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             C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Monday, November 13, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 224



                            Headlines

AAC HOLDINGS: December 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
ACTAVIS INC: Insurers Not Obligated to Defend Opioid Lawsuits
ALLIED INTERSTATE: Faces "McCormick" Suit in E.D. New York
ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Extends Time to File Response in "Teodoro"
APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Court Narrows Claims in "Shasta" Suit

AUSTRALIA: NT Aboriginal Detainees' Class Action Can Proceed
AUSTRALIA: Queensland to Settle Palm Island Class Action
AUTOVEST LLC: Class Settlement in "Garcia" Has Final Approval
AXON ENTERPRISE: Faces SEC Inquiry Amid Class Action
BANK OF NAPA: Shareholder Files Class Action Over Merger

BANNER HEALTH: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Ramos" ERISA Suit
BAR TACO: Faces Class Action Following Hepatitis A Exposure
BAYCARE HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Figueroa" Denied
BAYER & MERCK: Faces Coppertone Sport Class Action
BLACK LIVES: Court Rulings Toss Lawsuit, Allow CA Payments

BRACCO'S CLAM: Faces "Ortega" Suit in E. Dist. New York
BRISTOL-MYERS: New Jersey Awaits Full Impact of High Court Ruling
BUCHER AND CHRISTIAN: Judgment on Pleadings in "Brown" Affirmed
BURLINGTON, VT: Judge Rules City Can Take Down Homeless Camp
CAREFIRST: Wants Supreme Court to Toss Data Breach Class Action

CHRYSLER: Judge Seals Motion to Certify UConnect Class Action
CLUB IDL: Faces "Brown" Suit in Northern District Ohio
CNOVA NV: March 15 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
COMMUNITY HEALTH: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Morrow"
CORELOGIC SAFERENT: Court Denies Summary Judgment in FCRA Suit

CROWDERGULF LLC: Faes "Palmisano" Suit in District of New Jersey
DETROIT, MI: State High Court Asked to Review Foreclosures
DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Defends Class Action Over OB-GYN Fake Identity
DIMENSION THERAPEUTICS: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action
DUNHAMS ATHLEISURE: Hamza's Bid to Dismiss 3rd Party Suit Denied

ECOLAB INC: "Bankwitz" Stayed Pending Ruling in "Morris"
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: "Reyes" CIPA Suit Partly Stayed
EMERSON ELECTRIC: Feb. 6 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
EQUIFAX INC: LSCU Joins Class Action Lawsuit
FCNH INC: Court Grants Nesbitt Relief from Taxation of Costs

FERRARA CANDY: Baker Sterchi Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
FORD MOTOR: Dec. 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
FRITO-LAY INC: July 17 Hearing on Class Deal Prelim Approval
FUNDAMENTAL LABOR: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Tonge" FCRA Suit
GC SERVICES: Faces "Geisinsky" Suit in E. Dist. New York

GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Chevrolet Corvette Class Action
GNC HOLDINGS: Class Suit Transferred to Pennsylvania Court
HANNA ANDERSSON: Faces "Marett" Suit in S.D. of New York
HC WAINWRIGHT: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Class Action
HERMES LANDSCAPING: Ct. Enters Deposition Order in "Rodriguez"

HONDA: Feb. 7 Airbag Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
HONDA MOTOR: U.S. Airbag Class Action Hits Quarterly Profit
HYATT CORP: Faces Class Action Over Employee Fingerprinting
IFC ASSET: Faces "Juana Doe" Suit in District of Delaware
IHEARTMEDIA: Court Approves $171K Settlement in Wage Suit

ILLINOIS: Class of FOID Card Applicants Seeks Summary Judgment
IMPERVA INC: Jan. 31 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
JOHN VARVATOS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Knox" EPA Class
JPMORGAN CHASE: Faces "Hunt" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
KAPLAN AND WEST: 9th Cir. Says Legal Fees May Not Be Enough

KEYCORP: Court Grants Partial Bid to Dismiss "Stolarick" Suit
KUSHNER COS: AG Probes Rental Practices Following Class Action
LA BOOM DISCO: Faces "Duran" Suit in Eastern District New York
LABELLE HOMEHEALTH: Court Certifies Employee Class in "Richert"
LENDING CLUB: Class Definition Order in Securities Suit Entered

LEVAIN BAKERY: Faces "Andrews" Suit in E. Dist. New York
LONG BEACH, CA: Court Terminates "Ochoa" ADA Suit
MAC'S CONVENIENCE: B.C. Court OKs Migrant Workers' Class-Action
MALLINCKRODT PLC: Faces Antitrust Class Action Over Achtar Pricing
MDL 2143: Judge OKs Optical Disk Drive Price-Fixing Settlement

MECTA CORP: Faces Product Liability Class Action in California
MEDRITE CARE: Faces "Young" Suit in Southern District of NY
MICROSOFT CORP: Three Women Seek to Lead Gender Bias Class Action
MICROSOFT CORP: Barnes & Thornburg Discusses Court Ruling
MODERN MD: Faces "Young" Suit in Eastern District New York

MONARCH RECOVERY: Court Consolidates FDCPA Suits Under "Mellon"
MONTEREY COUNTY, CA: Deal Enforcement in "Hernandez" Partly OK'd
MOUNTAIN FARMS: Faces "Escalante" Suit in S.D. New York
MRS BPO LLC: Faces "Preston" Suit in Northern District of Ill.
MURPHY OIL: Awaits SCOTUS Decision on Class Action Waivers

NEW RELEASE: Judge Tosses ADA Class Action Over DVD Kiosks
NISSAN NORTH: $2.5MM Verdict in Dashboard Class Action Overturned
NORTHRUP GRUMMAN: Judge Okays Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fee Request
NUCO2 MANAGEMENT: Faces "Hernandez" Suit in Calif. Superior Court
OMEGA FLEX: 8th Cir. Reverses Ruling Denying Standing in "George"

PACIFIC SEAFOOD: Ct. Stays "Whaley" Antitrust Suit Pending Appeal
PHOENIX WAREHOUSE: Faces Class Action Over Alleged "Sweatshops"
PREMIER ORGANICS: Court Allows Discovery in Coverage Suit
PRIDE TRANSPORT: Settlement in "Jacob" Suit Has Prelim Approval
PUBLIC STORAGE: Faces "Fox" Suit in Cent. Dist. Cal.

PURDUE PHARMA: City of Quincy Plans to Join Opioid Crisis Lawsuit
PURITY PRODUCTS: Faces "Wuest" Suit in N. Dist. Cal.
PYRAMID ADVISORS: Faces "Egan" Suit in West. Dist. Penn.
RANDSTAD US: Court Stays "Robledo" Pending Decision in "Morris"
RDL ENERGY: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Trevino" Nixed

REAL TIME: Faces "Tabick" Suit in Eastern District New York
RETROFITNESS LLC: Cannot Seek Indemnification from Hanover
ROBERT BOSCH: Court Denies Motion to Dismiss RICO Class Action
ROTHENBERG VENTURES: Ex-CFO Wins Case, Class Action Pending
SEC: Disgorgement Practices Challenged in Lawsuit

SHOWTIME: Files Motions to Compel Arbitration in Two Boxing Cases
SIU: More Female Doctors to Join Wage Discrimination Lawsuit
STANDARD & POOR'S: Plaintiffs Given OK to Pursue Deceit Claim
STANDARD INSURANCE: Settles New Mexico Employees' Class Action
STANFORD TRUST: Class Certification Order in "Lillie" Affirmed

STEPHEN CUNNINGHAM: Faces "Moreno" Suit in S.D.N.Y.
SUBWAY: Soda Tax Class Action Continues in Local County Level
SURNIAK HOLDINGS: Faces Class Actions Over IEI Warehouse Fire
SINGING RIVER: Addresses Pension Settlement Concerns at Hearing
T-MOBILE LTD: Sanctioned to Pay $8K in Attys' Fees in "Martinez"

TALBOTS INC: Court Dismisses Coverage Suit Against AIG
TGI FRIDAY'S: Class Certification Improper for TCCWNA Claims
TRIVAGO NV: December 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Updated Spying Class Action
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Likely to Dodge Drivers' Suit Over Data Hack

UNITED SERVICES: Settlement in "Bastian" Suit Has Final Approval
UNITED STATES: Nov. 27 Deadline for Tribal Members to Claim Money
UNITED STATES: Tea Party Happy with IRS Settlement
UNITED VAN: Can Compel Arbitration in "Dennis" FLSA Suit
VIZIO INC: Faces "Brenner" Suit in West. Dist. Wash.

WALDEN UNIVERSITY: Ct. Allows Doctoral Student to Amend Complaint
WENDYS COMPANY: Faces First Choice Union Suit in Colorado
YOUNGSTOWN, OH: Faces Class Action Over Sewer Services Race Bias
ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Dismissal of "Leonard" FDCPA Suit Affirmed

* CFPB's Richard Corday Asks Trump to Veto Class Action Rule
* Congress May Override Resolution to Nullify CFPB Rule
* Drinker Biddle & Reath Attorney Discusses TCPA Ruling





                            *********


AAC HOLDINGS: December 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

DR. JOSEPH F. KASPER, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

        v.


AAC HOLDINGS, INC., JERROD N. MENZ,
MICHAEL T. CARTWRIGHT, ANDREW W.
MCWILLIAMS, and KIRK R. MANZ,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-CV-00923-JPM
(Consolidated)


SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION

To: All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
AAC securities between October 2, 2014, and August 4, 2015 at 9:40
a.m. (EDT).

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, that the above
captioned litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class
action.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THE ACTION.  A full printed notice of Pendency of Class Action is
currently being mailed to known Class Members.  If you have not
yet received the full printed Notice, you may obtain copies of
this document by contacting:

           Kasper v. AAC Holdings
           Notice Administrator
           c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
           P.O. Box 170500
           Milwaukee, WI  53217

Inquires, other than requests for the Notice, may be made to Class
Counsel:

          Frederic S. Fox
          Donald R. Hall
          Jeffrey P. Campisi
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          (212)  687-1980

          Lewis S. Kahn
          Ramzi Abadou
          Alexander Burns
          KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC
          206 Covington Street
          New York, NY 10022
          Madisonville, LA 70447
          (504)  455-1400

          David W. Garrison
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          (615)  244-2202

If you are a Class Member, you have the right to decide whether to
remain a member of the Class.  If you choose to remain a member of
the Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than
to retain your documentation reflecting your transactions in AAC
securities.  You will automatically be included in the Class.  If
you are a Class Member and do not exclude yourself from the Class,
you will be bound by the proceedings in the Action, including all
past, present and future orders and judgments of the Court,
whether favorable or unfavorable.

If you ask to be excluded from the Class, you will not be bound by
any order or judgment of this Court, and you will not be eligible
to receive a share of any money that might be recovered for the
benefit of the Class.  To exclude yourself from the Class, you
must submit a written request for exclusion postmarked no later
than December 11, 2017 in accordance with the instructions set
forth in the full printed Notice.  Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is within the Court's
discretion as to whether a second opportunity to request exclusion
from the Class will be allowed if there is a settlement or
judgment in the Action.  The trial in the Action has been
scheduled by the Court to begin on August 6, 2018.

Further information may be obtained by directing your inquiry in
writing to the Notice Administrator.

Dated:  October 30, 2017

BY THE ORDER OF THE COURT:

United States District Court
Middle District of Tennessee
[GN]


ACTAVIS INC: Insurers Not Obligated to Defend Opioid Lawsuits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that insurers have no obligation
to defend drug makers against lawsuits brought by governments
fighting the opioid epidemic, since the policies only cover
accidents and not intentional misrepresentations by Big Pharma,
California's Fourth Appellate District ruled on Nov. 7.

The appeals case is THE TRAVELER's PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF
AMERICA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ACTAVIS, INC., et
al., Defendants and Appellants, G053749 (Cal. App.).

A full-text copy of the Opinion is available at
https://is.gd/mN8nyS

Blank Rome, Elizabeth B. Kim and James R. Murray for Defendants
and Appellants.

Dentons US, Ronald D. Kent, Joshua Kroot; Choate Hall & Stewart,
Robert A. Kole and Jean-Paul Jaillet for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.


ALLIED INTERSTATE: Faces "McCormick" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allied Interstate
LLC.  The case is styled as Annie McCormick, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Allied Interstate
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06231 (E.D. N.Y., October 25,
2017).

Allied Interstate is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel C Cohen, Esq.
   Daniel Cohen, PLLC
   407 Rockaway Avenue
   Brooklyn, NY 11212
   Tel: (646) 645-8482
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: dancohenlaw@gmail.com


ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Extends Time to File Response in "Teodoro"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Parties' Stipulation on Extension of Time to
File Respond to Defendant's Motions in the case captioned TANYA
TEODORO, individually, and on behalf others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; and
DOES I-V and ROES VI-X, inclusive; Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
02135-APG-VCF (D. Nev.).  A full-text copy of the District Court's
September 29, 2017 Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9yv234lfrom Leagle.com.

Tanya Teodoro, Plaintiff, represented by Ines Olevic-Saleh, Jesse
Sbaih & Associates, LTD, 170 South Green Valley Parkway, Suite
280Henederson, NV 89012.

Tanya Teodoro, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse M. Sbaih, Jesse
Sbaih & Associates, Ltd..

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Abran E. Vigil -- VIGILA BALLARDSPAHR.COM --
Ballard Spahr.


APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Court Narrows Claims in "Shasta" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the cases, SHASTA LINEN SUPPLY,
INC., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC.; APPLIED UNDERWRITERS
CAPTIVE RISK ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.; CALIFORNIA INSURANCE
COMPANY; and APPLIED RISK SERVICES, INC., Defendants. PET FOOD
EXPRESS LTD., and ALPHA POLISHING, INC. d/b/a GENERAL PLATING CO.,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC.; APPLIED UNDERWRITERS
CAPTIVE RISK ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.; CALIFORNIA INSURANCE
COMPANY; and APPLIED RISK SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Civ. Nos.
2:16-00158 WBS AC, 2:16-01211 WBS AC (E.D. Cal.).

California requires that all employers purchase workers'
compensation insurance coverage for employees that suffer injury
or death due to an occupational accident.  The California
Insurance Code also requires that all workers' compensation
insurance policy forms, rates, and rating plans be filed for
approval with the California Workers Compensation Insurance Rating
Bureau and approved by the California Department of Insurance.

The Defendants allegedly marketed and sold a workers' compensation
insurance program under the names EquityComp and SolutionOne to
the Plaintiffs and other California employers.  The Defendants
filed this policy with the Bureau and got approval from the
Department of Insurance.  After the program's policies took effect
for the Plaintiffs, the Defendants allegedly required them to sign
a Reinsurance Participation Agreement ("RPA").

The Plaintiffs allege that the RPA modified the terms of the
existing insurance policies, including the rates, causing them to
incur significantly higher costs for the insurance program than
the Defendants had marketed.  On Jan. 26, 2016, Shasta brought an
action in the Court alleging fraud and unfair competition against
the Defendants for their marketing and sale of the insurance
program and RPA.  With respect to the RPA, Shasta argued that the
RPA was void because Defendants did not file it with the
Commissioner of the California Department of Insurance prior to it
taking effect, thereby violating Section 11735.

Shasta argued that billing the Plaintiff under the void RPA
constituted fraud and was an unfair business practice.  The
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint to the extent it relied
on Section 11735, arguing that a rate is legal unless and until
the Commissioner holds a hearing and disapproves the rate,
pursuant to Section 11737.

On June 20, 2016, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  Because Shasta had not alleged that the Commissioner had
held a hearing and disapproved the RPA, the Court concluded that
the Plaintiff did not plausibly allege that the RPA was void.
On the same day as the Court's order of dismissal, the
Commissioner issued a Decision and Order in Shasta's
administrative case, holding that the RPA must be filed and
approved by the Commissioner pursuant to Section 11735 before use.
Because the Defendants did not file the RPA before it took effect,
the Commissioner stated, the RPA is void as a matter of law.

Based on the Commissioner's Order, Shasta filed a motion for
reconsideration of the June 20 Order granting the motion to
dismiss.  The Court denied Shasta's motion for reconsideration,
holding that the Commissioner's Order did not control the Court
and that its previous June 20 Order was not clearly erroneous.

Pet Food Express, Ltd. filed a separate class action against the
Defendants in state court asserting claims for unfair competition,
rescission, declaratory relief, and fraud.  The action was removed
to federal court on March 29, 2016.  The Defendants, as they had
in the Shasta case, moved to dismiss the Pet Food complaint to the
extent it sought to invalidate the RPA on the ground that it is an
unfiled rate or rating plan in violation of Section 11735.  The
court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss as moot because Pet
Foot's complaint did not rely on Section 11735.

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiffs in both actions filed amended
complaints that are nearly identical.  The complaints assert
claims under the federal Racketeer Influence Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") statue, under the California Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"), and for unjust enrichment.  The Defendants move to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Shubb finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that
each subsidiary had a distinct role in the enterprise.  They've
been able to plead that each of the four corporate entities played
a unique role in the enterprise, thus satisfying the "something
more" standard.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged a plausible basis to infer a specific intent to defraud,
and their RICO claim must be dismissed.  Given the existence of
the patent, even if the Plaintiffs were given leave to amend, the
Judge cannot see how they would be able to plead facts to create a
plausible inference that the Defendants intended to conceal the
structure of the program and thereby defraud the Plaintiffs.

The Judge then turns to the Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive
relief and restitution under the UCL.  He finds that while there
may be no risk of injury from future programs, the Plaintiffs
still face a real and immediate threat of injury from the RPA that
has already been issued to them.  Accordingly, they have
established standing in order to seek injunctive relief.  At this
stage, the Plaintiffs have also sufficiently pled their right to
restitution.

Because the Plaintiffs have not successfully argued that the
Commissioner's Order constituted a rate disapproval hearing within
the meaning of section 11737 that rendered the RPA retroactively
unlawful, the Court's reasoning for its previous dismissal remains
applicable and the Defendants' reliance on the prior ruling is
appropriate.  Accordingly, Judge Shubb will again grant the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims to the extent
they seek to declare the Defendants' use of the RPA was illegal on
the theory that defendants failed to comply with Section 11735.

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants were unjustly
enriched when they deceptively sold the Plaintiffs and the Class
members the illegal insurance program and received and retained
the benefits.  This statement, according to the Judge, is
sufficient to state a quasi-contract cause of action.
Accordingly, he will construe the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claim as a claim for quasi-contract and deny the motion to dismiss
as to this claim.

Judge Shubb therefore ordered that the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaints be, and the same is, granted as
to the Plaintiffs' RICO claims; granted as to Plaintiffs' attempts
to invalidate the RPA on the theory that the Defendants violated
Insurance Code section 11735; and denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/xvitGQ from Leagle.com.

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Craig E.
Farmer -- cfarmer@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith & Lane LLP &
John L. Hall -- jhall@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith & Lane
LLP.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., Defendant, represented by John Russell
Stedman -- rstedman@barwol.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Shand
Scott Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP &
Travis R. Wall -- twall@mail.hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP.

Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Travis R. Wall --
twall@mail.hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Shand
Scott Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.

California Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Travis R.
Wall -- twall@mail.hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP &
Shand Scott Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper
LLP.

Applied Risk Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Spencer Y.
Kook -- skook@mail.hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
Shand Scott Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper
LLP & Travis R. Wall -- twall@mail.hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by Raoul
Dion Kennedy -- raoul.kennedy@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, Shand Scott Stephens, DLA Piper Llp & Travis
R. Wall, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


AUSTRALIA: NT Aboriginal Detainees' Class Action Can Proceed
------------------------------------------------------------
Amos Aikman, writing for The Australian, reports that lawyers
seeking to represent as many as 1,200 juvenile delinquents housed
in Northern Territory detention centres over a 10-year period have
been told they cannot claim their clients suffered human rights
abuses simply because a majority of them are Aboriginal.

Earlier this year, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers launched an "opt-out"
class action headed by lead applicants Dylan Jenkings and Aaron
Hyde.  Mr. Hyde, who is not indigenous, was jailed for 11 years in
2015 over a crime spree and ice-fuelled car crash that killed one
of his friends.

NT Police announced in July 2016 that they were searching for
Mr. Jenkings in connection with a series of car thefts and ram
raids and a collision with a police vehicle.  Mr. Jenkings, who is
indigenous, was subsequently charged with property offences; his
case is before the courts.

In a decision handed down by the Federal Court on Friday, Justice
Richard White ruled that the Maurice Blackburn case could proceed
as a class action and should not be transferred to the Supreme
Court of the NT -- significant wins for the applicants.

Justice White said the "gist" of their claims was that detention
centre staff had "routinely" used force in ways that periodically
amounted to assault, battery and unfair deprivation of liberty and
"involved discrimination on the basis of race".

He noted that neither alleged unfair treatment of the Aboriginal
detainees in particular, "but instead that the whole cohort of
(class action) Group Members was treated differently than would
have been the case had it not been comprised overwhelmingly by
Aboriginals."

"The allegation is that, over a period of approximately 10 years,
Group Members were subjected, while in detention, to unauthorised
forms of conduct which were based on race and which infringed
their fundamental human rights," Justice White said.

"The allegations of systemic or routine conduct of a kind which
would not have been engaged in had the detainees not been
Aboriginal is akin to an allegation of institutional racial
discrimination. Such an allegation is particularly serious."

But he found the applicants' pleading contained no facts "capable
of supporting a conclusion" that prison guards would have behaved
differently "had the overwhelming majority of children in youth
detention centre not been Aboriginal."

"The absence of such a pleading is especially stark," Justice
White remarked.

Maurice Blackburn's Class Action Principal, Ben Slade, said the
judgment was an important victory for current and former youth
detainees.  "There are many current and former detainees who
deserve to be compensated for the wrongs they have suffered,"
Mr Slade said.

He declined to reveal how many of the 800-1200 current and former
inmates his firm estimated could join class action had actually
contacted Maurice Blackburn.

Justice White also ruled that four former Don Dale detainees who
the Supreme Court of the NT in March awarded damages ranging from
$12,000-$17,000 could rejoin the class action.  The Supreme Court
found the four had been wrongly spit-hooded, shackled and
handcuffed.

The Australian understands Maurice Blackburn will seek to prove
institutional racism in an amended statement of claim (its third).
[GN]

AUSTRALIA: Queensland to Settle Palm Island Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Melanie Petrinec, writing for The Courier-Mail, reports that the
State Government has given the green light to settle a class
action over the racist police response to riots on Palm Island, in
an abrupt about-face set to cost millions of dollars.

It was revealed in the Federal Court on Oct. 31 that settlement
instructions and a top figure have been confirmed by the Caretaker
Advisory Group, which oversees government business during election
campaigns, and an agreement could be reached before Christmas.

It would mark the end of an ugly chapter in Queensland's history
which unfolded under another Labor government in 2004 when Cameron
"Mulrunji" Doomadgee died in custody and riots broke out in the
tiny indigenous community, which armed specialist police later
stormed.

In a test case last year, Justice Debbie Mortimer found police
breached the Racial Discrimination Act multiple times in
protecting controversial cop Chris Hurley and acting with "a sense
of impunity", awarding $220,000 in total to convicted rioter Lex
Wotton and his family.

The government abandoned an appeal amid a backlash and instead
prepared to go to trial against more than 500 Palm Island
residents who launched claims on the back of the landmark
determination.

But on Oct. 31, the government's barrister Andrew Crowe QC said he
had been instructed to settle all of the claims.

"We have a figure that we can go to . . . that has been confirmed
by the Caretaker Advisory Group," he said.

Barrister Dr Kristine Hanscombe QC, acting on behalf of the people
of Palm Island, said the proposed settlement came as a surprise
and expressed concern over the result of the looming election.

Lex Wotton was a prominent figure in the riot and subsequent legal
actions.

However the court was told any settlement would be binding no
matter who takes power.

Previous estimates have put total compensation in the range of
several million dollars and Mr Crowe said the government had
already spent a significant amount on the case, including more
than $200,000 for various reports.

He said settlement offers would be modelled on the original
judgment, in which the lowest compensation awarded was $10,000.

If a settlement isn't reached after mediation begins on December 6
it will go to trial next year and Hurley -- who was acquitted of
manslaughter over Mulrunji's death -- may be called to give
evidence. [GN]


AUTOVEST LLC: Class Settlement in "Garcia" Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS EFRAIN LEONEL GARCIA, an individual, and
LORRAINE BELT, an individual, on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AUTOVEST, LLC, a foreign limited liability
company; Defendant, Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-00601-JAD-CWH (D.
Nev.), Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada granted the parties' Joint Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, and granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Attorney's Fees.

The hearing for Final Approval came before the Court based upon
the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Approving Notice, and Scheduling Final Approval
Hearing, filed Feb. 6, 2017, which was modified on June 23, 2017
("Amendment"), and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees
filed on Sept. 5, 2017.

Judge Dorsey approved the settlement in the Class Action
Settlement Agreement and Amendment to Class Action Settlement
Agreement.  She certified the Class, solely for the purposes of
settlement, described as all persons who were sued by Autovest in
Nevada between March 17, 2015 and the date of entry of a Final
Judgment in the case for the deficiency balance owed under a
Simple Interest Vehicle Contract and Security Agreement more than
four years after the date of the last voluntary payment made under
the Contracts and where the Contracts were secured by a lien on a
motor vehicle.

Within the Class, the Judge certified two subclasses, again solely
for the purposes of settlement: a Judgment Subclass and a Non-
Judgment Subclass.  The Judgment Subclass is comprised of Class
Members against whom Autovest obtained a judgment before the
future date of entry of a Final Judgment in the case.  The "Non-
Judgment Subclass" is comprised of Class Members against whom
Autovest had not taken a judgment as of the future date of entry
of Final Judgment in the case.

She appointed the Named Plaintiffs, Carlos Garcia and Lorraine
Belt, as the representatives of the Class.  She also appointed the
counsel to the Named Plaintiffs, Mitch D. Gliner, Daniel A.
Edelman, Dan L. Wulz, and Sophia A. Medina, as the Class Counsel.

As there are no objections on file and no one appeared at the
hearing to object, the Terms of Settlement set forth in the
Agreement is approved.  Judge Dorsey also approved the provisions
of the Agreement making the settlement and its release of claims
binding on all Class Members, whether or not they actually
received notice of the Action or its settlement.  The Judge
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Sb85EZ from Leagle.com.

Carlos Efrain Leonel Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Dan L. Wulz
-- dwulz@lacsn.org -- Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc..

Carlos Efrain Leonel Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A.
Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, pro hac vice,
Mitchell D. Gliner, Law Office of Mitchell D. Gliner, pro hac vice
& Sophia A. Medina, Legal Aid Centers.

Autovest, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer L. Yazdi --
jyazdi@snllp.com -- Simmons & Narita LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica A.
Green -- JGREEN@LIPSONNEILSON.COM -- Lipson, Neilson, Cole,
Seltzer & Garin, P.C., Robert Travis Campbell --
tcampbell@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita, pro hac vice & Joseph P.
Garin -- JGARIN@LIPSONNEILSON.COM -- Lipson Neilson Cole Seltzer &
Garin, P.C..


AXON ENTERPRISE: Faces SEC Inquiry Amid Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Rich Duprey, writing for Madison.com, reports that a spam filter
plunged Taser maker Axon Enterprise into an SEC inquiry, a falling
stock, and numerous class action lawsuits.  It could've been an
otherwise humorous development, but for the ramification of what
the regulatory probe is targeting.

Return to sender

Over the course of a month and a half beginning on Aug. 10, the
SEC sent Axon a series of emails requesting explanations for
several accounting practices, most prominently why its backlog
surged in 2016.  The SEC also wanted a fuller understanding of the
company's revenue-recognition policies on its TASER 60 program
that allows customers to pay for hardware purchases over five
years.

Axon never responded until Oct. 19 because of "miscommunication
issues" that it revealed to Fast Company was actually the result
of an overly aggressive email spam filter.  Because Axon's new CFO
had never corresponded with the SEC before and the regulatory
agency sent its requests by email instead of snail mail, as it
typically does, the requests got sent to a junk folder. Doh!

It's not surprising that Axon Enterprise is suddenly in turmoil.
Any hint of an SEC inquiry will typically send a stock lower, and
the stun-gun maker's shares are down almost 9% since the
revelation.  Nor is it helping that trial lawyers are piling on,
seeking to file class action lawsuits for losses sustained as a
result of the snafu.

What investors should focus on is the substantive issues the SEC
raised.  For that, we'll have to wait until Axon responds to the
agency to find out how serious the concerns may be.

Here's why Axon could have a problem.

Building up backlog

In Axon's annual report for 2016, the stun-gun maker said its
backlog for products and services had grown from $183.9 million at
the end of 2015 to $384.2 million at the end of last year, triple
the amount.  The backlog included $51 million and $85 million,
respectively, of deferred revenue.

Backlog is sales orders that need to be completed.  On its fourth-
quarter 2016 earnings conference call with analysts this past
February, Axon President Luke Larson attributed the dramatic
increase to the launch of and demand for its new Axon 2 camera,
which he said at the time stood at around 9,000 units, but that he
believed the company would work through the increased demand by
the second quarter.

Little mention, however, was made of backlog in Axon's second-
quarter call.  In the first quarter it declined to 7,000 units.
Now the SEC wants Axon to disclose "the amount of backlog
attributable to each reportable segment, and disclose the amount
of total backlog expected to be realized in the next year."

Recognizing a revenue problem

The bigger issue may be the TASER 60 program, which a short-seller
on Seeking Alpha named Aparecium Research recently identified as
"aggressive" because it allowed Axon to recognize revenue when a
contract was signed, rather than over the five-year life of the
agreement.

TASER 60 is a plan whereby a customer enters into a five-year
purchase agreement for its TASER weapons and also gets an extended
warranty on the products.  Axon says it recognizes revenue for the
weapons at the time of the sale but recognizes the warranty
revenue over the life of the contract.  Further, it defers the
sales commission costs of the sales over five years.

Using Freedom of Information Act requests from several police
departments to view their billing records to Axon, Aparecium
believes Axon has inflated its revenue by at least 10% and
adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization by at least 40%.

Whether or not the intricacies of these allegations pan out, Axon
Enterprise is the one responsible for having them thrust into the
public spotlight because, of all things, a spam filter. Typically,
the SEC and a company hash these matters out behind the scenes,
and only well after the fact are the matters publicly disclosed.

Because Axon had a spam filter as aggressive as its accounting
practices are purported to be, investors have something of a real-
time ringside seat to the unfolding drama.  As a result, investors
may want to use caution in buying its stock until the issue is
resolved or else risk getting shocked by further disclosures. [GN]


BANK OF NAPA: Shareholder Files Class Action Over Merger
--------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Huffman, writing for Napa Valley Register, reports that
a Bank of Napa shareholder who has a fondness for filing class-
action lawsuits has initiated such a complaint against the bank,
its directors and would-be purchaser Bank of Marin.

Bank of Marin should not be allowed to purchase Bank of Napa,
reads the complaint filed by Paul Parshall, who owns 70 shares out
of some 2.3 million shares of Bank of Napa stock.  The value of
Parshall's stock is about $805.

Mr. Parshall's class-action complaint states that the merger
application contains "false and misleading" statements and is
missing important information.

The application for the sale, or registration documents, is
missing relevant information about both banks' financial
projections, reads Mr. Parshall's complaint.  Projected financial
information is important because it allows shareholders to better
understand the proposed merger, the complaint states.

Because of false and misleading statements in the application, Mr.
Parshall and other shareholders "are threatened with irreparable
harm," it reads.

Tom LeMasters, the president and CEO of Bank of Napa, issued a
comment about Mr. Parshall's complaint.

"It appears that Mr. Parshall is a serial plaintiff who routinely
files nuisance lawsuits in transactions such as ours with the goal
of securing a personal financial settlement," said
Mr. LeMasters.

"We are very confident there is no merit to his claim.  We look
forward to the opportunity to defend ourselves."

Russ Colombo, president and CEO of Bank of Marin, declined to
comment on the complaint.

The merger of the two banks was first announced in late July. Bank
of Napa has two branches in the county. Bank of Marin has one
branch in Napa County.

The deal, worth $51 million, was said to close in the fourth
quarter, according to a news release from the Bank of Napa.

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholders
of Bank of Napa will receive 0.307 shares of Bank of Marin common
stock for each share of Bank of Napa common stock.

After the deal is closed, Bank of Marin would have approximately
$2.4 billion in assets and operate 22 branches in five counties:
San Francisco, Marin, Sonoma, Napa and Alameda.

Mr. Parshall could be considered an expert in class-action
lawsuits.

He's filed or been involved with more than 40 similar complaints
in a variety of states including California, New York, Florida,
Arizona, Indiana, Colorado and Utah.

He's part of so many lawsuits that when a reporter called him at
his Florida home to ask about the Napa Bank complaint, Mr.
Parshall said he couldn't remember the specific details.

"I've got a lot of them pending," said Mr. Parshall.  "That's what
I do."

According to the complaint, Mr. Parshall bought his 70 Bank of
Napa shares in November 2016.  The two banks started merger talks
in January of this year.

Mr. Parshall, 77, said he researches companies that look to be
likely candidates for a merger and then buys stock in those
entities.

"I own a lot of stock," he said.  He said he has previously owned
media companies including newspapers, and "I also own patents and
intellectual property."

He reportedly retired at age 45 but, "I've been fully invested in
the stock market for over half a century," Mr. Parshall said.

"It keeps me out of the bars and wineries," he added.

Mr. Parshall said he files these class action complaints to
advocate for the other shareholders.  Sometimes he challenges the
value of the stock the shareholders are scheduled to receive in
the transaction.

For example, "If we file litigation maybe the (bank) directors
will say we have to have more money for the shareholders," he
said. "In some cases they are looking out for themselves not the
shareholders."

Even though his own investment in Bank of Napa is worth less than
$1,000, Mr. Parshall said he doesn't consider the class-action
complaint a waste of time or money for him or the bank's
management.

"That's what they pay attorneys for," he said.  Plus, "It's not a
waste of time for the shareholders."

He also said he is not an opportunist.

"I have a right," to ask such questions, Mr. Parshall said.
Besides, if he prevails, the bank will pay his costs and attorney
fees, he noted. [GN]


BANNER HEALTH: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Ramos" ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order denies Defendant Jeffrey Slocum & Associates,
Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the case captioned LORRAINE M. RAMOS, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. BANNER HEALTH, et al., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 15-cv-2556-WJM-MJW (D. Colo.).

In this action brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1132 under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
Plaintiffs Lorraine M. Ramos and others bring a putative class
action against numerous Defendants including Banner Health and
numerous of its officers or employees and against Jeffrey Slocum &
Associates, Inc., an independent third-party investment consultant
hired by Banner Health to function as a fiduciary with respect to
the investment and administration of the assets of employee 401(k)
plan and other Banner Health corporate assets and sponsored
retirement plans.

Slocum filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II of the Amended
Complaint.  Slocum argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged
breaches of fiduciary duties that arose within the areas of
responsibility or actions for which Slocum rather than Banner
Health or the Committee had fiduciary responsibilities.

Count I: Excessive Administrative Fees

Plaintiffs' Allegations

First, Plaintiffs allege that Banner Health (advised by Slocum)
failed to engage in a competitive bidding process in retaining
Fidelity as the Plan's record-keeper.  Second, Plaintiffs allege
that certain mutual funds which Fidelity offered in the Plan
engaged in revenue sharing by which the mutual funds paid back
part of their asset-based fees to Fidelity.  Third, Plaintiffs
allege that Banner Health and Slocum permitted Fidelity to offer
Plan participants its Portfolio Advisory Service, marketed as an
independent discretionary investment management service to advise
Plan participants "how to invest their retirement savings among
the Plan's investment options."

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled factual
matters which, taken as true, show that Slocum held at least co-
fiduciary responsibility for some aspects of the selection and
monitoring of the Plan's trustee and/or record-keeper, as well as
for negotiation of at least some of the administrative fees. This
is sufficient to defeat Slocum's Motion to Dismiss.   And, since
Plaintiffs pled all of their more specific factual theories
regarding administrative fees as a single count, the Court's
finding of sufficient allegations to state a claim is sufficient
to resolve Slocum's Motion as to Count I, and the Court need not
address Plaintiffs' additional factual theories in detail at this
stage.

Count II: Imprudent Investment Options

Plaintiffs' Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that Banner Health, advised by Slocum, retained
underperforming funds, and made investment decisions that would
drive revenues and profits to Fidelity. Among other more specific
factual allegations, Plaintiffs allege that by including so many
mutual funds rather than focusing on fewer options, Defendants
exposed Plan participants to higher fees and expense ratios which
could have been avoided by consolidating assets into fewer
investment vehicles, and thus being eligible for, or able to
negotiate, lower fees and expenses.

The Court finds that Slocum's arguments again seek to disprove
Plaintiffs' allegations on their merits or to put into evidence
facts beyond what Plaintiffs have pled. This again demonstrates
that Plaintiffs' allegations may be contested, but not that they
are implausible or insufficiently pled as a matter of law under
Rule 12(b)(6). Even if it is true that Slocum may have evidence to
disprove Plaintiffs' claim that it had at least shared
responsibilities to evaluate the Fund's mutual fund offerings,
such questions of proof are not properly resolved on a motion
brought under Rule 12(b)(6).

It is evident to the Court that granting Slocum's Motion on this
basis would require it to treat the documents submitted by Slocum
as evidence defeating the factual allegations of the Amended
Complaint, rather than treating Plaintiffs' well-pled factual
allegations as true.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yaqyulvgfrom Leagle.com.

Lorraine M. Ramos, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott
Schwartz -- aschwartz@uselaws.com. -- Schlichter Bogard and
Denton, LLP.

Lorraine M. Ramos, Plaintiff, represented by Heather Lea,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and
Denton, LLP, Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton,
LLP, Troy Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,100
South Fourth Street, Suite 900, St. Louis, MO 63102 & Jerome
Joseph Schlichter -- jschlichter@uselaws.com -- Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP.

Constance R. Williamson, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott
Schwartz, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and
Denton, LLP, Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton,
LLP, Troy Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome
Joseph Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Karen F. McLeod, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott Schwartz,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Troy
Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome Joseph
Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Robert Moffitt, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott Schwartz,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Troy
Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome Joseph
Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Cherlene M. Goodale, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott
Schwartz, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and
Denton, LLP, Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton,
LLP, Troy Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome
Joseph Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Linda Ann Heyrman, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott
Schwartz, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and
Denton, LLP, Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton,
LLP, Troy Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome
Joseph Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Delri Hanson, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Elliott Schwartz,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Michael Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Troy
Andrew Doles, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP & Jerome Joseph
Schlichter, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Banner Health, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl --
richard.pearl@dbr.com -- Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore
M. Becker -- theodore.becker@dbr.com -- Drinker, Biddle & Reath,
LLP.

Banner Health Board of Directors, Defendant, represented by
Richard Jason Pearl, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M.
Becker, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP.

Laren Bates, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Wilford A. Cardon, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Ronald J. Creasman, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Gilbert Davila, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

William M. Dwyer, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Peter S. Fine, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Susan B. Foote, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.

Michael J. Frick, Defendant, represented by Richard Jason Pearl,
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker, Drinker, Biddle
& Reath, LLP.


BAR TACO: Faces Class Action Following Hepatitis A Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dan Reiner, writing for lohud, reports that less than one week
after a hepatitis A exposure temporarily shut down the popular
bartaco restaurant, a class-action lawsuit was filed against its
owners for alleged negligence and damages.

Crystal Lopez, of Yonkers, was one of thousands who claimed they
visited bartaco between Aug. 22 and Oct. 23, the time frame
Westchester County health officials say patrons may also have been
exposed to hepatitis A virus from an infected employee.

The Health Department closed the restaurant Oct. 25, and was
cleared to reopen a day later.

On Oct. 30, Ms. Lopez filed a class-action lawsuit in state
Supreme Court against Bar Taco Port Chester, LLC, owners of
bartaco. The lawsuit filing alleges bartaco caused damages to more
than 3,000 patrons who received preventative treatments, including
vaccinations, from the county.

According to the complaint, bartaco "owed a duty to its patrons
and to plaintiffs to manufacture, distribute, prepare, serve and
sell" food that "was fit for human consumption" and "was free of
pathogenic viruses or other substances injurious to human health."

Pam Ritz, a spokesperson for bartaco, said a hotline has been
opened for customers to individually settle their complaints with
the restaurant.

"Lawsuits are always discouraging and I think they're a terribly
long process," Ms. Ritz said.  "Why wouldn't you get on the
hotline and let us solve the problem for it? There's never been a
need for litigation. We've fully embraced it and we've been
helping each and every customer."

The plaintiffs are being represented by Seattle-based firm Marler
Clark, which has an extensive history of hepatitis A lawsuits,
according to the complaint.

Hepatitis A is generally a mild illness with symptoms that include
fatigue, fever, poor appetite, abdominal pains, diarrhea, dark
urine, light colored stool, and jaundice, according to Westchester
County Health Commissioner Sherlita Amler.

Hepatitis A is transmitted by consuming food or drinks that have
been handled by an infected person.  It may also be spread from
person to person by ingesting something that has been contaminated
with the stool of a person with Hepatitis A.  Casual contact, such
as sitting together, does not spread the virus.

Vaccinations will continue through Nov. 6 but must be done by
appointment.  The county Health Department has posted information
on the vaccinations on its website.  Vaccinations are only
effective within two weeks of exposure.

The plaintiffs in the bartaco complaint are seeking compensation
"for all pain and suffering" and any damages associated with the
situation.

Customers who wish to reach out to bartaco directly can call 844-
617-8242, 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., seven days a week. [GN]


BAYCARE HEALTH: Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Figueroa" Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ELAYNE FIGUEROA, on her own behalf and all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. BAYCARE HEALTH
SYSTEM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-1780-T-30JSS (M.D.
Fla.), Judge James S. Moody, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint
with Prejudice.

This is a putative class action brought under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA").  According to the first amended complaint,
on May 14, 2015, Figueroa applied for employment with Baycare as a
Patient Care Technician.  At the time that she applied, the
Plaintiff received the Defendant's "Authorization of Background
Investigation."

The Plaintiff alleges that the document is not a "stand-alone"
FCRA disclosure document.  She alleges that the disclosure
document also required her to promise that if the Company hires
her or contracts for her services, her consent will apply, and the
Company may, as allowed by law, obtain additional background
reports pertaining to her, without asking for her authorization
again, throughout her employment or contract period from HireRight
and/or other consumer reporting agencies.  She avers that she
never would have consented to the requirements contained in the
Defendant's form had she realized the extent to which it purported
to allow the Defendant to invade her privacy.  The Plaintiff
further alleges that the disclosure document contained
inappropriate extraneous items of information.

Based on these alleged violations, the Plaintiff asserts two FCRA
claims against the Defendant on behalf of herself and a single
putative class of the Defendant's employees and prospective
employees.  Count I alleges that the disclosure the Plaintiff and
each member of the putative class executed to authorize Defendant
to obtain a background report as part of the employment process
failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)'s
requirement of a stand-alone disclosure.  Count II alleges that
because the Defendant obtained consumer reports related to the
Plaintiff and other members of the putative class without proper
authorization under the FCRA, the Defendant also violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).

The Defendant's motion to dismiss argues that Counts I and II of
the first amended complaint are subject to dismissal with
prejudice because: (i) the Plaintiff cannot state a claim as a
matter of law; and (ii) even if the Plaintiff could state an
actionable claim, the Defendant's actions were not objectively
unreasonable, i.e., willful.

Judge Moody disagrees with the Defendant's first argument that the
Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law because the disclosure
document did not violate the FCRA as a matter of law.  At this
stage, the Plaintiff's allegations regarding the disclosure
document are sufficient.

With respect to the issue of willfulness, Judge Moody finds that
the Defendant's motion reads like a motion for summary judgment
and is premature at this juncture because he cannot determine
whether the Defendant's actions were willful until the Court is
presented with record evidence about what actions the Defendant
took to comply with the FCRA.

The Judge therefore ordered the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Class Action Complaint with Prejudice is denied.
The Defendant will file an answer to the first amended complaint
within 14 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/IEvRwP from Leagle.com.

Elayne Figueroa, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon J. Hill --
bhill@wfclaw.com -- Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, PA.

Elayne Figueroa, Plaintiff, represented by Luis A. Cabassa --
lcabassa@wfclaw.com -- Wenzel Fenton Cabassa, PA.

BayCare Health System, Inc., Defendant, represented by Nathan
Paulich -- npaulich@tsghlaw.com -- Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez &
Hearing, PA & Thomas M. Gonzalez -- tgonzalez@tsghlaw.com --
Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez & Hearing, PA.


BAYER & MERCK: Faces Coppertone Sport Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that a class claims in a federal
lawsuit that Bayer & Merck's Coppertone Sport High Performance
sunscreen spray does not have the advertised Sun Protection Factor
rating of 30+, as testing revealed an SPF rating of 30 or lower.

The case is KEVIN CURRAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC and MERCK &
CO., INC., Defendants, Case No. __ (N.D. Ill.).

A full-text copy of the Complaint is available at
https://is.gd/WQMaQ7

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

     Theodore B. Bell
     Carl V. Malmstrom
     WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLC
     70 W. Madison St., Suite 1400
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Telephone: 312-984-0000
     Fax: 312-214-3110
     Email: tbell@whafh.com
            malmstrom@whafh.com

        -- and --

     Janine Lee Pollack
     WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
     270 Madison Avenue
     New York, NY 10016
     Telephone: 212-545-4600
     Fax: 212-686-0114
     Email: pollack@whafh.com

        -- and --

     Stephen P. DeNittis
     Joseph A. Osefchen
     Shane T. Prince
     DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, PC
     5 Greentree Centre
     525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
     Marlton, NJ 08053
     Telephone: 856-797-9951
     Fax: 856-797-9978
     Email: sdenittis@denittislaw.com


BLACK LIVES: Court Rulings Toss Lawsuit, Allow CA Payments
----------------------------------------------------------
The Baltimore Sun reports that a federal judge has dismissed a
lawsuit that accused Black Lives Matter and several movement
leaders -- including Baltimore's DeRay Mckesson -- of inciting
violence that led to a gunman's deadly ambush of law enforcement
officers in Louisiana last year.

And in a separate matter, another judge ruled that Mckesson and
others may receive awards up to $1,000 in cash in a class-action
settlement claiming police violated protesters' civil rights in
arresting them after the deadly shootings.

