering the period from July 8, 2013 to Jan. 29,
2017, for any individual who consented to a background check as
part of the sign-up process to use Uber software application
and/or used the Uber software application to generate leads in
California" during that period.

Upon the Price settlement, the Plaintiffs renewed their request
to amend a PAGA claim to be brought by Plaintiff Thomas Colopy
covering only the post-Price period after Jan. 29, 2017.

After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, Judge Chen
will deny the Plaintiffs' request for amendment at this time,
without prejudice to their ability to renew the request after the
Ninth Circuit has resolved the appeal of the Court's prior orders
concerning class certification and the enforceability of Uber's
arbitration agreements.

As a preliminary matter, because the events supporting the PAGA
claim arise after Jan. 29, 2017, they arise after the filing of
the original complaint and therefore an amendment would
constitute a supplemental pleading under Rule 15.

The Plaintiffs' argument for inserting a PAGA claim into the case
is premised on the assumption that the Court would bifurcate
trial such that the PAGA claim would be adjudicated in an
expedited manner while the Ninth Circuit appeal is pending and
before the certified Rule 23 claims.  Alternatively, the
Plaintiffs argue that trial could proceed on Plaintiff Colopy's
individual Labor Code Section 2802 claim and the predicate
question of employee/independent contractor status, resolution of
which would also determine whether Mr. Colopy is an "aggrieved
employee" with standing to bring a PAGA claim.

Judge Chen would not accept the Plaintiffs' proposed trial plan
if amendment were permitted.  Though other courts have bifurcated
trial of individual Labor Code claims in advance of a
representative PAGA claim premised on the same Labor Code
violation, no court appears to have followed that procedure in a
case where, as here, a Rule 23 class on the same claim has been
certified and is pending.  That adds a layer of procedural
complexity to the present case that does not appear in others.
It also introduces a number of potential complications to which
Plaintiffs have offered no persuasive response.

Moreover, the Judge says, the one-way intervention rule prevents
a Court from adjudicating a class claim on the merits before
notice has been sent to the class.  Although it does not apply
directly here because a class has already been certified and
noticed, if the class definition is modified in a way that
requires a new notice to be issued, that could be problematic
under the rule.  Although a PAGA trial or resolution of Mr.
Colopy's individual claim under Labor Code Section 2802 would not
technically constitute class adjudication, it would include
factual and legal issues that are so "interwoven" with the Rule
23 class claim that serious questions would be raised.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' proposal raises
significant case administration concerns.  He says putting aside
whether adjudication of PAGA claims may generally take into
account the question of manageability, amending in a PAGA claim
may complicate manageability and judicial efficiency of this case
which includes a Rule 23 class action, factors relevant in
considering a request to supplement pleadings under Rule 15.
Multiple overlapping trials would likely be required.

For those reasons, amendment is unwarranted at this time,
particularly because if it were permitted, the PAGA claims would
remain stayed with the rest of the case not only to avoid the
problems identified above, but also because it is impossible to
gauge the resulting impact of PAGA claims when the scope of the
Rule 23 class action is not yet known.  There thus does not
appear to be any compelling reason to permit amendment; there is
no looming statute of limitations for the PAGA claim, for
example.

Notably, the Plaintiffs' counsel identified no reason why Mr.
Colopy cannot pursue his PAGA claim in Superior Court where a
PAGA case (albeit different in scope as currently framed) is
pending.

For these reasons, Judge Chen denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion.  He advised the parties that, in future
filings, they will make only sparing, efficient, and reasonable
use of footnotes.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/rW4Ww5 from Leagle.com.

Douglas O'Connor, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano --
apagano@llrlaw.com -- Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac
vice.

Douglas O'Connor, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Ben Weber -- bweber@llrlaw.com -- Lichten
and Liss-Riordan, P.C., Benjamin J. Meiselas, Geragos and
Geragos, APC, Brian Stephen Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP,
Brian C. Tackenberg -- btackenberg@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac
vice, George R. Baise, Jr. -- gbaise@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Jennifer R. Liakos, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, John Granville
Crabtree, pro hac vice, Mark J. Geragos, Geragos & Geragos, APC,
Matthew David Carlson -- mcarlson@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-
Riordan, P.C., Sara Smolik, Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C.,
Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shant Arthur
Karnikian -- sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Thomas Colopy, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano, Lichten
and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August, Browne
George Ross LLP, Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles
Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice, George R.
Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice,
Matthew David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Sara Smolik,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C..

