CAR_Public/180130.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


             Tuesday, January 30, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 22



                            Headlines


ACADEMY LTD: "Lasley" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Rodriguez" Suit in District of New Jersey
ALCON LABORATORIES: 3d Cir. Denies Rehearing in "Cottrell"
ALL ABOUT YOU: WCJ Judgment in Worker's Compensation Suit Upheld
AMERICAN HONDA: Faces "Floyd" Suit in C.D. California

AMERICAN PAYMENT SYSTEMS: "Palacios" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
ANTHEM INSURANCE: $48MM Fee Request in Settlement Challenged
APPLE INC: Faces Class Action in Korea Over iPhone Performance
ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Kuhn Appeals Ruling to Ninth Circuit
ARYZTA LLC: "Barnes" Remanded to the State Court

ASD SPECIALTY: Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed
ATLANTIC MARINE: "Whatley" Suit Underway in South Carolina
AUTO-OWNERS: Bid to Dismiss "Lammert" Suit Denied
BALDWIN TAVERN: Fails to Pay for Kitchen Staff's OT, Rosario Says
BERKSHIRE HEALTH: "Clark" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages

BMW: Faces Class Action in Australia Over Use of Takata Airbags
BP EXPLORATIONS: "Harriel" Suit Transferred to Mississippi
BUFFALO WILD: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
CARMAX BUSINESS: "Santos" Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court Narrows Claims in "Clark" FDCPA Suit

CAVIUM INC: "Stein" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
CHARLES SCHWAB: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Fleming" Suit
CHERRY HILL GOURMET: "Cuahuizo" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
COMPUTER SCIENCES: Fails to Provide Rest Periods, Action Claims
CORELOGIC INC: Mitchell Sues for Denied OT Pay, Wage Statements

CORIZON HEALTH: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in "Abraham" Class Suit
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CA: "Harris" Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
COVELLI ENTERPRISES: Ex-Panera Bread Employee Files Class Action
DEMI AG INC: Court Enters Default Judgment in "Juarez" Labor Suit
DRY CAST: Sent Unsolicited Fax Messages, "Conner" Suit Says

EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Wants Banana Boat Sunscreen Class Action Nixed
EDWARDS WILDMAN: Li Sues over Defective Cosmetic Products
ELM RIDGE: Feb. 8 Planning Conference in "Neiberger" Suit
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Averts Class Action Over Drug Pricing Methods
FAIRWAY STAFFING: Fails to Pay Employees OT, "Gomez" Suit Says

FCA US: Faces "Sheets" Class Suit Over Workers Benefits Seniority
FCA US: Court Issues Final Pretrial Order in "Hall" Suit
FEDLOAN SERVICING: Gallagher Sues Over Student Loan Mismanagement
FERGUSON ENTERPRISES: Fails to Pay All Wages, Conner Says
FOGO DE CHAO: Does Not Properly Pay Employees, Action Claims

FORD MOTOR: Responds to Class Action Over Emissions Cheating
FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Anderson" MMPA Suit
GENERAL NUTRITION: Judgment in "Chevalier" Suit Partly Affirmed
GOPRO INC: Faces Class Action, March 12 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
GREEN SUMMIT: Sued by "Garcia" Over Unpaid OT Wages, Tips

HARRIS TEETER: "Laurence" Class Cert. Motion Due May 16
HEALTH GENESIS: Echevarria Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
HERMOSA BEACH, CA: "Marks" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA
HIGHLINE BUILDING: Berrios Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
HOSPITALITY STAFFING: "Rodriguez" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages

HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Karpik Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Denial of Class Certification Bid Reversed
INTEL CORP: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
INTEL CORP: Faces at Least 12 Class Actions Over Chip Flaws
J.K. GREEN: Answer to "Marquez" Suit Due Jan. 31

J.M. SMUCKER: Joseph Alleges Mislabeling of Crisco No-Stick Spray
JAMES HOLDINGS: Court Vacates Class Certification in "Bagot"
JOHNSON COUNTY, IN: Ind. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Alford" Suit
JP MORGAN CHASE: "Doherty" Suit over Robocalls Dismissed
KELLOGG CO: Court Lifts Two-Year Stay in "Mohamed" Suit

KRISPY KREME: Court OKs Disclosure Only Class Action Settlement
KROGER CO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended "Perez" Suit
LEPRINO FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Wage and Hour Suit
LEPRINO FOODS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in "Vasquez" Suit OK'd
LUXOR LIMO: "Chohan" Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay, Reimbursements

M & Y CARE: "Cardwell" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages
MBA WASTE SERVICES: Discovery in "Moore" Wages Suit Underway
MDL 2804: Judge OKs Expanded Plaintiffs Leadership Team
MI GROUP: Files Answer to Amended Complaint in "Roy" Suit
MOUNT SINAI: 2nd Circuit Affirms Ruling in TCPA Class Action

NEW KANG SUH: "Lee" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
NEW JERSEY: "Cloud" Suit Alleging Harassment Underway
NEW JERSEY: "Miller" Suit over Discrimination Underway
NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE: "Reynoso" Class Suit Shelved
NFL: 3d Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Finkelman" Suit

NIAGARA BOTTLING: Frompovicz Files Suit Over False Ad
NORTH ALABAMA FAMILY: Sued for Denying Health Care Staff OT Pay
NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE: Cal. App. Refuses to Certify "Caudle" Class
O'REILLY AUTO: Davidson Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to 9th Cir.
PALO ALTO NETWORKS: Fifth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Godert" Suit

PARK COUNTY, CO: Inmates File Class Action v. Corrections Dept.
PHARMAVITE LLC: Ference Appeals Order in "Barrera" to 9th Circuit
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES: Settles Price-Fixing Class Action
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: Compelled to Reply to "Adamov" RFPs
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: ERISA Suit Stayed Pending "Sweda" Ruling

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Stewart Files Suit Over Deceptive Ads
PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: Alpizar-Fallas Appeals Ruling to 3rd Circuit
QUALITY CABLE: Helpers Not Included in Class of Foremen
QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in "Racies"
REINS INT'L: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Kim" Labor Suit

REPROS THERAPEUTICS: Neuterman Seeks to Block Allergan Deal
RICHMOND HOMES: All Claims in Homeowners' Suit Dismissed
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY BANK: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Bridges"
SCANA CORP: Consumers' Class Action Ongoing
SEATIDE GOURMET: "Gonzalez" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages

SIX FLAGS: Littler Mendelson Attorneys Discuss BIPA Case Ruling
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM: 3d Cir. Won't Enforce Settlement vs. La. AG
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON: Sued Over Los Angeles-Area Wildfires
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Wages, "Caudle" Suit Says
STEAK N SHAKE: Court Certifies Class of Missouri Managers

SUGAR TRANSPORT: Court Denies Certification of Truck Drivers
SUNRISE CREDIT: Liberato Sues over Debt Collection
SYNEOS HEALTH: Jan. 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
TDS TELECOM: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Carroll" Suit
TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Feller"

UNITED STATES: Prelim Injunction in Detainees' Suit Affirmed
UNITED STATES: Prelim Injunction in Hawai'i Suit Partly Affirmed
US STEEL CORP: Athan Files Suit to Recover Wages, Benefits
USAA GENERAL: 2 Suits over Medical Reimbursements Consolidated
WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: $7.3MM Arbitration Award Confirmed

WILLOWICK, OH: Denial of Judgment Bid in "Abramezyk" Affirmed
WILLOWICK, OH: Denial of Judgment Bid in "Ragazzo" Affirmed
WYNDHAM HOTELS: Macias Sues over Sexual & Disability Bias
ZTO EXPRESS: "Guo" Suit Remanded to Superior Court

* Class Action Settlements Hit Record High, Seyfarth Report Shows
* Courts Let Companies Keep Sexual Misconduct Under Cover



                            *********



ACADEMY LTD: "Lasley" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
Allan Lasley, Plaintiff, v. Academy, Ltd., Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-00897 (E.D. Tex., December 29, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, costs and reasonable attorney's
fees under the provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act in behalf
of similarly situated individuals who have worked as Assistant
Managers, including Hardlines Managers, Softlines Managers,
Logistics Managers or Operations Managers, or in comparable roles
with different titles for Academy Ltd.

Defendant operates over 230 retail store locations across the
United States offering sports and outdoor equipment. Lasley was
employed by Defendant as an assistant manager. He claims to have
worked 55-60 hours per week without overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alan L. Quiles
      Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
      Camar R. Jones, Esq.
      SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
      1515 S. Federal Highway
      Boca Raton, FL 33432
      Telephone: (561) 447-8888
      Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
      Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
             cjones@shavitzlaw.com
             aquiles@shavitzlaw.com


ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Rodriguez" Suit in District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Account Control
Technology, Inc. The case is captioned as ALICIA RODRIGUEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. ACCOUNT CONTROL TECHNOLOGY, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 2:17-cv-12306-CCC-JBC (D.N.J., Dec. 1, 2017). The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Claire C. Cecchi.

ACT offers debt recovery, debt collection, accounts receivable
management and business process outsourcing solutions for the
education, consumer finance, government and commercial
markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari Hillel Marcus, Esq.
          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          OCEAN, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695 3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: ari@marcuszelman.com
                  yzelman@marcuszelman.com


ALCON LABORATORIES: 3d Cir. Denies Rehearing in "Cottrell"
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONARD COTTRELL; SANDRA HENON; WILLIAM REEVES;
GEORGE HERMAN; SIMON NAZZAL; CAROL FREBURGER; JACK LIGGETT;
PATRICIA BOUGH; MACK BROWN; DOLORES GILLESPIE; DEBORAH
HARRINGTON; ROBERT INGINO; EDWARD ROGERS, JR.; DEBORAH
RUSIGNULOLO; DOROTHY STOKES; JOSEPHINE TROCCOLI; HURIE WHITFIELD;
THOMAS LAYLOFF; CAROLYN TANNER; PATSY TATE; JOHN SUTTON; JESUS
RENTERIA; GLENDELIA FRANCO; NADINE LAMPKIN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v.
ALCON LABORATORIES; ALCON RESEARCH LTD; FALCON PHARMACEUTICALS
LTD; SANDOZ INC.; ALLERGAN INC, RP; ALLERGAN USA INC; ALLERGAN
SALES LLC; PFIZER INC; VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL;
BAUSCH & LOMB INC; ATON PHARMA INC; MERCK & CO INC; MERCK SHARP &
DOHME CORP; PRASCO LLC; AKORN INC., Case No. 16-2015 (3d Cir.),
Judge L. Felipe Restrepo of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit denied the Appellees' petition for rehearing by the
panel and the Court en banc.

The petition for rehearing filed by the Appellees has been
submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of the
Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the
circuit in regular active service.  No judge who concurred in the
decision has asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of
the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing.

The Plaintiffs are consumers of prescription eye drop medications
manufactured and distributed by the Defendants.  The medication
is sold in bottles designed with dropper tips that dispense more
liquid than the relevant portion of the human eye can hold at any
one time.  Since the entire amount of each drop cannot be
contained within the eye -- where it is pharmaceutically
beneficial -- the bottle's design necessarily results in a
portion of each drop being wasted.  Arguing that this waste
constitutes an unfair or unconscionable practice under state
consumer protection statutes, the Plaintiffs filed a putative
class action complaint.

In his dissenting opinion, Judge David Brookman Smith joined Jane
Richards Roth in holding that the Plaintiffs have not established
that they have standing to bring their claim in federal court.
He finds that the Plaintiffs would prefer that the eye drops
prescribed for them be sold in a different type of packaging.
The wisdom of their preference, however, is better left tested in
the marketplace, not in the Court, he says.  Creating a disparity
with one of our sister circuits, the Majority's opinion reasons
otherwise.  Because he believe the Plaintiffs' unfulfilled
preferences do not constitute an "injury" that the Court can
evaluate in light of Article III of the Constitution, he
respectfully dissents the denial of rehearing en banc.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/CNdX34 from Leagle.com.


ALL ABOUT YOU: WCJ Judgment in Worker's Compensation Suit Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHRISTUS HEALTH SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA D/B/A
CHRISTUS ST. PATRICK HOSPITAL, v. ALL ABOUT YOU HOME HEALTHCARE,
INC., ET AL, Case No. 17-606 (La. App.), Judge Ulysses Gene
Thibodeaux of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Third
Circuit affirmed workers' compensation judge (WCJ)'s judgment
awarding Christus $1,398.03 in unpaid/underpaid charges, $2,000
in penalties, and $14,840 in attorney fees.

In this workers' compensation dispute, the claimant, Christus,
filed a 1008 Disputed Claim for Compensation in the Office of
Workers' Compensation against the employer, All About You, and
its insurer, Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Co., alleging the
nonpayment and underpayment of medical charges.  Related to the
matter is a motion filed by a class of Louisiana hospitals and
ambulatory surgery centers, of which Christus is a member, that
sought to enforce a class action settlement agreement between the
class and FairPay Solutions, Inc., the Defendants' billing review
service.

After the trial court granted the motion in favor of the class,
FairPay appealed to the Court.  Thereafter, the Defendants filed
exceptions of res judicata, lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and nonjoinder of an indispensible party, all of which the
workers' compensation judge (WCJ) denied.  The WCJ then rendered
judgment in favor of Christus on the merits, awarding Christus
the unpaid and underpaid amounts due under our Louisiana Workers'
Compensation Act ("LWCA") as regulated by the Louisiana
Reimbursement Schedule, together with penalties and attorney
fees.

The Defendants now appeal that judgment, and Christus has
answered the appeal, seeking an increase in attorney fees for
work done on appeal.  The Defendants ask the Court to decide:

     a. whether the WCJ legally erred in refusing to recognize
the prior confected settlement agreement provisions, which
dictate the payment of this medical bill that, if paid according
to Christus's claim, was overpaid, and nevertheless held that the
Defendants underpaid the medical bill pursuant to the fee
schedule, which had no application to the initial determination
in the case;

     b. whether it was legal error to find that payment of a
medical bill, which was more than Christus contends it was
entitled to under the settlement agreement, permitted the
imposition of penalties and attorney fees despite no provision in
the settlement agreement for penalties and when these defendants
acted reasonably;

     c. whether it was legal error to find the Defendants
solidarily liable with a non-party for penalties and attorney
fees absent a finding of fault on the employer and insurer when
the statute clearly states that penalties are only imposed based
upon a party's fault;

     d. whether the WCJ legally erred in not dismissing the claim
pursuant to the exception of nonjoinder of indispensible party as
a necessary party to the litigation, FairPay, was not and could
not be made a party to the suit;

     e. whether the WCJ legally erred in denying the Defendants'
exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as it involves
the interpretation of a contract and not a claim arising under
the LWCA as was previously determined by this circuit in an
earlier companion case, Opelousas General Hospital Authority, 118
So.3d 1269; and

     f. whether the WCJ legally erred in denying the Defendants'
exception of res judicata as the claim concerns a matter
previously compromised between the same parties in a prior
lawsuit.

Judge Thibodeaux finds that the WCJ did not err in awarding
Christus $1,398.03, the difference between what the Defendants
paid ($656.13) and the fee schedule rate ($2,054.16), and in
imposing penalties and attorney fees for the Defendants' failure
to reasonably investigate or controvert the disputed charges.  He
further finds no abuse of discretion in its award of $2,000 in
penalties and $14,848 in attorney fees.

The Judge likewise affirms the WCJ's rulings on the Defendants'
exceptions of nonjoinder, subject matter jurisdiction, and res
judicata.  He says though artfully drafted, every one of these
exceptions is based on an application of the settlement agreement
and the FFPM to the disputed claim.  But a disputed claim for
compensation can only be brought (i) against an employer and its
insurer in the manner set forth in La.R.S. 23:1032,6 and (ii) in
the OWC, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all disputed
claims arising under the LWCA. see La.R.S. 23:1310.3(F).  As the
WCJ found, FairPay is a third-party bill reviewer.  Because a
party is only deemed indispensible when that party's presence is
absolutely necessary to protect its substantial rights, it
logically follows that FairPay is not an indispensible party to
the workers' compensation litigation.

Moreover, the Judge finds that rather than precluding the claim,
paragraph 11.7 of the settlement agreement explicitly grants
Christus the right to seek redress in the OWC under the
circumstances, i.e., 30 days after Christus presented its dispute
to FairPay when the dispute has not been resolved and FairPay has
not requested mediation.  Neither the settlement agreement nor
the judgment approving the settlement bars the litigation of this
new, and as yet undecided, disputed claim for compensation
against the employer in the OWC, thus rendering the doctrine of
res judicata inapplicable.  Accordingly, he holds the Defendants'
arguments regarding their exceptions are meritless.

In its answer, Christus seeks additional attorney fees for work
done on appeal.  Judge Thibodeaux finds that the award of
additional attorney fees is warranted when the claimant
successfully defends its judgment.  Accordingly, he awards
Christus an additional $5,000 for work done on the appeal.

For these reasons, Judge Thibodeauz found no error or abuse of
discretion in the WCJ's judgment awarding Christus $1,398.03 in
unpaid/underpaid charges, $2,000 in penalties, and $14,840 in
attorney fees.  He further awarded Christus $5,000 in attorney
fees for work done on the appeal.  Costs of the appeal are
assessed to the Defendants/Appellants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lN5bQJ from Leagle.com.

Thomas Allen Filo, Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, L.L.C., 723
Broad Street, Lake Charles, LA 70601, Telephone: (337) 436-6611,
COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee - Christus Health Southwest
Louisiana d/b/a Christus St. Patrick Hospital.

Kevin Andrew Marks -- kmarks@mmkfirm.com -- Melchiode, Marks,
King, LLC, 639 Loyola Avenue - Suite 2550, New Orleans, LA 70113,
Telephone: (504) 336-2880, COUNSEL FOR: Defendants/Appellants -
Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company and All About You Home
Healthcare, Inc.


AMERICAN HONDA: Faces "Floyd" Suit in C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Honda
Motor Co., Inc. The case is captioned as Heather Floyd,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., a California
Corporation and Honda North America, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation, Case No. 2:17-cv-08744-SVW-AS (C.D. Cal., Dec. 4,
2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Stephen V. Wilson.

The American Honda Motor Company, Inc. is a North American
subsidiary of the Honda Motor Company, Ltd. It was founded in
1959.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Theodore W. Maya, Esq.
          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT AND WOLFSON PC
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474 9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474 8585
          E-mail: tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com
                  rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com


AMERICAN PAYMENT SYSTEMS: "Palacios" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
ERIKA PALACIOS, and other similarly situated Individuals, the
Plaintiff, v. NORTH AMERICAN PAYMENT SYSTEMS, LLC, and ZULFIE R.
RAJAKARIAR, individually, Defendant(s), the Defendants, Case No.
64819645 (Fla. Cir., 11th Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County,
Nov. 30, 2017), seeks to recover damages exceeding $15,000
excluding attorneys' fees or costs for unpaid wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff performed work for
Defendants as anon-exempt employee from April 15, 2017 through
August 15, 2017. The Defendants had or should have had full
knowledge of all hours worked by Plaintiff; including those hours
worked by Plaintiff in excess of 40 in a given work week. For the
period April 15, 2017 through on August 15, 2017, Plaintiff
worked numerous hours -- for which he received no compensation
whatsoever, in violation of the laws of the United States and the
State of Florida. For this period of time Plaintiff is owed
unpaid wages for over 60 hours of overtime. Additionally,
Plaintiff was asked to go to Colombia to open a Customer Service
Center. The Defendant failed to cover the expenses while abroad
for food; transportation, accessories and supplies for office
use, in accordance with Defendant's assertions on which Plaintiff
detrimentally relied.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          Loanmy Saranova, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          Courthouse Tower 44 West Flagler St, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: 305 416 5000
          Facsimile: 305 416 5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  Isaranova@rgpattorney.com


ANTHEM INSURANCE: $48MM Fee Request in Settlement Challenged
------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that a prospective
class member has objected to the Anthem data breach settlement,
specifically criticizing a fee request of nearly $38 million, and
planning to ask that a special master investigate the case for
potential over-billing.

An objection says the fee request, which is 33 percent of the
$115 million settlement, was "outrageous on its face" and should
be closer to $13.8 million.


APPLE INC: Faces Class Action in Korea Over iPhone Performance
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kim Jae-seop, writing for the hankyoreh, reports that a civic
group claims that the software updates are intended to drive up
sales of new products.

A class action suit is to be filed in South Korea on Jan. 13 in
connection with Apple's degradation of performance on its old
iPhone models.  The civic group Citizens United for Consumer
Sovereignty (CUCS) announced on Jan. 10 that it plans to file
suit with Seoul Central District Court on Jan. 13 to demand
damages from Apple and Apple Korea.

An initial group of 150 people are reportedly to take part as
plaintiffs, with requested damages set at 2.2 million won
(US$2,050) each in view of average device costs and compensation
payments.

The key question in court is likely to be whether Apple software
updates that degraded the performance of older iPhone models were
deliberately intended to drive up sales of new products.  Users
claim the degradation was a ploy to increase new iPhone sales,
noting that Apple was aware of it when the updates occurred.

If the intent is proven, Apple is likely to face not only damages
but also public censure. Many are also watching to see how the
iPhone users attempt to prove negative material and psychological
effects from the performance degradation in court.  Users of the
iPhone 6, 6S, and other older models have reported failures with
money transfers and applications as a result of Apple's update.

"Apple impaired the function of iPhone devices through in update
without prior notification or user consent," said attorney Jeong
Jun-ho of CUCS's consumer law center.

"This could be seen as a serious infringement of consumer
rights," he added.

More domestic suits to claim damages appear to be on the horizon.
The law firms Hannuri and Hwimyung are currently recruiting
litigants for their own cases. [GN]


ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Kuhn Appeals Ruling to Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Joel Kuhn filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Joel Kuhn v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:16-cv-08505-PSG-PJW, in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, three
securities class action lawsuits against Arrowhead
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al. have been consolidated at the behest
of Joel Kuhn.  The consolidated lawsuit is styled In re:
ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION.

The Plaintiffs bring claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regarding certain public
statements in connection with the Company's drug research
programs and seek damages in an unspecified amount.

The appellate case is captioned as Joel Kuhn v. Arrowhead
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-56956, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by January 26, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on February 26, 2018;

   -- Appellant Joel Kuhn's opening brief is due on April 6,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Christopher R. Anzalone, Arrowhead
      Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Bruce Givens and Kenneth A.
      Myszkowski's answering brief is due on May 7, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JOEL KUHN, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Adam M. Apton, Esq.
          Adam McCall, Esq.
          Nicholas I. Porritt, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          1101 30th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290
          Facsimile: (202) 333-2121
          E-mail: AApton@zlk.com
                  amccall@zlk.com
                  nporritt@zlk.com

Defendants-Appellees ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., CHRISTOPHER
R. ANZALONE, KENNETH A. MYSZKOWSKI and BRUCE GIVENS, M.D., are
represented by:

          Gregory S. Bok, Esq.
          Alexander Kosta Mircheff , Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          333 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
          Telephone: (213) 229-7461
          Facsimile: (213) 229-6461
          E-mail: gbok@gibsondunn.com
                  amircheff@gibsondunn.com


ARYZTA LLC: "Barnes" Remanded to the State Court
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to the State Court the case
captioned JAMEL BARNES, Plaintiff, v. ARYZTA, LLC, Defendant, No.
17-cv-7358 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that Defendant
violated Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), and
acted negligently; (2) injunctive and other equitable relief as
is necessary to protect the interests of the class, including an
order requiring Defendant to collect, store, and use biometric
identifiers or biometric information in compliance with BIPA; (3)
statutory damages under BIPA, as well as attorneys' fees and
costs; (4) pre and post-judgment interest, and (5) any other
relief that the Court deems reasonable and just. Defendant
contends that the time-clock in issue does not collect or store
an employee's fingerprint or any other biometric identifier or
biometric information to establish any statutory liability under
the BIPA on behalf of Plaintiff or a purported class.

The issue before the Court is whether Defendant's removal of this
class action lawsuit from state court was proper.

Defendant argues in opposition to Plaintiff's motion to remand
that satisfaction of the jurisdictional prerequisites under the
CAFA is sufficient for removal purposes and that Defendant,
having established CAFA jurisdiction, may raise the Article III
standing issue at some later point in these proceedings in
federal court. But to say that a court is without jurisdiction to
decide a case on its merits yet has jurisdiction merely to remove
the case is to state a contradiction. Section 1441 of Title 28
U.S.C. authorizes the removal of cases of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction. By jurisdiction the statute
means power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render
a binding decision thereon.  The statute does not contemplate a
result that permits a district court to remove a case which it is
required to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

In any event, Defendant admits that Article III standing based on
Spokeo in the context of Plaintiff's claims in this case is
unsettled. That consideration alone supports remand, as any doubt
regarding jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of the states.
Indeed, as a general matter, federal courts should interpret the
removal statute narrowly and presume that the plaintiff may
choose his or her forum.

Defendant, as the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the
risk of non-persuasion. Defendant has gone from arguing that this
Court does not have jurisdiction to taking the position that
federal jurisdiction may or may not later prove to be lacking. In
short, Defendant does not even attempt and thus necessarily fails
to persuade the Court that federal jurisdiction exists. The Court
grants Plaintiff's motion to remand to state court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybc7zy8e from Leagle.com.

Jamel Barnes, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Harris
Richman -- brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Jamel Barnes, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Fish, The Fish
Law Firm, P.C., 1770 North. Park St., Suite 202, Naperville, IL
60563, J. Eli Wade Scott -- ewadescottWedelson.com -- Edelson PC,
John C. Kunze, The Fish Law Firm, Kimberly A. Hilton, The Fish
Law Firm, P.C., 200 E 5th Ave Suite 123. Naperville, IL 60563,
Roger J. Perlstadt -- rperlstadt@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C.,
Sydney M. Janzen -- sjanzen@edelson.com -- Edelson Pc & Todd M.
Logan tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice.

ARYZTA LLC, Defendant, represented by Kevin Michael O'Hagan, --
kohagan@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer, LLC, Jamie L. Filipovic
-- jfilipovic@ohaganmeyer.com -O'Hagan Meyer, LLC & Kristen Ann
Cemate -- kcemate@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer, LLC.


ASD SPECIALTY: Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed
----------------------------------------------------
SANDUSKY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC, the Petitioner, v. ASD SPECIALTY
HEALTHCARE, INC., the Respondent, Case No. 17-803 (U.S., Dec. 4,
2017), is an appeal filed before the United States Supreme Court
from a lower court decision in a fraud class action, Case No. 16-
3741 (6th Cir., June 11, 2017).

Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.[BN]

Attorneys for Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC:

          Glenn L. Hara, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          E-mail: ghara@andersonwanca.com


ATLANTIC MARINE: "Whatley" Suit Underway in South Carolina
----------------------------------------------------------
The venue of the case styled as Amanda Whatley, SSgt Joshua
Whatley, Leah Fuhrman, PO1 Randy Fuhrman, Stephany Cross, SSgt
Paul Cross, CW4 Robert Domen, GySgt Scott Howe, Jenna Risher and
Sgt Levi Risher, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Atlantic Marine Corps Communities
LLC doing business as: Atlantic Marine Corps Communities at Tri-
Command and Atlantic Marine Corps Communities Property Management
LLC, the Defendants, was removed from Beaufort County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2017-CP-07-01799, on October 6, 2017, to
the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Case
No. 9:17-cv-02716-DCN (D.S.C.). The case is assigned to Honorable
David C Norton for all further proceedings.[BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Bert Glenn Utsey, III, Esq.
     PETERS MURDAUGH PARKER ELTZROTH AND DETRICK
     PO Box 1164
     Walterboro, SC 29488
     Telephone: (843) 549-9544
     Facsimile: (843) 549-9546
     Email: butsey@pmped.com

          - and -

     Ronnie L Crosby, Esq.
     PETERS MURDAUGH PARKER ELTZROTH AND DETRICK PA
     PO Box 457 101 Mulberry Street E
     Hampton, SC 29924
     Telephone: (803) 943-2111
     Facsimile: (803) 943-3943
     Email: rcrosby@pmped.com

          - and -

     Samuel C Bauer, Esq.
     BAUER AND METRO PC
     PO Box 7965
     Hilton Head Island, SC 29938
     Telephone: (843) 842-5297
     Facsimile: (843) 842-6563
     Email: sbauer@bauerlawfirm.com

Defendant is represented by:

     H Brewton Hagood, Esq.
     James A Bruorton, IV, Esq.
     ROSEN ROSEN AND HAGOOD
     PO Box 893
     Charleston, SC 29402
     Telephone: (843) 577-6726
     Facsimile: (843) 724-8036
     Email: bhagood@rrhlawfirm.com
     Email: cbruorton@rrhlawfirm.com

          - and -

     Liam Donovan Duffy, Esq.
     H Brewton Hagood, Esq.
     James A Bruorton, IV, Esq.
     ROSEN LAW FIRM
     PO Box 1840
     Charleston, SC 29402
     Telephone: (843) 266-8121
     Email: lduffy@rrhlawfirm.com


AUTO-OWNERS: Bid to Dismiss "Lammert" Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREGORY J. LAMMERT, JAMIE LAMMERT, LARRY REASONS,
and SUSAN REASONS, Plaintiffs, v. AUTO-OWNERS (MUTUAL) INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00819 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge
Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Question to the Tennessee
Supreme Court; (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Resolve
Their Pending Motion for Class Certification Before, or at Least
Simultaneously with, a Ruling on any Dispositive Legal Issues;
and denied without prejudice to refiling after the certification
process has been completed both the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Class and Auto-Owners' Motion to Dismiss.

The named Plaintiffs in the putative class action are two married
couples.  Both couples had property insurance through Auto-
Owners.  Both also sustained covered losses to their property and
received (or were offered) payments for that loses that
depreciated not only materials, but also labor.

The Lammerts own a dwelling and other structures in Nashville,
Tennessee.  Those properties are insured under a standard form
"Dwelling Insurance Policy" issued by Auto-Owners.  Hail damaged
some of the Lammerts' residential buildings on May 10, 2016, and
they filed a claim.  Auto-Owners calculated its obligation to the
Lammerts to be $9,986.36.  It did so by first estimating the cost
to repair or replace the damage with new materials ($12,146.55)
and then subtracting for depreciation ($2,160.19).  Both labor
and materials were depreciated for certain line items.

The Reasons own a home and other structures (including a pool
house) in Jackson, Tennessee.  Those structure were insured under
Auto-Owners' standard form "Homeowners Insurance Policy."  On
Nov. 18, 2016, some of the structures on Reasons' property
suffered wind damage.  They also suffered losses on March 9,
2017, as a result of a hail storm that damaged their residence
and four other structures.  Auto-Owners accepted both claims.
With regard to the November 2016 claim, Auto-Owners calculated
the cost to replace the wind-damaged roofs and then deducted an
amount to account for pre-loss depreciation.  With regard to the
March 2017 claim, the Reasons' policy provided for full
replacement cost coverage, but the Reasons opted for the actual
cash value under the policy.  Accordingly, Auto-Owners again
calculated the costs to repair or replace the damage property,
and then deducted pre-loss depreciation, including labor.

According to the Plaintiffs, many insurers licensed to do
business in Tennessee pay full labor costs to both remove and
reinstall damaged building material when making an actual cash
value payment.

The Plaintiffs' request the question on whether an insurer may
withhold a portion of repair labor as depreciation when making an
ACV payment under the actual cash value terms and conditions of
the two insurance policies at issue b certified.  In response,
Auto-Owners proposes the question on whether an insurer is
prohibited by Tennessee law from deducting the estimated pre-loss
depreciation in a structural property's economic value from the
estimated cost of labor to repair or replace the property when
estimating the property's pre-loss actual cash value under an
insurance policy that does not define ACV, explains that ACV
includes a deduction for depreciation, or provides that ACV is
calculated as the cost of repair or replacement less the amount
of depreciation applicable to the damaged property immediately
prior to loss.

Having considered the parties' submissions, Judge Crenshaw
certified the question on whether an insurer in making an actual
cash value payment may withhold a portion of repair labor as
depreciation when the policy (a) defines actual cash value as the
cost to replace damaged property with new property of similar
quality and features reduced by the amount of depreciation
applicable to the damaged property immediately prior to the loss,
or (b) states that actual cash value includes a deduction for
depreciation.  The Judge holds that the Tennessee Supreme Court
is free to exercise its discretion to reframe the Rule 23
certified question before it so as to provide the guidance
actually sought.

Auto-Owners has filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the
Complaint fails to state a claim because, under well-established
in Tennessee and elsewhere, the cost approach to calculating ACV
is widely accepted and consistent with Tennessee's adoption of
the broad evidence rule, and because the Plaintiffs claim relies
on a purported labor-depreciation prohibition that does not exist
in Tennessee law.  Judge Crenshaw finds that these grounds are
inextricably linked to the question to be certified and, as such,
the Motion is denied without prejudice to refiling after the
certification process has concluded.  The Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification, which is also connected to the question to
be certified because the Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
insured who received actual cash value payment that depreciated
labor cost, is denied without prejudice.

This leaves the Plaintiffs' Motion to Resolve Class Certification
Issue Before or at Least Simultaneously With, a Ruling Any of the
Dispositive Legal Issues Presented.  At this point, the Judge
says, the Court is simply reserving ruling on Auto-Owner's Motion
to Dismiss pending a decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court
should it accept certification.  Regardless, the Sixth Circuit
has consistently held that a district court is not required to
rule on a motion for class certification before ruling on the
merits of the case.  The Court will decide the order in which to
address the Motion for Class Certification and the Motion to
Dismiss after the certification process has concluded.

In their reply brief, the Plaintiffs also ask the Court to decide
the class certification issue before certifying the question,
arguing that the Tennessee Supreme Court is more likely to answer
the question if the case is already certified as a class.  The
Judge holds that whether that is true, the Court has no way of
knowing, particularly because the potential statewide
ramifications of the question are made abundantly clear in both
the decision and the Order Certifying Question.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/GJ9rRG from Leagle.com.

Gregory J. Lammert, Jamie Lammert, Larry Reasons & Susan Reasons,
Plaintiffs, represented by David McMullan --
dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com -- Don Barrett, P.A., Don Barrett -
- dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com -- Don Barrett, P.A., J. Brandon
McWherter, Gilbert Russell McWherter PLC & T. Joseph Snodgrass --
jsnodgrass@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP.

Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Charles C. McLaurin -- cmclaurin@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Jeff Mason --
jeffrey.mason@stinson.com -- Stinson Leonard Street LLP, John S.
Hicks -- jhicks@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Todd A. Noteboom --
todd.noteboom@stinson.com -- Stinson Leonard Street LLP & Zane
Gilmer -- zane.gilmer@stinson.com -- Stinson Leonard Street LLP.


BALDWIN TAVERN: Fails to Pay for Kitchen Staff's OT, Rosario Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A Motion to Certify FLSA Collective Action/Motion for Conditional
Certification, Leave to Distribute Notice, and Tolling Pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b), was filed Jan. 19 in the case, Luis A.
Rosario, on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly-situated, the Plaintiff, v. Baldwin Tavern Inc.
d/b/a Kitty O'Hara, David Baker and Shay Leavy, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-05879-SJF-ARL, (E.D.N.Y., October 6, 2017).

Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to
Certify.

Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay on Jan. 5 entered an order
holding that the pre-motion conference requirement is waived, and
setting this timeline:

     -- Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification due
        Jan. 19, 2018;

     -- Defendants' opposition to be served by Feb. 2, 2018; and

     -- Plaintiff may serve any reply by Feb. 9, 2018, at which
        time the motion papers shall be filed with the court.

The Plaintiff states in his complaint that he work for the
Defendants as a kitchen staff employee and was required by the
Defendants to work six days a week without a scheduled break.
Plaintiff states that the Defendants required him to work 52-1/2
hours per week. Plaintiff states that throughout the entirety of
his employment, Defendants failed to pay him at the rate of 1-1/2
times his regular rate of pay for any hour that he worked in a
week in excess of forty hours. Also, throughout Plaintiff's
employment, Defendants failed to compensate for spread of hours
with an additional hour's pay at the New York State minimum wage
rate.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

Joan B. Lopez, Esq.
Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 328
Great Neck, New York 11021
Telephone: (516) 248-5550
Facsimile: (516) 248-6027

Attorneys for Defendant:

Frank A. Cecere, Esq.
Janice Berkowitz, Esq.
AHMUTY, DEMERS & MCMANUS, ESQS.
200 I.U. Willets Road
Albertson, NY 11507
Tel: (516) 294-5433
Fax: (516) 535-2400
E-mail: frank.cecere@admlaw.com
        janice.berkowitz@admlaw.com


BERKSHIRE HEALTH: "Clark" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Shayla Clark, on behalf of herself and all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Berkshire Health Systems, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-30186 (D. Mass., December 29, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the Massachusetts Wage
Act, Massachusetts common law and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Berkshire Health Systems, Inc. operates multiple medical
facilities in Berkshire County Massachusetts. Clark worked as a
licensed practical nurse at their Hillcrest Family Health Center
in Pittsfield, MA. Plaintiff worked through approximately 75% of
her scheduled meal breaks without compensation. Berkshire
automatically deducts 30-minutes from her hours worked without
regard to whether the break was actually taken, notes the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin Knox Steffans, Esq.
      STEFFANS LEGAL LLC
      28 North Street, Suite 307
      Pittsfield, MA 01201
      Tel: (413) 418-4176
      Email: bsteffans@steffanslegal.com

             - and -

      Jeffrey S. Morneau, Esq.
      CONNOR & MORNEAU LLP
      273 State Street, Second Floor
      Springfield, MA 01103
      Tel: (413) 455-1730
      Email: jmorneau@cmolawyers.com


BMW: Faces Class Action in Australia Over Use of Takata Airbags
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Farnsworth, writing for ABC News, reports that German car
maker BMW and Japanese manufacturer Nissan are facing legal
action over the use of Takata airbags which have been linked to
18 deaths worldwide.

The two car companies are the latest to be drawn into the class
action before the New South Wales Supreme Court.

Sydney lawyer Damien Scattini -- damianscattini@quinnemanuel.com
-- from law firm Quinn Emanuel, said the statement of claims
against the companies were lodged recently.

All up five manufacturers including Honda, Subaru, Nissan, Toyota
and BMW are now facing class-action law suits.

It is claimed the car manufacturers marketed, distributed and
promoted defective vehicles fitted with Takata airbags, stating
they were safe to drive and did not take adequate steps to warn
people of the dangers.

Mr Scattini said the court action is seeking refunds based on an
Australian consumer law that entitles consumers to refunds if a
product has a fault that makes it unsafe and the problem cannot
be rectified within a reasonable time.

BMW Group Australia and Nissan Australia have been contacted for
comment.

Last year, the Japanese company, Takata Corporation, pleaded
guilty to fraud and agreed to pay a $US1 billion ($1.3 billion)
penalty for concealing evidence that its airbag inflators could
explode with too much force.

In the defective airbags, the ammonium nitrate used to inflate
the airbags deteriorates over time and when deployed can shoot
out shards of metal at people in the car.

More than 180 injuries have been recorded worldwide, prompting
the recall of 100 million vehicles globally -- making it the
biggest recall in automotive history.

The faulty airbags have been linked to the death of a 58-year-old
Australian man in Sydney.

A 21-year-old woman in Darwin was also injured in April.

In Australia, 2.1 million vehicles have been recalled, but an
investigation by consumer group Choice last year found more than
two-thirds of those have not yet had their faulty airbags
replaced.

The three-month investigation found car owners were being told by
manufacturers there was a minimum six-month wait to remove the
potentially lethal safety devices.

Choice also found that a number of car manufacturers, including
BMW, have been replacing the airbags with like-for-like devices
as a temporary fix.

Last year, the Minister for Small Business Michael McCormack
proposed a compulsory recall of all vehicles with defective
Takata airbags installed which would require car makers to
replace airbags within a specific timeframe. [GN]


BP EXPLORATIONS: "Harriel" Suit Transferred to Mississippi
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN HARRIEL, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC.
ET AL. SECTION "J"(2), Civil Action No. 17-7024 (E.D. La.),
Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Easter District of Louisiana (i) denied the
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Disclosure and Motion to Conduct
Further Proceedings in the Eastern District of Louisiana; (ii)
granted the Defendant's motion to transfer venue; and (iii)
transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, Eastern Division.

The BELO portion of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement
Agreement in In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, and the Court's Case
Management Orders ("CMO") in the case, provide for determination
by the Court, with the input of the parties, of the appropriate
venue for discovery and dispositive proceedings.

Harriel filed a Motion to Compel Disclosure and a Motion to
Conduct Further Proceedings in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
He seeks to compel the Defendants to provide the names, addresses
and telephone numbers of all employees or co-workers who worked
with him while he was employed by Dynamic Environmental, Inc. as
a cleanup worker at the "ERG BP Yard" in Morgan City, Louisiana,
and while he was employed by Wallace-Eutaw, LLC as a beach
cleanup worker in Gulfport, Mississippi.  This type of discovery
is expressly prohibited by the CMO, which limits the information
that the parties must exchange during the initial proceedings
phase of the lawsuit.

The Defendants filed a timely memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiff's motion to compel, and filed a Motion to Transfer
Venue to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi.

Magistrate Judge Wilkinson finds that the CMO provides that no
discovery may be commenced and all discovery in all BELO lawsuits
is stayed at this time.  Discovery is prohibited until after any
BELO lawsuit is transferred to another court or reallotted within
the Eastern District of Louisiana as provided in the CMO.  The
Plaintiff may seek discovery of additional information pursuant
to the appropriate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after the
case is transferred or reallotted.  Accordingly, the Judge denied
Harriel's motion to compel disclosure of additional information.

Considering the factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a)
and applicable case law, and the disclosure information provided
by the Plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge finds that the most
appropriate venue for further proceedings in the BELO lawsuit is
the Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division.  The
convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice warrant transfer of the case.  A magistrate judge is
authorized to transfer a case of this sort to another district.
Accordingly, he transferred the instant matter to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern
Division.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2017 Order and Reasons is
available at https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20171207c41
from Leagle.com.

