/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/180313.mbx
C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R
Tuesday, March 13, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 52
Headlines
ACCIDENT FUND: Court Denies Bid to Stay "Beatty" Suit
ADELPHIA SUPPLY: Final Judgment in "Bolling" TCPA Suit Sought
ALABAMA: City Sued Over Taxes for Nixed School System
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Settlement in "Larey" Has Final Approval
APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Gender Pay Discrimination
APPLE INC: Cal. App. Vacates Class Cert in Power Button Suit
ALUF PLASTICS: Orangeburg Residents Sue Over Smell
AMD: Faces More Spectre Class-Action
BELLE OF SIOUX: CAA Seeks to Certify Class of Charitable Entities
BEVERLY HEALTH: April 30 Hearing on Approval of "Ahmed" Deal
BIOVERATIV INC: Faces Booth Trust Suit Over Sanofi Merger
BOLLA OPERATING: "Benitez" Seeks to Recover Spread-of-Hours Pay
BRAZTECH INT'L: Magistrate Recommends Merging "Bedwell," "Burrow"
BRISTOL-MYERS: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
CEVA GROUP: Court Enjoins McEvoy from Prosecuting CIL Suit
CHALK MOUNTAIN: "Cervantes" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
CHAPARRAL ENERGY: Objection to West Class Action Claim Granted
COMCAST CABLE: Court Dismisses "Scott" FLSA Suit
COMMONWEALTH BANK: CBA Denies AUSTRAC Class Action Liability
CORECIVIC INC: Forces Immigrant Detainees to Work, Class Says
DOMETIC CORP: April 19 Hearing on "Papasan" Transfer Bid
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Envision Faces Possible Florida Class Action
FACEBOOK INC: Can't Dodge Class Suit Over Facial Data Harvesting
FORJAS TAURUS: Magistrate Recommends Merging "Bedwell," "Burrow"
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS: Sued for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES: Class of Workers Certified in "Holland"
GENERAL MOTORS: "Frank" Suit Seeks Damages for Defective Air Con
GEO GROUP: 10th Cir. Affirms Certification of 2 "Menocal" Classes
GOOGLE LLC: Judge Orders Class to Amend Fraud Claims
HELIX TCS: Appeals D. Colo. Ruling in "Kenney" Suit to 10th Cir.
HONEYWELL INT'L: Santiago Seeks to Certify Property Owners Class
HOUGHTON PLOT: Class Action Lawsuit Filed
HOOVESTOL INC: Terry Moves to Certify Class and 7 Subclasses
HULU LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under Labor Code, Van Auken Says
IDEA BUYER: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Knight" AIPA Suit
ILLINOIS: Court Denies "Smith" in Forma Pauperis Bid
INDIO, CA: Sued Over "For Profit Prosecution Scheme"
INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Court Certifies Class in Levin Hat TCPA Suit
INTERNATIONAL MARINE: $61K Deal in "Velazquez" Suit Has Final Nod
IOVANCE BIOTHERAPEUTICS: Judge Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Suit
KERN COUNTY, CA: Juvenile-Detention Staffers Sued Over Teen Abuse
LEAPFROG: Will Pay $5.5MM to Settle a Shareholder Class Action
LONE STAR WRECKER: Garcia Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Pay
MASSACHUSETTS: Dookhan Defendants Sue for Return of Probation Fee
MASSMUTUAL: Accused of Shorting Policyholders on Dividends
MCDONALD'S RESTAURANTS: Sued Over Failure to Properly Pay Workers
MDL 2741: "Boblitz" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: "Wilson" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Calif.
MDL 2804: Catoosa Joins Lawsuit Against Drug-Makers
MILDON BUS: Counsel Has 30 Days to Replace Plaintiff
MILDON BUS: Wins Summary Judgment in Community School's TCPA Suit
MIMEDX GROUP: Block & Leviton Files Class Action
MOTOROLA INC: Must Face Claims for Birth Defects
MURATA MANUFACTURING: Cambridge Alleges Inductor Price-rigging
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Class Certification Sought in "Gajewski" Suit
NQ MOBILE: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Action
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL: Court Won't Review Denial of Judgment
OHIO: Tax Collection Lawsuit Dismissed
PENN MUTUAL: Brown Appeals Decision in "Harshbarger" to 3rd Cir.
PETRELLA PHILLIPS: Atty Fees Bid in Malpractice Suit Dismissed
PLATINUM LIMOUSINE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in "Pelayo"
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE: Ct. Won't Amend Denial of Class Cert
RESTORATION HARDWARE: Unnamed Member Can't Appeal w/o Notice
RIOT BLOCKCHAIN: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
RIVERSOURCE LIFE: Davis Moves for Certification of Three Classes
SANTEE COOPER: S.C. Electric Cooperatives Plan to Sue
SILVERTON INT'L: "Cohen" Hits Misclassification, Seeks OT Pay
SNYDER'S-LANCE: "Daniel" Suit Seeks to Halt Sale to Campbell Soup
STAGES OF BEAUTY: Court Narrows Claims in "Lopez" Suit
STATE FARM: Court Allows Spine Care to Amend Suit
SWEPI LP: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in "Rogers" Suit
TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces "Rexhepi" Suit in California Over IPM Defect
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Refuses to Certify Subclass in "Ferris"
TRINITY INDUSTRIES: City Settles Guardrail Spear Action for $400K
TRUMP NAT'L GOLF: Settles Golfers' Suit for $5.4-Mil.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Demurer to Evidence in UCL Suit Affirmed
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers' Suit Granted Class Certification
UBIQUITI NETWORKS: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
UBIQUITI NETWORKS: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action
UNITED OF DEFENDANT: Class Certification Sought in "Bentley" Suit
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA: Tribunal Accepts Class Suit
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH: Camesi Appeals Ruling to Third Circuit
VITAL RECOVERY: "Garvin" Suit Disputes Collection Letter
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Settles U.S. Diesel Owner Lawsuit on Eve of Trial
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY: Negligent With Data, Suit Says
WELLS FARGO: Crooks Files Suit Over FCRA Breach
WEST REVENUE: Gerlach Seeks Compensation for Missed Breaks
WESTERN EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice "Ratliff" Suit
WYNDHAM VACATION: Loses Bid for Partial Findings re Evidence
WYNN RESORTS: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Suit
*********
ACCIDENT FUND: Court Denies Bid to Stay "Beatty" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL BEATTY, Plaintiff, v. ACCIDENT FUND GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-1001-NJR-
DGW (S.D. Ill.), Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the
Defendants' Motion to Stay Initial Disclosures and Discovery
Pending Ruling on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.
On Sept. 19, 2017, Beatty filed a three count class action
complaint against 45 Defendants, generally alleging the various
insurance companies and third party administrators entered into a
conspiracy to deprive Illinois physicians of the interest
payments they are entitled to under 820 ILCS 305/8.2(d)(1-3), and
fraudulently concealed their failure to pay the statutorily
required interest. In response, the Defendants have filed
various Motions to Dismiss, some assert Beatty's claims are
partially barred by the statute of limitations, others allege
Beatty has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Those motions are currently pending before the District
Court.
On Jan. 5, 2018, a telephonic Scheduling Conference was held in
which all of the parties participated. The hearing addressed the
parties' disagreements about the scope of discovery on the issue
of class certification. During that hearing, the Defendants
requested an extensive amount of discovery, including the
opportunity to file both 40 joint and 25 individual
interrogatories (totaling over 1,100), as well as the opportunity
to depose Beatty for up to seven hours jointly and then three
hours individually (totaling 142 hours).
The Court ultimately entered a Scheduling Order that provided the
Defendants with a substantial amount of discovery, but less than
they had requested. Four days later, the Defendants filed their
Motion to Stay Initial Disclosures and Discovery Pending Ruling
on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss filed by all Defendants arguing
that discovery will be unduly burdensome in light of the pending
motions to dismiss and that a stay would be a cost effective
measure to ensure that they are not burdened with expensive
discovery.
The Defendants' main argument is that they should not be burdened
with discovery because the Illinois Courts have recently ruled
that insurers have no obligation to pay statutory interest under
the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act ("IWCA"). Beatty responds
that the case law cited by the Defendants is irrelevant because
his claims are brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, not
the IWCA .
Given their attempts to obtain even more discovery, Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson finds the Defendants' claim about the excessive
expense somewhat disingenuous. Further, while it is true
discovery may appear extensive if the Defendants are considered
as a group, there is no showing that the burden on each
individual Defendant is actually onerous. If anything, discovery
in the case is substantially more onerous for the Plaintiff, who
objects to the Stay. For these reasons, discovery will not be
stayed pending resolution of the Motions to Dismiss.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/a24J4d from Leagle.com.
Michael Beatty, Plaintiff, represented by John G. Simon --
jsimon@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC, Benjamin R. Askew --
baskew@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC, Robert H. Wendt --
rwendt@wendtlawfirm.com -- Wendt Law Firm & Kevin M. Carnie, Jr.
-- kcarnie@simonlawpc.com -- Simon Law Firm PC.
Accident Fund General Insurance Company, Accident Fund Insurance
Company of America & Accident Fund National Insurance Company,
Defendants, represented by John Sandberg --
jsandberg@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg, Phoenix et al.,
Anthony L. Martin -- amartin@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg,
Phoenix et al. & Natalie J. Kussart --
nkussart@sandbergphoenix.com -- Sandberg, Phoenix et al.
Acuity, A Mutual Insurance American Compensation Insurance
Company, Defendant, represented by Glenn F. Fencl --
fenclg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell LTD., Amber N. Lukowicz --
lukowicza@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell, Ltd. & Genevieve M.
LeFevour -- lefevourg@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
American Zurich Insurance Company & Zurich American Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Bruce M. Engel --
bengel@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP, Patrick C. Frye --
pfrye@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP & Robert M. Baratta,
Jr. -- bbaratta@freeborn.com -- Freeborn & Peters LLP.
Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company & Auto Owners Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Lori A. McAllister --
lmcallister@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC.
Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Wendy N. Enerson -- wenerson@cozen.com -- Cozen
O'Connor & Thaddeus C. Baria -- tbaria@cozen.com -- Cozen
O'Connor.
Broadspire Services Inc. & Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Richard B. Polony --
rpolony@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson & Kyle C. Oehmke -
- koehmke@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.
Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Edward S. Bott, Jr. -- esb@greensfelder.com -- Greensfelder,
Hemker & Gale, PC & Robert Duckels -- rld@greensfelder.com --
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, PC.
Constitution State Services, LLC & Travelers Property & Casualty
Company of America, Defendants, represented by Raja S. Gaddipati,
DLA Piper US LLP & Joseph Anton Roselius --
joseph.roselius@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.
Chubb Indemnity Insurance Company, ESIS, Inc. & Indemnity
Insurance Company of North America, Defendants, represented by
Mark D. Bauman -- mbauman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson,
David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson & James M. Brodzik -- jbrodzik@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.
Commerce and Industry Insurance Company, Inc., Illinois National
Insurance Company, Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania
& New Hampshire Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by
Shane W. Blackstone -- sblackstone@winston.com -- Winston &
Strawn, Adam J. Kaiser -- adam.kaiser@alston.com -- Alston & Bird
LLP & Steven Robert Campbell -- steven.campbell@alston.com --
Alston & Bird LLP.
ADELPHIA SUPPLY: Final Judgment in "Bolling" TCPA Suit Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BOLLING PRESCRIPTION LAB, INC., d/b/a ROSELAND
PHARMACY, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. ADELPHIA SUPPLY USA,
INC., YUDAH NEUMAN, REUVEN SOBEL, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants,
Case No. 17 CV 1485 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks Judge Manish
S. Shah of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to (i) enter a final judgment against the Defendants in
the amount of $42,000 in statutory damages pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"); and (ii) enjoin the
Defendants from sending advertisements by facsimile without prior
express invitation or permission and without a statutorily-
compliant opt-out notice.
The Plaintiff is an independent pharmacy located in Chicago, Cook
County, Illinois. Adelphia is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in Brooklyn, Kings County, New York.
Upon information and belief, Adelphia was dissolved on June 29,
2016.
On Feb. 27, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the action against the
Defendants to secure redress for the Defendants' transmission of
unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines to the
Plaintiff, and others, in violation of the TCPA and the common
law of conversion. The Defendants sent 28 junk faxes to the
Plaintiff for which the Plaintiff seeks recovery under the TCPA.
On June 6, 2017, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint stating the same claims as the original complaint. All
three Defendants have been served in the action and none of them
have filed a responsive pleading, nor filed an appearance or
otherwise communicated with the Plaintiff or its counsel within
the 21-day period provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
On Aug. 3, 2017, the Court entered an order of default as to all
three Defendants and granted the Plaintiff leave to move for
prove up of damages and final judgment. The Plaintiff seeks
entry of a final judgment against the Defendants in the amount of
$42,000 in statutory damages pursuant to the TCPA.
The Defendants did not send the faxes accidentally, therefore
they sent the fax advertisements to the Plaintiff willfully or
knowingly and thus trebling is appropriate. As a result, the
Plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,500 for each of the 28 junk
faxes Defendants sent them, a total of $42,000 for violating the
TCPA.
A full-text copy of the Plaintiff's Motion is available at
https://is.gd/b8I6Qd from Leagle.com.
Bolling Prescription Lab, Inc., doing business as Roseland
Pharmacy, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip A. Bock --
phil@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch,
Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Caleb Stephen Frigerio, Bock, Hatch,
Lewis & Oppenheim, Mara Ann Baltabols -- mara@classlawyers.com --
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC & Tod Allen Lewis --
tod@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC.
ALABAMA: City Sued Over Taxes for Nixed School System
-----------------------------------------------------
Daniel Jackson, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
an Alabama resident leading a class action claims he has for the
last four years paid taxes to a Birmingham suburb for a school
district that doesn't exist.
Because a racial desegregation order has governed the Jefferson
County Board of Education since 1971, students from predominantly
black communities can attend schools in the city of Gardendale by
taking advantage of a majority-to-minority transfer provision.
As its schools became more racially diverse than the city
population, Gardendale, a city of under 14,000 north of
Birmingham, launched a grassroots effort in 2012 to create a
separate municipal school system.
Filed February 23 in Jefferson County Circuit Court, Gardendale
resident Jay Campbell's class action seeks a declaration that a
tax earmarked for the city's own school district is illegal, as
well as an order for taxpayers to be refunded.
The lawsuit comes less than two weeks after the 11th Circuit
barred the predominantly white Glendale from operating its own
school system, finding that racial discrimination motivated the
secessionist movement and the separation would hamper
desegregation efforts in Jefferson County.
"Gardendale has not appropriated or used any of the money
collected under the municipal tax since it began being collected,
but rather is holding those monies," Campbell's complaint states.
"And now, they cannot be used for that purpose, because
Gardendale is legally prohibited from operating public schools."
The lawsuit adds that the collected taxes have been used for
"paying school administrators to supervise a non-existent school
system, and . . . . funding lawyers to prosecute a
catastrophically, and now finally, unsuccessful effort to form a
splinter district."
Lead plaintiff Campbell is represented by attorney Wilson Green,
Esq. with Fleenor and Green in Tuscaloosa, Ala., who declined to
comment on the lawsuit. Gardendale did not immediately respond
February 26 to a request for comment.
Over the last few years, according to the complaint, residents
like Campbell have been doubly taxed.
In 2014, the city - authorized by a referendum - began to collect
a tax from its residents to pay for its own school district,
which it hoped to form after it seceded from the county's school
system.
But at the same time, Gardendale residents continued to pay taxes
to fund Jefferson County's school district, the complaint states.
According to a lawsuit Gardendale filed in 2015, the northern
Birmingham suburb formed its own board of education but the
county refused to cede control of the schools at issue, even
though then-State Schools Superintendent Tommy Bice authorized
the separation. The city and the county have been in litigation
ever since.
Campbell's lawsuit argues double taxation is illegal, but if the
court finds the city's tax permissible, then he asks for a
declaratory judgment and an order making the county repay him and
other Gardendale residents.
"Alternatively, Gardendale cannot lawfully use its taxing
authority to displace the county's authority," the complaint
states.
On Feb. 13, the 11th Circuit denied the city's request to run its
own schools. U.S. Circuit Judge William Pryor wrote in a 62-page
decision that allowing the separation would exacerbate the
problem of segregation and go against a 1971 desegregation order.
According to the Atlanta-based appeals court's order, Gardendale
is about 88 percent white. The three-judge panel led by Pryor
upheld the district court's finding that the city's "secession
movement communicated 'messages of inferiority' to black
students."
As an example, the 11th Circuit pointed to comments on a Facebook
page maintained by local secession leaders, including one post
that compared Gardendale's predominantly white population with
the more diverse population in Gardendale schools.
"A look around at our community sporting events, our churches are
great snapshots of our community. A look into our schools, and
you'll see something totally different," the post allegedly
stated.
The 11th Circuit overturned the district court's decision to
allow a partial succession.
"The finding that a racially discriminatory purpose motivated the
Gardendale Board also obliged the district court to deny the
motion to secede," Pryor wrote.
The decades-old desegregation order was put in place after a
black father sued Jefferson County's school district in 1965,
alleging the biracial district violated his daughter's rights
enumerated by the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The deregulation order may soon be a thing of the past, though.
The 11th Circuit panel noted that the district court may receive
"a plan for the final resolution of this litigation, which has
lasted more than half a century."
The case is JAY CAMPBELL, on behalf of himself and other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF GARDENDALE,
ALABAMA; JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, and J.T. SMALLWOOD, in his
official capacity as Tax Collector of Jefferson County, Alabama,
Defendants, Case No. _______________, filed with the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County, Alabama.
OF COUNSEL:
James E. Fleenor, Jr., Esq.
Wilson F. Green, Esq.
Fleenor & Green LLP
1657 McFarland Blvd. N., Ste. G2A
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35406
Tel: (205) 722-1018
Email: wgreen@fleenorgreen.com
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Settlement in "Larey" Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL H. LAREY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:14-cv-4008
(W.D. Ark.), Judge Susan O. Hickey of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas, Texarkana Division, granted the
Plaintiff's Agreed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Class Certification for Settlement Purposes,
Appointment of Class Representatives and Appointment of Class
Counsel.
Larey, the sole remaining named Plaintiff, filed the operative
complaint, the Second Amended Class Action Complaint, alleging
that Allstate violated applicable law and breached its contracts
with insureds by depreciating labor when calculating actual cash
value payments for structural claims. Allstate has denied, and
still denies, any liability, wrongdoing, and damages with respect
to the matters alleged in the Complaint.
After litigation between the Parties and arms-length negotiations
between the Class Counsel and Allstate's counsel, the Parties
reached a settlement that provides substantial benefits to the
Class, in return for a release and dismissal of claims against
Allstate.
The Plaintiff and Allstate executed the Stipulation of Settlement
and exhibits thereto on May 31, 2017. The Parties executed a
Revised Stipulation of Settlement and exhibits thereto on Oct. 2,
2017.
On June 2, 2017, the Parties filed with the Court the original
Stipulation of Settlement, along with a Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Proposed Settlement. On Sept. 25, 2017, the
Court entered its Order Preliminary Approving Class Settlement,
preliminarily approving the Stipulation, preliminarily certifying
the Class as a class action for settlement purposes only, and
scheduling a hearing for Feb. 1, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. to consider
final approval of the Proposed Settlement and other actions
described in the Preliminary Approval Order and the Stipulation.
As part of its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court
conditionally certified for settlement purposes only a class
defined as all persons in Arkansas who had a Covered Loss, where
estimated labor depreciation was initially deducted from the
claim payment, and where the claim was paid at less than the
limit of liability (accounting for deductible) as set forth on
the declarations page of the applicable Policy.
On Jan. 26, 2018, the Plaintiff moved the Court for Final
Approval of the terms of the Proposed Settlement and for the
entry of the Final Order and Judgment. The Settlement provides
substantial monetary benefits to the Class Members who timely
submit completed Claim Forms. In addition, Allstate has agreed
to fund the costs of notice and settlement administration.
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge Hickey confirmed the final certification of the Class for
the purpose of the Settlement, in accordance with the
Stipulation. She granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval and all provisions and terms of the Stipulation are
finally approved in all respects. The Parties to the Stipulation
are directed to consummate the terms of the Stipulation in
accordance with its terms, as may be modified by subsequent
orders of the Court.
Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Judge appointed Larey as the Representative
Plaintiff for the Class, and the following counsel are appointed
as the counsel for the Class: D. Matt Keil, Esq., William B.
Putman, Esq., John C. Goodson, Esq., R. Martin Weber, Jr. Esq.,
A.F. "Tom" Thompson, III, Esq., Richard E. Norman, Esq., Kenneth
P. Castleberry, Esq., James M. Pratt, Jr., Esq., Jack Austin
Mattingly, Jr., Esq., Matthew L. Mustokoff, Esq., and Richard A.
Russo, Jr., Esq.
The Judge granted the Class Counsel's Application for Fees.
Pursuant to Rule 23(h), she awarded the Class Counsel the total
sum of $412,500 in attorneys' fees and costs. In addition, she
awarded the Representative Plaintiff a service award of $5,000.
Payments to the Class Members who timely file a completed Claim
Form will be made in the amounts, within the time period, and in
the manner described in the Stipulation.
Judge Hickey appointed James W. Tilley as the Neutral Evaluator
to carry out the duties and responsibilities set forth in the
Stipulation. She dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety on the
merits, with prejudice and without leave to amend, without fees
or costs to any party except as otherwise provided.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Final Order and
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/G9g5AL from Leagle.com.
Michael H. Larey, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by D. Matt Keil,
Attorney at Law, George L. McWilliams, Law Office of George L.
McWilliams, P.C., John C. Goodson, Keil & Goodson, William B.
Putman, Putman Law Office, A.F. (Tom) Thompson, III , Murphy,
Thompson, Arnold, Skinner & Castleberry, Jack Austin Mattingly,
Jr., Mattingly Roselius PLLC, James M. Pratt, Jr., James M.
Pratt, Jr., P.A., Jason Earnest Roselius, Mattingly & Roselius,
Kenneth P. Castleberry, Murphy, Thompson, Arnold, Skinner &
Castleberry, Matthew L. Mustokoff -- mmustokoff@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, R. Martin Weber, Jr. --
mweber@crowleynorman.com -- Crowley Norman LLP, Richard E. Norman
-- rnorman@crowleynorman.com -- Crowley Norman LLP, Richard A.
Russo, Jr. --rrusso@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP &
Tanner Hicks, Mattingly Roselius PLLC.
Allstate Property and Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
Christopher J. Heller --heller@fridayfirm.com -- Friday, Eldredge
& Clark, Mark L. Hanover -- mark.hanover@dentons.com -- Dentons
US LLP, pro hac vice & Leah R. Bruno -- leah.bruno@dentons.com --
Dentons US LLP.
APPLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Gender Pay Discrimination
------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Apple pays women "experts" less than it pays similarly situated
men, a class action claims in L.A. Superior Court.
APPLE INC: Cal. App. Vacates Class Cert in Power Button Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
One, issued an Opinion vacating the trial court's judgment
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned APPLE INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; ANTHONY SHAMRELL et al., Real Parties
in Interest, No. D072287 (Cal. App.).
The Cal. App. is presented with an issue of apparent first
impression: Does the Supreme Court's analysis of the
admissibility of expert opinion evidence in Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747
(Sargon) apply when a trial court considers a motion for class
certification?
Plaintiffs alleged that Apple's iPhone 4, 4S, and 5 smartphones
were sold with a defective power button that began to work
intermittently or fail entirely during the life of the phones.
The power button (also known as the sleep/wake button) is
important to the operation of Apple's iPhones. A malfunctioning
power button can prevent a user from powering the phone on or
off, rebooting the phone, locking the phone's screen, and putting
the phone to sleep. Plaintiffs alleged Apple knew of the power
button defects based on prerelease testing and post-release field
failure analyses, yet Apple began selling the phones and
continued to sell the phones notwithstanding the defect.
Based on these allegations, plaintiffs asserted causes of action
under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and for breach of express and implied
warranty. Plaintiffs sought certification of their lawsuit as a
class action, restitution, compensatory and exemplary damages,
injunctive relief, and reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Opposition
Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify two classes, one for iPhone
4 and 4S purchasers and one for iPhone 5 purchasers. The proposed
classes consisted of California citizens who had purchased the
specified iPhones and whose iPhone power button stopped working
or worked intermittently during the phone's warranty period. The
warranty period was one year from the date of purchase for the
iPhone 4 and 4S and three years from the date of purchase for the
iPhone 5.
Following oral argument on plaintiffs' motion, the trial court
found that plaintiffs had not shown that common questions
predominate and declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed classes.
The court did not believe plaintiffs had adequately shown how the
fact of damage could be proved on a class-wide basis. For
example, plaintiffs had not shown how the total number of
affected purchasers would be calculated or how Xitco would
calculate damages for the classes. Given the complexity of the
issues involved, however, the court did not deny plaintiffs'
motion outright. The court allowed plaintiffs to file
supplemental documents addressing the court's concerns.
Order Granting Class Certification
After oral argument, the court issued a lengthy minute order
granting plaintiffs' motion to certify their proposed classes.
The order confirmed the court's belief that Sargon did not apply.
The court stated, "The issues Apple raises with respect to the
materials Plaintiffs' experts will rely upon in forming their
opinions and whether Plaintiffs' experts' analyses rely on
accepted methodologies and whether the analyses are correct are
issues for trial. These issues are common to the class."
Apple challenged the court's class certification order by
petition for writ of mandate in this court. Apple argued the
court erred because it failed to apply Sargon, because it did not
credit evidence of post-sale events, and because it found that
common issues would predominate at trial.
Class Certification Overview
The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the
discretion of the trial court, and Cal. App. affords that
decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest
abuse of discretion. Because trial courts are ideally situated
to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting
group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or
denying certification. A certification order generally will not
be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial
evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on
erroneous legal assumptions. Predominance is a factual question;
accordingly, the trial court's finding that common issues
predominate generally is reviewed for substantial evidence. The
Court must presume in favor of the certification order the
existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce
from the record.
Expert Opinion Evidence in Class Certification
In Sargon, the Supreme Court built on prior interpretations of
these statutes and provided definitive guidance to courts
considering the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Under
Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the trial
court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony
that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not
reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material
on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative. This means that a
court may inquire into, not only the type of material on which an
expert relies, but also whether that material actually supports
the expert's reasoning. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.
The Cal. App. sees no reason why Sargon should not apply equally
in the context of class certification motions. There is only one
standard for admissibility of expert opinion evidence in
California, and Sargon describes that standard. The Court bound
to adhere to that decision. The Court would conclude that its
standards for admissibility apply here. Although class
certification is merely a procedural device, and not a
determination on the merits, it has profound consequences for the
trial court's management of the litigation and the rights of the
parties. The corrosive effects of improper expert opinion
testimony may be felt with substantial force at class
certification, just as at summary judgment or at trial. The trial
court's gate-keeping role serves a similar salutary purpose in
each of these contexts.
The trial court here expressly declined to apply Sargon. In its
order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification, it
wrote that Apple's criticisms of plaintiffs' experts based on
Sargon were issues for trial: The issues Apple raises with
respect to the materials Plaintiffs' experts will rely upon in
forming their opinions and whether Plaintiffs' experts' analysis
rely on accepted methodologies and whether the analyses are
correct are issues for trial. Similarly, regarding the Apple
documents Xitco proposed to rely on for cost of repair, the court
wrote, Although Apple argues its documents do not provide the
information necessary to Plaintiffs' experts' analysis, the
merits of Plaintiffs' experts['] analysis and conclusions are
common to the class and are issues for trial.
The court's analysis does not follow Sargon, which expressly
requires trial courts to consider the materials and methodologies
of proposed expert opinion evidence. Where the matter relied
upon does not provide a reasonable basis for the opinion or the
opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture, the opinion
may be excluded. Such deficiencies may well be common to a
proposed class, but that does not mean the class should be
certified on that basis. The court erred by holding otherwise.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the superior
court to vacate its April 14, 2017, order granting plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and reconsider that motion in
accordance with the views expressed herein.
A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' January 29, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybrqtgfr from
Leagle.com.
O'Melveney & Myers, Matthew D. Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- E.
Clay Marquez and Kelsey M. Larson -- klarson@omm.com -- for
Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Doyle Lowther, William J. Doyle -- bill@doylelowther.com -- John
A. Lowther -- john@doylelowther.com -- and Chris W. Cantrell,
Suite 150. 10200 Williow Creek Road. San Diego, CA 92131; Gomez
Trial Attorneys, John H. Gomez -- john@gomeztrialattorneys.com --
and Deborah S. Dixon -- ddixon@gomeztrialattorneys.com -- Niddrie
Addams Fuller, Rupa G. Singh for Real Parties in Interest Anthony
Shamrell and Daryl Rysdyk.
ALUF PLASTICS: Orangeburg Residents Sue Over Smell
--------------------------------------------------
Kimberly Redmond, writing for Lohud, reports that claiming that
odors released from a plastic manufacturing plant have forced
them indoors and made them captive inside their homes, a group of
Orangeburg residents has filed a class-action lawsuit against
Aluf Plastics.
The suit, filed February 20 in state Supreme Court in Rockland
County, seeks compensation for "the nuisance" as well as any
"negative impact" the smell has had on property values.
It also asks that the company be ordered to change the way it
operates its Glenshaw Street facility "to significantly reduce,
if not eliminate the emission of odors."
While only six plaintiffs are listed, their attorney Michael
Greenspan,Esq. said more than 195 households have contacted him
to "document their experiences with odors" they attribute to
Aluf. He said he believes there are more than 3,000 homes in the
factory's 1.5-mile radius that are impacted.
Describing the "noxious odors" as "invading, indecent and
offensive to the senses," the lawsuit said it prevents residents
from being able to enjoy their properties.
Complaints about the smell -- which has been described as
everything from "a burning, chemical, plastic odor" to "a
chemical perfumey kind of scent" by residents -- first began
about two years ago.
Residents have told The Journal News/lohud that while the scent
is not consistently in the air, it arrives unexpectedly at random
times throughout the week and can linger for quite some time.
Typically, residents said they notice it the most on Sundays, but
complaints have been registered both day and night on weekdays.
Since 2016, more than 100 complaints have been logged with the
Town of Orangetown, and the state Department of Environmental
Conservation, as well as Aluf. There have also been community
meetings and discussions between the town, DEC and Aluf.
Aluf manufactures industrial liners and other plastic products in
its 500,000-square foot factory on Route 303.
Residents believe an increase in the number of extruders -- which
are used to melt solid plastic so it can be re-manufactured into
new plastic products such as bags, liners and film -- has "caused
noxious odors."
When Aluf first opened the factory in the 1980s, there were eight
extruders. Now, there are 80 and the plant is running six days a
week, 24 hours a day, according to the suit.
It also alleges Aluf of being negligent by not installing and
maintaining "adequate technology to properly control its
emissions," particularly the facility's air filters and carbon
filtration system.
Plaintiffs Joseph and Elizabeth Dudley said it makes them "feel
captive in our own home" and has "forced" them to come indoors on
many occasions.
Also involved with the suit are residents Alex Gadd, Jennifer
Gadd, Daniel Sullivan and Allyson Sullivan. Just one defendant is
listed - Aluf Plastics.
Representatives from Aluf Plastics could not be reached for
comment February 21.
In early 2017, an engineering consultant hired by the Town of
Orangetown found there were no unusual odors nor odor-causing
chemicals above allowable levels in the area during a series of
air quality tests in the fall and winter of 2016, the Journal
News reported at the time.
In the past, Aluf has suggested the smell could be coming from
other manufacturers in the area.
Changes, such as replacing and repairing air filters and air
ducts, have already been made. The company also launched a
website, alufcommunity.com, to try and keep residents better
informed.
It has said it would work on upgrades to its ventilation and
filtration systems to address indoor air quality and potential
emissions, however zoning board approval is required to install
them. The town's litigation to stop Aluf from releasing any odors
is on hold pending the installation of the new systems, the
company has also said.
Orangetown's Town Supervisor Chris Day said, "This lawsuit is
another tool by which to ensure neighborly behavior, one which
should not have been necessary but sadly is. Orangetown is open
for business, but we expect all our residents of all types to be
good neighbors and follow the law."
He added: "The town continues pursuing enforcement action, to
include filing new violations and referring Aluf back to the
Zoning Board of Appeals due to their denial of access for our
testers, a violation of the performance standards which could
result in revocation of their permit for new equipment." [GN]
AMD: Faces More Spectre Class-Action
------------------------------------
Carly Page, writing for The Inquirer, reports that AMD has been
slapped by more class-action lawsuits over its handling of the
Spectre CPU flaws affecting its chips.
The firm has already been whacked by one lawsuit courtesy of
shareholder Doyun Kim, who claims that AMD artificially inflated
its stock price by keeping quiet about the fact that Spectre
flaws affect its chips, and now it's facing three more.
