CAR_Public/180131.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Wednesday, January 31, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 23



                            Headlines


ABCO MAINTENANCE: Bid to Dismiss "Guzman-Reina" FLSA Suit Denied
ADVANCED CALL: Court Denies Arbitration in "Taylor"
ALISAL UNION: Faces Class Action on Reuse of Blood Test Needles
ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Refuses to Dismiss "Konecky"
ALROSE GROUP: "Rosenberg" Suit Alleges Warranty Act Violations

AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Suit
APPLE INC: Dragged Into Intel Class Action in Israel
ARADIGM CORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action
ARADIGM CORP: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Suit
AZZ INC: Glancy Prongay & Murray Files Class Action

AZZ INC: Howard G. Smith Files Class Action
AZZ INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY: $10.2MM Deal in "Reyes" Has Final OK
BARRACUDA NETWORKS: Shareholders Challenge $1.6BB Acquisition
BLEIER & COX: Faces Class Action on Abusive Debt Collection

BOZEMAN, MO: Argues Right to Keep Remaining Settlement Money
BROTEN GARAGE: "Bailey" Sues Over Racial Discrimination
CALIFORNIA: Court Denies Inmate's Bid for TRO in "Jones"
CAVIUM INC: Fineberg Seeks to Halt Marvell Tech Merger Deal
CAVIUM INC: Faces Class Action on $6-Billion Tech Merger

CEDAR RAPIDS, IA: Lawsuit Filed Over Traffic Camera Tickets
CENTRAL PAYMENT: Court Orders ESI Discovery in Custom Hair Suit
CHELSEA, MI: Court Partly Grants Summary Judgment Bids in "Mote"
CLEVELAND COUNTY EMERGENCY: Connor Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT
CNX GAS: Court Partly Quashes Subpoena in MAWC's Suit

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Settlement in "Boswell" Has Final Approval
CPA GLOBAL: Firm Welcomes Implications Of UDRP Decision
DJNG INC: Court Dismisses "Castaneda" Suit With Prejudice
DUNBAR ARMORED: "Solis" Wage-and-Hour Suit Remanded to State Ct.
DYNAMIC LEDGER: Court Won't Enjoin Sale of Unqualified Securities

ENHANCED RECOVERY: Leavy Sues Over Auto-dialed Collection Calls
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: "Brannon" Suit Moved to Minnesota Court
EKSO BIONICS: "Bekhet" Sues Over Share Price Drop
EQUIFAX INC: Durand State Bank Hits Data Breach, Claims Damages
FIAT CHRYSLER: Auto Workers Say Union Bribes Were Behind Layoffs

FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Court Grants Dismissal of "Antista"
FITNESS FIRST: Customer Complaints Pile Up Amid Class Action
FORD MOTOR: Faces Super Duty Emissions Class Action in Michigan
FORD MOTORS: Motorists Claim Firm Used "Defeat Devices"
GEICO GENERAL: Contract Class Action Can Proceed, Judge Rules

GENERAL CABLE: "Rosenblatt" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
GENERAL MILLS: Claims in Age Discrimination Suit Narrowed
GENESCO INC: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in "Shumate"
GENOVA PALAZZO DUCALE: Refund Demanded Over Fake Modigliani Works
GERMANY: Accepts Court Summons to Appear in NY in Genocide Case

GOLDMAN SACHS: Thwarts Fraud Class Action Tied to Abacus CDO
GOPRO INC: "Park" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
GOPRO INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
GUITAR CENTER: Denial of Class Certification in "George" Affirmed
HALIFAX HEALTH: Court Stays Proceedings in MSPA Suit

HOME DEPOT: Misrepresents Wood Products, Class Action Says
IGNYTA INC: Faces Class Action on Proposed Acquisition
INTEL CORP: Israelis Seek Class Action Suit
INTEL CORP: March 12 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
INTEL CORP: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action

INTEROIL CORP: Block Files Securities Class Action in Mass.
KENT SECURITY: Worker May Pursue Wage Claim as Class Suit
LA CAMPANA RESTAURANT: "Aguilar" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay
LOGIK PRECISION: "Rodriguez" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
LOUISIANA: La. App. Affirms Dismissal of School Bus Driver's Suit

LTD FINANCIAL: Court Certifies "Bordeaux" FDCPA Class
LUBRIZOL CORP: "Jones" Suit Seeks Wages for Pre-shift Prep Work
LYONS DOUGHTY: Court Dismisses "Saroza" FDCPA Suit
MACY'S WEST: Court Grants Final Approval of $1.55MM Class Deal
MAINE: Court to Hear Oral Arguments in Medicaid Suit vs. MDHHS

MANITOBA: Judge Approves $90MM Settlement Over Floods
MASON COMPANIES: Made Illegal Calls, "Gonzales" Suit Says
MDL 2359: Court Excludes Wolf's Expert Testimony
MDL 2359: Hardieplank Siding Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
MDL 2424: 9th Circuit Rules on Fuel Efficiency Class Action

MDL 2455: Feb. 12 Deadline for Final Settlement Approval Motion
MDL 2785: Court Refuses to Consolidate "Brannon" into MDL
MDL 2804: Westfield Monitoring Opioid Class-Action Lawsuit
MENDEZ FUEL: "Goussen" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT: Feliciano Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages

MURATA MANUFACTURING: Sued Over Inductor Price Fixing
NATIONAL GAS: Court Denies Arbitration in "Johansen" TCPA Suit
NATIONAL GENERAL: Ct. Junks Amended "Alderson" Insurance Suit
NEW YORK: Settles NYPD Officer's Suit Over Ban on Beards
NORTHERN CONCRETE: Court Certifies Time Travel Class in "Morgan"

PENN MUTUAL: Court OKS $10K Attorney's Fees in "Harshbarger"
PENNSYLVANIA: Class Assails for Linking Drug Crimes, Driving
PFIZER INC: Bid to Strike Nationwide Class Allegations OK'd
PHILADELPHIA, PA: Drug Convicted Drivers Sue Over Licenses
PHILADELPHIA: Suit Alleges License Suspension Law Discriminates

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: 3d Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in "Panico"
QUALCOMM INC: Faces Antitrust Class Action in British Columbia
QUEEN OF VALLEY: Denial of "Lampe" Class Certification Affirmed
REDSTONE FEDERAL: Ct. Denies Bids to Junk "Caldwell" FDCPA Suit
RURAL METRO: Court Compels Witness Deposition in "Calleros" Suit

SCOTTRADE INC: "Martin" FDUTPA Suit Transferred to Missouri
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Cooperates in Class Suit vs. Other Airlines
SPORTS TRADING Arabella Foster Facing Court Action
ST. JUDE: Canadian Suit Launched Over Cardiac Defibrillators
STARBUCKS CORP: Judge Dismisses Putative Class Action

TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Grants Termination Class in "Buchanan"
TD BANK: Court Certifies Class in "Rench" Racketeering Suit
TOKYO ELECTRIC: Judge Dismisses Class Action
UNITED STATES: Bid to Dismiss Counts 4-6 in "Hamama" Denied
UNITED STATES: Releases Undocumented Teen Amid Class Action

UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS: Sued Over Fees for Copy of Medical Records
VIRCUREX: Customer Files Class Action Lawsuit in Colorado
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Canadian Unit Agrees to Settle Class Action Suit
VOCUS GROUP: To Restructure Amid Class Action Over Fin'l Guidance
WECONNECT INC: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Goplin"

WELLMONT HEALTH: Tenn. App. Flips Class Certification
WELLS FARGO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Muniz" as Moot
WELLS FARGO: Can Compel Arbitration in "Gadomski" FCRA Suit
WEXFORD HEALTH: Court Denies Move for Class Action Status
WORTHINGTON PJ: Settlement in "O'Connor" Suit Has Prelim Approval

YUME INC: "Rosenfeld" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
ZAIS GROUP: Potential Fiduciary Duty Breach Investigated







                            *********



ABCO MAINTENANCE: Bid to Dismiss "Guzman-Reina" FLSA Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge I. Leo Glasser of the U.S. District Court for the Easter
District of New York denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
case, SHIRLEY GUZMAN-REINA, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. ABCO MAINTENANCE, INC., JAMES
VIRGA, THOMAS VIRGA, and PETE GHAZARIAN, Defendants, Case No. 17-
CV-1299 (E.D. N.Y.).

From Sept. 23, 2013 through May 2, 2016, the Plaintiff worked as
one of several dispatchers for the Defendants at ABCO Maintenance
in Staten Island, New York.  As a dispatcher, she was responsible
for communicating and coordinating with ABCO's laborers regarding
their daily tasks.  The Plaintiff typically worked five night-
shifts per week, beginning at 10 p.m. and ending the following
morning at either 7 or 8 a.m.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants routinely required her
to work more than 40 hours per workweek and that she regularly
worked between 45 and 50 hours per week without additional
compensation.  She further alleges that the Defendants generally
refused to pay wages for more than 40 hours of work, as a
deliberate policy, and that they obscured their time keeping
records to minimize such payments.

The Plaintiff initiated the action on March 7, 2017, asserting
Fair Labor Standards Act and New York labor law claims.  She also
seeks other various forms of relief including liquidated damages,
civil penalties, interest, costs, and attorneys' fees.

On May 8, 2017, the Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss
the Complaint and a memorandum of law in Support of their motion.
On June 6, 2017, the Plaintiff filed her opposition to the
Defendants' joint motion to dismiss.  On June 28, 2017, the
Defendants filed their reply.

Judge Glasser finds that the Defendants mistakenly argue that the
Plaintiff utterly fails to plead any of the elements necessary
for a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  The Plaintiff
has not yet moved to certify the putative collective action, and
so the Defendants' arguments, which cite authority appropriate
for challenging a motion to certify a collective action, are
premature.  Even if this were the appropriate stage to challenge
the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's collective action allegations,
the Judge says the Complaint satisfies the Plaintiff's burden.

The Judge holds that the Complaint accomplishes that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a policy to which other
dispatchers may plausibly be subject.  He says the Defendants'
arguments are more properly directed toward whether a collective
action should be certified here, rather than whether the
Plaintiff's claims are facially sufficient, and would be better
considered in that context.

For all of these reasons, Judge Glasser denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum Order is
available at https://is.gd/Nzaatn from Leagle.com.

Shirley Guzman-Reina, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander T.
Coleman, Borrelli & Associates PLLC, Janine Kapp, Borrelli &
Associates, P.L.L.C., Michael J. Borrelli --
mjb@employmentlawyernewyork.com -- Borrelli & Associates, P.C. &
Jeffrey Robert Maguire -- jrm@employmentlawyernewyork.com --
Borrelli & Associates.

ABCO Maintenance, Inc., Thomas Virga, Pete Ghazarian & James
Virga, Defendants, represented by Michael Domenico Hamersky --
mhamersky@grifflegal.com -- Griffin Hamersky P.C.


ADVANCED CALL: Court Denies Arbitration in "Taylor"
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case
captioned KATHLEEN TAYLOR, Individually and on behalf Of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED CALL CENTER
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17 C 1805 (N.D. Ill.).

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Kathleen Taylor (Taylor)
alleges that Defendant Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC
(ACCT) violated Section 1692g(a)(1) of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) when, in a letter to Taylor seeking to
collect debt owed on her Toys "R" Us credit card with Synchrony
Bank, it failed to inform her that the account balance may vary
based on application of interest.

That letter states:

   This account has been listed with our office for collection.

   All payments should be made directly to Synchrony Bank using
the enclosed envelope. All payments should be made directly to
Synchrony Bank using the enclosed envelope. Do not send payments
to this office. Taylor's original Toys "R" Us cardholder
agreement with GE Capital Reserve Bank, the predecessor-in-
interest to Synchrony, is governed by federal law and, to the
extent state law applies, the laws of Utah without regard to its
conflicts of law principles.

Invoking this provision in Taylor's cardholder agreement, ACCT
seeks to compel Taylor to arbitrate her FDCPA claim. Taylor does
not dispute the validity of the arbitration clause nor claim that
she opted out of it. Rather, her basis for opposing ACCT's Motion
is that ACCT, as a non-signatory to the cardholder agreement, may
not enforce the arbitration provision against her.

ACCT, conceding that it is a non-signatory, instead maintains
that it enjoys the benefits of the arbitration provision as
Synchrony's agent.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that as a general rule, only
parties to the contract may enforce the rights and obligations
created by the contract.

Irrespective of whether ACCT's affidavit evidence confirms its
status as Synchrony's agent, Utah law in this circumstance does
not permit ACCT to compel Taylor to arbitrate. Had the parties
done their diligence, they doubtless would have discovered Belnap
v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2017), in which the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held without dissent that, as a
matter of Utah law, an agency relationship with a principal to a
contract does not give the agent the authority to enforce a
contractual term for the agent's own benefit.

In sum, Utah Supreme Court precedent as interpreted by the Tenth
Circuit makes clear that a non-signatory's agency relationship
with a principal does not authorize the agent to enforce a
contractual term, such as an arbitration clause, for the agent's
own benefit. The non-signatory agent here, Defendant ACCT, is
seeking to enforce the arbitration clause in the Synchrony-Taylor
cardholder agreement for its own benefit that is, to compel
Plaintiff Taylor to arbitrate. As such, the Court denies ACCT's
Motion to Compel Arbitration.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is denied with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7zoqx7l from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Taylor, Plaintiff, represented by Holly Rose Mccurdy,
Community Lawyers Group, Ltd, 73 W Monroe St Ste 514
Chicago, IL, 60603-4955

Kathleen Taylor, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Jacob Wood  --
mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com -- Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.
& Celetha Chatman -- cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com --
Community Lawyers Group, Ltd.

Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, Defendant, represented by
David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, Brandon S. Stein -- bstein@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Jennifer W. Weller --
jweller@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLC.


ALISAL UNION: Faces Class Action on Reuse of Blood Test Needles
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
parents claim in a federal class action that a fifth-grade
teacher at Dr. Oscar F. Loya Elementary School in Alisal Union
School District in Salinas used the same needle on multiple
students to subject them to blood-sugar tests, without parental
notice.

The case is MARIO V.; GERALDINE JULIE B.; I.G.V., a minor by and
through Guardian At Litem, MARIO V.; OSCAR G.; CHRISTINA G.;
O.D.G., a minor by and through Guardian At Litem, CHRISTINA G.;
Y.P., a minor by and through Guardian At Litem, CHRISTINA G.;
HUGO P.; ALICIA P.; A.P.H., a minor by and through Guardian At
Litem, ALICIA P., and other Similarly Situated Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs, vs. ALISAL UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, OSCAR F. LOYA
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, HENRY AMENTA, DIANA GARCIA, AND DOES 1 THROUGH
50, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. _____ (N.D. Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Charles A. Bonner, Esq.
     A. Cabral Bonner, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER
     475 Gate Five Rd, Suite 212
     Sausalito, CA 94965
     Tel: (415) 331-3070
     Fax: (415) 331-2738
     Email: cbonner799@aol.com
            cabral@bonnerlaw.com


ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Refuses to Dismiss "Konecky"
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Missoula Division issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint in the case captioned
SETH KONECKY and JENNIFER KONECKY, husband and wife, FLATHEAD
COUNTY DIST., INC., a Montana Corporation, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE
FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, No. CV 17-
10-M-DWM (D. Mont.).

Plaintiffs allege that Allstate violated Montana's "made whole"
rule by subrogating for property damages when Plaintiffs had
unrecovered losses, costs, and attorney fees within that category
of coverage. Next, Plaintiffs' claim that Allstate violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a contract
claim, and thus not barred by Montana's Unfair Trade Practices
Act.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' constructive fraud claim is pled
with sufficient particularity because it lays out the who, what,
when, where, and how of the alleged constructive fraud, and,
because Plaintiffs' tort claims survive, so do Plaintiffs' civil
conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. Finally, Plaintiffs'
specific claim for contractual underinsured coverage is
sufficient to maintain their breach of contract claim.

Allstate insists subrogation was appropriate because it was not
required to cover Plaintiffs' unrecovered damages under the
policy. Plaintiffs argue Allstate violated the "made whole" rule
Subrogation is the `substitution of one party for another whose
debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to rights,
remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the
debtor.

Allstate first argues subrogation is proper because it paid
Plaintiffs the amount owed under the policy, regardless of
whether Plaintiffs have unrecovered attorney fees or other costs.

This argument does not square with Montana's "made whole" rule:
"an insured must be totally reimbursed for all losses as well as
costs, including attorney fees, involved in recovering those
losses before the insurer can exercise any right of subrogation,
regardless of any contract language providing to the contrary.
Whether Allstate is contractually bound under the policy to pay
Plaintiffs' deductible, rental expenses, or attorney fees
incurred while pursuing damages is irrelevant to the question of
whether the "made whole" rule applies.

Section 33-18-242(3) provides, inter alia, that an insured who
has suffered damages as a result of the handling of an insurance
claim may bring an action against the insurer for breach of the
insurance contract, for fraud, or pursuant to this section, but
not under any other theory or cause of action. In turn, every
contract, regardless of type, contains an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. A breach of the covenant is a breach
of the contract.

Accordingly, Allstate's motion to dismiss as it relates to Count
Three is denied because the Plaintiffs' claim sounds in contract,
not tort.

Allstate asserts that Plaintiffs' fail to plead constructive
fraud (Count Four) with sufficient particularity. Plaintiffs
respond that constructive fraud need not be pled with the same
particularity as actual fraud, and, the particularity requirement
notwithstanding, their allegations tell Allstate the details of
the claim.

Plaintiffs have alleged Allstate pursued subrogation by means of
misrepresentations and non-disclsoures, giving them the false
impression that they had no further right to compensation. These
allegations which detail the exact action and inaction Plaintiffs
contend constitute constructive fraud give Allstate sufficient
notice of the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct
charged, as well as what is false or misleading" and why it is
false.

Allstate's motion to dismiss Count Four is denied.

When the tort has been dismissed and there is no underlying tort
action forming a basis for civil conspiracy, the civil conspiracy
claim must be dismissed. Plaintiffs agree Counts Seven and Eight
would fail in the event no tort claims survive.

However, Count Four survives Allstate's challenge because it is
pled with sufficient particularity. And Allstate has not
specifically challenged Counts Two or Six, which, in any event,
survive Allstate's broader attack that Plaintiffs have failed to
allege a cognizable subrogation claim. Accordingly, Allstate's
motion to dismiss Counts Seven and Eight is denied.

Allstate finally argues that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
(Count One) should be dismissed because it fails to identify any
contractual provision Allstate supposedly breached and because
Plaintiffs "never made a demand for[] coverage. Plaintiffs insist
they identified the portion of the policy at issue, and that the
suit itself is their claim for coverage.

Plaintiffs are correct.

Allstate relies on Williamson v. Montana Public Service
Commission for the proposition that a breach of contract claim is
deficient where a plaintiff fails to identify the contractual
provision that was breached. 272 P.3d 71, 85 (Mont. 2012). In
Williamson, however, the plaintiffs were not parties to the
contracts at issue. Instead, they sought standing before the
Montana Public Service Commission as third-party beneficiaries to
street lighting contracts between NorthWestern Energy and various
Montana cities.

The Montana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because Montana statute did not authorize them to bring
an action for breach of contract in the [Public Service
Commission], the plaintiffs were not intended third-party
beneficiaries of the contracts, and the plaintiffs failed to
identify the specific contractual provisions they wished to
enforce. Here, however, the Plaintiffs are parties to the
insurance contract, and they have identified the contractual
provision they wish to enforce. Allstate's motion to dismiss
Count One is denied.

Plaintiffs' allegations meet the pleading standard required by
Rule 8(a) and, where necessary, Rule 9(b). Accordingly, IT IS
ordered that Allstate's motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y88my4ry
from Leagle.com.

Seth Konecky, husband, Jennifer Konecky, wife & Flathead Valley
Dist., Inc., a Montana Corporation, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alan
J. Lerner -- lerner@lernerlawmt.com -- LERNER LAW FIRM, Allan M.
McGarvey -- contact@mcgarveylaw.com -- McGARVEY HEBERLING
SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, Brian Joos -- joos@bigskyattorneys.com --
VISCOMI & GERSH, PLLP & Judah M. Gersh --
gersh@bigskyattorneys.com  -- VISCOMI & GERSH, PLLP.

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Allstate Indemnity
Company, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company &
Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by Mark L.
Hanover -- mark.hanover@dentons.com -- DENTONS US LLP, pro hac
vice & Peter F. Habein -- phabein@crowleyfleck.com -- CROWLEY
FLECK PLLP.


ALROSE GROUP: "Rosenberg" Suit Alleges Warranty Act Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Allen Rosenberg and the Alrose Group, LLC, individually and on
behalf of all themselves and all others similarly situated v.
Intel Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-00147 (E.D. N.Y., January 9,
2018), is brought against the Defendant for violations of the New
York General Business Law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Plaintiffs bring this action against Intel Corporation on behalf
of individuals and businesses who purchased or own devices
containing Intel processers with the security flaw known as the
"Kernel Flaw," within the statute of limitations period.

Plaintiff Allen Rosenberg is an individual citizen residing in
Atlantic Beach, New York. Rosenberg purchased a computer with an
Intel CPU processor during the Class Period.

Plaintiff Alrose Group LLC is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business located in Woodmere, New York. Alrose
purchased Affected Products during the Class Period and currently
uses its products to conduct its business.

Defendant Intel Corp. is engaged in the business of designing,
manufacturing, selling and/or distributing CPUs. Defendants
design, manufacture, develop and ship their products to
purchasers, resellers and distributors in and from California,
maintain a direct sales force and customer service department in
California, sell their products through retail outlets in
California, and create the specifications for their products in
and/or disseminates them from California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
      Joseph Lipari, Esq.
      Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
      THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
      85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
      Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
      Tel: (845) 483-7100
      Fax: (888) 749-7747
      E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com


AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Robbins Geller Files Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP disclosed that a class action
has been commenced by an institutional investor on behalf of
purchasers of AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. Class A common
shares during the period between December 20, 2016 and August 1,
2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"), including purchasers in the
Company's secondary public offering on or about February 8, 2017
(the "SPO"). The action, Case No. 18-cv-00299, was filed in the
Southern District of New York.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than 60 days from January 11. If you wish to discuss
this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your
rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's counsel, Samuel
H. Rudman or David A. Rosenfeld of Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900
or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. If you are a
member of this class, you can view a copy of the complaint as
filed at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/amcentertainment/.Any
member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead
plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do
nothing and remain an absent class member.

The complaint charges AMC, certain of its officers and directors
and the underwriters of the SPO with violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and/or the Securities Act of 1933. AMC is
principally involved in the theatrical exhibition business and
owns, operates or has interests in theaters located in the United
States and Europe. On December 21, 2016, AMC completed the
acquisition of Carmike Cinemas, Inc. ("Carmike") for $858.2
million. As of the acquisition date, Carmike operated 271
theaters and 2,923 screens located in 41 states across the United
States. On November 30, 2016, AMC completed the acquisition of
the outstanding equity of Odeon and UCI Cinemas Holdings Limited
("Odeon") for $637 million. As of the acquisition date, Odeon
operated 242 theaters with 2,243 screens throughout Europe.

On December 21, 2016, AMC filed a shelf Registration Statement
with the SEC to permit the Company to offer and sell AMC common
shares. On February 9, 2017, AMC filed the Prospectus for the
SPO, which incorporated the Registration Statement. Pursuant to
the Registration Statement and Prospectus, AMC sold 20.3 million
common shares at $31.50 per share, raising nearly $640 million.
The complaint alleges that the Registration Statement and
Prospectus included materially inaccurate statements regarding
the revenue growth of its newly acquired Carmike business and
omitted material facts and included materially inaccurate
statements associated with AMC's newly acquired international
business.

In addition, the complaint alleges that during the Class Period,
defendants made false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose adverse facts regarding AMC's business and prospects.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that defendants failed to
disclose that Carmike's operations had been experiencing a
prolonged period of financial underperformance due to a
protracted period of underinvestment in its theaters, that
Carmike had experienced a significant loss in market share when
its loyal patrons migrated to competitors that had renovated and
upgraded their theaters, that AMC was able to retain only a very
small number of Carmike's loyalty program members after the
Carmike acquisition, and that these issues were then having a
material adverse effect on Carmike's operations and theater
attendance. As a result of defendants' false statements and/or
omissions, the price of AMC common shares was artificially
inflated during the Class Period, trading above $35 per share.

On August 1, 2017, after the close of the market, AMC announced
its preliminary second quarter 2017 financial results, disclosing
that it expected to report total second quarter revenues of
approximately $1.2 billion and a net loss in the range of $178.5
to $174.5 million, or a loss of $1.36 to $1.34 per diluted share.
AMC also announced that its 2017 revenues were expected to be
between $5.10 and $5.23 billion and its 2017 net loss to be
between $150 and $125 million, or a loss of $1.17 to $0.97 per
diluted share. In response to these much worse-than-expected
results, the price of AMC common shares fell nearly 27% in one
day to close at $15.20 per share on August 2, 2017, or more than
50% below the price at which the shares were sold in the SPO.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
AMC Class A common shares during the Class Period, including
purchasers in the Company's SPO on or about February 8, 2017 (the
"Class"). The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which
has extensive experience in prosecuting investor class actions
including actions involving financial fraud.

Robbins Geller is widely recognized as a leading law firm
advising and representing U.S. and international investors in
securities litigation and portfolio monitoring. With 200 lawyers
in 10 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of the largest
securities class action recoveries in history. For the third
consecutive year, the Firm ranked first in both the total amount
recovered for investors and the number of shareholder class
action recoveries in ISS's SCAS Top 50 Report. Robbins Geller
attorneys have shaped the law in the areas of securities
litigation and shareholder rights and have recovered tens of
billions of dollars on behalf of the Firm's clients. Robbins
Geller not only secures recoveries for defrauded investors, it
also implements significant corporate governance reforms, helping
to improve the financial markets for investors worldwide. Please
visit http://www.rgrdlaw.comfor more information.

         Contacts
         Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
         David A. Rosenfeld, Esq.
         Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
         Tel: 800-449-4900
         Email: djr@rgrdlaw.com
                SRudman@rgrdlaw.com,
                DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com [GN]


APPLE INC: Dragged Into Intel Class Action in Israel
----------------------------------------------------
On Jan. 8 Patently Apple posted a report titled "Intel gets hit
with a String of Class Action Lawsuits over Meltdown and Spectre
Security Flaws found in their Processors.  The report pointed to
the initial wave of class actions starting with five.  Another
eight have been filed.  A new class action is now going before
the courts in Israel that drags ARM and Apple into the suit.

According to a new Israeli report, a group of Israelis have filed
a request with the Haifa District Court to file a class-action
lawsuit against Intel, ARM and Apple -- all based on recent
revelations that processors manufactured by Intel are vulnerable
to hacking.  The plaintiffs are represented by attorney Rimon
Zinati, and they include users of computers and cell-phones that
include processors made by the companies.

In the complaint, Mr. Zinati writes that "something new has
appeared on the tech landscape.  Our worst nightmares have come
to pass, and a giant tech bubble has burst.  That this is an
earthquake is an understatement.  Since the announcement by the
companies of the vulnerabilities of their products, we realize
that we are living in a fantasy world and now realize that we do
not even have a minimum of privacy."

The court is set to give its decision on the matter in the coming
weeks.  The Israeli lawsuit is one of many that are being
prepared in countries around the world.

The report doesn't explain why Apple has been dragged into this
suit and we'll have to wait for more details if the Israeli court
allows the suit to go forward. [GN]


ARADIGM CORP: Gainey McKenna Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed against Aradigm Corporation in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf
of a class consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired Aradigm securities on the open market from July 27, 2017
through January 8, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking
to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
the methodology underlying the Company's Linhaliq Phase III
clinical trials was not well tailored to yield consistent
efficacy findings or to provide data sufficient to account for
discordant efficacy findings; (2) the endpoint of the Phase III
trials -- namely, delaying the time to first exacerbation on
study therapy compared to placebo over approximately one year of
observation -- was unlikely to demonstrate a clinically
meaningful benefit with respect to a patient population that
would likely be taking the drug for a longer duration; (3)
accordingly, these studies were unlikely to support FDA approval
of the Linhaliq NDA; and (4) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.  When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit
claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the March 12, 2018
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-
law.com or gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


ARADIGM CORP: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood on Jan. 14 disclosed that on January 11,
2018, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California against
Aradigm Corporation (NASDAQ:ARDM).  The complaint alleges
violations of federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including
allegations of issuing a series of material or false
misrepresentations to the market which had the effect of
artificially inflating the market price during the Class Period,
which is July 27, 2017 through January 8, 2018.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Aradigm
Corporation shareholders who purchased common stock during the
Class Period and are therefore a member of the Class as described
above.  You may move the Court no later than Monday, March 12,
2018 to serve as a lead plaintiff for the entire Class.  However,
in order to do so, you must meet certain legal requirements
pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information
and participate in this or any other securities litigation, or
should you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice
or preservation of your rights, please contact:

         Robin Hester
         FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
         10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
         Oklahoma City, OK 73120
         Email: rkh@federmanlaw.com
         Website: www.federmanlaw.com [GN]


AZZ INC: Glancy Prongay & Murray Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired AZZ Inc. securities between April 22, 2015 and January
8, 2018, inclusive. AZZ investors have until March 12, 2018 to
file a lead plaintiff motion.

Investors suffering losses on their AZZ investments are
encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy of GPM to discuss their
legal rights in this class action at 310-201-9150 or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com.

On January 9, 2018, AZZ announced that the Company's audit
committee and outside accounting firm determined the Company
should have accounted differently for certain contracts within
its Energy Segment.

According to the Complaint filed in this class action, throughout
the Class period, AZZ made materially false and misleading
statements about the Company's compliance, operational and
business policies. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the
Company issued false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) repeatedly misrepresented their financial
results, (2) failed to report revenues in compliance with FASB
accounting standards, (3) lacked adequate controls over financial
reporting, and (4) failed to disclose the failure of more than
two years of purported efforts to evaluate new accounting
standards.

If you purchased shares of AZZ during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than March 12, 2018 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the Class you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you
wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Lesley
Portnoy, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los
Angeles California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-
9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at http://glancylaw.com.If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

         Lesley Portnoy, Esq.
         Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP
         Tel: 310-201-9150
                  888-773-9224
         Email: lportnoy@glancylaw.com [GN]


AZZ INC: Howard G. Smith Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased AZZ
Inc. ("AZZ" or the "Company") (NYSE: AZZ) securities between
April 22, 2015 and January 8, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). AZZ investors have until March 12, 2018 to file a lead
plaintiff motion.

Investors suffering losses on their AZZ investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to
discuss their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847
or by email to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On January 9, 2018, AZZ announced that the Company's audit
committee and outside accounting firm determined the Company
should have accounted differently for certain contracts within
its Energy Segment.

The Complaint alleges that during the Class Period, AZZ violated
federal securities laws by making materially false and/or
misleading public statements, and/or failing to disclose material
information, to investors. Specifically, the complaint alleges
that defendants: (1) repeatedly misrepresented their financial
results, (2) failed to report revenues in compliance with FASB
accounting standards, (3) lacked adequate controls over financial
reporting, and (4) failed to disclose the failure of more than
two years of purported efforts to evaluate new accounting
standards.

If you purchased shares of AZZ during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than March 12, 2018 to ask the Court to
appoint you as lead plaintiff if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the Class you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or
take no action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you
wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Howard G.
Smith, Esquire, of Law Offices of Howard G. Smith, 3070 Bristol
Pike, Suite 112, Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020 by telephone at
(215) 638-4847, toll-free at (888) 638-4847, or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com, or visit our website at
http://www.howardsmithlaw.com.

         Howard G. Smith, Esq.
         Law Offices of Howard G. Smith
         Tel: 215-638-4847
         E-mail: howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com [GN]


AZZ INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of AZZ Inc. (NYSE: AZZ) from April 22, 2015 through
January 8, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
seeks to recover damages for AZZ investors under the federal
securities laws.

To join the AZZ class action, go to http://rosenlegal.com/cases-
1267.html or call Phillip Kim, Esq. or Daniel Sadeh, Esq. toll-
free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
dsadeh@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, defendants during the Class Period made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) AZZ misstated revenues for its Energy Segment
for the duration of the Class Period; (2) AZZ had failed to
report revenues in compliance with FASB's Accounting Standards;
(3) AZZ lacked adequate internal controls over financial
reporting; (4) AZZ's purported efforts for over two years to
evaluate revenue recognition standards had been an apparent
failure; and (5) as a result, AZZ's publicly disseminated
financial statements were materially false and misleading. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
March 12, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting
on behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If
you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://rosenlegal.com/cases-1267.htmlor to discuss your rights
or interests regarding this class action, please contact Phillip
Kim, Esq. or Daniel Sadeh, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
dsadeh@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Since 2014, Rosen Law Firm has
been ranked #2 in the nation by Institutional Shareholder
Services for the number of securities class action settlements
annually obtained for investors.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Daniel Sadeh, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Tel: (212) 686-1060
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com,
                dsadeh@rosenlegal.com [GN]


BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY: $10.2MM Deal in "Reyes" Has Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for final approval of the class action settlement in the case
captioned JUAN M. REYES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAKERY AND
CONFECTIONERY UNION AND INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL PENSION FUND, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-05596-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs, participants in the Bakery and Confectionery Union
and Industry International Pension Fund (Fund), brought this
action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated
participants pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, (ERISA). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 2012 the
Fund and its trustees 2012 failed to comply with the requirements
of ERISA and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) in adopting
an amendment to the pension plan.  Plaintiffs allege that the
2012 Amendment is void for illegality under ERISA because it has
neither been enacted nor effectuated in compliance with ERISA's
provisions, including the provisions of the PPA which create a
narrow exception to ERISA's anti-cutback scheme.

Plaintiffs assert that the 2012 Amendment is null and void
because it illegally reduced or eliminated benefits without the
Fund having first provided proper notice under ERISA Section
305(e)(8)(C), or, in the alternative, because (1) the Fund failed
to provide adequate information to the actuary regarding
projections of industry activity, including future employment and
contribution levels, and (2) the trustees breached their
fiduciary duty by failing to monitor and oversee adequately the
actions of the actuary who certified the Fund to be in critical
status before taking action upon that certification.
Plaintiffs moved for class certification.

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion and certified the following
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class:

     All participants in the Bakery and Confectionery Union and
Industry International Pension Fund or, if deceased, their
beneficiaries or Estates, who (i) accrued (a) years of Covered
Employment credits and (b) age credits towards eligibility for
pension benefits under Plan C (also known as the Golden 90) or
Plan G (also known as Golden 80), and (ii) who would be eligible
for Plan C or Plan G benefits except that their age and years of
service first totaled 80 (with respect to Plan G eligibility) or
90 (with respect to Plan C eligibility) on or after May 1, 2012,
at a time when they were not working in covered employment.

Terms of the Settlement

Class members who did not receive a pension during the Payment
Period must submit an application form to receive payment under
the Settlement. Application forms will be sent with the class
notice to Probable Payees, whom the Fund believes are likely to
qualify for monetary relief based on review of its records, as
well as those "whom the Fund identifies as having been within two
years of qualifying as a Probable Payee. At the time of
preliminary approval, Plaintiffs estimated that Class Members in
Pay Status would be guaranteed to receive $6,013,000, while
$6,204,000 would be available to Probable Payees, for a total
potential settlement amount of $12,217,000.

The parties subsequently filed a stipulation that the total
settlement amount is $10,225,006.20.  Payments to both groups
will be reduced by the amount of any attorneys' fees, expenses,
and incentive awards authorized by the Court to be paid out of
the settlement fund.   The settlement provides for an
administrative remedy process to resolve disputes that includes a
right to motions practice with this Court.

FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Adequacy of Notice

The class must be notified of a proposed settlement in a manner
that does not systematically leave any group without notice.
Strategic Claim Services (SCS), the settlement administrator,
timely mailed the Court-approved notice to 46,150 out of 46,562
class members. This list includes 44,046 class members who were
mailed a class notice only; 789 Class Members In Pay Status who
were mailed a class notice with an exemption letter explaining
that they did not need to file an application to receive a
payout;3 and 1,727 Probable Payee and Within Two Years class
members who were mailed both a class notice and an application
form. Six class members were mailed a late class notice and
application form after class counsel assisted SCS with locating
their addresses.

In light of these actions, and the Court's prior order granting
preliminary approval, the Court finds the parties have provided
adequate notice to the settlement class members.

Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness

Strength of Plaintiffs' Case; Risk, Expense, Complexity, and
Likely Duration of Further Litigation; and Risk of Maintaining
Class Status Throughout Trial

This Court has already noted class counsel's acknowledgment that
the Court might narrow the scope of relief during the damages
phase of the case, as well as counsel's consideration of the
financial position of the fund in assessing the value of
settlement now.  The Court further observed that, while
Plaintiffs have already succeeded in obtaining class
certification, dispositive motions briefing and an eventual trial
would surely prolong the wait class members face to obtain
relief. Indeed, Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' motion for
final approval makes clear that they would vigorously litigate
this case if it did not settle.

Although there appears to be little risk that the class could not
be maintained throughout the trial of this matter, the risks of
pursuing the case through to a litigated conclusion are high. In
addition, any relief to the class would be significantly delayed,
putting the likelihood of actual recovery in more doubt.
Accordingly, these factors weigh in favor of approving the
settlement.

Settlement Amount

The data provided by the settlement administrator indicates that
only approximately one-third, and not two-thirds, of class
members who are receiving payouts 2012 789 out of 2,516 2012 will
receive a payment without the need to complete a claims form.  On
the other hand, as discussed below, the Court will award only a
25% fee award from the common fund, and this amount will be
offset by statutory fees paid by Defendants, so the overall
amount available for class member payouts will be greater. The
question remains a close one, but the Court concludes that the
settlement amount is reasonable and favors approval.

Extent of Discovery

Discovery extended through mediation and "for nearly six months
thereafter as settlement terms were discussed."  This discovery
process was sufficient to allow the parties to make an informed
settlement decision.

This factor therefore weighs in favor of approval.

Counsel's Experience

Plaintiffs' counsel recommend that the Court approve the
settlement. The recommendations of plaintiffs' counsel should be
given a presumption of reasonableness. Counsel for both sides
have substantial ERISA experience, and the settlement was reached
after a full day of mediation with a JAMS mediator.
This factor weighs in favor of approval.

Reaction of the Class

Three remaining objections express dissatisfaction with the
amount of the settlement, claiming that class members are
receiving too little of the amounts to which they believe they
are entitled. The final objection states an intent to appeal the
amount the lawyers will receive and appeal on the benefits of
settlement, which the Court construes as an objection to the
amount of the settlement. The Court acknowledges these objectors'
frustrations but, as discussed above, nonetheless finds the
settlement amount to be reasonable given the risks and delay of
further litigation.

On balance, the Court concludes that the reaction of the class
weighs in favor of approval.  After reviewing all of the required
factors, the Court finds the settlement fair, reasonable, and
adequate, and grants Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the
settlement.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Class counsel seek attorneys' fees both under the ERISA fee-
shifting statute and as a percentage of the common fund in this
case.

Defendants argue that a common fund fee award is unavailable
where, as here, the Court awards statutory fees. However,
Defendants also recognize that the Ninth Circuit has not so held.
To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has held that, unless Congress
has forbidden the application of the common fund doctrine in
cases in which attorneys could potentially recover fees under the
type of fee-shifting statutes at issue here, the courts retain
their equitable power to award common fund attorneys' fees.

This Court  concludes that class counsel may be awarded fees from
the common fund in addition to any award under ERISA's fee-
shifting statute.

Statutory Fees and Costs

The Court first considers Plaintiffs' claim for statutory fees.
ERISA provides that a court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.
Class counsel originally calculated the lodestar, including
projected future hours, at $1,731,185.75. Their November 9, 2017
updated report calculated the lodestar at $1,806,471.00. Counsel
request a multiplier of 1.25, yielding a requested enhanced
lodestar of $2,258,088.75.

In addition, class counsel originally requested $307,518.87 in
costs: $73,972.93, including an estimated $14,794.58 in future
expenses, for counsel; and $233,545.94, including an estimated
$80,000 in future expenses, for the settlement administrator. Id.
at 30. They now seek $343,841.39 in costs: $73,425.20 for counsel
and $270,416.19 for the settlement administrator. ECF No. 164 at
3. The settlement administrator estimates that it will incur
another $29,000 in expenses through initial distribution,
bringing the estimated costs for the settlement administrator to
$299,416.19, and the total costs to $372,841.39.

Hourly Rates

The reasonable hourly rate must be based on the experience,
skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.
The declaration of Mr. Kantor  is sufficient to establish that
the $700 hourly rate claimed by Mr. White, an attorney with 42
years of experience, is reasonable. Likewise, this Court recently
awarded Mr. Kantor, an attorney with 31 years of experience, a
$700 hourly rate. Mr. Frumkin, Ms. Kaboolian, and Ms. Spanier
have between 28 and 39 years of experience, which is within the
same range of experience as Mr. Kantor and Mr. White.
Accordingly, the Court finds $700 to be a reasonable hourly rate
for these three attorneys as well.

Plaintiffs submit no evidence to establish that $350 is a
reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Gadsen's paralegal work, and the
record is silent as to her amount of experience. Given the
claimed associate rates of $200 per hour, and Ms. Fowler's
paralegal rate of $125 per hour, the Court reduces Ms. Gadsen's
hourly rate to $125.

Ms. Spanier claims a total of 336.75 hours.  (254.75 hours),
(33.75 hours),  (48.25 hours).7 Ms. Gadsen claims 36.75 hours.
The reduction in hourly rates therefore results in a reduction in
the lodestar of $67,200.

Hours

Class counsel originally reported that they have spent a total of
2,531.15 hours working on this case, plus an estimated 350 hours
that will be required for future work. Their final claimed number
of hours is 2,997.80.

Overstaffing/Duplicative Work

On the Court's own review, the majority of the remaining 725.6
hours identified by Defendants refer to intra- and inter-office
communications by telephone or email. While, particularly in a
large class action such as this, some number of intra-office
conferences are not only to be expected, but will often result in
a savings of attorney time by ensuring that all attorneys on a
team are kept apprised of important information about the case as
it becomes available, the amount of such communications in this
case was excessive.

In MacDonald, for example, the amount billed for intra-office
communication was approximately 7% of the overall billing. Here,
by contrast, the identified 725.6 hours represent nearly 25% of
the total number of hours claimed by counsel. When faced with a
massive fee application the district court has the authority to
make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of
hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure `as a practical
means of trimming the fat from a fee application. Here, rather
than examine individually the 48 pages of billing entries
identified by Defendants as duplicative, the Court finds it
reasonable to reduce the claimed 725.6 hours by 50%.   This
results in a reduction to the lodestar of $237,063.12.

Block Billing

Defendants next request a 20% reduction in the hours claimed by
the lawyers at Abbey Spanier, LLP and the Law Office of Geoffrey
V. White because they contend that these lawyers engaged in
impermissible block billing. While Defendants are correct that
attorneys at these firms did not separate time entries per day by
task and instead billed all tasks for each day in a single entry,
they have not identified any instances where such block billing
makes it impossible for the Court to determine the reasonableness
of time expended. The requested reduction is therefore denied.
In a footnote, Defendants argue that time billed by Abbey
Spanier, LLP should be reduced by 20% because the firm billed in
quarter-hour, rather than tenth-of-an-hour, increments.   The
Ninth Circuit approved such a reduction where hours were inflated
because counsel billed a minimum of 15 minutes for numerous phone
calls and e-mails that likely took a fraction of the time. Here,
however, Defendants have not identified any time entries where
quarter-hour billing resulted in an inflation of hours.
Consequently, this request is also denied.

Time Entries of 0.1 Hour

The Court's review of the other entries identified by Defendants
reveals that the vast majority do not include multiple 0.1-hour
entries by the same attorney on the same date, and such entries
could not have been consolidated. Accordingly, the Court does not
apply any further reductions to the lodestar for 0.1-hour billing
entries.

Time Spent on Particular Activities

Amended Stipulation

The Court's independent review of the time entries identified by
Defendants,  also reveals no obviously unreasonable time entries
aside from excessive intra- and interoffice communications. The
Court has already reduced the lodestar for these excessive hours
and does not find any further reductions to be appropriate.

