CAR_Public/171212.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, December 12, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 245



                            Headlines

AAA SOUTH JERSEY: Wilson Sues Over Membership Renewal Practices
ADECCO USA: Dec. 12 Case Management Conference in "Shepardson"
ADP LLC: Cal. App. Affirms Summary Judgement in Wage Suit
ALABAMA: Court OKs Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement
ALEXANDER MCQUEEN TRADING: Faces "Norman" Suit in S.D. of NY

ALLERGAN INC: Court Certifies Class in Asacol Antitrust Suit
AMMA PRIVATE: Bannister Law Investigates Potential Class Action
AMERICAN HONDA: Faces Class Action Over CVT Transmission Problem
AMPLIFY SNACK: Wants Consumer Fraud Suit in Illinois Dismissed
ARS NATIONAL: $11K Attys Fees Awarded in "Mateo" FDCA Suit

ASAHI BEER: McDermott Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
AUNT NANCY INC: Faces "Sofia" Suit in E. Dist. New York
AUTO CAR: Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik Files Class Action
AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Certifies Class in Securities Suit
BAE SYSTEMS: $2.9MM Settlement in "Nunez" Labor Suit Has Final OK

BAKER HUGHES: Judge OKs $3MM Drillers' Class Action Settlement
BARBARDOS: Non-Nationals File "Right to Vote" Class Action
BARNEYS NEW YORK: "Swartz" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
BAYER AG: Court Grants Statewide Class Certification in "Farar"
BFT LP: Court Denies Bid to Strike/Dismiss AMP TCPA Suit

BMW: Faces Engine-Defect Class Action in New Jersey
BORDER TRANSFER: Court Certifies Former Drivers' Class
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: "Lowenthal" Suit Alleges Consumer Fraud
CACAFE INC: "Marino" Has Conditional FLSA Certification
CANADA: Motorists' Highway 13 Class Action v. Quebec Can Proceed

CANADA: Ontario Faces Class Action Over Ongoing College Strike
CANADA: MSA Clarifies Position on Class Action Against Ontario
CANADA: Metis Man Sues Over Sixties Scoop Settlement Exclusion
CAPFUSION LLC: "Menichiello" Suit Alleges Illegal Call Recording
COPPER HEN: Servers File Class Action Over Tip-Pooling Violations

CREDIT BUREAU: "Lopez" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
D. DANIELS CONTRACTING: "Mena" Labor Suit Claims Overtime Pay
DANZE INC: Court Junks Breach of Warranty Claim in "Duncan"
DAVITA HEALTHCARE: "Harris" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
DAVITA HEALTHCARE: "Sullivan" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

DIRECTV LLC: "Pointer" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
DOLLAR TREE: Loses Bid to Dismiss PAGA Claims in "Snipes"
DOLLAR TREE: Averts Employees' Class Action Over Pay Stubs
DOLLAR TREE: Atkinson Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling
E*TRADE SECURITIES: Order Sustaining Demurrer Upheld

EAST COUNTY: Court Denies Approval of Settlement in "Galindo"
EDDIE BAUER: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Jan. 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
ENHANCED RECOVERY: "Rhodes" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
EQUIFAX INC: Unlikely to be Held Accountable for Security Breach

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: To Show Cause Why Suit Remain in Fed. Ct.
FAMILY DOLLAR: Settlement in "Scott" Suit Has Preliminary OK
FIELDTURF USA: Faces New Castle School Suit in W.D. Penn.
FRED MEYER: Faces FCRA Class Action Over Background Checks
FRY'S ELECTRONICS: Order Denying Arbitration in "Silva" Upheld

FXCM: Investor Class Action Over Services Agreement Continues
GC SERVICES LIMITED: Faces "Madar" Suit in E. Dist. New York
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Law Firm Investigates Possible Fiduciary Breach
HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Actress Files Proposed Class Action
HERSHEY CO: Faces Class Action Over Reese's, Whoppers Slack Fill

HILTON GRAND: Court Vacates Dismissal of "Connelly" TCPA Suit
HORSEHEAD HOLDING: Objection to Lead Plaintiff Ruling Overruled
HSBC BANK: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Giron" RICO Suit
HYUNDAI CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Exploding Sunroofs
IDS PROPERTY: Wins Summary Judgment in "Achziger" Suit

ILLINOIS: Sex Offenders File Class Action v. Corrections Dept.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL: Court Partly Dismisses "Hightower" Suit
INSIGHT GLOBAL: Court Issues Order re AEO Responses in "Barker"
KIA MOTORS: "Simpson" Suit Alleges Consumer Fraud Act Violation
KUSHNER COS: Faces Class Action Over Apartment Rent Overcharges

MARRONE BIO: Jan. 25 Hearing on Reconsideration Bid
MARYLAND: Court Dismisses "Owens-El" for Lack of Jurisdiction
MCAFEE INC: Summary Judgment in Shareholders' Suit Affirmed
MENARD INC: Plaintiffs Appeal ICFA Class Action Dismissal
MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Jan. 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set

MILBERG LLP: Plaintiffs Lawyers Appeal Malpractice Suit Dismissal
MONTANA: Court Refuses to Certify "Archer" Prisoners Class
NATIONAL GENERAL: "Harvey" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
NATURE MADE: TINA.org Objects to TripleFlex Settlement
NEW BOSTON PIE: Court Certifies Driver Class in "Brayak"

NEW JERSEY: Court Certifies Class in "Gayle" Suit
NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Reconsiders Denial of Stay in "Bui" Suit
OCWEN LOAN: New York Court Narrows Claims in "Delgado" Suit
OREGON: ACLU Files Class Action Against Police Over "Kettling"
PHILIP MORRIS: Fla. Dist. App. Flips Final Judgment in "Duignan"

PITCHER PARTNERS: Faces Class Action Over Slater & Gordon Audit
POWERSECURE INT'L: Dismissal of Amended "Maguire" Suit Affirmed
PROFESSIONAL PLACEMENT: Faces "Suleymanov" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
QUALITY VACATION: Class Action Mulled Over Timeshare Abuse
QUICKEN LOAN: "Mattson" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS: Faces Class Action Over Deck Coating Products
SHOWTIME NETWORKS: Mayweather/McGregor Class Action Can't Proceed
SINGING RIVER: Court Consolidates 3 Suits, Names Reeves as Atty
STATE FARM: Court Denies Bid for Reconsideration in "Arnold" Suit
SYSCO CORPORATION: Court Limits Petrossian Deposition in "Frieri"

TD BANK: "Diaz-Lebel" TCPA Suit Moved to Minnesota
TENNESSEE: Court Denies Certification of Ex-SCDC Inmate's Suit
TEZOS: Faces Second Securities Class Action in Florida
TRANSURBAN: Drivers File Class Action Over Illegal Toll Charges
TRG CUSTOMER: Can Compel Arbitration of Myers' Individual Claims

TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Former Students Wants Out of Class Action
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Class Action Over Assault by Drivers
USCB CORP: Court Denies Judgment on Pleadings Bid in "Gilmore"
UTILITY SERVICE: "Komoroski" Class Settlement Has Final Approval
UTILITY SERVICE: Court Awards $3,500 to "Komoroski" Class Reps

WATER OF LIFE: Suit Over Unlicensed Investment Adviser Continues
WELLNX LIFE: Faces "Choo" Suit in Eastern District of Cal.
WHIRLPOOL CORP: Schechner Seeks to Compel Sears to Produce Docs
ZHEJIANG SUNRIVER: Zhao Wei, Husband Faces Investor Class Action

* Class Actions to Be Included in Ireland Civil Justice Review





                            *********


AAA SOUTH JERSEY: Wilson Sues Over Membership Renewal Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL A. WILSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AAA South Jersey, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. CAM-L-004502-17, (N.J. Sup., November 21, 2017), seeks to
recover the membership revenues AAA has collected for months that
were not covered by the annual membership and to enjoin this
unfair, deceptive and unlawful business practice pursuant to the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

AAA South Jersey is in the business of selling annual memberships
to its New Jersey automobile club, offering roadside assistance,
automotive-related expertise, travel-related services, insurance
services and financial services to residents of New Jersey.

On July 27, 2017, Wilson contacted AAA by phone to renew his
membership and made a payment of $111 to take advantage of a
promotion offered. Instead of providing 12 full months of
membership benefits and services commencing on the transaction
date, AAA backdated Wilson's new period of membership to the prior
expiration date such that his renewed membership expired on May
31, 2018, not 12 months following the renewal transaction date.

AAA deprived Wilson of a portion of the annual membership renewal
that he had purchased. Wilson paid for a full 12-month term of
membership but was granted less than 12 months of membership
privileges in return, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       James C. Shah, Esq.
       Natalie Finkelman Bennett, Esq.
       SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
       475 White Horse Pike
       Collingswood, NJ 08107
       Telephone: (856) 858-1770
       Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
       Email: jshah@sfmslaw.com
              nfinkelman@sfmslaw.com


ADECCO USA: Dec. 12 Case Management Conference in "Shepardson"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KAITLYN SHEPARDSON, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. ADECCO USA, INC., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 3:15-CV-05102-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward
M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California continued the Case Management Conference ("CMC") from
Nov. 16, 2017 to Dec. 12, 2017 at 2:30 p.m.

The Plaintiff filed the proposed class action on or about Aug. 18,
2015.  The Defendant removed the action to this Court and filed a
Motion to Compel single plaintiff arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement between the parties, which contains a ban on
class actions.  The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Compel.

After the Court ruled on the Motion to Compel in the case, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Morris v. Ernst Young held that
bans on class actions in arbitration agreements violate the
National Labor Relations Act.  The United States Supreme Court
granted review of the Morris v. Ernst Young decision to resolve
the enforceability of class actions bans in arbitration agreements
in light of the National Labor Relations Act.  This matter was
stayed pending resolution of the issue as it may impact whether
the ban on class actions in this case is valid.

The Supreme Court held oral argument on Oct. 2, 2017. As of the
date of the submission, the Supreme Court has yet to render a
decision.  Should the Supreme Court issue their Opinion by Nov.
13, 2017 the parties will be prepared to discuss at the CMC how to
proceed based on the outcome of Morris v. Ernst Young.  Should the
Supreme Court not issue their Opinion by Nov. 13, 2017, the
parties request a two-week continuance to allow the Supreme Court
to rule.

Based on the parties' Stipulation, Judge Chen ordered that the CMC
set for Nov. 16, 2017 will be continued to Dec. 12, 2017 at 2:30
p.m.  The stay of this action will remain in effect pending the
resolution of Morris v. Ernst Young.  A Joint CMC Statement will
be due Dec. 5, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/fbgTyr from Leagle.com.

Kaitlyn Shepardson, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Righetti,
Righetti Glugoski, P.C., John Glugoski, Righetti Glugoski, P.C. &
Michael C. Righetti, Righetti Glugoski, P.C..

Adecco USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Julie Erin Patterson -
- jepatterson@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave LLP & Julie Westcott
O'Dell -- julie.odell@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave LLP.


ADP LLC: Cal. App. Affirms Summary Judgement in Wage Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, E.H. SUMMIT, INC., Cross-Complainant and Appellant,
v. ADP LLC, et al., Cross-Defendants and Respondents, Case No.
B271858 (Cal. App.), Judge Lamar Baker of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Second District, Division Five, affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment for ADP.

Cross-Complainant and Appellant E.H. Summit, Inc. is the entity
that owns, on behalf of Efrem Harkham, a hotel on Sunset Boulevard
in Los Angeles.  The years after adoption of ezLabor, one of
Cross-Complainant and Appellant E.H. Summit, Inc.'s former
employees filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging Summit's
time rounding practices meant Summit had failed to pay all due
wages, including overtime wages, and that paychecks provided to
Summit employees did not accurately reflect work time or the
correct amount of wages due.  Summit filed a cross-complaint
against Cross-Defendants and Respondents ADP LLC, ADP, Inc., and
AD Processing LLC.

As ultimately set forth in a Second Amended Cross-Complaint (the
operative complaint), Summit asserted seven causes of action
against ADP: breach of written contract, breach of oral contract,
breach of implied-in-fact contract, negligence, equitable
indemnity, failure to defend pursuant to the tort of another
doctrine, and declaratory relief.  The gist of the operative
complaint is that ADP breached a contract with Summit, and certain
duties of care allegedly owed to Summit, by providing timekeeping
services that used quarter hour rounding and by failing to
affirmatively warn Summit of the litigation risks of that
practice.

As the litigation progressed, Summit settled the wage and hour
claims brought by its former employee.  Summit did not admit
liability and instead maintained it settled in order to avoid the
risks and costs of litigation.  Summit's cross-action, however,
remained pending against ADP, and ADP filed a motion for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication ("Motion").

The Motion argued that ADP had not breached any terms of the only
valid written contract between the parties -- Time & Labor
Management Terms and Conditions" document ("TLM Agreement"); that
there was no evidence of an oral or implied contract; and that
oral or implied contracts would in any case be barred by the terms
of the TLM Agreement.  ADP also contended Summit's remaining
causes of action failed because they were barred by release
language included in the TLM Agreement and the economic loss rule.
Summit opposed the Motion on a number of grounds; the most
important, was the contention that Summit (as opposed to the Luxe
Rodeo, which was owned by a different entity) never assented to
the TLM Agreement and was therefore not bound by its terms.

After extensive argument by counsel during a hearing on the
Motion, the trial court granted summary judgment for ADP.  The
court found the TLM Agreement was a valid contract between Summit
and ADP, and that finding largely defeated the remainder of
Summit's claims.  The court determined there was no evidence of a
written, oral, or implied contract between Summit and ADP other
than the TLM Agreement, and the court additionally concluded an
integration clause in the TLM Agreement would preclude recognizing
an oral or implied contract even if there were evidence of one.
It further found the TLM Agreement defeated Summit's tort claims,
and the claim for equitable indemnity failed in any event because
negligent performance of a contract can give rise to only contract
damages.

Judge Baker finds that on the summary judgment record, there is no
disputing that the TLM Agreement is a valid contract between ADP
and Summit.  Harkham Assistant Controller Regina Taned had
apparent authority to assent to the TLM Agreement, and her assent
indisputably was on behalf of Summit (the owner of the Luxe
Sunset), even if it were also true that her assent operated to
bind Luxe Rodeo or other Harkham entities to the agreement as
well.

As Summit's reply brief implicitly acknowledges, his conclusion
that the TLM Agreement is the only valid contract between Summit
and ADP has something of a domino effect on the validity of the
causes of action asserted in the operative complaint.  That is to
say, there is no evidence of another contract with terms ADP is
said to have breached, and the TLM Agreement's integration clause
in any event defeats any suggestion that a valid oral or implied
contract existed between Summit and ADP.

Summit's tort claims fail in light of language in the TLM
Agreement that establishes ADP owes Summit no duty of care.  Its
equitable indemnity claim fails for the same reason to the extent
it sounds in tort (and because contract damages would be
recoverable at most), and to the extent it is founded on a
contractual obligation, it fails because there is no substantial
evidence of a contract that imposes such an obligation.  Finally,
because there is no basis to award declaratory relief given that
no other viable cause of action exists, summary judgment for ADP
was proper.

The Judge confirmed the judgment.  The Respondent is to recover
its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s Nov. 14, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/OO4D6Q from Leagle.com.

Fagelbaum & Heller, Jerold Fagelbaum, and Philip Heller, for
Cross-Complainant and Appellant.

Jones Day, Matthew J. Silveira -- msilveira@jonesday.com -- Brian
L. Hazen -- bhazen@mofo.com -- and Rick Bergstrom --
rjbergstrom@jonesday.com -- for Cross-Defendants and Respondents.


ALABAMA: Court OKs Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama, Northern Division, issued an Opinion for Phase 2A
Involuntary Medication Settlement Final Approval in the case
captioned EDWARD BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN,
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department
of Corrections, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:14cv601-MHT
(M.D. Ala.).

Before the court on a promised opinion explaining why, in partial
resolution of this litigation, it previously approved a settlement
of the group's claims challenging the Department's involuntary-
medication policies and procedures.

The plaintiffs in this phase, Phase 2A, of the lawsuit are a group
of seriously mentally ill state prisoners and the Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), which represents mentally
ill prisoners in Alabama.  The plaintiffs claim that the
Department's involuntary-medication policies and procedures
deprive prisoners of due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Specifically, they contend that the Department's involuntary-
medication policies and procedures: (1) deny prisoners subject to
involuntary-medication orders substantive due process by requiring
them to be medicated absent a recent finding of dangerousness; (2)
deny prisoners subject to involuntary-medication orders procedural
due process by failing to provide them with adequate notice of
hearings and other protections provided for in the applicable
regulation; and (3) deny prisoners who are not subject to
involuntary-medication orders substantive and procedural due
process by coercing consent to take medications that they
otherwise would refuse.

The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement of the involuntary-medication claims.  After a
hearing on the joint motion, the court preliminarily approved the
proposed settlement.  After the fairness hearings, the court, on
September 6, 2017, entered an order granting final approval of the
Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication Settlement Agreement and
granted the parties' request to enter their settlement agreement
as a consent decree.

The agreement includes the following substantive provisions:

   * Revised Involuntary-Medication Regulation:  The Commissioner
agrees to adopt and implement the revised Administrative
Regulation (AR) 621, which is the Department's involuntary-
medication regulation. The revised regulation contains the
following provisions, in relevant part:

   (1) a policy against threatening or coercing prisoners to
accept psychotropic medications;

   (2) a requirement that the Department consider and document
whether there is a current and substantial likelihood of serious
physical harm towards self or others when deciding to place a
prisoner on an involuntary-medication order;

   (3) a requirement that the Involuntary Medication Review
Committee find that involuntary-medication is in the patient's
best medical interest before deciding to issue an involuntary-
medication order;

   (4) a policy requiring an independent and knowledgeable advisor
to review involuntary-medication orders and assist prisoners in
challenging an adverse involuntary-medication order, where
appropriate;

   (5) the creation of an involuntary-medication review board,
consisting of providers who were not involved in the patient's
treatment; and

   (6) a requirement that a patient be afforded an opportunity to
be unmedicated for 30 days if on an involuntary-medication order
for 180 days.

In approving the agreement, the court had to make three
determinations.  First, the court assessed whether the procedural
and substantive protections provided by Rule 23(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were satisfied.  Second, because the
proposed settlement included an award of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiffs' counsel, Rule 23(h) required the court to determine
whether such a fee award was reasonable.  Finally, the court
evaluated the proposed settlement's compliance with the PLRA,
which establishes certain requirements for affording prospective
relief in cases involving prisons, including when that prospective
relief takes the form of a court-enforceable settlement.

The notice form was posted in the law library, dining areas, and
mental-health office waiting areas of each ADOC or work-release
facility. Notice forms were placed next to the shower area in each
residential treatment unit (RTU) or in the infirmaries for
prisoners housed in those units. In addition, notice forms were
hand delivered to prisoners on the mental-health caseload in those
units.  The notice and comment forms and copies of the proposed
agreement were made available in English, Spanish, Braille, and in
large print. Upon request, prisoners were to receive assistance in
reading the documents and in writing comments.  A copy of a
comment form was to be provided along with a copy of the notice
form.  Notice of the proposed agreement was posted by June 2,
2017, and prisoners were given until July 17, 2017, to submit
comments. The court received more than 200 prisoner comments by
mail or from the facilities themselves, which were thereafter
docketed for review.

Prisoners raised a variety of issues relating to the proposed
settlement agreement in their comments submitted to the court.
After a careful review of all the comments and objections filed by
class members and the testimony of prisoners at the fairness
hearings, the court found that none of the prisoners' comments
seriously called into question the fairness of the agreement, in
whole or in part.

Class counsel contended that the proposed agreement was a fair,
adequate, and reasonable resolution of the plaintiffs' Phase 2A
involuntary-medication claims. At the fairness hearing on August
24, 2017, counsel argued that the agreement was rigorously
negotiated and was reached through a great deal of hard work on a
variety of disputed issues. Counsel firmly believed this
settlement was advantageous to the certified class and complied
with the requirements of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 235
(1990).  Upon consideration of the views of class counsel, the
court found that nothing addressed by the parties seriously called
into question the fairness, adequacy, or reasonableness of the
agreement.

Based on the evidence and argument presented by the parties and
class members, the court determined that the proposed settlement
agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Accordingly, upon an independent review of prisoner comments and
the views of class counsel, the court found the agreement to
represent a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement of the
plaintiffs' involuntary-medication claims.

The settlement agreement provides that the Department will pay the
plaintiffs' counsel $230,000.00 in fees and costs.

In support of the attorneys' fee request, the plaintiffs' counsel
submitted evidence that they have incurred, or will incur,
approximately $230,000.00 in litigation expenses on the Phase 2A
involuntary-medication claims and fees associated with ADAP's role
in monitoring the Department's compliance with the agreement and
revised involuntary-medication regulation.

The plaintiffs' counsel expended over 476.3 total hours of
billable time on this portion of the case as of the date of
signing the settlement and significant time for almost four (4)
months after signing the agreement.  It is impossible to determine
the exact number of hours that ADAP will spend monitoring the
implementation of the new policies under the settlement agreement
after final settlement approval and during the settlement term,
but the parties jointly agree that the $230,000.00 request
represents a reasonable fee for litigation of this kind.

After considering the Johnson factors, the court found that the
fee was reasonable and no adjustment of the lodestar figure was
warranted.

Here, the parties agreed that the proposed settlement satisfies
the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements of 18 U.S.C.
Section 3626(a)(1)(A).  Proposed Phase 2A Involuntary Medication
Settlement Agreement. Based on the court's independent review of
the agreement, the court agreed.

In Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court recognized that
prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 494 U.S. at 221-22.
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently recognized the need to
balance its "longstanding adherence to the principle that inmates
retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarceration
with the recognition that prison authorities are best equipped to
make difficult decisions regarding prison administration.

The court also, again, recognizes the important role played by
prisoners, who, in this context, are subject to the Department's
involuntary-medication regime, as well as the numerous prisoners
who submitted comments, for their advocacy on behalf of themselves
and others.

The court approved and adopted, as its own partial final judgment,
the parties' settlement of the plaintiffs' involuntary-medication
claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/SKhqlo from Leagle.com.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh -
awalsh@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Jack Richard Cohen,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center,
PO Box 2087400 Washington Ave., Montgomery, AL 36102-2087,
Patricia Clotfelter -- pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein,
Southern Poverty Law Center, PO Box 2087400 Washington Ave.,
Montgomery, AL 36102-2087, William Glassell Somerville, III --
wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program. 400 South Union Street, Suite 280, Montgomery,
Alabama 36104

Tedrick Brooks, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Gary Lee Broyles, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Chandler Clements, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Christopher Gilbert, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack
Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Dwight Hagood, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Sylvester Hartley, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

Christopher Jackson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack
Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Brandon Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard
Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities
Advocacy Program.

John Maner, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Jack Richard Cohen,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center,
Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz
PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, William
Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz &William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy
Program.

Ruth Naglich, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill, Alabama
Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd -- dboyd@balch.com -
Balch & Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of
Corrections, John Garland Smith -- jgsmith@balch.com -- Balch &
Bingham LLP, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of
Corrections, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr. -- rdorr@maynardcooper.com -
- Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Matthew Reeves --
mreeves@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh
Bansilal Shah -- mshah@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper &
Gale, PC, Steven C. Corhern -- scorhern@balch.com -- Balch &
Bingham, William Richard Lunsford -- blunsford@maynardcooper.com -
- Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Melissa K. Marler --
mmarler@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Michael
Paul Huff -- mhuff@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale PC &
Stephen Clarence Rogers -- srogers@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard
Cooper and Gale PC.

Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant, represented by David
Randall Boyd, Balch & Bingham LLP, John W. Naramore, Balch &
Bingham LLP, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Anne Adams
Hill, Alabama Department of Corrections, Elizabeth Anne Sees,
Alabama Department of Corrections, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr.,
Alabama Dept of Corrections, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham &
William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.
Jefferson S. Dunn, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill,
Alabama Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd, Balch &
Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of
Corrections, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Joseph
Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of Corrections, Luther Maxwell
Dorr, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Matthew Reeves, Maynard
Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
PC, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, William Richard Lunsford,
Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Melissa K. Marler, Maynard, Cooper &
Gale PC, Michael Paul Huff, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC & Stephen
Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC.

MHM Correctional Services, Inc., Movant, represented by Brett T.
Lane, MHM Services, Inc. & Deana Johnson, MHM Services, Inc., pro
hac vice.

Corizon Health, Inc., Movant, represented by Melissa K. Marler,
Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper
and Gale PC & William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.

Kim Thomas, Movant, represented by Melissa K. Marler, Maynard,
Cooper & Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
PC, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC & William
Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC.


ALEXANDER MCQUEEN TRADING: Faces "Norman" Suit in S.D. of NY
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alexander McQueen
Trading Americas, Inc. The case is styled as Virginia Norman and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Alexander McQueen Trading Americas, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-09379 (S.D. N.Y., November 30, 2017).

Alexander McQueen Trading Limited manufactures women's and men's
ready-to-wear designer apparel, accessories, eyewear, and
fragrances.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


ALLERGAN INC: Court Certifies Class in Asacol Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned IN RE ASACOL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. 15-cv-12730-DJC. (D. Mass.), is a putative class action in
which the Plaintiffs, members of a putative class of end-payor
purchasers of certain pharmaceutical products, allege that the
Defendants, manufacturers of certain pharmaceutical products,
engaged in exclusionary conduct impermissible under antitrust laws
by pulling one product, Asacol 400mg, from the market at the same
that it introduced a new product, Delzicol.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), and denying
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class defined as follows:

     All persons or entities in the United States and its
territories who purchased and/or paid for some or all of the
purchase price for Delzicol or Asacol HD in Arizona, California,
Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia for consumption by
themselves, their families, or their members, employees, insureds,
participants, or beneficiaries, during the period July 31, 2013
through and until the anticompetitive effects of Defendants'
unlawful conduct cease and also purchased and/or paid for some or
all of the purchase price for Asacol 400mg prior to July 31, 2013.

The Plaintiffs contend that they have met their burden of showing
numerosity because the proposed class includes most individuals
who filled a prescription for Asacol HD or Delzicol in the Class
state and in 2013, there were 318,000 prescriptions for Asacol HD
and 128,000 prescriptions for Delzicol in those states.  The Court
thus finds that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving
numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1).

With respect to commonality, the Plaintiffs must also demonstrate
that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. The
Plaintiffs contend that the common questions of law or fact
include, inter alia, the relevant market definition, the existence
of monopoly power on the part of the Defendants, and the market
effect of the Defendants' decision to pull Asacol 400mg off the
market.  The Defendants do not contest that the commonality
requirement is met, but rather contend that issues common to the
class do not predominate over individual issues, as is required by
Rule 23(b)(3).  The Court finds that the commonality requirement
is satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class.  An antitrust injury, however, occurs the moment the
purchaser incurs an overcharge, whether or not that injury is
later offset by savings attributable to the same or related
transaction.  Even if the named plaintiffs did not suffer a net
injury, the named plaintiffs still experienced an injury the
putative overcharge and seek to recover on that injury on the
basis of an antitrust claim, just like the other class members.
The Court finds that the typicality requirement is satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.  As Conti
explains, there is good reason for making this exclusion for
individual consumers but not for third-party payors.  She opines
that unlike the consumer of an Asacol HD or Delzicol prescription
who may be new to using the franchise, a TPP is much more likely
than not to have paid for an Asacol 400mg prescription as well
since they cover so many consumers and pay for many prescription
drug purchases.  The Court concludes that there is no conflict
created between the named plaintiffs and members of the purported
class on this basis and that the Plaintiffs have met their burden
as to adequacy.

To meet the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, the party
seeking certification must show that 'the fact of antitrust impact
can be established through common proof' and that any resulting
damages would likewise be established by sufficiently common
proof. Predominance is not defeated by individual damages
questions as long as liability is still subject to common proof.

Rule 23(b)(3) carries an implied requirement that the class
definition be sufficiently definite such that the class members
are ascertainable.  The First Circuit explained in Nexium, "the
need for some individualized determinations at the liability and
damages stage does not defeat class certification," at least so
long as there is only a de minimis number of uninjured class
members.  The question is whether there is a de minimis number of
brand-loyal consumers or not.  Between the two expert reports, it
seems that, by the end of the relevant period, somewhere around
10% of the class members would have opted for Asacol HD or
Delzicol even in the presence of generic Asacol 400mg. But, even
so, the Defendants do not sufficiently show that even 10% of the
class constitutes more than a de minimis number sufficient to deny
class certification.

A putative class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) also
bears the burden of showing that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

The Plaintiffs contend that a class action is superior to other
methods of adjudication because each individual plaintiff's
damages are relatively small and thus would not have sufficient
incentive to bring individual lawsuits.  They further contend that
the case is sufficiently administrable as a class action.  The
Defendants contend that the class is not administrable because, as
they argued with respect to ascertainability, the Plaintiffs have
not proposed a mechanism to separate uninjured from injured class
members.  But, for the same reasons this Court rejected that
argument in the ascertainability context, it rejects that argument
here.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycpjnlhz
from Leagle.com.

Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan, Plaintiff,
represented by David P. Barclay -- barclaydavidp@gmail.com --
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice.

Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan, Plaintiff,
represented by Diana J. Zinser -- dzinser@srkattorneys.com --
Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice, Eric D. Barton --
ebarton@wcllp.com -- Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey L. Kodroff -- jkodroff@srkattorneys.com -- Spector Roseman
& Kodroff, P.C., John A. Macoretta --  jmacoretta@srkattorneys.com
-- Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice, Peter J. Mougey
-- pmougey@levinlaw.com -- Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell,
Rafferty & Proctor, pro hac vice & Tyler W. Hudson --
thudson@wcllp.com -- Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice.

Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan, Plaintiff,
represented by Nathaniel L. Orenstein --
norenstein@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco.

NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, Plaintiff, represented by David P.
Barclay, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice, Diana J. Zinser,
Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice, Eric D. Barton,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey L. Kodroff, Spector
Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., John A. Macoretta, Spector Roseman &
Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice, Peter J. Mougey, Levin, Papantonio,
Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, pro hac vice, Tyler W.
Hudson, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, pro hac vice & Nathaniel L.
Orenstein, Berman Tabacco.

Wisonsin Masons' Health Care Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
Daniel E. Gustafson, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, pro hac vice, Joshua J.
Rissman, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, pro hac vice, Karla M. Gluek,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, pro hac vice, Michelle J. Looby, Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, Canadian Pacific Plaza120 South 6th Street, Suite
2600Minneapolis, MN 55402. & Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman
Tabacco.

Minnesota Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, Plaintiff, represented
by Devona L. Wells -- dwells@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac vice, Heidi M. Silton --
hmsilton@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, pro hac vice
& Karen H. Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal
Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac vice.

Minnesota Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, Plaintiff, represented
by Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman Tabacco.
AFSCME Health and Welfare Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman Tabacco.

Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund, Plaintiff, represented
by Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman Tabacco.

Ahold USA, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by David S. Nalven --
davidn@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Lauren G.
Barnes -- lauren@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Thomas M. Sobol -- tom@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP & Kiersten Taylor -- kierstent@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Allergan Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Hanstead, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana E.
Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Demetra V. Frawley, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, J.
Mark Gidley, White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E. Pace, III,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson, White &
Case, LLP, Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew Shandy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J.
Gallagher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Miles Greaves, Taus,
Cebulash & Landau, pro hac vice, Nicholas L. Wilkins, White & Case
LLP, Noah Brumfield, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Peter J.
Carney, White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Sonia Murphy, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Trisha Grant, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C.
Adam, White & Case, LLP & Nicole J. Benjamin, Adler Pollock &
Sheehan P.C..

Warner Chilcott Limited, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Celia McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana
E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, J. Mark Gidley, White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E.
Pace, III, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson,
White & Case, LLP, Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Matthew Shandy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J.
Gallagher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Noah Brumfield, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney, White & Case, LLP, pro
hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer, White & Case LLP, Trisha Grant, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP &
Nicole J. Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C..

Cadila Healthcare Limited, Defendant, represented by Andy J.
Miller, Locke Lord LLP, pro hac vice, Randall A. Hack, Locke Lord
LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen G. Huggard, Locke Lord LLP & Elizabeth
H. Kelly, Locke Lord LLP.

Allergan USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Hanstead,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Dana E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Demetra V.
Frawley, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Eileen M. Cole, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, J. Mark Gidley, White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E.
Pace, III, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson,
White & Case, LLP, Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Matthew Shandy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J.
Gallagher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas L. Wilkins,
White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Peter J. Carney, White & Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Sonia Murphy,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Thomas David Brooks, Sperling & Slater, pro hac
vice, Trisha Grant, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam,
White & Case, LLP & Nicole J. Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan
P.C..

Allergan Sales, LLC., Defendant, represented by Alison Hanstead,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Barry S. Taus, Taus, Cebulash & Landau, Caitlin
Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana E. Foster, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Demetra V. Frawley, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Eileen M. Cole, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly
Letourneau, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, J. Mark Gidley, White
& Case, LLP, pro hac vice, Jack E. Pace, III, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, John P. Bjork, Vanek Vickers & Masini PC, pro hac
vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson, White & Case, LLP, Matthew Bernstein,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Shandy, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas L. Wilkins, White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney, White & Case, LLP, pro
hac vice, Sonia Murphy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan M.
Mentzer, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Trisha Grant, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP & Nicole
J. Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C..

Allergan, PLC, Formerly known as Actavis, PLC, Defendant,
represented by Alison Hanstead, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice &
Angela Daker, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Allergan, PLC, Defendant, represented by Caitlin Cipicchio, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Eileen M. Cole, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly
Letourneau, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, J. Mark Gidley, White
& Case, LLP, Jack E. Pace, III, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Katherine A.H. Dyson, White & Case, LLP, Matthew Bernstein, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Shandy, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Nicholas L. Wilkins, White & Case LLP, Noah Brumfield, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Peter J. Carney, White & Case, LLP, pro
hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer, White & Case LLP, Trisha Grant, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP &
Nicole J. Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C..

Warner Chilcott (US), LLC, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Celia McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana
E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Demetra V. Frawley,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson, White & Case, LLP,
Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Shandy,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Noah Brumfield, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Sonia Murphy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Trisha Grant, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP, Nicole J.
Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C. & Peter J. Carney, White &
Case, LLP.

Warner Chilcott Sales (US), LLC, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Celia McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana
E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Demetra V. Frawley,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson, White & Case, LLP,
Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Shandy,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Noah Brumfield, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Sonia Murphy, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Stefan M. Mentzer,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Trisha Grant, White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP, Nicole J.
Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C. & Peter J. Carney, White &
Case, LLP.

Warner Chilcott Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alison
Hanstead, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Angela Daker, White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Caitlin Cipicchio, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Celia McLaughlin, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dana
E. Foster, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Holly Letourneau, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine A.H. Dyson, White & Case, LLP,
Matthew Bernstein, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Shandy,
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Michael J. Gallagher, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Noah Brumfield, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Stefan M. Mentzer, White & Case LLP, Trisha Grant, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin C. Adam, White & Case, LLP, Nicole J.
Benjamin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan P.C. & Peter J. Carney, White &
Case, LLP.


AMMA PRIVATE: Bannister Law Investigates Potential Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Bailey, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports
that the law firm whose class action forced Reckitt-Benckiser to
pay $3.5 million for misleading claims about Nurofen will now try
and relieve the $185.3 million of investor pain caused by
collapsed music streamer, Guvera.

Bannister Law is investigating a potential class action against
AMMA Private Equity, the firm engaged by Guvera to help it raise
capital between 2009 and 2016, as well as against the accounting
firms incentivised to funnel investor money into the business.

Mark Cohen was one of approximately 3,000 investors invested in
Guvera on the advice of accountants, and is one of two to have
joined the class action so far.

"I am a simple investor and lost $30,000 of my superannuation
savings on the poor advice of my accountants," Mr Cohen said.

Bannister Law has begun preparing its case while also seeking the
minimum seven separate investors required to allow the class
action to proceed.

"We are investigating how the money was raised and any advice
provided to consumers when considering the investment" said
Charles Bannister, principal at the Sydney-based firm.

It was too early to reveal the accounting firms through which
Mr Cohen and fellow plaintiffs invested, Mr Bannister said.

Gold Coast entrepreneur Darren Herft was the sole director and a
significant shareholder in AMMA, as well as a co-founder and
director of Guvera.

On the $185 million AMMA had raised for Guvera before its proposed
initial public offering, Guvera had paid AMMA over $22 million in
commissions, its prospectus showed.  The IPO for the heavily-
indebted company was ultimately blocked by the ASX in June 2016.

Mr Herft was due to be grilled at a public examination in the
Supreme Court, called by the liquidator of three Guvera
subsidiaries, Eddie Senatore of Deloitte.  However that hearing
has been postponed to a date to be set in December the flooding at
the Sydney Supreme Court complex.

The class action against Reckitt-Benckiser is the highest-profile
class action settled by Bannister law to date.  It has also
launched actions on behalf of Volkswagen owners after the carmaker
rigged emissions data, on behalf of owners of Fords with faulty
transmissions, and more recently on behalf of shareholders in
beleaguered timber company Quintis.

Mr Herft did not respond to requests for comment. [GN]


AMERICAN HONDA: Faces Class Action Over CVT Transmission Problem
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
consumers claim in a federal class action that Honda Civic 2016-18
models with CVT transmissions may not be in "park" when so
indicated, making them dangerous.

The case is HEATHER FLOYD, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.,
INC., a California Corporation, and HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Case No.: 17-cv-8744 (C.D.
Calif.).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
     Theodore Maya, Esq.
     AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
     10728 Lindbrook Drive
     Los Angeles, CA 90024
     Tel: (310) 474-9111
     Fax: (310) 474-8585
     Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
            tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

        -- and --

     Greg F. Coleman, Esq.
     GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
     800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
     Knoxville, TN 37929
     Tel: (865) 247-0080
     Fax: (865) 522-0049
     Email: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com

        -- and --

     Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
     J. Hunter Bryson, Esq.
     WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
     900 W. Morgan St.
     Raleigh, NC 27603
     Tel: 919-600-5000
     Fax: 919-600-5035
     Email: Dan@wbmllp.com
            Hunter@wbmllp.com


AMPLIFY SNACK: Wants Consumer Fraud Suit in Illinois Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Hutton, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that attorneys
for a snack food company are asking the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois to dismiss the case against one
of two consumers who filed a class action lawsuit against the
business over allegations of fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.

Amplify Snack Brands filed a motion to dismiss Sept. 28 over it
claims that one plaintiff fails to allege an unjust enrichment
claim and other counts.

Gayle Greenwood of Illinois and Dominique Morrison of Missouri
filed a complaint individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated May 3 in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois against Amplify Snack Brands Inc. over the
company's labeling of sugar on its chip products.

In her complaint, Greenwood claimed that she purchased chips made
by Amplify because she saw the term "evaporated cane juice" in the
ingredient list of an old label.  The company has since changed
the labels to state cane sugar.

This, according to Greenwood, led her to believe that the chips
did not contain any sugar and she would not have purchased the
product had she known otherwise.  She also claims to have paid a
premium price for the product.

However, Amplify, which produces Paqui Roasted Jalapeno and
Grilled Habanero tortilla chips, stated that its Amplify Snack
Brands do not contain any sugars despite having evaporated cane
juice, which is considered as sugar.

Amplify maintains in its motion that Greenwood stated in a state
court that she was aware that evaporated cane juice is sugar,
which means she could not claim she would not have purchased the
chips if she knew they contained sugar because she knew the
products contained sugar and purchased them anyway.

The plaintiff further maintained that under the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, Greenwood is prevented from making conflicting
representations to two different courts.

Moreover, Amplify maintains that Greenwood's admissions prove
there was no injury and, as a result, she has failed to make any
claims to support her allegations of injury and deception, key to
her case.

According to court records, Greenwood also was aware that Paqui
had changed its labels long before the threatened legal action.
The change occurred when its supplier changed the way it portrayed
its ingredients, the motion states.

Citing Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank, Amplify maintains that a plaintiff
aware of how a business works isn't likely to be harmed by the
practices going forward.

As a result, Amplify has asked the court to dismiss the case as it
regards to Greenwood's claims and dismiss her as a plaintiff.

Amplify is represented by BraunHagey & Bordon in San Francisco and
Buckley & Buckley in St. Louis, Missouri.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois case
number 3:17-cv-00464-SMY-RJD [GN]


ARS NATIONAL: $11K Attys Fees Awarded in "Mateo" FDCA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ABNER MATEO, Plaintiff, v. ARS NATIONAL
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-8434-
SCM (D. N.J.), Judge Steven C. Mannion of the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey awarded $11,260.85 in attorneys'
fees and costs to the Plaintiff.

