CAR_Public/171102.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


           Thursday, November 2, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 217



                            Headlines

A FOREVER RECOVERY: "Easterday" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
ACE USA: Miami Judge Approves $9.8MM Class Settlement
ACOSTA INC: Not Compelled to Reply to Discovery in "Ezell"
ADT LLC: Court Approves $16MM "Edensborough" Class Settlement
ADT LLC: $310K Settlement in "Flores" Has Preliminary Approval

AETNA INC: Faces Another HIV Patient Privacy Breach Class Action
ALCON LABORATORIES: 9th Circuit Revives Eye Drops Class Action
ALDEN MANAGEMENT: Umland Sues Over Illegal Use of Biometric Data
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Court Grants Dismissal of "Porto" ADTPA Suit
AMERICAN EAGLE: Can Appeal Denial of 12(c) Motion

APPLE INC: Amazon Sends E-Book Payout Creditors to Customers
APPLE HOSPITALITY: Salas Wang Inks $5.5MM Shareholder Settlement
APRIA HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses "Washington" Suit
AT&T SERVICES: Court Grants Prelim OK of FLSA Class Settlement
AVISTA CORP: Faces "Sharpenter" Suit Over Merger With Hyrdro One

AVISTA CORP: Samuel Challenges Proposed Merger With Hyrdro One
BAYER AG: Seeks Dismissal of One-A-Day Labeling Class Action
BOJANGLES' RESTAURANTS: Thaxton Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
CALGARY, AB: Lawyer Unsuccessful in Certification of Class Action
CANADA: WRP Female Officers' Gender Bias Class Action Pending

COCA-COLA CO: Diet Soda Makers Sued for Misleading Consumers
COMCAST CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in "Noonan" Suit
COUSINS SUBMARINES: "Nuchell" Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
COX INDUSTRIAL: Fails to Properly Pay Employees, Madrigal Says
CSK AUTO: "Aguilar" Stayed Pending "Davidson" Class Cert Hearing

CTI BIOPHARMA: Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval
DELANO FARMS: Court Approves $6MM "Arredondo" Class Settlement
DELANO FARMS: Court Awards $476K in "Arredondo" Class Suit
DICK SMITH: Faces Second Shareholders' Class Action
EL AL AIRLINES: Slapped with $40MM Suit Over Cancellation Fees

EMPIRE CHINESE: $100K Settlement in "Bolanos" Labor Suit Approved
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Fried" Class Suit Arising From Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Protect Class Members' PII, Chenault Claims
EQUIFAX INC: Sued by Duke Over Failure to Protect Personal Info
FCA US: Faces "Limon" Suit Over Defective Uconnect Infotainment

FCA US: Awarded $27.3K in Costs in "Faltermeier" MMPA Suit
FRITO-LAY: 'All Natural' Labels Dropped to Settle Class Action
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Accused by "Haskins" Suit of Violating ERISA
GENERAL MOTORS: Corvette CA Revs Up in Miami Federal Court
GENERAL MOTORS: Oregon to Get $1.7MM from Ignition Switch Deal

GENERAL NUTRITION: Court Dismisses Suit Over Gold Card Program
GLOBAL BROKERAGE: Seeks Dismissal of Securities Class Action
GUILFORD COLLEGE: Faces Title IX Gender Discrimination Lawsuit
HENRY SCHEIN: TCPA Suit Stayed Pending Resolution in "Nomax"
HERTZ CORP: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Bradley"

HERTZ CORP: Court Dismisses Gold Member's Claims in "Bradley"
INVECOR LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit
J. JILL INC: Arons & Arons Files Securities Class Action
KIMBERLY-CLARK: 9th Cir. Revives Flushable Wipes Class Action
LAMRITE WEST: Ohio App. Affirms Judgment on Pleadings in "Martin"

LOANLEADERS: Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik File Class Action
LOUISIANA: Class Action Over Public Defense System Can Proceed
LULAROE: Consultants File Class Action Over "Pyramid Scheme" Model
MAGIC MANAGEMENT: Court Approves $10,000 Settlement in "Williams"
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: Wins Summary Judgment in "Aguilar" Suit

MARY KAY: Forum Selection Clause Frees Firm from Class Suit
MASSAGE ENVY: Can't Depose 6 Non-Parties in "McKinney-Drobnis"
MCKESSON CORP: Town of Greenfield to Join Opioid Class Action
MDL 2445: Court Dismisses Antitrust Suit vs. RBH
MDL 2503: Court Grants Certification of Direct Purchaser Class

MED-CARE DIABETIC: Court Certifies of TCPA Class
MERCHANT SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Enforce Deal in "Rainbow"
MSP CROSSROADS: Former Renters Settle Class Suit for $650,000
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Accused by "Livers" Suit of Violating FLSA
NAVIENT CORP: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit

NAVIENT CORP: Pomerantz LLP Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
NEW YORK: City Spent More Than $1 Billion on Lawsuit Payouts
NORTH STAR: Van Liew Sues Over Not Having Meal and Rest Breaks
NORTHSTAR ALARM: Aug. 6 Class Certification Hearing in "Smothers"
NOVARTIS PHARMA: "Young" Wage and Hour Suit Remanded to State Ct.

OAK PARK: Employee Fingerprint Scans Land Provider in CA Lawsuit
OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Summary Disposition in "Rafaeli" Affirmed
OHIO: Findlay City to Join Class Action Over New Tax Rule
OHIO: City of Marietta Joining Income Tax Bills Class Action
PENNSYLVANIA: Revocation of In Forma Pauperis Status Affirmed

PERFORMANCE SPORTS: Settles Securities Class Action in New York
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Ledford Seeks to Recover Damages Under FDCPA
RANCHO PALOS: Terranea Workers Allege Wage Violations
REAL TIME STAFFING: Accused by Perez of Not Paying Overtime Wages
RIO TINTO: May Face Fraud Class Action Outside United States

RIO TINTO: Mclernon Mulls Shareholders' Suit vs. Directors
RJ REYNOLDS: Farah Law Firm Fined $9MM Over Tobacco Litigation
RM GALICIA: Court Approves $1.5MM TCPA Class Settlement
RODBRA INC: Owes More Overtime Pay to Class, "Dieda" Suit Asserts
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CA: Dismissal of Reporter Fee Suit Reversed

SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Arnall Golden Attorney Discusses Ruling
SCANA CORP: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
SHARP CORPORATION: LCD Settlement Distribution Protocol Approved
SHENZEN SUNSHINE: Court Strikes Class Allegations in "Black"
SSC LEXINGTON: Court Stays "Allen" Pending Arbitration

ST LOUIS, MO: Federal Court Hears ACLU Class Action
STARWOOD WAYPOINT: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Suit
TESLA INC: Khang & Khang Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
TESLA INC: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
TRANSENTERIX INC: Court Dismisses Securities Class Action

TRUE NORTH: Williams Seeks to Recover Regular and Overtime Wages
TURFCARE OF NASHVILLE: Underwood Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
TWENTIETH CENTURY: Ct. Narrows Claims in Juvenile Detainees' Suit
TWITTER INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Shenwick" Securities Suit
UNILIFE CORP: $4.4MM Settlement Reached in Securities Suit

USA GYMNASTICS: Faces Class Action Over Nassar Sexual Abuses
VAIL VALLEY: Developer Sues for Discrimination Under ADA
VANLAW FOOD: Accused by Torres of Not Accurately Paying Workers
VECTOR MARKETING: Faces Class Action Over Unfair Labor Practices
VICTORIA: VBA Unclear on Class Action Payout

WELLS FARGO: Derivative Ruling Won't Help in Class Action
WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Tentatively Approves Revised Settlement
WILLMARK COMMUNITIES: Group of Tenants Files Class Action
WINDSOR SURRY: Bid to Dismiss "Torch" Suit Denied as Moot

* Justice Pariente: Legal Aid Apt Beneficiary of Class Action Win
* Mississippi Lawyer Calls for More Opioids Class Actions




                            *********


A FOREVER RECOVERY: "Easterday" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
MELINDA EASTERDAY, an individual, and SHANDAL KLINGSMITH, an
individual v. A FOREVER RECOVERY, INC., a domestic for profit
corporation, PAMELA ANDERSON, an individual, and PER WICKSTROM, an
individual, Case No. 1:17-cv-00860 (W.D. Mich., September 26,
2017), accuses the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to compensate the Plaintiffs for all
hours worked.

The action is brought by the Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated to recover for the Defendants'
alleged willful and knowing violation of the FLSA.

A Forever Recovery is a domestic for-profit corporation that
operates rehabilitation centers throughout Michigan.  The
Individual Defendants are owners of A Forever Recovery.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
          Victoria Smalley, Esq.
          AVANTI LAW GROUP, PLLC
          600 28th St. SW
          Wyoming, MI 49509
          Telephone: (616) 257-6807
          E-mail: ralvarez@avantilaw.com
                  vsmalley@avantilaw.com


ACE USA: Miami Judge Approves $9.8MM Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------
Celia Ampel, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that more
than 100,000 people on the "Do Not Call" list will receive a nice
sum from an insurance company that allegedly spammed their
landlines.

U.S. District Judge Marcia Cooke on October 18 gave final approval
to a nearly $9.8 million class action settlement in a Telephone
Consumer Protection Act case filed in Miami. Class members are set
to receive at least $55 each from ACE USA Inc. and ACE American
Insurance Co., according to the settlement agreement.

"I'd say per person, it was an above-average payout for the
class," said Houston plaintiffs lawyer W. Craft Hughes, who filed
the case with his Hughes Ellzey law partner, Jarrett Ellzey. "Our
claim rate in this settlement was definitely above average
compared to normal class settlements. Our claim rate was above 10
percent. Most class settlements are [about] 5."

The class is limited to people on the "Do Not Call" list who were
customers of Nationstar Mortgage or BB&T Bank. The mortgage
lenders were not defendants, but they allegedly provided
Philadelphia-based ACE with lists of mortgage holders who were
then targeted with marketing calls pitching hazard insurance.

Cooke approved attorney fees of $2.9 million and costs of $150,000
for Hughes Ellzey, along with a $10,000 award for lead plaintiff
Justin Boise, a Hialeah resident.

The TCPA has garnered large settlements in recent years from
companies such as Capital One, JPMorgan Chase and AT&T. Defense
lawyers joked to the Wall Street Journal this year that the law
should be called "Total Cash for Plaintiffs Attorneys."

"I'd say there's some uncertainty in the law and I'm probably not
alone in thinking that maybe someday there won't be as many of
these TCPA lawsuits," Hughes said. "Maybe because companies will
start to comply."

TCPA litigation may look very different after a decision from the
D.C. Circuit Court in the ACA International case, which challenged
the Federal Communications Commission to clarify rules it issued
regulating auto-dialing and other telemarketing practices.

"When that opinion comes out, that will clarify a lot of points of
dissent that defense lawyers are using to defend these cases,"
Hughes said.

In the ACE case, plaintiffs lawyers published notice of the
settlement in USA Today and People magazine, along with direct
mail and a website that accepted electronic claims. More than
107,000 claims came in, but funds could be left over if some class
members fail to cash their checks.

If that happens, all the attorneys involved want the money to go
to rebuilding the areas damaged by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.
Hughes Ellzey, Esq. and co-counsel Benjamin Crumley, Esq. --
ben@cwbfl.com -- of Crumley Law Firm in Jacksonville, along with
ACE's lawyers Marlin Green, Esq. -- mgreen@brownsims.com -- of
Brown Sims in Miami and Archis Parasharami, Esq. --
aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- and Matthew Ingber,Esq. --
mingber@mayerbrown.com -- of Mayer Brown in Washington, filed a
joint proposal for the cy pres designation.

"It just kind of made sense to us after everything that's happened
in the last couple months," Hughes said. "My law firm's in Houston
and this lawsuit was filed in Miami, and so the defense counsel
and I just thought we would propose Habitat for Humanity to
benefit victims of both hurricanes."

Green did not immediately respond to a request for comment. [GN]


ACOSTA INC: Not Compelled to Reply to Discovery in "Ezell"
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie L. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
Cross-Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Discovery Demands
in the case captioned MARGUERITE EZELL and SHERILYN SILVER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ACOSTA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:16CV870 RLW
(E.D. Mo.).

The case was originally filed on June 16, 2016.  The Plaintiffs
filed their Amended Class Action Complaint on Aug. 22, 2016, and a
Second Amended Class Action Complaint on Sept. 1, 2016, as a
collective and class action alleging that Acosta has engaged in an
unlawful pattern and practice of failing to pay minimum wage and
overtime pay as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
and in violation of Missouri Common Law and Public Policy.

On Sept. 22, 2016, U.S. District Judge Carol E. Jackson (retired)
issued a Case Management Order ("CMO") pertaining to Phase I of
the collective action.  Since the date of the original CMO, the
parties have filed three motions to amend the CMO requesting
extensions of the Phase I discovery deadline and the deadlines for
filing and briefing the motion to certify a class.  Judge Jackson
granted the motions, and the Order of July 21, 2017 set the Phase
I discovery deadline as Sept. 15, 2017, and the deadline for
filing a motion to certify a class as Sept. 29, 2017, per the
parties' request.  The Order further stated that all other
deadlines in the CMO remained unchanged.  On July 28, 2017, the
case was transferred to Judge White by Administrative Order.  Four
business days later, on Aug. 3, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion
to Compel Deposition Testimony and Motion for Sanctions.

Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed two unopposed motions for
extension of time to respond to the motion to compel, requesting
extended dates for the Plaintiffs' response and the Defendant's
reply.  On Sept. 15, 2017, the deadline for Phase I discovery, the
parties filed a Joint Case Status Report and Motion for Extension
of Time, again stating that the parties have continued to discuss
the possibility of mediation.  The Court granted all motions for
extension of time to file the Plaintiffs' response and the
Defendant's reply to the motion to compel.

However, over one month has passed, and the parties have not
requested a stay to pursue mediation or filed a timely motion
seeking an extension of the Phase I discovery completion date.
Instead, the Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion to Compel Responses
to Plaintiffs' Discovery Demands.

With regard to the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion to Compel, Judge White
will deny it.  First, he notes that the Plaintiffs filed the
motion over one month after the Phase I discovery completion date.
They did not file any motion to extend the deadline as required by
the CMO, nor have they attempted to show good cause for filing a
motion to compel after the close of discovery.  The latest date
that the dispute could have arisen was June 8, 2017, the date that
Defendant objected to the Plaintiffs' Second Request for
Production of Documents.  However, the record shows that the
Plaintiffs did not contact the Defendants until over a month
later, and they did not present the dispute to the Court until
over 4 months after the Defendant's objections.  The Plaintiffs
offer no explanation for this delay or their failure to comply
with the scheduling orders of the Court, including its failure to
timely file a motion for class certification.

With regard to the Defendant's motion to compel, the Judge notes
that the motion was timely, and the Court will consider the motion
once the briefing is completed.  However, he reiterates that the
discovery cut-off date for Phase I has passed, and any discovery
beyond discovery sought in the motion to compel is untimely.

Accordingly, Judge White denied the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion to
Compel Responses to Plaintiffs' Discovery Demand.  He ordered the
parties to file a proposed briefing schedule for the motion for
class certification no later than Nov. 3, 2017, and to notify the
Court, in writing and no later than Nov. 3, 2017, whether the
Court should refer the case to Alternative Dispute Resolution for
mediation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/jE55CL from Leagle.com.

Marguerite Ezell, Plaintiff, represented by Fran L. Rudich,
KLAFTER AND OLSEN LLP.

Marguerite Ezell, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan E. Fortman,
LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN E. FORTMAN, LLC, Michael H. Reed, KLAFTER
AND OLSEN LLP, Seth R. Lesser, KLAFTER AND OLSEN LLP, W.
Christopher McDonough, THE MCDONOUGH LAW FIRM, LLC & Ryan A. Keane
-- ryan@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC.

Sherilyn Silver, Plaintiff, represented by Fran L. Rudich, KLAFTER
AND OLSEN LLP, Jonathan E. Fortman, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN E.
FORTMAN, LLC, Michael H. Reed, KLAFTER AND OLSEN LLP, Seth R.
Lesser, KLAFTER AND OLSEN LLP, W. Christopher McDonough, THE
MCDONOUGH LAW FIRM, LLC & Ryan A. Keane, KEANE LAW LLC.

Acosta, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lisa A. Schreter --
lschreter@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., Patricia J.
Martin -- pmartin@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. & Richard
W. Black -- rblack@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.


ADT LLC: Court Approves $16MM "Edensborough" Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned MICHAEL EDENBOROUGH, Plaintiff, v. ADT, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 16-cv-02233-JST (N.D. Cal.).  Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint is also granted.

Plaintiffs Edenborough and Wilson assert claims under Florida's
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, California's Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law.
Plaintiffs' claims arise from their purchase of wireless ADT home
security services. Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant: (1)
did not fulfill its duty to disclose that the wireless home
security systems sold by ADT are unencrypted, lack authentication,
and are otherwise vulnerable to attack, and (2) deceived
reasonable consumers by virtue of the company's lack of
disclosure.

ADT's records indicate that there are potentially 6.4 million
potential settlement class members. Joinder of this many members
would be impracticable.

The Court agrees that the issues Plaintiffs identify whether
Defendant's wireless security systems were vulnerable to attack
and whether the omissions misled and damaged consumers will be
central to the resolution of the case and are commonly shared by
all class members. The resolution of these issues will turn on
factual determinations, such as the internal technology used in
the security systems and the representations to consumers, likely
to be common to all class members.  Thus, the Court finds that the
settlement satisfies the commonality requirement.

Plaintiffs challenge the failure to disclose the risks associated
with the wireless home security systems that ADT sold to all
potential class members.  Plaintiffs purchased ADT security
services without knowledge or disclosure from ADT regarding
vulnerabilities in the wireless security system, and the same can
be said for other class members. Plaintiffs do not allege any
other individual claims in this matter.  Plaintiffs have satisfied
the typicality requirement.

The evidence demonstrates that counsel for all Plaintiffs are
adequate legal representatives of the class, including: Mark
Chavez and Nance Becker of Chavez & Gertler LLP, Andrew Friedman
and Francis Balint of Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, and
Thomas Zimmerman of Zimmerman Law Offices.

There is no information in the record to suggest that Plaintiffs'
counsel have any conflicts that would prevent them from
representing the class, and the Court has no reason to believe
that Plaintiffs' counsel are otherwise less than qualified and
competent. The Court finds that the proposed class counsel and the
named Plaintiffs have and will continue to prosecute this action
vigorously on behalf of the class.  The adequacy requirement is
therefore satisfied.

The issues Plaintiffs identify, including whether Defendant's
wireless security systems were vulnerable to attack and whether
the omissions misled and damaged consumers, will be central to the
resolution of the case and are commonly shared by all class
members.  These issues appear to predominate over any individual
issues that might affect Plaintiffs or any particular class
member. Therefore, resolving these disputes in a single class
action, or in this case a single class settlement, would be more
efficient than resolving them on an individual level. The proposed
class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Because each element of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) is satisfied,
this Court finds that conditional certification of the proposed
settlement class is appropriate.

Plaintiffs' counsel has experience in class action litigation,
including in cases involving consumer protections. The Court will
therefore appoint the following class counsel pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g): Mark Chavez and Nance Becker of
Chavez & Gertler LLP, Andrew Friedman and Francis Balint of
Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, and Thomas Zimmerman of
Zimmerman Law Offices.

Terms of the Settlement

Under the terms of the agreement, Defendant agrees to pay no more
than $16,000,000 as a gross settlement amount, inclusive of
Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs, the cost of class notice
and settlement administration, and class representative service
awards.

Plaintiffs argue that the agreement achieves an excellent result
for the Settlement Class, especially when measured against
considerable risks for continued litigation. These risks include:
(1) the expense and length of time necessary to prosecute the
Actions through trial; (2) the uncertainty of outcome at trial and
the possibility of an appeal by either side following the trial;
(3) the possibility that a contested class might not be certified,
and if certified, the possibility that such certification would be
reversed on appeal; (4) the risk that ADT could file a motion for
summary judgment that, if granted, could dispose of all or many of
the claims in the Actions; (5) the risk in establishing a premium
price paid by Settlement Class members which is hotly contested in
this litigation; and (6) the risk in establishing a class-wide
measure of damages.

Turning to the damages calculation, Plaintiffs allege that the
total settlement amount of $16 million is fair in light of the
aforementioned expenses, risks, and negotiations.  At the Court's
urging, Plaintiffs provided additional details on the damages
calculations, including importantly, that the settlement only
applies to class claims that Plaintiffs allege against ADT for the
"economic loss attributable to payment for monitoring services,
not for any actual damages to property or persons attributable to
an actual home intrusion due to any exploitation of the
vulnerability.

The Court concludes that the negotiations and agreement were non-
collusive. As Plaintiffs note, the parties reached agreement on
settlement terms following considerable discovery and two separate
days of mediation before an experienced mediator. These facts
support the conclusion that the settlement is non-collusive and
likely to benefit the class members.

Other signs support the conclusion that the settlement was not the
product of collusion. The settlement does not contain a
reversionary clause, meaning that all of the net settlement award
will be distributed to the class and settlement money that goes
uncollected will be distributed pro-rata to class members.

The proposed notice forms meet all these requirements. Plaintiffs
have appointed Dahl Administration, a class action notice provider
with significant experience, to handle provisions of notice.  For
the 2.25 million probable class members, the notice program
provides for direct postcard notice and, to the extent possible,
email notice.  If any postcards are returned the Settlement
Administrator will take reasonable effort to forward the notice to
an identifiable address. For the 3 million possible class members,
the notice program provides, to the extent possible, email notice,
along with publication in USA Today, the settlement website, and a
tweet by ADT.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9c7qqdzfrom Leagle.com.

Michael Edenborough, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Andrew Chavez
-- mark@chavezgertler.com -- Chavez & Gertler LLP.

Michael Edenborough, Plaintiff, represented by Adam David Warden,
Saxena White P.A., 5200 Town Center Cir Ste 601, Boca Raton, FL,
33486-1033, pro hac vice, Andrew S. Friedman -- afriedman@bffb.com
-- Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, P.C., pro hac vice,
Francis Joseph Balint, Jr. --  fbalint@bffb.com -- Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, P.C., pro hac vice, Nance Felice
Becker -- nance@chavezgertler.com -- Chavez & Gertler LLP & Thomas
A. Zimmerman, Jr., Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., 77 West Washington
St Suite 1220. Chicago, IL 60, pro hac vice.
ADT, LLC, Defendant, represented by Katherine A. Wolf --
kwolf@uber.com --  Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Mark Leslie Levine
-- mark.levine@bartlit-beck.com -- Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar &
Scott, pro hac vice, Charles Sanders McNew, McNew P.A., 2385 NW
Executive Center Dr Ste 100, Boca Raton, FL, 33431-8510, pro hac
vice, Daniel Ryan McElroy -- daniel.mcelroy@bartlit-beck.com --
Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP, pro hac vice, Mark S.
Ouweleen -- mark.ouweleen@bartlit-beck.com -- Bartlit Beck Herman
Palenchar & Scott LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew W. Brewer --
matthew.brewer@bartlit-beck.com -- Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar &
Scott LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew James Vanis -- mvanis@shb.com --
Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.C. & Rebecca Weinstein Bacon --
weinstein.bacon@bartlit-beck.com -- Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar
& Scott LLP, pro hac vice.


ADT LLC: $310K Settlement in "Flores" Has Preliminary Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned EDHER FLORES, individually and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. ADT LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-0029-AWI-JLT (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court
for Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion
for preliminary approval of the class action settlement.

The Plaintiff alleges he was employed by ADT as an hourly-paid,
non-exempt Service Technician from approximately August 2012 to
March 2015.  The Plaintiff, alleges, among other things, that he
and other Service Technicians were not paid for all hours worked,
because all hours worked were not recorded and were entitled to be
paid at a regular rate of pay, and corresponding overtime rate of
pay, that included as eligible income all income derived from
shift differential pay, standby bonus pay and/or holiday bonus
pay.

Based upon these facts, the Plaintiff identified the following
causes of action in his complaint filed in Kern County Superior
Court, Case No. BCV-15-101564: (i) unpaid overtime in violation of
Cal. Labor Code Sections 510 and 1198; (ii) unpaid minimum wages
in violation of Cal. Labor Code Sections 1194, 1194, and 1197.1;
(iii) failure to provide proper meal periods in violation of Cal.
Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512(a); (iv) failure to provide
proper rest breaks in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 226.7;
(v) failure to provide complaint wage statements and maintain
accurate payroll records in violation of Cal. Labor Code Sections
226(a) and 1174(d); (vi) failure to provide timely wages upon
termination in violation of Cal. Labor Code Section 201 and 202;
(vii) unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Section 17200; and (viii) unlawful business practices in
violation of Section 17200.

The Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on Jan. 8, 2017, thereby
initiating the action in the Court.  The Court entered its
Scheduling Order on March 18, 2016, after which the parties
engaged in discovery.

The parties engaged in private mediation with Alan Berkowitz in
February 2017.  In May 2017, the Defendant began contacting
putative class members to seek individual settlements of the
claims against the Defendant.  As a result, the Defendant obtained
releases from many putative class members, each of whom received
payment in the gross amount of $750.

On June 16, 2017, the parties reached an agreement on the
principal terms of a settlement on June 16, 2017.  The Plaintiff
now seeks preliminary approval of these terms.

The parties agreed to settle all class claims and representative
claims alleged in the Action in exchange for the Class Settlement
Amount of up to $310,000.  The Defendant agrees to fund the
Settlement for the class of all persons who worked as non-exempt
or hourly employees of Defendant in California as Service
Technicians at any time from Aug. 18, 2013 to the Preliminary
Approval Date, and who do not timely opt out of participation in
the Action.

The settlement fund will cover payments to class members and a
payment to the Plaintiff for his role as a class representative.
In addition, the Settlement provides for payments to the Class
Counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses and to the Settlement
Administrator.

Specifically, the settlement provides for the following payments
from the gross settlement amount: (i) the class representative
will receive $7,500; (ii) the class counsel will receive fees not
to exceed one-third of the Class Settlement Amount (of $103,333)
and expenses not to exceed $25,000; and (iii) the settlement
administrator will receive reasonable costs of administration.  In
addition, the Defendant will receive "a credit" for the amounts
paid individuals who have released their claims in the amount of
$76,989.

After the identified deductions and payments, the remaining funds
will be distributed to all participating class members.
Currently, the average net recovery is estimated to be $805 per
class member.

The Settlement provides that the Plaintiff and the Class Members,
other than those who elect not to participate in the Settlement,
will release the Defendant from the claims arising from Aug. 18,
2013 through the date of final approval of the settlement.

Any class member who wishes may file objections or elect not to
participate in the Settlement.  The proposed Notice of Class
Action Settlement explains the claims that are released as part of
the Settlement.  In addition, the Notice outlines the procedures
to claim a share of the settlement, object to the settlement, or
elect not to participate in the Settlement.

Magistrate Judge Thurston vacated the Nov. 2, 2017 hearing date.
She granted the Plaintiff's request for conditional certification
of the Settlement Class and the class is defined as all persons
who worked as non-exempt or hourly employees of the Defendant in
California as Service Technicians at any time from Aug. 18, 2013
to the Preliminary Approval Date.

The Judge granted preliminary approval of the parties' proposed
settlement agreement, as modified by her Order and approved the
proposed notice plan, as set forth.

She appointed Edher Flores as the Class Representative, the law
firm of Capstone Law APC as the Class Counsel, and CPT Group, Inc.
as the Settlement Administrator, with responsibilities pursuant to
the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

The Magistrate Judge preliminarily granted the Plaintiff's request
for a class representative enhancement payment up to the amount of
$7,500, subject to a petition and review at the Final Approval and
Fairness Hearing.  The Class Members and their counsel may support
or oppose this request, if they so desire, at the Final Approval
and Fairness Hearing.

The Class Counsel's requests for fees of not to exceed 33 1/3% of
the gross settlement amount and expenses up to $25,000 are
preliminarily, subject to counsel's petition for fees and review
at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.  The Class Members and
their counsel may support or oppose this request, if they so
desire, at the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing.

Magistrate Judge Thurston ordered that the petition for attorneys'
fees and for class representative enhancement fee must be filed no
later than Jan. 19, 2018.  She preliminarily approved the proposed
Notice, and directed the parties to file a finalized Notice with
the required revisions for the Court's approval no later than Oct.
31, 2017.  The Defendant will provide the Settlement Administrator
with the Class List no later than Nov. 14, 2017.  The Settlement
Administrator is also directed to mail the approved Class Notice
within 10 days of receiving the Class List, or no later than Nov.
24, 2017.

A class member who wishes to be excluded from settlement will
postmark the Exclusion Request within thirty days, or no later
than Dec. 26, 2017.  Any objections to or comments on the
Settlement Agreement must be filed with the Court and mailed to
the Settlement Administrator no later than Dec. 26, 2017.

A Final Approval and Fairness Hearing is set for Feb. 20, 2018, at
10:00 a.m., before the Magistrate Judge.  The Court reserves the
right to vacate the Final Approval and Fairness Hearing if no
comments or objections are filed with this Court on or before Dec.
26, 2017; and the right to continue the date of the Final Approval
and Fairness Hearing without further notice to class members.

The Court retains jurisdiction to consider all further
applications arising from or related to the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/eHYn93 from Leagle.com.

Edher Flores, Plaintiff, represented by Arnab Banerjee --
arnab.banerjee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC.

Edher Flores, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon Kyle Brouillette -
- Brandon.Brouillette@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC,
Melissa Grant -- melissa.grant@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law
APC, Raul Perez -- raul.perez@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law
APC, Ruhandy Glezakos -- Ruhandy.Glezakos@capstonelawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC & Suzy E. Lee -- slee@aogllp.com -- Capstone Law,
APC.

ADT LLC, Defendant, represented by Alec Hillbo --
alec.hillbo@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart, P.C., Jennifer Lindsay Katz --
jennifer.katz@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, Linda Claxton -- linda.claxton@odnss.com - Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Fontaine Yuk --
fontaine.yuk@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C.


AETNA INC: Faces Another HIV Patient Privacy Breach Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Storace, writing for Law.com, reports that Aetna is facing
its second prospective class action for allegedly breaching the
privacy of HIV patients.

The health insurance giant, which appeared in federal court in
Pennsylvania in August, was sued again on Oct. 12 in U.S. District
Court in Hartford by three individuals representing the class.
The lawsuit alleges the insurance giant mailed letters referring
to HIV medications this past summer to 12,000 people in 20 states.
The lawsuit contends the names of the recipients were clearly
visible through large, transparent envelope windows.

The latest class action was brought on behalf of two Florida
residents and one Illinois resident.  It was filed in Connecticut
because Aetna's national headquarters is based in Hartford.

Aetna was named as a defendant in two separate lawsuits in 2014
and 2015 stating the practice of requiring customers to receive
HIV medications through the mail risked violating their privacy by
disclosing their use of HIV medications to third parties.  Aetna
settled those lawsuits for $24,000 per plaintiff earlier this
year. As part of the settlement agreement, Aetna was required to
notify customers who had submitted claims for HIV medications of
their various options for obtaining those medications.
Ironically, the lawsuit contends, Aetna once again mailed notices
that allowed third parties to see who was getting information on
HIV medication.

The lawsuit states that at the end of July "Aetna recklessly and
unlawfully revealed confidential HIV-related information" of
12,000 people.  The suit contends the plaintiffs were caused
significant harm and have suffered stress and anxiety and that the
HIV disclosure increased the "risk of stigma and ostracism in
their personal and professional lives."

The latest suit contains comments from several officials from non-
profits that work with individuals with HIV and AIDS.

They include Rhonda Goldfein, executive director of the AIDS Law
Project of Pennsylvania, who said Aetna's alleged breach "creates
a tangible risk of violence, discrimination and other trauma."

The lawsuit alleges six counts: negligence and negligence per se;
breach of contract; unjust enrichment; invasion of privacy;
violation of Illinois' AIDS Confidentiality Act; and violation of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,

The lawsuit seeks to proceed as a class action, ordering
injunctive relief including the implementation of procedures to
protect HIV-related information moving forward; plus statutory and
or punitive damages.

The three attorneys representing "Jane Doe" plaintiffs in the
class actions did not respond to requests for comment on Oct. 18.
They are Brian Murray -- bmurray@glancylaw.com -- a partner with
Glancy Prongay & Murray in New York City, Paul Whalen, a solo
practitioner in Manhasset, New York and Attorney Jasper Ward, who
is with Jones Ward in Louisville.

No one from Aetna's media relations department responded to
requests for an interview.

The case will be heard in front of U.S. District Court Judge
Michael Shea in Hartford. [GN]


ALCON LABORATORIES: 9th Circuit Revives Eye Drops Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for Law.com, reports that a putative
class action over the size of eye medicine drops dismissed by a
federal judge for lack of standing has been revived by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The class action was filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and alleged that the defendant
pharmaceutical companies manufactured dispensers that emitted
drops that were too large and wasted medicine, causing the
plaintiffs economic harm.  The case was filed under numerous
states' unfair trade practice laws.

The defendants are Alcon Laboratories, Alcon Research Ltd., Falcon
Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Sandoz Inc. Allergan Inc., RP, Allergan USA
Inc., Allergan Sales, Pfizer Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Bausch & Lomb Inc., Aton Pharma Inc., Merck & Co.
Inc., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., Prasco and Akron Inc.

The litigation was dismissed after a district judge held that
plaintiffs didn't plead facts to illustrate standing.

Third Circuit Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo said in the court's
opinion that the district judge erroneously concluded that because
the plaintiffs failed to prove fraud collusion between the
pharmaceutical companies, the plaintiffs had no claims.

"This reasoning fails to recognize a category of business
practices entirely separate from practices that are fraudulent,
deceptive, or misleading--'unfair' business practices--prohibited
under the state consumer protection statutes invoked," Restrepo
said.

Additionally, Judge Restrepo said a valid claim for relief is not
a requirement for standing.

Judge Restrepo said the district judge "cast the plaintiffs'
allegations as mere grumblings that defendants' products were
priced too high or packaged inefficiently, because the allegations
lacked notes of fraud, deception, or misrepresentation."

He continued, " . . . Therefore, the district court's
characterization of plaintiffs' claims as 'sound[ing] in fraud'
was inaccurate, and the conclusion that plaintiffs were without
standing due, in part, to the absence of theories of injury
'normally attendant to consumer fraud claims,' misses the mark."

Kirkland & Ellis attorney Robyn Bladow -- rbladow@kirkland.com --
argued the case on behalf of the defendants and did not respond to
a request for comment.

The plaintiffs' attorney, Kevin Carnie of Simon Law Firm, also did
not respond to a request for comment.

While Third Circuit Judge Michael Chagares sided with Restrepo,
Judge Jane Richards Roth dissented.

"I am sympathetic to the difficulties in demonstrating marketwide
injuries in class action litigation," Roth wrote in her dissenting
opinion.  "The difficulty of such a showing, however, is not an
excuse to treat jurisdiction lightly; 'jurisdiction is a strict
master.' [The] ruling flouts this principle, allowing class action
plaintiffs to ignore 'the exacting federal standing requirements'
by offering nothing more than speculation about complex and
industry-specific pricing models. [GN]


ALDEN MANAGEMENT: Umland Sues Over Illegal Use of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE UMLAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ALDEN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., an Illinois
corporation, and ALDEN ESTATES OF BARRINGTON, INC., an Illinois
corporation, Case No. 2017-CH-13046 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty.,
September 27, 2017), seeks to put a stop to the Defendants'
alleged unlawful collection, use, and storage of the Plaintiffs
and the proposed class members' sensitive biometric data.

Alden Management Services, Inc., is a corporation existing under
the laws of the state of Illinois with its principal place of
business located in Chicago, Illinois.  Alden Estates of
Barrington, Inc., is a corporation existing under the laws of the
state of Illinois with its principal place of business located in
Chicago.

Alden Management is a health care and senior living provider.
Alden Estates manages one of Alden Management's facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Sydney M. Janzen, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 13th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589-6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589-6378
          E-mail: jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com
                  sjanzen@edelson.com

               - and -

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: (630) 355-7590
          Facsimile: (630) 778-0400
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Court Grants Dismissal of "Porto" ADTPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Western Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned BOB PORTO, d/b/a
BOB PORTO BUILDERS on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, No. 4:17CV00440 JLH (E.D. Ark.).

Porto is a licensed roofer. He works on storm-damaged homes. Porto
says he has been passed over for jobs because Allstate forces its
customers to select the roofer who submits the lowest bid, even
though Allstate knows those roofers will not comply with Arkansas
building codes. Count I of the class action complaint alleges
violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark.
Code Ann. Section 4-88-101 through 116, and Count II seeks relief
pursuant to the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act, Ark. Code Ann.
Section 16-111-101 through 117.

Allstate has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Allstate maintains that because it is a regulated entity engaged
in regulated conduct, the Act does not apply.

Chief Judge Brian S. Miller entered a Certification Order
certifying two questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which
under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-8 may resolve questions of Arkansas law
before a federal court if the questions are determinative and
there is no controlling precedent.  The first question asks
whether the Arkansas Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope of
the safe harbor are in conflict and if so, how to resolve that
conflict. The second question asks whether the safe harbor applies
to conduct prohibited under laws administered by state and federal
regulators. The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the questions on
March 2, 2017, briefing has been completed, and the court is
working to schedule oral argument.

Porto requests that the District Court refrain from ruling on
whether the conduct alleged in the complaint falls within the safe
harbor provision until the Arkansas Supreme Court answers the
certified questions.

That request is granted. Porto's complaint must be dismissed for
other reasons.

The issued here is causation. Porto alleges that he and other
roofers lost jobs as a result of Allstate's unfair business
practice of steering its customers to select the lowest bidder,
even though Allstate knows that bidder will not comply with the
building codes. The alleged connection between Porto's injuries
and Allstate's unlawful conduct is too tenuous for purposes of
Article III.  Allstate did not select the bidder; its insured
selected the bidder.

The complaint gives no detail as to how many roofers bid on each
project, or how those roofers' qualifications compared to Porto's
qualifications. In short, the complaint does not plausibly allege
facts from which the Court can infer that but for Allstate's
unlawful conduct, Porto would have been selected for any specific
roofing job. Therefore, for purposes of Article III, too many
factors stand in the way of a direct causal relationship.
Even if Porto sufficiently alleged that he has standing, the
complaint would fail for lack of particularity. Porto alleges that
Allstate's practice violates the Act's catch-all provision, which
prohibits engaging in any other unconscionable, false, or
deceptive act or practice in business, commerce, or trade. While
section 107(a)(10) does not use the word fraud, the other
provisions of section 107 prohibit making false representations,
engaging in fraud, and improperly using economic leverage in a
trade transaction.

The Eighth Circuit has therefore interpreted the catch-all
provision to reach similar instances of false representation,
fraud, or the improper use of economic leverage in a trade
transaction. To state a claim for a violation of section
107(a)(10), Porto must allege (1) a deceptive consumer-oriented
act or practice which is misleading in a material respect, and (2)
injury resulting from such act.

The complaint never alleges the who, what, when, where, and how of
any fraudulent transaction.  No specific roofing job is identified
anywhere in the complaint. No specific Allstate insured who was
forced to hire a bad roofer is identified. No date is stated on
which any bids were submitted on any roofing job. No roofer or
roofing company who won bids to work Allstate customers without
intending to perform the work according to code is identified. No
specific code violations are identified. No explanation is given
as to how or the extent to which any code violations caused
discrepancies in the bids submitted by roofers.
The complaint fails to allege, the who, what, when, where, and how
of any fraudulent transaction. In short, the complaint wholly
fails to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).

Count II cites the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act, Ark. Code
Ann. Section 16-111-101 through 117, as independent grounds for
relief.

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides that in a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought.

Here, the complaint fails to allege facts showing that Porto has
standing and it fails to meet the pleading requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Porto's claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief must be dismissed along with his
other claims for relief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb8occxcfrom
Leagle.com.

Bob Porto, Plaintiff, represented by James Clark Wyly, WylyRommel,
PLLC, 4004 Texas Blvd, Texarkana, TX 75503-3009
Bob Porto, Plaintiff, represented by Scott E. Poynter, Poynter Law
Group, 500 President Clinton Avenue, Suite 305, Little Rock, AR
72201. & Sean Fletcher Rommel, Wyly Rommel, PLLC, 4004 Texas Blvd,
Texarkana, TX 75503-3009

Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Christopher J. Heller -- heller@fridayfirm.com --
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Leah R. Bruno, Dentons US LLP, pro
hac vice & Mark L. Hanover, Dentons US LLP, 233 South Wacker
Drive, Suite 7800Chicago, IL 60606-6404, pro hac vice.


AMERICAN EAGLE: Can Appeal Denial of 12(c) Motion
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Certify
Order but denied the Motion to Stay Proceedings in the cases
captioned EVER BEDOYA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN EAGLE
EXPRESS, Defendant, Civil Action No. 14-2811 (ES) (JAD), Civil
Action No. 14-2811 (ES) (JAD) (D.N.J.).

Plaintiffs are delivery drivers. Defendant is a logistics company
that coordinates delivery services throughout several states
(including New Jersey). Defendant employs Plaintiffs as
independent contractors. Plaintiffs brought this putative class
action to challenge their status as independent contractors; they
contend that, under New Jersey law, they are employees.

On August 7, 2015, Defendant moved under Federal Rule of Procedure
12(c) for judgment on the pleadings.  Defendant's 12(c) motion
advanced a single, potentially case-dispositive argument: that
Plaintiffs' Complaint is preempted by the Federal Aviation
Authorization Administration Act of 1994 ("FAAAA").  In a November
21, 2016 Order, the Court denied Defendant's 12(c) motion.

Defendant now moves (i) to certify the Order for interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b); and (ii) to stay this
action pending appeal.

Defendant argues that the Order offers "a substantial ground for a
difference of opinion" because (i) there is no controlling
authority in the Third Circuit; (ii) there is a circuit split
between the First Circuit and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits;
(iii) the Order involves a novel and complex issue of statutory
interpretation; and (iv) the Supreme Court, when considering a
writ of certiorari from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Costello
v. Beavex, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S.Ct. 267 (Oct. 3, 2016), invited the Solicitor General to weigh
in on this issue.

The District Court finds that the Order offers substantial ground
for a difference of opinion.  As an initial matter, Plaintiffs
agree that there is no controlling authority on this issue.  And
although Plaintiffs contend there is unanimous district-wide
authority on this issue that eliminates any difference of opinion,
Plaintiffs do not cite law for that proposition.  Defendant,
however, correctly observes that substantial ground for a
difference of opinion exists when the matter involves one or more
difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled by controlling
authority.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has satisfied the
second prong under Section 1292(b).

The Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.

A Section 1292(b) certification materially advances the ultimate
termination of the litigation where the interlocutory appeal
eliminates: (1) the need for trial; (2) complex issues that would
complicate trial; or (3) issues that would make discovery more
costly or burdensome.

The Court finds that the Order, if appealed, will materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.

First, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant's
12(c) motion did not seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims. Defendant's 12(c) motion did so expressly.
Second, the Court agrees with Defendant that its 12(c) motion
challenged all three prongs under the New Jersey ABC test, whereas
the plaintiffs before the First Circuit challenged only the second
prong of the Massachusetts ABC test. Finally, Defendant has shown
that its appeal involves a potentially case-dispositive issue:
whether Plaintiffs' entire Complaint is pre-empted by the FAAAA.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant has satisfied the third prong
under Section 1292(b).

The Court denies Defendant's request to stay the action at this
time. But, in the event the Third Circuit agrees to hear
Defendant's appeal, Defendant may move before the Court for
reconsideration of its stay request.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yah6982r
from Leagle.com.

EVER BEDOYA, Plaintiff, represented by R. ANDREW SANTILLO --
asantillo@winebrakelaw.com --  WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC.

EVER BEDOYA, Plaintiff, represented by MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD --
mgottesfeld@winebrakelaw.com --  WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC.

DIEGO GONZALES, Plaintiff, represented by R. ANDREW SANTILLO,
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC & MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD, THE WINEBRAKE
LAW FIRM LLC.

MANUEL DECASTRO, Plaintiff, represented by R. ANDREW SANTILLO,
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC & MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD, WINEBRAKE &
SANTILLO, LLC.

AMERICAN EAGLE EXPRESS, INC., Defendant, represented by GREGORY T.
ALVAREZ -- AlvarezG@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C., JOSEPH
C. DEBLASIO -- Joseph.DeBlasio@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS
P.C. & KELLY DAWN GUNTHER -- Kelly.Gunther@jacksonlewis.com --
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.

AMERICAN EAGLE EXPRESS, INC., Third Party Plaintiff, represented
by GREGORY T. ALVAREZ, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., JOSEPH C. DEBLASIO,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & KELLY DAWN GUNTHER, JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

AMERICAN EAGLE EXPRESS, INC., Counter Claimant, represented by
GREGORY T. ALVAREZ, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., JOSEPH C. DEBLASIO,
JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & KELLY DAWN GUNTHER, JACKSON LEWIS P.C..

EVER BEDOYA, Counter Defendant, represented by R. ANDREW SANTILLO,
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC & MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD, WINEBRAKE &
SANTILLO, LLC.

MANUEL DECASTRO, Counter Defendant, represented by R. ANDREW
SANTILLO, WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC & MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD,
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC.

DIEGO GONZALES, Counter Defendant, represented by R. ANDREW
SANTILLO, WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC & MARK JUSTIN GOTTESFELD,
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC.


APPLE INC: Amazon Sends E-Book Payout Creditors to Customers
------------------------------------------------------------
Cody Fenwick, writing for Patch, reports that Amazon emailed its
customers on Oct. 18 with payout credits from a legal battle tied
to the sale of Apple e-books.

If you're an Amazon customer, go check your email before you read
any farther -- there may be some money waiting for you in your
inbox.  Then come back here and read about why the company is
sending out these payments.

It may not be much money -- some customers received as little as
38 cents. (For more national stories, subscribe to the Across
America Patch to receive daily newsletters and breaking news
alerts.)

"Apple Inc. (Apple) funded this credit to settle antitrust
lawsuits brought by State Attorneys General and Class Plaintiffs
about the price of electronic books (eBooks)," Amazon explains in
the email.  "This new credit is in addition to any previous credit
you received from the settlement."
Amazon customers don't have to do anything to receive the
payments. The money will automatically be credited to their
accounts.

The payments can be used in the Kindle bookstore or at Amazon.
The credit will expire by April 20, 2018.

Amazon previously issued payouts for this lawsuit in June of 2016.
Apple was charged with anti-competitive practices in the e-book
market in a class-action suit. I t settled the lawsuit in November
2014. [GN]


APPLE HOSPITALITY: Salas Wang Inks $5.5MM Shareholder Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Salas Wang LLC,
Eccleston Law, LLC, and Law Office of Christopher J. Gray, P.C.:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SUSAN MOSES, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated,
Case No.1:14-cv-03131 (SMG)

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE HOSPITALITY REIT, INC.,



Defendant.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS, AND PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT
HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

To: ALL PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ACQUIRED SHARES OF APPLE
REIT SEVEN AND/OR APPLE REIT EIGHT PURSUANT TO THE APPLE REITS'
DIVIDEND REINVESTMENT PLANS (DRIPs) BETWEEN JULY 17, 2007 AND JUNE
27, 2013 INCLUSIVE.

