CAR_Public/171031.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, October 31, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 215



                            Headlines

2 GOLD LLC: Wins Summary Judgment in Sandy Property Damages Suit
A+ TIRES: Fourth Circuit Appeal Initiated in "Alfaro Zelaya" Suit
ABBOTT LABS: Entitled to Immunity Under Michigan Statute
ABBVIE INC: Appeal in "Sidney Hillman" Case Underway
ABBVIE INC: Still Faces Suits by Medical Mutual & Allied Services

ABBVIE INC: 90% of Depakote Claims Pending
ABBVIE INC: Suit by Rubinstein, et al. Still Pending
ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement Awaits Final Court Approval
ACCELERATE DIAGNOSTICS: Appeal Filed in "Chang" Suit
AIR EVAC: "Hundley" Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Consumers

ALABAMA: Braggs, et al. Seek to Certify Dental Class
ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Extends Response Filing Date in "Teodoro"
AMERICAN EAGLE: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in "Bedoya" Suit
AMERICAN STRATEGIC: Faces "Hanze" Suit in Middle District of Fla
ANSELMO LINDBERG: Court Dismisses "Wolter" for Lack of Standing

ARENA PHARMACEUTICALS: Consolidated Class Suit Pending in Calif.
ARS NATIONAL: Court Certifies Settlement Class in "Thomas" Suit
AVX CORPORATION: Still Defends Class Action
BANCORPSOUTH INC: Class Action Appeal Pending Before 6th Cir.
BANCORPSOUTH INC: 7th. Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Coverage Suit

BANK MUTUAL: "Schumel" Class Suit Underway
BERKELEY UNIFIED: Court Narrows Claims in IDEA Violations Suit
BEST BUY: "Harris" Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
BET INTERACTIVE: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
BIG EASY FOODS: "Ramos" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations

BMW AG: Audubon Imports Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violation
BURGER KING: Florida Court Dismisses "Gesten" FACTA Suit
BUSH ROSS P.A.: "Kagno" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Court Narrows Claims in "Jensen"
CALIFORNIA: Chief Justice Says Cash Bail System Unsafe, Unfair

CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces "Teitlebaum" Suit in E.D. New York
CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces "Teitelbaum" Suit in E.D. New York
CBE GROUP: Truglio Seeks to Certify New Jersey Consumer Class
CHARLES SCHWAB: Appeal in Total Bond Market Fund Suit Pending
CHRISTUS HEALTH: Texas Court Dismisses "Meyer" FDCPA Suit

CINTAS CORP: "Cassingham" Suit Seeks Conditional Certification
CITGO PETROLEUM: Claims Tech Firms Liable for Spam Text Accord
CORECIVIC INC: Still Defends Against "Grae" Suit
CREDIT CONTROL: Certification of Consumer Class Sought
DC CAP HOTELIER: Faces "Jorge" Suit in S.D. New York

DELI PARTNERS: Smiley Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
DIMENSION THERAPEUTICS: Faces "Scarantino" Securities Suit
DITECH FINANCIAL: Class Settlement in "Fein" Suit Has Final OK
DUN & BRADSTREET: Portion of O&R Case Settlement Denied
DUN & BRADSTREET: Appeal Related to "Thomas" Case Dismissed

E&M ASSOCIATES: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Suit
ECOLAB INC: "Miner" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
EDUCATIONAL FIN'L: Dec. 6 Case Mngt Conference in "Cabiness"
EGS FINANCIAL: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Nolet"
EPIC RESTAURANT: Court Certifies Settlement Class in "Magee" Suit

EQUIFAX INC: "Pierre" Suit Alleges FCRA Violations
FALLS COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
FARMERS INSURANCE: "Tompkins" Class Settlement Has Final Approval
FCA US: Sued by Shipley Over Defective Transmission Systems
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Downing Appeals Ruling to Eleventh Circuit

FINANCIAL CORP: Faces "Encarnacion" Suit in M.D. Florida
FINGERS FACES: Pineda Caballero Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
FIRST POTOMAC: Wooldridge Sues Over Misleading Proxy Statement
FOX: Must Face Unjust Enrichment Claims Over Empire Filming
FUSION LOGISTICS: Court Approved Settlement Agreement

G & H DAIRY: Agrees to Pay $600,000 to Settle Workers' Suit
GALE/TRIANGLE INC: "Turk" Class Settlement Has Final Court OK
GANNETT SATELLITE: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
GC SERVICES: Faces "Feldman" Suit in E.D. New York
GC SERVICES: Faces "Kodirova" Suit in E.D. New York

GENE BY GENE: Cole Appeals Alaska Court Decision to Ninth Circuit
GENERAL MOTORS: Inks $120MM Ignition-Switch Accord with States
GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Class Suit in Nevada Still Pending
GREGG PETERSON: Certification of Sales Reps Class Sought
GUAM: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Crawford" Class Suit

HARRIS & HARRIS: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Squitieri & Fearon Named Class Counsel
HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Against Suits over Dental Supplies
HERC HOLDINGS: Appeal in Securities Litigation Underway
IC SYSTEM: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

ICAHN ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss to Dismiss Suit Underway
ICAHN ENTERPRISES: Michigan Class Action Remains Stayed
INT'L WAREHOUSE: NY High Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Labor Suit
INTERSTATE HOTELS: "Richardson" Suit Seeks to Certify 5 Classes
INTERSTATE WAREHOUSING: Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part

JOE'S SHANGHAI: Kitchen Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime
JOHN CHRISTNER: "Huddleston" Wage-and-Hour Suit Moved to Okla.
JOHNS HOPKINS: Day Appeals D. Maryland Decision to Fourth Circuit
KAISER PERMANENTE: Kaiser Owes Call-Center Nurses for Unpaid Work
KELLER UNLIMITED: "Sellers" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

KI MOON RESTAURANT: Faces "Lopez" Suit in E.D. New York
KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Class Cert. Hearing Continued to Dec. 12
L-3 COMMUNICATIONS: New York Court Dismisses "Price" ERISA Suit
L'OREAL USA: Court Allows Keratin Products Suit to Proceed

LANDAUER INC: Faces "Sharpenter" Suit Over Sale to Fortive Corp.
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Discovery Underway in Shareholder Suit
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Class Suit Trial Set for September 2018
LENDINGCLUB CORPORATION: Federal Consumer Class Action Underway
LENNY & LARRY'S: Illinois Court Narrows Clams in "Cowen"

LINCARE HOLDINGS: Faces "Giancola" Suit in M.D. Florida
LOS ANGELES: Court Approves Class Certification Bid in "Garcia"
LOWE'S HOME: Faces "Banda" Wage and Hour Class Suit in California
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Kempf"
MAHLER ENTERPRISES: "Rhodes" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

MARIETTA MEMORIAL: Seeks 6th Cir. Review of Order in "Myers" Suit
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Class Suit Against Starwood Dismissed
MASSAGE ENVY: "Tamburelli" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
MATCH GROUP: Court Denies Move to Dismiss Securities Suit
MCCLATCHY CO: Faces "DeJesus" Suit in S.D. New York

MDL 1720: Court Allows Amendments in Credit Card Antitrust Suit
MDL 2084: AbbVie Still Defends Against AndroGel Antitrust Suit
MDL 2545: AbbVie Still Faces TRT Products Liability Litigation
MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces "Hernandez" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in E.D. New York

MERCHANTS CREDIT: Taylor Seeks to Certify 4 Settlement Classes
METALWORKING LUBRICANTS: "Averett" Class Settlement Has Final OK
MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Guerrero" Suit in M. Dist. Fla.
MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Bushberger"
MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Meyer"

NASSAU, NY: Court Narrows Claims in Traffic Ordinance Suit
NEUROTROPE INC: Securities Actions Pending in New York
NEW JERSEY: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Ortiz" Class Suit
NEW MEXICO: LCCF Inmate Allowed to Amend Civil Rights Complaint
NORMANDIN'S: Court OK's Filing of TAC in "Brinker"

NORTH CAROLINA: Court Junks Lanesboro Inmate's Class Claims
OCULAR THERAPEUTIX: 3 Class Suits Pending in New Jersey
OHANA MILITARY: Court to Review Trespass Claims Ruling in "Lake"
OKLAHOMA: Court Dismisses "Jamison" Civil Rights Action
ORBITAL ATK: Virginia Court Dismisses Securities Suit

ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Discovery Underway
PANATTE LLC: Faces "Aikens" Suit Over FDCPA Violation
PCL CONSTRUCTION: Court Names Whitfield Bryson Co-Lead Counsel
PJ OHIO: Court Certifies "Hatmaker" Case as Collective Action
PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT: Judge Finds FLSA Settlement Fair

PROGRESSIVE PROTECTIVE: "Thenarse" Suit Seeks Upaid Wages
PROVIDENCE LITTLE: "Nowak" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
QUANTA SERVICES: "Benton" Class Suit Underway
RADNET MANAGEMENT: French Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Faces "Lavi" Suit in E.D. of New York

REDFLEX TRAFFIC: Denial of Bid to Dismiss "Watson" Affirmed
REGENCY CENTERS: Stipulation of Settlement Awaits Court Approval
RENT-A-CENTER INC: Directed to Reply in "Blair"
RESOURCE CAPITAL: Discovery Underway in "Levin" Suit
S.A.W. ENTERTAINMENT: Pera Seeks to Certify Class of Dancers

SABRA HEALTH: Consolidated Investor Suit Ongoing in Delaware
SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Court Certifies Classes in "Ontiveros" Suit
SALT LAKE CITY: Dismissal of Suit Over Parking Code Affirmed.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Fraker Suit Alleges Magnuson-Moss Act Breach
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: "Hinkhouse" Suit Alleges Breach of Warranty

SCYNEXIS INC: Stockholder Class Suit Ongoing in New Jersey
SENTRY CREDIT: Faces "Garretson" Suit in S.D. of West Virginia
SORIN GROUP: Sawvel Sues Over Exposure to Bacteria During Surgery
SOUTHERN GLAZER'S: Cal. App. Flips Grants of Demurrer to Evidence
SPARK NETWORKS: Expensed $52,000 Related to Settlement

SPEEDWAY LLC: "Teggerdine" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
STARION ENERGY: 3d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Pricing Suit
STATE COLLECTION: Court Certifies 3 Consumer Subclasses
STEMLINE THERAPEUTICS: Consolidated Class Suit Underway
SUN LIFE FINANCIAL: Court Grants Partial Dismissal of RICO Suit

SUPERIOR AIR-GROUND: "Lundsteen" Hits Biometrics Data Retention
TAISHAN GYPSUM: "Polk" Suit Consolidated in Chinese Drywall MDL
TAISHAN GYPSUM: "Redden" Suit Consolidated in Chinese Drywall MDL
TAVERN IN THE SQUARE: Faces "Gomez" Suit in S.D. New York
TD AMERITRADE: Nov. 20 Deadline for Class Cert Bid in "Klein"

TDJ OILFIELD: "Barnhill" Suit Seeks to Certify Employees Class
TOYOTA MOTOR: Appeals Decision in "Jeffers" Suit to 4th Circuit
TT OF PINE: "Mahoney" Suit Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
TWITTER INC: Misled Investors About Growth, Judge Rules
UBS PAINEWEBBER: Lampkin Appeals S.D. Texas Ruling to 5th Circuit

UNITED STATES: Wins Summary Ruling in Just Compensation Suit
UNITED STATES: VA Settles World War II Veterans Benefits Case
UNITED STATES: AFGE, AFL-CIO Appeals Ruling in Suit vs. OPM
U.S. CONCRETE: "Ruedelstein" Class Suit Underway
U.S. GOVERNMENT: Faces Charleston Area Medical Suit in COFC

UMPQUA HOLDINGS: Faces "Amirian" Suit in C. Dist. Cal.
US BANK: 8th Cir. Affirms ERISA Suit Dismissal
VEIN CENTERS: Court Awards $500 Damage for TCPA Claim
VERNON CONSTRUCTION: Neill Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
VHL PLUMBING: "Tanner" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT, Reimbursement

WARNER MUSIC: Denial of Class Certification Bid Under Appeal
WEIGHT WATCHERS: Appeal in "Roberts" Suit Still Ongoing
WELCH FOODS: Consumer Fraud Class Action Transferred to New York
WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in Stockholder Derivative Suit
WHOLE FOODS: "Banus" Suit Seeks Damages Over FCRA Violations

WORD ENTERPRISES: Court Certifies Pizza Delivery Drivers' Class
WORLD ACCEPTANCE: Dec. 18 Final Settlement Approval Hearing
ZIONS BANCORPORATION: Evans v. CB&T Action Underway


                            *********


2 GOLD LLC: Wins Summary Judgment in Sandy Property Damages Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, New York County, issued an Order granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned JOSE
HERNANDEZ-ORTIZ and KEVIN SARDELLI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. 2 GOLD, LLC, 201
PEARL, LLC, TF CORNERSTONE, INC., GOLD/PEARL PARKING CORP., and
IMPERIAL PARKING SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants, Docket No. 158155/2012
(N.Y. Sup.).

Defendants 2 Gold, LLC (2 Gold), 201 Pearl, LLC (201 Pearl) and TF
Cornerstone, Inc. (Cornerstone) move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs Jose Hernandez-Ortiz and Kevin Sardelli, individually
and on behalf of the class of all other similarly situated tenants
of the Buildings, move pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to strike
portions of defendants' affirmative defenses.

This class action seeks to recover damages for the loss and/or
diminution in value of personal property allegedly sustained by
the tenants of two New York City apartment buildings, 2 Gold
Street and 201 Pearl Street.  Plaintiff's claims arise from a
flood and oil leak at the Buildings, caused by the landfall of
Hurricane Sandy.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants' summary judgment motion is
untimely, as it was filed two days after the deadline set by the
court, absent good cause, summary judgment motion even one day
late shall be denied as untimely. Based on this delay, plaintiffs
demand that the motion be denied.

Defendants have offered a reasonable explanation sufficient to
establish good cause for their delay, that the delay was due to
the difficulty in obtaining an executed copy of their expert's
affidavit, as he had undergone knee surgery and was subsequently
out of the country. This made contact with him difficult.
Separately, a prior delay on plaintiff's part in producing a copy
of the deposition transcript of Sofia Estevez in admissible form
also unnecessarily delayed defendants' filing of the motion. Once
the executed expert affidavit was received, the motion was filed
within the next two days. Thus, the Court finds good cause for the
subject delay.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs' motion to strike their
affirmative defenses is, in actuality, a motion for summary
judgment, and, as such, is untimely and should be denied. However,
plaintiffs' motion is made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b) to dismiss
the affirmative defenses on the ground that they have no merit. As
such a motion may be made at any time, it was not untimely.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges four causes of action, sounding in
(1) negligence prior to Hurricane Sandy, (2) negligence after
Hurricane Sandy, (3) breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, and (4) gross negligence. The negligence claims are
premised on several theories, including negligent planning and
preparation, negligent maintenance, negligent design and
construction, and the failure to mitigate damages.

Plaintiffs seek damages for loss and diminution in value of their
personal property, loss of income, costs of relocation, loss of
business opportunities and business interruption, evacuation
expenses, and the cost of maintaining monthly utilities for months
without use. Defendants answered and interposed fourteen
affirmative defenses and three "set-offs and counterclaims.
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint
against them in its entirety.

In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2)
a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom.
In the absence of a duty, as a matter of law, there can be no
liability.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the negligence and gross negligence claims against
them, because the unprecedented level of flooding sustained during
Hurricane Sandy was not reasonably foreseeable.  Defendants argue
that the Buildings were built in accordance with the Building
Code, with flood protections sufficient to weather a 100-year
flood, and that it was not foreseeable that further protections
were necessary, because it was not foreseeable that Hurricane
Sandy would deposit flood waters over two feet in excess of the
100-year flood level.

Turning first to long-term susceptibility, while it is accepted
that lower Manhattan is susceptible to flooding, FEMA addressed
this risk through the establishment of the 100-year flood plain,
as did the Building Code, which requires that all buildings built
within the 100-year flood plain must be protected at least to that
level. In other words, the mere fact that lower Manhattan is
susceptible to any form of flooding is not the relevant inquiry.
Rather, the analysis must be whether it was foreseeable that lower
Manhattan was susceptible to flooding of the magnitude that
occurred during Hurricane Sandy, which was far in excess of the
100-year flood standard. While plaintiffs argue that it was
foreseeable that there would be some amount of flooding, they have
not provided any tangible evidence that it was foreseeable that
the flooding would rise to a level that would overtop the
Buildings' protections.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not sufficiently refuted defendants'
contention that the flooding at the Buildings during Hurricane
Sandy was unforeseeable. Thus, defendants are entitled to
dismissal of that portion of the negligence/gross negligence
claims predicated on alleged failure to properly protect the
Buildings from flooding.

Plaintiffs' negligence and gross negligence claims also include
allegations that defendants failed to implement an emergency plan
and failed to properly maintain or prepare the Buildings for
flooding. Plaintiffs assert that the defendants failed to provide
sandbags to protect the seismic joint, or gap between the
buildings, or to secure the 2 Gold lobby entrance. However, it is
noted that these areas of the Buildings were located well above
the 100-year flood plain.

As it was unforeseeable that the floodwater would surmount the
seismic joint, the floodgate or the 2 Gold lobby entrance,
defendants are entitled to dismissal of that portion of the
negligence/gross negligence claims against them predicated on
their alleged failure to properly maintain and/or prepare the
Buildings for flooding.

Plaintiffs claim that regardless of the ultimate flood height,
negligent design and construction of the Buildings caused them to
flood. However, importantly, none of the defendants in this action
built or designed the Buildings. Rather, defendants are the owners
and managing agent of the Buildings. With respect to such
entities, it has been held that if a building was constructed in
compliance with code specifications and industry standards
applicable at the time, the owner is under no legal duty to modify
the building thereafter.

Plaintiffs claim that defendants were negligent in failing to
mitigate damages to the Buildings after the flooding. However, the
record shows that defendants remedied the damage to the Buildings
as quickly as possible, given the circumstances. The work included
draining the Buildings and removing and replacing the damaged
electronics in the basement. In fact, defendants reopened the
Buildings to the tenants as soon as they received the authority to
do so from DOB.

Defendants also move for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs'
claim for breach of the warranty of habitability.

In support of their motion, defendants argue that even assuming
arguendo that the warranty of habitability was breached,
plaintiffs suffered no compensable damages resulting from such
breach. Defendants fully abated the tenants' rent during the four
months that the Buildings were uninhabitable, and abated rent for
an additional two weeks after the tenants returned to the
Buildings.

Plaintiffs move to strike 12 of defendants' 14 affirmative
defenses. Eleven of the 12 affirmative defenses deal with the
mitigation of damages. As the court has determined that defendants
are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as
against them, the issues involving mitigation of damages need not
be reached, and these affirmative defenses are moot. The final
affirmative defense is a liability defense that was not relied
upon in the above determination. Accordingly, it is not necessary
to determine whether this defense is applicable.
Thus, plaintiffs' motion to strike defendants affirmative defenses
is denied.

A full-text copy of the Supreme Court's September 27, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycaawabqfrom Leagle.com.




A+ TIRES: Fourth Circuit Appeal Initiated in "Alfaro Zelaya" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rossel O. Alfaro Zelaya, Edward Hernandez and Montoya
Moreno filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit styled
Rossel Alfaro Zelaya, et al. v. A+ Tires, Brakes, Lubes and
Mufflers, Incorporated, et al., Case No. 5:13-ccv-00810-D, in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina at
Raleigh.

The appellate case is captioned as Rossel Alfaro Zelaya, et al. v.
A+ Tires, Brakes, Lubes and Mufflers, Incorporated, et al., Case
No. 17-400, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners ROSSEL O. ALFARO ZELAYA, a/k/a Rossel
Sandoval, EDWARD HERNANDEZ and MONTOYA MORENO, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          J. Derek Braziel, Esq.
          LEE & BRAZIEL, LLP
          1801 North Lamar Street
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 749-1400
          E-mail: jdbraziel@l-b-law.com

               - and -

          Michael Bernard Cohen, Esq.
          Gilda Adriana Hernandez, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ
          1020 Southhill Drive
          Cary, NC 27513
          Telephone: (919) 741-8693
          Facsimile: (919) 869-1853
          E-mail: mcohen@gildahernandezlaw.com
                  ghernandez@gildahernandezlaw.com

Defendants-Respondents A+ TIRES, BRAKES, LUBES AND MUFFLERS,
INCORPORATED, FLORES WELDING, INCORPORATED, JULIO FLORES and
MARIELLE BELHASSEN are represented by:

          Joseph Alan Davies, Esq.
          James Robertson Vann, Esq.
          VANN & SHERIDAN, LLP
          1720 Hillsborough Street
          Raleigh, NC 27605-0000
          Telephone: (919) 510-8585
          E-mail: jdavies@vannattorneys.com
                  jrvann@vannattorneys.com


ABBOTT LABS: Entitled to Immunity Under Michigan Statute
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment in the case captioned IN RE DEPAKOTE: RHEALYN
ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., and
ABBVIE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 12-CV-52-NJR-SCW (S.D. Ill.).

Defendants filed several identical motions for summary judgment
claiming absolute immunity under the statutory defense established
by Michigan products liability law.

Plaintiffs in this mass action allege that they suffered serious
birth defects as a direct result of exposure to Depakote.  The
exposure for each Plaintiff is alleged to have occurred in utero
after his or her biological mother ingested Depakote during
pregnancy.  Plaintiffs contended that Defendants failed to warn
Plaintiffs' biological mothers of the real risk of birth defects,
even though Defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the
true risks.

Michigan law creates almost total immunity for drug manufacturers
and sellers. Simply put, a manufacturer or seller of a drug that
has been approved by the FDA United States Food and Drug
Administration has an absolute defense to a products liability
claim if the drug and its labeling were in compliance with the
FDA's approval at the time the drug left the control of the
manufacturer or seller.

Plaintiffs assert that the Michigan statute is an affirmative
defense, and Defendants have not met their burden to assert
immunity because they failed to show that Depakote was FDA-
approved when the drug left Abbott's control. To support this
position, Plaintiffs assert that the off-label promotions by
Abbott eviscerated the FDA approval.

Additionally, they argue that granting summary judgment in favor
of Defendants based in part on pre-emption would render the
statute inoperable. Defendants' reply asserts that they have met
their burden to establish immunity under the Michigan statute and
that the settlements for non-FDA-approved uses of Depakote are not
applicable to the present claims because Plaintiffs used Depakote
for FDA-approved indications.

Michigan law grants absolute immunity to a drug manufacturer or
seller unless the drug manufacturer or seller misrepresented
information to the FDA about the drug and the drug would not have
been put on the market if the information had been accurately
represented.

Plaintiffs did not presented evidence of an FDA determination that
Abbott committed fraud to secure any relevant label. Instead,
Plaintiffs direct the Court to consider other courts' holdings on
the Michigan immunity statute, most notably the Second Circuit's
opinion in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co. 467 F.3d 85, 94.

Plaintiffs assert the plain text chosen by Michigan's legislature
to describe the exceptions to immunity does not include
limitations to circumstances where FDA or the Federal Government
has previously found fraud or bribery. As instructed by the
Michigan Supreme Court, the District Court must not read those
limitations into the statute.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' position, the Michigan Supreme Court
expressly held that the legislature tied the rebuttal mechanism to
the determinations of the FDA. Further, it is not that the entire
exception is invalidated by pre-emption; rather, findings by the
FDA serve as an evidentiary feature, or measuring stick, in
assessing the reasonableness of a manufacturer's actions. The
Sixth Circuit addressed Plaintiffs' inoperability charge in
Garcia. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 966-96, noting the presence of
Michigan's general severability clause and then concluding that
the pre-emption of Plaintiffs' claims did not rendered the entire
statute inoperable.

This Court finds no reason to deviate from this rationale. For
these reasons, Abbott's Motions for Summary Judgment are granted.

The Court finds that there is no just reason to delay entering a
judgment in these cases. The claims of any one Plaintiff in the
mass action -- even those Plaintiffs who brought their claims in
one unified complaint -- are not dependent upon one another to be
resolved on the merits. While the Court previously found certain
cases sufficiently similar to warrant joint trials, entering
judgment on an individual Plaintiff's claim would not trigger the
type of piecemeal appeal the Supreme Court cautioned against in
Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438.

Here, summary judgment was granted because Defendants are entitled
to immunity under the Michigan product liability statute.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7yjkuek
from Leagle.com.

V.A., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD., 7110 West Main Street, Belleville, IL
62223

V.A., Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

M.A., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

T.M., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

V.S., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

A.C., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD, Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD & S. Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners LLP.

J.D., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

D.B., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

D.M., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

Z.K., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

J.P., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

I.J., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

C.S., Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD & Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

K.B., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD, Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD, Michael J. Gras, Law Office of Christopher
Cueto, LTD & Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office of Christopher
Cueto, LTD.

Z.M., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

J.B., Plaintiff, represented by Christopher F. Cueto, Law Office
of Christopher Cueto, LTD & Michael J. Gras, Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD.

Abbott Laboratories, Inc, Defendant, represented by Joel H. Smith
-- joel.smith@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and Brooke LLP, Kelly
R. Kimbrough -- kelly.kimbrough@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and
Brooke, LLP, Mary T. Novacheck --
mary.novacheck@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman & Brooke LLP, Randall
L. Christian -- randall.christian@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman
and Brooke, LLP & Stefan Mallen --   samallen@bryancave.com --
Bryan Cave LLP.


ABBVIE INC: Appeal in "Sidney Hillman" Case Underway
----------------------------------------------------
The appeal in the case, Sidney Hillman Health Center of Rochester,
et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., remains pending, AbbVie Inc., said
in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

In August 2013, a putative class action lawsuit, Sidney Hillman
Health Center of Rochester, et al. v. AbbVie Inc., et al., was
filed against AbbVie in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by three healthcare benefit
providers alleging violations of Federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes and state deceptive business
practice and unjust enrichment laws in connection with
reimbursements for certain uses of Depakote from 1998 to 2012.
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages and/or equitable relief and
attorneys' fees. In February 2017, the court dismissed this
lawsuit with prejudice and in March 2017, the plaintiffs appealed
that dismissal with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: Still Faces Suits by Medical Mutual & Allied Services
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the Company continues to defend against
lawsuits by Medical Mutual of Ohio and Allied Services Division
Welfare Fund.

In November 2014, a putative class action lawsuit, Medical Mutual
of Ohio v. AbbVie Inc., et al., was filed against several
manufacturers of testosterone replacement therapies (TRTs),
including AbbVie, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on behalf of all insurance
companies, health benefit providers, and other third party payors
who paid for TRTs, including AndroGel. The claims asserted include
violations of the federal RICO Act and state consumer fraud and
deceptive trade practices laws. The complaint seeks monetary
damages and injunctive relief.

A similar lawsuit, Allied Services Division Welfare Fund v. AbbVie
Inc., et al., was filed in the same court in October 2015 on
behalf of the same putative class members and a putative class of
consumers.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: 90% of Depakote Claims Pending
------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that product liability cases are pending in which
plaintiffs generally allege that AbbVie did not adequately warn
about risk of certain injuries, primarily various birth defects,
arising from use of Depakote. Over ninety percent of the
approximately 675 claims are pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and the rest are
pending in various other federal and state courts. Plaintiffs
generally seek compensatory and punitive damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: Suit by Rubinstein, et al. Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc., continues to defend against Rubinstein, et al. v
Gonzalez, et al., according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

In November 2014, five individuals filed a putative class action
lawsuit, Rubinstein, et al. v Gonzalez, et al., on behalf of
purchasers and sellers of certain Shire plc (Shire) securities
between June 20 and October 14, 2014, against AbbVie and its chief
executive officer in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that the defendants made
and/or are responsible for material misstatements in violation of
federal securities laws in connection with AbbVie's proposed
transaction with Shire.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS: Settlement Awaits Final Court Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
Acadia Pharmaceuticals Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017, that the settlement of a class action
lawsuit remains subject to final court approval.

A final approval hearing was set for October 3, 2017.

In March 2015, following the Company's announcement of the update
to the timing of its planned NDA submission to the FDA for
NUPLAZID for the treatment of PD Psychosis and the subsequent
decline of the price of its common stock, two putative securities
class action complaints (captioned Rihn v. ACADIA Pharmaceuticals
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-0575-BTM-DHB, and Wright v. ACADIA
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 15-cv-0593- BTM-DHB) were filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
(the "Court") against the Company and certain of its current and
former officers. The complaints generally alleged that the
defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the timing of the Company's planned NDA
submission to the FDA for NUPLAZID, thereby artificially inflating
the price of its common stock. The complaints sought unspecified
monetary damages and other relief.

On April 10 and June 1, 2015, the Court entered orders deferring
the defendants' response to the Rihn and Wright complaints until
after the Court appointed a lead plaintiff and assigned lead
counsel. On May 12, 2015, several putative stockholders filed
separate motions to consolidate the two actions and be appointed
lead plaintiff.

On September 8, 2015, the Court issued an order consolidating the
two actions, appointing lead plaintiff, and assigning lead
counsel. On November 16, 2015, lead plaintiff filed a consolidated
complaint with the Court which, like the prior complaints, accuses
the defendants of making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the anticipated timing of the Company's
planned NDA submission to the FDA for NUPLAZID.

On January 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint. On September 19, 2016, the Court issued an
order denying the motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint.

On March 13, 2017, the parties signed a Stipulation of Settlement
setting forth the terms of the proposed settlement. On June 9,
2017, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement (the
"Preliminary Approval Order").  Among other things, the
Preliminary Approval Order set an opt-out deadline of August 29,
2017; an objection deadline of September 13, 2017; and a final
approval hearing for October 3, 2017.

Additional information on the case is available at:

            http://www.acadiasecuritiessettlement.com/

Acadia is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the development
and commercialization of innovative medicines to address unmet
medical needs in central nervous system, or CNS, disorders.


ACCELERATE DIAGNOSTICS: Appeal Filed in "Chang" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Accelerate Diagnostics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017, that the plaintiff has filed an appeal
in the case, Chang v. Accelerate Diagnostics, Inc., et al., No.
2:15-CV-00504-SPL (9th Cir. filed Feb. 26, 2016).

The Company said, "On March 19, 2015, a putative securities class
action lawsuit was filed against Accelerate Diagnostics, Inc.,
Lawrence Mehren, and Steve Reichling, Rapp v. Accelerate
Diagnostics, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court, District of
Arizona, 2:2015-cv-00504. The complaint alleges that we violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and SEC Rule 10b-5, by making false or misleading statements about
our Accelerate Pheno(TM) system, formerly called the BACcel
System. Plaintiff purports to bring the action on behalf of a
class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired our stock
between March 7, 2014, and February 17, 2015."

"On June 9, 2015, Julia Chang was appointed Lead Plaintiff of the
purported class. On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, by making false or
misleading statements or omissions about our ID/AST System and by
allegedly employing schemes to defraud. Plaintiff sought
certification of the action as a class action, compensatory
damages for the class in an unspecified amount, legal fees and
costs, and such other relief as the court may order. Defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint on July 21, 2015. The Court
granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice on
January 28, 2016.

"On February 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
challenges the dismissal of the amended complaint. Chang v.
Accelerate Diagnostics, Inc., et al., No. 2:15-CV-00504-SPL (9th
Cir. filed Feb. 26, 2016). The appeal has been fully briefed and
is scheduled for argument in September 2017."


AIR EVAC: "Hundley" Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Consumers
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Connie R. Hundley, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Air
Evac EMS, Inc. d/b/a AirMedCare Network; Med-Trans Corporation;
and Matthew Ellis, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-12428 (S.D.
W.Va.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for class certification of:

     "all West Virginia consumers who purchased or renewed a
     membership from Defendant Air Evac from July 25, 2012 to the
     date of certification"

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=43Um7JcP

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq.
          Raymond S. Franks II, Esq.
          Bailey & Glasser LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Phone: 304-345-6555
          Facsimile: 304 342 1110
          E-mail: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com
                  rfranks@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          S. Douglas Adkins, Esq.
          Michael C. Walker, Esq.
          Cyrus, Adkins & Walker
          636 Fourth Avenue
          Huntington, WV 25701
          Telephone: 304 522 9593
          Facsimile: 304 522 9596
          E-mail: sdadkins@cyrusandadkins.com
                  mcwalker@cyrusandadkins.com


ALABAMA: Braggs, et al. Seek to Certify Dental Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled EDWARDS BRAGGS, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
JEFFERSON DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., the Defendants, Case
No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court for an order certifying a renewed motion for certification
of a dental class consisting of:

     "all persons with serious dental needs who are now, or will
     in the future be, subject to defendants' dental care
     policies and practices at ADOC facilities."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=9j0S87RQ

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Maria V. Morris, Esq.
          Latasha L. McCrary, Esq.
          Caitlin J. Sandley, Esq.
          Rhonda Brownstein, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Avenue
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (334) 956 8200
          Facsimile: (334) 956 8481
          E-mail: rhonda.brownstein@splcenter.org
                  maria.morris@splcenter.org
                  latasha.mccrary@splcenter.org
                  cj.sandley@splcenter.org

               - and -

          Lisa W. Borden, Esq.
          William G. Somerville, III, Esq.
          Andrew P. Walsh, Esq.
          Dennis Nabors, Esq.
          Patricia Clotfelter, Esq.
          BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,
          CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ PC
          420 20th Street North, Suite 1400
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 328-0480
          Facsimile: (205) 322-8007
          E-mail: lborden@bakerdonelson.com
                  wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com
                  awalsh@bakerdonelson.com
                  dnabors@bakerdonelson.com
                  pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com


ALLSTATE FIRE: Court Extends Response Filing Date in "Teodoro"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order for Extension of Time for Plaintiff to Respond
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Strike Class Allegations in the
case captioned TANYA TEODORO, individually, and on behalf others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY; and DOES I -- V and ROES VI -- X, inclusive;
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02135-APG-VCF (D. Nev.).

Defendant filed its (1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
Memorandum in Support and (2) Alternative Motion to Dismiss or
Strike Class Action Allegations and Memorandum in Support.

The Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to extend the deadline for
Plaintiff to file responses to Defendants' Motions.

The request is made in good faith as Plaintiff's counsel is
scheduled to appear in a trial on October 13, 2017 and was
required to respond to unanticipated briefings and hearings in
preparation for said trial.  Consequently, Plaintiff's counsel
needs additional time to adequately respond to Defendants'
Motions.

They agreed that Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to
Defendants' Motions will be due by November 17, 2017.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7g8dzd4from Leagle.com.

Tanya Teodoro, Plaintiff, represented by Ines Olevic-Saleh, Jesse
Sbaih & Associates, LTD, 170 South Green Valley ParkwaySuite
280Henederson, NV 89012.

Tanya Teodoro, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse M. Sbaih, Jesse
Sbaih & Associates, Ltd..

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Abran E. Vigil -- VIGILA BALLARDSPAHR.COM --
Ballard Spahr.


