CAR_Public/171213.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


           Wednesday, December 13, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 246



                            Headlines

24 HOUR FITNESS: Mendizabal Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in Similac Non-GMO Suit
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Wins Summary Judgment in "Thomas" TCPA Suit
ALABAMA: Phase2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Has Final OK
ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Vera Sues over Sweetened Beverage Tax

ASPLUNDH TREE: Fails to Pay OT Under FLSA, "Belloso" Suit Claims
BACCARAT NEW YORK: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. of New York
BAMBOO SUPPLY: Hunter Sues over "Natural Bamboo" Fabric Claim
BARNEY'S INC: Faces Mendizabal Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Site
BROADSOFT INC: "Franchi" Securities Suit Questions Sale to Cisco

BLACKROCK INSTN'L: Dec. 22 Reply to Judicial Notice Objection
BRIDAL WAREHOUSE: Class Certification in "Witak" Suit Vacated
BUILD.COM INC: Court Dismisses Wire Tap Suit for Lack of Standing
BULGARI CORP: Sued by Mendizabal Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS: Tapia Seeks Overtime Wages under Labor Code

CASHCALL INC: Settlement in "De La Torre" Suit Has Final Approval
CENTRAL TRI-AXLE: Court Conditionally Certifies "Swafford" Class
CENTURA HOMEOWNERS: Misclassifies Employees, Shreve Suit Says
CHANEL INC: Web Site Inaccessible to Blind, Mendizabal Says
CONAGRA BRANDS: First Circuit Appeal Filed in "Lee" Class Suit

COOK COUNTY, IL: Pietryla Asks Court to Reactivate Employment
CR ENGLAND: Court Allows Deposition of Absent Class Members
CU RECOVERY: "Jeffries" Remanded to West Virginia State Court
DAIRYAMERICA INC: Filing of Redacted FACC in "Carlin" OK'd
DELIU LLC: Faces "Etienne" Class Suit Over Unsolicited Text Ads

ECLINICALWORKS: Suit Says Deficiencies Led to Inaccurate Records
ELK GROVE, IL: Court Dismisses "Singh" Suit with Leave to Amend
EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Faces Class Action Lawsuit in Boston
FCA US: Borkowicz May Testify as Expert Witness in "Flynn" Suit
FIRST NATIONAL: Hordge Can Substitute Carter in FDCPA Suit

FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Myron" Suit in E.D. New York
FRIENDLY HILLS: Valerio Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Matrakas" Suit in E.D. New York
GERDAU AMERISTEEL: Court Approves "Comer" Class Settlement
GLOBAL FITNESS: 6th Cir. Reverses Contempt Finding in "Gascho"

GRASSHOPPER HOUSE: Fails to Pay Wages, "Guillen" Suit Says
HONDA NORTH: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Merkin" Suit
INDIANA: Ct. Denies Certification of Disenfranchised Voters Class
INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Dismissal Bid in TCPA Suit Denied
INT'L HAIR: "Doucet" Suit Remanded to California State Court

INVENTURE FOODS: "Chamat" Class Suit Seeks to Enjoin Sale to Utz
J.JILL INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
JEFF SCHMITT: Appeal from Indemnification Ruling Dismissed
KING CITY, CA: Court Narrows Claims in Unlawful Towing Suit
KLEINFELD BRIDAL: Faces "Mendizabal" Suit in S.D. New York

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: Class Members Subject to Del. Law Certified
L.A. HARDWOOD: Thor Sues over Chinesemade Laminate Flooring
LATIN GROUP: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, "Arevalo" Suit Says
LAZ PARKING: "Watts" Suit Seeks Premium Wages under Labor Code
LENSCRAFTERS INC: Lee Sues over Lost Market Share

LEXISNEXIS RISK: Loses Bid for Interlocutory Appeal in DPPA Suit
LIBERTY MUTUAL: Class Settlement in "Moyle" Has Prelim Approval
MARKETSOURCE INC: Fails to Pay All Earned Wages, Delgado Says
MARVELL TECHNOLOGY: Class Notice in "Luna" Conditionally Approved
LEXISNEXIS RISK: Loses Bid for Interlocutory Appeal in DPPA Suit

MDL 1869: Court Refuses to Certify Direct Purchasers Class
MDL 2314: Court Dismisses Facebook Internet Tracking Suit
MDL 2543: Court Denies New GM's Bid to Dismiss FACC
MDL 2820: "Harris" Suit Transferred to Southern Illinois Dist. Ct.
MENTOR USA: Accused by "Weisberg" Class Suit of Invading Privacy

MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
MORRIS COLLEGE: Students File Class Action Suit Because of Mold
MPR PROPERTY: Burchfield Sues over Rental Agreement
MULTIMEDIA SALES: Lopez Wants Collection of Biometric Info Halted
NATION ONE: Must Pay Former Workers $4,323 for Court Filings

NIDEC MOTOR: "Pounds" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of California
NOVAN INC: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
PANATTE LLC: Deadline for Land Home to Reply to "Aikens" Extended
PARK HOTELS: Faces "Mims" Suit over Sensitive Biometric Data

PAYPAL INC: "Ezeude" Stayed Pending Appeal in Traffic Monsoon
PC HOSPITALITY: Guadarrama Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
PG&E CORPORATION: Sued over Unsafe Electrical Infrastructure
PIGGLY WIGGLY: ERISA Suit Can't Proceed as Derivative Suit
PROFESSIONAL CREDIT: Settlement in "McCurdy" Suit Has Final Nod

PTTEP AUSTRALASIA: Oil Spill Victims Win More Time to File Claim
RADY CHILDREN: Denial of "Hefczyc" Class Certification Affirmed
RAPID ARMORED: Gallimore Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
RIABLE LAW FIRM: Faces "Higgins" Suit in E.D. of Arkansas
RJD INVESTMENTS: "Lamarca" Suit Moved Southern Dist. of Florida

RYB EDUCATION: Faces "Qian" Securities Class Suit
SAN DIEGO, CA: Class-Action Lawsuit Filed on Behalf of Homeless
SCOTTRADE INC: "Hine" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of Missouri
SHAMROCK FOODS: Court Grants Protective Order in "Chavez"
SILV COMMUNICATIONS: Settlement in Slamming Suit Has Final OK

SINGING RIVER: Court Won't Lift Stay in "Jones" for Discovery
SINGING RIVER: Court Won't Lift "Jones" Stay for Objectors
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Ct. Denies Bid for Attys Fees in Voucher Suit
ST. CLOUD STATE: Students Want Class Suit for Title IX Claims
STARBUCKS CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in "Armstead"

SUTTER HOME: Faces "Ruiz" Suit in California Superior Court
SYNERMED: Fails to Give Notice Before Layoffs, "Araya" Suit Says
T-MOBILE USA: Cesarina Files Suit Over False Ads
TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS: Cherokee Nation Suit Moved to N.D. Okla.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: "Huellemeier" Suit Moved to Connecticut

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Brueggeman Sues Over Improper OT Calculations
TRG CUSTOMER: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in "Cronk" FLSA Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Secure Private Info, Agans Alleges
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Sued by DeSignor Over Failure to Protect PII
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Suit Blames Company for Sexual Assaults

UTILIQUEST LLC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, "Muniz" Suit Says
UTOPIA HOME: "Darby" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Law
WATERTON HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay All Wages, Maasrani Says
WESTLAKE WELLBEING: "Edelstein" Remanded to State Court
WORTH COUNTY, GA: School Drug Search Leads to $3MM Class Suit






                            *********


24 HOUR FITNESS: Mendizabal Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA MENDIZABAL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. 24 HOUR FITNESS USA, INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-09223-ER
(S.D.N.Y., November 23, 2017), is brought under the Americans with
Disabilities Act in connection with the Defendant's alleged
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web site
to be fully accessible to and independently usable by the
Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.

Ms. Mendizabal is a visually-impaired and legally blind person,
who requires screen-reading software to read Web site content
using her computer.  Because the Web site is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the ADA, she contends.

24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., is a California business corporation
registered to do business in New York.  The Defendant operates
http://www.24hourfitness.com/and its Web site, and advertises,
markets, distributes, and sells fitness center memberships,
including access to its physical locations in the state of New
York and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          JOSEPH H. MIZRAHI LAW P.C.
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (718) 425-8954
          E-mail: Joseph@Jmizrahilaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


ABBOTT LABORATORIES: Court Narrows Claims in Similac Non-GMO Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned CRYSTAL KAO, ET
AL., Plaintiffs, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES INC., Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-02790-JST (N.D. Cal.).

In this putative consumer class action, Plaintiffs Crystal Kao and
Nina Barwick assert claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
claims under California and Tennessee state law, and various
common law claims against Abbott Laboratories, alleging deceptive
and unfair business practices in the advertisement and sale of
Similac Advance Non-GMO baby formula (Similac Non-GMO).

Plaintiffs allege that Abbott's conduct in marketing Similac Non-
GMO as containing ingredients that are not genetically engineered
deceived and/or was likely to deceive the public, and Plaintiff
Kao and Plaintiff Barwick.  Plaintiffs commissioned tests of
Similac Non-GMO in different lots purchased in different
locations, including in California and Tennessee, at different
times.  Those tests allegedly showed "the presence of GTS-40-3-2
Soy, a genetically engineered version of soy developed by Monsanto
that has been altered to be glyphosate herbicide tolerant."

According to Plaintiffs, this modified soybean line was developed
to allow for the use of Monsanto's Roundup(R) herbicide.
Plaintiffs allege that no significant process changes, vendor
changes, or supply-chain changes occurred in the production of
Similac Non-GMO from the inception of the product to the market
through the present, and therefore, it can be assumed that all
formulations of Similac Non-GMO contain this same presence of GTS-
40-3-2 Soy.

Abbott moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the
grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs' state law claims are pre-empted by
federal law giving the USDA sole responsibility for regulating GMO
labeling; and (2) Plaintiffs' lone federal claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) fails as a matter of law because
product labeling is not a warranty that can give rise to liability
under the statute.

The Court denies Abbott's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' state-law
claims based on pre-emption.  The Court grants Abbott's motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the MMWA, and dismisses these
claims with prejudice.

Here, Plaintiffs do not seek to impose a requirement above and
beyond what is required by a federal agency.  Indeed, Plaintiffs'
claims are consistent with the only guidance the USDA has provided
to date regarding its anticipated implementation of the NBFDS.
That guidance provides that food manufacturers may voluntarily
label their foods with information about whether the foods were
not produced using bioengineering, as long as such information is
truthful and not misleading.  The fact that Plaintiffs' claims are
consistent with the current USDA guidance supports the Court's
conclusion that allowing Plaintiffs to pursue their state-law
claims would not frustrate Congressional intent in enacting the
express pre-emption provision.

Plaintiffs' claims do not seek to impose a new regulatory system
or require a manufacturer to provide specific additional
information to consumers.  Rather, they seek to ensure that
products do not contain affirmative misrepresentations and that,
consistent with the USDA Guidance, any labels manufacturers like
Abbott choose to place on their products are truthful.

Given the strong presumption against federal impression in matters
of health and safety, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' state-
law claims are not pre-empted by the NBFDS, and will deny Abbott's
motion to dismiss on this basis.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that its claims under the
MMWA and its state-law warranty claims rise and fall together.
First, as Abbott correctly notes, Plaintiffs' claims under the
MMWA make specific reference to the definitions and requirements
under the text of the MMWA itself.  They do not allege a breach of
written warranty under the MMWA based on state law.  Second, the
Court does not read the Ninth Circuit's decision in Daniel, as
Plaintiffs do, to completely eviscerate the plain language of the
statute, which defines an express warranty in unambiguous terms.

Plaintiffs' MMWA claims are inconsistent with the plain language
of the statute and therefore must be dismissed.  Moreover, based
on the alleged contents of the label, Plaintiffs' MMWA claims
cannot be remedied through amendment and fail as a matter of law.
Thus, the Court will grant Abbott's motion to dismiss these claims
with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y95azz83from Leagle.com.

Crystal Kao, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan David Weissglass -
- jweissglass@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP.

Crystal Kao, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Gastel,
Branstetter Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, J. Gerard
Stranch, IV, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice &
Michael Isaac Miller, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, The
Freedom Center223 Rosa L. Parks AvenueSuite 200Nashville, TN
37203.

Nina Barwick, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan David Weissglass,
Altshuler Berzon LLP, Benjamin Gastel, Branstetter Stranch &
Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Branstetter,
Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice & Michael Isaac Miller,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC.

Abbott Laboratories Inc., Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L.
Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP,
Gregg LoCascio -- gregg.locascio@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP & Jonathan Patrick Jones -- jonathan.jones@kirkland.com
-- Kirkland and Ellis LLP


ABERCROMBIE & FITCH: Wins Summary Judgment in "Thomas" TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
Melissa N. Thomas, Plaintiff, v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-11467 (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Melissa N. Thomas alleges that in April 2016, she
received four unsolicited text messages from defendants
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. and Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
(A&F).  Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that A&F,
along with up to twelve John Doe defendants, violated the This is
a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending her and
other customers four unsolicited text message.

Defendant seeks summary judgment on the grounds of the affirmative
defense of consent.  Where a defendant seeks summary judgment on
an affirmative defense on which it will bear the ultimate burden
of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper only if the record
shows that the defendant established the defense so clearly that
no rational jury could have found to the contrary.

To create some issue of material fact as to whether the second
text message exchange on that date, in which defendant's
admissible records reveal she consented to receive up to ten texts
per month, is accurate, plaintiff must provide some evidence
showing that the Hello World system actually could have generated
a nonexistent exchange between her and A&F.

Because she has not provided her text message history from her
phone or admissible records of her text messaging activity, the
only evidence plaintiff has is her own deposition testimony.
During her deposition, plaintiff stated only that she did not
recall any text messages sent between her and A&F in December
2015, but she did not affirmatively deny that all four messages
were sent. Plaintiff testified that it was possible she deleted
the December 2015 text messages.

The record in this case contains unambiguous and uncontroverted
evidence that plaintiff expressly consented to receive up to ten
marketing text messages per month on December 4, 2015.

Plaintiff's available evidence does not contradict that fact, and
her testimony precludes her from arguing that she did not consent
to receive the text messages at issue in this lawsuit. There is no
genuine issue of material fact, based on the evidence available to
the Court, as to whether plaintiff consented to receive the April
2016 marketing text messages from A&F.

Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted to defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yay64qvpfrom
Leagle.com.

Melissa N. Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Oppenheim --
david@classlawyers.com -- Bock, Hatch, Lewis, & Oppenheim, LLC.
Melissa N. Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by James M. Smith --
jim@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC, Tod A. Lewis -- tod@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law
Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC & Phillip A.
Bock -- phil@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock,
Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Incorporated, Defendant, represented
by Meredith Connie Slawe -- meredith.slawe@dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle and Reath LLP, Anthony D. Pignotti -- APignotti@fbmjlaw.com
-- Foley Baron Metzger & Juip, PLLC, Michael J. Stortz --
michael.stortz@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP & Randall A.
Juip -- RAJuip@fbmjlaw.com -- Foley Baron Metzger & Juip, PLLC.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Defendant, represented by Meredith Connie
Slawe, Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP, Anthony D. Pignotti, Foley
Baron Metzger & Juip, PLLC, Michael J. Stortz, Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP & Randall A. Juip, Foley Baron Metzger & Juip, PLLC.


ALABAMA: Phase2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Has Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, Northern Division, issued an Opinion for Phase 2A
Involuntary Medication Settlement Final Approval in the case
captioned EDWARD BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN,
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department
of Corrections, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:14cv601-MHT
(M.D. Ala.).

This class-action lawsuit brought by a group of seriously mentally
ill prisoners in the custody of the Alabama Department of
Corrections (ADOC or Department) is before the court on a promised
opinion explaining why, in partial resolution of this litigation,
it previously approved a settlement of the group's claims
challenging the Department's involuntary-medication policies and
procedures.

The plaintiffs in this phase, Phase 2A, of the lawsuit are a group
of seriously mentally ill state prisoners and the Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), which represents mentally
ill prisoners in Alabama. The defendants are ADOC Commissioner
Jefferson Dunn and the ADOC Associate Commissioner of Health
Services Ruth Naglich, who are both sued in only their official
capacities.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 27, 2017 Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/fNwCmF from Leagle.com.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh -
awalsh@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Jack Richard Cohen,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center,
PO Box 2087400 Washington Ave, Montgomery, AL 36102-2087, Patricia
Clotfelter -- pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern
Poverty Law Center, PO Box 2087400 Washington Ave., Montgomery, AL
36102-2087, William Glassell Somerville, III --
wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program. 400 South Union Street, Suite 280, Montgomery,
Alabama 36104

Tedrick Brooks, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Gary Lee Broyles, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Chandler Clements, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Christopher Gilbert, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack
Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Dwight Hagood, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Sylvester Hartley, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Christopher Jackson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack
Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Brandon Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

John Maner, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard Cohen,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center,
Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz
PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, William
Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz &William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy
Program.

Ruth Naglich, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill, Alabama
Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd -- dboyd@balch.com -
Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of
Corrections, John Garland Smith -- jgsmith@balch.com -- Balch &
Bingham LLP, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of
Corrections, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr. -- rdorr@maynardcooper.com -
- Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Matthew Reeves --
mreeves@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh
Bansilal Shah -- mshah@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper &
Gale, PC, Steven C. Corhern -- scorhern@balch.com -- Balch &
Bingham, William Richard Lunsford -- blunsford@maynardcooper.com -
- Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Melissa K. Marler --
mmarler@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Michael
Paul Huff -- mhuff@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC &
Stephen Clarence Rogers -- srogers@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard
Cooper and Gale PC.

Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant, represented by David
Randall Boyd, Balch & Bingham LLP, John W. Naramore, Balch &
Bingham LLP, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Anne Adams
Hill, Alabama Department of Corrections, Elizabeth Anne Sees,
Alabama Department of Corrections, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr.,
Alabama Dept of Corrections, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham &
William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.
Jefferson S. Dunn, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill,
Alabama Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd, Balch &
Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of
Corrections, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Joseph
Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of Corrections, Luther Maxwell
Dorr, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.,Matthew Reeves, Maynard
Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
PC, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, William Richard Lunsford,
Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Melissa K. Marler, Maynard, Cooper &
Gale PC, Michael Paul Huff, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC & Stephen
Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC.

MHM Correctional Services, Inc., Movant, represented by Brett T.
Lane, MHM Services, Inc. & Deana Johnson, MHM Services, Inc., pro
hac vice.

Corizon Health, Inc., Movant, represented by Melissa K. Marler,
Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper
and Gale PC & William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.

Kim Thomas, Movant, represented by Melissa K. Marler, Maynard,
Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
PC, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC & William
Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.


ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Vera Sues over Sweetened Beverage Tax
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN VERA, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. (S.D. Fla., Dec. 1, 2017),
seeks to recover award, actual damages, attorney's fees and costs,
including interest, as allowed or required by law.

The case is a class action brought on behalf of the class of
persons, who were improperly charged the Cook County sweetened
beverage tax by Jewel-Osco stores in Cook County, Illinois on
their retail purchases of unsweetened beverages in Cook County,
Illinois.

The Cook County Sweetened Beverage Tax Ordinance imposes a tax at
the rate of $0.01 per ounce on the retail sale of all sweetened
beverages in Cook County, Illinois. Notwithstanding the
requirements in the Cook County Sweetened Beverage Tax Ordinance,
Defendant charged Plaintiff the sweetened beverage tax on his
purchases of Jarritos Mineragua Club Soda beverages, resulting in
an unlawful tax charge.

Defendant's acts and omissions alleged violate the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Plaintiff
paid $0.50 sweetened beverage tax on each of his bottles of Club
Soda as a condition of the sale and receipt of the product. The
local Jewel-Osco stores cannot control whether the sweetened
beverage tax is charged on unsweetened beverages sold in their
stores, as the Jewel Osco POS System is programmed by Defendant
and the sweetened beverage tax is automatically applied by that
uniform system to certain product codes in all Jewel-Osco retail
stores in Cook County. As such, Plaintiff and Class members were
damaged by being improperly charged the sweetened beverage tax on
beverages that are exempt from the tax.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          Maebetty Kirby, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          www.attomeyzim.com
          77 West Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440 0020
          E-mail: tom@gttorneyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com
                  matt@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com
                  maebetty@attorneyzim.com


ASPLUNDH TREE: Fails to Pay OT Under FLSA, "Belloso" Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
MILTON ANTONIO BELLOSO, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated v. ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT, CO. and ASPLUNDH TREE
EXPERT, LLC, Case No. 6:17-cv-02020-PGB-GJK (M.D. Fla., November
22, 2017), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act for
alleged failure to pay overtime wages.

Asplundh provides tree pruning and removal, right-of-way clearing
and maintenance, vegetation management, and emergency storm work
and support.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott C. Adams, Esq.
          N. Ryan Labar, Esq.
          LABAR & ADAMS, P.A.
          2300 East Concord Street
          Orlando, FL 32803
          Telephone: (407) 835-8968
          Facsimile: (407) 835-8969
          E-mail: sadams@labaradams.com
                  rlabar@labaradams.com


BACCARAT NEW YORK: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Baccarat New York,
L.L.C. The case is styled Lawrence Young, Individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v
Baccarat New York, L.L.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-09524 (S.D.
N.Y., December 5, 2017).

Baccarat New York LLC owns and operates hotel. The company was
founded in 1764 and is based in New York, New York. As of February
6, 2015, Baccarat New York LLC operates as a subsidiary of
Sunshine Insurance Group Co., Ltd.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Bronson Lipsky LLP
   630 Third Avenue, 5th Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: dlipsky@bronsonlipsky.com


BAMBOO SUPPLY: Hunter Sues over "Natural Bamboo" Fabric Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------
LARE'SHEA HUNTER, the Plaintiff, v. ZACHARY POLLOCK, ET AL., the
Defendant, Case No. CV 17 889645 (in the Ct. of Common Pleas
Cuyahoga Coty., Ohio, Nov. 29, 2017), alleges unfair and deceptive
consumer sales practices of Defendants Bamboo Supply Co. ("BSC")
related to its advertising and sale in Ohio of synthetic rayon
masquerading as natural bamboo fabric.  Specifically, BSC is in
violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.

The Plaintiff and the Class did not receive the benefit of their
bargains, i.e. the benefits of Bamboo, when they purchased from
BSC Bamboo Derivative Products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Schlachet, Esq.
          3515 Severn Road
          Cleveland, Ohio 44118
          Telephone: (216) 225 7559
          Facsimile: (216) 932 5390
          E-mail: markschlachet@me.com


BARNEY'S INC: Faces Mendizabal Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Site
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA MENDIZABAL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. BARNEY'S INC. and BARNEYS NEW YORK, INC., Case No.
1:17-cv-09220 (S.D.N.Y., November 23, 2017), alleges that the
Defendants fail to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
Web site to be fully accessible to and independently usable by the
Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.

Ms. Mendizabal is a visually-impaired and legally blind person,
who requires screen-reading software to read Web site content
using her computer.  Because the Web site is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the ADA, she contends.

Barney's, Inc., is a New York business corporation with its
principal executive offices in New York County.  Barneys New York,
Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive
offices in New York County.  The Defendants operate
http://www.barneys.com/and its Web site advertises, markets,
distributes, and sells Men's and Women's high-end designer
clothing and footwear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          JOSEPH H. MIZRAHI LAW P.C.
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (718) 425-8954
          E-mail: Joseph@Jmizrahilaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


BROADSOFT INC: "Franchi" Securities Suit Questions Sale to Cisco
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTHONY FRANCHI, Individually and On Behalf of All Similarly
Situated v. BROADSOFT, INC., JOHN D. MARKLEY, JR., MICHAEL
TESSLER, DAVID BERNARDI, JANE DIETZE, JOHN J. GAVIN JR., ANDREW M.
GEISSE, PAUL MAGELLI, DOUGLAS L. MAINE, EVA SAGE-GAVIN, CISCO
SYSTEMS, INC., BROOKLYN ACQUISITION CORP., Case No. 8:17-cv-03488-
TDC (D. Md., November 22, 2017), stems from a proposed
transaction, pursuant to which BroadSoft will be acquired by Cisco
Systems, Inc., through its subsidiary Brooklyn Acquisition Corp.

On October 20, 2017, BroadSoft's board of directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Cisco.
Pursuant to that agreement, shareholders of BroadSoft will receive
$55 per share in cash.

BroadSoft is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal
executive offices in Gaithersburg, Maryland.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  BroadSoft
is a technology innovator in cloud PBX, unified communications,
team collaboration and contact center solutions for businesses and
service providers across 80 countries.

Cisco is a California corporation and a party to the Merger
Agreement.  Cisco designs and sells a range of products, provides
services, and delivers integrated solutions to develop and connect
networks around the world.  Brooklyn Acquisition is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Cisco and a party to the Merger Agreement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas J. Minton, Esq.
          GOLDMAN & MINTON, P.C.
          3600 Clipper Mill Rd., Suite 201
          Baltimore, MD 21211
          Telephone: (410) 783-7575
          Facsimile: (410) 783-1711
          E-mail: tminton@charmcitylegal.com

               - and -

          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
          Wilmington, DE 19803
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310

               - and -

          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800


BLACKROCK INSTN'L: Dec. 22 Reply to Judicial Notice Objection
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Charles Baird et al., Plaintiffs, v. BlackRock
Institutional Trust Company, N.A., et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-1892-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco Division, granted the Parties' stipulation that the
Plaintiffs will file any objection to the Defendants' Request for
Judicial Notice by Dec. 8, 2017 and the Defendants will file any
reply by Dec. 22, 2017.

On Nov. 8, 2017, the Defendants filed a Request for Judicial
Notice in connection with the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Class Action Complaint, filed on the same day.
Because the Request for Judicial Notice relates to the Motion to
Dismiss, the Parties have conferred and agreed that it makes sense
to align the remaining briefing on the two motions.  The Parties
have therefore stipulated and agreed to the following briefing
schedule for the Request for Judicial Notice, which coincides with
the existing briefing schedule for the Motion to Dismiss: (i) Dec.
8, 2017, the Plaintiffs' objection to the Request for Judicial
Notice due and (ii) Dec. 22, 2017, the Defendants' reply due.

The parties have not requested any previous enlargement of time
with respect to the Request for Judicial Notice.  There have been
four previous time adjustments in the matter, none of which
affected discovery or the trial date and each of which related to
the motion to dismiss the original complaint and its hearing
schedule.

Judge Gilliam granted the Parties' stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Stipulated Order is
available at https://is.gd/WRH1O1 from Leagle.com.

Charles Baird, Plaintiff, represented by Nina Rachel Wasow --
nina@feinbergjackson.com -- Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman & Wasow
LLP.

Charles Baird, Plaintiff, represented by Julia Horwitz --
jhorwitz@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll, Karen
L. Handorf -- khandorf@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers
and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Michelle C. Yau --
myau@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro
hac vice & Todd F. Jackson -- todd@feinbergjackson.com --
Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman and Wasow LLP.

BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A., Defendant,
represented by Brian David Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny
Myers LLP, Adam Manes Kaplan -- akaplan@omm.com -- O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, Meaghan McLaine VerGow -- mvergow@omm.com -- OMelveny
and Myers LLP & Randall W. Edwards -- edwards@omm.com -- O'Melveny
& Myers LLP.

Blackrock, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian David Boyle,
O'Melveny Myers LLP, Adam Manes Kaplan, O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Meaghan McLaine VerGow, OMelveny and Myers LLP & Randall W.
Edwards, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

The BlackRock, Inc. Retirement Committee, Defendant, represented
by Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny Myers LLP, Adam Manes Kaplan,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Meaghan McLaine VerGow, OMelveny and Myers
LLP & Randall W. Edwards, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Jason Herman, Defendant, represented by Brian David Boyle,
O'Melveny Myers LLP, Adam Manes Kaplan, O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Meaghan McLaine VerGow, OMelveny and Myers LLP & Randall W.
Edwards, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

The Administrative Committee of the Retirement Committee,
Defendant, represented by Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny Myers LLP,
Adam Manes Kaplan, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Meaghan McLaine VerGow,
OMelveny and Myers LLP & Randall W. Edwards, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP.

The Investment Committee of the Retirement Committee, Defendant,
represented by Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny Myers LLP, Adam Manes
Kaplan, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Meaghan McLaine VerGow, OMelveny
and Myers LLP & Randall W. Edwards, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Catherine Bolz, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Chip Castille, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Paige Dickow, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Daniel A. Dunay, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Jeffrey A. Smith, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Anne Ackerley, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Edwards,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.


BRIDAL WAREHOUSE: Class Certification in "Witak" Suit Vacated
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIDAL WAREHOUSE, INC., Appellant, v. KRISTY WITAK,
ELAURA HAYNES, KHRISTINA RAMOS AND CANDACE AYLMER, Appellees, Case
No. 2017-CA-000072-ME (Ky. App.), Judge Sara W. Combs of the U.S.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky vacated the trial court's order
certifying a class action and remanded to the Jefferson Circuit
Court for additional proceedings.

Bridal Warehouse sells new, ready-to-wear bridal gowns; bridal
party dresses; prom/pageant dresses; and accessories. It operates
four retail stores in four cities: Louisville; Elizabethtown;
Goodlettsville, Tennessee; and Evansville, Indiana.  In addition
to its retail stores, Bridal Warehouse operates a warehouse
facility in Elizabethtown where it receives, sorts, and arranges
to ship to its various retail stores gowns that it orders directly
from dress manufacturers.  Since May 1, 2010, it has been a policy
of Bridal Warehouse to charge a fee of $20 for shipping and
handling fee whenever a customer at one of its retail stores
purchases a bridal gown that is part of the inventory at another
of its retail stores; purchases a gown from inventory stored at
the Elizabethtown warehouse; or purchases a gown ordered from the
manufacturer that is shipped to the Elizabethtown warehouse.

On Jan. 14, 2014, Witak filed a class action complaint in
Jefferson Circuit Court.  She purported to represent all Kentucky
residents who had purchased gowns to be ordered directly from the
manufacturer by Bridal Warehouse (between Jan. 1, 2003, and Jan.
14, 2014) to whom Bridal Warehouse had instead provided "used
dresses off the rack" from one of its retail sales floors.  Upon
information and belief, Witak alleged that Bridal Warehouse had
delivered thousands of "used" gowns to its customers.  She
asserted claims for fraud, violations of Kentucky's Consumer
Protection Act, and breach of contract.  She alleged that the
class members had each sustained similar damages.

On Jan. 27, 2014, Witak filed an amended complaint, which included
an additional five Plaintiffs, four of whom are Kentucky
residents.  No new allegations were made against Bridal Warehouse,
and no information concerning the new Plaintiffs (aside from their
addresses and residency) was included.  On Feb. 6, 2014, Bridal
Warehouse filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief may be granted.

On March 6, 2014, Witak, filed a second amended class action
complaint, alleging that the gown delivered to her had been either
an "on the floor dress" from one of Bridal Warehouse's other
retail sales floors or an item sent from the Elizabethtown
warehouse inventory.  Witak alleged that she believed that she had
been induced to pay an extra $20 fee even though Bridal Warehouse
had not ordered her gown directly from the manufacturer
specifically for her.  She alleged that she suffered injury as a
result.

Additional Plaintiffs, (Elaura Haynes, Shanna Stephens, Mary
Settles, Sarah Bryant, Candace Alymer, April Reynolds, Jessica
Endler, Shonya Nicole Murphy, Erica Simpson, Amanda Decker, Kasey
Ramsey, Beth Gray, Kaly Madsen, Angela Orem, Krystal Simpkinson,
Marena DeWitt, and Whitney Hopkins) claimed that they, too, had
been induced to pay an extra $20 fee and/or an additional upcharge
for their gowns to be ordered directly from the manufacturer.

On March 7, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed another pleading captioned
as "Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Corrected)."  In this
complaint, Khristina Ramos joined the action as a Plaintiff.  On
June 20, 2014, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order
granting the motion to dismiss with respect to six Plaintiffs
(April Reynolds, Shonya Murphy, Beth Gray, Shanna Stephens, Sarah
Bryant, and Whitney Hopkins) because their claims had been filed
out of time.

On Aug. 27, 2014, the Plaintiffs requested leave to file another
amended complaint.  The tendered amended complaint included an
additional Plaintiff, Shelly Chestnut; eliminated 16 of the 19
previously Named Plaintiffs; and sought to include a prayer for
injunctive relief.  Bridal Warehouse objected to the dismissal of
Plaintiff Candace Aylmer because her dismissal was without
prejudice.  Aylmer was not dismissed from the action.

On May 29, 2015, Plaintiffs Witak, Ramos, Haynes, and Aylmer filed
a motion for class certification.  They purported to represent two
sub-classes of litigants.  The first sub-class was defined as any
customer who, from December 1, 2008, contracted with Bridal
Warehouse to purchase a wedding gown that Bridal Warehouse
promised to special order directly from the gown's manufacturer
but who instead received a gown either from the retail sales floor
inventory of a Bridal Warehouse store or from the Elizabethtown
warehouse stock.  The second sub-class was defined as any customer
who was billed during the period for an undisclosed special order
fee or fees.

Bridal Warehouse vigorously resisted the motion and filed its own
motion for summary judgment.  On Jan. 4, 2017, the Jefferson
Circuit Court granted class certification for both sub-classes.
The appeal followed.

Judge Combs holds that the trial court abused its discretion by
certifying the class in the case because none of the Named
Plaintiffs' claims fairly encompasses either of the proposed sub-
class claims.  Since the proposed class representatives are not
part of either of the sub-classes they purport to represent, it is
impossible to conclude that they have demonstrated the
prerequisites for class action certification.

As her summary of the evidence indicates, none of the Plaintiffs
demonstrated that she was promised by Bridal Warehouse to order a
gown specially for her from the manufacturer but that she instead
received a gown from the retail sales floor inventory of a Bridal
Warehouse store or a gown from the Elizabethtown warehouse stock.
Similarly, none of them was charged an undisclosed fee.  The
Plaintiffs' admissions, the documentary evidence, and the
testimony of Bridal Warehouse representatives exclude the
Plaintiffs from the proposed sub-classes.  Therefore, they have
failed to show numerosity, commonality, typicality, or adequate
representation.  Consequently, the order of the trial court
granting class certification must be vacated.

Accordingly, Judge Combs vacated the order certifying a class
action and remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for additional
proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/5VDHLf from Leagle.com.

Dana R. Howard -- dana.howard@skofirm.com -- Lexington, Kentucky,
Brief for Appellant.

Ben Carter -- BEN@BENCARTERLAW.COM -- John Bahe, Louisville,
Kentucky, Brief for appellees.


BUILD.COM INC: Court Dismisses Wire Tap Suit for Lack of Standing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum and Order
granting, with prejudice, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the second
amended complaint in the case captioned RHONDA JURGENS, Plaintiff,
v. BUILD.COM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-00783-AGF (E.D.
Mo.), for failure to state a claim and lack of standing.

This putative class action arises out of Build.com, Inc.'s alleged
interception of its online customers' names, addresses, telephone
numbers, and credit card information (Credit Card Details), and
disclosure of those details to unrelated third parties, without
the customers' consent.

Plaintiff's second amended complaint asserts three claims: (1)
Violations of the Wiretap Act, as amended by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) 18 U.S.C. Section
2511(1)(a) (Interception); (2) Violations of the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 2511(1)(c) (Disclosure); and (3) Common-Law Unjust
Enrichment. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the maximum
allowable statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys'
fees.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
violation of the Wiretap Act (Counts 1 and 2) because Plaintiff
has not alleged any interception of an electronic communication.
Defendant argues that, accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true,
Plaintiff's Credit Card Details were acquired by Defendant from
storage in Plaintiff's computer, rather than, as required by the
Wiretap Act, as part of an electronic communication that Plaintiff
was transmitting beyond her own computer.

