CAR_Public/171122.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


          Wednesday, November 22, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 231



                            Headlines

AIRBNB INC: Vancouver Strata Files Class-Action Lawsuit
ALL COAST: Wins Joint Bid for Class Certification in "Adams" Suit
ALLERGAN INC: Faces Suit Over Sherman Act Violations
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Faces "Misonzhnik" Suit in E.D. New York
AMERICAN HONDA: Grodzitsky Appeals Denial of Bid to Certify Class

ALLIED CONSTRUCTION: "DiSantis" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
AMERICAN SAVINGS: Awarded $17,848 Attorney's Fees in "Moskowitz"
AUSTRALIA: Wait Before Manus Detainees Get Paid Compo
CAFE ISTANBUL: Nazih Moves to Certify Class of Servers Under FLSA
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Faces "Leitner" Suit in E.D. New York

CARDINAL INNOVATIONS: Faces Federal Wage Class-Action Lawsuit
COASTAL STAFFING: "Harder" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Faces "Warman" in East. Dist. New York
COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams' Bid for Class Certification Withdrawn
CREDIT PROTECTION: Faces "Brown" Suit in S.D. Mississippi

CREEK OILFIELD: "Gregory" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
CRYSTAL CLEAR: 6th Cir. Flips Partial Dismissal of "Cates"
CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Ct. Narrows Subpoena Topics in "Valdivieso"
D & A SERVICES: Faces "Weber" Suit in Eastern District New York
DAUM INC: Faces "Lopez" Suit in Southern District New York

DAYTON, MN: Seeks Eighth Circuit Review of Order in "Orduno" Suit
DFT INC: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Copper Sands Suit
DOLLAR TREE: Sued for Denying Seats in Workplace
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Mirarchi" Suit in N.D. Georgia
FORD MOTOR: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

GALIANO ENTERPRISES: "Gutierrez" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
GBJ INC: "Diaz" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
GEICO GENERAL: Assignee Cannot Intervene in PIP Policies Suit
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Pomerantz LLP Files Class Action Lawsuit

GOOGLE INC: Law Firm May Sue Over Pixel 2 XL Screen Issues
GRANT COUNTY, IN: Timbs to Amend Complaint; Dec. 12 Hearing Set
INDIANA: Court Refuses to Certify Class of Westville Inmates
INTELLIBOUND LOGISTICS: Slade Files Suit Under Ca. Labor Code
IPAYMENT INC: Faces Distefano Class Suit in Calif.

JACOBY & MEYERS: Court Denies Class Certification in "Harding"
JAYSON HOME: Faces "Norman" Suit in Southern District New York
JENNIFER CONVERTIBLES: Faces "Norman" Suit in S.D. New York
JOBCASE INC: "Fente" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
JOINT COMMISSION: Boston Trustees Agree to Opioid Lawsuit

JOINT COMMISSION: FDL County Joins Opioid Class Action Lawsuit
JOINT COMMISSION: West Virginia Cities Sue Over Opioid Addiction
JP MORGAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Scott" Suit
LAGASSE LLC: Ct. Denies Alpha Tech's Bid to Certify Class
LRR ENERGY: Hurwitz Seeks to Certify Class in Securities Suit

LYFT INC: "Camilo" Sues Over Excessive Fees and Taxes
M.L. ZAGER: Faces "Labin" Suit in E.D. New York
MAJU PUNCAKBUMI: Suit Against The Arc @ Cyberjaya Adjourned
MDL 2445: Court Denies Mono Sol's Move to Dismiss Antitrust Suit
MDL 2672: Court Denies Bosch's Bid to Dismiss SAC

MIAMI JEWISH: "Flanagan" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
MICHIGAN: Court Stays "Guertin" Suit vs. City of Flint
MINOTTI SPA: Faces "Norman" Suit in Southern District New York
MONDELEZ INT'L: Faces "McMorrow" Suit in S.D. California
MOTHERISK: Judge Junks Proposed Drug Testing Scandal Class-Action

NEW YORK: Vendors Entitled to Receive Offers of Judgment
MOTHER TRUCKER: "Brooks" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT
NORTHLAND GROUP: Certification of Class Sought in "Bauer" Suit
NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Certifies ERISA Class in "Marshall" Suit
O'CONNELL PROTECTION: Faces "Olivencia" Suit in E.D. New York

OHIO: Robinson Files Suit in Supreme Court of Ohio
PANASONIC CORP: NEC Tokin Settlement Has Final Approval
PANDA RESTAURANT: "Barragain" Sues Over Unpaid Wages
PHOENIX WAREHOUSE: Lawsuit Hopes to Prove Wage Assault
PORTLAND, OR: Herber Files Class Action v. Mayor, et al.

PREMARA FINANCIAL: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Suit
PROFESSIONAL ORTHOPEDIC: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. New York
RETRIEVAL-MASTERS: Faces "Junik" Suit in E.D. New York
SAN DIEGO, CA: Faces "Bloom" Suit in S.D. California
SHELL LANES: Faces "Lopez" Suit in Southern District New York

SIROB IMPORTS: "Guevara" Suit Certified as FLSA Collective Action
STAAR SURGICAL: Court Cuts Atty Fees in "Todd" to $1.75MM
TEZOS: Blockchain Startup Faces Class Action Over $232MM ICO
TGI FRIDAY'S: Court Denies as Moot Calabrese's Bid to Certify
TIM TADDER: "Gill" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages

TINTRI INC: "Golosiy" Remanded to Calif. State Court
ULTA SALON: Court OKs Stipulation Dismissing Wage & Hour Suit
UNIQUE BEVERAGE: Court Narrows Claims in "Silva"
UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Gutman" Suit in E.D. of New York
UNITED STATES: Wins Move to Dismiss Suit Over Dividend to Banks

VERIZON WIRELESS: "Gonzalez" Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
WALDEN & SCHUSTER: Class Certification Sought in "Gruentzel" Suit
WHITEFIELD MEDICAL: Khawaja Files Suit for Unlawful Termination
XBIOTECH: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
ZULILY INC: Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval





                            *********


AIRBNB INC: Vancouver Strata Files Class-Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Keith Fraser, writing for Vancouver Sun, reports that a downtown
Vancouver strata corporation has filed a class-action lawsuit
against Airbnb, the online property rental business.

The strata, located in the city's Yaletown neighbourhood, claims
that Airbnb has rented out properties throughout B.C. and Canada
without the consent of the rightful owners and has profited from
the unauthorized rentals without any compensation to those owners.

Polina Furtula, Esq. -- phf@westpointlawgroup.com -- a lawyer
representing the strata, said that the lawsuit is not just being
filed on behalf of strata corporations.

"There's other owners of apartments or houses or real estate who
have not authorized the rental of their property, the short-term
rental," said Furtula, who also sits on the Yaletown strata's
council. "And they're finding their properties are being listed on
Airbnb without their consent."

The suit claims that the rentals by Airbnb violate strata bylaws
that prevent rentals for less than a year except with approval of
the strata.

In some cases the rentals are being listed by people who are
renting or leasing an apartment and don't inform the owners that
they're listing the suites at Airbnb, said Furtula.

"Sometimes it's even people who manage to get a key and they're
not even the tenants," she said. "There's people renting out their
residential apartments on a short-term basis and basically using
the building as a hotel. That has consequences to the other
owners, to the strata corporations."

Furtula said it is difficult to detect the problem because of the
way Airbnb has structured their business model and their listings.

"It's very easy to list the property without disclosing the
correct location. And sometimes they even use photographs of other
apartments just so you can't tell which building exactly it is."

The consequence of the short-term rentals is the use of the common
facilities -- including lobbies, elevators, swimming pools, saunas
and gardens -- in a way that breaches the rules and bylaws of the
strata corporations, she said.

"And that can include parties, for example. That's a common one.
Sometimes there's damage as well. There's increased administrative
costs, maintenance costs. There is a price to it apart from
nuisance as well."

The suit is seeking a court order to be certified as a class-
action proceeding and an injunction requiring the defendants to
cease advertising rentals of properties located in B.C. and Canada
without the consent of the legal owners, including the strata
corporations.

It also seeks an accounting of income received by Airbnb regarding
the alleged unauthorized rentals as well as unspecified general,
special and punitive damages.

Furtula said anyone whose property was being rented out without
their consent can contact her law firm for information about the
case. She said she expects to update the lawsuit in several weeks
with some amendments and to add some parties to the suit.

No response has yet been filed to the lawsuit, which contains
allegations that have not been tested in court.

A spokeswoman for Airbnb in Canada said that they are reviewing
the lawsuit but will not be commenting on ongoing litigation at
this time. [GN]


ALL COAST: Wins Joint Bid for Class Certification in "Adams" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Patrick J. Hanna grants the joint motion for conditional
certification in the lawsuit styled WILLIAM ADAMS, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALL COAST, LLC,
Case No. 6:16-cv-01426-UDJ-PJH (W.D. La.).

Judge Hanna also:

   -- appoints Plaintiff William Adams as class representative;

   -- appoints Moore & Associates as class counsel;

   -- rules that the class shall include Cooks; Mates; Deckhands;
      Ordinary Seaman; and Able-Bodied Seaman employed by All
      Coast, LLC in the workweeks in which they were employed in
      these classifications in the last three (3) years, except
      for those employees, who signed waiver and release
      agreements;

   -- rules that the class shall exclude Captains; Training
      Captains; Licensed Engineers and Unlicensed Engineers
      employed by All Coast, LLC in the last three (3) years;

   -- decrees that other than the approved notice and consent
      form, the parties and their counsel will not affirmatively
      act to encourage or discourage participation;

   -- rules that All Coast, LLC's right to seek decertification
      of the class or summary judgment on any issue of law or
      fact shall not be affected by the Joint Motion or this
      Order;

   -- decrees that the deadline for Adams or any current opt-in
      plaintiffs to respond to outstanding written discovery is
      extended until November 10, 2017;

   -- orders that the parties shall forego depositions until the
      close of the opt-in period;

   -- rules that the parties shall have the right to conduct
      merits-based discovery following the close of the opt-in
      period; and

   -- rules that the agreed and approved notice and consent form
      will be sent by Moore & Associates by mail and personal
      e-mail at Defendant's cost as detailed in the schedule.
      The mail and e-mail shall contain only the agreed and
      approved notice and consent form.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XQP8LhM7


ALLERGAN INC: Faces Suit Over Sherman Act Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Cesar Castillo, Inc., and all others similarly-situated v.
Allergan, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-06474 (E.D. N.Y., November 7,
2017), seeks to recover threefold damages, interest, costs of suit
and reasonable attorneys' fees under the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.

The Plaintiff filed the case for the injuries sustained resulting
from Defendant's unlawful anticompetitive foreclosure of
cyclosporine sales in the United States.

Plaintiff Cesar Castillo, Inc. is a corporation organized under
the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with its principal
place of business and headquarters located in Rio Piedras, Puerto
Rico. During the relevant period, Plaintiff purchased Restasis
directly from Allergan at supra-competitive prices as a result of
Allergan's scheme.

Defendant Allergan, Inc. is a corporation organized under Delaware
state law with its principal place of business located in Irvine,
California. Allergan is the holder of approved New Drug
Application No. 50-790 for Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion,
0.05%, sold under the Restasis trademark. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
      Bradley J. Demuth, Esq.
      NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
      1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
      New York, NY 10036-8718
      Tel: (917) 438-9189
      E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
              bdemuth@nussbaumpc.com

          - and -

      James E. Cecchi, Esq.
      Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq.
      Michael A. Innes, Esq.
      CARELLA BYRNE, CECCHI,
      OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, PC
      5 Becker Farm Road
      Roseland, NJ 07068
      Tel: (973) 994-1700
      E-mail: jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
              ltaylor@carellabyrne.com
              minnes@carellabyrne.com


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Faces "Misonzhnik" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alltran Financial,
LP. The case is styled as Naomi Misonzhnik, on behalf of herself
and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Alltran
Financial, LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06683 (E.D. N.Y.,
November 15, 2017).

Alltran Financial is a debt collector.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


AMERICAN HONDA: Grodzitsky Appeals Denial of Bid to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Phyllis Grodzitsky, et al., filed an appeal from a
court ruling seek review of the District Court's order refusing to
certify a class in their lawsuit titled PHYLLIS GRODZITSKY, JEREMY
BORDELON, STEPHANIE MANZO, SOHAL SHAH, JOYCE YOUNG, CHARITY
ANYIAM, JONATHAN PENDARVIS, and DENNIS MASON on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. AMERICAN HONDA
MOTOR CO., INC., Case No. 2:12-cv-01142-SVW-PLA, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Phyllis
Grodzitsky, owner of a Honda Odyssey, and Jeremy Bordelon of
Tennessee, owner of a Honda Element, alleged in the original
complaint that they reported repeated failures of window
regulators in their vehicles.  Ms. Grodzitsky further claims that
she contacted her local Honda service manager and was told, "all
[Honda Odysseys] have that problem."

The product defect case against American Honda is for alleged
failure to disclose a material defect in window regulators in a
single vehicle model during certain model years that causes the
windows to fail in ordinary use and creates a safety hazard.  The
affected part is the window regulator -- the vehicle component
that controls and supports glass windows.  The Plaintiffs-
Petitioners allege that these Regulators are not strong and
durable enough to withstand the dynamic vibrational forces --
millions of vibrations equivalent to raising and lowering the
window tens of times per second -- that occur when the vehicle is
driven in ordinary use.

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners sought to certify two classes of
owners/lessees of 2003-2008 Honda Pilots: a damages class under
Rule 23(b)(3) for those who paid to replace a failed regulator,
and a declaratory/injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2) for
all owners or lessees.  The damages class seeks reimbursement of
out-of-pocket costs.

In their appeal, the Plaintiffs-Petitioners want the Appeals Court
to determine whether the District Court erred in denying class
certification by:

   (1) failing to perform a rigorous analysis and ignoring
       evidence critical to its commonality determination;

   (2) excluding an expert's opinions on the basis of gross
       distortions of those opinions; and

   (3) ignoring established Circuit authority?

The appellate case is captioned as Phyllis Grodzitsky, et al. v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Case No. 17-80238, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners are represented by:

          Jonathan D. Selbin, Esq.
          Annika K. Martin, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          E-mail: jselbin@lchb.com
                  akmartin@lchb.com

               - and -

          Mark P. Chalos, Esq.
          Andrew R. Kaufman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          One Nashville Place
          150 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1650
          Nashville, TN 37219-2423
          Telephone: (615) 313-9000
          Facsimile: (615) 313-9965
          E-mail: mchalos@lchb.com
                  akaufman@lchb.com

               - and -

          Marc Godino, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG, LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: mgodino@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Jon A. Tostrud, Esq.
          TOSTRUD LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2150
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 278-2600
          Facsimile: (310) 278-2640
          E-mail: jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com

               - and -

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          HUDSON MALLANEY SHINDLER & ANDERSON, P.C.
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IA 50265
          Telephone: (515) 223-4567
          Facsimile: (515) 223-8887
          E-mail: jbgoplerud@hudsonlaw.net


ALLIED CONSTRUCTION: "DiSantis" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
John DiSantis and Victor Hunter, and all others similarly-situated
v. Allied Construction dba Allied Energy Efficiency Experts, Inc.
and John Does 1-10, Case No. 1:17-cv-11379 (D.N.J., November 7,
2017), is brought against the Defendant for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, and the New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law.

Plaintiff John DiSantis worked for Defendants as a Technician from
in or around late April and/or early May 2015 to around April
2017.

Plaintiff Victor Hunter worked for Defendants as a Community
Representative from in or around early February 2017 to around
August 11, 2017.

The Defendants assist customers in making their homes more energy
efficient by performing energy efficiency assessments on homes in
order to develop a customized home performance and energy savings
program for its consumers.  As their primary service, Defendants
inform and counsel customers on the benefits of government
incentive programs such as the Home Performance with Energy Star
program and the New Jersey Clean Energy Program . [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Travis B. Martindale-Jarvis, Esq.
      Joshua S. Boyette, Esq.
      SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
      1101 Kings Hwy N, Ste. 402
      Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
      Tel: (856) 685-7420
      Fax: (856) 685-7417


AMERICAN SAVINGS: Awarded $17,848 Attorney's Fees in "Moskowitz"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii issued
a Findings and Recommendations granting in part and denying in
part Defendant American Savings Bank, F.S.B.'s Motion for Rule
41(3) Costs and Stay Proceedings in the case captioned CRAIG
MOSKOWITZ, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B., Defendant, Civil No.
17-00299 HG-KSC (D. Haw.).

Plaintiff filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut captioned Moskowitz v. American Savings
Bank, F.S.B., Civil No. 3:17-00307 AWT (Moskowitz I), alleging
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.

Plaintiff commenced this action, asserting the same claims against
Defendant as in Moskowitz I.  The Complaint is identical save for
two changes: (1) paragraph 6 was edited to identify this district
as the proper venue because it is where Defendant resides and (2)
a date in paragraph 11 was edited from 2015 to 2016.

The Court, exercising its discretion, finds that FRCP 41(d)
applies here because (1) Plaintiff dismissed his previous action,
Moskowitz I; (2) both Plaintiff and Defendant were parties in the
previous action; and (3) Plaintiff has filed a substantively
identical Complaint in this action.

FRCP 41(d) is collateral to the underlying claims in a case,
unlike other cost provisions such as FRAP 7 and 39, and FRCP 68.
It is akin to a sanction, unconnected to the actual claims
presented in the litigation, and concerns a plaintiff's conduct
related to litigation, versus a party's liability as to the claims
in a given case. Appellate costs, like FRCP 54 fees and costs, are
awarded to prevailing parties. In those instances, the award of
fees and costs is tied to the claims in a respective action, and
it logically follows that the statute underlying the cause of
action must provide for fees and costs.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that FRCP 41(d) permits the
recovery of both fees and costs. The Court does not impose a
requirement that fees are only available when authorized by the
statutes/provisions governing the underlying claims.

Despite Plaintiff's claim that his decision to voluntarily dismiss
Moskowitz I was primarily motivated by a desire to conserve
resources and minimize costs, it is equally as plausible that
Plaintiff sought to avoid an adverse ruling and dismissal in
Connecticut.

Plaintiff deems preposterous Defendant's allegation that he
engaged in forum shopping. Plaintiff believes that he could not
have engaged in forum shopping because Hawaii is the least
convenient forum for him and his attorneys and the most convenient
for Defendant. Defendant's point is that Plaintiff forum shopped
by improperly filing Moskowitz I in Connecticut, the forum most
convenient to him, notwithstanding questions about the existence
of personal jurisdiction. Whether or not Plaintiff engaged in
forum shopping, however, does not affect the outcome of this
Motion. Defendant is not required to establish that Plaintiff
engaged in forum shopping to prevail.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant be awarded fees
and costs under FRCP 41(d).

Defendant requests $22,572.26 in fees. This amount excludes work
that will still be useful to Defendant in the present litigation.

Defendant requests the following hourly rates:

   John Doroghazi   $355.00
   Kim Rinehart     $436.50
   Elana Bildner    $261.25
   Nicole Chavez    $215.00

Plaintiff contests these rates and argues that this district's
prevailing rates control. Applying what he claims are the
prevailing rates in this district, Plaintiff submits that the
hourly rates should be reduced to $220.00, $275.00, $165.00 and
$80.00.

Plaintiff is incorrect.

In determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, the
experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees
are taken into account.  The reasonable hourly rate should reflect
the prevailing market rates in the community.

Mr. Doroghazi

Mr. Doroghazi is a partner with 11 years of experience, including
significant class action defense and experience with TCPA
litigation. Based on its review of hourly rates awarded for
attorneys with comparable experience in Connecticut, the Court
finds $310.00 to be a reasonable rate.

Ms. Rinehart

Ms. Rinehart is a partner and has been a trial court and appellate
litigator for over 18 years.  The Court finds that $375.00 is a
reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Rinehart.

Ms. Bildner

Ms. Bildner is a litigation associate with four years of
experience The Court finds that $220.00 is a reasonable hourly
rate based on her experience.

Ms. Chavez

Ms. Chavez is a paralegal with over 20 years of experience In
Connecticut, paralegals have been awarded hourly rates ranging
from $100 to $150.

Hours Reasonably Expended

Beyond establishing a reasonable hourly rate, a prevailing party
seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of proving that the fees
and costs taxed are associated with the relief requested and are
reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained.  After
conducting a thorough review of defense counsel's submissions, the
Court finds that reductions should be made for clerical tasks,
insufficient descriptions, reusable work, and block billing.

Clerical Tasks

Clerical or ministerial costs are part of an attorney's overhead
and are reflected in the charged hourly rate.

Certain of the clerical tasks were block billed with a compensable
task. That is, Ms. Chavez included multiple tasks within a single
time entry. Therefore, even though the entire time entry may not
have involved clerical tasks, the Court will recommend exclusion
of the entire entry because the use of block billing precludes the
Court from reasonably apportioning the time between the clerical
task and the compensable task. Based on its careful review of the
time sheets, the Court recommends that the district court deduct
5.2 hours from Ms. Chavez for her work on clerical tasks.

Insufficient Descriptions

The Court finds that Mr. Doroghazi's 4/17/17 entry must be
excluded due to the inadequacy of the description. Local Rule
54.3(d)(2) requires that the party seeking an award of fees must
describe adequately the services rendered, so that the
reasonableness of the requested fees can be evaluated.

Mr. Doroghazi's 4/17/17 entry states: Telephone call with insurer.
It properly includes the participants, but fails to identify the
purpose of the call. Entries that are not sufficiently descriptive
preclude an assessment of reasonableness.

Thus, the Court recommends a reduction of 0.3 hours for Mr.
Doroghazi.

Reusable Work

Defendant acknowledges that it is only entitled to fees for work
that will be of no utility in this litigation.  The Court
recommends that Mr. Doroghazi's hours be reduced by 0.2 and that
Ms. Chavez's hours be reduced by 0.3.

Block Billing

Though limited, Mr. Doroghazi utilized block billing. The term
'block billing' refers to the time-keeping method by which each
lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time spent
working on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on
specific tasks.

Mr. Doroghazi billed 0.9 hours in the block format 4/5/17 and
5/15/17. Consider strategy due to plaintiff's failure to respond
to motion to dismiss and e-mail E. Bildner and K. Rinehart re
same; review notice of voluntary dismissal; e-mail re same.
Applying the 20% reduction, the Court recommends that Mr.
Doroghazi's hours be reduced by 0.18.

Based on this, the Court finds that defense counsel reasonably
expended 74.52 hours on work in Moskowitz I that will be of no
utility here: Mr. Doroghazi - 15.82 hours; Ms. Rinehart - 2 hours;
Ms. Bildner - 53.2 hours; and Ms. Chavez - 3.5 hours.

Total Fee Award

In sum, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to $17,848.20
in fees:

   NAME             HOURS   RATE   TOTAL
   ----             -----   ----   -----
   John Doroghazi   15.82 $310.00  $4,904.20
   Kim Rinehart      2.00 $375.00    $750.00
   Elana Bildner    53.20 $220.00 $11,704.00
   Nicole Chavez     3.50 $140.00    $490.00
                                  ----------
   TOTAL                          $17,848.20

The Court recommends that the district court award Defendant
$17,848.20 in fees.

Costs

Defendant also requests $1,196.23 in costs, which is comprised of
$1,192.29 for legal research and $3.94 for a conference call.
The Court finds that Defendants reasonably incurred the requested
legal research and conference call costs. Mr. Doroghazi represents
that the costs related to the motions and briefing that were filed
in the Connecticut Litigation. The Court having already found that
the motions and briefing filed in Moskowitz I will not contribute
to the defense here, any related costs are compensable.

An itemization of the legal research costs is not necessary given
Mr. Doroghazi's representation that they related to the motions
and briefing filed.  Legal research costs totaling $1,192.29 are
manifestly reasonable for the motion to dismiss and opposition to
motion for class certification.  Accordingly, the Court recommends
that Defendant be awarded $1,196.23 in cost.

The Court recommends that Defendant be awarded $17,848.20 in fees
and $1,196.23 in costs.

Stay

Lastly, Defendant requests a stay until Plaintiff pays the FRCP
41(d) award and dismissal if Plaintiff fails to pay. The Court,
exercising its discretion, declines to stay the matter because
doing so might disrupt the timely and orderly disposition of this
Motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Findings
and Recommendation is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb426ya5
from Leagle.com.