In the first lawsuit, U.S. District Judge Brian Jackson's ruling
said lawyers for a Baton Rouge sheriff's deputy wounded in the
attack "utterly failed to state a plausible claim" and instead
launched a "confused attack" against Black Lives Matter and
others, including movement leader Mckesson, 32, a prominent
Baltimore-based activist.

Jackson previously ruled that Black Lives Matter is a social
movement and therefore can't be sued. In September, he threw out a
separate lawsuit in which a Baton Rouge police officer blamed
Black Lives Matter and Mckesson for injuries he sustained during a
protest over a black man's shooting death during a struggle with
police.

The officer's lawyers also attempted to add "#BlackLivesMatter" as
a defendant, but Jackson ruled a hashtag can't be sued either.

Donna Grodner, a Baton Rouge-based attorney who filed both suits,
filed a notice October 26 she is appealing the September ruling to
the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. She declined to comment on
the judge's latest ruling.

Black Lives Matter is a movement that can't be sued, judge rules
Gavin Long, a 29-year-old black former Marine from Kansas City,
Missouri, shot and killed three officers and wounded three others
outside a convenience store and car wash near Baton Rouge police
headquarters before he was shot dead. The attack on July 17, 2016,
occurred less than two weeks after a white Baton Rouge police
officer shot and killed 37-year-old Alton Sterling, a black man.

The suit doesn't name the wounded officer but its description of
the plaintiff matches East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Deputy
Nicholas Tullier.

Jackson said nothing in his ruling "impugns the character and
courage" of the wounded deputy. "That he suffered and continues to
suffer from the injuries he sustained in the line of duty is not
in question, nor should it be minimized," the judge added.

Activist DeRay Mckesson to leave Baltimore school system
In the class-action filing, U.S. District Judge John W.
deGravelles approved a settlement that awards up to $1,000 to
protesters who claim police used excessive force in arresting
them.

Mckesson is among 69 arrested protesters eligible for payments
ranging from $500 to $1,000.

The judge, who said the total value of the settlement is about
$136,000, ruled from the bench after a hearing Mckesson and
another plaintiff attended.

Mckesson said the settlement demonstrates courts can be effective
in holding officers and city governments "accountable" for police
misconduct.

"This can be a blueprint for activists and organizers and lawyers
across the county to think about what remedies look like at the
court level. And it's not just money," he said after the hearing.
[GN]


BRACCO'S CLAM: Faces "Ortega" Suit in E. Dist. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bracco's Clam &
Oyster Bar, Inc. doing business as: Bracco's Clam & Oyster Bar.
The case is styled as Jann Ortega, Widman Sanchez, Gerard Bracco
and Felipe Estevez, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Bracco's Clam & Oyster Bar, Inc.
doing business as: Bracco's Clam & Oyster Bar, Michael Bracco,
Jonathan Bracco and Robert Bracco, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
06189 (E.D. N.Y., October 24, 2017).

Bracco's Clam & Oyster Bar, Inc. operates a seafood
restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


BRISTOL-MYERS: New Jersey Awaits Full Impact of High Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
David E. Sellinger, Esq. -- sellingerd@gtlaw.com -- and Aaron Van
Nostrand, Esq. -- vannostranda@gtlaw.com -- of Greenberg Traurig,
in an article for Law.com, wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision last term in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior
Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (June 19, 2017), concerning
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants has generated
substantial buzz.  But a survey of recent cases in the federal and
state courts in New Jersey, both before and after the decision,
reveals that Bristol-Myers did not substantially change the
landscape for when out-of-state defendants -- and corporate
defendants in particular -- can be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction in New Jersey, except where the plaintiffs also are
non-residents.

There also does not appear to be a divergence between state and
federal courts in New Jersey on the standard for specific personal
jurisdiction, which is important for plaintiffs in deciding where
to file a complaint and for defendants in deciding whether or not
to remove a case to federal court.  Nevertheless, Bristol-Myers,
which specifically addressed claims brought by out-of-state
plaintiffs, does open the door to challenges to many nationwide
class actions filed against non-resident defendants, and that
potentially could have enormous consequences.

The Supreme Court's recent personal jurisdiction jurisprudence --
particularly relating to non-resident corporations -- began three
years ago in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014).  Citing
existing case law, the court clarified that a corporation has two
"paradigm" forums for the purposes of general jurisdiction: (1)
the state of incorporation; and (2) the principal place of
business.  Only in "an exceptional case" may "a corporation's
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation
or principal place of business" be "so substantial and of such a
nature as to render the corporation at home in that State." Id. at
761, n.19. Most courts examining general personal jurisdiction
since Daimler have observed that Daimler "circumscribed the view
of general jurisdiction." Dutch Run-Mays Draft v. Wolf Block, 450
N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. 2017). Thus, after Daimler, it is
difficult to obtain general jurisdiction over a defendant that is
not incorporated in or does not have its principal place of
business in the forum state.

Given the difficulties in obtaining general jurisdiction, specific
jurisdiction has often assumed utmost importance.  This past term,
the Supreme Court examined the standards for personal jurisdiction
in Bristol-Myers.  Bristol-Myers, a Delaware corporation
headquartered in New York, had significant contacts with the forum
state of California and was being sued for product liability
claims  in the very same lawsuit by 86 in-state California
plaintiffs as well as 592 out-of-state plaintiffs.  The Supreme
Court nevertheless confirmed that, consistent with Daimler,
notwithstanding the substantial presence, facilities, offices,
operations, employees and sales of the at-issue drug in
California, general jurisdiction was lacking.

The court then considered whether specific jurisdiction was
available over the non-residents' claims.  The Supreme Court
rejected specific jurisdiction with respect to the claims by all
out-of-state plaintiffs, holding that Bristol-Myers' substantial
presence and contacts with California were not relevant to the
specific jurisdiction analysis for out-of-state plaintiffs because
each plaintiff and "[each] plaintiff's suit . . . must aris[e] out
of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. at
1780.  The court further held that "a defendant's relationship
with a . . . third party," such as defendant's California
wholesaler/distributor of the product or the in-state plaintiffs,
"is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction." Id. at 1781.  The
court held that specific jurisdiction requires "[an] activity [by
defendant] or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State"
as to each plaintiff giving rise to the cause of action." Id. at
1780-81.

Some commentators have concluded that Bristol-Myers has
circumscribed the standard for specific jurisdiction, as Daimler
had for general jurisdiction.  A review of District of New Jersey
and New Jersey state cases before and after Bristol-Myers reveals
that, other than regarding the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs
unconnected to the defendant's in-state activities, the decision
has not resulted in a significant change in the standard, and that
these courts consistently have applied a similar standard when
assessing specific jurisdiction.

A pair of recent Appellate Division opinions illustrates the
point.  Two months before Bristol-Myers was decided, the Appellate
Division analyzed personal jurisdiction in Fairfax Financial
Holdings Limited v. S.A.C. Capital Management, 450 N.J. Super. 1
(App. Div. Apr. 27, 2017). (Greenberg Traurig -- the firm where
the authors of this article practice -- represented one of the
defendants in this matter.) The court in Fairfax, citing U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, found that the defendant must
deliberately direct its conduct at the plaintiff in the forum
state.  Id. at 74 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 12, 14-15
(2014)).  The court also recognized that specific jurisdiction
cannot be based on the connections of a third party, such as a co-
defendant, with the forum, but rather that minimum contacts "must
be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises
jurisdiction."  Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers
reaffirmed each of these principles.

Nine days after Bristol-Myers, the Appellate Division again
addressed specific jurisdiction in Dutch Run-Mays Draft v. Wolf
Block, 450 N.J. Super. 590 (App. Div. July 5, 2017).  The law firm
defendant in Dutch Run, like the corporate defendant in Bristol-
Myers, had significant contacts with New Jersey. Those contacts,
however, were not enough because "the negligence forming
plaintiff's cause of action did not arise from defendant's
contacts with New Jersey.  Plaintiff cannot show any relationship
between the underlying matter and the business or attorneys in New
Jersey." Id. at 604. Thus, as the Supreme Court found in Bristol-
Myers, the general contacts with the state were insufficient where
the conduct forming the basis of the cause of action did not occur
in New Jersey.  In other words, in both cases, the Appellate
Division utilized the same essential principles in determining
that specific jurisdiction was lacking. Bristol-Myers did not play
a significant part in the subsequent result in Dutch Run.

Similarly, two post-Bristol-Myers decisions from the District of
New Jersey relied not only on Bristol-Myers but also on pre-
existing principles in their analysis of specific jurisdiction.
In Christie v. National Institute for Newman Studies, F. Supp. 3d
(D.N.J. June 28, 2017), the court noted the three key principles
from Bristol-Myers: (i) specific jurisdiction depends on a
"'connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue,"
id. (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1781); (ii) "'[each]
plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff
would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct
in the forum, and point to specific activity indicating that the
defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum,'" id.
at *4 (quoting IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 266 (3d
Cir. 1998)); and (iii) "[the] contacts with the forum State must
be created by the 'defendant himself'" and not by a third party.
Id. at *4 (quoting Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122).  Thus, Christie
recognized that some of the key principles in
Bristol-Myers already were in place prior to that decision.

Similarly, in Weerahandi v. Shelesh (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017), the
court's recitation of the standard for specific jurisdiction
relied solely on pre-Bristol-Myers law.  It was not until the
court applied that standard that it relied on Bristol-Myers to
find that the defendant's substantial, but general, connection to
the state was not enough to satisfy specific jurisdiction:
"Plaintiff also argues Individual Defendants should be subject to
this Court's jurisdiction 'since they are profiting from
advertising revenue generated through . . . their videos which are
viewable worldwide including . . . in the State of New Jersey.'
The Supreme Court recently rejected this reasoning. 'For specific
jurisdiction, a defendant's general connections with the forum are
not enough.' 'What is needed . . . is a connection between the
forum and the specific claims at issue.'" Id. at *5 (quoting
Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1781).

Although some commentators have treated Bristol-Myers as a
watershed event, and some courts elsewhere have even stayed
proceedings late in litigation -- notably, even mid-trial in one
case -- to analyze the impact of Bristol-Myers, a survey of recent
decisions in state and federal courts in New Jersey reveals that
Bristol-Myers has thus far not significantly altered the standard
for specific jurisdiction.  Both before and after that decision,
federal and state courts in New Jersey have rejected arguments
that the defendant's generalized contacts with New Jersey, even if
substantial, are sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.
Rather, consistent with Bristol-Myers, those decisions held the
defendant must have deliberately directed its conduct at the
plaintiff in New Jersey, and that conduct must form a basis for
the claims in the case. In other words, arguments based on these
principles were just as available pre-Bristol-Myers as they are
now.

An additional conclusion revealed by this survey is that federal
and state courts in New Jersey are consistent with one another in
applying personal jurisdiction principles, although this is
perhaps not surprising given that New Jersey's long-arm statute
provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the due process
requirements of the U.S. Constitution.

The impact of Bristol-Myers on nationwide class actions against
non-resident defendants remains uncertain but potentially could be
dramatic. Bristol-Myers did not involve a class action, and the
majority decision did not directly address the impact on
nationwide class actions, but Justice Sotomayer in her dissent
stated that "[t]he Court today does not confront the question
whether its opinion here would also apply to a class action in
which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a
nationwide class of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured
there." 137 S.Ct. at 1789 n.4. Nevertheless, some defendants have
begun filing motions that nationwide class allegations should be
stricken, or the claims of non-resident putative class members
dismissed, based on the holding in Bristol-Myers, arguing that a
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims of non-resident
class members who have no connection to the forum.  The Bristol-
Myers opinion provides support for such a motion. Given the high-
stakes nature of nationwide class actions, we expect this issue
will be an important battleground, although the issue likely will
have to percolate in the lower courts before the U.S. Supreme
Court addresses it. This is the area in which Bristol-Myers'
impact could be a game-changer.

Mr. Sellinger is a shareholder, and Mr. Van Nostrand is of
counsel, at Greenberg Traurig in Florham Park.  Their practices
focus on complex litigation matters. [GN]


BUCHER AND CHRISTIAN: Judgment on Pleadings in "Brown" Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Raymond Brown, on behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Bucher and Christian
Consulting, Inc., d/b/a BCforward, Appellee-Defendant, Case No.
49A04-1611-PL-2564 (Ind. App.), Judge John G. Baker of the Court
of Appeals of Indiana affirmed the trial court's order granting
the Defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on
Brown's claims under the Wage Payment Statute.

On Dec. 9, 2013, BCforward hired Brown as a consultant pursuant to
an employment agreement.  During Brown's tenure with BCforward,
the company paid him an annual salary of approximately $36,000.
Brown was entitled to additional compensation as follows: he was
eligible to receive "Incentive Compensation" or sales commission,
each of which was calculated and paid monthly, and each of which
were paid forty-five days after the calendar month in which they
were earned.  For the first six months of his employment, he was
guaranteed a minimum monthly Incentive Compensation payment of
$500.

On March 1, 2016, Brown quit his employment with BCforward.  On
March 28, 2016, Brown filed a class action complaint against
BCforward under the Wage Payment Statute, arguing that BCforward
failed to pay its employees their salary-based wages within the
timeframe mandated by Indiana's Ten-Day Rule.  Individually, Brown
also filed claims that BCforward failed to pay him all commissions
earned following his voluntary termination of employment and
thereby (i) violated the Wage Payment Statute and (ii) breached
its contract with him.  On May 24, 2016, BCforward filed a motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings.

On Aug. 22, 2016, the trial court granted BCforward's motion and
dismissed Brown's class action claims under the Wage Payment
Statute.  Brown's individual claim for breach of contract is still
pending before the trial court.

Brown now appeals.  He argues that the trial court erroneously
ruled as follows: (i) under the Wage Payment Statute, an employee
is only entitled to damages and attorney fees for unpaid wages,
and Brown's wages are not unpaid; and (ii) Brown's commission
payments do not qualify as wages under the Wage Payment Statute.

We find that the trial court did not err by finding that the
Incentive Compensation and commission payments made by BCforward
to Brown were not wages pursuant to the Wage Payment Statute. In
sum, the trial court did not err by granting BCforward's motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judge Baker disagrees with Brown's argument that applying the
current version of the statute retroactively is prohibited because
it violates a vested right or constitutional guarantee.  The Judge
says the liquidated damages provision, as well as the attendant
court costs and attorney fees, is punitive in nature, and there is
no vested right to prejudgment punitive damages.  Consequently,
there is no bar to the retroactive application of the Wage Payment
Statute, and the trial court did not err in this regard.

As liquidated damages are "in addition" to the employee's recovery
of unpaid wages, attorney fees, and court costs, the plain
statutory language signifies that if one is not entitled to the
latter, one may not seek the former.  As a result, the Judge finds
no error in the trial court's conclusion that because Brown has no
unpaid wages, as a matter of law his claim for costs, fees, and
liquidated damages under the Wage Payment Statute must fail.
Judge Baker also finds that the trial court did not err by finding
that the Incentive Compensation and commission payments made by
BCforward to Brown were not wages pursuant to the Wage Payment
Statute.

In sum, the trial court did not err by granting BCforward's motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings.  Accordingly, Judge Baker
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/N5pekn from Leagle.com.

Ronald E. Weldy -- rweldy@bhclegal.com -- Barker Hancock & Cohron,
Noblesville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Michael A. Blickman -- michael.blickman@icemiller.com -- Paul C.
Sweeney -- paul.sweeney@icemiller.com -- Derek R. Molter --
derek.molter@icemiller.com -- Justin P. Spack --
justin.spack@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis,
Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.


BURLINGTON, VT: Judge Rules City Can Take Down Homeless Camp
------------------------------------------------------------
The Republic reports that a federal judge has ruled that Vermont's
largest city can dismantle a homeless encampment in the woods
where three men have been staying while their case proceeds
through court.

The American Civil Liberties Union had filed a class action
lawsuit on behalf of the men and Burlington's homeless population
saying the city is violating their rights by threatening to close
down the encampment without finding alternative housing.

The lawsuit came after the city removed a homeless encampment in
another area of the city.

City officials counter the encampment is in an environmentally
sensitive area.

U.S. District Court Judge Geoffrey Crawford said October 27 that
the men have other options.

He wrote that it's clear the plaintiffs are "not being threatened
with prosecution for being homeless" but "they are threatened with
the consequences of remaining in a single location when there are
options open to them," ranging from seeking housing through social
agencies to moving to another location on city property.

The case is not over. The decision means the city can remove the
camp while the case proceeds. The city must respond to the ACLU
complaint. [GN]


CAREFIRST: Wants Supreme Court to Toss Data Breach Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that with the federal
circuits following divergent paths in class actions stemming from
the online theft of personal data, a new petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court argues that the justices must help lower courts
figure out whether data breach victims have a constitutional right
to sue.

The health insurer CareFirst is asking the Supreme Court to
reverse a decision by the District of Columbia U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals that allows a data breach class action against the
company to move forward.  CareFirst contends that its case
provides an ideal vehicle for the justices to make sense of a hash
of appellate decisions addressing the threshold question of
whether data breach victims meet Article III's requirement of a
concrete or imminent injury.

That guidance, CareFirst said, is increasingly necessary as the
incidence of data theft -- and ensuing class action litigation --
continues to rise.  "Lower courts have struggled to consistently
apply Article III standing principles to future injuries allegedly
caused by data theft, including the increased risk of future
identity theft," wrote CareFirst's lawyers at Eversheds
Sutherland.  "Without guidance, courts, litigants, cybersecurity
insurers and corporate America will remain uncertain as to when a
federal court can hear such claims."

Lower courts are so inconsistent, CareFirst said, that judges in
different federal circuits have reached opposite conclusions in
nearly identical data breach class actions against the insurer.
District Court judges in Baltimore and Peoria found purported
victims of the breach hadn't established a real or impending
injury from the theft of their birthdates and insurance ID
numbers.  But the D.C. Circuit, in the case CareFirst is asking
the Supreme Court to review, said the insurer's customers did have
standing to sue "simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of
the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken."

The D.C. Circuit's ruling, CareFirst said, is at odds with
decisions from the 3rd, 4th and 8th Circuits, which have held the
mere theft of personal information does not establish a right to
sue.  The 4th Circuit's February 2017 ruling in Beck v. McDonald
explicitly held that under the U.S. Supreme Court's 2013 precedent
in Clapper v. Amnesty International, the risk of identity theft
after a data breach is too speculative to give plaintiffs a
constitutional right to sue.  The 8th Circuit said pretty much the
same thing in In re: Supervalu, although the appeals court went on
to find plaintiffs established standing by alleging actual misuse
of stolen credit card data.

The 6th and 7th Circuits, meanwhile, have agreed with the D.C.
Circuit that because hackers steal data in order to commit
identity fraud, data breach victims are at imminent risk and
therefore have standing to sue.  The 7th Circuit was the first to
reach that conclusion, in 2015's Remijas v. Neiman Marcus. The 6th
Circuit followed suit in 2016's Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual.

The circuit court confusion seems undeniable to me, but Jonathan
Nace of Nidel & Nace, who represents plaintiffs suing CareFirst,
said he and his co-counsel will emphasize that every case has
presented different facts to the appellate courts that have ruled
on standing for data breach victims.  "Clearly there are a lot of
circuit opinions but I can't tell you there's a clear factual
pattern," he said.  Mr. Nace also said his side will argue the
Supreme Court should take a pass on the CareFirst case because the
D.C. Circuit was right to find standing.  "Standing is supposed to
be an easy threshold to cross," Mr. Nace said.

Mandatory arbitration clauses, meanwhile, are likely to make
consumer class actions increasingly rare.  But at the moment,
class actions are just about the only way consumers can demand
compensation for the time and expense they lose because of data
breaches.  Personal information belonging to tens of millions of
American consumers has been exposed to hackers.  The Supreme Court
owes it to them -- and the businesses they're suing -- to clarify
standing in data breach class actions.[GN]


CHRYSLER: Judge Seals Motion to Certify UConnect Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Madison County Record reports that without explanation, on a
motion from former U.S. attorney Stephen Wigginton, U.S. District
Judge Michael Reagan sealed a motion to certify a class action
against Chrysler.

Judge Reagan sealed the class certification motion and 36 exhibits
with it on Oct. 19, by docket entry rather than written decision.

He rejected Chrysler's plea to post it for the public with
redactions.

Mr. Wigginton represents Brian Flynn, a Belleville lawyer who
claims remote hackers can seize control of his Jeep.

Flynn blames an optional communication device, UConnect, for the
vulnerability.

He sued Chrysler in 2015, along with UConnect maker Harman
International.

The suit alleges negligence, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
and warranty violations under state and federal law.

Mr. Flynn seeks to recover for risk of harm or fear of risk.

He claims he paid too much for the Jeep and would sell it for too
little. He proposes a national recall, arguing that Chrysler
performed an inadequate one.

His suit followed publication of an article in Wired magazine,
describing successful hacking through UConnect on a closed course.

Last year, Judge Reagan dismissed the negligence claim with
prejudice and denied the recall petition with prejudice.

He dismissed the claim of misrepresentation without prejudice, and
dismissed the claim of risk and fear without prejudice.

He also dismissed warranty claims against Harman International
without prejudice.

The claim of unjust enrichment remains pending against Chrysler
and Harman, and warranty claims remain pending against Chrysler.

Mr. Wigginton amended the complaint, but Chrysler and Harman
answered that he merely revived claims that Reagan dismissed.

On Oct. 13, Mr. Wigginton moved to file under seal a memorandum
for a class certification motion with all exhibits.

Mr. Wigginton wrote that he acted out of an abundance of caution,
as defendants had designated the vast majority of documents as
confidential.

Chrysler counsel Kathy Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- of Thompson Coburn in St. Louis,
opposed the motion on Oct. 16.

"Plaintiffs once again have displayed either no ability, or simply
no desire, to discern what information in their filings is
confidential and what is not," Ms. Wisniewski wrote.

She wrote that if plaintiffs had a genuine question as to whether
portions of the memorandum could be deemed confidential, they
could have picked up a phone.  Because they elected not to do so,
she wrote, it would be difficult if not impossible to discern what
plaintiffs culled from confidential documents.

"[O]f course only plaintiffs can attest where they uncovered the
information on which they rely," she wrote.

She wrote that the motion to seal should be granted to the extent
the memorandum and exhibits reflect confidential information.

She wrote that Chrysler would not embrace a broad brush approach
to sealing when it opposes class certification.

Three days later Reagan posted on the docket that, "Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to seal motion for class certification and
memorandum in support is granted."

"Plaintiffs are granted leave to file unredacted versions of their
motion to certify class and memorandum in support thereof," he
wrote.

Judge Reagan has set trial in May. [GN]


CLUB IDL: Faces "Brown" Suit in Northern District Ohio
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Club IDL USA.  The
case is styled as Virgil E. Brown Insurance on behalf of itself
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Club
IDL USA, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02257-DCN (N.D. Ohio, October
25, 2017).

Club IDL USA is a driver's license office specializing in
international drivers license.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Brian D. Flick, Esq.
   Dann Law Firm - Cleveland
   P.O. Box 6031040
   Cleveland, OH 44103
   Tel: (513) 645-3488
   Fax: (216) 363-0536
   Email: bflick@dannlaw.com


CNOVA NV: March 15 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued pursuant to Court Order
regarding the In re Cnova N.V. Securities Litigation Settlement.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE CNOVA N.V. SECURITIES LITIGATION
This Document Relates To: All Actions
MASTER FILE 16 CV 444-LTS

To: All persons and entities that purchased Cnova N.V. ordinary
shares from November 19, 2014 through February 23, 2016, both
dates inclusive.

This Summary Notice is given pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Court"),
dated October 11, 2017.  The purpose of this Summary Publication
Notice is to inform you of the proposed settlement of the above-
entitled class action ("Action") against defendants Cnova N.V.
("Cnova"), Vitor Faga de Almeida, German Quiroga, Emmanuel
Grenier, Jean-Charles Naouri, Libano Miranda Barroso, Eleazar de
Carvalho Filho, Didier Leveque, Ronaldo Iabrudi dos Santos
Pereira, Arnaud Strasser, Fernando Tracanella, Nicolas Woussen,
Yves Desjacques, and Bernard Oppetit, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Deutsche Bank
Securities Inc., BNP Paribas Securities Corp., HSBS Securities
(USA) Inc., Natixis Securities Americas LLC, and SG Americas
Securities, LLC (collectively, the "Defendants").

A settlement hearing will be held before the Honorable Laura
Taylor Swain, United States District Judge, at the Daniel Patrick
Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY
10007, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. on March 15, 2018 in order: (1) to
determine whether the Court should grant certification to the
Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; (2) to determine whether the proposed Settlement
consisting of $28,500,000 in cash should be approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the Class and the proposed Final
Judgment entered; (3) to determine whether the proposed Plan of
Allocation for the proceeds of the Settlement is fair and
reasonable, and should be approved by the Court; (4) to determine
whether the applications by Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel for an award
of attorneys' fees equal to up to one-third of the Settlement Fund
and reimbursement of their litigation expenses should be approved;
and (5) to rule upon such other matters as the Court may deem
appropriate.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Cnova ordinary shares
between November 19, 2014 and February 23, 2016 (both dates
inclusive), and are not otherwise excluded from the Class, you are
a Class Member.  Class Members will be bound by the Final Judgment
of the Court.  If you are a Class Member, in order to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof
of Claim postmarked no later than March 12, 2018, establishing
that you are entitled to recovery.  A Proof of Claim is being sent
with this Notice. If you are a Class Member and need an additional
Proof of Claim, copies may be obtained by telephoning the Claims
Administrator at 1-866-613-0970 or by downloading the form on the
internet at www.choosegcg.com/cases-info/CNV.

If you do not wish to be included in the Class, you do not wish to
participate in the Settlement and you do not wish to receive a
distribution from the Net Settlement Fund, you may request to be
excluded, in the manner set forth in the full Notice of Pendency
of Class Action and Proposed Settlement ("Notice"), no later than
January 24, 2018.  If you are a Class Member and do not timely and
validly request exclusion from the Class, and you wish to object
to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and/or Plaintiffs' Lead
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and/or
reimbursement of expenses, you may submit a written objection.
You also may, but are not required to, appear at the Final
Approval Hearing.  You must file and serve your written objection,
in the manner specifically set forth in the Notice, no later than
January 24, 2018.

This Summary Notice is only a summary of information regarding the
Action, and the Settlement.  You are urged to obtain a copy of the
full, detailed Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed
Settlement, which includes, among other things, a description of:
(1) the litigation in the Action prior to the Settlement; (2) the
terms of the proposed Settlement; (3) the benefits of the
Settlement to the Class; (4) the Plan of Allocation for the
proceeds of the Settlement; (5) the rights of Class Members; (6)
the release of claims against Defendants; (7) the application for
an award of attorneys' fees and expenses; and (8) additional
details concerning the Final Approval Hearing, excluding oneself
from the Class and/or objecting to the Settlement, the Plan of
Allocation, and/or the application for attorneys' fees and/or
reimbursement of expenses, including the procedures that MUST be
followed for Class Members to request exclusion from the Class or
to object to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation and/or
application for attorneys' fees and/or reimbursement of expenses.

A copy of the full Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed
Settlement may be accessed at: www.choosegcg.com/cases-info/CNV,
and for additional information, you may contact Garden City Group,
LLC, the Claims Administrator, at the following address:

          Cnova Securities Class Action
          Claims Administrator
          c/o GCG
          PO Box 10493
          Dublin, OH 43017-4093

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

Dated: October 31, 2017

Honorable Laura Taylor Swain
United States District Judge
[GN]


COMMUNITY HEALTH: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Morrow"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONALD MORROW, Plaintiff. v. COMMUNITY HEALTH
SYSTEMS, INC., et al. Defendants, Case No. 3-16-cv-1953 (M.D.
Tenn.), Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, granted in part
and denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and denied
as moot the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The First Amended Complaint in the purported class action alleges
that CHS and its direct and indirect subsidiaries have a policy
and practice of breaching their provider contracts with health
insurers, causing monetary damages to third-party beneficiaries of
those contracts, including the Plaintiff and other potential class
members.  The Plaintiff contends that CHS and its affiliates are
required by their provider contracts to submit the bills of
insured patients to their respective health insurance carriers and
to accept the insurer's contractually agreed-upon discounted
payment as full payment for those bills, minus any co-pays or
deductibles owed by the patients.

The Plaintiff asserts that he received emergency medical care at
South Baldwin Regional Medical Center, an Alabama hospital owned
and operated by CHS, after a motor vehicle accident in May of
2015.  His health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama
("BCBS") paid the hospital for services rendered to him, at the
discounted rate mandated by the provider contract between South
Baldwin and BCBS.  Upon realizing that his injuries were the
result of a motor vehicle accident, South Baldwin (per CHS's
policy) refunded BCBS's discounted payment and billed him for the
full, undiscounted amount.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants began contacting the
Plaintiff's attorney, attempting to collect the full, undiscounted
balance of the hospital bill from any settlement he made with the
other driver's liability insurance carrier.  The Plaintiff asserts
that, because South Baldwin breached its contractual obligation to
accept BCBS' discounted payment (plus the Plaintiff's co-pay) as
full payment for its hospital charges, he has been unable to
settle with the other driver and has suffered monetary losses.

The Plaintiff has asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, intentional interference with contractual relations,
and civil conspiracy.  The Defendant CHS has moved to dismiss the
First Amended Complaint.

Judge Trauger finds that even if CHS were directly liable under
the Participating Hospital Contract, the Plaintiff still has no
standing to allege breach, because he is neither a party to, nor a
third-party beneficiary of, that Contract.  Therefore, he has
failed to state a claim for breach of contract against CHS, and
that claim will be dismissed.

Judge Trauger finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged,
under Alabama and Tennessee law, an unjust enrichment claim, and
that claim will not be dismissed.  The Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that a benefit was conferred upon CHS from the Plaintiff's
and others' tort recoveries and/or health insurance carriers, and
that the Defendant knowingly received and appreciated that
benefit, and that it would be inequitable for CHS to retain the
wrongfully-obtained money.

Because the Judge finds that the Plaintiff is neither a party to,
nor a third-party beneficiary of, the Contract, the Plaintiff has
no standing to bring his claim of tortious interference with a
contractual relationship.  It presupposes the existence of an
enforceable contract.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's tortious
interference with contractual relationship claim will be
dismissed.  Because he has found that the Defendants did not
tortiously interfere with those contractual relations, the Judge
will dismiss the Plaintiff's conspiracy claim.

Finally, CHS bases its argument to compel arbitration on a
provision of the Contract.  Because neither the Plaintiff nor CHS
is a party to that contract, and because the only remaining claim
depends upon there being no contract, the Judge says CHS' Motion
to Compel Arbitration is moot.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Trauger granted in part and
denied in part CHS' Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff's claims for
breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual
relations, and civil conspiracy are dismissed.  The Judge denied
as moot CHS' Motion to Compel Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/K3hrpp from Leagle.com.

Donald Morrow, Plaintiff, represented by Charles F. Barrett --
cbarrett@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC.

Donald Morrow, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey A. Zager --
jzager@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC, Kenneth A. Metzger
-- Kenny@taylormartino.com -- Taylor-Martino, P.C., Philip N.
Elbert -- pelbert@nealharwell.com -- Neal & Harwell, PLC, Richard
H. Taylor -- richardtaylor@taylormartino.com -- Taylor-Martino,
P.C., Steven A. Martino -- SteveMartino@TaylorMartino.com --
Taylor-Martino, P.C. & W. Lloyd Copeland --
Lloyd@TaylorMartino.com -- Taylor-Martino, P.C..

Community Health Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by John R.
Jacobson -- JJacobson@rwjplc.com -- Riley, Warnock & Jacobson &
William M. Outhier -- WOuthier@rwjplc.com -- Riley, Warnock &
Jacobson.


CORELOGIC SAFERENT: Court Denies Summary Judgment in FCRA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned ABDULLAH JAMES GEORGE
WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CORELOGIC SAFERENT, LCC, Defendant, No. 14-
CV-2477 (JPO) (S.D. Cal.) and Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

Abdullah James George Wilson filed the action under federal and
state fair credit reporting laws against Corelogic SafeRent, LLC
(SafeRent), a company that provides background reports to
landlords. Wilson's application to lease an apartment was rejected
on the basis of a SafeRent report indicating that he had been
convicted of robbery in 1995. That conviction, however, had been
vacated in 2009 on habeas review.

When SafeRent's procedures are properly considered in context of
all the evidence presented at this stage, the Court concludes that
there is a genuine factual dispute as to their reasonableness.
The parties agree that SafeRent wholly failed to consult the "the
actual and original sources" -- the county court records before
reporting the inaccurate criminal background information about
Wilson.

Moreover, Wilson has submitted additional evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that SafeRent's procedures were
negligent.  For example, in her declaration, NYDOC Associate
Commissioner of Population Management Anne Marie McGrath explained
that NYDOC maintains, reports, and provides incarceration and
parole data relating to an individual's confinement to New York
State Prison, but that it does not maintain complete data
regarding the conviction beyond its nature and class, such as the
date of conviction, date of offense, date of sentence, criminal
case number, or prior criminal history.  SafeRent concedes that
the NYDOC's database is updated irregularly and that it could
return a record that had not been updated in six months.

Finally, and perhaps most important, SafeRent's argument for the
inherent reasonableness of reliance on NYDOC data, upon which its
entire position depends, rests on a faulty premise. SafeRent
asserts that former inmates like Plaintiff, by definition, have a
criminal history. This argument, however, obscures an intrinsic
ambiguity in the word conviction. There is a difference between
conviction as historical fact, whether we continue to endow that
historical fact with legal significance.

Wilson's circumstances are instructive on this point. His
historical conviction was obtained in contravention of our
constitutional criminal law and is now considered a legal nullity.
In short, incarceration is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish that an individual has a criminal record.
It is important to note that Section 1681e(b) erects a standard of
"maximum possible accuracy."  That requires more than merely
allowing for the possibility of accuracy. Here, a factfinder
should decide whether SafeRent failed to employ reasonable
procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy when it reported
inaccurate criminal history information about Wilson without
consulting any court records.

SafeRent's motion for partial summary judgment is therefore
denied.

The Court finds that Wilson has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the proposed class would meet
the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). To meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(1), the class must be so large that
joinder of all members would be impracticable.

If Wilson were able to identify numerous individuals for whom
SafeRent inaccurately reported criminal background information in
reliance on NYDOC data, he may have succeeded in meeting Rule
23(a)(1)'s requirement. Instead, he has provided no evidence to
rebut SafeRent's representation that it is presently unaware of
any record currently in the Multistate Database and available for
return that has been previously vacated, expunged, sealed, or
dismissed, nor any reported records that were previously vacated,
sealed, expunged or dismissed prior to their reporting. Indeed,
Wilson took no discovery of NYDOC's database nor of any data from
any other jurisdiction.  Because Plaintiff has offered no evidence
of the number of persons affected by records" that were inaccurate
due to reliance on NYDOC data, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his
burden to prove numerosity.

Accordingly, the motion for class certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycfpukclfrom
Leagle.com.

Abdullah James George Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by David A.
Searles -- dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman,
P.C., pro hac vice.

Abdullah James George Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by James A.
Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman,
P.C., pro hac vice, John Soumilas -- jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com
-- FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C., Lauren Kw Brennan --
lbrennan@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman, P.C., pro hac
vice, Mark D. Mailman -- mmailman@consumerlawfirm.com -- FRANCIS &
MAILMAN, PC, Monica Welby, Legal Action Center & Sally B.
Friedman, Legal Action Center of the City of New York.

Corelogic Saferent, LLC, Defendant, represented by Christina
Heather Bost Seaton -- christina.bostseaton@fisherbroyles.com -
FisherBroyles, LLP, Alan Durrum Wingfield --
alan.wingfield@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, David Neal
Anthony -- david.anthony@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro
hac vice, Kevin Patrick Wallace -- kevin.wallace@troutman.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP & Timothy James St. George --
tim.st.george@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice.


CROWDERGULF LLC: Faes "Palmisano" Suit in District of New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Crowdergulf, LLC.
The case is styled as Joseph Palmisano, Jay Hajeski, Sean Wall and
Walter Everett, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Crowdergulf, LLC, Bil-Jim Construction
Co., Inc., Maple Lake, Inc., R. Kremer and Son Marine Contractors,
LLC, John C Ramsay, Lyman W Ramsay Jr., James R Johnson Jr., David
L Johnson, Carolyn J Hordichuk, ABC Corporations (1-100), DEF
Corporations (1-500) and John Does (1-10), Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-09371 (D.N.J., October 25, 2017).

Crowdergulf, LLC provides disaster recovery, debris removal and
coastal restoration services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


DETROIT, MI: State High Court Asked to Review Foreclosures
----------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Detroit homeowners asked the Michigan Supreme Court to grant their
appeal of rulings that a tax tribunal rather than trial court
should hear claims of discriminatory and inflated property taxes
they say caused tens of thousands of people to lose their homes.

In July 2016, seven black Detroit homeowners and a coalition of
neighborhood associations brought a class-action lawsuit against
the city and Wayne County, claiming evictions arising from unpaid
property taxes overwhelmingly affect African-Americans, in
violation of the Fair Housing Act, or FHA.

Wayne County foreclosed homes for unpaid taxes even though Detroit
had failed to comply with a duty to assess property taxes every
year during Great Recession and in the years after, according to
the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, which is
representing the homeowners.

According to the Tax Foundation, the median annual property tax
for Wayne County from 2007 to 2009 was $2,304.

The tax foreclosure crisis was the worst in the state since the
Great Depression, the ACLU says. It claims the city overvalued
properties and failed to accurately assess property taxes based on
the fair market value of the homes. Homeowners should never have
paid the taxes in the first place, the group contends.

Wayne County Circuit Court Chief Judge Robert Colombo ruled that
the case belonged in the Michigan Tax Tribunal, rather than in his
court, despite finding that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for
race discrimination under fair-housing laws.

The homeowners challenged Colombo's ruling in the Michigan Court
of Appeals, but that court affirmed the judge's decision in
September in an unpublished, per curiam decision.

On November 1, the ACLU and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund announced they asked the Michigan Supreme Court to hear their
appeal.

ACLU of Michigan Legal Director Michael Steinberg said Detroit's
tax foreclosure process is a "government-created catastrophe that
is destroying neighborhoods and undermining the city's economic
recovery."

"Nobody should lose their home for inability to pay taxes they
never should have had to pay in the first place," Steinberg said
in a statement.

Wayne County spokesman Bruce Babiarz declined to comment on the
ACLU's application for leave to appeal, as did Charles Raimi,
deputy corporation counsel of the Detroit Law Department.

In court papers, ACLU staff attorney Daniel Korobkin argued that
the trial court misinterpreted the FHA, which gives plaintiffs a
right to litigate civil claims in court rather than before an
administrative body. He said the court improperly ruled that under
Michigan law, the homeowners must present their FHA claim before a
tax tribunal.

Korobkin said that the issues in the case fall outside the
tribunal's "narrow expertise" and that an administrative agency
cannot decide them.

"Michigan courts have broad powers, including the power to hear
federal fair housing claims, and cannot shut the courthouse door
to plaintiffs' claim under the FHA simply because it relates to an
issue of taxation," according to the application for leave to
appeal.

The homeowners are asking the Michigan Supreme Court to hear their
case as soon as possible. The ACLU says that homeowners are facing
another round of foreclosures in February 2018.

In recent foreclosure auctions, Wayne Count sold thousands of
homes owned by people who were unable to pay their property tax
bills. Two of the named plaintiffs are facing eviction next year,
according to the ACLU.

Still pending in circuit court is the homeowners' claim that
Detroit has made it unduly burdensome for homeowners to get a
poverty exemption for the property taxes.

City officials denied homeowner Walter Hicks' exemption based on
the assumption that a property owner with the same name owned
another piece of property. Even after he proved that he did not
hold the asset, the city refused to exempt him, according to the
ACLU.

In addition to the ACLU and NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, the law firm of Covington & Burling also represents the
plaintiffs.

In their filings, the homeowners said that over the last decade
more than 130,000 parcels in Detroit had been forced into
foreclosure and that Wayne County had auctioned 78,000 parcels in
tax foreclosure actions.

The ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund did not
immediately respond to requests for comment on November 2.


DIMENSIONS HEALTH: Defends Class Action Over OB-GYN Fake Identity
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ayla Ellison, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that
Dimensions Health, a Maryland system serving residents of Prince
George's County, argued in a motion to dismiss filed on Oct. 27
that it should not face a putative class-action lawsuit alleging a
former OB-GYN used a fake identity while providing care to at
least 1,000 women at Dimensions' facilities.

Two former patients, Monique Russell and Jasmine Riggins, brought
the lawsuit against Dimensions in Maryland federal court.  They
allege a physician used a false identity while providing prenatal
care to Ms. Russell and delivering Ms. Riggins' baby.  The two
women brought their claim as a class action, as they assert there
are at least 1,000 women who saw Oluwafemi Charles Igberase, MD,
while he was using the fake name Charles J. Akoda, MD.

Ms. Riggins and Ms. Russell's complaint does not challenge
Dr. Igberase's competence to practice as an OB-GYN.  They claim
they suffered significant harm due to the fact that the physician
did not use his real name.  They further allege Dimensions was
negligent in either hiring the physician or granting him
privileges that allowed him to practice at its facilities.

In its motion to dismiss, Dimensions claims the lawsuit should be
tossed because plaintiffs failed to meet the arbitration
requirements specified in the Maryland Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act and because the health system owed the plaintiffs no
legal duty to ensure Dr. Akoda was not using an assumed name or
that his Social Security number belonged to him.  Dimensions also
argues the plaintiffs failed to show that a reasonable
investigation by the health system would have turned up
information that would have prevented the physician from being
hired.

Dimensions argues the emotional injuries the plaintiffs allegedly
suffered were not caused by learning their OB-GYN used a fake name
and that the physician's actions did not put patient safety at
risk.

"Whether Dr. Akoda practiced under his 'real' name of Igberase or
whether he used a Social Security number that did or did not
belong to him has nothing at all to do with patient safety,"
states Dimensions' motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs claim the physician invaded their privacy in
several ways, including by performing medical procedures on them.
However, Dimensions quoted Sir William Shakespeare to argue that
regardless of the physician's name, he was licensed to practice
medicine.

The fact that the physician used a false name and Social Security
number does not "transform routine prenatal, labor and delivery
care into an invasion of the patient's privacy," states
Dimensions' motion to dismiss.  "As Shakespeare wrote over 400
years ago, 'What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any
other word would smell as sweet.' Whether the patients knew him as
'Akoda' or 'Igberase,' both names denote the exact same person,
and that person was a licensed physician, who was experienced and
competent in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology." [GN]


DIMENSION THERAPEUTICS: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. on Oct. 31 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts on behalf of holders of Dimension
Therapeutics, Inc. ("Dimension") (Nasdaq:DMTX) common stock in
connection with the proposed acquisition of Dimension by
Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. and its affiliate ("Ultragenyx")
announced on October 3, 2017 (the "Complaint").  The Complaint,
which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
against Dimension, its Board of Directors (the "Board"), and
Ultragenyx, is captioned Scarantino v. Dimension Therapeutics,
Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-11964 (D. Mass.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120, Wilmington,
DE 19803, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-
legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On October 2, 2017, Dimension entered into an agreement and plan
of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Ultragenyx.  Pursuant to
the Merger Agreement, shareholders of Dimension will receive $6.00
in cash for each share of Dimension common stock they own (the
"Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a
Solicitation Statement (the "Solicitation Statement") filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
Complaint alleges that the Solicitation Statement omits material
information necessary to enable shareholders to make an informed
decision as to how to tender their shares in the tender offer,
including material information with respect to Dimension's
financial projections and potential conflicts of interest.  The
Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on
behalf of holders of Dimension common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than January 2, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may move the Court
to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

With offices in Wilmington, Delaware and Garden City, New York,
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. -- http://www.rigrodskylong.com--
regularly prosecutes securities fraud, shareholder corporate, and
shareholder derivative litigation on behalf of shareholders in
state and federal courts throughout the United States. [GN]


DUNHAMS ATHLEISURE: Hamza's Bid to Dismiss 3rd Party Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ABDUL HAMZA, Plaintiff, v. DUNHAMS
ATHLEISURE CORPORATION, Defendant/Third-party Plaintiff, v. AISHA
HAMZA, Third-party Defendant, Case No. 16-11641 (E.D. Mich.),
Judge Denise Page Hood of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied Third-party
Defendant Aisha Hamza's Motion to Dismiss the Amended TPC.

On Feb. 23, 2016, Third-party Defendant Aisha Hamza completed an
internet form to enter a Detroit Red Wings sweepstakes program, a
program that was sponsored by Dunham's.  Opting-in to receive text
messages from Dunham's required the entrant to affirmatively check
the box, as the default setting was an unchecked box. When
completing the Form, Aisha Hamza opted-in to receive messages from
the Defendant.  After the sweepstakes closed, the Detroit Red
Wings sent a file to Dunham's that included the telephone numbers
that had opted-in, including the Number.  The Plaintiff began
receiving text messages from Dunham's on the Number on Feb. 29,
2016.

On May 6, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint
against Dunham's, alleging that Dunham's violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") by sending, without his prior
express written consent, text message promotions to the Number,
which he owned and which he did not know how Dunham's had obtained
it, and that the text messages he received were from an automatic
telephone dialing system ("ATDS").  The Plaintiff later amended
his Class Action Complaint.  On March 22, 2017, the Court granted
in part and denied in part Dunham's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint.

Dunham's filed a third-party complaint ("TPC") against Third-party
Defendant Aisha Hamza on June 2, 2017, which Dunham's amended on
June 23, 2017 ("Amended TPC").  In the Amended TPC, Dunham's
alleges that Aisha Hamza fraudulently misrepresented that the
Number was hers, as she did not have authority to provide the
Number on the Form or check the box on the Form that represented
that the Number was hers.  The Dunham's further alleges that Aisha
Hamza, by providing the Number and indicating that it was hers,
intended to have Dunham's sent text message promotions to the
Number.  Dunham's alleges that, had Aisha Hamza not provided the
Number on the Form and represented that it was hers, Dunham's
would not have sent any text messages to the Number.  Aisha Hamza
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended TPC on July 7, 2017
("Motion").

Judge Hood is not persuaded by Aisha Hamza's arguments, which
largely rely on the contention that she did not provide consent to
receive ATDS messages when completing the Form.  Aisha Hamza's
arguments also fail to take into account that Dunham's has filed a
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, not a TCPA claim.