Wiretap Act (Counts I and II)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's interactions with
her own computer were not communications at all.  Tautologically,
a communication will always consist of at least two parties: the
speaker and/or sender, and at least one intended recipient.  And
if they were communications, then, according to Plaintiff's own
allegations, they were made within the confines of Plaintiff's own
computer before transmission over the Internet.  As such, they
were not electronic communications transmitted by a system that
affects interstate commerce, as required under the Wiretap Act.
Use of a keylogger will not violate the Wiretap Act if the signal
or information captured from the keystrokes is not at that time
being transmitted beyond the computer on which the keylogger is
installed.  Thus, Plaintiff's Wiretap Act claims must be dismissed
in any event.

Unjust Enrichment (Count III)

Putting aside the question of whether Plaintiff has standing to
assert an unjust enrichment claim, the Court finds that she fails
to state such a claim. Under Missouri law, unjust enrichment
requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on
the defendant; (2) the defendant appreciated the benefit; and (3)
the defendant accepted and retained the benefit under inequitable
and/or unjust circumstances.

Plaintiff claims that the unjust enrichment here is the money she
paid to Defendant for merchandise, which she received in full,
because part of that money should have gone to pay for better data
security measures. But Plaintiff does not allege any facts giving
rise to a reasonable inference that any specific portion of the
money she paid was intended or required to be spent on data
protection. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that
she conferred a benefit on Defendant the retention of which would
be inequitable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9fgzjqw
from Leagle.com.

Rhonda Jurgens, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Stampley --
dstampley@kamberlaw.com -- KAMBERLAW, LLC, pro hac vice.

Rhonda Jurgens, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen F. Gaunt,
STEELMAN, GAUNT & HORSEFIELD 901 Pine Street, Suite 110, Rolla, MO
65401 & Michael J. Aschenbrener, KAMBERLAW LLC. 220 North Green
Street, Chicago, Illinois 60607

Build.com, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L. Schultz --
jschultz@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP,
Alexander Clark Barrett- abarrett@armstrongteasdale.com --
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP & Matthew D. Turner --
mturner@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP, pro hac
vice.


BULGARI CORP: Sued by Mendizabal Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA MENDIZABAL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. BULGARI CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Case No. 1:17-cv-09225
(S.D.N.Y., November 23, 2017), is a civil rights action arising
from the Defendant's alleged failure to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its Web site to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or visually-
impaired people.

Ms. Mendizabal is a visually-impaired and legally blind person,
who requires screen-reading software to read Web site content
using her computer.  Because the Web site is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the Americans with Disabilities Act, she contends.

Bulgari Corporation of America is a New York domestic business
corporation registered to do business in New York.  The Defendant
operates http://www.bulgari.com/and its Web site, and advertises,
markets, distributes, and sells jewelry and luxury goods and
fragrances in the state of New York and throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          JOSEPH H. MIZRAHI LAW P.C.
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (718) 425-8954
          E-mail: Joseph@Jmizrahilaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


CAPSTONE LOGISTICS: Tapia Seeks Overtime Wages under Labor Code
---------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN TAPIA, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; PINNACLE WORKFORCE LOGISTICS, L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 17CV319864 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov.
30, 2017), seeks to recover penalties and/or damages for failure
to pay overtime wages, failure to provide proper wage statements,
and failure to pay wages in a timely manner, in violation of the
California Labor Code.

Capstone Logistics provides performance workgroup services for
manufacturing operations and distribution centers in the United
States. It offers production support services, including line
delivery, raw materials line takeaway, machine loading, scrap/re-
work, and inspection.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lany W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nick Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488 6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488 6554

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531 4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634 0333


CASHCALL INC: Settlement in "De La Torre" Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDUARDO DE LA TORRE, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CASHCALL,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 08-cv-03174-MEJ (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Maria-Elena James of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval and the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and
Service Awards.

After litigating the certified class action for nearly nine years,
the Plaintiffs submitted to the Court a proposed Settlement which
resolved one of their claims.  On June 21, 2017, the Court
preliminarily approved the proposed settlement and directed notice
be sent to Class Members.  The Plaintiffs now move the Court to
(i) finally approve the Settlement; (ii) grant their Motion for
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards; and (iii) enter
judgment.

The Class Counsel request $650,000 in fees and costs incurred in
litigating the Conditioning Claims.  Of that figure, $601,336.74
represents attorneys' fees and $48,663.25 represents costs:

   (i) Firm Costs Gibbs Law Group LLP - $374.36;
  (ii) The Law Office of Arthur D. Levy - $16,921.46;
(iii) Rukin Hyland LLP - $4,167.90;
  (iv) The Law Offices of Damon - $729.64;
   (v) Connolly Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC - $1,470;
  (vi) The Sturdevant Law Firm - $24,999.90.

The Settlement provides for service awards of $10,000 each to Ms.
Kempley and Mr. De La Torre.

The Court held a hearing on these matters on Nov. 16, 2017.  In
light of the foregoing analysis, Magistrate Judge James granted
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement and
granted their Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

The Magistrate Judge confirmed Lori Kempley and Eduardo De La
Torre as the Class Representatives.  The Sturdevant Law Firm, APC;
The Law Office of Arthur D. Levy; Gibbs Law Group, LPP; Rukin
Hyland LLP; The Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly; and The Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC are confirmed as the Class Counsel.

She ordered that CashCall will pay to Class Counsel $601,336.74 in
attorneys' fees and $48,663.26 in costs, to be allocated in the
amounts set forth above.

Pursuant to the Settlement: (i) the Settlement will become
effective as of the date of the Order as no Class Member has filed
an objection; (ii) CashCall will fund the settlement within 10
days of the Order; and (iii) not later than 20 days after funding,
KCC will distribute payments to Class Members, service awards to
the Class Representatives, and attorneys' fees and costs to Class
Counsel.

The Magistrate Judge approved the California Reinvestment
Coalition, Consumer Federation of California, National Association
of Consumer Advocates, and Consumer Federation of America as cy
pres nominees.  The Court will determine the amounts, if any, to
be paid to these nominees.

Each member of the Settlement Class not listed in Exhibit A to the
Order will be bound to the Settlement Agreement.  Each of them is
released from liability from all NSF fees CashCall charged prior
to the cancellation, if any, of their respective authorizations to
collect loan payments via EFT, regardless of whether the Class
Member actually paid such fees.  CashCall will not engage in any
further action to collect such NSF fees with respect to any loans
that are still owned by CashCall.  If any Class Member has an open
loan account that includes unpaid charges for NSF fees, CashCall
will recalculate such loan account to eliminate such unpaid
charges.

The Order will constitute a final judgment in the action.  The
Court will conduct a status conference on May 10, 2018 at 10:00
a.m.  No later than seven days before the status conference, the
parties will file a joint status report.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/gVBwqJ from Leagle.com.

Eduardo De La Torre, Plaintiff, represented by Damon Mathew
Connolly, Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly.

Eduardo De La Torre, Plaintiff, represented by James C.
Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm, Whitney Stark, Terrell
Marwill Daudt & Willie, PLLC, Arthur David Levy, Jessica Lee
Riggin -- jriggin@rhdtlaw.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP, Melinda Fay
Pilling -- melinda.pilling@doj.ca.gov -- Rukin Hyland Doria and
Tindall & Steven M. Tindall -- smt@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law
Group LLP.

Lori Saysourivong, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur David Levy,
James C. Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm, Melinda Fay Pilling,
Rukin Hyland Doria and Tindall, Steven M. Tindall, Gibbs Law Group
LLP & Whitney Stark -- whitneystark@tmdwlaw.com. -- Terrell
Marwill Daudt & Willie, PLLC.

Cashcall, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brad W. Seiling --
bseiling@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Claudia
Callaway, Manatt Phelps & Phillips, LLP, pro hac vice, Lydia
Michelle Mendoza -- lmendoza@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps and
Phillips LLP & Noel Scott Cohen -- ncohen@polsinelli.com --
Polsinelli LLP.

Cashcall, Inc., Counter-claimant, represented by Brad W. Seiling,
Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Claudia Callaway, Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP, Lydia Michelle Mendoza, Manatt Phelps and Phillips
LLP & Noel Scott Cohen, Polsinelli LLP.

Eduardo De La Torre, Counter-defendant, represented by Damon
Mathew Connolly, Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly, James C.
Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm, Whitney Stark, Terrell
Marwill Daudt & Willie, PLLC & Arthur David Levy.

Cashcall, Inc., Counter-claimant, represented by Brad W. Seiling,
Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Claudia Callaway, Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP, Lydia Michelle Mendoza, Manatt Phelps and Phillips
LLP & Noel Scott Cohen, Polsinelli LLP.

Lori Saysourivong, Lori Saysourivong, Counter-defendant,
represented by Arthur David Levy, James C. Sturdevant, The
Sturdevant Law Firm & Whitney Stark, Terrell Marwill Daudt &
Willie, PLLC.

Eduardo De La Torre, Counter-defendant, represented by Damon
Mathew Connolly, Law Offices of Damon M. Connolly, James C.
Sturdevant, The Sturdevant Law Firm, Whitney Stark, Terrell
Marwill Daudt & Willie, PLLC & Arthur David Levy.


CENTRAL TRI-AXLE: Court Conditionally Certifies "Swafford" Class
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, issued an Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion to Conditionally Certify a Collective Action
and Facilitate Notice in the case captioned CATHY SWAFFORD and
RICK WOEHLECKE, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CENTRAL TRI-AXLE INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-00278-TWP-DML (S.D. Ind.).

Plaintiffs previously were employed by Defendant Central Tri-Axle,
Inc. (CTI) as dump truck drivers.  Plaintiffs generally worked
fifty to sixty-six hours per week for CTI, yet CTI failed to
accurately record their hours worked and failed to pay Plaintiffs
overtime premium for overtime hours worked.  Because they were not
paid overtime wages and suffered other wrongful deductions,
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against CTI under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 and the Indiana Wage
Payment, Wage Deductions, and Wage Claim statutes, Ind. Code
Sections 22-2-5-1.

The Court determines that conditional certification of a
collective action for Plaintiffs' FLSA claim is appropriate
because Plaintiffs have made a threshold showing that they are
similarly situated to other drivers who were denied overtime wages
by CTI.  Plaintiffs' declarations establish their work duties,
their overtime hours, and the denial of overtime wages.  The
declarations also sufficiently describe the similar conditions of
other drivers employed by CTI.  While CTI argues that Plaintiffs'
assertions regarding other drivers are unfounded beliefs and
speculation because they did not work the same hours as other
drivers, CTI ignores Plaintiffs' assertions that they talked with
fellow drivers about their experiences at CTI.

Additionally, the report from the Department of Labor's
investigation is strong evidence that the drivers at CTI were
similarly situated and faced the same policies and practices that
denied them overtime wages.  The Court also notes that CTI's
argument about discrepancies between 374 or 364 miles driven per
day compared to 500 miles is not relevant to the question of
similarly situated employees being denied overtime wages. This
minor, irrelevant discrepancy does not undermine the propriety of
certifying a collective action.

Concerning the argument of the breadth of the proposed class, the
Court agrees with Plaintiffs' position. The proposed release is
limited in its scope of time, and there is no evidence before the
Court that a release of claims was executed by potential
plaintiffs who cashed checks. The Court notes that there is a
difference between waiving rights to file a lawsuit and waiving
rights to join a lawsuit that is already pending. There is no
evidence that CTI informed any potential class members that a
collective action was already pending. Thus, the Court determines
that narrowing the proposed class is not appropriate that this
stage of the litigation.

The Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion and conditionally certifies
the FLSA claim as a collective action for the following class:

     All current and former dump truck drivers who are or were
employed by Defendant Central Tri-Axle, Inc. during the three-year
period prior to the date of this Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8qsj7fxfrom Leagle.com.

CATHY SWAFFORD, Plaintiff, represented by Philip J. Gibbons, Jr.,
GIBBONS LEGAL GROUP, P.C., 15720 Brixham Hill Ave, Ste
331Charlotte, NC 28277

CATHY SWAFFORD, Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Hunt, LAW
OFFICE OF ROBERT J. HUNT LLC. 3091 E. 98th St., Suite 280
Indianapolis, IN 46280-1970

RICK WOEHLECKE, Plaintiff, represented by Philip J. Gibbons, Jr.,
GIBBONS LEGAL GROUP, P.C. & Robert J. Hunt, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT
J. HUNT LLC.

CENTRAL TRI-AXLE INC., Defendant, represented by Alaina Cathrine
Hawley -- AHAWLEY@SCOPELITIS.COM -- SCOPELITIS GARVIN LIGHT HANSON
& FEARY PC, Alvin Jackson Finklea, III -- jfinklea@scopelitis.com
-- SCOPELITIS GARVIN LIGHT & HANSON & Peter C. Morton --
PMORTON@SCOPELITIS.COM -- SCOPELITIS GARVIN LIGHT HANSON & FEARY
PC.


CENTURA HOMEOWNERS: Misclassifies Employees, Shreve Suit Says
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KAREN SHREVE, and All others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
CENTURA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
CACE-17-021581 (in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Cir in
and for Broward Cty., Florida, Nov. 29, 2017), seeks to recover
damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and all other
remedies allowable as a result of Defendant's violations of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act and Florida
Whistleblower Act.

According to the complaint, Defendant's consistent
misclassification of employees has resulted in substantial cost
savings to Defendant and have provided Defendant with an unfair
competitive advantage against its competitors who comply with
their legal obligations. Injunctive relief is necessary to put an
end to Defendant's unlawful misclassification practice. The
Plaintiff has retained undersigned counsel and agreed to pay a
reasonable attorneys' fee for all services rendered.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Freddy Perera, Esq.
          PERERA LAW GROUP, P.A.
          12555 Orange Dr., Ste. 268
          Davie, FL 33330
          Telephone: 786 485 5232
          Facsimile: 786 485 1519
          E-mail: freddy@pereralaw.com


CHANEL INC: Web Site Inaccessible to Blind, Mendizabal Says
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MARIA MENDIZABAL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. CHANEL, INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-09229 (S.D.N.Y.,
November 23, 2017), accuses the Defendant of failing to design,
construct, maintain, and operate its Web site to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people.

Ms. Mendizabal is a visually-impaired and legally blind person,
who requires screen-reading software to read Web site content
using her computer.  Because the Web site is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the ADA, she contends.

Chanel, Inc., is a New York domestic business corporation
registered to do business in New York.  The Defendant operates
http://www.CHANEL.com/and its Web site, and advertises, markets,
distributes, and sells clothing, luxury goods and accessories in
the state of New York and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          JOSEPH H. MIZRAHI LAW P.C.
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (718) 425-8954
          E-mail: Joseph@Jmizrahilaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


CONAGRA BRANDS: First Circuit Appeal Filed in "Lee" Class Suit
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Plaintiff Margaret Lee filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Lee v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:17-cv-11042-RGS, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, Boston.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the putative
class action lawsuit was removed from state court to the District
Court.

The nature of suit is stated as "Other Personal Property Damage."

The appellate case is captioned as Lee v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et
al., Case No. 17-2131, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MARGARET LEE, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Edward F. Haber, Esq.
          Patrick J. Vallely, Esq.
          SHAPIRO HABER & URMY LLP
          Seaport East
          2 Seaport Ln
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 439-3939
          Facsimile: (617) 439-0134
          E-mail: ehaber@shulaw.com
                  pvallely@shulaw.com

Defendants-Appellees CONAGRA, STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY LLC,
ROCHE BROS. INC., ROCHE BROS. SUPERMARKETS, INC., and ROCHE BROS.
SUPERMARKETS, LLC, are represented by:

          Kevin M. Duddlesten, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          2000 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1400
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 932-6419
          Facsimile: (214) 273-7484
          E-mail: kduddlesten@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Angela M. Spivey, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          1230 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2100
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3534
          Telephone: (404) 443-5720
          Facsimile: (214) 273-7484
          E-mail: aspivey@mcguirewoods.com


COOK COUNTY, IL: Pietryla Asks Court to Reactivate Employment
-------------------------------------------------------------
JACOB PIETRYLA, the Plaintiff, v. THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF OF COOK
COUNTY in his official capacity, THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S
MERIT BOARD, and the COUNTY OF COOK as joint employer and
indemnor, the Defendant, Case No. 2017-CH-15753 (Cir Ct. of Cook
County, Ill., Nov. 30, 2017), seeks an order directing Defendants
Sheriff and Cook County to return Plaintiff to active employment
and/or pay status, and/or to compel payment of back pay and all
other make whole relief.

The Plaintiff on behalf of himself and those similarly-situated
also moves the Court to direct Defendants to expunge, purge, and
remove the Board's void decision from all of their files, and to
treat Plaintiff as if he is an active employee of Defendants Dart
and Cook County.

Cook County is a county in the U.S. state of Illinois. It is the
second-most populous county in the United States after Los Angeles
County, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Cass T. Casper, Esq.
          TALON LAW, LLC
          1153 West Lunt Avenue, Suite 253
          Chicago, IL 60626
          Telephone: (312) 351 2478
          Facsimile: (312) 276 4930
          E-mail: ctc@talonlaw.com


CR ENGLAND: Court Allows Deposition of Absent Class Members
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for District of Utah, Central
Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part
Motion to Amend Fourth Amended Scheduling Order For Approval to
Depose Absent Class Members in the case captioned Charles Roberts
et al., Plaintiffs, v. C.R. England, Inc., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 2:12-cv-0302 (D. Utah).

This matter is a class action involving Plaintiffs who allege that
Defendants fraudulently solicited and sold them a business
opportunity to drive large trucks.  Defendants own and operate a
trucking company, a company that leases trucks, and a school that
provides instruction for students so they can obtain a commercial
driver license (CDL).  Plaintiffs allege violations of various
state and federal laws.  In short, Plaintiffs assert that
Defendants misrepresented the income that was available to
students who ended up leasing trucks from Defendants.

Defendants bring the present motion requesting to take 100
depositions of absent class members and to extend the fact
discovery deadline to allow the depositions to occur.  Defendants
claim they need this information to rebut the inference of
reliance and causation and to demonstrate the individual disparity
in damages.

Plaintiffs assert that in reality this is a thinly-veiled attempt
to obtain new evidence to decertify the class.

Discovery directed toward absent class members is permissible.

Discovery of absentee or unnamed class members under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is neither prohibited nor sanctioned
explicitly.  The general rule is that discovery requests to absent
class members are generally disfavored.  But, that rule is not
absolute, and discovery of absent class members may be allowed in
certain circumstances.  In deciding whether to allow these
discovery, courts have applied a variety of factors.

One consistent factor, however, found among all the tests is the
proponent of the discovery bears the burden.  It is not always
entirely clear what this burden is in requesting absentee class
discovery as some courts have required a strong showing to
discharge this burden, while others seem to simply decide the
issue on the basis of judicial discretion.

During arguments Defendants have repeatedly pointed to a decision
out of the Eastern District of California, Arredondo v. Delano
Farms Co., 2014 WL 5106401, which permitted depositions for a
portion of the class members.  In Arredondo, the plaintiffs sought
a protective order to prevent the Defendants from taking 196
depositions of absent class members.  The court rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments concerning the defendants' prior access to
evidence, that the court's decision regarding class certification
prohibited such discovery and case law prevented it.

The Arredondo court permitted the taking the depositions of
roughly 200 less than one percent of the 25,000 class members.
These individuals were part of a pilot study designed by an expert
to determine issues of variability and whether certain subgroups
of class members, for example, those who worked during certain
time periods and for certain foremen, had more homogeneous
experiences with regard to pre-shift work. The number of
depositions was based on what the expert felt would be
statistically relevant and the court noted the need for the
sampling to be grounded in the methods and procedures of science.

Here, Defendants argue that 100 depositions would be a
statistically significant sample and propose that each side pick
50.  Additionally, defendants do not object to conducting the
depositions after the period for opting in or out of the class
ends, provided that the schedule allows it.  The court agrees with
Defendants suggestion that the depositions be conducted after the
period for opting in or out of the class.  This will help prevent
a class member's decision of whether or not to join the class
being improperly based on a potential deposition hanging over
their head.  But, the court is not convinced that 100 depositions
is a statistically significant sample.

Defendants do not submit any evidence from an expert like in
Arredondo.  Rather without any support 100 appears to be a
convenient number reached out of thin air.  The court could
arbitrarily pick a number but that would be an improper exercise
of judicial discretion based on conjecture.  In short it could
likely be a waste of time and resources to engage in 100
depositions without support that such a number is statistically
significant.  The court will permit depositions and extend the
discovery deadline to do so, but Defendants are ordered to propose
a statistically significant sample size based on the work of an
expert in this case, not conjecture based on a number used in
another case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ydawvjkafrom Leagle.com.

Charles Roberts, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin J. Glicksman -
- bjg@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK, pro hac vice.

Charles Roberts, Plaintiff, represented by Jason E. Greene,
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700Salt Lake City,
UT 84101, Kevin P. Roddy -- kroddy@wilentz.com -- WILENTZ GOLDMAN
& SPITZER PA, pro hac vice, Robert S. Boulter -- rsb@boulter-
law.com -- pro hac vice, Thomas R. Karrenberg --
tkarrenberg@aklawfirm.com -- ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, Aaron H.
Aizenberg - aha@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK SC, pro
hac vice, Benjamin R. Prinsen - brp@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT HOVEL
& KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice, Christopher J. Krawczyk, KRAVIT HOVEL
& KRAWCZYK SC, 825 North Jefferson Street, Suite 500Milwaukee, WI
53202-373, pro hac vice, Heather M. Sneddon, ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
- hsneddon@aklawfirm.com -- Jon V. Harper --
jharper@jonharperlaw.com -- HARPER LAW PLC & Stephen E. Kravit -
kravit@kravitlaw.com -- KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice.

Kenneth McKay, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin J. Glicksman,
KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK, pro hac vice, Jason E. Greene, ANDERSON
& KARRENBERG, Kevin P. Roddy, WILENTZ GOLDMAN & SPITZER PA, pro
hac vice, Robert S. Boulter, pro hac vice, Thomas R. Karrenberg,
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, Aaron H. Aizenberg, KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK
SC, pro hac vice, Benjamin R. Prinsen, KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK SC,
pro hac vice, Christopher J. Krawczyk, KRAVIT HOVEL & KRAWCZYK SC,
pro hac vice, Heather M. Sneddon, ANDERSON & KARRENBERG, Jon V.
Harper, HARPER LAW PLC & Stephen E. Kravit, KRAVIT HOVEL &
KRAWCZYK SC, pro hac vice.

C.R. England, Defendant, represented by Drew R. Hansen --
dhansen@tocounsel.com -- THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James
S. Jardine - jjardine@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, Adam Kenji
Richards - arichards@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, Andrew S.
Jick -- ajick@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP,
pro hac vice, Christopher K. Petersen -- cpetersen@akingump.com  -
- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, David B.
Dibble - ddibble@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, Gregory W.
Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
LLP, pro hac vice, Neal R. Marder -- nmarder@akingump.com -- AKIN
GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, Rex S. Heinke --
rheinke@akingump.com -- AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro
hac vice & Scott A. Hagen - shagen@rqn.com -- RAY QUINNEY &
NEBEKER.

Opportunity Leasing, Defendant, represented by Drew R. Hansen,
THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY QUINNEY
& NEBEKER, Andrew S. Jick, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro
hac vice, Christopher K. Petersen, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
LLP, pro hac vice, David B. Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, Gregory
W. Knopp, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, Neal
R. Marder, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice, Rex
S. Heinke, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, pro hac vice &
Scott A. Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.

Opportunity Leasing, Counter Claimant, represented by Drew R.
Hansen, THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY
QUINNEY & NEBEKER, David B. Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER & Scott
A. Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.

C.R. England, Counter Claimant, represented by Drew R. Hansen,
THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY QUINNEY
& NEBEKER, David B. Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER & Scott A.
Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.

Kenneth McKay, Counter Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Glicksman, KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK & Robert S. Boulter, pro hac
vice.

Charles Roberts, Counter Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Glicksman, KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK & Robert S. Boulter, pro hac
vice.

C.R. England, Counter Claimant, represented by Drew R. Hansen,
THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY QUINNEY
& NEBEKER, David B. Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER & Scott A.
Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.

Opportunity Leasing, Counter Claimant, represented by Drew R.
Hansen, THEODORA ORINGHER PC, pro hac vice, James S. Jardine, RAY
QUINNEY & NEBEKER, David B. Dibble, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER & Scott
A. Hagen, RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER.

Kenneth McKay, Counter Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Glicksman, KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK & Robert S. Boulter, pro hac
vice.

Charles Roberts, Counter Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Glicksman, KRAVIT, HOVEL & KRAWCZYK & Robert S. Boulter, pro hac
vice.


CU RECOVERY: "Jeffries" Remanded to West Virginia State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the case captioned NORMAN E.
JEFFRIES, Plaintiff, v. CU RECOVERY, INC. and GREATER IOWA CREDIT
UNION, Defendants, Civil Action No. 5:17CV124 (STAMP) (N.D.W.V.),
to the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia.

The plaintiff filed a motion to remand arguing that the defendants
have failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00 exclusive of interests and costs.

The plaintiff, Norman E. Jeffries, originally filed his class
action complaint in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West
Virginia, against defendants CU Recovery, Inc. ("CU Recovery") and
Greater Iowa Credit Union ("GICU").  The plaintiff, individually
and on behalf of a class of West Virginia consumers, alleges that
the defendants violated Chapter 46A, Article 2 of the West
Virginia Code by attempting to collect debts that were barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. The complaint makes claims
for (1) statutory violations and (2) unjust enrichment. The
plaintiff seeks actual damages, statutory damages, debt collection
relief, and an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court in
instances where the federal court is able to exercise original
jurisdiction over the matter. Federal courts have original
jurisdiction over primarily two types of cases: (1) those
involving federal questions under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, and (2)
those involving citizens of different states where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a).

The Court finds that the defendants fail to demonstrate that the
amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied. The
defendants have established that the amount of the debt is
$20,550.00, and the plaintiff agrees that this is the amount of
debt in controversy. However, the defendants fail to state any
other amount with any specificity, and the amount of debt alone
falls below the $75,000.00 threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
Therefore, because the defendants only speculate as to the amount
of damages above $20,550.00, removal is improper. Removal
jurisdiction is strictly construed, and, if federal jurisdiction
is doubtful, the federal court must remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9sd8wa3from Leagle.com.

Norman E. Jeffries, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B.
Frost, Hamilton Burgess Young & Pollard, PLLC, 5493 Maple Lane,
P.O. Box 959Fayetteville, WV 25840

Norman E. Jeffries, Plaintiff, represented by Jason E. Causey,
Bordas & Bordas, PLLC, 1358 National Rd, Wheeling, WV 26003, Jed
R. Nolan, Hamilton Burgess Young & Pollard, PLLC, Ralph C. Young,
Hamilton Burgess Young & Pollard, PLLC & Steven R. Broadwater,
Jr., Hamilton Burgess Young & Pollard, PLLC, Maple Lane, PO Box
959, Fayetteville, WV 25840

CU Recovery, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bruce M. Jacobs -
bjacobs@spilmanlaw.com -- Spilman, Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Sharon
L. Potter - spotter@spilmanlaw.com -- Spilman Thomas & Battle PLLC
& Ryan W. Weld - rweld@spilmanlaw.com -- Spilman Thomas & Battle
PLLC.

Greater Iowa Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Ryan W. Weld,
Spilman Thomas & Battle PLLC, Sharon L. Potter, Spilman Thomas &
Battle PLLC & Bruce M. Jacobs, Spilman, Thomas & Battle, PLLC.


DAIRYAMERICA INC: Filing of Redacted FACC in "Carlin" OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GERALD CARLIN, JOHN RAHM, PAUL ROZWADOWSKI
and DIANA WOLFE, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYAMERICA, INC., and
CALIFORNIA DAIRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:09-cv-00430-AWI
(EPG)(E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' Request to Seal Document and File Redacted Version
pursuant to Civil Local Rules 140 and 141.

The Magistrate Judge permitted the Plaintiffs to file a redacted
version of the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint
on the public docket, and they will email the unredacted version
of the document to ApprovedSealed@caed.uscourts.gov for filing
under seal.  Only the parties' counsel of record, the Court and
its staff will have access to the unredacted document.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/A6XRHE from Leagle.com.

Gerald Carlin, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler --
cpoppler@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman Tabacco.

Gerald Carlin, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony David Phillips --
aphillips@archernorris.com -- Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle
Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC, Brent W. Johnson -- bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg
-- claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro
hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger --
cheffelfinger@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman Tabacco, George F.
Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli
E. Farris -- jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP,
Justin N. Saif -- jsaif@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio --
gfarah@cohenmilstein.com -- pro hac vice, Leslie M. Kroeger --
lkroeger@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt -- rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

John Rahm, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler, Berman
Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle
Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers &  Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson,
Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C.
Laufenberg, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher
Heffelfinger, Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein
Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

Paul Rozwadowski, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler,
Berman Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin
Doyle Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson,
Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C.
Laufenberg, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher
Heffelfinger, Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein
Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

Diana Wolfe, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler, Berman
Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle
Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers &  Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson,
Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C.
Laufenberg, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher
Heffelfinger, Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein
Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice &
Ryan McDevitt, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

DairyAmerica, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles M. English,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, E. John Steren --
esteren@ebglaw.com -- Ober Kaler, pro  hac vice, Joseph Michael
Marchini -- jmm@bmj-law.com -- Baker, Manock & Jensen, Wendy M.
Yoviene -- wyoviene@bakerdonelson -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice,
Allison Ann Davis -- allisondavis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP, Joy G. Kim -- joykim@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP &
Sanjay Mohan Nangia --  sanjaynangia@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP.

California Dairies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lawrence
Michael Cirelli -- lcirelli@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett,
Shannon Marie Nessier, Hanson Bridgett LLP & Megan Oliver
Thompson, Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Bimemiller Candice, Unknown, represented by Edward Zusman, Markun
Zusman Freniere & Compton LLP.

James Rehberg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A. Tostrud, Tostrud
Law Group, P.C..

Ronald Hayek, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A. Tostrud, Tostrud
Law Group, P.C..

Michael K. Schugg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP.

Timothy L. Rawlings, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J.
Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris,
Keller Rohrback LLP, Mark A. Griffin, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac
vice & Raymond J. Farrow, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice.

Land O' Lakes, Inc., Amicus, represented by Gregory M. Schweizer -
- gschweizer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice,
Scott C. Solberg --ssolberg@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro
hac vice & Seth D. Hilton -- sethhilton@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives
LLP.

California Farmers Union, Amicus, represented by Daniel Bennett
Harris.

California Dairy Campaign, Amicus, represented by Daniel Bennett
Harris.

Lani Ellingsworth, Movant, represented by Darin M. Dalmat --
dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C. & Glenn Rothner,
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone.


DELIU LLC: Faces "Etienne" Class Suit Over Unsolicited Text Ads
---------------------------------------------------------------
EROLE ETIENNE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DELIU, LLC d/b/a CRUNCH FITNESS OAKLAND PARK, a
foreign limited liability company, Case No. 0:17-cv-62297-FAM
(S.D. Fla., November 22, 2017), alleges that to promote its
services, the Defendant sends text messages to consumers using an
autodialer on their cellular telephones without their prior
express written consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Defendant is a Delaware limited liability company with its
principal place of business located in Oakland Park, Florida.  The
Defendant owns and operates a Crunch fitness center located in
Oakland Park.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Brendan A. Sweeney, Esq.
          SWEENEY LAW P.A.
          800 S.E. 3rd Ave., Fl 4
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316-1152
          Telephone: (954) 440-3993
          E-mail: brendanasweeney@gmail.com


ECLINICALWORKS: Suit Says Deficiencies Led to Inaccurate Records
----------------------------------------------------------------
Evan Sweeney, writing for Fierce Healthcare, reports that less
than 6 months after paying $155 million to settle claims it
falsely obtained certification for its EHR software,
eClinicalWorks has been hit with a class-action lawsuit that
claims deficiencies in the company's software meant patients could
not rely on the accuracy of their medical records.

The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of New York, was brought by Kristina Tot who oversees the
estate of Stjepan Tot. The suit claims Tot, who died of cancer,
was "unable to determine reliably when his first symptoms of
cancer appeared" because his EHR "failed to accurately display his
medical history on progress notes."

Tot further alleged that because eClinicalWorks' software did not
meet the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT's
certification requirements, "millions of patients have had their
medical records compromised" and "can no longer rely on the
accuracy and veracity" of their EHR. The suit noted that more than
850,000 healthcare providers use eClinicalWorks.

A cover sheet filed with the complaint lists a monetary demand
just shy of $1 billion.

The lawsuit points to specific shortcomings within the EHR
software, including a failure to meet federal data portability
requirements, accurately track user actions in an audit log and
reliably record diagnostic image orders. Failure to meet these
certification requirements meant patient information and progress
notes were periodically displayed incorrectly, while inaccurate
audit logs misled physicians over the course of a patient's
treatment.

The class-action suit claims eClinicalWorks breached its fiduciary
duty by failing to maintain the integrity of medical records,
categorizing the company's failure to meet federal certification
requirements as "grossly negligent."

A spokesperson for the company did not immediately respond to a
request for comment.

In May, eClinicalWorks paid $155 million to settle claims by
federal prosecutors that the company had knowingly falsified
Meaningful Use certification, triggering fraudulent incentive
payments to providers. The case marked the first time the
Department of Justice pursued an EHR vendor for failing to meet
certification requirements, and some former federal IT officials
hinted that eClincalWorks was not the only vendor that had taken
liberties with ONC's certification criteria.

When the settlement was announced, eClinicalWorks CEO Girish
Navani said the agreement signaled the company had "addressed the
issues raised, and have taken significant measures to promote
compliance and transparency."

Despite that settlement, the company recently posted it's the best
quarter of the year, adding 3,750 new providers and $130 million
in revenue. [GN]


ELK GROVE, IL: Court Dismisses "Singh" Suit with Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California dismissed with leave to amend the
case, RON SINGH, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF ELK GROVE; NATHAN
CHAMPION, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-2027 MCE DB PS (E.D. Cal.).

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiff's complaint and motion
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.
The Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the Defendants engaged in
an illegal search and seizure.

The Plaintiff alleges that the subject property is located at 6136
Demonte Way, Elk Grove, California.  In 2017, the Elk Grove City
had illegal surveillance at the subject property without any
warrant.  Almost every week on different occasions within last two
years including on Jan. 16, 2016, on March 15, 2016, on Sept. 18,
2016, on Dec. 28, 2016, on Jan. 9, 2017 and on Sept. 9, 2017, the
Elk Grove City Police, Nathan Champion conspiring with the Elk
Grove City Police and other Defendants illegally trespassed the
subject property, illegally damaged the subject property and
illegally seized the personal properties of the Plaintiffs without
any warrant.

The complaint purports to be brought on behalf of the Plaintiff,
all others similarly situated, and others who will join the
lawsuit.

Magistrate Judge Barnes finds that the Plaintiff's complaint is
deficient.  The complaint fails to contain a short and plain
statement of a claim showing that the Plaintiff is entitled to
relief.  Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a
flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the Defendant fair
notice of the Plaintiff's claims and must allege facts that state
the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly.  Moreover, the
complaint does not explain how Defendant Champion acted under
color of state law.

For the reasons she stated, the Magistrate Judge says the
Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.  The undersigned has
carefully considered whether the Plaintiff may amend the complaint
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  She cannot say
that it appears beyond doubt that leave to amend would be futile.
The Plaintiff's complaint will therefore be dismissed, and the
Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint.  The
Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if he elects to file an
amended complaint, the tenet that a court must accept as true all
of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Barnes dismissed with leave to amend
the complaint filed Sept. 29, 2017.  Within 28 days from the date
of the Order, an amended complaint will be filed that cures the
defects noted in the Order and complies with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice.  The amended
complaint must bear the case number assigned to the action and
must be titled "Amended Complaint."  Failure to comply with the
Order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation that the
action be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/f1kIlR from Leagle.com.

Ron Singh, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Faces Class Action Lawsuit in Boston
-------------------------------------------------------
Luther Turmelle, writing for New Haven Register, reports that a
class action in lawsuit has been filed in U.S. District Court in
Boston claiming Eversource Energy and Avangrid manipulated
capacity in New England's natural gas transmission network and
cost 7.1 million electric customers across New England $3.6
billion in overcharges between 2013 and 2016.