Kevin Harriel, Plaintiff, represented by Franklin G. Shaw, Leger
& Shaw.

Kevin Harriel, Plaintiff, represented by Brigid E. Collins, Leger
& Shaw, Walter John Leger, III, Leger & Shaw & Walter John Leger,
Jr., Leger & Shaw.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Kevin Michael Hodges -- khodges@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly,
LLP, Catherine Pyune McEldowney -- cpm@maronmarvel.com -- Maron
Marvel Bradley and Anderson LLC & Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.

BP America Production Company, Defendant, represented by Kevin
Michael Hodges, Williams & Connolly, LLP, Catherine Pyune
McEldowney, Maron Marvel Bradley and Anderson LLC & Don Keller
Haycraft, Liskow & Lewis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lN5bQJ from Leagle.com.

Thomas Allen Filo, Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, L.L.C., 723
Broad Street, Lake Charles, LA 70601, Telephone: (337) 436-6611,
COUNSEL FOR: Plaintiff/Appellee -- Christus Health Southwest
Louisiana d/b/a Christus St. Patrick Hospital.

Kevin Andrew Marks -- kmarks@mmkfirm.com -- Melchiode, Marks,
King, LLC, 639 Loyola Avenue - Suite 2550, New Orleans, LA 70113,
Telephone: (504) 336-2880, COUNSEL FOR: Defendants/Appellants -
Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company and All About You Home
Healthcare, Inc.


BUFFALO WILD: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Monteverde & Associates PC on Jan. 9 disclosed that it has filed
a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for
The District of Minnesota, case no. 0:18-cv-00047, on behalf of
shareholders of Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. ("Buffalo Wild Wings" or
the "Company") (NASDAQ: BWLD) who held Buffalo Wild Wings
securities and have been harmed by Buffalo Wild Wings and its
board of directors' (the "Board") for alleged violations of
Sections 14(a), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") in connection with the merger of the Company
to Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc.

Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Buffalo Wild Wings
shareholders will have the right to receive $157.00 in cash per
share for each share of Company common stock they own (the
"Merger Consideration").  The Proposed Transaction is valued at
approximately $2.9 billion. December 28, 2017, Buffalo Wild Wings
filed a Definitive Proxy Statement (the "Proxy") on Schedule 14A
with the SEC.  The complaint alleges that the Proxy, which
recommends that Buffalo Wild Wings shareholders vote in favor of
the Proposed Transaction, omits or misrepresents material
information concerning, among other things: (i) the financial
analyses conducted by the Company's financial advisor, Goldman
Sachs & Co. LLC ("Goldman Sachs"); and (ii) past dealings or a
historical relationship between Goldman Sachs and either Buffalo
Wild Wings or Arby's.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than 60 days from January 9, 2018.  Any member of the
putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this
action, or have any questions concerning this notice or your
rights or interests, please contact:

Click here for more information:
www.monteverdelaw.com/investigations/m-a/ It is free and there is
no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a boutique class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm committed that has recovered
millions of dollars and is committed to protecting shareholders
and consumers from corporate wrongdoing.  Monteverde & Associates
PC lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect
investors by recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct.

Contact:

Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
The Empire State Building
350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
New York, NY 10118
United States of America
jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
Tel: (212) 971-1341 [GN]


CARMAX BUSINESS: "Santos" Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled ANTHONY GILBERT SANTOS, Plaintiff, v. CARMAX
BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02447-
RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California granted Carmax's motion
to dismiss Santos' amended putative class action complaint.

In 2006, Santos purchased a 2002 Ford F-150 pickup truck from a
California Carmax location.  According to Santos, that vehicle
was subject to an active safety recall by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") due to a risk of catching
fire, even when parked without the engine running. Santos asserts
that he was not aware of the recall at the time he acquired the
truck, and that Carmax failed to inform him of the recall.  He
also claims that during the period leading up to the fire,
nothing put him on notice of the vehicle's problems.

On April 29, 2014, Santos's F-150 caught fire while parked in his
driveway with its engine off.  The vehicle was completely
destroyed.  As a result, Santos filed this putative class action
on April 28, 2017, which was dismissed on Aug. 9, 2017.  In his
amended complaint, Santos advances eight claims for relief:
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law; violation of California's
False Advertising Law; violation of California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act; breach of implied warranty of merchantability;
violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; breach of
contract; and common law representation.

Carmax once again moves to dismiss, arguing, among other things,
that all of Santos' claims are barred by the applicable statutes
of limitations.  In opposition, Santos concedes that his
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
claims are not timely.  He asserts that his other claims,
however, are not time-barred because he did not discover the
facts giving rise to his claims until 2014.

Judge Seeborg holds that Santos alleges facts demonstrating that
his discovery of the issues with his vehicle was hindered by
Carmax's guarantee that there were no such issues.  To impose an
unreasonable obligation on consumers to double-check every
guarantee made by their used-car dealer would render those
guarantees virtually meaningless.  Accordingly, Santos has
successfully invoked the discovery rule with respect to his
remaining claims.

As to Carmax's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Santos'
claims sound in fraud and are not pleaded in accordance with the
heightened requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),
the Judge holds the FAC does not make the necessary temporal
connection to satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading standard.  Although
Santos adequately identifies the misrepresentations at issue (the
125+ Point Inspection guarantee and failure to disclose the
active recall) and the general format in which these
representations take place, he fails to specify how he was
exposed to the representations at the time he purchased his
vehicle from Carmax.

The Judge says the Plaintiff amend his complaint to, for example,
allege that a Carmax salesperson represented that his vehicle had
passed the inspection and was free of defects, that the 125+
Point Inspection was advertised at the dealership where Santos
purchased his vehicle, or that Santos saw the guarantee
advertised on Carmax's website before he purchased his vehicle.
As pled, however, his FAC does not make the necessary temporal
connection to satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading standard.

Judge Seeborg therefore dismissed the FAC with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/wLHuGQ from Leagle.com.

Anthony Gilbert Santos, Plaintiff, represented by Edward William
Hess, Jr. -- ed_hess@pacbell.net -- Law Offices of Edward W.
Hess, Jr..

Carmax Business Services, LLC, Carmax Auto Superstores
California, LLC, Carmax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc. &
Carmax, Inc., Defendants, represented by Alan Durrum Wingfield --
alan.wingfield@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Chad R.
Fuller -- chad.fuller@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.


CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court Narrows Claims in "Clark" FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part
the CPS and CSI's motion to dismiss the case, LUKE CLARK, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, CAVALRY SPV I, LLC, and
SCHACHTER PORTNOY, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 17 CV 99 (VB) (S.D.
N.Y.).

The Plaintiff had a credit card issued by HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.
He recalls using his HSBC credit card to purchase personal items,
but does not aver whether he eventually failed to pay the
balance.  In any event, in 2009, HSBC "charged-off" $3,188.22 of
his debt ("underlying debt").

In 2010, CSI acquired the Plaintiff's debt.  According to the
amended complaint, CSI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CPS, and
both entities are debt collectors.  The Plaintiff was not
notified by HSBC, CSI, or CPS about the assignment of his debt.

On March 12, 2012, either CSI or CPS engaged SP, a law firm, to
pursue a collection action against the Plaintiff.  On Aug. 15,
2012, SP filed a complaint on CSI's behalf in Supreme Court,
Sullivan County, to collect on the Plaintiff's debt ("state court
action").  According to the Plaintiff, the summons and complaint
in the state court action were served at his parents' address in
Barryville, New York.  At the time, he was estranged from his
parents and living in California.  Thus, he never received the
service documents, nor was he made aware of the action against
him.  As such, the Plaintiff never appeared in the state court
action.

On Jan. 14, 2013, CSI obtained a default judgment against the
Plaintiff in the amount of $4,294.80, which accounted for the
underlying debt, plus interest, costs, and disbursements.  On
Aug. 25, 2015, the Plaintiff received a copy of his credit report
and discovered CSI's judgment against him.

On Aug. 24, 2016, the Plaintiff timely commenced the action in
Supreme Court, Westchester County.  The Plaintiff alleges the
Defendants violated the  Fair Debt Collection Act ("FDCPA") by
(i) bringing the state court action in a judicial district where
he did not reside at the commencement of the action (first cause
of action); (ii) falsely stating that he owed interest on the
underlying debt and seeking such interest in the state court
action (second cause of action); (iii) attempting to collect a
debt they did not have a legal right to collect, or standing to
pursue (third cause of action); and (iv) threatening to take
action they could not legally take (fourth cause of action).  The
Plaintiff further asserts the state court action and the
Defendants' application for a default judgment amounted to a
deceptive act and practice in violation of New York General
Business Law ("GBL") Section 349 (fifth cause of action).

On June 28, 2017, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims
against SP pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  On Jan. 5, 2017,
the Defendants removed the action to the Court.

Before the Court is CPS and CSI's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).  The Defendants argue the Plaintiff's first cause
of action must be dismissed because they're not vicariously
liable for SP's decision to file the state court action in
Sullivan County.  They further argue the Plaintiff's second,
third, fourth, and fifth causes of action must be dismissed
because they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Judge Briccetti concludes that the Plaintiff has plausibly and
sufficiently alleged the Defendants' control over SP such that
they may be held vicariously liable for SP's actions.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's first cause of
action will be denied.

As to the Plaintiff's second, third, and fourth causes of action,
the Judge agrees with the Defendants that these causes of action
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  He disagrees,
however, as to the Plaintiff's fifth cause of action.  He says
the amount of judgment, and the Defendants' standing and legal
right to bring the state court action and collect against the
Plaintiff are issues that were decided when judgment was entered
in CSI's favor.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's second, third, and
fourth causes of action are barred by res judicata, and the
Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims will be granted.

Since the fifth cause of action arises from facts unrelated to
the Defendants' right to collect on the underlying debt, the
Judge will deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
fifth cause of action.

For these reasons, Judge Briccetti granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
The second, third, and fourth causes of action are dismissed.
The first and fifth causes of action will proceed.  The Clerk is
instructed to terminate the motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/nNSLnw from Leagle.com.

Luke Clark, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell L. Pashkin, Mitchell
L. Pashkin, Esq.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC & Cavalry SPV I, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Thomas Robert Dominczyk --
tdominczyk@MauriceWutscher.com -- Maurice & Needleman, P.C..


CAVIUM INC: "Stein" Suit Alleges Exchange Act Violations
--------------------------------------------------------
Shiva Stein, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Cavium, Inc., Syed B. Ali, Anthony S.Thornley, Sanjay
Mehrotra, Edward H. Frank, Brad W. Buss, and Madhav V. Rajan,
Case No. 5:18-cv-00141 (N.D. Calif., January 8, 2018), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

This is a shareholder class action brought by Plaintiff on behalf
of herself and all other similarly situated public shareholders
of Cavium to enjoin the Proposed Transaction whereby the Board
has agreed to sell Cavium to Kauai Acquisition Corp., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Marvell, for $40.00 in cash and 2.1757 shares
of Marvell common stock for each share of Cavium stock owned.

The Plaintiff alleges that rhe Proposed Transaction is at an
unfair price and on grossly unfair and inadequate terms.

The Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants failed to disclose
certain material information necessary for Cavium stockholders to
properly assess the fairness of the Proposed Transaction, thereby
violating SEC rules and regulations and rendering certain
statements in the S-4 materially incomplete and misleading.

Plaintiff has owned the common stock of Cavium since prior to the
announcement of the Proposed Transaction herein complained of,
and continue to own this stock.

Cavium is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Delaware and maintains its principal offices in San
Jose, California. Cavium is, and at all relevant times hereto
was, listed and traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol "CAVM".
Cavium is a provider of integrated semiconductor processors that
enable intelligent processing for wired and wireless
infrastructure and cloud for networking, communications, storage
and security applications.

The Individual Defendants are officers and directors of Cavium.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      10866 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1470
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Tel: (424) 256-2884
      Fax: (424) 256-2885
      E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com

          - and -

      Gregory M. Nespole, Esq.
      Benjamin Kaufman, Esq.
      Gloria Kui Melwani, Esq.
      WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
      FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
      270 Madison Avenue
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 545-4600
      Fax: (212) 686-0114


CHARLES SCHWAB: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Fleming" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
cases styled FRANCIS X FLEMING, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION; CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC.; WALTER W.
BETTINGER II; UBS SECURITIES LLC, Defendants-Appellees. LOUIS
LIM, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., INC., Defendant-
Appellee, Case Nos. 16-15179, 16-15189 (9th Cir.).

Schwab is a financial services firm that trades securities for
its clients.  In 2004, it agreed to route 95% of its "non-
directed trades" (trades for which clients have not selected
another trading venue) to UBS Securities, LLC.

Lim and Charles Fleming are Schwab retail customers.  Their
Account Agreements state that Schwab routes equity and options
orders for execution to UBS and note that Schwab may receive
remuneration from a market center to which orders are routed.
Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs alleged in separate complaints, that
Schwab breached various state-law duties by routing trades to
UBS.  They claimed that Schwab could have routed trades to many
other venues, and that its arrangement with UBS sometimes
resulted in unfavorable executions, both in terms of price and
speed.

On May 8, 2005, Lim filed a putative class action complaint in
the Northern District of California alleging that Schwab's
routing of order executions to UBS (1) violated the California
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) breached Schwab's fiduciary
duty to its clients; and (3) unjustly enriched Schwab.  Lim
alleged that Schwab's common law duty of best execution in
routing its clients' orders required Schwab to consider numerous
factors when routing client trades, including execution price,
market depth, order size, and trading character of the security.
By blindly routing non-directed orders to UBS, Lim alleged,
Schwab breached this duty.

On June 24, 2015, Fleming filed a similar putative class action
complaint in the same court against Schwab and UBS.  Fleming
alleged that Schwab (1) breached its contract; (2) violated the
UCL; (3) engaged in intentional misrepresentation; and (4)engaged
in negligent misrepresentation.  Fleming also alleged that UBS
violated the UCL.

After the two cases were assigned to the same district judge,
Schwab and UBS moved to dismiss the complaints.  They assert the
Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing or, in the alternative,
that Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA")
deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.  The
district court upheld the Plaintiffs' standing, but dismissed
both actions pursuant to SLUSA.

The issue for decision is whether SLUSA deprived the district
court of subject matter jurisdiction over complaints alleging a
breach by a securities dealer of the "duty of best execution" in
completing trades.

Examining the substance of the allegations of the Plaintiffs'
complaints, Judge Hurwitz concludes that all of the pleaded
causes of action allege deceptive conduct.  The district court
correctly characterized the gravamen of these complaints as
Schwab either misrepresented that best execution would be
achieved for its customers, or failed to disclose that best
execution was no longer possible.  In either case, the district
court properly concluded, the Plaintiffs are accusing Schwab of
engaging in deceptive conduct.

However, the Judge says that complaints merely involving contract
interpretation that do not allege deception or manipulation are
not covered by SLUSA even if they involve securities.  And, only
actions filed on behalf of a covered class (more than 50 people)
fall within SLUSA's purview.

The Plaintiffs assert that because the promise of best execution
does not induce clients to trade a particular security, Schwab's
breach of its best execution duty cannot be "in connection with"
the Plaintiffs' trades.  But SLUSA requires only that the
misrepresentation makes a significant difference to someone's
decision to purchase or to sell a covered security.

Finally, as to Fleming's allegation that UBS violated the UCL by
allowing so-called "high frequency traders" access to Schwab's
order flow, enabling them to engage in market manipulation, the
Judge finds that the complaint contended that once the trades
from Schwab are routed to UBS, they are vulnerable to multiple
forms of manipulation, resulting in a loss of profit
opportunities for Schwab clients.  He says the complaint thus
plainly pleads a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security,
and is SLUSA-barred.

For these reasons, Judge Hurwitz affirmed the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/BDcYX4 from Leagle.com.

Andrew Love -- alove@rgrdlaw.com -- (argued) and Susan K.
Alexander -- salexander@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, San Francisco, California; Juan Carlos Sanchez --
jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com -- Ashley M. Price -- aprice@rgrdlaw.com --
Benny C. Goodman III -- bennyg@rgrdlaw.com -- and Andrew J. Brown
-- andrewb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San
Diego, California; Gerald L. Rutledge and Alfred G. Yates Jr. --
info@yatesclassactionlaw.com -- Law Office of Alfred G. Yates Jr.
P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; for Plaintiff-Appellant. Francis
X Fleming Jr.

Leslie E. Hurst -- lhurst@bholaw.com -- (argued), Paula R. Brown,
Thomas J. O'Reardon II -- toreardon@bholaw.com -- and Timothy G.
Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, San
Diego, California; Leonid Kandinov -- lkandinov@robbinsarroyo.com
-- Ashley R. Rifkin -- arifkin@robbinsarroyo.com -- Kevin A.
Seely -- kseely@robbinsarroyo.com -- and Brian J. Robbins --
brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, San Diego,
California; David J. Harris Jr. , William R. Restis --
support@restislaw.com -- and Jeffrey R. Krinks ,
Finkelstein & Krinsk LLP, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-
Appellant. Louis Lim.

David C. Bohan -- david.bohan@kattenlaw.com -- (argued), Patrick
M. Smith -- patrick.smith@kattenlaw.com -- Peter G. Wilson --
peter.wilson1@kattenlaw.com -- and Allison M. Freedman --
allison.freedman@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,
Chicago, Illinois, for Defendant-Appellee UBS Securities LLC.

Gilbert R. Serota -- gilbert.serota@apks.com -- (argued) and
Erica M. Connolly -- econnolly@velaw.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP,
San Francisco, California; Lowell Haky -- lowell.haky@schwab.com
-- and Mai Klaassen -- mai.klaassen@schwab.com -- Charles Schwab
& Co. Inc., San Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellees
The Charles Schwab Corp., Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., and Walter
W. Bettinger II.


CHERRY HILL GOURMET: "Cuahuizo" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
PANFILO CUAHUIZO, on behalf of himself, and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. CHERRY HILL GOURMET, INC., doing
business as CHERRY HILL GOURMET MARKET, located at 1901 Emmons A
venue, Brooklyn, New York 11235, and DAVID ISAEV, individually,
Defendants, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-06895-KAM-RLM
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 27, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid wages and
minimum wages; unpaid overtime compensation; liquidated damages;
prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and
costs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York
Labor Law.

The Plaintiff is an adult resident of Kings County, New York.
Panfilo Cuahuizo was employed by Defendants in Brooklyn, New
York, to work as a stock person and cleaner/general helper in the
produce department, for Defendants' grocery store known as
"Cherry Hill Gourmet" from September 15, 2009, continuously
through September 29, 2017. The Defendants knowingly and
willfully failed to pay Plaintiff his lawfully earned wages in
contravention of the FLSA and New York Labor Law. During
Plaintiff's employment by Defendants, he worked over 40 hours per
week. The Plaintiff generally worked six shifts per week, 12
hours per shift. As such, Plaintiff's worked approximately 72
hours per week. Plaintiff was not paid for all hours worked, or
overtime compensation.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          708 Third A venue - 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209 3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209 7102
          E-mail: pcooper@jcpclaw.com


COMPUTER SCIENCES: Fails to Provide Rest Periods, Action Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Arreola, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Computer Sciences Corporation and Does 1
through 100, Case No. BC690043 (Cal. Super. Ct., January 11,
2018), is brought against the Defendants for failure to provide
rest period of at least 10 minutes for each 4-hour period worked.

Computer Sciences Corporation is in the business of providing
information technology services to businesses. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Paul K. Haines, Esq.
      HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
      2274 East Maple Ave.
      El Segundo, CA 90245
      Telephone: (424) 292-2350
      Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
      E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroiip.com

         - and -

      Sam Sani, Esq.
      SANI LAW, APC
      1055 West 7th Street, 33rd Floor
      Los Angeles, CA 90017
      Telephone: (310) 935-0405
      Facsimile: (310)935-0409
      E-mail: ssani@sanilawfirm.com


CORELOGIC INC: Mitchell Sues for Denied OT Pay, Wage Statements
---------------------------------------------------------------
Harriett Mitchell, individually, on behalf of others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v.
CoreLogic, Inc. (d/b/a CoreLogic Valuation Solutions, Inc.) and
Does 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 17-cv-02274, (C.D. Cal., December
29, 2017), seeks redress for Defendant's failure to pay overtime
compensation and provide wage statements in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, California Labor Code and the California
Business and Professions Code.

Mitchell conducts residential appraisals for Defendants' property
appraisal business.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Bryan J. Schwartz, Esq.
      DeCarol A. Davis, Esq.
      1330 Broadway, Suite 1630
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Telephone: (510) 444-9300
      Facsimile: (510) 444-9301
      Email: bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com
             decarol@bryanschwartzlaw.com


CORIZON HEALTH: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in "Abraham" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Andrew Abraham filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Andrew Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc., Case
No. 3:16-cv-01877-PK, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon, Portland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed against Clackamas County, and Corizon Health, Inc.,
formerly known as: Prison Health Services, Inc., on September 23,
2016.  The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Paul Papak.

The lawsuit is brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Andrew Abraham v. Corizon
Health, Inc., Case No. 17-36047, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by January 29, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on February 26, 2018;

   -- Appellant Andrew Abraham's opening brief is due on April 9,
      2018;

   -- Appellee Corizon Health, Inc.'s answering brief is due on
      May 7, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ANDREW ABRAHAM, on behalf of himself, and for
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          John David Burgess, Esq.
          Carl L. Post, Esq.
          Daniel J. Snyder, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL J. SNYDER
          1000 S.W. Broadway
          Portland, OR 97205
          Telephone: (503) 241-3617
          Facsimile: (503) 241-2249
          E-mail: johnburgess@lawofficeofdanielsnyder.com
                  carlpost@lawofficeofdanielsnyder.com
                  dansnyder@lawofficeofdanielsnyder.com

Defendant-Appellee CORIZON HEALTH, INC., FKA Prison Health
Services, Inc., is represented by:

          Anne M. Talcott, Esq.
          SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON & WYATT
          1211 SW 5th Avenue
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 222-9981
          E-mail: atalcott@schwabe.com


COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CA: "Harris" Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright II of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California dismissed with prejudice the case,
BERNADINE HARRIS; OUDY WALL; and MARIA REYES, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; ERIC GARCETTI, in his
official capacity as Mayor of Los Angeles; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a
public entity; CITY OF INGLEWOOD, a public entity; CITY OF
HAWTHORNE, a public entity; CITY OF GARDENA, a public entity;
CITY OF TORRANCE, a public entity; CITY OF CARSON, a public
entity; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-08293-ODW (AGR) (C.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed the action in Los Angeles Superior Court on
Aug. 29, 2017, and assert numerous claims for the Defendants'
purported violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), among other derivative causes of action.  On Nov. 14,
2017, the City of Los Angeles removed the case.  Several of the
Defendants joined in the removal, and then moved to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The cities of Carson, Inglewood, and Hawthorne moved to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' Complaint on Nov. 21, 2017.  The City of Los
Angeles moved to dismiss on Nov. 27, 2017.  And the City of
Torrance moved to dismiss on Dec. 6, 2017.  All of the moving
Defendants noticed the hearing for their respective motions on
Jan. 8, 2018.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' oppositions to the
motions to dismiss were due on Dec. 18, 2017.  The Plaintiffs
have not opposed any of the motions.

On Dec. 19, 2017, Plaintiff Harris voluntarily dismissed her
claims against the City of Los Angeles, and City of Gardena.

Since Harris dismisses her action against the City of Gardena,
one of several Defendants named in the class action complaint
that has not filed an answer or motion for summary judgment.
Similarly, although the City of Los Angeles filed a Motion to
Dismiss, Harris still has the "absolute right" to dismiss her
action against that the Defendant prior to the filing of its
answer or motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, Judge Wright
will dismiss Harris' action against the City of Gardena and City
of Los Angeles.  Subject to the Court's ruling on the pending
motions to dismiss, to the extent Harris has claims against any
of the other Defendants, they remain intact.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs' failure to oppose the
motions to dismiss demonstrates that the Plaintiffs are not
interested in prosecuting the action.  He says the Plaintiffs are
represented by counsel in this class action, and thus cannot
claim ignorance of deadlines.  Furthermore, on Nov. 16, 2017, the
Court issued a minute order advising that the counsel are
strongly encouraged to review the Central District's website for
additional information.  The Plaintiffs' lack of diligence is
highlighted by the fact that their counsel is aware of the action
since he filed dismissals on behalf of Harris, but still failed
to oppose the four pending motions to dismiss.  While there may
be less drastic sanctions available, this factor does not weigh
heavily in either direction.  Accordingly, the Judge will grant
the Defendants' motions to dismiss.

For these reasons, Judge Wright dismissed Harris' action against
City of Los Angeles and City of Gardena.  He also granted City of
Inglewood, City of Hawthorne, City of Torrance, City of Los
Angeles, and City of Carson's Motions to Dismiss.  Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' action against each of the foregoing Defendants is
dismissed with prejudice.  With respect to the City of Los
Angeles' Motion to Dismiss, the Judge did not grant it as to
Harris because she dismissed her action prior to the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/tacemj from Leagle.com.

Bernadine Harris, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Oudy Thomas Wall, Jr., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated & Maria Reyes, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Jonathan Daniel Winters --
jwinters@jwinterslaw.com -- Law Offices of Jonathan Winters.

County of Los Angeles, a public entity, Defendant, represented by
Dusan Pavlovic -- dpavlovic@counsel.lacounty.gov -- Office of the
County Counsel.

City of Los Angeles, a public entity, Defendant, represented by
Kevin E. Gilbert -- kgilbert@ohshlaw.com -- Orbach Huff Suarez
and Henderson LLP.

City of Inglewood, a public entity & City of Hawthorne, a public
entity, Defendants, represented by Kenton E. Moore --
kmoore@mccuneharber.com -- McCune and Harber LLP & Benson Edward
Garrett -- bgarrett@mccuneharber.com -- McCune and Harber LLP.

City of Carson, a public entity, Defendant, represented by Marsha
Michiko Yasuda -- myasuda@awattorneys.com -- Aleshire and Wynder
LLP.

City of Torrance, a public entity, Defendant, represented by
Daniel K. Spradlin -- dspradlin@wss-law.com -- Woodruff Spradlin
and Smart APC & Myles S. Couch -- mcouch@wss-law.com -- Woodruff
Spradlin and Smart APC.


COVELLI ENTERPRISES: Ex-Panera Bread Employee Files Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lindsay McCoy, writing for WFMJ, reports that an employee who
worked at a Northeast Ohio Panera Bread files a class action
lawsuit against Covelli Enterprises, claiming she wasn't paid for
working overtime.

The plaintiff in the lawsuit worked as an assistant manager at a
Panera in Wadsworth, which is just outside of Akron.

Erin E. Kis and her attorney are alleging violations under the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

Covelli Enterprises describes the lawsuit as "frivolous".

The lawsuit claims Covelli Enterprises allegedly violated state
law by failing to pay assistant managers time and half for hours
worked beyond 40 hours.

The class action suit seeks to include current and former
employees that worked as assistant managers in the U.S. dating
back three years from the day the suit was filed and those who
work or worked as assistant managers at Ohio Panera Bread
locations dating back the last two years.

21 News reached out to Kis and her attorney and have yet to hear
back.

Covelli Enterprises is headquartered in Warren.  It's the largest
Panera Bread franchisee with more than 250 locations, including
many in Ohio.

The company released this statement in response to the lawsuit
filed on Jan. 9:

"The accusations in the complaint are 100 percent false.  These
are salaried employees, who our company is vigilant about paying
fairly and in compliance with all wage and hour laws.  All
employees who are entitled to overtime pay are paid by the
Company in accordance with the law.  Unfortunately, these types
of frivolous lawsuits involving salaried managers have become too
common place in the service industry.  We thank our employees for
their hard work and dedication and look forward to seeing this
case dismissed." [GN]


DEMI AG INC: Court Enters Default Judgment in "Juarez" Labor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California granted in part and denied in
part the  Plaintiffs' motion for entry of default judgment in the
case captioned OCTAVIANO JUAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAFAEL
VILLAFAN, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00688-DAD-SAB
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are a group of workers who were employed by the
Defendants pursuant to an oral contract of employment in Fresno
County.  They Plaintiffs were hired to pick grapes from Sept. 11,
2015 through Sept. 15, 2015.

Defendants Villafan and Demi Ag were operating as farm labor
contractors without a license as required by Cal. Labor Code
Section 1683(a) and/or as labor contractors under Cal. Labor Code
Section 2810.3(b).  The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Sangha
Sundip Singh contracted with Defendant Villafan, Defendant Demi
Ag, and/or Defendant Rafael Villafan, doing business as Demi Ag,
Inc., to supply workers to perform agricultural work on his
vineyards in Selma.

The Plaintiffs filed the action on May 13, 2016, alleging
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); violation of
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
("AWPA"); and California labor law; California's Unfair
Competition Law; and the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA").

Defendant Villafan has not answered the complaint.  Defendant
Demi Ag answered the complaint on June 3, 2016.  However, the
answer was filed by the owner of the business, Margarita Ortega,
and not a lawyer.  On June 7, 2016, the Court issued an order
requiring Defendant Demi Ag to retain counsel and have said
counsel appear in the matter.  When Defendant Demi Ag did not
respond to the June 7, 2016 order, the Court issued an order
requiring Defendant Demi Ag to show cause why its answer should
not be stricken for its failure to comply with the Court's June
7, 2016 order.  Defendant Demi Ag did not respond to the Court's
order to show cause.  Therefore, on Aug.23, 2016, the Court
struck Defendant Demi Ag's answer from the record.

On Sept. 27, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an amended request to
enter default against Defendants Villafan and Demi Ag.  On that
same day, the Court entered default against these Defendants.  On
Oct. 6, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint
against Defendants Villafan, Demi Ag and Singh.  On May 4, 2017,
the Plaintiffs settled with Defendant Singh.

On Oct. 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for default
judgment against Defendants Villafan and Demi Ag.  They're not
seeking recovery for the fifteenth claim in the motion for
default judgment as they concede the claim under California's
Unfair Competition Law.  The motion was served on Defendant Demi
Ag, who has appeared, but not on Defendant Villafan, who has not
appeared.

During the Nov. 22, 2017 hearing on the motion for default
judgment, the Plaintiffs requested that they be allowed to file
supplemental briefing to address some of the Court's questions.
On Nov. 22, 2017, the Court directed the Plaintiffs to file
supplemental briefing regarding the motion for default judgment.
After receiving an extension of time, the Plaintiffs filed their
supplemental briefing on Dec. 8, 2017.

The Magistrate Judge concludes that Defendants Villafan and Demi
Ag's failure to respond was due to the affirmative decision not
to oppose the action rather than excusable neglect.  He says the
defaulting Defendants have not defended the action despite having
the opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, he finds that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment and the motion should
be granted.

Magistrate Boone finds that the Plaintiffs sufficiently allege
that the defaulting Defendants have violated the FLSA by failing
to provide at least minimum wages to Plaintiffs by not paying
them wages due and owing to them.  Therefore, Plaintiffs
sufficiently plead the FLSA claim for failure to pay minimum
wages.  He also finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that the defaulting Defendants violated four provisions
of the AWPA: 29 U.S.C. Section 1831(b); 29 U.S.C. Section
1831(c)(2); 29 U.S.C. Section 1832(a); and 29 U.S.C. Section
1832(c).

For the Plaintiffs' third claim, the Magistrate Judge finds that
Plaintiff Arturo Santo has not sufficiently stated a claim for
wages owed entitling them to recover piece-rate wages under
Sections 216 and 218 of the California Labor Code.  However, he
finds that Plaintiffs Octaviano Juarez, Angel Mendez Mendez, Noe
Moises Ramirez Salazar, Patricio Reyes Venegas, Alejandro Rivera
Fonseca, Daniel Ramirez Cuevas, Sergio Gomez Gonzales, Abel
Isidro B., Pablo Lopez Cruz, Angelina Isidro B., Honorina Cruz
Salinas, Rolando Juarez Martinez, Manual Juarez Ramirez, and
Juana R. Mayoral Silva have sufficiently alleged a claim for and
are entitled to damages for failure to pay wages owed under
sections 201 and 218 of the Labor Code.

Magistrate Boone finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged (i) that the Defendants failed to pay them minimum wages
under California law; (ii) that they are owed liquidated damages
for failure to pay minimum wage under Cal. Lab. Code Section
1194.2; and (iii) that the Defendants failed to provide
Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements, violating section
226(a.

The Magistrate Judge further finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have
not sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim for failure to
allow inspection under Cal. Lab. Code Section 1695(a)(5); (ii)
Plaintiff Juana Mayoral Silva has not sufficiently pled a claim
for overtime; and (iii) the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged facts to state a claim for failure to allow inspection
under Cal. Lab. Code Section 1695(a)(5).

For these reasons, Magistrate Boone recommended that the
Plaintiffs' motion for entry of default judgment be granted in
part and denied in part.  He further recommended that judgment
should be entered in the Plaintiffs favor and against Defendants
Villafan and Demi Ag.  The Plaintiffs should be awarded damages
totaling $101,313.70, attorneys' fees in the amount of
$44,525.25, and costs in the amount of $677.34.  The total award
should reduce by the $25,000 paid due to the settlement with
Defendant Singh.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district
judge assigned to the action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(B) and the Court's Local Rule 304.  Within 14 days of
service of this recommendation, any party may file written
objections to these findings and recommendations with the Court
and serve a copy on all parties.  Such a document should be
captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and
Recommendations."  The district judge will review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(1)(C).  The Magistrate Judge advised the parties
that failure to file objections within the specified time may
result in the waiver of rights on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Findings and
Recommendations is available at https://is.gd/9vZDpC from
Leagle.com.

Octaviano Juarez, Angel Mendez Mendez, Noe Moises Ramirez
Salazar, Patricio Reyes Venegas, Alejandro Rivera Fonseca, Daniel
Ramirez Cuevas, Sergio Gomez Gonzales, Arturo Santos, Abel B
Isidro, Pablo Lopez Cruz, Angelina B Isidro, Honorina Cruz
Salinas, Manuel Juarez Ramirez, Juana Mayoral Silva & Rolando
Juarez Martinez, Plaintiffs, represented by Aida S. Macedo --
asmacedo@mse-law.com -- Miles, Sears & Eanni, Blanca A. Banuelos,
California Rural Legal Assistance & Estella Maria Cisneros --
ecisneros@crla.org -- California Rural Legal Assistance.

Demi Ag. Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, Pro Se.


DRY CAST: Sent Unsolicited Fax Messages, "Conner" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Steven A. Conner DPM, P.C., individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v. Dry
Cast Holdings LLC d/b/a Dry Cast, Case No. 2:18-cv-00139-AB (E.D
Penn., January 11, 2018), seeks to put an end to the Defendants'
practice of sending one or more telephone facsimile messages
about cast protection devices, without prior express consent.

Dry Cast Holdings LLC is a manufacturer of dry cast original and
dry cast swim products.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard Shenkan, Esq.
      SHENKAN INJURY LAWYER LLC
      6550 Lakeshore St. West
      Bloomfield, MI 48321429
      Telephone: (248) 562-1320
      Facsimile: (888) 769-1774
      E-mail: rshenkan@shenkanlaw.com

         - and -

      Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
      BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
      134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Telephone: (312) 658-5500
      Facsimile: (312) 658-5555
      E-mail: service@classlawyers.com


EDGEWELL PERSONAL: Wants Banana Boat Sunscreen Class Action Nixed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stewart Bishop, writing for Law360, reports that an attorney for
the makers of Banana Boat sunscreen on Jan. 10 asked a New York
federal judge to toss a proposed class action claiming they
falsely exaggerate the sun protection level on its children's
sunscreen as SPF 50, when in fact it provides much less
protection, saying the Food and Drug Administration should take
up the dispute.

The consolidated, putative class action was filed against
Edgewell Personal Care Co., Playtex Products LLC and Sun
Pharmaceutical LLC, which jointly manufacture the sunscreen. [GN]


EDWARDS WILDMAN: Li Sues over Defective Cosmetic Products
---------------------------------------------------------
SHUXIN LI, an individual, and Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. EDWARDS SCOTT PALMER, an individual, and EDWARDS
WILDMAN LLP, RONNIE M. SCHMELZ, an individual, and Partner with
EDWARDS WILDMAN; STEPHEN R. TUGGY, an individual, and Partner
with LOCKE LORD, LLP SUZELLE M. SMITH, an individual, and Partner
HOWARTH &SMITH, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. CV17-08732 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 4, 2017), seeks to recover
damages as a result of Defendant's legal malpractice and
constructive fraud.

According to the complaint, in 2013, the principal party
connected to the instant complaint is Jack Qin ("QIN") who at the
time was a citizen of California and founder of EFT Holdings,
Inc. ("EFT') As the Chief Executive Officer of EFT Holding, Inc.,
Qin was the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors.

The Plaintiff alleges that EFT sold common stock to its customers
at $3.80 per share. The Plaintiff and other class members were
stockholders with a personal equity interest in EFT products
allegedly made in United States, and sold in Asian markets,
mostly to Chinese citizens, and Chinese Americans.

The Plaintiff alleges that EFT is well an organized, well-funded,
multijurisdictional in reach and with the express aimed of
maximum profits from the distribution of its products to foreign
countries allegedly made in the United States. While doing
business in California in 2012, the Plaintiff alleges that Qin
manufactured cosmetic and digestive products it knew were
defective, unsafe, and offered the products on the market to
consumers in the form of common stock or penny stock, knowing
that the stock were worthless and would cause physical harm to
consumers. The Plaintiff alleges Qin sold its EFT stock primarily
to uninformed Chinese shareholders and Chinese Americans. The
alleged products EFT sold on the market were mislabeled and
false, and caused the Plaintiff and other class members to
abdicate their equity interest in EFT shock, which caused the
Plaintiff to suffer economic damages as a result.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shuxin, Li, Esq.
          1320 West 83 Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90044


ELM RIDGE: Feb. 8 Planning Conference in "Neiberger" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
JOHN NEIBERGER, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiff, v. ELM RIDGE OPERATING CO., INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02886-MJW (D. Colo., Dec. 2, 2017),
seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Colorado Wage Claim Act, and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are those similarly
situated persons who worked for Elm Ridge and were paid a salary,
but did not receive overtime for all hours worked over 12 in each
day and/or 40) in each workweek. The Plaintiff and the Putative
Class Members routinely work (and worked) in excess of 12 hours
per day and/or 40 hours per workweek. The Plaintiff and the
Putative Class Members were not paid overtime for all hours
worked in excess of 12 per day and/or 40 hours per workweek.

The decision by Elm Ridge not to pay overtime compensation to
Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members was neither reasonable
nor in good faith. Elm Ridge knowingly and deliberately failed to
compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime for
all hours worked in excess of 12 per day and/or 40 hours per
workweek.

                           *     *     *

In a Dec. 6 Order, Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe set this
timeline:

     -- Consent/Non-Consent Form due on or before Jan. 25, 2018.

     -- Scheduling/Planning Conference set for Feb. 8, 2018, at
        10:30 a.m. in Courtroom A 502.

On Jan. 19, Defendant filed its answer to the Complaint.

On Jan. 26, the case was randomly reassigned to Judge Philip A.
Brimmer.[BN]

Attorneys in Charge for Plaintiff and the Putative
Class Members:

          Brian D. Gonzales, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN D. GONZALES, PLLC
          2580 East Harmony Road, Suite 201
          Fort Collins, CO 80528
          Telephone: (970) 214 0562
          E-mail: BGonzales@ColoradoWageLaw.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON2X, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TXs 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452 1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452 1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Averts Class Action Over Drug Pricing Methods
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg BNA, reports that Anthem
Inc. and Express Scripts Inc. defeated a proposed class action
challenging their drug pricing methods under federal benefits,
racketeering, and health discrimination law.

The companies couldn't be liable under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act for allegedly setting high drug prices,
because they weren't acting as ERISA fiduciaries when they set
those prices, a federal judge ruled Jan 8.  The judge also
rejected claims by HIV-positive patients who said the high drug
prices were discriminatory under the Affordable Care Act.  He
dismissed all claims in the 17-count lawsuit, although he gave
the patients and health plans that filed suit another chance to
litigate.

The ruling is the latest chapter in the $15 billion battle
between health insurer Anthem and pharmacy benefit manager (PBM)
Express Scripts.  Anthem sued Express Scripts in 2016, claiming
the company was overcharging for prescription drug benefits in
violation of the parties' agreement.  That case remains pending
after a federal judge dismissed some of Express Scripts'
counterclaims against Anthem.

Both cases stem from a 2009 deal in which Express Scripts agreed
to provide prescription drug services for Anthem health plans and
Anthem sold Express Scripts three PBM companies for more than $4
billion.  The patients who filed this lawsuit say Express Scripts
paid a multibillion-dollar premium for the PBM companies and in
turn began significantly overcharging Anthem patients for
prescription drugs.

Anthem has since announced plans to start its own PBM unit and
signed a five-year deal with Express Scripts' biggest competitor,
CVS Health Corp.

Case Dismissed
The decision focused on whether Anthem and Express Scripts
qualified as ERISA fiduciaries of the relevant health plans, and
thus whether they could be liable for fiduciary breach.

The patients said Express Scripts was an ERISA fiduciary because
the company's deal with Anthem gave it discretion to set drug
prices and therefore to determine what compensation it received
from ERISA plan assets.  The judge disagreed, saying service
providers don't act as fiduciaries when they merely follow the
terms of a contract.

The patients also argued for Anthem's fiduciary status, saying
the company exercised fiduciary discretion in creating this deal
with Express Scripts.  The judge again disagreed, saying Anthem
was making business decisions -- and not plan administration
decisions--when it contracted with Express Scripts and negotiated
drug pricing terms.