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, that the above-
captioned litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class
action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain
persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by
definition as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency
of Class Action, Certification of Settlement Class, and Proposed
Settlement; (II) Settlement Hearing; and (III) Motion for an Award
of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses (the
"Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that the Plaintiff in the Action, on behalf
of herself and the other members of the Settlement Class, has
reached a proposed settlement of the Action for $5,500,000 in cash
(the "Settlement").  If the Settlement is approved by the Court,
it will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on January 16, 2018 at 4:30 p.m., before
the Honorable Steven M. Gold, United States Magistrate Judge, at
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, 225 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York 11201, Courtroom
13-D, to determine: (i) whether the proposed Settlement should be
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the
Action should be dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and
the Releases specified and described in the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated August 25, 2017 (and in the Notice)
should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation
should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of litigation expenses should be approved.

The Class Period covered by the Settlement runs from July 17, 2007
until June 27, 2013 inclusive, and the claims of all Settlement
Class members concerning purchases of Apple REIT 7 and/or Apple
REIT 8 shares during that period will be released under the terms
of the Settlement unless Settlement Class members affirmatively
exclude themselves and opt out of the Settlement Class. The period
June 28, 2013 through February 12, 2014, which was formerly
defined as part of the class period in Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint, is not part of the Class Period covered by the
Settlement.  You will not receive any compensation for purchases
of Apple REIT 7 and/or Apple REIT 8 shares between June 28, 2013
and February 12, 2014 in connection with the Settlement, and if
you wish to pursue claims concerning purchases during this period
you would need to commence a separate legal action within the
applicable statute of limitations.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice, you may obtain copies of these documents by
contacting the Settlement Administrator by writing to: Apple
Hospitality REIT Settlement, c/o KCC Class Action Services, P.O.
Box 404033, Louisville, KY 40233-4033, calling (866) 860-8925, or
by e-mail to info@applereitsettlement.com.  Copies of the Notice
and Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website maintained
by the Settlement Administrator, www.applereitsettlement.com.

At this time, it is not possible to determine precisely how much
each Class Member may receive from the Settlement.  However, using
a conservative estimate assuming that every Class Member
participates, and assuming that a request for attorneys' fees for
the maximum potential sum permitted under the Settlement Agreement
($1.833 million) is granted, and that an application for
reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $150,000 is granted,
then Class Members would receive at least $1.26 per share for DRIP
shares purchased between July 22, 2011 and January 13, 2012 for
Apple REIT Seven and between July 22, 2011 and February 19, 2013
for Apple REIT Eight.  Class members would receive at least $0.02
per share for DRIP shares purchased between July 17, 2007 and July
21, 2011 as well as January 14, 2012 to June 27, 2013 for Apple
REIT Seven and April 23, 2008 to July 21, 2011 as well as February
20, 2013 to June 27, 2013 for Apple REIT Eight.

The Settlement Administrator will send a Verification Form with
the basis for your payment calculation.  You may dispute this
amount by submitting documentation to the Settlement
Administrator.  The Settlement Administrator will determine the
validity of that dispute and adjust payment if the dispute is
valid.

If you do not dispute the payment amount prior to the date noted
in the Verification Form, you will receive the payment amount
shown on the Verification Form.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is postmarked no later than December 29,
2017, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.
If you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you
will not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court
in the Action and you will not be eligible to share in the
proceeds of the Settlement. Any objections to the proposed
Settlement, the proposed Plan of Allocation, or Lead Counsel's
motion for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses, must be filed with the Court and delivered to Lead
Counsel and Defendant's Counsel, postmarked no later than December
29, 2017, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the
Notice.

Exclusions should be mailed to:

Apple REIT Settlement
c/o KCC Class Action Services
3301 Kerner Boulevard
San Rafael, CA 94901
info@applereitsettlement.com
www.applereitsettlement.com

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Apple
Hospitality REIT, Inc., or Defendant's Counsel regarding this
notice.  All questions about this notice, the proposed Settlement,
or your eligibility to participate in the Settlement should be
directed to the Settlement Administrator or Lead Counsel.

All other inquiries should be made to Lead Counsel:

         Jeffrey M. Salas, Esq.
         Salas Wang LLC
         E-mail: jsalas@salaswang.com  [GN]


APRIA HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses "Washington" Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order dismissing, pursuant to Rule 25 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the action styled MAC ARTHUR
WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. APRIA HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., Defendant,
No. 1:16-cv-00847-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Mac Arthur Washington commenced this putative class
action for violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act against
defendant Apria Healthcare Group, Inc.

Counsel represents that plaintiff Washington passed away after the
commencement of the action, and that counsel has been unable to
locate a representative of plaintiff's estate or other successor
in interest.  Defendant Apria filed a brief regarding dismissal of
the action pursuant to Rule 25. The parties jointly filed with the
court a notice that 90 days had elapsed since the filing of the
formal suggestion of death.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part:
If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may
order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution
may be made by any party or by the decedent's successor or
representative. If the motion is not made within 90 days after
service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against
the decedent must be dismissed.

Ninety days have now passed since counsel's filing of the
suggestion of death, and no motion for substitution has been made
by any party.

Accordingly, the action is dismissed pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017
Memorandum and Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9zon3ao
from Leagle.com.

Mac Arthur Washington, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon -
- abacon@attorneysforconsumers.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C..

Mac Arthur Washington, Plaintiff, represented by Todd M. Friedman,
Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C..

Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Rochelle
L. Wilcox -- rochellewilcox@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.


AT&T SERVICES: Court Grants Prelim OK of FLSA Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement in the case captioned WENDELL WALTON and MICHAEL
MANTONYA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. AT&T SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
15-cv-03653-VC (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs allege that AT&T violated wage and hour laws by
misclassifying class members as exempt, and, as a result,
unlawfully denying overtime compensation and violating meal and
rest period laws and related California laws.

For settlement purposes only, the Parties have proposed
conditional certification of the settlement class comprising all
individuals who worked for AT&T who are not bound by the
Management Arbitration Agreement (MAA), and who worked as a
Designer or Deliverer or preliminary approval of the settlement
for California-based employees (California Class Members).

The Court finds and concludes that for purposes of the Settlement
only, the California Settlement Class satisfies all of the
requirements for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The California Settlement Class is sufficiently numerous that
joinder is impracticable.  The members of the California
Settlement Class share common issues of fact and law regarding (i)
whether AT&T's practice of classifying Class Members as exempt
violates the FLSA and state wage laws; (ii) whether AT&T failed to
pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA and state wage
laws; (iii) whether AT&T's policies and lack thereof violate the
California meal period or rest break laws; and (iv) the proper
method of calculating damages if the violations are proven.

Each Class Representative's claims are typical of those of the
Class he proposes to represent, because they arise out of the same
policies and practices and course of conduct complained of by all
California Class Members.  Each Class Representative is an
adequate representative of the Class he proposes to represent,
because his interests are co-extensive with those of the
California Class Members, and he has retained experienced counsel
to represent him and the California Class Members.

Questions of law or fact common to the California Settlement Class
predominate over individualized issues, and a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy.

Because certification of the California Settlement Class is
proposed in the context of a settlement, the Court need not
inquire whether the case, if tried as a class action, would
present intractable management problems.

Accordingly, the Court certifies the Class under Rule 23(a) and
(b)(3).

The Court finds and concludes that each Class Representative has
claims typical of the Members of the Class he proposes to
represent, and he is an adequate representative of the Class he
seeks to represent.  The Court hereby appoints Plaintiffs to serve
as Class Representatives.

The Court finds and concludes that Outten & Golden LLP and Posner
& Rosen LLP have, separately and collectively, extensive
experience and expertise in prosecuting wage-and-hour class
actions and collective actions. The Court appoints these firms as
Class Counsel.

The Court finds and concludes that the Settlement is the result of
arms-length negotiations between the Parties conducted after Class
Counsel had adequately investigated Plaintiffs' claims and become
familiar with their strengths and weaknesses. The assistance of an
experienced mediator in the settlement process supports the
finding that the Settlement is non-collusive. Based on all of
these factors, the Court concludes that the proposed Settlement
meets the criteria for preliminary settlement approval. The
Settlement has no obvious defects and falls within the range of
possible approval as fair adequate, and reasonable, such that
notice to the Class Members is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Settlement is preliminarily approved.

Within ten days after Plaintiffs' Preliminary Approval Motion was
filed, notice of the Settlement was mailed to the Attorney General
of the United States of America and the appropriate state official
in each state in which, based on AT&T's records of last known
mailing address, Class Members reside; and the notice contains the
documents required by 28 U.S.C. section 1715(b)(1)-(8). On this
basis, the notice of the Settlement is approved and the Court
finds that AT&T has discharged its obligations under CAFA to
provide notice to the appropriate federal and state officials.

Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that the proposed plan
for distributing the Class Notice will provide the best notice
practicable, satisfies the notice requirements of Rule 23(e), and
satisfies all other legal and due process requirements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybt9f6dsfrom Leagle.com.

Wendell Walton, Plaintiff, represented by Deirdre A. Aaron, Outten
& Golden LLP, 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor, New York, NY 10017

Wendell Walton, Plaintiff, represented by Jason C. Marsili, Posner
and Rosen LLP, 3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1800, Los Angeles, CA
90010, Michael N. Litrownik, Outten and Golden LLP, Relic Sun,
Outten and Golden LLP & Jahan C. Sagafi, OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, 685
Third Avenue, 25 Floor, New York, NY 10017
Michael Mantonya, Plaintiff, represented by Deirdre A. Aaron,
Outten & Golden LLP, Jason C. Marsili, Posner and Rosen LLP,
Michael N. Litrownik, Outten and Golden LLP & Jahan C. Sagafi,
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP.

AT&T Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Thomas
Campbell -- mcampbell@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter Hampton LLP, Paul Berkowitz --
pberkowitz@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter Hampton
LLP & Thomas Roy Kaufman -- tkaufman@sheppardmullin.com --
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP.


AVISTA CORP: Faces "Sharpenter" Suit Over Merger With Hyrdro One
----------------------------------------------------------------
TED SHARPENTER, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. AVISTA CORPORATION, ERIK J. ANDERSON, KRISTIANNE
BLAKE, DONALD C. BURKE, REBECCA A. KLEIN, SCOTT H. MAW, SCOTT
MORRIS, MARC RACICOT, HEIDI B. STANLEY, R. JOHN TAYLOR, JANET
WIDMANN, HYDRO ONE LIMITED, OLYMPUS HOLDING CORP., and OLYMPUS
CORP., Case No. 2:17-cv-00336 (E.D. Wash., September 26, 2017),
stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Avista will
be acquired by Hydro One Limited ("Parent") and its indirect
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Olympus Holding Corp. ("US Parent") and
Olympus Corp. ("Merger Sub").

On July 19, 2017, Avista's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger.  Pursuant to the
terms of the Merger Agreement, Hydro One will acquire all of the
outstanding shares of Avista common stock for $53 per share in
cash.

Avista is a Washington corporation and maintains its principal
executive offices in Spokane, Washington.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  Avista was
incorporated in the territory of Washington in 1889.  The Company
is primarily an electric and natural gas utility with certain
other business ventures.

Defendant Parent is a corporation organized under the laws of the
Province of Ontario, and a party to the Merger Agreement.
Defendant US Parent is a Delaware corporation, an indirect wholly-
owned subsidiary of Parent, and a party to the Merger Agreement.
Defendant Merger Sub is a Washington corporation, an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent, and a party to the Merger
Agreement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roger Townsend, Esq.
          BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND, PLLC
          1000 Second Avenue, Suite 3670
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 652-8660
          Facsimile: (206) 652-8290
          E-mail: rtownsend@bjtlegal.com

               - and -

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
          Wilmington, DE 19803
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com


AVISTA CORP: Samuel Challenges Proposed Merger With Hyrdro One
--------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR SAMUEL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. AVISTA CORPORATION, SCOTT L. MORRIS, R. JOHN TAYLOR,
ERIK J. ANDERSON, MARC F. RACICOT, KRISTIANNE BLAKE, REBECCA A.
KLEIN, DONALD C. BURKE, HEIDI B. STANELY, SCOTT HARLAN MAW, and
JANET D. WIDMANN, Case No. 2:17-cv-00334-SAB (E.D. Wash.,
September 26, 2017), seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding
the stockholders vote on a proposed merger and taking any steps to
consummate the merger unless, and until, material information is
disclosed to Avista stockholders sufficiently in advance of the
vote on the merger or, in the event the merger is consummated, to
recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On July 19, 2017, the Company's board of directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger between
Avista and Hydro One Limited, pursuant to which the Company's
shareholders stand to receive $53 in cash for each share of Avista
stock they own, representing $5.3 billion in total value.

Avista is incorporated in Washington and maintains its principal
executive offices in Spokane, Washington.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  Avista is
an energy company, which generates, transmits, and distributes
electric and natural gas to both business and residential
customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roger M. Townsend, Esq.
          BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC
          1000 Second Avenue, Suite 3670
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 652-8660
          Facsimile: (206) 652-8290
          E-mail: rtownsend@bjtlegal.com

               - and -

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Ave., 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com


BAYER AG: Seeks Dismissal of One-A-Day Labeling Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Cara Bayles and Steven Trader, writing for Law360, report that
Bayer asked a California federal judge on Oct. 18 to toss a
putative class action over the labeling of Bayer AG's One-A-Day
vitamins, saying that the whole case rested on the contention the
pills had no value, but that he'd gotten the plaintiffs' own
expert to admit the vitamin "is not worthless."

Bayer attorney Jonathan Cohn -- jfcohn@sidley.com -- of Sidley
Austin LLP told U.S. District Judge William Orrick that the
plaintiffs' whole case was built on their contention the vitamins
were worthless.  He said that argument alone knocked out their
move for an injunction, because the named plaintiffs wouldn't
continue to be harmed by the labeling, since "consumers don't go
around purchasing products they think are worthless."

But he also said the deposition testimony of Dr. Edward Blonz
knocked out the rest of the case.  The plaintiffs' expert had
admitted that One-A-Day does have health benefits for consumers
who get less than the recommended daily amount of vitamins, and
said he recommends supplements for his own patients.  According to
Mr. Cohn, Dr. Blonz only contended the labeling would make
consumers think the vitamins prevented disease, a problem he said
could be solved by adding the word "normal" to the product's
claimed benefits, so its label would say the vitamins could
promote "normal immune health."

"The FDA has never required the use of the word 'normal.'
Plaintiffs never argued the word 'normal' matters in any of their
briefs. There's no legal support for that assertion," Mr. Cohn
said.  "They have to show more than a lack of evidence.  They have
to show our claims are false. Their own expert says we only have
to add the word 'normal.'"

Plaintiff Colleen Gallagher filed suit in 2014, alleging on behalf
of a class of One-A-Day buyers that the company overstepped its
bounds with promises that the vitamins would benefit anyone who
takes them by boosting heart health, immunity and physical energy,
according to court records.  But the vitamins only benefit people
who are vitamin-deficient, a rare condition that most average
consumers wouldn't have, the suit alleges.

Bayer sought to throw out the suit in December, contending that
its statements were protected under the federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act because they were about structure and function,
rather than disease.

In March, Judge Orrick found that the FDCA preempted the
plaintiffs' claims about heart health and the immune system, but
gave them a chance to amend their claims, according to court
documents.

On Oct. 18, Judge Orrick complimented Mr. Cohn on the deposition
performance, saying, "I thought you did a great job in cross," and
that "come time for trial, it's going to help a lot," but he
disagreed that the concessions were enough to completely undo the
expert's opinion or to toss the whole case.

The judge did wonder about whether the admission that the vitamins
weren't worthless knocked out the suit's bid for a full refund.
When plaintiffs' attorney Stephen Gardner of Stanley Law Group
said Bayer couldn't be rewarded for "bad behavior," the judge told
him, "that's a lousy argument."

"To win on the full refund, you have to show me you've got a
reasonable claim the vitamins are worthless, and you've just told
me you're concerned about a couple of the claims on the box," he
said.  "You're not selling the claims, you're selling the
product."

The judge also heard arguments on class certification, and said
while he was unlikely to certify a nationwide class as requested,
he might allow class claims to move forward in New Jersey, Florida
and California, the states where the three named plaintiffs
reside.  He asked Mr. Gardner how he could prove his clients
relied on the labeling.

"[Bayer's] own internal studies show that they're making the claim
because they thought customers relied on it. . . . It's deceptive
to make a claim when you don't know if it's true," Mr. Gardner
said. "It really is impossible to look into the soul of every
purchaser. You should hold Bayer to what it chose to tell people."

Mr. Cohn countered that Bayer could rely on known health benefits
of the vitamins without doing a clinical trial on its product. He
also added that there wasn't even uniform misrepresentation among
the three class members, contending that their understanding of
the vitamins ranged from a supplement that boosted "general
health" to "a superpill that will make you jump higher, run
faster."

"There's no survey showing how consumers interpret these claims,"
he said.  "There's no classwide evidence of materiality."

Bayer is represented by Ryan M. Sandrock -- rsandrock@sidley.com
-- Benjamin M. Mundel -- bmundel@sidley.com -- and Jonathan
Frederick Cohn -- jfcohn@sidley.com -- of Sidley Austin LLP.

Ms. Gallagher is represented by Laurence D. King --
lking@kaplanfox.com -- Linda M. Fong -- lfong@kaplanfox.com -- and
Robert N. Kaplan -- rkaplan@kaplanfox.com -- of Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Amanda Marie Howell and Stephen Henry Gardner of
Stanley Law Group.

The case is Gallagher et al v. Bayer AG et al, Case No. 3:14-cv-
04601.  The case is assigned to Judge William H. Orrick.  The case
was filed October 15, 2014. [GN]


BOJANGLES' RESTAURANTS: Thaxton Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------------
BARBARA THAXTON and ANGELA D. MAYES, Individually, and on behalf
of themselves and all other similarly situated current and former
employees v. BOJANGLES' RESTAURANTS, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
and BOJANGLES', INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 1:17-cv-
00269-TRM-CHS (E.D. Tenn., September 26, 2017), is brought against
the Defendants as a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act to recover unpaid overtime compensation for the
Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former
employees of the Defendants.

Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its
principal executive office located in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Bojangles' Restaurants is a subsidiary of Bojangles' Inc.
Bojangles' Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
executive office located in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Bojangles'
Inc. is the parent of Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc.

The Defendants constitute an integrated enterprise and jointly own
and operate Bojangles' restaurants.  The Defendants own, operate
and franchise Bojangles restaurants with their core menu centered
on "chicken 'n biscuits."  As of December 2015, Defendants
operated company owned Bojangles restaurants in several states
across the United States, including Tennessee, Alabama, Maryland,
Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          James L. Holt, Jr., Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  jholt@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com


CALGARY, AB: Lawyer Unsuccessful in Certification of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brenda Neufeld, writing for Global News, reports that a lawyer
fighting for those evicted from Midfield Mobile Home Park said
October 20 he expects those councillors who expressed support for
the residents during the election campaign to step up now and walk
the talk.

Matthew Farrell, barrister and solicitor at Guardian Law Group,
talked to Danielle Smith on News Talk 770 after a failed attempt
in court to get certification for a class-action lawsuit against
the City of Calgary.

"This isn't about politics for the people of Midfield, this is
about their homes", Farrell said. "We have a new council now and a
lot of them said this is an important issue and that they're going
to try to do right by these people. Now it's time for them to step
up."

Because the City of Calgary was able to successfully argue against
the certification, Farrell is going to have to try to find all of
the former residents of Midfield to see if they want to
participate in the suit against the city.

With a class-action lawsuit, they would all be included
automatically. Farrell is still going to try for certification
down the road.

"We're probably going to end up having to make the class-action
argument later, if we win, to try to round up anybody that we
haven't been able to reach."

Farrell will argue in court on Nov. 22 that the residents of the
northeast mobile home were wrongly evicted from their homes. He
said even those residents who accepted the city's deal should be
getting more than the $10,000 they received for their properties.

Farrell is also appealing to Calgarians who feel the handling of
Midfield residents has been bungled, to call their city
councillor.

"All those people that cared about this issue during the election
-- I'm sure they still care. So, I really hope they will call
their councillors because that actually does make a difference."

The city sent out eviction notices a year ago, telling residents
the property would be permanently closed due to the state of
underground utilities. [GN]


CANADA: WRP Female Officers' Gender Bias Class Action Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Liz Monteiro, writing for The Record, reports that a Waterloo
Regional Police officer who is suing her employer for gender-based
discrimination and sexual harassment has started a national
advocacy group for female officers facing discrimination.

"We (the group) are targeting issues of systemic and institutional
sexual harassment and discrimination in policing," said Const.
Angelina Rivers, who along with former Const. Sharon Zehr, created
the group.

Ms. Rivers said since the class-action lawsuit against the police
was launched in June, she has been contacted by "well over 100
women" in policing who have experienced similar stories of
discrimination.

"Before I was a part of the lawsuit, I didn't know how widespread
it was," she said.  "I had no idea there were women who had the
same story as I did."

Ms. Rivers said the primary focus of the group -- National Women
in Law Enforcement Association -- is to lobby the government to
change the Police Services Act so that there is "real independent
oversight."

In the lawsuit, Ms. Rivers and Ms.  Zehr allege they were
subjected to routine harassment and abuse by their male
counterparts and their bosses.

The women described Waterloo Regional Police as a "culture of
misogyny."

Also part of the claim and the advocacy group is retired regional
police Supt. Barry Zehr, the husband of Sharon Zehr.  He said he
repeatedly spoke to police brass about systemic discrimination but
nothing was done. He retired in April.

The three plaintiffs are leading the class-action suit on behalf
of all female members of the local service.  Total damages they
are seeking amount to $167 million.  The allegations in the suit
have not been proven in court.

Lawyers for both sides appeared in a Brampton court on Sept. 25.
Waterloo Regional Police Services Board and the Waterloo Regional
Police Association put forward documents to support their claim
that the courts have no jurisdiction to deal with the case.

An affidavit by current police association president Mark Egers
says issues arising between employee and the employer are governed
by the collective agreement.

In a statement, the police service said it does not condone or
tolerate any form of discrimination or harassment in the
workplace.

Police Chief Bryan Larkin said some of the allegations date back
to 1988 and only came to the attention of the service now.  He
said other allegations were investigated and dealt with
appropriately.

Doug Elliott, lead lawyer for the suit, said Justice Deena Baltman
will hear arguments on jurisdictional issues as well as the issue
of certifying the suit as a class-action suit.

Mr. Elliott said the plaintiffs are speaking for all female
officers and need permission from a judge to represent others.  He
said every female officer is automatically part of the case at the
beginning, but they can opt out of the suit.

Mr. Elliott said he has not heard from any female officers with
Waterloo Regional Police who wish to opt out of the lawsuit.

Instead, he said he has heard from many female officers who are
glad the lawsuit is going ahead, and from female officers "who are
very fearful of being identified with this case because of fear of
retaliation."

"The system is broken. In fact, there have been no formal
grievances from women ever in the history of Waterloo Regional
Police," Mr. Elliott said.

The reason for this is that the "collective bargaining system is
so broken that women are not using it to address problems of sex
discrimination," he said.

"I don't think Waterloo is unique. The police work environment is
especially bad," said Mr. Elliott, referring to a traditional
male-dominated environment.

The next court date is June 2018 in Brampton.  Mr. Elliott said he
expects the judge will reserve her decision and release it next
fall. [GN]


COCA-COLA CO: Diet Soda Makers Sued for Misleading Consumers
------------------------------------------------------------
ABC 7 News reports that a class action lawsuit is taking the soft
drink industry to task for its use of the word "diet."

The suit was filed against the Pepsi-Cola company, Coca-Cola
Company, and Doctor Pepper Snapple Group.

It accuses the soft drink makers of misleading consumers by
advertising diet drinks that are sweetened with aspartame, which
does not help in the body's ability to metabolize calories.

The lawsuit claims that consumers could mistakenly believe
drinking diet soda will assist in weight loss or management.

The Calorie Control Council, whose members include manufacturers
of artificial sweeteners including aspartame and the makers of
diet soda said, "Reduced-calorie products are an important tool in
helping consumers improve their diet and lose weight."

In a statement to ABC News, the American Beverage Association
which represents these three soda companies called the lawsuits
"meritless," saying diet beverages have been shown to help people
manage their diets and weight. [GN]


COMCAST CORP: Can Compel Arbitration in "Noonan" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JUDITH NOONAN, at al., Plaintiffs, v.
COMCAST CORP., Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00458 (PGS) (D.
N.J.), Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted the Defendant's Renewed Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation.

On Dec. 8, 2015, the Plaintiffs initiated the class action in
Superior Court, Ocean County.  On Jan. 27, 2016, the Defendant
removed the matter to this Court pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  The Plaintiffs allege: (i)
declaratory relief; (ii) violations of the Plain Language Act;
(iii) violations of the Consumer Fraud Act; (iv) breach of
contract; (v) bad faith; and (vi) prima facie tort, arising out of
Comcast's allegedly arbitrary pricing, deficient telephone,
television, and computer services, deficient equipment, and
abandoned equipment and advertising material.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant arbitrarily priced its
equipment and services, provided deficient services and equipment,
left promotional literature on door knobs, abandoned equipment,
used confusing contractual and promotional language, and provided
deficient customer service.

The Defendant seeks to compel arbitration and stay litigation,
contending that the Plaintiffs are bound by an arbitration
agreement in their Comcast Agreement for Residential Services
("Subscriber Agreement").  Comcast provided copies of the
Subscriber Agreement to the Plaintiffs as an insert in a monthly
billing statement and as part of a welcome kit when services were
installed.

For the purposes of the motion, the parties have submitted a
Stipulation as to which versions of the Subscriber Agreements were
in place at the time the Plaintiff received services.  The
stipulation is significant because the language of the current
Subscriber Agreement available on the Defendant's website differs
from those in dispute.

In particular, the Defendant revised Section 13 which contains the
arbitration provision.  The arbitration provision further provides
for a convenient location, and a single neutral arbitrator with
either party able to appeal a decision to a three-arbitrator
panel.  The provision also contains a severability clause.  The
Defendant advances all fees and arbitration costs, but a customer
must pay if he or she loses.

Judge Sheridan finds the Plaintiffs' arguments unpersuasive.  The
Plaintiffs do not deny that all the agreements were agreed to, and
those agreements all contain valid arbitration provisions.  Under
Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., a contract must make clear that
a consumer is waiving his or her constitutional right to sue in
court when agreeing to arbitration.  When read by a reasonable
person, the arbitration provision is clear and unambiguous in its
waiver of rights.  The provision satisfies the Atalese requirement
in defining what arbitration means, and goes on to describe the
process in detail.  The agreement's description includes eleven
explanatory paragraphs.  The court in Atalese acknowledges that no
particular form of words is necessary to accomplish a clear and
unambiguous waiver of rights.

The Judge does not elect to disregard Atalese as the Defendant
argues.  Those concerns have been duly addressed in the case law.
Atalese has been cited by the Third Circuit a number of times.
Rather, he finds that the arbitration provision satisfies the
clear and unambiguous standard for a waiver of rights.

When comparing the Defendant's provision with the one in Atalese,
Judge Sheridan finds that the Defendant's provision is
distinguishable.  The provision in Atalese is only one paragraph,
and never defines arbitration.  Here, the provision adequately
defines arbitration which means one will have a fair hearing
before a neutral arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or
jury.  The actions of the parties and the provision as a whole,
makes clear that the parties agreed to arbitrate.

Next, the Judge inquires whether this dispute falls within the
scope of the arbitration agreement.  The Plaintiffs do not make
specific arguments as to the scope of the provision being
insufficient to cover their claims against the Defendant. He finds
that the Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, bad faith and
other tort claims fall under dispute as defined in the arbitration
provision.

For these reasons, Judge Sheridan granted the Defendant's Motion
to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation and dismissed without
prejudice the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/jK9qNO from Leagle.com.

WILLIAM J. HEMPSTEAD, JR., Movant, Pro Se.

JUDITH NOONAN, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL ANTHONY LEODORI --
info@leodori.com.

TERRY STELLA RISTAINO, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL ANTHONY
LEODORI.

JOHN MCGUINNESS, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL ANTHONY LEODORI.

HENRY REINHARD, Plaintiff, represented by PAUL ANTHONY LEODORI.

COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL P. DALY --
michael.daly@dbr.com -- DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH, LLP, MICHAEL W.
MCTIGUE, JR. -- michael.mctigue@dbr.com -- DRINKER, BIDDLE &
REATH, LLP & KATIE BAILEY GARAYOA -- katie.garayoa@dbr.com --
RINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.


COUSINS SUBMARINES: "Nuchell" Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned AMANDA NUCHELL, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COUSINS
SUBMARINES, INC. D/B/A COUSINS SUBS, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-
232-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the parties' Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action
Settlement, and granted their Joint Stipulation to Certify a
Collective Action Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and to
Certify a Class Action Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The parties have filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class and Collective Action Settlement.  They have attached their
Settlement Agreement, and have explained how they reached the
settlement and the reasons they believe that the settlement is
fair, reasonable and adequate.

They also applied the Rule 23(a) and (b) standard to the proposed
class of all individuals employed by the defendant as an hourly
Assistant Manager at any time between Feb. 24, 2014 and Sept. 2,
2017, as identified in Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Pepper finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable and adequate.  Accordingly, she approved the Joint
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class and Collective Action
Settlement, and approved their Joint Stipulation to Certify a
Collective Action Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and to
Certify a Class Action Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Judge appointed Amanda Nuchell as the class representative,
and Hawks Quindell, S.C. as the class counsel.

Judge Pepper finds that the parties' Notice of Class Action
Settlement constitutes valid, due and sufficient notice for
distribution to the Rule 23 Class.  She ordered that the class
counsel mail the notice within seven days of the date of her
Order.  The Putative Collective Class members may file a consent
form within 30 days of the notice's mailing.

Any individual who wishes to exclude himself or herself from the
Rule 23 Class must opt out, per the instructions in the Notice of
Class Action Settlement, within 30 days of the mailing of that
notice.  Any individual who does not exclude him or herself from
the Rule 23 settlement will be bound by the Court's order finally
approving settlement.

Any Rule 23 Class Member who wishes to object in any way to the
proposed settlement agreement must file and serve such written
objections, following the instructions in the notice, no later
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice, together with copies
of all papers in support of his or her petition.

Judge Pepper has scheduled a fairness hearing for Nov. 28, 2017 at
12:30 p.m., for the Court to make its determination as to the
final approval of the settlement and the amounts paid to class
counsel as attorneys' fees and costs, and to hear the objections
of any Rule 23 Class Member who validly objected to the settlement
agreement as provided in the notice.

The Class counsel will file a motion for approval of attorneys'
fees and costs at least 14 days prior to the fairness hearing.
Any supplemental brief in support of final approval of the
Settlement Agreement or in response to any objections to the
application for attorneys' fees will be filed at least seven days
prior to the fairness hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/u3hX0D from Leagle.com.

Amanda Nuchell, Plaintiff, represented by Larry A. Johnson --
ljohnson@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC.

Amanda Nuchell, Plaintiff, represented by Summer H. Murshid --
smurshid@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC & Timothy P. Maynard --
tmaynard@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC.

Cousins Submarines Inc, Defendant, represented by Brett D.
Schnepper -- bschnepper@buelowvetter.com -- Buelow Vetter Buikema
Olson & Vliet LLC, Daniel G. Vliet -- dvliet@buelowvetter.com --
Buelow Vetter Buikema Olson & Vliet LLC, Joel S. Aziere --
jaziere@buelowvetter.com -- Buelow Vetter Buikema Olson & Vliet
LLC & Kevin C. Pollard --  kpollard@buelowvetter.com -- Buelow
Vetter Buikema Olson & Vliet LLC.


COX INDUSTRIAL: Fails to Properly Pay Employees, Madrigal Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN MADRIGAL AND ANGEL MADRIGAL, On Behalf of Themselves and
All Others Similarly Situated and On Behalf of the General Public
as Private Attorneys General v. COX INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Case
No. BC677543 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., September 27,
2017), alleges that that Defendants failed to pay all overtime,
minimum, regular, and prevailing wages to the Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated employees/staff.

Cox Industrial Services, Inc., is a California corporation with a
principal place of business located at in Signal Hill, California.
The Company's line of business includes specialized repair
services.  The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are
unknown to the Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gary R. Carlin, Esq.
          Brent S. Buchsbaum, Esq.
          Laurel N. Haag, Esq.
          John F. Litwin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CARLIN & BUCHSBAUM, LLP
          555 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 818
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 432-8933
          Facsimile: (562) 435-1656
          E-mail: gary@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  brent@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  laurel@carlinbuchsbaum.com
                  john@carlinbuchsbaum.com


CSK AUTO: "Aguilar" Stayed Pending "Davidson" Class Cert Hearing
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California stays the case captioned ADRIAN AGUILAR, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CSK
AUTO, INC., O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC., and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-04263-RS (N.D. Calif.).

Plaintiff and Defendants filed a stipulation to stay the action
pending resolution of class certification proceedings in a first-
filed action.

Accordingly, the Court stays the action for all purposes, pending
an order on the class certification motion pending in the Davidson
Action, which is currently set for hearing on December 4, 2017.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya932yptfrom Leagle.com.

Adrian Aguilar, Plaintiff, represented by Carey A. James --
caj@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith and Marcy.

Adrian Aguilar, Plaintiff, represented by Brent A. Robinson,
Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Hallie Von Rock -- hvr@asmlawyers.com --
Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Randall Bruce Aiman-Smith --
ras@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy & Reed W.L. Marcy --
rwlm@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith & Marcy

CSK Auto, Inc., Defendant, represented by James Michael Peterson -
- peterson@higgslaw.com -- Higgs Fletcher and Mack LLP & Edwin
Mendelson Boniske, Higgs Fletcher and Mack LLP.

O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Edwin
Mendelson Boniske -- boniske@higgslaw.com -- Higgs Fletcher and
Mack LLP, James Michael Peterson, Higgs Fletcher and Mack LLP &
Jason Conroy Ross -- jasross@gmail.com -- Higgs Fletcher Mack LLP.


CTI BIOPHARMA: Settlement in Securities Suit Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE CTI BIOPHARMA CORP. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 2:16-cv-00216-RSL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert
S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, granted the Lead Plaintiff's motion for preliminarily
approval of the Settlement in accordance with the Stipulation,
certification of the Settlement Class for purposes of the
Settlement only, and approval of notice to the Settlement Class
Members.

The Parties have determined to settle all claims asserted against
Defendants in the Action with prejudice on the terms and
conditions set forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement dated Sept. 1, 2017 subject to approval of the Court.

The Lead Plaintiff has made an application for an order
preliminarily approving the Settlement in accordance with the
Stipulation, certifying the Settlement Class for purposes of the
Settlement only, and allowing notice to Settlement Class Members.

Judge Lasnik has read and considered the Lead Plaintiff's motion,
the papers filed and arguments made in connection therewith, and
the Stipulation and the exhibits attached.

Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Judge certified, solely for purposes of
effectuating the proposed Settlement, a Settlement Class
consisting of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired CTI Securities during the period from March 9, 2015
through Feb. 9, 2016, inclusive, and were damaged thereby.

He finds and concludes that pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and for the purposes of the Settlement
only, Lead Plaintiff DAFNA and the additional Named Plaintiff
Michael Li are adequate class representatives and certified them
as the Class Representatives for the Settlement Class.  He also
appointed the Lead Counsel as the Class Counsel for the Settlement
Class, pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Judge Lasnik preliminarily approved the Settlement, as embodied in
the Stipulation, as being fair, reasonable and adequate to the
Settlement Class, subject to further consideration at the
Settlement Hearing to be conducted.  He will hold the Settlement
Hearing on Feb. 1, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 15106 of the
United States Courthouse, 700 Stewart Street, Seattle, WA 98101.
The Notice of the Settlement and the Settlement Hearing will be
given to the Settlement Class Members as set forth in the Order.

The Lead Counsel is authorized to retain Garden City Group, LLC
("Claims Administrator") to supervise and administer the notice
procedure in connection with the proposed Settlement as well as
the processing of Claims.  The Notice of the Settlement and the
Settlement Hearing will be given by Lead Counsel as follows:

     a. within five business days of the date of entry of the
Order (at no cost to the Settlement Fund, Lead Counsel or the
Claims Administrator), (i) CTI will provide or cause to be
provided to the Claims Administrator, in electronic format,
Depository Trust Co. position reports covering dates on a monthly
basis during the Class Period that CTI maintains in the regular
course of business or has access to; and (ii) the Underwriter
Defendants will provide or cause to be provided to the Claims
Administrator, in electronic format, lists (consisting of names
and addresses) of the beneficial owners on whose behalf they
purchased CTI Securities during the Class Period and the persons
and entities who purchased CTI Series N-1 Preferred Stock and CTI
Series N-2 Preferred Stock in the offerings of those securities;

     b. not later than 12 business days after the date of entry of
the Order, the Claims Administrator will cause a copy of the
Notice and the Claim Form to be mailed by first-class mail to the
potential Settlement Class Members at the addresses set forth in
the records provided by CTI and the Underwriter Defendants or in
the records which CTI or the Underwriter Defendants caused to be
provided, or who otherwise may be identified through further
reasonable effort;

     c. contemporaneously with the mailing of the Notice Packet,
the Claims Administrator will cause copies of the Notice and the
Claim Form to be posted on a website to be developed for the
Settlement, from which copies of the Notice and Claim Form can be
downloaded;

     d. not later than 10 business days after the Notice Date, the
Claims Administrator will cause the Summary Notice to be published
once in Investor's Business Daily and to be transmitted once over
the PR Newswire; and

     e. not later than seven calendar days prior to the Settlement
Hearing, the Lead Counsel will serve on the Defendants' Counsel
and file with the Court proof, by affidavit or declaration, of
such mailing and publication.

Judge Lasnik approved, as to form and content, the Notice, the
Claim Form, and the Summary Notice.  The date and time of the
Settlement Hearing will be included in the Notice and Summary
Notice before they are mailed and published, respectively.

The Brokers and other nominees who purchased or otherwise acquired
CTI Securities during the Class Period for the benefit of another
person or entity will (i) within seven calendar days of receipt of
the Notice, request from the Claims Administrator sufficient
copies of the Notice Packet to forward to all such beneficial
owners and, within seven calendar days of receipt of those Notice
Packets, forward them to all such beneficial owners; or (ii)
within seven calendar days of receipt of the Notice, send a list
of the names and addresses of all such beneficial owners to the
Claims Administrator in which event the Claims Administrator will
promptly mail the Notice Packet to such beneficial owners.

Upon full compliance with the Order, such nominees may seek
reimbursement of their reasonable expenses actually incurred in
complying with the Order by providing the Claims Administrator
with proper documentation supporting the expenses for which
reimbursement is sought.  Such properly documented expenses
incurred by nominees in compliance with the terms of the Order
will be paid from the Settlement Fund, with any disputes as to the
reasonableness or documentation of expenses incurred subject to
review by the Court.

The Settlement Class Members who wish to participate in the
Settlement and to be eligible to receive a distribution from the
Net Settlement Fund must complete and submit a Claim Form in
accordance with the instructions contained therein.  Unless the
Court orders otherwise, all Claim Forms must be postmarked no
later than 100 calendar days after the Notice Date.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Lead Counsel may, at its
discretion, accept for processing late Claims provided such
acceptance does not delay the distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund to the Settlement Class.

Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to exclude himself,
herself, or itself from the Settlement Class must request
exclusion in writing within the time and in the manner set forth
in the Notice no later than 21 calendar days prior to the
Settlement Hearing, to: In re CTI BioPharma Corp. Securities
Litigation, EXCLUSIONS, c/o GCG, P.O. Box 35100, Seattle, WA
98124-1100.

Any Settlement Class Member who does not request exclusion from
the Settlement Class may file a written objection to the proposed
Settlement, the proposed Plan of Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's
motion for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses no later than 21 calendar days prior to the
Settlement Hearing.

Until otherwise ordered by the Court, Judge Lasnik stayed all
proceedings in the Action other than proceedings necessary to
carry out or enforce the terms and conditions of the Stipulation.

All reasonable costs incurred in identifying Settlement Class
Members and notifying them of the Settlement as well as in
administering the Settlement will be paid as set forth in the
Stipulation without further order of the Court.  The contents of
the Settlement Fund held by Signature Bank (which the Court
approved as the Escrow Agent) will be deemed and considered to be
in custodia legis of the Court, and will remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as they will be
distributed pursuant to the Stipulation and/or further order(s) of
the Court.

The Lead Counsel is authorized and directed by Judge Lasnik to
prepare any tax returns and any other tax reporting form for or in
respect to the Settlement Fund, to pay from the Settlement Fund
any Taxes owed with respect to the Settlement Fund, and to
otherwise perform all obligations with respect to Taxes and any
reporting or filings in respect thereof without further order of
the Court in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
Stipulation.

The Lead Counsel is also directed to file and serve the opening
papers in support of the proposed Settlement, the Plan of
Allocation, and the Lead Counsel's motion for an award of
attorneys' fees and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses no later
than 35 calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing; and reply
papers, if any, will be filed and served no later than seven
calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

As set forth in the Stipulation, and pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), the Defendants will timely serve
CAFA notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KwZ4wm from Leagle.com.

Marcello Zucca, Movant, represented by Dan Drachler --
ddrachler@zsz.com -- ZWERLING SCHACHTER & ZWERLING.

Paul Sapan, Movant, represented by Dan Drachler, ZWERLING
SCHACHTER & ZWERLING.

Ernie Lemoi, Movant, represented by Dan Drachler, ZWERLING
SCHACHTER & ZWERLING.

Stefano D'Agostino, Movant, represented by Dan Drachler, ZWERLING
SCHACHTER & ZWERLING.

James Lessard, Movant, represented by Juli E. Farris --
jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK.

Rebecca Lessard, Movant, represented by Juli E. Farris, KELLER
ROHRBACK.

IPConcept (Luxemburg) S.A., Movant, Pro se.

Medical Opportunities Fund, Movant, represented by Stuart W.
Emmons -- swe@federmanlaw.com -- FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD, pro hac
vice, William B. Federman -- wbf@federmanlaw.com -- FEDERMAN &
SHERWOOD, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, KELLER ROHRBACK.

DAFNA Lifescience, LP, Movant, represented by David R. Stickney --
davids@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro
hac vice, Jonathan D. Uslaner -- jonathanu@blbglaw.com --
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice & Roger M.
Townsend -- rtownsend@bjtlegal.com -- BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND
PLLC.

DAFNA LifeScience Select, LP, Movant, represented by David R.
Stickney, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice,
Jonathan D. Uslaner, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro
hac vice & Roger M. Townsend, BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Darron McGlothin, Plaintiff, represented by Clifford A. Cantor --
cliff.cantor@outlook.com.

DAFNA Lifescience, LP, Plaintiff, represented by Julia E. Johnson
-- julia.johnson@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMANN, pro hac vice & Roger M. Townsend, BRESKIN JOHNSON &
TOWNSEND PLLC.

DAFNA LifeScience Select, LP, Plaintiff, represented by Julia E.
Johnson, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice &
Roger M. Townsend, BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

Michael Li, Plaintiff, represented by David R. Stickney, BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice, Jonathan D. Uslaner,
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice, Julia E.
Johnson, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN, pro hac vice &
Roger M. Townsend, BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

William Ahrens, Consol Plaintiff, Pro se.

Penelope Ahrens, Consol Plaintiff, Pro se.

CTI BioPharma Corp, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Kilduff --
jkilduff@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah
Godesky -- lgodesky@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac
vice, Reuben Goetzl -- rgoetzl@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP,
pro hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin -- rgalin@omm.com -- O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice & Brendan Thomas Mangan --
brendanmangan@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

James A Bianco, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Kilduff,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah Godesky, O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Reuben Goetzl, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro
hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice
& Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Louis A Bianco, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Kilduff,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah Godesky, O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Reuben Goetzl, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro
hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice
& Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Piper Jaffray & Co, Defendant, represented by Erik D. Ruda --
ruda.erik@dorsey.com -- DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice, James K.
Nichols -- nichols.james@dorsey.com -- DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac
vice, Thomas P. Swigert -- swigert.tom@dorsey.com -- DORSEY &
WHITNEY, pro hac vice, Zachary E. Davison, DORSEY & WHITNEY &
Shawn J. Larsen-Bright -- larsen.bright.shawn@dorsey.com -- DORSEY
& WHITNEY.

Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. Inc, Defendant, represented by Erik D.
Ruda, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice, James K. Nichols, DORSEY &
WHITNEY, pro hac vice, Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, DORSEY & WHITNEY,
Thomas P. Swigert, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice & Zachary E.
Davison, DORSEY & WHITNEY.

Roth Capital Partners, LLC, Defendant, represented by Erik D.
Ruda, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice, James K. Nichols, DORSEY &
WHITNEY, pro hac vice, Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, DORSEY & WHITNEY,
Thomas P. Swigert, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice & Zachary E.
Davison, DORSEY & WHITNEY.

National Securities Corporation, Defendant, represented by Erik D.
Ruda, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice, James K. Nichols, DORSEY &
WHITNEY, pro hac vice, Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, DORSEY & WHITNEY,
Thomas P. Swigert, DORSEY & WHITNEY, pro hac vice & Zachary E.
Davison, DORSEY & WHITNEY.

Reed V. Tuckson, Consol Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Kilduff,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah Godesky, O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Reuben Goetzl, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro
hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice
& Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Richard L Love, Consol Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Kilduff,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah Godesky, O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Reuben Goetzl, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro
hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice
& Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Mary O Mundinger, Consol Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
Kilduff, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Leah Godesky,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Reuben Goetzl, O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Ross Bradley Galin, O'MELVENY & MYERS
LLP, pro hac vice & Brendan Thomas Mangan, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE.


DELANO FARMS: Court Approves $6MM "Arredondo" Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order and Judgment granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned SABAS ARREDONDO, JOSE CUEVAS, HILARIO COMEZ, IRMA
LANDEROS, ROSALBA LANDEROS, AND ISIDRO PANIAGUA individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DELANO
FARMS COMPANY, a Washington State Corporation; CAL-PACIFIC FARM
MANAGEMENT, L.P.; T&R BANGI'S AGRICULTURAL SERVICES, INC.; KERN AG
LABOR MANAGEMENT, INC.; ELITE AG LABOR SERVICES, INC.; AND DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:09-cv-01247-MJS
(E.D. Cal.).

The Court held the Fairness and Approval Hearing and Mario
Martinez and Anna Walther appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs.
Leonard Comden and Kelton Lee Gibson appeared on behalf of former
class counsel. Named Plaintiffs Sabas Arredondo, Hilario Gomez,
Irma Landeros, and Rosalba Landeros also were present. William
Hahesy, Sarah Bigelow, and David Bruce appeared on behalf of
Defendant Delano Farms Company. D. Greg Durbin and Laura Wolfe
appeared on behalf of the remaining Defendants.

The Settlement Class is defined as follows:

     Any and all individuals who are or were employed as non-
exempt agricultural employees of Cal-Pacific Farm Management, LP,
T&R Bangi's Agricultural Services, Inc., Kern Ag Labor Management,
Inc., La Vina Contracting, Inc., or Elite Ag Labor Services, Inc.
and performed work at Delano Farms in California between July 17,
2005 and the date of entry of the Order of Certification and
Preliminary Approval who do not opt out, excluding those who
worked only as irrigators, tractor drivers, or swampers or only in
cold storage.  This includes employees, without limitation, who
previously opted out of the previously certified class in the
Arredondo Action. For clarity, the phrase "performed work at
Delano Farms in California" as used in this paragraph does not
include work performed at premises other than Delano Farms, such
as Blanc Vineyards and Red Cedar Vineyards in Paso Robles.

Based on its familiarity with the Arredondo and Paniagua Actions,
the record, the procedural history, the parties and the work of
their counsel, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement was
not the product of collusion and is without any indicia of
unfairness.