The law firm Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro filed the class action
case on November 14 and announced it on November 16 evening.
Eversource Energy has headquarters locations in Hartford and
Boston while Avangrid is based in Orange.

Avangrid oversees the United States companies owned by Spanish
Energy giant Iberdrola, including The United Illuminating Co. in
Connecticut and Central Maine Power Co. Eversource serves electric
customers in western Massachusetts, a large part of the Boston
area and is the predominant provider of electricity in New
Hampshire.

Officials with the law firm weren't immediately available for
comment on the case, which appears to be based on a report
released by the New York City-based Environmental Defense Fund.
The report claimed the two companies' natural gas subsidiaries
manipulated capacity by scheduling more deliveries of the fuel
than they actually needed on any given day. The report's authors
allege that the natural gas utilities would then cancel some of
the capacity requests later in the same day so that the space
could no longer be resold.

More than half of the electricity produced on any given day
usually comes from power plants that run on natural gas. Because
of the way power plant operators buy the natural gas they need, a
shortage of capacity drives up electric costs.

The complaint alleges the scheme violates multiple federal and
state competition laws and state consumer protection statutes.

Both companies have repeatedly denied any wrongdoing in the matter
and have claimed the report is misleading.

Caroline Pretyman, a Boston-based Eversource spokeswoman, said
company officials are aware of the lawsuit and are reviewing it.

"The allegations underlying this lawsuit are untrue and baseless,"
Pretyman said. "The expenditure of resources to further these
false claims is regrettable for all parties involved."

Avangrid officials did not respond to requests seeking comment
regarding the litigation. [GN]


FCA US: Borkowicz May Testify as Expert Witness in "Flynn" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BRIAN FLYNN, GEORGE and KELLY BROWN, and
MICHAEL KEITH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, f/k/a Chrysler Group LLC and
HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:15-
cv-855-MJR-DGW (S.D. Ill.), Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Bar Neil Borkowicz
from testifying as an Expert Witness.

This is a proposed class action in which the Plaintiffs, owners
and lessees of Chrysler vehicles, claim there is a design flaw in
some of Chrysler's 2013-2015 vehicles that received public
attention in a 2015 WIRED magazine article.  Generally, the
Plaintiffs allege that the uConnect system, manufactured by Harman
International Industries, Inc., has design vulnerabilities that
allow hackers to take remote control of the vehicle's functions,
including the vehicle's steering and brakes.

The matter is now before the Court on the motion to strike and bar
Neil Borkowicz from testifying as an expert witness filed by the
Plaintiffs on Sept. 15, 2017.  The Defendants timely responded to
the Plaintiffs' motion and a motion hearing was held on Oct. 12,
2017 before the undersigned.

Magistrate Judge Wilkerson finds that a plain reading of the
disclosure of Mr. Borkowicz evidences the subject matter on which
he is expected to present evidence -- mainly, the variance of
cybersecurity risk for the vehicles.  Although the subject matter
may cast a wide net, it meets the requirement of Rule
26(a)(2)(C)(i).

Further, the Magistrate Judge finds that Mr. Borkowicz's
disclosure indicates that he expects to opine that: (i) the
factors that affect cybersecurity risk in the vehicles at issue
include their features, Electronic Control Units, architecture and
topology, CAN messages, and software; and (ii) the cybersecurity
risk for the vehicles varied at the time of first sale, and has
never been, and is not now, the same.  Although the Defendants did
not outline Mr. Borkowicz's opinions in detail, this is not the
requirement, only a summary is required.

More importantly, unlike many of the cases relied on by the
Plaintiffs, the Magistrate Judge finds that the summary of the
opinions Mr. Borkowicz is expected to present is not merely a
recitation of conclusory statements, but rather, provides the
Plaintiff with adequate notice of his proposed testimony.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson concludes that the
Defendants properly disclosed Mr. Borkowicz as an expert pursuant
to Rule 26(a)(2)(C).  Therefore, he denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Strike and Bar Neil Borkowicz from testifying as an Expert
Witness.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OZss8x from Leagle.com.

Brian Flynn, George Brown, and Kelly Brown, Plaintiffs,
represented by Christopher D. Baucom --
cbaucom@armstrongteasdale.com -- Emily Buckley --
ebuckley@armstrongteasdale.com -- IJay Palansky --
ipalansky@armstrongteasdale.com -- Lucas T. Pendry --
lpendry@armstrongteasdale.com -- Stephen R. Wigginton --
swigginton@armstrongteasdale.com -- at Armstrong Teasdale LLP;
Michael J. Gras -- Lloyd M. Cueto -- at Law Office of Lloyd M.
Cueto, P.C.; Christopher F. Cueto -- at Law Office of Christopher
Cueto, LTD.

Michael Keith, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher D. Baucom --
cbaucom@armstrongteasdale.com -- Stephen R. Wigginton --
swigginton@armstrongteasdale.com -- at Armstrong Teasdale LLP.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Kathy A. Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Stephen A. D'Aunoy --
sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Scott H. Morgan --
smorgan@thompsoncoburn.com -- Sharon B. Rosenberg --
srosenberg@thompsoncoburn.com -- at Thompson Coburn LLP.

Harman International Industries, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Andrew Blair Fromm -- afromm@foley.com -- Elizabeth Mazzocco --
emazzocco@foley.com -- John R. Trentacosta --
jtrentacosta@foley.com -- Michael D. Leffel -- mleffel@foley.com -
- Vanessa L. Miller -- vmiller@foley.com -- & William J. McKenna -
- wmckenna@foley.com -- at Foley & Lardner LLP.


FIRST NATIONAL: Hordge Can Substitute Carter in FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARJORIE CARTER, Plaintiff, v. FIRST
NATIONAL COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., et al, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 4.15-CV-1695 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Keith P. Ellison of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, granted Kyonnie Hordge's Motion for Substitution of
Plaintiff.

Ms. Carter alleged that on Jan. 7, 2015, the Defendants sent her a
letter seeking to collect on a credit card debt.  What the letter
did not say was that the four-year statute of limitations on the
debt had expired and that the Defendants were thus time-barred
from legally enforcing the debt.  The Plaintiff alleges that by
extending a settlement offer on a time-barred debt, without
disclosing that the debt is time-barred, the Defendants falsely
suggested that they could file suit to enforce the debt.  To
imply, in this manner, that a time-barred debt is legally
enforceable is, the Plaintiff claims, a deceptive and unfair
practice in violation of Section 1692e and Section 1692f of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").

Ms. Carter brings the putative class action against the
Defendants, alleging that the Defendants that violated the FDCPA.
The Plaintiffs Complaint sets out allegations ostensibly
satisfying FED. R. Civ. P. 23.  However, no class has been
certified to date.

On Oct. 9, 2015, the Court granted an unopposed motion to stay the
case pending ruling in Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.,
et al., before the Fifth Circuit.  The Court ordered the stay
lifted on March 6, 2017.

On July 21, 2017, the Court was informed that Ms. Carter passed
away on March 28, 2016.  Then, on Aug. 14, 2017, Ms. Hordge, moved
to substitute the Plaintiff.  Ms. Hordge is one of Ms. Carter's
children and the Independent Administrator of Ms. Carter's estate.

The Defendants oppose substitution because they argue that it will
only result in the failure of class certification later due to Ms.
Hordge's inadequacy as a representative of the class.  Ms. Hordge,
in reply, argues that while the Defendants' arguments would be
better addressed in the briefing on class certification, nothing
precludes her from being an adequate or typical class
representative.

Judge Ellison finds that Ms. Hordge cites a Seventh Circuit FDCPA
class action where the class representative could proceed in
seeking recovery of actual damages for the class even if she
herself did not incur actual damages.  He also explains that Ms.
Hordge's involvement prior to Ms. Carter's death is of little
relevance; Ms. Hordge will step into Ms. Carter's position.
Moreover, because the Fifth Circuit evaluates collection letters
by an objective unsophisticated consumer standard, Ms. Carter's
confusion will not need to be the subject of testimony.  Finally,
the Judge finds that in both cases the Defendants cite, the courts
suggest that the conflict might be cured by a showing that all of
the estate's beneficiaries consented to the executor acting on
behalf of the class.  Ms. Hordge should have the opportunity to
make that showing, on briefing for class certification.  For these
reasons, Judge Ellison granted Ms. Hordge's Motion to Substitute.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/zjswek from Leagle.com.

Kyonnie Hordge, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Edelman --
dedelman@edcombs.com -- Edelman Combs et al.

Kyonnie Hordge, Plaintiff, represented by Francis Richard Greene -
- fgreene@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC &
Daniel J. Ciment.

First National Collection Bureau, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Robbie LuAnn Malone -- info@robbiemalonepllc.com -- MALONE AKERLY
MARTIN PLLC.

LVNV Funding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Robbie LuAnn Malone,
MALONE AKERLY MARTIN PLLC.

Resurgent Capital Services, LP, Defendant, represented by Robbie
LuAnn Malone, MALONE AKERLY MARTIN PLLC.

Alegis Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by Robbie LuAnn Malone,
MALONE AKERLY MARTIN PLLC.


FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Myron" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Firstsource
Advantage, LLC. The case is styled Dane Myron, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Firstsource
Advantage, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-07035 (E.D. N.Y.,
December 4, 2017).

Firstsource Advantage provides debt collections services to credit
card issuers, financial institutions, and healthcare
providers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Sanders Law, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


FRIENDLY HILLS: Valerio Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
-----------------------------------------------------------
ALVARO VALERIO, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. FRIENDLY HILLS COUNTRY CLUB, a
California corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, the
Defendant, Case No. BC685395 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 1, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid wages and interest for Defendants' failure
to provide legally compliant meal periods and/or pay meal period
premium wages; failure to provide legally complaint rest breaks
and/or pay rest break premium wages; statutory penalties for
failure to provide accurate wage statements; waiting time
penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely
pay employee all earned and unpaid wages due upon separation of
employment; applicable civil penalties; injunctive relief and
other equitable relief; and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to
California Labor Code.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          Andrea Rosenkranz, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 432 0000
          Facsimile: (310) 432 0001
          E-mail: ilavi@lelawfirm.com
                  arosenkranz@lelawfirm.com


GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Matrakas" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Genpact Services
LLC. The case is styled Panagiota Matrakas, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v Genpact
Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-07034 (E.D. N.Y.,
December 4, 2017).

Genpact is a global provider of business and technology
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GERDAU AMERISTEEL: Court Approves "Comer" Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, issued an Order granting Final Approval
of Class Settlement in the case captioned DANIEL L. COMER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. GERDAU AMERISTEEL US INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 8:14-cv-607-T-23AAS (M.D. Fla.).

Under the settlement, Gerdau will contribute $1,800 annually to a
Health Retirement Account (HRA) of a class member older than 65.
To adjust for inflation, Gerdau will increase the contribution by
1.375% annually.  Gerdau will offer the services of "One Exchange"
(or a comparable service) to assist a class member in obtaining
supplemental Medicare insurance, but a class member need not
purchase the supplemental insurance through One Exchange (or the
comparable service if Gerdau contracts with another service) to
receive the HRA contribution.

Gerdau will contribute $3,600 annually to the HRA of a class
member younger than 65 but eligible for Medicare as a result of a
disability. Again, Gerdau will increase the contribution by 1.375%
annually to adjust for inflation. Gerdau will offer the services
of "One Exchange" (or a comparable service) to assist a class
member in obtaining supplemental Medicare insurance, but a class
member need not purchase the supplemental insurance through One
Exchange (or the comparable service if Gerdau contracts with
another service) to receive the HRA contribution. After a class
member in this group turns 65, Gerdau will contribute an amount
equal to Gerdau's contribution to a class member older than 65.

Approval depends partly on the substance and amount of class
opposition to the settlement.  No person objected at the fairness
hearing, and one of the 456 class members submitted a written
objection.  Edgar Fairchild, who worked at the plant for several
decades, states that the class members will be giving up what was
agreed upon.  But, uncertainty about Gerdau's obligation under the
union contracts pervades this action and greatly increases the
risk that the plaintiffs might recover little or nothing after
protracted litigation.

In this circumstance, a settlement that continues the health-
insurance subsidy resolves the plaintiffs' claims fairly and
reasonably.

The plaintiffs move under Rule 23(h), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for a reasonable attorney's fee and state that Gerdau
agreed to pay $725,000, which includes the attorney's fee, costs,
and expenses. The application of the pertinent Johnson factors
shows that the agreed fee reasonably compensates class counsel.

The agreed sum of $725,000 compensates class counsel at an
effective hourly rate less than $300 (after subtracting costs and
reasonable expenses, the agreed sum yields an hourly rate of
approximately $250). Because the agreed fee reasonably compensates
class counsel in this instance, the motion for an attorney's fee
is granted.

Because the settlement resolves the action fairly, reasonably, and
adequately, the settlement is approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yaw3cppsfrom Leagle.com.

Daniel L. Comer, Plaintiff, represented by Ivelisse Berio LeBeau,
Sugarman & Susskind, PA, 100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300, Miami (Coral
Gables), FL 33134

Daniel L. Comer, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Hurt --
JHURT@FDPKLAW.COM -- Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, Pamina
Ewing -- PEWING@FDPKLAW.COM -- Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec,
LLC, pro hac vice, Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA,
100 Miracle Mile, Suite 300, Coral Gables, Florida 33134, Ruairi
McDonnell -- RMCDONNELL@FDPKLAW.COM -- Feinstein Doyle Payne &
Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice & William T. Payne -- WPAYNE@FDPKLAW.COM
-- Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice.

Richard D. Scott, Plaintiff, represented by Ivelisse Berio LeBeau,
Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Joel Hurt, Feinstein Doyle Payne &
Kravec, LLC, Pamina Ewing, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Ruairi
McDonnell, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice &
William T. Payne, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Oliver Frank Wright, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Ivelisse Berio
LeBeau, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Joel Hurt, Feinstein Doyle Payne
& Kravec, LLC, Pamina Ewing, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Ruairi
McDonnell, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice &
William T. Payne, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Stephen Solomon, Plaintiff, represented by Ivelisse Berio LeBeau,
Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Joel Hurt, Feinstein Doyle Payne &
Kravec, LLC, Pamina Ewing, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Ruairi
McDonnell, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice &
William T. Payne, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Glen Hubanks, Plaintiff, represented by Ivelisse Berio LeBeau,
Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Joel Hurt, Feinstein Doyle Payne &
Kravec, LLC, Pamina Ewing, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Ruairi
McDonnell, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice &
William T. Payne, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Gerdau Ameristeel US INC., Defendant, represented by Brett J.
Preston -brett.preston@hwhlaw.com -- Hill Ward Henderson, PA,
David L. Luikart, III -- dave.luikart@hwhlaw.com --  Hill Ward
Henderson, PA & Carolina Yvonne Blanco --
carolina.blanco@hwhlaw.com --  Hill Ward Henderson, PA.

Gerdau Ameristeel US Retiree Medical Plan, Defendant, represented
by Brett J. Preston, Hill Ward Henderson, PA, David L. Luikart,
III, Hill Ward Henderson, PA & Carolina Yvonne Blanco, Hill Ward
Henderson, PA.

Jack L. Townsend, Sr., Mediator, represented by Jack Light
Townsend, Sr. -- info@JackTownsend.com -- Law Office of Jack L.
Townsend, Sr, PA.

United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-
CIO/CLC, Movant, represented by Ivelisse Berio LeBeau, Sugarman &
Susskind, PA, Joel Hurt, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC,
Pamina Ewing, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice,
Robert A. Sugarman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Ruairi McDonnell,
Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice & William T.
Payne, Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, pro hac vice.

Edgar E. Fairchild, Movant, Pro Se.


GLOBAL FITNESS: 6th Cir. Reverses Contempt Finding in "Gascho"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Amul R. Thapar of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's contempt finding and
remanded the appeals cases captioned AMBER GASCHO, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. GLOBAL FITNESS HOLDINGS, LLC, doing business as
Urban Active, Defendants-Appellants (17-3579 & 17-3827), DAHL
ADMINISTRATION, LLC, Defendant-Appellee (17
3821/3822/3825/3826/3827), LAURENCE E. PAUL (17-3577 & 17-3821);
ROYCE G. PULLIAM (17-3578 & 17-3825); TOMI ANNE PULLIAM (17-3804 &
17-3826); STEPHEN PAUL (17-3805 & 17-3822), Interested Parties-
Appellants, Case Nos. 17-3577, 17-3578, 17-3579, 17-3804,17-3805,
17-3821, 17-3822, 17-3825, 17-3826, 17-3827 (6th Cir.), for
further proceedings.

Global Fitness owned and operated a number of gyms.  The
Plaintiffs were members of those gyms and believed that Global
Fitness misrepresented the terms of its gym memberships.  They
banded together and sued as a class.  Eventually, the parties
settled.  In the settlement agreement, Global Fitness agreed to
pay (i) $1.3 million to the class members, (ii) the class
counsel's fees as ordered by the court, and (iii) the claims
administrator's fees and costs.

Some of the class members objected to the settlement.  After a
fairness hearing, the district court approved the agreement and
ordered the parties to implement its terms.  Still, some class
members were dissatisfied and appealed.  The Appellate Court
affirmed the district court's order, Gascho v. Global Fitness
Holdings, LLC, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Blackman
v. Gascho; Zik v. Gascho.

With this denial, the district court's order was final, and it was
time for Global Fitness to pay up.  But by this point, Global
Fitness was nearly broke.  It had sold all of its gyms and
funneled nearly $10.4 million of the sale proceeds to the
company's managers through what it termed "tax distributions."
Fortunately for the class members, the payments Global Fitness
owed to them had been placed in escrow under the terms of the
settlement agreement.  But unfortunately for the class counsel and
the claims administrator, the agreement made no provision for the
escrow of their payments.  Two days before its payment obligation
under the settlement agreement came due, Global Fitness notified
the district court it was out of money and could not meet its
remaining obligations under the agreement.

So the Plaintiffs asked the district court to hold Global Fitness
and its four managers in civil contempt.  The district court did
so and ordered them to pay the full amount owed to the class
counsel and the claims administrator, as well as statutory
interest.  Global Fitness and the managers now appeal.

Judge Thapar says no one disputes that Global Fitness violated a
definite and specific court order by failing to pay the class
counsel and the claims administrator.  The question is when the
district court's order to do so became definite and specific.  He
explains that when a class-action settlement calls for payment
from a company with shaky finances, self-help is indispensable.
Concerned parties are well-advised to insist upon an escrow
provision, or even personal guarantees from the Individual
Defendants.  The settlement agreement included neither here.
Thus, Global Fitness had no legal obligation to conserve funds to
pay class counsel and the claims administrator while the appeals
were pending.  Its obligation to pay became definite and specific
only once the appeals were exhausted -- on March 21, 2017.

The Judge finds that Global Fitness' obligation to pay the class
counsel and the claims administrator was not definite and specific
until March 21, 2017.  So the district court erred in considering
any of Global Fitness's conduct from before then.  And likewise
the district court also erred in relying on pre-order conduct to
hold the managers in contempt.  As such, a remand is appropriate
so the district court can consider whether the evidence after
March 21, 2017, is sufficient to support a contempt finding.

Finally, he finds that while the district court had authority to
sanction the managers, those sanctions are permissible against
individual officers only when (i) they are intended to compensate
for actual losses, and (ii) the actual losses compensated for were
caused by the officer's contumacious conduct.  Here, the district
court erred by holding the managers jointly and severally liable.
On remand, if the district court determines sanctions are
appropriate, it must then determine the extent to which each
manager deliberately caused Global Fitness's inability to pay.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Thapar reversed the district
court's contempt finding and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's Nov. 15, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/dDaQ61 from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Christopher J. Hogan -- hogan@litohio.com -- ZEIGER,
TIGGES & LITTLE LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants Royce Pulliam
and Tomi-Anne Pulliam.

Pierre H. Bergeron -- pierre.bergeron@squirepb.com -- SQUIRE
PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants Laurence
Paul and Stephen Paul.

David A. Owen, DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for
Appellant Global Fitness.

Thomas N. McCormick -- tnmccormick@vorys.com -- VORYS, SATER,
SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for the Gascho Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Christopher J. Hogan, ZEIGER, TIGGES & LITTLE LLP,
Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants Royce Pulliam and Tomi-Anne
Pulliam.

Pierre H. Bergeron -- pierre.bergeron@squirepb.com -- Larisa M.
Vaysman, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, Richard
S. Gurbst -- richard.gurbst@squirepb.com -- Marques P.D. Richeson,
SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants
Laurence Paul and Stephen Paul.

David A. Owen -- DOwen@dickinsonwright.com -- DICKINSON WRIGHT
PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, Jonathan R. Secrest --
JSecrest@dickinsonwright.com -- DICKSINSON WRIGHT PLLC, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellant Global Fitness.

Thomas N. McCormick, John J. Kulewicz -- jjkulewicz@vorys.com --
VORYS, SATER, SEYMOUR AND PEASE LLP, Columbus, Ohio, Gregory M.
Travalio -- gtravalio@isaacwiles.com -- Mark H. Troutman --
mtroutman@isaacwiles.com -- ISAAC WILES BURKHOLDER & TEETOR, LLC,
Columbus, Ohio, for the Gascho Appellees.


GRASSHOPPER HOUSE: Fails to Pay Wages, "Guillen" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------
MARCOS GUILLEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. GRASSHOPPER HOUSE LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company; GRASSHOPPER HOUSE PARTNERS LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company; FEDERAL RECOVERY SYSTEMS
LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; 6390 MEADOWS
COURT LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; 6390A MEADOWS
COURT LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; PASSAGES TEEN
CENTER LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; PASSAGES
SILVER STRAND LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; DOES
1 through 25, the Defendants, Case No. BC685116 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 30, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid wages.

Grasshopper House is a specialty outpatient clinic located in
Malibu, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron C. Gundzik, Esq.
          Rebecca G. Gundzik, Esq.
          GARTENBERG GELFAND HAYTON LLP
          15260 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1920
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (213) 542 2100
          Facsimile: (213) 542 2101

               - and -

          MARSHALL A. CASKEY, Esq.
          DANIEL M. HOLZMAN, Esq.
          N. CORY BARARI, Esq.
          CASKEY & HOLZMAN
          24025 Park Sorrento, Ste. 400
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 657 1070
          Facsimile: (818) 297 1775


HONDA NORTH: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Merkin" Suit
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued a Memorandum and Order granting, without prejudice,
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JOEL MERKIN,
Plaintiff, v. HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC., AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,
INC., and HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., Defendants, Civil Action No.
17-cv-03625 (PGS)(DEA) (D.N.J.).

Plaintiff purchased a pre-owned 2013 Honda Accord, purportedly
within the New Vehicle Limited Warranty from a Honda dealership in
Toms River, New Jersey.  The limited warranty extended coverage
for the lesser of 3 years or 36,000 miles.  According to the FAC,
in May 2016, with approximately 40,400 miles, Plaintiff began
experiencing issues starting his vehicle.  At least once or twice
a week, Plaintiff's vehicle would not start immediately and would
require him to turn the ignition repeatedly in order to start the
engine.  Two months later, with an additional 18,000 miles,
Plaintiff claims his vehicle would not start approximately five to
six times a day.

Plaintiff brings six causes of action based on state law, on
behalf of himself and the putative class. Specifically, he alleges
violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA); breach of
express warranty; breach of implied warranty; breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing; and unjust enrichment.

Counts I and IV (Fraud Based Claims)

Plaintiff asserts causes of action under the NJCFA and common-law
fraud. Honda seeks dismissal of these claims for failing to
adequately plead that Honda engaged in unlawful conduct.
Specifically, Honda contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege
that Honda knew of the defective starter at the time of
Plaintiff's purchase.

The Court agrees.

Here, Plaintiff only identifies two complaints made to the NHTSA
prior to his purchase.  However, these complaints lack the
specificity provided in Afzal v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 15-8009.

First, these posts do not report to have had their vehicles
diagnosed starter problems.  Second, and more importantly, neither
post claimed to have directly reported their problem to Honda or
that Honda diagnosed their vehicles as having the starter defect.
Simply put, even when taking into consideration the totality of
the allegations the Court is unable to reasonably infer that Honda
had knowledge of the defect prior to Plaintiff's purchase.
Finally, Plaintiff's arguments that Honda's TSB and quality
assurance metrics further demonstrate its knowledge do not compel
a different result.

Under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff "must plead with particularity the
'circumstances' of the alleged fraud."  The purpose of Rule 9(b)
is to provide notice of the 'precise misconduct' with which
defendants are charged and to prevent false or unsubstantiated
charges."  However, where the defendants may have concealed
issues, courts should apply the rule with flexibility.  Here, even
when viewing Rule 9(b) flexibly, Plaintiff's alternative arguments
do not satisfy this standard. First, Honda issued the TSB seven
months after he purchased his car; however, Plaintiff has failed
to present any competent evidence that plausibly infers that Honda
was aware of this defect prior to his purchase. This issue also
belies Plaintiff's quality assurance metrics argument.  As such,
because Plaintiff has failed to adequately demonstrate that Honda
had knowledge or notice of the starter defect, Count I is
dismissed.

Defendants also seek dismissal of Count IV of Plaintiff's
Complaint, which alleges common law fraud, since he has failed to
demonstrate that Defendants were aware of the defect at the time
that Plaintiff purchased his vehicle.

Under New Jersey law, the elements of common law fraud are: "(1) a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact;
(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an
intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable
reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages."
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Honda had
knowledge of the defect, Count IV will be dismissed.

Count II (Breach of Express Warranty)

Honda argues that Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim
fails since: (1) Plaintiff did not comply with pre-suit notice
requirements; (2) the warranty expired prior to the manifestation
of the defect; and (3) the terms of the warranty were not
unconscionable.

First, in New Jersey, a buyer seeking to assert a breach of
express warranty must first notify the seller of the breach. This
notice requirement is a condition precedent to alleging a breach
of warranty. Here, since Honda was not the direct seller of
Plaintiff's vehicle, Honda's notice argument is misplaced.
Second, under New Jersey law, in order to state a claim for breach
of express warranty, Plaintiffs must properly allege: (1) that
Defendant made an affirmation, promise or description about the
product; (2) that this affirmation, promise or description became
part of the basis of the bargain for the product; and (3) that the
product ultimately did not conform to the affirmation, promise or
description.

Here, Plaintiff did not experience starter issues until the
warranty period had expired (three years old and had over 40,000
miles). Therefore, because Plaintiff alleges that the defect
manifested itself outside the warranty period, he does not state a
valid claim for breach of express warranty.

The Court finds fatal Plaintiff's failure to allege any facts
demonstrating Defendants' manipulation of warranty coverage to
avoid paying for replacement parts. As discussed above, the record
fails to support Plaintiff's claim that Honda had knowledge of the
defect prior to his purchase; as such, it follows that Honda could
not have manipulated warranty coverage for a defect it did know
existed.

Therefore, since Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
limited warranty was unconscionable, Honda's Motion to Dismiss
Count II will be granted.

Count III (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability)

Honda next moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff contends that Honda
breached its implied warranty of merchantability, since the Class
Vehicles were not in merchantable condition and are not fit for
the ordinary purpose for which cars are used.

Putting aside the fact that the alleged defect was not discovered
until after the term of the warranty, Plaintiff nevertheless fails
to demonstrate that his Accord was not merchantable.  Although the
defect purportedly required Plaintiff to turn the ignition
repeatedly to start his vehicle, the vehicle nevertheless met is
ordinary purpose of providing transportation for the owner.

Therefore, since Plaintiff's complaint fails to demonstrate that
his vehicle was unfit for purposes of driving, Honda's Motion to
Dismiss Count III is granted.

Count V (Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

Plaintiff contends that Honda breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing since it failed to notify Plaintiff and others of
the defect and to properly repair this defect.

Here, the FAC alleges, Defendants acted in bad faith and/or with a
malicious motive to deny Plaintiff some benefit of the bargain.
However, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual support for this
assertion, he does not identify any particular conduct by Honda
that demonstrated bad faith or malicious motive. Nor does
Plaintiff provide any facts for which this Court could possibly
infer such motive or conduct. Simply put, Plaintiff presents
nothing more than threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.

Therefore, Honda's Motion to Dismiss Count V will be granted.

Count VI (Unjust Enrichment)

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim,
since a direct relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants does
not exist.

This Court agrees.

To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, Plaintiff must show
both that the defendant received a benefit and that retention of
that benefit without payment would be unjust.

Here, no direct relationship has been alleged and Plaintiff, in
their Brief in Opposition, does not contest this. According to the
FAC, Plaintiff purchased his vehicle from an authorized Honda
retailer, not Honda. As such, no direct relationship has been
demonstrated and, therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for
unjust enrichment.

Therefore, this Court will grant Honda's Motion to Dismiss Count
IV.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y87pcfv5
from Leagle.com.

JOEL MERKIN, Plaintiff, represented by MATTHEW D. SCHELKOPF -
mds@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP.

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL
LAWRENCE MALLOW -- MMALLOW@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP.


INDIANA: Ct. Denies Certification of Disenfranchised Voters Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Plaintiff's First Amended Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned DEMETRIUS BUROFF and IANBARNHART, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID
GLADIEUX, in his official capacity, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-CV-
124-TLS (N.D. Ind.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant systematically
disenfranchised hundreds of eligible voters who were being
confined in the Allen County Jail during the 2016 General
Election. Both are United States citizens, over eighteen years
old, and residents of Allen County, Indiana.  Plaintiff Buroff was
held in the Allen County Jail as a pre-trial detainee on
misdemeanor criminal charges.  Plaintiff Barnhart was held in the
Allen County Jail as a pre-trial detainee on felony criminal
charges.

The Plaintiffs allege that on November 8, 2016, they were eligible
to vote in the 2016 General Election but that the Defendant
prevented them from doing so from the Allen County Jail.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs were denied access to in-person early
voting, absentee ballots, or any other means of voting.

The Defendant challenged class certification and asserted that (1)
neither of the named Plaintiffs has standing to bring a claim
individually or on behalf of the class, and (2) neither of the
named Plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.

The Defendants persuasively argue that Plaintiff Buroff lacks
standing to bring this action.  Plaintiff Buroff must demonstrate
that (1) he has suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to Defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) a favorable
judicial decision will likely redress the injury in fact.

Here, Plaintiff Buroff has failed to allege an injury in fact.  He
was arrested on October 31, 2016, while the deadline to register
to vote in the 2016 General Election was October 11, 2016.  He had
not registered to vote by the October 11, 2016, deadline.  Thus,
he would not have been permitted to vote in the 2016 General
Election.  Therefore, he did not suffer a cognizable Article III
injury when he was not permitted to vote on November 8, 2016.

Like Plaintiff Buroff, Plaintiff Barnhart must demonstrate that
(1) he has suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to Defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) a favorable
judicial decision will likely redress the injury in fact.

Plaintiff Barnhart has alleged that he was otherwise eligible to
vote in the 2016 General Election and that the Defendant prevented
him from doing so through inadequate policies, practices, or
procedures in the Allen County Jail. He further claims that money
damages will make him whole. He has met his burden and properly
invoked federal jurisdiction.

Here, the Plaintiff has identified dozens of individuals who claim
to have been harmed by the Defendant's actions. However, the
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that these individuals or any
of the other individuals in Allen County Jail on November 8, 2016,
were either registered to vote or requested an absentee ballot
while in Allen County Jail. The Plaintiff asserts that at any
given time there are 500 to 600 individuals incarcerated in the
Allen County Jail, and that on November 8, 2016, a majority of the
incarcerated population at Allen County Jail was eligible to vote
in the 2016 General Election.

The Plaintiff, however, has provided no other support for this
contention. Each of these individuals could have been registered
to vote on November 8, 2016, or could have tried to register for
the 2016 General Election. Or they may not have. The Plaintiff has
provided a potential upper bound for the class size, but has not
produced enough to show how big or small the class may actually
be. Without that information, the Court does not know whether
joinder is impracticable.

The Plaintiff, though, received a list of each individual held,
detained, incarcerated, and/or confined at any time in the Allen
County Jail on November 8, 2016 who was not serving a sentence for
a felony crime. Further, the Allen County Board of Voter
Registration maintains a publicly available database of
individuals registered to vote in Allen County. The Plaintiff
likely has the tools available to determine whether the class is
so numerous to make joinder of all claims impracticable. At the
moment, though, the Plaintiff has not carried his burden under
Rule 23(a)(1).

The Court denies, with leave to refile, the Plaintiff's First
Amended Motion for Class Certification and dismisses Plaintiff
Demetrius Buroff.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017,
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yaoqeo23from
Leagle.com.

Ian Barnhart, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher C. Myers,
Christopher C Myers & Associates, 809 S Calhoun St #400, Fort
Wayne, IN 46802, USA

Ian Barnhart, Plaintiff, represented by David W. Frank,
Christopher C Myers & Associates, 809 S Calhoun St #400, Fort
Wayne, IN 46802, USA

David Gladieux, Defendant, represented by J. Spencer Feighner,
Haller & Colvin PC & John O. Feighner, Haller & Colvin PC, 444 E
Main St, Fort Wayne, IN 46802, USA


INNATE INTELLIGENCE: Dismissal Bid in TCPA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEVINE HAT CO., on behalf of itself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. INNATE INTELLIGENCE, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 4:16-cv-01132 SNLJ (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied Profax's Motion for
Entry of Proposed Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Count VIII.

Plaintiff Levine Hat filed the putative class action lawsuit
against Innate and Nepute Enterprises, LLC, alleging violations of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  On Jan. 3, 2017,
the Plaintiff amended the complaint to add an additional nine
Defendants, including Defendant Profax, Inc.

The Plaintiff claims in Count VIII that Profax violated terms of
the TCPA by sending a "junk fax" to members of the class without
displaying an opt-out notice compliant with TCPA's 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200.  The TCPA allows for an entity to bring a private
right of action against violators of the statute, and such an
action may recover up to $1,500 for each willful or knowing
violation of the statute.

On July 11, 2017, however, Profax deposited $4,000 into the trust
account of Profax's attorney, held exclusively for the benefit of
the Plaintiff.  It provided the Plaintiff within instructions on
how to access the account and withdraw the funds.  Profax then
filed the instant motion for entry of proposed judgment and motion
to dismiss Count VIII.  The proposed judgment includes an
injunction prohibiting Profax from sending further faxes to the
Plaintiff in violation of the TCPA.  Profax filed the instant
motion because it says the proposed judgment provides the
Plaintiff with every form of individual relief that the Plaintiff
seeks in its complaint against Profax and fully resolves all TCPA
claims against Profax.

Profax essentially argues that its offer was accepted because it
has made $4,000 available to the Plaintiff, in an account for its
benefit held by its attorneys.  In light of the funds and the
injunction set forth in the proposed judgment, Profax argues that
the Plaintiff no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit and that its lawsuit must be dismissed as moot under
Campbell-Ewald.

Judge Limbaugh says the Court has previously declined to allow a
defendant to deposit funds with the Court and enter judgment
against the plaintiff where the class had not yet been certified.
Agreeing with an opinion out of the District of Minnesota, the
Court denied defendant's motion, holding that there is no
principled difference between a plaintiff rejecting a tender of
payment and an offer of payment, a distinction that did not
persuade the majority in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez.

Profax points out that the Court denied the motion in Radha
Giesmann, M.D., P.C. v. ZocDoc, Inc. because it did not comport
with Rule 67, which allows for deposits with the Court only under
certain circumstances.  The Judge finds that Profax apparently
tries to avoid that problem by depositing the funds into a trust
account with its attorneys.  Profax's "tender" of the funds,
however, does not mean that Profax's offer has been accepted --
the tender is still an offer that can be refused.  Indeed,
Profax's offer did not offer all that was requested in the
complaint.

Ultimately, the Judge says the law does not countenance the use of
individual offers to thwart class litigation, because the class-
action device is designed to allow similarly situated plaintiffs
to aggregate smaller claims, promoting judicial efficiency.
Profax's offer or tender was not accepted.  Pursuant to relevant
Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent, Judge Limbaugh denied
Profax's Motion for Entry of Proposed Judgment and Motion to
Dismiss Count VIII.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/3daIJE from Leagle.com.