As reported by The Register, "at least" four separate lawsuits --
including the above -- have now been filed against the chipmaker
at the US district court in San Jose.
The three newly-uncovered cases represent pissed-off punters who
purchased AMD processors. They allege that the firm, which was
warned about Spectre by Google's Project Zero in June last year,
continued to market its processors as high-performance chips
despite knowing that this level of performance wasn't possible
without exposing users to the Spectre attack.
In particular, the lawsuit calls out AMD's Ryzen Threadripper
1950X and 1920 processors, which were launched in July and August
last year, respectively.
"Despite its knowledge of the Spectre Defect, AMD continued to
sell its processors to unknowing customers at prices much higher
than what customers would have paid had they known about the
Spectre Defect and its threat to critical security features as
well as on the processing speeds of the devices they purchased,"
one of the complaints reads.
The plaintiffs go on to argue that a permanent fix will be
difficult to roll out and will likely cause a drop in
performance.
"The software updates or 'patches' pushed by AMD onto CPU owners
does not appear to provide protection from all the variants of
Spectre. At the very least, firmware updates or changes will be
required. Even then, these 'patches' dramatically degrade CPU
performance," they said.
The aforementioned shareholder complaint seeks damages on behalf
of anyone who bought AMD shares in the year leading to January 11
2018, the date AMD admitted its processors were vulnerable to
both variants of the Spectre attacks.
"As a result of defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the company's common
shares, plaintiff and other class members have suffered
significant losses and damages," the filing states.
News of AMD's legal wrangling comes just days after Intel
admitted it had so-far been hit by 32 -- yes, 32 -- lawsuits over
the Meltdown and Spectre flaws found in its processors.
"As of February 15, 2018, 30 customer class action lawsuits and
two securities class action lawsuits have been filed," explained
Intel in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing.
The chipmaker is being hit from two sides, with customer class
action looking to sue it for "monetary damages and equitable
relief" and the securities lawsuits seeking action against Intel
and its top brass. [GN]
BELLE OF SIOUX: CAA Seeks to Certify Class of Charitable Entities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY OF
SIOUXLAND on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated
v. BELLE OF SIOUX CITY, L.P.; and IOWA GAMING COMPANY, LLC, and
PENN NATIONAL GAMING, INC., Case No. 5:16-cv-04141-LRR (N.D.
Ia.), seeks an order certifying the case as a class action with
the class defined as:
All charitable entities MRHD identified in its November 21,
2016 resolution, in accordance with its role as the only
licensed Qualified Sponsoring Organization in Woodbury
County, Iowa, as eligible recipients for the distribution
and/or administration of grants for the available portion of
three percent of Belle's adjusted gross receipts for
calendar months May, 2013 through July, 2014, which Belle
would have been legally required to remit to a Qualified
Sponsoring Organization had Belle lawfully operated the
Argosy Casino Sioux City during that period.
The action challenges the Defendants' alleged failure to remit 3%
of the Belle of Sioux City, L.P.'s adjusted gross receipts from
operating the Argosy Casino Sioux City during the calendar months
May 2013 through July 2014 to charity as Belle previously
promised and in accordance with the obligations of all lawfully
operating casinos in the State of Iowa. The Defendants, thereby,
enriched themselves at the expense of CAA and similarly situated
charitable entities, the Plaintiff contends.
CAA also asks the Court to appoint Lane & Waterman LLP as class
counsel.
A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PmdbDSyc
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Terry M. Giebelstein, Esq.
Richard A. Davidson, Esq.
LANE & WATERMAN LLP
220 North Main Street, Suite 600
Davenport, IA 52801-1987
Telephone: (563) 324-3246
Facsimile: (563) 324-1616
E-mail: TGiebelstein@L-WLaw.com
RDavidson@L-WLaw.com
BEVERLY HEALTH: April 30 Hearing on Approval of "Ahmed" Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HENNA AHMED, an individual, Plaintiff, v. BEVERLY
HEALTH AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, LLC and Does 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-01747-WBS-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge William S. Shubb of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California reset
the hearing date for final approval of class action settlement.
The Court's Feb. 7, 2018 Order be amended as follows: The hearing
set for May 14, 2018 is reset for April 30, 2018.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/1vVpLn from Leagle.com.
Henna Ahmed, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Joshua Wasserman --
rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley P.C.
Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., a California
Corporation, Defendant, represented by Adriana Cara --
adriana.cara@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Andrew B.
Millar -- drew.millar@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, pro
hac vice, Charles Matthew Roesch -- chuck.roesch@dinsmore.com --
Dinsmore and Shohl LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica Grace Wilson --
jessica.wilson@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP & Susan
Jackson -- susan.jackson@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore & Shohl LLP,
pro hac vice.
BIOVERATIV INC: Faces Booth Trust Suit Over Sanofi Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
Booth Family Trust, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated v. Bioverativ Inc., John G. Cox, Brian S. Posner,
Alexander J. Denner, Geno J. Germano, Louis J. Paglia, and Anna
Protopapas, Case No. 1:18-cv-10287-MLW (D. Mass., February 15,
2018), is brought on behalf of all public stockholders of
Bioverativ Inc., to enjoin the expiration of a tender offer on a
proposed transaction, pursuant to which Bioverativ will be
acquired by Sanofi through its indirect wholly-owned subsidiary
Blink Acquisition Corp.
According to the complaint, Bioverativ filed a
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which recommends that
Neustar stockholders tender their shares in favor of the Proposed
Transaction. However, the Recommendation omits or misrepresents
material information concerning, among other things: (i)
Bioverativ management's projections, utilized by the Company's
financial advisors, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC and Guggenheim
Securities, LLC, in their financial analyses; (ii) the sale
process that resulted in the Proposed Transaction; (iii) the data
and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses that
support the fairness opinions provided by J.P. Morgan and
Guggenheim; and (iv) potential conflicts of interest of Company
insiders. The failure to adequately disclose such material
information constitutes a violation of the Exchange Act as
Bioverativ stockholders need such information in order to make a
fully informed decision whether to tender their shares in support
of the Proposed Transaction or seek appraisal. The Complaint says
the Proposed Transaction will unlawfully divest Bioverativ's
public stockholders of the Company's valuable assets without
fully disclosing all material information concerning the Proposed
Transaction to Company stockholders. To remedy the Defendants'
Exchange Act violations, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the expiration
of the Tender Offer unless and until such problems are remedied.
Bioverativ Inc. is a global biotechnology company focused on the
discovery, research, development and commercialization of
innovative therapies for the treatment of hemophilia and other
blood disorders. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
733 Summer Street, Suite 304
Stamford, CT 06901
Telephone: (203) 992-4523
Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
E-mail: shopkins@zlk.com
- and -
Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
WEISSLAW LLP
1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Telephone: (212) 682-3025
Facsimile: (212) 682-3010
E-mail: racocelli@weisslawllp.com
mrogovin@weisslawllp.com
kkeenan@weisslawllp.com
BOLLA OPERATING: "Benitez" Seeks to Recover Spread-of-Hours Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
WALTER HERNANDEZ BENITEZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. BOLLA OPERATING LI CORP. d/b/a BOLLA
MARKET, and BOLLA OPERATING CORP., d/b/a BOLLA MARKET, Case No.
601411/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., January 31, 2018), seeks
to recover alleged unpaid spread-of-hours pay and other damages
on behalf of all of the Defendants' current and former Deli
Workers and Clerks, based on Bolla Market's violation of the New
York Labor Law.
Bolla Operating LI Corp. and Bolla Operating Corp. are domestic
corporations, authorized to do business pursuant to the laws of
the state of New York. The Defendants, which do business as
Bolla Market, maintain their principal place of business in
Garden City, New York.
Bolla Market owns and operates over 45 locations in the state of
New York. Bolla Market's primary purpose is serving food or
drink items. Bolla Market's customers purchase their food and
beverage from Bolla Market for on-premise and take-out
consumption. Bolla Market's locations are not full-service
restaurants.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Troy L. Kessler, Esq.
Garrett Kaske, Esq.
SHULMAN KESSLER LLP
534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275
Melville, NY 11747
Telephone: (631) 499-9100
Facsimile: (631) 499-9120
E-mail: tk@shulmankessler.com
gkaske@shulmankessler.com
- and -
Anthony A. Capetola, Esq.
THE LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY A. CAPETOLA
Two Hillside Avenue, Building C
Williston Park, New York 11596
Telephone: (516) 746-2300
E-mail: acapetola@capetolalaw.com
BRAZTECH INT'L: Magistrate Recommends Merging "Bedwell," "Burrow"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to consolidate the case, SUZANNE M.
BEDWELL, individually and as mother and next friend of R.Z.B., a
minor and ERNEST D. BEDWELL, individually and as father and next
friend of R.Z.B., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. BRAZTECH INTERNATIONAL,
L.C., Defendant, Case No. 17-Civ-22335-TORRES (S.D. Fla.) with
William Burrow and Oma Louise Burrow v. Forjas Taurus and
Braztech, case no. 1:16-cv-21606-EGT.
The Bedwell Plaintiffs filed the action on Sept. 16, 2016 (four
months after the Burrow case) in the U.S. Court for the District
of Alaska as a proposed class action alleging negligent design or
manufacture of Rossi-brand .357 Magnum revolvers. On Jan. 20,
2015, Ms. Bedwell purchased a Magnum revolver at an outdoor
equipment retailer in Wasilla, Alaska.
On Feb. 21, 2015, Ms. Bedwell, along with her husband and son,
drove to an ammunition store to purchase supplies before driving
to Palmer, Alaska to engage in target practice. In the process
of exiting the motor vehicle in the parking lot, the revolver
inadvertently fell out of its holster, landed on its hammer, and
unintentionally discharged a round of ammunition that struck Ms.
Bedwell's son in his left leg. Ms. Bedwell suggests that the
accidental discharge of the firearm was directly and proximately
caused by the firearm's defective condition, including
manufacturing and/or design defects.
As a result of the injury to Ms. Bedwell's son, Alaska state
troopers were called to the scene. After hearing Ms. Bedwell's
explanation for the cause of the accident, the officers took the
firearm into their possession. On April 14, 2015, Alaska state
troopers tested Ms. Bedwell's firearm for a potential misfiring
defect by tapping the revolver on the hammer with a small mallet.
The test allegedly resulted in an unintentional misfiring of the
weapon. The Plaintiff then purchased three additional Rossi .357
revolvers and a local gunsmith tested them for defects. Out of
the three, one discharged in the same way as Ms. Bedwell's
revolver when struck on the hammer with a mallet.
As such, Ms. Bedwell filed the class action seeking to force
Braztech to recall, repair, and/or repurchase the defective .357
revolvers sold to Ms. Bedwell and the class. Specifically, the
Bedwell Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class that
includes all individuals in the United States and its territories
who own a Rossi .357 Magnum revolver. The Magnum revolvers
include models R46202, R46102, R97206, and R97104.
In sum, the Bedwell Plaintiffs allege that Braztech violated the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, committed two
counts of negligence (failure to warn and failure to test), and
breached several warranties. Judge Sedgwick, in the District of
Alaska, transferred the case to the Southern District of Florida
pursuant to the first-filed rule because there was substantial
overlap between Bedwell and Burrow.
William Burrow and Oma Louise Burrow filed their complaint on May
5, 2016 with allegations that certain handguns that Forjas Taurus
manufactured -- and that Braztech distributed in the United
States -- are defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Specifically, the Burrow Plaintiffs claim that several handguns
share safety features with identical designs and that they are
prone to drop-fires. The Burrow Plaintiffs own a Rossi .38
Special which allegedly discharges when dropped. As such, the
Burrow Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class that
includes all individuals in the United States who own a Revolver.
The revolvers are defined as models R35102, R35202, R85104,
R97206, R97104, R46202, and R46102.
The Court issued its Scheduling Order in the Burrow case on June
28, 2016. That Order initially established a trial date of March
5, 2018 with a discovery deadline of Oct. 4, 2017 and a deadline
for motions for Oct. 9, 2017. These deadlines were subsequently
extended and a new trial date is set for July 16, 2018. The
discovery deadline is now Feb. 2, 2018 and the deadline to file
motions is April 13, 2018. To date, the Burrow Plaintiffs have
issued discovery requests to both Braztech and Forjas Taurus, and
both the Defendants have produced documents in response.
Braztech moves to consolidate the action with the Burrow case.
Braztech argues that there is substantial overlap between Bedwell
and Burrow and that consolidating the two actions should be in
the interest of all parties. First, Braztech contends that both
cases involve the same models of Rossi-branded.357 branded Magnum
revolvers. Second, Braztech suggests that both cases involve
common questions of law and fact such as the allegations that the
revolvers contain a defective hammer-block mechanism. Third,
Braztech argues that the two cases present the same issues as to
whether the revolvers discharge when dropped as a result of a
manufacturing or design defect.
On Nov. 8, 2017, the Burrow Plaintiffs filed a motion to
intervene to Braztech's motion to consolidate. On Dec. 7, 2017,
the Bedwell and Burrow Plaintiffs filed an amended response to
Braztech's motion to consolidate. Both sets of the Plaintiffs
now agree with Braztech that the best way to protect the
interests of absent class members is to have everyone in a single
case represent both the .38 Special purchasers and the .57 Magnum
purchasers.
Magistrate Judge Torres explains that the only contested issue is
whether these cases should be merged into one action or
consolidated solely for discovery and class certification
purposes. The primary objection from Braztech is that Forjas
Taurus will be prejudiced because the Bedwells could assert new
claims against a new defendant that they previously chose not to
sue. The Magistrate Judge finds at least two ways that the
Bedwells could still pursue their claims against Forjas Taurus,
weakening any argument that Forjas Taurus will be prejudiced as a
result of a merged case. Accordingly, Bedwell and Burrow will be
merged into one case pursuant to Rule 42 for all purposes,
including trial.
Given the commentary to Rule 23 and the Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth), the Magistrate Judge finds that the
appointment of interim counsel is inappropriate in the case
because there is a single law firm seeking to represent the
proposed class of .38 Special owners, and a different law firm
proposing to represent the non-overlapping proposed class of .357
Magnum owners. Absent special circumstances, he prefers to
consider the appointment of the class counsel when there is a
motion for class certification. Accordingly, there is no need to
appoint interim class counsel at this time.
As to the final issues to address: (i) whether the personal
injury claims -- and the related counterclaims -- in Bedwell
should be stayed and (ii) whether the Scheduling Order in Burrow
should be modified, Magistrate Judge Torres directs the parties
to confer and advise the Court through a joint status report of
how much additional time is needed to accommodate the merger of
these two cases for all purposes, including trial. A joint
status report will be submitted within 14 days from the date of
the Order. Upon review of the parties' submission, a revised
Scheduling Order will be entered.
For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Torres granted in
part and denied in part Braztech's motion to consolidate. The
Burrow Case and the Bedwell Case are merged for all further
matters. A copy of the Order will be filed in both actions, but
all further filings will be submitted only in Burrow. He
directed the parties to confer and advise the Court through a
joint status report of how much additional time is needed to
accommodate the merger of these two cases. A joint status report
will be submitted within 14 days from the date of the Order. Upon
review of the parties' submission, a revised Scheduling Order
will be entered.
The Magistrate Judge stayed the personal injury claims -- and the
related counterclaims -- in Bedwell pending final disposition of
the merged action in Burrow. The Burrow and Bedwell Plaintiffs
will file a consolidated complaint within 21 days from the date
of the Order. He denied the appointment of interim class counsel
at this time.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/pI6U3f from Leagle.com.
Suzanne M. Bedwell, as mother and next friend of R.Z.B., a minor
& Ernest D. Bedwell, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian William
Warwick -- bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com -- Varnell & Warwick,
P.A., Christian Bataille, Flanigan & Bataille, pro hac vice &
Richard Blackburn Adams, Jr., Cole Scott & Kissane.
William Burrow & Oma Louise Burrow, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew Franklin Knopf -- andrew@knopfbigger.com --
Paul Knopf Bigger.
Braztech International LC, Defendant, represented by John B.
Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness & Johnson, LLC,
John P. Marino -- jmarino@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell &
Russell, LLP, John F. Weeks -- jweeks@sgrlaw.com -- IV, Smith,
Gambrell & Russell, LLP & Kristen W. Bracken --
kbracken@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP.
Braztech International, L.C., Counter Claimant, represented by
John B. Thorsness, Clapp Peterson Tiemessen Thorsness & Johnson,
John Patrick Marino, Smith Gambrell Russell, John F. Weeks, IV,
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP & Kristen Wenger Bracken, Smith
Gambrell & Russell, L.L.P..
Ernest D. Bedwell, Counter Defendant, represented by Brian
William Warwick, Varnell & Warwick, P.A., Christian Bataille,
Flanigan & Bataille & Richard Blackburn Adams, Jr., Cole Scott &
Kissane.
Suzanne M. Bedwell, Counter Defendant, represented by Brian
William Warwick, Varnell & Warwick, P.A., Christian Bataille,
Flanigan & Bataille & Richard Blackburn Adams, Jr., Cole Scott &
Kissane.
BRISTOL-MYERS: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company ("Bristol-Myers" or
the "Company") (NYSE:BMY) and certain of its officers. The
class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
Southern District of New York, and docketed under 18-cv-01611, is
on behalf of a class consisting of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired common shares of Bristol-Myers between January
27, 2015 and October 9, 2016, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.
If you are a shareholder who purchased Bristol-Myers securities
between January 27, 2015, and October 9, 2016, both dates
inclusive, you have until April 10, 2018, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-
free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number
of shares purchased.
Bristol-Myers is a global biopharmaceutical company that
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and sells
pharmaceutical and nutritional products. Bristol-Myers products
and experimental therapies address cancer, heart disease, HIV and
AIDS, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, hepatitis, organ transplant
rejection, and psychiatric disorders.
As of January of 2015, the Company's CheckMate-026 study
investigating the use of Opdivo (nivolumab) monotherapy as first-
line therapy in patients with advanced non-small cell lung cancer
("NSCLC") was underway.
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Bristol-Myers'
CheckMate-026 trial was more likely to fail than Defendants were
representing; (ii) Bristol-Myers' CheckMate-026 trial failed more
severely than the Company indicated in its August 5, 2016,
announcements and disclosures concerning the trial; and (iii) as
a result, Bristol-Myers's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.
On August 5, 2016, the Company announced that its CheckMate-026
trial investigating the use of Opdivo (nivolumab) as monotherapy
had failed because it did not meet its primary endpoint of
progression-free survival.
On this news, the Company's stock price fell $12.04 per share, or
16%, to close at $63.28 per share on August 5, 2016, on unusually
heavy trading volume. The stock price continued to fall on the
next trading day, declining another $2.98 per share, or 4.7%, on
unusually heavy trading volume, to close at $60.30 per share on
August 8, 2016.
Even after the announcement of August 5, 2016, Bristol-Myers
continued to mislead the market before releasing the complete
results of the trial, claiming that the release of all of the
trial data would demonstrate the efficacy of Opdivo.
Then, on October 9, 2016, Bristol-Myers disclosed the final
primary analysis of CheckMate-026, including the finding that
overall survival was only 14.4 months for Opdivo versus 13.2
months for chemotherapy.
On this news, the Company's stock price fell $5.62 per share, or
10.1%, to close at $49.81 per share on October 10, 2016, on
unusually heavy trading volume.
The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms
in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as
the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. See www.pomerantzlaw.com
Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
Pomerantz LLP
E-mail: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]
CEVA GROUP: Court Enjoins McEvoy from Prosecuting CIL Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: CIL Limited, Chapter 7, Debtor, Case No. 13-
11272-JLG (S.D. N.Y.), Judge James L. Garrity, Jr., of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted
Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay and Award Damages for
Willful Stay Violations by the Putative Class Action Plaintiff
and His Counsel filed by Salvatore LaMonica, as the court
appointed chapter 7 trustee for the estate of CIL.
In the spring of 2013, the Debtor was a holding company known as
CEVA Logistics Ltd. that was controlled by several investment
funds under the control of Apollo. Its sole asset was its direct
and indirect ownership of nearly 100% of the equity of CEVA Group
PLC, itself a holding company for certain operating companies
comprising one of the world's largest non-asset-based freight
management and supply chain logistics companies. Its creditors
consisted of the holders of certain payment-in-kind notes ("PIK
Noteholders").
In March 2013, CIL acquiesced to and participated in an out-of-
court restructuring and recapitalization of CEVA Group. In one
step in that restructuring transaction, CIL caused CEVA Group to
issue new shares of its stock ("CEVA Equity Transfer") to a newly
created Apollo affiliate called CEVA Holdings, LLC. Turner and
Beith, then CIL's directors and Apollo employees, oversaw the
CEVA Restructuring transaction.
CIL is a Cayman Islands exempted company. After the CEVA Equity
Transfer, but before all steps in the CEVA Restructuring were
completed, CEVA Logistics changed its name to "CIL Ltd." and
filed a petition commencing liquidation proceedings in the Grand
Court of the Cayman Islands. Those proceedings are on-going.
A few weeks later, on April 22, 2013, three PIK Noteholders filed
an involuntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code
against CIL in the Court. On May 14, 2013, the Court entered an
order for relief against CIL and, thereafter, entered an order
appointing the Trustee.
On July 3, 2013, the Trustee sought and thereafter obtained leave
of the Court to conduct Rule 2004 discovery. Thereafter, he
undertook an extensive discovery process to investigate the
conduct that would eventually form the basis for the Adversary
Proceeding that has been pending since December 2014. The
Directors, CEVA Group and CEVA Logistics Finance B.V. are among
the Defendants named in the Trustee's Amended Complaint. Apollo
is not named in the complaint, although its affiliate CEVA
Holdings is, and Apollo's role in the CEVA Equity Transfer and
CEVA Restructuring is alleged throughout the Amended Complaint
and goes to the heart of several of the Trustee's theories of
recovery.
The gravamen of the Amended Complaint is that the CEVA
Restructuring was a fraudulent transaction that was orchestrated
by Apollo, for its benefit and to the detriment of the PIK
Noteholders, pursuant to which CIL was stripped of its only
valuable asset for no consideration. It alleges various causes
of action arising from the CEVA Equity Transfer. Among them are
claims against the Directors for breach of fiduciary duties.
Further, the Amended Complaint includes fraudulent transfer
claims against CEVA Group and CEVA Holdings for carrying out and
receiving the CEVA Equity Transfer.
Recently, the Court granted in part motions filed by the
Defendants to dismiss certain causes of action alleged in the
Amended Complaint.
The CEVA Logistics entities are the product of Apollo's 2007
acquisition and combination of TNT Logistic, a global logistics
company based in Hoopdorf, Netherlands, and EGL, Inc. ("Eagle"),
a global freight management company based in Houston, Texas.
Beginning in 2007, certain management-level employees of TNT, and
later, after the creation of CEVA Logistics, certain of their
counterparts at Eagle ("Employee Investors"), exercised the
opportunity to purchase restricted shares of stock ("CIL Class A
Shares") in the entity that would become CIL. At all times
relevant to the Florida Complaint, the Employee Investors held
roughly 344,000 shares of CIL's Class A Shares, which represented
approximately 8.6% of CIL's Class-A equity.
McEvoy contends that Apollo induced the Employee Investors to
invest in CEVA Logistics by representing to them that they would
obviously participate in the management of CEVA Logistics and
that CEVA Logistics was to be operated as a 'partnership' based
upon good faith, mutual trust, and confidence. The allegations
central to McEvoy's complaint essentially track the Trustee's
allegations in the Amended Complaint.
The Florida Complaint identifies the common questions of law and
fact that "predominate" as (i) whether the Defendants, in
orchestrating and executing the CEVA Restructuring, perpetuated a
fraud upon the Employee Investors which caused damages to the
Employee Investors; (ii) whether the Defendants, in orchestrating
and executing the CEVA Restructuring, breached their respective
fiduciary duties owed to the Employee Investors which caused
damages to the Employee Investors; and (iii) to what extent the
Employee Investors sustained damages and what is the proper
measure of damages.
The Complaint asserts damage claims against the Defendants for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. It seeks to recover damages
caused by their fraudulent orchestration and implementation of a
corporate restructuring in the Spring of 2013 that resulted in
the Employee Investors' individual monetary losses totaling in
excess of EUR14,000,000.
Following the commencement of the Class Action, during August and
September 2017, representatives of the CIL estate contacted
McEvoy's counsel to advise him that prosecution of the Class
Action violated the automatic stay and to request that he cease
pursuing it. When McEvoy continued to prosecute the action, the
Trustee sent a letter formally demanding that McEvoy withdraw and
dismiss it. As of the date of the Trustee's Motion, the Class
Action has been stayed until further Order and administratively
closed.
LaMonica is seeking to enjoin Michael McEvoy and his
professionals from prosecuting the Class Action he commenced by
filing a complaint on Aug. 3, 2017, in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Florida against Defendants Gareth
Turner, Mark Beith, and Apollo Global Management, LLC, and
declaring such action void. The Trustee maintains that McEvoy's
continued prosecution of the Class Action violates section
362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code because the claims at issue in
that action belong to CIL, and continued pursuit of that action
will interfere with his adversary proceeding in this Court
against the Directors and others. Turner and Beith support the
Motion.
McEvoy opposes it. He asserts that the claims at issue in the
Class Action are not estate property because they are direct
claims against the Defendants that belong to him and the members
of the putative class of Employee Investors that he represents.
Judge Garrity finds that McEvoy has failed to allege direct or
particular damage claims in favor of the Employee Investors
against the Defendants. McEvoy has not pled independent, direct
claims against the Defendants because he has not alleged injuries
particularized to the Employee Investors that can be traced to
the Defendants' actions. The loss McEvoy complains of is not
distinct from, but rather, is derivative of, the loss suffered by
the CIL estate when CIL's interest in CEVA Group was all but
eliminated after the CEVA Equity Transfer.
The Judge also finds no merit to McEvoy's assertions to the
contrary. The case law that McEvoy relies on is not to the
contrary and does not support his assertion that the Employee
Investors have suffered direct injuries. The CEVA Equity
Transfer did not impact the relative economic and voting
interests of McEvoy, the Employee Investors or any other CIL
shareholder; those shareholder rights remained unchanged after
the transfer. Instead, the CEVA Equity Transfer adversely
impacted CIL's interest in CEVA Group by diluting its shares by
almost 100%. That gives rise to a derivative claim belonging to
CIL, not a direct claim of the shareholders.
Finally, the Judge finds that McEvoy has also failed to allege
the non-damage elements of a direct cause of action against them.
Under Cayman Islands law, directors only owe fiduciary duties to
the company for which they serve, not to its investors or
shareholders. Thus, a claim for breach of fiduciary duties is a
derivative action and generally prohibited under Cayman Islands
law.
Judge Garrity concluded that the claims at issue in the Florida
Complaint are derivative claims that are assets of the CIL
estate, not direct claims belonging to McEvoy and the Employee
Investors. In prosecuting the Class Action, McEvoy and his
counsel are violating the automatic stay. The Class Action is
null and void ab initio as to the Defendants and McEvoy and his
professional are enjoined from prosecuting that action. He
therefore granted the Trustee's Motion.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/NdACVo from Leagle.com.
CIL Limited, Debtor, represented by Dominic J. Picca --
DJPicca@mintz.com -- Mintz Levin Cohen Ferris Glovsky & Popeo,
Paul J. Ricotta -- PJRicotta@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Kevin J. Walsh -- KWalsh@mintz.com -- Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris et al.
Salvatore LaMonica, Trustee, pro se.
Salvatore LaMonica, Trustee, represented by Paul Nii-Amar Amamoo,
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, Michele Angell --
mangell@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz, Benson, Torres LLP, Jeffrey R.
Gleit, Togut, Segal & Segal LLP, Gary Frederick Herbst, LaMonica
Herbst & Maniscalco, Holly R. Holecek, LaMonica Herbst &
Maniscalco, LLP, Salvatore LaMonica, LaMonica Herbst &
Maniscalco, Robert M. Novick -- rnovick@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz
Benson Torres LLP & David S. Rosner -- drosner@kasowitz.com --
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP.
United States Trustee, U.S. Trustee, represented by Andrea Beth
Schwartz -- andrea.b.schwartz@usdoj.gov -- U.S. Department of
Justice Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S. Federal Office.
CHALK MOUNTAIN: "Cervantes" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------------------
Allan Cervantes, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Chalk Mountain Services of
Texas, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-00097 (D. N.M., January 31, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, damages, declaratory and
injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New Mexico Minimum Wage
Act.
Chalk Mountain is an oilfield services company where Cervantes
worked as a sand pusher from March 2017 to the present, regularly
working in excess of forty hour per week. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Melissa Moore, Esq.
Curt Hesse, Esq.
Bridget Davidson, Esq.
MOORE & ASSOCIATES
Lyric Center
440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 222-6775
Facsimile: (713) 222-6739
CHAPARRAL ENERGY: Objection to West Class Action Claim Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: CHAPARRAL ENERGY, INC., et. al., Chapter 11,
Debtors, No. 16-11144 (LSS), Jointly Administered (D. Del.),
Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Delaware granted the Reorganized Debtors'
Objection to Class Action Proof of Claim filed by Lisa West.
On May 9, 2016, Chaparral and certain affiliated entities,
including Chaparral Energy, LLC ("Chaparral") filed voluntary
petitions under chapter 11 of title 11 in the Court.
Approximately three months prior, on Feb. 18, 2016, the
Plaintiffs filed a Petition in the District Court of Pottowatomie
County, State of Oklahoma styled Lisa West and Stormy Hopson,
individually and as Class Representatives v. ABC Oil Company,
Inc. et al., Case No. 1649.
By the Petition, Ms. West and her co-plaintiff, commenced a
lawsuit against 15 Defendants, including Chaparral. The Petition
sounds in four causes of action: private nuisance, ultrahazardous
activity, negligence and trespass. The underlying conduct for
which the Plaintiffs seek redress is relief associated with
earthquakes allegedly caused by injection of wastewater into the
Arbuckle formation located in Oklahoma.
In the Petition, the Plaintiffs seek to certify the class of all
persons having an insurable interest in real property in the
Class Area from 2011 through the time the Class is certified, and
thereafter while any injunctive relief granted remains in force.
The "Class Area" is eight counties in Oklahoma: Pottawatomie,
Cleveland, Lincoln, McClain, Okfuskee, Oklahoma, Pontotoc and
Seminole. The form of relief requested is injunctive relief --
both prospective and retrospective -- for the cost of earthquake
insurance.
The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma. Thereafter, on Oct. 16, 2016, the
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against Chaparral and 18
other Defendants. While sounding in the same four counts, the
requested class, the definition of "Class Area" and the form of
relief all changed.
In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs seek to certify the
class of all persons owning an interest in real property in the
Class Area from 2011 through the time the Class is certified, and
thereafter while any injunctive relief granted remains in force.
The "Class Area" was increased from 8 counties to 26 counties:
Alfalfa, Blaine, Caddo, Canadian, Cleveland, Creek, Dewey,
Garfield, Grady, Grant, Hughes, Kay, Kingfisher, Lincoln, Logan,
Major, Noble, Okfuskee, Oklahoma, Payne, Pottawatomie, Seminole,
Woods, Woodward and Osage. In addition to injunctive relief, the
Plaintiffs now seek awards for (i) damages to real and personal
property, (ii) economic expenses and (iii) economic loss from
business interruption.
On May 12, 2017, the District Court (Hon. Stephen P. Friot,
presiding) heard argument on multiple Defendants' motions to
dismiss. Thereafter, he issued a Minute Order granting multiple
Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief and applies that ruling to all Defendants.
On July 18, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended
Complaint, refining the class definition and the relief requested
to conform to the Minute Order. Specifically, they ask the Court
to certify a class of all persons owning an interest in real
property in the Class Area from 2011 through the time the Class
is certified. As for the "Class Area," the Plaintiffs added
three more counties: Pawnee, McLain and Tulsa. In the Second
Amended Complaint, they note that Chaparral emerged from
bankruptcy on March 21, 2017 and the Plaintiffs allege that in
addition to seeking relief for Chaparral's pre-bankruptcy
activities, Chaparral's post-bankruptcy conduct caused two
earthquakes for which they also seek relief.
At the Debtors' request, on July 1, 2016, the Court entered an
Order establishing Aug. 19, 2016 ("Bar Date") as the date by
which claimants were to file claims against the estates. On July
26, 2016, Ms. West timely filed the Class Claim. The proof of
claim form reflects the assertion of an unsecured claim in an
undetermined amount. The Petition is attached to the proof of
claim form.
The Objection was filed on Aug. 9, 2017. By the Objection, the
Reorganized Debtors assert both that Ms. West cannot meet the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and that the
Court should decline to exercise its discretion to permit the
filing of a class proof of claim under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7023. The Objection further notes the Minute Order
dismissing the Amended Complaint and the footnote in the Amended
Complaint and questions whether, therefore, the proof of claim
continues to assert a claim against the Debtors' estates.