AMERICAN EAGLE: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in "Bedoya" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant American Eagle Express Inc. filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Ever Bedoya, et al. v. American
Eagle Express Inc., Case No. 2-14-cv-02811, in U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs and other delivery drivers,
who make deliveries for AEX and are based in or operate in the
state of New Jersey.

The Plaintiffs contend that they have been subject to improper
deductions from their pay and have been denied overtime pay, and
have otherwise been unjustly forced to bear the costs of AEX's
business.

The appellate case is captioned as Ever Bedoya, et al. v. American
Eagle Express Inc., Case No. 17-8053, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents EVER BEDOYA, DIEGO GONZALES and MANUEL
DECASTRO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
          R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO
          715 Twinning Road
          Suite 211, Twinning Office Center
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone: (215) 884-2491
          Facsimile: (215) 884-2492
          E-mail: mgottesfeld@winebrakelaw.com
                  asantillo@winebrakelaw.com

Defendant-Petitioner AMERICAN EAGLE EXPRESS INC, DBA Aex Group, is
represented by:

          Gregory T. Alvarez, Esq.
          Joseph C. DeBlasio, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS
          220 Headquarters Plaza
          East Tower, 7th Floor
          Morristown, NJ 07960
          Telephone: (973) 538-6890
          E-mail: alvarezg@jacksonlewis.com
                  Joseph.DeBlasio@jacksonlewis.com


AMERICAN STRATEGIC: Faces "Hanze" Suit in Middle District of Fla
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Strategic
Insurance Corp.  The case is styled as Aldo Hanze, Jr. and David
Kirker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. American Strategic Insurance Corp., ASI
Underwriters Corp. and ARX Executive Holdings, LLLP, Defendants,
Case No. 8:17-cv-02432-EAK-AAS (M.D. Fla., October 16, 2017).

American Strategic Insurance Corp., together with its
subsidiaries, provides personal lines residential property
insurance, commercial lines property insurance, personal umbrella
insurance, and flood and excess flood insurance products and
services in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Amber L. Karns, Esq.
   Starzyk & Associates, P.C.
   10200 Grogans Mill Road, Suite 300
   The Woodlands, TX 77380
   Tel: (281) 364-7261
   Fax: (281) 364-7261
   Email: akarns@starzyklaw.com


ANSELMO LINDBERG: Court Dismisses "Wolter" for Lack of Standing
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned ELISA WOLTER and MARIA G. BOK, by her daughter and next
friend EILISA WOLTER, individually and on behalf of a class,
Plaintiffs, v. ANSELMO LINDBERG OLIVER, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
16 C 4205 (N.D. Ill.).  Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
is denied as moot.

Plaintiff Elisa Wolter, on her own behalf and on behalf of the
Estate of plaintiff Maria G. Bok, has brought a putative class
action complaint against defendant Anselmo Lindberg Oliver, LLC,
alleging violations of Section 1692 of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA).

Plaintiffs contend that they suffered an informational injury, as
did the plaintiff in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 374
(1982). In Havens, the plaintiff, a housing discrimination tester,
met the injury in fact requirement because she had suffered an
informational injury. In Havens, however, the plaintiff failed to
receive the information to which she was legally entitled. As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Groshek, a plaintiff suffers an
injury in fact when the plaintiff fails to obtain information
which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. Groshek,
865 F.3d at 887.

Therefore, like the plaintiff in Groshek, and unlike the
plaintiffs in Adkins and Public Citizen, plaintiffs are not
seeking to compel defendant to provide them with information. They
have not alleged that, after receiving the allegedly misleading
letter, they requested defendant to provide them with information
about whether they could be sued for a deficiency judgment and
were denied such information. Thus, because plaintiffs have not
failed to obtain information, they have not suffered an
informational injury.

Plaintiffs cite many district court cases from this district and
others in support of their argument that violations of the FDCPA
inflicts concrete informational injury. Each of these cases is
distinguishable from the instant case. In some, the plaintiffs
alleged informational injuries that arose from the defendant's
failure to provide information required by statute, or that the
defendant did more than mislead, but lied to the plaintiffs.
Consequently, because the court concludes that plaintiffs have
failed to allege an informational injury, as defined by the
Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit, they have failed to allege
Article III standing.

For these reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is
granted and the case is dismissed for lack of standing.
Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y7934fhofrom Leagle.com.

Elisa Wolter, Plaintiff, represented by Cathleen M. Combs,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, 20 South Clark Street
Suite 1500, Chicago, IL 60603

Elisa Wolter, Plaintiff, represented by James O. Latturner,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Michelle A. Alyea,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, Llc & Daniel A. Edelman,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC. 20 South Clark Street
Suite 1500, Chicago, IL 60603

Anselmo Lindberg Oliver LLC, Defendant, represented by James V.
Noonan -- jnoonan@noonanandlieberman.com -- Noonan & Lieberman,
Robert Edward Haney -- rhaney@noonanandlieberman.com -- Noonan &
Lieberman, Ltd. & Solomon Maman -- smaman@noonanandlieberman.com -
- Noonan & Lieberman, Ltd.


ARENA PHARMACEUTICALS: Consolidated Class Suit Pending in Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Arena Pharmaceuticals, Inc. continues to defend a consolidated
class action in California, according to its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

The Company said, "Beginning on September 20, 2010, a number of
complaints were filed in the US District Court for the Southern
District of California, or District Court, against us and certain
of our current and former employees and directors on behalf of
certain purchasers of our common stock. The complaints were
brought as purported stockholder class actions, and, in general,
include allegations that we and certain of our current and former
employees and directors violated federal securities laws by making
materially false and misleading statements regarding our BELVIQ
program, thereby artificially inflating the price of our common
stock. The plaintiffs sought unspecified monetary damages and
other relief."

On August 8, 2011, the District Court consolidated the actions and
appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel. On November 1, 2011,
the lead plaintiff filed a consolidated amended complaint. On
March 28, 2013, the District Court dismissed the consolidated
amended complaint without prejudice. On May 13, 2013, the lead
plaintiff filed a second consolidated amended complaint.

On November 5, 2013, the District Court dismissed the second
consolidated amended complaint without prejudice as to all parties
except for Robert E. Hoffman, who was dismissed from the action
with prejudice.

On November 27, 2013, the lead plaintiff filed a motion for leave
to amend the second consolidated amended complaint. On March 20,
2014, the District Court denied plaintiff's motion and dismissed
the second consolidated amended complaint with prejudice.

On April 18, 2014, the lead plaintiff filed a notice of appeal,
and on August 27, 2014, the lead plaintiff filed his appellate
brief in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or Ninth
Circuit.

The Company said, "On October 24, 2014, we filed our answering
brief in response to the lead plaintiff's appeal. On December 5,
2014, the lead plaintiff filed his reply brief. A panel of the
Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on the appeal on May 4, 2016."

"On October 26, 2016, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed the
District Court's dismissal of the second consolidated amended
complaint and remanded the case back to the District Court for
further proceedings.

"On January 25, 2017, the District Court permitted us to submit a
renewed motion to dismiss the second consolidated amended
complaint. On February 2, 2017, we filed the renewed motion to
dismiss. On February 23, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed his
opposition, and on March 2, 2017, we filed our reply.

"On April 28, 2017, the District Court denied our renewed motion
to dismiss. Due to the stage of these proceedings, we are not able
to predict or reasonably estimate the ultimate outcome or possible
losses relating to these claims."

Arena is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing novel,
small-molecule drugs with optimized receptor pharmacology designed
to deliver broad clinical utility across multiple therapeutic
areas.


ARS NATIONAL: Court Certifies Settlement Class in "Thomas" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ERICA K. THOMAS, on behalf of herself and
those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ARS NATIONAL SERVICES,
INC., and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-
03635-JAD (D.N.J.), the Hon. Joseph A. Dickson entered an order
certifying a settlement class of:

      "all consumers residing in the State of New Jersey to whom
      ARS National Services, Inc. mailed a written communication
      in a windowed envelope between May 29, 2014 and May 29,
      2015, to collect a debt on behalf of Comenity Capital Bank,
      where the bar code containing the file number associated
      with the consumer's debt was visible from the outside of
      the envelope, and/or which identified the creditor as "Bill
      me Later".

ARS shall make the following payments:

     (a) ARS shall create a class settlement fund of $15,000.00
         which the Settlement Administrator shall distribute pro
         rata among those Class Members who did not exclude
         themselves.  Claimants will receive a pro rata share of
         the Class Recovery by check, Checks issued to Claimants
         will be void 60 days date, along with any unclaimed
         funds remaining in the Class Recovery, will be donated
         as a cy pres award to Northeast New Jersey Legal
         Services, Inc.

     (b) ARS shall pay Plaintiff $2,500.00.

     (c) ARS shall pay Class Counsel $50,000.00 for their
         attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the action. Class
         Counsel shall not request additional fees or costs from
         ARS or the Settlement Class.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=yAsig1sJ

Erica K. Thomas, on consent of Defendant, moved the Court on
October 25 for an Order granting final approval of the Parties'
class settlement agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

A copy of the Notice of Consent Motion is available at no charge
at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=K9Mz7mfM

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN & THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081-1315
          Telephone: (973) 379 7500

               - and -

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Avenue, Suite 200
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273 7117


AVX CORPORATION: Still Defends Class Action
-------------------------------------------
AVX Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that during calendar year 2014, AVX was named as a
co-defendant in a series of cases filed in the United States and
in the Canadian provinces of Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia,
Saskatchewan and Manitoba alleging violations of United States,
state and Canadian antitrust laws asserting that AVX and numerous
other companies were participants in alleged price-fixing in the
capacitor market. The cases in the United States were consolidated
into the Northern District of California on October 2, 2014. Some
plaintiffs have broken off from the United States class action and
filed actions on their own. These cases are still in progress. AVX
believes it has meritorious defenses and intends to vigorously
defend the cases.

AVX is a worldwide manufacturer, supplier, and reseller of a broad
line of passive electronic components, interconnect devices, and
related products. Electronic components and connector products
manufactured or resold by AVX are used in virtually all types of
electronic products, including those in telecommunications,
automotive, transportation, energy harvesting, consumer
electronics, military/aerospace, medical, computer, and industrial
markets.


BANCORPSOUTH INC: Class Action Appeal Pending Before 6th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bancorpsouth, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the appeal in a class action lawsuit remains
pending before the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On July 31, 2014 the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and
former Chief Financial Officer were named in a purported class-
action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee on behalf of certain purchasers of the
Company's common stock.  The complaint was subsequently amended to
add the former President and Chief Operating Officer.  The
complaint alleges that the defendants made misleading statements
concerning the Company's expectation that it would be able to
close two merger transactions within a specified time period and
regarding the Company's compliance with certain Bank Secrecy Act
and anti-money laundering requirements.

On July 10, 2015, the District Court granted in part and denied in
part the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the
statements concerning the Company's expectations about the closing
of the mergers were "forward-looking statements" within the
meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of
the Exchange Act, were protected by the safe harbor provision of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and thus
were not actionable.  Class certification was granted by the
District Court on April 21, 2016, and a petition for immediate
appeal of the class certification order was filed and was granted.

The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the class
certification order and remanded the case to the District Court
for further proceedings.  On June 26, 2017 the District Court
issued a Memorandum Opinion and signed an Order granting class
certification.

On July 10, 2017 the defendants again filed a Petition for
Permission to Appeal Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) in
the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The plaintiff seeks an
unspecified amount of damages and awards of costs and attorneys'
fees and such other equitable relief as the District Court may
deem just and proper.

At this stage of the lawsuit, management cannot determine the
probability of an unfavorable outcome to the Company as it is
uncertain whether the second class certification order will
withstand review and the exact amount of damages is uncertain.
Although it is not possible to predict the ultimate resolution or
financial liability with respect to the litigation, management is
currently of the opinion that the outcome of this lawsuit will not
have a material adverse effect on the Company's business,
consolidated financial position or results of operations.


BANCORPSOUTH INC: 7th. Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Coverage Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment dismissing the
Bancorpsouth Incorporated's coverage lawsuit against Federal
Insurance Company.

Shane Swift filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated against BancorpSouth, Incorporated, in
the Northern District of Florida based upon its assessment and
collection of excessive overdraft fees. Bancorp and Swift entered
into a settlement agreement wherein Bancorp agreed to pay $24
million to the settlement class.

Bancorp had previously notified its insurer, Federal Insurance
Company, that it sought coverage for defending the lawsuit, and
eventually, to indemnify the settlement costs. Federal denied all
coverage, and consequently, Bancorp filed a complaint against
Federal alleging breach of contract, as well as bad faith denial
of coverage.

The district court found that Exclusion 3(n) unambiguously
excludes from coverage losses arising from fees. Accordingly,
since the claims alleged in the Swift Complaint arose from the
imposition of excessive overdraft fees, the district court ruled
that Exclusion 3(n) applied, and Federal had no duty to defend or
indemnify. Thus, the district court dismissed the two breach of
contract claims, and also dismissed the bad faith claim since
there was no longer a contractual breach upon which Bancorp could
recover.

Under Mississippi law, insurance policies are contracts, and as
such, they are to be enforced according to their provisions. When
the words of an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous, the
court will afford them their plain, ordinary meaning and will
apply them as written. Ambiguous or unclear language will be
resolved in favor of the insured. Mere disagreement as to the
meaning of a policy provision does not render the policy
ambiguous.

Rather, ambiguities exist when a policy can be logically
interpreted in two or more ways. Provisions that limit or exclude
coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured.
However, because insurance policies are contracts, insurance
companies must be able to rely on their statements of coverage,
exclusions, disclaimers, definitions, and other provisions, in
order to receive the benefit of their bargain and to ensure that
rates have been properly calculated.

Bancorp argues that the district court erred in dismissing Count
Two, the duty to indemnify, without drawing reasonable inferences
in favor of Bancorp. Under Mississippi law, the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify. Whereas a duty to defend
arises whenever an insured faces potential liability under the
insurance contract, the duty to indemnify kicks in only when the
insured is found liable for something that the policy actually
covers. Bancorp's argument assumes Federal had a duty to defend
the Swift Complaint in the first place.

Because the Seventh Circuit concludes that defending the Swift
Complaint was excluded from coverage, Federal does not owe a duty
to indemnify the cost of settling that lawsuit and Count Two was
correctly dismissed.

Because the Seventh Circuit concludes that the district court
correctly dismissed Counts One and Two, Count Three alleging bad
faith denial of coverage was also correctly dismissed since there
were no longer underlying claims.

The appeals case is captioned BANCORPSOUTH, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-
Appellee, No. 17-1425 (7th Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's October 12, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y94ofdwefrom Leagle.com.

Christopher A. Wadley, for Defendant-Appellee.

Christina L. Fugate, Esq. -- christina.fugate@icemiller.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Derek Read Molter, Esq. -- derek.molter@icemiller.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew A. Stulce, 600 Peachtree St NE, Bank of America Plaza,
Suite 4100, Atlanta, GA, 30308 for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lawrence J. Bracken, II -- lbracken@hunton.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Michael S. Levine, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


BANK MUTUAL: "Schumel" Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------
The case, Schumel et al v. Bank Mutual Corporation et al., remains
pending, Bank Mutual Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

On July 28, 2017, two substantially identical purported class
action complaints, each by various individual plaintiffs, were
filed in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Milwaukee County on
behalf of the respective named plaintiffs and other Company
shareholders against the Company, the members of the Company's
board of directors, and Associated Banc-Corp ("Associated") in
connection with the proposed merger transaction between the
Company and Associated, pursuant to which the Company will be
acquired by Associated.

The lawsuits are captioned Schumel et al v. Bank Mutual
Corporation et al., case no. 2017CV006201, and Paquin et al. v.
Bank Mutual Corporation et al., case no. 2017CV006202. Both
complaint allege state law breach of fiduciary duty claims against
the Company's board for, among other things, seeking to sell the
Company through an allegedly defective process, for an allegedly
unfair price and on allegedly unfair terms.  The lawsuits seeks,
among other things, to enjoin the consummation of the transaction
and damages.  The complaints allege that Associated aided and
abetted the directors' alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.  The
Company believes the allegations are without merit.


BERKELEY UNIFIED: Court Narrows Claims in IDEA Violations Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned STUDENT A, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02510-JST (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendants
BUSD; Superintendent of BUSD Donald Evans; the BUSD Board of
Education; and the individual directors of that board. They assert
claims for (1) violations of IDEA; (2) violations of the
Rehabilitation Act; (3) violations of Title II of the ADA; (4)
violations of California Education Code section 56000, and (5)
declaratory relief.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the basis that
Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
and have failed to state a claim because claims against public
officials in their official capacities are redundant when those
claims are also asserted against public entities.

At the core of Defendants' motion is the assertion that Plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing
suit.

The IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme, conferring on
disabled students a substantive right to public education and
providing financial assistance to enable states to meet their
educational needs. Federal funds are dependent on states
implementing policies assuring a free appropriate public
education, sometimes referred to as a FAPE, for all children with
disabilities.

The IDEA also provides procedural safeguards to allow parental
involvement concerning the child's educational program and allows
parents to obtain administrative and judicial review of decisions
they deem unsatisfactory or inappropriate.

Moreover, Plaintiffs allege they are bringing facial challenges to
allegedly invalid policies which distinguishes this case from
those in which exhaustion of CRPs are inadequate substitutes for
due process hearing exhaustion. While the Court recognizes that
merely labeling claims as systemic as a way of circumventing the
administrative process could make the requirement to exhaust
meaningless it cannot summarily discount the allegations of the
Complaint at this time. Since the pleadings on their face make a
case for systemic violations that, under pertinent case law, bring
Plaintiffs' complaint outside individualized FAPE issues the Court
cannot find as a matter of law that exhaustion in general is
required.

Plaintiffs clearly allege that Defendants have failed to put into
effect policies, procedures, and programs that ensure that all
students with suspected reading disorders are timely identified,
located, evaluated, and that all students with eligible conditions
based on reading disorders are provided appropriate special
education and related aids and services, and monitored to ensure
FAPE in the LRE. Plaintiffs take issue with several parts of the
BUSD's policies and practices with regard to these students.

Defendants contest whether the CDE actually ignored or rejected
Plaintiffs' complaints, but these disagreements merely highlight
disputed questions of fact that are not appropriate for
disposition here. Defendants also argue that they should not be
held responsible for the inaction or failures, if any, of the CDE,
but this misapprehends Plaintiffs' argument. Whether the CDE would
require the BUSD to take corrective action is relevant to whether
further administrative proceedings would be futile. Plaintiffs
clearly allege that the BUSD did not sufficiently change its
policies in response to previous CRPs, and the truth of this
allegation cannot be resolved as a matter of law.
The Court concludes that Defendants have not shown Plaintiffs'
complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust and will deny
the motion made on that ground.

Defendants also argue that the Court must dismiss the individual
Defendants because they are redundant. An official capacity suit
is equivalent to a suit against the entity.  The Court agrees that
suing the school board members in their official capacity is
nothing more than another way of stating a claim against the
entities and is therefore duplicative" in the absence of a
constitutional claim where the Eleventh Amendment may apply.
At the hearing on this motion, Plaintiffs' stated that they would
not seek leave to amend these claims, and leave to amend is not
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yahdpu5brfrom Leagle.com.

Student A, Plaintiff, represented by Anjali Moorthy, Esq. --
amoorthy@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP.

Student A, Plaintiff, represented by Arlene Brynne Mayerson,
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., 3075 Adeline St
Ste 210, Berkeley, CA 94703, Brendan Eugene Radke --
BRadke@goodwinlaw.com --  Goodwin Procter LLP, Deborah Rose
Jacobson -- djacobson@jacobsoneducationlaw.com -- Jacobson
Education Law, Larisa M. Cummings, Disability Rights Education &
Defense Fund, Inc., Ramaah Sadasivam, DREDF., 3075 Adeline St Ste
210, Berkeley, CA 94703 & David Shane Brun -- sbrun@goodwinlaw.com
-- Goodwin Procter LLP.

Student B, Plaintiff, represented by Anjali Moorthy, Goodwin
Procter LLP, Arlene Brynne Mayerson, Disability Rights Education &
Defense Fund, Inc., Brendan Eugene Radke, Goodwin Procter LLP,
Deborah Rose Jacobson, Jacobson Education Law, Larisa M. Cummings,
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Ramaah
Sadasivam, DREDF & David Shane Brun, Goodwin Procter LLP.

Student C, Plaintiff, represented by Anjali Moorthy, Goodwin
Procter LLP, Arlene Brynne Mayerson, Disability Rights Education &
Defense Fund, Inc., Brendan Eugene Radke, Goodwin Procter LLP,
Deborah Rose Jacobson, Jacobson Education Law, Larisa M. Cummings,
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Ramaah
Sadasivam, DREDF & David Shane Brun, Goodwin Procter LLP.

Student D, Plaintiff, represented by Anjali Moorthy, Goodwin
Procter LLP, Arlene Brynne Mayerson, Disability Rights Education &
Defense Fund, Inc., Brendan Eugene Radke, Goodwin Procter LLP,
Deborah Rose Jacobson, Jacobson Education Law, Larisa M. Cummings,
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., Ramaah
Sadasivam, DREDF & David Shane Brun, Goodwin Procter LLP.

Berkeley Unified School District, Defendant, represented by
Beatriz Berumen -- bberumen@gordonrees.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP.
Board of Education of the Berkeley Unified School District,
Defendant, represented by Beatriz Berumen, Gordon & Rees LLP.


BEST BUY: "Harris" Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled STARVONA HARRIS AND JONATHAN STRICKLAND,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, the
PLAINTIFFS, v. BEST BUY STORES, L.P., A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the
DEFENDANT, Case No. 4:17-cv-00446-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Starvona Harris
and Jonathan Strickland will move the Court on December 14, 2017,
for an order:

   1. certifying a Class, including Overtime Wage Subclass, Wage
      Statement Subclass and Waiting Time Subclass (Subclasses);
      and

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as Class representatives; and

   3. appointing Woodall Law Offices and Barnes Law Offices as
      Class counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=HZhV5s4X

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Starvona Harris, Jonathan Strickland And
Those Similarly Situated:

          Kevin F. Woodall, Esq.
          WOODALL LAW OFFICES
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 413 4629
          Facsimile: (866) 937 4109
          E-mail: kevin@kwoodalllaw.com

               - and -

          Page R. Barnes, Esq.
          BARNES LAW OFFICES
          580 California St., 16th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 231 6110
          Facsimile: (888) 415 0801
          E-mail: page@pbarneslaw.com


BET INTERACTIVE: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bet Interactive,
LLC. The case is styled as Phillip Sullivan Jr., on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bet
Interactive, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07972 (S.D.N.Y.,
October 17, 2017).

Bet Interactive, LLC operates as a television network providing
entertainment, music, news, and public affairs programming for the
African-American audience.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


BIG EASY FOODS: "Ramos" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Noe Vega Ramos, Ana Karen Valenzuela Soto, Jose Adrian Leyva, Ana
Karen Quiroz, and J. Aaron Felix, and all others similarly-
situated v.  Big Easy Foods of Louisiana, LLC, and Melchor Maya
Soto, Case No.  2:17-cv-01298 (W.D. La., October 11, 2017), seeks
to recover damages for Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Louisiana law,
and for breach of contract.

Plaintiffs are Mexican nationals and former guestworkers who were
recruited and employed as food-processing factory workers by
Defendants.

Defendant Big Easy Foods of Louisiana, LLC operates as a prepared
frozen food supplier business known as Big Easy Foods, with its
main office located at 3935 Ryan St., Lake Charles, Louisiana
70605.  Big Easy Foods specializes in purveying Louisiana
specialties including sausage, boudin, stuffed chickens, turkeys,
Tur-Duc-Hens, gumbo, jambalaya, and etouffee.

Individual Defendant Melchor Maya Soto is a manager at Big Easy
Foods. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Edward B. Cloutman, III, Esq.
      CLOUTMAN & CLOUTMAN, LLP
      3301 Elm Street
      Dallas, TX 75226-1637
      Tel: (214) 939-9222
      Fax: (214) 939-9229
      E-mail: ecloutman@lawoffices.email

          - and -

      Christopher J. Willett, Esq.
      Anna Bocchini, Esq.
      Colleen Mulholland, Esq.
      EQUAL JUSTICE CENTER
      510 S. Congress Ave., Ste. 206
      Austin, TX 78704
      Tel: (512) 474-0007 ext. 107
      Fax: (512) 474-0008
      E-mail: cwillett@equaljusticecenter.org
              abocchini@equaljusticecenter.org
              cmulholland@euqlajusticecenter.org


BMW AG: Audubon Imports Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Audubon Imports, LLC, dba Mercedes Benz of Baton Rouge, and all
others similarly-situated v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, BMW
North America, LLC, Volkswagen AG, Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc., Audi AG, Audi of America, LLC, Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG,
Porsche Cars of North America, Inc., Daimler AG, and Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-01127 (E.D. Va., October 10, 2017), is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act.

Plaintiff AudubonImports, LLC, dba Mercedes Benz of Baton Rouge,is
a limited liability corporation organized and operated under the
laws of the State of Louisiana. Plaintiff bought, owned and
operated a Mercedes-Benz dealership in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
from January 1, 2005, to September 1, 2008.  Plaintiff purchased
Mercedes-Benz vehicles directly from Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC.

Defendant Volkswagen AG is a German corporation with its principal
place of business in Wolfsburg, Germany.  It is one of the largest
automobile manufacturers in the world, and is in the business of
designing, developing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. is a New Jersey corporation with
its principal place of business located at 2200 Ferdinand Porsche
Drive, Herndon, Virginia. VWGOA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Volkswagen AG, and it engages in business, including the
advertising, marketing and sale of Volkswagen-branded automobiles,
in all 50 states.

Audi AG isa German corporation with its principal place of
business in Ingolstadt, Germany.  Audi AG is a subsidiary of
Volkswagen AG and is the corporate parent of Audi of America, LLC.
Audi AG designs, develops, manufacturers, and sells luxury
automobiles.

Audi of America, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company with
its principal place of business located at 2200 Ferdinand Porsche
Drive, Herndon, Virginia.  Audi of America is a wholly-owned U.S.
subsidiary of Audi AG, and it engages in business, including the
advertising, marketing and sale of Audi automobiles, in all 50
states.

Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG is a German corporation with its
principal place of business in Stuttgart, Germany.  Porsche AG
designs, develops, manufacturers, and sells luxury automobiles.
Porsche AG is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Volkswagen AG.

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business located at 1 Porsche Drive,
Atlanta, Georgia. PCNA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Porsche AG,
and it engages in business, including the advertising, marketing
and sale of Porsche automobiles, in all 50 states.

Daimler AG is a German corporation with its principal place of
business in Stuttgart, Germany. It is a major worldwide automaker
and is in the business of designing, developing, manufacturing,
and selling automobiles.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC is a Delaware limited liability corporation
with its principal place of business at 303 Perimeter Center
North, Atlanta, Georgia, although prior to July 2015, MBUSA
maintained its principal place of business in Montvale, New
Jersey.  MBUSA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Daimler AG, and it
engages in business, including the advertising, marketing and sale
of Mercedes-Benz automobiles, in all 50 states

Bayerische Motoren Werke AG is a German corporation with its
principal place of business in Munich, Germany. It is a major
worldwide automaker and is in the business of designing,
developing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles.

BMW North America, LLC is a Delaware limited liability corporation
with its principal place of business at 300 Chestnut Ridge Road,
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey.  BMW America is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of BMW AG, and it engages in business, including the
advertising, marketing and sale of BMW automobiles, in all 50
states.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michelle A. Parfitt, Esq.
      ASHCRAFT & GEREL, LLP
      4900 Seminary Road, Suite 650
      Alexandria, VA 22311
      Tel: (703) 931-5500
      Fax: (703) 820-1656
      E-mail: Mparfitt@ashcraftlaw.com

          - and -

      Warren T. Burns, Esq.
      Daniel H. Charest, Esq.
      Will Thompson, Esq.
      BURNS CHAREST, LLP
      900 Jackson Street, Suite 500
      Dallas, TX 75202
      Tel: (469) 904-4550
      Fax: (469) 444-5002
      E-mail: wburns@burnscharest.com
              dcharest@burnscharest.com
              wthompson@burnscharest.com

          - and -

      Thomas P. Thrash, Esq.
      Cydni Arterbury
      THRASH LAW FIRM, P.A.
      1101 Garland Street
      Little Rock, AR 72201
      Tel: (501) 374-1058
      Fax: (501) 374-2222
      E-mail: tomthrash@thrashlawfirmpa.com

          - and -

      Isaac L. Diel, Esq.
      SHARP MCQUEEN, PA
      Financial Plaza
      6900 College Blvd, Suite 285
      Overland Park, KS 66211
      Tel: (913) 661-9931
      Fax: (913) 661-9935
      E-mail: idiel@sharpmcqueen.com


BURGER KING: Florida Court Dismisses "Gesten" FACTA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in
case captioned Ryan D. Gesten, Plaintiff, v. Burger King
Corporation d/b/a Burger King, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-
22541-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.).

Gesten filed this suit, alleging that Burger King violated Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), which prohibits
printing more than the last five digits of a credit card number or
the expiration date on a receipt.  Gesten alleges that he was
subject to a heightened risk of identity theft and that his
private information was exposed as a result of the FACTA
violation.  Gesten alleges that similar violations have taken
place at dozens of Burger King's restaurants, and seeks to
represent a class of all persons in the United States who made a
payment at a Burger King restaurant using a credit card and
received a receipt displaying more than the last five digits of
the card number and/or the expiration date.

Gesten argues that the disclosure of one's private information is
a concrete harm that has long been recognized by courts, and that
FACTA recognizes a right of privacy not to have credit card
account information exposed. However, Gesten has not shown that
any disclosure of his private information actually occurred. Since
Gesten took possession of the receipt at the time of the
transaction the heightened risk of identity theft alleged in the
Complaint is a risk that has not, and could not, materialize in
this instance.

Although Gesten alleges that the information was disclosed to
Burger King employees, this disclosure is no different than the
disclosure that happens any time a consumer uses a credit card to
pay for a transaction. It is not the type of harm that Congress
identified in enacting FACTA. Moreover, the additional digits of
his account number that were displayed are digits that multiple
courts have recognized identify only the issuer of the card.
Gesten alleges that the issuing institution was separately printed
on the receipt, and Congress has not prohibited the printing of
the issuing institution on receipts.

Therefore, the Court finds that Gesten has not alleged that any
additional private financial information was displayed beyond that
included in the last five digits of his credit card account
number, nor has he alleged that such information was disclosed to
anyone other than the employees who handled his transaction.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court must join the numerous
courts outside of this circuit holding that a plaintiff does not
have standing to pursue a FACTA claim absent an allegation of
actual harm or a material risk of harm. Gesten's alleged injury is
precisely the type of abstract injury that Spokeo held was
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of concreteness.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7jq3z42from Leagle.com.

Ryan D. Gesten, Plaintiff, represented by Bret Leon Lusskin, Jr.,
Bret Lusskin, P.A., 1001 North Federal Highway, Suite 106,
Hallandale, FL 33009

Ryan D. Gesten, Plaintiff, represented by Keith James Keogh, Keogh
Law, Ltd.,55 W. Monroe St. #3390, Chicago, IL 60603, Sean Martin
Holas, Scott D. Owens, P.A. & Scott David Owens, SCOTT D. OWENS,
P.A., 3800 S. Ocean Dr. Suite 235, Hollywood, FL 33019

Burger King Corporation, Defendant, represented by Anthony Nolan
Upshaw, McDermott Will & Emery, Jeremy Marc White, McDermott Will
& Emery, LLP & Kerry Alan Scanlon, McDermott Will & Emery, LLP,
333 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4500, Miami, FL, 33133 pro hac
vice.


BUSH ROSS P.A.: "Kagno" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JULIET KAGNO, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BUSH ROSS, P.A., the
Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-1468-T-26AEP (M.D. Fla.), Ms. Juliet
Kagno asks the Court for an order certifying her corrected motion
for class certification and appointing her proposed class counsel.

The Plaintiff says the Court should certify the following class:

   "all persons (a) with a Florida address, (b) to whom Bush
   Ross, P.A., (c) from June 16, 2016 through October 11, 2017,
   (d) in connection with an attempt to collect any alleged debt
   incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, (e)
   mailed an initial debt collection communication not returned
   to Bush Ross, P.A. as undeliverable that: (1) stated "[u]nless
   the entire sum is paid within thirty (30) days of the date of
   this letter, we may proceed with action to protect the
   Association's interests, including, but not limited to the
   recording of a claim of lien, which can result in additional
   attorney's fees, costs and interest," and/or (2) stated "[i]f
   you notify the attorney named below within the said 30-day
   period that the aforesaid debt, or any portion thereof, is
   disputed, the attorney named below shall obtain written
   verification of said debt and mail same to you," and/or (3)
   failed to provide a statement that, upon the consumer's
   written request within the 30-day period after receipt of the
   communication, the debt collector will provide the consumer
   with the name and address of the original creditor, if
   different from the current creditor.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=a290y5t3

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
          Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826 5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961 5684
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com
                  jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com


CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Court Narrows Claims in "Jensen"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
PAUL JENSEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CABLEVISION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, a
Delaware Corporation; ALTICE N.V., and DOES 1 through 100,
Inclusive, Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-00100 (ADS)(AKT) (E.D.N.Y.).

Presently before the Court is a motion by the Defendants, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(2) and
Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Plaintiff's entire complaint.

The Plaintiff Paul Jensen commenced this action individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated against the Defendants,
Cablevision Systems Corporation, and Altice N.V. (Defendants) for
damages stemming from violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349.

According to Jensen, he did not authorize Cablevision to use the
wireless router to broadcast Optimum Public Wi-Fi. Jensen claims
that he has been forced to incur a higher electricity bill as a
result of the Defendants' wireless router. He further alleges that
his Optimum Online Wi-Fi network has experienced decreased speeds
and that the wireless router leased from the Defendants have been
exposed to possible, additional use by unknown third parties
without his knowledge or authorization.

In this case, the Plaintiff has not properly alleged that Altice's
contacts with New York are so substantial that it is essentially
at home. Although Altice does have a New York subsidiary, that
does not render it essentially at home. Thus, the Court finds that
Altice is not subject to general jurisdiction in the State of New
York.

The Defendants allege that the Plaintiff's allegations solely
relate to Altice's subsidiary, Cablevision, which became known as
Altice USA after the Altice/Cablevision transaction, and may not
be attributed to Altice for the purpose of obtaining specific
personal jurisdiction.

The Court finds that for the purposes of CPLR Section 302(a)(1),
Altice has engaged in sufficient purposeful activity in New York
to determine that it has transacted business, and that this
Plaintiff's claims arise from this business. Therefore, the
Plaintiff has sufficiently presented a prima facie case to
establish specific personal jurisdiction over Altice in this
matter.

Although the Defendants argue that Cablevision is not an agent or
mere department of Altice so that this Court has no personal
jurisdiction over Altice, the Defendants' argument focuses on the
scope of general jurisdiction not the applicability of specific
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1).

The Court is unpersuaded that the Defendants' argument is
applicable to Section 302(a)(1).