Levine Hat Co., Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg -
- alex@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC.

Levine Hat Co., Plaintiff, represented by Ryan A. Keane --
ryan@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC.

Innate Intelligence, LLC, Defendant, represented by Kevin Paul
Green -- kevin@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC, Mark C.
Goldenberg -- mark@ghalaw.com -- GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC & Thomas A.
Brodnik, DONINGER AND TUOHY LLP.

Nepute Enterprises LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
Douglas Longo, LONGO BIGGS, LLC, Kevin Paul Green, GOLDENBERG
HELLER, PC & Mark C. Goldenberg, GOLDENBERG HELLER, PC.

ProFax, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lauren R. Cohen --
Lcohen@capessokol.com -- CAPES AND SOKOL & Mark E. Goodman --
goodman@capessokol.com -- CAPES AND SOKOL.


INT'L HAIR: "Doucet" Suit Remanded to California State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Larry Alan Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California remanded the case, IZABELLE J. DOUCET, et
al., Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL HAIR INSTITUTE, LLC, et al.,
Defendant, Case No. 17cv823-LAB (KSC) (S.D. Cal.), to the Superior
Court of California for the County of San Diego.

The claims in the case arise from the purchase of hair products.
The amended complaint alleges that when consumers respond to one
of the Defendants' risk-free trial offers, they require the
consumer to provide his or her credit card or debit card billing
information, purportedly to pay nominal shipping and handling fees
(typically less than $5) to receive the advertised product.
However, 30 days after the consumer receives the product, the
Defendants charge the consumer the full price of the trial
product, imposing charges that often amount to $159.90 or more
onto the consumer's credit or debit card.

The putative class consists of all individuals in California who,
within the statute of limitations period, were either (i) charged
the full price for a Defendants' Product that was represented as a
free trial, a risk-free trial, or at a discounted price, and for
which Defendants charged a higher price if the product was not
returned within a limited period of time, and/or (ii) enrolled in
Defendants' auto shipment program.

The complaint identifies four California statutes as the basis for
the Plaintiffs' claims: the Automatic Renewal Law; the False
Advertising Law; the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act; and
the Unfair Competition Law.

The Defendants removed the case from state court, citing diversity
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.  After the
Plaintiffs amended their complaint, the Defendants moved to
dismiss or stay the action in favor of bilateral arbitration.

The briefing on the motion brought to the forefront some reasons
to doubt whether the Court had jurisdiction over the case.  In
particular it appeared Izabelle Doucet and Charlotte Dukich, the
two Named Plaintiffs, may lack standing.  There are two important
standing problems.  First, except possibly for the nominal
shipping fees (which were disclosed), the Named Plaintiffs have
not lost any money or property.  A declaration by Plaintiffs'
counsel suggested that Doucet's charges (except for the shipping
fees) were refunded, and that Dukich's credit card was never
charged.  If neither of them suffered any cognizable harm, they
have no standing to seek any relief either on their own behalf or
on behalf of a class.  Second, Plaintiffs on behalf of the people
of California are seeking equitable relief that it does not appear
would provide any redress to either Doucet or Dukich.

Additionally, because the two Named Plaintiffs they were never
charged for products, they are not members of the class they
purport to represent.  The Court does not rely on this, partly
because the issue was not briefed, and partly because it concerns
only their standing to represent the class, not standing to bring
their own claims.  Where no Named Plaintiff has standing, the
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case, and the defect
cannot be cured by substitution of another plaintiff.  The Court
therefore issued an order directing both parties to address
jurisdiction.  The parties have now filed their responses.

Judge Burns finds that the Defendants' response fails to meet
their burden of establishing removal jurisdiction.  The fact that
Doucet was charged a shipping fee does not give rise to
jurisdiction.  The Judge also finds that because the Plaintiffs
concededly will not be injured in the future by the actions they
ask the Court to enjoin, and because an injunction would provide
them with no redress, they lack standing.  Although they requested
other kinds of relief, such as declaratory relief, the Plaintiffs
did not address those in their response, and in any event the
analysis appears to be the same.

Judge Burns concludes that the Plaintiffs lack standing, and that
it therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.  The
Plaintiffs have requested that should the Court find they lack
standing, they be allowed to pursue their claims in state court.
Unless it is completely clear the state court would also dismiss
the claims, remand rather than dismissal is appropriate.
Accordingly, he remanded the action in its entirety to the
Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ahKujG from Leagle.com.

Izabelle J. Doucet, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink --
Jim.Hannink@SDLaw.com -- Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP.

Izabelle J. Doucet, Plaintiff, represented by Zachariah Paul
Dostart -- zdostart@sdlaw.com -- Dostart Hannink Coveney LLP.

Charlotte Dukich, Plaintiff, represented by Zachariah Paul
Dostart, Dostart Hannink Coveney LLP.

International Hair Institute, LLC, Defendant, represented by James
B. Saylor -- jsaylor@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren LLP,
pro hac vice, Joseph A. Boyle -- jboyle@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley
Drye & Warren LLP, pro hac vice, Lee S. Brenner --
lbrenner@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye and Warren LLP & Michael C.
Lynch, Jr. -- mlynch@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren LLP,
pro hac vice.

Keranique, LLC, Defendant, represented by James B. Saylor, Kelley
Drye & Warren LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph A. Boyle, Kelley Drye &
Warren LLP, pro hac vice, Lee S. Brenner, Kelley Drye and Warren
LLP & Michael C. Lynch, Jr., Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, pro hac
vice.

Atlantic Coast Media Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by James
B. Saylor, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Joseph A. Boyle, Kelley Drye
& Warren LLP, Lee S. Brenner, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP & Michael
C. Lynch, Jr., Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.


INVENTURE FOODS: "Chamat" Class Suit Seeks to Enjoin Sale to Utz
----------------------------------------------------------------
MAURICIO CHAMAT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. INVENTURE FOODS, INC., TERRY E. MCDANIEL,
MACON BRYCE EDMONSON, ASHTON D. ASENSIO, PAUL J. LAPADAT, TIMOTHY
A. COLE, and JOEL D. STEWART, Case No. 2:17-cv-04294-JJT (D.
Ariz., November 22, 2017), seeks to enjoin the proposed sale of
the Company to Utz Quality Foods, LLC, or, in the event the
Proposed Transaction is consummated, recover damages resulting
from the Individual Defendants' violations of securities laws.

On October 25, 2017, the Company and Utz entered into a definitive
agreement under which Utz will acquire all of the outstanding
common shares of Inventure in an all-cash tender offer.  If
consummated, Inventure stockholders will receive $4 in cash per
common share of Inventure.  The Proposed Transaction has a value
of approximately $165 million.

Based in Phoenix, Arizona, Inventure is a Delaware corporation
that manufactures and markets snack foods under a variety of
Company-owned and licensed brand names.  The Individual Defendants
are directors and officers of the Company.

Non-party Utz is a privately-held Delaware limited liability
company that markets, manufactures, and distributes salty snacks
in national and international markets.  Utz maintains its
principal executive offices in Hanover, Pennsylvania.  Non-Party
Heron Sub, Inc., is a Delaware corporation and wholly-owned
subsidiary of Utz formed for the purpose of effectuating the
Proposed Transaction.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gerald Barrett, Esq.
          WARD, KEENAN & BARRETT, P.C.
          2141 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 100
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 279-1717
          Facsimile: (602) 279-8908
          E-mail: gbarrett@wardkeenanbarrett.com

               - and -

          Donald J. Enright, Esq.
          Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290
          Facsimile: (202) 337-1567
          E-mail: denright@zlk.com
                  etripodi@zlk.com


J.JILL INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm disclosed that a class action complaint has
been filed on behalf of shareholders of J.Jill, Inc. (NYSE:JILL)
who purchased shares pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's
Initial Public Offering on or around October 9, 2017.  A complaint
has been filed on behalf of shareholders.

The complaint alleges that the Registration Statement and
Prospectus filed for the Company's IPO contained materially false
and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the
Company's purportedly unique and superior sales and marketing
approach had not insulated the Company from adverse trends
affecting the overall retail industry; (2) the Company's historic
gross margin growth was not sustainable and would not continue, as
it relied on various short-term boosts to revenues; (3) the
Company was carrying increasing amounts of slow moving inventory
and would need to significantly markdown sales items and increase
promotional efforts in an attempt to continue its sales growth;
(4) the Company's brick-and-mortar stores were failing, as they
were experiencing difficulty attracting customers and maintaining
profitability, which would result in the Company shuttering up to
eight stores in fiscal 2017, with the rate of store closures
accelerating; and (5) as a result of the aforementioned, J.Jill's
business, prospects and ability to service its long-term debt had
been materially impaired.

Shareholders have until December 12, 2017 to petition the court
for lead plaintiff status. Your ability to share in any recovery
does not require that you serve as lead plaintiff. You may choose
to be an absent class member.

If you suffered a loss during the class period and wish to obtain
additional information, please contact Joseph Klein, Esq. by
telephone at 212-616-4899 or visit
http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-sbm/j-jill-inc

Joseph Klein, Esq. is an experienced attorney and has also
practiced as a Certified Public Accountant. Mr. Klein represents
investors and participates in securities litigations involving
financial fraud throughout the nation. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes. [GN]


JEFF SCHMITT: Appeal from Indemnification Ruling Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. JEFF SCHMITT AUTO GROUP, INC., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT
CADILLAC, JEFF SCHMITT AUTO GROUP, INC., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT
MITSUBISHI, JEFF SCHMITT CHEVROLET LTD., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT
CHEVROLET SOUTH, JEFF SCHMITT CHEVROLET LTD., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT
CHEVROLET NORTH, JEFF SCHMITT MAZDA L.L.C., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT
MAZDA, and JEFF SCHMITT NISSAN, INC., d.b.a. JEFF SCHMITT NISSAN,
Defendants-Appellants, Appeal No. C-170061 (Ohio App.), Judge
Russell Mock of the U.S. Court of Appeals of Ohio for the First
District, Hamilton County, dismissed the dealerships' appeal on
the trial court's order granting GECU's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of indemnification, but did not determine
the amount owed.

GECU filed suit against the Dealerships seeking a declaration that
the Dealerships were obligated to indemnify GECU for litigation
costs arising from consumer class-action lawsuits filed in
Montgomery and Greene Counties against the dealerships and GECU.
The trial court granted GECU's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of indemnification, but did not determine the amount owed.
After the trial court issued a decision pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B)
that there was no just reason for delay, the dealerships appealed
the decision.

Judge Mock held that the decision of the trial court that the
dealerships were required to indemnify GECU was not a final
appealable order without a determination of the amount owed.
Because the court's decision was not a final appealable order, the
Civ.R. 54(B) determination of no just reason for delay was of no
effect.  When the record certified for his review does not contain
a final appealable order, he must dismiss the appeal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Accordingly, he dismissed the
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/GHOFO0 from Leagle.com.

Statman, Harris & Eyrich, LLC, and William B. Fecher --
wbfecher@statmanharris.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Green & Green Lawyers and Thomas M. Green for Defendants-
Appellants.


KING CITY, CA: Court Narrows Claims in Unlawful Towing Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part
and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned RUFINA RECENDIZ GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
KING, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:16-cv-06712-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Rufina Recendiz Garcia and Eladio Huitzil initiated the
suit against Defendants City of King, several of the City's police
officers, and Leyva's Towing, Inc., to challenge the allegedly
unlawful towing and storage of their vehicles.

On March 10, 2014, Jesus Garcia initiated a putative class action
suit against the City, several City police officers, and Brian A.
Miller, the owner of Miller's Towing, asserting federal civil
rights claims and related state claims based upon the alleged
unlawful towing of his vehicle.  Among other things, Garcia
alleged that the individual police officers targeted economically
disadvantaged and low-income persons of Hispanic descent for
traffic stops without a legitimate reason and unlawfully seized,
impounded, sold or otherwise appropriated the drivers' vehicles to
the permanent use and benefit of one or more the defendants.

Garcia filed a First Amended Complaint that added named
plaintiffs, repeated the federal claims, added state law claims
for conversion, trespass to personal property, deceit and fraud,
conspiracy, negligence, and redefined the proposed class as
follows:

     All persons whose motor vehicles were seized and ordered
impounded by an officer(s) of the King City, California, Police
Department during the period beginning three (3) years before the
filing of this lawsuit until the present and: (a) Whose motor
vehicles were thereafter sold or otherwise disposed of while under
an impound order by the City of King City; or (b) Who were charged
and paid impoundment and storage fees in excess of the lawful
amount in order to recover their vehicles.

The parties settled the case and filed a joint motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  The
Settlement Agreement defined the class in pertinent part as
follows:

     All natural persons whose motor vehicles were stopped and
ordered towed and/or impounded by Miller's Towing at the direction
of one of the following officers of the King City, California
Police Department: Bruce Miller between March 9, 2011 and February
25, 2014.

The City moves to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint
that contain allegations regarding the March and October 2013
towing incidents on the grounds that any claims based on these
towing incidents are time barred, having been filed on November
18, 2016, after the expiration of California's 2-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims provided by Cal. Code.Civ.
Proc. Section 335.1 and after the three year statute of
limitations for discrimination claims provided by Cal.Gov't Code
Section 11135.

First, Plaintiffs contend that the earlier-filed Garcia Class
Action tolled the statute of limitations until January 25, 2017,
when the Garcia Class Action settlement received final approval.
The City argues that the Plaintiffs would not qualify as class
members in the Garcia Class Action because that suit involved
different legal claims than the instant action.

Second, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are equitably estopped
from asserting a statute of limitations defense because Defendants
had actual or constructive knowledge that the towing incidents
were unlawful.

Third, Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations was
tolled by the delayed discovery rule. The discovery rule postpones
accrual of a claim until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover the cause of action.

Here, Plaintiffs have not set forth a sufficient factual predicate
for delayed discovery. Rather, the alleged facts suggest that
Plaintiffs knew of their injuries when the events giving rise to
the injuries occurred in 2013. Specifically, Recendez Garcia knew
of her alleged injury the moment her request to remove the 2004
Pontiac Sunfire was denied. Similarly, Plaintiffs knew of their
alleged injury upon receipt of notices written in the English
language.

As for the allegation that Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs
of their right to a storage hearing with respect to the October
2013 towing of the Toyota Camry, Plaintiffs do not set forth any
facts explaining when they learned of the towing or the alleged
failure of Defendants to give notice. Plaintiffs also do not set
forth facts explaining their inability to have discovered the lack
of notice earlier despite reasonable diligence.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to strike is granted in part as to
paragraph 33 (lines 17-18) with leave to amend, and 46 (lines 18-
20), 52 (lines 14-15, 17), and 59 without leave to amend.
Defendants' motion to strike is denied in all other respects.

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for Unreasonable Seizure

Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to
state a claim for unreasonable seizure. Plaintiffs allege, inter
alia, that Defendants' towing and storage of their vehicles were
not authorized by a warrant.  Plaintiffs further allege that their
vehicles were not impeding traffic, were parked in legal parking
spots, did not pose a hazard to other drivers, and were not at
risk for vandalism. Plaintiffs also allege that the thirty-day
hold on the truck was unreasonable Such an inquiry would be
premature at the pleading stage without the benefit of a fully
developed record.  Defendants' motion to dismiss the first cause
of action is denied.

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for Violation of Procedural Due
Process

Plaintiffs' allegation regarding failure to provide notice of a
storage hearing for the Toyota Camry is beyond the scope of the
Garcia Class Action, and therefore any claim based upon that
allegation is time barred. Defendants' motion to dismiss the
second cause of action is granted.

Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for Violation of Cal. Govt. Code
Section 11135 et seq.

Neither party has cited nor is the Court aware of any statute or
controlling caselaw governing the specific circumstances in this
case. The most analogous cases cited by Defendants suggest,
however, that the City's alleged failure to provide notices in the
Spanish language does not constitute discrimination.
In the absence of a California statute or caselaw authorizing
Plaintiffs' cause of action, this Court declines to recognize
Plaintiffs' cause of action for the alleged failure to provide
Spanish-language versions of Storage Notices and Notices of
Pending Lien Sales.  Defendants' motion to dismiss the third cause
of action is granted.

Plaintiffs' Sixth through Ninth Causes of Action

Plaintiffs assert four tort claims: negligence per se, trespass to
chattel, negligence and conversion.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant had a mandatory duty imposed
by CVC Section 14602.6 to refrain from towing and causing a
thirty-day hold of their vehicles unless a police officer arrested
the driver or the vehicle was involved in an accident. Plaintiffs'
interpretation of Section 14602.6, however, is not supported by
caselaw.  To the extent Plaintiffs' negligence per se claim is
based upon Section 14602.6, the cause of action is dismissed.

The seventh cause of action for trespass to chattel is based upon
allegations that Defendants caused Plaintiffs' truck to be stored
for a prolonged period of time and charged exorbitant tow and
storage fees. The ninth cause of action for conversion is based
upon the allegation that Defendants intentionally and
substantially interfered with Plaintiffs' property by refusing to
return all three of Plaintiffs' vehicles upon request, wrongfully
taking possession of Plaintiffs' vehicles and personal property
within them, and wrongfully disposing of Plaintiffs' vehicles and
personal property.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are not entitled to immunity
for these actions because they are ministerial and operational.
The Court agrees that the alleged conduct is properly
characterized as day-to-day operational and ministerial actions as
opposed to discretionary policy-based decisions. Accordingly,
Defendants' motion to dismiss the seventh and ninth causes of
action is denied.

In the eighth cause of action for negligence, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants violated their mandatory duties to comply with the
law when towing and storing Plaintiffs' vehicles and charging
related fees and disposing of vehicles.  The eighth cause of
action is dismissed because it appears to be entirely duplicative
of the negligence per se claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y87gd7g4 from Leagle.com.

Rufina Recendiz Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Andrew
Saenz, Mexican Amercian Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 634 S.
Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90014

Rufina Recendiz Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Miranda Galindo,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 634 S. Spring
Street Los Angeles, CA 90014 & Denise Marie Hulett --
dhulett@maldef.org -- Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center.

Eladio Huitzil, Plaintiff, represented by Miranda Galindo, Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund & Denise Marie Hulett,
Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center.

City of King, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson --
rthompson@hurleylaw.com -- Law Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Leyva's Towing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christine Marie
Wheatley - cwheatley@merrillnomura.com -- Merrill, Nomura &
Molineux.

Police Chief Anthony J. Sollecito, Defendant, represented by Ryan
M. Thompson, Law Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Darius Engles, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson, Law
Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Sergeant Alejandrina Tirado, Defendant, represented by Ryan M.
Thompson, Law Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Joey Perez, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson, Law Office
of Vincent P. Hurley.

Brennan Lux, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson, Law
Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Joshue Partida, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson, Law
Office of Vincent P. Hurley.

Elias Orozco, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Thompson, Law
Office of Vincent P. Hurley.


KLEINFELD BRIDAL: Faces "Mendizabal" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kleinfeld Bridal
Corp. The case is styled as Maria Mendizabal, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kleinfeld Bridal
Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-09496 (S.D. N.Y., December 4,
2017).

Kleinfeld Bridal Corp. sells designer wedding gowns through its
bridal store in Brooklyn.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Joseph H Mizrahi Law PC
   337 Avenue W Suite 2f
   Brooklyn, NY 11223
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: jmizrahilaw@gmail.com


KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: Class Members Subject to Del. Law Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned JENNIFER UNDERWOOD, on Behalf of Herself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT
STORES, INC. and CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 15-730 (E.D. Pa.).

Named Plaintiff Jennifer Underwood seeks to certify a class
against Defendants Kohl's Department Stores, Inc., and Capital
One, National Association, arguing that the two companies were
unjustly enriched at her and the class' expense.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants profited from a deficient
credit-monitoring product called PrivacyGuard that was sold to her
and members of the putative class.  In particular, when Plaintiff
and putative class members did not complete the second step in
registering for PrivacyGuard services, they did not receive the
full range of promised credit-monitoring services.

The Court certifies Plaintiff's proposed class as to class members
who are subject to Delaware law. However, Plaintiff's request to
certify a class whose members are subject to Virginia law is
denied.

Plaintiff's proposed class includes those seeking to recover for
unjust enrichment under either Delaware or Virginia law. More
specifically, for putative class members who opened a Kohl's card
account before April 1, 2011, their unjust enrichment claims would
be governed by Delaware law pursuant to the choice-of-law
provision of their cardmember agreement, and, for those who opened
a Kohl's card account after April 1, 2011, and received notice of
the changed choice-of-law provision under the Capital One
cardmember agreement, their unjust enrichment claims would be
governed by Virginia law.

Although Defendants argue otherwise, the putative class is not
limited to members who, like Plaintiff, tried to cancel
PrivacyGuard without success.  Rather, the putative class is
broader, consisting of those who did not complete the second step
of activation but still paid the PrivacyGuard fees.

Plaintiff has satisfied the numerosity requirement. More than
26,000 Kohl's card holders did not complete the second step of
activation.  Thus, a proposed class subject to Delaware law or a
proposed class subject to Virginia law will likely exceed the
threshold of 40.

At oral argument, Defendants acknowledged that their computer
records could be used to identify such putative class members.  It
is also probable that these records can distinguish among class
members who are subject to Delaware law or Virginia law.  All that
would be needed is the date a class member opened her Kohl's card
account, since Delaware law applies to those who opened an account
before April 1, 2011 and Virginia law applies to those who opened
an account on any date afterwards.  The ascertainability
requirement is therefore met.

The factors here weigh in favor of finding that the class-action
device is superior.  For the first factor, the putative class
members do not have an individual interest in prosecuting their
unjust enrichment claims because the sum of money in controversy
for each individual is relatively low.  For the other factor, the
class-action device does not pose significant difficulties since
Plaintiff has only one remaining claim for unjust enrichment still
extant. Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the superiority requirement.

The common question of Defendants' liability under Delaware law
still predominates because Plaintiff has shown that Defendants
lack evidence for their voluntary payment defense.  Indeed,
Plaintiff claims that she has not, to date, received any evidence
regarding a putative class member who voluntarily paid the fees
and knew that she would not receive the full range of PrivacyGuard
services.  Defendants do not contend otherwise, and the parties
completed all fact discovery pursuant to stipulation months ago.

At this point, then, Plaintiff has shown a class-wide absence of
evidence in support of Defendants' voluntary payment defense.
Plaintiff has, in other words, established that it is more likely
than not that the common issue of Defendants' liability under
Delaware's law of unjust enrichment will predominate over
individualized assessments about putative class members'
knowledge. Plaintiff has accordingly satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement as to putative class members who will
proceed under Delaware law.

By contrast, Plaintiff has not shown that the common question of
Defendants' liability under Virginia law predominates over
individual questions affecting class members.

Although briefed by neither party, individual issues arising under
the voluntary payment rule render a Rule 23(b)(3) class improper
for those asserting claims under Virginia law. In contrast to
Delaware's voluntary payment rule, Virginia's presumes that any
payment made is voluntary until the contrary is made to appear.
The proposed Virginia class members, then, bear the burden of
showing that their payment was not voluntary.

Accordingly, Plaintiff, as opposed to Defendants, must demonstrate
that the Virginia class members did not know that failure to
complete the second step would limit their PrivacyGuard services.
This distinct burden imposed by Virginia law defeats predominance.
Particularized questions about the Virginia class members'
subjective knowledge questions that the class members themselves
must affirmatively and individually answer will likely overwhelm
the otherwise common question of Defendants' liability.  Plaintiff
has therefore not satisfied the predominance requirement under
Rule 23(b)(3) for the proposed Virginia class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y77n7euf
from Leagle.com.

JENNIFER GORDON, Plaintiff, represented by ANGELA EDWARDS --
angela.edwards@dinsmore.com -- LAW OFFICE OF ANGELA EDWARDS.

JENNIFER GORDON, Plaintiff, represented by CHARLES J. KOCHER --
SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY PC, LEE S. SHALOV, MCLAUGHLIN
& STERN LLP, 260 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, PATRICK
HOWARD -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY & WADE C. WILKINSON
-- wwilkinson@mclaughlinstern.com -- MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP.

VALERIE TANTLINGER, Plaintiff, represented by ANGELA EDWARDS, LAW
OFFICE OF ANGELA EDWARDS, CHARLES J. KOCHER, SALTZ MONGELUZZI
BARRETT & BENDESKY PC, LEE S. SHALOV, MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP,
PATRICK HOWARD, SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY & WADE C.
WILKINSON, MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP.

JENNIFER UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff, represented by ANGELA EDWARDS, LAW
OFFICE OF ANGELA EDWARDS, CHARLES J. KOCHER, SALTZ MONGELUZZI
BARRETT & BENDESKY PC, LEE S. SHALOV, MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP,
PATRICK HOWARD, SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY & WADE C.
WILKINSON, MCLAUGHLIN & STERN LLP.

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Defendant, represented by MARTIN
C. BRYCE, Jr. -- BRYCE BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS
AND INGERSOLL, L.L.P., DANIEL J.T. MCKENNA --
MCKENNADBALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL,
LLP, JOSEPH J. SCHUSTER, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO & MICHAEL BRYAN KUNZ -
- KUNZM BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP.

CAPITAL ONE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant, represented by
MARTIN C. BRYCE, Jr., BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS AND INGERSOLL, L.L.P.,
DANIEL J.T. MCKENNA, BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP &
MICHAEL BRYAN KUNZ, BALLARD SPAHR LLP.


L.A. HARDWOOD: Thor Sues over Chinesemade Laminate Flooring
-----------------------------------------------------------
YVETTE THOR, individually, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. L.A. HARDWOOD FLOORING,
INC., a California Corporation, d/b/a ETERNITY FLOORS; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC685349 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Dec. 1, 2017), alleges breach of warranty, fraudulent
concealment, and state consumer protection law class action filed
on behalf of all consumers who reside in California, who purchased
Chinesemade laminate flooring distributed and sold under the
"Eternity Floors" brand label between December 21, 2012 and
December 21, 2016.  The Defendants designed, manufactured,
imported, distributed and sold Laminate Flooring, which failed to
meet California's formaldehyde emission regulations as well as
failed to meet the abrasion ratings advertised by Eternity in its
marketing and sales brochures and product labeling.

Laminate Flooring is considered in the industry as a commodity
product, in the sense that its construction is relatively uniform
across brands and models, with each seller competing largely on
the basis of price. Laminate Flooring produced in China is
manufactured by only a handful of factories, all of which use
identical materials and manufacturing processes. The differences
among each model of Laminate Flooring are primarily cosmetic-
designed to meet varying interior decoration preferences of
consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexander Robertson, IV, Esq.
          Mark J. Uyeno, Esq.
          ROBERTSON & ASSOCIATES, LLP
          32121 Lindero Canyon Road, Suite 200
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone (818) 851-3850
          Facsimile (818) 851-3851
          E-mail: arobertson@arobertsonlaw.com
                  muyeno@arobertsonlaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          Patrick M. Wallace, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27609
          Telephone (919) 600 5000
          Facsimile (919) 600 5035
          E-mail: dan@wbmllp.com
                  pat@wbmllp.com


LATIN GROUP: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, "Arevalo" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
NORIS AREVALO, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C.
216(b) v. LATIN GROUP, INC. d/b/a LATIN CAFE, JOSE R MORE, Case
No. 1:17-cv-24257-CMA (S.D. Fla., November 22, 2017), alleges that
the Defendants willfully and intentionally refuses to pay the
Plaintiff's overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Latin Group, Inc., doing business as Latin Cafe, is a corporation
that regularly transacts business within Dade County.  Jose R.
More is a corporate officer, owner or manager of the Defendant
Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com


LAZ PARKING: "Watts" Suit Seeks Premium Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARIO WATTS, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated,
and the general public, the Plaintiff, v. LAZ PARKING CALIFORNIA,
LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; LAZ PARKING SAN
FRANCISCO, LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; LAZ KARP
ASSOCIATES, LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; LAZ KARP
PARTNERS, INC., a Connecticut corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC684831 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 29, 2017), seeks to recover premium wages under California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide him and
all other similarly situated individuals with meal periods; failed
to provide them with rest periods; failed to pay premium wages for
missed meal and/or rest periods; failed to pay them for all hours
worked; failed to pay tips; failed to reimburse them to all
necessary business expenses; failed to provide them with accurate
written wage statements; and failed to timely pay them all of
their final wages following separation of employment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 907
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone (310) 888 7771
          Facsimile (310) 888 0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  thomas@setarehlaw.com


LENSCRAFTERS INC: Lee Sues over Lost Market Share
-------------------------------------------------
KIM LEE, O.D., individually and on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LENSCRAFTERS, INC. an Ohio
corporation, EYEMED, INC., a California corporation, and
Does 1-500, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-17-562793 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Nov. 30, 2017), alleges that the Plaintiff and the other
licensed optometrists unaffiliated with retail chain optical
stores lost market share in their optometry practice due to
Defendants' unlawful practice of controlling an optometrist at
Defendants' stores. Lee further alleges that he and the other
licensed optometrists who sell optical products as part of their
practice and are unaffiliated with chain optical stores, lost
market share in their optical retail sales due to Defendants'
practice of controlling an optometrist at Defendants' stores as a
means of improperly increasing their market share of optical
product sales in California.

LensCrafters is an American retailer of prescription eyewear, and
prescription sunglasses, and the largest optical chain in the
United States, with about 90 stores in California alone.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Quadra, Esq.
          Rebecca M. Coll, Esq.
          Niall Vignoles, Esq.
          Terry Gross, Esq.
          Adam C. Belsky, Esq.
          QUADRA & COLL, LLP
          649 Mission Street, 5th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 426 3502
          Facsimile: (415) 795 4530


LEXISNEXIS RISK: Loses Bid for Interlocutory Appeal in DPPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Statesville Division, issued an Order denying
Defendant's Motion for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal in
the case captioned DELORIS GASTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, et al., Defendants, No. 5:16-cv-9
(W.D.N.C.).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Action
Amended Complaint.  Defendants argued that the definition of
personal information under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA) expressly excludes all information from vehicular
accidents, accident reports, from regulation under the DPPA.
Based on this interpretation, defendants argued that plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Appearing from the face of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff had
stated a cognizable claim, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was summarily
denied by Order entered September 13, 2017.

A district court may certify an order for immediate appeal if such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. A question of law refers to a
question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional
provision, regulation, or common law doctrine as opposed to an
issue of fact.

The definition that defendants ask this Court to certify for
clarification is, as follows: personal information means
information that identifies an individual, including an
individual's photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip
code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,
but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving
violations, and driver's status.

Applying a modicum of common sense to what is a clearly written
statute, being involved in a fender bender on the way to work is
clearly an insufficient reason to expose protected personal
information (especially a person's name and home address) to a web
audience increasingly inhabited more by identity thieves than boy
scouts. Rather than certify what would most likely be a futile and
expensive interlocutory appeal, the Court will allow defendants to
revisit the legal issue at summary judgment, but only after the
close of discovery.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybgf3v3ofrom Leagle.com.

Deloris Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Wilkerson, The
Van Winkle Law Firm. 11 N Market St., Asheville, NC 28801-2902
Deloris Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by Eugene Clark Covington,
Jr. -- gcovington@covpatlaw.com -- Covington, Patrick, Hagins,
Stern & Lewis, P.A., pro hac vice, Heather Whitaker Goldstein, The
Van Winkle Law Firm & Larry S. McDevitt, The Van Winkle Law Firm,
11 N Market St., Asheville, NC 28801-2902

Leonard Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Wilkerson, The
Van Winkle Law Firm, Eugene Clark Covington, Jr., Covington,
Patrick, Hagins, Stern & Lewis, P.A., pro hac vice, Heather
Whitaker Goldstein, The Van Winkle Law Firm & Larry S. McDevitt,
The Van Winkle Law Firm.

LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dennis
Kyle Deak -- kyle.deak@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders, LLP,
Hsiao (Mark) C. Mao -- mark.mao@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders
LLP, pro hac vice & Ronald I. Raether, Jr. --
ron.raether@troutman.com  -- Troutman Sanders, pro hac vice.

PoliceReports.US, LLC, Defendant, represented by Dennis Kyle Deak,
Troutman Sanders, LLP, Hsiao (Mark) C. Mao, Troutman Sanders LLP,
pro hac vice & Ronald I. Raether, Jr., Troutman Sanders, pro hac
vice.


LIBERTY MUTUAL: Class Settlement in "Moyle" Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled GEOFFREY MOYLE, an individual, PAULINE ARWOOD,
an individual, THOMAS ROLLASON, an individual, and, JEANNIE
SANDERS, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, and ROES 1 through 500, inclusive, Plaintiffs,
v. LIBERTY MUTUAL RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLAN; LIBERTY MUTUAL
RETIREMENT PLAN RETIREMENT BOARD; LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP INC., a
Massachusetts company; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Massachusetts company; and, DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 10-cv-02179-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The proposed Settlement is the product of over seven years of
litigation.  The Parties reached a settlement after completion of
fact and expert discovery, an order certifying a class, a ruling
in favor of Defendants on their motion for summary judgment, a
cross-appeal to the Ninth Circuit, supplemental briefing and
argument on Defendants' supplemental motion for summary judgment
and a pending motion for reconsideration.  They engaged an
experienced class action and ERISA mediator and attended two
separate full-day mediations, which was followed by several weeks
of follow up over the telephone when the parties finally accepted
the mediator's proposal on Aug. 8, 2017.  Thus, the posture of the
litigation and the process of negotiating the Settlement indicate
that the deal is informed and non-collusive.  Further, the
Settlement's terms demonstrate procedural fairness and lack of
collusion.

The proposed Settlement provides a New Benefit in addition to the
existing retirement benefits provided by the Plan.  The New
Benefit will grant 50% past service credit for years of employment
by Golden Eagle Insurance Co. for purposes of benefits accrual,
and subject to all the other terms and conditions of the Plan.
The Class has yet to be notified of the Settlement and given an
opportunity to object.

After considering the papers and supporting documents, including
the Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release, Judge Curiel
finds that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and other laws and rules applicable to
preliminary settlement approval of class actions have been
satisfied.  Accordingly, he preliminarily approved the settlement
of the Action as memorialized in the Settlement Agreement, subject
to further consideration at the Final Fairness and Approval
Hearing.

The Judge also approved the Notice of Class Action Settlement.  He
finds that the notice and objection process set out in the
Settlement Agreement is the best notice practicable under the
circumstances and suffices to meet the due process requirements
imposed by the Constitution of the United States and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.

Judge Curiel ordered the Defendants to cause the Notice of Class
Action Settlement to be provided to each Class Member, or in the
case of any deceased Class Member, such Class Member's beneficiary
as determined under the Plan, by Nov. 27, 2017, according to the
procedures described in the Settlement Agreement.  He also ordered
the Plaintiffs to file their motion for attorneys' fees and costs
by Dec. 15, 2017.

The deadline for objections by Class Members to the settlement is
Jan. 16, 2018, in the form and manner described in the Class
Notice.  The deadline for a response to any objections by Class
Members to the settlement is Jan. 30, 2018.  The motion for Final
Approval and Dismissal of the Action will be filed by Feb. 6,
2018.  A hearing on the Final Approval and Dismissal of the Action
will be held on March 2, 2018, at 1:30 p.m. before the undersigned
Judge in Courtroom 2D of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, located at 221 West Broadway, San
Diego, CA 92101.

The Defendants will cause pension election kits to be sent to the
Members of the Settlement Class by March 9, 2018.  The deadline
for them to receive election forms from Class Members is May 11,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/h8cR8L from Leagle.com.

Geoffrey Moyle, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Tomasevic --
atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas and Tomasevic LLP.

Geoffrey Moyle, Plaintiff, represented by Craig McKenzie Nicholas
-- cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas and Tomasevic, Georg
Capielo, Jack B. Winters, Jr., Law Offices of Winters and
Associates, Matthew B. Butler -- mbutler@butler-firm.com -- The
Butler Firm, Sarah D. Ball, Winter and Associates & David Gerald
Greco -- dgreco@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas & Tomasevic, LLP.