Presumably in response to the Objection and to make clear that
Ms. West still asserts claims against Chaparral, on August 16,
2017, Ms. West filed an amended proof of claim. The proof of
claim form also reflects the assertion of an unsecured claim in
an undetermined amount but attaches the Second Amended Complaint.
At the hearings on the Objection, Chaparral and Ms. West agreed
to limit the issue before the Court to Bankruptcy Rule 7023. The
parties have reserved for another day the objection based on Rule
23. As Plaintiff amended her proof of claim after the Objection,
the Objection will be construed as an objection to both the
original proof of claim and the amended proof of claim.
On Dec. 19, 2016, the Debtors filed their Joint Plan of
Reorganization for Chaparral Energy, Inc. and its Affiliate
Debtors Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Plan
treated over $1.7 billion in debt primarily consisting of the
Prepetition Notes Claims (allowed in the amount of
$1,267,410,336) and the Prepetition Credit Agreement Claims
(allowed in the amount of $444,439,907). In the disclosure
statement accompanying the Plan, the Debtors projected General
Unsecured Claims in the amount of $4.5 million and Convenience
Class Claims of $1.3 million.
The Court confirmed the Plan on March 10, 2017. Subsequently,
the Debtors filed a notice stating that the effective date of the
Plan was March 21, 2017.
Judge Silverstein explains that while the exercise of the
discretion is a fact and case specific analysis, courts have
developed a three-factor framework to help guide their discretion
in determining if Bankruptcy Rule 7023 should be extended to the
claims administration process. Those factors are: (1) whether
the class was certified prepetition; (2) whether the members of
the putative class received notice of the bar date; and (3)
whether the class certification will adversely affect the
administration of the estate ("Musicland factors"). No one
factor is dispositive; a factor may take on more or less
importance in any given case.
The Judge finds that the first Musicland factor weighs against
applying Bankruptcy Rule 7023 to the Class Claim, as the putative
class was not certified prepetition. The second Musicland factor
also weighs against applying Bankruptcy Rule 7023 to the Class
Claim as notice of the Bar Date was sufficient with respect to
Ms. West and the putative class. The Third Musicland factor also
weighs in favor of declining to apply Bankruptcy Rule 7023 to the
putative class. The nature of the underlying lawsuit is
significant.
Here, not only is Ms. West asking the Oklahoma District Court to
certify a class of the Plaintiffs, she is also asking the
District Court to certify a class of the Defendants. Ms. West
anticipates proceeding against all the Defendants, including
Chaparral, in one forum, the Oklahoma District Court, and
developing evidence, both fact and expert, in a unified fashion
with respect to all defendants. In these circumstances, the pace
of this litigation is not only outside of the control of the
Court, but also not wholly within Chaparral's control. Because
the lawsuit is still in its beginning stages, the Judge concludes
that the delay attendant to the litigation would create an
unwarranted delay in final distributions to unsecured creditors.
For these reasons, Judge Silverstein granted the Reorganized
Debtors' Objection to Class Action Proof of Claim filed by Lisa
West.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum Order is
available at https://is.gd/RI4eYE from Leagle.com.
Chaparral Energy, Inc., Debtor, represented by Joseph Charles
Barsalona II -- barsalona@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger,
P.A., William E. Chipman, Jr. -- Chipman@ChipmanBrown.com --
Chipman Brown Cicero & Cole, LLP, Mark D. Collins --
collins@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Christopher
Michael De Lillo -- delillo@rlf.com -- Richards, Layton & Finger,
P. A., Albert Kass -- akass@kccllc.com -- Kurtzman Carson
Consultants, LLC, John Henry Knight -- knight@rlf.com --
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Richard A. Levy --
richard.levy@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Yelizaveta
Lozovatskaya, Latham & Watkins LLP, David McElhoe, LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP, Brendan Joseph Schlauch -- schlauch@rlf.com --
Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Keith A. Simon --
keith.simon@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Marc A. Zelina --
marc.zelina@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP.
U.S. Trustee, U.S. Trustee, represented by David L. Buchbinder,
Office of the U.S. Trustee & Natalie M. Cox , United States
Department of Justice.
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC, Claims Agent, represented by
Joseph Charles Barsalona II, Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. &
Albert Kass, Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC.
COMCAST CABLE: Court Dismisses "Scott" FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDRE SCOTT, an individual; KEN FASSLER, an
individual; ELIJAH MAXWELL-WILSON, an individual, and on behalf
of themselves, all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC, a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-
cv-06869-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California
Comcast employed the Plaintiff as a Direct Sales Representative
from May 14, 2012 to July 8, 2014, with the Plaintiff's last day
worked at Comcast occurring on April 17, 2014.
The Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on Nov. 30,
2016which alleges the following six claims for relief under
California and Federal law: (1) failure to provide meal periods
under California law; (2) failure to provide rest breaks under
California law; (3) failure to pay hourly and overtime
compensation under California law; (4) waiting time penalties for
late final pay under California law; (5) unfair competition
pursuant to California Business and Professions Code Sections
17200 et seq.; and (6) overtime under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").
The Plaintiff sought to proceed as a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and a collective action under action
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216. The Action was not conditionally
certified or certified as a collective action. It was not
certified as a class action.
The Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC")
on Jan. 31, 2017. He alleged in the FAC that he was incorrectly
classified as an exempt outside salesperson because he spent more
than half of his time completing tasks other than sales such as
installing equipment, picking up and dropping off equipment,
carrying various equipment and tools in their trucks, traveling
to and from installation, checking on the status of orders and
doing data entry. He alleged in the FAC that he typically worked
approximately 55 hours per week.
Comcast vigorously denied that the Plaintiff was incorrectly
classified as an exempt outside salesperson, and produced several
documents in discovery showing that the Plaintiff's primary duty
was door-to-door sales of Comcast's residential customer services
and that Comcast realistically expected him to spend more than
half his time making sales away from Comcast's offices. It also
contends that the Plaintiff's FLSA claim is barred by the two-
year statute of limitations in the FLSA.
Comcast took the Plaintiff's deposition on Aug. 9, 2017. The
Plaintiff admitted at deposition that Comcast expected him
primarily to spend his time making sales door-to-door and away
from Comcast's offices. Following the Plaintiff's deposition,
the Parties agreed to resolve the Plaintiff's claims in the
Action.
As part of the Parties' confidential settlement of all of the
Plaintiff's claims in the Action, Comcast has agreed to pay the
Plaintiff $1,578.45 for the dismissal with prejudice and release
of his Sixth Claim for Relief, which alleges that Comcast
violated the FLSA. The payment above is based on (1) the
Plaintiff's 18.57 weeks worked during the claimed three-year
statute of limitations period from the date he filed the Action,
and (2) five hours of weekly overtime over that time period.
The Parties stipulated that the settlement amount represents a
fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute and that
the Plaintiff's Sixth Claim for Relief under the FLSA be
dismissed with prejudice with each party bearing its own costs
and attorneys' fees.
Judge Chen approved the release of Fassler's Sixth Claim for
Relief in the First Amended Complaint, and dismissed with
prejudice the Sixth Claim for Relief.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/oLnFAu from Leagle.com.
Andre Scott, Ken Fassler & Elijah Maxwell-Wilson, Plaintiffs,
represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com --
Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal --
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.
Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Daryl Steven Landy -- daryl.landy@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jennifer P. Svanfeldt --
jennifer.svanfeldt@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
& Sarah Jane Allen -- sarah.allen@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis and Bockius LLP.
COMMONWEALTH BANK: CBA Denies AUSTRAC Class Action Liability
------------------------------------------------------------
SBS News reports that Commonwealth Bank has denied liability in a
shareholder class action alleging it breached continuous
disclosure obligations with its handling of AUSTRAC's
investigations into its compliance with money-laundering and
terrorism-funding laws.
Australia's largest bank on February 23 partially admitted to 11
of the 100 additional allegations in the amended statement of
claim filed by AUSTRAC in December, but denied misleading
shareholders by not revealing the regulator's concerns when it
was first alerted to them in 2015.
"We consider that we have complied with our continuous disclosure
obligations at all times," CBA said in a statement.
"There was no price sensitive information about the matters
raised in the AUSTRAC proceeding that required disclosure."
Law firm Maurice Blackburn filed the class action in the Federal
Court in Victoria in October, naming chairman Catherine
Livingstone and outgoing chief executive Ian Narev in its
statement of claim.
Maurice Blackburn said CBA publicly confessed that its board was
aware of the breaches in the second half of 2015, but the bank
said nothing to the Australian share market until August 2017.
Commonwealth Bank shares were 98 cents, or 1.3 per cent, higher
at $75.63 at 1448 AEDT, still lower than before AUSTRAC's
allegations were made public.
CBA on February 23 also denied 89 of the additional 100
allegations AUSTRAC filed in December, but partially admitted to
the remainder involving late, missing or incomplete reports about
potentially suspicious transactions.
The lender reported a 1.9 per cent fall in first-half profit
after setting aside $375 million for potential penalties in its
Federal Court tussle with AUSTRAC. [GN]
CORECIVIC INC: Forces Immigrant Detainees to Work, Class Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Hall, writing for My Statesman, reports that a class-action
lawsuit filed in federal court February 22 argues that a company
that manages immigrant detention centers -- including the T. Don
Hutto Center in Taylor -- is violating the federal Trafficking
Victims and Protection Act by forcing labor on those in the
center.
Martha Gonzalez -- a Harris County resident who was formerly
detained at one center in Laredo, one in Taylor and a third
center just north of Laredo -- is suing private prison company
CoreCivic on behalf of herself and "all others similarly
situated."
Gonzalez's lawsuit says she was required to work at these
detention centers under threat of isolation, retaliation and
other deprivations.
"CoreCivic threatened detainees who refused to work with
confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained
restrictions, deprivation, violation of their liberty and
solitary confinement," the lawsuit says. "CoreCivic made frequent
examples of individual detainees who complained or refused to
work."
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement contracts with CoreCivic
to operate the detention center. Neither entity responded to
requests for comment.
The suit mentions that "Hutto's facilities were nicer than the
Laredo Detention Center and there was more freedom during off
time, but the work was the same -- forced labor -- and was
conducted using the same system of reward and punishment."
Some detainees who volunteered for such work were paid $1 to $2
per day, which was only redeemable at the detention centers'
stores, the suit says.
"The money was not available for outside purchases while
detained. . . . Some of the detainees were forced to work without
any pay at all," the suit says.
According to the lawsuit, the plaintiffs in the suit had to
perform such work as scrubbing bathrooms, showers and toilets;
cleaning and maintaining CoreCivic's on-site medical facility;
cleaning floors and windows; cleaning patient rooms and medical
staff offices; sweeping, mopping, stripping and waxing floors;
laundry; preparing and serving meals; clerical work; barber
services; running and managing the law library; cleaning intake
areas and the solitary confinement unit and maintaining the
exterior and landscaping of the CoreCivic buildings.
Gonzalez was released in August and is a current visa holder, the
suit says.
The plaintiffs in the suit are asking a federal judge to declare
CoreCivic's practices unlawful. They are also seeking damages and
to be paid for their work at the rate required "under the minimum
wage and overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act."
The T. Don Hutto center has been in the spotlight recently after
Austin-based activist group Grassroots Leadership said it
received letters from three women accusing guards at the
detention center of sexual misconduct. One of those women is
Laura Monterrosa, who has said she was sexually assaulted by a
female guard.
The guard "harassed me, telling me threatening words and forcing
me to have unwanted relations with her, which I did not want, but
I had to do what she wanted," Monterrosa has said in a letter.
"She looked for or took advantage of every moment she could to
touch my breasts or my legs, she knew where and when she did it.
I don't remember the dates because there are many."
ICE officials said they have offered to transfer Monterrosa to
another facility, but she declined the offer.
Earlier this week, Austin City Council Member Greg Casar tried to
meet with Monterrosa, but an ICE official called him while he was
on his way and told him he couldn't visit her. Officials denied
him access to the center when he arrived, Casar said.
On February 23, ICE officials again declined to comment on that
matter. [GN]
Courthouse News Service reports that the case is captioned MARTHA
GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CORECIVIC, INC., Defendant, CAUSE NO.
1:18-cv-169 (W.D. Tex.).
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Thomas H. Padgett, Jr. Esq.
Josef F. Buenker
THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
Houston, Texas 77018
Tel: 713-868-3388
Fax: 713-683-9940
Email: tpadgett@buenkerlaw.com
jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com
DOMETIC CORP: April 19 Hearing on "Papasan" Transfer Bid
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CATHERINE PAPASAN, NELSON AND MARJORIE GOEHLE,
ANDREW YOUNG, JIMMY BYERS, CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON, RICHARD AND LEAH
VOLLBERG, TIMOTHY CHERRY, PAULA MEURER, JILL AND SID GARRETT,
RICHARD LANDSHEFT, GARY GRAUS, GWENDOLYN AND LOUIS KING, and all
The persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DOMETIC
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-02117-HSG (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, Oakland Division, has entered an
order continuing the hearing Dometic's Transfer Motion from March
1, 2018 to March 6, 2018 or, alternatively, April 19, 2018.
On Oct. 20, 2017, Dometic filed the Motion to Transfer Venue. On
Jan. 4, 2018, the parties appeared before the Court for oral
argument on the Transfer Motion. Following the decision from the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML")
in IN RE: Dometic Gas Absorption Refrigerator Prod. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 2811 ("MDL Action"), the Court reset the hearing on the
Transfer Motion for March 1, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. (ECF No. 117);
The lead counsel for Dometic has an unavoidable scheduling
conflict on March 1, 2018 that will prevent him from being able
to attend the hearing on the Transfer Motion scheduled for March
1, 2018. The counsel for Dometic has conferred with counsel for
the Plaintiffs regarding this scheduling conflict, and the
Plaintiffs' counsel has stated that they are also available on
March 6, 2018 and do not oppose the requested continuance.
The parties recognize that their stipulated continuance date of
March 6, 2018 is not during the Court's normal hearing times but
seek to propose as short a continuance as possible. If the Court
prefers the normal Thursday call, the parties are available on
April 19, 2018.
On May 3, 2016, the Court granted the parties' stipulation to
extend the time for Dometic to answer or otherwise plead to the
initial Complaint by 30 days. On July 18, 2016, the Court
granted the parties' stipulation to extend the time for Dometic
to answer or otherwise respond to the First Amended Class Action
Complaint by 28 days.
On Nov. 27, 2017, Dometic filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time
to Answer or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Class Action Complaint. On Nov. 28, 2017, the Court granted the
Motion for Enlargement, requiring Dometic to respond to the
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint 14 days after
the later of (i) the Court's order on Dometic's Transfer Motion,
or (ii) the JPML's decision in the MDL Action.
No other case deadlines have been set by the Court and,
therefore, the continuance of the hearing on Dometic's Transfer
Motion would have no impact on the schedule for the case. The
parties stipulated and agreed, and Judge Gilliam approved that
the hearing on Dometic's Transfer Motion will be continued from
March 1, 2018 to March 6, 2018 or, alternatively, April 19, 2018.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/2ZOpLX from Leagle.com.
Catherine Papasan, Nelson Goehle, Andrew Young, Jimmy Byers,
Christopher Johnston, Richard Vollberg & Leah Vollberg,
Plaintiffs, represented by Jeff D. Friedman -- jefff@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Terrence Allen Beard, Law
Offices of Terrence A. Beard, Ashley A. Bede --
ashleyb@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser --
toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.
Sid Garrett, Marjorie Goehle, Richard Landsheft, Gary Graus, Jill
Garrett, Timothy Cherry, Louis King, Paula Meurer & Gwendolyn
King, Plaintiffs, represented by Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.
Dometic Corporation, Defendant, represented by Peter Allen Wald -
- peter.wald@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Adam L. Rosenbloom -
- adam.rosenbloom@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Emily Rose
Goebel, Latham & Watkins LLP, Marcy Christina Priedeman --
marcy.priedeman@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Robert Christian
Collins, III -- robert.collins@lw.com -- Latham and Watkins LLP,
pro hac vice.
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Envision Faces Possible Florida Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Geert De Lombaerde, writing for Nashville Post, reports that a
Florida man has filed a putative class action that accuses
Envision Healthcare of violating state laws through the use of
balance-billing practices.
The case filed in federal court in the Middle District of Florida
says Nashville-based Envision bills patients directly for
services that patients did not know were being delivered outside
of their insurance networks. The proposed class would cover all
Florida residents with commercial insurance who were billed
directly by Envision after visiting an emergency department
managed by the company.
Envision has faced similar allegations elsewhere but officials
said the company works to keep costs down as much as possible.
"Contrary to the allegations in the lawsuit, Envision engaged in
lawful and appropriate billing at all times," the company said in
a statement to the Post. "In this case, the plaintiff's health
insurance plan placed him in an unfortunate situation by not
covering his medical bill. The claims against Envision are
meritless."
Envision shares (Ticker: EVHC) were up almost 1 percent to
$37.84. They are down more than 20 percent over the past six
months.
Local blockchain technology development company Hashed Health has
teamed up with a subsidiary of a $12 billion Japanese
conglomerate to work on improving provider and payer
collaboration.
New Jersey-based ODH Inc. will take the lead of Hashed's working
group focused on bringing blockchain to value-based care. The
move builds on other partnerships Germantown-based Hashed has
built with Change Healthcare, Accenture and others.
"As a company dedicated to combining data, analytics and insights
to enable integrated patient care, ODH adds depth to our
community," said Hashed Health CEO John Bass. "ODH's focus on
addressing behavioral and physical health comorbidities brings a
unique perspective to our initiatives. At the same time, ODH will
benefit from the technical and business model innovation
resources at Hashed Health, as well as exposure to our firm's
growing global community of partners and their collective
expertise."
ODH is a unit of Otsuka America, which itself is part of the
Otsuka Group of companies that's active in pharmaceuticals,
nutriceuticals and other consumer products.
Two analysts following Acadia Healthcare have pushed up their
price targets for the provider of behavioral health care after
its strong fourth-quarter earnings report.
Franklin-based Acadia on February 21 said it had earned $69.6
million in the three months ended Dec. 31 -- a nice jump from
$41.8 million in the same period a year earlier -- on revenues of
nearly $725 million. Adjusted profits per diluted share came in
at 61 cents, six cents better than analysts had expected.
That led A.J. Rice at Credit Suisse and Whit Mayo at Robert W.
Baird -- who both have 'neutral' ratings on the stock -- to raise
their targets. Rice now sees Acadia climbing to $40 (from $35) in
the coming year. Baird is expecting the stock to push to $42
versus his previous target of $37. In midday action February 22,
Acadia (Ticker: ACHC) was changing hands at about $38.80, up 7
percent. [GN]
FACEBOOK INC: Can't Dodge Class Suit Over Facial Data Harvesting
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports
that rejecting suggestions on how the Founding Fathers might view
modern digital privacy rights, a federal judge on February 22
refused to dismiss a class action claiming Facebook harvested
users' biometric facial data without consent.
In 2016, Facebook attorneys argued in court that the authors of
the U.S. Constitution never intended that people be allowed to
sue Facebook in federal court for the mere violation of a law,
unless the plaintiffs suffered actual harm.
U.S. District Judge James Donato rejected that argument February
26, finding Facebook's allegedly unauthorized collection of
biometric facial data caused "intangible harm" by depriving users
of control over their private data.
The social network sought to dismiss three consolidated class
actions brought by Facebook users in Illinois. The lawsuits claim
Facebook's analyzing and storing of facial data for its "Photo
Tag Suggest" function violates the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA), enacted in 2008.
Under BIPA, companies are required to obtain consent before
collecting or disclosing biometric data, such as retina scans,
fingerprints, voiceprints, hand scans, or facial geometry.
"A violation of the BIPA notice and consent procedures infringes
the very privacy rights the Illinois legislature sought to
protect by enacting BIPA," Donato wrote in his 10-page ruling.
"That is quintessentially an intangible harm that constitutes a
concrete injury in fact."
Donato delayed ruling on Facebook's motion to dismiss for more
than a year as he waited for the Ninth Circuit to issue an
opinion in the remanded case, Robins v. Spokeo. In Spokeo, the
Supreme Court ruled in May 2016 that a Virginia man could not sue
an online search engine for posting inaccurate information about
him unless he suffered actual harm as a result.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit held in August 2017 that Robins
could sue Spokeo because misinformation about his age, family and
economic status caused "concrete" harm that could affect his
ability to get a job, unlike more innocuous misinformation like a
wrong zip code.
"Our circuit has specifically affirmed findings of concrete
injury, and standing to sue, when plaintiffs were deprived of
procedures that protected privacy interests without any attendant
embarrassment, job loss, stress or other additional injury,"
Donato wrote in his ruling.
Facebook has argued that its user agreement and data policy fully
complied with the Illinois privacy law. Donato found that factual
dispute must be decided at summary judgment or trial.
The judge denied Facebook's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
A hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
scheduled for March 29 in San Francisco.
Attorneys for both sides did not immediately return phone calls
seeking comment Monday afternoon.
The plaintiffs are represented by Paul Geller, Esq. --
PGeller@rgrdlaw.com -- of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, in Boca
Raton, Florida. Facebook is represented by Vincent Connelly, Esq.
-- vconnelly@mayerbrown.com -- of Mayer Brown, in Chicago.
Cofounded in 2004 by Harvard dropout and Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg, the Menlo Park-based social network had 1.4 billion
active daily users as of December 2017 and was valued at $407.3
billion as of May 2017, according to Facebook and Forbes.
FORJAS TAURUS: Magistrate Recommends Merging "Bedwell," "Burrow"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to consolidate the case, SUZANNE M.
BEDWELL, individually and as mother and next friend of R.Z.B., a
minor and ERNEST D. BEDWELL, individually and as father and next
friend of R.Z.B., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. BRAZTECH INTERNATIONAL,
L.C., Defendant, Case No. 17-Civ-22335-TORRES (S.D. Fla.) with
WILLIAM BURROW and OMA LOUISE BURROW, Plaintiffs, v. FORJAS
TAURUS S.A. and BRAZTECH INTERNATIONAL, L.C., Defendants, Case
No. 16-Civ-21606-TORRES (S.D. Fla.).
The Bedwell Plaintiffs filed the action on Sept. 16, 2016 (four
months after the Burrow case) in the U.S. Court for the District
of Alaska as a proposed class action alleging negligent design or
manufacture of Rossi-brand .357 Magnum revolvers. On Jan. 20,
2015, Ms. Bedwell purchased a Magnum revolver at an outdoor
equipment retailer in Wasilla, Alaska.
On Feb. 21, 2015, Ms. Bedwell, along with her husband and son,
drove to an ammunition store to purchase supplies before driving
to Palmer, Alaska to engage in target practice. In the process
of exiting the motor vehicle in the parking lot, the revolver
inadvertently fell out of its holster, landed on its hammer, and
unintentionally discharged a round of ammunition that struck Ms.
Bedwell's son in his left leg. Ms. Bedwell suggests that the
accidental discharge of the firearm was directly and proximately
caused by the firearm's defective condition, including
manufacturing and/or design defects.
As a result of the injury to Ms. Bedwell's son, Alaska state
troopers were called to the scene. After hearing Ms. Bedwell's
explanation for the cause of the accident, the officers took the
firearm into their possession. On April 14, 2015, Alaska state
troopers tested Ms. Bedwell's firearm for a potential misfiring
defect by tapping the revolver on the hammer with a small mallet.
The test allegedly resulted in an unintentional misfiring of the
weapon. The Plaintiff then purchased three additional Rossi .357
revolvers and a local gunsmith tested them for defects. Out of
the three, one discharged in the same way as Ms. Bedwell's
revolver when struck on the hammer with a mallet.
As such, Ms. Bedwell filed the class action seeking to force
Braztech to recall, repair, and/or repurchase the defective .357
revolvers sold to Ms. Bedwell and the class. Specifically, the
Bedwell Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class that
includes all individuals in the United States and its territories
who own a Rossi .357 Magnum revolver. The Magnum revolvers
include models R46202, R46102, R97206, and R97104.
In sum, the Bedwell Plaintiffs allege that Braztech violated the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, committed two
counts of negligence (failure to warn and failure to test), and
breached several warranties. Judge Sedgwick, in the District of
Alaska, transferred the case to the Southern District of Florida
pursuant to the first-filed rule because there was substantial
overlap between Bedwell and Burrow.
William Burrow and Oma Louise Burrow filed their complaint on May
5, 2016 with allegations that certain handguns that Forjas Taurus
manufactured -- and that Braztech distributed in the United
States -- are defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Specifically, the Burrow Plaintiffs claim that several handguns
share safety features with identical designs and that they are
prone to drop-fires. The Burrow Plaintiffs own a Rossi .38
Special which allegedly discharges when dropped. As such, the
Burrow Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class that
includes all individuals in the United States who own a Revolver.
The revolvers are defined as models R35102, R35202, R85104,
R97206, R97104, R46202, and R46102.
The Court issued its Scheduling Order in the Burrow case on June
28, 2016. That Order initially established a trial date of March
5, 2018 with a discovery deadline of Oct. 4, 2017 and a deadline
for motions for Oct. 9, 2017. These deadlines were subsequently
extended and a new trial date is set for July 16, 2018. The
discovery deadline is now Feb. 2, 2018 and the deadline to file
motions is April 13, 2018. To date, the Burrow Plaintiffs have
issued discovery requests to both Braztech and Forjas Taurus, and
both the Defendants have produced documents in response.
Braztech moves to consolidate the action with the Burrow case.
Braztech argues that there is substantial overlap between Bedwell
and Burrow and that consolidating the two actions should be in
the interest of all parties. First, Braztech contends that both
cases involve the same models of Rossi-branded.357 branded Magnum
revolvers. Second, Braztech suggests that both cases involve
common questions of law and fact such as the allegations that the
revolvers contain a defective hammer-block mechanism. Third,
Braztech argues that the two cases present the same issues as to
whether the revolvers discharge when dropped as a result of a
manufacturing or design defect.
On Nov. 8, 2017, the Burrow Plaintiffs filed a motion to
intervene to Braztech's motion to consolidate. On Dec. 7, 2017,
the Bedwell and Burrow Plaintiffs filed an amended response to
Braztech's motion to consolidate. Both sets of the Plaintiffs
now agree with Braztech that the best way to protect the
interests of absent class members is to have everyone in a single
case represent both the .38 Special purchasers and the .57 Magnum
purchasers.
Magistrate Judge Torres explains that the only contested issue is
whether these cases should be merged into one action or
consolidated solely for discovery and class certification
purposes. The primary objection from Braztech is that Forjas
Taurus will be prejudiced because the Bedwells could assert new
claims against a new defendant that they previously chose not to
sue. The Magistrate Judge finds at least two ways that the
Bedwells could still pursue their claims against Forjas Taurus,
weakening any argument that Forjas Taurus will be prejudiced as a
result of a merged case. Accordingly, Bedwell and Burrow will be
merged into one case pursuant to Rule 42 for all purposes,
including trial.
Given the commentary to Rule 23 and the Manual for Complex
Litigation (Fourth), the Magistrate Judge finds that the
appointment of interim counsel is inappropriate in the case
because there is a single law firm seeking to represent the
proposed class of .38 Special owners, and a different law firm
proposing to represent the non-overlapping proposed class of .357
Magnum owners. Absent special circumstances, he prefers to
consider the appointment of the class counsel when there is a
motion for class certification. Accordingly, there is no need to
appoint interim class counsel at this time.
As to the final issues to address: (i) whether the personal
injury claims -- and the related counterclaims -- in Bedwell
should be stayed and (ii) whether the Scheduling Order in Burrow
should be modified, Magistrate Judge Torres directs the parties
to confer and advise the Court through a joint status report of
how much additional time is needed to accommodate the merger of
these two cases for all purposes, including trial. A joint
status report will be submitted within 14 days from the date of
the Order. Upon review of the parties' submission, a revised
Scheduling Order will be entered.
For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Torres granted in
part and denied in part Braztech's motion to consolidate. The
Burrow Case and the Bedwell Case are merged for all further
matters. A copy of the Order will be filed in both actions, but
all further filings will be submitted only in Burrow. He
directed the parties to confer and advise the Court through a
joint status report of how much additional time is needed to
accommodate the merger of these two cases. A joint status report
will be submitted within 14 days from the date of the Order. Upon
review of the parties' submission, a revised Scheduling Order
will be entered.
The Magistrate Judge stayed the personal injury claims -- and the
related counterclaims -- in Bedwell pending final disposition of
the merged action in Burrow. The Burrow and Bedwell Plaintiffs
will file a consolidated complaint within 21 days from the date
of the Order. He denied the appointment of interim class counsel
at this time.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/kDkqDP from Leagle.com.
William Burrow & Oma Louise Burrow, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brannon J. Buck -- bbuck@badhambuck.com -- Badham & Buck, LLC,
pro hac vice, Gregory A. Brockwell, Letman, Siegal & Payne, P.C.,
pro hac vice, Vincent Swiney -- jvs@sblaw.net -- Swiney &
Bellenger, LLC, pro hac vice & Andrew Franklin Knopf, Knopf
Bigger.
Forjas Taurus, S.A., Defendant, represented by Colin Dang Delaney
-- cdelaney@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac
vice & John Patrick Marino -- jmarino@sgrlaw.com -- Smith
Gambrell Russell.
Braztech International, L.C., Defendant, represented by John
Patrick Marino, Smith Gambrell Russell, John F. Weeks, IV --
jweeks@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac vice
& Timothy A. Bumann -- tbumann@sgrlaw.com -- Smith Gambrell &
Russell LLP, pro hac vice.
FUJIFILM HOLDINGS: Sued for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
------------------------------------------------------
Asbestos Workers Philadelphia Pension Fund, on behalf of itself
and all other similarly situated stockholders of Xerox
Corporation v. Fujifilm Holdings Corp., Xerox Corp., Jeff
Jacobson, Gregory Q. Brown, Joseph J. Echevarria, William Curt
Hunter, Robert J. Keegan, Cheryl Gordon Krongard, Charles Prince,
Ann Reese, Stephen H. Rusckowski, and Sara Martinez Tucker, Case
No. 650766/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., February 15, 2018), arises out of
the Defendants' alleged breach of fiduciary duties of care, good
faith, loyalty, candor, and independence to the Plaintiff and
Xerox's other shareholders. Specifically, the Director Defendants
did not act in the best interests of the Company and its
shareholders when they negotiated and ultimately approved a
transaction that disproportionately favors Fuji, significantly
undervalues the Company, and provides a negative premium to
Plaintiff and all other Xerox shareholders. The Director
Defendants also improperly structured the Transaction in a manner
that leaves Xerox shareholders hostage to Fuji as a controlling
stockholder in the combined company, says the complaint.
Fujifilm Holdings Corp. operates a Japanese multinational
photography and imaging company located in Tokyo, Japan.
Xerox Corp. is a global provider of digital print technology and
related solutions. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
Avi Josefson, Esq.
Abe Alexander, Esq.
John Vielandi, Esq.
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
Telephone: (212) 554-1400
E-mail: MarkL@blbglaw.com
avi@blbglaw.com
abe.alexander@blbglaw.com
john.vielandi@blbglaw.com
FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES: Class of Workers Certified in "Holland"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., granted the Plaintiff's Second
Motion for FLSA Conditional Collective Action Certification and
Notice in the lawsuit captioned HELEN HOLLAND, Individually, on
behalf of herself and on behalf of all other similarly situated
current and former employees v. FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES, INC.,
PHOENIX TACO, L.L.C., MICHAEL FULENWIDER, TOM HIRUNPUGDI, AND
ERSKINE WHITE, Case No. 1:17-cv-00048-MOC-DLH (W.D.N.C.).
The Fair Labor Standards Act class consists of:
All current and former employees who were misclassified as
exempt Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers ("AUM")
of Defendants' KFC, Taco Bell and Long John Silver's
franchise restaurants located in the United States who work
(or have worked) at said restaurants at any time during the
applicable limitation's period covered by this Collective
Action Complaint (i.e. two years for FLSA violations, three
years for willful FLSA violations), up to and including the
date of final judgment in this matter, and who is the Named
Plaintiff and those who elect to opt-in to this action
pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).
Judge Cogburn also ruled that within 14 calendar days of this
Court's Order, the Defendants shall provide the Plaintiff's
counsel (in computer-readable electronic format) the names, job
locations, dates of employment, mailing addresses, phone numbers,
and e-mail addresses of all persons who are, have been, or will
be employed by defendants as Assistant Unit Managers or Assistant
Managers at the Defendants' restaurants within the last three
years.
