CAR_Public/180301.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Thursday, March 1, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 44



                            Headlines


AARON BROTHERS: "Basile" Wage Suit Remanded to State Court
AARP INC: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Commissions
ACADIA PHARMA: Court Approves $2.925MM "Rihn" Class Settlement
ACRE MORTGAGE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "James" RESPA Suit
ASSOCIATED MATERIALS: Court Narrows Claims in "Harney"

BANK MUTUAL: Lawsuits over Associated Banc-Corp Deal Dropped
DELTA AIR: Appeal in First Bag Fee Antitrust Suit Still Pending
BAYER CONSUMER: 2d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Kommer" Suit
BHP: Faces Class Action Over Worker's Casual Status
BIG HEART: Faces Class Action Over Contaminated Dog Food

BITCONNECT INT'L: Silver Miller Files Class Action Lawsuit
BITCONNECT INT'L: Faces Another Securities Class Action in Fla.
BNSF RAILWAY: Court Issues Protective Order in "Sumlin"
CALIFORNIA: Pro Se Complaint Failed to Survive Screening
CALIFORNIA: Prisoner Sleep Deprivation Suit Moved to Sacramento

CENTURY FINANCIAL: Faces "Teele" Suit in Connecticut
CF ARCIS: CF Arcis IV Added as Defendant in "Hart"
CHARLES SCHWAB: Court Denies Arbitration of ERISA Claims
CMRE FINANCIAL: Court Grants Joint Move to Dismiss "Crooks" Suit
CORE CIVIC: Faces "Gonzalez" Suit in W.D. of Texas

CRAZY HORSE: 4th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in "Degidio"
DELTA AIR: Still Faces Capacity Antitrust Litigation
DEPOMED INC: Derivative Litigation Stayed
DEVRY UNIVERSITY: Averts Class Action Over Post-Graduate Stats
DON HUMMER TRUCKING: Faces "Ratliff" Suit in S.D. of Iowa

DUKE UNIVERSITY: Mintz Levin Discusses Antitrust Class Action
EI DUPONT: GenX Found in West Va. Wells, NC Class Action Ongoing
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Class Action Over "Balance Billing"
FARMERS RESTAURANT: "Stephens" Conditional Certification OK'd
FEDERAL SAVINGS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Baugh" RESPA Suit

FMM ENTERPRISES: Court Grants TRO in "Glass" FLSA Suit
FOREVER 21: Court Dismisses Suit Over Illegally Collected Tax
FOX NEWS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in Southern District New York
FRITO-LAY INC: $6.5MM "Acosta" Suit Settlement Has Prelim OK
FUYAO GLASS: Judge Allows Workers' Class Action to Proceed

GARDNER, MA: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action Over Water System
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Faulty Air-Conditioning
GEO GROUP: Court Allows Immigrants' Class Action to Proceed
GM LAW: Faces Class Action Over Student Loan Fraud
HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Bail System Unconstitutional, 5th Cir. Rules

HOOTERS OF AMERICA: Faces "Factor" Suit in N.D. Georgia
HORIZON PHARMA: Court Dismisses "Schaffer" Securities Suit
HUAWEI DEVICE: Consumers Can Amend Nexus 6P Class Action
HYUNDAI MOTORS: Recent Class Action Ruling Alarms Plaintiffs Bar
INTEREXCHANGE INC: Class Action to Impact U.S. Au Pair Program

J&B CLEANERS: Faces "Paredes" Suit in S.D. New York
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Stockholders File Securities Class Action
JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Faces Class Action Over Celgene Merger
KABBAGE INC: Court Strikes Class Allegations in TCPA Suit
L'OREAL USA: Motion to Dismiss Hair Product Class Action Nixed

LJM FUNDS: April 10 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
LENDER PROCESSING: Third Party Defendants in "Lemieux" Dismissed
LOMA NEGRA: Argentina Class Action Suit Still Ongoing
MARTHA STEWART: Court Won't Review Ruling in "Raden" Suit
MASTERCARD: Squire Patton Attorneys Discuss Interchange Fee Case

MCDONALD'S CORP: Blind Customers File Class Action in Chicago
MDL 2804: Niagara County's Civil Suit Over Opioid Crisis Ongoing
MIDWAY IMPORTING: Faces "Rivera" Suit in C.D. California
MONRO INC: Settles FLSA Class Action for $1.95 Million
MONTRES JOURNE NY: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. of New York

NBTY INC: Court Dismisses "DeBernardis" Consumer Fraud Suit
NCAA: Fights $40MM Fee Bid in Antitrust Class Action
NEIMAN MARCUS: Appeal in "Tanguilig" Suit Still Ongoing
NEIMAN MARCUS: "Rubenstein" Settlement Motion Due March 14
NEIMAN MARCUS: Proceeds in "Ohle" Class Settlement Distributed

NEIMAN MARCUS: "Attia" Class Action Remains Stayed
NEIMAN MARCUS: "Nguyen" Suit in California Remains Stayed
NEIMAN MARCUS: "Connolly" Suit Remains Stayed
NEIMAN MARCUS: Facing Class Suit by Healthcare Plan Beneficiary
NEIMAN MARCUS: Faces NY Class Suit by Visually Impaired

NEIMAN MARCUS: Settlement of Cyber-Attack Suits Still Pending
NISSAN MOTORS: CSC Suit Struggles to Obtain Class Certification
OHIO HOSPICE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Count III in "Spano"
PAGEDALE, MO: Class Action Plaintiffs Agree with Consent Decree
PARK STERLING: Merger Class Suits Dismissed

PCL CONSTRUCTION: Stay in Power Outage Suit Stay Extended
PELLA: Settles Class Action Over ProLine Windows for $25.75MM
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Dismissal of Amended Antitrust Suit Affirmed
RADIOSHACK CORP: Obtains Favorable Ruling in ERISA Class Action
RAINERI JEWELERS: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York

REMINGTON: Bankruptcy Linked to Defective Rifles, Critic Says
RENT-A-CENTER: Court Won't Stay Briefing on Arbitration Bid
ROGER DUBUIS: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York
REUTERS AMERICA: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Must Face Class Action Over Battery Life

SAN FRANCISCO, CA: $20K Atty Fees in Misappropriation Suit Upheld
SENTRY CREDIT: Court Grants Judgment on Pleadings in "Riccio"
SHINOLA/DETROIT: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York
STRAIGHT PATH: Delaware Stockholders Class Suit Remains Stayed
STRAIGHT PATH: "Zacharia" Deal Awaits Court Approval

STUSSY INC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
SUPER MICRO: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
SWEET HOME: "Williams" Class of HHAs/DCWs Conditionally Certified
SYNERGY PHARMA: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action
TEVA PHARMA: Hearing to Impose Provigil Accord Set for Apr. 23

TEVA PHARMA: Consolidated Multidistrict Suit on AndroGel Ongoing
TEVA PHARMA: 2 Class Members Seek Appeal from Ciprofloxacin Pact
TEVA PHARMA: Still Faces Class Action Suit on Venlafaxine Accord
TEVA PHARMA: Still Defends Class Action on Lamotrigine Agreement
TEVA PHARMA: Antitrust Breaches Suit over Niaspan Accord Ongoing

TEVA PHARMA: Has Tentative Pact to Settle Lidoderm Litigation
TEVA PHARMA: Enters into Settlement with Aggrenox End Payers
TEVA PHARMA: Class Suits over Takeda Pharma Pact Still Ongoing
TEVA PHARMA: Suits on Namenda IR Settlement Pact Still Pending
TEVA PHARMA: Unit Still Faces Antitrust Suit over Intuniv Accord

TEVA PHARMA: Still Faces Antitrust Suit on Price-Fixing Matters
TEVA PHARMA: Awaits Court Order Dismissing Conn. Securities Suit
TEVA PHARMA: Conn. Suit over Stock Purchase Plan Still Pending
TEVA PHARMA: Seeks to Transfer Securities Suit to Connecticut
THREE AND SEVENTY-THREE: Faecs "Olsen" Suit in S.D. of New York

TOYOTA MOTOR: ADR Deadline in "Robey" Suit Moved to March 7
ULTA BEAUTY: Zimmerman Law Files Nationwide Class Action
UNITED STATES: Faces "Trinh" Suit in C. Dist. Calif.
VICE MEDIA: Faces Class Action in California
WASHINGTON: Bid to Certify of Questions of Law to High Ct. Denied

WYNDHAM RESORT: Abbott's Opt Out Bid in "McGrath" Deal Denied

* ERISA Class Action Settlements Cost Employer $927.8MM in 2017







                            *********


AARON BROTHERS: "Basile" Wage Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge M. James Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand
the case, HEATHER BASILE, Plaintiff, v. AARON BROTHERS, INC. et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:17cv485-L(NLS) (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a complaint in State court asserting numerous
California Labor Code violations and violation of California
Business and Professions Code Section 17200 on behalf of non-
exempt employees of Defendants Aaron Brothers and Michaels
Stores, Inc.  The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants failed to
(1) provide meal and rest breaks as required by law; (2) pay
minimum and regular wages, including to cover missed meal and
rest breaks; (3) pay overtime wages; (4) indemnify for necessary
business expenses; (5) provide accurate wage statements; and (6)
timely pay all wages due upon separation from employment.

The Defendants removed the action to the Court under 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1453 and 1446 based on diversity jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  In their notice of removal,
the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff's claims as pled place
more than $5 million in controversy.  In her motion to remand,
the Plaintiff challenges this assertion.  She does not dispute
that other jurisdictional requirements are met.

In the first and second causes of action, the Plaintiff alleged
that the Defendants failed to provide the statutory-mandated meal
and rest breaks.  The Defendants contend these claims place $3.6
million at issue.  The calculation is based on the evidence that
(1) the average shift during the relevant period was 6.42 hours,
i.e., long enough to trigger the duty to provide a meal period
and a rest period; (2) 91.5% of the shifts were longer than 3.5
hours, i.e., long enough to trigger the duty to provide a rest
period; and (3) that the employees worked 3.83 days per week on
average.  In addition, the calculation is based on the assumption
of one alleged meal break and rest break violation per employee
per week.  The Plaintiff counters that the assumption is
unsupported and unreasonable.

For the rate of violation, the Defendants rely solely on the
Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint.

The Plaintiff alleged a systematic pattern of violations, a
pattern and practice of not providing proper breaks, and that the
violations occurred regularly as a result of a common policy and
practice.  Although these allegations indicate that violations
were regular, they do not speak to their frequency, and are
therefore insufficient to support the assumption of any
particular rate of violation.  Furthermore, employees worked only
3.83 days per week on average.  The Plaintiff's qualified
allegations and the short work week further undermine the
Defendants' assumption that each violation occurred once every
week for every employee.

In her third cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged that the
Defendants failed to pay minimum and regular wages.  The
Defendants contend the wage claim places at least $2.4 million at
issue.  They base their calculation in part on the assumption of
one hour of unpaid time per employee per week.  The Plaintiff
disputes its reasonableness.  The assumption is based solely on
the complaint.  Although the complaint alleged the circumstances
of the violations and their regularity, it does not speak to
frequency.  The Defendants' assumption of one unpaid hour per
week per employee is therefore unsupported.  It is further
undermined by the fact that the average workweek was only 3.83
days per week.

In her sixth cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged that the
Defendants did not provide an accurate itemized statement with
each wage payment.  The Defendants contend that this claim places
at least $500,000 at issue.  They base their calculation on the
evidence that they employed at least 450 employees at any time
during the relevant time, and paid them bi-weekly.  They further
assumed that each wage statement was inaccurate.  The Plaintiff
disputes this assumption.  The Defendants present no evidence in
support of their assumption, but rely on the Plaintiff's
allegations.  As discussed, the Plaintiff's allegations regarding
the circumstances giving rise to the violations and their
systematic nature do not speak to their frequency.  The
Defendants' assumption is therefore unsupported.

In the seventh cause of action, the Plaintiff alleged that the
Defendants did not timely pay all wages due upon separation from
employment and that they made final wage payments with a pay
card.  The Defendants argue that the claim puts $3.9 million at
issue.  The Plaintiff counters that the amount is unsupported.
The Defendants' average shift evidence is not on point.  They
calculated the average starting with Feb. 1, 2013; however, the
alleged violations reach only to Feb. 1, 2014.  Because of the
uncertainty regarding the average shift for purposes of
calculating the employees' daily wages, the Defendants' ultimate
calculation is unsupported.

Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's request for
attorneys' fees places an additional $1.7 million at issue.
Statutory attorneys' fees may be aggregated to arrive at the
amount in controversy.  The Plaintiff argues, however, that the
calculation is not properly supported.  The Defendants did not
meet their burden to establish the amount in controversy as to
any of the claims they discussed in their opposition.  Their fee
calculation is therefore unsupported.

Judge Lorenz concludes the Defendants did not meet their burden
by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.  He therefore granted the
Plaintiff's motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/dDjoNV from Leagle.com.

Heather Basile, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated employees of Defendants in the State of California,
Plaintiff, represented by Nicole R. Roysdon --
nroysdon@grahamhollis.com -- GrahamHollis APC.

Aaron Brothers, Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Michaels Stores,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, represented by Gregory
W. Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and
Feld LLP & Jonathan S. Christie -- christiej@akingump.com -- Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.


AARP INC: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Commissions
-------------------------------------------------------
Monica Pais, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class action claims AARP is pocketing millions by duping
unsuspecting seniors and disabled individuals into paying
artificially inflated prices for Medicaid supplemental health
insurance policies.

In a federal complaint filed in Fort Pierce, Florida on Feb. 8,
lead plaintiff William Sacco claims AARP is collecting
unconscionable commissions on insurance policies it sells in
partnerships with co-defendants UnitedHealth Group Inc. and
UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company.

Mr. Sacco, who is represented by Scott Bursor from Bursor &
Fisher PA, claims that AARP refers to these commissions as
"royalty" payments for the use of its intellectual property, and
fails to disclose that they are collected by charging seniors and
disabled individuals an additional amount over and above the
insurance premium paid to UnitedHealthcare.

"Defendants' motive to term a commission payment a "royalty" is
two-fold: it allows AARP to avoid oversight by insurance
regulators, and it allows AARP to avoid paying taxes on the
income it generates through insurance sales," Mr. Sacco says.

According to the complaint, AARP is violating the Florida
Insurance Code because even though it does not have a license to
operate as an insurance agent in Florida, it still acts as a "de
facto agent" for UnitedHealth by selling and renewing "AARP
Medigap" insurance policies in exchange for a 4.95 percent
commission.

The complaint alleges that similar Medigap policies offered by
other companies have lower costs, but AARP secretly charges its
clients unlawful insurance agents' commissions to maximize its
profits.

"AARP earns substantial revenue through business partnerships
with large insurance companies, like defendant UnitedHealth, to
sell its own AARP-branded insurance policies," the complaint
says.

Mr. Sacco claims UnitedHealth is AARP's largest business partner,
and says that according to the organizations own 2010-2012
financial statements, 65 percent of its royalty income comes from
the sale or renewal of UnitedHealth insurance products.

AARP's program offers Medicare-related insurance such as Part D
prescription drug insurance, Medicare Advantage and Medigap.

The complaint claims that any consumer who wants to purchase
Medigap coverage from UnitedHealth needs to buy the AARP Medigap
plan, and thus they are contributing to AARP's illegal
commissions without even knowing about it.

"In 2012, AARP generated $704 million in revenues from its so
called royalties, which is nearly three times higher than income
generated from membership dues, and makes up 52% of AARP's 2012
total operating revenue," the complaint says.

Mr. Sacco says that AARP and UnitedHealth are scheming and taking
advantage of unsuspecting senior citizens who have placed their
trust in them.

He is seeking compensatory damages on claims of conversion,
unjust enrichment and fraudulent concealment.

Mark Bagley, a media relations representative for AARP, said that
they are reviewing the lawsuit details, but that "it is
immediately apparent that the allegations are meritless."

Attorney for Plaintiff:

     Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     888 Seventh Avenue
     New York, NY 10019
     Telephone: (212) 989-9113
     Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
     Email: scott@bursor.com


ACADIA PHARMA: Court Approves $2.925MM "Rihn" Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, Attorney's Fees and Expense
in the case captioned JEFF RIHN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ACADIA
PHARMACEUTICALS INC., ULI HACKSELL AND STEPHEN R. DAVIS,
Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-00575 BTM-DHB (S.D. Cal.).

The claims were premised on allegations that Defendants knowingly
and recklessly made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the timing and status of Acadia's New Drug Application
(NDA) for its lead product candidate, Nuplazid, pimavanserin.
These false and misleading statements allegedly artificially
inflated stock prices of Acadia between November 10, 2014 and
March 11, 2015 (Class Period).

Rule 23(a) sets forth four prerequisites for class certification:
(1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy
of representation. The Court finds that all four of these
requirements have been satisfied.

The numerosity requirement is satisfied if the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The
proposed class is numerous, consisting of 27,830 Class Members.
There are common questions of fact and law concerning whether
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the status and timing of Acadia's NDA for Nuplazid
(pimavanserin). Plaintiffs' claims are typical because they
allege that they purchased publicly traded securities of Acadia
during the Class Period and were damaged because Defendants
artificially inflated the price of Acadia securities through
their dissemination of false and misleading statements about the
NDA.

It appears that Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. They have
vigorously prosecuted the case thus far and it does not appear
that there are any conflicts of interest.

The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation
and focuses on the relationship between the common and individual
issues.

Here, the damages for each class member would be small.
Therefore, class members would have little motivation to pursue
individual cases. Furthermore, due to the common issues in this
case, it is desirable to litigate the claims in one forum to
ensure consistency of rulings and findings. The parties are
unaware of any competing litigation, and the Court need not be
concerned regarding any difficulties with management of the class
action due to this settlement.

In sum, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied and certifies the Settlement Class under Rule
23(b)(3).

Terms of the Settlement

The settlement provides for a gross payment of $2,925,000. The
settlement amount will be paid into escrow and, after paying
attorneys' fees and expenses approved by the Court, and other
costs of settlement, the net settlement amount will be
distributed among the class members with recognized losses who
timely submit valid Proof of Claim and Release Forms.

Legal Standard

Before approving a class action settlement, the court must
determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.

In reaching this determination, courts consider a number of
factors, including: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's case; (2)
the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5)
the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the
proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the
presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of
the class members to the proposed settlement.

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case and Risk, Complexity, Expense, and
Duration of Litigation

Plaintiffs would face substantial risks in continued litigation,
which would undoubtedly be time-consuming and costly. Lead
Plaintiffs would have faced a great deal of difficulty in
obtaining the necessary documents and depositions as the events
alleged in the CCAC took place as long as four and a half years
ago, and the company is under new management. The relevant
documents may have been misplaced, former employees may be
difficult to locate, and the memories of the parties involved in
the actions alleged in the CCAC may have faded. The complexity of
the allegations would have required the retention of additional
FDA experts, serving third party document subpoenas, and
countless depositions.

Amount Offered in Settlement

The settlement amount of $2,925,000 represents approximately 15%
of the damages recoverable by Class Members in the Action.
Accordingly, the benefit provided to the class members is
substantial.

Stage of Proceedings and Experience and Views of Counsel

Lead Counsel, on behalf of Lead Plaintiffs, conducted an
extensive investigation into the facts alleged in the Action,
including reviewing FDA documents, press releases, SEC filings,
conference call transcripts, and analyst reports. Prior to
settlement, the Court had denied Defendants' motion to dismiss
but had not yet ruled on Defendants' motion for reconsideration
of the order denying the motion to dismiss.

Reaction of the Class Members

The reaction of Class Members has been positive. No objections
have been filed and there has only been one request for
exclusion.

Lack of Collusion

Because this settlement was reached prior to class certification,
the Court examines the Settlement for evidence of collusion.
There is no indication of collusion. Lead Counsel seeks a fee
award totaling 25% of the Settlement Fund. This percentage of
recovery is typical and does not represent a disproportionate
distribution of the settlement to counsel.

Notice to the Class

Here, Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC (KCC), pursuant to the
Preliminary Approval Order, mailed the Settlement Notice to
27,830 potential Class Members beginning on June 30, 2017.   The
Settlement Notice and the Proof of Claim form were also made
available on www.AcadiaSecuritiesSettlement.com, which has been
visited 7,463 times as of August 23, 2017. The Publication Notice
was published in Investor's Business Daily and posted by PR
Newswire on July 10, 2017. Additionally, KCC set up a toll-free
telephone helpline to accommodate potential Class Members who had
questions regarding the Settlement. The help line received 90
calls as of August 23, 2017.

Final Approval

The Court grants final approval of the Settlement.

Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees in the amount of $731,250, 25% of
the anticipated $2,925,000 Settlement Fund.

Here, a rough calculation of the lodestar comes to $709,630.
Based on the lodestar, the multiplier is 1.03. Courts have
routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect the risk of non-
payment in common fund cases. To restrict Class Counsel to the
hourly rates they customarily charge for non-contingent work here
payment is assured would deprive them of any financial incentive
to accept contingent-fee cases which may produce nothing. Courts
have therefore held that counsel are entitled to a multiplier for
risk.

Multipliers of 1 to 4 are commonly found to be appropriate in
common fund cases. Accordingly, the 1.03 multiplier is within the
range or reasonableness. Therefore, the lodestar cross-check
supports the reasonableness of the requested fees of $731,250.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 22, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya23uu39 from Leagle.com.

Jeff Rihn, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David C. Walton --
davew@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Henry Montague Willis -- hmw@ssdslaw.com --
Schwartz Steinsapir Dohrmann and Sommers.

Daniel P. Fay & Teresa L. Fay, Plaintiffs, represented by
Alexander Louis Burns -- alexander.burns@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn
Swick Foti LLC, pro hac vice & Ramzi Abadou
ramzi.abadou@ksfcounsel.com, Kahn Swick Foti LLP.

Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc., Uli Hacksell & Stephen R. Davis,
Defendants, represented by Blake M. Zollar -- bzollar@cooley.com
-- Cooley LLP, Koji F. Fukumura -- kfukumura@cooley.com -- Cooley
Godward Kronish & Peter M. Adams -- padams@cooley.com -- Cooley
Godward Kronish.

Roger G. Mills, Defendant, represented by Koji F. Fukumura,
Cooley Godward Kronish & Peter M. Adams, Cooley Godward Kronish.

Ahmad Ahmad, Movant, represented by James Hail James Hail --
jim@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther.

Russ Belden, Movant, represented by Elaine T. Byszewski -
elaine@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens, Berman, Sobol & Shapiro, LLP.

Paul Levine, Movant, represented by Barbara A. Rohr --
brohr@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, Benjamin Heikali
bheikali@faruqilaw.com, Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, Katherine M. Lenahan
-- klenahan@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice,
Lubna M. Faruqi --  lfaruqi@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi LLP,
pro hac vice, Megan Sullivan -- msullivan@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi
& Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice & Richard William Gonnello --
rgonnello@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice.

Robert E. Pries, Lisa Hancock & Solomon A. Monderer, Movants,
represented by Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.


ACRE MORTGAGE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "James" RESPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RENITA JAMES, Plaintiff, v. ACRE MORTGAGE &
FINANCIAL, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. RDB-17-1734 (D.
Md.), Judge Richard D. Bennett of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and/or for Summary Judgment.

The Class Action Complaint in the case alleges in one count that
the Defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA") by entering into a kickback scheme whereby it received
unearned fees from Genuine Title, LLC for referrals.

The alleged kickback scheme in the case involves Genuine Title
which has an extensive history with the Court.  In December 2013,
Edward and Vickie Fangman (represented by the same counsel
involved in the case) filed a complaint against Genuine Title
involving essentially identical allegations in the Circuit Court
of Baltimore County that was removed to the Court in January
2014.  The Fangmans alleged that Genuine Title, in exchange for
the referral of title services on their mortgage loan, paid cash
kickbacks to loan brokers and provided marketing materials for
free or at a drastically-reduced rate for various loan officers
who were part of the mortgage lending process.

On Jan. 2, 2015, the plaintiffs in Fangman filed a First Amended
Complaint naming other financial institutions, including E
Mortgage Management, LLC.  That First Amended Complaint in
Fangman alleged violations of RESPA, Maryland's state-law analog
to RESPA, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.  The Fangman
plaintiffs further alleged that Genuine Title and its affiliated
marketing companies provided Free Marketing Materials and/or
"Referring Cash" payments without disclosure on HUD-1 settlement
documents.

They filed a Second Amended Complaint on May 20, 2015, adding
additional parties and clarifying some of their previous
allegations.  Following discovery concerning Genuine Title's
business practices and relationship with other lenders, some
defendants have struck class settlements which have been the
subject of public filings and class notices.  The Court granted
final approval of the E Mortgage settlement on May 31, 2017.

Meanwhile, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and
the Maryland Attorney General initiated an enforcement action in
the Court on Jan. 22, 2015 against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. predicated on similar schemes involving
Genuine Title.  The CFPB and Attorney General also filed an
enforcement action on April 29, 2015 directly against Genuine
Title, its principals, and affiliates arising out of the same
alleged scheme.

The CFPB issued a press release on April 29, 2015 in which the
CFPB outlined the enforcement action against Genuine Title based
on the same facts alleged by the Fangman Plaintiffs.  On May 1,
2015, the CFPB and Maryland Attorney General announced a
settlement with Genuine Title, and the Court entered a Stipulated
Final Judgment and Order approving the settlement.  The
settlement orders in these enforcement actions explicitly
contemplate related litigation by affected consumers.

Plaintiff James closed her loan with Acre on Dec. 21, 2012 and
filed the action on June 23, 2017.  The Plaintiff's Class Action
Complaint asserts a RESPA claim based on an alleged kickback
scheme between Genuine Title and Brian and Jeffrey Krasner, who
were employees of Acre from May 2012 to January 2013.  The
Krasners allegedly created their own company in 2008, Morgan
Management, to receive these personal kickbacks.

Plaintiff James seeks to represent the purported class of all
individuals in the United States who were borrowers on a
federally related mortgage loan originated or brokered by Acrefor
which Genuine Title provided a settlement service, as identified
in Section 1100 on the HUD-1, between Jan. 1, 2009, and Dec. 31,
2014.  Acre ultimately filed the currently pending Motion to
Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiff's counsel, who has been in possession of Genuine
Title's records since 2014 and who processed the data by June
2015, has filed the following seven class actions against other
lenders who, like the defendants in Fangman, allegedly engaged in
kickback schemes with Genuine Title: (i) Edmondson v. Eagle
National Bank, et al., Civil Case No. RDB-16-3938 (D. Md.); (ii)
Dobbins, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., Civil Case No. RDB-17-
540 (D. Md.); (iii) Callum v. Priority Financial Services, Civil
Case No. RDB-17-0623 (D. Md.); (iv) James v. Acre Mortgage &
Financial, Civil Case No. RDB-17-1734 (D. Md.); (v) Baugh, et al.
v. The Federal Savings Bank, Civil Case No. RDB-17-1735 (D. Md.);
(vi) Ryman v. First Mortgage Corporation, Civil Case No. RDB-17-
1757 (D. Md.); (vii) Bezek, et al. v. First Mariner Bank, Civil
Case No. RDB-17-2902 (D. Md.).

On Oct. 31, 2017, Miles & Stockbridge, defense counsel in both
Edmondson (RDB-16-3938) and Bezek (RDB-17-2902), requested a
consolidated hearing on ripe motions to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs'
counsel, Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, agreed to a consolidated
hearing for the ripe motions to dismiss in five of the seven
cases -- namely, Edmondson (RDB-16-3938); Dobbins (RDB-17-540);
James (RDB-17-1734); Baugh (RDB-17-1735); and Bezek (RDB-17-
2902).  Generally, the motions to dismiss in these five cases
present statute of limitations and equitable tolling issues.  The
Court conducted the requested consolidated hearing on Jan. 16,
2018.

The Plaintiff concedes that RESPA's one-year statute of
limitations would bar the lawsuit, which was filed more than four
years after the Plaintiff closed her loan and two years after her
counsel processed Genuine Title's data.  However, the parties
dispute whether equitable tolling saves her claim.  The
Defendant's motion alternatively requests summary judgment in its
favor, but the Defendant agreed at oral argument to focus the
analysis upon the motion to dismiss standard under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Beneett holds that even if the Plaintiff can establish that
she was pursuing her rights diligently with or without credit for
her counsel's actions, he Court cannot ignore the role the
Plaintiff's counsel has played in determining the timing of the
action -- and the other pending cases related to the Genuine
Title kickback scheme.  In June 2015, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's counsel had access to Genuine Title's buyers' names,
addresses, telephone numbers, property addresses, settlement
dates, lender and in some cases mortgage broker information,
information sufficient to uncover the scheme in this case.  Even
if the Plaintiff's counsel's knowledge is not relevant to the due
diligence analysis, the counsel's in-depth investigation into
Genuine Title's records certainly bears heavily on the question
of whether "extraordinary circumstances" stood in the Plaintiff's
way and prevented timely filing.

The Judge further holds that the Plaintiff fails to fulfill the
extraordinary circumstances element required to equitably toll
her claim.  The Plaintiff proffers no amendment to the pleadings
that could overcome this conclusion, and no amount of discovery
would aid the Judge's analysis of the Plaintiff's claim for
equitable tolling.  As the Plaintiff has failed to establish the
extraordinary circumstances element, the Judge needs not
determine whether the Plaintiff was diligently pursuing her
rights.  While the parties here earnestly contest the content of
the due diligence requirement in the wake of Menominee, he finds
no reason to address those contentions.

For the reasons stated, Judge Bennett granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/KxflBA from Leagle.com.

Renita James, Plaintiff, represented by Megan Aileen Benevento --
mbenevento@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and Laake, P.A.,
Melissa Lynn English -- menglish@sgs-law.com -- Smith Gildea &
Schmidt LLC, Michael Paul Smith -- psmith@sgs-law.com -- Smith
Gildea and Schmidt LLC, Sarah A. Zadrozny -- szadrozny@sgs-
law.com -- Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC, Timothy Francis Maloney
-- tmaloney@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA &
Veronica Byam Nannis -- vnannis@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald
and Laake PA.

Acre Mortgage & Financial, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ari
Karen -- akaren@offitkurman.com -- Offit Kurman.


ASSOCIATED MATERIALS: Court Narrows Claims in "Harney"
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL HARNEY
and OZZIE GILBERT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ASSOCIATED MATERIALS, LLC, dba
AMI, a Delaware limited liability company, and ASSOCIATED
MATERIALS INCORPORATED, dba AMI, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-1587-SI (D. Ore.).

As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, AMI sells and
distributes vinyl siding (Siding) throughout the United States
for installation on homes and commercial buildings.  Named
Plaintiff Michael Harney is a resident of Beaverton, Oregon, and
lived in a house clad with AMI's vinyl siding.  While preparing
his house for sale, Mr. Harney found blistering and distortion
problems with the Siding.  Mr. Harney completed a Warranty
Inquiry Packet to make a claim for repair, refinishing, or
replacement of the siding.  AMI denied Mr. Harney's claim
stating, "our findings conclude that your particular concern is
not the result of a manufacturing defect covered by the
warranty."

Plaintiffs allege that AMI has received numerous warranty claims
alleging a manufacturing or design defect in the Siding. Rather
than notify consumers about the defects, Plaintiffs claim, AMI
has intentionally embarked on a campaign to blame any distortion
in the Siding on external or 'unusual heat sources.

Plaintiffs bring five claims for relief against AMI: (1) breach
of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranties; (3) unjust
enrichment; (4) unlawful trade practices; and (5) declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief.

Identification of a Defect

AMI argues that Plaintiffs have alleged only injury and have
failed to identify either a design or engineering defect. Because
each of Plaintiffs' claims rest upon an allegation that AMI's
Siding was defective, AMI argues, insufficient description of the
precise defect renders each of Plaintiffs' claims insufficient
under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs respond that to state a claim for breach of warranty,
Plaintiffs need allege only that the product did not perform as
promised or, in the case of implied warranty, failed of its
essential purpose. Plaintiffs further argue that they have
sufficiently alleged a defect in AMI's siding. Plaintiffs are
correct.

In alleging that the Siding became distorted and deformed, and
that siding should not become distorted and deformed when exposed
to normal weather conditions, Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that AMI's product is defective. To require a
sophisticated statement of the mechanical or chemical failings of
the Siding would place a prohibitively high burden on plaintiffs
at the pleading stage, and would go beyond the requirements of
Rule 8(a).

Breach of Implied Warranty

Plaintiffs claim that the Siding failed its essential purpose and
that AMI breached the implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability. AMI moves to dismiss this claim on the bases
that Plaintiff Harney is not in privity with AMI and Plaintiff
Gilbert's implied warranty claim is time-barred under Georgia
law.

Plaintiff Harney

Oregon does not require privity for a consumer who has suffered
property damage to recover under an implied warranty claim.
Although the Second Amended Complaint does not specifically
allege how and when Plaintiff Harney came to own the AMI Siding,
it does state that his previous home, the Moon Valley Terrace
Residence, had AMI Siding that he observed to be blistering and
distorting when he prepared the home for sale in Summer 2015.
Plaintiff Harney is therefore in the normal distribution chain of
AMI's products.

Plaintiffs have thus sufficiently alleged the existence of
property damage.

Plaintiff Gilbert

Georgia applies a four-year statute of limitations to claims of
breach of implied warranty.  Plaintiff Gilbert alleges that she
was impeded from discovering the defective nature of the Siding
because of AMI's affirmative acts of concealment regarding the
inherent defects of its Siding. Plaintiff Gilbert does not,
however, point to any particular communication or act of
concealment on the part of AMI.

Such an allegation, therefore, is more legal conclusion than
factual allegation and is insufficient to support an inference
that the tolling exception for fraudulent concealment applies to
Plaintiff Gilbert's claim. Because Plaintiff Gilbert has not
alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the statute of
limitation should be tolled, her claim for breach of implied
warranty is time-barred.

Unjust Enrichment

AMI argues that Plaintiffs cannot maintain an unjust enrichment
claim because the Warranty bars such a claim, because that claim
is time-barred, and because Plaintiffs conferred no benefit on
AMI. Because the Court agrees that the Warranty bars Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim, and that it is time-barred, the Court
does not reach AMI's third argument.

AMI also argues that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims are
time-barred. Oregon's statute of limitations for unjust
enrichment claims is six years, and accrues when the benefit is
received. Georgia's statute of limitations for unjust enrichment
claims is four years, and accrues on the date that suit on the
claim can first be brought. Plaintiffs argue that the statute of
limitations should be tolled due to AMI's fraudulent concealment.
Plaintiffs plead no facts giving rise to a reasonable inference
of affirmative concealment of the Siding's defects on the part of
the Defendants. Because the Siding for Plaintiff Harney's home
was purchased in 2002, and Plaintiff Gilbert bought the Siding in
2000, both of their claims for unjust enrichment are, in addition
to being barred due to the existence of an enforceable contract,
time-barred.

Unlawful Trade Practices

AMI argues that Plaintiffs' unlawful trade practices claim must
be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that
they detrimentally relied on AMI's alleged unlawful trade
practices, and AMI's alleged misrepresentations are non-
actionable puffery. Plaintiffs respond that they have
sufficiently pleaded reliance as to the affirmative
misrepresentations, and that reliance is not required for a
failure to disclose claim.

Affirmative Misrepresentations

Reliance

To prevail on a claim of affirmative misrepresentation under ORS
Section 646.608(1)(e) (misrepresentations of characteristics,
uses, benefits) and (g) (misrepresentations of quality, standard,
or grade), a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of ORS
646.608(1); (2) causation (as a result of); and (3) damage
(ascertainable loss).

Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that allege a third-party
reliance theory. Plaintiffs have not pleaded factual allegations
that they relied on AMI's representations or that such
representations were communicated to them before purchasing the
Siding or the house. Instead, Plaintiffs claim in a conclusory
fashion that they reasonably relied on AMI's representations and
failures to disclose, to their detriment, but plead no factual
allegations to support this legal conclusion. Plaintiff Harney
has not alleged that he relied on any of AMI's representations or
that someone else communicated those representations to him
before purchasing, or even that Harney relied on someone else's
reliance.