The case arises from alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collect
Practices Act.  Mr. Mateo filed his Complaint on Nov. 10, 2016,
alleging that ARS violated the Fair Debt Act while attempting to
collect a consumer debt from him.  ARS is a debt collection firm.
Mr. Mateo alleges that on or about Jan. 18, 2016, ARS attempted to
collect on his consumer debt by issuing a collection letter, the
terms of which violated the Fair Debt Act.

On or about May 30, 2017, ARS served an Offer of Judgment under
Rule 68 which states in relevant part that the Defendant offers to
allow Judgment to be taken against it in the action in the amount
of $1,001, in damages, plus reasonable and recoverable Attorney
Fees and Costs earned through and including 14 days after the
making of the Offer as determined by the Court.  Mr. Mateo
accepted the Offer on June 13, 2017.

The parties negotiated but were unable to settle the issue of Mr.
Mateo's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and on Aug. 30,
2017, Mr. Mateo filed the present motion for attorneys' fees and
costs.  On Sept. 18, 2017, ARS filed its Opposition, and on Sept.
25, 2017, Mr. Mateo filed his Reply.

Mr. Mateo seeks an award of attorneys' fees and costs totaling
$17,065.55.60.  He asks an award of fees for Joseph K. Jones,
Esq., for 19.94 hours at $525.00 per hour -- totaling $10,468.50,
and for Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq. for 14.16 hours at $425.00 per hour
-- totaling $6,018.00.  Mr. Mateo also seeks to recover $579.05 in
litigation costs.

ARS opposes Mr. Mateo's motion on several grounds.  ARS contends
that the request is unreasonable because, among other things, Mr.
Mateo's attorneys expended an unreasonable number of hours on
certain tasks.  Additionally, ARS maintains that the Court should
not entertain Mr. Mateo's motion because it is untimely.

Judge Mannion finds that Mr. Mateo has not satisfied his burden to
establish that the claimed time is reasonable.  After a review of
the Complaint, he finds that Mr. Jones' 0.78 hours of time spent
communicating with his client to be reasonable, but of the
remaining 4.63 hours spent outlining and drafting the Summons and
Complaint, the Judge will reduce Mr. Jones' time billed by 2.13
hours.  Accordingly, Mr. Mateo can recover fees for 2.50 hours of
Mr. Jones' time billed drafting the Complaint and communicating
with his client.

The Judge further finds Mr. Mateo failed to address the objection
that form requests and objections formed the majority of Mr.
Mateo's discovery requests and responses.  Consequently, he has
not satisfied his burden to establish that the claimed time is
reasonable, and the Judge will reduce Mr. Jones and Mr. Wolf's
time billed on discovery by 50%.  Accordingly, Mr. Mateo may
recover fees for 3.87 hours of time billed by Mr. Jones, and for
3.96 hours for Mr. Wolf.

For these reasons, Judge Mannion granted in part Mr. Mateo's
motion for attorneys' fees and costs.  The Judge awarded Mr. Mateo
$10,681.80 in attorneys' fees and $579.05 in litigation costs, for
a total award in the amount of $11,260.85.  An appropriate order
will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/459JjR from Leagle.com.

ABNER MATEO, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES, Jones,
Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

ABNER MATEO, Plaintiff, represented by BENJAMIN JARRET WOLF,
Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC & GLEN H. CHULSKY.

ARS NATIONAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant, represented by PETER
GEORGE SIACHOS -- psiachos@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP &
YEVGENY ROYMISHER -- eroymisher@grsm.com -- GORDON & REES, LLP.


ASAHI BEER: McDermott Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Marc E. Sorini, Esq., of McDermott Will & Emery, in an article for
Mondaq, reports that the US District Court for the Central
District of California issued an order in the Shalikar v. Asahi
Beer U.S.A., Inc. false advertising class action case.  Like many
similar cases, Shalikar alleges that the plaintiffs, as
representatives of a purported class of consumers, were deceived
into paying more for Asahi beer because they believed the beer was
made in Japan when, in fact, the beer sold in the United States
was produced in Canada.  In the recent order, the court denied
Asahi's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (a 12(b)(6)
motion).

The Shalikar plaintiffs brought their case under California's
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law, and False
Advertising Law, and also pled common-law claims for breach of
implied warranty, fraud, intentional misrepresentation and unjust
enrichment.  Asahi beer that is sold in the United States is
brewed in Canada, and each label states "Brewed and Bottled under
Asahi's Supervision by Molson Canada, Toronto, Canada."  Each
label also states "Product of Canada" as required by US customs
regulations.  Plaintiffs alleged, however, they were deceived into
paying more for the product because the labels and packaging use
the word "Asahi," which means "morning sun" in Japanese, and the
label and packaging employs Japanese characters in several places.
Plaintiffs also produced a survey purporting to show that the
beer's packaging led 86 percent of the respondents to believe that
the product was brewed in Japan.

The court denied Asahi's motion to dismiss in its entirety. It
reasoned:

     "Although the Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau (TTB) had
approved the label, the "safe harbor doctrine" does not shield
Asahi's conduct.  Notably, the court was confronted by differing
rulings on the subject, with decisions both applying (the Cruz Bud
Light Lime-a-Rita case) and rejecting (the Hofmann Tito's Vodka
case) the safe harbor defense.  Rejecting the defense, the
Shalikar court reasoned that a TTB-issued Certificate of Label
Approval (COLA) does not have the force of law, and therefore a
fundamental prerequisite of the safe harbor defense (that the
defendant acted in accordance with a regulatory requirement) was
not present."

The court next rejected Asahi's contention that the complaint did
not allege that the labeling and packaging of Asahi beer was false
or misleading to a reasonable consumer.  Examining the contentions
of the plaintiffs and the counter-arguments of Asahi, which
pointed to the clear disclosures on the label, the court concluded
that resolving the dispute could not be determined as a matter of
law (g., Asahi would need evidentiary support, presumably at the
summary judgement stage).  The court also credited the plaintiffs'
survey.

The court also denied Asahi's motion to dismiss the implied
warranty claim.  Asahi argued that because of the US three-tier
distribution system, a warranty claim was precluded by
California's requirement that "vertical contractual privity" exist
between a plaintiff and a defendant for such a claim to succeed.
Examining case law on the subject, the Shalikar court held that
the pleadings justified applying an exception to the privity rule
where the plaintiff is the "intended beneficiary" of the alleged
warranties at issue.

Finally, the Shalikar court rejected the motion to dismiss the
remaining common law claims, referring back to its conclusion that
the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Asahi's labeling and
packaging could mislead a reasonable consumer.

The Shalikar ruling provides another reminder that producers need
to remain vigilant about their US marketing.  Pro-plaintiff
decisions like this one often precipitate settlements that are
lucrative to the lawyers bringing such cases, suggesting that the
"wave" of false advertising suits engulfing the alcohol beverage
industry will not likely go away soon.

The Shalikar decision also includes some important fodder for
further consideration. First, the court's conclusion that COLAs do
not have the force of law can have implications far beyond the
class action context.  Indeed, one would expect TTB to weigh in
against this notion should Shalikar be taken up on appeal. Second,
in permitting a claim relying solely on vague allusions to a
country-of-origin (Japanese characters, etc.), the Shalikar
decision seems decidedly at odds with a number of other recent
decisions.  If accepted, this aspect of the decision is an
extremely troubling one for brand owners, as a central point of
"deception" alleged by the Shalikar plaintiffs is the use of the
Asahi brand name itself. Third, the effective use of survey
evidence by the plaintiffs may portend a trend in future
litigations.

As a single ruling by a US district court, Shalikar does not, of
course, represent the last word on these subjects.  Moreover,
given the troubling implications of some of its reasoning, Asahi
may be more likely to continue litigating this case than many
other defendants have been after losing at the motion to dismiss
stage.  But it is increasingly clear that class actions like this
one will continue to plague the alcohol beverage industry for the
foreseeable future. [GN]


AUNT NANCY INC: Faces "Sofia" Suit in E. Dist. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aunt Nancy Inc. The
case is styled as Daniel Sofia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aunt Nancy Inc. and Aunt
Nellie, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-06996-LDW-AKT (E.D.
N.Y., November 30, 2017).

Aunt Nancy Inc. is an American company registered in the
jurisdiction of New York NY State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James E. Bahamonde, Esq.
   James E. Bahamonde, P.C.
   2501 Jody Court
   North Bellmore, NY 11710
   Tel: (516) 783-9662
   Fax: (646) 435-4376
   Email: James@civilrightsNY.com


AUTO CAR: Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The Sacramento labor law attorneys at Blumenthal, Nordrehaug &
Bhowmik on Nov. 15 filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Auto
Car, Inc., failed to correctly classify their California auto
Service Advisor employees as "non-exempt", resulting in alleged
unpaid overtime wages.  The Auto Car, Inc., class action lawsuit,
Case No. SCV0040342 is currently pending in the Placer County
Superior Court for the State of California.

According to the lawsuit, Auto Car, Inc., allegedly fails to
accurately classify their auto Service Advisor employees as
"non-exempt" employees and due to this misclassification,
PLAINTIFF and the other CALIFORNIA CLASS Members are not provided
with overtime compensation and other benefits required by law as a
result of being classified as "exempt" by DEFENDANT .  As a matter
of company policy, practice, and procedure, Auto Car, Inc., has
uniformly, unlawfully, unfairly and/or deceptively classified
every Service Advisor as exempt from overtime pay and other
related benefits, failed to pay the required overtime compensation
and otherwise failed to comply with all applicable labor laws with
respect to these Service Advisors.

Furthermore, the Complaint claims that Auto Car, Inc., is in
violation of Cal. Lab. Code Secs. 226.7 and 512, by allegedly
failing to provide Plaintiff and the other members of the
California Class with all legally required off-duty, uninterrupted
thirty (30) minute meal breaks and the legally required paid rest
breaks.

If you would like to know more about the Auto Car, Inc. lawsuit,
please contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw today by calling
(800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal, Nordrehaug and Bhowmik is a California employment law
firm that dedicates its practice to helping employees, fight back
against unfair business practices, including violations of the
California Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. The firm has
offices located in San Diego, Los Angeles, Riverside, San
Francisco, Sacramento and Chicago. [GN]


AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Certifies Class in Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Civil Action No. 13-11157 (D. Mass.), Judge Denise J.
Casper of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and accepted their
proposed class period.

The Plaintiffs are shareholders of Aveo, a biopharmaceutical
company focused on discovering, developing, and commercializing
cancer therapies.  Plaintiff Paul Sanders filed a class action
complaint on May 9, 2013.  Plaintiffs Robert Levine and William
Windham subsequently filed the first amended complaint, Windham
alleging that the Defendants violated Section 10 (b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder ("Count I"),
and Section 20 of the Exchange Act ("Count II").

The Court allowed the Defendants' motion to dismiss that pleading
without prejudice on March 20, 2015.  The Plaintiffs filed a
second amended complaint on April 17, 2015.  On Nov. 18, 2015, the
Court allowed the Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint and judgment was entered for the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs later moved to set aside that judgment, relying
upon newly discovered evidence from a complaint filed by the SEC.
D. 96.  The Court allowed the motion and vacated the judgment.
The Plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint ("TAC"), the
operative complaint, on Feb. 2, 2017.

The Plaintiffs have moved for class certification.  The Plaintiffs
have brought the class action suit on behalf of all persons other
than Defendants who purchased AVEO common stock between May 16,
2012 and May 1, 2013.  The Defendants do not dispute class
certification, but do dispute the class period proposed by the
Plaintiffs.

Judge Casper finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule
23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) requirements.  She also accepts the
Plaintiffs' proposed class period.  The Judge agrees with the
Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs plausibly allege for purposes of class
certification that cure of the omissions in the market did not
occur until the May 2, 2013 ODAC panel meeting.  Accordingly,
their theory is that the purchasers who purchased stock before
this time paid an inflated price, thereby injured, by the
Defendants' material omissions even if there were some partial
cure by the April 30, 2013 briefing materials.  The Plaintiffs
focus their allegations relating to the release of the
presentation on issues relating to the request, and ignoring of
that request, for Aveo to conduct a second study, as well as
methodological criticisms relating to the location of study sites
and the study's unproven hypothesis.

In other words, the Judge finds that by offering their own view of
the outcome of the Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee ("ODAC")
meeting as it pertained to the likelihood of approval, the
Defendants created a link between approval, over which any news
was material to the market, and the actual outcome of the meeting.
The FDA and ODAC panel's full view of the new drug application
("NDA") could not become clear to the market until the ODAC
meeting, generally the only forum in which the FDA publicly states
its views on interactions with applicant companies like Aveo or
clinical trials.

If disclosures fail to convey the extent of a piece of
information, they cannot be considered curative for class
certification purposes.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement as to the class
period.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Casper granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and accepted their proposed class
period.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/0Ubw43 from Leagle.com.

Paul Sanders, Plaintiff, represented by Edward F. Haber --
ehaber@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP.

Paul Sanders, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Adam M.
Stewart -- astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Joshua
B. Silverman -- jbsilverman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Louis C. Ludwig -- lcludwig@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro
hac vice & Patrick V. Dahlstrom -- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Robert Levine, Plaintiff, represented by Edward F. Haber, Shapiro
Haber & Urmy LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Omar Jafri, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Adam M. Stewart,
Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Joshua B. Silverman, Pomerantz LLP, pro
hac vice, Louis C. Ludwig, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick
V. Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

William Windham, Plaintiff, represented by Edward F. Haber,
Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro
hac vice, Omar Jafri, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Adam M.
Stewart, Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Joshua B. Silverman, Pomerantz
LLP, pro hac vice, Louis C. Ludwig, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice &
Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Christine Krause, Plaintiff, represented by Theodore M. Hess-
Mahan, Hutchings -- thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com --
Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP.

Aveo Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel
Willey -- dan.willey@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr LLP, Eric D. Wolkoff -- eric.wolkoff@wilmerhale.com
-- Wilmer Hale LLP, Jeffrey Olshan -- jeff.olshan@wilmerhale.com -
- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Jessica R. Lisak --
jessica.lisak@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Michael G. Bongiorno -- michael.bongiorno@wilmerhale.com
-- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter A. Spaeth --
peter.spaeth@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Hale LLP & William H. Paine
-- william.paine@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Hale LLP.

Tuan Ha-Ngoc, Defendant, represented by James R. Carroll --
james.carroll@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Daniel Willey, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP,
Eric D. Wolkoff, Wilmer Hale LLP, Jeffrey Olshan, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Jessica R. Lisak, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Michael G. Bongiorno, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Michael S. Hines, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Peter A. Spaeth, Wilmer Hale LLP, Sara
J. van Vliet, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & William
H. Paine, Wilmer Hale LLP.

David N. Johnston, Defendant, represented by John F. Sylvia --
JSylvia@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo,
PC, Daniel Willey, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP,
Emily B. Kanstroom, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo,
PC, Eric D. Wolkoff, Wilmer Hale LLP, Jeffrey Olshan, Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Jessica R. Lisak, Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Jessica C. Sergi, Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC, Michael G. Bongiorno,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter A. Spaeth, Wilmer
Hale LLP & William H. Paine, Wilmer Hale LLP.

William Slichenmyer, Defendant, represented by Daniel P. Tighe,
Prince Lobel Tye LLP, Daniel Willey, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, Eric D. Wolkoff, Wilmer Hale LLP, Jeffrey Olshan,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Jeffrey Jackson Pyle,
Prince Lobel Tye LLP, Jessica R. Lisak, Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr LLP, Michael G. Bongiorno, Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter A. Spaeth, Wilmer Hale LLP & William H.
Paine, Wilmer Hale LLP.

Ronald DePinho, Defendant, represented by Michael G. Bongiorno,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter A. Spaeth, Wilmer
Hale LLP, William H. Paine, Wilmer Hale LLP & Eric D. Wolkoff,
Wilmer Hale LLP.

Scott Principi, Movant, represented by David Pastor, Pastor Law
Office, LLP.

Rodney A. Samaan, Movant, represented by Theodore M. Hess-Mahan,
Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP.


BAE SYSTEMS: $2.9MM Settlement in "Nunez" Labor Suit Has Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EDUARDO NUNEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BAE SYSTEMS SAN DIEGO SHIP
REPAIR INC., a California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-2162 JLS (NLS) (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Janis S. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court, for the
Southern District of California granted (i) the Parties' Joint
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; (ii) the
Class Counsel's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Incentive
Fees; and the Parties' Motion to Substitute Plaintiff Bryan De
Anda as the sole Named Plaintiff.

Nunez filed a class action suit seeking compensation on behalf of
all non-exempt employees of Defendant BAE Systems San Diego Ship
Repair, Inc. ("BAE SDSR") for unpaid wages and penalties, as well
as other violations of California law.  The proposed class
includes all non-exempt employees at BAE SDSR who worked at any
time during the period May 27, 2012 through Oct. 13, 2016.

The Parties entered into extensive pre-suit negotiations for the
purpose of settling their disputes.  The mediation was successful
and resulted in a non-reversionary settlement of $2.9 million,
though he Defendant maintains its complete denial of wrongdoing.

On Feb. 13, 2017, the Court issued an Order (i) conditionally
certifying the settlement class action; (ii) preliminarily
approving the proposed settlement; (iii) approving the notice to
be sent to the Class; and (iv) setting a final approval hearing
date.  On March 15, 2017, the Court-appointed the Settlement
Administrator mailed the Class Notice to 1,970 Settlement Class
Members.  The Settlement Class Members were advised that they
could object to or opt-out of the Settlement by no later than May
15, 2017.

Then, on May 12, 2017, the Court received a contested motion to
substitute attorney filed by Plaintiff Nunez.  At the status
conference, the Court granted Nunez's motion to substitute
attorneys from the law firm Hewgill & Cobb to represent him in his
individual capacity as an objector to the Settlement (not as new
Class Counsel), and also requested briefing on the question of
whether Nunez could continue to serve as the sole named Class
Representative given his eleventh-hour objections to the
Settlement.  The Court held a final fairness hearing on Nov. 7,
2017.

On Oct. 24, 2017, the Parties (the Class Members and the
Defendant) filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Joint
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.  The Parties
now present to the Court Joint Motions for an Order: (i)
reaffirming the Court's certification of the Settlement Class;
(ii) granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement; (iii)
approving of and awarding attorney's fees, costs, and a Class
Representative service award; and (iv) removing Nunez as named
Class Representative and substituting De Anda in his place.
They've also filed a supplemental brief addressing the responses
from the Class Members after the supplemental notice.

BAE SDSR stands to pay a Maximum Settlement Amount of $2.9
million.  It will automatically make Settlement payments to the
Class Members (unless they have chosen to opt out) based on the
following formula:

     a. After deducting from the Maximum Settlement Amount the
Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs for the Class Counsel, a
payment for the Settlement Administrator's fees and expenses,
payment to the State of California Labor and Workforce Development
Agency ("LWDA"), the employer's portion of FICA, FUTA, and all
other state and federal payroll taxes on the wage portion of the
Settlement payments to the Class Members, an additional flat
amount of $250 for each employee separated from employment during
the Covered Period, and a Court-approved service payment to the
Class Representative(s), the entirety of the remaining funds will
automatically be distributed to the payment-eligible Settlement
Class Members.

     b. Payment-eligible Class Members will receive a payment
based on each person's number of compensable work-weeks, which
will be all weeks worked as a non-exempt employee by the Payment-
Eligible Class Members since May 12, 2012.  The dollars per
Compensable Work Week will be calculated by dividing the total
Compensable Work Weeks for the entire Settlement Class into the
Net Settlement Amount.  That amount (in dollars per week) will be
multiplied by the number of Compensable Work Weeks for each
payment-eligible Class Member.

The check will escheat to the State of California or any other
State having jurisdiction over the Class Member's assets if the
Class Member fails to cash his or her check within 120 days after
it is mailed.

Judge Sammartino finds certification of the Settlement Class
proper under Rule 23(b)(3).  Accordingly, he reaffirmed
certification of the Settlement Class for settlement purposes
only.  He granted the Parties' Final Approval Motion regarding the
Rule 23 Settlement.

The Judge concludes that the Class Counsel's requested attorney's
fees of $725,000, which constitutes 25% of the Settlement Fund,
are reasonable and therefore granted the Class Counsel's Fee
Motion in this regard.  Additionally, he finds that the Class
Counsel's requested reimbursement for costs in the amount of
$14,995.34 is validly recoverable and therefore granted the Class
Counsel's Fee Motion in this regard.

Judge Sammartino in his discretion determines that the requested
Service Awards are reasonable on the facts of this particular
case.  Given the foregoing, he granted the Class Counsel's Fee
Motion regarding Class Representative Service Awards and awarded
$3,000 to Nunez and $2,000 to De Anda.

Finally, with respect to the Parties' Joint Motion to Substitute
Class Representative, the Judge finds that Nunez has failed to
demonstrate that De Anda is an inadequate class representative or
that his claims and defenses are otherwise not typical of the
claims and defenses of the class.  Rather, the record shows that
De Anda is informed and willing to act in the best interests of
the Class.  Accordingly, he finds that De Anda's claims and
defenses are typical of those of the Class under Rule 23(a)(3) and
that he adequately represents the Class in accordance with Rule
23(a)(4).  Thus, the Judge granted the Parties' Motion to
Substitute.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/CBYjiP from Leagle.com.

Eduardo Nunez, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander I. Dychter --
alex@dychterlaw.com, Dychter Law Offices, APC, Efaon Cobb, Law
Office of Hewgill and Cobb & Justin Greer Hewgill, Law Office of
Hewgill and Cobb.

BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair Inc., Defendant, represented by
Mary Dollarhide -- marydollarhide@paulhastings.com -- DLA Piper
LLP & Taylor H. Wemmer -- taylor.wemmer@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper
LLP.


BAKER HUGHES: Judge OKs $3MM Drillers' Class Action Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal judge approved a $3 million class action settlement on
Nov. 27 against Baker Hughes, for misclassifying drillers as
independent contractors.  The settlement includes about $42,000
per class member, and $750,000 in attorneys' fees.

The case is MARC MCCULLOCH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAKER HUGHES
INTEQ DRILLING FLUIDS, INC., et al., Defendant, No. 1:16-cv-00157-
DAD-JLT (E.D. Calif.).


BARBARDOS: Non-Nationals File "Right to Vote" Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Rachelle Agard, writing for Nation News, reports that Attorney
Wilfred Abrahams must file paperwork to the Supreme Court,
treating the civil suit brought by three non-nationals for the
right to vote in Barbados' next general election as a class action
suit.

This was confirmed by co-counsel Bryan Weekes, who was speaking to
the media at the Supreme Court after a preliminary hearing before
Chief Justice Sir Marston Gibson in chambers in the No. 1 Supreme
Court on Nov. 15.

"The court made orders joining Mr [Gregory] Nicholls' clients to
ours, and also made an order joining the Electoral and Boundaries
Commission as a defendant . . . This means the case is not limited
to the named parties, but applies to everybody in a class which
the decision applies," he explained.

By descent

Mr. Nicholls originally represented Sharon Juliet Edgecombe-
Miller, who holds British citizenship as a result of being born in
Montserrat and is a Grenadian by descent; and Jamaican attorney
Michelle Melissa Russell, while Mr. Weekes and Abrahams stood for
Grenadian Shireene Ann Mathlin-Tulloch.

"The court gave us certain directions to file affidavits and legal
arguments, and we're returning to the court on December 14.
"The court will decide whether the matter is ready . . . as we
prepare final arguments with a hope to resolve the issues, or if
other procedural matters need to be taken care of at that time.
"But the court is [fully] seized to the issues, meaning it now
knows the basic position of both sets of parties, and hopefully we
will have a resolution to the matter sooner rather than later,"
Mr. Weekes said.

Opportunity

"The court has given the respondents the opportunity to put their
affidavit evidence, or their side of the story, in.
"Once both sides file their legal arguments, the court will decide
whether it has enough information to proceed to attempt to make a
decision in the matter or not.  If it does, then great; if not,
then the court will give us further directions if necessary.
"The point is, the court is treating the matter with the urgency
it deserves, and hopefully by the end of the year we will have a
decision determining these people's right to vote in the upcoming
election, and all other people who fall into that category,
whether or not they will be allowed to participate in the next
general election," he said.

The three are contending that as Commonwealth citizens, having
legally resided in Barbados for more than three years in each
case, they are entitled to be registered as electors pursuant to
Section 7 of the Representation of the People Act.

Ms. Russell said the right to vote already existed by virtue of
the act, which they were trying to have enforced.

"What the Chief Electoral Officer has done is that he has blocked
us from being registered as voters even though the law allows us
to be registered.  They have implemented a policy that stops us
from doing just that," she said.

"We've never been allowed to register. Section 7:1 sets out the
people who qualify to be registered as electors - Commonwealth
citizens who have resided here for three years or more, Barbadian
citizens and persons over the age of 18.

"This means we qualify to go and register as electors, but when we
try they say no. Even after reminding them of what the act says,
they said they won't register us," Ms. Russell added. [GN]


BARNEYS NEW YORK: "Swartz" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Helen Swartz, individually, on her behalf and on behalf of all
other individuals similarly situated v. Barneys New York, Inc.,
Case No. 1:17-cv-08974 (S.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017), seeks
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and for
damages pursuant to the N.Y. Exec. Law Section 296 and the New
York Civil Rights Law.

Plaintiff Helen Swartz is a Florida resident, is sui juris, and
qualifies as an individual with disabilities as defined by the
ADA. Ms. Swartz has multiple sclerosis and is mobility impaired,
and uses an electric scooter to ambulate.

Defendant owns, leases, leases to, or operates places of public
accommodation known as Barneys New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lawrence A. Fuller, Esq.
      FULLER, FULLER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
      12000 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 502
      North Miami, FL 33181
      Tel: (305) 891-5199
      Fax: (305) 893-9505
      E-mail: Lfuller@fullerfuller.com


BAYER AG: Court Grants Statewide Class Certification in "Farar"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ILANA FARAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAYER AG, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-04601-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William H.
Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification,
except their request for a nationwide class, and denied the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs bring suit as individuals as well as on behalf of a
nationwide class and three statewide classes in California,
Florida, and New York.  They seek equitable relief, including an
injunction enjoining defendants from making such claims,
restitution, and/or disgorgement, as well as damages.

They allege (i) unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business
practices in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law on
behalf of Ms. Farar and the California class; (ii) unlawful and
deceptive business practices in violation of California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act on behalf of Ms. Farar and the California
class; (iii) false or misleading advertising in violation of
California law on behalf of Ms. Farar and the California class;
(iv) unfair or deceptive practices in violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act on behalf of Ms. Lopez
and the Florida class; (v) misleading advertising in violation of
Florida Statute Section 817.41 on behalf of Ms. Lopez and the
Florida class; (vi) deceptive acts and practices in violation of
the New York General Business Law Section 349 on behalf of Ms.
Cosgrove and the New York class; (vii) false advertising in
violation of the New York General Business Law Section 350 on
behalf of Ms. Cosgrove and the New York class; and (viii) unjust
enrichment/quasi-contract on behalf of the nationwide class.

Fact discovery closed on Nov. 9, 2016.  The Plaintiffs filed their
Motion for Class Certification on Jan. 11, 2017.  In that motion,
they seek certification of these four classes:

     a. Nationwide: All persons in the United States who purchased
Bayer One A Day Supplements in the United States that contained
one or more Claims from Oct. 15, 2010 until the date of
certification ("Class Period").

     b. California: All persons in California who purchased Bayer
One A Day Supplements in California that contained one or more
Claims during the Class Period.

     c. Florida: All persons in Florida who purchased Bayer One A
Day Supplements in Florida that contained one or more Claims
during the Class Period.

     d. New York: All persons in New York who purchased Bayer One
A Day Supplements in New York that contained one or more Claims
during the Class Period.

The Defendants opposed that motion and contemporaneously filed a
motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2017.  Judge Orrick heard
argument on Oct. 18, 2017.

Judge Orrick granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, except their request for a nationwide class,
because they meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  The
Plaintiffs fail to meet this burden.  Because the issue may be
raised again, however, the Judge also notes that the Defendants
too fail to meet their burden to show that foreign law, rather
than California law, should apply to class members' claims.

Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. places the burden on the
Defendants to fulfill the three-step governmental interest test,
which the Defendants in Mazza did by exhaustively detailing the
ways in which California law differs from the laws of the other
jurisdictions in which class members reside.  The Defendants
instead rely on Mazza to argue only that these state consumer
protection laws diverge on key questions including scienter and
reliance.  While this may or may not suffice to establish that the
relevant laws differ, the Defendants fail all together to address
the next two steps of the inquiry.  Should the Plaintiffs be able
to show significant contacts so as to satisfy due process in the
future, the Defendants should be prepared to more thoroughly
explain why foreign law should apply to class members' claims.

Judge Orrick denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
because material facts are in dispute.  The Defendants have failed
to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether their claims are false or misleading.  They offer the
expert report of Dr. Jeffrey R. Blumberg to support their claim
that One A Day multivitamins do support heart health, immunity,
and physical energy, but his report does not address Dr. Blonz's
argument that the average American is not biochemically deficient,
and therefore derives no measureable benefit from the
multivitamins.  Even if he did, however, such conflicting evidence
would merely create a genuine issue of material fact inappropriate
for summary adjudication.

A further Case Management Conference to set the trial and
remainder of the case schedule is set for Dec. 19, 2017 at 2:00
p.m.  The Joint Case Management Statement is due on Dec. 12, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/JZDb65 from Leagle.com.

Ilana Farar, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence D. King --
lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Ilana Farar, Plaintiff, represented by Lauren I. Dubick, Kaplan
Fox Kilsheimer LLP, pro hac vice, Linda M. Fong --
lfong@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew Joseph
Zevin, Stanley Law Group & Robert N. Kaplan --
rkaplan@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Kilsheimer & Fox LLP.

Andrea Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Linda M. Fong, Kaplan Fox
& Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew Joseph Zevin, Stanley Law Group &
Laurence D. King, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Rosanne Cosgrove, Plaintiff, represented by Linda M. Fong, Kaplan
Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew Joseph Zevin, Stanley Law Group &
Laurence D. King, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.

Bayer AG, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Sandrock --
RSANDROCK@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, LLP, Benjamin Milton Mundel
-- BMUNDEL@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, pro hac vice, Cara Rafaela
Viglucci Lopez, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Eugene A. Schoon
-- ESCHOON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan
Fredrick Cohn -- JFCOHN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac
vice & Paul Joseph Ray, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice.

Bayer Corporation, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Sandrock,
Sidley Austin, LLP, Benjamin Milton Mundel, Sidley Austin, pro hac
vice, Cara Rafaela Viglucci Lopez, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac
vice, Eugene A. Schoon, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan
Fredrick Cohn, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice & Paul Joseph Ray,
Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice.

Bayer HealthCare LLC, Defendant, represented by Ryan M. Sandrock,
Sidley Austin, LLP, Benjamin Milton Mundel, Sidley Austin, pro hac
vice, Cara Rafaela Viglucci Lopez, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac
vice, Eugene A. Schoon, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan
Fredrick Cohn, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice & Paul Joseph Ray,
Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice.


BFT LP: Court Denies Bid to Strike/Dismiss AMP TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jay C. Zainey of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and/or Motion to Strike the case styled AMP AUTOMOTIVE, LLC v. B F
T, LP d/b/a GREAT AMERICAN BUSINESS PRODUCTS SECTION A(5), Civil
Action No. 17-5667 (E.D. La.).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited faxes advertising
its products and services.  AMP categorizes Great American's
actions as a "Junk Fax Campaign."  AMP alleges that Great American
blasted thousands of junk faxes in direct violation of the Act and
the regulations promulgated under the Act by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC").  AMP specifically provides 15
allegedly unsolicited faxes that were sent as advertisements from
Great American to AMP.

AMP further alleges that Great American sent junk faxes without
complying with opt-out notice requirements in violation of the Act
and the FCC's regulations promulgated thereunder.  Moreover, it
argues that Great American is precluded from raising an
established business relationship defense because the opt-out
language provided at the bottom of the advertisements is not
compliant with FCC regulations.  Therefore, the established
business relationship defense would not apply to Great American.

AMP also seeks to bring this suit as a class action.  Moreover, it
seeks to be the Named Representative of the Plaintiff Class and
seeks an incentive award for its efforts as class representative.
AMP also seeks statutory damages of $500 for each violation of the
Act, trebling of damages if the Court finds fit, and injunctive
relief prohibiting Great American from continuing to send
allegedly non-compliant fax advertisements.

Great American brings the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on the ground that AMP has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  Great American also brings a motion
to strike AMP's proposed class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
on the ground that AMP's class definition is inherently flawed.

While Judge Zainey recognizes the Defendant's alleged
misunderstanding, he says dismissing the case at this stage in the
proceedings would be improper.  Whether there was or was not an
established business relationship between the parties at the time
of each allegedly unsolicited fax is a fact-intensive inquiry not
suitable for this 12(b)(6) motion.  The relationship between the
parties is certainly contested and the facts put forth by the
Defendant show an understandable confusion regarding the intended
recipient of the faxes.  However, at this stage in the
proceedings, the Judge says he must view the facts in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff.  He finds that the Plaintiff's
Complaint does not concede that there was an established business
relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.  Therefore,
at this time, the Judge does not find Defendant falls under the
exception provided by 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(C).

Judge Zainey disagrees with the Defendant's argument that a class
defined as those subscribers of phone numbers who it sent fax
transmissions to is administratively unfeasible.  In Fairway
Medical Center LLC v. McGowan Enterprises, Inc., Judge Fallon
addressed the same issue regarding a defendant's motion to strike
plaintiff's class definition.  In Fairway Medical, Judge Fallon
found that the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's class
definition was premature.  Specifically, Judge Fallon found that
the issues of whether the faxes sent by the defendant were
solicited and whether the faxes complied with the Act and FCC
regulations were issues of merit, not of improper pleading.
Therefore, the court denied defendant's arguments as premature.

Judge Zainey agrees with the cases outlined.  The Plaintiff's
class definition is not necessarily administratively unfeasible.
The Defendant's remaining arguments contending the Plaintiff is
not part of the proposed class and that the class is an
impermissible "fail-safe" class are better suited as merit issues,
not of improper pleading.

For these reasons, Judge Zainey denied the Defendant's Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and its Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)
Motion to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order and Reasons is
available at https://is.gd/joUYoL from Leagle.com.

AMP Automotive, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by George Brian Recile
-- GBR@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray,
Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC.

AMP Automotive, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Arthur
Sherman -- MAS@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman, Williams,
Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LC, Patrick R. Follette --
PRF@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile,
Stakelum & Hayes, LLC, Preston Lee Hayes -- PLH@CHEHARDY.COM --
Chehardy, Sherman, Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC
& Ryan Paul Monsour -- RPM@CHEHARDY.COM -- Chehardy, Sherman,
Williams, Murray, Recile, Stakelum & Hayes, LLC.

B F T, LP, Defendant, represented by Kimberley M. Spurlock,
Spurlock & Associates, PC, pro hac vice, Katharine Rachael
Colletta -- colletta@chaffe.com -- Chaffe McCall LLP & Misty A.
Hataway-Cone, Spurlock & Associates, PC, pro hac vice.


BMW: Faces Engine-Defect Class Action in New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------
Linda Chiem and John Kennedy, writing for Law360, report that BMW
is facing yet another class action in New Jersey federal court
over engine defect claims, this one alleging that problems with
certain models' chain assemblies caused poor acceleration or
sudden engine failure, according to a complaint filed on Nov. 13.

Eight drivers accused BMW of North America LLC and its German
parent of concealing inherent design defects in the engines of
model years 2012-15 BMW vehicles with the N20 and N26 direct
injection turbocharged engines, including certain X3 SUVs, 528xi
sedans and 328i sedans.  The drivers are seeking to represent a
nationwide class of consumers as well as subclasses of consumers
in New York, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, Texas, Oregon
and Wisconsin.

They claim that all of those vehicles are equipped with engines
containing two components -- the primary and secondary chain
assemblies -- that are prone to failure, resulting in poor
performance and limited ability to accelerate or even sudden
catastrophic engine failure.

"Indeed, BMW touts itself as the manufacturer of 'the ultimate
driving machine,'" the complaint says.  "In this case, class
members have been left with a machine that ultimately will not
drive!"

The suit focuses on a different alleged engine defect than the one
at issue in another New Jersey case targeting BMW.  That one
concerns rod bearings, main bearings, the clearance distance
between engine rods, and allegedly insufficient engine lubrication
in BMW's S65 engine.

In the new case, the drivers allege that the primary chain, often
called the timing chain, has a plastic guide assembly made mostly
of a defective polycarbonate composition that becomes brittle and
breaks apart, lodging in the crankshaft drive sprockets and
causing the chain to break or skip and damage or destroy the
engine.

The secondary chain, which connects the oil pump and balance shaft
assemblies to the crankshaft, also fails prematurely because it's
made of insufficient materials that are unable to prevent high-
resistance wear, the suit alleges.  This causes the chain to
stretch out prematurely, damaging the chain sprocket and causing
chain slippage, the drivers say.

The drivers claimed BMW had knowledge of the defect going back to
late 2012, but still marketed and sold the cars to consumers
without ever telling dealers about the problem.

They say BMW had a heads up on the defect because of the extensive
number of warranty claims involving the timing chain assemblies,
customer complaints, field investigations, communications with
dealers and service technicians, discussions in online forums,
several redesign attempts and the fact that the identical timing
chain components in predecessor models had experienced failure,
according to the complaint.

Specifically, BMW had to have known about the problem by late 2012
because the company began to redesign the chain tensioner without
revealing the problem to consumers.  Indeed, there have been five
redesigns of the chain assemblies for the engines in the class
vehicles dating to 2013 and in some instances the parts were used
for less than one model year, the suit claims.

"The defendant deliberately ignored the primary and secondary
chain assembly defects for years to avoid the costs associated
with remedying these defects while the class vehicles were still
under warranty," the complaint says.  "Now defendant is attempting
to conceal the primary chain defects by changing the primary chain
assembly components for the purported purpose of remedying the
secondary chain assembly noise."

The named plaintiffs bought pre-owned, demo or brand-new BMW
vehicles whose timing or secondary chains failed and caused the
cars to stall, prompted the engines to make knocking or whining
noises, trigger warning lights, or completely break down,
according to the complaint.

Some of the plaintiffs spent as much as $10,000 out of pocket to
have the engine replaced, the suit says.

The suit asserts claims for violations of New Jersey's Consumer
Fraud Act, common law fraud, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty, breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, as well as violations of Massachusetts'
Consumer Protection Law, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Action, the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Oregon
Unlawful Trade Practices Act, and violations of New York and
California consumer protection laws.

Meanwhile, in the other case, BMW hasn't been able to shake
allegations of knowingly selling vehicles with faulty engines.

U.S. District Judge Madeline Cox Arleo ruled in July that the
drivers in that suit, who allege certain defects can cause
catastrophic engine failure, had done enough to back up their
claims that the German automaker should have known about the
problem years ago.

The judge found that the plaintiffs in that case, Afzal v. BMW of
North America, sufficiently asserted claims for fraud and
violations of California consumer protection laws by pointing to
various online posts discussing the alleged defect and providing
evidence that the engine design deviated far enough below industry
standard that BMW of North America LLC and its German parent
should have been tipped off.

Representatives for BMW could not be immediately reached for
comment on Nov. 14.

The plaintiffs in the instant suit are represented by Bruce H.
Nagel of Nagel Rice LLP and attorney Joseph Santoli.

Counsel information for BMW was not immediately available on
Nov. 14.

The case is Chris Williams et al. v. BMW of North America LLC et
al., Case No. 2:17-cv-11567 (D.N.J.).  The case is assigned to
Judge William H. Walls.  The case was filed November 13, 2017.
[GN]


BORDER TRANSFER: Court Certifies Former Drivers' Class
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned MARCOS DaSILVA and
MATTEUS FERREIRA, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. BORDER TRANSFER OF MA, INC., and PATRICK
McCLUSKEY, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-11205 (D. Mass.).

Plaintiffs DaSilva and Ferreira used to work as delivery drivers
for Defendant Border Transfer.  They claim that Border Transfer
improperly treated them as independent contractors when they were,
in fact, employees, and that, as a result, Border Transfer
unlawfully deducted certain business expenses from their pay under
the Massachusetts Wage Act.

The proposed class is defined as follows:

   All individuals who (1) entered into a Contract Carrier
Agreement (or similar agreement) directly or through a business
entity; (2) personally provided delivery services for Border
Transfer on a full-time basis in Massachusetts; and (3) who were
classified as independent contractors, at any time since June 23,
2013.