Judge Cogburn added that within 30 calendar days of this Court's
Order, counsel for the conditional class are directed to file a
Motion for Approval of Opt-in Notice and attach as exhibits the
proposed opt-in notice and consent forms. The Plaintiff's
counsel should note in the caption of the motion whether the
Motion for Approval is contested or unopposed, and the motion
should highlight any disagreements on language requiring the
Court's attention.
A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=prs8ULA9
GENERAL MOTORS: "Frank" Suit Seeks Damages for Defective Air Con
----------------------------------------------------------------
Billy Frank and John O'Brien, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. General Motors Company,
Case No. 18-cv-0096 (M.D. Tenn., January 31, 2018), seeks actual,
general, special, incidental, statutory, punitive and
consequential damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest on
monetary relief, appropriate injunctive and/or declaratory relief
including, without limitation, an order that requires GM to
repair, recall, and/or replace concerned vehicles and to extend
applicable warranties to a reasonable period of time, reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in this action, including counsel
fees and expert fees and such other and further relief resulting
from unjust enrichment, breach of express and implied warranty of
merchantability, pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection
Act and the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act.
Frank owns a 2015 Chevrolet Suburban manufactured by General
Motors with a defective air conditioning systems. It developed
either a cracked refrigerant line or a cracked condenser that
causes the refrigerant to leak, posing a health risk to the
passengers. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Mark P. Chalos, Esq.
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
One Nashville Place
150 Fourth Avenue North, Suite 1650
Nashville, TN 37219-2423
Telephone: (615) 313-9000
Facsimile: (615) 313-9965
Email: mchalos@lchb.com
- and -
Jonathan D. Selbin, Esq.
Annika K. Martin, Esq.
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10013-1413
Telephone: (212) 355-9500
Facsimile: (212) 355-9592
Email: akmartin@lchb.com
jselbin@lchb.com
- and -
Patrick Newsom, Esq.
BRUNO NEWSOM PLLC
40 Music Square E.
Nashville, TN 37203
Tel: (615) 251-9500
Email: patrick@brunonewsom.com
GEO GROUP: 10th Cir. Affirms Certification of 2 "Menocal" Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ALEJANDRO MENOCAL, MARCOS BRAMBILA, GRISEL
XAHUENTITLA, HUGO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES ARGUETA, JESUS GAYTAN, OLGA
ALEXAKLINA, DAGOBERTO VIZGUERRA, and DEMETRIO VALEGRA, on their
own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE GEO GROUP, INC., Defendant-
Appellant, and NATIONAL ADVOCACY CENTER OF THE SISTERS OF THE
GOOD SHEPHERD; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT; NATIONAL
GUESTWORKER ALLIANCE; NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER; NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER; PANGEA LEGAL SERVICES; PUBLIC CITIZEN;
SANCTUARY FOR FAMILIES; SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER; AMERICAN
IMMIGRANTS FOR JUSTICE; ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE;
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK; HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER; ILLINOIS
COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS; JUSTICE STRATEGIES;
LEGAL AID AT WORK; HUMAN TRAFFICKING PRO BONO LEGAL CENTER;
TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER; ASISTA IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE; FREEDOM
NETWORK USA, Amici Curiae, Case No. 17-1125 (10th Cir.), Judge
Scott Matheson Jr. of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's certification of both the TVPA
class and the unjust enrichment class.
At all times relevant to the appeal, GEO owned and operated the
Aurora Facility under contract with the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). In operating this facility, GEO
implemented two programs that form the basis for the case: (1)
the Housing Unit Sanitation Policy, which required all detainees
to clean their common living areas; and (2) the Voluntary Work
Program ("VWP"), which compensated detainees $1 a day for
performing various jobs.
While there, the Plaintiff Detainees ("Appellees") rendered
mandatory and voluntary services to GEO. Under GEO's mandatory
policies, they cleaned their housing units' common areas. They
also performed various jobs through a voluntary work program,
which paid them $1 a day.
The Appellees alleged that the TVPA class members were all forced
to clean the housing units for no pay and under threat of
solitary confinement as punishment for any refusal to work. Five
of the nine named Plaintiffs and three other detainees filed
declarations further explaining that they had fulfilled their
cleaning assignments because of the Sanitation Policy's threat of
solitary confinement.
The complaint alleged that the VWP class members were all paid $1
per day for their VWP. Five of the nine named Plaintiffs and
three other detainees who had participated in the VWP filed
declarations further describing their work. Their jobs had
included serving food, cleaning the facilities, doing laundry,
and stripping and waxing floors. Their hours had ranged from two
to eight hours a day, and they had all received $1 a day in
compensation.
The Appellees filed a class action complaint against GEO in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on behalf of
current and former ICE detainees housed at the Aurora Facility.
The complaint alleged: (1) a TVPA forced labor claim based on the
Sanitation Policy, and (2) an unjust enrichment claim under
Colorado law based on the VWP.
GEO moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim.
Regarding the TVPA claim, GEO argued that the Thirteenth
Amendment's civic duty exception to the prohibition on
involuntary servitude should also apply to the TVPA's ban on
forced labor. The district court rejected these arguments and
denied GEO's motion to dismiss the TVPA and unjust enrichment
claims. GEO moved for reconsideration of the court's rulings
which the court denied.
GEO then moved for an order certifying an interlocutory appeal
from the orders denying its motion to dismiss and its motion for
reconsideration. The district court denied GEO's motion to
certify an interlocutory appeal on all the questions.
After they prevailed on the motion to dismiss, the Appellees
moved for certification of a separate class for each claim under
Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court certified two separate classes: (i) all
detainees housed at the Aurora Facility in the past ten years
("TVPA class"), and (ii) all detainees who participated in the
Aurora Facility's voluntary work program in the past three years
("unjust enrichment class").
On interlocutory appeal, GEO argues that the district court
abused its discretion in certifying each class under Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It primarily
contends that the Appellees' TVPA and Colorado unjust enrichment
claims both require predominantly individualized determinations,
making class treatment inappropriate.
Judge Matheson holds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying the TVPA class based on its rigorous
analysis of the Rule 23 requirements contested. The court
reasonably determined that the class members could show causation
through class-wide inference and that individual damage
assessments would not predominate over the class's common issues.
Its findings on commonality, typicality, and superiority were
likewise reasonable and fell within its discretion.
The Judge further holds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying the unjust enrichment class based on its
"rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23 requirements contested. The
court reasonably determined that the class members shared the
circumstances relevant to the unjustness question and that
individual damage assessments would not predominate over the
class's common issues. Its findings on commonality, typicality,
and superiority were likewise reasonable and fell within its
discretion.
For these reasons, Judge Matheson affirmed the district court's
certification of both classes. The Judge granted the outstanding
motions for leave to file amicus briefs.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/RHjWIH from Leagle.com.
Mark Emery -- mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP, Washington, D.C. ( Charles A. Deacon --
charlie.deacon@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright
US LLP, San Antonio, Texas; and Dana Eismeier --
deismeier@bfwlaw.com -- Burns, Figa & Will, Greenwood Village,
Colorado, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant.
David Lopez , Outten & Golden LLP, Washington, D.C. ( Juno Turner
-- jturner@outtengolden.com -- and Elizabeth V. Stork, Outten &
Golden LLP, New York, New York; R. Andrew Free --
andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com -- Law Office of R. Andrew Free,
Nashville, Tennessee; Alexander Hood, David Seligman, and Andrew
Schmidt, Towards Justice, Denver, Colorado; Brandt Milstein --
Brandt@MilsteinLawOffice.com -- Milstein Law Office, Boulder,
Colorado; Andrew H. Turner, The Kelman Beuscher Firm, Denver,
Colorado; and Hans Meyer -- hans@themeyerlawoffice.com -- Meyer
Law Office, P.C., Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Scott D. McCoy and Shalini Agarwal --
shalini.agarwal@splcenter.org -- Southern Poverty Law Center,
Tallahassee, Florida, Alia Al-Khatib --
alia.alkhatib@splcenter.org -- Southern Poverty Law Center,
Miami, Florida, and Lisa Graybill, Southern Poverty Law Center,
New Orleans, Louisiana, filed a brief for the Southern Poverty
Law Center as Amicus Curiae, in support of Appellees.
Adina H. Rosenbaum and Scott L. Nelson, Public Citizen Litigation
Group, Washington, D.C., filed a brief for Public Citizen, Inc.,
and The National Employment Law Project, as Amici Curiae, in
support of Appellees.
Katherine E. Melloy Goettel, Mark Fleming, Claudia Valenzuela,
and Keren Zwick, National Immigration Justice Center, Chicago,
Illinois, filed a brief for National Immigrant Justice Center, et
al., as Amici Curiae, in support of Appellees.
Andrew C. Lillie -- andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com -- Nathaniel
H. Nesbitt -- nathaniel.nesbitt@hoganlovells.com -- and Ann C.
Stanton -- ann.stanton@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Denver, Colorado, filed a brief for Human Trafficking Pro Bono
Legal Center, Tahirih Justice Center, Asista Immigration
Assistance, Freedom Network USA, and Sancuary for Families, as
Amici Curiae, in support of Appellees.
GOOGLE LLC: Judge Orders Class to Amend Fraud Claims
----------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal judge ordered a class February 20 to amend fraud claims
against Google over its pay-per-click advertising by April 23.
The case is GURMINDER SINGH, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 16-cv-03734-BLF (N.D. Calif.).
HELIX TCS: Appeals D. Colo. Ruling in "Kenney" Suit to 10th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Helix TCS, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Robert Kenney, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Helix TCS, Inc., Case No. 1:17-
CV-01755-CMA-KMT, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado - Denver.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiff seeks to recover alleged unpaid overtime wages and
other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Helix TCS provides its clients with marijuana security services,
including providing armed and unarmed site security services and
security guards.
The appellate case is captioned as Helix TCS, Inc. v. Kenney,
Case No. 18-701, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.[BN]
Plaintiff-Respondent ROBERT KENNEY, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:
Andrew Wells Dunlap, Esq.
Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
Michael Andrew Josephson, Esq.
JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
Houston, TX 77046
Telephone: (713) 352-1100
Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
litkin@mybackwages.com
mjosephson@mybackwages.com
Defendant-Petitioner HELIX TCS, INC., is represented by:
Jordan D. Factor, Esq.
Jeremy T. Jonsen, Esq.
ALLEN VELLONE WOLF HELFRICH & FACTOR PC
1600 Stout Street, Suite 1100
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: (303) 534-4499
E-mail: jfactor@allen-vellone.com
jjonsen@allen-vellone.com
HONEYWELL INT'L: Santiago Seeks to Certify Property Owners Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned KAREN SANTIAGO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No. 1:16-cv-25359-MGC (S.D.
Fla.), filed with the Court a redacted motion for class
certification.
The Class is defined as:
All residential property owners throughout the State of
Florida who had an analog meter removed and Smart Meter
installed by Honeywell for FPL. This Class would exclude
the approximately. . ..[redacted]
Ms. Santiago also asks the Court to appoint her as representative
of the Class and to appoint her counsel as counsel for the Class.
She further asks that in the interest of safety, the Defendant
shall remove each Smart Meter of the Plaintiff and the Class in
order to adequately inspect the meter and the meter can to
determine if there is any damage, and that the Defendant is
enjoined from installing future Smart Meters without first
properly training its employees and agents, among other things,.
A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=p17sN4qA
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Robert J. McKee, Esq.
THE McKEE LAW GROUP
P.O. Box 551333
Davie, FL 33335
Telephone: (954) 888-9877
Facsimile: (954) 217-0150
E-mail: rmckee@themckeelawgroup.com
- and -
Jeannete C. Lewis, Esq.
LEWIS LEGAL GROUP, P.A.
8551 W. Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 300
Plantation, FL 33322
Telephone: (954) 660-4499
Facsimile: (954) 660-4818
E-mail: jelewis@lewislegalgroup.com
- and -
David W. Brill, Esq.
Joseph J. Rinaldi, Jr., Esq.
BRILL & RINALDI, THE LAW FIRM
17150 Royal Palm Blvd, Suite 2
Weston, FL 33326
Telephone: (954) 876-4344
Facsimile: (954) 384-6226
E-mail: David@brillrinaldi.com
Joe@brillrinaldi.com
The Defendant is represented by:
Todd A. Noteboom, Esq.
Jeannine L. Lee, Esq.
STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP
150 South Fifth Street, Suite 2300
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Telephone: (612) 335-1500
Facsimile: (612) 335-1657
E-mail: todd.noteboom@stinsonleonard.com
jeannine.lee@stinsonleonard.com
- and -
Gregory M. Palmer, Esq.
Lauren Defabio Flanagan, Esq.
RUMBERGER, KIRK, & CALDWELL, P.A.
Brickell City Tower, Suite 3000
80 Southwest 8th Street
Miami, FL 33130-3037
Telephone: (305) 358-5577
Facsimile: (305) 371-7580
E-mail: gpalmer@rumberger.com
lflanagan@rumberger.com
HOUGHTON PLOT: Class Action Lawsuit Filed
-----------------------------------------
Karyn Anselmo, writing for WENY News, reports that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of owners and residents within
the Houghton Plot neighborhood of Corning in federal court.
Corning Incorporated, Corning Homes, Inc. and John Does are all
named as defendants in the suit. According to Knauf Shaw LLP, the
firm representing Houghton Plot residents, the neighborhood was
previously used by Corning Incorporated to dump ash and other
wastes. The complaint alleges damages from "decreased property
values, loss of the reasonable use and enjoyment of property and
quality of life, nuisance, negligence, strict liability, and
response costs under the federal Superfund Law (CERCLA)."
The suit is seeking a full remediation of the neighborhood.
The state Department of Environmental Conservation has required
Corning to investigate and remediate the neighborhood but leave
in place most contamination that is under two feet below ground
surface. According to the lawyers filing the suit, no remediation
efforts have been taken in the neighborhood. The suit also claims
the "Value Assurance Program" being offered by Corning doesn't
provide compensation to owners who do not sell their homes, has
many restrictions, and requires a liability release.
Lawyers say residents of Houghton Plot have organized a citizen's
group, Houghton Plot, Inc. to provide a unified voice regarding
the contamination and environmental issues.
Contamination was first discovered in the area during excavation
work being done at Corning High School in 2012. The DEC later
expanded the testing area to the surrounding neighborhoods in
2014, and then again expanded to include the entire Houghton Plot
area.
In a statement, Corning Incorporated said it "does not comment on
pending litigation." But in this case, the company says "we
believe it would be a disservice to our neighbors if we didn't
respond to the inaccurate assertions and misstatements."
The statement goes on to say:
"The Company intends to vigorously defend against the claims
asserted in this lawsuit.
We have worked diligently with the NYSDEC and with the residents
of the Study Area and have performed NYSDEC-approved work as
quickly and efficiently as possible, while minimizing disruption
in the neighborhood.
Corning has conducted work in the Study Area under a state-
approved process and will do the same for future remediation
work, where required. Corning has met all schedules and deadlines
with NYSDEC for soil testing and remediation activities.
As a result of our work and the cooperation of the residential
property owners in the Study Area, the NYSDEC has already issued
"No Further Action Letters" to 125 property owners." [GN]
HOOVESTOL INC: Terry Moves to Certify Class and 7 Subclasses
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled RICHARD TERRY on behalf of
himself, all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
general public v. HOOVESTOL, INC.; and DOES 1-100, Case No. 3:16-
cv-05183-JST (N.D. Cal.), moves the Court for an order certifying
the action as a class action as to these Class and Subclasses:
* Class:
All present and former non-exempt drivers of Hoovestol who
were paid on an hourly basis and who worked at a Hoovestol
location in California at any time from July 20, 2012 to the
date the Court issues an order certifying the Class.
* Unpaid Straight Time Wages During Meal Periods Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2012,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
who were not paid during meal periods.
* Unpaid Straight Time Wages During Sleeper Berth Time
Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2012,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
who were not paid during the time they were logged into the
sleeper berth on their Department of Transportation Logs.
* Non-Duty-Free Rest Break Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2012,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
who worked one or more work period in excess of three and a
half (3´) consecutive hours.
* Non-Duty-Free Meal Break Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2012,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
who worked one or more work period in excess of five (5)
consecutive hours.
* Facially Unlawful Meal Break Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2012,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
who worked one or more work period in excess of ten (10)
consecutive hours.
* Wage Statement Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2015,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
and who received a wage statement.
* Waiting Time Penalties Subclass:
All current and former non-exempt hourly drivers who worked
for Hoovestol in California at any time from July 20, 2013,
to the date the Court issues an order certifying the Class
whose employment with Defendant has ended.
Mr. Terry also asks the Court to appoint him as Class
Representative and to appoint his counsel as Class Counsel.
The Court will commence a hearing on March 29, 2018, at 2:00
p.m., to consider the Motion.
A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=YXG5DOMf
The Plaintiff is represented by:
William Turley, Esq.
David Mara, Esq.
Jill Vecchi, Esq.
Matthew Crawford, Esq.
THE TURLEY & MARA LAW FIRM, APLC
7428 Trade Street
San Diego, CA 92121
Telephone: (619) 234-2833
Facsimile: (619) 234-4048
E-mail: bturley@turleylawfirm.com
dmara@turleylawfirm.com
jvecchi@turleylawfirm.com
mcrawford@turleylawfirm.com
HULU LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under Labor Code, Van Auken Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
KERRI VAN AUKEN, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated v. HULU, LLC, an unknown
business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
BC692349 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., January 31, 2018),
accuses the Defendants of failing to pay the Plaintiff and class
members for all regular and/or overtime wages earned and for
missed meal periods and rest breaks in violation of the
California Labor Code.
Hulu, LLC, provides online television streaming services. The
Company allows users to access TV shows and clips; movies,
including trailers and documentaries; and programs for kids
online. The Company also provides Hulu subscription service that
allows subscribers to access programs on Internet-connected TVs,
Blu-ray players, set-top boxes, gaming console, mobile phones and
tablets and other network appliances. The true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants are unknown to the
Plaintiff.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 265-1020
Facsimile: (818) 265-1021
E-mail: edwin@lfjpc.com
IDEA BUYER: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Knight" AIPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MYRON KNIGHT and
ROYCE DICKERSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IDEA BUYER, LLC. et
al., Defendants-Appellees, No. 17-3539 (6th Cir.).
Myron Knight and Royce Dickerson filed the class-action lawsuit
on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated customers
against the invention promoter Idea Buyer, LLC, and certain of
its officers and employees. They allege that Idea Buyer violated
the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA).
Idea Buyer filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that an arbitration
provision in the Fast Track Agreement that each Plaintiff entered
into requires that the claims be arbitrated. The Plaintiffs
argue, inter alia, that subjecting such claims to arbitration
would undermine the statute's consumer-protection purpose.
According to the Sixth Circuit, the Plaintiffs' contention that
subjecting AIPA claims to arbitration would undermine the
consumer-protection purpose of the statute is belied by the
Supreme Court's numerous decisions holding that claims under
federal consumer-protection statutes are arbitrable.
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a specific defense to the
arbitration provision itself and have not identified any evidence
that establishes a clear congressional intent that AIPA claims
are nonarbitrable, the Sixth Circuit said.
The Sixth Circuit therefore affirms the judgment of the district
court.
A full-text copy of the District Court's January 29, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9oqpdsq from Leagle.com.
ILLINOIS: Court Denies "Smith" in Forma Pauperis Bid
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis in the case captioned
JARED M. SMITH, #K58441, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and WARDEN MATTHEW SWALLS, Defendants, No. 18-cv-
00142-DRH (S.D. Ill.).
Plaintiff Jared M. Smith, an inmate who is currently incarcerated
at Vienna Correctional Center brings this civil rights class
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, in order to challenge
the conditions of his confinement at Vienna. In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Vienna inmates have been exposed to
tainted water, pest infestations, and dirty showers for years. As
a result, Plaintiff and others have suffered from skin rashes and
possible internal injuries.
Plaintiff also brings a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement against Warden Matthew Swalls and the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC). He seeks declaratory judgment,
monetary damages, and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed as a poor person without
prepayment of the Court's usual $350.00 filing fee in a civil
case.
In civil actions, a prisoner's affidavit of indigence must be
accompanied by a certified copy of the trust fund account
statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the
6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which
the prisoner is or was confined.
Plaintiff's IFP Motion does not comply with these requirements.
Plaintiff used this Court's standard form when preparing his IFP
Motion. However, he did not respond to any of the questions about
his income, assets, debts, or liabilities. Plaintiff essentially
filed a blank IFP Motion.. He also failed to sign the IFP Motion,
in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that every pleading, written motion, and other
paper must be signed by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented.
The Court looks to the allegations set forth in the original
Complaint when determining whether Plaintiff faces imminent
danger of serious physical injury. In his Complaint, Plaintiff
complains of poor water quality, mice, roaches, insects, and
dirty showers at the prison. He includes the affidavits of
several other prisoners, who complain of this and more. When
considering whether Plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious
physical injury, the Court looks only at the allegations that
pertain to Plaintiff.
These allegations do not suggest that he now faces imminent
danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff identifies no
present threat to his health or safety, but rather speculative
complaints about possible health problems that may have resulted
from his long-term exposure to these conditions. The Court will
not grant the IFP Motion based on speculation.
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the formal requirements for
requesting IFP status. In addition, he cannot overcome the 3-
strikes bar set forth under Section 1915(g). Under the
circumstances, Plaintiff's IFP Motion will be denied.
A full-text copy of the District Court's January 29, 2018
Memorandum Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybf26vk2
from Leagle.com.
Jared M. Smith, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
INDIO, CA: Sued Over "For Profit Prosecution Scheme"
----------------------------------------------------
Ann Maher, writing for Northern California Record, reports that
an Indio property owner has filed a civil rights class action
seeking to vindicate the rights of people who have been
criminally prosecuted for municipal ordinance violations and then
charged thousands of dollars to cover the alleged cost of their
own prosecution.
Attorneys for the Institute for Justice (IJ) represent the
proposed class that include Ramona Morales, who in 2015 agreed to
pay a $225 fine for failing to force her tenants to remove a few
backyard chickens, but had no way of knowing that what started
out as a misunderstanding would ultimately cost her nearly
$6,000.
Filed Feb. 13 in Superior Court of Riverside County, the suit
names the cities of Indio and Coachella as defendants, as well as
private law firm Silver & Wright of Indio which acts as deputy
city prosecutor for code enforcement cases.
The IJ is a national, public interest law firm that is partnering
with O'Melveny & Myers of Los Angeles to pursue the litigation.
According to the suit, Silver & Wright is funded by fees that it
collects from the people it prosecutes, none of whom have any
idea when they plead guilty to minor infractions and misdemeanors
that their prosecutor has a personal, financial stake in their
case and will later try to collect thousands of dollars in fees.
The alleged scheme plays out after a property owner agrees to
plead guilty and pay a fine, rather than fight in court. The law
firm then bills the owner "for every second spent prosecuting the
case at private firm rates, even if that costs ten or a hundred
times more than the original fine," the IJ says.
It also says that Morales was one of an "untold number" of
property owners caught up in the "unconstitutional scheme" by
Silver & Wright to turn the cities' property maintenance codes
into big business.
"No one should have a warrant out for their arrest and be forced
to pay $6,000 to resolve a simple dispute about a few backyard
chickens," said Jeffrey Redfern, an attorney at IJ. "This could
have been resolved with a simple phone call, but it wasn't, in
part, because Silver & Wright's business model creates a perverse
financial incentive to prosecute cases like Ramona's in criminal
court, rather than treat homeowners with goodwill."
The proposed class action seeks to vacate all criminal
convictions obtained by Silver & Wright in Riverside County,
obtain the return of all fines and fees paid in connection with
prosecutions by the firm in Riverside County, and enjoin the firm
from further unconstitutional prosecutions in cases in which the
firm has a financial interest.
According to a press release from the IJ, Morales has worked for
most of her life cleaning houses and selling Avon makeup in the
Coachella Valley. In 2015, after receiving a pair of "confusing"
warnings, Ramona received a $75 citation in the mail from the
city of Indio. It said that a city inspector noticed a chicken in
the backyard of a home she rents out. Rather than resolving the
matter administratively the city and Silver & Wright went
directly to criminal court, which meant that Indio police also
issued a warrant for Ramona's arrest.
Morales went to court to explain that her tenants were confused
about the legality of raising chickens in Indio, and she
ultimately agreed to pay the nominal fine, the release states.
She thought the ordeal was over, but nearly a year later, Morales
then received a bill in the mail from Silver & Wright, demanding
$3,030 in attorney's fees. It allegedly threatened to sell her
property, if she refused to pay. She appealed the fees, lost, and
was billed an additional $2,628 for the cost of the appeal. In
the end, she paid nearly $6,000 in attorneys fees for a minor
infraction of the city code.
The IJ states that dozens of California cities started to hire
the firm in 2013 to, among other things, serve as official city
prosecutor for code enforcement cases.
"The firm's pitch was appealing," the release states. "It offered
'cost neutral or even revenue producing' prosecution services, so
long as the city changed its ordinances to allow the firm to
directly bill property owners for its full attorneys fees, which
range from $159 to $175 per hour. As a result, homeowners
agreeing to pay small fines for minor code infractions were later
billed thousands of dollars under the guise of 'cost recovery' by
a law firm acting in an official capacity.
"Once cities amended their codes to allow Silver & Wright to bill
their time, the firm got to work prosecuting a large number of
cases."
Most of the prosecutions were for fairly minor violations, such
as long grass, broken garage door, construction without requisite
permits, sun damaged address numbers, decorations hanging in
public places, broken windows, and keeping chickens.
Another attorney for IJ, Josh House, said that financial
incentives have no place in the justice system.
"Government prosecutors have a duty to seek justice, not maximize
earnings or generate revenue for a city," he said. "In Indio, and
across California, Silver & Wright is treating homeowners like
ATMs. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that prosecutors
cannot have a personal financial stake in the cases they bring.
We're confident the California courts will see this for what it
is: an illegal attempt to turn a profit off of the criminal
justice system." [GN]
INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Court Certifies Class in Levin Hat TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEVINE HAT CO., on behalf of itself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INNATE INTELLIGENCE, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 4:16-cv-01132 SNLJ (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.
Defendant Innate is an umbrella organizations for advertising and
managing chiropractic clinics, operating 12 chiropractic offices
in four markets across the United States. The Plaintiff contends
that Innate contracted with Defendant ProFax to send tens of
thousands of unsolicited fax advertisements to persons with whom
Innate had no preexisting relationship of any kind. On July 5,
2016, Defendant Innate, through facsimile broadcaster ProFax,
sent the Plaintiff a fax advertising a "FREE Lunch 'n Learn on
Stress Management for your employees."
The Plaintiff alleges that the opt-out notice does not comply
with the minimum requirements of 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200. On
July 12, 2016, it initiated the action, under the TCPA, on behalf
of itself and a purported nationwide class. The Plaintiff
alleges it was annoyed and disturbed by receiving the fax from
Innate, that it lost employee time in reviewing and disposing of
the funk fax, and that it wasted the use of its fax machine and
ink and paper used to print the junk fax.
Through discovery, the Plaintiff has obtained documents that
purportedly shows all the broadcast transmissions Innate hired
ProFax to make. The transmission logs show that 9,553 fax
transmissions were sent by ProFax to 8,542 persons in Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Washington, and Wisconsin. Profax also
produced a list of 1,693 recipients who opted out of receiving
Innate's faxes, which means those recipients certainly received a
fax with Innate's unique PIN. Of those 1,693 recipients, 1,489
have fax numbers that do not appear among the successful
transmissions listed in the five transmission logs produced by
Innate. Thus the total number of Innate fax recipients is 10,031
according to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff has moved for class certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 of the class of all persons who
received a facsimile transmission sent by ProFax, on behalf of
Innate or its chiropractic clinics between Jan. 27, 2016 and July
13, 2016, as confirmed by either: (i) presence on a facsimile
transmission log produced by Innate in the case showing one or
more transmissions sent and complete; or (ii) presence on a list
of those who opted out from receiving future faxes from Innate,
produced by ProFax in the case.
Judge Limbaugh finds that none of the parties contests that the
Plaintiffs have met the standards of Rule 23. Notably, none of
the Defendants argues that the factors of Rule 23 are not met.
Innate and Nepute did not oppose class certification at all.
Only ProFax filed a brief in opposition to the Plaintiff's
motion, but ProFax contends that, as a policy matter, the TCPA
should not be used in a class action context. ProFax opposes the
motion to certify class on the basis that the class action device
is improper and that, moreover, ProFax is not a proper defendant
in the case anyway.
As to ProFax's public policy argument that TCPA claims should be
brought by individuals and not as a class, the Judge finds that
ProFax stops short of arguing that the individual Plaintiff
actions are the superior method of adjudication.
As for ProFax's contention that it is not a proper Defendant in
the case, the Judge says ProFax's arguments regarding its
indemnification agreement with the Defendant Innate are misplaced
in the context of class certification. Although discussion of
the merits is sometimes necessary in establishing whether the
Rule 23 requirements are met, ProFax's arguments do not go to
whether any of the Rule 23 factors are met. Ultimately, no party
contests that the Plaintiff has met the Rule 23 class
certification requirement.
Judge Limbaugh concludes that that the proposed class meets those
requirements, and accordingly granted the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/r7hiEP from Leagle.com.
Levine Hat Co., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg --
alex@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC & Ryan A. Keane --
ryan@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC.
Innate Intelligence, LLC, doing business as Innate Wellness
Centers, Defendant, represented by Kevin Paul Green --
kevin@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC, Mark C. Goldenberg --
mark@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC & Thomas A. Brodnik,
DONINGER AND TUOHY LLP.
Nepute Enterprises LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
Douglas Longo, LONGO BIGGS, LLC, Kevin Paul Green, GOLDENBERG
HELLER, PC & Mark C. Goldenberg, GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC.
ProFax, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lauren R. Cohen --
Lcohen@capessokol.com -- CAPES AND SOKOL & Mark E. Goodman --
goodman@capessokol.com -- CAPES AND SOKOL.
INTERNATIONAL MARINE: $61K Deal in "Velazquez" Suit Has Final Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned HECTOR VELAZQUEZ; HUMBERTO LOPEZ; RUBEN
GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL MARINE AND INDUSTRIAL
APPLICATORS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16cv494-MMA (NLS) (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for
Final Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class
Representative Enhancement.
Lopez and Velazquez originally filed this action in superior
court on May 7, 2015. Velazquez voluntarily dismissed all his
claims on Sept. 22, 2015. On Jan. 22, 2016, Lopez filed the
operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). On Feb. 25, 2016, the
Defendant removed the action to the Court.
The complaint alleges wage and hour claims against the Defendant,
which is a nationwide company that contracts to perform work on
ocean going ships -- primarily sand blasting and the application
of paint and other protective materials. IMIA has operations in
many U.S. shipyards and secures contracts to work on specific
ships.
The class members work on specific contracts and when those
contracts are fulfilled, the workers are no longer needed.
However, IMIA might have contract work at a different shipyard on
a different ship. Thus, some shipyard workers, including the
class members and employees of other companies, travel from city
to city to work wherever work is available. The Plaintiffs
allege that when class members travel from one city to another,
but worked for IMIA at both locations, they remained IMIA's
employees while traveling and should have been paid their hourly
wages while traveling.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Lopez and Garcia filed the class action
complaint alleging claims for (1) failure to pay wages and
overtime compensation for business travel under the California
Labor Code; (2) failure to pay wages and overtime compensation
for business travel in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"); (3) failure to indemnify for necessary expenditures;
(4) unfair business practices; and they seek (5) declaratory
relief; (6) an accounting; and (7) injunctive relief.
They bring the case on behalf of both a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 Opt-Out Class ("Rule 23 California Class" or "Rule
23 Class") and an FLSA Opt-In Collective Action ("FLSA Non-
California Class" or "FLSA Class") on behalf of all of IMIA's
non-exempt employees who were paid a per diem for working at
locations remote from their home.
On Feb. 13, 2017, the parties filed a notice of settlement,
indicating they were finalizing a Settlement Agreement which
would dispose of the action in its entirety. Magistrate Judge
Nita L. Stormes ordered the parties to file a motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement on or before
March 20, 2017. The Plaintiffs timely filed the finalized
Settlement Agreement along with their unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.
On June 30, 2017, the Court entered an Order of Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement. On Dec. 19, 2017, the
Plaintiffs filed the instant motions for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, and Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class
Representative Enhancement. The Defendant filed notices of non-
opposition to both motions on Jan. 8, 2018.
The Settlement Agreement proposes both a Rule 23 California Class
and an FLSA Non-California Class. The Rule 23 California Class
is comprised of all individuals who, while employed in a non-
exempt position by the Defendant while domiciled in California,
traveled to perform a work assignment for the Defendant at a
remote location outside of California, at any time during the
Rule 23 California Class Settlement Period. The Rule 23
California Class Settlement Period means the period from May 7,
2011 through and including the date of Preliminary Approval.