Plaintiffs, thus, have not pleaded reliance on AMI's statements
sufficient to state a claim for affirmative misrepresentation.

Puffery

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating any reliance on
AMI's statements before purchasing or owning the Siding. The
Court need therefore not determine whether AMI's statements are
non-actionable puffery. Plaintiffs are correct, however, in
noting that in both Georgia and Oregon, whether a party's
statements are non-actionable puffery is often a question of fact
for the jury.

Failure to Disclose

Under ORS Section 646.608(1)(t), it is an unlawful trade practice
to fail to disclose any known material defect or material
nonconformity at the time that the goods are tendered. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants violated the Oregon and Georgia unfair
trade practices laws because: (1) The Siding did not have the
approvals, characteristics, uses, benefits, grade, qualities, and
standards represented by AMI, (2) The Siding was not of a
particular standard, quality, or grade, and (3) AMI knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the
Siding contained material defects and AMI failed to disclose such
defects.

Neither party cited, nor could the Court find, any case requiring
a plaintiff to have relied on an omission by the defendant to
state a claim under Ga. Code Ann. Section 10-1-372. Given the
similarities between Georgia and Oregon unlawful trade practices
statutes described above, Plaintiffs need not plead reliance in a
failure to disclose theory for claims brought under ORS Section
646.638(1) or Ga. Code Ann. Section 10-1-372. Plaintiffs, thus,
have sufficiently alleged causation under both laws.

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion
is granted as to Plaintiff Gilbert's implied warranty claim, and
both Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims, which are dismissed
with prejudice. Defendants' motion is also granted as to
Plaintiffs' unlawful trade practices claims based on affirmative
misrepresentation, which are dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants' motion is denied as to all other claims, including
Plaintiffs' unlawful trade practices claims based on Defendants'
failure to disclose.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6mw9as from
Leagle.com.

Michael Harney, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Nelson --
anelson@bensonpc.com -- Benson, Kerrane, Storz & Nelson, P.C.,
pro hac vice, Michael J. Lowder -- mlowder@bensonpc.com --
Benson, Kerrane, Storz & Nelson, P.C., pro hac vice, Robert W.
Wilkinson -- rwilkinson@balljanik.com -- Ball Janik, LLP &
Anthony T. Blake -- ablake@balljanik.com -- Ball Janik, LLP.

Ozzie Gilbert, Plaintiff, represented by Robert W. Wilkinson,
Ball Janik, LLP & Anthony T. Blake, Ball Janik, LLP.

Associated Materials, LLC., a Delaware limited liability company
doing business as Alside Building Products, Inc & Associated
Materials Incorporated, a Delaware corporation doing business as
Gentek Building Products, Inc. doing business as Alside Building
Products, Inc., Defendants, represented by Daniel M. Kavouras --
dkavouras@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael K. Farrell -- mfarrell@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler
LLP, pro hac vice, Sam A. Camardo -- scamardo@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice & Darin M. Sands --
sandsd@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell, PC.


BANK MUTUAL: Lawsuits over Associated Banc-Corp Deal Dropped
------------------------------------------------------------
Bank Mutual Corporation said in its Form 10-Q report for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2017, that plaintiffs have
agreed to dismiss their class action lawsuits challenging the
Company's merger deal with Associated Banc-Corp.

As disclosed in the Company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2017, and in the Proxy
Statement/Prospectus dated September 15, 2017, relating to the
special meeting of shareholders on October 24, 2017, related to
pending merger with Associated (the "Proxy
Statement/Prospectus"), on July 28, 2017, two substantially
identical purported class action complaints, each by various
individual plaintiffs, were filed with the Wisconsin Circuit
Court for Milwaukee County on behalf of the respective named
plaintiffs and seeking to represent other Company shareholders
against the Company, the members of the Company's board, and
Associated in connection with the proposed merger between
Associated and the Company.

The lawsuits were captioned Schumel et al. v. Bank Mutual
Corporation et al., case no. 2017CV006201, and Paquin et al. v.
Bank Mutual Corporation et al., case no. 2017CV006202. Both
complaints alleged state law breach of fiduciary duty claims
against the Bank Mutual board for, among other things, seeking to
sell Bank Mutual through an allegedly defective process, for an
allegedly unfair price and on allegedly unfair terms.

On August 30, 2017, a third purported class action complaint,
captioned Wollenburg et al. v. Bank Mutual Corporation et al.,
case no. 2017CV007312, was filed in the Wisconsin Circuit Court
for Milwaukee County, purportedly on behalf of the same class of
shareholders and against the same defendants as the prior two
complaints.

The Wollenburg complaint asserted similar allegations as the
prior two complaints, and further alleged that the preliminary
proxy statement/prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") contained various alleged misstatements or
omissions.

The Paquin, Schumel, and Wollenburg complaints alleged that
Associated aided and abetted the directors' alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty.

On September 13, 2017, Associated filed a notice of removal of
the Paquin, Schumel, and Wollenburg actions to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; however, on
October 11, 2017, that Court remanded the three actions back to
Wisconsin Circuit Court.

On September 6, 2017, a fourth purported class action complaint,
captioned Parshall et al. v. Bank Mutual Corporation et al., case
no. 17-CV-1209, was filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, purportedly on behalf of the
same class of shareholders and against the same defendants as the
prior complaints.

The Parshall complaint criticized the adequacy of the merger
consideration and alleged that Bank Mutual, the members of the
Bank Mutual board and Associated allegedly omitted and/or
misrepresented certain information in the registration statement
of which the Proxy Statement/Prospectus formed a part in
violation of securities laws and related SEC regulations.

The Company, Associated and the other defendants believe that the
claims asserted in the four lawsuits were without merit and that
the disclosures in the Proxy Statement/Prospectus were adequate
under the law.

However, to avoid the risk that the lawsuits might delay or
otherwise adversely affect the consummation of the merger and to
minimize the expense of defending such actions, on October 13,
2017 the Company and Associated determined to voluntarily make
certain supplemental disclosures related to the merger. It was
stated that nothing in those disclosures was to be deemed an
admission of the legal necessity or materiality under applicable
law of any of such disclosures. The Company and Associated
specifically denied that any further disclosure was required to
supplement the Proxy Statement/Prospectus under applicable law.

In light of the supplemental disclosures, on October 13, 2017,
the plaintiffs in the four lawsuits agreed to dismiss their
individual claims with prejudice.

Effective February 1, 2018, pursuant to the terms of the Merger
Agreement, BKMU was merged with and into Associated, with
Associated continuing as the surviving entity in the Merger.
Following the Merger, Bank Mutual's wholly owned banking
subsidiary will merge with and into Associated's wholly owned
banking subsidiary, Associated Bank, N.A., with Associated Bank,
N.A. continuing as the surviving entity in the Bank Merger. The
Bank Merger is expected to occur in late second quarter or early
third quarter 2018.

Bank Mutual Corporation is the third largest financial
institution holding company headquartered in Wisconsin based on
total assets.


DELTA AIR: Appeal in First Bag Fee Antitrust Suit Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Delta Air Line, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017, that the plaintiffs' appeal in the First Bag
Fee Antitrust Litigation remains pending.

In May-July 2009, a number of purported class action antitrust
lawsuits were filed against Delta and AirTran Airways
("AirTran"), alleging that Delta and AirTran engaged in collusive
behavior in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in November
2008 based upon certain public statements made in October 2008 by
AirTran's CEO at an analyst conference concerning fees for the
first checked bag, Delta's imposition of a fee for the first
checked bag on November 4, 2008 and AirTran's imposition of a
similar fee on November 12, 2008. The plaintiffs sought to assert
claims on behalf of an alleged class consisting of passengers who
paid the first bag fee after December 5, 2008 and seek injunctive
relief and unspecified treble damages. All of these cases have
been consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in the Northern
District of Georgia.

On July 12, 2016, the Court issued an order granting the
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On October 7, 2016,
the U.S. Court of Appeals granted the defendants' petition for
interlocutory review of this order, and that appeal remains
pending.

On March 29, 2017, the District Court granted the defendants'
motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and that appeal remains pending.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. is a major American airline, with its
headquarters and largest hub at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia.


BAYER CONSUMER: 2d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Kommer" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES KOMMER, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BAYER CONSUMER
HEALTH, a division of Bayer AG, MSD CONSUMER CARE, INC., BAYER
CONSUMER CARE HOLDINGS LLC, BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC, BAYER
CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-1772 (2d Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court dismissing Kommer's request for
injunctive relief for lack of Article III standing, and the
balance of the complaint for failure to state a claim.

Kommer brought the putative class action in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the
Defendants' marketing of their product, "Dr. Scholl's Custom Fit
Orthotic Inserts," constitutes a deceptive business practice and
false advertising under New York General Business Law ("GBL")
Sections 349 and 350.  In essence, the complaint alleges that
Kommer and other consumers were led to believe incorrectly that
the orthotics -- which they purchased in prepackaged sizes, over-
the-counter at retail stores such as Walmart -- were "custom fit"
in the sense that they were individually designed for each
consumer's specific feet.  On motion of the Defendants, the
district court dismissed the request for injunctive relief for
lack of Article III standing, and the balance of the complaint
for failure to state a claim.

Kommer challenges the district court's determination that he
lacks Article III standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of
himself and the putative class.  He challenges the district
court's determination that his complaint fails to state a claim
under GBL Sections 349 and 350.

The Appellate Court considered Kommer's arguments and find them
to be without merit.  Kommer fails to establish a likelihood of
future harm.  Accordingly, he has no standing under Article III
to enjoin the Defendants' sales practices, and the court properly
deemed him precluded from seeking that relief.

Moreover, an independent review of the allegations and relevant
state law confirms that the complaint fails to state a claim.
This is so for substantially the reasons articulated in the
district court's May 18, 2017 Memorandum and Order.  In
particular, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the
Defendants engaged in conduct likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances, a required
element of both claimed violations of the GBL.  The court
therefore properly dismissed the case.

For these reasons, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7Gqvx5 from Leagle.com.

ROBERT J. BERG -- rberg@mdpcelaw.com -- (with Jeffrey I. Carton -
- jcarton@denleacarton.com -- on the brief), Denlea & Carton LLP,
White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

EUGENE A. SCHOON -- eschoon@sidley.com -- (with James D. Arden --
jarden@sidley.com -- on the brief), Sidley Austin LLP, New York,
NY and Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.


BHP: Faces Class Action Over Worker's Casual Status
---------------------------------------------------
Adelle Chua, writing for HRD, reports that a mine operator and a
labour-hire firm are facing class action led by a worker who was
denied pay claims because of his casual status.

Chandler Macleod hired Simon Turner for BHP to operate a truck at
the Mt. Arthur coal mine in the NSW Hunter Valley, but Mr. Turner
suffered spinal injuries after his truck was hit by a coal
excavator in 2015.

Mr. Turner, 47, was totally incapacitated but both companies
refused to pay him the industry standard accident compensation
because he was classified as a casual worker, ABC News reported.

He receives $411 per week instead of the $1,800 per week he would
have received under the award as a permanent employee.

"I hate it.  We do exactly the same job, work the same hours and
are exposed to the same dangerous conditions, yet they pay us
about half of what the BHP employees get," Mr. Turner said.

The class action is brought by more than 400 mine workers who
alleged that BHP, Chandler Macleod and another labour-hire firm,
Tesa, hired them as casuals to avoid paying them entitlements
worth $20,000 per annum.

The claimants allege that BHP was involved with Chandler Macleod
and Tesa over a period of six years to casualise its workforce.

"We want to be treated as normal humans and [be] paid exactly the
same as everyone else for doing the same job and working the same
hours . . . you can't go and get a loan, you can do anything,
they say you're casual," Mr. Turner said.

They set out to show the contractors at the mine are treated
exactly like the permanent employees: Both groups are expected to
work a full roster, published up until the end of 2019 and both
are required to submit leave requests to BHP up to four weeks in
advance.

Lawyer Rory Markham said the class action would challenge the
legal basis for employing casual mine workers and would have
implications for mining companies across Australia.

Mt Arthur is the largest coal mine in NSW, with a production
workforce, including direct employees and labour hire
contractors, of about 1,900 people. [GN]


BIG HEART: Faces Class Action Over Contaminated Dog Food
--------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Fletcher, writing for ABC7, reports that an ABC7
investigation exposed the euthanasia drug, pentobarbital, in the
national brand pet food, Gravy Train.

The class action lawsuit was filed in a US District Court in
California against "Big Heart Brands," owned by Smucker's and the
maker of Gravy Train.

Big Heart Brands is also the maker of Meow Mix, Milk Bone,
Kibbles'n Bits, 9 Lives, Natural Balance, Pup-Peroni, Gravy
Train, Nature's Recipe, Canine Carry Outs, Milo's Kitchen, Alley
Cat, Jerky Treats, Meaty Bone, Pounce and Snausages.

The suit alleges the company "knowingly, recklessly and/or
negligently is selling contaminated dog food containing
pentobarbital, a substance largely used to euthanize animals."

As pointed out in our initial investigation, pentobarbital would
never be used on animals intended for food, as that would be
illegal.

So where is it coming from?

"It comes from euthanasia of animals using that euthanasia drug.
If they say it doesn't come from dogs, cats and horses where does
it come from? It doesn't come from outer space," says
Dr. Nicholas Dodman, Chief Scientific Officer for the Center for
Canine Behavior Studies and Former Director of the Animal
Behavior Program and Tufts University. [GN]


BITCONNECT INT'L: Silver Miller Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Silver Miller recently announced that a class action lawsuit was
commenced on behalf of individuals and entities who held
investments at the recently-shuttered BitConnect cryptocurrency
exchange and lending platform.  The lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
and is captioned Wildes, et al. v. BitConnect International PLC,
et al., Case No. 9:18-cv-80086-DMM (the "Lawsuit").

Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as
lead plaintiff through counsel of his/her/its choice or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.  If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff in the Lawsuit, however, you must
move the Court no later than April 13, 2018 to appoint you as the
lead plaintiff.  If you wish to discuss the Lawsuit or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests as
they relate to the Lawsuit, please contact plaintiffs' counsel
David C. Silver of Silver Miller at (954) 516-6000 or
DSilver@SilverMillerLaw.com

The Complaint alleges that BitConnect International PLC,
BitConnect Ltd., BitConnect Trading Ltd., and the companies'
U.S.-based Directors and affiliates/promoters operated a Ponzi
scheme that -- through an army of highly-compensated recruiters
who lured in investors through social media channels --
fraudulently promoted exorbitant monthly and daily returns on
investments that were actually nothing more than reallocated
funds from other investors.  According to the lawsuit, the
defendants also engaged in a fraudulent and unregistered offering
and sale of securities that violated numerous state and federal
securities laws, including Sections 5, 12(a), 15, and 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 77e, 77l(a), 77o, and
77q(a).  The Lawsuit pleads that the Court rescind all
investments in BitConnect; require BitConnect to account for all
funds raised from BitConnect investors; and adjudicate that
BitConnect and its affiliates violated multiple securities laws.

The plaintiffs are represented by Silver Miller --
http://www.silvermillerlaw.com-- a cryptocurrency investor law
firm, with actions currently pending against the Coinbase,
Kraken, and Cryptsy exchanges as well as against Initial Coin
Offering promoters Tezos and Monkey Capital. [GN]


BITCONNECT INT'L: Faces Another Securities Class Action in Fla.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nikhilesh De, writing for CoinDesk, reports that yet another
lawsuit seeking class-action status has been filed in Florida
against BitConnect, constituting the third legal action of its
kind to be initiated in the state and the fifth overall in the
U.S.

Florida residents Andrew Kline, Dusty Showers and Lena Hunt,
along with Rhode Island resident Charles Mabra, filed the lawsuit
in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Florida on
Feb. 7, public records show.  Additional suits have been filed in
Minnesota and Kentucky.

Like the previous lawsuits filed in the past month, this one
names Bitconnect's various arms as defendants.  Among the
defendants cited in this instance are BitConnect director Glenn
Arcaro and affiliate Ryan Maasen, as well as other unknown
entities involved in the alleged Ponzi scheme.

The suit claims that BitConnect sold unregistered securities in
the state and committed fraud by overstating the possible returns
that users who purchased the BitConnect tokens would see.  The
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated Florida
trade and securities laws, as well as the applicable laws in
Rhode Island.

The plaintiffs are seeking a jury trial, which would result in
damages being levied against the defendants if they are
successful.  Proceeds would repay investors, as well as provide
for the costs of the trial, according to the document.

Just last month, BitConnect saw its assets frozen after a
previous lawsuit was filed by aggrieved investors.  In the wake
of the closure of BitConnect's lending platform, the price of its
BCC token has fallen, tumbling from above $300 to roughly $2.90
as of press time.

In January, regulators in Texas and North Carolina moved against
BitConnect ahead of a planned token sale, issuing cease-and-
desist notices before the lending platform closure announcement
later that month. [GN]


BNSF RAILWAY: Court Issues Protective Order in "Sumlin"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Eastern Division, issued a Stipulated Protective
Order in the case captioned HENRY SUMLIN and BRIAN LEE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, and DOES 1-50, Defendants,
Case No. 5:17-cv-02364-JFW(KKx) (C.D. Cal.).

The parties stipulate, "It is the intent of the parties that
information will not be designated as confidential for tactical
reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith
belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public
manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the
public record of this case."

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yags3m9v from Leagle.com.

Henry Sumlin, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Brian Lee, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Craig J. Ackermann
-- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and Tilajef PC, David S.
Winston, Winston Law Group, P.C., Jonathan Melmed --
jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group PC & Sam Vahedi, Ackermann
and Tilajef, 1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610. Los Mario J.es,
California 90035 PC.

BNSF Railway Company, Defendant, represented by Amanda Pade
Ellison -- apellison@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Amanda C.
Sommerfeld -- asommerfeld@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Charles W.
Shewmake -- Charles.Shewmake@tklaw.com -- Thompson and Knight
LLP, Donald J. Munro -- dmunro@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac
vice & Koree Blyleven -- kblyleven@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


CALIFORNIA: Pro Se Complaint Failed to Survive Screening
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Screening Order dismissing for failure to
state a claim the case captioned DARRON DANIELS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01510-AWI-
BAM (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Darron Daniels (Plaintiff) is a state prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma paueris, in this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an
officer or employee of a governmental entity.

To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially
plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the
Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. The sheer possibility that a defendant
acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with
liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard.

Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of himself and
three other inmates: Travis Washington, Jr., Omar Samuels, and
Michael Anthony Miller.

Plaintiff alleges that California voters adopted California
Constitution Article I, Section 32 (Proposition 57) as law, which
purportedly declares that inmates are to serve only their primary
offense. Plaintiff contends that since its adoption, defendants
have failed to cause Proposition 57's language to be given effect
by way of moratorium, and thus remedy is with the courts.
Plaintiff was informed by Defendants Kane and Jones that they
lack jurisdiction to effectuate California Constitution Article
I, Section 32.

Plaintiff purports to bring claims for violation of the
California Constitution, along with claims for violation of the
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action or representative action
on behalf of other inmates. However, he may not do so. A non-
attorney proceeding pro se may bring his own claims to court, but
he may not represent others.

Plaintiff sues several State entities for alleged constitutional
violations.

Most of Plaintiff's allegations fail to assert the requisite
causal link between the challenged conduct, a specific defendant,
and a clearly identified constitutional violation. Under Section
1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.
Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a group of defendants,
but must set forth specific facts as to each individual
defendant's" deprivation of his rights.

Plaintiff names the CDCR, California State Superior Courts,
Parole Hearing Board, and the Attorney General for the State of
California as defendants in this action.

Plaintiff is informed that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
federal courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which
damages or injunctive relief is sought against state agencies
(such as CDCR) and individual prisons, absent a waiver by the
state or a valid congressional override. The Eleventh Amendment
bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against
a state, 'an arm of the state, its instrumentalities, or its
agencies.

Plaintiff's claim is not cognizable under Section 1983 as it
asserts only a violation or misinterpretation of state law.
Section 1983 provides a remedy only for violation of the
Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.  State
courts "are the ultimate expositors of state law. Plaintiff has
not alleged that he qualifies for parole consideration under the
requirements of Proposition 57.

In a Section 1983 lawsuit, Plaintiff is restricted to limited
procedural challenges and cannot proceed if he seeks to challenge
the validity or duration of his sentence. Federal courts may
order a new parole suitability hearing only under very limited
circumstances that are not alleged here.

The Court is not convinced that there is mandatory language in
Proposition 57 creating a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in parole eligibility, of which Plaintiff cannot be
deprived without due process. Parole consideration of a person
who is eligible under Proposition 57 is discretionary and is a
matter of state law. Plaintiff may not transform a state-law
issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due
process. The violation of state regulations, rules and policies
of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to state a
claim for relief under Section 1983.

Nonetheless, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend to
allege that standards for parole have been met, and the minimum
procedures adequate for due-process protection of that interest
have not been met, to the extent Plaintiff can do so in good
faith.

In this instance, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief on
his federal claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Liberally construing the claims in the complaint, it appears that
Plaintiff is bringing state law claims for false imprisonment. As
Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable federal claims in
this action, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law causes of action.

Plaintiff's complaint fails state a claim upon which relief may
be granted under section 1983.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6v3s7dv from Leagle.com.

Darron Daniels, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Travis Washington, Jr., Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Omar Samuels, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Michael Anthony Miller, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


CALIFORNIA: Prisoner Sleep Deprivation Suit Moved to Sacramento
---------------------------------------------------------------
SFGate reports that two lawsuits that claim certain state
prisoners suffered severe sleep deprivation during noisy suicide
and welfare checks have been moved from federal court in San
Francisco to Sacramento.

U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria of San Francisco ordered the
transfer to the Sacramento-based federal court for the Eastern
District of California on Feb. 9, a day after holding a hearing
on the state's request for dismissal of the lawsuits and on
whether to transfer the cases.

The federal court in Sacramento is the home of the settlement of
a 1990 class action lawsuit concerning mental health treatment of
prisoners.

That settlement was held in 2013 to require regular suicide and
welfare checks of prisoner held in isolation in Security Housing
Units, in which inmates generally spend 22 and one-half hours per
day in their cells.

Since 2015, according to the lawsuits, guards have completed each
check by striking a metal wand against a metal pad outside the
door of each cell.  Electronics in the wand record the time and
location of the check.

The inmates claim the loud clanging causes sleep deprivation and
related medical problems amounting to cruel and unusual
punishment.

The state attorney general's office had asked Judge Chhabria to
dismiss the lawsuits, saying that the two cases were precluded by
the previous class-action settlement.

Judge Chhabria did not rule on the request for dismissal in his
brief order transferring the cases.  That decision will now be
made by the new judge handling the lawsuits in Sacramento.  That
jurist is expected to be U.S. District Judge Kimberly Mueller,
who is presiding over the settlement of the mental health case.

Although Judge Mueller won't necessarily be influenced by the
proceedings before Judge Chhabria, prisoners' advocate Verbena
Lea said she was heartened that Judge Chhabria expressed concern
about the alleged sleep deprivation during the hearing on Feb. 8.

Ms. Lea is a member of the PHSS Committee to End Sleep
Deprivation, which is part of the Bay Area-based Prisoner Hunger
Strike Solidarity Coalition.

"I'm hoping that once (Mueller) has the case in front of her, she
will make the right decision and conclude the sleep deprivation
is a constitutional violation," Ms. Lea said. [GN]


CENTURY FINANCIAL: Faces "Teele" Suit in Connecticut
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Century Financial
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Kyonda Teele, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Century Financial Services, Inc. d/b/a Century Healthcare
Collection In Connecticut and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00320 (D. Conn., February 22, 2018).

Century Financial Services Inc. is a provider of professional
accounts receivable management services to healthcare providers
in Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CF ARCIS: CF Arcis IV Added as Defendant in "Hart"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an order approving the stipulation
dismissing Defendant CF ARCIS X Holdings LLC and adding DEFENDANT
CF ARCIS IV HOLDINGS LLC in the case captioned LAWRENCE HART,
CLYDE STEPHEN LEWIS, JAMES PRESTI, and MICHAEL RALLS, individual
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CF
ARCIS VII LLC d/b/a THE CLUB AT SNOQUALMIE RIDGE, d/b/a TPC AT
SNOQUALMIE RIDGE, and d/b/a SNOQUALMIE RIDGE GOLF CLUB, et al.,
Defendants, No. C17-01932 RSM (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs seek to add CF Arcis IV Holdings, LLC, as a named
defendant.

Plaintiffs and the Arcis Defendants therefore agree to ask that
the Court amend the case caption to read as follows:

LAWRENCE HART, CLYDE STEPHEN LEWIS, JAMES PRESTI, and MICHAEL
RALLS, individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CF ARCIS VII LLC d/b/a THE CLUB AT SNOQUALMIE
RIDGE, d/b/a TPC AT SNOQUALMIE RIDGE, and d/b/a SNOQUALMIE RIDGE
GOLF CLUB, CF ARCIS IV HOLDINGS, LLC, ARCIS EQUITY PARTNERS, LLC,
BLAKE S. WALKER, individually and on behalf of the marital
community of BLAKE S. WALKER and JANE DOE WALKER, and BRIGHTSTAR
GOLF SNOQUALMIE, LLC, Defendants.

The Court ordered that Defendant CF Arcis X Holdings, LLC d/b/a
Arcis Golf is dismissed from this case under Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and CF Arcis IV Holdings, LLC, is added as a
Defendant.

A full-text copy of the District of Court's January 22, 2018
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydgtdyfw from
Leagle.com.

Lawrence Hart, Clyde Stephen Lewis, James Presti & Michael Ralls,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adrienne McEntee --
amcentee@tmdwlaw.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC & Beth E.
Terrell -- bterrell@tmdwlaw.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP
PLLC.

CF Arcis VII LLC, doing business as The Club at Snoqualmie Ridge,
d/b/a TPC at Snoqualmie Ridge, and d/b/a Snoqualmie Ridge Golf
Club, Arcis Equity Partners, LLC, Blake S. Walker, individually
and on behalf of the marital community of Blake S. Walker and
Jane Doe Walker & CF Arcis IV Holdings, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Rebecca J. Francis -- rebeccafrancis@dwt.com --
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Stephen M. Rummage --
steverummage@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.


CHARLES SCHWAB: Court Denies Arbitration of ERISA Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned MICHAEL F. DORMAN, individually
as a participant in the SCHWAB PLAN RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND
INVESTMENT PLAN and on behalf of a class of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES SCHWAB & CO. INC.; CHARLES SCHWAB
& CO INC.; SCHWAB RETIREMENT PLAN SERVICES INC.; CHARLES SCHWAB
BANK; CHARLES SCHWAB INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.; JOHN DOES 1-50;
and XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-5, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00285-CW
(N.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to compel individual
arbitration of Plaintiff Michael F. Dorman's claims against
Defendants and to stay or dismiss this action while the
arbitration is pending. Alternatively, Defendants move to stay
the action pending a ruling by the Supreme Court in Morris v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).

The Charles Schwab Corporation (Charles Schwab) and its
subsidiaries, Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. and Charles Schwab Bank
(the Schwab entities), provide a wide range of financial
services, including wealth management, securities brokerage,
banking, money management, custody, and financial advisory
services.

Dorman was employed at Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. for six years,
until he left the company. Shortly after starting his employment,
he completed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer (Form U-4), which is required for all
registered representatives under the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) rules.

Dorman electronically signed an Acknowledgment of the Schwab
Investor Financial Consultant Compensation Plan (Compensation
Plan Acknowledgment). The Compensation Plan describes the
compensation structure of a financial consultant (FC) like
Dorman. The Acknowledgment contains a section entitled 11.0
Arbitration of Disputes.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that any agreement
within its scope shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. The FAA represents a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreement, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

Defendants contend that the Plan Document, Form U-4, and the
Compensation Plan Acknowledgment are valid agreements that
require arbitration under the FAA.

Defendants provide no authority supporting their contention that
a plan document executed after the participant has ceased
participation in the plan can bind the participant to
arbitration. But there is no indication that the plan's mandatory
arbitration clause was enacted after the plaintiff ceased all
participation in the plan. The remaining cases cited by
Defendants are similarly unavailing because, in each case, the
plan document was in effect while the plaintiff participated in
the plan.  The Plan Document therefore does not bind Dorman.

Defendants argue that Form U-4's arbitration provision
encompasses Dorman's claims because the provision covers any
dispute, claim or controversy between Dorman and Schwab.
Defendants read this provision out of context.  The arbitration
provision does not apply to any dispute between Dorman and
Schwab, but only those that are required to be arbitrated under
the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the SROS indicated in
Section 4. Section 4 of Form U-4 lists a number of SROs, or self-
regulatory organizations such as FINRA, but mentions nothing
whatsoever about the Plan. Defendants fail to explain adequately
why the language of this provision encompasses Dorman's claims.

The Compensation Plan Acknowledgment arbitration and class action
provisions are limited to claims arising out of or relating to
the financial consultant's employment or the termination of
employment.  Dorman's claims, which arise not under the
Compensation Plan but under the SchwabPlan, are therefore
governed by the claims procedures of the SchwabPlan.
Because the arbitration provisions cited by Defendants do not
encompass Dorman's claims, they do not require him to submit his
claims to arbitration.

Even if the arbitration provisions cited by Defendants
encompassed Dorman's claims, the provisions could not be
enforced. Dorman brings his claims pursuant to Sections 502(a)(2)
and 502(a)(3) on behalf of the plan. He cannot waive rights that
belong to the Plan, such as the right to file this action in
court.

The Court recently resolved this question in a similar case,
Cryer v. Franklin Templeton Res., Inc., 2017 WL 4410103 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 4, 2017). There, a release and class action waiver
signed by the plaintiff could not be enforced against the
plaintiff's Section 502(a)(2) claims brought on behalf of the
plan. Relying on Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1999),
the Court explained that a plan participant cannot settle,
without the plan's consent, a Section 502(a)(2) breach of
fiduciary duty claim seeking a return to the plan and all
participants of all losses incurred and any profits gained from
the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.

Here, too, enforcement of the arbitration and class action
provisions would violate the principles set forth in Bowles v.
Reade. Dorman brings Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) claims
seeking to restore losses incurred by the Plan.  As a result, he
cannot release the right to file a claim in court or the right to
file a class action, both of which belong to the Plan.

The Court denies Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yayq995r from Leagle.com.

Michael F. Dorman, individually as a participant in the SCHWAB
PLAN RETIREMENT SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN and on behalf of a
class of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
James A. Bloom -- jbloom@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider
Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Kyle Geoffrey Bates --
kbates@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns LLP & Todd M. Schneider --
tschneider@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP.

Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., The Charles Schwab Corporation, Schwab
Retirement Plan Services Inc., Charles Schwab Bank & Charles
Schwab Investment Management, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Howard Shapiro -- howshapiro@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose,
LLP, Lowell Harry Haky, Charles Schwab and Co., Inc. Office of
Corporate Counsel, Mai Petersen Klaassen, Charles Schwab, Myron
D. Rumeld -- mrumeld@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose, Ronald
Scott Kravitz -- rkravitz@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman,
Miller & Shah, LLP, Stacey C.S. Cerrone -- scerrone@proskauer.com
-- Proskauer & Tulio Dock Chirinos -- tchirinos@proskaue.com --
Proskauer Rose LLP.

Charles R. Schwab, Joseph R. Martinetto, Martha Tuma, Jay Allen,
Dave Callahan, John C. Clark & Walter W. Bettinger, III,
Defendants, represented by Howard Shapiro, Proskauer Rose, LLP,
Myron D. Rumeld, Proskauer Rose & Ronald Scott Kravitz, Shepherd,
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP.


CMRE FINANCIAL: Court Grants Joint Move to Dismiss "Crooks" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned TANEESHA CROOKS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CMRE FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00270-H-JLB (S.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff Crooks and Defendant filed a joint motion to dismiss
the action with prejudice as to Plaintiff Crooks and without
prejudice as to the putative class.

The Court has considered the factors identified in Diaz v. Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands and is satisfied that dismissal
would not be collusive or prejudicial to the putative class
members. 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the Court grants the joint motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y778dw7d from Leagle.com.

Taneesha Crooks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian -
- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law Group, APC, Joshua B. Swigart -
- josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart, Yana A. Hart --
yana@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart & Daniel G. Shay -
- DanielShay@SanDiegoBankruptcyNow.com -- Law Offices of Daniel
G. Shay.

CMRE Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by David J.
Kaminski -KaminskiD@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson and Messer.


CORE CIVIC: Faces "Gonzalez" Suit in W.D. of Texas
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Core Civic, Inc.
The case is styled as Martha Gonzalez, individually and on behalf
of all similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Core Civic, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00169 (W.D. Tex., February 22, 2018).

CoreCivic, formerly the Corrections Corporation of America, is a
company that owns and manages private prisons and detention
centers and operates others on a concession basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Thomas H. Padgett , Jr., Esq.
   The Buenker Law Firm
   2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
   Houston, TX 77018
   Tel: (713) 868-3388
   Fax: (713) 683-9940
   Email: tpadgettlaw@gmail.com


CRAZY HORSE: 4th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Denial in "Degidio"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming District Court's judgment denying Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned ALEXIS
DEGIDIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAZY HORSE SALOON AND
RESTAURANT INC, d/b/a Thee New Dollhouse, Defendant-Appellant,
and JOSEPH B. HARGADON, Third Party Defendant, No. 17-1145 (4th
Cir.).

This appeal concerns the enforceability of arbitration agreements
that were executed more than a year after this litigation began.

Degidio alleged that Crazy Horse misclassified her and other
putative class members as independent contractors and that it
further violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.

Degidio also claimed that Crazy Horse violated the South Carolina
Payment of Wages Act SCPWA, S.C. Code Section 41-10-10 et seq.,
by failing to pay entertainers the appropriate minimum wages,
improperly denying them overtime wages, and inappropriately
withholding the entertainers' tips.

In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Crazy Horse
submitted signed declarations in which entertainers explained why
they chose to sign the agreement. All of the entertainers stated
that they preferred to be independent contractors because they
enjoyed having the freedom to work at other clubs, set their own
work schedules, and keep the money they received in tips. Crazy
Horse also filed an affidavit from its CFO Laura Watson
explaining that Crazy Horse had begun entering arbitration
agreements with entertainers in November 2014.

The district court entered an order denying Crazy Horse's motion
to compel arbitration, the court found that Crazy Horse had
obtained the arbitration agreements through a unilateral,
unsupervised, and misleading pattern of communication with absent
class members initiated more than a year after the pendency of
this case.  It thus declined to enforce the arbitration
agreements.  Crazy Horse now appeals this decision.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) adopted a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements. The FAA recognizes that
arbitration is an expeditious way to resolve disputes and
conserve judicial resources. It accordingly requires that courts
stay any suit or proceeding pending arbitration of any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration. Pursuant to this directive, courts generally respect
contractual agreements to settle disputes via arbitration.
Courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts.

However, the policy undergirding the FAA is not without limits. A
litigant may waive its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration
Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that
to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party
opposing the stay.

The arbitration agreements that Crazy Horse presented to
potential plaintiffs painted a false picture of the entertainers'
legal posture. Specifically, the agreements suggested that the
entertainers' ability to keep tips and set their own schedules
was a result of their designation as independent contractors, and
that this designation would be imperiled if the entertainers
joined Degidio's suit.

In their declarations, the entertainers appear to have been
operating under the misunderstanding that they would be able to
keep their tips and flexible work schedule only if they were
independent contractors, and that they would be able to assure
themselves of that status only by signing the arbitration
agreements. But the benefits that seemingly led the entertainers
to sign arbitration agreements are available to both employees
and independent contractors alike.

The FLSA requires that employers pay a minimum wage and overtime
rates to their employees.  It does not prevent parties whether
they be businesses, employees, or independent contractors from
getting together to settle most questions of wages and scheduling
to their mutual satisfaction.  In other words, while the parties
cannot circumvent the FLSA with a simple contractual declaration,
they remain free to determine most features of their
relationship.  Insofar as the entertainers signed the arbitration
agreements because they thought that employment status would
deprive them of any say-so over the conditions of their
employment, the agreements are misleading.