The Judge also finds that Dunham's has sufficiently pled each of
the six elements in a manner that plausibly shows that it would be
entitled to relief on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against
Aisha Hamza.  With respect to the first element, Dunham's alleges
Aisha Hamza made a material representation when she submitted the
Form and indicated that her phone number was the Number.  With
respect to the second element, Dunham's alleges that Aisha Hamza's
material representation that the Number was hers was false.  With
respect to the third element, Dunham's alleges that Aisha Hamza
knew the material representation was false when she made it.  With
respect to the fourth element, Dunham's alleges that Aisha Hamza
made the material misrepresentation with the intention that it
should be acted upon by Dunham's.  With respect to the fifth
element, Dunham's alleges that it acted in reliance on the
material misrepresentation.  Finally, with respect to the sixth
element, Dunham's alleges that it suffered damage or injury as a
result of the material misrepresentation.  Having found that
Dunham's Amended TPC adequately alleges a plausible claim for
fraudulent misrepresentation, Judge Hood denied the Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NoInaT from Leagle.com.

Abdul Hamza, Plaintiff, represented by Jenny Diane DeFrancisco,
Lemberg Law, LLC.

Abdul Hamza, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen F. Taylor, Lemberg
Law, LLC & Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg Law, LLC.

Dunhams Athleisure Corporation, Defendant, represented by Matthew
M. Dybas -- mdybas@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, Robert M.
Horwitz -- rhorwitz@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC & Thomas M.
Schehr -- tschehr@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett.

Dunhams Athleisure Corporation, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented
by Matthew M. Dybas, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Robert M. Horwitz,
Dykema Gossett PLLC & Thomas M. Schehr, Dykema Gossett.

Aisha Hamza, ThirdParty Defendant, represented by Jenny Diane
DeFrancisco, Lemberg Law, LLC, Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg Law, LLC &
Stephen F. Taylor, Lemberg Law, LLC.


ECOLAB INC: "Bankwitz" Stayed Pending Ruling in "Morris"
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT BANKWITZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ECOLAB, INC.,
A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-02924-EMC (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California conditionally denied the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, and granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's motion to stay.

The Plaintiffs are employees of Ecolab who claim they were
misclassified as exempt employees and therefore wrongfully denied
overtime and doubletime premiums.  They filed the class action
wage and hour complaint against their employer, after signing the
Ecolab's Arbitration Agreement purporting to require arbitration
of all employment-related claims and to prohibit class,
collective, and representative actions in any forum.  They bring
claims under the California Labor Code, the Unfair Competition
Law, and the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA").

Ecolab moved to compel arbitration of all of the Plaintiffs'
claims except the PAGA claim, or in the alternative to stay the
case pending the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on the enforceability
of arbitration agreements like Ecolab's in Morris v. Ernst &
Young, LLP.  In opposition to the Defendant's motion, the
Plaintiffs argue that the Agreement is unenforceable under Morris
because it requires them to waive their right to bring any class
or collective action in any court or in arbitration related to any
dispute.  They also argue that, irrespective of the legality of
the class action waiver, the Agreement is unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.

Judge Chen finds that though traces of unconscionability are
present, he finds that it is not enough to render the Agreement
unenforceable.  Accordingly, the enforceability of Ecolab's
Arbitration Agreement rises and falls with the lawfulness of the
class action waiver under Morris.  Nevertheless, if appropriate,
the parties may revisit the issue after the case is decided.

As for Ecolab's requests a stay of proceedings in light of the
Supreme Court's impending decision in Morris, the Judge finds that
the forthcoming Supreme Court ruling in Morris minimizes the
potential damage because the stay would be short and not
indefinite.  Given the risk that PAGA claims might be stayed
pending arbitration, and the relatively short stay pending Morris,
he leans slightly in favor of granting a stay of the litigation
provided the Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed with discovery on
Bankwitz's individual claims.  The Judge also agrees with Ecolab
that the stay is in the interest of judicial economy because
Morris may foreclose the Plaintiffs' class claim.

In these circumstances, a limited stay of this litigation pending
the Supreme Court's review of Morris is justified.  Therefore,
Judge Chen granted the stay upon the following conditions: (i) the
parties may proceed with individual discovery, (iii) the parties
will undertake preservation of evidence relevant to all claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), and (iii) the
parties will meet and confer regarding a limited discovery plan to
facilitate ADR.

For the reasons stated, Judge Chen denied the Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration, and conditionally stayed proceedings,
except as specified, pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Morris.  The Judge will hold a case management conference on Oct.
26, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., with an updated case management statement
due one week earlier.  The ADR will be discussed at that time.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/C8SCB7 from Leagle.com.

Robert Bankwitz, Plaintiff, represented by Alejandro Pedro
Gutierrez -- agutierrez@hathawaylawfirm.com -- Hathaway Building.

Robert Bankwitz, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Jay Palay, Palay
Law Firm, Michael Anthony Strauss -- mike@strausslawyers.com --
Strauss & Strauss, APC, Brian Daniel Hefelfinger --
bdh@calemploymentcounsel.com -- Palay & Hefelfinger, APC & Andrew
Clayton Ellison -- andrew@strausslawyers.com -- Palay Law Firm.

William Jacobo, Plaintiff, represented by Alejandro Pedro
Gutierrez, Hathaway Building, Andrew Clayton Ellison, Palay Law
Firm, Daniel Jay Palay, Palay Law Firm, Michael Anthony Strauss,
Strauss & Strauss, APC & Brian Daniel Hefelfinger, Palay &
Hefelfinger, APC.

Joshua Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Alejandro Pedro
Gutierrez, Hathaway Building, Andrew Clayton Ellison, Palay Law
Firm, Daniel Jay Palay, Palay Law Firm, Michael Anthony Strauss,
Strauss & Strauss, APC & Brian Daniel Hefelfinger, Palay &
Hefelfinger, APC.

Ecolab, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Jody Ann Landry -- jlandry@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & John
Anthony Ybarra -- jybarra@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
pro hac vice.


EDUCATIONAL CREDIT: "Reyes" CIPA Suit Partly Stayed
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, AJ REYES, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-00628-BAS-AGS (S.D. Cal.),
Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's ex parte application for a temporary stay of all
proceedings.

Reyes brought the suit over two and half years ago against
Defendant ECMC on behalf of a putative class alleging violations
of California's Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA").  Specifically,
the Complaint alleges that ECMC violated Section 632.7(a) of the
CIPA in the course of dealing with the Plaintiff and other
putative class members by recording their cellular phone calls
without their consent.

On Sept. 19, 2017, the Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification pursuant to Rule 23 and appointed the
Plaintiff as the class representative.  The class the Court
certified is defined as all individuals who, between Aug. 2, 2014,
to March 31, 2015, inclusive, participated in an inbound telephone
conversation with a live representative of ECMC that was: (i)
placed to an ECMC phone line that used the non-mandatory message
setting for its admonition that the call is being recorded; (ii)
made from a telephone number that includes a California area code;
(iii) transmitted via cellular telephone; and (iv) recorded
without the caller's consent.

In certifying the class, the Court observed that the fourth part
of the class definition was compelled by the class allegations in
the Complaint.  Although Reyes moved to certify a class which
removed the lack of consent feature, the Court noted that it could
not broaden the class beyond the class alleged in the Complaint.

On Oct. 3, 2017, ECMC filed a Petition for Leave to Appeal the
Class Certification Order with the Ninth Circuit on Oct. 3, 2017.
Its Petition presents three issues: (i) whether Plaintiff Reyes
can represent the certified class when the evidence cited by the
District Court demonstrates that he is not a class member; (iii)
if Plaintiff Reyes can represent the class, can Rule 23's
requirements be met when the evidence cited to certify the class
was deemed unreliable by the District Court; and (iii) whether the
District Court certified an impermissible failsafe class by adding
the language recorded without the caller's consent to the class
definition.

ECMC filed the instant ex parte application to stay proceedings in
the Court pending the resolution of its Petition.  The Ninth
Circuit has not accepted the Petition as of the date of the Order.
Plaintiff Reyes has also filed an answer in opposition to ECMC's
Petition.

Judge Bashant finds that there is potential irreparable harm to
the class if notice is prematurely disseminated.  It is important
to recognize that this is a harm to class members because of the
potential confusion it can cause.  Where the potential irreparable
harm concerns a specific aspect of the proceedings, the courts
have developed tailored stay procedures to address that harm
rather than permitting a full stay.  Here, the Judge will adopt a
tailored procedure temporarily staying proceedings concerning
class notice, including the requirement that the parties jointly
submit a proposed class notice and notice dissemination plan.
She, however, will permit all other proceedings to continue,
including class discovery.

Lastly, the Judge finds that the public interest does not warrant
a stay of all proceedings given the length of time the case has
been pending and the underlying allegations.  The case is over two
and a half years old.  California residents have an interest in
the efficient prosecution of California's privacy laws and seeking
to hold those who violate those laws accountable.  The public
interest will not be served by a stay of all proceedings at the
time.

For these reasons, Judge Bashant granted in part and denied in
part ECMC's request for a temporary stay of the proceedings.  She
ordered that all proceedings relating to class notice, including
the obligation of the parties to jointly submit a proposed class
notice and notice dissemination plan, are temporarily stayed.  If
the Ninth Circuit accepts ECMC's Petition, the stay on class
notice will extend until the Ninth Circuit issues a decision on
ECMC's appeal.  If the Ninth Circuit does not accept ECMC's
Petition, ECMC must immediately notify the Court of its denial,
and the parties must jointly submit a proposed class notice and
notice dissemination plan based on the certified class within 30
days of the denial of the Petition.

The Judge vacated the Oct. 17, 2017 deadline for the parties to
file a proposed class notice and notice dissemination plan.  All
other proceedings, including class discovery proceedings, are not
stayed at this time.  If the Ninth Circuit accepts ECMC's
Petition, ECMC is permitted to submit a properly noticed motion
for a stay as to all other proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MAZ719 from Leagle.com.

Educational Credit Management Corporation, Defendant, represented
by David J. Kaminski, Carlson and Messer & Martin Schannong,
Carlson & Messer LLP.

A J Reyes, Plaintiff, represented by Alexis M. Wood --
admin@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron.

A J Reyes, Plaintiff, represented by Kas L. Gallucci, Law Offices
of Ronald A. Marron, Ronald Marron -- ron@consumersadvocates.com -
- Law Office of Ronald Marron & Daniel G. Shay, Law Offices of
Daniel G. Shay.

Educational Credit Management Corporation, Defendant, represented
by David J. Kaminski -- kaminskid@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson and Messer
& Martin Schannong -- schannom@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson & Messer LLP.


EMERSON ELECTRIC: Feb. 6 Settlement Approval Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------
The following is being released by the F-201 Instant Hot Water
Filter Settlement Administrator on behalf of Emerson Electric Co.
d/b/a InSinkErator ("InSinkErator") and Plaintiffs' law firms,
Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC and McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, about
the lawsuit Desio v. Emerson Electric Co. d/b/a InSinkErator,
No. 2:15-cv-00346-SJM.

InSinkErator and Plaintiffs announced a Settlement to resolve a
nationwide class action lawsuit related to certain InSinkErator F-
201 filters used in water filtration systems ("F-201 System"),
which were designed to be used with instant hot water dispenser
systems.  Plaintiffs allege that model F-201R water filter
cartridges manufactured from 2001 through January 31, 2011 ("Old
Filters") that were sold as both part of the F-201 System and as
replacement equipment for use in the F-201 System can crack and
cause leaks and water damage.  InSinkErator purchased the Old
Filters from a third party manufacturer and as the distributor of
the product denies that it did anything wrong.  The Settlement
includes all people and entities that own or lease a residence or
other structure located in the United States that contains both an
installed F-201 System and an Old Filter.

If the Settlement is approved by the judge presiding over the
matter in the Eastern District of Washington, a $3.8 million fund
will be established that will provide settlement benefits to class
members, pay attorneys' fees, cover costs and expenses of
providing notice and administering the settlement, and pay a
service award to the two Representative Plaintiffs who filed the
lawsuit.  Settlement Class Members who file eligible claims can
ask for (1) a free new filter to replace the Old Filter (up to
three per person), (2) a cash award of $15 per Old Filter (up to
three per person), or (3) a cash award to pay for up to 40% of any
property damage expenses paid out-of-pocket related to Old Filter
failures occurring after January 22, 2018.

The Court will hold a hearing on February 6, 2018 to consider
whether to approve the Settlement.  Class members have until
January 22, 2018 to either exclude themselves from the litigation
or object to the Settlement.

For more information or to obtain a Claim Form, visit the
Settlement website, www.F201WaterFilterSettlement.com, or call
1-833-FILTER5 (1-833-345-8375).


EQUIFAX INC: LSCU Joins Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------
Angel Coker, writing for Birmingham Business Journal, reports that
the League of Southeastern Credit Unions & Affiliates has joined a
class-action lawsuit against Equifax, following a widespread data
breach at the credit-monitoring firm.

The LSCU's board of directors voted during a special Oct. 26
meeting to become a plaintiff in the suit alongside a bevy of
other credit union associations and the Credit Union National
Association.

CUNA originally filed the suit in Federal Court in Atlanta in
early October, seeking to recover the costs borne by credit unions
in the aftermath of the breach that affected 146 million
customers' personal information, including 209,000 credit card
account numbers.

According to a press release from LCSU, the breach's effects will
cost credit unions multiple financial losses related to crisis
services such as canceling and reissuing compromised cards,
reimbursing consumers for fraudulent charges, increasing
fraudulent activity monitoring, taking appropriate action to
mitigate the risk of identity theft and fraudulent loans,
sustaining reputational harm, and notifying consumers of potential
fraudulent activity.

"The extent of this breach and potential effect on credit unions
and their members is unprecedented," said Patrick La Pine,
president and CEO of the LSCU & Affiliates. "The League is joining
this suit as a protection measure for our affiliated credit unions
and to hold Equifax accountable for negligence and the damages
that will ensue. Protecting members is a top priority of all
credit unions. This massive breach has the potential for negative
repercussions for many years to come. The costs to credit unions
will be significant."

The LSCU & Affiliates, which includes 252 credit unions and more
than 7.5 million members in Alabama and Florida, is encouraging
credit unions to join the suit to help recover the costs of
resources and damages likely to be associated with the breach.

Other lead plaintiffs include LSCU affiliated credit union Army
Aviation Center Federal Credit Union, headquartered in Daleville,
Ala., and the Greater Cincinnati Credit Union.

The Credit Union Association of New Mexico, the California-Nevada
Credit Union League, the Michigan Credit Union League and the
Illinois Credit Union League have also joined the suit. [GN]


FCNH INC: Court Grants Nesbitt Relief from Taxation of Costs
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RHONDA NESBITT, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FCNH, INC., VIRGINIA
MASSAGE THERAPY, INC., MID-ATLANTIC MASSAGE THERAPY, INC., STEINER
EDUCATION GROUP, INC., STEINER LEISURE LTD., SEG CORT LLC, d/b/a
as the "Steiner Education Group", Defendants, Civil Action No. 14-
cv-00990-RBJ (D. Colo.), Judge R. Brooke Jackson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the
Plaintiff's motion for review of and relief from taxation of
costs.

On March 2, 2017, the Court entered its final judgment dismissing
all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in the case with prejudice.
As the prevailing parties, the Defendants were awarded their
reasonable costs to be taxed by the Clerk pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(d)(2) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1. ECF No. 107.

On March 16, 2017, the Defendants filed their Bill of Costs
seeking an award of $5,982.04.  An amended Bill of Costs was filed
on April 19, 2017 decreasing the amount requested to $5,757.86.
On April 26, 2017, the Clerk taxed costs in favor of the
Defendants in the amount of $4,873.31.

On May 1, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the pending Motion for Review
of and Relief From Taxation of Costs.  It became ripe for review
upon the filing of the Plaintiff's reply on June 1, 2017.
Meanwhile the case has been appealed and is pending in the Tenth
Circuit.

The Clerk disallowed every item in the Defendants' amended bill of
costs except costs incident to the taking of depositions.  These
were the reporter's charges for 14 transcripts, including the
deposition of Ms. Nesbitt and at least five of the opt-in
Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs do not contend that the costs were not incurred, or
that they were unreasonable in amount.  Rather, they argues that
she is indigent and unable to afford the costs, and that the
issues addressed in the case were close and difficult.  The
Defendants do not dispute Ms. Nesbitt's claim of indigency.

Judge Brooke finds that the amount of costs is not huge in the
abstract, but it is huge to an indigent person.  In his view, the
huge disparity in economic circumstances between Ms. Nesbitt and
the Defendants assures him that exercising discretion in favor of
a waiver of costs in this specific case would not work an economic
hardship on the Defendants.

Having reflected on these issues, the Judge's judgment in the
particular case is that the costs should be waived.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's motion for review of and relief from taxation of
costs is granted.  The Clerk's taxation of costs is vacated.  An
Amended Final Judgment will issue reflecting that each party will
bear her or its own costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/prCuxR from Leagle.com.

Rhonda Nesbitt, Plaintiff, represented by David H. Miller --
dmiller@sawayalaw.com -- Sawaya Law Firm.

Rhonda Nesbitt, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Murdoch-Kitt
Harrison, Sawaya Rose McClure & Wilhite PC, Brian David Gonzales -
- bgonzales@coloradotriallaw.com -- Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC, Leon
Marc Greenberg -- leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com -- Leon Greenberg,
Attorney At Law & Rachel Graves -- RGraves@sawayalaw.com -- Sawaya
Law Firm.

FCNH, INC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Max Lippa --
LippaJ@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Natalia Solis
Ballinger -- Natalia.ballinger@denvergov.org -- Denver City
Attorney's Office-West Colfax Avenue, Scott David Segal --
ssegal@myhrattorney.com -- Law Offices of Scott D. Segal, PA &
Todd David Wozniak -- wozniakt@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig,
LLP.

Virginia Massage Therapy, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
Max Lippa, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Natalia Solis Ballinger, Denver
City Attorney's Office-West Colfax Avenue, Scott David Segal, Law
Offices of Scott D. Segal, PA & Todd David Wozniak, Greenberg
Traurig, LLP.

Mid-Atlantic Massage Therapy, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey Max Lippa, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Natalia Solis
Ballinger, Denver City Attorney's Office-West Colfax Avenue, Scott
David Segal, Law Offices of Scott D. Segal, PA & Todd David
Wozniak, Greenberg Traurig, LLP.

Steiner Education Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
Max Lippa, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Natalia Solis Ballinger, Denver
City Attorney's Office-West Colfax Avenue, Scott David Segal, Law
Offices of Scott D. Segal, PA & Todd David Wozniak, Greenberg
Traurig, LLP.

Steiner Leisure LTD., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Max Lippa,
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Natalia Solis Ballinger, Denver City
Attorney's Office-West Colfax Avenue, Scott David Segal, Law
Offices of Scott D. Segal, PA & Todd David Wozniak, Greenberg
Traurig, LLP.

SEG Cort LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Max Lippa,
Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


FERRARA CANDY: Baker Sterchi Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Martha Charepoo, Esq. -- mcharepoo@bscr-law.com -- of Baker
Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC, in an article for Lexology, reports
that candy manufacturers nationwide are increasingly finding
themselves in Missouri state court, facing class action
allegations that their use of over-sized packaging misleads
consumers into believing the package contains more product than is
actually present.  A recent Eighth Circuit decision in a "slack-
fill" case suggests that when a corporate defendant removes to
federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), it may
face a stiff challenge when the plaintiffs move to remand the case
to state court, on the grounds that the value of their claims
total less than $5 million.

In Waters v. Ferrara Candy Co., people who bought Red Hot candies
initiated claims against the candy company for violation of the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA") based on under-
filled or "slack-filled" cardboard boxes of the candies.  The
consumers filed suit in the City of St. Louis Circuit Court.
Presumably seeking a less plaintiff-friendly venue, the candy
company removed the case to the federal court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, under CAFA, arguing that the total value of
the consumers' claims exceeded $5 million, the minimum amount
required for the district court's jurisdiction under that statute.
The candy company based its calculation on what the consumers
could potentially recover as compensatory damages (total sales in
Missouri for the past five years), attorney's fees (at 40% of
compensatory damages), and punitive damages (at 5 times
compensatory and punitive damages), and the cost of changing its
packaging processes to eliminate slack-fill.

The consumers moved to remand the case back to the City of St.
Louis, arguing that the $5 million threshold was not met.  In
opposition, the candy company submitted affidavits from executives
attesting to the total retail sales of all Red Hots products for
the previous five years and how much it would cost to change its
packaging processes to eliminate slack-fill, if it were compelled
to do so.

The district court considered each category of potential recovery
by the consumers and concluded that taken together or separately,
the value of the consumers' claims did not meet the $5 million
threshold and ordered the case back to the City of St. Louis.  The
court concluded that compensatory damages and attorney's fees
added up to less than $1 million, and that punitive damages should
not be included in the calculation, because the consumers had not
adequately pled punitive damages in their petition and, therefore,
punitive damages would not be recoverable in this case.  That left
the value of injunctive relief.  In deciding how to calculate the
value of injunctive relief, the court followed "longstanding
Eighth Circuit tradition" and looked at it from the consumers'
point of view, rejecting the "either viewpoint" test, which
compares the value of injunctive relief to consumers to the cost
to the manufacturer and taking the more expensive of the two.  The
candy company urged adoption of the "either viewpoint" test but
presented no evidence of the value of injunctive relief from the
consumers' point of view, so the court disregarded this factor as
well.

The court went on to criticize the efficacy of the candy company's
affidavits to establish the cost of injunctive relief from the
manufacturer's point of view.  The CEO's affidavit addressed the
cost of changing its packaging to eliminate slack-fill based on an
estimated cost to upgrade its packing equipment. The court found
this to be speculative because it did not specify what injunctive
relief would actually require the manufacturer to do -- add more
candy to the existing package size, shrink the package size to
more closely fit the current weight of actual candy, or modify
every Red Hots candy production line.  As a result, the court
found the proposed cost to be too speculative to allow the
consumers' to rebut it.

The candy company appealed this decision, challenging (among other
things) the district court's adoption of the "plaintiff's
viewpoint" test.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was unmoved.
The appeals court found it unnecessary to rule on whether the
district court should have applied the "plaintiff's viewpoint" or
the "either viewpoint" test, because it found that under either
standard, the candy company failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.
The appeals court agreed with the district court that the two
affidavits did not adequately quantify what it would cost the
company to comply with an injunction.

Given another chance, the Eighth Circuit might decide that the
"plaintiff's viewpoint" test determines the value of injunctive
relief for establishing the jurisdictional amount under CAFA.
Thus, a reasonable and conservative strategy to keep a slack-fill
class action in federal court would be to present evidence from
the consumers' point of view and be as specific as possible about
the method and cost of eliminating slack-fill.  This is a calculus
that can be accomplished before deciding to remove, and if neither
of these amounts can be supported with specific evidence to
establish a finding of at least $5 million, it might be more cost
effective to just stay in state court.

Counsel should also keep in mind that in cases where plaintiffs
have adequately pled punitive damages in their state court
petition (which did not occur in the Waters case), it is not
uncommon for punitive damages to total up to 10 times the amount
of compensatory damages, and this can be a critically important
factor in determining whether the CAFA threshold has been met.
[GN]


FORD MOTOR: Dec. 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Oct. 30 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Ford Motor Company ("Ford" or the "Company")
(NYSE:F) and certain of its officers.   The class action, filed in
United States District Court, for the Eastern District of
Michigan, and docketed under 17-cv-13536, is on behalf of a class
consisting of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Ford
securities, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by
defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Ford securities between
February 18, 2014, and October 26, 2017, both dates inclusive, you
have until December 29, 2017, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action,
contact Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Ford Motor Company designs, manufactures, and services cars and
trucks. The Company also provides vehicle-related financing,
leasing, and insurance through its subsidiary.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) flaws in the Company's
manufacturing processes, supply chain, and/or quality control
rendered at least 841,000 Ford vehicles unsafe to drive; (ii) the
foregoing issues, when revealed, would foreseeably subject Ford to
additional regulatory scrutiny and impact the Company's
profitability; and (iii) as a result, Ford's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On October 27, 2017, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA") announced a preliminary investigation
into 841,000 Ford vehicles, citing concerns that the vehicles'
steering wheels could detach while the vehicles are in motion.
NHTSA stated that it is specifically investigating 2014-2016 model
Ford Fusion sedans.

On this news, Ford's share price fell $0.21, or 1.71%, to close at
$12.06 on October 27, 2017.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust
class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known
as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions.  Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct.  The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. [GN]


FRITO-LAY INC: July 17 Hearing on Class Deal Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ELIAZAR SANCHEZ, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FRITO-LAY, INC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:14-cv-00797-DAD-MJS (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Michael J. Seng of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California continued the hearing on the Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement,
currently set for Jan. 12, 2018, until July 17, 2018, at 9:30
a.m..

The Plaintiff will file his Motion for Preliminary Approval no
later than 28 days prior to that hearing.

Judge Seng granted the continuance, as stipulated, (i) to give the
Plaintiff an opportunity to thoroughly reexamine, reevaluate and,
if and as necessary, renegotiate the proposed terms of settlement
of the claims of the class; and (ii) to give the Plaintiff one
final opportunity to submit a Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement that complies with applicable law and
rules and is supported by law, facts, evidence and logic, all of
which must be clearly, competently and persuasively presented to
the Court in the Motion for Preliminary Approval.  Another failure
to present a proper such motion likely will result in denial of
class certification and leave the Plaintiff with no option but to
pursue the action solely on his own behalf or dismiss it entirely.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/mpEY0o from Leagle.com.

Eliazar Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Brian D. Chase --
bchase@bisnarchase.com -- Bisnar Chase, LLP.

Eliazar Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Jerusalem F. Beligan --
jbeligan@bisnarchase.com -- Bisnar Chase, LLP.

Frito-Lay, Inc., Defendant, represented by Samantha D. Hardy, Esq.
-- shardy@sheppardmullin.com -- Ashley Teiko Hirano, Esq. --
ahirano@sheppardmullin.com -- and Daniel Francisco De La Cruz,
Esq. -- ddelacruz@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER &
HAMPTON LLP.


FUNDAMENTAL LABOR: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Tonge" FCRA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned CHRISTINE TONGE, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FUNDAMENTAL LABOR
STRATEGIES, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-6310 (E.D. Pa.).

This is a putative class action on behalf of job applicants who
claim that Defendant Fundamental Labor Strategies (FLS) violated
their rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) when they
applied for trucking jobs. The sole named Plaintiff is Christine
Tonge.  She alleges that FLS violated the FCRA first when it
requested her consumer report after obtaining her consent on an
inadequate disclosure form, and then a second time when it denied
her job application based on the report's contents without first
giving her a copy of the report, a summary of her FCRA rights, and
a chance to discuss and dispute the report's contents, which she
believes to be inaccurate.

Defendant moves to dismiss Tonge's Amended Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction based on Article III standing, relying
on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 136 S.Ct. 1546.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

In 1970, as the emergence of computer technology created the
possibility of a nationwide data bank covering every citizen,
Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure that the growing credit
reporting industry would be fair and accurate.

Two separate FCRA protections are at issue in this case. Section
1681b(b)(2)(A), establishes that a person or entity may not
procure a consumer report for employment purposes unless: (i) a
clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the
consumer at any time before the report is procured in a document
that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may
be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has
authorized in writing the procurement of the report by that
person.

The second, Section 1681b(b)(3)(A), provides that: In using a
consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse
action based in whole or in part on the report, the person
intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the
consumer to whom the report relates (i) a copy of the report; and
(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer to
obtain and dispute information in the report.

Tonge's Claims and the Putative Classes

Plaintiff Tonge brings claims on behalf of herself and two
putative classes. She alleges that FLS violated both of the FCRA
protections set out above: Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i)'s disclosure
requirement (Count One), and Section 1681b(b)(3)(A)'s pre-adverse
action requirements (Count Two).  These protections, Tonge
alleges, are intended to protect consumers' private, sensitive
information and ensure that they are informed of their rights to
control the dissemination and dispute the contents of their
consumer reports.

FLS's Standing Challenge

Defendant FLS moves under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss Tonge's claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that she has no
Article III standing. FLS asserts that Tonge has failed to prove
each of the three elements of standing: injury in fact, causation,
and redressability.

The Court rules that FLS has not provided evidence outside of the
pleadings to dispute any fact material to the question of whether
Tonge has standing. The evidence FLS presented including its
application documents, two affidavits, the HireRight consumer
report on Tonge, and an email from HireRight documenting her
dispute largely admit the allegations of Tonge's complaint. FLS
agrees that it uses the Consent Form Tonge identified, that its
application process is generally as Tonge described, and that
Tonge did not receive a copy of the report or a summary of her
rights under FCRA before her application was denied.

FLS does dispute the contents of its post-adverse action phone
conversations with Tonge and the accuracy of the contents of her
consumer report. But here, where Tonge has alleged violations of
two FCRA sections intended to ensure consumers' access to certain
information and to protect their privacy, these facts are not
material to whether Tonge and the putative classes have adequately
alleged an injury in fact.

The Court acknowledges that whether FLS's challenge is facial or
factual depends on which view of the law it adopts. If the Court
was to adopt the Defendant's view of standing for FCRA claims,
facts relevant to the question of concrete harm could include the
accuracy of the underlying accidents and whether an opportunity
for Tonge to view and dispute her report pre-adverse action would
have altered FLS's decision not to hire her.

But, the Court says it does not believe that standing law in the
Third Circuit supports FLS's view, which hinges on economic harm
and whether the FCRA violation would have unquestionably altered
the ultimate outcome of the plaintiff's employment application. As
I see the law, it makes no difference which standard applies
because the parties agree on all relevant facts.

Standing and Spokeo

A plaintiff has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court when she has "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.

Tonge's Claims Satisfy Both of Spokeo's Benchmarks

Even if the Court had the ability to predict that FLS would
ultimately be proven right about the fate of Tonge's application,
she still would have been deprived of information to which she was
statutorily entitled, including an accurate description of her
rights. The Court says it does not believe that Congress, in
enacting the FCRA, intended to inform consumers of their rights
only if the information would unequivocally avoid financial harm
to those consumers. In this view, the Court joins the Third
Circuit and its Eastern District colleagues.

Accordingly, the Court finds that when an applicant alleges that
she consented to a background check based on an unclear
disclosure, and was denied employment without an opportunity to
learn her pre-adverse action rights, view the background check
report, or dispute it, she alleges exactly the kind of harms
against which Congress sought to protect.

It is clear to me that Congress, in enacting the FCRA, intended to
create substantive rights to privacy and to certain statutorily-
mandated information, regardless of whether a consumer's knowledge
of that information would certainly alter the ultimate trajectory
(economic or otherwise) of a given interaction between the
consumer and an employer or credit reporting agency. Accordingly,
the Court finds that Tonge has adequately alleged injuries in fact
so as to give rise to standing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybz5vsy9from
Leagle.com.

CHRISTINE TONGE, Plaintiff, represented by RICHARD H. KIM, THE KIM
LAW FIRM LLC. 1500 Market Street, Centre Square -- West Tower,
Suite W-3110, Philadelphia, PA 19102

CHRISTINE TONGE, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF --
david@prolawpa.com -- PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, DRUCILLA
TIGNER, THE KIM LAW FIRM, 1500 Market Street, Centre Square --
West Tower, Suite W-3110, Philadelphia, PA 19102, JEFFREY J.
CIARLANTO -- david@prolawpa.com -- Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto,
P.C. & KEVIN J. KOTCH -- info@ferraralawgp.com -- Ferrara Law
Group, P.C..

FUNDAMENTAL LABOR STRATEGIES, INC., Defendant, represented by HOPE
A. COMISKY -- comiskyh@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, LEE
E. TANKLE -- tanklel@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & TRACEY
E. DIAMOND -- diamondt@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP.


GC SERVICES: Faces "Geisinsky" Suit in E. Dist. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership.  The case is styled as Yisroel Geisinsky, on behalf
of himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff
v. GC Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
06190 (E.D. N.Y., October 24, 2017).

GC Services is the largest privately-held outsourcing provider of
call center management and collection agency services in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Chevrolet Corvette Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that a class of Chevrolet Corvette
owners claims in federal court that General Motors sold them
sports cars with a defective cooling system that caused them to go
into "limp mode" at reduced speed, and then refused to fix the
issue.

The case is PETER JANKOVSKIS and JONATHAN WHITE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, vs.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant, No. 1:17-cv-07822 (N.D. Ill.).

A full-text copy of the complaint is available at
https://is.gd/tdMDTP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class:

     Steve W. Berman, Esq.
     Shelby Smith, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Telephone: (206) 623-7292
     Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
     Email: steve@hbsslaw.com
            shelbys@hbsslaw.com

        -- and --

     Elizabeth A. Fegan, Esq.
     HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
     455 N. Cityfront Plaza Drive, Suite 2410
     Chicago, IL 60611
     Telephone: (708) 628-4960
     Facsimile: (708) 628-4950

       -- and --

     Stuart Z. Grossman, Esq.
     Rachel Furst, Esq.
     GROSSMAN ROTH YAFFA COHEN
     2525 Ponce de Leon, Suite 1150
     Coral Gables, FL 33134
     Telephone: (888) 296-1681
     Facsimile: (305) 285-1668
     Email: szg@grossmanroth.com
            rwf@grossmanroth.com

       -- and --

     Jason D. Weisser, Esq.
     SCHULER, HALVORSEN, WEISSER, ZOLLER & OVERBECK
     1615 Forum Place, Suite 4
     West Palm Beach, FL 33401
     Telephone: (561) 689-9180
     Facsimile: (561) 684-9683
     Email: jweisser@shw-law.com


GNC HOLDINGS: Class Suit Transferred to Pennsylvania Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert B. Kugler of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage, granted the Defendant's motion to
transfer the case, BRANDON REGISTER, On Behalf Of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. GNC HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendant, Civil No. 17-1320 (RBK/AMD) (D. N.J.), to the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

The action arises from GNC's Gold Card Program which afforded
benefits to customers for repeatedly shopping at GNC.  GNC has
made various changes to this program since its inception in 1991.
Register purchased a membership loyalty Gold Card from GNC in
2015, and renewed it in March 2016.  In December 2016, GNC
restructured its Card program, eliminating membership pricing and
Card benefits.

The Card itself is gold and was provided to Register at purchase.
It has accompanying terms and conditions.  Amongst these terms and
conditions is a forum selection clause submitting any claim
relating to the Card program, its terms, or the relationship
between the customer and GNC to the laws of the United States and
Pennsylvania and agreeing to personal and exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts located within Pennsylvania.

Register brings a breach of contract claim on behalf of a
nationwide class as a result of the cancellation.  He also brings
a New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. Section 56:8-1 ("CFA"),
claim on behalf of a New Jersey subclass.  The Defendant moves to
dismiss the class action complaint or, in the alternative,
transfer the action to the Western District of Pennsylvania.

Judge Kugler explains that federal law determines whether a forum
selection clause is enforceable.  Forum selection clauses are
"prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is
shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the
circumstances.  He finds that the forum selection clause at issue
is reasonable.

Register used the Card.  The Card contained a URL to GNC's website
where the terms and conditions were readily available.  He renewed
his membership after using the card -- thus, he unambiguously had
the terms and conditions before he bought the disputed second
membership term.  Because the forum selection clause in the
parties' agreement is valid, Judge Kugler granted the motion to
transfer and the case will be transferred to the Western District
of Pennsylvania.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/BLOQ5z from Leagle.com.

BRANDON REGISTER, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES C. SHAH --
jshah@sfmslaw.com -- SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP.

GNC HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant, represented by ROBERT D. BALIN --
robbalin@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP.

Mr. Douglas Cook, Amicus, represented by STEPHEN ERIC RAYMOND --
seraymond@rclawnj.com -- RAYMOND COLEMAN HEINOLD, LLP.


HANNA ANDERSSON: Faces "Marett" Suit in S.D. of New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hanna Andersson,
LLC. The case is styled as Lucia Marett, Individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff
v. Hanna Andersson, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-08183-JPO
(S.D.N.Y., October 24, 2017).

Hanna Andersson is an American, Portland, Oregon-based corporation
that specializes in children's apparel. The company operates mail-
order, online, and retail stores in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group P.C.
   44 Court Street, Suite 1217
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Fax: (718) 504-7555
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


HC WAINWRIGHT: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP on Oct. 30 disclosed that it
has filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California against H.C.
Wainwright & Co., LLC ("Wainwright") and financial analyst, Oren
Livnat ("Livnat") for violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  The lawsuit was filed on behalf of a class
(the "Class") consisting of persons and entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired MannKind Corporation ("MannKind") (NASDAQ:
MNKD) securities between 4:03 AM Pacific Time on
October 10, 2017 (7:03 AM Eastern Time) and 9:02 PM Pacific Time
on October 10, 2017 (12:02 AM Eastern Time on October 11, 2017)
(the "Class Period").

If you are a member of the Class described above, you may move the
Court no later than 60 days from October 30, 2017, the date of
this notice to serve as lead plaintiff.

On October 10, 2017, Wainwright, through an announcement
publicized by Wainwright analyst, Livnat, initiated coverage of
the MannKind stock with a "Buy" rating and a $7 per share price
target. At the time of Wainwright's statements, MannKind's stock
was trading at $5.33 per share. That night, MannKind announced a
registered direct offering at an offering price of $6.00 per
share. On this news, MannKind's stock price fell to a close of
$5.47 per share on October 11, 2011.

The lawsuit alleges that Defendants' statements were materially
misleading for failure to disclose that just 15 hours following
Wainwright's report on MannKind, MannKind would announce a
registered direct offering.

To be a member of the Class you need not take any action at this
time.  You may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and
remain an absent member of the Class. If you wish to learn more
about this action, or if you have any questions concerning this
announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these
matters, please contact Thomas Elrod, Esquire, of Kirby McInerney
LLP, 825 3rd Avenue, New York, NY 10022, at 212-371-6600 or by
email to telrod@kmllp.com. [GN]


HERMES LANDSCAPING: Ct. Enters Deposition Order in "Rodriguez"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Kenneth G. Gale of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for a Protective Order as to the Method and
Location of Plaintiff's Deposition in the case captioned ANTONIO
CHAVEZ RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HERMES LANDSCAPING, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 17-2142-CM-KGG (D. Kan.).

Rodriguez worked for the Defendant in Kansas as an H-2B worker
from Mexico.  The H-2B program allows foreign nationals to come
into the United States temporarily to perform temporary service or
labor if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or
labor cannot be found in the country.  The Plaintiff contends that
for almost 10 years, he would come to Kansas to work in
landscaping and then return to Mexico when the work was completed.

The Plaintiffs bring the present lawsuit on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Kansas law, and Missouri law, and alleging
damages for the Defendant's breach of its contracts with the H-2B
workers.  Because of the nature of the claims at issue, it is
uncontested that the lawsuit could only have been brought in
Kansas or Missouri.

The present motion seeks a Protective Order from the Court
regarding the method and location of the Plaintiffs' depositions.
They contend that immigration restrictions make travel to the U.S.
for depositions difficult.  They also contend they do not have the
financial means to do so.  As such, they propose that the
depositions occur in Mexico City or by video-conference.

The Defendant responds that it would face an undue financial
burden if the depositions were to occur in Mexico.  It also argues
that video depositions would be impractical given the potential
length of the depositions, the need for a translator, and the
likely number of deposition exhibits.

Magistrate Judge Gale finds that while he agrees with the
Plaintiffs that they should not be required to travel to the
United States for their depositions, the Court finds Plaintiffs'
offer of depositions by video conference to be less than ideal.
He also finds that while changing the place of depositions in the
case to Mexico is appropriate, he does not find it appropriate to
totally shift the cost of travel to the Defendant in light of the
general rule.  In the present case, the Plaintiffs expect to be
suitable class representatives -- and the Plaintiffs' counsel
presumably will ask to be appointed as suitable counsel for the
class.  As such, the Plaintiffs and their attorneys in the present
matter should expect to bear certain expenses.

He therefore granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion.  The
Magistrate Judge ordered that the depositions of the three Named
Plaintiffs be taken in Mexico at one location, during the course
of one trip if the Plaintiffs will pay the reasonable travel
expenses (airfare and lodging) for one defense counsel.  The
parties are instructed to confer regarding other expenses, such as
a court reporter and translator/interpreter.

Should the parties be unable to reach an agreement about these
additional costs, they are instructed to schedule a telephone
conference with the undersigned Magistrate Judge.  If the
Plaintiffs are unwilling or unable to pay the reasonable costs for
defense counsel to travel to Mexico, the Plaintiffs' motion will
be deemed denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/UQIrhd from Leagle.com.

Antonio Chavez Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Heather J.
Schlozman -- heather@duganschlozman.com -- Dugan Schlozman LLC.

Antonio Chavez Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Mark V. Dugan
-- mark@duganschlozman.com -- Dugan Schlozman LLC & Patricia C.
Kakalec -- pkakalec@kakalec-schlanger.com -- Kakalec & Schlanger,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Isaac Chavez Duarte, Plaintiff, represented by Mark V. Dugan,
Dugan Schlozman LLC.

Jose Alfredo Soto Servin, Plaintiff, represented by Mark V. Dugan,
Dugan Schlozman LLC.

Hermes Landscaping, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jennifer K.
Oldvader -- jennifer.oldvader@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Justin M. Dean --
justin.dean@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, PC & Patrick F. Hulla -- patrick.hulla@ogletree.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC.


HONDA: Feb. 7 Airbag Class Action Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
If you are a current or former owner or lessee of certain Honda
and Nissan vehicles, you could get cash and other benefits from a
class action settlement.

Settlements have been reached in a class action lawsuit alleging
that consumers sustained economic losses because they purchased or
leased vehicles from various auto companies that manufactured,
distributed, or sold vehicles containing allegedly defective
airbags manufactured by Takata Corporation and its affiliates.
The Settlements include certain vehicles made by Honda and Nissan
(the "Subject Vehicles"). Honda and Nissan deny any and all
allegations of wrongdoing and the Court has not decided who is
right.

If you have already received a separate recall notice for your
Honda or Nissan vehicle and have not yet had your Takata airbag
repaired, you should do so as soon as possible.  When recalled
Takata airbags deploy, they may spray metal debris toward vehicle
occupants and may cause serious injury.  Please see your original
recall notices and www.AirBagRecall.com for further details.

Am I included in the proposed Settlements? The Settlements include
the following persons and entities:

   -- Owners or lessees, as of September 19, 2017, of a Subject
Vehicle that was distributed for sale or lease in the United
States or any of its territories or possessions, and

   -- Former owners or lessees of a Honda Subject Vehicle that was
distributed for sale or lease in the United States or any of its
territories or possessions, who, between November 11, 2008 and
September 19, 2017, sold or returned pursuant to a lease, a
Subject Vehicle that was recalled before September 19, 2017, or

   -- Former owners or lessees of a Nissan Subject Vehicle that
was distributed for sale or lease in the United States or any of
its territories or possessions, who, between April 11, 2013 and
September 19, 2017, sold or returned pursuant to a lease, a
Subject Vehicle that was recalled before September 19, 2017.

A full list of the Honda and Nissan Subject Vehicles can be found
at www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com.  The Settlements do not involve
claims of personal injury.

What do the Settlements provide? Honda and Nissan have agreed to
Settlements with a combined value of approximately $703 million,
including a 10% credit for the Nissan Rental Car/Loaner Program
and a 20% credit for the Honda Enhanced Rental Car/Loaner Program.
The Settlement Funds will be used to pay for Settlement benefits
and cover the costs of the Settlements over an approximately four-
year period.

The Settlements offer several benefits for Class Members,
including (1) payments for certain out-of-pocket expenses incurred
related to a Takata airbag recall of a Subject Vehicle, (2) a
Rental Car/Loaner Program while certain Subject Vehicles are
awaiting repair, (3) an Outreach Program to maximize completion of
the recall remedy, (4) additional cash payments to Class Members
from residual settlement funds if any remain, and (5) a Customer
Support Program to help with repairs associated with affected
Takata airbag inflators and their replacements.  The Settlement
website explains each of these benefits in detail.

How can I get a Payment?

You must file a claim to receive a payment during the first four
years of the Settlements.  If you still own or lease a Subject
Vehicle, you must also bring it to an authorized dealership for
the recall remedy, as directed by a recall notice, if you have not
already done so.  Visit the website and file a claim online or
download one and file by mail.  The deadline to file a claim will
be at least one year from the date the Settlements are finalized
and will be posted on the website when it's known.

What are my other options? If you do not want to be legally bound
by the Settlements, you must exclude yourself by January 8, 2018.
If you do not exclude yourself, you will release any claims you
may have against Honda and Nissan, in exchange for certain
settlement benefits.  The potential available benefits are more
fully described in the Settlements, available at the settlement
website.  You may object to the Settlements by January 8, 2018.
You cannot both exclude yourself from, and object to, the
Settlements.  The Long Form Notices for each Settlement available
on the website listed below explain how to excluded yourself or
object.  The Court will hold a fairness hearing on February 7,
2018, to consider whether to finally approve the Settlements and a
request for attorneys' fees of up to 30% of the total Settlement
Amount and incentive awards of $5,000 for each of the Class
Representatives.  You may appear at the fairness hearing, either
by yourself or through an attorney hired by you, but you don't
have to.

For more information, including the relief, eligibility and
release of claims, in English or Spanish, call or visit the
website below.

1-888-735-5596


wwww.AutoAirbagSettlement.com


HONDA MOTOR: U.S. Airbag Class Action Hits Quarterly Profit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Hans Greimel, writing for Automotive News, reports that Honda
Motor Co. reported a 33 percent drop in operating profit in the
latest quarter as outlays for a U.S. class action lawsuit over
defective Takata airbags undercut rising sales.

Operating profit fell by a third to 152.9 billion yen ($1.36
billion) in the company's fiscal second quarter ended Sept. 30,
from 228 billion yen ($2.03 billion) a year earlier.

Net income declined 1.7 percent to 174 billion yen ($1.55 billion)
in the three months, the company said on Nov. 1 while announcing
fiscal second-quarter financial results.

Revenue advanced 15.7 percent to 3.78 trillion yen ($33.59
billion) in the latest quarter, as global retail sales increased
6.1 percent to 1.29 million vehicles, Japan's No. 3 carmaker said.

Operating profit was hit by a 53.7 billion yen ($477.2 million)
charge to a settle class action lawsuit in the U.S. brought by
customers of cars with defective Takata airbag inflators.