Matthew Manahan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice,
Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice,
George R. Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro
hac vice, Matthew David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. &
Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Elie Gurfinkel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Ben Weber, Lichten and Liss-Riordan,
P.C., Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles Morris
Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice, George R. Baise,
Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice, Matthew
David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shannon Liss-
Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Ronald Gillette, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon Liss-Riordan,
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Adelaide Pagano, Lichten and Liss-
Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August, Browne George Ross
LLP, Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Brian C.
Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and
Auslander, pro hac vice, George R. Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John
Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice, Theodore Walter Maya, Ahdoot &
Wolfson, P.C. & William Copley Jhaveri-Weeks, Goldstein, Borgen,
Dardarian & Ho.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael
Spurchise -- aspurchise@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Marcellus Antonio McRae -- mmcrae@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Theane D. Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law, Brandon J. Stoker --
bstoker@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Debra
Wong Yang -- dwongyang@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn Crutcher
LLP, Dhananjay Saikrishna Manthripragada --
dmanthripragada@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, John
C. Fish, Jr. -- jfish@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC,
Joshua Seth Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
and Crutcher LLP, Kevin Joseph Ring-Dowell --
kringdowell@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Stephen A. Swedlow -- stephenswedlow@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice & Theane Evangelis
Kapur, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

7x7 Executive Transportation LLC, Defendant, represented by James
Parton, III, Parton & Sell PC.

Rasier-CA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael
Spurchise, Littler Mendelson, P.C..

Caren Ehret, Movant, represented by Myron Milton Cherry --
mcherry@cherry-law.com -- Myron M. Cherry & Associates LLC.

Ricardo Del Rio, Movant, represented by Christopher James Hamner
-- chamner@hamnerlaw.com -- Hamner Law Offices, APC, Amy Tai
Wootton, Hamner Law Offices, APC, Benjamin J. Meiselas, Geragos
and Geragos, APC, Brian Stephen Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP, Joshua H. Haffner, Kabateck Kellner LLP, Mark J. Geragos,
Geragos & Geragos, APC & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown
Kellner LLP.

Greg Fisher, Movant, represented by Christopher James Hamner,
Hamner Law Offices, APC.

John Doe, Movant, Pro Se.

Todd Johnston, Movant, represented by Brian J. Malloy, The Brandi
Law Firm.

Steven Price, Interested Party, represented by Christopher John
Morosoff, Law Office of Christopher J. Morosoff & Douglas Caiafa,
Attorney at Law.

City of Cleveland, Ohio, Interested Party, represented by Carl E.
Meyer, City of Cleveland.

Rosario Richardson, Interested Party, represented by Carey A.
James -- caj@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith and Marcy & Shant
Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Kathy Robinson, Interested Party, Pro Se.

Leticia Alcala, Objector, represented by Hunter J. Shkolnik,
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Paul Napoli, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, pro hac
vice, Jennifer R. Liakos, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC & Shant Arthur
Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Marc Borgen, Objector, represented by Hunter J. Shkolnik, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC, Paul Napoli, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Jennifer R.
Liakos,

Napoli Shkolnik PLLC & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown
Kellner LLP.

Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Objector, represented by Andre Emilio
Jardini -- aej@kpclegal.com -- Knapp Petersen & Clarke.

Uladzimir Tabola, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky --
alexei@sfbizlaw.com -- Klein Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian -
sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Alexander Kazakov, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky,
Klein Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP.

Yahor Zgurski, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky, Klein
Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Maksim Hancharuk, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky,
Klein Law Group.

Omar Zine, Objector, represented by Christopher John Gansen,
Gansen Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP.

Nahabet Narsis, Objector, represented by Kevin Todd Barnes, Law
Offices of Kevin T. Barnes.