Craig Moskowitz, Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Y. Bellin, Bellin
& Associates LLC, 85 Miles Avenue White Plains, New York 10606,
pro hac vice.

Craig Moskowitz, Plaintiff, represented by Justin A. Brackett --
justinbrackettlaw@gmail.com

American Savings Bank, F.S.B., Defendant, represented by Hoi Shan
Wirt -- swirt@awlaw.com -- Ashford & Wriston, John M. Doroghazi,
jdoroghazi@wiggin.com -- Wiggin and Dana LLP, pro hac vice & Kevin
W. Herring -- kherring@awlaw.com -- Ashford & Wriston.


AUSTRALIA: Wait Before Manus Detainees Get Paid Compo
-----------------------------------------------------
9News.au reported that former Manus Island detainees will likely
be given the option of having their share of $70 million in
compensation held in a trust while their futures remain uncertain.

About 1650 former Manus Island detainees, including some of the
hundreds refusing to leave the mothballed compound, are expected
to receive money under the settlement with the Australian
government and centre operators.

A Victorian Supreme Court judge has already approved Australia's
largest human rights class action settlement but has to give the
final OK for the payments to be made.

Justice Cameron Macaulay said a significant number of people had
been added to the list of registered participants since he
approved the scheme.

He said the number of group members who could not be contacted had
shrunk to what might be said to be a hard core of people who were
unlikely to ever be able to be reached.

Law firm Slater and Gordon says about 88 per cent of 1870 group
members in the class action, who represent the majority of people
detained in the offshore immigration detention centre since 2012,
have registered to share in the settlement.

Barrister Melanie Szydzik said the overall administration of the
settlement distribution scheme was proceeding well but there had
been some delays outside the administrator's control.

It is understood the firm has received contact details for further
former detainees it had not previously been able to reach along
with more medical records relevant to the individual assessments.

The court heard the scheme administrator has been investigating
setting up a trust to give group members another option to receive
their payment.

"The circumstances that these group members find themselves in is
for many of them quite unstable in terms of their residential
circumstances and life circumstances," Ms Szydzik told the court.

More than 900 people have so far provided instructions for payment
of their share of the settlement, including 100 interested in the
trust option if it is approved by the court.

Ms Szydzik said another option was to have it paid via a trusted
friend or relative.

Slater and Gordon had originally hoped to have the settlement paid
out to detainees before the Manus Island Regional Processing
Centre closed and the remaining detainees also ended up scattered
around the world.

Lawyer Rory Walsh said the payments could commence within days if
the court made the order at a hearing on November 24.


CAFE ISTANBUL: Nazih Moves to Certify Class of Servers Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Anass Nazih and opt-in Plaintiff Saad Bouhajra move the
Court for an order conditionally certifying the action captioned
Anass Nazih, On behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
Cafe Istanbul of Columbus, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00947-
ALM-EPD (S.D. Ohio), as a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards and designating Plaintiff Nazih as the representative of
a class consisting of:

     All servers or other tipped employees who worked at Cafe
     Istanbul in Easton Town Center at any time during the three
     years prior to the granting of this motion to the present.

In connection with this conditional certification, the Plaintiffs
further move the Court to order expedited discovery and to
authorize Plaintiffs to send notice of the lawsuit to putative
class members informing them of their rights.

Plaintiff Anass Nazih filed the action under the FLSA and Ohio law
to recover unpaid minimum wages on behalf of himself and similarly
situated tipped employees at Cafe Istanbul in Columbus, Ohio.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=O9Abt3w4

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew Biller, Esq.
          Andrew Kimble, Esq.
          Eric Kmetz, Esq.
          MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Telephone: (513) 651-3700
          Facsimile: (513) 665-0219
          E-mail: abiller@msdlegal.com
                  akimble@msdlegal.com
                  ekmetz@msdlegal.com


CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Faces "Leitner" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital Management
Services, L.P. The case is styled as Jacob Leitner, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Capital Management Services, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
06680 (E.D. N.Y., November 15, 2017).

Capital Management is a nationally licensed and recognized
collections agency, providing the highest level of delinquent
receivables resolution.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



CARDINAL INNOVATIONS: Faces Federal Wage Class-Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Journal Now reports that a federal judge will allow a class-action
lawsuit to proceed against Cardinal Innovations Healthcare
Solutions in a complaint involving claims of violation of federal
wage standards.

Cardinal and at least seven plaintiffs have been engaged in the
discovery process since Judge Thomas Schroeder denied on Sept. 1
Cardinal's motion to modify the lawsuit, including limiting or
halting plaintiffs' ability to opt in.

Charlotte radio-station WFAE reported that Cardinal's chief
financial officer, James Otterberg, resigned from the agency Oct.
2.

That was the same day Cardinal received the second of two scathing
state audits that focused on executive compensation, particularly
the $635,000 annual salary of Chief Executive Richard Topping that
was nearly 3-1/2 times above the maximum allowed by state law.

The agency lists on its website that Trey Sutton, a former N.C.
Department of Health and Human Services executive, is its interim
chief financial officer.

Cardinal is the largest of the state's seven behavioral health
managed-care organizations with more than 875,000 enrollees. It
covers 20 counties, including Alamance, Davidson, Davie, Forsyth,
Rockingham and Stokes in the Triad, in overseeing providers of
mental health, developmental disability and substance abuse
services.

Cardinal recently moved its headquarters from Kannapolis to the
NASCAR Hall of Fame building in uptown Charlotte. It handles more
than $675 million in annual federal and state Medicaid money.

The lawsuit by primary plaintiff Molly Kirkpatrick, of York, S.C.,
was filed in August 2016. She is employed by Cardinal as an
intellectual/development disability (I/DD) care coordinator.

Kirkpatrick claims Cardinal has violated the federal Fair Wage
Standards Act by not providing overtime pay for work outside 40
hours per week "that takes them outside the learned-professional
exemption." Kirkpatrick claims she and more than 100 other
potential plaintiffs' employment status have been misclassified by
Cardinal.

Kirkpatrick estimated that on a near-weekly basis, she worked
between 41 to 66ยด hours without receiving overtime pay. She said
she was paid instead a straight 40-hour weekly salary. She is
pursuing compensation to cover the missing overtime pay.

Schroeder approved making any Cardinal I/DD care counselor from
the past three years eligible to be included in the lawsuit.

Cardinal issued a statement November 3 that repeats much of the
legal argument it made in answering Kirkpatrick's complaint.

"Cardinal Innovations' I/DD care coordinators are an integral part
of (our) business, and require a specialized education and skill
set," the MCO said. "As such, they are classified as exempt
employees and compensated accordingly.

"Cardinal Innovations believes it has properly classified its care
coordinators under the FLSA and denies the allegations against it,
and will vigorously defend this lawsuit."

The lawsuit is among the latest legal challenges facing Cardinal.

On Oct. 17, Cardinal's board -- by a 5-3 vote -- approved reducing
the salary of Topping from $617,526 a year to $204,195. That
reduces the salary to the maximum allowed by North Carolina law.

Topping remained listed November 2 as Cardinal's top executive on
its website.

Cardinal's board chairwoman, Lucy Drake, said Topping said he
cannot accept the decrease, according to media reports. It's
unclear if Topping qualifies for a board-approved severance
package of up to three years of salary and health care benefits
should he choose to resign because of the salary cut.

It also is unclear whether Otterberg received a severance package
following his resignation. Otterberg could have received one to
two years of salary and health care benefits.

Cardinal provided a short statement that Otterberg left the agency
"to pursue a position closer to his family in Greensboro."
Otterberg served as chief financial officer of Unifi Inc. until
resigning in November 2015.

After the second of two scathing state audits, DHHS issued a
statement Oct. 2 saying, "Cardinal should immediately bring its
salary/compensation package for its CEO in line with the other
MCOs, and shed its excessive severance offerings. DHHS will
continue to monitor Cardinal's performance."

Dave Richard, the state's top Medicaid official, told legislators
Oct. 11 that he would present to the Cardinal board a list of
state compliance requirements for Cardinal.

Richard said Oct. 18 that Cardinal's board is taking steps to
comply with state law, "and we look forward to continuing to work
with Cardinal to ensure North Carolinians receive excellent care
and state resources are handled appropriately." [GN]


COASTAL STAFFING: "Harder" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Clifford Harder and Tabaitha Vital, and all others similarly-
situated v. Coastal Staffing Services, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-01457
(W.D. La., November 7, 2017), seeks to recover regular pay and
overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Louisiana Wage Payment Act.

Plaintiff Clifford Harder is a resident of Calcasieu Parish,
Louisiana who worked for the Defendant in that state. He performed
work as a crew member, or general laborer.

Plaintiff Tabaitha Vital is a resident of Harris County, Texas who
worked for Defendant in that state. She performed work as a crew
leader and subsequently as a supervisor.

Defendant is a staffing company that employs individuals to
provide temporary, temporary-to-hire, direct hire, contract, and
payroll services for its clients. At all times relevant to this
Complaint, Defendant employed individuals on a temporary basis to
travel to homes and provide disaster relief to those affected by
Hurricane Harvey devastation. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      James E. Sudduth, III, Esq.
      Lori N. Nunn, Esq.
      Kourtney L. Kech, Esq.
      SUDDUTH AND ASSOCIATES, LLC
      1109 Pithon St.
      Lake Charles, LA 70601
      Tel: (337) 480-0101
      Fax: (337) 419-0507


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Faces "Warman" in East. Dist. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Convergent
Outsourcing, Inc.  The case is styled as Rivka Warman, on behalf
of herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff
v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06659
(E.D. N.Y., November 15, 2017).

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. is an IT service management
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams' Bid for Class Certification Withdrawn
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on November 3, 2017, in the case
captioned Walter Williams, et al. v. Sheriff of Cook County, et
al., Case No. 1:16-cv-07639 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing
held before the Honorable Gary Feinerman.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is granted in part;

   -- Plaintiff's motion to certify class is withdrawn; and

   -- By November 7, 2017, at 3:00 p.m., Defendants shall file a
      memorandum indicating whether they oppose dismissal and, if
      so, on what grounds.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=9prXiTLI


CREDIT PROTECTION: Faces "Brown" Suit in S.D. Mississippi
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Protection
Association, LP. The case is styled as Johnny Brown, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Credit
Protection Association, LP and John Does 1 through 25, Defendants,
Case No. 3:17-cv-00912-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss., November 15, 2017).

Credit Protection specializes in low-balance, high-volume
collections in cable and home video markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher E. Kittell, Esq.
   THE KITTELL LAW FIRM
   P. O. Box 568
   230 West Center Street
   Hernando, MS 38632
   Tel: (662) 298-3456
   Fax: (855) 896-8772
   Email: ckittell@kittell-law.com


CREEK OILFIELD: "Gregory" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Bernard Gregory and Clinton Perry, and all others similarly-
situated v. Creek Oilfield Services, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-00240
(D. N.D., November 7, 2017), is brought against the Defendant for
failure to pay proper overtime in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Bernard Gregory, is a resident of Watford City, North
Dakota. Defendant employed Plaintiff as a driver from about
December 20, 2016 to the present.

Plaintiff Clinton Perry, is a resident of Gretna, Louisiana.
Defendant employed Plaintiff as a fueler tech from June 19, 2017
through August 23, 2017.

Defendant is an oilfield services company that provides fracing
and fueling services to its clients in the oil and gas industry.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      James M. Loren, Esq.
      GOLDBERG & LOREN, P.A.
      3523 45th Street, Suite 100
      Fargo, ND 58104
      Tel: (954) 585-4878
      Fax: (954) 585-4886
      E-mail: JLoren@goldbergloren.com


CRYSTAL CLEAR: 6th Cir. Flips Partial Dismissal of "Cates"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the District
Court's judgment dismissing for failure to state a claim the case
captioned COURTNEY CATES; BRIAN STOVER; JASON MILLER, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. CRYSTAL CLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, LLC; CARBINE &
ASSOCIATES, LLC; TOLLGATE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC.; BRIDGEMORE
VILLAGE OWNERS' ASSOCIATION INC.; BRIDGEMORE DEVELOPMENT GROUP,
LLC; TOLLGATE FARMS, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-6714 (6th
Cir.).

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims for
failure to state a claim and subsequently denied as futile the
plaintiffs' motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint.

The three named plaintiffs brought a purported class action
alleging that the developers of their neighborhoods created
agreements that violated both state and federal law by requiring
the neighborhoods' homeowners to pay for basic telecommunications
services provided by Crystal Clear Technologies, LLC (Crystal
Clear), an entity owned and controlled by the developers.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the first amended
complaint failed to assert allegations necessary for the federal
claims and that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on
behalf of the owners' associations. The district court dismissed
the first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) without addressing the standing argument and declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.

The plaintiffs then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59
to alter or amend the judgment and under Rule 15 for leave to file
a second amended complaint that asserted the same federal claims.
The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion after determining
that the second amended complaint would fail to survive a motion
to dismiss and was thus futile. The plaintiffs timely appealed
from both the district court's dismissal and its refusal to allow
the second amended complaint.  However, the plaintiffs agree that
the second amended complaint reflects the plaintiffs' most recent
and developed pleading for purposes of this appeal. Accordingly,
we consider only whether the district court erred in refusing to
allow the second amended complaint under Rule 59 and Rule 15.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs challenge only the district court's
decisions regarding their tying and exclusivity claims.

Unlawful Tying Under the Sherman Act

A tying arrangement is defined as an agreement by a party to sell
one product, a tying product, only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different (or tied) product.  The typical tying
case involves a seller's attempt to exploit its economic power
over one product or in one market to force a less desirable, tied
product on a buyer. Illegal tying therefore occurs only if the
seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market
and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in
the tied market.

The defendants argue that, even if the plaintiffs sufficiently
pleaded substantial harm on the relevant tied market, the district
court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs' defined market for
the tying product (the sale of homes) is proper. The proper
definition of a tying product market and whether a defendant has
market power within that market are fact-intensive questions best
addressed following discovery. This is because the inquiry
requires considering both the attributes of the product that make
it unique from others and the geographic market within which
consumers may seek comparable products.

The plaintiffs allege that the neighborhoods represent the
majority of centrally-planned neighborhoods that are located in a
small-town setting in a county that is otherwise filled with more
densely populated communities. The plaintiffs further allege that
the neighborhoods are unique from others because they provide the
homeowners with access to superior area schools and local
covenants that restrict home construction to houses typically
purchased by middle to upper-middle income households.
As the district court correctly noted, the plaintiffs' allegations
on the tying product market are plausible on their face.

Exclusivity Under the Federal Telecommunications Act

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has explicit authority
to impose regulations specifying exclusive conduct that the
Federal Telecommunications Act prohibits.

The plaintiffs allege that the Agreements violate the Exclusivity
Order by making Crystal Clear the exclusive provider of services
for the neighborhoods. The district court dismissed this claim, as
alleged in the first amended complaint, noting that both the
Agreements and the allegations contradicted the plaintiffs' claim
that the Agreements were exclusive contracts.

The plaintiffs allege that the Agreements make Crystal Clear the
exclusive provider by creating unlawful and unreasonable barriers
to entry, such as requiring homeowners to pay for services
regardless of usage, referencing Crystal Clear's easements, and by
granting Crystal Clear the exclusive right to negotiate with
providers about access to deliver services to the neighborhoods.
According to the plaintiffs, the cumulative effect of the barriers
makes it both economically and practically unfeasible for any
other provider to offer its services. The plaintiffs point to both
the Agreements' terms, which state that Crystal Clear will operate
on an exclusive basis, and the MBSC letter, which describes
Crystal Clear's easements as exclusive and barring other
providers.

As the district court noted, there are several contradictions
amongst the plaintiffs' allegations and the Agreements' terms. The
plaintiffs allege both that the Agreements make Crystal Clear the
exclusive provider and that Crystal Clear is not truly a provider,
contracting with DirecTV to be the actual provider. The plaintiffs
note the Agreements' terms describing the arrangement as
exclusive, but the Agreements' terms mandate that homeowners must
have access to other providers. The plaintiffs allege both that
Crystal Clear's easements are exclusive and that they are part of
a non-exclusive franchise agreement.

The Sixth Circuit concludes that these contradictions foreclose
the plaintiffs' exclusivity claim.

The Sixth Circuit reverses the district court's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion seeking leave to file the second amended
complaint on plaintiffs' tying claim; affirms the district court's
denial of the plaintiffs' motion seeking leave to file the second
amended complaint on plaintiffs' exclusivity claim; and remands
the action to the district court for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's October 30, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yc76wjhafrom Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Benjamin Andrew Gastel, BRANSTETTER STRANCH & JENNINGS,
PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

D. Alexander Fardon, RILEY WARNOCK & JACOBSON, PLC, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellees Crystal Clear Technologies and Carbine &
Associates.

Valerie Diden Moore, BUTLER SNOW LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, for
Appellees Tollgate Village Association and Bridgemore Village
Owners' Association.

ON BRIEF: Benjamin Andrew Gastel, BRANSTETTER STRANCH & JENNINGS,
PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants.

D. Alexander Fardon, RILEY WARNOCK & JACOBSON, PLC, Nashville,
Tennessee, Craig V. Gabbert, Jr., BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC,
Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees Crystal Clear Technologies and
Carbine & Associates. Valerie Diden Moore, BUTLER SNOW LLP,
Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees Tollgate Village Association
and Bridgemore Village Owners' Association.


CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Ct. Narrows Subpoena Topics in "Valdivieso"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Anthem, Inc.'s Motion to Quash and Objections to
Subpoena to Testify in the case captioned LUIS A. VALDIVIESO,
Plaintiff, v. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:17-
cv-118-T-23JSS (M.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff issued the Subpoena to Anthem seeking information to
support his claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint
concerning the alleged lack of notice of his rights under the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).
The Subpoena seeks testimony concerning twenty-three deposition
topics.

The Emergency Motion is granted in part and denied in part. The
Emergency Motion is granted as to Topics 7, 8, and 20 (identified
as number 18).  All remaining Topics are limited to the COBRA
notice at issue in the lawsuit and to the time period of 2013 to
2016.  The Emergency Motion is denied as to Topics 1 through 5.
Finally, the Emergency Motion is granted in part as to the
remaining Topics because the Court limited the scope of these
Topics at the hearing on the Emergency Motion.

The Motion and the Motion for Reply are denied as moot in light of
the ruling on the Emergency Motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8xpgkekfrom Leagle.com.

Luis A Valdivieso, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon J. Hill,
Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, PA, 1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300,
Tampa, FL 33602

Luis A Valdivieso, Plaintiff, represented by Chad Andrew Justice,
Black Rock Trial Lawyers, 201 S Westland Ave, Tampa, FL, 33606 &
Luis A. Cabassa, Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, PA. 1110 N Florida Ave Ste
300, Tampa, FL, 336023300

Cushman & Wakefield Inc., Defendant, represented by Merry E.
Lindberg -- mlindberg@fordharrison.com -- Ford & Harrison, LLP &
Todd Sidney Aidman -- taidman@fordharrison -- Ford & Harrison,
LLP.

Brett J. Preston, Mediator, represented by Brett J. Preston --
brett.freston@hwhlaw.com -- Hill Ward Henderson, PA.

Anthem, Inc., Movant, represented by Edward M. Mullins --
emullins@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Sujey Scarlett Herrera
-- sherrera@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


D & A SERVICES: Faces "Weber" Suit in Eastern District New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against D & A Services, LLC
of IL. The case is styled as Nathan Weber, on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. D & A
Services, LLC of IL, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06681 (E.D. N.Y.,
November 15, 2017).

D & A Services provides all aspects of customer service and
compliant collection remedies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.co


DAUM INC: Faces "Lopez" Suit in Southern District New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Daum, Inc. The case
is styled as Victor Lopez and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Daum, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-08986 (S.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.[BN]


DAYTON, MN: Seeks Eighth Circuit Review of Order in "Orduno" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant City of Dayton filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Samantha Orduno v. City of Dayton, et al., Case
No. 0:14-cv-01393-ADM, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota - Minneapolis.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ms. Orduno
filed the putative class action on May 2, 2014, alleging
violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).  She has
served as City Administrator for the City of Dayton, Minnesota
from 2005 until she was terminated in 2013.

During her tenure with the City, Mr. Pietrzak served as the Dayton
Chief of Police.  She alleged that while he was employed as Chief
of Police, Mr. Pietrzak accessed from the Minnesota Driver and
Vehicle Services database (the "DVS Database") her personal
information and that of at least 850 others for a purpose not
permitted under the DPPA.  She further alleged that the City of
Dayton, through its supervisors, knew of his unlawful accesses and
failed to monitor and prevent the accesses.

The appellate case is captioned as Samantha Orduno v. City of
Dayton, Case No. 17-3486, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.

According to the Appellate Docket, the originating court document
filed consists of Notice of Cross-Appeal, Order (Doc. 313) filed
09/29/17, Amended Judgment (Doc. 315) filed 10/04/17, Second
Amended Judgment (Doc. 317) filed 10/16/17, and docket
entries.[BN]

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Brief Appellant, Samantha Orduno, is due on December 28,
      2017;

   -- Appendix is due on December 28, 2017; and

   -- Appellee/cross Appellant brief due 30 days from the date
      the court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellant's brief.

Plaintiff-Appellee Samantha Orduno, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Lorenz F. Fett, Jr., Esq.
          Sonia Miller-Van Oort, Esq.
          Jonathan A. Strauss, Esq.
          Robin M. Wolpert, Esq.
          SAPIENTIA LAW GROUP
          120 S. Sixth Street, Suite 100
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 756-7100
          E-mail: larryf@sapientialaw.com
                  soniamv@sapientialaw.com
                  jons@sapientialaw.com
                  robinw@sapientialaw.com

               - and -

          Susan Mae Holden, Esq.
          Marcia Kay Miller, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Montpetit, Esq.
          SIEBENCAREY, P.A.
          901 Marquette Avenue, Suite 500
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-0000
          Telephone: (612) 333-4500
          E-mail: susan.holden@knowyourrights.com
                  marcia.miller@knowyourrights.com
                  jeffrey.montpetit@knowyourrights.com

Defendant-Appellant City of Dayton is represented by:

          Stephanie A. Angolkar, Esq.
          Jon K. Iverson, Esq.
          Susan Marie Tindal, Esq.
          IVERSON REUVERS CONDON
          9321 Ensign Avenue, S.
          Bloomington, MN 55438-0000
          Telephone: (952) 548-7200
          E-mail: stephanie@irc-law.com
                  jon@irc-law.com
                  susan@irc-law.com


DFT INC: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Copper Sands Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant DFT, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Copper Sands Homeowners Association, Inc. v. DFT,
Inc., Case No. 2:10-cv-00510-GMN-NJK, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Copper Sands
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit.  That
appellate case is entitled Copper Sands Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. DFT, Inc., Case No. 17-17220.

The nature of suit is stated as other real property actions.

The appellate case is captioned as Copper Sands Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. DFT, Inc., Case No. 17-17308, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire is due on November 21, 2017;

   -- First cross appeal brief is due on February 6, 2018, for
      Copper Sands Homeowners Association, Inc.;

   -- Second brief on cross appeal is due on March 6, 2018, for
      DFT, Inc.;

   -- Third brief on cross appeal is due on April 6, 2018, for
      Copper Sands Homeowners Association, Inc.; and

   -- Optional cross appeal Reply brief for DFT, Inc., is due
      within 21 days after service of Third brief on cross
      appeal.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee COPPER SANDS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a
Nevada non-profit corporation, on their own behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Terry L. Wike, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TERRY L. WIKE
          10120 W. Flamingo Road, Suite 4-107
          Las Vegas, NV 89147
          Telephone: (702) 630-2934
          Facsimile: (702) 966-7778
          E-mail: twike@wikelaw.com

Defendant-Appellant DFT, INC., a California corporation, DBA
Cannon Management Company, is represented by:

          Peter Carlton Brown, Esq.
          BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA, LLP
          1160 North Town Center Drive, Suite 250
          Las Vegas, NV 89144
          Telephone: (702) 258-6665
          E-mail: pbrown@bremerwhyte.com

               - and -

          Robert C. Carlson, Esq.
          Andrew C. Green, Esq.
          KOELLER NEBEKER CARLSON & HALUCK LLP
          400 S. 4th Street, Suite 600
          Las Vegas, NV 89101
          Telephone: (702) 853-5500
          E-mail: carlson@knchlaw.com
                  Andrew.green@knchlaw.com


DOLLAR TREE: Sued for Denying Seats in Workplace
------------------------------------------------
Eric De La Cruz, individually and on behalf others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Defendants, Case
No. BC680178, (Cal. Super., October 18, 2017), seeks civil
penalties, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of suit and such
other relief pursuant to the California Labor Code and Industrial
Wage Commission Wage Order No. 7.