This class definition excludes so-called secondary drivers, who
provided delivery services for Border Transfer under contracts
between Border Transfer and other persons, and so-called absentee
contractors, who held contracts with Border Transfer but did not
drive a truck themselves.

The record does not make it clear how many of the 59 contractors
utilized by Border Transfer during that time period personally
delivered for Border Transfer on a full-time basis but it is
certainly not all 59.  Thus, at least five of the 59 contractors
would be excluded from the proposed class definition.  Regardless,
it is likely that more than 40 of Border Transfer's contractors
fall within the class definition.

Defendants argue that individualized evidence is required to
determine whether Massachusetts law applies to all putative class
members' claims.  The Court finds that because the proposed class
members' relationship with Border Transfer centered on the
Westwood facility, where they met every morning to get
instructions, Massachusetts wage law applies even to drivers from
out of state who spent much of their time delivering out of state.
Thus, the Massachusetts Wage Act would apply to all of the members
of the putative class, and there is no choice-of-law obstacle to
certification.

Although the class definition avoids the individualized Chambers
inquiry into applicability of the Wage Act, Plaintiffs still must
show that Border Transfer took deductions that were improper under
the Wage Act.  The plaintiffs argue that Border Transfer took the
same types of deductions from each of its contractors and that
those deductions are outlined in the CCAs and other Border
Transfer documents. The defendants do not seem to contest this
point. The propriety of deductions under the Wage Act can be
resolved on common evidence.  Commonality is met for a class of
drivers who personally drove for Border Transfer on a full-time
basis.

The Defendant points out that DaSilva's business only operated one
truck, that his business was formed when he signed the CCA with
Border Transfer, and that some of his testimony is contradicted by
testimony of others thus casting doubt on his credibility.  None
of these problems defeats typicality.  DaSilva and Ferreira's
experiences, although different in some ways from each other's,
are reasonably coextensive with those of other motor carriers who
contracted with Border Transfer.  All of the motor carriers are
pursuing the same Wage Act theory.

The plaintiffs' attorneys are highly experienced in class-action
employment litigation and specifically in Wage Act
misclassification claims. The defendants do not contest their
qualifications.

The plaintiffs must take the following steps to prevail: (1) show
that Massachusetts is the correct choice of law; (2) show that
while they signed CCAs with Border Transfer through their
corporate entities, they are still entitled to protection as
individuals under the Wage Act; (3) prove misclassification by
showing that one of the two control tests in Prong A is not met or
that the independently established business test in Prong C is not
met; (4) show that deductions were taken that were unlawful for
employees under the Wage Act; and (5) show a measure of damages.

Steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 in that chain appear to be provable by common
evidence which predominates over any individualized issues
identified by the defendants. Step 5 will require individual
inquiry into each class member's alleged deductions. The question
is whether that inquiry defeats predominance.  The need for
individual damage determinations in step 5 does not alone defeat
predominance.

The defendants raise an argument that is best understood under the
label of ascertainability, that it is not clear how to determine
who worked on a full-time basis during the relevant time period.
The defendants fail to fully develop this argument but Border
Transfer's driver records should allow an objective determination
of who qualifies under that class requirement, which the certified
class defines as at least 40 hours per week.

The Court appoints Marcos DaSilva and Matteus Ferreira as class
representatives, and Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., as class
counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8b28mvl
from Leagle.com.

Marcos DaSilva, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Weber --
bweber@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C..

Marcos DaSilva, Plaintiff, represented by Harold L. Lichten --
hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C..

Matteus Ferreira, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Weber,
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Harold L. Lichten, Lichten & Liss-
Riordan, P.C..

Border Transfer of MA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Judith A.
Leggett --  Judith@LeggettLawFirm.com -- Leggett Law Firm, LLC,
Adam C. Smedstad -- ASMEDSTAD@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin
Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., Andrew J. Butcher --
ABUTCHER@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis, Garvin Light Hanson &
Feary, pro hac vice & Paul D. Root -- PROOT@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, PC, pro hac vice.

Patrick McCluskey, Defendant, represented by Paul D. Root --
PROOT@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
PC.


CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: "Lowenthal" Suit Alleges Consumer Fraud
------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Lowenthal, individually and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated v. Cablevision Systems Corporation and Neptune
Holdings US CORP. nka Altice USA, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-06697,
(E.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017), is brought against the Defendants
for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.

This class action case arises from Defendants' deceptive and
misleading change in their billing practices for consumers who
cancel their cable, telephone and internet services and their
deceptive and improper notice to consumers about this change.

Plaintiff is an individual who, at all relevant times, was a
citizen of the state of New Jersey. He enrolled in Defendants'
telephone, cable and internet services from approximately April
2004 until October 19, 2017, when he canceled his services and
returned all of his equipment.

Defendants provide cable, internet and telephone services in New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut under the Optimum brand name.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marisa K. Glassman, Esq.
      John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN
      COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      201 N. Franklin St., 7th Floor
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Tel: (813) 223-5505
      Fax: (813) 222-2434
      E-mail: mglassman@forthepeople.com
              jyanchunis@forthepeople.com


CACAFE INC: "Marino" Has Conditional FLSA Certification
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Conditional Certification
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of the Collective Action styled
LEONA MARINO, Plaintiff, v. CACAFE, INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 16-cv-6291 YGR (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Leona Marino filed her wage and hour complaint seeking
minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest break penalties, late
payment penalties, and reimbursement of expenses.  The action
arises from a dispute over whether plaintiff and a group of
similarly situated workers were misclassified as independent
contractors and not employees.

Marino seeks conditional certification of a collective action as
to:

     All persons who work or worked for Defendants as In-store
Demonstrators and any other employees performing the same or
similar duties for Defendants, within the United States, at any
time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the
final disposition of this case.

Plaintiff contends that all of the members of the proposed
collective action were misclassified as independent contractors
for purposes of their claims under the FLSA for unpaid minimum
wages and overtime.

The evidence offered by Marino, at least at this early stage with
its low threshold, is sufficient for conditional certification
against Costco and CDS.  Regardless of the ultimate merits of the
action, the evidence submitted is sufficient to indicate that the
members of the proposed collective action are similarly situated
with respect to the alleged joint employer factors concerning the
power to control the conditions of employment through the Standard
Operating Policy and CDS checklists.

Costco and CDS contend that, barring denial of the motion, the
Court should delay conditional certification as to them because
they intend to file motions for summary judgment on the joint
employer issue. The standard for conditional certification is met
now. No motion has been brought despite the pendency of this
action for more than a year and defendants' prior representations
that they would bring such a motion. As defendants concede,
delaying conditional certification as to them would prejudice
members of the collective action, whose claims will not be tolled
as against these defendants until the motion is granted. The Court
finds no reason for delay.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7av58rffrom Leagle.com.

Leona Marino, Plaintiff, represented by Eduard R. Meleshinsky --
eduard@bryanschwartzlaw.com -- Bryan Schwartz Law, 1330 Broadway,
Suite 1630, Oakland, CA 94612

Leona Marino, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan Jeffrey Schwartz --
bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com -- Bryan Schwartz Law.

CAcafe, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sam Xiong-Jie Wu --
debtfree@lawofficeofsamwu.com -- Attorney at Law.

Jane Zheng, Defendant, represented by Sam Xiong-Jie Wu, Attorney
at Law.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant, represented by Catherine
M. Dacre -- cdacre@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, David D.
Kadue -- dkadue@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Justin Taylor
Curley -- jcurley@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Tatyana
Shmygol -- tshmygol@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Club Demonstration Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Mustafa El-Farra -- melfarra@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C. & Fermin Humberto Llaguno -- fllaguno@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson.

Ted Chao, Defendant, represented by Sam Xiong-Jie Wu, Attorney at
Law.


CANADA: Motorists' Highway 13 Class Action v. Quebec Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Montreal Gazette reports that a Superior Court judge has given the
green light to a class action suit after hundreds of motorists
were left stranded on Highway 13 during a snowstorm last March.

The lawsuit launched by motorist Gilles Beauchamp, who was trapped
on the highway for seven hours beginning at 8 p.m. March 14, names
the Quebec government and the city of Montreal as defendants.

The suit contends the province and city failed in their duty to
properly manage the traffic jam, which was caused after two trucks
became stuck in the snow and ice and their drivers refused to be
towed.

The suit is seeking $2,000 for each of the approximately 500
motorists trapped on the highway during the time it took to unclog
the thoroughfare amid a breakdown in emergency services
communications.

In Quebec City, Transport Minister Andre Fortin said his comments
on the case would be limited because it is before the courts, but
he said Quebec has acted to correct the problem.

"We don't ever want to see a situation like what happened on
Highway 13 ever happen again in Quebec," Mr. Fortin told
reporters.  "That's why we are putting measures in place.

"I already visited twice the 24-7 traffic control centre in
Montreal and in Quebec City to make sure they have the right tools
in place so a situation like this does not happen again."

Mr. Fortin said additional teams are being put in place across
Quebec and Quebec is now requiring any new contractor working for
the government to equip itself with GPS locators so officials can
track how many snow plowing trucks are on the road and their
location. [GN]


CANADA: Ontario Faces Class Action Over Ongoing College Strike
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that a proposed class action lawsuit
over Ontario's ongoing college strike has been launched on behalf
of students affected by the labour dispute.

The legal action comes as striking faculty who've been off the job
for about a month began to vote on Nov. 14 on a contract offer.

Some 12,000 Ontario college professors, instructors, counsellors,
and librarians haven't been at work since Oct. 15, leaving
hundreds of thousands of students out of class.

Law firm Charney Lawyers filed the proposed class action against
the province's 24 colleges on Nov. 14, saying 14 students have
come forward to potentially stand as representative plaintiffs.

The notice of action alleges the colleges breached contracts with
students by failing to provide vocational training and a full term
of classes.

It seeks full refunds for students who choose not to continue with
their programs and refunds "equivalent to the value of the lost
instruction" for students who do want to continue. [GN]


CANADA: MSA Clarifies Position on Class Action Against Ontario
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shiona Thompson, writing for Global News, reports that a proposed
class action lawsuit over Ontario's ongoing college strike has
been launched on behalf of students affected by the labour
dispute.

The legal action, announced on Nov. 14, comes as striking faculty
who've been off the job for about a month began to vote on a
contract offer.

The Mohawk Students' Association is not currently part of the
legal action, but president Samantha Hoover said she hopes the
proposed lawsuit could be a catalyst to help end the strike.

"Whatever it takes to get students back in the classroom is ideal
and hopefully this does gain more traction," she said on The Bill
Kelly Show.

Ms. Hoover later clarified that the association has no plans to
join the proposed suit or any others, while it recognizes "the
right of any student to take legal action if they choose to do so
(in the event of losses due to the strike)."

The MSA isn't choosing sides in the labour dispute, Hoover said,
but the group is disappointed that a deal hasn't been reached
after five weeks.

"We are still neutral, however we are more firmly advocating day
after day for a better contingency plan for all students, because
this is quite frankly an unfair situation for everybody,"
Ms. Hoover said.

Ms. Hoover said she understands why the class action lawsuit has
been proposed. She said the students' futures are in limbo "with
some 700 at Mohawk alone due to graduate this term."

Meanwhile, students are waiting, with fingers crossed, for the
results of the current voting on a contact offer.

About 12,000 Ontario college professors, instructors, counsellors,
and librarians haven't been at work since Oct. 15, leaving
hundreds of thousands of students out of class.

Law firm Charney Lawyers filed the proposed class action against
the province's 24 colleges, saying 14 students have come forward
to potentially stand as representative plaintiff.

The notice of action alleges the colleges breached contracts with
students by failing to provide vocational training and a full term
of classes.

It seeks full refunds for students who choose not to continue with
their programs and refunds equivalent to the value of the lost
instruction" for students who do want to continue. [GN]


CANADA: Metis Man Sues Over Sixties Scoop Settlement Exclusion
--------------------------------------------------------------
CBC News and Radio-Canada's Pascale Bouchard report that a Metis
man from Saskatchewan has filed a human rights complaint against
Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Minister Carolyn
Bennett, saying she discriminated against Metis people by failing
to include them in a $800-million class-action settlement over the
Sixties Scoop.

On Oct. 6, Ms. Bennett announced the federal government had
reached an agreement in principle with survivors of the Sixties
Scoop, which refers to a period between 1951 and 1991 when
thousands of Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their
homes and placed with non-Indigenous families.

'From hope, to disbelief'

Robert Doucette was taken from his family and placed with a foster
home in 1962.

In a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, he writes
that the minister discriminated against Metis people when a
decision was made that the settlement would only include First
Nations and Inuit survivors.

"I went from hope, to disbelief and then disgust when all Metis
Sixties Scoop survivors across Canada came to the painful
realization that Metis adopted/foster children were left out of a
major announcement which was heralded as a moment of contrition
and reconciliation by the government of Canada," Mr. Doucette
writes in the complaint.

'Why not the Metis?'

Mr. Doucette said he decided to file the complaint after receiving
no response to letters of complaint that he wrote to Bennett,
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau or Minister of Indigenous Services
Jane Philpott.

"My question: why not the Metis? Are we a less than Aboriginal
person as defined under Section 35 of the Canadian constitution?
Is there a two-tier system for dealing with the rights of
Aboriginal people in Canada?

On Oct. 6, Ms. Bennett said the agreement will "begin to right the
wrongs" caused by forcibly removing Indigenous children from their
birth families.

"They have lived their lives not being able to be proud Indigenous
people," Ms. Bennett said of the then children who were adopted
out of their home communities.  "They have lived their lives not
having secure personal cultural identity.  That was robbed away.
Someone thought that a non-Indigenous family somewhere else in the
world was going to do a better job."

Ms. Bennett said the government has set aside $750 million for
individual compensation.  Another $50 million has been earmarked
for a foundation dedicated to reconciliation initiatives.

In a statement provided to CBC Saskatoon on Nov. 14, Ms. Bennett's
office stated that the "Sixties Scoop represents a dark and
painful chapter in our history."

"The current agreement in principle represents the first step in
resolving this issue. We know that there are other claims that
remain unresolved, including those of the Metis," the statement
said.

"We remain committed to working with all Indigenous peoples
affected by the Sixties Scoop to resolve the remaining litigation.
We will continue to work collaboratively and collectively with all
parties to resolve these claims."

"The reason Metis are not included is because there is no records
to identify Metis during the relevant period of time," he told CBC
News.

Complaint seeking respect: Doucette

Mr. Doucette's complaint argues that the Metis should be included
because the Supreme Court ruled in the Daniels v. Canada case that
"Metis and non-status Indians are Indians under section 91.24 of
the Constitution Act 1867."

"I'm looking for the recognition of the federal government to
finally realize and accept that the Metis are under their
jurisdiction and to treat us with that respect, because there is
no respect there right now," said Doucette in an interview with
Radio-Canada.

Mr. Doucette, who is the former president of Metis Nation-
Saskatchewan, said he plans to pursue a class action lawsuit if
the Human Rights Commission does not rule in his favour. [GN]


CAPFUSION LLC: "Menichiello" Suit Alleges Illegal Call Recording
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Menichiello, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Capfusion, LLC, and Does 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02040
(C.D. Cal., November 21, 2017), seeks statutory damages and
injunctive relief resulting from violations of the California
Penal Code Section 632.7.

Capfusion is engaged in the business of providing funding for
emerging businesses. In February 2017, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff on his phone to solicit products to Plaintiff without
providing a recording advisory for the said call but was recorded
without his consent nevertheless. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (877) 206-4741
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com


COPPER HEN: Servers File Class Action Over Tip-Pooling Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On November 10, 2017, servers who formerly worked for The Copper
Hen Cakery, LLC filed a class action lawsuit in Hennepin Country
claiming violations of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act
("MFLSA").  The Copper Hen is a local farm-to-table restaurant in
Minneapolis that opened in 2014.

The servers who filed the lawsuit allege that The Copper Hen
required them to share, or pool, a portion of their tips with
other employees.  Under the MFLSA, employees may voluntarily share
tips, but employers may not require their direct-service employees
to pool tips with indirect service employees.  The servers accuse
The Copper Hen of violating this provision of the MFLSA.  The
Complaint further alleges that as a result of its tip-pooling
requirements, The Copper Hen denied servers the full amount of the
gratuities they were entitled to under state law.
"Servers work hard for their tips and are rewarded for great
customer service and attentiveness.  It's not fair or legal for
their employers to use these tips to subsidize other wage payment
obligations," Plaintiff's attorney Rebekah L. Bailey --
bailey@nka.com -- of Nichols Kaster, PLLP explains.

The plaintiff-servers brought their case as a class action and
seek to include all individuals employed as servers for The Copper
Hen during the last three years.  Their complaint pleads damages
equal in amount to their diverted tips, liquidated (double)
damages, and civil penalties, among other things, for themselves
and the proposed class.

Plaintiffs are represented by Rebekah L. Bailey, Steven A. Smith,
and Paige C. Fishman of Nichols Kaster, PLLP, which has offices in
Minneapolis and San Francisco. The case is entitled, Dunham-Sunde
and Sonaram et al. v. The Copper Hen Cakery, LLC d/b/a Copper Hen
Cakery and Kitchen, 27-cv-17-17288 (Fourth Judicial District of
Minnesota).

Additional information about the case may be found at www.nka.com
or by calling Nichols Kaster, PLLP toll free at (877) 448-0492.
The firm is led by its partners, who are regularly selected by
their peers as Super Lawyers and Best Lawyers, and are leaders in
numerous professional organizations, such as the National
Employment Lawyers Association, the ABA Federal Labor Standards
Legislation Committee, the Practising Law Institute, Minnesota
National Employment Lawyers Association, Public Justice, and the
Council for the Minnesota State Bar Association's Consumer
Litigation Section. [GN]


CREDIT BUREAU: "Lopez" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Shaylene Lopez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Credit Bureau of Farmington, Inc. dba CBF Services,
Case No. 1:17-cv-01145 (D.N.M., November 16, 2017), is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Plaintiff is a natural person who at all relevant times resided in
the State of New Mexico, County of San Juan, and City of Aztec.

Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged, by
use of the mails and telephone, in the business of attempting to
collect a "debt" from Plaintiff. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Anita M. Kelley, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF ANITA M. KELLEY
      1121 Fourth Street NW, Suite 1-A
      Albuquerque, NM 87102
      Tel: (505) 750-0265
      Fax: (866) 317-2674
      E-mail: akelley@consumerlawinfo.com


D. DANIELS CONTRACTING: "Mena" Labor Suit Claims Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Mena and Damon Greenridge, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. D. Daniels Contracting
Ltd. and David E. Daniels, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-06798, (E.D.
N.Y., November 21, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and
attorneys' fees and prejudgment and post-judgment interest
associated with the bringing of this action, plus any additional
relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor
Law.

Defendants operate as a Daniels Sanitation, a waste disposal
company where Plaintiffs worked as truck helpers. They claim to be
denied overtime pay and wage statements. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Darren P. B. Rumack, Esq.
      THE KLEIN LAW GROUP
      11 Broadway Suite 960
      New York, NY 10004
      Tel: (212) 344-9022
      Fax: (212) 344-0301


DANZE INC: Court Junks Breach of Warranty Claim in "Duncan"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edmond E. Chang of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Danze Inc.'s move
for summary judgment on the breach of express warranty claim in
the case captioned DUNCAN PLACE OWNERS ASSOCIATION, on its own
behalf and as Assignee of Association members, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. DANZE, INC., f/k/a GLOBE UNION AMERICAN CORP., GLOBE UNION
GROUP, INC., AND GLOBE UNION INDUSTRIAL CORP., Defendants, (N.D.
Ill.).

Duncan Place is a condominium association in the State of
Washington.  The association and its individual condo owners
contend that faucets sold by Danze have failed, causing property
damage throughout Duncan Place condos.

In April 2015, Duncan Place and then-Plaintiff Phyllis Zisser
filed a Class Action complaint regarding the Danze faucets.  In
the lawsuit Duncan Place's breach of express warranty claim arises
from purported defects in the Danze faucets.  According to Duncan
Place, Danze has failed to repair or replace the faucets as
promised in its written warranty.

Danze's first motion to dismiss followed, and the Court dismissed
Duncan Place's breach of implied warranty claims as untimely.  The
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint came in September 2015, which
still named Duncan Place and Zisser as the Plaintiffs, but also
included 41 individually identified condominium owners, as well as
an additional singular Plaintiff, Daniel Donnelly.  Along with
class-action allegations, the Second Amended Complaint alleged six
different claims for relief, including breach of express warranty,
breach of warranty of merchantability, negligence, strict products
liability, unjust enrichment, and a violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Zisser was dismissed with prejudice, having accepted an Offer of
Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. R. 70.  Then, Danze again moved
to dismiss the complaint on various grounds.  The Court dismissed
the negligence, unjust enrichment, and strict liability products
claims as to all Plaintiffs, as well as Donnelly's implied
warranty of merchantability claim.  The only surviving claims were
for breach of express warranty and Donnelly's Illinois consumer
fraud claim, each of which was subject to position statements
filed by the Plaintiffs to ensure that each party actually relied
on Danze's warranty representations.  After the Plaintiffs were
unable to allege reliance on Danze's warranty for the individual
condo owners, those claims were dismissed.  They Plaintiffs also
voluntarily dismissed Donnelly.  Thus, in November 2016, only
Duncan Place's claim for breach of express warranty remained in
the case.

Now, on its own behalf as the owners association for Duncan Place
Condominiums, Duncan Place seeks relief for Danze's failure to
live up to its warranty.  After the dismissal of the other claims
and additional discovery, Danze now moves for summary judgment,
arguing that Duncan Place cannot show that it was in privity with
Danze or that it was an intended third-party beneficiary of
Danze's warranty.

Judge Chang finds that because the warranty says that it protects
"the original consumer purchaser," the warranty's text poses an
insurmountable problem for Duncan Place's claim for coverage.  To
Duncan Place's way of thinking, the condo owner would never see
the warranty, because the builder buys and installs the faucets.
Combine that with the legal proposition that, under Washington
law, the Plaintiff invoking the express warranty must at least
know about the warranty at the time of purchase.  So no one, in
Duncan Place's view, will ever be able to successfully take
advantage of the warranty.

With the text of the warranty foreclosing Duncan Place's direct
path for coverage, Duncan Place argues that it is a third-party
beneficiary of the warranty.  But to create that entitlement, he
Judge explains that the contracting parties must intend that the
promisor assume a direct obligation to the intended beneficiary at
the time they enter into the contract.  There is no substantive
evidence, testimony, or argument that Danze ever intended that a
consumer-purchaser warranty would benefit nonparties, like a condo
association, that do not own or use the product.  Nor is there
anything in the contract between Danze and any purchaser that
necessarily requires that Danze confers a benefit to condo
associations, homeowners associations, or the like.  Even a
nonparty with a more direct claim for benefits does not qualify
for third-party beneficiary status under Washington law.

Finally, Duncan Place's final road to claim coverage as a
beneficiary of the warranty requires a multi-step path to
coverage: to succeed (i) Kimat Duncan Place, LLC, the plumbing
subcontractor, must be entitled to coverage under the warranty;
(ii) Duncan Place, LLC, the developer, must be a third-party
beneficiary of the warranty; and (iii) Duncan Place must be the
successor to all of the rights of Duncan Place, LLC.  Judge Chang
finds this path breaks down at each step.  First, the warranty
only covers the first owner of the faucet in a residential
setting, and not a plumbing subcontractor like Kimat Duncan Place.
Second, even if Kimat Duncan Place qualified as a purchaser
covered by the warranty, Duncan Place, LLC would not be a third-
party beneficiary of the warranty.  Third and last, even if Kimat
Duncan Place was entitled to invoke the warranty, and even if in
turn Duncan Place, LLC was entitled (through Kimat) to invoke the
warranty, still Duncan Place's path to coverage would fail because
it is not the successor owner of Duncan Place, LLC.

For these reasons, Judge Chang granted Danze's motion for summary
judgment.  No reasonable jury could find that Duncan Place is
covered by the express warranty.  Summary judgment is entered
against Duncan Place's express-warranty claim.  Because that was
the sole remaining claim, final judgment will be entered in favor
of Danze and against Duncan Place.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Q9YQtS from Leagle.com.

Duncan Place Owners Association, Plaintiff, represented by Kyle
Alan Shamberg -- kshamberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma
Greenberg, LLC, Andrew Charles Murphy -- acm@ditommasolaw.com --
DiTommaso Lubin, P.C., Anthony L. Rafel, Rafel Law Group Pllc, pro
hac vice, Patrick Doyle Austermuehle --
paustermuehle@ditommasolaw.com -- DiTommaso Lubin, P.C., Peter
Scott Lubin -- psl@ditommasolaw.com -- DiTommaso Lubin, P.C.,
Robert R. Ahdoot -- rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson,
Pc, pro hac vice, Tyler B. Ellrodt, Rafel Law Group Pllc, pro hac
vice, Vincent Louis DiTommaso -- vdt@ditommasolaw.com -- DiTommaso
Lubin, P.C. & Katrina Carroll
-- kcarroll@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg LLC.

Danze, Inc., Defendant, represented by Howard L. Lieber --
hlieber@ghlaw-llp.com -- Grotefeld & Hoffmann, LLP & Joshua James
Whiteside -- jwhiteside@ghlaw-llp.com -- Grotefeld Hoffmann
Schleiter Gordon & Ochoa.

Globe Union Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Howard L.
Lieber, Grotefeld & Hoffmann, LLP.


DAVITA HEALTHCARE: "Harris" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Myrna Harris, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Davita Healthcare Partners, Inc. and Total Renal Care
Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-02741 (D. Colo., November 16, 2017), seeks
to recover damages for Defendants' violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff, Myrna Harris is a resident of Colorado Springs,
Colorado. Plaintiff worked as administrative assistant for the
Defendants.

The Defendants provide a variety of health care services to
patients thought the United States and abroad. Defendants
specialize in dialysis services for patients with chronic kidney
failure and end stage renal disease. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Colleen T. Calandra, Esq.
      Madison Fiedler Carlson, Esq.
      Darren Natvig, Esq.
      RAMOS LAW
      3000 Youngfield Street
      Wheat Ridge, CO 80215
      Tel: (303) 733-6353
      Fax: (303) 865-5666
      E-mail: colleen@ramoslaw.com
              madison@ramoslaw.com
              darren@ramoslaw.com

          - and -

      Ronald L. Wilcox, Esq.
      WILCOX LAW FIRM, LLC
      383 Corona Street, #401
      Denver, CO 80218
      Tel: (303) 594-6720
      E-mail: ron@wilcox.legal


DAVITA HEALTHCARE: "Sullivan" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
Pat Sullivan, James Worsham, and Starr Davis, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Davita Healthcare
Partners, Inc. and Total Renal Care Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-02745
(D. Colo., November 16, 2017), seeks to recover damages for
Defendants' violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff, Pat Sullivan is a resident of Cocoa Beach, Florida and
worked as a technical trainer for the Defendants.

Plaintiff, James Worsham is a resident of Miami Beach Florida and
worked as a corporate trainer for the Defendants.

Plaintiff, Starr Davis is a resident of Hollywood, Florida and
worked as a delivery trainer for the Defendants.

The Defendants provide a variety of health care services to
patients throughout the United States and abroad. Defendants
specialize in dialysis services for patients with chronic kidney
failure and end stage renal disease. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Colleen T. Calandra, Esq.
      Madison Fiedler Carlson, Esq.
      Darren Natvig, Esq.
      RAMOS LAW
      3000 Youngfield Street
      Wheat Ridge, CO 80215
      Tel: (303) 733-6353
      Fax: (303) 865-5666
      E-mail: colleen@ramoslaw.com
              madison@ramoslaw.com
              darren@ramoslaw.com

          - and -

      Ronald L. Wilcox, Esq.
      WILCOX LAW FIRM, LLC
      383 Corona Street, #401
      Denver, CO 80218
      Tel: (303) 594-6720
      E-mail: ron@wilcox.legal


DIRECTV LLC: "Pointer" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
David Pointer, Michael Monday and Michael Hall, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. DirecTV, LLC, David
Moses d/b/a/ Sky Connect, Endeavor Communications, Endeavor
Holdings, Sky High Communications, Moses Capital Group, LLC and
Moses Holdings, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00235 (W.D. Tex.,
November 20, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and
other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act and Missouri Minimum Wage Law.

Defendants operated a satellite installation business in Arkansas
and Missouri selling DirecTV services where Plaintiffs worked as
satellite installation and repair technicians. They allege to be
misclassified as independent contractors, thus denied minimum wage
and overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Hollerman, Esq.
     Timothy Steadman, Esq.
     Jerry Garner, Esq.
     HOLLEMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
     1008 West Second Street
     Little Rock, AR 72201
     Tel: 501.975.5040
     Fax: 501.975.5043
     Email: jholleman@johnholleman.net
            tim@johnholleman.net
            jerry@johnholleman.net


DOLLAR TREE: Loses Bid to Dismiss PAGA Claims in "Snipes"
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned TERRY T. SNIPES, SR., an
individual, Plaintiff, v. DOLLAR TREE DISTRIBUTION, INC., a
Virginia corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, No. 2:15-cv-00878-MCE-DB (E.D. Cal.).

Dollar Tree moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Ninth through Nineteenth
Causes of action, which are brought pursuant to California's
Private Attorney's General Act (PAGA).

Through the present class action, Plaintiff Terry T. Snipes, Sr.,
challenges various wage and hour practices utilized by his
employer, Defendant Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., both on his
own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated.  According
to Plaintiff, Dollar Tree's uniform timekeeping practices
wrongfully excluded compensable time and operated to deprive
employees of their legally guaranteed uninterrupted thirty-minute,
duty-free, meal period.

Plaintiff invokes PAGA in seeking to police Defendant's wage and
hour practices as running afoul of California law and, pursuant to
PAGA, seeks to share in any penalties exacted against Defendant as
a result of those practices.

Defendant argues that under PAGA, the government lacks the robust
power necessary to control and/or intervene in an action
instituted by a private litigant like Plaintiff, and that the
absence of such power in the PAGA framework developed by the
legislature impinges on the executive's traditional power to
police statutory violations.  Thus, according to Defendant, PAGA
violates fundamental separation-of-power precepts.

Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, Inc., 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014),
like the present case, arose in the context of an employee's
putative class action against his employer for wage and hour
violations.  Iskanian held unequivocally that "our case law
contains no indication that the enactment of qui tam statutes is
anything but a legitimate exercise of legislative authority, with
such actions enhancing the state's ability to use its scarce
resources by enlisting willing citizens in the task of civil
enforcement."  Iskanian squarely held that PAGA is a type of qui
tam action.  Even more significantly, Iskanian went on to reject
the claim that PAGA violates the separation-of-powers principle
under the California Constitution.

The court made that determination after discussing the nature and
purpose of qui tam actions.  Moreover, Iskanian recognized that
even if PAGA and other qui tam actions occasioned some minimum
interference with governmental functions, the separation-of-powers
doctrine nonetheless "does not create an absolute or rigid
division of such functions."

Given Iskanian's unequivocal holding that PAGA does not violate
the California Constitution's separation-of-powers provisions,
Defendant's argument that the scope of that holding should be
restricted is unavailing.  Moreover, the fact that the California
Supreme Court has spoken on the issue precludes this Court from
revisiting that determination.  In assessing the extent of state
constitutional guarantees, the California judiciary is the court
of last resort.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycgzyqr3
from Leagle.com.

Terry T. Snipes, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Eugene Guzman -
- anthony@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation.

Terry T. Snipes, Plaintiff, represented by S. Brett Sutton --
brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC, Jared
Hague -- jared@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC
& Joseph Vidal Macias -- joseph.macias@maximintegrated.com --
Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC.

Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
J. Mann -- jmann@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Kurt R.
Bockes -- kbockes@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Lindbergh Porter, Jr. -- lporter@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
Steven B. Katz -- skatz@constangy.com -. Constangy Brooks Smith &
Prophete, LLP & Steven Woodrow Moore -- smoore@constangy.com --
Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP.


DOLLAR TREE: Averts Employees' Class Action Over Pay Stubs
----------------------------------------------------------
Dee Thompson, writing for Northern California Record, reports that
Dollar Tree stores have been cleared of wrongdoing in federal
court when a jury sided with the store in a class action regarding
employee access to electronic wage statements (pay stubs).

Plaintiff Francisca Guillen alleged in the lawsuit that as a
worker at Dollar Tree Stores Inc. she and other class members did
not have easy access to electronic wage statements.  Workers who
were paid by direct deposit were able to print off electronic wage
statements at the cash registers in the stores.

Dollar Tree argued that printing pay stubs at the cash register
was a way to assist employees who didn't have computers at home
and who wanted to print off their pay stubs.  Plaintiffs alleged
the system exposed other employees and customers to their
confidential pay information.

The class action was initially filed as a broader wage and hour
lawsuit.

The jury in the U.S. District Court, Central District of
California was asked if Dollar Tree violated California law
between April 2014, and August 2017, in providing wage statements
to members of the 5,400 retail Dollar Tree employees in the class.
The jury was also asked to consider a number of questions,
including: Did Ms. Guillen and the class not retain easy access to
their electronic wage statements? Was Dollar Tree's failure to
provide easy access to electronic wage statements knowing and
intentional? Did Ms. Guillen and each class member suffer a
resulting injury?

The class was certified in February by Judge Michael Fitzgerald
and the case was filed in the Central District of California.  The
class covered anyone working at Dollar Tree on or after
April 2, 2014, and who was paid by direct deposit or a pay card.
Class members could not have entered into an arbitration agreement
with the store.

An attorney for Dollar Tree did not respond to requests for
interview.

Matthew J. Matern, Mikael H. Stahle and Joshua D. Boxer of Matern
Law Group PC represented the plaintiffs and the class. Attorneys
Elena R. Baca -- elenabaca@paulhastings.com -- of Paul Hastings
LLP and Lindbergh Porter -- lporter@littler.com -- of Littler
Mendelson PC represented Dollar Tree Stores Inc. [GN]


DOLLAR TREE: Atkinson Attorneys Discuss Class Action Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amber S. Healy, Esq. -- ahealy@aalrr.com -- and Benny Hinojos,
Esq. -- bhinojos@aalrr.com -- of Atkinson Andelson Loya Ruud &
Romo, in an article for Lexology, report that a California jury
returned a verdict in favor of Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. finding
that the discount retailer's practice of printing employee
paystubs on cash register receipts did not violate California law
requiring employers to provide accurate wage statements to
employees. Guillen v. Dollar Tree Stores Inc., case number 2:15-
cv-03813, (U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California).

In the class action suit, named Plaintiff, Francisca Guillen,
claimed that she did not receive an itemized wage statement each
pay period because Dollar Tree did not provide its 5,400 employees
traditional wage statements or access to online wage statements,
but required employees to print their statements from store cash
registers.  By contrast, Dollar Tree's corporate employees are
able to access their wage statements online from the company's
website.  Dollar Tree argued that the practice was meant to
provide convenient access to wage statements for store employees
who may not have access to the internet or a printer at home.
Furthermore, the wage statements printed by employees on cash
register receipts included all information required under
California law.

The Guillen decision highlights an ongoing trend of employers
phasing out traditional paper wage statements in favor of
electronic wage statements as more employees are paid via direct
deposit or pay cards, rather than paper check.

No matter the form, wage statements provided to California
employees must contain the following nine pieces of information
required by Labor Code section 226(a):

   (1) Gross wages earned;

   (2) Total hours worked;

   (3) The number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable
piece rate;

   (4) All deductions;

   (5) Net wages earned;

   (6) The inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is
paid;

   (7) The employee's name and the last four digits of his or her
social security number or an employee identification number;

   (8) The name and address of the employer; and

   (9) All hourly rates and the number of hours worked at each
rate.

With the passage of mandatory sick leave laws, California
employers must also include available sick time on the wage
statement or on a separate writing provided at the time of pay.
Labor Code Section 246.

The Department of Labor Standards Enforcement has approved the use
of electronic wage statements so long as the following conditions
are satisfied:

   (1) The employee is able to easily access the electronic wage
statements and convert the electronic statements into hard copies
at no additional expense;

   (2) The electronic wage statement system provides adequate
safeguards for ensuring the confidentiality of employee
information;

   (3) The Employer retains records of the wage statements for a
period of at least three years; and

   (4) The employee retains the right to receive a paper wage
statement upon request.

DLSE Opinion Letter No. 2006.07.06 (July 6, 2006); Derum v. Saks &
Co. (S.D. Cal. 2015) 95 F. Supp.3d 1221, 1226.

Technical and strict compliance with California's exacting wage
statement requirements is necessary to avoid potentially stiff
penalties and costly class action litigation.  Employers that fail
to provide accurate wage statements face statutory penalties of up
to $4,000 per employee, plus additional civil penalties imposed on
a pay period basis.  Employers should revisit their wage
statements to ensure strict compliance with the Labor Code.  [GN]


E*TRADE SECURITIES: Order Sustaining Demurrer Upheld
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN C. SCRANTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. E*TRADE
SECURITIES LLC, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. H042291 (Cal.
App.), Judge Adrienne Grover of the Court of Appeals of California
for the Sixth District affirmed the trail court's judgment
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

Scranton entered into a customer agreement with E*Trade to provide
him brokerage services in connection with trading securities,
including stock options.  Regarding options trading, the agreement
provides E*Trade will automatically exercise any options that are
in the money by at least $.01 at the time of expiration.  That is,
if an option is about to expire (thereby becoming worthless) but
exercising the option will result in a profit for the customer of
$.01 or more, E*Trade will exercise it to avoid the loss the
customer would suffer if it expired.

In early 2011, Scranton purchased put options on 1,000 shares of
stock in a company called Duoyuan Global Water, Inc.  The
expiration of the options was June 18, 2011 and the exercise price
was $7.50, so if the share price of the underlying stock dipped
below that price before June 18, 2011, Scranton's options would be
in the money.

On April 19, 2011, the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading
on shares of Duoyuan.  At the time trading was halted, the share
price was $3.88.  The trading in the stock did not resume until
Jan. 26, 2012.  In the interim, Scranton did not instruct E*Trade
to exercise his options, nor did E*Trade automatically exercise
them, and so the options expired.

Scranton never took any action to ensure his options were
exercised because he relied on E*Trade's representation that it
would automatically exercise expiring options that were in the
money, and because E*Trade sent him account statements during the
time trading in the stock was suspended indicating the market
value for the shares was precisely $2.9250.  Scranton incurred a
loss of $7,500 as a result of the failure to exercise his options,
and he alleges the existence of a class of similarly situated
persons who suffered losses in the same manner.

In this putative class action, Scranton sued E*Trade for failing
to exercise certain stock options on his behalf.  The operative
pleading in this appeal is the third amended complaint.  Scranton
voluntarily amended his complaint once, and then twice more after
the trial court sustained demurrers with leave to amend.  The
third amended complaint asserts causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, based on E*Trade's failure to warn Scranton about several
matters.

Both causes of action allege that E*Trade was obligated to, but
did not, warn him about certain issues related to options trading.
Specifically, Scranton alleges E*Trade should have warned him that
it could not determine the market value for a stock when trading
had been halted, that he should not rely on the provided account
statements indicating a current market value for his shares, and
that E*Trade would not automatically exercise his options when
trading in the underlying stock was halted.

E*Trade filed a general demurrer on the ground that the complaint
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Regarding the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
E*Trade argued (i) Scranton's options were not "in the money" as
defined by the agreement; (ii) there was no special relationship
between the parties; (iii) the claim is preempted by federal law,
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA");
and (iv) the disclaimer of liability contained in the agreement
between the parties bars the claim.

Regarding the cause of action for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, E*Trade argued (i) Scranton's options were
not "in the money" as defined by the agreement; (ii) the
allegations contradict the express terms of the contract; (iii)
the claim is preempted by SLUSA; and (iv) the disclaimer of
liability bars the claim.

The trial court sustained the demurrer to the third amended
complaint without leave to amend, finding that the disclaimer of
liability in the customer agreement barred both causes of action.
In light of that finding, the trial court did not reach the other
bases for E*Trade's demurrer to the third amended complaint.
Scranton appeals from the resulting judgment of dismissal.

Judge Grover finds that the parties' agreement, when read as a
whole and taken in context, is not reasonably susceptible of the
meaning urged by Scranton.  She must therefore enforce the
agreement according to its express terms.  Under those terms,
E*Trade had no obligation to automatically exercise Scranton's
options because they were not "in the money," as that term is used
in the contract, at the time they expired.