The agreements in this case were all obtained after potential
plaintiffs met with Crazy Horse's CFO or counsel. The setting
here was ripe for duress: Not only were arbitration agreements
executed without knowledge of the court and in the context of an
employment relationship in which the employer alone could profess
the requisite legal expertise. They falsely suggested that
participation in the lawsuit would deprive potential plaintiffs
of important professional rights. The combination of these
circumstances rendered defendant's conduct indefensible from the
get-go. The district court was right to describe the
circumstances here as distinct and disturbing and it correctly
denied enforcement of these sham agreements.  The Fourth Circuit
said it respects the admirable care and patience of that court in
the face of obviously trying circumstances.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yayq995r from Leagle.com.

James Leon Holt, Jr., -- jholt@jsyc.com -- JACKSON, SHIELDS,
YEISER & HOLT, Cordova, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Jamisen A. Etzel -- jetzel@carlsonlynch.com -- CARLSON LYNCH
SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
Appellee.

Gary Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com -- CARLSON LYNCH SWEET
KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.


DELTA AIR: Still Faces Capacity Antitrust Litigation
----------------------------------------------------
Delta Air Line, Inc. continues to defend against claims in the
Capacity Antitrust Litigation, the airline said in its Form 10-K
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

In July 2015, a number of purported class action antitrust
lawsuits were filed alleging that Delta, American, United and
Southwest had conspired to restrain capacity. The lawsuits were
filed in the wake of media reports that the U.S. Department of
Justice had served civil investigative demands upon these
carriers seeking documents and information relating to this
subject. The lawsuits have been consolidated into a single Multi-
District Litigation proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.

In November 2016, the District Court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss the claims, and the matter is now proceeding
through discovery. Delta believes the claims in these cases are
without merit and is vigorously defending these lawsuits.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. is a major American airline, with its
headquarters and largest hub at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia.


DEPOMED INC: Derivative Litigation Stayed
-----------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Joint Stipulation to
stay the Derivative Litigation captioned GERALD ROSS,
Derivatively and on Behalf of DEPOMED, INC., Plaintiff, v. JAMES
P. FOGARTY, KAREN A. DAWES, ARTHUR J. HIGGINS, LOUIS J. LAVIGNE,
JR., WILLIAM T. MCKEE, GAVIN T. MOLINELLI, ROBERT G. SAVAGE,
PETER D. STAPLE, JAMES L. TYREE, SAMUEL R. SAKS, M.D., JAMES A.
SCHOENECK, DAVID B. ZENOFF, SRINIVAS G. RAO, M.D., PH.D. and R.
SCOTT SHIVELY, Defendants, and DEPOMED, INC., Nominal Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-06592-JST (N.D. Cal.), until and through the
resolution of the motion to dismiss that is anticipated to be
filed in the related securities class action lawsuit against
Depomed, Inc., Arthur J. Higgins, James A. Schoeneck, and August
J. Moretti, captioned Huang v. Depomed, Inc., et al., No. 3:17-
cv-04830, in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California (the "Securities Class Action").

The Parties believe that a stay of the Derivative Action will
promote the efficient and orderly administration of justice by
coordinating the Derivative Litigation with the Securities Class
Action.

The Derivative Litigation (including all discovery) shall be
stayed until 30 days after the earlier of the following of
events: (a) the Securities Class Action is dismissed in its
entirety with prejudice; or (b) Defendants file an answer to any
complaint in the Securities Class Action.

If the stay of proceedings expires, the Parties will meet and
confer and submit a proposed scheduling order governing further
proceedings in the Derivative Litigation, including the date by
which Defendants must answer or otherwise plead.

All hearings or conferences currently scheduled, including the
Case Management Conference currently scheduled for January 31,
2018, is postponed until after the stay of the Derivative
Litigation expires.  Should discovery proceed in the Securities
Class Action, or in any other subsequent derivative action based
on substantially the same factual allegations underlying the
Derivative Litigation and/or in connection with any threatened
related derivative action (including any books and records demand
made by a Depomed, Inc. shareholder), and the Derivative
Litigation continues to be stayed by virtue of this Stipulation,
a further Stipulation or Court Order, Plaintiff will promptly be
given copies of any written discovery responses, documents, and
deposition transcripts prepared and/or produced by any Defendants
and/or any non-party, such as are relevant to the claims or
defenses in the Derivative Litigation, pursuant to a mutually
agreed upon protective order governing the use of confidential
information. The provision of any such discovery materials will
not constitute waiver of, or in any way limit, Defendants' right
to move to dismiss the Derivative Litigation for failure to
adequately plead demand futility, or make a pre-suit demand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yba7km3e from Leagle.com.

Gerald Ross, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Heikali --
bheikali@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP & Stuart Jay Guber
-- sguber@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice.
James P. Fogarty, Karen A. Dawes, Arthur J. Higgins, Louis J.
Lavigne, Jr., William T. McKee, Gavin T. Molinelli, Robert G.
Savage, Peter D. Staple, James L. Tyree, Samuel R. Saks, James A.
Schoeneck, David B. Zenoff, Srinivas G. Rao, R. Scott Shively &
Depomed, Inc., Defendants, represented by Michael A. Mugmon --
michael.mugmon@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Rebecca A. Girolamo -- becky.girolamo@wilmerhale.com -
- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hall & Dorr LLP.


DEVRY UNIVERSITY: Averts Class Action Over Post-Graduate Stats
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lorraine Bailey, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that despite DeVry University's $49 million settlement with the
Federal Trade Commission over false advertising, a federal judge
ruled on Feb. 12 that DeVry graduates cannot sue the for-profit
college for falsely claiming 90 percent of its graduates found a
job in their chosen field six months after graduation.

Last year, private for-profit college DeVry University mailed
173,000 refund checks worth more than $49 million to former
students as part of a settlement with the FTC over its deceptive
advertisements.

The FTC accused DeVry of lying about its graduates' employment
records and post-graduation income to lure students into
enrolling.

Specifically, the FTC said DeVry falsely claimed, "As a result of
obtaining a DVU degree, for at least the last 30 years, 90
percent of DVU graduates who were actively seeking employment
landed or obtained new jobs in their field of study within six
months of graduation," and that 90 percent of DeVry graduates
from a specific year obtained the same results.

The school also falsely told potential students that the average
earnings of DeVry graduates were 15 percent higher than the
average earnings for graduates from other colleges, according to
the FTC.

Thirty-nine DeVry graduates filed a class action against DeVry
based on the same allegations of misconduct, claiming they relied
on the 90 percent post-graduation employment statistics when
deciding to enroll but were unable to find a job in their field
of study within six months of graduation.

But U.S. District Judge Manish Shah dismissed the students'
lawsuit on Feb. 12 because they cannot show their damages are
measureable.

"Based on the allegations, it would seem that the difference
between the true value and the inflated value can only be based
on speculative post-graduate career prospects and earning
potential," Judge Shah wrote in a 15-page opinion.

The students do not claim they were promised a certain employment
outcome or that they considered enrolling in another school with
better post-graduation employment rates, the judge stated.

"A consumer-fraud complaint need not allege a precise damages
amount or a fully-developed mathematical model for calculating
damages.  But it needs to allege facts sufficient to show that
plaintiffs suffered actual, measurable, non-speculative damages.
The complaint here falls short," Judge Shah said.

DeVry operates more than 50 campuses, plus online classes, and
enrolled 29,000 to 49,000 new students each year from 2008 to
2014.  It charged $609 per credit hour for the first seven credit
hours, then $365 for each credit hour after that.

A full-time student seeking a five-term associate degree during
these years paid $39,585 in tuition and a full-time student in
the eight-term business administration program paid total tuition
of $75,516.  Most DeVry students, however, attend part time and
pay a higher overall cost.


DON HUMMER TRUCKING: Faces "Ratliff" Suit in S.D. of Iowa
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Don Hummer Trucking
Corporation. The case is styled as Jerome Ratliff, Jr.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Don Hummer Trucking Corporation an Iowa corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00023-RGE-SBJ (S.D. Iowa, February
22, 2018).

Don Hummer Trucking provides transportation services across
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Ann E Brown, Esq.
   ANN BROWN LEGAL, PC
   600 THIRD STREET SOUTHEAST
   SUITE 302
   CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 52401
   Tel: (319) 826-2250
   Fax: (319) 826-2252
   Email: ann@annbrownlegal.com


DUKE UNIVERSITY: Mintz Levin Discusses Antitrust Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bruce D. Sokler, Esq. -- BDSokler@mintz.com -- of Mintz Levin
Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo PC, in an article for Lexology,
wrote that the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
issued guidance in the waning days of the Obama administration
reminding HR professionals and others that the antitrust laws
could apply in the employment arena, particularly with respect to
hiring and compensation matters.  There was some question about
how vigorously the Trump Administration's antitrust enforcement
would be in this area, but those questions should no longer
exist.  2018 is already turning out to likely be an important
year regarding antitrust attacks on "no-poach" agreements between
businesses, with a class being certified in a major damage action
and the head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
indicating last month that criminal indictments based upon such
agreements would be shortly forthcoming.  Executives and HR
Departments should recognize the significant risks associated
with express or implied agreements or "understandings" -- or even
"gentlemen's agreements" -- where businesses agree not to hire
(or poach) each other's employees or executives.

On February 1, 2018, a federal district court in North Carolina
certified a class of all persons employed during the period from
January 1, 2012 to the present as a faculty member with an
academic appointment at the Duke or University of North Carolinas
Schools of Medicine.  In the antitrust lawsuit seeking treble
damages, a Duke radiologist alleged that the deans at Duke and
UNC medical school had agreed not to permit lateral moves of
faculty between the schools. (The court declined to extend to
class to include non-faculty physicians, nurses, and skilled
medical staff on manageability grounds, but indicated that they
could bring their own separate suit.) Seaman v. Duke University,
et al., No 1:15-CV-462 (M.D.N.C. Feb.1., 2018).

During the Obama Administration, the Antitrust Division brought a
number of civil lawsuits against Silicon Valley companies,
including Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar alleging
that each entered into no-poach agreements with their
competitors.  All ended in consent decrees.  The inevitable class
action lawsuits followed, and the companies ultimately ponied up
nearly $1 billion to settle them.

Near the end of the Obama Administration, in October 2016, the
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued
"Antitrust Guidelines for Human Resource Professionals".  The
Guidelines indicated that the government would no longer pursue
no-poach and wage-fixing agreements as civil cases, but would
instead bring criminal prosecutions.  Moreover, the companies
targeted would not have to be business competitors -- it would
sufficient if they competed for the same employees.

Last month, during a panel discussion at a conference, the head
of Antitrust Division for the Trump Administration, Makan
Delrahim, confirmed that the Division has several active criminal
investigations and indicated: "In the coming couple of months you
will see some announcements [of criminal charges], and to be
honest with you, I've been shocked about how many of these [no-
poach agreements] there are, but they're real."  He suggested
that companies that continued such agreements after October 2016
would be pursued criminally, but those who abandoned those
agreements with the announcement of the Guidelines would only be
targeted with a government civil suit.

If businesses did not get their houses in order before with
respect to no-poach and wage understandings, they are well
advised to do so now.  In addition to government exposure, this
area will become an increasingly attractive target for plaintiff
class action lawyers. [GN]


EI DUPONT: GenX Found in West Va. Wells, NC Class Action Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Fayetville Observer's Greg Barnes and The Associated Press
report that GenX has been found in wells near a Chemours plant in
West Virginia, raising concerns there about contaminated drinking
water.

The News Journal of Wilmington, Delaware, reports Chemours is
testing drinking water this month near its Washington Works plant
in Parkersburg, per a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
request.

The EPA's acting water protection director, Kate McManus, had
said in a January letter to Chemours that GenX was found in four
wells near the facility, and the agency is concerned about area
drinking water contamination like in North Carolina.

The chemical is used to make nonstick cookware and other
products, and has been linked to several forms of cancer in
animal studies.

North Carolina started investigating GenX in July, after news
broke that researchers had found it and similar compounds in the
Cape Fear River downstream in Wilmington.

Chemours agreed to stop discharging GenX into the river, but it
has since been discovered in more than 250 private wells around
the facility.  Thousands of people from Cumberland County to the
coast are now drinking bottled water as a result.

The state cut off and capped a Chemours discharge pipe to the
Cape Fear River in November.  Less than two weeks later, GenX was
found in the river at a concentration of 2,300 parts per
trillion, more than 16 times higher than the 140 parts per
trillion the state considers safe. Researchers are investigating
whether the GenX came from soil surrounding the plant or from
another source.

Researchers are also testing rainwater surrounding Chemours to
determine whether GenX may be spreading by air as well as water.

More than 100 people from southeastern North Carolina have joined
a class-action lawsuit seeking $5 billion in damages from DuPont
and Chemours, which took over production of DuPont's
fluoroproducts in 2015.

The lawsuit says that DuPont and Chemours knew the chemicals were
"extremely dangerous" even in small doses and that they poured
them into the water and the air "simply to avoid the expense of
taking safety precautions."  The lawsuit was filed by Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll, the firm that is handling a class-action
lawsuit involving the Flint, Michigan, water crisis.

DuPont began producing GenX at its Fayetteville Works plant in
2009 as a safer alternative to perfluorooctanoic acid, which the
company called C8.

Last year, DuPont settled a lawsuit for $671 million that was
filed on behalf of people living near the Chemours plant in
Parkersburg.  The lawsuit alleged that for decades, DuPont dumped
C8 into the Ohio River knowing it was a human health hazard.

DuPont produced C8 at the Fayetteville Works plant from 2002 to
2009, when it switched to GenX. [GN]



ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Class Action Over "Balance Billing"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP on Feb. 12 disclosed that a class
action was filed February 8, 2018, in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida against physician
staffing firm Envision Healthcare Corporation and its affiliates,
EmCare Holdings Inc., Emcare Inc., and Baxley Emergency Physician
Services LLC, (collectively, "Envision").  Plaintiff's Complaint
alleges that Envision manages hospital emergency departments in
Florida, which includes treating patients and providing
administrative services, such as billing and collections for
emergency medical services rendered.  The complaint generally
alleges that Envision violated Florida law when "balance-billing"
patients for emergency medical services.

The Complaint alleges that "balance-billing" occurs when a
healthcare provider holds a patient liable for any remaining
charges not covered by the patient's health insurance company.
Balance-billing most often occurs when a patient receives medical
care outside their insurance network.  However, the Complaint
alleges that even when patients obtains emergency treatment at an
in-network hospital, they may still be balance-billed because
unbeknownst to the patient at the time of treatment, the treating
physicians was affiliated with or employed by Envision.
Accordingly, even patients that sought in-network healthcare may
receive surprise medical bills weeks or months later.  The
Complaint alleges that Florida is one of several states that has
passed laws to prohibit providers, like Envision, from balance-
billing emergency room patients due to their lack of choice in
obtaining in-network medical treatment in emergency situations.

According to the Complaint, Envision has consistently ignored
Florida's balance-billing law by continuing to deceptively and
fraudulently bill and collect payments from former patients.  As
a result of Envision's actions, the Complaint alleges that former
patients are owed damages for amounts collected by Envision for
its unlawful balance-billed charges.  Plaintiff seeks damages on
behalf of all Florida patients impacted by Envision's practices
and an injunction preventing Envision and its affiliates from
balance-billing patients in the future.

The patient-consumers are represented by Frederic S. Fox,
Laurence D. King, Donald R. Hall, Matthew B. George, and Aaron L.
Schwartz of Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, and Marc A. Wites of the
Wites Law Firm.  Plaintiff's counsel has extensive experience in
prosecuting class actions and recovering damages for affected
consumers.

Plaintiff's counsel is also investigating whether Envision
violated balance-billing laws in other states, including
California, Illinois, and New Jersey.  Consumers who would like
more information about this lawsuit or investigation should visit
www.kaplanfox.com or call Aaron L. Schwartz at (800) 290-1952.

For more information about this press release or lawsuit, please
contact:

         Frederic S. Fox
         KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
         850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
         New York, New York 10022
        (800) 290-1952
        (212) 687-1980
         Fax: (212) 687-7714
         E-mail: ffox@kaplanfox.com

         Laurence D. King
         KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
         350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
         San Francisco, California 94104
        (415) 772-4700
         Fax: (415) 772-4707
         E-mail: lking@kaplanfox.com

         Marc A. Wites
         WITES LAW FIRM
         4400 North Federal Highway
         Lighthouse Point, FL 33064
         Telephone: (954) 526-2729
         Email: Mwites@witeslaw.com [GN]


FARMERS RESTAURANT: "Stephens" Conditional Certification OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAYN STEPHENS et al., Plaintiffs, v. FARMERS
RESTAURANT GROUP et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-1087
(TJK) (D. D.C.), Judge Timothy J. Kelly of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' conditional-certification motion.

The Defendant operates five restaurants in the D.C. metropolitan
area: three in the District of Columbia (Founding Farmers DC,
Farmers Fishers Bakers, and Farmers & Distillers), one in
Maryland (MoCo's Founding Farmers), and one in Virginia (Founding
Farmers Tysons).

The Plaintiffs, eight current and former employees at the
restaurants, claim that the Defendants' conduct violated the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the D.C. Minimum Wage Act ("DCMWA"), the sick leave
provisions of the D.C. Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act of 2008
("Sick Leave Act"), the minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, and the payment requirements of
the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law.

They have brought their case as a putative opt-in collective
action under the FLSA and D.C. law, and as a putative Rule 23
opt-out class action under D.C. and Maryland law.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants engaged in various
allegedly improper employment practices, including requiring the
employees to use their own money to purchase uniforms including,
but not limited to, specific denim chambray  shirts, suspenders,
black non-slip shoes, aprons, and bow ties,  and to clean,
starch, and press their uniforms; (ii) requiring the employees to
purchase equipment for use while at work, including, but not
limited to, bottle openers, corkscrews, black lighters, and black
click-top pens; and (iii) requiring the employees to attend pre-
shift meetings before each shift that lasted on average 15 to 20
minutes, and employees were not compensated for time spent at the
meetings.  The Defendants allegedly applied these practices to
the named Plaintiffs and to similarly situated employees, namely
servers, wait staff, and bartenders.

Since the Amended Complaint was filed, the Plaintiffs have
submitted opt-in consents from five additional putative class
members that seek to participate in the action.  The Plaintiffs
now seek conditional certification of an opt-in collective action
under federal and D.C. law.

Judge Kelly will grant conditional certification with respect to
the Plaintiffs' minimum wage claim, except that certification is
not granted with respect to (i) the Plaintiffs' allegations
regarding uncompensated pre-shift meetings at the Founding
Farmers Tysons restaurant in Virginia or (ii) the alleged
"homework" policy.

He finds that the pre-shift work at the Virginia restaurant is
properly included in the claim related to non-tipped work, even
though the Plaintiffs have not met their burden on their claim
that pre-shift work at the Virginia restaurant was uncompensated.
While Plaintiffs do not seek to expand the scope of the proposed
class, they do seek to add a new and distinct factual theory with
little foundation in their operative complaint.  Not only does
the Amended Complaint fail to assert any allegation regarding
"homework," it also contains no description of the "training"
period during which the homework was allegedly assigned.

The Judge will grant conditional certification with respect to
the Plaintiffs' overtime claim only as it relates to allegations
regarding uncompensated pre-shift meetings.  Certification of the
overtime claim is denied in all other respects, including with
respect to the Plaintiffs' aggregation-of-hours and homework
allegations.

He finds that the Plaintiffs here have submitted multiple
declarations from other servers who were in a position to know
about the alleged practice, but they fail to corroborate it.  The
Plaintiffs have thus failed to establish that their evidence
rests on anything more than speculation, and so conditional
certification will be denied with respect to the alleged
aggregation-of-hours policy.  As explained in the context of
Plaintiffs' minimum wage claim, the Judge will not grant
certification with respect to the alleged "homework" policy,
because the Plaintiffs did not include that policy in their
Amended Complaint.  The same result applies here.

As to sick leave claim, conditional certification will be granted
with respect to the sick leave claim.  The Judge is not convinced
that such differences preclude conditional certification, because
the key issue is whether the Defendants had a common policy of
denying sick leave to eligible employees, not how individual
employees were affected.  Of course, he says, the Defendants may
move for decertification after discovery if they believe that the
differences among class members are too stark to permit class-
wide adjudication.

Judge Kelly holds that any opt-in Plaintiffs will be allowed to
assert claims extending as far back in time as each relevant
statute of limitations allows.  Neither the Plaintiffs'
declarations nor the Defendants' submissions contain any
suggestion that the policies at issue changed from mid-2014
onward.

Having addressed the substance of the conditional-certification
analysis, the Judge turns to administrative matters, starting
with the use of sub-classes.  The Plaintiffs bring their claims
on behalf of servers working in D.C., Maryland, and Virginia.
Each jurisdiction also has somewhat different procedural
mechanisms.  He presents an overview of these differences that
suffices to show why establishing a separate sub-class for each
jurisdiction where employees worked is prudent for case-
management purposes:

     a. District of Columbia Sub-Class: (i) Substantive Claims -
Minimum wage, overtime, and sick leave claims under the FLSA and
D.C. Law; and (ii) Procedural Aspects - FLSA collective action,
D.C. collective action (with possible conversion into a D.C.
class action)

     b. Maryland Sub-Class: (i) Substantive Claims - Minimum wage
and overtime claims under the FLSA and Maryland law; and (ii)
Procedural Aspects - FLSA collective action, Maryland putative
class action.

     c. Virginia Sub-Class: (i) Substantive Claims - Minimum wage
claim under the FLSA, with no claim relating to uncompensated
pre-shift meetings; and (ii) Procedural Aspects: FLSA collective
action.  These sub-classes likely overlap, because some putative
class members may have worked in multiple jurisdictions. For
example, Plaintiff Calvillo worked in D.C. and Maryland.

For these reasons, Judge Kelly granted and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' conditional-certification motion.  Conditional
certification is granted, with the following limitations: First,
the putative class is limited to servers.  Second, conditional
certification is not granted with respect to the following
factual allegations: (a) the Plaintiffs' "homework" allegations;
(b) their allegations regarding uncompensated time at pre-shift
meetings insofar as they relate to the Founding Farmers Tysons
restaurant in Virginia; and (c) the Plaintiffs' allegation that
Defendants failed to aggregate hours worked at different
restaurants for overtime purposes.

Third, the putative class will be divided into three sub-classes,
one for each of the three relevant jurisdictions (the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia).  Fourth, the Defendants will
be required to produce names, mailing addresses, and email
addresses for notice purposes within the next twenty days but,
absent a further order of the Court, will not be required to
produce telephone numbers or to include notices with paychecks
mailed to employees.  The opt-in period will last 60y days from
when notice is sent.  Fifth, the Judge did not approve the
Plaintiffs' proposed form of notice.  Instead, he directed the
parties to will meet, confer, and submit to the Court a revised
form of notice consistent with the foregoing Opinion by Feb. 9,
2018.

The Judge denied the Defendants' motion for leave to file a
surreply.  The Defendants sought leave to file a surreply in
order to address a suggestion in the Plaintiffs' reply that the
putative class includes "bussers."   His ruling, by limiting the
class to servers, has obviated any need for briefing on that
issue, and therefore the surreply motion will be denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/N5OaU6 from Leagle.com.

SHAYN STEPHENS, ANITA CLARK, VANESSA CALVILLO, SYLVIA RACHAELl
KROHN, DESMOND PITT & JEANIE WILLIG, Plaintiffs, represented by
Gregory K. McGillivary -- gkm@wmlaborlaw.com -- WOODLEY &
MCGILLIVARY, LLP, Theodore R. Coploff -- trc@wmlaborlaw.com --
WOODLEY & MCGILLIVARY, Sarah M. Block, WOODLEY & MCGILLIVARY &
Molly Ann Elkin -- mae@wmlaborlaw.com -- WOODLEY & MCGILLIVARY.

AUSTIN HALL & SHANNON STOREY, Plaintiffs, represented by Sarah M.
Block, WOODLEY & MCGILLIVARY & Molly Ann Elkin, WOODLEY &
MCGILLIVARY.

FARMERS RESTAURANT GROUP, DANIEL SIMON & MICHAEL VUCUREVICH,
Defendants, represented by Joy Catherine Einstein --
jeinstein@shulmanrogers.com -- SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY &
ECKER. P.A. & Meredith Sarah Campbell --
mcampbell@shulmanrogers.com -- SHULMAN, ROGERS, GANDAL, PORDY &
ECKER, P.A.


FEDERAL SAVINGS: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Baugh" RESPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, D'ALAN E. BAUGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK, Defendant, Civil Action No. RDB-17-1735 (D. Md.),
Judge Richard D. Bennett of the District Court for the District
of Maryland granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The Class Action Complaint in the case alleges that the Defendant
FSB violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA")
by entering into a kickback scheme whereby it received unearned
fees from Genuine Title, LLC for referrals.

The Class Action Complaint in the case alleges in one count that
the Defendant violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA") by entering into a kickback scheme whereby it received
unearned fees from Genuine Title, LLC for referrals.

The alleged kickback scheme in the case involves Genuine Title
which has an extensive history with the Court.  In December 2013,
Edward and Vickie Fangman (represented by the same counsel
involved in the case) filed a complaint against Genuine Title
involving essentially identical allegations in the Circuit Court
of Baltimore County that was removed to the Court in January
2014.  The Fangmans alleged that Genuine Title, in exchange for
the referral of title services on their mortgage loan, paid cash
kickbacks to loan brokers and provided marketing materials for
free or at a drastically-reduced rate for various loan officers
who were part of the mortgage lending process.

On Jan. 2, 2015, the plaintiffs in Fangman filed a First Amended
Complaint naming other financial institutions, including E
Mortgage Management, LLC.  That First Amended Complaint in
Fangman alleged violations of RESPA, Maryland's state-law analog
to RESPA, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.  The Fangman
plaintiffs further alleged that Genuine Title and its affiliated
marketing companies provided Free Marketing Materials and/or
"Referring Cash" payments without disclosure on HUD-1 settlement
documents.

They filed a Second Amended Complaint on May 20, 2015, adding
additional parties and clarifying some of their previous
allegations.  Following discovery concerning Genuine Title's
business practices and relationship with other lenders, some
defendants have struck class settlements which have been the
subject of public filings and class notices.

Meanwhile, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and
the Maryland Attorney General initiated an enforcement action in
the Court on Jan. 22, 2015 against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. predicated on similar schemes involving
Genuine Title.  The CFPB and Attorney General also filed an
enforcement action on April 29, 2015 directly against Genuine
Title, its principals, and affiliates arising out of the same
alleged scheme.

The CFPB issued a press release on April 29, 2015 in which the
CFPB outlined the enforcement action against Genuine Title based
on the same facts alleged by the Fangman Plaintiffs.  On May 1,
2015, the CFPB and Maryland Attorney General announced a
settlement with Genuine Title, and the Court entered a Stipulated
Final Judgment and Order approving the settlement.  The
settlement orders in these enforcement actions explicitly
contemplate related litigation by affected consumers.

Plaintiffs Baugh and Penny Frazier closed their loans with FSB on
March 29, 2013 and Sept. 23, 2013.  The Complaint on behalf of
these Plaintiffs was filed on June 23, 2017, over three years
after the Plaintiffs closed their loans.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent the proposed class of all
individuals in the United States who were borrowers on a
federally related mortgage loan originated or brokered by The
Federal Savings Bank for which Genuine Title provided a
settlement service, as identified in Section 1100 on the HUD-1,
between Jan. 1, 2009, and Dec. 31, 2014.

The Complaint alleges that Genuine Title paid kickbacks in the
form of referring cash, free marketing materials, and marketing
credits.  The free marketing materials were paid by Genuine Title
and/or by Competitive Advantage Media Group, LLC ("CAM").   The
Complaint further alleges that from 2012 to 2014, FSB referred
approximately 1,000 loans to Genuine Title, and in return, FSB
received kickbacks from Genuine Title and/or CAM in exchange for
the referrals.

FSB moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment.  At the hearing
on Jan. 16, 2018, all parties agreed to focus the analysis upon
the motion to dismiss standard under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiff's counsel, who has been in possession of Genuine
Title's records since 2014 and who processed the data by June
2015, has filed the following seven class actions against other
lenders who, like the defendants in Fangman, allegedly engaged in
kickback schemes with Genuine Title: (i) Edmondson v. Eagle
National Bank, et al., Civil Case No. RDB-16-3938 (D. Md.); (ii)
Dobbins, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., Civil Case No. RDB-17-
540 (D. Md.); (iii) Callum v. Priority Financial Services, Civil
Case No. RDB-17-0623 (D. Md.); (iv) James v. Acre Mortgage &
Financial, Civil Case No. RDB-17-1734 (D. Md.); (v) Baugh, et al.
v. The Federal Savings Bank, Civil Case No. RDB-17-1735 (D. Md.);
(vi) Ryman v. First Mortgage Corporation, Civil Case No. RDB-17-
1757 (D. Md.); (vii) Bezek, et al. v. First Mariner Bank, Civil
Case No. RDB-17-2902 (D. Md.).

On Oct. 31, 2017, Miles & Stockbridge, defense counsel in both
Edmondson (RDB-16-3938) and Bezek (RDB-17-2902), requested a
consolidated hearing on ripe motions to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs'
counsel, Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, agreed to a consolidated
hearing for the ripe motions to dismiss in five of the seven
cases -- namely, Edmondson (RDB-16-3938); Dobbins (RDB-17-540);
James (RDB-17-1734); Baugh (RDB-17-1735); and Bezek (RDB-17-
2902).  Generally, the motions to dismiss in these five cases
present statute of limitations and equitable tolling issues.  The
Court conducted the requested consolidated hearing on Jan. 16,
2018.

The Plaintiffs concede that RESPA's one-year statute of
limitations would bar this lawsuit, which was filed over three
years after they closed their loans and two years after their
counsel processed Genuine Title's data.  However, the parties
dispute whether equitable tolling saves the Plaintiffs' claim.

Judge Bennett holds that even if the Plaintiffs can establish
that they were pursuing their rights diligently with or without
credit for their counsel's actions, this Court cannot ignore the
role the Plaintiffs' counsel has played in determining the timing
of the action -- and the other pending cases related to the
Genuine Title kickback scheme.  In June 2015, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs' counsel had access to Genuine Title's
buyers' names, addresses, telephone numbers, property addresses,
settlement dates, lender and in some cases mortgage broker
information, information sufficient to uncover the scheme in the
case.  Even if the Plaintiffs' counsel's knowledge is not
relevant to the due diligence analysis, the counsel's in-depth
investigation into Genuine Title's records certainly bears
heavily on the question of whether "extraordinary circumstances"
stood in the Plaintiffs' way and prevented timely filing.

The Judge further holds that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
that their case presents one of those rare instances where it
would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against
them and gross injustice would result.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
has already secured significant awards for their efforts to hold
Genuine Title and other financial institutions accountable for
violating RESPA.  Genuine Title went bankrupt, and the Plaintiffs
do not allege that the Defendant continues to receive illegal
kickback payments through deceiving Plaintiffs or their fellow
class members.

The Judge says the Plaintiffs allege that between 2009 and 2014,
they were deprived of kickback-free settlement services and
impartial and fair competition and paid more for their settlement
services because kickbacks were paid instead of lower charges to
the consumers.  While the purported class may have some interest
in accountability and financial compensation, the Congress firmly
expressed an interest in providing certainty to the real estate
market when it set the RESPA statute of limitations at one year.
Given this context, the Judge says it would not be unconscionable
or grossly unjust to enforce RESPA's one-year statute of
limitations.  To hold otherwise would completely write out the
one year statute of limitations for RESPA violations.

For the reasons stated, Judge Bennett granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/tl79WJ from Leagle.com.

D'Alan E. Baugh & Penny Frazier, Plaintiffs, represented by Megan
Aileen Benevento -- mbenevento@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and
Laake, P.A., Melissa Lynn English -- menglish@sgs-law.com --
Smith Gildea & Schmidt LLC, Michael Paul Smith -- mpsmith@sgs-
law.com -- Smith Gildea and Schmidt LLC, Sarah A. Zadrozny --
szadrozny@sgs-law.com -- Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC, Timothy
Francis Maloney -- tmaloney@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and
Laake PA & Veronica Byam Nannis -- vnannis@jgllaw.com -- Joseph
Greenwald and Laake PA.

The Federal Savings Bank, Defendant, represented by Ari Karen --
akaren@offitkurman.com -- Offit Kurman.


FMM ENTERPRISES: Court Grants TRO in "Glass" FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Temporary Restraining Order
regarding improper communications with the punitive class in the
case captioned TYRELL GLASS; DUSTIN SCHNATZ; and JORDAN TERRADO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FMM ENTERPRISES, INC; EC LENDING, LLC; GTPD
ENTERPRISES, INC; CYNTHIA WASH; RYAN MCAWEEENEY; NEIL BILLOCK,
and DOES 1-10 jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-
cv-0563-JAH-KSC (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs brought a class action against Defendants alleging
labor law violations, including the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).  Plaintiffs' filed a Motion to Prohibit Ex Parte
Communications with Potential Members of the Class, which is
scheduled to be heard by this Court.

The purpose of a temporary restraining order (TRO) is to preserve
the status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing may be
held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to
prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment.

Plaintiffs' contend that they will suffer irreparable harm if the
Court denies their request for a TRO Plaintiffs' contend
Defendants' actions irreparably harm Plaintiffs' ability to
conduct a thorough investigation when Defendants direct their
employees and other potential class members to provide false
information regarding their pay, hours and other working
conditions.

Pre-certification communication between defendants and potential
plaintiffs is generally permitted.  It is critical, however, that
potential plaintiffs receive accurate and impartial information
regarding the status, purposes and effects of the class action.
The Court finds there is a high probability of irreparable harm,
if as alleged here, potential plaintiffs are being urged by
Defendants to sign declarations which they know to be false.
Since Plaintiffs have demonstrated the possibility of immediate
and irreparable injury, it need not demonstrate a strong
likelihood of success on the merits to prevail here.

However, based on the Court's review of the pleadings presented,
Plaintiffs have shown some likelihood of success on the merits of
their claim.  Also, the Court has considered the hardships placed
on Defendants' by granting this TRO, and finds any hardship
marginal in contrast to the irreparable harm that could befall
potential class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc95qbea  from Leagle.com.

Tyrell Glass, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Dustin Schnatz, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated & Jordan Terrado, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Gregory E. Mauro -- greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins,
APLC, Jason J. Thompson -- jthompson@sommerspc.com -- Sommers
Schwartz PC, pro hac vice, Jesse Lee Randol Young --
jyoung@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, pro hac vice, James R.
Hawkins James@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins APLC &
Trenton R. Kashima -- trk@classactionlaw.com -- Finkelstein &
Krinsk, LLP.

FMM Enterprises, Inc., jointly and severally, as, GTPD
Enterprises, Inc., jointly and severally, as, Cynthia Walsh,
jointly and severally, as, Ryan McAweeney, jointly and severally,
as & Neil Billock, jointly and severally, as, Defendants,
represented by Kara D. Siegel -- ksiegel@paulplevin.com -- Paul,
Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton LLP.


FOREVER 21: Court Dismisses Suit Over Illegally Collected Tax
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned LAURA TOGUT, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FOREVER 21, INC. and FOREVER 21
RETAIL, INC., Defendants, No. 17 Civ. 5616 (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff purchased twenty items of clothing from Defendants'
website, Forever21.com, for delivery in New York City.  Each item
was priced below $110 and, combined, totalled $283.40. Plaintiff
ultimately paid Defendants a total of $306.30 for her items, of
which $22.90 was labelled a tax. The monies Defendants collected
from Plaintiff under the label of a tax were not paid to the
Department.

Plaintiff alleging causes of action for unjust enrichment,
conversion, and money had and received which arise out of Togut's
purchase of items on Defendants' website for which she alleges
Defendants unlawfully charged her retail sales tax.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants improperly
collected retail sales tax on purchases Plaintiff made from
Defendants' website and which were shipped to her in New York
City, a retail sales tax exempt jurisdiction.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed
both because Plaintiff has failed to follow the New York State
administrative remedy proscribed by New York Tax Law Section 1139
and because Plaintiff has failed plausibly to state a claim.