Dollar Tree is a nationwide retail chain operation with over 200
stores throughout California. Plaintiff worked as a
checker/cashier in their Bellflower store. De la Cruz alleges that
the store does not provide suitable seats in the workplace. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Andre E. Jardini, Esq.
     K.L. Myles, Esq.
     KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE
     550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
     Glendale, CA 91203-1922
     Telephone: (818) 547-5000
     Facsimile: (818) 547-5329
     Email: aej@kpclegal.com
            klm@kpclegal.com

            - and -

     Michael V. Jehdian, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL V. JEHDIAN
     550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 2150
     Glendale, CA 91203
     Telephone: (818) 247-9111
     Facsimile: (818) 247-9222
     Email: jehdian@lawyer.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Mirarchi" Suit in N.D. Georgia
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is styled as Anthony Mirarchi, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Equifax, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-04600-WSD (N.D. Ga., November 15,
2017).

Equifax Inc. is a consumer credit reporting agency. Equifax
collects and aggregates information on over 800 million individual
consumers and more than 88 million businesses worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey L. Kodroff, Esq.
   Spector Roseman & Kodroff
   1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
   Philadelphia, PA 19103
   Tel: (215) 496-0300

      - and -

   Robert W. Killorin, Esq.
   Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP -Atl
   3975 Roswell Road, Suite A
   Atlanta, GA 30342
   Tel: (404) 275-7557
   Email: rkillorin@faruqilaw.com


FORD MOTOR: Brower Piven Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A Professional
Corporation, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan on behalf of purchasers of Ford Motor Company
(NYSE:F) ("Ford" or the "Company") securities during the period
between February 18, 2014 and October 26, 2017, inclusive (the
"Class Period").  Investors who wish to become proactively
involved in the litigation have until December 29, 2017 to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will
be selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Ford securities during the Class Period.  Members of
the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and counsel
chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been certified in
the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that flaws in the
Company's manufacturing processes, supply chain, and/or quality
control rendered at least 841,000 Ford vehicles unsafe to drive,
which would subject Ford to additional regulatory scrutiny and
impact the Company's profitability.

According to the complaint, following an October 27, 2017
announcement of a preliminary investigation by the U.S. National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration into 841,000 Ford vehicles,
citing concerns that the vehicles' steering wheels could detach
while the vehicles are in motion, the value of Ford shares
declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Ford securities purchased on or after February 18, 2014 and
held through the revelation of negative information during and/or
at the end of the Class Period and would like to learn more about
this lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead plaintiff,
without cost or obligation to you, please visit our website at
http://www.browerpiven.com/casesandinvestigations.html. You may
also request more information by contacting Brower Piven either by
email at hoffman@browerpiven.com or by telephone at (410) 415-
6616.

Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s.  If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of your
choice.  You need take no action at this time to be a member of
the class.

         Charles J. Piven, Esq.
         Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
         1925 Old Valley Road
         Stevenson, Maryland 21153
         Tel. No.: 410-415-6616
         Email: hoffman@browerpiven.com [GN]


GALIANO ENTERPRISES: "Gutierrez" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Omelia Del Rosario Gutierrez, and all others similarly-situated v.
Galiano Enterprises of Miami Corp., dba Galiano Restaurant and
Sultan Mamun, Case No. 1:17-cv-24081 (S.D. Fla., November 7,
2017), is brought against the Defendant for overtime and minimum
wage violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a waitress, cook, and
cleaner from August 19, 2002 through July 25, 2017.

The Defendants own and operate a restaurant in Miami-Dade County.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      E-mail: zabogado@aol.com


GBJ INC: "Diaz" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
David Diaz, and all others similarly-situated v. GBJ, Inc., dba
TBL Group, Inc. and dba AFC Transportation and dba Echo
Transportation, TBL Group, Inc., dba Echo Transportation and Echo
Tours & Charters, L.P., dba TBL Group, Inc., and Echo
Transportation, Case No. 4:17-cv-03401 (S.D. Tex., November 7,
2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, and attorney's fees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938.

Plaintiff David Diaz worked for Defendants as a driver from August
of 2016 until the present time. Diaz's duties included, but were
not limited to, picking up and transporting customers, luggage and
equipment to and from different locations. As part of his
employment duties, Plaintiff has regularly driven both busses and
motor coaches and sedans and sports utility vehicles.

The Defendants provide transportation services.  The Company
offers airport transfer, school bus, transit services, sightseeing
tour, and other solutions. AFC Transportation serves customers in
the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
      THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
      2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
      Houston, TX 77018
      Tel: (713) 868-3388
      Fax: (713) 683-9940
      E-mail: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com


GEICO GENERAL: Assignee Cannot Intervene in PIP Policies Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Intervene
and to Extend Time for Sending Class Notice in the case captioned
A&M GERBER CHIROPRACTIC LLC, a/a/o Conor Carruthers, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GEICO
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-62610-
BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla.).  Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order
is denied in part and granted in part.  Plaintiff's Motion to
Enforce Court Orders and/or for Issuance of an Order to Show Cause
is granted

GEICO pays Policy claims pursuant to the fee schedule permitted by
Florida Statute Section 627.736(5)(a) and GEICO's endorsement,
FLPIP (01-13).  Plaintiff billed GEICO for services less than the
amount payable under the elected fee schedule, and pursuant to the
Policy and Endorsement, GEICO paid 80% of the charge submitted.
Plaintiff pleads that, pursuant to its interpretation of the
Policy and Endorsement, GEICO paid an incorrect amount, a practice
GEICO allegedly employs on a wide-spread scale.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and has asked the Court to
interpret Florida Statute 627.736 and the insurance Policy issued
by GEICO and declare that Defendant's Policy requires payment of
100% of the billed charges for all charges submitted under the
Policy that are below the fee schedule amount.

On June 6, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification, and within that Order, it defined the class as
follows:

     All health care providers that received an assignment of
benefits from a claimant and thereafter, pursuant to that
assignment, submitted claims for no-fault benefits under GEICO PIP
policies to which Endorsement FLPIP (01-13) applies, and any
subsequent policies with substantially similar language that were
in effect since January 1, 2013, where GEICO utilized the Code BA
with respect to the payment of any claims.

It also appointed Plaintiff as the Class Representative and
Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel.

Since then, Plaintiff, Class Counsel, and Harvey A. Frank, D.C.,
P.A. filed a motion asking the Court to allow the intervention of
Harvey A. Frank, D.C., P.A. (the "proposed intervenor") as a class
representative as well as a named plaintiff.  At the Court's
recent case management conference, however, Class Counsel
clarified that Plaintiff is only seeking to add the proposed
intervenor for purposes of permissive intervention and is no
longer seeking his intervention as a class representative.  GEICO
challenges the proposed intervenor's standing, membership in the
class, and ability to intervene as a named Plaintiff in this
action.  In light of Plaintiff's recent clarification regarding
the purpose of the proposed intervention, the Court analyzes
whether the proposed intervenor is indeed a member of the class
and has an interest relating to the property that is the subject
of this lawsuit. The parties also address multiple discovery
matters within Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order and Motion
to Enforce. In an effort to provide further clarity and guidance
to the parties as to the limited discovery permitted at this late
stage of the proceedings, the Court also addresses each of those
Motions.

Intervention

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 allows intervention as a matter
of right and on a permissive basis.

Any party seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) must show: (1)
[the] application to intervene is timely; (2) [the party] has an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action; (3) [the party] is so situated that
disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or
impair [its] ability to protect that interest; and (4) [the
party's] interest is represented inadequately by the existing
parties to the suit.

Protective Orders

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows a party from whom
discovery is sought to seek a protective order. The court may, for
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense
by, for example, forbidding or limiting the disclosure or
discovery of a certain matter or specifying the terms of the
discovery.

Motion to Intervene

In support of intervention, Plaintiff and the proposed intervenor
argue that the request was made in a timely manner and that Harvey
A. Frank has an interest in the action that may be impaired and
may not be adequately protected. As evidence of his interest in
this action, they state that Harvey A. Frank is an assignee of the
insurance policy at issue and treated a patient for injuries
covered under the policy submitted claims for bills using CPT
codes covered under the policy that Defendant reduced using its
code BA, and contends that GEICO must pay the full billed amount
for each CPT code billed.

In this case, Plaintiff filed the class action lawsuit on November
3, 2016.  Even if the reassignment of benefits effectively
reassigned the benefits to patient Thania Brenes and then Ms.
Brenes effectively assigned her benefits to the proposed
intervenor, such an assignment was not effective until October 9,
2017, 13 months after this lawsuit was filed.

Florida's Motor Vehicle No Fault Law, as interpreted by Florida's
appellate courts, does not allow a party to obtain standing on a
retroactive basis. Therefore, the Court agrees with GEICO. The
proposed intervenor did not have a valid assignment and did not
have standing at the time this lawsuit was filed and, therefore,
is not a member of the class. As such, the proposed intervenor
does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 for intervention,
requiring that the Motion to Intervene be denied.

Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Enforce

Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order seeks an order (1)
requiring that contacts with any named Plaintiff's patients, any
class representative's patients, and any class members' patients
regarding matters and issues in this case be done through formal
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by way of
prior notice and subpoena;1 (2) disallowing GEICO from asking
questions in depositions about specific treatment and billings for
patients other than Conor Carruthers; (3) limiting GEICO to
completing the deposition of Dr. Gerber and a single corporate
representative designated under Rule 30(b)(6) of Harvey A. Frank,
D.C., P.A.; and (4) disallowing GEICO from taking the deposition
of Amy Gerber.

Given the current closed status of discovery, the Court need not
enter a protective order requiring that GEICO contact the patients
of Plaintiff and any class members through formal discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is because there will
be no additional discovery in this lawsuit other than the
completion of Dr. Gerber's deposition.

Thus, there will be no depositions of any of patients, no
deposition of the corporate representative of Harvey A. Frank,
D.C., P.A., and no deposition of Amy Gerber.2 To the extent that
GEICO recently served a Re-Notice of Taking Deposition of James
and Melissa Mancino, Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce is granted and
GEICO is prohibited from going forward with these depositions.
As to Plaintiff's request that GEICO be disallowed from asking Dr.
Gerber about his treatment of patients other than Conor
Carruthers, the request is granted. The Court previously entered
Order compelling Plaintiff to produce a corporate representative
to testify about the treatment provided to Conor Carruthers. The
Order did not allow GEICO to inquire about Dr. Gerber's medical
treatment of any other patients. Thus, consistent with the Court's
prior Order, GEICO may only make inquiries about Dr. Gerber's
treatment of Conor Carruthers.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y87loh9hfrom Leagle.com.

A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Edward
Herbert Zebersky, Zebersky Payne, LLP. 110 SE 6th St Ste 2150
Ft Lauderdale, FL, 33301

A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Mark S.
Fistos -- mark@pathtojustice.com -- Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing,
Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L., Michael Trent Lewenz, Zebersky
Payne LLP, 110 SE 6th St Ste 2150, Ft Lauderdale, FL, 33301,
Steven R. Jaffe -- steve@pathtojustice.com -- Farmer Jaffe
Weissing Edwards Fistos & Lehrman PL & Todd S. Payne, Zebersky &
Payne, LLP, 110 SE 6th St Ste 2150, Ft Lauderdale, FL, 33301

GEICO General Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Omar
Andres Giraldo -- omar.giraldo@csklegal.com -- Cole, Scott &
Kissane, P.A., Thomas Lee Hunker -- thomas.hunker@csklegal.com --
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. & Peter David Weinstein --
peter.weinstein@csklegal.com -- Cole Scott Kissane PA.


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against General Electric
Company ("GE" or the "Company") (NYSE: GE) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of a class who purchased or otherwise acquired
GE securities between July 21, 2017, and October 20, 2017, both
dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors are
encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/ge.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On October 20, 2017, GE revealed its quarterly results for the
third quarter 2017, divulging earnings per share ("EPS") of $0.29,
falling below earnings estimates of $0.49 per share. GE also
lowered its 2017 earnings expectations, lowering EPS to $1.05-
$1.10 from $1.60-$1.70. On that same day, GE held a conference
call to discuss its financial results and GE CEO John Flannery
said that the Company was finalizing a review of its operations
and that, "While the company has many areas of strength, it's also
clear from our current results that we need to make some major
changes with urgency and a depth of purpose. Our results are
unacceptable, to say the least." Following this news, GE stock
dropped close to 7% or $1.51 per share, over two trading sessions,
to close at $22.32 on October 23, 2017.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) GE's various operating segments, including
its Power segment, were underperforming Company projections, with
order drops, excess inventories and increased costs; (2) as a
result GE overstated its full year 2017 guidance; and, (3)
consequently, Defendants' statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were false and misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/ge or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or his
Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz &
Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in GE you
have until January 2, 2018 to request that the Court appoint you
as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't
require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique. Our primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients. In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration.

         Contact:
         Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or Yael Hurwitz
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Tel. No.: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Pomerantz LLP Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against General Electric Company ("General Electric" or the
"Company") (NYSE:GE) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in United States District Court, for the Southern
District of New York, and docketed under 17-cv-08473, is on behalf
of a class consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired General Electric securities, seeking to recover
compensable damages caused by defendants' violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a shareholder who purchased General Electric securities
between July 21, 2017, and October 20, 2017, both dates inclusive,
you have until January 2, 2018 to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and number of shares purchased.

General Electric operates along several segments, including:
Capital, Healthcare, Aviation, Power, Oil & Gas, Renewable Energy,
Energy Collections & Lighting, and Transportation.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that:  (i) the Company's various
operating segments, including its Power segment, were
underperforming Company projections, with order drops, excess
inventories and increased costs; (ii) in turn, the Company
overstated GE's full year 2017 guidance; and (iii) as a result of
the foregoing, General Electric's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On October 20, 2017, the Company disclosed quarterly results for
the third quarter 2017, disclosing earnings per share ("EPS") of
$0.29, falling below earnings estimates of $0.49 per share. The
Company also lowered 2017 earnings expectations, lowering EPS to
$1.05- $1.10 from $1.60-$1.70.

On that same day, October 20, 2017, the Company held a conference
call to discuss its financial results. On the call, Defendant
Flannery stated that the Company had been completing a review of
its operations and that, "While the company has many areas of
strength, it's also clear from our current results that we need to
make some major changes with urgency and a depth of purpose. Our
results are unacceptable, to say the least."

Following this news, the Company's stock price fell 6.34%, or
$1.51 per share, to close at $22.32 on October 23, 2017, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Florida,
and Los Angeles, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in
the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. See www.pomerantzlaw.com

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


GOOGLE INC: Law Firm May Sue Over Pixel 2 XL Screen Issues
----------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Cragg, writing for Android Authority, reports that Google
may need to brace itself, as a law firm appears to be sizing up a
possible class action lawsuit. The main target? Yes, it's those
widely-reported Pixel 2 XL screen issues.

As you may have seen by now, Google's larger 2017 flagship has
been bombarded with criticism over its LG-made 6.0-inch Quad HD+
pOLED display. Aside from more general complaints over the
screen's innate quirks, quality control concerns have been raised
over reports of premature screen burn-in by tech critics and a
"black smear" issue.

Those concerns appear to have sparked the interest of Girard Gibbs
LLP, which is calling for disgruntled Google Pixel 2 and Pixel 2
XL buyers to step forward as part of an investigation into the
claims.

A post on the firm's website states:

Girard Gibbs is investigating claims against Google, HTC, and LG
for manufacturing, marketing, and selling defective Google Pixel 2
and Pixel 2 XL phones. Both phones have exhibited abnormalities.
Owners of the more expensive Pixel 2 XL have reported that the
devices' OLED screens are suffering from "burn-in" -- a phenomenon
where a portion of the display remains visible even after changing
the screen to display something else, degrading user experience.
Pixel 2 XL owners have also reported significant "black smear" --
a problem affecting certain OLED displays, in which the movement
of pixels against a black backdrop creates a black smudge,
distorting the display.

While the core of the investigation focuses on the Pixel 2 XL, the
smaller second-gen Pixel is also included. This centers on
"clicking" and "whistling" sounds that have been reported by some
Pixel 2 and Pixel 2 XL users and is already on Google's fix-list.

The post encourages those impacted by any of the issues to contact
the firm and talk to an attorney as part of a "free and
confidential case consultation".

Should the New York and San Francisco-based firm receive an influx
of responses, it's highly likely that a class action lawsuit will
be on the cards. After all, Girard Gibbs has a history of going
after major technology companies, including several leading
smartphone manufacturers.

Most notably, the firm was behind the class action lawsuit against
LG over the widespread bootloop issues with the LG G4 and LG V10,
which later spread to the V20 and the Google Nexus 5X -- a phone
also made by the South Korean OEM.

This opinion feature was written by Bob Myers, an engineering and
tech veteran with years of experience working for companies
including Qualcomm, HP, and other tech industry leaders.  A long
time ago, when I was working in . . .

The firm also slapped Motorola with a $5 million lawsuit over
claims of poor customer service related to unfulfilled warranty
promises. This particular case was settled in September, after
which Motorola pledged to "implement several customer-friendly
improvements in the way it processes warranty claims."

As for the Pixel 2 and Pixel 2 XL, there's no doubt that some are
experiencing unfortunate issues with their new devices -- a
situation that's made all the more frustrating because of how
great the phones are otherwise.

Google announced just a few days ago that it is extended the
warranty period to two years for all Pixel 2 phones worldwide.
Defects are also covered by both Google and various carriers.

What do you think about a potential Pixel lawsuit? Is it
inevitable based on the widespread outcry, or is Google getting
unfairly attacked over knee-jerk complaints? Let us know in the
comments. [GN]


GRANT COUNTY, IN: Timbs to Amend Complaint; Dec. 12 Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Theresa L. Springmann entered an order in the lawsuit
entitled TYSON TIMBS, on his own behalf, and on behalf of those
similarly situated v. THE GRANT COUNTY PROSECUTOR, JAMES LUTTRULL,
in his official capacity and individual capacity, THE GRANT COUNTY
SHERRIF, REGGIE NEVELS, in his official capacity and individual
capacity, and THE MARION POLICE CHIEF, ANGELA HALEY, in her
official capacity and individual capacity, Case No. 1:17-cv-00372-
TLS-SLC (N.D. Ind.):

   -- granting the Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint and
      directing the Plaintiff to docket the proposed attached
      Amended Complaint as the Amended Complaint;

   -- denying as moot the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class, in
      light of the Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Certify Class;

   -- denying as moot, with leave to refile, the Defendants'
      Motion to Dismiss, in light of the Plaintiff's impending
      Amended Complaint;

   -- denying as moot, with leave to refile, the Defendants'
      Motion to Stay, because there is longer a pending Motion to
      Dismiss; and

   -- setting the case for a telephonic conference on
      December 12, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., in order to address the
      pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Because the Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the Complaint within
21 days after service of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
pursuant to Rule 15(a) 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Plaintiff may amend its Complaint as a matter of course, Judge
Springmann opines.

Judge Springmann adds that because the Complaint will be amended,
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which is premised on the
original Complaint, is moot.  Therefore, the Court finds that the
Defendants' Motion to Stay briefing on the Plaintiff's Motion to
Certify Class until the disposition of its Motion to Dismiss is
moot, as there is no pending Motion to Dismiss.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ueIA5B7g


INDIANA: Court Refuses to Certify Class of Westville Inmates
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class in the case captioned NATHAN
CAUDILL, and RODNEY SMITH, for themselves and on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v.
OFFICER HAYES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:15-CV-263-TLS (N.D.
Ind.).

Plaintiffs Nathan Caudill and Rodney Smith, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, bring this class action
against Defendants, asserting, through 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a
violation of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment, and their Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process.

Certification of a class is proper only if the class meets all of
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and one
of the requirements of Rule 23(b).  Rule 23(a) is satisfied if:

   (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;

   (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

   (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

   (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

As relevant here, Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied if:

   (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

The matters pertinent to these findings include:

   (A) the class members' interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;

   (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;

   (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

   (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of individuals defined as
the following:

     Inmates incarcerated in the General Services Complex of the
Westville Correctional Facility who on October 8, 2013, were
repeatedly forced into their assigned dorms by the Defendants, in
spite of the known imminent danger of attack, and whom, as a
result, were attacked by fellow inmates and then prison personnel
responding to the attacks, thereby subjecting the inmates to cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of their rights under the
Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

     The inmates that were forced back into their dorms were then
subjected to a denial of adequate medical care for their injuries
and unjustified disciplinary action for the attack that they
themselves suffered, in violation of their Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth
Amendment right to due Process.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' class definition is not
adequately identifiable because it requires highly individualized
inquiries regarding the merits of each potential member's claim.
Accordingly, the Court finds that parsing out whether each class
member was forced into their respective dorms on that day, was
attacked either by other inmates, the guards, or both, was harmed
as a result of the Defendants' specific actions, and was harmed in
a manner that rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment
requires significant individualized analysis, specifically because
the class definition is that of a fail-safe class. Because highly
individualized inquiries would be needed both to determine whether
a person is a member of the proposed class and to determine
damages, the Court finds that a class action is not superior to
other methods of resolving the matters in controversy.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requisite
elements Rule 23(a) for class certification, the Court declines to
address the remaining arguments against class certification, as
these issues are now moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ycqxjxnnfrom Leagle.com.

Nathan Caudill, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher C. Myers,
Christopher C Myers & Associate, 809 S Calhoun St #400, Fort
Wayne, IN 46802, USA

Nathan Caudill, Plaintiff, represented by Ilene M. Smith,
Christopher C Myers & Associates.

Rodney Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Ilene M. Smith,
Christopher C Myers & Associates.

Sergeant Burris, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein,
Indiana Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana
Attorney General's Office.

Lieutenant Creasy, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein,
Indiana Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana
Attorney General's Office.

Lieutenant Herr, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein,
Indiana Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana
Attorney General's Office.

Officer Horn, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein, Indiana
Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana Attorney
General's Office.

Mark Sevier, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein, Indiana
Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana Attorney
General's Office.

Andrew Pazera, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein, Indiana
Attorney General's Office.

Andrew Pazera, Assistant Defendant, represented by Kelly S. Witte,
Indiana Attorney General's Office.

George Payne, Assistant Defendant, represented by Jill E.
Esenwein, Indiana Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte,
Indiana Attorney General's Office.

C Whelan, Defendant, represented by Jill E. Esenwein, Indiana
Attorney General's Office & Kelly S. Witte, Indiana Attorney
General's Office.


INTELLIBOUND LOGISTICS: Slade Files Suit Under Ca. Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Slade on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Intellibound Logistics, LLC, Capstone
Logistics, LLC and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. RG17879244 (Cal. Super., October 18, 2017), seeks recovery of
all allowable compensation, including restitution and restoration
of sums owed and property unlawfully withheld, statutory
penalties, declaratory and injunctive relief interest, attorneys'
fees, and costs resulting from unfair business practices and
violation of the California Labor Code.

Slade worked for the Defendants as a sanitation worker at
Defendants warehouse located in Lathrop, California from August 16
to September 1, 2017. He was responsible for operating a pallet
jack to move pallets and then clean around them. He alleges that
the Defendant failed to provide a system by which their pay can be
withdrawn without paying a fee or incur a long waiting time. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Eric A. Grover, Esq.
      Robert W. Spencer, Esq.
      KELLER GROVER LLP 1965 Market Street
      San Francisco, CA 94103
      Telephone: (415) 543-1305
      Facsimile: (415) 543-7861
      Email: eagrover@kellergrover.com
             rspencer@kellergrover.com


IPAYMENT INC: Faces Distefano Class Suit in Calif.
--------------------------------------------------
Rosina Distefano, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. iPayment, Inc., iPayment of California,
LLC and Does 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No. BC680362 (Cal.
Super., October 18, 2017), seeks redress for Defendants' failure
to authorize or permit required meal periods, statutory penalties
for failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting time
penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely
pay employees all wages due upon separation of employment, failure
to maintain time-keeping records, reimbursement of business-
related expenses, injunctive relief and other equitable relief,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest under California
Labor Code and applicable Industrial Wage Orders.

iPayment -- https://www.ipaymentinc.com/ -- offers merchant credit
card payment processing services including evaluation and
acceptance of card numbers, detection of fraudulent transactions,
receipt and settlement of funds and service and support. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
      410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
      Glendale, CA 91203
      Tel: (818) 265-1020
      Fax: (818) 265-1021


JACOBY & MEYERS: Court Denies Class Certification in "Harding"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned NANCY HARDING et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. JACOBY & MEYERS, LLP, et al, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 14-5419 (JMV) (MF) (D.N.J.).