Operating profit also declined from a year earlier, when results
were buttressed by a one-time gain from a change in the company's
pension system to extend workers' retirement age.

Surging sales in mainland Asia and Japan powered the worldwide
volume increase, while positive foreign exchange rates helped lift
revenue by an even wider margin.

But the increases weren't enough to outweigh the hit from the U.S.
settlement charge.

Operating profit in Asia, which includes the key China market,
expanded 21 percent, while sales surged 18 percent to 570,000
vehicles in the quarter, making Asia Honda's biggest market.

Operating profit in Japan slipped, even as sales rose 7.1 percent
to 167,000 units.

North America, on the other hand, emerged as a weak link.  The
region slid to an operating loss of 660 million yen ($5.87
million) in the fiscal second quarter ended Sept. 30, hurt by the
Takata airbag settlement.  North American sales slid 5.6 percent
to 452,000 vehicles.

European regional operating profit surged 24-fold to 2.5 billion
yen ($22.2 million) as the region recovers, even as sales
retreated 4.4 percent to 43,000 vehicles from the year before.

Nevertheless, Honda lifted for a second time its full-year
earnings outlook for the current fiscal year ending March 31,
2018, citing gains from foreign currency rates and it motorcycle
business.

Honda now predicts full-year global operating income will come in
at 745 billion yen ($6.62 billion).  The new target represents a
decline of 11 percent from the year before.

Net income is now forecast to fall 5.1 percent to 585 billion yen
($5.20 billion), also a smaller decline than the 12 percent
retreat Honda had forecast before.

Predicting slightly better-than-expected sales in Japan, Honda
also lifted its global sales target by 5,000 vehicles in the
current fiscal year.  It now expects worldwide sales to inch ahead
0.1 percent to 3.69 million vehicles. [GN]


HYATT CORP: Faces Class Action Over Employee Fingerprinting
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer, Allison Grande and Diana Novak Jones, writing for
Law360, report that Hyatt Corp. on Oct. 30 became the latest
company targeted by a wave of putative class actions claiming
Illinois employers have been collecting employee fingerprints in
violation of the state's biometric privacy law.

Robin Rapai alleged the hotel chain has been violating the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act by using a fingerprint-
based time-clock system without the written permission and posted
privacy policies required by the law, putting the privacy of its
employees at risk.

Ms. Rapai said she worked as a server at a Hyatt hotel in Oak
Brook, Illinois, beginning at the end of September, and that
during her employment she was required to clock in and out of work
using a fingerprint scanner.

She claimed Hyatt did this without meeting BIPA's requirements
that employees give written permission for their fingerprints to
be collected and that the employer inform employees of what use
their biometric information will be put to, how long it will be
stored and when it will be destroyed.

Counsel for Ms. Rapai declined to comment.  Hyatt representatives
did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Oct. 31.

The suits are largely concentrated in Illinois' Cook County
Circuit Court, where they have been appearing on dockets at a rate
of two to three per week.  They are filed by workers against
companies that require employees to scan their fingers as part of
their timekeeping system.

Under the act's right of action, the workers claim their employers
did not get their consent to collect and store their fingerprints,
and are putting them at risk of identity theft should there be a
data breach.

The law -- passed in 2008 in the wake of privacy concerns raised
by the bankruptcy of biometrics company Pay By Touch --
specifically requires employers using biometric information to
secure a written release from employees as a condition of
employment.  Entities collecting the information are barred from
selling it and must publicize how long it is retained for,
according to BIPA.

It provides for liquidated damages of $1,000 for each negligent
violation and $5,000 for each willful or reckless violation of the
act, which could mean serious liability for employers, which often
require their workers to scan their fingers twice a day.

The use of biometric information -- commonly used in cellphones
and computers as a security measure -- has become increasingly
popular with employers who want to combat "buddy punching," or
people punching timecards for co-workers who are late or playing
hooky.

Ms. Rapai is represented by James X. Bormes and Catherine P. Sons
of The Law Office of James X. Bromes PC, and Frank Castiglione and
Kasif Khowaja of The Khowaja Law Firm.

Counsel information for Hyatt was not immediately available on
Oct. 31.

The case is Robin Rapai v. Hyatt Corp., case number 2017-CH-14483,
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division. [GN]


IFC ASSET: Faces "Juana Doe" Suit in District of Delaware
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against IFC Asset Managment
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Juana Doe I, Juana Doe II,
Juana Doe III, Juana Doe IV, Juana Doe V, Juana Doe VI, Juana Doe
VII, Juana Doe VIII, Juana Doe IX, Juana Doe X, Juana Doe XI,
Juana Doe XII, Juana Doe XIII, Juana Doe XIV, Juana Doe XV, Juana
Doe XVI and Juana Doe XVII, in his individual capacity and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. IFC Asset
Management Company, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01494-UNA (D.
Del., October 24, 2017).

IFC Asset Management Company, LLC is a private equity and venture
capital firm specializing in direct and fund of fund
investments.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Misty A. Seemans, Esq.
   Public Defender's Office
   820 North French Street, 3rd Floor
   Wilmington, DE 19801
   Tel: (302) 577-5141
   Email: mseemans@gmail.com


IHEARTMEDIA: Court Approves $171K Settlement in Wage Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Final Certification and Approval of Class Settlement Agreement
in the case captioned KARL VAN LITH, Plaintiff, v. iHEARTMEDIA +
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00066-
SKO (E.D. Cal.).

The Complaint includes, inter alia, the following two claims
against all Defendants on behalf of the proposed class: (1) First
Cause of Action, failure to furnish accurate wage statements in
violation of California Labor Code Section 226(a); and (2) Second
Cause of Action, failure to maintain accurate wage statements in
violation of California Labor Code Section 226(a).

The Proposed Settlement Agreement

The Settlement Agreement provides the following pertinent
definitions:

   1.3 Class Counsel Costs Payment means the expenses and costs
incurred by Class Counsel for Class Counsel's litigation and
resolution of this Action, as approved by the Court, which may not
exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000).

   1.4 Class Counsel Fees Payment means the attorneys' fees for
Class Counsel's litigation and resolution of this Action, as
approved by the Court, which may not exceed Eighty-Five Thousand
and Five Hundred Dollars ($85,500).

   1.6 Class Members mean all persons employed by Defendants in
the State of California during the Class Period who have not
signed an individual settlement agreement as of the date of entry
of the Court's Preliminary Approval Order. These individuals are
members of the class to be conditionally certified by the Court
pursuant to this Settlement and will remain members of the Class
if they do not properly elect to exclude themselves from this
Settlement, pursuant to the terms of this Settlement Agreement.

   1.16 Net Distribution Fund means the Total Settlement Amount,
less the amount that the Court approves for the PAGA Payment,
Plaintiff's Service Payment, Plaintiff's Settlement Payment, the
Class Counsel Fees Payment, the Class Counsel Costs Payment, and
Settlement Administrator Costs. This amount is estimated at One
Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($171,500).

In the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court found that the
requirements pertaining to the existence of a class, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation were all satisfied.
Following an inquiry from the Court, the parties stated at the
Hearing that there were no subsequent developments in this
litigation that would disturb the Court's prior findings as to
these requirements.  Further, the Court is not otherwise aware of
any developments that would alter these findings. Consequently,
the Court finds that the requirements relating to the existence of
a class, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
are all satisfied in this case.

Numerosity

In the present case, the proposed class includes all employees of
Defendants in the State of California including the date of the
Court's Preliminary Approval Order. Plaintiff states that the
proposed class includes 493 total participating members.
The Court finds that this potential class size satisfies the
numerosity requirement.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Predominance

The Court found that the predominance requirement was satisfied in
the Preliminary Approval Order, but noted that these claims must
be substantiated by evidence before the class is certified. The
Court therefore now addresses the predominance inquiry.
Here, the record reflects the following pertinent considerations:
(1) all Class Members received the same type of wage statements
from Defendants that Plaintiff contends were inaccurate, (2) the
alleged inaccuracies in the wage statements are identical with
respect to all Class Members, and (3) all Class Members could seek
the same penalties under Labor Code section 226(e) and PAGA.
These considerations support a finding of predominance.
The Court therefore finds that the predominance requirement is
satisfied in this case.

Superiority

The Court found that the second requirement of superiority was
satisfied in the Preliminary Approval Order. The parties stated at
the Hearing that there have been no subsequent developments in
this case that would disturb this finding, and the Court is not
otherwise aware of any such developments. As such, the Court finds
that the superiority requirement is satisfied here.
The Court finds that all of the pertinent requirements of Rule 23
are satisfied in this case. Accordingly, the Court will grant
final class certification.

Attorneys' Fees
Class counsel also moves for approval of their attorneys' fees.

Here, an upward adjustment is appropriate. Given the relatively
early settlement of this case, class counsel expended a
considerable amount of time litigating this action.  Additionally,
class counsel was able to secure a positive outcome for the class.
Finally, and importantly, class counsel accepted substantial risk
in litigating this case on a contingency fee basis with an
expectation that at least a modest risk enhancement would be
applied to any fee request. These considerations weigh strongly in
favor of applying a multiplier to the lodestar figure. The Court
therefore finds that the application of a multiplier is warranted.

The application of a relatively modest multiplier of two results
in an adjusted lodestar of $132,968 (the original lodestar figure
of $66,484 multiplied by two). This adjusted lodestar figure
exceeds Plaintiff's requested rate of $85,500, which the Court
found was supported by the percentage method. As the lodestar
calculation results in a figure that exceeds the result of the
percentage method, the Court finds that the lodestar cross-check
confirms that class counsel's fee request is reasonable.

In summary, the percentage method indicates that class counsel's
requested fees are reasonable. Additionally, the lodestar cross-
check supports this result. The Court therefore finds that
Plaintiff's requested attorneys' fees are reasonable.

Costs

Plaintiff also requests that the Court award costs.

Here, class counsel requests total costs in the amount of
$2,761.60.  These costs include postage, process server fees,
court reporter fees, online research charges, filing fees, and
Plaintiff's share of the mediator's fees. These costs are properly
recoverable by class counsel.  As such, the Court finds that class
counsel's requested costs of $2,761.60 are reasonable.

Service Payment

Finally, Plaintiff, the class representative, requests a service
fee in the amount of $3,000.

As the named plaintiff in this action, Plaintiff assisted counsel,
participated in formal and informal discovery and sat or
settlement negotiations. The class certainly benefited from
Plaintiff's efforts, as they secured the present settlement.
Plaintiff took on substantial risk in bringing this class action,
including exposing himself to notoriety, personal difficulties,
and risking damage to his professional reputation. Finally, the
requested service fee of $3,000 is well within if not lower than
the range of permissible service fees for named plaintiffs in
similar cases.   Based on these considerations, the Court finds
that Plaintiff's requested service fee of $3,000 is reasonable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8tc8mh7from Leagle.com.

Karl Van Lith, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Joshua Wasserman -
- rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley P.C.

Karl Van Lith, Plaintiff, represented by Vladimir Joseph Kozina --
vjkozinaj@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley P.C..

iHeartmedia + Entertainment, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jody
Landry -- jlandry@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Michael
Gerald Leggieri -- mleggieri@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.
Capstar Radio Operating Company, Defendant, represented by Jody
Landry, Littler Mendelson & Michael Gerald Leggieri, Littler
Mendelson.

iHeartmedia, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jody Landry, Littler
Mendelson & Michael Gerald Leggieri, Littler Mendelson.


ILLINOIS: Class of FOID Card Applicants Seeks Summary Judgment
--------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Isringhausen Gvillo, writing for Madison Record, reports
that a class of Illinois FOID card applicants seeks summary
judgment in regards to the "unlawfulness" of an extra $1
processing fee for firearm owner identification cards.

Thomas Maag of Wood River filed a motion for summary judgment as
to unlawfulness of the challenged FOID card fee on Oct. 18 on
behalf of the plaintiffs.

Mr. Maag argues that "it is undisputed that there exists no
mechanism for anyone to obtain a Firearm Owner's Identification
Card upon the payment of a $10.00 fee, as it is undisputed that
the only payment system that Defendants use to collect the fee
charges $11.00.  Defendant has not articulated any reason,
justification or excuse as to why they can legally charge $11.00
for a FOID card."

He adds that when asked "point blank" to articulate, the defendant
objected the request, arguing that it "requests attorney work
products and the mental impressions of Defendants' counsel."

"In other words," Mr. Maag wrote, "Defendant was unable to
articulate any actual lawful basis to support the surcharge, and
instead of admitting same, stated a baseless objection."

Mr. Maag asks the court to enter summary judgment on the issue of
the overcharge and to enjoin the defendants from charging or
collecting the fee.  He also asks the court to order the
defendants to disgorge and refund the fees.

Mr. Maag filed the suit Oct. 15, 2015, for plaintiff Gary Patrick
Sterr against Firearms Services Bureau Chief Jessica Trame and
Illinois Treasurer Michael Frerichs.

Ms. Trame and Mr. Frerichs are represented by Attorney General
Lisa Madigan.

In the complaint, Mr. Maag wrote that Mr. Sterr was charged the
extra dollar as a convenience fee through the Illinois E-pay
program for processing applications online.  He argues that
statute 430 ILCS 65/5 expressly states that the FOID fee is $10.

By charging an additional $1, he claims Ms. Trame is unilaterally
imposing a 10 percent surcharge on FOID cards without statutory
authority.

He further claims it is impossible to get a FOID card without
paying the extra fee on top of the $10 mandatory cost (except for
certain members of the military who are exempt all together)
because the Firearms Services Bureau stopped accepting paper
applications that allowed people to mail $10 checks or money
orders.

"Defendants have charged a minimum of ten thousand people, and
possibly substantially more, well into the hundreds of thousands
or millions of class members," Mr. Maag wrote.

In 2011, the state received 321,000 FOID applications, he wrote.

Mr. Maag notes that in order to lawfully possess a firearm in
Illinois, "it is generally required to have in a person's
possession a currently valid" FOID card.

Madison County Circuit Judge Dennis Ruth granted class
certification on June 28.

The class consists of "all persons who applied for a FOID card
from March 15, 2015, through and including the date of final
judgment and paid a fee in excess of $10.00 when applying for said
FOID card."

Madison County Circuit Court case number 15-L-1337
[GN]


IMPERVA INC: Jan. 31 Securities Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Imperva Securities Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND DIVISION

VISWANATH V. SHANKAR, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.
IMPERVA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

CLASS ACTION
Case No. 4:14-cv-01680-PJH

SUMMARY NOTICE

TO: ALL PERSONS AND ENTITIES WHO PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED IMPERVA,
INC. ("IMPERVA") SECURITIES BETWEEN MAY 2, 2013 THROUGH APRIL 9,
2014, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, that a
hearing will be held on January 31, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., before the
Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton, United States District Judge, at
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building &
United States Courthouse, 1301 Clay Street, Courtroom 3, Oakland,
California 94612, for the purpose of determining: (1) whether the
proposed settlement as set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement
dated August 30, 2017 ("Stipulation") of the above-captioned
action ("Litigation") for $19,000,000.00 in cash should be
approved by the Court as fair, just, reasonable, and adequate; (2)
whether a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice
should be entered by the Court dismissing the Litigation with
prejudice; (3) whether the Plan of Allocation is fair, reasonable,
and adequate and should be approved; and (4) whether the
application of Lead Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees and
expenses and Lead Plaintiff's expenses in connection with this
Litigation should be approved.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED IMPERVA SECURITIES BETWEEN MAY 2,
2013 THROUGH APRIL 9, 2014, INCLUSIVE, YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED
BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS LITIGATION. If you have not received a
detailed Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class
Action ("Notice") and a copy of the Proof of Claim and Release
form ("Proof of Claim and Release"), you may obtain copies by
writing to Imperva Securities Litigation, Claims Administrator,
c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC, P.O. Box 404031, Louisville, KY 40233-4031
or on the internet at www.impervasecuritieslitigation.com.

If you are a Class Member, in order to share in the distribution
of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and
Release by mail (postmarked no later than January 22, 2018) or
submitted electronically no later than January 22, 2018,
establishing that you are entitled to recovery.  Your failure to
submit your Proof of Claim and Release by January 22, 2018 will
subject your claim to possible rejection and may preclude you from
receiving any of the recovery in connection with the settlement of
this Litigation.  If you are a Member of the Class and do not
request exclusion, you will be bound by the settlement and any
judgment and release entered in the Litigation, including, but not
limited to, the Judgment, whether or not you submit a Proof of
Claim and Release.

To exclude yourself from the Class, you must submit a written
request for exclusion in accordance with the instructions set
forth in the Notice such that it is received no later than January
3, 2018.  All Members of the Class who have not requested
exclusion from the Class will be bound by the settlement entered
in the Litigation even if they do not submit a timely Proof of
Claim and Release.

Any objection to the settlement, the Plan of Allocation of
settlement proceeds, or the fee and expense application must be
submitted to the Court in accordance with the instructions set
forth in the Notice no later than January 3, 2018.  If you object,
but also want to be eligible for a payment from the settlement,
you must still submit a Proof of Claim and Release or you will not
receive a payment from the settlement.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE. If you have any questions about the settlement, you
may contact Lead Counsel at the following address:

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
DOUGLAS R. BRITTON
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101

DATED: October 11, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND DIVISION


JOHN VARVATOS: Court Conditionally Certifies "Knox" EPA Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TESSA KNOX, Plaintiff, v. JOHN VARVATOS ENTERPRISES
INC., Defendant, No. 17 Civ. 772 (GHW) (GWG) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Gabriel W. Gorenstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part Knox's
motion for conditional approval of a collective action.

Knox has sued her former employer on the ground that JV gave an
annual $12,000 clothing allowance to male sales associates but not
to female sales associates in violation of the Equal Pay Act
("EPA").  JV designs clothing and sells that clothing at JV-
operated retail locations.  From approximately August 2016 to
February 2017, JV employed Knox as a sales associate in its East
Hampton, New York store.

Knox seeks an order allowing the case to proceed as a collective
action, with the proposed persons to be notified consisting of all
current and former female sales associates employed by JV at JV-
operated stores in the United States at any time since Feb. 1,
2014.  Knox's motion in the case centers on the notice that she
seeks to have sent to JV's current and former female sales
associates.  But Knox also requests that the Court rules that the
statute of limitations be tolled for opt-in Plaintiffs as of at
least the date of the filing of the motion.

Judge Gorenstein finds that Knox has easily made the requisite
"modest factual showing" in light of her own observations and JV's
numerous statements that the male-only clothing allowance policy
exists.  Knox has made the requisite "modest factual showing" that
she and the potential opt-in Plaintiffs are similarly situated
with respect to Knox's allegation that JV's policy to provide the
clothing allowance to male sales associates and not to female
sales associates violated their rights under the EPA.  In sum, the
Judge approved the case to proceed as a collective action with
notices to be sent to female employees of JV at all 22 stores
nationwide.

With respect to whether the potential opt-in Plaintiffs have shown
entitlement to equitable tolling, Judge Gorentein finds that Knox
has failed to establish the prongs of the equitable tolling
doctrine.  The Judge has no basis for making a ruling at this time
that any current or future opt-in female sales associates' claims
must be equitably tolled given that there has been no showing that
they have met the "diligence" prong of the equitable tolling
doctrine.  Because governing precedent does not permit equitable
tolling, he denied Knox's application for a categorical ruling
tolling the statute of limitations for all opt-in Plaintiffs.
This ruling is without prejudice to any application by a Plaintiff
for equitable tolling that conforms to the requirements of the
equitable tolling doctrine.

Because Knox has not shown a realistic possibility that former
female sales associates whose employment ended outside the
limitations period will be able to demonstrate equitable tolling,
the notice will be sent only to individuals who were last employed
by JV within three years prior to the date the notices are mailed.

Because Knox has given no reason why she requires either dates of
birth or work locations to notify potential opt-in Plaintiffs, the
Judge rejected her Knox's request that JV produces dates of birth
and work locations, but otherwise granted Knox's request that JV
discloses the potential opt-in Plaintiffs' names, mailing
addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and dates of
employment.

JV asserts that Knox should not be allowed to send notice to
employees whose claims accrued before Knox's own employment began
in 2016 because Knox has not shown that the clothing allowance
policy existed before that date.  Judge Gorenstein finds it a fair
inference, however, that the policy did not come into existence
only when Knox was hired.  Thus, there is evidence that the policy
has been in effect for at least the three-year limitations period.

The Judge ordered that Knox's Proposed Notice of Pendency of
Lawsuit should include a statement in the introduction providing
in substance that "The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has not yet made any decision about
whether this lawsuit has merit."  The final notice should include
JV's proposed amendment, except that the reference to "other
tangible items in your possession" should be excised as there is
no suggestion that discovery would require production of such
items.

Judge Gorenstein authorized service of the notice by FedEx Express
Saver.  Knox will notify potential opt-in Plaintiffs by email and
send potential opt-in plaintiffs a reminder notice 21 days before
the opt-in deadline.  In light of the fact that there is no
suggestion that there will be any problem reaching current
employees though mail or email, the Court finds the posting of the
notice unnecessary.

For these reasons, Judge Gorenstein granted Knox's motion for
conditional approval of a collective action as set forth.  Knox
will provide a copy of the proposed mailing to JV prior to its
distribution.  If there are any further disputes, the parties
should discuss them and present any disagreement to the Court
promptly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/AHi8o9 from Leagle.com.

Tessa Knox, Plaintiff, represented by William Irvin Dunnegan --
wd@dunnegan.com -- Dunnegan & Scileppi LLC.

Tessa Knox, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Sup Chung --
ac@dunnegan.com -- Dunnegan & Scileppi LLC, Laura Jean Scileppi --
ls@dunnegan.com -- Dunnegan & Scileppi LLC & Richard Weiss --
rw@dunnegan.com -- Dunnegan & Scileppi LLC.

John Varvatos Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ned
Henry Bassen, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP & Jordan Elliot Pace,
Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Faces "Hunt" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Association. The case is styled as Mark Donald Hunt and
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Defendant, Case No.
0:17-cv-62094-BB (S.D. Fla., October 25, 2017).

JPMorgan Chase is a global financial services firm and one of the
largest banking institutions in the United States, with operations
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan Harris Kline, Esq.
   2761 Executive Park Drive
   Weston, FL 33331
   Tel: (954) 888-4646
   Fax: (954) 888-4647
   Email: emailservice@jklawfl.com


KAPLAN AND WEST: 9th Cir. Says Legal Fees May Not Be Enough
-----------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
the Ninth Circuit on October 30 again remanded a long-running
dispute over a fees award to attorneys who won a $9.5 settlement
involving Kaplan test prep courses.

In 2013, Kaplan and West Publishing agreed to pay $9.5 million to
settle an antitrust case involving bar exam review courses.

The Glendale law firm Harris & Ruble represented Stephen Stetson
in his 2008 class action against West Publishing and Kaplan,
claiming they colluded to squeeze out competitors in the market
for bar review courses.

Attorneys asked for $1.9 million in fees, which U.S. District
Judge Manuel Real called excessive. He awarded them $585,000.

But last year, the Ninth Circuit found that Real failed to justify
the 70 percent fee reduction and remanded to U.S. District Judge
Gary Klausner.

Klausner then awarded $918,898 in fees and the attorneys appealed
again.

On October 30, the Ninth Circuit panel remanded to Klausner again.
The panel said the judge erred in not making a calculation "to
compensate for the delayed payment" and relied on the attorneys'
2013 rates and a privately published analysis called the "Real
Rate Report."

While the attorneys argued in filings that Klausner's denial of
their fee request was "factually and legally unsound," the Ninth
Circuit did not go that far.

"The district court's decision reveals nothing of the report's
methodology. Use of the Real Rate Report may, however, be
appropriate if supported by findings that the report reflects
contemporaneous rates," the unsigned ruling states.

Harris & Ruble attorney Alan Harris, Esq. --
HarrisA@harrisandruble.com -- argued in court filings that the
case carried inherent risks and legal hurdles that Klausner should
have factored into the award.

"The risk of nonpayment includes both the possibility that a
plaintiff will not make any recovery as well as the possibility
that the defendant will be insolvent," Harris wrote.

The panel vacated the award and told Klausner to reconsider the
risk the attorneys had taken in litigating the case, as well as
the attorneys' updated hourly rate.

The court did affirm Klausner's denial of expert fees, finding the
attorneys had provided little evidence of their contribution to
the case.

"The district court denied costs for expert fees because the
amount requested for two experts was not justified and the time
records submitted by appellants did not reveal which fees were
attributed to which expert," the 5-page memo states.

Ninth Circuit Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Richard Paez and Milan
Smith sat on the panel.


KEYCORP: Court Grants Partial Bid to Dismiss "Stolarick" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the Defendant's
partial motion to dismiss the case captioned KYLE E. STOLARICK,
for himself and all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v.
KEYCORP., trading as KEYBANK, N.A, et al. Defendants, Civil Action
No. 17-0593 (E.D. Pa.).

On Jan. 22, 2016, the Plaintiff commenced an action against his
mortgage lender, First Niagara, captioned Stolarick v. First
Niagara Financial Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 16-0296 ("Previous
Litigation"), and asserted claims against First Niagara for, inter
alia, violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
("FDCPA"), and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law ("UTPCPL").  That matter was assigned to this
Court.

Stolarick's claims were premised on allegations that following a
successful completion of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy in August 2014,
First Niagara continued to process his mortgage account as if it
was not current, in default, and nonperforming, despite the
account being current. Because the damages alleged were below
$150,000, the matter was placed in the court's mandatory
arbitration program pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 53.2
and scheduled for an arbitration hearing to be held on
Dec. 2, 2016.

Two months before the scheduled arbitration, Plaintiff filed a
motion for leave to amend the complaint seeking to add class
action claims and a claim for a violation of Section 2605 of
RESPA. Plaintiff's proposed RESPA claim was premised upon First
Niagara's alleged failure, as a mortgage servicer, to address
requested corrections to Plaintiff's mortgage account after
Plaintiff sent First Niagara a Qualified Written Request ("QWR").
By Order dated Nov. 16, 2016, this Court denied his motion to
amend the complaint.

On Dec. 2, 2016, the Plaintiff and First Niagara participated in
the scheduled arbitration which resulted in an award of $30,000 in
Plaintiff's favor.  On Jan. 10, 2017, a civil judgment was entered
on the arbitration award and the matter was closed.

On Feb. 8, 2017, less than a month after judgment was entered in
the Previous Litigation, the Plaintiff commenced the current
litigation against Defendant KeyBank (First Niagara's successor-
in-interest) in which he asserts claims for violations of the
FDCPA, Pennsylvania's UTPCPL, and RESPA.  While the Plaintiff's
current complaint contains some limited facts that occurred the
afternoon following the arbitration, most of the allegations
therein are identical or at least similar to those alleged in the
Previous Litigation.

As in the Previous Litigation, the Plaintiff essentially contends
in the current complaint that following the successful completion
of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy, KeyBank continued to incorrectly
process the Plaintiff's mortgage account as if it was not current,
in default, and non-performing.  Like his proposed amended
complaint in the Previous Litigation, the Plaintiff's current
complaint alleges a RESPA claim premised upon KeyBank's alleged
failure to respond to the Plaintiff's QWR, in violation of 12
U.S.C. Section 2605(e).

Before the Court is the partial motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) filed by Keycorp, which
seeks the dismissal of all but one of the claims asserted against
it by the Plaintiff based on the doctrine of res judicata.
Specifically, the Defendant argues that the claims that the
Plaintiff now asserts against it were, or should have been,
litigated in a previous action before the Court captioned
Stolarick v. First Niagara Financial Group.  The Plaintiff opposed
the motion.

Judge Quinones Alejandro finds that a side-by-side comparison of
the allegations in the two complaints with respect to the FDCPA
and UTPCPL claims reveals significant, if not complete,
duplication.  The Plaintiff's current RESPA claim is also
duplicative in almost all respects of the claim the Plaintiff
sought to assert in the Previous Litigation by way of an amended
complaint.  Absent from his current complaint, however, are any
facts that were either unknown to the Plaintiff or undiscoverable
at the time of the Previous Litigation.  As such, the Plaintiff's
current FTCPA, UTPCPL, and RESPA claims are premised on the same
causes of action asserted in the Previous Litigation.  Therefore,
the claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

For the reasons stated, Judge Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro granted
the Defendant's partial motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant KeyBank under the FDCPA
(Count I), the UTPCPL (Count II) and Section 2605(e) of RESPA
(Count IV) are dismissed.  An Order consistent with the Memorandum
Opinion follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/F1ViFM from Leagle.com.

KYLE E. STOLARICK, Plaintiff, represented by STUART A. EISENBERG -
- mccullougheisenberg@gmail.com -- MCCULLOUGH EISENBERG LLC.

KEYCORP, Defendant, represented by JEREMY M. CAMPANA --
Jeremy.Campana@ThompsonHine.com -- THOMPSON HINE LLP, JESSICA
SALISBURY-COPPER -- Jessica.Salisbury-Copper@ThompsonHine.com --
THOMPSON HINE LLP & RICHARD A. FRESHWATER --
Richard.Freshwater@ThompsonHine.com -- THOMPSON HINE LLP.

WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., L.P.A., Defendant, represented by
RICHARD J. PERR -- rperr@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN KREKSTEIN &
HARRIS, P.C. & MONICA M. LITTMAN -- mlittman@finemanlawfirm.com --
FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC.


KUSHNER COS: AG Probes Rental Practices Following Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Doug Donovan, writing for The Baltimore Sun, reports that
the Maryland Attorney General's office is investigating the rental
practices at Baltimore-area apartment complexes owned by the real
estate company of senior White House adviser Jared Kushner, the
company confirmed.

"We have been working with the Maryland Attorney General's Office
to provide information in response to its request," said Christine
Taylor, a spokeswoman for the Kushner Cos. in New York City.  "We
are in compliance with all state and local laws."

A spokeswoman for Attorney General Brian Frosh, a Democrat, said
the office never confirms or denies the existence of any
investigation.

Mr. Kushner, the son-in-law of President Donald J. Trump, was CEO
of the Kushner Cos. from 2008 until Jan. 19, when he stepped down
to join the Trump administration.  He retains ownership of the
firm.

It was unclear what, specifically, the attorney general's office
would be investigating.  The company is being sued by tenants who
allege the firm charges them improper fees and then uses the
threat of eviction to collect.

Frosh has been a critic of the use of civil arrest warrants to
pressure tenants to pay outstanding rent and other debts.

Since 2013, the first full year in which the Kushner Cos. operated
in Maryland, corporate entities affiliated with the firm's 17
apartment complexes here have sought the civil arrest of 105
former tenants for failing to appear in court to face allegations
of unpaid debt, The Baltimore Sun has reported.

That's the most by any property manager in the state during that
time. Court records show that 20 former Kushner tenants have been
detained.

The Kushner Cos. operates nearly 8,800 units in Maryland, most of
them in Baltimore County.  They generate at least $90 million in
revenue annually, according to prospectuses by the mortgage giant
Freddie Mac, and at least $30 million in profit, according to
financing documents provided to investors who hold the mortgages.

Three of the portfolio's apartment complexes -- Dutch Village in
Northeast Baltimore, Carriage Hill in Randallstown and Highland
Village in Lansdowne -- received $6.1 million in federal rental
subsidies since Jan. 1, 2015, according to records obtained
through a Freedom of Information Act request. That's money that
helps the poor pay rent.

A White House representative told The Sun in April that Kushner
would recuse himself from any policy decisions related to vouchers
administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, or HUD.

Congressional Democrats from Maryland have been trying since
August to get the Kushner Cos. to provide information about rental
practices to help them determine if the company is in compliance
with HUD rules.  A Kushner Cos. attorney said in August that the
company is in compliance with the Housing Choice voucher program,
also known as Section 8.

The vouchers have helped 268 tenants pay rent at the Kushner
properties, finance records show. Apartments rented for an average
of nearly $950.

Baltimore County renters filed a class action lawsuit in 2015
challenging the collection tactics of Sawyer Property Management,
a partner of the Maryland Kushner affiliate Westminster
Management. Tenants claimed the firms violated the state's
Consumer Protection Rights Act by pursuing money without a debt
collector's license.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals disagreed in November.

"Each complaint failed to state a claim under the Consumer Debt
Collection Act or under the Consumer Protection Act," the court
wrote.

Two tenants of Kushner's Westminster Management properties in
Baltimore and Baltimore County filed a new class action lawsuit in
Baltimore in September alleging the firm has been charging
improper fees and threatening eviction to force payment.

In the lawsuit, the tenants allege Westminster improperly applied
tenants' rent payments to allegedly overdue fees for other
services, prompting more late fees and threats of eviction, and
perpetuating a cycle of debt.

The nonprofit Public Justice Center said Westminster officials
charge tenants "excessive, illegal fees, regularly misapply
tenants' subsequent payments in part to the illegal fees, and then
deem the next rent payments 'late' to justify additional excessive
fees."  A Kushner Cos. spokesman said the company "will respond to
the complaint at the appropriate time in the legal proceedings."
[GN]


LA BOOM DISCO: Faces "Duran" Suit in Eastern District New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against La Boom Disco Inc.
The case is styled as Radames Duran, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. La Boom Disco Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06331 (E.D. N.Y., October 31, 2017).

La Boom Disco Inc. is an Adult entertainment club in Huntington
Park, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


LABELLE HOMEHEALTH: Court Certifies Employee Class in "Richert"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
Jenna Richert, Plaintiff, v. LaBelle HomeHealth Care Service LLC,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-437 (S.D. Ohio).  Defendant's
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is denied and
Plaintiff's motion for equitable tolling is denied without
prejudice.

Plaintiff has been employed by LaBelle as a home health aide in
Ohio since August 2014.  She alleges that she regularly works more
than 40 hours per week. She further alleges that LaBelle employs
approximately 50 additional home health aides who work in excess
of 40 hours per week. The complaint asserts that LaBelle has not
paid plaintiff or members of the proposed class the overtime
compensation to which they are allegedly entitled under the "Home
Care Final Rule," a rule promulgated by the United States
Department of Labor in 2013 to extend wage and overtime
protections to home care workers.

The motion to conditionally certify and the motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings present the same question: whether
recovery for unpaid overtime under the Final Rule should begin
with alleged violations occurring on January 1, 2015 or should be
limited to the period after October 13, 2015.

A collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act may be
maintained against any employer by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated.

Plaintiff attests that she and other individuals who were employed
as home health aides by LaBelle performed the same primary work
duties and had the same compensation structure. She further
attests that she and other home health aides of whom she was aware
have regularly worked more than 40 hours but have not been paid
overtime wages by LaBelle. She asserts that LaBelle's failure to
pay overtime wages is pursuant to a company policy to pay home
health aides their regular hourly wages for overtime hours worked.

The Court finds that plaintiff has satisfied the fairly lenient
standard for conditional certification. The Court therefore grants
conditional certification of a collective action by a class
defined as all persons employed as a home health aide by LaBelle
HomeHealth Care Service LLC at any time from January 1, 2015
through the present who worked more than 40 hours per week but
were not paid overtime wages.

Equitable Tolling

A two-year statute of limitations applies to FLSA claims for
unpaid compensation, except that claims for willful violations
have a three-year statute of limitations. A claim accrues on the
date on which payment is owed, such that each pay-check which
fails to include owed wages constitutes a separate violation.
Courts typically consider the following five factors to in
determining whether equitable tolling should apply: 1) plaintiff's
lack of notice of the filing requirement; 2) plaintiff's lack of
constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 3) diligence in
pursuing one's legal rights; 4) absence of prejudice to the
defendant; and 5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in remaining
ignorant of the particular legal requirement for filing his claim.

Plaintiff requests that the claims of all unnamed class members be
tolled until the date on which they file their consent to join the
lawsuit. According to plaintiff, the parties engaged in good faith
efforts to reach an agreement regarding conditional certification
but were unable to do so.

Defendant responds that a blanket application of equitable tolling
in favor of potential class members would be premature and would
violate the principles that equitable tolling be used sparingly
and on a case-by-case basis.

In Atkinson v. TeleTech Holdings, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-253, 2015 WL
853234 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015), the court identified several
difficulties of examining a pre-certification motion for equitable
tolling in a FLSA collective action: "In contrast to a class
action lawsuit brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
the named plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action do not represent
anyone other than themselves. Accordingly, the named plaintiffs
have no authority to move to equitably toll the claims of the
potential opt-in plaintiffs.  Moreover, because the potential opt-
in plaintiffs do not become parties to the lawsuit until they file
their consent forms with the court, the court lacks jurisdiction
to grant them equitable relief."

The Court finds the reasoning of Atkinson to be persuasive. It is
true, as plaintiff notes, that other decisions from this District
have granted equitable tolling to FLSA claims for all putative
class members.  The Court presently lacks sufficient information
to apply the factors laid out in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151
(6th Cir. 1988). The Court finds that plaintiff has not met her
burden of showing that the potential plaintiffs' failure to meet
the deadline "unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond their
control.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y78thmwkfrom
Leagle.com.

Jenna Richert, Plaintiff, represented by Kimberly L. Hall --
khall@ccj.com -- Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, Ltd..

Jenna Richert, Plaintiff, represented by Tricia L. Pycraft --
tpycraft@ccj.com -- Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, Ltd..
LaBelle HomeHealth Care Services LLC, Defendant, represented by
Janay Marie Stevens -- janay.stevens@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore &
Shohl LLP & Jan Elizabeth Hensel -- jan.hensel@dinsmore.com --
Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP.

Sally Njume-Tatsing, Defendant, represented by Janay Marie
Stevens, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP & Jan Elizabeth Hensel, Dinsmore &
Shohl, LLP.


LENDING CLUB: Class Definition Order in Securities Suit Entered
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE LENDING CLUB SECURITIES LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 3:16-cv-02627-WHA
(N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California entered an order regarding
definition of the certified class.

On Oct. 20, 2017 the Court certified the class in the action.  The
Court's Order re Class Certification provides a purchase cut-off
date for the class of June 8, 2016.  The parties agree that, for
the reasons stated in the Court's order regarding tracing issues,
the appropriate cut-off date for Section 11 claims is June 8, 2015
rather than June 8, 2016.

The parties stipulated, subject to the Court's approval, that the
Class Definition should be all persons and entities who purchased
or otherwise acquired the common stock of LendingClub during the
period from Dec. 11, 2014 through May 6, 2016 (for claims under
the Exchange Act of 1934) and all those who purchased or acquired
LendingClub common stock during the period from December 11, 2014
through June 8, 2015 (for claims under the 1933 Securities Act)
and were damaged thereby.

Excluded from the Class are short sellers who incurred losses
during the class period as a result of their short sales, the
Defendants and their families, the officers, directors, and
affiliates of defendants, at all relevant times, members of their
immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs,
successors or assigns, and any entity in which defendants have or
had a controlling interest.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Class will include any
investment company or pooled investment fund, including, but not
limited to, mutual fund families, exchange traded funds, fund of
funds and hedge funds, in which the Underwriter Defendants, or any
of them, have, has or may have a direct or indirect interest, or
as to which any Underwriter Defendant's affiliates may act as an
investment advisor, but as to which any Underwriter Defendant
alone or together with any of its respective affiliates is neither
a majority owner nor the holder of a majority beneficial interest.

Judge Alsup granted the parties' stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4oqpMv from Leagle.com.

Steeve Evellard, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom &
Gross LLP, pro hac vice.

Steeve Evellard, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Water and Power Employees' Retirement, Disability and Death Plan
of the City of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, represented by Carissa
Jasmine Dolan -- cdolan@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and
Dowd LLP, Michael Albert -- malbert@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, Rachel Lynn Jensen -- rachelj@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Scott H. Saham --
scotts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Danielle
Suzanne Myers -- danim@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Darren Jay Robbins -- darrenr@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Jason A. Forge -- jforge@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Shawn A. Williams --
shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Thomas
Harry Peters -- thom.peters@lacity.org -- Los Angeles City
Attorney's Office.

Nicole Wertz, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob Allen Walker --
jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Lesley Elizabeth Weaver
-- lweaver@bfalaw.com -- Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP.

LendingClub Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Michael
Grable -- davegrable@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Sullivan LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles --
josephsarles@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver and
Hedges, Alexandra P. Summer -- asummer@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett,
Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Beth A. Kaswan -- BKASWAN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -
- Scott & Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, Diane M. Doolittle --
dianedoolittle@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, John T. Jasnoch -- JJASNOCH@SCOTT-SCOTT.CO -- Scott
Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, John Mark Potter --
johnpotter@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, Kyle Kenneth Batter -- kylebatter@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, Mark Cotton Molumphy --
mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy LLP, Robert
Patrick Vance, Jr. -- bobbyvance@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP, Sean Masson -- SMASSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM
-- Scott & Scott Attorneys At Law, Victoria Blohm Parker --
vickiparker@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan,
LLP & William C. Fredericks -- WFREDERICKS@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM --
Scott and Scott Attorneys At Law.

Renaud LaPlanche, Defendant, represented by Scott Alexander
Edelman -- sedelman@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed, pro hac vice,
Adam Joshua Fee -- afee@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed, pro hac
vice, Lisa Marie Damm Northrup -- lnorthrup@milbank.com --
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy LLP, Robert John Liubicic --
rliubicic@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed & Sarah L. Rothenberg --
srothenberg@milbank.com -- Milbank, Tweed, Hadley McCloy LLP.

Carrie L Dolan, Defendant, represented by Charlene Sachi Shimada -
- charlene.shimada@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Lucy Han Wang -- lucy.wang@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Susan Diane Resley -- susan.resley@morganlewis.com -
- Morgan Lewis & Bockius.

Daniel T. Ciporin, Defendant, represented by David Michael Grable,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.

Jeffrey Crowe, Defendant, represented by David Michael Grable,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.

Rebecca Lynn, Defendant, represented by David Michael Grable,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.

John J. Mack, Defendant, represented by David Michael Grable,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.

Mary Meeker, Defendant, represented by David Michael Grable, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and
Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Sullivan, LLP.

John C. (Hans) Morris, Defendant, represented by David Michael
Grable, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.

Lawrence H. Summers, Defendant, represented by David Michael
Grable, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan LLP, Diane M. Doolittle,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John Mark Potter, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver and Hedges, Kyle Kenneth Batter, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr., Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan, LLP & Victoria Blohm Parker, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, LLP.


LEVAIN BAKERY: Faces "Andrews" Suit in E. Dist. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Levain Bakery, Inc.
The case is styled as Victor Andrews, Individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff
v. Levain Bakery, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06196 (E.D.
N.Y., October 24, 2017).

Levain Bakery is a retail bakery that opened in 1995 and is
located at 167 West 74th Street, on the Upper West Side
neighborhood of Manhattan, New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


LONG BEACH, CA: Court Terminates "Ochoa" ADA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale S. Fischer U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California entered judgment to terminate the case captioned
HECTOR OCHOA, CYNDE SOTO, CATHY SHIMOZONO, BEN ROCKWELL, AND
SHARON PARKER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, a public entity, and
ROBERT GARCIA, in his official capacity as Mayor, Defendants, Case
No. 2:14-cv-04307-DSF-FFM (C.D. Cal.).

In accordance with the Court's order granting final approval of
the class action settlement, judgment is entered in the case with
respect to all claims asserted by the Named Plaintiffs and the
certified class in the complaint.  The clerk is ordered to
terminate case No. 2:14-cv-04307-DSF-FFM.  The Court retains
jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement during the Settlement
Term, and over any disputes that may arise during the Settlement
Term.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/YrIgxh from Leagle.com.

Hector Ochoa, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee --
alee@gbdhlegal.com -- Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho.

Hector Ochoa, Plaintiff, represented by Anna Mercedes Rivera --
anna.rivera@drlcenter.org -- Disability Rights Legal Center, Linda
M. Dardarian -- ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com -- Goldstein Borgen
Dardarian and Ho, Meredith Jayne Weaver -- mweaver@dralegal.org --
Disability Rights Advocates, Sean Betouliere --
sbetouliere@dralegal.org -- Disablity Rights Advocates, Stuart
Seaborn -- seabornlegal@outlook.com -- Disability Rights
California, Maronel Barajas -- mbarajas_law@yahoo.com --
Disability Rights Legal Center & Raymond A. Wendell --
rwendell@gbdhlegal.com -- Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho.

Cynde Soto, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein
Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Anna Mercedes Rivera, Disability Rights
Legal Center, Linda M. Dardarian, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and
Ho, Sean Betouliere, Disablity Rights Advocates, Stuart Seaborn,
Disability Rights California, Maronel Barajas, Disability Rights
Legal Center, Meredith Jayne Weaver, Disability Rights Advocates &
Raymond A. Wendell, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho.

Cathy Shimozono, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee,
Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Anna Mercedes Rivera,
Disability Rights Legal Center, Linda M. Dardarian, Goldstein
Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Sean Betouliere, Disablity Rights
Advocates, Stuart Seaborn, Disability Rights California, Maronel
Barajas, Disability Rights Legal Center, Meredith Jayne Weaver,
Disability Rights Advocates & Raymond A. Wendell, Goldstein Borgen
Dardarian and Ho.

Ben Rockwell, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein
Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Anna Mercedes Rivera, Disability Rights
Legal Center, Linda M. Dardarian, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and
Ho, Sean Betouliere, Disablity Rights Advocates, Stuart Seaborn,
Disability Rights California, Maronel Barajas, Disability Rights
Legal Center, Meredith Jayne Weaver, Disability Rights Advocates &
Raymond A. Wendell, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho.

Sharon Parker, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee,
Goldstein Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Anna Mercedes Rivera,
Disability Rights Legal Center, Linda M. Dardarian, Goldstein
Borgen Dardarian and Ho, Sean Betouliere, Disablity Rights
Advocates, Stuart Seaborn, Disability Rights California, Maronel
Barajas, Disability Rights Legal Center, Meredith Jayne Weaver,
Disability Rights Advocates & Raymond A. Wendell, Goldstein Borgen
Dardarian and Ho.

City of Long Beach, Defendant, represented by Allan Edward Ceran -
- aceran@bwslaw.com -- Burke Williams and Sorensen LLP, Brian S.
Ginter -- bginter@bwslaw.com -- Burke Williams and Sorensen LLP,
Cheryl Johnson-Hartwell -- cjohnson-hartwell@bwslaw.com -- Burke
Williams & Sorensen LLP & Vincent C. Ewing, Alvarez-Glasman and
Colvin.


MAC'S CONVENIENCE: B.C. Court OKs Migrant Workers' Class-Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Keung, writing for The Star, reports that a B.C. court
has approved a class-action lawsuit against Mac's Convenience
Stores and three immigration consulting firms by migrant workers
who say they paid thousands of dollars for jobs in Canada that did
not materialize.