The FLSA Non-California Class is comprised of all individuals
who, while employed in a non-exempt position by the Defendant
while domiciled in the United States but not domiciled in
California, traveled to perform a work assignment for the
Defendant at a remote location outside of the individual's state
of domicile, at any time during the FLSA Non-California Class
Settlement Period. The FLSA Non-California Class Settlement
Period means the period from the date three years before the date
of Preliminary Approval through and including the date of
Preliminary Approval.
The proposed settlement provides each Class Member with a
proportionate share of the "Net Settlement Fund" based on the
number of times the Class Member traveled to or from the Class
Member's state of domicile to begin or return from a work
assignment for IMIA at a location outside the Class Member's
domicile. Specifically, IMIA will pay a cash settlement of
$26,538, (minus applicable taxes) to 144 members of the
Settlement Class Members. Any amounts unclaimed by the Class
Members who fail to participate will be distributed to the
participating class members on a pro-rata basis.
The "Gross Settlement Fund" or "Gross Settlement Amount" means
the maximum of $61,000, which will cover the settlement
allocation to all the Class Members, the Plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees ($15,250) and costs ($2,500), the total amount of service
payments to the Plaintiffs ($1,500), and all Administrative
Expenses ($15,212).
In the Settlement Agreement, the Defendants agree not to oppose
service payments of up to $1,000 for Plaintiff Lopez and up to
$500 for Plaintiff Garcia. Additionally, they agree not to
oppose the attorneys' fees not to exceed $15,250 and costs not to
exceed $2,500. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs request $1,500 in
enhancements for Plaintiffs Lopez and Garcia, and an award of
$15,250 for attorneys' fees and $2,500 for litigation costs.
Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the Class Notice
described the lawsuit and settlement, instructed Class Members
how to participate in or opt-out of the settlement, instructed
Class members how to object to the settlement, provided details
on the final approval hearing and contact information for class
counsel, and instructed Class Members how to obtain court
records.
On July 31, 2017, the counsel for the Defendant provided
Simpluris, the Settlement Administrator with the Class List. The
Claims Administrator mailed the Class Notices to the Class on
Aug. 17, 2017, utilizing the updated mailing addresses. No
objections to the settlement have been made, one member of the
Rule 23 Class opted out, and 35 members of the FLSA Class opted
in. The Settlement Administrator's costs in the matter are
$15,212.
Judge Anello finds the proposed settlement of the class action
appropriate for final approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e). He finds that the proposed settlement appears
to be the product of serious, informed, arms-length negotiations,
and that the settlement was entered into in good faith, and that
the Plaintiffs have satisfied the standards for final approval of
a class action Settlement under federal law. Further, the Judge
finds the Settlement Administration fees and costs in the amount
$15,212 are reasonable. He finds the Plaintiffs' request for an
award of attorneys' fees in the amount of 25% of the common fund,
or $15,250, and the requested costs in the amount of $2,500, are
reasonable. Finally, he finds the class representative
enhancement awards of $1,000 to Plaintiff Lopez and $500 to
Plaintiff Garcia are reasonable.
Accordingly, Judge Anello granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for Final
Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative
Enhancement. He dismissed with prejudice the Class Action. The
Clerk of Court is instructed to enter final judgment in
accordance with the Order.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/iFBRiQ from Leagle.com.
Hector Velazquez, on behalf of themselves and in a representative
capacity for all others similarly situated & Humberto Lopez, on
behalf of themselves and in a representative capacity for all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Paul David
Jackson -- paul@jacksonlaw.biz -- Law Offices of Paul D. Jackson
& Jeffrey Phillip Jackson -- jeffrey@jacksonlaw.biz -- Jakcson
Law LLP.
International Marine and Industrial Applicators, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Aaron Alan Buckley -- abuckley@paulplevin.com --
Paul Plevin Sullivan and Connaughton, Kara D. Siegel --
ksiegel@paulplevin.com -- Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton
LLP & Nancy G. Berner, Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP.
IOVANCE BIOTHERAPEUTICS: Judge Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge on Feb. 15
dismissed some of the class action claims against Iovance
Biotherapeutics Inc. that accused the company of misleading
investors by paying writers to promote its stock, ruling the
plaintiff could not trace his stock to the disputed offering.
The case is JAY RABKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LION
BIOTECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02086-
SI (N.D. Calif.).
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey on behalf of investors who
purchased Johnson & Johnson ("Johnson & Johnson") (NYSE:JNJ)
securities between February 22, 2013 and February 7, 2018.
Click here to learn about the case: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
c/johnson-johnson?wire=3. There is no cost or obligation to you.
According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, the
Company issued materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) Johnson & Johnson has known for
decades that its talc products include asbestos fibers and that
the exposure to those fibers can cause ovarian cancer and
mesothelioma; and (2) as a result, Defendants' public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
If you suffered a loss in Johnson & Johnson you have until April
9, 2018 to request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.
Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you
serve as a lead plaintiff. To obtain additional information,
contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com, by
telephone at 212.425.1140, or visit http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
c/johnson-johnson?wire=3.
Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has
represented investors in securities litigations involving
financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel: 212.425.1140
Fax: 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]
KERN COUNTY, CA: Juvenile-Detention Staffers Sued Over Teen Abuse
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Three disabled Kern County, California, teens claim in a federal
class action that juvenile-detention staffers abused them with
pepper spray, prolonged solitary confinement, excessive force,
painful prone restraint holds and denial of education.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Melinda Bird, Esq.
Disability Rights California
350 S. Bixel Street, Suite 290
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 213-8000
Facsimile: (213) 213-8001
Email: melinda.bird@disabilityrightsca.org
-- and --
Carly J. Munson, Esq.
Disability Rights California
1831 K Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4114
Telephone: (916) 504-5800
Facsimile: (916) 504-5801
Email: carly.munson@disabilityrightsca.org
-- and --
Thomas P. Zito, Esq.
Freya Pitts, Esq.
Disability Rights Advocates
2001 Center Street, Fourth Floor
8 Berkeley, California 94704-1204
Telephone: (510) 665-8644
Facsimile: (510) 665-8511
Email: tzito@dralegal.org
fpitts@dralegal.org
LEAPFROG: Will Pay $5.5MM to Settle a Shareholder Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Leapfrog will pay $5.5 million to settle a shareholder class
action accusing it of misleading investors about the market for
its educational toys.
LONE STAR WRECKER: Garcia Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------
Jaime Garcia and Monet Gilmore, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Lone Star Wrecker
Service, LLC and Eric J. Cantu, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00029,
(S.D. Tex., January 31, 2018), seeks all available relief,
including compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and
costs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Lone Star provides general towing and off-road recovery services
throughout the Coastal Bend and is located at 4908 Up River Road,
Corpus Christi, Texas 78407. Garcia worked for Lone Star from
approximately August 2015 until January 2017 as a tow truck
driver/operator while Gilmore worked for Lone Star from
approximately 2013 until December 2016 as a dispatcher/operations
manager. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Clif Alexander, Esq.
Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
Carter T. Hastings, Esq.
Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
Alan Clifton Gordon, Esq,
George Schimmelm Esq.
ANDERSON2X, PLLC
819 N. Upper Broadway
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
Tel: (361) 452-1279
Fax: (361) 452-1284
Email: clif@a2xlaw.com
lauren@a2xlaw.com
carter@a2xlaw.com
austin@a2xlaw.com
MASSACHUSETTS: Dookhan Defendants Sue for Return of Probation Fee
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shawn Musgrave, writing for Boston Globe, reports that in the
latest development in the Annie Dookhan scandal, plaintiffs filed
a federal class-action lawsuit February 23 seeking the repayment
of probation fees and other fines paid to the state in drug cases
that were dismissed due to evidence tampering by the disgraced
former state chemist.
"The Commonwealth took millions of dollars from the pockets of
people who were wrongfully convicted, and it must now give them
their money back," Daniel Marx, Esq. a lawyer representing the
plaintiffs, said in a press release.
Last year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated more
than 21,000 cases involving so-called Dookhan defendants. The
suit contends that their due process rights were violated and
they should be paid back the money they paid in the course of
their arrests, incarcerations, and probations.
Last week, the SJC agreed to hear a related case from a man who
paid thousands in fees after pleading guilty to drug possession
charges.
Both cases rely on a US Supreme Court ruling from last April,
Nelson v. Colorado, which was published the same day thousands of
Dookhan-related convictions were vacated. In that case, the
Supreme Court ordered the state of Colorado to refund fees to a
woman who was convicted but later acquitted of felony charges.
"The existence of both these cases just shows that, although
convictions have now been overturned, the state hasn't done much
of anything to actually right the wrongs that were imposed on
Dookhan defendants," said Matthew Segal, legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts.
One of the plaintiffs, Stacy Foster of Hyde Park, pleaded guilty
to drug distribution in 2005. He was sentenced to two years of
probation, during which he paid a monthly supervision fee,
according to the suit. Foster also had to pay to reinstate his
driver's license.
Police seized approximately $1,800 from another plaintiff, Jamie
Kimball of Woburn, when she was arrested in 2010. According to
the complaint, Kimball "explained to the police that the funds
were from her legitimate employment and for her monthly rent."
The court ordered Kimball to undergo drug testing and counseling
at her own expense, the suit said.
The third plaintiff, Jonathan Riley, pleaded guilty in 2008 to
drug possession with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to
two years of probation.
The suit named as defendants Governor Charlie Baker, Attorney
General Maura Healey, Esq. and other state officials, as well as
several district attorneys. [GN]
MASSMUTUAL: Accused of Shorting Policyholders on Dividends
----------------------------------------------------------
David Siegel, writing for CVN News, reports that a California
state court jury heard closing arguments on February 23 in a
class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 300 MassMutual term
life insurance policyholders who accuse the company of failing to
pay contractually owed dividends as its profits soared.
Attorneys for plaintiff Christina Chavez, who serves as the class
representative, argued that MassMutual breached its contract with
policyholders in the Los Angeles area who purchased 20 year-year
term life insurance policies, known as T20G policies, from 2000
to 2004.
Timothy Morris, Esq. of Gianelli & Morris told jurors during his
closing argument that because MassMutual is owned by its
policyholders it had an obligation to pay out excess profits each
year, but failed to do so from 2000 to 2010. He said MassMutual
improperly withheld $717,000 in dividends owed to the class
members.
MassMutual maintained that the T20G policies were "bare bones"
plans, and that the company was only required to pay out
dividends on more expensive whole life policies that generate a
profit.
Morris told jurors that MassMutual's total surplus profits
doubled from $5 billion to $10 billion from 2000-2010, but that
the company never performed the accounting analysis necessary to
determine whether T20G policyholders should receive dividends.
"They never made that annual determination. They didn't," Morris
said. "They admitted it dozens and dozens of times. They promised
in the contract they would make an annual determination, and they
never once did."
Morris suggested MassMutual's compensation structure for top
actuaries created a conflict of interest, since dividend payments
reduced the amount of profit-linked bonuses the actuaries
received.
MassMutual's attorney Jennifer Keller, Esq. --
jkeller@kelleranderle.com -- of Keller/Anderle LLP told the jury
during her closing argument that Chavez's policy did not
contribute to any divisible surplus and did not earn any
dividends, making Chavez ineligible for any payout.
"That's the case right there," Keller said. "That's it."
Keller argued that MassMutual met its only obligation to Chavez
when it paid her a $1 million death benefit after her husband
passed away. However Keller stressed that the T20G policies
failed to meet even their conservative five percent profit
margin, and that MassMutual is only obligated to pay dividends on
more expensive and profitable policies.
MassMutual agreed to a $37.5 million settlement in 2017 in
Massachusetts federal court in a similar, though much larger
class action lawsuit over allegedly unpaid dividens. That case
involved 2.9 million policyholders from throughout the United
States.
In addition to Timothy Morris, Esq. the Chavez class is also
represented by Mary T. Rahmes, Esq.
MassMutual is also represented by Jesse Gessin, Esq. --
jgessin@kelleranderle.com -- of Keller Anderle, and by Joel
Feldman, Esq. -- JFELDMAN@SIDLEY.COM -- Christopher Assise, Esq.
-- Sean Commons, Esq. -- SCOMMONS@SIDLEY.COM -- and Melissa
Evidente, Esq. -- MEVIDENTE@SIDLEY.COM -- of Sidley Austin LLP.
The trial took place before Judge Maren Nelson, and gavel-to-
gavel video of the full trial is available to CVN subscribers.
[GN]
MCDONALD'S RESTAURANTS: Sued Over Failure to Properly Pay Workers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lora Capehart c/o Minnillo & Jenkins Co., individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated v. McDonald's Restaurants
of Kentucky, Inc., Case No. 2:18-cv-00025-WOB-CJS (E.D. Ken.,
February 15, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for failure
to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
McDonald's Restaurants of Kentucky, Inc. owns and operates
McDonald's Restaurant located at 15 Donnermeyer Drive, Bellevue,
Kentucky. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Paul J. Minnillo, Esq.
Christian A. Jenkins, Esq.
Robb S. Stokar, Esq.
2712 Observatory Avenue
Cincinnati, OH 45208
Telephone: (513) 723-1600
Facsimile: (513) 723-1620
E-mail: pjminnillo@minnillojenkins.com
cjenkins@minnillojenkins.com
rstokar@minnillojenkins.com
MDL 2741: "Boblitz" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit filed on January 25, 2018 captioned Rosetta Boblitz,
on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated individuals
v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 4:18-cv-00129 was transferred on
February 15, 2018 from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. The District Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 3:18-cv-00993-VC to the proceeding.
The Boblitz case is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation
titled In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation MDL No. 2741.
According to an order entered by the United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, it appears that the actions in
the litigation involve questions of fact that are common to the
actions previously transferred to the Northern District of
California and assigned to Judge Vince Chhabria.
In this complaint, the Plaintiff seeks damages as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and sale of the herbicide Roundup(R), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.
Monsanto Company owns and operates a multinational agricultural
biotechnology corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Seth S. Webb, Esq.
BROWN AND CROUPPEN P.C.
One Metropolitan Square
211 N. Broadway, Suite 1600
St. Louis, MO 63102
Telephone: (314) 222-2222
Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
MDL 2741: "Wilson" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit filed on January 25, 2018, styled Gwendolyn and
Edward Wilson, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 4:18-cv-00127, was
transferred on February 15, 2018, from the U.S. District Court
Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District Court
California Northern District. The District Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 3:18-cv-00992-VC to the proceeding.
The Wilson case is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation
titled In re: Roundup Products Liability Litigation MDL No. 2741.
According to an order entered by the United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, it appears that the actions in
the litigation involve questions of fact that are common to the
actions previously transferred to the Northern District of
California and assigned to Judge Vince Chhabria.
In this complaint, the Plaintiff seeks damages as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and sale of the herbicide Roundup(R), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.
Monsanto Company own and operate a multinational agricultural
biotechnology corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Seth S. Webb, Esq.
BROWN AND CROUPPEN P.C.
One Metropolitan Square
211 N. Broadway, Suite 1600
St. Louis, MO 63102
Telephone: (314) 222-2222
Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
MDL 2804: Catoosa Joins Lawsuit Against Drug-Makers
---------------------------------------------------
Adam Cook, writing for The Catoosa County News, reports that
Catoosa County commissioners have agreed to pass a resolution
acknowledging the current opioid crisis in the area and to join a
class-action lawsuit against drug manufacturers and distributors.
During the bi-monthly Board of Commissioner's meeting on Feb. 20,
County Attorney Chad Young, Esq. -- chadyoung@pattylaw.com --
discussed the opioid situation in the area that has evolved to
crisis status over the past few years.
"The current state of the opioid crisis that you all read about
in the news, and I'm sure the sheriff can attest to how it
affects or has affected our county, is a serious health matter,"
Young said. "There has been some class-action litigation filed by
local governments from various states and state governments
that's pending against the manufacturers and distributors of
these drugs."
Young said that the class-action lawsuit is an attempt for
governments to recoup some of the added expense the opioid issue
has created.
"The purpose is to try to recover the increased costs that local
governments are having to face, whether it be through law
enforcement or emergency management responses based on the over-
prescription of these drugs," Young said. "For instance, all
counties in the state of Georgia are being solicited by big law
firms that have expertise in this class-action type of
litigation, including Catoosa County. We've had multiple
solicitations."
Young said that when the county's data was evaluated, it revealed
that prescription numbers for opioids are being written at an
alarming rate.
"There are more opioid prescriptions written in Catoosa County
than there are people in Catoosa County," Young said.
Commission Chairman Steven Henry clarified that the numbers show
there are 116 opioid prescriptions written for every 100 people
in the county.
Before voting on whether to join the lawsuit, the board
unanimously approved passing a resolution essentially declaring
that the opioid crisis has had negative effects on Catoosa County
to the extent that it is a public nuisance, which in turn
authorizes legal action against fighting that nuisance.
Per the vote, the county will retain the Atlanta-based law firm
of Lewis Brisbois Brisgaard & Smith LLC to represent Catoosa
County, with Patty & Young to serve as local council.
Young and fellow county attorney Clifton M. "Skip" Patty, Esq. -
skippattylawfirm@gmail.com -- say there will not be any cost
involved for the county unless there's a favorable outcome.
"There is no fee due by the county unless a monetary claim is
awarded in the suit," Young said. "If there is a monetary
recovery, the fee is the standard contingent fee of one-third of
the recovery."
Young added that if won or settled, his and Patty's office would
share some of the one-third portion with the bigger firm
spearheading the case.
While going after the drug-makers may seem like a tough task,
Young compared it to suits against tobacco-makers in the late
1990s.
"This is similar in nature to what state governments did in the
tobacco litigation, where they sued the manufacturers to recover
the increased health costs and other costs they had to pay,"
Young said.
Young also said that while offsetting the costs accumulated with
battling the opioid epidemic is important, the bigger picture
involves the safety of the community.
"It's more than about money. It's about tightening down on the
prescriptions," Young said. "It used to be that we could all go
into a convenience store at one time and buy as much Sudafed as
we wanted before the methamphetamine crisis, and now we all know
that's regulated and behind the counter. The hope would be that
it's going to address much more than just money."
Commissioner Bobby Winters said he's frustrated with the
prescription abuse and wonders how the county got to the point
where it now houses four different methadone clinics.
The newest of those establishments, the Ringgold Treatment Center
on U.S. Highway 41 just past the Depot, drew criticism from
Ringgold residents in 2016 when it tried opening its doors.
Commission Chairman Steven Henry said he's glad the board is
taking the necessary steps to fix the growing problem.
"I think it's a great thing that we're being able to take some
sort of stand," Henry said. [GN]
MILDON BUS: Counsel Has 30 Days to Replace Plaintiff
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF PITTSBURGH, INC., a
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. MILDON BUS LINES, INC.,
a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v.
CAROLINE ABRAHAM and JOEL ABRAHAM, Third Party Defendants, Civil
Action No. 09-1572 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Joy Flowers Conti of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania gave
the counsel for the Plaintiff 30 days to file a motion to
substitute a new Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff filed a motion to certify class on July 7, 2017,
and brief in support thereof. On Aug. 7, 2017, the Defendant
filed a response in opposition, and Community Vocational Schools
filed its reply brief on Aug. 28, 2017. A hearing on the motion
to certify a class was held on Sept. 19, 2017, and the parties
were ordered to file supplemental briefs. Community Vocational
Schools filed its supplemental brief on Sept. 26, 2017, and
Mildon filed its supplemental brief in response on Oct. 3, 2017.
The Court by separate order dated Feb. 9, 2018, granted Mildon's
motion for summary judgment, holding that Community Vocational
Schools lacked standing and that a reasonable jury could not
render a verdict in favor of Community Vocational Schools. The
class cannot be certified because in order to pursue a class
action claim on behalf of itself and the putative class, the
named Plaintiff must have standing. Community Vocational
Schools, the only named Plaintiff, does not have standing.
The counsel for the Plaintiff will have 30 days to file a motion
to substitute a new Plaintiff. Failure to do so will result in
dismissal of the amended complaint. An appropriate order denying
the motion to certify a class without prejudice will be entered.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/evprmc from Leagle.com.
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF PITTSBURGH, INC., a corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by John C. Evans --
Jce@ssem.com -- Specter Specter Evans & Manogue, Tod A. Lewis --
tod@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, pro
hac vice, Brian J. Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
and Wanca, Deborah Bussert, Anderson + Wanca, Jeffrey A. Berman -
- jberman@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, pro hac vice,
Phillip A. Bock -- phil@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC
dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Ross M. Good --
rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, pro hac vice, Ryan M.
Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, pro hac
vice & David J. Manogue, Specter Specter Evans & Manoque, P.C.
MILDON BUS LINES INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant,
represented by Arthur J. Leonard, Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP &
Amy M. Kirkham, Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill LLP.
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Movant, represented by Allan C. Molotsky
-- amolotsky@fhmslaw.com -- Fowler Hirtzel McNulty & Spaulding,
LLP.
MILDON BUS LINES INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, ThirdParty
Plaintiff, represented by Arthur J. Leonard, Robb Leonard
Mulvihill LLP & Amy M. Kirkham, Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill LLP.
MILDON BUS: Wins Summary Judgment in Community School's TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF PITTSBURGH, INC., a
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. MILDON BUS LINES, INC.,
a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v.
CAROLINE ABRAHAM and JOEL ABRAHAM, Third Party Defendants, Civil
Action No. 09-1572 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Joy Flowers Conti of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted Mildon's motion for summary judgment.
Community Vocational Schools initiated the action on Nov. 30,
2009, against Mildon advancing a claim under the TCPA for sending
an unlawful facsimile advertisement. Mildon filed a motion to
dismiss on Feb. 3, 2010, and in response, Community Vocational
Schools filed its first amended class action complaint on Feb.
11, 2010. Specifically, Community Vocational Schools alleges
that Mildon on Jan. 11, 2006, sent one unsolicited advertisement
to it by telephone facsimile machine in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005 ("TCPA").
On Feb. 16, 2010, Erie Insurance Exchange filed a claim against
the Defendant, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
at Erie Ins. Exch. v. Mildon Bus Lines, Inc. & Community
Vocational Sch. of Pittsburgh, Alleg. Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas,
Civil Action No. GD-10-003030 ("coverage action"), concerning
insurance coverage with respect to this action. Mildon filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed in the action on
Feb. 18, 2010. The motion to dismiss was denied without
prejudice on Aug. 6, 2010, just prior to Mildon filing for
bankruptcy.
On July 27, 2010, Mildon filed for bankruptcy in In re Mildon Bus
Lines, Ins., Bankruptcy Action No. 10-25312, in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. A
suggestion of bankruptcy was filed in the instant action on Sept.
22, 2010. That same day, the Court issued a stay pending
resolution of Mildon's bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy
case was terminated on Oct. 23, 2012, with the Defendant
receiving a discharge.
After the termination of the bankruptcy action, the Court
continued the stay of the matter pending the resolution of the
summary judgment motions filed by Erie and Community Vocational
Schools in the coverage action. On Nov. 22, 2016, after being
advised that summary judgment was denied in the coverage action,
the Court held a status conference, at which point, it lifted the
stay and reopened the case and ordered fact discovery to be
completed by Feb. 15, 2017.
After the stay was lifted, Mildon filed its answer and
affirmative defenses on Dec. 15, 2016. On Dec. 20, 2016, with
leave, Mildon filed a third-party complaint joining Caroline
Abraham and Joel Abraham as third-party Defendants. On Jan. 30,
2017, the court granted Community Vocational Schools' unopposed
motion to extend fact discovery and ordered that discovery be
completed by May 15, 2017. Erie filed a motion for leave to
intervene pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 24 on Feb. 1,
2017, which was denied on March 27, 2017, with prejudice. On
April 18, 2017, default was entered against the third-party
Defendants.
After the close of discovery, on July 7, 2017, Mildon filed its
motion for summary judgment, brief in support thereof, and
concise statement of material facts. Mildon specifically asserts
that (i) Community Vocational Schools lacks standing because
Community Vocational Schools cannot prove that it sustained a
concrete injury that falls within the zone of interest sought to
be protected by the TCPA; and (ii) it is entitled to summary
judgment because there is insufficient evidence that Mildon sent
a fax advertisement to Community Vocational Schools in violation
of the TCPA.
A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on Sept.
19, 2017.
Judge Conti finds insufficient evidence to determine that what
was actually sent was a fax that violated the TCPA or that an
unsolicited fax was received. Even considering the facts in the
light most favorable to Community Vocational Schools, Community
Vocational Schools failed to proffer sufficient evidence
demonstrating that a Community Vocational Schools' telephone line
was in fact occupied by an advertisement in violation of the
TCPA. Accordingly, the Judge is constrained to conclude that
Community Vocational Schools did not sustain a concrete injury.
The Judge further finds insufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that B2B's facsimile machine was used on behalf of
Mildon to send one or more faxes of an unsolicited advertisement
to Community Vocational Schools' telephone fax machine or to find
that a transmission constituting an unsolicited advertisement was
received by Community Vocational Schools in violation of the
TCPA.
Even considering the facts in the light most favorable to
Community Vocational Schools, Judge Conti concludes that
Community Vocational Schools does not have standing and, even if
it did, a reasonable jury could not render a verdict in favor of
Community Vocational Schools. Accordingly, he granted summary
judgment Mildon and against Community Vocational Schools. An
appropriate order will be entered.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/sqGgqu from Leagle.com.
COMMUNITY VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS OF PITTSBURGH, INC., a corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by John C. Evans --
Jce@ssem.com -- Specter Specter Evans & Manogue, Tod A. Lewis --
tod@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, pro
hac vice, Brian J. Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
and Wanca, Deborah Bussert, Anderson + Wanca, Jeffrey A. Berman -
- jberman@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, pro hac vice,
Phillip A. Bock -- phil@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC
dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Ross M. Good --
rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, pro hac vice, Ryan M.
Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson + Wanca, pro hac
vice & David J. Manogue, Specter Specter Evans & Manoque, P.C.
MILDON BUS LINES INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, Defendant,
represented by Arthur J. Leonard, Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP &
Amy M. Kirkham, Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill LLP.
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Movant, represented by Allan C. Molotsky
-- amolotsky@fhmslaw.com -- Fowler Hirtzel McNulty & Spaulding,
LLP.
MILDON BUS LINES INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, ThirdParty
Plaintiff, represented by Arthur J. Leonard, Robb Leonard
Mulvihill LLP & Amy M. Kirkham, Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill LLP.
MIMEDX GROUP: Block & Leviton Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP, a securities litigation firm representing
investors nationwide, disclosed that it has filed a class action
against MiMedx Group, Inc. and certain of its officers for
violations of the federal securities laws.
If you purchased MiMedx shares between March 7, 2013 through
February 19, 2018 inclusive (the "Class Period") and wish to
serve as a lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
April 25, 2018. As a member of the class, you may seek to file a
motion to serve as a lead plaintiff or take no action and remain
an absent class member. If you wish to become involved in the
litigation or have questions about your legal rights, you are
encouraged to contact attorney Bradley Vettraino at (617) 398-
5600, by email at bradley@blockesq.com, or by visiting
www.blockesq.com/mdxg.
In December of 2016, MiMedx was sued by two former employees
alleging wrongful termination in relation to their reporting of a
"channel-stuffing scheme" to "fraudulently recognize revenue"
with regard to a particular distribution contract. MiMedx denied
these claims. And in September 2017, when market analysts
published reports purportedly corroborating these allegations,
among others, MiMedx again denied any wrongdoing and sued for
defamation.
Then, on February 20, 2018, pre-market, MiMedx announced that the
Company's audit committee "has engaged independent legal and
accounting advisors to conduct an internal investigation into
current and prior-period matters relating to allegations
regarding certain sales and distribution practices at the
Company. Company executives are also reviewing, among other
items, the accounting treatment of certain distributor
contracts."
On this news, the Company's stock fell more than 39% to close at
$8.75 on February 20, 2018, causing tens of millions of dollars
in losses to investors.
The complaint, filed in U.S. Federal court for the Northern
District of Georgia alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that (i) MiMedx was engaged in a "channel-stuffing"
scheme designed to inappropriately recognize revenue that had not
yet been realized; (ii) the Company lacked adequate internal
controls over financial reporting; and (iii) that as a result of
the foregoing, MiMedx's publicly disseminated financial
statements were materially false and misleading.
Confidentiality to whistleblowers or others with information
relevant to this investigation is assured.
Block & Leviton LLP is a Boston-based law firm representing
investors nationwide. The firm's lawyers have collectively been
prosecuting securities cases on behalf of individual and
institutional investors for over 50 years, and have recovered
billions of dollars on their behalf. Block & Leviton's
investigations into corporate wrongdoing were recently covered by
the New York Times.
The court in which the action is pending is located at 75 Ted
Turner Drive, SW, Atlanta, GA 30303.
This notice may constitute attorney advertising.
CONTACT:
Bradley J. Vettraino, Esq.
Block & Leviton LLP
155 Federal Street, Suite 400
Boston, MA 02110
Tel: (617) 398-5600
Email: bradley@blockesq.com [GN]
MOTOROLA INC: Must Face Claims for Birth Defects
------------------------------------------------
Jeff D. Gorman, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
an Illinois appeals court revived a lawsuit accusing Motorola of
"willful and wanton misconduct" that caused numerous employees'
children to suffer severe birth defects in utero from their
fathers' exposure to toxic chemicals at its semiconductor plants.
Marcus Ledeaux and 48 other plaintiffs sued the electronics
manufacturer in Cook County Court, which found their claims
barred by workers' compensation laws.
But a unanimous three-judge panel of the Chicago-based First
District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on Feb. 20 in an
opinion by Justice Mary Anne Mason.
Jeremy Hardison and Sarina Finzer were two of the children born
with severe birth defects. Their fathers worked at Motorola
semiconductor plants in Texas and Arizona, respectively.
The plaintiffs sought damages for negligence, strict liability,
willful and wanton misconduct, breach of an assumed duty, and
loss of child consortium.
They claimed that though Motorola instituted hygienic procedures
in its semiconductor factory, the fathers were still exposed to
toxic chemicals. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's
finding that they had not proved facts that would entitle them to
relief.
Justice Mason wrote that the "plaintiffs properly pled a cause of
action for negligence and willful and wanton misconduct under
Arizona and Texas law and loss of child consortium under Arizona
law."
The fathers manufactured microchips, wafers and semiconductor
boards. Sarina was born with a club foot, while Jeremy was born
with an underdeveloped jaw.
Mason found that the families' claims are not barred by workers'
compensation law.
"The minor plaintiffs' birth defects are injuries personal to
them that exist apart from and regardless of a work-related
injury sustained by their parent," she wrote in the 24-page
opinion.
Motorola argued that fathers and mothers of children with birth
defects should be treated differently because the child is not in
utero in the workplace.
Mason wrote: "Motorola is willing to concede the viability of a
claim for birth defects suffered by the child of a female
employee exposed to toxic chemicals in the workplace, while
denying the viability of the same claim by a child of a male
employee exposed to the same chemicals."
She added that if an injury through a mother's exposure to
chemicals is foreseeable by Motorola, "it stands to reason it
could foresee that a male employee's impaired sperm could produce
the same result."
Motorola has not responded to an email request for comment.
Presiding Justice P. Scott Neville Jr. and Justice Michael Hyman
concurred.
MURATA MANUFACTURING: Cambridge Alleges Inductor Price-rigging
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cambridge Capital Corp., Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated, v. Murata Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
Murata Electronics North America, Inc., Panasonic Corporation,
Panasonic Corporation Of North America, Panasonic Electronic
Devices Co. Ltd, Panasonic Electronic Devices Corporation Of
America, Sumida Corporation, Sumida Electric Co., Ltd., Sumida
America Components, Inc., Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd., Taiyo Yuden
(U.S.A.) Inc., TDK Corporation, TDK-EPC Corporation and TDK
U.S.A. Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00686 (N.D. Cal.,
January 31, 2018), seeks damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from violations of the Sherman Act.
Defendants are manufacturers of discrete inductors and are
accused of fixing and stabilizing the prices of inductors.
Discrete inductors are passive electronic components fixed to a
circuit board and are ubiquitous in thousands of products that
rely on electronic circuits for power including laptop and
desktop computers, cars, televisions, wireless handsets, video
game consoles and wireless LAN boxes. Defendants allegedly formed
a cartel in the late 1990s resulting from increased competition
from Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers.
Cambridge is the successor-in-interest to Univisions-Crimson
Holding, Inc., a company that purchased Inductors and/or products
containing inductors directly from one or more of the Defendants.
[BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Todd A. Seaver, Esq.
Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr., Esq.
Jessica Moy, Esq.
Sarah Khorasanee McGrath, Esq.
BERMAN TABACCO
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
San Francisco, CA 94104
Tel.: (415) 433-3200
Fax: (415) 433-6282
Email: tseaver@bermantabacco.com
jtabacco@bermantabacco.com
jmoy@bermantabacco.com
smcgrath@bermantabacco.com
- and -
Vincent Briganti, Esq.