There is no evidence of collusion. The proposed settlement follows
both extensive litigation and arm's-length negotiation. The
Arredondo Action was vigorously litigated for seven years before
the Settlement Agreement was reached.

The Settlement Agreement provides for significant cash payments to
Settlement Class Members who choose to submit Claim Forms. No
portion of the $6,000,000 Settlement Amount will revert back to
Defendants.

The Settlement Class is and was at all times adequately
represented by the Representative Plaintiffs and Class Counsel,
including in litigating the Arredondo and Paniagua Actions and in
entering into and implementing the Settlement Agreement, as
required to satisfy Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, and
applicable law. Class Counsel submit that they have fully and
competently prosecuted all causes of action, claims, theories of
liability, and remedies reasonably available to the Settlement
Class Members.

The response of the Settlement Class to the Settlement Agreement -
- including the definition of the Settlement Class, the scope of
the Releases, the amount of the fee request by Current Class
Counsel, and the requested enhancement awards -- after full, fair,
and effective notice thereof strongly favors final approval of the
Settlement Agreement. Out of 36,054 Settlement Class members,
5,815 submitted valid and timely claims, only 222 submitted opt-
out forms (with 179 of those who opted out also submitting
settlement claims) and none objected to the Settlement Agreement.

Based upon the declarations of counsel and the Settlement
Administrator, the Court finds and concludes that:

   a. The First Mailing of the Class Notice was made on May 19,
2017 and the Second Mailing on June 12, 2017. Both mailings were
performed in the form and manner agreed to under the Settlement
Agreement and approved by the Court in the Order of Certification
and Preliminary Approval. Ultimately, 5,239 of the 35,797 Class
Notice packets remained undeliverable.

   b. A toll-free information line began on May 8, 2017, and a
website disseminating the Class Notice was established by the
Settlement Administrator on May 18, 2017. The Settlement
Administrator also placed 545 radio public-service announcements
from June 19, 2017 until July 14, 2017, and placed three
advertisements in English and Spanish language media and/or
publications that serve the Delano, Bakersfield, and Visalia areas
between May 19, 2017 and May 31, 2017.

In addition, a community-outreach administrator selected by Class
Counsel assisted with notifying Settlement Class Members of the
Settlement Agreement, completing and submitting Claim Forms,
answering questions about the Settlement Agreement, and updating
addresses and contact information for Settlement Class Members.
Although not required by the Order of Certification and
Preliminary Approval, the Bangi Defendants also distributed flyers
to current employees with their paychecks, advising them of the
settlement and how to make a claim in text approved by Class
Counsel.

The Class Notice, in the form and manner approved by the Court,
satisfies the requirements of due process, the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and other applicable provisions of law.
Notices Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1715.

Based on the requirements of the Settlement Agreement and the
declarations submitted in support of final approval, the Court
finds that all notices and requirements of the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. Section 1715, have been satisfied.

The payment of attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,500,000 and
$476,289.17 in costs as approved and directed in the Order
Regarding Enhancement Awards and Attorney's Fees and Costs shall
be the sole award of fees and expenses to which Class Counsel or
any other counsel are entitled or may claim with respect to the
Arredondo or Paniagua Actions or the Settlement Agreement, or
Class Counsel's administration of the Settlement Agreement.
Enhancement Awards to Representative Plaintiffs.

In accordance with the Order Regarding Enhancement Awards and
Attorney's Fees and Costs, the Court approves enhancement awards
of $7,000 each to the five Arredondo class representatives and an
award of $2,000 for Mr. Paniagua.

Based upon the declarations of counsel and the Settlement
Administrator, the Court finds that $700,000 has been paid by
Defendants to the Qualified Settlement Fund. Defendants will
deposit the remaining Settlement Amount ($5,300,000) within 30
days of the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, or earlier
at Defendants' option.

The Arredondo Action is dismissed with prejudice, without an award
of attorneys' fees or costs to any party except as provided in
this Final Order and Judgment. In accordance with the Settlement
Agreement, the parties will file in the Paniagua action a
voluntary dismissal with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
and Judgment is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya7t69ukfrom
Leagle.com.

Sabas Arredondo, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball --
aball@ballandYorkelaw.com -- Law Office of Ball & Yorke.
Sabas Arredondo, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Ramirez --
gramirez@ballandyorkelaw.com  --  Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones &
Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero -- jperero@mwgjlaw.com -- Myers,
Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, Jessica Arciniega --
jarciniega@alrb.ca.gov --  Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, Mario
Martinez -- mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho &
Lynch Aplc, William Cooper Callaham -- wcallaham@wilcoxenlaw.com -
- Wilcoxen Callaham, Katherine Winder, Condon & Forsyth LLP,
Marcos Rodrigo Camacho, Marcos Camacho, A. Law Corporation &
Melissa Meeker Harnett, Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Esensten,
L.L.P.

Jose Cuevas, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones &
Feingold, LLP, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder, Condon & Forsyth
LLP.

Hilario Gomez, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Irma Landeros, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Rosalba Landeros, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law
Office of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden &
Casselman, Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc,
William Cooper Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez,
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero,
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Delano Farms Company, Defendant, represented by Ryan Solomon,
Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, Joshua Green Building1425 Fourth
Avenue, Suite 800Seattle, WA 98101-2272, pro hac vice, William C.
Hahesy --  bill@hahesylaw.com -- Law Offices of William C. Hahesy,
Cynthia A. Stross, Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, David
N. Bruce, Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Howard A.
Sagaser, Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, PC, James P. Savitt, Savitt
Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Miles A. Yanick, Savitt Bruce &
Willey LLP, pro hac vice & Sarah Gohmann Bigelow, Savitt Bruce &
Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua Green Building1425 Fourth Avenue,
Suite 800Seattle, WA 98101-2272.

Cal-Pacific Farm Management, L.P., Defendant, represented by D.
Greg Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP, P.O.
Box 28912 5 River Park Place East Fresno, CA 93720-1501 & Laura A.
Wolfe -- Laura.Wolfe@mccormickbarstow.com -- McCormick, Barstow,
Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP.

T & R Bangi's Agricultural Services, Inc., Defendant, represented
by D. Greg Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP
& Laura A. Wolfe, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth
LLP.

Kern Ag Labor Management Inc., Defendant, represented by D. Greg
Durbin, Martin Law Firm.

Elite Ag Labor Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by D. Greg
Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP.

Anderson & Middleton Company, Unknown, represented by William C.
Hahesy, Law Offices of William C. Hahesy.

Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, LLP, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
LLP, Claimant, represented by Leonard Jesse Comden, Wasserman,
Comden, Casselman & Esensten, LLP.

Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, Claimant,
represented by Kelton Lee Gibson -- KGibson@mwgjlaw.com -- Myers,
Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold LLP.


DELANO FARMS: Court Awards $476K in "Arredondo" Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order reducing the Cost Award in the case
captioned SABAS ARREDONDO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DELANO FARMS
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:09-cv-01247-MJS (E.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs.
Plaintiffs filed their motion seeking final approval of the
Settlement Agreement, wherein they requested enhancement awards to
the Representative Plaintiffs.

The Settlement Agreement requires Defendants to pay a total of
$6,000,000.00 into a Qualified Settlement Fund (QSF). The
following amounts are expected to be deducted or set aside from
the QSF prior to any payments on class members' claims:

   Attorney's Fees: $1,500,000
   Attorney's Costs: $$476,289.17
   Enhancement Payments: $37,000
   Taxes: $300,000 (estimated)
   Administration: $185,000 (estimated).

The remaining net settlement fund is estimated to be
$3,501,710.83.  This amount will be distributed to the
approximately 5,656 class members who have submitted claims forms.
Accordingly, the average recovery for each class member is
approximately $619.11.

Four of the representative plaintiffs initially refused to sign
the settlement agreement. Mr. Arredondo, Ms. Irma Landeros, Ms.
Rosalba Landeros, and Mr. Gomez sought enhancement awards of
$50,000 each.

It is recognition of the Arredondo representatives' extra efforts
that the proposed $37,000 award will come up to that one percent
cautionary level mentioned in Ontiveros. It will provide the
Arredondo Plaintiffs with more than ten times that which the
average class member will receive. It will compensate each of the
five Arredondo plaintiffs at a rate of between $20 and $27 per
hour for each hour they spent on behalf of the class; that is no
windfall by any means, but it is reasonable compensation and not
out of proportion with the hourly rate approved for attorney time
Furthermore, doubling the amount the five would take from the
settlement fund as requested would only exacerbate, not lesson,
the likelihood of their being ostracized by co-workers and
employers.

Accordingly, the Court will award $7,000 in enhancement payments
to each of the Arredondo plaintiffs and $2,000 to Mr. Paniagua,
for a total award of $37,000, as preliminarily approved.

Class counsel requests an award of $1,500,000 in attorney's fees.
They also request that any unclaimed funds and any refunded taxes
on those funds be distributed to counsel as fees, so long as such
distribution, when combined with the $1,500,000 fee award, does
not exceed 33% of the settlement fund. Counsel estimates that such
unclaimed funds and associated taxes will not exceed $50,000.

Here, the requested award of $1,500,000 is 25 percent of the
common fund and therefore presumptively reasonable. The results
obtained and amount of work counsel performed on this case support
the benchmark award.  There was never any certainty of recovery in
this case; it, like most contingency fee cases, presented risk
and, further, seems to have required devotion of an unusual
commitment of attorney time and resources in hopes that the risk
would be justified.

Class counsel was genuinely and effectively focused on seeing that
the action did the maximum good for the maximum deserving
claimants and has received an excellent result for the class
despite numerous challenges. The settlement will result in
recovery that individual class members most certainly would not
have obtained on their own. There is every indication that counsel
who negotiated this settlement did so with the objective of
benefiting their clients, the class, first.

There is ample support for an award of 25% of the common fund.

The hourly rates charged are substantially in excess of those
charged by competent attorneys in the Fresno Division.
Nonetheless, the Court can envision no reduction in hours,
downward adjustment of rates, or other modification which would
result in a lodestar less than the requested $1,500,000 in fees.
Assuming the documented 9,381.53 hours of attorney time claimed by
the Martinez and Ball & York firms were reasonably expended, the
$1,500,000 award would result in an average hourly rate for them
of only $160 per hour, before taking into account paralegal time
or estimated hours by Mr. Callaham.

This is lower than competent attorneys in this Division charge for
standard hourly work and certainly provides no extra compensation
for the risk involved in a contingency fee case such as this.
Additionally, former class counsel has submitted a notice of claim
for attorney's fees in relation to the fee allocation dispute.
Without resolving the competing claims or commenting on their
propriety, adding all attorney hours and dividing them into the
$1.5M would result in an average hourly rate of approximately
$100.

The requested fees are well within the range of any reasonable
lodestar calculation. They will be awarded in full.

Based on the analysis in the preceding section, the Court finds
that an award of up to and even exceeding $50,000 in additional
attorney's fees would certainly be reasonable. Such an increase
would be negligible under the percentage of fund method and fully
supported by any reasonable lodestar calculation.

The Court, however, is not prepared at this juncture to approve in
advance payment over to counsel of amounts in excess of $50,000
without knowing how much in excess they may be. Thus, any amount
of unclaimed funds and taxes in excess of $50,000 shall be held in
the Qualified Settlement Fund for distribution by order of the
Court on motion made once the amount thereof is finally
determined.

Plaintiffs request the reimbursement of costs incurred by five law
firms that represented Plaintiffs during the lengthy course of
this action. Each firm's request is addressed in turn.

Martinez, Aguilasocho & Lynch, APLC

The Martinez firm requests reimbursement of $21,977.40 in costs
incurred in relation to this action.  The cost billing submitted
by the Martinez firm is exemplary in its level of detail. There
can be no real question that the requested costs were reasonably
and necessarily incurred in advancing the interest of the class.

Wilcoxen Callaham, LLP

The Wilcoxen firm requests reimbursement of $96,223.87 in costs
incurred in relation to this action. Nearly half of these costs
are attributable to various expert expenses. The remaining costs
are primarily attributable to deposition transcripts (over
$14,000), mediation fees (over $14,000), and minimal travel
expenses ($3,283.97).  In light of this explanation, the costs
attributable to Jay-Allen Eisen Law Group are reasonable, as are
the remainder of the requested costs. The requested amount of
$96,223.87 will be granted in full.

Law Office of Ball & Yorke

The Law Office of Ball & Yorke requests reimbursement of
$96,055.48 in costs incurred in this action.  The Court finds the
amounts requested are reasonable and the request for $96,055.48 in
costs will be granted in full.

Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP

Myers Widders requests $122,808.09 in costs. The firm also was
invited to provide further support for travel-related costs.
Attorneys Gregory J. Ramirez and James E. Perero incurred travel
costs in the amount of $15,044.05. The Court's review of the
nature and extent of the individual costs leads it to conclude
that, although actually incurred, some were incurred at a rate
greater than necessary and with little regard for the needs of the
firm's clients. For example, counsel enjoyed more than one sushi
dinner in excess of $507, as well as dinner at One Market at a
cost of nearly $100 per person.

Meanwhile, the Martinez firm rarely, if ever, incurred costs above
$15 per person for meals for attorneys, witnesses, or class
members during this same period. The Court can hardly justify
reimbursing counsel from the common fund for dinner at One Market
while the representative Plaintiffs are eating at Jack in the Box.
For these reasons, and particularly in light of the nature of the
claims and recovery in this action, the Court finds that a 10%
reduction in the firm's requested travel costs is warranted. Only
$13,539.65 of these costs will be awarded.  In sum, Myers Widders
will be awarded costs in the reduced amount of $100,216.17.

Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, LLP

Wasserman requests $171,299.47 in costs. These travel costs are
far outside the scope of what is recoverable in this action. By
the Court's calculation, the firm expended $15,645.89 on travel
and meals. As stated, $7,039.55 of that figure is attributable to
a single mediation. When compared with the expenditures of the
Martinez firm, it would appear that Wasserman could have reduced
these costs by up to 76 percent.

Moreover, even if the Court was willing to review the firm's
travel expenses line by line, it could not do so. With the
exception of the $7,039.55 in mediation expenses, the firm has not
provided the type of detail that would allow the Court to assess
the reasonableness of these expenses. Based on all of these
factors, the Court concludes that a 50 percent reduction in all
travel expenses is warranted. The firm may recover travel and meal
costs in the amount of $7,822.95

These excessive costs cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of
the firm's cost billing. An additional area of concern is copying
and printings costs which, by the Court's calculation, amount to
$6,641.12 of the firm's request. Only minimal detail is provided
regarding what was copied, and nothing about the number of pages
or the rate per page. Although this case has involved substantial
briefing, investigation, and discovery, the charges nonetheless
appear high. Given the skepticism raised by excessive travel cost
charges and the meager explanation given for copying costs, the
court will reduce them by 25%.

In sum, Wasserman will be awarded costs in the reduced amount of
$161,816.25.

The total cost award in the action will be $476,289.17, to be
awarded as follows:

   Martinez, Aguilasocho & Lynch      $21,977.40
   Ball & York                        $96,055.48
   Wilcoxen Callaham                  $96,223.87
   Myers Widders                     $100,216.17
   Wasserman, Comden & Casselman     $161,816.25

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
and Judgment is available at  http://tinyurl.com/ycrgyu7zfrom
Leagle.com.

Sabas Arredondo, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball --
aball@ballandYorkelaw.com -- Law Office of Ball & Yorke.

Sabas Arredondo, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Ramirez --
gramirez@ballandyorkelaw.com  --  Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones &
Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero -- jperero@mwgjlaw.com -- Myers,
Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, Jessica Arciniega --
jarciniega@alrb.ca.gov -- Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, Mario
Martinez -- mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho &
Lynch Aplc, William Cooper Callaham -- wcallaham@wilcoxenlaw.com -
- Wilcoxen Callaham, Katherine Winder, Condon & Forsyth LLP,
Marcos Rodrigo Camacho, Marcos Camacho, A. Law Corporation &
Melissa Meeker Harnett, Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Esensten,
L.L.P.

Jose Cuevas, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones &
Feingold, LLP, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder, Condon & Forsyth
LLP.

Hilario Gomez, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Irma Landeros, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law Office
of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman,
Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, William Cooper
Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero, Myers, Widders,
Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Rosalba Landeros, Plaintiff, represented by Allen R. Ball, Law
Office of Ball & Yorke, Jessica Arciniega, Wasserman, Comden &
Casselman, Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc,
William Cooper Callaham, Wilcoxen Callaham, Gregory Ramirez,
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP, James Engel Perero,
Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP & Katherine Winder.

Delano Farms Company, Defendant, represented by Ryan Solomon,
Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, Joshua Green Building1425 Fourth
Avenue, Suite 800Seattle, WA 98101-2272, pro hac vice, William C.
Hahesy --  bill@hahesylaw.com -- Law Offices of William C. Hahesy,
Cynthia A. Stross, Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, David
N. Bruce, Savitt Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Howard A.
Sagaser, Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, PC, James P. Savitt, Savitt
Bruce & Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Miles A. Yanick, Savitt Bruce &
Willey LLP, pro hac vice & Sarah Gohmann Bigelow, Savitt Bruce &
Willey LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua Green Building1425 Fourth Avenue,
Suite 800Seattle, WA 98101-2272,
Cal-Pacific Farm Management, L.P., Defendant, represented by D.
Greg Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP, P.O.
Box 28912 5 River Park Place East Fresno, CA 93720-1501 & Laura A.
Wolfe -- Laura.Wolfe@mccormickbarstow.com -- McCormick, Barstow,
Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP.

T & R Bangi's Agricultural Services, Inc., Defendant, represented
by D. Greg Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP
& Laura A. Wolfe, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth
LLP.

Kern Ag Labor Management Inc., Defendant, represented by D. Greg
Durbin, Martin Law Firm.

Elite Ag Labor Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by D. Greg
Durbin, McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth LLP.
Anderson & Middleton Company, Unknown, represented by William C.
Hahesy, Law Offices of William C. Hahesy, Wasserman, Comden &
Casselman, LLP, Wasserman, Comden & Casselman, LLP, Claimant,
represented by Leonard Jesse Comden, Wasserman, Comden, Casselman
& Esensten, LLP, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP,
Claimant, represented by Kelton Lee Gibson -- KGibson@mwgjlaw.com
-- Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold LLP.


DICK SMITH: Faces Second Shareholders' Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Sue Mitchell, writing for Financial Review, reports that Dick
Smith shareholders who bought into the retailer's $520 million
initial public offer almost four years ago may be able to recoup
some of their investment by joining a second class action against
the failed retailer.

Litigation funder ICP is finalising funding for a $200 million
shareholder class action against Dick Smith after spending the
last six months trawling through the company's accounts and
initial public offer documents.

The proposed class action, which is conditional on sufficient
numbers of shareholders joining the suit, could be the second
against Dick Smith in a month.

In September, Bannister Law, backed by British litigation funder
Vannin Capital, filed a class action in the Supreme Court of NSW
against DSHE Holdings and two former senior executives, Nick
Abboud and Michael Potts.

The proceedings were filed on behalf of DSHE shareholders who
bought shares between February 16, 2015, and January 3 2016, when
Dick Smith went into voluntary administration.

Bannister Law has alleged that Dick Smith's financial statements
in 2015 were "misleading and deceptive" and did not give a "true
and fair view" of the company's financial performance.

Alleging misrepresentations

The proposed ICP claim against the company would be open to more
Dick Smith investors because it goes back to the date of the issue
of the prospectus in November 2013.

ICP will allege there were misrepresentations made in the
prospectus as well as in company announcements in subsequent
months.

"People who invested in the prospectus lost over $200 million,"
ICP founder and chief executive John Walker, the former CEO of
litigation funder IMF Bentham, told The Australian Financial
Review this year after seeking court approval to inspect company
records, including directors and officers insurance policies, the
prospectus, and stock and rebate records.

Anchorage Capital Partners bought Dick Smith from Woolworths for
$94 million in September 2012 and floated it on the ASX for $520
million 15 months later. The retailer collapsed in January 2016,
leaving a $260 million shortfall to creditors.


EL AL AIRLINES: Slapped with $40MM Suit Over Cancellation Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Times of Israel reports that the Israel Consumer Council has
filed a class-action lawsuit against El Al airlines, alleging the
national airline illegally charged cancellation fees.

The amount on the claim is $40 million, and the Council estimates
that tens of thousands of passengers have been affected by El Al's
practices, according to a Channel 2 report.

The lawsuit claims that El Al routinely charged passengers to re-
book cancelled flights in violation of Israeli aviation laws.

The claimants allege the airline "failed to fulfill its duty to
its passengers when it issued the airline tickets in flagrant
violation of the law," and that El Al deliberately misled
customers, profiting at their expense.

Joshua Goldschmidt, CEO of the Consumer Council, told Channel 2
the group was "standing up for the rights of the many customers
affected by El Al," and would work towards reaching an
"appropriate" settlement.

The lawsuit, filed at the Lod District Court by attorneys Avner
Cohen and Ido Einat of Cohen Wilchek & Co., applies to passengers
who purchased tickets before July 29, 2013. [GN]


EMPIRE CHINESE: $100K Settlement in "Bolanos" Labor Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GREGORIO BOLANOS, JUAN BOLANOS, ELOY
BOLANOS, and DANEL FRANCISCO RAFAEL, Plaintiffs, v. EMPIRE CHINESE
RESTAURANT NY INC. d/b/a EMPIRE CHINESE RESTAURANT, MIN FE CHEN,
and GUI CHEN, Defendants, Case No. 17 Civ. 1448 (HBP) (S.D. N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the parties' application to
approve their settlement agreement.

The Plaintiffs allege that they worked in the Defendants'
restaurant during varying periods between February 2015 and
February 2017 as cooks and that some of the Plaintiffs also worked
as food preparers or occasional delivery workers.  The action is
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New
York Labor Law for allegedly unpaid overtime premium pay and
spread of hours pay.  They also assert claims based on the
Defendants' alleged failure to provide certain notices as required
by the Labor Law.

The parties reached their proposed settlement before a mediator as
part of the Court's Mediation Program for FLSA cases.  They've
agreed to a total settlement of $100,000.  The amount of unpaid
wages claimed by each of the Plaintiffs and the net amount that
each will receive after deduction for legal fees and costs are as
follows:

          Plaintiff     Net Amount Allocable     Claimed Share
          ---------     --------------------     -------------
      Gregorio Bolanos       $66,500              $30,429.66
        Eloy Bolanos         $39,000              $17,737.93
        Danel Rafael         $25,000              $11,352.27
        Juan Bolanos         $14,500              $6,790.14

           Total            $145,000               $66,310

The settlement agreement also provides that, after deduction of
the counsel's out-of-pocket costs of $540, approximately 33.33% of
the remaining settlement amount will be paid to the Plaintiffs'
counsel as a contingency fee.  Contingency fees of one-third in
FLSA cases are routinely approved in this circuit.  Therefore, the
contingency fee is reasonable.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge
Pitman approved the settlement in the matter.  In light of the
settlement, he dismissed the action with prejudice and without
costs.  The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement.  The Clerk of the Court is respectfully
requested to mark the matter closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/9Ug16R from Leagle.com.

Gregorio Bolanos, Plaintiff, represented by Giustino Cilenti,
Cilenti & Cooper, P.L.L.C..

Juan Bolanos, Plaintiff, represented by Giustino Cilenti, Cilenti
& Cooper, P.L.L.C..

Eloy Bolanos, Plaintiff, represented by Giustino Cilenti, Cilenti
& Cooper, P.L.L.C..

Danel Francisco Rafael, Plaintiff, represented by Giustino
Cilenti, Cilenti & Cooper, P.L.L.C..

Empire Chinese Restaurant NY Inc., Defendant, represented by Wendy
W. Tso, Law Office of Wendy Tso, P.C..

Min Fe Chen, Defendant, represented by Wendy W. Tso, Law Office of
Wendy Tso, P.C.


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Fried" Class Suit Arising From Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERT LOUIS FRIED, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. EQUIFAX, INC., a Georgia corporation, and DOES 1-100,
Case No. 3:17-cv-01955-CAB-KSC (S.D. Cal., September 26, 2017), is
a data breach class action on behalf of some 143 million consumers
whose personal identifying information was taken from Equifax in a
cyberattack that was first publicly announced on September 7,
2017.

Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Equifax is a credit reporting
agency.  Equifax is one of the three largest credit reporting
agencies in the United States, maintaining highly sensitive
personal identifying information for most Americans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William T. Payne, Esq.
          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
          429 Fourth Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1639
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          Facsimile: (412) 281-1007
          E-mail: wpayne@fdpklaw.com
                  jkravec@fdpklaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Protect Class Members' PII, Chenault Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JASMINE CHENAULT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. EQUIFAX, INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-03764-SCJ
(N.D. Ga., September 27, 2017), accuses the Defendant of failing
to protect and safeguard the Plaintiff's and class members'
confidential and personally identifiable information.

Equifax admits to a massive data breach placing the PII of
approximately 143 million Americans at risk of identity thief.

Equifax, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business located in Atlanta, Georgia.  Equifax is a "consumer
reporting agency" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robin Frazer Clark, Esq.
          ROBIN FRAZER CLARK, P.C.
          Centennial Tower, Suite 2300
          101 Marietta Street, NW
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 873-3700
          E-mail: robinclark@gatriallawyers.net


EQUIFAX INC: Sued by Duke Over Failure to Protect Personal Info
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTIAN DUKE and DALE MILLER, Individually, and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. EQUIFAX INC., a Delaware corporation,
Case No. 1:17-cv-03765-LMM (N.D. Ga., September 27, 2017), is
brought on behalf of the roughly 143 million consumers across the
United States harmed by Equifax's alleged failure to protect their
highly sensitive personal information.

Equifax is a Delaware corporation with principal offices in
Atlanta, Georgia.  The Company provides credit information
services to millions of businesses, governmental units, and
consumers across the globe.  Equifax is one of the three major
credit reporting agencies in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John C. Herman, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          Monarch Centre, Suite 1650
          3424 Peachtree Road, N.E.
          Atlanta, GA 30326
          Telephone: (404) 504-6500
          Facsimile: (404) 504-6501
          E-mail: jherman@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Robbins, Esq.
          Kevin A. Seely, Esq.
          Ashley R. Rifkin, Esq.
          Steven M. McKany, Esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com
                  kseely@robbinsarroyo.com
                  arifkin@robbinsarroyo.com
                  smckany@robbinsarroyo.com

               - and -

          Paul J. Geller, Esq.
          Stuart A. Davidson, Esq.
          Mark J. Dearborn, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          Facsimile: (561) 750-3364
          E-mail: pgeller@rgrdlaw.com
                  sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com
                  mdearborn@rgrdlaw.com


FCA US: Faces "Limon" Suit Over Defective Uconnect Infotainment
---------------------------------------------------------------
SALVADOR LIMON, et al. v. FCA US LLC f/k/a CHRYSLER GROUP LLC,
Case No. BC677271 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., September
27, 2017), is a class action for alleged breach of warranty and
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, the Unfair Business Practices Act, the Song-Beverly
Act and breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability against
Chrysler, arising out of its defective Uconnect "infotainment"
system.

Since 2013, Chrysler has issued at least 45 Technical Service
Bulletins ("TSBs") related to the Uconnect, which is installed in
numerous automobiles manufactured by FCA, according to the
complaint.  Chrysler has not only installed the defective Uconnect
system in tens of thousands of vehicles over the past several
years, but it also has falsely advertised the Uconnect system and
subsequently sought to cover its tracks by making materially
misleading and false statements designed to hinder consumers from
uncovering and pursuing action to remedy the defects, the
Plaintiffs allege.

FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrylser Group LLC, is a Delaware
Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in
Michigan.  FCA is an automobile manufacturer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lee A. Cirsch, Esq.
          Michael Akselrud, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, PC
          10866 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 277-5100
          Facsimile: (310) 277-5103
          E-mail: lee.cirsch@lanierlawfirm.com
                  michael.akselrud@lanierlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Bryce B. Bell, Esq.
          BELL LAW, LLC
          2600 Grand Blvd., Suite 580
          Kansas City, MO
          Telephone: (816) 886-8206
          Facsimile: (816) 817-8500
          E-mail: Bryce@BellLawKC.com

               - and -

          A. Scott Waddell, Esq.
          WADDELL LAW FIRM LLC
          2600 Grand Blvd., Suite 580
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 914-5365
          Facsimile: (816) 817-8500
          E-mail: scott@aswlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ryan C. Hudson, Esq.
          REX A. SHARP, P.A.
          5301 W. 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0505
          Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
          E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com
                  rhudson@midwest-law.com


FCA US: Awarded $27.3K in Costs in "Faltermeier" MMPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DAVID FALTERMEIER, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 4:15-cv-00491-DGK (W.D. Mo.), Judge Greg Kays of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western
Division, awarded FCA $27,320.95 in costs.

The Plaintiff alleged that Defendant FCA made misrepresentations
during a vehicle safety recall, causing him and other customers an
ascertainable financial loss.  On March 24, 2017, the Court
granted FCA's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Now before the Court is FCA's Proposed Bill of Costs.  It requests
$30,275.45 in costs.  Faltermeier raises specific objections to
various items in FCA's Proposed Bill of Costs.

Faltermeier objects to $4,266.50 in fees FCA paid for deposition
videos; Faltermeier does not object to fees paid for printed
transcripts.  Judge Kays holds that the class action case was
sufficiently large and complex such that both the printed and
video transcripts were necessarily obtained for use.  FCA may
recover the cost of video depositions.

FCA seeks $1,742.45 in printing costs.  Based on the invoices FCA
submitted, the Judge finds the $1,742.45 printing cost
recoverable.

FCA seeks $87.88 in exemplification costs.  This Circuit has
affirmed awards of costs for copies of exhibits and relevant
documents for use in depositions.  Hence, FCA may recover $87.88.

Faltermeier objects to $1,019.17 in fees FCA incurred renting
conference rooms to take depositions of his experts.  The
conference room rental fee is recoverable.  The costs of shipping
deposition exhibits to these out-of-town sites, shipping filings
to the Court, and producing documents to Faltermeier are likewise
recoverable.

Faltermeier objects to $2,565 in costs synchronizing deposition
video and transcripts and $389.50 for fees FCA incurred shipping
deposition transcripts.  Judge Kays these cost of synchronization
and shipping deposition transcripts are not recoverable.
Lastly, the Plaintiff objects to $4,080 in fees paid to the
Special Master.  After considering the facts in this case,
including the parties' original agreement to share the special
master costs, the Judge says the $4,080 payment to the Special
Master is recoverable.

Accordingly, Judge Kays awarded FCA $27,320.95 in costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/nFlkDt from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey W Schaeperkoetter, Special Master, Pro Se.

David Faltermeier, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher S. Shank
-- chriss@shankmoore.com -- Shank & Moore, LLC, David Lee
Heinemann -- davidh@shankmoore.com -- Shank & Moore, LLC & Stephen
J. Moore -- sjm@shankmoore.com -- Shank & Moore, LLC.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Kathy Ann Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, Scott
Harston Morgan -- smorgan@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn
LLP, Sharon B. Rosenberg -- srosenberg@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson Coburn LLP & Stephen A. D'Aunoy --
sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP.


FRITO-LAY: 'All Natural' Labels Dropped to Settle Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Esq. -- jedelstein@manatt.com -- at Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, in an article for Lexology, wrote that to
settle a class action challenging advertising for chips and dip
products touted as "made with all natural ingredients," Frito-Lay
North America, Inc., has agreed to change its labeling.

The consolidated litigation in New York federal court alleged that
the defendant falsely and deceptively labeled and marketed various
Tostitos, SunChips and Fritos Bean Dip products as "All Natural"
when, in fact, the products were made from unnatural, genetically
modified organisms (GMOs).

After more than five years of litigation -- including discovery
and multiple motions -- the parties reached an agreement. Frito-
Lay dodged payment to the class (although the company is
responsible for $215,000 toward class notice, up to $1.9 million
in counsel fees and representative awards for four named
plaintiffs), instead agreeing to injunctive relief.

Acknowledging that the litigation was an "important factor" in its
decision to modify the labeling and marketing challenged in the
lawsuit, Frito-Lay will refrain from labeling, marketing or
advertising the products at issue as "natural" or "Made With All
Natural Ingredients" unless the Food and Drug Administration
issues express guidance, or federal or state legislation is
enacted authorizing use of a "natural" claim on a product
containing GMO ingredients.

Further, the defendant will not make a non-GMO claim on the
products unless the claim is certified by an independent third-
party certification organization and will modify its website to
direct consumers looking for non-GMO ingredients to the
appropriate products.

In addition, "to protect consumers against the potentially
misleading use of a 'natural' claim on the products for reasons
other than the presence of GMOs in the products," Frito-Lay will
not label the products as "natural" for a period of five years,
unless the ingredients are approved or determined as acceptable
for products identified as "natural" by a federal agency or
controlling regulatory body.

"The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable," according to
the plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their unopposed
motion for final approval of the settlement. "From the outset,
Plaintiffs' main objective in filing the lawsuit was to remedy the
alleged deceptions in Frito-Lay's marketing and labeling of the
Products."

Although the defendant could withstand a monetary judgment, the
plaintiffs told the court the "substantial" injunctive relief
agreed upon provided "significant and valuable benefits to the
Class." Even if the plaintiffs succeeded at trial, "the injunctive
relief obtained is unlikely to be broader than that obtained in
the Settlement and could, in fact, be narrower," they argued.

Requesting final approval of the deal, the plaintiffs told the
court that no objections have been filed to date.

Why it matters: After almost six years of litigation, the parties
reached a deal providing injunctive relief for the class in the
form of "natural" claims being removed from the labeling of the
challenged products. [GN]


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Accused by "Haskins" Suit of Violating ERISA
--------------------------------------------------------------
KRISTI HASKINS, LAURA SCULLY, and DONALD J. JANAK, individually
and as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons in
the General Electric Retirement Savings Plan and the General
Electric Savings and Security Program v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
GENERAL ELECTRIC RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN TRUSTEES, and DOES 1-30,
Case No. 3:17-cv-01960-CAB-BLM (S.D. Cal., September 26, 2017),
alleges that the Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties
and engaged in prohibited transactions and unlawful self-dealing
in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and to
the detriment of the Plaintiffs.

General Electric Company is a New York corporation that operates a
global digital industrial company and, until 2016, operated an
investment management business through GE Asset Management
Incorporated.  GE is the Plan's sponsor and administrator and one
of the Plan's fiduciaries.

The General Electric Retirement Savings Plan Trustees are
fiduciaries of the Plan and were officers of GEAM.  The names,
identities and capacities of the Doe Defendants are presently
unknown to the Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Charles H. Field, Esq.
          Edward D. Chapin, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 577-4253
          Facsimile: (619) 577-4250
          E-mail: cfield@sanfordheisler.com
                  echapin@sanfordheisler.com

               - and -

          Kevin Sharp, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          611 Commerce St., Suite 3100
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 434-7001
          Facsimile: (615) 434-7020
          E-mail: ksharp@sanfordheisler.com

               - and -

          David Sanford, Esq.
          Andrew Miller, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          1666 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 310
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 499-5200
          Facsimile: (202) 499-5199
          E-mail: dsanford@sanfordheisler.com
                  amiller@sanfordheisler.com

               - and -

          David Tracey, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 402-5650
          Facsimile: (646) 402-5651
          E-mail: dtracey@sanfordheisler.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Corvette CA Revs Up in Miami Federal Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Celia Ampel, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that
another auto defect class action with well-known lawyers is
gaining speed in the Southern District of Florida.

Owners of the latest models of the Corvette Z06 are suing General
Motors, alleging the sports car has a design defect that causes
the engine to overheat when the driver hits racing speeds.

"They put a premium on the size to keep it aerodynamic and small
and sleek, when the area in which the engine is housed is
inadequate to give it proper ventilation," said plaintiffs lawyer
Stuart Grossman of Grossman Roth Yaffa Cohen in Coral Gables.

"It's terribly uncomplicated."

General Motors declined to comment on the litigation. The company
is represented by Miami attorney Paul Schwiep, Esq. --
Pschwiep@coffeyburlington.com -- of Coffey Burlington and
Washington lawyers April Ross, Esq. --
aross@crowell.com -- Jared Levine, Esq. -- jlevine@crowell.com --
and Kathleen Sooy, Esq. -- ksooy@crowell.com -- from Crowell &
Moring.

Grossman is working with Seattle attorney Steve Berman of Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro, a heavy hitter who led negotiations with
Toyota in the sudden acceleration litigation that ended in a $1.6
billion settlement.

The pair has a similar case against Ford in Miami federal court
over the Shelby GT350 Mustang, also a sleek luxury car the
plaintiffs allege overheats at high speeds.

Also representing the plaintiffs is Jason Weisser, Esq. --
jweisser@shw-law.com -- of Schuler, Halvorson, Weisser & Zoeller
in West Palm Beach, who owns the Corvette Z06 and said he has
experienced the defect in his car. The allegations cover the 2015,
2016 and 2017 models.

The General Motors case is before U.S. District Judge Darrin
Gayles, who received the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Among other things, the company argues the plaintiffs all bought
their cars from independent dealers.

"Plaintiffs thus cannot allege a duty to disclose because they did
not have, and do not allege, any direct relationship with GM," the
Sept. 25 motion to dismiss argues.

Grossman said the claims involve General Motors dealers who could
not offer a repair or replacement for the plaintiffs' cars.

"Unlike air bag litigation, where there could be numerous factors
involved in that, this whole thing is contained under the GM
umbrella, and that's why there's only one defendant," he said.

"One corporation is responsible for the design, manufacture, sale
and repair of the product."

General Motors argues the plaintiffs may not have been using the
car the way it was intended to be used.

"The Z06 is not a race car, and like any vehicle it has
limitations ... Its performance, especially at top speeds, also
depends heavily on the driver's skill and attention," the motion
to dismiss argues. "The Z06 owner's manual gives detailed
instructions for track driving. There is no allegation that any of
these plaintiffs followed these instructions."

The Southern District of Florida has been home to a number of
high-profile auto defect cases in recent years, including the
Takata air bag litigation, which is now winding down. [GN]


GENERAL MOTORS: Oregon to Get $1.7MM from Ignition Switch Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ted Sickinger, writing for The Oregonian, reports that Oregon will
receive $1.7 million as part of a consumer protection settlement
over faulty General Motors ignition switches, installed in various
car models between 2004 and 2014, that led to hundreds of deaths
and injuries.

Oregon is receiving only a small part of the $120 million, multi-
state settlement because the number of affected vehicles sold here
was relatively small. GM has said there were 64,930 affected
vehicles in Oregon, of which 44,836 have been repaired pursuant to
a recall, according to the Oregon Department of Justice.

The Justice Department will retain the money from the settlement,
which was announced earlier this week. Typically, consumer
settlement funds go to the Justice Department's consumer
protection and education account, while consumer restitution money
goes into a client trust fund. In this case, Attorney General
Ellen Rosenblum will get some discretion, said the agency'
spokewoman, Kristina Edmunson.

In early 2014, GM issued a recall for some 2.6 million Chevrolet
Cobalts, Saturn Ions and other small cars with ignition switches
that could turn to the "off" position while the vehicle was
underway, disabling a car's power steering, power brakes, and the
sensor that controls airbag deployment.

When accidents took place with the ignition in the "off" position,
some vehicles' airbags failed to deploy. The defect left 124
people dead and another 275 injured. GM failed to issue any
recalls until 2014 despite having known about the problem a decade
earlier, according to the lawsuit filed by the state in Multnomah
County Circuit Court.

The settlement with 49 states and the district of Columbia comes
on top of previous penalties and payouts of some $2.5 billion. It
does not resolve a class action suit still underway.

Edmunson said the Justice Department is not aware of any deaths or
injuries related to the defect in Oregon. [GN]


GENERAL NUTRITION: Court Dismisses Suit Over Gold Card Program
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Western District of
Pennsylvania, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DOUG COOK et al., Plaintiffs,
v. GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-
135 (W.D. Penn.).

Defendant, which is one of the world's largest specialty retailers
of health, wellness, and performance products, regularly and
continuously offered paid membership programs for its participant-
customers that were called the Gold Card Program and/or the Member
Price Program.  Defendant's customers paid a $15.00 annual
membership fee to participate in Defendant's Gold Card Program,
through which they received benefits for a period of one year from
the date of payment.

Defendant knew that it was going to terminate the Gold Card
Program at the end of 2016 but continued to sell Gold Card
memberships for the $15.00 annual fee without disclosing the
planned termination or that it would not refund the annual fee.
Defendant continued to sell annual memberships until December 18,
2016, and terminated the Gold Card Program on December 28, 2016.
Despite possessing more than $24,000,000.00 in deferred revenue
from the sale of Gold Card memberships, Defendant refused to honor
the benefits that the Gold Card members had purchased or to refund
the membership fees.

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, asserting claims against
Defendant for breach of contract; unjust enrichment; injunctive
relief; violation of Fla. Stat. Section 501.211(2); violation of
Ca. Civ. Code Section 1750, et seq.; violation of California
Business and Professions Code Section 17500, et seq.; and
violation of California Business and Professions Code Section
17200.

Pending before the Court in this matter is Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and supporting brief
and declaration.

Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim must be
dismissed because it reserved the right to terminate the Gold Card
Program. In support of its argument, Defendant attaches a copy of
the Gold Card Terms and Conditions that governed the Gold Card
Program and were in effect on or around January 2015 until
December 28, 2016. Defendant also attaches a copy of the GNC Gold
Card that was distributed in Pennsylvania, California, and Florida
in 2015 and 2016. Defendant asserts that because the Terms and
Conditions and the physical Gold Card expressly permitted it to
alter or terminate the membership benefits at any time, Plaintiffs
cannot establish a breach of contract.

The Court finds inapposite Plaintiffs' argument that the
contractual terms between the parties are ambiguous because
Defendant expressly promised that the membership would last for
one year, while also reserving the right to alter the benefits or
to discontinue the privileges granted by the card. Despite relying
upon this well-settled principle, Plaintiffs maintain, without
providing any authority, that the Court should annul the language
giving Defendant the discretion to alter the benefits of the Gold
Card Program.

However, in construing the contractual provisions together, it is
clear that the provision granting Defendant the discretion to
alter the program conditions the one-year membership provision.
Thus, the contract affords Defendant the discretion to alter or
terminate the Gold Card Program's benefits, which last for one
year in the absence of Defendant exercising its discretion.
Plaintiffs' argument with respect to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is likewise meritless. Again, without
providing authority, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant "breached
its duty of good faith and acting reasonably when it terminated
the Plaintiffs' rights before the end of their membership periods
and kept all the money. Pursuant to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the law will imply an agreement by the
parties to a contract to do and perform those things that
according to reason and justice they should do.

However, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applies only in the absence of an express provision.  The
contractual provisions at issue here are express, clear, and
unambiguous. Thus, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is inapplicable in this matter.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss as
to Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim.

At Count III of their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a
claim against Defendant for injunctive relief because Defendant
breached its duties to Plaintiffs.

While Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed
because it is designated as a separate claim in their First
Amended Complaint, it must also be dismissed because it is based
upon Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim.

Given that the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract
claim, their claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed as
moot.

Plaintiffs' Unjust Enrichment Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim must be
dismissed because the parties do not dispute the existence of the
contract which governs their relationship. In response, Plaintiffs
contend that they may simultaneously pursue their alternative
claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Under Pennsylvania law, the elements necessary to prove that a
party is entitled to recovery under the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment are: (1) benefits were conferred on one party by
another party; (2) the appreciation of such benefits by the
recipient; and (3) the acceptance and retention of those benefits
under circumstances that are inequitable for the recipient to
retain those benefits without payment of value.

In fact, where an express contract governs the relationship
between the parties, a party's recovery is limited to the amount
provided in the express contract, and where the contract fixes the
value of the services involved, there can be no recovery under a
theory of quantum meruit.

There is an express and enforceable contract between the parties
in this matter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim,
despite being pled in the alternative, must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs' Consumer Protection Claims

Courts applying Pennsylvania law routinely hold that plaintiffs
may not pursue out-of-state consumer protection claims. Plaintiffs
have not identified any fundamental policy of Florida or
California that would be defeated by applying the choice-of-law
provision to preclude the non-Pennsylvania consumer protection
claims. Thus, in accordance with well-settled law providing that a
claim under an out-of-state consumer protection statute may not be
asserted when the parties have contractually agreed that
Pennsylvania law applies to their relationship, Plaintiffs'
consumer protection claims will be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8gjh874
from Leagle.com.

DOUG COOK, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Borkovic --
dab@jgcg.com -- Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace LLP.

DOUG COOK, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Cohen --
dcohen@complexlaw.com -- Complex Law Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

JODY EBERHART, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Borkovic, Jones,
Gregg, Creehan & Gerace LLP & David M. Cohen, Complex Law Group,
LLC, pro hac vice.

BARBARA SWILLEY, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Cohen, Complex
Law Group, LLC & David A. Borkovic, Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace
LLP.

MATTHEW DOVNER, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Cohen, Complex
Law Group, LLC & David A. Borkovic, Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace
LLP.

CODY MAYFIELD, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Cohen, Complex
Law Group, LLC & David A. Borkovic, Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace
LLP.

GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by Jordan
Clark -- jordanclark@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac
vice, Sean M. Sullivan -- seansullivan@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice & Zana Z. Bugaighis --
zanabugaighis.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice.


GLOBAL BROKERAGE: Seeks Dismissal of Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Nikolova, writing for FinanceFeeds, reports that Global
Brokerage Inc (NASDAQ:GLBR) has stepped its efforts to have a
consolidated securities class action brought against it by former
investors dismissed.

The "mega lawsuit" names Global Brokerage, formerly known as FXCM
Inc, and 17 individuals, including directors and senior employees
at the brokerage accounting department, as defendants.  They are
accused of fraud, market manipulation and of filing false
financial statements with regulators.  This is a federal
securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all
persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded FXCM securities, including FXCM 2.25% Convertible Senior
Notes due 2018 and Class A common stock from March 15, 2012 to
February 6, 2017 (the "Class Period").

On October 18, the lawyers for Global Brokerage and the individual
defendants filed another memorandum with the New York Southern
District Court in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint
against them.

In the documents, seen by FinanceFeeds, the defendants replied to
the Plaintiffs who have argued that the nature of the "order flow"
payments agreed between Effex Capital and FXCM was not clear.

The defendants have submitted copies of the March 1, 2010 and the
May 1, 2010 Services Agreements between FXCM and Effex.  According
to the defendants, the Services Agreement was a pay-for-flow
agreement based upon trading volume--not a profit sharing
agreement.  They refer to the March 1, 2010 Services Agreement
explicitly stating that "[Forex Capital Markets, LLC] shall
receive from Effex a fee equal to $21.00 USD per one million units
of Base Currency . . . for the aggregated volume of Transactions
executed via the Trading System."  The May 1, 2010 Services
Agreement is materially the same in every respect, except that
FXCM Holdings, LLC is substituted for Forex Capital Markets, LLC,
the lawyers for the defendants explain.

The lawyers for the defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs'
argumentation can be boiled down to one truism: "Because I said
so."  The defendants claim that the Plaintiffs' Complaint is
"essentially copied from an unadjudicated regulatory complaint and
settlement consent order". Allegations cribbed from unadjudicated,
no-admit no-deny settlements with regulators are not facts, they
argue.

If all paragraphs in the Complaint that refer to or rely upon the
CFTC Order and NFA Complaint are stricken, there would be
virtually no remaining factual allegations, attorneys for the
defendants say.

Underlining their efforts to vigorously defend themselves in this
action, the defendants are now requesting an oral argument on the
motion to strike and dismiss the consolidated securities class
action complaint.