As the Second Circuit notes, there is extensive overlap between a
CPLR Section 302(a) analysis, which the Court has just conducted,
and a constitutional due process analysis, because if a defendant
transacted business in New York and the claim asserted arose from
that business activity within the meaning of section 302(a)(1),
and yet, in connection with the same transaction of business, the
defendant cannot be found to have purposefully availed itself of
the privilege of doing business in the forum and to have been able
to foresee being hauled into court there or the assertion of
specific jurisdiction would somehow otherwise offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Thus, it is especially unusual to find that a defendant has met
the requirements of Section 302(a)(1), yet failed a due process
analysis. The Court is unaware of any such decisions in the Second
Circuit.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is specific personal
jurisdiction over Altice. For these reasons, the Defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(2) is denied.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's complaint fails to
state a plausible claim based on a violation of the CFAA. In
particular, the Defendants assert that (a) the Plaintiff consented
to allowing the Defendants to use the wireless router to set up
Optimum Public Wi-Fi; and (b) the Plaintiff is unable to satisfy
the minimum loss requirement under the CFAA.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff failed to properly plead
a claim for relief under the CFAA because the Plaintiff consented
to the purported use of the wireless router. For the reasons
stated below, the Court finds that there is a factual dispute as
to whether Jensen consented to use of the wireless router to set
up Optimum Public Wi-Fi, which precludes the Court from dismissing
the claim at this time.

The Defendants' argument that the Agreement for Optimum Online is
incorporated by reference does not satisfy the first prong of the
test under New York law. The General Terms and Conditions of
Service's reference to the litany of terms and conditions for a
variety of Cablevision products does not identify the terms and
conditions that apply to the Plaintiff so that it may be properly
identified beyond all reasonable doubt at this stage.

The reference in the General Terms and Conditions of Service is to
the Optimum branded homepage, not the specific terms of service
that are at issue. Further, the Terms of Service, as defined
incorporates additional Cablevision services that are inapplicable
to an Optimum Online residential customer. This includes terms and
conditions for non-subscribers and for businesses.

Accordingly, the Court finds that at the very least, there is a
triable issue of fact as to whether the Agreement for Optimum
Online is incorporated by Reference. Because a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether the Defendants accessed the
Plaintiff's wireless router without authorization, the Defendants'
motion is denied on that basis.

The Defendants further argue that the Plaintiff's damages for his
CFAA claims are deficient because the pleading fails to meet the
CFAA's minimum loss requirement.  In opposition, the Plaintiff
contends that he may aggregate all putative class members' claims
for the purposes of meeting the statutory requirement.

In the instant case, in the amended complaint, the Plaintiff
pleads that all his claims under the CFAA resulted in the same
damage, namely increased electricity costs. Given that the Court
finds that the Plaintiff is unable to aggregate such damages, the
Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the Defendants violated
the CFAA in a manner that has caused the Plaintiff damages or
losses of at least $5,000 regarding any CFAA claim.

Therefore, the Court finds that the complaint fails to adequately
state a claim for relief under the CFAA. Accordingly, the Court
grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's CFAA
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice.

The Plaintiff's remaining claim is a state law claim that arises
under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349. Jensen contends that under
28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d), the Court has jurisdiction over such a
claim because the action involves 100 or more class members; at
least one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a State
different from the State of citizenship of Defendants and the
matter in controversy exceeds $5 million in sum or value.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has properly alleged that the
parties are minimally diverse and that the proposed class members'
claims aggregate to exceed the $5,000,000 requirement.
The Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the
Plaintiff's CFAA claims is granted. The motion is denied in all
other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum of Decision and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yaqw6fj3from Leagle.com.

Paul Jensen, Plaintiff, represented by Gillian Wade --
gwade@mjfwlaw.com -- Milstein, Adelman, Jackson, Fairchild & Wade,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Paul Jensen, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Henry Bates --
hbates@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Brian Tse-Hua Ku, Ku & Mussman, P.A., 11098 Biscayne Blvd. Ste.
301Miami, FL 33161-7491, Michael R. Casey, The Casey Law Firm LLC,
pro hac vice & Sara Dawn Avila -- savila@mjfwlaw.com -- Milstein
Adelman LLP, pro hac vice.

Cablevision Systems Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jason
I. Kirschner -- jkirschner@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
Matthew D. Ingber -- mingber@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP &
Archis A. Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer
Brown LLP.

Altice N.V., Defendant, represented by Jason I. Kirschner, Mayer
Brown LLP, Matthew D. Ingber, Mayer Brown LLP & Archis A.
Parasharami, Mayer Brown LLP.


CALIFORNIA: Chief Justice Says Cash Bail System Unsafe, Unfair
--------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
calling the state's cash bail system unsafe and unfair, California
Supreme Court Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye released a report
on Oct. 24 she hopes will help shape the future of pretrial
detention in California.

"I support the conclusion that California's current pretrial
system unnecessarily compromises victim and public safety and
agree with the recommendation to replace our current system of
money bail with one based on a defendant's risk to the public,"
the chief justice said in a statement.  "This report should serve
as a framework as we work with the governor and the Legislature to
address these issues that are central to our values and
responsibilities of providing fair and equal access to justice for
all Californians."

The report on California's bail system is the work of a head clerk
and 11 judges from trial courts up and down the state, who
recommended courts begin to use assessment tools to determine
whether a defendant is a flight risk or a threat to public safety
instead hitting them with a money bond which they say could let a
potentially dangerous defendant buy his freedom.

National pretrial trends show 61 percent of the country's inmates
have not been convicted -- and 64 percent of California's inmates
are awaiting arraignment, trial or sentencing, according to the
report.

"A pretrial system that relies exclusively on the financial
resources of the accused is inherently unsafe and unfair," the
judges wrote.  "The primary goals of an effective pretrial release
structure are to maintain public safety and to ensure that
defendants appear in court while treating people fairly. However,
use of a monetary bail system compromises public safety because
release is not premised on the risk posed by a defendant.

"Rather, use of monetary bail secures the release of the accused
without consideration of whether that release poses a danger to
the community -- thereby allowing potentially dangerous defendants
to purchase their release."

They added, "Once a bond is purchased and posted with the court,
few if any conditions of release are imposed on a defendant, who
has little to no accountability to the court for pretrial
behavior.  At the same time, many defendants with limited
resources remain in jail because they cannot post bail.  In
posting bail to gain pretrial release, individuals and their
families are often unnecessarily saddled with significant long-
term debt regardless of the outcome of the case."

A risk-assessment tool weighs factors in pretrial detainees'
background, including the current charge(s), prior convictions and
a history of failure to appear in court, and then assigns the
defendant a risk level based on those factors.

Additionally, the judges think every court in the state should
have pretrial services staff to supervise released defendants and
gather information about new arrestees to help judges determine
their restrictions.  Judges should also consider victims' rights
when determining conditions for release, and issue protective
orders or exclusion zones when appropriate.

"Thousands of Californians who pose no risk to the public are held
in jail before trial, while others charged with serious or violent
offenses may pose a high risk and can buy their freedom simply by
bailing out," Ventura County Judge Brian Back, the work group's
chairman, said in a statement.  "We think our recommendations, if
followed, will help keep Californians safer and preserve scarce
jail resources while providing new tools to monitor those released
before trial."

The report cites several court cases in California and throughout
the nation challenging money bail.  Since 2015, it says, there
have been 12 federal civil rights lawsuits in nine different
states.

Phil Telfeyan, executive director of Equal Justice Under Law, is
the lead attorney in Buffin v. San Francisco, a federal class
action claiming the cash-bail system unconstitutionally
criminalizes poverty.  In an email, Mr. Telfeyan hailed the
report, but said he had some concerns about the potential for
discrimination in a risk assessment.

"The current system amounts to wealth-based detention, and the
working group's recommendations are an important step in ending
pretrial poverty jailing," he wrote.  "I caution that, while the
working group recommends 'risk-based assessment,' computerized
risk-assessment programs have the potential to discriminate
against racial and ethnic minorities.  Computerized risk-
assessment programs can also overestimate someone's level of
'risk' before they have been convicted of any crime. It is
critical that, at all stages, we ensure that each individual's
right to pretrial freedom is maximized."

He added, "No person should spend even one day in jail simply
because he or she is poor.  Equal Justice Under Law is fighting
hard to bring this discriminatory system to an end by bringing
legal challenges across the country to end this unconstitutional
practice, which creates two separate systems of justice: one for
the rich and one for everyone else."

Mr. Telfeyan said he expects a ruling in the Buffin case by the
end of the year.

The report also brought a strong reaction from members of the
California Legislature, who responded triumphantly to the judges'
findings.  State Sen. Bob Hertzberg, D-Van Nuys, who has worked
for two years to end money bail in California, said in an
interview on Oct. 24 he felt vindicated after reading the report.

"I'm over the moon.  I've been in this fight every day for two
years and everything the other side told me has been debunked by
this recommendation from the working group.  It's just fantastic,"
he said.

The support of California's trial courts is crucial to ending the
money bail system, as its judges will be the ones evaluating
pretrial detainees.

"They see how hard it is and they see the injustice and they
really have done the homework on the statistics," Hertzberg said
of the work group.  "To have the courts, which are right on the
front lines everyday having to make these decisions, it just
doesn't get any better than that."

Sen. Hertzberg is the author of Senate Bill 10, which he said
mirrors the findings in the judges' report.  The bill passed out
of the state senate and the assembly's public safety committee,
but was held up in appropriations.  Sen. Hertzberg said he wasn't
sure it had enough votes to make it out of the full assembly, so
he and Assemblyman Rob Bonta, D-Oakland and the bill's co-author,
decided to put it on hold until next year.

"The argument being made against us was 'Wait for the report.'
Well, we did and it says exactly what we've been saying,"
Sen. Hertzberg said.  "The bottom line is this report will help
inform the discussion when meeting with the courts."

Assemblyman David Chiu, D-San Francisco, who also helped write
SB 10, said in an email: "As a co-author of bail reform in the
legislature, I'm thrilled that the chief justice is committed to
bail reform, to replacing our money bail system with a risk-based
assessment program.  By basing bail on a person's income and not
on the likelihood of future criminal behavior, our current bail
system is both unfair and compromises public safety."

Sen. Hertzberg says with the backing of the report and the chief
justice's commitment to bail reform, he feels confident that SB 10
will pass both houses.  Gov. Jerry Brown has also voiced his
desire to put an end to cash bail, and issued a joint statement in
August with Justice Cantil-Sakauye that said: "I believe that
inequities exist in California's bail system and I look forward to
working this fall on ways to reform the system in a cost-effective
and fair manner, considering public safety as well as the rights
of the accused."

The cost of implementing a new framework of rules remains a
concern, and the judges recommended "adequate funding and
resources" for the courts for reform to be successful.

"Significant initial investment of resources and ongoing funding
are essential," the judges wrote.  "If this system relies on
anticipated savings to cover new and continuing costs, it is
likely to fail before the public gains any benefits.  Without
adequate and consistent funding the system cannot be effective,
which may result in a rise in the number of accused who fail to
appear in court and an increased risk to public safety."

Hertzberg agreed that money will be an issue, but the cost will be
far less than keeping arrestees in jail.

"We are going to advocate that they get the resources they need,"
he said.  "You've got to look at both sides of the balance sheet.
Sixty-three percent of people in jail are pretrial detainees, and
that's going to reduce costs.

"There's no question the court needs proper funding to do this,
but on the flip side, what are you achieving?" he added.  "The
chief justice said the system is 'unsafe and unfair.' How do you
argue with that?"


CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces "Teitlebaum" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital Resource
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Menachem Teitlebaum, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff v. Capital Resource Management, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-06028-SJF-GRB (E.D. N.Y., October 16, 2017).

Capital Resource Management, Inc. is a registered investment
advisory firm located in Deerfield, Illinois.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


CAPITAL RESOURCE: Faces "Teitelbaum" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital Resource
Management, Inc..The case is styled as Menachem Teitelbaum, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff v. Capital Resource Management, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-06028 (E.D. N.Y., October 16, 2017).

Capital Resource Management, Inc. is a registered investment
advisory firm located in Deerfield, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CBE GROUP: Truglio Seeks to Certify New Jersey Consumer Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARNI TRUGLIO individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CBE GROUP, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:15-cv-03813-TJB (D.N.J.), the Plaintiff, on
consent of Defendant, will move the Court on November 6, 2017, for
an Order certifying this case as a class action, and granting
final approval of the settlement, on behalf of the following
class:

   "all New Jersey consumers who were sent collection letters
   and/or notice during the period beginning June 8, 2014, and
   ending June 8, 2015, from Defendant CBE Group attempting to
   collect an obligation owed to DirectTV that contain at least
   one of the alleged violations arising from Defendant's
   violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692 et seq., which were mailed
   in a windowed envelope such that certain alpha numeric
   information associated with the consumer's debt was visible
   from the outside of the envelope."

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=NwK7paLG

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695 3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: Ari@MarcusZelman.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Concepcion Montoya, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022


CHARLES SCHWAB: Appeal in Total Bond Market Fund Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Charles Schwab Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017, that the appeal in the Total Bond
Market Fund Litigation remains pending.

On August 28, 2008, a class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf
of investors in the Schwab Total Bond Market Fund(TM). The
lawsuit, which alleged violations of state law and federal
securities law in connection with the fund's investment policy,
named CSIM, Schwab Investments (registrant and issuer of the
fund's shares) and certain current and former fund trustees as
defendants. Allegations include that the fund improperly deviated
from its stated investment objectives by investing in
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and investing more than
25% of fund assets in CMOs and mortgage-backed securities without
obtaining a fundholder vote. Plaintiff seeks unspecified
compensatory and rescission damages, unspecified equitable and
injunctive relief, costs and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's federal
securities law claim and certain of plaintiff's state law claims
were dismissed.

On August 8, 2011, the court dismissed plaintiff's remaining
claims with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
which issued a ruling on March 9, 2015 reversing the district
court's dismissal of the case and remanding the case for further
proceedings. Plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint on June
25, 2015, and in decisions issued October 6, 2015 and February 23,
2016, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Plaintiff has
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where the case is again pending.

The Charles Schwab Corporation (CSC) is a savings and loan holding
company engaged, through its subsidiaries (collectively referred
to as the Company), in wealth management, securities brokerage,
banking, asset management, custody, and financial advisory
services.


CHRISTUS HEALTH: Texas Court Dismisses "Meyer" FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Western District of Texas,
San Antonio Division, issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned LORNA MEYER, pleading on her own
behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff, v. CHRISTUS HEALTH d/b/a TLRA DEBT RECOVERY,
Defendants, Civil Action No. SA-17-CV-213-XR (W.D. Tex.).

Plaintiff brings causes of action under the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (FDCPA).  Plaintiff incurred a debt for medical
treatment with Defendant Christus Health prior to February 16,
2017. Plaintiff alleges that Christus Health uses the name TLRA
Debt Recovery (TLRA) to collect its own debts and indicate to
consumers that a third party is collecting or attempting to
collect the debt. Plaintiff thus alleges that Defendant is a debt
collector. Plaintiff alleges Defendant, using the name TLRA, sent
its initial dunning letter to Plaintiff.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims that the voicemail
message was left in violation of the FDCPA, and that language in
the collection letter overshadowed the dispute notice required by
the FDCPA.

Plaintiff does not adequately allege that Defendant's voicemail
message failed to provide meaningful disclosure that it was a debt
collector.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA because it failed
to identify TLRA as a debt collector and did not indicate the
purpose of the phone call on the voice message it left for
Plaintiff. To prevail on an FDCPA claim, Plaintiff must prove (1)
she has been the object of collection activity arising from a
consumer debt, (2) Defendant is a debt collector defined by the
FDCPA, and (3) Defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited
by the FDCPA.

Plaintiff does not sufficiently claim that the phrase collection
division fails to provide meaningful disclosure that Defendant is
a debt collector. In the message as Plaintiff alleges it, TLRA
introduces itself as a division of Christus Health, and
specifically states that it is a collection division. Even taking
Plaintiff's allegations as true and construing them in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court does not find that
Plaintiff adequately alleges failure to meaningful disclose the
identity of a debt collector when the phrase collection division
is used. Plaintiff alleges no other facts about the message that
would lead the least sophisticated or an unsophisticated consumer
to believe TLRA was anything other than a debt collector.

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not adequately plead that Defendant,
by identifying itself as Collection Division, failed to provide
meaningful disclosure as to its identity as a debt collector.
Plaintiff does not adequately allege that Defendant's collection
letter overshadows Plaintiff's dispute rights.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FDCPA because it
instructed Plaintiff in a collection letter to call to dispute her
debt in a way that overshadowed the required dispute notice.
Plaintiff must prove she was the object of collection activity
arising from a consumer debt, that Defendant is a debt collector,
and Defendant engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the
FDCPA.

Although the letter asks Plaintiff to contact Defendant by phone,
that language does not contradict the language informing Plaintiff
of her right to dispute her debt in writing, nor does the letter
anywhere require Plaintiff to make an immediate payment. Plaintiff
does not adequately allege that the sentence that immediately
precedes the required validation rights language contradicts or
overshadows that validation rights language.

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not adequately plead that Defendant's
collection letter includes language that overshadows her dispute
rights.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yc32ds4hfrom Leagle.com.

Lorna Meyer, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Zemel, Zemel Law
LLC, 70 Clinton Ave., Suite 3, Newark, NJ 07114
Christus Health, Defendant, represented by Ashley Senary Dahlberg
-- ashley.dahlberg@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP & Michael William O'Donnell --
mike.odonnell@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP.


CINTAS CORP: "Cassingham" Suit Seeks Conditional Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARK CASSINGHAM, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORP.
and CINTAS CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
5:17-cv-05014-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff move the Court
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act on November 30, 2017, for
an order:

   1. granting conditional certification and approving a 60 day
      opt-in period for the following collective:

      "all similarly situated current and former hourly Fire
      Service Technicians who work or have worked for Defendants
      at any time from August 29, 2014 through judgment";

   2. requiring Defendants to identify all potential opt-ins
      within 14 days of the grant of conditional certification by
      providing a list in electronic and importable format, of
      the names, job titles, addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail
      addresses, dates of employment, location of employment, and
      date of birth, of each potential opt-in; and

   3. approving a proposed form of notice and authorizing it to
      be sent by U.S. Mail and e-mail to all potential opt-in
      plaintiffs, along with a shortened text message notifying
      each individual that the notice form was mailed and
      emailed.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=05VhsXgt

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jahan C. Sagafi. Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          One Embarcadero Center, 38th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 638-8800
          Facsimile: (415) 638-8810
          E-mail: jsagafi@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          Charles R. Ash, IV, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, Michigan 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355 0300
          Facsimile: (248) 436 8453
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                  crash@sommerspc.com


CITGO PETROLEUM: Claims Tech Firms Liable for Spam Text Accord
--------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Zantow, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
Citgo Petroleum Corp. claims two technology companies are liable
for an $8 million settlement it reached this summer in a federal
class action accusing it of sending text messages to contest
participants without permission.

Matthew Gottlieb filed the class action a year ago on behalf of
himself and others who received text messages from the gas giant
without permission during the months of August, October or
November 2016.  The case stems from Citgo's text-to-win
sweepstakes contests that launched in 2015 and took place at
concert venues, amusement parks and gas stations.

According to a lawsuit Citgo filed on Oct. 23 in Milwaukee County
Circuit Court, the oil and gas company contracted with Wisconsin
vendor MTI Connect LLC dba Black Canyon, which worked with Georgia
tech firm mGage LLC to use its proprietary text-messaging service
to implement the contests.

Documents obtained during discovery reportedly show that
Mr. Gottlieb and about 30,000 other sweepstakes entrants did not
receive an opt-in text that Citgo says it authorized and approved
for Black Canyon to use in the system.

The program was designed to employ a "double opt-in protocol"
where contestants could "Reply 'Y'" to a confirmation text that
asked for their consent to receive up to four texts a month from
Citgo, according to the 20-page lawsuit penned by attorney Gregory
Heinen -- gheinen@foley.com -- with Foley & Lardner in Milwaukee.

"Tens of thousands of contest entrants, including Gottlieb, did
not receive the 'Reply Y message' mandated by the double opt-in
protocol," the complaint states.  "These failures were caused by
the actions of Black Canyon, problems with the mGage text-
messaging service, or a combination of those factors."

Citgo agreed in July to settle Gottlieb's Telephone Consumer
Protection Act class action for $8 million.  The deal has been
preliminarily approved by a federal judge in Florida.

The gas giant now wants a Wisconsin judge to declare that Black
Canyon and mGage are responsible for the $8 million payment and up
to $300,000 in settlement administration costs.

"While Citgo denied that its text messages violated the TCPA,
Black Canyon and/or mGage's failure to send the confirmatory
'Reply 'Y'' text to Gottlieb and a large number of other members
of his purported class provided a non-frivolous basis on which
Gottlieb could sue Citgo, forced Citgo to incur substantial costs
and fees to defend against Gottlieb's claim, and created a risk
that the court would reject Citgo's position and find it liable
for TCPA violations and for statutory damages that could total
$300 million," the lawsuit states.

Citgo asserts claims of contractual indemnification, breach of
contract, negligence and misrepresentation.

Black Canyon and mGage LLC did not immediately respond on Oct. 24
to email requests for comment.

Citgo also did not respond to an email seeking comment.


CORECIVIC INC: Still Defends Against "Grae" Suit
------------------------------------------------
The case, Grae v. Corrections Corporation of America, remains
pending, CoreCivic, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017.

CoreCivic said, "In a memorandum to the BOP dated August 18, 2016,
the DOJ directed that, as each contract with privately operated
prisons reaches the end of its term, the BOP should either decline
to renew that contract or substantially reduce its scope in a
manner consistent with law and the overall decline of the BOP's
inmate population.  In addition to the decline in the BOP's inmate
population, the DOJ memorandum cites purported operational,
programming, and cost efficiency factors as reasons for the DOJ
directive.  On February 21, 2017, the newly appointed Attorney
General issued a memorandum rescinding the DOJ's prior directive
stating the memorandum changed long-standing policy and practice
and impaired the BOP's ability to meet the future needs of the
federal correctional system."

"Following the release of the August 18, 2016 DOJ memorandum, a
purported securities class action lawsuit was filed against us and
certain of our current and former officers in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, captioned
Grae v. Corrections Corporation of America et al., Case No. 3:16-
cv-02267.  The lawsuit is brought on behalf of a putative class of
shareholders who purchased or acquired our securities between
February 27, 2012 and August 17, 2016.  In general, the lawsuit
alleges that, during this timeframe, our public statements were
false and/or misleading regarding the purported operational,
programming, and cost efficiency factors cited in the DOJ
memorandum and, as a result, our stock price was artificially
inflated.  The lawsuit alleges that the publication of the DOJ
memorandum on August 18, 2016 revealed the alleged fraud, causing
the per share price of our stock to decline, thereby causing harm
to the putative class of shareholders.

"We believe the lawsuit is entirely without merit and intend to
vigorously defend against it.  In addition, we maintain insurance,
with certain self-insured retention amounts, to cover the alleged
claims which mitigates the risk such litigation would have a
material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of
operations, or cash flows."

On July 26, 2017, Corrections Corporation of America and other
defendants filed a Motion for Hearing regarding their Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

On July 27, 2017, District Judge Aleta A. Trauger, who presides
over the case, denied a Motion Requesting Oral Argument.

CoreCivic, Inc. is one of the nation's largest owners of
partnership correctional, detention, and residential reentry
facilities and one of the largest prison operators in the United
States.  Through three business offerings, CoreCivic Safety,
CoreCivic Properties, and CoreCivic Community, the Company
provides a broad range of solutions to government partners that
serve the public good through high-quality corrections and
detention management, innovative and cost-saving government real
estate solutions, and a growing network of residential reentry
centers to help address America's recidivism crisis.  As of June
30, 2017, CoreCivic owned or controlled 46 correctional and
detention facilities, owned or controlled 28 residential reentry
centers, and managed an additional 10 correctional and detention
facilities owned by its government partners, with a total design
capacity of approximately 87,400 beds in 20 states.


CREDIT CONTROL: Certification of Consumer Class Sought
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled PABLO RINCON-MARIN, on behalf of himself,
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CREDIT
CONTROL, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00007-VLB (D.
Conn.), the Parties ask the Court for an order certifying this
case to proceed as a class action, and granting preliminary
approval of the settlement, on behalf of the following class:

   "all consumers nationwide who were sent collection letters
   and/or notices from Defendant attempting to collect a consumer
   debt wherein said collection letters state both that "Please
   note that a negative credit bureau report reflecting on your
   credit record may be submitted to a credit reporting agency by
   the current account owner if you fail to fulfill the terms of
   your credit obligations. This notice in no way affects any
   rights you may have," and "The law limits how long you can be
   sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, LVNV Funding
   LLC will not sue you for it and LVNV Funding LLC will not
   report it to any credit reporting agency," since January 3,
   2016 through October 26, 2017."

The Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, which alleges that CCLLC violated
the FDCPA by sending consumers written collection communications
with language that both indicated the debt would be reported to
the credit reporting agencies, and with language that it would not
be reported.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=bghSEfRj

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Zemel, Esq.
          ZEMEL LAW, LLC
          78 John Miller Way, Suite 430
          Kearny, NJ 07114
          Telephone: (862) 227 3106
          E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com

               - and -

          Peter Van Dyke, Esq.
          EAGAN, DONOHUE, VAN DYKE & FALSEY, LLP
          24 Arapahoe Road
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (215) 872 5127
          E-mail: pvd@eddf-law.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          M. Brent Yarborough, Esq.
          Thomas R. Dominzcyk, Esq.
          MAURICE WUTSCHER LLP
          420 N. 20th Street, Suite 2200
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 295 6594
          E-mail: byarborough@mauricewutscher.com
                  tdominczyk@mauricewutscher.com


DC CAP HOTELIER: Faces "Jorge" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DC Cap Hotelier,
LLC. The case is styled as Carlos Jorge, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DC Cap Hotelier, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07983 (S.D.N.Y., October 17, 2017).

DC Cap Hotelier LLC is in the Community Membership Club
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


DELI PARTNERS: Smiley Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES SMILEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. DELI PARTNERS, LLC, a franchisee d/b/a "Jason's Deli";
HARVEY NORTH LITTLE ROCK, L.L.C., managing entity; and BOURKE C.
HARVEY, an individual, Case No. 4:17-cv-00612-SWW (E.D. Ark.,
September 25, 2017), seeks to recover alleged unpaid overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas
Minimum Wage Act for the Plaintiff arising out of hours worked in
his salaried assistant manager position below the level of general
manager, and for other current and former employees working in
assistant manager positions below the level of general manager.

Deli Partners, LLC, is a franchisee of Deli Management, Inc.
Harvey North Little Rock is an Arkansas corporation and is the
"Manager" of Defendant DP.  Bourke C. Harvey is one of HNLR's
officers.  DP and Harvey own and operate Jason's Deli restaurants
in Arkansas, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

               - and -

          C. Andrew Head, Esq.
          Donna L. Johnson, Esq.
          HEAD LAW FIRM, LLC
          White Provision, Suite 305
          1170 Howell Mill Road NW
          Atlanta, GA 30318
          Telephone: (404) 924-4151
          Facsimile: (404) 796-7338
          E-mail: ahead@headlawfirm.com
                  djohnson@headlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Fran L. Rudich, Esq.
          Seth R. Lesser, Esq.
          KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP
          Two International Drive, Suite 350
          Rye Brook, NY 10573
          Telephone: (914) 934-9200
          Facsimile: (914) 934-9220
          E-mail: Fran@klafterolsen.com
                  seth@klafterolsen.com


DIMENSION THERAPEUTICS: Faces "Scarantino" Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Louis Scarantino, and all others similarly-situated v. Dimension
Therapeutics, Inc., Alan B. Colowick, Mike Dybbs, Georges Gemayel,
John Hohneker, Annalisa Jenkins, George Migausky, Arlene M.
Morris, Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc., and Mystic River Merger
Sub Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-11964 (D. Mass., October 10, 2017), is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The action stems from a proposed transaction announced on
October 3, 2017, pursuant to which Dimension Therapeutics, Inc.
will be acquired by Ultragenyx Pharmaceutical Inc. and Mystic
River Merger Sub Inc. through a tender offer currently set to
expire on November 6, 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that the Solicitation Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which
renders the Solicitation Statement false and misleading.

Plaintiff Louis Scarantino is an owner of Dimension common stock.

Defendant Dimension is a rare disease company focused on
discovering and developing new therapeutic products for
individuals living with rare diseases associated with the liver
and based on the most advanced adeno-associated virus delivery
technology. Defendant Dimension is a Delaware corporation and
maintains its principal executive offices at 840 Memorial Drive,
Cambridge, MA 02139.  Dimension's common stock is traded on the
NasdaqGS under the ticker symbol "DMTX."

The Individual Defendants are directors of Dimension.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mitchell J. Matorin, Esq.
      MATORIN LAW OFFICE, LLC
      18 Grove Street, Suite 5
      Wellesley, MA 02482
      Tel: (781) 453-0100

          - and -

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
      Wilmington, DE 19803
      Tel: (302) 295-5310


DITECH FINANCIAL: Class Settlement in "Fein" Suit Has Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion granting Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Final Certification of the Settlement Class/Collective,
final approval of the Settlement Agreement, and service awards and
a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses in the case captioned
RYAN FEIN; ANTHONY RIZZELLO; CHRISTOPHER SALMIERI; JOSHUA BERLIN;
SHAWN BISHOP; RYAN FITZPATRIK; FRANCIS IANNOTTA; JI KIM; MARC
LANGLEY; CHRISTOPHERMEEKER; JASON NEWCOMER; JOHN SHALLOW; DAVID
BARON; and ARNOLD DAVENPORT, Plaintiffs, v. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC,
Defendant, No. 5:16-cv-00660 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit as a class/collective action
against Defendant on behalf of a putative class of similarly-
situated Loan Officers employed by Defendant.  Plaintiffs allege
that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act (PMWA) and Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law (WPCL) by failing to pay Plaintiffs and other
similarly-situated current and former employees at a rate equal to
or greater than 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for all hours
in excess of 40 worked in a single work week under the FLSA and
PMWA, and by failing to pay certain wages earned and due under the
WPCL.

The parties have agreed to settle this case for a total of
$1,383,000.  Of that amount, approximately $893,552.27 (Settlement
Fund) will be distributed to Class Members.

Plaintiffs seek the remaining amount for attorneys' fees, costs,
and expenses, service awards for the Class Representatives and
named Plaintiffs, and claims administration expenses.

Plaintiffs estimate that participating Class Members will receive
amounts ranging from the minimum payment of $50.00 up to a maximum
of approximately $22,000.00, with an average payout of
approximately $3,200.00, which Plaintiffs believe represents a
substantial percentage of the wages and overtime compensation
which Class Members reasonably could expect to prove at trial.

In this case, the Court finds that the State Law Class satisfies
the requirements for certification under Rule 23.

Under Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.

Although the first element, numerosity, does not require a
specific minimum number of plaintiffs to maintain a suit as a
class action, courts generally find that any number of potential
plaintiffs over 40 satisfies the first element of Rule 23(a).
Here, the parties have confirmed that the State Law Class has 119
members. The Class satisfies the numerosity requirement.

The second element, commonality, requires questions of law or fact
common to the class: (1) State Law Class Members were entitled to
overtime on commission for certain guaranteed commissions and/or
production bonuses or whether those commissions and/or bonuses
were discretionary, and thus properly excludable from their
regular rate under the PMWA; (2) whether Class Members earned the
2013 Production Bonus within the meaning of the WPCL by achieving
over $60,000,000 in production in 2013; (3) whether the 2013
Production Bonus Agreement contained an unlawful forfeiture clause
in violation of the WPCL; and (4) whether Class Members were
entitled to liquidated damages.
These similar legal and factual issues clearly satisfy the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).

The third element requires that claims or defenses of the
representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.

Here, the same unlawful conduct equally affected the proposed
Class Representatives, named Plaintiffs, and putative Class
Members: all claim that Defendant's failure to properly and timely
pay overtime compensation at a rate not less than 1.5 times their
regular rate, as well as its failure to pay them wages due and
owing, violated their rights under the PMWA and WPCL.

Thus, the class also satisfies the typicality requirement.

The fourth and final element of Rule 23(a) requires that the Court
determine that the named Plaintiffs and class counsel will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
The class members are adequately represented if (1) the interests
of the class representative do not conflict with the class
members' interests and (2) class counsel are experienced,
vigorously prosecuted the action, and acted at arm's length from
the defendant.

Here, no improper conflict of interest exists between the Class
Representatives and class counsel and any other member of the
Class; all State Law Class Members will receive payments
proportional to the degree Defendant's pay practices harmed them.
Furthermore, class counsel has significant experience with state
wage and hour class and FLSA collective actions, reached
settlement only after a thorough investigation of all claims
against Defendant, and negotiated at arm's length from Defendant
during a full-day mediation session. The named Plaintiffs and
class counsel have protected the interests of the Class fairly and
adequately.

Therefore, the proposed State Law Class satisfies the Rule 23(a)
requirements.

The class also satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

Having satisfied Rule 23(a), the class must now satisfy one of the
three subparts of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(3), under which
Plaintiffs seek final class certification, requires that questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

The Class Representatives and the Class Members share core common
issues of fact, specifically, Defendant's exclusion of certain
commissions and bonuses from its calculation of Class Members'
overtime rates under the PMWA and its refusal to pay Class Members
the second and/or third tranches of their 2013 Production Bonus
due to their no longer being employed at the time payment became
due.

Each Class Member also presents common legal issues under state
law: whether Defendant was legally entitled to exclude those
earnings in bonuses and commissions from its calculation of Class
Members' regular rate under the PMWA, and whether Defendant
unlawfully failed to pay Class Members tranches of their 2013
Production Bonus due to an unlawful forfeiture provision in
violation of the WPCL.

These common issues predominate over any idiosyncrasies of their
individual cases and militate in favor of resolution by class
action.

The State Law Class therefore meets the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) as well. Because the class complies with both Rules 23(a)
and 23(b)(3), this Court grants final certification of the State
Law Class.

Class notice was the best notice practical.

After final certification of the class, the Court must evaluate
the adequacy of the notice given to potential class members.
The Class Members' names and addresses are easily ascertainable
because Defendant previously employed all members of the
Settlement Class. The Class Notice and Exclusion/Opt-Out Form was
mailed to all 119 State Law Class Members, and the forms complied
with the requirements of Rule 23. Therefore, the notice given to
potential State Law Class Members complied with the requirements
of Rule 23.

Plaintiffs have carried their burden in this case. First, the
proposed FLSA Collective Members clearly had similar circumstances
of employment, as all worked in essentially the same position at
Defendant's offices in Fort Washington, PA, subject to the common
payroll policies and practices described above. FLSA Collective
Members advance similar claims and seek the same relief:
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to factor in certain
earnings in bonuses and/or commissions into its calculation of
FLSA Collective Members' overtime rates and unreasonably delayed
the payment of overtime on monthly commissions, which led to
Defendant's failure to pay FLSA Collective Members at a rate at
least 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked
over forty in a work week.
Accordingly, the Court's conditional finding, that FLSA Collective
Members are similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b)
stands.