The four lead plaintiffs -- two each from Nepal and the
Philippines -- allege that Mac's and the consulting firms had
promised them jobs but failed to deliver, and that the consulting
companies "unlawfully" collected recruitment fees from them.

Mac's and the consulting firms say the job positions were not
guaranteed and the fees were not for job placement but for
assistance with the immigration and settlement process.

The court's decision let the lawsuit proceed "is significant as it
means that workers recruited abroad to work in Canada and who have
paid recruitment fees, or whose contracts of employment have not
been honoured by Canadian employers, or who have otherwise had
their rights infringed, have an effective means of seeking
redress," said Charles Gordon, Esq. one of the lawyers for the
plaintiffs.

"Acting individually, legal action is not feasible for such
workers. By allowing them to act collectively as a class, the
court has provided them a means of seeking justice."

All three immigration companies named in the lawsuit -- Overseas
Immigration Services, Overseas Career and Consulting Services
(OCCS), and Trident Immigration -- are alleged by the claimants to
be controlled by Surrey, B.C. man Kuldeep Bansal, a licensed
consultant with the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory
Council.

According to the statement of claim, the lead plaintiffs were all
recruited in job fairs held in Dubai and paid around $8,000 in
fees in exchange for the promise of a job in Canada.

Typically, they paid $2,000 in cash in Dubai to get the process
started and then the balance of payment after they received an
employment offer from Mac's and a positive labour market
assessment approval for their visa to Canada, according to the
claim.

Under Canadian laws, employers are permitted to hire third-party
representatives to recruit foreign workers but they must pay for
all fees associated with the service and cannot download the costs
to workers. Recruiters are also prohibited from charging workers
fees for job placement.

Two of the workers' contracts with Mac's included a term that said
Mac's would assume the cost of transportation from the Middle East
to Alberta and back to their home countries, according to the
lawsuit.

The lead plaintiffs say they received a visa to Canada and were
issued work permits upon arrival. However, they say there was no
job for them at Mac's when they got here.

None of the allegations have been proven in court. No statement of
defence has yet been filed by Mac's or the consulting firms.

Counsel for the consulting firms didn't responded to the Star's
request for comment for this article. Mac's declined to comment.

According to the B.C. court decision's summary of the defendants'
submission, Mac's started using Overseas Career and Consulting
Services, a licensed employment agency in B.C., in 2012 to assist
in recruiting foreign workers in parts of Western Canada. It
agreed to pay the employment agency a success fee for every worker
that was hired.

In its submission, Mac's said it never authorized any party,
including OCCS, to charge or collect any payments from migrant
workers, directly or indirectly. Neither has Mac's ever collected
or received any such payment from workers, it said.

The company said its labour needs were changing constantly and it
only executed employment contracts when positions were available.
There was always a possibility that the position would no longer
be available by the time the temporary foreign worker candidates'
visas, work permits, and travel arrangements could be finalized.

Mac's also said it understood OCCS did not charge candidates fees
for securing jobs, but did charge them fees relating to assisting
them with processing immigration documents and navigating the
immigration process, which Mac's said it had no involvement in.

The consulting firms said in their court submission that they did
not collect any fees for job recruitment but for immigration and
settlement services for the workers.

In June, a parliamentary standing committee recommended an
overhaul of the regulations of immigration consultants, but the
Liberal government has yet to act on the recommendations, said NDP
immigration critic Jenny Kwan.

"The current system we have is broken," said Kwan. "It is time to
take action." [GN]


MALLINCKRODT PLC: Faces Antitrust Class Action Over Achtar Pricing
------------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Sagonowsky, writing for FiercePharma, reports that after
paying $100 million to settle charges that it quashed competition
for its blockbuster H.P. Acthar Gel, Mallinckrodt is facing more
legal heat.  In a lawsuit filed late on Oct. 30, plaintiffs
representing Medicare Advantage Organizations accuse the company
of blocking competition and dramatically raising prices on its
lead medication.

The plaintiffs say Mallinckrodt and Questcor have raised H.P.
Acthar Gel prices 85,000% since 2001.  Mallinckrodt purchased
Questcor in 2014 and inherited some of the legal issues tied to
the drug, including a Federal Trade Commission probe.

To stifle competition, the plaintiffs argue, Questcor's U.S. unit
purchased the rights to a potential competitor from Novartis in
2011, then sidelined that drug and continued raising prices on
Acthar.  After Mallinckrodt bought Questor, price hikes and
anticompetitive behavior continued, the lawsuit claims.

A company spokesperson told FiercePharma, "Mallinckrodt strongly
believes that none of the company actions outlined in the
plaintiff's complaint constitute a violation of any law and,
therefore, believes that the complaint should be dismissed in its
entirety. We will vigorously defend the company in this matter."

H.P. Acthar Gel, which boasts 19 FDA approvals and generated more
than $1 billion last year, now costs the payer-plaintiffs more
than $34,000 per vial, according to the lawsuit. In 2001, the
price was $40 per vial, the suit claims. The product is an
important treatment for infants with epilepsy, and it's also
approved to treat a variety of inflammatory conditions.

The company's price increases on Acthar have been smaller than
Questcor's were before the buyout, according to recent research,
but the drug's growth has been fueled partly by doctors who
prescribe the medication frequently. A company spokesperson said
the current price per vial for Acthar is $36,382 and that the
drugmaker provides discounts to both public and private payers.

The same research found that government programs cover the
majority of Acthar scripts. Researchers from Oregon State
University's College of Pharmacy found that the blockbuster drug's
sales have been paid for primarily by Medicare and Medicaid for
conditions that often could be treated with less expensive
corticosteroids.  Spending by Medicare for Acthar increased
tenfold and totaled $1.3 billion from 2011 to 2015, the
researchers found, in a study published in September in JAMA
Internal Medicine.

According to the company's spokesperson, that's a result of
practitioners learning more about the drug over time, resulting in
"increased usage in aging patient populations, particularly in the
rheumatology and pulmonology spaces, where Medicare coverage is
more likely to be utilized."

"H.P. Acthar Gel is typically used episodically and acutely with
patients, as opposed to a drug that is used regularly or
chronically with patients," he said. "Additionally, these patients
are often on concurrent treatments."

Plaintiffs allege violations of the Sherman Act and other consumer
antitrust and consumer protection laws, plus unjust enrichment.
They're seeking disgorgement of "ill-gotten gains" and other
damages.

Mallinckrodt has faced plenty of heat during the yearslong Acthar
saga. Earlier this year, it agreed to pay $100 million to the FTC
to wrap up a probe it inherited with the Questcor purchase. As
part of that deal, the company had to license the competing drug
it purchased, Synacthen Depot, for infantile spasms and nephrotic
syndrome in the U.S. to West Pharmaceuticals.

According to a New York Post report, it was actually infamous
pharma executive Martin Shkreli who blew the whistle on Questcor
with a 2014 lawsuit that triggered the FTC investigation. Shkreli
now awaits sentencing on securities fraud charges relating to his
time at Retrophin.

Since the FTC settlement, Mallinckrodt also left industry trade
group PhRMA ahead of new rules requiring members to spend
significant money on R&D.  The company left the organization only
15 months after joining. [GN]


MDL 2143: Judge OKs Optical Disk Drive Price-Fixing Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a federal judge on Nov. 7
signed off on a $55.5 million settlement of class action price-
fixing conspiracy claims by indirect purchasers of optical disk
drives, in which Philips and Pioneer will pay $50.5 million and
TEAC will pay $5 million.

The case is IN RE OPTICAL DISK DRIVE PRODUCTS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, No. 3:10-md-2143 RS (JCS)(N.D. Calif.).

A full-text copy of the Order is available at https://is.gd/1g54ea


MECTA CORP: Faces Product Liability Class Action in California
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth Castleman, writing for Citizens Commission on Human Rights
International's The Mental Health Industry Watchdog, reports that
a new class action lawsuit against electroshock treatment device
makers and ten unnamed defendants alleges negligence and product
liability

In September, attorneys from DK Law Group, LLP filed a Class
Action lawsuit against electroshock treatment device makers Mecta
Corporation, Somatics, LLC, and ten unnamed defendants involved in
the marketing and sale of electroshock treatment
(electroconvulsive therapy or ECT) devices.  The suit, filed on
behalf of four named plaintiffs and all other similarly situated
individuals, alleges negligence and product liability due to the
manufacturer's failure to warn of inherent risks of the ECT
device.  The suit was filed in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California.

The lawsuit alleges that members of the class action lawsuit have
suffered physiological, psychological and emotional trauma
including, "skin burns, permanent brain damage, severe permanent
cognitive and memory impairment, broken teeth, prolonged seizures,
myocardial infarction [heart attack], ruptured bowels, acute
and/or chronic organic brain syndrome, complete neurological
collapse, and sometimes death, all secondary to electroshock
treatment."  In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs claim they suffer
permanent brain damage, severe permanent long-term and short-term
amnesia, and acute and/or chronic organic brain syndrome following
the administration of ECT.

According to the lawsuit, the plaintiffs allege that the
defendants failed in their duty to submit safety and effectiveness
data to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requests in
1982 and 1997 to provide "any information known or otherwise
available," about the safety and efficacy of the ECT device.  When
the manufactures finally responded to the FDA request in 2009, the
lawsuit claims the defendants "failed to include any information
relating to the majority of physiological, psychological, and
emotional injuries frequently suffered by those who receive ECT
shock treatment."

The plaintiffs further allege that the defendants grossly
understated the incidence of death resulting from ECT and
continuously failed to "contact user facilities, conduct testing,
and report safety and effectiveness data to the FDA from 27 May
28, 1982 to the present."  According to the plaintiffs, "As a
direct and proximate result of Defendants' refusal to comply with
multiple orders by the FDA and satisfy their state duties running
parallel to their statutory duties, as of the time of this filing,
ECT devices have never satisfied the stringent premarket approval
standards that Class III medical devices [highest risk devices]
are required to meet."

The plaintiffs also state that during a 2011 FDA hearing regarding
the ECT device, "Defendants hired numerous psychiatrists with
conflicts of interest to perform a skewed culling of data points
(from about 60 studies out of 1,200) so as to suggest that ECT
shock treatment posed minimal risks and had significant short term
benefits, and had a death rate hundreds of times lower than the
actual death rate of those who undergo ECT shock treatment."

The plaintiffs countered that "the overwhelming weight of
scientific evidence suggests that there is no long-term benefit at
all to receiving ECT, that the alleged short-term benefits are
transient and are little more than a bout of mania following
electrically induced brain damage, that ECT inherently damages the
brain, and that any mechanism of action by which ECT is said to
'treat' depression or mental illness is merely hypothetical." The
lawsuit also states, "testing over the years has not shown any
conclusive benefit to receiving electroshock treatment beyond a
brief bout of mania.  But the actual risks of ECT include
permanent long-term memory loss, cognitive impairment,
debilitating electrical brain trauma, seizures, acute or chronic
organic brain syndrome, complete neurological collapse, and
death."

The plaintiffs claim that the device manufacturers' failure to
warn the FDA resulted in a lack of knowledge among medical
providers and the public in general about the dangers of ECT, and
denied them the opportunity to evaluate the risks of ECT before
administering it or agreeing to undergo it.  The plaintiffs state
that, had they been properly warned about the true nature of
electroshock treatment devices, they would not have received ECT,
and members of the medical profession would have refrained from
giving ECT to their patients.

The lawsuit asks the court to award the plaintiffs: (1)
compensatory damages in light of the pain and suffering, emotional
distress, loss of consortium, wrongful deaths, and other damages
suffered; (2) punitive damages in light of the defendants'
oppression, fraud, and malice; (3) accrued interest; (4) court
costs; and (5) attorney's fees. No dollar amount is specified in
the complaint.

The next step in the litigation is the discovery period where the
defendants must answer questions and supply documents for the
plaintiffs to build their case. [GN]


MEDRITE CARE: Faces "Young" Suit in Southern District of NY
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Medrite Care LLC.
The case is styled as Lawrence Young, Individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Medrite Care
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-08205 (S.D.N.Y., October 24,
2017).

Medrite Care LLC is one of 24 Urgent Care Medical Centers in New
York, NY 10010.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Bronson Lipsky LLP
   630 Third Avenue, 5th Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: dlipsky@bronsonlipsky.com


MICROSOFT CORP: Three Women Seek to Lead Gender Bias Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Burnson and Dina Bass, writing for Bloomberg News, report
that a lawsuit accusing Microsoft of discriminating against women
in technical and engineering roles is poised to grow a lot bigger
if it wins class-action status.

With the technology sector awash in challenges to white male
dominance, the three women spearheading the case against Microsoft
told a Seattle federal judge they want to represent about 8,630
peers who have worked for the company since 2012.

The women said their expert consultants have determined that
discrimination at the Redmond company cost female employees more
than 500 promotions and $100 million to $238 million in pay,
according to Oct. 27 court filings.  They also accused the
software maker of maintaining "an abusive, toxic 'boy's club'
atmosphere, where women are ignored, abused, or degraded."

Microsoft said it strongly disagrees with the allegations, saying
the filings "mischaracterize data and other information."

Similar cases brought by female engineers are pending against
Twitter, Alphabet's Google and Uber Technologies.  The Microsoft
case, filed in September 2015, may be the first to become a class
action, with a hearing on the request for group status set for
Feb. 9.

In affidavits filed with the court, current and former female
employees of Microsoft cite instances of male co-workers
discounting what they had to say at meetings and sexually
harassing them.  The alleged harassment included talking about
their bodies, staring at their breasts, and organizing an Xbox
party that included scantily clad women dancing on tables.

Microsoft has denied the women's claims that men are paid better
and get promoted more often.  It cited an in-house study in 2016
that found that women earned 99.9 cents for every dollar earned by
men.

The women call the study a "sham," saying in a court filing that
the company purposely "cooked" the numbers by including other
factors in the analysis that negated the effect of the alleged
gender discrimination.

Microsoft said it is committed to "building a diverse and
inclusive workforce where all employees have the chance to
succeed."

"While we've made important progress over the years including
increasing diverse representation and expanding training, we are
constantly learning and working to improve," a spokeswoman said in
an email. [GN]


MICROSOFT CORP: Barnes & Thornburg Discusses Court Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------
Barnes & Thornburg LLP, in an article for The National Law Review,
wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Microsoft Corp.
v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) that putative class-action
plaintiffs could not immediately appeal the denial of class
certification despite their attempt to manufacture a "final
decision" by dismissing their claims with prejudice.  Going
forward, this means that plaintiffs facing class-certification
denials are stuck with less inventive, less effective options.
They can ask for discretionary interlocutory review, proceed to
trial individually, or-if that's not worth it-settle or drop the
case entirely.

In Baker, a group of plaintiffs filed a class action, but suffered
early defeats as the district court struck their class allegations
(effectively denying certification) and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit declined their request for discretionary
interlocutory review.  At that point, plaintiffs could have braved
trial individually, settled, or given up.  But instead they went
all in on a procedural gambit: they voluntarily dismissed their
claims with prejudice, then appealed arguing that the dismissal
was an immediately appealable "final decision" under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1291.  The Ninth Circuit agreed, but -- in a decision that
split only on reasoning -- the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.

Justice Ginsburg's majority concluded that plaintiffs' dismissal
was not an appealable "final decision" under Sec 1291 for at least
four reasons. First, long-standing precedent holds that a class-
certification denial is not a final decision and there's no need
for a procedural loophole.  Second, plaintiffs facing
certification denial already have remedies, including seeking
discretionary interlocutory review under Sec 1292(b) or Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  Third, allowing plaintiffs to
skip those discretionary routes and to create their own automatic
appeal would clog appellate dockets.  And last, the majority
opinion reasoned that the practice would be unfair because only
plaintiffs (not defendants) can unilaterally dismiss their claims
and thus only plaintiffs (not defendants) could unilaterally
appeal adverse class-certification decisions.  In sum, the
majority rejected plaintiffs' ploy as an end run around Sec 1291.

But Justice Thomas's concurrence rejected the tactic on a
different basis -- the U.S. Constitution. His logic was
straightforward: if plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims
with prejudice, then there's no live "case" or "controversy" as
required for jurisdiction under the federal Constitution's Article
III.  In other words, once plaintiffs raise the white flag, the
legal fight is over.  There's nothing left to resolve.

At bottom, Baker means that plaintiffs facing class-certification
denial have no silver procedural bullet.  They cannot manufacture
a final decision through voluntary dismissal.  They must instead
make do with the traditional, imperfect options: seeking
discretionary interlocutory review, braving trial alone, settling,
or surrendering. [GN]


MODERN MD: Faces "Young" Suit in Eastern District New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Modern MD Management
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Lawrence Young, Individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Modern MD Management Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-
cv-06219 (E.D. N.Y., October 24, 2017).

Modern MD Management Services, LLC is at all relevant times a
Domestic Limited Liability Company organized under New York law,
and registered to do business in the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Bronson Lipsky LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: dl@bronsonlipsky.com


MONARCH RECOVERY: Court Consolidates FDCPA Suits Under "Mellon"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases captioned KATHLEEN MELLON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. MONARCH
RECOVERY MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant. JAMES CARUSO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v.
MONARCH RECOVERY MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant. KRISTINE M. FARRELL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff(s), v. MONARCH RECOVERY MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant,
Nos. 17-cv-2695 (ADS)(ARL), 17-cv-2710 (ADS)(SIL), 17-cv-2741
(ADS)(SIL)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Arthur D. Spatt of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York consolidated the three
cases under case number 17-cv-2695 (ADS)(ARL).

These three actions were brought by the Plaintiffs against
Monarch, all alleging that Monarch violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  Mellon and Caruso,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed
their complaint against Monarch on May 4, 2017, and Farrell,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, on
May 5, 2017.

On June 20, 2017, Monarch filed a motion in the Caruso action
asking the Court to dismiss, stay or consolidate the Caruso action
with the other actions.

The allegations in each of the actions pertain to debt collection
letters sent by Monarch to collect on debts allegedly owed by the
Plaintiffs to Synchrony Bank, who is not a party to any of these
actions.  The allegations in each of the actions are identical,
except for references to the Named Plaintiffs, and the precise
debts owed.  Similarly, the letters which form the basis of the
allegations are identical, except for references to the named
Plaintiff.  Each of the actions are putative class actions, and
the proposed class definition in each initial complaint is
identical.

The amended complaint in the Caruso action proposes to define the
putative class as follows: The Plaintiff brings the action
individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons
similarly situated in the State of New York from whom the
Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt incurred on a
PayPalExtras MasterCard underwritten by Synchrony Bank, where, as
here, the terms and conditions of the PayPalExtras MasterCard
underwritten by Synchrony Bank provide for continued interest and
late fees, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the
present.

The Amended complaint in the Farrell action proposes to define the
putative class as follows: The Plaintiff brings the action
individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons
similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant
attempted to collect a consumer debt incurred on a on a TJX
Rewards Master Card underwritten by Synchrony Bank, where, as
here, the terms and conditions of the incurred on a on a TJX
Rewards Master Card underwritten by Synchrony Bank provide for
continued interest and late fees, from one year before the date of
this Complaint to the present

Each of the amended complaints asserts causes of action for
violations of 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692(e) and 1692(g).

Presently before the Court is the Defendant's motion by to dismiss
the Farrell and Caruso actions; or to stay the actions pending the
outcome of the Mellon action; or to consolidate all three actions.
Monarch also asks that the Court awards attorneys' fees to it
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(k), and imposes sanctions on
the Plaintiffs for bringing duplicative cases pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

Judge Spatt finds that there are questions of law and fact common
to each of the cases.  The allegations in each case stem from the
same form letter, and grow out of debts owed to the same bank; and
the causes of action are brought pursuant to the same sections of
the FDCPA.  The only difference in the three actions is the type
of credit card issued to the Plaintiffs.  In each of the actions,
the debt was owed to Synchrony Bank because Synchrony Bank
underwrote the credit cards.  There is no evidence that there will
be any resulting confusion or prejudice if the cases are
consolidated.

Therefore, as there are questions of law and fact common to all
three cases, and the benefits of efficiency far outweigh any
possible prejudice, Judge Spatt finds that the three cases should
be consolidated.  He says he does not need to address the motion
to dismiss or stay those actions because the Defendant's motion to
stay or dismiss those actions was based on concerns about
duplicative litigation.

The Judge also finds that Monarch has not met its burden in
showing that the Plaintiffs engaged in bad faith.  Therefore,
attorneys' fees are improper.  Similarly, he that counsel for the
Plaintiffs has not engaged in bad faith.  While he is troubled by
the counsel's filing of duplicative cases in the instance, the
Judge does not find that it rises to the level of bad faith.  The
Counsel is cautioned that, in the future, cases that arise out of
the same facts and circumstances, such as the same form debt
collection letter, should be filed as a single case.

For the reasons stated, Judge Spatt granted the Defendant's motion
to the extent that the three actions are consolidated.  It is
denied in all other respects.  The Clerk of the Court is
respectfully directed to consolidate the three cases under case
number 17-cv-2695 (ADS)(ARL), and to amend the official caption
for that case to reflect the following:

KATHLEEN MELLON, JAMES CARUSO, KRISTINE M. FARRELL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), -
against- 17-cv-2695 (ADS)(ARL) MONARCH RECOVERY MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendant.

The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay for
discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/P2SB2j from Leagle.com.

Kathleen Mellon, Plaintiff, represented by Craig B. Sanders --
info@sanderslawpllc.com -- Barshay Sanders, PLLC.

Kathleen Mellon, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Barshay,
Sanders Law, PLLC.

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Joseph Adam Hess -- jahess@mdwcg.com -- Marshall Dennehey Warner
Coleman & Goggin.


MONTEREY COUNTY, CA: Deal Enforcement in "Hernandez" Partly OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSE HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF
MONTEREY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-02354-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the
Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiffs are a class of all inmates held at the Monterey
County Jail and a subclass of inmates with disabilities. They
brought the suit in May 2013 to challenge the medical care, mental
health care, safety, and disability access at the Jail.  After
substantial discovery, motion practice, and issuance of a
preliminary injunction, the parties entered into a Settlement
Agreement.  On Aug. 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge Paul S. Grewal, to
whom the case then was assigned, granted final approval of the
Settlement Agreement.

Among other things, the Settlement Agreement requires the parties
to develop implementation plans in specific subject areas for
improvement of care, services, programs, and activities at the
Jail.  Defendant California Forensic Medical Group ("CFMG"), the
private company hired by the County to provide medical and mental
health services to Jail inmates, and the County submitted proposed
implementation plans and on May 27, 2016, Judge Grewal approved
those plans in part.

CFMG's proposed implementation plan included a staffing plan
requiring, among other things, employment of a psychiatrist on-
site at the Jail forty hours per week and employment of an on-call
psychiatrist 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  Both CFMG's
proposed plan and the County's proposed plan included provisions
relating to care of Jail inmates at Natividad Medical Center.

While Judge Grewal approved the implementation plans in part, he
found a number of shortcomings in the plans.  Importantly for
purposes of the present motion, he found that the plans did not
adequately address telepsychiatry, and he ordered the Defendants'
implementation plans must have standards for when they can deviate
from a typical in-person encounter and use telemedicine or
telepsychiatry.  CFMG provided Class Counsel with a proposed
Telepsychiatry Policy in June 2017.

The Plaintiffs assert that CFMG has not complied with its staffing
obligations and that its proposed Telepsychiatry Policy does not
contain the standards required by Judge Grewal's order.  They also
assert that the County has denied Class Counsel and court-
appointed monitors access to Natividad records which are necessary
to confirm the Defendants' compliance with the Settlement
Agreement and related Court orders.  The Plaintiffs move to
enforce that Settlement Agreement against the County and CFMG.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to require CFMG to revise its
proposed policy in a manner which meets these 12 standards:

   1. The Defendants' use of telepsychiatry is limited to non-
initiating, routine, low-risk appointments -- such as medication
renewals for stable patients.

   2. All patients requiring psychiatric services who initiate
mental health treatment following booking will receive an on-site
evaluation by a psychiatrist.

   3. Telepsychiatry will not be used with patients who are in
crisis (including those who are suicidal, homicidal, and/or
gravely disabled).  Patients experiencing a mental health crisis
should be seen as soon as possible by the on-site psychiatrist or
the on-call psychiatrist.  In the event that the on-site
psychiatrist or the on-call psychiatrist cannot see the patient in
crisis within a reasonably short time frame, the patient should be
transferred to Natividad Medical Center for evaluation and
treatment.

   4. Telepsychiatry will not be used with patients have a
cognitive, speech, vision, or hearing disability, or who require a
language interpreter.

   5. Telepsychiatry will not be used without the patient's
informed consent, documented in writing in the patient's medical
record.

   6. Telepsychiatry providers will have adequate access to the
patient's medical record during telepsychiatry sessions.

   7. Telepsychiatrists must adequately document each patient
session.

   8. Telepsychiatrists must maintain regular and appropriate
communication and collaboration with the patient's on-site
treatment team.

   9. The Defendants' Telepsychiatry facilities and technological
capabilities must be regularly vetted to ensure: the normal
operation of the devices do not have technological difficulties;
up-to-date antivirus software and a firewall is installed;
reliable management software is used to provide consistent
oversight of applications; adequate security by using point-to-
point encryption; and the maintenance of the most reliable
connection method to access the Internet.  Technical problems that
interrupt or prevent adequate patient assessment should be
documented in a log as well as the patient record.

  10. Patients being evaluated for involuntary medication will see
an on-site psychiatrist.

  11. The Defendants' Telepsychiatry Policy should ensure that
telepsychiatric care is subject to Quality Assurance monitoring
that addressed the particular requirements for telemedicine.

  12. Telepsychiatry sessions will be conducted with adequate
privacy so that clinical discussion cannot be overheard by other
patients and/or correctional officers.

Judge Freeman finds that as of the filing of the Plaintiffs'
motion to enforce, CFMG was not in compliance with its obligation
to employ a psychiatrist on-site at the Jail for 40 hours per
week.  CFMG does not dispute this fact, but it claims that despite
good-faith efforts it had difficulty recruiting a psychiatrist to
fill a full-time position at the Jail.  However, CFMG recently
hired Dr. Paul Francisco to work as a full-time on-site
psychiatrist at the Jail, effective Sept. 6, 2017.  Accordingly,
while the Court reiterates that CFMG must provide an on-site
psychiatrist for forty hours per week, each and every week, the
portion of the Plaintiffs' motion seeking to enforce CFMG's
staffing obligations is denied as moot.

With respect to items 1, 2, and 3, the Judge concludes that
further proceedings are necessary in order to develop the record
as to the efficacy of telepsychiatry.  With the parties' consent,
he has referred to Magistrate Judge Cousins all issues regarding
use of telepsychiatry implicated by items 1, 2, and 3 on page 10
of the Plaintiffs' Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement.

With respect to item 4, it is his determination that the Americans
with Disabilities Act requires that reasonable accommodation be
provided to inmates requiring medical or mental health services,
and that there is no need for additional direction from the Court
on that point.

With respect to item 5, the parties have agreed to work together
to develop a written informed consent form to address the
Plaintiffs' concerns.

With respect to items 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12, the parties have
reached tentative agreement.  It is Judge Freeman's determination
that item 8 is subsumed into items 6 and 7.  Should the parties be
unable to finalize their tentative agreement as to one or more of
the items, the Court would entertain a renewed motion.

Accordingly, the portion of the Plaintiffs' motion seeking to
enforce CFMG's obligation to develop an appropriate telepsychiatry
policy is referred to Magistrate Judge Cousins with respect to
items 1, 2, and 3; denied as to item 4; and denied as moot with
respect to items 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Judge Freemand also concludes that the California's Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act ("LPS") provision requiring production only to
the Court is not binding in the case and that the Court has
authority to order production of the records in question to Class
Counsel and court-appointed monitors.  Because the state law
privilege created by LPS is not binding, and the burden to the
Court in conducting serial review of records would be significant,
the Judge sees no benefit to use of in camera review in the case.
Accordingly, the portion of the Plaintiffs' motion seeking access
to Natividad records is granted, subject to the Plaintiffs'
submission of particularized requests to the Court by means of
stipulation and proposed order or administrative motion.

If the Plaintiffs believe that they are entitled to attorneys'
fees in connection with any future administrative motion for
Natividad records, Judge Freeman held that they file a motion for
attorneys' fees under paragraph 63 of the Settlement Agreement.
The Court will consider any such fee motions on a case-by-case
basis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NaQOty from Leagle.com.

Jesse Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American
Civil Liberties Union.

Jesse Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld
-- ggrunfeld@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld LLP,
Krista Michelle Stone-Manista -- KStone-Manista@rbgg.com -- Rosen
Bien Galvan and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation
of Northern California, Inc., Andrew Glenn Spore --
aspore@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan Grunfeld, Eric Balaban,
American Civil Liberties Union, Ernest James Galvan --
egalvan@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Micaela
Davis, Michael William Bien -- mbien@rbgg.com -- Rosen Bien Galvan
& Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen -- vswearingen@rbgg.com -- Rosen
Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP.

Robert Yancey, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American
Civil Liberties Union, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld LLP, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP.

Richard Murphy, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American
Civil Liberties Union, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld LLP, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP.

Sarab Sarabi, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American Civil
Liberties Union, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan and
Grunfeld LLP, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan and
Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP.

Glenda Hunter, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American
Civil Liberties Union, Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld LLP, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP.

Cain Aguilar, Plaintiff, represented by Krista Michelle Stone-
Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser,
ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan,
Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William
Bien, Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP & Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld LLP.

Dennis Guyot, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American Civil
Liberties Union, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP & Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan and
Grunfeld LLP.

Albert Key, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American Civil
Liberties Union, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP & Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan and
Grunfeld LLP.

Cobb (Tran) Ha, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Takei, American
Civil Liberties Union, Krista Michelle Stone-Manista, Rosen Bien
Galvan and Grunfeld, Alan Lawrence Schlosser, ACLU Foundation of
Northern California, Inc., Ernest James Galvan, Rosen Bien Galvan
& Grunfeld LLP, Micaela Davis, Michael William Bien, Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Van Swearingen, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP & Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Rosen Bien Galvan and
Grunfeld LLP.

County of Monterey, Defendant, represented by Susan K. Blitch,
County Counsel, Anne Kristen Brereton, Monterey County Counsel,
Janet L. Holmes, County Counsel's Office, Mary Leeann Hapte --
Leeann.Habte@bbklaw.com -- Best, Best & Krieger LLP & Michael
Rudolph Philippi, County of Monterey.

Monterey County Sheriff's Office, Defendant, represented by Susan
K. Blitch, County Counsel, Anne Kristen Brereton, Monterey County
Counsel, Mary Leeann Hapte, Best, Best & Krieger LLP & Michael
Rudolph Philippi, County of Monterey.

California Forensic Medical Group, Defendant, represented by Jemma
Allison Parker Saunders -- jps@bertling-clausen.com -- Bertling
and Clausen, LLP, Paul David Singer -- pds@bertling-clausen.com --
Bertling and Clausen LLP & Peter George Bertling -- pgb@bertling-
clausen.com -- Bertling and Clausen, LLP.

Mark Vasquez Pajas, Sr., Movant, represented by Cindy Panuco,
Hadsell Stormer and Renick LLP.


MOUNTAIN FARMS: Faces "Escalante" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mountain Farms, Inc.
doing business as: Delmonico. The case is styled as Heber Ludim
Baten Escalante, on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Mountain Farms, Inc. doing business as: Delmonico, Paul
Previti, Kyu Ok Han and Jinny Lee, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-
08370 (S.D. N.Y., October 31, 2017).

Mountain Farms, Inc. offers a full line of highest quality dried
and preserved flowers, herbs, fruits, feathers, moss, raffia,
grains, grasses, pinecones, metallic accents, fillers, proteas,
wreaths, foliages, spices, design materials, branches, bouquets,
garlands, eucalyptus, pods, sheet moss, and hydrangeas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MRS BPO LLC: Faces "Preston" Suit in Northern District of Ill.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MRS BPO, LLC. The
case is styled as Neal Preston, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MRS BPO, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-07868 (N.D. Ill., October 31, 2017).

MRS BPO is a full service accounts receivable management firm
based in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Ahmad Tayseer Sulaiman, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181
   Email: ahmad.sulaiman@sulaimanlaw.com

      - and -

   Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181
   Email: mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com

      - and -

   Nathan Charles Volheim, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181 ext 113
   Email: nvolheim@sulaimanlaw.com

      - and -

   Omar Tayseer Sulaiman, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181
   Email: osulaiman@sulaimanlaw.com

      - and -

   James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
   Atlas Consumer Law, division of Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 581-5456
   Email: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com


MURPHY OIL: Awaits SCOTUS Decision on Class Action Waivers
----------------------------------------------------------
Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP wrote that the Supreme Court heard
oral argument in a case that will decide the validity of class or
collective action waivers in arbitration agreements and appeared -
- to no one's surprise -- split on the issue. The consolidated
oral argument in a trio of cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits (the first of the
Court's 2017-2018 term) focused on the intersection of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).  While some members of the Court -- such as Justices
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who told counsel for the
employers, "You recognize that this contract . . .  there is no
true bargaining") -- appeared to believe that such arbitration
agreements are irreconcilable with the NLRA, Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito seemed to adopt the opposite
position.  No questions were asked by Justices Clarence Thomas and
Neil Gorsuch, leaving Justice Anthony Kennedy as the likely swing
vote in the closely watched case.  A decision is expected from the
Court later this term.

Detailed discussion

The dispute first began in 2012, when a divided panel of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled in D.R. Horton that an
employment agreement waiving class or collective actions violated
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  Although the U.S. Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed the decision in 2013, the NLRB
was undeterred and maintained its position.

A split then developed among the federal appellate courts. Faced
with the question for a second time in Murphy Oil, the Fifth
Circuit stood fast and again rejected the NLRB's argument. "Murphy
Oil committed no unfair labor practice by requiring employees to
relinquish their right to pursue class or collective claims in all
forums by signing the arbitration agreements at issue here," the
panel wrote. Similar holdings followed from the Second and Eighth
Circuits.

But other courts agreed with the NLRB, including the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits in Epic Systems v. Lewis and Morris v. Ernst &
Young, respectively. In Morris, for example, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the NLRB is tasked with defining the scope of NLRA
rights, attaching deference to the NLRB's interpretation of the
statute.

"Section 7 protects a range of concerted employee activity,
including the right to 'seek to improve working conditions through
resort to administrative and judicial forums," the court stated.
"Concerted action is the basic tenet of federal labor policy, and
has formed the core of every significant federal labor statute
leading up to the NLRA."

Given the division among the courts, both sides asked the Supreme
Court to weigh in on the issue.

The justices agreed, granting certiorari and consolidating Murphy
Oil, Morris and Lewis, and allotting one hour for oral argument on
the question of "[w]hether an agreement that requires an employer
and an employee to resolve employment-related disputes through
individual arbitration, and waive class and collective
proceedings, is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act,
notwithstanding the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act."

At oral argument, the philosophically divided justices appeared
just that -- divided.  On one end of the spectrum, Justice Stephen
Breyer disagreed that the case was about arbitration, instead
suggesting it was really about labor law.  "I'm worried about what
you are saying is overturning labor law that goes back to . . .
the entire heart of the New Deal," he told counsel for the
employers.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg seemed to be on the same page,
characterizing employee agreements with class action waivers as
"yellow dog contracts."  "You recognize that this contract . . .
there is no true bargaining," she said.  "It's the employer [that]
says you want to work here, you sign this . . . That is, there is
no true liberty to contract on the part of the employee, and
that's what Norris-LaGuardia wanted to exclude."

Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor gave the impression of
leaning in favor of employees in their comments and questions,
while Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch -- contrary to his
prior chatty oral argument appearances -- remained silent.

Sparking hope for employers, Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito seemed skeptical of the NLRB's position, with
Justice Alito asking questions regarding "the scope" of the right
to engage in concerted activity.

In an interesting line of questioning, likely swing vote Justice
Anthony Kennedy suggested that as long as other types of concerted
activity are still permitted, an arbitration agreement could
lawfully ban class or collective actions.

For example, if three employees all hired the same lawyer to
represent them against an employer, "they're proceeding
concertedly," Justice Kennedy said.  "They have a single attorney.
They're presenting their case.  They're going to be decided maybe
in three different hearings."[GN]


NEW RELEASE: Judge Tosses ADA Class Action Over DVD Kiosks
----------------------------------------------------------
P.J. Dannunzio, writing for Law.com, reports that a federal judge
has thrown out a prospective class action filed on behalf of blind
and visually-impaired people against the owners of DVD rental
kiosks.

The plaintiff claimed that the kiosks' touch-screen format was
inaccessible to the blind and visually impaired, thus limiting
their ability to rent movies.

Chief U.S. District Judge Lawrence F. Stengel of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted New Release DVD's motion to
dismiss on the basis that the kiosks are not "places of public
accommodation" under the Americans with Disabilities Act. [GN]


NISSAN NORTH: $2.5MM Verdict in Dashboard Class Action Overturned
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Severance, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that the
Missouri Supreme Court has overturned a $2.5 million verdict
against Nissan North America Inc., which had been sued by a class
of plaintiffs that alleged the automaker had produced vehicles
with dashboards that became defective when there was heat or high
humidity.

The only plaintiff listed was Robert Hurst, but the certified
class had sued Nissan under the auspices of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act.  The decision was issued Oct. 5.

Supreme Court Justice Paul Wilson wrote in his majority opinion
that the trial court erred in its original decision.

"Assuming Nissan's statements that the FX vehicles were 'luxury'
and 'premium' and the like were in the latter category, there was
no evidence from which the jury reasonably could find those
statements were false," he wrote.

"Accordingly, it was error for the trial court not to grant
Nissan's motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict."

In the original trial, the court ordered Nissan to pay $2,000 in
damages to each of the 326 class members and $1.9 million in
attorney fees.

The case goes back to 2003 when Nissan began manufacturing
vehicles under the designation of Infinity.  According to the
ruling, one was a FX35 and the other was a FX45 and in all 118,000
FX vehicles were sold.  In 2005, Nissan started receiving
complaints that the dashboards in the FX vehicles began to bubble
when they were exposed to high humidity and temperatures, the
ruling states.

According to the ruling, lawyers for the plaintiffs claimed during
the trial that every class member sustained damages because of
Nissan's alleged misrepresentations.  They claimed the problematic
dashboards decreased the value of their vehicles because of a
stigma associated with the autos.  With that evidence, the jury
ruled in favor of the class.

Nissan appealed and the state Supreme Court agreed with the
carmaker.

"Even assuming Nissan's representations the FX vehicles were
'premium' and 'luxury' and the like are factual statements, those
statements could not have been false or misleading representations
unless there is proof the FX vehicles were constructed with low-
end, 'economy,' or 'standard' accoutrements," the opinion said.

Justin Arnold, general counsel for the Missouri Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, weighed in on the decision on the
organization's website.

"The MMPA was set up to protect consumers from misleading or
fraudulent misrepresentations when they sustained actual damages.
It was not created as a get-rich scheme for lawyers on the backs
of Missouri's employers," Mr. Arnold said.

"The MMPA should protect consumers by considering objective
measures to determine their actual damages and rein in attorney's
fees that bear no reasonable relationship to the amount of actual
damages suffered." [GN]


NORTHRUP GRUMMAN: Judge Okays Plaintiffs' Attorneys Fee Request
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nevin E. Adams, Esq., writing for NAPA NET, reports that
acknowledging the "exceptional result" achieved by the law firm of
Schlichter Bogard & Denton in an excessive fee litigation
involving Northrop Grumman, a federal judge has approved the fees
in the "protracted, eleven-year battle between the litigants."

The suit, filed in September 2006, had alleged that during the
five-year period preceding spring 2006, the Northrop Grumman Stock
Fund paid an average of $454,588.88 per year in investment
management expenses, "even though that Fund's singular investment
directive is to invest in Northrop Grumman Corporation common
stock."  The suit also alleged the investment management fees paid
by the plan that covered approximately 210,000 current and former
participants in the Northrop Grumman Savings Plan and Financial
Security and Savings Program were ". . . excessive and
unreasonable when compared to the market rate for institutional
investment management and in light of the actual asset management
services required and provided when compared to known and readily
available alternatives."  Moreover, they charged that the
administrative expenses of the plans that were paid by the plans
and collected via asset-based charges to each of the plans'
investment options were for services provided to the Plans by
Northrop employees and agents -- and were allegedly excessive.

The parties struck a deal on a $16.75 million settlement in the
case in June 2017.  The case, filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, was one of two filed by the
law firm of Schlichter Bogard & Denton against Northrop Grumman.
(The second suit was unaffected by this settlement.)

Exceptional Result

U.S. District Court Judge Andre Birotte Jr. found that the $16.75
million settlement obtained by plaintiffs' attorneys was an
"exceptional" result, that it was about 70% of the class'
approximately $24 million total net loss, and -- the court noted
that even after "deducting the amount Class Counsel requests in
fees, the settlement fund still represents around 40% of the
class' net loss" -- an amount "only slightly less than Defendants'
claimed $10.5 million maximum exposure."

Now, the court also noted that the settlement fund, as a
percentage of recovery, was "greater than recoveries obtained in
other cases where courts have awarded attorney fees of one-third
of a common fund," while concluding that "the exceptional result
achieved in this action justifies an attorney fee award of one-
third of the settlement fund."

The 16-page order outlines the factors the court saw as justifying
the award of attorney fees in the case, noting that "class counsel
expended significant effort on behalf of the class in prosecuting
this action," some 26,000 hours of attorney, paralegal and law
clerk time over the approximately 11 years the action has been
pending, "drafted and filed three detailed complaints," spent over
a year researching the complex area of law and the issues relating
to retirement plans, and "successfully appealed the Court's denial
of its motion for class certification to the Ninth Circuit, after
which it obtained class certification on remand."  Moreover, the
court noted that the plaintiffs' attorneys "reviewed millions of
pages of documents, took seventeen depositions, and prevailed on
the tried claims at the summary judgment stage," and participated
in three unsuccessful mediations, after which it proceeded to
prepare for trial.  "Accordingly, because SBD exerted great effort
on behalf of the class in litigating this action, the Court
concludes an award of one-third of the settlement fund in attorney
fees is justified."

The court also cited that they were "highly experienced in
representing plaintiffs in class action litigation, particularly
ERISA class actions" has been "investigating and preparing 401(k)
fiduciary breach cases for over ten years, was the first firm to
bring a 401(k) ERISA fiduciary breach case, and has been named
class counsel in numerous similar cases," including the successful
petition of "the United States Supreme Court to hear its first
ERISA fiduciary breach case regarding excessive fees, and obtained
9-0 decision favorably interpreting ERISA's statute of
limitation," as well as prevailing in "both of the two 401(k)
fiduciary breach cases that have gone to judgment after trial,"
all of which led the court here to conclude that their ". . .
unique experience representing plaintiffs in ERISA class actions
justifies an award of one-third of the settlement fund in attorney
fees."

Moreover, the court found that, having represented plaintiffs on a
"completely contingent basis, plaintiffs' attorneys "assumed great
risk in litigating this action."

The court noted that the law firm had been "in contact with 300
class members since the notice was mailed, and only four formal
objections to the settlement have been filed with the Court," and
that only two of those four objected to the request for attorney
fees.  "The objections to the attorney fees generally complain
that the amount SBD will receive in fees is large in comparison to
the amount each class member will receive," the court explained,
and then said "Although true, the objectors provide no support for
their arguments that SBD should receive a lesser amount in fees,"
and that "the lack of significant objections to the requested fees
justifies an award of one-third of the settlement fund" --
$5,583,333 in attorney fees.

Expense Recoveries

Plaintiff's attorneys sought a total of $1,159,114 in
reimbursement of expenses:

$49,026 for depositions
$278,765 for experts and consultants
$9,279 for filing, transcripts, subpoena services and related
costs
$27,986 for mediation and settlement costs
$274,958 for copies, postage, phone and fax
$330,152 for data development and document organization
$22,667 for research and investigation
$160,262 for travel, lodging and parking
$6,018 in trial costs

Since during the course of this action, the firm reviewed more
than 2.5 million pages of documents and took 17 depositions,
attempted mediation three times prior to trial, and -- those being
unsuccessful -- spent a week conducting its case-in-chief prior to
settlement, continued settlement efforts during trial, and
continued to negotiate details of the settlement for two months
following the initial agreement, the court, citing "SBD's efforts
and the protracted nature of this case," found that request to be
reasonable.

Each of the named plaintiffs -- Gary Grabek, Julie Spicer, Mark
Geuder and Dwite Russell -- were granted an inventive award of
$25,000. [GN]


NUCO2 MANAGEMENT: Faces "Hernandez" Suit in Calif. Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NUCO2 Management,
LLC. The case is styled as Alejandro Hernandez, individually, and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NUCO2 Management, LLC, a Delaware Company,
Defendant, Case No. BCV-17-102571 (Cal. Super. Ct., October 31,
2017).

Nuco2 Management LLC is in the Personnel Management business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Hann, Esq.
   R. Rex Parris Law Firm
   42220 10th St West Suite 109
   Lancaster, CA 93534
   Tel: 661-949-2595
   Email: www.rrexparris.com


OMEGA FLEX: 8th Cir. Reverses Ruling Denying Standing in "George"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled Bonnie George; Ed McKinzie; Tim Worstell; Cedar
Deraps; Casey Wasser; Tammy Volkart; James Rehm; Ron Metzgar,
Respondents, v. Omega Flex, Inc.; Ward Manufacturing, LLC;
Titeflex Corporation Petitioners, Case No. 17-8024 (8th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's order denying Article III standing to George, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, and remanded the case
to the circuit court of Pulaski County, Missouri.

The Petitioners manufacture and sell yellow-insulated corrugated
stainless steel tubing ("CSST").  The CSST is used to distribute
natural or propane gas within homes and other structures.  George
claims that CSST is susceptible to failure when exposed to
electrical arcing from household appliances, and to indirect or
direct lightning strikes.  George filed a class action lawsuit in
federal court alleging violations of the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act ("MMPA"), conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

The Petitioners moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  The
district court dismissed the claims without prejudice.  George
then sued in state court, again alleging MMPA violations,
conspiracy, and unjust enrichment, but adding loss of benefit-of-
the-bargain for the diminution in the value of the structures
containing CSST.  The Petitioners removed the case to federal
court, arguing George had Article III standing based on the
benefit-of-the-bargain claim.  They also moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.