As a result, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action and the demurrer must be sustained.
Because she finds it is properly sustained for that reason, she
says she needs not address the other grounds asserted for the
demurrer.  For these reasons, Judge Grover affirmed the trial
court's judgment.  The Defendant will recover costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/tQSVWt from Leagle.com.


EAST COUNTY: Court Denies Approval of Settlement in "Galindo"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Parties' request for
Settlement Approval in the case captioned HECTOR GALINDO,
Plaintiff, v. EAST COUNTY LOUTH INC. d/b/a THE PENNY FARTHING,
EAST PUB INC. d/b/a PHEBES, DEREK KIERANS, RYAN BIRKENHEAD, DERMOT
DELANEY, and MARK CANNAN, Defendants, No. 16 Civ. 9149 (KPF)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Hector Galindo filed a Class and Collective Action
Complaint against Defendants East County Louth Inc.  Plaintiff
alleged that he was employed by Defendants as a food runner at The
Penny Farthing.  However, despite the brief period of employment
at only one of the restaurants, Plaintiff sought to certify a
wide-ranging collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and corresponding class action under the New York Labor Law, for
two restaurants.

Plaintiff claimed that he and other employees were entitled to
recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid
spread-of-hours premiums, statutory penalties, liquidated damages,
and attorneys' fees pursuant to the FLSA and the NYLL.

In support of their claim for $29,708 in attorneys' fees,
Plaintiff's counsel submitted a log detailing the time spent on
this case and the hourly rates for each member of counsel's team.

The proposed agreement submitted by the parties is, in most
respects, fair and reasonable.  The settlement amount that
Plaintiff is to receive, $5,292, would cover all back wages,
liquidated damages, and statutory penalties.  Nonetheless, the
Court cannot approve the settlement agreement in its current form,
because the attorneys' fees are not fair and reasonable, and the
non-disparagement clause is overly broad.

Under the proposed settlement agreement, Plaintiff's counsel would
receive $29,708, or 85% of the total settlement amount.  The Court
is deeply concerned about this figure, which is more than five
times what Plaintiff is recovering and more than twice the typical
percentage-of-the-recovery award approved in this District.  In an
effort to assuage the Court's concerns, counsel observes that this
figure is in fact less than the lodestar of $29,920.  But while
that may be factually true, the proffered lodestar is itself
fundamentally flawed.

The lead attorney on the matter, C.K. Lee, claims entitlement to
an hourly rate of $550. The Court finds that this rate is not
reasonable, joining a chorus of other courts in this District. To
be clear, the Court does not fault counsel for believing himself
entitled to that rate; it does, however, fault him for suggesting
that courts in this District have specifically approved this rate
a position that is at best an inexcusable oversight and at worst
an equally inexcusable misrepresentation. Mr. Lee has been
repeatedly warned by judges in this District not to misstate the
decisions of other courts concerning his fee awards, particularly
awards that are in fact based on a percentage-of-the-recovery
basis.

A review of the billing records further reveals that counsel's
number of hours billed is excessive.  Under the circumstances, the
Court does not consider it reasonable for Plaintiff's counsel to
be compensated for all of the hours spent on the Certification
Motion. While the Court had considered requiring counsel to write
off all of the time spent on the motion, it will assume that
counsel had a sincerely-held belief in the legitimacy of the
motion when it was first conceived, and will thus require only
that half of the time spent on the motion be written off as
unreasonable.

The non-disparagement clause in the proposed settlement agreement
provides no such carve-out and is contrary to public policy
because it inhibits one of FLSA's primary goals to ensure that all
workers are aware of their rights.

The parties' request to approve the proposed settlement is denied
without prejudice to the filing of a revised settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y6uulwxgfrom
Leagle.com.

Hector Galindo, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC, 30 East 39th Street, Second Floor, New
York, NY 10016

Hector Galindo, Plaintiff, represented by C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation
Group, PLLC, 30 East 39th Street, Second Floor, New York, NY 10016

East County Louth Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A.
Kimmel -- jak@msf-law.com -- Meister Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi
Dabi, 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10017, Meister
Seelig & Fein LLP.

East Pub Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Kimmel,
Meister Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi Dabi, Meister Seelig & Fein LLP.

Derek Kierans, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Kimmel,
Meister Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi Dabi, Meister Seelig & Fein LLP.

Ryan Birkenhead, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Kimmel,
Meister Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi Dabi, Meister Seelig & Fein LLP.

Dermot Delaney, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Kimmel,
Meister Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi Dabi, Meister Seelig & Fein LLP.

Mark Cannan, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey A. Kimmel, Meister
Seelig & Fein LLP & Naomi Dabi, Meister Seelig & Fein LLP.


EDDIE BAUER: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting in part and denying
in part Eddie Bauer, LLC's Motion to Dismiss the first amended
putative class action complaint in the case captioned VERIDIAN
CREDIT UNION, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE BAUER, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
C17-0356JLR. (W.D. Wash.).

Eddie Bauer accepts credit and debit cards for payment from
customers at it point-of-sale (POS) registers.  In January 2016,
hackers accessed Eddie Bauer's POS systems and installed malicious
software (or malware) that infected every Eddie Bauer store in the
United States and Canada (Data Breach).  Through this malware,
hackers stole credit and debit card data from Eddie Bauer's
systems and sold it to other individuals who made fraudulent
transactions on those payment cards.

In its first amended complaint, Veridian alleges claims against
Eddie Bauer for (1) negligence (2) negligence per se (3)
declaratory and injunctive relief, (4) violation of RCW 19.255.020
and (5) violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA).
Veridian alleges that Washington law applies to its claims.  Eddie
Bauer, however, asserts that Iowa law applies.

The court grants in part and denies in part Eddie Bauer's motion
to dismiss.

Assuming that there is no "special relationship" between Veridian
and Eddie Bauer, Eddie Bauer may still have a duty to Veridian if
Eddie Bauer engaged in an affirmative act or misfeasance such that
it created a situation of peril for Veridian.  Veridian's alleges
myriad failures on Eddie Bauer's part.  For example, Veridian
alleges that Eddie Bauer failed to maintain adequate data security
measures, implement best practices, upgrade security systems, and
comply with industry standards, implement chip-based card
technology, otherwise known as EMV technology, take reasonable
steps to protect its computer systems from being breached, timely
upgrade its POS software to remedy security vulnerabilities, take
reasonable steps to upgrade and protect Payment Card Data, ensure
that its IT systems were adequately secured, make necessary
changes to its security practices and protocols, take necessary
measures to maintain an adequate firewall, comply with industry
standards for data security, and promptly notify its customers or
other affected entities concerning the Data Breach.

Indeed, Veridian expressly alleges that the key wrongdoing at
issue in this litigation is Eddie Bauer's failure to employ
adequate data security measures.  These allegations comprise
numerous omissions or nonfeasance on the part of Eddie Bauer, but
they do not describe misfeasance or any affirmative act that
created a situation of peril for Veridian.

Because Eddie Bauer can only be held liable for its alleged
omissions or nonfeasance in the context of a special relationship,
the court concludes that Eddie Bauer does not owe a duty to
Veridian based on common law principles of negligence in
Washington.

In evaluating Section 5 of the FTC Act, the court finds that
Veridian may not base Eddie Bauer's alleged standard of conduct on
the Act because the Act fails the first and second prongs of the
Restatement's test.  The court concludes that Section 5 of the FTC
Act is not designed to protect either the class of persons that
includes Veridian or the interest that Veridian alleges Eddie
Bauer invaded. Thus, Section 5 of the FTC Act fails the test under
Section 286 of the Restatement, and Veridian cannot allege that
Eddie Bauer owes it a duty predicated on this statute.

Unlike Section 5 of the FTC Act, however, the court finds that, in
the context of this lawsuit, RCW 19.255.020 meets the test of
Section 286 of the Restatement.  Based on its application of
Section 286 of the Restatement, the court concludes that the
reasonable care standard found in RCW 19.255.020 defines the
minimum standard of conduct under Washington law for processors or
businesses whose alleged failure to protect from unauthorized
access credit and debit card account information that is in their
possession causes damage to financial institutions.  Accordingly,
the court denies Eddie Bauer's motion to dismiss Veridian's
negligence claim on the grounds that Eddie Bauer does not owe
Veridian a duty as a matter of law.

Here, Eddie Bauer's alleged failure to take reasonable security
measures constitutes an unfair act because it knowingly and
foreseeably put Eddie Bauer's customers and payment card financial
institutions at a risk of harm from data theft and fraudulent
payment card activity and this harm allegedly occurred. Because
the court concludes that Veridian adequately alleges an unfair act
under the CPA, the court denies Eddie Bauer's motion to dismiss
Veridian's claim on that basis.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yc7hnoe6from Leagle.com.

Veridian Credit Union, Plaintiff, represented by Brian C.
Gudmundson -- brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com -- ZIMMERMAN REED LLP,
pro hac vice.

Veridian Credit Union, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan L.
Bleichner -- bbleichner@chestnutcambronne.com -- CHESTNUT
CAMBRONNE PA, pro hac vice, Chase Christian Alvord --
calvord@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Erin Green Comite -
- ecomite@sccitt-scott.com -- SCOTT + SCOTT LLP, pro hac vice,
Gary F. Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com -- CARLSON LYNCH SWEET
KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph P. Guglielmo --
jguglielmo@scott-scott.com -- SCOTT + SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
LLP, pro hac vice, Karen H. Riebel -- khriebel@locklaw.com --
LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN, pro hac vice, Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, --
kmbaxter-kauf@locklaw.com -- LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN, pro hac
vice, Kevin W. Tucker -- ktucker@carlsonlynch.com -- CARLSON LYNCH
SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER LLP, pro hac vice, Kim D. Stephens --
kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS & Stephen J. Teti,
SCOTT + SCOTT LLP, 156 South Main Street. Colchester, CT 06415,
pro hac vice.

Eddie Bauer LLC, Defendant, represented by Dyanne Cho --
Dyanne.Cho@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BIGAARD & SMITH
LLP, pro hac vice, Gordon Calhoun --
Gordon.Calhoun@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &
SMITH LLP, pro hac vice, Jon P. Kardassakis --
Jon.Kardassakis@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BIGAARD &
SMITH LLP, pro hac vice, Kathleen A. Nelson --
Kathleen.Nelson@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &
SMITH LLP & Sarah E. Demaree -- sarah.demaree@lewisbrisbois.com --
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP.


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Jan. 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Nov. 15 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Endo International plc ("Endo" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:ENDP) and certain of its officers.  The class
action, filed in United States District Court, for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and docketed under 17-cv-05114, is on
behalf of a class consisting of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Endo securities, seeking to recover compensable
damages caused by defendants' violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Endo securities between
September 28, 2015, and February 28, 2017, both dates inclusive,
you have until January 16, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you
as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action, contact
Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529
(or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-
mail are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone
number, and amount of shares purchased.

Endo International plc provides specialty healthcare solutions.
The Company develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes
pharmaceutical products and generic drugs. Endo International
offers its products to the medical and healthcare industries
around the globe.

On September 28, 2015, Endo announced that it had completed its
$8.05 billion acquisition of Par Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc.
("Par Pharmaceutical") from the private investment firm TPG (the
"Par Pharmaceutical Acquisition").  Par Pharmaceutical Companies
Inc. is a manufacturer and distributor of generic drugs and
operates as a subsidiary of Par Pharmaceutical.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Par Pharmaceutical had
colluded with several of its industry peers to fix generic drug
prices; (ii) the foregoing conduct constituted a violation of
federal antitrust laws; (iii) the competitive advantages of the
Par Pharmaceutical Acquisition, which Endo touted to its
shareholders as, inter alia, "a compelling opportunity to drive
future double-digit growth, serve our customers and build
shareholder value," were in fact derived in part from Par
Pharmaceutical's illegal conduct and thus unsustainable; (iv) for
the same reasons, the "impressive track record of delivering
strong operating results" that Endo attributed to former Par
Pharmaceutical executive Paul Campanelli in announcing his
promotion to Endo's CEO consisted in part of illegal conduct; (v)
for the foregoing reasons, Endo's revenues during the Class Period
were in part the result of illegal conduct and likewise
unsustainable; and (vi) as a result of the foregoing, Endo's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On November 3, 2016, media outlets reported that U.S. prosecutors
were considering filing criminal charges by the end of 2016
against Par Pharmaceutical and several other pharmaceutical
companies for unlawfully colluding to fix generic drug prices.  In
an article titled "U.S. Charges in Generic-Drug Probe to Be Filed
by Year-End."

On this news, Endo's share price fell $3.54, or 19.48%, to close
at $14.63 on November 3, 2016.

On March 1, 2017, Endo filed an Annual Report on Form 10-K with
the SEC, reporting in full the Company's financial and operating
results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2016.
Reflecting the extent to which Par Pharmaceutical's unlawful
conduct had previously inflated Endo's revenues, the Company
reported a net loss of $3.35 billion, or $15.03 per diluted share,
on revenue of $4.01 billion, citing, in part, a 27% increase in
cost of revenues and a decrease in gross margins from 36% in 2015
to 34% in 2016.

On this news, Endo's share price fell $0.83, or 6.08%, to close at
$12.82 on March 1, 2017.

On October 31, 2017, attorneys general from 46 states and the
District of Columbia amended their antitrust case on generic drug
price-fixing conspiracy against the $75 billion generic drug
industry to add 18 new companies, including Endo's wholly-owned
subsidiary Par Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc.  The states allege
these companies violated antitrust laws to artificially inflate
the prices of the drugs by agreeing to "collectively raise and/or
maintain prices for a particular generic drug," and agreeing to
divvy up the market for the drugs to reduce competition by
"refusing to bid for particular customers or by providing a cover
bid that they knew would not be successful." This in effect
"avoided price erosion" and "increased pricing for targeted
products without triggering a 'fight to the bottom' among existing
competitors."

According to the amended complaint, these companies conspired to
unreasonably restrain trade, artificially inflate and reduce
competition in the generic pharmaceutical industry for the markets
of fifteen generic drugs: Acetazolamide, Doxycycline Hyclate
Delayed Release, Doxycycline Monohydrate, Fosinopril-
Hydrochlorothiazide, Glipizide-Metformin, Glyburide, Glyburide-
Metformin, Leflunomide, Meprobamate, Nimodipine, Nystatin,
Paromomycin, Theophylline, Verapamil and Zoledronic Acid.  As a
result of the conspiracy, "[p]rices for dozens of generic drugs
have risen -- while some have skyrocketed, without explanation,
sparking outrage from politicians, payers, and consumers across
the country whose costs have doubled, tripled, or even increased
1,000% or more."

With offices in New York, Chicago, Florida, and Los Angeles, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust
class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known
as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions.  Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct.  The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. [GN]


ENHANCED RECOVERY: "Rhodes" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Paula Rhodes, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-04297
(S.D. Ind., November 16, 2017), seeks to recover damages for
Defendant's violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff, Paula Rhodes, is a resident in the Southern District of
Indiana, from whom Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent
consumer debt, which was allegedly owed for a credit card account.

Defendant, Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC operates a nationwide
debt collection business and attempts to collect debts from
consumers in several states, including consumers in the State of
Indiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      Angie K. Robertson, Esq.
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      E-mail: davephilipps@aol.com
              mephilipps@aol.com
              angiekrobertson@aol.com


EQUIFAX INC: Unlikely to be Held Accountable for Security Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Hembree, writing for Forbes, reports that for a few bracing
weeks this fall, consumers harmed by Equifax, Wells Fargo or
another financial institution had the right to their day in court.

But in late October, Senate Republicans voted to overturn the
newly minted rule by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
which gave consumers the right to join class-action lawsuits
against banks, credit bureaus and lenders.  Now consumers' only
recourse is a secret arbitration hearing -- which corporations win
93 percent of the time.

"This vote marked a truly shameful moment in Congress, said Amanda
Werner, campaign manager for Americans for Financial Reform and
Public Citizen, who dressed as Monopoly Man to "troll" Equifax CEO
Richard Smith during a Senate hearing in October. "Just weeks
after holding hearings on scandals of historic proportion, the
Senate granted Equifax and Wells Fargo a 'Get Out of Jail Free'
card."

Werner maintains it's now unlikely Equifax will be held
accountable for the errors leading to its massive security breach
-- errors that consumer advocates say they'd expect to find in a
small, not-so-savvy business rather than in a multibillion dollar
global security company.

Equifax's "rookie mistakes"

Meanwhile, cybersecurity experts are mystified at how a giant
multinational like Equifax had such lax control over customer data
security.

Besides the security issues that led to the hacking of 145 million
accounts, the credit bureau used stunningly simple PIN numbers
that were composed of the date and time that someone signed up for
its free identity theft tracking after the breach
-- an easy-to-break PIN first reported in this column on
September 9.

"Absolutely yes, this is a rookie mistake," says
Wes Moehlenbruck, MS, CISSP, CEH, CHFI, a California-based senior
cybersecurity engineer with a master of science degree in
cybersecurity.  "The PINs used to lock and unlock credit files
were simply based on the time and date -- nothing more complicated
than that.  Turns out they had been doing that for a long time.
Clearly, in using such a simplistic approach in PIN generation, a
user's PIN could easily be guessed or brute-forced by testing
every possible combination using a computer program."

Mr. Moehlenbruck says the other error revolved around PIN
integrity.  "All [a potential hacker] needed was to possess the
PIN; you didn't need to be authorized to use it," says
Moehlenbruck.  "Normally a company would use what we call 2FA, or
two-factor authentification, which requires all users to
"authenticate" receipt of a pin via an additional channel or key
piece of information, such as an email address, cell phone number,
and so on.  This is because a PIN or password can be easily
guessed, but obtaining the victim's cell phone and login to their
authenticator application is much harder.  2FA is common practice
now on banking websites, email accounts, and social media.  We're
all surprised that a company the size of Equifax isn't current
with the times.

Mr. Moehlenbruck points to a still more alarming example "of some
very grossly negligent security practices" at Equifax."  As
reported by security researcher Brian Krebs within a week of the
Equifax breach and picked up in TechCrunch, a company called Hold
Security LLC investigated Argentina's Equifax site "and
unbelievably, found it was 'protected' by the user name 'admin'
and the password 'admin.'" (!)  Once the investigators typed in
that combo, they had access to all the users' names and emails.
And, after cracking another "unbelievably" bad Equifax ID and
password combo, which consisted of the employees' last names for
both slots, researchers could access and modify all kinds of
private information, including the Argentine version of the
employees' social security numbers.

"'Admin/admin' as a database password is a surefire way to get
hacked almost instantly," Mr. Moehlenbruck says.  "A production
database with this account smells of poor security policy and a
lack of due diligence rather than simple oversight. Breaches at
Equifax or other companies will continue unless information
security becomes top priority at the highest levels of the
organization."

There is no perfect security, Mr. Moehlenbruck adds, "but this
breach should be a reminder to everyone to change their passwords,
pins and security questions regularly, as well as enable 2FA on
all the sites that provide it...In fact, if your bank doesn't
offer it, you should change banks."

In a roundtable discussion on the Equifax breach this fall with
Security Solutions Watch, some experts remarked mordantly that the
"Internet of Things" was fast becoming the "Internet of Insecure
Things." One reason for the increased attacks, Cyberinc CEO Samir
Shah suggested, is that many corporations are far behind the times
when it comes to hackers.

"The real question we should be asking ourselves is will anything
change in how companies protect against attacks," said Mr. Shah,
whose information security company offers an integrated solution
to malware and other cyberattacks.  He said attackers are quick to
take advantage of weak or outdated access systems or to use
advanced malware to sneak inside a company's platform through
browsers. "As this latest attack suggests, it certainly is time
for a change."

Equifax's post-attack snafus

But change is slow in coming. Even after the Equifax security
hack, which opened up nearly half the country to potential
identify theft, the security giant stumbled again.

Equifax created a site where people could enter the last four
digits of their social security number to see whether they were
caught up in the security breach.  Unfortunately, according to a
story in Mashable, a prankster cloned that site and used a similar
URL to host it.  Not realizing the error, Equifax tweeted out a
link to the phishing site eight times (Mashable provided
screenshots).

Mr. Moehlenbruck attributes the debacle to human error and a
likely hole in Equifax's overall security information assurance
(IA) training.  "The Twitter story hints strongly at a lack of
adequate security awareness training, which if provided at least
annually, might have prevented the embarrassment of re-tweeting a
phishing site link from the Equifax Twitter account not once, but
8 times!" said Mr. Moehlenbruck.  "You would think that this type
of training would be front and center of every employee's mind
when interacting online for one of the largest credit monitoring
companies, especially right after the breach."

The apparent lack of adequate IA training may have left Equifax
more vulnerable to attack, according to Mr. Moehlenbruck.  The
breach was reportedly made possible by the failure to patch a
critical vulnerability in Apache Struts, though Equifax was aware
of the vulnerability, he said. But from what he's read,
Mr. Moehlenbruck says, "The real problem was a very poor focus on
information security at the highest levels of the company -- what
we call C-level [CEO, CIO, CSO-suite level].  Training is great if
it's practiced and preached throughout the organization. But
evidence hints to the contrary."

As one example, he points to Equifax's choice for its chief of
security, who retired after the recent breach and whose LinkedIn
profile (now scrubbed) did not list any advanced technology or
security training, according to news reports.  Some news outlets
pounced on the finding that her college degree was in music
composition, prompting a rightful backlash from liberal arts
majors turned engineers and tech leads.  Mr. Moehlenbruck agrees
that a music major in no way hampers someone from working in tech,
but anyone in the position of chief security officer, he says,
"should have a deep background in information security, whose
policies and practices need to come from the top-down throughout
the organization."

"In its business model, customer privacy and data is Equifax's
biggest concern and most prized asset," Mr. Moehlenbruck observes.
"But it seems that adequate security training and other best
practices weren't in place to guard it."

Consumer advocates say that the best way to drive home that and
other pro-consumer messages is to take negligent corporations to
court.  Of course, the Senate and Trump just took away consumers'
right to sue financial institutions, noted Rosemary Shahan of
Consumers for Auto Responsibility and Safety (CARS), adding that
many car owners ruined financially in an auto loan scandal at
Wells Fargo now have little hope for justice. "It hurts, but we'll
keep on fighting," she says.  "I expect more people will send a
message on election time, especially since abuses will likely
proliferate -- especially because corporations no longer feel they
have to be on their best behavior." [GN]


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: To Show Cause Why Suit Remain in Fed. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, has issued an order to
show cause why the case captioned RONALD CHINITZ, on behalf of
himself and all others similar situated, Plaintiff, v. EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-06515-EJD
(N.D. Cal.) should not be remanded to Santa Cruz County Superior
Court.

The instant putative class action was removed to the District
Court by the Defendant on the grounds of federal question in that
the Plaintiff's claims substantially implicate the laws of the
United States, and the Plaintiff's right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of substantial questions of federal law.

As it must, the Court has reviewed the Notice of Removal and other
relevant pleadings to determine whether the Defendant has
adequately established a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Davila finds it has not.  He explains that when removal is
based on the presence of a federal question, the court looks to
the face of a well-pleaded complaint to determine whether a cause
of action is created by federal law or whether the Plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.

Looking at the complaint, it is apparent that none of the
Plaintiff's causes of action are created by federal law.  Indeed,
each arises under provisions of the California Civil Code and
California Business and Professions Code.  Although a federal law
is noted in the allegations, "the mere reference" does not
"convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action.  Nor is
it apparent that the Plaintiff's causes of action implicate
significant federal issues, such that removal is condoned by
Grable and another case in the same line of authority.

In the Notice of Removal, the Defendant simply concludes without
explanation that the Complaint's reference to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA") means that whether the Plaintiff is
entitled to any relief will depend entirely on the interpretation
and application of the FCRA and supporting federal regulations.
But the basis for this conclusion is not evidenced by the face of
the Complaint.  In fact, the Judge says, a close reading of the
Plaintiff's allegations reveals that the reference to the FCRA is
made solely to emphasize the alleged violation of a state statute,
such that neither interpretation nor application of the FCRA will
be required to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
In other words, any issue that may arise under the FCRA is
collateral, not necessary or substantial.

Because Defendant has not satisfied the obligation to
affirmatively demonstrate federal subject matter jurisdiction,
Judge Davila issued an order to show cause why the action should
not be remanded.  If the Defendant does not, by Nov.17, 2017, file
an amended Notice of Removal that establishes the Court's
jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the preceding discussion,
he will remand the action to Santa Cruz County Superior Court.  No
hearing will be held on the order to show cause unless otherwise
ordered by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/CjR6Zy from Leagle.com.

Ronald Chinitz, Plaintiff, represented by George Volney Granade,
Reese LLP.

Ronald Chinitz, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Robert Reese --
mreese@reesellp.com -- Reese LLP.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc, Defendant, represented by
Daniel John McLoon -- djmcloon@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Kerry C.
Fowler -- kcfowler@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Christopher Kevin
Spiers -- cspiers@jonesday.com  -- Hanson Bridgett LLP.


FAMILY DOLLAR: Settlement in "Scott" Suit Has Preliminary OK
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUANNA SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAMILY DOLLAR
STORES, INC., Defendant, Docket No. 3:08-cv-00540-MOC-DSC (W.D.
N.C.), Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. of the U.S. District Court, W.D.
North Carolina, Charlotte Division granted the Plaintiffs' Consent
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement.

The Judge found that the Settlement Agreement is sufficiently
fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests of the
parties and in accordance with law, subject to the right of any of
the class member to challenge the fairness, reasonableness or
adequacy of the Settlement Agreement and to show cause why a final
judgment dismissing this case with prejudice should not be entered
following a fairness hearing.

The Judge also approved the proposed form of Notice of Settlement
attached to the Plaintiffs' Consent Motion.  He directed the
parties to have the Settlement Administrator mail the Notice
document to the class members in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

Judge Cogburn appointed the settlement administration firm of
Settlement Services, Inc./Garden City Group, Inc. as the
Settlement Administrator to perform the duties set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.  He directed that all proceedings in the
case remain stayed until further Order of the Court, except as may
be necessary to implement the Settlement Agreement.

He also approved the schedule of events and procedures as set
forth in the Settlement Agreement for completing the final
approval process.  Based on his review of the parties' Joint
Motion, he scheduled a Final Approval Hearing for 9:30 a.m., on
March 14, 2018, at the U.S. Courthouse, 401 West Trade Street,
Charlotte, NC 28202.  The Judge will also rule on the Class
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses and service awards for Named Plaintiffs and Class
Representatives at that time.

The Court expressly reserves the right to continue or adjourn the
final approval hearing from time-to-time without further notice to
the Class Members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/eb4xyp from Leagle.com.

Luanna Scott, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones, Greg
Jones, P.A..

Luanna Scott, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory O'Dell Wiggins,
The Kress Building, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr. -- rwiggins@wcqp.com --
Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa, Jr. --
rcalamusa@wigginschilds.com -- Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis,
LLC.

Shunderia Garlington, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing
Jones, Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress
Building, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn &
Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis,
LLC.

Ruth Bell, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones, Greg
Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building, Robert L.
Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa,
Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Wendy Bevis, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones, Greg
Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building, Robert L.
Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa,
Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Katherine Bracey, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones,
Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building,
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Ruby Brady, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones, Greg
Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building, Robert L.
Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa,
Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Marie Alice Brockway, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing
Jones, Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress
Building, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn &
Pantazis & Rocco Calamusa, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis,
LLC.

Vickie Clutter, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones,
Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building,
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Diane Conaway, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Lawing Jones,
Greg Jones, P.A., Gregory O'Dell Wiggins, The Kress Building,
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC.

Family Dollar Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jason Craig
Schwartz -- jschwartz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Adam Karl Doerr -- adoerr@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson
Bradshaw & Hinson, David Calep Wright, III --
dwright@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P. A.,
Michele L. Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan C. Stewart --
rstewart@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac
vice, Theane Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac vice, Amanda Rae Pickens --
apickens@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A.
& John R. Wester -- jwester@rbh.com -- Robinson, Bradshaw &
Hinson, P. A..


FIELDTURF USA: Faces New Castle School Suit in W.D. Penn.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fieldturf USA, Inc.
The case is styled as New Castle School District, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fieldturf
USA, Inc, Fieldturf Inc. and Fieldturf Tarkett Sas, Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01554-CB (W.D. Pa., November 30, 2017).

Fieldturf engages in the manufacturing and installation of infield
artificial turf systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
   Levin Sedran & Berman
   510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
   Philadelphia, PA 19106
   Tel: (215) 592-1500
   Email: dlevin@lfsblaw.com


FRED MEYER: Faces FCRA Class Action Over Background Checks
----------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Ahearn, writing for Employment Screening Resources, reports
that a job applicant from Oregon has filed a class action lawsuit
that claims superstore chain Fred Meyer allegedly failed to
satisfy the requirements of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) when conducting background check reports on applicants,
according to a report from Top Class Actions.
Top Class Actions reports that plaintiff "Daniel W." applied for a
job with defendant Fred Meyer in March 2017 and "was presented
with three separate background check disclosures" after he was
hired.  In April, he received a copy of the background check
report and a pre-adverse action notice from Fred Meyer.

The plaintiff says the pre-adverse action notice told him to
address issues about the background check report with the firm
that conducted the background checks and not with Fred Meyer.  He
was fired a few days later "because he never got a proper chance
to dispute the contents of his background check report."

Top Class Actions reports that the plaintiff claims the defendant
failed to give him an opportunity to address problems with the
background check report before taking adverse action against him
based on the report's contents by deferring any disputes about the
report to the background check provider.

Top Class Actions reports the complaint says the defendant
provided "not one, but three disclosures, with each disclosure
containing unnecessary, extraneous, and unlawful information." The
FCRA requires background check disclosures to be in a "standalone"
document with no other information included.

The FCRA also requires employers to notify applicants about the
nature of the background check report, get their consent to
procure the report, and explain the applicant's rights under the
FCRA in the disclosure.  The applicant also has a right to get a
copy of the report and to contest the information in the report.
The plaintiff is asking the court to declare that the defendant's
"actions constitute violations of the FCRA," seeking an injunction
"to stop the actions complained of and to provide proper
disclosures, notices and summaries," and also seeking "an award of
damages, litigation expenses, and attorney fees."

The complaint proposes a "Disclosure Class" for all U.S. persons
who applied for a job with Fred Meyer on or after November 8,
2015, and had a background check report, and an "Adverse Action
Class" for all U.S. persons subjected to an adverse employment
action on or after November 8, 2015, by Fred Meyer.

The FCRA class action lawsuit is Case No. 3:17-cv-01791-YY filed
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The
complete report is available at https://is.gd/sFO16l

Enacted in 1970, the FCRA is federal legislation that promotes the
accuracy, fairness, and privacy of consumer information in the
files of consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) and protects consumers
from the willful and/or negligent inclusion of inaccurate
information in their background check reports. [GN]


FRY'S ELECTRONICS: Order Denying Arbitration in "Silva" Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jon B. Streeter of the U.S. Court of Appeals of California
for the First District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court's
order denying Fry's' petition to compel arbitration of various
claims asserted against it in the case CHRISTOPHER SILVA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRY'S ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant
and Appellant, Case No. A146622 (Cal. App.).

Fry's employed Silva from 2007 to 2010.  About one year into his
employment, Silva signed an arbitration agreement dated April 2,
2008.  The relevant provision stated that Silva and Fry's agree
that any and all disputes between Associate and Employer arising
from or in any way related to Associate's employment by Employer,
including but not limited to, claims for damages and violation of
laws and regulations related to harassment, wrongful termination,
or discrimination (excluding claims for workers' compensation,
unemployment insurance, administrative claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or any parallel state or local
agency, and any matter within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Commissioner) will be determined and decided by final and binding
arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act, or if inapplicable, the applicable state law.

On May 19, 2015, Silva filed a class action complaint against
Fry's, alleging claims for (i) unlawful deductions from wages,
(ii) failure to pay overtime compensation, (iii) illegal record
keeping, (iv) failure to pay compensation when due at time of
separation of employment, and (v) unfair competition.  Fry's moved
to compel arbitration of Silva's individual claims and to dismiss
his class claims.

The trial court ruled that none of the claims is covered by the
arbitration obligation.  Additionally, it noted the Arbitration
Agreement excluded only types of disputes, not particular claims.
The court thus rejected Fry's' argument that Silva's claims were
not exempt from arbitration because they were time-barred from
being filed with the Labor Commissioner.  Although the court
declined to decide whether Silva's claims were indeed timely, it
observed their timeliness was irrelevant to the question presently
before the Court: whether the dispute between Fry's and Silva must
be arbitrated.

Concluding the Arbitration Agreement excluded all of Silva's
claims, the trial court denied Fry's' petition.  Accordingly, the
court did not address Fry's' contention that Silva's putative
class claims should be dismissed on the ground that the parties
did not agree to arbitrate disputes brought on behalf of other
employees.  The timely appeal followed.

Judge Streeter finds that Silva and Fry's do not dispute the
enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement, but they disagree on
its interpretation.  Following general principles of contract
interpretation, he observed that any inconsistency would be of
Employer's own making as the drafter of the agreement, and it is
not a reason to stray from the usual and ordinary meaning of the
language stated in the agreement.  More importantly, when there
are conflicting clauses the more specific clause controls the more
general.

He also finds that the Arbitration Agreement unambiguously
excludes all claims of the type that could be brought before the
Labor Commissioner.  He rejects Fry's' several attempts to suggest
our decision about the scope of the issues covered in the
Arbitration Agreement is governed by cases that hold arbitration
agreements should be construed in a way that renders them
enforceable.  While there is some force to Fry's' argument that
the trial court's interpretation of the Arbitration Agreement
would exclude the most common claims asserted against employers
from arbitration, the ordinary and popular meaning of the clear
language in the provision controls.  In his view, the language
plainly provides that all claims that could be filed with the
Labor Commissioner are excluded from the arbitration obligation.

Finally, Judge Streeter finds that all of Silva's claims could be
brought before the Labor Commissioner.  He agrees with the trial
court's conclusion that all of Silva's claims, including four
claims pursuant to the Labor Code as well as the UCL claim, are
excluded from the arbitration obligation, since they are within
the categories of claims that can be filed with the Labor
Commissioner.  He rejects Fry's' contention that the Labor
Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Silva's claims because Silva
already chose to file suit and because the claims are time-barred.
The plain language of the Arbitration Agreement specifies only the
subject matter of the types of claims that are excluded from
arbitration, not their timeliness or the forum in which they are
brought.  All of Silva's claims, including the statutory wage
claims and the UCL claim, are the type of claims that could be
brought before the Labor Commissioner because they allege
violations of the Labor Code.  They are therefore excluded from
the mandatory arbitration provision of the Arbitration Agreement.

For these reasons, Judge Streeter affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/C4SLrY from Leagle.com.


FXCM: Investor Class Action Over Services Agreement Continues
-------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Nikolova, writing for FinanceFeeds, reports that
investors suing FXCM argue that the Court should disregard a
number of documents submitted by the broker as extraneous.

The "mega lawsuit" against FXCM and a number of its top executives
continues at the New York Southern District Court, with the latest
point of contention being whether copies of the "Services
Agreement" between FXCM and Effex Capital should be considered by
the Court or not.

The plaintiffs, who are purchasers of FXCM securities, had argued
that the defendants make a number of claims concerning the
"Services Agreement," but had at no point filed this agreement
publicly, nor had they attached this purported agreement to their
motion papers.  "If Defendants decline to supply the Court with
the relevant document, it is entirely inappropriate for them to
argue on a motion to dismiss that its contents contradict
Plaintiffs' allegations", the investors argued back in September
2017.

According to the investors, the "order flow" payments made by
Effex Capital to FXCM are "a complete sham".  From 2010 to 2014,
the plaintiffs say, no market maker besides Effex paid FXCM for
order flow.  These payments are dubbed to have been merely
kickbacks of FXCM's cut of profits generated by Effex from trading
against FXCM's retail customers.  That is, the supposed "order
flow" payments were merely disguised profit-sharing payments per
FXCM's arrangement with Effex.

In response, Israel Dahan, who represents the FXCM defendants,
filed a declaration in October, with the exhibits attached to it
including copies of the "Services Agreement".  The documents are
dated March 1, 2010 and May 1, 2010. According to the defendants,
the Services Agreement was a pay-for-flow agreement based upon
trading volume--not a profit sharing agreement.  They refer to the
March 1, 2010 Services Agreement explicitly stating that "[Forex
Capital Markets, LLC] shall receive from Effex a fee equal to
$21.00 USD per one million units of Base Currency . . . for the
aggregated volume of Transactions executed via the Trading
System." The May 1, 2010 Services Agreement is materially the same
in every respect, except that FXCM Holdings, LLC is substituted
for Forex Capital Markets, LLC, the lawyers for the defendants
explain.

On November 14, the plaintiffs sent a Letter Motion to Judge
Ronnie Abrams asking for the documents attached as exhibits to Mr.
Dahan's Declaration to be disregarded.  The plaintiffs argue that
these documents should have been provided earlier, when FXCM's
lawyers filed their motion to dismiss.  Moreover, the plaintiffs
say that they are unable to submit other documents to prove the
falsity of the documents submitted by the defendants.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs request that the Court strike or
disregard the extraneous documents submitted by Defendants with
the Declarations filed by Mr. Dahan.

The "mega lawsuit" names Global Brokerage Inc (NASDAQ:GLBR),
formerly known as FXCM Inc, and 17 individuals, including
directors and senior employees at the brokerage accounting
department, as defendants. They are accused of fraud, market
manipulation and of filing false financial statements with
regulators.  This is a federal securities class action on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired publicly traded FXCM securities, including FXCM
2.25% Convertible Senior Notes due 2018 and Class A common stock
from March 15, 2012 to February 6, 2017. [GN]


GC SERVICES LIMITED: Faces "Madar" Suit in E. Dist. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The case is styled as Yardena Madar, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GC
Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06979
(E.D. N.Y., November 30, 2017).

GC Services is the largest privately-held outsourcing provider of
call center management and collection agency services in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel C Cohen, Esq.
   Daniel Cohen, PLLC
   407 Rockaway Avenue
   Brooklyn, NY 11212
   Tel:(646) 645-8482
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: dancohenlaw@gmail.com


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Law Firm Investigates Possible Fiduciary Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Former United States Securities and Exchange Commission attorney
Willie Briscoe, founder of The Briscoe Law Firm, PLLC, on Nov. 14
disclosed that a federal class action lawsuit has been filed
against General Electric Company ("GE" or "Company") (NYSE: GE)
and several officers and directors for acts taken during the
period of July 21, 2017 and October 20, 2017 (the "Class Period").

Based upon the allegations in the class action, the firm is
investigating additional legal claims against the officers and
Board of Directors of GE.  If you are an affected GE shareholder
and want to learn more about the lawsuit or join the action,
contact Willie Briscoe at The Briscoe Law Firm, PLLC via email at
shareholders@thebriscoelawfirm.com or call toll free at (888) 809-
2750.  There is no cost or fee to you.

In the complaint, the defendants are alleged to have violated
certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Specifically, the complaint alleges, among other things, that
defendants misrepresented and/or failed to disclose during the
Class Period that: (1) GE's various operating segments, including
its Power segment, were underperforming Company projections, with
order drops, excess inventories and increased costs; (2) as a
result GE overstated its full year 2017 guidance; and, (3)
consequently, Defendants' statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were false and misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

On October 20, 2017, GE revealed its quarterly results for the
third quarter 2017, divulging earnings per share ("EPS") of $0.29,
falling below earnings estimates of $0.49 per share.  GE also
lowered its 2017 earnings expectations, lowering EPS from $1.60-
$1.70 to $1.05-$1.10.  That same day, GE held a conference call to
discuss its financial results.  On the conference call, GE's Chief
Executive Officer, John Flannery, said that the Company was
finalizing a review of its operations and that, "while the company
has many areas of strength, it's also clear from our current
results that we need to make some major changes with urgency and a
depth of purpose.  Our results are unacceptable, to say the
least."  Following this news, the Company's stock dropped
significantly.

The Briscoe Law Firm, PLLC is a full service business litigation,
commercial transaction, and public advocacy firm with more than 20
years of experience in complex litigation and transactional
matters. [GN]


HARVEY WEINSTEIN: Actress Files Proposed Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Gene Maddaus, writing for Variety, reports that an actress filed a
proposed class action lawsuit on Nov. 15 against Harvey Weinstein,
alleging that the disgraced producer denied her a movie role after
she refused to show him her breasts.

The actress is identified in the suit only as Jane Doe 1. She
alleges that Mr. Weinstein invited her to his private office for a
casting session.  She says she was told that she got the part and
was given a script to study.  But as she was preparing to leave,
Mr. Weinstein insisted that she disrobe because "the role required
him to review and approve of her breasts," the lawsuit states.
She balked, fearing that she was about to be sexually assaulted,
according to the suit.