The matter arises from a dispute between Nancy and Jeffrey Harding
and their former lawyers, Finkeistein & Partners, LLP (F&P).
Plaintiffs allege that they were improperly charged for work
performed by Total Trial Solutions, LLC, a litigation support
company that is owned by one of the named partners of Finkeistein
& Partners.

Plaintiffs filed this matter on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated. Plaintiffs claim that Total Trial's
work should have actually been covered by F&P's contingency fee
arrangement with Plaintiff instead, Plaintiffs were charged for
Total Trial's work as a separate expense.

Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the proposed class
satisfies the four requirements of Rule 23(a) of the federal Rules
of Civil Procedure:

   -- The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.

   -- There are questions of law or fact common to the class.

   -- The claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

   -- The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

The Court will only address those four areas. Defendant's
argument, at base, is that Plaintiff has failed to present
sufficient evidence, expert or otherwise, that would allow the
Court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
foregoing Rule 23 requirements have been met.

Typicality

The typicality requirement measures whether the interests of the
lead plaintiff align with the interests of the absent members, and
whether the circumstances of the purported class are the same.

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their claims are typical of
all other clients of F&P, in whose cases Total Trial was used,
during the requested period. Plaintiffs have not provided
sufficient evidence of which Total Trial services in their own
cases were actually legal services, should have been performed in-
house by F&P, and/or were overpriced. Plaintiffs, as lay persons,
cannot opine as to what constitutes legal services or services
that F&P should have performed itself.

Similarly, because Plaintiffs do not indicate that they are
personally familiar with the relevant industry (such as subpoena
service), they cannot opine as to which services were overpriced.
Without understanding this critical threshold information, the
Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs' claims are typical of all
other clients of F&P and Total Trial during the period. If
Plaintiffs do submit such evidence in the future, the Court will
be in a better position to assess the typicality prong.

Commonality

Typicality and commonality are both broad categories that tend to
merge because they focus on similar aspects of the alleged claims.
Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class
members 'have suffered the same injury. The class claims must rely
on a common contention that is capable of being resolved by the
class action.

The commonality prong is lacking for the same reasons as the
typicality requirement. The Court is well aware of the commonality
concerning the retainer agreements and the use of Total Trial, but
the Court is unable to form the common question (much less answer)
as to which specific Total Trial services are at issue. Again, if
Plaintiffs submit the appropriate evidence in the future, they may
be able overcome this relatively low hurdle.

For example, Plaintiffs may be able to produce evidence that any
F&P client who was charged for A, B, and C services by Total Trial
were improperly charged because F&P should have performed those
services in-house. Similarly, Plaintiffs may be able to produce
evidence that any F&P client who was charged for X, Y, and Z
services by Total Trial were overcharged. Yet, to date, Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently done so even as to their own claims.

Predominance

Here, as they have fallen short on commonality, Plaintiffs have
not met their burden as to predominance.

Damages

At this point, it is not clear how Plaintiffs propose to prove
damages because, as noted, it is not clear which Total Trial
services are at issue. Plaintiffs only state that their damages
would be simply a refund of unlawfully charged Total Trial fees.
Such an assertion begs the essential question of which fees were
unlawfully charged. If and when Plaintiffs provide sufficient
evidence as to the suspect charges, then their damage theory may
be viable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybq463f6from Leagle.com.

NANCY HARDING, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH R. SANTOLI. 615
Franklin Turnpike # 4, Ridgewood, NJ 07450, USA

NANCY HARDING, Plaintiff, represented by OLIMPIO LEE SQUITIERI --
lee@sfclasslaw.com -- SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP.

JEFFREY HARDING, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH R. SANTOLI &
OLIMPIO LEE SQUITIERI, SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP.

JACOBY & MEYERS, LLP, Defendant, represented by A. RICHARD ROSS,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE
CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO. 5 BECKER FARM ROAD
ROSELAND, N.J. 07068-1739

FINKELSTEIN & PARTNERS, LLP, Defendant, represented by A. RICHARD
ROSS, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA
BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO.

TOTAL TRIAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, represented by A. RICHARD
ROSS, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA
BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO.

ANDREW FINKELSTEIN, Defendant, represented by A. RICHARD ROSS,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE
CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO.

KENNETH OLIVER, Defendant, represented by A. RICHARD ROSS,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE
CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO.


JAYSON HOME: Faces "Norman" Suit in Southern District New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jayson Home,
Incorporated. The case is styled as Virginia Norman and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v Jayson Home,
Incorporated, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-08972 (S.D. N.Y.,
November 16, 2017).

Jayson Home offers an ever-evolving collection of modern & vintage
furniture and unique home furnishings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


JENNIFER CONVERTIBLES: Faces "Norman" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jennifer
Convertibles, Inc.  The case is styled as Virginia Norman and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Jennifer Convertibles, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-08969
(S.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

Jennifer Convertibles Inc. is an American retail company, based in
Woodbury, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


JOBCASE INC: "Fente" Suit Alleges TCPA Violations
-------------------------------------------------
Mary Fente, and all others similarly-situated v. Jobcase, Inc.,
and Lyft, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-24082 (S.D. Fla., November 7,
2017), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff Mary Fente is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

Defendant Jobcase owns and operates various job-related marketing
websites, including www.jobcase.com, www.designerjobs.com, and
www.jobhat.com.

Defendant Lyft is a transportation services company that develops,
markets and operates the Lyft car transportation mobile
application. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott A. Edelsberg, Esq.
      Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
      Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
      KOPELOWITZ OSTROW
      FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
      1 W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 525-4100
      Fax: (954) 525-4300
      E-mail: edelsberg@kolawyers.com
              ostrow@kolawyers.com
              kaufman@kolawyers.com

          - and -

      Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
      HIRALDO P.A.
      401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Ste 1400
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 400-4713
      E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

          - and -

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (305) 479-2299
      E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com


JOINT COMMISSION: Boston Trustees Agree to Opioid Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Gorman, writing for Akron Ohio News, reports that the Boston
Township Board of Trustees agreed Oct. 25 to join a class action
lawsuit seeking recovery of the costs of dealing with the opioid
crisis.

Trustee President Amy Anderson met with a group of lawyers working
on the case and said the Valley Fire District already signed on
for the lawsuit.

According to the legal services contract, the lawsuit will target
"individuals and entities related to the marketing, prescribing,
distribution or sale of opioids."

The four law firms working on the case are Nealon & Associates;
Raffaelli & Prazak; Motley Rice; and Brennan, Manna & Diamond.

"There is no cost to us," Anderson said. "They are fronting the
money."

The next Boston trustees' meeting is scheduled for Nov. 8 at 6:30
p.m. at Boston Township Hall, located at 1775 Main St. in
Peninsula. [GN]


JOINT COMMISSION: FDL County Joins Opioid Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
KFIZ.com reported that Fond du Lac County supervisors gave
unanimous approval to the county joining a class action lawsuit
against drug manufacturers. Specifically the suit hopes to recoup
some of the costs the county has incurred from the increase in
services caused by the opioid epidemic. Supervisors did have
questions about the lawsuit including how much time Corporation
Counsel and staff would have put in to supply information for the
lawsuit. County Executive Al Buechel says he hopes budget
information from social services, the health department and other
departments will be enough. Supervisor Ken Depperman says it was
important for counties to get in on the lawsuit now before the
state enters the fray. He noted when the state got a settlement
from tobacco companies counties were left out in the cold. Then
Governor Jim Doyle used a big chunk of the tobacco settlement to
balance the State Budget. [GN]


JOINT COMMISSION: West Virginia Cities Sue Over Opioid Addiction
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brad McElhinny, writing for Metro News, reports that three West
Virginia cities have filed a class action lawsuit over how the
nation's leading health care certification service described the
addictive power of opioids.

The lawsuit was filed November 2 against the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, which accredits and
certifies nearly 21,000 health care organizations and programs in
the United States.

The cities of Charleston, Huntington and Kenova are the plaintiffs
in the lawsuit that was filed in U.S. District Court in the
Southern District of West Virginia.

The cities claim the commission's 2001 campaign to explain new
pain management standards amounted to misinformation about the
additive nature of opioids.

The campaign, the lawsuit says, included statements such as "Some
clinicians have inaccurate and exaggerated concerns about
addiction, tolerance and risk of death. This attitude prevails
despite the fact that there is no evidence that addiction is a
significant issue when persons are given opioids for pain
control."

The cities claim the commission stuck to its original position,
even as evidence of an opioid epidemic sweeping the nation became
clear. The lawsuit claims that the organization failed to prevent
or curtail the opioid crisis.

"Defendants owed a duty of care to the municipalities, including
but not limited to taking steps to promulgate reasonable health
standards that would not lead directly to the misuse, abuse and
over-prescription of opioids," the lawsuit states.

The lawsuit also claims the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Health Care Organizations unjustly benefited from funding by
pharmaceutical companies such as Purdue. "These funds constitute
blood money," the lawsuit states. "Thousands have died and
millions suffer because of defendants' cooperation."

The municipalities claim they have been damaged through the
resulting addiction of citizens. The municipalities also say they
have experienced increased healthcare, workers compensation and
public safety costs.

The cities say they need significant additional resources, such as
treatment centers, to fight addiction.

"This lawsuit is a critical move toward eliminating the source of
opioid addiction and holding one of the most culpable parties
responsible," Huntington Mayor Steve Williams stated in a release
sent out by the City of Huntington.

"For too long, JCAHO has operated in concert with opioid producers
to establish pain management guidelines that feature the use of
opioids virtually without restriction. The JCAHO standards are
based on bad science if they are based on any science at all."[GN]


JP MORGAN: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Scott" Suit
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the cases captioned WILLIAM MARK
SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., Defendant,
Case Nos. 17-cv-249 (APM), 17-cv-387 (APM) (D.D.C.).

Plaintiffs William Mark Scott and Ronald Morin allege that they
served on juries in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
and received debit cards containing their juror compensation, but
did not receive all the compensation to which they were entitled.
Specifically, Plaintiffs complain that Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co. forced them to receive their compensation on debit cards,
provided them with misleading information about those cards,
structured the debit card program so as to prevent them from
receiving their full compensation, and charged them outrageous
fees for using that compensation.

They filed this putative class action against Defendant on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, demanding a jury
trial and seeking declarative, injunctive, and compensatory relief
under state and federal law.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike

A district court may consider documents attached to a motion to
dismiss, without converting the motion into a motion for summary
judgment, if those documents' authenticity is not disputed, they
were referenced in the complaint, and they are integral to one or
more of the plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiffs' Consolidated Complaint even includes a snapshot of a
portion of one document that Defendant attached in full to its
Motion.  In addition to being referenced in the Consolidated
Complaint and relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, the documents do not
contain any facts or opinions concerning Defendant's execution of
the agreement, which limits any potential prejudice to Plaintiffs.

Further, the court is not suspicious of the documents'
authenticity. Defendant includes an affidavit representing the
authenticity of each document and Plaintiffs challenge those
documents only on other grounds; namely, that the documents are
outdated or have been selectively disclosed. The additional
document attached to Defendant's Reply, a letter from the
Department of the Treasury to Defendant, extending Defendant's
designation as a financial agent, appears to cure Plaintiffs'
first concern, and Plaintiffs' generic assertion that the
documents have been selectively disclosed is neither persuasive
nor dispositive.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike is denied.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim is facially
plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.

Whether Defendant May be Held Liable for the Claims Alleged

Defendant asserts that, under the doctrine of derivative sovereign
immunity, it is immune from liability for the acts alleged in the
Consolidated Complaint, all of which it took pursuant to the
government's Financial Agency Agreement or the extension of the
U.S. Debit Card Program to the District of Columbia Courts through
the Direction to Agent. Defendant does not claim that its immunity
goes to the court's jurisdiction and does not move for summary
judgment based on this defense.

Based on the Consolidated Complaint and the documents offered by
Defendant, the court cannot say whether Defendant is immune from
suit and, accordingly, denies Defendant's Motion. Construing the
allegations and documents in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, as the court must, the court concludes Plaintiffs have
advanced plausible claims that are not defeated, on the present
limited record, by Defendant's assertion of derivative sovereign
immunity.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied insofar as it asks the
court to dismiss the Consolidated Complaint on the ground of
derivative sovereign immunity. The parties will be permitted to
take limited discovery on that question. Because resolution of the
immunity issue may resolve this matter, the court defers ruling on
all other aspects of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9q5hobbfrom Leagle.com.

WILLIAM MARK SCOTT, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Kaliel --
jkaliel@tzlegal.com -- TYCKO & ZAVAREEI, LLP.

WILLIAM MARK SCOTT, Plaintiff, represented by Sophia Jaclyn Goren
sgoren@tzlegal.com -- TYCKO & ZAVAREEI, LLP & Anna C. Haac, TYCKO
& ZAVAREEI, LLP, 1828 L Street, NW -- Suite 1000, Washington,
D.C. 20036

RONALD MORIN, Plaintiff, represented by Anna C. Haac, TYCKO &
ZAVAREEI, LLP, Donald J. Enright -- denright@zlk.com -- LEVI &
KORSINSKY, LLP, Elizabeth K. Tripodi -- etripodi@zlk.com -- LEVI &
KORSINSKY LLP, Quentin A. Roberts -- qroberts@zlk.com --  LEVI &
KORSINSKY LLP, pro hac vice & Rosemary M. Rivas --  rrivas@zlk.com
-- LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP, pro hac vice.

J.P. MORGAN CHASE AND CO., Defendant, represented by Jonathan
Edward Paikin -- jonathan.paikin@wilmerhale.com -- WILMER HALE,
Jamie S. Dycus -- jamie.dycus@wilmerhale.com -- WILMER CUTLER
PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, pro hac vice, Jenny R. Pelaez --
jenny.pelaez@wilmerhale.com -- WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR
LLP, pro hac vice & Noah A. Levine -- noah.levine@wilmerhale.com -
- WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, pro hac vice.


LAGASSE LLC: Ct. Denies Alpha Tech's Bid to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Thomas M. Durkin entered a memorandum opinion and
order in the lawsuit titled ALPHA TECH PET INC., ET AL. v.
LAGASSE, LLC, ET AL., Case No. 1:16-cv-00513 (N.D. Ill.):

   (1) granting the Defendants' a motion to deny class
       certification; and

   (2) denying the Defendants' motion for judgment on the
       pleadings on portions of the Plaintiffs' individual
       claims.

According to the Memorandum Opinion & Order, the Plaintiffs also
filed a motion to grant class certification on which the Court
held briefing in abeyance pending its decision on the Defendants'
motion to deny class certification.  For the same reasons that the
Defendants' motion to deny class certification is granted, Judge
Durkin denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

In its complaint, Plaintiff Alpha Tech alleges that Defendants
LaGasse LLC, Essendant Management Services LLC, Essendant Co., and
United Stationers, Inc., sent Alpha Tech eight unsolicited fax
advertisements in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005.

In December 2016, the Court consolidated Alpha Tech's case with
another case pending in this district for pre-trial proceedings.
The other case is Craftwood II, Inc. et al. v. Essendant, Inc.,
No. 16-cv-4321.

The Alpha Tech and Craftwood plaintiffs seek to certify classes of
all persons and entities to whom Essendant sent fax transmissions
from May 1, 2011 to May 1, 2015, which would implicate
approximately 1.5 million faxes in 725 separate transmissions to
nearly 24,000 unique fax numbers.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion & Order is available at no charge
at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PHOUql7L


LRR ENERGY: Hurwitz Seeks to Certify Class in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Hurwitz, Court-appointed lead plaintiff of the lawsuit
styled ROBERT HURWITZ, on Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated v. LRR ENERGY, L.P., ERIC MULLINS, CHARLES W.
ADCOCK, JONATHAN C. FARBER, TOWNES G. PRESSLER, JR., JOHN A.
BAILEY, JONATHAN P. CARROLL, VANGUARD NATURAL RESOURCES, LLC,
LIGHTHOUSE MERGER SUB, LLC, SCOTT W. SMITH, RICHARD A. ROBERT, W.
RICHARD ANDERSON, BRUCE W. MCCULLOUGH, and LOREN SINGLETARY, Case
No. 1:15-cv-00711-MAK (D. Del.), asks the Court to certify a class
consisting of:

     (a) as to claims under sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all persons and entities
     who held LRR Energy, L.P. ("LRR") common units as of
     August 28, 2015, and were entitled to vote on the
     acquisition of LRR by Vanguard Natural Resources, LLC
     ("Vanguard"), and were damaged thereby; and (b) as to claims
     under sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, all
     persons and entities who received Vanguard common units in
     exchange for their LRR common units on or about October 5,
     2015, pursuant to the Registration Statement, as amended,
     and were damaged thereby.

Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendants; (ii) members of the
immediate family of each individual Defendant; (iii) any person
who was an officer or director of Vanguard or LRR; (iv) any firm,
trust, corporation, officer, or other entity in which any
Defendant has or had a controlling interest; (v) any person who
participated in the wrongdoing alleged herein; and (vi) the legal
representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, beneficiaries,
successors-in-interest, or assigns of any such excluded person or
entity.

The Plaintiff also asks the Court to (1) appoint him as the Class
Representative, and (2) appoint Robbins Arroyo LLP as Class
Counsel and Cooch and Taylor, P.A., as Liaison Class Counsel in
the litigation.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ebqjFiSg

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          The Brandywine Building
          1000 West Street, 10th Floor
          Post Office Box 1680
          Wilmington, DE 19899
          Telephone: (302) 984-3800
          Facsimile: (302) 984-3939
          E-mail: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Robbins, Esq.
          Stephen J. Oddo, Esq.
          Nichole T. Browning, Esq.
          Eric M. Carrino, Esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 525-3900
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com
                  soddo@robbinsarroyo.com
                  nbrowning@robbinsarroyo.com
                  ecarrino@robbinsarroyo.com


LYFT INC: "Camilo" Sues Over Excessive Fees and Taxes
-----------------------------------------------------
Gustavo Camilo, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Lyft, Inc., Endor Car & Driver,
LLC, Tri-City, LLC and Tri-State Car and Driver, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 159265/2017 (N.Y. Sup., October 18, 2017), Defendants,
seeks all available relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

LYFT provides a transport service that allows drivers to sign up
as drivers using their privately owned cars, to pick up and drive
passengers for a fee using a mobile technology.

Lyft provides an insurance via Endor Car & Driver, LLC, Tri-City,
LLC and Tri-State Car and Driver, LLC to comply with and provide
the mandated coverage under New York State Law, an amount that is
taken from the fare. However, Lyft takes 11.4% on the total
overall fare, a vague combination of fees and taxes.

Camilo is employed by Defendants as a driver for hire using the
Lyft Platform from January 2014 to present. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Luigi Izzo, Esq.
     The LAW OFFICES of JOSEPH A. ROMANO P.C.
     1776 Eastchester Road, Suite 210
     Bronx, NY 10461
     Tel: (914)339-2605
     Fax: (845) 891-0156


M.L. ZAGER: Faces "Labin" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Law Offices of
M.L. Zager, P.C.  The case is styled as Rachel Labin, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
The Law Offices of M.L. Zager, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
06726 (E.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

The Law Offices of M.L. Zager, P.C. is a law firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


MAJU PUNCAKBUMI: Suit Against The Arc @ Cyberjaya Adjourned
-----------------------------------------------------------
Wan Ilaika Mohd Zakaria, writing for The Sun Daily, reports that a
class-action lawsuit representing 137 unit owners of serviced
apartment project The Arc @ Cyberjaya against its developer Maju
Puncakbumi Sdn Bhd has been adjourned.

The decision was made at the Shah Alam High Court on November 2,
after the lawyers were called into chambers by judicial
commissioner Datuk Roslan Abu Bakar before he postponed the matter
until Nov 9.

Vincent Lim, Esq. the lawyer who represents the owners, previously
told SunBiz that the class action was filed against the developer
on June 7 amid allegations that the owners stopped receiving their
rental after a year.

It was reported that the project came with two types of guaranteed
rental return (GRR) schemes, one for up to six years and another
for up to 25 years with a gross 8% rental income per annum for the
first term, of three and four years respectively.

Owners were given an option agreement to sign for the GRR scheme
when they signed the sale and purchase agreement.

Lim said the owners' claims against the developer included the
outstanding rentals owe by the developer to them, 8% interest on
the outstanding rentals, agreed liquidated damages as stated in
the agreement, general damages, and/or aggravated damages, as well
as exemplary damages.

On Oct 6, Meda Inc Bhd, the parent company of Maju Puncakbumi,
told the stock exchange it denies promising a fixed rental income
of up to 25 years to the apartment owners who have initiated the
class-action lawsuit against its subsidiary.

Meda said according to an option agreement between owners and Maju
Puncakbumi to exercise their option for a GRR, there is a fixed
term of three or four years (depending on the unit), and the
option to renew the agreement for up to 20 years was on Maju
Puncakbumi.

"In fact, we have terminated the GRR scheme pursuant to the option
agreement for majority of the units," it said, noting the class-
action suit is claiming breach of contract in relation to the
option agreement.

Meda said the owners are claiming RM3.97 million being the
outstanding rentals up till May 2017; 8% interest on the
outstanding rentals; agreed liquidated damages as stated in the
agreement, general damages, and/or aggravated damages, as well as
exemplary damages; 5% interest from the judgement till the full
payment date; cost; vacant possession of the unit; and any relief
deemed fit by the court.

"We have already captured all the outstanding rentals amounting to
RM 3.97 million, therefore, there is no financial impact in our
books," it added.

The project, which was launched in 2011, is a RM700 million
freehold development, comprising four blocks of serviced
apartments with at an average price of RM350,000 per unit and four
blocks of office towers. [GN]


MDL 2445: Court Denies Mono Sol's Move to Dismiss Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion denying Defendant Mono
Sol Rx's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned IN RE SUBOXONE
(BUPRENORPHINE HYDROCHLORIDE AND NALOXONE) ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Wisconsin, et al. v. Indivior Inc. et
al. Case No. 16-cv-5073. STATE OF WISCONSIN By Attorney General
Brad D. Schimel, et al. Plaintiffs, v. INDIVIOR INC. f/k/a RECKITT
BENCKISER PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al., Defendants. MDL No. 2445,
No. 13-MD-2445, CIV. No. 16-5073. (E.D. Pa.).

Indivior, Inc., introduced Suboxone, a drug designed for the
treatment of opioid addiction, as a sublingual tablet.  At that
time, the two component ingredients of Suboxone naloxone and
buprenorphine were not subject to any patent protection.  In 1994,
and in lieu of exclusivity through patent protection, the FDA
granted Indivior's Suboxone tablets a seven-year period of
exclusivity as an orphan drug based on Indivior's representation
that it would be unlikely to recover the costs of developing and
marketing the drug.

Nonetheless, Suboxone did not obtain actual marketing exclusivity
until 2002, thus allowing Indivior to market the Suboxone tablet
unit, without the threat of competition from any generic co-
formulated buprenorphine/naloxone tablet. Indivior allegedly
earned more than $2 billion on Suboxone tablets by 2010.

In a December 2006 meeting, MonoSol and Reckitt Benckiser
Healthcare UK Ltd. (RBH), Indivior's sister company, signed an
agreement to develop and market a sublingual film form of Suboxone
for the purpose of extending Indivior's exclusivity in the co-
formulated buprenorphine/naloxone market.

To speed up the approval process for the new film product, MonoSol
suggested that Indivior have a pre-NDA filing guidance meeting
with the FDA to request a priority review status The FDA rejected
Indivior's application due to concerns that the film could be
abused by patients and result in accidental exposure to children.
In response, Indivior submitted a revised Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) to address the safety concerns related
to the film form. Based on the REMS, the FDA approved Indivior's
NDA for Suboxone film on August 30, 2010. In response, Indivior
submitted a revised Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS)
to address the safety concerns related to the film form. Based on
the REMS, the FDA approved Indivior's NDA for Suboxone film on
August 30, 2010.