Jorge Zunigas, Objector, represented by Mark Alan Morrison --
markmorrison@paulhastings.com -- Morrison and Associates.

Jason Rosenberg, Objector, represented by Mark Alan Morrison,
Morrison and Associates.

David Lanier, Amicus, represented by Christopher G. Jagard,
McCurdy Ku & John Cumming, Department of Industrial Relations.

Abdo Ghazi, Intervenor, represented by Alec Llewellyn Segarich,
Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich LLP, Conor Daniel Granahan, Law Offices
of Conor Granahan, Jason Shelton Lohr, Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich
LLP & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.


UNIVERSAL PROTECTION: Fails to Pay OT Wages, Collick et al. Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
KOREY COLLICK 2009 Darnell Ct. Waldorf, MD 20602 TASHARE KING
2914 Saint Moritz Dr. #302 Temple Hills, MD 20748 ADETOLANBO
OLONIYON 5503 Auth Rd. Suitland, MD 20746 individually and on
behalf of a class of persons, the Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSAL
PROTECTION SERVICE LLC Eight Tower Bridge 161 Washington Street,
Suite 600 Conshohocken, PA 19428 Serve: Registered Agent, CT
Corporation System 1015 15th Street NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC
20005; ALLIED BARTON SECURITY SERVICES 1400 I Street, NW Suite
600 Washington, DC 20005 Serve: Registered Agent, CT Corporation
System 1015 15th Street NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20005; and
ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES 1400 I Street, NW Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005 Serve: Registered Agent, CT Corporation
System 1015 15th Street NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20005, the
Defendants, Case No. 2018-CA-002462-8 (D.C. Super. Ct., April 13,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees and all other costs and expenses as
permitted by the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act
and the District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants were contracted to
provide security services to buildings housing the International
Monetary Fund, located in the District of Columbia, until January
1, 2018. The Defendants employed security guards, and, during the
course of the guards' employment, defendants required these
employees to perform work prior to the scheduled start of their
shift and after the scheduled time that their shifts ended. This
pre-shift work included activities such as obtaining equipment
(including but not limited to firearms, ammunition, speed
loaders, radios, pepper spray, and handcuffs); obtaining their
daily assignments; and signing in with and speaking to a
supervisor about their shifts. After their shift ended,
Defendants required the security guards to perform additional
work such as turning in their firearms, ammunition, speed
loaders, pepper spray, handcuffs, radios, and then turning in
their daily activity logs to their supervisors. At all times
material herein, these pre-shift and post-shift work activities
took approximately 30 minutes or more each day. At some point in
2014 or 2015, the Defendants began providing the security guards
with 15 minutes of overtime compensation for their pre-shift
work. This amount did not cover all of the pre-shift work
performed by Plaintiffs. At no point have Defendants provided
overtime compensation for Plaintiffs post-shift work.

Universal Protection Service, LLC provides security solutions.
The Company specializes in the design, installation, and
monitoring of security and fire monitoring systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
          ROBERT B. FITZPATRICK PLLC
          1666 Connecticut A venue NW Suite 230
          Washington, D.C. 20009
          Telephone: (202) 588 5300
          Facsimile: (202) 354 5421
          E-mail: rfitzpatrick@robertbfitzpatrick.com

               - and -

          Gregory K. McGillivary, Esq.
          Sara L. Faulman, Esq.
          WOODLEY & McGILLIVARY LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave NW No. 1000
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone: (202) 833 8855
          Facsimile: (202) 452 1090
          E-mail: gkm@wmlaborlaw.com
                  slf@wmlaborlaw.com


VISTA PAINT: Parking Lot Not Accessible to Disabled, Pizzaro Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RAMON PIZZARO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. VISTA PAINT CORPORATION, the
Defendant, Case No. BC701090 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 10, 2018),
seeks to recover statutory damages and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs as a result of Defendant's violation of California's
anti-discrimination state statutes, the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
California Code, and the California Disabled Persons Act.