"When Jane Doe 1 continued to refuse, Weinstein angrily inquired
whether she knew who he was, told her he could 'make' her or
'break' her, and that she would 'never work in this town again,'"
the lawsuit states.  "You know, I could launch your career and I
can make you or I can break you," the suit quotes Mr.  Weinstein
as saying.

When she again refused, Mr.  Weinstein demanded she return the
script and said, "Without me, you will never work again," the suit
states.  He then locked her in a dark stairwell, according to the
suit, and she had to be freed by a maintenance worker.

The suit was filed by the class action firm of Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro, headquartered in Seattle.  The suit seeks to represent
"dozens, if not hundreds" of women whose careers were affected by
Weinstein's alleged "casting couch."  It names Weinstein as well
as the Weinstein Company as defendants, and alleges that numerous
other parties were complicit in
Mr.  Weinstein's sexual misconduct.  The suit also quotes
extensively from reports in the New Yorker and the New York Times
to allege an unlawful conspiracy.

The suit argues that the allegations should not be barred by
statutes of limitations because the full nature of the conspiracy
was not known until the New York Times published its report on Mr.
Weinstein on Oct. 5.

The Weinstein Co. did not respond to a request for comment.

Mr.  Weinstein's representatives reissued a statement that has
been given in response to other allegations:

"Any allegations of non-consensual sex are unequivocally denied by
Mr. Weinstein. Mr. Weinstein has further confirmed that there were
never any acts of retaliation against any women for refusing his
advances. Mr. Weinstein obviously can't speak to anonymous
allegations, but with respect to any women who have made
allegations on the record, Mr. Weinstein believes that all of
these relationships were consensual." [GN]


HERSHEY CO: Faces Class Action Over Reese's, Whoppers Slack Fill
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Hutton, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that the
plaintiff in a case against Hershey has asked the U.S District
Court for the Western Division of Missouri to grant a request for
class action certification.

Missouri resident Robert Bratton also asked the court Oct. 27 to
appoint him as representative of the class and appoint his
attorney as counsel for the class.  Mr. Bratton filed a putative
class action lawsuit against Hershey earlier this year claiming
that boxes of Reese's Pieces and Whoppers candies were large and
held less candy than they appeared to.

Mr. Bratton alleged that Hershey's consistently under-filled, or
"slack-filled," its candy packages without any reason, such as to
protect a product or leave room on the package for nutrition
information.  He also stated that he believed by purchasing a
larger package, he should receive more product, which he claims
isn't always the case.

The court already has rejected two motions by Hershey to dismiss
the lawsuit filed by Mr. Bratton, who claimed that he purchased
candy boxes that were as much as 41 percent empty.

According to a previous Legal Newsline story, Bratton claimed that
the packaging led him to believe he was getting more product, and
that the actual value of the candies he purchased was less than
the value of the products as represented.

Mr. Bratton claimed a violation of the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (MMPA) for a Missouri consumer and for unjust
enrichment brought on behalf of all classes, in which Bratton
requested restitution or disgorgement of Hershey's economic
enrichment.

In the request for certification, Bratton's attorneys noted that
Hershey hasn't denied that every member of the classes who
purchased the candies received the same size box with the same net
weight and same amount of candy and space inside the package.

They claim that the facts and evidence satisfy the primary factors
in federal guidelines for a class action lawsuit, including
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy.

Further, Mr. Bratton's legal team claims they will use common
evidence to prove that Hershey's packaging techniques prove it was
not above-board.  They maintain that if Hershey used nonfunctional
slack-fill in the products, the company violated statutory
provisions set forth in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
[GN]


HILTON GRAND: Court Vacates Dismissal of "Connelly" TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion Vacating
Order Dismissing Claims with Prejudice in the case captioned BRIAN
CONNELLY, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HILTON GRAND VACATIONS COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 12-CV-599-JLS (KSC) (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Defendant for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
Plaintiffs then moved for class certification, which the Court
denied.  Plaintiffs petitioned permission for interlocutory review
of that order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f),
and the Ninth Circuit denied the petition.

The Court granted the Parties' stipulation and dismissed the
action with prejudice.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, and
the Parties argued their case in front of the Ninth Circuit.

While the Parties' case was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S.Ct. 1702 (2017), which
abrogated Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2014), and held plaintiffs in putative class actions cannot
transform a tentative interlocutory order into a final judgment
within the meaning of Section 1291 simply by dismissing their
claims with prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit then dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction and Plaintiffs filed the Motion Vacating
Order Dismissing Claims.

The Court dismissed the action, which the Parties had requested
due to the then-prevailing Ninth Circuit authority.  At the time,
the law was settled in the Ninth Circuit, and the Parties relied
on this, making a choice to dismiss the case.  Microsoft abrogated
Berger while the Parties' case was pending in front of the Ninth
Circuit and long after they relied on Berger to stipulate to
dismiss their case.  Given this, the Court finds this factor
weighs slightly against granting Rule 60(b) relief.

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs exercised diligence in
pursuing their Rule 60(b) motion. This factor therefore weighs in
favor of granting Rule 60(b) relief.

Although the Parties dismissed their case with prejudice in this
Court, neither party thought they were done with this case in its
entirety as there is no question Plaintiffs would appeal the
decision.  Further, if Plaintiffs succeeded on appeal, the Parties
agreed to continue litigating this action.  But, as Defendants
argue, the Parties did not contemplate the current situation, and
Defendants had an interest in the finality of Plaintiffs' right to
pursue their case on an individual basis. Thus, because both
Parties present strong arguments, the Court finds this factor is
neutral.

The final judgment occurred over three years ago, but Plaintiffs
filed their Rule 60(b) motion promptly after the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the appeal.  The Court finds there is no unreasonable
length of time between the final judgment and the Rule 60(b)
motion, and any delay was not the fault of Plaintiffs. Thus, this
factor weighs in favor of granting Rule 60(b) relief.

The Court finds the facts of Microsoft and the facts of this case
are similar. Further, as mentioned above, Plaintiffs chose to
dismiss their case pursuant to Berger, which was abrogated by
Microsoft. Thus, the Court finds a close connection between
Plaintiffs' underlying case and Microsoft. This factor weighs in
favor of granting Rule 60(b) relief.

The Court finds there was no erroneous legal judgment to be
corrected here, as the Parties chose to dismiss the case. Although
the subsequent change in the law is unfortunately timed from
Plaintiffs' perspective, the conscious choice cannot be ignored.

Therefore, the Court finds this factor weights against granting
60(b) relief.

The Court grants Plaintiff's Motion and vacates its Order
Dismissing the Action with Prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9z6a37zfrom Leagle.com.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Charles T. Mathews-
Ted@mathewslawgroup.com -- The Mathews Law Group.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by George Stephen Azadian -
- George@ctmesq.com -- The Mathews Law Group, Zack I. Domb --
zdomb@fisherphillips.com -- The Mathews Law Group, Alexander R.
Wheeler awheeler@parrislawyers.com -- Parris Law Firm & John M.
Bickford -- jbickford@parrislawyers.com -- Parris Law Firm.

Keith Merritt, Plaintiff, represented by Charles T. Mathews, The
Mathews Law Group, George Stephen Azadian, The Mathews Law Group,
Zack I. Domb, The Mathews Law Group, Alexander R. Wheeler, Parris
Law Firm & John M. Bickford, Parris Law Firm.

Hilton Grand Vacations Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Angela C. Agrusa -- aagrusa@linerlaw.com -- Liner LLP, Daniel
Raymond Gutenplan -- dgutenplan@enensteinlaw.com -- Liner Grode
Stein Yankelevitz Sunshine Regenstreif & Taylor, Randall J.
Sunshine -- rsunshine@linerlaw.com -- Liner LLP & Sterling L.
Cluff -- scluff@baronbudd.com -- Selman Breitman, LLP.


HORSEHEAD HOLDING: Objection to Lead Plaintiff Ruling Overruled
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
issued a Memorandum Order overruling John and Mary Elizabeth
Moring Anacker' objection to Judge Burke's determination that
Dyson Capital Management Ltd. and Raymond Cook are the appropriate
Lead Plaintiff in in the case captioned IN RE HORSEHEAD HOLDING
CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Consolidated C.A. No. 16-292-LPS-CJB
(D. Del.).

Magistrate Judge Burke issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
consolidating C.A. No. 16-292-LPS-CJB and C.A. No. 16-369-LPS-CJB,
designating the group of Dyson and Cook as Lead Plaintiff, and
approving Lead Counsel and Liaison Counsel.

Judge Burke considered the Anackers' contention that Dyson does
not have standing, reasonably found that the Anackers failed to
carry their burden, and noted that Dyson submitted some evidence
on the issue.  Judge Burke acknowledged that there are missing
details about Dyson that may ultimately be dispositive; that is,
Judge Burke recognized that Dyson may not have standing.

Judge Burke considered the Anackers' position and reasonably
determined that, despite some uncertainty, Dyson is adequately
representative of the class.  That the Anackers can point to cases
in which other courts weighed these considerations differently to
determine that an investor manager, such as Dyson, faced
significant enough standing issues to preclude appointment as lead
plaintiff does not persuade the Court that Judge Burke abused his
discretion in selecting Cook and Dyson.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017,
Memorandum Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8ydhsu6from
Leagle.com.

Javier Soto, Plaintiff, represented by Joel E. Friedlander --
jfriedlander@friedlandergorris.com -- Friedlander & Gorris, P.A..

Javier Soto, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Quinn --
cquinn@friedlandergorris.com -- Friedlander & Gorris, P.A.,
Jeffrey M. Gorris -- jgorris@friedlandergorris.com- Friedlander &
Gorris, P.A. & Peter B. Andrews -- pandrews@andrewsspringer.com --
Andrews & Springer LLC.

Rory Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Brian D. Long -- bdl@rl-
legal.com -- Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. & Peter B. Andrews, Andrews &
Springer LLC.

Umesh Jani, Plaintiff, represented by Peter B. Andrews, Andrews &
Springer LLC, Craig J. Springer -- cspringer@andrewsspringer.com -
- Andrews & Springer LLC & David M. Sborz --
dsborz@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC.

James Hensler, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey Graham Grivner -
- geoffrey.grivner@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C.,
Gretchen L. Jankowski -- gretchen.jankowski@bipc.com -- Jagoe,
Christopher T. Ph.D., pro hac vice & Stanley Yorsz --
stanley.yorsz@bipc.com -- pro hac vice.

Robert D. Scherich, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey Graham
Grivner, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C..

Gregory M. Belland, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey Graham
Grivner, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C..

Raymond Cook, Movant, represented by Lisa Zwally Brown --
lbrown@mmwr.com -- Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP,
Sidney S. Liebesman -- sliebesman@mmwr.com -- Montgomery,
McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Avi Wagner -- avi@thewagnerfirm.com --
pro hac vice, Brian P. Murray -- bmurray@taftlaw.com -- pro hac
vice & Gregory B. Linkh -- glinkh@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Binkow &
Goldberg LLP, pro hac vice.

Dyson Capital Management Ltd, Movant, represented by Lisa Zwally
Brown, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, LLP, Sidney S.
Liebesman, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Brian P.
Murray, pro hac vice, Gregory B. Linkh, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg
LLP, pro hac vice, Werner Kranenburg -- werner@kranenburgesq.com -
& Werner Kranenburg, pro hac vice.

Dirk Sievers, Movant, represented by Blake A. Bennett --
bbennett@coochtaylor.com -- Cooch and Taylor.


HSBC BANK: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in "Giron" RICO Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RAMIRO GIRON, NICOLAS J. HERRERA, ORLANDO
ANTONIO MENDEZ, Plaintiffs, v. HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK
COMPANY, LTD., a foreign company, HSBC BANK USA, N.A., a national
banking association; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:15-cv-08869-ODW(JC)(C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II, of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, and denied as moot the
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions and the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Strike and Exclude.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class of individuals
who invested and lost money with any of the WCM777 entities by
transferring or having their money transferred to one of the
WCM777 accounts at HSBC Hong Kong.  The Named Plaintiffs did not
own an account with HSBC USA, and did not wire transfer any money
through HSBC USA.  Instead, they allege HSBC USA is liable because
it wire transferred other people's money to WCM777's HSBC Hong
Kong bank accounts.  The Plaintiffs argue that because HSBC USA
provided a way for other victims to wire money to the fraudulent
scheme, they aided and abetted WCM777's fraudulent activities.

On Jan. 11, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint alleging five claims for relief against HSBC USA and
HSBC Hong Kong, including: (i) aiding and abetting fraud; (ii)
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; (iii) aiding and
abetting an endless chain scheme; (iv) violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"); and (v)
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").  The
Plaintiffs subsequently filed additional amended complaints, and
the Defendants filed responsive pleadings challenging the
sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' allegations.

On June 29, 2016, the Court granted HSBC USA's Motion to Dismiss,
with prejudice, as to the Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and
abetting an endless chain scheme and RICO violations.  It also
dismissed the Plaintiffs' UCL claim with leave to amend, and held
that the Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged claims for aiding and
abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

On July 28, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended
Complaint ("TAC"), which is the operative complaint.  They moved
for leave to file a fourth amended complaint on Nov. 23, 2016.
They did not seek to replace the class representatives at this
time.  Instead, they sought to add a claim for violation of
California Penal Code section 496, which they had recently
learned, allows any person who has been injured by a violation of
section 496(a) to recover three times the amount of actual
damages, costs of suit and attorney's fees in a civil suit.  The
Court denied the Plaintiffs' request on Jan. 31, 2017.

On Aug. 18, 2016, HSBC Hong Kong moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
TAC for insufficient service of process, and lack of personal
jurisdiction.  After the parties briefed the motion, the Court
dismissed HSBC Hong Kong, and held that the Plaintiffs had not
established HSBC Hong Kong was subject to personal jurisdiction,
and denied the Plaintiffs leave to conduct jurisdictional
discovery.  Accordingly, HSBC USA is the only Defendant.

The Plaintiffs' only remaining claims against HSBC USA are: (i)
aiding and abetting fraud; (ii) aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty; and (iii) violation of California Business &
Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.

Before the Court are four motions: the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Class; the Defendant's Motion to Strike and Exclude
Evidence in support of the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class;
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike & Exclude Evidence in support of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class defined as all individuals
or entities who invested and lost money with any of the WCM777
entities by transferring or having their money transferred to one
of the WCM777 accounts at HSBC Hong Kong.  For purposes of the
class definition, an individual or entity lost money only if the
amount of money that the individual or entity received from
WCM777, including any return on investment, commissions, fees or
any other payments, was less than the amount of the individual's
or entity's money invested with WCM777.

Judge Wright denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.  He
says the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the typicality and adequacy
requirement of Rule 23(a).  They have not submitted evidence of
causation sufficient to generate a triable issue of material fact,
and thus their claims are subject to a unique defense as compared
to other putative class members, who may have transferred their
money through HSBC USA, and, therefore, might be able to
demonstrate causation.  They do not address typicality in their
Reply, despite HSBC USA's arguments in opposition.  There are also
several issues with the Named Plaintiffs' knowledge of the case,
and motives for representing the class, which further erode their
adequacy as representatives of the class.

At the hearing on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class, the
counsel indicated that he could identify different potential class
representatives who might be better suited to represent the
interests of the class, given the Court's concerns.  The
Plaintiffs have had significant time to conduct discovery, and to
identify the Plaintiffs that they thought would be typical of, and
adequately represent, the class.  However, despite adequate
opportunity to identify and propose different class
representatives, they chose to file their Motion to Certify Class,
and only raised the possibility of different class representatives
when substantively challenged regarding their typicality and
adequacy.  Accordingly, Judge Wright denied the Plaintiffs'
request for leave to substitute different, more adequate class
representatives.

The Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs' and the Defendant's
motions to exclude evidence.  He reviewed the parties' motions,
and confirmed at the hearing that none of the evidence that is the
subject of either party's motion addresses the issue of causation
as it pertains to the Named Plaintiffs.  Accordingly, he declines
to rule on these motions because they do not have an effect on the
primary issue here, which is whether the Plaintiffs submitted any
evidence establishing a causal connection between HSBC USA and the
Named Plaintiffs.

Judge Wright granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
He says the Court is presented with a motion for summary judgment,
not a motion to dismiss, and thus must evaluate the evidence the
Plaintiffs present, not the allegations.  Like in Neilson v. Union
Bank of Cal., N.A., the Court here allowed the Plaintiffs'
allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, but now their
allegations must be supported by evidence -- they are not.  The
Plaintiffs allege that HSBC USA's funds assisted in keeping WCM777
afloat, but provide no evidence that it was the sole bank acting
as a conduit for funds from unsuspecting investors.  Moreover,
they do not submit evidence regarding how much money WCM777 needed
to continue functioning vis a vis when HSBC USA provided money to
the enterprise, or how the timing of that infusion of capital
would have affected the Plaintiffs' decisions to invest in WCM777.
The Plaintiffs' reliance on Neilson does not assist in their
efforts to avoid summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/nGs132 from Leagle.com.

Ramiro Giron, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher H. Hagen --
chris@wardhagen.com -- Ward and Hagen LLP.

Ramiro Giron, Plaintiff, represented by Julio J. Ramos --
ramosfortrustee@yahoo.com -- Law Offices of Julio Ramos, Peter
Conrad Ward -- pcw@wardhagen.com -- Ward and Hagen LLP & Steven M.
Nunez -- snunez@wardhagen.com -- Ward and Hagen LLP.

Nicolas J. Herrera, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher H.
Hagen, Ward and Hagen LLP, Julio J. Ramos, Law Offices of Julio
Ramos, Peter Conrad Ward, Ward and Hagen LLP & Steven M. Nunez,
Ward and Hagen LLP.

Orlando Antonio Mendez, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher H.
Hagen, Ward and Hagen LLP, Julio J. Ramos, Law Offices of Julio
Ramos, Peter Conrad Ward, Ward and Hagen LLP & Steven M. Nunez,
Ward and Hagen LLP.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A., Defendant, represented by Camille A. Cameron
-- camille.cameron@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP,
Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin
Rosenman LLP & Gregory S. Korman -- greg.korman@kattenlaw.com --
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP.


HYUNDAI CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Exploding Sunroofs
----------------------------------------------------------
Erica Alini, writing for Global News, reports that Hyundai is the
target of a proposed class-action lawsuit related to alleged
issues with vehicle sunroofs, Global News has learned.

The lawsuit, which hasn't yet been certified as a class-action
lawsuit, was initiated in December of 2016 by Calgary-based law
firm Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes (JSS Barristers).

According to the statement of claim filed by JSS Barristers,
Hyundai started selling cars equipped with large panoramic
sunroofs, which span almost the entire length of the vehicle
roofs, around 2011.

But "panoramic sunroofs lack proper stability and integrity,
leaving them susceptible to spontaneous shattering under everyday
driving conditions," according to allegations in the document.

Hyundai is the car brand with the highest number of reports of
shattering sunroofs in Canada, Global News has previously reported
based on data obtained from Transport Canada.  The Hyundai Santa
Fe topped the charts for being the vehicle model with the most
complaints of the same kind, numbers as of Oct. 16, 2017, showed.

Hyundai is also the brand with the most such reports in the United
States, according to Consumer Reports.

The proposed class-action suit focuses on the following vehicles
if equipped with factory-installed or replacement panoramic
sunroofs:

   2013-2016 model year Hyundai Santa Fe Sport
   2013-2016 model year Hyundai Santa Fe
   2013-2016 model year Hyundai Elantra GT
   2011-2016 model year Hyundai Sonata
   2011-2016 model year Hyundai Tucson
   2011-2016 model year Hyundai Veloster

Contacted by Global News, Hyundai Canada said it would not comment
on ongoing legal matters. The allegations made in the statement of
claim have not been proven.

Alberta man is lead plaintiff

The lawsuit names Lethbridge, Alta. resident Robert Engen as
plaintiff. Engen, development manager at the University of
Lethbridge, is the owner of a 2013 Hyundai Santa Fe whose
panoramic sunroof shattered in August of last year, according to
the statement of claim.

"Shards of the glass from the Panoramic Sunroof fell all over the
car, including the front seat, on Mr. Engen and his wife, and over
the back seat, on the two child restraint systems located in the
backseat of the vehicle, which, fortunately, were not occupied at
the time of the incident," reads the statement of claim.

"Mr. Engen's wife sustained cuts and abrasions over her body," the
document continues.

The couple was driving home on Highway 519 after dropping off
their girls, then aged four and seven, at their grandparents, in
Nobleford, when they heard what sounded like a "gunshot,"
Mr. Engen told Global News via phone.

The two were showered with tiny glass pieces from the sunroof and
Mr. Engen's wife, who was wearing short sleeves, sustained cuts on
her arms, he added.

"It was definitely a spontaneous act," said Mr. Engen, who said
there were no nearby cars or projectiles that hit the roof of the
vehicle.

Mr. Engen was able to get the sunroof replaced at no cost at his
local Hyundai dealership but has since been driving with the
sunshield closed.

"We keep thinking 'what if'," said Mr. Engen.  "What if we had
been on a busy highway."

Or what if the kids, who had enjoyed looking at seagulls on the
way to their grandparents, had still been in the backseat.

"It could have been much worse."

Lawsuit alleges 'defective panoramic sunroofs'

Sunroofs often shatter because of accidental damage.  When a
projectile, such as a rock, breaks the sunroof glass, this is
meant to shatter into very small pieces, which pose a smaller
danger to vehicle occupants than larger, sharp shards.

The majority of complaints of shattering vehicles sunroofs
received by Transport Canada involved "breakage due to impact,"
the agency previously told Global News.

But manufacturing defects can also play a role, making sunroofs
more susceptible to breakage upon impact or even prone to
spontaneous shattering.

The class-action file viewed by Global News alleges that panoramic
sunroofs are coated in ceramic paint, which "significantly weakens
the structural integrity and strength of the glass."

The statement of claim references an investigation by the Korea
Automobile Testing & Research Institute (KATRI), the Korean
governmental automotive safety division, which concluded that
"panoramic sunroofs were susceptible to shattering," according to
the document.

Transport Canada is also currently pursuing a defect investigation
into shattering sunroofs in the 2013 Hyundai Santa Fe Sport model.

Hyundai said in comments provided to Global News for a previous
article that it "tracks claims regarding broken panoramic sunroofs
and, despite increasing the availability of the sunroofs across
its product range, the frequency of claims relative to the high
volume of products sold with the feature is very low."

"As always, Hyundai Auto Canada is fully supportive and
cooperative of Transport Canada initiatives," it said in reference
to the investigation.

According to the lawsuit, Hyundai issued a limited recall of 2012
Veloster vehicles because damage during factory assembly might
cause the panoramic sunroofs to break.

According to the lawsuit, the advisory note accompanying the
recall read: "Sunroof glass panel breakage, while the vehicle is
in motion, could cause driver distraction, which could result in a
crash causing property damage and/or personal injury.
Additionally, broken glass inside the vehicle poses a risk of
injury to vehicle occupants." [GN]


IDS PROPERTY: Wins Summary Judgment in "Achziger" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned GENE ACHZIGER,
Plaintiff, v. IDS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. C14-5445 BHS. (W.D. Wash.)

Plaintiff Gene Achziger filed a class action complaint against IDS
in Pierce County Superior Court asserting claims against IDS for
breach of contract and violations of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act (CPA).  Achziger moved for class certification,
which the Court denied.  The Court granted Achziger's motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage and the parties
began to discuss settlement.

In this case, the parties dispute whether they reached a binding
settlement agreement and whether the agreement should be set aside
due to the impossibility of performance or frustration of purpose.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Achziger, the
Court finds that the parties agreed to the material terms of a
settlement.  Although Achziger argues that there were material
changes to the agreement that were never agreed to, he fails to
give a concrete example of any such term.  Without identifying a
single material term in dispute and specifically arguing that he
did not agree to that term, he has failed to create a material
question of fact.  For example, Achziger could state that the
parties disputed the final settlement amount and that there was no
final agreement on this material term. Achzinger, however, fails
to identify any material term with such specificity. This failure
is sufficient to grant IDS's motion.

Achzinger has failed to submit any evidence that he did not intend
to be bound to this agreement. The first time that Mr. Nealey
raised the possibility of a failed settlement was after Baker,
and, even then, the reason for hesitation was the potential
impossibility of the agreement instead of any intent not to be
bound by the terms.  Therefore, the Court concludes that the
parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.

Achzinger has failed to show that a basic assumption of the
contract is destroyed. Achzinger admits that Baker is not on all
fours with the procedural history of this case, but the Ninth
Circuit could extend Baker to cover settlements like this one.
Thus, Achziger's entire argument is based on a hypothetical and is
essentially an argument that performance could be more difficult.
Such an argument is insufficient to show impossibility or
impracticability. Even if Achzinger met this burden, he has failed
to show that he did not bear the risk of this occurrence, much
less that the Baker opinion was unexpected. Therefore, the Court
concludes that this affirmative defense is without merit.
Second, a party's remaining duties under a contract may be
discharged if his principal purpose is frustrated by the
occurrence of an event.  Achzinger, however, concedes that
Washington has not adopted this principle of law. Even if this was
a rule of law in Washington, Achzinger has failed to show that
Baker substantially frustrates the purpose of his settlement or
that he did not bear the burden of its occurrence. Therefore, the
Court concludes that this affirmative defense is also without
merit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ycw97sonfrom Leagle.com.

Gene Achziger, Plaintiff, represented by Debra Brewer Hayes --
dhayes@dhayeslaw.com -- THE HAYES LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

Gene Achziger, Plaintiff, represented by Scott P. Nealey --
snealey@nealeylaw.com -- NEALEY LAW, pro hac vice, Stephen M.
Hansen --  info@stephenmhansenlaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN M.
HANSEN & Van Bunch -- vbunch@bffb.com -- BONNETT FAIRBOURN
FRIEDMAN & BALINT PC, pro hac vice.

IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Fletcher C. Alford -- falford@grsm.com -- GORDON & REES, pro hac
vice, Jordan S. Altura -- jaltura@grsm.com -- GORDON & REES, pro
hac vice & Shannon Wodnik -- swodnik@grsm.com -- GORDON & REES.


ILLINOIS: Sex Offenders File Class Action v. Corrections Dept.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Max Green, writing for Peoria Public Radio, reports that J.D.
Lindenmeier, the Rockford native committed a sex crime, and in
order to get out of prison he has to meet the state's long list of
rigid parole requirements for those convicted of predatory
criminal sexual assault.  He could remain behind bars for the rest
of his life if he doesn't find appropriate housing.  For
Mr. Lindenmeier, that means finding a place to live where, among
other things, he is away from children and has no internet-
accessible devices like smartphones and smart TVs.

Mr. Lindenmeier said he couldn't afford his own apartment, so he
turned to his family for help.  But their living situations
disqualified them under state law.  He said his father lived too
close to a park, his mother had a computer and smartphone, his
sister had small children, and his dad's girlfriend's home was too
close to a day care center. The rules even prohibit halfway houses
from taking in sex offenders. So he remains behind bars, searching
for a home.

And Mr. Lindenmeier isn't alone.  He's part of a class-action
lawsuit with other Illinois prisoners in similar situations,
though the exact number of sex offenders who remain behind bars
after their sentence is unknown.  That's because the Illinois
Department of Corrections doesn't track that information,
according to IDOC spokeswoman Dede Short.

When it comes to releasing sex offenders, Illinois has some of the
strictest restrictions in the country, said Melissa Hamilton, a
senior lecturer of law and criminal justice at the University of
Surrey's School of Law in England.  Former state Rep. Elaine
Nekritz said that's because lawmakers want to appear tough on
crime.

But Ms. Hamilton noted that sex offenders are much less likely to
re-offend than most other criminals.  For those sex offenders
stuck in prison, the laws have left them questioning when they
have served their time.  But the laws have also created a
situation where Illinois residents must weigh the cost of keeping
sex offenders out of their neighborhood.  It costs about $22,000
per year to house an inmate in Illinois.  In keeping
Mr. Lindenmeier locked for six years past his sentence the state
could have spent more than $100,000.

An infinite sentence

Under current Illinois laws, parole for certain sex offenders
doesn't start until they find adequate housing.  Only then will a
parole board re-evaluate offenders and decide when parole should
end.  But that wasn't always the case.

Prior to a 2012 Illinois Supreme Court ruling, a sex offender who
couldn't find compliant housing would serve their parole in
prison. Once the term of parole was complete, the prisoner would
be released.

But these new parole rules don't apply to all felonies. They apply
to certain sex crimes, such as dissemination of child pornography
and aggravated sexual assault, but not for people convicted of
crimes like arson, domestic violence, or even murder.

Adele Nicholas, an attorney representing Mr. Lindenmeier in the
class-action lawsuit against the Illinois Department of
Corrections, said the current laws are a violations of
constitutional rights.

She said lawmakers looking to score political points with voters
have created a host of restrictions that make it difficult for
felons to leave prison and adjust back into society.

"Entities involved want to appear like they're tough on crime, and
they don't want there to be any allegation that they don't care
about the safety of the community," Ms. Nicholas said.

When all of these restrictions are added up -- when every school,
day care, or park in Illinois is blacked out on a map -- there's a
lot of places where someone like Mr. Lindenmeier can't live.

On a larger scale, imagine a map of Illinois, with pins on it for
each of the 5,000 elementary and high schools across the state.
Add 10,000 more pins for each of the registered day care centers.
Add more points for public parks, pools, libraries, malls, and
other places where minors could congregate.

Then, cover virtually the whole map because stipulations also
restrict living places with access to the internet.

Trapped in the system

Mr. Lindenmeier, 34, pleaded guilty in 2005 to sexual contact with
a minor.  He said family and friends have tried to make changes in
their homes to meet the state's laws -- as well as other
restrictions laid out for him. It didn't work.

His mother, 52-year-old Denise Lindenmeier, said when her son's
original release date came up, her daughter was still a minor,
which took her home out of the running as a host site.  But after
her daughter turned 18, state rules about internet access in the
home pushed her to make an impossible decision.

"They said he couldn't come because of the internet," Denise
Lindenmeier said.  "But my daughter was in school, and she had to
have the internet.  I basically had to choose between my two
kids."

Other families have struggled and poured money into trying to get
relatives out of dead time.

Alfred Aukema, 43, pleaded guilty in 2013 to statutory rape for
having sex with a 15-year-old when he was 37.  He said his family
has gone to great lengths to get him out of prison.  They removed
photos of children and outfitted their homes with landlines, which
the state says is necessary for the GPS tracker Mr. Aukema will be
required to wear upon release.

As of November, Mr. Aukema was still in dead time.

Mr. Aukema said the restrictions put a financial and emotional
toll on poor families.

"If you don't have money or family members that are willing to
give up their lives and change their whole routine, you're stuck
in prison," Mr. Aukema said.  "You will be trapped in the system."

Denise Lindenmeier, who is unemployed and on disability, said
another family close to the Lindenmeiers went so far as to
purchase a house in an area that met all of the requirements set
forth by the state, only to have a day care open up nearby shortly
afterward.

"It's been a never-ending nightmare for me," Denise Lindenmeier
said. "I'm to the point now where, you know, I've been waiting for
a miracle and it's not gonna come.  And I'm really starting to ask
myself, 'Is he gonna be in there my whole life?'"

The Illinois Department of Corrections and the Illinois Attorney
General's office declined multiple requests for comment.

What's next?

The suit alleges the housing restrictions create a
disproportionate burden for poor families.  Ms. Nekritz, the state
representative who retired in September, said she saw that burden
firsthand during her 15 years in office.

"I have been contacted by a number of families who are just
looking for some relief and some stability so they can move on
with their lives, and it's hard to give them hope," Ms. Nekritz
said. "To my mind, the law is completely unjust when it comes to
impacts on those families."

She said she recalls how quickly lawmakers would rally behind
increased "enhancements" to sex offender laws.

"They would just sail through, because there was no objection to
them," Ms. Nekritz said.  "But as it turns out, as I've now
learned, many of (the laws) are conflicting with each other .
They're cumbersome and almost impossible for someone who is on the
sex offender registry to comply with."

Ms. Hamilton, the lecturer at the University of Surrey's School of
Law in England, called the laws "a de facto civil commitment." She
noted that the restrictions are inconsistent with scientific
evidence.

"Fear of sex offenders is based mostly on myth," Ms. Hamilton
said. "Some subsets of sex offenders pose higher risks for re-
offending than others, but most pose a relatively low risk of re-
offending."

Ms. Nekritz said change will likely only come through lawsuits,
like the class-action suit making its way through the courts. The
suit alleges the housing restrictions create a disproportionate
burden for poor families.

In August, U.S. Judge Virginia Kendall denied the state's request
to have the suit dismissed.

"There is no particularly convincing reason for individuals such
as J.D. Lindenmeier to continue to sit in prison on the taxpayer's
dime because of his indigent status," Kendall wrote.
For now, the rules mean Mr. Lindenmeier will continue his
revolving door of visits to the parole board every six months.
He's now almost 11-and-a-half years into a six-year sentence.

"Basically, when I go in there, they ask me if I have any
addresses to submit to them for host sites," Mr.  Lindemeier said.
"Most of the time, the answer I have for them is 'no,' in which
case they tell me that they'll see me again in another six
months." [GN]


ILLINOIS CENTRAL: Court Partly Dismisses "Hightower" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joe Billy McDade of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of Illinois, Peoria Division, partly dismissed the case,
ELIA L. WARR-HIGHTOWER, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL COLLEGE,
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ILLINOIS CENTRAL COLLEGE, CARL CANNON,
KELLY DANIELS, PAULA DAVIS, MICHAEL EVERETT, DIANE M. LAMB, FRANK
M. MACKAMAN, GALE THETFORD, DON BRENNAN, SUSAN K. TODER-
PORTSCHELLER, JOHN ERWIN, WILLIAM TAMMONE, BRUCE BUDDE, SHEILA
QUIRK-BAILEY, RITA ALI, MARTHA BLOODSAW, AMY DAXENBICHLER, EMILY
POINTS & TRACY MORRIS, Respondents, Case No. 1:17-cv-01153-JBM-JEH
(C.D. Ill.).

Hightower is an African American woman and has been employed by
ICC from 2011 until present as a Counselor and Advisor. She
alleges that she was unlawfully denied two promotions for which
she was qualified for on the basis of race.  Hightower alleges
that after being passed over for promotions and since she
complained, she has been unlawfully retaliated against in various
forms.  She alleges, among other things, that Daxenbichler
delivered a false and retaliatory disciplinary write up which
resulted in Hightower not being eligible for a standard pay raise,
denied her request to take vacation days even though white
employees were allowed to take those same days off, and required
Hightower to participate in extra training on the weekends and
evenings.

The Plaintiff further claims that Points and Daxenbichler
transferred her job location to another campus and that Points
"laughed it off" when Hightower's office was broken into.  She
further states that Morris and Daxenbichler denied Hightower the
benefit of tuition reimbursement that was afforded to other white
employees.

Hightower contends that Defendants have discriminated against her
on the basis of race and retaliated against her for complaining of
racial discrimination.  She brings claims for race discrimination
and retaliation under Title VII and the Illinois Civil Rights Act
("ICRA"). She brings individual-capacity equal protection claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Individual
Defendants.

On April 14, 2017, Hightower brought a class action complaint
against ICC alleging race discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  On July
28, 2017, Hightower filed an amended class action complaint adding
multiple Defendants in addition to ICC: ICC's Board of Trustees;
current and former members of the Board, Cannon, Daniels, Davis,
Everett, Lamb, Mackaman, Thetford, Brennan, and Yoder-
Portscheller; former President of ICC Erwin; former interim
President of ICC Temmone; former interim President of ICC Budde;
current President of ICC Dr. Quirk-Bailey; ICC's Vice President of
Diversity Ali; ICC's Vice President of Human Resources Bloodsaw;
and Hightower's supervisors, Daxenbichler, Points, and Morris.

On Aug. 21, 2017, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint making several arguments
in support of dismissal.  On Oct. 10, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a
response contesting all of the Defendants' arguments.  The
Defendants filed a reply on Oct. 27, 2017.

The Defendants advance several arguments in support of dismissal.
First, they argue that the Plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-
barred.  Second, they contend that the Plaintiff's Title VII
allegations are not actionable because the Plaintiff did not
suffer any materially adverse employment actions.  Third, they
contend that the Plaintiff's class Title VII claims are subject to
dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Fourth,
the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
plead class or individual claims under Title VII.  Fifth, the
Defendants assert that the Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims fail to
satisfy liberal pleading standards.  Sixth, the Defendants contend
that the individual Board members, former Presidents, and Bloodsaw
are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities.
Lastly, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff fails to state a
claim under ICRA or, alternatively, that the Court should decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's ICRA
claim.

Judge McDade granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.  He dismissed without
prejudice the Plaintiff's class allegations against ICC and the
Board or failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  As the
Plaintiff only makes class-wide allegations against the Board, the
Board is also dismissed without prejudice from the action.  He
finds that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not
unambiguously establish that her individual Title VII claims are
time-barred.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly pleaded
individual race discrimination and retaliation claims under Title
VII and ICRA against ICC and has plausibly pleaded individual
capacity Section 1983 claims against Defendants Bruce Budde, Rita
Ali, Martha Bloodsaw, Amy Daxenbichler, Emily Points, and Tracy
Morris.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has not plausibly
pleaded individual capacity Section 1983 claims against Defendants
Carl Cannon, Kelly Daniels, Paula Davis, Everett, Lamb, Mackaman,
Thetford, Quirk-Bailey, Erwin, Tammone, Brennan, and Yoder-
Portscheller.  Those Defendants are dismissed with from the
action.  Finally, the Judge denied as moot ICC's motion to dismiss
the original complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/eVrnlS from Leagle.com.

Celia L. Warr-Hightower, Plaintiff, represented by James Bryan
Wood -- bryan@jbryanwoodlaw.com -- WOOD LAW OFFICE, LLC.

Celia L. Warr-Hightower, Plaintiff, represented by Linda Debra
Friedman -- lfriedman@sfltd.com -- STOWELL AND FRIEDMAN, LTD &
Matthew Jason Singer -- msinger@sfltd.com -- STOWELL AND FRIEDMAN,
LTD.

Illinois Central College, Defendant, represented by Carrie L.
Kinsella -- Carrie.Kinsella@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS
P.C..

The Board of Trustees of Illinois Central College, Defendant,
represented by Carrie L. Kinsella, JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

Bruce Budde, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella, JACKSON
LEWIS P.C..

Rita Ali, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella, JACKSON
LEWIS P.C..

Martha Bloodsaw, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

Amy Daxenbichler, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

Emily Points, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

Tracy Morris, Defendant, represented by Carrie L. Kinsella,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C..


INSIGHT GLOBAL: Court Issues Order re AEO Responses in "Barker"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order regarding discovery
dispute joint report No. 7 in the case captioned JOHN BARKER,
Plaintiff, v. INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
5:16-cv-07186-BLF (HRL) (N.D. Cal.).

In Discovery Dispute Joint Report #7, the plaintiff challenges the
defendant's designation of certain of its discovery responses as
Attorneys' Eyes Only (AEO).  Defendant argues that the AEO
designation is correct.

The Stipulated Protective Order in this case defines AEO as
information of a type that could be used by a business competitor.
Plaintiff Barker works for Beacon Hill Staffing, which is a
competitor of defendant Insight Global (Insight).  The burden of
proof is on Insight, as the party who made the AEO designation, to
persuade the Court that the designation is necessary and
appropriate.

This is a putative class action.  If certified, the class would
comprise present or former employees of Insight who executed an
employment agreement which placed restrictions on their actions if
they left Insight's employ.  The complaint alleges the contractual
restrictions are anti-competitive and unlawful under California
law.

Various cases cited by the parties are fact specific, and none are
either binding or directly on point.  Only one, Bryant v. Mattel,
Inc., No. CV 04 09049, 2007 WL 5416684 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 6, 2007),
deals with whether particular information should be AEO or
something else where the parties cannot agree.  Bryant reached a
result that plaintiff likes, but the facts and the context were
very different than this case.

Here, the court must balance Insight's concern about possible
misuse of certain information against Barker's interest in having
access to that information for litigation purposes.  The burden of
proof is on Insight to convince the court the challenged
information should remain AEO in its entirety, and the court
concludes Insight has not met that burden.  The putative class
members' addresses and phone numbers may remain AEO.  The other
categories of information must be re-designated as Confidential,
and Barker may have access when he has executed the agreement the
Order requires.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yahcenp2from Leagle.com.