Travel Time

The corresponding travel time is also unreasonable, and the Court
will disallow the time spent on out-of-town travel by two
attorneys for both of these events: travel by Ms. Spanier and Mr.
Sinclair for the motion hearing in San Francisco, and travel by
Mr. White and Mr. Sinclair for the mediation in New York City.
This results in a reduction to the lodestar of $32,200.

Lodestar Summary

Incorporating all of the reductions, the lodestar is reduced from
$1,806,471.00 to $1,446,786.88.

Costs

That case's discussion on costs reads, in its entirety:  Class
counsel seek to recover the costs of litigation as well as their
fees. They request nearly $200,000 in expert and mediation fees
as well as $81,390.38 in general litigation costs. It appears to
the Court that the costs requested are reasonable in light of the
complexity of the litigation and the number of counsel involved,
and are therefore approved by the Court.

The Court reduces the amount of costs Plaintiffs claim for
travel. The Court has already found unreasonable the time claimed
by Ms. Spanier and Mr. Sinclair for the December 10, 2015 motion
hearing, and by Mr. White and Mr. Sinclair for the May 25, 2016
mediation, and the Court therefore does not award related travel
expenses. These expenses total $7,480.47. In addition, Mr.
Sinclair flew first or business class on two other trips,   and
those expenses, totaling $3,225.30, will also be disallowed as
unreasonable.  As a result, Plaintiffs' award of costs is reduced
by $10,705.77.

In sum, the Court reduces Plaintiffs' requested award of costs
from $372,841.39 to $348,153.57. This includes the settlement
administrator's estimated $29,000 in costs through the initial
distribution, so the actual amount of costs paid by Defendants
may vary.

INCENTIVE AWARDS

Plaintiffs request incentive awards of $1,000 to each of the
eleven named class representatives.

Plaintiffs argue that the class representatives diligently kept
informed of the litigation, communicated with Class Counsel as
necessary to assist with the effective prosecution of the case,
and provided documents and information, as needed. Defendants do
not oppose the proposed $1,000 incentive awards, and no class
member has objected to them. The requested $1,000 is below the
presumptively reasonable $5,000, and the requested awards in
aggregate represent less than 0.1% of the settlement fund. The
Court finds the requested incentive awards to be reasonable.

The Court grants final approval of the proposed settlement and
grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' motion for
attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6wgr3pq from Leagle.com.

Juan M. Reyes, Plaintiff, represented by Geoffrey V. White --
gvwhite@sprynet.com -- Law Office of Geoffrey V. White, Elizabeth
Evelyn Hunter, Frumkin Hunter LLP, 154 Main Street Goshen, NY,
10924-2116, pro hac vice, Judith Lynne Spanier --
jspanier@abbeyspanier.com -- Abbey Spanier, LLP, pro hac vice,
Nancy Kaboolian -- nkabooliam@abbeyspanier.com -- Abbey Spanier,
LLP, pro hac vice, Thomas O. Sinclair, Sinclair Law Firm, 104 S.
Main Street, Suite 701, Greenville, South Carolina 29601;
864.232.0041 & William D. Frumkin, Frumkin & Hunter LLP, 1025
Westchester Ave., Ste 309, White Plains, NY 10604  pro hac vice.
Salvatore Tagliareni, Angel De La Cruz, Antonio Merolla, Smail
Musovic, Tesfaye Ghebremedhin, Philip Rogers, Almond Reid,
Carmelo Calabro, Russell Neubert & John Williams, individually
and as representatives on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiffs, represented by Geoffrey V. White, Law Office
of Geoffrey V. White, Elizabeth Evelyn Hunter, Frumkin Hunter
LLP, pro hac vice, Judith Lynne Spanier, Abbey Spanier, LLP,
Nancy Kaboolian, Abbey Spanier, LLP, pro hac vice, Thomas O.
Sinclair, Sinclair Law Firm & William D. Frumkin, Frumkin &
Hunter LLP, pro hac vice.

Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension
Fund, Steven Bertelli, in their official capacities as Trustees,
David B. Durkee, in their official capacities as Trustees, Jethro
A. Head, in their official capacities as Trustees, Art Montminy,
in their official capacities as Trustees, James Rivers, in their
official capacities as Trustees, Randy D. Roark, in their
official capacities as Trustees, Barbara Brasier, in their
official capacities as Trustees, Travis Clemens, in their
official capacities as Trustees, Jon McPherson, in their official
capacities as Trustees, Lou Minella, in their official capacities
as Trustees, Doug Ruygrok, in their official capacities as
Trustees & John Wagner, in their official capacities as Trustees,
Defendants, represented by Concepcion E. Lozano-Batista --
clazano@unioncounsel.net -- Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld A
Professional Corporation, Emily P. Rich -- erich@unioncounsel.net
-- Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld A Professional Corporation, James
Graham Lake -- glake@bredhoff.com -- Bredhoff & Kaiser PLLC, pro
hac vice, Julia Penny Clark -- jpclark@bredhoff.com -- Bredhoff &
Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac vice & Robert W. Alexander, Bredhoff &
Kaiser, PLLC, pro hac vice.

Laurie Janouski, Objector, Pro Se.


BARRACUDA NETWORKS: Shareholders Challenge $1.6BB Acquisition
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that in
a federal class action, Barracuda Networks shareholders challenge
the company's $1.6 billion acquisition by Thoma Bravo, for $27.55
a share.

The case is STEPHEN BUSHANSKY, on Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs. BARRACUDA NETWORKS,
INC., WILLIAM JENKINS, JR., JEFFRY R. ALLEN, MICHAEL D. PERONE,
JOHN H. KISPERT, CHET KAPOOR, and STEPHEN P. MULLANEY,
Defendants, Case No. __________ (N.D. Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Telephone: 310/208-2800
     Facsimile: 310/209-2348
     Email: jelkins@weisslawllp.com


BLEIER & COX: Faces Class Action on Abusive Debt Collection
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
class action accuses Bleier & Cox APC and the National Collegiate
Student Loan Trust of abusive debt collection, in Superior Court.

The case is TRACY HORN, INDIVIDUALLY AND UNLIMITED JURISDICTION
AS ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS AMOUNT DEMANDED EXCEEDS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, vs. BLEIER & COX, APC; NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2006-3; AND DOES 1- 10, INCLUSIVE, Defendants,
Case No. 37-2018-00000378-CU-MC-CTL, filed with the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego.

Attorney for Plaintiff TRACY HORN and Others Similarly Situated:

     Law Offices of Andrew P Rundquist
     501 W Broadway, Suite A144
     San Diego CA 92101
     (619) 992-9148
     andrew@rundquistlaw.com


BOZEMAN, MO: Argues Right to Keep Remaining Settlement Money
------------------------------------------------------------
Katheryn Houghton, writing for the Bozeman Daily Chronicle,
reports that the city of Bozeman is alleging the Southwest
Montana Building Industry Association doesn't have the right to
decide what happens with $200,000 left over from a 2005 lawsuit
settlement.

This is tied to an argument that began in 1999. The building
association filed what became a class-action lawsuit against the
city, arguing Bozeman was overcharging builders and developers
for impact fees. Those fees are what a city charges developers to
help cover the costs of expanding its infrastructure for services
to reach new homes and businesses.

In a settlement, the city agreed to return $5 million to payees
and temporarily reduce its fees. SWMBIA was tasked with
administering reimbursements to those who qualified through the
settlement.

The newest part of the disagreement is who gets to decide what to
do with the money that was never claimed.

In 2011, District Court Judge David Cybulski ordered the industry
group to return the uncollected fees to the city so it could keep
what was left when the judgement expired in 2015. But because of
a clerical error, the Gallatin County Clerk of Court's office
didn't email that order to attorneys representing SWMBIA and the
city. After the omission was discovered, the order went out Jan.
5, 2017, and stated SWMBIA had to pay the money within 14 days
"of receipt."

But SWMBIA says it doesn't need to do that. In an appeal filed in
November 2017, the group argued the District Court doesn't have
the right to make that demand. They added even if it could, the
order came too late.

The city's attorney responded. It alleges that throughout the
record, SWIMBIA has admitted the District Court had authority to
fashion an order on what to do with the money. They said because
of that, SWIMBIA is "bound" to follow the court's findings now.

The city also argues the court doesn't lose its power to make an
order regarding unclaimed class-action settlement funds until
they're doled out.

"SWIMBIA argues that the 2005 Consent Decree has been
extinguished," according to the city's Jan. 11 concluding
response. "Nothing could be farther from the truth."

SWIMBIA Attorney Art Wittich, Esq. said the group plans to submit
a reply to the city's latest arguments.

"I have read it and they included facts that were faulty and
[use] faulty legal reasoning," Wittich said. "The facts weren't
faulty, the facts were inaccurate."

The city's argument claims Bozeman has "clean hands" and should
not be penalized for the District Court's late sending of the
2011 Order.

Following that, the argument states SWIMBIA spent approximately
$100,000 before receiving the judge's order without going through
the proper hoops to do so.

"All that money was spent to refunds or to watchdog the city's
rate-making," Wittich said.

By watchdog, Wittich said SWMBIA spent about $100,000 of the
settlement funds to hire consultants to evaluate the city's
impact fee management. The group's most recent study became the
foundation for another lawsuit they filed against Bozeman last
year. [GN]


BROTEN GARAGE: "Bailey" Sues Over Racial Discrimination
-------------------------------------------------------
Johnnie L. Bailey, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff(s), v. Broten Garage Door Sales, LLC and Gregg D.
Davis, Case No. 18-cv-60003 (S.D. Fla., January 1, 2018), seeks
to recover money damages for unpaid overtime wages and for
retaliation under the Fair Labor Standard Act and for retaliatory
discharge under Florida common law.

Broten is a company in the business of installing and servicing
garage doors where Plaintiff, a black man, worked as a garage
installer/service technician from October 18, 2007 until November
13, 2017. Bailey complained about black employees not allowed to
use the restrooms inside the building but rather the portable
toilets outside. Plaintiff also worked in excess of 40 hours per
week without overtime compensation.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
      SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
      20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
      Aventura, FL 33180
      Telephone: (305) 503-5131
      Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
      Email: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


CALIFORNIA: Court Denies Inmate's Bid for TRO in "Jones"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order adopting Findings and Recommendations
regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order in the case captioned DENO A. JONES, Plaintiff,
v. CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURTS, et al., Defendants, No. 1:17-cv-
00232-DAD-BAM (PC)(E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Deno A. Jones is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was denied parole
consideration under California's Proposition 57, the Public
Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. He alleged that the
defendant in this action, inter alia: (1) California State
Superior Courts, (2) California Department of Corrections.
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction and motion
for temporary restraining order. By these motions, plaintiff
seeks to have Proposition 57 applied to him, in effect requiring
immediate release. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to have his
three strikes sentence imposed upon him in state court adjusted
as purportedly required under California's Proposition 57.
The assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations
recommending that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction
and restraining order be denied because the court had previously
dismissed plaintiff's complaint, and therefore, had no present
case or controversy before it and could not consider plaintiff's
motions for preliminary injunction and restraining order in the
absence of a first amended complaint.

The court has reviewed plaintiff's objections, finds them to be
unpersuasive and concludes that there is no basis warranting
rejection of the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations.
Plaintiff also appears to raise objections to the magistrate
judge's October 5, 2017 screening order. Because plaintiff filed
a first amended complaint in this action on October 25, 2017, any
objections to the magistrate judge's screening order have now
been rendered moot.

Plaintiff's motion for injunction and motion for temporary
restraining order are denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycao6388 from Leagle.com.
Deno A. Jones, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


CAVIUM INC: Fineberg Seeks to Halt Marvell Tech Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scott Fineberg, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Cavium, Inc., Syed B. Ali,
Anthony S. Thornley, Sanjay Mehrotra, Edward H. Frank, Brad W.
Buss, And Madhav V. Rajan, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00011 (N.D.
Cal., January 2, 2018), seeks to enjoin defendants and all
persons acting in concert  with them from proceeding with,
consummating or closing the merger between Cavium and Marvell
Technology Group, rescinding it in the event defendants
consummate the merger, rescissory damages, costs of this action,
including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and
experts' fees and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Cavium shareholders stand to receive $40.00 in cash and 2.1757
shares of Marvell common stock for each share of Cavium stock
they own, representing a transaction value of $6 billion. Cavium
shareholders are expected to own 25% of the post-closing combined
company.

The complaint says merger documents omitted material information
regarding Cavium financial projections as well as projected free
cash flows as well as the valuation analyses performed by
Qatalyst Partners LP. Said disclosure of projected financial
information is material because it provides stockholders with a
basis to project the future financial performance of a company,
and allows stockholders to better understand the financial
analyses in support of its fairness opinion.

Cavium is a provider of semiconductor processors that enable
intelligent networking, communications and security applications.
Its product line includes multi-core processors for embedded and
data center applications, network connectivity for serve and
switches, storage connectivity, and security processors for
offload and appliance. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
      James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
      New Yor006B, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 983-9330
      Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
             jwilson@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145
      Wilmington, DE 19807
      Tel: (302) 482-3182
      Email: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Telephone: (424) 256-2884
      Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
      E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com


CAVIUM INC: Faces Class Action on $6-Billion Tech Merger
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
shareholders sued semiconductor giant Cavium in a federal class
action, challenging its $6 billion merger with Marvell, for $40 a
share plus 2.18 shares of Marvell stock for each share of Cavium.

The case is SCOTT FINEBERG, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CAVIUM, INC., SYED B.
ALI, ANTHONY S. THORNLEY, SANJAY MEHROTRA, EDWARD H. FRANK, BRAD
W. BUSS, and MADHAV V. RAJAN, Defendants, Case No. ______ (N.D.
Calif.).

Attorney for Plaintiff Scott Fineberg:

     Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
     FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
     10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Telephone: (424) 256-2884
     Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
     E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com


CEDAR RAPIDS, IA: Lawsuit Filed Over Traffic Camera Tickets
--------------------------------------0--------------------
Josh Scheinblum, writing for kcrg.com, reports that some people
are taking legal action against Cedar Rapids for sending out
collection letters to people who have not paid traffic camera
citations.

In early December, the city sent out 221,000 of collection
letters for unpaid tickets. The City has said about 45 percent of
traffic camera citations are unpaid which adds up to about $17-
million in revenue.

10 plaintiffs filed the class action lawsuit in Linn County
Court. It's against both the city of Cedar Rapids and the company
that issues their traffic camera tickets. The face of the suit is
conservative radio host Simon Conway.

Each person received letters from Municipal Collections of
America. In Conway's case, it was over a $75 ticket regarding an
alleged violation on I-380 back in 2015 and because he didn't pay
the fine it comes with a "late payment penalty" of 25%. The
lawsuit claims the letters violate Iowa's statute of limitations
law, due process, and the state constitution. I9 asked former US
Attorney Kevin Techau, Esq. if the suit can hold up in court.

"It's really unknown how far back the city of Cedar Rapids can
reach back and enforce those depending on pending litigation,
passed litigation, and really how the court would interpret the
status of those tickets," said Techau.

I9 reached out both to Mr. Conway and the City of Cedar Rapids
for comment. Conway says the tickets are "unfair" and he "didn't
do it," adding "I believe the cameras themselves to be
unconstitutional." A spokesperson for the city said they do not
comment on pending litigation. [GN]


CENTRAL PAYMENT: Court Orders ESI Discovery in Custom Hair Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nebraska has issued an order regarding discovery
of electronically stored information ("ESI") and hard copy
documents in the case, CUSTOM HAIR DESIGNS BY SANDY, LLC, and
SKIP'S PRECISION WELDING, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CENTRAL PAYMENT CO.,
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 8:17-CV-00310 (D. Neb.).

The Parties seek to facilitate the exchange of ESI and hard copy
documents in the Action, pursuant to the Court's authority and
with their consent.  The procedures and protocols set forth in
the Order will govern the production format of ESI in the action,
unless the Parties agree in writing to change them or they are
changed by the Court at the request of a Party.

The Parties will promptly meet and confer thereafter in an
attempt to resolve the issue concerning accessibility and, if no
resolution is reached, seek appropriate relief from the Court as
outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) and in
accordance with Magistrate Judge Zwart's Civil Case Management
Practices.

Generally, the costs of producing ESI pursuant to the Protocol
will be borne by each Producing Party.  Any Producing Party who
produces ESI in TIFF format will do so at their sole cost and
expense, and such Producing Party hereby waives the right to seek
reimbursement or taxing of such Tiffing costs pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1920, or any other state or federal cost recovery
provision.  The Parties will meet and confer in good faith in an
effort to resolve any disputes that may arise under the Order,
prior to seeking assistance from the Court, in accordance with
Magistrate Judge Zwart's Civil Case Management Practices.

The Parties will produce paper Documents and ESI according to the
specifications provided in the Order.  They will use reasonable,
good faith efforts to avoid the production of duplicate ESI.
They agree that production of ESI documents globally de-
duplicated to remove exact duplicate documents will constitute
production of documents as maintained in the ordinary course of
business provided that a single copy of the responsive document
or record is produced.

A Producing Party will produce Microsoft Excel and other
spreadsheet files in Native Format except where such files are
redacted in accordance with the Order.  Responsive ESI produced
in Native Format will be produced with all required Metadata
contained in or associated with that file to the extent
technologically possible.

All documents that are amenable to being imaged should be
produced in the same format specified for ESI.  To the extent
that a responsive document contains privileged content or non-
responsive Highly Confidential Material, the Producing Party may
produce that document in a redacted form.

Any redactions will be clearly indicated on the face of the
document, and each page of the document from which information is
redacted will bear a designation that it has been redacted.  In
the event that a Document requires redaction, the Parties agree
that the native version need not be produced, full text may be
replaced with OCR text that excludes the redacted material, and
Metadata fields may be redacted if they contain information that
may be redacted.

The Parties will produce a privilege log within 30 days of
substantially completing their respective document productions.
They'll not be required to log attorney-client privileged or
work-product materials relating to this lawsuit after the date of
the Class Action Complaint was filed on Aug. 8, 2017.

The Producing Party will collect and process Documents using
methods that preserve available data.  The Parties will exchange
lists of individual custodians.  Within three days following a
meet and confer on the Producing Party's responses and objections
to a request for production, the Producing Party will identify
its own proposed individual custodians (including their title) to
be used for a search of information potentially responsive to the
request for production.

The Parties will exchange lists of keyword search terms and date
restrictions to be used to identify ESI potentially responsive to
a request for production.  Within three days following a meet and
confer on the Producing Party's responses and objections to a
request for production, the Producing Party will identify
proposed search terms and date restrictions to be used for a
search of information potentially responsive to the request for
production.

The documents will be subject to the terms of the Protective
Order to be entered by the Court, as well as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B).

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/37HLv3 from Leagle.com.

Custom Hair Designs by Sandy, LLC, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated & Skip's Precision Welding, LLC, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Eric D. Barton -- ebarton@wcllp.com --
WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM, Melody R. Dickson --
mdickson@wcllp.com -- WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM & Tyler W.
Hudson -- thudson@wcllp.com -- WAGSTAFF, CARTMELL LAW FIRM.

Central Payment Co., LLC, Defendant, represented by Allison H.
White -- awhite@kslaw.com -- KING, SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice, Brandon R. Keel -- bkeel@kslaw.com -- KING, SPALDING LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, David L. Balser -- dbalser@kslaw.com -- KING,
SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Jonathan R. Chally --
jchally@kslaw.com -- KING, SPALDING LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Kenneth W. Hartman -- khartman@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW
FIRM & Krista M. Eckhoff -- keckhoff@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM.


CHELSEA, MI: Court Partly Grants Summary Judgment Bids in "Mote"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAUNA M. MOTE, DEBORAH CLARK, CARLOS GRAY-LION,
BRENDA BARANIAK, KAREN STREET, MERLYN STREET, LEE BENTON, by his
next friends RONALD M. BENTON and MARION BENTON, J.N., a minor,
by his next friends DANIEL and MARY JANE NELSON, ANN ARBOR CENTER
FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING, INC., and JENNIFER KUNDAK, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF CHELSEA, CHELSEA DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and WASHTENAW COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSION, Defendants, and CITY OF CHELSEA, Third-party
plaintiff, v. WASHTENAW COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Third-party
defendant, Case No. 16-11546 (E.D. Mich.), Judge David M. Lawson
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The case is before the Court again on the second round of
dispositive motions in this municipal sidewalk accessibility
dispute brought under the Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and their state-law counterpart.
The Court previously denied motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants Washtenaw County Road Commission ("WCRC") and Michigan
Department of Transportation ("MDOT").

The Plaintiffs are individual disabled persons, who live, work,
or frequently travel to and within the City of Chelsea, Michigan,
and who each require the use of a wheelchair, braces, cane, or
other assistive devices in order to get around, along with the
Ann Arbor Center for Independent Living ("AACIL"), which is an
association that represents disabled persons such as the
Plaintiffs throughout southeastern Michigan, including in
Chelsea.  Together, and on behalf of persons similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs complain that the public streets and sidewalks in
the City of Chelsea are less than fully accessible, at least in
part because of construction and renovation work done on public
sidewalks and streets by the City of Chelsea, the WCRC, and MDOT,
which either removed, omitted, or improperly constructed
accessibility features.  They also initially complained about
accessible public parking, but they have not developed those
claims and appear to have abandoned them.

The Plaintiffs filed their putative class-action complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the local and
state government Defendants on April 28, 2016, followed by an
amended complaint to correct procedural defects on Aug. 4, 2016,
and a second amended complaint on May 22, 2017.

The amended complaint alleges violations of ADA Title II (Count
I) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Count II) against the City
of Chelsea, the City's Downtown Development Authority, and MDOT.
The complaint also raises a congruent claim against the City of
Chelsea only under Michigan's Persons With Disabilities Civil
Rights Act ("PWDCRA").  With leave granted, the City of Chelsea
filed a third-party complaint against the WCRC, which the City
contends has exclusive control over and responsibility for
certain roadways within its city limits.

Defendant MDOT filed an answer to the original complaint and a
motion for judgment on the pleadings; WCRC responded in similar
fashion to the third-party complaint.  The Plaintiffs later
entered into a consent decree with the City of Chelsea, and they
filed their second amended complaint naming WCRC as a principal
Defendant.

After discovery closed, Defendants WCRC and MDOT filed their
summary judgment motions.

Judge Lawson finds that although the sovereign immunity defenses
asserted by Defendant MDOT lack merit, the Plaintiffs have not
offered evidence to satisfy their burden under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(c) of demonstrating a material fact issue for
trial.  He says their claims against MDOT, therefore, fail as a
matter of law.  MDOT has not offered good reason for the Court to
reconsider its order striking its latest brief; its motion for
reconsideration will be denied.

In addition, although the Plaintiffs have met their Rule 56(c)
burden on most of their claims against Defendant WCRC, the Judge
finds that they have not demonstrated an entitlement to relief
for their claim that certain curb ramps along Old U.S. 12 were
eliminated during reconstruction.  That claim will be dismissed.
Fact disputes preclude summary judgment for the City of Chelsea
on its third-party complaint against WCRC.

Accordingly, he granted in part and denied in part Defendant
WCRC's motion for summary judgment.  He dismissed with prejudice
the Plaintiffs' claims based on the alleged elimination of a pair
of curb ramps at some intersections.  He denied the motion in all
other respects.

Judge Lawson also granted the MDOT's for summary judgment and
dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against MDOT.  He
denied MDOT's motion for reconsideration and the City of
Chelsea's motion for summary judgment.

The Judge directed that the parties will appear before the Court
for a status conference to discuss further case management
deadlines on Jan. 17, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/J01AO5 from Leagle.com.

Shauna M. Mote, Plaintiff, represented by Denise M. Heberle,
Heberle & Finnegan.

Shauna M Mote, Plaintiff, represented by John Mark Finnegan,
Heberle & Finnegan.

Deborah Clark, Carlos Gray-Lion, Brenda Baraniak, Karen Street,
Merlyn Street, Lee Benton, JN, a minor, by Next Friends Daniel
and May Jane Nelson, Ann Arbor Center for Independent Living,
Inc., Jennifer Kundak, Daniel Nelson, Next Friend of JN, a minor
& Mary Jane Nelson, Next Friend on JN, a minor, Plaintiffs,
represented by Denise M. Heberle, Heberle & Finnegan & John Mark
Finnegan, Heberle & Finnegan.

City of Chelsea & Chelsea Downtown Development Authority,
Defendants, represented by Peter C. Flintoft --
flintoft@keuschlaw.com.

Michigan Department of Transportation, Defendant, represented by
John L. Tuttle, John L. Tuttle Assoc. & Michael J. Dittenber,
Michigan Department of Attorney General Transportation Division.

Washtenaw County Road Commission, Defendant, represented by
Thomas H. Derderian, Michael R. Kluck Assoc. & Wendy S. Hardt,
Michael Kluck Assoc.

City of Chelsea, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Peter C.
Flintoft.

Washtenaw County Road Commission, ThirdParty Defendant,
represented by Thomas H. Derderian, Michael R. Kluck Assoc. &
Wendy S. Hardt, Michael Kluck Assoc.


CLEVELAND COUNTY EMERGENCY: Connor Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sara B. Conner, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Cleveland County Emergency
Medical Services, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-0002, (W.D. N.C.,
January 2, 2018), seeks to recover overtime compensation and
statutory penalties for herself and all similarly situated
emergency medical services technicians for all hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Cleveland County EMS is a North Carolina government entity that
employs emergency medical services technicians within Cleveland
County, North Carolina. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Philip J. Gibbons, Jr., Esq.
     PHIL GIBBONS LAW, P.C.
     15720 Brixham Hill Ave #331
     Charlotte, NC 28227
     Tel: (704) 612-0038
     Fax: (704) 612-0038
     Email: phil@philgibbonslaw.com


CNX GAS: Court Partly Quashes Subpoena in MAWC's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena in the case captioned
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY, on behalf of itself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CNX GAS COMPANY,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:16-CV-422 (W.D. Pa.).

MAWC commenced the class action on February 26, 2016 in
Pennsylvania state court against defendants CNX and Noble Energy,
Inc.  Defendants removed the case on April 11, 2016.  MAWC filed
an amended complaint on November 7, 2016.  Therein, MAWC, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, alleges
breach of contract and conversion claims against defendants.

MAWC and defendants are parties to oil and gas leases under which
MAWC receives royalty payments from CNX and Noble.  CONE
Gathering provides "midstream gas gathering services" to CNX and
Noble through CONE Midstream.  CONE Midstream is controlled by
CNX, Noble, and CONE Gathering.  CNX is owned by CNX Gas
Corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of CONSOL Energy,
Inc.  MAWC contends that it is being underpaid because defendants
are deducting post-production costs that are either prohibited
under the leases altogether or are higher than allowed under the
leases.  MAWC also alleges that its royalty deductions are higher
due to defendants' affiliation with CONE Gathering.

MAWC served identical subpoenas on CONE Midstream, CONE
Gathering, and Fink.  Less than two weeks later, counsel for the
subpoena recipients sent the responsive emails to CNX and stated
that they intended to produce the emails unless CNX wished to
assert a privilege. CNX filed its instant motion to quash or, in
the alternative, for protective order.  MAWC responded in
opposition. The court directed CNX to produce the emails for in
camera review. The court received the emails. The court has
completed its review of the emails and the motion is fully
briefed and ripe for disposition.

CNX avers that the emails are privileged communications between
CONSOL employees and CONSOL attorneys regarding issues that
required legal advice. MAWC responds that communications to which
attorneys are recipients are not automatically privileged and the
court should independently review the content of each.
The protections afforded by this privilege extend to (1) a
communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in
confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal
assistance for the client.

A number of the emails concern general business discussions.
After a thorough review, the court finds that the following
emails and their corresponding attachments are not privileged
communications because (to the extent Furbee is contributing)
Furbee is giving business rather than legal advice: CONE-MAWC
01296-01298; CONE-MAWC 01299; CONE-MAWC 01300-01303; CONE-MAWC
01304-01306; CONE-MAWC 01307-01308 (except for content of January
12, 2012 email sent by Furbee at 2:36 p.m.); CONE-MAWC 01309-
01312 (except for content of January 12, 2012 email sent by
Furbee at 4:41 p.m.); CONE-MAWC 01313-01315; CONE-MAWC 01322-
01328; CONE-MAWC 01329; and CONE-MAWC 01368.

The remaining emails, in whole or in part, are privileged
communications. Those communications are contained in documents:
CONE-MAWC 01307 (content of January 12, 2012 email sent by Furbee
at 2:36 p.m.); CONE-MAWC 01309 (content of January 12, 2012 email
sent by Furbee at 4:41 p.m.); CONE-MAWC 01316-01318; CONE-MAWC
01319-01321; CONE-MAWC 01330; CONE-MAWC 01369; CONE-MAWC 01370-
01372 (except for the first two emails on the chain); CONE-MAWC
01373-01375; CONE-MAWC 01376-01380; CONE-MAWC 01418; CONE-MAWC
01419-01420; CONE-MAWC 01421-01423; and CONE-MAWC 01424-01426.

The court will grant in part and deny in part CNX's motion to
quash.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycg55s6v from
Leagle.com.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY, on behalf of itself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
David A. McGowan -- dmcgowan@cbmclaw.com -- Caroselli, Beachler,
McTiernan & Coleman, Robert C. Sanders --
rcsanders@rcsanderslaw.com -- Law Office of Robert C. Sanders &
Susan A. Meredith -- smeredith@cbmclaw.com -- Caroselli,
Beachler, McTiernan & Conboy.

CNX GAS COMPANY, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Lucas Liben --
lliben@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Nicolle R. Snyder Bagnell
-- nbagnell@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith & Thomas J. Galligan --
tgalligan@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

NOBLE ENERGY, INC., Defendant, represented by John K. Gisleson --
john.gisleson@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP &
Matthew H. Sepp -- matthew.sepp@morganlewis.com -- One Oxford
Centre.

CONE MIDSTREAM PARTNER LP, CONE GATHERING LLC & JOSEPH FINK,
Movants, represented by Rodger L. Puz -- rpuz@dmclaw.com --
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Settlement in "Boswell" Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Final
Approval of Class Settlement and for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and
Incentive Awards in the case captioned JAMES BOSWELL, MICHELLE
SALAZAR-NAVARRO, and JUNE KEEN on behalf of themselves, all
others similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiffs, v.
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION and LODC GROUP, LTD., Defendants,
Case No. 8:16-cv-00278-DOC-DFM (C.D. Cal.).

The Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Final Approval
of Class Settlement and for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive
Awards, this action is hereby dismissed, with prejudice,
including as to all Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2r7tce from
Leagle.com.

James Boswell, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by Jack
Fitzgerald -- jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- The Law Office of
Jack Fitzgerald PC.

James Boswell, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by
Melanie Rae Persinger -- mel@westonfirm.com -- The Weston Firm,
Paul K. Joseph -- Paul@pauljosephlaw.com --  The Law Office of
Paul K. Joseph, PC & Trevor M. Flynn --
trevor@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald PC.

Michelle Salazar-Navarro, on behalf of themselves, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Paul K. Joseph, The Law Office of Paul K. Joseph,
PC & Jack Fitzgerald, The Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald PC.

June Keen, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by Paul
K. Joseph, The Law Office of Paul K. Joseph, PC & Jack
Fitzgerald, The Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald PC.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant, represented by Frank
John Broccolo -- frank@brocololaw.com -- Law Office of Frank J.
Broccolo.

LODC Group, Ltd., doing business as Lily of the Desert,
Defendant, represented by Anthony Bruce Gordon --
law@anthonybgordon.com -Gordon and Gordon APLC.


CPA GLOBAL: Firm Welcomes Implications Of UDRP Decision
-------------------------------------------------------
Adam Houldsworth, writing for World Trademark Review, reports
that a WIPO UDRP panel has rejected CPA Global's attempt to gain
ownership of a domain name being used by a law firm which is
preparing a potential class action suit against the patent
renewals company. After the panel described the complaint as an
"abuse of the administrative proceeding", the firm which owns the
site welcomed the confirmation that it had a legitimate interest
in using CPA's name as part of online litigation efforts.

The dispute concerned ownership of 'cpaglobal-litigation.com', a
domain name set up by Kobre & Kim as part of its preparations for
a possible class action suit against CPA Global. In September
2017, Kobre & Kim, along with Jersey-based law firm Baker &
Partners, announced that it was investigating allegations that
the IP management services provider had systematically
overcharged clients for patent renewals, potentially to the tune
of hundreds of millions of dollars, and would consider suing CPA
Global on behalf of the thousands of suspected victims.

Shortly afterwards, CPA Global launched a UDRP complaint, arguing
that the website -- which gives information about the prospective
class action law suit and asks qualifying individuals wishing to
join the claim to register their interest -- infringes its
trademark rights. It argued that the domain was registered in bad
faith "for the sole purpose of disrupting the business of a
competitor, and to attract, for commercial gain, internet to its
website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
trademark".

Denying the complaint, WIPO found that, although the disputed
domain name was confusingly similar to CPA Global's trademark,
Kobre & Kim had not acted in bad faith and had a legitimate
interest in using the name to provide information about its
litigation efforts. Going further, the panel declared that CPA
should have known its complaint was "doomed to fail", stated that
it had been launched in bad faith, "primarily to harass the
respondent and disrupt its lawsuit", and opined that it
constituted "an abuse of the administrative proceeding".

Speaking to World Trademark Review, Michael Ng, Esq. --
michael.ng@kobrekim.com -- of Kobre & Kim welcomed the wider
implications of the decision, which he argues "sends a clear
message that using domain names for litigation in this way is
legitimate". The use of websites in connection with pending
proceedings, he stressed, was an important litigation tool,
especially in this type of case. "The decision also shows that
the tactics used by CPA Global in this instance are something
WIPO finds inappropriate," Ng continued: "Fortunately, as a
global firm, we are comfortable defending ourselves in WIPO
proceedings, but where there is a disparity of resources, such
tactics might otherwise be effective".

Domain names incorporating other companies' trademarks have been
used on several occasions to promote class action litigation
efforts against the brand owners:
'trumpuniversitylitigation.com', 'gmsecuritieslitigation.com' and
'uberlawsuit.com' are all examples. The CPA Global case appears
to be the first time such a website has been disputed before
WIPO, and although the decision was straightforward, the emphatic
way in which the complaint was rejected could serve to embolden
others to make use of similar domain names. [GN]


DJNG INC: Court Dismisses "Castaneda" Suit With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Marilyn L. Huff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California dismissed the case, ERICA CRYSTAL
CASTANEDA, individually, and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. DJNG, INC., a Florida corporation; EWC
HOLDINGS, INC., a Florida corporation; FRANKLIN EWC, Inc., a
California corporation; EWC FRANCHISE LLC; and DOES 1 through 20,
Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-03083-H-MDD (S.D. Cal.) with
prejudice.

On Jan. 2, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the
case with prejudice.  Judge Huff granted the motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/jox9L3 from Leagle.com.

Erica Crystal Castaneda, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Michael Houchin, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron &
Ronald Marron, Law Office of Ronald Marron.

Djng, Inc., a Florida corporation formerly known as European Wax
Center, Inc. & EWC Holdings, Inc., A Florida corporation,
Defendants, represented by Benjamin Joseph Treger --
btreger@hkemploymentlaw.com -- Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP & Gregory
S. Glazer -- gglazer@HKemploymentlaw.com -- Hirschfeld Kraemer
LLP.

Franklin EWC, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Douglas G.A. Johnston --
douglas.johnston@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC & Lisa
Barnett Sween -- Lisa.Sween@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C.

EWC Franchise LLC, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Joseph
Treger, Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP.


DUNBAR ARMORED: "Solis" Wage-and-Hour Suit Remanded to State Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied the Plaintiff's motion to remand
the case, ROBERT SOLIS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff, v. DUNBAR ARMORED, INC. and DOES 1-100, Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-2193 DMS (JLB) (S.D. Cal.).

On Oct. 18, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego pursuant to California's
Private Attorneys General Act to recover civil penalties based on
the Defendant's alleged wage-and-hour violations.  On Oct. 26,
2017, the Defendant removed the action to the Court based on
federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332.  The Defendant claims there is complete diversity between
the parties because the Plaintiff is a citizen of California, and
the Defendant is a citizen of Maryland.  The Defendant contends
the amount in controversy is satisfied by the potential recovery
of attorneys' fees and civil penalties recoverable under PAGA.
The Plaintiff's sole challenge is that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because of the absence of complete diversity.
He seeks an order remanding the case to state court.

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, Judge Sabraw finds
that there is complete diversity between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.  The Plaintiff is a citizen of California, and the
Defendant is a citizen of Maryland.  Because complete diversity
exists between the parties, the Judge denied the Plaintiff's
motion and the Plaintiff's request to recover fees associated
with filing the motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/omj09I from Leagle.com.

Robert Solis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by David Mara, The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC,
Jamie Serb -- jserb@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm,
APLC, William D. Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The
Turley Law Firm, APLC & Tony Roberts --
troberts@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC.

Dunbar Armored, Inc., Defendant, represented by Guillermo A.
Escobedo -- Guillermo.Escobedo@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C., Mia Farber -- FarberM@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP
& Kristen Nicole Silverman -- Kristen.Silverman-
Hunter@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C..


DYNAMIC LEDGER: Court Won't Enjoin Sale of Unqualified Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Application for
Temporary Restraining Order in the case captioned BRUCE
MAcDONALD, Plaintiff, v. DYNAMIC LEDGER SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-07095-RS (N.D. Cal.).

California resident Bruce MacDonald brings this putative class
action on behalf of all persons who contributed to the Tezos
Initial Coin Offering (ICO).  MacDonald alleges defendants
participated in an illegal sale of unqualified securities in
violation of California's Corporate Securities Law of 1968 and
California's Unfair Competition Law.  The instant action was
filed on December 13, 2017.  It is the fourth filed case before
the court involving the Tezos ICO.  One of the related cases,
Okusko v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc. et al, Case No. 17-cv-
6829, has a preliminary injunction hearing set for January 11,
2018.

MacDonald seeks a temporary restraining order enjoining
defendants from selling, transferring, converting, or otherwise
disposing of any assets collected or derived from the ICO in
advance of the preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for
January 11, 2018 in related case Okusko v. Dynamic Ledger
Solutions, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-06829.

MacDonald seeks an injunction preventing the defendants from
spending, converting, or dissipating the cryptocurrency assets
acquired through the Tezos ICO. He argues that in the absence of
a TRO, he, and the class members he purports to represent, will
suffer irreparable harm from defendants looting or converting the
cryptocurrency assets acquired in the ICO.

In support of this argument, MacDonald alleges: 1) there have
been very few updates about the project despite investors having
been told it would be launched by now; 2) there has been no
delivery of the promised tokens; 3) there is evidence of
infighting amongst Tezos leadership including accusations that
Board Member Gevers has engaged in self-dealing, self-promotion
and conflicts of interest; 4) the Foundation promised an audit
would be published in November but recently fired its auditor; 5)
the defendants have taken steps to convert the cryptocurrencies
received in the ICO into fiat currency (at an approximate rate of
$500,000 USD each day); and 6) the defendants have stated they
intend to use $50 million USD of the ICO proceeds to invest in
companies looking to build on the Tezos platform.

Unfortunately for MacDonald, the facts alleged are not enough to
suggest an immediate risk of irreparable harm. First, as a
threshold matter, it is not clear that damages would be
inadequate to compensate MacDonald for any harm he suffers. While
it is true that California Civil Code Section 25503 offers
rescission as a potential remedy, it also provides that, if the
consideration given for the security is not capable of being
returned, then the plaintiff may recover damages.

Unfortunately for MacDonald, the facts alleged are not enough to
suggest an immediate risk of irreparable harm. First, as a
threshold matter, it is not clear that damages would be
inadequate to compensate MacDonald for any harm he suffers. While
it is true that California Civil Code Section 25503 offers
rescission as a potential remedy, it also provides that, if the
consideration given for the security is not capable of being
returned, then the plaintiff may recover damages.

Moreover, MacDonald's allegations of looting simply do not have
enough behind them. The lack of updates regarding the project,
the infighting amongst Tezos leadership, the firing of an
auditor, and the delayed launch of the project are all worrisome.
None of them, however, are strong evidence of looting.
On the whole, MacDonald fails to show that the defendants are in
the process of dissipating assets, are strategizing to do so, or
have a history of past financial misconduct. As a result, his
concerns about dissipation rise to little more than speculation.
They are not sufficient to support a finding of irreparable harm
and therefore do not justify the "extraordinary remedy" of
issuing injunctive relief.

Because plaintiff has failed to show he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm, his other arguments regarding success on the
merits and whether the balance of equities and the public
interest favor injunctive relief need not be reached.

Plaintiff MacDonald's application for a temporary restraining
order is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdabajs from Leagle.com.

Bruce MacDonald, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob Allen Walker --
jake@blockesq.com --  Block & Leviton LLP.

Bruce MacDonald, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Anderson Fleming
-- joel@blockesq.com --  Block & Leviton LLP & Reed R. Kathrein -
- reed@hbsslaw.com -Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Patrick
Edward Gibbs -- pgibbs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Samantha Anne
Kirby -- skirby@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Tezos Stiftung, Defendant, represented by Neal Alan Potischman
neal.potischman@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell & Serge
Alexander Voronov.

Timothy Cook Draper, Defendant, represented by Christopher L.
Wanger -- cwanger@manatt.com --  Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP.
Draper Associates LP, Defendant, represented by Christopher L.
Wanger, Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP.


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Leavy Sues Over Auto-dialed Collection Calls
-------------------------------------------------- ------------
Lorraine J. Lane, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00001, (M.D. Fla., January 2, 2018),
seeks statutory and actual damages, declaratory and injunctive
relief, costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys'
fees and expenses, prejudgment interest and post-judgment
interest and such other and further relief for violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Enhanced Recovery is a debt collection agency who attempted to
collect an obligation Lane allegedly incurred using calls from an
automated dialing system. Lane claims she incurred unwanted
charges for these calls. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Stefan Coleman, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
      201 s. Biscayne Blvd., 28th floor
      Miami, FL 33131
      Tel: (877) 333-9427
      Fax: (888) 498.8946
      Email: law@stefancoleman.com

             - and -

      Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
      HIRALDO P.A.
      401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: 954-400-4713
      Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: "Brannon" Suit Moved to Minnesota Court
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRACI BRANNON, LINDSEY RIZZO, AND JAMIE HERR,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-2497-DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.), Judge Daniel D.
Crabtree of the District Court for the District of Kansas granted
Prime Therapeutics, LLC, Express Scripts Holding Co., and Express
Scripts, Inc.'s Motion to Transfer Venue.

The Plaintiffs have filed a Class Action Complaint against five
Defendants who own or operate pharmacy benefit management
companies ("PBM defendants"): (1) Express Scripts Holding Co.;
(2) Express Scripts, Inc.; (3) UnitedHealth Group, Inc.; (4)
OptumRx, Inc.; and (5) Prime Therapeutics, LLC.  The Plaintiffs
are enrolled in employer-provided welfare benefit health plans
through one of the Defendants.  The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") governs these plans.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant pharmacy benefit
managers contracted on behalf of health plans and insurers with
Mylan to purchase EpiPen epinephrine injectors.  As part of their
contracting, they assert that the Defendants violated ERISA by
engaging in extortion and deceptive conduct that unlawfully
extracted ever-larger portions of rebates and other payments from
Mylan.  Based on this theory, the Plaintiffs seek to recover
hundreds of millions of dollars allegedly paid to defendants
through the creation, maintenance, and concealment of a multi-
tiered fraudulent scheme designed to deceive consumers through
the marketing and sale of the EpiPen epinephrine injector.

They seek to represent a proposed class they define as all
individuals residing in the United States and its territories who
are or were enrolled in an ERISA-covered health benefit plan or
health insurance plan for which one or more of the PBM Defendants
administers or manages pharmacy benefits, who purchased an EpiPen
epinephrine injector pursuant to such plans or policies and were
required to pay all or a portion of the purchase price based on
an inflated list price ("ERISA Class").

The Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts four causes of action: (1)
violating ERISA Section 406(b) by engaging in prohibited
transactions between a plan and a fiduciary; (2) violating ERISA
Section 404 by breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty and
prudence; (3) violating ERISA Section 702 by discriminating
against plan participants and beneficiaries who have a medical
condition that requires an EpiPen because the Defendants' alleged
use of artificially inflated prices and undisclosed and excessive
PBM Kickbacks have required them to pay greater premiums and
contributions for their health plan benefits than those
participants and beneficiaries who do not require an EpiPen; and
(4) violating ERISA Section502(a)(3) by knowingly participating
in ERISA violations.

Almost three months before the Plaintiffs filed the action, Elan
and Adam Klein, and two other plaintiffs ("Klein Plaintiffs"),
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
filed a similar, but not identical Class Action Complaint in the
District of Minnesota, Klein v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC.  The
original Klein Complaint named four defendants who own or operate
pharmacy benefit management companies.  On Sept. 27, 2017, the
Klein Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, adding four more
Defendants.  The Klein Complaint asserts that the Defendant
pharmacy benefit managers violated their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by subjecting plan participants and beneficiaries to highly
inflated prices for the EpiPen.

The Klein Plaintiffs assert four ERISA-based causes of action.
They claim the Defendants: (1) violated ERISA Section
404(a)(1)(A) by breaching fiduciary duties owed to class members;
(2) violated ERISA Section 406(b)(2) by engaging in prohibited
transactions between a plan and a fiduciary; (3) violated ERISA
Section 405(a) by knowingly participating in, and enabling
breaches of fiduciary duties; and (4) violated ERISA
Section02(a)(3) for knowingly participating in ERISA violations.

The Klein Plaintiffs seek to represent a proposed class they
define as all persons residing in the United States and its
territories who are or were participants in, or beneficiaries of,
health insurance plans governed by ERISA, for which the
Defendants administered pharmacy benefits, and who paid any
portion of the purchase price for EpiPen, EpiPen Jr., EpiPen 2-
Pak, or EpiPen Jr. 2-Pak calculated by reference to a benchmark
price, including but not limited to WAC (Wholesale Acquisition
Cost) or AWP (Average Wholesale Price), as required by the terms
of their health insurance and/or prescription drug benefit plans.
The class begins on June 2, 2011 and continues through the
present.

The Moving Defendants contend that the Klein Plaintiffs assert
the same ERISA claims against substantially the same defendants
on behalf of a nearly identical putative class.  So, they argue,
the court should transfer the case to the District of Minnesota
where the first-filed action -- i.e., the Klein lawsuit -- is
pending.  The Moving Defendants ask the Court to transfer the
case to the District of Minnesota under the first-to-file rule.
Alternatively, they ask the court to transfer the case under 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

After considering all the relevant factors, Judge Crabtree
determines that transfer of this case to the District of
Minnesota is warranted under the first-to-file rule.  After
considering the factors for determining whether to transfer an
action under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404, the Judge, in his
discretion, concludes that a preponderance of the factors also
favor transfer under this provision.  While the analysis under
Section 1404 is not as one-sided as it is under the first-to-file
rule, he finds that transfer will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the interest of justice.  He
thus transfers the action to the District of Minnesota.

For reasons explained, Judge Crabtree granted the Moving
Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue.  He transferred the case to
the District of Minnesota.  He directed the Clerk of the Court to
take all necessary steps to effectuate the transfer.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/XptYmV from Leagle.com.

Traci Brannon, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Lindsey Rizzo, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Jamie Herr, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Derek
William Loeser -- dloeser@KellerRohrback.com --  Keller Rohrback,
pro hac vice, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice,
Gretchen Suzanne Obrist -- gobrist@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko --
lsarko@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul
J. Geller -- PGeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford , The Lanier Law Firm, PC,
pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Spencer Cox --
scox@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice, Stuart
A. Davidson -- SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Warren T. Burns --
wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Express Scripts Holding Company & Express Scripts, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Andrew S. Corkhill --
andrewcorkhill@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice, Eric G. Serron --
eserron@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice,
Jonathan G. Cooper -- jonathancooper@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Lyle -
- mikelyle@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr. -- pondrasik@steptoe.com
-- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice & William D. Beil --
billb@germanmay.com -- German May PC.

UnitedHealth Group, Inc. & OptumRx, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Bradley Joseph Schlozman -- bschlozman@hinklaw.com -- Hinkle
Law Firm LLC, Brian D. Boone -- brian.boone@alston.com -- Alston
& Bird, LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline M. Rawls --
caroline.rawls@alston.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP, pro hac vice,
Mitchell L. Herren -- herren@hinklaw.com -- Hinkle Law Firm LLC &
William H. Jordan -- bill.jordan@alston.com -- Alston & Bird,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Prime Therapeutics, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alan J.
Iverson -- iverson.alan@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro
hac vice, Carson M. Hinderks -- CHINDERKS@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM --
Berkowitz Oliver LLP, Christina Marie Wahl --
WAHL@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- Berkowitz Oliver LLP, David F. Oliver
-- DOLIVER@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- Berkowitz Oliver LLP, Jaime
Stilson -- stilson.jaime@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro
hac vice, Nicholas J. Bullard -- bullard.nick@dorsey.com --
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen P. Lucke --
lucke.steve@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro hac vice.


EKSO BIONICS: "Bekhet" Sues Over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------
Rimon Bekhet, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Ekso Bionics Holdings, Inc., Thomas Looby
and Maximilian Scheder-Bieschin, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00001,
(E.D. N.Y., January 2, 2018), seeks damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, as well as their reasonable attorneys'
fees, expert fees and other costs and such other and further
relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Ekso designs, develops, and sells exoskeletons for use in the
healthcare, industrial, military, and consumer markets in North
America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Ekso failed to
disclose that there was a material weakness in its internal
control over financial reporting and its disclosure controls and
procedures were not effective. On this news, shares of Ekso fell
$0.15 per share, or over 6%, from its previous closing price to
close at $2.28 per share on December 15, 2017, damaging investors
such as Bekhet. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Phillip Kim, Esq.
      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 686-1060
      Fax: (212) 202-3827
      Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
             pkim@rosenlegal.com


EQUIFAX INC: Durand State Bank Hits Data Breach, Claims Damages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Durand State Bank, in behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Equifax, Inc. and Equifax Information Services
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-04822, (N.D. Ga., January 2,
2018), seeks to recover actual and statutory damages, equitable
relief, restitution, reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses, other
compensatory damages resulting from negligence.

Equifax experienced a cybersecurity incident impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers exposing their names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, driver's license
numbers and credit card numbers. The companies are supplied with
data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as
information on everything from child support payments, credit
limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and
employer history.

Durand State Bank is a federally chartered community bank with
its principal place of business in Durand, Illinois. It holds
consumer deposits, provides consumer loans, processes consumer
transactions, issues credit and debit cards to consumers. It
claims to have suffered financial losses due to the Equifax Data
Breach.

Equifax, Inc. is engaged in the business of assembling,
evaluating, and dispersing information concerning consumers for
the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties upon
request. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thomas A. Withers, Esq.
     GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC
     8E Liberty Street
     Savannah, GA 31401
     Telephone: 912-447-8400
     Facsimile: 912-233-6584
     Email: twithers@gwllawfirm.com

            - and -

     Anthony C. Lake, Esq.
     GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC
     3490 Piedmont Road, N.E.
     One Securities Centre, Suite 1050
     Atlanta, GA 30305
     Telephone: 404-842-9700
     Facsimile: 404-842-9750
     Email: aclake@gwllawfirm.com

            - and -

     Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
     Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq.
     Bryan A. Fox, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Tel: (412) 322-9243
     Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
            jetzel@carlsonlynch.com
            bfox@carlsonlynch.com

            - and -

     Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
     Erin Green Comite
     SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
     The Chrysler Building
     405 Lexington Avenue, 40th Floor
     New York, NY 10174
     Telephone: (212) 223-6444
     Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
     Email: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
            ecomite@scott-scott.com


FIAT CHRYSLER: Auto Workers Say Union Bribes Were Behind Layoffs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Former Jeep Wrangler paint shop workers sued Fiat Chrysler and
United Automobile Workers, claiming they were forced out of their
northwest Ohio paint shop after union officials bargained away
jobs for bribes.

Two class-action lawsuits were filed by the former workers in
Toledo, Ohio, federal court.  In the first, lead plaintiff Robert
DeShetler Jr. alleges that he and 72 other workers were induced
to "retire" from Chrysler to work at the Jeep Wrangler paint shop
but were later forced out when Chrysler took control of the
operation.

At the time of the layoffs in 2012, their local union said
Chrysler had replaced them with younger, lower-paid employees.
The complaint also alleges age discrimination.

A second class action was filed by lead plaintiff Richard Sheets,
one of many workers who say they were stripped of benefits and
pay raises because of a November 2012 bargaining agreement.

Filed by Sandusky, Ohio, lawyer Leslie Murray, Esq. --
leslie@murrayandmurray.com -- both complaints alleged that the
paint shop workers lost key benefits and jobs because a corrupt
union official bargained them away. Murray did not immediately
respond January 12 to a request for comment.

The complaints link the alleged wrongdoing to former UAW
executive General Holiefield, who died in March 2015.

Last year, the Justice Department filed indictments against
Holiefield's wife and former Fiat Chrysler executive Alphons
Iacobelli, alleging he had paid more than $1.2 million in illegal
payments during a period that covers collective bargaining
negotiations outlined in the two lawsuits.

Holiefield and other executives had "two separate unlawful
motives directly adverse to plaintiffs at the time that they
bargained away plaintiffs' jobs with Iacobelli and Chrysler,"
DeShetler's complaint states.

"First, Holiefield and his team had accepted bribes, and hoped to
accept additional bribes, from Chrysler to take company friendly
positions at the expense of the UAW members that they
represented. Second, members of the Chrysler Department of the
UAW International Union had developed a lucrative side business
of selling Chrysler jobs. By acting in the manner described
above, these officials created over 70 open positions that could
be sold," the filing states.

In the backdrop was Chrysler's decision to handle the paint shop
in-house after several independent companies oversaw operations.
Around 2006, the 73 paint shop workers named as plaintiffs in
DeShetler's lawsuit retired from their positions at Chrysler to
work in the shop, painting Jeep Wranglers assembled at the Toledo
South plant.

Chrysler encouraged the workers to start collecting their
pensions and work at the paint shop, assuring them they would be
hired indefinitely, the lawsuit says.

But in 2012,Holiefield, in violation of the union's rules,
"systematically locked" out paint shop workers and the leadership
of their local union, UAW Local 12, as they entered in
negotiations over their futures, the plaintiffs allege.
Holiefield allegedly did not object or dispute Chrysler's
position that union workers in the Wrangler paint shop "were
functionally equivalent to new hires from the street."

Chrysler said it would "hire" paint shop workers but stripped
them of their seniority based on an arbitrary new hire date of
Nov. 30, 2012, according to DeShetler's lawsuit.

Workers lost pension and other benefits and were not able to
obtain raises based on the actual number of years they had worked
at the plant, the filing says. Instead, they say they were
treated as new hires and employees of the company that ran the
shop, Gonzales Contract Services.

Prosecutors say Iacobelli's bribes to Holiefield included
designer apparel, jewelry, and furniture as well as $262,219 for
the mortgage on Holiefield and his wife's home in Harrison, Mich.

The alleged bribes were paid from 2009 until 2014, at the same
time that Iacobelli and Holiefield were negotiating agreements
between Fiat Chrysler and the UAW, the workers say.

According to the DeShetler lawsuit, reports suggest that
authorities are also investigating the UAW International Union's
Chrysler Department for selling jobs for payments of a few
thousand dollars from prospective workers.

Despite interest from Toledo residents, a "suspiciously large
number" of people who took jobs at the paint shop relocated from
Detroit, the lawsuit says, adding that some of those people have
admitted paying for their jobs.

The former employees seek damages for lost pay and reinstatement
of their positions.

The defendants are FCA USA, the UAW International, and UAW Region
2B.

Fiat Chrysler spokesman Michael Palese declined to comment.

The unions did not immediately respond to requests for comment
January 12.


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Court Grants Dismissal of "Antista"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned LYNN ANTISTA, on behalf of herself & those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. FINANCIAL RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
CAVALRY SPV I, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1 TO 10, Defendants, Civ. No.
2:17-cv-3567 (WJM) (D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Lynn Antista brings this putative class action against
Defendants Financial Recovery Service (FRS) and Cavalry SPV I,
LLC (Cavalry), alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). According to the Complaint,
Defendants' collection letter contained a "false, deceptive, or
misleading representation" by stating that settlement may have
tax consequences.

This action arises from a collection letter that FRS sent to
Plaintiff  which stated that Plaintiff owed $410.31.2 After
describing three different settlement options, the letter made
the following proviso: "This settlement may have tax
consequences. Please consult your tax advisor. FRS is not a law
firm and FRS will not initiate any legal proceedings or provide
you with legal advice. The offers of settlement in this letter
are merely offers to resolve your account for less than the
balance due. For assistance, please feel free to call us at the
toll free number listed below or use our online consumer help
desk."

The Complaint principally alleges that this statement was false
deceptive and misleading because it deliberately fails to
disclose that such reporting requirement is subject to seven
exceptions, several of which allegedly apply to Plaintiff.
First, a discharged debt is excluded from gross income if the
discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent. Second, a debt
that remains disputed is not taxable.

There is no need to determine whether these exceptions apply to
Plaintiff; even if they do, the statement that settlement may
have tax consequences is not false, deceptive, or misleading.
Indeed, settlement may have tax consequences, depending on a
debtor's individual circumstances.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Opinion  is available at https://tinyurl.com/y75hwyct from
Leagle.com.

LYNN ANTISTA, On behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW T. THOMASSON, Stern Thomasson
LLP, PHILIP D. STERN, STERN THOMASSON LLP & YONGMOON KIM, Kim Law
Firm LLC, 150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor. Springfield, NJ 07081-
1315.

FINANCIAL RECOVERY SERVICES, INC. & CAVALRY SPV I, LLC,
Defendants, represented by RICHARD J. PERR --
rperr@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, PC &
MONICA M. LITTMAN -- mlittman@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN,
KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, PC.


FITNESS FIRST: Customer Complaints Pile Up Amid Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Brooke Kansier, writing for Record Eagle, reports that gym
memberships are the crux of many a New Year's resolution, but you
might want to check the fine print first.

Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette is urging caution this
month after 2017 brought a rash of new complaints about gyms,
health clubs and fitness centers across the state.

Last year, 595 complaints were filed with the state's Department
of Attorney General, compared to just 84 in 2016.  The jump
spurred the department to create Lose Weight, Not Money, a
consumer alert, to spread awareness of predatory practices.

"(When we receive a complaint), we help consumers try to solve a
problem as quickly and easily as they can," said Deputy Press
Secretary Megan Hawthorne.  "That's always our goal, to prevent a
bad situation."

About half of 2017's complaints were lodged against Family
Fitness, a western Michigan chain that, since July, has been
subject of a class action lawsuit led by Mr. Schuette.
Complaints against other gyms, the department says, focus on
discrepancies between employee promises and membership contracts,
aggressive sales tactics and confusing or expensive cancellation
processes.

Local gyms say future members should be sure before they commit
-- or start with a month-to-month contract.

"I think people try to get out of (their contracts) because they
change their mind," said Jenny Olds, a manager at Traverse City's
Battle Fitness.  "And it goes both ways -- some gyms can be
shady, too.  I've seen gyms where you get a great introductory
rate, and then it goes up and they charge your card.  I can see
where consumers are coming from."

Battle Fitness relies on more straightforward methods to draw
customers, Olds said.

"We don't do any hidden fees -- being local, our face is here and
plastered on our building.  We want to keep a good reputation,"
she said.  "Something I like to do when I'm doing a new
membership (is) run over the key points. We rarely get
complaints."

A member's rate won't change during the course of a membership,
Ms. Olds said, and introductory prices last through the full 12-
and 24-month membership options.

The only added charge Battle Fitness members see is a one-time
$15 club enhancement fee, which goes toward new equipment.

"(Members are) able to kind of vote on the new pieces of
equipment, too," Ms. Olds said.  "So they get a say."

Cancelling a membership early comes with a $50 charge.

"And you should have a reason -- if you're moving, show proof of
an address change; a doctor's note," Ms. Olds said.

Traverse City's Anytime Fitness takes a similar approach.

"We have a 12-month contract and an 18-month contract, and we do
month-to-month for those who don't want a contract," said manager
John Allen.

The gym's contracts are easy to navigate, he added, and members
are made aware of the $50 cancellation fee before signing.

"If they're in the military or moving, or having financial issues
and they come in and talk with us beforehand, we usually will
work with them," Mr. Allen said.

The gym hasn't received any complaints so far this year, he
added.

"The reason we do contracts is to give (members) some
accountability on their end to stick with it," Mr. Allen said.
"I haven't seen much hesitation."

Other gyms and health clubs offer a class-by-class structure --
which some, like Bodies in Motion owner Cheryl Send, say is
easier for consumers and their instructors.

"I have taught before at gyms and they kind of turn me off," she
said.  "I wanted to start something a little bit different, as
far as working out."

Ms. Send's studio, at 10660 E. Carter Road, specializes in dance-
based workouts like Zumba and cardio drumming, and rents its
space to different instructors. Each instructor sets their own
schedule and class-by-class rate.

Those who want more of a commitment -- and to try a few new
things -- have options, too.

"I do offer a coupon book," Ms. Send said.  "It's $50 and you can
use those coupons to try any class."

Trigger Boxing Gym, which offers classes for children and adults,
runs its martial arts classes on a session-by-session basis as
well.

"There's no contracts for what we do," said owner Bill Bustance.
"They sign a release, of course, and we have deals if you buy six
sessions at once."

Under Trigger's policy, there is no charge for sessions cancelled
at least 24 hours in advance. A normal session fee is charged for
no-shows and sessions cancelled within 24 hours.

The gym also offers nonprofit programs for children.

The best way to avoid an issue, Hawthorne says, is to read a
contract in full before signing, be aware of different policies
and to get promises from employees in writing before committing.

Don't be afraid to make a complaint if you encounter a problem,
either.

"Our goal is always to see less complaints, but we welcome people
to make them," Hawthorne said.  "We just want to help Michigan
consumers be more informed."

BEFORE YOU SIGN

Consumer tips offered in the Lose Weight, Not Money alert include
making sure you understand cancellation and refund policies
before signing a contract, taking contracts home to read fully
and carefully before signing, keeping a copy for later reference
and checking that promises from employees are put into writing.

Aspiring gym-goers should also be cautious, the alert says, of
unrealistically low prices changes in gym ownership.

To file a complaint, call 877-765-8388. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Faces Super Duty Emissions Class Action in Michigan
---------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a Ford
F-250 and F-350 emissions lawsuit alleges the trucks are more
"Super Dirty" than Super Duty.

The proposed class-action lawsuit includes current and former
owners or lessees of 2011-2017 Ford F-250 and F-350 Super Duty
trucks equipped with 6.7-liter Power Stroke diesel engines.

According to the lawsuit, Ford advertised the trucks as the
"Cleanest Super Diesel[s] Ever" that reduced nitrogen oxide
emissions by 80 percent over previous models.

However, the plaintiffs claim their scientifically valid
emissions testing has revealed the trucks emit levels of nitrogen
oxides many times higher than their gasoline counterparts and
higher than Environmental Protection Agency's maximum standards.

Furthermore, the fuel economy and towing capacity are allegedly
obtained only by turning off or turning down emission controls
when the software senses the trucks are not undergoing emissions
testing in a lab.

The lawsuit alleges the F-250 and F-350 Super Duty trucks exceed
federal and state emission standards and use "defeat devices"
that are almost always activated by illegal software in the
vehicle's engine control module, the computer that controls the
operation of the engine and emission control devices.

The plaintiffs say Ford accomplishes the alleged fraud by
reversing the traditional order of the exhaust treatment
components and putting the selective catalytic reduction in front
of the diesel particulate filters.  But the reordering allegedly
increases the need to use "active regeneration" to burn off
collected soot at high temperatures.

Ford's alleged solution was to conspire with the Robert Bosch
company to install defeat devices to purposefully reduce in-
cylinder nitrogen oxide controls that increased emissions.

According to the lawsuit, emission levels are routinely as high
as five times the standard in stop-and-go conditions.  And in
modest uphill road grades or with the use of a trailer that adds
weight, emissions allegedly exceed the standard by 30 to 50
times.

Specifically, the plaintiffs say testing shows the F-250 and F-
350 trucks operate 69 percent of the time above the emissions
standard, 45 percent of the time at twice the standard and 9
percent of the time at five times the standard.

As in lawsuits against Volkswagen and General Motors, parts
supplier Bosch is named in the Ford lawsuit as the company that
developed, manufactured and tested the electronic diesel control
(EDC) that allowed Ford to use the alleged defeat device.

The Bosch EDC17 is allegedly a good component for manufacturers
to employ defeat devices as it enables the software to detect
conditions when emission controls can be manipulated.  In
addition, the lawsuit says almost all of the vehicles found or
alleged to have been manipulating emissions in the U.S. (Audi,
Chrysler, General Motors, Mercedes, Porsche and Volkswagen) use
Bosch EDC17 devices.

The Ford F-250 and F-350 Super Duty emissions lawsuit was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan -
Len Gamboa, et al., v. Ford Motor Company, and Robert Bosch GMBH,
et al.

The plaintiffs are represented by Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, The Miller Law Firm PC, Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein,
Brody, Agnello, P.C., and Seeger Weiss LLP. [GN]


FORD MOTORS: Motorists Claim Firm Used "Defeat Devices"
-------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that in a federal class action
echoing the Volkswagen scandal, motorists claim Ford used "defeat
devices" in its diesel-powered Super Duty vehicles to evade
emissions standards.

The case is LEN GAMBOA, JEFF RETMIER, NIKIAH NUDELL, DAVID BATES,
PETE PETERSEN, and WILLIAM SPARKS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware
corporation; ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, a corporation organized under the
laws of Germany; and ROBERT BOSCH LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, Defendants, 2:18-cv-10106-DPH-EAS (E.D.
Mich.).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class:

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Telephone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

        -- and --

     E. Powell Miller, Esq.
     Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
     THE MILLER LAW FIRM PC
     950 W. University Dr., Ste. 300
     Rochester, MI 48307
     Telephone: (248) 841-2200
     Facsimile: (248) 652-2852
     Email: epm@millerlawpc.com
            ssa@millerlawpc.com

        -- and --

     James E. Cecchi, Esq.
     CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
     5 Becker Farm Road
     Roseland, NJ 07068
     Telephone: (973) 994-1700
     Facsimile: (973) 994-1744
     Email: JCecchi@carellabyrne.com

        -- and --

     Christopher A. Seeger, Esq.
     SEEGER WEISS LLP
     77 Water Street
     New York, NY 10005
     Telephone: (212) 584-0700
     Facsimile: (212) 584-0799
     Email: cseeger@seegerweiss.com


GEICO GENERAL: Contract Class Action Can Proceed, Judge Rules
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
refusing to grant Geico summary judgment, a federal judge cleared
for trial a contract class action claiming the insurer
systematically used its inability to obtain phone records as an
improper basis for claim denials.


GENERAL CABLE: "Rosenblatt" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Rosenblatt, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. General Cable Corporation, Sallie B.
Bailey, Ned Hall, Michael T. McDonnel, Gregory E. Lawton, Craig
P. Omtvedt, Patrick M. Prevost, John E. Welsch, III, Prsymian
SpA, and Alisea Corp., Case No. 2:18-cv-00010 (E.D. Ky., January
9, 2018), is a class action for violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The action stems from a proposed transaction announced on
December 4, 2017, pursuant to which General Cable Corporation
will be acquired by Prysmian S.p.A. and Alisea Corp. On December
22, 2017, Defendants filed a Preliminary Proxy Statement with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which
renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading, the complaint
asserts.

The Plaintiff owns General Cable common stock.

General Cable develops, designs, manufactures, markets, and
distributes copper, aluminum, and fiber optic wire and cable
products for use in the energy, industrial, construction,
specialty, and communications markets.

The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of General
Cable. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Mark K. Gray, Esq.
      Matthew L. White, Esq.
      Jacob E. Levy, Esq.
      GRAY & WHITE LAW
      713 E. Market St. #200
      Louisville, KY 40202
      Tel: (502) 805-1800


GENERAL MILLS: Claims in Age Discrimination Suit Narrowed
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration the case,
William Shields et al., Plaintiffs, v. General Mills, Inc.,
Defendant, Civ. No. 16-954 (MJD/KMM) (D. Minn.).

The Plaintiffs are former employees of General Mills.  General
Mills terminated their employment in a 2014-15 company-wide
reorganization and employee termination program that it called
"Project Catalyst."  Hundreds of employees were terminated
through this program, which followed an earlier 2012 employee
termination program called "Project Refuel."  In both programs,
the Plaintiffs allege that General Mills informed the employees
targeted for termination that they would not receive any
severance pay unless they signed a contract, drafted by General
Mills, called the "Release Agreement."  All the Plaintiffs but
Linda Kloeckner signed a Release Agreement.

The action was filed on April 12, 2016.  The Settled Plaintiffs
are asserting a declaratory judgment claim in Count 1, asking
that the Court find the waiver provision set forth in the Release
Agreement was and is invalid because General Mills failed to
comply with the statutory requirements to obtain a knowing and
voluntary waiver as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act ("OWBPA").

In all, nine claims have been asserted in the action. Count 1:
ADEA Collective Action -- Declaratory Judgment -- ADEA/OWBPA;
Count 2: ADEA Collective Action -- Disparate Treatment Age
Discrimination; Count 3: Individual Claims of ADEA Disparate
Treatment; Count 4: ADEA Collective Action -- Disparate Impact;
Count 5: Individual Claims of ADEA Disparate Impact; Count 6:
MHRA Disparate Treatment Age Discrimination for Plaintiff
Kloeckner; Count 7: MHRA Disparate Impact Age Discrimination for
Plaintiff Kloeckner; Count 8: Minn. Stat. Section 181.81
Dismissal for Age for Plaintiff Kloeckner; Count 9: Declaratory
Judgment -- National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").

On April 22, 2016, the parties jointly requested that the Court
stay the action pending the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in a related case, Elizabeth McLeod, et al. v. General
Mills, Inc.  The Court granted that request and the matter was
stayed on April 26, 2016.

On April 14, 2017, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision in
McLeod, reversing in part, and remanding the matter for the
district court to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim for lack
of jurisdiction and to grant the motion to compel individual
arbitration of the remaining ADEA claims.  By Order dated May 5,
2017, the stay in the matter was vacated.

After the decision in McLeod was filed, General Mills filed a
motion to dismiss in this case.  In response, the Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Complaint, which inter alia added a number of
Plaintiffs and a claim for declaratory judgment under the NLRA.
At the time the parties were briefing the motion, four of the
Settled Plaintiffs had commenced individual arbitration
proceedings to pursue their individual ADEA claims.

General Mills now moves to dismiss the claims of the Settled
Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint in accordance with the
decision in McLeod.  In response to General Mills' motion, the
Plaintiffs have indicated that they will withdraw Count 9.  In
addition, the Plaintiffs concede that the Settled Plaintiffs must
pursue their individual ADEA claims in arbitration and ask that
the Court stay Counts 2 through 5 pending such arbitration
proceedings.  They do challenge the motion to dismiss to Count 1
and challenge General Mills's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Linda
Kloeckner without prejudice and require her to file an
independent action or require her to file an Amended Complaint
asserting only claims related to her.

Judge Davis finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
that the Eighth Circuit's decision in McLeod is not controlling.
Accordingly, he finds that based on that decision, and the
decisions set forth in Calderon and Coffman, Count 1 does not
present a case or controversy under Article III.

The Judge also finds that there is no dispute that Plaintiff
Kloeckner has a right to bring her claims in the Court as her
claims are not subject to arbitration.  In addition, there are
common questions of fact, including statistical evidence
indicating age bias.  Further, although the Amended Complaint
includes allegations about persons and issues extraneous to
Kloeckner, he finds the Amended Complaint is clear as to which
allegations relate to her claims.  Accordingly, the Judge will
deny General Mills's motion as to Plaintiff Kloeckner.

Judge Davis therefore granted in part General Mill's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and to Compel Arbitration
on an Individual Basis as follows: Count 1 is dismissed without
prejudice, Counts 2 through 5 as they related to the Settled
Plaintiffs are stayed pending arbitration, Count 9 is dismissed
with prejudice, and the motion to dismiss or amend Counts 6
through 8 (Plaintiff Kloeckner's Individual Claims) is denied.
All Plaintiffs except Kloeckner may submit their claims to
arbitration on an individual basis only.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/PPOOas from Leagle.com.

William Shields, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, Laurie Bluhm, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Charles Nix, for
and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Cheryl Mason, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Ann Albertson, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Peter
Kokemueller, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Linda Kloeckner, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Laura Hapsch,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, Cheryl O'Fallon, for and in behalf of themselves and
other persons similarly situated, Nancy Karls, for and in behalf
of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Paige Miller,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, Carol Andraschko, for and in behalf of themselves and
other persons similarly situated, Matthew Lorence, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Susan
Hayes Jacobson, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Rick Marvig, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Annette Olson, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Robin
Feenie, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Ami Anderson, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Paul Fazio, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Kimberly Christ, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, Chris Muntifering, for and in behalf
of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Behroze
Mistry, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Theresa Panchyshyn, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Juanda White,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, Karen Cope, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, Jacki Filippi, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Ivan Martinez,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, Karen Guerrieri, for and in behalf of themselves and
other persons similarly situated, Jim Buccellato, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Cynthia Drantch, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, Donald Blue, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Jeffrey Carter,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, James Heflin, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, Michael Dickman, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Janet Ehlers,
for and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly
situated, Michael Murray, for and in behalf of themselves and
other persons similarly situated, Michael Allard, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Bruce
Fiedler, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Mark Iorio, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Linda Wentzlaff, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, James
Flanigan, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Kimberly Haas, Executor of the Estate of
Michael Haas, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Jerry Bemrich, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Joseph
Rastetter, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Denise Holtz, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Sean Roberts, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Elizabeth Mitchell, for and in behalf of themselves and other
persons similarly situated, John Williams, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Jeff Price, for
and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Carolyn Cooper, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, James Levi, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Denise Klaverkamp, for and
in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Carol Kline, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Janet Polakiewicz, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Ruth Meger, for
and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated,
Gordon Deeds, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Julie Dahly, for and in behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated, Michelle Motto, for and in
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated, Sharon
Narog, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Julie Fleischhacker, for and in behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated, Karen Reger, for
and in behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated
& Jeff Funaro, for and in behalf of themselves and other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brent C. Snyder --
brent.snyder@snyderattorneys.com -- Snyder & Brandt, P.A., Craig
A. Brandt -- craig.brandt@snyderattorneys.com -- Snyder & Brandt,
P.A., Lucas J. Kaster -- lkaster@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
Michelle L. Kornblit -- mkornblit@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster,
PLLP, Stephen J. Snyder -- stephen.snyder@snyderattorneys.com --
Snyder & Brandt, P.A. & Steven Andrew Smith -- smith@nka.com --
Nichols Kaster, PLLP.

General Mills, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron D. Van Oort
-- aaron.vanoort@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker Daniels LLP,
Jeffrey P. Justman -- jeff.justman@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker
Daniels LLP, Kathryn Mrkonich Wilson -- kwilson@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, PC, Keith C. Hult --  khult@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice, Marko J. Mrkonich --
mmrkonich@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, Peter Magnuson --
peter.magnuson@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker Daniels LLP & Susan
K. Fitzke --  sfitzke@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC.

AARP & AARP Foundation, Amicuss, represented by Susan M. Coler --
coler@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law.


GENESCO INC: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in "Shumate"
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard L. Young of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification, Expedited Opt-
In Discovery, and Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In
Plaintiffs in the case, JULIA SHUMATE, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GENESCO, INC., HAT WORLD, INC.
d/b/a LIDS SPORTS GROUP, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03574-RLY-
MPB (S.D. Ind.).

Shumate, filed the present lawsuit against her former employer,
Lids, and its parent corporation, Genesco, alleging overtime
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("OMFWSA"), in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio.  The case was
transferred to the Court on Oct. 4, 2017.

The Plaintiff was employed by Lids as a non-exempt store manager
between December 2014 and June 2015 at the Defendants' Lids Store
located at Polaris Fashion Place, 1500 Polaris Park, Columbus,
Ohio.  She was paid a fixed salary under the fluctuating work
week ("FWW") method of payment.  This method allows an employer
to pay an employee who works a fluctuating, irregular work week a
fixed weekly salary regardless of the hours worked whether they
exceed or fall below 40 hours in a given work week.  It further
permits the employer to pay an employee a minimum rate of one-
half (not the typical one and one-half) his or her regular rate
for overtime hours worked.

In her First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that in
addition to overtime compensation, she and similarly situated
store employees were paid bonuses in violation of the FLSA and
the OMFWSA.  Additionally, she alleges that all store managers
were subject to the same employment, timekeeping, and payroll
policies, practices and procedures.

In the present motion, the Plaintiff seeks conditional
certification of a collective action under the FLSA and approval
for a notice to prospective members of the collective action to
allow them the opportunity to opt-in to the case.  She seeks
conditional certification of the class of all former and current
non-exempt store managers of Lids who were paid overtime under
the fluctuating workweek method at any time between Feb. 2, 2014
and the present.  The Defendants oppose the Plaintiff's requests.

Judge Young, having read and reviewed the parties' submissions
and the applicable law, granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification, Expedited Opt-In Discovery, and Court-
Supervised Notice to Potential Plaintiffs.  He holds that the
Plaintiff has demonstrated that she is similarly situated to
current and former store managers of Lids.

Within 30 days of the date of the Order, the Defendants will
fully answer the Plaintiff's Expedited Opt-In Discovery, and will
provide to her counsel an Excel spreadsheet containing the name,
last known home address with zip code, last known telephone
number, last known email address, and dates of employment, of all
former and non-exempt store managers of Lids, who were paid
overtime under the fluctuating workweek method at any time
between Feb. 2, 2014 and the present.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/RZ6m9w from Leagle.com.

JULIA SHUMATE, Plaintiff, represented by D. Patrick Kasson --
pkasson@reminger.com -- REMINGER CO. LPA, pro hac vice, Anthony
J. Lazzaro, pro hac vice, Chastity Lynn Christy , LAZZARO LAW
FIRM LLC, pro hac vice, Houston Hum , REMINGER CO. LPA, Kari
Hehmeyer -- khehmeyer@reminger.com -- Reminger Co., L.P.A., Lori
M. Griffin, Lazzaro Law Firm, LLC & Tyler G. Tarney --
ttarney@reminger.com -- REMINGER CO. LPA.

GENESCO, INC. & HAT WORLD INC., doing business as LIDS SPORTS
GROUP, Defendants, represented by Bonnie Keane DelGobbo --
bdelgobbo@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, pro hac vice &
Joel Griswold -- jcgriswold@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP,
pro hac vice.


GENOVA PALAZZO DUCALE: Refund Demanded Over Fake Modigliani Works
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Cascone, writing for ArtNet News, reports that visitors
flocked to an exhibition of work by Amedeo Modigliani in Genoa,
Italy, last year -- but now that an expert has concluded that
many of the works on view were fake, some of them want their
money back. An Italian consumer group plans to file a class
action lawsuit to secure a full refund for visitors to the show.

The suit will also seek compensation for the 100,000 attendees'
travel expenses, according to the Times of London. A hotline has
even been set up for dissatisfied visitors, the Associated Press
reports. Tickets to the show, titled simply "Modigliani," were
priced at EUR13 ($15.67).

Neither the National Association for Protection of Consumers nor
consumer advocate Furio Truzzi, who is leading the refund effort,
responded to emails or phone messages seeking comment.

The Genova Palazzo Ducale opened the exhibition in March, but was
forced to shut it down three days early in July, after a local
prosecutor ordered the seizure of 21 works suspected to be
forgeries.

"When a painting is a fake, it is missing its soul, and these
were missing that three dimensional elegance of Modigliani --
even a child could see these were crude fakes," the collector
Carlo Pepi, who first raised suspicions about the works, told the
Telegraph at the time. "I thought, poor Modigliani, to attribute
to him these ugly abominations."

His opinion, delivered solely on the basis of reproductions in
the exhibition catalogue, has now been upheld by a court-
appointed expert, Isabella Quattrocchi, who proclaimed that 20 of
the 21 confiscated works are "blatantly fake," according to the
Italian news agency ANSA. The forgeries reportedly now face
possible destruction.

A spokesperson for the Palazzo Ducale told artnet News that
Quattrocchi's expert opinion "is not the final judgement." The
investigation "is ongoing," but if the final verdict is that the
works are forgeries, "Palazzo Ducale Fondazione per la Cultura,
which considers itself as the injured party in this matter, will
take the necessary legal action." The spokesperson could not
immediately confirm whether the museum plans to provide visitors'
refunds after the final verdict is in.

Several people involved in the show are also under investigation
by authorities on suspicion of fraud: Rudy Chiappini, the
exhibition's curator; Hungarian art dealer Joseph Guttmann, who
allegedly loaned 11 of the disputed paintings; and Massimo Vitta
Zelman, the president MondoMostre Skira, the company that
organized the show.

A representative for Zelman told artnet News: "Zelman doesn't
want to give any interviews because the official investigation
has not yet been completed and what has been published . . . are
just indiscretions."

Guttman, meanwhile, maintains that the works are the real deal.
"We firmly believe the paintings are authentic, as also confirmed
by their previous certifications, scientific analysis and
inclusion in important exhibitions and publications," he told
artnet News in an email. "To the best of our knowledge, the
investigation into the pictures is still ongoing, and we are not
in a position to comment further until the investigation is
complete. We look forward to this matter being resolved swiftly
so that the works can be returned to their respective owners."

Chiappini could not be reached for comment, but he has told the
Italian press that he based his opinions on existing attributions
and research and that "it will be necessary to go back . . . to
whoever made the first attributions."

For a variety of reasons, Modigliani is one of the most
frequently forged blue-chip artists. Experts warned the Telegraph
that the Genoa scandal is "the tip of the iceberg." The
increasingly pricey artist hit a record with the 2015 sale of Nu
couche (1917-18) for $170 million. At the time, it was the
world's second-most-expensive painting ever sold at auction.

Currently, Modigliani is the subject of major exhibitions at the
Tate Modern in London and the Jewish Museum in New York. Neither
is suspected of including forgeries. [GN]


GERMANY: Accepts Court Summons to Appear in NY in Genocide Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
AllAfrica's Kuzeeko Tjitemisa and Nampa report that following a
protracted legal challenge, the German government has finally
accepted a court summons to appear in the United States Federal
Court in New York in the class-action lawsuit for alleged crimes
against humanity that the Ovaherero and Nama people filed against
it.

Founding member of the US Association of the Ovaherero Genocide
Veraa Katuuo confirmed this to New Era.

Speaking from the US on Jan. 14, Katuuo said Germany has accepted
service of summons and will thus appear in court in New York on
January 25.

The Ovaherero and Nama people filed a lawsuit on January 5, 2017,
suing Germany for excluding them from current negotiations
between the German and Namibian governments concerning the 1904-
1908 genocide committed on Namibian soil.

The initiators of the legal challenge are Ovaherero chief Vekuii
Rukoro as representative of the Ovaherero Traditional Authority
(OTA), and chief and chairman of the Nama Traditional Authorities
Association, David Frederick, and the Association of the
Ovaherero Genocide in the USA.

Frederick, the !Aman Traditional Authority chief of Bethanie,
died on Jan. 12.  Meanwhile, descendants of the 1904-08 Nama and
Ovaherero genocide victims, supporters and sympathisers convened
in Okahandja on Jan. 13 to pray for good fortune ahead of the
federal class-action lawsuit in New York, United States of
America.

The Ovaherero-Ovambanderu Genocide Foundation (OGF) had invited
Namibians to Okahandja to pray for blessings ahead of the court
hearing.  Speaking to Nampa at the gathering, OGF chairperson
Utjiua Muinjangue said the date January 12, 2018, marked exactly
114 years since the extermination order was issued by German
Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha against the Ovaherero and
Nama communities.

Substantiating the significance of the mass prayer, attended by
about 400 people, Muinjangue said: "It is important for us to
come together and reflect as a community and give ourselves
strength to soldier on and move forward."

"The prayer is not funny. Former president Hifikepunye Pohamba
called for a prayer day against gender-based violence.  Some
people called for prayer for rain, and [against] car crashes.  So
we are coming to our Lord to pray that despite the intent by the
Germans to exterminate us, we survived. [It means] God had a plan
for us," she added.

The churches that were represented at the event included the
Evangelical Lutheran Church, Protestant Unity Church, St John
Apostolic Faith Mission, Orusuuo and others. [GN]


GOLDMAN SACHS: Thwarts Fraud Class Action Tied to Abacus CDO
------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stempel, writing for Reuters, reports that a U.S.
appeals court said a shareholder lawsuit accusing Goldman Sachs
Group Inc of fraudulently claiming to put client interests before
its own when creating risky subprime securities before the
financial crisis, including a collateralized debt obligation
known as Abacus, cannot proceed as a class action.

The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Manhattan said on
January 12 a lower court judge imposed too high a burden on the
Wall Street bank to show that its alleged conflicts of interest
and misleading statements had no impact on its stock price.

While the 3-0 decision permits shareholders to again seek class
certification, it may now be easier for Goldman to convince U.S.
District Judge Paul Crotty, who had certified a class action in
September 2015, not to let the plaintiffs sue as a group.

Thomas Dubbs, Esq. -- tdubbs@labaton.com -- a lawyer for the
shareholders, said he was "confident" a class action would again
be certified. Goldman had no immediate comment.

Shareholders from February 2007 to June 2010 claimed to lose more
than $13 billion because Goldman had in regulatory filings and
public comments overstated its ability to manage conflicts.

They said Goldman did this while concealing short positions that
the bank or hedge fund manager John Paulson made in four subprime
mortgage CDOs: Abacus 2007 AC-1, Anderson Mezzanine Funding 2007-
1, Hudson Mezzanine Funding 2006-1, and Timberwolf.

Shareholders sued after news about federal enforcement activity
hurt Goldman's stock, including when the Securities and Exchange
Commission brought civil fraud charges in April 2010 against
Goldman and vice president Fabrice Tourre over Abacus.

In certifying a class action, Crotty had said Goldman "failed to
conclusively sever the link" between its statements and its stock
price.

But in January 12's decision, Circuit Judge Richard Wesley,
citing a more recent ruling involving Barclays Plc, said Goldman
had only to show it more likely than not that its alleged
misrepresentations did not affect the stock.

Wesley also said Crotty should have let Goldman present evidence
of 34 dates prior to 2010 when news reports of its alleged
conflicts did not hurt its stock price.

Absent any impact, shareholder claims could "completely
collapse," Wesley said.

The SEC has estimated that Paulson made about $1 billion by
betting against Abacus.

Goldman settled with the SEC for $550 million in July 2010,
without admitting wrongdoing. A federal jury found Tourre liable
in August 2013, and a judge later ordered him to pay more than
$856,000, including a fine.

The case is Arkansas Teachers Retirement System et al v Goldman
Sachs Group Inc et al, 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 16-
250. [GN]


GOPRO INC: "Park" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
------------------------------------------------------
Jong Min Park, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GoPro, Inc., Nicholas Woodman, and Brian McGee, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00193 (N.D. Calif., January 9, 2018), seeks to
recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of
GoPro between November 2, 2017 and January 5, 2018.

Plaintiff purchased GoPro securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period and was damaged upon the
revelation of alleged corrective disclosure, says the complaint.

Defendant GoPro develops and sells mountable and wearable
cameras, and accessories in the United States and
internationally. The Company is incorporated in Delaware and its
principal executive offices are located at 3000 Clearview Way,
San Mateo, California 94402.