According to the complaint, on December 5, 2017, the Plaintiff
patronized the Vista Paint store located at 17445 Beach Blvd.,
Huntington Beach, CA to purchase goods and suffered
discrimination as a result of being denied full and equal access
to the store's parking lot. The Plaintiff was deterred from
parking in a handicap accessible parking space because the
parking lot did not have an adequate number of handicap
accessible parking spaces. In addition to not having the minimum
required amount of handicap accessible parking spaces, the
parking lot also lacked handicap accessible parking signage to
deter the use of handicap spaces by persons that are not
disabled. For example, the parking lot did not have additional
signage below the symbol of accessibility stating minimum fine
$250.00." As a result, Plaintiff was unable to park in a handicap
accessible parking space.

On December 29, 2017, the Plaintiff attempted to resolve this
dispute without the need for litigation by providing Defendant
with written notice and the opportunity to cure by requesting
that Defendant make accessible the 17445 Beach Blvd., Huntington
Beach, CA location. In his correspondence to the store manager,
the Plaintiff informed him or her that the store's parking lot is
not accessible to him for the above reasons, and asked that these
problems be fixed within 30 days. The Plaintiff did not seek any
monies or statutory damages. The Plaintiff received no response
to his December 209, 2017 letter. As a result, he is now being
deterred from patronizing all of Defendant's locations.

Vista Paint Corporation manufactures painting products. It offers
paints which includes primer, stain, finish, specialty, acoustic
kote, graffiti block, weather master, acribond, eggshell, gloss,
and sheen.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          9595 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 900
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 534 2590
          Facsimile: (310) 247 0160


WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Quash Subpoena in "Phipps" OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHERYL PHIPPS and SHAWN GIBBONS, Plaintiffs, v. WAL-
MART STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:12-cv-01009 (M.D.
Tenn.), Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division,
granted the Defendant's Motion to Quash the Subpoena to Hay
Group, Inc.

In this employment discrimination class action, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendant discriminated against them because of
their gender.  Among other claims, the Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendant's compensation policies, including its failure to
require managers to base pay decisions for individual employees
on job-related criteria, such as experience or documented
performance, have had an adverse impact upon its female employees
in Region 43.

The Hay Group is a third party consultant that worked with the
Defendant during the time of the Dukes litigation.  The Parties
have been involved in a discovery dispute regarding documents
related to the Hay Group's work.  Those documents have been
loosely termed "the Hay Group documents."  In addition to moving
to compel production of the Hay Group documents from the
Defendant, the Plaintiffs also served document requests by
subpoena on the Hay Group.

The documents requested are:

     1. All documents pertaining to the creation and
implementation of a new pay classification structure at
Defendant's stores, including but not limited to: (a) all
questionnaires and surveys conducted by you or anyone acting at
your direction or request, including responses to those
questionnaires and surveys, and any analyses or summaries of
same; (b) all documents related to focus groups, interviews, or
site visits conducted by you or anyone acting at your direction
or request, including but not limited to dates and locations of
those focus groups, interviews and site visits, minutes,
transcripts, agendas, notes, attendance records and recordings;
(c) all documents reflecting the methods and analyses you used in
formulating recommendations about the Defendant's pay
classification structure; (d) all documents related to a
neutralization adjustment made by the Defendant, to adjust pay
rates at the time of implementing the new hourly pay structure in
a manner which would reduce gender disparities; and (e) any
communications on the above listed topics.

     2. All documents related to any recommendations or proposals
made by you to the Defendant concerning the Defendant's
evaluation of or compensation for hourly or salaried employees
working in the Defendant's retail stores, including any
communications with Defendant regarding same.

     3. All documents related to any recommendations or proposals
made by you to the Defendant concerning its policies or
procedures for considering and selecting individuals for
promotion to any position in its retail stores, including any
communications with Defendant regarding same.

Before the Court is Wal-Mart Stores's Motion to Quash the
Subpoena to Hay Group, Inc.  It has also filed a supporting
Memorandum of Law.  The Plaintiffs have filed a Response in
Opposition.

As the documents sought are exclusively those related to the Hay
Group's work with the Defendant, Magistrate Judge Frensley finds
that the Defendant has standing to challenge the subpoena to the
Hay Group.