The Girsh factors demonstrate that the Settlement Agreement
satisfies the fairness requirements for both the State Law Class
Action and the FLSA Collective Action.

The Girsh factors support approval of the settlement. The first
factor, the complexity, expense, and likely duration of
litigation, is neutral.

The second Girsh factor, the reaction of the class to the
settlement, attempts to gauge whether members of the class support
the settlement. Of a combined group of 279 State Law Class and
FLSA Collective Members who received notice of the settlement,
none have objected or submitted requests for exclusion.
Therefore, this factor favors approval.

The third factor requires the Court to consider the stage of
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. Courts must
determine whether counsel had an adequate appreciation of the
merits of the case before negotiating.

The fourth and fifth Girsh factors consider the risk of
establishing liability and damages at trial and weigh the
likelihood of success against the benefits of an immediate
settlement.  Plaintiffs assert that trying this case would involve
significant risks to Class Members because of the fact-intensive
nature of proving liability under both the FLSA and Pennsylvania's
wage and hour laws. Therefore, the fourth and fifth factors weigh
moderately in favor of approving the settlement.

The likelihood of maintaining class certification if the action
were to proceed to trial, the sixth Girsh factor, weighs in favor
of approval but deserves only minimal consideration. There will
always be a risk or possibility of decertification, and
consequently the court can always claim this factor weighs in
favor of settlement.  As such, in a settlement class, this factor
becomes essentially toothless.

The seventh Girsh factor, Defendant's ability to withstand a
greater judgment, is neutral. Plaintiffs cite to a single online
news article from over a year ago discussing company restructuring
and layoffs by Defendant. However, Plaintiffs cite no other
evidence of Defendant's financial instability, and an isolated
article hardly demonstrates that Defendant cannot support a
greater judgment.

The eighth and ninth factors, the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery and the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of all the
attendant risks of litigation, ask the Court to consider whether
the settlement represents a good value for a weak case or a poor
value for a strong case.

The Girsh factors on the whole militate in favor of the Settlement
Agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds the terms to be fair,
reasonable, and adequate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) and fair
and reasonable under the FLSA.

Therefore, the Settlement Agreement meets all the requirements for
approval of a state law class action under Rule 23 and a FLSA
collective action, and this Court grants final approval.

The requested service awards are appropriate in this case.

The Plaintiffs request that the named Plaintiffs receive an
additional incentive award of between $1,000 and $2,500 each:
$2,500 to Class Representatives Ryan Fein, Anthony Rizzello, and
Chris Salmieri, and $1,000 to the remaining named Plaintiffs.
The Class Representatives and named Plaintiffs have participated
actively in this litigation: they provided documents to class
counsel, provided information concerning their experiences and
Defendant's practices, supplied testimony and documents critical
to investigation of the Class Members' claims, and made themselves
available for the mediation. This involvement and personal risk
justifies the awards which Plaintiffs seek.

The requested attorneys' fees are appropriate in this case.
Plaintiffs seek $456,390.00 in attorneys' fees, equal to
approximately 33% of the Settlement Fund, as well as $5,557.73 in
litigation costs and expenses.

A district court should consider seven factors when analyzing a
fee award in a common fund case: (1) the size of the fund created
and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence
of substantial objections by members of the class to the
settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill
and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and
duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the
amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7)
the awards in similar cases.

With respect to the first factor, the size of the fund created and
number of people benefitted, as a general rule, as the size of a
fund increases, the appropriate percentage to be awarded to
counsel decreases. Here, counsel's efforts led to a fund of
$1,383,000.00 for the benefit of 279 people.

Second, the Court considers the presence or absence of objections
to the fees requested. As discussed above, no potential Class
Members have objected to the Settlement Agreement or the requested
attorneys' fees and expenses. This factor favors approval of the
fees as requested.

With respect to the third factor, the skill and efficiency of the
attorneys, class counsel has substantial experience litigating
class and collective action employment disputes.  Additionally,
the single clearest factor reflecting the quality of class
counsels' services to the class are the results obtained. Counsel
have obtained a sizeable recovery for the class/collective on a
comparatively short timeline. Such skill merits the award of fees
requested.

The fourth factor considers the complexity and duration of the
litigation. The litigation began over a year and a half ago in
February 2016. Although the parties have reached settlement before
filing any dispositive motions, class counsel had to analyze the
wage and hour data of 279 people, which involved complicated and
time-consuming calculations of damages.
A percentage award of 33% appropriately compensates these efforts.

The Court compares the requested award with awards in similar
cases. In this Circuit, the percentage of the recovery award in
FLSA common fund cases ranges from roughly 20-45%. Class counsel
thus seeks a middle-of-the-road figure as compensation; in fact,
courts often find a benchmark of one-third of the settlement fund
appropriate.

This last factor weighs heavily in favor of approving the award.
Therefore, this Court grants the attorneys' fees and costs as
requested.

The Court certifies the State Law Class and FLSA Collective and
approves the terms of the class/collective action Settlement
Agreement as fair and reasonable.

The Court approves incentive awards in the amount of $2,500 to
Class Representatives Ryan Fein, Anthony Rizzello, and Chris
Salmieri, and $1,000 to the remaining named Plaintiffs.

The Court approves $456,390.00 in attorneys' fees and $5,557.73 in
litigation costs and expenses to be paid to class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8dfc8ymfrom
Leagle.com.

RYAN FEIN, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY, JR. -
- MURPHY@PHILLYEMPLOYMENTLAWYER.COM -- MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC.
RYAN FEIN, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

ANTHONY RIZZELLO, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH --
MURPHY@PHILLYEMPLOYMENTLAWYER.COM -- MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.
CHRISTOPHER SALMIERI, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

JOSHUA BERLIN, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.
SHAWN BISHOP, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.
RYAN FITZPATRIK, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

FRANCIS IANNOTTA, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

JI KIM, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY, JR.,
MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

MARC LANGLEY, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.
CHRISTOPHER MEEKER, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

JASON NEWCOMER, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

JOHN SHALLOW, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

DAVID BARON, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

ARNOLD DAVENPORT, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Defendant, represented by FLORA MANSHIP --
FManship@kilpatricktownsend.com -- KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON
LLP, JAMES H. COIL, III -- Jcoil@kilpatricktownsend.com --
KILPATRICK STOCKTON, JOHN W. ALDEN --
Jalden@kilpatricktownsend.com -- KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP & EDWARD
J. EASTERLY -- eeasterly@nmmlaw.com -- NORRIS MCLAUGHLIN & MARCUS
PA.


DUN & BRADSTREET: Portion of O&R Case Settlement Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, O&R Construction, LLC v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility
Corporation et al., Case No. 2:12-cv-02184 (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Thomas S Zilly denied, without prejudice, on October 13, 2017, the
deferred portion of plaintiffs' Third Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement.

The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the settlement in the
case, O&R Construction, LLC v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp.,
et al., No. 2:12 CV 02184 (TSZ) (W.D. Wash.), remains pending.

On December 13, 2012, plaintiff O&R Construction LLC filed a
putative class action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington against the Company and DBCC. In
May 2015, the Company acquired the parent company of DBCC,
Credibility. The complaint alleged, among other things, that
defendants violated the antitrust laws, used deceptive marketing
practices to sell the CreditBuilder credit monitoring products and
allegedly misrepresented the nature, need and value of the
products. The plaintiff purports to sue on behalf of a putative
class of purchasers of CreditBuilder and seeks recovery of damages
and equitable relief.

DBCC was served with the complaint on December 14, 2012. The
Company was served with the complaint on December 17, 2012. On
February 18, 2013, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the
complaint. On April 5, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint
in lieu of responding to the motion. The amended complaint dropped
the antitrust claims and retained the deceptive practices
allegations. The defendants filed new motions to dismiss the
amended complaint on May 3, 2013.

On August 23, 2013, the Court heard the motions and denied DBCC's
motion but granted the Company's motion. Specifically, the Court
dismissed the contract claim against the Company with prejudice,
and dismissed all the remaining claims against the Company without
prejudice. On September 23, 2013, plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint ("SAC"). The SAC alleges claims for negligence,
defamation and unfair business practices under Washington state
law against the Company for alleged inaccuracies in small business
credit reports.

The SAC also alleges liability against the Company under a joint
venture or agency theory for practices relating to
CreditBuilder(R). As against DBCC, the SAC alleges claims for
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, unfair and
deceptive acts, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. DBCC
filed a motion to dismiss the claims that were based on a joint
venture or agency liability theory. The Company filed a motion to
dismiss the SAC.

On January 9, 2014, the Court heard argument on the defendants'
motions. It dismissed with prejudice the claims against the
defendants based on a joint venture or agency liability theory.
The Court denied the Company's motion with respect to the
negligence, defamation and unfair practices claims. On January 23,
2014, the defendants answered the SAC. At a court conference on
December 17, 2014, plaintiff informed the Court that it would not
be seeking to certify a nationwide class, but instead limit the
class to CreditBuilder purchasers in Washington. On May 29, 2015,
plaintiff filed motions for class certification against the
Company and DBCC. On July 29, 2015, Defendants filed oppositions
to the motions for class certification.

On September 16, 2015, plaintiff filed reply briefs in support of
the motions for class certification. At the request of the
parties, on October 30, 2015, the Court entered an order striking
plaintiff's class certification motions without prejudice and
striking all upcoming deadlines while the parties negotiated a
written settlement agreement. On February 11, 2016, the parties
entered into a written settlement term sheet, and on May 16, 2016
the parties executed a settlement agreement, which was subject to
Court approval. On May 17, 2016, plaintiff filed an Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement.

On August 9, 2016, the Court denied plaintiff's motion without
prejudice and directed the parties to file either a renewed motion
for preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report. On October 14, 2016, the parties entered into an
amended settlement agreement, which amended some of the non-
monetary terms of the agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed
with the Court the amended settlement agreement together with an
unopposed renewed motion for preliminary approval of the amended
settlement.

On December 22, 2016, the Court denied plaintiff's renewed motion
and directed the parties to file either a renewed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report within 70 days.

On March 2, 2017, the parties entered into a second amended
settlement agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed the second
amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed renewed
motion for preliminary approval of the second amended settlement.
On May 5, 2017, the Court preliminarily certified the class for
settlement and approved the settlement, including the settlement
amount, subject to certain changes to the settlement's notice and
administration provisions. Plaintiffs were provided until June 2,
2017 to file supplemental papers addressing the notice and
administration issues the Court identified. Subsequently, the
parties requested extensions of the deadline for filing
supplemental papers in order to re-run and re-check data sets that
will be used to provide notice to the class and distribute the
settlement funds to class members.

Because plaintiffs' counsel raised additional questions and
concerns, on July 19, 2017, the parties requested an additional
extension from the Court in order to address the issues presented,
including modifications, if necessary, to the settlement
agreement. At the parties' request, the Court extended the
deadline for filing supplemental papers to August 25, 2017.

                Accord in Die-Mension Suit Pending

Dun & Bradstreet also said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the settlement in the case, Die-Mension
Corporation v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp. et al., No.
2:14-cv-00855 (TSZ) (W.D. Wash.) (filed as No. 1:14-cv-392 (N.D.
Oh.)), remains pending.

On February 20, 2014, plaintiff Die-Mension Corporation ("Die-
Mension") filed a putative class action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the
Company and DBCC, purporting to sue on behalf of a putative class
of all purchasers of a CreditBuilder product in the United States
or in such state(s) as the Court may certify. The complaint
alleged that DBCC used deceptive marketing practices to sell the
CreditBuilder credit monitoring products. As against the Company,
the complaint alleged a violation of Ohio's Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"), defamation, and negligence. As against
DBCC, the complaint alleged violations of the DTPA, negligent
misrepresentation and concealment.

On March 4, 2014, in response to a direction from the Ohio court,
Die-Mension withdrew its original complaint and filed an amended
complaint. The amended complaint contains the same substantive
allegations as the original complaint, but limits the purported
class to small businesses in Ohio that purchased the CreditBuilder
product.

On March 12, 2014, DBCC agreed to waive service of the amended
complaint and on March 13, 2014, the Company agreed to waive
service. On May 5, 2014, the Company and DBCC filed a Joint Motion
to Transfer the litigation to the Western District of Washington.
On June 9, 2014, the Ohio court issued an order granting the
Defendants' Joint Motion to Transfer. On June 22, 2014, the case
was transferred to the Western District of Washington. Pursuant to
an order entered on December 17, 2014 by the Washington court,
this case was coordinated for pre-trial discovery purposes with
related cases transferred to the Western District of Washington.
On January 6, 2015, the Court entered a stipulation and order
setting forth the case management schedule.

On January 15, 2015, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the
amended complaint. In response, Die-Mension filed a second amended
complaint on March 13, 2015. On April 3, 2015, Defendants filed
motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, and on May 22,
2015, Die-Mension filed its oppositions to the motions. Defendants
filed reply briefs on June 12, 2015. On July 17, 2015, Die-Mension
filed motions for class certification against the Company and
DBCC. On September 9, 2015, the Washington court entered an order
denying the Company's motion to dismiss, and on September 10,
2015, it entered an order granting DBCC's motion to dismiss
without prejudice. At the request of the parties, on October 30,
2015, the Court entered an order striking plaintiff's class
certification motions without prejudice and striking all upcoming
deadlines while the parties negotiated a written settlement
agreement.

On February 11, 2016, the parties entered into a written
settlement term sheet, and on May 16, 2016, the parties executed a
settlement agreement, which was subject to Court approval. On May
17, 2016, plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Class Action Settlement. On August 9, 2016, the
Court denied plaintiff's motion without prejudice and directed the
parties to file either a renewed motion for preliminary approval
of the class action settlement or a joint status report.

On October 14, 2016, the parties entered into an amended
settlement agreement, which amended some of the non-monetary terms
of the agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed with the Court
the amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed
renewed motion for preliminary approval of the amended settlement.
On December 22, 2016, the Court denied plaintiff's renewed motion
and directed the parties to file either a renewed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report within 70 days. On March 2, 2017, the parties
entered into a second amended settlement agreement. On the same
day, plaintiff filed the second amended settlement agreement
together with an unopposed renewed motion for preliminary approval
of the second amended settlement. On May 5, 2017, the Court
preliminarily certified the class for settlement and approved the
settlement, including the settlement amount, subject to certain
changes to the settlement's notice and administration provisions.
Plaintiffs were provided until June 2, 2017 to file supplemental
papers addressing the notice and administration issues the Court
identified. Subsequently, the parties requested extensions of the
deadline for filing supplemental papers in order to re-run and re-
check data sets that will be used to provide notice to the class
and distribute the settlement funds to class members. Because
plaintiffs' counsel raised additional questions and concerns, on
July 19, 2017, the parties requested an additional extension from
the Court in order to address the issues presented, including
modifications, if necessary, to the settlement agreement. At the
parties' request, the Court extended the deadline for filing
supplemental papers to August 25, 2017.

On Sept. 28, 2017, a stipulation and proposed order for withdrawal
and substitution of counsel was filed by the case parties.

                  Accord in Vinotemp Suit Pending

Dun & Bradstreet also said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the settlement in the case, Vinotemp
International Corporation and CPrint(R), Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet
Credibility Corp., et al., No. 2:14-cv-01021 (TSZ) (W.D. Wash.)
(filed as No. 8:14-cv-00451 (C.D. Cal.)), remains pending.

On March 24, 2014, plaintiffs Vinotemp International Corporation
("Vinotemp") and CPrint(R), Inc. ("CPrint") filed a putative class
action in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California against the Company and DBCC. Vinotemp and
CPrint purport to sue on behalf of all purchasers of DBCC's
CreditBuilder product in the state of California. The complaint
alleges that DBCC used deceptive marketing practices to sell the
CreditBuilder credit monitoring products, in violation of
Sec.17200 and Sec.17500 of the California Business and Professions
Code. The complaint also alleges negligent misrepresentation and
concealment against DBCC. As against the Company, the complaint
alleges that the Company entered false and inaccurate information
on credit reports in violation of Sec.17200 of the California
Business and Professions Code, and also alleges negligence and
defamation claims.

On March 31, 2014, the Company agreed to waive service of the
complaint and on April 2, 2014, DBCC agreed to waive service. On
June 13, 2014, the Company and DBCC filed a Joint Unopposed Motion
to Transfer the litigation to the Western District of Washington.

On July 2, 2014, the California court granted the Defendants'
Joint Motion to Transfer, and on July 8, 2014, the case was
transferred to the Western District of Washington. Pursuant to an
order entered on December 17, 2014 by the Washington court, this
case was coordinated for pre-trial discovery purposes with related
cases transferred to the Western District of Washington.

On January 6, 2015, the Court entered a stipulation and order
setting forth the case management schedule. On January 15, 2015,
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. In response,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 13, 2015.

On April 3, 2015, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended
complaint, and on May 22, 2015, plaintiffs filed their oppositions
to the motions. Defendants filed reply briefs on June 12, 2015. On
July 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed motions for class certification
against the Company and DBCC. On September 9, 2015, the Washington
court entered an order denying the Company's motion to dismiss. At
the request of the parties, on October 30, 2015, the Court entered
an order striking plaintiff's class certification motions and
DBCC's motion to dismiss without prejudice and striking all
upcoming deadlines while the parties negotiated a written
settlement agreement.

On February 11, 2016, the parties entered into a written
settlement term sheet, and on May 16, 2016, the parties executed a
settlement agreement, which was subject to Court approval. On May
17, 2016, plaintiffs filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Class Action Settlement. On August 9, 2016, the
Court denied plaintiffs' motion without prejudice and directed the
parties to file either a renewed motion for preliminary approval
of the class action settlement or a joint status report.

On October 14, 2016, the parties entered into an amended
settlement agreement, which amended some of the non-monetary terms
of the agreement. On the same day, plaintiffs filed with the Court
the amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed
renewed motion for preliminary approval of the amended settlement.
On December 22, 2016, the Court denied plaintiffs' renewed motion
and directed the parties to file either a renewed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report within 70 days.

On March 2, 2017, the parties entered into a second amended
settlement agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed the second
amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed renewed
motion for preliminary approval of the second amended settlement.
On May 5, 2017, the Court preliminarily certified the class for
settlement and approved the settlement, including the settlement
amount, subject to certain changes to the settlement's notice and
administration provisions. Plaintiffs were provided until June 2,
2017 to file supplemental papers addressing the notice and
administration issues the Court identified. Subsequently, the
parties requested extensions of the deadline for filing
supplemental papers in order to re-run and re-check data sets that
will be used to provide notice to the class and distribute the
settlement funds to class members.

Because plaintiffs' counsel raised additional questions and
concerns, on July 19, 2017, the parties requested an additional
extension from the Court in order to address the issues presented,
including modifications, if necessary, to the settlement
agreement. At the parties' request, the Court extended the
deadline for filing supplemental papers to August 25, 2017.

On Sept. 28, 2017, a stipulation and proposed order for withdrawal
and substitution of counsel was filed by the case parties.

               Accord in Flow Sciences Suit Pending

Dun & Bradstreet also said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the settlement in the case, Flow Sciences Inc.
v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., et al., No. 2:14-cv-01404
(TSZ) (W.D. Wash.) (filed as No. 7:14-cv-128 (E.D.N.C.)), remains
pending.

On June 13, 2014, plaintiff Flow Sciences Inc. ("Flow Sciences")
filed a putative class action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina against the Company and
DBCC. Flow Sciences purports to sue on behalf of all purchasers of
DBCC's CreditBuilder product in the state of North Carolina. The
complaint alleges that the Company and DBCC engaged in deceptive
practices in connection with DBCC's sale of the CreditBuilder
credit monitoring products, in violation of North Carolina's
Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 75-1.1 et seq. In
addition, as against the Company, the complaint alleges negligence
and defamation claims. The complaint also alleges negligent
misrepresentation and concealment against DBCC.

On June 18, 2014, DBCC agreed to waive service of the complaint
and on June 26, 2014, the Company agreed to waive service of the
complaint. On August 4, 2014, the Company and DBCC filed a Joint
Unopposed Motion to Transfer the litigation to the Western
District of Washington. On September 8, 2014, the North Carolina
court granted the motion to transfer, and on September 9, 2014,
the case was transferred to the Western District of Washington.
Pursuant to an order entered on December 17, 2014 by the
Washington court, this case was coordinated for pre-trial
discovery purposes with related cases transferred to the Western
District of Washington. On January 6, 2015, the Court entered a
stipulation and order setting forth the case management schedule.
On January 15, 2015, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the
complaint. In response, Flow Sciences filed an amended complaint
on March 13, 2015. On April 3, 2015, Defendants filed motions to
dismiss the amended complaint, and on May 22, 2015, Flow Science
filed its oppositions to the motions. Defendants filed reply
briefs on June 12, 2015.

On July 17, 2015, Flow Sciences filed motions for class
certification against the Company and DBCC. On September 9, 2015,
the Washington court entered an order denying the Company's motion
to dismiss and on October 19, 2015, it entered an order denying
DBCC's motion to dismiss. At the request of the parties, on
October 30, 2015, the Court entered an order striking plaintiff's
class certification motions without prejudice and striking all
upcoming deadlines while the parties negotiated a written
settlement agreement.

On February 11, 2016, the parties entered into a written
settlement term sheet, and on May 16, 2016, the parties executed a
settlement agreement, which was subject to Court approval. On May
17, 2016, plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Class Action Settlement. On August 9, 2016, the
Court denied plaintiff's motion without prejudice and directed the
parties to file either a renewed motion for preliminary approval
of the class action settlement or a joint status report.

On October 14, 2016, the parties entered into an amended
settlement agreement, which amended some of the non-monetary terms
of the agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed with the Court
the amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed
renewed motion for preliminary approval of the amended settlement.
On December 22, 2016, the Court denied plaintiff's renewed motion
and directed the parties to file either a renewed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report within 70 days.

On March 2, 2017, the parties entered into a second amended
settlement agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed the second
amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed renewed
motion for preliminary approval of the second amended settlement.
On May 5, 2017, the Court preliminarily certified the class for
settlement and approved the settlement, including the settlement
amount, subject to certain changes to the settlement's notice and
administration provisions. Plaintiffs were provided until June 2,
2017 to file supplemental papers addressing the notice and
administration issues the Court identified. Subsequently, the
parties requested extensions of the deadline for filing
supplemental papers in order to re-run and re-check data sets that
will be used to provide notice to the class and distribute the
settlement funds to class members.

Because plaintiffs' counsel raised additional questions and
concerns, on July 19, 2017, the parties requested an additional
extension from the Court in order to address the issues presented,
including modifications, if necessary, to the settlement
agreement. At the parties' request, the Court extended the
deadline for filing supplemental papers to August 25, 2017.

On Sept. 28, 2017, a stipulation and proposed order for withdrawal
and substitution of counsel was filed by the case parties.

                  Accord in Altaflo Suit Pending

Dun & Bradstreet said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the settlement in the case, Altaflo, LLC v.
Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., et al., No. 2:14-cv-01288
(TSZ) (W.D. Wash.) (filed as No. 2:14-cv-03961 (D.N.J.)), remains
pending.

On June 20, 2014, plaintiff Altaflo, LLC ("Altaflo") filed a
putative class action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the Company and DBCC. Altaflo
purports to sue on behalf of all purchasers of DBCC's
CreditBuilder product in the state of New Jersey. The complaint
alleges that the Company and DBCC engaged in deceptive practices
in connection with DBCC's sale of the CreditBuilder credit
monitoring products, in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act, N.J. Stat. Sec. 56:8-1 et seq. In addition, as against the
Company, the complaint alleges negligence and defamation claims.
The complaint also alleges negligent misrepresentation and
concealment against DBCC.

On June 26, 2014, the Company agreed to waive service of the
complaint, and on July 2, 2014, DBCC agreed to waive service. On
July 29, 2014, the Company and DBCC filed a Joint Unopposed Motion
to Transfer the litigation to the Western District of Washington.
On July 31, 2014, the New Jersey court granted the Defendants'
Joint Motion to Transfer, and the case was transferred to the
Western District of Washington on August 20, 2014. Pursuant to an
order entered on December 17, 2014 by the Washington court, this
case was coordinated for pre-trial discovery purposes with related
cases transferred to the Western District of Washington.

On January 6, 2015, the Court entered a stipulation and order
setting forth the case management schedule. On January 15, 2015,
Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. In response,
Altaflo filed an amended complaint on March 13, 2015. On April 3,
2015, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint,
and on May 22, 2015, Altaflo filed its oppositions to the motions.
Defendants filed reply briefs on June 12, 2015. On July 17, 2015,
Altaflo filed motions for class certification against the Company
and DBCC. On September 9, 2015, the Washington court entered an
order denying the Company's motion to dismiss, and on October 19,
2015, it entered an order granting DBCC's motion to dismiss
without prejudice.

At the request of the parties, on October 30, 2015, the Court
entered an order striking plaintiff's class certification motions
without prejudice and striking all upcoming deadlines while the
parties negotiated a written settlement agreement. On February 11,
2016, the parties entered into a written settlement term sheet,
and on May 16, 2016, the parties executed a settlement agreement,
which was subject to Court approval.

On May 17, 2016, plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement. On August 9,
2016, the Court denied plaintiff's motion without prejudice and
directed the parties to file either a renewed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement or a joint
status report. On October 14, 2016, the parties entered into an
amended settlement agreement, which amended some of the non-
monetary terms of the agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed
with the Court the amended settlement agreement together with an
unopposed renewed motion for preliminary approval of the amended
settlement. On December 22, 2016, the Court denied plaintiff's
renewed motion and directed the parties to file either a renewed
motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement or
a joint status report within 70 days.

On March 2, 2017, the parties entered into a second amended
settlement agreement. On the same day, plaintiff filed the second
amended settlement agreement together with an unopposed renewed
motion for preliminary approval of the second amended settlement.
On May 5, 2017, the Court preliminarily certified the class for
settlement and approved the settlement, including the settlement
amount, subject to certain changes to the settlement's notice and
administration provisions. Plaintiffs were provided until June 2,
2017 to file supplemental papers addressing the notice and
administration issues the Court identified. Subsequently, the
parties requested extensions of the deadline for filing
supplemental papers in order to re-run and re-check data sets that
will be used to provide notice to the class and distribute the
settlement funds to class members.

Because plaintiffs' counsel raised additional questions and
concerns, on July 19, 2017, the parties requested an additional
extension from the Court in order to address the issues presented,
including modifications, if necessary, to the settlement
agreement. At the parties' request, the Court extended the
deadline for filing supplemental papers to August 25, 2017.

On Sept. 28, 2017, a stipulation and proposed order for withdrawal
and substitution of counsel was filed by the case parties.


DUN & BRADSTREET: Appeal Related to "Thomas" Case Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the appeal in the case,
Jeffrey A. Thomas v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., No. 2:15
cv 03194-BRO-GJS (C.D. Cal.), has been dismissed.

On April 28, 2015, Jeffrey A. Thomas ("Plaintiff") filed suit
against DBCC in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. The complaint alleges that DBCC violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") (47 U.S.C. Sec.
227) because it placed telephone calls to Plaintiff's cell phone
using an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS"). The TCPA
generally prohibits the use of an ATDS to place a call to a cell
phone for non-emergency purposes and without the prior express
written consent of the called party. The TCPA provides for
statutory damages of $500 per violation, which may be trebled to
$1,500 per violation at the discretion of the court if the
plaintiff proves the defendant willfully violated the TCPA.
Plaintiff sought to represent a class of similarly situated
individuals who received calls on their cell phones from an ATDS.
DBCC was served with a copy of the summons and complaint on April
30, 2015.

On May 22, 2015, the Company made a statutory offer of judgment.
Plaintiff did not respond to the offer. DBCC filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on June 12, 2015, which the Court denied on
August 5, 2015. DBCC filed an Answer and asserted its Affirmative
Defenses on November 12, 2015. Discovery commenced and the Court
issued a schedule for amended pleadings, discovery, the filing of
any class certification motion and trial.

During the discovery period, the parties agreed to attempt to
settle the dispute through mediation. On June 2, 2016, the parties
conducted one day of mediation, and shortly after the mediation,
the parties reached an agreement to settle the dispute on a class-
wide basis. Since that time the parties have finalized a written
settlement agreement and all attendant documents.

The Court granted preliminary approval of the class action
settlement on September 26, 2016 and, entered an Order
conditionally certifying a settlement class, approving the class
action settlement and approving the parties' plan to give notice
to class members.

After the close of the claims period, on February 17, 2017,
Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion seeking final approval of the
class action settlement. On March 20, 2017, the parties appeared
before the Court for a hearing on Plaintiff's motion for final
approval. Shortly after the hearing, on March 22, 2017, the Court
entered an Order granting Plaintiff's motion for final approval of
the class action settlement.

On March 29, 2017, the Court entered a Final Judgement Order by
which it dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs,
except as provided for in the Court's Final Approval Order, and
terminated the case from the Court's docket.

On April 11, 2017, a class member filed a Notice of Appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the
District Court's Orders that granted final approval, awarded
counsel's fees and entered a final judgment in the case.

On April 21, 2017, the class member filed a motion to voluntarily
dismiss its appeal. The Ninth Circuit granted the class member's
motion on May 1, 2017 thereby terminating the proceedings in the
appellate court. The appeals deadline has passed. The District
Court's Final Judgment Order is effective and there are no further
Court-mandated deadlines or proceedings at this time.

In accordance with ASC 450, a reserve was previously accrued by
the Company for this matter in the consolidated financial
statements during the second quarter of 2016. This matter was
resolved and a settlement payment was made during the second
quarter of 2017 consistent with the amount accrued.


E&M ASSOCIATES: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Approval of a Collective
Action in the case captioned USVALDO CONTRERA et al., Plaintiffs,
v. IRVING LANGER et al., Defendants, No. 16 Civ. 3851 (LTS) (GWG)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs move to have this case conditionally approved as a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) with
notice being sent to all of Defendants' current and former
superintendents, porters, and handymen.

The amended complaint alleges that plaintiffs were not paid
minimum wage and overtime wage rates required by the FLSA. More
specifically, plaintiffs claim that superintendents employed by
defendants had to work an average of eighty (80) hours per week
and to be on-call at all hours of the day and night, but that
defendants failed to pay Superintendents for any hours that they
worked in excess of forty each week. Plaintiffs claim that porters
and handymen employed by defendants were also not paid for any
hours they worked beyond 40.

The amended complaint alleges that Langer, Lederman, Ginzberg, and
Brecher exercised sufficient control over the E&M Enterprise's
operations to be considered Plaintiffs' employers under the FLSA
It further alleges that the corporate entities named as defendants
are vertically integrated and function as a single enterprise with
unified management and personnel policies. It claims that all of
the defendants, often acting through E&M Bronx and/or Galil, had
the power to hire and fire, supervised and controlled work
schedules and conditions of employment, determined the rate and
method of paying and maintained employment records.

Plaintiffs define the class of potential opt-in plaintiffs as
superintendents, porters, and handymen currently or previously
employed at the E&M Enterprise's buildings. To support their claim
that defendants all operate as one enterprise, plaintiffs point to
the evidence described above and argue that it demonstrates common
ownership of the E&M Enterprise's constituent entities. They also
argue that this evidence shows that the wage and hour policies
applicable to plaintiffs applied to all of the handymen,
superintendents, and porters employed by defendants.

When there are ambiguities in the papers seeking collective action
status, the court must draw all inferences in favor of the
plaintiff at the preliminary certification stage. Reading all
inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the Court found that they have
met their burden of showing that one or more of the defendants was
their employer, and that these defendants are employers of
superintendents, handymen, and porters at the buildings plaintiffs
have identified.  Defendant Brecher, in a sworn deposition in a
separate case, testified that Galil and E&M are owned by the same
people, and run several hundred buildings principally owned by
Ginzberg, Langer, and Lederman.  As for plaintiffs, Lopez,
Batista, and Reyes each declared that they receive their paychecks
from StaffPro and StaffE&M, notwithstanding the fact that they
worked at many different buildings.

Ginzberg previously testified that many employees of E&M
Associates are officially under StaffPro, even though they really
work for our company apparently referring to E&M. He further
explained that E&M employees officially work for StaffPro. But E&M
is managing the company that makes those decisions to hire and to
fire, and that if someone were fired, StaffPro would then send a
termination letter, but the decision-making comes from E&M.
Memoranda from Staff E&M and Management on StaffPro letterhead
explain the work schedules and overtime policies for employees of
Staff E&M.

This evidence easily meets plaintiffs' modest burden at the
conditional certification stage to demonstrate that one or more of
the defendants commonly own and manage E&M and thus commonly own
or manage all the buildings in the E&M portfolio as well as manage
all the employees of those buildings.

Having established that one or more of the defendants manage or
supervise all the employees of E&M, the next question is whether
plaintiffs have shown that all superintendents, handymen, and
porters employed by the "E&M enterprise" are similarly situated to
plaintiffs with respect to their allegations regarding overtime
and other FLSA violations.

Plaintiffs here make both kinds of arguments. With respect to
their top-down arguments, plaintiffs have not shown that the
owners, managers, or operators of the E&M Enterprise had
instituted a citywide practice or policy of not paying its
superintendents, porters, or handymen overtime. In fact, some of
their documentary evidence suggests the opposite. The memoranda
from Staff E&M generally forbid employees from working greater
than 40 hours per week or 9-1/2 hours per day, and required that
employees record and submit their time worked on timesheets. The
other documents attached to plaintiffs' declarations do not
indicate that a uniform policy or practice across the E&M
Enterprise of violating labor laws existed. The plaintiffs supply
no other evidence as to policies or practices instituted by the
management levels of the E&M Enterprise regarding non-payment of
overtime or any of the other violations challenged here.

Superintendents

Contrera, Lopez, and Batista all declare that they worked as
superintendents at 655 or 638 West 160th Street, performed
substantially similar tasks, and were paid a flat salary despite
working well over 40 hours per week. They were issued
identification cards that read E&M Associates LLC or Galil
Management LLC. They each were supervised by Effi, Ephraim Weiss.
They each reported to the same office at 975 Walton Avenue in the
Bronx to receive their paychecks and to attend meetings led by
Weiss regarding their work responsibilities.  Contrera and Lopez
said they would have conversations at the 975 Walton Avenue office
with other superintendents from the Bronx and Upper Manhattan who
went there to pick up their pay checks, and who also complained
about the large number of hours they worked, the low pay, and the
lack of overtime pay.

The fact that these individuals were employed at the same two
buildings, worked for the same supervisor, regularly visited the
same management office operating under the same corporate name,
and were denied overtime wages despite working over 40 hours per
week, easily allows the inference that there was a policy or
practice at these two buildings of not paying overtime.