The district court ruled that the benefit-of-the-bargain claim
failed to bolster the claims enough for Article III standing.  The
court granted George's motion to remand.  The Petitioner moves for
permission to appeal asserting the benefit-of-the-bargain claim
sufficiently establishes standing even if the claims are
ultimately without merit.

The Circuit Court explains that Article III extends judicial power
only to cases and controversies.  It finds that George's
assertions of paying more than CSST is worth and the consequent
loss in value of the structures are economic injury sufficient to
establish Article III standing.  Accordingly, the petition for
permission to appeal is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Circuit
Court's Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/7huolg from Leagle.com.

David L. Steelman, for Respondent.

Paul Leslie Wickens -- pwickens@fwpclaw.com -- for Petitioner.

Stephen Frank Gaunt, for Respondent.

Neal Frederick Perryman -- nperryman@lewisrice.com -- for
Petitioner.

Robert B. Ellis -- robert.ellis@kirkland.com -- for Petitioner.

Scott A. Kamber, for Respondent.

Jacqueline M. Sexton -- jsexton@fwpclaw.com -- for Petitioner.

Thomas P. Berra, Jr. -- tberra@lewisrice.com -- for Petitioner.

Bruce A. Moothart -- bruce@sbhlaw.com -- for Petitioner.

Erin Murphy -- erin.murphy@kirkland.com -- for Petitioner.

Oliver H. Thomas -- othomas@lewisrice.com -- for Petitioner.

Deborah Kravitz -- dkravitz@kamberlaw.com -- for Respondent.

Naomi B. Spector, for Respondent.

Benjamin T. Kurtz -- benjamin.kurtz@kirkland.com -- for
Petitioner.

Michael S. Biehl -- michael.biehl@kirkland.com -- for Petitioner.

Jacqueline Gorbey -- jacqueline.gorbey@morganlewis.com -- for
Petitioner.

Thomas J. Sullivan -- thomas.sullivan@morganlewis.com -- for
Petitioner.

Charles B. Casper -- ccasper@mmwr.com -- for Petitioner.

John G. Papianou -- jpapianou@mmwr.com -- for Petitioner.

C. Harker Rhodes, IV -- harker.rhodes@kirkland.com -- for
Petitioner.


PACIFIC SEAFOOD: Ct. Stays "Whaley" Antitrust Suit Pending Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LLOYD D. WHALEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
PACIFIC SEAFOOD GROUP, et al., Defendants, Civ. No. 1:10-cv-3057-
MC (D. Ore.), Judge Michael McShane of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Oregon granted the Defendant's Motion to Stay
Arbitration.

In this antitrust action, the Plaintiffs, who are commercial
fishermen and vessel owners, claim that the Defendant Pacific
Seafood used their market power as wholesale buyers to lower
prices they paid for groundfish, Pacific whiting, and pink shrimp.
Through arbitration with then-District Judge Michael Hogan, in
2012 the parties entered into a Stipulation and Resolution
Agreement of Class Action Claims ("Resolution Agreement").  Based
on the Resolution Agreement, the Court entered judgment.

The parties agreed that the Resolution Agreement would remain in
effect for five years, and that Judge Hogan would have discretion
to renew the Agreement for another five-year term if conditions in
the West Coast markets for trawl-caught groundfish, whiting and
pink shrimp warrant.  The Resolution Agreement also provided that
if Judge Hogan was not available, Magistrate-Judge John Jelderks
would act as arbitrator in his place.  Judge Hogan later retired
from his federal judgeship and because a private mediator.

In May 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reopen.  Judge
McShane granted the motion, and ruled that because Judge Hogan has
retired from his federal judgeship, he was no longer an
appropriate arbitrator under the terms of the Resolution
Agreement.  After the parties' designated replacement arbitrator,
Judge Jelderks, declined the appointment, Judge McShane appointed
Magistrate-Judge Jolie Russo to act as the arbitrator.

Pacific Seafood appealed the order appointing Judge Russo, arguing
that Judge Hogan is available and is the arbitrator designated by
the Resolution Agreement.  Pacific Seafood now files a Motion to
Stay Arbitration pending its appeal.

Judge McShane concluded that a stay of arbitration pending Pacific
Seafood's appeal is appropriate.  Pacific Seafood has made a
sufficient showing that it may prevail on appeal.  Although he
adheres to his conclusion that the terms of the Resolution
Agreement show that the parties intended to appoint a sitting
federal judge as arbitrator, Pacific Seafood in its appeal has
raised a serious question whether the parties intended to
designate Judge Hogan as arbitrator, regardless of whether he
remained a federal judge.

He says Pacific Seafood, as well as the Plaintiffs, could be
harmed unless the Court grants a stay because if the Ninth Circuit
agrees with Pacific Seafood's position on appeal, then the parties
would have wasted time and resources during arbitration
proceedings before Judge Russo.  The Plaintiffs have not shown
that they would be significantly harmed by a stay, and preventing
the waste of judicial resources is in the public interest.
Accordingly, Judge McShane granted Pacific Seafood's Motion to
Stay Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TTjELx from Leagle.com.

Lloyd D. Whaley, Plaintiff, represented by Michael E. Haglund --
haglund@hk-law.com -- Haglund Kelley LLP.

Lloyd D. Whaley, Plaintiff, represented by Michael K. Kelley --
kelley@hk-law.com -- Haglund Kelley, LLP.

Todd L. Whaley, Plaintiff, represented by Michael E. Haglund,
Haglund Kelley LLP & Michael K. Kelley, Haglund Kelley, LLP.

Dynamik Fisheries, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Michael K.
Kelley, Haglund Kelley, LLP & Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley
LLP.

Brian Nolte, Plaintiff, represented by Michael K. Kelley, Haglund
Kelley, LLP & Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP.

Jeff Boardman, Plaintiff, represented by Michael K. Kelley,
Haglund Kelley, LLP & Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP.

Miss Sarah, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Michael K. Kelley,
Haglund Kelley, LLP & Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP.

MY Fisheries, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Michael K. Kelley,
Haglund Kelley, LLP & Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP.

Pacific Coast Seafoods Company, Defendant, represented by John W.
Stephens -- stephens@eslerstephens.com -- Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael E.
Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C. Lee -- rachel.lee@stoel.com
-- Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster -- randy.foster@stoel.com -
- Stoel Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston
& Timothy W. Snider -- timothy.snider@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives
LLP.

Pacific Choice Seafood Company, Defendant, represented by John W.
Stephens, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler,
Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C.
Lee, Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert
J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel
Rives LLP.

Bandon Pacific, Inc., Defendant, represented by John W. Stephens,
Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives
LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston,
Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Pacific Seafood Washington Acquisition Co., Inc., Defendant,
represented by John W. Stephens, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler,
Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley
LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel
Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston &
Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Pacific Seafood Group Acquisition Company, Inc., Defendant,
represented by John W. Stephens, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler,
Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley
LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel
Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston &
Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Frank Dulcich, Defendant, represented by John W. Stephens, Esler,
Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives
LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston,
Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Dulcich, Inc., Defendant, represented by John W. Stephens, Esler,
Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives
LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston,
Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Pacific Seafood Group, Defendant, represented by John W. Stephens,
Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP,
Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives
LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert J. Preston,
Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel Rives LLP.

Pacific Pride Sea Food Company, Defendant, represented by John W.
Stephens, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler,
Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C.
Lee, Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert
J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel
Rives LLP.

Pacific Surimi Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by John W.
Stephens, Esler, Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Kim T. Buckley, Esler,
Stephens & Buckley, LLP, Michael J. Esler, Esler, Stephens &
Buckley, LLP, Michael E. Haglund, Haglund Kelley LLP, Rachel C.
Lee, Stoel Rives LLP, Randolph C. Foster, Stoel Rives LLP, Robert
J. Preston, Elliott Ostrander & Preston & Timothy W. Snider, Stoel
Rives LLP.


PHOENIX WAREHOUSE: Faces Class Action Over Alleged "Sweatshops"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sandra t. Molina and Claudia Palma, writing for San Gabriel Valley
Tribune, report that for seven years, hundreds of workers, most
Latinos who could only speak Spanish, threatened with deportation
if they complained about not getting paid overtime, according to a
lawsuit that was granted class action status in summer.

Lawyers for 1,500 men and women who worked for Phoenix Warehouse
of California, a retail distribution center that delivers goods to
Walmart, Target and HomeGoods, among other retailers, said their
clients worked in "sweatshops in the truest sense of the word,"
according to the lawsuit.

The plaintiffs -- who from 2009 to 2016 worked in Phoenix
facilities in Santa Fe Springs, La Mirada and Cerritos -- are
seeking millions in restitution, plus interest, penalties and
legal fees, said attorney David Yeremian, of Glendale-based
Yeremian Law.

"These people were easily exploited because they don't typically
stand up for their rights," he said.

Achieving class-action status means the lawsuit can move forward
and the plaintiffs, in this case Yadira Espinoza and Edith Molina,
will represent all who can make similar claims.

A lawyer for Phoenix did not return repeated requests comment.

In Spanish, Espinoza of Torrance told Univision on Oct. 30 the
plaintiffs "worked more than 13 to 15 hours a day; and they didn't
let us have our lunch break.  Nobody deserves this treatment, we
all work for necessity."

The way Phoenix Warehouse treated its employees is tantamount to
"criminal activity," said Mr. Yeremian, whose practice specializes
in employee rights.  He and attorney Mark Ozzello, from the
Ozzello Practice at the Pacific Palisades-based Markun Zusman
Freniere Compton LLP, are representing the warehouse workers.

Laborers were expected to work eight to 12 hours a day, often
without meal or rest breaks, and always without getting paid for
the overtime, according to the lawsuit.

Time cards would be changed at the company's New Jersey
headquarters to reflect eight hours worked, according to the
lawsuit.  The company allegedly got around employment laws by
using three staffing companies: Fairway Staffing Services of
Bellflower, Coastal Employment of Pico Rivera and the now-defunct
Diamond Staffing Services.

"Phoenix would sidestep overtime by having someone work eight
hours for one agency, then tell them they needed to work another
eight hours for another agency at one of their other warehouses,"
Ozzello said in a written statement.  The workers would then
receive a paycheck showing only a few regular hours, if at all, he
said.

"There is no record," former employee Gilberto Avila Hernandez of
El Segundo told Univision, "because they manipulated the time
sheets."

The employees dared not say anything because their bosses
constantly reminded them they could easily be replaced, he said.
They were also told no one would believe any accusations they made
because they were undocumented.

Anyone who did complain, according to the lawsuit, was fired and
never received final payment, Ozzello said.

An attorney for Fairway Staffing Services denied the allegations.

"Fairway provides a service to the community by providing both
long- and short-term staffing jobs to those seeking employment,"
attorney Justin G. Schmidt, of Garden Grove-based Emilio Law
Group, said in a written statement.  "Fairway has been vigorously
defending this matter for years and will continue its defense up
and through trial if necessary."

The lawsuit also alleged sexual harassment. If a female employee
rebuked the sexual advances of a male manager, the woman would not
be paid for the day or be told not to work that day, according to
the lawsuit.

Diamond Staffing filed for bankruptcy shortly after the lawsuit
was filed and a judge dismissed the company as a defendant,
Mr. Yeremian said.  The judge, however, allowed those who received
payment from Diamond Staffing to remain as part of the lawsuit.

Coastal Employment's attorney stopped participating in the
procedures about a year ago, he said.

The next court date is scheduled for May 2018. [GN]


PREMIER ORGANICS: Court Allows Discovery in Coverage Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant Premier Organics,
Inc.'s Motion to Allow Time for Discovery in the case captioned
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
PREMIER ORGANICS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00302-YGR (N.D.
Cal.).

This declaratory relief action arises from a punitive class action
captioned Alan Ducorsky v. Premier Organics, Alameda County
Superior Court, Case No. HG16801566 (Ducorsky Class Action)
wherein the class action consumer plaintiffs sought damages from
Premier arising from its sale of coconut oil.  The class action is
now-tentatively-resolved and Travelers has contributed to the
settlement, with a reservation of rights. Travelers submits that
no potential for insurance coverage ever existed under Premier's
general liability policies.

Travelers argues that the insurance policy covers bodily injury
caused by an occurrence and that the Ducorsky Class Action does
not allege bodily injury. Premier disagrees positing that because
the class action plaintiffs alleged that coconut oil caused
health-related harms, it may fall within the purview of bodily
injury.

Premier Organics filed a motion to allow time for discovery and
continue all briefing and hearing on Travelers' motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(d).

Contractual Interpretation

Under California law, the fundamental goal of contractual
interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties.  The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is
determined by objective manifestations of the parties' intent,
including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic
evidence of such objective matters such as the surrounding
circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into
the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the
contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.  However, in
determining whether an ambiguity exists in the written provisions,
language in a contract must be construed in the context of the
instrument as a whole and in the circumstances of that case.
Extrinsic evidence may be admissible to prove that a term is, in
fact, ambiguous.

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment hinges in large part on
the interpretation of two policy terms, namely bodily injury and
occurrence.

At this juncture, the Court finds that defendant is only entitled
to discovery relevant to whether there exists ambiguity with
regard to the policy terms bodily injury and occurrence.
This includes, to the extent not already produced, (i) all
documents specifically referring to Premier and the Ducorsky
action which discuss the meaning of the terms bodily injury or
occurrence; (ii) underwriting files and manuals specifically
related to the terms bodily injury or occurrence; (iii) the
identity of all claims adjusters who handled defendant's claim;
(iv) the identity of all persons who evaluated, analyzed or
otherwise participated in the coverage determination for
defendant; (v) Travelers' internal communications related to the
interpretation of the terms bodily injury and occurrence; and (vi)
expenses actually incurred by Travelers in providing a defense to
Premier, broken down for each party which shared defense costs.
Under Rule 56, the Court must defer considering the summary
judgment motion and allow time for defendant to take limited
discovery of these materials only.

Having carefully considered the pleadings and the papers submitted
on this motion, defendant's motion to continue all briefing and
hearing on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiffs' pending motions are denied without prejudice to re-
filing once limited discovery is conducted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybq4zpa9from Leagle.com.

Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, Plaintiff, represented
by Alexander Eugene Potente -- alex.potente@sedgwicklaw.com --
Sedgwick LLP.

Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, Plaintiff, represented
by Bruce D. Celebrezze -- bruce.celebrezze@sedgwicklaw.com -
Sedgwick LLP & Lenell Topol McCallum, Sedgwick LLP. 333 Bush St Fl
30. San Francisco, CA 94104.

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, Plaintiff,
represented by Alexander Eugene Potente, Sedgwick LLP, Bruce D.
Celebrezze, Sedgwick LLP & Lenell Topol McCallum, Sedgwick LLP.
American Economy Insurance Company, Plaintiff, represented by
Kelley Kurtis Beck -- kbeck@lindahlbeck.com -- Lindahl Beck LLP.
First National Insurance Company of America, Plaintiff,
represented by Kelley Kurtis Beck, Lindahl Beck LLP.

Golden Eagle Insurance Corporation, Plaintiff, represented by
Kelley Kurtis Beck, Lindahl Beck LLP.

Premier Organics, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel Rapaport
-- drapaport@wendel.com -- Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP & Thiele
Robin Dunaway -- rdunaway@wendel.com -- Wendel, Rosen, Black &
Dean, LLP.


PRIDE TRANSPORT: Settlement in "Jacob" Suit Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA JACOB and CHRISTOPHER WATSON, individuals, on
behalf of themselves, and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PRIDE TRANSPORT, INC., a Corporation;
Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 5:16-CV-06781-
BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the parties'
proposed settlement.

On Sept. 28, 2017, a hearing was held on the Plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary approval of the parties' proposed settlement,
approval of the class notice, and the setting of a date for the
hearing on final approval of the settlement.

Pursuant to the Agreement, the following Class is conditionally
certified for settlement purposes: All current and former truck
drivers who are or were employed as truck drivers by Defendant at
any time during the period from May 31, 2012, to Dec. 28, 2016,
who performed any work in California and who were paid on the
basis of activity-based work.

Judge Freeman granted the parties' Agreement preliminary approval
as it meets the criteria for preliminary settlement approval.  He
finds the parties' proposed notice plan to be constitutionally
sound because individual notices will be mailed to all class
members whose identities are known to the parties, and such notice
is the best notice practicable.  The parties' proposed Notice of
Pendency of Class Action and Claim Correction Form sufficiently
informs Class Members of the terms of the Settlement, their rights
under the Settlement, their rights to object to the settlement,
their right to receive an Individual Class Member Payment or elect
not to participate in the Settlement, and the processes for doing
so, and the date and location of the final approval hearing, and
therefore are all approved.

The Judge directed the Class Counsel to make the minor
modifications to the Notice discussed and agreed upon at the
preliminary approval hearing to clarify that Class Members may
choose to opt out and bring individual actions at their own
expense.

Judge Freeman directed the Defendant to provide the Claims
Administrator the Class Data as specified by the Agreement no
later than 15 days after the date of the order.  The Settlement
Administrator is also directed to mail the approved Class Notice
by first-class mail to the Class Members no later than 30 days
after the date of the Order.

A final hearing will be held on Feb. 22, 2018, at 1:30 p.m.  The
Class Members and their counsel may support or oppose the
Settlement and the motion for an award of attorneys' fees and
costs and the Enhancement Awards, if they so desire, as set forth
in the Notice.  Any Class Member may appear at the final approval
hearing in person or by his or her own attorney, and show cause
why the Court should not approve the Settlement, or object to the
motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs and the Service
Awards.

Written comments or objections to the Settlement or to the
attorneys' fees and costs must be filed with the Court and served
on counsel not later than 45 days after mailing of the Notice.

The Court reserves the right to continue the date of the final
approval hearing without further notice to Class Members.  It
retains jurisdiction to consider all further applications arising
out of or in connection with the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 17, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/QmCWO3 from Leagle.com.

Linda Jacob, Plaintiff, represented by Aparajit Bhowmik --
aj@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik.

Linda Jacob, Plaintiff, represented by Kyle Roald Nordrehaug --
kyle@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Norman B.
Blumenthal -- norm@bamlawca.com -- Blumentha, Nordrehaug &
Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee -- piya@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik & Victoria Bree Rivapalacio --
victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug and Bhowmik.

Christopher Watson, Plaintiff, represented by Aparajit Bhowmik,
Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Kyle Roald Nordrehaug,
Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Norman B. Blumenthal, Blumentha,
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee, Blumenthal
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik & Victoria Bree Rivapalacio, Blumenthal,
Nordrehaug and Bhowmik.

Pride Transport, Inc., Defendant, represented by Richard Howard
Rahm -- rrahm@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Kristin E.
Hutchins -- khutchins@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


PUBLIC STORAGE: Faces "Fox" Suit in Cent. Dist. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Public Storage. The
case is styled as Ann Fox individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Public Storage and DOES
1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-07833 (C.D. Cal.,
October 25, 2017).

Defendant is engaged in the business of selling storage
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PURDUE PHARMA: City of Quincy Plans to Join Opioid Crisis Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Philip Cotter, writing for The Patriot Ledger, reports that
the City of Quincy has contracted a big D.C. law firm to sue
pharmaceutical companies, saying that the corporations have
responsibility for the rise in drug addiction over the past
several years.

"It seems to me Big Pharma has been getting away from this for a
long time," said Quincy Mayor Thomas Koch, referring to the giant
pharmaceutical companies.

The city has not yet filed a complaint to begin the lawsuit, but
they just signed a contract with law firm Motley Rice, and they
plan to go ahead with the suit after some further work between the
city and attorneys, Mr. Koch said on Oct. 31.

The city is still working to determine which companies it will
sue, the mayor said.  The city plans to allege that some
combination of drug manufacturers and distributors undersold the
addictive nature of opioids and misled prescribers about the risks
and research about drugs.  Mr. Koch said that helped open the
floodgates for opioids, which are synthetic drugs such as
oxycodone and fentanyl that mimic the effects of opium and are
often used by doctors as anesthetics and pain relievers.

"The big elephant in the room has been the pills," the mayor said.
"It's too easy to get pills."

The city will be seeking both injunctive relief and monetarily
damages.  Basically, the city is looking for the courts to order
the companies to behave differently, and for the corporations to
have to pay money to Quincy.  Mr. Koch said the city is working to
put a number on the total monetary cost to city services caused by
drug issues, and they will ask the courts to force the
pharmaceutical companies to pay for all of it.

The city, state and country have seen overdoses spike in recent
years. Quincy Police began carrying Narcan, a drug that reverses
the effects of opioid overdoses, in 2010, and officers as of this
October had used it to save 175 people in 2017, already well more
than in 2016.

That possibility of receiving some direct damages is one of the
reasons why the city is suing rather than leaving it up to states'
attorneys general to bring suits the way they did in the 1990s
against tobacco companies, which ended up having to pay out
hundreds of billions of dollars to the states.

"It's at the local level where all this stuff hits," Koch said.

Koch noted the recent investigation by news program 60 Minutes and
The Washington Post newspaper into the influence of the
pharmaceutical industry in federal politics and policy.  The
episode, which aired Oct. 15, included former Drug Enforcement
Administration officials blaming manufacturers and distributors
for the current opioid epidemic, and it led to Pennsylvania Rep.
Tom Marino, who had introduced legislation to make prescribing
opioids easier, to withdraw his name from consideration as
President Donald Trump's drug czar.

"That showed they have very heavy influence over congress in this
country," Mr. Koch said of pharmaceutical lobbyists.

Mr. Koch said it's still to be determined whether the suit ends up
being a class-action suit and whether it's filed on the state
level, the federal level, or both.

Motley Rice is no stranger to headline-grabbing class-action
lawsuits.  Its founders led the multi-billion-dollar successful
suit against tobacco companies in the 1990s, and the firm
continues to represent families of victims of the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks in a lawsuit against the perpetrators.

The city will not be paying Motley Rice a fee, but the firm is
entitled to 25 percent of any damages a court might award the
city.

Linda Singer, a former attorney general of Washington, D.C., is
working with the city on the impending lawsuit. She could not be
reached for comment on Oct. 31.

Over the past few months, various governmental bodies have begun
to take pharmaceutical companies to court.  Motley Rice is dealing
with a number of them, including suits from the City of Chicago
and the states of South Carolina, New Hampshire, Alaska and
Kentucky.

A group of 39 state attorneys general announced in June that they
are conducting an investigation into whether distributors and
manufacturers of opioids were using practices of deceptive
marketing and improper tracking and reporting.  Massachusetts
Attorney General Maura Healey's office on Oct. 31 said the
investigation, which Healey is part of, remains ongoing.

Her office and the other attorneys general are looking into drug
manufacturers Purdue Pharma, Endo, Janssen, Teva and Allergan and
distributors AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson, the
investigators announced in September.[GN]


PURITY PRODUCTS: Faces "Wuest" Suit in N. Dist. Cal.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purity Products
International, Inc.  The case is styled as Richard Wuest,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Purity Products International, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 3:17-cv-06093 (N.D. Cal., October 25, 2017).

Purity Products offers an array of evidence-based nutritional
supplements.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PYRAMID ADVISORS: Faces "Egan" Suit in West. Dist. Penn.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pyramid Advisors
Limited Partnership.  The case is styled as John Egan,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Pyramid Advisors Limited Partnership doing business
as: Pyramid Hotel Group, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01383-JFC
(W.D. Penn., October 25, 2017).

Pyramid Advisors Limited Partnership, doing business as Pyramid
Hotel Group, LLC, provides property management, asset management,
project management, acquisition, and lender/receiver services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
   Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP
   1133 Penn Avenue
   5th Floor
   Pittsburgh, PA 15222
   Tel: (412) 322-9243
   Email: bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com


RANDSTAD US: Court Stays "Robledo" Pending Decision in "Morris"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FREDDY J. ROBLEDO, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. RANDSTAD
US, L.P., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-01003-BLF (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted
the Defendant's motion to stay all proceedings pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP.

Randstad faces a putative class action brought by its current and
former employees alleging that Randstad violated the California
Labor Code and California's unfair competition laws.  Randstad now
moves the Court to compel arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims,
or in the alternative, to stay all proceedings pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, certiorari
granted, Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris.

Randstad argues that the Named Plaintiffs signed agreements to
arbitrate all of their employment-related disputes with Randstad,
and that these valid arbitration agreements contained enforceable
class action waivers.  Accordingly, Randstad urges the Court to
compel the employees to arbitrate their claims on an individual
basis.  The Plaintiffs oppose Randstad's motion to compel
arbitration, and further argue that a stay of proceedings is not
warranted.

Judge Freeman explains that although the Ninth Circuit recently
held in Morris that mandatory class action waivers violate the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and is currently reviewing that decision.  Oral
argument in Morris took place on Oct. 2, 2017.  The ultimate
outcome of Morris will determine whether the NLRA can prohibit an
employment agreement from being enforced under the Federal
Arbitration Act if the agreement requires employees to arbitrate
their claims on an individual rather than a collective basis.  The
Supreme Court's answer to the question posed in Morris will
directly impact this Court's determination of Randstad's motion to
compel arbitration.

Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), the Judge finds Randstad's motion to
stay suitable for submission without oral argument.  She finds
that Randstad's requested stay pending a ruling in Morris is
justified.  Therefore, Randstad's motion to stay all proceedings
in this case until the Supreme Court issues its decision in Morris
is granted.  The stay will be automatically lifted as of the date
the Supreme Court resolves Morris.

Judge Baker terminated without prejudice Randstad's pending motion
to compel arbitration and motion to strike to Randstad re-noticing
these motions after the stay is lifted.  She vacated the hearings
scheduled for Nov. 9, 2017 and Feb. 22, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Vgu41O from Leagle.com.

Jose Martinez Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Bernard James
Fitzpatrick, Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston.

Jose Martinez Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston.

Fernando Lara, Plaintiff, represented by Bernard James
Fitzpatrick, Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston & Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston.

Elisabeth Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Bernard James
Fitzpatrick, Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston & Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston.

Randstad US, L.P., Defendant, represented by Andrew More McNaught
-- amcnaught@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Elizabeth Jarvis
MacGregor -- emacgregor@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP &
Michael Anderson Wahlander -- mwahlander@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth
Shaw LLP.


RDL ENERGY: Partial Summary Judgment Bid in "Trevino" Nixed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALFONSO TREVINO, et al, Plaintiffs, v. RDL ENERGY
SERVICES, LP, et al, Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:14-CV-01936
(S.D. Tex.), Judge Melinda Harmon of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, mooted the
Defendant Greene's Energy Group, LLC's Motion for Leave to File
its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Request for Expedited
Consideration, denied RDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Statute of Limitations, and granted Greene's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The Plaintiffs were at varying times employed as non-exempt day-
rate employees with RDL, a Texas staffing corporation operating
throughout the United States.  They brought the class action
against RDL, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and seeking unpaid overtime compensation and
reimbursement of expenses incurred on the employer's behalf of
sums spent for the convenience of the employer under 29 C.F.R.
Section 778.217.

Pending before the Court are (i) Greene's Motion for Leave, (ii)
RDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Greene's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Judge Harmon finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts or
provide evidence that Greene's was a joint employer.  In their
third amended complaint, the Plaintiffs have simply parroted
boilerplate language of the FLSA for individual and enterprise
coverage without supporting facts.  They have made vague, general,
conclusory statements that fail to state plausible claims for
"joint employer" status, for overtime or minimum wages, for
willfulness, or for a collective action.  They further fail to
provide Greene's with notice of what duties the RDL employees
performed, under what terms, the time period they worked for RDL,
and when and which Plaintiffs performed duties for Greene's while
being employed by RDL.  Since Plaintiffs have not pled facts
sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face, the Judge granted Greene's Motion for Summary Judgment.

With respect to RDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the
Judge agrees with the Plaintiffs.  As the Court has already stated
in its Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Conditionally
Certify a Collective Action and mooting their' Motion to Toll
Statute of Limitations, the case will proceed as an individual
action brought by the Named Plaintiffs.  Because the Court has
stated the case is to proceed as an individual action and not a
collective one, the Plaintiffs are not required to file written
consent in order to commence the action for statute of limitations
purposes.  Since RDL's arguments hinge on the classification of
the Plaintiffs' action as collective, and since the Court has
already classified the Plaintiffs' action as individual, Judge
Harmon denied RDL's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute
of Limitations.

As a result of her granting Greene's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Greene's Motion for Leave to File its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is mooted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/aT9pDM from Leagle.com.

Alfonso Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Luisa Calderon --
lcalderon@calderonfirm.com -- Zeidman Spencer Beverly & Holt.

Alfonso Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz --
jsaenz@wsdllp.com -- Wagner Saenz, LLP.

Marvin Clark, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz,
Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly &
Holt.

Marvin R Clark, III, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel
Saenz, Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly
& Holt.

Chance Winfrey, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz,
Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly &
Holt.

Edwin Kiser, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz, Wagner
Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly & Holt.

Jonathan Lara, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz,
Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly &
Holt.

Forrest Ira Chanik, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz,
Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly &
Holt.

Michael Gray, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Daniel Saenz,
Wagner Saenz, LLP & Luisa Calderon, Zeidman Spencer Beverly &
Holt.

Mark Janecek, Plaintiff, represented by Luisa Calderon, Zeidman
Spencer Beverly & Holt & Jeremy Daniel Saenz, Wagner Saenz, LLP.

RDL Energy Services, LP, Defendant, represented by James M.
Cleary, Jr. -- cleary@mdjwlaw.com -- Martin Disiere et al, William
J. Wisdom, Martin Disiere et al & David J. Quan --
dquan@quanlaw.com -- Attorney at Law.

Baker Hughes Pipeline Management Group, Inc, Defendant,
represented by Michael James Muskat -- mmuskat@mmdmlaw.com --
Muskat, Mahony, Devine & Moses, LLP, DeAndrea C. Washington --
DeAndrea.Washington@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. &
Gabrielle S. Moses -- gmoses@mmdmlaw.com -- Muskat, Mahony, Devine
& Moses, LLP.

Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by Carolyn A.
Russell -- carolyn.russell@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al.

Weatherford U.S., L.P., Defendant, represented by David Bryce
Jordan -- djordan@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., John
Allen Douglas -- adouglas@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC &
Kevin Stephen Little -- klittle@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson
PC.


REAL TIME: Faces "Tabick" Suit in Eastern District New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Real Time
Resolutions, Inc.  The case is styled as Christopher Tabick, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-06227 (E.D. N.Y., October 25, 2017).

Defendant Real Time Resolutions, Inc. is a Texas corporation
licensed to do business in Ohio. Real Time is engaged in the
business of collecting debts, including delinquent and defaulted
mortgage loans on behalf of mortgage loan investors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


RETROFITNESS LLC: Cannot Seek Indemnification from Hanover
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment
on the Pleadings in the case captioned THE HANOVER INSURANCE
COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. RETROFITNESS, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 16-1751-BRM-TJB (D.N.J.).

On approximately January 16, 2014, Joseph Ardino, Samantha Ardino,
Krista DeFazio, Scott Ritcher, James Heaney and Phillip Mazucco
filed a class action complaint in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Middlesex County, against Retrofitness, ABC Financial
Services Company, Inc., Z Times Three LLC d/b/a Retrofitness of
Kenilworth, Britcarianna, LLC d/b/a Retrofitness Fairfield, PJ's
Fitness Express, Inc. d/b/a Retrofitness of Bordentown; PRJ
Holdings, LLC d/b/a Retrofitness of Wall, John/Jane Does 1-100,
Defendant Retrofitness Franchises 1-75, and XYZ Corporation 1-10.
The complaint alleges the Defendants violated the: (1) New Jersey
Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act ("TCCWNA");
(2) New Jersey Retail Installment Sales Act ("RISA"); (3) New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"); and (4) New Jersey Health
Club Services Act ("HCSA").  Hanover Insurance alleges the
Plaintiffs did not tender its defense to and demand
indemnification from Hanover Insurance for the Class Action
Lawsuit.

On March 30, 2016, Hanover Insurance commenced this action seeking
declaratory relief contending generally Hanover Insurance has no
duty to defend or indemnify Retrofitness and other defendants in
connection with the Class Action Lawsuit.  On July 25, 2016,
Hanover Insurance filed an Amended Complaint dismissing all
defendants but Retrofitness, still seeking declaratory relief.
Specifically, the Amended Complaint contains eight counts seeking
declaratory judgment, only two of which are relevant to Hanover's
Motion for Partial Judgment: (1) declaratory judgment based on the
absence of "Wrongful Acts"; and (2) declaratory judgment based on
the Hanover Policies Exclusion 11.

The parties agree the Hanover Policies are to be construed under
New Jersey law.  Under New Jersey law, the interpretation of an
insurance contract is a question of law.

When interpreting an insurance contract, the basic rule is to
determine the intention of the parties from the language of the
policy, giving effect to all parts so as to give a reasonable
meaning to the terms.

Hanover Insurance argues it has no duty to defend Retrofitness in
the Class Action Lawsuit because the complaint in the Class Action
Lawsuit does not state claims covered under the Hanover Policies.
Specifically, Hanover Insurance argues (1) Exclusion 11 of the
Hanover Policies is clear and unambiguous in excluding consumer
protection claims, (2) the exclusion also precludes coverage for
claims arising out of' consumer protection claims, and (3) the
Class Action Lawsuit only alleges breaches of New Jersey consumer
protection laws.

The Court concluded the actions that led to the peril were not
covered under the policy.  Here, even assuming Retrofitness was
negligent in its oversight of the franchisees, the peril that
caused the alleged claims and damages of the Class Action
Plaintiffs is expressly excluded from coverage under Exclusion 11.
Notably, there is no claim by the franchisees for negligent
supervision.

The Court finds Exclusion 11 is unambiguous and unequivocal, there
is no inherent inconsistency between the scope of the included
risks and the excluded risks, and there is no indication that
reading the exclusion as written frustrates the insured's
reasonable expectations. Because the interpretation of an
insurance contract is a question of law and the Court finds
Exclusion 11 is unambiguous and unequivocal, no material issues of
fact remain to be resolved and Hanover Insurance is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Pursuant to Exclusion 11, Hanover Insurance is not obligated to
defend Retrofitness in the Class Action Lawsuit and therefore
Hanover Insurance's Motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybc2fsr8from
Leagle.com.

THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, represented by ALEXANDER
G. HENLIN -- Alexander.Henlin@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

RETROFITNESS LLC, Defendant, represented by JUSTIN M. KLEIN -
justin@marksklein.com -- MARKS & KLEIN, LLP.


ROBERT BOSCH: Court Denies Motion to Dismiss RICO Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge on Oct. 30 denied a motion to dismiss from Robert
Bosch GmbH in a class-action lawsuit filed against it by hundreds
of Volkswagen franchise dealerships, alleging that Bosch played a
leading role in the Dieselgate scandal that blindsided dealers and
cost them millions, according to Hagens Berman.

The Oct. 30, 2017, order granted by Judge Charles Breyer of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
upholds the dealers' arguments that Bosch's involvement violated
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the same
law used to bring charges for mafia-related crime and other
organized racketeering.  In upholding RICO claims against Bosch,
the court also upheld trebling of damages, allowing dealers to
receive triple their losses.

The lawsuit alleges that Bosch partnered with Volkswagen, the
largest manufacturer of diesel vehicles in the world, in a
concerted effort to sell as many of the affected "clean-diesel"
TDI vehicles as possible.  The two made a strategic decision in
2005 to "launch a large-scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the
United States," in a scheme to misrepresent to regulators and the
public that Volkswagen's TDI vehicles complied with emission
standards and were environmentally friendly.

Bosch knowingly participated in this scheme by working with
Volkswagen to implement the defeat device that made the scheme
possible, and by promoting "clean diesel" technology in the United
States, the lawsuit states.

In January 2017, Judge Breyer approved a $1.67 billion settlement
for hundreds of Volkswagen-branded franchise dealers against the
automaker.  Attorneys have since continued to fight for the rights
of owners of hundreds of independently owned franchise dealerships
across the country against Bosch for its part in the Dieselgate
scheme.

"We are incredibly pleased that the court upheld claims against
Bosch and has seen through its thinly veiled ringleader position
in the Dieselgate scam," said Steve Berman, managing partner of
Hagens Berman and the lead attorney representing dealers.  "Bosch
and Volkswagen worked tirelessly to forge a secret deal to design
the emissions-cheating device and market it to boost sales.  Bosch
made sure it reaped handsome profits for its collusion, and we
will make sure it also reaps the just responsibility of payback to
franchise dealers."

"Bosch would rather live by the 'do as I say, not as I do'
philosophy, but the court saw its emails as a smoking gun," Berman
added.

The four named franchise dealers bringing the class-action suit
are Napleton VW Orlando, Napleton VW Sanford, and Napleton VW
Urbana and J. Bertolet Inc.; each operates a Volkswagen-branded
franchise dealership.  Franchise dealers across the country
purchased "clean diesel" vehicles from Volkswagen and sold those
vehicles to consumers, unaware of the defeat devices installed in
them, the lawsuit states. Only when the EPA issued its public
notice of the Dieselgate scandal did dealers learn about the fraud
affecting their inventory.

Judge Breyer stated that the defeat device in question "made the
affected vehicles unsaleable."

Bosch's Dieselgate Involvement

The defeat device in the affected VW clean diesel cars is part of
the electronic control unit which manages engine and emission
controls. As noted in the judge's order, Bosch designed and
manufactured this sophisticated computer, which is known as the
EDC17.

Bosch and Volkswagen worked together to transform the EDC17 into a
defeat device, the dealers state, and Bosch exercised near-total
control over the EDC17.  Volkswagen could not have modified the
EDC17 without Bosch's involvement and approval.

The complaint highlighted Bosch's intense involvement, including
that it typically locked the EDC17 to prevent customers like
Volkswagen from making significant changes on their own.

Judge Breyer's order upheld all claims brought against Bosch
stating, "In sum, the Franchise Dealers can satisfy their burden
of demonstrating that Bosch engaged in the predicate acts of mail
and wire fraud with allegations that Bosch was (1) a knowing
participant in a scheme to defraud, (2) that Bosch participated in
the scheme with the intent to defraud, and (3) that a co-schemer's
acts of mail and wire fraud occurred during Bosch's participation
in the scheme and were within the scope of the scheme."

Franchise dealers plausibly alleged that Bosch participated,
directly or indirectly, in (1) the conduct, (2) of an enterprise
that affects interstate commerce, (3) through a pattern, (4) of
racketeering activity.

Internal Emails

"Internal Volkswagen emails also support that Bosch was involved
in the scheme," the judge wrote in his order, citing a November
2006 email in which Dieter Mannigel, a member of Volkswagen's
software design team in the U.S. diesel engines division, emailed
Hanno Jelden, head of Volkswagen's powertrain electronics
division, about the "US07" project. That project involved the
design of the first iteration of "clean diesels" for sale in the
United States. Mannigel's email reads:

"Have you spoken with Bosch about the issue of US07 . . .?
This issue is slowly becoming critical . . . .
I came away from our meeting with Mr. Krebs [who joined Volkswagen
from Audi in 2005] with the following:
   - When we use the 'acoustic function,' it should have an
appearance that won't get us in trouble . . . .
   - He is very skeptical about its implementation on the U.S.
market: for one thing due to the very critical liability situation
. . . .

In my opinion, the requirement of 'nondiscoverability' has neither
been met for today's function nor the planned expansion.
The FP sheet for the expansion has been submitted to Bosch.
How do we proceed?"

"The express references in this email to the 'acoustic function,'
the 'US07' project, and the importance of not getting caught
illustrate Volkswagen's deception in undertaking the emissions
scheme," Judge Breyer wrote.  "But the email also casts Bosch as a
strategic partner in the scheme. The 'issue' discussed appears to
be how to implement the 'acoustic function' in the U.S. without
being discovered.  And Mannigel asks if Jelden has 'spoken with
Bosch about the issue,' suggesting that Bosch might be able to
help hide the "acoustic function" from U.S. regulators."

                     About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a
consumer-rights class-action law firm with 11 offices across the
country. [GN]


ROTHENBERG VENTURES: Ex-CFO Wins Case, Class Action Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Buhr, writing for TechCrunch, reports that former Rothenberg
Ventures CFO David Haase has won his case against the firm's
founder, Mike Rothenberg.

The ruling came down in favor of Haase in the Superior Court of
California.  Mr. Rothenberg must now pay Mr. Haase $166,000 for
expenses and losses incurred during his employment at the firm,
plus attorney fees for the suit and for legal services related to
an SEC investigation of the firm.

Mr. Haase joined Rothenberg Ventures in the spring of 2016 to help
the firm rapidly grow financially.  The former CFO routinely used
his own American Express card to cover expenses for the firm,
including flights, hotels, partial payment for Rothenberg's suite
at Oracle Arena for the Golden State Warriors games and just under
$35,000 Rothenberg put on the card to purchase a BeyoncÇ concert
suite for himself, which was eventually reimbursed to Mr. Haase
from his personal account.

Other expenses totaling more than $100,000 had not been
reimbursed, however, leaving Mr. Haase holding quite a large debt
in the four months he was employed at the firm.

Mr. Rothenberg owed Mr. Haase $109,352.20 plus interest accrued.
According to his suit, Rothenberg had "wrongfully and capriciously
refused to pay" that debt.  The head of the venture firm must now
pay that amount, as well as $57,000 in fees for the SEC
investigation, which includes Mr. Haase's activities when he was
acting CFO.

Mr. Rothenberg has so far not gotten back to us about the ruling,
but Mr. Haase tells TechCrunch he is "quite relieved" to be done
with the case.

"There were many good people at Rothenberg whose stories have not
been told," he added.   "Most were as surprised as the general
public to find out what Mike had been doing with investors' money.
I hope this helps them in their class action and also helps paint
a clear picture of the true story."

A separate class action lawsuit has been filed against Rothenberg
and his firm. [GN]


SEC: Disgorgement Practices Challenged in Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------
Hazel Bradford, writing for Pensions & Investments, reports that a
class-action lawsuit challenging the Securities and Exchange
Commission's statutory authority to collect fines and penalties
was filed October 26.

The lawsuit, which was filed in U.S. District Court in Boston by
international law firm Brown Rudnick on behalf of an F-Squared
Investment Management liquidation trustee and others, is seeking
the return of as much as $15 billion in penalties.

It follows a Supreme Court ruling June 5 that put new limits on a
common SEC strategy to recoup illegal profits from people found to
have violated federal laws, known as disgorgement. Because those
are penalties, the justices unanimously said the SEC is bound by a
five-year statute of limitations when seeking them.

"Hopefully, what this means is that the SEC is going to be
required by courts to stay in their lane and not seek remedies
without the proper statutory authority," said Brown Rudnick
partner Alex Lipman, Esq. -- alipman@brownrudnick.com -- a former
SEC enforcement division chief, in an interview.

Brown Rudnick partner Justin S. Weddle, Esq. --
jweddle@brownrudnick.com -- said the case could have a far-
reaching impact. "The point of our case is that executive branch
agencies aren't allowed to collect money without statutory
authority," Mr. Weddle said in the same interview.

The SEC extracted almost $3 billion in disgorgement payments in
2016 -- more than double what it collected in other types of
penalties.

Lead plaintiff Craig Jalbert is the liquidating trustee for F-
Squared Investment Management, which paid $30 million in
disgorgements that the SEC was not authorized to collect, the
lawsuit alleges.

F-Squared agreed in December 2014 to pay $35 million to settle SEC
charges that it made false claims about the performance of its
flagship investment product, including a $5 million fine and $30
million in disgorgement. According to the settlement, F-Squared
routinely promoted seven years of pre-2008 results for its
AlphaSector strategy, despite launching the product that year. The
results were hypothetical and miscalculated in a way that made
them look more favorable.

The SEC declined to comment on the lawsuit. [GN]


SHOWTIME: Files Motions to Compel Arbitration in Two Boxing Cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that it's Round 2
for lawyers suing on behalf of disgruntled boxing fans.

At least nine class actions have been filed over the Aug. 26 duel
between Floyd Mayweather and Conor McGregor.  Similar suits were
brought after a 2015 matchup between Mayweather and Emmanuel
"Manny" Pacquiao, dubbed the "Fight of the Century," in which
lawyers alleged that the event's promoters failed to disclose a
previous injury that led to Pacquiao's defeat.  This time, the
cases allege that consumers who paid $99.95 to view the fight
through live streaming couldn't see the bout at all due to
technical problems.

"The new cases are much more straightforward insofar as no one is
questioning any misrepresentation regarding the event that was
staged," said Hart Robinovitch -- ezimmerman@lowenstein.com -- a
partner at Zimmerman Reed in Scottsdale, Arizona, who has filed
two of the cases and served as lead plaintiffs counsel in the
litigation over the 2015 fight. "It's just simply a question of
someone buying something and not getting what they paid for, which
was the ability to see anything.  Our clients stared at blank
screens that night."

Showtime has moved to coordinate the cases into multidistrict
litigation in New York, where it's headquartered, according to an
Oct. 3 motion filed before the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.  Most plaintiffs attorneys support
coordination but prefer Nevada, where the boxing match took place
in Las Vegas.

The MDL panel is set to hear arguments on coordination on Nov. 30
in St. Louis.

The case is the latest to attempt to bring consumer fraud claims
over sporting events that left fans less than thrilled.  In
general, the cases have struggled to overcome the presumption that
fans got what they paid for.

On Aug. 25, a federal judge in Los Angeles dismissed the
multidistrict litigation over the fight between Mayweather and
Pacquiao.

The new lawsuits allege that consumers who paid to watch the fight
via cable or satellite, or through the UFC Fight Pass or Showtime
mobile apps, couldn't access it at all, experienced delays of
about 50 minutes or suffered other technical problems.

But the legal fight could be over before it's begun.

Showtime, which is a subsidiary of CBS Corp., has already filed
motions to compel arbitration in two of the four cases in which it
is a defendant, citing agreements signed by consumers that had
class action waivers.  A plaintiffs lawyer in one of those cases
has insisted that the arbitration agreement was buried in the
agreement.

Showtime and its lawyer, Yehudah Buchweitz --
yehudah.buchweitz@weil.com -- of Weil, Gotshal & Manges in New
York, did not respond to a request for comment.

Plaintiffs attorney Timothy Peter -- tpeter@faruqilaw.com -- a
partner in the Pennsylvania office of Faruqi & Faruqi, who has
sued defendants other than Showtime, argued in an Oct. 24 motion
that the arbitration agreements demonstrate why the cases
shouldn't be coordinated. He wrote that "plaintiffs in those
actions face significant factual issues concerning the
applicability and enforceability of those arbitration agreements."