Finally, the judge rejected the idea that the pricing terms
violated the ACA's nondiscrimination rules.  The HIV-positive
patients who advanced this argument didn't show they paid a
disproportionately high amount for HIV-related drugs compared
with other drugs, the judge said.

In so ruling, the judge declined to decide whether the ACA's
nondiscrimination rules, which prohibit health-based
discrimination against people with disabilities, allows for a
claim based on the "disparate impact" a policy could have on
people with disabilities.

Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York wrote the decision.

The patients are represented by Keller Rohrback LLP, Consumer
Watchdog, Whatley Kallas LLP, and Neubert Pepe & Monteith PC.
Express Scripts is represented by Quinn Emanuel and Steptoe &
Johnson LLP.  Anthem is represented by White & Case LLP and
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough.

The case is In re Express Scripts, Inc., 2018 BL 5645, S.D.N.Y.,
No. 1:16-cv-03399-ER, order granting motion to dismiss 1/5/18.
[GN]


FAIRWAY STAFFING: Fails to Pay Employees OT, "Gomez" Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Guadalupe Gomez, individually, and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Fairway Staffing Services, Inc.,
Elizabeth's Foods Co., Inc., and Does 1-50, Case No. BC689771
(Cal. Super. Ct., January 11, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages for work more than
40 hours in a week.

Fairway Staffing Services, Inc. owns and operates an employment
agency located at 17610 Bellflower Blvd. Suite A-204, Bellflower,
CA 90706.

Elizabeth's Foods Co., Inc. owns and operates a wholesale bakery
located at 19301 S Santa Fe Ave, Compton, CA 90221. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Heather Davis, Esq.
      Amir Nayebdadash, Esq.
      Cody Payne, Esq.
      Priscilla Gamino, Esq.
      PROTECTION LAW GROUP, LLP
      136 Main Street, Suite A
      El Segundo, CA 90245
      Telephone: (424) 290-3095
      Facsimile: (866) 264-7880
      E-mail: heather@protectionlawgroup.com
              amir@protectionlawgroup.com


FCA US: Faces "Sheets" Class Suit Over Workers Benefits Seniority
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard J. Sheets, Nichole Wawrzyniak, Jeffrey Weills, Deion C.
Barnett Sr., Dennis Beaver, Don K. Byers, La Donn Coleman,
Matthew G. Condon, Edmund Contreras, Andrew Czop, William F.
Dear, Scott A. Deselms, Ryan Devol, Robert L. Dotson, Melissa
Dotson, Marcus Everly, Pamela Gilmore, Randy Hall, Eve Harper,
James M. Harrison, Robert E. Hartwig, Kim Hayward, Randall A.
Holvey, Lisa Horn, Jose Huerta, Kenneth A. Kohn, Anthony M.
Koperski, William Kuehling, Shawn Madalinski, Gregory Mattice,
Daniel Miller, Nikola Nedeski, Earl R. Oswald Iii, Panfilo Ramon,
Jr., Jason Renner, William D. Renner, Sharon Riger-Long, Tracey
Rivard, Dennis J. Ross, Howard F. Rudes, Jamie Schetter, Donald
J. Sinclair, Matthew Smith, Michael Stukenborg, Marc Styles,
Kelley Szych, Paul Ulman, Sam Withrow, and Joseph A. Wood,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. FCA US
LLC, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, and United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Region
2B, Case No. 3:18-cv-00085 (N.D. Ohio, January 11, 2018), is
brought on behalf of all individuals who were hired by nominally
independent suppliers to work in a Chrysler plant, then
unlawfully stripped of their Chrysler benefits and seniority.

The Plaintiffs bring this action against FCA US LLC and their
labor union, the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement pursuant to the Labor Management Relations
Act, and against their labor union, the UAW International Union,
for violations of its duty of fair representation by accepting
bribes to bargain away the Plaintiffs' seniority and benefits.

FCA US LLC operates a foreign automobile company organized under
the laws of the State of Delaware.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America is one of the largest
and most diverse labor organizations in the United States,
representing over 400,000 active workers and 580,000 retirees.

United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, Region 2B is a labor organization and is a
constituent part of the UAW International Union responsible for
overseeing and supporting UAW locals in Ohio and Indiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Leslie O. Murray, Esq.
      John T. Murray, Esq.
      Michael J. Stewart, Esq.
      MURRAY & MURRAY CO., L.P.A.
      111 East Shoreline Drive
      Sandusky, OH 44870
      Telephone: (419) 624-3125
      Facsimile: (419) 624-0707
      E-mail: lom@murrayandmurray.com
              jotm@murrayandmurray.com
              stewart@murrayandmurray.com


FCA US: Court Issues Final Pretrial Order in "Hall" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California has issued the final pretrial order in the
case captioned, DENNIS L. HALL and MICHELLE L. HALL, Plaintiffs,
v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
Case No. 1:16-cv-00684-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal.).

On March 30, 2016, Plaintiffs Dennis Hall and Michelle Hall filed
the action against FCA in the Kern County Superior Court,
alleging state law causes of action for breach of express and
implied warranties under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,
Cal. Civ. Code Section 1794 et seq., and fraudulent inducement.

The Plaintiffs purchased a new 2012 Dodge Durango on Aug. 29,
2011, from Haddad Dodge.  The subject vehicle was covered by
express written warranties issued by FCA, including the "Basic
Limited Warranty" and the "Powertrain Limited Warranty."  The
Plaintiffs timely submitted a request for exclusion from the
proposed settlement of a class action lawsuit which concerned
alleged defects in the TIPM-7 control module, Velasco, et al. v.
Chrysler Group, LLC.

The Plaintiffs seek restitution or damages for the diminished
value of the vehicle, plus incidental and consequential damages.
Additionally, they seek a civil penalty of up to two times the
actual damages for the Defendant's alleged willful failure to
comply with the Song-Beverly Act.  They seek damages, including
punitive damages, for the Defendant's fraudulent concealment of a
known defect.

The Plaintiffs request a jury trial.  They suggested in the
pretrial statement that they anticipated a jury trial lasting 10
to 12 days, while the Defendant estimates a jury trial would take
five days.  At the pretrial conference, the Plaintiffs' counsel
agreed these cases typically require five to seven days of trial.
Therefore, the Court anticipates the trial will consume
approximately five court days.

On Nov. 29, 2017, the Court issued a tentative pretrial order
which gave the parties 14 days to file objections, and seven days
thereafter to file any replies.  The Defendant filed objections
on Dec. 13, 2017.  No objections were received from the
Plaintiffs, and they filed no reply to the Defendant's
objections.  The Court now issues the final pretrial order.

The parties have filed motions in limine.  Opposition to these
motions in limine will be filed no later than 14 days before
trial and any replies will be filed no later than 10 days before
trial.  Upon receipt of any opposition briefs, the Court will
notify the parties if it will hear argument on any motions in
limine prior to the first day of trial.

The parties have had settlement discussions, but have been unable
to reach a resolution.  They attended a mandatory, Court-
supervised settlement conference on March 22, 2017, at which time
the case did not settle.  They plan to continue negotiating, and
advised the Court at the Final Pretrial Conference that a further
court-supervised settlement conference would not be helpful at
this time.  If the parties' position in that regard should change
prior to trial, the counsel will so notify the Court.

The parties do not seek a separate trial of any issues.  They've
each designated their own experts and do not seek Court-appointed
impartial expert witnesses.  Further, the parties do not believe
that a limitation of the number of expert witnesses is advisable.
The Defendant objects to the Plaintiff's expert witnesses as
indicated.

The Plaintiffs will move for an award of reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs under California Civil Code Section 1794(d) if
they are the prevailing party at trial or by settlement.  The
parties do not seek a protective order.

Judge Drozd directed that the trial briefs addressing the points
of law implicated by the remaining claims will be filed with the
Court no later than seven days before trial in accordance with
Local Rule 285.  There are none abandoned claims or issues by the
Plaintiffs.  The Defendant withdraws its first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth,
sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth affirmative
defenses.

The anticipated witnesses for both parties are named, including
Dennis L. Hall, Michelle L. Hall and Michael McDowell, FCA's
Person Most Knowledgeable, Irvine, California.  Each party may
call any witnesses designated by the other.

Jury trial is set for Jan. 9, 2018 at 8:30 a.m.  The trial is
anticipated to last approximately five court days.  The parties
are directed to Judge Drozd's standard procedures available on
his webpage on the Court's website.  The counsel are to call
Renee Gaumnitz, Judge Drozd's courtroom deputy, at (559) 499-
5652, one week prior to trial to ascertain the status of the
trial date.

The parties will file any proposed jury voir dire 7 days before
trial.  Each party will be limited to 15 minutes of jury voir
dire.

The Judge directs the counsel to meet and confer in an attempt to
generate a joint set of jury instructions and verdicts.  The
parties will file any such joint set of instructions 14 days
before trial, identified as "Joint Jury Instructions and
Verdicts."  To the extent the parties are unable to agree on all
or some instructions and verdicts, their respective proposed
instructions are due 14 days before trial.

The counsel is also directed to e-mail a copy of all proposed
jury instructions and verdicts, whether agreed or disputed, as a
Word document to dadorders@caed.uscourts.gov no later than 14
days before trial; all blanks in form instructions should be
completed and all brackets removed.

Objections to proposed jury instructions must be filed seven days
before trial; each objection will identify the challenged
instruction and will provide a concise explanation of the basis
for the objection along with citation of authority.  When
applicable, the objecting party will submit an alternative
proposed instruction on the issue or identify which of his or her
own proposed instructions covers the subject.

The trial briefs are due seven days before trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Final Pretrial
Order is available at https://is.gd/qkXZaY from Leagle.com.

Dennis L. Hall & Michelle L. Hall, Plaintiffs, represented by
Sepehr Daghighian -- sepehr@daghighian.com -- Hackler Daghighian
Martino & Novak, P.C., Steve Mikhov, Knight Law Group, Alastair
Hamblin, Knight Law Group LLP & Russell W. Higgins, Knight Law
Group.

FCA US, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendant,
represented by Aaron M. Brian -- abrian@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon
Peabody LLP, Lisa Caryn Schwartz Tudzin -- tudzinl@gmail.com --
Kristi Livedalen, Nixon Peabody, LLP & Scott Steven Shepardson --
sshepardson@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon Peabody LLP.


FEDLOAN SERVICING: Gallagher Sues Over Student Loan Mismanagement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Arianne Gallagher, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency (d/b/a Fedloan Servicing), Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-
02416, (M.D. Pa., December 29, 2017), seeks damages, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest, costs of the suit, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and any other further
relief resulting from negligence, breach of contract and
violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law.

Arianne Gallagher is a federal student loan holder. Pennsylvania
Higher Education Assistance Agency constantly breached its duties
it owed to service her loans properly due to processing delays,
by placing Gallagher's account into forbearance on three separate
occasions, spanning at least five monthly payments, denying her
the opportunity to take part in alternative repayment plans and
the opportunity to make qualifying payments, denying her Federal
Interest Subsidies that the Department of Education must
contribute on her behalf during repayment and denying her the
reduced interest rates available for borrowers in repayment
status and capitalization of accrued interest, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
     Kevin W. Tucker, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Tel: (412) 322-9243
     E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
             ktucker@carlsonlynch.com

            - and -

     Bryan L. Bleichner, Esq.
     Gary K. Luloff, Esq.
     CHESTNUT CAMBRONNE PA
     17 Washington Avenue North, Suite 300
     Minneapolis, MN 55401
     Tel: (612) 339-7300
     Fax: (612) 336-2940
     E-mail: bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com
             gluloff@chestnutcambronne.com

            - and -

     Brian C. Gudmundson, Esq.
     Michael J. Laird, Esq.
     ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
     1100 IDS Center
     80 South 8th Street
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Tel: (612) 341-0400
     Fax: (612) 341-0844
     E-mail: brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com
             michael.laird@zimmreed.com

            - and -

     Arthur M. Murray, Esq.
     MURRAY LAW FIRM
     650 Poydras Street, Suite 2150
     New Orleans, LA 70130
     Telephone: (504) 525-8100
     Facsimile: (504) 584-5249
     E-mail: amurray@murray-lawfirm.com


FERGUSON ENTERPRISES: Fails to Pay All Wages, Conner Says
---------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND CONNER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Virginia corporation; WOLSELEY INVESTMENTS, INC., a Virginia
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. BC6856S4 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 4, 2017), seeks to
recover unpaid wages, compensatory damages, penalties, and
related relief through this class action under the California
Labor Code, the Industrial Welfare Commission Order, and the
Business and Professions Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable to him and other
similarly situated current and former non-exempt hourly employees
in California for unpaid wages and other related relief. These
claims are based on Defendants' alleged failures to pay all wages
for all hours worked at the correct rates of pay, including, but
not limited to, overtime hours, provide all meal and rest
periods, provide accurate written wage statements, timely pay
final wages upon termination of employment, fairly compete.
Defendants are also liable to Plaintiff for retaliation and
wrongful termination.

Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., headquartered in Newport News,
Virginia, is the largest plumbing wholesaler in North America and
a major distributor of HVAC&R equipment, waterworks and fire.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G. Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Ste. 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone (818) 582 3086
          Facsimile (818) 582 2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com


FOGO DE CHAO: Does Not Properly Pay Employees, Action Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Moussa, an individual on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Fogo De Chao Churras Caria (California),
LLC and Does 1 through 10 inclusive, Case No. BC689391 (Cal.
Super. Ct., January 11, 2018), is brought against the Defendants
for failure to maintain accurate records of the actual hours
worked by each member of the Class, failure to provide a meal
period after 5 hours of work or 10 hours of work due to lack of
coverage, failure to pay premium pay for missed meal period, and
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the California
Labor Code.

Fogo De Chao Churras Caria (California), LLC owns and operates
five Brazilian-style steakhouses in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles,
San Diego, San Francisco, and San Jose. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      George S. Azadian, Esq.
      Ani Azadian, Esq.
      Edrik Mehrabi, Esq.
      AZADIAN LAW GROUP, PC
      790 E. Colorado Blvd., 9th Floor
      Pasadena, CA 91101
      Telephone: (626) 449-4944
      Facsimile: (626)628-1722
      E-mail: George@azadianlawgroup.com

FORD MOTOR: Responds to Class Action Over Emissions Cheating
------------------------------------------------------------
Ratchet+Wrench reports that a class action lawsuit filed on
Jan. 10 by law firm Hagens Berman accuses Ford and Bosch of
knowingly installing emissions-cheating software devices in 2011-
2017 Ford 250 and 350 Super Duty diesel pickup trucks akin to the
devices at the center of Volkswagen's Dieselgate scandal,
allowing the affected pickups to pollute at levels up to 50 times
legal limits.

The suit adds that the diesel Super Duty trucks that pollute at
illegal levels cost $8,400 more than their gasoline counterparts.
Even in average stop-and-go conditions, emissions are routinely
as high as five times the standard, the suit says.

The class action hits Ford and Bosch with a total 58 counts of
violations of state consumer laws, false advertising laws,
deceptive trade laws as well as violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), adding that
"Ford did not act alone," but colluded with Bosch in an organized
scheme to evade emissions requirements, for sake of profit.

The lawsuit, filed Jan. 10, 2018, in the U.S. District for the
Eastern District of Michigan, states that the trucks' touted
performance, power and towing capabilities are only obtained by
switching off or turning down emissions controls when the
software senses the vehicle is not in an emissions-testing
environment.

Update:
Bosch representatives sent the following statement to
Ratchet+Wrench:

"Bosch takes the allegations of manipulation of the diesel
software very seriously.  Bosch is cooperating with
investigations in various jurisdictions and is defending its
interests in the litigation.  As a matter of policy, and due to
the sensitive legal nature of these matters, Bosch will not
comment further concerning matters under investigation and in
litigation."

Ford representatives sent Ratchet+Wrench the following statement:

"All Ford vehicles, including those with diesel engines, comply
with all U.S. EPA and CARB emissions regulations.  Ford vehicles
do not have defeat devices.  We will defend ourselves against
these baseless claims." [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Anderson" MMPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Phillips of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri, Southern Division, denied Ford's Motion to
Dismiss the case, MICHELLE ANDERSON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR
COMAPNY, Defendant, Case No. 17-3244-CV-S-BP (W.D. Mo.).

Starting in the 2007 model year, Ford introduced vehicles with
expanded sunroofs known as panoramic sunroofs.  Panoramic
sunroofs are made of tempered or laminated glass, and Ford is
alleged to have used tempered glass.  It also used ceramic paint
or enamel on the glass prior to tempering.

The Plaintiff alleges that the use of ceramic paint or enamel in
panoramic sunroofs make them prone to spontaneously bursting.
She further alleges that Ford was aware of this defect in its
panoramic sunroofs based on a number of studies on panoramic
roofs and consumer complaints of panoramic roofs spontaneously
shattering.

In January 2016, the Plaintiff purchased a new 2016 Ford Escape
from Friendly Ford in Springfield, Missouri.  Her Escape included
a panoramic sunroof.  The Plaintiff alleges she researched the
vehicle before purchasing it and that the panoramic sunroof was a
"huge selling point" in her buying decision.  She asserts that
she would not have purchased the vehicle or would have paid
substantially less given this defect.

On Feb. 7, 2017, the Plaintiff was driving on I-44 East near
Springfield when she alleges she heard what sounded like a
shotgun being fired.  Thereafter, she discovered a hole in the
sunroof as well as shattered glass inside the vehicle.  She took
the vehicle to Friendly Ford to have the sunroof repaired, but
the dealer told her that the sunroof was not covered by the
warranty.  The Plaintiff then paid to have the sunroof replaced.

Count I asserts a breach of express warranty on behalf of a
nationwide class, or alternatively on behalf of a Missouri class.
Count II asserts fraudulent concealment on behalf of a nationwide
class, or alternatively on behalf of a Missouri class.  Count III
asserts violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act
("MMPA"), on behalf of a Missouri class.  Count IV alleges breach
of implied warranty of merchantability on behalf of a Missouri
class.  All four counts assert claims on behalf of purchasers of
16 Ford vehicles that are sold with panoramic sunroofs.

Ford filed its Motion to Dismiss.  It first argues that the
Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue claims concerning the
15 vehicle models she did not purchase.  It then argues that
Counts II and III should be dismissed for any of three
independent reasons: (i) the Plaintiff has not alleged an
actionable omission, (ii) Ford did not have a duty to disclose
information to the Plaintiff, or (iii) the claims are barred
under Missouri's economic loss doctrine.

The Plaintiff argues that the standing argument is more
appropriately considered at the class certification stage and
that Counts II and III properly state causes of action for
concealment and violation of the MMPA.

Judge Phillips finds that Ford may be correct that the Plaintiff
lacks standing to assert claims as to the 15 vehicle models, but
she cannot resolve the dispute at this stage of the case.
Moreover, even if the Court later determines that Ford is correct
and the Plaintiff can assert claims with respect to the Ford
Escape only, the matter may be more efficiently resolved at the
class certification stage by limiting the class definition.  For
these reasons, she will deny Ford's request to dismiss all claims
related to the other fifteen models.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff has pleaded that Ford had
reason to know about the issues with the panoramic sunroof and
that the problem could not timely be known by the Plaintiff.  The
Plaintiff also alleges she would not have entered into the
contract, had she known of the defect.  Arguably, this claim is
based on conduct that preceded the formation of the contract.
Thus, given the stage of the litigation it is premature to
dismiss the Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim.

Judge Phillips concludes that Ford's arguments regarding the
Plaintiff's ability to assert claims regarding panoramic sunroofs
in vehicle models she did not purchase cannot be properly
evaluated at this time.  The arguments Ford has raised to support
dismissal of Counts II and III are rejected.  Accordingly, she
denied Ford's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/aBKuxc from Leagle.com.

Michelle Anderson, Plaintiff, represented by Adam A. Edwards --
adam@gregcolemanlaw.com -- pro hac vice, Gregory F. Coleman , pro
hac vice, Lisa A. White , pro hac vice, Mitchell M. Breit --
mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS AND HANLY, LLC, pro hac vice &
Sarah S. Burns -- sburns@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Law Firm.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Bradley M.
Strickland -- brad.strickland@alston.com -- Cari K. Dawson --
cari.dawson@alston.com -- pro hac vice, Jamie S. George --
jamie.george@alston.com -- pro hac vice, Kyle G.A. Wallace --
kyle.wallace@alston.com -- pro hac vice & Sherry A. Rozell --
sherry.rozell@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft.


GENERAL NUTRITION: Judgment in "Chevalier" Suit Partly Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, TAWNY L. CHEVALIER AND ANDREW HILLER, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellees, v.
GENERAL NUTRITION CENTERS, INC. AND GENERAL NUTRITION
CORPORATION, Appellants. TAWNY L. CHEVALIER AND ANDREW HILLER, ON
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. GENERAL
NUTRITION CENTERS, INC. AND GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION,
Appellants, Nos. 1437 WDA 2016, 92 WDA 2017 (Pa. Super.), Judge
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's judgment
in Employees' favor, vacated the order concerning fees and costs,
and remanded for further proceedings.

Chevalier and Hiller, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated ("Employees") worked as store managers,
assistant managers, or senior store managers for GNC during the
period between 2009 and April 2011.  The Employees were salaried
employees whose weekly pay was the same no matter the number of
hours worked.  However, when a salaried employee worked more than
40 hours in a workweek, GNC was also required to pay overtime for
the hours worked over the 40-hour workweek.

Both parties agree that the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
("PMWA") requires a payment of at least one and one-half of the
employee's regular rate for each hour worked in excess of 40
hours.  However, they disagree over how to calculate the
employee's regular rate.

GNC contends that through payment of salary, the salaried
employee has already received regular pay for each of the 50
hours or, in other words, the salary covers the first 100% of the
overtime.  Thus, the employee is owed only an additional 50% of
the wage as overtime.  GNC's method of calculating overtime pay
is called the fluctuating workweek ("FWW") method of compensating
overtime.

The Employees contend that the regular rate should be calculated
based on what is earned in a 40-hour workweek.  Thus, the regular
rate should be calculated by dividing the $1,000 weekly payment
by forty hours.  This produces a $25 per hour amount which they
treat as their regular rate.  They next multiply each hour of
overtime by one and one-half of this dollar amount, which,
according to them is consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") which uses a 40-hour workweek.  This will be referred to
as the 40-hour method of compensating salaried employees.

In 2014, GNC and the Employees filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, limited to the issue of whether GNC's use of the FWW
method to calculate overtime compensation complies with the PMWA.
On Oct. 20, 2014, the trial court granted Employees' motion and
denied GNC's motion.

On Dec. 16, 2014, the Employees filed a motion for class
certification, which GNC opposed.  On July 15, 2015, the trial
court granted the Employees' motion, certifying a class of
current and former GNC employees in Pennsylvania who were paid
overtime compensation using the FWW method.

Thereafter, GNC requested additional discovery.  On March 15,
2016, the Employees filed a motion for a protective order
objecting to the requested discovery, which the trial court
granted.  Also on March 15, 2016, the Employees filed a motion to
include commissions in the calculation of their damages for
unpaid overtime.  The trial court granted the motion, concluding
that GNC may not use the FWW method of calculating overtime as to
Employees' commissions.

On Sept. 6, 2016, the trial court entered final judgment in favor
of the Employees in the amount of $1,378,494.77 plus interest
calculated at 6% per annum from the date of the non-payment of
any overtime earned, or $362,286.08 for a total sum of
$1,740,780.85 for interest accruing after the date of judgment at
the statutory rate, plus costs and attorney's fees and incentive
payments in amounts to be determined through further proceedings.

On Sept. 29, 2016, GNC timely appealed from the judgment.  On
Sept. 15, 2016, the Employees filed a petition for counsel fees,
litigation costs, and incentive payments, to which GNC filed a
response.  On Dec. 30, 2016, the trial court awarded counsel fees
in the amount of $360,000 and litigation costs in the amount of
$8,000 but denied the Employees' request for incentive payments.
On Jan. 17, 2017, GNC timely appealed from that order.

GNC raises these issues on appeal:

     a. Whether the FWW method of computing overtime compensation
violates the PMWA; that is, whether under the PMWA: (i) the
regular rate associated with a non-exempt employee's salary must
be determined by dividing the employee's weekly salary by 40
(rather than by all hours worked); and (ii) the additional
overtime compensation premium owed on that salary must be
calculated at 1.5 times that regular rate for all hours worked
over 40 (rather than 0.5 times the regular rate).

     b. Whether the Employees' motion for class certification
should have been granted, despite the fact that GNC presented
evidence that putative class members had an agreement or
understanding with GNC that their overtime would be calculated
pursuant to 34 Pa. Code Section 231.43(d)(3).

     c. Whether 34 Pa. Code Section 231.43(d)(3) permits GNC to
calculate overtime compensation pursuant to an agreement or
understanding with class members.

     d. Whether under the PMWA: (i) the regular rate associated
with a non-exempt employee's commission earnings must be
determined by dividing the employee's weekly commissions by 40
(rather than by all hours worked); and (ii) the additional
overtime compensation premium owed on those commissions must be
calculated at 1.5 times that regular rate for all hours worked
over 40 (rather than 0.5 times the regular rate).

     e. Whether the trial court was authorized to apply a 1.5
contingency multiplier enhancement to the lodestar when
calculating the award of attorney's fees, where the lodestar
already reflected counsel's contingent risk.

In light of the two concurring and dissenting opinions filed in
this matter, the Court summarized its disposition as follows.
First, based on the agreement of Judges Moulton and Solano, it
holds that GNC's method of calculating an employee's "regular
rate" by dividing the employee's salary in a given week by the
number of hours actually worked in that week did not violate the
PMWA.  Second, based on the agreement of Judges Moulton and
Musmanno, it holds that GNC's payment of an overtime premium of
only one-half the "regular rate" violated the PMWA and its
accompanying regulations.  Finally, based on the agreement of
Judges Moulton and Solano, it vacated the fees and costs order.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
judgment.  It vacated the fees and costs order vacated.  The case
is remanded for further proceedings.  Jurisdiction is
relinquished.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/5z2y0l from Leagle.com.

Allison Renee Brown -- arbrown@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C., for Appellant, General Nutrition Corporation.

Robert William Pritchard -- rpritchard@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C., for Appellant, General Nutrition Corporation.

Allison Renee Brown , Littler Mendelson, P.C., for Appellant,
General Nutrition Centers, Inc.

Robert William Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.C., for Appellant,
General Nutrition Centers, Inc.

Adrian Nathaniel Roe -- aroe@roeandsimonllc.com -- Roe & Simon
LLC, for Appellee, Andrew Hiller.

Michael D. Simon -- mdsimon@roeandsimonllc.com -- Roe & Simon
LLC, for Appellee, Andrew Hiller.

William N. Narwold, for Appellee, Andrew Hiller.

Adrian Nathaniel Roe, Roe & Simon LLC, for Appellee, Tawny L.
Chevalier.

Michael D. Simon, Roe & Simon LLC, for Appellee, Tawny L.
Chevalier.

William N. Narwold, for Appellee, Tawny L. Chevalier.


GOPRO INC: Faces Class Action, March 12 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, on Jan. 10
disclosed that a shareholder class action lawsuit has been filed
against GoPro, Inc. (Nasdaq: GPRO) ("GoPro" or the "Company") on
behalf of purchasers of the Company's securities between
November 2, 2017 and January 5, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

Investors who purchased GoPro securities during the Class Period
may, no later than March 12, 2018, seek to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff representative of the class.  For additional
information or to learn how to participate in this action please
visit https://www.ktmc.com/new-cases/gopro-inc-2018#join

GoPro shareholders who wish to discuss this action and their
legal options are encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP (Darren J. Check, Esq., D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq. or
Adrienne Bell, Esq.) at (888) 299-7706 or at info@ktmc.com

GoPro develops and sells mountable and wearable cameras and
accessories.  During the Class Period, GoPro's product offerings
included "Karma," a premium remote-controlled drone that retailed
for $799.

On November 1, 2017, GoPro held an earnings conference call with
investors and financial analysts to discuss the Company's
financial results.  During that call, GoPro's Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") represented to investors that "the consumer
feedback to Karma specifically, actual owners of Karma has been
quite good, and so we're feeling really good about our prospects
in the future there."

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that, throughout
the Class Period, GoPro and certain of its senior executive
officers made false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) the market prospects for Karma were untenable
due to margin challenges in an extremely competitive aerial
market and a hostile regulatory environment in Europe and the
United States; and (ii) as a result, defendants' public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On January 8, 2018, GoPro disclosed, among other things: (i) that
it was reducing its global workforce by approximately 20%; (ii)
that, due to "margin challenges in an extremely competitive
aerial market," the Company would be exiting the aerial market
after selling its remaining Karma inventory; and (iii) that the
Company would incur an estimated $23 - 33 million in
restructuring charges.

Following this news, shares of GoPro's stock fell $0.96 per
share, or over 12.7%, to close on January 8, 2018 at $6.56 per
share, on heavy trading volume.

GoPro shareholders may, no later than March 12, 2018, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member.  A lead plaintiff
is a representative party who acts on behalf of all class members
in directing the litigation.  In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the
class member will adequately represent the class in the action.
Your ability to share in any recovery is not affected by the
decision of whether or not to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check -- http://www.ktmc.com--
prosecutes class actions in state and federal courts throughout
the country. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world.  The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in
the recovery of government dollars).  The complaint in this
action was not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. [GN]


GREEN SUMMIT: Sued by "Garcia" Over Unpaid OT Wages, Tips
---------------------------------------------------------
Luis Garcia, Noe Rojas and Alejandro Salas, on behalf of
themselves and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, v. Green
Summit Group LLC, Columbia Organic Holdings, LLC, Freefoods NYC
150 East 52nd Street, LLC, Peter Schatzberg and Michael
Schatzberg, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-10220 (S.D. N.Y., December
29, 2017), seeks unpaid wages for off-the-clock work caused by
time shaving, unpaid spread-of-hours and overtime premium,
illegally retained tips, liquidated damages, statutory penalties
and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and New York Labor Law.

Defendants own and operate Freefoods NYC restaurant and Green
Summit online restaurant where Garcia, Rojas and Salas worked as
delivery persons. Defendants also implemented a tip-credit but
failed to provide proper statements, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      Anne Seelig, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 465-1188
      Fax: (212) 465-1181


HARRIS TEETER: "Laurence" Class Cert. Motion Due May 16
-------------------------------------------------------
Terry Laurence, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Harris Teeter, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-006602, (W.D.N.C., October 6, 2017), seeks to
recover unpaid regular rate of pay for all hours worked including
overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act and Defendant's contractual obligation
to pay its employees for all hours worked.

Plaintiff's complaint states that Defendant has employed
Keyholders, Grocery Managers and Assistant Grocery Managers at
all if not most of its supermarket locations. Defendant has
classified the Plaintiff and other similarly situated hourly-paid
Keyholders, Grocery Managers and Assistant Grocery Managers as
hourly-paid, non-exempt employees and has not guaranteed them any
minimum weekly salaries.  The Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees have regularly worked full-time schedules
which regularly include hours in excess of forty hours in a
workweek. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not paid for
the time they spent picking up keys and driving to the
supermarket before and after shifts. Further, the Plaintiff and
other similarly situated persons did not receive pay for thirty
minutes of break.  They did not enjoy a free uninterrupted break
during such time because they were required to continue
performing work. Furthermore, the Defendant did not include a
profit bonus in calculation of overtime rate. In addition,
Plaintiff throughout his employment with the Defendant did not
receive compensation at time-and-a-half of his regular rate of
pay.

In a Jan. 5, 2018 Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan, Judge
Robert J. Conrad, Jr., set this timeline:

     -- Plaintiffs Class Certification Motion due 5/16/2018.

     -- Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Class
        Certification shall be filed by June 15, 2018.

     -- Plaintiffs reply shall be due on June 29, 2018.

     -- Discovery due by 4/16/2018.

Defendant has a pending Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's State Law
Claims.  The Motion to Dismiss was filed Nov. 1.

Harris Teeter is a North Carolina limited liability company that
operates a supermarket chain in approximately 243 stores in seven
states.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Trey Lindley, Esq.
     LINDLEY LAW, PLLC
     225 S. McDowell Street
     Charlotte, NC 28204
     Telephone: (704) 457-1010
     Facsimile: (704) 457-1002
     Email: tlindley@lindleylawoffice.com

          - and -

     Jason T. Brown, Esq.
     Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
     JTB LAW GROUP, LLC
     155 2nd St., Suite 4
     Jersey City, NJ 07302
     Telephone: (877) 561-0000
     Facsimile: (855) 582-5297
     Email: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
     Email: nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com

Counsel For Defendant(s):

     Kevin Scott Joyner, Esq.
     Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
     4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1100
     Raleigh, NC 27609
     Tel: (919) 787-9700
     Fax: (919) 783-9412
     E-mail: kevin.joyner@ogletreedeakins.com

          - and -

     Regina Worley Calabro, Esq.
     Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart
     4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1100
     Raleigh, NC 27609
     Tel: (919) 787-9700
     Fax: (919) 783-9412
     E-mail: gina.calabro@ogletree.com


HEALTH GENESIS: Echevarria Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAVIER ECHEVARRIA, and other similarly situated .employees,
Plaintiff, v. HEALTH GENESIS CORPORATION, a Florida Profit
Corporation, DAVID BOZDOGAN, individually and IRENA BOZDOGAN,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 64712808 (Fla. Cir., 11th
Judicial, Miami Dade County, Nov. 29, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees and
costs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants had or should have had
full knowledge of all hours worked by Plaintiff, including those
hours worked by Plaintiff in excess of 40 in a given week. The
Plaintiff was at work and there was a surprise inspection, his
supervisor then immediately told Plaintiff to shut down his work
production because the F.D.A was not going to approve the way
they handled their production, and then told Plaintiff to make
fraudulent, Plaintiff refused. During Plaintiff's employment,
Plaintiff complained that his supervisor was making fraudulent
work logs that are required by law Defendant was violating the
F.D.A regulations, The Plaintiff was terminated on August31, 2017
in retaliation of his complaints and refusing to do and
fraudulent work logs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler St., Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: 305 416 5000
          Facsimile: 305 416 5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  rregueiro@rgpattorneys.com
                  pn@rgpattorneys.com


HERMOSA BEACH, CA: "Marks" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
AARON MARKS; MATTHEW HOYT; THOMAS SURBER; SCOTT DURKIN;
MIKE SMOTRYS; JIM BRUCCOLIERI; BRIAN GREBBIEN; MICHAEL
GAROFANO; AARON BUSH; JAMES CRAWFORD; DAVID SCHWARTING;
STEVE RAMIREZ; JAMES DE LOS SANTOS, the Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
HERMOSA BEACH, a Municipal Corporation; HERMOSA BEACH FIRE
DEPARTMENT, a public safety department; DOES I-X, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-08739-FFM (S.D. Fla., Dec. 4, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages
and reasonable attorney fees, declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs bring this collective action on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated who were
members of the Hermosa Beach Fire Department, between December
2014 and present and who were required or permitted to work
additional hours, in excess of 53 hours a workweek (or 212 hours
in a 28-day work period, if an 207k work period was established
by the CITY OF HERMOSA BEACH), without being compensated the
requisite compensation. The exact number of members similarly
situated in the collective group, as herein above identified and
described, is estimated to consist of not more than 50.

Hermosa Beach is a beachfront city in Los Angeles County,
California, United States. Its population was 19,506 at the 2010
census. The city is located in the South Bay region of the
greater Los Angeles area and is one of the three Beach
Cities.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Corey W. Glave, Esq.
          1249 8th Street
          Hermosa Beach, CA 90254
          Telephone: (323) 547 0472
          E-mail: POAattorney@aol.com


HIGHLINE BUILDING: Berrios Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
----------------------------------------------------
Angel Berrios, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Highline Building Services, LLC
and Strategic Outsourcing, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-10233
(S.D. N.Y., December 31, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime wages due,
together with maximum liquidated damages, costs and attorney's
fees pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act, New York Labor Law and
New York Minimum Wage Act.

Strategic Outsourcing and Highline Building Services are staffing
agencies who employed Berrios as a cleaner. Plaintiff claims to
have worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without overtime
pay.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
     ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
     215-28 Hillside Avenue
     Queens Village, NY 11427
     Tel: (718) 740-1000
     Fax: (718) 355-9668
     E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


HOSPITALITY STAFFING: "Rodriguez" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Arevalo R. Rodriguez, and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. Hospitality Staffing Team LLC, Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-24719, (S.D. Fla., December 29, 2017), seeks unpaid
overtime compensation, as well as an additional amount as
liquidated damages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Hospitality Team is a provider of temporal, part-time and
fulltime staffing to the hospitality industry where Rodriguez was
assigned as a maintenance employee in the Berkeley Hotel, located
at 1610 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Plaintiff is
claiming approximately 14 weeks of overtime wages. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Telephone: (305) 446-1500
     Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
     Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Karpik Sues for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Karpik, Michelle Lewis, Deborah Mondell and Robert Owen,
individually and as representatives of class of similarly
situated persons, and on behalf of the Huntington Investment and
Tax Savings Plan, Plaintiffs, v. Huntington Bancshares
Incorporated, Huntington Bancshares Incorporated Board of
Directors, Stephen D. Steinour, Don M. Casto III, Jonathan A.
Levy, Ann B. Crane, Steven G. Elliot, Michael J. Endres, John B.
Gerlach Jr., D. James Hilliker, David P. Lauer, Gerard
Mastroianni, Richard W. Neu, David L. Porteous, Kathleen H.
Ransier, William R. Robertson, Peter J. Kight, Eddie R. Munson,
John C. Inglis, J. Michael Hochschwender, Gina D. France, Robert
S. Cubbin, Lizabeth Ardisana, and John Does 1-20, Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-01153 (S.D. Ohio, December 29, 2017), asserts
claims for breach of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
prudence, failure to monitor fiduciaries, prohibited transactions
with a party-in-interest and prohibited transactions with a
fiduciary and seeks to recover losses to the Huntington
Investment and Tax Savings Plan caused by Defendants' violations
of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, profits
earned by Huntington as a result of prohibited transactions and
other appropriate relief.

The complaint says Defendants applied a preference for Huntington
products and services within the Plan, despite excessive costs
compared to available options favored by similarly-sized plans;
used the Plan to sustain Huntington's failing mutual fund
business; and leveraged the Plan to Huntington's advantage in the
consolidation and eventual sale of the funds.

Huntington Investment and Tax Savings Plan is an employee pension
benefit plan and a defined contribution plan of which Plaintiffs
are members of. Huntington is the plan sponsor for the said plan.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
      BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
      250 E. Broad Street, 10th Floor
      Columbus, OH 43215
      Telephone: (614) 221-4221
      Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
      Email: bderose@barkanmeislish.com

             - and -

      Kai H. Richter, Esq.
      Carl F. Engstrom, Esq.
      Brandon McDonough, Esq.
      NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
      4600 IDS Center
      80 S 8th Street
      Minneapolis, MN 55402
      Telephone: (612) 256-3200
      Facsimile: (612) 338-4878
      Email: krichter@nka.com
             cengstrom@nka.com
             bmcdonough@nka.com


HUNTINGTON NATIONAL: Denial of Class Certification Bid Reversed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James D. Jensen of the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the
Sixth District, Lucas County, reversed the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas' order denying Appellant's, Paul Cheatham IRA,
motion to certify a class in the case, Paul Cheatham IRA,
Appellant, v. The Huntington National Bank, Appellee, C.A. No. L-
16-1292 (Ohio App.).

On May 19, 2015, the Appellant filed the class action lawsuit
against the Appellee, The Huntington National Bank, on behalf of
itself and other bondholders who invested funds into a municipal
bond issue described as "$6,590,000 County of Lucas Ohio Hospital
Facilities Rrefunding Revenue (Non-Taxable) Bonds, Series 1998
(Villa North Project) CUSIP 54309 BP6, 549309 BQ4, 549309 BR2,
549309 BS0.

The complaint alleged that Lucas County was the technical obligor
on the bonds for tax purposes, but in reality, Foundation for the
Elderly, Inc. was the obligor and lessee of the Villa North
nursing home project.  The Appellee served as the trustee for the
bondholders and as lessor of the project pursuant to a Trust
Indenture entered into between appellee and Lucas County.

Sometime before June 2003, the Foundation went into default, and
West Toledo Healthcare became the substitute obligor.  By
December 2003, Benchmark Healthcare of Toledo, Inc. had become
the obligor in place of West Toledo Healthcare, and had defaulted
on the bond payments.  Notably, the Appellee provided notices to
the bondholders of the defaults and changes in obligors.

In May 2004, Benchmark filed for reorganization under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, and in December 2007, filed its First
Amended Plan of Reorganization.  After the bondholders voted in
favor of the plan, the bankruptcy court approved the plan.
Relevant here, the Appellant began purchasing these bonds for a
fraction of the face value on Nov. 3, 2003, and continued to
purchase them through June 7, 2007.

By July 2009, Benchmark had failed to implement the amended
reorganization plan.  Thus, the bankruptcy was dismissed, and the
Appellee filed a foreclosure action against Benchmark.  In
November 2014, the Villa North project was sold and a final
distribution was made to the bondholders.  In the final
distribution, the bondholders only received approximately
$350,000 of the $6,590,000 initial bond issue.

Within the class action complaint, the Appellant asserted claims
for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust under R.C. 5801.01
et seq., negligence, breach of contract, and liability for
mismanagement of the Villa North nursing home project.  Upon
motion of the Appellee, the trial court dismissed all of the
claims except the breach of contract claim as being barred by the
statute of limitations.

Thereafter, the Appellant moved to certify a class on the
remaining breach of contract claim, describing the class as all
persons or entities who own bonds.  The Appellee opposed the
motion for class certification, arguing, inter alia, that the
Appellant had not satisfied the requirement under Civ.R. 23(B)(3)
that, the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  The
Appellant concluded, therefore, that the right to sue for breach
of contract that was held by bondholders at the time of the
breach transferred to subsequent purchasers of the bonds.