The case is captioned In re Global Brokerage, Inc. f/k/a FXCM Inc.
Securities Litigation (1:17-cv-00916). [GN]


GUILFORD COLLEGE: Faces Title IX Gender Discrimination Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Seaman, writing for Triad Business Journal, reports that a
group of female student athletes and their former coaches have
filed a lawsuit against Guilford College, alleging that the
Greensboro institution has violated a federal law prohibiting
discrimination in education on the basis of a person's sex.

The lawsuit, which was filled in the Middle District of North
Carolina, states that Guilford College and Thomas Palombo, the
men's basketball coach, "discriminates on the basis of sex by,
among other things, providing male students with a greater
opportunity to participate in varsity and club intercollegiate
athletics than it provides to female students and providing
superior treatment and benefits to male athletes than female
athletes."

The lawsuit, in which the plaintiffs are seeking certification to
bring a class action, is filed by 14 women who are either current
or former students at Guilford College and varsity or club
athletes.  The two coaches, Kimberly Cash and Danny Cash, were
head coaches of women's track and field and cross country teams.
The lawsuit was filed on Oct. 16.

The lawsuit alleges Guilford College violated the federal Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 and its regulations by
providing "superior treatment and benefits" to male athletes in
several areas, including the provision of equipment and supplies;
scheduling of games and practice times; coaching and academic
tutoring; assignment and compensation of coaches; provision of
medical and training facilities; funding and fundraising
opportunities; recruiting and publicity.

Guilford College said in a statement on Oct. 18 that it has "just
received word of the lawsuit," and that "though we believe the
lawyer is misinformed regarding many of the facts, we recognize
and obviously respect the need to let the court process work."

"At Guilford, equality is one of the long-held core values to
which we hold ourselves accountable. To that end, we
enthusiastically support and celebrate the achievements of all
Guilford College student-athletes.  Success in our athletics
programs isn't reduced to the number of wins and losses, but
rather includes and emphasizes character development and the
rigorous pursuit of academic excellence," said Guilford College
President Jane K. Fernandes.

The lawsuit alleges that Guilford College and Palombo
discriminated against the two coaches "because of the sex of the
student athletes," and that Kimberly Cash was also discriminated
against because of her sex. The school allegedly did this by not
providing them with the personnel and resources needed to
"properly run" the track and field program, along with creating a
hostile work environment, the filing states.

While holding the coaching role, Palombo also served as the
college's athletic director from 2007 until September.  The
college transitioned to a full-time athletics director last month,
naming Nelson E. Bobb, the former athletics director at UNC-
Greensboro, as interim director.

The plaintiffs are represented by Felice Duffy of Duffy Law in New
Haven, Conn. and Robert Ekstrand of Ekstrand & Ekstrand LLP in
Durham. [GN]


HENRY SCHEIN: TCPA Suit Stayed Pending Resolution in "Nomax"
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants'
motion to stay the case captioned BPP, Plaintiff, v. HENRY SCHEIN
PRACTICE SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-
01370-JAR (E.D. Mo.).

BPP filed a class action complaint alleging that the Defendants
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") by faxing
unsolicited fax advertisements without a proper opt-out notice as
required by 47 C.F.R. Section 1200.

In the motion to stay, the Defendants request that the action be
stayed pending a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax, Inc.  They argue that
resolution of Nomax could significantly curtail or extinguish
altogether the Plaintiff's claims because the standing question
presented in Nomax is identical to the standing issue presented in
the case.  The Defendants argue that a stay would preserve
judicial and party resources and would not prejudice BPP because
the case is in its infancy, discovery has not yet commenced, and
the trial date is approximately 16 months away.

On the other hand, the Defendants contend that denial of a stay
will prejudice all parties because they would incur significant
expense in discovery only to later find out that Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue the case.  In addition, they point to the
decisions issued by the Court staying TCPA cases until final
rulings are issued by the FCC or decisions made by higher courts
on potentially case-dispositive issues.

BPP opposes a stay on the grounds that the decision made by the
Court in Nomax is an outlier in the law and that a rapidly growing
number of federal courts nationwide have been rejecting
Defendants' motions challenging Article III standing in TCPA
cases.  It further contends that the parties have already expended
significant judicial and party resources due to failed attempts at
early mediation, and that the Defendants failed to articulate a
good excuse for not seeking a stay in a more timely fashion.
Finally, BPP claims it will be prejudiced by a stay due to the
risk of lost evidence.

In light of the Eighth Circuit's pending decision in Nomax, and in
the interest of reaching consistent results in similar TCPA cases,
Judge Ross granted the Defendants' motion to stay the case.  He is
not persuaded that the Plaintiff will be unduly prejudiced by such
a stay, as the case is in the early stages of litigation.
Furthermore, he believes that a stay will preserve the resources
of the parties, as well as the Court, which weighs in favor of a
stay.  The case is stayed until a decision is made by the Eight
Circuit Court of Appeals in Nomax.

Every 90 days from the date of the Order, the Judge ordered the
Defendants to advise the Court of the status of the Nomax case.
He held in abeyance the Plaintiff's motions to strike, pending
further Orders of the Court.  The Clerk of Court is directed to
administratively close the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/hYPJyj from Leagle.com.

BPP, Plaintiff, represented by Philip M. Horwitz.

BPP, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Schultz, SCHULTZ AND
ASSOCIATES, L.L.P. & Ronald J. Eisenberg -- reisenberg@sl-
lawyers.com -- SCHULTZ AND ASSOCIATES, L.L.P..

Intergrated Media Solutions, Defendant, represented by Matthew D.
Guletz -- mguletz@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP &
Joseph M. Kellmeyer -- jkellmeyer@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON
COBURN, LLP.

Henry Schein Practice Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Timothy Charles Sansone, SANDBERG PHOENIX, P.C. & Katrina
Smeltzer, SANDBERG PHOENIX, P.C.


HERTZ CORP: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Bradley"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned EMMA BRADLEY and DAN ROEHRS, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 3:15-CV-
00652-NJR-RJD (S.D. Ill.).

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended Class Action Complaint filed by Defendant The Hertz
Corporation.

Bradley claims that she rented a vehicle from Hertz at Lambert-St.
Louis International airport for personal, family, or household
purposes at various times in 2010 and that Hertz charged her an
Energy Surcharge and Licensing Fee in connection with those
rentals.  Bradley seeks to represent a class of persons, as well
as a subclass of members of the Hertz Gold Program, who rented a
motor vehicle from Hertz in the State of Missouri for personal,
family, or household purposes and paid a so-called Energy
Surcharge and/or fee for Licensing Fee based on that rental.

It is true that, under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act
("MMPA"), a consumer's reliance on the misrepresentation is not
required. The Court recognizes, however, the difference between
reliance" and causation. Liability under the MMPA requires a
showing that plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss "as a result
of" the alleged deceptive practice. In other words, Hertz could
not have deceived Bradley and caused her a loss if she never saw
the alleged misrepresentation in the first place.

As an initial matter, the Court notes it previously found that
Bradley alleged she was exposed to all of these misrepresentations
while visiting Hertz's website to reserve a rental car.
Nevertheless, in reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Court
finds that Bradley alleges she used Hertz's website to rent a
vehicle from Hertz at various times in 2010 and that in connection
with those rentals she was required to pay an Energy Surcharge and
Licensing Fee as a condition of renting the car.

Further, she alleges that Hertz requires a customer to input her
location, car selection, and other information in order to
calculate a total fee. Along with the total fee, Hertz presents
the customer (Bradley) with a breakdown of the fees, which
includes the alleged deceptive and unfair Energy Surcharge and
License Fee. By clicking on the next to these terms, a customer
(Bradley) is then presented with descriptions of these terms.
Bradley alleges these descriptions are deceptive and unfair and,
thus, caused her substantial injury. When liberally construing the
Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds Bradley has sufficiently
stated a claim for a violation of the MMPA in Counts V and VI.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant The Hertz Corporation is
denied. This case shall proceed on Counts V and VI.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7zdc7ca
from Leagle.com.

Dawn Cooks, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning
Law Firm. 555 Washington Ave, #600A St. Louis, MO 63101

Dawn Cooks, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Jr.,
Bruning Law Firm, Kevin P. Green -- kevinghalaw.com -- Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg -- mark@ghalaw.com --
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld --
info@cornfeldlegal.com -- Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld,
Thomas P. Rosenfeld -- tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, David G. Bender -- DBENDER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM
-- Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al., Jessica C. Gittemeier --
JGITTEMEIER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -- Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et
al. & Richard S. Bender -- RBENDER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -
Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al..

Emma Bradley, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning,
Bruning Law Firm, Anthony S. Bruning, Jr., Bruning Law Firm, Kevin
P. Green, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office
of Richard S. Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, David G. Bender, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al.,
Jessica C. Gittemeier, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al. & Richard S.
Bender, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al.

Gayla Fennoy, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green, Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg, Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S.
Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC &
Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning Law Firm.

Christopher March, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green,
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg, Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard
S. Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC
& Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning Law Firm.

Dan Roehrs, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning
Law Firm & Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld.

The Hertz Corporation, Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Lichtman -- alichtman@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Daniel J.
Weiss -- dweiss@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Jacob D.
Alderdice -- jalderdice@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, John F.
Ward, Jr. -- jward@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Ross B.
Bricker -- rbricker@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP & William D.
Heinz -- wheinz@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP.


HERTZ CORP: Court Dismisses Gold Member's Claims in "Bradley"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Compel Arbitration as to Plaintiff Dan Roehrs in the case
captioned EMMA BRADLEY and DAN ROEHRS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE HERTZ
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 3:15-CV-00652-NJR-RJD (S.D.
Ill.).

The Second Amended Complaint alleges Hertz engaged in deceptive or
unfair practices with respect to two fees, the Vehicle Licensing
Recovery Fee (VLRF) and Energy Surcharge, charged in connection
with car rentals in Illinois, Missouri, California, Georgia,
Michigan, and California. Plaintiffs allege Hertz "deceptively
represents that it imposes these fees to reimburse it for certain
costs, but the fees are unrelated to those costs, greatly exceed
them, and, therefore, are designed to provide it with increased
profit, not cost reimbursement."

Specifically, Plaintiff Bradley alleges she rented cars from Hertz
in Missouri and paid a VLRF and Energy Surcharge. Bradley brings
two claims against Hertz under the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (MMPA). Plaintiff Roehrs is a member of Hertz's Gold
Plus Rewards Program (Gold Program) who rented cars from Hertz in
Illinois, California, Georgia, Colorado, and Michigan Roehrs
alleges he paid one or both fees in connection with those rentals
and asserts claims under the consumer protection statutes in each
of those states.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court must look to the four corners of
the December 29, 2015 contract to determine whether the parties
intended to require arbitration for all disputes arising between
the parties, even those arising from previous contracts.

Defendants argue that Cindy's Candle Co., Inc., is inapposite
because, in that case, there was no clause delegating issues
regarding the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration
agreement to the arbitrator.  Here, however, the parties
specifically agreed that all issues are for the arbitrator to
decide, including his or her own jurisdiction, and any objections
with respect to the existence, scope or validity of this
Arbitration Provision.

The Court agrees with Defendants. When Roehrs signed the first
contract, he agreed to be bound to the arbitration provision,
which provides that it covers any disputes and "any claims
relating to any aspect of the relationship or communications
between us." The scope of that provision, per the delegation
clause, is for the arbitrator to decide.

For these reasons, the Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by
Defendant The Hertz Corporation is granted.  Plaintiff Dan
Roehrs's claims are dismissed without prejudice pending
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7z7fz59
from Leagle.com.

Dawn Cooks, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning
Law Firm. 555 Washington Ave, #600A St. Louis, MO 63101

Dawn Cooks, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Jr.,
Bruning Law Firm, Kevin P. Green -- kevinghalaw.com -- Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg -- mark@ghalaw.com --
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld --
info@cornfeldlegal.com -- Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld,
Thomas P. Rosenfeld -- tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, David G. Bender -- DBENDER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM
-Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al., Jessica C. Gittemeier --
JGITTEMEIER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -- Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et
al. & Richard S. Bender -- RBENDER@ROSENBLUMGOLDENHERSH.COM -
Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al..

Emma Bradley, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning,
Bruning Law Firm, Anthony S. Bruning, Jr., Bruning Law Firm, Kevin
P. Green, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office
of Richard S. Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, David G. Bender, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al.,
Jessica C. Gittemeier, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al. & Richard S.
Bender, Rosenblum, Goldenhersh et al..

Gayla Fennoy, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green, Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg, Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S.
Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC &
Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning Law Firm.

Christopher March, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin P. Green,
Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC, Mark C. Goldenberg, Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard
S. Cornfeld, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC
& Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning Law Firm.

Dan Roehrs, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony S. Bruning, Bruning
Law Firm & Richard S. Cornfeld, Law Office of Richard S. Cornfeld.

The Hertz Corporation, Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Lichtman -- alichtman@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Daniel J.
Weiss -- dweiss@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Jacob D.
Alderdice -- jalderdice@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, John F.
Ward, Jr. -- jward@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP, Ross B.
Bricker -- rbricker@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP & William D.
Heinz -- wheinz@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, LLP.


INVECOR LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Noel L. Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
in the case captioned SPARKLE HILL, INC., individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons,
Plaintiff, v. Invecor, LLC, doing business as AMB Business Supply,
Defendant, Civil No. 13-4172 (NLH/AMD) (D. N.J.).

On Jan. 24, 2007, the Plaintiff, a dry-cleaning store, received an
unsolicited telephone facsimile on its fax machine from the
Defendant, which was in the business of selling cash register and
office supplies.  The fax was an advertisement selling paper rolls
for cash register and credit card machines.  The Defendant had
engaged Business to Business Solutions ("B2B"), which sold fax
blasting services, to send out faxes to advertise its business.

B2B gathered a list of targets from a database purchased from
InfoUSA, and after payment from the Defendant and the Defendant's
approval of the content of the fax, B2B successfully faxed 34,668
faxes to 28,836 different fax numbers.  The fax did not contain
the proper out-opt information, and the Plaintiff claims that it,
as well as the 28,835 other recipients, did not consent to
receiving the fax.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against the
Defendant for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").  On Feb. 25, 2016, the Court granted the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification, which was unopposed by the
Defendant.
The Court approved the class of all persons with whom Invecor did
not have an established business relationship, who were
successfully sent one or more unsolicited faxes during the period
Dec. 10, 2006, through Jan. 24, 2007, stating, Credit Card & Cash
Register Paper Rolls or Cash Register & Credit Card Receipt Paper
Rolls and AMB Business Supply 1161 Rankin Dr Troy MI 48083 Toll
Free: 800-399-4030.

The Plaintiff, through a claims administrator, mailed the Court-
approved notice to the class members -- i.e., owners of 28,836 fax
numbers that were sent the Defendant's fax.  The Plaintiff has now
moved for summary judgment in the class' favor in the amount of
$17,334,000, which is $500 in statutory damages for each time the
Defendant's unsolicited fax advertisement was successfully sent to
a class member's fax machine.  The Defendant has opposed
Plaintiff's motion.

Without dispute, Judge Hillman concludes that the fax at issue
advertised the Defendant's services, the Defendant designed the
fax, and the Defendant hired B2B to fax its advertisement.  Simply
arguing that it did not provide B2B with the fax numbers to which
B2B sent the fax does not absolve the Defendant from liability
under the TCPA.

As to the named Plaintiff, the Defendant has not provided any
evidence to refute that Plaintiff did not consent to the fax.
Thus, because its fax to the Plaintiff fails to meet the
exceptions to liability under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(C), the
Plaintiff has established the Defendant's liability for its
individual claim.  The same can be said for any member of the
class who is similarly situated -- i.e. any non-consenting member
of the class who received a fax from the Defendant's agent.

In sum, Judge Hillman finds that none of the transmitted faxes
satisfied the statute and accompanying regulations and therefore
each violated the TCPA.  Consequently, the certified class is
entitled to judgment in its favor for each advertisement faxed
that failed to contain the proper opt-out notice to each class
member.

For the reasons expressed, the Judge granted the Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on its class action complaint that the
Defendant violated the TCPA.  Within 15 days of the date of his
Opinion and accompanying Order, Judge Hillman directed the
Plaintiff to (i) inform the Court on the status of its state law
claims, (ii) provide documentation to demonstrate class member
opt-out notices, if any; and (iii) provide a proposed form of
judgment as to the TCPA claims, along with a justification for its
request for statutory damages for each violation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Blyxa2 from Leagle.com.

SPARKLE HILL, INC., Plaintiff, represented by JAMES C. SHAH,
SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP.

Invecor, LLC, Defendant, represented by JOHN H. KING --
kbothwell@tbblawfirm.com -- THOMPSON, BECKER & BOTHWELL, LLC.


J. JILL INC: Arons & Arons Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of those who
purchased or otherwise acquired shares of J.Jill, Inc. (NYSE:
JILL) traceable to the Company's March 9th, 2017 initial public
offering.

J.Jill Investors are encouraged to contact Jeffrey S. Arons, Esq.
of Arons & Arons, LLC at (973) 762-0795 or (877) 512-7667, or by
email at info@aronslaw.net. For more information:
http://www.aronslaw.net/securities-fraud

Arons and Arons, LLC. is reaching out to all shareholders who are
interested in serving as a lead plaintiff in this class action. A
lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts on behalf of
other class members in directing the litigation. Any member of the
class may move to the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through
counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an
inactive class member. No class has yet been certified in the
above action. Arons & Arons, LLC. has not filed the complaint in
this matter.

If you are a member of the class, you may no later than December
12th, 2017 to move to serve as lead plaintiff of the class, if you
so choose.

According to the complaint, the Company's Registration Statement
was negligently prepared and as a result contained untrue
statements of material fact, omitted material facts necessary to
make the statements contained therein and failed to make adequate
disclosures required under the rules and regulations.

On October 12, 2017, J.Jill common stock closed at $4.86 per
share, more than 62% below its offering price just seven months
after the IPO.

Arons & Arons, LLC is a family oriented law firm that provides
representation for investors who have been victimized by
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relentless in our efforts to hold corporate wrongdoers accountable
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Investors are encouraged to contact Jeffrey S. Arons, Esq. --
ja@aronslaw.net -- at Arons & Arons, LLC (Jeffrey Arons, Esq.) at
(973) 762-0795 or (877) 512-7667, or info@aronslaw.net

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under applicable laws and ethical rules.


KIMBERLY-CLARK: 9th Cir. Revives Flushable Wipes Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The Reporter, reports that a
dismissed class action over flushable wipes is alive again after a
federal appeals court ruled in a matter of first impression that
the plaintiff had standing to pursue injunctive relief in federal
court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found on October
20 that Jennifer Davidson, a consumer of Scott Natural Flushable
Moist Wipes, could sue in federal court to force Kimberly-Clark to
stop stating that the wipes are flushable. The ruling, which
reversed dismissal of the case, resolved a split on the issue in
district courts in California, where many consumer statutes
include injunctive relief.

"Today, we hold that California consumers who can seek in
California state court an order requiring the manufacturer of an
allegedly falsely advertised product to cease the false
advertising may also seek such an order in federal court," Mary
Murguia wrote, calling it the "most challenging issue in this
case." "Today, we resolve this district court split in favor of
plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief."

The panel also revived the case on the ground that Davidson had
made sufficient claims to establish false advertising under
California law.

Davidson's attorney, Matt McCrary of San Francisco's Gutride
Safier, wrote in an emailed statement: "We are very pleased that
the Ninth Circuit revived all the claims against Kimberly Clark
regarding its 'flushable' wipes. The court correctly concluded
that under California's consumer laws and the U.S. Constitution, a
victim of false advertising can sue in federal court to stop
deceptive and unlawful business practices."

A Kimberly-Clark Corp. representative declined to comment.
Constantine Trela, head of the Supreme Court and Appellate
Practice Group in Chicago at Sidley Austin, who represented
Kimberly-Clark, did not respond to a request for comment.

Several class actions nationwide have been brought over flushable
wipes not being flushable. One manufacturer, Nice-Pak Products
Inc., agreed to stop advertising its wipes as flushable under a
deal with the Federal Trade Commission. In 2015, U.S. District
Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York addressed
a similar issue on standing for injunctive relief, siding with the
plaintiff for many of the same reasons that the Ninth Circuit did
on October 20.

Davidson originally brought her class action in 2014 in San
Francisco Superior Court on behalf of California consumers who
purchased four brands of flushable wipes: Scott, Huggies, Kotex
and Cottonelle. She alleged the wipes weren't flushable because
they didn't disperse in the toilet water right away and, as a
result, could clog household pipes or damage sewer systems. She
claims she would not have purchased the wipes, which are sold at
premium prices, if she had known they weren't flushable.

Kimberly-Clark removed the case, which Phyllis Hamilton, chief
judge of the Northern District of California, dismissed in 2014.
Among other things, Hamilton found that Davidson hadn't
sufficiently alleged that the term "flushable" was false, nor was
she injured. Davidson also lacked Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief, Hamilton found, because she had no intention of
buying the product again.

But the panel found that although the wipes didn't wreak havoc on
Davidson's plumbing, she cited news stories and complaints about
flushable wipes doing just that. And her economic injuries were
sufficient harm for Davidson to pursue false-advertising claims.

In finding Davidson had standing for injunctive relief, the panel
acknowledged that federal judges in California had ruled
otherwise, such as a 2015 decision by U.S. District Judge James
Donato in the Northern District of California, who ended up
remanding the injunctive relief claims in a flushable wipes case
against Procter & Gamble to San Francisco Superior Court.

The panel found that consumers still have standing to pursue label
changes, even if they already know the advertising was false.

Holding otherwise, Murguia wrote, would allow defendants to remove
cases involving injunctive relief to federal court, and
"California's consumer protection laws would be effectively
gutted." [GN]


LAMRITE WEST: Ohio App. Affirms Judgment on Pleadings in "Martin"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County,
issued an Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court
granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the
case captioned BARBARA MARTIN, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
LAMRITE WEST, INC., Defendant-Appellee, No. 105395 (Ohio App.).

Plaintiffs-appellants, Barbara Martin and Erin Bovee appeal from
the order of the common pleas court granting judgment on the
pleadings in favor of defendant-appellee, Lamrite West, Inc.
d.b.a. Pat Catan's (Pat Catan's).

In Martin v. Lamrite West, Inc., 2015-Ohio-3585, 41 N.E.3d 850
(8th Dist.) (Martin I), the Ohio App. reversed the trial court's
summary judgment ruling on Martin and Bovee's Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act (CSPA) deceptive advertising claim.  The Ohio App.
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Martin and Bovee's unjust
enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract claims.

In Martin I, Martin and Bovee brought the action against Pat
Catan's, alleging that Pat Catan's deceptively advertises savings.
Bovee alleged that she purchased supplies from Pat Catan's on the
basis of advertising that she could Save 40% or more ON THOUSANDS
OF ITEMS EVERY DAY!; Martin alleged that she purchased picture
framing services that had been advertised by Pat Catan's as 50%
Off Your CUSTOM FRAMING Order EVERY DAY.  The appellants alleged
that the advertised percentage off its everyday prices was
illusory because Pat Catan's always sells those items for that
discount -- in other words, the advertised item is always the same
percentage off, every day, such that the claimed savings are non-
existent.

In Martin I, the Ohio App. also found that there was nothing in
Pat Catan's out-of-store advertisements that indicated that the
sales price referenced a reduction on prices offered by other
retailers or a reduction from the manufacturer's suggested retail
price, as Pat Catan's contends.  The Ohio App. held that
regardless of whether the advertisements promoted illusory savings
(as appellants claim) or were intended as a comparison of a
competitor's price or the manufacturer's suggested price (as Pat
Catan's contends), reasonable minds could find the relevant
advertisements to be deceptive under R.C. 1345.02(B)(8) and Ohio
Adm.Code 109:4-3-12 because the advertised discounts did not
specifically reference the prices to which the discounts applied.
Accordingly, the Ohio App. found that summary judgment on Martin
and Bovee's CSPA claim was improper.

Following the remand in Martin I, the trial court set a case
management schedule for certification of Martin and Bovee's class
claim.  A few months later, Pat Catan's moved for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that appellants' CSPA claim could not survive
as a class action claim because they did not adequately plead, nor
could they ultimately establish, that they suffered actual damages
as a result of the allegedly deceptive act and that Pat Catan's
had prior notice that its conduct was deceptive and
unconscionable, both required elements to maintain a CSPA class
action claim under R.C. 1345.09.  The trial court granted Pat
Catan's motion, finding that "[Martin and Bovee] failed to allege
actual damages as a result of the allegedly deceptive act as
required for class claims under the Ohio CSPA."

It is from this order that Martin and Bovee now appeal, raising a
single assignment of error for review: The trial court erred in
granting Pat Catan's motion for judgment on the pleadings on
Martin and Bovee's class CSPA claim.

Under R.C. 1345.05, the Ohio Attorney General has the authority to
adopt rules "defining with reasonable specificity the acts or
practices that violate the CSPA."  In Martin I, the Ohio App.
considered Pat Catan's advertisements under one of these rules
promulgated by the Attorney General, Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-12.
The Ohio App. found that reasonable minds could find the
advertising in question deceptive as defined by the Attorney
General in Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-12.  Therefore, the Ohio App.
finds that this rule constituted prior notice to Pat Catan's that
its advertising, in which Pat Catan's purports to compare its
prices to that of competitors and the manufacturer's suggested
price without stating so specifically, was deceptive and
unconscionable.

The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 1345.09(B) to require
that plaintiffs bringing CSPA class-action suits must allege and
prove that actual damages were proximately caused by the
defendant's conduct.

Here, Martin and Bovee claim they were damaged because they did
not receive the price reductions advertised by Pat Catan's, and
therefore, did not receive the value that they expected" and they
have incurred damages in the amount of that fake discount.

The Ohio App. rejected Martin and Bovee's contention that they are
entitled to a partial refund or reduction of the purchase price
based upon the amount of the advertised discounts in Martin I.

In addressing the trial court's dismissal of Martin and Bovee's
unjust enrichment claim, the Ohio App. found disagreement as to
whether Pat Catan's committed a violation of the CSPA is not the
same as saying that Pat Catan's was unjustly enriched. Regardless
of the nature of the discounts, both Martin and Bovee received the
benefit of what they paid for in an arm's-length transaction, so
they cannot recover on the basis that it would be unjust to allow
Pat Catan's to retain the purchase price.

Martin and Bovee also assert that their class claim should stand
because restitution is appropriate in this case and available as a
class-wide remedy under R.C. 1345.09(B).  The Ohio App. found in
Martin I that Martin and Bovee had not shown that Pat Catan's was
unjustly enriched by sales related to their advertising in
question.  Restitution is appropriate only where there has been a
showing of unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, Martin and Bovee's
argument that they are entitled to restitution fails as a matter
of law.

A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s October 12, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ydc8wddkfrom
Leagle.com.

Nicole T. Fiorell -- nfiorelli@dworkenlaw.com Patrick J. Perotti -
- pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., 60
South Park Place, Painesville, Ohio 44077, Attorneys for
Appellants.

Daniel M. Blouin, Kristine R. Argentine, Seyfarth Shaw L.L.P., 233
S. Wacker Drive -- Suite 8000, Chicago, Illinois 60606, Anthony M.
Catanzarite -- acatanzarite@reminger.com -- Brian Sullivan --
bsullivan@reminger.com -- Reminger Co., L.P.A., 1400 Midland
Building, 101 Prospect Avenue, West, Cleveland, Ohio 44115,
Attorneys for Appellee.


LOANLEADERS: Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Los Angeles employment law lawyers at Blumenthal, Nordrehaug &
Bhowmik filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Loanleaders of
America, Inc., allegedly failed to provide their California
employees with meal and rest periods in accordance with the
California Labor Code. Loanleaders of America, Inc., operates as a
residential mortgage loan finance company with extensive
experience in FHA, VA, Conforming and Jumbo home loans.  The
Loanleaders of America, Inc. lawsuit, Case No. 30-2017-00948611-
CU-OE-CXC is currently pending in the Orange County Superior Court
for the State of California.

According to the class action complaint the company allegedly
failed to provide all the legally required off-duty meal breaks to
their employees as required by the applicable Wage Order and Labor
Code.  The Complaint seeks penalties relating to alleged missed
meal breaks because allegedly Loan Leaders of America, Inc., did
not have a policy to provide their employees with thirty (30)
minute uninterrupted meal breaks prior to their fifth (5th) hour
of work.

Furthermore, the complaint directly states, "In addition, because
of Defendant's commission pay plan described herein, Defendant
failed to compensate Plaintiff and California Class Members for
their rest periods as required by the applicable Wage Order and
Labor Code.  Defendant did not have a policy or practice which
paid for off-duty rest periods to Plaintiff and the other
California Class Members."

If you think your company is violating the California Labor Code
and would like to know if you qualify to make a claim, please
contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw by calling (800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik is an employment law firm with
offices located in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento, Los
Angeles, Riverside and Chicago that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, investors and consumers fight back against
unfair business practices, including violations of the Labor Code
and Fair Labor Standards Act.  [GN]


LOUISIANA: Class Action Over Public Defense System Can Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Daley, writing for NOLA.com, reports that an East Baton Rouge
judge has allowed a class-action lawsuit challenging the
constitutional effectiveness of Louisiana's public defense system
to move forward.

Judge Todd Hernandez of the 19th Judicial District Court denied a
state motion to dismiss the suit, which names Gov. John Bel
Edwards, Chief Public Defender Jay Dixon and all members of the
Louisiana Public Defender Board as defendants.  Judge Hernandez
made his ruling Oct. 11.

The lawsuit was filed Feb. 13 by a group of 13 inmates who allege
their constitutional rights to counsel were denied because of an
insufficiently funded and staffed public defense system.  The suit
was filed on their behalf by attorneys from the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and
the law firms Jones Walker of New Orleans, and Davis Polk &
Wardwell of New York.

"Louisiana's broken public defender system has created a two-
tiered justice system -- one for those with the money for
meaningful representation, and another for the poor that simply
churns them through the system without the meaningful defense
required by the Constitution," said Lisa Graybill, the SPLC's
deputy legal director.  "We are grateful for the judge's ruling,
which will allow us to continue working to ensure that all
Louisianans, regardless of income, have adequate legal
representation."

The class-action suit filed in Baton Rouge seeks an injunction
against a public defenders system that it says fails to provide
constitutionally adequate representation.

Louisiana is the only state in the country that relies primarily
on traffic ticket revenue, court fees and fines to fund public
defense services.  While the lawsuit does not directly seek for
that system to be scrapped, it asks for a court order to prevent
state officials from "maintaining a public defense system where
the traditional markers of effective representation are absent or
significantly compromised."

The lawsuit also seeks certification from the court for a class
action "for all persons who are indigent and facing criminal
charges in Louisiana for non-capital offenses punishable by
imprisonment."  It asks for a declaration that the plaintiffs and
the class have been denied their constitutional rights to counsel
and equal protection.


Hernandez has scheduled a hearing to address class certification
on Feb. 23, 2018.

The lawsuit filed Feb. 6 asks a state court to declare Louisiana's
public defenders system 'significantly compromised' and appoint a
monitor to oversee changes.

The suit also asks the court to appoint a monitor to supervise the
state's public defense network until it is determined that state
officials have "implemented a system that provides effective
representation for the poor statewide and dismantled the
structural barriers to effective representation which exist in
Louisiana."

The lawsuit says each of the plaintiffs is indigent and facing the
possibility of years or decades in prison if found guilty of the
allegations against them.  They all have had public defenders
appointed for their cases, but the suit says that representation
"fails to meet minimum constitutional or professional ethical
standards by any measure."

The lawsuit said many of the plaintiffs had not had a single
confidential meeting with their attorneys, and some had met their
attorneys "only in passing." [GN]


LULAROE: Consultants File Class Action Over "Pyramid Scheme" Model
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Fashion Law reports that LuLaRoe is imploding.  Despite
boasting sales that soared 600 percent last year to around $1
billion and a seller base of more 80,000 individuals in the U.S.,
alone, the online retailer has been increasingly plagued with a
flurry of consumer complaints and litigation in recent years.
Most of the fallout centers on LuLaRoe's allegedly defective
products, its purportedly fraudulent business practices, and its
so-called "pyramid scheme" model.

Operating under a multi-level marketing model, LuLaRoe -- which
was founded by DeAnne Stidham, who, according to the company's
website, was a single mother of seven children, when she launched
LuLaRoe in 2012 -- relies on individual sellers (technically
independent contractors, as distinct from employees), who sign up
to act as representatives or "consultants" (LuLaRoe's lingo) for
the brand, and earn a commission based on their sales.

As noted by CBS earlier this year, "To become a LuLaRoe vendor,
new salespeople are required to buy what the company calls
'onboarding packages' containing an assortment of the its
[garments], at a price of $4,925 to upwards of $9,000.  LuLaRoe
also recommends that salespeople keep about $20,000 in inventory
at any given time and encourages consultants continually to invest
in their businesses."

One of the biggest problems with LuLaRoe, according to no shortage
of the company's consultants? Despite the company's buyback policy
-- in connection with which LuLaRoe has vowed to buyback 100
percent of a consultant's unsold inventory that is in "acceptable
condition" if a consultant wishes to cease working with the
company -- it has ceased to do so.

In addition to consistent complaints from LuLaRoe consultants,
claiming that the company is little more than a "scheme made to
look like a real business," there is also the issue of defective
garments, which, according to CBS, LuLaRoe has compounded by
"refusing to accept returned merchandise [from consultants] that
was torn after being worn or washed once, according to three sales
reps.  As result, some LuLaRoe salespeople are stuck with
thousands of dollars of unsellable merchandise."

And still yet, CBS' striking report -- which was published in
March -- shed light on the allegedly toxic culture that runs
rampant through the LuLaRoe community.  "Sales reps who have
publicly raised concerns about LuLaRoe's business practices have
found themselves punished by the company, which refuses to honor
their orders," sources told CBS.  "LuLaRoe encourages salespeople
to report fellow vendors who speak negatively about it to its
compliance department," others stated.

Two Months, Two Class Actions

It is against this backdrop that in April, LuLaRoe found itself on
the receiving end of a second class action lawsuit in just under
two months.  The first lawsuit -- which was filed in February in
federal court in Pennsylvania by LuLaRoe consultant Rachael
Webster -- alleged that LuLaRoe is "improperly and fraudulently
add[ing] a surcharge to purchases disguised as a 'sales tax' that
does not exist."

In particular, Ms. Webster claims that LuLaRoe "overcharges buyers
up to 10.25%" -- the highest combined clothing sales tax as of
January 2016 -- "every time a consultant who lives in a
jurisdiction that taxes clothing makes a sale where delivery is
made to a jurisdiction that does not."

In the second suit, which was filed in April in federal court in
San Francisco, plaintiffs Julie Dean and Suzanne Jones argue that
LuLaRoe has engaged in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business
practices by advertising and selling defective leggings, prompting
thousands of unsatisfied LuLaRoe customers to complain -- on
Facebook and in other forums -- about the brand's leggings, which
are "of such poor quality that holes, tears, and rips appear
before wearing, during first use or shortly thereafter."

That suit further alleged that LuLaRoe has a history of
misrepresenting the quality of its products, and of failing to
disclose the unfit and defective nature of the products in an
"immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially
injurious" manner.

As of now, both of those lawsuits are still pending in their
respective courts.

"Confidential" and "Defamatory" Information
Representatives for LuLaRoe have categorically denied all of the
allegations lodged against the company in the aforementioned
lawsuits, and have even recently taken what appear to be early
steps in preparation for initiating litigation of its own.

In one of the latest proceedings in this slew of seemingly
consistent litigation centering on LulaRoe, the troubled online
retailer has taken action against blogger Christina Hinks, who has
covered some of the innerworkings of LulaRoe on her blog
MommyGyver.

The Southern California-based company -- which filed a verified
petition for discovery against Ms. Hinks in state court in
Illinois -- is demanding that she "disclose the identity and
contact information of" the sources who provided her with what
LulaRoe claims to be "confidential" and "defamatory" information
about its business.

In a 100+ page filing, LuLaRoe argues that it needs Ms. Hinks to
turn over all "information of potential defendants who have
damaged LLR and its goodwill by providing [her] with LLR's
confidential and proprietary business information, information
about LLR and its merchandise, and false derogatory information
regarding LLR, much of which [Hinks] posted on her blog."

LuLaRoe also states in its petition -- which it will almost
certainly follow up with a formal complaint -- that it is working
to "protect and safeguard its brand, confidential information and
its tens of thousands of independent fashion retailers who rely on
LLR's goodwill and reputation to sell LLR products to retail
customers."

Ms. Hinks responded to the petition on her blog, writing: "Many of
[the] documents [from which I gathered information] have been
publicly shared in various groups for disgruntled consultants and
customers.  Knowing that you're IN those groups, and still choose
to harass me legally says a lot about what this [legal] document
really says."  She continued on to state: "Instead of processing
refunds, they'd much rather spend your dime on what looks like a
SLAPP-suit-in-the-making in an attempt to harass and intimidate me
and the other hundreds of people that are now speaking up -- and
LOUDLY."

For the uninitiated, an Anti-SLAPP motion generally consists of a
special motion to strike a complaint where the lawsuit arises from
activity that is protected by free speech, and thus, aims to
protect against "certain non-meritorious lawsuits that are brought
to deter common citizens from exercising their political or legal
rights or to punish them for doing so."

A Pyramid Scheme
In addition to attracting media interest for the petition it filed
against Hinks, LuLaRoe made headlines for another reason: For
changing the buyback policy for consultants who wish to cease
working with the company.

As LuLaRoe consultant Amanda Goldfarb told NBC, "Instead of 100
percent, they're giving back 90 percent and charging 10 percent"
for all unsold garments from exiting consultants.  On top of that,
Goldfarb says that LuLaRoe is also imposing "a five percent
restocking [fee]," which was not included in their original
policy.  "So really, you're getting back 85," Goldfarb explained.

A representative for LuLaRoe attempted to clarify the company's
buyback policy, saying that the 100 percent buyback "was never
intended to be permanent. We decided to end the [100 percent
model, which was in effect from April to September 2017] when it
became evident that a good number of retailers were abusing the
program by returning product in extremely poor condition and
providing inaccurate claims, as well as retailers using it as
temporary solution to struggles in their business."

Unsatisfied with LuLaRoe's "sudden change" in policy, four LuLaRoe
consultants have joined to file a class action lawsuit against the
company, per Yahoo.  This time around, the complaint -- which was
filed on October 13 in in California state court -- sets forth
claims of unfair competition and breach of contract, among others.

The plaintiffs, Stella Lemberg, Jeni Laurence, Amandra Bluder, and
Carissa Stuckart, claim that LuLaRoe has run afoul of the law in
rescinding its 100 percent buyback policy.  According to their
complaint -- which alleges that LuLaRoe is little more than a
"pyramid scheme" -- "Consultants were encouraged to max-out their
credit cards with inventory purchases, all of which would be
refunded at 100 percent, plus free shipping, should the
consultants decide to stop selling for LuLaRoe."  The plaintiffs
allege that has not turned out to be true.

The platintiffs -- who have asked the court to certify their class
action suit to enable thousands of other "similarly situated"
LuLaRoe consultants, both past and present, to join in the suit
and share in the ultimate settlement amount -- also claim that
"LuLaRoe holds itself out to be champions of women with children,
seeking financial freedom by working from home."  They claim that
could not be further from the truth.

In addition to their recently filed lawsuit, a Change.org petition
has also begun circulating, calling on LuLaRoe to honor its
original 100 percent buyback terms. As of now, the petition, which
was started by Florida-based consultant Alana Tanglier, boasts
12,321 signatures.

One particularly striking comment in connection with the petition,
"Lularoe has to learn that you can't screw all the consultants
that have made you what you are today!" This, my friends, appears
as though it may be the beginning of the very end if LuLaRoe does
not change its ways. [GN]


MAGIC MANAGEMENT: Court Approves $10,000 Settlement in "Williams"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LINDA WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MAGIC MANAGEMENT,
LLC d/b/a 74th STREET MAGIC, LLC and WENDY LEVEY, Defendants, Case
No. 16 Civ. 9834 (HBP) (S.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the parties' application to approve their settlement
agreement.

Plaintiff Williams alleges that from approximately 1999 through
2015, she worked in the Defendants' nursery school as a non-exempt
teacher.  The action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and the New York Labor Law for allegedly unpaid overtime
premium pay.  The Plaintiff also asserts claims based on the
Defendants' alleged failure to provide certain notices as required
by the Labor Law.

The parties reached their proposed settlement.  They've agreed to
a total settlement of $10,000.  They've have also agreed that
$540.49 of the settlement figure will be allocated to reimburse
the Plaintiffs' counsel for their out-of-pocket costs, $3,153.17
(or one-third) of the remaining $9,459.51 will be paid to the
Plaintiff's counsel as fees and the remaining $6,306.34 will paid
to the Plaintiff.

The settlement agreement also provides that, after deduction of
the counsel's out-of-pocket costs, approximately 33% of the
remaining settlement amount will be paid to the Plaintiff's
counsel as a contingency fee.  Contingency fees of one-third in
FLSA cases are routinely approved in this circuit.  Therefore, the
contingency fee is reasonable.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, Magistrate Judge Pitman
approved the settlement in the matter.  In light of the
settlement, he dismissed the action with prejudice and without
costs.  The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement.  The Clerk of the Court is respectfully
requested to mark this matter closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ncpIWy from Leagle.com.

Linda Williams, Plaintiff, represented by Gennadiy Naydenskiy --
naydenskiylaw@gmail.com -- Naydenskiy Law Group.

Wendy Levy, Defendant, represented by Stephen Andrew Fuchs --
sfuchs@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..

Magic Management, LLC, Defendant, represented by Stephen Andrew
Fuchs, Littler Mendelson, P.C..


MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: Wins Summary Judgment in "Aguilar" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARISELA AGUILAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION d/b/a MTC, Defendant, Civil No.
16-00050WJ/GJF (D. N.M.), Judge William P. Johnson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the
Defendant's summary judgment motion with respect to the
Plaintiffs' claims asserted under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act ("NMMWA").

This is a collective/class action lawsuit filed by current or
former employees of MTC who claim they were not paid for some of
their hours worked on assignment for MTC at the Otero County
Prison Facility near Chaparral, New Mexico.  The lawsuit asserts
claims for unpaid wages and overtime, as well as other statutory
damages and the recovery of attorneys' fees, under the FLSA and/or
the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiffs contend they should be compensated for various pre-
and post-shift activities which they argue are compensable, namely
(i) waiting at the prison, (ii) clearing security, (iii) taking
and returning equipment, and (iv) meeting and reporting to other
detention officers.  In addition, they accuse MTC of unlawful
"rounding" practices with respect to their compensation.

In sum, the Judge Johnson finds and concludes that the Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims,
specifically he agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs'
"rounding policy" theory does not apply in the case, and therefore
he rejected the Plaintiffs' illegal "rounding" argument as a basis
for their claims in this lawsuit.  He finds and concludes that the
only pre- and post-shift activity that is compensable under the
FLSA is the pass-down briefings on post.  The Defendant is denied
summary judgment on that sole issue.

However, the Judge also finds and concludes that the Defendant is
not precluded as a matter of law from asserting the de minimis
defense, and further finds that any discrepancy between what the
Plaintiffs should be paid and their scheduled start/end times is
de minimis, thereby granting the Defendant summary judgment on all
of the Plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA.

Judge Johnson needs not address Defendant's estoppel argument,
having found in favor of the Defendant on the issue of
compensability of the activities for which the Plaintiffs seek
compensation.  His findings on the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims with
regard to pre-and post-shift activities also apply to their state
law claims, and based on those findings, the Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims under the New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

The Judge denied the Plaintiffs' Opposed Motion for Leave to
Supplement a New Timekeeping Policy Issued by the Defendant on
Sept. 1, 2017 to the Record For Four Pending Motions because the
supplemental exhibit would not provide any reason for him to
modify any of the findings in this decision.

Based on his review of the Plaintiffs' claims asserted in the
Amended Complaint, Judge Johnson says his Memorandum Opinion and
Order disposes of all of the Plaintiffs' claims in their entirety.
Therefore, he granted the Defendant's Opposed Motion for Summary
Judgment on Liability.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/N4nPkq from Leagle.com.

Marisela Aguilar, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern --
par@kernlawfirm.com -- Kern Law Firm, pro hac vice.

Marisela Aguilar, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Blumenfeld --
bblumenfeld@acaciapark.com -- Mendel Blumenfeld, PLLC.

Miguel Blanco, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern Law
Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld, PLLC.

Francisco J Carranza, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern,
Kern Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel
Blumenfeld, PLLC.

Rafael Gallegos, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern Law
Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld, PLLC.

Benjamin Guerrero, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern,
Kern Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel
Blumenfeld, PLLC.

Ivan Eloy Gurrola, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern
Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld,
PLLC.

Vaughn D Hayes, Sr., Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern
Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld,
PLLC.

Jose R Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern
Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld,
PLLC.

Rogelio Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by David L. Kern, Kern
Law Firm, pro hac vice & Robert Blumenfeld, Mendel Blumenfeld,
PLLC.

Management & Training Corporation, Defendant, represented by Aaron
C. Viets -- aviets@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &
Robb, P.A., Charles J. Vigil -- cvigil@rodey.com -- Rodey Dickson
Sloan Akin & Robb, P.A. & Krystle A. Thomas -- kthomas@rodey.com -
- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A..


MARY KAY: Forum Selection Clause Frees Firm from Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for New Jersey Law Journal, reports that
a wage-and-hour suit on behalf of Mary Kay sales consultants won't
be heard in New Jersey after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled that Texas law governs interpretation of a
forum-selection clause in the cosmetics company's employment
contract.

The appeals court, in a published decision, affirmed a ruling from
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing
a potential class action against Addison, Texas-based Mary Kay
after finding that Texas law dictates that the claim belongs in
that state's courts.

Ina Collins, who held the positions of sales consultant and sales
director for Mary Kay, brought suit on behalf of fellow New Jersey
residents who worked for the company from September 2009 to the
present. She claims that the company improperly categorizes sales
representatives and sales managers as independent consultants, in
violation of New Jersey's Wage Payment Law. Collins also contends
that Mary Kay improperly requires sales representatives to pay for
marketing materials, merchandise and uniforms out of their own
earnings.

U.S. District Judge Madeline Arleo dismissed the suit after Mary
Kay brought a forum non conveniens motion, relying on employment
agreements specifying that legal claims would be submitted to a
Texas court and dictating that Texas law would apply. Arleo's
decision was based on federal common law. On appeal, Collins'
lawyer argued that the analysis should be governed by New Jersey
law.

The appeal focused on the scope of the forum-selection clause, not
its enforceability, Collins' lawyer said in briefs and at oral
argument.

Third Circuit Judges Michael Chagares, L. Felipe Restrepo and Jane
Roth concluded that state contract law, not federal common law,
governs the interpretation of the forum-selection clauses in the
case. As for which state's contract law applies, they said the law
of New Jersey, the forum state, applies to choice-of-law questions
in a diversity case like the present one. And New Jersey choice-
of-law rules dictate that when parties to a contract have agreed
to be governed by the laws of a particular state, New Jersey
courts will ordinarily uphold the contractual choice, the court
said. But the parties' contractual choice doesn't control in cases
where the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction, and there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice; or where application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state
that has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the particular issue, the court said.

Collins has not demonstrated that either of those exceptions
apply, Restrepo wrote for the court. There is no dispute that the
parties have a substantial relationship to Texas, and Collins has
not shown why New Jersey has a materially greater interest in the
application of its own contract law to the interpretation of
forum-selection clauses, or how the application of Texas contract
law would offend a fundamental policy of New Jersey, Restrepo
wrote.