John Barker, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin I. Fink
bfink@bfvlaw.com -- Berman Fink Van Horn P.C., pro hac vice.
John Barker, Plaintiff, represented by Tyler Mark Paetkau --
tyler.paetkau@procopio.com -- Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch
LLP.

Insight Global, LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher Carl
Marquardt -- chris.marquardt@alston.com -- Alston Bird LLP, Jeremy
Matthew Mittman -- jmittman@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP,
Anna Beth Saraie -- anna.saraie@alston.com -- Alston and Bird LLP,
pro hac vice & Isabella Pei-Ying Lee -- isabella.lee@alston.com --
Alston and Bird LLP Labor and Employment, pro hac vice.

Insight Global, LLC 2013 Incentive Unit Plan, Defendant,
represented by Christopher Carl Marquardt, Alston Bird LLP,
Isabella Pei-Ying Lee, Alston and Bird LLP Labor and Employment,
Jeremy Matthew Mittman, Proskauer Rose LLP & Tyler Mark Paetkau,
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP.

Insight Global, LLC, Counter-claimant, represented by Christopher
Carl Marquardt, Alston Bird LLP, Jeremy Matthew Mittman, Proskauer
Rose LLP, Anna Beth Saraie, Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice &
Isabella Pei-Ying Lee, Alston and Bird LLP Labor and Employment,
pro hac vice.

John Barker, Counter-defendant, represented by Benjamin I. Fink,
Berman Fink Van Horn P.C., pro hac vice, Charles John Smith, III -
- smith@hslawoffice.com -- Law Offices of Charles J. Smith III,
Olga Savage -- olga.savage@procopio.com -- Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves & Savitch LLP & Tyler Mark Paetkau, Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves & Savitch LLP.

Insight Global, LLC, Counter-claimant, represented by Christopher
Carl Marquardt, Alston Bird LLP, Jeremy Matthew Mittman, Proskauer
Rose LLP, Anna Beth Saraie, Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice &
Isabella Pei-Ying Lee, Alston and Bird LLP Labor and Employment.

John Barker, Counter-defendant, represented by Benjamin I. Fink,
Berman Fink Van Horn P.C., pro hac vice, Charles John Smith, III,
Law Offices of Charles J. Smith III, Olga Savage, Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves & Savitch LLP & Tyler Mark Paetkau, Procopio, Cory,
Hargreaves & Savitch LLP.


KIA MOTORS: "Simpson" Suit Alleges Consumer Fraud Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicole L. Simpson, on behalf of herself and a class of all other
similarly situated persons v. Kia Motors America, Inc., Kia Motors
Finance, R.K. Chevrolet, Inc. dba R.K. Auto Group, dba R.K. Kia,
and John Does 1-5, ABC Corp., and XYZ Corp., Case No. 004462-17
(N.J. Super., November 16, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,
the New Jersey Consumer Protection Leasing Act, the Truth in
Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act, common law fraud,
negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

Plaintiff Nicole L. Simpson is an individual adult, residing in
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.

Defendant Kia Motors Finance was a captive automobile finance
company of Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. and is the alter ego
or mere instrumentality of Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. and
maintains no independent existence apart from Defendant Kia Motors
America, Inc.

Defendant R.K. Chevrolet, Inc. dba R.K. Auto Group, dba R.K. Kia
acted as an agent for and on behalf of Defendant Kia Motors
America, Inc. and Defendant Kia Motors Finance. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jesse Klaproth, Esq.
      KLAPROTH LAW PLLC
      1500 Walnut Street, Suite 800
      Philadelphia, PA 19102
      Tel: (215) 644-7463
      Fax: (202) 618-7463
      E-mail: jklaproth@klaprothlaw.com


KUSHNER COS: Faces Class Action Over Apartment Rent Overcharges
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for Law.com, reports that Kushner Cos. has
been hit with another lawsuit regarding Jared Kushner's conduct as
a landlord, this time accusing him of charging market-rate rents
to tenants of an apartment building in Brooklyn that was supposed
to be rent-stabilized. [GN]


MARRONE BIO: Jan. 25 Hearing on Reconsideration Bid
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND III QP, L.P., SPECIAL
SITUATIONS CAYMAN FUND, L.P., and DAVID M. FINEMAN, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v.
MARRONE BIO INNOVATIONS, INC., PAMELA G. MARRONE, JAMES B. BOYD,
DONALD J. GLIDEWELL, HECTOR ABSI, ELIN MILLER, RANJEET BHATIA,
PAMELA CONTAG, TIM FOGARTY, LAWRENCE HOUGH, JOSEPH HUDSON, LES
LYMAN, RICHARD ROMINGER, SHAUGN STANLEY, SEAN SCHICKEDANZ, and
ERNST & YOUNG LLP, Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-02571-MCE-KJN
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division,
granted the parties' stipulation that the Plaintiffs will file
their opposition to the Reconsideration Motion on or before Dec.
18, 2017; and the Defendant will file its reply on or before Jan.
18, 2018.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Denial of its
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Certify an Interlocutory
Appeal on Nov. 2, 2017.  The hearing on the Reconsideration
Motion, previously scheduled for Nov. 30, 2017, has by Order of
the Court been vacated and submitted without appearance and
argument subject to further order of the Court.

Upon the Plaintiffs' request, the Parties met and conferred to set
a mutually agreeable schedule to complete the briefing of the
Reconsideration Motion.  They agree that the Plaintiffs will file
their opposition to the Reconsideration Motion on or before De.
18, 2017; and the Defendant will file its reply on or before Jan.
18, 2018.

If the Court determines that a hearing is necessary on the
Reconsideration Motion, the Parties agree to set the hearing for
Jan. 25, 2018, or on a day thereafter that is convenient for the
Court.

All discovery in the action, including but not limited to the
filing of a Rule 26(f) discovery plan and/or responding to the
discovery-related topics in the Order Requiring Joint Status
Report, has been stayed by the parties' so ordered Stipulation,
which stay concluded on Oct. 30, 2017.

The parties have met and conferred concerning discovery, and agree
that the interests of all parties and judicial efficiency will be
served by continuing a stay of discovery while the Reconsideration
Motion is pending, including because the Reconsideration Motion
seeks reconsideration of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which
implicated the automatic stay of discovery under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-
4(b)(3)(B), and to accommodate counsels' previously scheduled
trial obligations.

The Parties stipulated and agree, through their respective counsel
of record, that the Plaintiffs will file their opposition to the
Reconsideration Motion on or before Dec. 18, 2017 and the
Defendant's reply is due on or before Jan. 18, 2018.  Should the
Court determine that a hearing is necessary on the Motion, the
hearing will be set for Jan. 25, 2018, or a day thereafter that is
convenient for the Court.

For the benefit of the Parties and in the interests of judicial
efficiency, and in light of 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(b)(3)(B), all
discovery in this action, including but not limited to the filing
of a Rule 26(f) discovery plan and/or responding to the discovery-
related topics in the Order Requiring Joint Status Report, is
stayed while the Reconsideration Motion is pending.

If the Court denies the Reconsideration Motion, the parties will
meet and confer concerning discovery within 10 days after the
Court's order, and within 20 days after that submit a Rule 26(f)
discovery plan to the Court and/or respond to the discovery-
related topics in the Order Requiring Joint Status Report.

In the event the Court declines to approve the stipulation, the
Parties will have 30 days from said denial to submit a Rule 26(f)
discovery plan to the Court and/or respond to the discovery-
related topics in the Order Requiring Joint Status Report.

Judge England granted the parties stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/DWpgvo from Leagle.com.

Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P., Plaintiff, represented by
Michael John McGaughey -- mmcgaughey@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein
Sandler LLP.

Special Situations Cayman Fund, L.P., Plaintiff, represented by
Michael John McGaughey, Lowenstein Sandler LLP.

Kent Oldham, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green &
Noblin, P.C..

David M. Fineman, Plaintiff, represented by Michael John
McGaughey, Lowenstein Sandler LLP.

Marrone Bio Innovations, Inc., Defendant, represented by Judson
Earle Lobdell -- jlobdell@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Pamela G. Marrone, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

James B. Boyd, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Donald J. Glidewell, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle
Lobdell, Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Hector Absi, Defendant, represented by John V. McDermott --
jmcdermott@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, pro
hac vice, Jonathan Charles Sandler -- jsandler@bhfs.com --
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck & Judson Earle Lobdell, Morrison &
Foerster LLP.

Elin Miller, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Ranjeet Bhatia, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Pamela Contag, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Tim Fogarty, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Lawrence Hough, Defendant, represented by Judson Earle Lobdell,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Special Situations Cayman Fund, L.P., Movant, represented by
Lawrence M. Rolnick -- lrolnick@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein
Sandler LLP, pro hac vice, Michael John McGaughey, Lowenstein
Sandler LLP, Steven M. Hecht -- shecht@lowenstein.com --
Lowenstein Sandler LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas E. Redburn, Jr. --
tredburn@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler LLP, pro hac vice.

Special Situations Fund III QP, L.P., Movant, represented by
Lawrence M. Rolnick, Lowenstein Sandler LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
John McGaughey, Lowenstein Sandler LLP, Steven M. Hecht,
Lowenstein Sandler LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas E. Redburn, Jr.,
Lowenstein Sandler LLP, pro hac vice.

Marrone Investor Group, Movant, represented by Jon A. Tostrud --
jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C..

United States of America, Movant, represented by Todd A. Pickles,
United States Attorney's Office.


MARYLAND: Court Dismisses "Owens-El" for Lack of Jurisdiction
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
issued a Memorandum dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the case
captioned JAMES JOSEPH OWENS-EL, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MARYLAND,
CITY OF BALTIMORE, PAMELA HOWELL CAB CO., Respondents, Civil
Action No. JKB-17-3057 (D. Md.).

James Joseph Owens-El's claims include that Defendants have
conspired to murder him, acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and their actions constitute breach
of contract.  He avers the public is owed an apology for the
misappropriation of money.  He also asks that this case be
converted into a class action, presumably on behalf of other
dialysis patients transported by the taxi cab company.

Owens-El filed an Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus with a
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis.

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1361, federal district courts have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or one of its
agencies to perform a duty owed to a petitioner. The court's
authority to issue a writ of mandamus extends only to federal
officers, employees, or agencies.

Regarding his request to bring a class action, Owens-El's
allegations do not amount to claims of constitutional or federal
moment.  As a private citizen, Owens-El may not bring criminal
charges against another.  Criminal charges in this court must be
brought by federal prosecutors.  Further, as a pro se non-
attorney, Owens-El does not meet the pre-requisite of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) that the representative must fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Pro se plaintiffs have been considered not equipped by reason of
training and experience to litigate on behalf of others.  A pro se
non-attorney cannot be placed in a position where he might put at
risk the rights of others, given that the ability to protect the
interests of the class depends in part on the quality of counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/yagyf3gafrom
Leagle.com.

James Joseph Owens-El, Petitioner, Pro Se.


MCAFEE INC: Summary Judgment in Shareholders' Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CENTRAL LABORERS' PENSION FUND, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. McAFEE, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents,
Case No. H039508 (Cal. App.), Judge Eugene M. Premo of the U.S.
Court of Appeals of California for the Sixth District affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment as to the nine outside director
Defendants and reversed the judgment as to DeWalt and the
corporate Defendants.

The operative, consolidated amended complaint was filed on Jan. 6,
2011, after McAfee's shareholders voted in favor of a merger on
Nov. 2, 2010, but before the deal closed after regulatory
approvals.  This is a class action brought by former public
shareholders of security technology company McAfee.  Intel Corp.
acquired McAfee in a cash sale at $48 per share for a total of
$7.68 billion.  The Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the class,
alleges that McAfee, Intel, and the former members of McAfee's
board of directors -- comprised of nine outside directors and the
former president and CEO, David DeWalt -- engaged in an unfair
merger process contaminated by conflicts.

The Plaintiff claims that in pursuit of his own self-interest,
DeWalt withheld material information about negotiations with Intel
management from McAfee's board of directors, whose members failed
to safeguard the process and who consequently approved an
undervalued price per share.  It also claims that the Defendants
omitted material information from the merger proxy statement on
which McAfee's public shareholders relied in voting for the
merger.

The trial court, applying Delaware law, granted summary judgment
for the Defendants on Feb. 13, 2013.  The court found no triable
issue of material fact regarding the Individual Defendants'
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, and concomitantly no liability
on behalf of McAfee and Intel for aiding and abetting.

The Plaintiff challenges the summary judgment as well as an
earlier order setting the matter for a trial to the court without
a jury.  It asserts that in deciding the motion for summary
judgment, the trial court disregarded its fundamental task to
construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.  It contends that the court drew improper
inferences in the Defendants' favor and granted summary judgment
in the face of several triable issues of fact concerning
Defendants' conduct and the information supplied to McAfee
shareholders before the merger vote.  The Defendants respond that
the Plaintiff's portrayal of the merger process derives from
speculation and guesswork, and is unsupported by evidence
sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.

Judge Premo's review of the grant of summary judgment in the case
is closely bound to the applicable standard of review of the
challenged transaction under Delaware law.  He begins by analyzing
the Plaintiff's claim for entire fairness review and finds that
the standard was not met.  Accordingly, he reviews the Defendants'
conduct in the merger proceedings under the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review.

The Judge finds that there are no triable issues of material fact
related to the breach of fiduciary duty action against the nine
independent directors and will affirm the grant of summary
judgment in their favor.  He concludes that absent some evidence
supporting its claim of a non-exculpated fiduciary duty, the
Plaintiff has failed to create a triable issue of material fact
regarding the independent directors' alleged disclosure
violations.

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate because any
disclosure violation would implicate only the duty of care and
would not lead to the imposition of monetary damages under
McAfee's section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision.  Alternatively,
as the Plaintiff acknowledges, the court cannot grant monetary or
injunctive relief for disclosure violations in connection with a
proxy solicitation in favor of a merger after that merger has been
consummated where there is no evidence of a breach of the duty of
loyalty or good faith by the directors who authorized the
disclosures.

Judge Premo also finds that triable issues remain related to
Defendant DeWalt's apparent nondisclosure of arguably material
information to the board and the shareholders, and will reverse
the grant of summary judgment in his favor.  He says the Plaintiff
has raised one or more triable issues of material fact related to
DeWalt's apparent nondisclosure of arguably material information
about James' $50-per-share overture.  Even if the evidence at the
time that Intel made its revised offer at $48 per share showed
that it was Intel's best and final offer, conflicting inferences
emerge as to why DeWalt did not mention James's probing inquiry
two weeks earlier.

Judge Premo will also reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of McAfee and Intel on the aiding and abetting claim.  The
sole basis for the Defendants' motion on the aiding and abetting
claim, and the basis on which the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendants McAfee and Intel, was the claimed
absence of an underlying breach of duty.  By relying entirely on
the theory that the Plaintiffs could not demonstrate a triable
issue on any breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Defendants have
failed to meet their initial burden to show that one or more
elements of the aiding and abetting cause of action cannot be
established with respect to an assumed breach by DeWalt.

For these reasons, Judge Premo affirmed the judgment as to
Defendants Charles Robel, Carl Bass, Thomas Darcy, Leslie Denend,
Jeffrey Miller, Lorrie Norrington, Denis O'Leary, Robert Pangia,
and Anthony Zingale.  He reversed the judgment as to Defendants
DeWalt, McAfee, and Intel.  Each side will bear its own costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/o68Kfb from Leagle.com.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Rick Atwood, Jr. --
ricka@rgrdlaw.com -- Randall J. Baron -- randyb@rgrdlaw.com --
Maxwell R. Huffman -- mhuffman@rgrdlaw.com -- Counsel for
Plaintiff/Appellant: Central Laborers' Pension Fund.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Paul J. Collins --
pcollins@gibsondunn.com -- Mark A. Perry -- mperry@gibsondunn.com
-- Wayne W. Smith, Thomas G. Hungar, Linda D. Lam, Casey J.
McCracken, Counsel for Defendants/Respondents: McAfee, Inc., Intel
Corporation.

Wilson Sonsini, Rodney G. Strickland -- RStrickland@wsgr.com --
Boris Feldman -- Boris.Feldman@wsgr.com -- Counsel for
Defendants/Respondents: David DeWalt, Thomas E. Darcy, Denis J.
O'Leary, Robert W. Pangia, Carl Bass, Jeffrey A. Miller, Anthony
Zingale, Leslie G. Denend, Lorrie M. Norrington, Charles J. Robel.


MENARD INC: Plaintiffs Appeal ICFA Class Action Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------
Sara McCleary, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that two
plaintiffs who accused a hardware store chain of violating the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
(ICFA) have appealed a trial court's dismissal of their claims.

Michael Fuchs and Vladislav Krasilnikov, who brought the suit
against Menard Inc. individually and as a potential class action
submitted their notice on Oct. 30 that they would appeal the
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The decision they're appealing was filed on Sept. 29 by Judge
Edmond E. Chang of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  At that time, the court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as the plaintiffs had
already amended their complaint once and had not asked to do so
again.

In its motion to dismiss, Menard argued that the plaintiffs had a
lack of standing and had failed to state a claim.

In Mr. Chang's written opinion, he first considered the question
of standing, finding that the plaintiffs' claims that they would
not have purchased the lumber had the labels been accurate, or
they would not have been willing to pay so much for it, qualify as
a financial injury, which is sufficient to show standing.

Regarding the plaintiffs' claim that Menard misled consumers by
using common names rather than true sizes in labeling its lumber,
the court found Menard made no false representation on the lumber
labels.

"First, the labels are literally true," writes Mr. Chang.
"Specifically, the store labels shown in Fuchs' and Krasilnikov's
complaint do not have inch-mark symbols after the customary trade
names of lumber pieces."

The court accepted Menard's argument that it follows the industry
standard of labeling products with its "nominal" size, not the
lumber's actual size. Therefore, "no reasonable consumer would
think that the labels showed the exact dimensions of the lumber,"
wrote Chang.

Furthermore, because the lumber is freely available for the
consumer to measure, and therefore the information in question was
in fact available, the lumber's labels cannot be considered
deceptive under the ICFA. Because of this finding, the court also
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of unjust enrichment.

Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of breach of
express warranty and breach of implied warranty, finding that in
both cases "Menards made no actionable affirmation of fact or
promise on the dimensional lumber labels." [GN]


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Jan. 16 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP:

To: All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
securities of Meridian Bioscience, Inc. ("Meridian Bioscience")
(NASDAQ:VIVO) between March 25, 2016 and July 13, 2017.  You are
hereby notified that a securities class action lawsuit has been
commenced in United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. To get more information go to:

http://www.zlk.com/plsra-c/meridian-bioscience-inc?wire=3

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500, toll-
free: (877) 363-5972. There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (i) Defendant's lead tests provide inaccurate
results; and (ii) as a result of the foregoing, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

If you suffered a loss in Meridian Bioscience you have until
January 16, 2018 to request that the Court appoint you as lead
plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky -- http://www.zlk.com-- is a national firm with
offices in New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C.
The firm's attorneys have extensive expertise and experience
representing investors in securities litigation, and have
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for aggrieved
shareholders. [GN]


MILBERG LLP: Plaintiffs Lawyers Appeal Malpractice Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that plaintiffs
lawyers are asking an appeals court to reinstate certification of
their class-action legal malpractice lawsuit against Milberg LLP
and its lawyers, insisting that a U.S. Supreme Court decision
earlier this year didn't derail their case. [GN]


MONTANA: Court Refuses to Certify "Archer" Prisoners Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAURICE R. ARCHER, JOHN W. CHAMBERS, CHARLES CLARY,
KEITH E. DOYLE, and BRIAN D. SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. TIMOTHY FOX,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF MONTANA; HON. MIKE McGRATH, CHIEF
JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF MONTANA, et. al., Defendants,
Case No. CV-17-108-GF-BMM-JTJ D. Mont.), Judge Brian Morris of the
District Court for the District of Montana, Great Falls Division,
adopted in full Magistrate Judge Johnston's Findings and
Recommendations and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs filed motions to proceed in former pauperis, a
motion for class certification, and a motion for appointment of
counsel.  U.S. Magistrate Judge John Johnston issued an Order and
Findings and Recommendations in the matter on Oct. 18, 2017.
Magistrate Judge Johnston ordered that the Plaintiffs' claims be
severed, and that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied.
The Magistrate Judge further recommended that the Court deny the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  He separately granted
the Plaintiffs' motions to proceed in forma pauperis on Oct. 23,
2017.

Archer filed an objection on Nov. 6, 2017.  Archer objected to
Magistrate Judge Johnston's order of severance and resultant
"recharacterization" of the complaint from a class action to five
individual cases.  The objection further contained substantial
reargument of the Complaint's arguments regarding the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Judge Morris finds that Magistrate Judge Johnston's recommendation
to deny class certification does not concern the benefits of
proceeding as a class action.  The Magistrate Judge based his
recommendation instead solely on the standing prohibition on pro
se plaintiffs acting in a representative capacity.  Such
prohibition has been recognized by the Ninth Circuit.  The
perceived benefits of proceeding as a class do not defeat the
rule.  The Judge has reviewed the remainder of Magistrate Judge
Johnston's Order and Findings and Recommendations for clear error
and finds no error.

Accordingly, Judge Morris adopted in full Magistrate Judge
Johnston's Findings and Recommendations.  He denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KqGk4o from Leagle.com.

Maurice Ronald Archer, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


NATIONAL GENERAL: "Harvey" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Harvey, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. National General Insurance Agency, Inc., Case No.
1:17-cv-02406 (N.D. Ohio, November 16, 2017), seeks all available
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983 and the Ohio
Minimum Fair Wages Standards Act.

Plaintiff, Sarah Harvey is an adult individual resident of the
city of Cleveland, county of Cuyahoga, state of Ohio. Plaintiff is
a former employee of National General. The primary job duty of
Harvey and those similarly situated was to sell the insurance
products of third party insurance carriers over the phone.

Defendant, National General is a foreign for-profit corporation
lawfully licensed to conduct business in the state of Ohio, which
maintains a place of business located at 800 Superior Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio 44114. Defendant sells insurance. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chris P. Wido, Esq.
      THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
      25200 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 200
      Beachwood, OH 44122
      Tel: (216) 291-4744
      Fax: (216) 291-5744
      E-mail: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com


NATURE MADE: TINA.org Objects to TripleFlex Settlement
------------------------------------------------------
Continuing its efforts to fight for settlements that are fair to
consumers and mandate real changes to deceptive marketing, ad
watchdog organization truthinadvertising.org (TINA.org) has filed
an objection in a proposed class-action settlement involving the
brand-name glucosamine supplement, Nature Made TripleFlex.

The proposed settlement, TINA.org argues in a legal brief, gives
too much money to plaintiffs' attorneys, too little compensation
to victims, and does nothing to change the alleged deceptive
labeling of the supplement in regard to unsupported claims to
increase joint mobility and reduce joint pain -- the very claims
that served as the basis for the complaint.

Often marketed for joint pain, glucosamine is one of the most
popular non-vitamin dietary supplements sold in the U.S., with
sales topping $750 million in 2012.  But a recent review of
available research on the effects of glucosamine found the
supplement no better than a placebo at reducing arthritic pain.
Meanwhile, both the Osteoarthritis Research Society International
and the U.S. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
have issued guidance about the lack of evidence for glucosamine as
a cure for joint pain.

TINA.org filed a legal brief in the case arguing that the
settlement does not adequately address the deceptive marketing
issues because it only bans TripleFlex's marketer, Pharmavite,
from using two specific words on the label of its glucosamine
supplement -- rebuild and rejuvenate (and derivatives of these two
words).  Furthermore, the ban is binding for, at most, two years.
Far longer is the lifetime ban on suing the company for deceptive
advertising that the proposed settlement imposes on class members.

Under the settlement terms, plaintiffs' attorneys will pocket more
than $4 million while cash refunds for the class members they
represent are capped at $100 per household.  The settlement
agreement defines the class as any U.S. resident who purchased
TripleFlex at a cost of $15-$40 a bottle between approximately May
2007 and June 2017.

According to TINA.org's Executive Director Bonnie Patten, "Not
only does this proposed settlement fail to remedy the deceptive
marketing alleged in the operative complaint, but it shields
defendant's marketing from future litigation.  The clear winner
here is not the consumer but the marketer and the plaintiffs'
attorneys who continue to profit handsomely at the expense of the
very people they claimed to represent."

Read more about TINA.org's objection here:
www.truthinadvertising.org/glucosamine-settlement-raw-deal-
consumers/

See more of TINA.org's legal actions at:
www.truthinadvertising.org/legal-action/legal-efforts/

             About TINA.org (truthinadvertising.org)

TINA.org -- http://www.truthinadvertising.org-- is a non-profit
organization that uses investigative journalism, education, and
advocacy to empower consumers to protect themselves against false
advertising and deceptive marketing. [GN]


NEW BOSTON PIE: Court Certifies Driver Class in "Brayak"
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BADR BRAYAK, AHMED GHARRARI, HAMID KACI, ADIL
ABDELJALIL, KHALID AKOUHAR, MOHAMED ESSAFI, and TAOUFIK BOUCHRIT,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. NEW
BOSTON PIE, INC., and CHARBEL RIZKALLAH, Civil Action No. 16-
12322-RWZ (D. Mass.), Judge Rya W. Zobel of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Between 2013 and 2016, the Plaintiffs received an hourly wage of
$4 to $5 plus tips, known as a tipped minimum wage.  The
Defendants imposed on customers a delivery charge of about $3 of
which they paid drivers a flat amount ($1.25 as of May 2017) for
gas mileage and retained the remainder.  The Plaintiffs regularly
worked more than 40 hours per week but did not receive overtime
compensation.

The case is the most recent iteration of Domino's delivery
drivers' challenges to the wage practices of their franchisee
employers.  In the instant action, the Plaintiffs allege three
violations of the wage laws.  First, they claim that the
Defendants failed to pay overtime wages, in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the Massachusetts Wage Act.
They next contend that the Defendants' practice of charging
customers for delivery without remitting that entire charge to
drivers constitutes a violation of the Massachusetts Tips Law.
Finally, they allege violations of state and federal minimum wage
requirements because the Defendants paid them tipped minimum wages
even for non-tipped "inside work" such as folding pizza boxes in
the store; failed to provide written notice of the Tips Law; and
unlawfully retained some of the drivers' tips in the form of
delivery charges, all in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149,
Section 152A and its implementing regulations at 454 CMR Section
27.03(2), and the FLSA.

Judge Zobel finds that the delivery charge and inside work claims
have received thorough treatment in a recent decision of the Court
certifying a nearly identical class.  She fully adopts Judge
Talwani's analysis and conclusions in that case and allow the
Plaintiff's motion to certify the driver class.  Therefore, she
examines only the new claim for overtime wages.

The Judge says it is well settled that federal overtime claims
must be brought as collective actions under 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b) rather than as class actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Unlike Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 class actions,
FLSA collective actions require similarly situated employees to
affirmatively opt-in and be bound by any judgment.  And this is
not the case in which the Plaintiffs with independently valid
state and federal claims seek class certification of both
together.  Instead, the Plaintiffs first cite federal overtime
protections as a basis for state Wage Act recovery, but later
disclaim the federal scheme governing those protections when it
carries less advantageous procedural requirements.  Thus, although
the Plaintiffs assert a state law claim, what is at bottom an
action to recover federally mandated overtime wages cannot
circumvent the opt-in collective action procedures set forth in
Section 216.

For the reasons, Judge Zobel allowed the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification as to the "Driver Class" on the inside work
and delivery charge claims (Counts I and II), and denied as to the
"Overtime Class" (Count V).

The "Driver Class" is certified as all individuals who have worked
as delivery drivers for the Defendants at any time from Nov. 19,
2013 to the present.  Pursuant to Rule 23(g), the Judge appointed
Stephen Churchill and Brian Casavant of Fair Work, P.C., as the
class counsel based on their qualifications and experience.  She
further appointed the Named Plaintiffs as the class
representatives.

By Dec. 7, 2017, after conferring with the Defendants' counsel,
the Judge directed the class counsel to submit a proposed Notice
to the Class -- which will include a description of the claims in
the case, the class, the class representatives, and the class
counsel -- and propose to the Court a plan for providing notice of
the certification of the class to the class.  The Defendants may
file any response to the proposed notice and plan no later than
fourteen days thereafter.  A hearing is scheduled on Jan. 9, 2018,
at 2:30 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Memorandum of
Decision is available at https://is.gd/HpphD0 from Leagle.com.

Badr Brayak, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill --
stephen@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C..

Ahmed Gharrari, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill,
Fair Work, P.C..

Hamid Kaci, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill, Fair
Work, P.C..

Adil Abdeljalil, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill,
Fair Work, P.C..

Khalid Akouhar, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill,
Fair Work, P.C..

Mohamed Essafi, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill,
Fair Work, P.C..

Taoufik Bouchrit, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill,
Fair Work, P.C..

New Boston Pie, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eric R. LeBlanc --
eleblanc@bennettandbelfort.com -- Bennett & Belfort PC, Craig D.
Levey, Bennett & Belfort PC & Todd J. Bennett, Bennett & Belfort,
P.C..

Charbel Rizkallah, Defendant, represented by Eric R. LeBlanc,
Bennett & Belfort PC, Craig D. Levey --
clevey@bennettandbelfort.com -- Bennett & Belfort PC & Todd J.
Bennett -- tbennett@bennettandbelfort.com -- Bennett & Belfort,
P.C..


NEW JERSEY: Court Certifies Class in "Gayle" Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, GARFIELD GAYLE, et al., Plaintiffs/Petitioners, v.
WARDEN MONMOUTH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al.,
Defendants/Respondents, Civ. Action No.:12-cv-02806(FLW) (D.
N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and dismissed Sheldon Francois from the case.

The first petition for habeas corpus was filed by Gayle,
individually, in May 2012, urging that he be given a bond hearing
because U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement violated the
dictates of Section 1226(c) by not detaining him immediately after
he was released from state custody.

In November 2012, a First Amended Petition was filed.  The First
Amended Petition added Neville Sukhu's and Francois' individual
claims for habeas relief to the petition previously filed by
Gayle, as well as claims brought on behalf of a putative class,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  Also, on Nov. 15,
2012, the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all individuals
who were or would be subject to Section 1226(c) mandatory
detention in the District of New Jersey.  The Defendants moved to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended petition, and opposed their motion
for class certification.

On May 10, 2013, the Court dismissed Gayle's and Sukhu's
individual habeas claims as moot, but otherwise denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss and denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  It instructed the
Plaintiffs to file an amended habeas petition and class action
complaint, along with a supplemental brief explaining why Francois
was entitled to individual relief on his Joseph claims, which the
Plaintiffs did on May 17, 2013.

On Feb. 21, 2014, after the conclusion of discovery, the
Plaintiffs sought, again, to certify a class consisting of all
individuals in New Jersey who are or will be detained pursuant to
8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c).

On Aug. 15, 2013, the Government moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Third Amended Complaint.  Thereafter, on March 14, 2014, the Court
partially granted the Government's motion to dismiss.  It also
terminated the Plaintiffs' pending motion for class certification
and directed them to re-file that motion with a proposed class
limited to those individuals who are entitled to a Joseph hearing
consistent with the Opinion.

Based on the Court's March 14, 2014 Opinion, the Plaintiffs filed
their third motion to certify a class on May 12, 2014, redefining
the class as all individuals who are or will be detained within
the State of New Jersey pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1226(c), and
who have a substantial challenge to threshold deportability or
inadmissibility on one of the statutory grounds that trigger
mandatory detention.  Additionally, the parties also filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.

On Jan. 28, 2015, the Court issued an Opinion and Order addressing
the summary judgment and class certification motions.  It held
that the Named Plaintiffs had standing to sue as to each of their
prospective class claims.  As to the merits of their claims, the
Court entered partial summary judgment for the Plaintiffs.  The
Court denied the Plaintiffs' class certification motion as moot.
Both Parties appealed.

On Sept. 22, 2016, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the
Court's two prior Opinions and Orders of March 14, 2014 and Jan.
28, 2015, finding that, absent a certified class, the Court lacked
jurisdiction to reach the merits of the Plaintiffs' Petition,
since the individual Plaintiffs' claims were moot.  It noted that
if the prerequisites of Rule 23 are otherwise met, the impending
mootness of individual claims counsels in favor of certification
regardless of whether individual relief would theoretically render
classwide relief unnecessary.  For in that situation, class
certification may be the only way to provide relief.

On Nov. 14, 2016, the Third Circuit issued its mandate, and the
case was reopened in the Court on Dec. 15, 2016.  The Plaintiffs
have renewed their motion to certify a class of all persons in the
District of New Jersey, now and in the future, who are mandatorily
detained pursuant to Section 1226(c), who have a substantial
challenge to threshold deportability or inadmissibility on one of
the statutory grounds that trigger mandatory detention, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).  In order to answer
the class certification question, the Court has been instructed by
the Third Circuit to engage in the rigorous analysis of Rule 23
criteria.

Judge Wolfson finds that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence each of the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2).  Accordingly, he
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  He
certified the following class: the right of all persons within the
District of New Jersey, now and in the future, who are mandatorily
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c) to obtain a bond
hearing on the basis of a substantial claim to relief that would
prevent the entry of a removal order, which includes challenging
the constitutionality of the Joseph hearing process, namely, the
allocation of the burden of proof and the contemporaneous
recording of the hearing.  The representatives for the class are
Plaintiffs Gayle and Sukhu.

However, because Francois, Gayle and Sukhu are not adequate to
represent the class as to the due process claims involving the
current version of Form I-286 and its addendum, they lack standing
to pursue such claims.  Plaintiffs Gayle and Sukhu each received
Form I-286s with the First Box checked off, indicating that they
could seek redetermination of their custody status by an
Immigration Judge.  However, none of the two Named Plaintiffs
received a custody redetermination hearing, also known as a
"Joseph hearing."

Finally, the Judge Wolfson dismissed Francois from the case
because Francois lacked standing to challenge the Government's
mandatory detention procedures because he did not challenge
whether he fell within a Section 1226(c) category.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/V9H2ro from Leagle.com.

NEVILLE SUKHU, Petitioner, represented by LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG --
llustberg@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS, PC.

BRIAN ELWOOD, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

MONMOUTH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent, represented by
GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE
NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

SCOTT A. WEBER, Respondent, represented by GISELA A. WESTWATER,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

JOHN T. MORTON, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

JANET NAPOLITANO, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE &
CRAIG WILLIAM KUHN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

ERIC HOLDER, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

JUAN OSUNA, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER, OFFICE
OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

JOHN TSOUKARIS, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT
BOBER, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE.

RAY SIMONSE, Respondent, represented by DAVID VINCENT BOBER,
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, GISELA A. WESTWATER, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & STEFANIE NOTARINO HENNES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Reconsiders Denial of Stay in "Bui" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned ANH BUI, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTHROP
GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORP., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive; Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-1397-WQH-WVG (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Anh Bui commenced the action by filing a Class Action
Complaint against Defendant, her former employer, in San Diego
County Superior Court.  Plaintiff filed the First Amended Class
Action Complaint (FAC), the operative complaint in this case.  The
FAC asserts four individual and putative class claims under
California wage and hour laws, an individual and a putative class
claim under California Business & Professions Code Section 17200
et seq., and a claim under California's Private Attorneys' General
Act (PAGA Claim).

The Defendant filed a Motion to Stay the case pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Morris Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, 137 S.Ct.
809, on the grounds that the basis for the District Court's Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider will disappear and
Plaintiff will again be required to arbitrate her wage-and-hour
and UCL claims on an individual basis if the Supreme Court
reverses the Court of Appeals in Morris.  The District Court
denied Defendant's Motion to Stay.

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the Order Denying Defendant's
Motion to Stay based on two recent developments related to Morris.
Defendant's first ground for reconsideration is an Order issued by
the Court of Appeals in O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 15-
17420 (9th Cir. September 22, 2017), that withdrew from submission
several cases involving concerted action waivers pending the
Supreme Court's resolution of Morris and its companion cases or
until further order of the Court of Appeals.  Defendant's second
ground for reconsideration is the change in the position of the
United States Department of Justice on whether the NLRA bars
concerted against waivers like those at issue in Morris and this
case.

Plaintiff contends that the O'Connor order does not justify
reconsideration of the Order Denying the Motion to Stay because
O'Connor is an appellate case whose very determination is reliant
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Morris.  Plaintiff contends
that the change in the position of the United States Department of
Justice does not justify reconsideration of the Order Denying the
Motion to Stay because the Ninth Circuit's decision in Morris
remains controlling law.

The District Court denied Defendant's motion to stay after finding
that district courts have no authority to await a ruling by the
Supreme Court before applying the circuit court's decision as
binding authority.  The Court of Appeals withdrew from submission
several cases involving concerted action waivers pending the
Supreme Court's resolution of Morris.  Federal district courts
have broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its
power to control its own docket.

In light of the Court of Appeal's decision to withdraw the cases
before it pending Morris, the District Court finds it appropriate
to stay this case.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is granted and
the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Stay is vacated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8oas54ofrom
Leagle.com.

Anh Bui, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory E. Mauro, James
Hawkins, APLC.

Anh Bui, Plaintiff, represented by James R. Hawkins --
james@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James Hawkins APLC.

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Defendant, represented by Jesse A.
Cripps, Jr. -- jcripps@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP.


OCWEN LOAN: New York Court Narrows Claims in "Delgado" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MARGARITA
DELGADO, WILLIAM SHEPPARD, GERALDINE MAHOOD, KEVIN CROWNING, LYA
CROWNING, PAUL EMMERT, CAROLYN TOTR, BRIAN RAFACZ, JENNIFER
RENDRICKS, CYNTRIA BENIWAL, KIMBERLY KAYES, JUSTIN WISNEWSKI,
LAURIE CREAMITRU, DALE ZIMMER, MICRAEL BENRAMU, MEGHAN FOX, DAN
WILKINSON, KENT COLLIER, THERESA McCULLOUGR, BEN ELLIOTT, JASON
ABT, CAMIPELOZA, and TERRY OLIVER, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, CROSS COUNTRY ROME SERVICES, INC., SANDRA FINN,
and "JOHN DOES 1-10," Defendants, No. 13-CV-4427 (NGG) (ST)
(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendants
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Cross Country Home Services, Inc.,
Cross Country's President Sandra Finn, and John Does 1-10.
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants engaged in a deceptive check
solicitation scheme that led Plaintiffs and other consumers
unknowingly to enroll in, and pay monthly fees for, Cross
Country's warranty plans.

Defendants filed a motion for partial-dismissal of the Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Motion
contains several subparts.  First, Defendants argue that the
claims brought under six of the state consumer protection statutes
are deficient under the terms of those statutes.  Second, the
Motion contends that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment and breach of
fiduciary duty claims fail under the laws of fourteen and ten of
the states cited in the Complaint, respectively.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part.  Plaintiffs' claims for violations of the Alabama Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, and
the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act are dismissed without
prejudice.  Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under
the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law, the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, the Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act, Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment under
the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana,
Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington, and Plaintiff's breach of
fiduciary duty claims under the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia,
Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Virginia, and
Washington is denied.

Defendants argue that several of the state consumer protection
statute-based claims are inadequately pled based on their
inclusion of class claims, the absence of certain required
allegations, and the timeliness of the claims.

The Court concluded that it is compelled to follow Justice
Stevens' concurrence in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.,
v. Allstate Insurance Company, 559 U.S. 393 (2010), and apply the
class action bar incorporated in the Alabama, Georgia, and
Tennessee consumer protection laws over Rule 23 on that basis.
The Court concludes that the overlap between Justice Stevens'
concurrence and the dissent both of which "concluded that the
validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turns, in part,
on the rights afforded by the state rule that the Federal Rule
displaces renders Justice Stevens' concurrence controlling.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' class claims under Alabama's Deceptive
Trade Practices Law, Georgia's Fair Business Practices Act, and
Tennessee's Consumer Protection Act are dismissed without
prejudice.

The court concludes that the allegations in the Complaint give
rise to an inference that the Arizona Plaintiffs could not have
discovered the alleged fraud in the exercise of reasonable
diligence from the face of billing statements provided by
Defendants. As alleged in the Complaint, one of the integral
components of the alleged scheme was the practice of obfuscating
the source and nature of payments to Cross Country on Plaintiffs'
mortgage and escrow statements by, inter alia, hiding the charges
within Ocwen-provided statements as a line item and using
intentionally vague or inconspicuous descriptions of those
charges.

The Court finds these allegations sufficient to support a
plausible inference that the Arizona Plaintiffs' delay in
discovering the alleged fraud from the billing statements was
reasonable and so that the actions, initiated within a year of
Plaintiffs' actual discovery of the charges, was timely.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to the Arizona CFA
claims.