The Individual Defendants are officers of GoPro. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      355 S. Grand Avenue, Ste 2450
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Tel: (213) 785-2610
      Fax: (213) 226-4684
      E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


GOPRO INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed against GoPro, Inc. and certain of its officers.   The
class action, filed in United States District Court, for the
Northern District of California, and docketed under 18-cv-00265,
is on behalf of a class consisting of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired the securities of GoPro between August 4, 2017
and January 5, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period").
Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

If you are a shareholder who purchased GoPro securities between
August 4, 2017, and January 5, 2018, both dates inclusive, you
have until March 12, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing
address, telephone number, and quantity of shares purchased.

GoPro, Inc. develops and manufactures wearable and gear mountable
cameras along with related accessories.  Its primary product
offerings include: HERO5/HERO6, a line of cloud-connected
cameras; GoPro Plus, a cloud-based storage solution that enables
subscribers to access, edit and share content; Quik, a desktop
app that provides expanded editing options for power users;
Capture, a mobile app that allows users to preview and play back
shots, control their GoPro cameras, and share content on the move
using their smartphones; Karma, a compact, foldable drone and
versatile stabilization solution; and Karma Grip, a handheld and
body-mountable camera stabilizer to capture zero-shake and smooth
video. GoPro markets and sells its products primarily through
retailers and distributors, as well as through its website.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) demand for the
GoPro brand had dramatically declined and retailers were not
stocking up for 2017 holiday sales to the extent GoPro had
budgeted for; (ii) demand for GoPro's Karma drones was
sufficiently weak that the Company could no longer afford to
manufacture and sell them profitably; (iii) the Company would be
forced to dramatically slash prices on its newly launched HERO6
Black and its dated HERO5 Black and HERO5 Session cameras, as
well as its Karma drone, during the quarter and would need to
further slash HERO6 prices in January 2018; and (iv) as a result
of the foregoing, GoPro was not on track to achieve the financial
results it had led the market to believe it was on track to
achieve during the Class Period.

On January 8, 2018, before the open of trading, GoPro issued a
press release filed on Form 8-K with the SEC entitled "GoPro
Announces Preliminary Fourth Quarter 2017 Results," revealing
that its fourth quarter 2017 sales were $340 million,
significantly below analysts' projections of over $470 million.
GoPro blamed the results on the slashing of prices for its HERO6
Black, HERO5 Black, and HERO5 Session cameras, as well as its
Karma drone, during the quarter, which the Company had been
forced to engage in to move inventory and which had a negative
$80 million impact on revenues. GoPro also disclosed it was
cutting more than one-fifth of its workforce and exiting the
drone market altogether, requiring it to dump the rest of its
Karma drone inventory. GoPro had cut the price for its HERO5
Black camera in December 2017 and announced it was now reducing
the price of its newly launched HERO6 model to $399 from $499.
The workforce reduction would cost GoPro $33 million, mainly in
severance costs.

On this news, GoPro's stock price declined, falling from a close
of $7.52 per share on January 5, 2018, to trade as low as $5.04
per share in intraday trading on January 8, 2018, before closing
at $6.56 per share on unusually high trading volume of more than
59 million shares traded.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms
in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as
the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. See www.pomerantzlaw.com.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


GUITAR CENTER: Denial of Class Certification in "George" Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kerry R. Bensinger of the Court of Appeals of California,
Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's order
denying the Plaintiffs's motion for class certification in the
case, ASON GEORGE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GUITAR
CENTER, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No. B275956
(Cal. App.).

George and Justin Hupalo, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against Guitar
Center alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of
1971.  They challenge Guitar Center's practice of requesting and
recording personal identification information when customers in
its California stores pay using a credit card.  They allege a
single cause of action for violation of the statute, seeking
civil penalties, declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement,
and attorney fees.  On Dec. 9, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a first
amended class action complaint against Guitar Center.

On Nov. 30, 2012, Guitar Center filed a motion for summary
adjudication which the trial court denied on Nov. 21, 2014.

On May 29, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking the
certification of a class of all persons in California who
purchased merchandise at a Guitar Center retail store using a
credit card from May 24, 2010 until Dec. 6, 2011, and from whom
Guitar Center requested, or required as a condition to accepting
a credit card payment, the cardholder's personal identification
information and caused such information to be recorded.  Guitar
Center argued in opposition to the motion that the proposed class
was not ascertainable, common issues of law or fact did not
predominate, and the Named Plaintiffs' claims were not typical of
the class.

On Jan. 27, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
class certification motion.  The court stated its tentative view
that Guitar Center's liability under the statute depended on
whether the customer understood that he or she need not provide
an email address in order to pay by credit card.  It conducted
another hearing on May 3, 2016, followed by an order ruling on
the motion.  On May 3, 2016, the trial court filed an order
denying the class certification motion.

The Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their class
certification motion contending the trial court improperly denied
the motion based on its erroneous interpretation of the statute.
The order incorporated and adopted the court's oral tentative
ruling.  Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argued that even if the
statute included a reasonable consumer perception standard, some
Guitar Center customers provided their email addresses without
knowing the credit card transaction was completed, and therefore
liability would attach.  Under this theory, however, the court
found the Plaintiffs needed to present a statistical plan for
managing the individual issues, and they had failed to do so.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed from the order denying class
certification contending the trial court improperly denied the
motion based on its erroneous interpretation of the statute.
They raise two arguments on appeal.  First, they contend the
trial court erred in its construction of the Act, which led to
its erroneous finding that common issues did not predominate, and
second, a statistical plan was not required.

Judge Bensinger holds that the trial court properly interpreted
the statute.  Contrary to the Plaintiffs' argument, he finds that
substantial evidence supports the court's finding the sales
clerks did not adhere to a script and used inconsistent language
when requesting customers' personal identification information.

The Judge finds that Guitar Center presented declarations by its
sales clerks that scripts were not used when requesting personal
identification information.  Guitar Center encouraged its sales
clerks to engage customers in a natural, conversational manner,
and the dialogue varied from customer to customer.

Given the lack of uniformity and the need for individualized
proof regarding the language of the request in order to determine
whether the customer would reasonably perceive the request as a
condition to accepting a credit card payment, substantial
evidence supports the finding that common questions do not
predominate.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying class certification.

Judge Bensinger therefore affirmed the trial court's order
denying the class certification motion.  Guitar Center is
entitled to costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/f9D24r from Leagle.com.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Frank J. Janecek, Jr. --
frankj@rgrdlaw.com -- Christopher Collins -- chrisc@rgrdlaw.com -
- Susannah R. Conn -- sconn@rgrdlaw.com -- Andrew S. Love --
alove@rgrdlaw.com -- Christopher M. Wood -- cwood@rgrdlaw.com;
Capstone Law, Jordan L. Lurie -- Jordan.Lurie@CapstoneLawyers.com
-- Robert K. Friedl -- Robert.Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- and
Cody R. Padgett -- Cody.Padgett@CapstoneLawyers.com -- for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, Steven D. Atlee and Christine E.
Ellice -- cellice@stroock.com -- for Defendants and Respondents.


HALIFAX HEALTH: Court Stays Proceedings in MSPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Stay Proceedings in the case captioned MSPA CLAIMS 1,
LLC, Plaintiff, v. HALIFAX HEALTH, INC, Defendant, Case No. 6:17-
cv-1790-Orl-31DCI (M.D. Fla.).

MSPAC filed this purported class action as the assignee of
Florida Healthcare Plus, Inc., a Medicare Advantage Organization.
In its Complaint, originally filed in state court and
subsequently removed, MSPAC alleges that one of FHCP's enrollees
incurred $32,000 in medical bills for treatment from Halifax.
The enrollee also had medical coverage through 21st Century
Preferred Insurance Company, which was the primary payer for that
enrollee.  MSPAC contends that Halifax billed both FHCP -- which
was secondarily liable -- and 21st Century the full amount of the
enrollee's bill.  21st Century paid its $10,000 policy limit, and
FHCP paid the entire $32,000.

In Count I of the Complaint, MSPAC seeks to recover the $10,000
overpayment (as FHCP's assignee) pursuant to the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act (the "MSP Act"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1395y(b).
MSPAC also argues that Halifax's failure to reimburse FHCP was a
violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
Fla. Stat. Section 501.201 et seq. (Count II) and constituted
unjust enrichment (Count III). Halifax has filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing inter alia that MSPAC lacks a legal basis for
pursuing those claims. That motion is ripe for review. In the
instant motion, Halifax requests a stay to avoid incurring
discovery costs before the motion to dismiss has been resolved.

In its initial discovery request in this putative class action,
MSPAC seeks, inter alia, financial records for every Medicare
recipient treated at Halifax in the past seven years. Thus,
discovery in this case is likely to be highly burdensome. Facial
challenges to the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such
as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, should be
resolved before discovery begins.

The Court will grant Halifax's request for a stay of discovery
pending resolution of its motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb6nxzpk from Leagle.com.

MSPA Claims 1, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, as
assignee of Florida Healthcare Plus, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated Medicare Advantage Organizations in the
State of Florida, Plaintiff, represented by Alan H. Rolnick --
arolnick@riveromestre.com -- Rivero Mestre, LLP.

MSPA Claims 1, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, as
assignee of Florida Healthcare Plus, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated Medicare Advantage Organizations in the
State of Florida, Plaintiff, represented by Frank Carlos Quesada
-- fquesada@msprecovery.com -- MSP Recovery Law Firm, Jorge A.
Mestre -- jmestre@riveromestre.com -- Rivero Mestre, LLP & Andres
Rivero -- arivero@riveromestre.com -- Rivero Mestre, LLP.
Halifax Health, Inc, a Florida non-profit Corporation doing
business as Halifax Medical Center, Defendant, represented by
Cory W. Eichhorn -- Cory.Eichhorn@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight,
LLP, Lawrence Joseph Hamilton, II -- larry.hamilton@hklaw.com --
Holland & Knight, LLP & Michael Manuel Gropper --
michael.gropper@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight, LLP.


HOME DEPOT: Misrepresents Wood Products, Class Action Says
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Home Depot misrepresents wood products as mahogany, consumers
claim in a federal class action.

The case is CLYDE GOLDEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFF, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.,
DEFENDANT, Case No. ____ (E.D. Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class:

     Keith L. Altman, Esq.
     Solomon Radner, Esq.
     Ari Kresch, Esq.
     EXCOLO LAW, PLLC
     26700 Lahser Road, Suite 401
     Southfield, MI 48033
     516-456-5885
     kaltman@excololaw.com


IGNYTA INC: Faces Class Action on Proposed Acquisition
------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
shareholders brought a federal class action against the cancer
biotech firm Ignyta for its proposed acquisition by Roche Holding
for $27 a share or $1.7 billion.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Tel: 310/208-2800
     Fax: 310/209-2348
     Email: jelkins@weisslawllp.com


INTEL CORP: Israelis Seek Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------
Dror Halavy, writing for Hamodia, reports that a group of
Israelis has filed a request with the Haifa District Court to
file a class-action lawsuit against Intel, ARM and Apple -- all
based on recent revelations that processors manufactured by Intel
are vulnerable to hacking. The plaintiffs are represented by
attorney Rimon Zinati, and they include users of computers and
cell-phones that include processors made by the companies.

In the complaint, Zinati writes that "something new has appeared
on the tech landscape. Our worst nightmares have come to pass,
and a giant tech bubble has burst. That this is an earthquake is
an understatement. Since the announcement by the companies of the
vulnerabilities of their products, we realize that we are living
in a fantasy world and now realize that we do not even have a
minimum of privacy."

The court is set to give its decision on the matter in the coming
weeks. The Israeli lawsuit is one of many that are being prepared
in countries around the world. [GN]


INTEL CORP: March 12 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC, and KSF partner, former Attorney General
of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that they
have until March 12, 2018 to file lead plaintiff applications in
a securities class action lawsuit against Intel Corporation, if
they purchased the Company's securities between July 27, 2017 and
January 4, 2018, inclusive.  This action is pending in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California.

What You May Do

If you purchased securities of Intel and would like to discuss
your legal rights and how this case might affect you and your
right to recover for your economic loss, you may, without
obligation or cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis
Kahn toll-free at 1-877-515-1850 or via email
(lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
http://ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-intc/to learn more. If you
wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you must
petition the Court by March 12, 2018.

                         About the Lawsuit

Intel and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On January 2, 2018, news reports revealed a "fundamental design
flaw" in Intel's processor chips that increased vulnerability to
hacking and that repair updates could slow down the processors
significantly, which the Company confirmed the next day; however,
subsequent reports revealed that the Company knew of the flaws "a
while ago" and then, on January 4, 2018, media outlets reported
that Intel's CEO sold millions of dollars' worth of Intel shares
after learning of the problems, prior to public disclosure.

On this news, the price of Intel's shares plummeted.

                   About Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

KSF, whose partners include the former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is a law firm focused on securities,
antitrust and consumer class actions, along with merger &
acquisition and breach of fiduciary litigation against publicly
traded companies on behalf of shareholders. The firm has offices
in New York, California and Louisiana.

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         Tel: 1-877-515-1850
         E-mail: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


INTEL CORP: Hagens Berman Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP alerts investors in Intel
Corporation (to the securities class action pending in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California and
to the March 12, 2018 Lead Plaintiff deadline. If you purchased
or otherwise acquired securities of Intel between July 27, 2017
and January 4, 2018 and suffered losses contact Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP. For more information, visit:

https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/INTC

or contact Reed Kathrein, who is leading the firm's
investigation, by calling 510-725-3000 or emailing

INTC@hbsslaw.com.

On January 2, 2018, news outlets began reporting security flaws
in certain Intel processor designs. A Google team reportedly
uncovered two security flaws. The more serious ("Meltdown")
apparently affects only Intel chips. The other ("Spectre")
affects microprocessors from Intel, AMD and ARM. One researcher
called Meltdown "probably one of the worst CPU bugs ever found."
Google reportedly conveyed its findings to Intel on June 1, 2017.

This news drove the price of Intel shares down over 5% during two
trading days to close at $44.43 on January 4, 2018.

Shortly before the news broke, Intel's CEO sold substantial
amounts of his Intel shares, reaping millions of dollars.

"We're focused on the extent of Intel's undisclosed chip
problems, when senior executives knew of the problems,
potentially improper insider trading, and the damages inflicted
on Intel investors," said Hagens Berman partner Reed Kathrein.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
Intel should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program. Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call Reed
Kathrein at 510-725-3000 or email INTC@hbsslaw.com.

About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman is a national investor-rights law firm
headquartered in Seattle, Washington with 70+ attorneys in 11
offices across the country. The Firm represents investors,
whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex litigation. More
about the firm and its successes can be found at www.hbsslaw.com.
For the latest news visit our newsroom or follow us on Twitter at
@classactionlaw.

         Reed Kathrein, Esq.
         Tel: 510-725-3000
         E-mail: reed@hbsslaw.com[GN]


INTEROIL CORP: Block Files Securities Class Action in Mass.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kim C. Block, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, vs. Interoil Corporation, Exxon Mobil
Corporation, Michael Hession, Christopher Finlayson, Chee Keong
Yap, Dr. Ellis Armstrong, Ford Grant Nicholson, Isikeli Reuben
Taureka, Sir Wilson Kamit and Sir Rabbie L. Namaliu, Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv-00007 (D. Mass., January 2, 2018), seeks to pursue
remedies under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933.

Plaintiff held approximately 7,850 shares of InterOil stock as of
January 10, 2017. It was acquired by an affiliate of Exxon for
$45.00. As a result of this, Plaintiff was forced to sell her
InterOil shares and purchase Exxon shares.

Said acquisition of Exxon shares by Defendants to InterOil
shareholders was allegedly by means of a false and misleading
prospectus, mainly an oilfield exploration in the Gulf Province
of Papua New Guinea that failed to produce oil. Defendants
prevented InterOil shareholders from accurately valuing the
contingent resource payment in connection with the acquisition,
i.e. volume uncertainties of the failed oilfield, potentially
costing InterOil shareholders hundreds of millions to billions of
dollars in additional merger consideration.

InterOil was a publicly-traded oil and gas company incorporated
in Yukon Territory, Canada.

Exxon is an integrated oil and gas company that explores and
produces crude oil and natural gas in the United States, Canada,
South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia/Oceania and
also manufactures petroleum products and petrochemicals, in
addition to selling and transporting crude oil, natural gas and
petroleum products. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joe Kendall, Esq.
      Jamie J. McKey, Esq.
      KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
      McKinney Avenue, Suite 700
      Dallas, TX 75204
      Tel: (214) 744-3000
      Fax: (214) 744-3015 (fax)
      Email: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com
             jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com

             - and -

      Timothy Z. Lacomb, Esq.
      David T. Wissbroecker, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
      San Diego, CA 92101-8498
      Telephone: (619) 231-1058
      Fax: (619) 231-7423
      Email: dwissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

      Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
      BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
      New York, NY 10165
      Telephone: (212) 697-6484
      Facsimile (212) 697-7296
      Email: peretz@bgandg.com


KENT SECURITY: Worker May Pursue Wage Claim as Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the putative class action lawsuit captioned BRENTON ADAMS,
ETC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENT SECURITY OF NEW YORK, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent, 5316N, 161589/15 (N.Y. Sup.), plaintiff
asserts a single claim for untimely payment of wages in violation
of Labor Law Section 191 and seeks to recover liquidated damages
and attorney's fees under Labor Law Section 198.

In connection with his employment by defendant, plaintiff
executed an arbitration agreement in which he agreed to submit
any claims arising out of his employment to binding arbitration
before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in Miami-Dade
County, Florida.

Defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement (CPLR 7503), and plaintiff opposed, arguing that he had
not agreed to arbitrate Labor Law claims, that any such agreement
would be against public policy, and that, based on his limited
financial means, as detailed in a supporting affidavit, the fee
splitting and venue provisions of the agreement render
arbitration financially prohibitive.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First
Department, holds that plaintiff has made a preliminary showing
that the fee sharing and venue provisions in the arbitration
agreement have the effect of precluding him from pursuing his
statutory wage claim in arbitration.  Accordingly, the N.Y. App.
Div. remands for further proceedings, consistent with Brady,
Matter of Brady v Williams Capital Group, L.P., 14 N.Y.3d 459
[2010]), which, at a minimum, would include proof of plaintiff's
income and assets, as well as proof of the expected costs and
fees to arbitrate this dispute in Florida.  Because the parties'
arbitration agreements contain a severability clause, in the
event plaintiff prevails on his claim that the fee sharing and
venue provisions should be held unenforceable under Brady, the
matter should proceed to arbitration in New York, with defendant
to bear the costs of the arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybwtoykz from Leagle.com.
Abdul Hassan Law Group, PLLC, Queens Village ( Abdul K. Hassan --
abdul@abdulhassan.com  -- of counsel), for appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York ( Brian Pete --
brian.pete@lewisbrisbois.com -- of counsel), for respondent.


LA CAMPANA RESTAURANT: "Aguilar" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------------
Daydis Acevedo Aguilar and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. La Campana Restaurant, Inc., Ramon Tieles and Naiyu
Andres, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-20015, (S.D. Fla., January 2,
2018), requests double damages and reasonable attorney fees,
jointly and severally, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
for all overtime wages still owing, along with court costs,
interest and any other relief.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a waitress from on or about
February 25, 2017, through the present and ongoing. Aguilar
worked an average of 50 hours a week but was never paid overtime
premium. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com


LOGIK PRECISION: "Rodriguez" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Jose Rodriguez, on behalf of himself individually, and all others
similarly situated v. Logik Precision Inc. & Water Jet Division,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00066 (S.D. Tex., January 9, 2018), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime pay and damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Jose Rodriguez resides in Harris County, Texas and
works for Logik as a CNC Machinist. Plaintiff has worked as a CNC
Lathe Machinist from October 2015 until the present time.

Defendant Logik is one stop, CNC, full service ISO machine shop
providing water jet cutting, mill/lathe machining,
welding/fabrication. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Taft L. Foley, II, Esq.
      THE FOLEY LAW FIRM
      3003 South Loop West, Suite 108
      Houston, TX 77054
      Tel: (832) 778-8182
      Fax: (832) 778-8353
      E-mail: Taft.Foley@thefoleylawfirm.com


LOUISIANA: La. App. Affirms Dismissal of School Bus Driver's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice in the case captioned case JOYLE PERTUIT, v. THE
LOUISIANA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND THE JEFFERSON
PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, No. 17-CA-393 (La. App.).

The dispute centers on the JPSB's classification of operational
pay and whether that portion of a school bus driver's operational
pay that exceeds his actual dollar-for-dollar operating expenses
should be reclassified as earnable compensation for purposes of
calculating a school bus operator's pension contributions.

There are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Mr.
Pertuit, a retired school bus operator, was employed by the JPSB
for over thirty years, and was the owner and operator of the bus
he drove. During his employment, as required by La. R.S. 17:496
and La. R.S. 17:497, Mr. Pertuit received two forms of
compensation: (1) a salary, which compensated him for the labor
of driving his bus, and was based on his years of service driving
the school bus and his years of experience; and (2) operational
pay, which was a cents-per-mile rate of compensation for
reimbursement of expenses associated with his owning and
operating the school bus, and was based on the number of miles he
drove.

Mr. Pertuit filed the instant class action law suit against the
JPSB and LSERS, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated persons, seeking a declaratory judgment in favor of
school bus operators that pension contributions are due on all
payments made by the JPSB to school bus operators that exceeded
the fixed payment schedule set forth in La. R.S. 17:497. Mr.
Pertuit avers that the JPSB pays its school bus operators
operational pay that exceeds the actual amount needed to
compensate operators for the expenses associated with owning and
operating their buses.

In response, the JPSB filed a motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of Mr. Pertuit's request for declaratory relief on the
basis that, pursuant to La. R.S. 17:81(U), the JPSB is vested
with the sole authority to prescribe the duties and fix the
salaries" of its employees, including the salaries of its school
bus operators.

Finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed, the trial
judge rendered judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the
JPSB and against Mr. Pertuit dismissing his claims, with
prejudice.

Mr. Pertuit avers the trial court erred in the following
respects:

   (1) in interpreting that, pursuant to the provisions of La.
R.S. 11:1002(12), La. R.S. 17:496 E and F, La. R.S. 17:497, and
La. R.S. 17:498, operational pay is synonymous with operational
expenses;

   (2) in finding that all compensation paid to school bus
operators on a cents-per-mile basis pursuant to La. R.S. 17:497
is for reimbursement of expenses incurred to operate the bus and,
as such, are exempt from earnable compensation for purposes of
calculating retirement benefits, when the compensation exceeds
the operator's actual operating expenses;

   (3) in failing to find that the cents-per-mile rate of
compensation set forth in La. R.S. 17:497 prescribes a fixed rate
that cannot be exceeded or subsidized by local school boards; and

   (4) in failing to find that the applicable statutes (namely,
La. R.S. 11:1002(12), La. R.S. 17:495 though La. R.S. 17:498) are
ambiguous because they can be interpreted to require compensation
be paid to school bus operators not only as reimbursement of
their actual operating expenses, but also as remuneration for
their services of driving the bus.

La. R.S. 17:497's Cents-per-mile Rate Schedule

The trial court determined that La. R.S. 17:495 makes it clear
that the schedule provided by La. R.S. 17:497 contains the
minimum amounts prescribed for operational pay, and that the
JPSB's decision to pay its school bus drivers more than the "bare
minimum" set forth in La. R.S. 17:497 was not a violation of the
statute. The La. App. agrees.

The Attorney General stated the following, in pertinent part:
"La. R.S. 17:497 governs operational expenses of operators of
buses. La. R.S. 17:497 sets forth a schedule setting the rate of
compensation to be paid per mile driven The question presented is
whether the rate schedule in La. R.S. 17:497 limits the
compensation for operational expenses a bus driver receives to
the amounts per mile provided in the schedule or if the schedule
sets forth minimum rates."

While the minimum mileage rates set forth therein may have been
sufficient to cover an operator's operating expenses in 1986, it
is unlikely that those same rates would cover the cost of
operating, maintaining and repairing a school bus today as it is
indisputable that operating expenses have increased, at least to
some degree, over the past thirty years. This fact alone begs
support for the contention that the Legislature did not intend
for the rate schedule established in La. R.S. 17:497 to be a
fixed schedule, but rather, intended it to be a minimum rate
schedule to be used by school boards as a template for
determining an operator's base operational pay that could
thereafter be subsidized by using local funds.

Accordingly, the La. App. affirms the trial court's finding that
the JPSB's decision to pay its school bus drivers more cents-per-
mile than the minimum mileage rate set forth in La. R.S. 17:497
was not a violation of the statute.

Operational Pay Exceeding the Minimum Rate Schedule

Mr. Pertuit argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Dunn v. City of Kenner, supra, supports his contention that the
amount of operational pay that exceeds La. R.S. 17:497's minimum
rate schedule and an operators' actual expenses must be
classified as salary and included in the calculus of their
"earnable compensation" for retirement purposes.

La. App. disagrees.

La. R.S. 17:496 governs minimum salaries for driving a bus. A
school bus operator's salary is based on his years of experience
driving a bus, not on the number of miles he drives. Thus, no
matter how many miles an operator drives on his daily route, his
salary will remain the same. La. R.S. 17:497 governs payment of
an operator's operational pay, which, according to the plain
language of the statute, is intended to compensate an operator
for the expenses associated with operating the bus on a cents-
per-mile basis and not for an operator's services of driving the
bus.

Moreover, Mr. Pertuit's argument ignores the reality that,
regardless of whether the operational pay JPSB pays its operators
is limited to the minimum rate set forth in the mileage rate
schedule found in La. R.S. 17:497, the operator who drives the
longest daily route is always going to receive more operational
pay than the operator who drives a shorter daily route.
Nonetheless, the pension benefits these two operators receive
will still be the same because operational pay is excluded from
an operator's earnable compensation for purposes of calculating
retirement benefits. Whether this system is fair and equitable is
not an issue before the La. App. to decide.

Accordingly, determining that no ambiguity exists in the statutes
governing this matter, the La. App. finds Mr. Pertuit's fourth
assignment of error to be without merit.

The La. App. finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that, as a matter of law, the statutory framework pertaining
to school bus operators' salary and operational pay is
unambiguous and that the JPSB's school bus operators' operational
pay program complies with La. R.S. 17:495 through La. R.S.
17:497. Accordingly, the La. App. finds there is no legal basis
for this Court to interfere with the JPSB's authority to fix the
and classify the salaries of its employees, including its
decision concerning the payment and classification of operational
pay for its school bus operators, including Mr. Pertuit.

Therefore, the La. App. affirms the trial court's judgment
granting the JPSB's motion for summary judgment and dismissing
Mr. Pertuit's claims, with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Courts' December 27, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yddhuz48  from Leagle.com.

James F. Willeford -- jimwilleford@willefordlaw.com -- Reagan L.
Toledano, 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 4208, New Orleans, LA
70170,  COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, JOYLE PERTUIT.

Michael G. Fanning, Glenn D. Price, Jr., 238 Huey P. Long, Avenue
Gretna, LA 70053  COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, JEFFERSON
PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.

LTD FINANCIAL: Court Certifies "Bordeaux" FDCPA Class
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Class Certification in the case
captioned ROBERTA BORDEAUX, on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.P.,
ADVANTAGE ASSETS II, INC, and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, Defendants,
Civil No. 2:16-0243 (KSH) (CLW). (D.N.J.).

Bordeaux, a New Jersey resident, owed Citibank a past-due credit
card debt on her account, which it then sold to Advantage Assets.
LTD Financial, the debt collecting branch of Advantage Assets,
mailed Bordeaux a letter stating the amount due, offering three
different settlement options with payment plans. The letter
cautioned that discharge of the debt might have tax consequences.
Plaintiff alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).

Bordeaux seeks to define the class as:

     All natural persons residing in the State of New Jersey, to
whom LTD Financial Services, L.P. sent a collection letter dated
from January 13, 2015 through and including January 13, 2016, in
an attempt to collect a consumer debt allegedly owed to Advantage
Assets II, Inc.

The Court finds that Bordeaux's proposed class is ascertainable.
All potential members are easily identified and can be contacted
through defendants' business and mailing records. The Court is
satisfied that Bordeaux has pleaded the threshold requirements of
ascertainability.

Here, 1,994 people residing in New Jersey received the form
letter with the same language about tax consequences. This
proposed class meets the numerosity requirement.

If plaintiffs allege that the settlement letter is in
contravention of FDCPA, while defining the class as those persons
who have received the same letter, logic suggests that those
other recipients would share the same cause of action arising
from that letter especially because FDCPA is akin to a strict
liability statute.  The typicality requirement is satisfied.

Bordeaux meets this requirement, as do her lawyers. She claims
that she is willing and able to serve as class representative.
Her lawyers claim extensive experience in class action and FDCPA
cases, as well as a willingness to commit sufficient resources to
represent this class.

Bordeaux is seeking Rule 23(b)(3) certification, which requires
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Here, defendants sent nearly identical letters in attempts to
collect debts owed on Home Depot credit cards. The central
question of law is also similar among class members. The merits
of the class's case turn on whether the Tax/Legal Consequences
Warning in the letter violates the FDCPA.

FDCPA cases fit cleanly within this rationale. Congress intended
the FDCPA to be self-enforcing by private attorneys general. The
purpose of a citizen suit provision is to "aid their less
sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely themselves to bring
suit under the Act, but who are assumed to benefit from the
deterrent effect of civil actions brought by others.

If each class member needed to demonstrate her own state of mind
as to whether she was actually confused or deceived by the
letter, then a class action may not be appropriate. That barrier,
however, is removed because the FDCPA applies an objective
standard. The statute serves to "protect all consumers, the
gullible as well as the shrewd. Because of the strict liability
nature of the FDCPA, a class action is a superior form of
adjudication.

The Court finds the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are
met, and that certification of Bordeaux's proposed class is
proper.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybf32voh from
Leagle.com.

ROBERTA BORDEAUX, on behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW T. THOMASSON, Stern
Thomasson LLP, PHILIP D. STERN, STERN THOMASSON LLP, 150 Morris
Avenue, 2nd Floor. Springfield, NJ 07081-1315. & YONGMOON KIM --
ykim@kimlf.com -- Kim Law Firm LLC.

LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.P. & ADVANTAGE ASSETS II, INC.,
Defendants, represented by RICHARD J. PERR, FINEMAN KREKSTEIN &
HARRIS, PC & MONICA M. LITTMAN, FINEMAN, KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, PC,
1735 Market Street. Mellon Bank Center, Suite 600. Philadelphia,
PA 19103


LUBRIZOL CORP: "Jones" Suit Seeks Wages for Pre-shift Prep Work
---------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Jones, and all those similarly-situated, collectively,
Plaintiff(s), v. The Lubrizol Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-00011 (N.D. Ohio, January 2, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
compensation and benefits, plus an equal amount of liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees,
including the costs and expenses of this action and such other
legal and equitable relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendant is a global corporation that manufactures chemicals for
various industries and has manufacturing facilities in Ohio where
Plaintiff was a material handler between June 2014 and November
2017. He claims overtime for pre-shift activities, like changing
into and out of their uniform and personal protective equipment,
walking to and from their assigned area of the production floor
and getting tools and equipment necessary to perform their
production work. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
      Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
      Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
      THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
      920 Rockefeller Building
      614 W. Superior Avenue
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Phone: (216) 696-5000
      Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
      Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
             chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
             lori@lazzarolawfirm.com


LYONS DOUGHTY: Court Dismisses "Saroza" FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned Nestor SAROZA, Plaintiff, v. LYONS,
DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C., Defendant, Civil No. 17-0523 (RBK/AMD)
(D.N.J.).

This case is about $82.00.  That sum is the value of a court
filing fee and a service fee connected to a credit card debt
collection action.  Plaintiff Nestor Saroza has sued Defendant, a
law firm representing a client seeking to recover a debt, on the
theory of a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., filed suit in the Superior Court of
New Jersey against Saroza on January 19, 2016, seeking recovery
of $9,971.55 in credit card debt that Saroza had allegedly failed
to pay.  Capital One also sought costs in the complaint, but not
attorneys' fees or interest.  Counsel for Capital One, and
Defendant in this action, paid $75.00 to file and $7.00 for
service, a sum of $82.00.  The court-issued summons sought
$9,971.55 and made no mention of the filing fee or service fee,
though it does say the action would be inclusive of court costs
if Saroza failed to respond.

Saroza alleges that collection letters which do not explain the
filing fees of a related court proceeding to collect on a debt
violate the FDCPA. The Act provides that a debt collector may not
use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation in
connection with the collection of any debt.

Defendant is plainly a debt collector who is bound by these
provisions, but the letter Defendant sent to Saroza is not false
under the FDCPA. It accurately describes the relationship between
the parties. Saroza had an account with Capital One, allegedly
defaulted, and Capital One filed a lawsuit seeking recovery on
the debt. Defendant then sent a letter notifying Saroza of this
that included in the requested sum the $82.00 filing and service
fee.

Saroza was on notice that this could happen, the Customer
Agreement said she would be on the hook for costs if it came to
that. But Saroza nonetheless argues that the letter makes a false
representation. In essence, the line Saroza wants this Court to
draw seems to be that collection notices which say with costs are
permissible under the FDCPA but those that add the costs into the
requested sum are not. That is a distinction without a
difference, at least where there is no dispute that the costs are
accurate.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Opinion  is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydcgfjsx from
Leagle.com.

NESTOR SAROZA, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by LAWRENCE C. HERSH, 17 Sylvan
Street, Suite 102B. Rutherford, New Jersey 07070

LYONS, DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, P.C., Defendant, represented by
STEPHEN PATRICK DOUGHTY, LYONS DOUGHTY & VELDHUIS, 136 Gaither
Drive Suite 100. Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054


MACY'S WEST: Court Grants Final Approval of $1.55MM Class Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for final approval of the class action settlement and request for
an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the case captioned RAMON
GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MACY'S WEST STORES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-04440-WHO (N.D. Cal.).

The Class is comprised of: All individuals who performed services
as Drivers and/or Helpers delivering Macy's/Bloomingdale's
products and/or furnishings, and associated with Joseph Eletto
Transfer, Inc. out of/at the location identified as the Macy's
Logistics and Operations distribution center, 1208 Whipple Road,
Union City, California 94587 from July 1, 2012 to December 27,
2014.

Ramon Garcia, Victor Ramirez, Adrian Valente, Mario Pinon, and
Mynor Cabrera are confirmed as Class Representatives and awarded
$2,00.00 each for their services as Class Representatives.

The Law Office of Thomas W. Falvey, and JML Law, APLC are
confirmed as Class Counsel.

Payment of fees and other charges of the settlement administrator
KCC Class Action Services, LLC, totaling up to $15,000.00 are
approved.

The Court finds that an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of
25% of the Settlement Fund of $1,550,000.00 is justified and an
award of litigation costs of $11,620.09 is justified based on the
declarations submitted. While a good result was achieved for the
class, counsel did not comply with this District's Procedural
Guidance for Class Action Settlements and provided only the total
hours they spent, rather than the required detailed lodestar
information that would have allowed the Court to evaluate their
desire for a 33% recovery. This failure, and the lack of
litigation (as opposed to settlement) effort needed, make an
award of 25% of the Settlement Fund (almost double the amount
they claimed as the lodestar) appropriate.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybcn3hgl from Leagle.com.

Ramon Garcia, Victor Ramirez, Adrian Valente, Mario Pinon & Mynor
Cabrera, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael Hagop Boyamian --
mike.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey,
Armand Raffi Kizirian -- armand.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law
Offices of Thomas W. Falvey, David Francis Tibor --
david@tiborlaw.com -- JML Law, Jospeh M. Lovretovich --
jml@jmllaw.com  -- The Law Offices of Joseph M. Lovretovich &
Thomas Walker Falvey -- thomaswfalvey@gmail.com -- Law Offices of
Thomas W. Falvey.

Macy's West Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
Hamilton Newhouse -- Jeffrey.Newhouse@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C., Fraser Angus McAlpine --
Fraser.McAlpine@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Michael
C. Christman, Macy's Law Department.

Joseph Eletto Transfer, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam Carl
Smedstad asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin Light
Hanson & Feary, P.C. & Andrew J. Butcher --
ABUTCHER@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis, Gavin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, pro hac vice.

XPO Logistics, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Hamilton
Newhouse, Jackson Lewis P.C., Adam Lewis Lounsbury  --
Adam.Lounsbury@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, PC, pro hac
vice & Fraser Angus McAlpine, Jackson Lewis P.C.



MAINE: Court to Hear Oral Arguments in Medicaid Suit vs. MDHHS
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maine issued
an Interim Order on Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
YVONNE R. RICHARDSON, by her Conservator Barbara Carlin, and the
MAINE POOLED DISABILITY TRUST, on its own behalf and on behalf of
its current and future participating beneficiaries over age 64,
and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. RICKER HAMILTON, in his official Capacity as
Acting Commissioner of the MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, Defendant, No. 2:17-cv-00134-JAW (D. Me.).

The Commissioner moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on the
ground that the Medicaid Act requires MDHHS to treat such asset
transfers in the manner that it does.

A Medicaid beneficiary and a pooled disability trust bring this
action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services
(MDHHS), alleging improper treatment of deposits into pooled
special needs trusts for purposes of benefits eligibility
determinations in violation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C.
Sections 1396.

The Medicaid beneficiary deposited the proceeds of the sale of
her former home in the trust. MDHHS treated this asset transfer
as one that did not give the beneficiary equal value, and, as a
result, MDHHS notified the Medicaid beneficiary that it would
temporarily suspend certain benefits as a penalty. The
beneficiary administratively appealed, and MDHHS continued her
benefits given the pending appeal.

As a consequence of the pre-certification nature of the matter,
for the purposes of assessing the pending motion to dismiss, the
potential claims of putative class members other than the named
plaintiff are simply not before the court. Therefore, in
reviewing the motion, the Court wonders about the parties'
positions as to whether the Court should treat MPDT and Ms.
Richardson's claims as being brought solely by MPDT and Ms.
Richardson.

Although no party raises the issue of standing, the Court must
satisfy itself that MPDT has constitutional standing to sue.
On this issue, the Court is particularly interested in what, if
any, injury MPDT might have suffered. The allegations in the
Complaint and the briefing provide little detail about the MPDT
itself or how the MDHHS action has impacted it as an entity, as
opposed to impacts upon its beneficiaries.

In Count I of the Complaint the Plaintiffs allege violation of
Section 1396p, apparently as a whole. Count I objects to MPDT's
treatment of deposits into the MPDT by individuals over age
sixty-four as transfers of assets for less than fair market value
on the basis that Ms. Richardson and others similarly situated do
receive fair market value from the expenditures that MPDT can
make on their behalf.

At oral argument, counsel should be prepared to address, inter
alia:

(1) Whether Ms. Richardson's claims are ripe for judicial review.

(2) Whether the Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya78dggy from Leagle.com.

YVONNE R. RICHARDSON, By her Conservator Barbara Carlin & MAINE
POOLED DISABILITY TRUST, Plaintiffs, represented by RICHARD L.
O'MEARA -- romeara@mpmlaw.com -- MURRAY PLUMB & MURRAY, RENE H.
REIXACH, JR. -- rreixach@woodsoviatt.com -- WOODS OVIATT GILMAN
LLP, pro hac vice & RONALD M. LANDSMAN -- rml@ronmlandsman.com --
RON M. LANDSMAN P.A., pro hac vice.

MARY C. MAYHEW, In her official capacity as Commissioner of the
Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant,
represented by CHRISTOPHER C. TAUB, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL.


MANITOBA: Judge Approves $90MM Settlement Over Floods
-----------------------------------------------------
Steve Lambert, writing for The Globe and Mail Inc., reports that
a judge has approved a $90-million payout to residents of four
Manitoba Indigenous communities that were flooded out almost
seven years ago.

The settlement resolves a class-action lawsuit filed by members
of the Lake St Martin, Dauphin River, Little Saskatchewan and
Pinaymootang First Nations.

The lawsuit alleged that members of the four First Nations were
forced to leave their homes in 2011 when the Manitoba government
diverted water from the Assiniboine River to reduce the risk of
flooding in Winnipeg.

The federal and Manitoba governments had agreed to pay the $90-
million to as many as 7,000 potential recipients, but the offer
still needed a judge's approval.

Justice James Edmond told Court of Queen's Bench in Winnipeg that
the settlement is reasonable and offers a faster resolution than
proceeding to trial.

"A settlement need not be perfect," he said, adding any
negotiated deal requires some form of compromise.

Clifford Anderson, one of the plaintiffs from Pinaymootang, said
the deal is fair and will bring closure to everyone.

"We're losing elders. In fact, we lost one today," he said
outside court earlier in the day. "I, for one, would not like
this to drag on anymore because I know if it does go back to the
courts, it'll be another 10 years."

Others said the compensation plan has a funding formula that is
deeply flawed.

Geraldine Beardy from Lake St. Martin said a points system used
to determine people's individual suffering and compensation
amount shortchanges her community, which was hardest hit.

Almost seven years after the flood, most Lake St. Martin
residents have been unable to return because of the extent of the
damage. They deserve a sharply higher dollar figure than people
in Pinaymootang, where many community services were uninterrupted
and the evacuation was shorter, Beardy said.

"It is inappropriate. It is unjust. It is inequitable. The
formula that the negotiators used was not a good formula."

Michael Peerless, Esq. -- peerless@mckenzielake.com -- lawyer for
the plaintiffs, said only a small number of residents have so far
opted out or objected to the settlement.

He told court that individual payments will vary depending on how
people were affected, but any adult who was displaced is likely
to receive between $42,000 and $67,000 as a basic amount.

Additional amounts are available for people who lost personal
property, income or who faced increased health costs.

Residents were allowed to break away from the class-action
lawsuit and pursue their cases individually, but some in court
January 12 said they were unaware of a Nov. 30 deadline to opt
out until it was too late. [GN]


MASON COMPANIES: Made Illegal Calls, "Gonzales" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------
Santiago Gonzales, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Mason Companies, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-00001 (D. N.M., January 2, 2018), seeks injunctive
relief prohibiting telemarketing calls from an automatic
telephone dialing system, declaratory relief, statutory damages
of $500.00 for each and every call, treble damages of up to
$1,500.00 for each and every call, attorneys' fees and costs and
such other relief for violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Mason has repeatedly placed automated calls using prerecorded
voices to Gonzales' cellular telephone, often looking for another
person aside from the Plaintiff, says the complaint.

Mason is a mail order footwear company and e-commerce retailer
located at 1251 First Avenue, Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin 54729-
1691. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Blake J. Dugger, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF BLAKE J. DUGGER
      1704 Llano St., Ste. B-1064
      Santa Fe, NM 87108
      Telephone: (505) 510-4090
      Email: blakejdugger@gmail.com

             - and -

      LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.
      43 Danbury Road, 3rd Floor
      Wilton, CT 06897
      Telephone: (917) 981-0849
      Facsimile: (888) 953-6237


MDL 2359: Court Excludes Wolf's Expert Testimony
------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: HARDIEPLANK FIBER CEMENT SIDING LITIGATION.
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 12-md-2359, MDL
No. 2359 (D. Minn.), Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota granted the Defendant's
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Experts' Testimony, and denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

In 2000, Hardie was reaching 32 million consumers through its
advertising.  Hardie's marketing strategy used intermediaries to
transmit its representations about Hardieplank to consumers
through cooperative marketing.

A 1997 Hardie advertisement stated that Hardieplank is "low
maintenance," "resists moisture damage," "won't crack, rot or
delaminate," and "offer[s] a lifetime of low maintenance backed
by a 50-year product warranty."  In 2000-2004, it advertised that
Hardieplank was "backed with a 50-year limited transferable
warranty" and asserted that Hardieplank is "low maintenance,"
"resists moisture damage," "won't crack, rot or delaminate," or
other similar statements.

From 2001 through 2015, Hardie sold billions of square feet of
Hardieplank in the United States and received warranty claims on
a very small percentage of the siding sold.  The Plaintiffs'
experts opined that, based on warranty claims, delamination was
the primary cause of Hardieplank failure and that such failures
occurred more often in cold, wet conditions.

