CAR_Public/180316.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Friday, March 16, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 55



                            Headlines


ABM INDUSTRIES: McDonald Seeks to Certify BIPA Class and Subclass
ADVENTIST MIDWEST: Court Denies Smith's Revised Class Cert. Bid
ADVOCATE HEALTH: Magpayo's FLSA Class Conditionally Certified
AFNI INC: Wins Prelim. Approval of "Heerema" Class Settlement
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Motion to Dismiss TCPA Class Action Denied

AMERICAN RENAL: Wins Prelim. OK of $4MM Accord in "Esposito" Suit
AMN SERVICES: Shaw Moves to Certify Class of Traveling Nurses
ANTHEM: CEI's Ted Frank Opposes Class Action Settlement
ASHBURN CORP: DOJ Files Statement of Interest in Class Action
ASSURANCE TECHNOLOGIES: Deardorff's Bid for Collective Suit Ok'd

AT&T CORP: Move to Strike Class Allegations in "Wexler" Granted
ATT CORP: Court Directs Thompson to File Bid to Certify by May 31
AUTO CLUB GROUP: Class of Call Receivers Certified in "Neibarger"
AUTOVEST LLC: Frank Moves for Certification as Class Action
BARKERVILLE GOLD: Ontario Court Approves Class Action Settlement

BIRD ELECTRIC: Guajardo Moves to Certify Class of Electricians
BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP, MI: Water Bills Class Action Trial Closes
BNSF RAILWAY: Sumlin Seeks Certification of Calif. Workers Class
BOW & TRUSS: Smith's Cert. Bid Withdrawn; May Refile by Apr. 12
BRENTWOOD VILLAGE: Class of Residents Certified in "Borum" Suit

BUTLER'S SPORTS: Coach Faces Class Action Over Sexual Abuses
CABLE MARKETING: Court Certifies FLSA Collective in "Hobbs" Suit
CALIFORNIA: "Buck" Inmate Suit Not Allowed as Class Action
CENTRAL COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Johnson" Suit
CENTURY INT'L: Melton Moves to Certify Class of AK-47 Gun Owners

CHEFS' WAREHOUSE: Bid to Certify Class in "Robinson" Suit Denied
CHICAGO, IL: Cook County Sheriff Sued Over Bond System
CHICAGO ORNAMENTAL: Garrido Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
COLORADO: Sheriff Faces Class Action Over Immigrant Detention
CONSOL ENERGY: Fitzwater's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot

CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIONS: Time to File Cert Bid in "Allen" Moved
COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams Moves to Certify Class of Detainees
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL: Mortgagors Classes Certified in "Waldrup"
CREDENCE RESOURCE: Certification of Class Sought in "Betz" Suit
CREDIT BUREAU: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit

CURADEN AG: Lyngaas' Class Cert. Bid Denied Without Prejudice
DE VILLE ASSET: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit
DENKA PERFORMANCE: Wins to Bid Dismiss Taylor's Class Allegations
DENVER, CO: Trial in Homeless Class Action Expected This Year
DON HUMMER TRUCKING: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Ratliff" Class Suit

ENHANCED RECOVERY: Johnson Seeks to Certify Class Under FDCPA
ESSEX, NJ: Sanchez Seeks to Certify Detainees Classes & Sub-Class
F. MILLER PROPERTIES: Hannon Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
FIELDTURF USA: Arlington County Not Planning to Join Class Action
FINANCIAL BUSINESS: Class Certification Sought in "Holmes" Suit

FIREBIRDS OF OVERLAND: Nolen Seeks to Certify of Class of Servers
FITBIT INC: Seeks Decertification of 2 Classes in "Brickman" Suit
FLOWERS FOODS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Wiatrek" Class
GATESTONE & CO: Ballaj Moves for Final Nod of Class Settlement
GC SERVICES: Certification of Class Sought in "Beaufrand" Suit

GERMED INC: Fauley's Class Certification Bid Entered and Cont'd
GREAT CIRCLE: Court Certifies Case Managers Class in "Bush" Suit
GREEN STAR: Bohlke Seeks Certification of Two Classes Under TCPA
GSP TRANSPORTATION: Campbell Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
HALLIBURTON CO: Seeks Supreme Court Review of Class Action Ruling

HANSEN & ADKINS: FCRA Class Certification Sought in "Luna" Suit
HELIX TCS: Court Grants Equitable Tolling in "Kenney" FLSA Suit
HERMES LANDSCAPING: Class Certification Sought in "Rodriguez"
HORIZON PHARMA: Trust Funds Appeal Order in "Schaffer" to 2nd Cir
HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING: Rowe Loses Bid to Certify Collective Suit

IC SYSTEM: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit
INTEL CORP: Sued in Canada Over "Spectre" & "Meltdown" Defects
ISLE OF CAPRI: Wins Final Approval of Settlement in "Brna" Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: April 9 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
KEYSTONE SANITARY: Pennsylvania Residents File Class Action

KROGER CO: Wash. App. Affirms Denial of Arbitration in "Cox"
LOUISIANA: Class of LSP Inmates Certified in "Lewis" Suit
MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES: Leary Moves to Certify Class of Consumers
MDL 2804: Allegany County Joins Opioid Epidemic Class Action
MDL 2804: Lee County Joins Class Action Over Opioid Crisis

MDL 2804: Louisiana Lawyers File Class Action Over Opioid Crisis
MEGGITT-USA SERVICES: Trout Amends Bid for Prelim. OK of Accord
MIAMI LAKES AM: Cespedes Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Robinson Moves for FDCPA Class Certification
MID-AMERICA APARTMENT: Cleven Seeks to Certify Class of Tenants

MIDLAND CREDIT: Wins Summary Judgment in "Pierre" FDCPA Suit
MIMEDX GROUP: Holzer & Holzer Files Class Action in Georgia
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Wins Prelim. OK of Settlement in "Kang" Suit
NCB MANAGEMENT: Class Certification Sought in "McDaniel" Suit
NEW HAMPSHIRE: Gzekalski Moves to Certify Class of Inmates

NONGSHIM CO: Moves to Decertify Class of Indirect Purchasers
NORTH CAROLINA: Class Certification Sought in "Dillard" Suit
NURSE FORCE: Pinard Moves for Certification of Therapists Class
OAKWOOD, OH: Class of House Sellers Certified in "Thompson" Suit
OCWEN LOAN: Snyder's Bid to Certify Class Nixed Due to Settlement

OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Dombrowski Seeks Certification of Class
PARKER DRILLING: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Newton" FLSA Suit
POWERSECURE INT'L: 4th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Class Action
PRIME COMMUNICATIONS: Lorenzo's Remaining FLSA Claims Approved
PROFESSIONAL PLACEMENT: Safranski Seeks Final OK of $9K Accord

PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS: Talarico Moves to Certify Care Workers Class
QUALITY RESOURCES: Court Grants Toney's Bid to Certify Class
QUEEN CITY ROOFING: Verne Moves to Certify Class of Employees
RACK ROOM: Prelim. Approval of "Stebbins" Class Settlement Sought
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in DC Class Suit

SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Court Certifies Class of Arrestees in "Buffin"
SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Royalty Owners Cannot Pursue Underpayment Suit
SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Class Cert. Sought in Lanier Trust Suit
SANTA CLARA, CA: Class of Disabled Prisoners Certified in "Cole"
SCHIFF NUTRITION: Cochoit Moves to Certify 2 Classes of Consumers

SPECTRUM LABORATORY: Court Denies Move to Dismiss in "Casso"
SPRINT CORPORATION: Rubio Seeks Final Nod of Class Settlement
STATE COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Fetai" Suit
STEIN MART: Wins Summary Judgment as to All of Sperling's Claims
SUN PRINCESS: Class Action Mulled Following Gastro Outbreaks

T & B MANAGEMENT: Chavez Moves to Certify Server/Bartender Class
TOYOTA MOTORS: Quinn Emanuel Sues Over Takata Airbags
TREECYCLE LAND: Equipment Operators Class Certified in "Freese"
TWITTER INC: KBC Asset Moves to Certify Class of Stockholders
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Sued in Calif. Over Lack of Wheelchair Access

UBIQUITI NETWORKS: April 23 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
UNION PACIFIC: Court Grants Withdrawal of Bid to Remand "Logan"
UNITED COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Gajewski" Suit
UNITED STATES: Judge Blocks Deportation of Young Immigrants
UNITED STATES: Detained Immigrants Not Entitled to Bond Hearings

UNITED STATES: Black Farmers Urged to Join Class Action v. USDA
UNITED STATES: Class of DACA Recipients Certified in Inland Suit
WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION: Cal. App. Sustains Demurrer in "Mora"
WEINSTEIN CO: Bankruptcy Filing to Complicate Class Action
WEST VIRGINIA: Parents Mull Class Action Over Teacher Strike

WEST VIRGINIA: Burch's Bid for Certification Denied as Moot
WINES 'TIL SOLD: AGs Oppose "Unfair" Class Action Settlement
WISCONSIN: Class-of-One Certification Sought in "Gage" Suit
WISE ELECTRICAL: Time to File "Perez" Certification Bid Extended
WORLD OUTGAMES: Faces Class Action Over Failed LGBTQ Sports Event

WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE: Embree May File 2nd Amended Suit, Says Court
XPO LOGISTICS: "Quinlan" Stayed Until March 20 Due to Mediation
ZILLOW GROUP: Court Consolidates 2 Shareholders Derivative Suits

* Germany May Have Framework for Class Actions by November
* Securities Litigation an Investment Opportunity, FRT Says


                         Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Estimates $37MM Liability at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Still Defends PI Suits at Dec. 2
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 1 Lawsuit vs. Haynes Int'l Pending at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Has 2,600 Claims Pending at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Has 1,600 Pending Claims at Dec.31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Graham Corp. Still Defends Lawsuits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Has $559MM Liability at Dec.31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Dismisses "Montanez" Appeal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Summary Ruling Favoring Moore Dry Dock Affirmed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Precision Must Answer Discovery

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Affirms $64MM Judgment in Favor of Utica
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kansas Bill Adds Requirements to Asbestos Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Crestwood Lake Apt. Complex
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Atkins Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Widow's Asbestos Suit Revived by New Evidence

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Industrial Talc Asbestos Trial Underway in Fla.
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Risks Lurking in Aussie Hopitals
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bonded Asbestos Discovered After Flooding
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Perthville Man Fined $7,500 for Asbestos Dumping
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Find Leads to Metro Project Shutdown

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contractors Convicted of Illegal Removal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Green Island Landfill
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dockyard Workers Heirs Get EUR12,000
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Machinist Names John Deere in Asbestos Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Battles Claims Talc Products Have Asbestos

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Superfund Site Mobilization Begins
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Reopens Lawn Fertilizer Mesothelioma Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-Contaminated House Consumed by Fire
ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Approach to Asbestos Disposal Urged
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Council Failed to Protect Workers From Asbestos

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pipe Connecting Power Plant Lined With Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dad's Buddies Died Early Due to Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Caught Illegally Taking Asbestos to Landfill
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bill Could Rob Victims Rights for Justice
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Hinders Hospital ICU Plan



                            *********


ABM INDUSTRIES: McDonald Seeks to Certify BIPA Class and Subclass
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned CURTIS MCDONALD,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals v. ABM INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED, a Delaware
corporation, and ABM AVIATION, INC., a Georgia corporation, Case
No. 1:17-cv-08154 (N.D. Ill.), moves the Court to certify the
classes of individuals, who were subjected to the Defendants'
violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act:

   The Class: All individuals whose biometrics were captured,
              collected, used, or disseminated by Defendants
              within the state of Illinois during the limitations
              period.

    Subclass: All individuals on whose behalf a grievance was
              served on Defendants regarding Defendants' capture,
              collection, use, or dissemination of their
              biometrics within the state of Illinois during the
              limitations period.

Mr. McDonald also asks the Court to appoint him as Class
Representative and to appoint Myles McGuire, Esq., Evan M.
Meyers, Esq., and Jad Sheikali, Esq., of McGuire Law, P.C. as
Class Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=YPTXXRXo

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          Evan M. Meyers, Esq.
          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                  emeyers@mcgpc.com
                  jsheikali@mcgpc.com


ADVENTIST MIDWEST: Court Denies Smith's Revised Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ronald A. Guzman entered a memorandum opinion and order
in the lawsuit captioned RYAN SMITH, on behalf of himself,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
ADVENTIST MIDWEST HEALTH, an Illinois nonprofit corporation,
d/b/a ADVENTIST HEALTH CARE AT HOME, Case No. 1:16-cv-07606 (N.D.
Ill.):

   -- sustaining in part the Defendant's objections to Magistrate
      Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert's Report and Recommendation;

   -- setting aside in part and adopting in part the Report and
      Recommendation; and

   -- denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's revised motion
      for Rule 23 class certification of his state-law claim and
      for certification of his claim under Section 216(b) of the
      Fair Labor Standards Act.

A status hearing was set for March 6, 2018, at 9:30 a.m., to
discuss the next steps in the case.

The Defendant filed objections to Magistrate Judge Gilbert's
Report and Recommendation of November 17, 2017, which addressed
the Plaintiff's revised motion for certification of a class and a
collective action.

Ryan Smith brought the action against Adventist under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law to recover
allegedly unpaid overtime wages on behalf of himself and all
similarly-situated individuals.  He worked for Adventist as a
home health care nurse and seeks to represent other nurses as
well as occupational therapists, physical therapists, and speech
pathologists (collectively, "Clinicians") who are or were
employed by Adventist and classified as exempt employees and who
worked more than 40 hours per week.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=oI1sQcuc


ADVOCATE HEALTH: Magpayo's FLSA Class Conditionally Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 20, 2018, in the case
titled Crixenia Magpayo v. Advocate Health Care Network, et al.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-01176 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held
before the Honorable John Robert Blakey.

The minute entry states that:

   -- for the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion and Order,
      the Court partially grants and partially denies the
      Defendants' motion for summary judgment; and

   -- the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to certify her
      state-law claims as class actions and conditionally certify
      her FLSA class.

The case was set for a case management conference last March 6,
2018, in Courtroom 1203.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=OLZeomT4


AFNI INC: Wins Prelim. Approval of "Heerema" Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James B. Clark, III, preliminarily approves the class
settlement agreement entered by the parties in the lawsuit
captioned GEORGE E. HEEREMA, on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated v. AFNI, INC. and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Case No.
2:16-cv-00244-JBC (D.N.J.).

The "Settlement Class" is defined as:

     All persons who reside in the State of New Jersey to whom
     AFNI, Inc. mailed a written communication, in connection
     with its attempt to collect a debt owed to Sprint, which
     included a statement that "[p]ayments made electronically to
     Afni may be subject to a $4.95 processing fee" during the
     period beginning January 14, 2015, and ending January 14,
     2016.

The "Class Claims" are defined as those claims arising from
AFNI's collection letters, which attempt to collect a $4.95
"processing fee" for electronic payments made by consumers, and
which allegedly violate 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(2)(A),
1692e(2)(B), 1692f, and 1692f(1).

Judge Clark appoints Mr. Heerema as the Class Representative;
Stern Thomasson LLP and Kim Law Firm, LLC, as Class Counsel; and
Dahl Administration as the Settlement Administrator to administer
notice to Class Members and administer the Settlement.  The Court
approves the Parties' proposed Class Notice and directs that it
be mailed to the last known address of each member of the
Settlement Class as shown in AFNI, Inc.'s business records.

The Settlement Administrator will cause the Class Notice to be
mailed to Class Members on or before 28 days from the date of
this Order.  Class Members shall have until April 13, 2018 (73
days from the date of this Order), to exclude themselves from, or
object to, the Settlement.

A final hearing on the fairness and reasonableness of the
Agreement and whether final approval shall be given to it and the
requests for fees and expenses by Class Counsel will be held on
May 4 2018, at 2:00 p.m. (90 days from the date of this Order).

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=u62065wK


ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Motion to Dismiss TCPA Class Action Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
Thaddeus Ewald, Esq., of Carlton Fields, in an article for
JDSupra, wrote that the Northern District of Illinois cleared the
way for a plumbing company's putative TCPA class action against
Allstate Insurance Company and Oh Insurance Agency by denying
defendants' motions to dismiss, which were inspired by the
Supreme Court's Spokeo v. Robins decision.  The plumbing company
alleged that the insurance companies committed TCPA violations
when they placed two phone calls to it: one went to voicemail and
another was answered by a company employee.  The company's
purported injuries were the statutory violation as well as
business interruption, annoyance of the company's principal, and
invasions of privacy.  The defendants moved to dismiss on two
grounds: lack of standing because the plumbing company had not
alleged sufficiently concrete injuries under Spokeo, and mootness
based on Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez because Allstate had offered a
settlement and deposited the settlement funds into an escrow
account.

First, the court found the plumbing company had suffered
sufficiently concrete injuries and thus had standing to sue.  It
noted that several courts in the Seventh Circuit have held, post-
Spokeo, that alleged TCPA violations satisfy Article III's
requirement for concrete injury-in-fact.  Under Spokeo, a
statutory violation can constitute sufficient injury where the
violation risks harm to the "underlying concrete interest"
Congress intended to protect in the statutory enactment. Not only
did the complaint allege harm to the interest Congress intended
to protect in the TCPA, the court concluded, but the plumbing
company also alleged injuries of business interruption, invasion
of privacy, and annoyance of an employee which were in addition
to the pure statutory violation.  Notably, the court refused to
consider whether and at what volume putative class members
received calls in violation of the TCPA because such had "no
bearing" on whether the plumbing company alleged sufficient
injury or whether its claims were moot -- issues which must be
addressed "prior to consideration of any class claims."

Second, the court rejected the idea that Allstate's proffer of a
settlement and deposit of funds into an escrow account mooted the
claims under Campbell-Ewald.  After the parties briefed the
mootness issue the Seventh Circuit had decided several cases
extending Campbell-Ewald's reasoning against forced settlements
to circumstances similar to this case -- including a reversal of
a district court decision Allstate heavily relied upon in its
briefing.  Accordingly, the court held that Allstate's "offer of
judgment and deposit of funds into an escrow account" did not
moot the claims.  Additionally, the facts here encouraged this
specific holding, because the escrow agreement's terms restricted
the bank's disbursement until a court order directed it to do so,
an impossible outcome because mooting the claims would deprive
the court of any jurisdiction to enter a merits judgment.

Abante Rooter & Plumbing, Inc. v. Oh Ins. Agency, Case No. 15-
9025 (N.D. Ill. February 20, 2018). [GN]


AMERICAN RENAL: Wins Prelim. OK of $4MM Accord in "Esposito" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Allison D. Burroughs preliminarily approves the $4
million class action settlement in the lawsuit styled MARY
ESPOSITO, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated v. AMERICAN RENAL ASSOCIATES HOLDINGS, INC.,
JOSEPH A. CARLUCCI, JONATHAN L. WILCOX, SYED T. KAMAL, JONATHAN
J. McDONOUGH, CENTERBRIDGE CAPITAL PARTNERS L.P., MERRILL LYNCH,
PIERCE, FENNER, & SMITH, INC., BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., GOLDMAN,
SACHS & CO., WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC, SUNTRUST ROBINSON
HUMPHREY, and LEERINK PARTNERS LLC, Case No. 1:16-cv-11797-ADB
(D. Mass.),

The Court preliminarily certifies, for settlement purposes only,
a Settlement Class defined as:

     (a) all Persons that purchased or otherwise acquired ARAH
     securities between April 20, 2016 and August 18, 2016,
     inclusive, including (b) all Persons that purchased or
     otherwise acquired ARAH securities pursuant or traceable to
     ARAH's Form S-1/A, as amended, and the Form 424B Prospectus
     (together, the "Registration Statement") filed in connection
     with the Company's April 20, 2016 offering, but excluding
     Defendants, their spouses, and anyone (other than a tenant
     or employee) sharing the household of any Defendant, and any
     Persons who submit a valid and timely request for exclusion
     pursuant to the Notice.

The Stipulation of Settlement established a $4,000,000 cash
Settlement Fund that, after payment of certain Court-approved
expenses, such as attorneys' fees and administration costs, is
intended for distribution to Settlement Class Members in exchange
for the settlement of the case and the release by Settlement
Class Members of the claims.

The Court also approves, as to form and content, the Postcard
Notice of Proposed Settlement, and the Full Notice of Settlement
of Class Action and Settlement Fairness Hearing, and Motion for
an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses, the Summary Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class
Action to be published on a national business newswire, and the
Proof of Claim and Release.

The firm of Garden City Group, LLC, is appointed to supervise and
administer the notice procedure, as well as the processing of
claims.

The Court will commence a final hearing on June 14, 2018, at 2:00
p.m., to consider the Settlement.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=X6E9myTD

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ira M. Press, Esq.
          KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP
          825 Third Avenue, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 371-6600
          E-mail: ipress@kmllp.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jed M. Schwartz, Esq.
          MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP
          28 Liberty Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 530-5000
          Facsimile: (212) 822-5149
          E-mail: jschwartz@milbank.com


AMN SERVICES: Shaw Moves to Certify Class of Traveling Nurses
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled ROBERT SHAW, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and
as a proxy of the State of California on behalf of aggrieved
employees v. AMN SERVICES, LLC, KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., and THE
PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., Case No. 3:16-cv-02816-JCS (N.D.
Cal.), move the Court for an order certifying this class under
Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure:

     All traveling nurses who worked in the job position(s) of
     Registered Nurse, Licensed Practical Nurse, or another
     nursing position(s), for Defendant AMN and/or Defendant
     Kaiser, in one or more Kaiser facilities in California.

This is the "Subclass B" alleged in the Plaintiffs' operative
complaint.  The Plaintiffs assert that they do not seek
certification of the broader "Subclass A" previously alleged,
which includes traveling nurses at non-Kaiser facilities.

The Plaintiffs tell the Court that they seek certification of the
First through Eighth Cause of Action.  They assert that they do
not seek certification of the Ninth Cause of Action, which is a
representative law enforcement claim for civil penalties brought
under the Private Attorneys General Act.

The Plaintiffs further move the Court to appoint Plaintiffs
Robert Shaw, Jennifer Corona-Tietelbaum, and Candy Kucharski to
represent the class and to appoint the law firm of Schneider
Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP to serve as class counsel.

All three proposed representative plaintiffs have worked at a
Kaiser facility in California as an AMN traveling nurse during
the applicable time period, and are members of the proposed class
for certification.

The Court will commence a hearing on June 8, 2018, at 9:30 a.m.,
to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ht0p4Zex

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua Konecky, Esq.
          Nathan Piller, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: jkonecky@schneiderwallace.com
                  npiller@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
          Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
          E-mail: scarson@bm.net
                  sschalman-bergen@bm.net


ANTHEM: CEI's Ted Frank Opposes Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
Bob Dorigo Jones, writing for Newsmax, reports that when a
federal judge slaps class-action lawyers for trying to hit the
jackpot at the expense of victims, we can stand back in awe
because it happens so infrequently.

The recent rebuke of several class action lawyers by a federal
judge who is ruling on a lawsuit they filed against insurance
provider Anthem in a high-profile data breach case should be
making headlines across the country.  Consumers need to know
about this case and the proposed legal settlement because it
reveals how they can be victimized twice when their sensitive
financial information is stolen.

In 2015, Anthem discovered that criminal hackers had broken into
its computer system containing the personal information of 78.8
million people.  The fear in situations like this is always that
the criminals will use the information to commit identity theft,
so Anthem agreed to provide free credit monitoring to all of the
people whose information was compromised.

In the wake of the breach, the insurance commissioners of seven
states undertook an investigation to determine who committed the
attack and if Anthem's security systems prior to the attack were
appropriate.  Last year, the investigators issued a report saying
that they likely knew the identity of the hacker and that they
had "a medium degree of confidence that the attacker was acting
on behalf of a foreign government."

Importantly, the investigators also determined that Anthem had
"taken reasonable measures prior to the data breach to protect
its data" and that "Anthem's improvements to its cybersecurity
protocols and planned improvements were reasonable."

Despite this, Anthem became the target of a massive class action
lawsuit which, of course, was filed shortly after the data
breach.  Why should the American legal system wait for the facts
of an investigation to be completed before allowing a potentially
lucrative class action lawsuit to be filed, right? Unfortunately,
that's how it works.

And that's just the problem.  These huge class action lawsuits
are often extremely lucrative, but not for those who you would
think should reap the benefits.  Often, consumers aren't the ones
who see the majority of the cash payments from these lawsuits.
Many times, the lawyers are the ones who really hit the jackpot.

In the Anthem case, the four law firms who took the lead in the
litigation and eventually reached a settlement with the company
after two years were only able to secure credit monitoring
services for most class members.  The company did not admit any
wrongdoing while agreeing to the settlement.

Yet, as class action lawyers often do in these cases in an effort
to inflate their own pay day, they claimed their actions would
benefit far more people than actually turned out to be the case.
If every consumer the lawyers purported to represent signed up
for the free credit monitoring services, this in-kind benefit
would have been worth up to $500 million.  However, just 1.86
percent of the class members signed up, for a total benefit of
about $51 million out of the $115 million settlement.  The rest
of the money would go for attorneys' fees and costs.

That's right, when you add up all the legal fees and costs, the
lawyers would come out of the settlement with more money than the
class members they represented.  The payout to all the lawyers
involved would be about $63 million.

As outrageous as that is, these types of ridiculous settlements
often get approved by the court.  That's starting to change,
though.

Thankfully, in recent years, common sense has started to creep
back into the resolution of these massive class action lawsuits
because of the efforts of reform-minded attorneys like Ted Frank
and tough judges like Lucy Koh.

Mr. Frank is an attorney at the Competitive Enterprise Institute
who, as The Wall Street Journal said in a recent editorial,
helped blow the lid off this scam.  He did this by doing what he
has become well-known for in the legal world since creating the
Center for Class Action Fairness several years ago.  He derails
ridiculous legal settlements that usually fly under the radar of
the media long after the initial sensationalistic reporting on
the story has passed.

Mr. Frank filed an objection to the settlement in federal court
and found that the judge in the case appears to be as fed up with
these kinds of scams as he is.

Judge Lucy Koh of the federal district court in California
chastised the attorneys for their bill request and has taken the
rare action of appointing a special master to review the lawyers'
billing saying, "It does bother me that 55 percent would go to
attorney fees and administrative costs and only 45 percent goes
to class members."

As CEI has pointed out, temporary staff attorneys provided "low-
level legal work like document review and are typically billed at
cost -- perhaps $50/hour -- to paying clients. Yet parties
submitted millions of dollars' worth of billing for contract
attorneys at hundreds of dollars an hour."  Judge Koh admonished
the lawyers saying, "I would never have appointed you . . . had I
known you were going to pile on 53 law firms on this case."

U.S. consumers will benefit at least two ways from the actions of
Ted Frank and Judge Koh.

If they were part of the Anthem class action, they will know that
their own lawyers won't be allowed to rip them off by getting
ridiculous fees.  And, even if they weren't part of the lawsuit,
they will know that fewer class action settlement scams like this
are being rubber-stamped today.  That's not only good for
consumers, it's good for job providers who have been targeted in
these lawsuits for years.


ASHBURN CORP: DOJ Files Statement of Interest in Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wilson Barmeyer, Esq., Alexander FuchsAlexander Fuchs, Esq., and
Lewis Wiener, Esq., of Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP, in an
article for JDSupra, wrote that the US Department of Justice
(DOJ) plans to take a more active role in reviewing and objecting
to class action settlements under a rarely used procedure
established by the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) more than a
dozen years ago.  CAFA, enacted in February 2005, significantly
expanded federal court jurisdiction over class and mass actions,
in addition to setting various rules and procedures related to
the settling of class actions.

Under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1715, when settling a class action,
each defendant in the matter must serve upon the appropriate
state official, generally the State Attorney General, and the US
Attorney General, notice of the proposed settlement within 10
days of filing with the court.  In theory, this provision was
designed to give state and federal officials an opportunity to
assess the fairness of proposed class settlements and intervene
in the action to oppose the proposed settlement should they
consider the terms of those settlements unfair.

In practical application, however, few proposed class settlements
are challenged by state or the US Attorneys General.  According
to departing US Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General
Rachel Brand, the DOJ receives on average 700 CAFA notices a year
but has challenged only two class settlements since the enactment
of CAFA.  AAG Brand attributed part of the DOJ's passivity to
inefficiencies in mail delivery within the Department of Justice,
stating that the notices were often not routed to DOJ attorneys
with sufficient time to review and sometimes were not received
until after final settlement approval had already been granted.
In her recent comments regarding CAFA, Ms. Brand hinted that many
of these inefficiencies have been corrected, putting the DOJ in a
better position to review settlements.

AAG Brand also warned that "if a settlement isn't fair or
reasonable under CAFA, DOJ may file a statement of interest
saying so."  Ms. Brand concluded her remarks on CAFA by
cautioning to "be on the lookout in the coming days for the first
example."

This first example has already been filed.  On February 16, 2018,
one day after AAG Brand's remarks, the DOJ Consumer Protection
Branch filed a statement of interest in Cannon v. Ashburn
Corporation, et al (1:16-cv-01452 D.N.J.), a class action
concerning false advertisement related to discount wine prices,
urging the court to reject a proposed class settlement in the
case.  The DOJ argues that the proposed settlement, which
provides each class member with a $2 dollar non-transferable
coupon and awards class counsel $1.7 million in attorneys' fees,
provides little value to consumers while enriching plaintiffs'
counsel to the tune of millions of dollars.  As the DOJ
succinctly argues in its statement "[e]ither plaintiffs' claims
are strong, in which case a settlement that has meaningful value
to the class is required, or plaintiffs' claims are meritless, in
which case their counsel is not entitled to a massive fee."
Either way the settlement is not fair, reasonable or adequate as
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Ms. Brand's comments and the DOJ's filing in Cannon may indicate
an increased government scrutiny of class action settlements.
While increased scrutiny may in the end prove helpful in
discouraging suits that are strictly attorney-fee driven in
nature, in the short term the scrutiny injects a new level of
uncertainty into the class settlement process for all parties.

Takeaways:

Class action settlements must be fair, reasonable and adequate to
satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Traditionally, courts have rejected proposed settlements that
provide minimal or illusory benefit to the class, while enriching
class counsel.

In its recently filed statement of interest, the DOJ argues that
these factors warrant rejection of proposed class action
settlements.

While it is still unclear how active the DOJ will be in this
space, proposed class settlements that provide actual relief to
class members are more likely to avoid DOJ scrutiny and warrant
court approval. [GN]


ASSURANCE TECHNOLOGIES: Deardorff's Bid for Collective Suit Ok'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 8, 2018, in the case
titled Bart Deardorff, et al. v. Assurance Technologies, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:17-cv-09263 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing
held before the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Status hearing held on February 8, 2018, and continued to
      April 17, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.;

   -- Plaintiff's motion for certification of collective action,
      for disclosure of potential opt-in plaintiffs contact
      information and court-approved notice is granted without
      objection;

   -- Parties shall file an agreed notice by February 22, 2018;

   -- Defendants shall answer or otherwise plead by February 28,
      2018;

   -- Parties shall submit (not file) an agreed confidentiality
      order by March 12, 2018, the link for which can be found on
      Judge St. Eve's Web page;

   -- Mandatory initial discovery shall be disclosed by April 6,
      2018;

   -- Written discovery shall be issued by April 16, 2018;

   -- Fact discovery shall be completed by September 7, 2018;

   -- Any potentially dispositive motion, with supporting
      memorandum, shall be filed by October 12, 2018;

   -- Parties are directed to meet and confer pursuant to Rule
      26(f) and exhaust all settlement possibilities prior to the
      next status hearing.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fuCdioHO


AT&T CORP: Move to Strike Class Allegations in "Wexler" Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Strike Class Allegations in the case captioned EVE WEXLER, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. AT&T CORP., Defendant, Case No. 15-CV-0686 (FB) (PK)
(E.D.N.Y.).

AT&T moves to strike the class allegations in Dr. Wexler's
complaint on the ground that she is not an adequate
representative of the class.

Dr. Wexler, on behalf of herself and a proposed class of
similarly situated individuals, has sued AT&T Corp. under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

A motion to strike class allegations under Rule 12(f) is
disfavored because it requires a reviewing court to pre-emptively
terminate the class aspects of litigation, solely on the basis of
what is alleged in the complaint, and before plaintiffs are
permitted to complete the discovery to which they would otherwise
be entitled on questions relevant to class certification.  Here,
however, the lack of discovery is not a cause for concern because
the following facts, though not alleged in the complaint, are
undisputed -- the lawsuit was filed on February 11, 2015, by Dr.
Wexler's husband, Shimshon, and, one month later, James Giardina
joined Mr. Wexler as counsel for plaintiff.

At issue here is Dr. Wexler's adequacy as a representative of the
class.  The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class
they seek to represent. Thus, the proposed class representative
must have an interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the
class, and must have no interests antagonistic to the interests
of other class members.

The Court is aware that the importance of a vigilant class
representative is easily overstated. Even a conflict-free
representative is unlikely to be much of a watchdog. The very
nature of a class action creates conflicts of interest between
the class, class counsel and the class representative. That is,
to a large extent, the reason the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) however fallible they may be must be
scrupulously enforced.

Because Dr. Wexler has an interest in a possible fee award to her
husband, she cannot adequately represent the interests of absent
class members. Therefore, AT&T's motion to strike the class
allegations in her complaint is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yagktmwm
from Leagle.com.

Eve Wexler, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James S. Giardina, The
Consumer Rights Law Group, PLLC, 3104 West Waters Avenue, Suite
200. Tampa, Florida 33614 & Keith James Keogh --
keith@koeghlaw.com -- Keogh Law, Ltd., pro hac vice.

AT&T Corp., Defendant, represented by Christopher James Houpt --
choupt@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Archis A. Parasharami -
- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP & Evan M. Tager
-- etager@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown, LLP, pro hac vice.


ATT CORP: Court Directs Thompson to File Bid to Certify by May 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 14, 2018, in the case
styled James Thompson v. ATT Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-03607 (N.D.
Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the Honorable Ruben
Castillo.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is denied
      without prejudice; and

   -- The Court has directed the Plaintiffs to file a new motion
      for class certification by May 31, 2018.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=OMww6B8r


AUTO CLUB GROUP: Class of Call Receivers Certified in "Neibarger"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Magistrate Judge Ray Kent granted in part the Plaintiff's
motion for conditional certification of collective action in the
lawsuit captioned JENNIFER NEIBARGER and MELINDA KONDRACKI v. THE
AUTO CLUB GROUP and AUTO CLUB SERVICES, INC., Case No. 1:16-cv-
01196-PLM-RSK (W.D. Mich.).

The Court conditionally certifies a collective action for unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to 29 U.S.C Section 216(b) defined as:

     All non-exempt Call Receivers, Product Specialists, Call
     Managers, Customer Service Representatives and Quality
     Assurance Specialists who worked for Defendants The Auto
     Club Group and/or Auto Club services, Inc., at defendants'
     Grand Rapids Office located at 3525 Eagle Park Drive at any
     time in the three years prior to the filing of this action.

The Defendants are directed to provide plaintiffs with the names,
all known addresses, e-mail addresses, cell phone numbers, as
well as dates and location(s) of employment of the potential
Collective members.

The Plaintiffs' proposed "Notice of right to join lawsuit" is
approved, with the modification that the notice be sent to those
individuals in the Class.  Sommers Schwartz, P.C. and Avanti Law
Group, PLLC are appointed as interim class counsel.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=DI0gPf9N


AUTOVEST LLC: Frank Moves for Certification as Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled PHYLLIS FRANK, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. AUTOVEST, LLC,
et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-02773-RJL (D.D.C.), moves the Court to
certify the matter as a class action.

Phyllis Frank also seeks to be designated as the class
representative.  If any matter in the Motion is found to be
insufficiently supported by proof, the Plaintiff asks a stay of
the Motion pending discovery or other preliminary proceedings.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=9hFwdIWA

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dean Gregory, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DEAN GREGORY
          1717 K Street NW, Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 905-8058
          Facsimile: (202) 776-0136
          E-mail: dean@deangregory.com


BARKERVILLE GOLD: Ontario Court Approves Class Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Read this notice carefully as it may affect your rights.

If you acquired securities in Barkerville Gold Mines Ltd. between
June 28, 2012 and October 8, 2013 in the secondary market and
held some or all of those securities at the close of trading on
October 8, 2013, then this notice is for you (the "Class")

A settlement had been reached in a class action against
Barkerville Gold Mines Ltd. ("Barkerville").  It is alleged that
during the Class Period, Barkerville misled the Class about its
mineral resource estimates for the Cow Mountain sector of the
Caribou Gold Project.

Barkerville has agreed to pay or cause to be paid CAD$250,000 to
settle the claim.  The settlement is a compromise of disputed
claims and is not an admission of liability or wrongdoing by
Barkerville.

The settlement has been approved by the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice (the "Court").

For more information, see the Long Form Notice of Settlement
Approval, available online at www.morgantico.com, or call 647-
344-1900.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has authorized distribution
of the Notice.

Questions about this Notice should NOT be directed to the Court.
[GN]


BIRD ELECTRIC: Guajardo Moves to Certify Class of Electricians
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled JASON GUAJARDO, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. BIRD ELECTRIC
ENTERPRISES, LLC, Case No. 7:18-cv-00025-DC (W.D. Tex.), moves
for expedited conditional certification and judicially-supervised
notice under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The class is defined as:

     All current and former electricians who were employed by
     Defendant and who were paid by the hour at any time in the
     last three years.

In his complaint, Mr. Guajardo asserts that the Defendant paid
electricians on an hourly basis, knew they were working in excess
of 40 hours per week, and knew that that they were working off
the clock during overtime hours.  Yet the Defendant violated the
FLSA by knowingly refusing to pay him and Class Members for off-
the-clock time, he alleges.

Mr. Guajardo also asks the Court to direct prompt disclosure by
the Defendant of contact information for potential class members,
and to authorize his counsel to notify prospective class members
of this lawsuit.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=TC7MqDsk

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          The Commissioners House at Heritage Square
          2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 782-2293
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com

               - and -

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          MORELAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Telecopier: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com


BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP, MI: Water Bills Class Action Trial Closes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Anne Runkle, writing for The Oakland Press, reports that
Bloomfield Township residents will soon learn whether they will
receive a refund on a portion of their water and sewer bills.

Attorneys for the township and for residents who filed a class
action lawsuit gave closing arguments on Feb. 27 in a bench trial
that was to decide whether the township overcharged water and
sewer account holders.

Closing arguments were to wrap up on March 1 before Oakland
County Circuit Judge Daniel O'Brien.

Judge O'Brien will decide whether the township charged residents
more than it cost to provide water and sewer service, as alleged
by the plaintiffs in the suit.

The trial began in early February, said township Supervisor
Leo Savoie.

Kickham Hanley, a Royal Oak-based law firm, represented the
residents in the case.  The firm also represented residents in
several other metro Detroit communities who have also filed class
action suits claiming inflated water bills.

Critics have said that in cities where the lawsuits were
successful, account holders only received a rebate of a few
dollars each, and that the law firm was the big winner.

Mr. Savoie expressed confidence that the township will prevail in
the lawsuit.

Representatives for Kickham Hanley did not return phone calls
from The Oakland Press. [GN]


BNSF RAILWAY: Sumlin Seeks Certification of Calif. Workers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled HENRY SUMLIN and BRIAN LEE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY; a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1-10, Case
No. 5:17-cv-02364-JFW-KK (C.D. Cal.), seek to certify this Class:

     all current and former employees of Defendant who worked a
     shift greater than 3.51 hours in California and who were
     paid in whole or in part on a "trip rate" basis at any time
     from April 4, 2013 through the date that the Court certifies
     the Class.

The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendants of failing to provide the
Class and/or subclass during the Class Period paid rest breaks or
pay missed rest break premiums in violation of California Labor
Code.

Mr. Sumlin also seeks to certify and represent a "California
Resident Subclass" (i.e. all members of the Class that have had
California taxes withheld from their wages), and to represent the
PAGA Aggrieved Employees (i.e., all members of the Class who were
employed in California from January 31, 2016 through the present)
in connection with the derivative penalty claims pursuant to the
Private Attorney General Act.  He further seeks appointment as
the PAGA representative for his derivative penalties pursuant to
the PAGA and the California Labor Code.

The Court will commence a hearing on March 26, 2018, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Memorandum of Points is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=xJeZyU91

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 277-0614
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          E-mail: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Melmed, Esq.
          MELMED LAW GROUP P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 824-3828
          Facsimile: (310) 862-6851
          E-mail: jm@melmedlaw.com

               - and -

          Davis S. Winston, Esq.
          WINSTON LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (424) 288-4568
          Facsimile: (424) 532-4062
          E-mail: david@employmentlitigators.com


BOW & TRUSS: Smith's Cert. Bid Withdrawn; May Refile by Apr. 12
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 12, 2018, in the case
entitled Krystal Smith, et al. v. Bow & Truss, LLC, et al., Case
No. 1:17-cv-01809 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before
the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Rule 16(b) status hearing was held on February 12, 2018,
      with attorneys for both sides;

   -- Status hearing is continued to March 14, 2018, at
      8:30 a.m.;

   -- Motion for class or corrective action certification is
      withdrawn without prejudice to renewal or refiling; and

   -- Motion is to be renewed or refiled by April 12, 2018.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Zh9NMnBX


BRENTWOOD VILLAGE: Class of Residents Certified in "Borum" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Rudolph Contreras granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the lawsuit
entitled ADRIANN BORUM, et al. v. BRENTWOOD VILLAGE, LLC, et al.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-01723-RC (D.D.C.).

This class is certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All individuals who reside at Brookland Manor in a three-,
     four-, or five-bedroom unit with one or more minor child,
     and are at risk of being displaced from a three-, four-, or
     five-bedroom unit at Brookland Manor as a direct result of
     the proposed redevelopment.

Judge Contreras also granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Appointment of Class Counsel.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=INakle6U


BUTLER'S SPORTS: Coach Faces Class Action Over Sexual Abuses
------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Crawford, writing for First Coast News, reports that
a Jacksonville woman is part of a class-action lawsuit filed
against one of the most influential youth volleyball coaches in
the country.  The lawsuit was filed on Feb. 27 in Illinois.

Rick Butler is being sued after recently being banned from USA
Volleyball and the AAU following allegations by several women who
claim he sexually abused them when they were minors.
Sarah Powers-Barnhard of Jacksonville is among his accusers.

"Twenty-two years ago when we came out, we were very cautious to
share who we were because we were afraid," Ms. Powers-Barnhard
said.  "So for 22 years our story wasn't really told.  He's had
22 years to cultivate and communicate his version of the story.
It makes sense to me as it alleges people did not know the truth,
and I agree because our story was not out there because we were
being protected."

The class-action complaint was filled by Laura Mullen, the mother
of a former player at Butler's Sports Performance Volleyball Club
in Illinois.

The lawsuit alleges, "Had she and members of the punitive Class
known that a child sexual predator would coach their teenage
daughters, they never would have given money to Defendants and
never would have sent their girls to Sports Performance."

Butler's wife, Cheryl Butler, is also named as a defendant, along
with his company that owns Sports Performance Volleyball.

The suit said "Butler has sexually abused, as well as physically
and emotionally abused, no fewer than six -- and on information
believe, numerous more -- underage girls in his care."

According to the complaint, they "actively concealed his abuses
for years by pressuring his victims -- often by threatening to
end their futures in the game -- to remain silent."

"He has a good program.  He's a good volleyball coach, and people
gravitated towards that," said Ms. Powers-Barnhard.  "I did not
realize what his past was and we weren't out there to continually
tell it. Now people are learning the truth and that's what this
complaint alleges that they did not know the truth."

Mr. Butler has previously denied all accusations against him and
says he has never sexually abused anyone. [GN]


CABLE MARKETING: Court Certifies FLSA Collective in "Hobbs" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ivan L. R. Lemelle granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Court-
Supervised Notice in the lawsuit captioned DARRELL HOBBS, On
behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. CABLE
MARKETING & INSTALLATION OF LOUISIANA, INC., ET AL., Case No.
2:17-cv-04766-ILRL-JCW (E.D. La.).

The Plaintiff's request to conditionally certify a collective
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act is granted.  The
collective is defined as "All individuals who provided cable
repair and installation services for Cable Marketing and
Installation of Louisiana, Inc. or Cable Marketing &
Installations, Inc. at any time since February 6, 2015, and who
were classified as independent contractors."

Judge Lemelle directs the parties to file into the record (1) a
copy of the proposed notice, (2) a copy of the proposed
abbreviated text message notice, and (3) any objections thereto.

The Defendants shall provide to the Plaintiff's counsel a list of
the names, addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and
dates of employment for individuals, who fall within the
definition of the collective.  The opt-in period for potential
plaintiffs is 60 days, beginning for the collective on the date
when the Defendants provide the list of contact information to
Plaintiff's counsel.

The Plaintiff's request to toll the statute of limitations is
denied without prejudice as premature, to be reurged if necessary
once the parties develop a sufficient evidentiary record within
applicable discovery deadlines.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kImQWflF


CALIFORNIA: "Buck" Inmate Suit Not Allowed as Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff's Pro Se Petition
in the case captioned ELVIN RAY BUCK, Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents, No. 2:18-cv-0197
KJN P (E.D. Calif.).

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. Section 2254 together with an application to proceed in
forma pauperis, together with an application to proceed in forma
pauperis.

The Court finds that it appears that petitioner is attempting to
bring this action as a class action.  Plaintiff, however, is a
non-lawyer proceeding without counsel.  It is well established
that a layperson cannot ordinarily represent the interests of a
class. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286 (9th Cir.
1966).  This rule becomes almost absolute when, as here, the
putative class representative is incarcerated and proceeding pro
se. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975).
In direct terms, plaintiff cannot "fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class," as required by Rule 23(a)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Middendorf, 420
F.Supp. 779 (D. D.C. 1976). This action, therefore, will not be
construed as a class action and instead will be construed as an
individual civil suit brought by plaintiff.

Accordingly, Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted, but the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the
Petitioner filing a pleading that bears his signature; that
pleading must comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights
Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of
Practice.  The pleading must also bear the docket number assigned
to this case. Failure to file such pleading in accordance with
this order may result in the dismissal of this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9rjlle8 from Leagle.com.

Elvin Ray Buck, Petitioner, pro se.


CENTRAL COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Johnson" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eneida Johnson moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit captioned ENEIDA JOHNSON,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
CENTRAL COLLECTION CORPORATION, Case No. 2:18-cv-00281-PP (E.D.
Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be
filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
contends that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff tells
the Court.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff argues.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=VhEz6zVb

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CENTURY INT'L: Melton Moves to Certify Class of AK-47 Gun Owners
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned JEFFREY MELTON, EZEKIEL
MORRIS, TOMMY JOHNSON, JUAN VALDES, and MANVILLE SMITH,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARMS CORP., CENTURY ARMS, INC., CENTURY
ARMS OF VERMONT, INC., and CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARMS OF VERMONT,
INC., Case No. 1:16-cv-21008-FAM (S.D. Fla.), ask the Court to
certify a nationwide class based on the omission and
nondisclosure of the Class Defect under Florida's laws, including
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and unjust
enrichment under the laws of every state:

     All individuals in the United States who, on or before
     March 18, 2016, purchased a Century AK-47 model pattern
     firearm, including the following model platforms: WASR;
     M70AB2; RPK; DRAGUNOV; AMD65; M70Bl; M72; GP 1972; 1975 AK
     Bullpup; Golani; 2007 Champion Pistol; Galil; Draco Pistol;
     PLS54C; M70B1; M70B2; M76; AK74; Tantal; C39v2; AES10B;
     1960AK; AKMS; GP 1975; Saiga; PAPM85; PAPM92; M70; M74;
     N-PAP; GPAK 74; MAK-22; PAPM90; MAADI; MAK-90; and AK63D.