New York Tax Law Section 1139 states that a consumer who seeks
the return of sales tax erroneously, illegally or
unconstitutionally collected or paid to a person required to
collect tax must apply for a refund to the state tax commission.

The Second Circuit has held that the refund process is the
'exclusive remedy available to any person for the review of tax
liability imposed' under state sales tax law, and no
determination or proposed determination of tax or determination
on any application for refund shall be enjoined or reviewed by
any action or proceeding other than a proceeding under article
seventy-eight of the New York civil practice law and rules.
Estler v. Dunkin' Brands, Inc., 691 F. App'x 3, 5 (2d Cir. 2017).

The Court finds that Plaintiff's conclusory allegation is
insufficient to merit wading into Estler's jurisprudential
opening. The court in Kupferstein, which addressed a situation
akin to the one hypothesized by the Second Circuit and presented
here, provides guidance. There, a plaintiff alleged that a
merchant overcharged her sales tax, which the plaintiff termed an
undisclosed fee. After recognizing that the contested fee was
sales tax and construing plaintiff's complaint to allege that the
defendant collected the excess sales taxes without remitting them
to the taxing authorities, the court chose not to credit what it
found as simply speculation by the plaintiff when there was
nothing more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.

The same situation is present here. Based exclusively on
information and belief, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have
not remitted the collected monies to the Department. No further
alleged facts or documents have been presented in support. Alone,
this is not enough to establish jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 15, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaw9nud2 from Leagle.com.

Laura Togut, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lee Scott Shalov --
lshalov@mclaughlinstern.com -- McLaughlin and Stern, LLP &
Bradley Jason Bartolomeo -- bbartolomeo@mclaughlinstern.com --
McLaughlin and Stern, LLP.

Forever 21, Inc. & Forever 21 Retail, Inc., Defendants,
represented by David George Keyko -- david.keyko@pillsburylaw.com
-- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP.


FOX NEWS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in Southern District New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fox News Network,
LLC. The case is styled as Luc Burbon and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fox News Network, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01662 (S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Fox News is an American basic cable and satellite television news
channel owned by the Fox Entertainment Group, a subsidiary of
21st Century Fox.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   AviNaveh, Esq
   Law Office of Avi A. Naveh
   175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
   New York, NY 10014
   Tel: (646) 881-4471
   Email: court@navehlaw.com


FRITO-LAY INC: $6.5MM "Acosta" Suit Settlement Has Prelim OK
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL ACOSTA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FRITO-LAY,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-02128-JSC (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the (1) Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval of class and collective action
settlement, and (2) Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Greg Frye as
the class representative and the Named Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs were and are truck drivers employed by the
Defendants who work in San Francisco as well as other various
counties in California.  Plaintiffs Acosta, Jose Hernandez,
Dennis Easley, Orlando Castillo, and Greg Frye filed the action
in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of San Francisco on Feb. 25, 2015 alleging failure to provide
meal rest periods, failure to pay minimum wages for all time
worked, associated pay check stub and waiting time penalties, and
unfair business practices.

The Plaintiffs brought six claims: (1) Labor Code Sections 226.7
and 512; (2) Labor Code Section 226.7 and Section 12 of the IWC
Wage Orders; (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage; (4) Labor Code
Section 203; (5) Labor Code Section 226; and (6) California
Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. - Unfair Business
Practices.

On March 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint
("FAC") alleging the same claims.  The Defendants answered the
FAC on May 8, 2015 and removed the case to the district on May
11, 2015.

On Nov. 3, 2015, the Plaintiffs' counsel moved to withdraw as the
counsel for named Plaintiff Greg Frye.  The motion was granted on
Nov. 23, 2015.  On June 7, 2016, the parties attended a full-day
mediation with court-appointed mediator Arthur Siegel but were
unable to reach a settlement.  The parties returned for a second
mediation on April 25, 2017 with Michael Dickstein.  After a full
day of negotiations the parties reached a settlement whose terms
are memorialized in the Stipulation and Settlement of Class
Action Claims.

The class consists of 254 long haul or "over-the-road" drivers
employed by Defendants in California from Feb. 25, 2011 to July
31, 2017.

Now pending before the Court are two motions: (1) the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval of class and collective action
settlement, and (2) the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Greg Frye
as a class representative and named plaintiff.

The parties agree to the certification of the class to include
all the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs agree to file a Second
Amended Complaint to add causes of action for penalties under the
California Private Attorney's General Act ("PAGA") and for unpaid
wages under the FLSA so that these causes of action can be
settled and released through the Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Agreement establishes a common fund of $6.5
million dollars inclusive of attorney's fees, costs and expenses,
service payments to the named Plaintiffs, payment to the Labor
Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), employee-owed taxes, and
administration costs including settlement administration fees.

The common fund will be allocated in the following manner: (1)
$1.625 million, or 25% to Plaintiffs' counsel as a Fee Award; (2)
$60,000 to Plaintiffs' counsel as a Costs Award; (3) $20,000 to
each named Plaintiff for a total of $80,000 as a Service Award;
(4) $50,000 representative of penalties recoverable under PAGA
and payable to the LWDA, 75% or $37,500 of which will be paid to
the LWDA and the remaining 25% or $12,500 will remain in the
payout fund; and (5) $15,000 for administration expenses.

The Plaintiffs' counsel has incurred $36,000 in expenses to date.
All the class members will receive a state law award.  All the
class members who opt into the FLSA collective action by
submitting a consent form will also receive a federal law award.
The parties agreed and submitted a revised notice and an errata
to the Settlement Agreement.  The revised Notice includes the
changed deadline of 60 days to opt-out of the class action, opt-
in to the FLSA award, or object to the settlement.  The errata
for the Settlement Agreement reflects the same changes,
consistent with the Notice.

All consent forms will be submitted to the settlement
administrator who will certify to the counsel of both parties
whether the forms were timely submitted.  If the consent form is
defective, the form will be returned to the class member who will
be informed of the defect and given 15 days to return the consent
form to the settlement administrator.  If the consent form is not
returned within 15 days it will be untimely and rejected.

Within 10 days of the Settlement Agreement's effective date, the
Defendants will wire the settlement administrator the entire
common fund amount of $6.5 million plus employer-owed taxes into
a qualified settlement account set up by the settlement
administrator for distribution.  After deducting the fees award,
costs award, service awards, payment to LWDA, and administration
fees, the remaining amount will be labeled the "Payout Fund," the
entirety of which will be distributed to the class members.

Eighty-percent of the Payout Fund will be allocated to the
payment of the state law awards.  All the class members will
receive a state award on a pro-rata basis based on the number of
weeks worked compared to the number of weeks worked by all class
members.  Twenty-percent of the Payout Fund will be allocated to
the payment of federal funds.  Payment for federal claims will be
determined by the same pro-rata formula used for state funds.

Twenty-five percent of all award payments to class members will
be called the "Wage Portion" where payroll deductions will be
made for state and federal withholding taxes and other payroll
deductions.  Seventy-five percent of all award payments will
represent the "Non-Wage Portion" and include interest and
penalties sought in the action.

Within 20 days of the Settlement Agreement's execution Defendants
will provide the settlement administrator with a "Class List and
Data Report" identifying each Plaintiffs' name, current mailing
address, telephone number, social security number, and the
representative number of weeks each Plaintiff worked during the
class period.  The Defendants will provide each Plaintiff's work
week information to the settlement administrator no later than 30
days after the close of the class period.

The settlement administrator has the authority to make payments
of all the awards set out in the Settlement Agreement.  The Fees,
Costs, and Service Awards will also be paid by the settlement
administrator within 20 days of the effective date.  The
settlement administrator will also calculate the individual
awards for the class members and will be responsible for issuing
the payments and calculating and withholding all the state and
federal taxes owed by the class members.

Checks paid to class members will remain valid for 120 days from
the date of their issuance and may thereafter be automatically
canceled if not cashed.  The funds from voided checks will be
distributed to cy pres to the United Way Bay Area Matchbridge
Program, an organization that supports Bay Area youth in gaining
employment skills to break the cycle of poverty.  The settlement
administrator is responsible for mailing the notice of settlement
and the FLSA consent form.

After the hearing, at the Court's instruction, the parties added
the language to the Notice regarding: (1) not opting out of the
state award and opting into the federal law award results in
class members receiving both awards, (2) the right to object to
the settlement, including the amount of attorneys' fees sought,
and who to serve the objection on, (3) the final approval hearing
date of May 3, 2018, and (4) the date the Plaintiffs will file
the attorney fee motion and that a copy of the motion will be
available on Plaintiffs' counsel's website.

Having carefully reviewed the briefs and having had the benefit
of oral argument on Jan. 16, 2018, Judge Corley granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the class and
collective action settlement, and motion to dismiss Greg Frye as
a named Plaintiff and class representative.  The Plaintiffs'
counsel is instructed to add the following two items to the
Notice: (1) March 15, 2018 as the deadline for filing its
attorney's fees motion, and (2) the website link where the fee
motion will be available.

The Judge concludes Mr. Frye is an inadequate class
representative.  The parties stipulated, as a term in the
Settlement Agreement, to dismiss Mr. Frye as a named Plaintiff.
The parties further agree Mr. Frye may remain as a class member
and collect any recovery he is entitled to.

The Order disposes of Docket Nos. 68 and 69.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/J7Hf6x from Leagle.com.

Daniel Acosta, Jose Hernandez, Dennis Easley & Orlando Castillo,
Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel Myers Kopfman --
dkopfman@wagnerjones.com -- Law Offices of Wagner Jones, Andrew
Butler Jones, Esq. -- ajones@wagnerjones.com -- Wagner & Jones,
Lawrence Mark Artenian -- lartenian@wagnerjones.com -- Wagner
Jones Kopfman & Artenian LLP & Nicholas John Paul Wagner --
kschemen@wagnerjones.com -- Law Offices of Wagner & Jones.

Greg Frye, Plaintiff, pro se.

Frito-Lay, Inc., FL Transportation Inc. & PEPSICO, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Daniel Francisco De La Cruz --
ddelacruz@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter,
Hampton, LLP, Ashley Teiko Hirano -- ahirano@sheppardmullin.com -
- Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Hali Michelle Anderson
-- evanderson@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and
Hampton LLP & Samantha D. Hardy -- shardy@sheppardmullin.com --
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton.


FUYAO GLASS: Judge Allows Workers' Class Action to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Gnau, writing for Dayton Daily News, reports that a
federal judge has granted class-action status to Fuyao Glass
America workers and former workers in a lawsuit against the
company.

The class-action status will include current and former Fuyao
production workers in the last three years, and attorneys for
those suing Fuyao now have permission to contact those people.

The workers involved in the lawsuit so far -- about 13 -- have
alleged that the Moraine manufacturer of auto safety glass has
not properly paid workers for overtime work or did not completely
relieve them of duties for unpaid meal breaks and other times.

The company has denied the allegations and is fighting the
lawsuit, which was first filed in Dayton's federal court last
June by a former Fuyao employee.

"The allegations in the complaint and the plaintiffs'
declarations agree that defendant's (Fuyao's) staff share similar
primary job duties and responsibilities and are alleged to be
victims of the same policy, decision and practice to deny them
overtime pay," wrote Judge Thomas Rose, in a decision dated
Feb. 7.

"This suffices to consider plaintiffs and putative collective
members and sub-class members similarly situated for purposes of
conditional certification," Judge Rose added.

The judge ordered Fuyao to give plaintiffs' attorneys a list of
prospective class members -- people who have worked for Fuyao in
the last three years.

Fuyao has 14 days to provide the plaintiffs' attorneys the
workers' and former workers' names, job positions, last-known
mailing addresses, last-known telephone numbers, email addresses
and other information.

Attorneys for those suing Fuyao have also asked to give workers
and former workers 60 days to "opt in" to the lawsuit, Judge Rose
wrote. (In an amended filing, Judge Rose raised that number to 90
days.)

Attorneys may contact workers via U.S. postal mail and email.

Earlier this month, Scott Young, an attorney for Fuyao, said:
"Fuyao Glass America (FGA) denies any allegations by the
plaintiffs that they were not properly paid by FGA."

Mr. Young and his colleagues then took the position "that class
certification is not appropriate." [GN]


GARDNER, MA: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action Over Water System
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paula J. Owen, writing for Telegram.com, reports that the city is
seeking to have a lawsuit filed against it and two of its water
consultants dismissed, arguing it was not filed within the
statute of limitation and that the city is immune to liability on
the issue.

The suit alleges that the city and the companies hired to manage
its water supply were negligent and sold, supplied and
distributed corrosive water to residents and businesses.

In response, the city of Gardner, through its legal counsel,
Jason Crotty -- jcrotty@piercedavis.com -- of Pierce, Davis &
Pierritano LLP in Boston, is seeking to have the Worcester court
dismiss the suit.

In December, lawyer Michelle Blauner -- mblauner@shulaw.com -- of
the firm Shapiro Haber & Urmy in Boston filed the class action
lawsuit against the city, Suez Water Environmental Services and
AECOM Technical Services, on behalf of all residents and
businesses in Gardner whose copper heating coils, water heaters
and boilers were allegedly damaged by corrosive water.

The city and its water companies knew for years they could fix
the problem by adjusting the water chemistry with an additive,
according to the complaint.

The class action suit was filed in Worcester Superior Court by
Gardner resident Janice Magliacane, who alleges the water supply
was "unreasonably corrosive" and "unreasonably damaged" the hot
water heating systems of Gardner residents.  The suit contends
the city "failed to implement its own corrosion control plan and
failed to take other actions which the City knew would mitigate
coil corrosion."

In addition, Ms. Magliacane alleges that the coil corrosion
problem could have been avoided if the city added orthophosphate
to its water treatment system to inhibit corrosion of the
distribution system piping and plumbing, as required by state
law.

However, the city contends that the incident Ms. Magliacane's
lawsuit is based on occurred before 2010, yet she did not bring
it to the city's attention until October 2017.

In a news release, City Solicitor John M. Flick asserts that the
suit was not filed within the two-year statute of limitation.

"To the extent Ms. Magliacane's claims occurred on or before
October 12, 2015, they are now time barred for failure to present
her claims within two years and likely by the three-year statute
of limitations as well," the city contends in its argument.  "In
addition, her presentment letter failed to allege nuisance as a
potential claim. Massachusetts law is clear, on this point."

Additionally, the city argues that, even if Ms. Magliacane is
able to "overcome her failures to comply with the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act," her suit must be dismissed because the city is
immune from liability.

According to state law, a municipality cannot be held liable for
"(A)ny claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or
diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation,"
the argument contends.

A municipality can only be liable for a harm when an "affirmative
act" by the municipality "originally caused" the harm, not a
failure to act by a public employer, the city argues.

"On the contrary, she faults the City for failing to change the
alkalinity of the water," the city argues.  "Ms. Magliacane's
allegations merely present an alleged omission by the City, not
an affirmative act by any City employee in any aspect of the
incident . . . Simply put, the City must weigh the benefit of
adding a chemical to its drinking water supply that will benefit
a small percentage of the water using population versus the
possible future harm to the greater percentage of the City's
water using population.  Thus, the issue is a matter of public
policy and planning therefore, a discretionary act."

When the city sought approval from the state to build the Crystal
Lake and Snake Pond wastewater treatment plants, a consultant
recommended adding orthophosphate to the water to protect the
pipes in the late 1990s, according to Ms. Blauner.  The city's
water company sought approval to add orthophosphate to the water
and though the state approved the measure, it was never added,
she said.

When coils started to fail in the mid- to early 2000s,
Ms. Blauner said, Gardner still did not add the orthophosphate.
The city began receiving complaints of coil failures and started
investigating, she said, and eventually contacted the
Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 about the issue.

Documents from 2012 indicate 400 coil failures, she said. The
average cost of replacing one of the coils is around $500 to
$600, she said.

The EPA later determined the alkalinity of the water was very
low, Ms. Blauner said.  A year after a 2015 report, the city
asked the state, again, for approval to add orthophosphate, she
said.  That was approved in August, 2017.  It is unknown if the
city added the chemical. [GN]


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Faulty Air-Conditioning
---------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a class of motorists claims
General Motors sold them vehicles with faulty air-conditioning
systems despite advertising tri-zone automatic climate change
with separate settings for the driver, front-seat passenger and
back-seat passengers.


GEO GROUP: Court Allows Immigrants' Class Action to Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Democracy Now reports that a federal appeals court has ruled a
group of immigrants detained at the for-profit Aurora ICE
Processing Center in Colorado can proceed with their class action
lawsuit against the prison's owner, GEO Group.  The men accuse
GEO Group of forcing detained immigrants to clean the prison
without pay, under threat of solitary confinement.  The men are
also accusing GEO Group of breaking labor laws by paying detained
immigrants only $1 a day. [GN]


GM LAW: Faces Class Action Over Student Loan Fraud
--------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action accuses the GM Law Firm and three Florida
attorneys of fraud, malpractice and conversion in "so-called
'private student loan resolution services.'"

Attorney for Plaintiff:

     Daniel Gamez, Esq.
     GAMEZ LAW FIRM, PC
     501 W. Broadway, Suite 800
     San Diego, CA 92101


HARRIS COUNTY, TX: Bail System Unconstitutional, 5th Cir. Rules
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that the Fifth Circuit on Feb. 14 affirmed that Texas' biggest
county unconstitutionally imposes cash bail on poor misdemeanor
defendants, but vacated an injunction requiring the county to
release them from custody within 24 hours.

U.S. District Judge Lee Rosenthal ruled in April 2017 that Harris
County unconstitutionally favored those who can afford cash bail
by having magistrates set bail at probable cause hearings with a
fee schedule based on the charges.

Judge Rosenthal's injunction took effect in July last year, and
after a hearing in October, the Fifth Circuit agreed that a
preliminary injunction was justified.

But the panel on Feb. 14 dialed back Judge Rosenthal's order for
Harris County to release on unsecured personal bonds all
misdemeanor defendants who have not had a probable cause hearing
within 24 hours of their arrest.  Unsecured personal bonds do not
require upfront fees.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Fifth Circuit Judge
Edith Clement Brown vacated the injunction and remanded the case
to Judge Rosenthal.

Judge Brown advised Judge Rosenthal to expand the deadline by
which Harris County must provide probable causing hearings to
misdemeanor arrestees from 24 to 48 hours.

"We conclude that the federal due process right entitles
detainees to a hearing within 48 hours," Judge Brown wrote in a
26-page order.

Judge Brown, a George W. Bush appointee, made other suggestions
on how Rosenthal should craft the injunction on remand, but said
the Fifth Circuit will leave the details up to Judge Rosenthal.

Judge Brown suggested keeping in place Judge Rosenthal's order
that Harris County pretrial services staff interview misdemeanor
arrestees about their finances within 24 hours of their arrest.

The panel advised Judge Rosenthal to include a clause in her
injunction that if misdemeanor defendants sign an affidavit
stating they cannot pay the preset money bail, and have not been
released on an unsecured bond, they are entitled to a hearing
before a magistrate within 48 hours of their arrest.

"At the hearing, the arrestee must have an opportunity to
describe evidence in his or her favor, and to respond to evidence
described or presented by law enforcement," Judge Brown wrote in
a template for the new injunction.

That suggestion addresses evidence that Harris County magistrates
and sheriff's officers habitually told defendants not to say
anything during the hearings so as not to incriminate themselves.

Harris County's chief public defender Alex Bunin leads a program
that began in July 2017, in which his office provides counsel for
defendants at these probable cause hearings.

He told Courthouse News in January that his public defenders were
stopping defendants from speaking on the record.  "So instead of
having defendants confess, they are represented by a lawyer who
speaks for them and protects their rights," Mr. Bunin said.

To hold the magistrates accountable for declining to reduce bail
from the preset amount to an affordable one, the Fifth Circuit
suggested that on remand Judge Rosenthal order the magistrates to
explain their reasons for the decision, on the record.

The panel disagreed with Judge Rosenthal's laser focus on
defendants' ability to pay bail, one of five factors that judges
are to consider in setting bail under Texas law, and said
Rosenthal did not give sufficient weight to judges' interest in
ensuring defendants show up for hearings.

Though Texas and federal law say judges must customize a
defendant's bail amount based on their circumstances, evidence
presented during an eight-day hearing in March last year showed
that Harris County's magistrate and criminal judges imposed the
scheduled bail amount 90 percent of the time, even for homeless
people.

Lead plaintiff Maranda ODonnell sued Harris County in May 2016,
after she was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of driving with an
invalid license and a magistrate judge set her bail at $2,500.

She claimed the county's system of using a fee schedule to set
bail based on the charges violates Fifth and 14th Amendment
rights to due process and equal protection.

She named as co-defendants Harris County's 16 criminal court
judges, its sheriff and five magistrate judges who set bond at
probable cause hearings.

Judge Rosenthal agreed with Ms. O'Donnell's key claim that
setting bail higher than defendants can afford is de facto
preventive detention, which is illegal for misdemeanor defendants
in Texas.

But the Fifth Circuit rejected that, finding that Judge
Rosenthal's order amounted to an automatic right to pretrial
release for misdemeanor arrestees.

This is "too broad a reading of the law," Judge Brown wrote,
noting that "Texas courts have never sought to eliminate the use
of bail bonds."

The Harris County criminal court judges sought dismissal of the
claims against them because judges are not liable when enforcing
state law in their judicial capacity.

But the Fifth Circuit credited Ms. O'Donnell's claims that the
criminal judges set rules on how to set bail, so they are
effectively policy makers, meaning they can be held liable as
county officials for a policy that infringes on constitutional
rights under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.

The panel did, however, dismiss Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez
from the lawsuit because, Judge Brown said, he has no
policymaking authority. He cannot release a defendant from jail
in defiance of a bail set by a magistrate or criminal judge.

The dismissal is poetic justice for Sheriff Gonzalez, who has
been opposed to the county's defending its bail system since the
litigation's early stages.  The county has spent more than $5
million on outside counsel fighting the class action.

Then-Sheriff-elect Gonzalez submitted an affidavit in November
2016 in which he said he agreed with Ms. O'Donnell.  "I believe
that the current operation of the money bail system, including
the sheriff's active participation in that system, violates the
United States Constitution," he wrote.

The bail bond industry, not surprisingly, denounced Judge
Rosenthal's preliminary injunction, arguing in friend-of-the-
court filings that there is no constitutional right to affordable
bail and that bail bondsmen help courts run smoothly because they
track down clients who do not show up for hearings.

Criminal justice reform advocates credit Rosenthal for revealing
that the status quo in Harris County, which held 50,000 bail
hearings for misdemeanor defendants in 2015, too often sees poor
petty criminals pressured to accept plea bargains to avoid
spending weeks in jail.

Ms. O'Donnell is represented by attorneys with Washington, D.C.-
based Civil Rights Corps, which has filed similar lawsuits in
several other states.  It opened another front with a Jan. 21
filing of a challenge to the bail policies in Dallas.

Assistant Harris County Attorney Robert Soard told the Texas
Tribune he is pleased the Fifth Circuit reined in Rosenthal's
mandate for the county to release most misdemeanor defendants on
personal bonds.

"The Fifth Circuit agreed that money bail could be used after an
assessment of risk in accordance with Texas law," he said in a
statement.

He added that the appellate court's proposed injunction "provides
a framework for a settlement."


HOOTERS OF AMERICA: Faces "Factor" Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hooters of America,
LLC. The case is styled as Rebecca Factor, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hooters of
America, LLC a Georgia limited liability corporation, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00792-MHC-CMS (N.D. Ga., February 22, 2018).

Hooters of America, LLC is engaged in operating and franchising
restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adian Miller, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PLLC - Atl
   191 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 4200
   P.O. Box 57007
   Atlanta, GA 30343
   Tel: (404) 496-7332
   Email: armiller@forthepeople.com

      - and -

   Rachel Soffin, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, P.A. - T.FL
   201 N. Franklin Street
   7th Floor
   Tampa, FL 33602
   Tel: (813) 223-5505
   Fax: (813) 222-2434
   Email: rsoffin@forthepeople.com


HORIZON PHARMA: Court Dismisses "Schaffer" Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned GEORGE S. SCHAFFER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HORIZON
PHARMA PLC, et al., Defendants, No. 16-CV-1763 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.).

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs bring securities fraud
claims against Horizon Pharma PLC (Horizon), a number of
Horizon's executives, (Individual Defendants), and various
underwriters (Defendants). Plaintiffs allege that Horizon and the
Individual Defendants made certain material misstatements and
omissions in connection with its Prescriptions-Made-Easy or PME
program and, in so doing, committed securities fraud in violation
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. Section 240 (Exchange Act claims). The Amended Complaint
also contains claims against the Underwriter Defendants  in
addition to Horizon and the Individual Defendants under Sections
11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act claims).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff. The Court will not dismiss claims unless
Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim
to relief that is facially plausible, that is, one that contains
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged,

Exchange Act Claims

Plaintiffs first seek to hold Defendants liable for securities
fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and
Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. To state a claim that
Defendants made material misrepresentations or omissions in
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Plaintiffs must allege
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and
(6) loss causation.

Material Misrepresentations or Omissions

Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims are based on three categories of
statements: (1) Statements Relating to the Relationship Between
Horizon and the PME Pharmacies; Statements Relating to Alleged
Improper Business Practices; and Statements Relating to the
Alleged Improper Practices.

Statements Relating to the Relationship Between Horizon and the
PME Pharmacies

Plaintiffs claim that the captive nature of the pharmacies is
evidenced by the transferring of prescriptions from one pharmacy
to another. But that claim suffers from a fundamental defect: the
source for it is a civil complaint that does not even mention
Horizon.  The civil complaint alleges that a minority owner of
both Halsted Pharmacy and Clybourn Park  not Horizon transferred
prescriptions from one pharmacy to the other.

Thus, Plaintiffs provide no allegations plausibly linking Horizon
to the prescription-swapping allegations. In short, although
Plaintiffs certainly establish that Horizon and the PME
pharmacies had close and synergistic relationships, they fall
short of establishing that the pharmacies were dominated
financially and operationally by Defendants, let alone captive
(whatever that means).

It follows that Plaintiffs fail to establish that Defendants'
statements about Horizon's relationships with the PME pharmacies
were false or misleading within the meaning of the Exchange Act.

Statements Relating to Alleged Improper Business Practices

Horizon's Direction of the Pharmacies

Plaintiffs' first allegation fails because it is not sufficiently
particularized to establish that Horizon itself directed the
pharmacies to refill prescriptions without authorization. As an
initial matter, the allegation that Clybourn Park's management
instructed employees to auto-refill prescriptions bears no direct
nexus to Horizon. By contrast, the information attributed to a
Linden Care employee does allege that Horizon instructed the
pharmacy to place all prescriptions on auto-refill, but it falls
short for a separate reason: it is not pleaded with sufficient
specificity. Notably, the Amended Complaint does not allege that
Horizon instructed Linden Care, or any pharmacy for that matter,
to do anything without a patient's authorization.

Plaintiffs' allegation that Horizon instructed its pharmacies to
withhold pricing information from patients also lacks sufficient
particularity. Here too, one unnamed rank-and-file employee
claims that he was instructed at an unknown time, in an unknown
place, and by an unknown person not to tell patients the price of
the drugs or what their insurance company was being billed.
Without more information regarding who instructed him and whether
Horizon had any connection to the directive the Court finds this
allegation to be lacking sufficient particularity to support the
probability that the witness possessed the information alleged.

Horizon's Direction of Its Employees

First, the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not support
the conclusory assertion that Horizon improperly directed its
sales representatives to mislead doctors about the price of its
drugs. Plaintiffs cite two confidential sources as support for
their assertion: one who states that he was instructed to focus
on the benefits of the program and another who was directed to
tell doctors that there would be minimal copay to the patient if
the prescription went through a specialty pharmacy.

Regardless, Horizon's pricing model was no secret. To the extent
it was, Plaintiffs point to no obligation for Horizon
salespersons to affirmatively disclose the intricacies of their
business model to every prescribing physician.

Plaintiffs' second claim that Horizon directed its employees to
provide gifts to doctors in order to influence their prescribing
choices also falls short.  Even taken together, however, these
allegations demonstrate only that Horizon and its employees
sought to cultivate relationships with doctors no doubt because
its business model depended on physicians prescribing Horizon's
drugs. In fact, given that the fees paid to doctors are publicly
available it is telling that Plaintiffs cannot muster anything
more significant than the allegations relating to Dr. Yee. Put
simply, securities plaintiffs cannot meet the heightened pleading
standards imposed by Rule 9 and the PSLRA with such conclusory
claims of undisclosed wrongdoing.

Statements Relating to the Alleged Improper Practices

Plaintiffs' arguments here can be easily dismissed. First,
Plaintiffs fail to allege that Horizon employed improper
practices in connection with the PME program. Without a plausible
allegation that Horizon acted  or directed its employees or
pharmacies to act improperly or illegally, Horizon's statements
concerning its compliance with laws, regulations, and its own
Code of Conduct cannot have been misstatements.

Second, Horizon explicitly disclosed that it was exposed to the
risk that our employees [and third parties] may engage in
fraudulent or other illegal activity and that despite adopting an
internal code of conduct, it is not always possible to identify
and deter misconduct by our employees and other third parties,
and the precautions we take to detect and prevent this activity
may not be effective. Nor were these risk warnings themselves
misleading, as Plaintiffs argue, because Horizon was presently
violating such laws and regulations.

Aside from the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any
underlying violations, no reasonable investor would interpret
such a generic risk warning as an assurance of present
compliance.

Scienter

In any event, Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims are subject to
dismissal for a related, albeit independent, reason: failure to
adequately plead scienter.

In this Circuit, a plaintiff may satisfy the scienter pleading
requirement in either of two ways: by alleging facts (1) showing
that the defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit the
fraud or (2) constituting strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness.

The latter requires allegations of either actual intent or
conscious recklessness, a state of mind approximating actual
intent, and not merely a heightened form of negligence. More
specifically, a plaintiff must allege conduct by a defendant that
is, at the least, conduct which is highly unreasonable and which
represents an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care to the extent that the danger was either known to the
defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware
of it.

As a general matter, courts have approved of claims when
plaintiffs have specifically alleged defendants' knowledge of
facts or access to information contradicting their public
statements. Under such circumstances, defendants knew or, more
importantly, should have known that they were misrepresenting
material facts related to the corporation.

In this case, Plaintiffs make no attempt to establish scienter
with respect to each Individual Defendant. By itself, that
warrants dismissal of their Exchange Act claims.  But even on
their own terms, Plaintiffs' allegations of scienter fall short.

Motive and Opportunity

Plaintiffs' motive and opportunity arguments can be swiftly
rejected. Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant sold shares
during the Class Period. The Second Circuit has made clear,
however, that it is not sufficient to allege goals that are
possessed by virtually all corporate insiders, such as the desire
to maintain a high credit rating for the corporation or otherwise
sustain the appearance of corporate profitability or the success
of an investment, or the desire to maintain a high stock price in
order to increase executive compensation. S. Cherry St., LLC v.
Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009).
That is all Plaintiffs do here. Because they fail to allege that
Defendants received a "concrete and personal" benefit from the
alleged scheme, and certainly do not allege that each Defendant
received such a benefit, they fail to demonstrate a cognizable
motive.

Circumstantial Evidence of Conscious Misbehavior or Recklessness

Plaintiffs fall short of adequately alleging either actual intent
or conscious recklessness on the part of Defendants. Moreover,
Plaintiffs' allegations of misconduct are ultimately less
compelling than the nonculpable explanation presented by
Defendants: that Horizon's stock price declined when it became
clear to the market that the PME program was bound to fail.
Notably, the risks that led to that failure were disclosed to
investors over and over again.  Additionally, as Plaintiffs
themselves note, Horizon itself engaged a third party to review
its practices even before it received the Department of Justice
subpoena. It makes little sense that Defendants would engage a
third party to undertake such a review if they were involved in
committing (or covering up) a fraud.

In short, Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead scienter and their
Exchange Act claims must be dismissed.

Securities Act Claims

In contrast to their Exchange Act claims, Plaintiffs' claims
under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act do not
require a showing of scienter, reliance, or loss causation.
Instead, Plaintiffs need only show that Defendants issued or
signed a registration statement containing an untrue statement of
a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading. Nevertheless, the parties acknowledge that the
alleged misstatements in the Offering Documents concern the same
underlying allegations discussed above in connection with the
Exchange Act claims namely Horizon's captive relationship with
the PME pharmacies, which it used to direct those pharmacies to
implement improper business practices. Indeed, Plaintiffs'
Securities Act claims track their Exchange Act claims often
verbatim.

It follows that Plaintiffs' Securities Act claims must be and are
dismissed for failure to adequately plead a material
misrepresentation or omission as well.

Items 303 and 503

With respect to Item 303, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants'
failure to disclose its relationship with the PME pharmacies and
its improper business practices created substantial uncertainty"
about the Company's future operating performance. But Plaintiffs
fail to identify any adverse economic event or trend that
occurred prior to the Offering that was not disclosed in the
Offering Documents. Nor do Plaintiffs plead, with any
specificity, facts establishing that Defendants possessed any
actual knowledge of the purported trend or event.

Plaintiffs' claim under Item 503 similarly falls short. Given
that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that Horizon
dominated the PME pharmacies or engaged in improper conduct, they
also fail to identify a material omission in Horizon's Offering
Documents. Instead, the most significant risk factor for Horizon
was that its PME-focused strategy would fail because Horizon was
selling drugs at higher prices than its competition. And this was
disclosed by Horizon in its fifty-eight-page Risk Factors
section.

Thus, Plaintiffs' claims under Item 503 are also dismissed.
Plaintiffs' claims under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
SEC Rule 10b-5 must be and are dismissed. It follows that their
claims for control person liability under Section 20(a), which
depend upon the existence of a primary violation, also fail.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15
of the Securities Act also fail.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yay95sfj from
Leagle.com.

Locals 302 and 612 of the International Union of Operating
Engineers-Employers Construction Industry Retirement Trust, Lead
Plaintiff, represented by Alec Tibor Coquin, Labaton & Sucharow
LLP, Christine Marie Fox -- cfox@labaton.com -- Labaton &
Sucharow LLP, Jonathan Gardner -- jgardner@labaton.com -- Labaton
Sucharow, LLP, Michael Walter Stocker -- mstocker@labaton.com --
Labaton & Sucharow LLP, Francis Paul McConville --
fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP & Serena Pia
Hallowell -- shallowell@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP.
George S. Schaffer, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander
Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan
Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Saba Banie, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Jonathan Walden, Movant, represented by Shane Thomas Rowley -
srowley@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Employees' Retirement System of the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority, Movant, represented by Robert Craig Finkel --
rfinkel@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP.

Springer and Nichols, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim -
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

City of Atlanta Firefighters' Pension Fund, Movant, represented
by Curtis Victor Trinko, Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
16 W 46th St Fl 7. New York, NY, 10036-4503.

Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund, Movant, represented by
Abraham Alexander -- abe.alexander@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Gerald H. Silk --
jeery@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
Hannah Elizabeth Ross -- hannah@blbglaw.com. -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Serena Pia Hallowell --
shallowell@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

Horizon Pharma PLC, Timothy P. Walbert, Paul W. Hoelscher &
Robert J. De Vaere, Defendants, represented by Jonathan Paul Bach
-- jbach@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, David James Bright --
dbright@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Koji Francis Fukumura, Cooley
LLP & Peter Morgan Adams -- padams@cooley.com -- Cooley L.L.P.
William F. Daniel, Michael Grey, Jeff Himawan, Virinder Nohria,
Ronald Pauli, Gino Santini, H. Thomas Watkins, John J. Kody &
Robert F. Carey, Defendants, represented by Koji Francis Fukumura
-- kfukumura@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Jefferies LLC, Cowen & Company
LLC Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, Defendants, represented by Richard
A. Rosen rrosen@paulweiss.com, Paul Weiss.


HUAWEI DEVICE: Consumers Can Amend Nexus 6P Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal judge gave consumers until Feb. 27 to amend their
putative class action alleging severe defects in Huawei's and
Google's Nexus 6P smartphones.