Pauline Arwood, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Tomasevic,
Nicholas and Tomasevic LLP, Craig McKenzie Nicholas, Nicholas and
Tomasevic, Georg Capielo, Jack B. Winters, Jr., Law Offices of
Winters and Associates & Sarah D. Ball, Winter and Associates.

Thomas Rollason, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Tomasevic,
Nicholas and Tomasevic LLP, Craig McKenzie Nicholas, Nicholas and
Tomasevic, Georg Capielo, Jack B. Winters, Jr., Law Offices of
Winters and Associates, Matthew B. Butler, The Butler Firm, Sarah
D. Ball, Winter and Associates & David Gerald Greco, Nicholas &
Tomasevic, LLP.

Jeannie Sanders, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Tomasevic,
Nicholas and Tomasevic LLP, Craig McKenzie Nicholas, Nicholas and
Tomasevic, Georg Capielo, Jack B. Winters, Jr., Law Offices of
Winters and Associates, Matthew B. Butler, The Butler Firm, Sarah
D. Ball, Winter and Associates & David Gerald Greco, Nicholas &
Tomasevic, LLP.

Liberty Mutual Retirement Benefit Plan, Defendant, represented by
Aimee E. Axelrod, Jackson Lewis, Amber Gardina-Quintanilla --
amber.gardina-quintanilla@procopio.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C.,
Ashley Bryan Abel -- AbelA@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP,
pro hac vice, Julia M. Ebert, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice &
Robert M. Wood, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice.

Liberty Mutual Retirement Plan Retirement Board, Defendant,
represented by Aimee E. Axelrod, Jackson Lewis, Amber Gardina-
Quintanilla, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Ashley Bryan Abel, Jackson Lewis
LLP, pro hac vice, Julia M. Ebert, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice
& Robert M. Wood -- WoodR@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis LLP,
pro hac vice.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Amber
Gardina-Quintanilla, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ashley Bryan Abel,
Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a Massachusetts company,
Defendant, represented by Julia M. Ebert, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro
hac vice.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Robert
M. Wood, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Group Inc., Defendant, represented by
Aimee E. Axelrod, Jackson Lewis, Amber Gardina-Quintanilla,
Jackson Lewis, P.C., Ashley Bryan Abel, Jackson Lewis LLP & Julia
M. Ebert, Jackson Lewis LLP, pro hac vice.


MARKETSOURCE INC: Fails to Pay All Earned Wages, Delgado Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
RAY DELGADO, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MARKETSOURCE, INC., d/b/a
MARYLAND MARKETSOURCE, INC., a Maryland corporation; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 17CV319866 (Cal
Super. Ct., Nov. 30, 2017), seeks to recover penalties and/or
damages for failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
and for failure to pay all earned wages to discharged employees.

This complaint challenges systemic illegal employment practices
resulting in violations of the California Labor Code against
Plaintiff individually and against other individuals who worked
for Defendant. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant acted
intentionally and with deliberate indifference and conscious
disregard to the rights of all employees in receiving complete and
accurate wage statements, and timely payment of final wages. The
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is engaged in, among other
things, a system of willful violations of the California Labor
Code and the applicable IWC Wage Orders by creating and
maintaining policies, practices and customs that knowingly deny
employees the above stated rights and benefits.

MarketSource Inc. provides outsourced sales solutions for
organizations. It offers retailer solutions, such as direct sales,
experiential demo days, consumer engagement, and merchandising
audit and enhancement; and manufacturer and services solutions,
including training and brand advocacy, direct and assisted
sales.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nick Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488 6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488 6554

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531 4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634 0333


MARVELL TECHNOLOGY: Class Notice in "Luna" Conditionally Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL LUNA, Individually and on Behalf of) All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. MARVELL TECHNOLOGY GROUP,
LTD., et al., Defendants, Case No. C 15-05447 WHA, Case No. 3:15-
cv-05447-WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco
Division, conditionally approved the proposed class notice subject
to the revisions.

On Oct. 27, 2017, the Court certified the action as a class action
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Class
consists of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired the common stock of Marvell during the period from Feb.
19, 2015 through Dec. 7, 2015, inclusive, and were damaged
thereby.

The parties stipulated procedures for dissemination of the class
notice.  The proposed Notice Plan to the Class comply with the
requirements of due process and with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and constitute the best notice practicable
under the circumstances.  The firm of Gilardi & Co., LLC is
appointed and authorized to supervise and administer the notice
procedure.

Within 10 calendar days after the Court's approval and entry of
the Stipulation and Order, Marvell will instruct its securities
transfer agent to produce to the Notice Administrator a list, in
electronic form, of all persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired Marvell common stock during the Class Period.  Within 15
calendar days of its receipt of Marvell's Transfer List, the
Notice Administrator will send, by first class mail, the agreed-
upon proposed Notice of Pendency of Class Action to each purchaser
or acquirer identified on the Transfer List.  For all Notices
returned as undeliverable, the Notice of Administrator will use
best efforts to locate updated addresses.

The Notice Administrator will use reasonable efforts to give
notice to brokerage firms, banks, institutions, investment funds,
investment companies, investment advisors, investment portfolios,
mutual fund trusts, mutual investment funds, investment managers,
and any other persons or entities who are or who claim to be
nominees that purchased or otherwise acquired Marvell common stock
during the Class Period for the benefit of another Person.

Such nominees will be requested to either: (a) send the Notice to
all such beneficial owners of Marvell common stock within 10
calendar days of receipt of the Notice; or (b) send a list of the
names and addresses of such beneficial owners to the Notice
Administrator within 10 calendar days after receipt of the Notice,
in which case the Notice Administrator will promptly mail the
Notice to such beneficial owner.  Upon full and timely compliance
with these directions, such nominees may seek reimbursement from
the Notice Administrator of their reasonable expenses actually
incurred by providing the Notice Administrator with proper
documentation supporting the expenses for which reimbursement is
sought.  Any disputes with respect to the reasonableness or
documentation of expenses incurred will be subject to review by
the Court.  The Class Counsel will then communicate weekly with
the brokers and custodians identified on the Nominees List to
ensure the Notice is sent to beneficial owners in a timely manner.

Within 10 calendar days after the Notice Date, the Notice
Administrator shall: (i) cause the Summary Notice to be published
on one occasion in the national edition of Investor's Business
Daily; and (ii) cause the Notice to be posted to the Notice
Administrator's case website.

Within 10 calendar days after the Notice Date, the Class Counsel
shall: (i) issue a press release containing the Summary Notice;
(ii) post the Notice on the website of Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP.

The Notice will provide an address for the purpose of receiving
requests for exclusion from the Class and requests for additional
copies of the Notice.  The Notice Administrator will identify and
number all exclusion requests received and create copies of those
requests for counsel for all parties.  The Notice Administrator
will provide via email weekly reports of exclusion requests
received to counsel for all parties. The Notice Administrator will
maintain original requests in its files.

The requests for exclusion from the Class will be made by
submitting a written request for exclusion as set forth in the
Notice and will be postmarked within 45 calendar days after the
Notice Date.

Within 15 calendar days following the deadline for requesting
exclusion, the Notice Administrator will submit a declaration to
the Court setting forth its notification efforts and summarizing
the exclusion requests that it received.  Within 15 calendar days
following the deadline for requesting exclusion, the Class Counsel
will file all such requests for exclusion with the Court.

Except for the costs associated with obtaining Marvell's Transfer
List, the costs of the notice process will be borne by the Class
Counsel, and not by the Defendants.

Judge Alsup conditionally approved the Class Notice and ordered
these revisions:

     a. On page one, the alignment of the header must be fixed,
and the tabbed space between the words "common and stock" must be
deleted.

     b. On page three under number five, the sentences "You may
not have the further opportunity to seek exclusion from the Class
at the time of any settlement.  In other words, this may be your
only change to opt out of the lawsuit" must be deleted.  He
ordered to replace with the sentences "If there is a settlement in
this lawsuit, you will have another opportunity to opt out of the
Class at that time.  Opting out of a settlement may preserve your
right to bring an individual lawsuit unless your claims are time-
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or repose.  You
may want to consult an attorney before opting out of any
settlement."

     c. On page five, the words "on the 16th floor" after the
words "Office of the Clerk of Court" will be added.

Although the Court has thoroughly reviewed the proposed notice to
identify typographical and formatting errors, the parties must
proofread the next version carefully, particularly since the edits
above could introduce new errors.

The parties' stipulated procedures for dissemination of the class
notice and their selection of the firm of Gilardi & Co. LLC as
notice administrator are approved.  As set forth in the
stipulation, the notice will be distributed by no later than Dec.
4, 2017 via first class mail.  Any request to be excluded from the
class will be addressed to Luna v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd.
c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC, PO Box 8040, San Rafael, CA 94912-8040,
postmarked by no later than Jan. 18, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lUTDe9 from Leagle.com.

Daniel Luna, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Daniel Luna, Plaintiff, represented by Casey Edwards Sadler --
csadler@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi
Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongayn & Murrary LLP &
Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Philip Limbacher, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan
Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Joseph
Alexander Hood, II, Pomerantz LLP, Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Jim Farno, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP, Joseph Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP & Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP.

Marvell Technology Group LTD, Defendant, represented by Diane M.
Doolittle -- dianedoolittle@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Harry Arthur Olivar, Jr. --
harryolivar@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, Alyssa L. Greenberg -- alygreenberg@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Jason Frank Lake --
jasonlake@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan
& Valerie Suzanne Roddy -- valerieroddy@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP.

Sehat Sutardja, Defendant, represented by Jason David Russell --
jason.russell@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP.

Michael Rashkin, Defendant, represented by Joshua Garrett Hamilton
-- joshua.hamilton@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & James Hyeoun
Ju Moon -- james.moon@lw.com -- Latham and Watkins LLP.

Sukhi Nagesh, Defendant, represented by Bahram Seyedin-Noor --
bahram@altolit.com -- Alto Litigation, PC, Bryan Jacob Ketroser,
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Ian Edward Browning, Alto
Litigation, PC.

Employees Pension Plan Of The City Of Clearwater, Movant,
represented by Curtis Victor Trinko -- ctrinko@trinko.com -- Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.

Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund, Movant,
represented by Carissa Jasmine Dolan -- cdolan@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, David Avi Rosenfeld --
DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Jonah
Goldstein -- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Matthew Isaac Alpert -- malpert@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman Dowd LLP, Nadim Gamal Hegazi -- nhegazi@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Scott H. Saham --
scotts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Shawn A.
Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

Cambridge Retirement System, Movant, represented by Gerald H. Silk
-- jerry@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP
& Avi Josefson -- avi@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP.

Oakland County Employees' Retirement System, Movant, represented
by Gerald H. Silk, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Avi
Josefson, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Hui Qian, Movant, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy, Pomerantz
LLP.

The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Marvell
Technology Group, Ltd., Miscellaneous, represented by John P.
Stigi, III -- jstigi@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton LLP.


LEXISNEXIS RISK: Loses Bid for Interlocutory Appeal in DPPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Statesville Division, issued an Order denying
Defendant's Motion for Certification of an Interlocutory Appeal in
the case captioned DELORIS GASTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
LEXISNEXIS RISK SOLUTIONS, et al., Defendants, No. 5:16-cv-9
(W.D.N.C.).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Action
Amended Complaint.  Defendants argued that the definition of
personal information under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA) expressly excludes all information from vehicular
accidents, accident reports, from regulation under the DPPA.
Based on this interpretation, defendants argued that plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Appearing from the face of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff had
stated a cognizable claim, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was summarily
denied by Order entered September 13, 2017.

A district court may certify an order for immediate appeal if such
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. A question of law refers to a
question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional
provision, regulation, or common law doctrine as opposed to an
issue of fact.

The definition that defendants ask this Court to certify for
clarification is, as follows: personal information means
information that identifies an individual, including an
individual's photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip
code), telephone number, and medical or disability information,
but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving
violations, and driver's status.

Applying a modicum of common sense to what is a clearly written
statute, being involved in a fender bender on the way to work is
clearly an insufficient reason to expose protected personal
information (especially a person's name and home address) to a web
audience increasingly inhabited more by identity thieves than boy
scouts. Rather than certify what would most likely be a futile and
expensive interlocutory appeal, the Court will allow defendants to
revisit the legal issue at summary judgment, but only after the
close of discovery.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybgf3v3ofrom Leagle.com.

Deloris Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Wilkerson, The
Van Winkle Law Firm. 11 N Market St., Asheville, NC 28801-2902
Deloris Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by Eugene Clark Covington,
Jr. -- gcovington@covpatlaw.com -- Covington, Patrick, Hagins,
Stern & Lewis, P.A., pro hac vice, Heather Whitaker Goldstein, The
Van Winkle Law Firm & Larry S. McDevitt, The Van Winkle Law Firm,
11 N Market St., Asheville, NC 28801-2902

Leonard Gaston, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Wilkerson, The
Van Winkle Law Firm, Eugene Clark Covington, Jr., Covington,
Patrick, Hagins, Stern & Lewis, P.A., pro hac vice, Heather
Whitaker Goldstein, The Van Winkle Law Firm & Larry S. McDevitt,
The Van Winkle Law Firm.

LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dennis
Kyle Deak -- kyle.deak@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders, LLP,
Hsiao (Mark) C. Mao -- mark.mao@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders
LLP, pro hac vice & Ronald I. Raether, Jr. --
ron.raether@troutman.com  -- Troutman Sanders, pro hac vice.

PoliceReports.US, LLC, Defendant, represented by Dennis Kyle Deak,
Troutman Sanders, LLP, Hsiao (Mark) C. Mao, Troutman Sanders LLP,
pro hac vice & Ronald I. Raether, Jr., Troutman Sanders, pro hac
vice.


MDL 1869: Court Refuses to Certify Direct Purchasers Class
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued an
Opinion denying Direct Purchasers Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned In re RAIL FREIGHT FUEL
SURCHARGE ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This document relates to: ALL
DIRECT PURCHASER CASES, MDL Docket No. 1869, Miscellaneous No. 07-
0489 (PLF) (D.D.C.).

This case involves the claim that defendants BNSF Railway Company;
CSX Transportation, Inc.; Norfolk Southern Railway Company; and
Union Pacific Railroad Company engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy to coordinate their fuel surcharge programs as a means
to impose supra-competitive total price increases on their
shipping customers.  A rail fuel surcharge (FSC) is a separately-
identified fee that is charged by the railroads for agreed-upon
transportation services, purportedly to compensate for increases
in the cost of fuel.  Plaintiffs allege, however, that the four
defendants, through their collective action, conspired to impose
Rail Fuel Surcharges that far exceeded any increases in the
Defendants' fuel costs, and thereby collected billions of dollars
of additional profits during the conspiracy.

Plaintiffs have been divided into two putative classes: (1) the
direct purchasers who allegedly purchased rail freight
transportation from defendants and who were assessed a rail fuel
surcharge for the transportation; and (2) the indirect purchasers
those who allegedly purchased rail freight transportation services
indirectly from defendants. Plaintiffs in both putative classes
allege that defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 1, by conspiring to fix prices through the use of
fuel surcharges, and seek recovery under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 15.

Defendants do not contest the numerosity requirement.  Plaintiffs
previously represented that the putative class included
approximately 30,000 shippers, which number was later changed to
16,000 shippers.  The Court finds that this change has no bearing
on the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs satisfy the numerosity
requirement.  When the class is large here, approximately 16,000
shippers alone are dispositive.  The Court therefore finds that
plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the putative class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.

As Plaintiffs assert, and as Defendants do not dispute, the
question whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy is common to
all putative class members because the answer to that question
will focus exclusively on defendants' conduct.  The Court
therefore finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.

As Plaintiffs describe it, the claims of the named Plaintiffs and
the absent Class members alike arose out of the same course of
events: Defendants' conspiracy to impose stand-alone, rate-based
Fuel Surcharges in order to raise shipping prices across the
board.  On remand, defendants no longer argue that plaintiffs have
failed to satisfy the typicality requirement.  The Court finds
that the claims of the eight named class representatives "are
based on the same legal theory as the claims of the other class
members" and that their injuries "arise from the same course of
conduct that gives rise to the other class members' claims."
Consequently, plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing by
a preponderance of the evidence that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class.

Defendants do no dispute the eight named plaintiffs as class
representatives; nor do they object to Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, and Hausfeld LLP as qualified class counsel. The
Court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class because
the interests of the eight named representatives do not conflict
with those of other putative class members, and because they will
vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified
counsel.

The Court, however, is not persuaded that class revenue is a
legitimate measure of injury to satisfy predominance.  For these
reasons, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to
establish that all or virtually all class members were injured by
the alleged conspiracy.  The plaintiffs' damages model indicates
that at least 12.7% of class members or at least 2,037 shippers
are uninjured.  This is more than de minimis and insufficient to
demonstrate impact on a class-wide basis.

Because the Court has concluded that plaintiffs have failed to
meet the predominance requirement and that the proposed class
action would require significant individualized inquiries
regarding both injury and damages, it cannot conclude that a class
action would be superior in this case.  The Court finds that
plaintiffs have failed to establish each fact necessary to meet
the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure by a preponderance of the evidence.  Specifically,
plaintiffs have failed to establish predominance and superiority
under Rule 23(b)(3).

The Court therefore will deny the direct purchaser plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yammk7cafrom Leagle.com.

In re RAIL FREIGHT FUEL SURCHARGE ANTITRUST LITIGATION -- MDL NO.
1869, represented by Roger M. Adelman, LAW OFFICES OF ROGER M.
ADELMAN, 1100 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 730. Washington DC 20036

In re RAIL FREIGHT FUEL SURCHARGE ANTITRUST LITIGATION -- MDL NO.
1869, represented by Richard P. Rouco -- rrouco@qwwdlaw.com --
WHATLEY DRAKE & KALLAS, LLC, pro hac vice.

DAKOTA GRANITE COMPANY, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur N.
Bailey, Jr. -- abailey@hausfeldllp.com -- HAUSFELD LLP, James
Joseph Pizzirusso -- pizzirusso@hausfeldllp.com -- HAUSFELD LLP,
Michael David Hausfeld -- mhausfeld@hausfeldllp.com -- HAUSFELD
LLP, Richard M. Hagstrom, rhagstrom@hjlawfirm.com --  HELLMUTH &
JOHNSON, PLLC, Scott W. Carlson -- vesades@heinsmills.com --
HEINS, MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C., Vincent J. Esades --
vesades@heinsmills.com -- HEINS, MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C., Allen D.
Black, FINE, KAPLAN & BLACK, One South Broad Street, Suite
2300Philadelphia, PA 19107, pro hac vice, Benjamin D. Brown --
bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC,
Brent W. Landau -- blandau@hausfeldllp.com -- HAUSFELD LLP,
Douglas A. Millen -- dmillen@fklmlaw.com --  FREED KANNER LONDON &
MILLEN LLC, pro hac vice, Steig D. Olson --
steigolson@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN
LLP & Steven A. Kanner-skanner@fklmlaw.com -- MUCH SHELIST FREED
DENENBERG & AMENT, P.C.

MCINTYRE GROUP, LTD., Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin D. Brown,
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC, Allen D. Black, FINE, KAPLAN &
BLACK, pro hac vice, James Shedden, SCHAD DIAMOND & SHEDDEN P.C.,
332 S Michigan Ave., Chicago, IL 60604, Lawrence W. Schad, SCHAD
DIAMOND & SHEDDEN P.C., Matthew S. Burns, SCHAD DIAMOND & SHEDDEN
P.C. & Tony Kim, SCHAD DIAMOND & SHEDDEN P.C., 332 South Michigan
Avenue, Suite 1000Chicago, IL 60604-4408.

GVL PIPE & DEMOLITION, INC., Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin D.
Brown, COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC, Simon B. Paris --
SALTZ, MONGELUZZI, BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C., pro hac vice, Allen
D. Black, FINE, KAPLAN & BLACK, pro hac vice, Daniel E.
Gunstafson, GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC, 120 South 6th Street., Suite
2600, Minneapolis, MN 55402, pro hac vice, Donald L. Perelman,
FINE, KAPLAN & BLACK, One South Broad Street, Suite
2300Philadelphia, PA 19107, pro hac vice, Jason S. Kilene,
GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC, 120 South 6th Street., Suite 2600,
Minneapolis, MN 55402, pro hac vice, Patrick Howard -- SALTZ,
MONGELUZZI, BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C., pro hac vice & Thomas A.
Muzilla, THE MUZILLA LAW FIRM, LLC, Tower at Erieview, Suite 1100,
1301 East 9th Street, Cleveland, OH 44144 pro hac vice.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Andrew Santo
Tulumello, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, David G. Meyer, JONES
DAY, pro hac vice, Randy M. Mastro, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER,
L.L.P., pro hac vice, Richard Joseph Favretto, MAYER BROWN LLP,
Robert C. Walters, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, Shari Ross
Lahlou, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Veronica S. Lewis, GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER, LLP, David Daniel Cross, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, Linda
Sue Stein, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, Michael E. Lackey, Jr., MAYER
BROWN PLLC & Samuel M. Sipe, Jr., STEPTOE & JOHNSON, L.L.P..

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant, represented by David Daniel
Cross, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, David G. Meyer, JONES DAY, pro hac
vice, Kent Alan Gardiner, CROWELL & MORING LLP, George D.
Ruttinger, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Michael Wyld Lieberman, CROWELL &
MORING LLP, Richard McMillan, Jr., CROWELL & MORING, L.L.P. &
Shari Ross Lahlou, CROWELL & MORING LLP.

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant, represented by David
G. Meyer, JONES DAY, pro hac vice, Jennifer B. Patterson, KAYE
SCHOLER, LLP, John Murray Nannes, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOM LLP, Claudia R. Higgins, KAYE SCHOLER, LLP, David Daniel
Cross, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, Saul P. Morgenstern, KAYE SCHOLER
LLP & Sean Michael Tepe, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Alan
Mitchell Wiseman, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, James Scott Ballenger,
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Thomas Adam Isaacson, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, Tyrone R. Childress, JONES DAY, pro hac vice, Alfred C.
Pfeiffer, Jr., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel M. Wall,
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, pro hac vice, David Daniel Cross, MORRISON &
FOERSTER LLP, Gregory P. Lindstrom, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, pro hac
vice & Timothy L. O'Mara, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, pro hac vice.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, Interested Party, represented by
Virginia Strasser, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD.

OXBOW CARBON & MINERALS LLC, Interested Party, represented by John
Richard Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP.

OXBOW MINING, LLC, Interested Party, represented by John Richard
Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP & Roman M. Silberfeld, ROBINS KAPLAN
LLP, pro hac vice.

OXBOW CALCINING INTERNATIONAL LLC, Interested Party, represented
by John Richard Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP & Roman M. Silberfeld,
ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, pro hac vice.

OXBOW MIDWEST CALCINING LLC, Interested Party, represented by John
Richard Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP.

OXBOW CALCINING LLC, Interested Party, represented by John Richard
Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP & Roman M. Silberfeld, ROBINS KAPLAN
LLP, pro hac vice.

TERROR CREEK LLC, Interested Party, represented by John Richard
Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP & Roman M. Silberfeld, ROBINS KAPLAN
LLP, pro hac vice.

JONATHAN LEE RICHES, Movant, Pro Se.

DINESH PALIWAL, Movant, Pro Se.

HUNTER PARRISH, Movant, Pro Se.

PETER H. DIAMANDIS, Movant, Pro Se.

SOUTHERN COMPANY, Intervenor, represented by Gabriela Richeimer,
CLYDE & CO US LLP, John Richard Gerstein, CLYDE & CO US LLP, Barry
J. Brett, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, pro hac vice & Daniel N. Anziska,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, pro hac vice.

DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, Intervenor, represented by Nathan P. Eimer,
EIMER STAHL LLP & Scott C. Solberg, EIMER STAHL LLP.

RAYONIER INC., Intervenor, represented by William J. Blechman,
KENNY NACHWALTER, P.A. & Richard Alan Arnold, KENNY NACHWALTER,
P.A.


MDL 2314: Court Dismisses Facebook Internet Tracking Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, dismissed the case
styled In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, Case No. 5:12-
md-02314-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that Facebook
improperly tracked the web browsing activity of logged-out
Facebook users on third-party websites.  They previously asserted
a variety of common law claims and claims for violations of
federal and state statutes.  After two rounds of motions to
dismiss, the Court dismissed the majority of the Plaintiffs'
claims with prejudice for lack of standing and for failure to
state a claim.  The Court granted leave to amend only as to the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing.  They timely filed their third
amended complaint ("TAC").  Facebook now moves to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 15(c).

The parties agree that the Facebook's Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities ("SRR") constitutes a contract.  However, the SRR
itself does not contain a promise to not track logged-out users.
Rather, the Plaintiffs argue that the operative contract is a
combination of provisions from Facebook's SRR, Facebook's Privacy
Policy, and Facebook's Help Center pages.

Judge Davila finds that the Data Use Policy was not incorporated
by reference into the SRR because the SRR did not "clearly and
unequivocally" reference it.  He also finds that the Help Center
pages cited in the TAC were not incorporated into the Privacy
Policy because they were not known or easily available to the
contracting parties.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing claim, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs
have not identified contractual provisions that prohibited
Facebook from tracking logged-out users in the manner they allege.
The Plaintiffs' claim must therefore be dismissed.

Judge Davila further finds that the Plaintiffs did not obtain
Facebook's consent or the Court's leave to expand its class
allegations.  Accordingly, their expanded class allegations are
stricken.

Finally, the Court previously allowed the Plaintiffs to amend
their claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.  Since their amendments did not cure the
defects the Court identified, the Plaintiffs' claims will be
dismissed without leave to amend.

For these reasons, Judge Davila granted Facebook's motion to
dismiss.  The Clerk will close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/eBaeYI from Leagle.com.

Alexandria Parrish, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson,
III --krobertson@bflawfirm.com -- BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY.

Alexandria Parrish, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson,
Jr., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick
Frickleton -- jimf@bflawfirm.com -- BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, 170 Monmouth Street,
Red Bank, NJ 07701,  pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter --
mwinter.bflawfirm.com -- Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny,
Paul R. Kiesel -- kiesel@kbla.com-- Kiesel Law LLP, Peter F.
Burns, Peter S. Mackey, Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC,
4330Belleview Ave, Suite 200, Kansas City, MO 64111 Phone 816-756-
5071 & William Mitchell Cunningham, Jr.

Sharon Beatty, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Straite, Kaplan
Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus
Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS
FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Edward
D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer
L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice, Joel Grant Woods, Grant
Woods PC, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson &
Gorny, P.C. & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Brooke Rutledge, Plaintiff, represented by David Shelton, David
Shelton, PLLC, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice,
Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, P.C.,
Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law
Firm, LC.

Michael Singley, Plaintiff, represented by Alice London, Daniel W.
Bishop, II, Bishop London & Dodds PC, Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen
M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Dana Howard, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, Mark Chandler Goldenberg, Goldenberg Heller
Antognoli and Rowland, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Stephen
M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC & Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg
Heller Antognoli and Rowland, P.C..

John Graham, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Michelle L. Marvel, Bartimus, Frickleton,
Robertson & Gorny, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M.
Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

David Hoffman, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, Emily Ward Roark, Bryant
Law Center, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice,
Mark P. Bryant, Bryant Law Center, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus
Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP
& Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Janet Seamon, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, L.J. Hymel, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus
Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Michael Reese Davis, Hymel
Davis and Petersen, LLC, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Richard
P. Ieyoub, Ieyoub Law Firm, LLC, Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law
Firm, LC & Tim P. Hartdegen.

Chandra L. Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Stephan
Lyskowski, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and
Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice, Mary
Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson & Gorny, P.C., Paul
R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm,
LC.

Facebook Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Gutkin --
jgutkin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Kyle Christopher Wong --
kylewong99@yahoo.com -- Cooley LLP, Matthew Dean Brown --
brownmd.cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Adam Christopher Trigg --
atrigg@be-law.com -- Cooley LLP.


MDL 2543: Court Denies New GM's Bid to Dismiss FACC
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To All Actions, Case Nos. 14-MD-2543 (JMF),
14-MC-2543 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the Fourth Amended
Consolidated Complaint ("FACC"), and denied New GM's motion to
dismiss and/or strike, except to the extent that it concerns
claims that the Court previously dismissed and claims on behalf of
the new Plaintiffs that the Court previously found unviable for
similarly situated Plaintiffs.

In the multidistrict litigation ("MDL"), the Plaintiffs bring
economic-loss claims against Defendant New GM on behalf of a broad
putative class of General Motors car owners and lessors whose
vehicles were subject to recalls beginning in February 2014.

In prior opinions addressing partial motions to dismiss filed by
New GM, the Court ruled on the viability of the Plaintiffs'
independent claims under federal law and the law of 16
jurisdictions.  Following the Court's most recent decision, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the currently
operative FACC.

In their Proposed Fifth Amended Consolidated Complaint ("PFACC"),
they seek to (i) add seven new Named Plaintiffs and proposed class
representatives; (ii) remove 24 Named Plaintiffs previously
dismissed for failure to complete discovery; and (iii) remove nine
Named Plaintiffs who have provided written consent to dismiss
their claims.  New GM opposes the motion, and has also filed a
cross-motion to dismiss or strike certain claims in the PFACC.

Upon review of the parties' submissions, Judge Furman granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the FACC and denied New GM's
motion to dismiss and/or strike, except to the extent that it
concerns claims that the Court previously dismissed and claims on
behalf of new Plaintiffs that the Court previously found unviable
for similarly situated Plaintiffs.

New GM contends that leave to amend should nonetheless be denied
because the Plaintiffs were not sufficiently diligent in proposing
the new representatives and because amendment would be
prejudicial.  With respect to the former argument, the Judge did
previously state that whether the Plaintiffs should be permitted
to amend might turn on "who knew what and when."  Upon reflection,
however, what the Plaintiffs had to "know" was not only that there
were new potential Plaintiffs, but also that there was need to
fill a class representative gap; from that standpoint, the Judge
is not prepared to say that the Plaintiffs were insufficiently
diligent to establish "good cause" within the meaning of Rule
16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  With respect to
the latter argument, New GM fails to establish that it would be
prejudiced by allowing amendment.  And whether the claims have
merit is not a question for this stage, except insofar as adding
such claims would be "futile."

That leaves the question of futility, which New GM raises as a
basis of both its opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion for leave
to amend and its cross-motion to dismiss or strike.
Significantly, Judge Furman finds that only two of New GM's
arguments are truly contested: first, that five of the seven new
Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient "contact with or connection
to" New GM, or "any actionable conduct" by New GM, to support
independent claims against New GM; and, second, that a July 2017
ruling by the Bankruptcy Court bars used car purchasers of non-
Delta-Ignition-Switch-Defect Old GM vehicles, including five of
the new Plaintiffs, from bringing claims against New GM based on
Old GM conduct.

The Judge defers both arguments to another day, however.  He
declines to consider the first argument because it is inadequately
briefed: New GM devotes little more than a few stray sentences to
it, and cites no authority in support of the argument.  He
declines to consider the second argument because the Bankruptcy
Court's ruling is the subject of pending appeals to the Court.
There is little point in addressing the argument until the appeals
are resolved.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/8TegL4 from Leagle.com.

GM Ignition Switch MDL Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by
Elizabeth J. Cabraser -- ecabraser@lchb.com -- Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, Robert Hilliard, Hilliard Munoz Gonzales LLP,
pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Fayne Dotson, Law
Office of Daniel F. Dotson, Mark Parker Robinson, Robinson
Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. & Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, L.L.P.

Shenyesa Henry, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Madelaine Koppelman, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Frances Ann Fagans, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Wayne Wittenberg, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

David Young, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Nathaniel Fagans, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Roseann Hinds, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Joseph Sylvester, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Paul Pollastro, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

GM Ignition Switch MDL Defendants, Defendant, represented by
Andrew Baker Bloomer -- andrew.bloomer@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP.

Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd., ADR Provider, represented by Marcus
W. Lee -- mlee@pljpc.com -- Parsons, Lee & Juliano, PC.


MDL 2820: "Harris" Suit Transferred to Southern Illinois Dist. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
accepted for filing a motion to transfer several cases, including
the lawsuit styled GREGORY HARRIS v. MONSANTO COMPANY, BASF
CORPORATION, BASF SE, BASF CROP PROTECTION, and E.I. DUPONT DE
NEMOURS AND COMPANY, Case No. 3:17-cv-05262-MJW (W.D. Mo.,
November 20, 2017), to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois.

The multidistrict litigation is titled IN RE: Dicamba Herbicides
Litigation, MDL No. 2820.

The litigation arises out of the design, manufacture, and sale of
defective dicamba herbicides and dicamba resistant crop systems by
Defendants Monsanto Company, BASF Corporation, Dupont De Nemours
and Company, and their subsidiaries and affiliates.  In
conjunction with each sale, the Plaintiff argues, the Defendants
falsely marketed and advertised that their dicamba herbicides and
dicamba resistant crop systems could be used safely and
effectively without risk of off-target herbicide movement.

The GMO products at issue are Monsanto's Roundup Ready 2 Xtend
Soybeans and Bollgard II XtendFlex cotton ("Xtend products"),
which are utilized in conjunction with the Defendants' dicamba
herbicides (Monsanto's XtendiMax(R) Herbicide with VaporGrip(R)
Technology ("XtendiMax"), BASF's Engenia herbicide ("Engenia") and
DuPont's FeXapanTM herbicide Plus VaporGrip(R)
Technology("FeXapan")).

Mr. Harris, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, seeks entry of preliminary and permanent injunctions
providing that Monsanto and DuPont shall be enjoined from selling,
marketing, distributing, or otherwise disseminating Xtend
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles F. Speer, Esq.
          Charles D. Miller, Esq.
          SPEER LAW FIRM, P.A.
          104 W. 9th Street, Suite 400
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 472-3560
          Facsimile: (816) 421-2150
          E-mail: cspeer@speerlawfirm.com
                  cmiller@speerlawfirm.com


MENTOR USA: Accused by "Weisberg" Class Suit of Invading Privacy
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID WEISBERG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MENTOR USA; DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
8:17-cv-02053 (C.D. Cal., November 22, 2017), accuses the
Defendants of negligently, knowingly and willfully contacting the
Plaintiff on his cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, thereby invading his privacy.

Mentor USA is a company engaged in the business of providing
student loan repayment services.  The true names and capacities of
the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notified investors that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against Meridian Bioscience,
Inc. securities and certain of its officers, on behalf of a class
who purchased Meridian between March 25, 2016 and July 13, 2017,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors are encouraged to
join this case by visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/vivo.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) Defendant's lead tests provide inaccurate
results; and (2) consequently, Meridian's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/vivo or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in
Meridian you have until January 16, 2018 to request that the Court
appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, is a corporate litigation
boutique.  Our primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients.  In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Tel. No.: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


MORRIS COLLEGE: Students File Class Action Suit Because of Mold
---------------------------------------------------------------
Warren Stocker, writing for wistv.com, reports that a group of
Midlands college students filed a lawsuit against their school
because of mold.

Five students who lived in student housing at Morris College in
Sumter have filed the class action lawsuit saying they were
exposed to toxic mold and other hazardous substances.

The attorney says several students had to be hospitalized or even
drop out of school.

The students are demanding a trial by jury and are asking for at
least $55 million.

A spokesperson for the college said on November 17 that they did
not have a statement to release because they had just learned of
the lawsuit. [GN]


MPR PROPERTY: Burchfield Sues over Rental Agreement
---------------------------------------------------
PATRICIA RAE BURCHFIELD, Individually and on behalf all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MPR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
INC. and KEYBELL PACINI LLC, the Defendants, Case No.2017CH15752
(in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Nov. 29, 2017),
seeks an order permitting Plaintiff and the Ordinance Summary
Class to terminate their rental agreements by written notice as
provided in the City of Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant
Ordinance.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to attach to
Plaintiffs and the class's leases the then current RLTO summaries,
including separate summary, respective rights, obligations, and
remedies of landlords and tenants with respect to security.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          JS Law
          29 E. Madison Street, Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone (312) 756-1330
          E-mail: jeffs@jsslawoffices.com


MULTIMEDIA SALES: Lopez Wants Collection of Biometric Info Halted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of a class similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. MULTIMEDIA SALES &
MARKETING, INC., a Delaware corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
2017CH15750 (in the Cir Ct. of Cook Cty., Ill., Nov. 29, 2017),
seeks to recover damages and other legal and equitable remedies
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant in capturing,
collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated individuals' biometric identifiers and biometric
information without informed written consent, in direct violation
of the Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act.