Barbara Hart, Esq.
LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
44 South Broadway
White Plains, NY 10601
Tel: (914) 997-0500
Fax: (914) 997-0035
Email: vbriganti@lowey.com
bhart@lowey.com
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Class Certification Sought in "Gajewski" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Gajewski moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit entitled JENNIFER GAJEWSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
NATIONWIDE CREDIT INC. and CHASE BANK USA N.A., Case No. 2:18-cv-
00191-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay
the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff
(and the Defendants) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.
Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of
the plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the
court enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing
of a class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).
To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").
While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual
settlement of a class representative's claims, the same decision
cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from
representing a class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing
Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June 20, 2017). The Plaintiff
asserts that one defendant has attempted a similar tactic by
sending a certified check to the proposed class representative.
Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also
Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No.
15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24,
2016).
The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.
As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense
when short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an
amended motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.
The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.
A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Krw3z7Bj
The Plaintiff is represented by:
John D. Blythin, Esq.
Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
3620 East Layton Avenue
Cudahy, WI 53110
Telephone: (414) 482-8000
Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
meldridge@ademilaw.com
jfruchter@ademilaw.com
bslatky@ademilaw.com
NQ MOBILE: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of investors who
purchased NQ Mobile Inc. ("NQ") (NYSE:NQ) securities between
March 30, 2017 and February 6, 2018.
Click here to learn about the case: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
c/nq-mobile-inc?wire=3. There is no cost or obligation to you.
According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, the
Company issued materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) NQ failed to disclose related party
transactions involving the Transaction between NQ Mobile and
Tongfang Investment Fund; (2) due to the related parties involved
in the Transaction, NQ agreed to consideration in the form of a
note with a high likelihood of default; (3) Defendant Shi's
interest in the Transaction was not fully disclosed; and (4) as a
result, Defendants' statements about NQ's business, operations
and prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis at all relevant times.
If you suffered a loss in NQ you have until April 11, 2018 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve
as a lead plaintiff. To obtain additional information, contact
Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com, by telephone
at 212.425.1140, or visit http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-c/nq-
mobile-inc?wire=3.
Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has
represented investors in securities litigations involving
financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel: 212.425.1140
Fax: 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL: Court Won't Review Denial of Judgment
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned TOBIAS BERMUDEZ CHAVEZ, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Defendant,
No. 17 Civ. 3459 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.).
The Court issued an Opinion and Order denying the motion for
judgment on the pleadings of defendant Occidental Chemical Corp.
The standard governing motions for reconsideration is strict, and
reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party
can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked.
Occidental seeks reconsideration of the Court's holding that
under the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling,
plaintiffs' claims were tolled continuously from August 31, 1993
to June 3, 2010. Occidental raises three arguments in support of
its bid for reconsideration.
Occidental argues primarily that the Court, in holding that
plaintiffs reasonably could have relied on the maintenance of a
putative class action following Judge Lake's 1995 orders,
erroneously assumed the availability and continuation of class-
action proceedings in the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs' home
countries.
Occidental's arguments mischaracterize both this Court's Opinion
and Judge Lake's 1995 orders.
First, contrary to Occidental's suggestion, this Court did not
make any assumption (let alone any holding) as to the
availability of class actions in the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs'
home countries. Rather, the Court considered only what Judge Lake
held, and how his orders reasonably would have been received by
members of the putative Carcamo/Delgado class.
The question before the Court, in other words, was not whether
the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs ultimately could have pursued
class-wide relief abroad, but rather whether Judge Lake's orders
reasonably allowed for class proceedings in any forum as the
lawsuit moved forward. The Court answered that question in the
affirmative.
Occidental represents that the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs
themselves represented before Judge Lake that class actions were
unavailable in the plaintiffs' home countries. Whatever relevance
this fact might otherwise have to the reasonableness of an absent
class member's reliance on that litigation as a basis for not
initiating suit after Judge Lake's conditional transfer order,
Occidental forfeited that argument.
As Occidental concedes, the document on which it bases this
argument, the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs' June 6, 1995 Response
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens and
Comity Grounds, was not part of the (voluminous) record before
this Court on the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Occidental does not offer any reason why this document, and any
attendant argument, could not have been raised at the motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, this argument is not properly presented on the
motion for reconsideration.
In a separate, single-paragraph objection, Occidental argues next
that this Court erred in holding that the class action filed in
Hawaii preserved plaintiffs' claims. The Court did not so hold.
The discussion at issue was in a footnote clearly denoted as
dictum. The Court stated there only that Occidental's reliance on
Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1987), had been misplaced.
As the Court explained, the anti-stacking rule enunciated in
Korwek applies only where there has been a definitive
determination of the inappropriateness of class certification,
whereas here, as this Court had just held, there had not been any
such determination. It was for this reason that the Court noted,
as alternative support for tolling during the Hawaii litigation's
pendency, that the Hawaii action "would have justified a toll
during its pendency."
A full-text copy of the District Court's January 29, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yazcs7wc from
Leagle.com.
Tobias Bermudez Chavez, Julio Abrego Abrego, Alvarado Alfarfo
Miguel Francisco, Jorge Luis Aguilar Mora, Edwin Aguero Jimenez &
Gonzalez Araya Franklin, Plaintiffs, represented by Barbara H.
Stratton, Knepper & Stratton, 1228 North King Street, Wilmington,
DE 19801, Jonathan Massey -- jmassey@masseygail.com -- Massey &
Gail LLP, Rebecca Ruth Webber -- rwebber@hendlerlaw.com --
Hendler Lyons Flores, PLLC & Scott M. Hendler --
shendler@hendlerlaw.com -- Hendler Lyons Flores PLLC, pro hac
vice.
Occidental Chemical Corporation, individually and as successor to
other Occidental Chemical Company other Occidental Chemical
Agricultural Products Inc. other Hooker Chemical and Plastics
other Occidental Chemical Company of Texas other Best Fertilizer
Company, Defendant, represented by Conor Paul McEvily --
cmcevily@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Devon Charles
Holstad -- dholstad@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Donald
Ferguson McNiel, III -- fmcniel@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins
L.L.P., Jennifer Marie Kinkus -- jkinkus@ycst.com -- Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, pro hac vice,
OHIO: Tax Collection Lawsuit Dismissed
--------------------------------------
Josh Ellerbrock, writing for Lima Ohio News, reports that a
Franklin County Common Pleas Court judge dismissed a class-action
lawsuit Feb. 21 brought forward by Ohio municipalities --
including the City of Lima -- contesting a law that gives
businesses a second option to pay their local taxes.
Of the roughly 160 municipalities represented, the lawsuit
includes Lima, Van Wert, Delphos, Bluffton, St. Marys and
Minster.
Local governments say the state is overreaching aspects of "home
rule," and the new law cuts the amount of taxes received by
municipalities by imposing a 0.5 percent handling fee on any tax
collected through the state's secondary system.
The original impetus behind the law was to streamline tax filings
by businesses operating across town and county lines.
"How can a judge disregard the 500-plus cities that are going to
be affected by this in a negative way?" Van Wert Mayor Jerry
Mazur said. "But that's what the court system is for."
Many city and village legal councils expect the filers of the
lawsuit to appeal the action, and the final decision will most
likely be made in the Ohio Supreme Court. Due to such, the new
law will not affect tax filings in the foreseeable future due to
a preliminary injunction request, which puts a freeze on laws
examined in the judicial system.
Lima Law Director Tony Geiger said a similar lawsuit has also
been filed in Toledo, which is also contesting the new law.
Depending on the actions of the court, the final decisions should
affect tax filings no earlier than one to two years, Geiger said.
Despite the legal problems, villages and cities are amending
municipal law to ensure they are in compliance with the state.
If the class-action lawsuit were to be dismissed at the highest
court levels, the actual effects to municipalities remain to be
seen.
Mazur said the half-percent handling fee would put a damper onto
the amount of local tax shuffled through state's hands, which
would need to be made up by increasing the city's tax base.
"Gross net profit tax, it's a huge value. This is the first step
in the state taking over all of the tax opportunity that we
have," Mazur said. "It takes up a lot of money to make up what
the state takes from us."
St. Marys Law Director Kraig Noble said the effect may be minimal
depending on how businesses decide to pay their taxes.
"Our department has a good working relationship with most of the
industries. They may choose to stay with our department," Noble
said.
"We're very disappointed in the results, and I would expect the
attorneys in Columbus are considering our options and would hope
they find grounds to appeal the decision," Minster Village
Solicitor James Hearn Sr. said. [GN]
PENN MUTUAL: Brown Appeals Decision in "Harshbarger" to 3rd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jeff M. Brown filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Daniel Harshbarger, et al. v. Penn Mutual Life
Insurance Co., Case No. 2-12-cv-06172, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 31, 2018, the
District Court granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
approval of Defendant's payment of attorney's fees, reimbursed
litigation expenses, and class representatives' incentive awards.
The Motion is granted and an award of $10,000,000 in attorneys'
fees to Class Counsel; an award of $700,000 in expenses to Class
Counsel; a service award of $3,750 to Daniel J. Harshbarger; and
a service award of $3,750 to Edith M. Harshbarger.
The appellate case is captioned as Daniel Harshbarger, et al. v.
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., Case No. 18-1118, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Plaintiff-Appellant JEFF M. BROWN, of Boca Raton, Florida,
appears pro se.[BN]
Plaintiffs-Appellees DANIEL J. HARSHBARGER and EDITH M.
HARSHBARGER, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons Similarly
Situated, are represented by:
Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 300
Phoenix, AZ 85016
Telephone: (602) 274-1100
E-mail: afriedman@bffb.com
- and -
Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC LLC
Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
429 Fourth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Telephone: (412) 281-8400
E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com
Defendant-Appellee PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. is represented
by:
Jay H. Calvert, Jr., Esq.
Joseph B.G. Fay, Esq.
John P. Lavelle, Jr., Esq.
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 963-5462
E-mail: jay.calvert@morganlewis.com
joseph.fay@morganlewis.com
john.lavelle@morganlewis.com
PETRELLA PHILLIPS: Atty Fees Bid in Malpractice Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELPHI HEALTHCARE PLLC, DELPHI HOSPITALIST SERVICES
LLC, WORKFIT MEDICAL, LLC, WORKFIT STAFFING LLC, AND HEALTHCARE
SUPPORT SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. PETRELLA
PHILLIPS LLP AND THOMAS A. PETRELLA, Defendants-Appellants, Case
1345 CA 16-02320 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department, has entered an
order unanimously modifying the order appealed from by granting
those parts of the motion with respect to the second and fourth
causes of action, and with respect to the remaining causes of
action to the extent that they seek damages for attorneys' fees
associated with the class action lawsuit and dismissing the
complaint to that extent, and as modified, the order is affirmed
without costs.
The Plaintiffs commenced the action for, inter alia, accounting
malpractice and breach of contract, alleging that they had hired
the Defendants as their accountants, in part to ensure that the
Plaintiffs were in compliance with the overtime compensation and
wage notice requirements set forth in the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law. The Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants failed to provide the aforementioned
services, which resulted in a class action lawsuit being
commenced against them in federal court on behalf of their
current and former employees.
In the instant action, the Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for
attorneys' fees incurred in the defense and settlement of the
underlying class action, as well as damages for loss of business,
business reputation, and contract payments. The Defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, and the
Defendants now appeal the order entered by the Supreme Court,
Monroe County (Judge Matthew A. Rosenbaum), on Sept. 22, 2016,
granting their motion only in part, dismissing the cause of
action for indemnification and contribution.
The Defendants contend that Supreme Court should have granted
their motion in its entirety because the remaining causes of
action and classes of damages constitute requests for
indemnification, which are barred by the FLSA.
The Court explains that it is well established that there is no
right of contribution or indemnity for employers found liable
under the FLSA, and the FLSA preempts any conflicting provisions
of state labor laws, including those of New York. A party may
not avoid this bar on indemnity by seeking indemnification
damages through other legal theories.
In view of this, the Court agrees with the Defendants that
seeking attorneys' fees associated with the class action is a
request for indemnity. It therefore modified the order by
granting those parts of the motion seeking dismissal of the
complaint to the extent that it seeks damages for attorneys' fees
associated with the class action.
Contrary to the Defendants' contention, that determination does
not require dismissal of the complaint in its entirety inasmuch
as the remaining classes of damages sought by plaintiffs are not
barred by the FLSA. Damages for loss of business, business
reputation, and contract payments arise directly from the
business relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants,
and awarding such damages does not indemnify the Plaintiffs for
their liability under the FLSA in the underlying class action.
The Defendants contend, in the alternative, that the second
through fourth causes of action, for negligence, breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty, should be dismissed as
duplicative of the first cause of action, for accounting
malpractice. The Court agrees with them with respect to the
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, and it
therefore further modified the order accordingly.
Causes of action for negligence, breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty are duplicative of professional malpractice causes
of action where they are based on the same factual allegations
and seek similar damages. Here, the Court finds that the
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action are
duplicative of the accounting malpractice cause of action
inasmuch as they share the same set of underlying facts and seek
the same damages as that cause of action. Moreover, the
allegation in the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action that
the Defendants concealed their errors and omissions from the
Plaintiffs does not differentiate that cause of action from the
accounting malpractice cause of action inasmuch as there is no
independent cause of action for concealing malpractice.
Upon construing the complaint liberally, and affording the
Plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the
Court rejects the Defendants' contention that the breach of
contract cause of action is duplicative of the accounting
malpractice cause of action. The breach of contract cause of
action is based on allegations that the Defendants breached their
agreements with the Plaintiffs by failing to perform certain
services, and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all
compensation paid to the Defendants for those unperformed
services. That is separate and distinct from the allegations in
the accounting malpractice cause of action, which seeks damages
based on allegations that defendants did perform services
pursuant to the contract but failed to comply with the accepted
standards of care.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/avJoZO from Leagle.com.
LANDMAN CORSI BALLAINE & FORD P.C., NEW YORK CITY (WILLIAM G.
BALLAINE -- wballaine@lcbf.com -- OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.
WEBSTER SZANYI LLP, BUFFALO (D. CHARLES ROBERTS, JR. --
croberts@websterszanyi.com -- OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-
RESPONDENTS.
PLATINUM LIMOUSINE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in "Pelayo"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Platinum Limousine Services, Inc., and Kurt Tsuneyoshi
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Arsenio
Pelayo, et al. v. Platinum Limousine Services, et al., Case No.
1:15-cv-00023-DKW-KJM, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii, Honolulu.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
complaint alleges that the Defendants: (1) failed to pay overtime
and minimum wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act;
(2) required employees to work split shifts; (3) failed to timely
pay wages when due; (4) converted pay owed the Plaintiff; (5) was
unjustly enriched; and (6) owes punitive damages.
The appellate case is captioned as Arsenio Pelayo, et al. v.
Platinum Limousine Services, et al., Case No. 18-15169, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:
-- Transcript must be ordered by March 5, 2018;
-- Transcript is due on April 2, 2018;
-- Appellants Platinum Limousine Services, Inc. and Kurt
Tsuneyoshi's opening brief is due on May 14, 2018;
-- Appellees Brandon Boreliz, Francis Manankil and Arsenio
Pelayo's answering brief is due on June 11, 2018; and
-- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
service of the answering brief.[BN]
Plaintiffs-Appellees ARSENIO PELAYO, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; FRANCIS MANANKIL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and BRANDON
BORELIZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, are represented by:
Richard Loren Holcomb, Jr., Esq.
HOLCOMB LAW, LLLC
1136 Union Mall, Suite 805
Honolulu, HI 96813
Telephone: (808) 545-4040
Facsimile: (808) 356-1954
E-mail: rholcomblaw@live.com
Defendants-Appellants PLATINUM LIMOUSINE SERVICES, INC., and KURT
TSUNEYOSHI are represented by:
Sheri J. Tanaka, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF SHERI J. TANAKA
4348 Waialae Avenue, #586
Honolulu, HI 96816
Telephone: (808) 276-4942
Facsimile: (808) 748-3165
E-mail: sheri.tanaka@gmail.com
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE: Ct. Won't Amend Denial of Class Cert
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CLARK R. HUFFMAN; PATRICIA L. GRANTHAM;
LINDA M. PACE; and BRANDI K. WINTERS, individually and on behalf
of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant, No. 2:10-cv-
05135 (E.D. Penn.), the United States District Court for the
Eastern District Pennsylvania issued an Order granting in part
and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct the
Orders Denying Class Certification and the Response in opposition
thereto and certified a Rule 23(b)(3) Subclass defined as
follows:
All beneficiaries of ERISA-governed employee benefit plans
that were sponsored by J.P. Morgan Chase, Inc. or Con-Way, Inc.,
and that were insured by group life insurance contracts issued by
Prudential that provided Life Insurance is normally paid to the
beneficiary in one sum, for whom Prudential established an
Alliance Account between September 30, 2004, and October 31,
2011.Excluded from the subclass are beneficiaries of contracts
that were sitused in Arkansas, Colorado, or Nevada, and
beneficiaries who resided in Maryland.
A full-text copy of the District Court's January 29, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yalqm6t5 from Leagle.com.
CLARK R. HUFFMAN, PATRICIA L. GRANTHAM, LINDA M. PACE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED & BRANDI K. WINTERS, Plaintiffs, represented by CARY L.
FLITTER, FLITTER MILZ, P.C., ANDREW M. MILZ, FLITTER MILZ, P.C.,
JOHN C. BELL, Jr., BELL & BRIGHAM, LEE W. BRIGHAM, BELL &
BRIGHAM, M. SCOTT BARRETT, Barrett Wylie, LLC & STUART T.
ROSSMAN, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER.
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant,
represented by DONALD E. WIEAND, Jr., STEVENS & LEE, EDWIN G.
SCHALLERT, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, MAEVE O'CONNOR, DEBEVOISE &
PIMPTON, MARTIN C. BRYCE, Jr., BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS AND
INGERSOLL, L.L.P., ALISON V. DOUGLASS, GOODWIN, PROCTER & HOAR,
LLP, DAVID ROSENBERG, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, JAMES O. FLECKNER --
jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com -- GOODWIN, PROCTER & HOAR, LLP, JORDAN
D. WEISS -- jweiss@goodwinlaw.com -- GOODWIN PROCTER LLP &
MICHAEL K. ISENMAN -- misenman@goodwinlaw.com -- GOODWIN PROCTOR,
LLP.
RESTORATION HARDWARE: Unnamed Member Can't Appeal w/o Notice
------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of California issued an opinion affirming the
judgment of the Court of Appeal denying Muller's Motion to Vacate
Judgment in the case captioned MIKE HERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs
and Respondents; FRANCESCA MULLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
RESTORATION HARDWARE, INC., Defendant and Respondent, No. S233983
(Cal.).
The issue the state Supreme Court addresses is when does an
unnamed class action member become a party of record with the
right to appeal a class action settlement or judgment under
section 902?
Plaintiff Michael Hernandez filed a class action law suit against
defendant Restoration Hardware, Inc., alleging the company
committed numerous violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act
when it asked for and recorded ZIP codes from customers who used
credit cards in making RHI purchases.
A notice to potential class members advised them of the pending
class action. The notice also advised the potential class members
that if they elected to remain in the class, they could appear in
court through class counsel. Francesca Muller, an unnamed class
member and the appellant, received the June 2013 class action
notice, but did not join the class as a party or opt out at that
time. Instead, Muller's attorney filed a notice of an appearance
on her behalf.
Muller was served with the attorney fees motion and a copy of
class counsel's percentage of the common fund calculation, but
did not object to the proposed total fee award. Instead, she
filed a Request for Clarification and asked to appear
telephonically at the settlement fairness hearing on the fee
proposal. The request stated that the parties' pleadings do not
indicate that class members were notified of the settlement of
the attorney fees issue and of the hearing on September 5, 2014,
to approve class counsel's fee request. The trial court permitted
Muller to file her request.
After the hearing on the settlement of the proposed fee award,
the court issued a Second Amended Minute Order denying Muller's
request for clarification and approving the fee and costs
requests.
Muller did not file a section 663 motion to vacate the judgment;
instead she filed a notice of appeal.
Representatives challenged Muller's claims on their merits. They
also challenged Muller's right to file her appeal because she was
neither a party nor aggrieved by the trial court's alleged
erroneous judgment as required under section 902 and the state
Supreme Court's decision in Eggert, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 201.
The court dismissed Muller's appeal for lack of standing,
concluding it was bound to follow Eggert under Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, decisions of
state supreme court are binding on all other state courts; courts
of inferior jurisdiction may not overrule higher court
decisions).
The Court of Appeal also concluded that Muller cited no
persuasive authority to support her argument that changes to
federal procedural rules for managing class actions in federal
trials undermine the analysis of state statutes limiting who may
appeal.
The state Supreme Court granted Muller's petition for review on
the right to appeal issue only.
Muller claims that because a class settlement is generally
binding on all class members (assuming class representatives have
complied with due process regarding notice and adequate
representation), the state Supreme Court should create an
exception to Eggert that allows members to appeal their denied
objections to settlement without formal intervention.
This Court declines to do so. Following Eggert and requiring
intervention does not discourage unnamed class members from
filing a meritorious appeal. Rather, it continues a manageable
process under a bright-line rule that promotes judicial economy
by providing clear notice of a timely intent to challenge the
class representative's settlement action. Formal intervention
also enables the trial court to review the motion to intervene in
a timely manner.
Muller had the opportunity to intervene in the trial court
proceedings but chose not to do so. Instead, she made a strategic
choice to wait and see if she agreed with the settlement amount
and attorney fees agreement. By filing an appeal without first
intervening in the action, however, Muller never became an
aggrieved party of record to the action as the law requires.
Muller also fails to justify her request that the state supreme
court overrule Eggert under the well-established jurisprudential
rule of stare decisis that we follow prior applicable precedent
even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided
differently. This is so parties can regulate their conduct and
enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the
governing rules of law. Although the doctrine is flexible because
it permits this court to reconsider, and ultimately depart from,
our own precedent when changes or developments in the law
recommend it, the Court conclude that Muller presents no
persuasive reason for the court to reconsider Eggert's rule, much
less depart from it. The contours of section 902 are clear, and
Eggert's bright-line rule is consistent with the statute. Muller
will be bound by the Hernandez class judgment as an unnamed class
member who never became a party to the action.
The Legislature has limited the right of unnamed class members to
appeal by expressly requiring that class action objectors who
wish to appeal be parties of record who have been aggrieved by
the court's decision.
Had Muller properly intervened in the class action or filed a
section 663 motion to vacate the judgment, and been denied
relief, she would have had a clear path to challenge the attorney
fees award (or settlement or judgment) on appeal. Muller offers
no persuasive reason why we should create an exception to our
long-standing rule, or overrule or distinguish Eggert.
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal judgment.
A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's January 29, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9223cha from
Leagle.com.
Law Office of Lawrence W. Schonbrun and Lawrence W. Schonbrun for
Plaintiff and Appellant, 86 Eucalyptus Road. Berkeley, CA 94705.
Patterson Law Group, James R. Patterson --
jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Allison H. Goddard --
ali@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Stonebarger Law, Gene J. Stonebarger
-- gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com -- and Richard D. Lambert --
rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Nelson & Fraenkel, Gretchen M. Nelson -- gnelson@nflawfirm.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro and Kevin K. Green --
keving@hbsslaw.com -- for Consumer Attorneys of California as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
RIOT BLOCKCHAIN: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against Riot Blockchain, Inc. f/k/a Bioptix, Inc. ("Riot"
or the "Company") (NASDAQ:RIOT) and certain of its officers.
The class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
District of Colorado, and Docketed under 18-cv-00440, is on
behalf of a class consisting of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Riot's securities between October 4, 2017
through February 15, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
against the Company and certain of its top officials.
If you are a shareholder who purchased Riot securities between
October 4, 2017, and February 15, 2018, both dates inclusive, you
have until April 18, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing
address, telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.
Riot Blockchain, Inc. purports to operate as a digital currency
company. The Company represents that it focuses on buying
cryptocurrency and blockchain businesses, as well as supporting
blockchain technology companies. Founded in 2000, the Company
was formerly known as Bioptix, Inc. ("Bioptix") and changed its
name to Riot Blockchain, Inc. in October 2017.
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Riot lacked a
meaningful business plan with respect to the cryptocurrency
business and had only minimal investments in cryptocurrency
products; (ii) the Company changed its name to Riot Blockchain,
Inc. as part of a scheme to capitalize on public interest in
cryptocurrency products, thereby driving up the Company's stock
price and enriching inside shareholders; (iii) Riot never
intended to hold its Annual General Meetings scheduled for
December 28, 2017, and February 1, 2018; and (iv) as a result of
the foregoing, Riot shares traded at artificially inflated prices
during the Class Period, and class members suffered significant
losses and damages.
On February 16, 2018, CNBC published a report based on an
investigation of Riot. The CNBC report noted that Riot's "stock
shot from $8 a share to more than $40, as investors wanted to
cash in on the craze of all things crypto," but that Riot did not
appear to have meaningful involvement in the cryptocurrency
business: "Until October, its name was Bioptix, and it was known
for having a veterinary products patent and developing new ways
to test for disease." In addition, CNBC reported numerous "red
flags" in Riot's SEC filings: "annual meetings that are postponed
at the last minute, insider selling soon after the name change,
dilutive issuances on favorable terms to large investors, SEC
filings that are often Byzantine and, evidence that a major
shareholder was getting out while everyone else was getting in."
On this news, Riot's share price fell $5.74, or over 33.37%, to
close at $11.46 on February 16, 2018, damaging investors.
The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms
in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as
the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. See www.pomerantzlaw.com.
Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
Pomerantz LLP
Tel.No.: 888-476-6529 Ext. 9980
E-mail: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]
RIVERSOURCE LIFE: Davis Moves for Certification of Three Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled PAUL M. DAVIS, individually
and as trustee/settlor/grantor of the PAUL M. DAVIS REVOCABLE
TRUST OF 2011, MIREYA OCON, by and through Power of Attorney
Valeska Cosci, and on behalf of the putative class v. RIVERSOURCE
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota corporation, AMERIPRISE
FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 4:16-
cv-02801-JSW (N.D. Cal.), moves for certification of these
classes:
-- Section 10127 Disclosure Class A:
All persons from January 1, 2008 to the present who were
issued a RiverSource RAVA 5 or RAVA 4 deferred annuity
policy, with a guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit
rider, when they were 60 years old or older, while residing
in the State of California (or, if deceased, the person or
estate to whom death benefits were paid for which any
surrender charge or penalty was assessed);
-- Section 10127 Disclosure Class B:
All persons from January 1, 2008 to the present who were
issued a RiverSource RAVA 5 or RAVA 4 deferred annuity
policy, without a guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit
rider, when they were 60 years old or older, while residing
in the State of California (or, if deceased, the person or
estate to whom death benefits were paid for which any
surrender charge or penalty was assessed); and
-- Financial Elder Abuse Class:
All persons from January 1, 2008 to the present who were
issued a RiverSource RAVA 5 or RAVA 4 deferred annuity
policy while they were 65 years old or older, while
residing in the State of California (or, if deceased, the
person or estate to whom death benefits were paid for which
any surrender charge or penalty was assessed).
Mr. Davis also moves for his appointment as class representative
for the class members for all three putative Classes. He further
moves for the appointment of Andrew S. Friedman, Esq., of Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, PC, and Ingrid M. Evans, Esq., of
Evans Law Firm, Inc., as Class Counsel for the Classes.
The Court will commence a hearing on March 30, 2018, at 9:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.
A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=f4ERkYWG
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
Phoenix, AZ 85016
Telephone: (602) 274-1100
Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
E-mail: afriedman@bffb.com
fbalint@bffb.com
- and -
Ingrid M. Evans, Esq.
EVANS LAW FIRM, INC.
3053 Fillmore Street, #236
San Francisco, CA 94123
Telephone: (415) 441-8669
Facsimile: (888) 891-4906
E-mail: ingrid@evanslaw.com
SANTEE COOPER: S.C. Electric Cooperatives Plan to Sue
-----------------------------------------------------
Andrew Brown, writing for The Post and Courier, reports that
South Carolina's electric cooperatives plan to sue Santee Cooper
to stop the public utility from charging customers for V.C.
Summer, fracturing the two groups' long-held business
relationship and inflaming an economic crisis that has already
consumed the state.
The cooperatives' decision to file a legal claim against state-
run Santee Cooper comes half a year after the troubled nuclear
project near Jenkinsville was abandoned due to ballooning costs
and endless construction problems.
It's unclear exactly how the legal challenge could impact the
utility's finances. But it might jeopardize the $4 billion in
bonds Santee Cooper issued for the reactors over the past decade.
The cooperatives are Santee Cooper's largest customer.
The cooperatives' attorneys, among other things, argue that
Santee Cooper should not be allowed to charge people for the
nuclear project because the unfinished reactors aren't producing
power and are unlikely to start pumping out electricity to
people's homes and businesses any time soon.
The leaders of the state's 20 electric cooperatives also want 70
percent of the $831 million that Santee Cooper received through a
settlement with Toshiba, the parent company of its nuclear
contractor Westinghouse Electric.
Santee Cooper had yet to see the actual legal complaint, said
Mollie Gore, the utility's spokesperson. The cooperatives don't
plan to file anything in court until next week.
The legal claim will actually be filed by Central Electric Power
Cooperative, the entity that buys power from Santee Cooper and
distributes it to the cooperatives spread throughout South
Carolina's 46 counties. Central is led by a board of 40
cooperative members.
"We took this action because it's the right thing to do to
protect both our member-cooperatives and their consumer-members,"
said Robert Hochstetler, Central's president and CEO. "From the
beginning, we've made the consumers our first priority. They are
both our owners and our customers, so we're going to do what we
must to protect their interests in this very difficult
situation."
The cooperatives paid more than $422 million to Santee Cooper to
finance the reactors since workers broke ground on the project.
Last year, around 5.5 percent of Central's overall power costs
were attributable to V.C. Summer.
But the price of those nuclear payments on individual cooperative
customers is harder to pinpoint because of decisions made by the
leaders of the 20 local cooperatives.
The legal claim spun off of an ongoing class-action case filed by
a cooperative customer in the aftermath of the V.C. Summer
cancellation. As part of that ongoing battle in circuit court,
the cooperatives are able to challenge Santee Cooper and its
ability to collect money for useless power plants.
The dispute could place the cooperatives and Santee Cooper in the
spotlight for the first time since the reactors were canceled
last August.
For months, state officials have focused their attention on S.C.
Electric & Gas, the majority owner of the reactors at V.C.
Summer. State lawmakers are still wrestling over what to do about
the $37 million a month that utility continues to collect from
its 700,000 customers.
But Gov. Henry McMaster has spent recent months courting
investor-owned utilities in an attempt to sell Santee Cooper.
"If SCE&G ratepayers shouldn't be charged, then neither should
the co-op customers of Santee Cooper," McMaster tweeted February
23. "That's what I have been saying, and that's why selling
Santee Cooper is the only way to protect co-op customers."
Mike Couick, the CEO of The Electric Cooperatives of South
Carolina, said the legal challenge won't impact McMaster's and
other lawmakers' attempts to significantly transform Santee
Cooper.
But other lawmakers in the Statehouse aren't interested in a
sale. They worry that exempting co-op customers from the nuclear
charges will weaken Santee Cooper and harm the 176,000 customers
served directly by the utility.
"I'm greatly disappointed in the actions of the cooperatives of
South Carolina," said Sen. Larry Grooms, R-Charleston. "A
partnership of 75 years may have been irreparably harmed today."
Grooms, who represents Moncks Corner where Santee Cooper is
based, said the cooperatives claim could cripple the state
utility -- a vestige of the New Deal era. He also points out that
the cooperatives agreed to a contract in 2013 that allowed the
V.C. Summer project to continue.
"The co-ops played a major role in moving forward with the
project," Grooms said. [GN]
SILVERTON INT'L: "Cohen" Hits Misclassification, Seeks OT Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shardaya Cohen, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Silverton International, LLC
(d/b/a Cameo of Charlotte), Damon Woolums and Sirinity (last name
unknown), Defendant, Case No. 18-at-00059 (W.D. N.C., January 31,
2018), seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, interest
thereon, liquidated damages, costs of suit and reasonable
attorney fees and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Charlotte known
as Cameo of Charlotte where Cohen worked as an exotic dancer.
Defendants classify their entertainers as independent contractors
and do not pay them any wages at all. Their only compensation is
in the form of tips received directly from patrons. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Charles H. Rabon, Jr., Esq.
Gregory D. Whitaker, Esq.