The case is IN RE NEXUS 6P PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case
No. 17-cv-02185-BLF (N.D. Calif.).  The defendants are Huawei
Device USA, Inc., and Google LLC.


HYUNDAI MOTORS: Recent Class Action Ruling Alarms Plaintiffs Bar
----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that last month's
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a
case against Hyundai struck a nerve with the class action bar
because it brought to the surface a longstanding debate over how
much is required to approve nationwide settlements when varying
state laws are involved.

The Ninth Circuit's Jan. 23 opinion in In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel
Economy Litigation imposed a strict set of requirements that
alarmed lawyers on both sides -- but mostly those in the
plaintiffs bar. [GN]


INTEREXCHANGE INC: Class Action to Impact U.S. Au Pair Program
--------------------------------------------------------------
Josh Eidelson, writing for Bloomberg Businessweek, reports that a
newly certified class, estimated to total more than 90,000
foreign workers, is alleging that a wage-fixing conspiracy
artificially depressed earnings in the U.S. Au Pair program.  The
lawsuit, one of a number of efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to use
antitrust laws to target treatment of employees, represents a
challenge to the Au Pair program overseen by the U.S. Department
of State.

Colorado-based federal district judge Christine Arguello
certified the class on Feb. 2, allowing the lawsuit to proceed on
behalf of current and former au pairs.  The plaintiffs are suing
15 private agencies authorized by the State Department to
administer the program, which allows foreign workers under the
age of 27 to enter the U.S. on J-1 cultural exchange visas to
provide live-in child care to host families.  "They control the
entire market for au pair labor," says attorney Nina DiSalvo,
executive director of Towards Justice, a Denver-based legal
nonprofit representing the au pairs.  The law firm Boies Schiller
Flexner has joined with Towards Justice to represent the
plaintiffs.

Along with fraud and wage-and-hour allegations, the suit contends
that the agencies have violated the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act by
colluding to keep au pairs' wages low and discouraging families
from paying more.  According to the plaintiffs, agencies
allegedly told au pairs they will receive the exact same rate
regardless of who they work for and falsely claimed that the
government set their maximum weekly wage at $195.75.  The
agencies and their trade association, the Alliance for
International Educational and Cultural Exchange, declined to
comment on the lawsuit or did not respond to requests for
comment.  The State Department declined to comment, citing the
ongoing litigation, and provided a link to its au pair program
compensation requirements.

Defendants have until Feb. 16 to notify the court if they will
appeal the class certification.  In court filings, the sponsors
deny any wrongdoing, saying the stipend amount is set by the
State Department.  One agency, InterExchange Inc., wrote that
"the central element of the au pair program is not work, but
rather the cultural knowledge and experience gained" by the au
pair.  "The program facilitates cultural exchange through a
careful balance of give-and-take; host families must be willing
to welcome a stranger into their homes and families, and in
exchange, those strangers become de facto family members,
providing limited childcare and continuing their education."

Another defendant, Cultural Care Inc., said the allegations
demonstrate, at best, "an inexcusable ignorance of basic
governmental immunity principles," because the agencies were
simply "acting at the direction of the federal government."

That argument was rejected by a U.S. magistrate judge, who wrote
in 2016 that it was "wholly without merit" to claim the sponsors
were immune from antitrust law.  "There is no evidence that the
federal government 'directs,' or in any other way mandates, that
an au pair's wages are set at $195.75," the judge wrote, saying a
2007 State Department memo cited by the defendants does not
prevent families from paying a higher rate.

The lawsuit is one of many controversies surrounding the State
Department's half-century-old J visa, which has been dogged for
decades by allegations that through initiatives such as the Au
Pair and Summer Work Travel programs it fosters underpaid,
underregulated guest-worker labor under a veneer of cultural
exchange.  The Au Pair program began as a pilot in 1986 in
response to a proposal from the American Institute for Foreign
Study.  During congressional debate in 1989, AIFS argued against
limiting au pairs' workweek to 45 hours, citing the tremendous
need for affordable child care as more women entered the
workforce.  At the same time, it argued that regulating the au
pair program as a labor program would "strangle the special
relationship" between au pairs and their hosts.

In 1990, when J-1 visas were still overseen by the now-defunct
U.S. Information Agency, the General Accounting Office issued a
report finding that the program lacked adequate oversight and
that the handling of visas, including those for au pairs,
contradicted congressional intent.  In 2011 participants in the
J-1 Summer Work Travel program went on strike at a Hershey's
chocolate factory, alleging that they were being threatened with
deportation if they spoke up about exploitative conditions.  At
the time, Hershey's said the plant was being operated by a
logistics contractor, who in turn said participants were provided
through a staffing company.  "We don't have a lot of influence
over some of those issues that they've raised," the contractor
told the New York Times in 2011.  In 2013, J-1 participants
working for a McDonald's franchisee walked off the job, claiming
that the owner was making them work 20-plus-hour shifts,
withholding wages, and charging participants exorbitant rent to
live in crammed basements.  Amid the protests, McDonald's issued
a statement saying that the franchisee had "agreed to leave the
McDonald's system," and said that it was "also working on
connecting with the guest workers on an individual basis to most
effectively address this situation."  The franchisee had said
that authorities had looked into the situation and "there is no
violation."

As a candidate, Donald Trump pledged to replace J-1 visas with an
inner-city youth jobs program.

The stipend for au pairs is far lower than the prevailing wage
for domestic workers in the U.S., says American University law
professor Janie Chuang.  "Host families and the State Department,
and certainly the sponsoring au pair agencies, resist the idea
that this is a labor program, because if it were treated as such,
it would no longer be affordable for a lot of these families,"
she says.

One former au pair who came to the U.S. from Germany and is a
plaintiff in the suit says that before starting the program she
was told by her sponsor that all participants in the U.S.
received the same rate of $195.75 per week and that the rate was
set by the government.  The au pair claims she regularly was told
to work more than the 45-hour limit.  The experience did not
match the way the program was initially promoted by the agency.

Anticompetitive behavior by employers, including price-fixing
conspiracies, noncompete clauses banning staff from departing for
similar jobs, and no-poaching agreements, like those alleged in
Silicon Valley that led to a $415 million settlement in 2015,
have broader labor-market consequences, say economists.  "It's
quite plausible that this is part of the reason why we're seeing
sluggish wage growth," says Princeton University's Alan Krueger,
who chaired the Council of Economic Advisers under President
Obama and recently conducted research that found the majority of
big franchise chains banned franchisees from hiring away each
other's workers.

"If the agencies were truly competing against each other in
recruiting au pairs, there would be more of a race to the top,"
says University of San Diego law professor Orly Lobel.  "There is
no reason that each au pair, regardless of her prior experience
and education level, would all just work for minimum wage." [GN]


J&B CLEANERS: Faces "Paredes" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against J&B Cleaners, Inc.
The case is styled as Yeimi "Jenny" Paredes, Individually And on
behalf of all other employees similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
J&B Cleaners, Inc. d/b/a Lincoln Terrace Cleaners and Bernard
Park, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01638 (S.D. N.Y., February 22,
2018).

J&B Cleaners, Inc. operates a dry cleaning business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Stockholders File Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reports that Johnson & Johnson stock
holders have filed a class action against the company, contending
that the defendant has known for "decades" that its talc products
include asbestos fibers and "misrepresented and failed to
disclose" the alleged danger its products posed to consumers.

The Feb. 8 federal securities class action complaint filed in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey was filed by
Frank Hall individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated. [GN]


JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Faces Class Action Over Celgene Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
directors are selling Juno Therapeutics too cheaply through an
unfair process to Celgene, for $87 a share or $9 billion,
shareholders claim in a federal class action.

Attorney for Plaintiff:

     Roger Townsend, Esq.
     BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC
     1000 Second Avenue, Suite 3670
     Seattle, Washington 98104
     Tel: 206-652-8660
     Fax: 206-652-8290
     Email: rtownsend@bjtlegal.com

OF COUNSEL:

     Evan J. Smith, Esq.
     Marc L. Ackerman, Esq.
     BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
     Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510
     Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
     Phone: (610) 667-6200
     Facsimile: (610) 667-9029
     Email: esmith@brodskysmith.com
            mackerman@brodskysmith.com


KABBAGE INC: Court Strikes Class Allegations in TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Strike Class Allegation in the
case captioned A CUSTOM HEATING & AIR  CONDITIONING, INC.,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. KABBAGE, INC.; GULFCO LEASING LLC; MICHAEL HENRY;
And JOHN DOES 1-12, Defendants, Case No. 16 C 2513 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. (Plaintiff)
sued Defendant Kabbage, Inc. (Kabbage), among others, claiming
that Defendants sent or caused to be sent to Plaintiff fax
advertisements in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, as amended by the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005, (TCPA).
Plaintiff pursued other causes of action as well, but this Court
dismissed them for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The standard for evaluating motions to strike class allegations
is the same as the standard for certifying a class under Rule 23.

The heart of Kabbage's objection to the class allegations is
Plaintiff's proposed class definition:

     All persons who were sent one or more telephone facsimile
messages on or after four years prior to the filing of this
action, that advertised the commercial availability of property,
goods, or services offered by Defendants, that did not contain an
opt-out notice that complied with federal law.

According to the Court, the trouble here is imprecision.
Plaintiff defines its proposed class as a group of persons who
received advertisements lacking TCPA-compliant opt-out notices.
Kabbage cries foul because, as the Court earlier observed, the
definition fails to distinguish between those class members that
gave prior permission to Defendants to receive such
advertisements and those members that did not.

Plaintiff alleges that it received an unsolicited fax
advertisement from or one caused to be sent by Defendants. But
if, as the proposed class definition currently allows, the class
contains members who received only solicited faxes, there will
not be enough congruence between their claims and Plaintiff's.
Indeed, there will be no congruence at all the members that
received only solicited faxes have no TCPA claim against
Defendants. The class definition is thus overbroad, encompassing
members who do not share a viable claim with the representative
Plaintiff. If, as Plaintiff contends elsewhere in its FAC all of
the proposed class members received only unsolicited faxes, the
class definition should say so.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9uc97lv from Leagle.com.

A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., an Illinois
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by James
Michael Smith --  jim@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, John P. Orellana, Bock,
Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Kimberly M. Watt --
kimberly@classlawyers.com -- Bock & Hatch Llc, Tod Allen Lewis --
tod@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC & Phillip A. Bock  -- phil@classlawyers.com --
Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Kabbage, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kristine Marie
Schanbacher -- kristine.schanbacher@dentons.com -- Dentons US
LLP, Mark A. Silver -- Mark.silver@dentons.com -- Dentons US LLP
& Nathan Lewis Garroway -- nathan.garroway@dentons.com -- Dentons
US LLP.

Celtic Bank Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bart Thomas
Murphy -- bart.murphy@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller LLP, Heather
Lynn Maly -- Heather.Maly@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller, Isaac J.
Colunga l-  isaac.colunga@icemiller.com -- ICE MILLER LLP &
Martha Larson Kohlstrand --  Martha.Kohlstrand@icemiller.com --
Ice Miller LLP.

Michael Henry, Defendant, Pro Se.

Kabbage, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Mark A. Silver,
Dentons US LLP & Nathan Lewis Garroway, Dentons US LLP.

A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., an Illinois
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Cross Defendant, represented by
Phillip A. Bock, Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis &
Oppenheim, LLC, James Michael Smith, Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock,
Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, John P. Orellana, Bock, Hatch,
Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Kimberly M. Watt, Bock & Hatch Llc & Tod
Allen Lewis, Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis &
Oppenheim, LLC.

The United States District Court for Eastern District Michigan,
Southern Division. ALICE RADEN and BOBBIE MOORE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MARTHA
STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and
MEREDITH CORPORATION, an Iowa Corporation, Defendants.


L'OREAL USA: Motion to Dismiss Hair Product Class Action Nixed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Angela Underwood, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a big
brand hair product's motion to dismiss is limp, according to U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York Judge Lorna
Schofield.

In a late 2017 opinion, Judge Schofield denied L'Oreal USA Inc.
and Matrix Essentials LLC's motion to dismiss a first amended
complaint of a class action complaint brought against them by
plaintiffs Brandi Price and Christine Chadwick over alleged false
representations in the three of their popular hair products, but
did dismiss the unjust enrichment claim under both New York and
California law.

Rather than restoring their hair, L'Oreal subsidiary Matrix's
Biolage Keratindose Pro-Keratin + Silk Shampoo, Conditioner and
Renewal Spray (products), which advertise Keratindose Pro Keratin
+Silk, caused hair loss and damage, according to the plaintiffs.
The opinion also states the plaintiff's expert testified the
products do not even have the natural human protein keratin in
them.

Ms. Price alleged she suffered brittle and dry damage to her hair
in 2014 after purchasing one of the products in New York, and
Chadwick alleged she suffered the same in 2016 when buying two of
the products in California.  While both plaintiffs seek
restitution and injunctive relief, L'Oreal was looking to have
the whole matter dropped, specifically arguing that the
plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded fraud under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Citing that Rule 9(b) claims must meet keen requirements,
Schofield detailed that the plaintiffs had properly claimed
fraud.

"The fact that the advertisements did not use the word 'keratin'
in isolation and instead used the word 'Pro-keratin' does not
change the analysis," Judge Schofield wrote in the opinion.  "It
is unclear what 'Pro-keratin' is and, given the inclusion of the
word 'keratin' and the characterization of the shampoo, for
example, as 'our keratin shampoo,' Defendants plausibly
misrepresented that the products contain keratin."

Judge Schofield detailed the actual reliance of California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and False Claims Act (FLA).  While
defendants charge that under Kwiset Corp. v. Superior Court from
2011 that actual reliance is in fact a factor in the UCL and FLA
California Law, Schofield showed otherwise.

"Here, the complaint alleges that products were sold nationwide
and each plaintiff, having seen the products' name and marketing
materials, believed that the products contained keratin,"
Schofield wrote in the opinion.  "The complaint also alleges that
each plaintiff would not have purchased the products or would
have paid less for them had she known the products did not
contain keratin.  In sum, the complaint sufficiently alleges
actual reliance to support the UCL and FAL claims."

L'Oreal then attempted to claim breach of express warranty, also
denied by the judge.

"It is well established that '[a] seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty,'" Judge Schofield wrote in the opinion.

However, the judge did find favor with L'Oreal's motion to
dismiss the unjust enrichment respectively under both the East
Coast and West Coast laws.

"While unjust enrichment may be pleaded as an independent claim
under New York law, 'it is available only in unusual situations
when, though the defendant has not breached a contract nor
committed a recognized tort, circumstances create an equitable
obligation running from the defendant to the plaintiff," Judge
Schofield wrote in the opinion, adding "Generally, in California,
where there is a valid express contract covering the same subject
matter, there is no standalone cause of action for unjust
enrichment." [GN]


LJM FUNDS: April 10 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC on Feb. 12 notified investors
that a class action lawsuit has been filed against LJM Funds
Management Ltd. ("LJMIX" or the "Company") (LJMIX) and certain of
its officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased LJM
Preservation and Growth Fund Class I ("LJMIX") (MUTF: LJMIX)
between February 28, 2015 and February 7, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period").  Such investors are encouraged to join this case
by visiting the firm's site: http://www.bgandg.com/ljmix

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
defendants made materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) LJMIX was not focused on capital
preservation and left investors exposed to an unacceptably high
risk of catastrophic losses; and (2) LJMIX had not taken
appropriate steps to preserve capital in down markets.

On February 5, 2018, the S&P dropped about 4.6% and LJMIX dropped
roughly 80% from a previous close price of $9.82 per share on
February 2, 2018 to $1.94 per share on February 7, 2018.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
http://www.bgandg.com/ljmixor you may contact Peretz Bronstein,
Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484.  If you
suffered a loss in LJMIX you have until April 10, 2018 to request
that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to
share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC -- https://www.bgandg.com --
is a corporate litigation boutique.  Its primary expertise is the
aggressive pursuit of litigation claims on behalf of our clients.
In addition to representing institutions and other investor
plaintiffs in class action security litigation, the firm's
expertise includes general corporate and commercial litigation,
as well as securities arbitration. [GN]


LENDER PROCESSING: Third Party Defendants in "Lemieux" Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN LEMIEUX, Plaintiff, v. LENDER PROCESSING
CENTER; HIGHTECHLENDING, INC., Defendants. HIGHTECHLENDING, INC.,
Third-Party, Plaintiff, v. 800 CAPITAL, INC., et al., Third-
Party, Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-01850-BAS-DHB (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Third Party Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Third Party Plaintiff Hightech is a California-based residential
mortgage loan originator organized into separate branches.  Each
branch is responsible for its own marketing and lead generation.
Third Party Defendants Elite and 800 Capital are California-based
entities in the business of providing lead generation services
via telemarketing, and Third Party Defendants Shebab Tareh, Amir
Montazeran and Allen Buenafe are all individuals who are either
employees, directors, officers, managers, or, in Buenafe's case,
CEO, Secretary or CFO of Elite and 800 Capital.  One of
Hightech's branch offices entered into an agreement with Elite
and 800 Capital to provide lead generation services.

Lemieux filed a putative class action claiming he received a call
on his cellular telephone from an automatic telephone dialing
system ("ATDS") in violation of the  Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA").  An individual informed the Plaintiff
the call was from LPC, but then transferred the call to an
application manager who informed him the call was from Hightech.

Hightech alleges that the TCPA violation was the fault of Third
Party Defendants who generated the lead.  Thus, Hightech brings
the Third Party Complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution
and declaratory relief against all Third Party Defendants.
Hightech also asserts a state law breach of contract claim
against Elite and 800 Capital.  Hightech invokes supplemental
jurisdiction over the Third Party Complaint because the
underlying Complaint is based on a violation of a federal
statute, the TCPA.

The Plaintiff has since settled his claims against Hightech.  His
claim has been dismissed with prejudice and the claim on behalf
of the class has been dismissed without prejudice.  Thus, the
only remaining claims in the action are those asserted in the
Third Party Complaint.

All but one Third Party Defendants now move for judgment on the
pleadings claiming there is no right of contribution or indemnity
under the TCPA now moves for judgment on the pleadings claiming
there is no right of contribution or indemnity under the TCPA.

Judge Bashant rejects Hightech's argument that Ninth Circuit and
FCC precedent shows that indemnity and contribution are available
under federal law for violations of the TCPA.  Like the Court,
she says, several courts considering the issue have concluded
that claims for contribution and indemnity are not available
under the TCPA.  The Judge recognizes that the result may be that
the true violator of the TCPA is not held responsible for his
conduct, but this is an insufficient reason for enlarging on the
remedial provisions contained in this carefully considered
statute.  Although the Plaintiff could have filed suit against
the Third Party Defendants, he chose not to do so.  The TCPA is
in essence a strict liability statute and it is not up to the
Court to equitably temper its bite.  The Judge concludes the
Third Party Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as
to these claims must be granted.

Having dismissed the claims based on indemnity and contribution
under the federal TCPA statute, and in consideration of the early
stage of these proceedings, the Judge declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Hightech's breach of contract
claim.

Finally, because the Judge has concluded that Hightech's claims
for indemnity and contribution for violations of the TCPA fail as
a matter of law, Hightech cannot possibly win the relief it seeks
from Montazeran.  Accordingly, the claims against Montazeran must
be dismissed with prejudice.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Bashant granted the Third Party
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  She dismissed
with prejudice Hightech's claims for indemnity and contribution
and, to the extent it is premised on such claims, Hightech's
request for declaratory relief.

The Judge declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Hightech's state law breach of contract claim and, to the extent
it is premised on such claim, Hightech's request for declaratory
relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c).  She ordered that
the entry of default against Third Party Defendant Montazeran be
set aside.  Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), she dismissed with
prejudice Hightech's claims against Third Party Defendant
Montazeran.  All Third Party Defendants are dismissed from the
case and the Clerk is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/0c7F9T from Leagle.com.

Hightechlending, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by
Michael Allen Hellbusch -- mhellbusch@tldlaw.com -- Tredway
Lumsdaine and Doyle & Shannon Marie Jenkins -- jenkins@tldlaw.com
-- Tredway Lumsdaine and Doyle.

Elite One Plus, Inc., 800 Capital, Inc. & Shabab Tareh,
ThirdParty Defendants, represented by Brent Randall Phillips --
bphillips@phillipslawcorporation.com -- Phillips Law Corporation.


LOMA NEGRA: Argentina Class Action Suit Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
Loma Negra Compania Industrial Argentina Sociedad Anonima said in
its Form F-1/A Report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission that the company continues to defend itself from a
class action filed by Damnificados Financieros Asociacion Civil,
in Argentina.

In February 27, 2007, Damnificados Financieros Asociacion Civil
filed a class action as representative of the holders of the
notes issued by Inversora Electrica de Buenos Aires S.A., or
IEBA, in an aggregate principal amount of Ps.200,000,000, in
1997, or the IEBA Notes, against several defendants (including
us, as a former minority shareholder of IEBA). Plaintiff seeks to
extend liability to the defendants for the lack of payment of the
IEBA Notes alleging, among other things, under-capitalization of
IEBA, as issuer.

The Company filed several defenses, including, without
limitation, lack of standing to sue, statute of limitations, that
the Company was no longer shareholders of IEBA at the time of the
issuance of the IEBA Notes and that the IEBA Notes have been
successfully restructured through a reorganization plan duly
endorsed by the competent court with effect against all holders
of the IEBA Notes and declared fulfilled by resolution of the
same court dated April 18, 2008. On August 28, 2017, the court
admitted the class action and the Company is in the process of
appealing the court's decision.

Loma Negra said "Based on the foregoing and on our Argentine
litigation counsel' opinion, we believe that the chances of
success of the claim against us are remote."

Loma Negra Compania Industrial Argentina Sociedad Anonima is the
leading cement producer in Argentina. The company produces and
distributes cement, masonry cement, aggregates, concrete and lime
to wholesale distributors, concrete producers and industrial
customers, among others.


MARTHA STEWART: Court Won't Review Ruling in "Raden" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in the case
captioned ALICE RADEN and BOBBIE MOORE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MARTHA
STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and
MEREDITH CORPORATION, an Iowa Corporation, Defendants, Case No.
16-12808 (E.D. Mich.).

This lawsuit arises from Plaintiffs Alice Raden and Bobbie Moore
(Plaintiffs) class action complaint alleging that Defendants
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia) and Meredith Corporation (Meredith) violated
Michigan's Personal Privacy Protection Act (PPPA) and were
unjustly enriched by disclosing sensitive and statutorily
protected information to third parties.

In an Opinion and Order, the Court granted, in part, Defendants'
motion to dismiss. In that decision, the Court found that
Plaintiffs did not allege actual damages as required under the
amended PPPA and dismissed Count I of the complaint. The Court
denied Defendants' motion to dismiss on Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court committed a palpable defect when
it based the applicability of the amended PPPA on the date
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs maintain that the
Court erred in failing to recognize that the applicability of a
statute depends on when the cause of action accrues not when the
complaint was filed.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on the same date the amendment
took immediate effect. The conclusion other courts have reached
concerning the applicability of the amended PPPA is not contrary
to this Court's decision because the complaints in those cases
were pending prior to the amendment taking effect. Here, as
supported by a clear reading of the statute, the intent was for
the amendment to take immediate effect, which happened to be on
the same date Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. Because
Plaintiffs failed to allege actual damages as required under the
amended PPPA, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' PPPA claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9mv2m8p from
Leagle.com.

Alice Raden, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Scott Thomassen
bthomassen@edelson.com --  Edelson PC, Eve-Lynn Rapp --
erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Henry M. Scharg & Ari J. Scharg
-- ascharg@edelson.com --  Edelson P.C.

Bobbie Moore, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Scott Thomassen,
Edelson PC, Eve-Lynn Rapp, Edelson PC, Henry M. Scharg & Ari J.
Scharg, Edelson P.C.

Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Andrew M. Harris -- andrew.harris@kitch.com  -- Kitch, Drutchas,
Wagner, Valitutti & Sherbrook.

Meredith Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jacob A. Sommer -
- jake@zwillgen.com -- Zwillgen, PLLC, Lara F. Phillip --
lara.phillip@honigman.com -- Honigman, Miller & Nury R. Siekkinen
-- nury@zwillgen.com. -- ZwillGen PLLC.


MASTERCARD: Squire Patton Attorneys Discuss Interchange Fee Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Garon Anthony, Esq., and Helen Cain, Esq., of Squire Patton Boggs
(US) LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, report that
the previous four episodes of the Mastercard saga focused on a
number of legal battles between Mastercard and both consumers and
retailers.

These disputes have centred on Mastercard's alleged
"uncompetitive" interchange fees and restrictive rules on cross-
border acquiring.  The latest claim by retailers follows a class
action brought on behalf of consumers under the Consumer Rights
Act 2015 in relation to the same charges.

Retailers including Nando's, the Cooperative Group and Harvey
Nichols have launched a new claim worth approximately รบ300
million (plus interest and costs), on the basis that Mastercard
allegedly breached EU and UK regulations through the setting of
"unlawful and anti-competitive" fees.  This follows Humphries
Kerstetter's announcement in June 2017 that it would be bringing
the claim on behalf of 27 high street retailers.

In addition to arguing that Mastercard's service charges are
anti-competitive, the claimants allege that Mastercard has abused
its dominant position in the market.  The claimants say that
Mastercard credit cards are such a popular payment mechanism that
retailers view them as "must-take".  The claimants are also
seeking a declaration that the interchange fees are (and always
were) void and unenforceable.

In 2007, the EU found that Visa and Mastercard's high interchange
fees breached Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, thus inviting the consumer class action referred
to above (led by Walter Merricks and discussed in a previous blog
post) followed by several similar claims by retailers.

Until recently, it would have been forgivable to think that the
retailer's current claim (and the consumer class action claim)
would be bound not to succeed.  This is because in Sainsbury's'
unsuccessful claim against Visa in respect of their high
interchange fees, Mr Justice Phillips ruled that the credit card
giant's fees were not inherently anti-competitive (however,
Sainsburys is still expected to appeal this decision).

In light of the legal developments since 2007, the outcome of the
retailer's claim and the consumer class action are far from
predictable. [GN]


MCDONALD'S CORP: Blind Customers File Class Action in Chicago
-------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a class action filed in
Chicago federal court claims McDonald's restaurants are
inaccessible to blind customers during the late-night hours when
food can only be purchased via drive-thru.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
     William H. Beaumont, Esq.
     BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
     3151 W. 26th Street, 2nd Floor
     Chicago, Illinois 60623
     Telephone: (773) 831-8000
     Facsimile: (504) 272-2956
     Email: whb@beaumontcostales.com

        -- and --

     Glenn M. Goffin, Esq.
     920 Beach Park Blvd, Apt 39
     Foster City, CA 94404
     Tel: (415) 845-8556
     Email: ggoffin@glenngoffinlaw.com


MDL 2804: Niagara County's Civil Suit Over Opioid Crisis Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Danny Spewak, writing for WGRZ, reports that a measure to declare
the opioid epidemic a "public nuisance" sailed through Niagara
County legislative committees on Feb. 12, intended as a move to
bolster the county's ongoing civil lawsuit against major drug
manufacturers.

The full Niagara County legislature is now widely expected to
pass the local law with bipartisan support.

Rebecca Wydysh, a county legislator and chairwoman of the
committee on opioid addiction, said the county attorney
recommended a public nuisance law as a legal strategy.  The
designation could give the county leverage in court as it seeks
to recover damages associated with the opioid crisis.

Niagara County is one of at least three local governments in
Western New York to officially file a lawsuit against
pharmaceutical companies, along with Erie and Chautauqua
counties.  The suits accuse the nation's largest drug companies
of misleading doctors and patients about the addictive nature of
painkillers and opioids.

Instead of joining a class-action suit, however, Niagara County
enlisted New York City-based Napoli Shkolnik PLLC to represent it
in an individual suit.

"Certainly, it has been a huge financial burden on the taxpayers
of Niagara County, as it has all over the country," Ms. Wydysh
said. "That's something that, hopefully, we will get a little bit
back from the pharmaceutical companies to help cover the costs
that the crisis has caused here."

Overdoses killed 31 people in Niagara County last year, according
to Ms. Wydysh.  The county also tallied 308 non-fatal overdose
calls, and it ranked fourth statewide in opioid prescriptions per
capita.

In all, at least seven Western New York counties have either
filed a lawsuit or explored the possibility of legal action
against major drug companies.

Hundreds of local governments across the United States -- and
even some individual states -- have filed nearly identical
lawsuits against manufacturers like Purdue Pharma and Johnson &
Johnson, among others.  The wave of lawsuits even led Purdue
Pharma to announce it will stop promoting OxyContin to doctors.

The companies have long insisted that the lawsuits are an
oversimplification of the problem and unfairly lay the blame
solely on their shoulders. In a statement to 2 On Your Side last
year, Purdue Pharma's spokesperson noted that OxyContin accounted
for only two percent of its painkiller prescriptions, adding that
the company was an "industry leader" in abuse deterrence. Another
company, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, called the allegations "legally
and factually unfounded."

However, county and state governments still feel the companies
should essentially reimburse them for the costs of the opioid
crisis.

In Niagara County, the skyrocketing number of overdoses places an
increased financial burden on public health, law enforcement and
mental health departments.

"This is something that has hit every department in the county,"
Ms. Wydysh said.

The question for public officials, however, is this: Will the
money recovered through lawsuits actually go toward addiction
treatment and recovery? The tobacco settlements of the '90s, for
example, paid out billions of dollars to governments, but the
money wasn't always used for anti-smoking or health initiatives.

Ms. Wydysh promised any earnings would be used for the right
purposes.

"Certainly," she said.  "That's something we have to focus on."

First, of course, the county must prove in court that it is
entitled to actually collect damages from the drug companies.  It
appears the "public nuisance" law, which is still subject to
public hearings before a vote, will factor into those arguments.

Randy Bradt, the Niagara County Legislature Majority Leader,
called the public nuisance proposal an example of "bipartisanship
at its finest."

The issue is especially personal for Mr. Bradt, who lost a
relative to the opioid epidemic.

"I will keep doing everything in my power, everything in my legal
means as legislator, to combat this, and help every family,"
Mr. Bradt said, "so that it doesn't happen to any other
families." [GN]


MIDWAY IMPORTING: Faces "Rivera" Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midway Importing,
Inc. The case is styled as Nicky Rivera, Balmore Prudencio,
Michelle Quintero and John Does (1-100), on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Midway Importing,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01469 (C.D. Cal., February 22,
2018).

Midway Importing, Inc. distributes and supplies health and beauty
care products.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


MONRO INC: Settles FLSA Class Action for $1.95 Million
------------------------------------------------------
Tire Business reports that Monro Inc. agreed recently to settle
an eight-year-old class-action suit related to unpaid wages and
overtime for former technicians and assistant store managers,
agreeing to pay $1.95 million to the plaintiffs.

Monro said in its third quarter 10-Q filing with the Securities
and Exchange Commission that it estimated the amount to be less
than the legal fees and expenses it believed it likely would
incur in connection with defending such matter during the next 12
months.

Monro said the settlement resulted in a reduction in third-
quarter net income of 4 cents per share.

The class-action suit -- Ellersick, et al., v. Monro Muffler
Brake Inc. and Monro Service Corp. -- was filed originally in
September 2010 by John Ellersick, David Ellersick, Travis Myles,
Lewis C. Youngs Jr. and Richard Curry Jr., who described
themselves as "technicians" and/or "mechanics" employed by Monro
for varying lengths of time.

The plaintiffs claimed they were denied "regular, overtime and
meal and rest period compensation" as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act lawsuit at any time within three years prior to the
filing date of the action.

The suit over time attracted more than 1,100 co-plaintiffs,
according to court records.  The case was heard in the U.S.
District Court, Western District of New York.

Among specific charges levied by the plaintiffs were that Monro
management told employees not to clock-in, clocked out employees
while the employees continued to work, altered time records and
did not pay employees who worked during meal and/or rest periods.

The settlement arose out of mediation the parties agreed to after
a series of motions and appeals throughout 2017 regarding the
federal court's granting on March 31 to decertify the class-
action.

In comments to financial analysts in a recent conference call,
CFO Brian D'Ambrosia said the company opted to settle the case
because its analysis "led us to the conclusion that the
settlement was a better amount of favorable one.

"Any litigation takes a certain amount of management's time, . .
. and we believe that settling this matter will allow management
to focus and running the company's operations and executing the
initiatives previously laid out."

Legal counsel representing the plaintiffs in the case declined to
comment, saying there were still technicalities to sort out.
Monro said technically, the matter is still pending until the
court issues its final approval of the arbitrated settlement.
[GN]


MONTRES JOURNE NY: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Montres Journe NY,
LLC. The case is styled as Braulio Thorne, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Montres Journe
NY, LLC, doing business as: F.P. Journe, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-01658 (S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Montres Journe America, LLC was founded in 2009. The company's
line of business includes the wholesale distribution of jewelry,
precious stones and metals, costume jewelry, watches, clocks, and
silverware.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


NBTY INC: Court Dismisses "DeBernardis" Consumer Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JOSHUA
DeBERNARDIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NBTY, INC., and UNITED STATES NUTRITION,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 17 C 6125 (N.D. Ill.).

Defendants make four challenges against Plaintiff's Complaint,
the most important of which is that Defendants claim that the
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case involving non-
resident class of plaintiffs based on the recent Supreme Court
case Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,
137 S.Ct. 1773 (June 19, 2017).

The four-count Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and
misleading claims concerning the beneficial effects of the
product. Count I alleges violations of state consumer fraud acts
on behalf of a multi-state class; Count II alleges violation of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act on behalf of Illinois purchasers;
Count III alleges violations of Express Warranty on behalf of the
nation-wide class, and Count IV alleges unjust enrichment on
behalf of the nation-wide class.

The Court finds that the applicability of Bristol-Myers Squibb to
this case is a close question. The Court understands the argument
that there is a distinction between a mass tort action that was
present in Bristol-Myers Squibb and a nation-wide class action
that is present here. As noted in the Chinese Dry Wall case to
qualify as a class action the plaintiff must meet the
requirements of Rule 23, numerosity, typicality, adequacy of
representation, predominance and superiority. Mass torts on the
other hand will be hard pressed to establish typicality and
predominance due to the almost certain differences in damages.

The Court believes that it is more likely than not based on the
Supreme Court's comments about federalism that the courts will
apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to outlaw nationwide class actions in
a form, such as in this case, where there is no general
jurisdiction over the Defendants. There is also the issue of
forum shopping, which was mentioned in the Chinese DryWall,
Chinese-Manufactured DryWall Products, 2017 WL 5971622,  case as
a basis for distinguishing mass torts from class actions, but
possible forum shopping is just as present in multi-state class
actions. Consequently, to the extent that Counts I, III and IV
seek to recover on behalf of out-of-state plaintiff classes, the
Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Defendants' next contention is that Count III seeking recovery
for violation of an express warranty cannot stand because
Plaintiff failed to provide Defendants with pre-suit notice of
his contention that Defendants breached an express warranty as
required by Illinois law, 810 ILCS 5/2-607(3)(a).

Plaintiff responds by contending that he is exempt from the
notice requirement because the Defendants had actual knowledge of
the product's defect.

The Illinois Supreme Court decision in Connick v. Suzuki Motor
Co., Inc., 174 Ill. 2d. 482 (1996), explained that the notice of
the breach required is not of the facts, which the seller knows
quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, but of buyer's
claim that they constitute a breach. The Seventh Circuit applied
this reasoning in Anthony v. Country Life Manufacturing, LLC., 70
F.Appx. 379 (2003), a case involving nutritional bars. The Court
held that even though the defendant may have been aware of the
trouble with the specific product, the notice requirement is
satisfied only when the manufacturer is somehow apprised of the
trouble with the particular product purchased by a particular
buyer. A manufacturer's knowledge of its own ingredients is
insufficient under Illinois law to constitute actual knowledge of
the alleged defect.

The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted.

The final objection on Defendants' part is their claim that Count
IV, unjust enrichment, must be dismissed as it applies to the
nationwide class allegations. Since the Court has dismissed the
nationwide allegations, the Court need not deal with this count
any further.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the allegations in
Counts I, III, and IV as to the putative national class of
Plaintiffs. The Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Count III,
breach of warranty, without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y86x9py6 from Leagle.com.