On Nov. 16, 2016, the trial court entered its judgment denying
the Appellant's motion to certify a class.  The Appellant has
timely appealed the trial court's judgment, asserting one
assignment of error for the Court review:  The trial court
incorrectly interpreted the provisions of R.C. 1308.16(A)
(Section 8-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code) in ruling that the
transferors' right to file a lawsuit was not one of the rights
that was transferred when a municipal bond (an investment
security) was acquired by the transferee, the Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Judge Jensen finds that the Appellant's cause of action arises
from a breach of the Trust Indenture, which is part of the
contract with the bondholders.  The Appellee argues that R.A.
Mackie & Co., L.P. v. PetroCorp Inc. is distinguishable because
in that case the cause of action was against the issuer, not the
indenture trustee.  However, the Judge does not find that
distinction to be meaningful since the basis for the claim is
grounded in the same instrument that is part of the contract with
the bondholders.  The Appellee's position leads to the
incongruous result that breach of the trust indenture by an
issuer is a "right in the security," but breach of the same trust
indenture by the trustee is not.  Therefore, he holds that a
contract claim for breach of the Trust Indenture, whether
asserted against the trustee or the obligor, arises out of the
contract with the bondholders and is thus a right in the security
that automatically transfers to subsequent purchasers pursuant to
R.C. 1308.16(A).  Accordingly, the Appellant's assignment of
error is well-taken.

In addition to arguing in opposition to the Appellant's
assignment of error, the Appellee argues that class certification
under Civ.R. 23 is still not appropriate as appellant has failed
to satisfy the other requirements of that rule.  However, Judge
Jesen says, because the trial court based its determination
solely on Civ.R. 23(B)(3), and did not consider any of the other
requirements, he declines to rule on those issues for the first
time on appeal.  Therefore, he must remand the matter to the
trial court to consider the remaining Civ.R. 23 requirements.

For these reasons, Judge Jensen reversed the judgment of the
Lucas County Court of Common Plea.  The matter is remanded to the
trial court to consider the remaining Civ.R. 23 requirements for
class certification and for further proceedings consistent with
his decision.  The Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.  A certified copy of the entry will
constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Decision and
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/k4rLQ6 from Leagle.com.

Ronald R. Parry, for appellant.

J. Philip Calabrese -- pcalabrese@porterwright.com-- Jay A.
Yurkiw --  jyurkiw@porterwright.com -- Robert W. Trafford --
rtrafford@porterwright.com -- and Ryan L. Graham --
rgraham@porterwright.com -- for appellee.


INTEL CORP: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Jan. 10
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Intel Corporation (NASDAQ: INTC)
between July 27, 2017 and January 4, 2018, both dates inclusive
("Class Period").  The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Intel
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Intel class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1265.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Daniel Sadeh, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or dsadeh@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) there is a fundamental design flaw in Intel's processor
chips as they contain a feature that makes them vulnerable to
hacking; (2) updates to fix the problems in Intel's processor
chips could cause Intel chips to operate 5-30 percent more
slowly; and (3) as a result, Defendants' public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.  When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed.  If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
March 12, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  If you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1265.htmlor to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Daniel Sadeh of Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-
767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
dsadeh@rosenlegal.com [GN]

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents
investors throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in
securities class actions and shareholder derivative litigation.


INTEL CORP: Faces at Least 12 Class Actions Over Chip Flaws
-----------------------------------------------------------
At least 12 class action lawsuits have been filed against Intel
after security vulnerabilities were revealed in its processors
early this month.

After three class action lawsuits were reportedly filed
separately on January 4, nine additional suits have been filed
regarding a "fundamental design flaw" in Intel processors.

The bulk of complaints were filed in northern California, but two
were filed in New York and one in Illinois.

Researchers found a pair of chip flaws, known as Meltdown and
Spectre, which affect virtually every computer and smartphone in
the world and could leave them vulnerable to hacking.

The revelations triggered class action lawsuits as consumers
found out their devices could be affected, said Mark Rifkin --
rifkin@whafh.com -- a partner at Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman &
Herz, which has been retained to pursue a class action lawsuit
against Intel.  The complaint was filed in U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California.

While Intel rolls out fixes, the Wolf Haldenstein suit pointed
out that the proposed software update for Meltdown would drag
down performance by as much as 30%, and no solution has been
published for Spectre.

"In short, defendant has not been able to offer an effective
repair to its customers," the suit claims.

"Anyone who bought a chip, or a computer with a chip that had
this defect, is entitled to be compensated for the difference
between what they thought they were getting and what they got,"
Mr. Rifkin said.

Meanwhile, media outlets are comparing the embattled chipmaker
with its main competitor, Advanced Micro Devices. However, no
class action suits against AMD could be found during a PACER
search.

An Intel representative said the firm doesn't comment on pending
litigation.


J.K. GREEN: Answer to "Marquez" Suit Due Jan. 31
------------------------------------------------
Roberto Marquez on behalf of himself and all other Plaintiffs
similarly situated known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. J.K.
Green Deli Corp. dba Deli On The Green, Merrick Blvd LLC. and Suk
Hwan Jeong, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-07014 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
1, 2017), seeks to recover overtime compensation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff regularly worked over
10 hours per day and over 40 hours per week. The Defendants never
compensated Plaintiff with spread of hours pay nor overtime
premium. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants' failure to
pay overtime wages is willful and intentional.

                           *     *     *

According to a Jan. 18 docket entry, Defendants have until Jan.
31 to file their answer to the complaint.

The case is assigned to Judge Leonard D. Wexler and Magistrate
Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan J. Kim, Esq.
          INSEED LAW, P.C.
          2454 E Dempster St Suite 301
          Des Plaines, IL 60016


J.M. SMUCKER: Joseph Alleges Mislabeling of Crisco No-Stick Spray
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA JOSEPH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-08735-FMO-GJS (C.D. Cal., Dec. 4,
2017), seeks to recover damages, restitution, declaratory and
injunctive relief, and all other remedies the court deems
Appropriate for Defendant's violation of the California Civil
Code and the California Business and Professions Code.

The Plaintiff brings this consumer protection and false
advertising class action lawsuit against Defendant, based on
Defendant's false and misleading business practices with respect
to the marketing and sale of its Crisco (TM) 100% Extra Virgin
Olive Oil No-Stick Spray and Crisco (TM) 100% Canola Oil Original
No-Stick Spray. The Defendant has, labeled, marketed, and sold
the Products as "100% EXTRA VIRGIN Olive Oil" and "100% CANOLA
OIL", thereby representing that the Products contain only a
single ingredient, canola oil or extra virgin olive oil.

According to the complaint, however, unbeknownst to consumers,
the Products also contain Soy Lecithin, Dimethyl Silicone, and
Propellant.  Therefore, the Products fail to conform with a
statement of quality made in Defendant's labeling because neither
of the Products are 100% oil, as represented by Defendant.

The Defendant's misrepresentations extend past the Products'
front label as the ingredient Defendant represents as
"Propellant" is actually comprised of Propane and Isobutane,
substances that are classified as "Hazardous Ingredients" by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United
Stated Department of Labor.

The Plaintiff and other consumers purchased the Products,
reasonably relying on Defendant's 100% Oil representation, and
believing that the Products contain oil as the only ingredient.
Had Plaintiff and other consumers known that the Products
contained the Additional Ingredients, they would not have
purchased the Products or would have paid significantly less for
the Products. Therefore, Plaintiff and consumers have suffered
injury in fact as a result of Defendant's deceptive practices.

The J. M. Smucker Company, also known as Smucker and Smucker's,
is an American manufacturer of fruit spreads, ice cream toppings,
beverages, shortening, peanut butter, and other products in North
America.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff Joshua Joseph:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256 2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256 2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com


JAMES HOLDINGS: Court Vacates Class Certification in "Bagot"
------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the judgment of the trial court granting class
certification in the case captioned RICHARD BAGOT, JOAN BAGOT,
WILSON REVELLE, DARLA REVELLE, MARK GUILLOTE, AND LASHAN
GUILLOTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, v. JAMES HOLDINGS, LLC, VOLKERT, INC., PARISH OF
JEFFERSON AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, No. 17-CA-121 (La.
App.).

Plaintiffs, who are homeowners on Elizabeth Street in Metairie,
brought this action for damages allegedly caused to their homes
by heavy trucks using their street during an I-10 construction
project in 2013.  Homeowners Richard Bagot, Joan Bagot, Mark
Guillote and Lashan Guillote brought this suit as putative class
representatives against James Holdings, L.L.C., Volkert, Inc.,
Three C's Properties, State of Louisiana Department of
Transportation, and Lefarge North America seeking class
certification for all property owners on Elizabeth Street whose
properties were similarly damaged.

In their timely filed appeal, defendants raise the following
assignments of error:

   (1) The trial court erred in finding plaintiffs met their
burden of proof regarding threshold requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation as
required under La. C.C.P. art. 591(A).

   (2) The trial court erred in failing to consider the
provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 591(B) in determining whether the
proposed class meets the requirements for class action
certification.

The requirements for certification of the class are set forth in
La. C.C.P. art. 591, which states, in part:

     "A. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all, only if:

         (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable.

         (2) There are questions of law or fact common to the
class.

         (3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.

         (4) The representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

         (5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms
of ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the
constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of
any judgment that may be rendered in the case.  This prerequisite
shall not be satisfied if it is necessary for the court to
inquire into the merits of each potential class member's cause of
action to determine whether an individual falls within the
defined class.

The party seeking class certification is responsible for
demonstrating that the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 591 have
been met.

In this case, the trial court, in its analysis of the numerosity
requirement, focused solely on the mathematical number of
potential plaintiffs and thereafter afforded plaintiffs the
benefit of a non-existent presumption based upon that number to
find that joinder was impracticable.  The trial court's
application of this incorrect legal standard mandates that we
conduct a de novo review of the evidence presented relevant to
the numerosity element in order to determine whether plaintiffs
met their burden as to this element.

The parties' arguments regarding the numerosity element, both
before the trial court and this Court, focus largely on whether
there are, in fact, 39 to 40 damaged homes whose owners have
potential causes of action. Plaintiffs argue that the numerosity
requirement has been satisfied because they provided both
documentary evidence in the form of an aerial photograph showing
there are approximately 40 homes on or adjacent to Elizabeth
Street and testimony from the putative class representatives and
an expert witness as proof that there are at least 40 individual
claims that are ripe for adjudication arising from the singular
course of conduct at issue.

Plaintiffs have argued, correctly, that they are not required to
identify every member of a potential class prior to
certification.   However, plaintiffs' argument and the trial
court's statement that 39 or 40 potential claims would create a
presumption that joinder is impractical is legally incorrect.
There is no threshold requirement or magic number which will
render joinder impracticable as a matter of law.

To establish numerosity is a determination made on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.  Our rigorous analysis of
the facts and circumstances in this case is guided by factors
adopted by the Supreme Court in Doe that may inform a court's
determination of whether the proposed class has a sufficient
number of members so that joinder is impracticable.

These factors include:

Geographic dispersion of the class

Wide geographic dispersion of class members supports a finding of
impracticability of joinder and therefore, a conclusion that the
numerosity requirement is satisfied. The evidence of this case
indicates that the class members are not widely distributed
across a large geographic area, but rather narrowly concentrated
to specific blocks on a single street in the same neighborhood.
Accordingly, this factor supports a finding that joinder would be
practical and that the numerosity requirement has not been met.

Ease with which class members may be identified

Knowledge of names and existence of members has been called the
most important factor because it renders joinder practicable.
In this case, over the course of the more than two-year time span
between the initial filing of the litigation and the
certification hearing, the class members may have been very
easily identified by a simple public records search to determine
the homeowners on the few blocks of Elizabeth Street, or a simple
door-to-door inquiry as purportedly done by Mr. Bagot. This
factor does not support a finding that the numerosity requirement
has been met.

Nature of the action

Plaintiffs have filed claims under theories of negligence,
inverse condemnation, and negligence per se for property damage,
diminution of property value, mental anguish, and emotional
distress. At least with regard to plaintiffs' claims for
emotional distress and mental anguish, the individualized nature
of such claims weigh against the use of the class action
mechanism for their resolution. This Court has also found that
claims for diminution of value require individualized proof and
must be assessed on an individual basis.

This factor, therefore, does not support a finding that the
numerosity requirement has been met.

Size of each plaintiff's claim and the financial resources of the
class members

Plaintiffs have not introduced any evidence indicating the size
of class members' claims or their financial wherewithal to pursue
individual litigation. Accordingly, the La. App. concludes that
this factor does not support a finding that the joinder of all
members in the proposed class would be impracticable.

Judicial economy arising from avoiding multiple actions

Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of other lawsuits
arising from the I-10 construction project. They also have not
presented evidence that there are, in fact, a large number of
dissatisfied persons that have come forward over the many years
since completion of the I-10 widening project and the filing of
plaintiffs' original petition who have expressed an interest in
pursuing a claim for damages. Mr. Bagot testified that he spoke
to the owners of all 40 houses on Elizabeth Street and that those
persons reported experiencing property damage similar to the
Bagots following the construction project.

He did not testify whether or not those persons were interested
in pursuing claims or seeking redress for those damages. Despite
the close geographic proximity and the ease with which the
potential claimants could be identified, none of the putative
class representatives testified to speaking to a large number of
neighbors who expressed an interest in filing a claim or joining
a suit. The evidence presented by plaintiffs suggests that there
are, in fact, a dozen or fewer persons besides the putative class
representatives interested in pursuing claims.

This factor therefore weighs against a finding that the claims
are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable.

Therefore, the La. App. vacates the judgment granting the motion
to certify the class, and remands this case for further
proceedings.

A full-text copy of the La. App.'s December 20, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc85gce4 from Leagle.com..

Scott R. Bickford -- usdcedla@mbfirm.com -- Lawrence J. Centola,
III, Neil F. Nazareth -- nfn@mbfirm.com -- Spencer R. Doody,
Jason Z. Landry, 338 Lafayette St. New Orleans, LA 70130.COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, RICHARD BAGOT, JOAN BAGOT, MARK GUILLOTE,
AND LASHAN, GUILLOTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS,
SIMILARLY SITUATED.

Thomas G. Buck -- tbuck@bluewilliams.com -- Brett W. Tweedel  --
btweedel@bluewilliams.com -- COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
JAMES HOLDING, LLC.

Daniel J. Caruso -- danc@spsr-law.com -- Susan M. Caruso --
susanc@spsr-law.com -- COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, VOLKERT,
INC.

A. Jacob Culotta, Jr. -- jculotta@shmrlaw.com -- COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

Joseph M. Guillot -- jmguillot@christovich.com -- COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INC.

Robert E. Birtel, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, THREE C'S
PROPERTIES, INC, 3900 N Causeway Blvd #625, Metairie, LA 70002,
USA


JOHNSON COUNTY, IN: Ind. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Alford" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James S. Kirsch of the Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the case, Kenneth Alford et al.,
Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Johnson County Commissioners et al.,
Appellees-Defendants, Case No. 73A04-1702-PL-223 (Ind. App.).

Each of the Appellants in the case is an indigent Defendant and
was charged with at least one felony in the Johnson County
Courts.  The cases of six of the Appellants, Alford, Hasket,
Daniels, Bunton, Nye, and Strong, are still pending before the
Johnson County Courts.  Owens entered into a plea agreement, the
details of which are not included in the record.  A public
defender has been appointed to represent each of the Appellants.

The Appellants' complaint names five attorneys ("Public
Defenders") -- Michael Bohn, Daniel Vandivier, Matthew Soloman,
John Wilson and John Norris -- that were assigned, at various
times, to the seven named Appellants.  The attorneys who act as
public defenders in Johnson County act in that capacity in
addition to maintaining their own private practices.  The
complaint makes allegations against the Public Defenders in two
general areas: (i) caseload in 2014 (the year prior to when the
Appellants were arrested and charged); and (ii) deficiencies in
performance as counsel.

On Oct. 8, 2015, the Appellants filed a class action complaint
against: (i) the Johnson County Commissioners, in their official
capacities; (ii) Bohn, Vandivier, Solomon, Wilson, and Norris as
individual attorneys who had entered into contracts to act as
public defenders in Johnson County; and (iii) four Johnson County
judges in their official and individual capacities, Mark Loyd,
Kevin Barton, Lance Hamner, and Cynthia Emkes ("Judicial
Appellees").  The Appellants sought declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief, and damages for alleged violations of their
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana
Constitution, and as third-party beneficiaries of the Public
Defenders' contracts to act as attorneys for indigent Defendants.

Specifically, the complaint sought declaratory judgment stating
that all of the Defendants are depriving the Appellants of their
rights under the United States Constitution, the Indiana
Constitution, and the Public Defenders' contracts.  The complaint
also sought injunctive relief to enjoin the Johnson County
Commissioners from violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution in the provision of indigent
defense services.

Additionally, the Appellants sought an injunction enjoining the
Johnson County Commissioners and the Judicial Appellees from
violating Article 1, Section 13(a) of the Indiana Constitution in
the provision of indigent defense services.  They also sought a
third injunction to compel the creation of public defender
services, which are not under the Courts' supervision or
financial control, which are adequately funded, and which conform
to the caseload standards set by the American Bar Association and
the Indiana Public Defender Commission.  Lastly, the Appellants
sought damages against all of the defendants for breach of
contract and for payment of Appellants' costs and attorney fees.
They also sought class certification.

In response to the complaint, two motions to dismiss pursuant to
Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) were filed: one by the Johnson County
Commissioners and the Public Defenders ("Non-Judicial Appellees")
and one by the Judicial Appellees.  After a hearing on the
motions to dismiss, the trial court issued its order granting the
motions to dismiss.

The Appellants now appeal.  They raise the following dispositive
issue for Court review: whether the Appellants sufficiently
alleged facts to support their claims for relief under the United
States and Indiana Constitutions and their third-party
beneficiary breach of contract claim such that the trial court
erred when it dismissed their complaint.

Judge Kirsch concludes that the Public Defenders' contracts at
issue here do not support the complaint as alleged.  He explains
that the Public Defenders have an obligation pursuant to the
contracts to not undertake too great a workload, such that they
are able to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in their
representation of clients.  He finds that the Appellants'
complaint does not allege that the Judicial Appellees have
systematically compelled the Public Defenders to accept case
assignments and to undertake more work than they can competently
handle after the Public Defenders have declined a case assignment
due to an excessive workload.

The Judge says the complaint merely alleges that the named Public
Defenders have not provided effective assistance to the
Appellants, which is an allegation of an individualized claim for
relief, and not a claim of a systematic deprivation of
constitutional rights.  The Judge holds that such individualized
claims are better suited for relief pursuant to criminal trial
procedures, such as direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or
petition for writ of habeas corpus relief, or legal malpractice
actions against their individual attorneys, but these avenues can
be pursued only after a claim has actually ripened.

Judge Kirsch further concludes that the Appellants have failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  On the facts
alleged in the complaint, including the language of the Public
Defenders' contracts, it is the Public Defenders who are
responsible for any deficient representation, and any alleged
deficient representation is not attributable to either the
Judicial Appellees or the Johnson County Commissioners.

The Judge finds that the complaint did not contain any
allegations that the Judicial Appellees or the Johnson County
Commissioners were compelling the Public Defenders to take on a
heavier caseload than they could handle.  The trial court did not
err when it dismissed the Appellants' complaint pursuant to Trial
Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim as to the claims under
the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana
Constitution.

For these reasons, Judge Kirsch affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/KXKgeA from Leagle.com.

Jessica A. Wegg -- jessica@sllawfirm.com -- Jonathan C. Little --
jon@sllawfirm.com -- Saeed & Little, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana,
Michael K. Sutherlin -- msutherlin@gmail.com -- Michael K.
Sutherlin & Associates, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for
Appellants.

Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Kyle Hunter,
Deputy Attorney General, Attorneys for Judicial Appellees.

William W. Barrett -- wbarrett@wbwlawyers.com -- Daniel J. Layden
-- dlayden@wbwlawyers.com -- Williams Barrett & Wilkowski, LLP,
Greenwood, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees Johnson County
Commissioners and Public Defenders.


JP MORGAN CHASE: "Doherty" Suit over Robocalls Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff has filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the
lawsuit, Michael Doherty, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-02070-JAH-KSC, (S.D.
Cal., October 6, 2017).

The case sought damages, injunctive relief and any other
available legal or equitable remedies for defendant's violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff's complaint states that on December 7, 2015, the Law
Office of Daniel Shay sent by facsimile a Cease and Desist Notice
to the Defendant expressly revoking any alleged consent to
contact the plaintiff on the telephone numbers associated with
their account with and prior to that date he did not provide his
cell phone number to the Defendant. But, despite the explicit
written revocation request communicated directly to the
Defendant, the Defendant called the Plaintiff's cell phone
through the use of an automatic dialing system which has the
ability to store telephone numbers, does store telephone numbers,
and has the ability to generate telephone numbers to be called
from a stored database for the purposes of dialing such numbers.
Defendant or its agent did not have prior express consent to
place calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone. Thus the Plaintiff
for himself and other similarly situated person brings the class
action against the Defendant for negligent and willful violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
     Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
     KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue, Suite D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Telephone: (800) 400-6808
     Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ak@kazlg.com
     Email: jason@kazlg.com

          - and -

     Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
     LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
     409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Telephone: (619) 222-7429
     Facsimile:  (866) 431-3292
     Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com

          - and -

     Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
     HYDE & SWIGART
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Telephone: (619) 233-7770
     Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
     Email: josh@westcoastlitigation.com


KELLOGG CO: Court Lifts Two-Year Stay in "Mohamed" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge M. James Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California lifted the stay order in the case, TASNEEM
L. MOHAMED, Plaintiff, v. KELLOGG COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
14cv2449-L (MDD) (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a putative consumer class action alleging
violation of California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising
Law, Consumer Remedies Act, and breach of express warranty.  He
alleges that the Defendant's representations on its Gardenburger
product, that it is "made with natural ingredients" is false and
misleading because it includes hexane processed soy ingredients.
The Defendant's primary jurisdiction argument is based on the
premise that the federal Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") is
conducting an active regulatory review of the use of the word
'natural' in food labeling.

On Jan. 6, 2016, the Court granted Joint Motion to Stay Case
Pending the Ninth Circuit's Resolution of Pending Appeals in
Similar False Food Labeling Cases.  The case was initially stayed
based on a joint request to await the decisions in Brazil v. Dole
Food Company, Inc., Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., and Kosta v.
DelMonte Foods, Inc., which were pending before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.  The parties were ordered to notify the Court
when lifting the stay would be warranted.

When no activity occurred through Oct. 30, 2017, the Court issued
an Order to Show Cause ("OSC"), directing the parties to show
cause why the stay should not be lifted.  In their respective
responses, the parties disagreed regarding further necessity for
a stay.  The Plaintiff argues stay should be lifted because all
three cases had been resolved, while the Defendant presents a new
argument that the stay should continue based on Kane v. Chobani,
LLC, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Upon review of responses to the OSC and further briefing
submitted by both parties, the stay is lifted.  Judge Lorenz
holds that none of the foregoing considerations counsel
continuing the stay of the action.  Finally, so far the progress
of the FDA's deliberations on the matter has proceeded at a
glacial pace.  Although the FDA has been considering defining the
term "natural" since 1991, so far, it has not decided whether it
will define the term at all.

In addition, the Judge says the Defendant has not informed the
Court of any report from the FDA regarding the timing of its
decision.  Accordingly, no assurances are provided that, if
further stayed, the resolution of Plaintiff's claims would not be
needlessly delayed.  For these reasons, and because the case has
already been stayed for nearly two years, the Judge denied the
Defendant's request to extend the stay.  No later than Jan. 5,
2018, the parties will contact the assigned Magistrate Judge to
schedule a case management conference and issue a scheduling
order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/l1X6QS from Leagle.com.

Tasneem L. Mohamed, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica Lynn Campbell, Aegis
Law Firm, Samantha Alane Smith -- samanthas@haelaw.com --
Haeggquist & Eck, LLP & Scott B. Cooper, The Cooper Law Firm,
P.C..

Kellogg Company, Defendant, represented by Dean Nicholas Panos --
dpanos@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, pro hac vice & Kenneth
Kiyul Lee -- klee@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP.


KRISPY KREME: Court OKs Disclosure Only Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mack Sperling, Esq. -- msperling@brookspierce.com -- of Brooks
Pierce McLendon Humphrey & Leonard LLP, in an article for
Lexology, reports that "Judge Gale's approval of a class action
settlement, in In re Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. Shareholder
Litigation, 2018 NCBC  1 gives me another opportunity to rail
against disclosure only settlements.  You know that I don't like
them. If you don't know that, I've written on this subject
several times. . ."

"The Krispy Kreme shareholder class litigation followed what has
become the inevitable path for almost every merger deal.  The
transaction was announced on May 9, 2016. Seven shareholder
lawsuits alleging that the Krispy Kreme board members had
breached their fiduciary duties in agreeing to the transaction
(five in NC state courts and later consolidated in the NC
Business Court) followed in the next month.

"The plaintiff shareholders filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction blocking any shareholder vote on the transaction until
supplemental disclosures in Krispy Kreme's proxy statement were
made.  The very next day, in connection with a settlement
agreement, Krispy Kreme filed a Form 8-K to supplement its proxy
statement.  The shareholder vote went ahead on July 27th, with
95% of those voting approving the deal.

"The value of those additional disclosures was assessed by Judge
Gale in determining whether to approve the settlement.  As the
Opinion didn't consider the amount of attorneys' fees to be
awarded to Plaintiffs' class counsel (there has not yet been an
application for fees), Judge Gale assessed the "give and the get"
of the 'give' of the release by the class against the materiality
of the additional disclosures (the "get").

"North Carolina assesses materiality based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's definition of that term in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, 4266 U.S. 48 (1976).  The holding in TSC Industries
was:

"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote . . . . It does not require
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his
vote.  What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the
omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.  Put another way,
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available.

Id. at 449.

"Okay.  Let's assume that I am a reasonable investor looking at
the Krispy Kreme supplemented proxy.  Would the supplemental
disclosures obtained through the blood and sweat of Plaintiffs'
counsel have "significantly altered the 'total mix of information
made available" to me in the original proxy?

I don't think so.

"First, '[t]he Supplemental Disclosures included the specific
projected unlevered, after-tax free cash flows of Krispy Kreme
for the remainder of 2017 and for the fiscal years 2018 through
2023,as derived from the financial projections provided to Wells
Fargo by Krispy Kreme management.'  This disclosure was designed
to deal with the lack of disclosure of Krispy Kreme's specific
projected unlevered after-tax free cash flows Wells Fargo used in
its DCF analysis." Op.

"That would not change the mix of information before me because
it is actually meaningless to me, Unlevered? Come on.  What? I
don't have a clue what that supplemental disclosure means.  Maybe
a hedge fund manager or an MBA student focusing on finance would.
But they would be too knowledgeable to be considered "reasonable
investors".

"Class counsel argued that the differences between the discounted
cash flow analyses, while 'slight in any particular year' that
"the differences over time have greater significance." Op. Par
58. Judge Gale accepted that as "a reasoned argument that some
shareholders might have found" that the Supplemental Disclosure
regarding the DCF analysis was material." Op. Par 58.

"The next supplemental disclosure has a little more meaning to
me.  It was in response to Plaintiffs complaining that the
original Proxy did not disclose whether the Krispy Kreme board
"had discussed post-Merger employment opportunities at the
inception of merger negotiations." Op. Par 52.

"In a less than stunning supplemental disclosure, the Defendants
added this nugget of questionable value:

that Krispy Kreme board members, in preliminary discussions about
a potential merger . . . discussed [the buyer's] 'history or
managing its portfolio companies for long-term growth and relying
on company management to run the business.'

Op. Par. 52.

"So board members also employed by Krispy Kreme might have been
influenced to vote in favor of the transaction because they might
keep their jobs? That speculation makes no difference to me.  And
how many board members served in company management? Did they
have excessively rich employment contracts being drafted with the
buyer of Krispy Kreme's assets? Were their votes essential to the
approval of the deal?

"Another supplemental disclosure concerned the previous
relationship of Wells Fargo -- the investment banker on the deal
--- to Krispy Kreme and its acquiror.

"The supplemental disclosures revealed that in the two years
before the deal was struck, Krispy Kreme had paid Wells Fargo
$300,000 for 'investment banking services" and that an affiliate
of the buyer had paid Wells Fargo $1 million "in connection with
corporate loans.' Op. Par 52.

"Would that have caused reasonable investor me to discount Wells
Fargo's analysis of the transaction because they were tainted by
their previous receipt of fees? No. $1.3 million doesn't carry
the influence that it used to.

"There's at least one other Krispy Kreme ruling imminent from the
Business Court.  That will be the ruling on the fee application
from the Plaintiff class' lawyers.  I will be watching for that.

"I should probably disclose that I prefer Dunkin' Donuts over
Krispy Kreme." [GN]


KROGER CO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss 2nd Amended "Perez" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SONIA PEREZ, individually, and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. THE KROGER CO.;
and DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case 2116 2:17-cv-02448-ODW (AGR)
(C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California denied the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Perez's Second Amended Class Action Complaint
("SAC").

This is a consumer product class action.  Perez alleges that
Kroger's use of the statement "No Sugar Added" on Kroger 100%
Apple Juice, Kroger 100% Natural Apple Juice, and Simple Truth
Organic 100% Apple Juice, does not comply with the applicable
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulations, specifically 21
C.F.R. Section 101.60(c)(2).  Perez further alleges that Kroger's
failure to comply with FDA regulations violates various
California consumer protection statutes -- the Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL"), the False Advertising Law ("FAL"), and the
Consumer's Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA").

Perez alleges that in January 2017, she purchased Kroger 100%
Apple Juice after reading and relying on the product's "No Sugar
Added" label, because sugar level is important to her and she
believed that Kroger 100% Apple Juice was healthier than other
brands of apple juice.  She claims that she would not have bought
Kroger 100% Apple Juice if she had known that similar products
contained the same level of sugar.  If Kroger 100% Apple Juice
had not included the "No Sugar Added" label, Perez alleges, she
would have either not purchased the product or paid less for it.

On Feb. 9, 2017, Perez filed a class action complaint in Los
Angeles County Superior Court against Kroger.  On March 29, 2017,
Kroger removed the action to the Court.  On May 6, 2017, Kroger
moved to dismiss the complaint, and on May 26, 2017, Perez filed
her first amended complaint, mooting the motion to dismiss.

Kroger moved to dismiss again on June 16, 2017, arguing that
Perez failed to state a claim and that the doctrines of
preemption, primary jurisdiction, and safe harbor required
dismissal.  The Court granted Kroger's Motion in part, finding
that Perez had failed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) by pleading fraud with particularity and
dismissed her FAL and CLRA claims and some of her UCL claims with
leave to amend.  It denied the remainder of Kroger's Motion.

Perez timely submitted her SAC on Sept. 8, 2017.  Kroger moved to
dismiss the SAC on Oct. 6, 2017.  Kroger moves to dismiss the
entire action for failure to state a claim.  It has also
requested the Court to take judicial notice of a number of
documents referenced in Kroger's Motion and its Reply.  Perez
opposes Kroger's Motion and the request for judicial notice
related to Kroger's Reply.

Judge Wright finds that although a court may take judicial notice
of the existence and content of files in another court, it cannot
take judicial notice of the truth of the facts recited therein.
Because Kroger asks the Court to take judicial notice of the
facts contained within the FDA letter, which the Court cannot do,
he will deny Kroger's request for judicial notice as to that
document.

In her SAC, Perez corrects the deficiencies outlined in the
Court's previous Order.  Perez now alleges that she observed two
different apple juice containers, Martinelli's and Langers, which
did not include a "No Sugar Added" label.  Therefore, and for the
reasons discussed in the Court's previous Order, the Judge holds
that Perez has sufficiently stated a claim for violations of the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA.

He also holds that Perez has standing to assert her claims.  The
Judge finds that Perez alleges that if Kroger Apple Juice's label
had not included the "No Sugar Added" claim, she would not have
purchased it, or would have paid less for it.  This satisfies the
standards set out in Kwikset, despite Kroger's argument regarding
the competing juices.

Finally, as to Kroger's argument that the Court should dismiss
Perez's CLRA claim because she admits that the "No Sugar Added"
label on Kroger Apple Juice is "literally true," the Judge says
the Court already addressed and rejected that very argument in
its previous Order, and he declines to address it again here.

For these reasons, Judge Wright denied Kroger's Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/324AL0 from Leagle.com.

Sonia Perez, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Robert K. Friedl
-- Robert.Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Trisha
Kathleen Monesi -- trisha.monesi@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC.

The Kroger Co., an Ohio corporation, Defendant, represented by
Kelsey Marie Stricker -- kstricker@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster LLP & Purvi G. Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster LLP.


LEPRINO FOODS: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Wage and Hour Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned JOHN
PEREZ and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation;
LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTGS COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation;
and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-00686-AWI-
BAM (E.D. Cal.).

Leprino moves for judgment on the pleadings regarding Plaintiff's
first (failure to pay minimum wages), second (failure to
compensate for all hours worked), third (failure to pay overtime
wages), and eighth causes of action.

Plaintiff and the putative class members are all non-exempt,
hourly employees, who work pursuant to a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between Leprino and the Teamsters Union.

The central factual allegation in the Plaintiff's action is that
Leprino has a practice of requiring Plaintiff and the putative
class members to work substantial amounts of time without pay.
Leprino does not pay Plaintiff and the putative class members for
all required pre- and post-shift work activies that are necessary
and integral to their overall employment responsibilities, such
as: donning and doffing required sanitary gear, walking to
production lines, waiting in line to sanitize, and waiting for
sanitary gear and/or supplies.

Leprino emphasizes the following sections of the CBA:

   1. The lowest hourly wage rate for any employee provided for
in the CBA is $12.99.

   2. Employees who are required to change into and out of
uniforms will be paid a total of 14 minutes of additional
compensation for donning and doffing at the straight time rate
for each shift worked. This compensated time is not considered
hours worked.

   3. Time and one-half (1-1/2) will be paid for all hours worked
above eight (8) hours within nine and one-half (9-1/2)
consecutive hours in any one (1) day, or forty (40) hours in any
one (1) week, whichever is greater.

Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action

Plaintiff goes on to highlight that the CBA continues on to
explain that this compensated time is not considered hours
worked. Plaintiff appears to suggest that the fourteen minutes of
additional compensation paid by Leprino for donning and doffing
is not considered hours worked for purposes of the California
Labor Code because the CBA indicates that the compensated time is
not considered hours worked.

The Court rejects that position. If, as the CBA requires, the
putative class members were compensated for fourteen minutes
worth of time for donning and doffing, Plaintiff and the putative
class members could not recover for failure to pay the minimum
wage for that fourteen minutes. If, however, Plaintiff and the
putative class members regularly spend more than fourteen minutes
donning and doffing sanitary gear, they could recover for
underpayment of that time. Plaintiff's allegations do not support
one theory clearly over the other. Plaintiff has alleged facts
that, if true, could just as easily support liability as an
absence of liability.
Insofar as Plaintiff's first claim is premised upon failure to
pay wages for donning and doffing, it must be dismissed and
Defendants' motion granted.

Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action

California Labor Code Section 510 requires an employer to pay a
non-exempt employee overtime for any work in excess of eight
hours in one workday or forty hours in one workweek.

Plaintiff points out that Section 514 exempts employees from the
reach of Section 510 only when the valid collective bargaining
agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours
worked. Plaintiff argues that by defining time spent donning and
doffing sanitary gear as something other than hours worked, the
CBA does not provide a premium wage rate for all overtime hours
worked for purposes of the California Labor Code. Plaintiff
argues that to conclude otherwise would allow unionized employers
to avoid overtime by unilaterally choosing what activities it
will and will not count as hours worked. Although Plaintiff's
position ignores the role that a labor union has in negotiating a
CBA, an employer of unionized employees can take no unilateral
action impacting the pay or conditions of employment of those
employees--Plaintiff's position is not without merit.

The California Labor Code only provides an exemption to payment
of overtime pursuant to Section 510 if a premium wage is paid for
all overtime hours worked.  That limitation would be largely
undermined if the parties to a CBA could exclude activities that
are integral to performance of the principal work activity from
consideration as "hours worked" for purposes of calculating
overtime compensation. On the face of the CBA, it is clear that
it does not require Leprino to pay a premium rate for all
overtime hours worked, to wit donning and doffing time is not
counted as hours worked for purposes of overtime calculation.

Based on the allegations before the Court, Section 514 does not
exempt Plaintiff or the putative class from the reach of the
overtime requirements of Section 510(a).

Defendants' motion to for judgment on the pleadings as to
Plaintiff's third cause of action will be denied.

Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action

Plaintiff alleges that Leprino wrongfully withheld earned wages
and other monies from Plaintiff and the putative class. In
particular, Leprino failed to pay all wages earned pursuant to
the applicable employment laws and regulations.

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's claim fails because
the Plaintiff and putative class members did not allege that they
held title to the wages allegedly converted or that the alleged
wages were a specific sum capable of identification.

In order to plead a cause of action, Plaintiff must specifically
allege the basis for their claim and how a specific sum that was
allegedly converted could be ascertained. In light of the likely
absence of any identifiable specific sum converted, this claim
will be dismissed. A claim that Defendants, over time, failed to
pay Plaintiff an incalculable amount of wages regardless of why
the amount is incalculable will not suffice.

The Court cannot now determine that it would be futile to permit
amendment. However, if any amended complaint does not cure the
defect identified herein, Plaintiff's conversion claim will be
dismissed without further leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7w8wvg9 from Leagle.com..

John Perez, and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Cory Lee --
downeyjusticelee@gmail.com -- The Downey Law Firm, LLC.

Leprino Foods Company, A Colorado Corporation & Leprino Foods
Dairy Products Company, A Colorado Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Sandra L. Rappaport --
srappaport@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP, Daniel
Robert Lentz -- DLentz@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP,
Kyle Aaron Mabe -- kmabe@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett
LLP & Lisa M. Pooley -- lpooley@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson
Bridgett LLP.


LEPRINO FOODS: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in "Vasquez" Suit OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ICTOR VASQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-00796-AWI-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the  Defendants' motion for
judgment on the pleadings regarding the Plaintiffs' fourth cause
of action for conversion.

On May 8, 2017, Vasquez and Hefke filed the instant wage and hour
class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
non-exempt, hourly employees at the cheese processing plant
operated by the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs and the putative
class members are all non-unionized non-exempt, hourly employees
who work at the West Lemoore dairy/cheese processing facility.

Until May of 2017, Leprino had a policy of "de crewing" on days
when more workers arrived at the West Lemoore Plant than were
needed for production. Leprino's policy involved sending workers
home prior to the start of their scheduled shifts without pay.
When sending workers home without pay, Leprino would require
those workers to fill out Time Off Request forms ("TOR").  Those
workers who did demand pay were ordered to forfeit a vacation day
if they wished to be paid in lieu of Leprino paying them 4 hours
of Reporting Time Pay ("RTP").

Leprino maintains or maintained during the class period, a policy
of requiring the Plaintiffs and putative class members to remain
on call and subject to return to work during their rest and meal
breaks.

Leprino removed the action to the Court on May 18, 2017.  The
action proceeds forward on the Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), filed on June 16, 2017, consisting of five
causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code, an
Unfair Business Practices Act claim, and a conversion claim.  The
Defendant filed an answer on June 30, 2017.

Leprino moves for judgment on the pleadings regarding the
Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for conversion.  The Plaintiff
opposes that motion.  The Plaintiffs allege two bases for their
conversion claim.  First, they allege that Leprino wrongfully
withheld earned wages and/or coerced them into forfeiting
vacation days in lieu of being paid reporting time pay.  Second,
the Plaintiffs allege that Leprino failed to pay them for
requiring them to remain on duty and to respond to work
instructions during meal and rest breaks.  They also allege
separate Labor Code violations for both of those alleged courses
of conduct.

Judge Ishii holds that neither of those theories gives rise to a
viable claim for conversion.  Under California law, when the
Legislature creates a right that did not exist at common law and
provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for that right, the
statutory remedies are exclusive.  Both of the theories pursued
by the Plaintiffs are reliant on protections created by the Labor
Code as part of a comprehensive remedial scheme.  Likewise, a
right to recover reporting time pay did not exist at common law.
As a result, the Plaintiff's conversion claim is precluded
insofar as it seeks to recover wages for meal period premiums or
reporting time pay.  Because amendment would be futile as to both
theories, the Plaintiff's fourth cause of action will be
dismissed without leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Ishii granted the Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Plaintiffs' fourth
cause of action.  That claim is adjudicated in favor of Leprino.
Leave to amend will not be granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Ng1xJk from Leagle.com.

Victor Vasquez & Linda Hefke, Plaintiffs, represented by Cory
Lee, The Downey Law Firm, LLC.

Leprino Foods Company, a Colorado corporation & Leprino Foods
Dairy Products Company, a Colorado corporation, Defendants,
represented by Lisa M. Pooley -- lpooley@hansonbridgett.com --
Hanson Bridgett LLP, Sandra L. Rappaport --
srappaport@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP & Kyle Aaron
Mabe -- kyle.a.mabe@gmail.com -- Hanson Bridgett LLP.


LUXOR LIMO: "Chohan" Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay, Reimbursements
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sajjad Chohan, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Luxor Limo Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 17-cv- 07602, (E.D. N.Y., December 31, 2017), seeks
unpaid commissions and unlawful wage deductions, full
reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement for monies spent
cleaning and maintaining uniforms, unpaid commissions and
unlawful wage deductions, maximum liquidated damages, interest,
and attorneys' fees pursuant to New York Labor Law.