If the Court declines to certify a nationwide class under FDUTPA,
the Plaintiffs propose these state classes under the consumer
protection laws for the respective states:

     All individuals in the jurisdictions of Arizona, Florida,
     and Illinois who, on or before March 18, 2016, purchased a
     Century AK-47 model pattern firearm, including the following
     model platforms: WASR; M70AB2; RPK; DRAGUNOV; AMD65; M70Bl;
     M72; GP 1972; 1975 AK Bullpup; Golani; 2007 Champion Pistol;
     Galil; Draco Pistol; PLS54C; M70B1; M70B2; M76; AK74;
     Tantal; C39v2; AES10B; 1960AK; AKMS; GP 1975; Saiga; PAPM85;
     PAPM92; M70; M74; N-PAP; GPAK 74; MAK-22; PAPM90; MAADI;
     MAK-90; and AK63D.

Century imports, manufactures, and sells AK-style semi-automatic
rifles.  Century primarily obtains these rifles from foreign
vendors, who sell them to Century as fully automatic rifles.

The Plaintiffs allege that Century's imported AK-style assault
rifles (the "Class Weapons") all have a common defect: the gun
will fire if the safety selector is raised above the dust cover
(the "Class Defect").  They contend that Century has known about
this problem for at least 10 years and did nothing to fix it.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Hagens Berman and
Angelo Marino, Jr., Esq., as class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=3dWphMhz

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Angelo "Tony" Marino, Jr., Esq.
          ANGELO MARINO, JR, P.A.
          645 SE 5th Terrace
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 765-0537
          Facsimile: (954) 765-0545
          E-mail: amjrpamail@aol.com
                  amjrpal@hotmail.com

               - and -

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          Jerrod C. Patterson, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  jerrodp@hbsslaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ryan L. Erdreich, Esq.
          Anthony M. Pisciotti, Esq.
          Danny C. Lallis, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Malsch, Esq.
          PISCIOTTI MALSCH
          30 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 205
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 245-8100
          Facsimile: (973) 245-8101
          E-mail: rerdreich@pmlegalfirm.com
                  apisciotti@pmlegalfirm.com
                  dlallis@pmlegaLfirm.com
                  jmalsch@pmlegalfirrn.com


CHEFS' WAREHOUSE: Bid to Certify Class in "Robinson" Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Richard Seeborg denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify
class in the lawsuit styled SHAON ROBINSON, et al. v. THE CHEFS'
WAREHOUSE, et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-05421-RS (N.D. Cal.).

Judge Seeborg granted motion for leave to file a further amended
complaint and denied the sealing motion.

In this putative class action, named plaintiffs Shaon Robinson
and Sean Clark seek to represent a class of delivery drivers
employed by The Chefs' Warehouse West Coast, LLC, in asserting
various wage and hour claims.

This action is not the first time CW has been sued for an alleged
failure to provide meal and rest breaks, according to the Order.
In 2012, an action filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court
entitled Gustavo Chicas v. The Chefs' Warehouse West Coast, LLC
advanced the same categories of wage and hour claims as alleged
here, except for failure to reimburse business expenses.  Both
Robinson and Clark were members of the Chicas class and signed
declarations stating that they understood CW's policies regarding
meal and rest breaks, accurate timekeeping, and reporting any
violations of CW's policies.  Moreover, they expressly admitted
they were always provided with and took their meal and rest
breaks, their supervisor insisted they take their meal breaks,
their time sheets were always accurate, they were always paid for
all hours worked, and they never worked off the clock.

"Thus, even assuming CW has been violating wage and hour laws
since 2014 (or even that it was doing so prior to 2013,
notwithstanding Robinson and Clark's declarations that they were
not personally affected), Robinson and Clark are not similarly-
situated to putative class members who did not sign similar
declarations in Chicas," Judge Seeborg opines.  "The declarations
Robinson and Clark signed plainly could be used to undermine
their credibility when advancing claims that CW's actual
practices nullify the effectiveness of its official policies.  At
trial they could be subjected to cross-examination and
impeachment that a fact-finder very well might find fatal to
their case -- thereby also dooming the claims of the rest of the
class," Judge Seeborg explains.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=oXa6Ek38

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Hoffman, Esq.
          Leonard Emma, Esq.
          Stephen Noel Ilg, Esq.
          HOFFMAN EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
          580 California Street, Suite 1600
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 362-1111
          Facsimile: (415) 362-1112
          E-mail: mhoffman@employment-lawyers.com
                  lemma@employment-lawyers.com
                  silg@employment-lawyers.com


CHICAGO, IL: Cook County Sheriff Sued Over Bond System
------------------------------------------------------
Lorraine Bailey, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports
that a class claims Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart's new policy
unconstitutionally delays the release of jail detainees, pending
his personal review, even though they have already posted bail.

Last year, Cook County Chief Judge Timothy Evans implemented
major changes to Chicago's bond system to ensure that no one is
held in jail simply because they cannot afford to pay bail.

Before the reform, many individuals suspected of non-violent
crimes remained in jail because they could not afford to pay a
couple hundred dollars to make bail -- at great expense to the
county, which pays about $126 per day to keep someone in jail.

Since mid-September, the Cook County jail population has gone
down about 15 percent from 7,500 to 6,530.

Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart initially supported the bond
reforms, but recently expressed his dissatisfaction with the
results.

Mr. Dart sent a letter to Cook County Board President Toni
Preckwinkle saying that the changes have overwhelmed the county's
electronic monitoring, or EM, program.  He said hundreds of
people charged with serious gun crimes have been released from
jail on electronic bracelets, posing a public safety concern.

"Moving forward, my office will closely scrutinize all
individuals who are assigned to E.M. by carefully reviewing their
charges and criminal histories, a process that may take up to 48
hours," Sheriff Dart wrote.  "Those who are deemed to be too high
a security risk to be in the community will be referred back to
the court for further evaluation."

Sheriff Dart's announcement immediately prompted a class-action
lawsuit filed late on Feb. 26 by lead plaintiff Taphia Williams,
who remained in jail at the time of her filing despite having
posted bail on Feb. 23.

"More than 60 hours after her bond had been posted, in the early
afternoon of Monday, February 26, 2018, an agent of the Chicago
Community Bond Fund called the records department at Cook County
Jail to inquire why Ms. Williams had not yet been released," the
complaint states.  "He was told that she was being held pursuant
to the defendant Dart's new policy wherein Dart was conducting
his own administrative review of individuals with 'serious
charges' who were being released on bond to determine if he
approved their release or not."

Ms. Williams says Sheriff Dart's unilateral decision violates her
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizure.

"Dart's policy is unconstitutional in that it holds individuals
in pre-trial detention, even though a judge has set a bond and
the bond has been posted, without legal justification, and
because it violates separation of powers in that Dart is refusing
to execute and/or effectively overruling a binding judicial
order," Ms. Williams' lawsuit states.

She seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting the sheriff from
continuing his new policy of delaying the release of suspects who
have posted bond.

Ms. Williams is represented by Sara Garber with Thedford Garber
Law in Chicago.

Sheriff Dart's office did not respond on Feb. 27 to a request for
comment. [GN]


CHICAGO ORNAMENTAL: Garrido Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled Rene Garrido and Sergio
Patino v. Chicago Ornamental Iron, Inc., Jonathan Samek, and
Enrique Montes, Case No. 1:17-cv-03236 (N.D. Ill.), moves for
class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

During those weeks when the putative class members worked
overtime hours (more than 40 hours), the Defendants paid the
putative class members at a reduced regular hourly rate and,
thus, paid the class members at a reduced overtime hourly rate,
the Plaintiffs allege.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=gAT5lEbE

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Raul Villalobos, Esq.
          VILLALOBOS & ASSOCIATES
          1620 W. 18th Street
          Chicago, IL 60608
          Telephone: (312) 666-9982
          Facsimile: (312) 666-4533
          E-mail: rvillalobos@villaloboslaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Antonio Caldarone, Esq.
          LANER, MUTCHIN LTD.
          515 N. State St., Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 467-9800
          Facsimile: (312) 467-9479
          E-mail: acaldarone@lanermuchin.com


COLORADO: Sheriff Faces Class Action Over Immigrant Detention
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Pampuro, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
the ACLU accused a Colorado sheriff of breaking state law on
Feb. 27 by wrongfully detaining released persons for ICE.

At the request of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, El Paso
County Sheriff Bill Elder has held numerous individuals in prison
days, weeks, and months after posting bond, completing their
sentence, or having their cases cleared.

The class action lawsuit was filed by Saul Cisneros, 47, and Rut
Noemi Chavez Rodriguez, 21, two Colorado Springs residents who
have been imprisoned since November.  ACLU estimates 200 other
individuals have been retained on ICE holds in El Paso over the
last year.

"Colorado law authorizes sheriffs to deprive someone of their
liberty only when there is probable cause of a crime, not for
suspected civil violations of federal immigration law," said
Mark Silverstein, legal director ACLU of Colorado.  "When
individuals have posted bond or resolved their criminal case,
Colorado law requires that Sheriff Elder release them."

After Mr. Cisneros' eldest daughter posted his $2,000 bail, she
learned that he would not be released until ICE finished its
investigation.  Ms. Rodriguez's family prepared her $1,000 bail,
but was told she would remain imprisoned.

Once the state has ordered the individual's release, a new arrest
with a new cause is required to continue to hold them.  A local
law enforcement officer cannot make an arrest on behalf of ICE
without a warrant signed by a judge.

Yet the complaint alleges "Sheriff Elder . . . carries out these
lawless deprivations of liberty in the absence of a judicial
warrant, without probable cause of a crime, and without any other
valid legal authority."

In the past, ICE has routinely issued detainer requests, or "ICE
holds," asking local sheriffs to hold persons up to five days
beyond their legal release while the federal office investigates
whether to take them into custody for a suspected immigration
violation.

ACLU reports that ICE issued more than 8,700 detainer requests to
Colorado jails between October 2011 and August 2013.  In 2013,
the Colorado legislature repealed a law requiring local law
enforcement to enforce federal immigration policy in hopes of
building trust between immigrants and local police.

"Since 2007, we have not changed any of our practices as it
relates to the arrest and housing of inmates to include foreign
born nationals," Sheriff Elder said.  "We arrest and house
criminals where probable cause exists for a state crime. If the
criminal is unlawfully present, EPSO honors the detainer filed by
ICE and requires ICE to pick up the inmate within a reasonable
period of time."

It is the policy of the El Paso Sheriff's Office to immediately
notify ICE when a "foreign born national is arrested on state
charges."  Sheriff Elder also pointed out that El Paso County
does not consider itself a sanctuary and that the El Paso County
Sheriff's Office has never been added to ICE's warning list for
failing to cooperate.

"What we've seen is any communication between local law
enforcement and ICE break community trust, and it really makes
sheriffs' jobs harder, because people are afraid to collaborate
with them," said Brendan Greene, campaign director for the
Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition.  "Folks no longer see them
as sheriffs representing the whole community.  They are really
seen as ICE agents."

A new strategy being promoted by ICE includes issuing
administrative warrants with their detainer requests.  Without a
judge's signature, the lawsuit claims, Colorado sheriffs have no
authority to execute them.

"Now they (ICE agents) are pushing a new program, that if they
fax them a different combination of papers, none of which are
approved by a judge, that they all of suddenly magically become a
federal prisoner of ICE authority and that is not how it works,"
Mr. Greene added.

In addition to seeking compensation for Ms. Cisneros, the class
action suit seeks "declaratory judgment and an injunction on
behalf of all current and future prisoners who are the subject of
ICE detainers."

In addition to the ALCU Colorado, the plaintiffs are being
represented by Stephen Masciocchi, Esq. an attorney with Holland
& Hart. [GN]


CONSOL ENERGY: Fitzwater's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., denied as moot the Plaintiffs'
motion to certify class in the lawsuit captioned BENNY FITZWATER,
and CLARENCE BRIGHT, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated v. CONSOL ENERGY, INC., and CONSOLIDATION COAL CO., and
FOLA COAL CO., LLC, and CONSOL OF KENTUCKY, INC., and BUCHANAN
MINING CO., LLC, and KURT SALVATORI, Case No. 2:16-cv-09849
(S.D.W. Va.).

"In view of the scheduling order of this court this day issued in
these now-consolidated cases, this motion is denied as moot, but
the evidentiary hearing on the motion is preserved for a like
motion to be filed herein," according to the Order.

The lawsuit is consolidated with Case No. 1:17-cv-03861.

The Clerk is requested to transmit the Order to all counsel of
record and any unrepresented parties.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=sTOcTIV6


CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIONS: Time to File Cert Bid in "Allen" Moved
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, New York County, issued a Decision and Order
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension to File Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned TRAVIS ALLEN, GATH
BROWN, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, v. CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIONS, LLC, BUILDING ENTERPRISE
SERVICES, INC., AND ALL OF THEIR AFFILIATED ENTITIES AND
SUCCESSORS, AND HOLLISTER CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC, Defendants,
Docket No. 158197/2017, Motion Seq. No. 001 (N.Y. Sup.).

Plaintiffs moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR 2004, for an
extension of time to file their motion for class certification
until that time that a preliminary conference has been held and
the Court has set dates to 1) complete pre-class certification
discovery; and 2) move for class certification.

Plaintiffs Travis Allen and Garth Brown, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, commenced this action against
defendants Construction Directions, LLC (CD), Building Enterprise
Services, Inc. (BES) and all of their affiliated entities and
successors, and Hollister Construction Services, LLC (Hollister)
seeking to recover, inter alia, unpaid wages and overtime pay.
This Court, in its discretion, grants plaintiffs' motion pursuant
to CPLR 2004 to extend the 60-day time period fixed by CPLR 902
to move for class certification based on the plaintiffs' need to
conduct class certification discovery. In reaching its decision,
this Court considers that the instant motion was filed on
December 20, 2017, only six days after plaintiffs' time to move
expired.
Thus, plaintiffs' very brief delay in moving for an extension of
time was minimal. Further, plaintiffs could not have requested a
preliminary conference until issue was joined, and the answers of
all three defendants were untimely.

Moreover, since the instant motion is unopposed, no party has
demonstrated that it would be prejudiced if plaintiffs were
granted the requested extension of time.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for an order extending their time
to move for class certification is granted.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's February 5, 2018
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y77ruz9l
from Leagle.com.


COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams Moves to Certify Class of Detainees
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled TAPHIA WILLIAMS,
Individually and on Behalf of those similarly situated v. COOK
COUNTY, and COOK COUNTY SHERIFF TOM DART, Case No. 1:18-cv-01456
(N.D. Ill.), asks the Court to enter an order certifying that the
case may be maintained as a class action on behalf of:

     all individuals who are currently detained or in the future
     will be detained at the Cook County Jail, even though their
     bond has been posted, pursuant to Dart's new policy of
     conducting his own review of bond decisions made by Cook
     County Judges.

Ms. Williams also asks the Court to appoint her attorneys as
class counsel.

As more fully articulated in the Complaint, Ms. Williams asserts
that she was detained by Sheriff Dart at the Cook County Jail
long after her bond was posted pursuant to Dart's new policy
whereby Cook County Correctional Administrators, at Dart's
direction, detain individuals even after their bonds are posted
to conduct Dart's own "review" of bond decisions made by Cook
County Judges to determine whether he felt those bond decisions
were appropriate. Pursuant to this policy, she contends, when
Dart determines the bonds set by Cook County Judges in various
cases are not appropriate he continues to detain them after their
bonds are posted in order to try to get a re-consideration of
bond by a Cook County Judge.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=vSYUYR7e

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sara A. Garber, Esq.
          THEDFORD GARBER LAW
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 638
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 614-0866
          Facsimile: (312) 754-8096
          E-mail: sara@thedfordgarberlaw.com


COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL: Mortgagors Classes Certified in "Waldrup"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Christina A. Snyder granted the Plaintiffs' joint motion
for class certification in the lawsuits styled BARBARA WALDRUP v.
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ET AL., Case No. CV13-8833-
CAS(AGRx), consolidated with Case No. CV16-4166-CAS(AGRx) (C.D.
Cal.).

The Nationwide RICO Class is defined as:

     All residents of the United States of America who, during
     the period January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2008,
     obtained an appraisal from LandSafe in connection with a
     loan originated by Countrywide.

The Texas Unjust Enrichment Class is defined as:

     All residents of the State of Texas who, during the period
     January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2008, obtained an
     appraisal from LandSafe in connection with a loan originated
     by Countrywide.

The Court appoints Baron & Budd, P.C., and Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP as class counsel.

The Plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuits, on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated home mortgagors, allege that
the Defendants engaged in a fraudulent appraisal scheme that
charged each class members hundreds of dollars in fees for home
appraisals that failed to comply with the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice.

Copies of the Civil Minutes are available at no charge at:

   * http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=pAszf3dJ
   * http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=afCGHZvF


CREDENCE RESOURCE: Certification of Class Sought in "Betz" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robin Betz moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled ROBIN BETZ, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CREDENCE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-00279-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=TG1XOr4r

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CREDIT BUREAU: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Keanna Gochet moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit entitled KEANNA GOCHET, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CREDIT BUREAU
OF NAPA COUNTY, INC. d/b/a CHASE RECEIVABLES, Case No. 2:18-cv-
00260-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay
the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff
(and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material
to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff contends, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff states
that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a
certified check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v.
CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns
v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-
1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff tells
the Court.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=qX3Fashm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CURADEN AG: Lyngaas' Class Cert. Bid Denied Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith entered an order in the lawsuit titled
BRIAN LYNGAAS, D.D.S., individually and as the representative of
a class of similarly-situated persons v. CURADEN AG, CURADEN USA
INC, and JOHN DOES 1-12, Case No. 2:17-cv-10910-MAG-MKM (E.D.
Mich.):

   1. denying without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion to certify
      class, including the issue of tender of relief to moot
      Plaintiff's claims; and

   2. ordering the parties to submit supplemental briefing
      regarding the applicability of Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure 4(k)(2) in connection with Defendant Curaden AG's
      motion to dismiss.  The briefs shall not exceed 5 pages and
      was to be submitted no later than February 27, 2018.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=nt6JJAJr


DE VILLE ASSET: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Keanna Gochet moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit captioned KEANNA GOCHET,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. DE
VILLE ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Case No. 2:18-cv-
00257-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay
the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff
(and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material
to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ObWxkvyg

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


DENKA PERFORMANCE: Wins to Bid Dismiss Taylor's Class Allegations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Martin L. C. Feldman entered an order and reasons in the
lawsuit styled ROBERT TAYLOR, JR., ET AL. v. DENKA PERFORMANCE
ELASTOMER LLC, ET AL., Case No. 2:17-cv-07668-MLCF-KWR (E.D.
La.):

   -- denying the Plaintiffs' Rule 54(b) motion to reconsider the
      Court's order denying motion for extension of time to file
      for a motion for class certification;

   -- granting DuPont's motion to strike the Plaintiffs' motion
      for class certification and appointment of class counsel,
      which is construed as a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
      class allegations;

   -- dismissing the Plaintiffs' class allegations; and

   -- denying as untimely the plaintiffs' motion for class
      certification.

The litigation arises from the Defendants' production of neoprene
at their St. John the Baptist Parish facility, which allegedly
exposes those living in the vicinity to concentrated levels of
chloroprene well above the upper limit of acceptable risk,
resulting in a risk of cancer more than 800 times the national
average.

The Pontchartrain Works facility (PWF), located in LaPlace,
Louisiana, is the only facility in the United States that
continues to manufacture a synthetic rubber known as neoprene.
The neoprene production works at PWF were owned and operated from
1969 through November 2015 by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company.  DuPont still owns the land, but the production works
are now owned and operated by Denka Performance Elastomer LLC.
As part of the neoprene production process, chloroprene is
manufactured; since 2010, chloroprene has been classified by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as a likely human
carcinogen.

Robert Taylor, Jr., Kershell Bailey, Shondrell P. Campbell,
Gloria Dumas, Janell Emery, George Handy, Annette Houston, Rogers
Jackson, Michael Perkins, Allen Schneider, Jr., Larry Sorapuru,
Sr., Kellie Tabb, and Robert Taylor, III, are all individuals
living near PWF in Reserve, Edgard, and LaPlace, Louisiana.  On
June 29, 2017, these individuals, individually and as
representatives of a putative class of similarly situated
plaintiffs, sued Denka Performance Elastomer LLC and E.I. DuPont
De Nemours and Company in the Louisiana 40th Judicial District
Court in St. John the Baptist Parish.  The plaintiffs allege that
DuPont has emitted chloroprene for many years at levels resulting
in concentrations many times the upper limit of acceptable risk,
and DPE continues to do so.  In April 2017, the EPA released a
redacted inspection report showing more than 10,000 violations by
Denka related to emissions of chloroprene from the PWF.

A copy of the Order and Reasons is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=TvqV107M


DENVER, CO: Trial in Homeless Class Action Expected This Year
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Walker, writing for Westword, reports that remember that
big federal lawsuit in which thousands of people experiencing
homelessness are suing Denver, alleging that their constitutional
rights are being violated during sweeps of their encampments?
Westword caught up with the representing attorney, Jason Flores-
Williams, to find out the latest.

But first, a quick primer

The saga began back in August 2016, when Flores-Williams sued the
city -- as well as Mayor Michael Hancock and Denver Police Chief
Robert White -- in federal court, alleging that the
constitutional rights of the homeless were being violated when
the city conducted large-scale sweep operations.  Mr. Flores-
Williams alleged that Denver violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
amendments (protection against unlawful searches and seizures and
the equal-protection clause, respectively) when it was
confiscating -- and in some instances trashing -- the belongings
of people experiencing homelessness.

In April 2017, the case became a big deal when U.S. District
Court Judge William Martinez made the rare step of granting class
certification, making every person experiencing homelessness in
Denver (over 3,000 people) a plaintiff in the case against the
city.  Mr. Flores-Williams called the ruling "historic" at the
time, and the suit soon gained additional firepower when civil-
rights attorney David Lane jumped on board as Mr. Flores-
Williams's co-counsel.

The two attorneys gathered evidence through depositions of city
officials and by requesting city emails, and were so confident in
the strength of the evidence they obtained that they filed a
motion for summary judgment in August -- meaning they asked the
federal court to rule without a full trial.  In response, the
city also made its own motion for summary judgment.

Westword's recent interview with Flores-Williams explains things
from there.

Westword: When are you expecting to hear from the court regarding
the motions for summary judgment?

Jason Flores-Williams: Usually the court is supposed to respond
within six months.  So because we filed last August, it could be
any day now.

What's the main difference between your motion for summary
judgment and the city's?

We're right and they're wrong [laughs].  But, really, it's that
ours shows, factually, what happened to large amounts of people
when the city straight-up stormtrooped encampments, [like] at
Arkins Court [in July 2016].

The city's, as is usual, is procedurally based.  It's an attempt
to out-procedure us.  They filed what's called a motion to
strike, which is a way of trying to get rid of the evidence.  The
city has also, in their opposition to our motion for summary
judgment, tried to put distance between themselves and any bad
actors out there.  So they try to separate what park rangers did,
what DPD was aware of, what the mayor was aware of.  It's parsing
the liability.  The reality is that there is about a thousand
yards of intentionally constructed procedure that's been injected
by corporations and cities and other powerful bad actors so that
they're never held responsible for what they end up doing to
people.

If the federal court agrees to a summary judgment and rules in
your favor, what might that ruling look like?

The most typical remedy would be requiring some kind of hearing
or due-process proceedings regarding someone's possessions if
police were trying take them.

Would the camping ban be affected at all?

No, that's not part of this. It's not included because I've seen
all of the other cases across the country where constitutional
challenges of camping bans haven't succeeded.

What do you think will happen?

I think we have real ground to prevail.  However, I would not be
surprised if [the opposing] motions for summary judgment balance
each other out and we end up having to go to trial.  So I think,
ultimately, we'll end up by the end of this year going to a
monster trial.

What would that trial look like?

This is where it gets complicated and uninteresting [laughs].
You get to choose between having a federal judge making a ruling
or a jury making a ruling.  I always prefer a jury but would have
to refer to co-counsel.  At the same time, the weight of having a
federal judge making a ruling sets a greater precedent than a
jury, which would award money through damages.

No matter what, it's a landmark case as far as the treatment of
the homeless and [dispossession] by a city like Denver that has
tons of money.  It cannot simply cast aside the poor and people
who didn't have leverage in the name of making a buck for the
stockbrokers who control the development corporations that
invariably invest in the city government and elections and
ultimately hold sway over politics.  This mayor's office has been
one of the most pro-developement mayor's offices in the country,
as far as I can tell. [GN]


DON HUMMER TRUCKING: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Ratliff" Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ronald A. Guzman granted the Defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the lawsuit entitled
Jerome Ratliff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
individuals v. Don Hummer Trucking Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-07173
(N.D. Ill.).

All pending motions are denied as moot and the civil case is
terminated, according to the Court's memorandum opinion and
order.

Judge Guzman opines that the fact that the Plaintiff resides in
Illinois is, without more, insufficient to create personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, citing Chopra v.
Naik, No. 16 C 10262, 2017 WL 4339804, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,
2017).  Moreover, Judge Guzman explains, the Plaintiff has not
established that his Fair Credit Reporting Act claim is related
to the Defendant's contacts with Illinois.

Because the Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof with
respect to establishing this Court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court grants Defendant's motion
to dismiss on that ground.

The Plaintiff applied online for a commercial truck-driver
position with Defendant on or about November 14, 2014, in
response to a solicitation on its Web site.  On November 26,
2014, the Defendant obtained a background report from HireRight,
LLC.  According to Plaintiff, on information and belief, the
Defendant disqualified him for the job based on information it
learned from the background report, and did not hire him.

Mr. Ratliff alleges that the Defendant did not provide him with
the notice required by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act,
informing him that he was not hired based on information in his
background report within three business days of deciding not to
hire him.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=xgSwnpkC


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Johnson Seeks to Certify Class Under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled ERIN JOHNSON, on behalf of
plaintiff and a class v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC, Case No.
2:16-cv-00330-PPS (N.D. Ind.), renews the motion to certify this
class:

     (a) all individuals in Indiana (b) who were sent a letter by
     defendant (c) offering a settlement (d) and stating that
     "your delinquent account may be reported to the national
     credit bureaus" (e) where the debt was reported to one or
     more national credit bureaus (Equifax, Trans Union, or
     Experian) on or before the date in the letter for receipt of
     the settlement, or first payment thereof (f) and the letter
     was sent at any time during a period beginning July 12, 2015
     (one year prior to the filing of this action) and ending
     August 1, 2016 (21 days after the filing of this action).

The action concerns alleged attempts by the Defendant to collect
an alleged telephone debt incurred, if at all, for personal,
family or household purposes and not for business purposes.  The
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Plaintiff further asks that Edelman, Combs, Latturner &
Goodwin, LLC be appointed counsel for the class.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kcKBfqXT

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel A. Edelman, Esq.
          Cassandra P. Miller, Esq.
          EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
          20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 739-4200
          Facsimile: (312) 419-0379
          E-mail: dedelman@edcombs.com
                  cmiller@edcombs.com


ESSEX, NJ: Sanchez Seeks to Certify Detainees Classes & Sub-Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled LAZARO SANCHEZ, both
individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly
situated v. COUNTY OF ESSEX, Case No. 2:15-cv-03391-MCA-LDW
(D.N.J.), seeks certification of these classes and sub-class:

   * THE MALE DETAINEE STRIP SEARCH CLASS:

     All male detainees who have been or will be placed into the
     custody of the Essex County Correctional Facility after
     being ordered detained on any criminal, civil or family
     offenses other than those involving immigration violations,
     and were strip searched upon their entry into the Essex
     County Correctional Facility ("the male detainee strip
     search class").  The class period commences on May 15, 2013,
     and extends to the date on which Essex County is enjoined
     from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its policy, practice,
     and custom of conducting blanket public group strip searches
     of on all detainees admitted to the Essex County
     Correctional Facility in the absence of appropriate privacy
     protections. Specifically excluded from the Male Detainee
     Strip Search Class are Defendant and any and all of its
     respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs,
     successors, employees, or assignees;

   * THE NON-INDICTABLE STRIP SEARCH CLASS:

     All detainees who have been or will be placed into the
     custody of the Essex County Correctional Facility after
     being charged with non-indictable offenses, summary
     violations, violations of probation, traffic infractions,
     civil commitments or other minor crimes, including failure
     to pay fines, and were strip searched in the absence of
     reasonable suspicion upon their entry into the Essex County
     Correctional Facility ("the Non-Indictable Strip Search
     Class"). The class period commences May 15, 2013, and
     extends to the date on which Essex County is enjoined from,
     or otherwise ceases, enforcing its policy, practice, and
     custom of conducting blanket strip searches on all detainees
     admitted to the Essex County Correctional Facility.
     Specifically excluded from the Strip Search Class are
     Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates,
     legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees, or
     assignees; and

   * THE NON-INDICTABLE STRIP SEARCH SUBCLASS:

     All detainees who have been or will be placed into the
     custody of the Essex County Correctional Facility after
     being charged with non-indictable offenses, summary
     violations, violations of probation, traffic infractions,
     civil commitments or other minor crimes, including failure
     to pay fines, and were strip searched in the absence of
     reasonable suspicion upon their entry into the Essex County
     Correctional Facility (a) prior to an appearance before a
     judge or judicial officer with authority to release the
     detainee and/or (b) without being given a reasonable
     opportunity to post bail ("the Non-Indictable Strip Search
     Sub-Class").  The class period commences May 15, 2013, and
     extends to the date on which Essex County is enjoined from,
     or otherwise ceases, enforcing its policy, practice, and
     custom of conducting blanket strip searches on all detainees
     admitted to the Essex County Correctional Facility before
     they appear before a judge or judicial officer.
     Specifically excluded from the Strip Search Sub-Class are
     Defendant and any and all of its respective affiliates,
     legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees, or
     assignees;

Pursuant to the Court's Motion schedule, the Motion will be
returnable on the Court's March 19, 2008 Motion day, and requires
a response on or before March 5, 2018.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Ab3T3VN7

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, PC
          One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
          Albany, NY 12205
          Telephone: (518) 434-1718
          E-mail: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
          Alexandra Warren, Esq.
          CUNEO, GILBERT & LaDUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          E-mail: charlesl@cuneolaw.com
                  awarren@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Lawrence J. Friscia, III, Esq.
          FRISCIA & ASSOCIATES
          119 Wilson Avenue, Suite A
          Newark, NJ 17105
          Telephone: (973) 500-8024
          E-mail: lawrence.friscia@friscialaw.com


F. MILLER PROPERTIES: Hannon Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned SHANNON HANNON, MELISSA
TORRES AND SHELLY GUIDRY v. F. MILLER PROPERTIES, LLC, Case No.
3:17-cv-00304-JWD-EWD (M.D. La.), move for an order certifying
the action as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Shannon Hannon, et al., also ask the Court to direct the
Defendants to produce the name, address, and last known mailing
addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers and cell phone
numbers for:

   Class I: Every person employed as a Server or Salesperson at a
            Waffle House Restaurant owned or operated by Miller
            Properties, Inc. or F Miller Properties, LLC at any
            time during the period May 10, 2014 to the current
            date.

  Class II: Every person employed as a Server or Salesperson at a
            Waffle House Restaurant covered by or subject to an
            Operating Agreement or other agreement between (a)
            Waffle House, Inc., and (b) Miller Properties, Inc.,
            and/or F Miller Properties, LLC and/or Frank G.
            Miller, which gave Waffle House, Inc. rights to
            manage, operate or oversee the operation or
            management of the subject restaurants.

The Plaintiffs further ask the Court to authorize notice of this
action and of prospective class members' right to opt into the
action, to each such person in such form and manner as the Court
may deem appropriate, and to declare the time limitation for
filing claims by the Opt in Plaintiffs is tolled effective May
10, 2017 (the date the Complaint was filed) or alternatively the
date of Order.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=TDbbJ4Yl

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Christopher L. Zaunbrecher, Esq.
          BRINEY FORET CORRY
          413 Travis Street, Suite 200
          Post Office Drawer 51367
          Lafayette, LA 70505-1367
          Telephone: (337) 237-4070
          Facsimile: (337) 233-8719
          E-mail: zaunbrecher@brineyforet.com


FIELDTURF USA: Arlington County Not Planning to Join Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bridget Reed Morawski, writing for ARL Now, reports that
Arlington County is not currently planning to join the class
action lawsuit against FieldTurf USA Inc., the company that
installed turf at several county fields.

Several school districts and local governments across the country
have accused the company of installing defective turf.

"At this time we have not experienced our turf failing, we have
not had that experience," said Robert Capper, Arlington Parks &
Recreation's capital assets manager.

One of the turf fields at Long Bridge Park is scheduled to be
replaced beginning in late March, a process that will take three
months and cost just over $400,000.  FieldTurf USA was outbid by
GTR Turf, Inc. for the replacement contract.

The fields, which are under warranty until early 2019, will be
replaced early so that all three Long Bridge Park fields will not
be replaced simultaneously.

Fields come with an eight-year warranty, and are generally
replaced eight or nine years after installation, according to
Lisa Grandle, Arlington County Parks & Recreation's park
development division chief.

The warranty for one of the Long Bridge Park's synthetic turf
fields covers defective material or installation workmanship
problems, but doesn't cover what Ms. Grandle called normal wear
and tear or heavy usage.

"Like tires on your car, the more hours you're on them, the more
the fields wear down," said Ms. Grandle.

The county has not completed a cost comparison between synthetic
turf and natural grass because synthetic field allows more
options for playing and lasts longer than natural grass, she
said.

Natural grass can sustain about 900 hours of playtime before it
is considered degraded.  Synthetic turf can last for
approximately 2,100 hours of playtime prior to degradation,
according to county officials. [GN]


FINANCIAL BUSINESS: Class Certification Sought in "Holmes" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Holmes moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit titled RACHEL HOLMES, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. FINANCIAL
BUSINESS AND CONSUMER SOLUTIONS, INC., and JEFFERSON CAPITAL
SYSTEMS, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00227 (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendants) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2JoWytgK

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


FIREBIRDS OF OVERLAND: Nolen Seeks to Certify of Class of Servers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled JOSH NOLEN, On Behalf of
Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. FIREBIRDS OF
OVERLAND PARK, L.L.C., And FIREBIRDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case
No. 2:17-cv-02237-JWL-JPO (D. Kan.), ask the Court to issue an
order:

   1. certifying a class, composed of all current and former
      servers and bartenders of Firebirds International, Inc.,
      who worked for the Defendants at any time from May 12, 2014
      to the Present;

   2. requiring the expedited issuance of the notice form as set
      forth in Exhibit A to those class members, and setting a
      deadline of 90 days after the date of the Court's Order
      granting certification, for which putative class members
      can join this matter;

   3. requiring Defendants to provide to Plaintiffs' counsel a
      list both electronically (in an Excel spreadsheet with each
      item of the employee's name and address designated as a
      separate field) and by hard copy, of all individuals who
      meet the class description, including their current or last
      known address, phone number, and e-mail address, within 15
      days of the issuance of the order;

   4. requiring Defendants to post notices and opt-in forms at
      time clocks, micros, and other conspicuous locations (such
      as bulletin boards or bulletin boards where job notices are
      posted) at Defendants' locations for a period of 90 days
      where employees can see such notices;

   5. tolling the statute of limitations period for the putative
      class members from the date of filing of Plaintiffs' Motion
      for Conditional Class Certification until the close of the
      opt-in period;

   6. designating Plaintiffs Josh Nolen and Maggie Brooks as
      class representatives for the collective class; and

   7. approving Plaintiffs' counsel to act as class counsel in
      this matter.

This is not a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs say.
Rather, the Plaintiffs add, this Motion is brought pursuant to
the collective action provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Plaintiffs have brought the current action, challenging the
Defendants' alleged use of the tip credit for certain non-tip-
producing activities that exceeded 20% of their workday or
workweek.  The Plaintiffs allege that they should have been paid
full minimum wage for that time.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=by3o5QgY

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Hodgson, Esq.
          THE HODGSON LAW FIRM, LLC
          3699 SW Pryor Rd.
          Lee's Summit, MO 64082
          Telephone: (816) 600-0117
          Facsimile: (816) 600-0137
          E-mail: mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Phillip M. Murphy II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP M. MURPHY II
          4717 Grand Avenue, Suite 250
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (913) 661-2900
          Facsimile: (913) 312-5841
          E-mail: Phillip@phillipmurphylaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Robert Hingula, Esq.
          POLSINELLI PC
          900 W. 48th Place, Suite 900
          Kansas City, MO 64112-1895
          Telephone: (816) 753-1000
          Facsimile: (816) 753-1536
          E-mail: rhingula@polsinelli.com


FITBIT INC: Seeks Decertification of 2 Classes in "Brickman" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the lawsuit titled JAMES P. BRICKMAN, et al.,
individually and as a representative of all others similarly
situated v. FITBIT, INC., Case No. 3:15-cv-02077-JD (N.D. Cal.),
asks the Court to decertify the two certified state-specific
classes in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in In re
Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, Nos. 15-56014, 15-56025,
et al., 2018 WL 505343 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2018):

   Class 1: All California residents who have purchased and
            registered online a Fitbit Flex, One, or Ultra in the
            State of California between 2009 and October 27, 2014
            (when Fitbit added an arbitration clause to its terms
            of use); and

   Class 2: All Florida residents who have purchased and
            registered online a Fitbit Flex, One, or Ultra in the
            State of Florida between 2009 and October 27, 2014.

Fitbit contends that the Plaintiffs' failure to show class-wide
exposure to the on-the-box representations at issue -- in the
face of evidence refuting such exposure -- is fatal to their
ability to maintain this case as a class action.  Fitbit adds
that the Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, make that showing and
Fitbit's evidence disproves class-wide exposure; nor should the
Plaintiffs be permitted to define a "fail-safe" class.

The Court will commence a hearing on March 29, 2018, at 10:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=AZXscpjE

The Defendant is represented by:

          David F. McDowell, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          707 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 6000
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
          Telephone: (213) 592-5200
          E-mail: DMcDowell@mofo.com

               - and -

          Erin M. Bosman, Esq.
          Julie Y. Park, Esq.
          Kai Bartolomeo, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          12531 High Bluff Drive
          San Diego, CA 92130-2040
          Telephone: (858) 720-5100
          Facsimile: (858) 720-5125
          E-mail: EBosman@mofo.com
                  JuliePark@mofo.com
                  KBartolomeo@mofo.com


FLOWERS FOODS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Wiatrek" Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, San Antonio Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Conditional Certification in the case captioned
RICHARD WIATREK, Individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FLOWERS FOODS, INC. and FLOWERS BAKING
CO. OF SAN ANTONIO LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. SA-17-CV-
772-XR (W.D. Tex.).

Richard Wiatrek alleges that he was employed as a distributor for
Defendants Flowers Foods, Inc., and Flowers Baking Co. of San
Antonio, LLC, and that they improperly misclassified him and
other distributors as independent contractors rather than
employees, resulting in violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) overtime requirements.

The FLSA permits an employee to bring an action against an
employer on behalf of himself and other employees similarly
situated. Unlike a Rule 23 class action, in which plaintiffs "opt
out" of the class, a Section 216 plaintiff must opt in to become
part of the class.  This Court applies the two-step approach of
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987), in regard
to conditionally certifying a class and giving notice to putative
class members. Botello v. COI Telecom, LLC, No. 10-CV-305-XR,
2010 WL 5464824 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2010).

The two stages of the Lusardi approach are the notice stage and
the decertification stage.

Plaintiff has stated in his affidavit that he believes other
current and former distributors would be interested in joining
this lawsuit if they were made aware of it. This statement is
based on his twenty years of experience working as a Distributor.
The existence of several classes conditionally certified that
have involved numerous opt-in plaintiffs supports the conclusion
that other similarly situated distributors will want to opt in.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing
for class certification.

Defendants contend that, if a class is certified, it should be
limited to the warehouse in Kerrville from which Plaintiff
operated. Plaintiff asks the Court to certify the class as all
warehouses belonging to FBC of San Antonio, noting that, as in
the other cases certifying distributor classes, Defendants have
not shown why a plaintiff's status as an employee or independent
contractor would vary by warehouse. The cases certifying
distributor classes against Flowers Foods have not limited it to
the particular warehouses utilized by the named plaintiff, and
Plaintiff argues that other cases limiting a class to a
particular location are distinguishable based on those particular
workplaces and structures.

Plaintiff thus contends that because Defendants have failed to
show how a particular warehouse may affect the status of a
distributor as an employee or an independent contractor and
because evidence suggests that the policies and practices
applicable to Flowers Baking Co. of San Antonio distributors are
the same from warehouse to warehouse, notice should be sent to
all Flowers Baking Co. of San Antonio warehouses. The Court
agrees with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff requests a period of 90 days after the initial notices
are mailed for opt-in plaintiffs to file their Notices of
Consent, and also seeks permission to both mail (with a self-
addressed, stamped envelope) and email the notices. Plaintiff
also seeks permission to post notices of the lawsuit at
Defendant's warehouses. Plaintiff states that most distributors
work seven days a week and thus should have additional time to
consider opting in. Plaintiff contends that these are reasonable
conditions, and notes that other courts have approved them in
FLSA actions.

Defendants contend that a 90-day notice and opt-in period is too
long because there is no indication that any opt-in plaintiffs
would be hard to locate or contact, and it should be 45 days at
most. Defendants further contend that posting notice in the
warehouses is unwarranted because it has not been shown that mail
would be insufficient.

The Court finds that a 60-day notice and opt-in period is
appropriate, with notices to be mailed only. The Court further
finds that posting in the warehouses is not warranted.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Corrected Motion to Conditionally
Certify Class is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xqvdho from Leagle.com.

Richard Wiatrek, Individually and on Behalf of all Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alfonso Kennard,
Jr., Kennard Richard P.C., 2603 Augusta Dr., Suite 1450. Houston,
Texas 77056

Flowers Foods, Inc. & Flowers Baking Co. of San Antonio, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Michael D. Mitchell, Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Stephen E. Hart, Ogletree Deakins,
301 Congress Ave. Ste 1250. Austin, TX 78701


GATESTONE & CO: Ballaj Moves for Final Nod of Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled VALBONA BALLAJ, on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated v. GATESTONE & CO.
INTERNATIONAL INC.; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Case No. 2:16-cv-
01311-CLW (D.N.J.), moves for an order granting final approval of
the Parties' class settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=zYfNMZRr

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081-1315
          Telephone: (973) 379-7500
          Facsimile: (973) 532-0866
          E-mail: philip@sternthomasson.com
                  andrew@sternthomasson.com

               - and -

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Avenue, Suite 200
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com


GC SERVICES: Certification of Class Sought in "Beaufrand" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Beaufrand moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned CARLOS BEAUFRAND,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. GC
SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Case No. 2:18-cv-00242-LA (E.D.
Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be
filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Zr4tALID

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


GERMED INC: Fauley's Class Certification Bid Entered and Cont'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 8, 2018, in the case
captioned Shaun Fauley v. GerMed Inc., et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-
00065 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the
Honorable Edmond E. Chang.

The minute entry states that the Plaintiff's class certification
motion is premature and was brought only to stave off possible
mootness, so it is entered and continued generally.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=dyvDk0w1


GREAT CIRCLE: Court Certifies Case Managers Class in "Bush" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian C. Wimes grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Collective Action
Certification in the lawsuit styled MELISSA BUSH v. GREAT CIRCLE,
Case No. 2:17-cv-04070-BCW (W.D. Mo.).

Plaintiff Melissa Bush alleges claims against the Defendant for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and Missouri
law.  On October 3, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the motion for
conditional collective action certification on the basis that she
and others, in their capacities as Foster Care Case Managers
employed by the Defendant, were misclassified as exempt under the
FLSA.

In this case, the Plaintiff has defined the putative collective
class to include all individuals, who were employed by the
Defendant as Foster Care Case Managers during the three-year
period prior to Plaintiff's filing of this suit.

Judge Wimes grants the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
certification.  The Plaintiff's motion for approval of the
proposed collective action notice, however, is granted in part
and denied in part.

"The notice attached to this order reflects the Court's rulings
and is approved for dissemination to the putative collective
class," Judge Wimes opines.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=I1v74rex

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Alan Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997-9150
          Facsimile: (314) 997-9170
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Erin M. Naeger, Esq.
          STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP
          1201 Walnut, Suite 2900
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 691-2364
          E-mail: erin.naeger@stinson.com


GREEN STAR: Bohlke Seeks Certification of Two Classes Under TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled ROBERT BOHLKE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GREEN STAR
CAPITAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and
each of them, Case No. 9:17-cv-81379-DMM (S.D. Fla.), moves for
class certification under Rules 23(B)(2) and 23(B)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mr. Bohlke defines the Classes as:

   * Autodialed Class consists of:

     All persons within the United States who received any
     solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to
     said person's cellular telephone made through the use of any
     automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
     prerecorded voice and such person had not previously
     consented to receiving such calls within four years to the
     filing of this Complaint.

   * DNC Class consists of:

     All persons within the United States who received two or
     more calls on a residential line2 within any twelve month
     period, from Defendant, or their agents, whose phone number
     was registered on the National Do Not Call List for at least
     31 days prior to receiving at least two of the calls, who
     was not the intended recipient of the call from Defendant,
     and who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor
     had a prior established business relationship, between
     December 21, 2013 and present.

The putative class action centers on a few simple allegations
which, if found to be true, constitute numerous violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, according to the Plaintiff's
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the Motion.
Robert Bohlke alleges that Green Star made autodialed and/or
prerecorded voice calls to the cellular telephones of the
Plaintiff and putative class members without prior express
consent.

Mr. Bohlke also asks the Court to designate him as Class
Representative and to appoint his counsel as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Memorandum of Points is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=G35dvb8t

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raymond R. Dieppa, Esq.
          FLORIDA LEGAL, LLC
          14 NE First Ave., Suite 1001
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 901-2209
          E-mail: Ray.dieppa@floridalegal.law

               - and -

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN,
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com


GSP TRANSPORTATION: Campbell Seeks Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled SUSAN CAMPBELL, Individually,
on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other similarly
situated current and former employees v. GSP TRANSPORTATION,
INC., a South Carolina Corporation, d/b/a Thrifty Rental Car
Franchisee, Dollar Rental Car Franchisee and Hertz Rental Car
Franchisee; and JEFF SCHOEPFEL, Case No. 1:17-cv-00045-TRM-CHS
(E.D. Tenn.), moves the Court to:

   (1) authorize this case to proceed as a collective action
       against Defendant GSP Transportation, Inc. and Jeff
       Schopfel for overtime wage violations under the Fair Labor
       Standards Act, on behalf of Defendants' managers who were
       misclassified as exempt from the overtime requirements of
       the FLSA during the last three years who were subject to
       Defendant's practice requiring suffering and permitting
       Plaintiffs to work over 40 hours per week without overtime
       compensation;

   (2) issue an Order directing Defendant to immediately provide
       a list of names, last known addresses, and last known
       telephone numbers for all putative class members within
       the last three years;

   (3) issue an Order that notice be prominently posted at each
       of Defendant's locations where putative class members
       work, attached to current hourly employees' next scheduled
       pay check, and be mailed to the hourly employees so that
       they can assert their claims on a timely basis as part of
       this litigation; and

   (4) Order that the Opt-In Plaintiffs' Consent Forms be deemed
       "filed" on the date they are postmarked.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=NyPwUPO8

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          James L. Holt, Jr., Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  jholt@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com


HALLIBURTON CO: Seeks Supreme Court Review of Class Action Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that it's been
nearly four years (!) since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
decision in Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, reconfirming that
shareholders in securities fraud class actions are entitled to
rely on the presumption that the market responds to material
misrepresentations by large, widely-traded companies.
Halliburton was a big disappointment for class action opponents
who had hoped the Supreme Court would do away with its
longstanding fraud-on-the-market precedent.  But the decision did
provide a bit of solace for defendants, holding that they have a
right to rebut the presumption that the market reacted to
corporate executives' supposedly misleading statements.