His case, and four other lawsuits, name two companies with which
Showtime contracted to provide the live stream: NeuLion Inc., an
internet service provider based in Plainview, New York, and Las
Vegas sports promoter Zuffa LLC, a division of William Morris
Endeavor Entertainment LLC that does business as UFC, or Ultimate
Fighting Championship.

In an Aug. 29 post on Twitter, UFC president Dana White
acknowledged the live streaming problems "because of NeuLion's
technical issues" and vowed to begin issuing refunds.

The UFC defendants have scheduled a Nov. 28 mediation session in
Las Vegas.  They argued in an Oct. 12 motion that the cases should
be coordinated in Nevada, where consumers signed contracts with
them under Nevada law.  They also suggested U.S. District Judge
Andrew Gordon, who has never overseen an MDL, should be assigned
the judge--an appeal to the panel's increasing desire to diversify
the pool of MDL judges.

NeuLion attorney Jura Zibas -- jura.zibas@wilsonelser.com -- a New
York partner at Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, who also
supported Nevada, and Jeffrey Jacobson -- jjacobson@kelleydrye.com
-- of Kelley Drye & Warren in New York, who represents the UFC
defendants, did not respond to requests for comment.

The mediation session might not be limited to the UFC defendants,
however.  Attorney Mark Geragos of Geragos & Geragos in Los
Angeles also supported Nevada as a venue, even though he filed a
case against Showtime and one against Sony Interactive
Entertainment LLC on behalf of fans who paid to live stream the
fight to their Play Station 4.

"Although the UFC defendants are not defendants in the plaintiffs'
cases, it would be efficient to mediate the Showtime cases with
the plaintiffs and defendants in the UFC actions in one
mediation," he wrote in an Oct. 24 motion. [GN]


SIU: More Female Doctors to Join Wage Discrimination Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Dean Olsen, writing for The State Journal-Register, reports that
about 125 female doctors employed now and in the past by Southern
Illinois University School of Medicine have been asked to join a
class-action lawsuit alleging gender-based wage discrimination.

Notices giving the doctors the option of joining the lawsuit filed
by former SIU doctor Sajida Ahad were mailed in mid-October,
according to one of Ahad's attorneys, J. Bryan Wood, Esq. of
Chicago.

The mailing followed a Sept. 29 ruling by U.S. District Court
Judge Sue Myerscough in Springfield granting Ahad's request for
"conditional collective action certification." The ruling allows
other women to join Ahad in the case.

Any doctors receiving the notice must affirm that they want to be
part of the lawsuit before they can be eligible for potential
monetary damages under the federal Equal Pay Act against SIU and
its not-for-profit group practice of physicians, SIU Medicine.

Wood said the case is far from over, and even more female doctors
may be allowed to join the suit if Myerscough grants class
certification under "Rule 23" of the federal rules of civil
procedure.

But Wood said October 27 that that ruling was "a significant
development because it affords an opportunity for others to join
the lawsuit and because it acknowledges facts about the
defendants' pay practice."

SIU officials declined to comment on the latest development in the
2015 case. The civil lawsuit could lead to a jury trial, a trial
conducted by a judge or an out-of-court settlement against the
Springfield-based medical school and practice group.

According to Myerscough, Ahad has "shown that there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that there are similarly situated
class members affected by a common policy that potentially
violates" the Equal Pay Act.

Myerscough noted in the September ruling that SIU officials
opposed Ahad's request for conditional collective action
certification, and officials contended the medical school's pay
system wasn't discriminating against female doctors.

But the judge said Ahad "need not prove at this stage in the
proceedings that pay discrepancies between men and women are due
to discriminatory practices. The court does not assess the merits
of the plaintiff's claim when determining whether to certify the
collective action."

If Rule 23 certification is granted in coming months, as many as
165 current and previous SIU female doctors may be eligible for
damages retroactive to 2010 or earlier, Wood said.

And depending on how Myerscough rules in the future, the women may
be eligible for damages regardless of whether they voice a
preference before the case is resolved, Wood said.

A Tennessee-based economic expert retained by Ahad determined that
female physicians at SIU were being paid more than $12,200 per
year less than male doctors for similar work.

Ahad, 42, a general and bariatric surgeon, was employed by SIU and
treated patients through SIU Medicine, also known as SIU
Physicians and Surgeons and SIU HealthCare, from 2008 through
2014.

Ahad sought class-action status in the case against SIU, according
to Wood, because "Dr. Ahad said that she's not in this just for
herself. She wants to change the fact that women are underpaid
there and in general."

Ahad received a base salary of $125,000 from the medical school
and $110,903 from SIU Medicine in fiscal 2013, the last full
fiscal year in which she worked for SIU, according to a report
filed in court by Ahad's retained expert, D.C. Sharp of Econ One
Research Inc.

Ahad now is employed in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, as a surgeon by the
University of Iowa.

The consent form mailed to doctors by Ahad's lawyers "must be sent
to plaintiffs' counsel as soon as possible if you want to join. If
you do not respond within 60 days, you may not be able to recover
all of the wages you are owed."

Wood said current and former female SIU doctors with any questions
are free to contact him. One female doctor already has sent in the
form to join the lawsuit, he said.

"None of the female doctors we've spoken with discouraged us from
moving forward," Wood said. [GN]


STANDARD & POOR'S: Plaintiffs Given OK to Pursue Deceit Claim
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Danckert, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports
that investors participating in a class action against Standard &
Poor's have been given the green light to argue the ratings agency
deceived them into believing risky financial products were safe
investments.

The Federal Court has granted leave to investors in the class
action brought against S&P by global law firm Squire Patton Boggs
to pursue a tort of deceit claim against S&P over the way it rated
a type of structured investment product known as synthetic
collateralised debt obligations.

The fresh argument means the statute of limitations of six years
could be extended significantly and help several local councils,
charities and super funds recoup their losses on the product.

Squire Patton Boggs partner Amanda Banton said it was major
development for the case as many investors -- including local
councils and charity organisations -- purchased the products more
than 10 years ago.

"It's not that often that the tort of deceit claim is run. If you
can get up on a tort of deceit claim it extends the limitations
from the six years from the date that you could have found out
about the (alleged) deceit," Ms Banton said.

"So instead of the normal six-year limitation running it can
extend the relief a lot longer, but you have got to have the right
circumstances to be able to make a tort of deceit," she said.

By arguing they were deceived, investors can claim the limitations
period does not apply until they discovered the deceit, rather
than it being backdated to when they suffered a loss.

Investors will now argue that S&P intentionally altered its
ratings methodology to rate the SCDOs higher than they would have
otherwise been allowed.

S&P is appealing the decision.

Local councils from around Australia, charities and other
organisations, including some investment houses, have rules that
restrict them from purchasing any investment product with a rating
below the highest rating of AAA.

A synthetic CDO was designed to give investors exposure to a
portfolio of fixed-income assets such as mortgage-backed
securities.

Investors around the world, including hundreds of Australian
investors and organisations, piled into the complex product
because they were rated as being the highest grade of investment
product available.

The reality was that the quality of these products was far from
high grade and were instead made up of low and high quality debts.

Problems with the quality of SCDOs first came to light in the
fallout of the global financial crisis.

SCDOs have become so synonymous with the GFC, they played a
starring role in the Hollywood hit The Big Short.

Ms Banton said the decision could impact other cases she is
running against ratings agencies.

"We've got about five other ones that will be affected by this
amendment and we will definitely apply for the same amendments to
applied in those cases. There are other cases of ours as well that
might be affected," Ms Banton said.

ANZ Bank, Commonwealth Bank and collapsed US investment bank
Lehman Brothers have also been drawn into the class actions
brought by Squire Patton Boggs over their role in selling the
complex products.

In 2016, about 90 councils, churches and charities settled a class
action against S&P for a sum believed to be in excess of $100
million. [GN]


STANDARD INSURANCE: Settles New Mexico Employees' Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Barker, writing for KRQE, reports that when the Standard
Insurance Company was hired to provide life insurance to New
Mexico public employees there was not a whiff of scandal.  But
what a difference a few years makes.

A 2012 KRQE News 13 investigation found Standard committing
misdeeds that is costing the out-of-state insurance company
millions of dollars for business practices referred to as
coldhearted and shameful.

What happened?

You need to go back five years. Gene Moser was State Personnel
Director.  "I've never encountered anything like this. It staggers
me," Moser told KRQE News 13 in 2012.

To Martin Hoefler, it was a matter of life and death.  He was a
wildland firefighter with New Mexico's State Forestry Division.
Martin bought extra life insurance to provide for his family in
case something happened.  Tragedy struck in 2012 when Martin died
of cancer leaving behind his wife and eight children.  Martin
Hoefler was just 50 years old.

Then, weeks after Martin's funeral the Hoefler family received
another devastating blow.  Instead of mailing a check for $33,000,
the Standard Insurance Company refused to pay the death claim.
The news came in a cold three-page letter in which Standard said
when Martin applied for his life insurance policy he didn't fill
out a required medical form.  Standard said, no form, no life
insurance.  This, despite the fact Standard had been pocketing
Martin's premiums every two weeks for years.

And it's not just Martin Hoefler.  Bob Allard was a state employee
working at Heron Lake State Park.  "He was the kind of person that
would show up early, leave late." Park Superintendent Anthony
Marquez told KRQE News 13 in 2012.  "He took great pride in what
he did here at the park.  He took the job in his late 60's to
provide health insurance for him and his family and worked hard
every single day that he came here."

Bob had been paying his life insurance premiums all along.  But
when he died, Standard refused to pay Bob's widow the $22,000
death claim because, the insurance company said, a medical form
had not been filled out.

"When I found out that the two employees were denied coverage I
was shocked," General Services Cabinet Secretary Ed Burckle told
KRQE News 13 in 2012.  "I found it unbelievable that Standard had
denied their claim when the two employees had been paying their
premiums all along."

"When a family is expecting that . . . money . . . for death
benefits and find out that they are not getting anything, I think
that's obscene. (Standard's) response was immoral. It's wrong,"
Gene Moser said in 2012.

A Class Action Lawsuit

Standard Insurance is headquartered in Portland, Oregon. The firm
would not discuss the matter over the phone.  And, they wouldn't
talk about it in person either when KRQE News 13 visited the
company in October 2012.  In a prepared statement, a Standard
spokesperson wrote, "The State of New Mexico and The Standard are
committed to fully addressing and resolving this situation."

Standard sold life insurance to 74,505 public employees across New
Mexico. KRQE News 13's investigation found the firm denied more
than $200,000 in death benefits to various families holding
legitimate policies.  In 2012, victims filed a Class Action
lawsuit in federal court naming Standard Insurance and New
Mexico's General Services Division as defendants.

"Standard essentially waited until somebody died before they tried
to figure out whether or not they were covered," attorney Robert
Hanson said.  Mr. Hanson represents the victims in the Class
Action lawsuit.

"We brought the lawsuit essentially alleging that the state and
Standard were misrepresenting to state employees and local public
body employees that they were in fact insured when they may have
been at risk for having a claim denied," Mr. Hanson said.

In September, U.S. Magistrate Judge Karen Molzen approved a $2.4
million out-of-court settlement in the Class Action case.

"If you're a beneficiary of a loved one who has passed away and
you find out that your life insurance carrier has denied your
death benefits it's an extremely big deal," Secretary Burckle
said.  The New Mexico General Services Department agreed to settle
the lawsuit for $100,000.

"The state wanted this issue behind us, to have it resolved.  So
we felt that adding $100,000 to enable both parties to settle the
case was the appropriate action and greatly reduced the state's
future risk," Secretary Burckle told KRQE News 13.

Secretary Burckle adds, after Standard refused to pay death claims
for Martin Hoefler and Bob Allard in 2012, the state General
Services Division issued checks to the families to cover the full
amount owed under the life insurance policies.  "I want (state)
employees to know that (New Mexico) always had their back. When we
said that we would make any individual whole whose death benefit
was denied, we stuck to our word," Burckle said.

The Settlement

The Standard Insurance Company agreed to settle the Class Action
case for $2.3 million.

The good news is that every public employee who paid life
insurance premiums to Standard will get a share of the settlement
proceeds.  The bad news is there are more than 74,000 employees
who qualify.  Any public employee who had basic life coverage with
Standard will receive $5.06.  Employees who opted for supplemental
life insurance will get checks for $42.05.  The first settlement
checks are expected to be mailed out in about 30 days.

The Standard Insurance Company no longer has the contract to
provide life insurance to New Mexico public employees.

"We have to find a better way to provide insurance coverage and
peace of mind for people (who have life insurance) rather than
waiting until after somebody has died to figure out whether or not
they are covered," attorney Robert Hanson said.  "One would hope
that through a multi-million dollar settlement, the
executives . . . of the insurance company would be reevaluating
the way that they do business."

Statement from Standard Insurance for Larry Barker, KRQE

Oct. 31, 2017

We are pleased that the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico granted approval of the settlement in the Brett Woods &
Kathleen Valdes et al. v. Standard Insurance Company & the State
of New Mexico General Services Department

Importantly, employees who thought that they had purchased
additional life insurance are now covered by the benefits they
expected.

The plaintiffs in this Lawsuit sought remedies from Standard
Insurance Company and the State of New Mexico General Service
Department ("GSD") for certain individuals who had paid for
additional life coverage through GSD payroll, but whose coverage
was ineffective because they never submitted nor obtained approval
of evidence of insurability as required by the group life
insurance policy administered by GSD.

Enrollment and premiums under this group policy are administered
by the policyholder, not by the insurance company.

After issues arose with several individuals, we worked with the
GSD to ensure that State employees requiring an evidence of
insurability first complete that process.

Prior to reaching settlement of the Lawsuit, agreement was reached
between GSD and Standard to provide coverage to those individuals
who had paid premiums yet were not insured.

Statement may be attributed to Bob Speltz, senior director, Public
Affairs, Standard Insurance. [GN]


STANFORD TRUST: Class Certification Order in "Lillie" Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TROY LILLIE, LEAH FARR, KENNETH DOUGHERTY,
CHARLES WHITE, MARTHA JEAN WITMER, SHARON WITMER, OLIVIA SUE
WARNOCK, CLYDE J. CHISHOLM, RONALD McMORRIS, ARTHUR ORDOYNE,
WILLIAM DAWSON, TERRY TULLIS, JAMES STEGALL, ANTHONY VENTRELLA,
ROBERT SMITH, THOMAS SLAUGHTER, LARRY PERKINS, WILLIAM PHILLIPS,
CHARLES HART, RICHARD FEUCHT, LONNIE ORDOYNE, ARTHUR WAXLEY,
DARRELL COURVILLE, MERRILL LAPLANTE, JAMES BROWN, IRA CAUSEY,
JERRY BURRIS, JACQUELINE MILLET, LOUIS MIER, MAMIE BAUMANN,
CHARLES SANCHEZ, JOSEPH CHUSTZ, JR., ROBERT BUSH, BOBBY NIX,
CLAUDE MARQUETTE, GWEN FABRE, ROBERT SCHWENDIMANN, WANDA BEVIS,
TERRY TARVER, MARCEL DUMESTRE, RONALD VALENTINE, BENNIE O'REAR,
JULIE SAVOY, LAURA LEE, DENNIS KIRBY, BILLIE RUTH McMORRIS, LARRY
SMITH, KENNETH WILKEWITZ, MURPHY BUELL, KERRY KLING, LYNN
GILDERSLEEVE MICHELLI, WILLA MAE GILDERSLEEVE, ANITA ELLEN CARTER,
FRED DEMAREST, NANCY GILL, LINDA BOYD, VIRGINIA BUSCHEME, ROBERT
GILDERSLEEVE, WALTER STONE, VIRGINIA McMORRIS, CAROL STEGALL, GARY
MAGEE, MONTY PERKINS, JOAN FEUCHT, KATHLEEN MIER, MAMIE SANCHEZ,
MARGARET S. NIX, MARGARET DUMESTRE, CLAUDIA O'REAR, GORDON C.
GILL, JOHN BUSCHEME, AND CHARLIE L. MASSEY, THOMAS E. BOWDEN, G.
KENDALL FORBES, DEBORAH S. FORBES, WILLIAM BRUCE JOHNSON, TERENCE
BEVEN, M.D., RALPH D. D'AMORE, DANIEL P. LANDRY, RONALD R.
MARSTON, RODNEY P. STARKEY, STEPHEN WILSON, JEANNE ANNE MAYHALL,
JOHN WADE, LYNN J. PHILIPPE, LISA SCRANTZ, v. STANFORD TRUST
COMPANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY, Case No. 2013 CA 1995 (La. App.), Judge
John Michael Guidry of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First
Circuit, denied the Plaintiffs' answer to the appeal and affirmed
the class certification judgment.

On Aug. 20, 2009, 86 individuals, who claimed to have heavily
invested in Stanford International Bank Ltd. ("SIB") certificates
of deposit (CDs) and consequently suffered substantial financial
losses, filed a class action lawsuit against the Stanford Trust
Co., SEI Investments Co., and the State of Louisiana, Office of
Financial Institutions ("OFI") for alleged breaches of fiduciary,
statutory, and contractual duties.  In the petition, the
Plaintiffs claimed that investment advisors, working as agents for
Stanford Trust, induced the Plaintiffs to invest either directly
in SIB CDs held in trust with Stanford Trust as the trustee or to
designate Stanford Trust as the custodian of their IRA accounts,
whereby Stanford Trust converted the funds in the IRA accounts to
SIB CDs.

With respect to the OFI, the Plaintiffs asserted that the agency
wrongly allowed the SIB CDs to be marketed and sold to Stanford
Trust without proper examination of the risk profile of the CDs or
assurance that such information was being disclosed to investors.
Moreover, despite examinations that eventually caused the OFI to
first restrict the sales of SIB CDs, and later order the removal
of SIB CDs from Stanford Trust, they alleged that the OFI failed
to disclose the perceived risks that prompted its actions to
investors who purchased or renewed SIB CDs from Jan. 1, 2007 to
Feb. 13, 2009, or to suspend the sale of the CDs in the state
after discovering the risk associated with the CDs.

With respect to the other two Defendants, SEI and the Stanford
Trust, the Plaintiffs noted that the entities had entered into an
agreement whereby SEI would perform the trust functions of
accounting and reporting of investments in SIB CDs; however, they
claimed that the companies failed to properly determine and report
the value of the SIB CDs, and in doing so, engaged in unfair trade
practices and committed violations of Louisiana securities law.

On March 5, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification and to conduct discovery on class certification
issues.  The trial court granted the motion to conduct discovery
and scheduled the motion for class certification for a
contradictory hearing.  Thereafter, a motion was filed to
voluntarily dismiss Stanford Trust from the litigation without
prejudice, which the trial court granted on March 24, 2010.
Hence, the matter of class certification proceeded against SEI and
the OFI only.

Following the two-day class certification hearing, the trial court
took the matter under advisement, and for reasons pronounced on
Dec. 5, 2012, the trial court certified the Plaintiffs' lawsuit
against SEI and the OFI as a class action consisting of: (i)
persons who purchased SIB CDs in Louisiana between Jan. 1, 2007
and Feb. 13, 2009; (ii) persons who renewed any SIB CD in
Louisiana between Jan. 1, 2007 and Feb. 13, 2009; and (iii)
persons for whom Stanford Trust purchased SIB CDs in Louisiana
between Jan. 1, 2007 and Feb. 13, 2009.  The trial court later
signed a judgment and an amended judgment in conformity with its
reasons on Dec. 17, 2012 and Jan. 16, 2013, respectively.

SEI and the OFI both filed motions to devolutively appeal the Dec.
17, 2012 judgment, as amended, which were granted by the trial
court on Feb. 5 and 8, 2013, respectively.  However, on Feb. 1,
2013, the Plaintiffs filed a "First Amended and Restated Class
Action Petition," wherein three new Plaintiffs were named and
seven insurance companies, as insurers of SEI, were added as
Defendants to the lawsuit.

Subsequently, six of the newly added insurance Defendants filed a
motion to remove the lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana.  Following the removal, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the entire action to state
court.  The OFI filed a separate motion with the federal court to
sever the claims against it and to remand those claims to state
court, citing its immunity from suit in federal court under the
Eleventh Amendment as the basis for remand.

Before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana could act on the motions filed by the Plaintiffs and the
OFI, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
issued an order transferring the Plaintiffs' claims against SEI
and its insurers from the Middle District of Louisiana to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, where other
Stanford-related securities litigation was pending.

As for the Plaintiffs' claims against the OFI, the MDL Panel
separated those claims and maintained them in the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, because it determined
that those claims focused on factual issues unique to OFI, with
respect to the conduct of its examiners and nature and scope of
its regulatory authority.  As a consequence of the actions of the
MDL panel, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana denied the OFI's request to sever as moot, but granted
the OFI's motion to remand.

Consequently, SEI has abandoned its devolutive appeal of the
instant class certification judgment and is not a party to the
appeal pending before this Court.  However, the Plaintiffs have
filed an answer to the OFI's appeal seeking review of the trial
court's decision to exclude from the class those persons who made
a decision not to redeem their SIB CDs prior to maturity between
Jan. 1, 2007 and Feb. 13, 2009.

Judge Guidry finds no error in the trial court's finding that the
answer to the question of whether the OFI had a duty to disclose
the riskiness of the CDs or to prohibit the sale of the CDs is
equally common to all the proposed Plaintiffs, such that in one
stroke, it could determine the liability of the OFI as to all of
the Plaintiffs.  Accordingly, he finds no error in the trial
court's determination of commonality.

Although the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs does not
identify a date of purchase or renewal for a majority of the
individuals identified, the Judge cannot say the trial court was
clearly wrong in finding this evidence sufficient to establish the
numerosity element.  The evidence shows that SIB CD accounts were
owned by the identified individuals during the relevant time
period and therefore they have the potential to be class members.
As such, he finds no merit in the OFI's assertion that the
Plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to establish numerosity.

And finally, Judge Guidry rejected the arguments raised by the OFI
to refute the trial court's finding that the Plaintiffs met their
burden of establishing the superiority of the class action
procedure and the predominance of the issues common to the class
pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 591(B)(3).  Likewise, he finds no
error in the trial court declining to extend membership in the
class to persons who made a decision not to redeem SIB CDs prior
to maturity based upon express representations made by the Trust,
their agents, or the Stanford Financial Group or based upon the
values stated by SEI between Jan. 1, 2007 and Feb. 13, 2009.

Having thoroughly considered the issues and arguments raised in
the class certification matter, Judge Guidry finds no abuse of the
trial court's discretion in certifying a class action and affirm.
Accordingly, he denied the Plaintiffs' answer to the appeal and
affirmed the class certification judgment.  All costs of this
appeal, in the amount of $13,049, are cast to the State of
Louisiana, Office of Financial Institutions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3M9Xth from Leagle.com.

Phillip W. Preis, Charles M. Gordon, Jr., Crystal D. Burkhalter,
Caroline P. Graham, Baton Rouge, LA, Counsel for
Plaintiffs/Appellees Troy Lillie, et al.

Jeff Landry, Attorney General, David M. Latham, Keary L. Everitt,
Marie G. Everitt, Special Assistant Attorneys General, New
Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant State of Louisiana
through the Office of Financial Institutions.

Robert E. Kerrigan, Jr. -- rkerrigan@deutschkerrigan.com -- Duris
L. Holmes -- dholmes@deutschkerrigan.com -- New Orleans, LA,
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees SEI Investments Company and SEI
Private Trust Company.


STEPHEN CUNNINGHAM: Faces "Moreno" Suit in S.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stephen Cunningham.
The case is styled as Fernando Barrales Moreno, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Carnival Corporation, a
foreign corporation, Defendant, 165 Bleecker Caterer's Inc.
doing business as: Fiore's Pizza, ADR Provider, Case No. 1:17-cv-
08392 (S.D.N.Y., October 31, 2017).

Fiore's Pizza is a pizza restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SUBWAY: Soda Tax Class Action Continues in Local County Level
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ashok Selvam, writing for Chicago Eater, reports that a Chicago-
based law firm has filed a class-action lawsuit against Subway,
arguing the chain unfairly collected extra money from the sale of
sugary drinks citing Cook County's soon-to-be-defunct soda tax.
Even though the Cook County board in September voted to rescind
the controversial tax, the participants trudged on with their
lawsuit, which was heard in federal court.  The lawsuit -- which
federal judge kicked back to the local county level -- claimed
Subway employees were charging upwards of 20 cents more than the
drink's price.

The tax, which affected soda, unsweetened iced tea, and other
drinks, went into effect on August 1.  Locals didn't respond well
to the rationale behind the tax, as supporters claimed reduced
sugar intake was a public health problem.  Opponents felt the
county was squeezing its residents.

In lieu of the commissioners' vote, the county will continue to
collect the tax only through December.  The Zimmerman Law Offices
filed many class-action cases in regards to the tax, reported Cook
County Record.  There are other similar lawsuits filed against
McDonald's, KFC, and PepsiCo.  The McDonald's case was dismissed
in August. There are 49 Subway locations in Chicago, according to
the chain's website.

In court a September court appearance -- before the board voted to
abolish the tax -- Subway's attorneys told the judge that the
chain would spend $100,000 to $5 million to upgrade its cash
register systems to more accurately collect the tax.  Many
restaurants didn't know how much to collect or which drinks were
affected.  Subway no longer needs to spend that money now that the
tax is going away. [GN]


SURNIAK HOLDINGS: Faces Class Actions Over IEI Warehouse Fire
-------------------------------------------------------------
WTAP reports that another lawsuit relating to the IEI Plastics
Recycling fire is filed in Wood County Circuit Court.

Filed by the Sims Law Firm, it charges the company was negligent
in operating the recycling facility destroyed in the fire that
broke out October 21.

It also accuses the company of illegally operating a dump site
there, and for wrongfully withholding information on what was
stored there.

They add that action hampered firefighters efforts to put it out.

In addition to seeking financial damages and medical monitoring,
it requires IEI to provide safe storage of plastics materials.

A hearing on the case is set for November 22.

Parkersburg attorney Jim Leach filed a class action lawsuit on
Oct. 31 against the people and companies he says are responsible
for the fire that destroyed the IEI Plastics Recycling warehouse
in south Parkersburg, and allegedly caused health problems for
many local residents.

Attorney Jim Leach says he is partnering with Detroit-based Liddle
& Dubin, P.C., a firm that focuses on class action litigation
surrounding environmental impacts, to help local residents collect
money in the lawsuit.

The class action lawsuit, filed on behalf of 3 Parkersburg
plaintiffs in Wood County Circuit Court, is against Saurabh Naik,
International Export-Import, Inc., Surnaik Holdings of WV, LLC,
Sirnaik, LLC, Polymer Alliance Services, LLC, and Green
Sustainable Solutions, LLC.

The lawsuit alleges, in part, that Saurabh Naik and his companies'
failure to correct WV DEP violations and known fire safety hazards
at the IEI, Inc.  Plastics Recycling warehouse in south
Parkersburg contributed to the cause and spread of the fire that
destroyed that facility and spread burning plastics and chemicals
into the region's air, from October 21 to October 29.

Jim Leach L.C. and Liddle & Dubin, P.C. are encouraging those
affected by the fire to visit the "Jim Leach IEI, Inc. Fire
Lawsuit Site" (under the "Related Links" section of this story) to
fill out the "IEI Plastics Fire Survey" concerning exposure to the
fire that will assist in the investigation of this matter.

Their legal team is available for free consultations concerning
the legal rights of those affected by the IEI, Inc. Fire.

A resident of Camden Avenue has filed the second lawsuit stemming
from the fire that began October 21 at the IEI Plastics recycling
plant.

Paul Snider says it also includes residents and businesses in an
8.5 mile radius of the warehouse.

It charges negligence on the part of the building's owner Surniak
Holdings, L.L.C.

It also alleges reckless, willful and wanton indifference
motivated by financial gain.

The suit seeks punitive damages for Snider and people living as
far across the Ohio River as Belpre.

A class action suit was also filed two days after the fire began.
[GN]


SINGING RIVER: Addresses Pension Settlement Concerns at Hearing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Karen Nelson, writing for SunHerald, reports that Singing River
Health System has addressed concerns the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals listed when the court questioned the fairness of the SRHS
pension settlement and sent it back to U.S. District Court Judge
Louis Guirola.

In a statement issued on Oct. 31, SRHS attorney Kelly Sessoms
said, "In order to approve the settlement, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals asked for additional information regarding the health
system's financial health and ability to pay."

The proposed settlement involves 3,200 current and past employees
of the county hospital system, 200 of which are opposed to it on
the grounds they feel it will fail within a few years from lack of
funding.

Mr. Sessoms said that in a brief filed on Oct. 30, SRHS shows how
"a financial turnaround is now generating enough net revenue to
fund the proposed settlement for the foreseeable future.

"Singing River," he said, "has already deposited over $7 million
into an escrow account for the plan pending the outcome of the
settlement, and committed to a total of $156 million over the next
34 years to support the plan, all under the supervision of the
courts."

Attorneys for the class-action settlement also filed a brief
answering, among other things, why they need their fee paid sooner
rather than later.

In vacating Judge Guirola's decision and sending the case back to
him in July, the 5th Circuit Court panel told Judge Guirola to
consider four factors before approving the settlement.

One was whether the county health system would have the money and
ability to pay in years to come.  The panel also wanted to know
why payments from other lawsuits in the case -- like the one
against auditors KPMG -- wouldn't supplement the settlement.  It
wanted to know how future payments and existing assets would
intersect to pay claims.

And the court wanted to know why the class-action attorneys in
favor of the settlement will get their fees paid up front, rather
than face the same risk as the retirees and plan members.

The 5th Circuit panel wrote: "Perhaps the most intriguing fact is
that" attorneys for the class action arranged for a complete
payout of their fees from SRHS before the end of 2018, which
alleviates any risk of not getting paid, while the plan
participants "bear considerable risk and, worse, uncertainty."

The attorneys for the class-action -- including Coast attorney Jim
Reeves and attorneys with Cunningham Bounds in Mobile -- said this
in their brief:

Typical fees are 25 percent, and they were only asking 10 percent.

The fee is to be paid by SRHS on top of the settlement and not
come out of the settlement.

The fee is fair, considering they spent 7,800 hours and took the
chance that SRHS might not make a financial turnaround.

"The involvement of a governmental entity, the substantial number
of defendants and the multitude of defense firms that represent
them, the time pressure associated with the daily depletion of the
trust, an intense media spotlight, and unusual public attention
also made this case particularly complex and difficult," they
said.

They warned the court that stretching payments over years to the
attorneys for the class action "sets a powerful and chilling
precedent that will" hurt the incentive for attorneys to take
cases like this in the future.

And then they told the court they plan to ask for more money.

"In light of all of the hundreds of additional hours expended on
this case since April 1, 2016 (the date of the original fee
petition), class counsel intends to file a supplemental motion for
attorneys' fees and costs seeking a modification of the fee award"
from the $4.8 million awarded in June 2016 to $6.45 million, an
amount they originally petitioned for.

They said the class action has already been notified of that
amount and has previously had an opportunity to object.

The attorneys asked the court to establish a payment schedule for
the remaining $1.64 million.

On the other points, they said the longterm outlook for population
growth and market for SRHS on the Coast is strong. And the class
and trust have their own claims against KPMG that are not part of
the settlement. [GN]


T-MOBILE LTD: Sanctioned to Pay $8K in Attys' Fees in "Martinez"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN MARTINEZ and RAQUEL SAUCEDO, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. T-
MOBILE LIMITED, A/KA WIRELESS VISION, ST. LOUIS, LLC; WIRELESS
VISIONS HOLDINGS, LLC; MARK DENHA; OMAR AMMORI and SABER AMMORI,
Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-7020 (N.D. Ill.), Magistrate Judge
Susan E. Cox of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, ordered the Defendants to pay Mr.
Glenn Dunn $5,600 in attorneys' fees, and Mr. Jeffrey Brown
$2,327.50 in attorneys' fees as sanctions for their failure to
obey the Court's previous discovery order.

On May 25, 2017, the Court held a discovery hearing, after which
the Court ordered the Defendants to perform searches using certain
terms and begin producing emails returned by those searches.  As
of July 13, 2017, the Defendants had still not produced a single
email, and the Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions on that
basis (among others).

The Defendants contended that the search terms had returned too
many emails, and that it would be overly burdensome to review them
for production.  The Court rejected the Defendants' arguments,
noting that they had failed to raise the burden argument at the
May 25 conference, despite the fact that the number of hits from
the Plaintiffs' proposed search terms was knowable at that time,
and ruled that the Defendants' failure to produce any e-mail from
the search terms that the Court ratified in its May 25, 2017 order
is a violation of the Court's discovery order, and sanctions are
appropriate.

The Court ruled that the appropriate sanctions were to pay the
Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in preparing their motion for
sanctions.  The Plaintiffs provided a fee petition in connection
with that order, seeking $12,457.50 in fees that are itemized as
follows: (i) 16 hours at $550/hour for attorney Glenn Dunn, and
(ii) $3,657,50 at $550/hour for attorney Jeffrey Grant Brown.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' fee petition is not
reasonable, because: (i) the Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions was
only partially successful; (ii) the Plaintiffs' counsel's billing
rate was not supported by a third-party affidavit; and (iii) much
of the billing was for duplicative work, consisting of "ping-
ponging" the motion between Messrs.

Magistrate Judge Cox does not believe that the Plaintiffs' fee
petition should be discounted because their motion for sanctions
was only partially successful.

In determining the appropriate billable rate, the Magistrate Judge
finds that Mr. Dunn has slightly more experience than the attorney
in Franks (Mr. Dunn graduated law school in 2001), and a year has
elapsed since that decision was rendered.  As such, the Magistrate
Judge believes that a rate of $350 is reasonable for Mr. Dunn in
the matter.  Mr. Brown has less experience in the Chicago market,
but more experience in the contingent-fee class action and complex
litigation field.  The best evidence the Court has on how to weigh
these competing factors is Mr. Brown's request that he be
compensated at the same rate as Mr. Dunn.  She finds this to be
reasonable and she will grant that request, albeit at the reduced
rate of $350.

Magistrate Judge Cox has also reviewed the time sheets submitted
by the Plaintiffs' attorneys, and does not believe that the hours
spent are excessive.  There is nothing untoward about co-counsel
collaborating on a filing, and the time spent here by Mr. Brown is
not outside the realm of normalcy.  As such, she finds that the
6.65 hours billed by Mr. Brown is also reasonable under the
circumstances.  At the revised billable rate of $350, she awards
Mr. Dunn $5,600, and Mr. Brown $2,327.50.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Cox ordered the Defendants to
pay Mr. Glenn Dunn $5,600 in attorneys' fees, and Mr. Jeffrey
Brown $2,327.50 in attorneys' fees as sanctions for their failure
to obey the Court's previous discovery order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/zqdQwB from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Martinez, Plaintiff, represented by Glen Joseph Dunn, Jr.
-- gdunn@gjdlaw.com -- Glen J. Dunn & Associates.

Jonathan Martinez, Plaintiff, represented by Angel Petrov Bakov --
abakov@gjdlaw.com -- Glen Dunn & Associates, Ltd. & Jeffrey Grant
Brown, Jeffrey Grant Brown, P.C..

Raquel Saucedo, Plaintiff, represented by Glen Joseph Dunn, Jr.,
Glen J. Dunn & Associates, Angel Petrov Bakov, Glen Dunn &
Associates, Ltd. & Jeffrey Grant Brown, Jeffrey Grant Brown, P.C..

T-Mobile, Limited, Defendant, represented by Joseph Scott Streb --
streblaw@sbcglobal.net -- Joseph S. Streb Co. LPA, Kevin William
Doherty -- kwd@doherty-progar.com -- Doherty & Progar LLC, Michael
Thomas Sprengnether -- mts@doherty-progar.com -- Doherty & Progar
& Ryan Andrew Danahey -- rad@doherty-progar.com -- Doherty &
Progar LLC.

Wireless Vision, St, Louis, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph
Scott Streb, Joseph S. Streb Co. LPA, pro hac vice, Kevin William
Doherty, Doherty & Progar LLC, Michael Thomas Sprengnether,
Doherty & Progar & Ryan Andrew Danahey, Doherty & Progar LLC.

Wireless Vision Holdings, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph
Scott Streb, Joseph S. Streb Co. LPA, pro hac vice, Kevin William
Doherty, Doherty & Progar LLC, Michael Thomas Sprengnether,
Doherty & Progar & Ryan Andrew Danahey, Doherty & Progar LLC.

Mark Denha, Defendant, represented by Joseph Scott Streb, Joseph
S. Streb Co. LPA, Kevin William Doherty, Doherty & Progar LLC,
Michael Thomas Sprengnether, Doherty & Progar & Ryan Andrew
Danahey, Doherty & Progar LLC.

Omar Ammori, Defendant, represented by Joseph Scott Streb, Joseph
S. Streb Co. LPA, Kevin William Doherty, Doherty & Progar LLC,
Michael Thomas Sprengnether, Doherty & Progar & Ryan Andrew
Danahey, Doherty & Progar LLC.

Saber Ammori, Defendant, represented by Joseph Scott Streb, Joseph
S. Streb Co. LPA, Kevin William Doherty, Doherty & Progar LLC,
Michael Thomas Sprengnether, Doherty & Progar & Ryan Andrew
Danahey, Doherty & Progar LLC.


TALBOTS INC: Court Dismisses Coverage Suit Against AIG
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned THE TALBOTS, INC., v. AIG SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, Civil Action No. 17-11107-RGS (D. Mass.).

This insurance dispute arises from a California state court
lawsuit brought against The Talbots, Inc., by two former Talbots
employees, individually and on behalf of a proposed class of
employees, alleging various violations of the California Labor
Code (the Lopez Action).  Talbots sought defense costs and
indemnification for the Lopez Action from its insurer, defendant
AIG Specialty Insurance Company, which in turn denied coverage
under the terms of Talbots' policy.  Talbots responded by bringing
suit in this court, alleging breach of contract (Count I) and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(Count II).  AIG moves to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the
claims brought against Talbots in the Lopez Action fall within
various exclusions to the AIG Policy.

Talbots is a specialty retailer and marketer of women's apparel,
accessories, and shoes.  Talbots' parent company, Tailor Holdings,
LLC, purchased a Management Liability for Private Companies policy
from AIG. The Policy, which applied to Tailor's subsidiaries
(among them Talbots), included three separate coverage sections:
1) the Directors and Officers Liability Coverage Section (the D&O
Coverage Section); 2) the Employment Practices Liability Coverage
Section (the EPL Coverage Section); and 3) the Fiduciary Liability
Coverage Section. The parties agree that only the first two
coverage sections are implicated in the current dispute.

Both the D&O Coverage Section and the EPL Coverage Section require
AIG to advance defense costs and pay losses incurred by an insured
arising from claims against the insured, subject to the exclusions
and exceptions that are at issue in this case. Exclusion 4(q) of
the D&O Coverage Section provides that AIG is not liable for Loss
in connection with any Claim made against an Insured alleging,
arising out of, based upon, or attributable to the employment of
any individual or any employment practice, including, but not
limited to, wrongful dismissal, discharge or termination,
discrimination, retaliation or other employment-related claim.

In short, the EPL Section covers the listed types of employment
claims in Section 2(b), excluding the labor claims set out in
Endorsement 1 including, most relevant to this case, state law
analogs to the FLSA.

The specific counts alleged in the Lopez Action complaint, and
their corresponding provisions of the California Labor Code were
as follows: 1) Unpaid Overtime; 2) Unpaid Meal Period Premiums; 3)
Unpaid Rest Period Premiums.

Talbots focuses primarily on Counts 5-10 of the Lopez Action,
essentially conceding that the wage and hour claims of Counts 1-4
trigger the Policy's exclusionary clauses. The court has little
difficulty concluding that claims for unpaid overtime (Count 1),
unpaid meal period premiums (Count 2), unpaid rest period premiums
(Count 3), and unpaid minimum wages (Count 4) are textbook
examples of claims arising out of, based upon, or attributable to
the employment of individuals, D&O Exclusion 4(q), and also allege
"the refusal, failure or inability of any Insureds to pay wages or
overtime pay and the failure to provide or enforce legally
required meal or rest break periods," as spelled out in
Endorsement 1.

There is also no traction to Talbots' assertion that there is
clearly coverage for at least Counts 5 through 10 of the
Underlying Lawsuit. Counts 5-9 allege violations of state labor
regulations that govern how employers must disburse wages,
maintain records relating to employees, and reimburse employees
for business expenses. Talbots cites no authority or persuasive
rationale for the proposition that these claims do not also arise
out of, or are attributable to, Talbots' employment of any
individual or any employment practice under the terms of Section
4(q) of the D&O Coverage Section.  Nor are the claims advanced in
these counts included in the definition of Employment Practice
Violations in Section 2(b) of the EPL Coverage Section. The court
therefore finds that these claims, too, are not covered by the
Policy.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yazkqxzb
from Leagle.com.

The Talbots, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jason W. Morgan --
JMORGAN@DTM-LAW.COM -- Drohan Tocchio & Morgan P.C.

AIG Specialty Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Michael
P. Duffy -- mduffy@peabodyarnold.com -- Peabody & Arnold LLP &
Scarlett M. Rajbanshi -- srajbanshi@peabodyarnold.com -- Peabody &
Arnold LLP.


TGI FRIDAY'S: Class Certification Improper for TCCWNA Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence I Weinstein, Esq. -- lweinstein@proskauer.com -- Jennifer
Yang, Esq. -- jyang@proskauer.com -- Daniel Werb, Esq.
-- dwerb@proskauer.com -- of Proskauer Rose LLP, in an article for
National Law Review, wrote that in recent years, creative
plaintiff-side class action attorneys in New Jersey have attempted
to seek relief under the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and
Notice Act ("TCCWNA"), which allows for $100 in statutory damages
per violation to "aggrieved consumers" when terms in certain
contracts or other writings violate a "clearly established legal
right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller." N.J. Stat.
Ann. Sec 56:12-14 et seq.  Although the TCCWNA has been around
since the 1980s, it has only recently been employed by named
plaintiffs in putative class actions, most likely in an attempt to
circumvent the ascertainable loss and causation requirements of
New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA") and because the prospect
of $100 per violation greatly exceeds actual damages in many
cases.  Thankfully for defendants, a recent New Jersey Supreme
Court decision, Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 2017 WL 4399352 (N.J.
Oct. 4, 2017), makes it more difficult to certify class actions
brought \under the TCCWNA and circumscribes the type of "clearly
established legal right[s]" that may form the basis of a TCCWNA
claim.

Dugan is a consolidated appeal of two actions in which plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant operators of New Jersey restaurants
engaged in unlawful practices with respect to the disclosure of
prices charged to customers for alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages.  In the first action, plaintiffs alleged that TGI
Fridays and Carlson Restaurants (collectively, "TGIF") offered
beverages in menus without listing their prices.  Plaintiffs
claimed this was a violation of the CFA and a related regulation,
Sec. 56:8-2.5, which provides that it is unlawful to sell
merchandise at retail unless the "total selling price" is plainly
marked at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale. The
named plaintiff in the second action similarly claimed that
Carrabba's Italian Grill (and other restaurants) violated the CFA
and the same regulation based on allegations that menus and other
displays failed to disclose drink prices and discounts in effect
at different times the restaurant was open. Plaintiffs in both
actions also sought relief under the TCCWNA.

At the class certification stage, the lower courts in the two
cases were split on whether common questions predominate over
individual issues with respect to ascertainable loss.  On appeal,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that class certification was
improper for the TCCWNA claims because, among other things,
plaintiffs failed to show that "questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members." Specifically, the Supreme Court noted
that the TCCWNA, by its terms, does not apply when a defendant
fails to provide the consumer with a required writing, be it a
"contract," "warranty," "notice" or "sign."  Thus, each member of
the class would have to prove he or she was presented with a menu
during his or her visit to the defendants' restaurants.  This
individual question would require testimony by each class member
or another witness to prove that the member is an aggrieved
consumer.

The Supreme Court also held that the failure to provide prices on
a menu is not a violation of a "clearly established legal right of
a consumer or responsibility of a seller" as required under the
TCCWNA because such cases have never arisen in the history of
prosecutions under Sec 56:8-2.5.  Moreover, the Supreme Court
noted that "if plaintiffs were to prove that each of the thirteen
to fourteen million restaurant visits by a member of the plaintiff
class gave rise to a TCCWNA violation warranting a civil penalty
of $100, [then] TGIF would be liable for penalties amounting to
more than a billion dollars."  The Supreme Court found there is
nothing in the legislative history of the TCCWNA suggesting the
legislature intended to impose billion-dollar penalties on
restaurants that serve unpriced food and beverages to customers.
[GN]


TRIVAGO NV: December 29 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against Trivago N.V.
("Trivago" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: TRVG) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of a class who purchased Trivago American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") (1) pursuant and/or traceable to
Trivago's Registration Statement and Prospectus, issued in
connection with the Company's initial public offering on or about
December 16, 2016 (the "IPO" or the "Offering"); and/or (2) on the
open market between December 16, 2016 and October 26, 2017, both
dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors are
encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/trvg.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

Trivago N.V. provides online hotel search platform. The Company,
through its platform, offers price information, reviews, photos,
booking, and other travel services.  Trivago serves customers
worldwide and is a subsidiary of Expedia, Inc.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) the Company engaged in deceptive sales
practices; (2) such practices were nearly certain to bring Trivago
under enhanced regulatory scrutiny; and (3) consequently,
Trivago's public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.

On October 27, 2017, the U.K.'s Competition and Markets Authority
("CMA") revealed that it was investigating the manner in which
Trivago displays information to customers.  Specifically, the CMA
cited concerns about "pressure selling," the way in which
discounts are applied, and how hotels are ranked in search results
on its website. Following this news, Trivago's American Depositary
Receipt price has dropped $0.36 per share, or 4.54%, to close at
$7.57 on October 27, 2017.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/trvg or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484.  If you suffered a loss in
Trivago you have until December 29, 2017 to request that the Court
appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique.  In addition to representing institutions and other
investor plaintiffs in class action security litigation, the
firm's expertise includes general corporate and commercial
litigation, as well as securities arbitration.  [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Updated Spying Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Linda Chiem and Cara Bayles, writing for Law360, report that Uber
asked a California federal judge on Oct. 27 to toss a Lyft
driver's amended suit accusing it of illegally tracking competing
drivers, insisting the rejiggered complaint still quotes from a
single online article and Wikipedia to make unfounded allegations
that cannot pass muster as a class action.