Defendant is in the business of providing transportation services
where Chohan was employed as a driver. He claims overtime for
hours rendered in excess of 40 per workweek and reimbursement of
business expenses.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
     ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
     215-28 Hillside Avenue
     Queens Village, NY 11427
     Tel: (718) 740-1000
     Fax: (718) 355-9668
     E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


M & Y CARE: "Cardwell" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Rubie D. Cardwell and Charles M. Hill, on behalf of themselves
and all other similarly situated employees v. M & Y Care, LLC,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00044 (N.D. Ohio, January 8, 2018), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime compensation and other benefits of
employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiffs currently reside in Cleveland, Ohio and were at
all relevant times employed by Defendant as home health aides.

Defendant M & Y is a home care agency that provides home
healthcare services, including homemaker, custodial, and skilled
and non-skilled home healthcare services to elderly and disabled
persons. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      David W. Neel, Esq.
      DAVID W. NEEL, LLC
      16781 Chagrin Blvd.
      Shaker Heights, OH 44120
      Tel: (216) 522-0011
      Fax: (844) 548-3570


MBA WASTE SERVICES: Discovery in "Moore" Wages Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant on Jan. 22 filed its answer to the complaint in the
case titled, Daniel Moore, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MBA Waste Services LLC and
Kenneth W. Mitchell, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03948-ELR,
(N.D. Ga., October 6, 2017).

According to a Jan. 22 docket entry, discovery ends on June 21,
2018.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants failed
to count all hours worked, to pay for all hours worked, failed to
pay overtime and to keep accurate records of all hours worked as
to Plaintiff and all employees similarly situated in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Further, Plaintiff and all
similarly situated employees have been damaged because of the
said uniform and company-wide policies that resulted in the
systematic failure to pay overtime at time and a half regular
rate as well as the systematic failure to pay workers for all
hours worked.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

    David S. Fried Georgia, Esq.
    Joseph A. White, Esq.
    Daniel Wyatt Georgia, Esq.
    FRIED & BONDER, LLC
    White Provision, Suite 305 1170
    Howell Mill Road, NW
    Atlanta, GA 30318
    Telephone: (404) 995-8808
    Telephone: (678) 576-7816
    Email: dfried@friedbonder.com
    Email: jwhite@friedbonder.com
    Email: danielwyatt@wyatt-law.com


MDL 2804: Judge OKs Expanded Plaintiffs Leadership Team
-------------------------------------------------------
Law.com reports that a federal judge has approved a plaintiffs
leadership team in the opioid litigation that's expected to get
bigger--much bigger.  U.S. District Judge Dan Polster in Ohio on
Jan. 4 approved a team of 22 lawyers to spearhead more than 180
lawsuits brought over the opioid epidemic, which has led to a
public health crisis across the nation.  The team reads like a
"Who's Who" in mass torts and includes many of the same lawyers
who obtained the $246 billion settlement with Big Tobacco.

The proposed slate was submitted in a court filing on Jan. 3,
complete with an organizational chart that shows various
committees and working groups in which several more attorneys
would be named.  Overseeing those groups would be a plaintiffs
steering committee, whose membership has yet to be decided.

"I anticipate there will be dozens of more law firms involved
than are identified in the current time," said Joe Rice --
jrice@motleyrice.com -- co-lead counsel on the team.  "As to who
they'll be, and what their role will be, will be largely dictated
on how the court will organize the case."

Peter Weinberger, managing partner of Cleveland's Spangenberg
Shibley & Liber, who is one of three liaison counsel on the team,
wrote in an email that he planned to submit additional names to
the leadership slate following a Jan. 9 hearing, at which Judge
Polster has indicated he could decide the structure of the MDL
and whether to appoint a special master.

The slate approved on Jan. 4 includes the most senior positions,
including three co-lead counsel and 16 members of an executive
committee.  The membership was slightly revised from the original
leadership team proposed last month after Judge Polster ordered
that two lawyers representing nongovernmental entities --
specifically, hospitals and third-party payors -- should be
included.  He also limited the number of attorneys from the same
law firm who could be on the executive committee.  That dropped
Jayne Conroy -- JConroy@simmonsfirm.com -- of Simmons Hanly
Conroy, Burton LeBlanc of Baron & Budd and Linda Singer of Motley
Rice from the executive committee.  Paul Hanly --
phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- of Simmons Hanly and Rice, of Motley
Rice, are co-lead counsel, along with Paul Farrell of West
Virginia's Greene, Ketchum, Farrell, Bailey & Tweel and Roland
Tellis of Baron & Budd are on the executive committee.  Morgan &
Morgan also was added to the executive committee after objecting
to a selection process that took place at the Hilton Cleveland
Downtown Hotel last month.

"West Virginia and Appalachia, more especially, is the epicenter
to the opioid epidemic," said James Young, the Morgan & Morgan
partner in Jacksonville, Florida, who was named to the revised
slate.  Mr. Young was special counsel to the attorney general in
Florida, prosecuting pharmaceutical fraud cases.  His firm has
filed nine opioid cases on behalf of cities in West Virginia.  He
said the ordinary leadership structures in most MDLs -- usually
limited to lead counsel, an executive committee and plaintiffs
steering committee -- wouldn't work in the opioid litigation
because it's "simply too big."  "I think of it as a collection of
MDLs within a single consolidated proceeding," he said. "There
are multiple defendants, which is a bit of a rarity, and multiple
theories, in terms of governmental entities, different damages
elements, causes of action.  It's a very complex, huge piece of
historic litigation."  Those myriad parties and claims have
complicated the creation of a leadership team.

Claims against distributors, for instance, have focused on the
failures of those companies to flag unusually large orders of
opioids, while manufacturers have faced allegations of falsely
marketing the prescription painkillers as not addictive.  The
approved leadership slate would include separate co-chairs
focused on the disparate claims against seven manufacturers and
five groups of distributors.  In addition, the majority of the
cases have been brought by governmental entities, like states,
counties and cities, but hospitals, labor unions and Native
American tribes also have brought suits -- all of which would be
represented on the leadership team.  After two groups of lawyers
raised concerns last month that the original leadership slate did
not include nongovernmental plaintiffs, Judge Polster ordered
that lawyers be appointed to represent hospitals and third-party
payors.

The revised slate on Jan. 3 includes James Dugan of The Dugan Law
Firm in New Orleans, for third-party payors, and Don Barrett of
Barrett Law Group in Lexington, Mississippi, for hospital
plaintiffs.  The lawyer who objected on behalf of hospitals,
J. Nixon Daniel of Beggs & Lane in Pensacola, Florida, filed a
motion on Jan. 3 arguing that he should have been appointed to
that slot -- either in addition to or in place of Mr. Barrett.
Neither Messrs. Daniel nor Barrett responded to requests for
comment.


MI GROUP: Files Answer to Amended Complaint in "Roy" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Defendant on Jan. 19 filed its answer to the amended complaint in
the case, Samir Roy, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, the
Plaintiff, v. The MI Group, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-
cv-05800-EDL, (N.D. Cal., October 6, 2017).

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated persons were or are employed by the Defendant as
Relocation Managers and Relocation Associates and were non-exempt
employees under federal and state wage-and-hour laws, and should
have been classified as such and received overtime pay consistent
with the requirement of these laws. However, the Defendant failed
to pay the appropriate overtime compensation as required by
federal and state law.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bryan Schwartz, Esq.
     Logan Talbot, Esq.
     BRYAN SCHWARTZ LAW
     1330 Broadway, Suite 1630
     Oakland, CA 94612
     Telephone: (510) 444-9300
     Facsimile: (510) 444-9301
     Email: bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com
     Email: talbot@bryanschwartzlaw.com


MOUNT SINAI: 2nd Circuit Affirms Ruling in TCPA Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Hector E. Lora, Esq., of Maurice Wutscher LLP, in an article for
Lexology, wrote that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently affirmed the entry of judgment on the pleadings
against the plaintiff in a putative class action alleging that a
text message sent by a third party on behalf of a hospital
reminding the plaintiff about a flu shot violated the federal
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), holding that the
plaintiff provided his prior express consent to receive such
messages in a hospital admission form.

The case is DANIEL LATNER v. MOUNT SINAI HEALTH SYSTEM, INC, WEST
PARK MEDICAL GROUP, P.C.

The plaintiff went to a medical clinic owned by a hospital for a
routine health examination in 2003. He completed several new
patient forms, including one that gave consent to the hospital to
use his health information "for payment, treatment and hospital
operations purposes."

In June 2011, the hospital contracted with a third party to send
mass text messages, "including flu shot reminder texts" on the
hospital's behalf.  In September 2014, the plaintiff received a
text message advising him that "[i]ts [sic] flu season again" and
providing a telephone number to make an appointment for a "flu
shot."

The plaintiff sued the clinic and hospital, alleging that the
hospital violated Sec 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA, which "makes
it unlawful to send texts or place calls to cell phones through
automated telephone dialing systems, except under certain
exceptions or with consent."

In December 2016, the trial court granted the hospital's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case. The
plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the Second Circuit explained that "Congress delegated
authority to issue regulations under the TCPA to the Federal
Communications Commission." The Court then discussed the history
of the FCC's TCPA rulemaking, beginning with a 1992 order in
which the FCC "concluded that 'persons who knowingly release
their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or
permission to be called at the number which they have given,
absent instructions to the contrary.'"

The Court went on to explain that "[i]n 2008, the FCC extended
this proposition to cell phone numbers."  Then, in 2014, the FCC
clarified that "the scope of [an individual's prior express]
consent must be determined upon the facts of each situation."

In addition, the Court explained that "[i]n 2012, the FCC devised
a 'Telemarketing Rule' requiring 'prior written consent for
autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls.'"

However, in the Telemarketing Rule, the FCC exempted from the
written consent requirement "calls to wireless cell numbers if
the call 'delivers a 'health care' message made by, or on behalf
of, a 'covered entity' or its 'business associate,' as those are
defined in the HIPPA Privacy Rule. . . . HIPPA defines health
care to include 'care, services, or supplies related to the
health of an individual . . . [and] exempts from its definition
of marketing all communications made '[f]or treatment of an
individual by a health care provider . . . or to direct or
recommend alternative treatments' to the individual."

The Court then reasoned that although the trial court held that
"the text message qualified for the FCC's Healthcare
Exception[,]" its "analysis was incomplete."  This was because
the trial court found that the text message delivered a "health
care" message under the HIPPA Privacy Rule, but "it did not then
go on to determine whether [plaintiff] provided his prior express
consent to receive the text message."

The Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the trial court's
judgment because after "considering 'the facts of the
situation,'" the Court determined that the plaintiff had given
his prior express consent to be called and texted when he
provided his cell phone number when he first visited the clinic
in 2003.

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.  [GN]


NEW KANG SUH: "Lee" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
YOUNG MIN LEE, individually and on behalf of all employees
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NEW KANG SUH INC. d/b/a
Korea Garden and MYUNG SOOK CHOI, the Defendants, Case No. 7:17-
cv-09502-NSR (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 4, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and
costs under the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

According to the complaint, from 2001 until 2015 Plaintiff was
paid at a flat daily rate of $55 regardless of the actual hours
she worked. From 2015 until June 15, 2017, Plaintiff was paid at
a flat rate of $60 regardless of the actual hours she worked.

The Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime
compensation according to state and federal laws. The Plaintiff
was not compensated for New York's "spread of hours" premium for
shifts that lasted longer than 10 hours. The Defendants did not
provide Plaintiff with a wage notices at the time of her hiring.

The Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly,
intentionally and willfully. The Defendants knew that the
nonpayment of overtime and the "spread of hours" premium would
economically injure Plaintiff and the Class Members by their
violation of federal and state laws.

The Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime pay, spread
of hours pay, and failure to provide the required wage notice at
the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws.

The Defendant is a longtime Korean BBQ stop offering grill-at-
the-table meats 24/7 in a dinerlike space.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip H. Kim, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY, 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353 8588
          E-mail: pkim@hanglaw.com


NEW JERSEY: "Cloud" Suit Alleging Harassment Underway
-----------------------------------------------------
Nakinya Cloud, the Plaintiff, v. State of New Jersey and John
Does 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case No. MER-L-002185-17, (N.J.
Super. Ct., October 6, 2017), remains pending.

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she began working for
Mercer Airport on December 15, 2015 as a shuttle driver/parking
attendant and she was subjected to sexual harassment during the
course of her employment. Plaintiff avers that the harassment was
regular, ongoing and continuous such that the entirety of the
harassment is actionable under the continuing violation doctrine.
Immediately after she began her employment, plaintiff was
subjected to sexually harassing comments from her Supervisor,
Stanley Patterson. Plaintiff alleges violations of the defendant
that includes sexual harassment and retaliation under the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  The Plaintiff seeks the court
for an equitable relief that includes the Defendants to cease and
desist all conduct inconsistent with the claims made herein going
forward.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin M. Costello, Esq.
     COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC
     18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800
     Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
     Telephone: (856) 727-9700


NEW JERSEY: "Miller" Suit over Discrimination Underway
------------------------------------------------------
The case, Clifton Miller, the Plaintiff, v. State of New Jersey
and John Does 1 to 10, the Defendant, Case No. MER-L-002183-17,
(N.J. Super. Ct., October 6, 2017), remains pending.

The Plaintiff alleges that he has been the victim of unlawful
harassment in violation of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination ("LAD") and that he has been subjected to
harassment based upon race, disability, perception of disability
and/or retaliation, singly or taken as a continuum.

Plaintiff is an African American and he began employment with the
State of New Jersey on or about May 15, 2015, as an Investigator
and has been subjected to harassment based upon his race since
his employment. Plaintiff was subjected to harassment that
exceeds two years preceding the filing of his complaint.  All
harassment suffered by the Plaintiff was severe and pervasive.
Plaintiff was subjected to intentional, egregious, malicious
and/or engaged in with a willful and wanton disregard for the
rights of the Plaintiff.  The harassment was participated in
and/or willfully ignored by upper management and punitive damages
are warranted.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin M. Costello, Esq.
     COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC
     18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800
     Mount Laurel, NJ 08054
     Telephone: (856) 727-9700


NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE: "Reynoso" Class Suit Shelved
-------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as YUDELKA REYNOSO, ROMAN WACH, and JENNIFER
AHMAD, on behalf of herself and all other Class Members similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, a New
Jersey Body Corporate and Politic; NJ E-ZPASS, as agent in the
state of New Jersey on behalf of the Electronic Toll Collection
Consortium which includes the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, the
South Jersey Turnpike Authority, the Delaware River Port
Authority, the Delaware River and Bay Authority, etc.; JOSEPH W.
MROZEK, in his capacity as an individual and in his capacity as
the Executive Director of the New Jersey Turnpike Authority;
VERONIQUE HAKIM, in her individual capacity and in her former
capacity as the Executive Director of the New Jersey Turnpike
Authority; DONNA MANUELLI, in her individual capacity and in her
capacity as Chief Financial Officer (formerly as Comptroller) of
the New Jersey Turnpike Authority; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-50, JANE
AND JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-12356-JMV-
JBC (D.N.J., Dec. 1, 2017), has been administratively terminated.

In a January 17 Stipulation and Order, Judge John Michael Vazquez
said the action is stayed pending a decision in the case, James
Long and Homer Walker v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, Case No
A-001557-17T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div.).  Within 14 days of the
Termination Date, Counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants in this
action shall meet and confer regarding a schedule for this action
and shall submit a joint status report with the Court that
includes a proposed schedule and formal request to re-open the
matter.  The Clerk is directed to administratively terminate this
matter without prejudice.

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority is a state agency responsible
for maintaining the New Jersey Turnpike and the Garden State
Parkway. The agency is headquartered in Woodbridge Township, New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew Peter Faranda-Diedrich, Esq.
          ROYER COOPER COHEN BRAUNFELD
          Two Logan Square
          100 N 18th St., Suite 710
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 546 0275
          E-mail: mfd@rccblaw.com


NFL: 3d Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Finkelman" Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Judge Julio M. Fuentes of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the case, JOSH
FINKELMAN, on behalf of himself and the Putative class,
Appellant, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; NFL VENTURES, L.P.; NFL
PROPERTIES, L.L.C.; NFL VENTURES, INC.; NFL ENTERPRISES, L.L.C.,
Case No. 16-4087 (3d Cir.).

Finkelman had the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to buy tickets
to Super Bowl XLVIII held in his home state of New Jersey in
February 2014.  However, the NFL withheld almost all of these
tickets -- 99% -- from the general public for league insiders,
offering the remaining 1% to lucky winners of a lottery that all
could enter.  To get his tickets, Finkelman turned to the
secondary market, purchasing two tickets with a face value of
$800 each for $2,000 each.

In January 2014, one month before the Super Bowl, Finkelman filed
a putative class action in the District of New Jersey against the
NFL and various affiliated entities, alleging that the Defendants
violated New Jersey's Ticket Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 56:8-
35.1, by withholding more than 5% of tickets to the Super Bowl.

In the first round of the case, the Defendants moved to dismiss
Finkelman's first amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and the
District Court granted the motion.  Without addressing Article
III standing, the District Court reasoned that the Defendants
never "withheld" tickets within the meaning of the Ticket Law
because they did not keep tickets in their custody.  The District
Court also concluded that Finkelman failed to plead causation
under the CFA because he never entered the ticket lottery.

On appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that Finkelman did not
establish Article III standing.  It remanded to allow the
District Court to exercise its discretion as to whether Finkelman
should be granted leave to amend.

The District Court granted Finkelman's motion to amend the
complaint, and Finkelman filed a Second Amended Complaint.  In
it, Finkelman pursued only the second theory of standing, mapped
out in the Appellate Court's first opinion.  To do so, Finkelman
added facts alleged by Daniel Rascher, an economist who
specializes in sports and ticketing on the workings of secondary
ticket markets in events like the Super Bowl. Rascher concludes
that the NFL's withholding resulted in fewer tickets being
available on the secondary market and higher prices for those
tickets that were available.

The Defendants again moved to dismiss, and the District Court
granted the motion.  Finkelman appeals the District Court's
judgment which followed the Appellate Court's remand, arguing
that he has properly pleaded Article III standing and has
properly pleaded a claim under the Ticket Law to overcome the
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

In finding that Finkelman had not properly alleged standing in
our initial opinion, Judge Fuentes compared the case to Dominguez
v. UAL Corp., in which the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and
found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.  Like Finkelman
in his earlier complaint, the plaintiff could only speculate as
to whether an end to United's prohibition would have led to lower
ticket prices.

Here, however, in his amended complaint, the Judge finds that
Finkelman has offered specific factual allegations above and
beyond those described in Dominguez.  Finkelman did not just
allege that prices would be lower on the secondary market were it
not for the NFL's withholding.  Instead, Finkelman alleged a
causal chain justifying why the NFL's withholding set into motion
a series of events that ultimately raised prices on the secondary
market.

Given his additional factual allegations, Finkelman has offered
economic facts that are specific, plausible, and susceptible to
proof at trial.  The Defendants may be correct that Finkelman
will not be able to prove that the 2014 Superbowl secondary
ticket market worked as he claims.  They remain free to bring a
factual challenge to jurisdiction disputing just that.  But
Finkelman is not required to prove his economic theory in his
complaint, and, at this stage in the litigation, he has alleged
sufficient factual allegations to show that the Defendants'
withholding raised the price that he paid for tickets on the
secondary market.  Thus, Finkelman has Article III standing.

For these reasons, Judge Fuentes reversed the District Court and
finds that the Appellate Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the matter.  He deferred action on the merits of the appeal
pending a decision by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on a
petition for certification of questions of state law.  The Court
will retain jurisdiction over the appeal pending resolution of
the certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ToVvpD from Leagle.com.

Greg M. Kohn, Esq. -- gkohn@nagelrice.com -- Bruce H. Nagel, Esq.
-- bnagel@nagelrice.com -- [ARGUED], Andrew Pepper, Esq. --
apepper@nagelrice.com -- Robert H. Solomon, Esq. Nagel Rice, 103,
Eisenhower Parkway, Roseland, NJ 07068, Counsel for Appellant.

Karen A. Confoy, Esq. -- kconfoy@foxrothschild.com -- Fox
Rothschild, 997, Lenox Drive, Princeton Pike Corporate Center,
Building 3, Lawrenceville, NJ 08648, William Feldman, Esq.,
Jonathan D. Pressment, Esq. -- jonathan.pressment@haynesboone.com
-- [ARGUED], Haynes & Boone, 30, Rockefeller Center, 26th Floor,
New York, NY 10112, Counsel for Appellees.


NIAGARA BOTTLING: Frompovicz Files Suit Over False Ad
-----------------------------------------------------
Stanley F. Frompovicz dba Far Away Springs, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Niagara Bottling, LLC, Ice
River Springs Water Co., Inc., Crossroads Beverage Group, and
James J. Land, Jr. dba MC Resource Development aka Pine Valley
Farms Springs, Case No. 2:18-cv-00054 (E.D. Pa., January 8,
2018), seeks monetary damages and other relief under the Lanham
Act and Pennsylvania law, in connection with the advertising and
sale of bottled water that is falsely, deceptively, and
misleadingly marketed, labeled and sold as "spring water" by
Defendants.

Plaintiff, Stanley F. Frompovicz is a resident and citizen of
Pennsylvania. Mr. Frompovicz does business as Far Away Springs, a
fictitious trade name registered in Pennsylvania. Far Away
Springs has its principal place of business in Auburn,
Pennsylvania.

Defendants Niagara, Ice River, and Crossroads are bottlers. They
operate water bottling facilities in which extracted raw water is
processed, potentially treated in some fashion depending on the
water classification, and placed in containers and distributed to
retail and other outlets for sale and human consumption.  All
three bottling Defendants source raw water from Defendant Land
dba MC Resource Development aka Pine Valley Farms Springs.
Bottling Defendants then bottle, market, and sell this water as
"spring water." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard M. Golomb, Esq.
      Ruben Honik, Esq.
      Kenneth J. Grunfeld, Esq.
      David J. Stanoch, Esq.
      GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C.
      1515 Market Street, Suite 1100
      Philadelphia, PA 19102
      Tel: (215) 985-9177
      Fax: (215) 985-4169
      E-mail: rgolomb@golombhonik.com
              rhonik@golombhonik.com
              kgrunfeld@golombhonik.com
              dstanoch@golombhonik.com


NORTH ALABAMA FAMILY: Sued for Denying Health Care Staff OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tammy Maples, Kenya Henson, Angela Watkins, Olive Turner, Jessica
Watts, Carleb Delices, Ricky Gray, Chequitia Griggs individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
North Alabama Family Services, Inc., North Alabama Professional
and Residential Services, Inc., Ficticious Defendants A-D and
Deanna Wilks, an individual Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02196
(N.D. Ala., December 29, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid
compensation and benefits, plus an equal amount of liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees,
including the costs and expenses of this action and such other
legal and equitable relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

North Alabama Family Services provides health care services to
adults in need of care structured as a group home with four adult
group home locations. Plaintiffs were employed as non-
professional health care providers. They claim to have been
inaccurately compensated for overtime hours. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J. Allen Schreiber, Esq.
      Lauren E. Miles, Esq.
      SCHREIBER LAW FIRM, P.C.
      6 Office Park Circle, Suite 209
      Birmingham, AL 35223
      Phone: (205) 971-9140
      Tel: allen@schreiber.law
           lauren@schreiber.law


NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE: Cal. App. Refuses to Certify "Caudle" Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled JOSEPH CAUDLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
NORTHBAY HEALTHCARE GROUP, Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
A148912 (Cal. App.), Judge James A. Richman of the U.S. Court of
Appeals of California for the First District, Division Two,
affirmed the trial court's order denying Caudle's motion for
class certification.

On Oct. 16, 2013, Caudle received treatment at one of NorthBay's
emergency rooms for injuries he suffered in an automobile
accident.  He did not have health insurance, nor was he covered
by a governmental health program.  He was given a copy of
NorthBay's Hospital and Outpatient Service Agreement, on which
his wife signed his name.  The agreement provided that he would
pay NorthBay its regular rates and terms for the services
provided.  He did not read the agreement, nor did he ask what the
services would cost.

NorthBay billed Caudle $39,534.34 for his emergency room visit.
No portion of the bill was ever paid.  Caudle believed the
reasonable cost for the services he received was $800.

On Jan. 23, 2015, Caudle filed a putative class action against
NorthBay, challenging its unreasonable, unfair and unlawful
practice of billing emergency room patients its chargemaster
rates.  He alleged that NorthBay's financial agreement was vague
and ambiguous as to pricing and payment terms, in that it fails
to describe, specify, explain, or identify any price or pricing
schedule for NorthBay's services and treatment rendered or to be
rendered to an emergency care patient.  As such, he contended,
the agreement contains an "open" pricing term, prohibiting
NorthBay from charging self-pay patients its "grossly excessive"
chargemaster rates and obligating self-pay patients to pay no
more than the reasonable value for emergency care provided in
NorthBay's hospitals.

The complaint asserted one cause of action for declaratory
judgment, seeking a determination as to whether NorthBay's
financial agreement allows it to bill self-pay patients its full
chargemaster rates or contains an open term that limits it to the
reasonable value of services rendered.

In addition to declaratory relief, Caudle alleged that he and the
members of the Class are further entitled to injunctive relief
and to restitution, in an amount to be proven at trial.  The
prayer for relief additionally sought attorney fees, expert fees,
and costs.

On March 10, 2016, Caudle filed a motion for class certification.
He sought certification of the class of all individuals who,
between March 1, 2011 and the date of class certification, had
one or more eligible patient hospital visits to a Defendant
Hospital's Emergency Department.  NorthBay opposed Caudle's class
certification motion.

Caudle's motion came on for hearing on July 6, 2016.  After
taking the matter under submission, the trial court denied
certification, finding Caudle had not demonstrated that the class
was ascertainable and that common issues predominated over
individual issues.

Caudle appeals, contending the trial court erred in requiring
ascertainability and predominance because his putative class was
a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2)
(Rule 23) "equivalent" class, neither of which requires
ascertainability or predominance.  Alternatively, he argues he
established both ascertainability and predominance.

As the trial court rightly observed, Judge Richman finds that the
gravamen of Caudle's claims is the reasonableness of NorthBay's
chargemaster rates.  In order to declare that NorthBay's practice
of billing chargemaster rates is unfair, unreasonable, and
illegal, as Caudle requests, the court would be required to make
individualized determinations as to whether each chargemaster
rate billed to each class member was reasonable given the unique
circumstances of each patient.

Caudle vigorously disputes this fact, labeling it a
mischaracterization of his claims and repeatedly insisting he
only seeks a determination that NorthBay's practice of billing
from its chargemaster rate schedule violates the financial
agreement, a determination that does not require an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the chargemaster rates themselves.  As he
explains his theory in his reply brief that the trial court
failed to realize is that the practice of billing Chargemaster
rates to Class members would be improper and unauthorized by
Hospital's Contract, regardless of whether the amounts billed
were reasonable or unreasonable.  Caudle says it is the propriety
of billing in accordance with a rate schedule that was never
agreed to which is in dispute, and the propriety of such billing
practice is not dependent on whether the actual amount billed to
each individual under such practice was reasonable or
unreasonable.

Judge Richman finds this quite simply wrong: if NorthBay's
chargemaster rates are in fact reasonable, a declaration that its
billing practices are unfair, unreasonable, and illegal merely
because the rates are derived from a schedule would be
unwarranted.  In other words, the Judge says, there would be no
basis for enjoining NorthBay from billing its chargemaster rates
if those rates were reasonable.  Caudle's refusal to recognize
this fact is at the heart of his disagreement with the trial
court's order.  This fact is fatal to his appeal.

Judge Richman concludes the trial court properly required
ascertainability and predominance, and substantial evidence
supports the court's findings that Caudle failed to establish
these two requirements.  He also rejects Caudle's argument that
the trial court should have at least certified an "issue" class
under California Rules of Court, rule 3.765(b), and he denies his
request that he remands the case with instructions that he be
permitted to file a renewed motion for class certification based
on a claim of unconscionability.  Accordingly, Judge Richman
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/CRSJey from Leagle.com.


O'REILLY AUTO: Davidson Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Kia Davidson filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Kia Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC,
Case No. 5:17-cv-00603-RGK-AJW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Riverside.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 29, 2017, the
District Court denied Davidson's motion for class certification
of:

   Wage Statement Class:

   "[a]ll persons who worked for [O'Reilly] as a non-exempt,
   hourly paid employee in California (excluding Assistant Store
   Managers and Store Managers) at any time from March 29, 2016
   until April 2017"; and

   Rest Period Policy Class:

   "[a]ll person who worked for [O'Reilly] as a non-exempt,
   hourly paid employee in California (excluding Assistant Store
   Managers and Store Managers) at any time from March 29, 2013
   until the date of certification."

The District Court held that, "While Davidson does provide
evidence that, for some period of time, O'Reilly had a written
rest break policy that violated California law, she provides
limited evidence showing how, or even if, that policy was
consistently applied to all 21,000 proposed class members.
Specifically, Davidson provided the Court with her own
declaration stating that she was not aware of receiving any rest
period premiums for working shifts between six and eight hours in
length; a copy of the written policy at issue; and deposition
testimony from O'Reilly's Rule 30(b)(6) designee stating that the
policy was provided to managers and that managers are charged
with implementing the policy.  Although Davidson asserts in her
Reply that this constitutes "significant proof," the Court finds
that on balance, her evidence fails to implicate any illegal
practices.  In fact, Davidson's own declaration does not even
state that she was ever denied proper rest breaks.  Thus, Davison
failed to meet her burden.  O'Reilly not only maintained a
facially defective policy, but also implemented unlawful
practices pursuant to the policy."

The appellate case is captioned as Kia Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto
Enterprises, LLC, Case No. 17-80260, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner KIA DAVIDSON, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Liana Carter, Esq.
          Glenn A. Danas, Esq.
          Robert Drexler, Jr., Esq.
          Matthew Thomas Theriault, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          E-mail: Liana.Carter@CapstoneLawyers.com
                  Glenn.Danas@CapstoneLawyers.com
                  Robert.Drexler@capstonelawyers.com
                  Matthew.Theriault@capstonelawyers.com

Defendant-Respondent O'REILLY AUTO ENTERPRISES, LLC, is
represented by:

          James M. Peterson, Esq.
          Jason Conroy Ross, Esq.
          HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
          401 West A Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 236-1551
          Facsimile: (619) 696-1410
          E-mail: peterson@higgslaw.com
                  rossj@higgslaw.com


PALO ALTO NETWORKS: Fifth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Godert" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Kevin Godert filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Kevin Godert v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., Case No.
3:16-CV-2079, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, Dallas.

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Kevin Godert v. Palo Alto
Networks, Inc., Case No. 17-11544, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant KEVIN GODERT, And all similarly situated
employees, is represented by:

          Mark D. Johnson, Esq.
          FLANNIGAN & JOHNSON, P.L.L.C.
          5600 Tennyson Parkway
          Plano, TX 75024
          Telephone: (972) 383-9377
          Facsimile: (214) 593-1441
          E-mail: mark@flanniganlawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INCORPORATED, is
represented by:

          John Bridges Brown, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          8117 Preston Road
          Preston Commons, W.
          Dallas, TX 75225
          Telephone: (214) 987-3800
          E-mail: john.brown@ogletreedeakins.com


PARK COUNTY, CO: Inmates File Class Action v. Corrections Dept.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sal Christ, writing for Canyon Courier, reports that more than
two dozen inmates at the Park County jail in Fairplay have filed
a class action lawsuit against the jail, the Park County
Sheriff's Office, the Colorado Department of Corrections, and two
U.S. corrections industry contractors -- Trinity Serve Group Inc.
and Securus Technologies -- alleging the denial of privileges
they claim are afforded to them as Department of Corrections
inmates. [GN]


PHARMAVITE LLC: Ference Appeals Order in "Barrera" to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Justin Ference filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled Lorean Barrera, et al. v.
Pharmavite LLC, Case No. 2:11-cv-04153-CAS-AGR, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 3, 2018, the
District Court issued an order granting the Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Approval of Settlement in the case.

For settlement purposes only, the District Court certified the
following Settlement Class:

     All residents of the United States who purchased for
     personal use, and not resale or distribution, a Covered
     Product between May 1, 2007 and June 6, 2017.

The District Court also made the following awards to the
Plaintiff and Settlement Class Counsel:

   -- $3,475,000 as attorneys' fees collectively to Bonnett,
      Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., Siprut, PC, Boodell &
      Domanskis, LLC, Levin Sedran & Berman, and Westerman Law
      Corp.;

   -- $600,000 as costs collectively to Bonnett, Fairbourn,
      Friedman & Balint, P.C., Siprut, PC, Boodell & Domanskis,
      LLC, Levin Sedran & Berman, and Westerman Law Corp.; and

   -- $10,000 as an incentive award to the Class Representative.

The appellate case is captioned as Lorean Barrera, et al. v.
Pharmavite LLC, Case No. 17-56959, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Justin Ference's opening brief is due on
      February 26, 2018;

   -- Appellees Lorean Barrera and Pharmavite LLC's answering
      brief is due on March 28, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant JUSTIN FERENCE is represented by:

          Caroline V. Tucker, Esq.
          TUCKER POLLARD ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          2102 Business Center Drive
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 253-5710
          E-mail: ctucker@tuckerpollard.com

Plaintiff-Appellee LOREAN BARRERA, On Behalf of Herself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Nada Djordjevic, Esq.
          Max A. Stein, Esq.
          BOODELL & DOMANSKIS, LLC
          1 N. Franklin Street, Suite 1200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 938-1003
          E-mail: ndjordjevic@boodlaw.com
                  mstein@boodlaw.com

               - and -

          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6978
          E-mail: mmuecke@bffb.com
                  psyverson@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: eryan@bffb.com

               - and -

          Howard Sedran, Esq.
          LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19106-3697
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          E-mail: hsedran@lfsblaw.com

               - and -

          Stewart M. Weltman, Esq.
          SIPRUT, PC
          17 North State Street, Suite 1600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 236-0000
          E-mail: sweltman@siprut.com

               - and -

          Jeff S. Westerman, Esq.
          WESTERMAN LAW CORP
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 2200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 698-7450
          E-mail: jwesterman@jswlegal.com

Defendant-Appellee PHARMAVITE LLC, a California limited liability
company, is represented by:

          Bridget Ahmann, Esq.
          Joseph Michael Price, Esq.
          FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP
          90 South Seventh Street, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 766-8055
          Facsimile: (612) 766-1600
          E-mail: bridget.ahmann@FaegreBD.com
                  joseph.price@FaegreBD.com

               - and -

          Juliet Arlene Markowitz, Esq.
          Rene P. Tatro, Esq.
          Steven R. Tekosky, Esq.
          TATRO TEKOSKY SADWICK LLP
          333 S. Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 225-7171
          Facsimile: (213) 225-7151
          E-mail: jmarkowitz@ttsmlaw.com
                  renetatro@ttsmlaw.com
                  steventekosky@ttsmlaw.com


PHILIPPINE AIRLINES: Settles Price-Fixing Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Lipman, writing for Law360, reports that three airlines
accused of fixing the price of long-haul flights to Pacific
destinations have agreed to pay a total of $29.4 million to
settle a proposed class action, passengers told a California
federal court on Jan. 10.

The plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval in the Northern
District of California of the agreements with Philippine Airlines
Inc., Air New Zealand Ltd. and China Airlines Ltd.  The deals
would leave just two carriers left fighting the suit -- All
Nippon Airways Co. Ltd. and EVA Airways Corp.

The case is In re TRANSPACIFIC PASSENGER AIR TRANSPORTATION
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case No. 3:07-cv-05634 (N.D. Calif.).  The
case is assigned to Judge Charles R. Breyer.  The case was filed
November 6, 2007. [GN]


PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: Compelled to Reply to "Adamov" RFPs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allison Claire of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's motion for discovery in the case, YURY ADAMOV,
Plaintiff, v. PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP, Defendant, Case No.
2:13-cv-01222-TLN-AC (E.D. Cal.).

On June 19, 2013, Adamov filed a wage-and-hour putative class
action against his former employer, PwC.  The Plaintiff alleged
that PwC misclassified him and other California employees working
as "Attest Associates" at PwC after June 19, 2009.  The Attest
Associates were not licensed as certified public accountants
("CPAs") by the State of California.  He alleges that PwC
misclassified these employees as "exempt" and therefore
improperly failed to pay them overtime wages required under
California law.

The case is in phased discovery.  The Plaintiff's motion for
class certification is due on March 9, 2018, and discovery going
to class certification must be completed by Jan. 19, 2018.  A
motion for summary judgment is pending before the District Judge.

According to the parties' joint discovery statement, the factual
disputes at issue in the case include:

     a. Whether the Plaintiff worked any overtime hours as a
first-year Attest Associate during the relevant class period.
The Plaintiff contends that the relevant class period for Mr.
Adamov's individual claim runs from June 19, 2009 through Nov. 9,
2009; PwC contends that the relevant class period for Mr.
Adamov's individual claim runs from June 19, 2009 through Aug.
31, 2009.

     b. Whether the claims of Mr. Adamov are typical of the
claims of the putative class.

     c. Whether the defenses of PwC to Mr. Adamov's claims are
similar to or different from its defenses to the claims of the
putative class.

     d. Whether accounting is a learned profession.

     e. Whether the work of first-year Attest Associates requires
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study.

     f. Whether first-year Attest Associates customarily and
regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment in the
performance of duties.

     g. Whether first-year Attest Associates work under only
general supervision.

     h. Whether the duties and responsibilities of first-year
Attest Associates involve the performance of office or non-manual
work directly related to management policies or general business
operations of their employer or their employer's customers.

The Plaintiff asks the Court to compel responses to multiple
requests for production ("RFPs"), including RFP 1, 3-9, 17, 27,
32, 36, 37, 50-51, 55, 57, 58, 62, and 74.

     a. RFP 1 seeks the name and last known contact information
for each Attest Associate.

     b. RFPs 3-9 seek information regarding PwC's arbitration
program, including information on Attest employees who agreed
and/or declined to participate in the arbitration program,
information on employees that are subject to the arbitration
program, and communications between PwC and Attest employees
about the arbitration program.

     c. RFP 17 seeks any and all transcripts related to auditor
malpractice that were commenced or pending from June 19, 2009 to
present in which issues were raised regarding the supervision of
unlicensed audit staff, their qualifications or competence, their
quality of work, their lack of CPA licensure, or the independence
between PwC and an audit client.

     d. RFP 27 requests any and all documents, including email,
related to communications between any PwC partner, human
resources employee, and/or manager or supervisor related to the
development of any job descriptions for Attest Associates.

     e. RFP 32 seeks all affidavits, declarations, or witness
statements, including all drafts, obtained by PwC or its counsel
that relate in any way to this case or the job duties and work
responsibilities of Attest Associates.

     f. RFP 36 requests any and all documents relating to the
Plaintiff.

     g. RFP 37 requests the complete audit work papers, including
complete "MyClient" and "Aura" files, for each PwC audit
engagement to which the Plaintiff was assigned work during the
class period.

     h. RFPs 50-51 seek documents related to educational
requirements established by PwC, and documents related to changes
in those requirements, for the position of Attest Associates of
the "Assurance" Line of Service.

     i. RFP 55 seeks all documents relating to or describing
PwC's rationale or reasons for requiring passage of the PA Exam
as a prerequisite for advancement to the audit senior associate
level.

     j. RFP 57 seeks all documents relating to the Defendant's
policy and/or practice of staffing audit engagements with
associates from other divisions and/or lines of service,
including Systems Process Assurance ("SPA") Associates.

     k. RFP 58 seeks all documents relating to speeches or
statements by former PwC Chairman Bob Moritz that refer to or
discuss the job duties and work responsivities of Attest
Associates.

     l. RFP 62 seeks all documents describing accounting as an
apprenticeship profession, and refers as an example to PwC's 2014
Audit Quality Report at p. 11.

     m. RPF 74 seeks all documents relating to the promotion of
unlicensed audit personnel, who have not taken or have failed any
section of the Uniform CPA Examination, to the Senior Associate
position.

The parties filed a joint discovery statement on Nov. 15, 2017.
A hearing was held before the undersigned on Dec. 20, 2017.

Having considered the arguments of the parties presented in the
joint statement and at the hearing, Judge Claire granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiff's motion.  The motion is granted
with respect to RFP Nos. 1, 3-9, 17, 32, AND 37; and is denied
with respect to RFP Nos. 27, 36, 50-51, 55, 57, 58, 62 and 74.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/WKLAcV from Leagle.com.

Yury Adamov, Plaintiff, represented by Jean Evelyn Lewis --
jlewis@kg-law.com -- Kramon & Graham, P.A., James P. Ulwick --
julwick@kg-law.com -- Kramon & Graham, P.A., pro hac vice, Lyle
W. Cook, Kershaw, Cutter & Ratinoff, LLP, Stuart C. Talley,
Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC & William A. Kershaw, Kershaw, Cook &
Talley PC.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Defendant, represented by Joseph M.
Ortega -- jortega@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
pro hac vice, Julie A. Totten, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP, Norman C. Hile -- nhile@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington and
Sutcliffe LLP, Daniel J. Thomasch -- dthomasch@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice & Lauren J. Elliot --
lelliot@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac
vice.


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: ERISA Suit Stayed Pending "Sweda" Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration
in the case captioned ELYSEE NICOLAS, individually and as
representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Princeton University 403(b) Plan, Plaintiff, v. THE
TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-
3695.(D.N.J.), and granting the Motion to Stay the case.

Plaintiff brings this putative class action alleging breaches of
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).  Plaintiff, like other faculty and staff at
Princeton University, is a participant in the Princeton
University Retirement Plan and the Princeton University Savings
Plan (Plans).  Defendant is the governing body of Princeton
University, a private, non-profit institution of higher learning
and administrator of the Plans.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions caused participants in
the Plans to pay excessive administrative and recordkeeping fees.
In particular, Plaintiff cites Defendant's failure to use its
bargaining power to negotiate lower fees or conduct competitive
bidding for record-keepers; contracting with two recordkeepers
instead of one and using an asset-based model instead of a fixed
dollar amount per participant.