The Supreme Court didn't spell out the mechanics of rebutting the
presumption of market reliance in the 2014 Halliburton decision,
leaving that to the lower courts to figure out.  They've failed,
according to a new Supreme Court petition from Barclays.

The bank wants the justices to grant review of a decision from
the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming certification of
a shareholder class suing Barclays, in order to clarify standards
for defendants attempting to rebut the presumption.

Specifically, Barclays' lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell and
Williams & Connolly argue that the 2nd Circuit's decision in its
case, which involved allegations that the bank deceived investors
about its dark pool trading platform, sowed confusion in two
different ways: The 2nd Circuit, according to Barclays, split
with 8th Circuit precedent in 2016's IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund
v. Best Buy to hold that defendants bear the burden of countering
the presumption of market efficiency by a preponderance of the
evidence; and the appeals court contributed to post-Halliburton
uncertainty across the lower courts about how shareholders can
prove the market's reaction to alleged misrepresentations.

Barclays also contends the 2nd Circuit was just plain wrong in
its interpretation of the federal rules of evidence and the
Supreme Court's directive in Halliburton -- and its mistakes will
force securities defendants into unwarranted settlements.

"Absent guidance from this court, courts and litigants will
continue to be uncertain as to what a defendant must show to
rebut the presumption and what a plaintiff must show to invoke
the presumption in the first place," the petition said.  "(The
ruling) lowers the bar for plaintiffs to establish the . . .
presumption in class actions involving large, publicly traded
companies, while at the same time raising the bar for defendants
to rebut the presumption -- particularly in the 2nd Circuit,
where thousands of companies are located or listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other public markets."

Does Barclays have a shot at Supreme Court review? The bank, you
may recall, is not the first recent securities class action
defendant to raise a Supreme Court ruckus about the 2nd Circuit's
post-Halliburton standard for class certification.  Last fall,
the Brazilian oil company Petrobras protested the 2nd Circuit's
decision to uphold certification of a shareholder class even
though investors didn't offer empirical evidence, via an event
study, of a market response to alleged misrepresentations. Like
Barclays, Petrobras argued in its petition for Supreme Court
review that the 2nd Circuit had all but obliterated defendants'
ability to rebut the presumption of fraud-on-the-market reliance,
making class certification a foregone conclusion.  It contended,
like Barclays, that the 2nd Circuit was not only wrong but was
also contributing to nationwide confusion about the empirical
standard for market reaction.

Petrobras got amicus support from some influential law profs, but
it ended up settling the class action before the Surpeme Court
evaluated its petition for review of the 2nd Circuit decision.

Barclays' petition plays up the 2nd Circuit's purported split
with the 8th Circuit's Best Buy ruling.  Best Buy, as Reuters'
Ms. Frankel wrote at the time, was the first defendant to use the
Supreme Court's Halliburton ruling to defeat class certification
by rebutting the presumption of market efficiency.  The 8th
Circuit's ruling rested on investors' failure to establish a link
between Best Buy's share price and alleged misstatements by
corporate execs.

But the appeals court also addressed evidentiary burdens.  It was
up to Best Buy, the 8th Circuit said, to provide initial rebuttal
evidence breaking the link between market price and alleged
misrepresentations.  After the defendant broke the chain, the
appeals court said, the burden shifted to shareholders to show
why they were entitled to rely on the presumption of market
efficiency.

The 2nd Circuit in Barclays looked more searchingly at the first
step in the evidentiary burden analysis.  Unlike the 8th Circuit,
which shifted the burden to shareholders with the mere production
of defense evidence rebutting the fraud-on-the-market
presumption, the 2nd Circuit held that Barclays had to show by a
preponderance of evidence that the bank's alleged misstatements
didn't affect its share price.

The 2nd Circuit acknowledged the 8th Circuit's ruling in Best Buy
that shareholders bear the burden of proof of market reliance but
said it was dicta because the holding didn't determine the
outcome of the case.

Barclays' Supreme Court petition argues that the 2nd Circuit was
too quick to shrug off its disagreement with the 8th Circuit.
"The 8th Circuit's decision in Best Buy established a legal rule
that will plainly govern future decisions in that circuit," the
petition said.  "The 8th Circuit expressly invoked Rule 301 (of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and articulated the
defendant's burden as only involving a burden of production . . .
The conflict between the 8th Circuit's rule and the 2nd Circuit's
rule is square, and that conflict warrants this court's review."

The evidentiary burden in rebutting the presumption of market
reliance may seem like a pretty technical question for the
Supreme Court, but the justices have had a strong taste for
securities class actions in the past several years, especially
when defendants want their attention.  The lead lawyer for
Barclays' shareholders, Jeremy Lieberman of Pomerantz, told me in
an email that he was not available to comment on the bank's
petition.  Ms. Frankel has a feeling, though, that investors will
tell the court there's less to the circuit split than Barclays
contends. [GN]


HANSEN & ADKINS: FCRA Class Certification Sought in "Luna" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned LEONARD LUNA, and IAN
HALL on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v.
HANSEN & ADKINS AUTO TRANSPORT, Inc., a California Corporation,
and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 8:17-cv-00990-DOC-KES (C.D.
Cal.), move for an order certifying the case as a class action on
behalf of this class:

     All natural persons residing in the United States (including
     all territories and other political subdivisions of the
     United States) who were the subject of a consumer report or
     investigation that was procured by Defendant (or that
     Defendant caused to be procured) within five years of the
     filing of the Complaint through the date of final judgment
     in this action under FCRA, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681p.

The Plaintiffs also seek authority to send notice to class
members in a form to be approved by the Court after a conference
with defense counsel.  They further ask the Court to appoint them
as Class Representatives and to appoint Desai Law Firm, P.C., and
Aashish Y. Desai, Esq., as class counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on April 16, 2018, at 8:30
a.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=AlaQg5Rr

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aashish Y. Desai, Esq.
          Adrianne De Castro, Esq.
          DESAI LAW FIRM, P.C.
          3200 Bristol St., Suite 650
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (949) 614-5830
          Facsimile: (949) 271-4190
          E-mail: aashish@desai-law.com
                  adrianne@desai-law.com


HELIX TCS: Court Grants Equitable Tolling in "Kenney" FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for District of Colorado issued
an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Equitable Tolling and
Defendant's Motion to Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal in the
case captioned ROBERT KENNEY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HELIX TCS, INC.,
Defendant. Civil Action No. 17-cv-01755-CMA-KMT. (D. Colo.)

Defendant provides security and compliance services to businesses
in Colorado's marijuana industry.  Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant willfully failed to pay him and other security guards
employed by Defendant overtime wages.  Plaintiff filed suit
against Defendant.  He asserts a single claim against Defendant
under the collective action provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Equitable Tolling. Plaintiff asks
the Court to equitably toll the FLSA's statute of limitations for
all potential opt-in class members from the date Defendant filed
its frivolous Motion to Dismiss to the date the Court authorizes
the provision of notice to potential class members or issues an
order denying conditional certification.

Defendant filed its Motion for Certification for Appeal of the
Court's Order Denying its Motion to Dismiss. Defendant requested
that the Court certify its previous Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(b). The Court granted Defendant's Motion for
Certification for Appeal.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING

A claim brought under the FLSA must be commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrue except that a cause of action
arising out of willful violation may be commenced within three
years after the cause of action accrued.

Plaintiff argues in this case that the statute of limitations
should be equitably tolled in order to protect the interests of
absent potential class members who have been, and continue to be,
affected by Defendant's unreasonable delay tactics.

The Court agrees.

Although early notice to opt-in potential plaintiffs in a
collective is favored, such notice has not been possible here.
This Court has yet to rule on Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification and Notice to Putative Class Members, which
Plaintiff filed four months ago, but to which Defendant has only
just recently responded.  Much of this delay can be attributed to
Defendant's steady filings of motions that postponed the
necessity of it responding to Plaintiff's certification motion.
Allowing potential opt-in plaintiffs' claims to diminish or
expire due to circumstances beyond their direct control here,
Defendant's delay tactics would be particularly unjust. Moreover,
Defendant does not argue that it will be prejudiced by such
equitable tolling.

Having considered the particular facts of this case, the Court
concludes that the interests of justice are best served by
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Equitable Tolling.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY PENDING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants this
Court broad discretion to make any order which justice requires
to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or
undue burden or expense.

In deciding a motion to stay, this Court may weigh: (1)
plaintiff's interest in proceeding expeditiously with the civil
action and the potential prejudice of a delay; (2) the burden on
defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests
of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the
public interest.

First, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has an interest in
proceeding expeditiously with his case. However, because the
Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Tolling and tolls
the FLSA's statute of limitations, the potential for prejudice to
Plaintiff and to potential opt-in class members is significantly
reduced.

Second, the Court agrees with Defendant that proceeding with
discovery may be wasteful, and thus may be a burden to Defendant,
if the Tenth Circuit reverses this Court's Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Third, it is more convenient for the Court to stay discovery
until it is clear that the case will proceed.

Fourth, the Court does not know of any nonparties with interests
in this case.

Fifth and finally, if the public has any interest in this case,
it is a general interest in its efficient and just resolution.
Avoiding wasteful efforts by the Court clearly serves this
interest.

Weighing the relevant factors, the Court concludes that staying
discovery pending resolution of Defendant's appeal is
appropriate.
Plaintiff's Motion for Equitable Tolling is granted.

Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Interlocutory Appeal
is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9cdf62u from Leagle.com.

Robert Kenney, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Wells Dunlap,
Josephson Dunlap Law Firm, Lindsay R. Itkin, Josephson Dunlap Law
Firm & Michael Andrew Josephson, Josephson Dunlap Law Firm. 11
Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050, Houston, TX 77046

Helix TCS, Inc., Defendant, represented by Carissa V. Sears,
Allen Vellone Wolf Helfrich & Factor P.C., Jeremy Thayer Jonsen,
Allen Vellone Helfrich & Factor P.C. & Jordan D. Factor, Allen
Vellone Helfrich & Factor P.C., 11001 W 120th Ave, Broomfield, CO
80021.
Helix TCS, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy
Thayer Jonsen, Allen Vellone Helfrich & Factor P.C. & Jordan D.
Factor, Allen Vellone Helfrich & Factor P.C., 11001 W 120th Ave,
Broomfield, CO 80021


HERMES LANDSCAPING: Class Certification Sought in "Rodriguez"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled ANTONIO CHAVEZ RODRIGUEZ,
ISAAC CHAVEZ DUARTE, and JOSE ALFREDO SOTO SERVIN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. HERMES
LANDSCAPING, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-02142-CM-KGG (D. Kan.), move
the Court for certification of their action as a class action.

The Motion is brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to the Plaintiffs' 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 8th
causes of action.

The Plaintiffs also move to be appointed as class
representatives, have their counsel appointed as class counsel,
and be authorized to send class notice to class members.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=lqOFPeqC

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Patricia Kakalec, Esq.
          KAKALEC & SCHLANGER, LLP
          85 Broad Street, 18th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 500-6114
          E-mail: pkakalec@kakalec-schlanger.com

               - and -

          Mark Dugan, Esq.
          Heather Schlozman, Esq.
          DUGAN SCHLOZMAN LLC
          8826 Santa Fe Drive, Suite 307
          Overland Park, KS 66212
          Telephone: (913) 322-3528
          E-mail: heather@duganschlozman.com
                  mark@duganschlozman.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Patrick F. Hulla, Esq.
          Justin M. Dean, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART
          4520 Main Street, Suite 400
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 271-1301
          Facsimile: (816) 271-1303
          E-mail: patrick.hulla@ogletreedeakins.com
                  Justin.dean@ogletreedeakins.com


HORIZON PHARMA: Trust Funds Appeal Order in "Schaffer" to 2nd Cir
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Movants Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund and Carpenters
Pension Trust Fund for Northern California, and Plaintiff Locals
302 and 612 Of The International Union of Operating Engineers-
Employers Construction Industry Retirement Fund filed an appeal
from the District Court's opinion and order dated January 18,
2018, and the District Court's Clerk's judgment dated January 19,
2018, in the lawsuit styled Schaffer, et al. v. Horizon Pharma
PLC, et al., Case No. 16-cv-1763, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, beginning on
March 8, 2016, two federal securities class action lawsuits
(captioned Schaffer v. Horizon Pharma plc, et al., Case No. 16-
cv-01763-JMF and Banie v. Horizon Pharma plc, et al., Case No.
16-cv-01789-JMF) were filed in the District Court against the
Company and certain of the Company's current and former officers
(the "Officer Defendants").

On March 24, 2016, the District Court consolidated the two
actions under Schaffer v. Horizon Pharma plc, et al. On June 3,
2016, the District Court appointed Locals 302 and 612 of the
International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Construction
Industry Retirement Trust and the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund
for Northern California as lead plaintiffs and Labaton Sucharow
LLP as lead counsel.

On July 25, 2016, lead plaintiffs and additional named plaintiff
Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund filed their consolidated
complaint, which they subsequently amended on October 7, 2016,
including additional current and former officers, the Company's
Board of Directors (the "Director Defendants"), and underwriters
involved with the Company's April 2015 public offering (the
"Underwriter Defendants") as defendants.  The plaintiffs allege
that certain of the Company and the Officer Defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, by making false and/or misleading statements about,
among other things: (a) the Company's financial performance, (b)
the Company's business prospects and drug-pricing practices, (c)
the Company's sales and promotional practices, and (d) the
Company's design, implementation, performance, and risks
associated with the Company's Prescriptions-Made-Easy program.
The Plaintiffs allege that certain of the Company, the Director
Defendants and the Underwriter Defendants violated sections 11,
12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, (the
"Securities Act") in connection with the Company's April 2015
public offering.  The Plaintiffs seek, among other things, an
award of damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs and the
putative class, including a reasonable allowance for costs and
attorneys' fees.

The appellate case is captioned as Schaffer, et al. v. Horizon
Pharma PLC, et al., Case No. 18-470, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Locals 302 and 612 Of The International Union
of Operating Engineers-Employers Construction Industry Retirement
Fund; and Movants-Appellants Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for
Northern California and Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund
are represented by:

          Jonathan Gardner, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          E-mail: jgardner@labaton.com

Defendants-Appellees Horizon Pharma PLC, Timothy P. Walbert, Paul
W. Hoelscher, Robert J. De Vaere, William F. Daniel, Michael
Grey, Jeff Himawan, Virinder Nohria, Ronald Pauli, Gino Santini,
H. Thomas Watkins, John J. Kody and Robert F. Carey are
represented by:

          Jonathan P. Bach, Esq.
          COOLEY LLP
          1114 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 479-6470
          E-mail: jbach@cooley.com

Defendants-Appellees Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Jefferies
LLC, Cowen & Company LLC and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC are
represented by:

          Richard Rosen, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 373-3000
          Facsimile: (212) 373-2359
          E-mail: rrosen@paulweiss.com


HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING: Rowe Loses Bid to Certify Collective Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Lance M. Africk denied the Plaintiff's motion to
conditionally certify a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in the lawsuit entitled ZABIAN ROWE v. HOSPITAL
HOUSEKEEPING SYSTEMS, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-09376-LMA-JVM (E.D.
La.).

Mr. Rowe asserts that HHS "underpays wages and overtime by
reducing hours from employee time records, and encourages and
pressures individual supervisors to do the same."  He further
contends that "HHS also applies a half-hour automatic lunch
deduction from its employee's time records, even though
[p]laintiff often worked through his meal break."

Judge Africk opines that Mr. Rowe's current showing fails to
establish a "reasonable basis for the allegation that a class of
similarly situated persons may exist," citing Lima, 493 F. Supp.
2d at 798.  On this record, Judge Africk notes, the Court cannot
conclude that this case should proceed as a collective action.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=lZyhrrgq


IC SYSTEM: Certification of Class Sought in "Gochet" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Keanna Gochet moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit titled KEANNA GOCHET, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. I.C. SYSTEM
INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00256-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks
that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and
to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local
Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs
and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jcxkMe1W

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


INTEL CORP: Sued in Canada Over "Spectre" & "Meltdown" Defects
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rochon Genova LLP on Feb. 27 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit was commenced on February 23 in the Ontario Superior
Court against Intel, Microsoft, Lenovo, Apple, Dell, and Hewlett
Packard.  The claim stems from the recently disclosed and
widespread "Spectre" and "Meltdown" defects, which allowed
consumers' private and confidential information to be made
publicly available.

The claim alleges that Intel, as the manufacturer of CPU chips,
and Microsoft, Lenovo, Apple, Dell, and Hewlett Packard computers
containing Intel's CPU chips, marketed these defective products
to consumers that made their computers vulnerable to being
hacked.

The claim alleges that all of the Defendants knew of the defect
from at least June 2017.  The claim also alleges that none of the
Defendants warned consumers of this chip defect, but rather
continued to offer the defective CPUs and computers that used the
defective CPU.

"Consumers are extremely concerned over these serious security
breaches and about having been kept in the dark for months while
their computers were vulnerable to attack," said Joel P. Rochon,
Esq. -- jrochon@rochongenova.com -- partner at Rochon Genova LLP,
whose firm, with a team of lawyers from Bell Temple LLP led by
Katherine E. Kolnhofer, Esq. -- kkolnhofer@belltemple.com -- is
representing class members.  "This type of vulnerability is
particularly serious in the current climate of exponentially
increasing cybersecurity threats.  This defect has resulted in
consumers being unknowingly exposed to an attack vector for which
the defendants must be held accountable," added Ms. Kolnhofer.

There is no effective "fix" for the defective CPUs.  Software
updates that add some level of security, known as "patches",
cause the CPUs to operate up to 30% slower.  Further, it is not
certain that these "patches" are effective.  The only way to
ensure that the security vulnerability is addressed is a complete
replacement of the computer's CPU.  Many consumers have been
forced to spend money replacing their defective CPUs, or
replacing their entire computer.

None of the allegations have been proven in court, though Intel
has admitted that sensitive data can be improperly gathered by
hackers from user computers through Intel's CPUs, and Microsoft,
Lenovo, Apple, Dell, and Hewlett Packard have released their own
security updates in an attempt to stop the flow of sensitive
information from their products.

For further information: Rochon Genova LLP, 121 Richmond St.
West, Suite 900, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2K1, Telephone: 416-363-
1867; Bell Temple LLP, 393 University Avenue, Suite 1300,
Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1E6, Telephone: 416-581-8200
www.rochongenova.com [GN]


ISLE OF CAPRI: Wins Final Approval of Settlement in "Brna" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Federico A. Moreno entered an order in the lawsuit
entitled DANIEL A. BRNA, RAMON FERNANDEZ and JAMES E. SCOTT, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. ISLE OF
CAPRI CASINOS INC. and INTERBLOCK USA, LLC, Case No. 0:17-cv-
60144-FAM (S.D. Fla.), granting final approval of class action
settlement and entering final judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court finally certifies the Settlement Class for settlement
purposes only, as identified in the Settlement Agreement, which
shall consist of:

     All Fan Club members who played the game of craps on
     Interblock's Organic Dice machines at IOC's Pompano Park
     casino during the Class Period and who placed and won a Buy
     Bet while playing craps.  Excluded from the Settlement Class
     are (a) officers, directors, and employees of IOC,
     Interblock and their parents and subsidiaries; and (b)
     judicial officers and employees of the Court.

     The Class Period is July 8, 2015 to January 22, 2017,
     inclusive.

The Court finally designates Cristina M. Pierson, Esq., of the
law firm of Kelley Uustal PLC and Daren Stabinski, Esq., of the
law firm Daren Stabinski, P.A., as Class Counsel in this case.
The Court also finally designates Plaintiffs Daniel A. Brna and
James E. Scott, as Class Representatives.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Fees and Costs is granted.  The Court
awards Class Counsel attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount
of $155,000 payable by the Defendants pursuant to the terms of
the Settlement Agreement.

The Court also awards and finally approves incentive awards in
the amount of $2,500 to Plaintiff Daniel A. Brna and $2,500 to
Plaintiff James E. Scott, payable by the Defendants pursuant to
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

A copy of the Final Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0Gqe55mn


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: April 9 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, on Feb. 27
disclosed that class action litigation has been filed on behalf
of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly
traded securities of Johnson & Johnson ("J&J" or the "Company")
(NYSE: JNJ) between February 22, 2013 and February 7, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired J&J publicly traded
securities during the Class Period, you may move the Court for
appointment as lead plaintiff by no later than April 9, 2018. A
lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf of
other class members in directing the litigation.  Your share of
any recovery in the actions will not be affected by your decision
of whether to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.  You may retain
Lieff Cabraser, or other attorneys, as your counsel in the
actions.

J&J investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and how
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should contact Sharon M.
Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at 1-800-541-7358.

Background on the J&J Securities Class Litigation

J&J, headquartered in New Brunswick, New Jersey, together with
its subsidiaries researches and develops, manufactures, and sells
health care products worldwide.

The action alleges that, throughout the Class Period defendants
failed to disclose that: (1) J&J has known for decades that its
talc products include asbestos fibers and that exposure to such
fibers can cause ovarian cancer and mesothelioma; and (2) as a
result, defendants' statements about J&J's business, operations,
and prospects were materially false or misleading when made.

According to an internal Company memorandum made public in recent
lawsuits against J&J, in the 1990s, J&J outlined a plan to hike
lower sales of its powder "by targeting" black and Hispanic
women.

On September 21, 2017, after the market closed, Bloomberg
reported that "documents indicate that J&J has known for decades
that its talc products include asbestos fibers and that the
exposure to those fibers can cause ovarian cancer."  On that
news, the price of J&J shares fell $2.28 per share over the next
five trading days, or 2.81% from the closing price of $130.94 on
September 20, 2017, to close at $129.47 per share on September
28, 2017.

On February 5, 2018, CNBC reported that lawsuits filed against
J&J claiming that its talc products caused cancer "could expose
potentially damaging documents."  On that news, the price of J&J
shares dropped $7.29 per share, or 5.29% from the previous
closing price of $137.68 on February 2, 2018, to close at $130.39
per share on February 5, 2018, on elevated trading volume.

After the market closed on February 7, 2018, the Beasley Allen
law firm announced that "[i]nternal Johnson & Johnson documents
from 1972 note that asbestos was found in 100 percent of talc
samples tested at the time, but this information was never
released publicly."  The firm's press release also stated J&J
ceased funding for a project designed to test talc samples for
asbestos contamination after a majority of sample batches tested
positive for asbestos.  On that news, the price of J&J shares
dropped $5.06 per share, or 3.67% from the closing price of
$131.42 on February 7, 2018, to close at $126.36 on February 8,
2018.

                     About Lieff Cabraser

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, Nashville, and Seattle, is a nationally
recognized law firm committed to advancing the rights of
investors and promoting corporate responsibility. [GN]


KEYSTONE SANITARY: Pennsylvania Residents File Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cody Boteler, writing for WasteDIVE, reports that two
Pennsylvania women, seeking a class action lawsuit against
Keystone Sanitary Landfill Inc., filed charges in the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas, alleging Keystone did not take
proper measures to control odor emissions, as originally reported
by The Times-Tribune.

The lawsuit says at least 108 neighbors have told attorneys they
have been negatively affected by the odors from the landfill, and
that Keystone has acted negligently in their duty to mitigate
odor. The lawsuit says Keystone created a private nuisance, was
negligent and requests a trial by jury.

A consultant for Keystone told The Times-Tribune the lawsuit
amounted to "extortion," and said the landfill took necessary
steps to mitigate odor and commissioned a study which showed the
landfill does not negatively impact nearby property value.

Dive Insight:

The lawsuit seeks class action status so it can represent the
thousands of people who live within a 2.5 mile radius of the
landfill's property line over the last 3 years -- a complicated
process that is unlikely to capture every single person or
household that could potentially have a claim.

The plaintiffs are seeking a trial by jury, a judgment in excess
of $50,000, compensatory damages, punitive damages due to alleged
reckless indifference, and injunctive relief. It is yet to be
seen how this case will play out, though similar cases have been
successful in the past.

While Keystone says it is operating legally and safely to
mitigate odor and other potential damages, this is not the first
time the landfill has been mired in some controversy.

The state Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) cited the
landfill in 2016 over leachate violations. In May last year, the
site was facing issues related to its application to expand.
DEP's assessment said there were many remaining questions about
leachate management, groundwater monitoring and air quality
monitoring. [GN]


KROGER CO: Wash. App. Affirms Denial of Arbitration in "Cox"
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, issued an
Opinion affirming the trial court's judgment denying Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned RONALD COX, an
individual, and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Respondent, v. THE KROGER COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, FRED
MEYER STORES, INC., doing business as QUALITY FOOD CENTERS (aka
QFC), Appellants, No. 76143-9-1 (Wash. App.).

Ronald Cox, a former Quality Food Centers Inc. (QFC) employee,
filed this class action challenging QFC's policy of rounding
hourly employees' clocked-in time to the nearest quarter hour.
Specifically, he contends QFC intentionally manipulated the
application of this policy to result in underpayment of wages.
QFC appeals the trial court's denial of the motion to compel
arbitration. Because the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
governing Cox's employment do not clearly and unmistakably waive
his right to a judicial forum for statutory wage claims, the
arbitration provision does not encompass his claims.

In determining whether to enforce an arbitration provision, this
court must consider (1) whether the arbitration agreement is
valid  and (2) whether the agreement encompasses the claims
asserted.

Here, the grievance and arbitration procedure is contained in
article 19 of the Clark County CBA and the Portland CBA. The
procedure applies to any grievance or dispute concerning the
application or interpretation of this Agreement. Because article
19 does not identify any specific statutes or make any general
reference to statutory wage claims, it does not make it
unmistakably clear that claims under chapter 49.52 RCW or ORS
section 652.120 are subject to arbitration.

QFC argues the separate wage claims provisions found in article 6
of the CBAs support arbitration. Article 6 states, All claims for
back wages or overtime not paid must be presented through the
Union to the Employer.

But the wage claims provisions contain no arbitration clause and
no reference to article 19. Article 6 also sets a different
deadline for filing a claim than a grievance subject to the
article 19 arbitration provision.  In other sections of the CBAs,
the parties included express references to article 19
illustrating the clear intent to apply the arbitration procedures
to such provisions. The failure to include a similar cross-
reference to article 19 in the wage claim provision is
inconsistent with an objective manifestation of intent that the
arbitration procedure of article 19 applies to wage claims under
article 6.

The wage claim provisions also fail to identify any specific
statutes covered by the agreement. Absent any reference to
specific statutes or article 19, the article 6 CBA wage claim
provisions do not support arbitration.

The CBAs do not clearly and unmistakably waive the right to a
judicial forum for Cox's statutory wage claims. Therefore, the
CBA arbitration provision does not encompass Cox's claims and the
trial court did not err in denying the motion to compel
arbitration. Given this conclusion, we do not need to address
Cox's alternative arguments concerning waiver and
unconscionability.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' February 5, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yct25dn3 from
Leagle.com.

Francis L. Van Dusen, Jr., Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, 2801
Alaskan Way Ste. 300, Pier 70, Seattle, WA, 98121-1128, Megan
Leigh Starich, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, 2801 Alaskan Way
Ste. 300, Pier 70, Seattle, WA, 98121-1128, Katie Loberstein,
Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, 2801 Alaskan Way Ste. 300,
Seattle, WA, 98121-1128 Alyson L. Palmer, Miller Nash Graham &
Dunn LLP, 2801 Alaskan Way Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98121-1128,
Counsel for Appellant(s).

Peter D. Stutheit, Stutheit Kalin LLC, 308 Sw 1st Ave. Ste. 325,
Portland, OR, 97204-3410, Donald W. Heyrich, HKM Employment
Attorneys LLP, 600 Stewart St. Ste. 901, Seattle, WA, 98101-1225,
Jason Andrew Rittereiser, HKM Employment Attorneys LLP, 600
Stewart St. Ste. 901, Seattle, WA, 98101-1225, Counsel for
Respondent(s).


LOUISIANA: Class of LSP Inmates Certified in "Lewis" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled ANTHONY TELLIS and BRUCE
CHARLES, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated
prisoners at David Wade Correctional Center v. JAMES M. LEBLANC,
SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
CORRECTIONS; JERRY GOODWIN, WARDEN OF DAVID WADE CORRECTIONAL
CENTER; COL. LONNIE NAIL; DOCTOR GREGORY SEAL; ASSISTANT WARDEN
DEBORAH DAUZAT; STEVE HAYDEN; AERIAL ROBINSON; JOHNIE ADKINS; and
THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00161-SDD-RLB (M.D. La.), move the Court to certify a
class of persons similarly situated for the purposes of the
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act to include:

     all persons with mental illness who are or who will be
     confined in extended lockdown or solitary confinement at
     David Wade Correctional Center.

The sub-class is entirely included within the class, but limited
to individuals within the class, who have a mental illness of
sufficient severity to qualify as a disability within the meaning
of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the Plaintiffs assert.

The Plaintiffs further move that Bruce Charles and Anthony Tellis
be appointed as class representatives and that their attorneys
for the Advocacy Center and MacArthur Justice Center, including
Jonathan Trunnell, Esq., Katie Schwartzmann, Esq., Sarah Voigt,
Esq., Ronald Lospennato, Esq., and Melanie Bray, Esq., be
appointed as class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=OsD6GV1m

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jonathan C. Trunnell, Esq.
          Sarah H. Voigt, Esq.
          Melanie Bray, Esq.
          Ronald K. Lospennato, Esq.
          ADVOCACY CENTER
          8325 Oak Street
          New Orleans, LA 70118
          Telephone: (504) 708-1460
          Facsimile: (504) 507-1956
          E-mail: jtrunnell@advocacyla.org
                  svoigt@advocacyla.org
                  mbray@advocacyla.org
                  rlospennato@advocacyla.org

               - and -

          Katie M. Schwartzmann, Esq.
          RODERICK & SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
          4400 S. Carrollton Avenue
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 620-2259
          E-mail: katie.schwartzmann@macarthurjustice.org


                    *     *    *

The Hon. Shelly D. Dick grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the lawsuit styled JOSEPH LEWIS, JR., ET AL. v.
BURL CAIN, ET AL., Case No. 3:15-cv-00318-SDD-RLB (M.D. La.).

Judge Dick appoints the Named Plaintiffs -- Joseph Lewis, Jr.,
Kentrell Parker, Farrell Sampier, Reginald George, John Tonubbee,
Otto Barrera, Clyde Carter, Edward Giovanni, Ricky D. Davis,
Lionel Tolbert, and Rufus White -- who are still living and
currently housed at Louisiana State Penitentiary, and have fully
exhausted administrative remedies at the time of the filing of
this lawsuit, as class representatives.  The Court also
designates the Plaintiffs' counsel as Class Counsel.

The Class and Subclass are defined as: "all inmates who now, or
will be in the future, incarcerated at LSP" and "all qualified
individuals with a disability, as defined by the ADA/RA, who are
now, or will be in the future, incarcerated at LSP."

The Court will set a Scheduling Conference by separate notice.

Burl Cain is a prison administrator and the former warden at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) in West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana.

The suit is brought by several inmates incarcerated at the LSP
alleging that the medical care provided at LSP violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Plaintiffs also claim that the medical treatment of disabled
inmates at LSP violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the Rehabilitation Act.

A copy of the Ruling is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=KKRUYYM7


MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES: Leary Moves to Certify Class of Consumers
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled ALISON N. LEARY and TIMOTHY
M. LEARY, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-02070-BMS
(E.D. Pa.), moves for an order certifying a class defined as:

     All consumers who purchased from McGowen Enterprises, Inc.
     d/b/a CarSense, Inc. a vehicle and accepted the Lifetime
     Engine Guarantee during the period from May 5, 2013 to
     January 8, 2017.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as Class
Representatives and to appoint Michael McKay, Esq., at Schneider
Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=SVGLEL8A

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael McKay, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          8501 N. Scottsdale Road, Suite 270
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253
          Telephone: (480) 428-0145
          Facsimile: (866) 505-8036
          E-mail: mmckay@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
          Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KIPELA CARPENTER
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (619) 756-6994
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                  tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
                  ekilpela@carslonlynch.com

               - and -

          Michael K. Yarnoff, Esq.
          KEHOE LAW FIRM
          1500 JFK Blvd., Suite 1020
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 792-6676
          Facsimile: (215) 990-0701
          E-mail: myarnoff@kehoelawfirm.com


MDL 2804: Allegany County Joins Opioid Epidemic Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
WCBC Radio reports that the Allegany County Commissioners voted
unanimously to allow a Florida-based law firm to represent the
county in a mass federal lawsuit against large pharmaceutical
companies that allegedly contributed to the opioid epidemic.  The
action is known as a mass tort or multi district tort litigation
which is similar to a class action lawsuit.   According to county
attorney Bill Rudd, Allegany County has the largest per capita
OxyContin prescription rate in the state of Maryland. The
litigation, he says, is based on "stopping the deceptive and
improper marketing ploys of the manufacturer"


MDL 2804: Lee County Joins Class Action Over Opioid Crisis
----------------------------------------------------------
Whitney Shelton, writing for WALB, reports that Lee County
commissioners voted on Feb. 27 to take part in the fight against
the opioid epidemic by signing on to an existing lawsuit.

Commissioner Billy Mathis endorsed joining the class action
lawsuit to the board after seeing many cities and even some whole
states signing on to support the lawsuit.

Lee County recognizes that the opioid crisis is real and
affecting the entire nation, with over 90 percent of opioids
being sold in the United States.

This lawsuit will ask the manufacturers through court proceedings
to not market and sell opioids the way they have been doing.

"The way that the manufacturers are marketing these things and,
you might as well say it, pushing it on Americans, it's a real
problem," said Mr. Mathis.

The board of commissioners voted 5 to 0 to join the lawsuit. [GN]


MDL 2804: Louisiana Lawyers File Class Action Over Opioid Crisis
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sabrina Wilson, writing for Fox8, reports that the opioid
epidemic is not only deadly, but it causes many newborns to enter
the world with withdrawal symptoms like tremors, the inability to
eat and a shrill, constant cry.  And now some prominent local
attorneys are going after manufacturers and others in the opioid
distribution pipeline.

"The opioid crisis is the single largest industry created health
crisis that this country has seen," said attorney Scott Bickford.

He and others filed a class action lawsuit in St. Tammany Parish
on behalf of Tyler M. Roach, on behalf of his minor child, as
well as a class of babies statewide with neonatal abstinence
syndrome or NAS.

"The plaintiff and class representative is Baby R.  His mother
became addicted to opioids when she, her husband and her 5-year
old child were involved in a severe car accident," Mr. Bickford
continued.

The lawyers said the woman became pregnant while still taking the
potent prescription drugs.

"She chose to carry the child, who unfortunately was born
addicted, like her, to opiates," Mr. Bickford stated.

The lawsuit not only seeks damages for families with babies born
with NAS, but also funds for lifelong medical monitoring.  The
suit names among the long list of defendants, McKesson
Corporation, John & Johnson and Allergan.

Pharmacies are targeted, too.

"Pharmacists have, under the law, obligations when dispensing
narcotics such as opiates, particularly narcotics such as
opiates, and the lawsuit alleges that they have violated their
duties under the law because of the sheer volume of the opioids
running through the pharmacies in Louisiana and out to patients,"
he said.

Last year, the state health department filed its own suit against
a long list of companies, alleging that drug manufacturers
"undertook an orchestrated campaign to flood Louisiana with
highly addictive and dangerous opioids."

Mollye Demosthenidy is a health policy expert in Tulane's School
of Public Health.  She has not taken a position on the lawsuits.

"I think you're seeing states, parishes, counties, local
governments, everybody's trying to figure out a way to tackle the
epidemic, right? And that means tackling the consequences of
addiction as well as addressing the sources of addiction,"
Ms. Demosthenidy said.

Of course, there are questions about the long-term impact on
children born with NAS and the effect on society as a whole.

"There are a host of long-term costs related not just to the
treatment but to the social safety net that's required to support
children and families and really help communities that have been
hit hard by the epidemic," Demosthenidy added.

"Baby "R" now suffers from developmental disorders," said
Mr. Bickford.

The legal team and their medical advisers also said damages will
be directed to academic and research institutions, long-term
treatment centers and training for doctors and nurses. [GN]


MEGGITT-USA SERVICES: Trout Amends Bid for Prelim. OK of Accord
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled BROOK TROUT, an individual,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
MEGGITT-USA SERVICES, INC., Case No. 2:16-cv-07520-ODW-AJW (C.D.
Cal.), again seeks preliminary approval of a Fair Labor Standards
Act collective action settlement.

Mr. Trout filed his initial complaint on October 7, 2016.  The
complaint raised class action claims for unpaid overtime and
improper pay stubs, and collective action claims for unpaid
overtime under the FLSA.  On December 6, 2017, the Court denied
the request to certify the Rule 23 class action but granted
certification of the collective action (Document #44, ORDER
GRANTING FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION,
DENYING RULE 23 CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND DENYING PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL FOR FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT).

The Court granted certification of the collective action in the
December 6, 2017 order, and the Amended Motion and memorandum
only addresses the three specific points that the Court directed
the parties to brief, Mr. Trout notes.

The parties agreed that Paragraph 31 of the Settlement will be
amended to read "All individuals who opt-in to the FLSA
settlement release only claims under the FLSA asserted in the
Second Amended Complaint," according to the Amended Motion.  The
parties also agreed that the Paragraph 16 will be amended to read
"The 'FLSA Attorney's Fees approved for the FLSA Settlement are
not to exceed $212,500.00."

The parties jointly request that the Court allow the reversion of
unclaimed FLSA settlement funds:

   a) A reversion to MEGGITT should be permitted because MEGGITT
      is paying the full value of all FLSA claims and a
      non-reversion would result in MEGGITT double paying people
      who do not opt-in.

A copy of the Amended Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=AOhJJbhW

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael L. Tracy, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL TRACY
          2030 Main Street, Suite 1300
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 260-9171
          Facsimile: (866) 365-3051
          E-mail: mtracy@michaeltracylaw.com


MIAMI LAKES AM: Cespedes Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Cespedes, Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled Robert Cespedes,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Miami
Lakes AM, LLC, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-20057-UU (S.D. Fla.), and
Opt-in Plaintiffs Oscar Veiga Martinez, Richard Montero and
Martin E. Cespedes, move the Court for an order:

   (1) granting conditional certification of the action as a
       collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (with
       the proposed class defined herein);

   (2) expediting discovery production by the Defendants, within
       15 days of the Court Order, of a complete list of each and
       every person -- and their last known home address,
       telephone number, and e-mail addresses -- who was ever
       employed as an automobile salesperson at any of the auto
       mall dealership locations owned and/or operated by
       Defendants Miami Lakes AM, LLC; Atlantic Coast Automotive,
       Inc.; Kendall Lakes Automotive, LLC, and; Faisal Ahmed in
       Miami-Dade County and/or Broward County, Florida, between
       January 5, 2015 and the present;

   (3) requiring Defendants to format and produce on an expedited
       basis said list, both in hard copy and electronically in
       an editable Excel spreadsheet, organized alphabetically
       from "A" to "Z" and with each person's last known home
       address and telephone number, and email addresses in a
       separate field corresponding with each name; and

   (4) permitting Plaintiffs' counsel to mail a Court-Approved
       Notice to all such persons about their rights to opt into
       this collective action by filing a Consent to Join
       Lawsuit.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=H4ZFPFan

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anthony F. Sanchez, Esq.
          ANTHONY F. SANCHEZ, P.A.
          6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 101
          MIAMI, FL 33143
          Telephone: (305) 665-9211
          Facsimile: (305) 328-4842
          E-mail: afs@laborlawfla.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Haas Hatic, Esq.
          Evan B. Klinek, Esq.
          GREENSPOON MARDER LLP
          200 East Broward Blvd. Suite 1800
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 491-1120
          Facsimile: (954) 343-6956
          E-mail: haas.hatic@gmlaw.com
                  evan.klinek@gmlaw.com


MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Robinson Moves for FDCPA Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned DAVID L. ROBINSON, an
individual, and GAYLE ROBINSON, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. MONTEREY
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, a California limited liability company,
d/b/a "MFS," and "Monterey Loan Servicing," Case No. 2:17-cv-
00520-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla.), ask the Court to certify this class:

     All persons (i) with addresses in the State of Florida to
     whom letters in the same form as Exhibit "A" were sent (ii)
     in an attempt to collect a debt which, according to the
     nature of the creditor or the debt, or the records of the
     creditor or defendant, was incurred for personal, family, or
     household purposes (iii) which were not returned undelivered
     by the U.S. Post Office (iv) during the one year prior to
     the filing of the complaint in the instant action.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representative and to appoint their attorney as class counsel.

The instant action involves a claim by the Robinsons arising out
of an alleged collection communication dated August 21, 2017
("Initial Collection Communication") by Defendant, Monterey
Financial Services, LLC ("MFS") which sought to collect
delinquent time-share company assessment fees.  The Plaintiffs
allege that MFS has violated the requirements of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act by failing to provide a proper
disclosure of the rights of consumer to obtain debt validation as
mandated by the FDCPA.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=snl2jL3v

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert W. Murphy, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW FIRM
          1212 S.E. 2nd Avenue
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 763-8660
          Facsimile: (954) 763-8607
          E-mail: rwmurphy@lawfirmmurphy.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Dale T. Golden, Esq.
          Charles J. McHale, Esq.
          GOLDEN SCAZ GAGAIN, PLLC
          201 North Armenia Avenue
          Tampa, FL 33609
          Telephone: (813) 251-5500
          E-mail: dgolden@gsgfirm.com
                  cmchale@gsgfirm.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Scherer, Jr., Esq.
          LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN LLP
          50 Fountain Plaza, Suite 1700
          Buffalo, NY 14202
          Telephone: (716) 853-5100
          E-mail: rscherer@lippes.com


MID-AMERICA APARTMENT: Cleven Seeks to Certify Class of Tenants
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled CATHI CLEVEN, TARA CLEVEN,
ARELI ARELLANO and JOE L. MARTINEZ, for themselves and all others
similarly situated v. MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMMUNITIES, INC., as
General Partner of MID-AMERICA APARTMENTS, LP, MID-AMERICA
APARTMENTS, LP, Individually and as General Partner of
CMS/COLONIAL MULTIFAMILY CANYON CREEK JV LP, and CMS/COLONIAL
MULTIFAMILY CANYON CREEK JV LP, Case No. 1:16-cv-00820-RP (W.D.
Tex.), seek certification of a damage class defined as:

     All persons during the Class Period who (i) were residential
     tenants of apartment properties in the State of Texas under
     written leases where MAA or its predecessor in merger,
     Colonial, served as an owner or landlord, and (ii) were
     assessed and paid an initial rent late fee of $75.00 and/or
     a daily rent late fee of at least $10.00.

The case challenges a statewide, uniform rent late fee policy
(here, a fixed initial $75 late fee and daily late fees of at
least $10, referred to as the "$75/10 rent late fee") as an
unenforceable penalty under Section 92.019 of the Texas Property
Code.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as Class
Representatives and to appoint their counsel as Class Counsel.
The Plaintiffs further ask the Court to order notice to be sent
to all class members.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=pMQVEwD8

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Britton D. Monts, Esq.
          THE MONTS FIRM
          401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 474-6092
          Facsimile: (512) 692-2981
          E-mail: bmonts@themontsfirm.com

               - and -

          Jason W. Snell, Esq.
          THE SNELL LAW FIRM, PLLC
          Chase Tower
          221 W. 6th Street, Suite 900
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 477-5291
          Facsimile: (512) 477-5294
          E-mail: firm@snellfirm.com

               - and -

          R. Martin Weber, Jr., Esq.
          Richard E. Norman, Esq.
          CROWLEY NORMAN LLP
          Three Riverway, Suite 1775
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (713) 651-1771
          Facsimile: (713) 651-1775
          E-mail: rnorman@crowleynorman.com
                  mweber@crowleynorman.com

               - and -

          Stacey V. Reese, Esq.
          STACEY V. REESE LAW PLLC
          910 West Avenue, Suite 15
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 212-1423
          Facsimile: (512) 233-5917
          E-mail: stacey@reeselawpractice.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Wins Summary Judgment in "Pierre" FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned RENETRICE R. PIERRE, Individually and on Behalf of
others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Kansas Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 16 C
2895 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Renetrice Pierre sued Defendant Midland Credit
Management, Inc., on behalf of a class of plaintiffs (Count I)
and herself individually (Count II), alleging violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et
seq.

Pierre opened and began to use a credit card account with Target
National Bank (TNB).  She eventually failed to pay off the
balance and later defaulted in March or April 2008.  Thereafter,
TNB sold the debt to Midland Funding, LLC, for which Defendant
Midland Credit Management, Inc., is a debt collector.

That letter is the keystone in this case, so some description of
it is necessary. The letter stated a current balance of $7,578.57
and listed Target National Bank as the original creditor to the
debt.

Count I: Class Action Claims

Pierre alleges that Midland's letter violates the FDCPA because
it falsely represents the character and legal status of the debt,
15 USC Section 1692e(2), it is a deceptive communication, 15 USC
Section 1692e(10), and because Midland's use of the letter was an
unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect a debt, 15
USC Section 1692f.

To establish a prima facie case under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must
prove: she is a natural person or consumer" who is harmed by
violations of the FDCPA; the debt arises from a transaction
entered for personal, family, or household purposes; the
defendant is a debt collector; and the defendant has violated a
provision of the FDCPA.

Here, Pierre has shown there is no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether she is a consumer who accrued her debt from a
transaction entered into for personal, family, or household
purposes.

Pierre levies several arguments for how the dunning letter is
impermissibly misleading. One argument in particular persuades
the Court. When Midland sent Pierre the dunning letter in
September 2015, the statute of limitations on any debt collection
action had passed. Pierre thus bore no legal responsibility to
pay that stale debt and could face no legal jeopardy whatsoever
if she refused to pay it.

However, under Illinois law, had Pierre made a partial payment or
promised to repay that debt, she could have revived the statute
of limitations and subjected herself to the debt obligation anew.
Pantoja I, 78 F.Supp.3d at 746 (Ross v. St. Clair Foundry Corp.,
271 Ill. App. 271, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1933)). Pierre argues that
because the letter failed to warn of this possibility, the letter
is misleading as a matter of law.

The Court agrees.