Uber Technologies Inc. filed a motion seeking to dismiss for good
named plaintiff Michael Gonzales' amended suit accusing the ride-
hailing giant of spying on the locations of drivers for its
competitor Lyft Inc. through a software program known within the
company as "Hell."

Mr. Gonzales' amended suit still makes weak privacy and unfair
competition allegations by claiming he didn't consent to Uber
tracking his location when he used the Lyft app and doesn't even
properly allege that he lost any money or property as a result of
Uber's alleged actions, according to Uber's motion to dismiss.

"Plaintiff's amended complaint is again based mostly on
allegations made in a single online article, now bolstered with
Wikipedia articles about basic internet technology and a host of
allegations made only on 'information and belief,'" Uber said.

The San Francisco-based company argued that the Sept. 29 amended
complaint still doesn't allege enough facts to demonstrate that
Uber violated the federal Wiretap Act, as amended by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the California Invasion of
Privacy Act, the Federal Stored Communications Act or the
California Unfair Competition Law.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley in August granted
Gonzales' leave to amend the suit, saying the complaint as written
relied too heavily on "someone else's words" -- namely, a feature
article on technology news website The Information uncovering the
covert software -- and hadn't properly explained what was being
communicated and how the message was being intercepted.  That was
important, the judge said, because it would determine whether the
content was private and protected by wiretapping laws.

But rather than including new and potentially material facts,
Gonzales has used the amended complaint as a sort of supplemental
brief in which he tries again to explain his theory of the case,
Uber maintained in its motion to dismiss, this time just adorned
with buzzwords like HTTP, TCP, "scraping" and "sniffing."

"There are no new facts here that matter.  Plaintiff still alleges
only that Uber acted as a Lyft rider in order to receive driver ID
and GPS information from Lyft, data that Uber supposedly then used
for its own commercial purposes," Uber said in the motion.

That does not allege an "interception" of the "contents" of
anyone's "communications," or that Uber was "eavesdropping" on
anyone, Uber said, especially since the drivers were readily
providing their location information when they agreed to use the
app.

Gonzales first launched the suit in April against Uber, Uber USA
LLC and Rasier-CA on behalf of drivers across the country,
claiming Uber was scoping out its ride-sharing rival's coverage
areas and looking for drivers who worked for both companies.

The spyware Uber allegedly used -- called "Hell" as a riff on
Uber's software to track its drivers and riders known as "God
View" or "Heaven" -- allowed Uber personnel to gain unauthorized
access to Lyft computer systems, pose as Lyft customers and see
the locations of Lyft drivers and their unique Lyft
identification, according to the complaint.

Uber allegedly cross-referenced the location data it gathered on
Lyft drivers with its own internal records to figure out which
drivers were working for both companies.  Then, it allegedly tried
to persuade them to quit Lyft by offering more frequent and
profitable fares, according to court documents.

Attorneys for the plaintiff could not be immediately reached for
comment on Oct. 30.

Mr. Gonzales and the proposed class are represented by
Michael A. McShane and Mark E. Burton Jr. of Audet & Partners LLP
and Caleb Marker -- caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- of Zimmerman Reed
LLP.

Uber Technologies Inc., Uber USA LLC and Rasier-CA are represented
by Patrick L. Oot Jr. -- oot@shb.com -- M. Kevin Underhill --
kunderhill@shb.com -- and Annie Y.S. Chuang -- achuang@shb.com --
of Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP.

The case is Michael Gonzales v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al.,
case number 3:17-cv-02264, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.  The case is assigned to
Jacqueline Scott Corley.  The case was filed April 24, 2017. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Likely to Dodge Drivers' Suit Over Data Hack
---------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports
that a federal judge indicated on November 2 she would toss a
nearly three-year-old class action accusing Uber of failing to
protect drivers' private information, but encouraged the parties
to reinitiate settlement negotiations.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler seemed to tentatively grant
Uber's motion to dismiss the case for lack of standing, because
the plaintiffs had not shown their social security numbers were
disclosed in a 2014 hack of Uber's database containing driver
information.

"It's not there. It's just not what you think it is," Beeler said
during a hearing in downtown San Francisco. "It really isn't
enough to allege a case."

Former Uber driver Sasha Antman sued the ride-hailing company in
March 2015, claiming it failed to secure his personal information
in the attack and took too long to notify drivers their
information had been stolen. The attack led to an attempted theft
of his identity when someone applied for a Capital One credit card
in his name, he claims.

Gustave Link, a second ex-driver added to the lawsuit this past
July, claims the Internal Revenue Service rejected his 2014 tax
return because someone used his stolen information to file a
fraudulent return in his name and to collect his tax refund.

The May 2014 data breach gave an unknown entity access to the
personal information of roughly 50,000 drivers, according to a
statement issued by Uber almost a year later. Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher attorney Michael Wong, Esq. -- mwong@gibsondunn.com --
representing Uber, said in court on November 2 the company
believes a competitor hacked its database, not an identity thief.
He declined to name the competitor, but Uber has in the past
blamed Lyft for the breach.

Beeler dismissed Antman's first amended complaint in December 2015
for lack of standing, because Antman had only claimed the theft of
driver names and license numbers. The judge concluded that without
a hack of higher-stakes information such as social security
numbers, there was no "obvious, credible risk" of identity theft
that risked "real, immediate injury."

Wong repeated that finding on November 2, arguing the plaintiffs
had not shown harm in their second amended complaint.

Antman had again failed to show his social security number had
been stolen, Wong said, or that the information the hacker did get
was used to apply for the credit card -- which would have required
Antman's social security number. And Link had not shown his
information was even in the hacked database, Uber added in a
brief.

"Although we have conceded that there was a small number of other
drivers' social security numbers in the database, there are no
allegations that these drivers' numbers were in it," Wong said.

Antman and Gustave had their identities stolen using their social
security numbers, and neither has been notified that the numbers
were stolen in any other data breach, according to the complaint.

Theodore Maya, Esq. -- tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com -- an attorney with
Ahdoot & Wolfson who represents the plaintiffs, countered that his
clients had in fact shown direct harm. He noted Uber acknowledged
after Beeler dismissed the complaint that drivers' social security
numbers had been taken -- after initially announcing that the
database contained only names and license numbers -- and that Uber
had refused to tell Antman whether his social security number was
one of them.

"What they said to Mr. Antman was, 'Your banking information was
disclosed.' What does that mean? I use my social security number
in connection with banking," Maya said.

Maya asked Beeler for permission to examine Uber's database to
determine what banking information was stolen. But Beeler said she
did not believe the plaintiffs would find anything more than what
Uber had already told them, and instead suggested the parties
revisit settlement discussions over the next two weeks.

"I don't want to let Uber off the hook entirely," Beeler said in
pushing for settlement. "You do have some responsibility to your
drivers. I know you engaged in the settlement process in good
faith, and it's just sort of a shame that you're here."


UNITED SERVICES: Settlement in "Bastian" Suit Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHANTAL BASTIAN, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, WILLIAM LAKER, and OLIVER SUTTON, Plaintiffs,
v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 3:13-cv-1454-
J-32MCR (M.D. Fla.), Judge Timothy J. Corrigan of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville
Division, granted the parties' Joint Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and the Class Counsel's Motion for
Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Named Plaintiff Service Awards.

The Second Amended Complaint filed in the Action alleges that the
Defendants breached their Florida Automobile Insurance Policies in
resolving claims of some policyholders for Total Losses, by
improperly failing to include what the Plaintiffs contend is the
correct amount of sales tax required to be paid under the terms of
the insurance policies and applicable Florida law.  The Defendants
have maintained throughout the Litigation that they have properly
paid for sales tax on such claims consistent with their position
regarding the terms of the applicable insurance policies and
Florida law, and have denied that they have engaged in any
wrongful or unlawful conduct.

The parties have executed and filed a Class Action Settlement
Agreement with the Court on April 25, 2017, and they filed a
Notice of filing amended exhibits 1-3 to the Settlement Agreement
with the Court on May 22, 2017.

The Court, on June 5, 2017, entered an Order Preliminarily
Approving Class Settlement, requiring modifications to exhibit 2
of the Settlement Agreement (Long Form Notice) and preliminarily
certifying, for settlement purposes only, the Action as a class
action.

As part of its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court certified for
settlement purposes only a Settlement Class defined as follows:
each and every Person who (i) was insured by a Defendant under a
Florida Automobile Insurance Policy; (ii) during the Class Period
suffered a Covered Total Loss; and (iii) received from a Defendant
an Actual Cash Value Payment for the Covered Total Loss.

The Court also approved the Mailed and Emailed Notice and method
of notification for the potential Settlement Class Members, and
directed that the Mailed and Emailed Notice of the Proposed
Settlement and of the Fairness Hearing be disseminated in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement and the Preliminary
Approval Order.

In accordance with the Mailed and Emailed Notice, the Fairness
Hearing was duly held before the Court on Oct. 24, 2017, at 2:00
p.m.  Having read and considered all submissions made in
connection with the Joint Motion for Final Approval and the Class
Counsel's Motion for Fees and Service Awards, Judge Corrigan
granted the parties' Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement.  He certified the Settlement Class, for
settlement purposes only.

The Judge reconfirmed the appointment of Plaintiffs Chantal
Bastian, William Laker, Oliver Sutton, Ryann Love and Terry Smith
as the representatives of the Settlement Class, and reconfirmed
the appointment of the following Class Counsel as the counsel for
the Settlement Class:

   Christopher B. Hall, Esq.
   HALL & LAMPROS, LLP
   1230 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 950
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel. 404-876-8100

      -- and --

   Tracy L. Markham, Esq.
   AVOLIO & HANLON, P.C.
   2800 N 5th Street, Suite 302
   St. Augustine, FL 32084
   Tel. 904-794-7005

Judge Corrigan approved the Opt-Out List submitted by the
Settlement Administrator.  Timely requests for exclusion were
submitted by 22 potential Settlement Class Members, and those
potential Settlement Class Members are excluded from the
Settlement Class and will neither share in nor be bound by the
Final Order and Judgment.  All other potential Settlement Class
Members are adjudged to be members of the Settlement Class and are
bound by the Final Order and Judgment and by the Agreement,
including the Release provided for in the Agreement and this Final
Order and Judgment.

The Action is dismissed in its entirety on the merits, with
prejudice and without leave to amend, and without fees or costs
except as expressly provided in the Final Order and Judgment.
Within 30 days after the Effective Date, the Class Counsel and/or
other attorneys for the Plaintiffs will return to the Defendants
all Confidential Information, and all confidential documents,
data, or information, and all copies thereof in their possession,
custody, or control, and any other confidential documents provided
by the Defendants.  Within 45 days after the Effective Date, the
Class Counsel will deliver an affidavit to the Defendants
certifying their compliance.

Judge Corrigan also granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Named Plaintiffs' Service Awards.
He awarded the Class Counsel jointly the sum of $5 million in
attorneys' fees and $100,000 in costs.  In addition, he awarded
$10,000 to Class Representatives Chantal Bastian, William Laker,
and Oliver Sutton, and $8,000 to Class Representatives Terry Smith
and Ryann Love as service awards.  The Defendants will pay the
attorneys' fee award to Class Counsel and the service awards to
the Class Representatives, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.

The Judge reaffirmed the appointment of Dahl Administration, LLC
as the Settlement Administrator.  He also reaffirmed the
appointment of Michael T. Callahan as the Neutral Evaluator to
carry out the duties and responsibilities set forth in the
Agreement.

Any Settlement Class Member who receives a check in connection
with a claim submitted under the Agreement and does not cash that
check within 180 days of its date is deemed to have withdrawn that
claim, and the Defendants have no obligation to pay that claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/a0nApI from Leagle.com.

Chantal Bastian, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Hall,
Hall & Lampros.

Chantal Bastian, Plaintiff, represented by Tracy Lynne Markham,
Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

William Laker, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Hall, Hall
& Lampros & Tracy Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

Oliver Sutton, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Hall, Hall
& Lampros & Tracy Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

Ryann Love, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Hall, Hall &
Lampros & Tracy Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

Terry Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher B. Hall, Hall &
Lampros & Tracy Lynne Markham, Avolio & Hanlon, PC.

United Services Automobile Association, Defendant, represented by
Andrew Abramovich, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Benjamin C. Jensen --
bjensen@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP, Kristen M. Van der Linde,
-- kvanderlinde@boydjen.com -- Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Stephen E.
Goldman -- sgoldman@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP & Wystan M.
Ackerman -- wackerman@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP.

USAA Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Abramovich, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Benjamin C. Jensen, Robinson &
Cole, LLP, Kristen M. Van der Linde, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Stephen
E. Goldman, Robinson & Cole, LLP & Wystan M. Ackerman, Robinson &
Cole, LLP.

Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Andrew Abramovich, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Benjamin
C. Jensen, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Kristen M. Van der Linde, Boyd &
Jenerette, PA, Stephen E. Goldman, Robinson & Cole, LLP & Wystan
M. Ackerman, Robinson & Cole, LLP.

USAA General Indemnity Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Abramovich, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Benjamin C. Jensen, Robinson &
Cole, LLP, Kristen M. Van der Linde, Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Stephen
E. Goldman, Robinson & Cole, LLP & Wystan M. Ackerman, Robinson &
Cole, LLP.

Jennifer Hinojosa, Claimant, Pro Se.


UNITED STATES: Nov. 27 Deadline for Tribal Members to Claim Money
-----------------------------------------------------------------
spokesman.com reports that American Indian tribal members and
their descendants have until Nov. 27 to ask for their share of the
remainder of $3.4 billion in settlement money awarded to Native
Americans after a major class-action lawsuit against the federal
government.

The Cobell v. Salazar case began in 1996 when Blackfeet Nation
banker Eloise Cobell claimed the Bureau of Indian Affairs had been
mismanaging, squandering and stealing billions of dollars in land-
lease royalties and other tribal property for a century, the
Billing Gazette reported.

A settlement in the case was reached in 2009 and became U.S. law
in 2011.

Ninety-five percent of the settlement money has already been
handed out, according to North Carolina-based lawyer David Smith.

Under the terms of the settlement, the payout an individual is
entitled to depends on the amount of money that has gone through
their Individual Indian Money accounts.

The minimum amount awarded to class members is typically $2,000,
Smith said. The maximum he has seen was several million dollars.

U.S. District of Columbia District Court Judge Thomas Hogan set
the Nov. 27 deadline in a January order, after it was apparent
that efforts to find tribe members to entitled to the award money
listed as "whereabouts unknown" were no longer as successful.

"The data the government gave us for these roughly 450,000 tribal
members, most had no addresses. All we had was a name and tribal
affiliation," Smith said.

More than 3,000 individuals listed as "whereabouts unknown" within
the tribes based in Montana's seven federally recognized
reservations have yet to be located, according to the Garden City
Group.

Unclaimed funds that remain after the deadline passes will be
added to the Cobell Educational Scholarship Fund. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Tea Party Happy with IRS Settlement
--------------------------------------------------
Michael Coleman, writing for Albuquerque Journal, reports that
after a multiyear legal battle, the leader of the Albuquerque Tea
Party lauded the U.S. Justice Department's admission that the
Internal Revenue Service had targeted conservative groups for
extra scrutiny. The IRS also apologized for its actions.

The Justice Department announced that it has settled two lawsuits
-- one for millions of dollars -- in connection with the IRS'
scrutiny of Tea Party groups in Albuquerque and across the
country.

The Albuquerque Tea Party had earlier opted out of the class-
action lawsuit that resulted in a multimillion settlement, but the
group's president, Graham Bartlett, said the local political group
is part of a second settlement in which the IRS admitted that it
was wrong to target the groups for extra scrutiny.

"We are very pleased with our settlement," Bartlett told the
Journal on October 27, adding that his group sued the government
on "principle." The Albuquerque group was among the earliest in
the nation to protest the IRS taking so long to determine whether
it was a tax-exempt group.

"We got, basically, what we wanted, which is to make sure the IRS
does not do this to anybody else -- not just conservative groups -
- but anybody else. The government can't bully us around just
because of our political thinking."

Both cases are final pending approval from the district courts.
The actual dollar amount of the class-action settlement with the
federal government was kept confidential, but the plaintiffs'
Kansas City-based attorney, Edward Greims, confirmed to the
Journal on October 27 that it totaled millions of dollars.

The Justice Department said it is settling the lawsuit involving
the Albuquerque Tea Party and some 40 other conservative groups
with an apology from the IRS for the intensive scrutiny of the
groups. The group argued that their constitutional rights were
violated when they were singled out for additional tax scrutiny
based on their political views.

In 2012, the American Center for Law and Justice filed a lawsuit
against the IRS on behalf of the Albuquerque Tea Party and other
conservative groups whose requests for tax-exempt status was
delayed during the Obama administration. The ACLJ is a
conservative, Christian-based organization associated with Regent
University School of Law in Virginia Beach, Va. The organization's
chief counsel is Jay Sekulow, a member of President Donald Trump's
private legal team.

In 2013, the IRS admitted targeting the groups in part by focusing
attention on those with "tea party" or "patriot" in their names.
Many had their applications delayed for months and years. Some
were asked improper questions about their donors and even their
religious practices, an inspector general's report found. The
Albuquerque Tea Party was finally granted tax-exempt status in
July after an eight-year fight.

While the Trump administration's decision to settle the lawsuits
favors political groups that are mostly political allies of the
White House, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said it was clear the
IRS abused its power and "there is no excuse for this conduct."

"The IRS' use of these criteria as a basis for heightened scrutiny
was wrong and should never have occurred," Sessions said in a
statement Thursday. "It is improper for the IRS to single out
groups for different treatment based on their names or ideological
positions. Any entitlement to tax exemption should be based on the
activities of the organization and whether they fulfill
requirements of the law, not the policy positions adopted by
members or the name chosen to reflect those views."

The FBI in 2014 announced its investigation into IRS tactics found
examples of "mismanagement and poor judgment," but no evidence to
support criminal prosecution. The Obama Justice Department
announced in 2015 that no one at the IRS would be prosecuted. It
said investigators found mismanagement but no evidence that the
tax agency had targeted a political group based on its viewpoints
or obstructed justice.

Greims, the Kansas City-based lead attorney on the class action
case, told the Journal that while the Albuquerque Tea Party is not
a part of the class-action settlement that will be spread among
more than 400 plaintiff groups, it was among the earliest groups
to protest their treatment by the IRS and that actually prolonged
their tax status fight.

"Once you had the wrong kind of viewpoint, you were automatically
put in a special section at the IRS," Greims said. "It just builds
on itself and that's how it can take eight years."

Republicans were disappointed earlier this year when the Trump
Justice Department, under Sessions, said it would not reopen its
case against Lois Lerner, who had led the IRS office that
processes applications for tax exempt status.

Much of the agency's leadership, including Lerner, resigned or
retired over the scandal. One of the proposed agreements calls
senior management "delinquent" in providing control and direction
over the process. It faults Lerner for failing to tell upper-level
management of the long delays in processing applications from tea
party and other conservative groups.

"We hope that today's settlement makes clear that this abuse of
power will not be tolerated," Sessions said in announcing the deal
on October 26. [GN]


UNITED VAN: Can Compel Arbitration in "Dennis" FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie L. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case, SAMMY DENNIS, Plaintiff,
v. UNITED VAN LINES, LLC, Defendant, No. 4:17CV1614 RLW (E.D. Mo.)
and stayed the case pending the completion of arbitration
proceedings.

The Plaintiff is a moving van owner-operator employed as a truck
driver for moving commercial and household goods.  The Defendant
is a licensed interstate household goods motor carrier under the
federal Motor Carrier Act that operates nationally through a
network of regional agents, including Holman Moving Systems.  The
Defendant classifies the Plaintiff as an independent contractor
pursuant to a written Independent Contractor Operating Agreement
("ICOA") that the Plaintiff entered into with Holman.

On June 2, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and under the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law ("MMWL").  He brings the suit on behalf
of himself and putative class members, who are current and former
United drivers that the Plaintiff alleges are improperly
misclassified as independent contractors.  He contends that the
Defendant failed to pay him and the class the federal minimum wage
in violation of the FLSA and the MMWL.

On July 25, 2017, the Defendant filed the present Motion to Compel
Arbitration or Dismiss Complaint.  In the alternative, it argues
that the Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs FLSA claims depend upon
the work he performed for Holman pursuant to the ICOA.  Further,
it contends that Plaintiffs theory of liability alleges that the
signatory, Holman, and the Defendant engaged in concerted
misconduct that resulted in the misclassification of the Plaintiff
as an independent contractor and the failure to pay minimum wages.
Judge White agrees that equitable estoppel applies in this case.

Further, because the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant exercised
control of their employment and classified him as an independent
contractor through Holman, he essentially alleges that concerted
misconduct by both nonsignatory, United, and signatory, Holman, by
misclassifying him and failing to pay minimum wage.  The Judge
says the Plaintiff cannot claim that United and Holman are his
employers responsible for FLSA and MMWA violations yet deny United
the right to invoke the arbitration clause.  Thus, he finds that
equitable estoppel applies, and the Defendant can compel
arbitration of the ICOA under Delaware law.

The dispute raised by the Plaintiff arises in connection with the
ICOA, which governs his classification and compensation, because
he alleges that he was misclassified as an independent contractor
and thus did not receive the pay he was entitled to under federal
and state statutory provisions.  Therefore, Judge White finds that
the arbitration agreement applies to the Plaintiffs' FLSA and MMWA
claims.

The Judge also finds that the ICOA is not a contract of employment
exempted under Section 1, and the FAA applies to the Plaintiffs
claims.  Under the ICOA, the Plaintiff assumed full control over
scheduling work hours and rest periods; selecting routes and
stops; making decisions regarding maintenance; and arranging for
loading and unloading.  Further, the Plaintiff furnished his own
truck and was able to hire, pay, supervise, and discharge
additional personnel.

Finally, because he finds that the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration should be granted, the Judge will not address the
Defendant's alternate arguments that the case should be dismissed
under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
transferred under the first-filed rule.

Accordingly, Judge White granted the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and stayed the case pending the completion of
arbitration proceedings.  He directed the parties to jointly
submit a joint status report in the case no later than 10 days
following the completion of arbitration.  He directed the Clerk of
the Court to administratively close the case pending completion of
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/yCTZGw from Leagle.com.

Sammy Dennis, Plaintiff, represented by Graham G. Lambert, HAFFNER
LAW PC.

Sammy Dennis, Plaintiff, represented by John F. Edgar --
jfe@edgarlawfirm.com -- EDGAR LAW FIRM LLC, Joshua H. Haffner,
HAFFNER LAW PC, pro hac vice & Matthew Taylor Swift --
mts@edgarlawfirm.com -- EDGAR LAW FIRM LLC.

United Van Lines, LLC, Defendant, represented by Booker T. Shaw --
bshaw@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Laura M. Jordan
-- LJordan@ThompsonCoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Michael J.
Morris -- mmorris@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Noah
A. Finkel -- nfinkel@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, Cheryl
Ann Luce -- cluce@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, pro hac vice
& Kyle A. Petersen -- kpetersen@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW,
LLP, pro hac vice.


VIZIO INC: Faces "Brenner" Suit in West. Dist. Wash.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vizio, Inc.  The
case is styled as Cody Brenner, on his own behalf and on behalf of
other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Vizio, Inc., a
California corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-05897 (W.D.
Wash., October 31, 2017).

Vizio is an American privately held company that develops consumer
electronics. Headquartered in Irvine, California, United States,
the company was founded in October 2002 as V Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Scott Crispin Greco Blankenship, Esq.
   THE BLANKENSHIP LAW FIRM
   1000 SECOND AVENUE, STE 3250
   SEATTLE, WA 98104
   Tel: (206) 343-2700
   Email: sblankenship@blankenshiplawfirm.com


WALDEN UNIVERSITY: Ct. Allows Doctoral Student to Amend Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LATONYA THORNHILL, Plaintiff, v. WALDEN
UNIVERSITY, LLC, et. al, Defendants, Case No. 2:16-CV-962 (S.D.
Ohio), Plaintiff, LaTonya Thornhill, is a former doctoral student
at Walden who contends that Walden misrepresented the cost of
doctoral studies at Walden and the time frame in which these
doctoral studies could be completed, and operates an unfairly
drawn-out dissertation process for the purpose of receiving more
tuition revenue.

Thornhill enrolled at Walden in 2011 after viewing and relying
upon representations on its websites that the program she chose,
Doctor of Philosophy in Management, would take 30 credit hours, or
five, six-credit-hour classes.  When she contacted Walden, Walden
assigned her a recruiter, Wajoili Ward-Jiggets.  During a phone
call about one month prior to her enrolling at Walden, Ward-
Jiggets told Plaintiff that it would take only 18 months to
complete her dissertation and 3.5 years to complete the entire
program.  Plaintiff relied on these statements when enrolling, and
when re-enrolling during each term of her enrollment.  Plaintiff
completed a number of required doctoral-level courses, and
received As and Bs. She also completed three residency courses.

Due to Defendants' misrepresentations and prolonging of the
dissertation process, Plaintiff's experience at Walden took much
longer, and cost way more, than advertised.  She had to take a
leave of absence after the fall 2015 quarter, knowing by that time
"that to complete the educational process, at a minimum, would
require more time and more tuition payments beyond what she had
reasonably anticipated she would have had Walden not engaged in
its illegal conduct."

The Court pointed out that Plaintiff would not have enrolled at
Walden if she had known about Walden's abysmally low completion
rate. She also would not have enrolled had Walden been honest with
her about the cost and/or timeline of a Walden doctorate degree,
or the dysfunction in its dissertation process. Had she not
enrolled, she would not have incurred the cost of tuition,
residency fees, supply costs, student loans, or other costs
associated with her failed degree at Walden.

Under Sixth Circuit precedent, in deciding whether to grant a
motion to amend, courts should consider undue delay in filing,
lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving
party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of
amendment.

Although Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff's request for
leave to amend, they will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff filing an
amended complaint.  Moreover, Defendants have notice of the facts
Plaintiff wishes to allege in her amended complaint; they
responded to these facts in their reply brief. This case is in the
pleadings stage, and discovery has been stayed, so an amendment
will not require Defendants to expend significant additional
resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial.

There is no indication that Plaintiff has sought to amend in bad
faith or that she has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments. Because allegations connecting the dispute to
Minnesota are central to Plaintiff's claims (she pleads Ohio-based
claims only to the extent the dispute does not belong under
Minnesota law), having these allegations properly before the Court
is critical to the Court deciding her claims on their merits.

Therefore, to aid in its analysis on the merits of Defendants'
motion to dismiss, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for leave
to amend her complaint to include allegations discovered after the
filing of her amended complaint.  In light of the Court's ruling,
the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Defendants'
Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Class Action Allegations without
prejudice to re-filing them should Plaintiff's amended complaint
so warrant.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8ggkshufrom Leagle.com.

LaTonya Thornhill, Plaintiff, represented by Marnie C. Lambert,
Lambert Law Firm, LLC, 4889 Sawmill Road Ste 125. Columbus, OH
43235-7266.

LaTonya Thornhill, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Lesko --
plesko@prwlegal.com -- Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane,
pro hac vice & Alan L. Rosc -- arosca@prwlegal.com -- Peiffer
Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane.

Walden University, LLC, Defendant, represented by Anthony Walter
Kraus -- akraus@milesstockbridge.com -- Miles & Stockbridge PC,
100 LIGHT ST, BALTIMORE, MD, 21202-1036, pro hac vice, Sanford E.
Watson -- Sanford.watson@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP,
Brian J. Laliberte -- brian.laliberte@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker
Ellis LLP, Kathleen Pontone -- kpontone@milesstockbridge.com --
Miles & Stockbridge PC, pro hac vice, Scott J. Stitt --
scott.stitt@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP & Stephanie Kaye
Baron, Miles & Stockbridge PC, 100 Light Street, Baltimore, MD
21202, pro hac vice.

Laureate International Universities, Defendant, represented by
Anthony Walter Kraus, Miles & Stockbridge PC, pro hac vice,
Sanford E. Watson, Tucker Ellis LLP, Brian J. Laliberte, Tucker
Ellis LLP, Kathleen Pontone, Miles & Stockbridge PC, pro hac vice,
Scott J. Stitt, Tucker Ellis LLP & Stephanie Kaye Baron, Miles &
Stockbridge PC, pro hac vice.


WENDYS COMPANY: Faces First Choice Union Suit in Colorado
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Wendy's Company.
The case is styled as First Choice Federal Credit Union, AOD
Federal Credit Union, Tech Credit Union, Veridian Credit Union,
South Florida Educational Federal Credit Union, Preferred Credit
Union, Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union, Associated Credit
Union, Centrue Bank, Envista Credit Union, First NBC Bank, Align
Credit Union, Navigator Credit Union, The Seymour Bank, Financial
Horizons Credit Union, North Jersey Federal Credit Union, Nusenda
Credit Union, Greater Cincinnati Credit Union, KEMBA Financial
Credit Union, Wright-Patt Credit Union, Greenville Heritage Credit
Union, Credit Union National Association, Georgia Credit Union
Affiliates, Indiana Credit Union League, Michigan Credit Union
League, Ohio Credit Union League and Members Choice Credit Union,
on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs v. The Wendy's Company, Wendy's Restaurants, LLC,
Wendy's International, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-mc-00171-PAB
(D. Colo., October 31, 2017).

Wendy's is engaged in the business of operating, developing and
franchising a system of quick-service restaurants in the retail
sales of food and beverages, including retail sales of sweetened
beverages subject to the Sweetened Beverage Tax in Cook County,
Illinois.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

   Diane Carol Utz, Esq.
   Beltzer Bangert & Gunnell, LLP
   4582 South Ulster Street, Suite 400
   Denver, CO 80237
   Tel: (720) 576-7225
   Email: diane@bbglawgroup.com


YOUNGSTOWN, OH: Faces Class Action Over Sewer Services Race Bias
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
a Youngstown woman filed a civil rights class action against the
mayor of the blighted northeast Ohio town, claiming it
discriminates against residents in a historic black neighborhood
by not providing working storm sewers.

Venicee Howell filed the class-action lawsuit against the city and
Mayor John McNally on Nov. 3 in Youngstown federal court on behalf
of the Sharonline community.

She says her community is deprived of storm sewer services that
other residents in the city enjoy.  The result, Ms. Howell says,
is that Sharonline's homes are tainted with mold and mildew.

Youngstown does not provide storm sewers there even though the
city charges residents for the services through fees and taxes,
according to the lawsuit filed by Columbus-based attorney
Percy Squire.  Ms. Howell claims the city is violating Sharonline
residents' rights to equal protection and due process under the
U.S. Constitution.

Mr. Squire told Courthouse News that his client said the sewer
problems in Sharonline have existed for close to a century.  He
said that Howell grew up in the neighborhood and that the water
damage had slowly eroded her property to the point that the
foundation was ruined.

"She can't let her grandchildren go down in the basement because
of the fungus. We've worked with the city.  We've tried to get the
city to remediate the problem, and they've taken this very hard
line," Mr. Squire said in a phone interview on Nov. 7.

Ms. Howell claims that for years, either storm sewers did not
exist in Sharonline or did not work properly, leading to a build-
up of stormwater at Ms. Howell's home on Bott Street.

She has lived in the home she built with her late husband for 47
years but says Youngstown improperly charged her fees for a dual
sewer system.

"These backups caused extensive damage to the foundation of 2104
Bott Street, and similarly situated houses, caused mold and mildew
to accumulate within the residence, caused subsidence of the soil
and greatly diminished the value and habitability of 2104 Bott
Street," the 10-page lawsuit states.

Neither the city nor the mayor's office immediately responded on
Nov. 7 to requests for comment.

Sharonline extends from the Pennsylvania state line northeast to
Hubbard, Ohio, and north of Oak Street to the Liberty Township,
according to the lawsuit, and was established after a steady
stream of non-union black workers moved from the southern part of
the country to replace striking European steelworkers in
Youngstown, which is 65 miles southeast of Cleveland.

The move to recruit thousands of African-Americans during the
Steel Strike of 1919 caused a wave of resentment among whites in
the region.

Youngstown was part of the Rust Belt in the United States and was
known for steel production.  But it has been in steady decline
since the industry's demise, and Youngstown is now one of the most
impoverished cities in the nation.

Youngstown's leaders and officials segregated the workers into the
Sharonline community, an area that at the time was lacking
essential amenities including a sewage system, streetlights,
sidewalks and paved roads, according to the lawsuit.

In terms of a functioning sewer system, Ms. Howell suggests that
not much has changed.

"Due to the nature of its establishment Sharonline has been
plagued by a long history of overt and intentional racial
discrimination.  And has received fewer city services," the
complaint states.

Four candidates are vying to replace Youngstown Mayor McNally in
the Nov. 7 election.

Mayor McNally lost the Democratic primary earlier this year to
Jamael Brown.  Mayor McNally, the city's 49th mayor, pleaded
guilty in February 2016 to four misdemeanors relating to the sale
of an office building while he was Mahoning County Commissioner.

Ms. Howell claims Mayor McNally is "responsible for the past acts
of racial discrimination committed by predecessor mayors that have
caused injury to plaintiff and the putative class."

Alleging equal protection and due process violations and inverse
condemnation, Ms. Howell seeks at least $75,000 in damages for the
putative class of black residents in Youngstown's Sharonline
community.

Her attorney, Mr. Squire, estimated there are between 5,000 and
6,000 people affected.

"No one who knows this community is going to challenge the
proposition that's there's been an inequitable distribution of
services to the Sharonline.  The Sharonline has that reputation.
Everybody knows it.  It's not something that anyone is seriously
going to contest around here," Mr. Squire said.

The case is VENICEE HOWELL, PLAINTIFF, V. THE CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN,
OHIO, AND THE HONORABLE JOHN MCNALLY, DEFENDANTS, Case No. ___
(N.D. Ohio).

A full-text copy of the Complaint is available at
https://is.gd/FEyxvA

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Percy Squire, Esq.
     Percy Squire Co., LLC
     341 S. Third Street, Suite 10
     Columbus, Ohio 43215
     Tel: 614-224-6528
     Email: psquire@sp-lawfirm.com


ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Dismissal of "Leonard" FDCPA Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the case, RICHARD LEONARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-10174
(11th Cir.), for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

According to Leonard's amended complaint, the operative filing in
the case, Zwicker, a debt collector, sought to collect a consumer
debt from Leonard on an American Express Gold Card credit-card
account issued by American Express Centurion Bank.  On Dec. 9,
2015, Zwicker mailed Leonard a letter seeking payment of the debt
($14,619.71), which was Zwicker's initial communication with
Leonard about the debt.  The letter identified the creditor as
"American Express" and listed the final five digits of an account
number.

Leonard alleged that Zwicker misnamed the creditor as "American
Express," when the "actual creditor" was either "American Express
Centurion Bank," which owned and serviced the credit-card account,
or "American Express Receivable Financing Corporation III LLC,"
which owned the credit-card account receivables through an
agreement with American Express Centurion Bank.  He further
alleged that this misidentification was confusing because numerous
different entities identified themselves as "American Express,"
including over 50 business entities in Florida whose names began
with "American Express," and because "American Express" was a
trademark owned by an entity that did not issue credit cards.

Based on these allegations, Leonard claimed that Zwicker failed to
identify "the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed," in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(2) of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and sent a false, deceptive,
or misleading communication to attempt to collect a debt, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(10).  Zwicker moved to
dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

The district court granted Zwicker's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.  Leonard now
appeals.

The Circuit Court explains that nothing in the FDCPA expressly
requires that debt collectors use a creditor's full business name
or its name of incorporation when identifying the "name of the
creditor" in a Section 1692g notice.  It finds that Zwicker
clearly identified "American Express" as the name of the creditor.
Its use of "American Express," instead of the full business name
"American Express Centurion Bank" or "American Express Receivables
Financing Corporation III, LLC," provides accurate information to
the consumer about the creditor's identity.  "American Express" is
the name under which the financial-services company usually
transacts business, and the company is commonly referred to by
that name.  That identification was not technically "false," any
more than a commonly used nickname could be considered a "false"
identification of a person.  Accordingly, Leonard failed to state
a claim under Section 1692g.

The Circuit Court further finds that Zwicker's use of "American
Express" was not misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.
Hence, the district court properly dismissed Leonard's Section
1692e claim for failure to state a claim.

In sum, the Circuit Court agrees with the district court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning
that Zwicker adequately identified the name of the creditor and
that the communication was not misleading.  Accordingly, it
affirmed the dismissal of Leonard's complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 1, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yRnMCi from Leagle.com.

Brian C. Frontino -- bfrontino@stroock.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Leo W. Desmond, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sovathary Keley Jacobson -- jacobson@verobeachlegal.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


* CFPB's Richard Corday Asks Trump to Veto Class Action Rule
------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Lambert and Pete Schroeder, writing for Reuters, report that
a top U.S. regulator for Wall Street took the unusual step on Oct.
30 of directly asking President Donald Trump to veto a resolution
that allows financial companies to block customers from banding
together to sue, a request likely to be ignored.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an independent regulator
headed by Democrat Richard Cordray, finalized a rule in July
barring banks, credit-card issuers and other financial companies
from requiring customers to give up their rights to join group
lawsuits, known as class actions, and only take potential disputes
to closed-door arbitration.

Congress recently voted to kill the rule in a special resolution
that Trump, a Republican, is expected to sign into law soon.

"You alone now have the power to safeguard people's ability to
take action together and go to court when they are wronged,"
Mr. Cordray, expected to resign soon to run for Ohio governor,
wrote to Trump.

White House officials were not immediately available to comment on
the letter.

In class actions, individuals with the same complaint band
together to lower lawsuit costs.

Trump has not vetoed any legislation since taking office in
January.  But he has frequently criticized both Mr.  Cordray,
appointed by former Democratic President Barack Obama, and the
CFPB, established after the financial crisis to protect
individuals against predatory lending.

Mr. Cordray wrote he had never met or spoken to Trump, but that
"many have told me . . . . your mind is made up" about the
resolution.

Shortly after the Senate passed the resolution, the White House
released a statement saying the CFPB rule would give consumers
fewer options to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently and
would primarily enrich trial lawyers.  The administration has also
said the CFPB used faulty research to write the rule.

The CFPB says its five-year study into mandatory arbitration was
thorough and its rule based on sound data.  Rule supporters say
arbitration is stacked in favor of companies, which hire the
mediators, and that the right to trial is enshrined in the
Constitution.  On Oct. 27, military veterans also asked for a
veto.

Regulators almost never make personal pleas for vetoes, let alone
release their requests publicly.

Mr. Cordray has a strained relationship with Republicans, who say
he has too much power because he both writes and enforces rules
and can only be fired "for cause," a strict standard nearly
impossible to meet.  Trump has gone as far as arguing in court
filings that the CFPB is unconstitutional and he should have the
power to fire its director. [GN]


* Congress May Override Resolution to Nullify CFPB Rule
-------------------------------------------------------
Nick Mehler, Esq. -- nmehler@lowenstein.com -- and Ed Zimmerman,
Esq. -- ezimmerman@lowenstein.com -- of Lowenstein Sandler LLP, in
an article for Forbes, wrote that class action waiver clauses in
consumer contracts have been a subject of ongoing debate by
federal regulators, the federal courts and the public in recent
years, and the U.S. Senate added its voice.  With Vice President
Pence casting the tie-breaking vote, the Senate passed a joint
resolution by a 51-50 margin to nullify a Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) rule issued earlier this year.  The CFPB
rule, which was scheduled to take effect in March 2018, would have
barred providers of certain consumer financial services (credit
card companies, retail banks, payment processors and consumer
credit reporting companies like Equifax, for instance) from using
arbitration clauses to prevent consumers from participating in
class action lawsuits.  That bar would have made it easier for
plaintiffs' lawyers to bring class action litigations against
those companies.  The Senate action -- which will allow these
companies to continue to use arbitration clauses to insulate
themselves from class actions -- follows passage of the joint
resolution by the U.S. House of Representatives in July.
President Trump is expected to sign the joint resolution (and may
have already done so by the time you read this), thereby
nullifying the CFPB rule.

Now that the federal government is repealing the CFPB rule,
companies in the consumer financial services industry -- as well
as companies in other industries -- can expect that, under current
law, U.S. courts will continue to enforce properly-drafted and
presented arbitration/class action waiver clauses in online terms
of service and other agreements with consumers.  As careful
readers (or those who spend too much time with lawyers) might have
gathered, the issues we raise in that last sentence are "under
current law" and "properly-drafted and presented."  While a string
of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, starting with the Supreme
Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, provides
strong support for companies seeking to enforce these waivers in
consumer contracts, those Supreme Court decisions were based on
interpretation of a federal statute (rather than constitutional
law where the Supreme Court has the last word).  Because these
cases arise from interpreting a statute, Congress can override
this precedent by simply enacting new legislation.  Similarly, a
future Administration can issuing a new regulations to circumvent
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and subsequent cases.

The Supreme Court has also been tracking the use of class action
waivers and mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements.  As Ed Zimmerman and Julie Werner wrote in "US Supreme
Court to Determine Whether Workers Waive Class Action" (Forbes,
October 1, 2017), the Supreme Court is deciding Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis, Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, and NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA,
Inc., argued earlier in October.  That case will decide "whether
arbitration clauses in the employment or independent contractor
context result in enforceable waivers of a worker's right to bring
or participate in a class action."

Courts applying the AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion precedent still
closely scrutinize how a specific class action waiver is drafted
and presented to the consumer. As a result, while the Supreme
Court has established that arbitration/class action waiver clauses
are generally enforceable in consumer contracts, in specific cases
plaintiffs have successfully attacked these clauses on the basis
of defects in drafting and presentation to consumers, especially
where the courts felt that the notice didn't really hit the
consumers over the head.  For example, last year in Sgouros v.
TransUnion Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit refused to enforce the arbitration/class action waiver
clause contained in the terms of service that TransUnion presented
to customers who bought credit reports on TransUnion's website.
Although TransUnion presented its terms of service to customers as
part of the online purchase process, and customers were required
to click on an "I accept" button below the terms of service before
they could complete their purchases, the court nevertheless found
that the customers were not sufficiently put on notice that they
were agreeing to the terms of service.  In its decision, the court
cited two flaws in the way that TransUnion presented its terms of
service to customers:  first, the terms of service were in a
scroll-box with only the first few lines visible to the customer
unless the customer scrolled through the terms in order to
understand that the terms were meant to govern the customer's
credit report purchase.  Second, TransUnion included a blurb
between the terms of service scroll box and the "I accept" button
which stated that clicking on the "I accept" button constituted
the customer's authorization for TransUnion to obtain his or her
personal information.  The court concluded that "no reasonable
person would think that hidden within that disclosure was also the
message that the same click constituted acceptance of the Service
Agreement."  For companies that wish to use class action waiver
provisions in their consumer contracts, the take-away from the
Sgouros decision is that in order for a class action waiver to be
enforceable, the consumer needs to be put on clear notice that she
or he is accepting a class action waiver.

In addition to facing potential challenges to class action waivers
in a court of law, companies that use these waivers can face
challenges in the court of public opinion, particularly when the
waivers are used aggressively, and it can be very difficult for a
company to emerge victorious from that sort of challenge.  For
example, in April 2014, General Mills garnered negative press for
requiring customers to agree to class action waivers in order to
download coupons from General Mills's website.  For instance,
Alison Griswold, in her Slate column "Why People Are Freaking Out
Over General Mills' New Legal Policy," (April 18, 2014) wrote:

General Mills, the massive food company behind Cinnamon Toast
Crunch, Yoplait, Cheerios, and dozens of other labels, added
language to its website that fundamentally alters its customers'
legal rights.  Under the new terms, people who interact with
General Mills in a broad range of ways -- downloading a coupon
online or entering a contest, for example -- waive their right to
class action and agree to resolve any disputes with the company
through informal negotiations or binding arbitration.

Three days later, Ms. Griswold updated the article to report on
the retreat from General Mills due to public backlash:

Update, April 21, 2014: On Saturday, Oct. 28, General Mills
announced that it had reversed the legal changes made and reverted
to its original terms.  The changes, the company said, had been
"widely misread" and caused concern among consumers.  "We never
imagined this reaction," General Mills wrote in a blog post.  "On
behalf of our company and our brands, we would like to apologize.
We're sorry we even started down this path."  So go ahead and
download those coupons.

More recently, Equifax, on the heels of its recent data breach,
tried to require customers to agree to class action waivers as a
condition to receiving free identity theft monitoring services.
In both of these cases, public outcry forced General Mills and
Equifax to quickly backtrack and remove the class action waiver
provisions from their terms of service, but only after having
scorn heaped upon them in the press.  Perhaps as a result of the
potential for negative publicity, at least some large web-based
consumer-facing companies (Google and Apple, for example) have
opted not to use class action waivers in their terms of service.

On the one hand, class action waiver clauses are powerful tools
that companies can use to reduce the risk of potentially onerous
consumer class action litigation, particularly in the face of a
class action plaintiffs' bar that has been aggressively pursuing
consumer class action lawsuits in recent years.  On the other
hand, companies that use these waivers risk public backlash, and
are not guaranteed that their particular waiver clauses will
survive scrutiny by a court or legislative changes.  All of this
has ramifications for anyone drafting web-based terms of service
or other agreements with consumers.  How a given company resolves
whether to use class action waivers in consumer agreements will
depend on cost-benefit analysis that is specific to that company
and the context in which it operates.

Ed Zimmerman founded & chairs Lowenstein Sandler LLP's Tech Group.
He has taught VC/Angel Investing in Columbia's MBA program for a
decade. Ed invests in startups & venture funds.[GN]


* Drinker Biddle & Reath Attorney Discusses TCPA Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------
Michael P. Daly, Esq. -- michael.daly@dbr.com -- of Drinker Biddle
& Reath LLP, in an article for National Law Review, wrote that in
June a Second Circuit decision held that a consumer cannot
unilaterally revoke consent that she provided in a bilateral
contract.  "It is black letter law," the court explained, "that
one party may not alter a bilateral contract by revoking a term
without the consent of a counterparty," and that "consent to
another's actions can 'become irrevocable' when it is provided in
a legally binding agreement." As a result, the TCPA "does not
permit a consumer to revoke his consent to be called when that
consent forms part of a bargained-for exchange."

The Plaintiff filed a motion for panel rehearing or, in the
alternative, rehearing en banc.  On October 20, 2017, the Second
Circuit denied that motion in a three-sentence Order that says
simply that "the petition is denied."  Its earlier decision
therefore continues to weigh heavily in favor of including consent
provisions in customer-facing contracts. [GN]


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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