Defendant has brought to the Court's attention an appeal pending
before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Sweda v. University
of Pennsylvania, 2017 WL 4179752 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017),
appeal filed, No. 17-3244 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2017). In that case,
a plaintiff brought a putative class action claiming fiduciary
breaches of ERISA by the University of Pennsylvania, on the basis
of substantially overlapping factual allegations as those alleged
by Plaintiff here.

Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion to Stay, arguing such an
indefinite stay is exceedingly rarely granted, prejudicial to
Plaintiff, and needlessly delays necessary discovery. Plaintiff
also notes that, while the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
dismissed the complaint in its entirety in Sweda, many other
courts including this Court have allowed similar claims to
proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage.

The Court turns to the anticipated length of the stay. It is
undisputed that a stay awaiting a decision in Sweda would be for
an uncertain and significant period of time, lasting potentially
a year or more.  Regarding the advisability of a stay given its
potential length, the Court notes that the parties in this action
have repeatedly stipulated to extended briefing schedules.
Overall, the Court determines that any anticipated delay is not
excessive considering the likelihood that the Third Circuit's
decision will resolve the dispositive issues presently in
dispute.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Stay is granted.

Defendant argues that the Court committed clear errors of law in
its prior opinion.  In particular, Defendant asserts that the'
Court misconstrued controlling Third Circuit law, namely Renfro
v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011) and In re Unisys
Savings Plan Litigation, 173 F.3d 145 (3d. Cir. 1999).  Defendant
also asserts the Court misconstrued evidence presented regarding
material facts necessary for the Court's disposition of
Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment.

Having concluded that a stay is appropriate, the Court need not
address at length the motion for reconsideration. In view of the
impending Third Circuit consideration of Sweda, further changes
in controlling law are currently anticipated. It would be unwise
for the Court to disturb its previous ruling, given that the
Third Circuit will soon resolve many of the precise issues that
Defendant requests this Court to reconsider.

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Opinion  is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9hgpx4x from
Leagle.com.

ELYSEE NICOLAS, Individually and as representative of a class of
participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Princeton
University 403(b) Plan, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH J.
DEPALMA -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG,
LLC.

THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, represented by
NEIL V. SHAH -- nshah@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP.


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Stewart Files Suit Over Deceptive Ads
-------------------------------------------------------
Elise Stewart, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated v. Procter & Gamble Co., Case No. 2:18-cv-00143 (C.D.
Calif., January 8, 2018), is a class action complaint for unfair
and unlawful business acts and practices, deceptive advertising
practices and violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

This case arises out of Defendant's unlawful merchandising
practices with respect to its Pampers Natural Clean wipes.
Defendant falsely and deceptively labels, markets and advertises
the Product as being natural, both by the prominent
representation "Natural Clean" on the packaging, and by the
Product's other packaging design features, which include green
coloring and nature-related images, such as flowers, trees and
leaves.

Plaintiff Elise Stewart is a resident of San Pedro, California.
Ms. Stewart purchased Pampers "Natural Clean" wipes numerous
times during the class period.

Defendant P&G manufactures, markets, promotes, advertises, and
sells baby-care products, including the Product at issue.
Defendant is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of
business at One Procter & Gamble Plaza, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Naomi Spector, Esq.
      Christopher D. Moon, Esq.
      KAMBERLAW, LLP
      9404 Genesee Avenue, Suite 340
      La Jolla, CA 92037
      Tel: (310) 400-1051
      Fax: (858) 800-4277
      E-mail: nspector@kamberlaw.com
              cmoon@kamberlaw.com


PROGRESSIVE GARDEN: Alpizar-Fallas Appeals Ruling to 3rd Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Ana Lidia Alpizar-Fallas filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Ana Alpizar-Fallas v. Frank
Favero, et al., Case No. 3-17-cv-02768, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

The lawsuit arises from insurance-related issues.

The appellate case is captioned as Ana Alpizar-Fallas v. Frank
Favero, et al., Case No. 17-3837, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ANA LIDIA ALPIZAR-FALLAS, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Charles X. Gormally, Esq.
          Thomas Kamvosoulis, Esq.
          BRACH EICHLER LLC
          101 Eisenhower Parkway
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 228-5700
          E-mail: cgormally@bracheichler.com
                  tkamvosoulis@bracheichler.com

Defendants-Appellees FRANK E. FAVERO, BRIAN BARBOSA and
PROGRESSIVE GARDEN STATE INSURANCE CO. are represented by:

          Francis X. Nolan, IV, Esq.
          EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP
          1114 Avenue of the Americas
          The Grace Building, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 389-5083
          Facsimile: (212) 389-5099
          E-mail: FrankNolan@eversheds-sutherland.com


QUALITY CABLE: Helpers Not Included in Class of Foremen
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Jeremy Ryan Card, on behalf of himself and
on Behalf of All Others similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Quality
Cable Partners, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:17-CV-00524
(S.D. Tex.), Judge Stephen WM Smith of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiff's opposed motion for
conditional certification.

Card was employed by QCI as a foreman from Jan. 19, 2015 to July
22, 2016.  Prior to January 2015, QCI did not directly employ any
installers.  Instead, QCI outsourced the installation services to
several businesses, including Needham Communications.  This
changed in January 2015, when QCI directly hired several Needham
workers, including the Plaintiff, who was then a foreman.

As a foreman, the Plaintiff was primarily paid a commission for
each project, calculated on a piece rate basis for the service
performed, such as $20 per cable installed, $5 per cable
terminated.  Unlike foremen, the helpers who worked on the
projects under a foreman' direction were paid by the hour.

The Plaintiff has requested conditional certification of a
proposed class of similarly situated foremen and helpers who
worked for QCI during the relevant time period.  The evidence
accompanying his motion leaves little doubt that other QCI
foremen were similarly situated to the Plaintiff, given that they
performed the same duties and were paid on the same piece-rate
commission basis (at least after January 2015).  In addition, a
foreman's pay was subject to certain deductions, including the
hourly pay of the helpers on the job.  Thus, while the foremen
might work at different job sites, they were all subject to a
single pay policy.

The helpers are a different story, however.  Their job duties
were obviously not the same as the foremen who oversaw their
work.  Nor were they paid on the same basis as the foremen.
Instead of a piece rate commission, helpers were paid by the
hour. In other words, the helpers were paid based upon the actual
time spent on the job, while the foremen were paid under a
completely different system. Moreover, the material factual
differences between the two job classes might also give rise to
different legal defenses at trial.

Based on this record the only thing the foremen and helpers have
in common is the complaint that QCI failed to pay  them overtime.
This is insufficient to establish that they were all the victims
of a single decision, policy or plan.  Otherwise, the similarly
situated limitation on FLSA collective actions would be rendered
meaningless.

Judge Smith finds that the fact that the Plaintiff previously
worked as a helper for Needham Communications for two months in -
- does not alter the analysis.  The Plaintiff's declaration makes
clear that he was a foreman, not a helper, when he transferred
over as an employee of QCI in January 2015.  Nor does it appear
that QCI itself employed any helpers prior to that time.

For these reasons, the Judge concludes that QCI helpers were not
similarly situated to the Plaintiff and other QCI foremen, and
should not be included in the conditional class.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's opposed motion for conditional certification is
granted in part and denied in part.  A separate order granting
the motion consistent with his opinion will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/tlOOd8 from Leagle.com.

Jeremy Ryan Card, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg M. Rosenberg --
info@rosenberglaw.com -- Rosenberg Sprovach.

Quality Cable Installers, LLC, Defendant, represented by William
J. Wisdom -- wisdom@mdhjwlaw.com -- Martin Disiere et al.


QUINCY BIOSCIENCE: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in "Racies"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Quincy Bioscience, LLC, filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Phillip Racies v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, Case
No. 4:15-cv-00292-HSG, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, Oakland.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 29, 2017, the
Hon. Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification and
      certifies the following class for both Plaintiff's UCL and
      CLRA claims:

      "all California consumers who, within the applicable
      statute of limitations period, purchased Prevagen Regular
      Strength, Prevagen Extra Strength, or Prevagen Mixed Berry
      Chewable"; and

   2. appointing Phillip Racies as Class representative and the
      law firms of Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C.,
      and Siprut, PC as Class Counsel.

The Court had set a case management conference for January 16,
2018, at 2:00 p.m.

The appellate case is captioned as Phillip Racies v. Quincy
Bioscience, LLC, Case No. 17-80259, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent PHILLIP RACIES, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Manfred P. Muecke, Esq.
          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6978
          E-mail: mmuecke@bffb.com
                  psyverson@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: eryan@bffb.com

               - and -

          Stewart M. Weltman, Esq.
          SIPRUT, PC
          17 North State Street, Suite 1600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 236-0000
          E-mail: sweltman@siprut.com

Defendant-Petitioner QUINCY BIOSCIENCE, LLC, a Wisconsin limited
liability company, is represented by:

          William P. Cole, Esq.
          Matthew R. Orr, Esq.
          Joshua G. Simon, Esq.
          CALL & JENSEN, APC
          610 Newport Center Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 717-3000
          Facsimile: (949) 717-3100
          E-mail: wcole@calljensen.com
                  moor@calljensen.com
                  jsimon@calljensen.com


REINS INT'L: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Kim" Labor Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge  Audrey B. Collins of the U.S. Court of Appeals of
California for the Second District, Division Fourth, affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the case, JUSTIN KIM, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. REINS INTERNATIONAL CALIFORNIA, INC., Defendant and
Respondent, Case No. B278642 (Cal. App.).

Kim was employed by Reins as a "training manager," a position
Reins classified as exempt from overtime requirements.  Kim sued
Reins in a putative class action, alleging that training managers
were salaried employees who worked between 50 and 70 hours per
week, and should not have been classified as managers because
they never performed any managerial tasks.

In his first amended complaint (the operative complaint for
purposes of appeal), Kim alleged causes of action for failure to
pay wages and overtime; failure to allow meal and rest periods;
failure to provide adequate wage statements pursuant to section
226, subdivision (a); waiting time penalties under section 203;
unfair competition under Business and Professions Code, section
17200 et seq. (section 17200); and civil penalties under the PAGA
pursuant to section 2699.

Kim signed an arbitration agreement when he began working for
Reins in 2013.  Based on this agreement, Reins moved to compel
arbitration of Kim's individual claims, dismiss the class claims,
and stay the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
("PAGA") cause of action until arbitration was complete.  The
trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, reserved
the issue of class arbitrability for the arbitrator, and stayed
litigation on the PAGA claim and the claim for injunctive relief
under section 17200.

While arbitration was pending, Reins served Kim with an offer to
compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998.  Kim
accepted the offer.  Pursuant to the parties' agreement, Kim
dismissed his individual claims with prejudice and dismissed the
class claims without prejudice, leaving only the PAGA cause of
action intact.  The court lifted the stay on the PAGA cause of
action and set a date for trial.

Reins filed a motion for summary adjudication of Kim's PAGA cause
of action.  It argued that because Kim had dismissed his
individual causes of action against Reins, he was no longer an
"aggrieved employee" under the PAGA and therefore could not
maintain the PAGA cause of action.  Kim opposed the motion,
asserting that he did not lose PAGA standing by settling his
individual claims against Reins.

The court granted the motion for summary adjudication, and then
granted Reins' oral motion to dismiss the case.  At the hearing,
as the court dismissed the case, it encouraged the parties to
appeal.  The court entered judgment in favor of Reins. Kim timely
appealed.  It entered judgment in favor of Reins.

Kim timely appealed.  Kim asserts that the court essentially
allowed Kim's arbitration agreement to waive his right to pursue
a PAGA claim by keeping Kim's claim stayed during the compelled
arbitration and then using Kim's settlement in arbitration as a
bar to his right to continue with his PAGA claim.

Judge Collins disagrees and concludes that Kim's lack of PAGA
standing is unrelated to the court's order to arbitrate the
individual claims.  Moreover, no findings were made by an
arbitrator.  Had Kim chosen to dismiss his individual claims with
prejudice in the absence of any arbitration agreement, the Judge
would reach the same conclusion.  Kim's acknowledgement that he
no longer has any viable Labor Code claims against Reins -- not
the order relating to arbitration -- is the fact that undermines
Kim's standing.  The effect of arbitration on PAGA standing is
not presented in the case, and the Judge does not decide any such
issue here.  Accordingly, the Judge affirmed the judgment.  Reins
is entitled to costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/SkCh6F from Leagle.com.

Kingsley & Kingsley, Eric B. Kingsley --
eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Ari J. Stiller --
ari@kingsleykingsley.com -- and Lyubov Lerner --
luba@kingsleykingsley.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Tim L. Johnson --
tim.johnson@ogletree.com -- Jesse C. Ferrantella --
jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- and Jonathan H. Liu --
jonathan.liu@ogletree.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


REPROS THERAPEUTICS: Neuterman Seeks to Block Allergan Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mark Neuterman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Repros Therapeutics Inc.,
Patrick Fourteau, Katherine A. Anderson, C.P.A., Daniel F. Cain,
Larry Dillaha, M.D., Nola E. Masterson, Saira Ramasastry and
Michael G. Wyllie, Ph.D., DSC, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-03918
(S.D. Tex., December 29, 2017), seeks to enjoin defendants and
all persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating or closing the acquisition of Repros by Allergan
PLC, and rescinding it in the event defendants consummate the
merger.  The Plaintiff further seeks rescissory damages, costs of
this action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's
attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further relief
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Allergan will commence a cash tender offer to acquire all of the
issued outstanding shares of Repros common stock for $0.67 per
share.

The complaint says the merger documents omitted material
information regarding Repros' financial projections as well as
projected free cash flows and the valuation analyses performed by
Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. Said disclosure of projected
financial information is material because it provides
stockholders with a basis to project the future financial
performance of a company, and allows stockholders to better
understand the financial analyses in support of its fairness
opinion, it adds.

Repros is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the development
of new drugs to treat hormonal and reproductive system disorders.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas E. Bilek, Esq.
      THE BILEK LAW FIRM, L.L.P.
      700 Louisiana, Suite 3950
      Houston, TX 77002
      Tel: (713) 227-7720

            - and -

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      Miles D. Schreiner, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
      New York, NY 10118
      Telephone: (212) 971-1341
      Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
             mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com


RICHMOND HOMES: All Claims in Homeowners' Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge James C. Mahan of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted in the
case, The SEASONS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Nevada
nonprofit corporation; and DOE HOMEOWNERS 1 through 1000,
Plaintiffs, v. RICHMOND HOMES OF NEVADA, INC., a foreign
corporation doing business in Nevada; RED ROCK MECHANICAL, LLC, a
Nevada company; ASPEN MANUFACTURING HOLDINGS, INC. fka ASPEN
MANUFACTURING, INC., a foreign corporation doing business in
Nevada; DOE INDIVIDUALS 1-200; and ROE BUSINESS or GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES 1-200, Defendants. AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS, Case No.
2:16-cv-01816-JCM-CWH (D. Nev.).

On July 30, 2016, Aspen filed its Petition for Removal to the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, which was joined
by Richmond American and Third-Party Defendant Red Rock on Aug.
15, 2016.  On Aug. 29, 2016, the Plaintiff filed its Motion to
Remand which the Court denied on Dec. 7, 2016.

In May 2017, the Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement
with Richmond American, Red Rock, and Third-Party Defendant NSI
Supply, Inc. requiring payment of $2,000,000 to resolve the
Plaintiff's claims against these settling parties, which is
contingent upon (i) this Court finding the Initial Settlement to
have been reached in good faith as contemplated by NRS 17.245;
(ii) dismissal of Aspen's claims against Richmond American, Red
Rock, and NSI; and (ii) entry of an order barring future claims
by the individual homeowners in the Seasons development.  The
Initial Settlement has no connection with or impact on NSI's
third-party claims against Aspen's insurers only.

Prior to removal of the action, NSI filed a cross-claim against,
among others, Aspen and Red Rock for implied indemnity,
contribution, declaratory relief, and apportionment.  It also
filed third-party complaint against, among others, Aspen, Red
Rock and several of Aspen's insurers for breach of contract based
on certain additional insured obligations.

On June 28, 2017, Richmond American, Red Rock, and NSI filed
their Joint Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement,
which seeks (i) a judicial finding the Initial Settlement to have
been reached in good faith pursuant to NRS 17.245; (ii) dismissal
of Aspen's claims against Richmond American, Red Rock, and NSI;
and (iii) an order barring all current and/or future claims for
contribution and equitable or implied indemnity as against
Richmond American, Red Rock, and NSI.

On June 28, 2017, the Plaintiff, Richmond American, Red Rock, and
NSI filed a Stipulation and Order Barring Settled Claims
Involving Separate Interest Property.  On June 29, 2017, Red Rock
filed its Motion to Deem Settlement Agreement Signed and an
Errata thereto.  On July 17, 2017, Richmond American filed its
Notice of Non-Opposition related to the Joint Motion.  On July
20, 2017, Red Rock filed its Notice of Non-Opposition related to
the Motion to Deem.

In July 2017, the Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement
with Aspen requiring payment of $500,000 to resolve the
Plaintiff's claims against Aspen, which is contingent upon (i)
the Court finding the Aspen Settlement to have been reached in
good faith as contemplated by NRS 17.245; (ii) a similar good-
faith finding of a settlement reached in a related matter styled
as Skypointe Unit Owners' Association v. Aspen Manufacturing
Holdings, Inc. fka Aspen Manufacturing, Inc., which is pending in
Department 30 of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State
of Nevada; and (iii) final court approval, pursuant to NRCP
23(e), of a class action settlement in a related matter styled as
In re: Aspen Series BB Evaporator Coil Litigation, Case No. A-14-
710463-D, which is pending in Department 16 of the Eighth
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada.

On Sept. 22, 2017, Aspen filed its Motion for Determination of
Good Faith Settlement, which seeks (i) a judicial finding the
Aspen Settlement to have been reached in good faith pursuant to
NRS 17.245; and (ii) an order barring all current and/or future
claims for contribution and equitable or implied indemnity as
against Aspen.

On Sept. 26, 2017, Richmond American filed its Limited Opposition
to the Aspen Motion, which does not oppose the substance of the
Aspen Motion and requests entry of orders granting the Joint
Motion, the Stipulation Barring Claims, and the Motion to Deem in
conjunction with an order granting the Aspen Motion.

At a hearing on Oct. 9, 2017, the Hon. Jerry Wiese granted
Aspen's motion seeking a good-faith finding pursuant to NRS
17.245 related to the settlement reached in the matter styled as
Skypointe Unit Owners' Association v. Aspen Manufacturing
Holdings, Inc. fka Aspen Manufacturing, Inc..

At a final fairness hearing on Nov. 1, 2017, the Hon. Timothy
Williams granted final approval of the class action settlement
reached in the matter styled as In re: Aspen Series BB Evaporator
Coil Litigation.

Richmond American, Red Rock, NSI, and Aspen have not yet tendered
their respective settlement payments to the Plaintiff.  They and
NSI and/or their insurers will fund their respective shares of
the settlement with the Plaintiff only after the Court enters
orders granting the pending motions.

The settling parties having obtained the orders in the In re:
Aspen and Skypointe matters, Aspen and/or its insurers will fund
the settlement reached with the Plaintiff in the matter only
after entry of orders granting its pending motion in the Seasons
action.  NSI has resolved its cross-claims and third-party claims
against all parties.

The parties have stipulated and agreed that the Court may grant
the Joint Motion, the Stipulation Barring Claims, the Motion to
Deem and the Aspen Motion.  Upon entry of orders granting the
foregoing motions and stipulation, all claims asserted in the
action, including, but not limited to, NSI's cross-claims and
third-party claims against Aspen, Red Rock, and Aspen's insurers,
as alleged in NSI's Third Party Complaint -- will be dismissed
with prejudice with each party to bear its own attorney's fees
and costs.

Based upon the stipulation, Judge Mahan dismissed with prejudice
all claims asserted in the action with each party to bear its own
attorney's fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/gfkr8D from Leagle.com

Seasons Homeowners Association Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Michael C. Rubino, Canepa Riedy & Rubino, Nathanael R. Rulis --
n.rulis@kempjones.com -- Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, Scott K.
Canepa, Canepa Riedy Abele & Costello, Terry W. Riedy, Canepa
Riedy Abele, J. Randall Jones -- r.jones@kempjones.com --
Harrison, Kemp & Jones, LLP & Michael J. Gayan --
m.gayan@kempjones.com -- Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP.

Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Janice M. Michaels -- jmichaels@wshblaw.com -- Wood Smith
Henning & Berman, Robin Marie Holseth, Wood Smith Henning &
Berman LLP, Stephen N. Rosen, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP &
Cassidy Roy Ellis -- cellis@wshblaw.com -- Wood Smith Henning &
Berman.

Aspen Manufacturing Holdings, Inc., formerly known as Aspen
Manufacturing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher J.
Curtis, Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush Eisinger, Philip
Goodhart -- png@thorndal.com -- Thorndal, Armstrong, Delk,
Balenbush & Eisinger & Sean D. Cooney -- sdc@thorndal.com --
Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger.

Red Rock Mechanical LLC, Defendant, represented by Kenneth
Michael Marias -- kenneth.marias@zurichna.com -- Cisneros &
Marias.

Middlesex Insurance Company, ThirdParty Defendant, represented by
Priscilla Louise O'Briant -- Priscilla.O'Briant@lewisbrisbois.com
-- Lewis Brisbois Bigaard & Smith, LLB.


SANTA CRUZ COUNTY BANK: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Bridges"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for the Sixth District
affirmed the superior court's judgment of dismissal of the case,
LYNN BRIDGES, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA CRUZ
COUNTY BANK, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. H043538 (Cal.
App.).

The Plaintiffs are 21 individuals who were among more than 150
investors in the GLR Growth Fund formed in 2003 by John Arnold
Geringer, Christopher Anthony Luck, and Keith Everts Rode.  On
June 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court
against those Individual Defendants and the Bank.  All four
Defendants were accused of conspiracy to commit fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty; the Bank was additionally charged with aiding
and abetting fraud, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,
and negligent misrepresentation.

The Plaintiffs had sued these Defendants two years earlier, in
federal court.  Their complaint in Bridges v. Geringer contained
the same causes of action except for breach of fiduciary duty
against all the Defendants, but it added a fifth cause of action
for violating section 12, subdivision (a)(2), of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Section 77l, subdivision (a)(2).  More
than 50 other investors also sued the Defendants in superior
court between February and May of 2015, in Strudley v. Santa Cruz
County Bank, et al.; Paetau v. Santa Cruz County Bank et al.; and
Panushka v. Santa Cruz County Bank, et al.

The Plaintiffs' federal lawsuit was dismissed upon the Bank's
motion because the only federal claim asserted, the violation of
section 12 (a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, was deficiently
pleaded.  The district court granted leave to amend the complaint
but declined to address the state law claims, citing lack of
jurisdiction.  When the Plaintiffs did not amend their complaint
by the June 5, 2015 deadline, the court entered judgment
dismissing the federal claim with prejudice and dismissing the
remaining claims without prejudice to the Plaintiffs' reasserting
those claims in a competent court.

The four civil actions in superior court were consolidated on
July 9, 2015, by stipulation of the parties.  On July 27, 2015,
the Bank demurred to the Bridges complaint.  On Oct. 26, 2015,
the court granted leave to amend in Strudley, Paetau, and
Panushka, and one week later those plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their cases so as to enable them to file in federal
court.

On April 19, 2016, after extensive written and oral argument
encompassing the issue of whether the Plaintiffs should be
granted leave to amend, the superior court sustained the Bank's
demurrer to the Bridges complaint without leave to amend on the
ground that plaintiffs' action was precluded by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), and ordered
that complaint dismissed with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs then
filed the timely appeal.  The Plaintiffs maintain that SLUSA is
inapplicable.

The Appellate Court agrees with the superior court that the
misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made by the Bank in
marketing the Fund call into play the preclusion provisions of
SLUSA.  Unquestionably, the Fund itself was not a covered
security.  However, in purchasing shares in the Fund, the
Plaintiffs relied on Maffia's representation that the investment
was safe because the Fund invested primarily in conservative U.S.
stocks and S&P 500 stocks.  The marketing materials themselves
represented that 75% of the Fund assets were invested in the S&P
100 (20%), the S&P 500 (20%), the NASDAQ (20%), and the Dow Jones
30 (15%).  Consequently, the Plaintiffs purchased shares in the
Fund intending and expecting that 75% of the Fund's assets would
be invested in covered securities.  By affirmatively recommending
and actively promoting the Fund as a "safe, conservative"
investment while knowing that the Fund was actually based on a
Ponzi scheme, the Bank, through Maffia, misrepresented this
"improper investment vehicle" and thus contributed to Plaintiffs'
losses.  These alleged facts bring the lawsuit within the scope
of SLUSA.

The Appellate Court's review of the complaint convinces it that
preclusion is applicable to the second and fourth causes of
action as well as those based on fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.  Following the Kingate analysis, it cannot
overlook the allegation in the second cause of action that
Maffia, representing the Bank, made material misrepresentations
to the Plaintiffs to induce them to purchase interests in the
Fund.  And in the fourth cause of action, the Plaintiffs alleged
that the Bank knew that Geringer, Luck, and Rode were breaching
their fiduciary duty, knew that the returns claimed by Geringer
were false, knew that the Fund was consistently losing money, and
knew that the Fund was an "improper investment vehicle."
Accordingly, the Court concludes that all of the Plaintiffs'
causes of action were precluded by the Act.

Finnaly, the Appellate Court agrees with the trial court that
demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend because
SLUSA precludes the Plaintiffs' state-law action.  The Plaintiffs
suggest no other amendment to the complaint that would take their
action outside the purview of SLUSA.  Their remaining argument
seeks only to plead, "with precision," that SLUSA does not apply
because the interests the Plaintiffs purchased in the Fund were
not "covered securities" within the meaning of the Act.  The
Appellate Court has already addressed this contention and
concluded otherwise, and the Plaintiffs do not propose to
dispense with their allegations of misrepresentation.

For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/7xOa9H from Leagle.com.


SCANA CORP: Consumers' Class Action Ongoing
-------------------------------------------
According to The Post and Courier's Brian Hicks, you have to
admire those chaps at SCANA -- they've got guts.

Or something.

In the past few months, we've learned that the poor, beleaguered
parent company of South Carolina Electric & Gas:

   -- Bilked customers out of nearly $2 billion to pay for
nuclear plants they couldn't build.
   -- Paid executives millions in bonuses for not doing their
jobs.
   -- And wined and dined the Public Service Commission so they
could keep raising electric rates while frittering away our money
on a project they planned to shut down.

Mere mortals would shrivel in shame over such a scandal.  But not
SCANA.  Even in the face of utter humiliation, they can still
muster the energy to be condescending.

On Jan. 9, an attorney for the power company told Circuit Judge
John Hayes III that he and other state jurists "lack the
expertise" to hear complaints against SCANA.

The attorney has a point.  After all, the state's utility
companies didn't take any judges kayaking or biking in the
California mountains, or treat them to a fun day at Sea World San
Diego.

And, so far as we know, not one judge has ever played a round of
golf in Florida on SCANA's dime.  Or stayed in a Holiday Inn
Express.

That's obviously the sort of expertise SCANA is talking about.

Roughing the rate-passer
The occasion for this snubbing of the judiciary was a hearing on
one of the five class-action lawsuits filed by SCE&G customers.

Who are, you know, kinda mad that SCANA forced them to finance a
project that they then failed to build.  And want us to keep
paying off for the next 60 years.

But SCE&G said this lawsuit did not belong in a piddly little
state court, where such charges might be tainted by an ugly,
highly technical, legal term.  Such as "fraud."

"Let this play out in front of the Public Service Commission,"
SCE&G attorney James Becker told the judge.

He meant no disrespect, surely.  He was simply pointing out the
Public Service Commission understands these issues so well.
Those seven commissioners, who make $100,000 each, are highly
skilled individuals with the technical knowledge required to
understand the plight of a poor, multi-billion dollar utility
company.

After all, our Public Service Commissioners have impressive
backgrounds in trucking, the dramatic arts, local politics,
selling insurance and high school sports officiating.

That kind of real-world experience, and the calculators on their
iPhones, allow them to study complicated requests for a 7 percent
increase in electric rates and rule that, instead, the company
can only raise rates . . . let's see . . . 3.5 percent.

Public Service Commissioners no doubt learned that at one of the
80 conferences they attended on some utility's dime in the past
five years, as Post and Courier reporter Andrew Brown documented.

Unfortunately, none of those conferences included a plenary
session entitled "How to file an ethics report."

Limited time offer?
Obviously, as SCANA points out, these frivolous class-action
suits don't belong in a state court of law.

They should totally be judged by SCANA's friends.

Come to think of it, those pesky plaintiffs' attorneys need not
be involved, either.

Daniel Haltiwanger, one of the lawyers for SCE&G ratepayers, had
the audacity to suggest that the utility's customers should get
their money back.

As if.

Clearly, he doesn't understand how modern capitalism works.  A
company, even a monopoly, must be guaranteed quarterly dividends
for stockholders or it just simply isn't fair.

It doesn't matter how inept they are at their jobs, or that they
were the secret authors of legislation that allowed a company --
say, SCE&G -- to charge all their bills to customers.

They must turn a profit to keep investors fat and happy . . . and
pay those exorbitant room rates at the Ritz Carlton Lake Oconee.

Basically, SCANA is arguing that the utility's well-being matters
far more than a mere 700,000 customers who've been fleeced for a
few thousand dollars.  Each. Why, that's barely enough for a
board of directors meeting at Ruth's Chris.

Judge Hayes politely took SCANA's argument under advisement, and
surely he will ultimately rule in their favor.

But he'd better hurry.  The General Assembly reconvened on
Jan. 9, and some lawmakers actually want to fire all those
experts at the Public Service Commission.  Something about
failure to disclose legalized bribes . . .

You know what that means?

SCANA's gonna need some new friends.  [GN]


SEATIDE GOURMET: "Gonzalez" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Angel Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Seatide Gourmet, Inc. dba Seatide Gourmet Fish
Market, and Paul Oliver, Case No. 1:18-cv-00111 (E.D. N.Y.,
January 8, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages for overtime work
and liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Angel Gonzalez was employed by Defendants as prep cook
from June 2004 to September 2017.

Defendants owned and operated a fish restaurant in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Samuel, Esq.
      SAMUEL & STEIN
      38 West 32nd St., Suite 1110
      New York, NY 10001
      Tel: (212) 563-9884
      E-mail: michael@samuelandstein.com


SIX FLAGS: Littler Mendelson Attorneys Discuss BIPA Case Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kwabena A. Appenteng, Esq. -- kappenteng@littler.com -- and
Philip L. Gordon, Esq. -- pgordon@littler.com -- of Littler
Mendelson PC, in an article for Lexology, wrote that since mid-
September 2017, more than 50 employers that use "biometric
timeclocks" in Illinois have been targeted with class action
lawsuits alleging violations of the state's Biometric Information
Privacy Act ("BIPA").  A unanimous ruling issued on December 21,
2017, by the Illinois Appellate Court, could reduce the flood to
a trickle.  The case holds that to state a claim under BIPA, a
plaintiff must allege more than a mere failure to comply with
BIPA's requirements to provide notice and obtain consent before
collecting biometric data.

The Illinois Appellate Court's ruling follows the Second
Circuit's recent decision affirming the dismissal of a BIPA class
action lawsuit for lack of standing to sue in federal court
because the plaintiff alleged only technical violations of BIPA's
notice and consent provisions without any attendant harm.  The
Illinois Appellate Court's decision is even more momentous for
employers because it provides a substantive defense that has the
potential for defeating BIPA class actions whether filed in
federal or state court.

Key Facts

The allegations asserted by the lead plaintiff in Six Flags
mirrored those being alleged against employers that have
implemented biometric timeclocks. Specifically, the plaintiff
alleged:

   -- Six Flags scanned his thumbprint for security purposes
using a biometric scanner.
   -- Before scanning his thumbprint, Six Flags did not provide
the plaintiff with a written disclosure that stated the purpose
of the collection and provided a destruction schedule.
   -- Before his thumbprint was scanned, Six Flags did not ask
him to sign a written release authorizing the collection and
disclosure of his biometric information.

Notably, the plaintiff in Six Flags was a minor who bought a
season pass to the amusement park while unaccompanied by a parent
and, therefore, arguably is a type of plaintiff who is even more
worthy of protection than an employee.

Six Flags responded to these allegations by moving to dismiss the
plaintiff's BIPA claims.  In its motion, Six Flags argued that
the plaintiff was not an "aggrieved" person--a requirement for
recovering actual or liquidated damages under BIPA's remedy
provision.  The lower court denied the company's motion and
certified an interlocutory appeal.

Issues Certified for Appeal

On appeal, the court addressed whether a plaintiff is "aggrieved"
under BIPA "when the only injury he or she alleges is a . . .
private entity collected his or her biometric identifiers and/or
biometric information without providing him or her the
disclosures and obtaining written consent . . ."

The Court Defines "Aggrieved" Under BIPA

The Appellate Court's ruling centered on the definition of the
term "aggrieved" as used in Section 20 (the remedy section) of
BIPA.  Because BIPA itself provides no definition, the court
looked to the plain meaning of the term "aggrieved."  The court
held that, by its plain language, "aggrieved" requires "an actual
injury, adverse effect, or harm in order for the person to be
aggrieved."  That a plaintiff does not receive notice or provide
consent before the collection of his or her biometric data,
standing alone, is insufficient to meet this standard.

The court supported this interpretation of the Act by
highlighting decisions by two other courts in comparable cases.
First, the court cited the decision of the Northern District of
Illinois federal court in McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.  In
McCollough, the court dismissed a BIPA class action filed against
the owner/operator of electronic storage lockers that used
fingerprint entry.  The plaintiff in McCollough alleged the same
"technical violations" of BIPA's notice and consent provisions as
did the plaintiff in Six Flags.  The McCollough court held the
plaintiff did not meet the dictionary definition of an
"aggrieved" party because she had not alleged any facts to show
that her pecuniary or other interests had been adversely affected
by the defendant's alleged violation of BIPA.

Second, the Illinois court cited a Wisconsin Appeals Court
decision involving an interpretation of the term "aggrieved"
person in the context of a Wisconsin statute that requires
mortgage brokers to provide a disclosure statement to consumers
before they enter into a mortgage broker agreement.  The
Wisconsin court ruled that a plaintiff who merely alleged a
defendant had failed to provide the statutorily required
disclosure form, without a showing of some actual injury or harm,
was not an "aggrieved party" under the Wisconsin Act.

Based on these decisions and the plain meaning of the term
"aggrieved," the Illinois Appellate Court concluded:

if the Illinois legislature intended to allow for a private cause
of action for every technical violation of the Act, it could have
omitted the word "aggrieved" and stated that every violation was
actionable  . . . Therefore, a plaintiff who alleges only a
technical violation of the statute without alleging some injury
or adverse effect is not an aggrieved person under section 20 of
the Act.7

Conclusion

The Illinois Appellate Court's decision provides much-needed
clarity on a gray area in BIPA that the plaintiffs' class action
bar has sought to exploit; namely, whether the mere "technical
violation" of failing to comply with the Act's notice and consent
provisions can serve as the basis for recovering, per employee,
liquidated damages of $1,000 for negligent violations and $5,000
for intentional or reckless violations.  The court's holding that
in order to have a right of action under BIPA a person must
allege an "injury, adverse effect, or harm" that stems from the
allegedly improper collection or storage of their biometric data
under the Act resolves that issue, and provides employers with a
basis to dismiss a BIPA claim that does not allege a cognizable
injury.  Because employers likely will see plaintiffs' class
action counsel attempt to "plead around" this holding with
"creative" allegations of a cognizable injury, they should
continue to obtain informed consent from employees in Illinois
before collecting their biometric data. [GN]


SMITHKLINE BEECHAM: 3d Cir. Won't Enforce Settlement vs. La. AG
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: FLONASE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. Smithkline
Beecham Corporation, d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline; n/k/a GlaxoSmithKline
LLC, including GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, Appellant, Case Nos. 16-
1124, 16-3019 (3d Cir.), Judge Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's orders denying GSK's motion to enforce the settlement
agreement against the Louisiana Attorney General, and GSK's
motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order.

On July 14, 2008, private indirect purchasers of Flonase, a
brand-name prescription drug, sued GSK in the U.S District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  They alleged that: (i)
GSK had filed sham citizen petitions with the Food and Drug
Administration to delay the introduction of a generic version of
Flonase; and (ii) this delay forced the private indirect
purchasers to pay more for Flonase than they would have if the
generic version were available.  The private indirect purchasers
sued on behalf of themselves and a class of other indirect
purchasers.  For the purpose of the case at bar, two motions
matter.

First, in the primary suit, the private indirect purchasers moved
for final approval of settlement on April 1, 2013, after the
District Court had certified the class, and had approved of the
notice to settlement class members.  The requested court order
"permanently enjoined" all members of the settlement class,
including Louisiana, from bringing released claims against GSK,
even in Louisiana's state court.  The proposed settlement
agreement, among other things, provided compensation to the
Plaintiffs and the class members, released the Plaintiffs' and
the class members' claims, reserved exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction over the Settlement and the Settlement Agreement for
the District Court, and gave GSK the power to enforce the
settlement.  On June 19, 2013, the District Court approved the
final settlement.

Second, in the ancillary suit, GSK filed a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement against the Louisiana Attorney General
because, according to GSK, Louisiana violated the settlement
agreement.  On Dec. 21, 2015, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied the request and dismissed the
case.  It then held that Louisiana's receipt of the CAFA Notice
is insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the State was
aware that it was a class member and voluntarily chose to have
its claims resolved by the Settlement Agreement.

Shortly before the District Court decided GSK's motion to enjoin
Louisiana's state court action, GSK moved pursuant to Rule
60(b)(2) for Relief from a Judgment or Order because of newly
discovered evidence that a third party had allegedly submitted a
settlement claim on behalf of Louisiana.  On May 31, 2016, the
District Court denied this motion.  GSK appealed the December 21
and May 31 orders.

Judge Greenaway holds that the Eleventh Amendment applies to the
primary suit.  In Missouri v. Fiske, the Supreme Court found that
the Eleventh Amendment applied to a motion to enjoin a state from
suing in its own court.  The Supreme Court came to this
conclusion because the Eleventh Amendment covers claims that seek
equitable remedies and because the private party's motion to
enjoin the State from suing in its own court qualified as a suit
that sought an equitable remedy.  Like the private parties in
Fiske, the private parties here sought an equitable remedy
against a State.  Second, the private parties sought equitable
relief in different types of motions.

Another court of appeals has come to a similar conclusion, albeit
in a slightly different situation.  In Thomas v. FAG Bearings
Corp., the Eighth Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment bars
involuntary joinder of a state because involuntary joinder will
compel the state to act by forcing it to prosecute a private
party at a time and place dictated by the federal courts.  These
same concerns motivate Judge Greenaway's decision.

The Judge distinguishes these Supreme Court and sister circuit
cases from the case at bar because none of the private parties in
the cases cited by GSK sought legal or equitable remedies against
the State.  Indeed they sought a writ of jurisdiction that acts
only on the record, a removal notice that was not "dissimilar"
from a writ of jurisdiction, a transfer motion that does not
involve any claim or counterclaim against the State, an in rem
admiralty action where the possession of the sovereign was not
invaded under process of the Court, and an in rem bankruptcy
determination not seeking to recover property in the State's
hands.  As a result, he concludes that the Eleventh Amendment
applies here.

Judge Greeaway also holds that the Eleventh Amendment prevented
the District Court from issuing an injunction against Louisiana
because Louisiana did not waive its sovereign immunity by
receiving a CAFA notice and by failing to oppose the settlement
based on that notice.  The Constitution requires more protections
for States than for ordinary litigants not because of their
sophistication but because of their status as sovereigns.
Analogizing states to private parties and comparing their
respective sophistication ignores this justification.  As a
result, he finds that Louisiana did not waive its sovereign
immunity when it received a CAFA notice and failed to act.

The Judge further holds that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying GSK's Rule 60(b) motion.  It came to this
conclusion because GSK did not draw on the Court's power to
recover the discovered information and because GSK did not show
that it could not have received this information with a court
order.  GSK has not cited a case to support its position that
reasonable diligence requires less than a court order.  As a
result, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.

For these reasons, Judge Greeaway concludes that the Eleventh
Amendment applies to the settlement agreement and the instant
enforcement action.  GSK may not avoid the Eleventh Amendment's
prohibition.  Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying GSK's Rule 60(b) Motion.  Accordingly, the
Judge affirmed the District Court's orders.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/C7qlYI from Leagle.com.

Lisa S. Blatt -- lisa.blatt@apks.com -- [ARGUED], R. Stanton
Jones -- stanton.jones@apks.com -- Sarah M. Harris --
sarahm81@gmail.com -- Robert Leider -- robert.leider@apks.com --
Sally L. Pei -- sally.pei@apks.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP, 601
Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20001, Stephen J.
Kastenberg -- kastenberg@ballardspahr.com -- Burt M. Rublin --
rublin@ballardspahr.com -- Jessica M. Anthony --
anthonyj@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr LLP, 1735 Market St.,
51st Fl., Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellant.

Richard A. Samp, Mark S. Chenoweth, Washington Legal Foundation,
2009 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, Counsel for
Amicus Appellants National, Association of Manufacturers and
Washington, Legal Foundation.

William S. Consovoy -- will@consovoymccarthy.com -- Thomas R.
McCarthy -- tom@consovoymccarthy.com -- Carmeron T. Norris,
Consovoy McCarthy Park, 3033 Wilson Blvd, Suite 700, Arlington,
VA 22201, Kate Comerford Todd, Steven P. Lehotsky, Janet Galeria,
U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, 1615 H Street, NW, Washington, DC
20062, Counsel for Amicus Appellant Chamber of, Commerce of the
United States of America.