The Plan to Delay Generic Entry

The orphan drug exclusivity on branded Suboxone tablets expired on
October 8, 2009, and ANDAs for approval to sell generic Suboxone
tablets were filed in late 2009. Nevertheless, generic
buprenorphine/naloxone tablets did not gain FDA approval until
February 2013.

Despite the fact that Indivior's Suboxone tablet REMS had just
been approved by the FDA in December 2011, Indivior allegedly did
not cooperate with the generic manufacturers in the finalization
and submission of a shared REMS. While not explicitly refusing to
participate, it engaged in multiple delay tactics to prolong the
approval of the ANDA for the generics. Indivior's refusal to
cooperate successfully delayed submission of the shared REMS until
August of 2012, when the generic ANDA filers obtained a waiver
allowing them to submit a shared REMS program of their own without
Indivior's cooperation.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice and only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. A complaint does
not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.

Whether the Amended Complaint Plausibly Alleges that MonoSol
Participated in an Unlawful Anticompetitive Agreement

To prevail on a section 1 claim or a section 2 conspiracy claim, a
plaintiff must establish the existence of an agreement, sometimes
also referred to as a conspiracy or concerted action. An agreement
exists when there is a unity of purpose, a common design and
understanding, a meeting of the minds, or a conscious commitment
to a common scheme. To plead an agreement, a plaintiff may allege
direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two.

Whether MonoSol and Indivior Can Conspire as a Matter of Law

In stark contrast to these cases, the patentee/licensee
relationship in this case is ancillary to the anticompetitive
conduct at the heart of the alleged conspiracy. As set forth
above, MonoSol, aware of Indivior's pending loss of exclusivity on
its Suboxone tablet, approached Indivior about developing Suboxone
film for the purpose of extending Indivior's exclusivity in the
co-formulated buprenorphine/naloxone market. The two companies
then allegedly entered into an agreement in which they would
jointly develop the film and MonoSol would receive royalty fees on
the sales of the film.

Subsequent to that agreement, MonoSol applied for the patent on
Indivior's behalf and the two companies strategized to minimize
manufacturing delays. MonoSol then allegedly suggested that
Indivior withdraw Suboxone tablets from the market in order to
convert the market from tablets to film, made adjustments to its
own costs to ensure that the film could be launched at a lower
price point, and participated in Indivior's plan to delay generic
entry by helping Indivior explore what citizen petition
opportunities may exist regarding Suboxone tablets.

The mere fact that this overall scheme included the existence of
an exclusive license relationship between Indivior and MonoSol
neither puts this case on par with those cited above or brings it
within the realm of the Copperweld doctrine. Rather, the Amended
Complaint describes two separate entities that engaged in
concerted action to jointly advance their independent economic
interests.

The Court finds that the Copperweld doctrine does not apply in
this case such that MonoSol and Indivior may be viewed as a single
economic entity.

Whether an Agreement to Develop and Introduce a New Product is
Pro-Competitive

Had Plaintiffs limited their allegations regarding the conspiracy
between Indivior and MonoSol to mere product innovation and
introduction of the Suboxone film, Plaintiffs would have been
hard-pressed to establish that the conspiracy acted in restraint
of trade or for a non-competitive purpose. Contrary to Defendant's
arguments, however, the Amended Complaint goes far beyond
allegations that the conspiracy was intended only to introduce a
new product into the market; rather it combines allegations of
product improvement with product withdrawal and other
anticompetitive conduct.  Considered collectively, the Amended
Complaint's allegations] plausibly plead that the conspiracy
between MonoSol and Indivior was designed squarely to stymie
competition, prevent consumer choice and reduce the market's ambit

Taking the allegations of the Amended Complaint as true, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged anticompetitive conduct
against MonoSol.

Whether Plaintiffs Adequately Pled Facts Supporting the Inference
that MonoSol Engaged in Exclusionary Conduct

MonoSol also contends that the Amended Complaint is devoid of
allegations that it participated in exclusionary conduct. MonoSol
argues that Plaintiffs' allegations against it center on (1) its
efforts to market its film technology as a differentiator for
products going off patent; (2) its efforts to reduce costs and
accelerate production of Suboxone film; (3) the fact that film
sales would rise if there were no tablets on the market; and (4)
unspecified discussions with Indivior about a potential citizen's
petition.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint permit such a plausible
inference.  The alleged product-hopping scheme at issue in this
case involves Defendants' introduction of a new film version of
Suboxone on the brink of the loss of patent exclusivity of the
Suboxone tablet, the subsequent withdrawal of the tablet from the
market, disparagement of the safety and efficacy of the tablet,
and efforts to delay the entry of generic tablets by failing to
cooperate in a shared REMS process and filing a sham citizen
petition against the generic tablets.

According to the Amended Complaint, MonoSol participated in this
scheme in multiple respects. Primarily, it approached Indivior
with the plan to file a new drug application to market Suboxone in
a sublingual film form purposely to extend Indivior's exclusivity
in the co-formulated buprenorphine/naloxone market. MonoSol then
allegedly negotiated with Indivior to receive royalty payments on
sales of Suboxone film, applied for the patent on Indivior's
behalf, and actively strategized with Indivior to minimize
manufacturing delays, all of which indicated its involvement in
some concerted action with Indivior.

The Amended Complaint explains that, in an effort to convert the
market for the purpose of ensuring the film's dominance in the
market, MonoSol explicitly suggested to Indivior that it make the
hard switch from tablets to film, withdraw the Suboxone tablet
from the market.

Finally, MonoSol allegedly participated in meetings with Indivior
about possible citizen petition possibilities to delay entry of
generic tablets. Reading these allegations collectively, and in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, I find that Plaintiffs
have created a plausible inference that MonoSol participated in
the alleged conspiracy

Whether the Amended Complaint Adequately Pleads Proximate
Causation

MonoSol next contends that Counts III and IV of the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not adequately
allege that MonoSol's conduct proximately cause their injuries.
Given the fairly liberal pleading standards with respect to
antitrust injury.

The Court disagrees.

In the present case, while MonoSol may ultimately adduce proof
that the FDA's delay in the approval of the generic tablets caused
the antitrust injury, they cannot, at this juncture, establish
that it completely breaks the causal link between the alleged
antitrust violation and that injury. Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pled that Indivior and MonoSol's actions had the intended effect
of delaying the FDA approval which, in turn, delayed the entry of
generics into the market.

In short, the Court heeds the Third Circuit's caution that the
existence of antitrust injury is not typically resolved through
motions to dismiss." Schuylkill Energy, 113 F.3d at 417. Although
Defendants may be able to prove that superseding acts have broken
the chain of causation between their actions and Plaintiffs'
alleged injuries, the well-pled allegations of the Amended
Complaint permit the plausible inference that Defendants' alleged
antitrust violation was a material cause of the claimed injuries.
Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 114 n.9.

As the rules of pleading require no more, the Court denies
Plaintiffs' motion on this ground.

Whether the Amended Complaint Plausibly Pleads a Relevant Market
MonoSol next claims that Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the
relevant product market are implausible.

To plead a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, a plaintiff must, among other elements, allege a relevant
product market.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Suboxone is a unique product and that
the relevant product market is limited to Suboxone in all of its
forms and dosage strengths and its AB-rated generic
bioequivalents. They further allege that Suboxone does not exhibit
significant, positive cross-elasticity of demand with respect to
price, with any opioid dependence treatment or other product other
than AB-rated generic versions of Suboxone.
The complaint further explains that Suboxone is unique because it
is the only opioid replacement maintenance therapy that can be
prescribed in an office setting and taken by patients at home
because it is categorized as a Schedule III drug and co-formulated
with an opioid antagonist to deter abuse. Methadone, for example,
is a Schedule II drug and must be administered in a clinic.

Further, Subutex, another opioid treatment drug marketed by
Reckitt, is not alleged to be reasonably interchangeable because
it lacks the opioid antagonist, and therefore is not recommended
for maintenance therapy. The Court says it must accept these
statements as true. Dismissal at the motion to dismiss stage for
failure to define a relevant market is disfavored. Plaintiffs have
referenced the rules of reasonable interchangeability and cross-
elasticity of demand and have plausibly explained why other
similar products do not fall within the relevant market. These
allegations are sufficient to state a claim and survive a motion
to dismiss, to the extent that a relevant market analysis is even
necessary where direct evidence of monopoly power is provided.
As Plaintiffs have pled both reasonable interchangeability and
cross-elasticity of demand in the current Amended Complaint, the
Court sees no reason to depart from its prior ruling that such
allegations satisfy a Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

Whether the Amended Complaint Adequately Pleads MonoSol's Specific
Intent

The various allegations within the Amended Complaint allow a
reasonable inference that MonoSol possessed the requisite intent
to help Indivior establish and maintain a monopoly through the
development of Suboxone film. For example: MonoSol convinced
Indivior to develop a film form of Suboxone and bring it to market
for the purpose of extending Indivior's exclusivity in the co-
formulated buprenorphine/naloxone market.

MonoSol's own website encouraged pharmaceutical companies to
engage in anticompetitive product-hopping by allowing companies to
avoid the patent claim, extend the patent life cycle for products,
and avoiding generic incursion and substitution as patent
expiration nears.

MonoSol negotiated with Indivior to receive royalty payments on
sales of Suboxone film, thereby incentivizing it to help Indivior
achieve monopoly power and profits.

These allegations permit the plausible inference that MonoSol
consciously committed to the common scheme of endowing illegal
monopoly power on Indivior and benefitting from such monopoly
power. Plaintiffs need allege nothing further in order to survive
Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.

Whether the Sherman Act and State Law Claims Against MonoSol are
Time Barred

The statute of limitations for a claim pursuant to the Sherman Act
is four years after the cause of action accrued.

The Court declines to dismiss the claims as time barred.  The
original Complaint in this action was not filed until September
22, 2016, meaning that to be timely, the causes of action would
have had to accrue no earlier than September 22, 2012. From the
face of the Amended Complaint, the Court says it is unable to
determine the precise accrual date.

Although MonoSol's last alleged action occurred sometime in 2011,
the citizen petition in which MonoSol purportedly had a hand was
not filed until September 25, 2012, and the withdrawal of Suboxone
tablets which allegedly occurred at MonoSol's urging did not occur
until March 18, 2013. It remains unclear when exactly the damages
were inflicted on and ascertainable by Plaintiffs.

Absent sufficient facts from which the Court can determine an
accrual date, it cannot conclusively hold that the claims against
MonoSol are barred by the statute of limitations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017
Memorandum and Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7f9unor
from Leagle.com.


MDL 2672: Court Denies Bosch's Bid to Dismiss SAC
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendants Bosch GmbH and Bosch
LLC's Motion to Dismiss the Volkswagen-branded franchise dealers'
second amended complaint in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN
"CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. This Order Relates To: Dkt. Nos. 2864, 4175, MDL No.
2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.).

The emissions fraud remains the subject here, but the primary
focus shifts to the conduct of two other defendants, Bosch GmbH
and Bosch LLC.

Plaintiffs are the owners of certain Volkswagen-branded franchise
dealerships (Franchise Dealers). They contend that Bosch conspired
with Volkswagen to develop and implement the defeat device that
Volkswagen used in its clean diesel vehicles to evade U.S.
emission standards.  By doing so, the Franchise Dealers allege
that Bosch participated in a racketeering enterprise in violation
of the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), and also
conspired to violate that statute.

Bosch's arguments for dismissal are divided into five categories:
(1) justiciability; (2) statutory standing; (3) Section 1962(c)
merits; (4) Section 1962(d) merits; and (5) personal jurisdiction
over Bosch GmbH.

Justiciability

Article III Standing

Standing requires a plaintiff to show that "he or she suffered 'an
invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and
particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Cases cited by Bosch are not on point because they
involve scenarios in which a product defect never manifests. That
is not the situation here, where the defeat device has made the
affected vehicles unsaleable.

Mootness

Bosch contends that the settlement has or will make the Franchise
Dealers whole and extinguishes any live controversy.

Bosch argues that the situation here is distinguishable because
the Volkswagen settlement by itself makes J. Bertolet, Inc. whole,
whereas the settlement in Flintkote, Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,
246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957), was only a partial settlement. Bosch
contends that there is accordingly no injury that could be trebled
here. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether Flintkote would
still apply if the plaintiff settles with a joint defendant for an
amount that covers all actual damages, but another district court
has applied Flintkote in such a scenario.

In doing so, the court there reasoned that it made no difference
that the plaintiffs' actual damages were completely, rather than
only partially, satisfied  because the critical factor is that the
full satisfaction to which treble damage claimants are entitled is
three times the proven actual damages and any award less than that
amount constitutes an incomplete recovery.
Full satisfaction of a civil RICO claim includes a trebling of
actual damages, so unless a plaintiff settles with a joint
tortfeasor for three times actual damages, the plaintiff's claim
against the non-settling defendant is not moot.

Statutory Standing

Congress has narrowed the scope of injuries that can trigger a
civil RICO violation, specifically limiting standing to those who
have suffered (1) an injury to business or property, that is (2)
by reason of a RICO violation. Bosch contends that the Franchise
Dealers have not satisfied either of these requirements.

Injury to Business or Property

RICO's injury standard requires the plaintiff to plead a harm to a
specific business or property interest, which is a categorical
inquiry typically determined by reference to state law.

Bosch also argues that a decline in the value of the affected
vehicles is a benefit-of-the-bargain defect theory that is too
speculative to support a RICO injury. The General Motors, General
Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, No. 14-md-2543, 2016 WL
3920353, (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), court reached this holding in
the consumer context, reasoning that a harm to a consumer's
expectation interest is not a harm to a property interest for
purposes of RICO.

In reaching this holding, the court expressly noted that a
different result may be warranted for a RICO claim against New GM
by dealers in GM-branded vehicles who expected to be able to sell
their stock at a certain price and received lower prices when New
GM's concealment was revealed. In other words, GM dealers could
plausibly allege a harm to their business, if not their property,
because of a decline in the value of their inventory of GM
vehicles. This latter scenario is similar to the one alleged here.
General Motors therefore does not counsel against the Franchise
Dealers' claim.

The Franchise Dealers have plausibly alleged multiple tangible
injuries to their business and property interests. They will
accordingly be allowed to make their case through presentation of
evidence. The one exception is that the Franchise Dealers may not
pursue a theory of harm to goodwill, which is an intangible injury
that cannot support a RICO claim.

Injury By Reason of a RICO Violation

Bosch makes two other proximate cause arguments. First, Bosch
asserts that the Franchise Dealers do not satisfy the proximate
cause standard because they have alleged a direct relationship
only with Volkswagen, not with Bosch.  What matters, though, is
not whether there is a direct relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant, but whether there is a sufficiently direct
relationship between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the
plaintiff's injury.

Here, irrespective of whether the Franchise Dealers have a direct
relationship with Bosch, there is a sufficiently direct connection
between Bosch's alleged conduct and the Franchise Dealers' alleged
injuries. Specifically, the Franchise Dealers allege that Bosch
partnered with Volkswagen to implement the defeat device in
Volkswagen's "clean diesel" vehicles. That conduct, in turn, has
made the Franchise Dealers' inventory of those vehicles
unsaleable.

Bosch argues that proximate cause is lacking because its
preconceived purpose was not to injure the Franchise Dealers.
Whether a RICO defendant intended to injure the plaintiff,
however, is not part of the proximate cause calculus.

In certain shareholder derivative actions, courts have held that
injury to the company was not proximately caused by the fraud of
management because the alleged injuries were neither the
preconceived purpose' nor the specifically-intended consequence of
the RICO defendants' acts. But given that directness, not
foreseeability or purpose, is the governing standard for RICO
proximate cause, the Court declines to apply these holdings
outside of the shareholder derivative context.

The Franchise Dealers have adequately pled that their injuries
were directly caused by Bosch's alleged RICO violation. No one
other than the Franchise Dealers can assert the injuries they have
alleged; questions as to the exact amount of damages are not so
speculative as to warrant dismissal; and there is no reason to
currently believe that this case will require the Court to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of
multiple recoveries.

Merits of the RICO Claim

Some of these allegations about the structure of Bosch's sectors
and divisions also appeared in the First Amended Complaint. But
the Second Amended Complaint has added additional detail and has
clarified that, as best the Franchise Dealers can tell at this
stage in the litigation, employees in Bosch's Diesel Systems
division do not commonly divide themselves along corporate lines.
These allegations support a plausible inference that the knowledge
of, and action undertaken by, employees of Bosch's Diesel Systems
division can be attributed to both Bosch GmbH and Bosch LLC.

Treating Bosch GmbH and Bosch LLC as a collective unit does not
prejudice the Bosch Defendants. A key justification for requiring
plaintiffs to separately plead allegations of fraud as to each
defendant is notice. Notice is not a problem here. Each Bosch
Defendant participated in conducting the affairs of the Diesel
Systems division, and each Bosch Defendant accordingly is on
notice that it may potentially be held responsible for the conduct
of that division.

Section 1962(c) Elements

To state a RICO claim, the Franchise Dealers must plausibly allege
that Bosch participated, directly or indirectly, in (1) the
conduct, (2) of an enterprise that affects interstate commerce,
(3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity.

Element 4: Racketeering Activity

RICO defines racketeering activity as any of the predicate acts
listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 1961(1). Those predicate acts include
mail and wire fraud, which are the acts that the Franchise Dealers
contend Bosch committed.

In arguing against co-schemer liability for mail and wire fraud,
Bosch also relies on WellPoint.  In discussing RICO's pattern
element, the district court there held that where RICO is asserted
against multiple defendants, a plaintiff must allege at least two
predicate acts by each defendant. The WellPoint court went on to
note, though, that the complaint need not identify false
statements made by each and every individual, but rather the
plaintiff need only identify the role of each defendant in the
alleged fraudulent scheme.

In sum, the Franchise Dealers can satisfy their burden of
demonstrating that Bosch engaged in the predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud with allegations that Bosch was (1) a knowing
participant in a scheme to defraud, (2) that Bosch participated in
the scheme with the intent to defraud, and (3) that a co-schemer's
acts of mail and wire fraud occurred during Bosch's participation
in the scheme and were within the scope of the scheme.

Knowing Participant in a Scheme to Defraud

Allegations support that Bosch participated in the scheme by
promoting clean diesel technology in the United States. The
Franchise Dealers allege that following the launch of the EDC17 in
2006, Bosch hired a lobbying firm, mcapitol Managers, to promote
its clean diesel products in Washington D.C. and with EPA. Bosch
also organized and hosted a two-day California Diesel Days event
in April 2009 in Sacramento, and invited lawmakers, journalists,
executives, and regulators to the event, which featured
Volkswagen's vehicles as ambassadors of 'Clean Diesel' technology.
Bosch also presented in June 2007 on "meeting the demands of U.S.
emission legislation, where it focused on lowering emissions in
diesel vehicles."

Bosch argues that its lobbying and promotional activities focused
on promoting clean diesel generally, and were not tied directly to
Volkswagen. As noted above, though, Bosch used Volkswagen's
vehicles as exemplars at certain promotional events. Further,
Volkswagen was the biggest diesel-vehicle manufacturer in the
world and made a strategic decision in 2005 to launch a large-
scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States. Given
Volkswagen's prominence in the clean diesel space, and Bosch's use
of Volkswagen's vehicles, it is reasonable to conclude that by
promoting clean diesel Bosch sought to increase demand for
Volkswagen's vehicles.

Intent to Defraud

Bosch's intent to defraud reasonably

Bosch's intent to defraud reasonably can be inferred from the
scheme itself. According to the allegations in the complaint, that
is the function for which Bosch allowed its EDC17 to be used for
years in Volkswagen's vehicles. Further, not only did Bosch
authorize this use of its EDC17, but it promoted "clean diesel"
technology despite knowing that the low NOx emissions levels that
Volkswagen reported to U.S. regulators, and promoted to U.S.
consumers, were false.

The Franchise Dealers' pleadings satisfy the intent requirement.

Volkswagen's Acts of Mail Fraud or Wire Fraud Within the Scope of
the Scheme

The complaint alleges numerous misrepresentations by Volkswagen to
U.S. regulators and consumers. These include Volkswagen's
applications for certification of the affected vehicles, which
Volkswagen submitted to EPA and the California Air Resources Board
(CARB) for each model year, and which misrepresented that the
vehicles complied with EPA and CARB's emission requirements;
falsified emission tests and sales marketing materials, including
advertising, websites, product packaging, brochures, and labeling,
which all misrepresented or concealed the affected vehicles'
emission levels.

All of these misrepresentations are alleged to have been made
through the use of the mails and wires. All of these
misrepresentations also occurred during Bosch's participation in
the scheme and were within the scope of the scheme so as to
support co-schemer liability.

The Franchise Dealers have accordingly satisfied the racketeering
activity element of their civil RICO claim.

Element 3: A Pattern of Racketeering Activity

A pattern of racketeering activity requires the commission of at
least two predicate acts within a ten-year period. Evidence of
multiple schemes is not required and indeed, proof of a single
scheme can be sufficient so long as the predicate acts involved
are not isolated or sporadic.  The predicate acts here were not
isolated or sporadic: the Franchise Dealers allege that Volkswagen
misrepresented the emission levels of multiple vehicle models over
the course of a decade. Bosch does not contend otherwise.

Element 2: An Enterprise that Affects Interstate Commerce

To state a RICO claim, the plaintiff must connect the alleged
racketeering activity with the conduct of an enterprise that
affects interstate or foreign commerce.

First, the allegations that Bosch knowingly participated with
Volkswagen in the scheme to defraud also support that Bosch and
Volkswagen shared a common purpose to design, manufacture, and
sell the clean diesel vehicles through fraudulent certifications,
false emissions tests, [and] deceptive and misleading marketing
materials, and [to derive] profits and revenues from those
activities.

Second, RICO's structural requirement requires only a relationship
among those associated with the enterprise.

Third, the Franchise Dealers allege that Bosch and Volkswagen's
emissions scheme extended over the course of a decade, as the
companies worked together to customize the EDC17 for use in a
variety of Volkswagen-branded vehicles offered in model years 2009
through 2016.  The enterprise, then, had a longevity necessary to
accomplish its purpose.

Section 1962(c) Merits Conclusion

The Franchise Dealers' allegations are sufficient to satisfy the
four elements of their Sec 1962(c) RICO claim. They have plausibly
alleged that Bosch partnered with Volkswagen to implement the
defeat device in the affected vehicles, and by doing so
participated in the conduct of a years-long enterprise to defraud
U.S. regulators and consumers.

Merits of the RICO Conspiracy Claim

The Franchise Dealers also allege that Bosch and Volkswagen
engaged in a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation in violation of
18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d). A RICO conspiracy under Section 1962(d)
requires only that the defendant was aware of the essential nature
and scope of the enterprise and intended to participate in it. The
same allegations that demonstrate Bosch's participation in the
enterprise support the Franchise Dealers' conspiracy claim. It is
plausible that Bosch was aware of the scheme because it exercised
near-total control over modifications to the EDC 17. And Bosch's
intent to participate in the scheme is inferable from its alleged
willingness to let Volkswagen use the modified EDC17 in its
vehicles for years.

Personal Jurisdiction over Bosch GmbH

Bosch GmbH seeks dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. At
the pleading stage, the Franchise Dealers need only make a prima
facie showing of jurisdictional facts.

Bosch GmbH also has not presented a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable. Bosch GmbH argues that it would be burdened by
defending in the United States as opposed to in Germany. But
unless such inconvenience is so great as to constitute a
deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear
justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction. The
inconvenience, that Bosch GmbH is headquartered in Germany, is not
an inconvenience of this magnitude. Bosch GmbH also notes that
Germany has a significant sovereign interest in regulating its
behavior.

The Court agrees, but there is no conflict with the sovereignty of
Germany here, as the Franchise Dealers bring this case for conduct
that was specifically targeted at the United States, based on
Bosch GmbH's alleged violation of U.S. law.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ycnctcxffrom Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, 15-4278, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B.
Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice.