Joshua DeBernardis, Plaintiff, represented by Nick Suciu, III
nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com. -- Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC,
Richard Lane Miller, II -- rlm@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler
Wallace LLP, Richard Steven Wilson -- rwilson@siprut.com --
Siprut Pc & Natasha Singh -- natasha_singh1230@yahoo.com --
Siprut Pc.

NBTY, Inc. & United States Nutrition, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Megan O'Neill -- moneill@willenken.com --
Willenken Wilson Loh & Delgado LLP, pro hac vice, William A.
Delgado -- williamdelgado@willenken.com -- Willenken Wilson Loh &
Delgado LLP, Rachael Cecelia Brennan Blackburn --
rblackburn@aandglaw.com -- A & G Law LLC & Robert M. Andalman, A
& G Law LLC.


NCAA: Fights $40MM Fee Bid in Antitrust Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Nathan Solis, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the National Collegiate Athletic Association fought a $40 million
attorney fee award at the Ninth Circuit on Feb. 15, in an
antitrust class action by former student-athletes who said the
organization forced students to sign their rights away while
reaping the benefits of licensing and merchandise agreements.

The federal case played out in court for six years as the
student-athletes challenged the makers of sports video games, a
college licensing company and the NCAA.

Former UCLA basketball star Edward O'Bannon claimed in the 2009
federal class action that students were forced to sign away the
rights to their own images if they wanted to play NCAA sports.

Like many other former athletes, Mr. O'Bannon's collegiate career
is archived in video footage, photographs and that content is
sold through merchandising deals.

In their class action, the former athletes said NCAA's backlog of
archived footage is estimated to be valued in the billions of
dollars.

Additional defendants included video game publisher Electronic
Arts and Collegiate Licensing Company.

In 2015, a Ninth Circuit upheld U.S. District Judge Claudia
Wilken's finding that the NCAA violated antitrust laws with rules
that were more restrictive than necessary. But the Ninth Circuit
did not agree with Judge Wilken's order awarding college athletes
$5,000 for each year they played in college.

The appeals court instead said NCAA schools could cover the cost
of tuition, but the student-athletes were not entitled to
additional cash.

In 2016, Judge Wilken ordered the NCAA to pay about $42.3 million
in attorneys' fees and other costs -- later lowered to just over
$40 million -- and the NCAA made a failed bid to bring the case
the Supreme Court.

Fighting the fee award at the Ninth Circuit on Feb. 15, NCAA
attorney Gregory Curtner from Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila said
plaintiffs adopted a winner-take-all approach in their antitrust
class action on Feb. 15 before the three-judge panel.

"A Game of Thrones approach.  There was no middle ground," said
Mr. Curtner, who noted the student-athletes sought to
revolutionize intercollegiate sports, failed, and aren't entitled
to a fee award.

"They're entitled to nothing," Mr. Curtner said bluntly.

The student-athletes' attorney Jonathan Massey --
Jmassey@masseygail.com -- from Massey & Gail said the case was a
hard-fought class action that didn't just end with "a narrow
injunction."  When analyzing the degree of success in the for a
fee award, Massey said the Ninth Circuit panel should keep in
mind that not all claims need to be successful.

"We think this court has established that it's OK to lose
sometimes," said Mr. Massey.  "You don't have to win every single
claim in order to be entitled fees for all of the claims."

The panel was made of Chief Circuit Judge Sidney Thomas, Circuit
Judge Jay Bybee and Senior U.S. District Judge Gordon Quist
sitting by designation from the Western District of Michigan.
The panel did not say when they would make their decision.


NEIMAN MARCUS: Appeal in "Tanguilig" Suit Still Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report for the
quarterly period ended October 28, 2017, that an appeal from a
court decision in the Bernadette Tanguilig class action lawsuit
remains pending.  Briefing is complete, and a judicial panel has
been assigned. The parties have requested oral argument, but no
date has been set.

In 2007, Bernadette Tanguilig filed a lawsuit in the Superior
Court of California for San Francisco County alleging wrongful
termination and retaliation arising from her refusal to sign the
Company's mandatory arbitration agreement. Ms. Tanguilig later
filed several amendments to her complaint adding claims under the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") and
class action allegations of wage and hour violations. She also
added Juan Carlos Pinela as an additional plaintiff. In December
2013, the Company filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Tanguilig's
claims based on her failure to bring her claims to trial within
five years as required by California law. In February 2014, the
Company's motion was granted and Ms. Tanguilig's claims were
dismissed. Ms. Tanguilig appealed.

In October 2011, the court ordered Mr. Pinela (a co-plaintiff in
the Tanguilig case) to arbitrate his claims in accordance with
the mandatory arbitration agreement. Mr. Pinela filed a demand
for arbitration seeking to arbitrate both his individual and
class claims, which the Company argued was in violation of the
class action waiver in the arbitration agreement. This led to
further proceedings in the trial court, a stay of the
arbitration, and a decision by the trial court to reconsider and
vacate its order compelling arbitration, which the Company
appealed. In June 2015, the appellate court upheld the trial
court's denial of the Company's motion to compel arbitration of
Mr. Pinela's claims. The Company's petition for rehearing by the
appellate court and petition for review by the California Supreme
Court were denied, and the case was returned to the trial court.
On December 10, 2015, the trial court issued a stay of the case
pending the conclusion of the Tanguilig appeal, which remains in
effect.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: "Rubenstein" Settlement Motion Due March 14
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Linda Rubenstein v. The Neiman Marcus Group LLC et
al., Case No. 2:14-cv-07155 (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. S. James Otero
signed off on a Stipulation continuing the deadline for plaintiff
to file a motion for preliminary approval of a class action
settlement until March 14, 2018.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report for the
Quarterly Period Ended October 28, 2017, that a putative class
action complaint was filed on August 7, 2014, against The Neiman
Marcus Group LLC in Los Angeles County Superior Court by a
customer, Linda Rubenstein, in connection with the Company's Last
Call stores in California. Ms. Rubenstein alleges that the
Company has violated various California consumer protection
statutes by implementing a marketing and pricing strategy that
suggests that clothing sold at Last Call stores in California was
originally offered for sale at full-line Neiman Marcus stores
when allegedly, it was not, and that the Company lacks adequate
information to support its comparative pricing labels. In
September 2014, we removed the case to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California.

After dismissing Ms. Rubenstein's original and first amended
complaint, the court dismissed her second amended complaint in
its entirety in May 2015, without leave to amend, and Ms.
Rubenstein appealed. In April 2017, the Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that Ms. Rubenstein's allegations were sufficient to
proceed past the pleadings stage of litigation. The case has been
transferred back to the district court and has a trial date of
July 24, 2018. On September 7, 2017, the district court issued an
order permitting Ms. Rubenstein to file a proposed Third Amended
Complaint, which modifies the putative class period.
Additionally, Ms. Rubenstein filed a motion for class
certification, which was set for hearing on December 18, 2017.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Proceeds in "Ohle" Class Settlement Distributed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The proceeds of the settlement in the lawsuit, Catherine Ohle v.
Neiman Marcus Group, have been distributed to the class members,
Neiman Marcus said in a regulatory filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

On September 27, 2016, a dormant Illinois putative class action
lawsuit, Catherine Ohle v. Neiman Marcus Group, originally filed
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, was revived by an Illinois
appeals court when it reversed a June 2014 trial court's order
granting summary judgment to the Company and dismissing the
matter in its entirety. In Ohle, the plaintiff alleged that the
Company's prior practice of conducting pre-employment credit
checks of sales associates and considering credit history as a
factor in its hiring decisions violated the Illinois Employee
Credit Privacy Act. The appellate court reversed, holding that no
exemption applied.

The Company appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court,
and review was denied on January 25, 2017. The case was returned
to the trial court for further proceedings. On September 19,
2017, the court granted final approval of a class settlement,
Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year
ended July 29, 2017.

Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-Q report for the Quarterly
Period Ended October 28, 2017, that the class settlement has been
funded and the proceeds have been distributed to the class
members. Any class proceeds that are uncashed or unable to be
distributed will be provided to two charities designated by
Neiman Marcus.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: "Attia" Class Action Remains Stayed
--------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-Q report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
Quarterly Period Ended October 28, 2017, that the case by Holly
Attia remains stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP.

The Company has several wage and hour putative class action
matters pending in California. The earliest, filed in December
2015 and amended in February 2016, was filed against The Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc. by Holly Attia and seven other named
plaintiffs, seeking to certify a class of nonexempt employees for
alleged violations for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to
provide meal and rest breaks, failure to reimburse business
expenses, failure to timely pay wages due at termination and
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Plaintiffs
also allege derivative claims for restitution under California
unfair competition law and a representative claim for penalties
under PAGA, and all related damages for alleged violations
(restitution, statutory penalties under PAGA, and attorneys'
fees, interest and costs of suit).

The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California in March 2016, and the Company filed a
motion to compel arbitration and requested to stay the PAGA
claim. In June 2016, the court granted the motion and compelled
arbitration of the individual claims. The court retained
jurisdiction of the PAGA claim and stayed that claim pending the
outcome of arbitration.

In October 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of the arbitration decision based on a recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Morris v. Ernst
& Young, LLP, and reversed its order compelling arbitration. The
Company appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari of
the Morris decision, and the Ninth Circuit appeal is currently
stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision. In June 2017, the
district court stayed the entire case pending the Supreme Court's
decision in Morris.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: "Nguyen" Suit in California Remains Stayed
---------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
has maintained the stay of the case launched by Xuan Hien Nguyen
against Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, the Company said in a
regulatory filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

On June 1, 2016, a PAGA representative action was filed against
The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. in the same court as Attia by Xuan
Hien Nguyen pleading only PAGA claims and asserting the same
factual allegations as the plaintiffs in Attia. The Company filed
a motion to dismiss or to stay the case. In September 2016, the
court granted the Company's motion and stayed the Nguyen case in
light of Attia.

At a status conference on September 5, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for November 8,
2017, Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal
year ended July 29, 2017.

At a status conference on November 8, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for January 29,
2018, Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-Q Report for the
Quarterly Period Ended October 28, 2017.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: "Connolly" Suit Remains Stayed
---------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
has maintained the stay of the case launched by Milca Connolly
against Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC, the Company said in a
regulatory filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

On July 28, 2016, former employee Milca Connolly also filed a
representative action alleging only PAGA claims against The
Neiman Marcus Group raising substantially identical claims to
those raised in both Attia and Nguyen. The Company filed a motion
to dismiss or stay the case in light of Attia and Nguyen. In
November 2016, the court granted the Company's motion to stay the
case.

At a status conference on September 5, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for November 8,
2017, Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal
year ended July 29, 2017.

In its Form 10-Q Report for the Quarterly Period Ended October
28, 2017, Neiman Marcus said that at a status conference on
November 8, 2017, the court maintained the stay and set a further
status conference for January 29, 2018.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Facing Class Suit by Healthcare Plan Beneficiary
---------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report for the
Quarterly Period Ended October 28, 2017, that a putative class
action complaint was filed against The Neiman Marcus Group LLC
and the Company's Health and Welfare Benefit Plan in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington on October
24, 2017, by a Plan beneficiary alleging violations of the
Federal Mental Health Parity Act and the Affordable Care Act
through the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") in connection with the alleged failure to cover
particular treatments for developmental health conditions.

"We cannot assess any potential liability at this early stage of
the proceedings," the Company said.


NEIMAN MARCUS: Faces NY Class Suit by Visually Impaired
-------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report for the
Quarterly Period Ended October 28, 2017, that a putative class
action complaint was filed on October 27, 2017, against Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc., The Neiman Marcus Group LLC, and Bergdorf
Goodman, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York by Victor Lopez, an allegedly visually-
impaired and legally blind individual, in connection with his
visits to Bergdorf Goodman, Inc.'s website. Mr. Lopez alleges, on
behalf of himself and those similarly situated, that Bergdorf
Goodman, Inc.'s website is not fully and equally accessible to
legally blind individuals, resulting in denial of access to the
equal enjoyment of goods and services, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York State and City
Human Rights Laws.


NEIMAN MARCUS: Settlement of Cyber-Attack Suits Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC continues to await court approval of
the settlement reached in the Cyber-Attack Class Action
Litigation.

In January 2014, three class actions relating to a cyber-attack
on Neiman Marcus' computer systems in 2013 (the "Cyber-Attack")
were filed and later voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs
between February and April 2014. The plaintiffs had alleged
negligence and other claims in connection with their purchases by
payment cards and sought monetary and injunctive relief. Three
additional putative class actions relating to the Cyber-Attack
were filed in March and April 2014, also alleging negligence and
other claims in connection with plaintiffs' purchases by payment
cards. Two of the cases were voluntarily dismissed. The third
case, Hilary Remijas v. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, was filed
on March 12, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.

On June 2, 2014, an amended complaint in the Remijas case was
filed, which added three plaintiffs (Debbie Farnoush and Joanne
Kao, California residents; and Melissa Frank, a New York
resident) and asserted claims for negligence, implied contract,
unjust enrichment, violation of various consumer protection
statutes, invasion of privacy and violation of state data breach
laws. The Company moved to dismiss the Remijas amended complaint,
and the court granted the Company's motion on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked standing due to their failure to
demonstrate an actionable injury. Plaintiffs appealed the
district court's order dismissing the case to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's ruling, remanding the case back to
the district court. The Company filed a petition for rehearing en
banc, which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied.

The Company filed a motion for dismissal on other grounds, which
the court denied. The parties jointly requested, and the court
granted, an extension of time for filing a responsive pleading,
which was due on December 28, 2016.

On February 9, 2017, the court denied the parties' request for
another extension of time, dismissed the case without prejudice,
and stated that plaintiffs could file a motion to reinstate.

On March 8, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate, which
the court granted on March 16, 2017.

On March 17, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking preliminary
approval of a class action settlement resolving this action,
which the court granted on June 21, 2017.

As widely reported, Neiman Marcus agreed to pay $1.6 million to
end the data breach lawsuit.

The court set for October 26, 2017 as the date for a fairness
hearing and consideration of final approval of the class action
settlement.

In September 2017, purported settlement class members filed two
objections asking the court to deny final approval of the
proposed settlement. The plaintiffs' and the Company's responses
to the objections are due on October 19, 2017, Neiman Marcus said
in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year ended July 29, 2017.

In its Form 10-Q Report for the Quarterly Period Ended October
28, 2017, Neiman Marcus disclosed that at the fairness hearing on
October 26, 2017, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the
objections. Objectors filed a supplemental brief in support of
their objections on November 9, 2017, and plaintiffs and the
Company filed their supplemental responses to the objections on
November 21, 2017. The Court has advised that it intends to rule
in writing on plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the
settlement.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman
and MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NISSAN MOTORS: CSC Suit Struggles to Obtain Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a
Nissan 370Z CSC (concentric slave cylinder) failure lawsuit is
still struggling for class-action certification as the plaintiff
tries to convince the judge about Nissan vehicles with clutch
pedals that fall to the floorboards.

According to the lawsuit, the Nissan 370Z and other models have
clutch pedals that stay on the floors because the thin aluminum
concentric slave cylinders don't transfer heat effectively.

In 2016, plaintiff Huu Nguyen filed the proposed class-action
lawsuit concerning Nissan 370Z cars, but the lawsuit was later
amended to the current version that adds the 2007-2009 Nissan
350Z, 2007-2008 Infiniti G35, the 2008-2014 Infiniti G37 and the
Infiniti Q60, all equipped with FS6R31A manual transmissions.

When the driver pushes the clutch pedal, "fluid pushes from the
clutch master cylinder to the slave cylinder, developing
hydraulic pressure and ultimately disconnecting the transmission
from the engine via the clutch disc to allow for smooth gear
shifts."

The plaintiff says the FS6R31A transmission has an internal slave
cylinder "placed inside the [bellhousing] unit along with the
clutch disc, pressure plate, and flywheel."

According to the lawsuit, the transmissions have defects in the
slave cylinder assemblies because "the plastic internal cylinder
requires excessive manipulation during the initial assembly in
order to fit inside the bellhousing unit."

The plaintiff claims this causes hydraulic fluid to leak from
stress fractures, taking fluid away from the slave cylinder and
allegedly damaging the clutch slave cylinder, clutch disc and
pressure plate.

On top of that, Mr. Nguyen says the slave cylinder is too thin
and prone to corrosion by constant exposure to hydraulic fluid.
This eventually causes the clutch pedal to fall to the floor and
leave a driver unable to shift gears.

According to the plaintiff, Nissan knew or should have known
about the clutch problems since at least 2008, but complaints
about the 2007 Nissan 350Z started in 2007.

In January 2008, Nissan issued customer service program "CSP
NTB08-002" for all 2007 Nissan 350Z cars because the clutch slave
cylinder assemblies could have experienced problems during
manufacturing after repairs were made.

The problem could cause the clutch pedal to feel "light" and
cause a driver problems using the clutch.  However, the lawsuit
alleges customers kept complaining about the clutch pedals.

Then in April 2013, Nissan issued a technical service bulletin
(TSB) for all 2009-2013 Nissan 370Z cars because of loose clutch
pedals that stayed on the floorboards.  Nissan dealers were told
to change the clutch hydraulic fluid, but the lawsuit alleges
owners continued to complain.

Mr. Nguyen says he bought a new 2012 Nissan 370Z in January 2012
from a California Nissan dealer, but in March 2014 and with about
26,629 miles on the odometer, the plaintiff told a Nissan dealer
the clutch pedal felt soft and would stick on the floor while the
car was in motion.

Based on the 2013 service bulletin, technicians replaced the
car's hydraulic fluid, but the plaintiff says the "repair was
inadequate" and the problem continued.  Nissan then "replaced the
vehicle's clutch master cylinder, clutch slave cylinder, and
brake tube at the clutch slave cylinder," which required "removal
of the entire transmission."

Even with all the repairs, Mr. Nguyen claims the car continued to
suffer from clutch pedal problems.  In February 2016 and with
about 50,000 miles on the odometer, the car was taken to a third-
party repair shop and had the clutch slave cylinder replaced with
an identical slave cylinder at a cost of $721.75 to Mr. Nguyen.

The Nissan 370Z clutch lawsuit was filed in September 2016 for
all owners and lessees of 2009-2016 Nissan 370Z cars, but in
December Nissan filed a motion to dismiss by arguing the
plaintiff had adequate legal remedies at hand.

The plaintiff didn't fight Nissan's dismissal request, but in
January 2017 both parties agreed to allow the plaintiff to file
the first amended lawsuit to try to fix deficiencies in the
complaint.

In February 2017, the plaintiff filed the amended complaint that
added additional models to the original 370Z clutch lawsuit:
2007-2009 Nissan 350Z, 2007-2008 Infiniti G35, the 2008-2014
Infiniti G37 and the Infiniti Q60.

Nissan filed another motion to dismiss by telling the judge the
lawsuit doesn't meet legal standards to be certified as a class-
action lawsuit.  The automaker argues the plaintiff has done
nothing to prove current and former owners have suffered the same
alleged harm.

Nissan told the judge the lawsuit should not be certified because
there are too many individual issues involved and the plaintiff
never shows that owners have the same probability of experiencing
the alleged clutch problems.  Nissan further argues every
affected vehicle would need to be checked because the implied
warranty claims involve individual cases.

Attorneys for Nissan also argue trying to determine damages by
using the average cost of repairs has no basis in legal fact and
the claim should be dismissed.

The Nissan concentric slave cylinder lawsuit was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California -
Nguyen v. Nissan North America Inc.

The plaintiff is represented by Capstone Law APC.

CarComplaints.com has complaints filed by owners of the Nissan
vehicles included in the concentric slave cylinder failure
lawsuit:

Nissan 350Z
Nissan 370Z
Infiniti G35
Infiniti G37
Infiniti Q60 [GN]


OHIO HOSPICE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Count III in "Spano"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VIRGINIA SPANO and SUSAN MIZAK, Plaintiffs. v. OHIO
HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE d/b/a Paramount Hospice and
Palliative Care, PARAMOUNT HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE, and JAMES
J. COX, individually, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-717
(W.D. Pa.), Judge Christopher C. Conner of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the
Defendants' motion dismiss Count III of the Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint.

Spano and Mizak commenced the action against their former
employers asserting claims under Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and
Collection Law ("WPCL"), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and a common law claim for wrongful discharge.

Spano and Mizak worked for Ohio Hospice which does business in
Pennsylvania as Paramount Hospice and Palliative Care.  Cox owns
Paramount Hospice.  Spano and Mizak allege that they each had a
written employment contract as well as "an implied oral contract"
that provided for overtime pay.  Hospice employees are required
to sign in and out at the reception desk each day and submit
timesheets logging their hours.  Spano and Mizak aver that they
were not permitted to include overtime hours worked on these
timesheets.

Spano and Mizak reported patients' "deplorable conditions" to the
Defendants.  They also informed supervisors of instances of
Medicare and Medicaid fraud.  They assert that the Defendants
retaliated against them for reporting the alleged fraud and abuse
of elderly patients by terminating their employment on Nov. 24,
2015.  They claim that the termination was partially grounded in
age discrimination as well.

Spano and Mizak contend that, following their termination, the
Defendants prevented them from filling out their final timesheets
and subsequently accused Spano and Mizak of falsifying various
timesheets during their employment.  They allege that there is a
class of the Defendants' current and former employees who are
owed overtime pay earned during the last five years.

Spano and Mizak filed an administrative complaint with the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a
right-to-sue letter.  On March 22, 2017, Spano and Mizak filed a
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania.

The Defendants removed the case to federal court on June 1, 2017.
Spano and Mizak are presently proceeding on their second amended
complaint.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
the Defendants move to dismiss Count III of the second amended
complaint which asserts a putative class action claim for
violation of the WPCL.  Alternatively, they seek to strike
certain allegations related to the putative class in Count III
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

The Defendants identify language in paragraphs 3 and 25 of the
second amended complaint in support of their argument that Spano
and Mizak have pled a fail-safe class.  The paragraphs read in
pertinent part the Plaintiffs, all Those Similarly Situated
refers to all employees and former employees of the Defendant
whose wages remain unpaid beyond 30 days or more in violation of
the WPCL.  Ad that based on information and belief, employees and
former employees of the Defendant had wages that have remained
unpaid beyond 30 days or more in violation of the WPCL.  The
Defendants contend that the class alleged in these paragraphs is
fail-safe because it requires the Plaintiffs to establish
liability in order to ascertain the identities of class members.

Judge Conner disagrees.  He says the parameters of the class are
ascertainable from the four corners of the Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint.  Spano and Mizak limit the putative class to
individuals employed by the Defendants during the last five years
who were denied overtime wages.  The class is further narrowed to
individuals who were required to omit overtime hours worked from
their timesheets.  To identify the former and current employees
who meet these criteria, Spano and Mizak propose to utilize the
Defendants' business records, specifically the sign in sheets
maintained by the receptionist and the timesheets submitted by
employees.  Spano and Mizak argue that they can compare
employees' true hours worked with the hours actually reported on
timesheets to ascertain which employees may be entitled to
withheld overtime pay.

The Judge says these business records constitute objective
criteria and a feasible, reliable mechanism for determining which
putative class members actually fall within the class definition.
Moreover, Spano and Mizak are not relying on the potential class
members' word when determining whether they were required to omit
overtime hours worked from their timesheets.  Paragraphs 3 and 25
standing alone might constitute a fail-safe class, but Spano and
Mizak satisfied their burden by providing objective criteria
elsewhere in the second amended complaint to show that the
putative class is ascertainable.

Therefore, Judge Conner denied the Defendants' motion.  An
appropriate order will issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/GvuwXw from Leagle.com.

VIRGINIA SPANO & SUSAN MIZAK, All Those Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Robert M. Davant --
info@pittsburghjustice.com -- Davant & Associates.

OHIO HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE, doing business as PARAMOUNT
HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE & PARAMOUNT HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE
CARE, Defendants, represented by April L. Cressler --
alcressler@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &
Goggin & Danielle M. Vugrinovich -- dmvugrinovich@mdwcg.com --
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin.

JAMES J. COX, Individually, Defendant, represented by Danielle M.
Vugrinovich, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin.


PAGEDALE, MO: Class Action Plaintiffs Agree with Consent Decree
---------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis Post-Dispatch reports that a federal judge's recent
preliminary approval of a sweeping consent decree forcing the
city of Pagedale to repeal cash-generating ordinances prompts a
legitimate question of whether the municipality could be the next
in St. Louis County to disincorporate.  Municipalities that
cannot deliver services without preying on citizens should be
dissolved.

Pagedale, with an area of about one square mile, denies that
ordinances -- such as a ban on sagging pants, walking on the left
side of a crosswalk, walking in a roadway if a sidewalk is
nearby, or barbecuing in your front yard (unless it's a national
holiday) -- are intended to raise revenue.  Community ordinances
banning dish antennas, basketball hoops, volleyball nets,
swimming or wading pools or other recreational equipment in the
front of a house also will be repealed.

City leaders say the ordinances are aimed at safety and quality
of life.  Maintaining standards in a community is a worthwhile
goal, but harassing and agitating residents with phony excuses
for raising revenue should not be part of the effort.

In 2014, Pagedale handed out 2,555 citations for such offenses,
nearly two per household for the city, the Post-Dispatch
reported.  An analysis of state court data showed that to be a
nearly 500 percent increase from 2010 -- which would be a
shocking wave of lawlessness by residents if the basis for the
citations weren't so contrived.

What happened over those years was that Pagedale, along with some
other municipalities, began raising money from non-traffic cases
because of a Missouri law that caps the amount of revenue
municipalities can collect from traffic fines.

The consent decree does not require Pagedale to refund money to
citizens who were ticketed or to pay attorney's fees.  Those who
were ticketed will not face jail unless they have an attorney or
have waived their right to an attorney.

The decree bans the city from using municipal arrest warrants to
collect civil court debt, which Pagedale denied doing.  City
authorities also agree to hold at least one day session and one
night court session monthly, and to hold no more than seven
trials per court session.

Pagedale residents Valarie Whitner, Vincent Blount and retiree
Mildred Bryant, plaintiffs in the class-action lawsuit against
the city, agreed with the consent decree.  Ms. Whitner said it
was "in the best interests of the class."

Among abuses cited in the lawsuit, Ms. Bryant was ordered to
repaint her house and ensure that it had matching curtains or
other window treatments.  Authorities threatened to demolish
Ms. Whitner and Mr. Blount's house after they were ticketed for
such offenses as high grass, peeling paint, an overgrown tree and
failing to recycle.

This is another solid reason to consolidate St. Louis County's
disparate municipalities and make more efficient use of taxpayer
money. [GN]


PARK STERLING: Merger Class Suits Dismissed
-------------------------------------------
Park Sterling Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2017, that the plaintiffs agreed to the
dismissal of their individual claims asserted in a class action
lawsuit related to a merger agreement.

On August 14, 2017, a putative stockholder class action lawsuit
captioned Roskopf v. Park Sterling Corp., C.A. No. 3:17-cv-00483,
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina in connection with the South State Merger and on
August 15, 2017, a similar putative stockholder class action
lawsuit captioned Parshall v. Park Sterling Corp., C.A. No. 3:17-
cv-00490 was filed in the same court.  Both Actions named as
defendants the Company and the Company's board of directors, and
the Parshall Action also named South State as a defendant. The
complaints in the Actions assert that the Company, the Company's
board of directors and, in the Parshall Action, South State,
omitted and/or provided misleading information in the
registration statement on Form S-4 filed with the SEC in
connection with the Merger in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and related SEC regulations.

The Company believes the Actions are without merit and
specifically denies that any further supplemental disclosure is
required under applicable law; however, to avoid the burden and
expense of further litigation and to avoid the risk that the
Actions may delay or otherwise adversely affect the consummation
of the merger, on October12, 2017, the Company entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the plaintiffs in the Actions
and the other named defendants regarding the settlement of the
Actions.

Pursuant to the terms of the MOU, the Company made available
additional information regarding the Merger in the Company's
Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the SEC on October 13,
2017. In return, the plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of their
individual claims asserted in the Actions with prejudice and to
the dismissal without prejudice of the claims asserted in the
Actions on behalf of a purported class of the Company's
shareholders pursuant to stipulations of dismissal to be filed
within three business days after the consummation of the Merger.

On November 30, 2017, pursuant to the terms of the Merger
Agreement, Park Sterling merged with and into South State, with
South State continuing as the surviving entity in the Merger.
Immediately after the Merger, Park Sterling's wholly owned bank
subsidiary, Park Sterling Bank, merged with and into South
State's wholly owned bank subsidiary, South State Bank, with
South State Bank as the surviving entity in the Bank Merger.

Park Sterling Corporation operates as the holding company for the
Park Sterling Bank, which provides various banking products and
services. The company offers a range of banking products,
including personal, business, and non-profit checking accounts;
IOLTA accounts; individual retirement accounts; business and
personal money market accounts; and time deposits, overdraft
protection, and safe deposit boxes, as well as online and mobile
banking services.


PCL CONSTRUCTION: Stay in Power Outage Suit Stay Extended
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge James C. Dever, III, of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina, Eastern Division, extended
the stay of the case, IN RE: OUTER BANKS POWER OUTAGE LITIGATION
This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Master File No. 4:17-CV-
141-D (E.D. N.C.) and stayed all proceedings in the matter up to
and including Feb. 12, 2018.

The parties filed their joint request to Amend the Interim Case
Management Plan (DE 5) and Joint Motion to Stay.  Finding that
good cause is shown and all parties consent, Judge Dever adopted
the parties' proposal.  Accordingly, he ordered that the stay be
extended and all proceedings in the matter will be stayed up to
and including Feb. 12, 2018.  He directed the Defendants to file
their Answer or responsive pleading to the Master Class Action
Complaint, 21 days after the end of the stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MFJgEp from Leagle.com.

Island Vibe Cafe, Morning Star Stables, TBM Construction &
Michael Janssen, Plaintiffs, represented by Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, John A. Yanchunis, Morgan &
Morgan Complex Litigation Group, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP & Daniel K.
Bryson -- dan@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Rhonda Derring, Robert Case & Marissa Gross, d/b/a Down Creek
Galleries, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel K. Bryson,
Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP, Matthew E. Lee -- matt@wbmllp.com
-- Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP, Scott C. Harris --
scott@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP & Joseph G.
Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo LLP.

Miss Ocracoke, Inc., Stephen J Wilson, Hatteras Blue, Inc.,
Steven J. Harris, Steven Wright, Charles Edward Hofmann & Alex
Daniel Garrish, Plaintiffs, represented by John R. Taylor,
Zaytoun Law Firm, PLLC, Matthew David Ballew, Zaytoun Law Firm,
PLLC, Robert E. Zaytoun, Zaytoun Law Firm, PLLC, Joseph G.
Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo LLP & Daniel K. Bryson, Whitfield,
Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Matthew Breveleri, Plaintiff, represented by Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, Patrick Donovan --
donovan@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Alder Freeman & Herz LLP,
Thomas H. Burt -- burt@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Alder
Freeman & Herz LLP, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo LLP &
Daniel K. Bryson, Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Thomas Edgar, Nina Edgar, Edward Waas & Jack Lewis, Plaintiffs,
represented by J. Michael Malone, Hendren, Redwine & Malone,
PLLC, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo LLP & Daniel K.
Bryson, Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Briggs McEwan, Las Olas, Inc., Tri-V Conery, Inc., Tami Lynette
Gray, d/b/a Family Water Adventures, Daniel Spaventa, Karen
Fitzpatrick & Edwin Fitzpatrick, Plaintiffs, represented by
Dennis C. Rose, Rose Harrison & Gilreath, P.C., John S. Hughes,
Wallace and Graham, P.A., M. Peebles Harrison, Rose Harrison &
Gilreath, P.C., Mona Lisa Wallace, Wallace and Graham, P.A.,
Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo LLP & Daniel K. Bryson,
Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Mike Warren, William Bailey & Kerry Fitzgerald, Plaintiffs,
represented by Daniel K. Bryson , Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

PCL Construction Enterprises, Inc., PCL Civil Constructors, Inc.,
PCL Construction Services, Inc. & PCL Construction Resources
(U.S.A.), Inc., Defendants, represented by Alexandra L. Couch --
acouch@ymwlaw.com -- Yates, McLamb & Weyher, LLP, David Michael
Fothergill -- dfothergill@ymwlaw.com -- Yates, McLamb & Weyher,
LLP & Rodney E. Pettey -- rpettey@ymwlaw.com -- Yates, McLamb &
Weyher, LLP.


PELLA: Settles Class Action Over ProLine Windows for $25.75MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
Trey Barrineau, writing for Door & Window Market Magazine,
reports that a 12-year-old class-action lawsuit against Pella is
over after the company agreed to pay $25.75 million to homeowners
who purchased aluminum-clad wood casement windows between
January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2009.

A filing in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois shows that Pella has agreed to set up a
$25.75 million fund for those who filed claims about its ProLine
windows, which the plaintiffs say "contain a latent defect that
allows water to penetrate and leak behind the aluminum cladding,
resulting in premature wood rot and other physical damage to both
the window and the main structure." The company will also set
aside another $9 million in attorney's fees, costs and expenses.

If all 700,000-plus members of the plaintiff class submit
eligible claims, each would get about $35, according to The Cook
County Record.  However, the legal publication cites a study by
Duke University School of Law that shows less than 10 percent of
eligible claimants in class-action suits actually submit claims.
If that turns out to be the situation in the Pella case, each
claimant could get about $350.

Pella agreed to place ads in Good Housekeeping, People and
Reader's Digest announcing the settlement.  Additionally, a
website for claims will be established, and potential class
claimants will also receive letters.

"We are pleased to have created a settlement framework to resolve
this 12-year-old case," Pella said in a statement.  "The
settlement provides Pella's customers with a claims process for
older ProLine casement, awning and transom windows.  In the
overwhelming majority of cases, these Pella windows performed
extremely  well, as designed.  The settlement is structured to
address the relatively small number of windows that may have
experienced a problem.  The lawsuit does not involve any products
currently sold by Pella and Pella continues to innovate in the
design and features of our windows and doors to improve their
performance and customer benefits."

The class-action lawsuit has been in the federal court system
since 2006.  In 2013, a $90 million settlement was announced that
gave the lawyers working on the case $11 million in legal fees.

However, that decision was appealed, and in 2014 it was
overturned by the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
according to The Cook County Record.  The appeals court cited a
"grave conflict of interest" because the lead counsel in the
class action litigation, Paul Weiss, was the son-in-law of
Leonard Saltzman, the man who had initially filed the lawsuit.
Additionally, Mr. Saltzman's daughter and Mr. Weiss' wife also
worked at the law firm handling the case.

"Only a tiny number of class members would have known about the
family relationship between the lead class representative and the
lead class counsel -- a relationship that created a grave
conflict of interest; for the larger the fee award to class
counsel, the better off Mr. Saltzman's daughter and son-in-law
would be financially -- and (which sharped the conflict of
interest) by a lot," wrote former judge Richard Posner in the
decision.

Mr. Weiss was eventually disbarred in 2015 by the Illinois
Supreme Court. [GN]


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Dismissal of Amended Antitrust Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal on Feb. 12 of a second
amended antitrust monopoly complaint against Quest Diagnostics,
in an unpublished opinion.


RADIOSHACK CORP: Obtains Favorable Ruling in ERISA Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nevin E. Adams, JD, writing for NAPA Net, reports that plan
fiduciaries have prevailed on appeal -- as they did at the
district court level -- against charges that they violated their
fiduciary duties under ERISA by continuing to allow employer
stock as an investment option, even as the firm slipped into
bankruptcy.

The plaintiffs here -- Manoj P. Singh, Jeffrey Snyder and William
A. Gerhart -- brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of those
who participated in RadioShack Corporation's 401(k) plan and held
RadioShack stock in their 401(k) accounts after Nov. 30, 2011.

The RadioShack 401(k) Plan provided an investment menu with more
than 20 investment options, and also had an employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP) that allowed participants to invest their
retirement savings in RadioShack stock, which was held in the
RadioShack Stock Fund.