RABON LAW FIRM, PLLC
225 E. Worthington Ave., Suite 100
Charlotte, NC 28203
Tel: (704) 247-3247
Fax: (704) 208-4645
Email: Crabon@usfraudattorneys.com
gwhitaker@usfraudattorneys.com
gwhitaker@usfraudattorneys.com
- and -
Jeremi K. Young, Esq.
Collin J. Wynne, Esq.
YOUNG & NEWSOM, PC
1001 S. Harrison, Suite 200
Amarillo, TX 79101
Tel: (806) 331-1800
Fax: (806) 398-9095
Email: jyoung@youngfirm.com
Collin@youngfirm.com
SNYDER'S-LANCE: "Daniel" Suit Seeks to Halt Sale to Campbell Soup
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Beth A. Daniel, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Snyder's-Lance, Inc., Jeffrey
A. Atkins, Peter P. Brubaker, C. Peter Carlucci, Jr., John E.
Denton, Brian J. Driscoll, Lawrence V. Jackson, James W.
Johnston, David C. Moran, Dan C. Swander, Isaiah Tidwell,
Patricia A. Warehime, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00058 (W.D.
N.C., January 31, 2018), seeks to enjoin defendants and all
persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating or closing the acquisition of Snyder's-Lance by
Campbell Soup Company, and rescinding it in the event defendants
consummate the merger. The suit also seeks rescissory damages,
costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for
plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and
further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Pursuant to the merger agreement, shareholders of Snyder's-Lance
will receive $50.00 per share in cash.
Snyder's-Lance manufactures and markets snack foods throughout
the United States. Snyder's-Lance's products include pretzels,
sandwich crackers, pretzel crackers, potato chips, cookies,
tortilla chips, restaurant style crackers, popcorn, nuts, and
other snacks.
According to complaint, the proxy statement omitted financial
projections and analyses performed by the company's financial
advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, in particular, unlevered free
cash flow, depreciation and amortization, taxes, increase in net
working capital, capital expenditures, net operating losses and a
reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics. Said disclosure
provides stockholders with a basis to project the future
financial performance of a company, and allows stockholders to
better understand the financial analyses, it says. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Nancy Meyers, Esq.
WARD BLACK LAW
208 West Wendover Avenue
Greensboro, NC 27401
Tel: (336) 510-2014
Fax: (336) 510-2181
Email: nmeyers@wardblack1aw.com
- and -
Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
WEISSLAW LLP
1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Tel: (212) 682-3025
Fax: (212) 682-3010
Email: racocelli@weisslawllp.com
mrogovin@weisslawllp.com
STAGES OF BEAUTY: Court Narrows Claims in "Lopez" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STAGES OF BEAUTY, LLC,
and DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 17cv1888-MMA (KSC) (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and denied its motion for
sanctions.
The Defendant sells cosmetics, beauty aids and related products
primarily through a website which markets weekly subscription
programs. These subscription programs constitute automatic
renewal and/or continuous service plans or arrangements.
The Plaintiff purchased a subscription plan from the Defendant
and seeks to represent a class of all persons within California
who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, up to
and including the date of final judgment in the action, purchased
any product or service in response to an offer constituting an
"Automatic Renewal" as defined by California Business and
Professions Code Section 17601(a) from Stages of Beauty, its
predecessors, or its affiliates.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's automatic renewal or
continuous service offers failed to present the offer terms in a
clear and conspicuous manner and in visual proximity to the
request for consent to the offer prior to purchasing the
subscription and that the Defendant charged the Plaintiff's and
class members' credit or debit cards, or third-party accounts,
without first obtaining the subscriber's consent to the agreement
containing the offer terms.
The Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant failed to provide
an acknowledgement including the full cancellation policy. After
subscribing to one of its plans, the Defendant sends a follow-up
email to the subscriber. The Plaintiff alleges that these emails
provide language regarding cancellation without specifying that a
subscriber must call the cancellation number at least one day
prior to the date the subscriber's next monthly delivery ships.
As a result, the Plaintiff alleges all goods, wares, merchandise,
or products, sent to the Plaintiff and the Class Members under
the automatic renewal or continuous service agreement are deemed
to be an unconditional gift. Based on these allegations, the
Plaintiff raises the following causes of action: (1) failure to
present the automatic renewal or continuous service offer terms
clearly and conspicuously and in visual proximity to the request
for consent offer in violation of California's Automatic Renewal
Law ("ARL"); (2) failure to obtain the consumer's affirmative
consent before the subscription is fulfilled in violation of the
ARL; (3) failure to provide an acknowledgement with the automatic
renewal terms and information regarding the cancellation policy
in violation of the ARL; and (4) violations of California's
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") for unlawful and/or unfair
business practices.
The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint on four
grounds. First, it argues the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing with respect to his ARL claims. Second, it asserts the
ARL does not provide a private right of action. Third, it
contends its pre- and post-transaction disclosures comply with
the ARL. Fourth, the Defendant states that the Plaintiff lacks
statutory standing and insufficiently pleads a UCL claim. The
Plaintiff opposes dismissal.
The Defendant also moves the Court for sanctions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because the Plaintiff's
Complaint is clearly frivolous, and objectively legally and
factually baseless. The Plaintiff opposes.
Judge Anello finds that the ARL does not create a private right
of action. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot bring causes of
action directly under the ARL and the Plaintiffs first, second,
and third causes of action will be dismissed with prejudice. He
also finds that the Plaintiff has properly alleged that he
suffered an injury in fact that was caused by the Defendant's
actions, and therefore meets the standing requirements of the UCL
and Article III.
The Plaintiff has alleged that all products received from the
Defendant in violation of the ARL constitute unconditional gifts
and, therefore, the Plaintiff seeks restitution in the amount of
the subscription payments. When a product is delivered to a
consumer in violation of the ARL, it is not considered a product
that has been sold, but is considered a gift. Thus, when the
Defendant collected money for that gift, it injured the
Plaintiff.
The Judge further finds that the Plaintiff plausibly alleges that
the Defendant's conduct or practices violates the ARL, and
therefore, the Plaintiff plausibly alleges a UCL claim.
Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
fourth cause of action will be denied.
In summation, Judge Anello granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion. He granted the Defendant's motion with
respect to the Plaintiff's ARL causes of action, and dismissed
with prejudice causes of action one, two, and three. He also
denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's UCL
cause of action.
As to the Defendant's motion for sanctions, Judge Anello finds
that the Plaintiff's UCL cause of action is not legally baseless
because he denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the UCL
claim. Although he disagrees with the outcome of the case law
cited by the Plaintiff, the Judge says those cases protect the
Plaintiff's claims from being "objectively baseless." Further,
he finds that the Plaintiff plausibly alleges the Defendant was
noncompliant with the ARL, meaning that if the Court found the
ARL created a private right of action, those claims would have
survived dismissal. Accordingly, the Judge denied the
Defendant's motion for sanctions.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/QoUm2o from Leagle.com.
Matthew Lopez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott J. Ferrell --
sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- Pacific Trial Attorneys.
Stages of Beauty, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Daniel Scott Silverman --
dssilverman@Venable.com -- VENABLE LLP & Matthew M. Gurvitz --
mmgurvitz@Venable.com -- Venable LLP.
STATE FARM: Court Allows Spine Care to Amend Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, SPINE CARE DELAWARE, LLC, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al, Civil Action No. 17-1816 (D.
Del.), Judge Mark A. Kearney of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware granted State Farm's motion to dismiss
without prejudice to Spine Care filing an amended complaint.
Delaware's General Assembly establishes the minimum automobile
insurance to be maintained by an owner of a vehicle in the state.
One statutory minimum requirement is Personal Injury Protection
("PIP") requiring coverage of $15,000 for any one person and
$30,000 for all persons injured in any accident to compensate the
injured persons for medical expenses, lost wages, and other
expenses from the accident.
Under the PIP mandate, insurers must pay or deny a PIP claim
within 30 days of submission. If the insurer denies the claim,
the insurer must explain its reasons in writing. If an insurer
fails to comply with the statutory deadline, Delaware authorizes
fixed additional interest on the unpaid amount and if the
insurer's failure to comply is in bad faith, Delaware allows us
to award costs and attorney's fees.
State Farm issues automobile insurance policies to owners of
Delaware registered vehicles. Spine Care treats patients injured
in accidents where the Delaware registered vehicle is insured by
State Farm.
Spine Care alleges State Farm violates the PIP scheme. Spine
Care submits unidentified claims covered under PIP and State Farm
fails to pay the claim within the 30-day statutory period. State
Farm also refuses to pay the additional statutory interest on
these late payments. At other times, Spine Care submits a PIP
claim and State Farm delays payment because of its ongoing
investigation. State Farm's denial pending the surgical bill is
not warranted because a surgical bill is not a medical record and
not "germane" to State Farm's decision to cover the anesthesia
bill.
Spine Care sued State Farm on behalf of itself and others
similarly situated in Delaware state court alleging violations of
the PIP mandate, breach of contract, bad faith breach of
contract, and seeking declaratory judgment. Spine Care alleges it
qualifies as a claimant to bring this lawsuit in its own right
because it submits PIP claims. Unknown Spine Care patients
assign their right to recover PIP benefits and statutory
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees under the PIP statute to
Spine Care. Unknown patients also assign their right to recover
damages for breach of contract and bad faith and punitive damages
to Spine Care.
Spine Care alleges State Farm violated the PIP mandate when it
failed to make timely payments, failed to pay all costs for a PIP
covered procedure, denied timely payments based on "ongoing
investigations," and failed to pay statutory interest on claims
paid after the deadline. Spine Care also alleges State Farm's
conduct breached its insurance contract and also constituted a
bad faith breach of contract because State Farm did not have
reasonable justification for its denials or late payments. Spine
Care also seeks declaratory judgment State Farm's alleged conduct
is unlawful under the PIP mandate.
State Farm moves to dismiss Spine Care's complaint for failure to
state a claim. It argues Spine Care fails to allege the
existence of the contract and contractual obligation breached by
State Farm. It moves to dismiss the bad faith breach of contract
claim because it is not a valid cause of action under Delaware
law and Spine Care fails to allege supporting facts. It also
moves to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim because it seeks
relief for past conduct and it duplicative of the breach of
contract claim. State Farm also moves to dismiss Spine Care's
request for attorneys' fees and punitive damages.
Judge Kearney finds that while Spine Care, as the medical
provider, may be a proper claimant under Sammons, it fails to
allege specific injury and harm caused by State Farm's conduct.
It needs to identify a specific claim such as Mrs. Sammons'
claim. Spine Care's burden is not difficult but it must specify
a claim to support its alleged "unlawful practice" and the injury
and harm caused by State Farm. The Judge will dismiss Spine
Care's claim for violating the PIP for failure to state a claim.
The Judge also finds that while Spine Care satisfies the second
part of Progressive Spine by alleging the language of assignment,
it does not allege specific patients who assigned their rights,
unlike Progressive Spine, where the medical provider filed claims
for specific patients. It can satisfy the pleading standard by
alleging language of the assignment or attaching a copy of the
actual assignment but its allegations must specify a patient who
both assigned rights to Spine Care and subjected to State Farm's
"unlawful practices. He will dismiss Spine Care's breach of
contract and bad faith breach of contract claims because it fails
to allege an assignment of contractual rights from a patient for
standing.
Finally, as to State Farm's argument that Spine Care fails to
state a claim for declaratory judgment because it seeks judgment
as to past conduct and declaratory judgments are inappropriate
solely to adjudicate past conduct, the Judge finds that Spine
Care concedes it cannot seek declaratory judgment for past
conduct and Spine Care seeks leave to amend its complaint to seek
injunctive relief.
Judge Kearney concludes that Spine Care omits a central step of
bringing a claim against State Farm -- the identity of a claim
assigned to it and affected by State Farm's alleged conduct. In
the accompanying Order, the Judge granted State Farm's motion to
dismiss without prejudice to Spine Care filing an amended
complaint curing the present deficiencies.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/5urJgs from Leagle.com.
Spine Care Delaware, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Spadaro --
jspadaro@johnsheehanspadaro.com -- John Sheehan Spadaro, LLC.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company & State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company, Defendants, represented by Colin M. Shalk -
- cshalk@casarino.com -- Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss,
P.A., Gavin Reinke -- gavin.reinke@alston.com -- Alston & Bird,
LLP, pro hac vice & Kyle G.A. Wallace -- kyle.wallace@alston.com
-- Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice.
SWEPI LP: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in "Rogers" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James L. Graham of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion
to compel arbitration in the case, Matt A. Rogers, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SWEPI
LP and Shell Energy Holding GP, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:16-
cv-999 (S.D. Ohio).
Energy production companies have entered into leases with
landowners in eastern Ohio since the discovery of significant
Utica Shale oil and gas reserves in 2011. Rogers, an Ohio
resident who owns land in Guernsey County, has entered into an
oil and gas lease with the Defendants in October 2012. The
Defendants have their principal place of business in Houston,
Texas and are corporate affiliates of Royal Dutch Shell plc.
The Lease contained a granting clause under which Rogers, the
lessor, conveyed to SWEPI, the lessee, a leasehold interest in
his land for purposes of oil and gas exploration and production.
Another clause provided that the parties could execute a
Memorandum of Lease, which would then be recorded. The parties
did so, and the recorded Memorandum of Lease gave notice of
SWEPI's leasehold interest in Rogers' property.
The Lease also contained a bonus payment clause. It provided
that SWEPI would pay Rogers a "signing bonus" of $5,000 for each
acre that was leased, subject to Lessee's verification of
Lessor's marketable title. SWEPI had 120 days from the execution
of the Lease to verify marketable title. If SWEPI determined to
its reasonable satisfaction that Rogers did not have marketable
title, then the Lease was terminated with no payments owed by the
Lessee to Lessor.
Rogers alleges that SWEPI never paid the signing bonus. Instead
he received a form letter in August 2012 acknowledging that
considerable time has passed since signing with Shell due to the
length of time the title review process is taking for the
project. The letter continued that Shell is committed to
continue with the leasing of his property and pay bonus based on
the acres that satisfy title research. As a solution to minimize
further time passage, Shell has canceled his original lease and
surrendered his Memorandum of Oil and Gas Lease. On Aug. 8,
2012, SWEPI filed and recorded a Surrender and Cancellation of
Oil and Gas Lease for Rogers' land.
Although the letter provided a phone number for SWEPI and
expressed SWEPI's desire to "initiate a new lease," Rogers
alleges that his attempts to contact SWEPI by phone were
unsuccessful. He contends that the phone number was out of
service and that a voicemail he left at another number was not
returned. Rogers never heard from SWEPI again.
The complaint alleges that many other landowners in eastern Ohio
entered into the same or substantially the same Lease with SWEPI
as Rogers did. The complaint further alleges that SWEPI likewise
failed to conduct title research for their properties and later
filed documents of Surrender and Cancellation of Oil and Gas
Lease in the county recorder's office. SWEPI allegedly did not
pay a signing bonus to any member of the proposed class, which
allegedly consists of about 800 landowners. The complaint
asserts a single cause of action for breach of contract relating
to SWEPI's alleged failure to pay the signing bonus.
The Defendants have moved to compel individual arbitration under
the Lease's arbitration clause.
Judge Graham finds that the final sentence of the bonus payment
clause did not negate the existence of a contract but rather
provided that once the Plaintiff made the initial conveyance, his
remaining obligations were conditioned upon SWEPI paying the
signing bonus. As to SWEPI's contention that the result reached
here is absurd because no dispute over the bonus payment or a
title defect could be arbitrated, despite the arbitration
clause's broad language, the Judge finds otherwise. He says the
parties are generally free to agree on which disputes they will
arbitrate and which they will not. While the Lease contained a
broad arbitration clause, the specific language of the bonus
payment clause made clear that the Plaintiff was not agreeing to
arbitration until he was paid his signing bonus.
Accordingly, Judge Graham denied the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration and granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for
leave to file a sur-reply brief. He also denied the Defendant's
motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss -- to argue that the
Plaintiff's reliance on the final sentence of the bonus payment
clause is an admission that no contract exists.
A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 9, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/fw2aiF from Leagle.com.
Matt A. Rogers, Plaintiff, represented by Shawn J. Organ --
sjorgan@organcole.com -- Organ Cole LLP, Carrie M. Lymanstall --
cmlymanstall@organcole.com -- Organ Cole LLP, Chanler A. Langham
-- clangham@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac
vice, Douglas R. Cole -- drcole@organcole.com -- Organ Cole, Ian
M. Gore -- igore@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac
vice, Patrick C. Buchanan -- buchananlaw@me.com -- Buchanan Law
Firm PLLC, pro hac vice & Robert S. Safi --
rsafi@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice.
SWEPI LP & Shell Energy Holding GP, LLC, Defendants, represented
by J. Nicholas Ranjan -- nicholas.ranjan@klgates.com -- K&L Gates
LLP.
TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces "Rexhepi" Suit in California Over IPM Defect
----------------------------------------------------------------
JEVDET REXHEPI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES USA, INC., and DOES 1-
10, inclusive, Case No. BC692528 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Cty., January 31, 2018), is brought on behalf of all California
residents, who own or have owned or leased a 2010 through 2016
model-year Prius Hybrid.
Mr. Rexhepi alleges that the Class Vehicles suffer from one or
more defects that cause their Intelligent Power Module, which is
located inside the inverter assembly of the hybrid system, to
have an inordinate and dangerous propensity to fail, creating a
serious risk of stalling the engine at high speed that can result
in a crash (the "IPM Defect") by, inter alia, causing other
drivers to collide with the stalled Class Vehicle, by causing the
driver to lose control of the Class Vehicle, or both.
Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., is a California corporation with
its principal place of business and headquarters in Torrance,
California. TMS is the sales and marketing arm for Toyota U.S.,
which oversees sales and other operations in the United States.
"Prius" is a registered marque of Toyota Motor Sales. The
Plaintiff does not know the true names or capacities of the Doe
Defendants.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Jeffrey L. Fazio, Esq.
FAZIO MICHELETTI LLP
2410 Camino Ramon, Suite 315
San Ramon, CA 94583
Telephone: (925) 543-2555
Facsimile: (925) 369-0344
E-mail: jlf@fazmiclaw.com
- and -
Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
4725 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20016
Telephone: (202) 789-3960
Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com
- and -
Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
Amy E. Keller, Esq.
DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
Chicago, IL 60602
Telephone: (312) 214-7900
Facsimile: (440) 953-9138
E-mail: alevitt@dlcfirm.com
akeller@dlcfirm.com
- and -
W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III, Esq.
H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C.
272 Commerce Street
Montgomery, AL 36104
Telephone: (334) 269-2343
E-mail: dee.miles@beaselyallen.com
clay.barnett@beaselyallen.com
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Refuses to Certify Subclass in "Ferris"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan entered a memorandum opinion in the
lawsuit styled RICHARD FERRIS v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC., et
al., Case No. 1:16-cv-03703 (N.D. Ill.), ruling that the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification is granted as to
claims under Section 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and denied as to Section 1692g.
Judge Der-Yeghiayan opines that in the Section 1692g claims, the
commonality and typicality requirement is not met. The subclass,
thus, cannot be certified.
Mr. Ferris sought to certify this class:
All individuals who were sent a letter by Convergent seeking
to collect a student loan allegedly held by a "National
Collegiate Trust, " which disclosed that the "current
creditor" was "Chase" and whose letters were sent at anytime
between the period beginning March 28, 2015 and ending
April 18, 2016.
Mr. Ferris also sought certification of a subclass that includes
all class members, who received such a disclosure in the first
communication they received from Convergent Outsourcing Inc.
In his complaint, Mr. Ferris alleges that Transworld Systems Inc.
is a debt collector that operates a network of debt collectors.
Convergent is allegedly a debt collector in Transworld's network.
The Defendants have allegedly been seeking to collect a debt on a
student loan for a family member of Mr. Ferris. He allegedly
acted as a cosigner for the loan.
A copy of the Memorandum Opinion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ZiPXcjqo
TRINITY INDUSTRIES: City Settles Guardrail Spear Action for $400K
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Juha, writing for the Stratford Beaconherald, reports
that Stratford's CAO Rob Horne said he is pleased the city was
able to reach a settlement in a class action suit it had launched
in 2015 against U.S. guardrail manufacturer Trinity Industries.
The proposed class action related to Trinity's guardrail end
unit, ET Plus, a system installed on highways across the U.S. and
Canada. The unit is supposed to absorb impact and guide the rail
so a crashing vehicle doesn't slam into the rigid steel end, but
lawyer Matt Baer, Esq. -- baer@mckenzielake.com -- alleged on
behalf of Stratford that secret changes made to the guardrails
had in fact made the barriers dangerous.
"We are pleased that we have arrived at a settlement . . . that
not only saw the city receive a small honorarium but we were able
to direct funds to a pro-active highway safety initiative," Horne
said February 23.
But the $400,000 the Dallas-based company has agreed to pay --
without any admission of guilt -- is a far cry from the $500
million in compensation the city had been seeking initially.
About $131,000 of the settlement money will go to the Canadian
National Institute for the Blind, $15,000 will go to the city as
an honorarium, and the rest will cover disbursements incurred by
its law firm, McKenzie Lake Lawyers.
The money being paid to the institute for the blind will be
earmarked for enhanced road safety nationally by allowing the
organization to offer municipalities funding to install audible
pedestrian signals in places where they otherwise might not have
been.
Horne admitted that a recent ruling by an American Appeal Court
in favour of the company last September played a big role in the
city's decision to seek a settlement. The U.S. court said it had
found no evidence Trinity had made secret cost-saving design
changes to the ET Plus.
"We respect the fact that the courts, particularly in this case
in the United States, had made some decision relative to the
guardrails that helped inform us," he said. "The entire court-
case is built in a number of things, but decisions made in other
courts were significant factors."
In that ruling, the U.S. Appeal Court in New Orleans overturned a
US$663-million judgment against Trinity that a Texas jury had
awarded to Joshua Harman, a self-styled whistleblower and failed
Trinity competitor.
The original jury finding in his favour prompted dozens of states
and some provinces to stop installing the units amid the various
legal actions after Harman blamed at least 200 deaths and
injuries in the U.S. on the ET Plus. American highway authorities
subsequently ordered rigorous retesting of the units and found no
defects.
In Stratford, the city went as far as replacing a total nine
guardrail end treatments along Quinlan Road and Mornington Street
in 2016.
"Given the speed at you can travel in those roads and the fact
that there are steep ditches, in my opinion, that was reason
enough to have them replaced to make sure we had a safe guardrail
treatment in place there as we could," Horne said.
Trinity had consistently maintained its products behaved as
intended and approved, and that various lawsuits related to ET
Plus were without any merit.
"Neither this agreement nor anything in it shall be interpreted
as a concession or admission of wrongdoing or liability by
(Trinity)," the settlement agreement states. "In fact, the
defendants continue to vigorously dispute and contest the
allegations made in the action." [GN]
TRUMP NAT'L GOLF: Settles Golfers' Suit for $5.4-Mil.
-----------------------------------------------------
Erik Larson, writing for Bloomberg News, reports that after
pledging to fight a $5.77 million judgment against one of his
luxury Florida golf clubs, President Donald Trump's company has
agreed to pay almost all of it.
The Trump National Golf Club in Jupiter will pay $5.44 million to
disgruntled former members' to settle a class-action lawsuit,
according to a filing February 23 in federal court in West Palm
Beach. Last year, U.S. District Judge Kenneth Marra ordered the
club to return all the membership fees and interest.
Trump bragged during the 2016 campaign that he doesn't settle
lawsuits, though he's done so frequently, according to court
records. The Trump Organization, owner of the golf club, was due
to argue its appeal before a federal court in Atlanta in May,
according to court records.
"This is an exclamation point on a big win," plaintiffs' attorney
Brad Edwards, Esq. -- Brad@epllc.com -- said in an email.
The Trump Organization's chief legal officer, Alan Garten, didn't
immediately return a call for comment.
Donald Trump Will See You in Court
In February 2017, a month after Trump's inauguration, Marra
concluded after a trial that the club breached the former
members' contract by denying them access and failing to refund
their deposits.
The former members sued to get their money back after Trump
changed the membership rules following his 2012 acquisition of
the money-losing venture from Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. The members
were on a list of people who had asked to resign from the club.
They paid $35,000 to $210,000 in deposits. Trump and his son Eric
initially said the they hadn't changed the membership rules or
barred former members from club facilities, but Eric Trump
testified during the trial that he was wrong and some members
were banned.
A judge must still approve the deal. [GN]
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Demurer to Evidence in UCL Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division One,
issued an Opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court
sustaining Demurrer to Evidence in the case captioned LEONID
GONCHAROV et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents, No.
A149347 (Cal. App.).
Plaintiffs Leonid Goncharov, Mohammed Eddine, Alan Freberg,
Trevor Johnson, Peter Kirby, and Jeremy Watt filed a putative
class action lawsuit against Uber Technologies, Inc., for
providing unlicensed transportation services that appropriated
passengers and income from licensed taxicab drivers. In the
second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged Uber failed to
comply with the California Public Utilities Commission licensing
requirements for charter-party carriers. In response, Uber filed
a demurrer to the SAC. The parties' arguments in support of and
in opposition to the demurrer closely mirrored those raised in
Uber's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court granted Uber's demurrer with leave to amend. The
court again held claims relating to UberX's operations prior to
April 7, 2014 and non-UberX operations were barred by section
1759. However, the court rejected Uber's argument that its
demurrer should be sustained on jurisdiction grounds because the
SAC alleged new claims regarding UberX's failure to comply with
the terms of its CPUC permit that are not barred by section 1759.
The court also concluded plaintiffs failed to state a claim under
the UCL because the relief sought amounts to a request for
damages, which is not available under the UCL, and failed to
state a claim for interference with prospective economic
relationship because plaintiffs failed to allege an economic
relationship, causation, or a duty of care.
Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint and stipulated to
entry of judgment. The trial court subsequently entered judgment,
and plaintiffs timely appealed.
When a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint
and elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is
required and it must be presumed that the plaintiff has stated as
strong a case as he can.
Plaintiffs argue Uber's demurrer to the SAC raised many of the
same arguments as were raised in its prior demurrer, which was
overruled. Because of these similarities, plaintiffs claim Uber
was required to comply with the statutory requirements for
reconsideration motions. Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred
in granting the demurrer because Uber failed to meet these
requirements.
Section 1008 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: "A party who
originally made an application for an order which was refused in
whole or part may make a subsequent application for the same
order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law."
However, section 1008 does not apply when a party files a
demurrer to an amended cause of action. As the court in Clausing
explained: "Respondents were not obliged to comply with Code of
Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b), in bringing their
second demurrer."
That statute, which provides that any subsequent application for
an order which was previously refused must be supported by an
affidavit setting forth particulars concerning the initial motion
and stating the new or different state of facts claimed to exist,
is simply not relevant under the facts of this case. Respondents'
second demurrer was an appropriate responsive pleading to a new
complaint
In the instant matter, plaintiffs ask this court to determine
whether Uber qualifies as a charter-party carrier and what
regulations should apply to its operations. This question is far
from resolved, and does not seek to apply a clearly set out rule.
Rather, the CPUC has been attempting to resolve these very
questions for over four years.
First, the CPUC is actively addressing these questions as to
Uber's non-UberX operations in Phase III.B., including: (1) \What
is Uber for purposes of determining the full extent of the
Commission's jurisdiction; (2) Should Uber be considered a
Charter-Party Carrier (TCP); and (3) Should any other Uber
subsidiary or Uber affiliated business be considered a TCP? The
CPUC also is evaluating whether it should reconsider its
determination that Uber is not a TNC.
Second, plaintiffs argue the CPUC has already determined UberX is
subject to CPUC regulations and, consequently, should have been
subject to those regulations during its entire operations period.
The Court disagrees.
The CPUC determined UberX's operations qualified as a TNC a new
category created during the initial stage of its Rulemaking. But
in making that determination and subsequently issuing a permit to
UberX, the CPUC is not done with UberX], as plaintiffs' counsel
suggested at oral argument. To the contrary, the CPUC continues
to retain regulatory jurisdiction over UberX's operations.
The 2014 permit issued to UberX, for example, expressly states,
The requirements and status of your issued TNC permit may change
pending determinations the [CPUC] may make in Phase II of
Rulemaking 12-12-011. Likewise, UberX's 2017 permit also notes,
The requirements and status of your issued TNC permit may change
pending determinations the CPUC may make in Rulemaking 12-12-011
or a successor proceeding.
These permits not only preserve the CPUC's jurisdiction over
UberX, but expressly reserve the CPUC's right to create and
modify the scope of regulations applicable to UberX's operations.
Any litigation regarding what regulations should apply to UberX
infringes upon the CPUC's ongoing rulemaking in this area and its
reserved authority to modify those regulations.
Allowing the SAC to proceed would require the trial court to make
factual findings regarding whether Uber falls within the charter-
party carrier definition and, if so, which regulations would
apply to its operations. A judicial determination on these issues
would directly infringe upon the CPUC's ongoing rulemaking in
this area. As such, the claims in the SAC are barred by section
1759. Because we find these claims barred by section 1759, we
need not address whether the SAC stated any viable claims for
relief.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' January 29, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yced4363 from
Leagle.com.
The Brandi Law Firm, Thomas J. Brandi -- tjb@brandilaw.com --
Brian J. Malloy -- bjm@brandilaw.com -- and Jason B. Friedman --
jbf@brandilaw.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo -- rcardozo@reedsmith.com -- and
David J. de Jesus -- ddejesus@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers' Suit Granted Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge on Feb. 16
granted class certification to drivers claiming Uber's new
pricing model shortchanges them by charging an "upfront" fee
based on estimated rather than actual time and distance for
rides.
The case is MARTIN DULBERG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
and RASIER, LLC, Defendants, No. C 17-00850 WHA (N.D. Calif.).
UBIQUITI NETWORKS: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. and certain of its
officers. The class action, filed in United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, is on behalf of a class
consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
Ubiquiti securities, seeking to recover compensable damages
caused by defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
If you are a shareholder who purchased Ubiquiti securities
between May 9, 2013, and February 20, 2018, both dates inclusive,
you have until April 23, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class. A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing
address, telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.
Ubiquiti develops technology platforms for high-capacity
distributed Internet access, unified information technology, and
next-generation consumer electronics for home and personal use.
The Company does not employ a traditional sales force. Instead,
it purports to "drive[] brand awareness largely through the
company's user community where customers can interface directly
with R&D, marketing, and support." The Company calls this user
community the "Ubiquiti Community."
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the number of the
Company's purported user community was drastically overstated;
(ii) Ubiquiti had exaggerated its publicly reported accounts
receivable; and (iii) as a result of the foregoing, Ubiquiti's
publicly disseminated financial statements were materially false
and misleading.
On September 18, 2017, Citron Research ("Citron") issued a report
entitled "Cintron Exposes Ubiquiti Networks," (the "Citron
Report") in which Citron detailed a series of "alarming red
flags," indicating that the Company had been deceiving investors
and was engaged in "corporate fraud," including, among other
things, that the Company had misrepresented the size of its
purported "Ubiquiti Community", as well as its levels of accounts
receivable, among other things.
On February 20, 2018, Ubiquiti filed a form 8-K with the
Securities and Exchange Commission stating, in material part: "On
February 13, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
'SEC') issued subpoenas to Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (the
'Company') and certain of the Company's officers requesting
documents and information relating to a range of topics,
including metrics relating to the Ubiquiti Community, accounting
practices, financial information, auditors, international trade
practices, and relationships with distributors and various other
third parties."
On the news of the SEC subpoenas, Ubiquiti's share price fell
more than 25 percent, from $74.04 at the close of the prior
trading day, to close at $55.28 on February 20, 2018.
The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms
in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as
the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. See www.pomerantzlaw.com
Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
Pomerantz LLP
E-mail: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]
UBIQUITI NETWORKS: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP disclosed that
a shareholder class action lawsuit has been filed against
Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. on behalf of purchasers of the Company's
securities between May 9, 2013 and February 20, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period").
Investors who purchased Ubiquiti securities during the Class
Period may, no later than April 23, 2018, seek to be appointed as
a lead plaintiff representative of the class. For additional
information or to learn how to participate in this action please
visit https://www.ktmc.com/new-cases/ubiquiti-networks-inc-
2018#join
Ubiquiti investors who wish to discuss this action and their
legal options are encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP (Darren J. Check, Esq., D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq. or
Adrienne Bell, Esq.) at (888) 299-7706 or at info@ktmc.com.
Ubiquiti offers a portfolio of wireless networking products and
solutions. The Company does not employ a traditional sales force,
"but instead drives brand awareness largely through the company's
'user community' where customers can interface directly with R&D,
marketing, and support."
The shareholder class action complaint alleges that Ubiquiti and
certain of its executive officers made a series of false and
misleading statements to investors during the Class Period, and
failed to disclose: (i) that the size of the Company's purported
user community was drastically overstated; (ii) that the Company
had exaggerated its publicly reported accounts receivable; and
(iii) that as a result of the foregoing, Ubiquiti's publicly
disseminated financial statements were materially false and
misleading.