Defendants separately move to dismiss as untimely claims under
Indiana's Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA) raised by Justin
Wisnewski, the sole Indiana-based plaintiff listed in the
Complaint.  The court concludes that Wisnewski was not required to
provide notice under the IDCSA, as the allegations in the
Complaint, taken as a whole, are more than sufficient to support a
finding that Defendants engaged in an incurable deceptive act. The
Complaint is replete with detailed allegations regarding
Defendants' scheme, the form of the solicitation checks, and the
means by which Defendants disguised the charges incurred by plan
recipients, including specific allegations that Defendants acted
with the purpose of deceiving and misleading mailing recipients.
Moreover, the Complaint provides specific allegations as to the
timing of Wisnewski's receipt of the allegedly fraudulent mailing,
the form of the solicitation and subsequent charges on his
mortgage statements, and his reliance on the fraudulent
representation. Taken together, these allegations provide ample
reason to conclude that Wisnewski was the victim of an incurable
deceptive act committed by Defendants and so is not bound by the
IDCSA's notice provisions.

The court concludes Plaintiffs' cause of action for unjust
enrichment under Texas law can proceed. While it is admittedly a
close call, the court concludes that the implicit recognition of
unjust enrichment by various decisions of the Texas Supreme Court
demonstrates that court's willingness to accept such causes of
action. Moreover, the court agrees with those federal courts in
Texas cited above in their conclusion that, regardless of whether
unjust enrichment is styled as a cause of action or simply as a
theory of recovery based on implied contract, Texas law clearly
permits recovery on that basis. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to
dismiss the claims of unjust enrichment under Texas law is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yctu9kt6
from Leagle.com.

Margarita Delgado, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen
-- jcj@cll.com -- Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C..

Margarita Delgado, Plaintiff, represented by Steven L. Wittels --
slw@wittelslaw.com -- Law Offices of Steven L. Wittels, James
Burkett McInturff, III -- jbm@wittelslaw.com -- Law Offices of
Steven L. Wittels & Tiasha Palikovic -- tpalikovic@wittelslaw.com
-- Wittels Law, P.C.

William Sheppard, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices of
Steven L. Wittels & James Burkett McInturff, III, Law Offices of
Steven L. Wittels.

Geraldine Mahood, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices of
Steven L. Wittels & James Burkett McInturff, III, Law Offices of
Steven L. Wittels.

Michael Benhamu, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Cami Peloza, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Carolyn Toth, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Brian Rafacz, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Terry Oliver, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Kevin Chowning, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Lya Chowning, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Kent Collier, Plaintiff, represented by J. Christopher Jensen,
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. & Steven L. Wittels, Law Offices
of Steven L. Wittels.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant, represented by Caroline
Kathryn Eisner -- ceisner@buckleysandler.com -- BuckleySandler
LLP, Dana Walsh Kumar -- dkumar@buckleysandler.com --
BuckleySandler LLP, Matthew P. Previn --
mprevin@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP, Ross Eric
Morrison -- rmorrison@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP &
Timothy Coley -- tcoley@buckleysandler.com -- BuckleySandler LLP,
pro hac vice.

Cross Country Home Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bruce
E. Alexander -- info@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner Brodsky Kider PC,
Cameron Andrew Tepfer -- ctepfer@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster,
Carrie H. Cohen -- ccohen@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP,
David John Fioccol -- dfioccola@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Grant Joseph Esposito -- gesposito@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP, Jason Wayne McElroy -- mcelroy@thewbkfirm.com --
Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, Jessica Kaufma -- jkaufman@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster, Robert James Baehr -- rbaehr@mofo.com --
Morrison & Foerster, Michael S. Trabon -- trabon@thewbkfirm.com --
Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, pro hac vice, Mitchel H. Kider --
kider@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner Brodsky Kider PC & Timothy P. Ofak
-- ofak@thewbkfirm.com -- Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, pro hac vice.

Sandra Finn, Defendant, represented by Bruce E. Alexander, Weiner
Brodsky Kider PC, David John Fioccola, Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Jason Wayne McElroy, Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, Michael S. Trabon,
Weiner Brodsky Kider PC, pro hac vice & Timothy P. Ofak, Weiner
Brodsky Kider PC.

Affinion Group, Inc., Respondent, represented by Kenneth M.
Kliebard -- kenneth.kliebard@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Ari Micah Selman --
ari.selman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius & Gregory T.
Fouts -- gregory.fouts@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
pro hac vice.

Trilegiant Corporation, Respondent, represented by Kenneth M.
Kliebard, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Ari Micah
Selman, Morgan Lewis & Bockius & Gregory T. Fouts, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, pro hac vice.

CitiMortgage, Inc., Objector, represented by Debra Bogo-Ernst --
dernst@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown, pro hac vice, Jennifer Marie
Rosa -- jrosa@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP & Christopher S.
Comstock -- ccomstock@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac
vice.


OREGON: ACLU Files Class Action Against Police Over "Kettling"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lyndsey Hewitt, writing for Portland Tribune, reports that the
Portland Police Bureau could have to pay up for its response to a
June 4 protest and march downtown Portland where it used a tactic
called "kettling" to detain hundreds of people, including a number
of local, national and freelance journalists, and two legal
observers with the American Civil Liberties Union Oregon.

ACLU Oregon has decided to go to bat against the city in a class-
action lawsuit that names the city of Portland, Mayor Ted Wheeler
and police officers Dan DiMatteo, Chris Lindsey, Jason
Christensen, Michael Pool, Justin Raphael and Kerri Ottoman.  The
lawsuit also lists up to 50 "John Doe" police officers, meaning
their names could be added to the lawsuit in the future.

The five plaintiffs, Josef Haber, Patrick Garrison, Jennifer
Nickolaus, Chris Whaley and Jade Sturms, were caught up as police
"kettled" marchers during the protest.  "For almost an hour,
people were seized by defendant PPB officers, with no access to
food or bathrooms," according to the 14-page complaint filed
Wednesday, Nov. 15, in U.S. District Court.

"The members of the plaintiff class, including the individual
named plaintiffs, were allowed to leave only after defendant PPB
officers photographed each individual and recorded their
identifying information."

ACLU attorneys claimed in the lawsuit that the city and police
officers violated the plaintiffs' Constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and equal protection.  They also
claimed that the "kettling" practice also violated their state
constitutional rights by holding them "without individualized
reasonable suspicion."

In addition to asking the court to declare the kettling practice
unconstitutional, ACLU lawyers are seeking unspecified
compensation for the plaintiffs and others in the protest, and
legal and court fees.

City officials haven't responded to media requests for comment
because of the pending litigation. No court date has been set for
the case.

'A minor offense'

The most controversial part of the day's events, which started in
a dueling protest between antifa groups at Chapman Square and an
alt-right "free speech" rally at Terry Scrunck Plaza, was when
officers decided to photograph IDs of everyone in the cordoned off
area of about 200 to 250 people, including this reporter and
Pamplin Media Group photographer Josh Kulla. Police at the time
said that people were being detained pending investigation into
disorderly conduct.

They wouldn't let anyone out of the kettle until their IDs were
photographed, regardless if journalists had press credentials.

The bureau said they were using the photographs to identify anyone
in footage who may have engaged in illegal activity during the
protests prior so they could hold them accountable. Police were
filming the day's events.

The police bureau later told media that they would destroy the
photographs of IDs.

ACLU Oregon issued a statement shortly after protests, saying the
strategy was unconstitutional and likely violated state law:
"Disorderly conduct is a minor offense and hardly something the
police should prioritize at the expense of the constitutional
rights of those who were detained."

The June 4 rally and counter protests were held only days after
the MAX stabbing when Jeremy Christian, a white supremacist,
killed two people and seriously injured another. [GN]


PHILIP MORRIS: Fla. Dist. App. Flips Final Judgment in "Duignan"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; R.J. REYNOLDS
TOBACCO COMPANY; LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY; and LORILLARD, INC.,
Appellants, v. KEVIN DUIGNAN, as personal representative of the
Estate of Douglas Clarence Duignan, deceased, Appellee, Case No.
2D15-5055 (Fla. Dist. App.), Judge Samuel J. Salario, Jr. of the
District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Second District
reversed trial court's final judgment entered in favor of Kevin
Duignan, the personal representative of the Estate of Douglas
Clarence Duignan, and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Engle progeny case proceeded to trial on an amended complaint
which alleged that before Nov. 21, 1996, Douglas Duignan developed
lung cancer as a result of having been addicted to cigarettes
containing nicotine.  It asserted claims for strict liability,
negligence, fraud by concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraud
by concealment and sought compensatory and punitive damages.  The
Estate acknowledged that Douglas Duignan bore some responsibility
for his smoking and asked for an apportionment of fault and
damages on his nonintentional tort claims -- i.e., the claims for
strict liability and negligence.

The trial court held a two-phase trial.  The first phase was to
determine the issues of Engle class membership, comparative fault,
legal causation on the Estate's fraud and conspiracy claims, and
the Estate's entitlement -- if any -- to punitive damages.  During
its Phase I deliberations, the jury sent the court a note about
how to locate specific portions of the evidence to review, asking
whether there's a key for the evidence because they're having
trouble finding things in the evidence boxes.  If not, they ask if
they can have the number for Dennis Duignan's deposition.  The
trial court expressed concern that allowing a readback of Dennis
Duignan's testimony would open a "Pandora's box" and perhaps give
"undue influence" to that testimony.  The trial court proposed to
instruct the jury that testimony is not generally read back to a
jury.  There is a possibility under some circumstances.  PM and
Reynolds objected to that instruction and proposed simply advising
the jury that a readback was possible.  The court declined.

The jury then returned a verdict that, in essence, determined that
Douglas Duignan was a member of the Engle class and found in the
Estate's favor on all claims.  It awarded $6,000,000 in
compensatory damages and found that the Estate was entitled to
punitive damages.  It apportioned fault as follows: 37% to PM, 30%
to Reynolds, and 33% to Douglas Duignan.  After the second phase
of the trial, the jury awarded punitive damages of $3.5 million
against PM and $2.5 million against Reynolds.

The trial court entered a judgment against PM and Reynolds finding
them jointly and severally liable for the entire compensatory
damage award, irrespective of the jury's comparative fault
allocation, because the Estate had prevailed on its intentional
tort claims and damages on such claims are not apportioned based
on comparative fault.  PM and Reynolds requested that the trial
court apply a credit to the punitive damages award based on a
"Guaranteed Sum Stipulation" entered into by the parties in the
original Engle litigation regarding the punitive damage award in
that case.  The trial court denied that request, and its judgment
included the punitive damages awards the jury made.  PM and
Reynolds timely appeal the judgment.

PM and Reynolds raise four issues.  First, they assert that the
trial court's response to the jury note concerning Dennis
Duignan's testimony both improperly discouraged the jury from
requesting a readback and, by advising the jury that a readback
would give "undue influence" to the testimony, improperly
commented on the evidence.  Second, they argue that the trial
court's instructions to the jury on the reliance element of the
Estate's fraud-based claims were erroneous because they failed to
require the jury to find that Douglas Duignan relied on "a
statement" by one of the tobacco companies.  Third, they claim
that the trial court erred by failing to reduce the compensatory
damages award based on the jury's comparative fault allocation
because Engle progeny cases are grounded in negligence, not
intentional torts, and principles of comparative fault therefore
apply notwithstanding the Estate's assertion of claims for fraud
by concealment and conspiracy.  And fourth, they contend that they
are entitled to a credit against the punitive damage award based
on the Guaranteed Sum Stipulation between the tobacco companies
and the Engle class in the original Engle litigation.

Judge Salario finds that the trial court abused its discretion in
addressing the jury's request for Dennis Duignan's deposition, and
the Estate has not met the burden to show that error was harmless.
Accordingly, the Judge must reverse and remand for a new trial.
In light of this result, he needs not further address PM and
Reynolds' argument that the trial court also improperly commented
on the evidence in its response to the jury's note.  He does,
however, address one other issue raised on appeal because it
relates to a matter that rests within the scope of his remand and
therefore requires his consideration.

The Judge turns to PM and Reynolds' argument that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on the reliance elements in the
claims for fraud by concealment and conspiracy because it failed
to tell the jury that Douglas Duignan was required to have relied
on "a statement" by PM or Reynolds in order for the Estate to
prevail.  He says that while he does not read the reliance
requirement as narrowly as PM and Reynolds do, the instruction in
the case was an abuse of discretion because it inaccurately told
the jury to determine whether Douglas Duignan generally relied on
PM and Reynolds to disclose material facts rather than telling the
jury to determine whether he relied on a misapprehension
concerning a material fact that PM and Reynolds concealed from
him.

At a minimum, the error would require a new trial on the Estate's
claims for fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to fraudulently
conceal.  The parties disagree, however, about whether it also
requires a new trial with respect to punitive damages.  While the
error itself is one worthy of articulation so that it is not
repeated in the second trial, Judge Salario says he needs not
reach a determination on what the scope of that error alone would
be on remand because he will reverse and remand for a new trial on
all issues based on the trial court's readback.

For these reasons, Judge Salario reversed the final judgment and
remanded the case for a new trial.  He certified conflict with
Schoeff, Calloway, McKeever, and Grossman with respect to the
comparative fault issue in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/b7o3rq from Leagle.com.

Cathy A. Kamm -- ckamm@shb.com -- Terri L. Parker --
tparker@shb.com -- Daniel F. Molony -- dmolony@shb.com -- and
Razvan Axente -- raxente@shb.com -- of Shook, Hardy & Bacon,
L.L.P., Tampa; Geoffrey J. Michael -- geoffrey.michael@apks.com --
and Daphne O'Connor -- daphne.o'connor@apks.com -- of Arnold &
Porter LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Gregory G. Katsas of
Jones Day (withdrew after briefing), Washington, District of
Columbia; and Charles R.A. Morse -- cramorse@jonesday.com -- of
Jones Day, New York, New York, for Appellants.

David J. Sales, Daniel R. Hoffman of David J. Sales, P.A.,
Jupiter; Gary M. Paige -- gpaige@fortheinjured.com -- Robert E.
Gordon -- rgordon@fortheinjured.com -- of Gordon & Doner, P.A.,
Davie; James W. Gustafson Jr. -- JWG@searcylaw.com -- of Searcy
Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., Tallahassee, for
Appellee.


PITCHER PARTNERS: Faces Class Action Over Slater & Gordon Audit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Lodewyke, writing for Lawyers Weekly, reports that Pitcher
Partners, which was Slater and Gordon's auditor until 30 June
2015, is being sued over its auditing of the listed law firm.

Two shareholder class actions were brought against the troubled
law firm after its systemic accounting issues came to light
following the acquisition of Quindell in the UK.

Slater and Gordon achieved rapid growth through a series of
acquisitions around Australia before expanding to the UK.  The
firm allegedly inflated its revenue by counting work in progress
as billings, despite not knowing whether the cases would be
successful.

Litigation funder Vannin Capital is funding the claim against
Pitcher Partners.  The accounting firm allegedly "failed to
exercise reasonable skill and care" in signing off on Slater and
Gordon's financial statements, according to Vannin Capital
investment director Adam Silverman.

The statement of claim filed against Pitcher Partners alleged that
the auditor wrongly signed off on statements that inflated Slater
and Gordon's revenue by over $130 million from 2012 to 2015
financial years, Fairfax reported.

A spokesperson for Pitcher Partners denied that the firm had
caused any loss to Slater and Gordon shareholders.

"Pitcher Partners is confident in the work it undertook as SGH's
previous auditor and that it has not caused any loss to SGH or its
shareholders," he said.

"Pitcher Partners did not advise upon and was not involved in the
acquisition of the Quindell business."

Johnson Winter and Slattery is acting for the shareholders.

Slater and Gordon will seek shareholder approval to settle the
class actions against it, as well as to implement its
recapitalisation plan at creditors' meetings on 28 November.

Slater and Gordon's senior lenders will control 95 to 96 per cent
of the firm's equity if the recapitalisation plan goes ahead.

The firm's financial troubles have fuelled debate over whether law
firms should be allowed to list on the stock exchange. [GN]


POWERSECURE INT'L: Dismissal of Amended "Maguire" Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allyson Kay of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Maguire's
amended complaint in the securities fraud class action styled
MAGUIRE FINANCIAL, LP, Movant-Appellant, and LEONARD ASH,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, and CLAY LESLIE; PAUL E. MOORE, Movants, v. POWERSECURE
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SIDNEY HINTON, Defendants-Appellees, and
CHRISTOPHER T. HUTTER, Defendant, Case No. 16-2163 (4th Cir.).

On May 22, 2014, Ash filed a securities class action suit against
PowerSecure, Hinton, and Hutter (PowerSecure's Chief Financial
Officer).  On Oct. 10, 2014, the district court granted a motion
to consolidate Ash's case with two other cases and named Maguire
Financial as the Lead Plaintiff.  On Dec. 29, 2014, the Plaintiffs
filed a consolidated securities class action suit.  It alleged
that PowerSecure's share price was artificially inflated after
Hinton's Aug. 7, 2013, statement that PowerSecure had obtained a
contract renewal, because PowerSecure knew then that its West Palm
Beach contract had not been extended, and it had instead been
awarded a less profitable contract in Ft. Myers.

Maguire Financial sought to impose liability based on 26 allegedly
materially false or misleading statements made by the Defendants.
On Sept. 15, 2015, the district court granted PowerSecure's motion
to dismiss.  The district court concluded that 25 of the
statements were not materially false or misleading.  The 26th
statement was that of Hinton on Aug. 7, 2013, noting that the
company was blessed to announce securing a $49 million three-year
contract renewal, both the renewal and expansion with one of the
largest investor owned utilities in the country.  The district
court found that Maguire Financial had adequately alleged that the
26th statement was materially misleading, but that the complaint
failed to adequately plead scienter.  It therefore granted leave
to amend.

The amended complaint sought to impose liability based only on
Hinton's Aug. 7, 2013, statement.  On Sept. 14, 2016, the district
court granted PowerSecure's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, finding that Maguire Financial again failed to
adequately plead scienter.  It concluded that neither the
allegation that Hinton had made a material misrepresentation nor a
holistic view of the facts were sufficient.  The appeal followed.

Judge Kay that Maguire Financial's amended complaint alleges that
Hinton was privy to confidential and proprietary information
concerning PowerSecure and that it is impossible that Hinton did
not know the contract was not a renewal but, instead, was an
entirely new contract for a different geographic area that would
require the company to hire and train new workers at considerable
expense.  It also alleged that Hinton and the company had various
motives to inflate PowerSecure's stock price, and that these
motivations, combined with Hinton's knowledge that he was
misspeaking, satisfy the scienter requirement.

Like the district court, the Judge finds the allegations of
scienter inadequate.  First, he must reject Appellant's theory
that an inference that Hinton knew his statement was false is
sufficient to show that Hinton acted intentionally or recklessly
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.  Second, he concludes that
upon a holistic evaluation of all the facts in the amended
complaint, the inference of scienter is neither cogent and
compelling, nor strong in light of other explanations.

For these reasons, Judge Kay concludes that Maguire Financial has
not adequately alleged scienter as required by Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act.  Accordingly, he affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Dr2Wri from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Charles J. Piven -- piven@browerpiven.com -- BROWER PIVEN,
Stevenson, Maryland, for Appellant.

Gregory Lewis Watts -- GWatts@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI, Seattle, Washington, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Michael A. Ostrander -- mostrander@wrlaw.com -- WILSON &
RATLEDGE, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina; David A.P. Brower --
brower@browerpiven.com -- Richard H. Weiss --
weiss@browerpiven.com -- BROWER PIVEN, New York, New York, for
Appellant.

Lee M. Whitman -- lwhitman@wyrick.com -- Tobias S. Hampson --
thampson@wyrick.com -- WYRICK ROBBINS YATES & PONTON LLP, Raleigh,
North Carolina; Barry M. Kaplan -- bkaplan@wsgr.com -- WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, Seattle, Washington, for Appellees.


PROFESSIONAL PLACEMENT: Faces "Suleymanov" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional
Placement Services, LLC. The case is styled as Boris Suleymanov
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Professional Placement Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-
cv-06978 (E.D. N.Y., November 30, 2017).

Professional Placement Services is a nationally licensed, full-
service collection agency located in Milwaukee Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
   Joseph H. Mizrahi Law, P.C.
   337 Avenue W, Suite 2f
   Brooklyn, NY 11223
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: jmizrahilaw@gmail.com


QUALITY VACATION: Class Action Mulled Over Timeshare Abuse
----------------------------------------------------------
Eyewitness News reports that commercial attorney Trudie Broekmann
is planning a class action over timeshare abuse against consumers.

She demands the full return of clients' "investments", as the
contracts are illegal and don't comply with the Consumer
Protection Act.

Ms. Broekmann has thus far legally terminated the contracts of 48
clients of time-share suppliers Quality Vacation Club, African
Club Innovations (ACI), Multi Destination Club, Dream Vacations,
Lifestyle Vacation Club and Flexi Club.

There are 740,000 timeshare owners in South Africa, according to a
2011 Grant Thornton study. [GN]


QUICKEN LOAN: "Mattson" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Erik Mattson, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated v. Quicken Loan, Inc., New Penn Financial, LLC, Vision
Quest Lending, and United Mortgage Corp., Case No. 3:17-cv-01840
(D. Ore., November 16, 2017), is brought against the Defendants
for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff filed the class action to stop the Defendants'
practice of making unsolicited telemarketing calls to the
telephones of consumers nationwide and to obtain redress for all
persons injured by their conduct, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Erik Mattson is a citizen of Portland, Oregon.

The Defendants are mortgage companies. In an effort to solicit
potential customers, Defendants recruited a third-party call
center to contact consumers who never inquired about mortgage
products through any medium. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gregory K. Zeuthen, Esq.
      GREGORY K. ZEUTHEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
      210 SW Morrison Street, Suite 400
      Portland, OR 97204
      Tel: (503) 227-7257
      Fax: (503) 228-1556
      E-mail: gkz@zlawoffice.com


SHERWIN-WILLIAMS: Faces Class Action Over Deck Coating Products
---------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a class of consumers claims
in a federal lawsuit that paint giant Sherwin-Williams' Duckback
and SuperDeck deck coating products do not provide the promised
protection, resulting in peeling, cracking and bubbling.

The case is ROSALINDA ALBRIGHT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS
COMPANY, THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, USA SHERWIN-
WILLIAMS CHEMICAL INDUSTRY GROUP, INC, and USA SHERWIN-WILLIAMS
CHEMICAL LLC, Defendants, Case No. ___ (N.D. Ohio).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Thomas A. Muzilla, Esq.
     THE MUZILLA LAW FIRM, LLC
     2996 Kingsley Road
     Cleveland, Ohio 44122
     Tel: (216) 401-8607
     E-mail: tom@muzillalaw.com

        -- and --

     Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
     Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
     Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
     MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
     555 Lancaster Avenue
     Berwyn, PA 19312
     Tel: (610) 200-0580
     Email: jgs@mccunewright.com
            mds@mccunewright.com
            jbk@mccunewright.com

        -- and --

     Bryan Clobes, Esq.
     CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL
     1101 Market Street, Suite 2650
     Philadelphia, PA 19107
     Tel: (215) 864-2800
     Fax: (215) 864-2810
     E-mail: bclobes@caffertyclobes.com

        -- and --

     Daniel O. Herrera, Esq.
     CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & SPRENGEL
     30 N LaSalle St., Suite 3200
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Tel: (312) 782-4880
     E-mail: dherrera@caffertyclobes.com


SHOWTIME NETWORKS: Mayweather/McGregor Class Action Can't Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John E. Goodman, Esq. -- jgoodman@bradley.com -- of Bradley Arant
Boult Cummings LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
boxing fan Victor Mallh, attempting to take a class action swing
at Showtime Networks for failures in its livestream broadcast of
the Mayweather/McGregor fight in August of this year, will have to
pursue his claim in arbitration, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled (Mallh v. Showtime Networks,
Inc., 2017 WL 5157247 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2017)).  While Mr. Mallh's
fight -- unlike McGregor's against Mayweather -- hasn't been
stopped, it will apparently now be confined to a single-plaintiff
arbitration against the entertainment company.

Mr. Mallh signed up to view the boxing match via livestream on
Showtime's website, paying $99.95 on the day of the fight. The
website's purchase page required purchasers to agree to Showtime's
Terms of Use (TOU), Privacy Policy and Video Services Policy, each
of which were hyperlinked to the page.  The TOU in turn contained
an express arbitration provision and class action waiver, whereby
purchasers agreed in the event of a dispute to either an
individual action in small claims court or an individual
arbitration proceeding administered by the AAA. Purchasers also
agreed to waive the right to trial by jury and the right to
participate in a class action.

Mr. Mallh claimed that Showtime rabbit-punched him during the
livestream, logging him out for a substantial portion of the
fight, and then hit him below the belt by delaying or making
incomplete various parts of the coverage.  When his request for a
refund was refused, he complained to the referee, but not the
referee actually in charge of the fight.  Ignoring the arbitration
provision, Mr. Mallh filed a putative class action against
Showtime in federal court, asserting contract, unfair practices
and unjust enrichment claims. Showtime counterpunched by moving to
compel arbitration pursuant to the TOU, or in the alternative to
dismiss or strike the complaint's class allegations.

The court granted Showtime's motion to compel, sounding the final
bell on Mr. Mallh's quest for a class action jury trial.
Acknowledging Second Circuit and other precedent, the court first
recognized that an electronic click can sufficiently manifest
assent to a contract, in the context of both "clickwrap" and
"browsewrap" electronic agreements. (The former requires users to
affirmatively click an "I agree" box after being presented with
terms of use; the latter -- as Showtime's was -- generally posts
detailed terms of use via hyperlink and does not require the user
to click an "I agree" box.) The court found that the Showtime
website required Mr. Mallh to acknowledge that he had read and
agreed to the TOU; the only remaining question was whether
Mr. Mallh received adequate notice via the website and links that
he was agreeing to individual arbitration.

The judge scored all rounds decisively for Showtime.  Contrary to
Mr. Mallh's arguments, the court held that the website was not
"cluttered" and the arbitration provision and class waiver were
not "buried," but instead were reasonably conspicuous.  On this
point the court held that there was nothing inherently wrong with
the TOU being made available only via hyperlink.  Relying on
Second Circuit authority, the court found it unobjectionable that
the consumer is "prompted to examine the terms of sale . . .
located somewhere else."  Given that Mr. Mallh did not deny that
he clicked on a box agreeing to the TOU, thus manifesting his
assent, the court granted the motion to compel arbitration, and
left Mr. Mallh's class action aspirations lying on the canvas.
[GN]


SINGING RIVER: Court Consolidates 3 Suits, Names Reeves as Atty
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Southern District of
Mississippi, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate the Actions
styled THOMAS JONES, JOSEPH CHARLES LOHFINK, SUE BEAVERS, RODOLFOA
REL, and HAZEL REED THOMAS, on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER HEALTH SERVICES
FOUNDATION, et al., Defendants, and, REGINA COBB, SUSAN CREEL, and
PHYLLIS DENMARK, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,
Defendants, and, MARTHA EZELL LOWE, individually and on behalf of
a class of similarly situated employees, Plaintiffs, v. SINGING
RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM, et al., Defendants, Cause Nos. 1:14CV447-LG-
RHW, 1:15CV1-LG-RHW, 1:15CV44-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss.), and appointing
James R. Reeves, Jr., as Interim Lead Counsel.

The Jones plaintiffs attempt to assert the following claims:
Contracts clause claims filed pursuant to the United States
Constitution and Mississippi Constitution; Takings Clause claims
filed pursuant to the United States Constitution and Mississippi
Constitution; Section 1983 claims filed against the individual
defendants in their official capacities; a breach of contract
claim; an accounting claim; a declaratory judgment claim; a claim
for injunctive relief; claims of fraud, intentional fraudulent
misrepresentation, and deceit filed against KPMG, Transamerica,
and the individual defendants in their individual capacities;
claims filed pursuant to ERISA.  The Jones plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed the following defendants: Hugo Quintana, Stephen
Nunenmacher, Martin Bydalek, William Descher, Joseph Vice, and
Eric Washington.

The Cobb plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against the following
defendants: Singing River Health System, the Board of Trustees for
the Singing River Health System, Michael J. Heidelberg, Michael D.
Tolleson, Allen L. Cronier, Tommy L. Leonard, Lawrence H. Cosper,
Morris G. Strickland, Ira S. Polk, Stephen Nunenmacher, Hugo
Quintana, Marva Fairley-Tanner, William S. Descher, Joseph P.
Vice, Martin D. Bydalek, Eric D. Washington, G. Chris Anderson,
and Kevin Holland.

Martha Ezell Lowe, acting on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, filed her lawsuit against the following
defendants: Singing River Health System, Transamerica Retirement
Solutions Corporation, KPMG, LLP, Gary Anderson, Michael Crews,
Michael Tolleson, Stephanie Barnes Taylor, Morris Strickland, and
Tommy Leonard.

The Jones plaintiffs ask the Court to stay the Cobb lawsuit
pursuant to the first-to file rule.  The Court denies the Motion
to Stay holding that the policies behind the first-to-file rule
apply equally to cases where related cases are pending before two
different judges in the same district court. However, there is no
need to impose the rule where, as here, the cases are pending
before the same judge. This is particularly true since courts
typically transfer the latter-filed case to the court or judge
handling the first-filed case.  Furthermore, the concern of
inconsistent, duplicative, or piecemeal rulings is removed when
both cases are pending before the same judge.

The primary consideration, aside from the existence of common
questions of law or fact, is whether consolidation would prevent
delay or the expenditure of unnecessary costs.

The facts in the Jones, Cobb, and Lowe class action lawsuits are
identical. Furthermore, all of the lawsuits present the issue of
whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duties while
managing the Plan. All three of the lawsuits are also in a similar
procedural posture. The Court finds that the Motions to
Consolidate should be granted, because consolidation would save
time and resources.

The attorneys who filed the Jones and Cobb lawsuits have each
filed Motions to Appoint Interim Lead Counsel, but the attorneys
who filed the Lowe lawsuit have not filed a motion.  The Court
finds that both Reeves and the Branstetter firm are qualified and
capable to serve as lead counsel in this consolidated action. They
have clearly done a significant amount of work and research
preparing the claims presented in their respective lawsuits.
Furthermore, the Court finds that both the Reeves and Branstetter
firms have the resources and knowledge necessary to handle this
case, given their firms' resumes and the staff that each firm has
been utilizing in this case thus far.  While the Branstetter firm
as a whole has more experience than Reeves handling class actions
related to retirement plans, only one attorney from the
Branstetter firm has appeared and been granted permission to
appear pro hac vice before this Court in this action. The Court is
aware that it is permissible to appoint an entire firm as lead
counsel, but in this case, the Court is concerned about appointing
an out-of-state firm to serve in this role.

The Court finds that a single, local attorney would be better
suited to serve in the capacity of lead counsel, since he would be
more readily accessible to the Court and the putative class.
Furthermore, Reeves has demonstrated through this case that he is
capable of prosecuting the current action. Specifically, the Court
has noted Reeves' ability to negotiate effectively with counsel
for the defendants to the benefit of the putative class. For
example, Reeves negotiated a ninety-day stay to prevent
termination of the Plan at issue. Reeves also worked with counsel
for the defendants to jointly seek appointment of a special master
and mediator for the Jones action.

Finally, the Court finds that appointment of co-lead counsel would
lead to disputes as well as a lack of cohesion in strategy, based
on the memoranda submitted in support of the present Motions.
After considering all of these factors, the Court finds that
Reeves should be appointed to serve as interim lead counsel until
further order of this Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9mtc78gfrom Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr. --
dgw@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC.

Thomas Jones, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Finkbohner, III
-- gwf@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, 160
Main St, Biloxi, MS 39530, USA, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts --
let@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice,
Steven L. Nicholas -- sln@cunninghambounds.com -- CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER,
PLLC & Thomas W. Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, 160 Main St,
Biloxi, MS 39530, USA

Joseph Charles Lohfink, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes,
Jr., CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Sue Beavers, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Rodolfoa Rel, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Hazel Reed Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Wirtes, Jr.,
CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III, CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr., LUMPKIN, REEVES &
MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro
hac vice, Steven L. Nicholas, CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC & Thomas W.
Busby, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Martha Ezell Lowe, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Angelique M.
Cooper, A. COOPER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, pro hac vice, Joe R.
Whatley, Jr., WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP, Richard P. Rouco, QUINN,
CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO, LLP, pro hac vice & Roger K.
Doolittle, ROGER K. DOOLITTLE, ATTORNEY.


STATE FARM: Court Denies Bid for Reconsideration in "Arnold" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNIE ARNOLD, etc., Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-0148-WS-C (S.D.
Ala.), Judge William H. Steele of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Northern Division, denied the
Defendant's motion for Section 1292(b) findings, certification of
question, and reconsideration.

The action was filed in state court and timely removed by the
Defendant.  According to the class action complaint, the
Plaintiff's house was insured by the Defendant under a policy
providing replacement cost value ("RCV") coverage.  The payment on
covered losses under such policies proceeds in two stages.

Initially, the Defendant pays actual cash value ("ACV"), which it
calculates as the estimated cost of materials and labor required
to complete the removal of damaged materials and subsequent
repairs, less depreciation.  The Defendant pays the difference
between ACV and RCV only if the insured accomplishes the repairs,
rebuilding or replacement of the damaged property within a
specific time frame and submits proof of same to the Defendant.
The insured therefore must front repair/replacement costs
exceeding the ACV payment.  In the Plaintiff's case, and as a
rule, in calculating ACV, the Defendant depreciates both materials
and labor.  The single claim presented is that the Defendant
breached its contractual duty to pay ACV by unlawfully
depreciating labor costs.

The Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing and for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.  As to
standing, the Defendant argued generally that, because it had paid
the Plaintiff RCV, including her undepreciated labor costs, before
she filed suit, she had been made whole and thus had no injury
that this action could redress.  Although the Plaintiff seeks
prejudgment contractual interest on the amount of the withheld
labor depreciation, as provided by statute, the Defendant argued
the Plaintiff could not satisfy the elements for recovery of such
interest.  The Court ruled that the Defendant's argument went not
to standing but to the merits of the dispute and accordingly held
the Plaintiff possesses standing.

As to failure to state a claim, the Defendant argued on several
grounds that the undefined policy term "actual cash value"
unambiguously encompasses depreciation of labor.  The Court
addressed each of these grounds and determined that, viewing the
issue through the lens required by Alabama law, the Defendant had
failed to demonstrate the correctness of its position.  Before the
Court is the Defendant's motion for Section 1292(b) findings,
certification of question, and reconsideration.

After careful consideration, Judge Steele denied the Defendant's
motion in its entirety.  Because he perceives no "substantial
ground for difference of opinion" as to its ruling on standing, he
denied the Defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal of the
standing issue.

Assuming without deciding that the Defendant presents a
controlling question of law, the Judge finds no "substantial
ground for difference of opinion."  To satisfy this element, the
Defendant relies exclusively on Ware v. Metropolitan Property and
Casualty Insurance Co.  Because "actual cash value" is not defined
in the Policy, and because the Ware Court did not address the
matters this Court discussed in construing the undefined term, he
does not believe that Ware furnishes substantial ground for
difference of opinion as to the issue the Court decided.
Accordingly, the Judge denied the Defendant's motion for
interlocutory appeal of the ACV issue.

Judge Steele also denied the Defendant's motion for certification.
He says the Defendant provides neither evidence nor quantification
of its assertion.  While the likelihood of the recurrence of the
particular legal issue is also to be considered, the "most
important" considerations are the closeness of the question and
the existence of adequate legal sources to render a principled
decision.  Thus, the possibility of recurrence does not outweigh
the weakness of the underlying legal argument.  Moreover, the
"amazing irony" that the Defendant now insists on the Alabama
forum it spurned by removing this action counsels further against
certification.  Finally, that sister courts are split on whether
to certify (different) questions regarding ACV and labor
depreciation, says nothing about the propriety of certification in
this Circuit or in this case.

Finally, the Judge denied the Defendant's motion for
reconsideration.  He says the Court did not so rule; instead, it
ruled that the ordinary meaning of fair market value does not
contemplate subtracting depreciation from an established fair
market value.  Nor could reconsideration alter the result of the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.  That motion failed because the
Defendant failed to sustain its burden of showing that the
undefined term "actual cash value" unambiguously contemplates
depreciation of labor costs.  That failure would remain intact
even were the Court to reconsider its discussion of Ballard v.
Lee; the Defendant does not argue otherwise.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/kNm46Q from Leagle.com.

Annie Arnold, Plaintiff, represented by David P. Martin --
david@erisacase.com -- The Martin Law Group, LLC.

Annie Arnold, Plaintiff, represented by Erik D. Peterson, Mehr,
Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, pro hac vice, Mendel
Austin Mehr, Mehr, Fairbanks & Peterson Trial Lawyers, PLLC, pro
hac vice & Philip Fairbanks, Mehr, Fairbanks & Peterson, pro hac
vice.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
James B. Newman -- jbn@helmsinglaw.com -- Helmsing, Leach,
Herlong, Joseph Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- Riley
Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice, Heidi Dalenberg --
hdalenberg@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro
hac vice, Jacob L. Kahn -- jkahn@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer
Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice & Tal C. Chaiken --
tchaiken@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac
vice.


SYSCO CORPORATION: Court Limits Petrossian Deposition in "Frieri"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute No. 3 in the
case captioned RICK FRIERI, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff, v. SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO SAN DIEGO, INC.; AND DOES
1-100, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-01432-JLS-NLS (S.D. Cal.).

The case is a putative class action of truck drivers for alleged
wage and hour violations while employed as drivers for defendants
Sysco San Diego, Inc., and/or Sysco Corporation.  Following a
lengthy class discovery period, eight months total, during which
the parties were unable to coordinate deposition dates, the
parties moved for and were granted leave to conduct three
deposition: (1) Plaintiff, (2) 30(b)(6) representative of Sysco
San Diego, and (3) 30(b)(6) representative of Sysco Corporation
after the class discovery cut-off.

The dispute before the Court arises from questions posed at the
deposition of the 30(b)(6) representative of Sysco San Diego, Mr.
John Petrossian.

The parties have agreed to the further deposition of Mr.
Petrossian but disagree as to the appropriate scope.  Defendants
argue that questioning should be limited to the questions the
witness was instructed not to answer and immediate follow up
questions. Plaintiff argues that his questioning was limited
because it was clear that counsel would object, and so the entire
lines of inquiry should permitted.

Central to that dispute and to Plaintiff's request for an
extension is the ability of Plaintiff to question Mr. Petrossian
on the number of non-driver employees of Sysco San Diego, a
category of potential class members which Plaintiff has never
previously identified in connection with the pending action.
Under the circumstances presented, the Court will exercise its
discretion to limit questioning on this previously un-explored
topic.

Plaintiff's motion to compel is denied in part and granted in
part. Plaintiff may re-ask the question and any specific and
limited follow up questions arising directly therefrom because the
Court does find that defense counsel's instruction not to answer
was improper.  However, Plaintiff's lack of diligence in the
pursuit of discovery as to any non-drivers precludes any further
questioning as to non-driver employees of Sysco San Diego as an
improper attempt to re-open discovery and disproportionate to the
needs of the case.

Defendants argue that the relationship between Sysco San Diego and
Sysco Corporation is a subject matter in Plaintiff's deposition
notice of the Sysco Corporation PMK, rendering further inquiry
into Mr. Petrossian's communications with Sysco Corporation
representatives improper as beyond the scope of his deposition
notice and converting his deposition to that of an individual
percipient witness.

The extent of Mr. Petrossian's communications with Mr. McKay, the
Sysco Corporation VP to whom Mr. Petrossian reports, may be
properly answered by Mr. Petrossian without re-noticing his
deposition or converting it to an individual percipient
deposition. However, because Plaintiff has noticed and identified
the topic of relationship between Sysco San Diego and Sysco
Corporation as a topic for the 30(b)(6) witness of the Sysco
Corporation, the Court finds it appropriate to limit Mr.
Petrossian's second deposition to the questions asked and any
follow up questions arising directly therefrom.