Shack 'Shock'

During the class period, RadioShack's stock price dropped from
$11.48 per share to "pennies" as the company slumped toward
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, according to the ruling of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.  In an opinion authored by Chief
Judge Carl E. Stewart, with Judges E. Grady Jolly and Priscilla
Richman Owen joining, the court noted that the complaint
"describes RadioShack's demise at length, citing numerous
articles that document the company's descent from an electronics
powerhouse to an obsolete brick-and-mortar retailer" -- a decline
that it notes was ". . . accompanied by a series of poor annual
and quarterly financial results, including eleven consecutive
quarters of substantial net losses and significant drops in
income from year to year."

Despite a series of turnaround initiatives, the stock continued
to decline, and in early 2014, RadioShack's financial advisors
counseled the board of directors to consider selling the company
or restructuring through bankruptcy.  The court noted that the
board of directors was also informed that the company's creditors
were restricting access to credit and vendors were demanding
letters of credit as a condition of business, as the stock
continued to lose value.  In its regular meeting on June 20,
2014, the plan committee decided to send participants a targeted
diversification letter.  The court noted that in the committee's
eight previous meetings, it had reviewed RadioShack's stock
performance but had not expressly considered limiting or removing
it from the plan.

Committee Consideration

In what was described as an "ad hoc" meeting on July 11, 2014 to
consider the propriety of RadioShack stock as a plan investment
option in view of a recent rating downgrade, including
consideration of freezing or capping future contributions,
removing the stock from the plan, and aggressively educating
participants about the importance of diversification and risks of
investing in a single stock.  Ultimately, they decided to freeze
future plan participant investment in RadioShack stock "as soon
as administratively feasible," which was Sept. 15, 2014.
However, the committee declined to divest the stock, reasoning
that it would force participants to sell their shares at an all-
time low and would send a negative message about the company's
prospects.

Ultimately, RadioShack was delisted from the New York Stock
Exchange and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Feb. 5, 2015.  In
October 2015, RadioShack stock was cancelled in bankruptcy
proceedings.

Case, Closed?

As noted above, the three named plaintiffs in this class action
had filed suit against the members of the plan committee, the
board of directors, and the plan trustees, as well as the plan
administrative committee and trustees of the RadioShack Puerto
Rico 1165(e) Plan.  The district court consolidated the cases.
Shortly after the plaintiffs filed their class action complaint,
they settled with the trustees.  The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the first complaint but granted the
plaintiffs leave to file a second, amended complaint.  However,
the district court concluded that the second, amended claim
failed to state a cause of action and dismissed all of
plaintiffs' claims and entered final judgment -- to which the
plaintiffs appealed.

The plaintiffs alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary
duties under ERISA by allowing the plan to invest in RadioShack
stock -- first, by failing to respond to public information
spelling RadioShack's financial ruin or insider information
suggesting RadioShack's stock was overvalued.  Secondly, they
argued that argued that the defendants violated the duty of
loyalty -- some by owning RadioShack stock, and others by not
owning it.  And thirdly, they argued that the director-defendants
failed to monitor the Committee adequately.

In the decision, Chief Judge Stewart noted that ERISA requires
fiduciaries to manage plan assets "with the care, skill prudence,
and diligence . . . that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters" would use under the circumstances
-- a duty that "trumps the instructions of a plan document, such
as an instruction to invest exclusively in employer stock even if
financial goals demand the contrary."

He went on to cite the Supreme Court's ruling in Fifth Third Bank
v. Dudenhoeffer, in which the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that
the duty of prudence applies fully to ESOPs, except that ESOPs
need not be diversified. Judge Stewart noted that Dudenhoeffer
establishes that for publicly traded stocks, "allegations that a
fiduciary should have recognized from publicly available
information alone that the market was over- or undervaluing the
stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in the absence
of special circumstances."  Thus, unless some "special
circumstance[]" makes the market price unreliable, "ERISA
fiduciaries  . . . may, as a general matter . . . prudently rely
on the market price" as a fair assessment of a stock's value.

Under that standard, Judge Stewart concluded that the plan
fiduciaries did not breach the duty of prudence by relying on
market price as a fair indicator of the value of RadioShack
stock.  While the complaint referenced scores of news articles
and analyst reports detailing RadioShack's demise, ". . . the
complaint provides no plausible reason that the negative
commentary from these sources was not incorporated into the
RadioShack stock price.  On the contrary, the overall decline in
the price of RadioShack stock during the class period shows that
the market accounted for this negative information."  Moreover,
the court concluded that "special circumstances" needed to exist,
and that while the Supreme Court had not yet defined those, it
has "said that such circumstances "affect[] the reliability of
the market price as 'an unbiased assessment of the security's
value in light of all public information.'" However, based on
this standard, the court concluded that "none of Plaintiffs'
allegations are special circumstances as defined in
Dudenhoeffer."

Citing Tibble v. Edison International, the plaintiffs also
alleged that the defendants failed to investigate the continued
prudence of the plan's investment in RadioShack stock and that
that failure amounted to a "special circumstance."  However,
Judge Stewart wrote that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege
that the purported lack of investigation had any effect on the
reliability of the market price, "so it cannot be a special
circumstance under Dudenhoeffer." And since the complaint does
not plausibly identify any special circumstances undermining the
market price as a measure of RadioShack's value, it did not state
a duty of prudence claim based on public information, according
to the court.

Indeed, the court found little evidence that RadioShack's
troubles were not completely taken into account in the stock
price.  "Plaintiffs did not plausibly plead that any Defendant
had information not available to the public," Judge Stewart
wrote.

Moreover, the court noted that in order to state a duty of
prudence claim based on nonpublic information, "a plaintiff must
plausibly allege an alternative action that the defendant could
have taken that would have been consistent with the securities
laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would
not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it."
As other plaintiffs in similar cases have argued, the plaintiffs
here argued that the defendants should have:

   -- frozen plan contributions earlier;
   -- disclosed inside information to the market to deflate the
stock price;
   -- liquidated the plan's holdings of RadioShack stock after
disclosing the alleged inside information;
   -- sought guidance from the SEC or the Department of Labor;
   -- resigned as plan fiduciaries; or
   -- engaged outside experts as advisors or independent
fiduciaries.

However, the court determined -- as other courts have previously
done -- that a prudent fiduciary could conclude that each of
these actions would have done more to harm the plan than to help
it, and that therefore, the district court properly dismissed the
plaintiffs' duty-of-prudence claims based on insider information.

The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' assertion that declining
to invest in RadioShack stock constituted a violation of the
defendants' duty of loyalty.  "Fiduciaries need not personally
invest in any particular asset in order to fulfill their duties,"
the court wrote.  As for the allegation that the director-
defendants artificially inflated the stock price to preserve
their personal wealth, the court explained that the plaintiffs "
. . . fail to point to any fact suggesting a conflict of interest
other than Defendants' stock ownership," and held that the
district court's dismissal of those "bare allegations" was
proper.

Fiduciary defendants have been successful at staving off
litigation in similar cases, most recently including HP and Wells
Fargo.

The case is Singh v. RadioShack Corp., 2018 BL 40265, 5th Cir.,
No. 16-11587, affirming district court decision 2/6/18. [GN]


RAINERI JEWELERS: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Raineri Jewelers,
Inc. The case is styled as Braulio Thorne, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Raineri Jewelers,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01660 (S.D. N.Y., February 22,
2018).

Raineri Jewelers, Inc. is a long-running retailer for engagement
rings, wedding bands & other fine jewels, plus watches.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel Chaim Cohen, Esq.
   Daniel Cohen PLLC
   407 Rockaway Avenue, 3rd Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11212
   Tel: (646) 645-8482
   Email: dan@cml.legal


REMINGTON: Bankruptcy Linked to Defective Rifles, Critic Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Dennison, writing for MTN News, reports that Remington, the
nation's oldest gun maker, reportedly is filing for bankruptcy
protection, in the face of falling sales and lawsuits related to
the 2012 Sandy Hook school shootings.

But a Montana man who's spoken out for years about problems with
the trigger mechanism of Remington bolt-action rifles told MTN
News on Feb. 12 he believes the company's financial woes also are
linked to public knowledge that its products are dangerous.

"I really think it's the liability of their product,"
Richard Barber of Willow Creek said in an interview.  "Remington
can't give its guns away.  I am certain that the inherent dangers
of their product have caused people not to buy them."

Remington officials couldn't immediately be reached for comment.

Mr. Barber's 9-year-old son, Gus, was killed by a Remington Model
700 rifle in 2000, after the weapon fired without the trigger
being pulled, he says.

Since then, Mr. Barber has spent years pushing the company to
repair what he says are defects with the trigger mechanism that
cause the popular Model 700 and other Remington rifles to fire
without a trigger pull.

In a 2017 settlement of a federal class-action lawsuit, Remington
agreed to fix the trigger mechanism on millions of rifles.

But Mr. Barber has harshly criticized the settlement, saying it
allows Remington to continue denying the rifles are defective and
thereby discourage people from bringing in the weapons for a
retrofitted trigger mechanism.

The settlement has been appealed to the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, further stalling action by Remington to fix the trigger
mechanisms.

The Associated Press reported on Feb. 12 that Remington has
reached a financing deal that will allow the company to keep
operating, while filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

The company has been hurt by declining sales of firearms since
Donald Trump won the presidency and by the aftermath of the 2012
Sandy Hook school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, the
Associated Press said.  One of the weapons used by the Sandy Hook
shooter was a Remington Bushmaster AR-15.

Mr. Barber, however, said on Feb. 12 he thinks Remington's
financial problems also are linked to liability for its defective
rifles and more lawsuits filed by people who are still getting
injured by rifles firing without a trigger pull.

"They've deprived me of my son and they deprived a lot of other
people of their children, and now they're being deprived of what
they value above all else, and that's their money," he said.

Mr. Barber said he's still getting calls from people who've had
their Remington rifles fire without a trigger pull and harm
someone.  Mr. Barber has posted tens of thousands of internal
company documents he says show that Remington knew about the
trigger-mechanism defects, but did nothing to warn consumers.

Mr. Barber also has been pushing to ban secrecy in civil-lawsuit
settlements in federal court, saying that information on
defective products should be made public, forcing companies to
repair the defects or face economic consequences from consumers.

"People would know that products were defective, and the company
would be forced to fix (the product) or go out of business," he
said.  "If nobody will by their product, then they're out of
business." [GN]


RENT-A-CENTER: Court Won't Stay Briefing on Arbitration Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MYRA WILLIAMS and SADE BEATON, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RENT-A-
CENTER, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:18-CV-00026 JAR (E.D. Mo.),
Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Stay Briefing on Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration, and granted in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration.

Defendant Rent-A-Center ("RAC") is in the furniture and appliance
leasing business.  The Plaintiffs are current or former customers
of RAC.  The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action in
state court, alleging RAC violated the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act by improperly taking default judgments against
customers without having first obtained personal jurisdiction.
RAC removed the action to the Court under the Class Action
Fairness Act, and on the basis of complete diversity.

The Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal review of state court
judgments.  RAC has moved to: (i) compel arbitration of each
Plaintiff's claims, on an individual (not class) basis; and (ii)
stay the litigation, pending such individual arbitrations.  In
the alternative, it asks the Court to dismiss this case without
prejudice, pending the individual arbitrations.  The Plaintiffs
seek to stay briefing on RAC's motion to compel pending the
Court's ruling on their motion to remand.  The Plaintiffs also
seek an extension of time to respond to RAC's motion to compel,
if necessary.

While the Court must confirm its own jurisdiction before ruling
on RAC's motion to compel, Judge Ross finds that a stay is not
warranted.  Regardless of whether the case is in state or federal
court, the Plaintiffs will be required to prepare and file an
opposition to RAC's motion to compel.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs
have not shown prejudice if a stay is not granted.  The
Plaintiffs have also not shown that a stay would promote judicial
economy or efficiency.  For these reasons, the Judge will deny
the Plaintiffs' motion to stay briefing on RAC's motion to compel
arbitration.  He will, however, grant the Plaintiffs an extension
of time to respond to RAC's motion.

Accordingly, Judge Ross denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay
Briefing on Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and granted
in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to Respond
to Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration.  The Plaintiffs will
file their response to the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration within 20 days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/8BorFh from Leagle.com.

Myra Williams & Sade Beaton, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
E. Roberts -- croberts@butschroberts.com -- BUTSCH ROBERTS &
ASSOCIATES, LLC & David T. Butsch -- dbutsch@butschroberts.com --
BUTSCH ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES, LLC.

Rent-A-Center, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jocelyn A.
Villanueva -- JVILLANUEVA@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- BERKOWITZ
OLIVER, LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas L. DiVita --
NDIVITA@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- BERKOWITZ OLIVER, LLP & Timothy R.
West -- twest@berkowitzoliver.com -- BERKOWITZ OLIVER, LLP.


ROGER DUBUIS: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Roger Dubuis North
America, Inc. The case is styled as Braulio Thorne, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Roger
Dubuis North America, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01657
(S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Roger Dubuis North America, Inc., f/k/a Helvetia Time
Corporation, is the distributor for the United States, Canada,
the Carribean and Mexico of Roger Dubuis Watches by virtue of a
distribution agreement with the manufacturer, Manufacturer Roger
Dubuis, SA, a Swiss Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel Chaim Cohen, Esq.
   Daniel Cohen PLLC
   407 Rockaway Avenue, 3rd Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11212
   Tel: (646) 645-8482
   Email: dan@cml.legal


REUTERS AMERICA: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Reuters America
LLC. The case is styled as Phillip Sullivan Jr., on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Reuters
America LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01631 (S.D. N.Y.,
February 22, 2018).

Reuters America LLC is the principal United States operating
subsidiary of Reuters Group Plc. The Company provides economic
and financial information along with technology solutions to its
customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Must Face Class Action Over Battery Life
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bruce Kaufman, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Samsung
must defend a would-be class action alleging it misrepresented
information about the battery life on a smart watch.

Samsung Electronics America Inc. won dismissal of two claims by
lead plaintiff David W. Noble stemming from his 2014 purchase of
a Samsung Galaxy Gear S Smartwatch for $199.

The suit alleges Samsung represented that the smartwatch battery
would last 24 to 48 hours without being recharged.  But Noble's
device only last about four hours between charges, his suit said.

Claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and for unjust
enrichment were dismissed Feb. 8 by the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey.

But Samsung must defend claims for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and for breach of express and implied
warranties, the court said.

The court said the rejected claim under the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act may be refiled under the laws of Georgia, where the
watch was purchased and the plaintiff resides.

Similar would-be class actions are proceeding against Apple over
iPhone battery life.

Samsung is already defending would-be consumer class actions
alleging eight phone models lost value because of their
propensity to overheat, catch fire or explode. The U.S. Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has been considering when the
suits benefit from consolidation for pretrial purposes.

Plaintiffs' attorneys include Lite, DePalma, Greenberg. Samsung's
attorneys include Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland, Perretti.

The case is Noble v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 2018 BL 45414,
D.N.J., No. 15-3713, 2/8/18. [GN]


SAN FRANCISCO, CA: $20K Atty Fees in Misappropriation Suit Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Four, issued an Opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court
awarding fees in the case captioned JOHNA PECOT et al.,
Plaintiffs and Cross-Respondents, v. DAVID WONG et al.,
Defendants and Cross-Appellants, No. A139566 (Cal. App.).

On appeal, defendants contend the trial court abused its
discretion in not making a larger attorney fee award.

The individual plaintiffs are employees of the San Francisco
Sheriff's Department and members of the SFDSA. The complaint
alleged that SFDSA and its former president, defendant David
Wong, hatched a scheme to misappropriate the membership dues of
the rank and file Sheriff's Deputy members of the SFDSA.

Defendants contended the market rate for services provided by an
attorney with their counsel's experience was $600 an hour and
that he had worked 158.95 hours to prepare the anti-SLAPP motion.
When the time spent by his officer manager and secretary were
included, the total claimed cost, before a multiplier, was
$99,195.75.

In opposition to the request for attorney fees, plaintiffs
submitted expert testimony that the reasonable hourly rate for a
skilled attorney specializing in anti-SLAPP law in the San
Francisco Bay Area was approximately $300 to $500 per hour,
depending on the attorney's experience; that defendant's counsel
had only some anti-SLAPP experience and only moderate success;
that the anti-SLAPP motion was of only moderate complexity and
could have been handled in 40 to 50 hours; and that $395 was a
reasonable hourly rate. Plaintiffs argued a reasonable attorney
fee recovery was $20,000.

A defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to
recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.

The Cal. App. discerned no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
The trial judge had read the papers in support of the anti-SLAPP
motion, was familiar with the evidence, and concluded, based on
the record of the motion and on his own extensive experience with
such motions, that 160 hours was excessive. The court's
conclusion that 50 hours or more than a full work week was
sufficient time to prepare a motion was not clearly wrong.
Nor is the Cal. App. persuaded the trial court failed to consider
the other relevant factors. There was evidence to support the
trial court's conclusion that a rate of $400 per hour was
reasonable. Although the court did not expressly make findings on
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill
displayed in presenting them, and the contingent nature of any
attorney fee, the court indicated that it was aware of and had
considered the step-by-step analysis.  The Cal. App. presumed the
trial court took into account the relevant factors.

In fact, the record indicates the court took these factors into
account. The judge noted that counsel had "great stuff" in the
anti-SLAPP motion, but concluded, based on his experience, that
the motion could have been prepared more efficiently. Indeed, as
the high court has explained, a trial court should award a
multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality
of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that
would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and
experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar
calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair
double counting and be unreasonable.

The record does not compel a conclusion that counsel met that
standard. And although the court noted that at least one of the
defendants was unwilling to pay counsel's fees, we are aware of
nothing in the record showing defense counsel had a contingent
fee arrangement with his clients.

The order awarding attorney fees is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s January 18, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7x6nfme from Leagle.com.


SENTRY CREDIT: Court Grants Judgment on Pleadings in "Riccio"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAUREEN RICCIO, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SENTRY CREDIT, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-1773 (BRM)(TJB)(D. N.J.), Judge
Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted Sentry's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

The dispute arises out of Riccio's putative class action claim,
alleging Sentry's debt collection practice violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA") by failing to properly inform
the least sophisticated consumer that to effectively dispute the
alleged debt, such dispute must be in writing.  On Aug. 15, 2016,
Riccio incurred a financial obligation, which had been assigned
to Sentry for debt collection purposes.  Sentry mailed the
Collection Letter to Riccio in connection with debt.  The
Collection Letter provided Riccio with a toll-free telephone
number, mailing address, and website to contact Sentry concerning
the debt.

The letter also stated, in relevant part that Riccio alleges the
Collection Letter violates the FDCPA by providing a debtor with
multiple options for contacting Sentry rather than requiring,
explicitly, any dispute be in writing, as required by the FDCPA.
On March 15, 2017, Riccio filed her single-count FDCPA Complaint.
On June 23, 2017, Sentry filed, with permission from the Court
after filing an Answer, the Motion for a Judgment on the
Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

Riccio attempts to both rely on and distinguish the Collection
Letter from the letters at issue in Panto v. Prof'l Bureau of
Collections and Cruz v. Fin. Recoveries.  In both Panto and Cruz
v. Fin. Recoveries, the defendant's debt collection letters
requested additional information from consumers in connection
with the debt.  In those cases, the court found the additional
language did not overshadow the language required by the FDCPA.
Riccio argues the Collection Letter includes additional language
but that, unlike Panto and Cruz, it overshadows the FDCPA
language.  Judge Martinotti is not persuaded by Riccio's argument
and finds the Collection Letter, when read as a whole, does not
contain overshadowing language.

Moreover, Riccio claims the Display Boxes are deceptive.  In
reviewing the Collection Letter, the Judge finds that Riccio's
contention is not supported by the facts.  The Collection Letter
is void of any reference stating if Riccio wants to dispute the
debt, she can call Sentry.  The Important Notice Box contains the
language notifying consumers a dispute of the debt must be made
in writing within 30 days.  There is no reference to a phone
number or a request for consumers to call in the entirety of the
Important Notice Box.

The Judge further finds that the Display Boxes do not instruct
nor suggest an alternative method of disputing the alleged debt,
but merely provide the consumer with Sentry's contact
information.  Accordingly, Sentry's debt collection letter does
not violate Section 1692g -- and therefore does not violate
Section 1692e(10) -- of the FDCPA.

For these reasons, Judge Martinotti granted Sentry's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. An appropriate Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/hiVnP9 from Leagle.com.

MAUREEN RICCIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES, Jones, Wolf
& Kapasi, LLC & BENJAMIN JARRET WOLF, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

SENTRY CREDIT, INC., Defendant, represented by PETER GEORGE
SIACHOS -- psiachos@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP & YEVGENY
ROYMISHER, GORDON & REES, LLP.


SHINOLA/DETROIT: Faces "Thorne" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shinola/Detroit,
LLC. The case is styled as Braulio Thorne, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Shinola/Detroit,
LLC doing business as: Shinola, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01659
(S.D. N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Shinola/Detroit, LLC was founded in 2011. The company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of durable
goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel Chaim Cohen, Esq.
   Daniel Cohen PLLC
   407 Rockaway Avenue, 3rd Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11212
   Tel: (646) 645-8482
   Email: dan@cml.legal


STRAIGHT PATH: Delaware Stockholders Class Suit Remains Stayed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Straight Path Communications Inc. said in a regulatory filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that the case
captioned as, In re Straight Path Communications Inc.
Consolidated Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0486-SG,
remains stayed.

On July 5, 2017, JDS1 LLC, a putative Straight Path stockholder,
filed a class action and derivative complaint in the Delaware
Court of Chancery captioned JDS1, LLC v. IDT Corp., C.A. No.
2017-0486-SG. The complaint named Straight Path's board of
directors, Howard Jonas, IDT, and The Patrick Henry Trust (the
"Trust") as defendants. The company was named as a nominal
defendant. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Straight
Path's directors, Howard Jonas, and the Trust breached their
fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of certain of the
company's IP assets and by resolving a possible claim for
indemnification that the company held against IDT (the
"Settlement") for inadequate consideration and that IDT aided and
abetted that breach. Plaintiff moved for expedited proceedings.

On July 11, 2017, another putative Straight Path stockholder, the
Arbitrage Fund, filed a class action complaint in the same court
naming Howard Jonas, IDT, and the Trust as defendants, captioned
The Arbitrage Fund v. Jonas, C.A. No. 2017-0502-SG. On July 24,
2017, the Court denied Plaintiff JDS1's motion for expedited
proceedings and consolidated the two cases under the caption In
re Straight Path Communications Inc. Consolidated Stockholder
Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0486-SG, with the JDS1 complaint
designated as the operative pleading. Plaintiffs subsequently
agreed to voluntarily dismiss defendants K. Chris Todd, William
F. Weld and Fred S. Zeidman without prejudice. On August 14,
2017, defendants Howard Jonas, IDT, and the Trust, as well as
Davidi Jonas, moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint. The
company, named as a nominal defendant, filed a statement in
response to the complaint. On August 29, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a
consolidated amended class action and derivative complaint
alleging, among other things, that Howard Jonas, the Trust, and
Davidi Jonas breached their fiduciary duties in connection with
the settlement and that IDT aided and abetted that breach. On
September 13, 2017, defendants Howard Jonas, IDT, and the Trust,
as well as Davidi Jonas, moved to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint.

On September 22, 2017, the Company filed a statement concerning
the consolidated amended complaint, Straight Path said in its
Form 10-K report for the fiscal year ended July 31, 2017.

In its Form 10-Q report for the quarterly period ended October
31, 2017, Straight Path disclosed that on November 2, 2017, the
Delaware Court of Chancery heard oral argument on defendants'
motions to dismiss. On November 20, 2017, the court issued an
opinion holding that the action was not yet ripe for adjudication
and staying the action until the Merger closes or is terminated
and upon motion of a party to the action.

Straight Path Communications Inc. is a communications asset
company. The company owns, via intermediate wholly-owned
entities, 100% of Straight Path Spectrum, Inc. ("Straight Path
Spectrum") and 100% of Straight Path Ventures, LLC ("Straight
Path Ventures"), and the company own 84.5% of Straight Path IP
Group, Inc. ("Straight Path IP Group"). The company is based in
Glen Allen, Virginia.


STRAIGHT PATH: "Zacharia" Deal Awaits Court Approval
----------------------------------------------------
A settlement of the case Zacharia v. Straight Path
Communications, Inc. et al., No. 2:15-cv-08051-JMV-MF, remains
subject to court approval.

On November 13, 2015, a putative shareholder class action was
filed in the federal district court for the District of New
Jersey against Straight Path Communications Inc., and Jonas and
Rand (the "individual defendants"). The case is captioned
Zacharia v. Straight Path Communications, Inc. et al., No. 2:15-
cv-08051-JMV-MF, and is purportedly brought on behalf of all
those who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common
stock between October 29, 2013, and November 5, 2015. The
complaint alleges violations of (i) Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act against the Company for materially false and
misleading statements that were designed to influence the market
relating to the Company's finances and business prospects; and
(ii) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the individual
defendants for wrongful acts by controlling persons. The
allegations center on the claim that the Company made materially
false and misleading statements in its public filings and
conference calls during the relevant class period concerning the
Company's spectrum licenses and the prospects for its spectrum
business. The complaint seeks certification of a class,
unspecified damages, fees, and costs.

The case was reassigned to Judge John Michael Vasquez on March 3,
2016. On April 11, 2016, the court entered an order appointing
Charles Frischer as lead plaintiff and approving lead plaintiff's
selection of Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as lead counsel and
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP as liaison counsel. On June
17, 2016, lead plaintiff filed his amended class action
complaint, which alleges the same claims described above. The
defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint on
August 17, 2016; the plaintiff opposed that motion on September
30, 2016, and the defendants filed their reply brief in further
support of their motion to dismiss on October 31, 2016.

On March 7, 2017, the Company and lead plaintiff in Zacharia
action entered into a binding memorandum of understanding to
settle the putative shareholder class action and dismiss the
claims that were filed against the defendants in that action.
Under the agreed terms, the Company will provide for a $2.25
million initial payment (the "Initial Payment") and a $7.2
million additional payment (the "Additional Payment"). The
Initial Payment will be paid into an escrow account within 15
days following preliminary court approval of the settlement, and
will be fully covered by insurance policies maintained by the
Company. The Additional Payment of $7.2 million will be paid
within 60 days after the closing of a transaction to sell the
Company's spectrum licenses as specified in the Consent Decree
with the FCC, or, in the event that the Company pays the non-
transfer penalty specified in the Consent Decree, within 60 days
after that payment is paid. In any event, the Additional Payment
will be payable no later than December 31, 2018, Straight Path
said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year ended July 31,
2017.  The settlement remains subject to entering in a definitive
agreement and court approval.

In its Form 10-Q report for the quarterly period ended October
31, 2017, Straight Path said the parties executed a formal
settlement agreement on October 10, 2017, and a motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement agreement is pending
before the court.

Straight Path Communications Inc. is a communications asset
company. The company owns, via intermediate wholly-owned
entities, 100% of Straight Path Spectrum, Inc. ("Straight Path
Spectrum") and 100% of Straight Path Ventures, LLC ("Straight
Path Ventures"), and the company own 84.5% of Straight Path IP
Group, Inc. ("Straight Path IP Group"). The company is based in
Glen Allen, Virginia.


STUSSY INC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stussy, Inc. The
case is styled as Brian Fischler, Individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Stussy, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01156 (E.D. N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Stussy is a clothing brand and private company started in the
early 1980s by Shawn Stussy. The company is one of many that
benefited from the surfwear trend originating in Orange County,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


SUPER MICRO: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP alerts investors in Super Micro
Computer, Inc. (NASDAQ:SMCI) to the securities class action
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California and to the April 9, 2018 Lead Plaintiff
deadline.  If you purchased or otherwise acquired securities of
SMCI between August 5, 2016 and January 30, 2018 and suffered
losses contact Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.  For more
information, visit: https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/SMCI

or contact Reed Kathrein, who is leading the firm's
investigation, by calling 510-725-3000 or emailing
SMCI@hbsslaw.com

Beginning on August 29, 2017, Super Micro Computer alerted
investors to problems with timely filing its financial statements
at the SEC.  This time, the Company said it would not file its
annual report for the year ended June 30, 2017.

Shortly thereafter, NASDAQ notified the Company that it was out
of compliance with listing rules.

During late October 2017 the Company announced it reversed
certain revenues recorded during the quarter ended December 31,
2016 and instead recognized them during the quarter ended March
31, 2017.

By January 30, 2018 the Company announced it had still not filed
its annual report, its Audit Committee completed its
investigation into the matter, and its CFO left the Company.

During the course of these events, the price of Super Micro's
shares fell from the August 29, 2017 closing price of $27.20 to
close at $22.83 on January 31, 2018 -- a loss of $4.37 or about
16%.

"We're focused on the extent of SMCI's apparent violations of
generally accepted accounting principles, whether it will
restate, and investors' damages," said Hagens Berman partner Reed
Kathrein -- reed@hbsslaw.com.

Whistleblowers:  Persons with non-public information regarding
SMCI should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC whistleblower program.  Under the
new program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call
Reed Kathrein at 510-725-3000 or email SMCI@hbsslaw.com

                       About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a national
investor-rights law firm headquartered in Seattle, Washington
with 70+ attorneys in 11 offices across the country.  The firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation. [GN]


SWEET HOME: "Williams" Class of HHAs/DCWs Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TINA WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SWEET HOME
HEALTHCARE, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-2353
(E.D. Pa.), Judge Berle M. Schiller of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the Rule 23
class action and granted conditional certification of a FLSA
collective action; and denied Sweet Home's motion to strike the
declaration of Amy Brandt.

Lawrence Harris and Williams brought the putative class action
lawsuit against Sweet Home, alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and the  Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
("PMWA").

Sweet Home Healthcare and Sweet Home Primary Care are home
healthcare agencies.  They employ home healthcare workers who
provide in-home support to elderly and disabled individuals
("consumers").  Sweet Home has two groups of home healthcare
workers: "home health aides" ("HHAs") and "direct care workers"
("DCWs").

The proposed class consists of both of these groups.  The
distinction between the two appears to be largely based on the
degree of government regulation and Sweet Home's different
hiring, training, and oversight procedures for each group.
According to Sweet Home, only HHAs are required by Pennsylvania
regulations to receive at least 75 hours of training and be
certified.  It also notes that it imposes different competency
and supervision requirements for HHAs and DCWs.  However, there
are few apparent differences in the actual work done by HHAs and
DCWs.  Both personnel groups work with consumers in their homes,
providing similar services, including medical assistance,
companionship, and homemaking.  The services provided by both
groups are based on the state-issued service authorization forms.
Moreover, all of the workers are paid hourly wages.

In addition to distinguishing between HHAs and DCWs, Sweet Home
classified some of its home healthcare workers as employees and
others as independent contractors.  This distinction has
potentially significant consequences for the Plaintiffs' case,
because only employees -- not independent contractors -- are
entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA and the PMWA.

The Plaintiffs -- and the evidence cited -- suggest that Sweet
Home's classification of workers during the relevant time period
was largely arbitrary and at times inconsistent.  In addition,
they claim that Sweet Home did not adhere to its own
classifications.  They argue that Sweet Home's classification of
certain workers as independent contractors was improper.  They
claim that they and all other HHAs and DCWs in the proposed class
-- at least 1,261 workers -- were "employees" as a matter of law
under the FLSA and the PMWA.  Therefore, they claim that all of
the putative class members should have been paid at the overtime
rate for the overtime hours they recorded.  In total, the
Plaintiffs claim the workers were underpaid for hundreds of
thousands of hours of overtime.

The Plaintiffs allege two distinct Sweet Home policies that both
effectively denied the putative class members overtime pay.
First, the Plaintiffs claim that Sweet Home regularly failed to
apply the 1.5 multiplier to its home healthcare workers' overtime
hours.  Second, around July of 2016, Sweet Home established a new
overtime policy.  Sweet Home's new policy was to pay its
employees at the overtime rate in form, but pay them a straight
hourly rate in substance.  Harris alleges that he was affected by
this wage manipulation policy; Williams was no longer working for
Sweet Home when it took effect.

The Plaintiffs sued Sweet Home under the overtime provisions of
both the FLSA and the PMWA.  They subsequently filed a motion to
conditionally certify a FLSA collective action.  They also moved
for certification of a class action under Rule 23(b)(3).

The Plaintiffs propose the following class definition for the
Rule 23 class action: All persons who worked for the Defendants
as HHAs or DCWs in Pennsylvania from Jan. 1, 2014 to the present
and were paid straight time with no overtime premium or were paid
a reduced straight time with a reduced overtime premium when they
worked more than 40 hours in one or more workweeks.

In addition to the Plaintiffs' motions, before the Court is Sweet
Home's motion to strike a declaration submitted by the
Plaintiffs' counsel, Amy Brandt, in support of their
certification motions.

Judge Schiller finds that the Plaintiffs have met the
requirements for certification of a Rule 23 class action.  The
Plaintiffs have also satisfied the requirements for conditional
certification of a FLSA Section 216(b) collective action.  Thus,
he granted both of the Plaintiffs' respective motions.

The Judge conditionally certified, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the class of all individuals
employed by the Defendants in the position of HHA or DCW in
Pennsylvania at any time in the three years prior to the
commencement of this lawsuit until the present who were not paid
at 1.5 times their regular rate of pay or who were paid at 1.5
times a reduced hourly rate for all hours worked over forty in
one or more workweeks.

The Judge appointed as the class representatives, Lawrence Harris
and Tina Williams, and the law firm of Weir & Partners, as the
class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(B).  He directed the
parties to confer regarding an appropriate notice of the Rule 23
class action and the FLSA collective action.  Within 30 days of
the date of the Order, the parties will submit a proposed notice
to the Court.

In addition, Judge Schiller denied Sweet Home's motion to strike.
He says he has already held that it does not take an expert to do
the "basic arithmetic" that Brandt performed in her analysis of
Sweet Home's payroll records.  And Sweet Home, of course, has
access to these records.  To the extent that Brandt offers
opinions regarding Sweet Home's "widespread" or "regular"
practices or the similarity of the class members, rather than her
summarized analysis of the payroll records, she is essentially
presenting legal conclusions that should be left to the briefing.
The Judge will not consider such statements.  He denied the
Defendants' reply thereon.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/dE11MH and
https://is.gd/ggWn6G , respectively, from Leagle.com.

TINA WILLIAMS & LAWRENCE G. HARRIS, Plaintiffs, represented by
STEVEN E. ANGSTREICH -- sangstreich@weirpartners.com -- WEIR &
PARTNERS, AMY R. BRANDT -- abrandt@weirpartners.com -- WEIR &
PARTNERS LLP & CAROLYN C. LINDHEIM -- clindheim@weirpartners.com
-- WEIR & PARTNERS.

SWEET HOME HEALTHCARE LLC, SWEET HOME PRIMARY CARE LLC, TEKIA
EMERSON & DARRYL EZELL, Defendants, represented by ALIZA R.
KARETNICK -- akaretnick@duanemorris.com -- DUANE MORRIS LLP, SEAN
ZABANEH -- SSZabaneh@duanemorris.com -- DUANE MORRIS LLP, ALYSSA
KOVACH -- AWKovach@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP &
CHRISTOPHER DRAKE DURHAM -- cddurham@duanemorris.com -- DUANE
MORRIS LLP.


SYNERGY PHARMA: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A
Professional Corporation, on Feb. 12 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York on behalf of
purchasers of Synergy Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Nasdaq:SGYP)
("Synergy" or the "Company") securities during the period between
September 5, 2017 and November 14, 2017, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  Investors who wish to become proactively involved in
the litigation have until April 10, 2018 to seek appointment as
lead plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will
be selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Synergy securities during the Class Period.
Members of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff
and counsel chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been
certified in the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that the loan from
CRG Partners III L.P. ("CRG Loan") did not fund Synergy's
operations through 2019, that the Company could not access the
second tranche of $100 million financing on or before
February 28, 2018 without issuing dilutive equity, and that the
Company could not access the third tranche of the CRG Loan if and
when needed because terms were required to be met in order to
access those tranches.