Nicholas Benipayo, 15-4278, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

David Fiol, 15-4278, Plaintiff, represented by William M. Audet --
waudet@audetlaw.com --  Audet & Partners, LLP, Jeff D. Friedman --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Peter B.
Fredman -- PETER@PETERFREDMANLAW.COM -- Law Office of Peter
Fredman, Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, 15-5659, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart -
- astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, 15-5659, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Nicholas Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Caleb Marker --
caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice &
Charles S. Zimmerman -- charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Brett Alters, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Joan Cabraser --
ecabraser@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
David S. Stellings -- dstellings@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann and Bernstein, Kevin R. Budner --  kbudner@lchb.com --
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand --
ndiamand@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP,
Phong-Chau Gia Nguyen, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP &
Tana Lin -- tana-lin-8795@ecf.pacerpro.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP.

Donald Ardine, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry --
awilliams.derry@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Dean
Noburu Kawamoto  -- dkawamoto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback LLP, Derek William Loeser -- dloeser@kellerrohrback.com -
- Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice,
Lynn Lincoln Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Annie Argento, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Dean Noburu Kawamoto, Keller Rohrback LLP,
Derek William Loeser, Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman
Cappio, Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback
LLP.

Arkansas State Highway Employees Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Jai K. Chandrasekhar -- jai@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, James A.
Harrod -- jim.harrod@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, Matthew I. Henzi -- mhenzi@swappc.com -- Sullivan,
War, Niki L. Mendoza, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
12481 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300 San Diego, CA 92130, Ross M.
Shikowitz -- ross@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, The Law
Offices of Susan R. Podolsky, 1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600,
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation (15-
4278), Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge
and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker -- chtucker@rhodesokla.com --
Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang --
dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David
M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Elizabeth L. Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-
us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Hugh J. Bode --
hbode@reminger.com -- Reminger & Reminger Co LPA, J. Randolph
Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King,
Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com --
Johns & Bell LTD, Jeffrey Lance Chase -- JChase@herzfeld-rubin.com
-- Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg --
jrugg@bhfs.com -- Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer
Marino Thibodaux, Gibbons PC, One Gateway Center Newark, New
Jersey 07102, John W. Cowden -- cowden@bscr-law.com -- Baker,
Sterchi, Cowden & Ric, LLC, John W. Cowden -- cowden@bscr-law.com
-- Baker Sterchi Cowden and Rice LLC.


MIAMI JEWISH: "Flanagan" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
-----------------------------------------------
Faye Flanagan and Rosanna Nunez, and all others similarly-situated
v. Miami Jewish Health Systems, Inc. and Molina Healthcare of
Florida, Inc., Case No. 4:17-cv-00507 (N.D. Fla., November 7,
2017), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Each Plaintiff is an adult resident of the State of Florida and
has been employed by Defendants as a "Case Manager".

Defendant Miami Jewish Health Systems, Inc. owns and operates
healthcare related facilities including a nursing home, assisted
living facility, hospital, ambulatory health clinic,
rehabilitation center, some or all of which are primarily engaged
in the care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally ill or
defective who reside on the premises.  MJHS also provides case
managers to support Molina's Medicaid long-term care contract with
the State of Florida.

Defendant Molina contracted with the State of Florida, Agency for
Health Care Administration, to provide managed care services,
including medical assistance and long-term care, for eligible
enrollees under the Medicaid program. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremiah J. Talbott, Esq.
      JEREMIAH J. TALBOTT, P.A.
      900 East Moreno Street
      Pensacola, FL 32503
      Tel: (850) 437-9600
      Fax: (850) 437-0906
      E-mail: jjtalbott@talbottlawfirm.com

          - and -

      Sean Culliton, Esq.
      SEAN CULLITON, ESQ., LLC
      150 John Knox Road
      Tallahassee, FL 32303
      Tel: (850) 385-9455
      Fax: (813) 441-1999
      E-mail: Sean.Culliton@gmail.com

          - and -

      John C. Davis, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JOHN C. DAVIS
      623 Beard Street
      Tallahassee, FL, 32303
      Tel: (850) 222-4770
      Fax: (850) 222-3119
      E-mail: john@johndavislaw.net


MICHIGAN: Court Stays "Guertin" Suit vs. City of Flint
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
the Motion to Stay the case captioned Shari Guertin, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. State of Michigan, et al., Mag. Defendants, United
States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division. Case No.
16-cv-12412.

Each of those defendants has filed or joined in a motion to stay
this case pending the outcome of their appeals.

The Court entered an opinion and order granting in part and
denying in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. In that
opinion, the Court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
substantive due process bodily integrity claim against defendants
City of Flint, Earley, Ambrose, Wyant, and Croft, and defendants
Shekter Smith, Busch, Prysby, Wurfel, Wells, Scott, Lyon, and
Peeler in their individual capacities.

Each of those defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the
Court's order, which were permitted because the Court's opinion
determined that qualified immunity did not apply to them.

The defendants generally make two arguments: (1) the filing of the
notices of appeal divested the Court of jurisdiction over at least
the claims that are the subject of the appeal, if not the entire
case; and (2) a stay is warranted on equitable grounds.

Plaintiffs argue that the notices of appeal filed are insufficient
to divest the Court of jurisdiction, that the appeals only divest
the Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeals
and not the entire case, and that the factors for an equitable
stay of the case do not justify a stay of the entire case.

A defendant's interlocutory appeal on federal qualified immunity
"does not divest the district court of jurisdiction over pendent
state-law claims," subject to the exception of state-law immunity
being asserted, denied, and appealed alongside federal qualified
immunity.  Neither Lockwood nor Veolia have moved to stay the
case.  And none of the defendants who seek stays have provided any
reason why permitting the claims to proceed against these two
parties would prejudice the moving defendants in this litigation.

Accordingly, the Court orders that the motions to stay pending
appeal are granted as to defendants City of Flint, Earley,
Ambrose, Wyant, Croft, Shekter Smith, Busch, Prysby, Wurfel,
Wells, Lyon, and Peeler, and this case is stayed as to those
defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya8o9vspfrom Leagle.com.

Shari Guertin, Plaintiff, represented by John B. Prior --
jprior@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, John S.
Sawin, Sawin Law Firm Ltd., 217 N. Jefferson Street Suite 602,
Chicago, IL 60661- 1114, Robert J. McLaughlin --
rmclaughlin@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC,
Steven A. Hart -- shart@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin &
Eldridge, LLC & David E. Hart -- dhart@maddinhauser.com -- Maddin,
Hauser

Diogenes Muse-Cleveland, Plaintiff, represented by John B. Prior,
Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, John S. Sawin, Sawin Law Firm
Ltd., Robert J. McLaughlin, Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC,
Steven A. Hart, Hart McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC & David E. Hart,
Maddin, Hauser

State of Michigan, Defendant, represented by Margaret A.
Bettenhausen, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Nathan A.
Gambill, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl,
Assistant Attorney General & Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan
Department of Attorney General.

Richard Snyder, Defendant, represented by Eugene Driker --
edriker@bsdd.com -- Barris, Sott, Margaret A. Bettenhausen,
Michigan Department of Attorney General, Morley Witus, Barris,
Sott, Denn & Driker, PLLC, Nathan A. Gambill, Michigan Department
of Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl, Assistant Attorney General,
Todd R. Mendel, Barris, Sott, & Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan
Department of Attorney General.

Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Defendant,
represented by Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Michigan Department of
Attorney General, Nathan A. Gambill, Michigan Department of
Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl, Assistant Attorney General &
Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan Department of Attorney General.

Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant,
represented by Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Michigan Department of
Attorney General, Nathan A. Gambill, Michigan Department of
Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl, Assistant Attorney General &
Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan Department of Attorney General.

City of Flint, Defendant, represented by Frederick A. Berg --
berg@butzel.com -- Butzel Long, Reed E. Eriksson, City of Flint,
Sheldon H. Klein -- klein@butzel.com -- Butzel Long, Stacy Erwin
Oakes, City of Flint & William Young Kim, City of Flint.
Howard Croft, Defendant, represented by Alexander S. Rusek, White
Law PLLC, Reed E. Eriksson, City of Flint & Stacy Erwin Oakes,
City of Flint.

Michael Glasgow, Defendant, represented by Brett T. Meyer --
bmeyer@owdpc.com -- O'Neill, Wallace & Doyle, P.C., Reed E.
Eriksson, City of Flint & Stacy Erwin Oakes, City of Flint.

Darnell Earley, Defendant, represented by Todd Russell Perkins --
tperkins@perkinslawgroup.net -- Nikkiya Branch, Perkins Law Group,
PLLC, Reed E. Eriksson, City of Flint & Stacy Erwin Oakes, City of
Flint.

Gerald Ambrose, Defendant, represented by Barry A. Wolf, Barry A.
Wolf, Attorney at Law, PLLC, Mott Foundation Building503 S.
Saginaw St., Suite 1410Flint, MI 48502- 1807, Reed E. Eriksson,
City of Flint & Stacy Erwin Oakes, City of Flint.

Liane Sheckter-Smith, Defendant, represented by Michael H. Perry -
- mperry@fraserlawfirm.com -- Fraser, Trebilcock, & Thaddeus E.
Morgan, Fraser -- tmorgan@fraserlawfirm.com -- Trebilcock.


MINOTTI SPA: Faces "Norman" Suit in Southern District New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Minotti S.P.A. The
case is styled as Virginia Norman and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Minotti S.P.A, Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-08967 (S.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

Minotti SpA manufactures upholstered furniture.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


MONDELEZ INT'L: Faces "McMorrow" Suit in S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mondelez
International, Inc.  The case is styled as Patrick McMorrow and
Marco Ohlin, on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated
and the general public, Plaintiffs v. Mondelez International,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-02327-BEN-JLB (S.D. Cal.,
November 16, 2017).

Mondelez International is an American multinational confectionery,
food, and beverage company based in Illinois which employs about
107,000 people around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Paul K. Joseph, Esq.
   The Law Office of Paul K. Joseph, PC
   4125 West Point Loma Blvd.
   No. 206
   San Diego, CA 92110
   Tel: (619) 767-0356
   Fax: (619) 331-2943
   Email: paul@pauljosephlaw.com


MOTHERISK: Judge Junks Proposed Drug Testing Scandal Class-Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Mendelson, writing for thestar.com, reports that a class-
action lawsuit is not the best way for the thousands of families
across Canada affected by Motherisk's flawed drug and alcohol
testing to fight for compensation in court, a Toronto judge has
ruled.

In his decision not to certify a proposed national class-action
lawsuit related to the litany of problems uncovered at the
Hospital for Sick Children's Motherisk lab, Superior Court Justice
Paul Perell said that because of the "intensely individualistic"
nature of the claims, individual lawsuits would be more "efficient
and expeditious."

"The significant damages are caused not by the common
unreliability of the tests, but by an individual's test being
wrong with sometimes tragic consequences," he said. "Class members
should not suffer the disappointment of a class action that will
not take them far enough on the path to substantive justice."

Perell noted that there are already 328 named plaintiffs pursuing
claims outside of the class-action lawsuit.

The lawyers for the plaintiff said November 2 they plan to appeal
the decision to Divisional Court.

"The main thrust of the decision, that these individuals should
proceed to soldier on in individual cases, we fundamentally
disagree with," lawyer Jody Brown, Esq. -- jbrown@kmlaw.ca --
said. "It would be uneconomical to have thousands of (people)
litigating on the same issues and it would deny people access to
the courts."

Brown said they also "strongly disagree" with Perell's finding on
punitive damages, which the plaintiff had asked him to certify on
top of ordinary compensation, arguing that the defendants -- who
include Sick Kids, Motherisk founder Dr. Gideon Koren and former
lab manager Joey Gareri -- prioritized business interests over
providing reliable test results.

Perell said: "However egregious the conduct of Dr. Koren and Mr.
Gareri in increasing the Hospital's not-for-profit revenues and
however egregious the failure of the administration of the
hospital to supervise its Motherisk laboratory, and, however
tragic and heartbreaking the outcomes in individual cases, a
punitive award would ultimately not be visited on the defendants
but rather would be inflicted on the sick children at the
hospital."

But Brown said no entity should be "immune" from punitive damages
simply because they do good work outside of the bounds of a court
case.

Perell's ruling underscores the complexity of a national tragedy
with no easy fix that was the product of failings across multiple
systems, including the hospital, child protection and the courts,
as the Star has reported.

Sick Kids made millions from Motherisk's hair-strand tests, which
influenced criminal cases, private custody fights and thousands of
child protection decisions, ranging from parents who briefly came
under the scrutiny of a child welfare agency to cases where
children were removed permanently.

The proposed class-action sought compensation for the estimated
10,000 individuals who produced a positive Motherisk test from
2005 to 2015, the period during which a government-commissioned
review deemed the lab's testing to be "inadequate and unreliable"
for use in legal proceedings.

If it were certified, the class-action lawsuit would have included
a common issues trial, where issues shared across the class could
be decided, followed by individual issues trials, where the unique
circumstances in individual cases could be determined.

But even if the plaintiff in this case proved in a common issues
trial that there was a class-wide breach of duty of care, the most
substantive issues -- whether Motherisk's tests were "unreliable,
false and adversely influential to the outcome of the individual's
court proceedings" -- would still have to be decided individually,
Perell said.

This "truth about the causation of the harm" explains why the
Motherisk Commission, which is probing affected child protection
files in Ontario, established a process to pinpoint cases where
the testing had a "significant impact" on the outcome, he said.

"The Motherisk Commission recognized that an unreliable test that
did not influence the result of the court proceedings does not
occasion a harm for which there might be compensatory damages," he
said.

Lawyer Darryl Cruz, Esq. -- dcruz@mccarthy.ca -- who represents
Koren, said Perell made the right decision.

The "issues are simply too individualized to be decided across the
entire population of people who were tested at Motherisk and this
decision will allow issues to be litigated fairly through the
regular court process," he said.

Queen's Park appointed retired judge Susan Lang to probe Motherisk
in late 2014 after a Star investigation exposed questions about
the reliability of the lab's hair tests. Sick Kids initially
defended the reliability of Motherisk's testing, but closed the
lab in the spring of 2015 after learning it had been misled about
Motherisk's international proficiency testing results.

Sick Kids CEO Michael Apkon issued a public apology in October
2015. Koren retired in June of 2015, and is now working in Israel.

Led by retired judge Judy Beaman, the Motherisk Commission has so
far identified 50 cases where Motherisk testing had a significant
impact on decisions to remove children from their families. [GN]


NEW YORK: Vendors Entitled to Receive Offers of Judgment
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion denying plaintiffs' motion to strike or
declare the Rule 68 offers of judgment to be of no effect in the
case captioned SANWAR AHMED and ANA BUESTAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
NEW YORK, and individually and in their official capacity as New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene Inspectors
JOSEPH PERSAUD and UKO UTIN and JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants, No. 17-
Cv-3044 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Sanwar Ahmed and Ana Buestan have moved pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) for an order striking the Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment served on each plaintiff and declaring the Rule 68 Offer
of Judgment to have no effect.

Plaintiffs Ahmed and Buestan are street vendors in New York City
who allegedly had their vending carts and other property "seized
and disposed of" by New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene inspectors without legal authority to do so.  Ahmed is an
immigrant from Bangladesh and a licensed New York City food vendor
who sells jhal muri, a Bangladeshi snack of puffed rice and
spices, from his food cart.  Buestan is an Ecuadorian immigrant
who sells flavored ices from her food cart and is also a licensed
food vendor.

They bring claims for violations of their constitutional rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and New York state law claims
for conversion and negligence on behalf of a putative class of
"all New York City street vendors who have been permanently
deprived of their vending pushcarts and other vending property by
defendants without any pre- or post-deprivation hearings."

Rule 68 reads in pertinent part as follows:

   (a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least 14
days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a
claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on
specified terms, with the costs then accrued.

   (b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered
withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an
unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs.

   (d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment
that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the
unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the offer was made.

And once a class is certified, Rule 68's procedures may not mesh
perfectly with Rule 23(e)'s requirement that the Court approve any
settlement.

Plaintiffs' motion, according to the Court, presents an easy case:
no motion for certification has been granted or even filed. The
individual plaintiffs, and not any as-yet theoretical class,
remain the opposing parties addressed by Rule 68.  Ahmed and
Buestan are entitled to receive and, if they wish, to accept
offers of judgment on their claims for relief.

Plaintiffs' motion to strike or declare the Rule 68 offers of
judgment to be of no effect is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb4tzutefrom Leagle.com.

Sanwar Ahmed, Plaintiff, represented by Justin S. Weddle --
jweddle@brownrudnick.com --  Brown Rudnick LLP.

Sanwar Ahmed, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Lee Day --
dday@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP, Matthew Shapiro --
svp@urbanjustice.org -- Urban Justice Center & Sean Joseph
Basinski -- svp@urbanjustice.org -- Urban Justice Center.

Ana Buestan, Plaintiff, represented by Justin S. Weddle --
jweddle@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP, Daniel Lee Day --
dday@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP, Matthew Shapiro, Urban
Justice Center & Sean Joseph Basinski, Urban Justice Center.

City of New York, Defendant, represented by Angelie Thomas, New
York City Law Department & Nicholas Robert Ciappetta, NYC Law
Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel.

Joseph Persaud, Defendant, represented by Angelie Thomas, New York
City Law Department & Nicholas Robert Ciappetta, NYC Law
Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel.

Uko Utin, Defendant, represented by Angelie Thomas, New York City
Law Department & Nicholas Robert Ciappetta, NYC Law Department,
Office of the Corporation Counsel.


MOTHER TRUCKER: "Brooks" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid OT
--------------------------------------------------------
Calvin Brooks, and all others similarly-situated v. Mother
Trucker, LLC and Henry Anthony Guerrero, Case No. 1:17-cv-04469
(N.D. Ga., November 7, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff worked as truck driver for Defendants.

Defendants own and operate solely within the State of Georgia,
hauling bulk aggregate for use in local construction projects.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN
      600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Tel: (954) 967-5377
      Fax: (954) 333-3515
      E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com


NORTHLAND GROUP: Certification of Class Sought in "Bauer" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jossette Bauer, Cheryl Kobleski and Rafael Cajigas move the Court
to certify the class described in the complaint of their lawsuit
titled JOSETTE BAUER, CHERYL KOBLESKI, and RAFAEL CAJIGAS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
NORTHLAND GROUP, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-01520-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiffs (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiffs assert, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

The Plaintiffs contend that they are obligated to move for class
certification to protect the interests of the putative class.
They argue that more than one defendant has already attempted the
scheme contemplated in Campbell-Ewald.  See Severns v. Eastern
Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).  Judge Randa
denied the defendant's request to deposit funds on grounds that a
class certification motion was pending.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ld27Cvlj

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NORTHROP GRUMMAN: Court Certifies ERISA Class in "Marshall" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Andre Birotte, Jr., grants the motion for class
certification filed by Clifton W. Marshall, Thomas W. Hall, Manuel
A. Gonzalez, Ricky L. Hendrickson, Phillip B. Brooks, and Harold
Hylton, Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled CLIFTON W. MARSHALL, et
al. v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP., et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-06794-AB-
JC (C.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court certifies a class of:

     All persons, excluding defendants and/or other individuals
     who are liable for the conduct described in the complaint,
     who are or were participants or beneficiaries of the
     Northrop Grumman Savings Plan at any time between
     September 9, 2010 and the date of judgment, and were
     affected by the conduct set forth in this complaint.

On September 9, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against Northrop
Grumman Corporation, the Northrop Grumman Corporation Savings Plan
Administrative Committee, the Northrop Grumman Corporation Savings
Plan Investment Committee, and certain officers and employees of
Northrop, and Plan fiduciaries.

On January 20, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The Court allowed Plaintiffs leave
to amend the putative class period to comport with the statute of
limitations, allegations involving Financial Engines and the
Emerging Markets Equity Fund in order to establish standing, and
allegations regarding the extent of Northrop's role as a
fiduciary.

The Court also appoints Schlichter, Bogard & Denton as class
counsel, and appoints Plaintiffs Marshall, Hall, Gonzalez,
Hendrickson, Brooks, and Hylton as class representatives.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=k3Gl44xP


O'CONNELL PROTECTION: Faces "Olivencia" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against O'Connell Protection
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Anthony Olivencia, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
O'Connell Protection Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
06709 (E.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

O'Connell Protection Services provides corporate executives,
celebrities and other high net-worth individuals and their
families with a full range of discreet, personal and professional
protection services that facilitate their business careers, public
appearances, social activities and private lives.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


OHIO: Robinson Files Suit in Supreme Court of Ohio
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against John Kasich,
Governor of Ohio. The case is styled as Gregory Robinson and
similarly situated individuals in Ohio prisons, Plaintiff v. John
Kasich, Governor of Ohio, Richard Michael DeWine, Attorney General
and Gregory Robinson, Defendants, Case No. 2017-1631 (Ohio,
November 16, 2017).

Ohio is a midwestern U.S. state stretching from the Ohio River and
Appalachian Mountains in the south to Lake Erie in the north.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PANASONIC CORP: NEC Tokin Settlement Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order granting Final
Approval of Class Action Settlements with Defendants NEC TOKIN
Corp./NEC TOKIN America Inc. (NEC Tokin), Nitsuko Electronics
Corporation (Nitsuko), and Okaya Electric Industries Co., Ltd.
(Okaya) in the case captioned IN RE: CAPACITORS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL INDIRECT PURCHASER
ACTIONS, Master No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD (N.D. Cal.).

The following Classes are certified for settlement purposes only,
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

   a. NEC TOKIN

     All persons and entities in the United States who, during,
the period from April 1, 2002 to July 15, 2016, purchased directly
from a distributor one or more Capacitor(s) that a Defendant
manufactured. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parent
companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators,
Defendants' attorneys in this case, federal government entities
and instrumentalities, states and their subdivisions, all judges
assigned to this case, all jurors in this case.

   b. NITSUKO

     All persons and entities in the United States who, during,
the period from January 1, 2003 to March 29, 2016, purchased
directly from a distributor one or more Capacitor(s) that a
Defendant manufactured. Excluded from the Class are Defendants,
their parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-
conspirators, Defendants' attorneys in this case, federal
government entities and instrumentalities, states and their
subdivisions, all judges assigned to this case, all jurors in this
case.

     c. OKAYA

     All persons and entities in the United States who, during,
the period from January 1, 2002 to April 14, 2016, purchased one
or more Capacitor(s) from a distributor (or from an entity other
than a Defendant) that a Defendant or alleged co-conspirator
manufactured. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parent
companies, subsidiaries and Affiliates, any co-conspirators,
Defendants' attorneys in this case, federal government entities
and instrumentalities, states and their subdivisions, all judges
assigned to this case, all jurors in this case, and all persons
and entities who directly purchased capacitors from Defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y97alyovfrom Leagle.com.

Chip-Tech, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by C. Andrew Dirksen --
cdirksen@cerallp.com -- Cera LLP.

Chip-Tech, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Joseph J. DePalma --
depalma@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, Solomon B.
Cera -- scera@cerallp.com -- Cera LLP, Steven J. Greenfogel --
sgreenfogel@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenburg, LLC, pro
hac vice, Daniel R. Karon, Karon LLC, 700 W. ST. CLAIR AVE. STE.
200 CLEVELAND, OHIO 4411,  pro hac vice, Eric L. Cramer --
ecramer@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., James W. Anderson,
Heins Mills Olson P.L.C., 310 Clifton Avenue, Minneapolis, MN
55403, James Gerard Beebe Dallal -- jdallal@alumni.rice.edu --
Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Jason Scott Hartley --
hartley@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson, LLP, Jessica N.
Servais, Heins Mills and Olson, P.L.C., 310 Clifton Avenue,
Minneapolis, MN 55403., pro hac vice, Michael C. Dell'Angelo, IV -
- mdellangelo@bm.net -- Ruthanne Gordon -- rgordon@bm.net --
Berger & Montague PC, Ryan James McEwan --
rmcewan@saverilawfirm.com -- Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc., Vincent
J. Esades, Heins Mills & Olson, P.L.C., 310 Clifton Avenue,
Minneapolis, MN 55403 & Joseph R. Saveri --
jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com- Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc.

Dependable Component Supply Corp., Plaintiff, represented by C.
Andrew Dirksen, Cera LLP, Solomon B. Cera, Cera LLP, Steven J.
Greenfogel, Lite DePalma Greenburg, LLC, Joseph R. Saveri, Joseph
Saveri Law Firm, Inc., Michael C. Dell'Angelo, IV, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P & William Henry London, Freed Kanner London
& Millen LLC.