Cary Silverman -- csilverman@shb.com -- Shook Hardy & Bacon, 1155
F Street, NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20004. H. Sherman Joyce,
Lauren Sheets Jarrell, American Tort Reform Association, 1101
Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 400, Washington, DC 20036, Counsel for
Amicus Appellant American Tort, Reform Association.

Bart D. Cohen -- bcohen@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group PC,
570 Lexington Ave., 19th Floor, New York, NY 10022, John Alden
Meade [ARGUED], Young Cotter & Meade, 909 Poydras St., Suite
1600, New Orleans, LA 70112, Counsel for Appellee.


SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON: Sued Over Los Angeles-Area Wildfires
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Burnson and Mark Chediak, writing for Bloomberg News,
report that Edison International's Southern California Edison was
blamed in a lawsuit for three wildfires that destroyed more than
1,000 buildings and killed a firefighter last month in the Los
Angeles area.

While no official findings about the cause of the fires in Los
Angeles, Santa Barbara and Ventura counties have been announced,
six people who suffered property losses amid hundreds of
thousands of acres that were scorched claim the blazes were
ignited by sparks from the utility's power lines or electrical
infrastructure.

"The fires were not an 'Act of God' but were caused by the
intentional, negligent and wrongful conduct of SCE and other
defendants," according to the class-action complaint filed in
state court in Los Angeles.

Among the claims in the suit is one under the California law of
inverse condemnation that could hold the company responsible for
damages, even if it isn't found negligent.  PG&E Corp. is
fighting similar claims in more than 100 suits filed by property
owners and others affected by fires in Northern California's wine
country that burned more than 245,000 acres in October.

"Southern California Edison is unable to comment on pending
lawsuits due to the Cal Fire investigation now underway," the
company said in a statement.

After a $6 Billion Wipeout, Wildfires Still Imperil PG&E

Edison International fell as much as 1.5 percent on Jan. 9, the
most since Dec. 28.  The company's shares have dropped 21 percent
since the outbreak of the Thomas fire in Southern California amid
investor concerns that the utility-owner may be liable for
damages tied to the blaze.  Last month, Edison said it believed
its power equipment is being probed as a possible cause of the
Thomas fire.

The case is Vitullo v. Southern California Edison, B688977,
California Superior Court, Los Angeles County. [GN]


SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Wages, "Caudle" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA CAUDLE and KRYSTLE WHITE, as individuals and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. SPRINT/UNITED
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Kansas corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
the Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-06874-KAW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
2017), seeks to recover unpaid wages and penalties under the
California Business & Professions Code, Labor Code, and the
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order.

According to the complaint, Joshua Caudle was employed by
Defendants from October 2014 until July 2017. Caudle first worked
at Defendants' Pittsburg, California retail store location as an
Assistant Store Manager from October 2014 until September 2015.
In approximately September 2015, Caudle was transferred to
Defendants' Novato, California retail store location, and in
approximately December 2015, he was promoted to Store Manager of
the Novato retail store location. In November 2016, Plaintiff was
transferred to Defendants' Pleasant Hill, California retail store
location, where he worked as Store Manager until the end of his
employment.

The Plaintiff Krystle White was employed by Defendants from 2013
until May 2017 as a Lead Retail Consultant. White initially
worked at Defendants' Pittsburg, California retail store
location, and transferred to Defendants' Pleasant Hill,
California retail store location in November 2016.

As retail employees of Defendants, Plaintiffs' compensation was
based partially on commission payments that they earned based on
Sprint service plans, cell phones, phone accessories, and other
products and services sold to customers. Plaintiffs' commissions
were generally calculated on a monthly basis, with their earned
commissions generally ascertained, calculated and paid out by the
last day of the following month. For example, Caudle was provided
a "Compensation Statement" reflecting his earned commissions for
August 2016 on September 21, 2016, to pay out on September 30,
2016.

From August 2016 through March 2017, Defendants instituted a
modification to retail store employees' commissions' structure,
called the "Sprint Promoter Score Adjustment." A Sprint Promoter
Score, or SPS, was calculated for each retail store location
based on the results of customer surveys, conducted by a third-
party company, that customers were given the option of completing
after their interaction with the store.

As a result of Defendants' unlawful deductions from wages, and
Defendants' resultant failure to pay all earned wages, Defendants
failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate itemized wage
statements and also failed to pay all wages owed to Plaintiffs
upon their separation of employment from Defendants.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          Tuvia Korobkin, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          2274 East Maple Avenue
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292 2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292 2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com
                  tkorobkin@haineslawgroup.com


STEAK N SHAKE: Court Certifies Class of Missouri Managers
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SANDRA DRAKE and RANDY SMITH, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STEAK N
SHAKE OPERATIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:14-cv-01535-JAR
(E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 23 Certification and (ii) denied the
Defendant's Motion for Decertification of the Conditionally
Certified FLSA Collective.

The Plaintiffs are 46 current and former salaried managers at
Steak-N-Shake ("SnS").  They filed a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, alleging that SnS failed to properly
pay them overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and the Missouri law.  SnS maintains that the
Plaintiffs are exempt from overtime protection because their
primary job duties are executive or administrative.

On Dec. 17, 2015, the Court granted the parties' joint
stipulation of conditional certification of a putative class of
the Plaintiffs.  The parties conducted limited discovery on the
issue of certification.

On May 30, 2017, the Plaintiffs moved to formally certify a class
of all persons who worked as SnS Managers at all corporate owned
retail restaurants located in the State of Missouri at any time
from Sept. 8, 2012 to the present.  The same day, the Defendant
moved to decertify the conditional FLSA class.

SnS argues that the Plaintiffs are not similarly situated with
respect to the key issues underlying their claims, the
experiences of one Plaintiff is not representative of any other
and, as such, the claims of the group cannot be adjudicated
without inquiring into each individual's particular
circumstances.

Judge Ross will deny SnS's Motion to Decertify the FLSA
Collective Action.  He says the case is about whether the
Plaintiffs qualify as exempt executive or administrative
employees.  To be sure, the answer to that question turns on the
individual employment experiences of each Plaintiff, but the
Plaintiffs' deposition testimony makes clear that those
experiences are substantially similar in the most important ways:
how the Plaintiffs spend the majority of their time at work;
whether and to what extent they exercise management
responsibilities; the amount of independence in their day-to-day
job performance; and their participation in executive and
administrative processes.

The Judge concludes that to the extent there are differences in
the Plaintiffs' individual employment experiences, those
differences are outweighed by the common questions of law and
fact regarding SnS Managers' classification as exempt employees.
The claim turns almost entirely on a single legal question that
may be adequately tested by representative testimony.  He will
therefore grant the Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 23 certification.

Accordingly, Judge Ross granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Rule
23 Certification and denied the Defendant's Motion for
Certification of the Conditionally Certified FLSA Collective.
Within 30 days of the date of the Memorandum and Order, the
parties will file a joint proposed schedule for the remainder of
the litigation, including a proposed trial date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Memorandum and
Order is available at https://is.gd/azxPpC from Leagle.com.

Sandra Drake & Randy Smith, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated,, Plaintiffs, represented by Brendan J.
Donelon -- brendan@donelonpc.com -- DONELON, P.C. & Daniel W.
Craig -- dan@donelonpc.com -- DONELON, P.C..

Steak N. Shake Operations, Inc., an Indiana Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Andrew Cahill Johnson --
anjohnson@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., Michael A.
Moffatt -- mmoffatt@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. &
Patricia J. Martin -- pmartin@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C..


SUGAR TRANSPORT: Court Denies Certification of Truck Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Proceeding as a Collective Action under the FLSA and
for Class Certification in the case captioned RYAN GUINN, an
individual, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SUGAR TRANSPORT OF THE
NORTHWEST, INC., a California Corporation, et al., Defendants,
CIV. No. 2:16-325 WBS EFB (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff was employed by Sugar Transport as a truck driver.
Sugar Transport contracted with Bronco and Classic to provide
hiring, training, supervising and disciplining of all drivers.
Approximately 40 Sugar Transport drivers were assigned to the
Bronco contract at a given time.  Over the course of the proposed
class period, Sugar Transport employed approximately 55 drivers.

Plaintiff filed a putative class and collective action
specifically alleging that Sugar Transport had (1) failed to pay
overtime wages in violation of the FLSA; (2) failed to timely pay
wages in violation of California Labor Code Section 204; (3)
failed to timely pay wages due at termination in violation of
California Labor Code Sections 201 and 203; (4) failed to provide
meal and rest periods in violation of California Labor Code
Section 512; (5) and engaged in unlawful and unfair business
practices in violation of Business and Professions Code Section
17200.

The Court held that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the similarly
situated requirement and his Motion to Proceed as a FLSA
Collective Action must therefore be denied with regard to all
defendants.

Plaintiff seeks to certify two different classes related to his
state law claims.  First, plaintiff requests certification of a
class for his overtime claims (overtime class) consisting of:

     All persons employed by SUGAR TRANSPORT OF THE NORTHWEST,
and jointly employed by BRONCO WINE COMPANY and CLASSIC WINES OF
CALIFORNIA, as a driver, or any other job title the principal job
functions of which are the same as those performed by its
drivers, in California, and who worked more than forty hours
during at least one workweek at any time on and after October 23,
2011.

Plaintiff also seeks certification of a class for his meal and
rest break claims (the meal and rest period class) consisting of:

     All persons employed by SUGAR TRANSPORT OF THE NORTHWEST,
and jointly employed by BRONCO WINE COMPANY and CLASSIC WINES OF
CALIFORNIA as a driver, or any other job title the principal job
functions of which are the same as those performed by its
drivers, in California, at any time on and after October 23,
2011.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires the proposed class to be so numerous that
joinder of all of the class members would be impracticable.
Numerosity is presumed where the plaintiff class contains forty
or more members. Plaintiff's proposed class includes 55
individuals.  Accordingly, plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity
requirement.

Commonality

Plaintiff contends that common questions of law and fact exist
with regard to whether defendants failed to provide meal breaks
and rest periods for the drivers, failed to provide them with
overtime pay, and whether these practices are unlawful under
California law and constitute violations of California's Labor
Code and the UCL. Plaintiff's claims, as pled, share a common
question of law whether any of the practices defendants are
alleged to have engaged in constitute violations of California
law and at least some of the facts to be analyzed with respect to
this question are the same.

The court can resolve this central question once for all class
members, and thus plaintiff has met the commonality requirement.

Typicality

The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) requires that
plaintiff have claims reasonably coextensive with those of
proposed class members.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not provide him and the
proposed class with the requisite overtime pay or sufficient
breaks during their shifts. Even if plaintiff and members of the
class did not suffer the same damages from the alleged
violations, they, according to plaintiff, suffered the same
injuries.
Because plaintiff has demonstrated that he possesses the same
interests and suffers the same injury as the class members, he
has satisfied the typicality requirement.

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representative will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Plaintiff's counsel are experienced attorneys who have knowledge
of class actions and of wage and hour and employment-related
claims.  The court finds no reason to doubt that plaintiff's
counsel are qualified to conduct this litigation and will
vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of class members.

The court finds that plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel are
adequate representatives of the class, and therefore that
plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements set forth in Rule
23(a).

Rule 23(b)

Plaintiff seeks to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires that questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members, and a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Predominance

The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.

The Meal and Rest Period Class

Plaintiff must do more than show that a meal break was not taken
to establish a violation. Instead, he must show that defendants
impeded, discouraged, or prohibited drivers from taking a proper
break. Although plaintiff argues that Sugar Transport's delivery
schedules impeded the ability of drivers to take meal and rest
breaks, the evidence indicates that in fact the drivers
themselves had discretion to decide when and if to take such a
break. In order for plaintiff to establish otherwise, the court
would need to analyze each particular driver and determine
whether or not, and why, he missed breaks.

With regard to plaintiff's meal and rest claims, plaintiff has
not satisfied the predominance component and therefore cannot
comply with Rule 23(b).

The Wage Class

Plaintiff's wage claim, which he brings under both the FLSA--as
discussed above in reference to the collective action--and the
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, centers around
whether the drivers were exempt from overtime pay.

Plaintiff borrows from the provisions of the FLSA to bring a
state claim under Section 17200.  Thus, plaintiff is essentially
attempting to certify two separate actions based on the FLSA: (1)
a collective action based on allegations that Sugar Transport
failed to pay the drivers overtime, and (2) a Rule 23 class
action based upon the same alleged violations.

Determining whether the drivers were exempt from the FLSA
overtime requirement would entail an individualized analysis and
determination as to which of the drivers, if any, engaged in
interstate transportation.

Therefore, for the same reason that plaintiff did not satisfy the
similarly situated requirement necessary to maintain a FLSA
collective action, he has also failed to demonstrate that common
issues would predominate over individual questions with regard to
his state law overtime claim as well.

Plaintiff's Motion for Proceeding as a Collective Action under
the FLSA and for Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 be, and the same is, denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 20, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybvdyf7p
from Leagle.com..

Ryan Guinn, an individual, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Ian A. Kass, Pagano & Kass APC, 96 North Third Street, Suite 525.
San Jose, California 95112

Ryan Guinn, an individual, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
James L. Pagano, Pagano & Kass APC, 96 North Third Street, Suite
525. San Jose, California 95112

Sugar Transport of the Northwest, Inc., a California corporation,
Defendant, represented by Cassandra M. Ferrannini --
cferrannini@downeybrand.com -- Downey Brand LLP & Alexandra K.
LaFountain -- alafountain@downeybrand.com -- Downey Brand LLP.
Bronco Wine Company, a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric J. Sousa, Rodarakis & Sousa, APC & Brandy
Barnes, Rodarakis & Sousa, APC, 100 Sycamore Ave Ste 101.
Modesto, CA95354-0577.

Classic Wines of California, a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric J. Sousa, Rodarakis & Sousa, APC & Brandy
Barnes, Rodarakis & Sousa, APC.


SUNRISE CREDIT: Liberato Sues over Debt Collection
--------------------------------------------------
MANUEL P. LIBERATO, on behalf of himself and those similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. SUNRISE CREDIT SERVICES, INC., and
JOHN DOES 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-12294-ES-MAH
(D.N.J., Nov. 30, 2017), seeks to recover damages arises from
Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is not in the business
of extending credit, selling goods or services to consumers.
Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect past-due and
defaulted debts of natural persons allegedly owed to others which
were incurred primarily for personal, family or household
purposes. When attempting to collect debts, Defendant uses the
mails, telephone, the internet and other instruments of
interstate commerce.

SCS is a collection agency. The Defendant has asserted that
Plaintiff incurred or owed a certain financial obligation to AT&T
Mobility. The Debt is alleged to arise from one or more
transactions which were primarily for Plaintiff's personal,
family, or household purposes. The debts alleged to be owed by
Plaintiff and those similarly situated were incurred for
personal, family or household purposes. Defendant contends that
the Account was past-due and in default. The Account was past due
and in default at the time it was placed with or assigned to SCS
for collection.

In an attempt to collect the debt, SCS mailed collection letters
to Plaintiff on December 1, 2016. Plaintiff received and reviewed
the SCS Letter. The SCS Letter was sent in attempt to collect the
Debt. The SCS Letter is a mass-produced, computer-generated, form
letter that is prepared by the Defendant and mailed to consumers
in the State of New Jersey, such as Plaintiff, from whom they are
attempting to collect a debt. The SCS Letter threatens "Our
client has now asked us to report this debt to your personal
credit report with a national credit bureau."

The SCS Letter further threatens "We will be reporting this debt
to one or more of the national credit bureaus on or about 12-11-
16. This process can be stopped if you act promptly." Contrary to
the statement contained in the SCS Letter, at no time did
Defendant report the Debt to a credit reporting agency.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and those similarly
situated:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Avenue 2nd Floor
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telepgone & Facsimile: (201) 273 7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com


SYNEOS HEALTH: Jan. 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong on Jan. 10 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of
investors who purchased Syneos Health, Inc. (formerly INC
Research Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ:INCR) securities between May 10,
2017 and November 9, 2017.

Click here to learn about the case:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-sb/inc-research-holdings-inc?wire=3
There is no cost or obligation to you.

According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, the
Company issued materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) the merger with inVentiv Health,
Inc. ("inVentiv") was not providing the benefit that defendants
stated it would; (2) inVentiv was underperforming; (3) in turn,
INCR's 2017 financial performance would be negatively impacted;
and (4) as a result, defendants' statements about INCR'S
business, operations, and prospects, were false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you suffered a loss in INCR you have until January 30, 2018 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve
as a lead plaintiff. To obtain additional information, contact
Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com by telephone
at 212.425.1140, or visit
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-sb/inc-research-holdings-inc?wire=3

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has
represented investors in securities litigations involving
financial fraud and violations of shareholder rights. [GN]


TDS TELECOM: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Carroll" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge S. Thomas Anderson of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee, Eastern Division, denied the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case, MARTHA CARROLL,
individually, and also on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. TDS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, TDS
TELECOM SERVICE CORPORATION, and TENNESSEE TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01127-STA-egb (W.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiff filed her original Complaint for Monetary Damages
and Injunctive Relief against TDS Telecommunications Corp. and
TDS Telecom Service, LLC on Dec. 14, 2015 in the Circuit Court of
Perry County, Tennessee.  On Feb. 8, 2016, the Plaintiff amended
her Complaint to include Tennessee Telephone Co. as a Defendant.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
on March 31, 2016.  The Plaintiff then moved to amend her Amended
Complaint on April 3, 2017.  The parties consented to granting
the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and denying the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.

The Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint on June 9, 2017.
The Plaintiff claims that the quality of internet service she
received could not be called high speed under the nature of the
parties' agreement or any meaning of the phrase.  Her SAC brings
claims of breach of contract, violations of the Wisconsin
Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("WDTPA"), fraud, unjust
enrichment, civil conspiracy, injunctive relief, and punitive
damages.  Her claims center around what is essentially an
accusation of false advertising regarding the Defendants'
provision of "High-Speed Internet."

The Plaintiff signed up for the Turbo Internet plan and paid
between $120 and $150 per month for TDS' internet and telephone
package, which is a rate commensurate with the cost of a joint
package containing high-speed internet service.  But TDS has not
provided Plaintiff with the high speed internet as advertised.
TDS representatives admitted to the Plaintiff or her family that
infrastructure and other problems prevented TDS from ever being
able to actually provide the high-speed internet that TDS
advertised and for which the Plaintiff had paid.

The Defendants filed their Notice of Removal on June 29, 2017.
They then filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint on July 27, 2017.  They maintain that the Plaintiff has
failed to state any claim for which relief may be granted.  The
Plaintiff filed her Response on Aug. 24, 2017, to which
Defendants filed their Reply on Sept. 7, 2017.

Judge Anderson finds that the Plaintiff has stated a claim for
breach of contract and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
inappropriate.  But, he says, nothing prevents the Defendants
from raising their argument that the Plaintiff cannot show that
they failed to perform at another stage of the litigation.

The Judge agrees with the Plaintiff that she has met the
heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) which requires that a
party alleging a claim sounding in fraud plead the elements of
the fraud with particularity.  He finds that the Plaintiff has
alleged, among other things, the advertised ranges for each high-
speed internet plan and then went into further details about the
advertisements for the Turbo Internet plan that she purchased,
specifically quoting websites it held up as accessible through
use of the Turbo Internet plan; and these advertisements were
ongoing for a period of time after the Defendants knew that they
could not support the infrastructure needed to comply with the
claims made in the advertisements since 2013.  While the
allegations would be stronger with the exact dates that the
Plaintiff read these statements and then relied on them to enter
into a contract with Defendants, the Judge finds that these
allegations are sufficient to put the Defendant on notice of the
particular statements she refers to.

Judge Anderson also finds that common law fraud requires no
allegations that were not required to support the Plaintiff's
WDTPA claim.  Therefore, he comes to the same conclusion: the
Plaintiff states a claim for fraud even under the higher standard
of Rule 9(b).

For the unjust enrichment claim, the Judge finds it premature to
dismiss the claim at this stage.  The Court has not yet concluded
that a contract exists.  And even if the parties agree that the
contract exists,  they disagree on the exact nature of the terms
and, as such, the contract may or may not encompass the
Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment.

For the civil conspiracy claim, the Judge will not apply a
doctrine of Tennessee law in a manner that the Tennessee courts
have not yet applied it in order to dismiss a claim.  He
concludes that the Plaintiff has carried her burden at this stage
of the litigation.  Finding no merit in the Defendants'
arguments, he concludes that dismissal of the Plaintiff's civil
conspiracy claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper.

Finally, for injunctive relief and punitive damages claims, Judge
Anderson finds that while the Plaintiff captions each demand as a
"Count" of her Second Amended Complaint, he does not believe she
intended to pursue either injunctive relief or punitive damages
as separate claims but as remedies for the other claims.  As
such, he will not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing either
remedy at this stage of the litigation.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Anderson has found that the
Defendant's arguments are without merit at this stage of the
litigation.  Accordingly, he denied the instant Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/c5S15q from Leagle.com.

Martha Carroll, Plaintiff, represented by Malcolm Brown Futhey,
III -- malcolm@futheylawfirm.com -- THE FUTHEY LAW FIRM PLC.

TDS Telecommunications Corporation, TDS Telecom Service
Corporation & Tennessee Telephone Company, Defendants,
represented by Eric S. Mattson -- EMATTSON@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY &
AUSTIN, pro hac vice, Lisa Erin Schwartz -- LSCHWARTZ@SIDLEY.COM
-- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, pro hac vice & Robert Dale Grimes --
dgrimes@bassberry.com -- BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC.


TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Feller"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Transamerica Life Insurance Company filed a sealed
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Gordon Feller,
et al. v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co., Case No. 2:16-cv-
01378-CAS-AJW, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 15, 2017, the
Hon. Christina A. Snyder has taken under submission these
motions:

   -- Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction;

   -- Plaintiff's motion for provisional class certification,
      appointment of class representative, appointment of class
      counsel, and issuance of class notice; and

   -- Plaintiff's motion for class certification, appointment of
      class representatives, and appointment of class counsel.

The appellate case is captioned as Gordon Feller, et al. v.
Transamerica Life Insurance Co., Case No. 17-80257, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents GORDON FELLER, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; MARY FELLER, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated; ERIC SCHNECK, as trustee for
the Burton I. Schneck Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust dated
2/24/1997, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated; ANDREW KRIEGMAN, as trustee for the Adrienne L. Hendler
Revocable Trust dated 6/4/1993, the Elizabeth Kriegman Revocable
Trust dated 6/8/1993, and the Patricia Sokolow Revocable Trust
dated 6/4/1993; GERALD R. LYONS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated; DONNA M. WHITE, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated; CLARENCE E. WHITE, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated; and GAIL THOMPSON,
individually and as Power of Attorney for Lois Thompson, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          Samuel M. Ward, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          600 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0800
          Facsimile: (619) 230-1874
          E-mail: sbasser@barrack.com
                  sward@barrack.com

               - and -

          Travis Murray Corby, I, Esq.
          SHERNOFF BIDART ECHEVERRIA, LLP
          3101 N Canon Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 246-0503
          E-mail: tcorby@shernoff.com

               - and -

          William M. Shernoff, Esq.
          SHERNOFF BIDART ECHEVERRIA, LLP
          600 S. Indian Hill Blvd.
          Claremont, CA 91711-5498
          Telephone: (909) 621-4935
          Facsimile: (909) 447-2043
          E-mail: wshernoff@shernoff.com

               - and -

          Allison Hughes Goddard, Esq.
          James Richard Patterson, Esq.
          PATTERSON LAW GROUP, APC
          402 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 398-4762
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: ali@pattersonlawgroup.com
                  jim@pattersonlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Harvey Rosenfield, Esq.
          CONSUMER WATCHDOG
          2701 Ocean Park Blvd.
          Santa Monica, CA 90405
          Telephone: (310) 392-0522
          Facsimile: (310) 392-8874
          E-mail: harvey@consumerwatchdog.org

Defendant-Petitioner TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY is
represented by:

          Dan Marmalefsky, Esq.
          Nancy R. Thomas, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
          Telephone: (213) 892-5809
          Facsimile: (213) 892-5454
          E-mail: dmarmalefsky@mofo.com
                  nthomas@mofo.com

               - and -

          James Sigel, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
          425 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2482
          Telephone: (202) 887-6948
          E-mail: jsigel@mofo.com

               - and -

          Joseph R. Palmore, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
          2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 887-1500
          E-mail: jpalmore@mofo.com


UNITED STATES: Prelim Injunction in Detainees' Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary
injunction requiring that the Defendants provide detainees with
mats and blankets after 12 hours in the case, JANE DOE, # 1; JANE
DOE, # 2; NORLAN FLORES, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v.
JOHN F. KELLY, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland
Security; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Commissioner, United States
Customs and Border Protection; RONALD VITIELLO, Chief, United
States Border Patrol; JEFFREY SELF, Commander, Arizona Joint
Field Command; PAUL BEESON, Chief Patrol Agent-Tucson Sector,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Case Nos. 17-15381, 17-
15383 (9th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs filed the action in the U.S. District Court for
Arizona on behalf of detainees confined in U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Facilities within the Tucson Sector of the U.S.
Border Patrol.  When a Border Patrol agent apprehends an
individual, the person is taken to one of eight stations in the
Tucson Sector.  At the station, the Border Patrol processes the
detainee, ascertaining the individual's identity and immigration
and criminal history.  The individual is then repatriated,
transferred into the custody of another agency, referred for
prosecution in accordance with the law or, in rare circumstances,
released.

The Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions in the stations were
deplorable and that it took up to three days for individuals to
be processed before transfer.  They alleged that the detainees
are packed into overcrowded and filthy holding cells, stripped of
outer layers of clothing, and forced to endure brutally cold
temperatures.  They are denied beds, bedding, and sleep. They are
deprived of basic sanitation and hygiene items like soap,
sufficient toilet paper, sanitary napkins, diapers, and showers.
And they are forced to go without adequate food, water, medicine,
and medical care.

In the fall of 2016, the district court certified the case as a
class action.  The Plaintiffs then sought a preliminary
injunction.  The district court accepted for purposes of the
preliminary injunction that the Border Patrol's 2008 Hold Rooms
and Short Term Custody Policy and the National Standards on
Transport, Escort, Detention and Search ("TEDS standards")
provided for constitutional conditions of confinement.  Although
the Defendants assert that these guidelines establish the status
quo, the district court found that the Plaintiffs had presented
persuasive evidence that the basic human needs of detainees were
not being met by the Defendants' current practices.

The district court ordered that (i) the clean bedding, which the
Defendants assert they are providing to all detainees, must
include a mat and a Mylar blanket for all detainees being held
longer than 12 hours; (ii) the personal hygiene needs of
detainees held longer than 12 hours include the need to wash or
clean themselves; and (iv) the Defendants will implement the
universal use of their Medical Screening Form at all stations and
ensure that the form questions reflect the TEDS requirements for
delivery of medical care to detainees.

The Defendants sought reconsideration and modification of the
preliminary injunction which the district court denied on Jan. 3,
2017.  The district court did clarify its order.  It explained
that: (i) for detainees held more than 12 hours, the Defendants
must provide bedding, including mats and Mylar blankets and some
means to maintain personal hygiene; (ii) it did not order the
Defendants to provide showers; and (iii) the 12-hours begins to
run from when the detainee arrives at the station.

The Defendants appeal alleging that the district court
misapprehended the standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, and
that the order was too rigid and burdensome.  The Plaintiffs also
appeal, alleging that the district court should have ordered the
Defendants to provide the detainees with beds and mattresses,
allow them access to showers, and deliver adequate medical care
through medical professionals.

Judge Callahan finds that the litigation arises out of the influx
of detainees in the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol in
2015.  He holds that the district court carefully considered the
Plaintiffs' allegations of constitutional violations, recognized
the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Bell, 441 U.S. 520,
and issued a limited preliminary injunction requiring the
Defendants to provide detainees with mats and blankets after 12
hours.  The Defendants have failed to show that, in doing so, the
district court misapprehended Bell or that the preliminary
injunction is overly rigid or burdensome.

The Judge also finds unpersuasive the Plaintiffs' assertions that
the district court should have required the Defendants to provide
detainees with beds, showers, and medical treatment provided by
medical professionals.  The Plaintiffs have not shown that the
district court's determinations were illogical, implausible, or
without support in inferences that may be drawn from the record.
The district court recognized the unique mission of the Border
Patrol and, at least for the purposes of a preliminary
injunction, reasonably balanced the government's interests and
the detainees' constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Judge Callahan affirmed the district court's orders.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/IwwDVe from Leagle.com.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Fcy6zU from Leagle.com.

James R. Sigel -- jsigel@mofo.com -- (argued), Robert J. Esposito
-- resposito@mofo.com -- and Elizabeth G. Balassone --
ebalassone@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco,
California; Deanne E. Maynard -- dmaynard@mofo.com -- Sophia M.
Brill -- sbrill@mofo.com -- Bryan J. Leitch -- bleitch@mofo.com -
- and Lena H. Hughes, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.;
Louise C. Stoupe -- lstoupe@mofo.com -- and Pieter S. de Ganon --
deganon@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Tokyo, Japan;
Colette Rainer Mayer -- crmayer@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Palo Alto, California; Linton Joaquin, Karen C. Tumlin, and
Nora A. Preciado, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles,
California; Kathleen E. Brody  Daniel J. Pochoda, and Brenda
Munoz Furnish, ACLU Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona;
James J. Cekola, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Diego, California;
Mary A. Kenney, Melissa E. Crow, and Aaron Reichlin-Melnick,
American Immigration Council, Washington, D.C.; Elisa Della-Piana
and Megan Sallomi, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San
Francisco Bay Area, San Francisco, California; Abigail L.
Colella, Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, New York; for
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Christina Parascandola (argued), Trial Attorney; Sarah B. Fabia ,
Senior Litigation Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director; Chad A.
Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division;
Office of Immigration Litigation, District Court Section, United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.


UNITED STATES: Prelim Injunction in Hawai'i Suit Partly Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and vacated in part the district court's preliminary injunction
order in the case captioned STATE OF HAWAII; ISMAIL ELSHIKH; JOHN
DOES, 1 & 2; MUSLIM ASSOCIATION OF HAWAII, INC., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as
President of the United States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; REX W.
TILLERSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 17-17168 (9th
Cir.).

On Jan. 27, 2017, one week after his inauguration, Pres. Donald
J. Trump signed an Executive Order entitled "Protecting the
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States."  EO-
1 took effect immediately and was challenged in several venues
shortly after it was issued.  On Feb. 3, 2017, a federal district
court in the State of Washington enjoined the enforcement of EO-
1.  The Government filed an emergency motion seeking a stay of
the injunction, which the Appellate Court denied.  The Government
later voluntarily dismissed its appeal of the EO-1 injunction.

On March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13,780
("EO-2"), which was given the same title as EO-1 and was set to
take effect on March 16, 2017.  EO-2 directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to conduct a global review to determine whether
foreign governments were providing adequate information about
their nationals seeking entry into the United States.

During this global review, EO-2 imposed a 90-day suspension on
the entry of certain foreign nationals from six Muslim-majority
countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.  That
90-day suspension was challenged in multiple courts and was
preliminarily enjoined by federal district courts in Hawai'i and
Maryland.  Those injunctions were affirmed by the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, respectively.  The Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari in both cases and left the injunctions in place
pending its review, except as to foreign nationals who lacked a
credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or
entity in the United States.

On Sept. 24, 2017, the President issued the Proclamation, which
indefinitely suspends immigration by nationals of seven countries
and imposes restrictions on the issuance of certain nonimmigrant
visas for nationals of eight countries.  The entry restrictions
were immediately effective for foreign nationals who (i) were
subject to EO-2's restrictions, and (ii) lack a credible claim of
a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United
States.

On Oct. 10, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in IRAP v. Trump as moot.  On Oct. 24, 2017, it vacated
the Appellate Court's opinion in Hawai'i I on the same grounds.
In vacating the Appellate Court's prior decision as moot, the
Supreme Court explicitly noted that it expressed no view on the
merits of the case.

On Oct. 10, 2017, the Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint
to include allegations related to the Proclamation.  The third
amended complaint includes statutory claims for violations of the
INA, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as constitutional claims
for violations of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantees of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

The Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order;
after expedited briefing, the district court granted the motion
on October 17, 2017.  Relying on the Appellate Court's now-
vacated opinion in Hawai'i I, the district court found that the
Proclamation suffered from the same deficiencies as EO-2.  At the
parties' request, the district court converted the temporary
restraining order into a preliminary injunction on Oct. 20, 2017,
rendering it an appealable order.

The Government timely appealed.  During the pendency of this
appeal, the Appellate Court partially stayed the district court's
preliminary injunction except as to foreign nationals who have a
credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or
entity in the United States.  On Dec. 4, 2017, the Supreme Court
granted the Government's request for a complete stay pending
review of the district court's preliminary injunction.

Now, for the third time, the Appellate Court is called upon to
assess the legality of the President's efforts to bar over 150
million nationals of six Muslim-majority countries from entering
the United States or being issued immigrant visas that they would
ordinarily be qualified to receive.  To do so, it must consider
the statutory and constitutional limits of the President's power
to curtail entry of foreign nationals in this appeal of the
district court's order preliminarily enjoining portions of
Section 2 of Proclamation 9645 entitled "Enhancing Vetting
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the
United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats"
("Proclamation").

The Court explains that the Proclamation, like its predecessor
executive orders, relies on the premise that the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") vested the President with broad powers to
regulate the entry of aliens.  Those powers, however, are not
without limit.  It concludes that the President's issuance of the
Proclamation once again exceeds the scope of his delegated
authority.  The Government's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. Section
1182(f) not only upends the carefully crafted immigration scheme
Congress has embodied in the INA, but it deviates from the text
of the statute, legislative history, and prior executive practice
as well.

Further, the Appellate Court says the President did not satisfy
the critical prerequisite Congress attached to his suspension
authority: Before blocking entry, he must first make a legally
sufficient finding that the entry of the specified individuals
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.  The
Proclamation once again conflicts with the INA's prohibition on
nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant
visas.  Lastly, the President is without a separate source of
constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation.

On these statutory bases, the Appellate Court affirmed the
district court's order enjoining enforcement of the
Proclamation's Sections 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (g), and (h).  It
limited the scope of the preliminary injunction, however, to
foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person
or entity in the United States.

The Court narrowed the scope of the injunction to give relief
only to those with a credible bona fide relationship with the
United States, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump.  In light of the Supreme
Court's order staying this injunction pending disposition of the
Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is
sought, it stayed its decision today pending Supreme Court
review.  Because it concludes that the Plaintiffs have shown a
likelihood of success on their statutory claims, the Appellate
Court needs not reach their constitutional claims.

The opinion disposition filed on Dec. 22, 2017, is withdrawn and
a new opinion disposition is filed concurrently with the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/DGyu3Y from Leagle.com.

Hashim M. Mooppan (argued), Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
Sharon Swingle, H. Thomas Byron III, and Lowell V. Sturgill Jr.,
Appellate Staff; Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney
General; Jeffrey B. Wall and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitors
General; Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General; Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
Defendants-Appellants.

Mitchell P. Reich -- mitchell.reich@hoganlovells.com -- (argued),
Neal Kumar Katyal -- neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com -- (argued),
Colleen Roh Sinzdak -- colleen.sinzdak@hoganlovells.com --
Elizabeth Hagerty -- elizabeth.hagerty@hoganlovells.com -- Yuri
S. Fuchs -- yuri.fuchs@hoganlovells.com -- Sundeep Iyer, and
Reedy C. Swanson, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Thomas
P. Schmidt -- thomas.schmidt@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US
LLP, New York, New York; Sara Solow --
sara.solow@hoganlovells.com -- and Alexander B. Bowerman --
alexander.bowerman@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Deirdre Marie-Iha, Donna H. Kalama,
Kimberly T. Guidry, Robert T. Nakatsuji, Kaliko Onalani D.
Fernandes, and Kevin M. Richardson, Deputy Attorneys General;
Clyde J. Wadsworth, Solicitor General; Douglas S. Chin, Attorney
General; Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawaii;
for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General; Barbara D. Underwood,
Solicitor General; Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor General;
Zainab A. Chaudhry, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel;
Office of the Attorney General, New York, New York; Lisa Madigan,
Attorney General; David L. Franklin, Solicitor General; Office of
the Attorney General, Chicago, Illinois; Xavier Becerra, Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California;
George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
Hartford, Connecticut; Matthew P. Denn, Attorney General,
Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; Thomas J.
Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Des
Moines, Iowa; Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Augusta, Maine; Brian E. Frosh, Attorney
General, Attorney General's Office, Baltimore, Maryland; Maura
Healey, Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Boston,
Massachusetts; Hector Balderas, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Salem, Oregon;
Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General, Providence, Rhode Island; Thomas J. Donovan Jr.,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Montpelier,
Vermont; Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia; Robert W. Ferguson,
Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Seattle,
Washington; Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae States of
New York, Illinois, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the
District of Columbia.

Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General; J. Campbell Barker, Deputy
Solicitor General; Ari Cuenin, Assistant Solicitor General; Ken
Paxton, Attorney General; Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant
Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Austin, Texas;
for Amici Curiae States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and West Virginia.

Richard D. Bernstein -- rbernstein@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae T.A., a U.S.
Resident of Yemeni Descent.

Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C., as and for Amicus Curiae Roderick
& Solange MacArthur Justice Center.

Nicole G. Berner, Deborah L. Smith, and Leo Gertner, Service
Employees International Union, Washington, D.C.; Judith Rivlin,
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Washington, D.C.; David J. Strom , American Federation of
Teachers, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.; Jody Calemine,
Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C.; Niraj R.
Ganatra and Ava Barbour; International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural. Implement Workers of America;
Detroit, Michigan; Mario MartĀ°nez, MartĀ°nez Aguilasocho & Lynch
APLC, Bakersfield, California; Nicholas Clark, United Food and
Commercial Workers, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae
International Labor Organizations.

Lynne Bernabei and Alan R. Kabat, Bernabei & Kabat PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Civil Rights Organizations.

Aaron X. Fellmeth, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona
State University, Phoenix, Arizona; Joseph M. McMillan --
JMcMillan@perkinscoie.com -- and Michelle L. Maley --
MMaley@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, Washington;
for Amici Curiae International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental
Organizations.

Benjamin G. Schatz, Amy Briggs -- abriggs@manatt.com -- John W.
McGuinness -- jmcguinness@manatt.com -- Sirena Castillo --
scastillo@manatt.com -- Matthew Bottomly -- mbottomly@manatt.com
-- Olufunmilayo Showole -- oshowole@manatt.com -- Ketakee Kane --
kkane@manatt.com -- and Eve Torres -- eltorres@manatt.com --
Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici
Curiae Muslim Justice League, Muslim Public Affairs Council, and
Council of American-Islamic Relations California.

Marc A. Hearron -- mhearron@mofo.com -- Sophia M. Brill --
sbrill@mofo.com -- and Sandeep N. Nandivada --
snandivada@mofo.com --  Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington,
D.C.; Jennifer K. Brown -- own@mofo.com -- and Amanda Aikman --
ikman@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, New York;
Purvi G. Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Los
Angeles, California; for Amici Curiae Interfaith Group of
Religious and Interreligious Organizations and Clergy Members.

Fatma Marouf, Fort Worth, Texas; Sabrineh Ardalan --
sardalan@law.harvard.edu -- Philip L. Torrey --
ptorrey@law.harvard.edu -- Nathan MacKenzie, Dalia Deak, Niku
Jafarnia, and Rachel Kroll, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Geoffrey
Hoffman, Houston, Texas; Karla McKanders, Nashville, Tennessee;
for Amici Curiae Immigration Law Scholars on Statutory Claims.


US STEEL CORP: Athan Files Suit to Recover Wages, Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------
David Athan, Daryl Jackson, Corey Parker and Robert Flannery, on
behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated,
known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v. United States Steel Corp., a
foreign profit corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-14220,
(E.D. Mich., December 29, 2017), seeks to recover benefits owed,
minimum and overtime wages, redress for failure to maintain
accurate records, liquidated damages equal to the total amount of
delayed compensation over the past three years, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Athan, Jackson, Parker and Flannery were employed as a
maintenance millwright mechanic, stove tender, operating
technician and mill-right at US Steel's Great Lakes Works
facility in Ecorse. They claim that their hours where shaved off
as Defendants allegedly do not maintain time-keeping facilities
and do not issue wage statements.

US Steel is a major steel producer with an electrogalvanizing
plant at 3000 Miller Road, Dearborn, MI 48120. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Bryan Yaldou, Esq.
     Leah Seliger, Esq.
     Omar Badr, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICES OF BRYAN YALDOU, PLLC
     23000 Telegraph, Suite 5
     Brownstown, MI 48134
     Phone: (734) 692-9200
     Fax: (734) 692-9201
     E-mail: Bryan@yaldoulaw.com


USAA GENERAL: 2 Suits over Medical Reimbursements Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lawsuits against USAA Casualty Insurance Company and USAA General
Indemnity Company have been consolidated.

The cases are:

     -- Gregory Haskin Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., a/a/o Jeffrey
        Rabin, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
        situated, the Plaintiffs, v. USAA Casualty Insurance
        Company, the Defendant, Case No. 0:17-cv-61979-KMW, (S.D.
        Fla., October 6, 2017); and

     -- Gregory Haskin Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., a/a/o Delmar
        Melton, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
        situated, the Plaintiff, v. USAA General Indemnity
        Company, the Defendant, Case No. 0:17-cv-61980-DPG, (S.D.
        Fla., October 7, 2017)

Judge William P. Dimitrouleas on Jan. 5, 2018, held that the two
cases 0:17-cv-61979-WPD and 0:17-cv-61980-WPD (kpe) are
associated.  Judge Dimitrouleas entered an order consolidating
the cases and granted an unopposed motion to extend joint
scheduling report deadline, and the time to respond to the
complaint.