The complaint alleges that the sales and marketing firm captures,
collects, stores and uses Plaintiff's and other workers' biometric
identifiers and/or biometric information without regard to BIPA
and the concrete privacy rights and pecuniary interests Illinois'
BIPA protects. The Defendant does this in the form of finger
scans, which capture a person's fingerprint, and then Defendant
uses that fingerprint to identify that same person in the future.

Following the 2007 bankruptcy of a company specializing in the
collection and use of biometric information, which risked the sale
or transfer of millions of fingerprint records to the highest
bidder, the Illinois Legislature passed detailed regulations
addressing the collection, use and retention of biometric
information by private entities, such as Defendant. Choosing to
shun more traditional timekeeping methods, Defendant has instead
implemented an invasive program that relies on the capture,
collection, storage, and use of its workers' fingerprints, while
disregarding the applicable Illinois statute and the privacy
interests it protects.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          William P. Kingston, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          Facsimile: (312) 275 7895
          E-mail: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                  wkingston@mcgpc.com


NATION ONE: Must Pay Former Workers $4,323 for Court Filings
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
directing Defendants to pay Plaintiff reasonable fees and costs
incurred in bringing the three latest motions to compel in case
captioned AURELIANO TORRES, on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated persons, known and unknown, Plaintiff, v.
NATION ONE LANDSCAPING, INC. and BRIAN EMMICK, Defendants, Case
No. 1:12-cv-09723 (N.D. Ill.).

This class action stems from Defendant Nation One Landscaping,
Inc.'s and Defendant Brian Emmick's failure to properly compensate
Nation One's employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. Section 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law, 820 ILCS Section 105/1 et seq. ("IMWL"), and the Illinois
Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS Section 115/1 et seq.
("IWPCA").  Throughout the course of this litigation, Defendants
have exhibited a lack of respect for the discovery process and an
unwillingness to comply with court-imposed deadlines.
Consequently, Plaintiff has been forced to file six motions to
compel the production of information necessary to move the matter
forward, the latest three of which were filed before this Court.

Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5), Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
expenses, including attorneys' fees and costs, for each of the
three motions to compel brought before the Court.

Plaintiff requests $1,255.00 in attorneys' fees for bringing his
first post-judgment motion to compel on May 17, 2017.  While the
Court finds this amount reasonable, the Court did not grant the
motion but chose to provide other relief.  One could consider the
relief provided "partial" as the Court's remedy allowed Plaintiff
to gather information sought but in a different manner than
Plaintiff requested.  The Court therefore reduces the costs by 50%
to $627.50.

Plaintiff seeks $1,950.00 in attorneys' fees for filing his second
post-judgment motion to compel on June 19, 2017, which includes
$825.00 for consulting with a CPA.  The Court agrees with
Defendants that the cost of the CPA should be deducted from the
total amount sought because the CPA was not essential to the
preparation and filing of the motion to compel.  It is very likely
that Plaintiff would have hired the CPA even if the motion to
compel had not been filed to assist with the evidentiary hearings
and litigation strategy overall.  Although the CPA may have
offered his expertise during the preparation of the motion, that
alone does not justify an award of costs when the value of the CPA
has been or will be realized elsewhere in the litigation. As such,
the Court orders Defendants to pay Plaintiff $1,125.00 ($1,950.00
- $825.00 = $1,125.00) for the fees and costs incurred filing the
second motion to compel.  The Court finds Defendants' objection to
the amount of time spent (one hour more than an earlier motion to
compel) without merit.

Plaintiff also requests $2,272.50 in attorneys' fees for filing
his third post-judgment motion to compel on July 14, 2017, which
includes $600.00 for consulting with a CPA.  The Court agrees with
Defendants that the cost of the CPA should be deducted from the
total amount sought.  Accordingly, the Court orders Defendants to
pay Plaintiff $1,672.50 ($2,272.50 - $600.00 = $1,672.50) for the
fees and costs incurred bringing the most recent motion to compel.

In addition to the fees and costs, Plaintiff seeks $898.11 for the
cost of copying bank records from First Midwest Bank, PNC Bank,
and Chase Bank.  The bank records concern multiple accounts of
Defendants, related company Nation One Snow & Ice, Inc. and the
President of both companies, Elizabeth Emmick.

The Court finds this additional amount associated with Plaintiff's
motions to compel reasonable and orders Defendants to pay
Plaintiff $898.11 for the supplemental costs incurred.

Accordingly, pursuant to Rules 37(a)(5)(A) and (C), Defendants
must pay Plaintiff $4,323.11 for the fees and costs incurred in
bringing the three motions to compel before this Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y8nth62zfrom Leagle.com.

Aureliano Torres, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J.
Williams, Workers' Law Office, PC, 53 W Jackson Blvd Ste 701
Chicago, IL, 60604-3606

Aureliano Torres, Plaintiff, represented by Alvar Ayala, Workers'
Law Office, P.C., 53 W Jackson Blvd Ste 701, Chicago, IL, 60604-
3606, Javier Eduardo Castro, Raise The Floor Alliance & Lydia
Colunga-Merchant, Raise the Floor Alliance. 1 N LASALLE ST.
SUITE 1275 L CHICAGO, IL 60602

Nation One Landscaping, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony S.
DiVincenzo, 33 N La Salle St., Chicago, IL 60602
Brian Emmick, Defendant, represented by Anthony S. DiVincenzo.


NIDEC MOTOR: "Pounds" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Gurtha Pounds, on behalf of
herself, and others similarly situated, and as an aggrieved
employee on behalf of other aggrieved employees, the Plaintiff, v.
Nidec Motor Corporation, a Delaware corporation, the Defendant,
Case No. 34-02017-00219048, was removed on Dec. 1, 2017 from the
Sacramento County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California - (Sacramento). The District
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-02527-JAM-KJN to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. District Judge John
A. Mendez.

Nidec Motor manufactures commercial, industrial, and appliance
motors and controls. The NMC product line features a full line of
high efficiency motors, large and small, which serve Industrial,
residential and commercial markets in applications ranging from
water treatment, mining, and oil fields.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caroline Tahmassian Zarneh, Esq.
          David Glenn Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Suite 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 582 3142
          Facsimile: (818) 582 2561
          E-mail: caroline@spivaklaw.com
                  david@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter L. Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP, PC
          5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (562) 256 1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256 1006
          E-mail: whaines@uelglaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Nicky Jatana, Esq.
          Sander JC van der Heide, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          725 S. Figueroa Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 689 0404
          Facsimile: (213) 689 0430
          E-mail: Jatanan@jacksonlewis.com
                  Sander.vdHeide@jacksonlewis.com


NOVAN INC: Vincent Wong Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been commenced in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina on behalf of investors who
purchased Novan, Inc. securities (1) pursuant and/or traceable to
Novan's IPO on or about September 26, 2016 or (2) between
September 26, 2016 and January 26, 2017.

Click here to learn about the case: http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-
sbm/novan-inc?wire=3. There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that the Company made materially false
and/or misleading statements in its Registration Statement and
Prospectus for the IPO, and made false statements throughout the
class period. In particular, among other allegations, the
complaint alleges that the Company repeatedly falsely stated that
two Phase 3 clinical trials for the treatment SB204 were identical
and omitted specific facts as to why the two critical trials were,
in fact, not identical; as a result of these false statements, the
Company's outlook and expected financial performance were not
accurately represented.

If you suffered a loss in Novan you have until January 2, 2018 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability
to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff. To obtain additional information, contact Vincent Wong,
Esq. either via email vw@wongesq.com, by telephone at
212.425.1140, or visit http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-sbm/novan-
inc?wire=3.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney that has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights.

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Tel. 212.425.1140
         Fax. 866.699.3880
         E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


OMEGA HEALTHCARE: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP has filed a class action lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Docket Number 1:17-cv-08983) on behalf of persons and
entities that acquired Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. securities
between February 8, 2017, and October 31, 2017, inclusive,
asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from the date
of this notice to move the court to serve as lead plaintiff in
this action.

Investors suffering losses on their Omega investments are
encouraged to contact Lesley Portnoy of GPM to discuss their legal
rights at 310-201-9150 or by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit the Omega case page on our website at
www.glancylaw.com/case/omega-healthcare-investors-inc.

On October 31, 2017, the Company held a conference call to discuss
its third quarter results. On the call, Daniel J. Booth, the
Company's COO, stated that Omega was experiencing "operator
performance issues," including issues with Signature Healthcare,
one of the Company's top ten operators. On the same call, Robert
Stephenson, the Company's CFO, stated that operating revenue for
the quarter was approximately $220 million, compared to $225
million for the third quarter of 2016, and that "[t]he decrease
was primarily a result of placing Orianna on a cash basis" which
caused the Company to record no Orianna revenue for the quarter.
Stephenson also stated that the Company lowered its 2017 adjusted
funds from operations guidance due, in part, to "the temporary
loss of Orianna revenue for both the third and fourth quarters"
and the fact that the Company placed another operator, Daybreak,
on a cash basis effective September 1st.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $2.11 per share, or
6.8%, to close at $28.86 per share on November October 31, 2017,
thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, and failed to disclose material adverse
facts about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose: (1) that financial
and operating results of certain of the Company's operators were
deteriorating; (2) that, as a result, certain of the Company's
operators were experiencing worsening liquidity issues that were
significantly impacting the operators' ability to make timely rent
payments; (3) that, as a result, certain of the Company's direct
financing leases were impaired and certain receivables were
uncollectible; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' statements about Omega's business, operations, and
prospects, were materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP.

If you purchased shares of Omega during the Class Period you may
move the Court no later than 60 days from the date of this notice
to ask the Court to appoint you as lead if you meet certain legal
requirements. To be a member of the Class you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take
no action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you wish to
learn more about this action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Lesley Portnoy, Esquire,
of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles California
90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number and number of shares purchased.

         Lesley Portnoy,Esq.
         Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP
         Los Angeles, CA
         Tel. No.: 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
         Email: lportnoy@glancylaw.com [GN]


PANATTE LLC: Deadline for Land Home to Reply to "Aikens" Extended
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington extended the time for Defendant Land Home
to answer, move or otherwise respond to the Complaint in the case,
DELIA AIKENS, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PANATTE, LLC, LAND HOME FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01519-BAT (W.D. Wash.).

On Oct. 10, 2017, Aikens filed a Class Action Complaint against
the Defendants.  Defendant Land Home was served through its
registered agent on Oct. 17, 2017.  Accordingly, absent an
extension of time, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)
would require it to answer, move or otherwise respond to the
Complaint on Nov. 7, 2017.  To allow its counsel adequate time to
investigate the allegations of the Complaint, its counsel has
requested an extension of time within which to answer, move or
otherwise respond to the Complaint, and the Plaintiff's counsel
has agreed to that request.

Based on this, the parties stipulate and agree that the time for
Defendant Land Home to answer, move or otherwise respond to the
Complaint is extended 30 days. Judge Lasnik granted the parties'
stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Stipulated Order is
available at https://is.gd/zhjnix from Leagle.com.

Delia Aikens, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Wieting --
chris@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC.

Delia Aikens, Plaintiff, represented by Drew Davis --
drew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW LLC, Jesse S. Johnson --
jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com -- GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, pro hac
vice, Milena Marie Vill -- milena@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP
& Mathew J. Cunanan -- matthew@dclglawyers.com -- DC LAW GROUP NW
LLC.

Land Home Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Andrea Delgadillo Ostrovsky -- andreao@calfoeakes.com -- CALFO
EAKES & OSTROVSKY PLLC.


PARK HOTELS: Faces "Mims" Suit over Sensitive Biometric Data
------------------------------------------------------------
JANELLE MIMS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PARK HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., d/b/a
HILTON WORLDWIDE, INC., HILTON ILLINOIS, LLC, and CONRAD
MANAGEMENT, LLC, d/b/a CONRAD CHICAGO, LLC, the Defendants, Case
No. 2017-CH-15781 (in the Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., Nov. 30,
2017), seeks to recover damages as a result of Defendants'
unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of Plaintiff's
and proposed Class' sensitive biometric data.

Hilton operates hotels and resorts located throughout the State of
Illinois. When Hilton hires an employee, he or she is enrolled in
an employee database. Hilton uses the employee database to monitor
the time worked by each of their employees, including salaried
employees. While most retail establishments use conventional
methods for tracking time worked (such as ID badge swipes or punch
clocks), Hilton employees are required to have their fingerprints
scanned by a biometric timekeeping device. Unlike ID badges or
time cards -- which can be changed or replaced if stolen or
compromised -- fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with each employee. This exposes Hilton
employees to serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example,
if a fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise
exposed -- such as in the recent Equifax data breach -- employees
have no means by which to prevent identity theft, unauthorized
tracking -- and other improper or unlawful use of this
information. Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from
situations like these, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information
Privacy Act. Despite this law, Hilton disregards its employees'
statutorily protected privacy rights and unlawfully procures,
collects, stores, and uses their biometric data in violation of
BIPA. Specifically, Hilton has violated and continues to violate
BIPA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 6060
          Telephone: 312 233 1550
          Facsimile: 312 233 1560
          E-mail: lawyers@stephanzouras.com


PAYPAL INC: "Ezeude" Stayed Pending Appeal in Traffic Monsoon
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, stayed the case,
KINGSLEY EZEUDE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PAYPAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-02558-LHK (N.D. Cal.), until the stay
order in SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC is lifted and the Tenth
Circuit resolves the interlocutory appeal in Traffic Monsoon.

On July 26, 2016, the SEC brought suit against Traffic Monsoon and
Charles David Scoville in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Utah.  The SEC's complaint alleged that (i) Traffic Monsoon, a
limited liability company with a principal place of business in
Utah, sold advertising products called "AdPacks"; and (ii)
Scoville is the only member and controlling person of Traffic
Monsoon and therefore controls and oversees all of Traffic
Monsoon's business functions.  It further alleged that Traffic
Monsoon's sale of AdPacks constituted a Ponzi scheme, which in
turn amounted to securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Section
240.10b-5(a) & (c).

Based on Traffic Monsoon's alleged fraud, the SEC filed an ex
parte application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), an
order appointing a receiver, and an order freezing Traffic
Monsoon's assets.  On July 26 and 27, 2017, the Utah Court granted
all of the SEC's requests.

Subsequently, on March 28, 2017, based on its finding that the SEC
has made a clear showing that it will prevail and that Mr.
Scoville will continue to violate the law by operating a Ponzi
scheme absent an injunction, the Utah Court issued a preliminary
injunction maintaining both the receivership and the asset freeze
imposed by the TRO.

On April 14, 2017, Traffic Monsoon and Scoville appealed the Utah
Court's preliminary injunction to the Tenth Circuit.  On April 17,
2017, the Tenth Circuit docketed this appeal.

On May 4, 2017, Plaintiffs Ezeude and Chukwuka Obi filed a
complaint against Defendants.  They brought their action both
individually and on behalf of a putative class.  In their
complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that (i) they are victims of the
Ponzi scheme operated by Traffic Monsoon and Scoville; (ii)
Defendant PayPal Inc., served as a payment processor for Traffic
Monsoon; and (iii) the Ponzi scheme operated by Traffic Monsoon
and Scoville was facilitated by the knowing assistance and
negligent actions of Defendant PayPal, Inc.  Their complaint
asserts five causes of action against the Defendants, including
(i) aiding and abetting fraud; (ii) aiding and abetting a breach
of fiduciary duty; (iii) gross negligence; (iv) negligence; and
(v) violation of Cal. Corp. Code Section 25504.1.

On Sept. 7, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  That
same day, they filed the instant motion seeking to stay the
proceedings in the case until the Utah Court's stay order is
lifted.

Judge Koh first finds that the possible damage to Plaintiffs from
a stay is likely minimal because the Plaintiffs define the
putative class as all persons who invested in Traffic Monsoon by
purchasing an AdPack by transferring funds into Traffic Monsoon's
PayPal account between September 2014 and February 2016, who have
not received a refund of their funds invested in Traffic Monsoon
from PayPal and who resided outside of the United States at the
time of their investment in Traffic Monsoon.

She explains that any request for discovery from Traffic Monsoon
and Scoville will likely have to be obtained from the Utah Court
Receiver.  Responding to discovery requests and litigating any
discovery disputes may divert the Receiver's attention and
resources away from the Receiver's investigation and efforts to
propose a plan of distribution.

Moreover, because the Receiver will likely be compensated from,
and the Receiver's legal expenses will likely be paid from, the
Receivership Estate, such discovery litigation expenses may
unnecessarily reduce the instant Plaintiffs' potential
compensation from the Receivership Estate.  Thus, the Judge finds
that the Defendants' hardship if they were required to go forward
with the case is considerable and outweighs the minimal damage to
Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Judge finds that considerations of judicial
efficiency and the orderly course of justice weigh heavily in
favor of staying the proceedings in the instant case.  The
Defendants' liability in the instant case is necessarily
derivative of, and therefore dependent upon, whether Traffic
Monsoon and Scoville committed fraud in connection with Traffic
Monsoon's sale of AdPacks.

Absent a stay, the instant Court would be the third forum to
adjudicate the issue of whether Traffic Monsoon and Scoville
committed fraud in connection with Traffic Monsoon's sale of
AdPacks.  Thus, allowing the instant case to go forward would be
duplicative of the Utah Court case and the Tenth Circuit appeal
and risks inconsistent rulings on the same issues.  Litigating the
same issues in a third jurisdiction does not facilitate the
orderly course of justice or promote judicial efficiency.

Because Judge Koh finds that all three Landis v. North American
Co. factors weigh in favor of a stay, she stayed the proceedings
in the case until the Tenth Circuit resolves the interlocutory
appeal in the Traffic Monsoon case and the Utah Court's stay order
is lifted.  Within seven days of the latter of these two events,
the parties are ordered to file an updated Joint Case Management
Statement pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-10(d).  The Clerk will
administratively close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Qv0gU5 from Leagle.com.

Kingsley Ezeude, Plaintiff, represented by Alan L. Rosca --
arosca@prwlegal.com -- Peiffer Rosca Abdullah and Carr, LLC, pro
hac vice.

Kingsley Ezeude, Plaintiff, represented by Lydia Marie Floyd --
lfloyd@prwlegal.com -- Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr and Kane,
pro hac vice & Adam Brett Wolf -- awolf@prwlegal.com -- Peiffer
Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane.

Chukwuka Obi, Plaintiff, represented by Alan L. Rosca, Peiffer
Rosca Abdullah and Carr, LLC, pro hac vice, Lydia Marie Floyd,
Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr and Kane, pro hac vice & Adam
Brett Wolf, Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane.

PayPal, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides --
atalarides@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP,
James Neil Kramer -- jkramer@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP & Suzette Pringle -- sbarnes@orrick.com  -- Orrick
Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP.

PayPal Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP, James Neil Kramer,
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP & Suzette Pringle, Orrick
Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP.


PC HOSPITALITY: Guadarrama Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARISOL GUADARRAMA, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PC HOSPITALITY, a California
corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC684849 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid wages and interest for Defendants' failure to provide
legally compliant meal periods and/or pay meal period premium
wages; failure to provide legally complaint rest breaks and/or pay
rest break premium wages; statutory penalties for failure to
provide accurate wage statements; waiting time penalties in the
form of continuation wages for failure to timely pay employee all
earned and unpaid wages due upon separation of employment;
applicable civil penalties; injunctive relief and other equitable
relief; and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to California
Labor Code Section 226(e); costs; and interest.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          Andrea Rosenkranz, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 432-0000
          Facsimile: (310) 432-0001
          E-mail: ilavi@leIavGSrm.com
                  arosenfaanz@Jelawfirm.com


PG&E CORPORATION: Sued over Unsafe Electrical Infrastructure
------------------------------------------------------------
LORE OLDS, d/b/a SKY VINEYARDS; SKYLA OLDS; NANCY HITCHCOCK;
HERMAN BOSSANO; REBECCA BAILEY, Ph.D., d/b/a IT'S MINE DON'T TOUCH
TRUST and TRANSITIONING FAMILIES; and CHARLES HOLMES, the
Plaintiffs, v. PG&E CORPORATION; PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY;
and DOES 1-20, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-17-562791 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Nov. 30, 2017), seeks to recover damages for, inter alia,
damage to and loss of use of real and personal property; loss of
income; loss of business; consequential and incidental damages;
emotional distress; and other harm caused by Defendants' wrongful
conduct.

In October 2017, a series of severe wildfires devastated nearly
250,000 acres across nine Northern California counties, damaging
and destroying homes, businesses, vineyards, farms, and lives.

According to the complaint, these fires had different points of
origin, but share a common underlying cause: they were sparked by
unsafe electrical infrastructure owned, operated and (improperly)
maintained by PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Company.

PG&E had a duty to properly maintain its electrical infrastructure
and ensure surrounding trees and vegetation were trimmed and kept
at a safe distance. PG&E violated that duty by knowingly operating
aging, improperly maintained infrastructure that it "ran to
failure." In fact, PG&E's violations had caused fires before, and
PG&E had been sanctioned numerous times for this. Yet PG&E's
corporate culture emphasized cutting comers and putting profits
over safety.

Had PG&E acted responsibly, these fires could have been prevented.
The Plaintiffs have suffered property damage, economic losses, and
disruption to their homes, businesses, lives, and livelihoods, and
they seek fair compensation for themselves in this case. They also
bring this case as a class action, because they believe all those
who suffered such damages and losses should be fairly treated and
included as beneficiaries of a comprehensive and consistent
adjudication or resolution of liability and damages.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956 1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956 1008
          E-mail: ecabraser@lchb.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.
          Lexi J. Hazam, Esq.
          Robert J. Nelson, Esq.
          Annika K. Martin, Esq.
          Abby R. Wolf, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956 1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956 1008


PIGGLY WIGGLY: ERISA Suit Can't Proceed as Derivative Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled Dana Spires, et al., Plaintiffs, v. David R.
Schools, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:16-616-RMG (D.
S.C.), Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the U.S. District Court for
the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, denied the
Plaintiffs' motion to proceed under Rules 23.1(a) and 23.1(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiffs, participants in the Piggly Wiggly Carolina
Company, Inc. and Greenbax Enterprises Inc. Employee Stock
Ownership Plan and Trust, have brought the class action on behalf
themselves and all other participants under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").  They estimate
that the number of Plan participants is approximately 5,000
persons.  They have now moved for leave to proceed without class
certification, as a derivative action on behalf of the Plan under
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  They also seek
to be excused from compliance with the derivative-action pleading
requirements of Rule 23.1(b).  The Defendants oppose the
Plaintiffs' motion.

In support of their motion, the Plaintiffs argue that class
actions are not required for claims under ERISA Section 502(a),
but courts sometimes have nonetheless required procedural
safeguards to ensure the plaintiffs are bona fide representatives
of other interested parties.  Thus, according to the Plaintiffs,
the courts have allowed ERISA Section 502(a) claims to proceed as
derivative actions on behalf of plans under Rule 23.1.  They note
that other courts have excused such actions from compliance with
the pleading requirements of Rule 23.1(b), but they provide no
argument about why that rule should not apply in the case.

In opposition, the Defendants argue that an ERISA plan lacks
standing to sue, that the amended complaint does not comply with
Rule 23.1(b), that the relief the Plaintiffs seek would unfairly
shift the burden of proof to Defendants, and that it would cause
unreasonable delay.

Judge Gergel finds that the Defendants are correct when arguing
that recasting the action as a derivative action would require
amendment of the complaint.  He says Amendment of the complaint to
base the entire action on a new legal theory would require
adjudication of new motions to dismiss.  The action was filed 18
months ago.  The Court will not return it to the pleading stage
absent extraordinary circumstances.  The Plaintiffs, however, do
not even attempt to show cause why, having chosen to file a class
action, they nonetheless should be excused from jumping through
the procedural hoops of prosecuting a class action.  Judge Gergel
therefore denied the Plaintiffs' motion to proceed as a derivative
action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/2gyDlk from Leagle.com.

Dana Spires, Plaintiff, represented by Alice W. Parham Casey --
tparham@wyche.com -- Wyche Law Office.

Dana Spires, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Braden Schoen -
- cschoen@wyche.com -- Wyche Law Office, David J. Ko --
dko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice, Eric
Bauman Amstutz -- eamstutz@wyche.com -- Wyche Law Office, Erin M.
Riley -- eriley@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback Law Office,
pro hac vice, Gary A. Gotto -- ggotto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, pro hac vice, Henry L. Parr, Jr. -- hparr@wyche.com --
Wyche Law Office, John C. Moylan, III -- jmoylan@wyche.com --
Wyche Law Office & Wade S. Kolb, III --  wkolb@wyche.com -- Wyche
PA.

Glenn Grant, Plaintiff, represented by Alice W. Parham Casey,
Wyche Law Office, Christopher Braden Schoen, Wyche Law Office,
David J. Ko, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice, Eric Bauman
Amstutz, Wyche Law Office, Erin M. Riley, Keller Rohrback Law
Office, pro hac vice, Gary A. Gotto, Keller Rohrback, pro hac
vice, Henry L. Parr, Jr., Wyche Law Office, John C. Moylan, III,
Wyche Law Office & Wade S. Kolb, III, Wyche PA.

Tom Miranda, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Braden Schoen,
Wyche Law Office, David J. Ko, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice,
Erin M. Riley, Keller Rohrback Law Office, pro hac vice, Gary A.
Gotto, Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Henry L. Parr, Jr., Wyche
Law Office & Alice W. Parham Casey, Wyche Law Office.

Susan Mohle, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Braden Schoen,
Wyche Law Office, David J. Ko, Keller Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice,
Erin M. Riley, Keller Rohrback Law Office, pro hac vice, Gary A.
Gotto, Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Henry L. Parr, Jr., Wyche
Law Office & Alice W. Parham Casey, Wyche Law Office.

David R Schools, Defendant, represented by Andrew David Salek-
Raham -- asalek@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars
C. Golumbic -- lgolumbic@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III -- lovic.brooks@janiklaw.com -- Brooks
Law Firm, Mark L. Bieter -- mbieter@groom.com -- Groom Law Group,
pro hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder -- nfedder@groom.com -- Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams -- sadams@groom.com -- Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Sean C. Abouchedid --
sabouchedid@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G.
Janik -- steven.janik@janiklaw.com -- Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle
-- monica.towle@janiklaw.com -- Janik LLP.

William A Edenfield, Jr, Defendant, represented by Andrew David
Salek-Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic,
Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III, Brooks Law
Firm, Mark L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Natasha S.
Fedder, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams, Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Steven G. Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle, Janik LLP.

Robert G Masche, Defendant, represented by Andrew David Salek-
Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III, Brooks Law Firm, Mark
L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G.
Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle, Janik LLP.

Joseph T Newton, III, Defendant, represented by Andrew David
Salek-Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic,
Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III, Brooks Law
Firm, Mark L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Natasha S.
Fedder, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams, Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Steven G. Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle, Janik LLP.

Burton R Schools, Defendant, represented by Andrew David Salek-
Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III, Brooks Law Firm, Mark
L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G.
Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle, Janik LLP.

Piggly Wiggly Carolina Company Inc & Greenbax Enterprises Inc
Employee Stock Option Plan and Trust Plan Committee, Defendant,
represented by Andrew David Salek-Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A.
Brooks, III, Brooks Law Firm, Mark L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro
hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah
M. Adams, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G. Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B.
Towle, Janik LLP.

Joanne Newton Ayers, Defendant, represented by Brian C. Duffy --
bduffy@duffyandyoung.com -- Duffy and Young.

Marion Newton Schools, Defendant, represented by Brian C. Duffy,
Duffy and Young.

Burton R Schools, Defendant, represented by Andrew David Salek-
Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A. Brooks, III, Brooks Law Firm, Mark
L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah M. Adams, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G.
Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B. Towle, Janik LLP.

Piggly Wiggly Carolina Company Inc & Greenbax Enterprises Inc
Employee Stock Option Plan and Trust Plan Committee, Defendant,
represented by Andrew David Salek-Raham, Groom Law Group, pro hac
vice, Lars C. Golumbic, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Lovic A.
Brooks, III, Brooks Law Firm, Mark L. Bieter, Groom Law Group, pro
hac vice, Natasha S. Fedder, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sarah
M. Adams, Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Sean C. Abouchedid, Groom
Law Group, pro hac vice, Steven G. Janik, Janik LLP & Monica B.
Towle, Janik LLP.

Joanne Newton Ayers, Defendant, represented by Blake Abernethy
McKie, Duffy and Young LLC & Brian C. Duffy, Duffy and Young.

Marion Newton Schools, Defendant, represented by Blake Abernethy
McKie, Duffy and Young LLC & Brian C. Duffy, Duffy and Young.


PROFESSIONAL CREDIT: Settlement in "McCurdy" Suit Has Final Nod
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER MCCURDY, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PROFESSIONAL CREDIT SERVICE,
Defendant, Case No. 6:15-cv-01498-AA (D. Or.), Judge Ann Aiken of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, Eugene
Division, granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion to finally
approve the parties' proposed settlement.

On June 5, 2017, the Plaintiff filed her unopposed motion to
preliminarily approve the parties' proposed class settlement,
which the Court approved on July 26, 2017.

On Aug. 15, 2017, the Defendant caused to be served (through the
Class Administrator) the Class Action Fairness Act notice required
by 28 U.S.C. Section 1715 on the United States Attorney General
and the Attorneys General of all 49 states where a class member
had his or her last known address.  Also on Aug. 15, 2017, First
Class, Inc. distributed notice of the parties' proposed class
settlement, as ordered.

On Sept. 28, 2017, the Plaintiff filed her unopposed motion to
finally approve the parties' proposed settlement.  On Nov. 15,
2017, the Court held a fairness hearing regarding the proposed
settlement.

Having considered the Plaintiff's unopposed motion, Judge Aiken
finally approved the proposed settlement.  She affirmed the
certification of the class of all persons with art address within
the United States, to whom Professional Credit Service sent an
initial written communication between April 1, 2015 and April 30,
2015, that stated: "If you dispute any account referenced in this
letter, please send all information regarding the dispute to P.O.
Box 70127, Springfield, OR 97475, in connection with the
collection of a consumer debt."

The Judge also affirmed the appointment of McCurdy as the class
representative for the class, and the following attorney and law
firm as the class counsel for class members: James L. Davidson
Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC 5550 Glades Road, Suite 500 Boca
Raton, Florida 33431

She approved the terms of the parties' settlement, the material
terms of which include, but are not limited to:

     a. The Defendant will create a non-reversionary settlement
fund in the amount of $25,000, which will be distributed on a pro-
rata basis to each Participating Class Member;

     b. The Defendant will pay to Ms. McCurdy $1,000;

     c. The Defendant has confirmed that it voluntarily removed
from its collection letters the language at issue in the
litigation, and that it will not re-insert that language into its
collection letters in the future; and

     d. The Defendant will pay the reasonable costs of notice and
administration of the settlement separate and apart from any
monies paid to the Plaintiff, the class members, or the class
counsel.

Judge Aiken approved the releases set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.  The released claims are consequently compromised,
settled, released, discharged, and dismissed with prejudice by
virtue of these proceedings and the Order.

She awarded a total of $86,687.51 for the class counsel's
attorneys' fees, litigation costs and expenses.  Finally, the
Judge dismissed with prejudice the action as to all other issues
and as to all parties and claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ZSCGAM from Leagle.com.

Jennifer McCurdy, Plaintiff, represented by James L. Davidson --
jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, pro
hac vice.

Jennifer McCurdy, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth P. Dobson --
landlaw.oregon@gmail.com -- Attorney at Law.

Professional Credit Service, Defendant, represented by Timothy J.
Fransen -- tfransen@cosgravelaw.com -- Cosgrave Vergeer Kester,
LLP & Robert E. Sabido -- rsabido@cosgravelaw.com -- Cosgrave
Vergeer Kester, LLP.


PTTEP AUSTRALASIA: Oil Spill Victims Win More Time to File Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Coade, writing for Lawyers Weekly, reports that the
Federal Court has granted a seaweed farmer from Indonesia more
time to prepare his claim as the lead applicant suing an oil
company over a devastating oil spill in 2009.

Daniel Sanda has been granted an extension of time by the Federal
Court with respect to a $200 million class action against the
operator of the Montara oil rig in the Timor Sea. Justice David
Yates granted Mr Sanda, an Indonesian seaweed farmer and the lead
applicant in the action, additional time to file his claim in
accordance with NT requirements.

Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, who is representing the claimants in
the class action, described the decision as a victory for over
15,000 Indonesian seaweed farmers who say their livelihoods have
been devastated by the spill.

Ben Slade, a class action principal at Maurice Blackburn, said
this decision returned attention to core issues in the case,
namely wrongdoing and compensation.

"This win means we can get on with the real business of securing
appropriate redress for the thousands of Indonesian seaweed
farmers who have had their lives severely impacted by the oil
spill," Mr Slade said.

Eight years ago, millions of litres of gas and oil from the
Montara rig spewed into the ocean for 74 days.

According to Maurice Blackburn, the leak (located about 690
kilometres west of Darwin and 250 kilometres southeast of Rote
Island, in the Indonesian province Nusa Tenggara Timur) was
plugged on 3 November 2009.

By that time the Montara rig had done its damage, described by
some as Australia's worst spill-related environmental disaster.
The aftermath of the oil spill continues to effect Indonesian
locals, with seaweed farmers claiming that their crops have become
weak and white, and are washed away by the current.

Proceedings against the operator of the rig PTTEP Australasia
(Ashmore Cartier) Pty Ltd were initiated on behalf of the class
action group in August.

"We are now looking forward to presenting the farmers' evidence
and having it heard and determined by Justice Yates," Mr Slade
said. [GN]


RADY CHILDREN: Denial of "Hefczyc" Class Certification Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joan Irion of the U.S. Court of Appeals of California for
the Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's
order denying the Plaintiff's motion for class certification in
the case, ARTUR HEFCZYC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RADY
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL-SAN DIEGO, Defendant and Respondent, Case No.
D071264 (Cal. App.).

On Nov. 10, 2015, Hefczyc filed a complaint against Rady, on
behalf of a proposed class, seeking declaratory relief to
establish that Rady's form contract, signed by patients or
guarantors of patients who receive emergency room care, authorizes
Rady to charge only for the reasonable value of its services, and
that Rady therefore is not authorized to bill self-pay patients
based on its master list of itemized charge rates, commonly
referred to as the "Chargemaster" schedule of rates.

Hefczyc alleged that his minor child was treated on Oct. 8, 2015,
at Rady's emergency room.  He had no outside source of payment for
the emergency room visit, such as insurance, and thus was a "self-
pay" guarantor of his child's financial obligation to Rady.  The
total amount that Rady billed to Hefczyc for the emergency room
visit was $9,831.34.

As alleged by Hefczyc, when a patient seeks care in Rady's
emergency room, all guarantors of emergency care patients are
required by Rady to sign an agreement titled Conditions of
Treatment/Admission ("COTA").  According to the complaint, each
patient is requested to sign the COTA, regardless of whether a
patient is a Medicaid, privately insured, HMO, or self-pay
patient.

In interpreting the COTA's financial obligation provision, Hefczyc
alleges that the fact that all patients, regardless of category,
are subject to the exact same pricing guarantee to pay in
accordance with the Hospital's regular rates and terms, despite
the fact that each category of patients is charged differently,
shows that the term the Hospital's regular rates and terms, as a
pricing term for the Hospital's services and treatment, is
inherently vague, ambiguous and meaningless.

Hefczyc alleges that the billed amount of $9,831.34 for his
child's emergency care treatment was based on Chargemaster rates
that were grossly excessive, unfair, and unreasonable.  Further,
he alleges that because the COTA purportedly contains an open
pricing term, under the law governing contracts with open pricing
terms, Rady is authorized to charge only the reasonable value of
such services.