In March 2011, Picht sued Hardie in Minnesota state court and the
matter was removed to the Court.  Hardie moved for summary
judgment and to dismiss.  The motion was stayed until the
remainder of the MDL cases were also at the summary judgment
stage.

After their individual cases were consolidated in the Court as a
Multidistrict Litigation, 11 Plaintiffs from eight states filed a
Consolidated Complaint.  On July 15, 2013, this Court denied in
part and granted in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Consolidated Complaint.

On Aug. 9, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended
Consolidated Complaint ("ACC"), which names the following as the
Named Plaintiffs: Picht (Minnesota), Bowers (Minnesota), Fenwick
(Nevada), Swiencki (Georgia), the Susan S. Buchanan Personal
Residence Trust through its trustee Buchanan (Florida),
Dillingham (California), Brown (Illinois), Kostos (Illinois),
Treece (Illinois), Kavianpour (Virginia), and Bethel (Ohio).

On June 30, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint in a tag-along
action filed by Wisconsin Plaintiff Steven Schindler.  Schindler
has since left the litigation and has been replaced with
Wisconsin Plaintiffs Angelicis.

On April 27, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint in a tag-along
action filed by Colorado Plaintiff Hernandez.

Based on the ACC, the Angelicis' Complaint, and Hernandez's
Complaint, remaining before the Court are (i) breach of express
warranties by all the Plaintiffs except Illinois Plaintiffs
Treece and Kostos; (i) breach of implied warranties by Minnesota
Plaintiff Picht and Colorado Plaintiff Hernandez; (iii) a
negligence claim by Picht; (iv) declaratory and injunctive relief
claims for all the Plaintiffs; (v) statutory consumer protection
claims by all the Plaintiffs; (vi) an unjust enrichment claim by
the Wisconsin Plaintiffs the Angelicis; and (vii) a  failure of
essential purpose claim by Hernandez.

Before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs'
Experts' Testimony.  The Court heard oral argument on Dec. 15 and
16, 2016.

In their motion, the Plaintiffs request that the Court certify
the following two classes:

     a. Rule 23(b)(3) Class: All individuals and entities that
own structures physically located in the states of California,
Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, Virginia, and Nevada on which
Hardieplank brand siding is currently installed and where the
owner has suffered any measurable injury from failure or
deterioration of Hardieplank.

     b. Rule 23(b)(2) Class: All individuals and entities that
own structures physically located in the United States on which
Hardieplank-brand siding is currently installed and where the
owner has suffered any measurable injury from failure or
deterioration of Hardieplank.

Hardie moves to exclude opinions by the Plaintiffs' expert Joel
Wolf and/or Exponent.  The Plaintiffs' expert Joel Wolf is an
engineer for Exponent Failure Analysis Associates.  Overall, Wolf
opined that all Hardieplank had a fundamental intrinsic defect:
low ILB, which made the siding vulnerable to moisture intrusion
and premature deterioration, which caused delamination and
reduced coating adhesion.  He also opined that Hardieplank
should, but would not, last 50 years.  Finally, he provided a
formula that purports to calculate damages on a classwide basis
by assuming that all houses are 3,000 square feet, two-story
houses, requiring 100% replacement of the siding for delamination
or paint adhesion problems and 50% replacement for gapping or
warping.  Wolf testified that Hardieplank does satisfy the ASTM
C1186 freeze-thaw standard.

Judge Davis granted the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs'
Experts' Testimony because the expert's methodology is
fundamentally flawed and untrustworthy and his opinions are
unhelpful and unreliable.  He finds that Wolf has no academic,
professional, or practical experience or qualifications to opine
on the average consumer's understanding of a warranty.  Wolf's
personal opinion of the meaning of the length of a warranty is
not helpful because it is no more valuable than the opinion of
any lay person who has had experience with a warrantied good,
such as a car or household appliance.  Also, Wolf cites no basis
or support for his opinion.

The Judge denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.  He
says any common issues of law and fact will be overwhelmed by a
myriad of individualized fact questions and a variety of
applicable state laws with material differences.  In particular,
causation issues will require individualized mini-trials for each
class member.

He also denied the Plaintiffs' alternative request to certify an
issue class.  He says that even if the Court certified a class
solely on the question of whether Hardieplank is flawed in that
it has a low ILB that increases its propensity to delaminate and
deteriorate in other ways, any efficiencies gained will
"ultimately unravel" because individual trials will be required
on causation and damages.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum of Law
and Order is available at https://is.gd/iWuHEL from Leagle.com.

HardiePlank Fiber Cement Siding Litigation, Plaintiff,
represented by Heidi A.O. Fisher -- hfisher@foxrothschild.com --
Fox Rothschild LLP.

Jonathan Lebedoff, Special Master, Pro Se.

Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by Karen Hanson
Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Melissa S. Weiner -- weiner@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, Robert
K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen PLLP, Scott Moriarity -- samoriarity@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP & Sean Clinton Woods, Audet &
Partners, LLP.

Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, Plaintiff, represented by Amy
Elizabeth Boyle -- boyle@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, Brian
Fox, Levin, Fishbein, Sadran & Berman, Charles J. LaDuca --
charles@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, Charles E.
Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman,
Christopher J. Moreland -- moreland@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen
Law, Clayton D. Halunen -- halunen@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law,
D. Michael Campbell, Campbell Law, Frances E. Baillon --
fbaillon@baillonthome.com -- Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP,
Lawrence Deutsch -- ldeutsch@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC, pro
hac vice, Melissa S. Weiner, Halunen Law, Michael A. McShane,
Audet & Partners, LLP, Nicholas J. Drakulich, The Drakulich Firm,
Robert K. Shelquist, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Robin
Switzenbaum -- rswitzenbaum@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC, Sean
Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners, LLP, Shanon J. Carson --
scarson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC & Shawn J. Wanta --
sjwanta@baillonthome.com -- Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP.

James Hardie Building Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Aron J. Frakes -- afrakes@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA,
Charles E. Weir -- cweir@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Christopher M. Murphy -- cmurphy@mwe.com -- McDermott Will &
Emery, pro hac vice, Daniel R. Campbell -- dcampbell@mwe.com --
McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Heidi A.O. Fisher --
hfisher@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP, Peter Allport --
pallport@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Rachna B.
Sullivan -- rsullivan@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA &
Steven P. Handler -- shandler@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery,
pro hac vice.


MDL 2359: Hardieplank Siding Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota granted (i) the Defendant's Combined Motion
for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (Picht) and (ii) its Motions
for Summary Judgment in the case, IN RE: HARDIEPLANK FIBER CEMENT
SIDING LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: HEIDI PICHT, Civil
File No. 11-958 (MJD/LIB) THE SUSAN S. BUCHANAN PERSONAL
RESIDENCE TRUST, Civil File No. 12-1393 (MJD/LIB) JAMES
DILLINGHAM, Civil File No. 12-1496 (MJD/LIB) HUGH FENWICK, Civil
File No. 12-1391 (MJD/LIB) MICHAEL SWIENCKI, Civil File No. 12-
1392 (MJD/LIB) MARK KOSTOS, Civil File No. 12-1497 (MJD/LIB)
JONATHAN BOWERS, Civil File No. 12-727 (MJD/LIB) RICHARD TREECE,
Civil File No. 12-1669 (MJD/LIB) MASOUD KAVIANPOUR, Civil File
No. 12-2268 (MJD/LIB) JOHN BROWN, Civil File No. 12-2817
(MJD/LIB) BRIAN BETHEL, Civil File No. 12-2728 (MJD/LIB) DAVID
AND SHARON ANGELICI, Civil File No. 14-285 (MJD/LIB) JOHN J.
HERNANDEZ, Civil File No. 14-4655 (MJD/LIB), Case No. 12-md-2359,
MDL No. 2359 (D. Minn.).

In 2000, Hardie was reaching 32 million consumers through its
advertising.  Hardie's marketing strategy used intermediaries to
transmit its representations about Hardieplank to consumers
through cooperative marketing.

A 1997 Hardie advertisement stated that Hardieplank is "low
maintenance," "resists moisture damage," "won't crack, rot or
delaminate," and "offer[s] a lifetime of low maintenance backed
by a 50-year product warranty."  In 2000-2004, it advertised that
Hardieplank was "backed with a 50-year limited transferable
warranty" and asserted that Hardieplank is "low maintenance,"
"resists moisture damage," "won't crack, rot or delaminate," or
other similar statements.

From 2001 through 2015, Hardie sold billions of square feet of
Hardieplank in the United States and received warranty claims on
a very small percentage of the siding sold.  The Plaintiffs'
experts opined that, based on warranty claims, delamination was
the primary cause of Hardieplank failure and that such failures
occurred more often in cold, wet conditions.

In March 2011, Picht sued Hardie in Minnesota state court and the
matter was removed to the Court.  Hardie moved for summary
judgment and to dismiss.  The motion was stayed until the
remainder of the MDL cases were also at the summary judgment
stage.

After their individual cases were consolidated in the Court as a
Multidistrict Litigation, 11 Plaintiffs from eight states filed a
Consolidated Complaint.  On July 15, 2013, the Court denied in
part and granted in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Consolidated Complaint.

On Aug. 9, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended
Consolidated Complaint ("ACC"), which names the following as the
Named Plaintiffs: Picht (Minnesota), Bowers (Minnesota), Fenwick
(Nevada), Swiencki (Georgia), the Susan S. Buchanan Personal
Residence Trust through its trustee Buchanan (Florida),
Dillingham (California), Brown (Illinois), Kostos (Illinois),
Treece (Illinois), Kavianpour (Virginia), and Bethel (Ohio).

On June 30, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint in a tag-along
action filed by Wisconsin Plaintiff Steven Schindler.  Schindler
has since left the litigation and has been replaced with
Wisconsin Plaintiffs Angelicis.

On April 27, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint in a tag-along
action filed by Colorado Plaintiff Hernandez.

Based on the ACC, the Angelicis' Complaint, and Hernandez's
Complaint, remaining before the Court are (i) breach of express
warranties by all the Plaintiffs except Illinois Plaintiffs
Treece and Kostos; (i) breach of implied warranties by Minnesota
Plaintiff Picht and Colorado Plaintiff Hernandez; (iii) a
negligence claim by Picht; (iv) declaratory and injunctive relief
claims for all the Plaintiffs; (v) statutory consumer protection
claims by all the Plaintiffs; (vi) an unjust enrichment claim by
the Wisconsin Plaintiffs the Angelicis; and (vii) a  failure of
essential purpose claim by Hernandez.

Based upon the files, records, and proceedings, Judge Davis
granted (i) the Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and
dismissed with prejudice the claims of Plaintiffs Swiencki,
Kavianpour, Susan S. Buchanan Personal Residence Trust,
Dillingham, Fenwick, Brown, Kostos, Treece, Bethel, Bowers,
Hernandez, and Angelicis; and (ii) the Defendant's Combined
Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (Picht).

The Judge held, among other things, that the two-year statute of
limitations applies to all of Picht's Minnesota claims because
Picht's claims, like Bowers' claims, seek to recover damages for
any injury to property arising out of the defective and unsafe
condition of an improvement to real property.  Picht alleges that
Hardieplank has left her home insecure and vulnerable to invasion
by the elements. Her Amended Complaint alleged that the siding
was both "defective and unsafe" and that it allows water to
penetrate into the structure.

The Judge finds that the current operative complaint, the ACC,
asserts because of the failure of the Siding, water penetrated
into Ms. Picht's home, damaging the underlying structure. The ACC
further alleges that the siding is susceptible to premature
failure, causing damage to the underlying structures and property
of Plaintiff by allowing water and moisture to penetrate into the
structure.  Thus, for the reasons explained with respect to
Plaintiff Bowers, the two-year statute of limitations applies to
Picht's Minnesota claims.

Finally, Picht points to no facts to support an unfair practices
claim.  Picht did not file a warranty claim with Hardie and, as
the Court has held, the Limited Warranty does not provide
coverage for design defects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum of Law
and Order is available at https://is.gd/2QVccf from Leagle.com.

HardiePlank Fiber Cement Siding Litigation, Plaintiff,
represented by Heidi A.O. Fisher -- hfisher@foxrothschild.com --
Fox Rothschild LLP.

Jonathan Lebedoff, Special Master, Pro Se.

Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel, Plaintiff, represented by Karen Hanson
Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Melissa S. Weiner -- weiner@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, Robert
K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen PLLP, Scott Moriarity -- samoriarity@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP & Sean Clinton Woods, Audet &
Partners, LLP.

Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, Plaintiff, represented by Amy
Elizabeth Boyle -- boyle@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, Brian
Fox, Levin, Fishbein, Sadran & Berman, Charles J. LaDuca --
charles@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, Charles E.
Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman,
Christopher J. Moreland -- moreland@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen
Law, Clayton D. Halunen -- halunen@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law,
D. Michael Campbell, Campbell Law, Frances E. Baillon --
fbaillon@baillonthome.com -- Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP,
Lawrence Deutsch -- ldeutsch@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC, pro
hac vice, Melissa S. Weiner, Halunen Law, Michael A. McShane,
Audet & Partners, LLP, Nicholas J. Drakulich, The Drakulich Firm,
Robert K. Shelquist, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Robin
Switzenbaum -- rswitzenbaum@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC, Sean
Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners, LLP, Shanon J. Carson --
scarson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC & Shawn J. Wanta --
sjwanta@baillonthome.com -- Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP.

James Hardie Building Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Aron J. Frakes -- afrakes@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA,
Charles E. Weir -- cweir@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Christopher M. Murphy -- cmurphy@mwe.com -- McDermott Will &
Emery, pro hac vice, Daniel R. Campbell -- dcampbell@mwe.com --
McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Heidi A.O. Fisher --
hfisher@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP, Peter Allport --
pallport@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Rachna B.
Sullivan -- rsullivan@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA &
Steven P. Handler -- shandler@mwe.com -- McDermott Will & Emery,
pro hac vice.


MDL 2424: 9th Circuit Rules on Fuel Efficiency Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that a federal judge used too
demanding a standard -- and ignored California law -- in
certifying a class of Hyundai and Kia owners who sued over
misstatements about fuel efficiency, the Ninth Circuit ruled on
Jan. 23.

The case is IN RE HYUNDAI AND KIA FUEL ECONOMY LITIGATION, D.C.
No. 2:13-ml-02424- GW-FFM.


MDL 2455: Feb. 12 Deadline for Final Settlement Approval Motion
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order setting deadline
for Objection to Final Approval of Settlement in the case
captioned IN RE: STERICYCLE, INC., STERI-SAFE CONTRACT
LITIGATION, No. 1:13-cv-5795, MDL No. 2455 (N.D. Ill.).

On October 26, the Court granted preliminary approval of a
settlement, calling for payment of $295 million in the Settlement
Agreement.

Under the terms of Preliminary Approval, the Opt-Out and
objection deadlines are both set for January 22, 2018, with a
very brief period until February 12 thus designated as this
Court's deadline for the Motion For Final Approval and Response
to Objections. For that schedule to have any realistic prospect
for compliance, it is essential that a counterpart of every Opt-
Out claim and of every court-filed objection to the final
Approval Plan must be emailed to bredflame@ameritech.net
contemporaneously with its in-court filing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycwc8qgt from Leagle.com.

Stericycle, Inc., Sterisafe Contract Litigation, Defendant,
represented by Raymond J. Etcheverry --
retcheverry@parsonsbehle.com -- Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Richard
H. Middleton, Jr., The Middleton Firm, LLC, 107 East Gordon
Street PO Box 10006. Savannah, GA 31412, Cory D. Sinclair --
csinclair@parsonsbehle.com -- Parsons Behle & Latimer, pro hac
vice, Elinor Hart Murarova, Duane Morris LLP, 190 South LaSalle
Street, Suite 3700. Chicago, Illinois 60603, Juliette P. White --
white@parsonsbehle.com -- Parsons Behle & Latimer, pro hac vice,
Mark A. Glick -- mglick@crai.com -- Parsons Behle & Latimer, pro
hac vice & Paul Evans Chronis, Duane Morris LLP,  1075 Peachtree
Street NE, Suite 2000. Atlanta, GA 30309-3929.

Lyndon Veterinary Clinic, PLLC, Plaintiff, represented by Steve
W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Daniel J. Kurowski -- dank@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP & Elizabeth A. Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Harry C. Midgley, III, Anesthesia & Pain Medicine, P.A. & Doctors
Outpatient Surgery Center of Jupiter, L.L.C., Plaintiffs,
represented by Barry L. Davis -- barry.davis@clydeco.us --
Thornton Davis & Fein & Nanci Rachel Schanerman, Thornton, Davis
& Fein, P.A.

COCHRANTON VETERINARY HOSPITAL, Plaintiff, represented by Steve
W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright, LLP & Katrina Carroll --
kcarroll@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg LLC.

Stericycle, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kathleen Patricia
Lally -- kathleen.lally@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Mark
Steven Mester -- mark.mester@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP.
Stericycle Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel J. Brady,
Hagerty & Brady & Michael A. Brady, Hagerty & Brady, 69 Delaware
Ave, Suite 1010 Buffalo, New York 14202

Stericycle Specialty Waste Solutions, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Michael A. Brady, Hagerty & Brady.


MDL 2785: Court Refuses to Consolidate "Brannon" into MDL
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas denied the Brannon Plaintiffs' request to
consolidate Brannon v. Express Scripts Holding Co., No. 17-2497-
DDC-TJJ into the case, IN RE: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP)
Marketing, Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation. (This
Document Applies to the Notice of Related Action Filed August 31,
2017 (Doc. 12)), MDL No 2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ (D.
Kan.).

On Aug. 29, 2017, Plaintiffs Traci Brannon, Lindsey Rizzo, and
Jamie Herr, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a Class Action Complaint in the District of
Kansas.  The Complaint names five Defendants who own or operate
pharmacy benefit management companies.  The five defendants are:
(1) Express Scripts Holding Co.; (2) Express Scripts, Inc.; (3)
UnitedHealth Group, Inc.; (4) OptumRx, Inc.; and (5) Prime
Therapeutics, LLC.  The Brannon Plaintiffs are enrolled in
employer-provided welfare benefit health plans through one of
those five defendants.  The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") governs these plans.

The Brannon Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant pharmacy benefit
managers contracted on behalf of health plans and insurers with
Mylan N.V., Mylan Specialty L.P., and/or Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. to purchase EpiPen epinephrine injectors.  And in doing so,
they assert, the Defendants violated ERISA by engaging in
extortion and deceptive conduct with the purpose to extract
unlawful portions of rebates and other payments funded by Mylan.
The Brannon Complaint refers to these payments as the "PBM
Kickbacks."

Based on this theory, the Brannon Plaintiffs seek to recover
hundreds of millions of dollars allegedly paid to the Defendants
through the creation, maintenance, and concealment of a multi-
tiered fraudulent scheme designed to deceive consumers through
the marketing and sale of the EpiPen epinephrine injector.

They seek to represent a proposed class they define as all
individuals residing in the United States and its territories who
are or were enrolled in an ERISA-covered health benefit plan or
health insurance plan for which one or more of the PBM Defendants
administers or manages pharmacy benefits, who purchased an EpiPen
epinephrine injector pursuant to such plans or policies and were
required to pay all or a portion of the purchase price based on
an inflated list price ("ERISA Class").

The Brannon Complaint asserts four claims: (1) violating ERISA
Section 406(b) by engaging in prohibited transactions between a
plan and a fiduciary; (2) violating ERISA Section 404 by
breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence; (3) violating
ERISA Section 702 by discriminating against plan participants and
beneficiaries who have a medical condition requiring an EpiPen
because the Defendants' alleged use of artificially inflated
prices and undisclosed and excessive PBM Kickbacks have required
them to pay greater premiums and contributions for their health
plan benefits than those participants and beneficiaries not
requiring an EpiPen; and (4) violation of ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
for knowing participation in ERISA violations.

On Aug. 31, 2017, consistent with our local rule 23-A, the
Brannon Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Related Case in the MDL.
Their Notice asks the court to consolidate the Brannon action
into MDL No. 2785 because, they contend, Brannon concerns the
same subject matter as pending in MDL No. 2785.

The Brannon Defendants have filed responses opposing
consolidation of Brannon into the MDL.  Also, the MDL Defendants
have filed a response opposing consolidation.  And, the
Plaintiffs in an action pending in the District of Minnesota
("Klein plaintiffs") have entered a limited appearance in the MDL
for the purpose of opposing consolidation.

Judge Crabtree holds that like Klein v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC,
the Brannon case differs significantly from the cases in the MDL
because Brannon involves different Defendants, different claims
and theories of liability, different putative classes, and seeks
different relief.  Moreover, the Brannon case shares significant
similarities to the Klein case.  The Brannon putative class
definition is quite similar to the Klein putative class
definition.  The Brannon Plaintiffs assert three of the same
ERISA claims that the Klein Plaintiffs assert in their Complaint.
And the Brannon Plaintiffs are suing three of the same Defendants
that the Klein Plaintiffs have sued.

For the same reasons that the JPML concluded that transfer of the
Klein action to the MDL would not serve the convenience of
parties and witnesses nor will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions, the Judge thus declines to consolidate
the Brannon case into the MDL.

Judge Crabtree therefore denied the Brannon Plaintiffs' request
to consolidate Brannon v. Express Scripts Holding Co. into MDL
No. 2785.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/4eHWLP from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs (for Lead/Liaison Counsel ONLY), Donna Anne
Dvorak, Michael Gill, April Sumner & Landon Ipson, Plaintiffs,
represented by Lynn Lincoln Sarko -- lsarko@KellerRohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller --
PGeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Rex A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA
& Warren T. Burns -- wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest
LLP, pro hac vice.

Rosetta Serrano & Shannon Clements, Plaintiffs, represented by
Arthur R. Miller, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Cristina
R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Dennis
Lienhardt, Jr. -- dal@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro
hac vice, Derek William Loeser -- dloeser@KellerRohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, E. Powell Miller -- epm@miller.law
-- The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Elizabeth C. Pritzker -
- ecp@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice,
Gretchen Freeman Cappio -- gcappio@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, pro hac vice, Jonathan K. Levine --
jkl@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice,
Joseph G. Sauder -- jgs@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright
Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Keller Rohrback,
pro hac vice, Michael W. Meredith -- mmeredith@KellerRohrback.com
-- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier
Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan
C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger --
sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode
-- ssa@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice,
Spencer Cox -- scox@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, pro
hac vice, Stephen J. Fearon, Jr. -- stephen@sfclasslaw.com --
Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice, W. Mark Lanier,
The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice & Warren T. Burns, Burns
Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Annette Sutorik, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur R. Miller, The
Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice & Cristina R. Delise, The
Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice.

Annette Sutorik, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated formerly known as Annette P. Wilcome Sutorik, Plaintiff,
represented by Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The Miller Law Firm, PC,
pro hac vice, Derek William Loeser, Keller Rohrback, pro hac
vice, E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice,
Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice,
Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Jonathan
K. Levine, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder,
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko,
Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Michael W. Meredith, Keller
Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson,
Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S.
Almonrode, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Spencer Cox,
Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen J. Fearon, Jr.,
Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice, W. Mark Lanier,
The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice & Warren T. Burns, Burns
Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Lesley Huston, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur R. Miller, The
Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Charles T. Schimmel, Wright
Schimmel LLC, Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro
hac vice, Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice,
Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Isaac
L. Diel, Sharp McQueen PA, Jonathan K. Levine, Pritzker Levine
LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP,
pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro
hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S.
Almonrode, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Steven N.
Williams, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice, W. Mark
Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice & W. Greg Wright,
Wright Schimmel LLC.

Chris Rippy, Lauren Coale, Raymond C. Buchta, III, Lee Seltzer,
Kimberly Dollander, also known as Kim Dollander, Denya Anderson,
Erin Korte-Lamparter, Joy Shepard, Alene McDaniel, Lorraine
Wight, Teia Amell, Todd Beaulieu, Heather DeStefano, Laura
Chapin, Sonya North, David H. Smith, Jae Jones, John Dodge, Amie
Vialet De Montbel, Heather Ruland, Cassandra Bredek, Elizabeth
Huelsman, formerly known as Liz Huelzman, Nikitia Marshall,
Stacee Svites, Rachel Fernandez, Linda Wagner, Eileen Montet,
Anastasia Johnston, Curt Palmer, Elizabeth Williamson, Mark
Kovarik, Miriam Clarke, Maria Giurland, Suzanne Harwood, Donna
Wemple, Cassandra Cobb, Christina James, Lori Collins, Jennifer
Walton, Meredith Krimmel, Connie Stafford, Francis Meyers,
formerly known as Francis Meyer & Kimberly Corcoran, Plaintiffs,
represented by Arthur R. Miller, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice,
Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, E.
Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Elizabeth
C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan K.
Levine, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder,
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford, The
Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp,
PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger, Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Steven N. Williams, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro
hac vice & W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice.

Vishal Aggarwal, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates, PC, pro hac
vice, Camille S. Bass -- cbass@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst &
O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice, Erich Paul Schork, Barnow and
Associates, PC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA &
Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice.

Vishal Aggarwal, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary Medellin
Rivas -- rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Angie Nordstrum, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated & Carly Bowersock, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brian D. Penny, Goldman Scarlato & Penny, PC, pro hac vice,
Damien J. Marshall -- dmarshall@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller &
Flexner, LLP, pro hac vice, Donald A. Ecklund --
DEcklund@carellabyrne.com -- Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein,
Brody & Agnello, PC, pro hac vice, Duane L. Loft --
dloft@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, pro hac vice,
James E. Cecchi -- JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- Carella, Byrne,
Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph Alm --
jalm@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Paul J.
Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Rex A.
Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Stuart A. Davidson --
SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice.

Sanofi-Aventis US, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Scott
Tolin -- adam.hemlock@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP,
pro hac vice, Diane P. Sullivan -- diane.sullivan@weil.com --
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac vice, Eric Shaun Hochstadt -
- eric.hochstadt@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac
vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice & Yehudah L. Buchweitz -- yehudah.buchweitz@weil.com --
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac vice.

Kenneth Evans, as an individual and as representative of the
class, Plaintiff, represented by Archie Grubb, II, Beasley Allen
Crow Methvin Portis & Miles, PC, pro hac vice, Brian Murphy,
Braswell Murphy, LLC, Kasie M. Braswell, Braswell Murphy, LLC,
pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & W. Daniel Miles,
III, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles, PC, pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin --
adam.levin@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, Brian C. Fries -- bfries@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop Gage
LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham -- dgraham@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill,
PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster --
david.foster@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, James Moloney -- jmoloney@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop Gage
LLP, Kathryn M. Ali -- kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Mitchell E. Zamoff --
mitch.zamoff@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice & Timothy Robert Herman -- therman@clarkhill.com -- Clark
Hill, PLC, pro hac vice.

Mylan Specialty LP, a Delaware limited partnership, Defendant,
represented by Adam K. Levin, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice,
Arnold B. Calmann -- abc@saiber.com -- Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice,
Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham, Clark
Hill, PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
pro hac vice, David A. Perez, Perkins Coie, LLP, pro hac vice,
James Moloney, Lathrop Gage LLP, Jeffrey S. Soos --
jsoos@saiber.com -- Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice, Kathryn M. Ali,
Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Mitchell E. Zamoff, Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Susan E. Foster, Yarmuth Wilsdon
Calfo, PLLC, pro hac vice, Thomas L. Boeder, Perkins Coie, LLP,
pro hac vice & Timothy Robert Herman, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac
vice.

Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam K.
Levin, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Brian C. Fries,
Lathrop Gage LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac
vice, David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice,
Kathryn M. Ali, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Mitchell E.
Zamoff, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy Robert
Herman, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice.

Heather Bresch, Defendant, represented by Brian C. Fries, Lathrop
Gage LLP & David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice.

King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Angela
(Angel) D. Mitchell -- amitchell@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon
LLP, Brendan Woodard -- bwoodard@whitecase.com -- White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Dimitrios Drivas -- ddrivas@whitecase.com --
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Edward Thrasher --
ethrasher@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph
M. Rebein -- jrebein@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kathryn
Swisher -- kathryn.swisher@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Raj Gandesha -- rgandesha@whitecase.com -- White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Milne -- rmilne@whitecase.com -- White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice & Sheryn George --
sheryn.george@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Angela (Angel) D. Mitchell, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Brendan
Woodard, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David E. Delorenzi,
Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Dimitrios Drivas, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Edward Thrasher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Joseph M. Rebein, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kathryn Swisher,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Raj Gandesha, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Robert Milne, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Sheryn George, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice & Silvia M. Medina,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Mylan, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arnold B. Calmann, Saiber,
LLC, pro hac vice, Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP & Jeffrey S.
Soos, Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice.

Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, represented by David E. Delorenzi,
Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph M. Rebein, Shook, Hardy & Bacon
LLP, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice & Silvia M. Medina, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

King Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Defendant, represented by David E.
Delorenzi, Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph M. Rebein, Shook,
Hardy & Bacon LLP & Silvia M. Medina, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice.

Traci Brannon, Lindsey Rizzo & Jamie Herr, Miscellaneouss,
represented by Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Ryan C. Hudson,
Rex A. Sharp, PA.


MDL 2804: Westfield Monitoring Opioid Class-Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Hope E. Tremblay, writing for Mass Live, reports that the City
Council's legislative and ordinance subcommittee January 11
reviewed the city's options for joining a class-action lawsuit
that seeks to recoup from pharmaceutical companies costs
associated with the opioid crisis.

First Assistant City Solicitor Shanna R. Reed said the city law
department is keeping an eye on other potential legal action
against the drug manufacturers and distributors.

"The attorney general's been investigating the matter," Reed
said. "So, we are monitoring what the AG is doing."

Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, Esq. has joined a
number of her counterparts around the U.S. to launch a probe into
whether pharmaceutical companies misrepresented the dangers of
prescription painkillers and ignored the public health risks of
opioids.

Reed said City Solicitor Susan C. Phillips joined an email group
on the topic, which is being discussed around the state.

Subcommittee member William Onyski asked if other communities
have signed onto the lawsuit.

"Yes, Greenfield is one of them," Reed said. "A lot of
communities are in the same position we are -- they're looking at
what the AG is doing."

Last fall, Greenfield joined the class-action lawsuit in an
attempt to recoup costs associated with a spike in drug overdoses
in recent years, Mayor William Martin told The Republican at the
time.

Subcommittee member Nicholas J. Morganelli Jr. asked what would
be required of Westfield if it joined the lawsuit.

"Is there an expectation on our part? Would there be time
involved?" he asked.

"There wouldn't be anything our office would take on," Reed said.

Outside law firms would handle the work, Reed said. If the
lawsuit is successful, the firms would receive one-third of the
award as payment.

The request to explore the lawsuit was made in October by former
Councilor Steve Dondley.

The lawsuit names as defendants three pharmaceutical companies,
identified as "the big three": McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health
and AmerisourceBergan. The lawsuit was filed by Levin Papantonio
of Pensacola, Florida, and the Sweeney Merrigan Law firm, which
has offices in Boston and Greenfield.

Attorney Peter M. Merrigan, Esq. said January 12 his firm has
filed suits on behalf of Greenfield, Methuen and Everett and
plans to file on behalf of several more communities.

"We have at least six to eight verbal commitments, including two
Western Massachusetts communities," said Merrigan. "We have had
some preliminary talks with Westfield and we are hopeful to have
more."

The suit seeks to recoup municipal spending that has resulted
from combating the problems associated with opioid addiction and
overdoses over the last several years. In Greenfield, Martin said
those costs include law enforcement, needle exchanges, purchases
of the drug Narcan to reverse overdoses, and assorted costs for
treatment.

"There is a genuine cost to the municipality in both monetary and
psychological terms," Martin said. Greenfield, as the largest
community in Franklin County, provides multiple services, he
said.

"The opioid epidemic is hitting Massachusetts harder than we
could have ever imagined," said Merrigan.

A Massachusetts Department of Public Health quarterly report on
overdose deaths across the state noted Westfield had 16 confirmed
opioid-related overdose deaths in 2016. That is double the amount
from 2014 and 2015. There were seven confirmed opioid-related
overdose deaths in the city in 2013 and five in 2012.

Southwick had two confirmed opioid deaths in 2016.

Data for 2017 is still being compiled. For the first nine months
of the year, DPH has confirmed 932 opioid-related overdose deaths
statewide and estimates there could be 491 to 582 more.
Additional cases for 2015 and 2016 are still being confirmed by
the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. [GN]


MENDEZ FUEL: "Goussen" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Jairo B. Goussen, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Mendez Fuel Holdings LLC and Michael Mendez, Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-20012 (S.D. Fla., January 2, 2018), seeks unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs and reasonable
attorney's fees under the provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act.

Goussen worked for Defendants as a cashier, cook and customer
service representative from on or about March 6 2014 through
December 7 2017. He worked an average of 62.5 hours a week but
was never paid overtime for any hours worked over 40 hours. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com


METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT: Feliciano Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Vincent Feliciano, Diana Longa, Greg Devaney, Peter Roness and
Carlo Tagliavia, individually, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Metropolitan Transport Agency
and Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-00026, (S.D. N.Y., January 2, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid compensation and benefits, plus an equal amount of
liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, reasonable attorneys'
fees, including the costs and expenses of this action and such
other legal and equitable relief pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

Plaintiffs are bridge and tunnel lieutenants and sergeants. They
claim overtime for pre-shift and post-shift activities such as
briefings and meetings and allege that Defendant automatically
rounds down clock-in times and miscalculating overtime rates.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Innessa Melamed Huot, Esq.
     Alex J. Hartzband, Esq.
     685 3rd Avenue
     New York, NY 10003
     Telephone: (212) 983-9330
     Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
     Email: dgottlieb@wigdorlaw.com
            trahman@wigdorlaw.com
            ahartzband@wigdorlaw.com

            - and -

     Joshua Beldner, Esq.
     Eric S. Tilton, Esq.
     TILTON BELDNER LLP
     626 RXR Plaza
     Uniondale, NY 11556
     Fax: (516) 324-2170
     Phone: (516) 262-3602
     Email: jbeldner@tiltonbeldner.com
            etilton@tiltonbeldner.com


MURATA MANUFACTURING: Sued Over Inductor Price Fixing
-----------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal antitrust class action accuses Murata, Panasonic and
others of conspiring to fix the price of inductors in electronic
products for 11 years.

The list of defendants includes Dependable Component Supply
Corp., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Murata Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; Murata Electronics
North America Inc.; Panasonic Corp.; Panasonic Corp. of North
America; Panasonic Electronic Devices Co. Ltd.; Panasonic
Electronic Devices Corp. of America; Sumida Corp.; Sumida
Electric Co. Ltd.; Sumida America Components Inc.; Taiyo Yuden
Co. Ltd.; Taiyo Yuden (USA) Inc.; TDK Corp.; TDK-EPC Corp.; and
TDK USA Corp.

Attorneys for Dependable Component Supply Corp.:

     Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
     Matthew S. Weiler, Esq.
     Emily C. Aldridge, Esq.
     BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
     555 12th Street, Suite 1600
     Oakland, CA 94607
     Telephone: (415) 445-4003
     Facsimile: (415) 445-4020
     Email: lweaver@bfalaw.com
            mweiler@bfalaw.com
            ealdridge@bfalaw.com


NATIONAL GAS: Court Denies Arbitration in "Johansen" TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
KEN JOHANSEN, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GAS & ELECTRIC LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-587 (S.D. Ohio).  Motion to stay class discovery is
granted.

Plaintiff Ken Johansen brings this putative class action under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Johansen alleges
that his residential telephone number is on the national Do Not
Call Registry and that defendant National Gas & Electric LLC
(NG&E) violated the Act by calling him on June 13, 14 and 15,
2017.

Johansen contends that arbitration was not among the terms or
conditions discussed during the June 13, 2017 phone call. The
Terms of Service document containing the arbitration provision
was not mailed to him until June 16, after NG&E allegedly
committed violations of the TCPA on June 13, 14 and 15.

The court agrees with Johansen that arbitration was not a term
discussed during the June 13 phone call. The transcript of the
call shows that the parties simply agreed that NG&E would supply
electricity to Johansen at a particular rate and monthly fee.
The court is not persuaded that June 26 is the correct date by
which Johansen was required to reject the agreement, for two
reasons. First, NG&E has not submitted proof of when its mailing
actually reached the address provided by Johansen, the Postal
Service's service standards are goals and not guarantees. See
USPS Service Standards, available
athttps://postalpro.usps.com/operations/service-standards.

Second, even assuming the mailing arrived on schedule, NG&E has
not submitted any law or argument in support for the proposition
that the three day deadline established in the Terms of Service
provided Johansen with a reasonable opportunity to review and
reject the proposed terms.

More importantly, even if June 26 is the right deadline and
Johansen was one day late in notifying NG&E of his rejection of
the Terms of Service, NG&E waived any timeliness-based objection
by accepting and honoring Johansen's rejection of the agreement.
A party may waive a contract term by words or conduct. The court
finds no legal basis for NG&E to single out the arbitration
clause for enforcement when it treated the rest of the agreement
as having been rejected.

NG&E' motion to compel arbitration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9e9hw6g
from Leagle.com.

Ken Johansen, Plaintiff, represented by Brian K. Murphy -
murphy@mmmb.com -- Murray Murphy Moul Basil LLP.

Ken Johansen, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Paronich --
anthony@broderick-law.com -- Broderick & Paronich, P.C., pro hac
vice, Edward A. Broderick -- ted@broderick-law.com -- Broderick
Law, P.C., pro hac vice & Jonathan P. Misny -- misny@mmmb.com --
Murray Murphy Moul + Basil.

National Gas & Electric, LLC, Defendant, represented by John L.
Landolfi -- jllandolfi@vorys.com -- Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease,
Benjamin D. Williams -- williams@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher Charles Wager --
ccwager@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP, Ezra Dodd
Church -- echurch@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
pro hac vice & Michelle Pector -- michelle.pector@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice.


NATIONAL GENERAL: Ct. Junks Amended "Alderson" Insurance Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v.
GARY ALDERSON, Defendant. GARY ALDERSON, Counter-Complainant, v.
NATIONAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Counter-Defendant, Case No.
17CV866 WQH-JMA (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted
without prejudice National General's motion to dismiss the first
amended class action and representative action counter-complaint.

On April 28, 2017, National General filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief in the district court seeking a judgment
declaring that it properly offered to pay for the physical
repairs to a "2014 Mercedes Benz Sprinter Van" under a personal
auto policy issued to Defendant Alderson.  It alleges that
Alderson was involved in a three car collision resulting in
physical damage to the Van, that Alderson reported the accident
to National General, and that Alderson and National General
agreed upon a repair shop.

National General alleges that checks were sent to the repair shop
to cover the cost of parts and repairs to the Van, and that the
body shop advised National General that Alderson advised the body
shop not to proceed with the repairs.  It alleges that counsel
for Alderson has notified it that it has an obligation to pay
Alderson for his loss of use and diminished value of the Van.
National General alleges that the checks issued payable to
Alderson and the lienholder for the Van represent the undisputed
amount owed under the Policy to repair the physical damage to the
Van.

On June 23, 2017, Alderson filed an Answer to the Complaint.

On Aug. 18, 2017, Alderson filed the First Amended Class Action
and Counter-Complaint for Damages, Equitable, and Injunctive
Relief.  In the Counter-Complaint, Alderson alleges that National
General improperly refused to deem his vehicle a "total loss"
when it failed to compensate him for the diminished value of the
vehicle.  Alderson alleges that National General engaged in
fraud, misrepresentation and deceit by marketing its policies to
cover "losses and damages" when National General only intended to
cover repair costs.

Alderson brings the following counterclaims: (1) unlawful, unfair
and fraudulent business practices under Business and Professional
Code Section 17200 et seq. and Section 17500 et seq.; (2)
negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of express contract and
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) fraud,
misrepresentation, and deceit.

On Sept. 9, 2017, National General filed a motion to dismiss the
amended class action and representative counterclaim under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Alderson filed a response in opposition and
National General filed a reply.

Judge Hayes holds that there are no facts alleged in the Counter-
Complaint to support a claim for express breach of contract or
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The
allegations that National General elected to pay the repair costs
and failed to pay "diminution in value" do not support a claim
for improper claims handling given the express provisions of the
policy.

The Judge finds that the Counter-Complaint includes claims for
deceptive business practices, misrepresentation, and fraud.  Each
of these claims allege that National General was not entitled to
offer a policy which reserves the right to elect to repair, or a
policy which excludes diminution in value from the recovery for
"loss."  Each of these claims rely solely upon assertions of bad
faith and contract provisions against public policy.  He
concludes that the facts alleged in support of these claims fail
to state a claim for deceptive business practices,
misrepresentation, or fraud.

Accordingly, Judge Hayes granted without prejudice National
General's motion to dismiss the first amended class action and
representative action counter-complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/20pHAk from Leagle.com.

National General Insurance Company, Plaintiff, represented by
Hugh Douglas Galt -- dgalt@woollspeer.com -- Woolls and Peer &
Jeffrey A. Dollinger -- dollinger@wpdslaw.com -- Woolls Peer
Dollinger & Scher.

Gary Alderson, Defendant, represented by Montie Stowell Day --
msdayesq@aol.com -- Day Law Offices.


NEW YORK: Settles NYPD Officer's Suit Over Ban on Beards
--------------------------------------------------------
Cindy Arboleda, writing for Yahoo!, reports that the NYPD has
recognized that beards are more than just a fashion statement.

New York City police officers can now grow beards for religious
reasons.  The new policy has been implemented after a Muslim cop
filed a lawsuit.  He claimed he was unjustly suspended for
wearing a beard more than 1 millimeter long.

Officer Masood Syed is responsible for the policy change.
Mr. Syed, 33, filed a class-action lawsuit in June 2016 in U.S.
District Court in Manhattan, challenging the constitutionality of
the NYPD's ban on beards.  He cited it as a violation of First
Amendment rights.

The lawsuit came after Mr. Syed, a Pakistani-American, was
suspended without pay when he refused to shave his 1-inch beard,
which he wears as a Sunni Muslim. Syed has worked as a law clerk
for the NYPD's deputy commissioner of trials since 2006.

Mr. Syed had kept his beard when he joined the force by asking
for medical accommodation.  Two years later, he asked for
religious accommodation, according to NBC News. In 2016, it was
the first time a supervisor told Mr. Syed he was out of
compliance with NYPD policy.  When he refused to shave, he was
suspended.

Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, he was restored to full duty
and permitted to keep his 1-inch beard.  But the fight wasn't
over.  In December 2016, the NYPD revised its policy allowing
facial hair of up to a half inch for religious beliefs with the
department's approval.

On Jan. 2, the city settled the class-action lawsuit.

"We are pleased with the resolution of this case," a New York
City Law Department spokesman told the Daily News about the
settlement.  "The agreed-upon reforms balance the operational
needs of the police department with the religious beliefs and
needs of officers."

The new NYPD policy allowing for longer beards also permits cops
to wear turbans for religious reasons.  The turbans will have to
be navy blue and display a departmental insignia.

"It's a major change," Police Commissioner James O'Neill said
about the rule change.  Mr. O'Neill has hopes the new dress code
will bring more diversity to the force, thus increasing the
number of applicants. [GN]


NORTHERN CONCRETE: Court Certifies Time Travel Class in "Morgan"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin issued a Decision and Order granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification
in the case captioned DWAYNE MORGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
NORTHERN CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION INC., Defendant, Case Nos. 16-C-
1283, 17-C-1007 (E.D. Wis.).

Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated against CSW, Inc. and Defendant Northern
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Northern Concrete).  The amended
complaint alleges that joint employers CSW and Northern Concrete
failed to pay the plaintiffs minimum wage and overtime pay, as
required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and straight
time and overtime pay, as required under Wisconsin Wage and Hour
law.

They seek the certification of two classes: (1) all employees who
traveled to Wisconsin to work on Northern Concrete jobsites after
being referred to Northern Concrete by CSW; and (2) all Northern
Concrete direct-hire employees who received a per diem that
exceeded their reasonably estimated meal expenses.

First, the Named Plaintiff seek certification of a class
consisting of all workers referred to Northern Concrete by CSW
who traveled away from their home communities to work for
Northern Concrete.