On timely motion, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the court to quash or modify a subpoena that: (1) does
not allow reasonable time to comply; (2) requires a non-party to
travel more than 100 miles from his or her residence; (3)
requires disclosure of a privileged or protected matter; or (4)
subjects a person to an undue burden.

The Magistrate Judge finds that the Court has previously found
that the documents sought by the subpoena to the Hay Group are
protected by the work product doctrine.  Because compliance with
the subpoena would require the Hay Group to disclose protected
matter, for the reasons explained in the Court's prior Order, he
granted the Defendant's Motion, and quashed the subpoena to the
Hay Group.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OD6jRs from Leagle.com.

Cheryl Phipps & Shawn Gibbons, On Behalf of Themselves and all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian C.
Corman, Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll PLLC, Christine Webber --
cwebber@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll
PLLC, David W. Garrison -- dgarrison@barretjohnston.com --
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jocelyn D. Larkin,
Impact Fund, Joseph M. Sellers -- jsellers@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Scott P. Tift --
stift@barretjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC & Seth Marcus Hyatt -- shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda Machin --
amachin@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Aubrey B.
Harwell, Jr. -- aharwell@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC,
Catherine Conway, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Gerald David
Neenan, Neal & Harwell, J. Graham Matherne --
gmatherne@wyattfirm.com -- Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs (Nashville
Office), Mark A. Perry -- mperry@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, Michele L. Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Olivia Adendorff --
oadendorff@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (Dallas
Office), Rachel S. Brass -- rbrass@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, LLP & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


WAL-MART STORES: Must Provide Docs in "Phipps" Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHERYL PHIPPS and SHAWN GIBBONS, Plaintiffs, v. WAL-
MART STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:12-cv-01009 (M.D.
Tenn.), Magistrate Judge Jeffery S. Frensley of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division,
granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel Production of Documents.

In this employment discrimination class action, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendant discriminated against them because of
their gender.  Among other claims, the Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendant's compensation policies, including its failure to
require managers to base pay decisions for individual employees
on job-related criteria, such as experience or documented
performance, have had an adverse impact upon its female employees
in Region 43.

The instant Motion seeks to compel Defendant to produce all
documents related to its analysis of and changes to the job
descriptions, compensation policies, and performance evaluations
used for the Defendant's retail positions, in response to the
Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents 5, 6, and 7.
The Defendant worked closely with a third party consultant called
the Hay Group on this project, and thus the Plaintiffs refer to
this collection of documents as Hay Group documents although that
is not intended to limit the request to documents created by the
Hay Group.

The Defendant responded to Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, and
7 by objecting on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and
attorney work product doctrine, among other, more general
objections.  Further, in response to Requests for Production Nos.
5 and 7, it stated that in addition, it objects to the Request on
the grounds that it is overbroad, not proportionate to the needs
of the case, and to the extent it seeks documents that are not
relevant to the Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the challenged
practices or the alleged 'core group of decisionmakers' in Region
43.

The Plaintiffs contend that these documents are highly relevant
to the Plaintiffs' disparate impact claims.  The Defendant has
withheld some of the Hay Group documents from production, and
argues that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to discover them
because: 1) the Plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent the
Court's prior Order mandating production only of responsive
documents that were provided to the Region 43 decision makers; 2)
the Hay Group documents are protected by attorney-client
privilege; and 3) the Hay Group documents are protected by the
work product doctrine.  The Plaintiffs dispute that the documents
are protected by either privilege or the work product doctrine,
but assert that even if they were, Defendant has waived those
protections by producing some Hay Group documents but not
similar, related documents.

Magistrate Judge Frensley granted in part and denied in part the
instant Motion.  He ordered the Defendant to produce non-
privileged, non-protected documents responsive to the Plaintiffs'
Requests for Production Nos. 5, 6, and 7, without regard to
whether such documents were shared with the "core decisionmakers"
of Region 43.

He finds that in those cases, if any, where the Defendant can
establish by reference to the criteria that a document is
attorney-client privileged, then it may protect the document from
production.  Otherwise, he finds that the Hay Group documents are
not, as a group, protected by the attorney-client privilege.