The appeals court declined to find fault with application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine by the judge below. Collins did not
dispute the availability of an alternate forum to hear her claim,
or address with any specificity the public interest factors that
could favor litigation in New Jersey federal court over Texas
state court, Restrepo wrote. The district court correctly granted
Mary Kay's forum non conveniens motion and dismiss the case
because Collins failed to meet the heavy burden required to resist
application of the forum-selection clause, the court said.

"We are mindful of the predicament that could arise for a
plaintiff who (a) performs work in her home state for a company
headquartered in another state, (b) seeks the substantive
protections guaranteed by her home state's wage payment law, and
(c) is subject to forum selection and choice-of-law clauses in her
employment agreement that point outside of her home state. But it
is incumbent on plaintiffs in those situations to challenge the
enforceability of the forum selection clauses and to outline for
the lower court exactly how they stand to be deprived of the wage
payment protections they are otherwise guaranteed. Collins made no
attempt to do so in this case," the court said.

Collins' lawyer, Ravi Sattiraju of Princeton, declined to comment
on the ruling other than to say that his client was weighing her
options.

Christine Amalfe of Gibbons in Newark, who represented Mary Kay,
declined to comment.

Mary Kay did not respond to a reporter's message left at company
headquarters.[GN]


MASSAGE ENVY: Can't Depose 6 Non-Parties in "McKinney-Drobnis"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BAERBEL McKINNEY-DROBNIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. MASSAGE ENVY FRANCHISING, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
16-cv-06450-MMC (KAW) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Kandis A.
Westmore of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted the Plaintiffs' request to quash the subpoena
concerning Kathleen Piccola, Angela Berlese, Lia Berlese, Chris
Berlese, Robert Berlese, and Michael Damiani; and denied the
request to quash the subpoena as to Mr. Drobnis, but will limit
the scope of the deposition to issues affecting adequacy only.

The Defendant operates a membership-based massage franchise that
allows members to receive one massage per month for a monthly fee
ranging between $39 to $59.  To obtain a membership, customers
execute a form Membership Agreement.  The Plaintiffs assert that
the provisions amount to an express clause with an explicit,
locked in amount that is to be paid each month until membership is
expired or terminated.  They also allege that each member of the
Class is purportedly assured that the membership fee will never
increase once they execute the agreement and begin making timely
payments.

Despite this alleged prohibition on unilateral increases of the
monthly membership dues, the Defendant unilaterally increases
(often without notice or forewarning) the monthly membership fees
owed by its members.  In addition to the unilateral fee increases,
the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendant seeks to make it as
'painful' as possible for customers to cancel a membership.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs filed the instant
putative class action.  They bring claims for: (i) breach of
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(ii) intentional interference with contractual relations; (iii)
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (iv)
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law; and (v)
declaratory relief.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the parties filed a joint letter regarding the
depositions of seven non-parties: Mr. Drobnis, Ms. Piccola, Ms.
Angela Berlese, Ms. Lia Berlese, Mr. Chris Berlese, Mr. Robert
Berlese, and Mr. Damiani.

Magistrate Judge Westmore finds that there is no showing that Mr.
Drobnis has "inserted" himself into the litigation, such that a
deposition is warranted.  While he has assisted Plaintiff
McKinney-Drobnis with understanding the litigation proceedings,
the Defendant does not suggest that Mr. Drobnis is a witness or
that he will be testifying or providing a declaration in support
of class certification or at trial.  The fact that he could be a
class member alone does not justify a deposition.  Similarly, the
fact that he is represented by the Plaintiff's counsel in
connection with the subpoenas at issue does not automatically make
him a percipient witness.  The Defendant may depose Mr. Drobnis on
the limited issue of Plaintiff McKinney-Drobnis' adequacy as a
class representative.

The fact that Ms. Piccola is an absent class member that is
represented by the Plaintiffs' counsel for the limited purpose of
dealing with this subpoena does not justify a deposition.  There
is no showing Ms. Piccola is a percipient or key witness, or that
the Plaintiffs intend to use her declaration or testimony to
support their case.  Similarly, there is no explanation for why
notice of the increases is relevant or material in this case.
Therefore, Magistrate Judge quashed the subpoena as to Ms.
Piccola.

Also, since Ms. Angela Berlese's and Ms. Lia Berlese's status as
absent class members alone does not warrant a deposition, without
something more to suggest that they have injected themselves into
this litigation.  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge quashed the
subpoena as to Ms. Angela Berlese and Ms. Lisa Berlese.

Again, there is no showing that discussions about the allegations
in the complaint have any effect on the merits of the case or
Plaintiff Berlese's adequacy, and does not otherwise suggest that
Mr. Chris Berlese would be a witness in this case.  Further, it is
not clear how Mr. Chris Berlese's payment of the increased
membership price, rather than immediately canceling, affects
typicality or the merits of this case.  Therefore, the subpoena as
to Mr. Chris Berlese is quashed.

As with the Berlese children, there is no showing that discussions
about the allegations in the complaint have any effect on the
merits of the case or Plaintiff Berlese's adequacy, or otherwise
suggest that Mr. Robert Berlese would be a witness in this case.
Likewise, the Defendant provides no explanation for why Mr. Robert
Berlese's conversations with Mr. Damiani, Plaintiff Berlese's
friend, would be discoverable.  There is no suggestion that
individuals were forced against their wills to become members of
Massage Envy; thus, Mr. Robert Berlese's decision not to become a
member has no effect on the Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the
use of an adhesion contract.  Therefore, the Magistrate Judge
quashed the subpoena as to Mr. Robert Berlese.

The Defendant again provides no explanation for why the
conversations with Mr. Berlese would have any relevance in the
instant case.  Further, again, the fact that Mr. Damiani is a
putative class member does not justify the taking of his
deposition without some showing that he has otherwise injected
himself into this case.  Therefore, the subpoena as to Mr. Damiani
is quashed.

For the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Westmore granted the
Plaintiffs' request to quash the subpoenas as to Ms. Piccola, Ms.
Angela Berlese, Ms. Lia Berlese, Mr. Chris Berlese, Mr. Robert
Berlese, and Mr. Damiani.  He denied the Plaintiffs' request to
quash the subpoena as to Mr. Drobnis, but will limit the scope of
the deposition to Plaintiff McKinney-Drobnis's adequacy only.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KqRzHC from Leagle.com.

Baerbel McKinney-Drobnis, Plaintiff, represented by Trenton Ross
Kashima -- trk@classactionlaw.com -- Finkelstein Krink LLP.

Joseph B. Piccola, Plaintiff, represented by Trenton Ross Kashima,
Finkelstein Krink LLP.

Camille Berlese, Plaintiff, represented by Trenton Ross Kashima,
Finkelstein Krink LLP.

Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, Defendant, represented by Luanne
Sacks -- lsacks@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case, LLP, Cynthia
A. Ricketts -- cricketts@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Kahn Abrahm Scolnick -- kscolnick@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Robert Brett Bader --
rbader@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP & Theodore J.
Boutrous, Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law.


MCKESSON CORP: Town of Greenfield to Join Opioid Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Aviva Luttrell, writing for Greenfield Recorder, reports that the
town of Greenfield is the newest signatory to a class-action
lawsuit against the three largest opioid pharmaceutical
distributors -- McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health and
AmerisourceBergen.

Spearheaded by Mayor William Martin, the lawsuit is being filed by
Levin Papantonio of Pensacola, Fla., and Sweeney Merrigan Law of
Boston and Greenfield, founded by Greenfield natives Thomas T.
Merrigan, Peter M. Merrigan and J. Tucker Merrigan.

The goal of the lawsuit is to recoup local and town budget dollars
spent on law enforcement, needle exchanges, Narcan,
education/prevention, treatment costs, etc., and ultimately to
develop new policy and law to protect individuals and communities
moving forward, according to a news release from the mayor's
office.

"This is a genuine cost to the municipality in both monetary and
psychological terms," Mr. Martin is quoted as saying in the
release.  "As the capital of Franklin County and the provider of
multiple county services, from hospitals, courts, corrections
facilities, and social support, the Greenfield community must
intervene and act for the benefit and survival of individuals,
families and the broader community."

The pharmaceutical distributors face state law liability for
negligence.  The standard of care is established by the industry
standards as outlined in Healthcare Distribution Management
Association's "Guidelines," the federal statutes and regulations,
and by applicable state law.  The lawsuit alleges that the named
distributors violated this standard of care by breaching their
duty to identify and report suspicious opioid orders to the Drug
Enforcement Administration or other relevant state agencies.

"The opioid epidemic is hitting Massachusetts communities like
Greenfield harder than we could have ever imagined,"
Peter M. Merrigan, partner and attorney at Sweeney Merrigan Law,
is quoted as saying in the release.  "In addition to the emotional
pain the epidemic is causing, the rapidly increasing financial
costs to Massachusetts city and town budgets is creating long term
economic damages.  Sweeney Merrigan Law is working with Greenfield
and other Massachusetts communities to hold pharmaceutical
companies and opioid distributors accountable, to recoup financial
losses and ease the ongoing strain on the communities."

The Levin Papantonio law firm is currently representing numerous
governmental agencies against wholesale distributors and
manufacturers of opioids in order to recover the damages they have
sustained.  Based on a long-standing relationship between the
firms, Levin Papantonio has partnered with Sweeney Merrigan Law
for local representation of Massachusetts towns and cities that
want to take action toward stopping the epidemic and recover
financial costs. [GN]


MDL 2445: Court Dismisses Antitrust Suit vs. RBH
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendant
Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Ltd. (RBH)'s Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned IN RE SUBOXONE (BUPRENORPHINE HYDROCHLORIDE AND
NALOXONE) ANTITRUST LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
Wisconsin, et al. v. Indivior Inc. et al., Case no. 16-cv-5073;
STATE OF WISCONSIN, By Attorney General Brad D. Schimel, et al.
Plaintiffs, v. INDIVIOR INC. f/k/a RECKITT BENCKISER
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al. Defendants, MDL No. 2445, No. 13-MD-
2445, Civ. A. No. 16-5073 (E.D. Pa.).

RBH moves to dismiss all claims against it, arguing that the
Pennsylvania District Court does not have jurisdiction and that
the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege any antitrust
or state law cause of action.

The Defendants in this multi-district litigation, Indivior Inc.,
f/k/a Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Reckitt Benckiser
Healthcare (UK) Ltd.; Indivior PLC, f/k/a/ Reckitt Benckiser
Group, plc; and MonoSol Rx, LLC, each play some role in the
manufacture, production, and/or sale of Suboxone, a medication
used for the treatment of opioid addiction.

Plaintiffs, a collection of states, have brought suit against
these Defendants alleging violations of federal and state
antitrust statutes and state unfair trade and consumer protection
laws.

The Defendant Entities Moving Defendant RBH is a British company
incorporated under the laws of England and Wales. According to the
Amended Complaint, RBH is engaged in the development and
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, including Suboxone, as well as
other health care products made and sold subject to FDA approval.
RBH is a subsidiary of Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC (RB Group), a
non-party.

Plaintiffs claim that Indivior, in conjunction with RBH and
MonoSol, launched the sale of the film in 2010, while
simultaneously taking steps to (a) convert the market's
prescription base from tablets to film and (b) delay the entry of
generic tablets by refusing to participate in a joint REMS safety
program and filing a baseless citizen petition.

The defendant at issue in the current motion is RBH. Plaintiffs
allege that RBH is responsible for some or all of the antitrust
conduct challenged in the Amended Complaint, including the joint
venture to create and manufacture Suboxone film, establishment of
the parameters for the timing of the launch and formulation of
Suboxone film, gathering and investigating all consumer complaints
as to Suboxone products, trademarking the names for the financial
programs to encourage the switch from Suboxone tablets to film,
and obtaining patents with MonoSol related to Suboxone film
development.

RBH argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish either general
or specific jurisdiction.

The United States Supreme Court has identified five factors that
courts should consider when balancing jurisdictional
reasonableness, including: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2)
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
(4) the interstate and international judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5)
the shared interest for the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.

RBH does not mention any of these factors or address how they
weigh against the exercise of personal jurisdiction. As Plaintiffs
have demonstrated facts that support an exercise of personal
jurisdiction, RBH's silence as to the constitutional
considerations neglects its burden of establish[ing] the presence
of other considerations that would render personal jurisdiction
unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Court declines to grant RBH's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitlement to relief'
requires more than labels and conclusions Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice and only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.

RBH puts forth three general arguments in support of its Motion to
Dismiss.

First, it asserts that Plaintiffs' monopolization and attempted
monopolization causes of action (Counts I and II) do not state a
claim as to RBH.

Second, it contends that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently stated a
conspiracy claim (Counts III and IV) as to RBH.

Finally, RBH alleges that all of Plaintiffs' state law claims
(Count V) fail to plead plausible causes of action.

Monopolization and Attempted Monopolization Claims

Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize,
attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize, interstate or
international commerce.  To succeed on a claim for actual
monopolization under Section 2, a party must prove: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historical accident.

A monopolization claim does not require proof of the specific
intent to monopolize, demanding only proof of a general intent to
do the act, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he
is doing. Nonetheless, the possession of monopoly power will not
be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.

This is so because the Sherman Act directs itself not against
conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against
conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. It is
well established that in order to sustain their claims of
monopolization and attempted monopolization, Plaintiffs must prove
the required elements against each individual defendant.
RBH contends that Plaintiffs have not plausibly pled either
monopoly power or anticompetitive conduct. Because the Court
agrees, it will dismiss Counts I and II against RBH.

Monopoly Power

To support a claim of monopoly power through indirect evidence, a
plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant had market power in the
relevant market and (2) there were barriers to entry into the
market.  The Third Circuit generally requires a plaintiff alleging
antitrust injury under Section 2 to show that the defendant
maintained a market share significantly larger than 55%' to
establish antitrust liability.

Allegations that the Reckitt" entities collectively maintained
monopoly power are insufficient to establish that RBH individually
maintained the requisite monopoly power. In an effort to cure this
deficiency, Plaintiffs assert that RBH manufactures Suboxone
tablets and the ingredients for Suboxone film, and that RBH
contracted with MonoSol to develop the film and obtain patents
relative to the film.

Plaintiffs do not allege that RBH held the primary patents over
the tablets and the film or controlled production of the film.
Indeed, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that
RBH sold Suboxone in any form in the United States or participated
in the United States market in any respect such that it could
maintain monopoly power.

As possession of monopoly power is a required element for a claim
of monopolization, a Sherman Act Section 2 claim against RBH
cannot survive.

Anticompetitive Conduct

Even assuming that Plaintiffs could establish that RBH had
monopoly power, their Section 2 claim against RBH would still fail
because they have not adequately pled that RBH individually
engaged in any anticompetitive conduct. Under the rule of reason
burden-shifting framework set forth by the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Microsoft Corp., the party seeking to impose antitrust
liability must initially provide evidence of the anticompetitive
nature of a defendant's conduct.

While the Amended Complaint alleges RBH's participation in the
first part of an illegal product-hopping scheme development and
introduction of a new product those acts alone are not
exclusionary. The Amended Complaint lacks allegations setting
forth RBH's participation in any other anticompetitive conduct,
such as falsely disparaging the safety of the tablets,
coordinating the removal of the tablets from the market to
effectuate a hard switch from the legacy product to the new
product, filing a sham citizen petition against the generic
manufacturers, or engaging in other activity to delay the entry of
generics into the market.

Plaintiffs' effort to impute Indivior's conduct to RBH by
including it in the collective entity known as Reckitt, merely as
a result of the alleged corporate relationship between the two
entities is not only factually unsupported by the Amended
Complaint, but again is legally impermissible.

Conspiracy Claims

Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint allege a conspiracy
between the Reckitt Defendants and MonoSol to monopolize under
Sherman Act Section 2 and to restrain trade under Sherman Act Sec
1 respectively. A Section 2 conspiracy claim has four elements:
(1) an agreement to monopolize; (2) an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy; (3) a specific intent to monopolize; and (4) a
causal connection between the conspiracy and the injury alleged.
In an effort to bolster the minimal allegations against RBH
individually, Plaintiffs again attempt to group RBH in with its
sister company of Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals (now
Indivior), referring to them jointly as Reckitt, and argue that
the illegal conspiracy was between MonoSol and Reckitt. But again,
such collective pleading is insufficient to impute the actions of
Indivior to RBH.

The Third Circuit has rejected efforts to hold multiple defendants
liable under a conspiracy claim where the complaint's allegations
lump defendants together by nature of their corporate
relationship, but set forth specific facts as to only some
defendants.   Plaintiffs do not suggest that RBH played any role
in the disparagement of Suboxone tablets, the filing of the
citizen petition, or the other delay tactics used to thwart
generic entry.

Therefore, the Court will grant RBH's motion to dismiss the
conspiracy claims against it.

State Law Claims

RBH asserts that the antitrust and consumer protection state law
claims against it must be dismissed for two reasons. First,
because each of the state antitrust laws at issue is interpreted
consistently with federal antitrust laws, those claims must be
dismissed for the same reasons as the federal antitrust claims.
Second, RBH contends that Plaintiffs have improperly used state
consumer protection statutes and unfair trade practices to
reassert deficient federal antitrust claims.

State Antitrust Claims

RBH first contends that the 35 state antitrust laws at issue are
either explicitly aligned or interpreted consistently with federal
antitrust laws, meaning that Plaintiffs' failure to state viable
federal antitrust claims against it is fatal to the corresponding
state antitrust claims. In response, Plaintiffs assert that ten of
the States' antitrust laws those from Wisconsin, North Carolina,
Utah, Vermont, New York, California, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, and
Connecticut differ from federal law and require a separate
analysis.

Plaintiffs' argument, however, rests on a string cite of cases
that do nothing more than reaffirm that the state antitrust laws
exist independently of the Sherman Act. These state antitrust
laws, however, continue to be consistently interpreted in
parallel, if not identically, with the Sherman Act.

Plaintiffs' state antitrust claims premised on the identical
actions that form the basis of the Sherman Act claims are
similarly deficient. Therefore, for the same reasons I dismissed
the Sherman Act claims against RBH, I dismiss the state law
antitrust claims against RBH.

State Unfair Trade Practices/Consumer Protection Statute Claims

RBH's final argument contends that all of the state unfair trade
practices claims must be dismissed.

Plaintiffs fail to identify any activities by RBH, aside from
those set forth in support of the federal antitrust claims, that
would invoke liability under any of the identified state statutes.
While Plaintiffs tout the distinctions among the various states'
laws, each of the state law claims in the Amended Complaint
follows the same format of repeating and realleging every
preceding allegation and then adding the conclusory statement that
the practices by Defendants, are in violation of a particular
state law.

Peeling away the allegations that are no more than legal
conclusions, the Court finds that the state law claims contain no
well-pled factual allegations that could plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief against RBH under the state consumer
protection and unfair competition statutes.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss all of these state law claims
against RBH.

The Court grants RBH's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety and
dismiss all claims against it.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8ovugu4
from Leagle.com.


MDL 2503: Court Grants Certification of Direct Purchaser Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order granting the Motion for Class
Certification filed by the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (DPPs) in
the case captioned IN RE SOLODYN (MINOCYCLINE HYDROCHLORIDE)
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Civil Action No. 14-md-02503 (D Mass.).

Solodyn is a drug, a minocycline hydrochloride extended release
tablet that treats inflammatory lesions resulting from acne in
patients age twelve and older, and is manufactured, marketed and
sold by Medicis.

This is a putative class action in which the DPPs allege that
Defendants Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation, Impax Laboratories,
Inc., Sandoz Inc., and Lupin Limited and Lupin Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1.
D. 91.

DPPs, direct purchasers of Solodyn, brought the first antitrust
suit against Defendants in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Rochester Drug Co-
Operative, Inc. v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., No. 2:13-cv-04270-JCJ.

Shortly thereafter, various EPPs, consumers and third-party payors
who indirectly purchased, paid for or provided reimbursement for
Solodyn other than for resale, filed suit.

Her, both putative classes have moved to certify the class under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Direct Purchasers

DPPs seek to certify a class with forty-eight members, defined as
follows:

     All persons or entities in the United States and its
territories, including Puerto Rico, who purchased (a) 45mg, 55mg,
65mg, 80mg, 90mg, 105mg, 115mg, and/or 135mg brand or generic
Solodyn tablets directly from any Defendant or other manufacturer
at any time during the period July 23, 2009 through and including
November 25, 2012 and/or (b) 55mg, 65mg, 80mg, 105mg, and/or 115mg
brand Solodyn tablets directly from Medicis at any time from
November 26, 2012 until November 30, 2015. Excluded from the Class
are Defendants, and their officers, directors, management,
employees, subsidiaries, or affiliates, and all federal government
entities.

The Court is persuaded that the ability and motivation of these
putative class members to litigate as joined plaintiffs supports
class certification. DPPs argue that Defendants' assertions that
all direct purchasers here would join in a common suit ignore the
formidable business realities and legal hurdles standing in the
way of such a strategy. The competitive relationship among some
class members serves as a significant business obstacle.

To illustrate this, DPPs conducted an empirical analysis of
approximately 20,000 federal case filings from the last fifteen
years involving one or more members of this class, finding that in
only five cases, were these members plaintiffs in pharmaceutical
antitrust cases that were not class actions.  DPPs explain that
such cases are so infrequent because the nature of the litigation
makes ascertaining damages difficult at the outset and many cases
mirror this one, where DPPs have demonstrated that approximately
half of the putative class members have negative value claims.

These cases are the reason why the class action mechanism exists:
there is no incentive for these parties to join in light of the
litigation costs as compared to the damages at stake.  The Court
thus finds that the DPPs have met their burden of proving
numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1).

DPPs argue that questions of law and fact predominate because
proof of violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the unlawful
conduct alleged here, will not vary among class members.
Defendants do not dispute, however, that proof of illegal activity
will not vary among class members; they instead argue that
individual questions will overwhelm common ones with respect to
common impact and damages.

The Court is persuaded that these forecasts serve as a better
proxy for unconstrained competition than the actual data of
generic and brand Solodyn sales.

First, DPPs argue that the brief generic entry during 2009 and
2010 did not establish unfettered competition between generics and
brand Solodyn. Dr. Leitzinger points out that each generic seller
separately entered the market for only a few days in each case
before entering into agreements with Medicis, at which point they
each announced that they were leaving the market.  At the start of
each brief launch there was rapid growth in retail prescriptions
filled by generics, but after each generic seller announced it
would be ending sales, the growth in generic prescription levels
halted, turning sharply downward. Dr. Leitzinger also presents
evidence that generic Solodyn was not accessible by many direct
purchasers or registered on large health insurers' formularies
until after the generics' sustained launch in 2011.

Second, Dr. Leitzinger explains that Medicis's couponing during
this period does not account for differences between actual sales
and forecasted sales of generics during this time because, among
other things, the primary process which drives generic penetration
is automatic substitution at the pharmacy level, which is not
impacted by any coupon or copay programs for consumers.

Third, DPPs argue that post-2011 generic sales are not a valid
proxy because by November 2011, Medicis had taken advantage of the
generic delay it had purchased to shift the majority of Solodyn
prescriptions from the Legacy to the Add-On Strengths.
Additionally, Dr. Leitzinger did take the actual data into account
in forming his conclusions, noting that even during the points of
limited entry, the generic was priced at approximately fifty
percent of the brand minocycline, and prices dropped even further
after full generic entry in November 2011.

To the extent Defendants further dispute whether the Medicis-Impax
agreement stifled competition and the date of sustained generic
entry absent the Medicis-Impax agreement, these are questions for
the jury to resolve, not the Court at class certification. The
Court is thus persuaded that Dr. Leitzinger's methodology is
sufficiently reliable to show common impact at this juncture.

Defendants argue that Dr. Leitzinger's damages model is unreliable
because it is not properly limited or causally linked to the
Medicis-Impax settlement.

First, Defendants argue that Dr. Leitzinger's damages model
improperly relies upon a product hopping  liability theory this
previously Court dismissed.  The theory present here is one of
illegal reverse-payment settlements specifically, the Medicis-
Impax agreement the impact of which is overcharges. If the jury
finds the Medicis-Impax agreement was unlawful and that class
members would have purchased lower-priced generic Solodyn rather
than brand Add-On Strength Solodyn, then these class members who
purchased brand Add-On Strength Solodyn were overcharged.

Second, Defendants argue that Dr. Leitzinger's model provides for
damages beyond the liability theory because it fails to isolate
the alleged impact attributable to the Medicis-Impax settlement
from that resulting from settlement agreements between Medicis and
other generic manufacturers.  Dr. Leitzinger's model, however,
provides for twelve but-for scenarios, contemplating the different
possible points of sustained generic entry absent the Medicis-
Impax agreement and the varying competitive conditions that would
have followed. The jury will need to resolve the disputes
regarding the appropriate but-for scenario to apply here, so that
the impact is appropriately tailored to the liability theory used.
At this stage, any disagreement in this respect does not overcome
the Plaintiffs' showing that damages will be substantially shown
by common proof.

Third, Defendants argue that Dr. Leitzinger's model is unreliable
because it fails to control for underlying supply and demand
conditions that caused generic penetration and purchase price to
vary widely among class members.

The need for some individualized damages determinations will not
defeat class certification.  The use of averages to develop the
aggregate amount of damages does not suggest Plaintiffs will be
unable to ensure recovery is only for injured parties.

Apportioning damages ought to wait until liability is decided upon
the merits and although Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish
predominance, uncertainties regarding damages should be resolved
against the wrongdoer, and not those who have allegedly been
injured.  This is particularly true in antitrust cases because
uncertainty regarding damages is generally the result of the
defendants' alleged wrongdoing. Antitrust plaintiffs have a
limited burden with respect to showing that individual damages
issues do not predominate because of the equitable notion that the
wrongdoer should not be able to profit by insistence on an
unattainable standard of proof.

Dr. Leitzinger has thus sufficiently shown that damages may be
demonstrated by a common methodology' applicable to the class as a
whole.

As to allegedly uninjured class members, Defendants argue that
eight putative class members did not purchase any generic Solodyn
during the period in question and ten members purchased only
generic Solodyn during this time, thus suffering no overcharges.
But these arguments do not account for the but-for world
consistent with DPPs' liability theory.

If Defendants are found liable on that theory, then these putative
class members would have also been injured by overcharges, as the
prices of both generic Solodyn and brand Solodyn during that time
would have been affected by Defendants' illegal conduct. DPPs have
thus sufficiently proven that if a jury finds Defendants liable,
DPPs will be able to show impact for at least the vast majority of
putative class members.
For all of these reasons, Defendants' contentions regarding lack
of injury for some class members are not sufficient to destroy
predominance for class certification purposes.

The End-Payors

The EPPs have also filed a motion for class certification.  EPPs
now seek certification as a damages class and an injunctive relief
class under Rule 23(b)(3) and (b)(2), respectively, for the
remaining state law claims.

Of the four Rule 23(a) factors, Defendants challenge only Rule
23(a)(4)'s requirement of adequacy of representation.
Defendants argue that there are conflicts among class members
because some class members, such as brand loyalists and insurers,
benefitted from a delay in generic entry.  EPPs do not address
this argument in their reply beyond a general argument that all
members of the putative class have identical interests in proving
liability and aggregate damages.

Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that the conflicts
between those allegedly uninjured class members and putative EPP
representatives destroy class certification here. Defendants'
reliance upon Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d
1181, is misplaced.  In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
certification of a class of direct purchasers where the putative
class did not challenge the defendants' "assertions that the three
national wholesalers, whose transactions with [a defendant]
constitute over fifty percent of the plaintiffs' total claims,
experienced a net gain from the absence of generic drugs in the
market."

Here, however, Defendants have not provided a similar percentage
of uninjured--or conflicted members of the putative class, nor
have they quantified the conflict.   Additionally, the Court is
not convinced that the number of uninjured class members here is
greater than de minimis such that predominance is not met.
Adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) focuses on
fundamental conflicts between class representatives and members.
The Court thus hold that the presence of a de minimis number of
uninjured members also does not defeat adequacy of representation.

EPPs seek certification as a class under Rule 23(b)(3), in their
pursuit of monetary damages. To succeed, EPPs must show that
common issues of law or fact predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.

Defendants argue that EPPs have failed to propose a definite class
in which the members of the class are ascertainable.
Defendants argue that the class definition is not ascertainable
because it includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured
members because EPPs' class definition is broader than EPPs'
expert's definition of a class that was harmed.  This argument
goes to common proof of injury and not whether the class is
ascertainable.  EPPs have provided objective criteria for defining
the class, which is sufficient to show that the class is
ascertainable, and therefore, definite for purposes of the
predominance inquiry.

As with the putative direct purchaser class, the Court must
determine whether the putative end-payor class is sufficiently
cohesive.

Defendants proffer the opinion of their expert, Dr. Cremieux,
President of Analysis Group, Inc., an economics research
consulting firm, and an adjunct economics professor,  to support
their argument that Plaintiffs' putative class contains a greater
than de minimis number of consumer and institutional end-payor
members who were not injured by Defendants' conduct, should they
be found liable. The Court addresses Defendants' arguments
regarding uninjured groups in turn, noting that the First Circuit
recently affirmed class certification in a similar class of end-
payors despite similar arguments regarding uninjured parties.

Defendants rely upon Dr. Cremieux's report, identifying several
groups of consumers that are likely to be unharmed and arguing
that no class-wide data or method could distinguish between these
unharmed consumers and those that could have suffered harm under
Plaintiffs' allegations.

The Court is not persuaded that the presence of any of these
consumer groups would cause individualized issues to predominate
in this case. Many of the categories of consumers Defendants
assert are uninjured here would have experienced injury if the
jury accepts EPPs' liability theory. Others rely on abnormalities
in the actual data of generic conversion here, which the Court has
explained is an imperfect proxy for the but-for world of
unfettered competition here  For the groups of uninjured parties
that remain such as brand loyalists--Defendants have not presented
a credible estimate of the group's size to suggest the group is
greater than de minimis. Additionally, EPPs have sufficiently
shown that to the extent uninjured consumers remain in the class,
their presence will be accounted for in an aggregate damages
calculation and a mechanism may be developed to distinguish them
prior to judgment. The Court thus declines to deny certification
on this basis.

Defendants also argue that many uninjured institutional, or third-
party, payors fall within EPPs' class definition.
The Court is thus persuaded that the putative class will be able
to show antitrust impact through common proof: if the jury finds
Defendants' conduct violated the state laws in question here, the
vast majority of EPPs who purchased generic or brand Solodyn
during this period and experienced injury in the form of
overcharges. The Court is not persuaded that any of the subgroups
identified by Defendants as uninjured class members create
individualized issues that undermine the predominance of the legal
questions here.

A putative class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) also
bears the burden of showing that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

Defendants reiterates its predominance arguments, contending class
litigation would be unmanageable and potentially violate
Defendants' rights, emphasizing the burden the Court would face
when fashioning jury instructions, in light of the vast
differences among the many states' laws at issue. Defendants have
not persuaded the Court that this case will be unmanageable. But
even accepting that there will be certain manageability obstacles
in this case's future, such is true of "most multi-state class
actions.

EPPs also seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) on the basis that
the harm putative members face is ongoing, as generic competition
for certain strengths of Solodyn will not begin until February
2018.

Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate when
money damages are the predominant relief that the plaintiffs seek.
Explaining the district court certified the class under Rule
23(b)(2) noting that "a national injunction was the only relief
available to" the class); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory
committee's note to 1966 amendment.  The EPPs argue that "monetary
relief alone cannot remedy [the] harm" that Defendants'
anticompetitive conduct has caused.

When the primary relief sought is monetary, however, certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate.

EPP assert that injunctive relief is their primary remedy sought.
The Court thus concludes that injunctive relief is merely
incidental to the vast monetary damages EPPs seek, rendering
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) inappropriate here.

Accordingly, the Court allows DPPs' motion for class certification
and allows EPPs' motion for class certification under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3), excluding Montana consumer protection claims, and
denies EPPs' motion for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2).

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7bnhsl4
from Leagle.com.

Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Archana Tamoshunas -- atamoshunas@tcllaw.com -- Taus, Cebulash &
Landau, LLP, pro hac vice, Barry S. Taus --  btaus@tcllaw.com --
Taus, Cebulash & Landau, pro hac vice, Daniel C. Simons --
dsimons@bm.net Berger & Montague PC, pro hac vice, Daniel Walker -
- dwalker@bm.net -- Berger & Montague PC, pro hac vice, David F.
Sorensen -- dsorensen@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac
vice, Joseph T. Lukens -- jlukens@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI &
FARUQI, pro hac vice & Peter Kohn --  pkohn@faruqilaw.com --
Faruqi & Faruqi LLP, pro hac vice.

Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by David S.
Nalven -- davidn@hbsslaw.com Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Lauren G. Barnes -- lauren@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, Andrew C. Curley -- acurley@bm.net -- Berger &
Montague, PC & Kiersten Taylor -- kierstent@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Albertson's LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Anna T. Neill
aneill@knpa.com  Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice, Richard
Alan Arnold -- raa@knpa.com --  Kenny Nachwalter, PA, Scott E.
Perwin -- sep@knpa.com --  Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. & Lauren C.
Ravkind -- lcr@knpa.com --  Kenny Nachwalter PA, pro hac vice.

HEB GROCERY CO. LP, Plaintiff, represented by Anna T. Neill, Kenny
Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice, Richard Alan Arnold, Kenny
Nachwalter, PA, Scott E. Perwin, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. & Lauren
C. Ravkind, Kenny Nachwalter PA, pro hac vice.

Safeway, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Anna T. Neill, Kenny
Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice, Richard Alan Arnold, Kenny
Nachwalter, PA, Scott E. Perwin, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. & Lauren
C. Ravkind, Kenny Nachwalter PA, pro hac vice.

The Kroger Co., Plaintiff, represented by Anna T. Neill, Kenny
Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice, Richard Alan Arnold, Kenny
Nachwalter, PA, Scott E. Perwin, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. & Lauren
C. Ravkind, Kenny Nachwalter PA, pro hac vice.

Walgreen Co., Plaintiff, represented by Anna T. Neill, Kenny
Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice, Richard Alan Arnold, Kenny
Nachwalter, PA, Scott E. Perwin, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A. & Lauren
C. Ravkind, Kenny Nachwalter PA, pro hac vice.

Rite Aid Corporation, Plaintiff, represented by Barry L. Refsin,
Hangley -- brefsin@hangley.com -- Aronghick, Segal, Pudlin &
Schiller, Daniel P. Thiel -- dthiel@hangley.com-  Hangley
Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice, Eric L. Bloom --
ebloom@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller,
pro hac vice, Monica L. Kiley -- mkiley@hangley.com -- Hangley
Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice & Scott E. Perwin
-- sep@knpa.com --  Kenny Nachwalter, P.A..

Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., Plaintiff, represented by Barry L. Refsin,
Hangley, Aronghick, Segal, Pudlin & Schiller, Daniel P. Thiel,
Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice, Eric L.
Bloom, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice,
Monica L. Kiley, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro
hac vice & Scott E. Perwin, Kenny Nachwalter, P.A..

CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Daniel P. Thiel,
Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice, Eric L.
Bloom, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller & Monica L.
Kiley, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, pro hac vice.

Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., Defendant, represented by ALEXANDER
L. HARRIS -- harrisa@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, pro hac
vice, Anjali B. Patel -- anjali.patel@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, BARBARA T.
SICALIDES -- sicalidesb@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, pro
hac vice, DANIEL J. BOLAND -- bolandd@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP, pro hac vice, James R. Carroll --
james.carroll@skadden.com -Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Julia K. York -- julia.york@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, STEVEN C. SUNSHINE,
steve.sunshine@skadden.com --  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, Sara L. Bensley -- sara.bensley@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Sean M. Tepe --
sean.tepe@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
pro hac vice, Christian R. Jenner -- cjenner@duffysweeney.com --
Duffy & Sweeney, Ltd., James Douglas Baldridge --
jbaldridge@Venable.com    -- Venable LLP & William K. Wray, Jr. --
wwray@duffysweeney.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP.

Impax Laboratories, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anna Fabish-
afabish@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle
R. Foley, drfoley@Venable.com   Venable LLP, pro hac vice, James
Douglas Baldridge, Venable LLP, pro hac vice, James J. Belanger --
jbelanger@csblaw.com -- Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, James R.
Carroll, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, John G.
Harkins, Jr. -- jharkins@harkinscunningham.com  -- Harkins
Cunningham, KENNETH R. O'ROURKE -- korourke@omm.com -- O'MELVENY &
MYERS LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine Louise DeStefano --
kdestefano@cblawyers.com -- Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Keith
Beauchamp -- kbeauchamp@cblawyers.com -- Coppersmith Brockelman
PLC, Kristin M. Koger -- kmkoger@Venable.com --  Venable LLP, pro
hac vice, Lisa Jose Fales -- ljfales@Venable.com -- Venable LLP,
pro hac vice, Neill C. Klin -- nkling@harkinscunningham.com --
Harkins Cunningham, Stephen J. McIntyre -- smcintyre@omm.com --
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Christian R. Jenner, Duffy &
Sweeney, Ltd., Joseph L. Demeo -- jdemeo@DemeoLLP.com -- Demeo
LLP, Lawrence S. Delaney -- ldelaney@DemeoLLP.com-  Demeo LLP &
William K. Wray, Jr., Brown Rudnick LLP.


MED-CARE DIABETIC: Court Certifies of TCPA Class
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
ARWA CHIROPRACTIC, P.C., an Illinois professional corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. MED-CARE DIABETIC & MEDICAL
SUPPLIES, INC. and STEVEN SILVERMAN, Defendants, No. 14 C 5602
(N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff has filed a motion for class certification pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 23(b)(3), seeking
certification solely with respect to its Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) claims.

Plaintiff received a series of six faxes from Med-Care Diabetic &
Medical Supplies, Inc. Based upon its receipt of these faxes,
Plaintiff has filed suit against Med-Care and its CEO, Steven
Silverman, alleging violations of the TCPA.  In addition,
Plaintiff has alleged state law claims for conversion and
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1.

Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity

Plaintiff asserts that it has established numerosity under Rule
23(a) because invoices from Med-Care's fax vendor with fax
transmission quantities show that Defendants sent over 46,000
faxes to thousands of recipients. The Court notes that the
invoices specify the quantity of fax transmissions, but they do
not appear to indicate the number of recipients per se. It may be
possible, for example, that Defendants sent thousands of fax
transmissions to a small number of recipients. Be that as it may,
Defendants, as the senders of the faxes, are in a position to know
the number of recipients, and they do not dispute Plaintiff's
assertion.  The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has satisfied
the numerosity requirement.

Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality

Plaintiff asserts that a number of common questions drive the
resolution of its claims, including: (1) whether Defendants'
prescription request form is an advertisement within the meaning
of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(a)(5); (2) whether Defendants obtained
"express invitation or permission" from recipient doctors before
sending the faxes to them; (3) whether the forms included
compliant opt-out language; (4) whether Defendants have sender
liability for the faxes; (5) whether Plaintiffs and other class
members are entitled to statutory damages; (6) whether Defendants'
violations were knowing or willful and, if so, whether the Court
should treble the statutory damages; and (7) whether the Court
should enjoin Defendants from faxing advertisements in the future
without prior express consent or without an opt-in notice.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement.

Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality

Plaintiff states that it meets the typicality requirement because
Defendants faxed each class member one or more "prescription
request forms" regarding an Ipratropium-Albuterol Nebulizer Kit.
According to Plaintiff, each of the class members was subjected to
the same conduct, and each member's claim is based on the same
legal theory as Plaintiff's.  Because the Court does not otherwise
find any reason to doubt that Plaintiff's claims have the same
essential characteristics as the claims of members of the class,
the Court concludes that the typicality requirement is satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy

The qualifications of counsel, Plaintiff notes, Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC, has proven expertise in TCPA litigation. Counsel
has "been litigating TCPA claims since 2003 and ha[s] prosecuted
dozens of such cases to successful resolution, including many
class-wide settlements."  With respect to the second prong of the
adequacy requirement, Plaintiff explains that it and the other
class members all seek statutory damages under the TCPA, they have
no antagonism toward one another, there is no potential for
conflicting interests, and Plaintiff understands the obligations
and nature of its claims.

Defendants' arguments that they had the express invitation or
permission of recipient doctors that Section 227(a)(5) requires
lack viability based on the record before the Court. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff would likely not need to devote
significant resources to litigate the consent defense on behalf of
the class, and Plaintiff would not have a misalignment in
incentives to protect the interests of the class as a whole.

Therefore, given the nature of Plaintiff's claims, there is no
indication that the named representative will be inadequate to
protect the interests of the class, or that there is risk of
antagonistic or conflicting claims arising within the class.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied the adequacy
requirement under Rule 23(a).

Rule 23(b)(3): Predominance

Plaintiff argues that predominance is satisfied because the class
members' claims arise under the same federal statute (the TCPA),
the Defendants sent all class members the same form of
advertisement in six fax blasts during a four-month period in
2013, and none of the putative class members provided prior
express invitation or permission.

In this case, Plaintiff has met its burden of demonstrating that
common questions predominate over individualized issues as to the
rest of the class. Each of the class members' claims arises under
the TCPA, Defendants sent all class members the same form by fax,
and there appear to be no viable individualized defenses based on
the record at this stage.

Moreover, once it is determined whether Defendants violated the
TCPA, calculating individual damages will be a simple matter of
tallying the number of unsolicited advertisements class members
received by fax and computing statutory damages under 47 U.S.C.
Section 227(b)(3).

Additionally, determining whether treble damages are available
based on a finding that Defendants willfully or knowingly violated
the TCPA, Section 227(b)(C), is likely, in this case, to be
resolved at the class level. For these reasons, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement of
predominance.

Rule 23(b)(3): Superiority

Because common questions predominate, class certification is the
most efficient method of adjudicating the class members' TCPCA
claims. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied
the superiority requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).

For these reasons, Plaintiff's Rule 23 motion for class
certification is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ybxhxsnwfrom Leagle.com.

Arwa Chiropractic, P.C., Plaintiff, represented by James Michael
Smith -: jim@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock,
Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Arwa Chiropractic, P.C., Plaintiff, represented by Phillip A. Bock
-- phil@classlawyers.com  Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch,
Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, John P. Orellana, Bock, Hatch, Lewis &
Oppenheim, LLC, Jonathan B. Piper -- jon@classlawyers.com -- Bock
& Hatch, LLC & Kimberly M. Watt, Bock & Hatch Llc.

Med-Care Diabetic & Medical Supplies, Inc., Defendant, represented
by James Kevin Schultz --  jschultz@sessions.legal -- Sessions
Fishman Nathan & Israel LLP, Bryan C. Shartle --
bshartle@sessions.legal -- Sessions, Fishman & Nathan, LLP, Daniel
James Mcginn-shapiro, Ungaretti & Harris Llp Three First National
Plaza 70 West Madison Street, Suite 3500, Chicago, IL 60602 &
Daniel W. Pisani -- dpisani@sessions.legal -Sessions Fishman
Nathan & Israel.

Steven Silverman, Defendant, represented by James Kevin Schultz,
Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel LLP, Daniel James Mcginn-shapiro,
Ungaretti & Harris Llp & Daniel W. Pisani, Sessions Fishman Nathan
& Israel.


MERCHANT SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Enforce Deal in "Rainbow"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied former Defendant Universal Card,
Inc.'s motion to enforce a settlement agreement and permanently
enjoin counterclaims brought in a New York state court lawsuit by
an individual named Michael A. Han in the case captioned RAINBOW
BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, d/b/a PRECISION TUNE AUTO CARE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. MERCHANT SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 10-cv-01993-CW (N.D. Cal.).

In this action, the Plaintiffs allege that Merchant Services
Defendants, including Universal Card, conspired with the
Defendants Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., MBF Leasing, LLC,
Northern Funding, LLC, SKS Associates, LLC, Jay Cohen, Sara
Krieger, Leonard Mezei and Sam Buono ("Leasing Defendants"), to
enroll small businesses in long term, unconscionable lease
agreements for payment card processing equipment and services.
They further allege that, when merchants stopped making payments
under those leases, MBF filed debt collection lawsuits in New
York, without regard to the merchant's location.

Merchant Services Defendants reached a settlement with the
Plaintiffs.  On Dec. 11, 2013, the Court granted final approval of
the settlement.  The Plaintiffs continue to pursue claims in the
action against the non-released parties.  The Court granted a
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement between the
Plaintiffs and the Leasing Defendants on Aug. 3, 2017, and a final
approval hearing is scheduled for Nov. 28, 2017.

One of the 2013 settlement class members was a company called WRS,
Inc., doing business as The Wedding Ring Shop ("WRS").  In August
2009, MBF filed an action in the Civil Court of the City of New
York, County of New York against Han.  MBF alleged that it had
entered into an equipment finance lease agreement with WRS,
payment on which was personally guaranteed by Han.  It alleged
that WRS had failed to make its required monthly payments and Han
therefore owed the balance, with interest, by reason of his
personal guarantee.

Neither Universal Card nor WRS was a party to the action.  Han
filed a verified answer and counterclaims, raising claims similar
to those in this action.  Almost eight years later, in June 2017,
MBF filed a third-party complaint in the same court against
Universal Card and its alleged employee Tina Marie Shorter,
seeking indemnification with regard to Han's counterclaims against
MBF.  Universal Card has submitted evidence that it was not aware
of the dispute between Han and MBF until MBF demanded
indemnification.

In its motion, Universal Card contends that, even though MBF is a
non-released party in the 2013 Merchant Services settlement, Han's
New York counterclaims are premised on Universal Card's alleged
misconduct in procuring the WRS lease.  It contends that the 2013
release in this action extended not only to the released parties
such as Universal Card, but to all claims, against anyone, that
could have been or actually were brought in this action and are
related in any way to the settled claims.  Thus, it argues, Han's
claims are barred by the release and by the doctrine of claim
preclusion.  It requests that the Court permanently enjoins Han
from pursuing his state court counterclaims.

Judge Wilken finds that Universal Card's argument is contrary to
the plain language of the agreement, which expressly and
repeatedly provides that no release is given to the defined non-
released parties.  It also makes no sense in light of the fact
that the Plaintiffs have continued to pursue such claims against
the non-released parties in this very action.

Because the Merchant Services settlement agreement did not release
any claims against MBF, Han's counterclaims are not barred by
claim preclusion.  Settling parties may waive or limit the effect
of res judicata by consent, as they did here.  Additionally, the
Judge says MBF and Universal Card are not in privity either in
connection with their interests in this lawsuit or in the New York
lawsuits.  The contractual relationship between MBF and Universal
Card, the fact that both were Defendants in this lawsuit and MBF's
attempt to seek indemnification from Universal Card are not
sufficient to support a finding of privity.

In this action, Merchant Services Defendants (including Universal
Card) and Leasing Defendants (including MBF) negotiated separate
settlement agreements expressly involving separate releases, and
only the Merchant Services settlement has been granted final
approval by the Court so far.  Likewise, in New York, MBF and
Universal are adversaries in the third-party indemnity litigation.
MBF apparently did not even notify Universal Card of Han's
counterclaims for many years, until it decided to sue Universal
Card to enforce its alleged right to indemnification.

Judge Wilken also finds that Universal Card has not shown that WRS
is the real party in interest in the New York action, where MBF
expressly alleged claims against Han as a guarantor rather than in
his capacity as an officer or agent of WRS.  In light of her
conclusion that MBF and Universal are not in privity, and res
judicata does not apply, she needs not consider whether Han and
WRS are in privity.  Because the New York counterclaims are
brought against non-released party MBF rather than against
Universal Card, Universal Card's motion to enforce the settlement
must be denied regardless of the role of WRS in the New York
lawsuit.