The Court said it is sympathetic to plaintiffs' argument that they
may be entitled to certain inferences because specific information
about the E&M Enterprise's multi-entity corporate structure is
uniquely within Defendants' knowledge and defendants have declined
to provide a full explanation of the ownership of their buildings.
The Court has therefore already accepted plaintiffs' argument that
one or more of the defendants may be deemed the employer of all
employees of the buildings owned by E&M. However, even where
businesses have common ownership, an FLSA plaintiff still must
make a showing that employees at all locations were subject to the
same illegal policies before a class may be approved consisting of
all employees at all locations.

Accordingly, the Court will authorize notice to all
superintendents who were supervised or managed by agents of the
defendants who operated out of 975 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York.

Porters

Unlike the superintendent plaintiffs, Herrera does not allege that
he had any conversations with other porters about their pay or
their work schedule, or ever had to visit the 975 Walton Avenue,
Bronx, office. Rather, Herrera claims that he worked with Contrera
at 655 West 160th Street and occasionally at 638 West 160th
Street, was supervised by Effi, never received overtime pay
despite working an average of 70 hours per week, and performed
similar tasks to what the superintendents did, such as taking out
garbage, removing mattresses, killing rats, and helping with
repairs.

According to Herrera's declaration, he performed substantially the
same duties as the superintendent plaintiffs, worked at the same
buildings in Upper Manhattan, reported to a supervisor who
supervised superintendents and porters at 975 Walton Avenue in the
Bronx, and was not paid for overtime work despite working well
over 40 hours per week. These allegations are enough to show that
Herrera and other porters were "similarly situated, for purposes
of the FLSA, to the superintendents who were supervised from that
office.

Accordingly, notice is authorized as to all porters who were
supervised or managed by agents of the defendants who operated out
of 975 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York.

Handymen

Two named plaintiffs, Batista and Reyes, worked as handymen for
enterprises called E&M or Galil. They generally worked until 5:30
p.m. Despite working 45 hours per week, they were only ever paid
for eight hours of work per day, 40 hours per week. They each
worked with a team of about 30 handymen.

However, plaintiffs present no evidence concerning any handyman
employed by defendants outside of the Bronx or Upper Manhattan.
Thus, the conditional collective action should be limited to those
employees supervised by the E&M office at 975 Walton Avenue in the
Bronx.

Accordingly, notice is authorized as to all handymen who were
supervised or managed by agents of the defendants who operated out
of 975 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York.

Form of Notice

Plaintiffs include a proposed notice with their motion papers, see
Proposed Notice, but it now must be revised both to reflect new
claims in the amended complaint and the rulings in this Opinion.
Accordingly, the Court directs the parties to discuss the proposed
notice and to bring any disputes to the Court's attention by
letter as promptly as possible. The one dispute that can be
addressed now is the question of whether notice should be provided
to individuals who worked for defendants within the last three
year -- the maximum limitations period under the Fair Labor
Standards Act -- as defendants propose, or whether it should be
given to individuals who worked for defendants within the last six
years the limitations period for claims under the New York Labor
Law.

In the present case, the Court believes that "the three-year
period more effectively serves the goal of efficiency and will
avoid confusing individuals whose claims arise only under the
NYLL.

Tolling

Plaintiffs' motion in this case centers on the notice that
plaintiffs seek to have sent to current and former employees of
defendants. But plaintiffs also request that the Court rule that
the statute of limitations be tolled for opt-in plaintiffs from
the date of the filing of the complaint or, at the latest, the
date the instant motion was filed.

Law Governing Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the conditions for
applying the doctrine are strict. Generally, a litigant seeking
equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements:
(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.

Here, plaintiffs have failed to establish the first prong of the
equitable tolling doctrine. Plaintiffs provide no facts or even
arguments regarding existing or potential opt-in plaintiffs that
reflect that these employees of the defendants have been pursuing
their rights diligently.

The plaintiffs on whose behalf equitable tolling is being sought
have not been identified. Although plaintiffs conclusorily allege
that many of the potential collective members do not speak English
and may be unaware of their rights under the FLSA no specific
information has been provided about any particular opt-in
plaintiff's circumstances. Thus, this Court cannot assess whether
any potential opt-in plaintiff has diligently pursued his or her
rights.

In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that there is a realistic
possibility that any individuals whose employment fell outside the
limitations period will be able to demonstrate equitable tolling.
Plaintiffs briefly note that potential opt-in plaintiffs are
likely unaware of their rights under the FLSA, and that this
ignorance is exacerbated by the possibility that many may not
speak English. However, in the cases cite by plaintiffs, the
courts pointed to factual circumstances in addition to the
plaintiff's own lack of knowledge or language facility This is
consistent with case law holding that ignorance of the law and
language barriers are normally insufficient to permit equitable
tolling.  Assuming arguendo that an employer's failure to post a
statutorily required notice might justify equitable tolling, no
such failure has been shown here.

In sum, because plaintiffs have not shown a realistic possibility
that employees whose employment ended outside the limitations
period will be able to demonstrate equitable tolling, notice will
be sent only to individuals who were last employed by defendants
within three years prior to the date the notices are mailed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybh5amkqfrom
Leagle.com.

Usvaldo Contrera, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Robert
Travis, Christopher R. Travis, Esq, Travis Law PLLC, 80 Maiden
Lane, Suite 2430, New York, NY, 10038

Usvaldo Contrera, Plaintiff, represented by Meredith Reade Miller,
Miller Law, PLLC, 135 Madison Ave, 8th Floor, New York, NY, 10016,
Marc Andrew Rapaport -- mrapaport@rapaportlaw.com -- Rapaport Law
Firm, PLLC.

Francisco Lopez, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Robert
Travis, Christopher R. Travis, Esq, Meredith Reade Miller, Miller
Law, PLLC & Marc Andrew Rapaport, Rapaport Law Firm, PLLC.
Pedro Batista, Plaintiff, represented by Meredith Reade Miller,
Miller Law, PLLC.

Fabian Herrera, Plaintiff, represented by Meredith Reade Miller,
Miller Law, PLLC.

Antonio Reyes, Plaintiff, represented by Meredith Reade Miller,
Miller Law, PLLC.

Ramon Medina, Plaintiff, represented by Marc Andrew Rapaport,
Rapaport Law Firm, PLLC.

Irving Langer, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael Martinez --
lmartinez@meltzerlippe.com  -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP, Christopher Paul Hampton --
champton@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP, Gerald Charles Waters -- gwaters@meltzerlippe.com
-- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Jonathan D.
Farrell, Meltzer -- jfarrell@meltzerlippe.com  -- Lippe, Goldstein
& Breitstone, LLP, Loretta Mae Gastwirth --
lgastwirth@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP & Robert R. Barravecchio --
rbarravecchio@meltzerlippe.com  -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP.

Leibel Lederman, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael Martinez,
Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher Paul
Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

Aryeh Z. Ginzberg, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

Meyer Brecher, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael Martinez,
Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher Paul
Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

E&M Bronx Associates LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

E&M Associates LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

E&M Harlem Holdings LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

E&M Harlem Equities LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.

E&M Lafayette Portfolio LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry
Rafael Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Christopher Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP, Gerald Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP, Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP, Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein
& Breitstone, LLP & Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe,
Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP.

E&M Lafayette Owner LLC, Defendant, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Christopher
Paul Hampton, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Gerald
Charles Waters, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Jonathan D. Farrell, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP,
Loretta Mae Gastwirth, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP
& Robert R. Barravecchio, Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone,
LLP.


ECOLAB INC: "Miner" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DOUG MINER, an individual, on behalf of
himself and other persons similarly situated; MOES 1 through
10,000, the Plaintiff, v. ECOLAB INC., a Delaware corporation; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
02313-FMO-JC (C.D. Cal.), Mr. Doug Miner will move the Court for
an order to certify a class pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act:

   "all current and former employees of Ecolab who are/were non-
   exempt, who have worked nationwide for Ecolab at any time
   between March 24 2014 and the trial of this action (the
   "Collective Period"), who were paid pursuant to a compensation
   structure that provided for an overtime rate that decreased as
   the worker's hours increased and, as a result, have not
   received full and correct pay for all hours worked."

The Plaintiff also seeks an order to immediately provide notice to
the FLSA Collective Action Class, consistent with the FLSA and
well-settled case law.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=g6kSq2HH

Attorneys for Plaintiff DOUG MINER and Putative Class:

          Alejandro P. Gutierrez, Esq.
          HATHAWAY, PERRETT, WEBSTER, POWERS,
          CHRISMAN & GUTIERREZ, APC
          5450 Telegraph Road, Suite 200
          Ventura, CA 93006-3577
          Telephone: (805) 644 7111
          Facsimile: (805) 644 8296
          E-mail: agutierrez@hathawaylawfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Palay, Esq.
          Brian D. Hefelfinger, Esq.
          PALAY HEFELFINGER, APC
          1484 E. Main Street, Suite 105-B
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 628 8220
          Facsimile: (805) 765 8600
          E-mail: djp@calemploymentcounsel.com
                  bdh@calemploymentcounsel.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Strauss, Esq.
          Aris E. Karakalos, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          121 North Fir Street, Suite F
          Ventura, CA 93001
          Telephone: (805) 641 6600
          Facsimile: (805) 641 6607
          E-mail: mike@strausslawyers.com
                  aris@strausslawyers.com

Attorneys for Defendant ECOLAB INC.

          Jody A. Landry, Esq.
          John A. Ybarra, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          501 W. Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101 3577
          Telephone: (619) 232 0441
          Facsimile: (619) 232 4302
          E-mail: jlandry@littler.com
                  jybarra@littler.com


EDUCATIONAL FIN'L: Dec. 6 Case Mngt Conference in "Cabiness"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order approving Parties' Stipulation to
Continue the Case Management Conference and Other Deadlines in the
case captioned WINIFRED CABINESS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EDUCATIONAL FINANCIAL
SOLUTIONS, LLC DBA CAMPUS DEBT SOLUTIONS, Defendant, Case No.
3:16-cv-1109-JST (N.D. Cal.).

The Parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding at mediation to
resolve this matter based on an agreed upon estimated class size
to be confirmed, with room for error of up to 15%.

The Parties are still working to finalize the resolution of this
matter to conclude their settlement; particularly involving the
process to address whether the actual class size is within the
estimated class size range agreed to by the Parties.

Plaintiff maintains that an individual Plaintiff seeks to
designate as an expert has calculated the size of the class based
upon extensive call records provided by Defendant and asserts it
is approximately 35% larger than the high end of the allowed class
size.

Defendant contends that it had obtained prior express written
consent to call approximately 25% the unique cellular telephone
numbers set forth in the call records provided and contends that
the class size is within the agreed upon estimate class size
range.

The parties agreed, and the Court approves, for the Court to
vacate the current deadlines for Plaintiff to file a Motion for
Preliminary Approval.

The October 11, 2017 case management conference is continued to
December 6, 2017 at 2:00 p.m.

An updated joint case management statement is due by November 27,
2017.4. The case management conference will be vacated if a motion
for preliminary approval of settlement is filed by November 27,
2017.

The parties should anticipate that if the December 6, 2017 case
management conference goes forward, the Court will set new
deadlines for the filing of a motion for class certification that
will not be subject to further continuance.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y77ssna8from Leagle.com.

Winifred Cabiness, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan Kemnitzer,
Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg, LLP, 445 Bush St., Fl 6, San Francisco,
CA 94108

Winifred Cabiness, Plaintiff, represented by Sharon Djemal --
sdjemal@ebclc.org -- East Bay Community Law Center, Elliot Jason
Conn -- elliot@kbklegal.com -- Kemnitzer, Barron & Krieg, LLP &
Kristin A. Kemnitzer -- kristin@kbklegal.com -- Kemnitzer, Barron
& Krieg, LLP.

Educational Financial Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by
James Harold Vorhis, Nossaman LLP, Beth-Ann Ellenberg Krimsky,
Greenspoon Marder, PA, pro hac vice & Jessica Brooke Alhalel,
Greenspoon Marder, PA, pro hac vice.


EGS FINANCIAL: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Nolet"
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LORALIE NOLET, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. EGS FINANCIAL
CARE INC. and SYNCHRONY BANK, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01476 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an
certifying proposed classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff
as class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court
may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jmGLHUf6

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


EPIC RESTAURANT: Court Certifies Settlement Class in "Magee" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RICHARD MAGEE, ANDREW CAROFANO, and AMANDA
FLETCHER, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. EPIC RESTAURANT GROUP, INC., a Florida corporation,
d/b/a OCEANS 234 f/k/a MAXWELL'S BY THE SEA, INC. d/b/a OCEANS 234
and DANIELLE ROSSE f/k/a DANIELLE WILLIAMS, an individual, the
Defendants, Case No. 0:17-cv-60646-WPD (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge
William P. Dimitrouleas entered an order:

   1. certifying a settlement class consisting of:

      "all servers and bartenders who worked for Epic Restaurant
      Group, Inc. d/b/a Oceans 234 located in Deerfield Beach,
      Florida at any time from February 1, 2013 to December 31,
      2016 and who were paid the subminimum wage applicable to
      tipped employees";

   2. appointing Bober & Bober, P.A. as Class Counsel for the
      Settlement Class;

   3. approving form and content of the Notice of Settlement;

   4. appointing Dahl Administration LLC as Settlement Claims
      Administrator; and

   5. scheduling final approval hearing to be held on Friday,
      February 23, 2018 at 10:30 a.m.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=hBUHem4N

A copy of the Plaintiffs' Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=nfyK7VOd

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Samara Robbins Bober, Esq.
          Peter J. Bober, Esq.
          SAMARA ROBBINS BOBER
          BOBER & BOBER, P.A.
          1930 Tyler Street
          Hollywood, FL 33020
          Telephone: (954) 922 2298
          Facsimile: (954) 922 5455
          E-mail: peter@boberlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Christopher M. Bentley, Esq.
          JOHNSON JACKSON LLC
          100 N. Tampa St., Ste. 2310
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 580 8400
          Facsimile: (813) 580 8407
          E-mail: kjohnson@johnsonjackson.com
          cbentley@johnsonjackson.com


EQUIFAX INC: "Pierre" Suit Alleges FCRA Violations
--------------------------------------------------
Alvin Pierre, Keisha Dykes, and Cheyra Acklin-Davis, and all
others similarly-situated v. Equifax Inc., and Equifax Information
Services, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-10520 (E.D. La., October 11,
2017), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, the Louisiana Database
Security Breach Notification Law, negligence, negligence per se,
and unjust enrichment.

Plaintiffs Alvin Pierre, Keisha Dykes, and Cheyra Acklin-Davis are
residents of Louisiana and are victims of Equifax' data breach.

Headquartered in Atlanta Georgia, Equifax Inc. is the parent of
company of Equifax Information Services, LLC, and Equifax Consumer
Services LLC. All Defendants are consumer reporting agencies and
nationwide consumer reporting agencies.   Equifax Information
Services, LLC's responsibilities specifically include collection
and reporting of consumer information to financial institutions.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Robert L. Campbell, Esq.
      WILLIAMSON, FONTENOT, CAMPBELL
      & WHITTINGTON, LLC
      955 McClung Street
      P.O. Box 3035
      Baton Rouge, LA 70821
      Tel: (225) 383-4010
      E-mail: robb@lawyerbatonrouge.com

          - and -

      Kevin Sharp, Esq.
      SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
      611 Commerce St., Suite 3100
      Nashville, TN 37203
      Tel: (615) 434-7001
      Fax: (615) 434-7020
      E-mail: ksharp@sanfordheisler.com


FALLS COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MEGAN BETZ and ROBIN BETZ, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
FALLS COLLECTION SERVICE INC. d/b/a FINANCIAL CONTROL SOLUTIONS,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01474 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to enter an order certifying proposed classes in
this case, appointing the Plaintiffs as class representatives, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=6vZUVru0

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


FARMERS INSURANCE: "Tompkins" Class Settlement Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued an Opinion granting Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Final Approval of the Class and Collective Action
Settlement in the case captioned WOODROW TOMPKINS; DAVID AMMON;
GARY BASSLER; ANTHONY DEFRANCESCO; SCOTT MUMLEY; CARLOS NAVARRO;
ADAM WAYCHOFF; JUSTIN ROUNDABUSH; MARK MORRILL; KEVIN HAYNES; and
JEFF ROUNDTREE, individually and for all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant, No. 5:14-cv-
3737 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiffs Woodrow Tompkins, David Ammon, Gary Bassler, Anthony
DeFrancesco, Scott Mumley, Carlos Navarro, and Adam Waychoff filed
a complaint against Farmers alleging that they and other
similarly-situated auto claims representatives and field adjusters
were required by Farmers to perform a variety of tasks, such as
starting up their computers and obtaining work assignments, before
beginning their shifts each day, and that they were not paid for
this work.

Plaintiffs filed their claims as a collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and as a class action under the
laws of Pennsylvania.

The parties have agreed to settle this case for a total of
$775,000.  The combined settlement (including both the FLSA
collective action and the state law class actions) will benefit a
total of 376 persons.  The FLSA collective action incudes 208
Plaintiffs, including the 11 named Plaintiffs plus 197 persons who
returned valid opt-in forms. The class action includes 199 total
members, who are divided into the following six state subclasses:
12 Connecticut residents, 29 Oregon residents, 34 Pennsylvania
residents, 39 Illinois residents, 40 New York residents, and 45
Washington residents.

Plaintiffs propose to divide the total $775,000 settlement amount
as follows:

   -- a $414,211.72 net settlement fund to the FLSA Opt-In
Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class Members;

   -- $48,500.00 to the eleven Named Plaintiffs as Service Awards;

   -- $271,250.00 in attorneys' fees to Class Counsel;

   -- a $26,038.28 cost reimbursement to Class Counsel; and

   -- $15,000.00 to Simpluris for class notice and settlement
administration services.

The Settlement Class Members will receive an average payment of
about $1,100.50.

Here, Plaintiffs' counsel have significant experience in
prosecuting class and collective actions, including multi-state
wage and hour claims and the named Plaintiffs do not appear to
have any interests incompatible with those of the class members.
In sum, the proposed state law classes meet Rule 23(a)'s
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation.

The class also satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).  Here,
there are questions of law and fact common to the class. In view
of Plaintiffs' allegations that Farmers enforced common policies
and procedures that required the class members, all of whom worked
in similar positions, to perform pre-shift work, the Court finds
that these commonalities predominate over any questions affecting
individual class members.  In view of the relatively small amount
recoverable by the individual class members and their relatively
limited financial resources, the superiority element is satisfied
in this case.  Therefore, because the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied, the Court will certify the
settlement class, including each of the six state-law subclasses.

The Court previously approved the notice process proposed by
Plaintiffs.  As described in the declaration provided by Jarrod
Salinas of Simpluris, the claims administrator in this action,
Simpluis followed the approved process.  Accordingly, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs provided sufficient notice under Rule 23.

The terms of the class action settlement are fair, reasonable, and
adequate under Rule 23(e).

Absent a negotiated settlement, this case would have required,
initially, resolution of Farmers' motion for partial judgment on
the pleadings, which sought dismissal of Plaintiffs' wage payment
claims under the laws of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Washington,
as well as Plaintiffs' claims under New York law. Resolution of
this motion would have required analysis of each of these states'
laws, adding to the complexity and duration of the litigation.

The parties have not received any objections and have received
only one request for exclusion from the class, thus indicating
that the class members support the settlement.

The experienced counsel in this case conducted extensive discovery
and a daylong mediation session before reaching settlement.

Farmers has pleaded several defenses, including that its policies
and procedures did not require off-the-clock work and that it had
no reason to know that the class members were performing such
work.  Farmers has filed motion for judgment on the pleadings,
seeking dismissal of several of Plaintiffs' state law claims.

Farmers is a large corporation that likely could withstand a
larger settlement. But in any class action against a large
corporation, the defendant entity is likely to be able to
withstand a more substantial judgment, and, against the weight of
the remaining factors, this fact alone does not undermine the
reasonableness of the settlement.

Here, the typical class member's claim has a maximum value of
$5,586, while, under the settlement agreement, the class members
will receive an average payment of about $1,100, which is about
20% of the maximum claim value.

Although Plaintiffs have cited several cases involving securities
litigation in which courts approved settlements with a lower
percentage of the maximum claim value, Plaintiffs have not pointed
to any cases involving wage-and-hour claims with comparable
percentages of maximum claim value.  Nevertheless, the Court finds
the terms to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Settlement Agreement meets all the requirements for approval
of a FLSA collective action and this Court grants final approval.

The Court approves Plaintiffs' unopposed request for incentive,
fee, and expense awards.  The requested service awards are
appropriate in this case.

Plaintiffs propose that of the eleven class representatives, two
representatives should receive awards of $5,000; five
representatives should receive awards of $4,500; and four
representatives should receive awards of $4,000. The awards that
Plaintiffs request fall within the range of compensation that
courts have approved for individual incentive awards.

In this case, the reputational risk the Named Plaintiffs took by
having their names attached to a class action suit they brought
against their employer particularly justifies an award.
Additionally, the named Plaintiffs have participated actively in
this litigation: they produced and assisted in the review of
documents, spoke with putative class members and encouraged their
cooperation with this case, provided declarations in support of
motions, and assisted with settlement negotiations. This
involvement and personal risk justifies the awards which
Plaintiffs seek.

The requested attorneys' fees and costs are appropriate in this
Plaintiffs seek $271,250 in attorneys' fees, equal to
approximately 35% of the $775,000 Settlement Fund, as well
$26,038.28 in litigation costs and expenses and a separate amount
of $15,000 owed to the Simpluris firm for administering the
settlement.

The Court certifies the state law settlement class, including the
six state law subclasses and approves the terms of the proposed
$775,000.00 settlement as fair and reasonable.

The Court approves payment of $48,500.00 in Enhancement Awards to
Named Plaintiffs Woodrow Tompkins ($5,000.00), Gary Bassler
($5,000.00), David Ammon ($4,500.00), Anthony DeFrancesco
($4,500.00), Scott Mumley ($4,500.00), Carlos Navarro ($4,500.00),
Adam Waychoff ($4,500.00) Justin Roudabush ($4,000.00), Mark
Morrill ($4,000.00), Kevin Haynes ($4,000.00) and Jeff Roundtree
($4,000.00).

The Court approves the requested $271,250.00 attorneys' fee, the
proposed $26,038.28 cost reimbursement, and the requested
$15,000.00 settlement administration cost.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8u2mbrbfrom
Leagle.com.

WOODROW TOMPKINS, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO --
aficzko@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

WOODROW TOMPKINS, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. COHEN,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M. EPSTEIN --
emepstein@aol.com -- JAMES B. ZOURAS -- jzouras@stephanzouras.com
-- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK -- josh@thiermanbuck.com --
THIERMAN BUCK LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F.
STEPHAN -- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.
DAVID AMMON, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO, STEPHAN
ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M. EPSTEIN,
JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK, THIERMAN BUCK
LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP

GARY BASSLER, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO, STEPHAN
ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M. EPSTEIN,
JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK, THIERMAN BUCK
LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

ANTHONY DEFRANCESCO, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M.
EPSTEIN, JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK,
THIERMAN BUCK LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F.
STEPHAN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

SCOTT MUMLEY, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO, STEPHAN
ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M. EPSTEIN,
JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK, THIERMAN BUCK
LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

CARLOS NAVARRO, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M.
EPSTEIN, JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK,
THIERMAN BUCK LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F.
STEPHAN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

ADAM WAYCHOFF, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW C. FICZKO, STEPHAN
ZOURAS LLP, DAVID J. COHEN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, ERIC M. EPSTEIN,
JAMES B. ZOURAS, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JOSHUA D. BUCK, THIERMAN BUCK
LLP, MARK R. THIERMAN, THIERMAN BUCK LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Defendant, represented by ANDREW M.
PALEY -- apaley@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, CANDICE T. ZEE
-- czee@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, GEORGE E. PREONAS --
gpreonas@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, JACOB OSLICK, SEYFARTH
SHAW LLP & MICHAEL R. GALEY, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP.


FCA US: Sued by Shipley Over Defective Transmission Systems
-----------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL SHIPLEY and MELINDA SHOEMAKER, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. FCA US, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-
13142-GCS-APP (E.D. Mich., September 25, 2017), arises from
alleged defective transmission systems in "Class Vehicles", which
include these makes and models: 2012-2015 Fiat 500 models
containing the C635 Dual Dry Clutch Transmission.

The Class Vehicles contain a defectively designed, manufactured
and programmed Powertrain Control Module ("PCM"), the Plaintiffs
allege.  They contend that the PCM in the Class Vehicles is
defective because it contains an incorrect software calibration
resulting in, among other problems, delayed and unpredictable
throttle response, sudden stalling, diminished ability to
accelerate, loss of power, inability to maintain vehicle speed and
failure to shift properly.  Furthermore, because of the incorrect
PCM software calibration by Defendant, this defect causes
excessive and premature wear of the dual clutches contained within
the transmission, as well as premature wear of the transmission
components, often resulting in catastrophic transmission failure
and/or risk of overheating and vehicle fire.

FCA US, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company with its
principal place of business located in Auburn Hills, Michigan.
Fiat is a member of the Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. family of
companies.  Fiat Chrysler is a Dutch corporation with its
headquarters in London, England.  The Defendant and/or its agents
manufactured, distributed, sold, leased, and warranted the Class
Vehicles throughout the United States.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
          Dennis A. Lienhardt, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          950 West University Drive, Suite 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 841-2200
          Facsimile: (248) 652-2852
          E-mail: epm@millerlawpc.com
                  ssa@millerlawpc.com
                  dal@millerlawpc.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 200-0580
          Facsimile: (610) 727-4360
          E-mail: jgs@mccunewright.com
                  mds@mccunewright.com
                  jbk@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          David C. Wright, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          3281 Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          E-mail: rdm@mccunewright.com
                  dcw@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Tiffany M. Yiatras, Esq.
          CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGAL, LLC
          308 Hutchinson Road
          Ellisville, MO 63011
          Telephone: (314) 541-0317
          Facsimile: (855) 710-7706
          E-mail: tiffany@consumerprotectionlegal.com


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Downing Appeals Ruling to Eleventh Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff William D. Downing filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit titled William Downing v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-00119-TCB, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed on July 26, 2016, and assigned to the Hon. Timothy C.
Batten, Sr.

Fidelity National provides title insurance, underwriting, escrow,
and closing services.

The lawsuit arose from alleged violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The appellate case is captioned as William Downing v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 17-14299, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- The appellant's brief is due on or before November 6, 2017;

   -- The appendix is due no later than 7 days from the filing of
      the appellant's brief;

   -- Appellees' Certificate of Interested Persons due on or
      before October 24, 2017, as to Appellees Fidelity National
      Title Insurance Company, et al.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant WILLIAM D. DOWING, on Behalf of Himself and
All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Berhold, Esq.
          JEFFREY L. BERHOLD, P.C.
          1230 Peachtree St. NE, Suite 1050
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 872-3800
          Facsimile: (678) 868-2021
          E-mail: jeff@berhold.com

               - and -

          William Thomas Lacy, Jr., Esq.
          LINDSEY LAW FIRM, PC
          2002 Commerce Dr., Suite 300
          Peachtree City, GA 30269
          Telephone: (770) 486 8445
          Facsimile: (770) 486 8889
          E-mail: tlacy@lacyfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY and COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY are represented by:

          Teresa Bonder, Esq.
          David Andrew Hatchett, Esq.
          Allison Stephens Thompson, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD, LLP
          1201 W Peachtree St. NW, Suite 4200
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3424
          Telephone: (404) 881-4249
          Facsimile: (404) 881-7777
          E-mail: tbonder@alston.com
                  andrew.hatchett@alston.com
                  allison.thompson@alston.com

Defendant-Appellee FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY is
represented by:

          Bruce P. Brown, Esq.
          BRUCE P. BROWN LAW
          1123 Zonolite Rd. NE, Suite 6
          Atlanta, GA 30306
          Telephone: (404) 881-0700
          E-mail: bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth Teutenberg Ferrick, Esq.
          Amy Elizabeth Sestric, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          211 N Broadway, Suite 3000
          Saint Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 241-1800
          Facsimile: (314) 259-5959
          E-mail: elizabeth.ferrick@snrdenton.com
                  amy.sestric@dentons.com

Defendant-Appellee OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
is represented by:

          Jason Maschmann, Esq.
          Charles A. Newman, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          211 N Broadway, Suite 3000
          Saint Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 241-1800
          Facsimile: (314) 259-5959
          E-mail: jason.maschmann@dentons.com
                  charles.newman@dentons.com

               - and -

          David C. Newman, Esq.
          SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP
          1230 Peachtree St., Suite 3100
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 815-3500
          E-mail: dnewman@sgrlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY is represented
by:

          Dane Rhodes Blunt, Esq.
          Marty J. Solomon, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, PA
          4221 W Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 1000
          PO Box 3239
          Tampa, FL 33607
          Telephone: (813) 223-7000
          E-mail: dblunt@carltonfields.com
                  msolomon@carltonfields.com

               - and -

          Walter H. Bush, Jr., Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT, PA
          1201 W Peachtree Street NW, Suite 3000
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3455
          Telephone: (404) 815-3400
          E-mail: wbush@carltonfields.com


FINANCIAL CORP: Faces "Encarnacion" Suit in M.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial
Corporation of America. The case is styled as Omar Encarnacion,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Financial Corporation of America, Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-00566-SPC-CM (M.D. Fla., October 16, 2017).

Financial Corporation of America (FCOA) offers professional debt
collection and receivables management services to help
organizations of all types improve operations and enhance their
bottom line.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Katie Marguerite Miller
   The Law Offices of Katie M. Miller, PA
   15701 State Road 50 Ste 204
   Clermont, FL 34715
   Tel: (407) 217-5807
   Fax: (407) 442-3693
   Email: attorneykstone@gmail.com


FINGERS FACES: Pineda Caballero Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ORTENCIA INES PINEDA CABALLERO, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. FINGERS FACES & TOES CORP. (D/B/A
FINGERS, TOES, NAILS), FINGERS TOES & NAILS CORP. (D/B/A FINGERS,
TOES NAILS), MANI & PEDI SPA INC., GHUU CHOI, KIM MI UN, KIM UN
and DAHYUN (A.K.A. SANDY) LEE, Case No. 2:17-cv-07449 (D.N.J.,
September 25, 2017), seeks to recover alleged unpaid minimum and
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The Defendant Corporations are corporations organized and existing
under the laws of the state of New Jersey and maintains an office
in Union, New Jersey. The Individual Defendants serve or served as
owners, managers, principals or agents of the Defendant
Corporations.

The Defendants operate or operated a nail salon at 520 Chestnut
St., in Union, New Jersey, under the name Fingers, Toes & Nails.
The Defendants are associated and joint employers, act in the
interest of each other with respect to employees, pay employees by
the same method, and share control over the employees.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sara J. Isaacson, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: sisaacson@faillacelaw.com


FIRST POTOMAC: Wooldridge Sues Over Misleading Proxy Statement
--------------------------------------------------------------
CYNTHIA WOOLDRIDGE v. FIRST POTOMAC REALTY TRUST, ROBERT H.
ARNOLD, JAMES P. HOFFMAN, ROBERT MILKOVICH, KATI PENNEY, THOMAS E.
ROBINSON and TERRY L. STEVENS, Case No. 1:17-cv-02845-RDB (D. Md.,
September 25, 2017), arises out of the Defendants' dissemination
of an alleged misleading proxy statement in connection with the
proposed sale of the Company to a subsidiary of Government
Properties Income Trust.

On June 28, 2017, FPO announced the definitive merger agreement
under which FPO would be acquired by GOV for just $11.15 per
share.  On August 24, 2017, the Defendants filed and disseminated
the Proxy to the Company's shareholders, recommending that FPO
shareholders vote in favor of the Merger at the special meeting of
shareholders on September 26, 2017.

FPO is a Maryland corporation headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.
The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the
Company.

FPO is a self-administered, self-managed real estate investment
trust that focuses on owning, operating, developing and
redeveloping office and business park properties in the greater
Washington, D.C. region.  GOV is a real estate investment trust
that focuses on properties that are leased to government
tenants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William N. Sinclair, Esq.
          SILVERMAN THOMPSON SLUTKIN WHITE
          201 N. Charles Street, 26th Floor
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 385-2225
          Facsimile: (410) 547-2432
          E-mail: bsinclair@mdattorney.com

               - and -

          David Wissbroecker, Esq.
          Eun Jin Lee, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: dwissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com
                  elee@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Willie C. Briscoe, Esq.
          THE BRISCOE LAW FIRM
          3131 McKinney Avenue, Suite 600
          Dallas, TX 75204
          Telephone: (214) 643-6011
          Facsimile: (281) 254-7789
          E-mail: wbriscoe@thebriscoelawfirm.com


FOX: Must Face Unjust Enrichment Claims Over Empire Filming
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lorraine Bailey, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge ruled on Oct. 16 that Fox must face claims it
was unjustly enriched by striking a deal with county officials to
use a Chicago juvenile detention center as a set for the hit show
"Empire," forcing kids to sit in chairs for days at a time.

In the summer of 2015, the Cook County Juvenile Temporary
Detention Center, or JTDC, was placed on lockdown so that it could
be used as a film set to shoot scenes for the Fox hit show
"Empire."

"The purpose of these lockdowns was to provide Fox with a
realistic prison facility to use as the primary set of two highly
profitable 'Empire' episodes," according to a class action filed
last year by relatives of incarcerated minors.

Meanwhile, the children who normally went to school, exercised,
and visited their family members in those parts of the building
were instead allegedly confined to "pod" areas right outside their
cell doors for days on end, where they were forced to sit in the
same spot at all times.

A federal judge rejected the families' constitutional claims
against Fox on Oct. 16, but upheld their claims seeking damages
for unjust enrichment.

"Construing plaintiffs' allegations and all reasonable inferences
in their favor, they have not plausibly alleged that the Fox
defendants and any state actor had an agreement to deny
plaintiffs' constitutional rights," U.S. District Judge Amy St.
Eve wrote in a 14-page ruling.  "Rather, plaintiffs' allegations
suggest that the Fox defendants were aware that their desire to
film Empire at the JTDC conflicted with the juvenile detainees'
needs."

Fox scouted the location and knew that its filming needs would
interrupt the children's education and rehabilitation, but this is
not enough to show that Fox conspired with Illinois officials to
violate the children's constitutional rights, according to the
judge's opinion.

However, St. Eve found that the complaint's claims are sufficient
to support allegations that Fox induced Cook County officials to
breach their fiduciary duties by allowing filming at the center
and that it was unjustly enriched by the deal.

"Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Fox defendants
economically benefitted from their improper conduct in connection
to the filming of Empire at the JTDC," St. Eve said.

The complaint does not state how much Fox paid Cook County for use
of the JTDC, scenes of which were featured prominently in the
first two episodes of the second season of "Empire."

"Empire," however, has been a big success for Fox, with
advertisers paying $750,000 per 30-second advertising spot in the
first episode of season two, and $600,000 per 30-second
advertising spot in the second episode, according to the class
action.

St. Eve had previously allowed the families' constitutional claims
against Cook County to move forward in an April ruling.