Hefczyc brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of
persons defined as the guarantors of all persons who within the
last four years, had one or more eligible patient hospital visits
to Rady's emergency department.  In relating these prayers for
declaratory relief to the request for class treatment in the
action, the complaint alleges that a determination as to whether
the COTA should be interpreted to only require payment at a
reasonable rate and for no more than the reasonable value of the
services rendered should be made only once, and should be equally
applicable to all Class members.  The complaint alleges that while
such a Declaratory Judgment would not in itself determine the
reasonable value of services rendered, it would allow a patient
the ability to dispute Rady's unreasonable demands, and provide
the ability to negotiate an appropriate payment amount and
reasonable payment terms.

Hefczyc filed a motion for class certification, in which he sought
an order certifying a class.  The trial court issued a ruling
denying class certification denying class certification concluding
that the class was not ascertainable, that common issues did not
predominate, and that class action litigation was not a superior
means of proceeding.

Hefczyc appealed.  His main appellate argument is that because his
complaint seeks only declaratory relief, the trial court should
have applied the class certification requirements set forth in
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 23(b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) (28
U.S.C.) rather than the requirements set forth in California case
law.  He also contends that even if the trial court properly
imposed those three requirements in the action, the trial court
abused its discretion in concluding that those requirements were
not met.

Judge Irion rejects Hefczyc's argument.  She says no California
authority supports the contention that ascertainability,
predominance and superiority are not required when a proposed
class action would be certified under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 23(b)(1)(A) or (b)(2) (28 U.S.C.) if it were
proceeding in federal court.  On the contrary, case law
consistently holds that ascertainability, predominance and
superiority are always required to certify a class action in
California under Code of Civil Procedure section 382.  Therefore,
the trial court did not err in concluding that class action
certification should be denied if Hefczyc did not establish those
requirements.

Considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that those requirements were not met, the Judge
concludes that the trial court (i) did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that Hefczyc failed to establish the ascertainability of
the class; (ii) was well within its discretion to conclude that
Hefczyc failed to establish that common issues predominate; and
(iii) was within its discretion to conclude that class treatment
was not a superior method for resolving the issue presented in the
complaint.

Finally, Judge Irion turns to Hefczyc's contention that the trial
court erred in denying certification on whether the COTA allows
Rady to charge self-pay patients its Chargemaster rates, or
whether the COTA contains an open price term which limits Rady to
charging no more than the reasonable value of the services
provided.  He says to issue a declaration that the COTA either
does not permit or does not allow Rady to bill at Chargemaster
rates, the trial court would be required to determine whether the
Chargemaster represents the reasonable value of Rady's services.

That inquiry presents individualized and complicated issues unique
to each class member, each of whom received different bills based
on different services.  Accordingly, the single issue that Hefczyc
has identified is not appropriate for class certification.
Moreover, even if Hefczyc had identified an issue appropriate for
class treatment, he still has not established the existence of an
ascertainable class.

For these reasons, Judge Irion affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/UPknrN from Leagle.com.

Carpenter Law, Gretchen Carpenter -- gretchen@gcarpenterlaw.com;
Law Office of Barry L. Kramer and Barry L. Kramer --
kramerlaw@aol.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Julie R. Dann --
Julie.Dann@lewisbrisbois.com; Hooper, Lundy & Bookman and Jennifer
A. Hansen -- jhansen@health-law.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.


RAPID ARMORED: Gallimore Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
-----------------------------------------------------------
Howard Gallimore, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Rapid Armored Corporation,
the Defendant, Case No. 523099/2017 (N.Y. Sup. CT., Nov. 30,
2017), seeks to recover overtime wages, liquidated damages,
attorney's fees and costs under the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant had a policy and
practice of paying Plaintiff and the putative class for only some
of their overtime hours worked. For example, for the week ending
November 11, 2017, Plaintiff worked at least 49.75 hours but
Defendant paid Plaintiff at his regular rate of $14.00 an hour for
42 of these hours and at his overtime rate of $21.00 an hour for
7.75 of these hours. By way of further example, for the week
ending October 10, 2015, Plaintiff worked at least 61.75 hours but
Defendant paid Plaintiff at his regular rate of $14.00 an hour for
47 of these hours and at his overtime rate of $21.00 an hour for
14.75 of these hours.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
          ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          215-28 Hillside Avenue
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: (718) 740 1000
          Facsimile: (718) 740 2000
          E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


RIABLE LAW FIRM: Faces "Higgins" Suit in E.D. of Arkansas
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Riable Law Firm Inc.
The case is styled Rickey Don Higgins, On behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Riable Law Firm Inc
doing business as: Riable Law Firm and Mark Justin Riable,
Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-00794-JLH (E.D. Ark., December 4,
2017).

The Defendant is a law firm in Little Rock, Arkansas focusing on
various areas of law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Corey Darnell McGaha, Esq.
   Crowder McGaha, LLP
   5507 Ranch Drive, Suite 202
   Little Rock, AR 72223
   Tel: (501) 205-4026
   Fax: (501) 367-8208
   Email: cmcgaha@crowdermcgaha.com

      - and -

   William Thomas Crowder, Esq.
   CrowderMcGaha, LLP
   5507 Ranch Drive, Suite 202
   Little Rock, AR 72223
   Tel: (501) 205-4026
   Fax: (501) 367-8208
   Email: wcrowder@crowdermcgaha.com


RJD INVESTMENTS: "Lamarca" Suit Moved Southern Dist. of Florida
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled David Lamarca and other similarly
situated non-exempt employees, the Plaintiff, v. RJD Investments,
Inc., a Florida Profit Corporation and Ralph J. DiSalvo,
individually, was removed on Nov. 29, 2017 to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach). The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 9:17-cv-81303-RLR to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to Judge Robin L. Rosenberg.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brody Max Shulman, Esq.
          Jason Saul Remer, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          Courthouse Tower
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416 5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416 5005
          E-mail: bshulman@rgpattorneys.com
                  jremer@rgpattorneys.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Christopher John Whitelock, Esq.
          WHITELOCK & ASSOCIATES
          300 SE 13th Street
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316-1154
          Telephone: (954) 463 2001
          Facsimile: (954) 463 0410
          E-mail: cjw@whitelocklegal.com

               - and -

          David Stephen Frank, Esq.
          MINERLEY FEIN
          1200 North Federal Highway
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 362 6699


RYB EDUCATION: Faces "Qian" Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------
XIYA QIAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. RYB EDUCATION, INC., CHIMIN CAO,
YANLAI SHI, PING WEI, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, MORGAN
STANLEY & CO. INTERNATIONAL PLC, CHINA INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
CORPORATION HONG KONG SECURITIES LIMITED, and BNP PARIBAS
SECURITIES CORP., the Defendants, Case No.17CIV05494 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Dec. 1, 2017), seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933.

The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of
RYB Education pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's
Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with
the Company's initial public offering completed on or about
September 27, 2017.

On August 30, 2017, the Company filed a registration statement on
Form F-l with the SEC. The registration statement was subsequently
amended, with the final amended registration statement on Form S-
l/A filed on September 22, 2017. The SEC declared the Registration
Statement effective on September 26, 2017. The Registration
Statement Contained a preliminary prospectus. The final prospectus
was filed on September 27, 2017. On or about September 27, 2017,
the Company completed its IPO, selling 7.8 million shares at
$18.50 per share and raising approximately $144 million. The
statements contained in W 27-28 were materially false and/or
misleading because they misrepresented and failed to disclose the
following adverse facts pertaining to the Company's business,
operations and prospects, which were known to Defendants or
recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) the Company's enforcement of its service standards across its
network was inadequate; (2) the Company's security and safety
protocols were inadequate; and (3) as a result, Defendants'
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis at all relevant times.

RYB Education is a private company for preschool education in the
People's Republic of China. As measured by annual total revenues
in 2016, the company is the largest provider of early childhood
education service in China.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785 2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226 4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


SAN DIEGO, CA: Class-Action Lawsuit Filed on Behalf of Homeless
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Hoffman, writing for KPBS, reports that the lawsuit filed
with the U.S. District Court in San Diego alleges that disabled
homeless people living in their recreational vehicles are unfairly
targeted for tickets.

City of San Diego municipal code states "oversized vehicles, non-
motorized vehicles and recreational vehicles" cannot be parked on
city streets from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. It is also "unlawful for any
person to use a vehicle while it is parked or standing on any
street as either temporary or permanent living quarters, abode, or
place of habitation either overnight or by day."

The fine for parking overnight is $100, plus a state-mandated
surcharge of $12.50 per ticket. The city has a temporary permit
process where people can park their RV's overnight, but applicants
must have proof of residency to acquire a permit.

In addition to the city of San Diego itself, the group is suing
Mayor Kevin Faulconer, all members of the city council, the police
department and Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman -- in their official
capacities.

"We think that the entire city government is unfortunately
responsible," said Ann Menasche, senior attorney for Disability
Rights California. "For the harassment and the discriminatory
treatment and unconstitutional treatment of our clients and of the
entire class."

In March, Disability Rights California sent a letter to the city
attorney's office, asking for a reasonable accommodation under the
American's with Disabilities Act -- what they considered to be a
stop to the ticketing. In September, the city attorney's office
met with the city council in closed session to discuss the letter,
but a spokesman said no action was taken during the meeting.

Now, after no action from the city, Disability Rights is
representing nine named clients. They are also including 817
people sleeping in vehicles that the Regional Task Force on the
Homeless identified during their annual homeless count this year.

"A lot of them had careers and jobs and became disabled and they
should not be punished for that," said Menasche. "It's not their
fault, there's no affordable housing."

In a statement November 16 afternoon, City Attorney of San Diego
Mara Elliott, Esq. said, "we have not been served and have not
seen the complaint. We will review the complaint and advise our
client accordingly." [GN]


SCOTTRADE INC: "Hine" Suit Moved to Eastern Dist. of Missouri
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Stephen Hine, on Behalf of Himself
and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. Scottrade,
Inc., a Missouri Corporation and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-01796, was removed on Dec. 1, 2017
from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri (St. Louis). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:17-cv-02803-RWS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. District Judge Rodney W. Sippel.

Scottrade is a discount brokerage firm that operates both online
and at branches. The company offers an electronic trading platform
for the purchase and sale of financial securities.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          BLOOD AND HURST, LLP
          701 B St., Suite 1700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338 1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338 1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com

               - and -

          James Jason Hill, Esq.
          Timothy D Cohelan, Esq.
          COHELAN AND KHOURY
          605 C St., Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 595 3001
          Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
          E-mail: jhill@ckslaw.com
                  tcohelan@ck-lawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brandi L. Burke, Esq.
          Christopher M. Hohn, Esq.
          Helen Byungsun Kim, Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          One US Bank Plaza
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 552 6000
          Facsimile: (314) 552 7000
          E-mail: bburke@thompsoncoburn.com
                  chohn@thompsoncoburn.com
                  hkim@thompsoncoburn.com


SHAMROCK FOODS: Court Grants Protective Order in "Chavez"
---------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Alexander F. MacKinnon of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California granted the parties'
Stipulated Protective Order to the limited information or items
that are entitled to confidential treatment in the case captioned,
MARIO RUIZ, RAUL GUERRERO, and ROBERT TORRES on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SHAMROCK FOODS COMPANY, an Arizona Corporation, and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-06017-SVW-AFM (C.D. Cal.).

The action is likely to involve trade secrets, and confidential
and proprietary information for which special protection from
public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than
prosecution of the action is warranted.  Accordingly, the Parties
stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the Protective Order.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (i) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (ii) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (iii) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of
Protected Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the
trial judge.  The Protective Order does not govern the use of
Protected Material at trial.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the
confidentiality obligations imposed by the Order will remain in
effect until a Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a
court order otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed
to be the later of (i) dismissal of all claims and defenses in
this action, with or without prejudice; and/or (ii) final judgment
after the completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings,
remands, trials, or reviews of the action, including the time
limits for filing any motions or applications for extension of
time pursuant to applicable law.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.  The Challenging Party will initiate the dispute
resolution process under Local Rule 37-1 et seq.  Unless the
Designating Party has waived or withdrawn the confidentiality
designation, all parties will continue to afford the material in
question the level of protection to which it is entitled under the
Producing Party's designation until the Court rules on the
challenge.

A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or
produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with the
Action only for prosecuting, defending or attempting to settle the
Action.  Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the
categories of persons and under the conditions described in the
Protective Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Stipulated
Protective Order is available at https://is.gd/X7FAJP from
Leagle.com.

Mario Ruiz, Plaintiff, represented by Maria Adrianne De Castro --
adrianne@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm PC.

Mario Ruiz, Plaintiff, represented by Aashish Y. Desai --
aashish@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm PC.

Raul Guerrero, Plaintiff, represented by Maria Adrianne De Castro,
Desai Law Firm PC & Aashish Y. Desai, Desai Law Firm PC.

Robert Torres, Plaintiff, represented by Maria Adrianne De Castro,
Desai Law Firm PC & Aashish Y. Desai, Desai Law Firm PC.

Shamrock Foods Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Sommer
-- asommer@connmaciel.com -- Conn Maciel Carey LLP, Kara M. Maciel
-- kmaciel@connmaciel.com -- Conn Maciel Carey PLLC, pro hac vice
& Teanna L. Buchner -- tbuchner@selmanlaw.com -- Selman Breitman
LLP.


SILV COMMUNICATIONS: Settlement in Slamming Suit Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, issued an Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Settlement Approval and Class Counsels' Motion
for Attorney's Fees, Expense Reimbursements and Class
Representative Award in the case captioned KIMBER BALDWIN DESIGNS,
LLC, Individually and on behalf of all others Similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SILV COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:16-
cv-448 (S.D. Ohio).

This civil action is before the Court on the motion of named
Plaintiff Kimber Baldwin Designs, LLC, for final settlement
approval Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees, expense
reimbursement, and class representative award.

Named Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, commenced this civil action against Defendant Silv
Communications, Inc.  Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated federal
law and engaged in fraud by changing the long-distance telephone
services of various businesses without authorization.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Defendant engaged in an unlawful
practice known as slamming when it obtained recordings of
employees of businesses answering yes to questions related to the
business name, addresses and telephone number, but then
manipulated those recordings to fabricate consent to switch to
Defendant's long-distance telephone service.  Premised on these
allegations, the Complaint asserts claims for violations of the
Wire or Radio Communications Act, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
Ohio Telecommunications Fraud.

The Settlement Class is appropriate for Rule 23 certification.
Plaintiff's motion for final approval asks the Court to certify
the Settlement Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.

The Court finds the substantial size of the Settlement Class in
this case easily satisfies the numerosity requirement.  Here, each
Class Member's claim raises questions of law or fact that are
common to the class, whether Defendant engaged in slamming and
whether its conduct was unlawful.  Because questions of law and
fact are common to the class, Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

Here, the issue of whether Plaintiff was slammed is common to all
Settlement Class Members. By litigating this central liability
issue, the Plaintiff can reasonably be expected to advance the
interests of all Class Members.  Accordingly, the typicality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied.

Here, Plaintiff and the Class Members are equally interested in
obtaining compensation from Defendant for its alleged "slamming"
practices. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the first prong of the
adequacy requirement.  Further, Plaintiff is represented by
qualified counsel with experience prosecuting class actions.
Accordingly, the second prong of the adequacy requirement is met.

Here, common questions predominate over questions affecting only
individual members, and given the difficulties that would be
inherent in managing a class as large as the Settlement Class, the
Court finds that certification is the most efficient, and the
superior, means to adjudicate the claims at issue.

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for final
certification of the Settlement Class.

The evidence before the Court is that the parties' settlement was
the result of arm's-length negotiations, free of collusion or
fraud, conducted by experienced counsel on both sides, and
achieved over the course of several months of negotiations.
Nothing before the Court suggests that the parties' settlement is
the result of fraud or collusion.

The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation
factor strongly favors approval because, absent settlement,
continued litigation would entail additional discovery, including
written discovery and depositions, class certification briefing,
dispositive motion briefing, and perhaps trial and appellate
proceedings. At the fairness hearing, Class Counsel stated they
were particularly concerned about the volume of digital discovery
that proceeding would entail.

Given the nature of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff argues that the
time and expense required to complete discovery would be enormous.
The parties recognized that, absent an early settlement, this case
would likely have consumed the resources of all involved,
potentially eliminating a recovery for Class Members.  The Court
finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.

The Likelihood of Success on the Merits factor weighs in favor of
approval because Defendant categorically denies Plaintiff's
claims. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not suffered a
cognizable harm, and every customer who switched to its service
did so voluntarily. If this case were to continue, Plaintiff and
the Class Members may not recover anything at all.

Class Counsel believes that this settlement is fair, adequate and
reasonable.  Plaintiff, the Class Representative, approved of the
Settlement Agreement by signing it. This factor weighs in favor of
approval.  The reaction of the class strongly supports approval.
The Settlement Administrator mailed more than 24,000 notices to
Class Members, but only 3 members opted out, and no one objected
to the settlement.

Class Counsel has requested an order approving the payment of
$150,000 for attorneys' fees, such award representing one-third of
the $450,000 Settlement Fund.

Here, each of the factors laid out in Ramey, 508 F.2d at 1196,
weighs in favor of granting the requested fee. First, Class
Counsel's work resulted in a significant benefit, a Settlement
Fund of $450,000. The Settlement Fund exists to provide early
relief to Class Members and eliminates additional risk and expense
the parties would otherwise incur if this litigation were to
continue.  Second, there is a benefit to society in ensuring that
small claimants may pool their claims and resources, and attorneys
who take on class action cases enable this.  Third, despite the
risks associated with prosecuting this case, Class Counsel took
this case solely on a contingency fee basis and were prepared to
make an investment with the very real possibility of an
unsuccessful outcome and no fee at all.  Fourth, a lodestar cross-
check, while unnecessary, also supports Class Counsel's fee
request. Under the lodestsar calculation, the Court multiplies the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate.  Fifth, this case involves numerous
complex factual questions pertaining to Plaintiff's slamming
allegations, as well as nuanced legal issues. Class Counsel
already successfully defeated Defendant's motion to dismiss, which
involved significant legal argument. This factor weighs in favor
of granting the requested fee.  Sixth, and finally, Plaintiff and
Defendant are represented by highly experienced counsel. All
counsel are highly qualified, and they all have substantial
experience in federal courts and class action litigation.  For
these reasons, the Court determines Class Counsel's requested fee
is reasonable, and grants Class Counsel's request for a fee of
$150,000.

Class Counsel are entitled to reimbursement of expenses.
Under the common fund doctrine, Class Counsel is entitled to
reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses
and costs in the prosecution of claims and in obtaining
settlement.  Here, Class Counsel seek $1,527.77 in out-of-pocket
litigation expenses. There are no objections to Class Counsel's
request. Upon review, all of Class Counsel's expenses were
reasonable and necessary in connection with litigating and
resolving this case and are therefore reimbursable.

Accordingly, the Court grants Class Counsel's request for
$1,527.77 for expense reimbursement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yasf39pdfrom Leagle.com.

Kimber Baldwin Designs, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Christian
A. Jenkins, Minnillo & Jenkins Co., LPA, 2712 Observatory Avenue,
Cincinnati, OH 45208

Kimber Baldwin Designs, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey
Scott Goldenberg -- jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com -- Goldenberg
Schneider, LPA, Robb S. Stokar, Minnillo & Jenkins Co., LPA, 2712
Observatory Ave.

Cincinnati, OH 45208 & Todd B. Naylor, Goldenberg Schneider, LPA,
1 W. Fourth St., 18th Floor, Cincinnati, OH 45202

Silv Communications, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert Alan
Steinberg, Robert Steinberg Co LPA, 9050 Ambercreek Dr.
Cincinnati, OH 45236 & Terrence Lee Goodman, Law Office of
Terrence L. Goodman, LLC, 17 Heritage Rd., Cincinnati, OH 45241


SINGING RIVER: Court Won't Lift Stay in "Jones" for Discovery
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Louis Guirola, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, denied the
Motions to Lift Stay for the Purposes of Obtaining Discovery and
to Take Depositions filed by the Objectors to the proposed class
settlement in the case, THOMAS JONES, et al., on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SINGING
RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., Defendants, Cause No. 1:14CV447-LG-
RHW, Consolidated With No. 1:15CV1-LG-RHW., 1:15CV44-LG-RHW (S.D.
Miss.).

These consolidated class action lawsuits arose out of the alleged
underfunding of the Singing River's Retirement Plan and Trust.  On
June 28, 2016, the Court entered an Amended Order and Final
Judgment approving the class action settlement in the matter.  On
July 27, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
entered an opinion vacating and remanding the Court's Order and
Final Judgment approving the settlement.  The Fifth Circuit did
not hold that the settlement should not be approved, or cannot be
approved as modified.

The Fifth Circuit instructed the Court to consider these issues on
remand:

     a. How, and how much, the future stream of SRHS's payments
into the Plan, together with existing Plan assets and prospective
earnings, will intersect with future claims of Plan participants,
including, but not limited to, what effect the Settlement has on
current retirees;

     b. What are SRHS's future revenue projections, showing dollar
amounts, assumptions and contingencies, from which a reasonable
conclusion is drawn that SRHS has the financial ability to
complete performance under the settlement;

     c. Why any payments from litigation involving KPMG,
Transamerica or related entities are permitted to defray SRHS's
payment obligation rather than supplement the settlement for the
benefit of class members; and

     d. Why class counsel's fees should not be tailored to align
with the uncertainty and risk that class members will bear.

Before the Court are the Objectors' Motions to Lift Stay for the
Purposes of Obtaining Discovery and to Take Depositions to the
proposed class settlement in the matter.  The Objectors ask the
Court for permission to conduct discovery regarding whether
Singing River shredded financial documents.  They also request
production of various financial records from Singing River and
Jackson County, Mississippi, as well as permission to conduct
depositions of the pension plan's former special fiduciary, the
plan's current special fiduciary, and all experts who have been
retained in the matter.

Judge Guirola finds that both Motions should be denied.  The Court
instructed the parties to the settlement to produce supplemental
memoranda addressing the issues delineated by the Fifth Circuit.
Singing River has produced updated financial documentation, and
the Jones plaintiffs have produced an updated expert report
concerning Singing River's finances.  It has also ordered the
parties to provide supplemental notice to the class, and it has
scheduled a supplemental fairness hearing.  After reviewing the
updated financial documentation produced by the parties, the Court
finds that additional discovery is unnecessary.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OxhgPH from Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr. --
dgw@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Finkbohner, III
-- gwf@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy
Elizabeth Tufts -- let@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS,
LLC, pro hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas -- sln@cunninghambounds.com
-- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Mestayer,
REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W. Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER,
PLLC.

Joseph Charles Lohfink, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes,
Jr., CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Sue Beavers, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Rodolfoa Rel, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Hazel Reed Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Martha Ezell Lowe, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Angelique M.
Cooper, A. COOPER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, pro hac vice, Joe R.
Whatley, Jr., WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP, Richard P. Rouco, QUINN,
CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO, LLP, pro hac vice & Roger K.
Doolittle, ROGER K. DOOLITTLE, ATTORNEY.

Transamerica Retirement Solutions Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Marianne Hogan -- marianne.hogan@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro hac vice, William J. Delany --
william.delany@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP,
pro hac vice & Ashley Eley Cannady -- acannady@balch.com -- BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP.

KPMG, LLP, Defendant, represented by Amelia Toy Rudolph --
amelia.rudolph@sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US) LLP,
pro hac vice, Patricia Anne Gorham --
patricia.gorham@sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US) LLP,
pro hac vice, R. David Kaufman -- dkaufman@brunini.com -- BRUNINI,
GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC-Jackson & Taylor B. McNeel --
tmcneel@brunini.com -- BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC-
Biloxi.


SINGING RIVER: Court Won't Lift "Jones" Stay for Objectors
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Louis Guirola, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, denied the
Motions to Lift Stay and to Strike the Jones Plaintiffs' and
Singing River's Responses to the Motion to Lift Stay in the case,
THOMAS JONES, et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants, Cause No. 1:14CV447-LG-RHW, Consolidated With No.
1:15CV1-LG-RHW., 1:15CV44-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss.).

These consolidated class action lawsuits arose out of the alleged
underfunding of the Singing River' Retirement Plan and Trust.  On
June 28, 2016, the Court entered an Amended Order and Final
Judgment approving the class action settlement in this matter.  It
also imposed a stay on all other lawsuits related to the claims
released in the settlement.  On July 27, 2017, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an opinion vacating and
remanding the Court's Order and Final Judgment approving the
settlement.

Before the Court is the Objectors' Motion to Lift Stay filed by
the Objectors to the proposed class settlement in the matter.
They ask the Court to lift its stay so that they can pursue a bill
of exceptions in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mississippi.
In essence, the Objectors are seeking a ruling from the Circuit
Court that Jackson County, Mississippi, cannot provide funds as
agreed to in the settlement.  They argue that their Bill of
Exceptions, if allowed to proceed, would disrupt the class
settlement.  The Objectors have also filed a Motion to Strike
responses to their Motion to Lift the Stay that were filed by the
Jones Plaintiffs and Singing River, because the Objectors claim
that only Jackson, County, Mississippi, had standing to oppose
their Motion.

Judge Guirola explains that an allegation of future injury may
suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there
is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.  The Objectors'
own Motion demonstrates that these factors are met, because they
argue that their Bill of Exceptions could disrupt the settlement
entered into by the Jones Plaintiffs and Singing River.  As a
result, he denied the Objectors' Motion to Strike these parties'
responses.

The Judge further denied the Objectors' Motion to Lift the Stay.
The Fifth Circuit did not hold that the settlement should not be
approved, or cannot be approved as modified, but remanded the case
for further consideration of four specific issues.  Therefore, it
would be imprudent, as well as a violation of the Fifth Circuit's
mandate, to lift the stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/qWMDCM from Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr. --
dgw@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Finkbohner, III
-- gwf@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy
Elizabeth Tufts -- let@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS,
LLC, pro hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas -- sln@cunninghambounds.com
-- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Mestayer,
REEVES
& MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W. Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Joseph Charles Lohfink, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes,
Jr., CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Sue Beavers, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Rodolfoa Rel, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Hazel Reed Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Martha Ezell Lowe, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Angelique M.
Cooper, A. COOPER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, pro hac vice, Joe R.
Whatley, Jr., WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP, Richard P. Rouco, QUINN,
CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO, LLP, pro hac vice & Roger K.
Doolittle, ROGER K. DOOLITTLE, ATTORNEY.

Transamerica Retirement Solutions Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Marianne Hogan -- marianne.hogan@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro hac vice, William J. Delany --
william.delany@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP,
pro hac vice & Ashley Eley Cannady -- acannady@balch.com -- BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP.

KPMG, LLP, Defendant, represented by Amelia Toy Rudolph --
amelia.rudolph@sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US) LLP,
pro hac vice, Patricia Anne Gorham --
patricia.gorham@sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US) LLP,
pro hac vice, R. David Kaufman -- dkaufman@brunini.com -- BRUNINI,
GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC-Jackson & Taylor B. McNeel --
tmcneel@brunini.com -- BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC-
Biloxi.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Ct. Denies Bid for Attys Fees in Voucher Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Plaintiff Gregory Markow's Motion for Award of Attorney's
Fees and Costs in the case captioned IN RE: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
VOUCHER LITIGATION, Case No. 11 C 8176 (N.D. Ill.).

The case involved Southwest Airlines's decision to stop honoring
drink vouchers that it had distributed to certain ticket
purchasers even though the vouchers did not have an expiration
date when issued.  Under a settlement, Southwest agreed to issue
replacement vouchers to class members who submitted claims.
Following negotiations over attorney's fees, Southwest agreed not
to oppose a fee request of up to $3,000,000.  Plaintiffs sought a
fee award in that amount, $3,000,000.  The Court declined this
request and awarded fees of $1,332,206.25 plus $18,522.32 in
expense.  After the Court entered final judgment, plaintiffs moved
to amend the judgment to increase the award of fees and expenses.
The Court granted the motion in part, increasing plaintiffs' fee
award to $1,649,118.

An appeal was filed by Gregory Markow and Alison Paul, two class
members who had objected to the settlement and fee award.

Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal seeking an increase in the fee
award.  The Seventh Circuit overruled Markow and Paul's objections
to the settlement and class counsel's objections to the fee award,
but the court eliminated the $15,000 incentive award for one
plaintiff due to a previously undisclosed conflict of interest and
reduced class counsel's fee award by the same amount.

Markow seeks a fee award and an incentive award for CCAF, to be
funded from class counsel's supplemental fee award.  This would
effectively undo the settlement that Markow and his counsel
willingly entered into.  In the settlement under which he
dismissed his appeal, Markow agreed to a reduced fee award of
$200,000 for class counsel.  But now Markow is essentially asking
for a reduction of that amount, specifically an order that would
take away part of it to pay Markow's counsel.

Markow willingly agreed to a settlement that left class counsel
with $200,000, without breathing a word suggesting that he would
later demand part of that money.  Requiring class counsel to pay
part of the agreed-upon fee award to Markow and his counsel --
which is what Markow requests -- would amount to undoing the
agreement that Markow and his counsel entered into when they
dismissed their appeal.  To put it in concrete terms, were the
Court to award Markow's counsel the requested $80,000 to be paid
by class counsel, class counsel would end up with $120,000, even
though Markow and his counsel specifically agreed to a $200,000
fee award.

The Court concludes that Markow is not entitled to the relief he
requests because it is contrary to his agreement that resulted in
dismissal of his appeal. It is no answer to this to say that the
settlement was silent on the issue of a later fee award for
Markow. What is important here is that taking away part of the
agreed-upon reduced amount for class counsel undoes the
settlement.

Markow likewise is not entitled to an award of fees or an
incentive award to be paid by Southwest.

First, Markow's original request to this Court was only for a fee
award to be financed by class counsel.

Second, when the Court specifically asked for the parties'
positions regarding whether the Court could and should direct
Southwest to pay any supplemental award, Markow initially said he
was indifferent. When pressed, however, Markow's counsel stated at
the evidentiary hearing that Markow was not asking for a fee award
to be paid by Southwest.

Third, the Court agrees with Southwest that directing it to pay
fees to Markow's counsel would run afoul of the settlement that
resolved the underlying case, which both this Court and the court
of appeals have already approved. Specifically, the settlement
agreement states that if the Court, for any reason, orders
Southwest to pay anything other than as expressly provided for,
Southwest has the right to terminate this Settlement Agreement
The Court sees no appropriate basis to enter an order that would
allow undoing the settlement that this Court and the Seventh
Circuit have approved.

The Court denies Markow's motion for attorney's fees and an
incentive award.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 13, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ybppydo4from Leagle.com.

Adam J Levitt, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph J. Siprut --
jsiprut@siprut.com -- Siprut PC.

Adam J Levitt, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Wood Jones,
Siprut PC, 17 North State Street, Suite 1600Chicago, IL 60602,
Richard Lane Miller, II -- rmiller@siprut.com -- Siprut, PC,
Richard Steven Wilson -- rwilson@siprut.com -- Siprut Pc & Stephen
C. Jarvis, Wawrzyn & Jarvis LLC.

Herbert C. Malone, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Wood Jones,
Siprut Pc, Joseph J. Siprut, Siprut PC, Richard Lane Miller, II,
Siprut, PC, Richard Steven Wilson, Siprut Pc & Stephen C. Jarvis,
Wawrzyn & Jarvis LLC.

Southwest Airlines, Co., Defendant, represented by Leonard A. Gail
-- lgail@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail & Eli Johnson Kay-
Oliphant -- ekay-oliphant@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail LLP, pro
hac vice.

Gregory Markow, Intervenor, represented by M. Frank Bednarz,
Center For Class Action Fairness, Melissa A. Holyoak, Competitive
Enterprise Institute, Center for Class Action Fairness, 1310 L
Street NW, 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 & Kirstin Beth Ives --
kbi@ffilaw.com -- Falkenberg Ives LLP.


ST. CLOUD STATE: Students Want Class Suit for Title IX Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nora G. Hertel, writing for St. Cloud Times, reports that a group
of St. Cloud State female athletes could spur the university to
examine how it funds and structures student teams if they win
their Title IX claims against the school.

First they need the judge to appoint them as class representatives
and make it a class action suit.

On November 15, attorneys for the students and the university
argued details of the Title IX case in a hearing held at the
University of Minnesota Law School, including whether to allow the
young women to represent a whole class of current and future
female students, said Sharon Van Dyck, one of the attorneys for
the students in the suit.

The attorneys argued before law students and Chief U.S. District
Judge John Tunheim on November 15.

After a few more months of proceedings, they could end up in a
trial.

It began with five women on St. Cloud State's varsity tennis team
who sued the university and alleged it offered more athletic
opportunities for men than for women over the years. Women from
the Nordic ski team joined the suit.

The lawsuit followed the 2016 removal of six SCSU athletic
programs: men's and women's tennis, women's Nordic skiing, men's
cross country and both indoor and outdoor men's track and field.

The university has denied allegations against it and claimed it's
compliant with Title IX, a 1972 U.S. law that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs funded
with federal dollars.

Assistant Attorney General Kevin Finnerty, Esq. --
kfinnerty@choate.com -- is representing the university. He was not
available for comment on November 16.

The initial lawsuit also claims sex-based discrimination in
violation of the Constitution's 14th Amendment, which guarantees
equal legal protection for all citizens.

Finnerty asked the judge on November 15 to rule on that claim
outside of a trial.

It's possible the judge will side with Finnerty on that item,
because the 11th Amendment of the Constitution protects states
from lawsuits in federal court, Van Dyck said. Title IX is an
exception to that protection.

The student athletes initially filed one Title IX claim alleging
the university did not provide equal opportunities for female
athletes.

They added two other Title IX claims regarding equal financial
assistance and benefits and treatment, Van Dyck said. A judge
initially denied that addition, but the women's attorneys
appealed.

"They're asking for equity in athletics," Van Dyck said. "If men
have an outstanding locker room, then women do too."

A victory with the class action status could force institutional
change, she said.

The judge can take as long as he likes to make a decision on the
students' motion and the university's motion argued November 15.

"I'd anticipate it's going to take months, not weeks," Van Dyck
said.

After that the attorneys have more opportunities to file motions
that could lead to dismissal of some of the claims or shape an
impending trial. [GN]


STARBUCKS CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in "Armstead"
----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned EBONY ARMSTEAD, Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-1163(PKC)(S.D. N.Y.), Judge
P. Kevin Castel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration and to stay the action, and denied without prejudice
the Defendant's motion to partially dismiss the Complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1).

Armstead alleges that Starbucks had a policy of "time shaving"
employee hours, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law.  According to Armstead, while employed by
Starbucks as a barista, she was required to clock out at a fixed
time but to continue working without compensation.  She alleges
that Starbucks required her to work approximately 9.5
uncompensated hours each week.

Starbucks moves to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.
According to Starbucks, during the hiring process, Armstead
electronically signed an Arbitration Agreement that requires her
claims to be decided by an arbitrator.  Starbucks moves to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act.  It also seeks to dismiss Armstead's allegations
in support of a collective or class action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Judge Castel concludes that Starbucks has established as a matter
of law that Armstead electronically consented to the arbitration
of her claims, and that Armstead has not come forward with
evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude
that her consent was not effective.  He separately concludes that
Armstead was, at a minimum, placed on inquiry notice of the
Arbitration Agreement, and is therefore bound by its terms.  The
agreement was presented in the context of a forward-looking
employment relationship.  Armstead unambiguously consent to the
agreement by electronically signing it.  Thus, accepting the truth
of Armstead's subjective confusion and the statements made by the
Starbucks branch manager, the Judge concludes that, at a minimum,
Armstead was on inquiry notice that she was executing the
Arbitration Agreement and consenting to be bound by it.  Lastly,
he says it is well accepted under New York law that it is not
unconscionable to be bound by an arbitration agreement in the
course of securing employment.  Judge Castel therefore granted the
motion to compel arbitration and stayed the action pending
arbitration.