For these reasons, Judge Wilken denied Universal Card's motion to
enforce the settlement agreement and permanently enjoin Han's
state court counterclaims.  He granted Universal Card's request
for judicial notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/ceWsei from Leagle.com.

Rainbow Business Services, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride
-- adam@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Rainbow Business Services, Plaintiff, represented by Kristen
Gelinas Simplicio -- kristen@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier
LLP.

Rainbow Business Services, doing business as Precision Tune Auto
Care, Plaintiff, represented by Marie Ann McCrary --
marie@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Rainbow Business Services, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Adam
Safier -- seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP & Todd
Michael
Knedy -- todd@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Volker Von Glasenapp, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride,
Gutride Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP,
Marie Ann McCrary, Gutride Safier LLP, Seth Adam Safier, Gutride
Safier LLP & Todd Michael Kennedy, Gutride Safier LLP.

Jerry Su, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride, Gutride Safier
LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP, Marie Ann
McCrary, Gutride Safier LLP & Seth Adam Safier, Gutride Safier
LLP.

Dietz Towing Inc, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride, Gutride
Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP, Marie
Ann McCrary, Gutride Safier LLP, Seth Adam Safier, Gutride Safier
LLP & Todd Michael Kennedy, Gutride Safier LLP.

The Rose Dress Inc, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride,
Gutride Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP,
Seth Adam Safier, Gutride Safier LLP & Todd Michael Kennedy,
Gutride Safier LLP.

Verena Baumgartner, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride,
Gutride Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP,
Seth Adam Safier, Gutride Safier LLP & Todd Michael Kennedy,
Gutride Safier LLP.

Terry Jordan, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride, Gutride
Safier LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP, Marie
Ann McCrary, Gutride Safier LLP, Seth Adam Safier, Gutride Safier
LLP & Todd Michael Kennedy, Gutride Safier LLP.

Merchant Services, Inc, Defendant, represented by Cary Donahue
Sullivan -- carysullivan@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Brian D.
Hershman -- bhershman@jonesday.com -- Kevin Hugh Logan --
kevin.logan@finra.org -- Jones Day, Thomas Reed Malcolm, Jones Day
& Travis Biffar -- tbiffar@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.

Universal Card, Inc., Defendant, represented by Cary Donahue
Sullivan, Jones Day, Brian D. Hershman, Kevin Hugh Logan, Jones
Day, Thomas Reed Malcolm, Jones Day & Travis Biffar, Jones Day.

National Payment Processing, Defendant, represented by Cary
Donahue Sullivan, Jones Day, Brian D. Hershman, Kevin Hugh Logan,
Jones Day, Thomas Reed Malcolm, Jones Day & Travis Biffar, Jones
Day.

MBF Leasing LLC, Defendant, represented by Rod Divelbiss --
rdivelbiss@jralp.com -- JRA Law Partners, LLP, Abraham Y. Skoff --
askoff@mosessinger.com -- Moses Singer, pro hac vice, Jennifer
Nigro, Moses & Singer LLP, pro hac vice, John Vincent Erickson,
JRA Law Partners LLP, John Merrill Heaphy, III --
jheaphy@harrisonheld.com -- Harrison and Held, LLP, pro hac vice,
Robert Lillienstein -- rlillienstein@mosessinger.com -- Moses
Singer LLP, pro hac vice, Scott E. Silberfein --
ssilberfein@mosessinger.com -- Moses and Singer LLP & Thomas J.
Kavaler -- tkavaler@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon Reindel LLP.

Northern Funding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Rod Divelbiss,
JRA Law Partners, LLP, Abraham Y. Skoff, Moses Singer, pro hac
vice, Jennifer Nigro, Moses & Singer LLP, pro hac vice, John
Vincent Erickson, JRA Law Partners LLP, Robert Lillienstein, Moses
Singer LLP, pro hac vice, Scott E. Silberfein, Moses and Singer
LLP & Thomas J. Kavaler, Cahill Gordon Reindel LLP.

Jay Cohen, Defendant, represented by Rod Divelbiss, JRA Law
Partners, LLP, Abraham Y. Skoff, Moses Singer, pro hac vice,
Jennifer Nigro, Moses & Singer LLP, pro hac vice, John Vincent
Erickson, JRA Law Partners LLP, Robert Lillienstein, Moses Singer
LLP, pro hac vice, Scott E. Silberfein, Moses and Singer LLP &
Thomas J. Kavaler, Cahill Gordon Reindel LLP.

Sara Krieger, Defendant, represented by Rod Divelbiss, JRA Law
Partners, LLP, Abraham Y. Skoff, Moses Singer, pro hac vice,
Jennifer Nigro, Moses & Singer LLP, pro hac vice, John Vincent
Erickson, JRA Law Partners LLP, Robert Lillienstein, Moses Singer
LLP, pro hac vice, Scott E. Silberfein, Moses and Singer LLP &
Thomas J. Kavaler, Cahill Gordon Reindel LLP.

Jason Moore, Defendant, represented by Cary Donahue Sullivan,
Jones Day, Brian D. Hershman, Kevin Hugh Logan, Jones Day, Thomas
Reed Malcolm, Jones Day & Travis Biffar, Jones Day.

Sam Buono, Defendant, represented by Rod Divelbiss, JRA Law
Partners, LLP, Abraham Y. Skoff, Moses Singer, pro hac vice,
Jennifer Nigro, Moses & Singer LLP, pro hac vice, John Vincent
Erickson, JRA Law Partners LLP, Robert Lillienstein, Moses Singer
LLP, pro hac vice, Scott E. Silberfein, Moses and Singer LLP &
Thomas J. Kavaler, Cahill Gordon Reindel LLP.

Fiona Walshe, Defendant, represented by Matthew Keenan Wegner --
mwegner@bwmllp.com -- Brown Wegner McNamara LLP, James Cai, Schein
& Cai LLP, Janet Suejean Park, Matrix Service Company, Matthew
Allen Berliner -- mberliner@fortislaw.com -- Brown Wegner Berliner
LLP & Seth Wesley Wiener -- mwegner@bwmllp.com -- Law Offices of
Seth W. Wiener.


MSP CROSSROADS: Former Renters Settle Class Suit for $650,000
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kirsten Swanson, writing for KSTP, reports that a class-action
lawsuit, alleging housing discrimination by an apartment complex
in Richfield, has been settled for $650,000.

The complex was formally known as "Crossroads at Penn." New
management renamed the units when it took over in the fall of
2015.

The rental units, owned by MSP Crossroads and Soderberg Apartment
Specialists, came under fire in 2015 when they announced they
would no longer accept federal Section 8 housing vouchers.

The move forced dozens of residents out.

Housing advocates say it's a first-of-its-kind settlement in the
nation. And it could set a new precedent for affordable housing
fights.

U.S. District Court judge Ann Montgomery approved the preliminary
settlement. The final settlement could be approved in January of
2018.

Former tenant Linda Soderstrom said the settlement is the
culmination of more than two years of heartbreak and hard work.

"I think it's really welcome," Soderstrom said. "Now tenants who
really wanted to put this behind them can move on."

The settlement will be divided between several entities and
tenants who qualify for class status under law.

Eric Hauge, the public policy director for HOME Line in Minnesota,
said the outcome of the lawsuit is a "symbolic measure."

"Treating folks this way -- it's not what we do in Minnesota,"
Hauge said. "This was a very unique application of Fair Housing
laws. We knew that the population of the apartment complex was
mostly people of color and people of under-protected classes."

Jim Soderberg, president of Soderberg Apartment Specialists, sent
a statement via email after the settlement announcement:

"In regard to the settlement of the class action lawsuit involving
the Concierge property, MSP Crossroads and Soderberg Apartments
Specialists deny that any of our conduct regarding the Concierge
property violated the law, and stridently maintain our belief that
we would have ultimately prevailed in the litigation.

"However, due to practical considerations, including the unique
characteristics of this property, we believed that a resolution
was appropriate." [GN]


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Accused by "Livers" Suit of Violating FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
LAWRENCE "POPPY" LIVERS, on his own behalf and on behalf of
similarly situated persons v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a the NCAA, and the following NCAA Division I
Member Schools as representatives of a Defendant Class of all
private and semi-public member schools that entered/enter into
Athletic Financial Aid Agreements with the Plaintiff Collective:
BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY, DREXEL UNIVERSITY, DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY,
FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY, LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, LAFAYETTE
COLLEGE, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY, MONMOUTH UNIVERSITY, RIDER UNIVERSITY,
ROBERT MORRIS UNIVERSITY, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, SAINT FRANCIS
UNIVERSITY, SAINT JOSEPH'S UNIVERSITY, ST. PETER'S UNIVERSITY,
VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, RUTGERS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW JERSEY, and TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, Case No. 2:17-cv-04271-MMB
(E.D. Pa., September 26, 2017), alleges that the Defendants
jointly refused, and failed, to properly classify the Plaintiff
and members of the Scholarship Athlete Collective as employees,
and to compensate them on a minimum wage scale, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants are the National Collegiate Athletic Association
and private and semi-public NCAA Division I member schools that
entered/enter into Athletic Financial Aid Agreements requiring
recipients of athletic scholarships to participate in NCAA
athletics.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul L. McDonald, Esq.
          P L MCDONALD LAW LLC
          1800 JFK Boulevard, Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 238-3835
          Facsimile: (267) 238-3801
          E-mail: paul@plmcdonaldlaw.com


NAVIENT CORP: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lundin Law PC, a shareholder rights firm, disclosed the filing of
a class action lawsuit against Navient Corporation ("Navient" or
the "Company") (Nasdaq:NAVI) concerning possible violations of
federal securities laws between February 25, 2016 and October 4,
2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired shares during the Class Period should contact
the firm prior to the December 15, 2017 lead plaintiff motion
deadline.

To participate in this class action lawsuit, you can call Brian
Lundin, Esq. -- brian@lundinlawpc.com -- of Lundin Law PC, at 888-
713-1033.

No class has been certified in the above action yet. Until a class
is certified, you are not considered represented by an attorney.
You may also choose to do nothing and be an absent class member.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, Navient
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: the Company engaged in deceptive practices to facilitate the
origination of subprime loans; that the Company committed unfair
and deceptive acts by steering student borrowers into payment
plans that postponed bills, allowing interest to accumulate,
rather than helping them enroll in income-driven repayment plans;
and thus, the Company's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times. Upon release of this news,
shares of Navient dropped in value materially, which caused
investors harm according to the Complaint.

Lundin Law PC was founded by Brian Lundin, Esq., a securities
litigator based in Los Angeles dedicated to upholding
shareholders' rights. [GN]


NAVIENT CORP: Pomerantz LLP Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Navient Corporation ("Navient" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:NAVI) and certain of its officers. The class action, filed
in United States District Court, District of New Jersey, is on
behalf of a class consisting of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Navient securities, seeking to recover
compensable damages caused by defendants' violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Navient securities between
February 25, 2016, and October 4, 2017, both dates inclusive, you
have until December 15, 2017, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action, contact
Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529
(or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-
mail are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone
number, and the number of shares purchased.

Navient provides asset management and business processing services
to education, healthcare, and government clients at the federal,
state, and local levels in the United States.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Navient engaged in deceptive practices to facilitate the
origination of subprime loans; (2) Navient committed unfair and
deceptive acts by steering student borrowers into payment plans
that postponed bills, allowing interest to accumulate, rather than
helping them enroll in income-driven repayment plans; and (3) as a
result, Navient's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On October 5, 2017, Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro
announced the filing of a lawsuit in United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Navient and one of
its subsidiaries for engaging in unfair and deceptive lending and
failed to offer proper prepayment plans to students (the "PA AG
Lawsuit").  Specifically, the PA AG Lawsuit alleged, among other
things, that "Defendants unfairly and deceptively engaged in a
series of acts and practices to facilitate originating . . .
subprime loans to many borrowers who had a high risk of
defaulting" and "since at least 2011, despite publicly assuring
borrowers that [Navient] will help them identify and enroll in an
appropriate, affordable repayment plan, Defendants have routinely
disregarded that commitment and instead steered borrowers
experiencing long-term financial hardship into forbearance."

On this news, Navient's share price fell $2.10, or over 14% from
its previous closing price, to close at $12.60 on October 5, 2017,
damaging investors.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in
the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, Esq. known
as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years
later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he
established, fighting for the rights of the victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The
Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on
behalf of class members. [GN]


NEW YORK: City Spent More Than $1 Billion on Lawsuit Payouts
------------------------------------------------------------
Kathianne Boniello, Dean Balsamini, Sara Dorn and Susan Edelman,
writing for The New York Post, reports that the city doled out the
staggering sum in settlements and judgments in fiscal year 2016,
with payments for injuries and other damages rising by 7 percent
over the prior fiscal year, city Comptroller Scott Stringer
reports.

Nearly 10,000 tort claimants received $629.5 million for alleged
police misconduct or mistakes, medical malpractice or unsafe
sidewalks and schools.

The payments also ended dust-gathering suits filed as long ago as
1993, including $13.5 million for seven murder victims of "Mafia
Cops" Louis Eppolito and Stephen Caracappa, NYPD detectives who
served the Lucchese crime family in the '80s and '90s.

Another $380.9 million paid claims in cases involving contracts,
salary disputes, or a lack of special-ed services.

Stringer called the payout total "alarming."

"The city needs to take a data-driven, agency-by-agency approach
to lowering these costs," he told The Post.

Payouts for wrongful convictions, hospital malpractice and
violence at Rikers Island drove up costs.

The biggest single payout, $15 million, went to Alan Newton, who
spent 22 years in prison for a rape he didn't commit. In another
federal civil-rights suit, $11.2 million went to lawyers in a
class-action case that found the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy
unconstitutional.

Eric Garner's family got the biggest payout for police actions,
receiving $5.9 million for his 2014 death during an arrest.

In a case over school negligence, the family of Avonte Oquendo, an
autistic 14-year-old who drowned in the East River after leaving
his Queens school, settled for $2.7 million.

Most claimants walked way with much less. Among tort cases, about
4,400 claimants, or 46 percent, got less than $10,000; only 114
received $1 million or more.

In 2014, Stringer launched ClaimStat, a program that tracks legal
claims against the city and identifies trends so preventive action
can be taken.

"This will allow us to be smart about settling the claims that
have merit -- and fighting the frivolous cases that don't," he
said.

                       Sidewalk Stumble

A city garbage man bagged $1.3 million after claiming injuries
from tripping on a sidewalk. Kenneth Normile, now 52, was
collecting trash in front of homes on Metropolitan Avenue in on
Oct. 5, 2009 when he stepped on "unlevel, broken concrete and
cobblestone." He had a spinal neurotransmitter implanted and never
returned to work after he "was forced to retire early."

                          Housing Hazard

Kwame Cummings, 25, charged that he was poisoned by lead paint in
a city-owned apartment in Washington Heights between ages 3 and 6.
He lived in the building at 519 W. 157th St. from March 17, 1990
to May 9, 1994 with his mother, Maricella. His suit alleged that
the city knew the walls were "peeling, cracking, scaling." The
youth was diseased by lead dust and paint chips, his suit alleged.
"There was no defense to his lead poisoning," Cummings' attorney
Corey Stern told The Post. He said the young man suffered
"cognitive deficits." Cummings and his mom received $2.5 million.

                   Bicyclist Beats City Hall

In one of the oldest suits on the city's books, Rhonda Wittorf won
the biggest payout in a "defective roadway" claim -- $2.78 million
-- for injuries suffered after hitting a pothole while cycling in
Central Park in 2005.

A city Department of Transportation supervisor let her ride on the
65th Street transverse road, even as a crew was closing it to fix
potholes and city workers were putting up cones to stop
traffic.

In the tunnel, "Rhonda fell into a ravine-sized crater big enough
for a car to fit in," said her attorney, Paul Dansker.

Wittorf, 49, underwent 18 operations, including "major plastic
surgery," he said.

The jury found her 40 percent liable and the city 60 percent.
After years of wrangling, the verdict was upheld by the state's
highest court.

She left the city in December 2009 and now lives in Colville,
Wash. Facebook photos show her enjoying the outdoors.

Contacted by The Post, she said, "I don't want to talk about a
painful part of my past." [GN]


NORTH STAR: Van Liew Sues Over Not Having Meal and Rest Breaks
--------------------------------------------------------------
CODY VAN LIEW, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NORTH STAR EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC., NORTHSTAR
EMERGENCY SERVICES, INC., NORCAL AMBULANCE, and DOES 1-25,
inclusive, Case No. RG17876878 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty.,
September 27, 2017), challenges the Defendant's alleged policies
and practices of failing to authorize and permit the Plaintiff and
the putative class members to take meal and rest breaks to which
they are entitled by law, and to take regularly scheduled meal and
sleeping periods when working 24-hour shifts.

North Star Emergency Services, Inc., is a California corporation
with its headquarters in Dublin, California.  North Star does
business as NORCAL Ambulance, and provides medical transportation
to clients in Northern California.  The true names and capacities
of the Doe Defendants are unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carolyn H. Cottrell, Esq.
          David C. Leimbach, Esq.
          Mira P. Karageorge, Esq.
          Michelle S. Lim, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                  dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com
                  mkarageorge@gmail.com
                  mlim@schneiderwallace.com


NORTHSTAR ALARM: Aug. 6 Class Certification Hearing in "Smothers"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JULIAN SMOTHERS, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
NORTHSTAR ALARM SERVICES, LLC, Defendant(s), Case No. 2:17-CV-
00548-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Parties' stipulation to modify the Pretrial Scheduling Order for
Class Certification and continued all of the referenced dates
contained therein by a period of not less than four months or by
any other period otherwise deemed appropriate by the Court
according to its schedule, such that the Parties may resolve the
current discovery disputes and obtain meaningful discovery.

On June 29, 2017, the Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order for
Class Certification setting, among other things: (i) a discovery
cut-off date for Nov. 26, 2017, with a scope of discovery focused
primarily on class certification; (ii) an expert disclosure date
of Nov. 27, 2017; and (iii) a motion for conditional FLSA
certification and class certification filing date of Feb. 26,
2018.

The Parties exchanged initial disclosures on July 6, 2017.  The
Plaintiffs propounded a Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition, a set of
Request for Production of Documents, and a set of Interrogatories
on July 18, 2017.  The Defendant provided the Plaintiffs with its
objections to the deposition notice on Aug. 8, 2017, and therefore
with its objections to the requests for production and the
interrogatories on Aug. 18, 2017.

The Plaintiffs provided the Defendant with meet-and-confer letters
on Aug. 22, 2017, responding to the Defendant's objections.  They
reached out to set up a meet and confer call on Aug. 22, 2017.
The Defendant responded to the Plaintiffs' request for a meet-and-
confer call on Aug. 28, 2017, and agreed to a call on Aug. 30,
2017.

The Parties met and conferred via phone on Aug. 30, 2017, and
determined that discovery disputes would need to be resolved by
the Court.  The Plaintiffs prepared a Joint Statement RE:
Discovery Dispute of over 100 pages and submitted the same to the
Defendant for comment and revisions on Sept. 11, 2017.  The
Defendant provided the Plaintiffs with its revisions on Sept. 21,
2017.

The Parties conferred on the revised Joint Statement RE: Discovery
Dispute via phone on Sept. 22, 2017, and agreed on the final draft
thereof.  The Parties filed the Joint Statement RE: Discovery
Dispute with the Court on Sept. 27, 2017.

The Court scheduled a hearing on the Joint Statement RE: Discovery
Dispute for its earliest available date on Oct. 26, 2017, to
resolve issues associated with the Plaintiffs' first set of
discovery initially propounded in July.  This would leave less
than one month before the Nov. 26, 2017, discovery cut-off date
and the Nov. 27, 2017, expert disclosure cut-off date.

The Parties have been exceedingly diligent in pursuing discovery
for a complex nationwide class action.  They've been exceedingly
diligent in meeting and conferring on a high number of discovery
disputes for a complex nationwide class action.

The Parties have met and conferred and agree that good cause
exists to modify the current Pretrial Scheduling Order for Class
Certification to continue all dates contained therein.
Specifically, the Parties request extension of the following dates
by a period of not less than four months, including: (i) the Nov.
26, 2017 Discovery Cut Off; (ii) the Nov. 27, 2017 Expert
Disclosure Cut Off; (iii) the Dec. 18, 2017 Rebuttal Expert
Disclosure Cut Off; (iv) the Jan. 19, 2018 Expert Discovery Cut
Off; and (v) the Feb. 26, 2018 Motion for Conditional FLSA
Certification and Class Certification Filing Deadline.

The Parties jointly stipulate that good cause exists and
respectfully request an Order modifying the Pretrial Scheduling
Order for Class Certification and continuing all of the referenced
dates contained therein by a period of not less than four months
or by any other period otherwise deemed appropriate by the Court
according to its schedule, such that the Parties may resolve the
current discovery disputes and obtain meaningful discovery.

Based on the Stipulation submitted by the Parties, and for good
cause showing, Judge Mueller ordered that the June 29, 2017
Pretrial Scheduling Order for Class Certification will be modified
to extend the all dates contained therein as deemed appropriate by
the Court.  Specifically, the following cut offs will be
continued: (i)

     a. Discovery Cut Off: Nov. 26, 2017 continued to March 26,
2018

     b. Expert Disclosure: Nov. 27, 2017 continued to March 30,
2018

     c. Rebuttal Expert Disclosure: Dec. 18, 2017 continued to
April 20, 2018

     d. Expert Discovery: Jan. 19, 2018 continued to May 21, 2018

     e. Motion for Conditional FLSA Certification: Feb. 26, 2018
continued to June 25, 2018

     f. Class Certification Hearing on any motion: April 6, 2018
continued to Aug. 6, 2018 at 10:00 in Courtroom No. 3

     g. Further Status Conference on Conditional FLSA
Certification or Class Certification: June 21, 2018 to Nov. 2,
2018 at 2:30 in Courtroom No. 3

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MWAYJo from Leagle.com.

Julian Smothers, Plaintiff, represented by Jared Hague --
jared@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC.

Julian Smothers, Plaintiff, represented by S. Brett Sutton --
brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC &
Anthony Eugene Guzman -- anthony@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague
Law Corporation.

Asa Dhadda, Plaintiff, represented by Jared Hague, Sutton Hague
Law Corporation, PC & S. Brett Sutton, Sutton Hague Law
Corporation, PC.

NorthStar Alarm Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew V.
Collins -- inquiries@mbmlawyers.com -- Mitchell Barlow &
Mansfield, P.C., pro hac vice, J. Ryan Mitchell, Mitchell Barlow &
Mansfield, PC, pro hac vice & Claire Yvonne Dossier, Mitchell
Barlow & Mansfield, P.C.


NOVARTIS PHARMA: "Young" Wage and Hour Suit Remanded to State Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
the case captioned CHANTAE YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. NOVARTIS
PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 7-cv-04390-EMC
(N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in San Mateo County
Superior Court, against her employer, for various California wage-
and-hour law violations.  NPC removed the case, invoking
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

A district court has jurisdiction over a class action if: (1) the
case involves at least 100 putative class members; (2) at least
one class member is a citizen of a state different from any
defendant; and (3) the aggregated amount in controversy exceeds $5
million, exclusive of interest and costs.

NPC presented uncontested evidence that the class consists of more
than 100 individuals. Thus, this jurisdictional requirement is
met.

NPC is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its U.S.
headquarters in New Jersey.  Plaintiff is a citizen of California.
Thus, the minimal  requirement is met.

The removing defendant of establishing bears the burden to
establish jurisdiction under CAFA. The defendant bears the burden
of showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and
of persuading the court that the estimate is a reasonable one.
The Court has given both parties ample opportunities to submit
evidence including and after the hearing on the motion. The Court,
in considering the evidence, must determine whether the $5 million
jurisdictional threshold has been established by a preponderance
of the evidence. NPC has failed to meet its burden of proving the
requisite amount in controversy for the following reasons.  Even
assuming that all the assumptions made for unpaid overtime wages,
waiting time penalties, and wage statement penalties are
reasonable, the amount in controversy for these three counts is
only $1,485,322.48. Therefore, the key issue is the amount of
controversy attributed to the meal and rest break premiums, which
makes up almost $5 million.

In calculating the meal and rest break premiums, NPC assumes a
100% violation rate.  NPC argues that this assumption is
reasonable because the allegations in the Complaint states that
class members were denied meal and rest breaks at all material
time, based on a uniform policy/practice of wage abuse that
involved failing to pay them for  missed meal periods and rest
breaks and policies and practices requiring employees to work
through their meal and rest periods without paying them proper
compensation.  NPC has not met its burden to prove that the 100%
violation rate assumption is reasonable and that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million.

Even if the Court were to assume a violation rate, of two days a
week, the damages for missed meal and rest breaks would amount to
$1,984,418.40. Adding the claims for unpaid overtime wages
($744,242.88), waiting time penalties ($595,929.60), wage
statement penalties ($145,150.00), total damages equals
$3,469,740.88. Even if a 25% fee award is added, the total amount
in controversy would still be only $4,337,176.10. However, even a
25% fee award cannot be counted.

NPC seeks to include attorneys' fees in the amount in controversy
and calculates the attorneys' fees to be 25% of recovery for
unpaid overtime, meal and rest break premium, waiting time
penalties, and wage statement penalties.

In this case, the only fee-shifting statute is for the wage-
statement-penalty claim.  Attorneys' fees for the wage-statement-
penalty claim must be calculated based on the number of hours
worked at a reasonable hourly rate  the lodestar method. NPC has
failed to present any evidence to support an estimate of
attorneys' fees that Plaintiff might recover based on a projected
lodestar. Nor has NPC provided any basis for the Court to conclude
that a 25% benchmark provides a reasonable proxy for the lodestar
estimate.

Therefore, NPC has not proven by a preponderance of evidence
attorneys' fees that should be included in the amount in
controversy. In any event, even if a 25% award were included, the
total amount of controversy would not read $5 million.
Because the preponderance of the evidence does not establish the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, the Court lacks
jurisdiction under CAFA. The Court therefore remands the matter to
the San Mateo County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7cn9fb2from Leagle.com.

Chantae Young, Plaintiff, represented by Edwin Aiwazian -
edwin@lfjpc.com --  Lawyers for Justice, PC.

Chantae Young, Plaintiff, represented by Jill Jessica Parker --
jill@lfjpc.com --  Lawyers for Justice, PC.

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Defendant, represented by A.
Marisa Chun -- mchun@mwe.com  -- McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Jeremy White, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, The McDermott Building,
Washington, DC 20001,  pro hac vice & Kerry Alan Scanlon,
McDermott Will & Emery, The McDermott Building, Washington, DC
20001,  pro hac vice.


OAK PARK: Employee Fingerprint Scans Land Provider in CA Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Mongan, writing for McKnight's, reports that an Illinois
nursing home is facing a class-action lawsuit filed by a worker
who argues that the facility's required daily fingerprint scans
pose a threat to their privacy.

The suit, filed October 17, claims Paramount of Oak Park
Rehabilitation & Nursing Center's practice of requiring biometric
scans when employees clock in and clock out is in violation of the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, or BIPA. The act was
created to regulate the "collection, use, safeguarding, handling,
storage, retention, and destruction" of biometric information such
as retina scans or fingerprints.

Martin Ragsdale, an employee of the Oak Park, IL, facility who
filed the suit, said in the complaint that the fingerprint scan
process is new, and the only way to prove work attendance. The
suit claims the scans are "invasive" and "expose workers to
serious and irreversible privacy risks -- risks that BIPA was
designed to avoid -- including the ever-present risk of a data
breach," Law360 reported.

"Unlike a Social Security number, which can be changed, no amount
of time or money can compensate [the workers] if their
fingerprints are compromised by the lax procedures through which
defendants capture, collect, store and use their workers'
biometrics," the suit reads.

The suit, which Ragsdale said could apply to hundreds of
employees, seeks an injunction on Paramount gathering more
fingerprints and requests that it destroy the ones it has already
collected. Each negligent violation of BIPA could result in $1,000
in damages, or up to $5,000 for willful or reckless violations if
the facility is found to be sending the fingerprint data to out of
state vendors.

A request for comment from Paramount was not returned by
production deadline October 19. [GN]


OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: Summary Disposition in "Rafaeli" Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jane Markey of the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed the
trial court's order granting the Defendants summary disposition
and denying the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration in the case
captioned RAFAELI, LLC, and ANDRE OHANESSIAN, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. OAKLAND COUNTY and ANDREW MEISNER, Defendants-
Appellees, Case No. 330696 (Mich. App.).

Each Plaintiff owned property on which the Defendants foreclosed
because of tax delinquencies.  The Plaintiffs' lawsuit, styled as
a putative class action, alleged various constitutional
violations.  The trial court found no such violations and ruled,
in connection with a motion for summary disposition, that the
Plaintiffs had forfeited their properties.

The Plaintiffs appeal as of right an order granting summary
disposition to the Defendants, Oakland County and its treasurer
Andrew Meisner, in their case involving the General Property Tax
Act ("GPTA").

Judge Markey rejects the Plaintiffs' claim of facial
unconstitutionality.  The Plaintiffs argue that the GPTA falls
short of the requirements of Jones v Flowers and Sidun v Wayne Co
Treasurer steps when knowing that attempts to serve notice have
failed and that, therefore, the GPTA is unconstitutional on its
face.  However, a statutory provision is not unconstitutional on
its face unless there is no set of circumstances under which it
could be applied constitutionally.  The GPTA does not authorize
proceeding to foreclosure where notice consists of a single
attempt at mailing known to have failed, but rather, it specifies
alternative means of identifying a valid address, mandates
personal visits to the subject property, and sets forth
requirements for notice by publication.  The Judge finds it
reasonable to presume that following the notice requirements of
the GPTA usually results in providing the affected taxpayer with
actual notice of foreclosure proceedings.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the GPTA, as applied to each them,
resulted in a deprivation of constitutional due process in
connection with notice.  The Judge disagrees.  She says the
efforts the Defendants undertook to serve notice on the Plaintiffs
satisfied the minimal requirements of due process, insofar as the
notice was intended to advise the corporation of its tax
liabilities and that its property would be subject to foreclosure
proceedings to satisfy those liabilities.  The validity of the
foreclosure depended not on perfect compliance with the GPTA, but
on satisfying minimal constitutional due process requirements.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the Defendants' administration of
the GPTA's show-cause hearing requirement allows them to play
judge, jury, and executioner without any of the procedural
safeguards required by the Due Process Clause.  Judge Markey
agrees with the Defendants that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing to raise this issue.  Because the Plaintiffs suffered no
injury relating to how the Defendants conduct show-cause hearings,
and can only speculate concerning what might have transpired had
they appeared for one and demanded their attendant statutory
rights, and because their having missed that opportunity in
connection with their respective property interests rendered the
issue moot, she affirms the circuit court's decision not to grant
relief with regard to this issue.

The Judge disagrees with the Plaintiffs' argument that the GPTA is
unconstitutional because it mandates that governmental entities
retain proceeds beyond those required to satisfy delinquent tax
bills; they argue that the GPTA therefore allows unconstitutional
takings.  The Defendants obtained the property by way of a
statutory scheme that did not violate due process.  The
constitution does not require them to compensate the Plaintiffs
for the lawfully-obtained property.  The Plaintiffs' taking
argument is without merit.

For these reasons, Judge Markey held that the trial court did not
err in granting the Defendants summary disposition and in denying
the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.  She affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/d9ZhJD from Leagle.com.

AARON D. COX -- aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com -- for RAFAELI, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant.

WILLIAM H. HORTON, for OAKLAND COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.

CHRISTOPHER J. RYAN -- cryan@gmhlaw.com -- for OAKLAND COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.

ANDREW FINK, for PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, Amicus Curiae.


OHIO: Findlay City to Join Class Action Over New Tax Rule
---------------------------------------------------------
Denise Grant, writing for The Courier, reports that Findlay City
Council has voted to join a class-action lawsuit challenging the
State of Ohio's plans to collect net-profit taxes from businesses.

The rules of council requiring three separate readings were
suspended, and the ordinance was adopted after its first reading
during council's regular session on Oct. 17.

The vote was 9-0, with Councilman John Harrington, R-5, absent.
Council also approved $6,000 to help pay for legal expenses.

Ohio House Bill 49, which is Gov. John Kasich's two-year budget
bill, will allow business owners to file tax returns directly with
the Ohio Department of Taxation, instead of with the municipality
in which the business operates.

The state says the new rule will streamline the filing process for
businesses, which often operate in multiple municipalities.

However, the Ohio Municipal League calls it a "power grab."

According to the Municipal League, the law will give the state
control of over $600 million in municipal revenue, and allow the
state to collect interest from the local government revenue, while
denying municipalities that ability.

The Central Ohio Mayors and Managers Association, representing
about 17 cities in central Ohio, has decided to file the suit,
with cities throughout the state joining in.

In a letter to council dated Oct. 13, Law Director Donald
Rasmussen said, "As you are aware, the State of Ohio has once
again assaulted our constitutional home rule powers.  Central
collection may affect our ability to review returns for accuracy,
and affect our ability to correct, audit and review returns.  It
may also affect our ability to verify rental income on business
filings, and eliminate our ability to approve refunds, among other
things."

Mr. Rasmussen said the expense to the city to join the suit is
worth it.

"I believe it is necessary to not only protect our rights to
municipal income tax revenue, but to fight the state from further
eroding away our home rule authority," he said.

In other business on Oct. 17, Mayor Lydia Mihalik submitted to
council the names of her appointees to the Downtown Design Review
Board.

Appointees include Eric Anderson, Pat Ball and Dr. Duane Wires,
all downtown business owners; Angela Debosky, Findlay-Hancock
County Economic Development; Jeff Fort, attorney; John Hunt and
Brad Wagner, both employed downtown; Hardy Hartzel, construction
specialist; and Jerry Murray, architect.

Their terms will expire Dec. 31, 2018.

In September, council voted to create the review board.  The board
will set standards for the outside appearance of downtown
buildings. [GN]


OHIO: City of Marietta Joining Income Tax Bills Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Janelle Patterson, writing for News and Sentinel, reports that
Marietta City Council passed legislations authorizing the city to
join a class-action lawsuit against the state Legislature and Ohio
Gov. John Kasich for allegedly violating both home rule and the
single subject rule in the passage of House Bills 5 and 49.

The two bills passed by the state in the last two years contain
broad and sweeping changes to Ohio's municipal income tax, the
main source of income for many municipalities including Marietta.

"This ordinance will make us a part of the coalition of other
governmental entities around the state that are challenging the
constitutionality of these bills," explained Councilman Tom
Vukovic, D-4th ward. "We have an income tax department here that
does an outstanding job and the state is trying to usurp that
authority from us."

Treasurer Cathy Harper was also present October 19 to explain that
the expansion of the Ohio Business Gateway as outlined in the
state legislation would hinder local business creation.

"This piece of legislation tonight is so important because the
state is already trying to make their pitch to local businesses
for the Ohio Business Gateway," she said.

Vukovic said the cost to join the coalition for the city is
$4,000, small in comparison to the loss he said would come if the
state is able to enforce the two bills and remove revenue from the
city.

"It will affect the services we support with those funds," he
said. "Mainly our police and fire."

The legislation joining the coalition passed unanimously October
19.

Three other pieces of legislation were introduced October 19
including the first reading of an ordinance to allow medical
marijuana businesses to set up shop within city limits.

That ordinance will see two further readings at special council
meetings scheduled for 5 p.m. both on October 24 and October 26.

Council also heard the first reading of articles pertaining to the
name change of Lookout Park, the proposed new name is Gold Star
Park in honor of a monument the Sgt. Bob O'Malley Detachment #1436
of the Marine Corps League is raising funds for at the park. The
legislation will have two further readings to give the public time
to comment.

Also introduced was a new chapter of the city's codified
ordinances, this one pertaining to a new "Comprehensive Right of
Way Ordinance."

Further discussion surrounding right of way and cell towers will
be held Nov. 1 at 4:15. [GN]


PENNSYLVANIA: Revocation of In Forma Pauperis Status Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued an Order affirming
the Order of the Court of Common Pleas revoking the Plaintiff's in
forma pauperis status in the case captioned Caine Pelzer, et al.
Appellant, v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. No.
309 C.D. 2017 (Pa. Cmmw.).

Before this Court is the appeal of Caine Pelzer (Plaintiff),
currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Pine
Grove (SCI-Pine Grove), from an order of the Greene County Court
of Common Pleas granting the motion filed by Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al., to revoke Plaintiff's in forma
pauperis status.

In its order granting Defendants' Motion to Revoke IFP Status, the
Trial Court determined that Plaintiff had not met this exception,
and granted him thirty days within which to pay filing fees
associated with his prison conditions lawsuit or face dismissal.

Appellant also argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion
in revoking his IFP status. The record demonstrates that Appellant
is an abusive litigator; he has had at least three prior actions
dismissed pursuant to Subsection 6602(e)(2). As a result of his
status as an abusive litigator, the provisions in subsection (b)
and (f) of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240 that provide
litigants with scant financial resources access to the courts are
inapplicable unless Appellant is in imminent danger of serious
injury.

Here, Plaintiff argues that he has credibly alleged imminent
danger in the form of assault by [oleoresin capsicum or pepper]
spray by prison guards and threat of assault by physical force at
the hands of prison guards.  He further alleges imminent danger to
other prisoners and asserts that events occurring in the STGMU
program he has successfully completed still pose imminent danger,
as do events in a new, unnamed program into which he has been
placed.

Plaintiff's claims are uncorroborated by medical or any other type
of evidence. In its  2017 order, the Trial Court notes that upon
review of the pleadings, and following arguments presented at the
hearing in which Plaintiff participated, it is clear that the
allegations of imminent danger cannot be construed to fit the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition of imminent danger.
Indeed, the Trial Court further recognized that Plaintiff is no
longer housed at the prison where the majority of the incidents
cited as posing imminent danger or the person involved therein
occurred. Our Court has defined a credible allegation as one that
goes beyond being merely rationale and conceivable and must
possess the additional characteristics of being reliable and
convincing. We find here that Plaintiff has failed to meet the
credible allegation standard set by the PLRA.

Further, Plaintiff's claim of danger to other prisoners cannot in
any circumstances satisfy the credible allegation standard because
our Courts have consistently held that a prisoner proceeding pro
se may not commence a class action lawsuit, and Plaintiff is
precluded from doing so here.

The Pa. Cmmw. concludes therefore that the Trial Court properly
revoked Plaintiff's IFP status, and provided him with thirty days
to pay the full filing fee.  The Commonwealth Court concludes
further that the Trial Court properly determined that matters
pending prior to the revocation of Plaintiff's IFP status were
moot.

A full-text copy of the Commonwealth Court's October 16, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybpprashfrom
Leagle.com.

Caine Pelzer, for Appellant, Pro Se.

Joseph G. Fulginiti, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, for
Appellee, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.

Theron Richard Perez, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, for
Appellee, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.


PERFORMANCE SPORTS: Settles Securities Class Action in New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
Old PSG Wind-down Ltd. (formerly, Performance Sports Group Ltd.)
(the "Company") on Oct. 27 disclosed that the Company and its
affiliated debtors (collectively, the "Debtors") have reached an
agreement in principle to settle the claim asserted against the
Company by the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund, in
its capacity as court-appointed lead plaintiff (the "Lead
Plaintiff") in the securities class action litigation styled as
Nieves v. Performance Sports Group Ltd., et al., Case No. 1:16-CV-
3591-GHW (S.D.N.Y.) and any potential objection of the Lead
Plaintiff to the joint Chapter 11 plan of liquidation (the "Plan")
put forward by the Company.

The settlement is conditional on, among other things, the approval
of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
(the "Bankruptcy Court") and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
(Commercial List) (the "Canadian Court") which will be sought in
the Debtors' jointly administered Chapter 11 cases pending in the
Bankruptcy Court and the CCAA proceedings pending before the
Canadian Court in conjunction with confirmation of the Plan and a
companion approval order.

The Bankruptcy Court and Canadian Court are jointly overseeing the
Debtors' restructuring proceedings.

                   About Performance Sports

Exeter, N.H.-based Performance Sports Group Ltd. --
http://www.PerformanceSportsGroup.com/-- is a developer and
manufacturer of ice hockey, roller hockey, lacrosse, baseball and
softball sports equipment, as well as related apparel and soccer
apparel.

On Oct. 31, 2016, Performance Sports Group Ltd. and certain of its
affiliates filed voluntary petitions under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code in the District of Delaware and commenced
proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act in the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The U.S. Debtors are: BPS US Holdings Inc.; Bauer Hockey, Inc.;
Easton Baseball/Softball Inc.; Bauer Hockey Retail Inc.; Bauer
Performance Sports Uniforms Inc.; Performance Lacrosse Group Inc.;
BPS Diamond Sports Inc.; and PSG Innovation Inc.

The Canadian Debtors are: Performance Sports Group Ltd.; KBAU
Holdings Canada, Inc.; Bauer Hockey Retail Corp.; Easton
Baseball/Softball Corp.; PSG Innovation Corp. Bauer Hockey Corp.;
BPS Canada Intermediate Corp.; BPS Diamond Sports Corp.; Bauer
Performance Sports Uniforms Corp.; and Performance Lacrosse Group
Corp.

The Debtors hired Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP as
counsel; Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel;
Stikeman Elliott LLP as Canadian legal counsel; Centerview LLP as
investment banker to the special committee; Alvarez & Marsal North
America, LLC, as restructuring advisor; Joele Frank, Wilkinson,
Brimmer, Katcher as communications & relations advisor; KPMG LLP
as auditors; and Prime Clerk LLC as notice, claims, solicitation
and balloting agent.

Ernst & Young LLP is the monitor in the CCAA cases.  The Monitor
tapped Thornton Grout Finnigan LLP, Allen & Overy LLP, and
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC as attorneys.

Andrew R. Vara, Acting U.S. Trustee for Region 3, on Nov. 10,
2016, appointed three creditors of BPS US Holdings, Inc., parent
of Performance Sports, to serve on the official committee of
unsecured creditors.  The Creditors' Committee retained by Blank
Rome LLP as counsel, Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP as Canadian co-
counsel, and Province Inc. as financial advisor.

The U.S. Trustee appointed a committee of equity security holders.
The equity committee is represented by Natalie D. Ramsey, Esq.,
and Mark A. Fink, Esq., at Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads,
LLP; and Robert J. Stark, Esq., Steven B. Levine, Esq., James W.
Stoll, Esq., and Andrew M. Carty, Esq., at Brown Rudnick LLP.

The U.S. Court appointed M.J. Renick & Associates LLC as the fee
examiner.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, effective as of Feb.
27, 2017, the Company consummated the sale of substantially all of
the assets of the Company and its North American subsidiaries,
including its European and global operations, pursuant to an asset
purchase agreement, dated as of Oct. 31, 2016, as amended, by and
among the Sellers, 9938982 Canada Inc., an acquisition vehicle
co-owned by affiliates of Sagard Holdings Inc. and Fairfax
Financial Holdings Limited, and the designated purchasers party
thereto, for a base purchase price of US$575 million in aggregate,
subject to certain adjustments, and the assumption of related
operating liabilities.

The transaction was the culmination of the process commenced by
the Sellers pursuant to creditor protection proceedings launched
on Oct. 31, 2016, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice under
the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, and in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, as amended.

The Company conducted a court-supervised sale and auction process
as part of its Canadian and U.S. court proceedings.  The bid made
by the Purchaser served as the "stalking horse" bid for purposes
of the process and was ultimately determined to be the successful
bid in accordance with the related court approved bidding
procedures.

In accordance with, and pursuant to, the terms and conditions of
the Agreement, the Company has changed its name to "Old PSG
Wind-down Ltd." from "Performance Sports Group Ltd." effective as
of March 20, 2017.  BPS US Holdings Inc. changed its name to Old
BPSUSH Inc.

On August 25, 2017, the Debtors filed their Plan of Liquidation
and related Disclosure Statement. On October 19, 2017, the Debtors
filed their modified Plan of Liquidation and modified Disclosure
Statement.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Ledford Seeks to Recover Damages Under FDCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Ledford, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Case No. 2:17-cv-01652-TMP
(N.D. Ala., September 26, 2017), is brought under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, for a finding that the Defendant's
collection actions violated the FDCPA, and to recover damages.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, is a Delaware limited
liability company that acts as a debt collector.  PRA operates a
nationwide debt collection business and attempts to collect
defaulted debts from consumers in virtually every state, including
consumers in the state of Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. Philipps, Esq.
          Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
          PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
          9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
          Palos Hills, IL 60465
          Telephone: (708) 974-2900
          Facsimile: (708) 974-2907
          E-mail: davephilipps@aol.com
                  mephilipps@aol.com

               - and -

          Bradford W. Botes, Esq.
          BOND, BOTES, REESE & SHINN, P.C.
          600 University Park Place, Suite 510
          Birmingham, AL 35209
          Telephone: (205) 802-2200
          Facsimile: (205) 802-2209
          E-mail: bbotes@bondnbotes.com


RANCHO PALOS: Terranea Workers Allege Wage Violations
-----------------------------------------------------
Cynthia Washicko, writing for Daily Breeze, reports that two
employees at Terranea Resort filed a class-action lawsuit October
19 alleging the resort's parent company failed to pay its workers
for time on the job and violated other work and wage regulations.

Galen Landsberg, a cook at Mar'sel restaurant, and Marvin
Ivarenga, a server at Catalina Kitchen, allege the Rancho Palos
Verdes resort failed to pay workers for time spent traveling on
company-required parking shuttles, required workers to falsely
file time cards that showed they took meal breaks, and didn't pay
them for overtime.

The suit, which names Long Point Management, Long Point
Development and Lowe Enterprises, does not specify how much
Landsberg, Ivarenga and other workers included as plaintiffs are
seeking in damages. Attorney Lauren Teukolsky, however, said the
amount could top $5 million.

A spokeswoman for Terranea said the resort had yet to receive a
copy of the suit, but added that the company follows all labor
regulations.

"Terranea Resort strictly adheres to and abides by all labor laws.
We value each of our associates and are committed to ensuring fair
treatment and compensation for their time and dedication," she
said in an email.

Employee dissatisfaction

Landsberg joined other Terranea employees and a large contingent
of hospitality workers represented by Local 11 of United Here for
a demonstration at the resort Thursday.

"I work hard in my job to provide great meals and service for our
guests. We're all dedicated to our jobs, which is one of the
reasons why this resort is so successful," he said. "But Terranea
has an underside. Behind the beautiful veneer, this company cuts
corners when it comes to paying its workers like me."

He added that he and other cooks buy basic kitchen tools out of
pocket, but aren't reimbursed by the resort.

Among other accusations, the suit alleges workers are regularly
forced to skip meal breaks and also instructed to file time cards
that show they went on breaks they never took.

Workers also are required to arrive at the resort early to receive
a uniform, but aren't paid for the time, according to the court
documents. And the company regularly fails to pay employees for
overtime worked, the suit alleges.

Parking requirements

Among the several complaints listed in the suit, Landsberg and
Ivarenga said the company often requires employees to park off-
site on days when the resort is expected to be busy to free up
parking for guests. Workers then take a shuttle from the lot to
the resort.

They aren't paid for that time on the shuttle, and the suit claims
employees often don't have any other choice for transportation to
the resort.

"Most of the employees who work at the resort live far away in
communities that are much more affordable," Teukolsky said. "Part
of Terranea's beauty is that it is isolated and hard to get to by
public transportation. Employees have no choice but to spend long
hours commuting by car."

Landsberg, who said he lives in mid-city Los Angeles, added that
the shuttle policy can add up to an hour of unpaid time to his
workday.