Midland leans heavily on a District of Kansas case in which its
argument prevailed. In Boedicker v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,
227 F.Supp.3d 1235, 1236 (D. Kan. 2016), the plaintiff claimed
that a Midland dunning letter violated the FDCPA by failing to
warn that under Kansas law, a partial payment toward stale debt
could renew the statute of limitations. The Boedicker court
awarded Midland summary judgment, concluding that the FDCPA did
not require such a warning.

But there are some problems with Midland's proposed application
of that ruling to this case. First, the Boedicker court read
Pantoja I differently than the Seventh Circuit did on appeal.
Boedicker took care to distinguish Pantoja I, but later concluded
(in language that Midland now borrows) that no case has
determined that a debt collector must warn of a potential revival
of a time-barred claim.

Midland next argues that even if a warning against possible
revival were required ordinarily, no such warning would be
necessary in this case because of Midland's policy never to
revive the statute of limitations after it expires. Pierre takes
umbrage with this defense on a number of grounds, but the most
persuasive of them is that revivals of the statute of limitations
are controlled not by Midland's policies, but by operation of
law.  A revival would be a hazard to Pierre, who may face suit by
Midland if it changed its policies or by someone else if Midland
sold Pierre's debt to another, less principled collector.

Arguing against materiality, Midland makes much hay of its claim
that Pierre never made any payments, and did not do anything
different as a result of the letter. Midland misses the point.
Materiality does not hinge upon whether the plaintiff actually
acted in reliance on a confused understanding, but rather whether
the misleading letter has the ability to influence a consumer's
decision.

Such is the case here. A consumer receiving this dunning letter
may well choose to pay up or promise to do the same, things she
likely would not have done but for her receipt and
misunderstanding of the letter. Thus, the letter may lead to a
real injury the newly revived vulnerability to suit, especially
and so the letter is materially misleading. Here, the collector's
silence about the significant risk of losing the ironclad
protection of the statute of limitations renders the letter
misleading and deceptive as a matter of law. Pierre and the class
members are thus entitled to summary judgment as to liability on
Count I.

Count II: Individual Claims

In Count II as in Count I, Pierre presses FDCPA claims based on
Sections 1692e and 1692f. Her rationale for those claims is
different here than in Count I, however, Count II's claims focus
on Midland's contested right to charge interest on Pierre's debt.
Counts I and II are both premised upon violations of the FDCPA,
the Court need not address the alternative arguments for
individual relief Pierre raises in Count II. Everyone in the
class is entitled to summary judgment on liability because they
received the FDCPA-violative letter. Pierre also received the
letter, so she is entitled to summary judgment on liability as
well.

Plaintiff Pierre's Motion to Summary judgment as to liability on
both Counts I and II is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Opinion
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y74h6nuw from Leagle.com.

Renetrice R. Pierre, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Karl G. Leinberger,
Markoff Leinberger LLC & Paul F. Markoff, Markoff Leinberger LLC,
134 N LaSalle Dr #1050, Chicago, IL 60602, USA

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a Kansas corporation, Defendant,
represented by David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Todd Philip Stelter --
tshelter@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson.


MIMEDX GROUP: Holzer & Holzer Files Class Action in Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------------
Holzer & Holzer, LLC, on Feb. 27 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit on behalf of investors in MiMedx Group Inc.
("MiMedx" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: MDXG) who purchased MiMedx
shares between March 7, 2013 and February 19, 2018.  The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.

The complaint alleges that MiMedx failed to disclose that the
Company was engaged in a "channel-stuffing" scheme designed to
inappropriately recognize revenue that had not yet been realized
and, as a result, the Company's financial statements were
inaccurate and misleading.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than April 24, 2018.  If you wish to discuss your legal
rights, you are encouraged to contact Corey D. Holzer, Esq. at
cholzer@holzerlaw.com or by toll-free telephone at (888) 508-
6832. Any member of the putative class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Holzer & Holzer, LLC -- http://www.holzerlaw.com-- is an
Atlanta, Georgia law firm that dedicates its practice to vigorous
representation of shareholders and investors in litigation
nationwide, including shareholder class action and derivative
litigation. [GN]


NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Wins Prelim. OK of Settlement in "Kang" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Leda Dunn Wettre granted the motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement in the lawsuit styled MA LEE
KANG and THERESA JANSON, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT, INC., and JOHN DOES 1 to
10, Case No. 2:15-cv-03251-LDW (D.N.J.).

The Court has made a preliminary determination to certify the
Settlement Class for purposes of settlement only:

     (i) All persons with addresses in the State of New Jersey;

    (ii) who were sent one or more collection letters from
         Defendant;

   (iii) which included either one or both of the following
         statements:

         a. "American Express is required to file a form 1099C
             with the Internal Revenue Service for any cancelled
             debt of $600 or more."

         b. "Because of interest, late charges, and other charges
             that may vary from day to day, according to any
             agreement you have with your creditor, the amount
             due on the day you pay may be greater."

    (iv) where the underlying debt being collected was incurred
         primarily for personal, family, or household use; and

     (v) the letter(s) bear a send date from May 8, 2014 through
         and including June 30, 2015.

The Court preliminarily appoints Plaintiffs Ma Lee Kang and
Theresa Janson as Class Representatives, appoints Rust
Consulting, Inc., as the Settlement Administrator, and appoints
Yongmoon Kim, Esq., of Kim Law Firm LLC, and Ronald I. LeVine,
Esq., and Eileen L. Linarducci, Esq., of the Law Offices of
Ronald I. LeVine as Class Counsel.

On May 8, 2015, this litigation was commenced by Plaintiff Ma Lee
Kang as a class action against the Defendant.  On May 19, 2016,
Plaintiff Theresa Jansen filed a class action complaint, at
Docket No. 2:16-cv-02870-MCA-LDW, against the Defendant.  The
complaints both alleged that the Defendant committed violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  On September 28,
2016, the Kang Action and Jansen Action were consolidated into
this action at Docket No. 2:15-cv-03251-MCA-LDW.

As a result of arm's-length negotiations between the Plaintiffs'
counsel and the Defendant's counsel, the Parties reached a
Settlement Agreement that provides, among other relief, monetary
relief to the Settlement Class.

The Settlement Agreement provides in part for the Defendant (1)
to retain the Settlement Administrator mutually selected by the
Parties; (2) to establish a Settlement Fund in the amount set
forth in the Settlement Agreement; (3) to pay the Class
Representatives' individual statutory damages and incentive
payments, subject to approval by the Court; and (4) not to oppose
Class Counsel's application to the Court for up to $61,000 for
Class Counsel's fees and litigation expenses, subject to approval
by the Court.

A Fairness Hearing will be held on July 25, 2018, at 10:00 a.m.,
for the Court to consider final approval of the Settlement.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0gjrYZyF

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Avenue, Suite 200
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com

               - and -

          Ronald I. LeVine, Esq.
          Eileen L. Linarducci, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD I. LEVINE
          210 River St., # 11,
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 489-7900
          E-mail: ron@ronlevinelaw.com
                  elinarducci@ronlevinelaw.com


NCB MANAGEMENT: Class Certification Sought in "McDaniel" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ronny McDaniel moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit styled RONNY MCDANIEL, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. NCB MANAGEMENT
SERVICES INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00250-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Hqfu9AqE

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: meldridge@ademilaw.com


NEW HAMPSHIRE: Gzekalski Moves to Certify Class of Inmates
----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled Jason A. Gzekalski v. William
Wrenn, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00557-JL (D.N.H.), moves for
class certification and for appointment of class counsel.

William Wrenn is the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department
of Corrections.

Mr. Gzekalski asserts that the issues raised in this action meet
the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequateness of the representative petitioner under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

   A. Count 1 affects almost all present inmates at NHDOC's three
      facilities, as well as many past and future inmates, which
      may involved somewhere from 3,000 to as many as 6,000 (or
      more) persons;

   B. Count 2 affects every inmate at NHDOC's facilities, who
      receive prescription medications, which petitioner
      estimates to be approximately one-half of those affected by
      Count 1;

   C. Count 3 affects an unknown number of inmates, who have been
      denied appropriate treatment, both for the specific issues
      cited in the Complaint, as v/ell as many others (HEP-C,
      diabetes, drug addiction, etc.), though petitioner believes
      that this group numbers in the hundreds; and

   D. Count 4 affects an unknown but significant number of
      inmates, who have suffered serious injury, up to and
      including death, due to defendants* failure to
      appropriately respond to serious medical issues in a timely
      manner.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=aUNMfwTX


NONGSHIM CO: Moves to Decertify Class of Indirect Purchasers
------------------------------------------------------------
Nongshim Co., Ltd., Nongshim America, Inc., Ottogi Co., Ltd., and
Ottogi America, Inc., Defendants in the consolidated lawsuit
captioned IN RE KOREAN RAMEN ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 3:13-
cv-04115-WHO (N.D. Cal.), move the Court for an order
decertifying the Indirect Purchaser Class and partially vacating
the Order Granting Motions for Class Certification insofar as the
Court certified a class of Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs.

Over a year ago, the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs moved to
certify a nationwide class of consumers, arguing that
California's Cartwright Act could be applied nationwide, the
Defendants state in their Motion.  In the alternative, the
Plaintiffs sought certification of a class encompassing
purchasers in California, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and New York.  The Defendants argued that a nationwide
class was impossible because "Illinois Brick" drove a fissure
through the various states' antitrust laws.

The Court agreed but instead opted for the Plaintiffs' last-
minute audible, called for the first time in their reply brief,
to certify a class including purchasers from 24 Illinois Brick
repealer jurisdictions because the Defendants had not satisfied
"their burden" of demonstrating conflicts among those states'
laws.

Last month, the Ninth Circuit clarified that "[a]s with any other
requirement of Rule 23, plaintiffs seeking class certification
bear the burden of demonstrating through evidentiary proof that
the laws of the affected states do not vary in material ways that
preclude a finding that common legal issues predominate."  In re
Hyundai & Kia Fuel Economy Litig., - F.3d -, 2018 WL 505343, at
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2018).

The Plaintiffs have never offered such evidentiary proof, the
Defendants contend.  To date, the Plaintiffs have never even
identified the specific other states' statutes that the
Cartwright Act can purportedly displace, the Defendants assert.
The Defendants add that the Plaintiffs cannot make that showing
now.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' representation that only "minor
variations" exist among Illinois Brick repealer states,
significant discrepancies exist among these state laws, the
Defendants argue.  The Defendants contend that the variations
range from the existence and scope of a pass-on defense to the
availability of treble damages, length of limitations periods,
and procedural prerequisites to suit.  These differences reflect
fundamental disagreement on issues of state policy including the
balance between providing relief and protecting against
duplicative recovery; the circumstances in which a state's
punitive power are warranted; and the determination of when
causes of action expire, among others, the Defendants explain.

Because respecting these choices will "swamp any common issues
and defeat predominance," the Court should now decertify the
class of indirect purchasers, the Defendants assert.

The Court will commence a hearing on March 28, 2018, at 2:00
p.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=oJ4fx3TM

Defendants OTTOGI CO., LTD., and OTTOGI AMERICA, INC., are
represented by:

          Scott A. Edelman, Esq.
          Rachel S. Brass, Esq.
          Minae Yu, Esq.
          Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
          San Francisco, CA 94105-0921
          Telephone: (415) 393-8200
          Facsimile: (415) 393-8306
          E-mail: sedelman@gibsondunn.com
                  rbrass@gibsondunn.com
                  myu@gibsondunn.com
                  jkleinbrodt@gibsondunn.com

Defendants NONGSHIM CO., LTD., and NONGSHIM AMERICA, INC., are
represented by:

          John R. Gall, Esq.
          Mark C. Dosker, Esq.
          Joseph P. Grasser, Esq.
          Maria A. Nugent, Esq.
          SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
          275 Battery Street, Suite 2600
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 954-0200
          Facsimile: (415) 393-9887
          E-mail: john.gall@squirepb.com
                  mark.dosker@squirepb.com
                  joseph.grasser@squirepb.com
                  maria.nugent@squirepb.com


NORTH CAROLINA: Class Certification Sought in "Dillard" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned Thomas T. Dillard, Jr. v.
Frank Perry, et al., Case No. 5:16-ct-03329-FL (E.D.N.C.), moves
for an order to allow certification as a class action pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Frank Perry is the secretary of the North Carolina Department of
Public Safety.

Mr. Dillard contends that he is only one of the many prisoners
within the custody, care and control of the NCDPS/DAC/PS, who has
suffered deprivation of 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment Rights
by which he has brought civil complaint in the case.

Mr. Dillard also asks the Court to appoint a counsel to represent
the case as a class action.  He further asks the Court to tax all
costs of this matter against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Vfg9axHW

The Defendants are represented by:

          Josh Stein, Esq.
          Joseph Finarelli, Esq.
          ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
          DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          9001 Mail Service Center
          Raleigh, NC 27699-9001
          Telephone: (919) 716-6400
          Facsimile: (919) 716-6750
          E-mail: Josh.Stein@ncdoj.gov
                  jfinarelli@ncdoj.gov


NURSE FORCE: Pinard Moves for Certification of Therapists Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled SAMANTHA PINARD individually
and on behalf of all persons similarly situated v. NURSE FORCE,
INC., Case No. 4:17-cv-00434-JAJ-RAW (S.D. Iowa), moves the Court
for an order conditionally certifying and allowing judicial
notice of the action to be sent to all potential opt-in
plaintiffs informing them of their right to opt-in to the case
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks conditional certification of this
class:

     All hourly Physical, Occupational, and Speech Therapists;
     Registered Nurses; Licensed Practical Nurses; Certified
     Nursing Assistants; Home Health Aides; Live-In Aides; and
     Companions employed by Nurse Force, Inc. from February __,
     2015 to the present whose work in a single workweek,
     including at least one in-home visit, resulted in, or would
     have resulted in, excess of forty (40) hours.

The case challenges Nurse Force, Inc.'s common overtime payroll
policy and the resulting failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and
the Class.  The Plaintiff moves for an order from this Court
granting permission to issue notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b) in order to advise potential opt-in plaintiffs that this
lawsuit is pending and to enable them to decide whether to join
the lawsuit.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=IBAb1F9U

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael D. Currie, Esq.
          Mark W. Thomas, Esq.
          GREFE & SIDNEY, P.L.C.
          500 E. Court Avenue, Suite 200
          Des Moines, IA 50309
          Telephone: (515) 245-4300
          Facsimile: (515) 245-4452
          E-mail: mcurrie@grefesidney.com
                  mthomas@grefesidney.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Douglas A. Fulton, Esq.
          Allison M. Steuterman, Esq.
          BRICK GENTRY, PC
          6701 Westown Parkway, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IA 50266
          Telephone: (515) 274-1450
          Facsimile: (515) 274-1488
          E-mail: douglas.fulton@brickgentrylaw.com
                  allison.steuterman@brickgentrylaw.com


OAKWOOD, OH: Class of House Sellers Certified in "Thompson" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Thomas M. Rose enters an order in the lawsuit entitled
JASON THOMPSON and 2408 HILLVIEW, LLC v. CITY OF OAKWOOD, OHIO,
and ETHAN KROGER, Case No. 3:16-cv-00169-TMR (S.D. Ohio):

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to
      liability on their:

      (a) Section 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment against
          Oakwood only;

      (b) Section 1983 claim under the unconstitutional
          conditions doctrine against Oakwood only; and

      (c) unjust enrichment/restitution claim against Oakwood;

   2. granting Ethan Kroger summary judgment in his favor as he
      is entitled to qualified immunity on both of Plaintiffs'
      Section 1983 claims; and

   3. certifying this class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
      Rules of Civil Procedure:

      All individuals and businesses that have (1) sold houses
      within the City of Oakwood since May 25, 2010; and (2) paid
      pre-sale inspection fees to the City of Oakwood in
      conjunction with the sale of their houses.

Judge Rose notes that in the next few days, the Courtroom Deputy
will contact the parties' counsel to schedule a conference call
regarding the next steps in this case.

The Plaintiffs own and have sold residential homes in Oakwood.
They brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against
Oakwood and Ethan Kroger, one of its code enforcement officers,
for allegedly infringing their constitutional rights by requiring
them to submit to warrantless searches or risk criminal
punishment before permitting them to sell their homes.  The
Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of similarly situated
individuals, who sold real estate in Oakwood and were "coerced
into paying pre-sale inspection fees."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Uz8D1y4w


OCWEN LOAN: Snyder's Bid to Certify Class Nixed Due to Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 22, 2018, in the case
entitled Keith Snyder, et al. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Case
No. 1:14-cv-08461 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before
the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly.

The minute entry states that the motion to certify class filed in
May 2017 is terminated as a pending motion because it has been
superseded by the preliminarily approved class-wide settlement in
this case.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=UahzGXDn


OLIPHANT FINANCIAL: Dombrowski Seeks Certification of Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
Steven Dombrowski moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned STEVEN DOMBROWSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
OLIPHANT FINANCIAL, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-00280-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.),
and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=tNSWU8GE

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


PARKER DRILLING: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of "Newton" FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's order granting Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned BRIAN
NEWTON, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARKER DRILLING
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD., Erroneously Sued As Parker Drilling
Management Services, Inc., Defendant-Appellee, and PARKER
DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Defendant, No. 15-56352 (9th Cir.).

This case presents the novel question whether claims under state
wage and hour laws may be brought by workers employed on drilling
platforms fixed on the outer Continental Shelf.

Brian Newton worked on such a platform off the coast of Santa
Barbara. His shifts lasted fourteen days and he regularly worked
twelve hours per day. After Parker Drilling (Parker) terminated
him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations
under California law. Parker removed the case to federal district
court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court granted the motion, concluding that the Fair Labor
Standards Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that is
exclusive of California wage and hour laws.

Newton appeals.

The district court granted Parker's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, reasoning that under the OCSLA, federal law governs
and state law only applies to the extent it is necessary 'to fill
a significant void or gap' in federal law. Finding no significant
voids or gaps in the FLSA, the district court held that Newton
could not invoke California wage and hour laws as surrogate
federal law. The district court reached this decision after
considering the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations elaborating
the FLSA.

While recognizing that the FLSA has a savings clause that
expressly allows for more protective state minimum wage and
overtime laws, the district court nevertheless concluded that
California wage and hour claims were unavailable to Newton. The
district court did not address Newton's request for leave to
amend.

A dismissal on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is reviewed
de novo. Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it
is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be
saved by any amendment.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

OCSLA's Choice of Law Provision

The outer Continental Shelf generally refers to submerged lands
lying more than three miles offshore, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the states.  Subject to certain exceptions and
conditions, the OCSLA declares that the Constitution and laws of
the United States extend to the outer Continental Shelf, as well
as all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
there-from to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State.

Judicial Interpretation of the OCSLA

The Supreme Court first applied the OCSLA's choice of law
provision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S.
352, 355 (1969). The families of two workers who perished on
drilling rigs fixed to the outer Continental Shelf off the
Louisiana coast brought claims pursuant to Louisiana state law
and the Death on the High Seas Act (High Seas Act). The High Seas
Act provides an admiralty remedy for deaths resulting from
traditional maritime activity on the high seas, in waters three
or more nautical miles from shore.

The Supreme Court explained that the OCSLA requires fixed
drilling platforms to be treated as artificial islands or federal
enclaves within a landlocked state, not as vessels.

As such, the federal admiralty action under the High Seas Act no
more applies to these accidents actually occurring on the islands
than it would to accidents occurring in an upland federal
enclave. Moreover, since the accidents befalling the workers
"involved no collision with a vessel, and the structures were not
navigational aids, their deaths were not attributable to
traditional maritime activity. Hence, the High Seas Act's
maritime remedy was unavailable, and any obstacle to the
application of state law by incorporation as federal law through
Section 1333(a)(2)] was removed.

The Instant Case

Newton's Claims under California Minimum Wage and Overtime Law
Parker paid Newton an hourly rate well above the state and
federal minimum wage, and also paid him premium rates for
overtime hours. Newton's principal wage and hour objection is
that he was not properly compensated for standby hours on the
drilling platform. The Court know of no appellate case law
examining whether, for the purposes of the OCSLA, state wage and
hour laws are inconsistent with the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Meaning of Not Inconsistent

As the Court sees it, because there are California and federal
statutory schemes that are applicable, in the ordinary sense of
that term, to the parties' conflict, the determinative question
in Newton's case is not which law is applicable, but whether
California wage and hour laws are inconsistent with existing
federal law. If they are not inconsistent, the OCSLA dictates
that state wage and hour grievances should be redressable as
federal claims on the OCS.

To further articulate a framework for deciding whether a state
law is inconsistent with federal law under the OCSLA, the Court
draws on cases that have arisen in the context of two statutes
involving the incorporation of state law into federal law: (1)
the Assimilative Crimes Act (Crimes Act). The Court looks to the
Crimes Act because it is an example of Congress applying state
law in conjunction with federal law on enclaves. The Court also
considers 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, because at the time Congress
enacted the civil rights statutes, it recognized that federal
civil rights law was not sufficiently comprehensive and would
have to rely, in part, on state law to effectuate its objectives.
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 (1984).

Unlike the OCSLA, Section 1988 does require a gap in federal law
as a prerequisite for assimilation of state law. Taking that
substantial difference into account, judicial interpretation of
the term not inconsistent in Section 1988(a) remains instructive
here. In enacting the federal civil rights acts, Congress
recognized that federal law would not contain every rule that may
be required to adjudicate suits brought under them. Accordingly,
in Section 1988(a), Congress determined that gaps in the federal
civil rights acts should be filled by state law, as long as that
law is not inconsistent with federal law.

Whether California Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws are
Inconsistent with Federal Law

The Court thus turns to the remaining question and the crux of
Newton's appeal: whether California's minimum wage and overtime
laws are inconsistent with the FLSA.

The FLSA was enacted to protect all covered workers from
substandard wages and oppressive working hours. It seeks to
prohibit labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers.

Parker cites numerous cases for its contention that the FLSA is
inconsistent with California's minimum wage and overtime laws. In
particular, Parker relies on Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions,
Inc., 60 Cal.4th 833 (2015). Mendiola involved California wage
and hour claims brought by security guards who regularly
patrolled construction sites for eight hours on weekdays and
sixteen hours on weekends, and who were required to reside,
uncompensated, in an employer-provided trailer for eight hours
after each shift and remain on-call.

The Mendiola court held that these on-call hours were hours
worked for the purposes of California's Wage Order 4, and that
the employer could not exclude sleep time' from the compensable
hours in the security guards' 24-hour shifts. In reaching this
result, the California Supreme Court rejected the employer's
argument that federal DOL regulations furnished the appropriate
definition for hours worked under California's wage order.
Emphasizing that it had previously cautioned against confounding
federal and state labor law, the California Supreme Court ruled
that the language of Wage Order 4 did not evidence the state
Industrial Welfare Commission's intent to incorporate, by
reference, federal law and regulations. Parker argues that
Mendiola illustrates that California law is inconsistent with the
FLSA.

The Court disagrees. Mendiola only establishes that California
embraces a more protective standard for determining hours worked,
not that California's standard is inconsistent with federal law.
Indeed, the savings clause in the FLSA reflects Congress's
express intent that states should be allowed to adopt more
protective standards. Parker has failed to demonstrate that
California's minimum wage and overtime laws are inconsistent with
federal law, and we know of nothing else indicating that
California's provisions for minimum wage and maximum hours worked
are inconsistent with the FLSA.

The Court concludes the district court erred by dismissing the
claims Newton brought pursuant to California's minimum wage and
overtime laws, and that California's minimum wage and maximum
hours worked provisions are applicable and not inconsistent, with
the FLSA. The Court vacates the order dismissing these claims and
remand to the district court.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's February 5, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y932jndz from Leagle.com.

Michael Strauss -- mike@strausslawyers.com -- (argued), Strauss &
Strauss APC, Ventura, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ronald J. Holland -- rholland@sheppardmullin.com -- (argued),
Ellen M. Bronchetti -- ebronchetti@sheppardmullin.com -- and
Karin Dougan Vogel -- kvogel@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, San Francisco, California, for
Defendant-Appellee.


POWERSECURE INT'L: 4th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP reported that on November 15, 2017, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (which hears appeals from
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West
Virginia) affirmed the dismissal of a putative securities fraud
class action against PowerSecure International, Inc.
("PowerSecure"), and Sidney Hinton, its president and CEO. This
case highlights the difficulty of pleading scienter (fraudulent
intent) and further reinforces that, in order to do so, a
plaintiff must plead facts that give rise to a strong inference
that the defendants intentionally or recklessly deceived,
manipulated or defrauded investors.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants defrauded investors by
knowingly making misrepresentations about the renewal of a major
contract in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  The
district court dismissed the complaint after finding that the
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed, stating that "[a] plaintiff may not stack
inference upon inference" to satisfy the PSLRA's heightened
pleading requirements for scienter.

In so doing, the court rejected the plaintiffs' primary argument
that the defendants' alleged knowledge that the statement was
false was sufficient to show scienter.  The court explained that
the plaintiffs' "argument fuses an inference that Mr. Hinton knew
enough to realize that his characterization was technically
incorrect with an inference that he intended it to deceive."
"Stacking inference upon inference," the Fourth Circuit held,
"violates [the PSLRA's] mandate that the strong inference of
scienter be supported by facts, not other inferences."

The Fourth Circuit also found that the complaint, when taken as a
whole, did not allow the court to draw a strong inference of
scienter.  First, the court found that the statement at issue did
not support an inference that the defendants intended to deceive
investors into thinking that PowerSecure could continue to serve
the same region or otherwise maintain its profitability.  Second,
the court declined to find intent to deceive from the defendants'
use of a "single possibly ambiguous word," noting that the fact
of the contract's renewal "itself embraces the possibility that
the new contract was not a renewal on identical terms."  Finally,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to establish scienter
through Hinton's own sale and transfer of PowerSecure stock and
observed that Hinton did not sell his shares when their value was
at their peak and that the transfer of shares was made months
after the alleged misstatement. [GN]


PRIME COMMUNICATIONS: Lorenzo's Remaining FLSA Claims Approved
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Kimberly A. Swank granted the parties' Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement Agreement of Remaining FLSA Claims and
Defendant Prime Communications, L.P.'s Undisputed Motion for
Leave to File Settlement Agreement Under Seal in the lawsuit
titled ROSE LORENZO, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. PRIME COMMUNICATIONS, L.P., a Texas General
Partnership, Case No. 5:12-cv-00069-H-KS (E.D.N.C.).

"The parties' settlement agreement is APPROVED in its entirety
and it is ORDERED, consistent with the settlement agreement, that
the FLSA claims of the accepting Plaintiffs are DISMISSED with
prejudice and the FLSA claims of the non-responsive Plaintiffs
are DISMISSED without prejudice," Judge Swank ruled.  Judge Swank
ordered the parties to act in accordance with the settlement
agreement.  The Court retains jurisdiction over the FLSA portion
of this matter to the extent consistent with the settlement
agreement.

Judge Swank also ruled that these motions are dismissed as moot
in light of the parties' settlement of the FLSA claims:

   1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Show Cause and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37
      Relief;

   2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
      Issues of FLSA Liability;

   3. Defendant's Motion for Decertification of Conditionally
      Certified FLSA Collective;

   4. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
      Plaintiffs' FLSA Claims; and

   5. Defendant's Motion to Strike and Exclude Expert Testimony.

Plaintiff Rose Lorenzo initiated this action on February 17,
2012, against her former employer, Prime Communications, L.P.,
asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act.  The Plaintiff claims that Prime
misclassified its Store Managers as exempt from payment of
overtime wages and seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, as
well as liquidated damages, attorney's fees and costs under the
FLSA.  The Plaintiff also asserts claims under the NCWHA on
behalf of herself and other individuals employed by Prime.  Prime
denies any wrongdoing or liability under the FLSA or NCWHA.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=9o6gFULB


PROFESSIONAL PLACEMENT: Safranski Seeks Final OK of $9K Accord
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled KATHY L. SAFRANSKI, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v.
PROFESSIONAL PLACEMENT SERVICES, LLC; a Wisconsin Limited
Liability Company; and, JOHN AND JANE DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00129-WCG (E.D. Wisc.), files with the Court her
unopposed motion for an order granting final approval of class
settlement agreement and release, including an award of Class
Counsels' fees and costs.

On November 14, 2017, the Court preliminarily approved the
Settlement and conditionally certified the settlement class under
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Court
defined the class as:

     All persons with addresses in the State of Wisconsin to whom
     Professional Placement Services, LLC mailed an initial
     written communication to collect a debt, between January 27,
     2016 and February 17, 2017, which states "Re: Partnership
     Community Health Center."

The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges PPS violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act by mailing consumers initial collection
letters which failed to identify the current creditor in a clear
and unambiguous fashion as required by the FDCPA.

According to the Settlement, PPS will create a class settlement
fund of $9,000 ("Class Recovery"), which a Third-Party Settlement
Administrator will distribute pro rata, not to exceed $50, among
those Class Members who does not exclude him/herself and who
timely returns a claim form.

Subject to Court approval, PPS shall pay $2,000 to the Plaintiff
for her statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section
1692k(a)(2)(B), which also takes into account her services to the
Settlement Class.

In connection with the Plaintiff's Counsel's application for
approval of attorney's fees and costs, the Parties stipulate
that, if the Court grants the Final Order, then the Litigation is
a "successful action" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. Section
1692k(a)(3), notwithstanding that PPS does not admit to
liability.  As such, PPS agrees Class Counsel shall be entitled
to receive $48,000, which covers all fees and all expenses
arising out of the Litigation, including all costs associated
with providing notice to the Settlement Class and administering
the Class Recovery.  The award of fees, costs, and expenses to
Class Counsel shall be in addition to, and shall not in any way
reduce, the settlement amounts provided to Class Members.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=pZy5Fvwo

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081-1315
          Telephone: (973) 379-7500
          Facsimile: (973) 532-2056
          E-mail: philip@sternthomasson.com
                  andrew@sternthomasson.com


PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS: Talarico Moves to Certify Care Workers Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled RALPH TALARICO, INDIVIDUALLY
AND, ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. PUBLIC
PARTNERSHIPS, LLC, D/B/A PCG PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS, Case No. 5:17-
cv-02165-JLS (E.D. Pa.), moves for conditional certification, or
certify a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and facilitate the issuance of notice to potential collective
members.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of this collective:

     All direct care workers in Pennsylvania who were employed by
     PPL between January 1, 2015 and the date of final judgment
     in this matter, and who worked over 40 hours in one or more
     weeks.

On May 11, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a class and collective
action complaint against the Defendant, seeking unpaid overtime
wages under federal and state law.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2BnRh9O2

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christine E. Webber, Esq.
          Miriam R. Nemeth, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          E-mail: cwebber@cohenmilstein.com
                  mnemeth@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Richard Katz, Esq.
          ARNOLD, BEYER & KATZ
          140A East King Street
          Lancaster, PA 17602
          Telephone: (717) 394-7204
          Facsimile: (717) 291-0992
          E-mail: rkatz@arnoldbeyerkatz.com

               - and -

          Rachhana T. Srey, Esq.
          Robert L. Schug, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 215-6870
          E-mail: srey@nka.com
                  schug@nka.com


QUALITY RESOURCES: Court Grants Toney's Bid to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ruben Castillo granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the lawsuit captioned Sarah Toney v. Quality
Resources, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:13-cv-00042 (N.D. Ill.)

The class claims to be tried are Counts II-V of the fourth
amended complaint, according to the Order.

Alexander H. Burke, Esq., Edward A. Broderick, Esq., Anthony I.
Paronich, Esq., and Matthew P. McCue, Esq., are appointed as
class counsel.  Sarah Toney, the named Plaintiff, is designated
as the class representative.

The Court was scheduled to hold a status hearing in open court
last March 6, 2018.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XTVuAQNl

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          155 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 9020
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 729-5288
          E-mail: ABurke@BurkeLawLLC.com

               - and -

          Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          BRODERICK LAW, P.C.
          99 High Street, Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (508) 221-1510
          E-mail: ted@broderick-law.com
                  anthony@broderick-law.com

               - and -

          Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE
          1 South Avenue, Suite 3
          Natick, MA 01760
          Telephone: (508) 655-1415
          Facsimile: (508) 319-3077
          E-mail: mmccue@massattorneys.net


QUEEN CITY ROOFING: Verne Moves to Certify Class of Employees
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled CORY VERNE, individually,
and on behalf of a Class of others similarly situated v. QUEEN
CITY ROOFING & CONTRACTING CO., a Missouri corporation, Case No.
6:17-cv-03051-MDH (W.D. Mo.), seeks certification of this class:

     All individuals, other than David Huskey, who worked for
     Queen City Roofing & Contracting Company in either the
     Roofing or Sheet Metal Department who worked on one or
     more Missouri Prevailing Wage projects from November 26,
     2009 to the present.

The conduct challenged in this case stems from Queen City's
systematic process of taking prevailing wage credit for
contributions it makes to its Voluntary Employee Benefit
Association ("VEBA") instead of increasing the class members' pay
for their prevailing wage work.  That practice creates a common
link between him and the class he seeks to represent, Mr. Verne
asserts.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=9LxFn16V

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradford B. Lear, Esq.
          Todd C. Werts, Esq.
          LEAR WERTS LLP
          2003 W. Broadway, Suite 107
          Columbia, MO 65203
          Telephone: (573) 875-1991
          Facsimile: (573) 875-1985
          E-mail: lear@learwerts.com
                  werts@learwerts.com

               - and -

          Robert D. Curran, Esq.
          CURRAN LAW FIRM, LLC
          3516 S. National Avenue
          Springfield, MO 65807
          Telephone: (417) 823-7500
          Facsimile: (417) 823-7510
          E-mail: rob@curranlawfirm.com


RACK ROOM: Prelim. Approval of "Stebbins" Class Settlement Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit titled TIFFINEY N. STEBBINS v. RACK
ROOM SHOES, INC., Case No. 6:17-cv-00619-UDJ-CBW (W.D. La.),
jointly move the Court for:

   * conditional class certification for settlement purposes, for
     appointment of class counsel;

   * preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement in
     this case; and

   * approval of the form and contents of the Notice of Pendency
     of Class Action, Proposed Settlement Agreement, Right to
     Share in Settlement Proceeds, Right to Request Exclusion
     from Settlement Proceeds, Hearing and Deadline for
     Objections ("Notice") and the manner of service of the
     Notice.

A copy of the Joint Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=isxh8rWr

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth D. St. Pe, Esq.
          KENNETH D. ST. PE, APLC
          La. Bar Roll No. 22638
          311 W. University Avenue, Suite A
          Lafayette, LA 70506
          Telephone: (337) 534-4043
          Facsimile: (337) 534-8379
          E-mail: kennethstpe@aol.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Phyllis Cancienne, T.A., Esq.
          Christopher G. Morris, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Liner, Esq.
          BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC
          450 Laurel Street, North Tower, 20th Floor
          Baton Rouge, LA 70801
          Telephone: (225) 381-7000
          Facsimile: (225) 343-3612
          E-mail: pcancienne@bakerdonelson.com
                  cmorris@bakerdonelson.com
                  bliner@bakerdonelson.com

               - and -

          Keith M. Weddington, Esq.
          PARKER, POE, ADAMS & BERNSTEIN LLP
          North Carolina Bar No. 14352
          Three Wells Fargo Center
          401 South Tryon Street, Suite 3000
          Charlotte, NC 28202
          Telephone: (704) 372-9000
          Facsimile: (704) 334-4706
          E-mail: keithweddington@parkerpoe.com


SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in DC Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff D.C. filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in his
lawsuit entitled D.C. v. County of San Diego, et al., Case No.
3:15-cv-01868-MMA-NLS, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as D.C. v. County of San Diego,
et al., Case No. 18-80022, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge
Michael M. Anello denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

The Plaintiff contests the constitutionality of medical
examinations conducted on children at Polinsky Children's Center,
a 24-hour facility of San Diego County for the temporary
emergency shelter of children who are separated from their
families.

On Aug. 22, 2014, the Plaintiff alleges he was taken to Polinsky
and upon his arrival, he was given a cursory wellness check by
staff and placed into the general population.  The next morning,
he contends he was subjected to a physical examination, including
an external examination of his genitalia and rectum.  He alleges
that his mother was not notified of the examination, was not
present for it, and did not consent to it.  The Plaintiff
contends that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the
examination, nor had the County or its agents obtained a court
order or warrant.

Based on the examination at Polinsky, Plaintiff D.C., a minor,
filed the putative class action through his guardian ad litem
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging the Defendants
violated his and putative class members' constitutional rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  He contends that Defendant County is liable to him
and putative class members because Polinsky maintained a policy,
custom, and practice of subjecting all children admitted to
Polinsky to the same 22-point physical examination that the
Plaintiff was subjected to within 24 hours of their admittance.

The First Amended Complaint states that the County's policy,
custom, and practice explicitly prohibited parents from attending
the examinations, and that County physicians routinely conducted
the examinations without first notifying the children's parents
or legal guardians, and without a court order, warrant, or the
presence of exigent circumstances.  The Plaintiff filed the FAC
on Feb. 19, 2016, and requests general damages, attorneys' fees,
pre- and post-judgment interest, and any other relief the Court
deems just and proper.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner D.C., a minor by and through his Guardian Ad
Litem, Helen Garter, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Donnie R. Cox, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DONNIE R. COX
          402 N. Nevada Street
          Oceanside, CA 92054
          Telephone: (760) 400-0263
          Facsimile: (760) 400-0269
          E-mail: drc@drcoxlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul Leehey, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PAUL W. LEEHEY
          210 E. Fig Street, Suite 101
          Fallbrook, CA 92028
          Telephone: (760) 723-0711
          Facsimile: (760) 723-6533
          E-mail: law@leehey.com

               - and -

          Rachele R. Rickert, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          750 B Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 239-4599
          E-mail: rickert@whafh.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey G. Smith, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545-4600
          E-mail: smith@whafh.com

Defendants-Respondents COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, A.B. AND JESSIE
POLINSKY CHILDREN'S CENTER and SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY are represented by:

          David Brodie, Esq.
          Christina Snider, Esq.
          OFFICE OF COUNTY COUNSEL
          1600 Pacific Highway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 531-4871
          Facsimile: (619) 531-6005
          E-mail: david.brodie@sdcounty.ca.gov
                  christina.snider@sdcounty.ca.gov


SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Court Certifies Class of Arrestees in "Buffin"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers entered an order in the lawsuit
titled RIANA BUFFIN, ET AL. v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
ET AL., Case No. 4:15-cv-04959-YGR (N.D. Cal.), granting the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification as modified by the
Court.

The Court certifies this class:

     All pre-arraignment arrestees (i) who are, or will be, in
     the custody of the San Francisco Sheriff; (ii) whose bail
     amount is determined by the Felony and Misdemeanor Bail
     Schedule as established by the Superior Court of California,
     County of San Francisco; (iii) whose terms of pretrial
     release have not received an individualized determination by
     a judicial officer; and (iv) who remain in custody for any
     amount of time because they cannot afford to pay their set
     bail amount.

The Court appoints lead plaintiffs Riana Buffin and Crystal
Patterson as class representatives of the certified class.  The
Court also appoints Phil Telfeyan, Esq., Catherine Sevcenko,
Esq., Rebecca Ramaswamy, Esq., and Marissa Hatton, Esq., of Equal
Justice Under Law, and Robert E. Sims, Esq., and Steven M. Bauer,
Esq., of Latham & Watkins LLP as class counsel.

The Order terminates Docket Numbers 134, 137, 138, 139, and 140.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=hjey4vwN


SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Royalty Owners Cannot Pursue Underpayment Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion holding that
Plaintiffs in the adversary proceeding captioned BAKER FARMS,
INC., et al Plaintiff(s), v. SANDRIDGE E&P, LLC Defendant(s),
Adversary No. 16-3223 (S.D. Tex.), are not entitled to commence
or continue an action asserting any remedies against the
Reorganized Debtors arising from alleged underpayments.

Baker Farms, Inc., and Steven T. Bouziden, trustee of the Steven
T. Bouziden Revocable Trust, individually and on behalf of a
putative class of royalty owners, filed the adversary proceeding
seeking declaratory relief with respect to certain oil and gas
leases located in Oklahoma and Kansas under which a debtor is the
lessee.

After negotiation, the parties agreed to submit, in lieu of a
trial, the following two questions to the Court based on legal
argument along with stipulated facts and exhibits:

Question 1: Are the Plaintiffs entitled to commence or continue
an action asserting any remedies (including damages or equitable
lease cancellation) against the Reorganized Debtors arising from
alleged underpayments of royalties under the Gas Leases occurring
on or before the Effective Date of the Plan, or, instead, is any
such action barred by the injunctions in the Confirmation Order
and/or the Plan subject to treatment as alleged General Unsecured
Claims or otherwise under the applicable provisions of the
Confirmation Order and Plan?

Question 2: Do the provisions of the Confirmation Order and the
Plan  including, but not limited to, paragraphs 72, 105, 144, and
145 of the Confirmation Order and Article IV(E) of the Plan
impact the analysis of Question 1, and if so, what impact do they
have?

In order to resolve the questions submitted by the parties, the
Court must determine the legal status of the various subject
leases under the Bankruptcy Code.  With respect to the Kansas oil
and gas leases, the parties agree that the applicability of 11
U.S.C. Section 365 will be determinative. The Plaintiffs assert
that the Kansas oil and gas leases are both executory contracts
and unexpired leases of real property. The Debtors assert that
they are neither.

With respect to the Oklahoma oil and gas leases, the Plaintiffs
rely upon the existence of a statutory lien and the Debtors'
purported failure to address those liens in the confirmed plan.
Should no lien exist, the parties agree that the Plaintiffs'
claims will be unsecured claims covered by the confirmed plan.
The Kansas Oil and Gas Leases.

The Plaintiffs first assert that the Kansas oil and gas leases
are executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. Section 365. A contract
is executory for purposes of Section 365 if at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, the failure of either party to complete
performance would constitute a material breach of the contract,
thereby excusing the performance of the other party.

Under Kansas law, a warranty of title is an agreement by the
grantor to compensate the grantee for any loss which the grantee
may sustain by reason of a failure of the title which the deed
purports to convey, or by reason of an encumbrance on the title.
At best, a breach of such a covenant creates a cause of action
for damages not the termination of the underlying lease. Under
the specific facts presented by the parties, the Court finds that
the Kansas oil and gas leases are not executory contracts.

The Plaintiffs next assert that the Kansas oil and gas leases are
unexpired real property leases under Section 365.

In Kansas, an oil and gas lease is not a lease in the ordinary
sense as it conveys no interest in the land. Under Kansas law, an
oil and gas lease grants the right to enter on described land,
explore for oil and gas, and if oil and gas be found in paying
quantities to operate and produce. The term 'lease' is applied
merely through habit and for convenience. They create no estate
in land, but merely a kind of license. The plaintiffs rely upon a
single decision issued by an Oklahoma bankruptcy court in In re
J. H. Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 8 B.R. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1981).  This Court joins the opinions subsequently issued by
Oklahoma District Courts questioning the reasoning of J.H. Land &
Cattle under the facts presented.

The interest created under the applicable Kansas oil and gas
leases based on the stipulated facts is not that of an unexpired
lease of real property for purposes of 11 U.S.C. Section 365.

Having concluded that the Kansas oil and gas leases are not
subject to Section 365, Court concludes that with respect to the
Kansas oil and gas leases, the answer to Question 1 is "no." The
Plaintiffs are not entitled to continue or initiate litigation
regarding alleged royalty amounts owed prior to the Effective
Date.

Neither party advances an argument concerning the impact of the
provisions referenced in Question 2. The Court therefore
concludes that the meaning of these provisions is unambiguous and
not subject to genuine dispute.

With respect to the Oklahoma oil and gas leases, the Plaintiffs
rely upon the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Owners' Lien Act of 2010 (Act)
to assert the existence of a secured claim against the Debtors.
Under the Act, royalty owners are granted a statutory lien that
attaches immediately to all oil and gas and continues
uninterrupted and without lapse in all oil and gas after
severance; and in and to all proceeds.

The substance of the questions posed to the Court is whether the
Plaintiffs' claims (secured or unsecured) are affected by the
bankruptcy case. The confirmed plan expressly addresses any claim
held by the Plaintiffs secured or otherwise. The entire
reorganization process would be negated if claimants whose claims
were addressed in a confirmed plan could continue to litigate
those claims in other forums at their option. The confirmed plan
is binding upon the Plaintiffs and they are prohibited from
commencing or continuing litigation regarding such claims that
arose prior to the Effective Date.

A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's February 5, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycw9p6t6
from Leagle.com.

Baker Farms, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Charles M. Rubio --
crubio@diamondmccarthy.com -- Diamond McCarthy, LLP & Rex A.
Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp PA.

SandRidge E&P, LLC, Defendant, represented by Mark E. McKane --
mark.mckane@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis & Steven N.
Serajeddini -- steven.serajeddini@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP.


SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Class Cert. Sought in Lanier Trust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Lead Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled DUANE & VIRGINIA
LANIER TRUST, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN TRUST I, SANDRIDGE
MISSISSIPPIAN TRUST II, TOM L. WARD, JAMES D. BENNETT, MATTHEW K.
GRUBB, RANDALL D. COOLEY, JIM J. BREWER, EVERETT R. DOBSON,
WILLIAM A. GILLILAND, DANIEL W. JORDAN, ROY T. OLIVER, JR.,
JEFFREY S. SEROTA, D. DWIGHT SCOTT, RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES,
INC., MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC (F/K/A MORGAN STANLEY & CO INC.),
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., CITIGROUP GLOBAL
MARKETS INC., and RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Defendants and
SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC., Nominal Defendant, Case No. 5:15-cv-
00634-SLP (W.D. Okla.), seek class certification pursuant to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Lead Plaintiffs are Ivan Nibur, Jase Luna, Matthew
Willenbucher, and the Duane & Virginia Lanier Trust, and movants
Reed Romine and Deborah Rath.

The lawsuit warrants class action treatment because the Class
members were injured by the Defendants' knowingly false and
misleading statements and omissions of material facts, the Lead
Plaintiffs contend.

All Class Members -- i.e., Class Period purchasers of SandRidge
Mississippian Trust I and SandRidge Mississippian Trust II --
were injured in precisely the same way, the Lead Plaintiffs
assert.  Proving all the elements of Plaintiffs' case --
including falsity, reliance, materiality, scienter, loss
causation, or economic loss -- involves common questions of fact
and law, the Lead Plaintiffs add.

The Lead Plaintiffs also seek appointment of the Proposed Class
Representatives as the Class Representatives and the appointment
of The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., as Lead Counsel and Farha Law, PLCC,
as Liaison Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2IcEram5

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nicholas G. Farha, Esq.
          FARHA LAW, PLLC
          1900 NW Expressway, Suite 501
          Oklahoma City, OK 73118
          Telephone: (405) 471-2224
          Facsimile: (405) 810-9901
          E-mail: nick@farhalawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Horne, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: jhorne@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com

               - and -

          J. Elazar Fruchter, Esq.
          WOHL & FRUCHTER, LLP
          570 Lexington Avenue, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 758-4000
          Facsimile: (212) 758-4004
          E-mail: jfruchter@wohlfruchter.com


SANTA CLARA, CA: Class of Disabled Prisoners Certified in "Cole"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Lucy H. Koh granted the joint motion for class
certification filed in the lawsuit styled DAVID COLE, LEROY
BENJAMIN, ERASMO FLORES, JR., ROBERT PHILLIPS and BRANDON
WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, a public entity, COUNTY OF
SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, a public entity under the
control of the County of Santa Clara, the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, a public entity under the control of the
County of Santa Clara, and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Case No.
5:16-cv-06594-LHK (N.D. Cal.).