Second, they seek conditional certification of a class consisting
of all of Northern Concrete's direct hire employees who received
a per diem from Northern Concrete.

With regard to their travel time claim, the Named Plaintiffs
assert that Northern Concrete is liable to them for unpaid
overtime as a joint employer because the Named Plaintiffs' travel
time to and from Wisconsin was not counted as hours worked.

To illustrate the nature of their overtime argument, the Named
Plaintiffs cite to Dwayne Morgan's time card for the week from
May 29, 2016, through June 4, 2016, which shows that he worked
34.86 regular hours between Monday and Friday that week. Assuming
that Morgan traveled more than 5.14 hours during working hours on
the Sunday preceding this work, they argue, he should have
received overtime pay for subsequent hours worked in excess of 40
at the end of the week.

Northern Concrete raises several objections to the proposed
notice and proposed consent form regarding the travel time class
that the Named Plaintiffs submitted with their motion for
conditional certification.

Northern Concrete points to several aspects of the Named
Plaintiffs' evidence to argue that individualized damage
calculations may be necessary, but travel times from set
distances, the main component of damages, can be readily
determined. And whether individual inquiries predominate over
common questions of law and fact is a question better answered at
the second step of the certification analysis.

The Named Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence for the
court to conclude that the Named Plaintiffs are similarly
situated with a group of concrete workers referred to Northern
Concrete by CSW who were subject to a common practice of not
paying compensation for travel time.

Accordingly, the Named Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification will be granted as to the travel time class.

Northern Concrete next objects that the proposed notice (as well
as the proposed consent form) is misleading because it indicates
that the suit seeks to recover unpaid overtime. Specifically, the
proposed notice states: The lawsuit alleges  that you may be
entitled to additional overtime pay once your travel time is
counted as hours worked. The Named Plaintiffs, however, have made
clear throughout their briefs that their objective is to recover
unpaid overtime, so opt-in plaintiffs whose pay records do not
establish hours worked in excess of forty in a given week, even
after including travel time, would not have any right to recover
overtime never earned. Because conditional class members could
recover only overtime pay actually earned, the notice is not
misleading with regard to travel time.

The Named Plaintiffs' also seek certification of a conditional
class consisting of Northern Concrete's direct-hire employees who
received per diem payments.

There is a factual dispute as to whether Northern Concrete paid
the per diem for meal expenses alone or for both meal and mileage
expenses. Considering a $26 dinner per diem rate in conjunction
with mileage costs for traveling between Waunakee and Milwaukee
suggests $35 is not an objectively unreasonable or excessive
reimbursement rate. Consequently, the Named Plaintiffs fall short
of showing that Daunte Davis, much less a similarly situated
class of Northern Concrete employees, was subject to a policy
that resulted in Northern Concrete's failure to include excess
per diem payments in the regular rate for purposes of calculating
overtime pay.

The nature of the Named Plaintiffs' per diem claim is ultimately
not amenable to efficient resolution on a collective basis.
Unlike the calculation for the travel time class, determining
whether the per diem reasonably approximated any individual
employee's expenses apparently turns on highly individualized
factors. These include: the distance between the particular work
site and the employee's home; whether the employee stayed in a
hotel; whether and where the employee ate breakfast, lunch and
dinner; and whether the employee drove his own vehicle, a company
truck, or car-pooled with another employee.

Moreover these various contingencies that determine each
employee's actual expenses vary from job to job and even from day
to day. Given the primacy of these individualized inquiries even
to determine liability, let alone damages, the court concludes
that the Named Plaintiffs have not made an adequate showing that
they are similarly situated with members of the proposed per diem
class, and the motion for conditional certification will
therefore be denied as to this class.

Given the court's decision denying conditional certification of
the per diem class, the Named Plaintiffs' motion is moot. Even
aside from this, it seems doubtful that Mannes would be a proper
substitute for Davis since Mannes was not a member of the class
Davis sought to represent at the time he brought his claim on
January 31, 2017. Mannes did not work for Northern Concrete until
the summer of 2017, and thus would have had no standing to assert
such a claim at that time. In any event, given the denial of the
Named Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification of the per
diem class, the motion to amend is denied.

Mannes may of course file a new action against Northern Concrete
if he wishes to assert a claim against it, but this suit is not
the appropriate setting for him to do so. In the meantime, the
Named Plaintiffs should advise the court and counsel for Northern
Concrete whether Davis' per diem claim should be dismissed for
failure to prosecute within the next ten days.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8dchs9g
from Leagle.com.

Dwayne Morgan, Clint Robinson, Paul Robinson, Michael Owens,
Marques Stewart, Cornelius Buford, Shaun Saunders, Daunte Davis &
Kendall Holmes, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher J. Ahrens
-- cia@previant.com -- The Previant Law Firm SC, Sara J. Geenen,
The Previant Law Firm SC, 310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100 MW
Milwaukee, WI 53203 & Yingtao Ho -- yh@previant.com -- The
Previant Law Firm SC.

CSW Inc, Defendant, represented by Thomas Wickham Schmidt --
wschmidt@dkattorneys.com -- Davis & Kuelthau SC.

Northern Concrete Construction Inc, Defendant, represented by
Devin S. Hayes -- dhayes@vonbriesen.com -- von Briesen & Roper
SC, Geoffrey S. Trotier -- gtrotier@vonbriesen.com -- von Briesen
& Roper SC & Roy E. Wagner -- rwagner@vonbriesen.com -- von
Briesen & Roper SC.


PENN MUTUAL: Court OKS $10K Attorney's Fees in "Harshbarger"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for approval of Defendant's payment of attorney's fees,
reimbursed litigation expenses, and class representatives'
incentive awards in the case captioned DANIEL J. HARSHBARGER and
EDITH M. HARSHBARGER, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. THE PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY Defendant, Civil Action No. 12-6172 (E.D. Pa.).

The motion is granted and an award of $10,000,000.00 in
attorneys' fees to Class Counsel; an award of $700,000.00 in
expenses to Class Counsel; a service award of $3,750.00 to Daniel
J. Harshbarger; and a service award of $3,750.00 to Edith M.
Harshbarger.

Having found the hourly rates and hours expended reasonable, as
of October 13, 2017, the aggregate lodestar calculation is
$2,724,788.75, for the 4,697 hours of attorney and support staff
work.  Class Counsel's request for $10,000,000.00 in fees
represents a multiplier of approximately 3.67 of the lodestar
amount.  Multiples ranging from 1 to 4 are often used in common
fund cases.  In addition, the Court has considered that Class
Counsel took the case on a contingent basis, see Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973); there were only two
objections filed by Settlement Class Members to the amounts
requested, see Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 229 F.R.D. 105,
124 (E.D. Pa. 2005); and Class Counsel has obtained a significant
recovery for the Settlement Class Members.

Therefore, having considered the relevant Gunter/Prudential
factors and performed the lodestar cross-check, this Court
approves the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees requested.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://is.gd/8yUVrT from
Leagle.com.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7x8l8yq from Leagle.com.

DANIEL J. HARSHBARGER, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW S.
FRIEDMAN -- afriedman@bffb.com -- BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN
AND BALINT, P.C.

DANIEL J. HARSHBARGER, Plaintiff, represented by FRANCIS JOSEPH
BALINT, Jr. --   fbalint@bffb.com -- BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN &
BALINT, JASON B. ADKINS -- jadkins@akzlaw.com -- ADKINS KELSTON &
ZAVEZ PC, JOSEPH N. KRAVEC, Jr. --  jkravec@fdpklaw.com --
FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC & MARK A. CHAVEZ --
mark@chavezgertler.com --  CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP.

EDITH M. HARSHBARGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW S. FRIEDMAN,
BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN AND BALINT, P.C., FRANCIS JOSEPH
BALINT, Jr., BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT, JASON B.
ADKINS, ADKINS KELSTON & ZAVEZ PC, JOSEPH N. KRAVEC, Jr.,
FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC & MARK A. CHAVEZ, CHAVEZ &
GERTLER LLP.

THE PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
JAY H. CALVERT, Jr. -- jay.calvert@morganlewis.com -- ANAPOL
WEISS, JOHN P. LAVELLE, Jr. -- john.lavelle@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN LEWIS BOCKIUS LLP, JOSEPH B.G. FAY --
joseph.fay@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP & MARISA
J. TILGHMAN, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, 1701 Market Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19103- 2921

RICHARD E. KISTLER, Respondent, Pro Se.

CECILY D. CORNISH, Respondent, Pro Se.

MICHAEL GRECCO, Respondent, Pro Se.

DONALD A. SOBERDASH, Respondent, Pro Se.

PATRICIA R. SOBERDASH, Respondent, Pro Se.

THOMAS S. BOMMARITO, Respondent, Pro Se.

RISIE R. HOWARD, Respondent, Pro Se.

JOHN W. MANSFIELD, Respondent, Pro Se.

JEFF BROWN, Respondent, Pro Se.


PENNSYLVANIA: Class Assails for Linking Drug Crimes, Driving
------------------------------------------------------------
Lana Morrelli, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Pennsylvania suspends the driver's licenses of people whether
they got caught with a few ounces of weed or killed someone with
their car. Two men convicted only of minor drug crimes claim in a
federal class action that the scheme is unconstitutional.

Represented by Goldstein Mehta and the nonprofit Equal Justice
Under Law, Russell Harold and Sean Williams filed their federal
complaint on Jan. 10 in Philadelphia.

"For people already facing the harsh realities of living with a
criminal conviction, the ability to find and maintain gainful
employment, pursue education, keep medical appointments, and care
for dependent family members is essential to a stable post-
conviction life," the complaint states. "By imposing additional
and debilitating measures against people with drug convictions,
defendants make successful post-conviction rehabilitation a near
impossibility."

Apart from offenses related to traffic safety, the complaint
continues, "drug convictions are the only crimes for which the
[Pennsylvania] Department of Transportation suspends the driver's
licenses of adults over 21." (Emphasis in original.)

Noting that drug convictions have no bearing on traffic safety,
Harold and Williams say "Pennsylvania's suspension policy can
only be explained as state-sanctioned discrimination on the basis
of a particular animus toward people with drug conviction."

Convicted of marijuana-related crimes last year, the lead
plaintiffs joined the 149,000 Pennsylvania drivers whose licenses
were suspended between 2011 and 2016 for drug-related offenses.

Pennsylvania "thus punish[es] people found in possession of a
small amount of marijuana (unrelated to driving) as harshly as
those who have been convicted of aggravated assault while driving
under the influence, vehicular manslaughter, or any other
dangerous activity that results in the loss of one's ability to
drive," the complaint states (parentheses in original).

Of the states that had similar drug-related license-suspension
policies, the complaint notes that 38 have abolished these laws
"to ensure successful rehabilitation of former drug offenders."

"Automatic and extended periods of license suspension for
individuals who pose no demonstrated risk to traffic safety is
irrational, counterproductive, and discriminatory," the complaint
continues. "License suspension burdens virtually every aspect of
a person's life while undercutting the state's interests in
rehabilitation and decreasing recidivism."

Lead plaintiff Russell is described as a 52-year-old disabled
grandfather who operates a home cleaning business.

Facing the loss of his license until 2019, Harold says he has
been unable to drive to clients' houses and his weekly income has
dropped from $700 to $200.

Co-plaintiff Williams is just 25 and his first child was born
prematurely in April 2017.

Though he has a "perfect driving record," the complaint says he
was arrested three times last year for carrying small amounts of
personal-use marijuana.

Because those convictions resulted in the suspension of his
license, Williams has had to take public transportation to visit
his son every day at the hospital and the burdens will only
intensify when the baby is released.

"As a premature infant he will require frequent medical
appointments, and because of his vulnerability, public
transportation poses a hazard to his health," the complaint
states.

"Because Mr. Williams cannot drive, he will be unable to take his
son to necessary doctor's appointments or to visit family
members," the complaint continues.

"If an emergency occurs with Mr. Williams' son, he will be unable
to drive him to seek emergency medical help."

The complaint also notes that the loss of his license has left
Williams unable to help his grandmother with her daily
activities, including transportation to doctor's appointments.

Phil Telfeyan of Equal Justice for All said in an email he hopes
"this legal challenge pushes the Department of Transportation in
the right direction, to finally end this unfair and
counterproductive practice."

"Pennsylvania's drug suspension laws are trapping too many people
in a cycle of poverty; without a driver's license, it's nearly
impossible to find and maintain employment," Telfeyan said. "This
law -- which is decades old -- is causing damage to hundreds of
thousands of Pennsylvanians, and the Department of Transportation
has already recognized the law's failure in testimony before the
state's legislature."

Becky Iannotta, a spokeswoman for Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
said the group "does not take a position on laws and offenses
that are unrelated to impaired driving or underage drinking."

Representatives for Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf have not returned
a request for comment.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Phil Telfeyan, Esq.
     Catherine Sevcenko, Esq.
     Rebecca Ramaswamy, Esq.
     Marissa Hatton, Esq.
     Equal Justice Under Law
     400 7th Street NW, Suite 602
     Washington, D.C. 20004
     (202) 670-1004
     ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
     catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
     rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
     mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org

        -- and --

     Zak Goldstein, Esq.
     GOLDSTEIN MEHTA LLC
     1221 Locust St.
     Philadelphia, PA 19107
     (267) 225-2545
     ztg@goldsteinmehta.com


PFIZER INC: Bid to Strike Nationwide Class Allegations OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Pfizer
Inc.'s motion to strike plaintiffs' nationwide class allegations
be granted in the case captioned RACHEL TYMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. PFIZER, INC., Defendant, No. 16-CV-06941 (LTS)
(BCM) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against defendant
Pfizer, Inc., the maker of Chapstick brand lip balm products,
alleging that Pfizer deceptively labels and markets certain of
its Total Hydration ChapStick varieties (ChapStick Products) as
100% NATURAL and as Clinically Proven to provide healthier, more
youthful looking lips, when in fact the Products contain
synthetic and unnatural ingredients and have not been subject to
any scientifically valid clinical testing verifying the
advertised effects on users' lips.

According to plaintiffs, Pfizer knowingly and intentionally
misrepresents the ingredients and benefits of the ChapStick
Products on their labels and in television and internet
advertising to induce consumers to buy the Products, at a premium
price, instead of purchasing less costly alternatives.

Plaintiffs argue, among others, the truthfulness of Pfizer's 100%
NATURAL' representations fails the test of math, because as a
matter of math and common sense, a product cannot be 100% natural
if it contains any amount of unnatural, highly or chemically
processed, synthetic ingredients.

Because the ChapStick Products have not been clinically tested
and there are no competent and reliable scientific studies
showing that they are clinically proven to provide any of the
advertised benefits, plaintiffs argue that is undeniably
deceptive for Pfizer to label the ChapStick Products as
clinically proven to provide healthier and more youthful looking
lips.

Both plaintiffs allege that they saw and read the '100% NATURAL'
and 'Clinically Proven' labels" on the ChapStick Products,
reasonably believed that those terms carry the definitions
attributed to them in the Complaint, and relied on those
statements to make their purchase decisions.

Plaintiffs allege that they were injured in various ways as an
immediate, direct and proximate result of Pfizer's false,
misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions. Their
primary claim is that they lost money or property because they
purchased, purchased more of, or paid more for the ChapStick
Products than they would have had they known the truth.

Pfizer moves to dismiss plaintiffs' breach of express warranty,
unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and FDUTPA claims
in their entireties. It also seeks dismissal of all of
plaintiffs' claims, however denominated, to the extent they are
based on alleged misstatements in product advertising or the
Products Website.

First, Pfizer argues that the heightened pleading standard of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) applies to plaintiffs' FDUTPA, negligent
misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment claims, and that under
that standard plaintiffs do not adequately allege injury for the
purpose of any of those claims.  Second, Pfizer argues that,
under any pleading standard, plaintiffs' negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of express
warranty claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b).  Third, Pfizer moves to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims
to the extent they are based on alleged misstatements included in
product advertising or on Pfizer's website, arguing that
plaintiffs cannot proceed on any theory of liability based on
alleged misstatements in product advertising, as opposed to
product labels, because neither plaintiff alleges that he or she
saw the ads or website much less that they affected his or her
purchasing decision.

Pfizer also moves to strike plaintiffs' nationwide class
allegations (to the extent the underlying claims are not
dismissed) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and 23(d)(1)(D).
Pfizer asserts that under New York's choice-of-law rules, each
proposed class member's claims are governed by the law of his or
her home state. Because the relevant laws vary substantially from
state to state, and because the National Class would include
members from all 50 states (and the District of Columbia), Pfizer
argues that it would be impossible to determine in a single
proceeding whether Pfizer is liable" to the class as a whole.
Plaintiffs counter that it is premature and inappropriate to
strike their nationwide class allegations prior to discovery.

While its motions to dismiss and strike were still pending Pfizer
moved to stay this action under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Pfizer argued that because the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) issued a request for public comments on the
definition of the term natural in the context of food labeling in
November 2015, this Court should delay adjudication of
plaintiffs' claims pending the FDA's forthcoming guidance on that
issue.

The Gravamen of Plaintiffs' Complaint is Fraud

Plaintiffs allege, repeatedly, that Pfizer intentionally made
deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and demonstrably false factual
representations in labeling and marketing the ChapStick Product
and purposefully concealed material information about them to
induce consumers to rely upon that information and buy and pay
premiums for the ChapStick Products. These common factual
allegations, are incorporated into each and every one of
plaintiffs' causes of action and in some cases are repeated even
within the causes of action that plaintiffs now claim to be
exempt from Rule 9(b).

Plaintiff Tyman's FDUTPA Claim

The Court rejects Pfizer's reading of the FDUTPA, and concludes
that plaintiff Tyman has adequately alleged injury for purposes
of her FDUTPA claim. She asserts that she paid money for the
promised benefits and natural properties of the ChapStick
Products but did not obtain the full value of the advertised
Products due to Pfizer's misrepresentations and omissions and
that she purchased, purchased more of, or paid more for, the
Products than [she] would have had she known the truth about the
Products. That is enough.

Negligent Misrepresentation and Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiffs' price premium allegations are also sufficient for
purposes of their negligent misrepresentation and unjust
enrichment claims. In Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., 2010 WL 2925955
(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010), the court found the allegation that
plaintiff "purchased vitaminwater's 'revive' and 'multi-v'
flavors at their premium price approximately one to two times per
week between October 2007 and October 2008 from various drug
stores such as Duane Reade located in New York to be sufficient
to plead plaintiffs' New York claims, including negligent
misrepresentation and unjust enrichment, with particularity, and
denied defendants' motion to dismiss as to those claims.

Plaintiffs' Negligent Misrepresentation Claims (Count VI) Should
be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

New York Law

Nothing in the Complaint distinguishes Robinson's purchase of
ChapStick Products from the vast majority of arms-length
commercial transactions, which do not give rise to negligent
misrepresentation claims. In the absence of 'even bare, minimal
contact' between the parties in a commercial transaction, no
privity-like relationship exists.  Similarly, where the statement
at issue is directed at a faceless or unresolved class or
persons, no duty of care arises. New York state and federal
courts have therefore  consistently held that advertisements
directed at consumers and intended to induce reliance" are not
sufficient to establish a special relationship.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that plaintiff Robinson's
negligent misrepresentation claim be dismissed with prejudice on
the ground that he alleges no relationship with Pfizer extending
beyond that which exists between an ordinary consumer and a
manufacturer of personal care products and therefore cannot
satisfy the "special relationship" requirement under New York
law.

Florida Law

In this case, plaintiff Tyman's negligent misrepresentation claim
alleges that the ChapStick Products failed to conform to their
label and depends upon precisely the same allegations as her
warranty claim. Both the warranty and tort claims allege that,
notwithstanding their labels, the Products are neither 100%
NATURAL' nor 'Clinically Proven.'  Because Florida's economic
loss rule applies to all tort claims" that "pertain only to the
quality of [defendant's] products" and allege only economic harm
arising from the claims, precisely what a breach of warranty
claim would allege, that rule bars the negligent
misrepresentation claim asserted by plaintiff Tyman.

The Court therefore recommends that plaintiff Tyman's negligent
misrepresentation claim be dismissed with prejudice.

The Unjust Enrichment Claims (Count V) Should Be Dismissed
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Pfizer seeks dismissal of both plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claims on the ground that they merely duplicate plaintiffs'
presumptively adequate tort and warranty claims. In addition,
Pfizer asserts, the unjust enrichment claims fail because
plaintiffs do not allege that they purchased the ChapStick
Products directly from Pfizer and therefore do not adequately
allege that they conferred a sufficiently direct benefit on
Pfizer.

The Court concludes that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a
direct economic benefit to Pfizer. However, they cannot proceed
on an unjust enrichment theory under either New York or Florida
law where, as here, their equitable claims are based upon the
same factual allegations and seek the same relief as their legal
claims, which they do not allege to be inadequate in any way.

Plaintiffs Adequately Allege a Direct Benefit to Pfizer

Under New York law, a plaintiff cannot succeed on an unjust
enrichment claim unless it has a sufficiently close relationship
with the other party.

Similarly, in Florida, no unjust enrichment claim will lie unless
the plaintiff conferred a direct benefit on the defendant.
However, direct benefit does not mean direct contact, which is
not required to state a claim for unjust enrichment. Rather, some
benefit must flow to the party sought to be charged.

The circumstances alleged here that the defendant manufacturer
marketed its product directly to consumers, but sold its product
through an intermediary, i.e. a retail outfit  satisfies the test
under both states' laws. "While the [product] is ultimately sold
through the retailer, [the manufacturer] is directly benefitted
through profits earned from the sale of the [product].

Here, athe plaintiffs are indirect purchasers who -- assuming the
truth of their allegations conferred a benefit on Pfizer by
purchasing the Products at inflated prices, albeit through
intermediary retailers. That is all that is required at this
stage of the case.

Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claims are Duplicative of Their
Legal Claims, Which They Do Not Allege to be Inadequate

Plaintiffs do not seriously dispute that their unjust enrichment
claims are based upon the same alleged facts as all of their
other claims, and seek to recover the same damages, on the same
price premium theory, from the same defendant. Nonetheless, they
argue that these claims cannot be viewed as duplicative because
they may pursue more than just price premium damages in the
future, and because the statute of limitation for unjust
enrichment is longer, in some states, than some of Plaintiffs'
other claims.

Under New York law, however, neither the theoretical prospect
that plaintiffs could plead a different damages theory in the
future nor a potentially more generous statute of limitations can
save an unjust enrichment claim from dismissal where the
substance of the claim, as currently pleaded, "simply duplicates,
or replaces, a conventional contract or tort claim."

The Court is unconvinced that there is an unjust enrichment
exception to Florida's general rule that equitable relief is "not
available where there is an adequate legal remedy. In this case,
plaintiffs do not even allege that they lack adequate remedies at
law. Nor do they argue that they could do so if given leave to
amend. Moreover, their unjust enrichment claims "seek[ ] recovery
for the exact same wrongful conduct as in their other claims."

The Court therefore recommends that both plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs' Breach of Express Warranty Claims (Count IV) Should
Be Dismissed Without Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Plaintiffs are silent as to when they purchased the Chapstick
Products. They are equally silent as to when they discovered or
should have discovered the alleged breach of warranty; that is,
that the Products were not 100% NATURAL or Clinically Proven.
Since plaintiffs fails to allege any facts that would permit the
Court to conclude that they notified Pfizer of the alleged
breaches within a reasonable time after discovering them, they
are barred from any remedy. Because the deficiency in plaintiffs'
pleading may be may be curable by amendment, however, the Court
recommends that plaintiffs' express warranty claims be dismissed
without prejudice.

Plaintiffs' Claims Fail to the Extent They Are Based on
Advertising Materials Other Than the Chapstick Product Labels

Plaintiffs allege that Pfizer made misleading statements about
the Chapstick Products on the front of the product packages, in
television commercials, and on the Products Website.

To prevail on their negligent misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, and NYGBL Section 350 claims, plaintiffs must plead and
prove that they relied on defendants' statements that the
Chapstick Products are 100% NATURAL and Clinically Proven. To
prevail on their claims under NYGBL Section 349 and the FDUTPA,
plaintiffs need not allege reasonable or justifiable reliance,
but must still plead and prove causation.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs Tyman and Robinson conspicuously
fail to allege that they relied on, or even saw, Pfizer's non-
label advertising. To the contrary: they explain in their brief
that their allegations regarding the Products Website and the
television commercials were pleaded to provide context to the
misrepresentations contained on the Products' labels  To the
extent not dismissed on other grounds, therefore, the Court
recommends that all of plaintiffs' claims be dismissed, without
prejudice, insofar as they are based on alleged misstatements or
omissions in Pfizer's non-label advertising for the Products.

THE MOTION TO STRIKE

If the Court accepts the recommendations regarding the motion to
dismiss, and dismisses all three claims in the nationwide class
allegations, the motion to strike will be largely moot.
Moreover, if plaintiffs successfully amend their complaint to
replead their breach of warranty claim (and if they once again
seek to pursue that claim on behalf of a nationwide class), their
class allegations can and should be evaluated in the context of
all of the facts alleged in the amended pleading.

The Court therefore recommends that the motion to strike be
granted, but only because plaintiffs' nationwide class
allegations are immaterial, to their claims under the NYGBL and
the FDUTPA. The Court further recommends that plaintiffs be given
leave to replead their nationwide class allegations if and when
they replead their breach of warranty claim.

The Court recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted in
part and that the following claims be dismissed:

   (1) Both plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims (Count
VI of the Complaint), with prejudice;

   (2) Both plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims (Count V), with
prejudice;

   (3) Both plaintiffs' breach of express warranty claims (Count
IV), without prejudice; and

   (4) All of plaintiffs' remaining claims, to the extent they
are based on non-label advertising, without prejudice.

The Court further recommends that the motion to dismiss be denied
with respect to plaintiff Tyman's FDUTPA claim (Count III), which
should remain for litigation along with plaintiff Robinson's
claims under the NYGBL (Counts I and II).

Finally, the Court recommends that Pfizer's motion to strike
plaintiffs' nationwide class allegations be granted, without
prejudice to repleading if and when plaintiffs replead their
breach of warranty claim.

A full-text copy of the District Courts' December 27, 2017 Report
and Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7buvfy8
from Leagle.com.

Rachel Tyman, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Johnathan Robinson, On behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by James C.
Shah -- jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah,
LLP, Jayne Arnold Goldstein -jgoldstein@sfmslaw.com -- Pomerantz
LLP, Joshua H. Eggnatz -- JEggnatz@ElpLawyers.com -- Eggnatz,
Lopatin & Pascucci, LLP, pro hac vice, Natalie Finkelman Bennett
-- nfinkelman@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah,
LLP & Kim Eleazer Richman -- krichman@richmanlawgroup.com --
Richman Law Group.

Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, represented by Thomas E. Fox --
thomas.fox@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Jessica D. Miller -- jessica.miller@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & John H. Beisner --
john.beisner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP.


PHILADELPHIA, PA: Drug Convicted Drivers Sue Over Licenses
----------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Moselle, writing for Why.org, reports that these days,
Russell Harold can get pretty depressed.

His house-cleaning business is foundering.  He hasn't seen his
grandchildren in months. And money is always tight.

"I feel hurt," he said.

Mr. Harold's troubles date back to the summer, when Philadelphia
police arrested him for drug possession.  He had prescription
pills and marijuana in his pocket while he was standing on the
corner.

Mr. Harold, 52, was sentenced to two years of probation, but he
also lost his driver's license for two years, until October 2019.

That threw a wrench in his business and getting out to see his
family.

Schlepping all his cleaning supplies on the bus isn't practical.

His grandchildren live in western Pennsylvania.  Without income
to supplement his disability checks, the rent and bills make a
bus ticket hard to afford.

"It's not in the budget," said Mr. Harold.

He filed a federal lawsuit against Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf and
the head of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.

The goal is to repeal the 1994 law under which his license was
suspended.

"You punish me not only for a criminal act.  Now you gonna punish
me for something that has something to do with transportation?
Vehicle?" said Mr. Harold.  "I don't see the sense of it," said
Mr. Harold.

Temporary loss of license complicates re-entry

Pennsylvania is one of just a few states that automatically
suspend driver's licenses for up to two years for drug
convictions.

The first conviction comes with a six-month suspension.  The
second time, it's a year.  The third conviction is two years.

It doesn't matter when the convictions happen.  A drug conviction
in 1988, for example, added another year to Mr. Harold's
suspension.

The suspension doesn't start until a driver surrenders his or her
license.  There's a restoration fee, currently $73, to reinstate
the license following the suspension.

Since 2011, nearly 150,000 people have had their licenses
suspended under the law.

The suit, which seeks class-action status, argues that's
unconstitutional, but also "irrational," "counterproductive," and
"crippling" for people who already struggle because of a criminal
record.

"Studies show that when someone is re-entering society after
serving prison time for a drug conviction, the most important
factor for them to return to a socially productive life is stable
employment.  The most important factor in keeping a job is having
a driver's license," said Phil Telfeyan, executive director of
Equal Justice Under the Law, the nonprofit behind the case.

The lawsuit also argues the law is discriminatory because it only
affects people with drug convictions, which are
disproportionately linked to highly-patrolled, poor black
communities.

"By imposing additional and debilitating measures against people
with drug convictions, defendants make successful post-conviction
rehabilitation a near impossibility," according to the suit.

A spokesman for Wolf was not immediately available for comment.
He has said Wolf supports legislation introduced to overturn the
automatic suspension.

Sean Williams, the lawsuit's other plaintiff, is a 25 year-old
father from Philadelphia who was convicted of drug possession.

Because Mr. Williams can't get his license back until next March,
he's been taking the bus to the visit his newborn son in the
hospital.

"Mr. Williams' son is coming home from the hospital soon. As a
premature infant, he will require frequent medical appointments,
and because of his vulnerability to infection, public
transportation poses a hazard to his health," according to the
suit. [GN]


PHILADELPHIA: Suit Alleges License Suspension Law Discriminates
---------------------------------------------------------------
An-Li Herring, writing for WESA FM, reports that two Philadelphia
men sued Governor Tom Wolf and the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation for automatically suspending their driver's
licenses when they were convicted of minor drug offenses.

The suspensions were mandated under a state law, which the class-
action lawsuit calls "irrational, counterproductive, and
discriminatory."

"Drug convictions, in and of themselves, are wholly unrelated to
traffic safety," the complaint asserts. "Pennsylvania's
suspension policy can only be explained as state-sanctioned
discrimination on the basis of particular animus toward people
with drug convictions."

The lawsuit points out that 38 states have already abolished
suspension regimes similar Pennsylvania's, which it describes as
a vestige of the War on Drugs.

In Pennsylvania, the lawsuit says, more than 149,000 people have
had their driver's licenses suspended due to drug-related
convictions since 2011.

"Nobody benefits from a law that suspends the licenses of people
who are safe drivers," said attorney Phil Telfeyan, Esq. --
ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- of Equal Justice Under Law,
the civil rights organization representing the plaintiffs.

Based in Washington, DC, the organization filed the class action
against PennDOT and Governor Wolf in federal court January 10.

The complaint describes Pennsylvania's suspension system as
counterproductive because, the document says, it "burdens
virtually every aspect of a person's life while undercutting the
state's interests in rehabilitation and decreasing recidivism."

One of the two named plaintiffs, Sean Williams, has an infant son
who was born prematurely and remains in the hospital, according
to the complaint. Without a license, Williams, who was convicted
of possessing small amounts of marijuana in 2017, said he finds
it difficult to visit his son.

Because his license is suspended until March 2019, Telfeyan said
the problem could persist after Williams' son comes home.

"If anything happens -- most parents would want to rush their
child back to the hospital to get immediate treatment; they jump
in the car, and they drive to the hospital," Telfeyan noted. "Mr.
Williams can't do that."

The other named plaintiff, Russell Harold, has struggled to keep
his home cleaning business afloat. Convicted for possessing a
small amount of marijuana and Xanax in 2017, the complaint says,
Harold has lost clients who are not willing to transport him and
his cleaning supplies to and from their homes.

Harold also struggles to keep doctor's appointments, according to
the complaint, which ties such obstacles to a cycle of poverty
that prevents low-income people from maintaining employment or
pursuing education.

Under state law, drug-related driver's license suspensions last
six months to two years. PennDOT is charged with enforcing the
law, but in October a PennDOT official said the department
supports repealing it through legislation that has been proposed
in the state House.

PennDOT declined to comment on the pending litigation. [GN]


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: 3d Cir. Flips Summary Judgment in "Panico"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW PANICO, Appellant, v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES, LLC, Case No. 16-3852 (3d Cir.), Judge Luis Felipe
Restrepo of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case for further consideration.

Panico is a resident of the state of New Jersey, who, by early
2010, allegedly incurred substantial debt on a credit card
account with MBNA America Bank ("MBNA").  As it arose from
spending for personal or household purposes, his obligation
qualifies as "debt" under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692a(5) of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  On June 18, 2010, MBNA
America Bank regarded Panico as delinquent on his then-
outstanding balance.  MBNA assigned the rights to the debt to
Appellee PRA, a debt collector.  Although PRA engaged in attempts
to collect the debt, it did not succeed.

On Oct. 20, 2014 -- more than three but fewer than six years
after the cause of action for debt collection accrued -- PRA sued
Panico in New Jersey Superior Court to recover the balance.  New
Jersey's relevant statute of limitations barred collection of
such debts after six years; Delaware's statute of limitations, by
contrast, proscribed collection of such debts after only three
years.  The credit agreement governing the relationship between
Panico and MBNA provided for application of the laws of the State
of Delaware, without regard to its conflict of laws principles,
and by any applicable federal laws.  Panico moved for summary
judgment, on the ground that the collections action was time-
barred.  Rather than litigate the issue of whether Delaware's
tolling statute applied to stop the state's three year statute of
limitations from running as to defendants residing outside the
state, PRA agreed to a stipulated dismissal.

In March 2015, Panico filed the putative class action in the
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The class action
alleged violations of the FDCPA and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act ("NJCFA"), on the grounds that PRA had sought to collect on a
time-barred debt.  PRA moved for summary judgment on the basis
that the debt it had sought to collect was not time-barred.  That
motion presented squarely the issue of whether the Delaware
tolling statute would apply to abrogate the statute of
limitations that would otherwise have barred the collection of
the underlying debt.  The parties agreed to address that issue
before addressing class certification, and ultimately, the
District Court granted PRA's motion for summary judgment on Sept.
14, 2016.  Panico timely appealed.

Judge Restrepo believes the courts of the case cited have the
correct reading of the interaction of the Delaware tolling and
limitations statutes as to such out-of-state defendants.  He
says, for decades, the Delaware tolling statute has abrogated the
State's statute of limitations only as to defendants not
otherwise subject to service of process.  He has heard no
evidence that the Delaware legislature intended to export the
state's tolling statute into out-of-state forums so as to
substantially limit the application of the Delaware statute of
limitations.

Departing from that precedent would also have the effect of
eliminating the protections of the FDCPA, NJCFA, and other state
statutes intended to protect debtors and regulate debt
collection.  The Judge sees no reason to predict that the
Delaware Supreme Court would reject the Hurwitch line of cases in
contravention of federal and out-of-state consumer protection law
in a manner that would result in indefinite tolling of the state
statute of limitations.  Accordingly, he declines to do so.
Therefore, Judge Restrepo reversed the order of the District
Court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with his
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/BbXqAq from Leagle.com.

PHILIP D. STERN, ESQ.  -- webinquiry@philipstern.com -- [ARGUED],
ANDREW T. THOMASSON, ESQ., Stern Thomasson, Springfield, NJ,
Counsel for Appellant Andrew Panico.

DAVID N. ANTHONY, ESQ. -- david.anthony@troutman.com -- [ARGUED],
STEPHEN C. PIEPGRASS, ESQ. -- stephen.piepgrass@troutman.com --
Troutman Sanders, Richmond, VA, AMANDA L. GENOVESE, ESQ. --
amanda.genovese@troutmansanders.com -- Troutman Sanders, New
York, NY. CINDY D. HANSON, ESQ. -- cindy.hanson@troutman.com --
Troutman Sanders, Atlanta, GA, Counsel for Appellees Portfolio
Recovery, Associates, LLC.


QUALCOMM INC: Faces Antitrust Class Action in British Columbia
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that an
antitrust class action accuses Qualcomm of conspiring to
monopolize the market for components in cell phones, in British
Columbia Supreme Court.

Plaintiff's address for service:

     KOSKIE GLAVIN GORDON
     1650-409 Granville Street
     Vancouver, B.C.
     V6C 1T2, Canada

     KOSKIE MINSKY LLP
     20 Queen Street West, Suite 900, Box 52
     Toronto, OH M5H 3R3

     Kirk M. Baert, Esq.
     Tel: 416-595-2117
     Fax: 416-204-2889
     Email: kmbaert@kmlaw.com

     James Sayce, Esq.
     Tel: 416-542-6298
     Fax: 416-204-2809
     Email: jsayce@kmlaw.com


QUEEN OF VALLEY: Denial of "Lampe" Class Certification Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL LAMPE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
QUEEN OF THE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent,
Case No. A146588 (Cal. App.), Judge Ignazio John Ruvolo of the
Court of Appeals of California for the First District, Division
Four, affirmed the trial court's order denying class
certification of Appellants Lampe and Karen McNair's wage and
hour claims against the Respondent.

QVMC is a full-service hospital with 94 departments where
Appellants Lampe and McNair are employed as nurses.  McNair
previously worked 8-hour shifts as an operating room nurse, and
in 2011 she became a relief charge nurse.  As a relief charge
nurse, she determines when to provide meal breaks for the nurses
she is supervising.  Lampe works 12-hour shifts in the mother-
child services department.

Beginning in 2011, the Appellants filed multiple versions of
their complaint in the action in three different counties.  The
current complaint is the fourth amended class action complaint
filed in Napa County, which alleges seven causes of action: (1)
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.;
(2) violation of Labor Code sections 206, 218, 226, 510, 1194,
and 1198; (3) failure to pay meal break penalties under Labor
Code sections 226.7 and 512, et seq.; (4) inaccurate wage
statements under Labor Code section 226; (5) violation of the
Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) under Labor Code sections
2698-2699; (6) unpaid wages due to illegal rounding under Labor
Code sections 218, 510, 1194, 1197 and 1198 and; (7) failure to
provide meal breaks under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512.

The Appellants filed a motion to certify an "overtime class," a
"meal break class," and a "wage statement" class.  The overtime
class consisted of two subclasses: (1) employees who earned
overtime bonuses where QVMC failed to properly calculate their
regular rate of pay, and (2) alternative work schedule ("AWS")
employees who were asked to leave work between the eighth and
twelfth hour of their shift who were not paid overtime wages.
The second class was the meal break class with a subclass of all
employees who signed meal break waivers.  The third class was
derivative of the other classes and included any QVMC employee
who received a pay stub.

They alleged QVMC has a company-wide policy of instituting and
implementing unlawful wage-and-hour policies.  They allege QVMC
does not properly compensate AWS employees who work short shifts
as required by California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
11050, subdivision 3(B)(2).  The Appellants contend that QVMC has
no written policy to inform employees that they are entitled to
overtime if they are flexed off their shift.  They argue QVMC
failed to properly calculate employees' regular rate of pay.
They also assert that QVMC required employees to waive one of
their two meal periods if they worked a 12-hour shift.

QVMC filed an opposition to the class certification motion,
arguing that the Appellants had failed to submit substantial
evidence to support their theories, and pointing out that
appellants only submitted their own declarations and offered no
testimony from any proposed class members.  It argued that
appellants raised AWS claims even though all AWS allegations were
stricken from their complaint and they were sanctioned for
repeatedly raising the claims.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court issued an order
denying the Appellants' motion for class certification.  It
concluded that individualized issues predominated and the claims
could not be proven efficiently as a class.  The Appellants
timely appealed.

Judge Ruvolo concludes that substantial evidence supports the
trial court's findings and it did not abuse its discretion in
denying class certification.  He agrees and concludes the trial
court properly denied certification of the regular rate subclass.
He finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the claim required individualized assessment and could
not be proven efficiently as a class.

The Judge also finds that the trial court correctly concluded
that common issues did not predominate and given the
individualized inquiries required and the potential conflict
between the Named Plaintiffs and the class, there were not
substantial benefits from proceeding as a class.  Finally, as to
the Appellants' move to certify a class of every nonexempt hourly
employee who received a pay stub since November 2010, he agrees
with the trial court that because class certification was not
appropriate for the overtime or meal break classes, there was no
basis to certify the wage statement class which was derivative of
the other wage claims.

Accordingly, Judge Ruvolo affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The Respondent will recover its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/yqj6kb from Leagle.com.


REDSTONE FEDERAL: Ct. Denies Bids to Junk "Caldwell" FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEMETRIUS D. CALDWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
REDSTONE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:15-
cv-01923-JHE (N.D. Ala.), Judge John H. England, III of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern
Division, denied the Defendant's motions to dismiss and granted
their alternative motions for a more definite statement.

On Oct. 29, 2015, the Caldwells initiated the action on behalf of
themselves and a purported class against Redstone and the Law
Office of C. Howard Grisham, alleging five counts including a
bankruptcy count of contempt for violating discharge injunctions
and a count for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA").   The Defendants moved to dismiss the Caldwells'
claims, and Judge England granted those motions in part and
denied them in part on Oct. 17, 2016, dismissing all but the two
claims identified.

On June 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint.  In
addition to the Caldwells, the amended complaint added named
Plaintiffs Jane B. Locklin, Bart Reeves, Mitchell A. Davis,
Jeremy D. Holland, Jessalyn Hooper, and Lorondo Brazelton ("New
Plaintiffs").  Each of the Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition in the Northern District of Alabama.  Each
owed money to Redstone and/or Grisham.  Each of them received a
discharge from the Bankruptcy Court.  Nevertheless, Redstone --
which had been mailed a copy of the discharge orders in each case
-- used Grisham to attempt to collect the discharged debt.

Specifically with respect to the Caldwells, Redstone obtained a
judgment against Sabrina Caldwell for a debt on Sept. 16, 2003.
The Caldwells jointly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on Oct. 16,
2005, and received a discharge of Redstone's debt on Jan. 25,
2006.  Despite the discharge, Redstone and Caldwell revived the
judgment and recorded it with the Madison County Probate Office
on June 20, 2013; afterwards, they attempted to collect the debt.

Redstone obtained judgments against each of the other named
Plaintiffs as well, the dates of which are identified in the
amended complaint.  The amended complaint also notes the dates on
which each Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the
dates on which each Plaintiff received a discharge of Redstone's
debt.  The amended complaint alleges as to each of the New
Plaintiffs that subsequent to the discharge, the Defendants have
attempted and/or continue to attempt to collect the discharged
debt from the Plaintiff.

On June 28, 2017, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
First Amended Class Action Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative,
for a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).  The
Plaintiffs filed a response opposing both motions, and the both
Defendants replied.

Judge England holds that the Caldwells can hang their factual
hats on the revived judgment; the New Plaintiffs have nothing
similar to support their claims.  This is insufficient to state a
claim for an FDCPA violation.  As the contempt claim relies on
the same unspecified collection activity supporting the FDCPA
claim, the Plaintiffs have likewise failed to state a claim for
contempt of the discharge order.

However, the Judge says, there is nothing to suggest these
Plaintiffs could not allege facts sufficient to support their
claims, and the Plaintiffs in fact state they are prepared to do
so.  Therefore, the motions to dismiss will be denied, and the
Plaintiffs will be permitted to amend their complaint to provide
facts identifying how the Defendants attempted to collected the
discharged debt from each of the new plaintiffs.

For these reasons, Judge England denied the motions to dismiss
and granted the alternative motions for a more definite
statement.  He ordered the Plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint by Jan. 16, 2018, which should include the factual
basis for the New Plaintiffs' claims that the Defendants
wrongfully attempted to collect the debts they discharged in
bankruptcy.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/G1kC48 from Leagle.com.