Terranea, which opened in 2009 on the bluffs where Marineland of
the Pacific formerly operated, is the only oceanfront resort on
the Los Angeles County coastline. The luxury resort offers 360
rooms and four full-service restaurants. [GN]


REAL TIME STAFFING: Accused by Perez of Not Paying Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AURELIA PEREZ, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. REAL TIME STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, a
California Limited Liability Company; SELECT STAFFING INC., a
California Corporation; EMPLOYBRIDGE, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company; NOVOLEX HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 100, Case No. BC677471 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., September 27, 2017), accuses the
Defendants of failure to pay all overtime wages under the
California Labor Code.

Real Time Staffing Services, LLC, Select Staffing Inc., and
EmployBridge, LLC did (and do) business by providing staffing
services.  Novolex Holdings, LLC did (and does) business by
offering foodservice packaging services nationwide.  The Plaintiff
does not know the true names or capacities of the Doe
Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          Fletcher W. Schmidt, Esq.
          Andrew J. Rowbotham, Esq.
          Stephanie A. Kierig, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          2274 East Maple Avenue
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292-2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com
                  fschmidt@haineslawgroup.com
                  arowbotham@haineslawgroup.com
                  skierig@haineslawgroup.com


RIO TINTO: May Face Fraud Class Action Outside United States
------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian reports that mining giant Rio Tinto is bracing for
class-action lawsuits out of the US after the Securities and
Exchange Commission charged the company and two former executives
with fraud.

The SEC on Oct. 18 filed charges against Rio, its former chief
executive Tom Albanese and former chief financial officer Guy
Elliott over its disastrous 2011 acquisition of Mozambique coal
play Riversdale Mining.

The SEC alleges the company and the executives "sought to hide or
delay disclosure" of problems with the Riversdale assets, while
also raising $US3 billion in US debt offerings soon after the
executives learned of the concerns.

The company also revealed it had copped a record-breaking ú27.4
million ($46m) fine from Britain's Financial Conduct Authority
over its delays in disclosing the problems with Mozambique.

The SEC charges will have sent shudders through executive ranks
across Australia, with Rio Tinto far from the only company to have
substantially overpaid for assets during the boom while also
tapping US debt markets for funding.

Legal sources said it was all but certain that the SEC charges
against Rio Tinto would be followed by a class action against the
company.

Rio Tinto said it would "vigorously" defend itself against the
allegations.

"Rio Tinto believes that the SEC case is unwarranted and that,
when all the facts are considered by the court, or if necessary by
a jury, the SEC's claims will be rejected," it said.

The ú27.4m fine to settle with the FCA followed the finding from
the watchdog that Rio Tinto should have announced the writedown
six months earlier.

In a statement, the FCA said the mining giant had "demonstrated a
serious lack of judgment" in not impairing the Mozambique assets
earlier, although Rio Tinto noted that the FCA had closed its case
without making any findings of fraud or of any systematic or
widespread failure by the company.

The fine is the largest imposed by the FCA for a breach of listing
rules, and would have been higher had Rio Tinto not agreed to
settle at an early stage.

The news of the SEC's charges prompted Mr Elliott to step down
from his EUR164,250 ($246,348) per year directorship of oil and
gas giant Royal Dutch Shell, with immediate effect.

Shell chairman Charles Holliday said the board respected Mr
Elliott's decision in light of the Rio legal proceedings.

"We will miss his insightful counsel and leadership and would like
to thank him for his seven years of valuable contribution to the
Shell board," Mr Holliday said.  "We sincerely hope he
satisfactorily resolves these proceedings and, in that event, he
would like to be considered for rejoining the board."

Mr Albanese called the charges "unwarranted" while a spokeswoman
for Mr Elliott said the former CFO would fight them.

The SEC's pursuit of Rio will be of concern to directors around
the country, given the abundance of other similarly trouble-
plagued deals in recent years.

While The Australian is not alleging that any of those companies
engaged in any wrongdoing, deals such as BHP's $US20bn shale
acquisitions, Newcrest Mining's $US9.5bn purchase of Lihir Gold,
the various Queensland coal-seam gas transactions and Slater &
Gordon's disastrous $1.2bn acquisition of British law firm
Quindell all exhibited a combination of performance issues,
exposure to US debt markets and massive writedowns.

The recent money-laundering allegations against the Commonwealth
Bank -- which has regularly raised debt through US markets --
could also come under scrutiny by the SEC.

The SEC is not the only powerful regulatory body probing the top-
of-the-market acquisitions in the resources sector.

The Australian revealed that the former chairman of a Chinese
state-owned enterprise had been handed over to Chinese prosecutors
investigating investments in Australian mining ventures that lost
more than $1bn.

Li Jinming had chaired Guangdong Rising Assets Management at the
time it acquired Australian listed companies Perilya, Caledon
Resources, PanAust and Northern Minerals.

Rio Tinto acquired Sydney-based Riversdale back in 2011 for $3.9bn
in the expectation its assets would support a major new coking
coal province.

However, the miner's initial plans to barge the coal down the
Zambezi River were rejected by the Mozambique government in
December 2011.

The SEC alleges that Rio knew at the time that it would only be
able to transport and sell about 5 per cent of the coal it had
originally assumed.

The Mozambique disaster came just years after the even worse Alcan
acquisition, and the SEC charges allege that Mr Albanese and Mr
Elliott knew that another big impairment would call into question
their ability to pursue Rio Tinto's business model.

The problems finally came to the surface in January 2013, with Rio
Tinto announcing the departure of Mr Albanese and a $US3bn
writedown on the value of the Mozambique assets.

Mr Elliott stepped down in April 2013.

The Mozambique assets were eventually sold by Rio Tinto in 2014
for just $US50m. [GN]


RIO TINTO: Mclernon Mulls Shareholders' Suit vs. Directors
----------------------------------------------------------
Neale Prior, writing for The West Australian, reports that class
action pioneer Hugh McLernon, Esq. -- hmclernon@imf.com.au -- is
examining a potential litigation by Rio Tinto shareholders against
former directors Tom Albanese and Guy Elliott on the back of a US
prosecution launched this week.

Mr McLernon, the head of litigation funder Bentham IMF, said Mr
Albanese and Mr Elliott likely had significant professional
indemnity insurance policies that could be claimed against on the
strength of Securities and Exchange Commission court allegations.

Mr McLernon said that if the Rio board did not take legal action
against the former directors based on the allegations,
shareholders could sue on the company's behalf.

The SEC claimed in its US District Court complaint that Rio Tinto,
Mr Albanese and Mr Elliott engaged in deceptive conduct by
concealing the "rapid and dramatic" declines of a Mozambique coal
venture acquired for $US3.7 billion in 2011.

Rio Tinto said the SEC case was unwarranted.

Lawyers across the globe are examining potential legal actions for
shareholders and for investors who took part in 2012 US bond
issues. [GN]


RJ REYNOLDS: Farah Law Firm Fined $9MM Over Tobacco Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
First Coast News reports that federal judges handed down
$9,164,404.12 in fines October 18 on prominent Jacksonville
litigation firm, Farah & Farah, P.A.

The judges' order states 1,250 frivolous tobacco claims were filed
by Farah & Farah and the Wilner Firm against the Engle Trust Fund.

Engle is a class action lawsuit named for a Miami pediatrician who
defeated tobacco companies in court. A multi-million dollar fund
paid by tobacco companies was set up for Floridians and their
survivors who suffered illnesses due to cigarette smoking from
1994-2006. The class action in 2008 was estimated to include
700,000 people.

Attorneys across Florida represented clients who believed they
qualified for a portion of the fund.

However, cases filed collectively by Jacksonville attorneys
Charlie Farah and Norwood Wilner prompted a U.S. Attorney Special
Master seven month investigation into possible misconduct in 2012.

The investigation revealed some cases filed by the attorneys were
for deceased clients, non-smokers, those who did not suffer from
one of the required diseases, and 572 that did not authorize the
attorneys to file lawsuits on their behalf.

According to the order, the lawyers explained that after 10-15
years of preparing thousands of tobacco cases, some clients were
deceased or unreachable once the case went to court.

The Court sanctioned Wilner and Farah as principles for each firm
and recommended a Florida Bar investigation into any violations of
ethics.

"[Wilner and Farah] are held to account for the immense waste of
judicial resources and contempt shown for the judicial process
occasioned by maintaining over a thousand non-viable claims," the
order reads.

"As a result of their actions, other litigants faced increased
delays as the Court had to divert its attention to cleaning up the
mess that was the Engle docket."

First Coast News reached out to Eddie Farah for comment on this
story, but we haven't heard back.[GN]


RM GALICIA: Court Approves $1.5MM TCPA Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of a Proposed Class Action Settlement in
the case captioned BELINDA GUTIERREZ-RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. R.M.
GALICIA, INC. DBA PROGRESSIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, Defendant, Case
No. 16-CV-0182 H BLM (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff alleges that, beginning around March 2015, Defendant
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), by using an
automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) or artificial/pre-
recorded voice system to call cellular telephones without prior
express consent. Defendant is a debt collector that performs
first- and third-party debt collection services, primarily for the
healthcare industry.

Proposed Settlement Agreement

Under the Proposed Settlement, Defendant will establish a
settlement fund of $1,500,000 to resolve the litigation involving
Damages Settlement Subclass members. This amount will pay approved
claims only one claim for each phone number called shall be
permitted and any and all settlement costs, defined as all costs
incurred in the litigation by Plaintiff, including but not limited
to Plaintiff's attorneys' fees, costs of suit, cost of litigation,
cost of notice and claims administration. For its attorneys' fees
and costs, Plaintiff's counsel agrees to request no more than 30%
of the settlement fund. (The cost of notice and claims
administration are estimated to be $110,815, assuming "the normal
take rate in TCPA cases" of 1-5%. The parties request appointment
of Rust as claims administrator. The settlement fund will also be
used to pay the class representative an incentive award of $7,500.

Class Certification

Plaintiff seeks to certify a class pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for purposes of settlement only. The
class includes all individuals who (1) received a telephone call
from Defendant or its agents; (2) on his or her cellular telephone
number; (3) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing
system or artificial or pre-recorded voice system as set forth in
47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A)(3); and (4) where Defendant has no
record of prior express consent for such individual to make such
call, within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint
through the date of final approval.

Plaintiff estimates that the Damages Settlement subclass alone
contains 61,939 members.  Accordingly, the proposed class
satisfies the numerosity prerequisite.

Whether Defendant used an ATDS or an artificial or pre-recorded
voice system to call cellular phones in violation of the TCPA
involves a common question of law that satisfies Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement. There is no evidence that any purported
class members gave prior express consent to Defendant's placement
of the calls at issue, or that Defendant obtained the persons'
cell phone numbers in the course of the underlying healthcare
transactions in which the alleged debts were incurred. Thus, at
this provisional stage, the Court is satisfied that individualized
issues of consent do not preclude a finding of commonality.
Accordingly, the commonality prerequisite is met.

Plaintiff and the purported class members held the same position
and claim the same injury namely, that they received calls on
their cell phones that were placed by Defendant using "LiveVox or
TCN and/or featuring a pre-recorded or artificial voice messages
without their prior express consent.  Because Plaintiff's claims
are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members,
the typicality prerequisite is met.

Here, there does not appear to be any conflicts of interest
between Plaintiff and the purported class members. Plaintiff and
her counsel have vigorously prosecuted the interests of the class
and class counsel has extensive experience in class actions and
complex litigation, including TCPA cases.  Accordingly, Plaintiff
and her counsel are adequate representatives of the proposed
class.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has met all of the requirements of
Rule 23(a).

Here, a single adjudication will resolve the central issue of the
case namely, whether Defendant violated the TCPA by calling class
members, without their prior express consent, using an ATDS or an
artificial or pre-recorded voice system. There do not appear to be
individualized consent issues that should preclude a finding of
predominance, given that the purported class is defined,
specifically, as persons whose numbers were not listed as those of
patients or guarantors indicating they did not give consent to
being called and who received one or more calls from Defendant
placed by LiveVox or TCN "and/or featuring a pre-recorded or
artificial voice messages.  Thus, the proposed class is
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,
and the predominance requirement is met.

Here, there is no evidence that absent class members wish to
pursue their claims individually. Moreover, any class member who
wishes to pursue an individual claim may elect not to participate
in the settlement agreement.  Accordingly, the superiority
requirement is met here, and Plaintiff has met the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3).

After reviewing the proposed settlement and the current stage of
the litigation, the Court concludes that preliminary approval is
appropriate. The proposed settlement appears to be the result of
serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations. The discovery
process in this case involved party and third-party discovery,
extensive meet and confer efforts by counsel, and the development
of a mutually agreed-upon sampling protocol to identify the unique
telephone numbers constituting the Damages Settlement Subclass.

While developing and running the protocol, the parties agreed to
participate in private mediation to explore the possibility of
settlement. A JAMS mediator with extensive experience with TCPA
cases supervised a day-long mediation session, and the parties
reached a class-wide settlement in principle. The parties then
worked to finalize the settlement's terms over the next few months
and also conducted confirmatory discovery to ensure the accuracy
of the information Defendant provided during mediation.

Here, the content of the notice is adequate. In clear,
understandable language, it provides the following: a description
of the lawsuit; a description of the settlement classes; an
explanation of the material elements of the settlement; a
statement that class members have the right to exclude themselves
from, or object to, the settlement, and a description of how class
members may do so; and a description of the fairness hearing.

The proposed method of notice is reasonable. Damages Settlement
Subclass members will receive individual notice by first class
mail. Any returned, non-delivered class notice will be re-mailed
to a forwarding address if determinable. The claims administrator
will maintain a settlement website that will contain class
information--such as class members' right to participate in the
settlement and to exclude themselves from, or object to, the
settlement and related documents, including, at a minimum, the
Settlement Agreement, the Notice, a Question & Answer Form Notice,
the Preliminary Approval Order, a Claim Form, which can be
completed and submitted electronically, the operative complaint,
the application for attorneys' fees and costs, and the Final
Approved Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y8y5wjewfrom Leagle.com.

Belinda Gutierrez-Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Alexis M.
Wood, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, 651 Arroyo Drive. San
Diego, CA 92103.

Belinda Gutierrez-Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Kas L.
Gallucci, Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron & Ronald Marron, Law
Office of Ronald Marron, 651 Arroyo Drive. San Diego, CA 92103.

R.M. Galicia, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bryan C. Shartle,
Sessions --  bshartle@sessions.legal -- Fishman, Nathan & Israel,
L.L.P., pro hac vice, David Israel -- disrael@sessions.legal --
Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, L.L.P., pro hac vice, Debbie
P. Kirkpatrick -- : dkirkpatrick@sessions.legal -- Sessions
Fishman Nathan and Israel & James Kevin Schultz --
jschultz@sessions.legal -- Sessions Fishman Nathan and Israel LLP.


RODBRA INC: Owes More Overtime Pay to Class, "Dieda" Suit Asserts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRADY DIEDA, an individual on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. RODBRA, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1
through 10 inclusive, Case No. BC677449 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles Cty., September 27, 2017), alleges that the Defendants
owed the Plaintiff and other class members additional overtime pay
based on a calculation using the correct, higher rate of pay
(taking into account non-discretionary commissions).

RODBRA, INC., is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Nevada with its principal place of business located in
Beverly Hills, California.  The Company does business as "208
RODEO Beverly Hills," a restaurant in Rodeo Drive in Beverly
Hills.  The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are
unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George S. Azadian, Esq.
          Ani Azadian, Esq.
          Edrik Mehrabi, Esq.
          AZADIAN LAW GROUP PC
          790 East Colorado Boulevard, 9th Floor
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (626) 449-4944
          Facsimile: (626) 628-1722
          E-mail: george@azadianlawgroup.com
                  edrik@azadianlawgroup.com
                  ani@azadianlawgroup.com


SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CA: Dismissal of Reporter Fee Suit Reversed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Franklin D. Elia of the Court of Appeals of California for
the Sixth District reversed the order dismissing the lawsuit filed
against the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County over reporter
fees.

In January 2014, Appellants Maria and Rafael Leon submitted a
claim against respondent under the Government Claims Act (Gov.
Code, Section 810 et seq.), alleging that on July 17, 2013 and
subsequent dates, they and others similarly situated paid a court
reporter fee but received no official court reporter.  On Feb. 2,
2014, the Respondent refunded appellants $120, the aggregate of
payments for four civil hearings at which a court reporter was not
provided to them.

On March 24, 2014, the Appellants submitted a supplemental
government claim, alleging that respondent attempted to implement
a policy that unless reimbursement for unprovided court reporter
services was demanded court would retain funds.  Having been
charged the fee without provision of the reporting service, the
Appellants alleged, they and others had to pay not only the fee
charged by the court but also the cost of a private reporter.

The Appellants then initiated the class action on Sept. 5, 2014,
alleging negligence by respondent's employees for collecting and
retaining fees without providing a court reporter; breach of a
mandatory duty not to allow the charging and retention of such
fees without providing the reporter; and breach of an implied
contract to provide a court reporter upon collection of the fee.
The Appellants also requested a judicial declaration that
respondent had a duty to provide reporters when fees are charged
for them and that it has no authority to retain such fees when
such services are not provided, as well as an injunction
prohibiting such practices.

The Respondent demurred to the complaint, denoting each cause of
action as meritless and moot, and disputing the timeliness of the
government claim.  The Honorable Marjorie L. Carter sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend as to the first (negligence) and
second (breach of mandatory duty) causes of action.  As to the
claim of breach of contract and the request for declaratory and
injunctive relief, Judge Carter granted leave to amend.

In their first amended complaint, filed Aug. 7, 2015, the
Appellants asserted that they represented a class of all persons
or entities that had paid a court reporter fee but received
neither an official reporter nor adequate compensation for the
lack of provision.  In the first cause of action for breach of
contract, the Appellants alleged that the collection of a reporter
fee implies a contract with respondent to provide reporter
services.  When reporter services were not provided, the
respondent breached the implied agreement and the affected
litigants lost both the fee and, in some cases, money they paid
for private reporting services.  In the second cause of action the
Appellants requested a declaration that respondent was obligated
to provide a court reporter if a fee is paid for one and that it
may not retain and must return fees obtained for that purpose when
no reporter is provided, with or without demand, and an injunction
enjoining such practices in the future.

In September 2015, the Respondent again demurred, asserting that
(i) the Appellants' claim was moot, as they had received the
refunds owed to them; (ii) no implied contract with a public
entity was created merely by payment of a fee; (iii) because there
was no merit to the Appellants' theory of an implied contract, no
declaratory or injunctive relief was warranted; and (iv) the
January 2014 government claim was untimely.  The Respondent also
sought judicial notice of its amended FAQs for "Court Reporting
Services Under One Hour," dated May 8, 2014.

After a hearing on Oct. 23, 2015, Judge Carter granted the request
for judicial notice, sustained the entire demurrer without leave
to amend, and ordered the action dismissed with prejudice.  This
timely appeal followed.

The Appellants seek review of a judgment dismissing their class
action against Respondent Superior Court of Santa Cruz County.
They seek review of orders sustaining without leave to amend
respondent's demurrer to two causes of action in their original
complaint and an additional cause of action in their first amended
complaint.  The Appellants contend that (i) they stated adequate
causes of action for breach of mandatory duty and negligence in
their original complaint; (ii) they pleaded viable claims for
breach of contract and declaratory and injunctive relief; and
(iii) the action was not moot.

Judge Elia finds that indeed at the time the court sustained the
demurrer to this cause of action, there was no evidence of refunds
beyond a response to interrogatories indicating reimbursement to
appellants themselves for four hearings.  It was only after that
disposition, without leave to amend, that respondent supplemented
its response by listing numerous other litigants who were issued
refunds for their payment of the $30 fee.  None of this evidence
was properly before the court in the demurrer proceedings.  If
there is dispositive evidence vitiating the causes of action for
failing to return the litigants' money, the Respondent should be
presenting that evidence in a motion for summary judgment.

To the extent that the Appellants were asserting negligence for
the failure to return the fee "as soon as practicable," they
stated a sufficient cause of action, the Judge says.  As he has
already explained, the Court had no mandatory duty under section
815.6 to provide official court reporters, but it did have a duty
to refund the fee if the party who paid it was not provided with
the service.

Turning to the Appellants' first amended complaint containing the
amended contract claim, which stated that per Government Code
section 814, liability may be imposed on a public entity for
breach of contract, Judge Elia explains that the collection of a
reporter fee implies a contract with the superior court to provide
reporter services.  Such services were not provided in breach of
the implied agreement, and money was lost due to the failure to
provide such services, both in the loss of the fee and, in some
cases, the need to obtain private reporting services.  This
allegation finds no legal support under section 8149 because no
contract could have been inferred from the mere collection of a
court reporter fee.

As he has already explained, the Respondent had no duty to provide
a court reporter upon payment of the fee, but section 68086 did
require it to return the fee as soon as practicable to the
remitting party or parties if no court reporting services were
provided.  Because a judiciable controversy was stated in the
Appellants' pleading, the demurrer to the declaratory relief claim
as well as those for negligence and breach of mandatory duty
should have been overruled.

Judge Elia says the case should have been resolved long ago,
either by settlement or summary judgment.  He cannot provide that
resolution, however, because the principles of review applicable
to demurrer rulings require this court to accept as true not only
the facts that were alleged but also those that can be inferred
from those expressly alleged.  As the claims pertaining to the
failure to refund the fee survived the Respondent's demurrers,
dismissal of the action was unjustified.

For these reasons, Judge Elia reversed the judgment of dismissal.
On remand, he directed the court to vacate its August 2015 order
sustaining the Respondent's demurrer to the Sept. 5, 2014
complaint without leave to amend as to the first and second causes
of action, and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer to the
first, second, and fourth causes of action in that complaint.  The
Appellants are entitled to their costs on appeal.

The appeals case is captioned MARIA LEON, et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY Defendant and
Respondent, Case No. H043183 (Cal. App.).

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/9cN64m from Leagle.com.


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Arnall Golden Attorney Discusses Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Leah Braukman, Esq. -- leah.braukman@agg.com -- of Arnall Golden
Gregory LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on August 22,
2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
(the "Court") affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud class
action against Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. (the "Company"), a
biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery and development
of therapies for the treatment of rare neuromuscular diseases,
such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy ("DMD"), and certain of its
current and former officers, that asserted violations of Section
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5 enacted thereunder.

The complaint alleged that the Company and its officers deceived
investors with their overly optimistic expectations regarding
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") of
the Company's lead product candidate, eteplirsen, a drug designed
for the treatment of DMD.  Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that
the Company's communications with investors were "misleadingly
rosy" and failed to adequately disclose the likelihood, or lack
thereof, that the FDA would accept the Company's new drug
application ("NDA") for eteplirsen, as the FDA had initially
expressed concerns regarding the Company's analysis of its trial
data.

After reviewing additional information from the Company about its
trial data, the FDA indicated that it was "open to considering an
NDA," subject to certain conditions.  The Company then issued a
press release and held a conference call with investors regarding
this development, noting that it was "very encouraged by the FDA
feedback."  The Company continued to make statements that its
progress with the FDA was "a tremendous achievement" and the "type
of information that every company hopes for."

In its de novo review of the lower court's decision, the Court
noted that the Company's statements regarding its communications
with the FDA were "opinion more than fact" and were "replete with
caveats."  According to the Court, such caveats (for example, that
the FDA needed additional information regarding the Company's
trial data and that the FDA did not offer any assurances that the
Company's NDA would be accepted), negate the inference of
scienter, a necessary element of a securities fraud claim under
Rule 10b-5.  At most, the Court noted, the Company was too
optimistic and underemphasized, perhaps negligently, the
reservations of the FDA regarding the Company's NDA.

The Court offered a few additional insights regarding an inference
of scienter which, in a broad sense, are helpful for public
biopharmaceutical companies navigating the FDA-approval process.

   -- Simple or excusable negligence is insufficient. A company
must consciously intend to defraud or act with a high degree of
recklessness.

   -- A company should provide investors with adequate warnings
regarding communications with the FDA, but is not obligated to
keep the public apprised of every detail of such communication.
Optimistic predictions about the future that prove to be off
target are immunized unless plaintiffs demonstrate intentional
deception.

   -- Pointing to omitted details and failing to explain how those
details render a company's disclosure misleading is insufficient
to prove an intentional or reckless omission of material facts.
   -- A company's need for essential funding and its officers'
desire to improve financial results is not strong evidence of
motive that supports an inference of scienter.

AGG Observations and Recommendations

   1. Note that the Court, in dicta, mused that the defendants'
actions might have been more in line with a claim of negligence.
As a result, issuers should be aware that disclosures in
registration statements that are similar to those made by the
Company and that are subject to potential liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Act") (which
generally calls for strict liability with respect to material
misstatements or omissions in registration statements), could
result in a finding of liability unless appropriate disclosure of
all relevant material facts is made.

   2. All circuit courts have held that recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement of a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5.
Some require some degree of intentional or conscious misconduct
while others have found scienter in cases of extreme recklessness.
Inclusion of appropriate caveats and risk factors can potentially
rebut allegations of scienter.

   3. Although not relevant in the Sarepta Therapeutics litigation
(presumably because the misstatements and omissions alleged
involved both historical factual information as well as forward-
looking statements), public issuers should always remember that,
in a securities fraud action, "forward-looking statements" are
protected by the safe harbor provided in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act") if such
statements are, among other things, identified as such and
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement.  Tailored
-- and not boilerplate -- cautionary language is necessary for
forward-looking statements to be protected under the Reform Act,
but if the requirements of that Act are met, defendants will not
be liable in a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5 unless the
plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge
that the statements were false or misleading. [GN]


SCANA CORP: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Lundin Law PC, a shareholder rights firm, disclosed a class action
lawsuit against SCANA Corporation ("SCANA" or the "Company")
(NYSE:SCG) for possible violations of federal securities laws
between January 19, 2016 and September 22, 2017, inclusive (the
"Class Period"). Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
shares during the Class Period should contact the firm prior to
the November 27, 2017 motion deadline.

To participate in this class action lawsuit, you can call Brian
Lundin, Esq. -- brian@lundinlawpc.com -- of Lundin Law PC, at 888-
713-1033.

No class has been certified in the above action yet. Until a class
is certified, you are not considered represented by an attorney.
You may also choose to do nothing and be an absent class member.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, SCANA
made false and/or misleading statements, and/or failed to
disclose, adverse information regarding the construction of its
project to build nuclear reactors at the V.C. Summer Nuclear
Station in South Carolina, assuring investors that costs spending
was prudent and substantial progress was being made, even when
cost overruns and other delays began to materialize.

On July 31, 2017, the Company announced that it would abandon
construction of the nuclear project because of cost overruns and
delays. On August 4, 2017, the South Carolina Attorney General
announced the opening of an investigation into the Company's
abandonment of the nuclear project. On the same day, South
Carolina state senators called for a special legislative session
to investigate SCANA. On September 22, 2017, the South Carolina
Attorney General publicly requested that the South Carolina State
Law Enforcement Division launch a criminal investigation into the
project. When this information reached the public, SCANA's stock
price fell materially, which caused investors harm according to
the Complaint.

Lundin Law PC was founded by Brian Lundin, Esq., a securities
litigator based in Los Angeles dedicated to upholding
shareholders' rights.

         Brian Lundin, Esq.
         Lundin Law PC
         Telephone: 888-713-1033
         Facsimile: 888-713-1125
         E-mail: brian@lundinlawpc.com [GN]


SHARP CORPORATION: LCD Settlement Distribution Protocol Approved
----------------------------------------------------------------
Siskinds of London, Ontario (Siskinds) and Camp Fiorante Matthews
Mogerman of Vancouver, BC (CFM) on Oct. 19 announced the court
approval of a protocol for the second distribution of settlement
funds in the Canadian LCD price-fixing class action.  The class
action alleges price-fixing in the market for liquid crystal
display (LCD) panels used in televisions, computer monitors and
laptop computers ("LCD products").

Settlements totalling $37.6 million have been reached with four
defendant groups.  This brings total settlements reached in this
action to over $75 million.  The settled defendants do not admit
any wrongdoing or liability.  The Ontario, British Columbia and
QuÇbec courts approved the settlements and a protocol for
distributing the second round of settlement funds (settlements
totalling $37.6 million were previously distributed).  The class
action is continuing against the remaining defendants, Sharp
Corporation, Sharp Electronics Corporation and Sharp Electronics
of Canada Ltd.

Persons who purchased LCD products (regardless of the manufacturer
or brand) between 1998 and 2006 are eligible to claim settlement
benefits.  Individuals can claim for a maximum of two undocumented
purchases.  Claims can be filed online at
www.lcdclassactioncanada.com on or before January 19, 2018.  More
information about the settlements, the distribution of settlement
funds and the claims process can be found online at
www.lcdclassactioncanada.com or by calling the claims
administrator at 1-888-663-7195.

"We are proud of our continued success on behalf of class
members," said Charles Wright of Siskinds LLP in London.   "These
court-approved settlements and protocol for distributing money
will allow Canadian businesses and consumers to recover some of
the funds they overpaid for LCD products."

"Siskinds and CFM will continue to work to ensure that Sharp is
held accountable for its conduct," said Mr. Wright.

                       About Class Counsel

Siskinds LLP is a full-service law firm with offices in Toronto
and London, and affiliate offices in Montreal and Quebec City.
Siskinds LLP is Canada's leading class action law firm.

CFM is a boutique law firm based in Vancouver specializing in
class actions, aviation accident litigation and product liability
litigation, on behalf of plaintiffs.

Bouchard Page Tremblay is a law firm based in Quebec City for more
than 25 years.  It provides complete legal services to its private
and corporate clients. [GN]


SHENZEN SUNSHINE: Court Strikes Class Allegations in "Black"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order striking class allegations in the case
captioned ALLAN BLACK, CHRISTOPHER JONES, ROGER WATTS, and ROBERT
MATOS RIVERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SHENZEN SUNSHINE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT,
LTD, ACUMEN ROBOT INTELLIGENCE, INC., SAM TSU, D/B/A ONAGOFLY, and
DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-CV-02370-BRO-JEM (C.D.
Cal.).  Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.

Defendant Acumen Robot Intelligence, Inc. moved to dismiss the
FAC. No other defendants have appeared. Plaintiffs moved for
relief from Local Rule 23-3, which sets the deadline for moving
for class certification.

Plaintiffs claim they suffered damages as a result of Defendants'
deceptive, fraudulent, and illegal practices relating to the
national marketing and sale of the Onagofly drone.  Plaintiffs
allege that, despite representations made by Defendants regarding
the specifications of the drone and its component parts, the
actual product contained subpar components consisting of a less
powerful battery, lower resolution camera, and faulty GPS
applications, among other things. Each Plaintiff is a resident of
a different state, and claims to have purchased the drone by
making a 'contribution' payment through the www.indiegogo.com
website.

Plaintiffs filed a two-page Motion, seeking relief from the
Central District's Local Rule 23-3, which requires a plaintiff to
move for class certification within 90 days of service of a
pleading purporting to commence a class action other than an
action subject to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.

Plaintiffs' provide no valid reason to extend the deadline for
class certification. If Plaintiffs were in legitimate settlement
talks with Acumen, they should have sought an extension of the
deadline, or filed a stipulation to continue it, in advance of the
deadline not on the day the motion for class certification was
due, and without following the proper procedures for doing so.
Plaintiffs' half-hearted attempt at seeking relief from a
mandatory deadline without any reasonable justification is not
enough.  Under these circumstances, the Court finds no good cause
to extend Plaintiffs' deadline, and strikes the class allegations.

Because the Court struck Plaintiffs' class allegations for failure
to comply with Local Rule 23-3, Plaintiffs no longer have a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction. If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.  Accordingly, because the Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' FAC.  The
Court denies as moot Acumen's Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycubcsf3from Leagle.com.

Allan Black, Plaintiff, represented by Kirk J. Wolden, Carter
Wolden Curtis LLP, 608 University Avenue Sacramento, CA 95825
Christopher Jones, Plaintiff, represented by Kirk J. Wolden,
Carter Wolden Curtis LLP.

Roger Watts, Plaintiff, represented by Kirk J. Wolden, Carter
Wolden Curtis LLP.

Robert Matos Rivera, Plaintiff, represented by Kirk J. Wolden,
Carter Wolden Curtis LLP.

Acumen Robot Intelligence, Inc., Defendant, represented by Yalan
Zheng -- yzheng@parkandzheng.com  -- Law Offices of Park and
Zheng.


SSC LEXINGTON: Court Stays "Allen" Pending Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina, in the case captioned CYNTHIA ALLEN, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. SSC
LEXINGTON OPERATING COMPANY LLC, a North Carolina Limited
Liability Company, d/b/a BRIAN CENTER NURSING CARE/LEXINGTON,
Defendant. No. 1:16CV1080. (M.D.N.C.).

Plaintiff filed this putative class and collective action against
Defendant alleging claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
including failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime
wages, and failure to keep records. Plaintiff also alleged similar
violations under certain provisions of the North Carolina Wage and
Hour Act (NCWHA) and the North Carolina Administrative Code
(NCAC).

As part of her employment, Allen was given certain documents
including an Employment Dispute Resolution Book (EDR Booklet),
which detailed an Employment Dispute Resolution Program (EDR
Program).

SSC argues that Allen agreed, as part of the EDR Program, to
arbitrate her individual claims as a condition of her employment.
In SSC's view, the sentence, "this Program covers only claims by
individuals and does not cover class or collective actions," is an
express collective action and class action waiver. The purported
waiver, according to SSC, expressly prohibits class and collective
arbitration. Therefore, SSC argues that Allen's individual claims
only should be compelled to arbitration.

Plaintiff relies primarily on an opinion from the Third Circuit,
Novosad v. Thi of Pennsylvania at Broomall, LLC, which held that
the plain language of "the sentence, covers only claims by
individuals and does not cover class or collective actions'"
indicates the parties did not agree to arbitrate Plaintiffs'
putative class and/or collective action claims. The court notes
that the Novosad opinion is not binding precedent to this court,
and the court is not persuaded by its holding.

Neither party disputes that the FLSA and state law claims, brought
individually, are covered disputes subject to arbitration. At a
minimum, the plain language of the agreement raises doubt as to
whether the parties intended their agreement to include a waiver
of class or collection action, and is susceptible to either of the
constructions asserted by the parties. Resolving all doubts in
favor of arbitration, the court finds that Plaintiff's claims must
be referred individually to arbitration.

Having concluded that Plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of
the EDR Booklet and the EDR Program, Section 3 of the FAA requires
the court to stay the proceedings until arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Despite the
language of Section 3, courts have noted that dismissal may be a
proper remedy when all claims presented in a lawsuit are
arbitrable. Here, however, Defendant specifically requested in its
motion that the case be stayed. Accordingly, the court will stay
the proceedings pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 29, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ya3kdjexfrom Leagle.com.

CYNTHIA ALLEN, Plaintiff, represented by JACOB R. RUSCH --
JRUSCH@JOHNSONBECKER.COM -- JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC.

CYNTHIA ALLEN, Plaintiff, represented by MOLLY E. NEPHEW --
MNEPHEW@JOHNSONBECKER.COM -- JOHNSON BECKER, PLLC & BENJAMIN P.
WINIKOFF -- bpwinikoff@emplaw.com -- ELLIOT MORGAN PARSONAGE,
PLLC.

SSC LEXINGTON OPERATING COMPANY LLC, Defendant, represented by
KEITH MICHAEL WEDDINGTON -- keithweddington@parkerpoe.com -PARKER
POE ADAMS & BERNSTEIN LLP, BRADFORD J. KELLEY --
bradford.kelley@agg.com -- ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY LLP & CHESLEY S.
MCLEOD -- chesley.mcleod@agg.com -- ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY, LLP.


ST LOUIS, MO: Federal Court Hears ACLU Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
PJ Randhawa, writing for KSDK, reports that handcuffed, pepper
sprayed and arrested.  Many people who were at the protests
following the Jason Stockley decision said that was their
experience, and they testified about it in federal court on Oct.
18.

It's all part of a class action lawsuit filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union against the city of St. Louis.

Some of the most compelling witness statements heard on Oct. 18
came from a Scott Airforce Airman who lives downtown, very close
to where one of the protests took place.  Alex Nelson said he
wasn't protesting.

Not only were he and his wife arrested, but he says he's now in
physical therapy because of the injuries he sustained from police.

Mr. Nelson testified that he and his wife were just taking a walk
down the street to see what was going on.

They said they were kettled into the intersection of Tucker and
Washington by police, handcuffed, then pepper-sprayed repeatedly
while on the ground.

Eventually, both were arrested along with dozens of others that
night alone.

Others say they weren't given a chance to disperse.  The ACLU says
the goal of the hearings is to convince the judge to require the
St. Louis Police Department to adopt protocols to protect the
constitutional rights of those involved in protest activity.

"What the judge can look at is, is there evidence here of police
not acting properly and how can they address that," said
Jeffrey Mittman, Executive director of the Missouri ACLU. [GN]


STARWOOD WAYPOINT: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., filed a class action complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland on
behalf of holders of Starwood Waypoint Homes ("SFR") (NYSE:SFR)
common stock in connection with the proposed acquisition of SFR by
Invitation Homes, Inc. and its affiliates ("INVH") announced on
August 10, 2017 (the "Complaint").  The Complaint, which alleges
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against SFR, its
Board of Directors (the "Board"), and INVH, is captioned Berg v.
Starwood Waypoint Homes, Case No. 1:17-cv-02896-JKB (D. Md.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq. -- sdr@rl-legal.com -
- or Gina M. Serra, Esq. -- gms@rl-legal.com -- at Rigrodsky &
Long, P.A., 2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120, Wilmington, DE 19803, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On August 9, 2017, SFR entered into an agreement and plan of
merger (the "Merger Agreement") with INVH.  Pursuant to the Merger
Agreement, shareholders of SFR will receive 1.6140 newly issued
shares of common stock of INVH for each share of SFR common stock
they own (the "Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4
Registration Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
Complaint alleges that the Registration Statement, which
recommends that SFR stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction, omits material information necessary to enable
shareholders to make an informed decision as to how to vote on the
Proposed Transaction, including material information with respect
to SFR's and INVH's financial projections, the analyses performed
by the companies' financial advisors, and potential conflicts of
interest.  The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and
damages on behalf of holders of SFR common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than December 18, 2017.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Wilmington, Delaware and
Garden City, New York, regularly prosecutes securities fraud,
shareholder corporate, and shareholder derivative litigation on
behalf of shareholders in state and federal courts throughout the
United States.

         Gina M. Serra, Esq.
         Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
         Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
         Tel. No: (888) 969-4242
                  (302) 295-5310
         Fax: (302) 654-7530
         E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com [GN]


TESLA INC: Khang & Khang Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Khang & Khang LLP disclosed the filing of a securities class
action lawsuit against Tesla, Inc. ("Tesla" or the "Company")
(Nasdaq: TSLA). Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired
shares between May 4, 2016 and October 6, 2017, inclusive (the
"Class Period"), are encouraged to contact the Firm in advance of
the December 11, 2017 lead plaintiff motion deadline.

If you purchased Tesla shares during the Class Period, please
contact Joon M. Khang, Esquire, of Khang & Khang LLP, 4000
Barranca Parkway, Suite 250, Irvine, CA 92604, by telephone: (949)
419-3834, or by e-mail at joon@khanglaw.com.

There has been no class certification in this case yet. Until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. You
may choose to take no action and remain a passive class member as
well.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, Tesla
made materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failed
to disclose, that contrary to the Company's representations that
it was prepared for the launch of its Model 3 sedan, the Company
had severely inadequate inventory and was woefully unprepared to
launch its Model 3 sedan as anticipated; and thus, its public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. On October 2, 2017, the Company cited "production
bottlenecks" as the reason for its failure to meet its production
goals for its Model 3 sedan. On October 6, 2017, the Wall Street
Journal published an article reporting, in part, that "[u]nknown
to analysts, investors and the hundreds of thousands of customers
who signed up to buy it, as recently as early September major
portions of the Model 3 were still being banged out by hand, away
from the automated production line, according to people familiar
with the matter." When this news was announced, shares of Tesla
declined in value materially, which caused investors harm
according to the Complaint.

If you wish to learn more about this lawsuit, or if you have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights, please contact
Joon M. Khang, Esquire, a prominent litigator for almost two
decades, by telephone: (949) 419-3834, or via e-mail at
joon@khanglaw.com.


TESLA INC: Lundin Law Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lundin Law PC, a shareholder rights firm, disclosed the filing of
a class action lawsuit against Tesla, Inc. ("Tesla" or the
"Company") (Nasdaq: TSLA) concerning possible violations of
federal securities laws between May 4, 2016, and October 6, 2017,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired shares during the Class Period should contact
the firm prior to the December 11, 2017 lead plaintiff motion
deadline.

To participate in this class action lawsuit, you can call Brian
Lundin, Esquire, of Lundin Law PC, at 888-713-1033, or you can e-
mail him at brian@lundinlawpc.com.

No class has been certified in the above action yet. Until a class
is certified, you are not considered represented by an attorney.
You may also choose to do nothing and be an absent class member.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, Tesla
made materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failed
to disclose, that contrary to the Company's representations that
it was prepared for the launch of its Model 3 sedan, the Company
had severely inadequate inventory and was woefully unprepared to
launch its Model 3 sedan as anticipated; and thus, its public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. On October 2, 2017, the Company cited "production
bottlenecks" as the reason for its failure to meet its production
goals for its Model 3 sedan. On October 6, 2017, the Wall Street
Journal published an article reporting, in part, that "[u]nknown
to analysts, investors and the hundreds of thousands of customers
who signed up to buy it, as recently as early September major
portions of the Model 3 were still being banged out by hand, away
from the automated production line, according to people familiar
with the matter." Upon release of this information, shares of
Tesla fell in value materially, which caused investors harm
according to the Complaint.

Lundin Law PC was founded by Brian Lundin, Esquire --
brian@lundinlawpc.com -- a securities litigator based in Los
Angeles dedicated to upholding shareholders' rights. [GN]


TRANSENTERIX INC: Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Vinita Bansal, writing for Journal Transcript, reports that
Transenterix Inc., a medical device firm that is pioneering the
application of robotics to enhance minimally invasive surgery,
reported that the U.S. District Court has dismissed the securities
class action case filed in June 2016.  Todd M. Pope, the CEO and
President, expressed that they are delighted that the securities
class action case was dismissed.  They remain confident in
accomplishing FDA 510(k) permission of the Senhance Surgical
Robotic System and continue to emphasis on transitioning toward
commercialization in the United States. [GN]


TRUE NORTH: Williams Seeks to Recover Regular and Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
JELEICE WILLIAMS, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. TRUE NORTH ENERGY, LLC, TRUE NORTH HOLDINGS, INC. and
TRUE NORTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-02028-CAB (N.D. Ohio,
September 27, 2017), seeks to recover all wages owed to the
Plaintiff and class members for unpaid regular and overtime hours
worked, and liquidated damages to the fullest extent allowable
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wages
Standards Act.

True North Energy, LLC, is a foreign limited liability company
lawfully licensed to conduct business in the state of Ohio, with
its principal place of business located in Brecksville, Ohio.
True North Energy, LLC, is a joint venture between True North
Holdings, Inc. and Shell Oil Company.  True North Energy maintains
hundreds of gas stations throughout Ohio, and conducts business in
Ohio.

True North Holdings, Inc., is a domestic for-profit corporation
lawfully licensed to conduct business in the state of Ohio, which
maintains a place of business located in Cleveland, Ohio.  True
North Management, LLC, is a domestic limited liability company
lawfully licensed to conduct business in the state of Ohio, which
maintains a place of business located in Cleveland.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chris P. Wido, Esq.
          THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          25200 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 200
          Beachwood, OH 44122
          Telephone: (216) 291-4744
          Facsimile: (216) 291-5744
          E-mail: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com


TURFCARE OF NASHVILLE: Underwood Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LINCOLN DONNIE UNDERWOOD, individually and on behalf of all
similarly-situated persons v. TURFCARE OF NASHVILLE, LLC, and
PATRICK MCKENNON, individually, Case No. 3:17-cv-01314 (M.D.
Tenn., September 27, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime
compensation owed to the Plaintiff and all current and former
employees of the Defendants, who are similarly-situated to the
Plaintiff, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

TurfCare of Nashville, LLC, is organized under the laws of the
state of Tennessee, with its principal place of business located
in Nashville, Tennessee.  TurfCare provides landscaping services
throughout the Middle Tennessee area.  Patrick McKennon is the
managing member and owner of TurfCare.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Martin D. Holmes, Esq.
          R. Cameron Caldwell, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          Fifth Third Center
          424 Church Street, Suite 800
          Nashville, TN 37219-2392
          Telephone: (615) 244-6538
          E-mail: mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com
                  ccaldwell@dickinsonwright.com


TWENTIETH CENTURY: Ct. Narrows Claims in Juvenile Detainees' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
T.S., et al., Plaintiffs, v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX TELEVISION, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 16 C 8303 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs, who were juvenile detainees during that time, allege
that JTDC officials placed off limits certain areas that are
essential to the JTDC's mission of educating and rehabilitating
the juveniles housed there, including the JTDC's school, its
facilities for family visits, the outdoor recreation yard, the
library, the infirmary, and the chapel.

The Fox Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that
it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Pursuant to the federal pleading standards, a plaintiff's factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.

Construing Plaintiffs' allegations and all reasonable inferences
in their favor, the Court finds that they have not plausibly
alleged that the Fox Defendants and any state actor had an
agreement to deny Plaintiffs' constitutional rights or that the
Fox Defendants and a state actor had a common, unconstitutional
goal Rather, Plaintiffs' allegations suggest that the Fox
Defendants were aware that their desire to film Empire at the JTDC
conflicted with the juvenile detainees' needs.

At best, Plaintiffs have alleged that the Fox Defendants sought to
enter into an agreement that would induce the administrators to
exclude children from the JTDC's second and third floors and that
all of the Defendants knew that filming Empire would result in
restrictions on the children. Although the result of this alleged
agreement may have deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights, Plaintiffs' allegations do not support the inference that
the state and private actors shared an unconstitutional goal in
the first instance.

The Court therefore grants Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' joint action liability claim as alleged in Count IV of
the Second Amended Complaint.  Because the Court previously
granted Plaintiffs leave to amend this claim, the Court dismisses
Count IV with prejudice.

In Count VI, Plaintiffs seek to establish the Fox Defendants'
liability for the alleged due process deprivations through a
Section 1983 conspiracy claim. The elements of a Section 1983
conspiracy claim include that (1) the individuals reached an
agreement to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and
(2) overt acts in furtherance of the agreement actually deprived
the plaintiff of those constitutional rights.

Here, Plaintiffs rely on the same arguments and allegations that
they made in support of their joint action liability claim. As
with their joint action allegations, Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged that the public and private actors in this
lawsuit reached an understanding or agreement to deny Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. Again, invoking the word illicit does not
necessarily describe a shared, unconstitutional goal, and it is
well-established that vague allegations of a conspiracy between
private and state actors do not bring private actors within the
scope of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Court therefore grants the Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss
Count VI with prejudice.

In Count VIII, Plaintiffs allege that the Fox Defendants
tortiously induced Defendant Dixon and the Doe Defendants the
warden and guardians of the juvenile detainees to breach their
fiduciary duty.

Under Illinois law, a party is liable for tortious inducement if a
plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant (1) colluded with a
fiduciary in committing a breach; (2) knowingly participated in or
induced the breach of duty; and (3) knowingly accepted the
benefits resulting from that breach.