On February 20, 2018, Ubiquiti disclosed that, "[o]n February 13,
2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 'SEC') issued
subpoenas to Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (the 'Company') and certain
of the Company's officers requesting documents and information
relating to a range of topics, including metrics relating to the
Ubiquiti Community, accounting practices, financial information,
auditors, international trade practices, and relationships with
distributors and various other third parties."
Following this news, shares of the Company's stock declined
$18.76 per share, or over 25%, to close on February 20, 2018 at
$55.28 per share, on heavy trading volume.
Investors who purchased Ubiquiti securities during the Class
Period (May 9, 2013 - February 20, 2018) may, no later than April
23, 2018, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative
of the class through Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other
counsel, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member. A lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on
behalf of all class members in directing the litigation. In order
to be appointed as a lead plaintiff, the Court must determine
that the class member's claim is typical of the claims of other
class members, and that the class member will adequately
represent the class in the action. Your ability to share in any
recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not to
serve as a lead plaintiff.
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state
and federal courts throughout the country. Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check is a driving force behind corporate governance reform,
and has recovered billions of dollars on behalf of institutional
and individual investors from the United States and around the
world. The firm represents investors, consumers and
whistleblowers (private citizens who report fraudulent practices
against the government and share in the recovery of government
dollars). The complaint in this action was not filed by Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information about Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, please visit www.ktmc.com.
Darren J. Check, Esq.
D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
Adrienne Bell, Esq.
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
Tel: (888) 299-7706
(610) 667-7706
E-mail: dcheck@ktmc.com
skaskela@ktmc.com
abell@ktmc.com [GN]
UNITED OF DEFENDANT: Class Certification Sought in "Bentley" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled JENNIFER BENTLEY, as
trustee of the 2001 Bentley Family Trust, and others similarly
situated v. UNITED OF DEFENDANT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; and DOES
1 TO 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:15-cv-07870-DMG-AJW (C.D. Cal.),
moves for an order:
(a) certifying her putative class in this litigation;
(b) appointing her as class representative; and
(c) appointing Joseph Vanek, Esq., of Vanek Vickers & Masini
and Jason Zweig, Esq., of Hagens Berman Sobol & Shapiro as
class counsel.
The Court will commence a hearing on March 30, 2018, at 9:30
a.m., to consider the Motion.
A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0egrN1Y7
The Plaintiff is represented by:
Christopher Pitoun, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
301 North Lake Avenue, Suite 920
Pasadena, CA 91101
Telephone: (213) 330-7150
E-mail: christopherp@hbsslaw.com
- and -
Steve W. Berman, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 623-7292
E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
- and -
Jason A. Zweig, Esq.
HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
455 N. Cityfront Plaza Drive, Suite 2410
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (708) 628-4949
E-mail: jasonz@hbsslaw.com
- and -
Joseph M. Vanek, Esq.
John P. Bjork, Esq.
VANEK, VICKERS & MASINI, P.C.
55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3500
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 224-1500
E-mail: jvanek@vaneklaw.com
jbjork@vaneklaw.com
- and -
Paul E. Slater, Esq.
SPERLING & SLATER, P.C.
55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3500
Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: (312) 641-3200
E-mail: pes@sperling-law.com
- and -
David S. Klevatt, Esq.
KLEVATT & ASSOCIATES, LLC
33 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, IL 60602-2619
Telephone: (312) 782-9090
E-mail: dklevatt@chicagolaw.biz
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA: Tribunal Accepts Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Smith, writing for The Georgia Straight, reports that in
an unusual move, the chair of the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal,
Diana Juricevic, has decided to accept a complaint against UBC
that she previously dismissed.
An unnamed woman, identified in a February 23 decision as KR,
alleged that seven female students and one female professor were
sexually harassed by a male UBC student over a period of years.
KR has not claimed that she herself was harassed but stepped
forward in the absence of anyone else filing a complaint.
On August 30, Juricevic refused to accept KR's complaint but
offered her the option of providing more information.
The complaint was allowed after KR supplied various particulars,
including the name of the female professor and the names of six
female students who were allegedly harassed.
Juricevic wrote in her recent ruling that she understands the
seventh female student may have been a minor.
The complaint may only be heard in connection with B.C. Human
Rights Code sections dealing with discrimination in
"accommodation, service and facility" and "employment", according
to the decision.
No names have been released.
"KR alleges that the male student was using an alleged disability
as a ruse to sexually harass female employees and students at the
University," Juricevic stated. "She alleges that the University
should not have accommodated the male student, because his
asserted condition does not amount to a disability under the
Code.
"She alleges that the University failed in its duty to inquire
about the male student's condition," the chair continued in her
ruling. "She alleges that, even if the male student had a
disability that required accommodation, the University's duty to
accommodate reached the point of undue hardship when the male
student sexually harassed female employees and students at the
University."
None of the allegations have been proven at the tribunal.
However, Juricevic stated that there were "sufficient particulars
to identify common issues of fact and law", which warranted
accepting this as a class complaint for actions that occurred
from 2015 to 2017.
But the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal chair did not allow KR to be
the representative of the class, declaring instead that the
unnamed professor must fulfill this role.
"The Professor has one month from the date of this decision to
confirm her participation as the class representative and to file
an amendment to the complaint," Juricevic wrote. "If the Tribunal
receives no correspondence from the Professor by this deadline,
the file will be closed."
KR noted in one submission: "Some of the women I spoke to felt
embarrassed by the sexual harassment, one woman expressed fear of
losing her job, and most felt not supported by [the University],
given the continued presence of the [male student] at [the
University] and fear of further attempts to sexually harass
them."
KR also stated that the termination of her employment at the
university might have "had a chilling effect" on female
university employees who've allegedly been harassed by the male
student. [GN]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH: Camesi Appeals Ruling to Third Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Dinah Baker, Karen Camesi, Erin O'Connell and Lori
Shaffer filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in their
lawsuit entitled Karen Camesi, et al. v. University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, et al., Case No. 3-09-cv-00085, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The appellate case is captioned as Karen Camesi, et al. v.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, et al., Case No. 18-
1112, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 5, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a court order in the lawsuit.
That appellate case is styled KAREN CAMESI, ERIN O'CONNELL, LORI
SHAFFER, and DINAH BAKER, on behalf of themselves and all other
employees similarly situated v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL
CENTER, Case No. 17-3746.
The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.[BN]
Plaintiffs-Appellants KAREN CAMESI, ERIN O'CONNELL, LORI SHAFFER
and DINAH BAKER, on behalf of themselves and all other employees
similarly situated, are represented by:
Jonathan W. Ferris, Esq.
J. Nelson Thomas, Esq.
THOMAS & SOLOMON LLP
693 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14607
Telephone: (585) 272-0570
E-mail: jferris@theemploymentattorneys.com
nthomas@theemploymentattorneys.com
Defendant-Appellee UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER is
represented by:
James F. Glunt, Esq.
REED SMITH
225 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Telephone: (412) 288-4121
E-mail: jglunt@reedsmith.com
- and -
John J. Myers, Esq.
William S. Myers, Esq.
ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT LLC
600 Grant Street
44th Floor, US Steel Tower
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Telephone: (412) 566-6000
Facsimile: (412) 566-6099
E-mail: jmyers@eckertseamans.com
wmyers@eckertseamans.com
VITAL RECOVERY: "Garvin" Suit Disputes Collection Letter
--------------------------------------------------------
Paul Garvin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Vital Recovery Services, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-00240, (S.D. Ind., January 31, 2018), seeks
monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief, all costs and
attorney's fees pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.
Vital is a debt collection agency who attempted to collect a
defaulted consumer debt Garvin allegedly owed originally to
WebBank. Vital sent a collection letter that contained
conflicting statements as to who the current creditor is, says
the complaint. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
David J. Philipps, Esq.
Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
Angie K. Robertson, Esq.
PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
Palos Hills, IL 60465
Tel: (708) 974-2900
Fax: (708) 974-2907
Email: davephilipps@aol.com
mephilipps@aol.com
angiekrobertson@aol.com
- and -
John T. Steinkamp, Esq.
5214 S. East Street, Suite D1
Indianapolis, IN 46227
Tel: (317) 780-8300
Fax: (317) 217-1320
Email: steinkamplaw@yahoo.com
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Settles U.S. Diesel Owner Lawsuit on Eve of Trial
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Shepardson, writing for Reuters, reports that Volkswagen
AG's U.S. unit on February 23 resolved a lawsuit brought by a
North Carolina man whose diesel emissions case was set to be the
first go to trial on February 19.
The settlement comes days after Virginia state court Judge Bruce
White rejected a request by the German automaker to delay the
trial over excess emissions because of what it called
"inflammatory" comments made by a lawyer representing car owners
that it feared would prejudice a jury.
White approved the case's dismissal on Friday. Virginia Lawyer
Mike Melkersen, Esq. who represents David Doar, the North
Carolina man along with more than 300 other U.S. VW diesel
owners, said the case had been dismissed by agreement but he
declined to disclose the terms. A Volkswagen spokeswoman declined
to comment.
The first U.S. trial could have resulted in testimony by current
and former VW executives and additional negative publicity
stemming from the emissions scandal. Doar had sued VW over fraud
and unfair trade practice claims and sought punitive damages as
well as compensation for the vehicle.
Doar bought a 2014 diesel Jetta for $23,700 and had rejected a
settlement offer from a 2016 class-action agreement that would
have reimbursed him for the value of the vehicle. He had sought
$725,000 plus attorneys fees in legal filings. The next trial is
set for June 4 involving another diesel owner.
Volkswagen said in early February publicity from a Netflix
documentary that disclosed the company had jointly sponsored
tests exposing monkeys in 2014 to toxic diesel fumes could
prejudice its chances of receiving a fair trial.
The German carmaker is being sued by some consumers after it
admitted in September 2015 to cheating on diesel emissions tests,
sparking the biggest business crisis in its history.
Nearly all U.S. owners of affected cars agreed to take part in a
$25 billion settlement in 2016 in the United States that
addressed claims from them, environmental regulators, U.S. states
and dealers and included buyback offers and additional
compensation for about 500,000 owners.
About 2,000 owners, however, opted out and most are pursuing
court claims seeking additional compensation.
Volkswagen of America had sought a six-month delay after
Melkersen was interviewed in the Netlfix documentary about the
company testing diesel fumes on monkeys.
Volkswagen lawyers said in legal papers that "pretrial publicity
has connected (the company) directly with Hitler and the
Holocaust," which they said was not relevant to a trial about
claims of consumer fraud.
Judge Bruce White had ruled that a fair jury could be seated.
"The jurors don't know much about these cases," White said of
high-profile cases. [GN]
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY: Negligent With Data, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Matt Pusatory, writing for KHQ News, reports that a class-action
lawsuit was filed against Washington State University, claiming
its negligence led to a burglary that put sensitive data at risk.
The Spokesman-Review reports the lawsuit filed in King County in
December consolidates several complaints that were filed
separately after confidential information was stolen from the
university last year.
Burglars stole a safe from a self-storage facility in downtown
Olympia last April. The safe contained a hard drive that had data
from nearly 1.2 million people, including names, Social Security
numbers and personal health records. The hard drive belonged to
the university's Social and Economic Sciences Research Center.
The lawsuit claims the university violated the state's Consumer
Protection Act.
University officials say the school is continuing work to improve
its cybersecurity. [GN]
WELLS FARGO: Crooks Files Suit Over FCRA Breach
-----------------------------------------------
Taneesha Crooks, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. f/k/a
Wachovia Bank, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00219 (S.D. Cal.,
January 31, 2018), seeks special, general, compensatory, punitive
and statutory damages, costs of this action, including reasonable
allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such
other and further relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
In or around 2006, Plaintiff purchased a vehicle via financing.
Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy on October 20, 2016 where said
debt was included where Crooks received a discharge order. Wells
Fargo did not file any proceedings to declare its debt "non-
dischargeable" and also did not request relief from the
"automatic stay" while Plaintiff's Bankruptcy was pending to
pursue the Plaintiff on any personal liability for any of the
underlying debt.
Two months after the discharge, Defendant submitted an
unauthorized account review credit report inquiry to a credit
reporting agency despite having no justifiable reason to pull
Crooks' credit report, says the complaint. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
Elizabeth Wagner, Esq.
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
Telephone: (800) 400-6808
Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
Email: ak@kazlg.com
elizabeth@kazlg.com
- and -
Joshua Swigart, Esq.
Yana A. Hart, Esq.
HYDE AND SWIGART
2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
San Diego, CA 92108
Telephone: (619) 233-7770
Facsimile: (619) 297-1022 to 26
Email: Josh@westcoastlitigation.com
yana@westcoastlitigation.com
- and -
Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL G. SHAY
409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
San Diego, CA 92108
Telephone: (619) 222-7429
Facsimile: (866) 431-3292
Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com
WEST REVENUE: Gerlach Seeks Compensation for Missed Breaks
----------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Gerlach, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. West Revenue Generation Services, LLC and
West Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-00170 (E.D. Wisc.,
January 31, 2018), seeks unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid
agreed upon wages, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any such other
relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws.
West Revenue provides business-to-business sales and account
management services to its clients operating multiple call center
locations in multiple states, including in the States of
Wisconsin and Texas where Gerlach worked as a Business Payment
Consultant at West Revenue's Appleton, Wisconsin call center
location. West Revenue allegedly failed to compensate employees
for work performed off-the-clock prior to their scheduled shift
start time and failed to compensate for 30-minute meal periods
during which compensable work was performed. [BN]
Plaintiff is represented by:
James A. Walcheske, Esq.
Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
Brookfield, WI 53005
Phone: (262) 780-1953
Fax: (262) 565-6469
Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
WESTERN EXPRESS: Court Dismisses Without Prejudice "Ratliff" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 2, 2018, in the case
titled Jerome Ratliff Jr. v. Western Express, Inc., Case No.
1:17-cv-07215 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the
Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman.
The minute entry states that:
-- Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the case is dismissed without prejudice;
-- If no motion is filed prior to March 15, 2018, the
dismissal will automatically convert to one with prejudice;
-- The parties are to bear their own attorneys' fees and
costs; and
-- Civil case terminated.
A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=98FLV97a
WYNDHAM VACATION: Loses Bid for Partial Findings re Evidence
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of
Tennessee, Knoxville, issued a Memorandum Opinion denying
Defendants' Motion for Partial Findings and Conclusions Regarding
Representative Evidence in the case captioned JESSE PIERCE and
MICHAEL PIERCE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC., and
WYNDHAM VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC., Defendants, No. 3:13-CV-641-CCS
(E.D. Tenn.).
Defendants provide family destination vacations. Customers
purchase points that may be used for vacations at Wyndham resorts
or other locations. Wyndham employs three groups of sales
representatives: (1) Front-Line Sales Representatives, (2) In-
House Sales Representatives, and (3) Discovery Sales
Representatives.
The Complaint alleges that certain sales representatives who
worked at Defendants' offices worked off the clock and were not
paid for working in excess of forty hours in a work week. The
Complaint alleges that Defendants willfully violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Defendants moved for decertification, which the Court denied. In
its decision, the Court analyzed the three-factor test outlined
in O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters. Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th
Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co., v.
Gomez, 136 S.Ct. 663 (2016), and found that Plaintiffs were
similarly situated to proceed to trial as a collective action.
With respect to Defendants' arguments that the representative
proof in this case was inadequate, the Court held that Plaintiffs
met their burden to proceed as a collective action but whether
Plaintiffs had actually presented representative testimony of
liability and damages of the collective action was reserved for
trial.
Plaintiffs presented live testimony of twenty-six witnesses. In
addition, they submitted the deposition testimony of five
Plaintiffs and four defense witnesses. They also submitted
depositions of rebuttal witnesses. Defendants presented live
testimony of nine witnesses.
Plaintiffs' Evidence
Kristen Creson
Kristen Creson testified that she was employed with Fairfield in
1999 and stayed with Fairfield until it was purchased by Wyndham
in 2000 or 2002.
Creson testified that in January 2004, she began working as the
administration manager at Wyndham's Nashville location This
change in position was a promotion. She testified that she was
responsible for everything, such as building maintenance,
accounts payable and receivables, and payroll. She was the
highest level of authority with respect to administration.
Creson further testified that she did not like falsifying
timesheets and that she expressed her concerns to Dave LaBelle
because she had a good working relationship with him. She also
expressed concerns to Miller and Camper and to Dottie Justice
(who was either the area Human Resource Officer or the regional
Human Resource Officer). She recalled telling Justice that
falsifying timesheets was a "lawsuit waiting to happen.
Creson also testified that she attended business unit meetings,
where she would meet with her counterparts from other resorts at
Corporate in Orlando, Florida. She continued that after one
meeting, a few individuals went to dinner, including Pam Borger,
the Administrative Director in South Florida; Judy Warren, the
Administrative Director in Orlando; Amanda Pedigo, the
Administrative Director at the Glade; and Donna Parton, the
Administrative Director at the Smokies. Creson explained that
during dinner, they discussed as follows: "We all had our own
individual policies of how we doctored the time and how we went
about getting signatures and covering our tails. So we just
started bouncing ideas off of each other, who did what, how they
did it, and who they assigned it to. Because we didn't have time
as admin directors to do it all the time, so we had to have
assistants that did some of our legwork for us."
Creson explained, "We all shared what we were doing."
Defendants did not cross examine Creson, and thus, did not
challenge Creson's testimony on a single point. Nor did
Defendants call Dave LaBelle, Corey Miller, Mellissa Camper,
Dottie Justice (or any of the individuals that she had dinner
with in Florida) as witnesses to rebut her accusatory testimony
regarding their knowledge and instructions as to "doctoring" time
sheets of the sales representatives.
Testimony of David Nelon
David Nelon worked as a manager and as an In-House Sales
Representative at the Crossing during the Recovery Period.
Nelon testified that he began working for Fairfield Communities,
Inc., in July 1980.
On cross examination, Nelon testified that sales representatives
thought it was a waste of time to clock in and out because
Wyndham recouped the hourly wage that sales representatives
received. He stated that he never told sales representative that
someone else could clock them in and out. He continued that no
one complained that his/her time was not recorded correctly. In
addition, he identified a few of his earning statements wherein
he was paid overtime. Further, Nelon testified that he signed
several documents, including the Salesperson Agreement, the
Business Principles, Employee Policy Handbook, Timekeeping and
Overtime Policy. In addition, Nelon identified his W2
statements, reflecting the amounts that he earned at Wyndham
during the Recovery Period.
The Court notes that Nelon's testimony regarding John
Geissberger, Amanda Hill, Lisa Jarvis, and Larry Whaley was not
impeached, nor were these individuals ever called witnesses by
Defendants.
Testimony of Jeff Cross
Jeff Cross testified that he worked as a manager and as a sales
representative at the Glade. Cross stated that he currently works
for Wyndham as a Senior Sales Associate at the Glade. He began
working for Wyndham in the 1980s when the company was named
Fairfield.
On cross examination, Cross acknowledged that he was paid
overtime on several occasions when some cards got through and he
was on the clock for over forty hours. In addition, Cross
acknowledged that one Punch Form reflected sixty-three hours of
work. Cross further acknowledged that he signed several Wyndham
documents, including Salesperson Agreements, Business Principles,
Employee Policy Handbook, Timekeeping and Overtime Policy, and
the Standards of Performance Agreement, Sales Representative.
Cross also testified that he signed the Ownership iPad
Acknowledgment, which states that he was required to obtain prior
authorization from his manager before using the iPad for work-
related activities to work from home or to work overtime hours.
Finally, Cross identified his earnings as reflected on his W2
statements from 2012 to 2013.
The Court notes that Cross's testimony regarding Camille Combs,
Mike Carneal, Dave LaBelle was not impeached, nor were they ever
called as witnesses by Defendants.
Defendants' Evidence
Defendants presented the testimony of nine witnesses during the
trial in this matter.
Greg Christian
Greg Christian testified that he is still employed at Wyndham and
that he has worked for Wyndham for approximately seventeen years.
He testified that he has worked at various locations during his
tenure with Wyndham but that during the Recovery Period, he
worked at the Crossing as an In-House Sales Representative.
On cross examination, Christian testified that he was good about
clocking in and out. He testified that a manager never completed
a fraudulent Punch Form for him. He continued that Front-Lines
Sale Representatives were required to report to work at 7:30
a.m., for the meeting and that if they missed the meeting, they
were placed on overage. "Overage" means that they were moved to
the bottom on the line with respect to receiving a tour."
Christian further testified that he does not think managers
edited time to insert lunch breaks because that was a fireable
offense. In addition, he stated that the quality assurance
department usually took thirty minutes to an hour and a half When
asked why there were thirty-three days showing that he produced
contracts but was not clocked in during those days, he testified,
"I guess I didn't clock in those days."
Jeanie Willis
Jeanie Willis testified that she is currently employed by Wyndham
and has worked for Wyndham for over twenty-eight years. She
stated that her current position is payroll manager and she has
worked in that position since before 2011. She works in the
cooperate office in Orlando, Florida. She oversees a team of
payroll specialists, who process sales representatives' and
managers' commissions. During the Recovery Period, she was the
payroll manager, and she supervised payroll for Tennessee sales
representatives.
Upon questioning by the Court, Willis testified that she assumed
that the hours recorded were accurate but that she did not know
if the hours recorded were accurate. She explained that the
payroll team was responsible for paying the hours and that it was
not responsible for the shifts that the sales representatives
worked. Willis also explained that sales TO means commission paid
on a TO function. She continued that when a sales representative
was sitting at the table with a customer and was able to finalize
a contract, usually a senior sales representatives or a sales
manager would take over, and the senior sales representative or
the sales manager would receive a commission for that TO function
based upon his/her commission plan. Sales TO were reported on the
commission statement. She further explained that management
commission was the sales manager's commission, and the sales
manager could get an override on his/her team's sales.
Dale Topping
Dale Topping testified that he is currently employed at Wyndham
and that he began his employment with Wyndham in September 2012.
He has worked as a Front-Line Sales Representative throughout his
employment with Wyndham.
Topping testified that he clocked in and out every day. He stated
that he usually arrived to work at 7:45 a.m., before the
meetings. He stated that tours came in waves: morning, noon, and
afternoon. He stated that the number of waves varied and that
sometimes there was no afternoon wave. He continued that if he
did not make a sale, he had no additional responsibilities and
turned the customers over to the Discovery Sales Representatives.
On cross examination, Topping testified that there were some
circumstances in which sales representatives did not have morning
meetings. He testified that June, July, and October (Rocktober)
were the highest volume months. With respect to his time detail,
he testified that he typically initiated Punch Forms and that the
time that he provided could have been incorrect because he was
not concerned about the exact number. He further testified that
the transaction date is the date that he submitted the contract
to be printed.
Overview
Pursuant to the FLSA, an employer generally must compensate an
employee at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed for work exceeding forty
hours per week.
Plaintiffs who bring claims under the FLSA for unpaid overtime
compensation must establish that they performed work for which
they were not properly compensated. The Supreme Court has
cautioned, however, that the remedial nature of this statute and
the great public policy which it embodies militate against making
that burden an impossible hurdle for the employee. This is simply
because under the FLSA, it is the employer's responsibility to
keep proper records, and employees seldom keep such records
themselves.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
These two practices were implemented by requiring Sales
Representatives to work off the clock and requiring Sales
Representatives to sign inaccurate Punch Forms after managers
altered their timecards (or risk being placed on overage). Many
times managers simply forged Punch Forms. In furtherance of
Wyndham's unwritten policy to not record overtime, Sales
Representatives (1) clocked out when not on tour but were still
working, (2) clocked out for lunch breaks, despite not taking a
lunch break, (3) clocked out before working nightline, if
approaching overtime; and (4) did not accurately record time
spent working party weekends and/or dinner parties.
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs worked from home and did not
record such hours, despite their managers having knowledge of
such work. Furthermore, the Court finds that Sales
Representatives were lulled into believing that underreporting
actual hours did not mean anything financially because the hours
would only be credited as hours at minimum wage, and therefore,
recouped from their commissions. They were never told that they
were entitled to overtime based on their commission amounts.
In particular, the Court finds Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' witness
(Kristen Creson), who testified that managers edited timecards,
highly credible on this issue, especially in light of the
documentary evidence and managers' own admission that they did in
fact doctor timecards. For instance, Kristen Creson, a non-party
to this action, testified that as the administration manager in
Nashville, she was directed to doctor timecards.
Defendants did not even cross examine Creson, let alone impeach
her testimony, nor did they call as witnesses those against whom
she made such damning claims.
The Court also finds David Nelon's testimony regarding how he
made illegitimate edits credible. During the Recovery Period,
Nelon was a manager and an In-House Sales Representative at the
Crossing. Nelon testified that he logged on to the computer and
adjusted sales representatives' time every Thursday before
timecards were turned in on Friday mornings. He knew that sales
representatives were working more than forty hours, but he was
instructed by management, such as John Geissberger, to adjust the
timecards. In fact, he identified several emails from Amanda Hill
requesting permission from Jim Acee and John Geissberger to
approve edits, which they approved within minutes.
He testified to similar situations of altering time cards. His
cross examination did not impeach his primary testimony at all,
nor were any witnesses called to impugn his testimony.
The Court further finds the testimony of Jeff Cross, a manager at
the Glade, also credible. He instructed his sales representatives
to clock out and continue working. When questioned why he gave
them these instructions, he stated that the sales representatives
had to pay the money back and that overtime affected the net
operating income. He explained that he also received emails from
his Human Resource Representative, Camille Combs, which included
information about sales representatives' timecard entries,
including whether they were missing a punch, whether they were
approaching thirty-two hours, or whether they had made a sale
while they were not clocked in.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Wyndham violated the FLSA
by prohibiting Sales Representatives from recording or recovering
overtime, despite working overtime, and by instructing sales
managers to edit timecards to misrepresent the time that Sales
Representatives worked to achieve that result.
The Court further finds that Wyndham knew that it was violating
the FLSA because upper management instructed sales managers to
edit timecards and to make sure that Sales Representatives did
not record overtime. Specifically, the Court finds that not only
did management know about the FLSA violations, but management was
also involved in violating the FLSA at all four Tennessee
locations. All Plaintiffs testified that their managers
instructed them to record less than forty hours despite working
more than forty hours. Managers acknowledged that they edited
timecards and were told to do so by site vice presidents,
directors of sales, and/or human resource officers. Further, it
appears this was done to increase the income/bonuses of upper
management, but whatever the reason, it was a violation of the
law.
Because Wyndham knew and even participated in the FLSA
violations, the Court finds it appropriate to assess liquidated
damages. Defendants have not shown that the failure to obey the
law was in good faith and predicated on reasonable grounds. To
the contrary, all they offered were current employees who
testified they did not do such things, but those supervisors
accused of such did not testify as noted herein.
A full-text copy of the District Court's January 29, 2018
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hwdyb5
from Leagle.com.
Jesse Pierce, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Michael Pierce, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Benjamin Blount, Nicholas Chappell, David
Hart, James H. Hicks, Nick Lucas, Kisa Abbott, Steven Brooks,
Stacy Caldwell, Jasyntha Cornwell, Bradley D. Dalton, Dennis
Gray, Matthew Greene, Heather Myrick, Cowan Rodgers, IV, Tiffany
Sweeley, Brett Williamson, Jaxon Wirgau, Krysty Burroughs,
William H. Repass, Amber Whaley, Heather D. Williams, Amber Leigh
Albertini, Tracy Capehart, Amanda Farmer, David Goodall, Deborah
A. Jones, Robert Kimbrough, Jeanne Swafford, Jeremy Ousley, Peter
E. Landers, Stacey Musick, Renee Oleson, William H. Dzaman,
Robert Ellis, Rachael A. Taylor, Rodney Taylor, Twila B. Higgins,
Brian Norris, Nakia M. Hatchett, Charles Culbertson, Charles T.
Simerka, Bobby Harold Stallings, Russell H Cooper, R Craig
Thrift, Carol A Panzera, Jason Yocum, Claudia Bogardus, James M
Fenner, Christina Smith Harrington, Karl E Lewanski, Leo E
Shalhoup, Jr, Tyrone Hickman, Thomas D Rentsch, Jeremy Zinsky,
James Reid, Belinda Drew, Clay H Dalton, Charles Griffin, Dolly D
Griffin, Michael L Huskey, Paul Naumoff, Joshua Selfridge,
William L Bensley, Jean Kay Chappell, Richard S Rang, Shellis L
Edwards, Jerry W White, Clark English, Adam G Evans, Rebecca J
Anderson, Barbara Bruce, Shoen Corey, Jimmy Dixon, Camille
Meadows, James E Meadows, Pamela C Phibbs, Jeremy Saine, Karen
Smith, Gary W Thorn, Chad Breece, Jeff Cross, Alexander Grimal,
Angela Woods, Janice M Deibel, Edwin B Garrett, Robert Derrick,
Pamela Haley, Lee Johnson & Mark Turner, Plaintiffs, represented
by Autumn L. Gentry -- agentry@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson
Wright, PLLC, Darrell L. West -- dwest@dickinsonwright.com --
Dickinson Wright, PLLC, M. Reid Estes, Jr. -- mrestes@dickinson-
wright.com -- Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Martin D. Holmes --
mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Peter F.
Klett -- pklett@dickinson-wright.com -- Dickinson Wright, PLLC &
Sherry D. O'Neal -- soneal@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson
Wright, PLLC, pro hac vice.
Roy Patrick Neuenschwander, Renee N Aumiller, Renee Patterson,
Rebecca Slone, Candace Keith, Katrina Marie Martin, Randolph
Navarro, Rebecca Hawkins, Clay Orbeson & Ira Kim Revette,
Plaintiffs, represented by Autumn L. Gentry, Dickinson Wright,
PLLC, Darrell L. West, Dickinson Wright, PLLC, M. Reid Estes,
Jr., Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Martin D. Holmes, Dickinson Wright,
PLLC, pro hac vice, Peter F. Klett, Dickinson Wright, PLLC &
Sherry D. O'Neal, Dickinson Wright, PLLC, pro hac vice.
Bryan S Tesh & Robyn Roque, Plaintiffs, represented by Autumn L.
Gentry, Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Darrell L. West, Dickinson
Wright, PLLC, M. Reid Estes, Jr., Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Martin
D. Holmes, Dickinson Wright, PLLC, pro hac vice & Peter F. Klett,
Dickinson Wright, PLLC.
Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. & Wyndham Vacation Ownership,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Christopher D. Lauderdale --
LauderdC@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice,
Craig A. Cowart -- Craig.Cowart@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis LLP, Stephanie L. Adler-Paindiris -- Adler-
Paindiris@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Colby S. Morgan -- Colby.Morgan@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
LLP, Oscar John Norris, III -- NorrisJ@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis LLP & William J. Anthony --
Anthony@jacksonlewis.com. -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice.
WYNN RESORTS: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A
Professional Corporation, disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been commenced in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Wynn
Resorts Limited (Nasdaq:WYNN) ("Wynn Resorts" or the "Company")
securities during the period between February 28, 2014 and
January 25, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors who
wish to become proactively involved in the litigation have until
April 23, 2018 to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.
If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court. The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action. The lead plaintiff will
be selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Wynn Resorts securities during the Class Period.
Members of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff
and counsel chosen by the lead plaintiff. No class has yet been
certified in the above action.
The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants' The
complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants' failure to
disclose during the Class Period that the Company's founder and
Chief Executive Officer, Stephen A. Wynn, had engaged in a
pattern of sexual misconduct with respect to Wynn Resorts
employees, including instances of sexual assault, and that
discovery of Wynn's misconduct would subject the Company to
heightened regulatory scrutiny and jeopardize Wynn's tenure at
the Company.
According to the complaint, following a January 26, 2018 article
published by The Wall Street Journal revealing detailed accounts
that Wynn had coerced and pressured several Wynn Resorts
employees to perform sex acts and that Wynn had paid a Wynn
Resorts employee $7.5 million after being accused of forcing the
employee to have sex with him, and that the Massachusetts Gaming
Commission announced that it would open a regulatory review into
the Company over the sexual misconduct allegations reported in
the Wall Street Journal article, the value of Wynn Resorts shares
declined significantly.
If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Wynn Resorts securities purchased on or after February 28,
2014 and held through the revelation of negative information
during and/or at the end of the Class Period and would like to
learn more about this lawsuit and your ability to participate as
a lead plaintiff, without cost or obligation to you, please
contact Brower Piven either by email at hoffman@browerpiven.com
or by telephone at (410) 415-6616.
Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s. If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of
your choice. You need take no action at this time to be a member
of the class. [GN]
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marion Alcestis A. Castillon, Jessenius Pulido, Noemi Irene A.
Adala, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche
Maricon Castillon-Lopez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A.
Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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