Demetrius D Caldwell, Sabrina B Caldwell, Jane B Locklin, Bart
Reeves, Davis A Mitchell, Jeremy D Holland, Jessalyn Hooper &
Loronda Brazelton, Plaintiffs, represented by Lange Clark --
langeclark@langeclark.com -- LAW OFFICE OF LANGE CLARK PC, Robert
Clois Keller , RUSSO WHITE & KELLER PC, Jeffrey P. Mauro --
jpmauro@baddleymauro.com -- BADDLEY & MAURO, LLC, John Parker
Yates -- parker@baddleymauro.com -- BADDLEY & MAURO LLC & Thomas
E. Baddley, Jr. -- tbaddley@baddleymauro.com -- BADDLEY & MAURO,
LLC.

Redstone Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by H.
Harold Stephens -- hstephens@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
CUMMINGS LLP, John E. Goodman -- jgoodman@bradley.com -- BRADLEY
ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP & Timothy P. Cummins --
tcummins@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP.

Law Office of C Howard Grisham, Defendant, represented by Larry
W. Harper -- lwh@phm-law.com -- PORTERFIELD HARPER MILLS & MOTLOW
PA, Christie J. Estes, QCHC, Inc. & James Michael Cooper --
jmc@phm-law.com -- PORTERFIELD HARPER MILLS & MOTLOW PA.


RURAL METRO: Court Compels Witness Deposition in "Calleros" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel
in the case captioned REUBEN CALLEROS AND RALPH RUBIO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated in
the State of California, Plaintiffs, v. RURAL METRO OF SAN DIEGO,
INC., RURAL METRO CORPORATION, AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC.,
ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, AND DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 17cv686-CAB(BLM) (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs, ambulance crew employees, allege that Defendants
failed to authorize and permit rest periods and violated
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200.
Plaintiffs sought additional responses to interrogatories
relating to the names and addresses of all putative class members
in California, not only those who worked in the San Diego area.
Plaintiffs also requested that a Belaire notice be sent to all
putative class members.

Defendants contended that a Belaire notice should only be sent to
putative class members who worked in the San Diego unit in which
the Plaintiffs worked.  In granting in part and denying in part
the motion, the Court noted that Plaintiffs have not provided
evidence making a prima facie showing that the Rule 23 class
requirements are satisfied for employees outside of the San Diego
region or that the requested discovery the identities of
employees who work outside the San Diego region is relevant,
proportional, and likely to establish the class allegations.

The Court further noted that if Plaintiffs discover evidence of
violations in the Northern California territories or company-wide
violations in the future, they may seek to expand the scope of
discovery at that time.

Plaintiffs seek to conduct a deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P
30(b)(6) of Defendant, Rural Metro Corporation (RMC), on topics
pertaining to whether or not RMC's ambulance crew members in
Santa Clara are relieved of all duties such that they are
permitted to take an off-duty rest period, as required by
California Law.

Defendants argue that nothing has changed since the Court's
previous discovery order in this matter and that the findings in
that order should apply to Plaintiff's' instant request.
Defendants ask that the Court issue an order limiting
precertification discovery to individuals and operations within
the San Diego region so that the parties do not keep rehashing
the same issue.

To the extent Plaintiffs are asking the Court to reconsider its
prior ruling, the Court holds that the request is untimely and
Plaintiffs have not provided any new facts. Pursuant to Local
Rule 7.1(i)(1), a party may apply for reconsideration whenever
any motion or any application or petition for any order or other
relief has been made to any judge and has been refused in whole
or in part.

Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration is untimely. The Court
issued its order on October 3, 2017. Twenty-eight days from
October 3, 2017 was November 20, 2017. While the parties
contacted the Court regarding their discovery dispute on November
17, 2017, at no point during the call did counsel for Plaintiffs
state that he wished to file a motion for reconsideration or
raise any concerns regarding the timing of filing such a motion.
Instead, Plaintiffs filed their request a week after the
deadline. Even if Plaintiffs' request had been timely, the motion
fails as Plaintiffs have not provided any "new or different facts
and circumstances. . . which did not exist, or were not shown,
upon such prior application."

Because Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is untimely and
lacking in any new or different facts or circumstances, the
motion is denied.

The scope of pre-class certification discovery lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. In seeking discovery before
class certification, Plaintiffs bear the burden of making a prima
facie showing that the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 requirements are
satisfied or that discovery is likely to substantiate the class
allegations.

While the Court finds that Plaintiffs still have not provided
evidence making a prima facie showing that the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are satisfied for employees outside of the San
Diego area, Plaintiffs have shown that the requested discovery, a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition, is relevant, proportional
and likely to establish class allegations. One of the key issues
for class certification is whether the employees in Santa Clara
County were governed by the same rules, regulations, and policies
regarding ambulance response times, out of chute times, use of
communication equipment such as pagers and cell phones, and rest
time as the San Diego County employees.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Topics 1-19 set forth in the
Amended Notice of Deposition are relevant and likely to establish
class allegations. Plaintiffs do not discuss Topics 20-22 and
therefore have not established that deposing a corporate witness
on those topics is likely to establish class allegations. The
Court also finds that a corporate deposition focused on the
relevant topics is proportional to the needs of this case.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part Plaintiffs' motion and
authorizes Plaintiffs to conduct a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)
deposition covering Topics 1-19.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7aqx9vk from Leagle.com.

Reuben Calleros, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated in the State of California & Ralph Rubio,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated in
the State of California, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Mark Pope
-- pope@popeberger.com -- Pope, Berger, Williams & Reynolds, LLP,
Harvey C. Berger -- berger@popeberger.com -- Pope, Berger,
Williams & Reynolds, LLP & Sara Jayne Waller, Pope, Berger,
Williams & Reynolds, LLP. 401 B Street, Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101

Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc., Rural Metro Corporation, American
Medical Response, Inc. & Envision Healthcare Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Michael S. Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com --
Epstein, Becker & Green, PC.


SCOTTRADE INC: "Martin" FDUTPA Suit Transferred to Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss as Moot the case captioned ANGELA LYNN MARTIN,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SCOTTRADE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-1042
T-24 AAS (M.D. Fla.), and granted the Defendant's Motion to
Transfer the case to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

Martin filed a putative nationwide class action in the Florida
Court against Scottrade, alleging claims for breach of express
contract, breach of implied contract, violations of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) and
substantially similar laws of other states, bailment, and
negligence.

In the amended complaint, Martin brought claims for breach of
contract, breach of implied contract, unjust
enrichment/assumpsit, violations of the FDUTPA, and fraudulent
inducement.  Scottrade then moved to strike the amended
complaint, arguing that it was filed without consent or leave of
court.  Alternatively, Scottrade moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, arguing that Plaintiff's claims were barred by res
judicata, that Martin failed to plead actual damages as a result
of the cyber-attack, that Martin's claims were foreclosed by the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Kuhns, that Martin failed to allege
a claim for fraudulent inducement, and that there was no personal
jurisdiction over Scottrade in Florida.

Motion to Strike

Because Martin filed her first amended complaint within 21 days
of Scottrade filing its September 19, 2017 motion to dismiss, she
did not need Scottrade's consent or leave or Court.  Accordingly,
Scottrade's motion to strike the first amended complaint is
denied. Moreover, because Martin properly filed her amended
complaint, Scottrade's September 19, 2017 motion to dismiss the
original complaint is denied as moot.

Motion to Transfer

Although Martin does not consent to transfer, she does not
dispute that this action could have originally been brought in
the Eastern District of Missouri. Indeed, she previously agreed
to transfer her prior case based on the same set of facts to the
Eastern District of Missouri. Moreover, Scottrade's headquarters
and principal place of business are in the Eastern District of
Missouri.  Accordingly, it is clear that this action could have
originally been brought in the Eastern District of Missouri.

Upon consideration of factors, the Court concludes that transfer
to the Eastern District of Missouri is warranted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycgvonaj from Leagle.com.

Angela Lynn Martin, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Anderson Benton
Dogali -- adogali@dogalilaw.com -- Dogali Law Group, PA, Geoffrey
E. Parmer  -- gparmer@dogalilaw.com, The Consumer Protection
Firm, PLLC, Geoffrey Joseph Spreter -- Spreter Law Firm, APC, pro
hac vice, James Jason Hill -- jhill@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan, Khoury
& Singer, pro hac vice, Joseph J. Siprut -- jsiprut@siprut.com --
Siprut PC, pro hac vice, Paula R. Brown -- pbrown@bholaw.com --
Blood, Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard L. Miller,
II -- rmiller@siprut.com -- Siprut, PC, pro hac vice, Richard S.
Wilson -- rwilson@rwlex.com -- Siprut, PC, pro hac vice, Thomas
J. O'Reardon II  -- toreardon@bholaw.com -- Blood, Hurst &
O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice, Timothy G. Blood --
tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood, Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice
& Timothy Douglas Cohelan, Cohelan, Khoury & Singer,  605 C St
Ste 200. San Diego, CA 92101-5394, pro hac vice.

Scottrade, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amy Lea Drushal --
drushal@trenam.com -- Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye,
O'Neill & Mullis,, Brandi L. Burke -- bburke@thompsoncoburn.com -
- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher M. Hohn --
chohn@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas E. Douglass, Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice & William
Albert McBride -- bmcbride@trenam.com -- Trenam, Kemker, Scharf,
Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Cooperates in Class Suit vs. Other Airlines
---------------------------------------------------------------
JD Supra reports that a federal judge has granted preliminary
approval of Southwest Airlines Co.'s settlement with a class of
plaintiffs alleging antitrust violations against Southwest,
American Airlines, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc., and United
Airlines, Inc.

The plaintiffs, on behalf of all purchasers of domestic flights
after July 1, 2011, allege that the four major airlines fixed
prices for domestic airline tickets by keeping seating capacity
artificially low.  Beginning in July 2015, plaintiffs across the
country filed suit alleging that the four largest U.S. commercial
airlines -- Southwest, Delta, American, and United -- agreed to
restrict capacity growth to artificially inflate airfares.  In
October 2015, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated these cases and assigned them to U.S. District Judge
Collen Kollar-Kotelly in Washington, D.C.  Based on similar
allegations, the Justice Department opened an investigation in
mid-2015 into collusion between the big four airlines to keep
flight capacity low to maintain profitability, but according to
the Wall Street Journal the Department did not find evidence
warranting a lawsuit.  Though dormant, the investigation remains
open, and it is unclear whether the Trump administration will
revisit the decision not to bring charges.

In October 2016, Judge Kollar-Kotelly denied the airlines' motion
to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
an injury-in-fact and an agreement to limit capacity growth to
artificially inflate airfares.  The case entered discovery in
early 2017, and following production of over 600,000 documents,
plaintiffs began negotiations with Southwest in September 2017.

Now, without admitting any wrongdoing, Southwest has agreed to
pay $15 million and provide extensive cooperation against the
remaining three defendants.  The settlement requires Southwest
to, among other things:  (i) provide, through counsel, a full
account of facts then known to Southwest regarding the
plaintiffs' claims, including details about communications,
pricing and profitability in the industry, and the identity of
individuals with knowledge about the alleged conduct; (ii)
facilitate and pay for informational meetings with an industry
expert; (iii) make seven Southwest employees at the vice
president level or lower available for interviews; (iv) make
three Southwest employees at the vice president level or lower
available for depositions; (v) make two Southwest employees at
the vice president level or lower available for
affidavit/declaration testimony; (vi) provide, through counsel,
information gathered from senior executives; and (vii) make one
Southwest employee at the vice president level or lower available
for trial testimony.  Judge Kollar-Kotelly's preliminary approval
triggers Southwest's payment and cooperation obligations under
the agreement, though the agreement will not be final until the
time to appeal a final approval decision has lapsed.

It is not surprising that the court granted preliminary approval
to the class settlement.  "Icebreaker" settlements that include
promises to cooperate against non-settling defendants are not
unusual in antitrust litigation, and courts have acknowledged
their value to plaintiffs attempting to prove their case and put
pressure on remaining defendants.  What remains to be seen,
however, is whether Southwest's cooperation will enable the
plaintiffs to overcome the remaining airlines' inevitable motion
for summary judgment.

The case is In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation,
15-MC-1404 (D.D.C.), and we will continue to monitor new
developments. [GN]


SPORTS TRADING Arabella Foster Facing Court Action
--------------------------------------------------
Greg Stolz, writing for The Courier-Mail, reports that Peter
Foster's niece is facing fresh court action over an alleged
multimillion-dollar sports betting scam linked to her notorious
conman uncle.

Arabella Foster is in the sights of more than 150 investors who
claim to have lost millions in the Hong Kong-based Sports Trading
Club.

Last June, the NSW Supreme Court ordered Ms Foster, the STC and
four other companies pay the investors almost $10 million after
they mounted a class action.

The investors have now launched Queensland Supreme Court action
to force Ms Foster, a "business and mindset coach for female
entrepreneurs", who divides her time between Brisbane and the
Gold Coast, to pay up.

A Sydney law firm representing the 153 claimants is seeking to
enforce the judgment against her to pay her share of the $9.7
million ordered by a judge, as well as almost $220,000 in
interest.

The action comes as Peter Foster, the self-described
"international man of mischief", languishes behind bars in NSW
awaiting trial on fraud charges linked to the STC.

He was arrested near his mansion in the Gold Coast's ritzy
Sovereign Islands early last year after STC investors hired a
private eye to probe his alleged links to the operation.

Foster was charged over an alleged scam to move more than $32
million in STC investor funds into offshore bank accounts.

In a failed bail plea in Southport Magistrates Court, Foster
admitted he had a "bad past" but claimed to be a changed man.

"My past is bad, I admit, but even God can't change the sins of
the past," he told the magistrate. Foster also claimed his life
was at risk in custody after giving evidence on accused Gold
Coast wife killer John Chardon while sharing a cell with him in
2015.

The NSW Supreme Court has issued multimillion-dollar judgments
against STC, Arabella Foster and companies including Arabella
Racing, which was linked to Caulfield Cup-winning horse
Azkadellia.

Racing Victoria stewards found Azkadellia and four other horses
were owned by Peter Foster, and charged trainer Ciaron Maher.

Peter Foster and others linked to STC are defending the class
action and a trial has been set down in the NSW Supreme Court
early next month.

Ms Foster has not filed a defence to the Queensland claim. [GN]


ST. JUDE: Canadian Suit Launched Over Cardiac Defibrillators
------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon Gibb, writing for LawyersandSettlements.com, reports that
imagine the panic one might feel when told the defibrillator
relied upon to help keep you alive, could fail at any time and
with little warning. In reality, that circumstance is one
Canadian lawsuit plaintiff Shirley Houle didn't have to imagine.
Amongst the St. Jude ICD and CRT-D device lawsuits, is a Canadian
class action launched this past May.

According to a story by The Canadian Press (CP) and carried by
CityNews (05/11/17), the Ontario resident had been implanted with
a Fortify Assura defibrillator in January, 2014. Such devices are
designed to last at least seven years before surgery is required
to replace them. In Houle's case 33 months on -- under three
years, with more than four years to go -- Houle was told by her
doctors that her medical device could fail at any time.

Without warning. And with potentially catastrophic results.

That conversation occurred in October, 2016. Five months later,
in March of last year, Houle was finally scheduled for
replacement surgery and was implanted with a different
defibrillator model.

However, for those five months Houle was left "enormously
distraught and anxious," according to CP. The Port Hope resident
remained fearful to drive on her own or to travel outside the
country for fear of suddenly losing consciousness.

A potential for 8,000 class members in Canada

That wasn't an idle fear. In Canada, according to CP, there have
been in excess of two dozen reports of patients suddenly blacking
out after their devices failed. While there were no reported
deaths in those particular situations, two European patients died
after the batteries in their defective St. Jude Cardiac
defibrillators suddenly failed. One of the two victims died just
days before a scheduled surgical replacement.

The Canadian class action lawsuit is intended to encompass some
8,000 Canadian patients implanted with the problematic
defibrillators manufactured by St. Jude Medical between January
2010 and May 23, 2015. Models include Fortify, Fortify Assura,
Fortify Assura MP, Unify, Unify Assura, or Unify Quadra. The
problem has to do with lithium cluster formation, which causes
the batteries to short-circuit. When this happens, power rapidly
depletes and leads to premature failure without warning.

When defibrillators are working properly -- including those
manufactured by St. Jude -- the devices emit a low vibration at
regular intervals, a signal to the patient that the device is
near the outer window of its life cycle and power is in decline.
Once those vibrations begin, the patient has about 90 days -- or
three months -- to get in to see their doctor and arrange for a
replacement.

In theory, it works well. Except, when it doesn't -- and that's
when defective St. Jude Cardiac defibrillators with problematic
batteries fail without warning, putting the lives of patients in
certain jeopardy.

An important aspect of any St. Jude ICD battery lawsuit is the
allegation that St. Jude Medical knew about the problems with
their ICD batteries for years, but played down the risk and
continued to ship them before finally recalling the defective St.
Jude Cardiac defibrillators in the fall of 2016.

The FDA famously took St. Jude to task

The preceding was no idle accusation. Such an allegation was made
by the very entity that rides shotgun over pharmaceuticals drugs
and medical devices -- the US Food and Drug Administration.
According to The New York Times (04/13/17), the FDA famously
issued a warning letter to St. Jude Medical in the spring of last
year taking the device maker to task for not doing enough to
rectify the situation, among other allegations.

"What bothers me most about this is that the doctors and the
patients weren't told about the potential" for failure, said Dr.
Robert G. Hauser, a retired cardiologist who campaigns for
improved safety of medical devices, in comments to The New York
Times. "And clearly this is for St. Jude's benefit. They can sell
products rather than scrapping it."

But the FDA itself did not escape Hauser's wrath. He faulted the
regulator for not having investigated St. Jude sooner. "[The FDA]
should have been in there years ago, looking at all the raw data
in order to determine if the incidence was low enough to allow
these devices to be shipped and implanted," he said.

Health Canada, the Canadian health regulator and the equivalent
to the FDA in that country, also issued warnings about the
defective St. Jude devices. Houle is joined as the representative
plaintiff in the Canadian class action by her husband Roland
Houle by way of the Family Law Act for damages suffered as the
result of injuries and losses suffered by his wife, according to
statements of claim.

St. Jude Medical Inc. and St. Jude Medical Canada are named as
co-defendants in the multi-million dollar Canadian class action
filed with the Ontario Superior Court.

Abbott acquires the assets, the liabilities and the headaches in
purchase

St. Jude was purchased a year ago by Abbott Laboratories. Based
in Chicago, Abbott paid US$25 billion to acquire St. Jude. In a
statement to CP Abbott said it would be defending its position in
the Canadian St. Jude lawsuit. Abbott told The New York Times
last April that "we have a strong history and commitment to
product safety and quality."

The Canadian class action is being stickhandled by Howie, Sacks &
Henry along with the involvement of the Waddell Phillips law
firm. In the Canadian Press article -- also carried by the
National Post as well as other major outlets in Canada --
attorney Paul Miller of Howie, Sacks & Henry noted that St. Jude
Medical breached its duty of care in failing to warn patients,
doctors as well as regulators with regard to the potentially
serious defect.

"Obviously, if you have an implanted device and you can have the
battery deplete without any warning, it could be a serious
problem," said Miller. In referencing lead plaintiff Houle,
Martin says the damages and injuries extend beyond the emotional
trauma of fearing her St. Jude defibrillator could fail at any
moment. "You are causing someone to have a surgery at an earlier
stage and at least an extra surgery," Miller said.

Allegations are yet to be proven in Court. The case is Houle et
al. v. St. Jude Medical Inc. et al., 2017 ONSC 5129, Case No. CV-
17-572508 CP in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. [GN]


STARBUCKS CORP: Judge Dismisses Putative Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal judge dismissed a putative class action accusing
Starbucks of underfilling lattes, saying the eight claims failed
to identify any false statements or misrepresentations.


TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Grants Termination Class in "Buchanan"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denied in part
the Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned BRIAN
BUCHANAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES, LTD.,
Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-01696-YGR (N.D. Calif.).

Plaintiffs Brian Buchanan and Christopher Slaight bring this
putative class action against defendant Tata Consultancy
Services, Ltd., for discrimination in employment practices.
Plaintiffs bring causes of action for disparate treatment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Third Amended Complaint (TAC) Plaintiffs Buchanan
and Slaight allege that TCS discriminated against them in their
hiring, employment, and/or termination practices based on race
and national origin.

Specifically, plaintiffs claim that TCS maintains a pattern and
practice of intentional discrimination in its United States
workforce whereby TCS treats persons who are South Asian2 or of
Indian national origin3 more favorably than those who are not
South Asian or of Indian national origin.

Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to file a fourth amended complaint
for the sole purpose of adding three additional named plaintiffs:
Steven Webber, Seyed Amir Masoudi, and Nobel Mandili. Defendant
opposes the motion on grounds of undue delay with regard to all
three, and futility with regard to Webber only.

Prejudice to TCS

Granting leave to amend will not prejudice TCS because TCS would
face claims by the proposed additional plaintiffs regardless of
whether the Court grants leave to amend. For example, were this
Court to deny leave to amend, the proposed additional plaintiffs
could file individual lawsuits alleging claims similar to those
asserted here.

Undue Delay

Defendant argues that plaintiffs cannot explain their significant
delay in moving for leave to amend nearly two years after this
lawsuit was filed.

With regard to Massoudi, the mere fact that plaintiffs' counsel
attempted to negotiate an individual settlement on behalf of
Massoudi several months before seeking leave to add him as a
named plaintiff does not establish undue delay. Defendant cites
no authority for the proposition that named plaintiffs must be
added within a certain date of attempting to negotiate an
individual settlement. With regard to Webber, plaintiffs
represent that Webber retained counsel just one day before
plaintiffs moved for leave to amend. This is sufficient. Finally,
and in any event, undue delay cannot alone justify the denial of
a motion to amend.

Futility

Here, TCS focuses its attack on Webber. Defendant does not argue
that the proposed amendment is futile with regard to Massoudi or
Mandili.

Specifically, defendant argues that Webber signed an arbitration
agreement and class action waiver which bars Webber from bringing
claims in federal court. The Mutual Agreement To Arbitrate
Claims" which Webber signed provides that TCS and Webber mutually
consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims or
controversies, past, present, and future.

The arbitration agreement which Webber signed contains no
language preventing Webber from bringing claims in an arbitration
forum together with other employees. Rather, the waiver simply
bars Webber from initiating or prosecuting any lawsuit or
administrative action" either individually or together with other
employees outside of the arbitration procedures set forth
therein. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement is enforceable
and the Court finds that adding Webber as a named plaintiff would
be futile.

The motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint is
granted in part. Leave is granted for the sole purpose of adding
plaintiffs Massoudi and Mandili. Leave is DENIED as to Webber.

Motion to Exclude Expert Opinion of Dr. Neumark

Plaintiffs offer Dr. Neumark, a professor of labor economics at
the University of California, Irvine, to opine that various
statistical disparities in the data produced by TCS are strongly
consistent with discrimination in hiring and terminations on the
basis of race and national origin.

Here, Dr. Neumark need not opine that the observed statistical
disparities were caused by discrimination for his testimony to be
relevant and helpful to the trier of fact. As in Obrey and
Coleman, Dr. Neumark's analysis shows statistical disparities
between South Asians and non-South Asians in TCS' workforce
composition and involuntary termination outcomes. The Court notes
that determining causation is the providence of the jury, not an
economic expert.

Non-discriminatory Factors

Defendant's second basis for excluding Dr. Neumark's opinion is
that he did not take into account non-discriminatory factors
which could explain the statistical disparities he observed.
TCS cannot simply identify non-discriminatory variables and
assert that controlling for such variables would cure the
observed statistical disparities. Rather, defendant must produce
credible evidence that curing the alleged flaws must also cure
the statistical disparity. Here, TCS's own economic expert, Dr.
Anderson, conceded that the data which TCS produced in this case
was insufficient to control for most of these variables through a
reliable multi-variable regression.

Thus, the Court finds that defendant has failed to demonstrate
how controlling for non-discriminatory variables explain the
statistical disparities identified by Dr. Neumark.

The Court finds that it was reasonable for Dr. Neumark to deem an
expat's first project in the United States as the expat's date of
hire.  However, the Court takes no position as to whether foreign
workers transferred to the United States pursuant to work visa in
fact constitute hires for the purposes of an employment
discrimination analysis. Rather, the Court's finding is limited
to the reasonability of Dr. Neumark's assumption, not its
ultimate validity. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants'
criticism of Dr. Neumark's inclusion of expats in his hiring
analysis goes to the weight of Dr. Neumark's opinion and does not
warrant exclusion.

Consistency with Prior Work

Defendant's fourth ground for exclusion of Dr. Neumark's opinion
is that his methodology is novel, untested, and inconsistent with
his prior published work. Defendant does not persuade, as Dr.
Neumark's methodology is consistent with the methodology used by
experts in employment discrimination cases.

Here, Dr. Neumark and TCS' economic expert Dr. Anderson
apparently agree that TCS did not produce sufficient data to
conduct a reliable multi-variable analysis which controls for
many of the variables potentially associated with productivity.
The dearth of published material employing the mythology used by
Dr. Neumark here thus does not reflect a novel or untested
mythology, but rare access to granular company-level data.

TCS' Actual Applicant Pool

TCS argues that Dr. Neumark's opinion should be excluded because
he failed to consider that 40% of TCS' actual applicant pool is
comprised of South Asian candidates.

Here, plaintiffs allege that TCS engages in a pattern and
practice of discrimination which extends to its use of third-
party recruiters to identify, target, attract, and hire South
Asian applicants. Therefore, Dr. Neumark's use of American
Community Service (ACS) employment data instead of TCS' actual
applicant pool was reasonable and TCS' criticisms go to weight,
not admissibility.

TCS' motion to exclude the expert opinion of Dr. Neumark is
denied.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Phase One: Plaintiffs' Prime Facie Case

During the initial liability stage, plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing a prima facie case that unlawful discrimination has
been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer.
Plaintiffs must show that intentional discrimination was the
defendant's standard operating procedure as opposed to an unusual
practice.

Phase One: Defendant's Rebuttal

If plaintiffs carry their initial burden of making a prima facie
showing, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut
plaintiffs' prima facie case by demonstrating that plaintiffs'
proof is inaccurate or statistically insignificant, or by
proffering a persuasive non-discriminatory explanation for the
statistical discrepancy.

Phase Two: Remedial Stage

During Phase Two, the burden shifts to the defendant but it will
have the right to raise any individual defenses it may have, and
to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an
employment opportunity for lawful reasons.

Phase One: Plaintiffs' Prime Facie Case

Plaintiffs here do not rely merely on statistical evidence alone
but offer additional documentary evidence of discrimination. The
second category of evidence is TCS documents which suggest a
pattern and practice of favoring benched South Asian expats over
Local Hires in allocating employees to onsite client projects.
Third, plaintiffs offer TCS documents which describe apparent
instructions to identify, target, and attract South Asian Local
Hires, also referred to as "Desi" applicants.

The Court finds that plaintiffs' statistical and documentary
evidence easily satisfies their burden to make a prima facie
showing. In the context of summary judgment the proof necessary
to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination is
minimal.

Phase One: Defendant's Rebuttal

Having found plaintiffs' prima facie showing sufficient, the
burden now shifts to defendant to rebut plaintiffs' prima facie
case by demonstrating that plaintiffs' proof is inaccurate or
statistically insignificant, or by proffering a persuasive
nondiscriminatory explanation for the statistical discrepancy.
TCS' attack on plaintiffs' prima facie case is that plaintiffs
fail to consider the fact that TCS' applicant pool is 40% South
Asian. Once again, defendant reiterates the same arguments
proffered in its attempt to exclude Dr. Neumark's expert opinion.
Dr. Neumark's decision to benchmark TCS' actual employment
results against the computer systems design and related services
industry is reasonable given the allegations and evidence in the
record that TCS' applicant pool may itself be the product of
discrimination.

TCS argues that the percentage of South Asians employed at TCS
decreased during the class period.  However, TCS' calculations
include only Local Hires and are thus limited to a sample size
which represents between 10% and 25% of TCS' United States
workforce.   Further, TCS offers no evidence as to whether the
statistical discrepancy between the percentage of South Asians
and non-South involuntarily terminated from the bench decreased
during the class period. The Court thus finds the evidence of
declining South Asian workforce composition insufficient in
itself to rebut plaintiffs' prima facie case.

The Court finds that TCS has failed to rebut plaintiffs' prima
facie case.

Phase Two: Remedial Stage

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to
(i) Buchanan because Buchanan cannot identify an available
position for which he was qualified and to which he applied, and
(ii) Slaight because Slaight was terminated for poor performance.
The Court finds that a ruling on the individual claims of
Buchanan and Slaight is premature.

In this case, plaintiffs' motion for class certification of their
claims is pending before this court. An individual assessment of
each plaintiff's intentional national origin discrimination claim
under McDonnell Douglas is premature.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Phase One liability
is denied. TCS' motion for summary judgment as to Phase Two is
denied as premature to the extent class certification is granted
as to Phase One.

Motion for Class Certification

Plaintiffs define the classes as follows:

   (1) Hiring Class: All individuals who are not of South Asian
race or Indian national origin who sought a position with Tata in
the United States and were not hired between April 14, 2011 and
the date of class certification.

   (2) Termination Class: All individuals who are not of South
Asian race or Indian national origin who were employed by Tata in
the United States, were placed in an unallocated status and were
terminated between April 14, 2011 and the date of class
certification.

Termination Class

With regard to the proposed Termination Class, the Court finds
that based on the standard articulated in Dukes, plaintiffs offer
sufficient proof that TCS operated under a general policy of
discrimination.

Numerosity

The Court finds that plaintiffs' showing of numerosity is
sufficient as to the Termination Class. Plaintiffs offer expert
testimony that TCS involuntarily terminated between 896 and 1,116
benched non-South Asian employees during the class period.

Hiring Class

By contrast, plaintiffs fail to offer sufficient proof that TCS
operated under a general policy of discrimination with regard to
the proposed Hiring Class.  The potential size of the proposed
Hiring Class dwarfs that of the Termination Class. According to
plaintiffs, third-party vendors alone submitted 126,000 candidate
resumes to TCS during the class period. Because third-party
vendors account for approximately half of TCS applications, the
size of the proposed class could easily exceed 250,000. The
Supreme Court suggested (when not explicitly stating) that the
sheer size of the Dukes class was key to the commonality
decision.

Typicality

As to the Termination Class, the Court finds that plaintiffs have
made a sufficient showing of typicality. To satisfy typicality,
plaintiffs must establish that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class.

The fact that TCS has articulated non-discriminatory reasons for
terminating Slaight does defeat typicality because such
justifications are merely alternative explanations for the
alleged discrimination, and it is `always the defendant's
contention in class action discrimination claims[] that the
plaintiffs suffered no discrimination, or at least that any
discrimination that occurred was isolated rather than systematic.

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)'s adequacy requirement considers (1) [whether] the
representative plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of
interest with other class members, and (2) [if] the
representative plaintiffs and their counsel will prosecute the
action vigorously on behalf of the class.

Slaight's inability to identify facts supporting his claim is
different than freely admitting that his claim fails. Further, at
the time of Slaight's deposition TCS had not produced many of the
documents which describe TCS' apparent corporate directive to
favor visa-ready individuals and expats.  Accordingly, Slaight's
inability to identify "facts that would establish" that Slaight
was terminated due to his race or national original during a
deposition which occurred before the conclusion of fact discovery
does not render Slaight an inadequate representative for the
Termination Class.

Additionally, plaintiffs' counsel, Kotchen & Low LLP, have
experience litigating class action claims in both federal and
state courts, and appear to have been prosecuting this action
vigorously. Defendant raises no arguments to the contrary.
Therefore, the Court finds that Slaight and his counsel have
satisfied the adequacy requirement under Rule 23(a)(4).

Superiority

Lastly, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that a class action is
superior to individual suits. To make this determination, the
Court considers the following four non-exhaustive factors: (1)
the interests of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against the members of the class; (3) the
desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.

TCS' main argument here hinges on its assertion that superiority
is "diminished by the sheer volume of individualized inquiries
necessary to establish individual recovery." Defendant does not
persuade. Although individualized inquires will necessarily
remain after Phase One, the remaining questions will be greatly
narrowed because the threshold question of whether TCS maintained
a pattern and practice of discriminating against non-South Asian
employees will have been be resolved on a classwide basis. By
trying Phase One a classwide basis, the Court and the parties
will achieve significant efficiencies by eliminating the need to
litigate the overarching pattern or practice issue for each
individual plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for class
certification of the Termination Class and denies the motion as
to the Hiring Class. In light of the Court's ruling, the motion
to certify a class under Rule 23(c)(4) is denies as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Courts' December 27, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y83jrvql from Leagle.com.

Brian Buchanan & Christopher Slaight, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel A. Kotchen dkotchen@kotchen.com., Kotchen & Low LLP,
Daniel Lee Low dlow@kotchen.com, Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael J.
Von Klemperer -- mvk@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP, Lindsey
Grunert -- ltremaine@kotchen.com -- Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael
F. Brown -- mbrown@dvglawpartner.com -- DVG Law Partner LLC &
Steven Gregory Tidrick -- sgt@tidricklaw.com -- The Tidrick Law
Firm.

Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd, Defendant, represented by
Michelle M. LaMar -- mlamar@loeb.com  -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Bernard
Robert Given, II -- bgiven@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb, Erin Michelle
Smith -- esmith@loeb.com -- Loeb and Loeb LLP, Laura Ann Wytsma -
- lwytsma@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Patrick Norton Downes --
pdownes@loeb.com -- Loeb And Loeb LLP & Terry D. Garnett --
tgarnett@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP.


TD BANK: Court Certifies Class in "Rench" Racketeering Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Staci M. Yandle of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the case, ABRA RENCH, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TD BANK, N.A., A-
1 ALLERGY RELIEF, INC., and HMI INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 3:13-cv-00922-SMY-RJD (S.D. Ill.).

In 2010, HMI engaged TD Bank's services to finance consumer
purchases of HMI products.  Specifically, in October 2010, TD and
HMI agreed to use TD's Renovate Card Program to facilitate HMI's
sales to consumers.  Under the Renovate Card Program, HMI
distributors provided consumers with Renovate Card Applications
to finance the purchase of HMI products.

HMI developed and utilized promotional materials, including
scratch cards.  The scratch cards were mailed to consumers.  The
back of the card instructed recipients to "Call Immediately" the
"Winners Hotline" to learn which prize they had won.  They were
designed to induce consumers to allow HMI sales associates into
their homes -- "entry approval" -- to sell HMI products (Doc. 70-
1 pp. 21-22, 43).

The Plaintiff received a scratch card in the mail sometime
between August and September 2012.  She scratched a winning hand
and called the "Winners Hotline" to see what prize she had won.
Without telling the Plaintiff what prize she had won, the
individual answering the hotline call told her that she had to
agree to an in-home product demonstration in order to receive her
prize.

Pam Williams, a sales associate with A-1, visited the Plaintiff
in her home on Sept. 7, 2012.  Williams proceeded with a sales
pitch for a FilterQueen vacuum and filter that lasted several
hours, during which time she instructed the Plaintiff to complete
a single-page TD Bank Credit Card Account Application.  The
application included the Plaintiff's age (72), occupation
("server") and monthly gross income ($1,690).  At the conclusion
of the visit, Williams left the air filter with the Plaintiff.
Although the Plaintiff had not purchased anything, TD charged
$970 to her Renovate credit card account on Sept. 10, 2012.

On Sept. 14, 2012, Williams came back to the Plaintiff's home, at
which time the Plaintiff told Williams that she did not want to
purchase the filter or vacuum. Nevertheless, Williams proceeded
with a second demonstration of the vacuum that again lasted
several hours.  During the second presentation, Williams offered
the Plaintiff several "deals" to entice her to purchase the
products on a TD Renovate credit card with 0% financing and a
two-month "trial period" during which Plaintiff could return the
products at no cost.  After several hours, the Plaintiff signed
the Sales Memorandum and Bill of Sale Receipt, which showed a
price of $2,798 charged to the Plaintiff for the vacuum and
filter.  She never received any documents disclosing the finance
charges or interest rates related to the Renovate Account. She
wrote to A-1 in October 2012 and requested that they come and
pick up the air filter.

The Plaintiff now moves for class certification under Rules 23(a)
and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

She seeks to represent three classes:

     a. The RICO Class: All individuals in the United States who,
within the four years preceding the filing of the Complaint: (A)
received in the mail a promotional sweepstakes scratcher ticket
identifying A-1 Allergy and/or Simple Air Solutions and not
identifying HMI and/or TD Bank; and (B)(i) purchased a Filter
Queen product; or (ii) incurred a charge for a Filter Queen
product on a Renovate Credit Card Account.

     b. The IPGA Subclass: All individuals who are citizens of
Illinois and who, within three years prior to the filing of the
Complaint: (A) received a promotional sweepstakes scratcher
ticket identifying a distributor of HMI, and not identifying HMI
and/or TD Bank; and (B)(i) purchased a Filter Queen product; or
(ii) incurred a charge for a Filter Queen product on a Renovate
Credit Card Account.

     c. The ICFA Subclass: All Illinois consumers who, within
three years prior to the filing of the Complaint, received a
promotional sweepstakes scratcher ticket identifying a
distributor of HMI, and not identifying HMI and/or TD Bank; and
(B)(i) purchased a Filter Queen product; or (ii) incurred a
charge for a Filter Queen product on a Renovate Credit Card
Account.

Judge Yandle granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification and the certified the following classes pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:

     All (A) individuals in the United States who, within the
four years preceding the filing of the Complaint received in the
mail a promotional sweepstakes scratcher ticket identifying A-1
and/or Simple Air Solutions and not identifying HMI and/or TD
Bank; or (B) individuals in the State of Illinois who, within the
four years preceding the filing of the initial Complaint in the
Litigation received in the mail a promotional sweepstakes
scratcher ticket identifying a distributor of HMI, and not
identifying HMI and/or TD Bank; and (C)(i) individuals who
purchased a Filter Queen product; or (C)(ii) individuals who
incurred a charge for a Filter Queen product on a Renovate Credit
Card Account through any HMI Distributor.

Further, the Judge appointed Sabra Rench, as the Class
Representative; and Kevin Green, Thomas Rosenfeld, Mark
Goldenberg and the law firm Goldenberg Heller Antognoli &
Rowland, P.C. as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/loKpH2 from Leagle.com.

Sabra Rench, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green --
kevin@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller et al., Mark C. Goldenberg
-- mark@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller Antognoli & Rowland, PC &
Thomas P. Rosenfeld -- tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC.

HMI Industries, Inc, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Gary K. Shipman -- gshipman@shipmanlaw.com --
Shipman & Wright, LLP, Scott D. Bjorseth -- sbjorseth@rssclaw.com
-- Rynearson, Suess et al & William G. Wright --
wright@shipmanlaw.com -- Shipman & Wright, LLP.


TOKYO ELECTRIC: Judge Dismisses Class Action
--------------------------------------------
Bianca Bruno, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
federal judge on January 5 dismissed without prejudice the latest
class action filed by hundreds of U.S. sailors exposed to
radiation in the Fukushima, Japan, nuclear disaster, finding a
San Diego courtroom isn't the right place for the case.

U.S. District Judge Janis Sammartino issued a 15-page order
dismissing the class action against Tokyo Electric Power Co.
(TepCo) and General Electric, finding the service members who
were stationed aboard the USS Ronald Reagan in San Diego have
failed to establish how the Japanese utility's acts were directed
at California.

"There is no targeting here. Plaintiffs' allegations that the
effects of TepCo's conduct were felt by American citizens while
on U.S. ships, one of which with a home port of San Diego, are
too attenuated to establish purposeful direction," Sammartino
wrote.

Sammartino added the sailors "have provided no information to
support an assertion that TepCo knew its actions would cause harm
likely to be suffered in California."

In an email, class attorney Cate Edwards, Esq. said, "We
appreciate the time and attention that Judge Sammartino gave our
arguments. Per her order, we intend to refile the case on behalf
of the Bartel Plaintiffs and continue to fight for the justice
these sailors deserve. We will also be moving forward with the
Cooper case in due course, and look forward to reaching the
merits in that case."

The judge's order dismisses the most recent class action filed in
San Diego Federal Court last August. It follows another class
action filed by an initial group of sailors in 2012, a year after
they were sent to render aid after the March 11, 2011 tsunami and
earthquake which caused the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant to
meltdown and release radiation. That case has survived dismissal
and an appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

More than 420 U.S. service members in the two cases seek
compensation and medical monitoring, testing and health care
costs for exposure to radiation. Some sailors have died from
complications of radiation exposure since the cases were filed,
and more than 20 are living with cancer, according to the
lawsuits.

In a court hearing January 4, Sammartino considered the motions
to dismiss from TepCo and GE. They argued California courts have
no jurisdiction over events in Japan. Sammartino also considered
a choice-of-law motion from General Electric, which wants to
apply Japanese law to the case or have it transferred to Japan.

TepCo operated the Fukushima nuclear plant, and GE designed its
reactors.

TepCo attorney Gregory Stone, Esq. -- Gregory.Stone@mto.com --
with Munger, Tolles & Olson in Los Angeles, said at the January 4
hearing all claims brought in the United States could be brought
in Japan and that the statute of limitations has not run out
there.

GE attorney Michael Schissel, Esq. -- michael.schissel@apks.com
--- with Arnold & Porter in New York, also said the case belongs
in Japan, where the facts originated and the witnesses are.
Schissel said the Japanese government declared the nuclear
meltdown was not a natural disaster, so TepCo could be held
liable for damages.

But former Sen. John Edwards, of the firm Edwards Kirby in North
Carolina, said it's important to look at the situation "from
altitude," to see things from the sailors' perspective.

"These are American sailors, American employees serving their
country, who were sent on American ships on international waters
at the request of the Japanese government . . .  their ally,
which owns the majority of stock in defendant TepCo," Edwards
said.

"Being on an American ship in international waters puts you on
American soil."

Edwards said that since the vast majority of the sailor-
plaintiffs were stationed in San Diego and GE designed the
nuclear reactors at its San Jose headquarters, the case belongs
in California.

"They want the case in Japan because they know it goes away;
that's clearly their strategy," Edwards said.

He added: "This case screams federal jurisdiction; this case
screams United States of America. The underlying concept of this
whole thing is fundamental and basic notions of fairness being
met."

Edwards' co-counsel Charles Bonner, Esq. with Bonner & Bonner in
Sausalito, said if the case were transferred to Japan, where GE
could be dismissed as a defendant, GE could "continue building
their defective reactors with impunity."

Bonner added that California has a vested interest in applying
its own laws, including strict liability for defective products,
and punitive damages to deter companies from selling defective
products. He pointed out that one-sixth of the U.S. Navy is based
in San Diego, with 69 Navy ships in San Diego Harbor.

"(Japan's) compensation act has not been applied to their own
citizens, only businesses. Why should we speculate their
compensation act will help our sailors? It will not," Bonner
said.

Stone countered that Bonner was "simply wrong" in claiming that
the Japanese nuclear damage compensation act had not benefited
individual Japanese citizens. He said it is the conduct of
defendants TepCo and GE -- which occurred in Japan -- and not the
plaintiffs' place of residence that should determine jurisdiction
over the case.

The sailors' attorneys indicated January 4 if Sammartino
dismissed the class action, they would seek leave to amend their
first case, Cooper v. TepCo, to add additional plaintiffs who
were dismissed from the second case, Bartel v. TepCo. The
defendants are expected to oppose the motion.

Stone and Schissel did not immediately return phone and email
requests for comment January 5.


UNITED STATES: Bid to Dismiss Counts 4-6 in "Hamama" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, USAMA J. HAMAMA, et al., Petitioners, v. REBECCA
ADDUCCI, et al., Respondents, Case No. 17-cv-11910 (E.D. Mich.),
Judge Mark A. Goldsmith of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, granted in part
the  Petitioners' motion for class certification, granted in part
the Petitioners' motion for preliminary injunction, and denied
the Government's motion to dismiss, as it pertains to counts four
through six.

The case arises out of the arrest and detention of Iraqi
nationals who are or were subject to long-standing final orders
of removal.  In June 2017, agents from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), a division of the Department of Homeland
Security, began arresting hundreds of these Iraqi nationals, the
majority of whom are Chaldean Christians who would face
persecution, torture, and possibly death if returned to Iraq.