Filming at the five-story facility lasted a total of two weeks,
split into three separate visits.  One of the reasons for the
multiple visits is that the character played by comedian Chris
Rock "had originally been depicted as a cannibal," but Fox
executives wanted to reshoot those scenes, the class-action
lawsuit states.

During filming, the children's "schooling continued in name only,
visits from their families were interrupted, cut back, or
effectively eliminated, sick-call requests were ignored, and
programs that are intended to help them overcome the problems that
landed them at the JTDC in the first place were cancelled or
interrupted," the complaint alleges.

The lawsuit says the crew arrived to film at the facility just
four weeks after a federal judge transferred administration of the
facility back to Cook County.  Systematic mistreatment of children
housed at the facility had forced the appointment of a federal
administrator to take over operation of the JTDC in 2008.

Fox spokesperson Chris Alexander said the broadcaster had no
comment on St. Eve's latest ruling.


FUSION LOGISTICS: Court Approved Settlement Agreement
-----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CHRISTIAL GEFFRARD, the Plaintiff, v. FUSION
LOGISTICS, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-01161-GAP-KRS
(M.D. Fla.), the Court enter an order granting joint motion to
approve a settlement agreement and dismissing the case with
prejudice.

The Clerk is directed to close the file. The Court finds that the
proposed settlement is a reasonable compromise of a bona fide
dispute between parties represented by competent counsel. The
Court further finds that the agreed-upon fee and costs to be paid
to Plaintiff's counsel was determined independently, did not
affect the payment to Plaintiff, and otherwise appears to be
reasonable.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=g8pfrhEm


G & H DAIRY: Agrees to Pay $600,000 to Settle Workers' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nick Cahill, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
Central California dairy farm will pay a class of migrant workers
$600,000, settling claims of underpaying Mexican employees and
providing them with substandard homes infested with rats and
cockroaches.

The federal class action claimed that G & H Dairy, located 90
miles east of San Francisco in the Central Valley town of Escalon,
purposely hired Hispanic migrant workers because they were
"unlikely" to complain about unlawful wages and conditions "no
white, U.S. citizen" would accept.

The approximately 120-member class claimed workers were required
to work six-day weeks without meal or rest breaks and were paid a
fixed salary regardless of the number of hours worked. After
milking and cleaning cows for over 10 hours per day, the
plaintiffs said they returned to shoddy mobile homes and
"cuartitos", little rooms in Spanish, provided by the dairy.

According to the second amended complaint filed in May, the homes
lacked heating or kitchen facilities.

"In addition, vermin, including fleas, cockroaches and rats were
present in the cuartitos," the complaint said. "No white employees
of defendants are provided poor quality housing, refused repairs
or required to live with the same conditions as plaintiffs."

In addition, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants used racial
slurs like "beaner" and told the migrant workers, "If you're not
happy here, then you can go home."

U.S. Magistrate Judge Kendall Newman approved the parties'
settlement on Oct. 13, and also awarded the class $170,000 for
attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs' attorneys at the California Rural Legal Assistance
Foundation in Sacramento said the dairy industry should take note
of the class action, because "litigation is expensive."

"I think unfortunately there are a fair number of dairy workers
housed in really poor living conditions," said Dawson Morton,
foundation attorney. "You are violating workers' rights if you
have them in substandard homes that fail basic California code."

Newman presided over negotiations during a settlement conference
in June. The dairy and its operators denied liability but agreed
to a three-year consent decree requiring it to change its employee
housing, meal break and overtime practices.

The dairy declined to comment on the settlement.

The agreement includes $40,000 to settle wrongful termination and
retaliation claims of three former employees.

Plaintiffs Hernan Guzman-Padilla and Cipriano and Guillermo
Benitez said the dairy destroyed their homes shortly after local
news outlets reported the lawsuit. They claim the dairy was trying
to destroy and hide evidence in wake of the news reports. The
dairy later fired the plaintiffs for "deficient work performance."

Morton, who is trying a similar case against Van Exel Dairy in
nearby Lodi, said the plaintiffs hope their lawsuit sparks change
in the dairy industry.

"Our clients are interested in seeing other workers also stand up
against illegal workplace conditions," Morton said.


GALE/TRIANGLE INC: "Turk" Class Settlement Has Final Court OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Judgment granting Parties' Joint Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plaintiff's Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs in the case captioned STEVE TURK, an
individual, Plaintiff, v. GALE/TRIANGLE, INC. a New Jersey
corporation; and PERFORMANCE TEAM FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., a
California corporation; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-00783-MCE-DB (E.D. Cal.).

The Court grants final approval, for purposes of settlement only,
of the Class as defined in the Settlement Agreement.

Sutton Hague Law Corporation is approved as Class Counsel and is
awarded $195,000 for attorneys' fees and $17,925 for reimbursement
of litigation costs and expenses, which the Court finds were
reasonably incurred in prosecution of this case.

Steven Turk is awarded $10,000 for his services in initiating and
maintaining this litigation as Class Representative.

The Claims Administrator is awarded $9,499 as payment for handling
the administration of the Settlement in this case.

Payment of $7,500 is approved to the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency for the resolution of the claims brought in
this case under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 (PAGA).  This payment represents the California Labor and
Workforce Development Agency's share of the $10,000 of the
Settlement Proceeds allocated PAGA penalties. The remaining $2,500
of the $10,000 in Settlement Proceeds allocated to PAGA penalties
will be disbursed to the aggrieved employees in accordance with
the terms of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Judgment is available at http://tinyurl.com/yc8p99wgfrom
Leagle.com.

Steve Turk, Plaintiff, represented by S. Brett Sutton --
brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC.
Steve Turk, Plaintiff, represented by Jared Hague --
jared@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC & Joseph
Vidal Macias, Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC, 6715 North Palm
Ave., Suite 216 Fresno, CA 93704

Gale/Triangle, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mark David Kemple -
- kemplem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig.

Performance Team Freight Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Mark David Kemple, Greenberg Traurig.


GANNETT SATELLITE: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gannett Satellite
Information Network, LLC.  The case is styled as Phillip Sullivan
Jr., on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07981 (S.D.N.Y., October 17, 2017).

Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC is in the Newspapers,
Publishing and Printing business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GC SERVICES: Faces "Feldman" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The case is styled as Stella Feldman, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GC
Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06050
(E.D.N.Y., October 17, 2017).

GC Services is the largest privately-held outsourcing provider of
call center management and collection agency services in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff represented by:

   Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
   Joseph H. Mizrahi Law, P.C.
   337 Avenue W, Suite 2f
   Brooklyn, NY 11223
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: jmizrahilaw@gmail.com


GC SERVICES: Faces "Kodirova" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership.  The case is styled as Zebinoso Kodirova, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GC
Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06046
(E.D. N.Y., October 17, 2017).

GC Services is the largest privately-held outsourcing provider of
call center management and collection agency services in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GENE BY GENE: Cole Appeals Alaska Court Decision to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Michael Cole filed an appeal from the District Court's
July 28, 2017 order denying class action certification in his
lawsuit titled Michael Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., Case No. 1:14-
cv-00004-SLG, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Alaska, Juneau.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Cole v. Gene by Gene,
Ltd., Case No. 17-35837, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

Mr. Cole has previously filed a Ninth Circuit appeal in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is entitled Michael Cole v. Gene by
Gene, Ltd., Case No. 17-80160.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Mr. Cole
purchased a DNA testing kit from http://www.familytreedna.com/,a
Web site operated by Gene by Gene.  Testing kits include a cheek
swab used to collect DNA samples and an optional release form to
authorize the sharing of the customer's name and e-mail address
with his or her genetic matches.  When testing is complete, Family
Tree e-mails its customers a web link where they may view their
results, locate genetic matches, and research their ancestral
origins.

Months later, after receiving excessive junk e-mail, Mr. Cole
searched the Internet for his e-mail address and found it on a Web
site called "Rootsweb."  He alleges that he then learned his DNA
test results had been publicly disclosed.  Mr. Cole initiated this
action alleging that its sharing of his DNA test results violated
Alaska's Genetic Privacy Act.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by November 13, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on December 11, 2017;

   -- Appellant Michael Cole's opening brief is due on
      January 22, 2018;

   -- Appellee Gene by Gene, Ltd.'s answering brief is due on
      February 22, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MICHAEL COLE, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ryan D. Andrews, Esq.
          John Aaron Lawson, Esq.
          EDELSON P.C.
          350 N. LaSalle St.
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589-9730
          E-mail: randrews@edelson.com
                  alawson@edelson.com

Defendant-Appellee GENE BY GENE, LTD., a Texas limited liability
company, DBA Family Tree DNA, is represented by:

          Holly Brauchli, Esq.
          Matthew Wojcik, Esq.
          BULLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1810
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 292-8930
          E-mail: Matt.wojcik@bullivant.com
                  holly.brauchli@bullivant.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Inks $120MM Ignition-Switch Accord with States
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Klasfeld, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
already $900 million in the hole, General Motors inked a $120
million deal on Oct. 19 with 49 states and the District of
Columbia to settle claims over faulty ignition switches that were
installed in several cars, allegedly as a cost-saving measure.

The latest settlement comes three years after GM recalled its
2005-10 Chevy Cobalts, Pontiacs and Saturns, along with several
other cars, amid reports from drivers that these models
spontaneously lost power on the road, resulting in collisions made
more dangerous because the power outages also disabled vehicle
brakes and air bags.

Revelations that GM had prior knowledge of the ignition defect
that is believed to have caused these incidents prompted a flurry
of litigation, including ongoing class actions as well as federal
and state investigations.

New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman blasted the Michigan-
based auto giant for having "turned a blind eye for years" to the
defects that would have it cost pennies to correct.

"New Yorkers should not have to worry about their steering or
brakes failing or their airbags not deploying when they get behind
the wheel," Mr. Schneiderman said in a statement.  "[Thurs]day's
settlement ensures that drivers receive the transparency they
deserve when they purchase a car."

More than $4 million in settlement money will go to New York.
Mr. Schneiderman noted that the 44-page consent decree also
requires GM to ensure future safety.

The extensive agreement outlines GM's obligations to honestly
advertise the safety records of its cars and to maintain global
organizations dedicated to vehicle safety and product integrity.

"Among its other functions, the Global Product Integrity
organization will establish processes to identify and resolve
potential safety issues in the design of GM Motor Vehicles and
using Design for Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (or its
functional equivalent) and/or strategies selected by GM to achieve
the same or similar results," the consent order states.

The Oct. 19 settlement comes two years after GM paid $900 million
to settle with federal authorities, who have tied at least 15
deaths to ignition-switch-related collisions.

The Center for Auto Safety has attributed more than 300 deaths to
the glitch, a figure that GM disputes.

Of cases that have gone to trial, individual drivers have had
little luck holding GM liable for their collisions.

In July, a federal jury rejected the case of Arizona resident
Dennis Ward, who failed to pin his fender-bender on the switch.

Louisiana resident Lawrence Barthelemy struck out a year earlier
in his attempt blame the defect for his injuries in a 15-car
pileup on an icy Crescent City Connection Bridge.

Before then, Oklahoma postal worker Robert Scheuer's case fell
apart after GM accused him of perjury.

Two Texas lawsuits filed against GM in state court also ended in
the auto giant's favor.


GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT: Class Suit in Nevada Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------
Golden Entertainment, Inc. continues to defend a class action
lawsuit in Nevada, the Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017.

Golden said, "In February and April 2017, several former employees
filed two separate purported class action lawsuits against us in
the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals employed by us in the State of
Nevada. The lawsuits allege we violated certain Nevada labor laws
including payment of an hourly wage below the statutory minimum
wage without providing a qualified health insurance plan and an
associated failure to pay proper overtime compensation. The
complaints seek, on behalf of the plaintiffs and members of the
putative class, an unspecified amount of damages (including
punitive damages), injunctive and equitable relief, and an award
of attorneys' fees, interest and costs."

"These cases are at an early stage in the proceedings, and we are
therefore unable to make a reasonable estimate of the probable
loss or range of losses, if any, that might arise from these
matters. Therefore, we have not recorded any amount for the claims
as of the date of this filing. While legal proceedings are
inherently unpredictable and no assurance can be given as to the
ultimate outcome of these matters, based on management's current
understanding of the relevant facts and circumstances, we believe
that these proceedings should not have a material adverse effect
on our financial position, results of operations or cash flows,"
the Company added.

Golden Entertainment is a diversified group of gaming companies
that focus on distributed gaming (including tavern gaming) and
casino and resort operations.


GREGG PETERSON: Certification of Sales Reps Class Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DUSTIN ILIFF, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
GREGG PETERSON CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC, a limited liability
company, et al, the Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-01040-R (W.D.,
Okla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
      of a class of;

      "current and former Outside Sales Representatives of
      Defendants, who worked for Defendants during any period
      between September 14, 2014, and the present";

   2. approving notice and consent forms;

   3. authorizing mail notice and consent forms to putative
      plaintiffs; and

   4. directing Defendants to identify putative plaintiffs and
      brief in support

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jWI0EK6q

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leah M. Roper, Esq.
          Amber Hurst, Esq.
          HAMMONS, GOWENS & HURST
          Mark Hammons, OBA No. 3784
          325 Dean A. McGee Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 235-6100
          Facsimile: (405) 235-6111
          E-mail: leah@hammonslaw.com
                  mark@hammonslaw.com
                  amber@hammonslaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kathryn D. Terry, Esq.
          Clayton D. Ketter, Esq.
          PHILLIPS MURRAH P.C.
          Corporate Tower, 13th Floor
          101 North Robinson Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 235 4100
          Facsimile: (405) 235 4133
          E-mail: kdterry@phillipsmurrah.com
                  cdketter@phillipsmurrah.com

               - and -

          Isabel A. Crosby, Esq.
          Allison Reddoch, Esq.
          ANDREWS KURTH KENYON, LLP
          1717 Main St, Suite 3700
          Dallas, TX 75201
          E-mail: isabelcrosby@andrewskurth.com
                  allisonreddoch@andrewskurth.com


GUAM: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Crawford" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Vicente Palacios Crawford filed an appeal from a court
ruling in his lawsuit styled Vicente Palacios Crawford v. A. B.
Won Pat Intl. Airport, et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00001, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Guam.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 8, 2017, the
Hon. Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood entered an order:

   1. denying Crawford's motion for summary judgment;

   2. granting in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment;

   3. granting summary judgment to each individual Defendant with
      respect to Crawford's claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
      section 1983;

   4. dismissing Crawford's claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
      section 1983 with prejudice;

   5. dismissing without prejudice Crawford's remaining local law
      claims; and

   6. denying Crawford's motion to certify class as moot, because
      all claims have been dismissed.

The appellate case is captioned as Vicente Palacios Crawford v. A.
B. Won Pat Intl. Airport, et al., Case No. 17-16942, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 26, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 27, 2017;

   -- Appellant Vicente Palacios Crawford's opening brief is due
      on January 4, 2018;

   -- Appellees Anthony Ada, Antonio B. Won Pat International
      Airport Authority, Guam, Eddie Baza Calvo and Ricardo C.
      Duenas' answering brief is due on February 5, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant VICENTE PALACIOS CRAWFORD, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ignacio Cruz Aguigui, I, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF IGNACIO CRUZ AGUIGUI
          341 S. Marine Corps Drive
          Suite 310, RK Plaza
          Tamuning, GU 96913
          Telephone: (671) 989-9253
          Facsimile: (671) 989-9255
          E-mail: ica@aguigui.com

               - and -

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          Scott M. Grzenczyk, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com
                  smg@girardgibbs.com

Defendants-Appellees ANTONIO B. WON PAT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, GUAM; and RICARDO C. DUENAS, GIAA Board Chairman, are
represented by:

          Kathleen V. Fisher, Esq.
          Genevieve Paulino Rapadas, Esq.
          CALVO FISHER & JACOB LLP
          555 Montgomery Street, Suite # 1155
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 374-8870
          Facsimile: (415) 374-8373
          E-mail: kfisher@calvofisher.com
                  grapadas@calvofisher.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Pangelinan, Esq.
          CALVO & CLARK, LLP
          259 Martyr Street
          Hagatna, GU 96910
          Telephone: (671) 646-9355
          E-mail: mpangelinan@calvofisher.com

Defendants-Appellees EDDIE BAZA CALVO and ANTHONY ADA, In His
Official Capacity as Chairperson of the Guam Ancestral Lands
Commission, are represented by:

          David J. Highsmith, Esq.
          AGGU - OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GUAM
          590 South Marine Corps Drive
          Tamuning, GU 96913
          Telephone: (671) 475-3324
          E-mail: dhighsmith@guamag.org


HARRIS & HARRIS: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARY ANN OLSZEWSKI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. HARRIS
& HARRIS, LTD., d/b/a HARRIS & HARRIS OF ILLINOIS, LTD., the
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01471-JPS (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff
respectfully asks the Court to enter an order certifying proposed
classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=R99QunuB

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Squitieri & Fearon Named Class Counsel
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement and Class Certification in the case
captioned RUDEL CORPORATION, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HEARTLAND PAYMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, Civ. No. 16-2229 (D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Rudel Corporation brings this putative class action
against Defendant Heartland Systems, Inc., for breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
unjust enrichment. Plaintiff runs Jacala Mexican Restaurant in San
Antonio, Texas.

Plaintiff alleges that in 2014 American Express introduced a new
program, OptBlue, that made it less expensive for merchants to
accept American Express cards. Defendant sent a letter to its
merchants that Defendant would process American Express cards with
the smaller fees already associated with Visa and Mastercard.

Defendant charged American Express fees at this discounted rate.
Defendant retroactively charged Plaintiff an American Express Fee
Adjustment of $255.44, without prior written agreement or notice;
other class members experienced similar charges. Defendant
represented that this charge was an adjustment to correct a
miscalculation. Plaintiff alleges this purported correction was,
instead, an improper rate increase which violated the uniform
contract between Defendant and the merchants in the putative
class.

Review of a proposed class action settlement is a two-step
process: preliminary approval and a subsequent fairness hearing.
Courts make a preliminary evaluation of the fairness of the
settlement, prior to directing that notice be given to members of
the settlement class.

The proposed settlement agreement here meets the not obviously
deficient standard.  First, the proposed settlement was reached
after discovery and through arm's-length negotiations between
experienced counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Attorneys for
both parties are experienced in similar class action litigation.
Second, the proposed settlement provides the class with reasonable
and adequate relief. Plaintiff acknowledges that the proposed
settlement will not fully compensate class members, but emphasizes
it will provide each class member with a monetary award.  Finally,
the proposed settlement does not appear to unreasonably favor the
class representative or any segment of the class. Indeed, the
nature of Plaintiff's claims are indistinct from the claims of
other class members, and nothing in the Settlement Agreement
divides the proposed settlement class into segments. Finding no
reason at this juncture to question the fairness of the
settlement, which was reached after negotiation between
experienced counsel and mediated by a respected retired jurist,
the Court grants preliminary approval to the settlement.

The proposed settlement class is defined in the proposed
Settlement Agreement as "Merchants who processed with Heartland
and were subject to an American Express Fee Adjustment in their
October 2014 account statements, retroactively implementing an
increased American Express Discount Fe and setting new American
Express pricing going forward."  This class meets the four Rule
23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy, and likewise meets the Rule 23(b) requirements of
predominance and superiority.

Plaintiff's brief outlines questions including whether the
contract permitted the rate change, whether there was notice,
whether any notice sufficed, whether Defendant acted in bad faith,
and whether Defendant was unjustly enriched.  These common
questions satisfy the commonality requirement.

Being subject to the fee increase and standard contract of which
Plaintiff complains is the defining characteristic for merchants
to be eligible as class members. Moreover, Plaintiff's theory of
recovery and of Defendant's liability is identical to those that
could be brought on behalf of the class.  Typicality is therefore
satisfied.

Plaintiff's interests are wholly aligned with those of the class;
Plaintiff suffered the same kind of injury as all class members
and will receive a pro rata portion of the settlement based on the
proposed Allocation Formula in the settlement agreement.  The
class is adequately represented.

Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of a standard, uniform
contract and an across-the-board rate increase which Defendant
allegedly unlawfully applied to all class members, the Court finds
that common issues sufficiently predominate here.

Turning to superiority, the Court must balance, in terms of
fairness and efficiency, the class action method of proceeding
against alternative available methods of adjudication. While Rule
23(b)(3) enumerates a number of factors courts may consider, this
Court has held that class treatment is superior where individual
claims are small or modest.

Plaintiff persuasively explains, in light of the small amount of
recovery to each putative class member compared with the costs of
litigation, individual merchants are less likely to be inclined to
file individual actions or to be able to settle and recover on
individual actions.
Therefore, the Court finds that the settlement meets the
superiority requirement and certifies the class as defined in the
settlement agreement.

The Court must also assure itself that the method of notice is the
best practicable. Plaintiff proposes that class members -- who
have all been identified by Defendant -- be notified by first-
class mail at their business addresses, which is unquestionably
the best notice practicable under the circumstances.  The Court
hereby approves the proposed Notice submitted by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint the law firm of
Squitieri & Fearon, LLP as Class Counsel. The Court determines
that this firm is sufficiently experienced in class action
litigation to represent the class. The firm partners have
extensive class action experience and have received praise for
their diligence and results in a number of federal courts.
Moreover, the representation provided on behalf of Plaintiff thus
far evidences the requisite skill to serve as Class Counsel going
forward.  The Court appoints Squitieri & Fearon, LLP as Class
Counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yas37n7yfrom Leagle.com.

HON. WILLIAM G. BASSLER, Mediator, represented by WILLIAM G.
BASSLER.

RUDEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, represented by OLIMPIO LEE SQUITIERI
-- lee@sfclasslaw.com -- SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP & RAYMOND
NICHOLAS BARTO -- Raymond@sfclasslaw.com -- SQUIRIERI & FEARON
LLP.

HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant, represented by ETHAN
MAXWELL SIMON -- Esimon@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP & SETH J.
LAPIDOW, BACKES & HILL LLP.


HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Against Suits over Dental Supplies
--------------------------------------------------------------
Class action complaints against Patterson Companies, Inc., Benco
Dental Supply Co. and Henry Schein, Inc. remains pending, Henry
Schein said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended July 1, 2017.

Beginning in January 2016, class action complaints were filed
against Patterson Companies, Inc., Benco Dental Supply Co. and
Henry Schein, Inc. Each of these complaints allege, among other
things, that defendants conspired to fix prices, allocate
customers and foreclose competitors by boycotting manufacturers,
state dental associations and others that deal with defendants'
competitors.  Subject to certain exclusions, these classes seek to
represent all persons who purchased dental supplies or equipment
in the United States directly from any of the defendants or
Burkhart Dental Supply Co. since August 31, 2008.  Each class
action complaint asserts a single count under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and seeks equitable relief, compensatory and treble
damages, jointly and severally, and reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees and expert fees.

"We intend to defend ourselves vigorously against these actions,"
the Company said.

Henry Schein, Inc. is a provider of health care products and
services primarily to office-based dental, animal health and
medical practitioners.


HERC HOLDINGS: Appeal in Securities Litigation Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Herc Holdings, Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that an appeal is pending in the case, In re Hertz
Global Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation.

In November 2013, a putative shareholder class action, Pedro
Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et al., was commenced
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey naming
Hertz Hol+dings and certain of its officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the federal securities laws. The complaint
alleged that Hertz Holdings made material misrepresentations
and/or omission of material fact in its public disclosures during
the period from February 25, 2013 through November 4, 2013, in
violation of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. The complaint sought unspecified monetary
damages on behalf of the purported class and an award of costs and
expenses, including counsel fees and expert fees.

In June 2014, Hertz Holdings moved to dismiss the amended
complaint. In October 2014, the court granted Hertz Holdings'
motion to dismiss without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to
amend the complaint a second time. In November 2014, plaintiff
filed a second amended complaint which shortened the putative
class period and made allegations that were not substantively very
different than the allegations in the prior complaint.

In early 2015, Hertz Holdings moved to dismiss the second amended
complaint. In July 2015, the court granted Hertz Holdings' motion
to dismiss without prejudice, allowing plaintiff to file a third
amended complaint. In August 2015, plaintiff filed a third amended
complaint which included additional allegations, named additional
then-current and former officers as defendants and expanded the
putative class period to extend from February 14, 2013 to July 16,
2015.

In November 2015, Hertz Holdings moved to dismiss the third
amended complaint. The plaintiff then sought leave to add a new
plaintiff because of challenges to the standing of the first
plaintiff. The court granted plaintiff leave to file a fourth
amended complaint to add the new plaintiff, and the new complaint
was filed on March 1, 2016. Hertz Holdings and the individual
defendants moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint with
prejudice on March 24, 2016. In April 2017, the court granted
Hertz Holdings' and the individual defendants' motions to dismiss
and dismissed the action with prejudice. In May 2017, plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal.

Herc Holdings Inc. is one of the leading equipment rental
suppliers with approximately 275 company-owned locations at June
30, 2017, principally in North America.


IC SYSTEM: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DEBORAH AL, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. IC SYSTEM, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01475 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying proposed classes in
this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Tx9fvVa6

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ICAHN ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss to Dismiss Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
Icahn Enterprises L.P. and Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P. said in
their Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that a
hearing was scheduled for October 12, 2017, on Icahn Defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint in the case, In re Federal-Mogul
Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litigation.

On September 29, 2016, September 30, 2016, October 12, 2016 and
October 19, 2016, respectively, four putative class actions,
captioned Skybo v. Ninivaggi et al., C.A. No. 12790, Lemanchek v.
Ninivaggi et al., C.A. No. 12791, Raul v. Ninivaggi et al., C.A.
No. 12821 and Mercado v. Ninivaggi et al., C.A. No. 12837, were
filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware against
the Board of Directors of Federal-Mogul (the "FM Board") and Icahn
Enterprises, Icahn Enterprises Holdings, certain of their
affiliates and Icahn Enterprises' Board of Directors (the "Icahn
Defendants"), and, in the case of Raul, Federal-Mogul. The
complaints allege that, among other things, the FM Board breached
its fiduciary duties by approving the proposed Merger Agreement,
that the Icahn Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the
minority stockholders of Federal-Mogul and/or aided and abetted
the FM Board's breaches of its fiduciary duties, as well as
alleging certain material misstatements and omissions in the
Schedule 14D-9 filed by Federal-Mogul (the "Schedule 14D-9"). The
complaints allege that, among other things, the then-Offer Price
was inadequate and, together with that the Merger Agreement, was
the result of a flawed and unfair sales process and conflicts of
interest of the FM Board and the special committee of independent
directors of Federal-Mogul (the "Special Committee"), alleging
that the Special Committee and Federal-Mogul's management lacked
independence from the Icahn Defendants. In addition, the
complaints allege that the Merger Agreement contains certain
allegedly preclusive deal protection provisions, including a no-
solicitation provision, an information rights provision and a
matching rights provision. Among other things, the complaints
sought to enjoin the transactions contemplated by the Merger
Agreement, as well as award costs and disbursements, including
reasonable attorneys' and experts' fees.  The Raul and Mercado
complaints further seek to rescind the transaction or award
rescissory damages, or (in the case of Raul) award a quasi-
appraisal remedy in the event that the transaction was
consummated, as well as award money damages.

On October 28, 2016, all four actions were consolidated under the
caption In re Federal-Mogul Holdings, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,
C.A. No. 12790-CB (the "Delaware Action"). On March 6, 2017,
plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint that does not
name Federal-Mogul as a defendant. Among other things, the
consolidated amended complaint also adds allegations regarding the
commencement and extension of the Offer, the increase in the Offer
price, the closing of the transaction, Federal-Mogul's subsequent
performance and public statements, Mr. Ninivaggi's post-merger
employment with Icahn Enterprises and the independence of the
chairman of the Special Committee.

Icahn Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint and
to stay discovery pending determination of that motion. The
plaintiffs responded and on July 10, 2017, the Icahn Defendants'
reply brief on the motion to dismiss was filed. A hearing was
scheduled for October 12, 2017.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Icahn Enterprises L.P. ("Icahn Enterprises") owns a 99% limited
partner interest in Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P. ("Icahn
Enterprises Holdings"). Icahn Enterprises Holdings and its
subsidiaries own substantially all of the assets and liabilities
of Icahn Enterprises and conduct substantially all of its
operations.


ICAHN ENTERPRISES: Michigan Class Action Remains Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------
Icahn Enterprises L.P. and Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P. said in
their Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that a
class action lawsuit in Michigan remains stayed.

On October 5, 2016, a putative class action captioned Sanders v.
Federal-Mogul Holdings Corporation et al., C.A. No. 16-155387 was
filed in the Circuit Court for Oakland County of the State of
Michigan against Federal-Mogul, the FM Board and the Icahn
Defendants (the "Michigan Action"). The complaint alleges, among
other things, that the FM Board breached its fiduciary duties and
that Federal-Mogul and the Icahn Defendants aided and abetted the
FM Board's breaches of its fiduciary duties, as well as alleging
certain material misstatements and omissions in the Schedule
14D-9.

The complaint alleges that, among other things, the then-Offer
Price was unfair and the result of an unfair sales process that
included conflicts of interest.  In addition, the complaint
alleges that the Merger Agreement contains certain allegedly
preclusive deal protection provisions, including a no-solicitation
provision, an information rights provision and a matching rights
provision. Among other things, the complaint sought to enjoin the
transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement, or, in the
event that the transactions were consummated, rescind the
transactions or award rescissory damages, as well as award money
damages and costs, including reasonable attorneys' and experts'
fees.

On March 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which,
among other things, dropped Federal-Mogul as a defendant.  The
amended complaint also: named certain additional Icahn-affiliated
individuals and entities as defendants; deleted various
allegations relating to process and purported disclosure
deficiencies; added allegations regarding the commencement and
extension of the Offer, the increase in the Offer price, the
closing of the transaction, Federal-Mogul's subsequent performance
and public statements, Mr. Ninivaggi's post-merger employment with
Icahn Enterprises, and the independence of certain directors; and
eliminated the request for injunctive relief given the
consummation of the transaction.

On April 4, 2017 the Court entered a stipulated order staying the
Michigan Action pending final determination of the Delaware
Action.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Icahn Enterprises L.P. ("Icahn Enterprises") owns a 99% limited
partner interest in Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P. ("Icahn
Enterprises Holdings"). Icahn Enterprises Holdings and its
subsidiaries own substantially all of the assets and liabilities
of Icahn Enterprises and conduct substantially all of its
operations.


INT'L WAREHOUSE: NY High Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, issued an Opinion denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JUAN BARAHONA, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, ERIK RIOS,
and MELBI MORALES, individually, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL
WAREHOUSE GROUP, INC., Defendant, Docket No. 603305-17, Mot. Seq.
001 (N.Y. Sup.).

In their complaint alleging a class action as well as individual
claims, plaintiffs set forth four causes of action. This present
motion concerns the Fourth, which in substance alleges that the
defendant, plaintiffs' employer, failed to comply with Labor Law
Section 195(1) in that plaintiffs were not provided at the time of
hiring with a notice containing the information required by that
section.

Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1),
documentary evidence, and (a)(7), failure to state a cause of
action. It presents three documents bearing the names of the
plaintiffs in support of its motion; each is entitled PAYCHEX at
the top left, with the words New Employee Packet to the right.
Each contains a check box for the full or part-time status, rate
of pay, and job category.

The Court concludes that dismissal of the Fourth cause of action
is inappropriate. The documentary proof submitted, the forms
allegedly given to plaintiffs at the time of hire, is not
authenticated, and even if they were, fall short of eliminating
all issues regarding compliance with Labor Law Section 195(1).

It is clear that the forms presented do not contain the employer's
address, telephone number, or state when wages will be paid, all
of which is required under this section. In the case of plaintiffs
Barahona and Morales, there are no check marks clarifying whether
the rate stated is for each hour worked or for a time period.

In sum, given the strict requirements for dismissal based on
documentary evidence under CPLR 3211(a)(1), this evidence is
insufficient to ground dismissal of the subject cause of action.

Accordingly, the motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's October 4, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yc74ezl3from
Leagle.com.

Shulman Kessler, LLP, Troy L. Kessler, Esq., Garrett Kaske, Esq.,
Tana Forrester, Esq., 534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275, Melville,
NY 11747, (631) 499-9100, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth Sprotzer, Esq., Make the Road New York, 92-10 Roosevelt
Avenue, Jackson Heights, NY 11372, (718) 565-8500, Attorneys for
Plaintiff.

Schwartz Ettenger, PLLC, Jeffrey S. Ettenger, Esq., 445 Broad
Hollow Road, Suite 205, Melville, NY 11747, (631) 777-2401,
Attorneys for Defendant.


INTERSTATE HOTELS: "Richardson" Suit Seeks to Certify 5 Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DINA RAE RICHARDSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
INTERSTATE HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation;
INTERSTATE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 3:16-cv-06772-WHA (N.D.
Cal.), Ms. Dina Rae Richardson will move the Court on November 16,
2017, for an order:

   1. certifying classes defined as:

      Rest Period Class:

      "all persons employed by Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
      and Interstate Management Company, LLC as room attendants
      at the Sheraton Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco,
      California, at any time from September 23, 2012 through
      November 29, 2016, who worked at least one shift over 3.5
      hours;

      Meal Period Class:

      "all persons employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees
      at the Sheraton Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco,
      California, at any time from September 23, 2012 through
      November 29, 2016, who worked at least one shift over 5
      hours;

      Second Meal Period Class:

      "all persons employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees
      at the Sheraton Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco,
      California, at any time from September 23, 2012 through
      November 29, 2016, who worked at least one shift over 10
      hours;

      Off-the-Clock Class:

      "all persons employed by Defendants as room attendants at
      the Sheraton Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco,
      California, at any time from September 23, 2012 through
      November 29, 2016, who performed work while clocked out;
      and

      Rounding Class:

      "all persons employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees
      at the Sheraton Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco,
      California, at any time from September 23, 2012 through
      November 29, 2016, whose time punches were rounded by
      Defendants";

   2. certifying the derivative claims for failure to pay all
      wages due to discharged and quitting employees, failure to
      furnish accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair
      business practices;

   3. appointing Plaintiff as class representative; and

   4. appointing Plaintiff's counsel, Matthew J. Matern, Launa
      Adolph, and Kayvon Sabourian of Matern Law Group, PC, as
      class counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=rhXOaURu

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Kayvon Sabourian, Esq.
          Launa Adolph, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531 1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531 1901
          E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  ladolph@maternlawgroup.com
                  ksabourian@maternlawgroup.com


INTERSTATE WAREHOUSING: Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KATHY WARREN, TONYA CALHOUN, CLARISSA
ROGERS, and persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
INTERSTATE WAREHOUSING, INC., A TIPPMANN GROUP COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00014 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon Judge
Aleta A. Trauger granted, in part, the parties' joint motion to
conditionally certify class for settlement purposes.

The Plaintiffs and Defendant asked the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the case as a settlement class
      under Rule 23(b)(2) and23(b)(3);

   2. appointing Kathy Warren, Tonya Calhoun and Clarissa Rogers
      as Class Representatives and Justin Gilbert, as Class
      Counsel

   3. granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement;

   4. approving notification plan to determine and notify class
      members; and

   5. scheduling a fairness hearing to consider final approval of
      the settlement, the incentive award to Class Representatives
      and awards to any Class Members in the settlement class,
      and attorney fees to Class Counsel.