In Home Tech Solutions, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Alexander
Dewitt Singh Kullar -- akullar@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer Lowenthal
Boodrookas Alvarez Smith LLP, Allan Steyer --
asteyer@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez &
Smith LLP, Gabriel Dash Zeldin -- gzeldin@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer
Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez Smith LLP & Simeon Andrew Morbey --
samorbey@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P..
Everett Ellis, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart Robinson -
- drobinson@robinsonfirm.com --  Robinson Calcagnie Robinson
Shapiro Davis, Inc., Anne Elizabeth Smith, Shaffer Lombardo
Shurin, Kathleen Kopach Woods, Shaffer Lombardo Shurin, Richard
Lombardo, Shaffer Lombardo Shuri, 2001 Wyandotte Street Kansas
City, Missouri 64108n & William Robert Pointer, II --
info@duncanfirm.com -- Duncan Firm.

Fredrick P. Hege, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart
Robinson, Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc..

Mike Fisher, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart Robinson,
Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.

Michael W. Davis, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart
Robinson, Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.

Jane Schmit, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart Robinson,
Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.

Johnny Walker, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart Robinson,
Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.

John E. McDowell, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Stewart
Robinson, Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc.

Panasonic Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L.
Kessler -- jkessler@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, A. Paul
Victor -- pvictor@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, David L.
Greenspan -- dgreenspan@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, Frank
S. Restagno -- frestagno@winston.com -- Ian L. Papendick --
ipapendick@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, Kyle James
Bonacum, Winston Strawn, Martin C. Geagan, Jr. --
mgeagan@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP, Matthew Robert
DalSanto -- mdalsanto@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP,
Mollie C. Richardson -- mrichardson@winston.com -- Winston and
Strawn LLP, Molly Donovan -- mmdonovan@winston.com -- Winston &
Strawn LLP, Patrick Stephen Opdyke -- popdyke@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn LLP, Rebecca Lara Litman -- rlitman@winston.com
-- Winston and Strawn LLP & William Owen Cooper --
wcooper@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn.

PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey L. Kessler, Winston & Strawn LLP, A. Paul Victor, Winston
& Strawn LLP, David L. Greenspan, Winston & Strawn LLP, Frank S.
Restagno, Ian L. Papendick, Winston & Strawn LLP, Kyle James
Bonacum, Winston Strawn, Martin C. Geagan, Jr., Winston and Strawn
LLP, Matthew Robert DalSanto, Winston and Strawn LLP, Mollie C.
Richardson, Winston and Strawn LLP, Molly Donovan, Winston &
Strawn LLP, Patrick Stephen Opdyke, Winston and Strawn LLP,
Rebecca Lara Litman, Winston and Strawn LLP & William Owen Cooper,
Winston & Strawn.

Sanyo Electric Group, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L.
Kessler, Winston & Strawn LLP, A. Paul Victor, Winston & Strawn
LLP, David L. Greenspan, Winston & Strawn LLP, Ian L. Papendick,
Winston & Strawn LLP, Mollie C. Richardson, Winston and Strawn LLP
& Molly Donovan, Winston & Strawn LLP.

Sanyo Electronic Device (U.S.A.) Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Jeffrey L. Kessler, Winston & Strawn LLP, A. Paul
Victor, Winston & Strawn LLP, David L. Greenspan, Winston & Strawn
LLP, Ian L. Papendick, Winston & Strawn LLP, Mollie C. Richardson,
Winston and Strawn LLP & Molly Donovan, Winston & Strawn LLP.

Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Adam C. Hemlock,
adam.hemlock@weil.com --  Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac
vice, Christopher J. Cox -- cris.cox@weil.com -- Weil Gotshal &
Manges, David Ramraj Singh -- david.singh@weil.com -- Weil,
Gotshal and Manges LLP, Steven A. Reiss,  Steven.Reiss@weil.com --
Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, pro hac vice

Taiyo Yuden (USA) Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam C. Hemlock,
Weil Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher J. Cox,
Weil Gotshal & Manges, David Ramraj Singh, Weil, Gotshal and
Manges LLP, Steven A. Reiss, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, pro hac
vice & David Ramraj Singh, Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP.
NEC Tokin Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jacob R. Sorensen
-- jake.sorensen@pillsburylaw.com -- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP, Roxane Alicia Polidora --
roxane.polidora@pillsburylaw.com -- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP & Laura Christine Hurtado --
laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com -- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
LLP.

NEC Tokin America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jacob R.
Sorensen, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Roxane Alicia
Polidora, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP & Laura Christine
Hurtado, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.

KEMET Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jacob R. Sorensen,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Lindsay A. Lutz, Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman & Roxane Alicia Polidora, Pillsbury Winthrop
Shaw Pittman LLP.

KEMET Electronics Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jacob R.
Sorensen, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Lindsay A. Lutz,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman & Roxane Alicia Polidora,
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.


PANDA RESTAURANT: "Barragain" Sues Over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------
Jose Barragain individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated employees, Plaintiff, v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc. and
Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. BC680246 (Cal.
Super., October 18, 2017), seeks compensation resulting from
failure to accurately pay overtime wages and minimum wages,
failure to provide meal periods and rest breaks, all wages earned
and owed upon separation from Defendant's employ, failure to
reimburse business related-expenses, and failure to provide
accurate itemized wage statements under California Labor Code and
applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

Defendant is a restaurant company that operates various
restaurants which provides an Asian dining experience to its
customers, operating throughout Los Angeles County. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
      Derek R. Guizado, Esq.
      Keren B. Serrano, Esq.
      MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC
      249 E. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 814
      Long Beach, CA 90802
      Telephone: (562) 590-5550
      Facsimile: (562) 590-8400
      Email: kmahoney@mahoney-law.net
             dguizado@mahoney-law.net
             kserrano@mahoney-law.net


PHOENIX WAREHOUSE: Lawsuit Hopes to Prove Wage Assault
------------------------------------------------------
John Cadiz Klemack, writing for NBC Los Angeles, reports that the
first filing happened in 2015 with claims Phoenix Warehouse of
California was withholding overtime pay. But when multiple cases
started to come forward, attorneys for alleged victims were able
to get the case changed to a class action.

"If you want to talk about wide spread, it's pretty much everyone
who worked for their company from 2009 through 2016," says
Glendale-based attorney David Yeremian. "We point the finger at
Phoenix."

Employees who spoke with NBC4 say their jobs were to take pallets
of goods for local big box stores like Walmart, Target and Home
Goods that came in from the Port of LA and to sort them for
shipping to Southern California stores.

But they say often their managers would refuse to allow them to
take breaks -- for lunch or for the bathroom -- and at least one
victim claims in court documents that if she turned down sexual
advances from her manager, she wouldn't get paid for the day.

"They wouldn't let me rest," says former employee Yadira Espinoza.
"I would work 13 to 15 hours a day."

Yeremian says the employees were hired through three different
staffing agencies, also named in the lawsuit, and that employees
would clock in for 40 hours under one agency, then work additional
hours under another without any overtime compensation.

"It's Phoenix managers who are in charge of these warehouses, who
are dictating the terms of employment, when they clock in, when
they clock out, when they take lunch breaks, when they have to
continue working," Yeremian says.

In a statement from Steve Brennan, an attorney representing
Phoenix, he denies the allegations and questions the motives of
the plaintiffs' attorneys:

"Phoenix Warehouse of California denies the allegations of the
Espinoza class action and will continue to vigorously defend its
position in Court. It should be noted that the Court denied
plaintiffs' original application for class certification because
they failed to provide evidence that other workers support their
claims, while Phoenix all of which is a matter of public record.
Ultimately, the claims of these few former workers will be weighed
against testimony of a much greater number of who refute those
claims. Phoenix believes that plaintiffs" current publicity
campaign, occurring over four-and-a-half years into the lawsuit,
is evidence they continue to lack meaningful co-worker support for
their claims.  Finally, Phoenix considers the representations made
by plaintiffs and their counsel in their campaign to be defamatory
and is investigating bringing an appropriate responsive action."

One of the named staffing agencies sent a statement as well, also
denying the allegations. Justine Schmidt wrote this: "Fairway
Staffing Services denies the allegations in the complaint. Fairway
provides a service to the community by providing both long and
short term staffing jobs to those seeking employment.  Fairway has
been vigorously defending this matter for years and will continue
its defense up and though trial if necessary."

There is no set date for trial yet but former employees say
they're ready to fight to the end, claiming their fears of
deportation stopped them before -- but not any more.

"People need to speak up," Espinoza says, "we cannot be quiet."
[GN]


PORTLAND, OR: Herber Files Class Action v. Mayor, et al.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the City of Portland
a municipal corporation. The case is styled as Josef Haber,
Patrick Garrison, Jennifer Nickolaus, Chris Whaley and Jade
Sturms, an individual, on behalf of themself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. City of Portland
a municipal corporation, Mayor Ted Wheeler
in his individual capacity, Dan DiMatteo, Portland Police Officer,
in his individual capacity, Chris Lindsey, Portland Police
Officer, in his individual capacity, Jason Christensen
Portland Police Officer, in his individual capacity, Michael Pool
Portland Police Officer, in his individual capacity, Justin
Raphael Portland Police Officer, in his individual capacity and
Kerri Ottoman Portland Police Officer, in his individual capacity,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-01827-PK (D. Or., November 15, 2017).

Portland, Oregon's largest city, sits on the Columbia and
Willamette rivers, in the shadow of snow-capped Mount Hood.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Alexander M. Tinker, Esq.
   TonkonTorp LLP
   1600 Pioneer Tower
   888 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600
   Portland, OR 97204-2099
   Tel: (503) 802-5734
   Fax: (503) 274-8779
   Email: alex.tinker@tonkon.com

      - and -

   Kelly K. Simon, Esq.
   P.O. Box 40585
   Portland, OR 97240
   Tel: (503) 227-6928
   Email: ksimon@aclu-or.org

      - and -

   Mathew W. dos Santos, Esq.
   P.O. Box 40585
   Portland, OR 97240
   Tel: (503) 227-6928
   Email: mdossantos@aclu-or.org

      - and -

   Megan R. Reuther, Esq.
   TonkonTorp LLP
   1600 Pioneer Tower
   888 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600
   Portland, OR 97204-2099
   Tel: (503) 802-2174
   Fax: (503) 274-8779
   Email: megan.reuther@tonkon.com

      - and -

   Sarah M. Einowski, Esq.
   TonkonTorp LLP
   1600 Pioneer Tower
   888 SW Fifth Avenue
   Portland, OR 97204
   Tel: (503) 802-5738
   Email: Sarah.Einowski@tonkon.com

      - and -

   Steven M. Wilker, Esq.
   TonkonTorp LLP
   1600 Pioneer Tower
   888 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600
   Portland, OR 97204-2099
   Tel: (503) 802-2040
   Fax: (503) 972-3740
   Email: steven.wilker@tonkon.com


PREMARA FINANCIAL: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., has filed a class action complaint in the
United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina on behalf of holders of Premara Financial, Inc.
("Premara") (OTCQB:PARA) common stock in connection with the
proposed acquisition of Premara by Select Bancorp, Inc. ("Select")
announced on July 21, 2017 (the "Complaint").  The Complaint,
which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
against Premara, its Board of Directors (the "Board"), and Select,
is captioned Sharpenter v. Premara Financial, Inc., Case No. 3:17-
cv-00607 (W.D.N.C.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120, Wilmington,
DE 19803, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-
legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On July 20, 2017, Premara entered into an agreement and plan of
merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Select.  Pursuant to the
Merger Agreement, shareholders of Premara will receive either (i)
1.0463 shares of Select Bancorp common stock; or (ii) $12.65 in
cash for each share of Premara common stock they own (the
"Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4
Registration Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
Complaint alleges that the Registration Statement, which
recommends that Premara stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, omits material information necessary to enable
shareholders to make an informed decision as to how to vote on the
Proposed Transaction, including material information with respect
to Premara's and Select's financial projections, the analyses
performed by the Company's financial advisor, and potential
conflicts of interest.  The Complaint seeks injunctive and
equitable relief and damages on behalf of holders of Premara
common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than January 2, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may move the Court
to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Wilmington, Delaware and
Garden City, New York, regularly prosecutes securities fraud,
shareholder corporate, and shareholder derivative litigation on
behalf of shareholders in state and federal courts throughout the
United States. [GN]


PROFESSIONAL ORTHOPEDIC: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional
Orthopedic and Sports Therapy, P.C.  The case is styled as
Lawrence Young, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Professional Orthopedic and
Sports Therapy, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-08932 (S.D.
N.Y., November 15, 2017).

Professional Orthopedic and Sports Physical Therapy, Pc is a well
known Physical Therapy Clinic of Franklin Square, New York.BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Bronson Lipsky LLP
   630 Third Avenue, 5th Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: dlipsky@bronsonlipsky.com


RETRIEVAL-MASTERS: Faces "Junik" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Retrieval-Masters
Creditors Bureau Inc. The case is styled as Sam Junik, on behalf
of himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff
v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau Inc. doing business as:
American Medical Collection Agency, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
06727 (E.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau Inc. is engaged in debt
collections.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


SAN DIEGO, CA: Faces "Bloom" Suit in S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the City of San
Diego. The case is styled as Michael Bloom, Stephen Chatzky, Tony
Diaz, Valerie Grischy, Penny Helms, Benjamin Hernandez, Doug
Higgins, Suzonne Keith and David Wilson, individually and on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
City of San Diego, David Alvarez, City Council Member, in his
official capacity only, Kevin Faulconer, Mayor, in his official
capacity only, Barbara Bry, City Council Member, in her official
capacity only, Chris Cate, City Council Member, in his official
capacity only, Myrtle Cole, City Council Member, in her official
capacity only, Georgette Gomez City Council Member, in her
official capacity only, Mark Kersey City Council Member, in his
official capacity only, Scott Sherman City Council Member, in his
official capacity only, Chris Ward City Council Member, in his
official capacity only, Lori Zapf City Council Member, in her
official capacity only, San Diego Police Department and Shelley
Zimmerman, Police Chief, in her official capacity only,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-02324-AJB-NLS (S.D. Cal., November
15, 2017).

San Diego is a city on the Pacific coast of California known for
its beaches, parks and warm climate.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Geoffrey Donovan Biegler, Esq.
   Fish & Richardson
   12390 El Camino Real
   San Diego, CA 92130
   Tel: (858) 678-4357
   Fax: (858) 678-5099
   Email: biegler@fr.com


SHELL LANES: Faces "Lopez" Suit in Southern District New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shell Lanes, Inc.
The case is styled as Victor Lopez and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Shell Lanes, Inc. and
Shell Lanes Coffee Shop Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-08989
(S.D. N.Y., November 16, 2017).

Shell Lanes, Inc. is a Bowling alley in Brooklyn, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
   The Law Offices of Bradly G. Marks
   280 Park Avenue South
   New York, NY 10010
   Tel: (646) 770-3775
   Fax: (212) 254-4202
   Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


SIROB IMPORTS: "Guevara" Suit Certified as FLSA Collective Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Gary R. Brown grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification of a collective action and preliminary
class certification in the lawsuit titled EDGAR GUEVARA AND LORENA
M. GUEVARA, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SITUATED v.
SIROB IMPORTS, INC., NICK BOBORIS and PETER BOBORIS, Case No. CV
15-2895 (GRB) (E.D.N.Y.).

Judge Brown grants in part as to the donning and doffing claims
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.  Judge Brown directs
the parties to meet and confer as to the appropriate form of
notice in light of the foregoing opinion, and submit a joint
revised notice and accompanying filings within 14 days of the date
of this opinion.

In this action, the Plaintiffs seek recovery under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law for alleged improprieties in
pay practices.  The Plaintiffs have moved for collective
certification under the FLSA and class certification under Rule 23
of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, while the Defendants
oppose these motions largely by seeking partial summary judgment
as to claims relating to: (1) pre- and post-shift work ("donning
and doffing"); and (2) rounding and uncompensated rest periods.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2AyNE8KY


STAAR SURGICAL: Court Cuts Atty Fees in "Todd" to $1.75MM
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Amended Judgment Approving Class Action
Settlement and Dismissing the Action styled EDWARD TODD,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. STAAR SURGICAL COMPANY, BARRY G. CALDWELL, and JOHN
SANTOS Defendants, Case No. CV 14-5263 MWF (GJS) (C.D. Cal.) with
Prejudice.

The Amended Judgment provides that Plaintiff's Counsel are awarded
attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,750,000 and expenses,
including experts' fees and expenses, in the amount of
$216,239.71, the amounts to be paid from out of the Gross
Settlement Fund.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 23, 2017 Judgment
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y97r52mvfrom Leagle.com.

Edward Todd, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.
Edward Todd, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Zevi Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Marc I.
Gross -- migross@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael J. Wernke -- mjwernke@pomlaw.com  -- Pomerantz LLP, pro
hac vice, Patrick V. Dahlstrom -- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Vincent Prongay --
rprongay@glancylaw.com --  Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP & Kevin
F. Ruf -kruf@glancylaw.com --  Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.
Staar Surgical Company, Defendant, represented by Dan E.
Marmalefsky -- dmarmalefsky@mofo.com -- Morrison and Foerster LLP
& Kai S. Bartolomeo -- kbartolomeo@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster LLP.

Barry G. Caldwell, Defendant, represented by Dan E. Marmalefsky,
Morrison and Foerster LLP & Kai S. Bartolomeo, Morrison and
Foerster LLP.

John Santos, Defendant, represented by Dan E. Marmalefsky,
Morrison and Foerster LLP & Kai S. Bartolomeo, Morrison and
Foerster LLP.


TEZOS: Blockchain Startup Faces Class Action Over $232MM ICO
------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Hancock, writing for The Recorder, reports that blockchain
startup Tezos has been hit with a potentially groundbreaking class
action lawsuit alleging that its blockbuster $232 million initial
coin offering (ICO) over the summer violated U.S. securities laws
and misled investors.

The civil suit comes after infighting among the leadership of
Tezos broke into the open, and one of its founders admitted that
momentum in developing the Tezos blockchain had slowed. It alleges
that after those developments, the value of futures for the
digital coin, called "Tezzies," tanked by almost half, to the
detriment of investors.

"Defendants did not register these Tezzies with the SEC, and many
of the representations defendants made regarding the status of the
Tezos project in the run-up to the ICO were either exaggerations
or outright lies," the complaint says.

The complaint was filed in San Francisco Superior Court on Oct. 25
by San Diego attorney James Taylor-Copeland on behalf of an
investor named Andrew Baker. It alleges that in July, Baker
invested one Bitcoin -- then valued at about $2,800 -- to buy
5,000 Tezzies that could be used on the future blockchain.

The suit says Baker's determination that Tezos was a worthwhile
investment was based on representations that the Tezos network
would be operational "by December 2017 at the latest."

In a blog post last month, Tezos' husband-and-wife co-founders
Arthur and Kathleen Breitman said their "current best estimate for
shipping the main net is now February of 2018, though the firm
date remains 'when it's ready.'" They added: "To say that we
regret the delay is an understatement."

In a statement responding to the lawsuit November 2, Brian Klein
of Los Angeles firm Baker Marquart, who is representing the
Breitmans, called the pair "brilliant entrepreneurs and
visionaries."

"This lawsuit is meritless, and they plan to vigorously defend
themselves," Klein added. "They expect to be fully vindicated."

The suit also names as defendants Dynamic Ledger Solutions Inc., a
company started by the Breitmans; the Switzerland-based Tezos
Foundation and its president Johann Gevers; and Strange Brew
Strategies, a San Francisco PR firm that the suit says was hired
by Tezos to pitch positive stories about its technology.

Gevers, reached by email on November 2, declined to comment on the
lawsuit. Strange Brew did not immediately respond to a request for
comment.  Guido Schmitz-Krummacher, a member of the Tezos
Foundation council, said in an email, "We can't comment on a
potential litigation -- especially if we are not sure, if it is of
relevance for the foundation in Switzerland."

The suit claims the Tezos defendants are liable under securities
law for issuing what amounted to an unregistered security. The
suit cites a July report by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission indicating that many ICOs are securities and subject to
applicable law.

It also alleges that the defendants made statements about the
future of Tezos that were false, and that they were not protected
by the "safe harbor" usually granted for forward-looking
statements. Strange Brew faces claims for false advertising and
unfair competition.

Taylor-Copeland said the proposed class includes an estimated
30,000 people who bought Tezzies, and seeks to allow them to
rescind their purchases and other damages. He said the lawsuit may
be the first civil action brought over an ICO.

The suit could also shed some more light on the relationship
between the Breitmans and the Tezos Foundation. The foundation is
an "independent Swiss entity whose goal is to promote and foster
the use of the Tezos blockchain, its technology and its ongoing
development," according to materials posted on the Tezos website.
It also oversaw the fundraiser.

In their Oct. 18 blog post, the Breitmans alleged that foundation
president, Gevers, "engaged in an attempt at self-dealing,
misrepresenting to the council the value of a bonus he attempted
to grant himself." They added, "We have been working with the
Tezos foundation to resolve the matter and have advocated for his
removal from the foundation council."

Gevers, in an email November 2, said the allegations against him
are "false."

Although the fundraiser was valued at $232 million at the time,
the lawsuit notes that the value of Bitcoin and Ether -- the two
cryptocurrencies in which Tezzies could be bought -- have
continued to skyrocket in value since. It estimates that the value
of the funds raised is now approximately $475 million.

According to the lawsuit, the "purported terms" of the ICO
characterized the purchase of Tezzies as a "non-refundable
donation" and not a speculative investment. "Lead plaintiff was
not shown these terms at any stage during the ICO process, nor did
he agree to them," it says. The complaint also says that Kathleen
Breitman compared the purchases to donating to a public television
station and receiving "a tote bag" in return.

It's unlikely to be the last lawsuit against Tezos. On Oct. 19,
South Florida-based investor law firm Silver Miller announced it
was investigating the company in connection with the ICO. In an
email November 2, co-founder David Miller said he expects to file
suit against the company. [GN]


TGI FRIDAY'S: Court Denies as Moot Calabrese's Bid to Certify
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. J. Curtis Joyner denied as moot the Plaintiff's motion to
certify class in the lawsuit entitled ADAM CALABRESE, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. TGI FRIDAY'S
INC., et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-00868-JCJ (E.D. Pa.).

"[T]his Court having just granted the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to
Certify Class is now DENIED AS MOOT," Judge Joyner held.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=mdWblfHB


TIM TADDER: "Gill" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
---------------------------------------------------
Joel Gill, individually and on behalf of a proposed Class of
workers, Plaintiff, v. Tim Tadder and Does 1-10, Defendants, Case
No. BC680360 (Cal. Super., October 18, 2017), seeks unpaid wages,
continuing wages, damages, statutory penalties, civil penalties
and attorneys' fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

Defendant employed Gill for two commercial productions featuring
professional baseball players. Gill was laid off without a return
date and was not timely paid for his services, and when he finally
received his compensation, he did not receive a paycheck for his
services on the first production, says the complaint.

Tadder did not provide wage statements and failed to make any
deductions from Plaintiff's wages for tax and related payments
owing to the State of California and the Internal Revenue Service,
the complaint adds. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alan Harris, Esq.
     David Garrett, Esq.
     Min Ji Gal, Esq.
     HARRIS & RUBLE
     655 North Central Avenue, 17th Floor
     Glendale CA 91203
     Tel: (323) 962-3777
     Fax: (323) 962-3004
     Email: harrisa@harrisandruble.com
            mgal@harrisandruble.com
            dgarrett@harrisandruble.com


TINTRI INC: "Golosiy" Remanded to Calif. State Court
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
the case captioned VLADIMIR GOLOSIY, Plaintiff, v. TINTRI, INC.,
ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-05876-YGR (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants Tintri, Inc., et al., removed the securities class
action alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. Section 77. The Court
related the case sua sponte to Clayton v. Tintri, Inc., 17-cv-
05683-YGR and Nurlybayev v. Tintri, Inc., et al,4:17-cv-05684-YGR,
which were remanded to state court for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 77(v)(a), which states
that except as provided in section 77p(c) of this title, no case
arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States.

Defendants were ordered to show cause as to why the case should
not be remanded to the California Superior Court in and for San
Mateo County for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Removal Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if the
action could have originally been filed in federal court.  A
plaintiff may seek to have a case remanded to the state court from
which it was removed if the district court lacks jurisdiction or
if there is a defect in the removal procedure.

The Securities Act of 1933

The Securities Act of 1933, which imposes liability for omissions
and misstatements in various securities-related communications,
provides concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts over
alleged violations of the Act. However, Section 77v(a) of the
Securities Act strictly forbids the removal of cases brought in
state court and asserting claims under the Act.