The Class is defined as:

     All individuals with mobility disabilities who are now, or
     will be in the future, incarcerated in the Santa Clara
     County Jails, which consist of three facilities: (1) the
     Santa Clara County Main Jail Complex ("Main Jail"),
     consisting of Main Jail North and Main Jail South, in San
     Jose, California; (2) facilities for male inmates at the
     Elmwood Correctional Complex in Milpitas, California
     ("Elmwood"); and (3) the Elmwood Complex Women's Facility in
     Milpitas, California.

Plaintiffs Cole, Benjamin, Flores, Phillips, and Williams shall
serve as representatives of the Class.

Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP and Disability Rights Advocates
are appointed as class counsel to represent the interests of the
plaintiff class.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=edRgPTIS


SCHIFF NUTRITION: Cochoit Moves to Certify 2 Classes of Consumers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled MARILYN COCHOIT, on behalf of
herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public v.
SCHIFF NUTRITION INTERNATIONAL, INC., SCHIFF NUTRITION GROUP,
INC., GANEDEN BIOTECH, INC., RECKITT BENCKISER LLC, Case No.
8:16-cv-01371-CJC-KES (C.D. Cal.), moves for an order certifying,
with respect to her claim for fraud by omission, a Nationwide
Class defined as:

     All persons in the United States who purchased the Schiff
     Digestive Advantage Daily Probiotic and the Schiff Digestive
     Advantage Gummies with the "100x better survivability"
     claims for personal and household use and not for resale
     from July 1, 2015 until the date class notice is
     disseminated.

     Excluded from the Class are governmental entities,
     Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling
     interest, its employees, officers, directors, legal
     representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly
     owned subsidiaries or affiliated companies, including all
     parent companies, and their employees; and the judicial
     officers, their immediate family members and court staff
     assigned to this case.

Additionally, the Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order
certifying, with respect to her claims for fraud by omission,
violation of the Unfair Competition Law, violation of the False
Advertising Law, and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, a California Class or Sub-Class defined as:

     All persons in California who purchased the Schiff Digestive
     Advantage Daily Probiotic and the Schiff Digestive Advantage
     Gummies with the "100x better survivability" claims for
     personal and household use and not for resale from July 1,
     2015 until the date class notice is disseminated.

     Excluded from the Class are governmental entities,
     Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling
     interest, its employees, officers, directors, legal
     representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly
     owned subsidiaries or affiliated companies, including all
     parent companies, and their employees; and the judicial
     officers, their immediate family members and court staff
     assigned to this case.

Ms. Cochoit also asks the Court to appoint her as class
representative and to appoint the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron
as Class Counsel.  She further moves for an order approving
notice to the Class in accordance with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court will commence a hearing on April 30, 2018, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Aebci9g8

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          Michael T. Houchin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com
                  mike@consumersadvocates.com


SPECTRUM LABORATORY: Court Denies Move to Dismiss in "Casso"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons denying Defendant Spectrum
Laboratory Products, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
CASSO'S WELLNESS STORE & GYM, L.L.C., v. SPECTRUM LABORATORY
PRODUCTS, INC., SECTION "N" (2), Civil Action No. 17-2161 (E.D.
La.).

Casso's Wellness Store and Gym, LLC, filed a putative class
action suit against Spectrum Laboratory Products, Inc., under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), as amended by
the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005 (JFPA), seeking to recover
damages for and to enjoin Spectrum's massive junk faxing
campaign.

Casso identifies Spectrum's alleged violations of the Act as
including, but not limited to, the unsolicited facsimile
advertisements sent to Casso's facsimile telephone number.
Casso alleges that it has suffered the following damages as a
result of Spectrum's unsolicited faxes -- Defendant has imposed
disruption, annoyance and cost on Plaintiff. Among other things,
these faxes tie up Plaintiff's telephone lines and facsimile
machines, misappropriate and convert Plaintiff's fax paper and
toner, require Plaintiff to sort through faxes to separate
legitimate fax communications from junk fax advertisements and to
discard the latter.

Rule 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action upon a
finding by the court that it does not have subject matter
jurisdiction. A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.

A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,
which consists of three elements: the plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Plaintiff's failure
to establish any one element deprives the federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear the suit.

In order for an opt-out notice to be compliant it must:

   (1) Be clear and conspicuous and on the first page of the
unsolicited advertisement;

   (2) State the recipient may opt out of future unsolicited
advertisements;

   (3) Note that a failure by the sender to comply with a proper
opt-out request within 30 days is unlawful;

   (4) Include a domestic contact number and fax number for the
recipient to send an opt-out request;

   (5) Include a cost-free mechanism to send an opt-out request;
and

   (6) Instruct the recipient that an opt-out request is valid
only if the recipient (i) sends the request to the number the
sender identified in the notice; (ii) identifies the fax number
to which the opt-out request relates; and (iii) does not
expressly invite fax advertisements thereafter.

The Court joins the various circuit and district courts in
finding that Casso has alleged a concrete and particularized
injury sufficient to meet the Article III standing requirements.
Casso alleged that Spectrum violated the TCPA by sending fax
advertisements that were unsolicited and failed to contain the
statutorily-mandated opt-out language. In addition to alleging
TCPA procedural violations, Casso specifically alleged
additional, real harm, it suffered as a result of receiving
Spectrum's unsolicited faxes, including disruption, annoyance,
cost, the loss of use of their telephone lines and fax machine
during receipt of the unsolicited faxes, misappropriation of fax
paper and toner, and loss of time to sort faxes.

Consequently, Casso has sufficiently alleged a concrete injury in
fact, which satisfies Article III standing.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
and Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8nyyp5o from
Leagle.com.

Casso's Wellness Store & Gym, L.L.C., on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by George Brian
Recile, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis, Murray ,Recile, Stakelum &
Hayes, LLP, Matthew Arthur Sherman, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis,
Murray ,Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLP, Patrick R. Follette,
Chehardy ,Sherman, Ellis ,Murray ,Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLP,
Preston Lee Hayes, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis, Murray, Recile,
Stakelum & Hayes, LLP & Ryan Paul Monsour, Chehardy, Sherman,
Ellis, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLP, 3850 North Causeway
Boulevard, Suite 1700. Lakeway II Building, Metairie, Louisiana
70002

Spectrum Laboratory Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Nancy Scott Degan -- ndegan@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, Jennifer Burrows McNamara, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & Katie L. Dysart, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz.  PC, 201 St. Charles
Avenue -- Suite 3600. New Orleans, LA 70170


SPRINT CORPORATION: Rubio Seeks Final Nod of Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled SAMUEL RUBIO, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, and on
behalf of the general public v. SPRINT CORPORATION, a SPRINT
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P., a Delaware Corporation;
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive, Case No. 2:17-cv-02231-SVW-GJS (C.D.
Cal.), moves the Court for final approval of the parties' Joint
Stipulation and Class Action Settlement Agreement.

Mr. Rubio also seeks entry of an order conditionally certifying
the collective and class action claims for settlement purposes
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court will commence a hearing on March 26, 2018, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Dn1dvK4P

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard E. Quintilone II, Esq.
          George A. Aloupas, Esq.
          QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES
          22974 El Toro Road, Suite 100
          Lake Forest, CA 92630
          Telephone: (949) 458-9675
          E-mail: req@quintlaw.com
                  gaa@quintlaw.com

               - and -

          Roger Carter, Esq.
          Bianca A. Sofonio, Esq.
          THE CARTER LAW FIRM
          23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 150
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 245-7500
          E-mail: rcarter@carterlawfirm.net
                  bianca@carterlawfirm.net

               - and -

          Marc H. Phelps, Esq.
          THE PHELPS LAW GROUP
          23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 150
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 629-2533
          E-mail: marc@phelpslawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Harold M. Brody, Esq.
          Pietro A. Deserio, Esq.
          Tracey L. Silver, Esq.
          Elaine H. Lee, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          2049 Century Park East #3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 557-2900
          Facsimile: (310) 557-2193
          E-mail: hbrody@proskauer.com
                  pdeserio@proskauer.com
                  tsilver@proskauer.com
                  ehlee@proskauer.com


STATE COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Fetai" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Emir Fetai moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit styled EMIR FETAI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. STATE COLLECTION
SERVICE INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-00262-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and
further requests that this Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XXSZBtP9

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


STEIN MART: Wins Summary Judgment as to All of Sperling's Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Andre Birotte, Jr., enters an order in the lawsuit
styled MARILYN SPERLING and JERRED SCHUH v. STEIN MART, INC.,
Case No. 5:15-cv-01411-AB-KK (C.D. Cal.):

   -- granting Stein Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all
      of the Plaintiffs' claims; and

   -- denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as
      moot.

Judge Birotte directs Stein Mart to file a Proposed Judgment
within 14 days of the date of Order.

This case centers on Stein Mart's use of comparative reference
prices on price tags.  Stein Mart's price tags displayed higher
"Compare At" prices next to lower "Our Price" prices for items
they sold in their retail stores.  The Plaintiffs claim they
purchased products from Stein Mart in reliance on the comparative
reference prices, but that those prices were misleading.

The Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of:

     [a]ll persons who, while in the State of California, and
     between July 15, 2011, and the present (the "Class Period"),
     purchased from Stein Mart one or more items at any Stein
     Mart store in the State of California with a price tag that
     contained a "Compare At" price which was higher than the
     price listed as the Stain Mart [sic] sale price on the price
     tag, and who have not received a refund or credit for each
     of their purchase(s).

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=p6NNAIO3


SUN PRINCESS: Class Action Mulled Following Gastro Outbreaks
------------------------------------------------------------
Lauren McMah, writing for news.com.au, reports that a passenger
who was struck down with gastro during what was meant to be a
dream cruise holiday has spoken of her misery -- and the final
insult that prompted her to join a class action against the
company.

Lorraine Thomas is among more than 16,000 passengers impacted by
back-to-back outbreaks of norovirus on eight Sun Princess
journeys between December 2016 and February 2017, who may be
eligible for compensation, according to Shine Lawyers.

Mrs Thomas, from Queensland, had saved up $2200 for a 14-day
voyage to New Zealand with a friend who was celebrating a
birthday.

The trip began well enough, aside from an overflowing toilet and
cabin keycard difficulties.  But about halfway into the voyage,
the two friends began to suffer the awful symptoms of the dreaded
norovirus.

IT WAS HORRENDOUS'

When the vomiting struck, Mrs Thomas was diagnosed over the phone
by the ship's doctor and told to remain quarantined in her cabin.

She was told someone would come and check on her -- but was made
to wait 11 miserable hours.

"To be quite honest, it was horrendous," Mrs Thomas told
news.com.au.

"It was a small cabin and -- I can't put this any more politely
-- there was only the ice bucket to be sick in.  The basin was
blocked, and we had problems with the loo anyway and it kept
overflowing.

"I kept ringing down to ask if someone could come up . . . They
kept saying they were busy and would get to us as soon as they
could."

Eventually, cleaners in Hazmat suits came to Mrs Thomas' cabin
for a "deep clean" -- which she said was anything but.

"They sprayed the back of the bathroom door and the other side of
the bathroom door and that was it," she said.

"They did not change my bed linen, they did not change the
towels. There was no proper deep clean.  I was still vomiting and
laying on the bed.

"Because of the length of time I was left feeling so ill, I did
think that was wrong."

Mrs Thomas was one of an estimated 140 people or more who got
norovirus on the New Zealand cruise in February 2017.

"It was just a nightmare," she said.  "There were parts of the
ship that smelled of sewerage so bad, it was awful."

While there was some attempts by staff to stop the spread of the
insidious virus, such as suspending self-service of food and
wiping down surfaces, she believed the virus was already on the
ship when they boarded at Brisbane.

The Sun Princess had previously been struck by a norovirus
outbreak on a cruise to Papua New Guinea.

"I feel quite strongly it was already on the ship when we got
there and that was my biggest issue," Mrs Thomas said.

"They should have given us that information, and we could have
made an informed decision as to whether we wanted to go."

THE FINAL STRAW

But things got worse was when Mrs Thomas was back on land. She
spent months repeatedly trying to contact the ship's operator
Princess Cruises to report her experience before she got a
response.

That came in the form of a $250 goodwill voucher, to be spent on
a future cruise.  Mrs Thomas said that added "insult to injury".

"I said, you have to be joking -- after half a holiday that we
couldn't enjoy, to sail with them again?" she said.

"I won't risk going back on another Princess cruise."

Mrs Thomas was then told the credit couldn't be used towards
another cruise she was planning with Princess Cruises' stablemate
P&O -- which, like Princess, is owned by Carnival.

And that's what finally prompted her to join the class action.

"I didn't want to in the beginning because I thought I needed to
give them the chance to come to the party and acknowledge that
there were mistakes, there were problems," Mrs Thomas said.

"And then when they gave the gesture of goodwill and didn't
honour it, I thought, well, no. You really, really don't care
about your customers.

"If they really, genuinely, wanted to, they could have honoured
the $250 against the P&O cruise and they chose not to.

"I know I'm only one voice, and only one person who won't affect
them in the least, but it's wrong they continue to do this.  It's
not something you'd want to go through."

'THERE WERE VERY SHORT TURNAROUNDS'

Shine Lawyers said more than 16,000 Australian passengers could
be eligible for compensation for either being sick with, or
impacted by, the eight norovirus outbreaks.

"Our investigation revolves around an alleged failure of a duty
of care by Carnival to properly and adequately sanitise the Sun
Princess on each cruise and also to give adequate guidelines and
safeguards to passengers in preventing them from coming down with
norovirus," Shine's transport law manager Thomas Janson said.

The Sun Princess, which was built in 1995, is operated by
Princess Cruises, which is owned by Carnival.

"Best practice dictates the ship should have been put into dry
dock for up to 48 or 72 hours and cleaned thoroughly.

"What we've been told is that there were very short turnarounds,
usually of around two hours, to clean the ship before the next
lot of passengers and new crew boarded . . . that's manifestly
inadequate to sanitise a ship that's the size of a skyscraper."

Mr Janson said compensation could be the equivalent of a full
refund, plus damages.

In a statement to news.com.au, a spokesman for Carnival Australia
said: "Princess Cruises leaves nothing to chance in maintaining a
healthy on-board environment with policies and procedures that
are in line with the highest international public health
standards.

"The incidence of gastrointestinal illness is much higher in the
general community than on a cruise ship.  Even in the
comparatively rare case of gastrointestinal illness on board, the
risk of actually becoming ill is one in 5500 as a result of the
focus on the well being of guests as a priority."

The investigation of class action against Carnival Australia
comes as the beleaguered company faces criticism over violent
brawls that broke out on another of its cruise ships, the
Carnival Legend, during a recent cruise of the South Pacific.
[GN]


T & B MANAGEMENT: Chavez Moves to Certify Server/Bartender Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled VANESSA CHAVEZ, AMY
BERLAK, BROOKE GRAHAM, and MELISSA VARNER on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated v. T & B MANAGEMENT, LLC and T
& B CONCEPTS OF HICKORY, LLC, each d/b/a HICKORY TAVERN, Case No.
1:16-cv-01019-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.), asks the Court to conditionally
certify an opt-in class of:

     all former and current tipped server and bartender employees
     at all Hickory Tavern restaurants from June 23, 2014 to the
     present.

The Plaintiffs also asks the Court to order Hickory Tavern to
provide their counsel with the names, last known addresses, e-
mail addresses, and cellular telephone numbers of all putative
class members, and to direct that notice of this action, in the
form and manner proposed by the Plaintiffs, be provided to all
Hickory Tavern employees similarly situated to the Plaintiffs.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=asAjrbjh

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James A. Roberts, III, Esq.
          LEWIS & ROBERTS, PLLC
          3700 Glenwood Avenue, Suite 410
          P. O. Box 17529
          Raleigh, NC 27619-7529
          Telephone: (919) 981-0191
          Facsimile: (919) 981-0199
          E-mail: jar@lewis-roberts.com

               - and -

          Paul R. Dickinson, Jr., Esq.
          LEWIS & ROBERTS, PLLC
          One Southpark Center
          6060 Piedmont Row Drive South, Suite 140
          Charlotte, NC 28287
          Telephone: (704) 347-8990
          Facsimile: (704) 347-8929
          E-mail: prd@lewis-roberts.com

Defendants T & B Management, LLC and T & B Concepts of Hickory,
LLC, each d/b/a Hickory Tavern, are represented by:

          Debbie Whittle Durban, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Bank of America Corporate Center, 42nd Floor
          100 North Tryon Street
          Charlotte, NC 28207
          Telephone: (803) 799-2000
          E-mail: debbie.durban@nelsonmullins.com

               - and -

          William H. Foster, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          Post Office Box 10084 (29603-0084)
          104 South Main Street, Ninth Floor
          Greenville, SC 29601
          Telephone: (864) 373-2222
          E-mail: bill.foster@nelsonmullins.com


TOYOTA MOTORS: Quinn Emanuel Sues Over Takata Airbags
-----------------------------------------------------
Ross Greenwood, writing for 4BC1116, reports that Quinn Emanuel
is taking action against car manufacturers who have sold cars
with the defective Takata airbags.

Ross Greenwood speaks with Damian Scattini from the law firm.

"We're suing the car manufacturers because they've put out a
product with these Takata airbags in them.  They didn't have to
do that

"They chose the cheapest airbags.  Many of them knew full well
these things were problematic a long time ago and they decide to
keep going on nonetheless.

"We say they should be called to account for it.

"Everyone one of us, you and me, will know someone who's got one
of these cars with one of these airbags. [GN]


TREECYCLE LAND: Equipment Operators Class Certified in "Freese"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Beth Bloom granted the Motion for Certification of
Collective Action and for Permission to Send Court Supervised
Notice in the lawsuit titled JOSHUA N. FREESE v. TREECYCLE LAND
CLEARING INC. and SEAN M. CASEY, Case No. 9:17-cv-81169-BB (S.D.
Fla.).

The Fair Labor Standard Act class is defined as:

    "All persons who are currently, or who were, employed by
     Treecycle Land Clearing Inc. and Sean M. Casey from
     October 18, 2014 to the present as an equipment operator or
     other similarly titled positions, either directly by
     Defendants or through any of their subsidiaries or
     affiliated companies."

Plaintiff Joshua A. Freese is appointed as the representative of
the Putative Class with authority to appear at any
mediation/settlement conference on behalf of and to bind the
Putative Class.

Judge Bloom also ruled that the matter will proceed with
expedited discovery.  The Plaintiff shall modify the previously
filed Notice as ordered by the Court to include the response
deadline of April 15, 2018, in bold typeface.  The Defendants
shall post the Notice in their break room for the entire Notice
Period, from February 15, 2018, to April 15, 2018, and shall
provide a copy of the Court-Approved Notice to all Putative Class
members in the first paycheck/pay stub provided to current
employees after February 15, 2018.

The Plaintiff shall promptly send the Notice by e-mail and by
U.S. Mail to all members of the Putative Class.  The Plaintiff
may reasonably follow up with each Putative Class member via text
or telephone.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=00BRhQ7T


TWITTER INC: KBC Asset Moves to Certify Class of Stockholders
-------------------------------------------------------------
KBC Asset Management NV, Lead Plaintiff in the consolidated
lawsuit styled IN RE TWITTER INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No.
3:16-cv-05314-JST (N.D. Cal.), asks the Court for an Order
certifying the matter as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class consists of: all persons and entities that, during the
period from February 6, 2015, through July 28, 2015, inclusive,
purchased or otherwise acquired shares of the publicly traded
common stock of Twitter, Inc., and were damaged thereby.

Excluded from the Class are Twitter; Anthony Noto and Richard
Costolo; members of the Individual Defendants' immediate
families; Twitter's subsidiaries and affiliates; any person who
is or was an officer or director of Twitter during the Class
Period; any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling
interest; and the legal representatives, heirs, successors and
assigns of any such excluded person or entity.

The Lead Plaintiff also seeks appointment of itself and the
National Elevator Industry Pension Fund as Co-Class
Representatives and the appointment of Motley Rice and Robbins
Geller as Co-Class Counsel.

The Court will commence a hearing on June 14, 2018, at 2:00 p.m.,
to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ZRJwlCb8

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
          BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
          555 12th Street, Suite 1600
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (415) 445-4003
          Facsimile: (415) 445-4020
          E-mail: lweaver@bfalaw.com

               - and -

          Gregg S. Levin, Esq.
          Meghan S. B. Oliver, Esq.
          Max N. Gruetzmacher, Esq.
          Christopher F. Moriarty, Esq.
          MOTLEY RICE LLC
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 216-9000
          Facsimile: (843) 216-9450
          E-mail: glevin@motleyrice.com
                  moliver@motleyrice.com
                  mgruetzmacher@motleyrice.com
                  cmoriarty@motleyrice.com

               - and -

          Scott H. Saham, Esq.
          Daniel S. Drosman, Esq.
          Nathan R. Lindell, Esq.
          Susannah R. Conn, Esq.
          Juan Carlos Sanchez, Esq.
          Christopher R. Kinnon, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: scotts@rgrdlaw.com
                  dand@rgrdlaw.com
                  nlindell@rgrdlaw.com
                  sconn@rgrdlaw.com
                  jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com
                  ckinnon@rgrdlaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Sued in Calif. Over Lack of Wheelchair Access
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, writing for San Francisco Examiner,
reports that Disability advocates filed a class-action lawsuit
against Uber on Feb. 27 over the company's lack of wheelchair-
accessible vehicles, alleging it amounts to "illegal
discrimination."

The case was filed in Alameda County Superior Court on behalf of
groups across the Bay Area, including the Independent Living
Resource Center in San Francisco.

"Uber is such an important transportation option in the Bay Area,
and many of our consumers who use wheelchairs are simply excluded
from it because Uber has done nothing to make its service
accessible to them," said Jessie Lorenz, executive director of
the resource center.

"We are deeply disappointed in Uber's continued resistance to
following the laws that keep transportation services open to
everyone," Ms. Lorenz added.

Uber issued a statement in response to the suit late on Feb. 27.

"We take this issue seriously, and are continuously exploring
ways to facilitate mobility and freedom via the Uber App for all
riders, including riders who use motorized wheelchairs," wrote an
Uber spokesperson.

The suit was filed by the nonprofit Disability Rights Advocates,
which has offices in New York and in California.  The suit
alleges Uber, whose market value is estimated at over $50
billion, has ignored its "legal responsibility" to the disability
community in its explosive growth, according to the complaint.

The crux of the complaint is the lack of vans equipped with
wheelchair ramps on Uber's ride-hail platform.  Such vans require
modifications that often cost tens of thousands of dollars in
order to board large, motorized wheelchairs, according to
accessibility advocates.

The group also told the San Francisco Examiner it opted not to
include Lyft in the suit.

Melissa Riess, an attorney with Disability Rights Advocates, said
"that doesn't mean the other ride-share services aren't
deficient.  This is also a problem with Lyft and we're thinking
about them."

Although Uber has a wheelchair-accessible service, called Uber
WAV, in the Bay Area, Disability Rights Advocates wrote in the
complaint that the service is "a sham."

The group conducted a test of the service and found that in
Alameda County, not a single wheelchair-accessible Uber was
available during a total of 120 tests, according to the
complaint.

In more than 60 tests the group conducted in San Francisco, a
wheelchair-accessible Uber was completely unavailable almost five
times out of six.  In the rare instance where a WAV was
available, the average wait time was about five times longer than
the wait for an UberX at the same location.

Sascha Bittner, 44, is an Ingleside Terrace resident who uses a
wheelchair and is a plaintiff in the suit.  Ms. Bittner said if
she wants to spontaneously meet up with friends, she often relies
on her stepfather to drive her in the family's accessibility-
equipped van.

"Not having Uber accessible to me is extremely frustrating and
makes me feel like I am a second class citizen," Bittner told the
Examiner, in a statement.  "It is just ridiculous we are still
experiencing this discrimination."

The Examiner previously covered the launch of Uber WAV, with an
exclusive interview with the service's one-time sole driver:
Jennifer Mendoza, a Marin resident whose husband, Peter Mendoza,
uses a motorized wheelchair.

Since she has her own wheelchair-accessible vehicle, Ms. Mendoza
approached Uber to help pioneer their Uber WAV service in
Jan. 2016.

Ms. Mendoza told the Examiner on Feb. 27 that another driver
eventually joined in her cause, but by the end of 2017 both had
stopped driving Uber WAV frequently due to their own scheduling
needs, and to a lack of support from Uber to expand the service.

"I've been told they would launch accessible rental cars and
people could drive them, that they would launch them (last) June.
There's always a reason why they couldn't -- registration
hurdles, insurance hurdles," Ms. Mendoza said.

She said she is not "surprised" Uber has been sued for its lack
of accessibility, and is only surprised it "took this long."

Ms. Mendoza added, "The reason I believed in accessible Uber and
Lyft is the drivers have flexibility. I wouldn't need to be a
full time driver. But when it became the two of us, it became a
burden. We were two women in San Francisco providing accessible
service for this multi-billion dollar company with no support."

Though services like paratransit vans and wheelchair-accessible
Muni buses are available to wheelchair users, paratransit taxi
cabs have faded from the public as the ride hail industry has led
to the decline of taxi cabs.

Wheelchair-accessible taxis provided a direct ride for wheelchair
users available immediately by phone.  Paratransit vans, by
contrast, are a separate service offered through the San
Francisco Municipal Transit Agency, and are scheduled far in
advance.

Wheelchair-accessible paratransit taxi trips in San Francisco
have dropped from as many as 1,300 a month in 2012 to as low as
700 trips in 2015, according to data previously provided by the
SFMTA.

That's not because demand has dropped, the SFMTA said at the
time, but because the taxis themselves are less available -- with
no alternative to replace them. [GN]


UBIQUITI NETWORKS: April 23 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Holzer & Holzer, LLC on Feb. 26 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased
Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. ("Ubiquiti" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
UBNT) securities between May 9, 2013 and February 20, 2018. The
complaint alleges that Ubiquiti made false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's number of users in its
community and its publically reported accounts receivable.

If you purchased Ubiquiti shares between May 9, 2013 and
February 20, 2018 and suffered losses on that investment, you are
encouraged to contact Corey D. Holzer, Esq. at
cholzer@holzerlaw.com or Alexandria P. Rankin, Esq. at
arankin@holzerlaw.com, call the firm by toll-free telephone at
(888) 508-6832, or visit the firm's website at www.holzerlaw.com
to receive additional information about your legal rights.

The case is pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and the deadline to move for
appointment as lead plaintiff is April 23, 2018.

Holzer & Holzer, LLC -- http://www.holzerlaw.com-- is an
Atlanta, Georgia law firm that dedicates its practice to vigorous
representation of shareholders and investors in litigation
nationwide, including shareholder class action and derivative
litigation.


UNION PACIFIC: Court Grants Withdrawal of Bid to Remand "Logan"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington issued an Order Withdrawing Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand in the case captioned MICHAEL L. LOGAN, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, No.
2:17-CV-0394-TOR (E.D. Wash.).

Plaintiff Michael L. Logan filed a Motion to Remand.  The matter
was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court
has reviewed the record and files, and is fully informed.

Plaintiff first moved the Court to remand the action back to
state court, complaining Defendant has failed to demonstrate that
either Plaintiff's individual claim against Defendant Union
Pacific Railroad is equal to or exceeds $75,000 or that the class
action as a whole has a potential claim for $5 million under the
Class Action Fairness Act.  Defendant opposed the motion by
demonstrating the class action could exceed $5 million.
Plaintiff now agrees the amount in controversy is met and
withdraws the Motion to Remand.

For good cause shown and pursuant to Plaintiff's request, the
Motion to Remand is withdrawn.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybvtsr4l from Leagle.com.

Michael L Logan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by India Lin Bodien --
india@indialinbodienlaw.com -- India Lin Bodien Attorney at Law,
Brian Denlinger, Ackermann & Tilajef PC, pro hac vice & Craig J.
Ackermann, Ackermann & Tilajef PC, 1180 South Beverly Drive,
Suite 610, Los Angeles, California 90035, pro hac vice.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Clarence M. Belnavis --
cbelnavis@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips LLP, Aaron S.
Markel -- amarkel@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice, Amanda
C. Sommerfeld -- asommerfeld@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac
vice & Donald J. Munro -- dmunro@jonesday.com. -- Jones Day, pro
hac vice.


UNITED COLLECTION: Class Certification Sought in "Gajewski" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Gajewski moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit titled JENNIFER GAJEWSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU INC and DEPARTMENT STORES NATIONAL BANK,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00224-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that
the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to
grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local
Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs
and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=CYw3o7mX

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



UNITED STATES: Judge Blocks Deportation of Young Immigrants
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Solis, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
a federal judge in Los Angeles granted a nationwide block on
young immigrants being deported or losing their "Dreamer"
protections for little to no reason in response to the Trump
administration's announcement last year to wind down the DACA
program.

The class action filed on behalf of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program recipients by the American Civil
Liberties Union stopped the federal government's practice of
terminating a DACA recipient's status without notice based on
allegations or a minor criminal history.

Approximately 800,000 young immigrants or "Dreamers" are
protected from deportation and are able to work and go to school
in the United States thanks to the DACA program. The program
protects undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United
States as children.

The ACLU named the Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection officials in their
federal class action filed last year.

Lead plaintiff Jesus Alonso Arreola Robles, 23, says he was a
cook at the famous Chateau Marmont in West Hollywood and working
as a driver for Uber and Lyft when federal immigration agents
arrested him in February 2017 while he was driving.

Mr. Arreola's complaint says authorities accused him of smuggling
a customer's family members into the United States. He has been
granted DACA status three times, in 2012, 2014 and again in 2016;
he says he'd been working two jobs to support his parents -- who
are permanent residents -- and had no criminal history.

The Inland Empire-Immigrant Youth Collective joined Mr. Arreola
in the initial lawsuit.

On Feb. 26, U.S. District Judge Philip S. Gutierrez said before
the hearing began that he was leaning toward granting the
classwide injunction and class certification, despite objections
from the federal government that it is too broad a class.

The court agreed that since the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services "automatically terminates DACA" according to its status
when it issues a court summons, there will be additions in the
future to the class.  Because there will be future class members
this satisfies a numerosity requirement, according to the court's
order.

The government said its actions involve an enforcement policy for
those it deems a risk.  But Mr. Arreola and the class say the
government believes "enforcement policy" extends to every DACA
recipient it issues a summons to, and that makes them eligible to
be terminated from the program.

Jeffrey Robins, attorney for the Department of Justice, called
the certification of a nationwide class an overreach.  But
Gutierrez asked Robins if the government's action against
Mr. Arreola was an enforcement policy and if he had been charged
with a felony.

"You're not wrong, there are no crimes that were charged," said
Mr. Robins.

Judge Gutierrez said he was bewildered that there was no answer
from law enforcement as to why someone like Mr. Arreola was a
priority.

"What was the conduct?" Judge Gutierrez asked.

Robins said the government believed there are facts to support
the allegations, but those were not discussed in court on
Feb. 26.  But government attorneys did say DACA is not a
guarantee against deportation, which the court agreed was
unclear.

Katrina Eiland, attorney with ACLU, said there are 22 people with
claims worthy of being part of the class because they've been
terminated from the DACA program. But there are likely more who
have had their DACA status removed without due process that no
one knows about, Ms. Eiland said.

"That's just the tip of iceberg. The government has records
showing all the individuals who have been terminated," said
Ms. Eiland.

"We saw this all around the country and what we also knew was it
was a violation of the government's own rules to terminate DACA
without notice, without process, without giving the DACA
recipient a chance to respond."

The Feb. 26 hearing in Judge Gutierrez's courtroom comes on the
heels of the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of President Donald
Trump's appeal of another federal judge's order blocking the end
of DACA. Trump had sought to hopscotch over the Ninth Circuit and
get the case in front of the high court directly. The justices
didn't bite.

"It is assumed that the court of appeals will proceed
expeditiously to decide this case," the high court said in the
Feb. 26 brief order.

But Gabriela Melendez with the ACLU told the San Jose Mercury
News Mr. Arreola's case matters because injunctions currently in
place and the Supreme Court's decision to let the case take its
course "does not mean much if the government can arbitrarily
strip any immigrant's DACA whenever it wants to, without even
providing any explanation."


UNITED STATES: Detained Immigrants Not Entitled to Bond Hearings
----------------------------------------------------------------
CBS News reports that the Supreme Court ruled on Feb. 27 that
immigrants the government has detained and is considering
deporting aren't entitled by law to periodic bond hearings.  The
case is a class-action lawsuit brought by immigrants who've spent
long periods in custody.

The group includes some people facing deportation because they've
committed a crime and others who arrived at the border seeking
asylum.

The San Francisco-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
had ruled for the immigrants, saying that under immigration law
they had a right to periodic bond hearings.  The appeals court
said the immigrants generally should get bond hearings after six
months in detention, and then every six months if they continue
to be held.

But the Supreme Court reversed that decision on Feb. 27 and sided
with the Trump administration, which had argued against the
ruling, a position also taken by the Obama administration.

On Feb. 26, President Trump criticized the 9th Circuit after the
Supreme Court rejected the administration's highly unusual bid to
bypass the appeals court and get the justices to intervene in the
fate of an Obama-era program that protects hundreds of thousands
of young immigrants from deportation.

"It's really sad when every single case filed against us is in
the 9th Circuit, we lose, we lose, we lose, and then we do fine
in the Supreme Court," the president said.  "But what does that
tell you about our court system. It's a very, very sad thing."

In the Feb. 27 ruling, Justice Samuel Alito wrote for five
justices that immigration law doesn't require periodic bond
hearings.  But the justices sent the case back to the appeals
court to consider whether the case should continue as a class
action and the immigrants' arguments that the provisions of
immigration law they are challenging are unconstitutional.

But Justice Stephen Breyer, writing a dissenting opinion joined
by two other liberal-leaning justices on the court, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said he would have
read the provisions of immigration law to require hearings for
people detained for a prolonged period of time.

"The bail questions before us are technical but at heart they are
simple," Justice Breyer wrote.  "We need only recall the words of
the Declaration of Independence, in particular its insistence
that all men and women have 'certain unalienable Rights,' and
that among them is the right to 'Liberty,'" he wrote.

The American Civil Liberties Union, which brought the case on
behalf of the immigrants, had previously said that about 34,000
immigrants are being detained on any given day in the United
States, and 90 percent of immigrants' cases are resolved within
six months. But some cases take much longer.

In the case before the justices, Mexican immigrant Alejandro
Rodriguez was detained for more than three years without a bond
hearing.  He was fighting deportation after being convicted of
misdemeanor drug possession and joyriding, and was ultimately
released and allowed to stay in the United States.

The justices first heard arguments in the case in November 2016,
when they were down a member following the death of Justice
Antonin Scalia.  An eight-justice court was apparently split over
the case, however, and the justices re-heard arguments after
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the court.  But after those arguments
Justice Elena Kagan withdrew from the case, saying her staff had
inadvertently overlooked a conflict.  That again left eight
justices ruling on the case.

The case is Jennings v. Rodriguez, 15-1204. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Black Farmers Urged to Join Class Action v. USDA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Herrington, writing for wmcactionnews5.com, reports that
a Memphis-based organization representing black farmers is asking
Pine Belt farmers with legitimate claims to join its class-action
lawsuit against the USDA.

The Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association hosted a
meeting on Feb. 27 at the Lake Terrace Convention Center.

The group filed suit in 2015, alleging that black farmers were
discriminated against in the second-phase of a previous court
settlement.

In October of 2017, an appeals court ruled in the group's favor,
meaning that some 15,000 farmers and their heirs could collect
payouts of more than $1 billion.

"We're here to say to our membership the lawsuit is yet on, you
have an opportunity to receive information and to be adjudicated
by the panel as to whether or not your claim is meritorious,"
said David A. Hall, ecumenical adviser for the Black Farmers and
Agriculturalists Association, Inc.

"The government has decided through court and through Congress
that there was discrimination, now time has come for those people
to receive those claims if possible.  Some will, some won't. We
know that this lawsuit will not long be in effect, so it's urgent
right now for people to come on board," Mr. Hall said.

In 1999, a settlement of a class-action lawsuit against the USDA
was approved by a federal appellate judge.  The suit claimed
African-American farmers, between 1983 and 1997, were denied crop
loans and other assistance based on race.

Congress added a provision to the 2008 Farm Bill allowing farmers
who missed a September 2000 deadline for filing claims in the
initial suit to petition the court.

In 2010, $1.2 billion was appropriated by Congress for the second
phase of settlements. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Class of DACA Recipients Certified in Inland Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez grants the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification and the Plaintiffs' motion for a
classwide preliminary injunction in the lawsuit entitled Inland
Empire - Immigrant Youth Collective, et al. v. Kirstjen Nielsen,
et al., Case No. 5:17-cv-02048-PSG-SHK (C.D. Cal.).

Kirstjen Nielsen is the United States Secretary of Homeland
Security.  The Motions were both filed by Plaintiffs Jose Eduardo
Gil Robles, Ronan Carlos De Souza Moreira, and Jesus Alonso
Arreola Robles.

The Court certifies this class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
     ("DACA") who, after January 19, 2017, have had or will have
     their DACA grant and employment authorization revoked
     without notice or an opportunity to respond, even though
     they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal
     offense.

The Court also appoints the moving Plaintiffs as Class
Representatives and Plaintiffs' counsel from the ACLU Immigrants'
Rights Project and the ACLU of Southern California as Class
Counsel.

Judge Gutierrez also rules that the Defendants are preliminarily
enjoined from terminating grants of DACA and related employment
authorization documents ("EADs") of class members absent a fair
procedure that complies with the Department of Homeland Security
DACA Standard Operating Procedures, as well as the Memorandum
from Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
(June 15, 2012), and which includes, at a minimum, notice, a
reasoned explanation, and an opportunity to be heard prior to
termination.

The Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from terminating grants
of DACA and related EADs based solely on the issuance of a Notice
to Appear ("NTA") that charges the DACA recipient as removable
due to his or her presence in the United States without admission
or having overstayed a visa.  The Defendants' decisions after
January 19, 2017, to terminate the DACA grants and EADs of class
members, without notice, a reasoned explanation, or an
opportunity to respond prior to termination, are preliminarily
enjoined.  The Defendants immediately will restore those
individuals' DACA and EADs, subject to their original date of
expiration.

The Defendants shall accept and adjudicate any applications to
renew DACA by individuals whose DACA grant and EAD would have
expired on or before March 5, 2018, but were unable to apply for
or obtain a renewal as a result of Defendants' unlawful
revocation decision, consistent with the terms of this Order,
Judge Gutierrez rules.

Judge Gutierrez directs the parties to meet and confer to develop
a notice that explains the requirements of the Order and provides
class members with contact information for Class Counsel within
seven days of this order.  Within 14 days of this Order, the
Defendants will send the notice to all individuals whose DACA
grant and EAD was revoked after January 19, 2017, without advance
issuance of a Notice of Intent to Terminate ("NOIT") and provide
copies of those notices to Class Counsel.

According to the Court's civil minutes, within 14 days of the
Order the Defendants shall identify all DACA recipients whose
DACA grant and EAD was revoked after January 19, 2017, without
issuance of a NOIT and determine if they have been convicted of a
disqualifying criminal offense.  If the individual has not been
convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense, Defendants
immediately will restore the individual's DACA grant and issue
the individual a new EAD.

If the individual's restored DACA grant and EAD have expired as
of the date of this Order or will expire on or before March 5,
2018, Defendants will permit the individual 60 days from the date
of this Order to submit a DACA renewal application to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services.  If the individual's
restored DACA grant and EAD expired on or before the date of this
Order, Defendants temporarily will restore that individual's DACA
grant and EAD for the 60-day period to submit a renewal
application.

The Defendants shall provide Class Counsel with a list of all
DACA recipients whose DACA grant and EAD was revoked after
January 19, 2017 without issuance of a NOIT.  That list shall
information for each person, including Name, Alien Number,
Mailing Address, and Phone Number.

For each such person, the Defendants also will provide Class
Counsel with copies of the Notices of Action previously
terminating the person's DACA grant and EAD, as well as the
Notices of Action and EADs for individuals whose DACA grants and
EADs are restored pursuant to this Order, including those DACA
grants and EADs that are temporarily restored.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=1Bl7f3NI


WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION: Cal. App. Sustains Demurrer in "Mora"
----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Five, issued an Opinion affirming the trial court's judgment
sustaining Defendant's Demurrer to Evidence in the case captioned
STEVEN MORA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WEBCOR CONSTRUCTION,
L.P., Defendant and Respondent, No. A148264 (Cal. App.).

The trial court sustained respondent's demurrer without leave to
amend and the Cal. App. affirms, concluding the payments are not
within the scope of Section 226(a).

In July 2015, appellant filed the putative class action in
Alameda County Superior Court and, in February 2016, appellant
filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC).  Plaintiff and appellant
contends defendant and respondent Webcor Construction, L.P.,
violated Section 226(a) by failing to list the hours and hourly
rate associated with a payment described as Union Vacation on his
wage statements. It is undisputed the amounts were payments to a
union vacation trust fund authorized by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act.

Respondent filed a demurrer, arguing the payments at issue were
outside the scope of Section 226(a) and, in any event,
appellant's claims were pre-empted by the LMRA.

The trial court sustained respondent's demurrer without leave to
amend. The court concluded the payments to the Union Vacation
Trust Fund were not wages within the meaning of Section 226(a),
in part because appellant never had possession or control of
these payments, or the right to control them. The court also
concluded appellant's claims were pre-empted by the LMRA because
the CBA would need to be interpreted in order to determine
whether and when appellant becomes entitled to the hourly
payments listed, whether any conditions attach, and when and how
such conditions are satisfied.

The LMRA/Taft-Hartley Act

The LMRA prohibits employers from making any payments to
representatives of its employees, but permits employers and
unions to create employer-financed trusts to fund employee
benefits for union employees.

Section 226(a)

Section 226(a) requires employers to semi-monthly or at the time
of each payment of wages, furnish each of his or her employees an
accurate itemized wage] statement. The wage statement must
include: (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked except by
salaried and exempt employees, (3) piece-rate units earned, (4)
all deductions, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of
the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the
employee and the last four digits of [the employee's] social
security number or an employee identification number, (8) the
name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, and
(9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period
and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate
by the employee.

Section 226(a) Does Not Encompass Payments to the Union Vacation
Trust Fund

Appellant contends Section 226(a) required respondent to specify
on his wage statements the hours and rate of pay for the payments
to the Union Vacation Trust Fund. He argues the payments were
part of his wages earned because his wage statements list dollar
amounts for Union Vacation as a category of earnings, the amounts
are included in total earnings, and he was taxed on the payments.

Certain California Supreme Court cases have broadly construed the
term wages. In Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co. (1982) 31 Cal.3d
774, at pages 779-780, the California Supreme Court explained
that vacation pay is not a gratuity or a gift, but is, in effect,
additional wages for services performed and a form of deferred
compensation. Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc. (2007)
42 Cal.4th 217, 228, wages or earnings' are the amount the
employer has offered or promised to pay, or has paid pursuant to
such an offer or promise, as compensation for that employee's
labor  Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1094, 1103, noting wages are defined to include those benefits to
which an employee is entitled including money, room, board,
clothing, vacation pay, and sick pay.

The Union Vacation payments at issue in the present case are
fundamentally different. The payments were not vacation pay
within the meaning of Suastez. Although each payment passed
through his check, appellant does not allege he exercised any
control over the funds, which were immediately deducted and
(presumably) transferred to an employer-financed trust, the Union
Vacation Trust Fund. Neither does he allege he could opt to alter
or decline to make the contribution. Furthermore, although
appellant had some expectation of benefits from the trust fund,
he does not allege an entitlement to receive the entirety of the
Union Vacation payments back from the trust fund.

Finally, although respondent's obligation to make the payments
arose from appellant's labor, appellant does not allege or
present authority respondent owed the payments to him, rather
than to the trust fund. The CBA authorizes the trust fund to
bring an action to collect any delinquent employer contributions.
In contrast, Suastez, Prachasaisoradej, and Murphy each
considered payments made to employees, subject to their control,
and actually owed to them under the applicable agreements or
statutes. The payments, therefore, were part of the compensation
directly owed to the employees for their labor. Thus, these cases
provide no support for concluding the disclosure of payments made
to a Taft-Hartley trust fund is governed by Section 226(a).

The judgment is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court Appeals' February 5, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yceem898 from Leagle.com.

Diversity Law Group, Larry W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com --
Nicholas Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com --  Polaris Law
Group, William L. Marderfor Plaintiff and Appellant, 550 South
Hope Street, Suite 2655 Los Angeles, California 90071

Simpson, Garrity, Innes & Jacuzzi, Ronald F. Garrity and Sarah
Lucas for Defendant and Respondent, 601 Gateway Boulevard, Suite
950, South San Francisco, CA 94080


WEINSTEIN CO: Bankruptcy Filing to Complicate Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Alexandra Olson, writing for Associated Press, reports that
a bankruptcy filing by The Weinstein Co. would be the latest
episode in the unraveling of a Hollywood powerhouse and have
repercussions for any lawsuits filed against the company over of
allegations of sexual misconduct by its co-founder, Harvey
Weinstein.

Here are some questions and answers about the possible bankruptcy
filing and what it means for Weinstein's accusers:

WHY IS THE WEINSTEIN CO. CONSIDERING A BANKRUPTCY FILING?

The Weinstein Co. had been trying to stave off bankruptcy since
the sexual misconduct scandal exploded in October, prompting the
company to fire Harvey Weinstein as CEO.

The movie studio had been on the brink of $500 million deal to
sell its assets to an investor group outside of bankruptcy when
New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a lawsuit
two weeks ago that halted the proceedings.

The buyers' group, led by former U.S. Small Business
Administrator Maria Contreras-Sweet, had been in talks with
Schneiderman's office in the hopes of reviving the sale, but the
board of the Weinstein Co. pulled the plug.

In a letter to the buyers, the company said the group had failed
to come through with interim funding necessary to keep the
company running pending finalization of the sale.  The letter
also said that the buyers, following a Feb. 21 meeting with the
attorney general's office, imposed other conditions that would
delay a closing of the sale for many months, something the
company could not afford. The company said an orderly bankruptcy
process has become the only viable option.

In a statement on Feb. 26, Ms. Contreras-Sweet said she was
surprised by the Weinstein Co.'s decision and that it has been
her "understanding that we were close to signing the transaction
documents in a couple of days."

WHO IS SUING THE WEINSTEIN CO.?

Civil lawsuits have been piling up accusing the company of aiding
and abetting Weinstein's misconduct.  Among those is a proposed
class-action suit filed in New York alleging that Weinstein's
former film companies operated like an organized crime group in
relation to the former CEO's sexual harassment and assaults. The
lawsuit was filed by six women but could potentially involve
hundreds more.  In another lawsuit, a former personal assistant
for Weinstein details several abuse allegations, including being
forced to take dictation from him while he was naked.

Mr. Schneiderman's lawsuit was filed on behalf of the Weinstein
Co.'s employees.  The attorney general accused Weinstein of
demanding sexual favors from some employees and forcing others to
facilitate his sexual conquests. The lawsuit said the company
knew of his behavior and failed to protect its employees from it.

The Weinstein Co. has said it was unaware of Weinstein's alleged
conduct and that he was solely responsible for his actions.
Harvey Weinstein has denied any allegations of assault.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE LAWSUITS NOW?