The Magistrate Judge also finds that the Hay Group documents are
relevant for the purposes of discovery in the matter.  He says
if, as the Plaintiff alleges, compensation system changes that
affected the pay of employees within Region 43 were the result of
decisions were made above the level of the Region 43
decisionmakers, with no discretion left to those decisionmakers
to modify or otherwise deviate from the upper-level decisions,
then documents reflecting those decisions are relevant to the
Plaintiffs' claims of disparate impact, regardless of whether
they were shared with Region 43 decisionmakers.

Given that the Parties were engaged in ongoing discussion
regarding the Hay Group documents were prepared in the course of
business, and not in anticipation of litigation, the Magistrate
finds that the Defendant proceeded reasonably in invoking the
claw-back provision in early January.  In light of that, he finds
that disclosure of these documents does not constitute a waiver
of any protection to which the documents may be entitled.

Finally, he finds that to the extent that Court's prior Order,
addressing another Motion to Compel filed by Plaintiffs, was made
above the level of the Region 43 decision makers, as the
Plaintiff asserts, he agrees that whether documents were provided
to Region 43 decision makers is irrelevant, and therefore finds
that its prior Order does not restrict the Plaintiffs' ability to
discover Hay Group documents.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 7, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/VZX04v from Leagle.com.

Cheryl Phipps & Shawn Gibbons, On Behalf of Themselves and all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian C.
Corman, Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll PLLC, Christine Webber --
cwebber@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll
PLLC, David W. Garrison -- dgarrison@barretjohnston.com --
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jocelyn D. Larkin,
Impact Fund, Joseph M. Sellers -- jsellers@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen, Milstein, Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Scott P. Tift --
stift@barretjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC & Seth Marcus Hyatt -- shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda Machin --
amachin@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Aubrey B.
Harwell, Jr. -- aharwell@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC,
Catherine Conway, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Gerald David
Neenan, Neal & Harwell, J. Graham Matherne --
gmatherne@wyattfirm.com -- Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs (Nashville
Office), Mark A. Perry -- mperry@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, Michele L. Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Olivia Adendorff --
oadendorff@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (Dallas
Office), Rachel S. Brass -- rbrass@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, LLP & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


WILSON SPORTING: Baseball Bat Non-Compliant, Sheeley & WalKer Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
THEODORE SHEELEY and TIMOTHY WAL KER, individually and on behalf
of similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. WILSON
SPORTING GOODS CO., a Delaware corporation, the Defendant, Case
No. 2018-CH-04770 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., April 12, 2018),
seeks to recover damages and restitution from Defendant for
selling products that did not conform to its representations and
warranties to consumers.

The Defendant is one of the largest manufacturers and sellers of
sporting goods and equipment in the country, including a number
of different types of baseball bats under a variety of brands it
owns and operates. The Defendant manufactures and distributes a
popular, premium brand of baseball bats known as the "Delvlarini"
brand. A large number of Defendant's customers play in various
local and national leagues that adhere to USSSA standards for
baseball bat manufacturing. Accordingly, a number of Defendant's
DcMarini baseball bats arc specifically labeled and advertised as
being "USSSA" compliant. However, a recent "audit" of several
models of DcMarini "youth baseball bats" has revealed that the
baseball bats purchased by Plaintiffs and the other members of
the proposed Class are not actually USSSA compliant, and cannot
be used for play in any league that adheres to USSSA regulations.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and
on behalf of similarly situated consumers in Illinois and
elsewhere nationwide to obtain redress for those who purchased
DeMarini baseball bats that failed to comply with USSSA
regulations.

Wilson Sporting Goods Company is an American sports equipment
manufacturer based in Chicago, Illinois. Since 1989, it has been
a subsidiary of the Finnish group Amer Sports.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the putative class members:

          Paul T. Geske, Esq.
          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          Facsimile: (312) 275 7895
          E-mail: nuncguire@mcb,rpc.com
                  pgeske@mcgpc.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN LAW FINN, LTD.
          55 West Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 327 3386
          Facsimile: (888) 396 2478
          E-mail: smorgan@smorgan-law.com


YALE UNIVERSITY: Loses Bid to Dismiss ERISA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg BNA, reports that Yale
University is the latest college to lose an early round in a
proposed class action challenging how it manages its retirement
plan.