According to the complaint, following a November 9, 2017
disclosure of the true terms of the CRG Loan and their effect
upon Synergy's financial condition, the value of Synergy shares
declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Synergy securities purchased on or after September 5, 2017 and
held through the revelation of negative information during and/or
at the end of the Class Period and would like to learn more about
this lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead plaintiff,
without cost or obligation to you, please contact Brower Piven
either by email at hoffman@browerpiven.com or by telephone at
(410) 415-6616.

Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s.  If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of
your choice.  You need take no action at this time to be a member
of the class. [GN]


TEVA PHARMA: Hearing to Impose Provigil Accord Set for Apr. 23
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited's lawsuit to enforce
settlement of one of the class members related to a PROVIGIL(R)
class action has been scheduled for trial starting April 23,
2018, according to the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12,
2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

In April 2006, certain subsidiaries of Teva were named in a class
action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.  The case alleges that the settlement
agreements entered into between Cephalon, Inc., now a Teva
subsidiary ("Cephalon"), and various generic pharmaceutical
companies in late 2005 and early 2006 to resolve patent
litigation involving certain finished modafinil products
(marketed as PROVIGIL(R)) were unlawful because they had the
effect of excluding generic competition.  The case also alleges
that Cephalon improperly asserted its PROVIGIL patent against the
generic pharmaceutical companies.

The first lawsuit was brought by King Drug Company of Florence,
Inc. on behalf of itself and as a proposed class action on behalf
of any other person or entity that purchased PROVIGIL directly
from Cephalon (the "Direct Purchaser Class").  Similar
allegations were made in other complaints, including those filed
on behalf of a proposed class of end payers of PROVIGIL (the "End
Payer Class"), by certain individual end payers, by certain
retail chain pharmacies and by Apotex, Inc. (collectively, these
cases are referred to as the "Philadelphia Modafinil Action").

Separately, Apotex challenged Cephalon's PROVIGIL patent, and in
October 2011, the Court found the patent to be invalid and
unenforceable based on inequitable conduct.  This decision was
affirmed on appeal in April 2013.

Teva has either settled or reached agreements in principle to
settle with all of the plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Modafinil
Action.  However, one of the end payers, United Healthcare
Services, took the position that it is not bound by the
settlement that was agreed to on its behalf and brought a
separate action in Minnesota federal court, which has been
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, where Teva has also filed suit to enforce the
settlement.  The suit to enforce the settlement has been
scheduled for trial beginning on April 23, 2018.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Consolidated Multidistrict Suit on AndroGel Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited continues to defend itself
in a consolidated multidistrict litigation in Georgia federal
court related to AndroGel(R) 1% (testosterone gel), according to
the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

In January 2009, the Federal Trade Commission and the State of
California filed a complaint for injunctive relief in California
federal court alleging that a September 2006 patent lawsuit
settlement between Watson and Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("Solvay") relating to AndroGel(R) 1% (testosterone gel) violated
the antitrust laws.  Additional lawsuits alleging similar claims
were later filed by private plaintiffs (including plaintiffs
purporting to represent classes of similarly situated claimants
as well as direct purchaser plaintiffs filing separately), and
the various actions were consolidated in a multidistrict
litigation in Georgia federal court.  Discovery in these actions
is now closed; the defendants filed various summary judgment
motions on September 29, 2017, which plaintiffs opposed on
December 12, 2017.

Annual sales of AndroGel(R) 1% at the time of the settlement were
approximately US$350 million, and annual sales of the AndroGel
franchise (AndroGel(R) 1% and AndroGel(R) 1.62%) were
approximately US$140 million and US$1.05 billion, respectively,
at the time Actavis launched its generic version of AndroGel(R)
1% in November 2015.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: 2 Class Members Seek Appeal from Ciprofloxacin Pact
----------------------------------------------------------------
Two class members have filed an appeal of a court ruling that
granted final approval of a settlement agreement which dismissed
a lawsuit against Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited's
subsidiaries for alleged violations of antitrust laws, according
to the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

Teva subsidiaries Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Barr") and The Rugby
Group ("Rugby") were sued in actions in California, Kansas and
Florida state courts by plaintiffs alleging that a January 1997
patent litigation settlement agreement between Barr, Rugby (then
a subsidiary of Sanofi Aventis) and Bayer Corporation concerning
the antibiotic ciprofloxacin was anticompetitive and violated
state antitrust and consumer protection laws.

In addition, Rugby is also named as a defendant in a Tennessee
action.

All of the litigation relating to such patent litigation
settlement agreement have either settled or are inactive.

In the California case, the trial court granted defendants'
summary judgment motions, and in May 2015, the California Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a
rule of reason inquiry.

On January 18, 2017, Barr agreed to settle with plaintiffs for
US$225 million and a provision has been included in the financial
statements.

On April 21, 2017, the court granted final approval of the
settlement.

Two class members who have objected to the settlement have filed
an appeal of the court's ruling granting final approval.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Still Faces Class Action Suit on Venlafaxine Accord
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited continues to defend itself
against class action suit related to venlafaxine (generic
Effexor(R) XR), according to the Company's Form 10-K filed on
February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

In December 2011, three groups of plaintiffs sued Wyeth and Teva
for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in connection with
their settlement of patent litigation involving extended release
venlafaxine (generic Effexor(R) XR) entered into in November
2005.  The cases were filed by a purported class of direct
purchasers, by a purported class of indirect purchasers and by
certain chain pharmacies in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey.  The plaintiffs claim that the
settlement agreement between Wyeth and Teva unlawfully delayed
generic entry.

In October 2014, the court granted Teva's motion to dismiss in
the direct purchaser cases, after which the parties agreed that
the court's reasoning applied equally to the indirect purchaser
cases.

Plaintiffs appealed, and on August 21, 2017, the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further
proceedings.

On November 20, 2017, Teva and Wyeth filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which remains
pending, and litigation has resumed before the district court.

Annual sales of Effexor(R) XR were approximately US$2.6 billion
at the time of settlement and at the time generic versions were
launched in July 2010.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Still Defends Class Action on Lamotrigine Agreement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited still defends itself in
purported class action suit related to its lamotrigine (generic
Lamictal(R)) settlement agreement with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK),
according to Teva's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2017.

In February 2012, two purported classes of direct-purchaser
plaintiffs sued GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Teva in New Jersey
federal court for alleged violations of the antitrust laws in
connection with their settlement of patent litigation involving
lamotrigine (generic Lamictal(R)) entered into in February 2005.
The plaintiffs claim that the settlement agreement unlawfully
delayed generic entry and seek unspecified damages.

In December 2012, the court dismissed the case.

In January 2014, the court denied the direct purchaser
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and affirmed its original
dismissal.

In June 2015, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.

On February 19, 2016, Teva and GSK filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied
on November 7, 2016.  In the meantime, litigation resumed before
the district court.

Annual sales of Lamictal(R) were approximately US$950 million at
the time of the settlement, and approximately US$2.3 billion at
the time generic competition commenced in July 2008.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Antitrust Breaches Suit over Niaspan Accord Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited is currently awaiting
judgment of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, on
its petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in a class action
suit over alleged violations of antitrust laws related to
Niaspan(R), according to the Company's Form 10-K filed on
February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

In April 2013, purported classes of direct purchasers of, and end
payers for, Niaspan(R) (extended release niacin) sued Teva and
Abbott for violating the antitrust laws by entering into a
settlement agreement in April 2005 to resolve patent litigation
over the product.  A multidistrict litigation has been
established in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.

Throughout 2015 and in January 2016, several individual direct
purchaser opt-out plaintiffs filed complaints with allegations
nearly identical to those of the direct purchaser class.

In October 2016, the District Attorney for Orange County,
California, filed a similar complaint, which has since been
amended, in California state court alleging violations of state
law.

Further proceedings in the California action have been stayed
pending resolution of Defendants' petition for writ of mandate or
prohibition filed with the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, which seeks an order vacating the Superior Court's
denial of Defendants' motion to strike all claims for restitution
and civil penalties to the extent they are not limited to alleged
activity in Orange County.

Annual sales of Niaspan(R) were approximately US$416 million at
the time of the settlement and approximately US$1.1 billion at
the time generic competition commenced in September 2013.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Has Tentative Pact to Settle Lidoderm Litigation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited disclosed in its Form 10-K
filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that it
has reached agreements in principle in January 2018 with the
various plaintiff groups to settle the multidistrict litigation
related to Lidoderm(R) (lidocaine transdermal patches).

In November 2013, a putative class action was filed in
Pennsylvania federal court against Actavis, Inc. and certain of
its affiliates, alleging that Watson's 2012 patent lawsuit
settlement with Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. relating to Lidoderm(R)
(lidocaine transdermal patches) violated the antitrust laws.
Additional lawsuits containing similar allegations followed on
behalf of other classes of putative direct purchaser and end-
payer plaintiffs, and the cases have been consolidated as a
multidistrict litigation in federal court in California.

Defendants moved to dismiss, and in November 2014, the court
granted the motions in part but denied them with respect to the
claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Plaintiffs then filed
amended consolidated complaints in December 2014, and additional
complaints have followed from retailers acting in their
individual capacities.

On February 21, 2017, the court granted both the indirect
purchaser plaintiffs' and the direct purchaser plaintiffs'
motions for class certification.  Discovery in these cases is now
closed.

In January 2018, the Company reached agreements in principle with
the various plaintiff groups to settle the multidistrict
litigation.

The Federal Trade Commission has also filed suit to challenge the
Lidoderm(R) settlement, initially bringing antitrust claims
against Watson, Endo, and Allergan in Pennsylvania federal court
in March 2016.  The FTC voluntarily dismissed those claims in
October 2016, but in January 2017, it re-filed the claims, along
with a stipulated order for permanent injunction, to settle its
claims against Endo, in the same California federal court in
which the private multidistrict litigation is pending.

On February 3, 2017, the State of California filed a complaint
against Allergan and Watson, and that complaint has also been
assigned to the California court presiding over the multidistrict
litigation.

After the FTC dismissed its claims in Pennsylvania, but before it
re-filed them in California, Watson and Allergan filed suit
against the FTC in the same Pennsylvania federal court where the
agency had initially brought its lawsuit, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the FTC's claims are not authorized by statute, or,
in the alternative, that the FTC does not have statutory
authority to pursue a disgorgement remedy.  That declaratory
judgment action remains pending, and on March 28, 2017, the court
in California stayed the FTC's claims against Allergan and Watson
pending there, and on October 27, 2017, entered a stipulation
staying the State of California's claims against Allergan and
Watson, pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action in
Pennsylvania.

Annual sales of Lidoderm(R) at the time of the settlement were
approximately US$1.2 billion, and were approximately US$1.4
billion at the time Actavis launched its generic version in
September 2013.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Enters into Settlement with Aggrenox End Payers
------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited is awaiting preliminary
approval of its settlement agreement with the end payer class
plaintiffs in a litigation related to Aggrenox(R), according to
the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

Since November 2013, numerous lawsuits have been filed in various
federal courts by purported classes of end payers for, and direct
purchasers of, Aggrenox(R) (dipyridamole/aspirin tablets) against
Boehringer Ingelheim ("BI"), the innovator, and several Teva
subsidiaries.  The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the
settlement agreement between BI and Barr entered into in August
2008 violated the antitrust laws.

A multidistrict litigation has been established in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut.  Teva and BI's
motion to dismiss was denied in March 2015.

On April 11, 2017, the Orange County District Attorney filed a
complaint for violations of California's Unfair Competition Law
based on the Aggrenox(R) patent litigation settlement.  Annual
sales of Aggrenox(R) were approximately US$340 million at the
time of the settlement and approximately US$455 million at the
time generic competition began in July 2015.

Teva has settled with the putative class of direct purchasers.
The settlement was approved by the Court on December 18, 2017.
Teva has also settled with the opt out direct purchaser
plaintiffs.

On January 8, 2018, Teva reached an agreement to settle with the
end payer class plaintiffs.  That settlement has been filed for
preliminary approval.  The Company said that a provision has been
included in the financial statements for this matter.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Class Suits over Takeda Pharma Pact Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited disclosed in its Form 10-K
filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that
lawsuits arising from the settlement agreements of Takeda
Pharmaceutical Companies Limited and generic manufacturers over
Actos(R) and Acto plus Met(R) products are still ongoing.

Since January 2014, numerous lawsuits have been filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York by purported
classes of end payers for and direct purchasers of Actos(R) and
Acto plus Met(R) (pioglitazone and pioglitazone plus metformin)
against Takeda, the innovator, and several generic manufacturers,
including Teva, Actavis and Watson.  The lawsuits allege, among
other things, that the settlement agreements between Takeda and
the generic manufacturers (including Takeda's December 2010
settlement agreement with Teva) violated the antitrust laws.

The Court dismissed the end payer lawsuits against all defendants
in September 2015.  In October 2015, the end payers appealed that
ruling, and on March 22, 2016, a stipulation was filed dismissing
Teva and the other generic defendants from the appeal.

On February 8, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal in part and vacated and remanded the
dismissal in part with respect to the claims against Takeda.

The direct purchasers' case had been stayed pending resolution of
the appeal in the end payer matter, and the direct purchasers
amended their complaint for a second time after the Second
Circuit's decision.

Defendants had moved to dismiss the direct purchasers' original
complaint and supplemental briefing on that motion based on the
new allegations in the amended complaint was completed on June
29, 2017.

At the time of the settlement, annual sales of Actos(R) were
approximately US$3.7 billion and annual sales of ACTO plus Met(R)
were approximately US$500 million.  At the time generic
competition commenced in August 2012, annual sales of Actos(R)
were approximately US$2.8 billion and annual sales of ACTO plus
Met(R) were approximately US$430 million.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Suits on Namenda IR Settlement Pact Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited disclosed in its Form 10-K
filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that
lawsuits related to the settlement agreement between Forest
Laboratories, LLC ("Forest"), Actavis PLC and several generic
manufacturers continues.

Since May 2015, two lawsuits have been filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York by a purported class
of direct purchasers of, and a purported class of end payers for,
Namenda IR(R) (memantine hydrochloride) against Forest
Laboratories, LLC ("Forest") and Actavis PLC, the innovator, and
several generic manufacturers, including Teva.  Teva is only a
defendant in the end payer case and defendants moved to dismiss
the claims made by the end payers.

The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the settlement
agreements between Forest and the generic manufacturers
(including Forest's November 2009 settlement agreement with Teva)
violated the antitrust laws.

On September 13, 2016, the court denied defendants' motions to
dismiss, but stayed the cases with respect to the claims brought
under state law, which are the only claims asserted against Teva.

Annual sales of Namenda IR(R) at the time of the settlement were
approximately US$1.1 billion, and are currently approximately
US$1.4 billion.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Unit Still Faces Antitrust Suit over Intuniv Accord
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited's unit, Actavis, still
defends itself against a consolidated lawsuit over alleged
violations of various state consumer protection and antitrust
laws when it entered into a settlement agreement with Shire
companies related to the ADHD drug Intuniv, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

In November 2016, three putative indirect purchaser class actions
were filed in federal courts in Wisconsin, Massachusetts and
Florida against Shire U.S., Inc. and Shire LLC (collectively,
"Shire") and Actavis, alleging that Shire's 2013 patent
litigation settlement with Actavis related to the ADHD drug
Intuniv(R) (guanfacine) violated various state consumer
protection and antitrust laws.

On December 30, 2016 and January 11, 2017, two additional similar
actions were filed, also in Massachusetts federal court, against
Shire and Actavis or Teva (as successor to Actavis) by putative
classes of direct purchaser plaintiffs.

All five cases are now in Massachusetts federal court, and on
March 10, 2017, both the indirect purchaser plaintiffs and the
direct purchaser plaintiffs filed consolidated amended
complaints.

Annual sales of Intuniv(R) were approximately US$335 million at
the time of the settlement, and approximately US$327 million at
the time generic competition began in 2014.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Still Faces Antitrust Suit on Price-Fixing Matters
---------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited continues to face legal
proceedings over alleged antitrust law breaches related to price-
fixing matters on certain generic drug products, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

Beginning on March 2, 2016, numerous complaints have been filed
in the United States on behalf of putative classes of direct and
indirect purchasers of generic drug products, as well as several
individual direct purchaser opt-out plaintiffs, including:
doxycycline, pravastatin, clobetasol, desonide, fluocinonide,
propranolol, glyburide, ursodial and baclofen.  These complaints,
which allege that the defendants engaged in conspiracies to fix,
increase, maintain and/or stabilize the prices of the generic
drug products named, have been brought against various defendants
including, among others, Teva USA, Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc.,
Actavis Elizabeth and Pliva, Inc.  The plaintiffs generally seek
injunctive relief and damages under federal antitrust law, and
damages under various state laws.

On April 6, 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) entered an order transferring cases brought by classes of
direct or indirect purchasers and alleging claims of generic
price-fixing for coordination or consolidation with the
multidistrict litigation currently pending in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; the panel subsequently transferred
further cases to that court, and the plaintiffs filed
consolidated amended complaints on August 15, 2017.

Defendants moved to dismiss certain of those consolidated amended
complaints on October 6, 2017.

Teva denies having engaged in any conduct that would give rise to
liability with respect to the subpoenas and civil suits.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Awaits Court Order Dismissing Conn. Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited remains a defendant in a
consolidated securities class action pending in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Connecticut and was originally filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018,
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2017.

On November 6, 2016 and December 27, 2016, two putative
securities class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California against Teva and certain
of its current and former officers.  After those two lawsuits
were consolidated and transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut, the court appointed the Ontario
Teachers' Pension Plan Board as lead plaintiff.  The lead
plaintiff then filed a consolidated amended complaint purportedly
on behalf of purchasers of Teva's securities between February 6,
2014 and August 3, 2017.

The consolidated complaint seeks unspecified damages, legal fees,
interest, and costs, and it asserts that Teva and certain of its
current and former officers and directors violated the federal
securities laws and Israeli securities laws in connection with
Teva's alleged failure to disclose Teva's participation in an
alleged anticompetitive scheme to fix prices and allocate markets
for generic drugs in the United States.

On December 1, 2017, Teva and the current and former officer and
director defendants filed motions to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint, with prejudice.  Those motions are currently
pending before the Court.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Conn. Suit over Stock Purchase Plan Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited continues to face a
potential class action lawsuit, originally filed with the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, related to its
the Teva Employee Stock Purchase Plan, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2017.

On July 17, 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio derivatively on behalf of the
Teva Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and alternatively as a
putative class action lawsuit on behalf of individuals who
purchased Teva stock through that plan.  That lawsuit seeks
unspecified damages, legal fees, interest and costs.

The complaint alleges that Teva failed to maintain adequate
financial controls based on the facts underpinning Teva's U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) deferred prosecution
agreement, and also based on allegations substantially similar to
those in the putative class action securities lawsuit pending in
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.

On November 29, 2017, the Court granted Teva's motion to transfer
the litigation to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut where the putative class action securities lawsuit is
pending.

On December 29, 2017, the parties jointly moved to stay the case
pending resolution of the motions to dismiss filed in the
consolidated putative securities class action.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


TEVA PHARMA: Seeks to Transfer Securities Suit to Connecticut
-------------------------------------------------------------
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited's motion to transfer a
putative class action securities lawsuit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the District of
Connecticut is currently pending before the Court, according to
the Company's Form 10-K filed on February 12, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

On August 21, 2017, a putative class action securities lawsuit
was filed by Elliot Grodko in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of purchasers of
Teva's securities between November 15, 2016 and August 2, 2017
seeking unspecified damages, legal fees, interest, and costs.

The complaint alleged that Teva and certain of its current and
former officers violated the federal securities laws and Israeli
securities laws by making false and misleading statements in
connection with Teva's acquisition and integration of Actavis
Generics.

On August 30, 2017, a putative securities class action was filed
by Barry Baker in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on behalf of purchasers of Teva's
securities between November 15, 2016 and August 2, 2017 seeking
unspecified damages, legal fees, interest, and costs.  The
complaint alleges that Teva and certain officers violated the
federal securities laws by making false and misleading statements
in connection with Teva's acquisition and integration of Actavis
Generics.

On November 1, 2017, the Court consolidated the Baker case with
the Grodko case.

Teva's motion to transfer the consolidated action to the District
of Connecticut is currently pending before the Court.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, a pharmaceutical company,
develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
medicines and a portfolio of specialty medicines worldwide.  It
operates through two segments, Generic Medicines and Specialty
Medicines.  The Company was founded in 1901 and is headquartered
in Petach Tikva, Israel.


THREE AND SEVENTY-THREE: Faecs "Olsen" Suit in S.D. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Three and Seventy-
Three Gourmet, LLC. The case is styled Thomas J. Olsen,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Three and Seventy-Three Gourmet, LLC
agent of Dallas BBQ, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01653 (S.D.
N.Y., February 22, 2018).

Three and Seventy-Three Gourmet, LLC is in the Barbecue
Restaurant business.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


TOYOTA MOTOR: ADR Deadline in "Robey" Suit Moved to March 7
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL ROBEY, MOE ASGHARNIA and JAMES COMB,
Individually and On Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated
Individuals, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., and
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-07212-EMC
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division,
continued the ADR deadline from Feb. 25, 2018 to March 7, 2018,
and the case management conference currently set for March 1,
2018 to April 5, 2018, as stipulated by the parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/IZoig1 from Leagle.com.

Michael Robey, Moe Asgharnia & James Comb, Plaintiffs,
represented by Mark Samuel Greenstone --
mgreenstone@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, represented by
Tamara Alicia Bush -- tbush@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLP,
Abirami Gnanadesigan -- agnanadesigan@dykema.com -- DYKEMA
GOSSETT LLP, Janet L. Conigliaro -- jconigliaro@dykema.com --
DYKEMA, pro hac vice & John Mark Thomas -- jthomas@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett PLLC.


ULTA BEAUTY: Zimmerman Law Files Nationwide Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Attorney Thomas Zimmerman, Jr. of the Chicago-based Zimmerman Law
Offices filed a nationwide class action suit against Ulta Beauty,
Inc. ("Ulta").  The suit alleges Ulta has a routine practice of
repackaging and resealing beauty products that have previously
been purchased, used and returned by Ulta's customers, before
returning those used products to its shelves to be purchased by
other consumers.

The case, Meghan DeVries v. Ulta Beauty, Inc., was filed on
February 8, 2018, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

The suit alleges that, for the past several years, managers at
Ulta's retail stores throughout the nation are given a quota as
to the number of returned items that can be deemed to be
"damaged" and thrown away, and store managers would get lectured
by Ulta's upper management if their stores were over the quota.
The suit notes that Ulta received and responded to complaints
from customers and employees regarding those practices, but it
nevertheless continued its corporate policy and practice of
surreptitiously reselling used beauty products.

Used beauty products -- such as mascara, foundation, and shampoo
-- were almost always placed back on the shelf since it is
difficult to tell if they were used, according to the complaint.
The suit further alleges that for beauty products that obviously
and visibly appeared to be used, Ulta's employees were instructed
to clean those beauty products with cotton swabs to make them
look like new, and place them back on Ulta's store shelves for
resale.

Consumers expect that beauty products are new and unused when
purchased from retailers, because, by nature, used beauty
products are unsanitary and unhygienic, and place people at a
risk of contracting disease.  Attorney Tom Zimmerman noted, "The
lawsuit cites to an undercover investigation that found used
beauty products at Ulta were contaminated with harmful bacteria,
including E. coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae, two types of
bacteria normally found in the intestinal tract that are expelled
with feces, such that people could literally be applying and
smearing someone else's fecal matter directly onto their lips."
Attorney Zimmerman continued, "The investigators also noted that
used beauty products can contain the herpes simplex virus --
which can survive on the surface of a lipstick tube for up to a
week -- as well as Staphylococcus aureus, which can cause very
serious infections, boils and lesions, especially if you have an
open cut on your skin or lips, or it gets in your eyes."

The lead plaintiff represents all consumers throughout the United
States impacted by Ulta's actions.  The lawsuit seeks damages for
the money consumers spent to purchase used beauty products from
Ulta, and injunctive relief to force Ulta to stop repackaging
used beauty products and reselling them as if they were new.

A copy of the complaint is available upon request.  Attorney Tom
Zimmerman will be available for interviews and the lead plaintiff
may also be available to speak with the media on a limited basis.

Contacts:

         Zimmerman Law Offices, PC
         Atty. Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr.
         (312) 440-0020
         tom@attorneyzim.com
         77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
         Chicago, IL 60602
         www.attorneyzim.com  [GN]


UNITED STATES: Faces "Trinh" Suit in C. Dist. Calif.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thomas D Homan. The
case is styled as Hoang Trinh, Vu Ha, Long Nguyen and Ngoc Hoang,
on behalf of themselves and all of those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Thomas D Homan, Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Jefferson B
Sessions III, David Marin, Sandra Hutchens and Doe 1
Warden, Adelanto ICE Processing Center, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-00316 (C.D. Cal., February 22, 2018).

Thomas D Homan is the acting director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


VICE MEDIA: Faces Class Action in California
--------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Vice Media on Feb. 13 became the latest company to face a class
action accusing it of paying women far less than similarly
situated men, in Los Angeles Superior Court.


WASHINGTON: Bid to Certify of Questions of Law to High Ct. Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Certify
Two Questions of State Law to the Washington Supreme Court in the
case captioned JADE WILCOX, Plaintiff, v. JOHN BATISTE and JOHN
DOES 1-300, Defendant, No. 2:17-CV-122-RMP (E.D. Wash.).

Plaintiff Jade Wilcox brought this putative class action lawsuit
against John Batiste, Chief of the Washington State Patrol and
his agents (WSP), alleging that the WSP violated the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), by disclosing personal information
in vehicle collision reports to third parties who used the
information in the reports to solicit legal business.

Defendant has moved the Court to certify two questions to the
Washington State Supreme Court:

   (1) Whether the Washington State Patrol's duty under RCW
46.52.060 includes disclosure of police traffic collision reports
to the public; and

   (2) If so, whether the disclosure of a police traffic
collision report under RCW 46.52.060 is related to the operation
of a motor vehicle or public safety.

Washington law provides that when in the opinion of any federal
court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is necessary to
ascertain the local law of this state in order to dispose of such
proceeding and the local law has not been clearly determined,
such federal court may certify to the supreme court for answer
the question of local law involved.

Plaintiff alleges that the WSP violates the DPPA when it
discloses Department of Licensing and Motor Vehicles personal
information to third parties for impermissible purposes.

Question One

WSP argues that whether RCW 46.52.060 establishes a duty to
disclose police traffic collision reports to the public has not
been clearly determined and is dispositive in this matter
involving an alleged violation of the DPPA.

However, the Court disagrees. The Court finds that RCW 46.52.060
is sufficiently clear for this Court to apply in this case. In
addition, the Court finds that even if there was some ambiguity
or conflict between Washington state statutes and Washington
state court opinions regarding the duties of the WSP, that
conflict would not be dispositive of the issues before this Court
regarding alleged violations of the DPPA. The issue before the
Court in this case is whether the WSP policies violate the DPPA.
Washington state law and the WSP practices are sufficiently clear
that the Court can decide that issue without further
clarification from the Washington State Supreme Court.

Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion to certify
Question One to the Washington State Supreme Court.

Question Two

Plaintiff argues that this issue calls for the interpretation of
federal, not state, law because it seeks an interpretation of the
language of the DPPA as to what is related to the operation of a
motor vehicle or public safety. The Court agrees. Although the
provision in the DPPA allows for the incorporation of state law
authority regarding whether such use is related to the operation
of a motor vehicle or public safety, the finding of whether
Washington State's use is related to the operation of a motor
vehicle or public safety within the meaning of the DPPA exception
is an issue of federal statutory interpretation, not state
statutory interpretation. Therefore, a decision by the Washington
State Supreme Court would not be dispositive of the issue in this
Court, which is whether the WSP is violating the DPPA, and
certification would not be appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court declines to certify Question Two.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 18, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaafyfgk from Leagle.com.

Jade Wilcox, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Richard Sweetser,
Sweetser Law Office, 1020 N Washington Spokane, W A 99201 &
Thomas G. Jarrard, Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrard, 1020 N
Washington St, Spokane, WA 99201, USA

John Bastiste, Chief of Washington State Patrol, Defendant,
represented by Shelley Anne Williams, Washington State Attorney
General's Office.


WYNDHAM RESORT: Abbott's Opt Out Bid in "McGrath" Deal Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jeffrey T. Miller of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denied James Shannon Abbott's
motion to opt out of the class action settlement in the case,
MICHELLE RENEE McGRATH and VERONICA O'BOY, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
WYNDHAM RESORT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation;
WYNDHAM VACATION OWNERSHIP, INC., a Delaware corporation; WYNDHAM
VACATION RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE
OPERATIONS, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 15cv1631 JM (KSC) (S.D. Cal.).

Abbott works at Wyndham Oceanside Pier in Oceanside, California.
During the class period, Abbott worked 204 weeks.  Under the
Settlement Agreement, he would receive an estimated $11,515.89.
The terms of the Settlement Agreement required the eligible class
members to request exclusion from the class by Nov. 13, 2017.
Abbott submitted notice of his request to opt out on Dec. 6,
2017, 23 days after the deadline had passed.  On Jan. 16, 2018,
six days before the final settlement approval hearing, Abbott
filed the instant pro se motion.

Abbott argues that Wyndham is in no way prejudiced by the 23 day
delay in submitting his request for exclusion.  However, after
Nov. 13, 2017, it would have been reasonable for Wyndham to
understand that all excluded class members had been identified.
Furthermore, the Court granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement, giving Wyndham a finality interest.

As for the length of his delay, Abbott argues that it has no
effect whatsoever on this proceeding and has zero impact on the
class settlement.  The reason Abbott gives for his delay is a
severe motor vehicle accident he was involved in on Nov. 30,
2016, nearly a year before the opt-out deadline.  It was not
until an attorney representing him in a Tennessee case informed
him about the action that Abbott went through his mail, located,
and read the notice letter in early December.  Abbott then
submitted notice of his request to opt out.

However, the Defendants note that there is no evidence that Mr.
Abbott was impaired or prevented from responding during the
notice period from Sept. 13, 2017, to Nov. 13, 2017.  Moreover,
during the notice period, Abbott gave a deposition and testified
at trial in a collective action against Wyndham pending in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, Case No. 3:13-cv-00641-HSM-CCS.  Abbott's ability to
work at Wyndham and participate in the Pierce Litigation
throughout the notice period belies his claim for excusable
neglect.

Judge Miller finds that despite Abbott's condition after his
November 2016 accident, it appears that the reason for the delay
was entirely within the reasonable control of the movant.  There
is no allegation that the notice letter arrived after the
deadline passed.  Once he looked through his mail, Abbott found
the notice letter.  His or his wife's failure to do so earlier
does not rise to the level of excusable neglect.  Thus, while
there is no evidence that Abbott's request was not brought in
good faith, he has failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.
Accordingly, the Judge denied his motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 31, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OXWZLf from Leagle.com.

Michelle Renee McGrath, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christina Marie
Lucio -- clucio@farnaeslaw.com -- Law Office of Malte L.L.
Farnaes APC, Jeff Geraci -- jgeraci@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury
& Singer, Malte L.L. Farnaes -- malte@farnaeslaw.com -- Farnaes &
Lucio, APC, Mitchell J. Murray -- mitch@farnaeslaw.com -- Farnaes
& Lucio, APC, Diana M. Khoury -- dkhoury@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan
Khoury & Singer, Isam C. Khoury -- khoury@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan
Khoury & Singer & Michael D. Singer -- msinger@ckslaw.com --
Cohelan, Khoury & Singer.

Wyndham Resort Development Corporation, an Oregon Corporation,
Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., a Delaware Corporation &
Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Sabrina Layne Shadi -- sshadi@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler
LLP & Shareef Farag -- sfarag@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hosteler,
LLP.


* ERISA Class Action Settlements Cost Employer $927.8MM in 2017
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Meacham, writing for Compensation.BLR.com, reports that
class action settlements and court decisions related to 401(k)
retirement plans in 2017 significantly affected the direction of
ERISA litigation, according to the newest edition of an annual
law firm report on workplace class action lawsuits.

The aggregate value of settlements dealing with ERISA litigation,
employment discrimination, wages and hours, and government
enforcement soared in the latest year, underscoring a trend that
has the potential to rock an employer's balance sheet, if not
bankrupt a company.

In many of the ERISA class actions, courts deliberated class
certification issues in cases involving challenges to allegedly
excessive investment management fees, continued employer stock
investments in 401(k) plans, and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs) -- according to the 14th annual "Workplace Class Action
Litigation Report" released by Seyfarth Shaw.

The yearly report studied 1,408 of the largest employment court
cases from 2017 to help guide its clients through class action
and collective action law, and to enable corporate counsel to
make informed litigation decisions while minimizing risk, the
firm said.

The cases decided in 2017 foreshadow the direction of class
action litigation this year, according to Seyfarth's report.

"One certain conclusion is that employment law class action and
collective action litigation is becoming ever more sophisticated
and will continue to be a source of significant financial
exposure to employers well into the future.  Employers also can
expect that class action and collective action lawsuits
increasingly will combine claims under multiple statutes," the
report said.

Retirement Case Issues
A dominant force in 2017 ERISA class action litigation was the
filing by the plaintiffs' class action bar of a wave of new
401(k) and 403(b) fee and investment lawsuits against various
employers, with a heavy focus on institutions of higher
education.

In retirement plan litigation, courts also continued to split on
whether plaintiffs who have received lump-sum distributions have
standing to sue under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), whether cash balance plans are inherently age-
discriminatory, and whether employers may modify retiree health
benefits.

Among workplace class actions, ERISA cases settled in 2017 were
the most costly for employers in total.  At $927.8 million they
strongly outpaced the second-largest category -- wage-and-hour
settlements -- valued at $525 million.

Combining all types of workplace class actions, settlement
numbers in 2017 totaled $2.72 billion, a significant increase
from 2016 when such settlements totaled $1.75 billion, the report
said.

Variety of Rulings

Federal circuit and state courts in 2017 issued a wide variety of
rulings on procedural and substantive matters in ERISA class
actions, the Seyfarth report said. Among other topics, the
rulings affected:

   -- Administrative fees, attorneys' fees and costs, damages,
and breach-of-fiduciary duty issues in these class actions;
   -- U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) enforcement litigation;
   -- 401(k) class actions;
   -- Class action litigation over retiree/employee benefits; and
   -- Stock-drop class actions.

"More often than not, class actions pose unique 'bet-the-company'
risks for employers.  An adverse judgment in a class action has
the potential to bankrupt a business and adverse publicity can
eviscerate its market share," said Seyfarth Shaw Chairman Peter
C. Miller in the letter opening the report.  "Likewise, the
ongoing defense of a class action can drain corporate resources
long before the case even reaches a decision point."

4 Key Trends

Seyfarth's overview of workplace class action litigation
developments in 2017 showed four key trends.

1. The monetary value of the top workplace class action
settlements rose dramatically in 2017. These numbers increased
over past years, even after they had reached all-time highs in
2014 to 2016.  The plaintiffs' employment class action bar and
governmental enforcement litigators were successful in monetizing
their case filings into large class-wide settlements, and they
did so at decidedly higher values than in previous years.

2. While federal and state courts issued many favorable class
certification rulings for the plaintiffs' bar in 2017, evolving
case law precedents and new defense approaches resulted in better
outcomes for employers in opposing class certification requests.

3. Filings and settlements of government enforcement litigation
in 2017 did not reflect a sharp pivot from the ideological
proworker (or antibig business) outlook of the Obama
administration to a probusiness, less regulation/litigation
viewpoint of the Trump White House.

4. Class action litigation increasingly has been shaped and
influenced by recent rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court that have
affected the prosecution and defense of class actions and
government enforcement litigation.  The past year continued that
trend, with several key decisions on complex employment
litigation and class action issues that were arguably more
probusiness than decisions in past years.

"The stakes in these types of employment lawsuits can be
extremely significant, as the financial risks of such cases are
enormous," said Mr. Miller in the report.  "More often than not,
class actions adversely affect the market share of a corporation
and impact its reputation in the marketplace.  It is a legal
exposure which keeps corporate counsel and business executives
awake at night." [GN]


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S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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