A chapter 11 bankruptcy filing would halt any civil lawsuits that
have been filed against the Weinstein Co.

It would also give the company's secured creditors priority over
the women suing the company, which has at least $225 million in
debt that would have been inherited by the Contreras-Sweet group.

Some Weinstein accusers had fiercely advocated for selling the
studio outside bankruptcy, seeing it as their only chance at
getting financial compensation from the company.  Lawyer Gloria
Allred, who represents some of the accusers and publicly backed
the Contreras-Sweet proposal, said she was concerned no money
would be left for plaintiffs in the event of a bankruptcy.

The Contreras-Sweet group would have set up a victims'
compensation fund beyond the $30 million the company's insurance
provides.  After a meeting with Mr. Schneiderman's office, the
group committed to dedicating up to $90 million for the fund,
which would have been overseen by an independent administrator.
Now, if the bankruptcy filing proceeds, the accusers will be left
with the insurance money and whatever is left after creditors are
paid.

The Chapter 11 filing, however, would not stop the lawsuit filed
by Mr. Schneiderman's office.  It also would not prevent the
civil lawsuits from going forward against other named individuals
and entities.

Both Weinstein brothers -- Harvey and Bob -- are named in the
class action suit and in the attorney general's lawsuit.

The lawsuit filed by Weinstein's former assistant, Sandeep Rehal,
also names the Weinstein brothers, along with the company's
former head of human resources.

"A bankruptcy filing, should it occur, has no actual impact on
the claims against the other individual defendants," said Genie
Harrison, an attorney for Mr. Rehal.  "It complicates the process
but I have confidence that the matter is going to unwind itself
appropriately."

Lawyers for the plaintiffs involved in the class action suit have
argued that a bankruptcy filing would bring transparency by
opening the company's finances to scrutiny.

John Woodman, a corporate law attorney at Sodoma Law who is not
involved in the cases against the Weinstein Co., said bankruptcy
proceedings would give the plaintiffs the right to question the
company about its assets.  It also could allow the plaintiffs to
weigh in on any future sale, though that could be complicated by
the fact their claims against the company are disputed.


WEST VIRGINIA: Parents Mull Class Action Over Teacher Strike
------------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Hodousek, writing for MetroNews, reports that some West
Virginia parents plan to file a class action lawsuit against the
state Legislature for not upholding their constitutional duty to
provide a "thorough and efficient" education to students,
according to state Senator John Unger (D-Berkeley, 16).

The potential suit during a statewide teacher strike.  Thousands
of school employees began picketing on Feb. 22 to demand better
pay and benefits.

"Parents are just getting very frustrated that the West Virginia
Legislature seems to not want do anything anymore," Sen. Unger
said on the Feb. 26's MetroNews "Talkline."

Educators have said a four percent raise over three years, signed
into law by Governor Jim Justice, is not enough to cover their
rising healthcare costs through the Public Employees Insurance
Agency.

The PEIA Finance Board voted to freeze proposed benefit changes
for the next 17 months until they reach a permanent fix.

Sen. Unger said "it's a start," but more needs to be done to find
a permanent solution.

Teachers entered a fourth day of a statewide work stoppage
Tuesday.  Schools in all 55 counties remained closed.

It's unknown how long the strike will last.  The governor has
stressed that PEIA cannot be fixed within the matter of days.
Lawmakers have said the current 2-1-1 pay raise is the best they
can provide due to the financial condition of the state.

Sen. Unger said a judge should weigh in on what needs to happen
if there's no movement at the statehouse.

"If the Legislature's not moving in making that we have thorough
and efficient free educations system, the judicial system has the
authority to step in and say you're not fulfilling your
contractual agreement with the people of West Virginia,"
Sen. Unger said.

West Virginia teachers are currently the 48th lowest paid in the
nation with an average salary of $45,000 annually.

The state has more than 700 teacher vacancies. Teachers have left
the West Virginia to make more money in neighboring states.  The
teachers that are still in the Mountain State say they need to be
given a reason to stay.

"All across the community -- people are angry," Sen. Unger said.
"I would like to see them go back to work, but we have to do our
job down here too."

Sen. Unger said attorneys are currently reviewing the potential
suit. He didn't say when it could be filed. [GN]


WEST VIRGINIA: Burch's Bid for Certification Denied as Moot
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Dwane L. Tinsley entered an order in the lawsuit titled
DENNIS BURCH, et al. v. BENITA MURPHY, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-
03311 (S.D.W. Va.), denying as moot the Plaintiff's:

   * Motion for Review of Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42
     U.S.C. Section 1983;

   * Motion for Appointment of Counsel; and

   * Motion for Certification of the Class.

Benita F. Murphy is the Chairman of the West Virginia Parole
Board.

According to the Order, pending before the Court is the
plaintiff's Motion for Review of "Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983," "Motion for Appointment of Counsel,"
and "Motion for Certification of the Class," in which the
Plaintiff requests that that Court conduct its initial screening
of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A and rule on the
pending motions.

On this date, Judge Tinsley says, he has submitted a Proposed
Findings and Recommendation recommending that the presiding
District Judge dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and that the pending motions be
denied.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=YtC81gSo


WINES 'TIL SOLD: AGs Oppose "Unfair" Class Action Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Joyce Hanson, writing for Law360, reports that a bipartisan group
of 19 state attorneys general joined on Feb. 26 to oppose in New
Jersey federal court what they call an "unfair" class action
settlement against online wine seller Wines 'Til Sold Out that
proposes to pay $1.7 million to class counsel while awarding only
"highly restrictive" coupons to consumers.

The 19 attorneys general in a friend of the court brief approved
by U.S. District Judge Renee M. Bumb cited the Class Action
Fairness Act in urging the court to reject the proposed
settlement.

The case is CANNON et al v. ASHBURN CORPORATION et al Case No.
1:16-cv-01452.  The case is assigned to Judge Renee Marie Bumb.
The case was filed March 15, 2016.


WISCONSIN: Class-of-One Certification Sought in "Gage" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shane Ryan Gage moves for class-of-one certification in his case
titled SHANE RYAN GAGE v. Katherine Zanon, et al., Case No. 1:18-
cv-00240-WCG (E.D. Wisc.).

The Plaintiff's "class-of-one complaint alleges that the
plaintiff was treated arbitrarily worse than others who were
identically situated," citing Lauth v McCollum, 424 F 3d 631,
633(7th Cir 2005).

Mr. Gage also asserts that action of the state through its
officers charged with administration of law, which is valid on
its face, may be of such character as to constitute denial of
equal protection of laws.  He adds that involvement of state
official may provide state action essential to show direct
violation of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment Rights, whether or
not the official's actions were officially authorized or lawful.

Mr. Gage states that he is aware that he may have to contend with
the appointment of counsel with this type of certification, but
he humbly asks that they only be appointed to assist him in the
measure of obtaining information that he needs with concerns to
the various witnesses and what they had seen, heard, etc., as
well as the ability to depose the various witnesses, and
Defendants, who are named in the complaint as to their actions
and statements.

The Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the Oshkosh Correctional
Institution, in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, appears pro se.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=gGcN87Y6


WISE ELECTRICAL: Time to File "Perez" Certification Bid Extended
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, New York County, issued a Decision and Order
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned LENNY PEREZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY WISE ELECTRICAL SERVICES, INC.,
WITH RESPECT TO A PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT PERFORMED AT JOHN JAY
COLLEGE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. WISE ELECTRICAL
SERVICES, INC., WHALEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., JOHN DOE BONDING
COMPANY Defendant, Docket No. 158511/2017, Motion Seq. No. 001
(N.Y. Sup.).

Plaintiff moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR 2004, for an
extension of time to file his motion for class certification
until the time that a preliminary conference has been held and
the Court has set dates to 1) complete pre-class certification
discovery; and 2) for plaintiff to move for class certification.

The Court, in its discretion, grants plaintiff's motion pursuant
to CPLR 2004 to extend the 60-day time period fixed by CPLR 902
to move for class certification based on the plaintiff's need to
conduct class certification discovery. In reaching its decision,
the court considers the fact that plaintiff had 60 days from the
expiration of defendants' time to answer within which to move.

Although Whalen served a timely answer, Wise did not answer and
its time to do so expired on October 25, 2017. Thus, plaintiff
had until December 25, 2017 to file the instant motion for an
extension of time. Although the instant motion was not filed
until January 3, 2018, just over one week late, plaintiff's very
brief delay in moving for an extension of time was minimal.

Further, since the motion has not been opposed, no party has
demonstrated that any prejudice would result from granting the
motion.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's February 5, 2018
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8e5qyna
from Leagle.com.


WORLD OUTGAMES: Faces Class Action Over Failed LGBTQ Sports Event
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jose Lambiet, writing for Miami Herald, reports that a class-
action lawsuit was just filed by a participant in last year's
disastrous World Outgames, an event that was supposed to feature
thousands of LGBTQ athletes from throughout the world competing
in Olympics-style South Florida competitions.

By the time many of the participants arrived, they quickly
learned organizers were unprepared and canceled most of the
Memorial Day week events, including the opening and closing
ceremonies.

In addition to a police investigation that led to no arrest and
an audit by the city of Miami Beach that showed organizers didn't
raise enough money, the lawsuit was filed in a federal court in
Miami.

The plaintiff is a Los Angeles TV producer who says he spent
$4,100 to attend the games, including airfare, hotel bills and a
$250-registration fee, and used up a week's vacation from work --
all for naught.

According to his complaint, 45-year-old Rodney Ferrell signed up
for the games after seeing ads on the web promising 15,000
athletes from more than 50 countries concerts, speakers and "top-
notch competition as well as comradery (sic) and friendship."

There was also supposed to be an opening ceremony featuring
national gay activist Omar Sharif Jr., a concert by Tito Puente
Jr. and other goodies.  The venues for the doomed events included
Marlins Park and The Fillmore Miami Beach.

Mr. Ferrell was registered to play in the tennis tournament but
discovered once he arrived in South Beach that it, too, was
canceled.

"My client was one of several thousand people who registered,
trained and spent money to compete in the games," said
Marc Wites, the Lighthouse Point attorney who represents Ferrell.

He said he filed the action as a class-action lawsuit but a judge
has yet to certify it as such.

"My client felt the lawsuit was the right thing to do because it
was exceedingly unfair for organizers to let people prepare
themselves while it was obvious the event was not going to
happen," Mr. Wites said.

The lawsuit shows organizers failed to reimburse participants for
registration fees and other expenses.

It also describes "registered athletes milling about the host
hotel, the event sites and registration desk dumbfounded that an
event promoted to be beginning May 26, 2017, was instead being
canceled May 26, 2017."

Defendants include companies World Outgames Miami 2017 and Gay
and Lesbian International Sport Association, and event CEO
Ivan Cano and COO Keith Hart.

They have yet to be served with the federal complaint.  Mr. Cano
didn't respond to a message requesting comment and Mr. Hart's
phone mailbox is full and isn't accepting messages.

Both sports groups named as defendants have taken down their
websites.

While the lawsuit seeks damages in excess of $5 million, it's
clear from the Miami Beach audit there's likely no money left for
jilted participants.

The audit showed the event was $1 million short of its $2.3
million-budget.

"We don't know that there's no money there," said attorney
Mr. Wites.  "There may be insurance money and other assets. We'll
explore this as part of the lawsuit." [GN]


WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE: Embree May File 2nd Amended Suit, Says Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Paul G. Byron enters an order in the lawsuit styled
TOMMY J. EMBREE v. WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE CORPORATION, WYNDHAM
VACATION RESORTS, INC., WYNDHAM VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC.,
FAIRSHARE VACATION OWNERS ASSOCIATION, RCI LLC, TERRI DOST, PETER
HERNANDEZ and ROB HEBELER, Case No. 6:16-cv-00928-PGB-GJK (M.D.
Fla.):

   1. granting the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss;

   2. dismissing without prejudice the Amended Complaint;

   3. denying as moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification because there is no operative complaint;

   4. ruling that the Plaintiff may file a Second Amended
      Complaint consistent with the directives in this Order;

   5. ruling that failure to timely file a Second Amended
      Complaint in accordance with this requirement will result
      in closure of this action without further notice; and

   6. ruling that should the Plaintiff file a Second Amended
      Complaint, at the close of pleadings, the parties are
      directed to meet and confer telephonically and submit an
      amended Case Management Report.

Judge Byron also rules that the case will be converted to a Track
III designation.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2K8atF2u


XPO LOGISTICS: "Quinlan" Stayed Until March 20 Due to Mediation
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., grants the parties' Second
Joint Motion to Stay Case Pending Completion of Mediation in the
lawsuit captioned BRICE QUINLAN & LAURA WILLIS On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. XPO LOGISTICS,
INC. & XPO LOGISTICS OF DELAWARE, INC., Case No. 4:17-cv-00186-
FJG (W.D. Mo.).

Judge Gaitan rules that the case is stayed from February 14,
2018, until March 20, 2018, or until either party files a motion
to lift the stay, whichever occurs first.  The parties are
ordered to mediate and engage in good-faith settlement
negotiations during the period of the stay.  The parties are
ordered to provide a joint status report to the Court regarding
the outcome of mediation on or before March 27, 2018.

Given that the pending motion for conditional certification of
collective action has been pending since last summer and is not
yet ready to rule because plaintiffs have not yet filed reply
suggestions to the motion (due to the previous stay), the Court
finds that the motion for conditional certification should be
temporarily denied, Judge Gaitan states.  If the parties are
unable to reach a settlement, the Court will re-open the motion
for conditional certification and consider it on its merits.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=T7Mrszwr


ZILLOW GROUP: Court Consolidates 2 Shareholders Derivative Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Parties'
Stipulation to Consolidation Actions captioned MATTHEW
SCIABACUCCHI, derivatively on behalf of ZILLOW GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. RICHARD N. BARTON, et al., Defendants, Case No.
C17-1568-JCC (W.D. Wash.), and MELVYN KLEIN, derivatively on
behalf of ZILLOW GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. RICHARD N. BARTON, et
al., Defendants, Case No. C18-0027-JCC (W.D. Wash.).

Melvyn Klein filed a nearly identical shareholder derivative
complaint against Defendants.  The parties in both Derivative
Actions now stipulate that: (1) the Derivative Actions should be
consolidated for all purposes; (2) Sciabachucchi and Klein should
be appointed lead plaintiffs in the consolidated Derivative
Action; (3) The Weiser Law Firm, P.C. and Gainey McKenna &
Egleston should be appointed co-lead counsel, with Badgley
Mullins Turner PLLC appointed liaison counsel; and (4) the
consolidated Derivative Action should be stayed pending the
Court's adjudication of a motion to dismiss in the Securities
Action.

The Derivative Actions should be consolidated because they
involve common questions of fact and law. The Court additionally
finds that it is appropriate for the fair and efficient
administration of this consolidated action.

Every pleading filed in the Consolidated Action, or in any
separate action included herein, shall bear the following
caption:
IN RE ZILLOW GROUP, INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE Master File No.
17-1568-JCC LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO, inter alia:
The files of the Consolidated Action will be maintained in one
file under Master File No. C17-1568-JCC.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 5, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yal9hdb6 from Leagle.com.

Matthew Sciabacucchi, derivatively on behalf of Zillow Group Inc,
Plaintiff, represented by Brett D. Stecker --
bds@weiserlawfirm.com -- WEISER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, James M.
Ficaro --  jmf@weiserlawfirm -- WEISER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice &
Duncan Calvert Turner -- duncanturner@badgleymullins.com --
BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC.

Melvyn Klein, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Thomas J. McKenna
-- tjmckenna@gme-law.com. -- GAINEY MCKENNA & EGLESTON, pro hac
vice & Duncan Calvert Turner, BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC.

Richard N. Barton, Defendant, represented by Alexander Mircheff -
- amircheff@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, pro hac
vice, Meryl L. Young -- myoung@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN &
CRUTCHER, pro hac vice, Sean C. Knowles --
SKnowles@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE & Ronald L. Berenstain -
- RBerenstain@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE.

Erik C Blachford, Lloyd D. Frink, Jay C. Hoag, Gregory B. Maffei,
Spencer M. Rascoff, Gordon S Stephenson, Gregory L Waldorf &
Kathleen Philips, Defendants, represented by Alexander Mircheff,
GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, pro hac vice, Meryl L. Young, GIBSON
DUNN & CRUTCHER, pro hac vice, Sean C. Knowles, PERKINS COIE &
Ronald L. Berenstain, PERKINS COIE.

Zillow Group, Inc, Nominal Defendant, represented by Alexander
Mircheff, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, pro hac vice, Meryl L.
Young, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, pro hac vice, Sean C. Knowles,
PERKINS COIE, Duncan Calvert Turner, BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC
& Ronald L. Berenstain, PERKINS COIE.

April Underwood, Consol Defendant, represented by Sean C.
Knowles, PERKINS COIE & Ronald L. Berenstain, PERKINS COIE.


* Germany May Have Framework for Class Actions by November
----------------------------------------------------------
IPE reports that Germany could have a framework for class action
lawsuits by November, based on the coalition agreement struck by
the country's two largest parties.

Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) reached a deal on another grand
coalition on 7 February after months of negotiation following
inconclusive national elections last September.

Their agreement, which is still to be ratified by SPD members,
contains plans to introduce a framework for class action lawsuits
to take effect by November this year.

This would mean setting up model case proceedings
(Musterfeststellungsverfahren) for all injured parties, such as
consumers of products and investors in a company.

According to Marc Schiefer, lawyer at TILP Litigation, however,
such a framework probably would not help investors much, as the
institutions presenting a claim would not have the financial
means or legal back office to work on high-volume cases.

Under the new system, a claim would be presented by a qualified
institution, which is a registered association acting on behalf
of injured parties.

Volkswagen and Porsche cases showed the German system was not
suited to deal with mass claims

Mr. Schiefer contrasted this with the class action system in the
US, where the representative for European investors pursuing
claims would be a law firm with enough financial means to pursue
litigation, and not just a supportive consumer organisation
without power or funds.

He said the law would likely be approved by November, he said,
"although the legislature has already worked for years on several
other models for class actions that never came into effect".

German model versus US model

In the US, a lead plaintiff represents the class from beginning
to end, but in Germany registrations would be necessary,
Mr.  Schiefer said.  He suggested that talking in terms of "mass
action" was more appropriate.

Under the proposed German framework, there would need to be a
minimum of 10 injured parties with substantiated claims to start
the proceedings.  There would also have to be 50 registered
individuals on a claims register to execute the proceedings.

Any decision would be binding on all parties who had registered
claims, if they had not withdrawn from the register before the
first day of the oral hearing.

Mr. Schiefer said the emissions scandal lawsuits currently being
pursued against Volkswagen and Porsche had shown that the current
procedural situation in Germany was not sufficient to deal with a
mass of consumer claims.

He said: "Consumers often refrain from claiming their rights due
to high litigation costs, especially in cases where individual
claims are for small amounts."

In Germany, each injured party must actively file their own
complaint to get compensation.  However, there is provision for a
group model -- the KapMuG -- to allow court rulings won by
individual investors to set damages for other investors in the
same position.

According to Mr. Schiefer, the drawback of KapMuG is that it is
only for investors who have suffered losses on the capital
market, not for consumers.  He added that it only addresses
abstract questions of law and fact, but does not completely and
comprehensively resolve a case. [GN]


* Securities Litigation an Investment Opportunity, FRT Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amanda White, writing for Investment Magazine, reports that
securities litigation is not just a way to recover money that
legally belongs to members, it's also an investment opportunity,
says Steven Longley, senior vice-president, corporate development
at Financial Recovery Technologies (FRT).

Speaking as part of a panel at the 2018 Investment Magazine
Investment Operations Conference, Mr. Longley said recovery
should not focus just on litigation.  He argued that securities
action could also be a marketable asset that could be sold.

"We have developed a fund where interested groups can consolidate
the exposure, and fraud, and sell it on secondary markets.  The
returns have been quite material," he said.  "It's about the
maximisation of every recoverable opportunity."

FRT is a technology-based services firm that helps institutional
investors identify eligibility, file claims and collect funds
made available in securities class actions.

While the majority of class actions are in the US, more
Australian investors are starting to investigate the
appropriateness for their funds. In a session chaired by Robert
Poulter, program director, ASO transformation at NAB Asset
Servicing, a panel debated whether it is good governance to
participate in class actions in Australia.

A poll of the participants found 58 per cent of organisations
have a defined protocol in their governance model for class
actions.

Also speaking on the panel was Tom May, general counsel and
company secretary at Australian Ethical Investments, which is one
of those investors actively participating in class actions.

Mr. May said owners of assets have a duty to collect those that
belong to the fund.

"Class actions are a lay down misere from our point of view," he
said.  "A legal action is a piece of property you need to
collect, and it is a simple and easy process. It's like money for
nothing. Not turning your mind to it is a failure."

Jeff Lubitz, executive director and head of securities class
action services at ISS, said it was a great opportunity to
recover a significant amount, and a business development
opportunity. He said the potential assets available for recovery
are incredibly significant.

ISS Securities class action services reported that it identified
162 approved securities class-action settlements in the US in
2017, which Mr. Lubitz said represented a relatively
disappointing figure in terms of dollars. However, it also
reported that while the volume of approved settlements worth
greater than $100 million each was low, the number of new cases
filed in 2017 was significantly higher than in the previous year.

Further, a case against Petrobras includes a US$2.95 billion
($3.76 billion) settlement; subject to final court approval, it
will be the fifth-largest ever, behind Enron, WorldCom, Cendant
and Tyco.

For investors, the cost for participation in securities action
varies from case to case but for the most part, ISS doesn't get a
cut of the settlement; rather, clients pay an annual flat fee.

There are other fee models. IMF Bentham, which is a litigation
funder listed on the ASX since 2001, charges a percentage fee on
resolved cases.

Clive Bowman, chief executive Australia and Asia at IMF Bentham,
said that of the cases it funds, on average, the claimant
receives 60 per cent from a resolution, and 40 per cent goes to
the funder and legal fees.

"It's not a question of whether to join an action but of how to
go about getting the best deal for your members, and what
considerations matter," Bowman said.

FRT's Longley said there were quite a few considerations and
options presented to investors in funding agreements that affect
how much the investor recovers.  In particular, the reputation
and experience of the funder is paramount.

But Australian Ethical's May said that in his experience there is
no downside to participating in class actions.

"We have thought through all of these things and looked at the
quality of the parties involved," he said.  "It's a few basis
points -- but it's worth chasing."

ISS's Lubitz said from a reputational point of view the recovery
of the assets is a good story at the end of the day.

"Because losses have already been incurred in years past,
anything you can get today can be added back in," he said.  "From
a reputational standpoint, that's a good story to share." [GN]


                           Asbestos Litigation



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rexnord Estimates $37MM Liability at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rexnord Corporation estimates US$37.0 million potential liability
for asbestos-related claims as of December 31, 2017, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal quarter ended December 31,
2017.

Rexnord Corp. states, "The Company's subsidiaries are involved in
various unresolved legal actions, administrative proceedings and
claims in the ordinary course of business involving, among other
things, product liability, commercial, employment, workers'
compensation, intellectual property claims and environmental
matters.  The Company establishes accruals in a manner that is
consistent with accounting principles generally accepted in the
United States for costs associated with such matters when
liability is probable and those costs are capable of being
reasonably estimated.  Although it is not possible to predict
with certainty the outcome of these unresolved legal actions or
the range of possible loss or recovery, based upon current
information, management believes the eventual outcome of these
unresolved legal actions, either individually or in the
aggregate, will not have a material adverse effect on the
financial position, results of operations or cash flows of the
Company.

"In connection with its sale of the Company, Invensys plc
("Invensys") provided the Company with indemnification against
certain contingent liabilities, including certain pre-closing
environmental liabilities.  The Company believes that, pursuant
to such indemnity obligations, Invensys is obligated to defend
and indemnify the Company with respect to the matters relating to
the Ellsworth Industrial Park Site and to various asbestos
claims.  The indemnity obligations relating to the matters are
subject, together with indemnity obligations relating to other
matters, to an overall dollar cap equal to the purchase price,
which is an amount in excess of US$900 million.  The following
paragraphs summarize the most significant actions and
proceedings:

  * In 2002, Rexnord Industries, LLC ("Rexnord Industries") was
named as a potentially responsible party ("PRP"), together with
at least ten other companies, at the Ellsworth Industrial Park
Site, Downers Grove, DuPage County, Illinois (the "Site"), by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA"), and the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA").  Rexnord
Industries' Downers Grove property is situated within the
Ellsworth Industrial Complex.  The USEPA and IEPA allege there
have been one or more releases or threatened releases of
chlorinated solvents and other hazardous substances, pollutants
or contaminants, allegedly including but not limited to a release
or threatened release on or from the Company's property, at the
Site.  The relief sought by the USEPA and IEPA includes further
investigation and potential remediation of the Site and
reimbursement of USEPA's past costs.  Rexnord Industries'
allocated share of past and future costs related to the Site,
including for investigation and/or remediation, could be
significant.  All previously pending property damage and personal
injury lawsuits against the Company related to the Site have been
settled or dismissed.  Pursuant to its indemnity obligation,
Invensys continues to defend the Company in known matters related
to the Site and has paid 100% of the costs to date.

  * Multiple lawsuits (with approximately 300 claimants) are
pending in state or federal court in numerous jurisdictions
relating to alleged personal injuries due to the alleged presence
of asbestos in certain brakes and clutches previously
manufactured by the Company's Stearns division and/or its
predecessor owners.  Invensys and FMC, prior owners of the
Stearns business, have paid 100% of the costs to date related to
the Stearns lawsuits.  Similarly, the Company's Prager subsidiary
is a defendant in two multi-defendant lawsuits relating to
alleged personal injuries due to the alleged presence of asbestos
in a product allegedly manufactured by Prager.  Additionally,
there are numerous individuals who have filed asbestos related
claims against Prager.  These claims are currently on the Texas
Multi-District Litigation inactive docket.  The ultimate outcome
of these asbestos matters cannot presently be determined.  To
date, the Company's insurance providers have paid 100% of the
costs related to the Prager asbestos matters.  The Company
believes that the combination of its insurance coverage and the
Invensys indemnity obligations will cover any future costs of
these matters.

"In connection with the Company's acquisition of The Falk
Corporation ("Falk"), Hamilton Sundstrand provided the Company
with indemnification against certain products-related asbestos
exposure liabilities.  The Company believes that, pursuant to
such indemnity obligations, Hamilton Sundstrand is obligated to
defend and indemnify the Company with respect to the asbestos
claims, and that, with respect to these claims, such indemnity
obligations are not subject to any time or dollar limitations.

"The following paragraph summarizes the most significant actions
and proceedings for which Hamilton Sundstrand has accepted
responsibility:

  * Falk, through its successor entity, is a defendant in
multiple lawsuits pending in state or federal court in numerous
jurisdictions relating to alleged personal injuries due to the
alleged presence of asbestos in certain clutches and drives
previously manufactured by Falk.  There are approximately 100
claimants in these suits.  The ultimate outcome of these lawsuits
cannot presently be determined.  Hamilton Sundstrand is defending
the Company in these lawsuits pursuant to its indemnity
obligations and has paid 100% of the costs to date.

"Certain Water Management subsidiaries are also subject to
asbestos litigation.  As of December 31, 2017, Zurn and numerous
other unrelated companies were defendants in approximately 6,000
asbestos related lawsuits representing approximately 16,000
claims.  Plaintiffs' claims allege personal injuries caused by
exposure to asbestos used primarily in industrial boilers
formerly manufactured by a segment of Zurn.  Zurn did not
manufacture asbestos or asbestos components.  Instead, Zurn
purchased them from suppliers.  These claims are being handled
pursuant to a defense strategy funded by insurers.

"As of December 31, 2017, the Company estimates the potential
liability for the asbestos-related claims as well as the claims
expected to be filed in the next ten years to be approximately
US$37.0 million, of which Zurn expects its insurance carriers to
pay approximately US$28.0 million in the next ten years on such
claims, with the balance of the estimated liability being paid in
subsequent years.  The US$37.0 million was developed based on
actuarial studies and represents the projected indemnity payout
for current and future claims.  There are inherent uncertainties
involved in estimating the number of future asbestos claims,
future settlement costs, and the effectiveness of defense
strategies and settlement initiatives.  As a result, actual
liability could differ from the estimate and could be
substantial.  The liability for the asbestos-related claims is
recorded in Other liabilities within the condensed consolidated
balance sheets.

"Management estimates that its available insurance to cover this
potential asbestos liability as of December 31, 2017, is
approximately US$241.0 million, and believes that all current
claims are covered by insurance.  However, principally as a
result of the past insolvency of certain of the Company's
insurance carriers, certain coverage gaps will exist if and after
the Company's other carriers have paid the first US$165.0 million
of aggregate liabilities.

"As of December 31, 2017, the Company had a recorded receivable
from its insurance carriers of US$37.0 million, which corresponds
to the amount of this potential asbestos liability that is
covered by available insurance and is currently determined to be
probable of recovery.  However, there is no assurance that
US$241.0 million of insurance coverage will ultimately be
available or that this asbestos liability will not ultimately
exceed US$241.0 million.  Factors that could cause a decrease in
the amount of available coverage include: changes in law
governing the policies, potential disputes with the carriers
regarding the scope of coverage, and insolvencies of one or more
of the Company's carriers.  The receivable for probable asbestos-
related recoveries is recorded in Other assets within the
condensed consolidated balance sheets."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/YonuwL


ASBESTOS UPDATE: H.B. Fuller Still Defends PI Suits at Dec. 2
-------------------------------------------------------------
H.B. Fuller Company still defends itself against asbestos-related
claims and lawsuits, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 2, 2017.

The Company states, "We have been named as a defendant in
lawsuits in which plaintiffs have alleged injury due to products
containing asbestos manufactured more than 30 years ago.  The
plaintiffs generally bring these lawsuits against multiple
defendants and seek damages (both actual and punitive) in very
large amounts.  In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable injuries or
that the injuries suffered were the result of exposure to
products manufactured by us.  We are typically dismissed as a
defendant in such cases without payment.  If the plaintiff
presents evidence indicating that compensable injury occurred as
a result of exposure to our products, the case is generally
settled for an amount that reflects the seriousness of the
injury, the length, intensity and character of exposure to
products containing asbestos, the number and solvency of other
defendants in the case, and the jurisdiction in which the case
has been brought.

"A significant portion of the defense costs and settlements in
asbestos-related litigation is paid by third parties, including
indemnification pursuant to the provisions of a 1976 agreement
under which we acquired a business from a third party.
Currently, this third party is defending and paying settlement
amounts, under a reservation of rights, in most of the asbestos
cases tendered to the third party.

"In addition to the indemnification arrangements with third
parties, we have insurance policies that generally provide
coverage for asbestos liabilities (including defense costs).
Historically, insurers have paid a significant portion of our
defense costs and settlements in asbestos-related litigation.
However, certain of our insurers are insolvent.  We have entered
into cost-sharing agreements with our insurers that provide for
the allocation of defense costs and settlements and judgments in
asbestos-related lawsuits.  These agreements require, among other
things, that we fund a share of settlements and judgments
allocable to years in which the responsible insurer is insolvent.

"We do not believe that it would be meaningful to disclose the
aggregate number of asbestos-related lawsuits filed against us
because relatively few of these lawsuits are known to involve
exposure to asbestos-containing products that we manufactured.
Rather, we believe it is more meaningful to disclose the number
of lawsuits that are settled and result in a payment to the
plaintiff.  To the extent we can reasonably estimate the amount
of our probable liabilities for pending asbestos-related claims,
we establish a financial provision and a corresponding receivable
for insurance recoveries."

Based on currently available information, we have concluded that
the resolution of any pending matter, including asbestos-related
litigation, individually or in the aggregate, will not have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial
condition or cash flow.  However, adverse developments and/or
periodic settlements could negatively impact the results of
operations or cash flows in one or more future periods.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/RK1GTv


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 1 Lawsuit vs. Haynes Int'l Pending at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Haynes International, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended December 31, 2017, that it is defending itself,
together with a number of other manufacturer defendants, against
one action alleging that asbestos in its facilities harmed the
plaintiff.

Haynes International states, "The Company believes that it has
defenses to these allegations and that, if the Company were to be
found liable, the cases would not have a material effect on its
financial position, results of operations or liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/kzxj6n


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Has 2,600 Claims Pending at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, Maremont Corporation, had around
2,600 pending asbestos-related claims at December 31, 2017,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "Maremont Corporation ("Maremont"), a
subsidiary of Meritor, manufactured friction products containing
asbestos from 1953 through 1977, when it sold its friction
product business.  Arvin Industries, Inc., a predecessor of the
company, acquired Maremont in 1986.  Maremont and many other
companies are defendants in suits brought by individuals claiming
personal injuries as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing
products.

"Maremont had approximately 2,600 and 2,800 pending asbestos-
related claims at December 31, 2017 and September 30, 2017,
respectively.  Although Maremont has been named in these cases,
in the cases where actual injury has been alleged, very few
claimants have established that a Maremont product caused their
injuries.  Plaintiffs' lawyers often sue dozens or even hundreds
of defendants in individual lawsuits, seeking damages against all
named defendants irrespective of the disease or injury and
irrespective of any causal connection with a particular product.
For these reasons, the total number of claims filed is not
necessarily the most meaningful factor in determining Maremont's
asbestos-related liability.

"Maremont engaged Bates White LLC ("Bates White"), a consulting
firm with extensive experience estimating costs associated with
asbestos litigation, to assist with determining the estimated
cost of resolving pending and future asbestos-related claims that
have been, and could reasonably be expected to be, filed against
Maremont.  Although it is not possible to estimate the full range
of costs because of various uncertainties, Bates White advised
Maremont that it would be possible to determine an estimate of a
reasonable forecast of the cost of the probable settlement and
defense costs of resolving pending and future asbestos-related
claims, based on historical data and certain assumptions with
respect to events that may occur in the future.

"As of September 30, 2017, Bates White provided a reasonable and
probable estimate that consisted of a range of equally likely
possibilities of Maremont's obligation for asbestos personal
injury claims over the next ten years of US$68 million to US$82
million.  After consultation with Bates White, management
recognized a liability of US$68 million as of each of December
31, 2017 and September 30, 2017 for pending and future claims
over the next ten years.  The ultimate cost of resolving pending
and future claims is estimated based on the history of claims and
expenses for plaintiffs represented by law firms in jurisdictions
with an established history with Maremont.  Maremont has
recognized incremental insurance receivables associated with
recoveries expected for asbestos-related liabilities as the
estimate of asbestos-related liabilities for pending and future
claims changes.

"Maremont has historically had insurance that reimburses a
substantial portion of the costs incurred defending against
asbestos-related claims.  The insurance receivable related to
asbestos-related liabilities was US$21 million and US$25 million
as of December 31, 2017 and September 30, 2017, respectively.
The receivable is for coverage provided by one insurance carrier
based on a coverage-in-place agreement.  Maremont currently
expects to exhaust the remaining limits provided by this coverage
sometime in the next ten years.  The difference between the
estimated liability and insurance receivable is primarily related
to exhaustion of settled insurance coverage within the forecasted
period.

"Maremont maintained insurance coverage with other insurance
carriers that management believed also covers indemnity and
defense costs.  During fiscal year 2013, Maremont re-initiated
lawsuits against these carriers, seeking a declaration of its
rights to coverage for asbestos claims and to facilitate an
orderly and timely collection of insurance proceeds.  During the
first quarter of fiscal year 2016, the dispute related to these
insurance policies was settled.  As a part of this settlement, on
December 12, 2015, Maremont received US$17 million in cash, of
which US$5 million was recognized as a reduction in asbestos
expense and US$12 million was recorded as a liability to the
insurance carrier as it is required to be returned to the carrier
if additional asbestos liability is not incurred.  During the
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, Maremont recognized an
additional US$9 million of the cash settlement proceeds as a
reduction in asbestos expense.  During the first quarter of
fiscal year 2017, the company recognized the remaining US$3
million of the cash settlement proceeds as a reduction in
asbestos expense.  The settlement also provides additional
recovery for Maremont if certain future defense and indemnity
spending thresholds are met.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related reserves and
recoveries from insurance companies are based upon assumptions
and estimates derived from currently known facts.  All such
estimates of liabilities and recoveries for asbestos-related
claims are subject to considerable uncertainty because such
liabilities and recoveries are influenced by variables that are
difficult to predict.  The future litigation environment for
Maremont could change significantly from its past experience,
due, for example, to changes in the mix of claims filed against
Maremont in terms of plaintiffs' law firms, jurisdictions and
diseases; legislative or regulatory developments; Maremont's
approach to defending claims; or payments to plaintiffs from
other defendants.  Estimated recoveries are influenced by
coverage issues among insurers and the continuing solvency of
various insurance companies.  If the assumptions with respect to
the estimation period, the nature of pending and future claims,
the cost to resolve claims and the amount of available insurance
prove to be incorrect, the actual amount of liability for
Maremont's asbestos-related claims, and the effect on the
company, could differ materially from current estimates and,
therefore, could have a material impact on the company's
financial condition and results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ZbCJSr


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Has 1,600 Pending Claims at Dec.31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, ArvinMeritor, Inc., still defends
itself against approximately 1,600 pending active asbestos claims
in lawsuits at December 31, 2017, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "ArvinMeritor, Inc.  ("AM"), a subsidiary of
Meritor, along with many other companies, has also been named as
a defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos used in certain components of Rockwell
products many years ago.  Liability for these claims was
transferred at the time of the spin-off of the automotive
business from Rockwell in 1997.  Rockwell had approximately 1,600
pending active asbestos claims in lawsuits that name AM, together
with many other companies, as defendants at December 31, 2017 and
September 30, 2017.

"A significant portion of the claims do not identify any of
Rockwell's products or specify which of the claimants, if any,
were exposed to asbestos attributable to Rockwell's products, and
past experience has shown that the vast majority of the claimants
will likely never identify any of Rockwell's products.
Historically, AM has been dismissed from the vast majority of
similar claims filed in the past with no payment to claimants.
For those claimants who do show that they worked with Rockwell's
products, management nevertheless believes it has meritorious
defenses, in substantial part due to the integrity of the
products involved and the lack of any impairing medical condition
on the part of many claimants.

"The company engaged Bates White to assist with determining
whether it would be possible to estimate the cost of resolving
pending and future Rockwell legacy asbestos-related claims that
have been, and could reasonably be expected to be, filed against
the company.  As of September 30, 2017, Bates White provided a
reasonable and probable estimate that consisted of a range of
equally likely possibilities of Rockwell's obligation for
asbestos personal injury claims over the next ten years of US$63
million to US$74 million.  After consultation with Bates White,
management recognized a liability for the pending and future
claims over the next ten years of US$63 million as of each of
December 31, 2017 and September 30, 2017.  The ultimate cost of
resolving pending and future claims is estimated based on the
history of claims and expenses for plaintiffs represented by law
firms in jurisdictions with an established history with Rockwell.

"Rockwell has insurance coverage that management believes covers
indemnity and defense costs, over and above self-insurance
retentions, for a significant portion of these claims.  In 2004,
the company initiated litigation against certain of these
carriers to enforce the insurance policies.  During the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2016, the company executed settlement
agreements with two of these carriers, thereby resolving the
litigation against those particular carriers.  Pursuant to the
terms of one of those settlement agreements, in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2016 the company received US$32 million in
cash from an insurer, of which US$10 million was recognized as a
reduction in asbestos expense, and US$22 million was recorded as
a liability to the insurance carrier as it is required to be
returned to the carrier if additional asbestos liability is not
ultimately incurred.  During fiscal year 2017 and the first
quarter of fiscal year 2018, Rockwell recognized an additional
US$10 million and US$2 million, respectively, of the cash
settlement proceeds as a reduction in asbestos expense.  Pursuant
to the terms of a second settlement agreement, in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2016 the company recorded a US$12 million
receivable to reflect expected reimbursement of future defense
and indemnity payments under a coverage-in-place arrangement with
that insurer.  In addition to the coverage provided from the
settlement agreements executed during the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2016, the company maintains a receivable of US$7
million related to a previously executed coverage-in-place
arrangement with other insurers.  The insurance receivable for
Rockwell's asbestos-related liabilities totaled US$38 million as
of each of December 31, 2017 and September 30, 2017.  Included in
these amounts are insurance receivables of US$17 million as of
each of December 31, 2017 and September 30, 2017, which are
associated with policies in dispute and have been fully reserved.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related reserves and
recoveries from insurance companies are based upon assumptions
and estimates derived from currently known facts.  All such
estimates of liabilities and recoveries for asbestos-related
claims are subject to considerable uncertainty because such
liabilities and recoveries are influenced by variables that are
difficult to predict.  The future litigation environment for
Rockwell could change significantly from its past experience,
due, for example, to changes in the mix of claims filed against
Rockwell in terms of plaintiffs' law firms, jurisdictions and
diseases; legislative or regulatory developments; Rockwell's
approach to defending claims; or payments to plaintiffs from
other defendants.  Estimated recoveries are influenced by
coverage issues among insurers and the continuing solvency of
various insurance companies.  If the assumptions with respect to
the estimation period, the nature of pending claims, the cost to
resolve claims and the amount of available insurance prove to be
incorrect, the actual amount of liability for Rockwell asbestos-
related claims, and the effect on the company, could differ
materially from current estimates and, therefore, could have a
material impact on the company's financial condition and results
of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ZbCJSr


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Graham Corp. Still Defends Lawsuits at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Corporation continues to face lawsuits alleging personal
injury from exposure to asbestos allegedly contained in or
accompanying its products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "We have been named as a defendant in
lawsuits alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos
allegedly contained in or accompanying our products.  We are a
co-defendant with numerous other defendants in these lawsuits and
intend to vigorously defend ourselves against these claims.  The
claims in our current lawsuits are similar to those made in
previous asbestos lawsuits that named us as a defendant.  Such
previous lawsuits either were dismissed when it was shown that we
had not supplied products to the plaintiffs' places of work or
were settled by us for immaterial amounts.

"As of December 31, 2017, we are subject to the claims, as well
as other legal proceedings and potential claims that have arisen
in the ordinary course of business.  Although the outcome of the
lawsuits, legal proceedings or potential claims to which we are
or may become a party cannot be determined and an estimate of the
reasonably possible loss or range of loss cannot be made, we do
not believe that the outcomes, either individually or in the
aggregate, will have a material effect on our results of
operations, financial position or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/ghMsty


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Johnson Controls Has $559MM Liability at Dec.31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Controls International plc estimated its asbestos-related
net liability to be US$559 million as of December 31, 2017,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
December 31, 2017.

Johnson Controls states, "The Company and certain of its
subsidiaries, along with numerous other third parties, are named
as defendants in personal injury lawsuits based on alleged
exposure to asbestos containing materials.  These cases have
typically involved product liability claims based primarily on
allegations of manufacture, sale or distribution of industrial
products that either contained asbestos or were used with
asbestos containing components.

"As of December 31, 2017, the Company's estimated asbestos
related net liability recorded on a discounted basis within the
Company's consolidated statements of financial position was
US$166 million.  The net liability within the consolidated
statements of financial position was comprised of a liability for
pending and future claims and related defense costs of US$559
million, of which US$54 million was recorded in other current
liabilities and US$505 million was recorded in other noncurrent
liabilities.

"The Company also maintained separate cash, investments and
receivables related to insurance recoveries within the
consolidated statements of financial position of US$393 million,
of which US$55 million was recorded in other current assets, and
US$338 million was recorded in other noncurrent assets.  Assets
included US$10 million of cash and US$283 million of investments,
which have all been designated as restricted.

"In connection with the recognition of liabilities for asbestos-
related matters, the Company records asbestos-related insurance
recoveries that are probable; the amount of such recoveries
recorded at December 31, 2017 was US$100 million.  As of
September 30, 2017, the Company's estimated asbestos related net
liability recorded on a discounted basis within the Company's
consolidated statements of financial position was US$181 million.
The net liability within the consolidated statements of financial
position was comprised of a liability for pending and future
claims and related defense costs of US$573 million, of which
US$48 million was recorded in other current liabilities and
US$525 million was recorded in other noncurrent liabilities.

"The Company also maintained separate cash, investments and
receivables related to insurance recoveries within the
consolidated statements of financial position of US$392 million,
of which US$53 million was recorded in other current assets, and
US$339 million was recorded in other noncurrent assets.  Assets
included US$22 million of cash and US$269 million of investments,
which have all been designated as restricted.  In connection with
the recognition of liabilities for asbestos-related matters, the
Company records asbestos-related insurance recoveries that are
probable; the amount of such recoveries recorded at September 30,
2017 was US$101 million."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/yd4grt


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Dismisses "Montanez" Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, at the
behest of Defendant-respondent Beck/Arnley Worldparts, Inc., has
dismissed the appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, New York
County, entered on or about February 9, 2017, in the case styled
In Re New York County Asbestos Litigation: Ivette Montanez and
Peter Montanez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Beck/Arnley Worldparts,
Inc., et al., Defendants-Respondents, (N.Y. App. Div.).

A full-text copy of the Decision dated March 8, 2018, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y83nvsbf from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Summary Ruling Favoring Moore Dry Dock Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The First District of the Court of Appeals of California affirmed
the summary judgment in the appealed case Sandra Foglia, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Moore Dry Dock Company, Defendant
and Respondent, No. A142125, (Cal. Ct. App. 1d), ruling that the
evidence was not sufficient to support a reasonable inference
that Felix Foglia was exposed to asbestos at Moore Dry Dock.

Plaintiffs Sandra Foglia, individually and on behalf of the
estate of Ronald Foglia (decedent), Michael Foglia and Annette
Rackley appeal the summary judgment entered against them on their
wrongful death claim against Defendant Moore Dry Dock (MDD),
based on the allegation that decedent developed mesothelioma
after secondary exposure to asbestos brought home by his father,
Felix Foglia (Father) from Father's work at a shipyard operated
by MDD.

MDD moved for summary judgment claiming it owed no duty of care
to decedent for secondary exposure and that Plaintiffs did not
have and could not reasonably obtain evidence to show that
decedent was exposed to asbestos from the clothing and person of
Father as a result of Father's employment at MDD from 1942 to
1945. The motion argued that decedent, who would have been barely
five years old when his father allegedly ceased work at MDD, had
been deposed and could provide only a vague recollection that
Father worked for MDD.

MDD argued that it had served plaintiffs with "state all facts"
special interrogatories and standard asbestos interrogatories and
that plaintiffs responded with nothing but allegations as to what
they believed "could have" happened.

Plaintiffs offered no evidence as to what the asbestos-containing
products consisted of, or the manner in which exposure occurred.
MDD asserted these responses were factually devoid and supplied
prima facie evidence that plaintiffs did not possess and could
not reasonably obtain evidence to support their claims.

Plaintiffs' evidence included the following:

     (1) Additional excerpts from decedent's deposition stating
that Father was a lead electrician and worked on ship conversions
at MDD and was employed by MDD, though he might have gone to
Kaiser and other places during this time and that Father would
come home without changing his clothes and they would play
(physical rough-housing, Father would pick decedent up and throw
him over Father's shoulder).

     (2) A declaration from Amelia L. Garcia, decedent's aunt and
Father's sister, who stated her brother Felix Phil Foglia was
decedent's father that he worked as an electrician on ships at
MDD in the early 1940s and that decedent lived with Father and
they would visit her and decedent's grandfather at grandfather's
home.