A federal judge on March 30 refused to dismiss most claims
against the school, including claims challenging the retirement
plan's administrative and investment fees.  The Yale workers who
filed suit are also moving forward with claims challenging the
"locked-in" nature of the plan's record-keeping services, which
the judge said may have prevented the school from properly
monitoring the plan's investments and record-keeping fees.

The workers scored another big win when the judge declined to
dismiss claims that Yale was wrong to offer retail share classes
of various plan investments.

The Yale lawsuit is one of a growing number of Employee
Retirement Income Security Act cases to argue that plan
fiduciaries should be held liable if they offer more expensive
retail share classes when identical institutional share classes
are available at a lower cost.  The federal courts have disagreed
over whether this is a viable claim under ERISA.  Judges have
allowed such claims to proceed against Cornell, Emory, and MIT,
while Johns Hopkins, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania
saw such claims dismissed. In 2017, a long-running class action
against Edison International forced the company to pay more than
$13 million for retirement plan violations, including its
decision to offer retail share classes.

Yale is one of more than a dozen prominent colleges to be hit
with proposed class actions challenging their retirement plans in
recent years.  So far, the University of Pennsylvania is the only
school to defeat one of these cases outright, with judges
allowing similar challenges to proceed against Cornell, Columbia,
Duke, Emory, New York University, Johns Hopkins, Princeton,
Vanderbilt, and the University of Chicago.

The March 30 decision in the Yale case was mostly a victory for
the university workers who filed suit, but the judge did dismiss
some claims against the school.  The judge dismissed allegations
that the school acted disloyally in managing its retirement plan.

The judge also said it wasn't wrong for Yale to offer "too many"
investment options in its retirement plan.  The workers said
overly large investment lineups leave employees confused and
paralyzed by indecision, but the judge said they offered no
indication that any specific employee was actually confused by
Yale's investment lineup.

Judge Alvin W. Thompson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut wrote the decision.

Schlichter Bogard & Denton LLP and Cohen & Wolf PC represent the
university workers.  Mayer Brown LLP represents Yale.

The case is Vellali v. Yale Univ., D. Conn., No. 3:16-cv-01345-
AWT, order partly denying motion to dismiss 3/30/18. [GN]


* New Wisconsin Legislation Expected to Modify Class-Action Rules
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erika Strebel, writing for Wisconsin Law Journal, reports that
Gov. Scott Walker was expected on April 3 to sign legislation
making a long list of changes to the state's civil litigation
rules.

Among the many changes, Assembly Bill 773 modifies the state's
construction statute of repose, which contractors commonly invoke
as a defense in certain personal-injury lawsuits.  The statute
prevents injured plaintiffs from suing over negligent design for
an injury that occurred more than 10 years after a project was
substantially completed.  A provision in AB 773 shrinks that
window to seven years.

Also under the bill, insurers will see a decrease in the interest
rate they must pay on overdue claims.  The proposed change lowers
the rate from 12 percent to 7.5 percent.

AB 773 will also make changes to the state's rules of discovery,
which lawyers use to gather facts that are relevant to their
cases.  Among other things, the changes would adopt a new scope-
of-discovery provision that includes a proportionality
requirement identical to the one found in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The changes will also, except in instances when a court orders
otherwise or the parties in a case stipulate otherwise, limit the
number of depositions that can be taken to 10, each of which can
last no more than 7 hours.  It will also limit the number of
interrogatories to 25 and prevent parties from requesting records
more than five years before a cause of action accrues. However,
certain records will be exempt from that limit.

The legislation will also modify the state's class-action rule.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has already revised the state's rule
to have it match its federal counterpart.  AB 773 modifies what
the justices had done previously by allowing for interlocutory
appeals of class-certification orders that will stall all
proceedings in a case, although courts will still be able to
consider and weigh in on settlements reached between parties.

That modification to class-action rules is the only provision
that won't take effect immediately now that the bill has been
signed by Walker.  That change will instead take effect on
July 1, when the rest of the class-action rule approved by the
high court goes into effect. [GN]




                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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