The vast majority of these individuals were ordered removed to
Iraq years ago (some decades ago), because of criminal offenses
they committed while in the United States.  While the detainees
were scheduled for imminent removal following their arrests, the
Court enjoined their removal in a July 24, 2017 ruling.

Having concluded that the Court had jurisdiction to rule on
Petitioners' habeas claims, the Court determined that Petitioners
were entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining their removal
until they had a meaningful opportunity to challenge the
continued validity of their orders of removal in immigration
courts and, if necessary, the courts of appeals.  Since the
Court's preliminary injunction was entered, roughly 91% of the
motions to reopen have been granted in the Detroit immigration
court.

Based on due process principles and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, the Petitioners now seek relief from detention
under a number of theories, as set forth in their motion for
preliminary injunction.

Petitioners first argue that they are entitled to release
pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, a seminal decision requiring,
except in extraordinary circumstances, release of detainees when
there is no reasonable likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.  In response, the Government submits
declarations from ICE officials stating that Iraq has agreed to
cooperate in the removal of the putative class members.

Judge Goldsmith agrees that the end point of the legal process is
reasonably foreseeable.  But he holds that there is insufficient
evidence in the record to determine whether Iraq is willing to
accept class-wide repatriation.  Without a reasonable expectation
that removal would follow the termination of legal proceedings,
the definitive "end-point" of the legal process does not solve
the due process problem of indefinite detention.  Because it is
unclear whether repatriation is likely, the Judge defers ruling
on Petitioners' Zadvydas claim, pending further discovery.

Petitioners' second theory is that, even if their removal is
reasonably foreseeable, their detention has become unreasonably
prolonged.  They argue that this unreasonable detention entitles
them to a bond hearing before an impartial adjudicator, such as
an immigration judge, to determine whether they are a flight risk
or danger to the community.  In response, the Government argues
that Sixth Circuit precedent defeats Petitioners' claim based on
an unreasonably prolonged detention and corresponding entitlement
to a bond hearing.

The Judge holds that those detainees who have been in custody for
six months or more are entitled to bond hearings, unless the
Government presents specific evidence to the Court demonstrating
why a particular detainee should be denied that right, such as
evidence that the detainee has engaged in bad-faith or frivolous
motion practice in an effort to artificially prolong the removal
process.  Bond hearings will be conducted by immigration judges
who will consider flight and safety risks.

The Petitioners contend that the Zadvydas and prolonged detention
claims are assertable by detainees, regardless of whether the
Government purports to detain them under the mandatory provisions
of Section 1226(c).  Therefore, they also ask that bond hearings
be ordered for those detainees being held under that provision.

The Government argues that those who have had their motions to
reopen granted are not exempt from mandatory detention, and that
courts have interpreted Section 1226(c) to require mandatory
detention for those who had been living in their community after
completion of their criminal sentences.

Judge Goldsmith agrees with the Petitioners and holds that
Section 1226(c) does not apply to those who have had their
motions to reopen granted or who were previously living in their
communities for years after the conclusion of their criminal
sentences.  He says Section 1226(c) contemplates an expeditious
removal proceeding, which is typically not possible when a motion
to reopen is granted and certainly is not the case here.
Further, the plain language of Section 1226(c) requires the
conclusion that mandatory detention is only permissible when an
alien is placed into immigration custody immediately following
the completion of his or her criminal sentence.

The Petitioners' motion for preliminary injunction intersects
with issues raised by the Government's motion to dismiss.  In its
motion, the Government seeks dismissal of all of Petitioners'
claims as pled in the amended complaint -- those pertaining to
detention, as well as those based on removal, transfer, and right
to counsel -- on the grounds that they are either
jurisdictionally barred or fail as a matter of law.

The Judge will consider -- and deny -- the Government's motion in
conjunction with the detention claims raised in the motion for
preliminary injunction, and defers a ruling on the remaining
issues raised in the Government's motion.

Finally, the Petitioners have filed a motion to certify the
putative primary class and three detention subclasses.  Because
the Judge is limiting its decision to detention issues, he will
only consider certification of the detention subclasses.

The Judge holds that these individual differences are
insufficient to defeat certification, and that the Petitioners
have made a sufficient showing for class certification of the
subclasses.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Goldsmith granted in part the
Petitioners' motion for class certification.  He certified a
subclass for the Zadvydas claim pleaded in count four.  The
subclass consists of all Primary Class Members, who are currently
or will be detained in ICE custody, and who do not have an open
individual habeas petition seeking release from detention.  The
definition of the primary class to be used for purposes of
defining the subclasses is all Iraqi nationals in the United
States who had final orders of removal at any point between March
1, 2017 and June 24, 2017, and who have been, or will be,
detained for removal by ICE.  The primary class itself is not
being certified at this time.

The Judge certified a detained final order subclass for those
pleading a prolonged detention claim pleaded in count five.  The
subclass consists of all Primary Class Members with final orders
of removal, who are currently or will be detained in ICE custody,
and who do not have an open individual habeas petition seeking
release from detention.

He certified a mandatory detention subclass for those pleading a
prolonged detention claim pleaded in count five and for those
pleading a Section 1226(c) claim pleaded in count six.  The
subclass consists of all Primary Class Members whose motions to
reopen have been or will be granted, who are currently or will be
detained in ICE custody under the authority of the mandatory
detention statute, and who do not have an open individual habeas
petition seeking release from detention.

Attorneys Margo Schlanger and Kimberly Scott of Miller Canfield
are appointed as the class counsel.  Any other relief requested
in the motion for class certification is deferred.  Any issues
pertaining to class action may be raised at the forthcoming
conference or through future proceedings.

Judge Goldsmith granted in part the Petitioners' motion for
preliminary injunction.  He required the Government to release,
no later than Feb. 2, 2018, any detained member of the detained
final order subclass and any member of the mandatory detention
subclass who has been detained, as of Jan. 2, 2018, for six
months or more, unless a bond hearing for any such detainee is
conducted on or before Feb. 2, 2018 before an immigration judge;
provided that neither release of a particular detainee nor a bond
hearing for that detainee will be required if the Government
files with the Court a memorandum, by Feb. 2, 2018, objecting to
a bond hearing for any specific detainee and supplies evidence
supporting the objection.  If such an objection is filed, the
release of the detainee and the conducting of a bond hearing will
be deferred pending further order of the Court.

The Judge ordered that any subclass member whose detention first
exceeds six months after Jan. 2, 2018, will be released no more
than 30 days after the six-month period of detention is
completed, unless a bond hearing for any such detainee is
conducted during that 30-day period before an immigration judge;
provided that neither release of such detainee nor a bond hearing
for such detainee will be required if the Government files with
the Court a memorandum, before the end of that 30-day period,
objecting to a bond hearing for such detainee and supplies
evidence supporting the objection.  If such an objection is
filed, the release of the detainee and the conducting of a bond
hearing will be deferred pending further order of the Court.

At the bond hearing, the immigration judge will release the
detainee under an order of supervision unless the immigration
judge finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the detainee
is either a flight risk or a public safety risk.  The parties may
engage in discovery directed to the Zadvydas claim.  The
discovery will encompass depositions of appropriate government
personnel with knowledge of the Iraq repatriation agreement or
program, and production of documents pertaining to that subject.

The Judge directed that the counsel will confer regarding
additional specific requests, and later depositions, by Jan. 5,
2018.  The disagreements regarding the discovery, including scope
and applicable privileges, will be addressed by the Court at the
forthcoming conference.  The parties' respective positions on any
disputes, including legal authorities, will be set out in the
Joint Statement of Issues referenced.  He held that the relief
requested regarding A-Files and ROPs will be addressed in a
separate order.

The Judge denied the Government's motion to dismiss, as it
pertains to counts four through six.  He says the consideration
of the balance of the motion is deferred pending resolution of
the appeal of the Court's earlier preliminary injunction before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and/or
pending other legal developments.

The Court will convene an in-person conference to address any
issue raised by the Opinion and Order on Jan. 11, 2018 at 9:30
a.m.  By noon on Jan. 9, 2018, the parties will file a Joint
Statement of Issues, setting forth their agreement and
disagreement on any matter that they wish to raise at the
conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/Lk0UBn from Leagle.com.

Usama J. Hamama, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba --
Bkitaba@aclumich.org -- American Civil Liberties Union of
Michigan, Kary L. Moss -- kmoss@aclumich.org -- American Civil
Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott --
scott@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, Lee Gelernt,
American Civil Liberties Union, Michael J. Steinberg --
msteinberg@aclumich.org -- American Civil Liberties Union Fund of
Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman -- maukerman@aclumich.org --
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code
Legal Aid, Inc., Nora Youkhana -- norayoukhana@gmail.com --
Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed --
susanree@michiganimmigrant.org -- Michigan Immigrant Rights
Center/Michigan Poverty Law Progr, Wendolyn W. Richards --
richards@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, Margo Schlanger
-- margo.schlanger@gmail.com -- Maria Martinez Sanchez --
msanchez@aclu-nm.org -- American Civil Liberties Union of New
Mexico & William W. Swor -- wwswor@sworlaw.com.

Atheer F. Ali, Ali Al-Dilami, HABIL NISSAN, Jihan Asker, Moayad
Jalal Barash & Sami Ismael Al-Issawi, Petitioners, represented by
Bonsitu A. Kitaba, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan,
Kary L. Moss, American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan,
Kimberly L. Scott, Miller, Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg,
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J.
Aukerman, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Nadine
Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger,
Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed, Michigan Immigrant Rights
Center/Michigan Poverty Law Progr, Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller,
Canfield, Margo Schlanger & Maria Martinez Sanchez, American
Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico.

Abdulkuder Hashem Al-Shimmary, Qassim Hashem Al-Saedy & Abbas Oda
Manshad Al-Sokaini, Petitioners, represented by Kimberly L.
Scott, Miller, Canfield, Maria Martinez Sanchez, American Civil
Liberties Union of New Mexico & Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller,
Canfield.

Mukhlis Murad, Adel Shaba, Kamiran Taymour, Jony Jarjiss, Jami
Derywosh & Anwar Hamad, Petitioners, represented by Kimberly L.
Scott, Miller, Canfield.

Thomas Homan & John F Kelly, Defendants, represented by August E.
Flentje, U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel Civil
Division, Briana Yuh, United States Department of Justice Civil
Division, Jennifer L. Newby, U.S. Attorney Defensive Litigation,
Michael Celone, United States Department of Justice Office of
Immigration Litigation, Sarah S. Wilson, U.S. Attorney's Office,
Vinita B. Andrapalliyal, United States Department of Justice,
Civil Division Office of Immigration Litigation & William C.
Silvis -- william.silvis@usdoj.gov -- United States Department of
Justice Civil Division.

Rebecca Adducci, Respondent, represented by August E. Flentje,
U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel Civil Division, Briana
Yuh, United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Jennifer
L. Newby, U.S. Attorney Defensive Litigation, Michael Celone,
United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration
Litigation, Sarah S. Wilson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Vinita B.
Andrapalliyal, United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division Office of Immigration Litigation & William C. Silvis,
United States Department of Justice Civil Division.

Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III & Elaine C. Duke, Respondents,
represented by Michael Celone, United States Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Sarah S. Wilson, U.S.
Attorney's Office, Vinita B. Andrapalliyal, United States
Department of Justice, Civil Division Office of Immigration
Litigation & William C. Silvis, United States Department of
Justice Civil Division.

The Chaldean Community Foundation, Amicus, represented by Carl M.
Levin -- clevin@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn
LLP, Gabriel E. Bedoya -- gbedoya@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller
Schwartz & Cohn LLP & Sarah E. Waidelich --
swaidelich@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP.

Current and Former U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Amicus,
represented by Elisa J. Lintemuth -- elintemuth@dykema.com --
Dykema.

Detention Watch Network, Amicus, represented by David W. Williams
-- dwilliams@jaffelaw.com -- Jaffe, Raitt.


UNITED STATES: Releases Undocumented Teen Amid Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Christina Zhao, writing for Newsweek, reports that the Trump
administration released a pregnant, undocumented teenager from
federal custody on Jan. 14, after she filed paperwork accusing
the Office of Refugee Resettlement of obstructing her from
getting an abortion.

The 17-year-old -- known as Jane Moe in court records -- is 17
weeks pregnant and the fourth undocumented immigrant the Trump
administration has tried to block from timely access to abortion
services.  The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) -- an office
within the Department of Health and Human Sciences -- has
jurisdiction over all unaccompanied minors who enter the U.S.
without authorization.

After Moe filed paperwork accusing the ORR of restricting access
to an abortion on Jan. 11, the Trump administration responded a
day later with plans to release her by January 26.

But instead, she was freed on Jan. 14, nearly two weeks early,
reported Vice News.

"While we are relieved that Jane Moe is reunited with her
sponsor, the government blocked her from her abortion for more
than two weeks, before deliberately moving her out of their
custody only when we filed to take them to court,"
Brigitte Amiri, a senior staff attorney at the American Civil
Liberties Union's (ACLU) Reproductive Freedom Project, said in a
statement.

"We continue to pursue all avenues to ensure that no other young
woman like her is forced to continue a pregnancy against her will
for purely political reasons."

The ACLU represented Moe and the three teenagers before her that
were also blocked from obtaining an abortion.  With their help,
the court sided with the women and they were all eventually
allowed to get abortions.

The ACLU has announced plans to engage in a class-action lawsuit
involving Moe and the three similar cases that preceded hers,
according to Vice News.  However, a judge must allow it to
proceed and no rulings have been made as yet.

"The Trump administration is effectively banning abortion for
these young women," Ms. Amiri said.

"We've already stopped the government from forcing three other
'Janes' to continue pregnancies against their will, but clearly
their heartlessness knows no bounds."

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS: Sued Over Fees for Copy of Medical Records
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
patient and his attorneys at Pomerantz and Crosby filed a class
action against University Hospitals Medical Group for charging
$78.78 for a copy of his medical records, in Cuyahoga County
Court.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

     James S. Wertheim, Esq.
     JAMES S WERTHEIM LLC
     24700 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 309
     Beachwood, OH 44122
     216-225-6663
     wertheimjim@gmail.com


VIRCUREX: Customer Files Class Action Lawsuit in Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
Lucinda Knapp, writing for ETH News, reports that several years
ago, the cryptocurrency exchange, Vircurex, halted trading and to
date, it has not returned all assets to its customers. This week,
a proposed class-action lawsuit was filed in the Colorado
District Court by a Vircurex customer on behalf of all of its
unsatisfied customers.

Many traders who used Vircurex say their funds have been frozen
since shortly after the MtGox scandal made 850,000 bitcoin
inaccessible in February of 2014. Vircurex had already weathered
two security breaches in the previous year -- attacks that left
it teetering on the brink of financial ruin. The pressure MtGox's
market vacuum placed upon Vircurex was too great; it no longer
had the liquidity to support withdrawals.

Initially, the exchange seemed to be on the level in its attempts
at providing refunds to its customers, including by releasing and
distributing a relatively small amount of funds from its own cold
storage wallet. But over time, that trickle dwindled down to
nothing. Vircurex's website reflects that the last recorded
payout was in 2016, while the exchange's mysterious management
have disappeared into obscurity.

Per the complaint filed by the law firm representing the
plaintiff, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP:

"Rather than repay the frozen funds, defendants took steps to
string along plaintiff and the class with deceptive statements
and false promises, and made efforts to cover their tracks and
create impediments designed to deter account holders from
bringing suit to recover the frozen funds, and efforts to
ultimately attempt to vanish without a trace."

Levi & Korsinsky says it was able to locate one of Vircurex's
founders, German national Andreas Eckert (who goes by the online
pseudonym "Kumala"), and also names an unknown Chinese partner
(which the suit labels "Defendant Doe").

The complaint alleges that Vircurex's conduct violates the
contract it struck with users, which stated they could withdraw
their funds at any time. It also asserts claims for fraud and
unjust enrichment, and seeks an order forcing the exchange to
deliver all of the frozen cryptocurrency, which included bitcoin,
Litecoin, Terracoin, Feathercoin, and Dogecoin, back to the
customers. [GN]


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Canadian Unit Agrees to Settle Class Action Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Volkswagen AG's Canadian unit said on
January 12 it had agreed to settle a class action lawsuit by
compensating users of some Volkswagen, Audi and Porsche diesel
vehicles over emission issues.

Under the proposed settlement, the company will compensate 20,000
car owners and lessees with cash and other benefits worth up to
C$290.5 million. [GN]


VOCUS GROUP: To Restructure Amid Class Action Over Fin'l Guidance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Corinne Reichert, writing for ZDNet, reports that Vocus has
announced that it will be separating its wholesale and enterprise
arms as part of what it called its accelerated transformation
program.

As a result, Vocus will now have four operating segments:
Enterprise and Government; Wholesale and International; Consumer;
and New Zealand.

In a statement to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), Vocus
CEO Geoff Horth said the restructure follows its AU$861 million
acquisition of Nextgen Networks in July 2016, which "opened new
markets and presented significant growth opportunities".

"The opportunities available in Vocus' domestic wholesale
business, combined with our investment in the Australia Singapore
Cable, warrants the creation of a dedicated Wholesale and
International division and will ensure that we have the focus,
products, and service proposition to be the provider of choice to
customers in this important market," Mr. Horth said.

The current CEO of Enterprise and Wholesale, Michael Simmons,
will run the Wholesale and International division; the current
CEO of Consumer, Scott Carter, will now lead the Enterprise and
Government arm; and Sandra de Castro will run Vocus Australia's
Consumer portfolio.

According to Mr. Horth, de Castro will bring digital
transformation and innovation expertise from her previous
strategy and marketing roles at AGL and the National Australia
Bank (NAB). She will "help to drive the next phase of growth and
customer centricity in our consumer division", he added.

Vocus also announced its intention to release interim results on
February 20, though this will be in its current structure of
three divisions.

The company had in October announced its decision to sell off the
New Zealand arm of its business, with a proposed completion date
by the end of FY18.

"The board has now determined that the Vocus New Zealand (VNZ)
business will be prepared for sale finalising appointment of
advisors," Vocus said at the time.

"The board has also progressed its review of the non-core
Australian assets: Advisors appointed to the sale of the
Australian datacentre assets [and] other non-core Australian
assets will continue to be evaluated with regard to potential
divestment or closure."

Despite selling its stake in Macquarie Telecom for AU$41 million
in March last year, Vocus' full-year results for FY17 saw a
turnaround in its FY16 net profit of AU$64.1 million to a net
loss of AU$1.5 billion due to "higher than forecast net finance
costs and a higher effective tax rate", along with what Horth
called "a more competitive business environment" in both
Australia and New Zealand.

Underlying net profit was AU$152.3 million, while underlying
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortisation
(EBITDA), not including significant items during the year, was
AU$366.4 million, up 70 percent.

Revenue grew by 119 percent year on year to AU$1.8 billion, and
the company's net debt increased by 35 percent to AU$1.03 billion
and is expected to climb even higher, to up to AU$1.06 billion
for FY18.

Last year, law firm Slater and Gordon announced that Vocus would
be facing a potential class action from its shareholders over
having downgraded its financial guidance in May.

According to Slater and Gordon, the proposed class action alleges
that "Vocus engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct because
it had no reasonable grounds for the original FY17 guidance
issued in November 2016"; and that the telco "breached its
obligations of continuous disclosure by failing to disclose that
it would not achieve the FY17 guidance".

Vocus' original guidance had relied on assumptions "without
proper visibility of profitability" made about growing the
business through its AU$1.2 billion acquisition of Amcom in June
2015, its Nextgen acquisition, and its merger with M2 in February
2016 to form the third-largest telecommunications provider in New
Zealand and the fourth-largest in Australia worth more than AU$3
billion, Slater and Gordon said.

Vocus' revised guidance saw forecast revenue reduced by AU$100
million, underlying EBITDA reduced by between AU$65 million and
AU$75 million, and net profit reduced by between AU$45 million
and AU$50 million.

As a result of its downgraded guidance, the company in June
received a takeover proposal from Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co
(KKR) to acquire 100 percent of its shares at a price of AU$3.50
per share via a scheme of arrangement, with Vocus then allowing
KKR to conduct due diligence to explore whether a binding
transaction could be agreed upon.

Shortly afterwards, Affinity Equity Partners submitted a takeover
proposal in July to acquire 100 percent of Vocus for the same
amount; however, two days before Vocus was due to announce its
FY17 full-year financial results, both takeover proposals were
terminated.

Vocus is set to begin laying the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC)
next month. [GN]


WECONNECT INC: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Goplin"
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin issued an Opinion and Order denying Motion to Dismiss
or Stay Proceedings in the case captioned BROOKS GOPLIN,
Plaintiff, v. WECONNECT, INC., Defendant, No. 17-cv-773-jdp (W.D.
Wis.).

WeConnect moves to dismiss the case in favor of arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement or to stay the case pending
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.

Plaintiff Brooks Goplin was a satellite/cable technician for
defendant WeConnect, Inc. In this proposed class action, Goplin
contends that WeConnect failed to pay him for some of the time he
spent working and altered his time records to deprive him of
regular and overtime wages, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and Wisconsin wage and hour laws.

WeConnect hired Goplin as a satellite/cable technician. A week
later, Goplin signed a document titled AEI Alternative
Entertainment, Inc. Open Door Policy and Arbitration Program.
The document contained the following arbitration provision:

   "By agreeing to this policy, you agree that in consideration
for your employment and in exchange for promises made by AEI,
Inc. (AEI or the Company), both you and AEI understand and agree
that either one may elect to resolve the following types of
disputes exclusively through binding arbitration. Disputes
between you and AEI (or any of its affiliates, officers,
directors, managers or employees) relating to your employment
with the Company (including but not limited to:

   (1) claims of discrimination under federal, state or local
laws, (2) claims regarding compensation, including overtime; (3)
claims regarding promotion, demotion, disciplinary action, and/or
termination; and (4) claims regarding the application or
interpretation of any of the terms of this agreement)."

It also contained what is sometimes called a concerted action
waiver:

   "By signing this policy, you and AEI also agree that a claim
may not be arbitrated as a class action, also called
'representative' or 'collective' actions, and that a claims may
not otherwise be consolidated or joined with the claims of
others."

WeConnect argues that Goplin "waived his right" to argue that the
concerted action waiver violates the NLRA by failing to assert
that argument in a charge filed with the National Labor Relations
Board within the six-month limitations period established by the
act.

The Court finds that there is no indication that WeConnect is a
party to the arbitration agreement. "WeConnect" does not appear
anywhere in the arbitration agreement; rather, the agreement
purports to bind Goplin and AEI. WeConnect argues that
'WeConnect' and AEI' are two names for the same entity. In
support, it adduces only a conclusory statement in the
declaration of Kevin LeCloux: "I am employed by WeConnect, Inc.,
formerly known as Alternative Entertainment, Inc. or AEI as
Director of Human Resources. There's no reason to think that
Goplin knew that AEI was another name for WeConnect (as WeConnect
suggests) at the time he signed the agreement. And in fact, AEI
isn't just another name for WeConnect.

As Goplin notes, WeConnect's own website indicates that AEI
ceased to exist in September 2016, when it merged with WeConnect
Enterprise Solutions to form WeConnect, Inc. Goplin didn't sign
the arbitration agreement until March 2017, half a year later.
WeConnect cites no authority for the proposition that WeConnect
can continue to enter into valid, enforceable contracts under
AEI's name post-merger, after AEI ceased to exist.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9dn5unx
from Leagle.com.

Brooks Goplin, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Marie Madden --
cmadden@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel, S.C. & David C. Zoeller --
dzoeller@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel, S.C.

WeConnect, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kurt A. Goehre,
Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C. & Ross William
Townsend, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C. 231 South Adams
Street, P.O. Box 23200, Green Bay, WI 5430


WELLMONT HEALTH: Tenn. App. Flips Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------
The appeals case captioned HIGHLANDS PHYSICIANS, INC., v.
WELLMONT HEALTH SYSTEM, No. E2017-01549-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App.),
is an interlocutory appeal as of right from certification of a
class.

Plaintiff, a physician-owned independent practice association,
and Defendant, an organization that owns several hospitals and
medical clinics, formed a physician-hospital organization to
further their mutual interests, such as joint negotiations with
entities such as insurance companies. Plaintiff filed a class
action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that Defendant
breached the contractual non-solicitation and non-competition
agreement between the parties, which caused harm to Plaintiff and
its members. Plaintiff moved to certify a class consisting of
itself and its members, and Defendant objected.

The trial court certified the class with respect to all claims
pursuant to each of the three categories of class actions
specified in Rule 23.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Wellmont presents the following issues for review on appeal:

   1. Whether the trial court erred in certifying a class because
HPI, a for profit corporation, does not have standing to assert
claims for individualized damages against Wellmont on behalf of
its shareholders, members, and independent medical practice
groups?

   2. Whether the trial court erred in certifying a class because
HPI failed to establish the requirements for class certification
under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.01?

   3. Whether the trial court erred in certifying a class because
HPI failed to establish the requirements for class certification
under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02?

Standing

Wellmont asserts that the trial court erred in certifying the
class because HPI, a for profit corporation, does not have
standing to assert claims for individualized damages against
Wellmont on behalf of its shareholders, members, and independent
medical practice groups. Wellmont continuously asserts that HPI
cannot represent the class because the proposed class is
comprised of HPI's own members/shareholders.

Rule 23.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure requires
compliance with each of Rule 23.01's four (4) requirements as
prerequisites to a class action lawsuit:

   (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable,

   (2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class,

   (3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and

   (4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class.

These requirements are commonly referred to as (1) numerosity,
(2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of
representation. Wellmont does not dispute that HPI has
demonstrated compliance with the first and second elements of
Rule 23.01  numerosity and commonality.

Typicality

Wellmont alleges that the trial court erred in finding that HPI
met its burden of proving that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties HPI are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.

According to Wellmont, to have the ability to bring direct claims
of the shareholders, HPI would have to establish, among other
things, that the shareholders' claims and HPI's claims are
distinct and not reliant on evidence of injury to the other.  HPI
and its members are all claiming individualized injuries flowing
from Wellmont's conduct. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at
Knoxville, affirmed the trial court's finding of typicality.

Adequacy of Representation

In addition to proving that HPI's claims are typical claims, HPI
must also prove that, as a putative class representative, it will
adequately represent the interests of the class.

Wellmont points to the fact that some of HPI's members are
employed by subsidiaries of Wellmont, and Wellmont assumes that
these members would "obviously" not want to harm the parent
company of their employer, Wellmont. Wellmont, however, does not
point to anything in the record on appeal to support this
statement. The most basic function of HPI as an organization is
to promote the interests of its members.

The Tenn. App. concludes that the record supports the trial
court's findings above and the determination that HPI is an
appropriate class representative.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02

After the proponent of class certification demonstrates
compliance with each of Rule 23.01's requirements, the proponent
must next establish the class action is maintainable under Rule
23.02.

Rule 23.02(1) allows for a class action lawsuit when: (1) the
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of (a) inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or(b) adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would as a practical matter
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or would substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interest.

With respect to subsection (b) of Rule 23.02(1), the trial court
found that HPI has pled claims the disposition of which could, as
a practical matter, be dispositive of its individual members'
claims. These claims should be decided on a class basis. Again,
the trial court did not elaborate on what claims could be
dispositive of individual members' claims. HPI asserts that "to
avoid giving Wellmont inconsistent obligations, a court could
bind HPI's members to an adverse ruling on such issues."

The Tenn. App. found this argument to be speculative and
unpersuasive.  HPI has not shown that there is a substantial risk
that any of the declaratory or injunctive relief sought by HPI
would infringe upon the rights of its individual members.
Furthermore, HPI has not claimed that the relief it seeks against
Wellmont might deplete Wellmont's resources or otherwise impair
others' rights to pursue and collect their own judgments against
Wellmont.

Therefore, the Tenn. App. reversed the trial court's finding that
certification is appropriate under Rule 23.02(1)(b).

Rule 23.02(2) creates a second type of class action when the
following requirement is met: (2) the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole.

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.02(3) provides that
the third type of class action set forth in Rule 23.02 is
permitted when: (3) the court finds that the question of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the findings include: (a) the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.

The Tenn. App. agreed with the trial court and HPI that a class
action trial would be superior to other methods available for
adjudicating the claims at issue in this case. Individual actions
are not a reasonable alternative. The Tenn. App. said it cannot
see how it would be preferable to have potentially hundreds of
cases with different judges in different courts dealing with
these same legal and factual issues. In such a scenario, there is
clearly the possibility of different results, with different
plaintiffs being treated differently and different obligations
for Wellmont. The Tenn. App. discerned no error in the trial
court's decision that a single class action lawsuit heard by one
judge resolving the issues once and for all for everyone is the
best course of action.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's
finding that the class would be manageable. In this particular
case, the claimants are all known and ascertainable  about 1,500
physicians/members of HPI. Further, there is an organization,
HPI, already in place that represents the interests of all
potential class members. HPI also has the ability to communicate
with all potential class members and the resources and counsel
secured to prosecute the case.

Accordingly, the Tenn. App. reversed the order of the trial court
granting class certification pursuant to Rule 23.02(1) and
affirmed the remainder of the trial court's order granting class
certification and remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Tenn. App.'s December 28, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yatzgpt8 from Leagle.com.

J. Ford Little and William Kyle Carpenter, 900 Riverview Tower,
900 S. Gay Street, Knoxville, TN -- 37902  Knoxville, Tennessee,
for the appellant, Wellmont Health System.

Elizabeth Hutton, 104 East Main Street, Johnson City, TN 37604,
Tennessee, and Gary Michael Elden -- gelden@shb.com -- Pro Hac
Vice, and Matthew C. Wolfe -- mwolfe@shb.com -- Pro Hac Vice,
Chicago, Illinois, for the appellee, Highlands Physicians, Inc.


WELLS FARGO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Muniz" as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------
Before the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California are the following two motions, (1) defendants Wells
Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage's (Wells Fargo) Motion to Dismiss Class Action
Complaint; and (2) Wells Fargo's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
Class Definition and Tolling Allegations.

By order filed November 30, 2017, the Court granted the parties'
stipulation to extend to December 18, 2017, the deadline for
plaintiff Victor Muniz to respond to the motions by filing an
amended complaint and thereby render the motions moot. On
December 18, 2017, Muniz filed his First Amended Complaint.

Wells Fargo's motions to dismiss and to strike are denied as
moot.

The case is VICTOR MUNIZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO &
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04995-MMC (N.D.
Cal.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y7o4xde9 from Leagle.com.

Victor Muniz, Plaintiff, represented by Derek William Loeser --
dloeser@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice.

Victor Muniz, Plaintiff, represented by Gretchen Freeman Cappio -
- gcappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac
vice & Matthew J. Preusch -- mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback, L.L.P..

Brian Brach, Plaintiff, represented by Eric H. Gibbs -
ehg@classlawgroup.com --  Gibbs Law Group LLP, Aaron Blumenthal -
ab@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP, Amy Marie Zeman --
amz@classlawgroup.com -- Girrard Gibbs LLP & Michael Lawrence
Schrag -- mls@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group LLP.

Wells Fargo & Company, Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves
-- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, Kobi Kennedy
Brinson -- kbrinson@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn, LLP, pro hac
vice & Stacie C. Knight -- sknight@winston.com -- Winston &
Strawn LLP, pro hac vice.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Amanda L.
Groves, Winston & Strawn LLP, Kobi Kennedy Brinson, Winston &
Strawn, LLP, pro hac vice & Stacie C. Knight, Winston & Strawn
LLP, pro hac vice.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Defendant, represented by Amanda L.
Groves, Winston & Strawn LLP, Kobi Kennedy Brinson, Winston &
Strawn, LLP, pro hac vice & Stacie C. Knight, Winston & Strawn
LLP, pro hac vice.


WELLS FARGO: Can Compel Arbitration in "Gadomski" FCRA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case, KELLIE GADOMSKI, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO
BANK N.A., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00691-TLN-AC (E.D. Cal.).

The claims at issue arise out of the parties' dealings regarding
a consumer credit account the Defendant provided to the
Plaintiff.  On Sept. 5, 2009, the Plaintiff signed a Preferred
Customer Credit Card Application.

The Application specifically states that a customer acknowledges
receipt of a copy of the credit card account agreement, the
existence of the arbitration agreement contained in the credit
card account agreement, and specifically agrees to be bound by
its terms.  Further, the Arbitration Agreement states, if any
party covered by this agreement elects arbitration, that election
is binding on all parties to the Agreement.

Sometime in 2012, the Plaintiff fell behind on her credit card
payments, prompting the Defendant to "charge off" the Account.
Then on or about April 23, 2013, the Plaintiff filed for Chapter
7 Bankruptcy.  Her debts owed to the Defendant were scheduled and
included in the Bankruptcy filing.  The Defendant was informed of
the Bankruptcy Action filing.

On Aug. 12, 2013, the Plaintiff's debts were successfully
discharged in the Bankruptcy Action.  On the same day, the
Defendant received notice of the Plaintiff's discharged debt.
The Plaintiff did not reaffirm the debt obligation to the
Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleges that on Nov. 13, 2016, the Defendant
reported, or caused to be reported, inaccurate information on an
Equifax credit report.  Additionally, she alleges the same
inaccurate information was reported in a TransUnion credit report
on the same day.  She alleges this information is inaccurate
because the Defendant classified the debt as "charged off,"
rather than discharged in Bankruptcy, which represented to
potential creditors that she was actively delinquent with respect
to the debts owed to the Defendant, when in actuality, the debts
were no longer owed to it.

Once aware of these inaccuracies, the Plaintiff disputed the
report in writing with Equifax and TransUnion.  On or about
December 2016, she received notification from Equifax and
TransUnion stating Defendant had been notified of the dispute.
She alleges that, rather than fix the inaccuracies, the Defendant
failed to correct the problem and continued to report inaccurate
information.

Further, she alleges that, because of the Defendant's inaccurate
reporting, her credit worthiness was damaged.  As a result of the
alleged reporting inaccuracies, the Plaintiff alleges the
Defendant has violated section 1681 of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA") and section 1785.1 of the California Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act ("CCCRAA").

Moreover, the Plaintiff seeks to bring the claim on behalf of all
those similarly situated.  Specifically, she alleges the class is
made up of potentially hundreds of thousands of individuals who
had a consumer credit report prepared on or after February 2012,
inaccurately depicting debts owed to Defendant as "charged off,"
rather than "discharged in bankruptcy."  Consequently, she
asserts the class is entitled to recover economic damages for the
inaccurate reporting.

The Defendant brings the Motion to Compel Arbitration of
Plaintiff's claims.

Judge Nunley finds that the Plaintiff failed to establish that
arbitration is unsuitable for her claims because the Agreement
was rendered unenforceable.  In addition, whether the Plaintiff's
claims arising under FCRA and CCCRAA are within the scope of the
Agreement must be decided by the arbitrator.

The Judge also finds the "small claims exception" inapplicable to
the Plaintiff's claims because the potential class of hundreds of
thousands of individuals ensures the claims would exceed the
jurisdictional limit of California's small claims court.  And
because both claims are to be arbitrated, he dismisses the
Plaintiff's claims in favor of arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Nunley granted the Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and dismissed the Plaintiff's claims pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6).  He directed the Clerk of the Court to close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ets2rP from Leagle.com.

Kellie Gadomski, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Seyed Abbas
Kazerounian -- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, APC, Clark
Ovruchesky -- co@colawcalifornia.com -- Law Office of Clark
Ovruchesky & Matthew M. Loker -- ml@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law
Group, APC.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Alisa A.
Givental -- aag@severson.com -- Severson & Werson & Rebecca
Snavely Saelao -- ss@severson.com -- Severson & Werson.


WEXFORD HEALTH: Court Denies Move for Class Action Status
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division an Order denying Plaintiff's
motion to amend the complaint and motion for class certification
in the case captioned PAUL ROBERSON, Plaintiff, v. Dr. PAUL
TALBOT; WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES; and CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES,
Defendants, No. 1:17-cv-04110-TWP-DML (S.D. Ind.).

Mr. Roberson filed a motion to amend his complaint and join
parties and a motion for class action status and certification.

The original complaint had not yet been screened, and defendants
had not yet been served nor had they answered. Thus pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), plaintiff could amend his complaint once
as a matter of course and thereafter with leave of court freely
given when justice so required. But plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint adds two more plaintiffs, both inmates of the
Department of Correction.

Neither have paid a filing fee nor sought in forma pauperis
status. While they assert their claims against the same
defendants are common, a review of the claims demonstrate
sufficient differences to require separate actions.

Given that each of the plaintiffs in Mr. Roberson's proposed
amended complaint would need to seek and obtain in forma pauperis
status separately, or pay the entire filing fee separately, it
would be better for each plaintiff to proceed on his own in
separate cases.

The motion to file an amended complaint that adds two additional
plaintiffs is denied.

The Court is not persuaded that there are questions of law or
fact that are common to the entire proposed class. The Court is
not persuaded that the claims and defenses of the proposed
representative parties are typical of all proposed members of the
class. Lastly, because plaintiff and the proposed class
representatives are not attorneys, they could not, at this time,
satisfy the fourth condition that they could fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. The motion for
class action status is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 28, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hutgw3 from Leagle.com.

PAUL ROBERSON, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

PAUL TALBOT, Dr., Defendant, Pro Se.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, Defendant, Pro Se.

CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES, Defendant, Pro Se.


WORTHINGTON PJ: Settlement in "O'Connor" Suit Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD O'CONNOR, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. WORTHINGTON PJ, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-608-FtM-38MRM (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Sheri Polster Chappell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, preliminarily approved
the parties' settlement.

The case involves claims relating to alleged minimum wage
violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Florida
Minimum Wage Act, and the Florida Constitution, as both a
collective action and Rule 23 class action.  The terms of the
settlement are set out in the Settlement Agreement fully executed
by the proposed Class Representatives, Ronald O'Connor and Jordan
Garrett, and Defendant Worthington PJ.

Pursuant to the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval,
the Court has preliminarily considered the Settlement to
determine, among other things, whether the Settlement Agreement
is sufficient to warrant the issuance of notice to members of the
proposed Settlement Class.  Judge Chappell preliminarily approved
the parties' settlement and set the following schedule for the
further approval and administration of the settlement:

     a. Deadline the Defendants must provide the Settlement
Notice Administrator with addresses for Class Notice to be mailed
- Jan. 16, 2018

     b. Deadline for the Defendants to mail CAFA notices - Jan.
12, 2018

     c. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to mail Class
Notice, Claim Forms, and Opt-Out Forms - Jan. 30, 2018

     d. Deadline for the Potential Claimants to post-mark Opt-Out
Forms - March 16, 2018 and Objections

     e. Deadline for the Potential Claimants to post-mark Claim
Forms - April 2, 2018

     f. Deadline for the Parties to file response to objections -
April 9, 2018

     g. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to provide list
of Claimants to Parties - April 12, 2018

     h. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to provide list
of Claimants to Parties - April 17, 2018

     i. Motion for Final Approval - April 20, 2018

     j. Final Fairness Hearing - TBD by United States Magistrate
Judge Mac R. McCoy

     k. Entry of Final Approval Order by Court Effective Date -
Within the later of 30 days after (1) the Final Approval Order;
(2) the dismissal of any timely filed appeal; or (3) a final
appellate judgment

     l. Deadline for the Defendant to Fund Claims - Within 14
days of Effective Date

     m. Deadline for the Settlement Administrator to mail
individual - Within 30 days of payments to each Participant
Claimant Effective Date

The Judge, in conducting the settlement approval process required
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, certified, for purposes of settlement
only, the Settlement Class of all persons who worked for
Worthington PJ at its Papa John's franchises as delivery drivers
at any time from Aug. 4, 2012 through the date of the Order.  He
appointed Named Plaintiff O'Connor and Opt-in Plaintiff Jordan
Garret to be the representatives for the Settlement Class, and
Sommers Schwartz, P.C. and Butcher & Associates, P.L. as the
Class Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class.

By no later than the date set forth in the schedule, the
Settlement Notice Administrator will cause the proposed Class
Notice, attached to the Settlement Agreement, with such non-
substantive modifications thereto as the parties may agree upon,
to be sent by first class mail to the last known address of each
member of the Settlement Class for whom the Settlement Notice
Administrator has a valid e-mail address.

The parties agree that the Class Counsel will seek approval of
attorney fees and reimbursement of expenses separate and apart
from the present motion and the Gross Settlement Fund.  Further,
upon consideration of the relevant authorities, Judge Chappell
preliminarily approved the proposed Class Representatives'
service awards.  The preliminary ruling regarding service awards
is subject to final review and approval upon the Court's review
of the Class Counsel's Motion for Final Approval and
consideration of any timely objection from a member of the
Settlement Class.  The Counsel will file their Motion for Final
Approval no later than the date set forth in the schedule.

A fairness hearing is referred to the U.S. Magistrate Judge Mac
R. McCoy.  The parties must contact Judge McCoy's Chambers to
arrange a mutually agreeable time to participate in the fairness
hearing.

The expenses of printing and mailing and publishing all notices
required will be paid as described in the Settlement Agreement.
The Order does not resolve the last pending claim or close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 2, 2018 Preliminary Approval
Order is available at https://is.gd/WJ5cfF from Leagle.com.

Ronald O'Connor, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles R. Ash, IV --
cash@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice, Jesse
L. Young -- jyoung@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, PC, Bradley
William Butcher -- bwb@b-a-law.com -- Butcher & Associates, PL,
Jason J. Thompson -- jthompson@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz
& Neil B. Pioch -- npioch@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz,
P.C..

Worthington PJ, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendant,
represented by Ignacio J. Garcia -- ignacio.garcia@ogletree.com -
- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C., J. Robert
McCormack -- bob.mccormack@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Jennifer K. Oldvader, Ogletree Deakins,
PC.


YUME INC: "Rosenfeld" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
----------------------------------------------------------
Joel Rosenfeld, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Yume, Inc., Eric Singer, Mitchell Habib,
Adriel Lares, Elias Nader, Christopher Paisley, John Mutch, Brian
Kelley, and Stephen Domenik, Case No. 5:18-cv-00194 (N.D. Calif.,
January 9, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant hereto, a
continuous stockholder of YuMe.

Defendant YuMe is a Delaware corporation and maintains its
principal executive offices at 1204 Middlefield Road, Redwood
City, California 94063. YuMe is a provider of multi-screen
programmatic video advertising technology.

The Individual Defendants are directors of YuMe. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
      Beverly Hills, CA 90210
      Tel: (310) 208-2800
      Fax: (310) 209-2348
      E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com


ZAIS GROUP: Potential Fiduciary Duty Breach Investigated
--------------------------------------------------------
Brad Bennett, writing for The Daily Telescope, reports that
shareholder rights law firm Johnson Fistel, LLP has launched an
investigation into whether the board members of ZAIS Group
Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: ZAIS) breached their fiduciary duties in
connection with the proposed sale of the Company to the Z
Acquisition LLC and Christian Zugel, the Company's Chairman and
Chief Investment Officer.  ZAIS is an investment management
company, focusing on investments in specialized credit
strategies.

On January 12, 2018, ZAIS announced that it had signed a
definitive merger agreement with Z Acquisition LLC. Under the
terms of the agreement, ZAIS shareholders would only receive
$4.10 in cash for each share of ZAIS common stock.

The investigation concerns whether the ZAIS board failed to
satisfy its duties to the Company shareholders, including whether
the board adequately pursued alternatives to the acquisition and
whether the board obtained the best price possible for ZAIS
shares of common stock.  Nationally recognized Johnson Fistel is
investigating whether the proposed deal price represents adequate
consideration, especially given that ZAIS last reported having
$1.12 per share in cash and no long-term debt.

If you are a shareholder of ZAIS and believe the proposed buyout
price is too low or you're interested in learning more about the
investigation or your legal rights and remedies, please contact
lead analyst Jim Baker (jimb@johnsonfistel.com) at 619-814-4471.
If emailing, please include a phone number.

                    About Johnson Fistel, LLP

Johnson Fistel, LLP -- http://www.johnsonfistel.com-- is a
nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm with offices in
California, New York and Georgia.  The firm represents individual
and institutional investors in shareholder derivative and
securities class action lawsuits. [GN]



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