Plaintiff is granted leave to conduct Mr. Petrossian's second
deposition.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 09, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8gxeal2from Leagle.com

Rick Frieri, Plaintiff, represented by Jill M. Vecchi, The Turley
& Mara Law Firm, APLC. 7428 Trade St. San Diego, CA 92121

Rick Frieri, Plaintiff, represented by William D. Turley --
bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm, APLC & Matthew
Evan Crawford, The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, 7428 Trade St.
San Diego, CA 92121

Sysco Corporation, Defendant, represented by Julie Kwun --
jkwun@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hosteler, LLP, Margaret Rosenthal --
mrosenthal@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, Sabrina Layne
Shadi -- sshadi@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP & Vartan S.
Madoyan -- vmadoyan@bakerlaw.com -- Baker and Hostetler LLP.
Sysco San Diego, Inc., Defendant, represented by Julie Kwun, Baker
& Hosteler, LLP, Margaret Rosenthal, Baker & Hostetler LLP,
Sabrina Layne Shadi, Baker & Hostetler LLP & Vartan S. Madoyan,
Baker and Hostetler LLP.


TD BANK: "Diaz-Lebel" TCPA Suit Moved to Minnesota
--------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SARA DIAZ-LEBEL, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TD BANK USA, N.A. and
TARGET CORP., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-1611 (JBS/AMD) (D.
N.J.), Judge Jerome B. Simandle of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Defendants' motion to change
venue in a matter arising out of alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

On March 9, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a putative class action
complaint against the Defendants in the District of New Jersey.
In the complaint, she alleges that the Defendants conducted (and
continue to conduct) wide-scale calling campaigns and repeatedly
made unsolicited calls to consumers' telephones without consent,
in violation of the TCPA.

Notably, at all times of the calls, the Plaintiff did not have a
Target REDcard and never had a Target REDcard.  Thus, she seeks to
represent a "wrong number class" consisting of all persons in the
United States whose (i) cellular telephone number has been called
by Defendants; (ii) more than once; (iii) with an artificial or
prerecorded voice and/or an automatic telephone dialing system;
and (iv) did not have a Target REDcard contract with the
Defendants, (v) from March 9, 2013 to the date that class notice
was disseminated.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a resident of
Methuen, Massachusetts, Target is a corporation headquartered in
Minnesota and doing business in New Jersey and nationwide, and TD
Bank is a large national bank chain that maintains its principal
office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey and, inter alia, underwrites,
funds, and owns Target Credit Card and Target MasterCard consumer
receivables in the U.S.  As relevant to the motion, the Plaintiff
avers that, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, the Defendants
conducted and continue to conduct business in the District of New
Jersey.  The Defendants acknowledge they conduct business in this
District, but deny that either company engaged in any transaction
or occurrence in this judicial district with respect to the civil
action.

On Feb. 27, 2016, Israel Garcia, a Texas resident, filed a similar
putative class action against Target (but not TD Bank), Garcia v.
Target Corp., in the Southern District of Florida.  On July 28,
2016, that action was transferred to the District of Minnesota on
Target's unopposed motion.  In his complaint, Garcia alleged that
Target violated the TCPA by making unauthorized automated
telephone calls using an ATDS to individuals who never provided
consent to be called by Target.

On Nov. 3, 2016, the District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted a motion to stay the Garcia action, pending the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's decision in ACA Int'l v. FCC.  As
of the date of this Opinion, the Garcia action is still stayed in
the District of Minnesota.

On Oct. 16, 2015, Charlene Martinez, a resident of California,
filed a class action complaint against TD Bank, Martinez v. TD
Bank USA, N.A. & Target Corp., in this District.  On March 1,
2016, Martinez filed an amended complaint, which added Target as a
Defendant.  On June 30, 2017, this Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Defendants on Martinez's TCPA claim.  Shortly
thereafter, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the entire
case without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), which the Court so ordered on Sept. 28, 2017.
The Martinez action is no longer pending before the Court.

Before the Court is the Defendants' motion to change venue in a
matter arising out of alleged violations of the TCPA.  The
principal issue is whether the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and the interest of justice favor transfer of the
action.

Judge Simandle finds that the Plaintiff has not alleged any nexus
between this District and the allegations raised in her complaint.
It is undisputed that TD Bank purchased Target's REDcard credit-
card portfolio in 2013 and that TD Bank maintains its principal
office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.  But, again, Plaintiff has not
alleged that any decisions related to TD Bank's acquisition of
Target's credit-card portfolio affect this case.  Accordingly, it
appears unlikely that any potential TD Bank witnesses would be
deposed in New Jersey.  The convenience of the parties and
witnesses thus weigh in favor of transfer to the District of
Minnesota.

Additionally, a substantially-similar class action was filed
before this action and is currently pending in the District of
Minnesota -- the District where much of the relevant conduct took
place and where one of the parties resides.  The Garcia action
pending in the District of Minnesota was filed more than one year
before the Plaintiff filed suit in this District.

Unlike the Martinez action described supra, Garcia involves
substantially-similar claims to those brought by the Plaintiff in
this case -- that Target made unsolicited calls to individuals who
never owned a Target REDcard and had never given "prior express
consent" for such calls.  Since it appears this Court and the
District of Minnesota have concurrent jurisdiction over a
substantially-similar class action, the first-to-file rule also
weighs in favor of transfer to the District of Minnesota.

For these reasons, Judge Simandle granted the Defendants' motion
and transferred the case to the District of Minnesota.  An
accompanying Order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 14, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/GrwZbk from Leagle.com.

SARA DIAZ-LEBEL, Plaintiff, represented by ADAM HERBERT WEINTRAUB
-- aweintraub@lchb.com -- LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP.

TD BANK USA, N.A., Defendant, represented by SUSAN M. LEMING --
sleming@brownconnery.com -- BROWN & CONNERY, LLP.

TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by SUSAN M. LEMING,
BROWN & CONNERY, LLP.


TENNESSEE: Court Denies Certification of Ex-SCDC Inmate's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, Greeneville, issued a Memorandum and Opinion denying
Plaintiff's request for class certification in the case captioned
SHAMSIDDEEN HATCHER, Plaintiff, v. WAYNE ANDERSON and GREGG
SIMCOX, Defendants, No. 2:17-CV-69-JRG-MCLC (E.D. Tenn.), and
dismissing the case for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff Shamsiddeen Hatcher, a former prisoner, brings this pro
se civil rights action and proposed class action for declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
against Sullivan County, Tennessee Sheriff Wayne Anderson and
Sullivan County Detention Center (SCDC) Chief Jailer Gregg Simcox.
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were
violated at the SCDC. Plaintiff further alleges that the rights of
similarly situated inmates likewise were violated.  Plaintiff
complains about conditions and treatment to which he was subjected
in the SCDC from January 29, 2014, to December 15, 2015.

The Court will deny Plaintiff's class certification request
because, as a former prisoner who is no longer confined in the
SCDC, he lacks standing to file a class action, alleging
violations of the rights of currently confined SCDC prisoners.
Plaintiff has not defined the proposed class, beyond stating that
he is seeking to assert the violations of the rights of similarly
situated inmates. Plaintiff who is not an inmate and is not
confined is not similarly situated to inmates who presently are
incarcerated in the SCDC. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any of the
four prerequisites for class certification. Furthermore, this case
is being dismissed sua sponte, given the deficiencies.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybe9voom
from Leagle.com.

Shamsiddeen Hatcher, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


TEZOS: Faces Second Securities Class Action in Florida
------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Stanley, writing for Coindesk, reports that for the second
time in less than three weeks, a lawsuit has been filed against
the founders of the Tezos project.

Pursued in the U.S. District Court in Florida, the suit alleges
Tezos founders Arthur and Kathleen Breitman deceptively sold
unregistered securities in violation of both federal and state law
when they raised $232 million in an initial coin offering (ICO) in
July.

The filing names the husband-and-wife pair, the Tezos Foundation
and Dynamic Ledger Solutions -- the Delaware-based company that
holds Tezos's intellectual property -- as defendants.  Further, it
accuses them of fraudulently and deceptively marketing the sale of
the platform's native token "Tezzies" as charitable contributions
and then pocketing "tens of millions of dollars" for themselves.

"Notwithstanding the defendants' attempts to avoid governmental
and private scrutiny, it is clear that the financiers were indeed
profit-seeking investors in a security and that Defendants
promoted and conducted an unregistered offering of securities, not
a charitable fundraiser," the complaint reads.

It continues:

     "[D]ue to the many misrepresentations, factual omissions and
unlawful activities engaged in by the defendants -- it appears
[participants in the ICO] cannot, and potentially will not, see
any return on their investments."

The Breitmans' lawyer did not immediately respond to a request for
comment on Nov. 15, but in previous cases they have denied any
wrongdoing and have signaled that they will aggressively fight
back against such lawsuits.

The news marks the latest development in the ongoing controversy
over the project, which broke into the public view when the
Breitmans accused Johann Gevers, the head of the Tezos Foundation
(created to support development of the project), of self-dealing.
Gevers, in turn, alleged that the Breitmans were seeking to usurp
control of the non-profit foundation.

The new complaint filed by David Silver, a partner at SilverMiller
in south Florida, echoes and expands upon allegations laid out in
a separate class action suit filed in California on Oct. 25, which
came just days after the dispute between the Breitmans and Gevers
went public. [GN]


TRANSURBAN: Drivers File Class Action Over Illegal Toll Charges
---------------------------------------------------------------
Yahoo News reports that drivers could soon throw away their e-tags
if a court case against toll companies is successful. Organisers
claim tolls already benefit from a road tax at the bowser.

Organisers of the class action claim the way tolls are charged is
illegal and should be scrapped.

Retiree Bob Jarvis wants his day in court to challenge the toll
companies he claims are illegally charging motorists.

"They're double dipping and they are not allowed to double dip,"
he said.

Mr Jarvis says we already pay a road tax every time we fill up at
the bowser via a fuel excise, and senior federal politicians
agree.

"If we go to pay for our roads we should pay for them once," NSW
Senator David Leyonhjelm said.

Now, Mr Jarvis has the class action numbers to take his fight to
court.

If successful, toll road providers like Transurban in Sydney who
operate the M7, M2, Lane Cove Tunnel, Eastern Distributor and the
M5 could be forced to scrap tolls and reimburse drivers the money
they've been charged.

But Transurban spokesman Jean Ker Walsh claims the hopeful
litigant is "really quite wrong".

"Well I'm aware of Mr Jarvis and what he's been saying and from
our perspective Mr Jarvis is really quite wrong," she said.

"I'm really quite concerned if people follow his advice they will
find themselves with toll notices.

"So please, unless the court says otherwise, please continue to
use the roads and pay for them." [GN]


TRG CUSTOMER: Can Compel Arbitration of Myers' Individual Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled MYLEE MYERS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRG CUSTOMER SOLUTIONS,
INC. d/b/a IBEX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
00052 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee, Columbia Division, granted
the Defendant's motion to compel Plaintiff Myers to pursue
individual arbitration of her claims but denied the motion to
dismiss the case in its entirety, and denied without prejudice the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification.

Plaintiff Myers brings the action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act individually and on behalf of all similarly situated current
and former employees of the Defendant.  She seeks to recover
unpaid wages owed to her and similarly situated employees who have
worked at IBEX's call centers in the United States.  Now before
the court is IBEX's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss
the Action.  Also still pending is the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Certification and the Issuance of Court-Supervised
Notice, the resolution of which the Court previously deferred.

Myers worked for IBEX as a customer service representative at its
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania call center from November 2013 through
September 2014.  She worked as a supervisor at the same call
center from September 2014 through June 2015.  The Complaint does
not include factual allegations regarding the circumstances under
which the Plaintiff's employment ended.

For purposes of the Defendant's Motion to Compel, Myers does not
dispute that she signed a document titled Direct Dialogue Program
and Mutual Agreement to Mediate/Arbitrate Acknowledgment and
Acceptance on Nov. 3, 2013, in which she acknowledged that she had
received and read the Direct Dialogue Program and Mutual Agreement
to Mediate/Arbitrate and will abide by it as a condition of her
employment.  The Direct Dialogue Program and Mutual Agreement to
Mediate/Arbitrate ("DDP"), to which the Acknowledgment and
Acceptance is attached.

Myers filed her Collective Action Complaint initiating the lawsuit
on June 1, 2017.  The next day, she filed a Motion for Conditional
Certification and for the Issuance of Court-Supervised Notice to
members of the conditionally certified class.  During the pendency
of that motion, several putative collective-action Plaintiffs
filed Notices of Consent to Become Party Plaintiff.

On Aug. 24, 2017, the Court entered an Order deferring ruling on
the Motion for Conditional Certification and directing the parties
to confer and discuss the possibility of reaching an agreement
regarding collective action and arbitrability.  Shortly after the
entry of that Order, the parties notified the Court that they
would not be able to reach an agreement on the issues of
conditional certification and arbitrability.

In light of that conclusion, the Defendant filed its Motion to
Compel and supporting documentation.  In accordance with a
scheduling Order entered by the Court, the Plaintiff filed her
Response in Opposition, and the Defendant filed a Reply.

The Defendant argues that the Court should grant its Motion to
Compel Arbitration because: (i) the Plaintiff signed the DDP, a
valid agreement to arbitrate; (ii) her claims in the lawsuit fall
within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (iii) the DDP
does not address, and therefore precludes, arbitration as a
collective action.  It also argues that the Court should dismiss
the case after referring it to arbitration, as the Court's
retention of jurisdiction during the pendency of arbitration would
serve no purpose.  In its Reply, the Defendant contends that, if
Myer's individual claims become moot, the Court should dismiss the
action as a whole, leaving the opt-in Plaintiffs free to pursue
their own actions if they choose.

The Plaintiff, for her part, does not dispute that she signed the
DDP when she was hired by IBEX, and she does not contest the
enforceability or validity of the agreement on the basis that it
lacks mutuality, was signed under duress, or is otherwise void or
voidable for any of the other standard reasons provided by state
law for challenging the enforceability of a contract.  Nor does
she contend that her claims fall outside the scope of the agree to
arbitrate.

The Plaintiff nonetheless argues that the Defendant's attempt to
force her into individual arbitration should be denied based on
NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., in which the Sixth
Circuit held that an arbitration provision requiring employees
covered by the NLRA individually to arbitrate all employment-
related claims is not enforceable.  She also argues that, even if
the Court concludes that the DDP signed by Myers is binding, the
Court should compel only Myers to arbitration but grant leave to
the other opt-in Plaintiffs to move to amend their complaint to
substitute one or more new Named Plaintiffs.

In its Reply, the Defendant contends that, if Myer's individual
claims become moot, the Court should dismiss the action as a
whole, leaving the opt-in Plaintiffs free to pursue their own
actions if they choose.

Because the Plaintiff's objection to the Defendant's motion is
premised entirely on the applicability of Alternative
Entertainment to her factual circumstances, Judge Trauger finds
that the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration must be granted,
and the Plaintiff will be compelled to pursue her claims in the
context of an individual arbitration proceeding.  Because there
are opt-in Plaintiffs in the case, the Judge cannot conclude that
compelling arbitration of the Named Plaintiff's claims
automatically requires dismissal of the entire case.

Moreover, the cases upon which IBEX relies involved mootness and
thus the Court's loss of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The Judge
says the Defendant offers no support for the suggestion that
granting a motion to compel arbitration of the Named Plaintiff's
claims in the case deprives the Court of subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claims of opt-in Plaintiffs.  Even though
the Named Plaintiff will be compelled to pursue her claims in an
individual arbitration, the opt-in Plaintiffs' claims remain
pending.  And it is an open question whether all of the opt-in
Plaintiffs signed valid and enforceable arbitration agreements.
Accordingly, he will not dismiss the action in its entirety and
will instead grant the Plaintiff 30 days within which to file a
motion to substitute the Named Plaintiff with one or more
appropriate Plaintiffs who believe in good faith that they did not
sign arbitration agreements.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Trauger granted in part and
denied in part IBEX's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss
the Action.  He granted that portion of the motion seeking to
compel arbitration of Plaintiff Myers' claims, but denied that
portion of the motion seeking dismissal of the action in its
entirety.  He granted the Plaintiff 30 days within which to file a
motion to amend the Complaint to substitute appropriate Named
Plaintiffs from among the current opt-in Plaintiffs.  If no motion
to amend is filed within that time frame, the Defendant may renew
its motion to dismiss.  He denied without prejudice the pending
Motion for Conditional Certification and the Issuance of Court-
Supervised Notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 15, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/bxepIV from Leagle.com.

Mylee Myers, Plaintiff, represented by Charles P. Yezbak, III --
yezbak@yezbaklaw.com -- Yezbak Law Offices.

Mylee Myers, Plaintiff, represented by David W. Garrison --
dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, John L. Mays -- john@maysandkerr.com -- Poole
Huffman LLC, Joshua A. Frank -- jfrank@barrettjohnston.com --
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift --
stift@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC & Seth Marcus Hyatt -- shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett
Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

TRG Customer Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda E.
Colvin -- amanda.colvin@bryancave.com -- Bryan Cave, LLP,
Christopher P. Galanek -- chris.galanek@bryancave.com -- Bryan
Cave, LLP & Daniel M. O'Keefe -- dmokeefe@bryancave.com -- Bryan
Cave, LLP.

TRG Customer Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by James
Craig Oliver -- coliver@bradley.com -- Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings LLP.

TRG Customer Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by John P.
Rodgers -- jrodgers@bradley.com -- Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
LLP & Matthew C. Lonergan -- mlonergan@bradley.com -- Bradley
Arant Boult Cummings LLP.


TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Former Students Wants Out of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nancy Dillon, writing for New York Daily News, reports that Trump
University was a grade-A fraud, and a former student deserves a
chance to ditch a $25 million class action settlement and take
President Trump to court, her lawyer argued in federal appeals
court Wednesday.

"She thinks (Trump) got off too easy," Deepak Gupta, a lawyer for
Sherri Simpson, told the Daily News after a 50-minute hearing at
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pasadena, Calif.

Mr. Gupta called Trump University "an egregious fraud" and "a
scam."

"She thinks there should be some public accountability for this,"
he said.

Ms. Simpson claims she lost $19,000 on bogus offerings from the
now-defunct school and was denied a "promised" right to opt out of
the global settlement reached last November that combined two
California class-action lawsuits and a civil action by New York
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

Under the deal, thousands of class members are due to receive
refunds for around 80% of their losses, while Trump never had to
admit wrongdoing.

U.S. District Judge Gonzolo Curiel handled the case and approved
the settlement March 31 after reviewing Ms. Simpson's objection
and deciding she missed a pre-settlement deadline to opt out of
the class.

Simpson appealed, and Gupta argued her case at the Ninth Circuit.

"Some public accountability, that's what she's seeking," Gupta
told the three-judge panel.

"Your client wants a jury trial?" Judge Steven Logan asked.

Speaking after the hearing, Mr. Gupta said his client deserves
more than $60,000 from Trump.

"She does," Mr. Gupta said.  "She wants to file her own case. She
wants to pursue the common law fraud claim."

Mr. Gupta said Ms. Simpson wants triple damages, an admission of
liability from Trump and a court finding that the settlement
reached after Trump's election unfairly denied class members the
right to opt out at the settlement stage.

Judge approves $25M settlement in Trump University fraud case
"What you're asking us to do is unravel a settlement that's fair
for thousands of people," Judge Andrew Hurwitz said.  "That's what
troubles me."

A lawyer for the class disputed Gupta's claim that Simpson was
promised a second chance to opt out at the settlement stage.  He
called her motivations "political" in comments to the panel.

A lawyer for Trump generated some levity when he complemented
Judge Curiel's stewardship of the litigation.

During his campaign, President Trump questioned Judge Curiel's
ability to be impartial because of his Mexican heritage.

Ex-Trump University student wants to take President to trial
"Setting aside who the defendant is, this is a typical, ordinary,
run of the mill class action.  It is also a textbook example of a
district court properly administering itself," Trump lawyer David
Kirman argued in court.

"So your client's view of Judge Curiel has changed?" Judge Hurwitz
asked, as many in the courtroom laughed.

"Yes," Mr. Kirman quickly replied.

Speaking after the hearing, Gupta said his client deserves at
least $60,000 from Trump.

Trump U fraud case payment to be paid 2 days before inauguration
"She paid thousands of dollars of her own hard-earned money
because she was promised an opportunity to learn skills that would
better herself, that would make her successful in the world of
real estate investing," Mr. Gupta told The News.  "The whole thing
was an egregious fraud."

"She paid money for a mentor, and the mentor never returned her
calls.  Trump University promised that people would learn from
Donald Trump's handpicked instructors, and those people had never
met Donald Trump," he said.

"If you have a settlement where the person who commits a fraud
still makes off with some of the money they defrauded people of,
the law is not accomplishing its goals."

The Ninth Circuit did not immediately rule on the case. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Class Action Over Assault by Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Roof, writing for TechCrunch, reports that a class action
lawsuit has been filed against Uber, claiming that the company
hasn't done enough to inform the public about alleged harassment
and assault by drivers.

The legal complaint, filed by Wigdor LLP on behalf of two
plaintiffs, alleges that "thousands of female passengers have
endured unlawful conduct by their Uber drivers including rape,
sexual assault, physical violence and gender-motivated
harassment."

The document suggests that Uber has taken shortcuts in its driver
screening.  "Uber has done everything possible to continue using
low-cost, woefully inadequate background checks on drivers and has
failed to monitor drivers for any violent or inappropriate conduct
after they are hired."

Jeanne M. Christensen -- jchristensen@wigdorlaw.com -- partner at
Wigdor LLP, sent us the following statement about the claims:

"As alleged in the complaint filed [Nov. 14] against Uber, the
Company must come forward with information about how many reports
it has received about rapes, sexual assaults and gender-motivated
harassment to allow consumers to assess whether Uber really does
provide safe rides, especially to women.  Uber must make drastic
changes to prevent another female rider from harm. As alleged, the
recent #MeToo campaign has exposed the heinous acts that female
riders have been forced to endure during Uber rides.  It is time
for Uber to "Do the right thing. Period."

The lawsuit claims that by labeling itself as a "technology"
company instead of a "transportation" company, Uber has been able
to avoid costlier background checks.

A spokesperson for Uber responded to the lawsuit, telling us,
"Uber received this complaint [Nov. 14] and we are in the process
of reviewing it.  These allegations are important to us and we
take them very seriously."

Earlier this year, a woman who claimed she was raped by an Uber
driver in India sued the company.  That lawsuit alleged that Uber
mishandled the incident and that company executives improperly
accessed her medical records because it doubted her account of the
incident.

Uber also has been in contact with the FBI after it turned out
that the recent New York terror suspect was one of its drivers.
Another Uber driver allegedly picked up passengers between
shootings.

Uber employs two million drivers worldwide, so it's statistically
probable that some of them will go on to commit crimes.  But the
severity of the above incidents have caused some people to
question whether Uber is doing enough to screen its drivers.

Uber asks its passengers to rate its drivers on a five-point
scale; some say it could be doing more to encourage riders to
report more detailed concerns.  It's unclear whether Uber received
complaints specific to these drivers.

It's been a tumultuous year for the ridesharing company. The fast-
growing business has faced a series of problems related to its
public image.

After legal situations and questions about its company culture,
co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick was pressured to step down in
June.

The former Expedia CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, took the helm in
August. [GN]


USCB CORP: Court Denies Judgment on Pleadings Bid in "Gilmore"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, Macon Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned PHILLIP
GILMORE, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. USCB CORPORATION, Defendant, Civil Action No. 5:17-
CV-119 (MTT) (M.D. Ga.).

Plaintiff Phillip Gilmore filed a class action complaint against
Defendant USCB Corporation, asserting violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).  Gilmore asserts that USCB began calling
his cellular telephone number in an attempt to collect an alleged
debt.  Gilmore alleges that USCB placed at least one call.  Upon
answering the call on at least one occasion, Gilmore states that a
pre-recorded voice asked for a person named Johnny Lancaster and
that he informed USCB that it had the wrong number.

USCB moved for judgment on the pleadings on Gilmore's FDCPA claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), after the
pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.  Judgment on the pleadings
is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Although not clear, Gilmore seems to assert two claims under
Section 1692d of the FDCPA: one for a violation of subsection (5)
and one under the section generally.

Section 1692d provides, in relevant part, that a debt collector
may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is
to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the
collection of a debt.  Without limiting the general application of
this section, the following conduct is a violation of Section "(5)
Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone
conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy,
abuse, or harass any person at the called number."

USCB also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because Gilmore is not a consumer as defined by Section
1692a(3) of the FDCPA.

The Court disagrees and explained that a consumer is defined by
the FDCPA as any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated
to pay a debt.  While Gilmore does not allege to be a debtor, that
is immaterial.  One of the purposes of the FDCPA is to ensure that
every person, including non-debtors, has a right to be treated in
a reasonable manner.

Accordingly, Gilmore has standing to bring his claims under
Section 1692d.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yapqmcmzfrom Leagle.com.

PHILLIP GILMORE, Plaintiff, represented by AARON D. RADBIL --
aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com

PHILLIP GILMORE, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES L. DAVIDSON --
jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com -- & SHIREEN HORMOZDI --
shireen@norcrosslawfirm.com

USCB CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by JOHN HENRY BEDARD, JR.
& MICHAEL KEVIN CHAPMAN -- michchap@me.com


UTILITY SERVICE: "Komoroski" Class Settlement Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Western Division, issued a Judgment and Order granting
final approval of the class action settlement in the case
captioned JAMES KOMOROSKI and GALEN VERHULST, individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UTILITY SERVICE
PARTNERS PRIVATE LABEL, INC. d/b/a SERVICE LINE WARRANTIES OF
AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 4:16-CV-00294-DGK (W.D. Mo.), and
dismissing the action with prejudice.

Plaintiffs James Komoroski and Galen Verhulst purchased utility
warranties from Defendant Utility Service Partners Private Label,
Inc., doing business as Service Line Warranties of America (SLWA),
which would defray the cost to repair and replace the water
service line running into their home. Plaintiffs' lawsuit alleges
SLWA denied warranty coverage for legitimate repair claims.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court approves
the settlement and finds that the settlement is, in all respects,
fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The Court further finds that the
settlement is the result of arm's-length negotiations between
experienced counsel representing the interests of the parties.
Accordingly, the Agreement is finally approved in all respects,
and the parties are directed to perform its terms.

The action is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and without
costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Judgment
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yde3j5gyfrom
Leagle.com.

James Komoroski, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph A. Kronawitter -
- jkronawitter@hab-law.com -- Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC.

James Komoroski, Plaintiff, represented by Phyllis Norman, The
Norman Law Firm LLC, 4310 Madison Avenue, Suite 120, Kansas City,
MO, 64111 & Robert A. Horn -- rhorn@hab-law.com -- Horn, Aylward &
Bandy, LLC.

Galen Verhulst, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph A. Kronawitter,
Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC, Phyllis Norman, The Norman Law Firm
LLC & Robert A. Horn, Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Benjamin J. Sitter -- bsitter@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuire Woods LLP, pro hac vice.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Jarrod D. Shaw -- jshaw@mcguirewoods.com -- pro hac
vice.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Michael S. Foster -- mfoster@polsinelli.com --
Polsinelli PC & Mark A. Olthoff, Polsinelli PC.


UTILITY SERVICE: Court Awards $3,500 to "Komoroski" Class Reps
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Western Division, issued an Order granting Class
Representative Awards and Ordering Additional Information
Concerning Attorney's Fees in the case captioned JAMES KOMOROSKI
and GALEN VERHULST, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. UTILITY SERVICE PARTNERS PRIVATE LABEL,
INC. d/b/a SERVICE LINE WARRANTIES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case No.
4:16-CV-00294-DGK (W.D. Mo.).

This case is a consumer class action.  Plaintiffs James Komoroski
and Galen Verhulst purchased utility warranties from Defendant
Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., doing business as
Service Line Warranties of America (SLWA), which would defray the
cost to repair and replace the water service line running into
their home. Plaintiffs allege SLWA denied warranty coverage for
legitimate repair claims.

The Court approves payments of $3,500 to class representatives
James Komoroski and Galen Verhulst for their service in this case.
Both men made important contributions to this case which
benefitted the class.

The Court needs additional information to evaluate the attorneys'
fees request.

Plaintiffs' counsel has provided the Court with a list of cases in
which area courts have approved awards with higher hourly rates
than those apparently sought here but only summaries of their work
performed in this case.  Counsel reports that the total amount of
paralegal and attorney time Horn Aylward & Bandy, LLC, invested in
this case was 219 hours, that the value of this time was $73,995,
and that their expenses were included in these fees.

They also report that Mr. Norman, of Norman & Graves, LLC, worked
80.3 hours on the case at a rate of $400 an hour, and that he was
not seeking reimbursement for any expenses. Counsel has offered,
however, to provide more detailed time records upon request.

Reviewing more detailed information will give the Court a better
understanding of the work performed, and so result in a better
decision. It might also give the public more confidence in the
fairness of the court's decision making, which will hopefully
dispel some of the cynicism surrounding attorneys' fees in class
action cases.

Consequently, the Court directs Plaintiffs' counsel to file: (1)
documentation of the time each individual attorney or staff member
spent on this case; (2) a detailed list of the expenses incurred;
and (3) the attorneys' fee agreements.  Counsel does not need to
supply individual billing records, although they may do so if that
is more convenient.  The Court sees no reason why these records
should be filed under seal, but if counsel has a compelling
reason, they may move to do so.  Once this material is filed, the
Court will rule promptly on the motion for attorneys' fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 9, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y8ppr2c4from Leagle.com.

James Komoroski, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph A. Kronawitter -
- jkronawitter@hab-law.com -- Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC.

James Komoroski, Plaintiff, represented by Phyllis Norman, The
Norman Law Firm LLC, 4310 Madison Avenue, Suite 120, Kansas City,
MO, 64111 & Robert A. Horn -- rhorn@hab-law.com -- Horn, Aylward &
Bandy, LLC.

Galen Verhulst, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph A. Kronawitter,
Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC, Phyllis Norman, The Norman Law Firm
LLC & Robert A. Horn, Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Benjamin J. Sitter -- bsitter@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuire Woods LLP, pro hac vice.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Jarrod D. Shaw -- jshaw@mcguirewoods.com -- pro hac
vice.

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Michael S. Foster -- mforster@polsenelli.com --
Polsinelli PC & Mark A. Olthoff, Polsinelli PC.


WATER OF LIFE: Suit Over Unlicensed Investment Adviser Continues
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dee Thompson, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a district
court has ruled that a lawsuit against a church by two of its
former members will continue.  The members claimed that the church
required them to attend financial planning courses conducted by a
member who had lost his license to sell securities.

Tamara Claiborne and Noel Havier-Habib, et al. v. Water of Life
Community Church was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California earlier this year.

Regarding the defendants' motions, the court concluded Aug. 25
that, "The motion to dismiss plaintiffs' direct negligence claim
is denied; the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' respondeat-superior
negligence claim, CLRA claim, UCL claim, and Securities Exchange
Act claim is granted. The court denies defendant's motion to
strike plaintiffs' class action allegations."

The defendant argued the class action allegations should be
dismissed as being legally insufficient, but the court disagreed,
saying, "given the early stage of these proceedings, it is
premature to decide whether this case may proceed as a class
action before the FAC has been answered, discovery has commenced,
or a motion for class certification has been filed."

According to the court's order, Water of Life Community Church was
founded in 1990 and is non-denominational and evangelical. Paul
Ricky Mata was one of the church elders and a founding member.
Church members allegedly were required to attend investment and
financial planning seminars Mata conducted.

Only by doing so could members be listed in the church directory,
do missionary work, or advance in the church hierarchy, according
to the order.

"Plaintiffs Tamara Claiborne and Noel Haver-Habib are former
members of the church. Plaintiffs invested money with Mata after
attending an investment seminar with him.  Plaintiffs believed the
investments Mata recommended 'were approved by or otherwise
consistent with the church's teachings,'" according to the order.

Plaintiffs allege that the church failed to disclose that
Mr. Mata had lost his license to sell securities.  Also, according
to the court, "Mata was fined and penalized by various
governmental and financial industry regulatory agencies for
violating various laws and financial advising standards for
several years."

Ms. Claiborne and Mr. Haver-Habib gave Mr. Mata $1.24 million to
invest in unregistered securities sold by Mata, the order states.
They allege the church represented that Mata was a reputable
financial consultant, and if they had known he had lost his
license they wouldn't have invested the money.  Mr. Mata's
dealings stopped when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
started an investigation of him.

In May, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging negligence,
violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, violation
of the California Unfair Business Practices Act and violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and motion to strike in July.

In regard to the plaintiffs' allegations, the court ruled that
"With respect to plaintiffs' respondeat-superior negligence claim,
for the reasons discussed supra, the court concludes amendment of
this claim would be futile.  That claim, therefore, is dismissed
without leave to amend.  Amendment of Plaintiffs' CLRA, UCL, and
Securities Exchange Act claims, however, do not appear to be
futile.  Accordingly, the court dismisses those claims with leave
to amend." [GN]


WELLNX LIFE: Faces "Choo" Suit in Eastern District of Cal.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wellnx Life
Sciences, Inc. The case is styled as Misty Choo and Dianne E. Lee,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Wellnx Life Sciences, Inc. and Platinum US
Distribution, Inc. Doing business as: Wellnx Life Sciences, USA,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02517-KJM-CMK (E.D. Cal., November
30, 2017).

Wellnx Life Sciences Inc. is a consumer packaged goods company
devoted to the discovery, development and marketing of weight-loss
& health care supplements.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Shub, Esq.
   Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C.
   One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
   Philadelphia, PA 19107
   Tel: (215) 238-1700
   Fax: (215) 238-1968
   Email: jshub@kohnswift.com


WHIRLPOOL CORP: Schechner Seeks to Compel Sears to Produce Docs
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case docketed as Toby Schechner, Barbara Barnes, Laura
Bliss, Kathleen Jordan, Kathryn Limpede, Louise Miljenovic,
Candace Oliarny, Beverly Simmons, Richard Thome and Mary Ellen
Thome, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Whirlpool Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 16-cv-12409, (E.D. Mich., October 19, 2016), Plaintiffs ask
the Court for an order compelling non-party Sears Holdings
Management Corporation to produce documents responsive to their
document subpoena dated October 19, 2016 and designate a
representative to sit for a deposition pursuant to Plaintiffs'
subpoena dated September 7, 2017. Said Order is filed under 17-cv-
08435 (N.D. Ill., November 21, 2017). [BN]

Whirlpool is being sued over their Aqualift Ovens that advertised
a self-cleaning feature that did little to minimize the soils on
the oven interior. Defendant manufactures home appliances that it
sells in Sears stores.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Frank Richter, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      200 S. Wacker Drive, 31st Floor
      Chicago, IL 60606
      Telephone: (312) 674-4674
      Fax: (312) 674-4676
      Email: frichter@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

      Paul J. Geller, Esq.
      Stuart A. Davidson, Esq.
      Christopher C. Gold, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500
      Boca Raton, FL 33432
      Telephone: (561) 750-3000
      Fax: (561) 750-3364
      Email: pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
             sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com
             cgold@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

      Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
      Mark S. Reich, Esq.
      Jordan D. Mamorsky, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      58 South Service Road, Suite 200
      Melville, NY 11747
      Telephone: (631) 367-7100
      Fax: (631) 367-1173 (fax)
      Email: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
             mreich@rgrdlaw.com
             jmamorsky@rgrdlaw.com

             - and -

      E. Powell Miller, Esq.
      Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
      THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
      950 West University Drive, Suite 300
      Rochester, MI 48307
      Telephone: (248) 841-2200
      Fax: (248) 652-2852

Whirlpool Corporation is represented by:

      Michael T. Williams, Esq.
      Jessica G. Scott, Esq.
      Laura McNabb, Esq.
      WHEELER TRIGG O'DONNELL LLP
      370 17th Street, Suite 4500
      Denver, CO 80202
      Email: williams@wtotrial.com
             scott@wtotrial.com mcnabb@wtotrial.com

             - and -

      Howard B. Iwrey, Esq.
      James P. Feeney, Esq.
      DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC
      39577 Woodward Avenue, Suite 300
      Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
      Email: hiwrey@dykema.com
             jfeeney@dykema.com

Sears Holdings Management Corporation is represented by:

       Suzanne Alton de Eraso, Esq.
       John S. Letchinger, Esq.
       BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
       191 North Wacker Drive, Suite 3100
       Chicago, IL 60606-1901
       Email: saltondeeraso@bakerlaw.com
              jletchinger@bakerlaw.com


ZHEJIANG SUNRIVER: Zhao Wei, Husband Faces Investor Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Li and Xie Yu, writing for South China Morning Post, reports
that Zhao Wei, the billionaire Chinese actress, faces class action
along with her husband from hundreds of investors who suffered
heavy losses because of their investments in a listed company that
had been targeted for a takeover by the couple last year,
according to lawyers representing the investors.

Wang Zhibin, a lawyer at Shanghai-based Bright & Young Law Firm,
representing the small investors said they could seek roughly 30
million yuan in compensation because of misleading information
disclosure linked to the takeover deal.

However, whether a lawsuit could be filed would depend on a final
decision by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the
stock market watchdog.

The CSRC barred Zhao, and her husband Huang Youlong, as well as
the owner of Zhejiang Sunriver Culture, the target company in the
takeover deal, from China's securities markets for five years, for
"seriously misleading the market", according to a filing by
Sunriver to the Shanghai Stock Exchange.

Lawyers said it could take another six months for the CSRC to
reach a decision on the final punishment, since Huang announced
through his Hong Kong-listed Sino Golf Holdings on November 10
that he would "submit a statement and plea to the CSRC to request
a hearing" on the five-year ban.

Once a final ruling was given by the CSRC, lawyers could file a
formal lawsuit, seeking compensation from the Zhao couple and
Sunriver, as both would be listed as joint defendants, according
to Wang.

"There are around 4,500 investors who so far have inquired from me
about bringing up the class action, of which about 100 have sent
their trading records to bring about the lawsuit," he said.
According to Wang, the major accusation the investors want to make
against the couple and Sunriver is "negligent misrepresentation",
meaning that the parties did not fully disclose important
information related to the deal in a timely manner as decreed
under China's Securities Law.

Another Chinese lawyer said some of the investors who wanted to
file the class action suit had incurred losses of millions of yuan
from investing in shares of Sunriver.

Actress Zhao Wei and husband banned from securities markets for
five years

"The proportion of such cases [negligent misrepresentation] only
accounts for a tiny fraction of all the lawsuits related to
China's securities market," said Xie Liang, a lawyer with
Guangdong-based Huanyu Jingmao Law Firm that specialises in
representing retail stock market investors.

"But this case should serve as a severe warning for other listed
companies in China even though the case has been magnified because
of Zhao's fame," he said.

Shares of Sunriver, formerly known as Zhejiang Wanjia, have
fluctuated wildly since Zhao's Longwei Culture & Media proposed to
pay 3 billion yuan for a 29.1 per cent stake in the little known
animation company at the end of last year.

Zhao Wei abandons 3b yuan bid for Hangzhou animation studio

Sunriver's share price surged by the daily limit of 10 per cent in
January after Zhao's announcement of the takeover and plunged by
10 per cent in February after she said she would scale back
because of financing difficulties.

The shares now trade at 9.2 yuan, 63.2 per cent lower from a high
of 25 yuan in January. [GN]


* Class Actions to Be Included in Ireland Civil Justice Review
--------------------------------------------------------------
Irish Legal News reports that the Government has agreed to put the
possible introduction of class action lawsuits -- or multi-party
actions -- to Mr Justice Peter Kelly as part of his ongoing review
of civil justice administration.

Government minister Catherine Byrne announced the decision in the
D†il last night during a debate on the Multi-Party Action Bill
2017.

The private member's bill was introduced by Sinn Fein TDs
Donnchadh O Laoghaire and Pearse Doherty.

Ms Byrne, speaking on behalf of Justice Minister Charlie Flanagan,
said the bill was technically flawed, particularly as it purported
to be based on a Law Reform Commission report which had proposed
that multi-party actions be dealt with by Rules of the Superior
Courts.

She said: "Whereas the Law Reform Commission took the Rules of
Court approach that I have just mentioned, the document before us
this evening just copies and pastes those Rules word by word into
the text of what is proposed to be a Bill.  This was not their
intended purpose."

Ms Byrne said this was one of a number of "fundamental issues"
identified by the Department of Justice as well as the Courts
Service of Ireland and the Office of the Attorney General.

She concluded: "Taking all of these matters into account, Mr
Flanagan has secured the agreement of the Government to refer the
question of the introduction of a multi-party action procedure in
the Irish legal system for consideration by Mr Justice Peter Kelly
as part of the Review of Civil Justice Administration which he has
recently commenced.

"In opposing tonight's Private Member's Bill for the very
substantial reasons I have set out therefore, I would at the same
time commend Minister Flanagan's initiative to the House.  Thank
you." [GN]




                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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