     (3) Excerpts from previous trial testimony and depositions
of James R. Moore, who had been designated in other cases as
MDD's Person Most Knowledgeable, and who testified therein that
outside contractors had installed asbestos-containing insulation
aboard MDD's ships, that there may have been asbestos in some
electrical equipment or material that MDD employees installed.
It's possible that there was asbestos in joiner work. Moore also
testified that at just about any given time during the ship
building period, laborers would be dry sweeping up asbestos dust
with brooms and dust pans.

     (4) Excerpts from the deposition of Barry Castleman, and a
declaration by Barry R. Horn, proffered experts.

Following a hearing on the motion, the court rejected MDD's claim
it owed no duty to decedent as a matter of law. The court found a
duty of care could arise on the part of an employer to protect
family members of its employees from exposure to harmful
substances encountered by its employees in the course and scope
of their employment. The court next concluded MDD had made a
sufficient showing based on plaintiff's factually devoid
discovery responses to shift the burden of proof to plaintiffs
regarding Father's exposure.

The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling the evidence was
not sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Father was
exposed to asbestos at MDD.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding MDD made a
sufficient showing, based on plaintiffs' factually devoid
discovery responses, to shift the burden of proof to them on the
issue of the exposure of Father. Plaintiffs further assert that
even if the burden did shift, their evidence raised triable
issues as to Father's exposure to asbestos from his employment at
MDD. Finally, Plaintiffs contend the court erroneously excluded
lay and expert testimony that raised a triable issue as to
Father's exposure to asbestos from his employment at MDD.

The Court notes that a threshold issue in asbestos litigation is
exposure to the Defendant's product. If there has been no
exposure, there is no causation. Plaintiffs bear the burden of
"demonstrating that exposure to asbestos products was, in
reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in causing
or contributing to the risk of developing cancer." Factors
relevant to assessing whether such a medical probability exists
include frequency of exposure, regularity of exposure and
proximity of the asbestos product.

Therefore, the Court says that Plaintiffs cannot prevail without
evidence of exposure to asbestos-containing materials
manufactured or furnished by a defendant with enough frequency
and regularity as to show a reasonable medical probability that
this exposure was a factor in causing the Plaintiff's injuries.
While there are many possible causes of any injury, a possible
cause only becomes probable when, in the absence of other
reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not
that the injury was a result of its action.

The Court also finds that Defendants did propound comprehensive
interrogatories, including specially-prepared interrogatories,
requesting that plaintiffs "state all facts" supporting their
contention that decedent and Father's alleged exposure to
asbestos-containing material was caused by MDD. Further, at his
deposition, decedent was asked about the basis for his testimony
as to the circumstances of his Father's alleged employment at MDD
and responded that his father and his aunt had told him so and
acknowledged he had no other basis for such knowledge.

The Court holds that a witness must have personal knowledge of a
subject for the testimony about it to be admissible, unless the
witness is testifying as an expert. "Personal knowledge means a
present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise
of the witness's own senses. A witness cannot competently testify
to facts of which he or she has no personal knowledge.

The trial court excluded decedent's testimony that Father was a
lead electrician for the shipyards, supervising a crew of men
working on ship conversions and that he believed Father worked at
MDD and was employed by MDD. Decedent was less than five years
old at the time and acknowledged he had no personal knowledge of
Father's employment and that his knowledge was based on what
Father and decedent's aunt had told him. Decedent admittedly
lacked personal knowledge as to this testimony, which was
entirely based on hearsay statements made to him. That a family
member is testifying as to what other family members told him
does not make this testimony admissible.

The Court determines that neither decedent nor Garcia was an
expert witness, and neither decedent's deposition testimony nor
Garcia's declaration disclosed the type of factual foundation or
explanation, from which an inference of personal knowledge or
expertise could be drawn. As such, the trial court did not err in
excluding decedent's testimony about his father's alleged work at
MDD.

The trial court sustained MDD's objections to those portions of
Garcia's declaration that her brother worked as an electrician at
MDD in the early 1940s, ruling Garcia did "not disclose any
source of knowledge about her brother's job duties other than
statements made by him." Garcia declared the matters stated
therein were based upon her "personal knowledge." But that
recitation carries no weight.

Plaintiffs argue that the court could reasonably infer that
Garcia had personal knowledge of her brother's occupation from
her statement that she lived at home with her mother and father
at the time and saw decedent and Father when they would visit.

The trial court determined the evidence in Garcia's declaration
was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Garcia had personal
knowledge that Father worked as an electrician on ships at MDD in
the early 1940s. Garcia's statement that "she lived at home with
her parents and saw Father and decedent" does not provide a
foundation of personal knowledge regarding father's alleged
employment as an electrician working on ships at MDD.

Plaintiffs further contend that Garcia's statement as to Father's
employment was not hearsay, as there was no sentence in the
declaration that was "an out of court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated." In the absence of any foundation
indicating personal knowledge in the declaration, the trial court
did not err in concluding the only source of Garcia's knowledge
was inadmissible hearsay from Father or her parents.

The trial court concluded that even if it had admitted decedent's
deposition testimony and Garcia's declaration, "there would still
be an absence of admissible evidence that Felix Foglia worked
with asbestos-containing materials, or that his work with
asbestos-containing materials would have released asbestos fibers
into the air as a result of MDD activities." It appears the court
was correct in this regard, as even placing Father as an
electrician working at MDD during the early 1940s does not
provide evidence he was exposed to asbestos.

As the trial court explained: "Plaintiffs suggest that because
there was insulation work being performed at MDD during the
relevant period of time, decedent's father must have been exposed
to asbestos from that work. However, there is no evidence in the
record of the amount of asbestos work that was being conducted at
MDD, what the levels of asbestos would have been at the shipyard
or on any ship, or that Felix Foglia was in the vicinity of
asbestos work while it was being performed. Even if the
declaration of Amelia Garcia and the deposition testimony of
decedent were admitted, the evidence is not sufficient to support
a reasonable inference of decedent's exposure resulting from MDD
activities.

Plaintiffs challenge the court's exclusion of the Castleman and
Horn testimony, claiming there was ample foundation for the
assumption that Father was "somewhere in the shipyard," citing to
decedent's deposition testimony. The trial court excluded the
testimony because there was no admissible evidence that Father
worked with or around asbestos insulation on ships at MDD. The
Court maintains that there was no foundation for the opinions
that Father brought home asbestos fibers on his clothes from work
at MDD or that Father worked with or around asbestos.

The Court points out that an expert's speculations do not rise to
the status of contradictory evidence, and a court is not bound by
expert opinion that is speculative or conjectural. The Court says
that parties cannot manufacture a triable issue of fact through
use of an expert opinion with self-serving conclusions devoid of
any basis, explanation, or reasoning.

The Court opines that the Castleman deposition was focused on the
issues of what MDD would have known about asbestos fiber
transportability in the early 1940s and the question of secondary
asbestos exposure. Castleman's opinion as to Father's exposure is
based on decedent's testimony that father worked at as an
electrician at MDD during World War II and would come home in his
dusty work clothing without changing. Such testimony is clearly
without foundation, absent other admissible evidence that Father
worked as an electrician in MDD shipyards during this period,
worked with or around asbestos, and would have been exposed to
asbestos due to his work. Further, Castleman's testimony did not
tend to prove or disprove any facts relating to Father's exposure
to asbestos and was therefore irrelevant to that issue.

As the trial court observed, Horn's declaration assumes that
Father worked on a ship at MDD, and there was no evidence
supporting that assumption. Horn's testimony is without
foundation where there was no admissible evidence that Father
worked on ships or in the shipyards around asbestos insulation or
other sources of asbestos at MDD.

On the record before the Court, admissible evidence connecting
Father with MDD was thin at best. In any event MDD did not appear
to dispute in its motion for summary judgment or in its separate
statement that Father worked for MDD. Moreover, for purposes of
the summary judgment motion the court assumed the records showed
Moore Securities Company and MDD were the same entity and that
Father worked at MDD.

Even so, the trial court accurately concluded that the records
"do not show where decedent's father was employed or his job
duties. There is no admissible evidence that decedent's father
worked as an electrician, that he worked at the shipyard or on
ships at MDD, that he worked with or in proximity to asbestos-
containing materials, or that he worked with or in proximity to
asbestos-containing materials that would have released asbestos
fibers into the air to which he was exposed. Plaintiffs suggest
that because there was substantial insulation work being
performed at MDD during the relevant period of time, or other
asbestos products on ships, decedent's father would inevitably
have been exposed to asbestos simply by being present on ships or
at the shipyard.

Plaintiffs concede that there is no evidence on this record of
the amount of asbestos work that was being conducted at MDD or
what the levels of asbestos would have been at the shipyard or on
any ship and that there is no evidence that decedent's father was
in the vicinity of insulation work while it was being performed
or work involving any other asbestos containing product."
Consequently, the court concluded there was no evidence of the
time, locations, or actual circumstances of the alleged exposure
and the record establishes that no such evidence exists.

A full-text copy of the Decision dated March 8, 2018 is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y73j3bok from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: American Precision Must Answer Discovery
---------------------------------------------------------
American Precision Industries, Inc. commenced this action on
December 16, 2014, seeking a declaration that the defendant
Insurers, Federal Insurance Company, Fireman's Fund Insurance,
and North River Insurance Company, must defend and indemnify
American Precision Industries "in connection with all pending and
future asbestos-related claims asserted against American
Precision Industries," and reimburse defense fees and costs and
settlement amounts "previously incurred by American Precision
Industries in connection with these asbestos-related claims."

Federal sold American Precision Industries five annual
comprehensive general liability insurance policies covering the
period from April 1, 1992 through April 1, 1997. Fireman's is
alleged to have sold American Precision Industries consecutive
primary comprehensive general liability insurance policies
covering April 1, 1985 through April 1, 1989. Finally, North
River allegedly issued a primary comprehensive general liability
insurance policy covering the period from December 31, 1974
through December 31, 1977.

American Precision Industries was formed as a corporation under
New York law in 1946. In 1996, American Precision Industries
formed three subsidiary companies: API AirTech, Inc., API Basco,
Inc., and API Heat Transfer, Inc. American Precision Industries
transferred certain assets to AirTech and Basco in return for all
outstanding shares of those companies. That same year, American
Precision Industries transferred all of the outstanding shares of
AirTech and Basco to Heat Transfer in return for all of the
shares of Heat Transfer. American Precision Industries never
transferred any asbestos liabilities to Heat Transfer, AirTech,
or Basco during these transactions.

Thereafter, Heat Transfer merged into AirTech and the surviving
company retained the name Heat Transfer. At the end of 1998,
Basco, and two other entities, API Ketema, Inc., and API Schmid-
Bretten Inc., merged into Heat Transfer. At that time, American
Precision Industries owned all of Heat Transfer as a subsidiary.
In 2002, American Precision Industries sold Heat Transfer to API
Heat Transfer Technologies Corporation.

According to the Complaint, American Precision Industries has
been named as a defendant in hundreds of asbestos claims in
numerous states since approximately 2002. These asbestos claims
allege third-party bodily injuries resulting from exposure to
asbestos contained in products manufactured and/or sold by
American Precision Industries, specifically, in heat exchangers
manufactured and/or sold by American Precision Industries. The
alleged third-party bodily injuries occurred during one or more
of the periods covered by the policies issued by the Defendant
Insurers.

The Defendant Insurers allege that "it has become abundantly
clear during this lawsuit that American Precision Industries is
actually seeking reimbursement of the defense costs it incurred
in connection with underlying asbestos suits against companies
other than American Precision Industries." According to Federal,
of the 753 underlying asbestos suits identified by American
Precision Industries in its "bordereaux" or claims report,
American Precision Industries was a named defendant in only one
lawsuit. In the vast majority of cases, the named defendant was
Heat Transfer, not American Precision Industries.

Federal requested that American Precision Industries admit that
it is "named as a Defendant in only one of the 753 Underlying
Asbestos Suits identified in the bordereaux" and if American
Precision Industries' response was anything other than an
unequivocal admission, "identify each and every Underlying
Asbestos Suit in which American Precision Industries is named as
a defendant."

American Precision Industries objected to the request on the
ground "that it seeks information with no relevance to this
action because the liabilities for the underlying Asbestos Suits
belong to American Precision Industries, rather than the
improperly named defendants." Federal also sought an admission
from American Precision Industries that Basco, Heat Transfer, and
AirTech are not named insureds or additional insureds under any
of the Federal Policies. American Precision Industries objected
to these requests "on the grounds that they seek legal
conclusions, rather than facts, and have no relevance to this
litigation because [Basco, Heat Transfer, and AirTech have no
liabilities for the Underlying Asbestos Suits."

Federal further requested that American Precision Industries
admit that it is "seeking reimbursement for amounts it spent for
the defense of non-API entities in 752 Underlying Asbestos Suits"
to which American Precision Industries objected on the ground
"that the phrase 'non- American Precision Industries entities' is
vague and ambiguous." American Precision Industries admitted that
"it seeks, among other things, coverage for amounts expended to
defend actions alleging liabilities retained by American
Precision Industries in 1996 in lawsuits improperly naming other
entities as defendants." American Precision Industries had a
nearly identical response to Federal's request that American
Precision Industries admit that it "is seeking defense for non-
API entities in current and future Underlying Asbestos Suits."

Attempts on behalf of the parties to resolve the discovery
dispute were unsuccessful. American Precision Industries takes
the legal position that because American Precision Industries
retained all pre-1997 asbestos liabilities in connection with its
1997 reorganization, it is entitled to coverage for amounts it
spent to defend Basco, AirTech, and Heat Transfer because
American Precision Industries owns the liabilities of those
companies. American Precision Industries seeks recovery of
amounts it spent to defend its own liabilities regardless of the
incorrectly named defendants." Federal argues that American
Precision Industries' relevance objection is improper at this
juncture in the litigation; and that, in any event, "the
requested matter is relevant from Federal's legal perspective
because no coverage is owed for defense of non-insured entities
regardless of whether the underlying plaintiffs sued the wrong
entities."

Federal, along with Fireman's and North River, now seek an Order
from the Court deeming the following matters admitted: that
American Precision Industries is named as a defendant in only one
of the 753 Underlying Asbestos Suits; that " American Precision
Industries is seeking reimbursement for amounts it spent for the
defense of non- American Precision Industries entities in 752
Underlying Asbestos Suits"; and that Heat Transfer, AirTech, and
Basco are not insured under the defendant Insurers' policies.

Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of New York finds that the
defendant Insurers have demonstrated that Request Nos. 32, 40-42,
50, 57-59, 67, 74-76, 84 are relevant in that they directly bear
on the issue of whether the parties named in the underlying
claims are covered under the insurance policies issued to
American Precision Industries. "It is well established under New
York law that a policyholder bears the burden of showing that the
insurance contract covers the loss." In this regard, American
Precision Industries will ultimately need to prove that the past,
present, and future asbestos-related claims for which it seeks
reimbursement, defense, and/or indemnification are covered under
the defendant Insurers' policies. Thus, contrary to American
Precision Industries' arguments, the identity of the defendants
in the asbestos-related claims and that of the named and
additional insureds is entirely relevant to Defendants' "coverage
obligations" and their defense that they are not obligated to
cover the losses under the policies issued to American Precision
Industries.

Although the fact that the process of identifying the named
defendants and insureds may be "burdensome," it does not change
the fact that it is necessary for American Precision Industries
to prevail in this action. American Precision Industries claims
that its bordereaux does not identify the specific defendants or
products in the asbestos lawsuits listed and that to respond to
the Requests, "it would have to work with its defense counsel in
each asbestos lawsuit to ensure [he or she] had reviewed every
operative pleading," and would have to "pull files for nearly 600
closed matters." But the Court says that whatever burden this
task might place on American Precision Industries or its counsel
must be weighed against the significant amount at stake in this
litigation, roughly $6.5 million, based on the addendum.

American Precision Industries apparently seeks over $6.5 million
for defense expenses from the defendant Insurers. Federal argues,
and the Court agrees, that "given the significant amount of the
defense costs, it is difficult to believe that American Precision
Industries' defense counsel did not perform the rudimentary task
[of ascertaining the named defendants] at the outset of each
lawsuit."

Even if no such inquiry was made before undertaking the defense
of these cases, the fact remains that American Precision
Industries is in the best position to identify the named
defendants in each of the asbestos-related claims for which it
seeks coverage and to determine if Heat Transfer, AirTech, and/or
Basco are named or additional insureds under the alleged
policies, issues absolutely central to this declaratory judgment
action. Accordingly, the Court directs American Precision
Industries to answer Federal Request Nos. 32, 40-42, 50, 57-59,
67, 74-76, 84, and the analogous Requests from Fireman's and
North River, within 45 days of the Decision and Order.

Regarding Federal Request No. 33, calling for an admission that
"American Precision Industries is seeking reimbursement for
amounts it spent for the defense of non-API entities in 752
Underlying Asbestos Suits," the Court finds that American
Precision Industries' response was sufficient given the vague and
misleading term "non-API entities." Defendants define "non-API
entities" as: "any and all entities not named American Precision
Industries Inc. for whom American Precision Industries expended
money to defend underlying Asbestos Suits for which American
Precision Industries is seeking reimbursement in this Declaratory
Judgment Action, and/or any and all entities not named American
Precision Industries for whom American Precision Industries is
seeking a defense in the Declaratory Judgment Action for in
current and future Underlying Asbestos Suits."

American Precision Industries objected to Defendants definition
of "non-API entities" on the ground that the phrase "non-API
entities" is vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving
its objections, American Precision Industries admits that it
seeks, among other things, coverage for amounts expended to
defend actions alleging liabilities retained by American
Precision Industries in 1996 in lawsuits improperly naming other
entities as defendants.

Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' motion to deem this
matter admitted, explaining that American Precision Industries
cannot be compelled to abandon its legal theory that the
liabilities of Basco, Heat Transfer, and AirTech are in fact
American Precision Industries' own liabilities.

The case is American Precision Industries, Inc., Plaintiff, v.
Federal Insurance Company, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, and
North River Insurance Company, Defendants, No. 14-CV-1050-RJA,
(W.D. N.Y.).

A full-text copy of the Decision and Order dated March 8, 2018,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yasf4l27 from Leagle.com.

American Precision Industries, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Adam J. Budesheim -- abudesheim@mccarter.com -- McCarter &
English, David C. Kane -- dkane@mccarter.com -- McCarter &
English & Gita F. Rothschild -- grothschild@mccarter.com --
McCarter & English.

Federal Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Emmett
Eugene McGowan , Siegal & Park & Seth Goodman Park , Siegal &
Park.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Jay
David Kenigsberg -- jay.kenigsberg@rivkin.com -- Rivkin, Radler
LLP, Lawrence A. Levy -- larry.levy@rivkin.com -- Rivkin, Radler
LLP, Michael Kotula -- michael.kotula@rivkin.com -- Rivkin,
Radler LLP & Peter P. McNamara -- peter.mcnamara@rivkin.com --
Rivkin, Radler LLP.

North River Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Douglas
J. Steinke -- douglas.steinke@kennedyscmk.com -- Kennedys CMK
LLP, Michael J. Tricarico -- michael.tricarico@kennedyslaw.com --
Kennedys CMK LLP & Martha E. Conlin --
martha.conlin@kennedyscmk.com -- Kennedys CMK LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Affirms $64MM Judgment in Favor of Utica
---------------------------------------------------------------
A jury trial was held between November 27, 2017, and December 13,
2017, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict in
favor of plaintiff Utica Mutual Insurance Company ("Utica") on
its sole claim for breach of contract. The jury awarded plaintiff
$35 million in damages plus interest running from September 22,
2008. Prejudgment interest was calculated at $29,092,192 and
judgment entered in favor of Utica for $64,092,192.

Defendant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("FFIC") now renews
its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule
50(b), arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50 both because Utica failed to present legally
sufficient proof that there was a breach of contract and because
FFIC proved its late notice defense as a matter of law.

FFIC raises three bases on which it claims the evidence was
lacking and consequently require the granting of its Rule 50
motion for judgment as a matter of law. First, FFIC argues that
the reinsurance certificates do not cover the loss at issue.
Second, the follow the settlements doctrine does not apply.
Third, notice was late and FFIC was economically prejudiced or
Utica's failure to implement routine procedures constituted gross
negligence or recklessness.

Utica opposes and contends that the presence or absence of
aggregate limits in the primary policies and the therefore
subsequent question of whether the reinsurance certificates cover
the loss at issue is irrelevant to the instant inquiry and it was
not required to prove such at trial. Instead, the evidence was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that its settlement decisions
were objectively reasonable and that FFIC failed to meet its
burden on its late notice defense.

Judge David N. Hurd of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York finds Utica correct in that it was not
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
primary policies contained aggregate limits for bodily injury in
order for the "follow the settlements clause" to apply and
obligate FFIC to pay under the reinsurance certificates. Instead,
the "follow the settlements clause" applied unless FFIC could
show that Utica's settlement decisions were objectively
unreasonable. The jury was instructed to decide whether Utica's
decision to settle with Goulds on the basis that its 1966 through
1972 primary policies contained aggregate limits was among the
objectively reasonable options available to Utica. Therefore,
FFIC's continued claim that there was no coverage in the first
place -- that the primary policies either lacked aggregate limits
and thus did not trigger the umbrella policies whatsoever, or in
the alternative, that if the primary policies included such
limits, the reinsurance certificates did not provide coverage
based on the umbrella declarations -- will not be entertained
here.

The Court notes that at the outset, neither party had a witness
with personal knowledge of the primary policies. Plaintiff
presented the following evidence in support of its position that
its settlement with Goulds was objectively reasonable. First,
Utica General Counsel Bernard Turi testified that Utica engaged
in a "full blown effort" to try to find copies of the missing
1966 to 1972 primary policies: Utica extensively searched its own
records, gathered records from Goulds, spoke with the brokers
that placed the coverage, examined comparable polices and
insurance certificates, and retained outside counsel to determine
the terms and scope of the missing policies.

California coverage counsel for Utica, Ron Robinson, testified
about the "virtual policy project" he completed in order to
reconstruct the missing policies. The "virtual policy project"
was based upon state filings, underwriting drafts, certificates
of insurance, and other secondary evidence respecting the missing
policies. Utica presented evidence that Goulds' summaries of its
own insurance program from the 1966 to 1972 period showed
aggregate limits for products liability. Two of the primary
policies from that time period showed an aggregate limit. Utica
argued that in the absence of evidence that Goulds intended to
change its insurance program, this "book end" proof provided
evidence to Utica that the intervening policies had the same
limits.

Further, Kristen Martin, the Utica attorney with day-to-day
responsibility for the underlying Goulds litigation testified
that the gathered evidence clearly established that the missing
primary polices contained aggregate limits and that Utica never
wavered from that position. In sum, the results of Utica's
investigation, Mr. Robinson's virtual policy project, and the
final advice from Utica's outside counsel all confirmed to Utica
that the 1966 to 1972 primary polices contained aggregate limits.
Dennis Connolly, one of plaintiff's experts, opined that
aggregate limits were standard in the 1960s and 70s and confirmed
the reasonableness of Utica's position on same. Utica also
introduced evidence that Brian Gagan, one of FFIC's prior experts
in the underlying litigation, agreed with that position.

Considering this and other evidence together, the Court
determines that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Utica
had a sufficient basis on which to reach the conclusion that the
Goulds primary polices contained aggregate limits and thus make
the settlement decisions that it did. Further in support of the
jury's verdict was testimony and documentary evidence from Utica
witnesses that the settlement itself was the result of arms-
length negotiations: the settlement negotiations began in 2004,
two years before the final settlement agreement; Utica and Goulds
held lengthy mediation discussions; in a stipulated order, the
overseeing judges found that the settlement was "fair, just and
reasonable" and had been "entered at arm's length and in good
faith by the parties."

In sum, the jury had ample evidence from which it could conclude
that Utica acted objectively reasonable in its decision to settle
with Goulds for $325 million on the basis that the primary
policies contained aggregate limits for bodily injury. Therefore,
the Court says that there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that the follow the settlements doctrine applied and FFIC was
obligated to pay under the reinsurance certificates.

While FFIC also put forth ample evidence refuting Utica's
contention that it acted reasonably, the Court points out that
evidence was not such that there could have been only a verdict
in defendant's favor. Regarding the umbrella declarations which
FFIC relied heavily on to support the position that the primary
policies lacked aggregate limits and thus Utica was not
reasonable in settling on the basis that there were such limits,
the pages themselves nor the testimony supporting this position
required the jury to find that Utica's determination of the
primary policy terms was unreasonable. Even if the jury
interpreted the umbrella policies as evidence that the primary
policies lacked aggregate limits, that evidence did not
automatically render Utica's evidence insufficient to permit a
reasonable juror to find in Utica's favor, particularly when now
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Utica,
the opposing party on the instant motion.

Accordingly, the Court denies FFIC's Rule 50 motion for judgment
as a matter of law on a legally sufficient evidentiary basis that
a reasonable jury could have concluded that Utica's settlement
decisions were objectively reasonable and thus the follow the
settlements doctrine applied.

Likewise, FFIC could not sustain its burden on its late notice
defense because there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that FFIC failed to prove either both late notice and
either material breach or demonstrable prejudice. The Court
explains that a reasonable jury could have concluded that FFIC
failed to carry its burden to prove tangible economic injury.
While FFIC employee Jeffrey Svestka testified regarding FFIC's
commutation prejudice chart, which was a summary of FFIC's
alleged prejudice. However, FFIC presented no witness involved in
any of FFIC's actual negotiations with its commuting reinsurers.

The Court notes that a reasonable jury could have afforded Mr.
Svestka's testimony little or no weight. From his testimony,
Utica attorneys submitted that he did not take into account the
following: any affirmative defenses that FFIC was asserting to
the billing; the amount of losses that Utica had paid as of 1996
or any other time; any objections to payment by FFIC's
reinsurers; the fact that 5 of the 13 reinsurers were insolvent
at the time of their commutations; and whether notice was in fact
due in 1996. By contrast, Utica put forth evidence that as of
1996 it had paid only about $100,000 over the past 10 years and,
at the same rate, it would have taken over 10,000 years to reach
FFIC's reinsurance layer. Considering this testimony, a jury
could have found Mr. Svestka's assumption that FFIC was faced
with a full limits loss in 1996 not credible.

Mr. Svestka testified that in 8 of the 13 commutations, FFIC
attributed zero dollars in liability for commutation of the $90
million in limits that FFIC had written as a direct insurer of
Goulds. While FFIC disputes the applicability of that evidence, a
jury could have found that there was no reason to believe FFIC
would have treated the Utica reinsurance claim any differently
than a direct insurance claim. Further, Utica evidence showed
that even after FFIC received formal notice of the Utica (Goulds)
reinsurance claim in July 2008, FFIC failed to take it into
account in two subsequent commutations. Considering this
evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that FFIC failed
to show that it suffered tangible economic injury from any late
notice. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to consider the late
notice prong.

The bulk of FFIC's evidence centered around Utica's specific
document retention policies and the fact that the primary
policies were never located. Utica's document retention policy
was 11 years, which met the industry standard. Testimony
established that missing or incomplete contract files from the
1960s and 1970s was not out of the ordinary for insurers dealing
with these types of liability claims in the 1990s and 2000s.
Utica put forth evidence that with respect to Goulds itself,
three of its five direct insurers lacked complete contract files
when coverage was being litigated.

Utica also put forth evidence that it provided early notice to
over a dozen facultative reinsurers that Utica was aware of
before notice was due. This evidence considered together formed a
sufficient basis for a jury to conclude that Utica had
implemented routine practices and controls to ensure notification
to reinsurers which worked in the majority of cases, and to the
extent those practices did not work in the FFIC matter, such
failure did not constitute bad faith, gross negligence, or
recklessness.
Accordingly, the Court denies FFIC's Rule 50 motion for judgment
as a matter of law because FFIC failed to sustain its burden to
prove its late notice defense.

FFIC moves in the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59 on
the same grounds as its Rule 50 motion. Even considering the
evidence under the less stringent standard of Rule 59, FFIC has
failed to meet its burden to be granted a new trial for the same
reasons considered under Rule 50. The jury apparently assigned
more weight to Utica's witnesses or evidence and it cannot be
said that the jury's conclusions on the follow the settlements or
the late notice defense were either seriously erroneous or a
miscarriage of justice. Considering the admissible evidence, the
jury's verdict was not egregious or against the weight of the
evidence. The jury's evaluations in resolving the credibility of
witnesses and other fact finding duties will not be disturbed in
this case.

The Court finds the record contained sufficient evidence to allow
the jury to determine that Utica provided a sufficient proof of
loss as of September 22, 2008, when it delivered a claims
narrative and billings to FFIC. FFIC employee Gary Ibello
testified that the materials Utica sent on September 22, 2008
were a standard format in the industry for a proof of loss. Utica
also put forth evidence that FFIC had direct knowledge of the
details of the Goulds asbestos claims because it insured Goulds
directly and was involved in the same Goulds coverage lawsuit as
plaintiff. Based on Mr. Ibello's and Christy Bresson's (the FFIC
employee who handled the Utica reinsurance claim) testimony, the
jury could have concluded that FFIC had sufficient information as
of September 22, 2008, intelligently to form some estimate of its
rights and liabilities. The verdict was thus not against the
weight of the evidence. Therefore, the Court also denies FFIC's
alternative Rule 59 motion for a new trial.

FFIC also moves to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a) and
requests correction of a manifest clerical error in the
calculation of interest reflected in the judgment. Specifically,
it contends the interest should be reduced from the current
$29,092,192 to $27,637,815 based on New York Civil Practice Law
and Rule section 5001.

FFIC asserts that the error resulted from the incorrect
assumption that the entire amount owed under the reinsurance
certificates ($35 million) became payable on September 22, 2008,
the date of Utica's initial billing. Instead, Utica's initial
bill was only for $16,794,738, and it sent six additional
billings to FFIC over the following 21 months for the remaining
balance of the $35 million. Therefore, because Utica issued its
billings over time and did not bill the entire amount on
September 22, 2008, FFIC contends interest began to accrue only
from the date of each subsequent billing. FFIC argues that under
New York law, prejudgment interest runs from the date of breach,
and it could not have breached until performance was due, i.e.,
the date each demand for payment was made. It contends that such
a recalculation is merely a mathematical and clerical one.

The Court finds FFIC's motion procedurally improper because such
a revision would be substantive rather than clerical and is thus
not the sort of recalculation appropriate under Rule 60(a). A
revision to the interest calculation here would require a finding
of fact regarding the (additional) dates from which the interest
would run. Those facts are properly ones for a jury to decide,
and they did so when they chose September 22, 2008 as the date
Utica provided sufficient proof of loss. Accordingly, the Court
also denies FFIC's motion to correct the interest calculation in
the judgment pursuant to Rule 60.

A full-text copy of the Memorandum-Decision and Order dated
February 28, 2018, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydd3ql92
from Leagle.com.

Utica Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiff, represented by Syed S.
Ahmad -- sahmad@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, LLP, Walter J.
Andrews -- wandrews@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel R. Thies -- DTHIES@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley, Austin Law
Firm, pro hac vice, Patrick M. McDermott -- pmcdermott@hunton.com
-- Hunton & Williams, LLP, pro hac vice, Thomas D. Cunningham --
TCUNNINGHAM@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley, Austin Law Firm, pro hac vice &
William M. Sneed -- WSNEED@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley, Austin Law Firm,
pro hac vice.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by John
B. Williams -- jbwilliams@williamslopatto.com -- Williams,
Lopatto Law Firm, pro hac vice, Mary A. Lopatto --
malopatto@williamslopatto.com -- Williams, Lopatto Law Firm, pro
hac vice & Fara N. Kitton -- fnkitton@williamslopatto.com --
Williams, Lopatto Law Firm.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, Counter Claimant, represented
by John B. Williams -- jbwilliams@williamslopatto.com --
Williams, Lopatto Law Firm, pro hac vice & Mary A. Lopatto --
malopatto@williamslopatto.com -- Williams, Lopatto Law Firm, pro
hac vice.

Utica Mutual Insurance Company, Counter Defendant, represented by
Syed S. Ahmad -- sahmad@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, LLP,
Walter J. Andrews -- wandrews@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams,
LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick M. McDermott -- pmcdermott@hunton.com
-- Hunton & Williams, LLP, pro hac vice.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kansas Bill Adds Requirements to Asbestos Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sherman Smith of Topeka Capital Journal reported that legislation
endorsed by the Kansas House would burden terminally ill cancer
victims with paperwork, an investigation and sworn statement
before seeking compensation from a company that exposed them to
asbestos.

House Bill 2457, supported by the Kansas Chamber of Commerce,
aims to reduce compensation awarded in jury trials. The bill
would require all possible claims against other defendants to be
filed within a 30-day window, allowing a jury to consider shared
liability among sources of asbestos exposure.

Representatives passed the bill on a 77-40 vote as lawmakers took
action on a multitude of proposals before breaking until they
return Wednesday.

In debating litigation, Rep. Pam Curtis, a Kansas City Democrat,
shared a personal story of her father-in-law's death from
asbestos exposure. She explained her vote against the bill by
saying asbestos has been a known carcinogen for decades, placing
workers' lives at risk.

Curtis pointed to the occupational health hazards of
firefighters, veterans, machinists and locomotive engineers and
called the bill unnecessary.

"It sends the wrong message to those injured workers, and their
family, whose lives have been shortened due to asbestos
exposure," she said. "I cannot support any measure that would
limit or make filing claims more difficult for individuals who
have been dealt a death sentence."

Proponents of the legislation say they want to disclose the money
victims may receive from bankruptcy trusts created to help settle
asbestos claims.

Extensive litigation stemming from the widespread use of asbestos
in the 20th century led to a system that allows companies filing
for bankruptcy to set aside money to be distributed for future
claims, leaving the company free from litigation when it emerges
from bankruptcy. In exchange, victims can quickly access money
from trust funds by filling out a form and documenting work
history. In many cases, however, depleted funds can only pay a
small percentage of a victim's compensation.

Representing the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Mark
Behrens testified in favor of the bill in January before the
House Judiciary Committee. Because the largest companies are no
longer a target, he said, attorneys are using civil lawsuits to
go after businesses that haven't filed for bankruptcy.

Using chess pieces as props, he described local "mom and pop"
businesses as pawns being used in a high-stakes game of
manipulation.

"You see the ads running on TV," Behrens said to lawmakers.
"Tonight, go home and turn on TV. I can guarantee you within 15
minutes, one of you will see an ad for asbestos, 'hire an
asbestos lawyer,' I guarantee you. They wouldn't be running ads
here if there weren't plaintiffs that they thought they could
recruit to file lawsuits."

In 2010, a RAND Corporation study of cases in six states revealed
plaintiff compensation decreases when defendants can assign blame
to bankrupt firms. Information about other claims already is made
available at trial, but victims aren't required to pursue all
trust claims before filing a civil lawsuit -- a requirement of
the House bill, which is modeled on American Legislative Exchange
Council policy. The bill also requires victims to make a sworn
statement affirming the totality of those claims, based on a
complete investigation.

A U.S. Government Accountability Office report in 2011 found
concerns that victims may misrepresent their history of asbestos
exposure.

Behrens suggested selective memory could be influenced by an
attorney. But Callie Denton, executive director of the Kansas
Trial Lawyers Association, said hypothetical memory lapse
described by Behrens also could be the result of someone
"suffering a debilitating, life-ending illness."

Attorneys already complete a work history and discover potential
sources of exposure by building their case, Denton said, and
ethical standards require them to disclose the information in
court proceedings. Failure to do so would warrant sanctions.

She repeatedly described the bill's requirements as "brutal,"
requiring victims to satisfy a defendant while potentially
delaying or halting their effort to be compensated.

"You got your diagnosis," Denton said, characterizing the message
of the bill. "Now go do all your filing with the trust claims
before we allow you to hold the defendant accountable. Most
likely what's going to happen is the plaintiff is going to die
before they are able to see justice."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Crestwood Lake Apt. Complex
--------------------------------------------------------------
News 12 Hudson Valley reported that tests conducted at an
apartment complex in Yonkers came back positive for asbestos.
Pipe insulation from 125 garages at the Crestwood Lake Apartment
Complex tested positive for asbestos after a limited
investigation.

Any amount of more than 1 percent is considered to be potentially
dangerous. These results ranged from 6 to 25 percent.

Residents at the complex say they are concerned and that there
have been problems with the piping for some time.

While symptoms may not develop for decades after exposure,
doctors in the area are suggesting tenants get a health
screening.

The city of Yonkers has received multiple complaints and has
handed down violations urging the property owner to test crawl
spaces, laundry facilities and apartments above the garages.

News 12 reached out to the Crestwood Lake Apartment Complex and
its management company but has not heard back.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Atkins Couple Sues Over Asbestos Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo of Madison County Record reported that a couple
claims the husband developed lung cancer after exposure to
asbestos while working in Peoria.

Patrick Atkins and Patricia Atkins filed a complaint on Feb. 13
in the St. Clair County Circuit Court against Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., Chicago-Wilcox Manufacturing Co., Hercules LLC
alleging negligence.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that at various
times during Patrick Atkins' career at various locations in
Peoria from 1967 to 1973, he was exposed to and inhaled or
ingested asbestos fibers emanating from certain products
manufactured, sold, distributed or installed by defendants. The
suit states that on or about Dec. 20, 2017, he first became aware
that he developed lung cancer, an asbestos-induced disease, and
that the disease was wrongfully caused.

He alleges he has been hindered from pursuing his normal course
of work, lost large sums of money and incurred substantial costs
for medical expenses.

The plaintiffs hold Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Chicago-Wilcox
Manufacturing Co., Hercules LLC, et al. responsible because the
defendants allegedly negligently included asbestos fibers in
their products when adequate substitutes were available and
failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning
the dangers of working with or around products containing
asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs seek economic damages of more than $50,000. They
are represented by Randy L. Gori of Gori, Julian & Associates PC
in Edwardsville.
St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 18-L-103


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Widow's Asbestos Suit Revived by New Evidence
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Graf of Law360 reported that the New Jersey Appellate
Division revived a widow's suit alleging her husband contracted
fatal mesothelioma from his exposure to a fertilizer that
contained asbestos, citing new evidence.

A three-judge panel vacated the dismissal of a suit brought by
Adrianne Brandecker, whose husband Lorenz died in 2012 after
being diagnosed with mesothelioma, finding that samples of lawn
fertilizer made by named defendant

The Scotts Company LLC that allegedly contained asbestos can be
classified as new evidence.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Industrial Talc Asbestos Trial Underway in Fla.
----------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reported that trial has commenced in an
asbestos industrial talc case, during which a jury will hear
claims that a former tile company employee developed mesothelioma
as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing talc products.

Open arguments were heard by the Florida 15th Judicial Circuit
Court for Palm Beach County on Feb. 22, sources confirmed to
HarrisMartin Publishing.

Plaintiffs Robert and Lola T. Lord filed the underlying
complaint, contending that Robert's malignant mesothelioma was
caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products not only while
living with his stepfather -- an employee at Florida Tile, Inc.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Risks Lurking in Aussie Hopitals
----------------------------------------------------------
Lorraine Kember of Asbestos.com reported that hospitals in
Australia rank among the best in the world for utilizing the
latest techniques and innovations.

Unfortunately the same cannot be said for safety.

Of the more than 700 public hospitals and 630 private hospitals
in Australia, many are not as safe as they appear.

Health unions and lawyers are warning that many major hospitals
in the country are riddled with asbestos. The deadly mineral is
the known cause of a number of diseases such as asbestosis, lung
cancer and mesothelioma.

Exposure to asbestos poses a serious health risk to hospital
staffs and the public.

The fact that asbestos lurks in Australian hospitals should come
as no surprise. Many of these buildings were built prior to the
1980s when asbestos was considered a wonder material.

Asbestos was incorporated into a wide range of products to
protect against fire, corrosion, acids, electricity and energy
loss.

The building industry used asbestos-containing products
extensively in the construction of homes and businesses,
including hospitals.

As a general rule, any establishment built or renovated before
the mid-1980s likely contains asbestos-containing materials.
Common areas where asbestos is found include:

   -- Lagging on steam pipes

   -- Ceiling cavities sprayed with asbestos

   -- Fire doors with asbestos cores

   -- Boiler houses and laundries insulated with asbestos

   -- Asbestos fireproofing on columns

   -- Electrical wiring insulation

   -- Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning ducts

   -- Underground service tunnels

Hospital Built on Top of Hundreds of Tons of Asbestos

Westmead -- one of Sydney's major hospitals -- was forced to
close its asbestos-riddled service tunnels in 2014.

Former James Hardie engineer Fred Sandilands told ABC News that
during his employment he supervised the dumping of tens of
thousands of tons of asbestos waste in the immediate area of the
hospital and throughout other suburbs surrounding the James
Hardie asbestos factory in Sydney.

The hospital itself is riddled with asbestos, found in old fire
doors, boilers and laundry rooms. The extensive network of hot
water pipes within the underground service tunnels are wrapped in
asbestos lagging, some of which has become friable.

For decades, hospital staff and nurses used the tunnels to
transport sick patients from one hospital building to another,
inadvertently exposing themselves and their patients to toxic
asbestos fibers.

The tunnels have also been used for nonmedical reasons including
visits by Technical and Further Education (TAFE) students and
even Halloween parties where decorations were draped on the
asbestos pipes.

Untrained Worker Exposes Asbestos Concerns

In 2014, a young apprentice -- untrained in the dangers of
asbestos -- cut into some lagging.

Following the incident, Westmead Hospital chief executive Danny
O'Connor acknowledged the risk but stated he had not seen any
reports of friable asbestos.

"There is asbestos in the tunnel but prior to the disturbance of
the lagging on the piping within the tunnel, all of the asbestos
was contained," he said.

Shortly after, however, the tunnels were inspected by industrial
hygienists who found white, brown and high-risk blue asbestos on
concrete columns, concrete surfaces and paths within the tunnels.

Following the report, the tunnels were closed to all but a select
few, who were required to wear protective clothing and face masks
when entering.

In 2015, the hospital began the first stage of a massive
redevelopment involving the demolition of some existing buildings
and the excavation of the top 8 inches of contaminated soil.

Under controlled conditions, the contaminated soil was removed
and transported to an approved disposal facility. Broken pieces
of bonded asbestos sheeting were also removed from the base of
plants in surrounding garden beds.

Calculated measures were taken to reduce the risk of residential
waste streams entering stormwater catchments during demolition.

The Health Services Union (HSU) worked closely with Westmead
management to prevent asbestos exposure risks in and around the
site.

HSU also began health monitoring of Westmead staff members who
worked in the tunnels and may have been unknowingly exposed to
asbestos.

The asbestos problem at Westmead has opened the eyes of many who
were unaware of the danger that lurks in buildings they thought
were safe.

Tragically, Westmead is just the tip of the iceberg.

Major hospitals in Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth and
Sydney are also known to have underground tunnels full of
asbestos and fire doors with asbestos cores.

Some of these materials are damaged and extremely dangerous.
According to the Asbestos Safety and Eradication Agency's 2016-17
report, occupational asbestos exposure increased to 70 percent
from 64 percent the previous year.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bonded Asbestos Discovered After Flooding
----------------------------------------------------------
Katie Burgess of The Canberra Times reported that asbestos
contamination has been found on another Mr Fluffy block, due to
go under the hammer on Thursday.

The house at 37 Goulburn Place, Macquarie was bulldozed 20 months
ago and taken off the register of Canberra properties impacted by
Mr Fluffy loose-fill asbestos.

But bonded asbestos was uncovered on the block when the ACT
Asbestos Taskforce tried to dig a drainage channel to allow pools
of water to drain.

Neighbour Greg Wilson emailed the taskforce after Sunday's
deluge, concerned about the large amount of water streaming into
his yard from the cleared Fluffy block.

The water flooded his side yard, dragging mud and muck through
the back garden before draining into an oval behind the property.

The taskforce got back to him, saying they would send someone out
to have a look, and workers showed up to fix the problem.

However they uncovered bonded asbestos in the rear corner of the
block, which required a licensed assessor to remove.

Mr Wilson's wife Melissa was warned not to go out in the backyard
while the work was ongoing.

Mrs Wilson said the worker who knocked on her door told her there
were "bits" of asbestos in the water.

The exchange alarmed Mrs Wilson, whose great-uncle died from
mesothelioma 15 years ago, because she was not told what sort of
asbestos was found.

The Wilsons were finally told that it was not loose-fill asbestos
and that the bonded asbestos had been removed.
But given the block would be sold, Mr Wilson was concerned who
would foot the bill if contaminants were found to have washed
through his yard.

"If something is found, who is liable," Mr Wilson said.
EPSDD's deputy director-general for sustainability and the built
environment Geoffrey Rutledge confirmed the site was now clear of
asbestos and the new owners would be informed of the removal.

"Potential purchasers of remediated Mr Fluffy blocks can have
confidence that blocks have had thorough soil testing undertaken
by a licensed asbestos assessor or soil validator to test the
demolition zone for loose fill asbestos fibres and confirm the
site is suitable for residential reuse," Mr Rutledge said.

Mr Rutledge said they would not undertake testing in the Wilsons'
backyard, as no loose-fill asbestos had been found on the block.
The Wilsons decided to share their concerns publicly, after it
was revealed another Mr Fluffy block sold at auction had been
contaminated with bonded and loose-fill asbestos.

The Steve and Jeffcott families have been left with mounting
costs after asbestos-ridden remnants of old house were found on
their $1.6 million block when the builder was preparing to lay
the slab.
Fairfax Media has learnt of at least one former Fluffy homeowner,
who after seeing the standard of the clean-up, did not opt to buy
their block back.

However Sydney University Emeritus Professor Bruce Armstrong, who
was one of the consultants engaged by the Australian National
University to look into the health effects of Mr Fluffy, said
people should exercise "normal, sensible caution" with the
blocks.

"There is asbestos in the air you and I breathe every day, we've
all got a decent  load of asbestos in our lungs but the risk at
those kind of background levels is low," Professor Armstrong
said.
"The people who are at high risk of course are the people who
actually worked with the raw asbestos,  either mining it or
milling it or using it to manufacture asbestos products. That's
where all the mesotheliomas have occurred.

"We do know that for example when people who worked in the
asbestos industry brought home the asbestos in their clothes and
in their hair or whatever, there is an increased risk to the
people who lived with them but in other circumstances of exposure
in normal homes, except for the specific instance of the Mr
Fluffy houses where we  have seen evidence of an increased risk
for men, it's been hard to demonstrate any risk in any of those
other circumstances."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Perthville Man Fined $7,500 for Asbestos Dumping
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Western Advocate reported that a Perthville resident's decision
to dump waste containing asbestos by the side of the road at
Gormans Hill instead of paying $35 to take it to the tip has cost
him $7500 following prosecution by the NSW Environment Protection
Authority.

The illegal dumping at a roadside reserve near the Bathurst Water
Filtration Plant was captured on a closed circuit television
camera installed by Bathurst Regional Council.

EPA acting regional director south and west branch Dr Sandie
Jones said illegally dumped waste had the potential to harm the
environmental harm and presented a hazard to the public.

"This is particularly of concern when asbestos is involved," Dr
Jones said.

"The cost of disposing of this waste legally at Bathurst landfill
would likely have been around $35, much less than the fine issued
to this individual.

"In the age of surveillance cameras, dashboard cameras and
cameras on mobile phones, the chances of a witness observing
waste dumpers are ever increasing."

Bathurst Regional Council paid more than $4000 for a licensed
asbestos contractor to clear the site and to have the site
remediated.