Pursuant to Section 77v(a), except as provided in section 77p(c)
of this title, no case arising under this subchapter and brought
in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to
any court of the United States.

Defendants rely on two arguments as to why this Court should
decline to remand the cases at this juncture:  First, the "Court
should defer ruling on the Remand Motions until the Supreme
Court's imminent and dispositive decision in Cyan."  Second,
defendant's bylaws require removal.

Defendant does not persuade.

As to the first argument, defendants highlight that the Supreme
Court is scheduled to hear argument in a case addressing removal
jurisdiction under the Securities Act on November 28, 2017 in
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Empl. Ret. Fund, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL
2742854 (granting certiorari, June 27, 2017). Judge Donato's
opinion in Apigee is instructive:  The mere granting of the writ
does not displace the well-developed case law on this issue. There
is no efficiency penalty imposed by remand, because defendants
will need to litigate the case in the meantime, whether here or in
the Superior Court. One way or another, this case will go forward.
Under current law, the proper forum for that is the state court.

Defendants' second argument fails because this argument is
premised on defendants' flawed assumption this Court has
jurisdiction over the cases.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybyc2r8afrom Leagle.com.

Vladimir Golosiy, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Robbins --
brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP.

Vladimir Golosiy, Plaintiff, represented by Eric M. Carrino --
ecarrino@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP & Stephen J. Oddo
--  soddo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP.

Tintri, Inc., Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi --
chashemi@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin
Matthew Crosson -- bcrosson@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati & Doru Gavril -- dgavril@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich and Rosati.

Ken Klein, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and
Rosati.

Kieran Harty, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.

Ian Halifax, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and
Rosati.

Peter Sonsini, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.

Adam Grosser, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.

Christopher Schaepe, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.

Harvey Jones, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.

John Bolger, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and
Rosati.

Charles Giancarlo, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Benjamin Matthew Crosson, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati & Doru Gavril, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
and Rosati.


ULTA SALON: Court OKs Stipulation Dismissing Wage & Hour Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order approving the stipulation dismissing
without prejudice the action styled KELLY CHANG-LUNA and ESTEBAN
SOLIS, Plaintiffs, v. ULTA SALON, COSMETICS & FRAGRANCE, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00363-AWI-SKO (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Kelly Chang-Luna and Esteban Solis and Defendant Ulta
Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., agree

The claims asserted and settled in the action styled Sarah Moore
v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., Case No. CV-12-3224
FMO (AGRx)("Moore action") included: (1) failure to pay overtime
compensation; (2) failure to compensate for all hours worked; (3)
failure to pay all wages due upon discharge; (4) failure to
provide required meal periods; (5) failure to authorize or permit
rest periods; (6) failure to maintain required records; (7)
waiting time penalties; and (8) unfair competition under
California Business and Professions Code section 17200.

Plaintiff Kelly Chang-Luna timely opted out of the settlement of
the Moore action and sought an individual settlement from
Defendant.

Plaintiff Chang-Luna now desires to dismiss her individual claims
with prejudice against Defendant due to a settlement with
Defendant.  Plaintiff Solis now desires to dismiss his individual
claims with prejudice in light of his participation as a class
member in the settlement of the Moore action and the action titled
Quinby et al. v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., in the
Northern District Court of California, Case No. CV-15-4099 WH.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ycds9bgefrom Leagle.com.

Kelly Chang-Luna, Plaintiff, represented by David Douglas Deason -
- david@yourlaborlawyers.com -- Deason & Archbold.

Esteban Solis, Plaintiff, Pro se.

Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., Defendant, represented by
John C. Kloosterman -- jkloosterman@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Alexis A. Sohrakoff -- asohrakoff@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson PC.

Ulta, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alexis A. Sohrakoff, Littler
Mendelson PC.


UNIQUE BEVERAGE: Court Narrows Claims in "Silva"
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued
an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as the
allegations in Paragraph 18 of the Complaint and denying as to
allegation on paragraph 19 of the Complaint in the case captioned
VICKY SILVA, an Oregon consumer, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNIQUE BEVERAGE COMPANY,
LLC, a foreign corporation, Defendant, No. 3:17-cv-00391-HZ (D.
Or.).

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she
purchased a Cascade Ice beverage product manufactured by
Defendant.  The front label depicted large colorful coconuts along
with the word.  Below the word Coconut, the label stated that the
product is a NATURALLY FLAVORED SPARKLING WATER beverage.

Plaintiff asserts that the product contains no coconut, coconut
water, coconut juice, coconut pulp, coconut jelly, or coconut
natural flavor. Additionally, she contends it does not taste like
coconut and has no coconut health qualities. Plaintiff alleges
that the label violates O.R.S. 646.608(1)(b) because it causes the
likelihood of confusion and misunderstanding as to the source of
the flavoring, ingredients, and properties in Defendant's product.

Further, she contends that the label violates O.R.S. 646.608(1)(e)
because it falsely represents that Defendant's coconut product had
ingredients, characteristics, benefits, quantities, or qualities
it did not have. She also alleges that the label violates O.R.S.
646.609(1)(g), because it falsely represented that Defendant's
coconut product was of a standard, quality, or grade it did not
have.

Defendant argues that dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint is
warranted because no reasonable juror could be confused by the
product labels and thus, as a matter of law the product is not
deceptive.  Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to
sufficiently allege damages.

Labeling

Generally, whether a product's labels are deceptive under a
consumer protection statute is a question of fact for the jury.

As can be seen from the images of the product's label, the front
of the bottle is adorned with fairly large images of several
coconuts. The word Coconut is prominently displayed on a white
background. Although the words NATURALLY FLAVORED SPARKLING WATER
appear on the front, they are in smaller font than the word
Coconut.

Moreover, these words are separate from the word Coconut such that
a reasonable consumer would not necessarily understand the label
to represent a naturally coconut-flavored drink. A reasonable
consumer could understand a phrase like naturally coconut-flavored
sparkling water to mean a drink that was flavored to taste like
coconut but not necessarily containing coconut.  But when the word
Coconut is not part of the "naturally flavored" phrase, that
understanding is not necessarily the only reasonable one to be
drawn. Instead, a reasonable consumer could understand that he or
she was purchasing a drink containing coconut and which also was
naturally flavored.

The large coconut depictions, the prominence of the word Coconut,
and the words NATURALLY FLAVORED SPARKLING WATER, plus the
location of those words separate from the word Coconut could cause
a reasonable consumer to believe that he or she was buying a
sparkling water beverage containing coconut.

The product does not hide that it contains no coconut. This is
made plain on the back or side label. But, due to the prominence
of the coconut depictions on the front label and the word Coconut,
a reasonable consumer could understand the statement that the
beverage contains no coconut to mean that it contains no coconut
meat or coconut milk, but that it still contained some quantity of
a coconut derivative such as coconut water or natural coconut
flavor. Thus, the term is ambiguous.

Given that the label as a whole could be misleading to the
reasonable consumer, the fact that the ingredient list shows that
it contains no coconut or coconut derivative cannot be used to
grant dismissal on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Williams.

Thus, the Court denies the motion to dismiss based on the
"reasonable consumer" argument.

Damages Allegations

Diminished Value Theory

According to Pearson, the basis of the diminished value theory is
that the product purchased is worth less than what the injured
customer paid for it. Pearson, 358 Or. at 118, 361 P.3d at 23.
Pearson provides that for consumable goods, a purchaser relying on
a diminished value theory of ascertainable loss in an UTPA claim,
suffers an economic loss only in the form of having paid too much
at the time of purchase.

The question here is whether Plaintiff's allegations of diminished
value in the Second Amended Complaint are sufficient to show some
loss. She must allege facts which support an inference that the
product as represented had a value greater than the value of the
product she actually received. Allegations suggesting that the
product costs the same with or without the represented
characteristic cannot logically support an inference that the
product without the feature is worth less.

The operative allegations in support of the diminished value
theory are that Plaintiff and the class paid more money, per fluid
ounce, for defendant's so-called coconut product than they could
have paid for other similar beverage products that also did not
contain any actual coconut. As a result of the alleged
misrepresentations regarding coconut, Plaintiff and the Oregon
class suffered an ascertainable loss in the amount of the
diminished value between the higher price paid per fluid ounce for
defendant's so-called coconut product and the lower price that
they could have paid for those similar alternative beverage
products.

These allegations are sufficient. If Plaintiff had alleged only
that she and the class suffered an ascertainable loss, the
allegation would not pass muster. However, Plaintiff has alleged
more than just a conclusory assertion. The allegations assert that
Plaintiff and the class paid more money and a higher price because
of Defendant's alleged misrepresentations. They also assert that
the comparable product is a similar product that contained no
coconut.

These allegations support an inference that the price Plaintiff
paid was the value of the product as represented and that because
the product did not actually contain coconut, it had a value of
less than what Plaintiff paid. Given that Plaintiff paid only
$0.68 for the product, it remains to be seen if she will
eventually prevail.

But, at the pleading stage, she has alleged sufficient facts to
support a diminished value theory.

Purchase Price Refund Theory

The purchase price refund theory is based on the alleged failure
to receive what Defendant's alleged misrepresentation led
Plaintiff to believe she was buying.

These are sufficient allegations of reliance. First, there is an
express allegation that Plaintiff relied on the coconut
representations in her decision to purchase the product.  Second,
Paragraph 17, although not using the word relied or reliance,
essentially alleges that Plaintiff would not have purchased the
product absent the allegedly false representation relating to
coconut and that Plaintiff and the class purchased the beverage
because of the allegedly false representation. These allegations
are reasonably understood as asserting that Plaintiff and the
class relied on the coconut representation in purchasing the
product.

Defendant contends that dismissal of allegations supporting the
purchase price theory is also appropriate because Plaintiff fails
to allege what she would have done differently absent any alleged
misrepresentation. Assuming for the purposes of this Opinion only
that such an allegation is required to state a claim based on this
damages theory, the Second Amended Complaint does allege that
Plaintiff would not have purchased the product. Although perhaps
not as clearly stated as it could have been, this allegation in
Paragraph 6 sufficiently contends that absent the
misrepresentation she would not have purchased the product.
The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently states ascertainable
loss based on a purchase price theory.

Objective Market Value Loss Theory

In Paragraph 18, Plaintiff alleges as follows: As a result of
defendant's false representations, and the likelihood of confusion
or misunderstanding caused by the representations that its so-
called coconut product was flavored by and contained some actual
coconut, Vicky Silva and the Oregon class ended up with a product
that did not actually contain any of the very ingredient, and its
corresponding properties and benefits, that was represented. Thus,
Vicky Silva and the Oregon class have also suffered an objective
ascertainable loss, capable of being discovered, in the form of
the value of the benefits, ingredients, and properties of the
product which they were led to believe they had purchased.

There is no objective loss of market value theory of ascertainable
loss separate from a diminished value theory. While a diminished
value theory may be sustained by something other than objective
market value or by inference. The essential assumption of the
theory is that certain represented features of the product enhance
the product's value and the product without those features is
worth less than what the plaintiff paid for the product.
Plaintiff's allegations in Paragraph 18 are that (1) she ended up
with a product that did not contain the represented coconut
feature or ingredient and (2) her loss is the equivalent of the
value of that ingredient or feature. This is a diminished value
theory and nothing more.

Nonetheless, the allegations in Paragraph 18 do not state a
cognizable theory of ascertainable loss separate and apart from
the two theories already alleged in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the
Second Amended Complaint.

Thus, the Court grants Defendant's motion as to Paragraph 18.

Defendant's request for judicial notice is granted. Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is denied as moot
as to any injunctive relief claim, is granted as to the
allegations in Paragraph 18, and is otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yahw6jh2from
Leagle.com.

Vicky Silva, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin J. Meiselas,
Geragos & Geragos, pro hac vice. 644 South Figueroa Street, Los
Angeles, CA 90017

Vicky Silva, Plaintiff, represented by Mark J. Geragos, Geragos &
Geragos, 644 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, CA 90017, pro hac
vice & Michael R. Fuller, Olsen Daines PC, 1867 Williams Hwy,
Grants Pass, OR 97527

Unique Beverage Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joe
Hochman, Hochman Legal Group, PLLC. 515 116th Ave NE, Ste 230,
Bellevue, WA 98004


UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Gutman" Suit in E.D. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United Collection
Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Moshe Gutman, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
United Collection Bureau, Inc, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06682
(E.D. N.Y., November 15, 2017).

United Collection provides debt collection services for companies,
government, healthcare, utility, financial service, communication,
and student.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.co


UNITED STATES: Wins Move to Dismiss Suit Over Dividend to Banks
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims issued a Memorandum
Opinion and Order granting the U.S. Government's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, and WASHINGTON
FEDERAL, N.A., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant, No. 17-194
(Fed. Cl.).

The American Bankers Association and Washington Federal filed a
Complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims.  Count I
alleged that the Government breached a contractual obligation to
pay a six percent dividend to Washington Federal and all other
member banks with assets in excess of $10 billion.  Count II
alleged that the Government violated the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing, by reducing the dividend rate paid to
Federal Reserve Bank member stockholders, contrary to the
reasonable expectations of Washington Federal and other similarly
situated member banks.  Count III alleged that the Government
violated the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by causing the Federal Reserve Banks to pay a
dividend that is less than six percent, thereby depriving
Washington Federal and other member bank stockholders of the value
of their investments in Federal Reserve Bank stock.

The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1491, to adjudicate any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.

To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff
must identify and plead an independent contractual relationship,
Constitutional provision, federal statute, and/or executive agency
regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages.

In a breach of contract case, the money-mandating requirement for
Tucker Act jurisdiction normally is satisfied by the presumption
that money damages are available for breach of contract, with no
further inquiry being necessary.

Standing.

Regarding The American Bankers Association.

The Government's Argument.

The AB is not in privity of contract with the Government. Nor does
the AB have standing to seek an adjudication of a Taking Clause
claim, because the April 14, 2017 Amended Complaint does not
allege a property interest or investment-backed expectation that
was adversely affected by the decreased dividend rates required by
the FAST Act.

Plaintiffs' Response.

Plaintiffs respond that the AB should be afforded associational
standing and allowed to represent member banks in this suit,
because the individual contracts between member banks and the
Federal Reserve Banks are similar or identical.

In this case, the AB alleged that some sixty-six member banks have
a contract with the Federal Reserve Bank, but each owns a
different amount of Federal Reserve Bank stock and experienced
different amounts of monetary loss, as a result of the
implementation of the FAST Act. Nevertheless, the AB insists that
individualized proof is not needed, because each member bank had
an equal reduction in dividend receipts. It may be true that the
net decrease in dividend receipts may differ, because each AB
member purchased a different amount of stock when it joined the
Federal Reserve System.

But the Amended Complaint did not allege that the AB suffered
individual monetary injury nor did it allege that any member bank
assigned to the AB the right to recover damages on their behalf.
The court must and has determined that the AB does not have
standing to seek an adjudication of the claims alleged in the
Amended Complaint.

Regarding Washington Federal, N.A.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the question of
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.

The April 14, 2017 Amended Complaint alleges that Washington
Federal's dividends decreased from $1,439,304 in 2015 to $502,471
in 2016 or a $936,833 loss.  That loss is concrete,
particularized, and fairly traceable to the implementation of the
FAST Act. In addition, that loss and subsequent financial injury
can be redressed by a monetary judgment.

The court has determined that Washington Federal has standing to
seek an adjudication of the claims alleged in the Amended
Complaint.

The Amended Complaint Fails to Satisfy the Requirements of RCFC
12(b)(6).

In this case, Counts I and II of the April 14, 2017 Amended
Complaint allege all of the elements of a breach of contract case.
Count III alleges that Plaintiffs had contractual and statutory
rights to a six percent dividend, that are private property and
subject to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

When a complaint alleges that a plaintiff's private property has
been taken without just compensation, the court first must
determine whether the plaintiff has a cognizable property
interest.  If the plaintiff has a cognizable property interest,
the court turns to whether the government action amounted to a
compensable taking of that property interest.  But, if the
plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of a cognizable
property interest, the court's task is at an end.

Washington Federal's Amended Complaint asserts that it has a
private property interest in "contractual and statutory rights" to
receive a six percent dividend on Federal Reserve Bank stock and
in Washington Federal's capital investments in Federal Reserve
Bank stock.  If Washington Federal, however, had no contractual
right to a six percent dividend, ipso facto it has no property
interest in a six percent dividend rate.  Assuming arguendo that
the court concluded Washington Federal had a contractual right to
a six percent dividend rate, the remedy for a breach of contract
is damages; no taking can occur, so long as that remedy exists.

This in an important factor in determining whether Washington
Federal had a property right to a six percent dividend since the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held:
The absence of crucial indicia of a property right, coupled with
the government's irrefutable retention of the right to suspend,
revoke, or modify that right compels the conclusion that [there
was no] property right.

For these reasons, the court has determined that, although
Washington Federal had an expectation that it would continue to
receive an annual six percent dividend on its Federal Reserve Bank
stock, it did not have a cognizable private property interest
subject to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

In examining a motion to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(6), the court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint, but is not "bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation  Washington Federal alleges that
it had contractual and statutory property rights to a six percent
dividend, and that the failure to pay dividends at that rate
amounted to a breach of contract, or, alternatively, a taking of a
compensable property interest under the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The court has determined, however, that as a matter of law,
Washington Federal, individually and on behalf of other national
banks similarly situated, had neither a contractual, statutory,
nor property right to a six percent dividend rate that would
entitle it to relief.

A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims' October 30, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9mncrvbfrom Leagle.com.

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen J.
Obermeier -- sobermeier@wileyrein.com -- Wiley Rein, LLP.

WASHINGTON FEDERAL, N.A., Plaintiff, represented by Stephen J.
Obermeier, Wiley Rein, LLP.

USA, Defendant, represented by Eric Peter Bruskin, U.S. Department
of Justice.


VERIZON WIRELESS: "Gonzalez" Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Kathy Gonzalez, and all others similarly-situated v. Verizon
Wireless Services, LLC, and Does 1 through 10, Case No. 5:17-cv-
02274 (C.D. Calif., November 7, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Plaintiff Kathy Gonzalez is a resident of California.

Defendant Verizon Wireless Services, LLC is a nationwide
telecommunications company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Tel: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com
              mgeorge@toddflaw.com
              twheeler@toddflaw.com


WALDEN & SCHUSTER: Class Certification Sought in "Gruentzel" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Louise Gruentzel moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit styled LOUISE GRUENTZEL, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. WALDEN &
SCHUSTER, S.C., Case No. 2:17-cv-01516-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions
that other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a
class, the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v.
Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th
Cir. June 20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has
attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the
proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-
cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account
Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=r83DHRbb

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com



WHITEFIELD MEDICAL: Khawaja Files Suit for Unlawful Termination
---------------------------------------------------------------
Qurban Khawaja on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Whitefield Medical Laboratory, Inc. and Does 1 to
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC680240 (Cal. Super.,
October 18, 2017), seeks declaratory relief, restitution and
compensation for work performed and moneys due to him under
California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law under the California
Business and Professions Code and applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders.

Khawaja worked for Whitefield as a cytotechnologist, reviewing
slides for cervical cancer. He was given a quota of 75 slides to
review within 8 hours a day with 6 of those hours being dedicated
to reviewing slides and 2 hours dedicated to other tasks.
Plaintiff repeatedly complained about the quota, saying that it
was too difficult to accurately review that number of slides in
the time he was given to review them. Plaintiff also informed
Defendant that there was patient safety risk involved with the
quota imposed on him. He submitted a written complaint on May 22,
2017 regarding the violation of the regulation on maximum slides
per workday. Khawaja was thereafter abruptly terminated on June
12, 2017.

Plaintiff was being paid at a piece-rate at a rate of $3.50 per
slide, with no rest breaks. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gary R. Carlin, Esq.
      Brent S. Buchsbaum, Esq.
      Roger E. Haag, Esq.
      Jean P. Buchanan, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF CARLIN & BUCHSBAUM, LLP
      555 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 818
      Long Beach, CA 90802
      Telephone: (562)432-8933; Facsimile: (562)435-1656
      Email: gary@carlinbuchsbaum.com
             brent@carlinbuchsbaum.com
             roger@carlinbuchsbaum.com


XBIOTECH: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas on behalf of investors who
purchased or otherwise acquired shares of XBiotech, Inc.
(NASDAQ:XBIT) (the "Company") between April 15, 2015 and April 20,
2017, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors who have incurred losses in XBiotech, Inc. are urged to
contact the firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or (800)
575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may obtain additional information
concerning the action on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in the securities of  XBiotech, Inc.
and would like to assist with the litigation process as a lead
plaintiff, you may, no  later than December 26, 2017, request that
the Court appoint you lead plaintiff of the proposed class. Please
contact Wolf Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an
investor in XBiotech, Inc.

The filed complaint alleges that  throughout  the Class Period
defendants made  false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that:

   -- the  results of its European Phase  III trial for the
treatment of colorectal cancer  with Xilonix were inconclusive;

   -- the Company misrepresented the endpoint used in the European
Study;

   -- the Company's claim of a 76% increase in improvement was
misleading and represented a relative improvement rate;

   -- ultimately, the Companies' studies would not support the
approval of the application with the EMA; and

   -- as a result, Defendants' statements about its business and
operations were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz  LLP has extensive
experience in the prosecution of securities class actions and
derivative litigation in state and federal trial and appellate
courts across the country.  The firm has attorneys in various
practice areas; and offices in New York, Chicago and San Diego.
The reputation and expertise of this firm in shareholder and other
class litigation has been repeatedly recognized by the courts,
which have appointed it to major positions in complex securities
multi-district and consolidated litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately contact
Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800) 575-0735, via e-mail at
classmember@whafh.com, or visit our website at www.whafh.com. [GN]


ZULILY INC: Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order approving Settlement,
Providing Notice and Scheduling of Hearing in the case captioned
IN RE ZULILY, INC. LITIGATION, Case No. C15-1424RSM (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs in this consolidated action, Karan Jugal, Scott Mao and
Patrick Pisano, filed a motion for an order preliminarily
approving the settlement of this matter, preliminarily certifying
the class for purposes of the settlement only, and directing
notice of the settlement to the class.

The Court preliminarily finds the Settlement set forth in the
Stipulation to be fair, just, reasonable, and adequate to the
Class.

The Court provisionally certifies a mandatory non-opt-out class
action, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of all record and beneficial
holders of ZU common stock (excluding Defendants and their
respective affiliates) at any time during the period from and
including August 16, 2015 through and including October 1, 2015,
the effective date of the Tender Offer (Class Period).

The Court will hold a settlement hearing  on March 6, at 9:00 a.m.
for the following purposes, inter alia:  (i) to determine whether
to grant final certification of the Consolidated Federal Action as
a class action solely for purposes of the Settlement, pursuant to
Rule 23; (ii) to determine whether the proposed Settlement of the
Consolidated Federal Action on the terms and conditions provided
for in the Stipulation is fair, reasonable, adequate and in the
best interests of the Class and should be finally approved by the
Court.

Pending Final Court Approval of the Settlement, the Plaintiffs
agree that all proceedings in the Consolidated Federal Action will
be stayed, except for those proceedings related to the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 30, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9ejd6xafrom Leagle.com.

Patrick Pisano, Plaintiff, represented by Evan J. Smith --
esmith@brodsky-smith.com -- BRODSKY & SMITH.

Patrick Pisano, Plaintiff, represented by Roger M. Townsend --
rtownsend@bjtlegal.com -- BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Karan Jugal, Plaintiff, represented by Evan J. Smith, BRODSKY &
SMITH, Juan E. Monteverde, FARUQI & FARUQI & Roger M. Townsend,
BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Scott Mao, Plaintiff, represented by Evan J. Smith, BRODSKY &
SMITH & Roger M. Townsend, BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Zulily, Inc., Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage --
steverummage@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas
Mangan -- brendanmangan@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Darrell Cavens, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE.

Mark Vadon, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.
W. Eric Carlborg, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE.

John Geschke, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Mike Gupta, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Youngme Moon, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Michael Potter, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE.

Spencer Rascoff, Defendant, represented by Stephen M. Rummage,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE.

Liberty Interactive Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bradley
S. Keller -- bkeller@byrneskeller.com -- BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL
LLP.

Mocha Merger Sub, Inc, Defendant, represented by Bradley S.
Keller, BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP.

Ziggy Merger Sub, LLC, Defendant, represented by Bradley S.
Keller, BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP.



                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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