However, the Judge denied the Defendant's motion to partially
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) without prejudice
to Starbucks re-asserting its arguments in the event that Armstead
brings a certification motion in the future.  He explains that no
motion for class certification or preliminary certification as a
collective action is pending.  Armstead is currently pursuing
claims only on her own behalf.  The Arbitration Agreement's effect
is better considered in the context of such certification motions,
rather than through the lens of subject matter jurisdiction at the
pleading stage.

Judge Castel directed the Clerk to terminate the motion and to
place the case on the suspense calendar.  The parties will by July
6, 2018 file a written status of the arbitration as of June 29,
2018.  If the parties fail to do so, the action will be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/mrhynZ from Leagle.com.

Ebony Armstead, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC.

Ebony Armstead, Plaintiff, represented by Taimur Alamgir, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Starbucks Corporation, Defendant, represented by Anastasia Marie
Kerdock -- akerdock@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP & Nathan J. Oleson -- noleson@akingump.com -- Akin, Gump,
Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP.


SUTTER HOME: Faces "Ruiz" Suit in California Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sutter Home Winery
Inc. The case is styled Eduardo Ruiz, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sutter Home Winery Inc,
Trinchero Family Estates and Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 34-
2017-00223127-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., December 4, 2017).

Sutter Home Winery Inc. is in the wineries industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph Lavi, Esq.
   LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
   8889 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 200
   Beverly Hills, CA 90211
   Tel: 800-459-7754


SYNERMED: Fails to Give Notice Before Layoffs, "Araya" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
SIMON ARAYA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. SYNERMED, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC685396
(S.D. Fla., Dec. 1, 2017), seeks to recover damages as a result of
Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff and Defendant's other
similarly situated employees 60 days of notice before layoffs, as
required by the California Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.

This case arises out of the massive layoff implemented by
Defendants on or about November 6, 2017. On or about that date,
Plaintiff and Defendants' other similarly situated employees were
terminated by Defendants as part of and/or as a result of mass
layoffs ordered by Defendants. The Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees also seek recovery of all available statutory
penalties, waiting time penalties and restitution as a result of
Defendants' failure to provide all wages due and owing at the time
of their layoff and/or termination.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bruce Kokozian, Esq.
          KOKOZIAN LAW FIRM, APC
          9440 South Santa Monica Blvd, Suite 510
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (323) 857 5900
          Facsimile: (310) 275 6301


T-MOBILE USA: Cesarina Files Suit Over False Ads
------------------------------------------------
SUZIE CESARINA, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Case No. 8:17-cv-02054
(C.D. Cal., November 23, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
alleged practice of falsely advertising its services in order to
falsely induce consumers to switch to their telephone service.

T-Mobile is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Washington.  The Defendant is engaged in the
advertising, sale, and provision of telephone services with a
large share of its business done in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS: Cherokee Nation Suit Moved to N.D. Okla.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Cherokee Nation, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., formerly known as: Takeda
Pharmaceuticals North America Inc.; Takeda Development Center
Americas Inc., formerly known as: Takeda Global Research &
Development Center Inc.; Takeda Pharmaceuticals America Inc.;
Takeda Pharmaceuticals International Inc.; Takeda Pharmaceuticals
Co. Ltd.; Eli Lilly & Co.; and Takeda California Inc., formerly
known as: Takeda San Diego Inc., Case No. 6:15-cv-01485, was
transferred on Nov. 29, 2017, from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma (Tulsa). The Northern District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 4:17-cv-00648-GKF-JFJ to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Chief Judge Gregory K. Frizzell.

Takeda Pharmaceutical is the largest pharmaceutical company in
Japan and Asia and a top 15 pharmaceutical company in the world.
The company has over 30,000 employees worldwide and achieved 16.2
billion USD in revenue during the 2012 fiscal year.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Curtis N Bruehl, Esq.
          BRUEHL LAW FIRM
          3216 NW 177th St
          Edmond, OK 73012
          Telephone: (405) 696 5695
          Facsimile: (405) 300 1140

The Defendants are represented by:

          D'Lesli M Davis, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP (DALLAS)
          2200 Ross Ave Ste 3600
          Dallas, TX 75201-7932
          Telephone: (214) 855 8221
          Facsimile: (214) 855 8200
          E-mail: dlesli.davis@nortonrosefulbright.com


TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: "Huellemeier" Suit Moved to Connecticut
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, granted the Defendants' Motion
to Transfer the case, Robert W. Huellemeier, derivatively on
behalf of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited Employee Stock
Purchase Plan, Plaintiff, v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
Limited, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-485 (S.D. Ohio) to
the District of Connecticut.

Teva is a global pharmaceutical company with operations in the
United States, Europe, and other markets, and with facilities in
Ohio.  Vigodman was a Director for Teva at all relevant times.
Eyal Desheh was the Chief Financial Officer for Teva at all
relevant times.  Shlomo Yanai was the President and Chief
Executive Officer for Teva at all relevant times.  Teva registered
70,000,000 American depository shares with the SEC in July 2010,
some for purchase by employees of the company through the Employee
Stock Purchase Plan ("ESPP").  Huellemeier is a current or former
Teva employee who purchased Teva shares through the ESPP between
Feb. 9, 2015 and Nov. 3, 2016.

Huellemeier alleges that Teva made a number of material
misstatements and omissions in the financial disclosure forms.  He
alleges that Teva failed to disclose that it was under an
antitrust investigation for price-fixing by the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and the Attorney General's Office for the State of
Connecticut, that it was under investigation by the DOJ for
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, including bribery
of Russian government officials, and that it lacked effective
internal controls over its financial reporting.

Huellemeir asserts the following claims for relief in the
Complaint based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the
registration statements: (ii) violation of Section 11 of the
Securities Act against all the Defendants; (ii) breach of
fiduciary duties against unspecified Defendants; (iii)
misrepresentation and non-disclosure against unspecified
Defendants; and (iv) breach of contract against unspecified
Defendants.

Huellemeier purports to bring the action as a derivative action on
behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Teva
American Depository Shares between Feb. 9, 2015 and Nov. 3, 2016.
He also asserts, in the alternative, a class action on behalf of
individuals who purchased or otherwise acquired the Teva shares
pursuant to the ESPP during the Class Period.

The Defendants now move the Court to transfer the action to the
District of Connecticut on the basis of the first-to-file rule or,
alternatively, to the District of Connecticut where two class
action suits are pending against Teva, Vigodman, and Desheh.
Huellemeier opposes the transfer of the action.

The Defendants move to transfer the case on the grounds that it is
duplicative of earlier-filed suits now pending in the District of
Connecticut: Galmi v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited,
filed on Nov. 6, 2016 and Leone v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
Limited, filed on Dec. 27, 2016.  Amram Galmi's claims were based
on alleged misstatements and omissions in Teva's 2014 20-F form
and 2015 20-F form.  Anthony Leone's claims were based on alleged
misstatements and omissions in Teva's 2013 20-F form, 2014 20-F
form, 2015 20-F form, and other forms.

On April 3, 2017, the district court consolidated Leone with
Galmi, and then transferred the consolidated Galmi case to the
District of Connecticut.  After the consolidated Galmi case was
transferred, the Connecticut district court designated Ontario
Teachers as the Lead Plaintiff on July 11, 2017.  The case is now
captioned Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board v. Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries, Limited.

Finally, OZ ELS Master Fund, Ltd. v. Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Limited, was initiated on Aug. 3, 2017.  Teva,
Vigodman, and Desheh are among the named Defendants.  The
plaintiffs in OZ ELS alleged that Teva participated in an unlawful
price-fixing scheme to inflate the price of generic drugs and made
misstatements in its 2013 20-F, 2014 20-5, and 2015 20-F forms.
On Aug. 30, 2017, the OZ ELS case was stayed pending resolution of
the Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint in
the Ontario Teachers case.

Judge Dlott concludes that the action should be transferred to the
District of Connecticut pursuant to the first-to-file rule.  The
parties and claims in the case are similar enough to those in the
Ontario Teachers case to make transfer appropriate.  Three of the
four Defendants in the action are defendants in the Ontario
Teachers action.  The Class Period of Feb. 9, 2015 to Nov. 3, 2016
in the action falls within the relevant class period of Feb. 6,
2014 to Aug. 2, 2017 in the Ontario Teachers action.  It would
appear that Huellemeier himself falls within the class defined in
the Ontario Teachers action as a person who purchased or acquired
Teva shares between Feb. 6, 2014 and Aug. 3, 2017.  The first-to-
file rule only requires that the parties in two actions
substantially overlap, not that they be identical.

In addition, the Judge says both actions involve alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in Teva's 2014 and 2015 20-F
forms.  Both actions involve allegations that Teva engaged in
price-fixing, with the focus on this case being that Teva failed
to disclose government investigations into price-fixing.  Both
actions include claims for violation of Section 11 of the
Securities Act.  Based on these similarities, it is highly likely
that there will be a substantial overlap in discovery and briefing
in the two cases.  The judicial economy factor, therefore, weighs
in favor of transfer.  It also seems likely that the failure to
transfer the case would create the possibility of inconsistent
judgments against Teva, Vigodman, and Desheh.

Because transfer is appropriate under the first-to-file rule, the
Judge needs not determine if transfer also would be appropriate on
the alternative basis of 28 U.S.C. Section 1404.  For these
reasons, Judge Dloyy granted the Defendants' Motion to Transfer.
She directed the Clerk to transfer the action to the District of
Connecticut.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KrkOn9 from Leagle.com.

Robert W Huellemeier, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas J. McKenna,
pro hac vice.

Robert W Huellemeier, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald Richard
Parry -- rrparry@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, Defendant, represented by
David Thomas Bules -- dbules@calfee.com -- Calfee, Halter &
Griswold LLP.

Erez Vigodman, Defendant, represented by David Thomas Bules,
Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP.

Eyal Desheh, Defendant, represented by David Thomas Bules, Calfee,
Halter & Griswold LLP.

Shlomo Yanai, Defendant, represented by David Thomas Bules,
Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Brueggeman Sues Over Improper OT Calculations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDREA BRUEGGEMAN on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. c/o Statutory Agent CT
Corporation System, Case No. 1:17-cv-02457 (N.D. Ohio, November
22, 2017), alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

The Defendant failed to include the commissions paid to the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees in their regular
rate of pay for purposes of calculating their overtime
compensation, according to the complaint.  As a result of that
failure, the Plaintiff and other similarly-situated debt
collectors were denied significant amounts of overtime
compensation.

Transworld Systems, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the state of California, licensed to
conduct business in the state of Ohio, with a physical location in
Cleveland, Ohio.  Transworld is a debt collection agency that
collects past due debts for its clients throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com


TRG CUSTOMER: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in "Cronk" FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled CARRIE CRONK and JEFFERSON BARBOSA,
Individually and on behalf of other similarly situated current and
former employees, Plaintiff, v. TRG CUSTOMER SOLUTIONS, INC. d/b/a
IBEX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-00059 (M.D.
Tenn.), Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, Columbia Division, granted in part
and denied in part IBEX's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to
Dismiss the Action, denied without prejudice the Intervenor
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss or Stay, and deferred ruling on the
Motion to Consolidate pending resolution of the question of
whether any claims remain before the Court in Myers v. TRG
Customer Solutions, Inc. or in the case.

Plaintiffs Cronk and Barbosa bring the action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated current and former employees of IBEX.  In
addition to bringing a collective action under the FLSA, they
assert supplemental state-law claims for breach of contract on
behalf of a Rule 23 class.  Under both theories, they seek to
recover unpaid wages and overtime pay owed to them and similarly
situated employees who have worked at IBEX's call centers in the
United States.

Before the court are the following motions: (i) IBEX's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the Action; (ii) the Intervenor
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay
Plaintiffs' Rule 23 Class and Section 216(b) Collective Claims;
and (iii) the Plaintiffs' and the Intervenor Plaintiffs' Motion to
Consolidate Actions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.  The first and
third motions have been fully briefed, but the Plaintiffs never
responded to the Intervenor Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss.  The
Court nonetheless finds that the Intervenor Plaintiffs' Motion to
Dismiss has been superseded by the joint Motion to Consolidate.

The Defendant alleges that, at the outset of their relationships
with IBEX, the Plaintiffs each separately signed a document titled
Direct Dialogue Program and Mutual Agreement to Mediate/Arbitrate
Acknowledgment and Acceptance ("DDP").  The form signed by Cronk
is dated Oct. 22, 2015.  The form electronically signed by
Barbosa, dated Feb. 9, 2016, likewise confirms his receipt of the
DPP and agreement to abide by it as a condition of his employment.

During the pendency of the Motion to Compel, the Intervenor
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Stay Ruling on the Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration, requesting that the Court delays
ruling on the motion in the case until after ruling on the
virtually identical motion filed by the defendant in Myers.  The
Court granted that motion and, in fact, has now issued a ruling in
Myers granting the defendant's motion to compel Plaintiff Myers to
pursue her claims in an individual arbitration.

The Defendant argues that the Court should grant its Motion to
Compel Arbitration because: (i) both Cronk and Barbosa signed the
DDP, which contains a valid agreement to arbitrate and an express
waiver of the right to bring a class action or collective action;
and (ii) all of the claims in the lawsuit fall within the scope of
the arbitration agreement.  It argues, based on the DDP, that all
claims must be mediated and arbitrated as individual claims.  IBEX
also argues that the Court should dismiss the case after referring
it to arbitration, as its retention of jurisdiction during the
pendency of arbitration would serve no purpose.

Although Judge Trauger concluded in Myers that National Labor
Relations Board v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc. was not
applicable in part because the arbitration agreement at issue in
Myers did not contain an express waiver of the right to pursue a
collective action, she is ultimately not persuaded that there is a
material difference between an arbitration agreement that is
silent on the topic and one in which each party expressly waives
the right to bring a class or collective action.  She remains
persuaded that neither a collective action under the FLSA nor a
Rule 23 class action to enforce contractual rights qualifies as
concerted activity protected by the NLRA.  Finally, the Judge
finds that the reach of Alternative Entertainment is limited to
claims brought "under the NLRA" -- that is, claims concerning
unfair labor practices that fall within the purview of the NLRA.
Accordingly, she will grant the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration, and the Plaintiffs will be compelled to pursue their
claims in the context of an individual arbitration proceeding.

However, Judge Trauger will not dismiss the action in its entirety
and will instead grant the Plaintiffs 30 days within which to file
a motion to substitute the Named Plaintiffs with one or more
appropriate Plaintiffs who believe in good faith that they have
not signed valid and enforceable arbitration agreements.  Despite
the Plaintiffs' failure to cogently make their point, and in
fairness to the more than 60 opt-in Plaintiffs, she finds that
compelling arbitration of the Named Plaintiff's claims does not
automatically require dismissal of the entire case at this
juncture.

The Judge finds that resolution of the Motion to Consolidate
should be stayed in light of the fact that the Court is granting
the Motions to Compel Arbitration in both Myers and the case, and
that it remains to be seen whether there are any individuals among
the opt-in Plaintiffs in either case who have not signed valid and
enforceable arbitration agreements.

For these reasons, Judge Traiger granted in part and denied in
part IBEX's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the
Action.  She granted that portion of the motion seeking to compel
arbitration of the Named Plaintiffs' claims, but denied that
portion of the motion seeking dismissal of this action in its
entirety.  The Judge granted the Plaintiffs 30 days within which
to file a motion to amend the Complaint to substitute appropriate
Named Plaintiffs from among the current opt-in Plaintiffs.  If no
motion to amend is filed within that time frame, the Defendant may
renew its motion to dismiss.  The Judge also denied without
prejudice the Intervenor Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss or Stay,
and deferred ruling on the Motion to Consolidate pending
resolution of the question of whether any claims remain before the
Court in Myers or in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 17, 2017 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/yQqOkP from Leagle.com.

Carrie Cronk, Plaintiff, represented by Gordon E. Jackson --
gjackson@jsyc.com -- Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt.

Carrie Cronk, Plaintiff, represented by J. Russ Bryant --
rbryant@jsyc.com -- Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt, James L.
Holt, Jr. -- jholt@jsyc.com -- Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt &
Paula R. Jackson -- pjackson@jsyc.com -- Jackson, Shields, Yeiser
& Holt.

Jefferson Barbosa, Plaintiff, represented by Gordon E. Jackson,
Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt, J. Russ Bryant, Jackson, Shields,
Yeiser & Holt, James L. Holt, Jr., Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt
& Paula R. Jackson, Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt.

TRG Customer Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda E.
Colvin -- amanda.colvin@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave, LLP,
Christopher P. Galanek, Bryan Cave, LLP, Daniel M. O'Keefe --
dmokeefe@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave, LLP, James Craig Oliver --
coliver@bradley.com -- Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP & John P.
Rodgers -- jrodgers@bradley.com -- Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
LLP.

Mary Andrews, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Charles P.
Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, David W. Garrison --
dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Jerry E. Martin -- jmartin@barrettjohnston.com --
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank --
jfrank@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC, Scott P. Tift -- stift@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Seth Marcus Hyatt --
shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC & Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Earvin Kyles, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Charles P.
Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, David W. Garrison, Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jerry E. Martin, Barrett Johnston
Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank, Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC, Seth Marcus Hyatt, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC &
Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Dylan Bertucci, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Charles P.
Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, David W. Garrison, Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jerry E. Martin, Barrett Johnston
Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank, Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC, Seth Marcus Hyatt, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC &
Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

John Hamric, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Charles P.
Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, David W. Garrison, Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jerry E. Martin, Barrett Johnston
Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank, Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC, Seth Marcus Hyatt, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC &
Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Mylee Myers, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Charles P.
Yezbak, III, Yezbak Law Offices, David W. Garrison, Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Jerry E. Martin, Barrett Johnston
Martin & Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank, Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC, Seth Marcus Hyatt, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC &
Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Fails to Secure Private Info, Agans Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN AGANS and AUDREY DIAZ SANCHEZ, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, and Does 1-50, Case No. 3:17-cv-06759 (N.D.
Cal., November 22, 2017), accuses the Defendant of failing to
secure and safeguard the Plaintiffs' personal identifying
information and that of some 57 million similarly situated people,
who either drove for the Defendant or used its services as riders.

Uber is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of
Delaware with its principal place of business in San Francisco,
California.  The Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants.

Uber develops, markets, and operates a mobile-app-based
transportation network called Uber.  The Uber app allows riders to
submit a trip request on their smartphone, which is routed to
Defendant's drivers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore Maya, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Daniel S. Robinson, Esq.
          Wesley K. Polischuk, Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE, INC.
          19 Corporate Plaza Dr.
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 720-1288
          Facsimile: (949) 720-1292
          E-mail: drobinson@robinsonfirm.com
                  wpolischuk@robinsonfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          900 W. Morgan St.
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: Dan@wbmllp.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Sued by DeSignor Over Failure to Protect PII
---------------------------------------------------------------
REBECCA DESIGNOR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.; RAISER, LLC; and
RASIER-CA, LLC, Case No. 5:17-cv-05289-EGS (E.D. Pa., November 22,
2017), seeks redress for the Defendants' alleged failure to
adequately safeguard personal identifying information and related
data.

The action arises from what may be one of the larger data security
breaches ever to occur in the United States, the Plaintiff
asserts.  As a result of this breach, the Plaintiff contends,
millions of individuals whose sensitive personal data was made
accessible now face substantial risk of further injury from
identity theft, credit and reputational harm, false tax claims, or
even extortion.

Uber Technologies Inc. is a global transportation technology
company incorporated in California, with its principal place of
business in San Francisco, California.

Rasier, LLC, is a California Limited Liability Company, with its
principal place {of business in San Francisco.  Rasier-CA, LLC, is
a California Limited Liability Company, with its principal place
of business in San Francisco.  The Defendants do business
nationwide, including in this District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dianne M. Nast, Esq.
          Daniel N. Gallucci, Esq.
          Joanne E. Matusko, Esq.
          Joseph N. Roda, Esq.
          NASTLAW, LLC
          1101 Market Street, Suite 2801
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 923-9300
          Facsimile: (215) 923-9302
          E-mail: dnast@nastlaw.com
                  dgallucci@nastlaw.com
                  jmatusko@nastlaw.com
                  jnroda@nastlaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Suit Blames Company for Sexual Assaults
----------------------------------------------------------
Kari Paul, writing for Market Watch, reports that on Jan. 18, a
California woman ordered an Uber home from a restaurant in the Los
Angeles neighborhood of Silver Lake. Despite only having consumed
a couple of drinks, a complaint filed in a San Francisco court
said, she felt very intoxicated and fell asleep in the back seat
during the ride home. When she awakened, she alleged she was being
sexually assaulted by her driver.

"Each week, women continue to experience gender-motivated
harassment at the hand of the agents that Uber has tasked with the
responsibility of transporting passengers safely from one
destination to another," the complaint reads. "Worse, these women
paid money to Uber for what they were told was a 'safe ride.'"

The woman, referred to as Jane Doe 2 in the lawsuit, is not alone.
She and another anonymous rider, who was physically carried out of
an Uber by her driver while incapacitated and sexually assaulted
in his home, are seeking class action status on behalf of all U.S.
passengers who were "subject to rape, sexual assault or gender-
motivated violence or harassment by their Uber driver in the last
four years." The complaint alleges the company uses "low-cost,
woefully inadequate background checks" for drivers and demands a
number of changes to make the app safer.

"Uber received this complaint and we are in the process of
reviewing it," a spokeswoman from Uber said. "These allegations
are important to us and we take them very seriously."

How could Uber make its service safer?

Some of the demands outlined in the complaint include barring
registered sex offenders nationally from becoming Uber drivers,
requiring drivers to undergo in-person screening interviews,
performing national background checks on drivers every six months,
and thorough character checks on prospective drivers that go
beyond mere criminal background checks.

Under current Uber regulations, drivers apply online and are
required to undergo a background check conducted by a third party
company using a legal document like a driver's license. Unlike a
national government background check, these do not require in-
person appearances or fingerprints. Harry Campbell, a Lyft and
Uber driver and author of the blog "The Rideshare Guy," said these
"lax" background checks will likely lead to more lawsuits in the
future.

These comprehensive background checks are at odds with the
contractor nature of the rideshare companies, he said, adding that
Uber and Lyft "don't want to do extensive background checks" on
each driver. In lawsuits in the U.S. and the U.K., Uber has
maintained that its drivers are not employees, but self-employed
contractors.

"The perception is that Uber and Lyft are safer than taxis, but
they both have their problems," he said. "Consumers are learning
they aren't as safe as they think they are."

Yellow cab drivers generally are required to undergo national or
FBI background checks involving fingerprint records that include
their complete criminal history, while Uber's background check
database only goes back seven years and shows a limited amount of
information, Campbell said.

Cities do not keep track of how many assaults occur on public
transportation, said Kristen Houser, spokeswoman for the National
Sexual Violence Resource Center, so it is difficult to know
whether ride sharing services are safer than traditional yellow
cabs.

"Sexual assault and sexual misconduct in any kind of commuter
transit is a common and well-documented phenomenon," she said. "We
have to recognize sexual violence is something that permeates all
parts of our culture."

Are women-only rideshare apps the answer?

At least two rideshare companies targeting women have emerged to
address the sexual assault problem in the field: Safr and See Jane
Go. See Jane Go is available in Orange County and Long Beach,
Calif. and they are an all female rideshare company (both drivers
and riders). Safr, which is available in Boston, allows both male
and female drivers but riders have the option to choose which
gender they feel most comfortable riding with.

Besides criminal background checks, Safr also offers additional
safety features, including bystander awareness and ride safety
training sessions for all drivers. The app is equipped with an SOS
button to contact Safr and 911 emergency services.

"Safr is one of the leading rideshare companies that is setting
the standards against sexual violence," said Lilly Kenyon, head of
operations at rideshare comparison site Ride Guru. While Uber is
at a disadvantage because its background check of drivers only
covers 7 years of history, assault can happen anywhere.

There have been multiple reports of sexual assault by yellow cab
drivers in New York and other cities, she said. "It seems as
though when assault happens in an Uber car, it tends to get more
publicity."

What changes would make vehicles safer?

The lawsuit is also demanding physical changes to the car to
encourage safety, including installing tamper-proof video cameras
in all Uber vehicles, disabling child lock features on passenger
doors of Uber vehicles and including in-app panic buttons on U.S.-
based apps that send messages to Uber consumer report, local
police and a designated safety contact during a possible assault.

The defendants also are calling on Uber to publicly release the
number of assaults that have occurred on rides facilitated by the
app. The "Who's Driving You?' campaign -- which is backed by the
Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association and, therefore, has a
vested interest in poaching ridesharing customers -- clocked 92
reports of sexual assault and rape by Uber and Lyft drivers in
three months of summer in 2017 based on news stories alone. (Lyft
did not respond to request for comment).

There have likely been far more incidents since rape is largely
underreported, Houser said. But with the rise of the #MeToo
campaign surrounding harassment and rape allegations against
Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, these reports are bringing
the problem to the forefront.

The #MeToo campaign is named in the Uber complaint, with tweets
from women alleging assault by Uber drivers added to their
examples of how the company has failed women. With a new CEO at
Uber and $5 million recently pledged to organizations that prevent
sexual assault and domestic violence, Houser said Uber is making
some moves towards education -- but change needs to be
comprehensive.

"We need to keep in mind that prevention is a broad range of
behaviors," she said. "As a company, your culture can be
protective against sexual assault or enable it -- and when you do
nothing you enable it." [GN]


UTILIQUEST LLC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, "Muniz" Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
JESUS GARCIA MUNIZ, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated and aggrieved employees, the Plaintiff, v.
UTILIQUEST, LLC, a limited liability company, and DOES 1-100,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC685160 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec.
1, 2017), seeks to recover minimum wage under California Labor
Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff brings this
representative and class action against Defendant for engaging in
systematic violations of wage and hour and California Labor Code
laws. The Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff and other current
and former non-exempt, aggrieved employees in California minimum
and overtime wages in violation of the California Labor Code and
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. In addition, Defendant
has failed to provide Plaintiff and other current and former non-
exempt, aggrieved employees in California with proper and accurate
wage statements, failed to authorize and/or permit Plaintiff and
other current and former non-exempt, aggrieved employees in
California to take their mandatory uninterrupted meal and rest
breaks, and failed to reimburse employees for all business
expenses, in violation of the California Labor Code.

UtiliQuest provides facility locating and damage prevention
services in North America. It also offers meter reading services
for electric, gas, and water utilities.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Rosa Vigil-Gallenberg, Esq.
          Raymond A. Gallenberg, Esq.
          Bridget Howze, Esq.
          GALLENBERG PC
          800 S Victory Blvd., Suite 203
          Burbank CA 91502
          Telephone: (818) 237 5267
          Facsimile: (818) 330 5266
          E-mail: rosa@gallenberglaw.com
                  ray@gallenberglaw.com


UTOPIA HOME: "Darby" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Law
------------------------------------------------------------
BEVOLYN DARBY Individually and on Behalf of All Other
Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. UTOPIA HOME CARE INC.
and JOHN DOES No. 1-10, the Defendants, Case No. 523239/2017 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 2017), seeks to recover overtime pay under New
York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff and the putative class were home health aides who
worked numerous 24 hour shifts for which they were illegally aid
for only 13 of the 24 hours worked, as they did not get meal
breaks and did not get 5 hours of uninterrupted sleep and a full 8
hours of sleep during the shifts. The Plaintiffs worked for
Defendants for more than 40 hours per week ("overtime hours") and
were illegally not paid any wages for many of their hours worked.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked for Defendants
for more than 40 hours per week ("overtime hours") during the last
6 years and performed more than 20% household work and thus were
illegally not paid time and one half for their overtime hours. The
Plaintiffs complain that they are entitled to back wages from
Defendant for hours worked for which they did not receive minimum
and/or regular wages; overtime hours worked for which they did not
receive time and one half the minimum wage or time and one half
their actual wages; and spread of hours work performed for which
they did not receive an extra hour of pay, as required by the New
York Labor Law.

Utopia Home is a family owned and operated home health care agency
that provides services since 1983.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiffs:

          William C. Rand, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM COUDERT RAND
          501 Fifth Avenue, 15th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 286 1425
          Facsimile: (646) 688 3078


WATERTON HOSPITALITY: Fails to Pay All Wages, Maasrani Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
MOATAZ MAASRANI, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated current and former employees and as proxy for the
LWDA, the Plaintiff, v. WATERTON HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT, an entity
of unknown type; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, the Defendant, Case
No. 17c1v05170 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid wages under California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, Maasrani was hired by Waterton to work
as a front desk/guest services agent at the Westin San Francisco
Airport on or about April 18, 2016. As a front desk agent,
Massrani's primary job duty was to manage reservations and
facilitate the check-in and check-out process for hotel guests.
Maasrani was properly classified as a non-exempt employee of
Waterton and paid on a bi-weekly pay period basis. As a non-exempt
employee, Maasrani was entitled to meal and rest periods pursuant
to California law.

Waterton required Maasrani to execute a document titled
"California Meal Period Waiver." Maasrani and other non-exempt
employees were also provided a document titled "California Meal
and Rest Period Policy Associate Acknowledgment". Waterton's
Meal/Rest Policy is facially deficient. Specifically, the policy
does not advise employees of the remedy available when an employee
is prevented from taking a meal/rest period. Additionally, the
policy impermissibly places the onus on the employee to submit a
"payroll adjustment form" to document denied rest periods.
Although Waterton keeps detailed time records for employees, and
thus would necessarily have notice whenever an employee did not
clock out for a meal period, did not take a full 30 minutes for a
meal period, started a meal period after the end of the 5th hour
of work, or started a second meal period after the end of the 10th
hour of work, the policy puts the impetus on the employee to
"notify" a supervisor of the issue.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William J. Gorham, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Scardigli, Esq.
          Robert J. Wasserman, Esq.
          Jenny D. Baysinger, Esq.
          MAYALL HURLEY P.C.
          2453 Grand Canal Boulevard
          Stockton, CA 95207-8253
          Telephone: (209) 477-3833
          Facsimile: (209) 477-4818
          E-mail: wgorham@mayallaw.com
                  nscardigli@mayallaw.com
                  rwasserman@mayallaw.com
                  jbaysinger@mayallaw.com


WESTLAKE WELLBEING: "Edelstein" Remanded to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Andre Birotte, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand the case styled SCOTT EDELSTEIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WESTLAKE WELLBEING PROPERTIES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
CV 17-06488-AB (JEMx) (C.D. Cal.) to state court.

Westlake Properties owns the Four Seasons Westlake Village.
Defendant Four Seasons Hotel is a Canada corporation that manages
more than 30 hotels and resorts across the United States,
including the Westlake Four Seasons.

In 2017, Edelstein used his MasterCard credit card to pay for his
stay at the Westlake Four Seasons.  That same year, Brooks used
his Visa credit card to pay for his stay at the Westlake Four
Seasons.  The Defendants provided them with a printed receipt for
their payment.

The Plaintiffs allege that beginning on Jan. 1, 2015, if not
earlier, through at least April 2017, the Defendants have provided
credit card and debit card receipts that contained more than the
last five digits of the account number and the card expiration
date through machines that were provided to customers at the point
of sale.  They allege that the receipts the Defendants provided
violate the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"),
and assert their claim as a putative class action.

The Defendants removed the action from state court to this Court
on Sept. 1, 2017.  On Sept. 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their
First Amended Complaints alleging a violation of FACTA on behalf
of the Individual Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated.  On
Oct. 3, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Remand, arguing
that they lack Article III standing to pursue their claim in
federal court, so it must proceed in state court.

Judge Birotte explains that the Plaintiffs are alleging a
violation of FACTA.  In support of their claim, they allege that
the Defendants printed more than five digits of their credit cards
on a receipt and that this receipt was given to them.  While FACTA
grants the Plaintiffs the statutory right to be protected from
such conduct and authorizes suit in instances of violation, this
bare procedural violation is not sufficient to allege an injury-
in-fact.

Unlike the plaintiff in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs have not plead any facts to show that the
sensitive information printed on the receipts was seen by anyone
except them.  The simple printing of the digits on the receipt
does not create a sufficient risk of harm like the kind Congress
sought to protect when it enacted FACTA.  In enacting FACTA,
Congress' main concern was identity theft.  The Plaintiffs have
pled no facts that suggest that the Defendants' actions exposed
them to a material risk of identity theft or other kinds of
economic and reputational harm.  Since the Defendants have failed
to distinguish Alvarado v. Univ. of S. Cal. from the case at bar,
the Judge finds it apposite and holds that the Plaintiffs have not
alleged a concrete enough injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement.

Turning to the issue of the appropriate remedy for the Plaintiffs'
lack of standing, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs rely on a
recent case from the Ninth Circuit to argue that in the absence of
Article III standing, the Court should remand a removed action
back to state court.  The Judge agrees.

He explains that in Polo v. Innoventions International, the Ninth
Circuit determined that a district court must remand a removed
action if it finds that it cannot exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction.  Lack of Article III standing is a subject-matter
jurisdiction defect for which the appropriate remedy is remand,
not dismissal.  Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal
courts have no power to adjudicate the matter.

For these reasons, Judge Birotte granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Remand and ordered that Plaintiffs' action be remanded to the
state court from which it was removed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/g5Iat4 from Leagle.com.

Scott Edelstein, Plaintiff, represented by Alex P. Katofsky --
alex@gaineslawfinn.com -- Gaines and Gaines APLC.

Scott Edelstein, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel F. Gaines --
alex@gaineslawfinn.com -- Gaines and Gaines APLC, Kenneth S.
Gaines -- ken@gaineslawfirm.com -- Gaines and Gaines APLC & Miriam
L. Schimmel, Gaines and Gaines APLC.

Steven Brooks, Plaintiff, represented by Alex P. Katofsky, Gaines
and Gaines APLC, Daniel F. Gaines, Gaines and Gaines APLC, Kenneth
S. Gaines, Gaines and Gaines APLC & Miriam L. Schimmel --
miriam@gaineslawfirm.com -- Gaines and Gaines APLC.

Westlake Wellbeing Properties LLC, Defendant, represented by
Anjali Moorthy -- amoorthy@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP &
Steven A. Ellis -- sellis@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP.

Four Seasons Hotels Limited, Defendant, represented by Anjali
Moorthy, Goodwin Procter LLP & Steven A. Ellis, Goodwin Procter
LLP.


WORTH COUNTY, GA: School Drug Search Leads to $3MM Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wsav.com reports that a drug search at a Georgia high school found
no drugs -- and led to accusations of inappropriate police
conduct.

A class-action lawsuit is close to a settlement, according to the
attorneys involved to the tune of $3 million.

It all started several months ago, when Sheriff Jeff hobby ordered
his deputies to do a pat down on every student at Worth County
high school.

He was looking for drugs, but didn't find any that day. Students
described the search as intrusive and inappropriate.

One student described the incident:  "And then she went around my
belt loop, and she put her fingers around the inside and just
conducted like that."

One parent said, "She was underneath her panty line."

Parents were outraged about the search, forming groups, including
one group who hired Atlanta-based attorney, Mark Begnaud, Esq. --
mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com -- to represent them in a civil suit.

He and the other attorneys involved in that suit say they came to
a settlement for $3 million.

WALB News spoke with Begnaud over the phone, who says the
settlement is a win for those who value civil liberties.

According to Begnaud, "We also hope this settlement sends a
message to law enforcement beyond south Georgia or beyond Georgia
that this abuse of power is not tolerated."

Raleigh Rollins represents sheriff hobby and multiple deputies in
the case.

He says Worth County taxpayers are not responsible for paying the
money. And the county entered an insurance coverage agreement that
covers the county in civil cases like this.

Attorneys reached an agreement, but the settlement is not official
yet.

It must first be approved by the U.S. District Judge Leslie
Abrams.

If approved, the money will be dispersed between a number of
people.

The suit is a class-action lawsuit meaning every student involved
in the search will get monetary compensation.

Begnaud said, "The way the class actions typically works is that
the named plaintiffs represent the entire class, so it's the
entire class of people who were searched who would be involved in
the payout, other than anybody who would opt out."

Begnaud also said students who were searched will get anywhere
from $1,000-$6,000 each. Students subjected to more invasive
searches will get higher amounts.

Once all claims are resolved and attorney fees paid, the rest of
the settlement will go into a fund to benefit worth county high
school students. [GN]



                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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