"There are significant costs borne by the community in the clean-
up of waste dumping and council will be seeking to recover the
costs of cleaning up this waste from those responsible for the
dumping," mayor Graeme Hanger said.

"I would like to thank the EPA for their assistance and I
encourage members of the community to report illegal dumping when
it occurs."

Illegal dumping can be reported to the EPA on 131 555 or Bathurst
Regional Council on 6333 6511. Witnesses should provide details
of the location, description of the waste and the date and time
the waste was seen.

Penalty notices are one of several tools the EPA can use to
achieve environmental compliance including formal warnings,
official cautions, licence conditions, notices and directions and
prosecutions.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Find Leads to Metro Project Shutdown
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Carey of The Age reported that part of the $11 billion Metro
rail tunnel project has been suspended after workers discovered a
large exposed asbestos pipe while digging up St Kilda Road.

The asbestos pipe was unearthed, but project managers waited to
stop work and begin to remove it.

They also waited to put up signage warning the public of the
find.

The exposed asbestos pipe is in the southbound lanes of St Kilda
Road, opposite Melbourne Grammar School and the luxury Domain
Apartments.

The road has been reduced to one lane in each direction but
trams, cycling lanes and footpaths remain open.

WorkSafe staff have been on-site and are making inquiries.

The CFMEU, many of whose members work on the site, accused the
project's builders of putting lives at risk.

"What kind of system can be condoned that allows anyone to
breathe in asbestos dust just for being unlucky enough to work,
live or go to school in St Kilda Road?" the union's Victorian
state secretary, John Setka, said.

"It takes only one single fibre of this death dust to land in our
lungs and the clock starts ticking.

"Maybe those pretending to be in charge of these major projects
should think about this for a minute," he said.

But the Melbourne Metro Rail Authority insisted there was no
threat to workers or the public.

Work around the immediate area where the pipe was unearthed was
stopped when the discovery was made.

The construction team was advised by a specialist to leave the
pipe undisturbed, because the asbestos was not airborne.

"Asbestos was regularly used in construction until the 1980s,
which is precisely why we're prepared for appropriately managing
discoveries such as these," an authority spokeswoman said.

"Our asbestos management plan was put into place and the asbestos
is being safely removed without delaying delivery of the urgently
needed Metro Tunnel project."

The huge Metro rail project has turned much of inner-city
Melbourne into a construction site, with busy Grattan Street and
Domain Street closed for the next five years, long-term lane
closures in St Kilda Road and the occupation of five city sites
where new underground train stations will be built.

The project is being built by the Cross Yarra Partnership, an
alliance comprising Lendlease Engineering, John Holland, Bouygues
Construction and Capella Capital.

The government recently announced that it is ahead of schedule,
with a revised completion date of 2025.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contractors Convicted of Illegal Removal
---------------------------------------------------------
7thSpace Interactive reported that two non-registered
contractors, who illegally removed the asbestos roofs from a
squatter structure in Fu Yung Shan Shan Tsuen in Tsuen Wan and at
Zenith Mansion on Shan Kwong Road in Happy Valley, were convicted
March 1 at Fanling Magistrates' Courts and on February 26 at
Eastern Magistrates' Courts respectively, for contravening the
Air Pollution Control Ordinance (APCO). The two contractors were
fined a total of $15,500.

An Environmental Protection Department (EPD) spokesman said that
complaints were received last June and August from members of the
public about the illegal removal of asbestos roofs in Tsuen Wan
and Happy Valley. The department conducted blitz inspections and
found that the asbestos removal works at both locations were not
carried out in accordance with the requirements stipulated under
the APCO, as no registered asbestos contractor was hired to
conduct the removal works and the EPD had not been notified prior
to the commencement of the works.

After investigation and evidence collection, the EPD initiated
prosecutions against the two non-registered contractors under the
APCO.

The spokesman said that, to safeguard public health, asbestos
abatement works must be carried out by a registered asbestos
contractor in accordance with the statutory requirements and the
code of practice on asbestos control to prevent the release of
asbestos fibres from affecting the workers and public health.
Offenders are liable to a maximum fine of $200,000 and six
months' imprisonment. Anyone failing to give not less than 28
days' written notice to the EPD of the commencement date of the
asbestos abatement work is also liable to a maximum fine of
$200,000.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Green Island Landfill
--------------------------------------------------------
Otago Daily Times reported that low risk levels of asbestos have
been found at two sites within the Green Island Landfill.

Group Manager Waste and Environmental Chris Henderson said
testing was undertaken at the landfill recently due to concerns
about stability at one of the sites.

This found asbestos levels of between less than 0.001% to 0.076%.
The acceptable level is 0.001%.

The asbestos was contained in two small areas not publicly
accessible, which are restricted to landfill staff and approved
commercial businesses.

"The level of asbestos detected presents a low risk to those
working in the area but a number of measures were taken
immediately to mitigate any possible risk.

"Staff and contractors are now required to wear personal
protective equipment, the areas have been fenced off and are
being kept wet to ensure asbestos doesn't become airborne through
dust being blown around," Mr Henderson said.

The landfill was approved to accept materials that contain
asbestos.

Monitoring equipment would also be provided to staff and added to
machinery, and the council was working on a longer term solution.
"The asbestos is contained to mitigate the risk of it spreading
further.

"There is no risk to the public, nearby properties or waterways."
One of the two sites is a designated asbestos disposal site
containing material from the Christchurch earthquake. The other
site contains wet materials including street sweepings.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dockyard Workers Heirs Get EUR12,000
-----------------------------------------------------
Edwina Brincat, writing for Times of Malta, reported that the
heirs of a dockyard worker have been awarded non-pecuniary
damages of EUR12,000 after a judge ruled that worker's right to
life was violated through his constant exposure to deadly
asbestos.

Emanuel Caruana's widow and four children had sued the Chief
Government Medical Officer and the Attorney General after medical
certificates showed beyond doubt that the pensioner's death in
September 2005 had been caused by years of exposure to the deadly
substance while working at Malta Drydocks.

The former labourer passed away after a nine-month long battle
against lung cancer at the age of 71, ten years after his
retirement.

Medical specialists testifying in civil proceedings instituted by
the deceased's heirs had declared that there existed a direct and
scientifically proved link between malignant mesothelioma and
asbestos, 'a staple material' widely used in insulation, boards
and wiring at the shipyard.

This link had been acknowledged since the 1960s, as recorded in
the British Medical Journal, the court was informed.

Mr Caruana had worked all his life at the dockyard, thereby
exposing himself to the substance which, according to a policy
manager testifying in the suit, though mostly used in its
harmless type, had nonetheless been present in a lesser amount in
its most dangerous form.

The dockyard manager had also explained how all asbestos had
eventually been dismantled and shipped abroad to be disposed of
according to established legal procedures.

Mr Justice Mark Chetcuti declared that the applicants had
sufficiently proven that their relative's death by cancer had
been caused by exposure to asbestos and this, in turn, on account
of a 'serious omission by the state' resulting in a breach of
fundamental human rights.

The dangers of the substance had long been known, the court
observed, pointing out that in spite of this not only did the
state not keep abreast with necessary legislative updates but it
had also 'failed to issue public warnings about asbestos and take
adequate preventive measures to eliminate the use of this
material so harmful to man's health.'

After taking into account all circumstances including the age of
the deceased, who had been well past the age of employment when
he died, the court declared that the protection of the man's
right to life as safeguarded under article 33 of the Constitution
and article 2 of the European Convention had been violated.

The court thereby held both respondents jointly responsible for
the payment of EUR12,000 by way of non-pecuniary damages in view
of the suffering endured by the wife and heirs of the deceased.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Machinist Names John Deere in Asbestos Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo of Madison-St. Clair Record reported that a man
formerly employed as machinist and truck driver alleges exposure
to asbestos during his career caused him to develop lung cancer.

Kenneth Bell and Mary Bell filed a complaint on Feb. 16 in the
St. Clair County Circuit Court against Armstrong Pump Co.,
Carrier Corp., John Deere Co., et al. alleging negligence.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that at various
times during the course of Kenneth Bell's work form 1964 to 1998,
he was exposed to and inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers
emanating from certain products manufactured, sold, distributed
or installed by defendants. The suit states that on or about Oct.
23, 2017, he first became aware that he developed lung cancer, an
asbestos-induced disease, and that the disease was wrongfully
caused.

The plaintiffs hold Armstrong Pump Co., Carrier Corp., John Deere
Co., and others responsible because the defendants allegedly
negligently included asbestos fibers in their products when
adequate substitutes were available and failed to provide
adequate warnings and instructions concerning the dangers of
working with or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages of more
than $50,000.

They are represented by Randy L. Gori of Gori, Julian &
Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 18-L-113


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J&J Battles Claims Talc Products Have Asbestos
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Schatz of New Brunswick Today reported that in December
2016, attorneys for Stephen Lanzo III, a 46-year-old New Jersey
resident with mesothelioma, filed a complaint against Johnson &
Johnson (J&J) and its talc supplier claiming that Lanzo's use of
J&J's baby powder caused his disease.

The trial, which is being held before Judge Ana Viscomi at the
Middlesex County Courthouse on Paterson Street, began on January
29.

It is expected to be handed to a jury for a verdict sometime in
March.

The multi-national medical corporation, which sells consumer
products, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices, has been based in
New Brunswick since it first opened for business in 1886.

Lanzo is not the first to sue J&J over its talc-based products,
which have been the target of several lawsuits from women who
alleged they contracted ovarian cancer by using the product on
their genital area, as we reported.

But it is only the second US case over claims that J&J's Baby
Powder and "Shower to Shower" products contain asbestos. J&J won
the first such mesothelioma trial, which was held in California.
Lanzo currently lives in Verona, but has also lived in California
and was diagnosed with mesothelioma, an incurable and fatal type
of cancer, at the end of July 2016, in Houston, Texas.

According the the complaint, Lanza was first exposed to asbestos
in "approximately 1972," while his last claimed exposure was in
"approximately 2003." He also smoked cigars occasionally up to
about 2002.

Lanza's attorney Moshe Maimon, of the firm Levy Konigsberg LLP,
simplified the claims for jurors in his opening statements.

"If you make a product that harms someone, you are responsible
for that harm," said Maimon, who has an office in Lawrenceville.
"It's that simple."

"We speak for Joe and [his wife] Kendra.  These are very
difficult and upsetting things that we will speak about," said
Maimon.

Lanzo's wife is also a plaintiff in the case, but doesn't have a
disease.  She was wrongfully deprived of her husband's society,
services and consortium, according the complaint.

Lanza's "malignant mesothelioma [was] caused by asbestos," Maimon
said.  "Asbestos has been documented in J&J's baby powder."

He told the jury they would view documents showing evidence that
J&J became aware talc it got from its supplier, Cyprus Amax
Minerals Company as "successor-in-interest to American Talc
Company, Metropolitan Talc Company," and others, contained
asbestos fibers, but the consumer product giant failed to warn
consumers.

But J&J and its suppliers argued that Lanzo's mesothelioma is the
result of exposure to asbestos inhaled from sources other than
baby powder. The fortune 500 company says talc products have
always been asbestos-free.

On J&J's side, Mike Brock of Kirkland & Ellis LLP told jurors
that the "supposed" link between baby powder and mesothelioma is
built on inaccurate testing methods and studies that are no
longer current.

"J&J's products never contained asbestos, and they performed
careful testing to confirm that," Brock told jurors.

"Johnson & Johnson is not responsible for the development of
mesothelioma in Mr. Lanza," he told the jury. "This is what the
plaintiffs will try to prove to you."

There is no science to support Lanza's claims, Brock argued,
saying that Lanza was exposed to asbestos at the house he grew up
in as well as in his school when he was a child.

"He had other substantial exposures," said Brock.  "He would need
to show that his disease state was caused by exposure to baby
powder and not something else."

Brock also pointed out that Lanzo has not claimed any lost income
and is actively coaching ice hockey.

"We are pleased the physicians reported that he has no recurrent
disease," said Brock.

Both lawyers educated the jurors, using slides as visual aides to
make their case.

Among the points on the J&J defense attorneys slides:
Decades of testing has consistently shown no asbestos in J&J body
powder/baby powder.

Real world studies prove that that cosmetic talc does not cause
Mesothelioma.

J&J's body powder did not cause Mesothelioma.

At issue was not only whether asbestos might have been in the
products, but also whether it was the cause of Lanza's disease,
which is a type of cancer that develops from the thin layer of
tissue that covers the lining of the lungs or chest wall.

Asbestos scars the tissue of the lungs, Maimon explained to the
jury.
The fact that Lanza is a lifelong smoker is "irrelevant," Maimon
continued, adding that asbestos found in samples of Lanza's
tissue was the same type allegedly discovered in J&J's baby
powder.

Moving to whether there was an occupational aspect to Lanza's
mesothelioma, the attorney asked: "Did Steve work in an industry
that exposed him?"

While the answer to that question was "no," the attorney admitted
that asbestos was found in the basement of a house Lanza lived
in, but it was removed without incident, he said.

"Unless it's disturbed and gets into the air, it does no harm,"
Maimon said, arguing that asbestos exposure in the home was not
responsible for his client's illness, concluding that Lanzo
wasn't exposed to any other possible sources of asbestos other
than from the baby powder he used.

The case also involved a lot of science, with many experts
testifying and lawyers providing the jury with their own geology
lessons about talc, "the softest mineral on Earth."

"Talc is a rock," explained Maimon.  "The rock is turned into
powder and what's in the powder is what originally came from the
mine."

While some of the impurities are taken out to make cosmetic grade
talc, Maimon argued that there is no way to ever get it all out.

"There was always a little bit left," he said, before making the
case that J&J had known since the 1970's that the talc in their
baby powder contained asbestos.  "If you try so hard to get it
out, it's because it is there."

In 1971, the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) was created and asbestos was the first
substance regulated by the agency, Maimon said.

Manufacturers began removing asbestos from consumer products,
buildings, libraries, and areas that children frequented,
according to Maimon.
For his part, Brock explained that there were some issues in the
1970's and testing "began ramping up and became a robust
process."

"I'm going to show you the documents, and you are going to see
that this is a problem that came up in the 70's," Brock
explained.

"A couple of scientists... were thinking about asbestos in a more
robust way and asking: are we addressing all the issues? [They]
conducted some tests, and reported them publicly," said Brock.

The tests revealed some asbestos in talcum powder and according
to Brock.

"It was widely publicized," he said.  "My client, J&J, did what
you would want a responsible company to do. It hired very, very
good experts in the field to look at the samples."

Brock said the federal Food and Drug Administration was also
interested in the issue, and never told J&J to do anything
different.

"[The FDA] hired people to look at the issue. J&J participated in
those discussions and the issue was put to rest. There was no
risk of developing a disease state from the use of J&J baby
powder," Brock argued.

"Now we are going back 40-plus years later and we are digging up
all this old stuff and we are repacking it and making a lawsuit
out of it, and that's what you are going to see as the evidence
develops in this case," said Brock.

But Maimon argued that J&J "had difficulties" trying to remove
asbestos from its talc. A mine in Vermont eventually became the
company's exclusive supplier, but that has since been outsourced
to Chinese mines.

Brock showed the jury a photo of a group of miners in Italy who
were exposed to talc daily during work, saying that they had
found "zero cases of mesothelioma" among those who worked in the
mines.

"This is not like a sprinkle a day. This is real exposure," Brock
said of the miners who milled the talc for a living.

"And here is the point to this case: Mr. Lanzo used J&J powder
from birth until 2016. He was using two of the big bottles per
month. You are not going to see any evidence in this case, not
one shred of it. There will be no direct evidence that Mr. Lanzo
ever used, a product that had asbestos," Brock said.

Maimon said that in the 1970's J&J developed a cornstarch-based
alternative baby powder. They found through customer surveys that
people liked it, he said, calling it the "Cornstarch
Contingency."

But the Lanzo family had no way of knowing that one could have
asbestos and the other one did not.

"Why didn't [J&J] go with only cornstarch? They chose not to warn
people," Maimon argued.

Brock countered in his opening by arguing that the cornstarch
version was a different product altogether, one that many
customers found less effective because it clumps together when it
absorbs sweat and doesn't provide the same "cool" feeling on the
skin as talc powder.

Brock urged the jury not to make up their mind until they hear
all of the evidence.

For his part, Maimon said the case is not about baby shampoo,
band-aids, Tylenol, J&J's medical devices, or many of the good
people who work at the company, which one of the county's largest
private employers.

"This case is about . . . actions and decisions [regarding] this
product, not the other products [sold by] the company."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Superfund Site Mobilization Begins
---------------------------------------------------
Kurt Liedtke of Herald and News reported that season three of
activities at the North Ridges Estates Superfund Site begins. It
is intended to be the final year of asbestos cleanup and storage
work for a residential area northeast of Klamath Falls that once
housed a World War II-era military hospital.

Preliminary work has already been underway for what is expected
to be a busy summer ahead to complete a multi-year project to
secure asbestos repositories, excavate remaining hazardous
asbestos materials, and restore properties and landscapes.

Official mobilization of activities commence on March 5 for the
third and final season, with full crews on-site anticipated by
April and concluding work by October.

While most of the heavy work has been completed over the past two
years, removing asbestos-contaminated trees and excavating
properties which necessitated relocating residents; the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) and North Wind still must excavate
the final 10 land parcels, remove and replace roads within the
North Ridge Estate property, close asbestos repositories and
plant new trees and plants.

The area, first developed as a military hospital during World War
II built largely out of asbestos, later became the initial campus
for Oregon Institute of Technology before being demolished in the
1970s to make way for residential properties. The demolition
process was handled poorly, resulting in much of the toxic
asbestos material ending up buried in the soil, which residents
in the North Ridge Estates properties soon began to notice
emerging from the ground following spring thaws.

After initial EPA cleanup efforts in 2006 proved unsuccessful,
the State of Oregon declared the 125-acre site a Superfund, a
federal designation for the most hazardous location in each state
necessitating federal aid for the cleanup. Once completed the
total cost to make the North Ridge Estates properties safe and
livable again is expected to top $35 million.

For season three the on-site office has been relocated to 3560
Old Fort Road, while a small veterans park that was built at the
back entrance on Old Fort Road in recognition of the site's
military base roots will also be relocated to the main entrance.

Truck traffic should be expected along Old Fort Road while work
continues, mostly to transport clean soil to the site while
contaminated materials are carefully secured in two on-site
repositories. To date, more than 150,000 cubic yards has already
been moved in the effort to remove toxic and contaminated
materials.

To prevent contamination beyond the North Ridge site, extensive
steps are taken to clean all vehicles and personnel while
minimizing access to the area.

By the fall, parcel back-fill is expected to be completed,
including repository covers and repaving of roads through the
residential properties. Even after the major work is completed
the site will continue to be closely monitored to assure
environmental and public safety.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Court Reopens Lawn Fertilizer Mesothelioma Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Mauney of Asbestos.com reported that a New Jersey appeals
court has reopened a 2012 lawsuit alleging a man developed
mesotheliomafrom using asbestos-contaminated Scotts lawn
fertilizer.

The decision comes after the discovery of new evidence the
appeals court believes "would probably have changed the result"
of the 2014 summary judgment in favor of Scotts.

The original plaintiff, Lorenz Brandecker, filed the lawsuit in
July 2012. The Wayne, New Jersey, resident claimed his twice-
yearly use of Scotts Turf Builder fertilizer from 1967 to 1980
caused him to develop mesothelioma, a terminal cancer.

According to a report from the National Asbestos Exposure Review
(NAER), a project of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR), the Scotts Company used the mineral vermiculite
in its consumer products as a carrier and filler until 2001.

From 1967 to 1980, Scotts used vermiculite from a mine in Libby,
Montana, that contained deadly asbestos.

The Scotts facility in Marysville, Ohio, exfoliated approximately
430,000 tons of Libby vermiculite during those years. The site
was included in the ATSDR Phase 1 evaluations and was listed as a
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) further action site.

Brandecker died in October 2012. His wife took over the suit as
the executrix of the estate.

New Evidence Reveals Vintage Fertilizer Samples

In the initial trial, Brandecker's lawyers asked Scotts to
provide samples of its fertilizer products manufactured with
vermiculite from Libby.

The lawn care company said it had a Turf Builder vermiculite
sample, but it could not determine when it was produced or where
the vermiculite came from. In 1980, Scotts switched to using
vermiculite ore from South Carolina, Virginia and South Africa.

The trial judge approved a motion to bar all or portions of
testimony from Brandecker's four expert witnesses because the
opinions were based on documents from W.R. Grace's Zonolite
vermiculite attic insulation and not Scotts fertilizer.

Scotts filed a separate motion for summary judgment, which was
granted on Jan. 10, 2014.

However, a few months later it was revealed Scotts had 26
"vintage" samples of Turf Builder products believed to be
manufactured with Libby vermiculite. Some of those samples were
presented in a separate 2015 case.

Scotts claims the samples were "categorized and stored" by their
attorneys in 2006 and "rediscovered" in Spring of 2014, according
to the appeals court report.

In July 2015, the counsel for Brandecker's estate filed a motion
to reopen the case. In the appeal, the plaintiff's lawyers
claimed the 26 samples constituted new evidence and that Scotts
made misrepresentations in discovery for the first trial.

A pending decision from the trial court will determine if the
plaintiff should be given addition time to file a motion
addressing the effect of the discovery violation and summary
judgement orders.

Scotts Was a Major Consumer of Libby Vermiculite

According to EPA records, the Scotts facility in Marysville was
the single largest U.S. consumer of vermiculite ore from the
Libby mines.

Several types of asbestos contaminated the Libby vermiculite
mines, including the amphibole asbestos varieties tremolite and
actinolite. The NAER report said the mines also contained the
asbestiform minerals winchite, richterite and ferro-edenite.

The EPA and the International Agency for Research on Cancer
classify all forms of asbestos as carcinogenic. Inhaling or
ingesting microscopic asbestos fibers can cause serious health
conditions such as asbestosis and mesothelioma.

Most asbestos-related diseases are diagnosed many years --
typically decades -- after initial asbestos exposure. Brandecker
was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2012, approximately 45
years after he began using the Scotts fertilizer product in
question.

Scotts used a process called exfoliation to heat and separate
non-vermiculite materials from the vermiculite used in its
fertilizer.

The vermiculite was then "trionized" by coating it with a polymer
resin called urea.

Scotts contends that even if asbestos fibers remained after
exfoliation, the trionization process coated the vermiculite,
making it safe.

In July 2017, a state court in Los Angeles ruled in favor of
Scotts in a separate lawsuit attempting to link Turf Builder to
mesothelioma. That case is on appeal.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-Contaminated House Consumed by Fire
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Hinchliffe of The Sydney Morning Herald reported that a
father and three children escaped a blaze that destroyed their
home in Melbourne's south-west.

Firefighters were called to the asbestos riddled house in Newport
just after 2.30am to find the single-storey weatherboard fully
engulfed by fire.

The intensity of the flames meant those firefighters could not
enter the building, on Graham Street, and instead acted to
prevent the blaze from spreading, saving neighbouring properties.

The man and three children living at the home had already self-
evacuated to their neighbour's place and all occupants were
accounted for.

Within 90 minutes their house was destroyed and the fire under
control.

By 7.30am Sunday morning, one fire truck and its crew remained on
scene with fire investigators expected to arrive soon to
determine a cause of the blaze which was believed to have started
in the kitchen.

A Metropolitan Fire Brigade spokesman said the asbestos in the
home posed no threat to those in the area.

He said firefighters involved in the incident would take steps to
protect themselves, including having all their clothing bagged
and taken away for treatment.

He said the water applied by firefighters would contain the
asbestos by dampening it down.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Approach to Asbestos Disposal Urged
--------------------------------------------------------
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that a lifetime of dread. This
is the best outcome that a group of innocent workers will have to
endure after their exposure to asbestos fibres at two council
sites. The worst-case scenario, which we pray will not happen,
involves a long, agonising death from one of the horrible wasting
diseases linked to contact with deadly asbestos fibres.

Today, Lisa Visentin has revealed the full horror of what
happened at two asbestos-contaminated sites at Lawson managed by
the Blue Mountains Council. The shocking details involve a litany
of neglect, bad management and appalling misconduct.

What happened in Lawson needs to be widely known and those who
made the decisions that led to these actions must be held
accountable. The council has already agreed to a number of
recommendations to improve its work practices, and is fighting
deregistration moves by the state government.

However, the issue of asbestos disposal is something that must
involve all levels of government.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption last year
recommended the NSW government should consider creating a
standalone asbestos dumping offence and establish a new regulator
to confront ongoing issues with black market waste dumping.

The commission had heard an illegal dumper disposing of one load
of an average 30-tonne truck could avoid up to $13,500 in tip
fees, including nearly $4000 in government levy payments.

Last year, a Herald investigation uncovered serious flaws in the
response to the illegal dumping of asbestos as removal jobs boom
in NSW.
Criminal operators stand to pocket huge sums by leaving their
asbestos on vacant lots and streets. Fines amount to small
fractions of the profits they stand to make. Prosecutions are
rare.

And the stakes are very high. Peter Tighe, chief executive of the
Asbestos Safety and Eradication Agency, has said that 2000
Australians die each year of painful asbestos-related diseases
such as lung cancer, asbestosis and mesothelioma.

Ironically, some of the high cost of dumping in NSW, which
creates the incentive to flout the laws in the first place, comes
from the government's

Waste Less Recycle More levy, which has raised the price of
dumping at a metropolitan tip from $58.80 a tonne in 2009 to
$135.70 last year. The levy is set to raise $337 million over the
next four years. Of that, $65 million has been set aside to fund
the fight against illegal dumping.

But what if the government made it easier, not harder, to safely
get rid of asbestos? What if they were to subsidise the extra
expense involved in safe disposal so businesses and homeowners
could cheaply and easily get rid of this toxic waste?

The Australian Safety and Eradication Agency, waste contractors'
associations, the diseases foundation and the acting NSW
Ombudsman have all argued that some forms of asbestos should be
exempted from dumping levies. There have also been local trials
to encourage the safe disposal of small amounts of domestic
asbestos.

Governments are always loath to take on extra costs. But in the
case of asbestos, doing nothing will ultimately lead to higher
costs, in the form of prolonged healthcare and compensation. That
is before you consider the horrible human cost. The lessons from
James Hardie, the Australian firm that manufactured asbestos in
the first place and for many years covered up the health risks
involved, show that it is cheaper and kinder to tackle this
problem sooner rather than later.

We need to make sure there are no more "Lawsons" and prevent a
lifetime of anxiety and possible untimely deaths for workers and
their families.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Council Failed to Protect Workers From Asbestos
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Visentin of The Sydney Morning Herald reported that the Blue
Mountains city council is facing an unfolding asbestos crisis,
after an independent inquiry found the council instructed its
workers to dig up, transport, and sift through soil it knew was
contaminated with asbestos.

As a result of critical failures by the council, which were
driven by cost-cutting concerns, an unknown number of workers
were exposed to potentially dangerous levels of asbestos,
including one man who was exposed for an entire month.

The scandal stems from a council decision in 2016 to build a car
park on an empty block of land next to the Lawson Community Hall,
and to authorise the transportation of the contaminated soil to a
nearby council stockpile site.

The Sun-Herald can reveal that, for two weeks, the council has
sat on damaging findings from an independent inquiry into its
asbestos management practices for the Lawson car park and
stockpile site.

The findings provide a damning chronology of events, beginning
with the revelation that the council had known since 2012 the car
park land was contaminated with asbestos. It then failed to
remediate it, before instructing workers to begin earthworks in
November 2016.

Workers were then exposed to further asbestos risks when they
were instructed by council to "screen" the asbestos from the
soil, so that the soil could be reused as fill or recycled.

This instruction, the report found, appeared to be driven by
financial and cost saving imperatives, after staff identified
between $40,000 to $50,000 could be saved in waste disposal fees
if the soil was "clean" of asbestos.

Both the recycling and reuse of asbestos waste in any form is
unlawful under the NSW Protection of the Environment Operations
(Waste) Regulation.

The findings are contained in a report by lawyer Michael Tooma,
an expert in occupational health and safety law, who was
appointed in November to investigate the council's asbestos
management practices.

Mr Tooma's report on the Lawson sites was the first of several
reports to be provided to the council, as part of his broader
investigation.

The council has kept the report confidential since receiving it
on February 16, while it seeks legal advice on its release.

However, the Sun-Herald has confirmed the detail of the report
and its findings through multiple sources who have read the
report.
The fact that contaminated soil was found at the Lawson sites is
not in dispute.

The council confirmed to the Sun-Herald that the contaminated
soil remained at the Lawson stockpile site until January, when
1,000 tonnes of material identified as "asbestos containing
material" was removed by licensed contractors.

A further 945 tonnes of possible "asbestos containing material"
was also removed as a precautionary measure.

In response to the crisis, the council has rolled out a voluntary
lung screening program for all employees, which is being
administered by the Dust Disease Board.

Over 130 employees have already been screened. Of these, 77
workers have been as "medium-to-high priority" based on their
potential exposure to asbestos, and taking into account the
nature of their work and the frequency of access to certain work
sites, including the Lawson sites, a council spokesperson said.

The Sun-Herald has confirmed that the Tooma report identifies 10
critical failures in council processes which culminated in
workers being unwittingly exposed to asbestos risks.

It also identifies instances where workplace and safety
regulations appear to have been breached, and, in some instances,
it identifies the council chain of command in connection with
those potential breaches.

At the time of the car park's construction, the council officers
responsible for the project management were aware of the
existence of a contamination assessment for the car park site,
the report found.

The Sun-Herald has obtained a copy of this assessment, which was
provided to the council in 2012 when it entered into a long-term
lease of the site from the Roads and Maritime Services.

The assessment stated that two pieces of asbestos were identified
at the site and "their visible presence suggests there is the
potential for more to be present".

"In addition to this, one piece was degraded, increasing the
chance of respirable fibres becoming airborne," the assessment
said.

The assessment recommended that an asbestos management plan be
implemented "to ensure the appropriate identification, removal
and validation of the asbestos contamination prior to
construction of the proposed development."

This plan was never prepared, and the contamination assessment
was not included on the project brief given to the council's
construction team, the Tooma report found.

In total, the report found that at least four separate work crews
were potentially exposed to the asbestos containing soil at the
Lawson sites between November 2016 and September 2017.

The first work crew worked on the car park's construction, which
began in November 2016. During the construction, workers found
asbestos pieces and raised the alarm with their superiors.
However, instead of halting construction and arranging for the
site to be tested, the report found that the council officers
authorised the transportation of the contaminated soil to the
Lawson stockpile site. The site is located on Park Street, one
kilometre from the car park.

These acts were identified in the report as a potential breach of
regulation 419 of the Work Health and Safety Regulations, which
states it is unlawful to "direct or allow a worker to carry out
work involving asbestos".

The report then details the "screening" process undertaken by a
construction worker at the stockpile yard. The Sun-Herald
understands that a single worker performed this "screening"
activity over a period of four weeks, using a piece of machinery
called a "hopper" or a "shaker".

When the worker discovered what he believed to be asbestos pieces
during the "screening" process, he was instructed by his
supervisor that it was not dangerous because it was bonded. He
was directed to continue the work, but to stay in the cabin and
wear a dust mask.

The Sun-Herald has been told the worker remained concerned and
attempted to further protect himself by wearing a higher quality
industrial mask, called a P2 mask.

The Tooma report found a further three crews worked in the
vicinity of the contaminated material at the Lawson stockpile
site between April and September 2017, sources confirmed.

During this period, no signs were erected to warn workers of the
potential presence of asbestos at the site.

At least one crew disturbed the stockpiles in July 2017,
including loading and unloading the soil off a truck, during the
course of training exercise where workers were taught to operate
an excavator. These workers were only informed in October that
the stockpiles were contaminated.

The report also found that soil from the stockpiles was also used
as fill at a private residence. The Sun-Herald has been told this
land has now been remediated.

The council declined to respond to questions about whether any
disciplinary action has been taken against any staff following
the receipt of Mr Tooma's report two weeks ago.

However, the council has accepted the 10 recommendations of the
Tooma report, which were made public, and which included
extensive reviews of existing council policies and staff roles,
as well as implementing new programs and staff training programs.

Local government Minister Gabrielle Upton was also provided a
copy of the Tooma report more than a week ago. Her office
declined to confirm whether she has read it.

The status of the report, and Mr Tooma's ongoing investigation
into the council, has been mired in uncertainty since conflict of
interest allegations were levelled at Mr Tooma.

The allegations, first raised on air by 2GB radio host Ray Hadley
on February 13, related to an apparent failure by Mr Tooma to
disclose his friendship with the council's acting director of
service delivery, Mark Mulligan, prior to commencing his
investigation.

Mr Tooma has strongly refuted the allegations, stating that no
conflict arose because Mr Mulligan's period of employment by the
council began one week before the investigation commenced,
placing him outside the scope of the inquiry.

The alleged conflict of interest is now at the centre of a legal
fight between the council and Ms Upton, after she seized on the
allegations and issued the council with a suspension order.

In her formal notice to the council, Ms Upton detailed concern
that "the processes adopted by council did not ensure that prior
associations were disclosed to the council when engaging Mr
Tooma".

The legal proceedings are now before the Land and Environment
Court, where the council is seeking an injunction to stop the
minister from executing the suspension order, which would see the
elected body suspended for three months and interim administrator
installed.

The Sun-Herald put a series of questions to Ms Upton on Friday,
including whether she still believed serious conflict of interest
issues had compromised Mr Tooma's investigation, and whether she
had confidence in his findings.

She declined to respond, citing the ongoing legal proceedings.

The council's 10 critical failures identified in the Tooma
report:

   1. Failure to remediate the soil

   2. Failure to place land on contaminated land register or
council's property information system

   3. Failure to prepare adequate project brief

   4. Failure to respond adequately to discovery of contamination
report

   5. Failure to make adequate inquiries regarding project

   6. Failure to stop work and engage licensed asbestos removal
contractor upon first asbestos find.

   7. Authorising the transport, and transporting, contaminated
soil to a stockpile site

   8. Instructing "screening" of contaminated soil by workers

   9. Failure to label contaminated soil at the stockpile site
and isolate the depot where the contaminated soil was stockpiled

  10. Authorising reuse of contaminated soil


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pipe Connecting Power Plant Lined With Asbestos
----------------------------------------------------------------
Marie Sharp of East Lothian Courier reported that coastal
communities could face an environmental disaster if they do not
put pressure on East Lothian Council and ScottishPower to find a
solution over a disused ash pipe, campaigners fear.

The pipe, which connected the former Cockenzie Power Station with
the ash lagoons at Levenhall has long been believed to be lined
with asbestos.

Campaigners say that it needs to be removed before the power
station and surrounding land is sold but it is understood that
East Lothian Council, which is the preferred bidder for the
ScottishPower-owned site, is unwilling to take ownership of it.

Prestonpans community councillor Calum Miller said that when
council officials were asked what would happen if the pipe broke
during a storm in 10 years' time, he was told "call Madrid" -- a
reference to the Spanish owners of ScottishPower Iberdrola.

He said: "The pipe is not deemed to be East Lothian Council's
responsibility, it will be retained by ScottishPower.

"We need action now. We need to look to other community councils
to join us in putting pressure on the local authority to demand
this is dealt with.

"There has to be a very public discussion about the pipe and the
impact it could have if it breaks, not just here but along the
coast and out to sea."

Councillor Fiona O'Donnell, ward member, said that negotiations
between
ScottishPower and East Lothian Council over the future of the
site were complex.

She told the community council: "They make Brexit look like a
breeze."

Fellow ward councillor Neil Gilbert added that the pipe -- part
of which, it is claimed, has been exposed from behind the
crumbling concrete casing originally put on it -- was part of the
sea defence walls. He said:

"Presumably if it is removed then something else would have to be
put in its place."

ScottishPower came under fire for failing to respond to repeated
calls from the community council for action to be taken on the
pipe.

Ferhan Ashiq, chairman of Preston Seton Gosford Area Partnership,
said: "They are not responding to us right now, never mind 10
years down the line."

ScottishPower confirmed it would be retaining the pipe in its
ownership for the foreseeable future.

A spokesperson said: "The original pipeline was manufactured
using cement with a very small amount of asbestos mixed in, which
was a common construction practice at the time.

"Some sections have been replaced with non-asbestos mix over the
years and ScottishPower continues to monitor, inspect and
maintain the pipeline to ensure it remains in a safe condition.

"We are continuing with the sale of the main Cockenzie station
and coal yard sites whilst the ash pipes along the remaining
route will remain in ScottishPower's ownership. As part of
ongoing management and maintenance of the pipelines, A visual
survey has now been undertaken on the pipeline route and some
minor general maintenance tasks identified to ensure the
pipelines are protected and remain in a safe condition."

A spokesperson for East Lothian Council said: "The ash pipe is
not part of the current negotiations with ScottishPower over the
future ownership of the site.

"The council along with local stakeholders is keen to understand
what ScottishPower's intentions are for the future maintenance
arrangements and the legacy of the ash pipe."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dad's Buddies Died Early Due to Asbestos
---------------------------------------------------------
Dave Himelfield of Huddersfield Examiner reported that today if
you work with asbestos you'll be given an arsenal of protective
gear and a long health and safety briefing before you're allowed
anywhere near it.

But when Frank Graham was working with the deadly material in the
1930s and 40s health and safety in the factory was virtually non-
existent.

Frank, who also worked with dangerous chemicals in the 1940s and
50s, was lucky.

Despite repeated exposure to lethal substances he lived to 88.
But his colleagues weren't so lucky, many of them dying in their
40s and 50s.

Between 1938 and 1940 he worked at Cocking Mill, Old Leeds Road,
making gaskets for motor vehicles from asbestos.

Asbestos was once used as an insulating material until people
released it caused mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer.
Frank's older son Douglas said: "They used to get big blocks of
asbestos and they would put them in these big machines that
flattened the asbestos.

"Then there were 20 women sat at a long table pressing gaskets
with their hands. They were covered in this white dust.

"They wouldn't have had any protective equipment in those days.
"That was how it was in those days; there was no health and
safety."

Douglas, 72, added: "You hear of women who have actually died
from washing asbestos from their husband's clothes."

Frank even saw the factory foreman hit and killed by a wagon when
its brakes failed while delivering asbestos to the premises.
And when Frank and his colleagues demanded extra pay for working
in hazardous conditions they were sacked on the spot, Douglas
said.

Frank served in the army during World War Two setting up anti-
aircraft guns before taking a job at ICI, Leeds Road, making
explosives.

The pay was good and Frank, who died in 2008, enjoyed the varied
social life that ICI put on for its employees.

But again dangerous chemicals were involved.

Douglas, from Berry Brow, said: "When he came home from work he
had green stuff on his ears, blue over his face and stuff all
over his hands.

"His colleagues were dying from bladder cancer. Thank God he got
out of there."

Frank moved onto David Brown engineers in Meltham working as a
mechanist before working for WC Holmes, at Turnbridge, which made
fans and furnaces.

Douglas said: "Holmes was a good place to work with good
conditions and it was run properly."

He added: "My dad wanted to work and he worked hard."

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Caught Illegally Taking Asbestos to Landfill
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Queensland Times reported that a man has been fined $36,000
for unlawfully transporting tonnes of asbestos to a Swanbank
landfill site.

The Ipswich Magistrates Court was told the man transported
approximately 21 tonnes of asbestos from a site at Haigslea in
2015 and deposited it at the Swanbank facility.

He did not have Environmental Authority to do so.

Department of Environment and Science officials had previously
attended the Haigslea site three times where asbestos material
was visible.

In 2015, an inspector from Workplace Health and Safety Queensland
also saw what he believed to be asbestos material on the site.
On August 7, 2015 a witness saw the man leaving the site in a
truck which contained asbestos material.

The man was found guilty on February 23 of carrying out an
environmentally relevant activity without an Environmental
Authority, contrary to the Environmental Protection Act 1994.

He was also found guilty of failing to record the prescribed
information in relation to the transport of asbestos on August 7,
2015.

The man was fined $35,000 for unlawfully transporting asbestos,
$1,000 for the waste tracking offence. He was also ordered to pay
legal costs of $4,500 and investigation costs of $1,241.20.
The Department regards dumping asbestos without the appropriate
approval and failing to provide the required information in a
waste tracking certificate as serious matters.

As no conviction was recorded, the Department cannot publish the
name of the offender.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bill Could Rob Victims Rights for Justice
----------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Bowman of Indianapolis Star reported that his eyes
flickered open, but just briefly.

The TV hummed softly in the background, probably on the westerns
channel,Larry Myers' favorite, but his wife, Loa, can't quite
remember.

"Do you need anything?" she asked, more out of love than any
expectation he would answer or that she could actually do
something.

Larry was tired, his eyelids heavy.

Heavier still were his lungs. Each breath waged a war against the
foreign fibers that had invaded his body and the tumors claiming
their territory -- each breath a losing battle.

Yet lying in the hospital bed, the machine's slow beeps betraying
the hopes that Loa would be able to bring her husband home, Larry
was still a winner. Just one year before, the lifelong Hoosier
and his wife had waged another battle in the court rooms of
Indiana.

This one was for the right to hold accountable those who
knowingly produced and exposed him to the asbestos fibers that
shackled his lungs. For the right to seek justice for the
mesothelioma cancer that, just hours after Loa posed her
question, claimed Larry's life at 79 years old.

The state's Supreme Court agreed with the Myers in its March 2016
opinion. That decision reaffirmed a previous court ruling that
said a provision in the Indiana Product Liability Act, which set
a cutoff period for when lawsuits could be brought against
manufacturers, did not apply to latent diseases such as those
caused by asbestos exposure.

"I think Larry knew that there wasn't much they could do for him,
but there's other people that are going to suffer with this
disease," Loa said, sitting recently at her kitchen table in the
home where she and Larry lived for the last 40 years of their 60-
year marriage. "If anything, this fight was for everybody, not
just for him."

But now, nearly two years after that ruling and one year after
Larry's death, a bill is working its way through the state's
General Assembly that could effectively kill not only future
asbestos lawsuits but also likely derail the more than 50 cases
currently pending in the state.

Here's why: The bill seeks to undue the Supreme Court ruling in
the Myers case and again impose that cutoff, or what in legal
terms is called a statute of repose. That means no one could sue
a manufacturer if more than 10 years had passed since the person
first became exposed to asbestos.

The problem is,mesothelioma and other diseases caused from
exposure to asbestos can take decades to present itself,
sometimes as many as 50 years, according to the Asbestos Disease
Awareness Organization. Asbestos disease is rarely diagnosed
within 10 years of exposure.

And even if that were the case, the law also states that a
medical diagnosis of an asbestos disease is only valid for the
purpose of taking legal action if that diagnosis is made 15 years
after the first exposure -- or 5 years past the cutoff to sue.

"So within the four corners of the bill itself, it's creating an
impossibility and setting an impossible standard," said Kathy
Farinas with the Indianapolis-based firm George & Farinas, which
represents asbestos victims across the state. "That statute
completely extinguishes any person's right to bring a cause of
action against those manufacturers."

If the proposal in the bill to create the 10-year cutoff becomes
law, Indiana would be the only state in the country where there
is not an exception to the statute of repose for latent or
asbestos diseases.

The legislation, titled the Asbestos Litigation bill, is authored
by Rep. Matt Lehman, R-Berne, and is crafted from a 2007model law
by the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).

The law, House Bill 1061, is being pushed by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, both of
which lobby for business interests.

Generally speaking, proponents of the law believe allowing
businesses to be held financially liable for actions committed
years, even decades, prior is an unfair burden that creates
financial uncertainty.

Specific to Indiana, Lehman also believes the Myers ruling that
undid the 10-year cutoff was, in essence, the courts making
legislation.

"The concern that I have," Lehman said, "is that I think it is
the responsibility of this legislative body to make public
policy. Not the judicial branch, but the legislative branch."

When asked whether his legislation, in effect, prevents any
future asbestos lawsuits he said it "in no way limits Hoosiers'
rights to seek justice," adding that the cutoff section of the
bill will be further examined.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Hinders Hospital ICU Plan
---------------------------------------------------
Mike Houlahan of Otago Daily Times reported that Dunedin
Hospital's much-delayed intensive care unit project has suffered
another setback which will result in the full facility not
opening until next year.

The hospital's present ICU is outdated, and in 2014 its training
accreditation was withdrawn by the College of Intensive Care
Medicine of Australia and New Zealand.

Four years on, intensive care specialists still cannot train at
Dunedin Hospital, although the Southern District Health Board
says it plans to request reaccreditation when the ICU rebuild is
complete and commissioned.

Work began on the first stage of the project last June, and the
SDHB expects 12 new beds will come into use on the fifth floor of
Dunedin Hospital's ward block in the second half of this year.
The second stage of the 22-bed unit, which combines ICU and the
existing high-dependency unit (HDU) and was originally scheduled
to be open at the end of this year, will be completed in the
first half of 2019.

"The unexpected discovery of asbestos in the site and proactive
measures to protect staff and patients from construction noise by
relocating a sixth-floor ward have slowed progress," SDHB chief
executive Chris Fleming said.

"This illustrates the challenges of working in an operational
hospital, and why it was the right decision to build a brand-new
hospital instead of attempting to refurbish the existing one."
A separate project for a new gastroenterology unit is on schedule
and will open in June this year, and in line with the timetable
to roll out the national bowel screening programme.

The redeveloped ICU is a stop-gap measure until the new Dunedin
Hospital is built -- a project not likely to be completed until
between 2022 and 2025.

Initially budgeted to cost $11 million, it was revealed last year
the cost of the new ICU  had risen to $14.8 million, the tight
market in Dunedin for building work being cited as a factor in
the increase.

Resident Doctors Association national secretary Deborah Powell
said delays getting the ICU back up to a training standard made
Dunedin a less  attractive place for junior doctors.

"If you are doing basic training, OK, but in terms of training
for the entire pathway through to vocation and registration,
Dunedin is just not making the grade, which is sad," she said.

"On the one hand, you can understand it because they have an
awful building which provides all sorts of barriers, but on the
other they don't seem to be putting the infrastructure which
supports training too high up the priority list."

The College of Intensive Care Medicine examines each training
hospital when it reapplies for accreditation to ensure it still
meets required standards.

If it fails, the college supplies a report stating why, but has
no further involvement with the hospital until it reapplies for
accreditation.

"It is a fairly straightforward process for any hospital [to be
reaccredited] if they have the will to change things," college
national chairman Jonathan Casement said.

The college provided guidelines for ICUs to meet minimum
standards for training, information which was available for those
designing a new unit for the hospital rebuild, he said.

A unit also had to have certain staffing levels to be an
accredited training facility.

Mr Fleming said while work in Dunedin's present ICU could not
count towards CICM's formal training programme, the department
still offered training opportunities.

"We still are able to continue to provide training and experience
in the care of critically unwell patients to a mixture of
medical, surgical, rural, and emergency medicine trainee doctors
and also to overseas anaesthetic and intensive care doctors
seeking education and experience in a busy general intensive care
unit," he said.

"We also continue to enjoy a reputation for providing excellent
aero-medical retrieval training and experience in the transfer of
critically unwell patients."

There were no other issues over training accreditation elsewhere
in the hospital, and training and education would remain a
function of both the old and new Dunedin hospitals, he said.

"The new hospital will be built to contemporary quality standards
to meet relevant accreditation requirements.

"This will include a professional development unit responsible
for education and training, as is the case in the current
hospital."


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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