In the suit against USAA General, Plaintiff cites the Defendant's
failure to pay the proper amount of reimbursements to the
Plaintiff and to all similarly situated persons for certain
medical services provided to the Defendant's insureds. Plaintiff
Delmar Melton states that he was involved in a motor vehicle
accident, and as a result, sustained bodily injuries related to
the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. As a
consequence, Plaintiff Delmar Melton was a contracting party
and/or a named insured and/or an omnibus insured under an
automobile insurance policy issued by USAA Indemnity, which
policy was in full force and effect and provided Personal Injury
Protection ("PIP") benefits coverage as required by Florida law.
Plaintiff Delmar Melton, as a result of the injuries sustained,
he sought and received reasonable, related, and necessary medical
services from Haskin Chiropractic. Haskin Chiropractic as the
assignee of Melton's PIP benefits, billed USAA Indemnity for
medical services provided. However, the subject payments were
improperly reduced. Thus, the plaintiff on behalf for himself and
all others similarly situated seeks the determination that the
Defendant engaged in an improper uniform business practice of
reducing by two percent (2%) its payments of all claims submitted
by Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons medical
services provided and billed under CPT codes 98940, 98941 and
98942, in violation of the Defendant's insurance policies and the
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.

USAA Indemnity sold automobile insurance coverage subject to the
"Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law" or the "PIP Statute".[BN]

In the case against USAA Casualty Insurance Company, the
Defendant, Case No. 0:17-cv-61979-KMW, (S.D. Fla., October 6,
2017), Plaintiff Jeffrey Rabin was a patient at Haskin
Chiropractic, who is and/or was an insured under an automobile
insurance policy providing personal injury protection ("PIP")
benefits issued by the Defendant, USAA Casualty, and who assigned
his rights and benefits of said automobile insurance policy to
Haskin Chiropractic. On or about December 12, 2012, the Plaintiff
Rabin was involved in a motor vehicle accident, and as a result,
sustained bodily injuries related to the operation, maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle. The Plaintiff as a result of the
injuries sustained, sought and received reasonable, related, and
necessary medical services from Haskin Chiropractic. The
Defendant made payments pursuant to the allowable rates
prescribed and consisted with its insurance policy and Florida
Statute Section 627.736.  However, the subject payments were
improperly reduced payments in direct violation of Defendant's
insurance policy and Florida Statute Section 627.736. Thus, the
Plaintiff for himself and all others similarly situated persons,
seeks the court for an award of damages representing full payment
of their PIP benefits as required under Sec. 627.736, including
prejudgment interest and interest on all benefits that were not
timely paid.[BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Tod Aronovitz, Esq.
     Barbara Perez, Esq.
     ARONOVITZ LAW
     2 South Biscayne Boulevard
     One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3700
     Miami, FL 33131
     Telephone: 305-372-2772
     Facsimile: 305-397-1886
     Email: ta@aronovitzlaw.com
     Email: bp@aronovitzlaw.com

          - and -

     Theophilos Poulopoulos, Esq.
     SCHILLER, KESSLER & GOMEZ, PLC
     7501 W. Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 201
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33319
     Telephone: 954-933-3000
     Facsimile: 954-667-5805
     Email: theo@injuredinflorida.com


WATERSTONE MORTGAGE: $7.3MM Arbitration Award Confirmed
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAMELA HERRINGTON, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. WATERSTONE
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 11-cv-779-bbc (W.D.
Wis.), Judge Barbara B. Crabb of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin (i) granted in part and denied in
part Herrington's motion to enforce judgment of the arbitration
award, and Waterstone's motion to vacate arbitration award or, in
the alternative, to modify the award; (ii) denied the Defendant's
motion to stay; and (iii) denied the Plaintiff's motion for
sanctions.

Herrington filed the proposed class action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and state law, alleging that the Defendant
failed to pay its loan officers for overtime work.  Shortly
thereafter, the Defendant moved to dismiss or stay the action on
the ground that the Plaintiff's claims were subject to
arbitration.  In an order dated March 16, 2012, Judge Crabb
concluded that the Plaintiff's claims would have to be resolved
through arbitration under an agreement between the parties, but
that the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") gave the Plaintiff
the right to join other employees in her case.  She closed the
case administratively to allow the parties to proceed with
arbitration.

The Plaintiff commenced arbitration on March 23, 2012.  George
Pratt, a former judge for the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, was chosen as arbitrator.  Arbitrator Pratt issued an
order determining that the arbitration could proceed as a
collective action.  Ultimately, 174 class members opted into the
arbitration.

While arbitration was pending, Judge Crabb denied several motions
by the Defendant seeking review of the arbitrator's decisions and
of the Court's initial order regarding arbitration.  The
arbitrator issued several interim orders relating to liability
and held a hearing in two parts on Oct. 17, 19-21, 2016, and Dec.
20-21, 2016.

On July 5, 2017, the arbitrator issued a final decision, holding
that the Defendant was liable under the FLSA for unpaid minimum
wages and overtime and attorney fees and costs, but not liable
under Wisconsin statutory or contract law.  Arbitrator Pratt
ordered that defendant owed $7,267,919 in damages, $3,318,851 in
attorney fees and costs and an incentive fee in the sum of
$20,000 to be paid to named Plaintiff Herrington.

Now before the Court are several motions relating to the
arbitrator's final award.  The Plaintiff has moved for
confirmation of the award under 9 U.S.C. Section 9, while the
Defendant has moved to vacate or modify the award.  The Plaintiff
has moved for sanctions against the Defendant, arguing that the
Defendant's objections to confirmation of the award are
frivolous.  Finally, the Defendant has moved to stay any action
relating to the award until the U.S. Supreme Court reaches a
decision in the consolidated cases of Ernst & Young, LLP v.
Morris; Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis; and National Labor Relations
Board v. Murphy Oil USA ("Morris"), in which the Court is
considering whether class and collective action waivers in
arbitration agreements violate the NLRA.

As an initial matter, the parties agree that the final award
contains a mathematical error relating to the $20,000 incentive
fee for named plaintiff Herrington.  In particular, on page 2 of
the final award, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $3,318,851 in
attorney fees, costs and incentive fees against defendant.
However, on the next page, the arbitrator stated that plaintiff
was entitled to $3,318,851 in attorney fees and costs, plus an
additional $20,000 in incentive fees.  Both parties agree that
page 3 contains a mathematical error and that the total amount of
attorney fees, costs and incentive fees owed plaintiff is
$3,318,851.  Therefore, Judge Crabb will modify the final award
accordingly.

The Plaintiff contends that the remainder of the final award
should be confirmed, as there is no valid reason to vacate the
award under 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a)(1)-(4).  For its part,
Defendant argues that the award should be vacated for two
reasons: (i) Arbitrator Pratt was biased against the Defendant;
and (ii) Arbitrator Pratt committed misconduct by sleeping during
portions of the hearing.

The Judge finds that neither of the Defendant's arguments is
persuasive.  Nothing about these alleged stray comments
demonstrates bias against the Defendant.  Rather, they suggest
simply that the arbitrator was interested in this case and
enjoyed arbitrating it.  Such comments are not a basis for
vacating an arbitration award.  In addition, the Defendant has
identified no basis for vacating the arbitration award, with the
exception of the mathematical error discussed.  Accordingly, the
Judge will confirm the award with modification of the amount owed
in attorneys' fees.

Finally, Judge Crabb will deny the Plaintiff's move for sanctions
against the Defendant, arguing that it should be sanctioned
because all of its arguments against confirmation of the award
were frivolous.  The Judge agrees with the Plaintiff that the
Defendant appears to have delayed this litigation far longer than
necessary and continues to do so.  However, his arguments
opposing confirmation of the award were not wholly frivolous,
although they were not persuasive.  Accordingly, she will decline
to issue sanctions against the Defendant for seeking to vacate
the award.

For these reasons, Judge Crabb granted in part and denied in part
both Herrington's motion to enforce judgment of the arbitration
award, and the Defendant's motion to vacate arbitration award or,
in the alternative, to modify the award.  She confirmed the July
5, 2017 arbitration award, with a single modification to the
amount of attorney fees, costs and incentive fees as follows: The
Defendant must pay the Plaintiff $3,298,851 in attorney fees and
costs, and a $20,000 incentive fee to Plaintiff Herrington.  The
Plaintiff is entitled to post-award interest at the rate set
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1961(a).  The Judge denied both the
Defendant's motion to stay and the Plaintiff's motion for
sanctions.

The Judge entered judgment in favor of Herrington against the
Defendant confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
$7,267,919 in damages, $3,298,851 in attorney fees and costs, and
a $20,000 incentive fee together with post-award interest rate
set at 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 (a).

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/6e4Ofr from Leagle.com.

Pamela Herrington, individually and behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Dan Getman, Getman
& Sweeney, PLLC & Matthew Dunn , Getman & Sweeney, PLLC.

Waterstone Mortgage Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jesse
Ferrantella -- jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins, Timothy Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins & Spencer Skeen -- spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins.


WILLOWICK, OH: Denial of Judgment Bid in "Abramezyk" Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RONALD ABRAMEZYK, et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. THE CITY OF WILLOWICK, Defendant-Appellant, Case
No. 2017-L-060 (Ohio App.), Judge Cynthia WestCottt Rice of the
Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eleventh District, Lake County,
affirmed the  trial court judgment denying the city's motion for
judgment on the pleadings on the Appellees' negligence claims.

On July 14, 2015, the Appellees, who are 148 homeowners and/or
residents of Willowick, filed a complaint against the city
asserting, as pertinent to the appeal, claims of negligence.  The
city owns, operates, and maintains a sanitary sewer system that
provides sewer services to its residents. On July 20, 2013, the
city's sewer system backed up into hundreds of homes in
Willowick, including the Appellees' homes, causing them to be
flooded with raw sewage, bacteria-tainted water, feces, urine,
dirt, debris, and noxious odors.

In the past several years prior to the July 20, 2013 sewer system
backup, the city's residents experienced a number of such
backups.  The Appellees alleged in their complaint that,
throughout 2011, city representatives continued to note concerns
regarding the condition and maintenance of the city's sanitary
sewer lines.

The Appellees alleged that, as a result of the city's failure to
maintain and repair the sewer system, the system backed up into
their homes on July 20, 2013.  They alleged the city had a duty
to maintain and repair its sewer system, and that the city's
breach of that duty resulted in damage to their homes and
personal property and personal injury, for which the city is
liable in negligence.

The city filed an answer, denying the material allegations of the
complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses, including
that the Appellees' complaint was barred by political subdivision
immunity, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744.  Two weeks later, the
city filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(C), arguing that the Appellees' claims were barred by
subdivision immunity.  In their brief in opposition, the
Appellees argued that maintenance and repair of a sewer system is
a "proprietary" function, which is an exception to the city's
immunity.

The trial court designated the case to be "complex litigation"
due to, in part, the extent of the discovery necessary to prepare
the case for trial.  The trial court entered a six-page, highly-
detailed judgment denying the city's motion.

The city appeals the trial court's judgment, asserting that the
trial court improperly denied it immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744
and judgment on the pleadings.

Judge Rice finds that it is undisputed that the city of Willowick
is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F).  Thus,
under the first tier of the analysis, the city is entitled to
general immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).

Under the second tier, the exception to subdivision immunity for
the negligent performance of a proprietary function under R.C.
2744.02(B), the Judge finds that the Appellees alleged sufficient
facts to support their claims and to defeat the city's immunity
defense.  The city ignores the Appellees' allegations that city
officials remained concerned about the condition and maintenance
of the sewer lines throughout 2011 and that, despite these
ongoing concerns, the city failed to repair the sewers, resulting
in the 2013 backup.

Finally, under the third tier of the immunity analysis, the
restoration of discretionary immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2),
Judge Rice finds that since the case involves the maintenance and
repair of sewers, which, per R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d), is a
proprietary function, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to
restore immunity to the city.

The Judge therefore holds the trial court did not err in denying
the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings and in finding
that the city was not entitled to political subdivision immunity
on the Appellees' negligence claims.  Accordingly, the assignment
of error is overruled.  Judge Rice affirmed the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Bhv0Bk from Leagle.com.

Phillip A. Ciano -- pac@c-g-law.com -- and Andrew S. Goldwasser -
- asg@c-g-law.com -- Ciano & Goldwasser, LLP, 1610 Midland
Building, 101 West Prospect Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44115; Daniel
P. Goetz and Robert E. Kennedy, Weisman, Kennedy & Berris Co.,
L.P.A., 1600 Midland Building, 101 Prospect Avenue, Cleveland, OH
44115; and Paul W. Flowers, Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Terminal
Tower, Suite 1910, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

John T. McLandrich -- jtm@mrrlaw.com -- and Robert F. Cathcart --
rcathcart@mrrlaw.com -- Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., 100
Franklin's Row, 34305 Solon Road, Solon, OH 44139; and Michael C.
Lucas , Wiles and Richards, 37265 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH
44094 (For Defendant-Appellant).


WILLOWICK, OH: Denial of Judgment Bid in "Ragazzo" Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KIMBERLEY RAGAZZO, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE CITY OF
WILLOWICK, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 2017-L-061 (Ohio App.),
Judge Cynthia WestCottt Rice of the Court of Appeals of Ohio for
the Eleventh District, Lake County, affirmed the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas denying the city's motion for
judgment on the pleadings on Ms. Ragazzo's negligence claim.

On July 14, 2015, Ms. Ragazzo, who is a resident of Willowick, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, filed a
class-action complaint against the city asserting, as pertinent
to the appeal, a claim for negligence.  On the same date, the
complaint in Abramezyk was filed.  Ms. Ragazzo states on appeal
that Abramezyk was filed out of concern that class action status
could be denied in the instant Ragazzo proceeding.  Ms. Ragazzo
subsequently filed an amended complaint that did not make any
substantive changes to the original.

The city owns, operates, and maintains a sanitary sewer system
that provides sewer services to its residents.  On July 20, 2013,
the city's sewer system backed up into hundreds of homes in
Willowick, including Ms. Ragazzo's home, causing them to be
flooded with raw sewage, bacteria-tainted water, feces, urine,
dirt, debris, and noxious odors.

In the past several years prior to the July 20, 2013 sewer system
backup, the city's residents experienced a number of such
backups.  Ms. Ragazzo alleged in her complaint that, throughout
2011, city representatives continued to note concerns regarding
the condition and maintenance of the city's sanitary sewer lines.
She alleged the city had a duty to maintain and repair its sewer
system, and that the city's breach of that duty resulted in
damage to her home and to the homes of others similarly situated,
for which the city is liable in negligence.

The city filed an answer, denying the material allegations of the
complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses, including
that the complaint was barred by political subdivision immunity,
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744.  Two weeks later, the city filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C),
arguing that Ms. Ragazzo's claim was barred by subdivision
immunity.  In her brief in opposition, Ms. Ragazzo argued that
maintenance and repair of a sewer system is a "proprietary"
function, which is an exception to the city's immunity.

The trial court designated this case to be "complex litigation"
due to, in part, the extent of the discovery necessary to prepare
the case for trial.  The trial court entered a seven-page,
highly-detailed judgment denying the city's motion.  The city
appeals the trial court's judgment, asserting that the trial
court improperly denied its immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 and
judgment on the pleadings.

At issue is whether the trial court erred in finding the city was
not entitled to political subdivision immunity.  The city's
appeal of a judgment in a related action, which asserted the same
allegations against the city, but without class action
allegations, is also pending before the Court in Abramezyk v.
Willowick, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-060.

Judge Rice finds that it is undisputed that the city of Willowick
is a political subdivision pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(F).  Thus,
under the first tier of the analysis, the city is entitled to
general immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).

Under the second tier of the analysis, the exception to
subdivision immunity for the negligent performance function under
R.C. 2744.02(B), the Judge finds that Ms. Ragazzo alleged
sufficient facts to support her claim and to defeat the city's
immunity defense.  The city ignores Ms. Ragazzo's allegations
that city officials remained concerned about the condition and
maintenance of the sewer lines throughout 2011 and that, despite
these ongoing concerns, the city failed to repair the sewers,
resulting in the 2013 backup.

Finally, under the third tier of the immunity analysis, the
restoration of discretionary immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2),
Judge Rice finds that since the case involves the maintenance and
repair of sewers, which, per R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d), is a
proprietary function, R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not apply to
restore immunity to the city.

The Judge therefore holds the trial court did not err in denying
the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings and in finding
that the city was not entitled to political subdivision immunity
on Ms. Ragazzo's negligence claim.  Accordingly, the assignment
of error is overruled.  Judge Rice affirmed the judgment of the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 29, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/x9w5j8 from Leagle.com.

Phillip A. Ciano -- pac@c-g-law.com -- and Andrew S. Goldwasser -
- asg@c-g-law.com -- Ciano & Goldwasser, LLP, 1610 Midland
Building, 101 West Prospect Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44115; Daniel
P. Goetz and Robert E. Kennedy, Weisman, Kennedy & Berris Co.,
L.P.A., 1600 Midland Building, 101 Prospect Avenue, Cleveland, OH
44115; and Paul W. Flowers, Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Terminal
Tower, Suite 1910, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

John T. McLandrich -- jtm@mrrlaw.com -- and Robert F. Cathcart --
rcathcart@mrrlaw.com -- Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., 100
Franklin's Row, 34305 Solon Road, Solon, OH 44139; and Michael C.
Lucas , Wiles and Richards, 37265 Euclid Avenue, Willoughby, OH
44094 (For Defendant-Appellant).


WYNDHAM HOTELS: Macias Sues over Sexual & Disability Bias
---------------------------------------------------------
HUMBERTO MACIAS, and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff(s), v. WYNDHAM HOTELS AND RESORTS, LLC, a Foreign
Limited Liability Company, the Defendant, Case No. 64706684
(Fla. Cir., 11th Judicial, Miami Dade County, Nov. 29, 2017),
seeks damages in excess of $15,000.00, independent of attorney's
fees, costs, and interest, as a result of Defendant's sexual
origin and disability discrimination against Plaintiff' in
violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Additionally this is an action by the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated individuals to recover unpaid overtime
compensation, and all additional equal amount as liquidated
damages, obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff performed work for
Defendants as a non-exempt employee from January 2013 to October
16, 2015, as an Assistant General Manager. Since Plaintiff
started working in January 2013, it was agreed that he would do a
background check and also a drug test. H.R (Vanessa) Stated no
drug testing will be done because everybody does drugs. Even
though the policy states a drug-test is mandatory.

The Plaintiff did a background check on 2014. The Plaintiff was
discriminated against due to his sexual orientation, throughout
Plaintiffs employment with Defendants, owner would treat
Plaintiff differently from the female employees; she would talk
down to him; she would always talk about men in a derogatory way
saying that men were good for nothing and that she did not have
children because that would mean that she would have to share the
children with their father, and she did not want that.  On
October 1, 2015, Plaintiffs position was changed to Banquet
Manager and on October 16, 2015 Plaintiff was brought into the
General Managers office and was terminated due to his background,
and also for his medical condition (HIV). Immediately after his
termination Plaintiff requested that his confidential medical
records and background would not be released to anyone, however
all of Plaintiffs confidential information was released to
employees at the hotel.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler St., Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: 305 416 5000
          Facsimile: 305 416 5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  rregueiro@rgpattorneys.com
                  pn@rgpattorneys.com


ZTO EXPRESS: "Guo" Suit Remanded to Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIAN GUO, Plaintiff, v. ZTO EXPRESS (CAYMAN) INC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-05357-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (i) granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand, (ii)
denied as moot the Defendants' joint motion for transfer, and
(iii) denied the Defendants' alternative request for a stay.

The securities class action was commenced in the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of San Mateo, on Aug. 11,
2017.  The Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of all persons
who purchased or otherwise acquired the common stock of ZTO
pursuant or traceable to the registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's initial public
offering commenced in October 2016 ("Offering").  The action
asserts claims solely under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933 against the Company, certain Company
officers and directors, certain venture capital firms subject to
liability as control persons, and the underwriters of the
Offering.

The Defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1441(a), which authorizes removal of federal
claims except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress.
They filed their motion to transfer on Sept. 15, 2017.  The
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to transfer on Sept.
29, 2017.  The Defendants filed their reply on Oct. 6, 2017.

The Plaintiff filed his motion to remand on Sept. 25, 2017.  The
Defendants filed their opposition to the motion to remand on Oct.
10, 2017.  The Plaintiff filed their reply on Oct. 17, 2017.

The parties disagree regarding whether Section 77v(a) prohibits
removal of securities fraud class actions that only raise federal
law claims.  Joining many other district courts in the Ninth
Circuit, Judge Tigar concludes that the plain language of the
statute supports the Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute
that the provisions prohibit removal.  The Judge reasons that the
Plaintiff only brings claims under the federal Securities Act and
the complaint lacks any claims under state law.  Thus, the
exception does not apply and the plain language of the statute
prevents the Defendant from removing to federal court.  He will
thus grant the Plaintiff's motion to remand.

In the alternative, the Defendants ask the Court to stay the case
pending the Supreme Court's resolution of certiorari petition in
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, which they state will
resolve the division among federal courts as to whether state
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over covered class
actions that allege only Securities Act claims -- the very issue
presented on removal in the case.

The Judge is not persuaded by this suggestion.  First, he says,
granting a stay will likely prejudice the Plaintiff because the
Supreme Court has not yet decided Cyan and it is not presently
known when the Supreme Court will issue a decision.  Second, the
Defendants have not clearly established that they would face
hardship or inequity if required to move forward.  Third, a stay
will not simplify the legal issues.  Cyan will not resolve any of
the underlying legal issues related to the securities claims
other than jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the Judge will deny the
Defendant's request to stay proceedings.

Judge Tigar will also deny as moot the Defendants' alternative
request to transfer the case to the Southern District of New
York, in light of the Court's conclusion that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.  The answer to the jurisdiction question is
plain.  There is no reason for the Court to avoid deciding
jurisdiction now.

For these reasons, Judge Tigar granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand.  The action is remanded to the San Mateo Superior Court.
He denied the Defendants' request for stay and denied as moot
their motion to transfer.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Wy5CFU from Leagle.com.

Jian Guo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Ian Jaconette --
jamesj@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Brian J.
Robbins -- brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP,
David William Hall -- dhall@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, Eric M. Carrino --  ecarrino@robbinsarroyo.com --
Robbins Arroyo LLP, Nichole T. Browning --
nbrowning@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Shawn A.
Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP & Stephen J. Oddo -- soddo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins
Arroyo LLP.

ZTO Express (Cayman) Inc., Defendant, represented by Virginia
Faye Milstead -- virginia.milstead@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Peter Bradley Morrison --
peter.morrison@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom
LLP, Robert A. Fumerton -- robert.fumerton@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Scott D. Musoff --
scott.musoff@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP.

Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc, China Renaissance
Securities (Hong Kong) Limited, Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC &
Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Defendants, represented by Daniel
Hector Rees Laguardia -- daniel.laguardia@shearman.com --
Shearman Sterling LLP, Adam S. Hakki -- ahakki@shearman.com --
Shearman & Sterling, Daniel Craig Lewis --
daniel.lewis@shearman.com -- Shearman and Sterling LLP, pro hac
vice & K. Mallory Brennan --  mallory.brennan@shearman.com --
Shearman & Sterling LLP.


* Class Action Settlements Hit Record High, Seyfarth Report Shows
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for Law.com, reports that the rise in
class action settlements and federal government workplace
litigation last year may not have been what business leaders
expected the first year of a Republican White House.

Seyfarth Shaw's annual report, Workplace Class Action Litigation
Report, published on Jan. 10, found the top class action
settlements shot up by $1 billion year over year to reach an all-
time record high -- $2.72 billion.

Government enforcement in the transition year ballooned,
according to the report.  Many Obama-era cases and enforcement
methods were a spillover from the Democratic administration,
according to the report.

"There were counterintuitive results of government enforcement
litigation at the federal level," said Gerald Maatman Jr., a
Seyfarth Shaw partner in the Chicago and New York offices and
author of the report.  "A lot of business folks thought with the
new Republican White House, enforcement agencies would be
business friendly. It took until the late fall in terms of
changes in policies and outreach to the business community."

Mr. Maatman predicted 2018 will be a year of a dramatic shift and
agencies are not expected to be pursue with the same vigor the
number of suits they did in previous years.  He noted that Trump
administration appointees and nominees for various agencies have
signaled a change in direction.

The Seyfarth Shaw report showed the monetary value of the top
workplace class action settlements rose by more than $970 million
to reach a new high of $2.72 billion in 2017.  The report notes
the rise in employment discrimination actions, statutory
workplace class actions and a jump in government enforcement
cases.  The largest increase was in government enforcement.

The report also found there were better statistical outcomes for
employers opposing class certification requests for the second
year in a row.  In wage-and-hour litigation, for instance,
employers won 63 percent of decertification rulings, which
represented a 20 percent increase from 2016.

The enforcement litigation sparked from the federal government
appeared to spill over from the Obama administration, the report
said.  Filings from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission more than doubled -- 184 lawsuits compared to 86 the
previous year.  According to the EEOC, 124 of those suits were
filed on behalf of individuals, 30 were non-systemic suits with
more than one victims, and 30 were systemic suits.

The top government settlements also increased from $52.3 million
in 2016 to $485 million last year.

Mr. Maatman said the Trump administration, as it settles and
implements new approaches, would slow the rise in settlements.
Still, he said he expects plaintiffs attorneys to step in.

Seyfarth Shaw's report also notes that employers are awaiting the
outcome of a U.S. Supreme Court case that considers the legality
of class action waivers in arbitration agreements.  The court
heard arguments in the case in October.

"The wild card is what is before the Supreme Court right now,"
Mr. Maatman said.  "[The case] will have such a major cause and
effect on workplace litigation." [GN]


* Courts Let Companies Keep Sexual Misconduct Under Cover
---------------------------------------------------------
Dan Levine, Benjamin Lesser and Renee Dudley, writing for
Reuters, report that Cristina Chen-Oster, a senior salesperson in
Goldman Sachs's convertible bonds department, was a few years out
of MIT when a male colleague pinned her against a wall, kissed
her, groped her and tried to engage in a sexual act, she said in
a lawsuit in federal court.  After reporting the incident to her
boss, the lawsuit alleged, she missed out on pay and promotions
while her accused attacker steadily rose through the ranks.

Cathy Sellars, a 59-year-old mother of two adult children, was
training to become a truck driver for freight hauler CRST when
she complained to her bosses about repeated sexual harassment by
male colleagues, according to a class action lawsuit against the
company. Her complaints ignored, she says in court records, she
eventually found herself in a truck cab with a male driver who
pulled a knife on her after she rebuffed his sexual advances.  He
then refused to allow her to exit the truck during a trip through
the southwest and held her for several hours, she said.

And Sebastian Kelly, a gay driver for an ambulance company in
Alabama, said in a lawsuit that he worked in a sexually charged
atmosphere, where two male co-workers routinely exposed their
genitalia.

News headlines of late have focused on sexual harassment
accusations against movie mogul Harvey Weinstein, former Today
show anchor Matt Lauer, former U.S. Senator Al Franken and other
media figures, entertainers and politicians.  In each case, the
accusers say they waited years to confront the men who accosted
them, most of them too ashamed or fearful to complain publicly or
persuaded to keep quiet by tactics meant to suppress the truth.

But these three plaintiffs, and many like them, chose to confront
their alleged abusers and hold the companies they work for
accountable in public court.  Rather than opening the incidents
to full public scrutiny, however, judges let companies push the
legal boundaries of what should be considered confidential and to
keep details of abusive behavior secret.

A Reuters review of federal court cases filed between 2006 and
2016 revealed hundreds containing sexual harassment allegations
where companies used common civil litigation tactics to keep
potentially damning information under wraps.  Plaintiffs in some
cases say companies sought to conceal internal documents that
reveal similar harassment claims, as well as corporate policies
that favored abusers over victims.

In one case, plaintiff lawyers collected secret evidence about
alleged criminal behavior, including details of a pharmaceutical
saleswoman who alleged a doctor sexually assaulted her at a work-
related event.  Her supervisor admitted to giving a sheriff's
detective false information about the allegations, court records
show.

The true number of such cases is likely much greater than the
hundreds identified by Reuters.  Federal courts categorize sexual
harassment within a larger group of gender discrimination claims,
which makes a full accounting difficult.  In addition, many
sexual harassment cases are filed in state courts.  Reuters
focused its review on the federal courts because records are more
accessible and consistent.

As a result of the sealed documents, cases that could shine light
on specific abusers, or on toxic corporate cultures, do the
opposite: They enable the very secrecy and corporate complicity
that allow sexual harassment to persist in the workplace.

Shira Scheindlin, a former Manhattan federal judge, said judges
should make public human-resources complaints that result in
employee discipline.

"Otherwise, you get the serial abuser just doing it at the next
job," said Scheindlin, who currently heads the American Bar
Association's federal courts subcommittee and whose private
practice includes advising companies on handling sexual
harassment complaints.  "If that record had been available, there
would have been no next job."

U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer said courts are going too far
in routinely sealing such cases.  Documents filed in federal
court are presumed to be public, he said, so people can
understand how the judiciary works.  Companies should not be
allowed to cloak evidence just because it is damaging, said the
judge, based in San Francisco.  That goes not only for sexual
harassment but also for broader corporate governance issues.

"It's hard to see why their private interests to avoid
embarrassment trumps the public's right to have access to
litigation," Breyer said.

Companies say they have good reason to seek broad protective
orders.  They frequently argue that their internal documents
contain unproven allegations that shouldn't be public, or
sensitive business information that could aid a competitor.
Plaintiff attorneys say they often agree to protective orders and
motions to seal information from public disclosure because
fighting over public access can increase the length and cost of a
lawsuit.

Many judges, meanwhile, are reluctant to enforce transparency
when neither side has requested it, according to several current
and former federal judges.

"I don't think any judge is presumptively hostile to the idea of
disclosure," Breyer said.  "We may be presumptively hostile to
doing more work. I'm speaking for myself."

Most civil cases settle before they can be publicly aired before
a jury.  That means the pre-trial secrecy allows companies to
permanently conceal information about their sexual harassment
policies and how they respond to specific complaints of abuse.

A broad protective order in the ongoing lawsuit by Chen-Oster and
three other women against Goldman has allowed the Wall Street
giant to keep hundreds of documents under wraps for three years.

Asked about the secrecy, a Goldman spokesperson told Reuters the
firm keeps details private because it promises employees
confidentiality when they report concerns.  The spokesperson
would not discuss the specific allegations raised by Chen-Oster
and the other plaintiffs.

In court documents, the company acknowledges that Chen-Oster told
her boss about the contact with her co-worker and that the
supervisor contacted Goldman's human resources department about
it.  Chen-Oster, the company says in court filings, did not want
to pursue a human resources complaint.

The protective order permitted lawyers on either side to mark any
document exchanged in discovery as confidential, thus barring
anyone from disclosing it outside the case.  Such orders have
become standard to ensure secrecy during the pre-trial evidence
discovery phase in U.S. civil litigation.

There are no nationwide standards on what information should be
sealed when discovery documents are later filed in court.
Several federal appeals courts recognize that trade secrets,
sensitive financial data, or personal information like Social
Security Numbers can remain secret.  When it comes to allegations
of misconduct, some case law allows information that would
intrude on an individual's privacy to be kept secret.  But it is
left to judges to decide if someone's privacy outweighs the
public's interest in disclosure.

Initially, Chen-Oster's lawyers agreed to the protective order,
but later, when they sought to broaden the case, they took the
rare step of arguing that many documents filed in court should be
made public.

Adam Klein, one of her lawyers, said plaintiff attorneys usually
agree to protective orders to gain access to company documents in
the first place.

"It's balancing the interest of the client to get information
with the public's right to know," Klein said.  In Chen-Oster's
case, Klein said, they later pushed to unseal documents in part
so that more women working at Goldman who could join the lawsuit
would know the details.

The lawyers asked then-U.S. Magistrate Judge James Francis IV in
Manhattan to certify the lawsuit as a class action to address pay
and promotions lost to gender discrimination at Goldman.  To
support their request, they filed, under seal, nearly 300
internal Goldman documents the company had given them during
discovery.  Some of those documents, the lawyers alleged, showed
that Goldman rewarded men who engaged in sexual misconduct.
Because Goldman had asserted confidentiality during discovery,
Chen-Oster's lawyers had to file those documents in secret.

The plaintiffs also secretly filed a chart that logged gender
discrimination complaints Goldman female employees made to the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The plaintiffs' first request in 2014 to unseal is itself not
public, nor is Goldman's response.  Francis sided with Goldman --
though his reasoning is unknown because he also sealed the ruling
from disclosure on the public court docket.

In a subsequent filing, Chen-Oster's lawyers argued that details
about Goldman HR investigations should be made public, at least
without revealing employee names, because they did not contain
the type of trade secrets that legal precedent allows companies
to keep confidential.

In response, Goldman attorneys argued the documents should remain
secret, arguing many contained hearsay and violated the privacy
of people who aren't parties to the suit.  The material had been
"selectively culled" from Goldman's internal personnel files to
"sensationalize this proceeding," Goldman's lawyers said.

U.S. District Judge Analisa Torres in Manhattan reaffirmed
Francis's ruling in 2017, saying the sealed materials "include
sensitive content about identifiable non-parties."  Because of
that, Torres ruled, the plaintiffs' request to make the material
public should wait until after a judge decides whether to let the
case proceed as a class action.

That legal question has now been pending for more than three
years.

Torres declined to comment.  Francis, who recently left the
bench, also declined to comment on the Goldman case.  But in
general, he said, judges often wait to wade into secrecy issues
until after they know what evidence will be important in their
rulings.  That way they have a roadmap to decide which secret
court filings are most relevant to the public, he said.

"Making a decision later with more information may be better,"
Francis said.  "But later may be much later, and that's
problematic."

Goldman says in court filings that it takes harassment seriously.
Out of 12 human-resources cases highlighted by Chen-Oster's
lawyers, Goldman said it had fired five subjects of those
complaints and disciplined five.  The identities of those
employees, however, are not public, leaving other companies
unaware of the abusers' histories.

Chen-Oster and one other plaintiff declined to talk for this
article, and the others did not respond to Reuters' efforts to
reach them.

IDENTITY BLACKOUT

In some cases, companies have persuaded judges to require
plaintiffs to keep secret the alleged abusers named in lawsuits,
before discovery even begins.

The 2011 claim filed by Sebastian Kelly against his former
employer, Regional Paramedical Services Inc. of Jasper, Alabama,
described a hyper-sexualized environment in which his colleagues
allegedly exposed their genitalia regularly and discussed sex in
graphic terms.  He described one instance in which a colleague
told Kelly that he "can't be gay, you like titties too much."

That employee's name, and several others, were blacked out in
Kelly's complaint on the order of Judge James Hancock of the
Northern District of Alabama.  Hancock ruled that all names of
employees who weren't in supervisory roles, including the human
resources director, must be kept secret.

Hancock wrote that allegations against non-supervisory employees
are "embarrassing" and that the public's right to access court
records was outweighed by the privacy interests of the employees.

In July 2012, both parties asked the judge to dismiss the case
after reaching an out-of-court settlement; the terms weren't
disclosed.

A company spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment.
The company denies Kelly's allegations in court documents. Kelly
would not disclose the terms of the settlement.

Because the case did not go to trial, the identities of the
accused remain blacked out in Kelly's lawsuit.  The accused are
named openly, however, in a complaint Kelly filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.  Kelly's lawyers filed the
document after Hancock ordered them to submit the EEOC records.
Anyone reviewing the filing would find the names of the accused
men.

Hancock, who has retired, could not be reached to explain why he
did not order the names to be blacked out when the lawyers filed
the EEOC complaint.

CLASS SECRETS

In the case against CRST Expedited Inc., a large trucking
company, secret court filings were compelling enough to persuade
Judge Leonard Strand that plaintiffs had grounds to mount a class
action alleging widespread systemic abuse against female
employees.  Yet even with the class certification, the judge
continues to keep important details under wraps.

The case, filed in U.S. District Court in Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
centers on the complaints of three women, including Cathy
Sellars, the 59-year-old who says she was held at knifepoint
after rejecting a coworker's sexual advances.  She said she
complained about harassment to her superiors and the human
resources department.  When she contacted human resources to
check on the status of her complaints, she says in her lawsuit,
she was told that information was "none of my business."

After Sellars and the other plaintiffs took CRST to court, their
attorneys sought information from the company about how it
handled sexual harassment complaints, and how many had been
filed.  The plaintiffs eventually obtained much of that
information.

However, the broad protective order adopted at the beginning of
the case -- agreed to by both the plaintiffs and the defendants -
- barred anyone from disclosing that information.  The order also
forced the plaintiffs to file secretly their motion asking the
court for class certification. As a result, all of their
allegations of widespread abuse at CRST remained confidential.

Judge Strand granted the plaintiffs' bid for a class action.  In
that March order, Strand disclosed some of the sealed material,
including the number of female employees -- 106 -- filing sexual
harassment complaints with CRST between October 2013 and February
2016.

But the documents he cited -- along with the entire motion he
ruled on -- still remain under seal.

"The public has a right to know about the gravity of harm in
cases like this," said Giselle Schuetz --
giselle@friedmanhouldingllp.com -- an attorney for Sellars. She
said she agreed to the sealing, however, because she couldn't
afford to delay the case.

The litigation is pending, and CRST attorney Kevin Visser said he
could not discuss the case or any of the specific allegations as
a result.  The company denied Sellars' allegations in court
documents. Strand did not respond to requests for comment.

CONCEALED EVIDENCE

Plaintiff attorneys say secrecy orders tie their hands even when
apparent criminal acts are uncovered during the pre-trial
exchange of information, such as evidence that women were
sexually assaulted while doing their jobs.

In one gender discrimination claim that went to trial eight years
ago, Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis attempted to keep secret
evidence that one of its managers had given false information to
a sheriff's detective investigating a sexual assault complaint,
court records show.

REUTERS INVESTIGATES

That attempt came to light when the manager testified during a
deposition with the plaintiff's attorneys before the trial.  The
attorneys could not disclose the revelation to law enforcement
authorities without seeking permission from the company or the
judge because the deposition was required to be kept secret under
the terms of the protective order.

Novartis tried to keep the details under wraps as the case went
to trial.  The company's lawyers argued that the alleged sexual
assault and the criminal investigation were irrelevant and would
prejudice the jury because the details were "unusually graphic
and offensive to any reasonable person."

The judge rejected that argument, so in April 2010, Novartis
sales rep Marjorie Salame told the jury that she was sexually
assaulted by a doctor at a work-related golf event.

Salame testified that she had considered herself on a management
track and enjoyed a good relationship with her boss when she
headed to a country club near Tampa, Florida, in May 2002.  At
the end of the night, Salame said at an earlier deposition, Dr.
Edwin Colon got her alone, lifted her skirt and penetrated her
with his fingers.

The next day, Salame told her manager, Joseph Simmons, what had
happened.  Simmons told the jury he also received a phone call
from Colon, who was apologetic but denied culpability, saying he
had been drinking.  The doctor said the sexual contact with
Salame had been consensual, Simmons testified.

Colon declined to discuss the case with Reuters. Simmons also
declined to comment.

Salame reported the incident to the sheriff's office, and
investigators interviewed Simmons.  The Novartis manager told a
detective that the doctor had not said he had been drinking and
that Novartis was not investigating the matter, court records
state.  In fact, Simmons later testified, a human resources
employee at Novartis was looking into the complaint, a fact he
knew when he talked with the detective.

Salame's ex-manager testified both in the pre-trial deposition
and during the jury trial that he had misinformed the detective
about what Colon told him and about Novartis investigating the
complaint, though he told the jury he had not deliberately lied.

The doctor was not charged with a crime.

Had Salame's lawyers wanted to tell law enforcement authorities
about Simmons' pre-trial revelation, they would have had to go
through an elaborate process with Novartis and the judge.
Nothing on the court docket shows they did so.  Katherine Kimpel,
who represented Salame and other women against Novartis, declined
to comment.

U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat, co-sponsored
legislation in 2014 that would have allowed victims to disclose
evidence obtained in civil litigation to law enforcement, if it
impacts public health or safety.  The bill died in committee.

Broad protective orders and motions to seal, Blumenthal said, can
often conceal evidence of criminal behavior, allowing abusers to
prey on unsuspecting women.

"The present practice sends her on a trail where all of the
warning signs about the dangers have been removed, and she's
there vulnerable and alone," he said.

Salame told Reuters she was too overwhelmed to pursue the matter
involving her supervisor after learning he had misled
investigators.  She did file a civil lawsuit against the doctor,
who denied her allegations. Three years ago, both sides agreed to
a settlement.

The manager's testimony was the first time Salame learned what he
had done. "It took eight years for it to come out and vindicate
me," Salame said in an interview.

Few sexual harassment cases reach trial, making the Novartis case
-- and the details disclosed during public testimony -- unusual.

The 2010 trial generated weeks of testimony -- and headlines --
about how the company treated women.  The jury eventually ordered
Novartis to pay $250 million in punitive damages in the class
action.  The company later decided to settle the case and pay
about $153 million to class members, rather than appeal the jury
verdict.

A Novartis spokesman declined to discuss the case with Reuters.

As part of the resolution of the case, the company agreed to
internal reforms, including annual training on a new sexual
harassment policy and new measures for tracking and investigating
complaints.  On pay, it agreed to analyze gender discrepancies
and to share the results of that analysis with the plaintiffs'
attorneys.

More than three years later, U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon
congratulated Novartis for successfully complying with the
reforms.

Yet even in a case with such transparency, the openness had its
limits.  The details of Novartis's compliance efforts were not
filed on the court docket and remain secret.





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