Plaintiffs state that the JTDC's administrators accepted the Fox
Defendants' inducements, and the Fox Defendants reached an
agreement with the County Defendants for Empire's film crew to
film at the JTDC. Viewing these allegations and all reasonable
inferences as true, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Fox
Defendants induced the County Defendants to breach their fiduciary
duty.

Thus, the Court denies the Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss Count
VIII of the Second Amended Complaint.

Under Illinois tort law, a civil conspiracy requires (1) an
agreement between two or more persons for the purpose of
accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by
unlawful means; and (2) at least one tortious act by one of the
co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement that caused an
injury to the plaintiff.

Plaintiffs' allegations lack sufficient detail raising their right
to relief above the speculative level that the Fox Defendants and
the County Defendants had an agreement "for the purpose of
accomplishing either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by
unlawful means. Indeed, although Plaintiffs adequately allege that
the Fox Defendants induced the County Defendants to breach their
fiduciary duty, there are no allegations suggesting that the
parties had an agreement to unlawfully restrict the juvenile
detainees.

The Court therefore grants the Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Illinois civil conspiracy claim with prejudice.
Unjust Enrichment/Accounting Claim -- Count XIII

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint also includes an unjust
enrichment/accounting claim in Count XIII. In Illinois, to state a
cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a
benefit to the plaintiff's detriment, and that defendant's
retention of the benefit violates the fundamental principles of
justice, equity, and good conscience.

Plaintiffs specifically allege that the Fox Defendants profited
from using the JTDC's incarceration facilities as the primary set
for two highly profitable Empire episodes because the scenes shot
at JTDC were featured prominently in the first two episodes of
Empire's second season, in which advertisers paid $750,000 per 30-
second advertising spot in Episode 1, and $600,000 per 30-second
spot in Episode 2.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that the Fox Defendants realized
profits from Empire by broadcasting these episodes overseas, as
well as licensing the episodes, streaming them over the internet,
and selling them for download. Based on these allegations and all
reasonable inferences, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the
Fox Defendants unjustly benefitted from their improper conduct to
the detriment of Plaintiffs under Iqbal and Twombly. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

As such, the Court denies the Fox Defendants' motion to dismiss
Count XIII.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yd6z3x25from Leagle.com.

T.S., Plaintiff, represented by Alexis Garmey Chardon --
ali@weilchardon.com -- Weil & Chardon LLC.

T.S., Plaintiff, represented by Stephen H. Weil, Weil & Chardon
LLC, 243 Deer Dr.Chardon, OH 44024.

Q.B., Plaintiff, represented by Alexis Garmey Chardon, Weil &
Chardon LLC & Stephen H. Weil, Weil & Chardon LLC.

Twentieth Century Fox Television, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey S. Jacobson -- jjacobson@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye &
Warren LLP, Matthew Charles Luzadder -- mluzzader@kelleydrye.com -
- Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Catherine E. James --
cjames@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren LLP & Janine Nicole
Fletcher -- jfletcher@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren Llp.

Fox Broadcasting Company, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S.
Jacobson, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Matthew Charles Luzadder,
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Catherine E. James, Kelley Drye & Warren
LLP & Janine Nicole Fletcher, Kelley Drye & Warren Llp.

Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
S. Jacobson, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Matthew Charles Luzadder,
Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Catherine E. James, Kelley Drye & Warren
LLP & Janine Nicole Fletcher, Kelley Drye & Warren Llp.

The County of Cook, Illinois, Defendant, represented by Anthony E.
Zecchin, Cook County State's Attorney's Office & Allyson Lynn
West, Cook County State's Attorney's Office.

Leonard Dixon, Defendant, represented by Anthony E. Zecchin, Cook
County State's Attorney's Office & Allyson Lynn West, Cook County
State's Attorney's Office.

The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendant,
represented by T. Andrew Horvat, Illinois Attorney General's
Office.


TWITTER INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Shenwick" Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DORIS SHENWICK,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. TWITTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
16-cv-05314-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Twitter is a social media company that, like other social media
companies, depends on advertising revenue. Accordingly, how many
users Twitter has, and whether those users are engaged with
Twitter's content, are deeply important to its success as a
company. In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Twitter
executives knowingly made inaccurate public statements regarding
these metrics, and failed to disclose internal information about
them, resulting in an inflated share price that fell when the
truth about user engagement became known.

This is a securities class action on behalf of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired Twitter common stock between
February 6, 2015 and July 28, 2015, inclusive (Class Period),
against Twitter and certain of its officers and/or directors for
violations of Sections 10 and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Act). Plaintiff Doris Shenwick alleges that Twitter and
certain of its officers and/or directors made materially false and
misleading statements during the Class Period in press releases
and filings with the SEC and in oral statements to the media,
securities analysts and investors.

Plaintiff's Complaint contains dozens of allegedly false or
misleading Class Period statements. The challenged statements fall
into three broad categories: (1) claims based on the omission of
Daily Activity Users (DAU) metrics, (2) claims based on
affirmative statements about user engagement, and 3) claims based
on affirmative statements about Monthly Activity Users (MAU).

Claim Based on Omission of DAU Metrics

The most plausible takeaway from these statements was that
Twitter's user engagement was improving and would continue to do
so. Yet Plaintiff plausibly alleged that user engagement, and DAU
in particular, was flat or declining leading up to and during the
Class Period. As with MAU, once defendants choose to tout positive
information to the market, about user engagement, they were bound
to do so in a manner that wouldn't mislead investors, including
disclosing adverse information that cuts against the positive
information.  Here, that meant disclosing specific DAU numbers,
which would have revealed that Noto's February 5 statements
suggesting positive DAU and user engagement trends were
misleading.  In sum, the Court denies Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's claim based on the omission of DAU metrics.

Claim Based on Affirmative Statements about Positive User
Engagement Trends

Plaintiff challenges Defendants' positive statements about ad
engagements as a measure of user engagement, both to the SEC
directly and to investors. In response to the SEC's letter request
that Twitter "describe the alternative metric(s) you anticipate
presenting in future filings to explain trends in user engagement
and advertising services revenue." Twitter stated that it did
include two user engagement metrics: changes in ad engagements and
changes in cost per ad engagement. Twitter further explained that
it internally tracks changes in ad engagements on the Twitter
platform to monitor trends in user engagement and believes this
metric is helpful to investors to understand the same. Twitter
also touted its ad engagement numbers directly to investors.

Plaintiff argues these statements were misleading first because
DAU, not ad engagements, was Twitter's primary user engagement
metric. They were also misleading, Plaintiff claims, because the
ad engagements trend was moving in the opposite direction from the
concealed trend in actual user engagement.

Defendants' response boils down to the following: even if DAU were
the key user engagement metric, ad engagements is another user
engagement metric and it was not misleading to accurately report
ad engagement trends.

The Court disagrees.

It was misleading for Defendants to rely on favorable ad
engagement trends to describe or predict user engagement when DAU,
Twitter's primary metric, was flat or declining. This is
especially true given the CWs' testimony that there is no direct
correlation between advertising engagement and MAU or DAU, because
Ad Load could always be increased to compensate for the lack of
user (MAU) growth and user engagement (DAU) growth.
Therefore, even if ad engagements could provide some insight into
user engagement, Twitter's reliance on that metric was misleading.

Claim Based on Affirmative Statements about Positive MAU Trends

Plaintiff also claims, however, that the positive statements of
Richard Costolo, Twitter's Chief Executive Officer, about MAU were
misleading because any MAU growth included and was potentially
driven by low quality users, not organic growth. Specifically,
Twitter's MAU numbers were allegedly inflated by SMS or registered
third-party applications, by robot accounts, and by efforts of
Twitter's marketing team.

This claim fails for two reasons.

First, Twitter never claimed that its MAU growth was wholly or
even mostly organic. On the February 5 Earnings Call, for example,
Costolo attributed the Q1 2015 turnaround in MAU to "a combination
of seasonality or return to organic growth and the set of product
initiatives Twitter created to drive growth.
The fact that that Twitter did not also explain that some of its
MAU growth was not organic does not make Costolo's statement
misleading.

Second, Defendants disclosed the existence of these low-quality
users. Indeed, Twitter always defined MAU to include SMS or
registered third-party applications" and explained that the third-
party activity can cause our system to count the users associated
with such applications as active users on the day or days such
contact occurs.

Similarly, Twitter disclosed the fact some of its users were using
robot accounts, that is, fake or spam accounts that could have
easily been created or bought. For example, in its Q2 2014 Form
10-Q, Twitter explained that it had performed an internal review
of a sample of accounts and estimated that false or spam accounts
represented less than 5% of our MAUs.

Finally, the fact that Twitter discussed its new product
initiatives on various earnings calls means that the Company did
not hide its attempts to improve DAU and MAU numbers through
marketing efforts. In other words, investors and analysts were on
notice about all three drivers of Twitter's allegedly low quality
MAU growth. A lack of detailed information on the numbers of these
types of users during the Class Period does not itself make
Defendants' statements about MAU growth misleading.

Scienter

Defendants emphasize the absence of allegations of relevant stock
sales during the Class Period. However, as Plaintiff notes, their
Complaint does not rely on allegations of an improper financial
motive to demonstrate scienter, nor does it reference stock sales.
Rather, Plaintiff's claim that Defendants were motivated by an
attempt to live up to the overly optimistic promises made at
Analyst Day.

The Court is therefore unwilling to draw a negative inference from
the absence of stock sales that benefitted the defendant chief
executive officer.  Here, Plaintiff's theory of the case is that
Defendants felt pressure to live up to the targets announced at
Analyst Day, not that they sought personal financial gain.
In sum, the core operations doctrine, together with Plaintiff's
other allegations, create a strong inference of scienter with
respect to the misleading statements.

Control Person Liability

Because Plaintiff adequately pleaded a section 10(b) violation,
the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's claim for
control person liability under section 20(a).

The Court grants the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's
claims based on Defendants' affirmative statements about MAU, but
denies it as to Plaintiffs DAU omissions theory and Plaintiff's
claims based on Defendants' affirmative statements about positive
user engagement trends.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 16, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yb8vhe8mfrom Leagle.com.

Doris Shenwick, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley Elizabeth Weaver
-- lweaver@bfalaw.com -- Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP.

Doris Shenwick, Plaintiff, represented by Shawn A. Williams --
shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Daniel S.
Drosman -- dand@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
Danielle Suzanne Myers -- denim@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, David Conrad Walton -- davew@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Jeffrey S. Abraham --
jabraham@aftlaw.com -- Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky, LLP & Susannah
Ruth Conn -- sconn@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

KBC Asset Management NV, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg S. Levin
-- glevin@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro hac vice, James
Michael Hughes -- jhughes@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro
hac vice, Joseph A. Fonti -- jfonti@bfalaw.com -- Bleichmar Fonti
Tountas & Auld LLP, Lesley Elizabeth Weaver -- lweaver@bfalaw.com
-- Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP, Matthew Sinclair Weiler --
mweiler@bfalaw.com -Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP. & Meghan Shea
Blaszak Oliver -- moliver@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro
hac vice.

Mark Wallace, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas --
rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, Charles J. Piven --
piven@browerpiven.com -- Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
& Quentin Alexandre Roberts, Levi & Korsinsky LLP.
Claire Degenhardt, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer
Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, J. Alexander Hood
II --  ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman --
(jalieberman@pomlaw.com  -- Pomerantz, LLP, Marc Gorrie --
mgorrie@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP, Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Peretz Bronstein --
peretz@bgandg.com -- Bronstein Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC.

Twitter, Inc., Defendant, represented by James Glenn Kreissman --
jkreissman@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP, Jonathan
K. Youngwood --  jyoungwood@stblaw.com --  Simpson Thacher and
Bartlett, pro hac vice & Simona Gurevich Strauss --
sstrauss@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

Richard Costolo, Defendant, represented by James Glenn Kreissman,
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood, Simpson
Thacher and Bartlett, pro hac vice & Simona Gurevich Strauss,
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

Anthony Noto, Defendant, represented by James Glenn Kreissman,
Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood, Simpson
Thacher and Bartlett, pro hac vice & Simona Gurevich Strauss,
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

John P. Norton, Movant, represented by Michael Walter Stocker --
mstocker@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, Christopher J.
Keller --  ckeller@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP & Francis
P. McConville -- fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP.

National Elevator Industry Pension Fund, Movant, represented by
Daniel S. Drosman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Danielle
Suzanne Myers, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Shawn A.
Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Susannah Ruth Conn,
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP.

Youri Hazanov, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A..

Diane Stearns, Movant, represented by Kim Elaine Miller, Kahn
Swick & Foti, LLC, Ramzi Abadou, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLP & Lewis S.
Kahn, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC, 12 East 41s' Street, Suite 1200. New
York, New York 10017 pro hac vice.

Zeyad AlMukhaizeem, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Charles Cheatham, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Joseph Cwiertniewicz, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

SNS Holding Co., Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz
LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Ernesto Espinoza, Movant, represented by Shane Palmesano Sanders,
Robbins Arroyo LLP.  600 B ST., STE. 1900, SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
Jim Porter, Interested Party, represented by Phong L. Tran --
phongt@johnsonfistel.com -- Johnson Fistel, LLP.


UNILIFE CORP: $4.4MM Settlement Reached in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
TO:  All persons and entities who, during the period between
November 9, 2011 and November 14, 2016 inclusive, purchased or
otherwise acquired the common stock of Unilife Corporation
("Unilife") and were damaged thereby (the "Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, that the above-
captioned litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class
action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain
persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by
definition as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency
of Class Action and Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Fairness
Hearing; and (III) Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Plaintiffs in the Action have reached a
proposed settlement of the Action for $4,400,000 in cash (the
"Settlement"), that, if approved, will resolve all claims in the
Action.

A hearing will be held on January 25, 2018 at 9:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Ronnie Abrams at the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, Courtroom 1506, 40 Foley Square, New York, NY
10007, to determine (i) whether the proposed Settlement should be
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the
Action should be dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and
the Releases specified and described in the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated March 22, 2017 (and in the Notice)
should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation
should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator at In re Unilife
Corporation Securities Litigation, c/o JND Legal Administration,
P.O. Box 6847, Broomfield, CO 80021, 1-844-864-9035.  Copies of
the Notice and Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website
maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.unilifesecuritieslitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked no later than February 20,
2018.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not submit a
proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in the
distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement but you will
nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the
Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than January 4, 2018,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.  If
you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will
not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in
the Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds
of the Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than January 4, 2018, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Unilife, or
its counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about this
notice, the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to
participate in the Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel
or the Claims Administrator.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Lead Counsel:

POMERANTZ LLP

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP

Jeremy Lieberman, Esq.

Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.

600 Third Ave., 20th Floor

1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100

New York, NY  10016

Los Angeles, CA 90067

1-888-476-6529

1-888-773-9224

settlement@pomlaw.com

settlements@glancylaw.com

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

In re Unilife Corporation Securities Litigation
c/o JND Legal Administration
P.O. Box 6847
Broomfield, CO 80021
1-844-864-9035
www.unilifesecuritieslitigation.com

By Order of the Court [GN]


USA GYMNASTICS: Faces Class Action Over Nassar Sexual Abuses
------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Bonesteel, writing for Washington Post, reports that inspired
to speak out by the burgeoning #MeToo movement, 2012 Olympic gold
medalist McKayla Maroney announced early on Oct. 18 on Twitter
that she had been molested by Larry Nassar, who pleaded guilty to
federal child-pornography charges in June and has been accused by
more than 100 women and girls of sexual assault during his time as
USA gymnastics' team doctor.

Ms. Maroney, 21, alleges that Nassar began molesting her at the
age of 13 at a U.S. national team training camp in Texas and
continued the abuse until she left the sport.  Ms. Maroney won a
team gold medal as part of the Fierce Five as well as a silver in
the vault at the 2012 Games in London where, she says, Nassar also
abused her. She last competed at the 2013 world championships and
announced her retirement in 2016.

Ms. Maroney's allegations echo those made by other gymnasts who
say they were abused by Nassar: that he molested her in the guise
of medical "treatment" for hip and back pain.

Ms. Nassar is scheduled to be sentenced on the federal child-
pornography charges on Nov. 27 in Michigan.  Prosecutors have
recommended that he be given a prison sentence of between 22 and
27 years.  Nassar still faces 22 state charges in Michigan over
allegations that he sexually assaulted children, and convictions
in those cases could result in a life sentence.  His actions also
are the subject of a class-action lawsuit filed by his alleged
victims against both USA Gymnastics and Michigan State, where
Nassar worked for a number of years.  It's unclear whether
Ms. Maroney is a plaintiff in the lawsuit. [GN]


VAIL VALLEY: Developer Sues for Discrimination Under ADA
--------------------------------------------------------
Jason Blevins, writing for The Denver Post, reports that the
company seeking to develop a drug rehabilitation facility at the
former Lodge and Spa at Cordillera has sued residents of the
luxury Vail Valley community who are battling the plan.

CSMN Investments, which purchased the property this summer as part
of a $136 million plan to convert the lodge into a high-end drug
and alcohol abuse treatment center, argues the Cordillera Property
Owners Association and Cordillera Metropolitan District violated
federal discrimination laws under the Americans with Disabilities
Act when the groups sued to block the sale and redevelopment of
the property. The lawsuit also argues that the two organizations
violated Colorado laws governing special districts by spending
more than $647,000 in public money to fight the project. CSMN
filed its civil lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Denver on
October 20, seeking to thwart a pending appeal by the property
owners as well as reimbursement for damages and attorneys fees.

"CSMN has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable injury
as a direct and proximate result of defendants' actions," reads
the lawsuit. "CSMN has been compelled to divert resources, energy,
and funds from other activities related to its efforts to assist
persons with disabilities to use, enjoy, and reside in the
Cordillera community."

Homeowners in Cordillera have spent more than a year fighting to
prevent the conversion of the former 56-room lodge and community
centerpiece into a rehabilitation facility that will charge as
much $60,000 a month for treatment. Last year, Cordillera
homeowners filed a $100 million class-action lawsuit arguing the
plan had devastated property values. In February, a federal judge
refused to delay the sale of the lodge, dealing a fatal blow to
the class-action lawsuit, which residents dropped. In September,
an Eagle County District Judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by
residents seeking to upend the Eagle County Board of Commissioners
approval of a 2009 change in the community's planned-unit-
development guidelines that permitted a potential medical facility
-- among many expanded possible uses -- at the former luxury
lodge. The homeowners have promised to appeal that decision.

The Concerted Care Group was the only serious buyer who was
interested in the property, which Texas-based investment firm
Behringer Harvard purchased in 2008 and listed for sale in 2013.
The group closed the lodge for renovations this summer after
buying the property.

The lawsuit filed October 20 includes more than a dozen emails
from residents supporting a legal challenge to the drug treatment
facility. Those emails reveal residents concerned for their safety
and lifestyle in the gated golf resort above the Vail Valley.

"I will no longer feel safe, I will no longer leave my doors
unlocked and I will no longer hike alone with my dog, as I will be
fearful that a drug addict may be lurking around. I am scared . .
.  This will ruin our paradise," reads one email from a property
owner that was part of the lawsuit filing.

Thomas Wilner, Esq. -- twilner@shearman.com -- an attorney and
Cordillera resident who is directing the legal fight and is named
in the lawsuit, said homeowners are confident they will prevail on
appeal of the Eagle County decision and the lawsuit filed October
20 by the new owners of the lodge is "frivolous and a blatant
attempt to try to intimidate members of the Cordillera community
and boards to drop out of litigation."

Wilner said a minority of homeowners initially expressed fears
over drug addicts in their neighborhood, but the community's
lawsuits and challenges have focused on the legality of the 2009
PUD amendment that created the possibility of closing the lodge to
residents.

"The community has always said drug treatment should be allowed.
The issue is taking the lodge away from the community. If (the
developer) allows the community to have access to the lodge, we
have no objection," Wilner said. "But he said we can't have access
because he wants to preserve the anonymity of his residents so he
can charge them more money. The idea that (the legal challenges)
are about drug treatment is simply not true."

Noah Nordheimer, the chief-executive of Concerted Care Group who
is leading the investment group CSMN, said the fight by residents
has impacted the project financially. But the lawsuit has more to
do with his patients, he said, and defending them from "the
stigmatization of drug addiction."

"If someone is sick and has cancer or other chronic diseases we
run out and give them a hug; we support them. If you suffer from a
substance abuse disorder or a behavioral health disorder, we
project shame on to you and say you aren't allowed in our
neighborhood," he said. "This was blatant discrimination. We are
fighting for all the people suffering who don't have a voice, who
don't have access to treatment. The head of the communities' legal
committee -- Mr. Wilner -- would love for people to believe they
are the victims, but they are a hate-filled group that has spewed
discriminatory thoughts, followed up by discriminatory actions.
They have been terrorizing us for well over a year and a half and
there are laws that are designed to protect us. The worst part is
they used taxpayer money to fund it." [GN]


VANLAW FOOD: Accused by Torres of Not Accurately Paying Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
IGNACIO TORRES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. VANLAW FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., a California Corporation,
doing business as VAN LAW PRODUCTS, INC.; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Case No. 30-2017-00946312-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Orange Cty., September 27, 2017), accuses the Defendants of
failing to lawfully and accurately pay the Plaintiff and Class
Members for all hours worked, including overtime.

Vanlaw Food Products, Inc., is a California corporation and does
business as "Van Law Food Products, Inc."  The Company produces
and distributes food products, including pan cake and waffle
syrups, flavorings, beverage bases, marinades, spaghetti and pasta
sauces, bar mixes, salad dressings, lemon juices, dipping,
flavorings, and ice cream toppings.  The Company was founded in
1945 and is based in Fullerton, California.  The true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Christina M. Lucio, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: James@Jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Christina@Jameshawkinsaplc.com


VECTOR MARKETING: Faces Class Action Over Unfair Labor Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Zavadski, writing for Daily Beast, reports that just after
graduating from high school, Nicholas LeBerth got an ambiguous
letter inviting him to a job interview.  The firm was called
Vector Marketing and it promised generous compensation and
flexible work schedules.

The job was selling kitchen knives, first to his parents.
"I started mostly trying to sell to my family and ran out of them
to sell to in like two weeks," Mr. LeBerth told The Daily Beast.

Vector Marketing is the sales wing of the Cutco Corporation, and a
"direct sales" company that focuses its recruiting on high school
and college students, and is even endorsed by some professors.
And, just off a multi-million dollar settlement over unpaid
training, the company is now being sued by managers who say they
should be employees, not contractors.

The Vector model depends on a revolving door of contractors that
allows Vector access to a large pool of salespeople at little
cost.  The company works with some 60,000 students yearly as
independent contractors, according to a recent profile in the
Santa Barbara Independent.

But many young people who attend the information sessions say they
are surprised to find out in training sessions that they're
supposed to drum up their own list of customers, starting with mom
and dad.

And now, back-to-back lawsuits may change the way the company
operates.

In February, Vector Marketing settled a class-action lawsuit with
sales representatives who were required to attend training
sessions but were not paid.  A judge certified the class action
despite Vector Marketing's claims that the contractors were not
employees and that there were differences between those who create
customer lists and those who did not.  Vector paid out $6.75
million total to plaintiffs, which included LeBerth who received
some compensation.

"We settled the case, not as an admission of fault or liability,
but to better invest our time, money, and energy into our
business," Joel Koncinsky, Vector's public relations manager, told
The Daily Beast.  "Our reps are not paid for training but, in
turn, we do pay them for each appointment completed even if no
sale is made. It's a mutual commitment."

Then in September, Vector faced a new class-action lawsuit
initiated by a division manager, alleging unfair labor practices
because he, too, was classified as an independent contractor. Such
a classification denied him and others in his classification
overtime pay, according to the suit.

According to the suit, division managers are the highest-ranking
class of workers who are not employees of the company.

The suit is still in the early stages, and the attorneys behind it
did not return a request for comment.  But if it is successful, it
could lead to further cases about how the company's other
independent contractors are classified.

In 1996, Vector stopped recruiting salespeople in Wisconsin after
concerns from authorities that it misled them about the hourly
rate.  In fact, they are paid by the appointment, regardless of
how much work it took to set the appointment up.  That is still a
common refrain among Cutco contractors, many of whom take to the
internet to complain.

"Vector Marketing doesn't offer a pay of fifteen dollars an hour,
it offers fifteen dollars per in-home appointment," former
marketing Kaitlyn Tomko wrote in a blog post in 2015.  Ms. Tomko
also claimed salespeople must get to their appointments and set
them up on their own time.

"Our positions aren't for everybody," Mr. Koncinsky admitted. "But
for people that have a positive attitude, great work ethic, and
want to gain valuable experience while getting paid what they're
worth? They have the opportunity to make career-like income, even
at a young age."

Mr. Koncinsky indicated the company has no plans to pay for
training.

And, until 2011, Vector required would-be contractors to purchase
a knife set for work, which the company referred to as a
refundable deposit, Mr. Koncinsky said.  Each recruit had to
invest money in the company before receiving a paycheck.

"Our representatives are not required to purchase a sample set
to begin working with us," Mr. Koncinsky said.

Despite these practices over the decades, Vector is endorsed by a
half-dozen professors from respected universities who sit on its
academic advisory board.  They provide the company with feedback
on how to connect with its young salespeople, advisory board
member Victoria Crittenden, a professor and chair of the marketing
division at Babson College, told The Daily Beast.  Professors from
Belmont, the University of South Carolina, the University of
Calgary, the University of Texas at Austin, and Oklahoma City
University did not return requests for comment.

"You know, 'you're really going to have to make a bigger shift in
the digital world, because that's where the college students are
living right now,'" she said.  "The academic advisory board is an
opportunity for the company to basically run ideas past us."
Ms. Crittenden's academic research focuses on direct sales, a
holdover from when her mother took a direct sales job with Avon to
support the family.

"It's this idea that direct selling offers such a wonderful
opportunity, back in the '60s and '70s, way back then, to enable
women who may not have had other opportunities for work,"
Crittenden said.  "Keep in mind, it was a different time period
back then."

She said she doesn't work directly with Vector Marketing's
independent contractors, but that she's had students who've worked
for it from time to time. The company gives them hands-on
experience in the real world of business, she said.

Ms. Crittenden said she's aware of the lawsuits against Vector
Marketing and the online testimonials from disgruntled
contractors. But those do not worry her, she said.

"Just like any company that's out there, things are gonna happen,
and they're gonna settle," Ms. Crittenden said.  "But how much of
what's online is true? How much is a person having an unhappy
experience?"
"The thing is, when these people sign up to be independent
contractors, they know exactly what they're selling," she said,
referring to the students, some as young as 17 years old.  "If you
have a problem selling a $500 set of knives, why sign up to be a
salesperson?"

And many of the initial subsequent sales would also be to friends
and family of the new contractor.

And the question of exactly how much they know when they sign up
remains. When The Daily Beast followed up on job postings listed
in the Rochester, New York area, the application website told
students they were applying to work for a small business.

"What is the job though?" The Daily Beast texted a listed number.
"Super busy right now, sorry. Check out the doc and it will
provide further instructions."

A follow-up text from a different number said the job was "a
little long to explain over text" but essentially "talking with
customers, answering questions, and helping place orders."

Then it asked when this reporter was available to come in for an
interview. [GN]


VICTORIA: VBA Unclear on Class Action Payout
--------------------------------------------
Chris Hughes at Sydney Morning Herald reports that Victoria's
building regulator hasn't set aside contingency funds for an
unprecedented class action lawsuit launched against it by 36
disgruntled homeowners last May, its annual report shows.

The Hinchliffe-Princeton Legal led class-action arose from an
alleged failure to protect homeowners from dangerous and inferior
building work.

"It is not possible to estimate amounts of any eventual payments
that may or may not be required in relation to these claims," the
Victorian Building Authority said.

The authority's total income rose to $56.1 million, up by $2.3
million from the previous year, most generated from building
permit levies and plumbing compliance certificates.

The organisation spent $650,000 on consultancy fees, the bulk --
$200,000 -- on restructuring and insolvency specialists PPB
Advisory for forensic investigations and consultancy services.

Another $124,800 was spent on upgrading occupational health and
safety systems.

Complaints against builders and plumbers shot up by 30 per cent
from the previous reporting period.

The authority increased the number of its executives paid more
than $100,000, the annual report shows.

Chief executive Prue Digby was paid annual salary around $350,000.
Five other executives were paid between $180,000 and $220,000.

Ms Digby said the city-wide audit of flammable aluminium cladding
on buildings following the Lacrosse tower blaze had chewed up
"significant resources" in the previous financial year.


WELLS FARGO: Derivative Ruling Won't Help in Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Jack Newsham, writing for Law360, reports that Wells Fargo & Co.
hit back at arguments by a proposed class of shareholders that the
success of another suit against the bank gives them a leg up,
telling a California federal judge that the other case was wrongly
decided and just different enough to be of no legal use to the
investors.

The bank, which is facing both a potential class action and a
shareholder derivative suit over the beating its stock price took
after its unauthorized accounts scandal was revealed, was dealt a
setback when U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar refused to dismiss most
of the derivative case.

Plaintiffs in the class action jumped on the decision, saying it
resolved several issues in their favor and urging Judge Tigar, who
is overseeing both cases, to apply the same logic to their claims.
But Wells Fargo argued that the decision was wrong or lacked
authority on key elements of federal securities fraud claims,
including falsity and knowledge of wrongdoing, or scienter.

"Defendants respectfully submit that the optimistic statements
regarding the general success or importance of Wells Fargo's
cross-selling [of new accounts to existing customers] that the
court held to be actionably false and misleading are, in fact,
nonactionable puffery and opinions," the company argued. It added
that while the judge found certain "red flags" had been ignored by
the company's board, which is defending against the derivative
suit, his conclusion that they amounted to scienter was a
departure from precedent.

Union Asset Management Holding AG, an investor that hopes to lead
the class, told the court in an Oct. 6 letter that the decision in
the derivative suit cut in its favor in other ways. It rejected
arguments by Wells Fargo directors that no "contemporaneous"
insider trading was alleged, UAMH noted, and it only dismissed a
claim against bank exec Michael J. Loughlin because the derivative
plaintiffs didn't allege that he made any false statements -- an
element UAMH's complaint included.

Wells Fargo sought to rebut both of those arguments. Judge Tigar's
decision on insider trading timing in the derivative case was
based on precedent from another derivative case whose facts were
"not analogous" to UAMH's allegations. Loughlin's statement in
UAMH's complaint isn't alleged to be false either, the bank said,
and the class action includes several defendants who aren't named
at all in the derivative case and therefore no worse off.

The suits followed a 9 percent drop in Wells Fargo's stock price
in September 2016. The Los Angeles Times had raised questions over
the company's high-pressure cross-selling focus, and the bank
reached a $185 million settlement with federal and Los Angeles law
enforcers that month. Shortly thereafter, the bank's CEO was
grilled by a congressional panel of outraged lawmakers, leading to
more bad press.

The putative class of shareholders alleges Wells Fargo and its
executives spent years hyping the company's focus on persuading
existing banking customers to sign up for new products like credit
cards, mortgages and retirement accounts, all while knowing that a
"significant" number of the signups were fraudulent. The bank had
sought the case's dismissal, when the decision came down in the
derivative action.

A lawyer for the plaintiffs declined to comment Thursday. A lawyer
for Wells Fargo didn't respond to a comment request.

The investors are represented by Salvatore Graziano, Adam
Wierzbowski, Rebecca E. Boon and Angus F. Ni of Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP and Shawn A. Williams, Aelish M. Baig and
Jason C. Davis of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Wells Fargo is represented by Brendan P. Cullen, Sverker K.
Hogberg, Ryan J. McCauley, Richard H. Klapper, Nicolas Bourtin and
Christopher M. Viapiano of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.

The case is Hefler et al. v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., case number
3:16-cv-05479, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California.


WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Tentatively Approves Revised Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
WTHR.com reported that a federal judge has tentatively approved a
revised settlement to a class-action lawsuit over a West Virginia
chemical spill that left up to 300,000 people without tap water
for up to nine days.

U.S. District Judge John Copenhaver on October 19 scheduled a
final hearing Jan. 9. The deadline for claims submissions is Feb.
21, 2018.

In January 2014, a tank at now-defunct Freedom Industries in
Charleston leaked thousands of gallons of coal-cleaning chemicals
that got into West Virginia American Water's treatment plant 1.5
miles downstream.

Copenhaver previously raised concerns about terms of an earlier
negotiated $151 million settlement with West Virginia American
Water Co. and Eastman Chemical.

The amended plan would raise payments for a simple household claim
from $525 to $550, and allow $180 for each additional household
resident. [GN]


WILLMARK COMMUNITIES: Group of Tenants Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Dorian Hargrove, writing for San Diego Reader, reports that in
May 2015, Bernard Vinluan's job at Willmark Communities became
more secret agent than apartment leasing agent.  Mr. Vinluan
waited for the employees to clock out of the office before he made
his move.

He snuck into his coworker Rita Ruiz's office and fumbled through
the collections administrator's desk drawers.  He grabbed
documents and invoices and took them down the hall to his office.
Mr. Vinluan and his boss Randy Williams removed the metal filing
cabinet from Ms. Ruiz's office and replaced it with a similar
cabinet.

The covert operations occurred at the headquarters of Willmark
Communities in Scripps Ranch, just east of Interstate 15 off the
Mira Mesa Boulevard exit.  Willmark owns and operates nine large
apartment complexes in San Diego County, and several other
properties out of state.

The spying began days after the company learned that a group of
tenants had filed a class-action lawsuit.  According to the
group's attorney, the number of plaintiffs now stands at 3000
people.

In the complaint, tenants claim that Willmark pocketed their
security deposits.  And when asked about the charges, the company
refused to provide proper invoices and tried to hide overcharges.
The class-action lawsuit also alleges that general manager
Williams and owner Mark Schmidt encouraged employees to lie and
show doctored photos on the witness stand if the tenants sued them
in small-claims court.  Court records show that since 2007, 62
former tenants filed lawsuits in small-claims court.

One of Kristen's boys had an allergic reaction to dog dander in
the rug; after moving out, Willmark charged her for replacing the
carpet.

In the following days, when Mr. Vinluan was not sneaking into his
coworkers' offices, he was on the phone calling hundreds of former
tenants.  He told them that an internal audit found mistakes on
their security deposits.  Mr. Vinluan said he would issue them a
check if they agreed to not be a part of the class-action lawsuit.

Mr. Vinluan admitted to as much in a statement (obtained by the
Reader through a Public Records Act request) that he provided to
the Unemployment Insurance Board in June of this year.

"I couldn't be truthful to some workers when asked what I was
working on," Mr. Vinluan wrote.  "Some of the things that I was
asked to do felt I felt were against my morals."

In the following months after the class action was filed, three
employees, including Rita Ruiz, filed lawsuits against the
company.  In their lawsuits they all claim the same things, that
Willmark Communities, with the owner and general manager's
knowledge, encouraged employees to lie in order to keep people's
security deposits.

"They shove the kids around"
Douglas Rice and his wife moved into Alpine Woods, a half mile
south of Interstate 8 along Tavern Road in Alpine, in 2010.
During his move-in, Mr. Rice brought his washing machine and
dryer. His dryer, however, was the wrong wattage and he rented one
from Willmark.  Five years later, when moving out, Mr. Rice took
his washer and the dryer he stored with him.

After moving out, Rice received a summary of charges from
Willmark.  They kept his entire deposit and charged Mr. Rice and
his wife $1000.  In all, the bill came to approximately $2400.
Willmark charged the couple to paint the entire apartment, to
install new carpet, and a list of other items, including for the
washer and dryer they brought with them five years earlier.

Mr. Rice says Rita Ruiz accused Rice of stealing the washer and
dryer. She threatened to report Rice to law enforcement when he
contested the charges.

"I was amazed at how brazen they are," Rice said in a September 21
interview.  "They are a few minor steps away from being mobsters.
I had thought about filing an attempted-extortion lawsuit.  I'm 70
years old and have been a tenant, owned property, and been a
landlord.  I have never seen an outfit that is legitimately so
mischievous.  This outfit is about as bad as it gets.  I don't
know how or why they are still allowed to operate in this state.
They are used to shoving people around. They shove the kids
around, and the kids don't know any better."

Mr. Rice says he was about to file a small-claims case but then
learned about the class action and joined.  "Even if they paid me
what they owed me I would still pursue this for what I say is
attempted extortion. It was blatantly illegal."

Kristen (who only wished to use her first name) and her two sons
moved into Prominence Apartments south of State Route 78 at Twin
Oaks Valley Road in San Marcos in July 2013.  She noted that there
were several stains on the carpet and it smelled like a dog had
lived in the apartment before.

Soon after moving in, Kristen's son's allergies worsened. She took
him to the doctor.  He found dog dander to be a possible cause to
his allergies.  She requested that the carpet be replaced.
Willmark told her that they would have it inspected but never
followed through.

In April 2015, Kristen notified Willmark that she was moving.  At
the time she was on a month-to-month lease agreement.  An employee
inspected the apartment after she moved. The employee said the
apartment needed to be touched up with paint in some places, the
carpet cleaned, and additional cleaning of the bathroom and
kitchen.

Three weeks later she received notice that Willmark charged her to
replace the carpet and paint the entire apartment, as well as
other fixes.  They took her $325 deposit and charged her an
additional $703.

"My first reaction was to sue them, because I was just blown
away," she said in a phone interview.  "To think that they were
charging me to replace the carpet that I had asked them to
replace, the same carpet that made my son sick . . . it infuriated
me."

Terri Winbush and her family moved into a two-bedroom apartment at
Rancho Hillside Apartments off Jamacha Road in Rancho San Diego.
In December 2012 the family bought a house. Long after the 21-day
deadline to receive security deposit returns, Ms. Winbush received
hers. It was postmarked late and had been sent to her address at
Rancho Hillside, not her new home.  Willmark took Ms. Winbush's
entire $199 deposit as well as charged her an extra $151. [GN]


WINDSOR SURRY: Bid to Dismiss "Torch" Suit Denied as Moot
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court, D. Oregon, Portland
Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an
amended complaint and denied as moot the Defendants' motion to
dismiss all of the causes of action in the case captioned ROBERT
TORCH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. WINDSOR SURRY COMPANY, d/b/a WINDSORONE; WINDSOR
WILLITS COMPANY, d/b/a WINDSOR MILL; and WINDSOR HOLDING COMPANY,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00918-AA (D. Or.).

This is a products liability case involving allegedly defective
wood boards used for external trim on houses and other buildings.
The Plaintiff and Putative Class Representative Torch alleges the
WindsorONE trim board installed at his house prematurely rotted
and deteriorated, causing significant damage to his home.  On
behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated persons, the
Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory relief.

On June 12, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the action against the
Defendants, asserting seven claims for relief: (i) strict products
liability, (ii) negligence, (iii) breach of express warranty, (iv)
breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Or. Rev. Stat.
Section 72.3140, (v) breach of implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose under Or. Rev. Stat. Section 72.3150, (vi)
breach of manufacturer's implied warranty of merchantability under
Or. Rev. Stat. Section 72.8020, and (vii) declaratory relief.

The Plaintiff seeks to bring the case as a class action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The proposed class is all
persons and entities in the State of Oregon who own or owned
homes, apartments, office buildings, or other structures in which
WindsorONE trim board is or was installed on the exterior.

On Aug. 11, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and,
alternatively, a motion to strike the class allegations, arguing
the Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statutes of limitations,
implied warranties do not apply because of the terms of the
express warranty, and the Plaintiff did not rely on any statements
about WindsorONE trim board in deciding to purchase his house.

The Defendants also contend that the Plaintiff's complaint is
defective because the proposed class is overbroad, includes
putative members who lack standing, and is insufficiently numerous
and because the Plaintiff is an atypical and inadequate class
representative.  Additionally, the Defendants aver that individual
issues will predominate and that individual actions would be a
superior method of adjudicating the controversy.

On Sept. 22, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend
the complaint.

Because the proposed amendments are not futile, because she finds
no other reason to decline to grant leave to amend exists, and
because permitting amendment serves the interests of justice,
Judge Aiken granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an
amended complaint.  The Defendants have not carried their burden
of showing that the amendment would be futile.  The Plaintiff is
granted leave to file an amended complaint within 14 days of the
Order.

Because the Defendants' motions to dismiss and to strike are based
on Plaintiff's initial complaint, Judge Aiken denied as moot those
motions.  The Defendant may again make those motions upon the
Plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint.  She realizes that
even upon the Plaintiff's amendment, substantial portions of the
Defendants' arguments may remain applicable and the Defendants may
reassert those arguments.

The Defendants, in their opposition to the Plaintiff's motion to
amend, request that the Court take judicial notice of a pending
action, Windsor Surry Company, et al. v. Jesus Gomez, filed Sept.
20, 2017 in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, County of
Multonomah.  That case, which the Defendants filed against
proposed plaintiff Gomez, asserts Gomez breached a settlement
agreement and release by attempting to join this lawsuit.

Judge Aiken granted the Defendants' request for judicial notice,
as Court filings are appropriate subjects of judicial notice.
However, the pending state court action does not justify denying
the Plaintiff's motion to amend because an unresolved breach of
contract claim does not establish futility of amendment.  The
Defendants may assert arguments regarding breach of a settlement
agreement and/or release in subsequent motions once the Plaintiff
files an amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 24, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/hupO35 from Leagle.com.

Robert Torch, Plaintiff, represented by Charles E. Schaffer --
cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac vice.

Robert Torch, Plaintiff, represented by Michael A. McShane, Audet
& Partners LLP, pro hac vice, S. Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners
LLP, pro hac vice & Steve D. Larson -- slarson@stollberne.com --
Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C..

Windsor Surry Company, Defendant, represented by Jennifer Kay
Oetter, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jonathan B. Gaskin --
jgaskin@kaufholdgaskin.com -- Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, Quynh K. Vu --
qvu@kaufholdgaskin.com -- Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, pro hac vice,
Steven S. Kaufhold -- skaufhold@kaufholdgaskin.com -- Kaufhold
Gaskin LLP, pro hac vice & William E. Pallares --
William.Pallares@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP, pro hac vice.

Windsor Willits Company, Defendant, represented by Jennifer Kay
Oetter, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jonathan B. Gaskin,
Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, Quynh K. Vu, Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, pro hac
vice, Steven S. Kaufhold, Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, pro hac vice &
William E. Pallares, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, pro hac
vice.

Windsor Holding Company, Defendant, represented by Jennifer Kay
Oetter, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jonathan B. Gaskin,
Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, Quynh K. Vu, Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, pro hac
vice, Steven S. Kaufhold, Kaufhold Gaskin LLP, pro hac vice &
William E. Pallares, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, pro hac
vice.


* Justice Pariente: Legal Aid Apt Beneficiary of Class Action Win
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Musgrave, writing for Palm Beach Post, reports that Florida
Supreme Court Justice Barbara Pariente watched her former law
partner hand the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County a hefty
check -- the fruits of his second successful class-action lawsuit
against an infamous South Florida foreclosure attorney who was
later disbarred.

The $206,700 check, which attorney Louis Silber presented to the
nonprofit law firm that serves low-income people, couldn't have
come at a better time, said Robert Bertisch, the agency's
executive director.

Hammered by funding cuts, he said the Legal Aid Society needs the
money to continue to help people who are exploited or victimized
by business people such as ex-lawyer David Stern. The Broward
County man made millions as a foreclosure attorney before his law
firm collapsed in 2011 amid a state investigation into allegations
of robo-signing and fraud.

While the investigation went nowhere, in 2014 the Florida Supreme
Court disbarred Stern. It accepted a recommendation from Palm
Beach County Judge Nancy Perez, who held a five-day hearing on 17
allegations of wrongdoing. "His failure to exercise care resulted
in massive injury to the system," she wrote.

Silber said it's fitting that the money he gave Legal Aid came
from a lawsuit he against Stern. Stern's aggressive pursuit of
homeowners facing foreclosure forced many to seek help from Legal
Aid, he said. Others, he said, became homeless.

That's why Silber chose Legal Aid and two homeless assistance
agencies -- The Lord's Place in West Palm Beach and the Miami
Rescue Mission -- as surprise beneficiaries of the litigation.

Since winning $1.2 million in the lawsuit he filed in 2007, Silber
said he and his legal team distributed payouts of between $600 and
$3,500 to nearly 900 of the roughly 1,150 people who joined the
litigation. But 250 of those entitled to money remain elusive.

In September, Palm Beach County Circuit Judge Cymonie Rowe agreed
he could distribute all but $40,000 of the unclaimed money to the
three charities, as allowed by law. If ongoing efforts to find the
remaining 250 people aren't successful, Legal Aid will receive
another $40,000 in January, according to the agreement Rowe
approved. She also authorized a $30,000 donation to The Lord's
Place and $10,000 to the Miami Rescue Mission.

It was the second time the Legal Aid Society has benefited from
Silber's successful pursuit of Stern. Three years ago, the
nonprofit law firm received nearly $166,000 in unclaimed money
from a separate lawsuit in which Silber and attorney Kirk
Friedland were awarded nearly $840,000 for another group of
Stern's victims.

Pariente, who practiced with Silber for 10 years before she was
appointed to the 4th District Court of Appeal and then to the
state's highest court, applauded her former partner's decision to
give the money to Legal Aid. Chief Justice Jorge Labarga, who also
lives in Palm Beach County, has made access to the courts for all
state residents the cornerstone of his term at the head of the
court.

Surveys show that 90 percent of state residents can't afford
lawyers when they need them, she said. While lawyers can donate
their services, it isn't enough. Legal aid is needed to make sure
courthouses remain open for all. "It is the Legal Aid Society that
day in and day out represents the people who can't afford to hire
an attorney," she said. [GN]


* Mississippi Lawyer Calls for More Opioids Class Actions
---------------------------------------------------------
Mark Strassmann, writing for CBS News, reports that the opioid
epidemic is killing tens of thousands of Americans every year --
and one attorney is fighting it in court.

As black market poison, opioids have become an American cradle-to-
grave scourge.

"There is an opioid-addicted baby being born in a hospital right
now," said Mike Moore.

Mr. Moore calls himself a "country lawyer from Mississippi." Don't
believe it.  He's a 65-year-old David who has found his next
Goliath: The big drug manufacturers.

Mr. Moore says the industry understated how addictive the
painkillers could be.

"They said there was a study that showed that less than 1 percent
of people taking opioids would get addicted if under a doctor's
care.  That turned out to be a big lie -- just wasn't true," Moore
said.  "They misled the American public.  They misled the doctors
in this country. Many of the doctors were duped. And frankly, I
think they misled the FDA."

But one lawyer taking on a multi-billion dollar industry? It may
sound like a mismatch. But don't believe that either.

"I do not believe nicotine or our product is addictive," said one
tobacco executive to Congress.

"I believe nicotine is not addictive," said another.

In 1994, Mr. Moore filed the first civil lawsuit against the
tobacco industry for misrepresenting the dangers of smoking.  He
was Mississippi's attorney general. Forty-six states eventually
joined him. They won the largest class action settlement in
history: $246 billion.

"My mama called me and told me it's time for me to come home," Mr.
Moore said.  "I mean everybody thought I'd gone absolutely nuts
cause nobody frankly had ever beaten them at all. But we had a
just cause."

Now Mr. Moore's pushing for a similar class-action suit against
the pharmaceutical industry.  He has convinced 11 states.

"It's a blunt instrument," Mr.  Moore said.  "It kinda hits people
upside the head and gets their attention.  Sometimes that works."

He admits that he "loves" being the David.

"These cases will get the truth out about this industry and maybe
we'll never repeat this in history," Mr. Moore said.  "Win or
lose." [GN]


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Marion
Alcestis A. Castillon, Ma. Cristina Canson, Noemi Irene A. Adala,
Joy A. Agravante, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at 856-381-
8268.



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