A copy of the Court's Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=KOJHShfL

A copy of the Plaintiffs' Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=iCYeCvN6

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Justin S. Gilbert, Esq.
          GILBERT McWHERTER SCOTT BOBBITT, PLC
          100 W. Martin Luther King Blvd., Suite 504
          Chattanooga, TN 37402
          Telephone: (423) 499 3044
          Facsimile: (731) 664 1540

               - and -

          Thomas M. Kimbrough, Esq.
          BARRETT McNAGNY LLP
          215 E. Berry Street
          P.O. Box 2263
          Fort Wayne, IN 46801
          Telephone: (260) 423 9551
          Facsimile: (260) 423 8920

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert E. Boston, Esq.
          NASHVILLE CITY CENTER
          511 Union Street, Suite 2700
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244 6380
          Facsimile: (615) 244 6804
          E-mail: Bob.boston@wallerlaw.com


JOE'S SHANGHAI: Kitchen Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------
Jian Ying Lin, Hui Qiu Chen and Xin He, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Shanghai Original,
Inc. d/b/a Joe's Shanghai, East Brother Corp., Shanghai City
Corp., Shanghai Duplicate Corp., Kiu Sang Si (a/k/a Joseph Si),
Yiu Fai Fong, Tun Yee Lam a/k/a Peter Lam, Gui Bing Shi, Solomon C
Liou, Mimi Si, William Ko, Lillian Liou, Cheng Kueng Liu, Yun Cai
and John Zhang, Defendants, Case No. 656134/2017 (N.Y. Sup.,
October 2, 2017), seeks unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, and
unpaid spread of hours due, liquidated damages, as well as an
award of reasonable attorney's fees under New York Labor Law.

Defendants operate various "Joe's Shanghai" restaurants in New
York City where Plaintiffs work as kitchen staff.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     John Troy, Esq.
     Troy Law, PLLC
     41-25 Kissena Boulevard, Suite 119
     Flushing, NY 11355
     Tel (718) 762-1324
     Email: johntroy@troypllc.com


JOHN CHRISTNER: "Huddleston" Wage-and-Hour Suit Moved to Okla.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and granting Motion to Transfer
Venue of the case captioned THOMAS HUDDLESTON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOHN
CHRISTNER TRUCKING, LLC, Defendant, No. 1:17-cv-00925-LJO-SAB
(E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Thomas Huddleston brings this wage-and-hour putative
class action lawsuit against defendant John Christner Trucking,
LLC (JCT). JCT moves to dismiss based on lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue, or, in the alternative, to
transfer the case to the Northern District of Oklahoma, the forum
specified in the forum-selection clause of the contract between
the parties.

Huddleston worked as an owner-operator for JCT. In that role, he
was responsible for operating a commercial vehicle and
transporting customer cargo to assigned destinations. Huddleston
claims JCT misclassified its owner-operators as independent
contractors, rather than employees, and thus violated a variety of
state and federal labor laws, including those governing payment of
wages, minimum wage, meal and rest breaks, and wage reporting.
Huddleston seeks to represent other owner-operators in a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
class actions under California and Oklahoma law.

JCT argues that because it is an Oklahoma corporation that holds
its driver orientations in Oklahoma and bases its drivers'
compensation on miles traveled nationwide, not merely in
California, it never directed its actions at California, and the
second prong is left unsatisfied. The Court disagrees. JCT's
contacts with California are not mere happenstance resulting from
Huddleston's incidental residence in the state independent of
JCT's conduct.

Huddleston alleges that JCT contracts with California residents
and instructs them to make pick-ups and drop-offs in California.
It is thus not Huddleston's personal choice to live in California
which drives the jurisdictional analysis, but JCT's choice to
dispatch deliveries to and from California which does.  Indeed,
courts have found the requirements of specific personal
jurisdiction satisfied where a shipping company contracts to ship
goods from one state to a second state and a cause of action
arises in a third state through which the goods were passing.
The purposeful-direction requirement is satisfied.

JCT argues that the center-piece of Huddleston's complaint is the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which set nationwide standards,
and because Huddleston performed long-haul truck-driving services
throughout the country, the FLSA claims could have arisen whether
he was a resident of California, Connecticut, Colorado, or any
other state in the country Being primarily a FLSA case, JCT
contends, it cannot be said that JCT's California operations made
the FLSA claim (or Oklahoma state claims) uniquely possible.

While FLSA claims can arise in any state, JCT's decision to hire
Huddleston, a California resident, to make pick-ups and drop-offs
in California means that his claims arose, at least in part,
there. Indeed, the list of pick-ups and drop-offs appended as
Exhibit B to the Crowley Declaration shows that twelve of the
twenty-five loads that JCT assigned to Huddleston had origin or
destination points within the state of California.

By orchestrating deliveries to and from California and applying
the allegedly unlawful employment practices to persons performing
those transportation services, JCT targets California. Even though
the defendant's headquarters from which the challenged policies
originated were located outside of California, jurisdiction was
still proper based on the application of the policies to the
company's activities in this state.
The policies at issue may have their origin in Oklahoma, but JCT's
decision to purposefully direct its activities toward California
and apply those policies in this forum give rise to specific
personal jurisdiction. Indeed, but for JCT's transportation
operation in California, Huddleston would not have any potential
claim under California law. Huddleston's claims arise out of JCT's
forum-related activities, and the second requirement is satisfied.

JCT has not met its burden of showing that the California Court's
exercise of specific jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

Though JCT's corporate documents and witnesses likely will be
located in Oklahoma, Huddleston and other members of the
California class likely will be located in California. Because
document collection is now mostly an exercise in electronic
discovery, the presence of corporate documents in Oklahoma does
not weigh heavily in favor of finding that jurisdiction in
California would be unreasonable.

A California forum is important to Huddleston's interest in
convenient relief, since he is a resident of and works in this
forum and has averred that traveling to Oklahoma to litigate this
case would present a burden.

Oklahoma is available as an alternative forum. However, whether
another reasonable forum exists becomes an issue only when the
forum state is shown to be unreasonable. Thus, this factor is not
at issue.

JCT has not made a sufficient showing that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is unreasonable.

Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the state in which the district is
located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3)
if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.

The general venue statute does not authorize venue in a single
district in which the most substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Instead, the federal
circuit courts appear to agree that venue may be proper in
multiple districts if a substantial part of the underlying events
took place in each of those districts.

Rather, for venue to be proper, significant events or omissions
material to the plaintiff's claim must have occurred in the
district in question, even if other material events occurred
elsewhere. Though only a quarter of the loads with pick-ups or
drop-offs in California occurred within the Eastern District, that
is enough to satisfy the requirement that a substantial portion of
the events giving rise to the suit arise in the District, even if
a greater part of the events occurred elsewhere.

JCT argues in the alternative that even if the California Court
does have specific personal jurisdiction and venue is proper in
this District, the case should be transferred to the Northern
District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404 and the
forum-selection clause.

The Ninth Circuit has outlined three situations in which
enforcement of a forum-selection clause would be unreasonable: (1)
if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of
fraud or overreaching; (2) if the party wishing to repudiate the
clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court were the
clause enforced; and (3) if enforcement would contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.

For a party to escape a forum selection clause on the grounds of
fraud, it must show that the inclusion of that clause in the
contract was the product of fraud or coercion. Overreaching' is a
ground short of fraud, and a mere showing of 'non-negotiability
and power difference does not render a forum selection clause
unenforceable.

Huddleston asserts that while JCT representatives outlined certain
provisions of the ICOA prior to his signing it, he was unaware of
the forum-selection clause and its implications. He also asserts
that the power differential between himself and JCT, the inability
to negotiate the contract, and his lack of advanced formal
education all work to render the provision a product of
overreaching.

The clause here is clearly marked; the section header is bolded,
and the forum-selection provision is in capital letters.
Huddleston does not allege that he was prevented from reading the
IOCA, misled about the effect of the forum-selection clause, or
that the clause was fraudulently inserted without his knowledge.
There is nothing to indicate that the provision was the product of
undue influence or overreaching.

Huddleston has failed to provide any evidence that the Contract's
terms regarding forum selection were not clearly communicated in
the ICOA or that the inclusion of the forum selection clause was
the product of fraud or overreaching.

The argument regarding fraud and overreaching fails.

Huddleston has submitted an affidavit outlining the "prohibitive"
financial hardship associated with litigating this case in
Oklahoma.

Serving as the named plaintiff in a class action is unlikely to
carry with it the requirement that Huddleston travel to Oklahoma
with much frequency, and Huddleston has failed to explain why
litigating in Oklahoma would require substantially more time away
from work than litigating in California such that he would be
denied the ability to bring the case.

The California Court said it cannot find on this record that
honoring the forum-selection clause would mean that Huddleston
will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally agreed that the choice-
of-law analysis is irrelevant to determining if the enforcement of
a forum selection clause contravenes a strong public policy.

Huddleston argues that enforcement of the forum-selection clause
would operate in tandem with the choice-of-law provision to apply
Oklahoma law to his claims and "result in a wholesale waiver of
all state wage and hour remedies. This is so, he argues, because
the ICOA provides for the application of Oklahoma law, and under
Oklahoma law, Huddleston does not meet the statutory definition of
employee and does not qualify for the sorts of unwaivable
statutory remedies to which he would otherwise be entitled under
California law.

The California Court is unpersuaded that transferring this case to
the Northern District of Oklahoma would serve to extinguish
Huddleston's California state law claims.  The ICOA's choice-of-
law provision is narrower than the forum-selection clause. The
ICOA states that the ICOA itself shall be interpreted in
accordance with, and governed by, the laws of the United States
and, of the State of Oklahoma, without applying a choice-of law
analysis. The forum-selection clause, by contrast, states more
broadly that any claim or dispute arising from or in connection
with this agreement, whether under federal, state, local, or
foreign law shall be brought exclusively in the state or federal
courts serving Creek County, Oklahoma.

In other words, while the "in connection with" language is broad
enough to encompass Huddleston's misclassification claims and
bring them under the umbrella of the forum-selection clause, the
ICOA provides that Oklahoma law applies only to interpretation of
the ICOA itself.

The Court concludes that the forum selection clause of the ICOA is
valid and enforceable.

In a case not involving a forum-selection clause, a district court
considering a Section 1404(a) motion would evaluate both the
convenience of the parties and various public interest
considerations.

Because the parties' private interests should not be considered,
the district court may consider only arguments about public-
interest factors. Public-interest factors will rarely defeat a
transfer motion, meaning that the practical result is that forum-
selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.

Huddleston argues that his claims brought pursuant to the Private
Attorney General Act (PAGA) are of such a strong local nature that
they should be litigated in California.

Huddleston makes the related argument that the PAGA claims fall
outside the ambit of the forum-selection clause. In EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, the Supreme Court held that a
governmental agency was not bound by an employee's arbitration
agreement such that it was barred from pursuing judicial relief in
an enforcement action.

The Court held that an arbitration agreement to which the EEOC was
not a party could not limit the remedies otherwise granted to the
EEOC by statute, which not only had the authority to pursue
independent actions in court for Title VII violations but, in the
context of the suit, also had exclusive authority over the choice
of forum and the prayer for relief once a charge has been filed.
Here, in contrast, the forum-selection clause is not limiting any
remedies that would otherwise be available to the government or
removing the case from the courts completely; instead, it merely
alters which specific court will hear those claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yahj5st3from Leagle.com.

Thomas Huddleston, Plaintiff, represented by David Christopher
Leimbach -- dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace
Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP.

Thomas Huddleston, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Boulter --
rsb@boulter-law.com -- Legal Solutions Group LLP, Mira P.
Karageorge -- mkarageorge@gmail.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP & Carolyn H. Cottrell --
ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns, LLP.

John Christner Trucking, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alaina
Cathrine Hawley -- AHAWLEY@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis, Garvin,
Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C. & Megan E. Ross --
MROSS@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary.


JOHNS HOPKINS: Day Appeals D. Maryland Decision to Fourth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Michael S. Day, Jr., and Christi Ann Jordan Jarrett
filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled
Michael Day, Jr., et al. v. Johns Hopkins Health System, et al.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-03944-JFM, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland at Baltimore.

The lawsuit is brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Day, Jr., et al. v.
Johns Hopkins Health System, et al., Case No. 17-2120, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MICHAEL S. DAY, JR., As Personal
Representative and Administrator of the Estate of Michael S. Day,
Sr. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and CHRISTI
ANN JORDAN JARRETT, As Personal Representative and Administrator
of the Estate of Junior McCoy Barr and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jonathan Barry Nace, Esq.
          NIDEL & NACE, PLLC
          5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20015
          Telephone: (202) 478-9677
          E-mail: jon@nidellaw.com

Defendants-Appellees JOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION,
d/b/a The Johns Hopkins Hospital; THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL,
d/b/a The Johns Hopkins Hospital; JOHNS HOPKINS IMAGING, LLC; and
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, d/b/a Johns Hopkins Hospital, are
represented by:

          James David Mathias, Esq.
          Robert J. Mathias, Esq.
          Benjamin David Schuman, Esq.
          DLA PIPER US LLP
          6225 Smith Avenue
          Baltimore, MD 21209-3600
          Telephone: (410) 580-4208
          Facsimile: (410) 580-3208
          E-mail: james.mathias@dlapiper.com
                  robert.mathias@dlapiper.com
                  ben.schuman@dlapiper.com

Defendant-Appellee PAUL WHEELER, MD, is represented by:

          Amy E. Askew, Esq.
          Andrew Jay Graham, Esq.
          Justin Akihiko Redd, Esq.
          KRAMON & GRAHAM, PA
          Commerce Place
          1 South Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202-0000
          Telephone: (410) 752-6030
          Facsimile: (410) 361-8219
          E-mail: aaskew@kg-law.com
                  agraham@kg-law.com
                  jredd@kg-law.com


KAISER PERMANENTE: Kaiser Owes Call-Center Nurses for Unpaid Work
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
California nurses will get roughly $6 million -- at their
attorneys nearly $2 million -- from health care giant Kaiser
Permanente for time spent doing unpaid work.

The payout settles a class action filed last year on behalf of
1,397 advice nurses who take calls from patients at three of the
Permanente Medical Group's call centers in Sacramento, Vallejo and
San Jose.

Debra Brown, Sandra Morton and Barbara Labuszewski sued in
September 2016, claiming Kaiser stiffed them on pay for time they
spent logging in and out of call center computers before and after
their shifts. Kaiser doesn't consider call center nurses clocked
in until after the log-in process is complete.

Kevin Stoop, Esq. -- kstoops@sommerspc.com -- one of the attorneys
representing the class, said Kaiser is required to pay its nurses
for those minutes.

"Under the law, those couple of minutes are compensable. If you
took five minutes a day, that's 30 minutes a week and 26 hours a
person is being shorted a year," Stoop said by phone on October
13. "Those numbers add up quickly."

Stoop said each nurse will receive around $3,000 under the
settlement, an amount he called "not inconsequential." Some may
get up to $9,500.

U.S. District Judge Vincent Chhabria also awarded the class'
attorneys at Sommers Schwartz and Outten & Golden fees of $1.8
million.

Kaiser did not respond to phone and email requests for comment
prior to publication.


KELLER UNLIMITED: "Sellers" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Ryan C. Sellers, and all others similarly-situated v. Keller
Unlimited LLC dba Two Keys Tavern, 57 Limited LLC, dba Two Keys
Public House and Mark Keller, Case No. 2:17-cv-02758 (D.S.C.,
October 11, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Ryan C. Sellers is a resident of Charleston County,
South Carolina and worked as a bartender for the Defendants.

Defendants own and operate Two Keys Tavern and Tow Keys Public
House in South Carolina.  Two Keys Public House and Two Keys
Tavern are Restaurants/Sports Bar. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
      MULLANEY LAW, LLC
      1037-D Chuck Dawley Blvd.
      Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
      Tel: (843) 588-5587
      E-mail: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net


KI MOON RESTAURANT: Faces "Lopez" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ki Moon Restaurant
Corp. doing business as: Pink Nori. The case is styled as
Francisco Lopez and Juan Carlos Mendez, on behalf of themselves
and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Ki Moon
Restaurant Corp. doing business as: Pink Nori, Jesse Tang, Danny
Tang and Shirley Tang, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-06078 (E.D.
N.Y., October 17, 2017).

Ki Moon Restaurant Corp. operates a Korean restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appears PRO SE.


KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Peter Zayers, the Plaintiff, v. Kiewit
Infrastructure West Co., the Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-06405-
PSG-PJW (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Philip S. Gutierrez entered an
order denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

   Class:

   "all current and former non-exempt employees employed by
   Defendant in the field in the State of California at any time
   from May 18, 2012 through the date of the certification"; and

   Waiting Time Subclass:

   "all Class Members who have separated their employment from
   Defendant from May 18, 2013 through the date of
   certification".

The Court said, "Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his theory of
recovery involves any practice that applies uniformly to all Class
Members, nor that common proof exists to make such a
determination. Because the Court determines that Plaintiff has not
met Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement or shown that common
questions predominate as required by Rule 23(b)(3), the Court need
not address the Rule's remaining requirements.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=j3dTMlWx


KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Class Cert. Hearing Continued to Dec. 12
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Jerome Ratliff Jr., the Plaintiff, v. Knight
Transportation, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07189, the
Hon. Judge Thomas M. Durkin entered an order continuing
Plaintiff's motion to certify class to Dec. 12, 2017 status
hearing.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on October 24,
2017, the Oct. 25 Notice Motion Date is stricken.  Plaintiff's
motion to certify class is entered and continued to the Dec. 12
status hearing.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Jd7t9IOt


L-3 COMMUNICATIONS: New York Court Dismisses "Price" ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JOHN PRICE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
MICHAEL STRIANESE and RALPH D'AMBROSIO, Defendants, No. 17-CV-652
(VEC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff John Price, a participant in L-3 Communications
Corporation's retirement savings plan, alleges that Defendants
Michael Strianese and Ralph D'Ambrosio, fiduciaries to the Plan
and L-3's CEO and CFO, breached their fiduciary duty of prudence
owed to Plan participants pursuant to Section 502 of Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). This purported class
action follows closely on the heels of a securities class action
arising out of the same underlying accounting misconduct, which L-
3 disclosed and the Complaint relies almost entirely on the same
alleged facts.

Plaintiffs argue that this case is like Jander v. Int'l Bus.
Machines Corp., 205 F.Supp.3d 538, an ERISA case in which the
district court held that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the
defendants knew or should have known that IBM's stock price was
artificially inflated, even though it also held that the
plaintiffs had not adequately alleged scienter in the related
securities action.  The Jander ERISA case is distinguishable. In
Jander, IBM had announced that it was taking a $2.4 billion write-
down in connection with the sale of its microelectronics business.

Plaintiffs alleged that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
required IBM to have recorded an earlier impairment of its
microelectronic assets and that IBM's stock price had therefore
been overvalued. The complaint plausibly alleged that the
individual defendants, IBM's CFO, General Counsel, and senior-most
accounting officer, knew that IBM's stock price was artificially
inflated because they had firsthand knowledge. IBM had been
struggling to sell its microelectronic business for several years
because the business was losing money and its assets were worth
little, and the individual defendants were involved in the
microelectronic business's financial reporting and efforts to sell
the business.

In contrast to Jander, in which the alleged misstatement related
to a $2.4 billion write down associated with the sale of an entire
business segment, in this case, the alleged material misstatement
arises out of improper recognition of $17.9 million in revenue
associated with a single contract in a subdivision of one of L-3's
four business segments.

A company's senior most executives, such as the defendants in both
cases, plausibly have knowledge of the former but not necessarily
the latter; a significant write down associated with the sale of a
business segment necessarily requires the involvement of the
company's senior most executives, whereas the revenue recognition
associated with a single contract typically does not.

Moreover, although the write down arising out of the C-12 Contract
ultimately grew to $69 million for 2011 through the second quarter
of 2014, even that larger number is less significant for a company
the size of L-3, which reported $4.3 billion in operating income
for that same period. The bigger the write down, the more likely
the underlying undisclosed information would have reached the
senior most executives. For these reasons, it was plausible to
infer in Jander that the individual defendants knew that the stock
price was artificially inflated, whereas it is not plausible in
this case.

In short, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants knew
or should have known that the L-3 Stock Fund had become an
imprudent investment during the Class Period because L-3's stock
price was artificially inflated as a result of accounting
improprieties associated with the C-12 Contract. Plaintiff's
Complaint is accordingly dismissed.

Even if Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that Defendants knew or
should have known that L-3 stock had become an imprudent
investment, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to allege an ERISA
duty of prudence claim. To allege that an ESOP fiduciary breached
his or her fiduciary duty of prudence, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege an alternative action that the defendant could have taken
that would have been consistent with the securities laws and that
a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have
viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.

Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants could have closed the L-3
Stock Fund to new purchases or otherwise prevented Plan
participants from purchasing L-3 stock until the stock price
corrected to a non-inflated value does not satisfy Fifth Third.
This alternative has been consistently proposed post Fifth Third
and has been consistently rejected in light of Fifth Third's
requirement that the plaintiff allege that a prudent fiduciary
could not have concluded that the alternative action would do more
harm than good.

For example, in Rinehart, where the ESOP invested in company stock
three months before Lehman Brothers' collapse, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court, holding that a prudent fiduciary
could have concluded that simply holding Lehman stock without
purchasing more would do more harm than good and that such an
alternative action in the summer of 2008 could have had dire
consequences. These dire consequences include sending the stock
into a significant price decline and weakening investor confidence
in the company particularly if the freeze is not accompanied by a
disclosure explaining the reason for the freeze.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants could
have satisfied their duty of prudence by halting investment in L-3
stock fails.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ydxth8okfrom Leagle.com.

John Price, Plaintiff, represented by Edward H. Glenn, Jr.,
Zamansky L.L.C., 50 Broadway -- 32nd Floor New York NY, 10004
John Price, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob H. Zamansky, Zamansky
& Associates LLC & Samuel Ethan Bonderoff, Zamansky L.L.C., 50
Broadway -- 32nd Floor New York NY, 10004

Michael Strianese, Defendant, represented by Michael John Garvey -
- mgarvey@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, David
Elbaum -- david.elbaum@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP & Paul C. Curnin -- pcurnin@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP.

Ralph D'Ambrosio, Defendant, represented by Michael John Garvey,
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, David Elbaum, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP & Paul C. Curnin, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.


L'OREAL USA: Court Allows Keratin Products Suit to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Sothern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned BRANDI PRICE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
L'OREAL USA, INC., et al., Defendants, No. 17 Civ. 0614(LGS)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Defendants L'Oreal and Matrix bring this partial motion to dismiss
the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

Defendant Matrix is a subsidiary of Defendant L'Oreal. They
manufacture, advertise and distribute the three hair products --
Matrix Biolage Keratindose Pro-Keratin + Silk Shampoo (Shampoo),
Pro-Keratin + Silk Conditioner (Conditioner) and Pro-Keratin
Renewal Spray (Spray) (Products).

Plaintiff Chadwick, a California resident, purchased the Shampoo
and Conditioner for $30.00 at a J.C. Penny salon in Sacramento,
California, after viewing in-store advertisements and/or Product
packaging, and receiving a recommendation from a salon employee
about the Products.  The Plaintiffs allege that when Defendants
marketed the Products as containing keratin and providing its
benefits, Defendants knew that the Products did not contain
keratin. Had Plaintiffs known that the Products did not contain
keratin, they would not have purchased them or would have paid
less for them.

Defendants move to dismiss the following claims for failure to
plead with the specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b): common law fraud (Count IV); violation of the
Unfair Business Acts and Practices Prong (Count VI); the
Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices Prong (Count VII); and the
Unlawful Prong (Count VIII) of California Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) and violation of California False Advertising Law (FAL).

The Complaint alleges that Defendants misrepresented the
ingredients of the Products by using the word keratin in the
Products' name, and by representing in the package instructions
and on the website that the Products contained Pro-Keratin with
benefits associated with keratin. The Complaint alleges
specifically where and when each Plaintiff bought the Products,
and therefore saw the labels. The Complaint further alleges that
the statements were fraudulent because the products did not
contain keratin, were incapable of delivering the benefits
associated with keratin and that Defendants, as the manufacturers
and distributors of the Products, knew that they did not contain
keratin.

Here, the Complaint alleges that Products were sold nationwide and
each Plaintiff, having seen the Products' name and marketing
materials, believed that the Products contained keratin.  The
Complaint also alleges that each Plaintiff would not have
purchased the Products or would have paid less for them had she
known the Products did not contain keratin. In sum, the Complaint
sufficiently alleges actual reliance to support the UCL and FAL
claims.

Defendants made specific representations in the Products' name,
which contains the word keratin, and the Products' marketing
materials, which provide that the Products contain Pro-Keratin.
These representations plausibly constitute an "affirmation of
[the] fact" and an express warranty that the Products contain
keratin. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs suffered personal
injury in the form of hair loss and hair damage because they
purchased and used the Products relying on Defendants' false
representations that the Products contained keratin.
The motion to dismiss the breach of express warranty claim is
therefore denied, despite the lack of privity between Plaintiffs
and Defendants.

Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II, the breach of contract
claim under New York Law, as duplicative of Count I, the breach of
express warranty claim under the New York Uniform Commercial Code,
is denied because Count II is pleaded in the alternative to Count
I. Both claims are premised on identical theories of express
warranty. Although a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same
injuries, New York law entitles a plaintiff to assert alternative
theories of liability, such that a plaintiff is not required to
elect the breach of express warranty theory over the breach of
contract theory at this time.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim under
New York law (Count V) is granted because it is duplicative of the
other claims. While unjust enrichment may be pleaded as an
independent claim under New York law, it is available only in
unusual situations when, though the defendant has not breached a
contract nor committed a recognized tort, circumstances create an
equitable obligation running from the defendant to the plaintiff.
An unjust enrichment claim is not available where it simply
duplicates, or replaces, a conventional contract or tort claim.
Under New York law, unjust enrichment is an equitable claim that
is unavailable where an adequate remedy at law exists.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim under
California law (Count V) is granted. Generally, in California,
where there is a valid express contract covering the same subject
matter, there is no standalone cause of action for unjust
enrichment.

The Complaint alleges that the Products' advertising and
Plaintiffs' subsequent purchase of the Products created a
contract, promising that the Products contained keratin, and that
Defendants breached this contract because the Products did not
contain keratin. Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is premised
on the same facts and does not dispute the enforceability or the
existence of this contract. Therefore, Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim is precluded and cannot be construed as a quasi-
contract claim.

Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' demand for injunctive
relief is granted. A plaintiff must plead a real or immediate
threat of injury in order to have standing to pursue injunctive
relief.

Plaintiffs argue that injunctive relief is available under New
York General Business Law Section 349, which is the basis for
Count IX of the Complaint and not the subject of this motion.
Although Plaintiffs may be correct, that relief is not available
in federal court because of the lack of Article III standing.
They must pursue injunctive relief, if at all, in state court.

Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants' argument that any remedy
for restitution is limited to the portion of Plaintiffs' purchase
price of the Products attributable to the alleged misstatements.
Plaintiffs' demand for restitution, to the extent it seeks the
full purchase price of the products, consequently is dismissed as
abandoned. This ruling does not address the calculation of damages
or other forms of requested relief apart from restitution.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied except for
Count V for unjust enrichment to the extent asserted under New
York and California law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yabegou6from
Leagle.com.

Brandi Price, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory F. Coleman, Greg
Coleman Law PC, First Tennessee Plaza, 800 S. Grey St., Suite
1100, Knoxville, TN 37929ennessee Plaza

Brandi Price, Plaintiff, represented by Jason Travis Brown, JTB
Law Group, LLC, 304 NEWARK AVENUE, JERSEY CITY, NJ 07302, Nick
Suciu, III --  nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com -- Barbat Mansour & Suciu
PLLC, Jason Thompson -- jthompson@sommerspc.com -- Sommers
Schwartz PC, Jonathan Betten Cohen, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, Rachel L. Soffin, Morgan & Morgan, 20 North
Orange Ave, Suite 1600, Orlando, FL 32801, Rod M. Johnston --
rjohnston@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C. & Patrick Sidney
Almonrode --  patalmonrode@jtblawgroup.com -- JTB Law Group, LLC.

Christine Chadwick, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory F. Coleman,
Greg Coleman Law PC, Jason Travis Brown, JTB Law Group, LLC, Nick
Suciu, III, Barbat Mansour & Suciu PLLC, Jason Thompson, Sommers
Schwartz PC, Jonathan Betten Cohen, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, Rachel L. Soffin, Morgan & Morgan, Rod M.
Johnston, Sommers Schwartz, P.C. & Patrick Sidney Almonrode, JTB
Law Group, LLC.

L'Oreal USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frederick Burdett
Warder, III, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP, Lauren
Capaccio, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP & Maren Jessica
Messing, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP.

Matrix Essentials, LLC, Defendant, represented by Frederick
Burdett Warder, III, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP, Lauren
Capaccio, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP & Maren Jessica
Messing, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP.


LANDAUER INC: Faces "Sharpenter" Suit Over Sale to Fortive Corp.
----------------------------------------------------------------
TED SHARPENTER, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. LANDAUER, INC., WILLIAM G. DEMPSEY, MICHAEL P.
KAMINSKI, DAVID E. MEADOR, THOMAS M. WHITE, STEPHEN C. MITCHELL,
JEFFREY A. STRONG, MICHAEL T. LEATHERMAN, JEFFREY ALLEN BAILEY,
TERI G. FONTENOT, FRANK B. MODRUSON, FORTIVE CORPORATION, and FERN
MERGER SUB INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-01349-UNA (D. Del., September
25, 2017), stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
Landauer will be acquired by Fortive Corporation ("Parent") and
its indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary, Fern Merger Sub Inc.
("Merger Sub").

On September 6, 2017, Landauer's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with
Fortive.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Merger
Sub launched a tender offer to acquire all of the Company's common
stock for $67.25 per share in cash.  Following the consummation of
the Tender Offer and the satisfaction or waiver of certain
conditions, Merger Sub will be merged with and into the Company,
and the Company will be the surviving corporation.

Landauer is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal
executive offices in Glenwood, Illinois.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  Landauer is
a global provider of technical and analytical services to
determine occupational and environmental radiation exposure and
the leading domestic provider of outsourced medical physics
services.

Defendant Parent is a Delaware corporation and a party to the
Merger Agreement.  Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation,
an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent, and a party to the
Merger Agreement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
          Wilmington, DE 19803
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rmaniskas@rmclasslaw.com


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Discovery Underway in Shareholder Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017, that discovery is continuing in the case, In
re LendingClub Corporation Shareholder Litigation.

During the year ended December 31, 2016, several putative class
action lawsuits alleging violations of federal securities laws
were filed in California Superior Court, naming as defendants the
Company, current and former directors, certain officers, and the
underwriters in the December 2014 initial public offering (the
IPO). All of these actions were consolidated into a single action
(Consolidated State Court Action), entitled In re LendingClub
Corporation Shareholder Litigation, No. CIV537300. In August 2016,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging violations of
Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) based on allegedly false and misleading
statements in the IPO registration statement and prospectus.

The Company filed a demurrer requesting the Court dismiss certain
of the claims alleged in the amended complaint, which was granted
in part in the fourth quarter of 2016. The plaintiffs then filed a
Second Amended Consolidated Complaint which the Company responded
to with a new demurrer seeking to dismiss certain claims. The
Court granted in part and denied in part this new demurrer. The
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint again in light to comply
with this Order, setting the operative complaint. In early April
2017 the plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification,
which the Company opposed. The motion was granted in part in a
June 2017 Order. Discovery is continuing.

The Company believes that the plaintiffs' allegations are without
merit, and intends to vigorously defend against the claims.


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Class Suit Trial Set for September 2018
---------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017, that trial has been set for September 2018 in
the Evellard and Wertz consolidated class actions.

In May 2016, two related putative securities class actions
(entitled Evellard v. LendingClub Corporation, et al., No. 16-CV-
2627-WHA, and Wertz v. LendingClub Corporation, et al., No. 16-CV-
2670-WHA) were filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, naming as defendants the Company
and certain of its officers and directors.

In mid-August 2016, the two actions were consolidated into a
single action. The Company moved to dismiss the amended complaint
filed in the fourth quarter of 2016.

The Court held a hearing on this motion in the first quarter of
2017 and ultimately granted in part and denied in part the motion.
The plaintiffs thereafter amended their complaint consistent with
the Order and the parties have now begun discovery.

The Court has set a schedule which includes a mediation in
September 2017, a hearing for motion for class certification for
October 2017, and trial for September 2018.

The Company believes that the plaintiffs' allegations are without
merit, and intends to vigorously defend against the claims.

LendingClub Corporation (LendingClub) operates an online
marketplace lending platform that connects borrowers and
investors. LC Advisors, LLC (LCA), is a registered investment
advisor with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
wholly-owned subsidiary of LendingClub that acts as the general
partner for certain private funds.


LENDINGCLUB CORPORATION: Federal Consumer Class Action Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
LendingClub Corporation continues to defend against the case,
Bethune v. LendingClub Corporation et al., according to its Form
10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

In April 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
federal court in New York (Bethune v. LendingClub Corporation et
al. (16 Civ. 2778)(NRB)), alleging that persons received loans,
through the Company's platform, that exceeded states' usury limits
in violation of state usury and consumer protection laws, and the
federal RICO statute. The Company filed a motion to compel
arbitration on an individual basis, which was granted in February
2017. The plaintiff has now filed an arbitration demand seeking
relief on an individual basis. The Company believes that the
plaintiff's allegations are without merit, and intends to defend
this matter vigorously.

LendingClub Corporation (LendingClub) operates an online
marketplace lending platform that connects borrowers and
investors. LC Advisors, LLC (LCA), is a registered investment
advisor with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
wholly-owned subsidiary of LendingClub that acts as the general
partner for certain private funds.


LENNY & LARRY'S: Illinois Court Narrows Clams in "Cowen"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and Motion to Strike in the case captioned LORI COWEN, ROCHELLE
IBARROLA, and AVA ADAMES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LENNY & LARRY'S, INC.,
Defendant, No. 17 CV 1530 (N.D. Ill.).

Defendant manufactures and sells the Complete Cookie online and in
retail outlets, allegedly targeting the protein and health foods
marketplace. The Complete Cookie is sold in two sizes and eleven
different varieties. The one product label plaintiffs provided to
the court describes the Snickerdoodle variety of the Complete
Cookie as baked nutrition with sixteen grams of protein and eight
grams of fiber. Additionally, the label states that the
Snickerdoodle Complete Cookie is vegan, contains no eggs, dairy,
or soy, and is non-GMO.

Plaintiffs allege that the Complete Cookies' labels are false and
deceptive for a number of reasons. Plaintiffs first allege that
the labels overstate the Complete Cookies' protein content. Next,
plaintiffs allege that the labels understate the content of other
nutrients, specifically calories, carbohydrates, fats, and sugars.

Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges the following: violation of
several states' consumer protection statutes (Count I); violation
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA), (Count II); violation
of the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law (PCPL) (Count III)
breach of express warranty (Count IV); breach of implied warranty
(Count V); negligent misrepresentation (Count VI); intentional
misrepresentation (Count VII); and unjust enrichment (Count VIII).

Defendant argues that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to
bring claims for varieties of the Complete Cookie they did not
purchase.

In Wagner v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 2017 WL 3070772, the court did
not engage in an Article III analysis because the parties agreed
that the plaintiff's claims should be analyzed under the
substantial similarity test. There is no such agreement in the
instant case. Although it has not spoken directly on the
substantial similarity test, the Seventh Circuit's position that
plaintiffs cannot piggy-back on the injuries of the unnamed class
members in order to acquire standing "through the back door of a
class action is clear.  Consequently, the court is convinced that
a named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing his
action on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have
afforded them standing had they been named plaintiffs, because a
person cannot predicate standing on injury which he does not
share.  Plaintiffs' claims as to the products they did not
purchase are therefore dismissed.

Defendant also argues that plaintiffs' multi-state and national
class claims should be dismissed or stricken because the amended
complaint does not, and plaintiffs cannot, satisfy Rule 23 class
elements such as typicality and predominance. This is so,
according to defendant, because Illinois choice-of-law principles
require the application of the law of the state in which the
injured party resides or purchased the Complete Cookie, and
applying conflicting laws of various states to plaintiffs' claims
will be unmanageable on a multi-state or national basis. Defendant
points to a number of material conflicts between the laws of the
states that comprise plaintiffs' proposed multi-state class to
support its position.

Plaintiffs offer little response to defendant's in-depth analysis
of the many ways in which the laws of the states that comprise the
proposed classes conflict. Instead, plaintiffs urge the court to
ignore conflicts in state law until plaintiffs move for class
certification, as the court did in Rysewyk v. Sears Holdings
Corp., 2015 WL 9259886.  That decision, however, is inapposite.
In Rysewyk, Judge Shah noted that the defendant, in moving to
strike class allegations, carried the burden of demonstrating that
specific variations of laws between specific states preclude class
treatment, and that the defendant did not make such a showing. In
the instant case, however, defendant used five pages of its
motion, in which it cited dozens of cases, to demonstrate specific
impediments to class certification in the way of conflicting state
laws.

Defendant's showing is a far cry from Rysewyk, where the
defendants failed to explain in any detail how the relevant laws
of the different states differ in material ways. Instead,
defendant's analysis makes it apparent at this stage that
individual questions will predominate over common ones rather than
repeating in generic ways that the laws of different states are
different.

Accordingly, the court grants defendant's motion on these grounds
and strikes all claims pled on behalf of the multi-state and
national classes.

Defendant's final argument is that the complaint should be
dismissed in its entirety for failure to comply with Rule 9(b).
According to defendant, the complaint is deficient for supplying
the court with the label of only one variation of the Complete
Cookie (Snickerdoodle) and not explicitly alleging that the labels
for the other variations are the same or sufficiently similar.

Although the complaint could be more specific in some respects
(such as when plaintiffs purchased the products), plaintiffs have
minimally satisfied Rule 9(b) by alleging the following: (1)
defendant (who); (2) made fraudulent representations (what); (3)
on their website and the packaging of the Complete Cookies, which
were purchased in plaintiffs' home states (where and how); (4)
during the class period, or over the past few years (when).
Because the complaint provides defendant with an outline of the
alleged scheme that is sufficient to notify defendant of the
alleged fraud, defendant's motion is denied on these grounds.
The court grants in part and denies in part defendant's motion to
dismiss and to strike class claims. Count I is dismissed and all
claims pled on behalf of the national class and multi-state
subclass are stricken. Counts II-VIII remain, but with respect
only to the Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania classes.

Plaintiff is directed to file a second amended complaint
conforming to the District Court's October 12, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order, a full-text copy of which is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ycmhmtqffrom Leagle.com.

Lori Cowen, Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Wallace --
eaw@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP.

Lori Cowen, Plaintiff, represented by Nick Suciu, III --
nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com -- Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC, Adam
Michael Prom -- ap@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP, Karin
Ruth Leavitt -- krl@wassermanlaw.com -- Wasserman Law Group, pro
hac vice, Kathryn S. Marshall, Wasserman Law Group, pro hac vice &
Steve K. Wasserman, Wasserman Law Group, pro hac vice, 5567 Reseda
Boulevard, Suite 330 P.O. Box 7033, Los Angeles, CA 91357,

Rochelle Ibarrola, Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Wallace,
Wexler Wallace LLP, Nick Suciu, III, Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC,
Adam Michael Prom, Wexler Wallace LLP, Karin Ruth Leavitt,
Wasserman Law Group, pro hac vice, Kathryn S. Marshall, Wasserman
Law Group, pro hac vice & Steve K. Wasserman, Wasserman Law Group,
pro hac vice.

Ava Adames, Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Wallace, Wexler
Wallace LLP.

Lenny & Larry's, Inc., Defendant, represented by David M. Schultz
-- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Robert
Leslie Wallan -- Robert.wallan@pillsbury.com -- Pillsbury Winthrop
Shaw Pittman LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan Joseph Vanderford --
ryan.vanderford@pillsburylaw.com -- Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP, pro hac vice, Todd Philip Stelter --
tstelter@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson, Andrew R.
DeVooght -- adevooght@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Brittney Nicole
Cato -- bcato@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson Llp &
Kimberly L. Buffington -- kbuffington@pillsbury.com -- Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.


LINCARE HOLDINGS: Faces "Giancola" Suit in M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lincare Holdings,
Inc. The case is styled as Andrew Giancola, Raymond T. Scott and
Patricia Smith, individually and on behalf of others similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs v. Lincare Holdings, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 8:17-cv-02427-VMC-AAS (M.D. Fla., October 16, 2017).

Lincare Holdings Inc. is a provider of oxygen and other
respiratory therapy services to patients in the home.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   David A. Weisz, Esq.
   Johnson Fistel, LLP
   40 Powder Springs Street
   Marietta, GA 30064
   Tel: (770) 200-3104
   Fax: (770) 200-3101

      - and -

   Frank J. Johnson, Esq.
   Johnson Fistel, LLP
   600 West Broadway, Suite 1540
   San Diego, CA 92101
   Tel: (619) 230-0063
   Fax: (619) 255-1856

      - and -

   Michael I. Fistel, Jr., Esq.
   Johnson Fistel, LLP
   40 Powder Springs Street
   Marietta, GA 30064
   Tel: (770) 200-3104
   Fax: (770) 200-3104

      - and -

   Peter L. Tragos, Esq.
   Tragos & Sartes, PL
   601 Cleveland St, Suite 800
   Clearwater, FL 33755
   Tel: (727) 441-9030
   Fax: (727) 441-9254
   Email: petertragos@greeklaw.com

      - and -

   Phong L. Tran, Esq.
   Johnson Fistel, LLP
   600 West Broadway, Suite 1540
   San Diego, CA 92101
   Tel: (619) 230-0063
   Fax: (619) 255-1856


LOS ANGELES: Court Approves Class Certification Bid in "Garcia"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Edgar Garcia, the Plaintiff, v. County of
Los Angeles, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-03549-FMO-
VBK (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Fernando M. Olguin will grant
Plaintiff's third amended motion for class certification and
preliminary approval of settlement.

According civil minutes, an order with the court's ruling will be
issued.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=08laCi2H

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Solomon E. Gresen
          RGLawyers, LLP
          15910 Ventura Blvd. Ste 1610
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 815 2727
          Facsimile: (818) 815 2737
          E-mail: seg@rglawyers.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Marlene M. Nicolas, Esq.
          Karina A. Layugan, Esq.
          SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          333 South Hope Street, Forty-Third Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 620 1780
          Facsimile: (213) 620 1398


LOWE'S HOME: Faces "Banda" Wage and Hour Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ALEX BANDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive,
Case No. BC676994 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Cty., September
25, 2017), is a purported wage and hour class action on behalf of
all persons employed by the Defendants, who were not provided with
accurate wage statements pursuant to California law.

Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, is a corporation, organized and existing
pursuant to the laws of the state of California, which has various
offices and locations in the State and serve numerous customers
throughout the State.  The identities of the Doe Defendants are
currently not known.

Lowe's Home operates home improvement stores.  The Company retails
appliances, tools, paints, lumber, and nursery products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "Kempf"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
KAREN KEMPF, Plaintiff, v. LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC., Defendant,
Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-492-DJH (W.D. Ky.), and granting
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw.

Karen Kempf purchased flooring for her home from Lumber
Liquidators, Inc. Within a few weeks of installation, Kempf
noticed several defects in her new floor. Kempf filed this
purported class action against Lumber Liquidators, alleging
violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act and breaches of
implied and express warranties. She brings this action on her own
behalf and on behalf of all individuals in Kentucky who purchased
the same floor for their homes.

At the time Lumber Liquidators filed its motion to dismiss, a
similar nationwide class action lawsuit was pending in the
Northern District of California. As a result, Lumber Liquidators
asked the Court to either dismiss Kempf's claims or, in the
alternative, stay this action pending the outcome of the
California case or transfer this action to the Northern District
of California.

However, the plaintiffs in the California case narrowed the scope
of their claims, moving to certify a class of individuals who
reside in California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia. With Kentucky excluded from this proposed
class, Lumber Liquidators moved to withdraw its alternative motion
to stay or transfer this action. This change does not affect
Lumber Liquidators' motion to dismiss.

In Count I of the complaint, Kempf alleges that Lumber Liquidators
violated the KCPA by engaging in unfair business practices,
failing to disclose material facts regarding the defective nature
of the Floor, and misrepresenting the appearance and durability
characteristics of the Floor.

To assert a KCPA claim, the plaintiff must allege that the
defendant engaged in unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce and that such
practices caused the plaintiff's harm. The terms 'false,
misleading and deceptive' [have] sufficient meaning to be
understood by a reasonably prudent person of common intelligence.
Therefore, they are given their ordinary meaning as understood by
a reasonably prudent person of common intelligence.

Lumber Liquidators argue that Kempf cannot bring a class action
under the KCPA. In support of this argument, Lumber Liquidators
cites an unpublished Kentucky trial-court case in which the court
stated that it did not believe that the KCPA was meant to be a
vehicle for Class Action suits. Arnold v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-
CI-00123, 2000 WL 36114007.

The Court finds, however, that the venue requirements of Section
367.220(1) do not prohibit class actions. A KCPA action may be
brought in one of three locations: (1) the circuit court where the
seller resides or has its principal place of business or is doing
business, (2) the circuit court where the purchaser resides, or
(3) the circuit court where the transaction occurred.
A class action might not easily fit within the second or third
venue category. For instance, in the present case, purchasers of
the floor will inevitably reside in different parts of the state,
and Lumber Liquidators has numerous Kentucky stores where the
floor might have been sold, meaning that transactions likely would
have taken place in different parts of the state as well. But a
class action could be filed under the first venue category, in the
circuit court where Lumber Liquidators has its principal place of
business.

Therefore, it is unclear why the statute's venue requirements
would pose a problem for class actions. Nor is it clear why the
Arnold court pointed to the language of Section 367.220 as an
obstacle to class actions when the statute simply provides any
person with a remedy. Accordingly, the Court concludes that, in
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, class actions
are not prohibited by the KCPA.

Second, the Court finds that Kempf has adequately pleaded a claim
under the KCPA. Kempf asserts that Lumber Liquidators failed to
disclose material facts regarding the defective nature of the
floor and misrepresented its appearance and durability. She also
asserts that the floor degrades far in advance of its purported
life as represented through its thirty (30) year warranty. The
facts alleged in the complaint, which the Court must accept as
true at this stage, demonstrate that the floor began shrinking,
cupping, making popping and cracking sounds, splintering, and
scratching within a few weeks of installation.

Lumber Liquidators argues, however, that even if Kempf had alleged
all the elements of a KCPA claim her KCPA claim fails to meet the
more stringent requirements imposed by Rule 9(b). Lumber
Liquidators is correct that the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading
standard applies to KCPA claims.  But Kempf has pleaded sufficient
facts to meet that heightened standard. She has specified the time
(February 2015), the place (the Lumber Liquidators store), and the
content, of the alleged misrepresentation.

The Court therefore finds that the allegations in Kempf's
complaint are sufficient to support a KCPA claim.

Count II of Kempf's complaint claims that Lumber Liquidators
breached its implied warranty by manufacturing, selling, and
distributing the Floor, which is defective in design, materials,
workmanship, and not fit for its intended purpose. Lumber
Liquidators argues that Kempf fails to allege sufficient facts
showing that the floor is not merchantable or fit for ordinary
use.

The problems with the floor alleged in the complaint, shrinking,
gapping, cupping, popping, splintering, and scratching,
demonstrate that the floor was not fit for its ordinary purpose.
The Court therefore finds that Kempf has sufficiently pleaded a
claim for breach of implied warranty.

Count II of the complaint further alleges that Lumber Liquidators
made and breached express warranties.

The complaint details the numerous problems Kempf noticed within
weeks of having her new floor installed, including shrinking,
cupping, popping and cracking sounds, splintering, and scratching.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is obligated to
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The Court infers from the
defects alleged in the complaint that any express warranties that
may have been made by the sales representative were breached.

Therefore, the Court finds that Kempf has adequately pleaded that
Lumber Liquidators breached the alleged express warranties.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yafo3px2from Leagle.com.

Karen Kempf, Plaintiff, represented by David N. Ward, Clay Daniel
Walton Adams PLC. 462 S. 4th St., Meidinger Tower, Suite 101,
Louisville, KY 40202

Karen Kempf, Plaintiff, represented by Laura E. Landenwich, Clay
Daniel Walton Adams PLC. 462 S. 4th St., Meidinger Tower, Suite
101, Louisville, KY 40202

Lumber Liquidators, Inc., Defendant, represented by Demetrius O.
Holloway -- dholloway@stites.com -- Stites & Harbison, PLLC.


MAHLER ENTERPRISES: "Rhodes" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
Janetta Rhodes, and all others similarly-situated v. Mahler
Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-01373 (E.D. Wis., October 11,
2017), seeks compensation for all unpaid overtime wages pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Wisconsin Wage laws.

Plaintiff Janetta Rhodes is a resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as housekeeper from April 2016
to May 2017.

Defendant operates MahlerClean, a division of Defendant that
provides janitorial, cleaning, and related light maintenance
services to medical, institutional, commercial, and industrial
clients in Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, and Florida. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sara J. Geenen, Esq.
      THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM, S.C.
      310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
      Milwaukee, WI 53203
      Tel: (414) 271-4500
      Fax: (414) 271-6308
      E-mail: sjg@Previant.com


MARIETTA MEMORIAL: Seeks 6th Cir. Review of Order in "Myers" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Marietta Health Care Inc., Marietta Memorial Hospital
and Selby General Hospital filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled YNNETT MYERS, et al. v. MARIETTA MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-02956, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 25,
2017, the District Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify
this class:

    "All of Defendants' current and former Nurses and Patient
     Care Technicians who were hourly employees and subject to
     Defendants' automatic meal deduction policy during the three
     years before this Complaint was filed up to the present."

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Marietta Memorial
Hospital, et al., Case No. 17-312, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents LYNNETT MYERS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; CAROL BUTLER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated; and ARVA LOWTHER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Lance Chapin, Esq.
          STEIN, CHAPIN & ASSOCIATES
          580 S. High Street, Suite 330
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-9100
          Facsimile: (614) 221-9272
          E-mail: rchambers@steinchapin.com

Defendants-Petitioners MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, MARIETTA HEALTH
CARE INC., dba Memorial Health System, and SELBY GENERAL HOSPITAL
are represented by:

          James E. Davidson, Esq.
          ICE MILLER LLP
          250 West Street
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 462-2286
          E-mail: james.davidson@icemiller.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Class Suit Against Starwood Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marriott International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017, that a class action lawsuit filed
against Starwood related to malware intrusion has been dismissed.

In November 2015, Starwood announced a malware intrusion had
affected point of sale systems at various outlets within certain
Legacy-Starwood branded hotels. This resulted in the potential
compromise of credit card data and associated personal
information. MasterCard imposed penalties as a result of the
breach. Visa has not yet done so, but this may be under
consideration.

"We do not expect the penalties to have a material impact on our
consolidated results of operations," the Company said.

In addition, a putative class action arising from the malware
intrusion was filed against Starwood on January 5, 2016 in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California. The named plaintiff, Paul Dugas, did not specify any
damages.

On June 28, 2017, the Court dismissed the case in its entirety.

"Plaintiffs have informed us that they are not going to pursue the
case further," the Company said.

Marriott is a worldwide operator, franchisor, and licensor of
hotels and timeshare properties in 125 countries and territories
under 30 brand names at the end of the 2017 second quarter.


MASSAGE ENVY: "Tamburelli" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ADAM TAMBURELLI, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MASSAGE ENVY
SPA MARINA DEL REY, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, the Defendant(s),
Case No. 2:17-cv-04208-AB-AGR (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move
the Court on June 29, 2018, to certify the following class
pursuant to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, and California Unfair Competition Law, California
Business & Professions Code:

   "all persons in the United States whose bank accounts were
   debited on a reoccurring basis by Defendants for increased
   pricing different than the pricing at the time of signup,
   without Defendants obtaining a written authorization signed or
   similarly authenticated for preauthorized electronic fund
   transfers within the one year prior to the filing of this
   Complaint";

   and

   "all persons in the United States whose bank accounts were
   debited on a reoccurring basis by Defendants after consumer's
   request for cancellation, without Defendants obtaining a
   written authorization signed or similarly authenticated for
   preauthorized electronic fund transfers within the one year
   prior to the filing of this Complaint".

The Plaintiff will also move the Court for appointment of
Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, and for appointment of
Plaintiffs' attorneys as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=xruOmgM2

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


MATCH GROUP: Court Denies Move to Dismiss Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, issued Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the cases captioned MARY
McCLOSKEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MATCH GROUP, INC. et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-549-L, No. 3:16-CV-668-L
(N.D. Tex).  The court allows Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings
to cure the deficiencies noted in the motions to dismiss.

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims for alleged
violations of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the federal
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) against all Defendants.
Plaintiffs seek to recover compensatory damages; equitable,
injunctive, or other relief deemed appropriate by the court;
attorney, accountant, and expert fees; and other costs and
disbursements.

Plaintiffs filed an omnibus response to the motions to dismiss in
which they disagree that their Amended Complaint fails to state
securities claims upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs
also cite to an opinion from the Southern District of Texas in
which the court granted a motion to dismiss but allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their securities violations pleadings,
including those regarding standing.

The court construes this as a request for leave by Plaintiffs to
amend their pleadings. The Underwriter Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend their pleadings because
doing so would be futile.

After reviewing the motions to dismiss, the parties' briefs, and
pleadings, the court has concerns whether Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to state securities claims upon which relief can
be granted Because it is unclear at this juncture whether allowing
Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings would be futile, and
Plaintiffs have previously only amended their pleadings once when
they were directed to file a consolidated amended complaint, the
court will deny without prejudice the motions to dismiss and allow
Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings.

The court denies without prejudice Underwriter Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and denies without
prejudice Match Group Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff is directed to amend complaint that cures the
deficiencies noted in the motions to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7zykvv3from Leagle.com.

Mary McCloskey, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Mary McCloskey, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac
vice, Alexa J. Mullarky -- amullarky@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Jamie Jean McKey --
jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group LLP, Jeffrey H.
Squire -- squire@bespc.com -- Bragar Eagel & Squire PC, pro hac
vice, Joe Kendall, Kendall Law Group LLP, 3232 McKinney, Ste 700,
Dallas, Texas 75204 , Kara M. Wolke -- kwolke@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Todd H. Henderson --
bragar@bespc.com  -- Bragar Eagel & Squire PC.

Craig Kneller, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy, Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, pro hac vice, Alexa J. Mullarky, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
pro hac vice, Jamie Jean McKey, Kendall Law Group LLP, Joe
Kendall, Kendall Law Group LLP, Kara M. Wolke, Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP & Todd H. Henderson, Bragar Eagel & Squire PC.

Stephany Kam-Wan Chan, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Lesley F.
Portnoy, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Brian Schall, Goldberg Law PC,
J. Alexander Hood, II, Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy Alan Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP, Marc Gorrie, Pomerantz LLP, Michael Goldberg,
Goldberg Law PC, Patrick Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, Peretz
Bronstein, Bronstein Gewirtz & Grossman LLC & Willie Briscoe, The
Briscoe Law Firm.

Match Group Inc, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus Behrens --
thad.behrens@haynesboone.com -- Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R.
Wilso -- BRWilson@wlrk.com -- Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz &
Stephen R. DiPrima -- SRDiPrima@wlrk.com -- Wachtell Lipton Rosen
& Katz.

Gregory R Blatt, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus Behrens,
Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R. Wilson, Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz & Stephen R. DiPrima, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.

Gary Swidler, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus Behrens,
Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R. Wilson, Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz & Stephen R. DiPrima, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.

Michael H Schwerdtman, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus
Behrens, Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R. Wilson, Wachtell Lipton
Rosen & Katz & Stephen R. DiPrima, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.

Gregg J Winiarski, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus Behrens,
Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R. Wilson, Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz & Stephen R. DiPrima, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.

Joseph M Levin, Defendant, represented by R. Thaddeus Behrens,
Haynes & Boone LLP, Bradley R. Wilson, Wachtell Lipton Rosen &
Katz & Stephen R. DiPrima, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz.

JP Morgan Securities LLC, Defendant, represented by Yolanda
Cornejo Garcia -- YGARCIA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Penny
P. Reid -- PREID@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Yvette
Ostolaza, Sidley Austin LLP.

Allen & Company LLC, Defendant, represented by Yolanda Cornejo
Garcia, Sidley Austin LLP, Penny P. Reid, Sidley Austin LLP &
Yvette Ostolaza, Sidley Austin LLP.

Merrill Lynch, Defendant, represented by Yolanda Cornejo Garcia,
Sidley Austin LLP, Penny P. Reid, Sidley Austin LLP & Yvette
Ostolaza, Sidley Austin LLP.

Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Yolanda Cornejo Garcia, Sidley Austin LLP, Penny P. Reid, Sidley
Austin LLP & Yvette Ostolaza, Sidley Austin LLP.


MCCLATCHY CO: Faces "DeJesus" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The McClatchy
Company doing business as: Centre Daily Times. The case is styled
as Ana Jessica DeJesus, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The McClatchy Company doing
business as: Centre Daily Times, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07982
(S.D.N.Y., October 17, 2017).

McClatchy is a news and information publisher.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MDL 1720: Court Allows Amendments in Credit Card Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint in the case
captioned IN RE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE FEE AND MERCHANT DISCOUNT
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. This document refers to: ALL ACTIONS. No.
05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO). (E.D.N.Y.).

The plaintiffs in this multi-district litigation, some acting on
behalf of putative classes of millions of merchants, and others
acting independently, have accused the corporate entities that
operate the Visa and MasterCard payment card networks as well as
several banks of violating federal and state antitrust laws.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated 14
actions asserting the antitrust claims and transferred them to
this court for pre-trial proceedings.  Since then, dozens more
have been added, and there are currently over 90 cases associated
with this action, some pleaded as class actions and some filed by
plaintiffs suing only on behalf of themselves.

After filing further supplemental pleadings and litigating
dismissal motions, the Class Plaintiffs filed their Second
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, which, together with two
supplemental complaints filed the same day, collectively comprise
the Class Plaintiffs' currently operative pleading. The Operative
Class Complaint omitted certain class claims that had been
included in its predecessor and added an antitrust claim against
Visa for fixing interchange fees for PIN debit card transaction
but otherwise replicated the class plaintiffs' earlier claims.  Of
particular relevance here, like its predecessor, the Operative
Class Complaint asserts that the Network Rules unlawfully allow
issuing banks to set interchange fees in the market for network
services at supra-competitive rates.

After extensive negotiations, the parties to the then-pending
class claims executed a proposed settlement agreement. The court
preliminarily approved the proposed settlement, provisionally
certified two classes, a class for damages claims, from which
members could opt out, and a class for injunctive relief in which
membership was mandatory and enjoined all members of the
provisionally certified settlement classes from litigating any
claims covered by the settlement. The court certified the two
settlement classes and approved the proposed settlement over the
objections of several named plaintiffs as well as several non-
party class members.

Under the approved terms, the defendants were released from any
claims arising from the Network Rules existing and the members of
the certified classes received over seven billion dollars in
damages and injunctive relief.

Following the court's preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement, three groups of merchants that had not previously
appeared as named parties the Target, 7-Eleven, and Home Depot
groups or, collectively, the Direct Action Plaintiffs, opted out
of the settlement's damages class and filed their own complaints
in other districts, all of which were ultimately transferred to
this court and consolidated in the instant multidistrict
litigation.

Target alleges that the defendants have violated Section 1 because
the Network Rules individually and in combination, preclude
merchants from gaining the benefits of competition as to the
terms, including a fee, if any, for the acceptance of cards of
particular issuing banks and preclude card issuers from competing
for merchant acceptance of their cards.

7-Eleven alleges that the defendants have violated Sections 1 and
2 and also state antitrust laws because the Network Rules have
prevented merchants from realizing the price-reducing benefits of
Issuers competing on price, which would have occurred in a
competitive market. Instead, merchants pay the same Interchange
Fee on a given transaction regardless of which Issuer is involved.
There is no competition.

Home Depot alleges that the defendants have violated Sections 1
and 2 (and also state antitrust laws) because the Network
Defendants' conduct has caused substantial and ongoing
anticompetitive harm to merchants as direct purchasers of General
Purpose Payment Card Network Services in the form of inflated
Interchange Fees paid directly by those merchants, foreclosure of
network competitors, and reduced output.

The various groups of plaintiffs now seek leave to amend their
complaints in several ways for a number of reasons.

The defendants consent to some of those amendments, but object to
any amendment that would assert antitrust claims predicated on the
definition of a two-sided market of the type described in AmEx.
Moreover, to the extent such amendments are allowed, the
defendants contend that they should not relate back to the time of
the pleadings they would supersede, and that the Direct Action
Plaintiffs' claims should not be given the benefit of a tolling
theory that would deem them to have been asserted as early as
2005.

The Damages Class Plaintiffs contend that they should be granted
leave to amend over the defendants' objections, and that the
amendment should relate back to their original complaint, because
the core of their allegations has been and continues to be that
Defendants' collusive agreements and network rules inflate prices
to supra-competitive levels.

The defendants fault the plaintiffs for delay, arguing that they
have had the opportunity to assert claims based on a two-sided
market at least since the defendants themselves raised it as a
defense to the Class Plaintiffs' assertion that the defendants had
harmed competition in a market defined to exclude cardholders as
relevant actors. Without more, however, such delay is not a reason
to deny leave to amend.

The ground has shifted under all of the parties. That does not
mean that one side alone should suffer by being limited to the
assertion of claims that may suddenly, and quite unexpectedly,
have become untenable. Over the past dozen years, all of the
parties to this litigation have invested heavily in their
assumption that controlling law presumes the relevant market to be
one-sided.

Now that the circuit court has upset that assumption, both sides
will have to invest still more to prepare for litigation of the
newly asserted claims. But that in itself is not a reason to
foreclose the claims entirely.  In the absence of any undue delay,
bad faith, or futility of the newly asserted claims predicated on
the existence of a two-sided market, the Court granted the Damages
Class Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend.

The Damages Class Plaintiffs argue that the new claims based on a
two-sided market relate back to their original complaint because
they rely on the same factual allegations about the defendants'
conduct as before and that the defendants were on notice of the
two-sided market theory because they themselves cited it in their
own defense.

The Court disagreed.

A plaintiff pleading a claim under Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act must allege a plausible relevant market in which competition
will be impaired. The Class Plaintiffs originally contended that
the defendants were liable because they engaged in conduct that
harmed the merchants who purchased their services in a one-sided
market, and that any benefits to cardholders arising from that
conduct could not avert that liability. Those same plaintiffs now
seek to plead a wholly new alternative claim: that the defendants'
conduct harmed competition in a different, two-sided market. The
Court said it is not going to run away from the fact that the two-
sided market theory is different than the one-sided market theory.

The Court therefore concluded that the Damages Class Plaintiffs'
new claims relating to a two-sided market do not relate back to
the original complaint.

The Direct Action Plaintiffs raise many of the same arguments in
support of leave to amend as the Damages Class Plaintiffs, and,
relying on the same reasoning, the Court granted their motions as
well. The Court noted, however, that the Direct Action Plaintiffs
are in a different position with respect to some of their
arguments.

First, granting leave to amend does not have as great an impact on
the discovery burdens facing the parties to the Direct Action
Plaintiffs' claims: because those claims were filed only after the
earlier class-wide settlement, discovery on those claims has not
proceeded nearly as far as discovery on the Class Plaintiffs'
claims; moreover, recent discovery productions have already begun
to focus on the role of cardholders.

Second, the Direct Action Plaintiffs are entitled in any event to
assert for the first time claims for injunctive relief that had
previously been barred under the terms of the class-wide
settlement. Because such claims can properly include allegations
of harm to cardholders in a two-sided market, the discovery that
the parties will inevitably conduct on the injunctive relief
claims that the Direct Action Plaintiffs are plainly entitled to
assert will in any event overlap significantly with the discovery
burdens that the defendants fear would arise as a result of
granting the contested motions to amend.

The Court therefore granted the Direct Action Plaintiffs leave to
amend.

Like the Damages Class Plaintiffs, the claims that the Direct
Action Plaintiffs originally filed were predicated on allegations
that the defendants' conduct harmed competition in a one-sided
market.

First, the Direct Action Plaintiffs' reliance on the same
anticompetitive rules and conduct alleged in the class complaint
and their proposed amendments incorrectly narrows the scope of the
notice required. A plaintiff must identify not only the
defendant's allegedly anticompetitive conduct, but also the
relevant market and the resulting anticompetitive harm.  But the
Class Plaintiffs' original complaints identified only a one-sided
market in which the effect of the defendants' conduct on
cardholders was immaterial.  As a result, the defendants were
never on sufficient notice that they needed to preserve and
develop evidence relating to the effect of their conduct on
cardholders who were actors in a two-sided market.

Second, Home Depot contends that declining to toll the alternative
market allegations in this case will force absent plaintiffs to
file separate actions if they disagree "even slightly" with any of
class counsel's litigation decisions. The Court disagreed, holding
that if Home Depot or any of the other Direct Action Plaintiffs
had refrained from asserting a two-sided market theory only out of
respect for American Pipe's preference to avoid a proliferation of
lawsuits they would have asserted such claims as soon as they
entered the fray rather than now.
It thus does no violence to the rationale of American Pipe to
observe that under the precise circumstances of this litigation,
equity does not compel the tolling the Direct Action Plaintiffs
seek. The goal of American Pipe tolling is to prevent a needless
multiplicity of actions which might result if putative class
members were required to file separate actions to hedge against
the possibility of the class action failing.

But that goal is not served by tolling in this case because no
putative class member ever had a reason to hedge against the
failure of the Class Plaintiffs' original claims by asserting a
separate claim predicated on allegations of competitive harm to a
two-sided market as the history of this litigation makes clear,
the incentive for any party to do so arose only once the circuit
court decided.

Finally, the Direct Action Plaintiffs cite the defendants'
acknowledgement that the new two-sided market claims will be
consolidated with earlier causes of action as a basis to conclude
that the two types of claims share sufficient common factual
issues to support American Pipe. Again, the Court disagreed,
holding that the standard for consolidation in multidistrict
litigation is wholly distinct from the analysis pertinent to a
request for American Pipe tolling.

The Court therefore concluded that the Direct Action Plaintiffs'
proposed two-sided market allegations are not entitled to American
Pipe tolling.

Accordingly, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
plaintiffs' contested motions for leave to file an amended
complaint. Specifically, the Court granted the plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaints to include allegations pertaining to a two-
sided relevant market over the defendants' objections, but only to
the extent that these claims are not time-barred: the two-sided
market claims do not relate back to earlier pleadings and are not
subject to equitable tolling. As to all other proposed amendments,
the Court granted leave on consent.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8knal9k
from Leagle.com.

Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Litigation, In Re, represented by Linda P. Nussbaum --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group, PC.

Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Litigation, In Re, represented by Alexandra S. Bernay --
xanb@rgrdlaw.com -- Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP,
pro hac vice, Benjamin R. Nagin -- BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP, Carmen A. Medici -- dmedici@rgrdlaw.com -- Coughlin
Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, pro hac vice, D. Cameron Baker,
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, David W. Mitchell --
davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP,
pro hac vice, Dennis Stewart -- dstewart@hulettharper.com --
Hulett Harper Stewart LLP, Eric H. Grush -- EHAUETER@SIDLEY.COM --
Sidley Austin LLP, Gary R. Carney, Jr. -- gcarney@paulweiss.com -
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garison, LLP, H. Laddie Montague -
- hlmontague@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., Jonah H.
Goldstein- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, K. Craig Wildfang -- KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Merrill G. Davidoff -- mdavidoff@bm.net --
Beger & Montague, P.C., Patrick Joseph Coughlin --
patc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller, Ryan W. Marth --
RMarth@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, pro hac vice, Stacey
Slaughter -- SSlaughter@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins, Kaplan, Miller
& Ciresi L.L.P. & Thomas J. Undlin -- TUndlin@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan, L.L.P..

Mr Gary Friedman, Movant, represented by Gary B. Friedman,
Friedman Law Group LLP, 270 Lafayette St, #1410, New York, NY,
Eastern Watch Co., Movant, represented by David S. Preminger --
dpreminger@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP.

Robert Gardner, Movant, represented by David S. Preminger, Keller
Rohrback LLP.

Karla F. Solis, D.D.S., Inc. d/b/a LA Holistic Dentistry, Movant,
represented by David S. Preminger, Keller Rohrback LLP.
The Perfect Sidekick, LLC, Movant, represented by David S.
Preminger, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al 05-cv-4520 JG-JO, Plaintiff, represented by K.
Craig Wildfang, Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Jeffrey Isaac Shinder --
shinder@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon LLP, Richard
J. Kilsheimer -- rkilsheimer@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Thomas M. Campbell -- tcampbell@tmc-law.com --
Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman, wblechman@knpa.com --
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs in civil action National Association of Convenience
Stores et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al 05-cv-4521 JG-JO,
Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder, Constantine
Cannon LLP, Richard J. Kilsheimer, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Thomas M. Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman,
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs in civil action Supervalu Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. et
al 05-cv-4650 JG-JO, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas M. Campbell,
Smith Campbell, LLP, David P. Germaine, Vanek Vickers & Masini,
P.C., pro hac vice, Joseph Michael Vanek, Vanek, Vickers & Masini,
P.C., 55 W Monroe St # 3500, Chicago, IL 60603, USA, pro hac vice,
Paul E. Slater -- pes@sperling-law.com -- Sperling Slater & Spitz,
Richard J. Kilsheimer, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Robert C.
Mason, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP & William Jay Blechman,
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.


MDL 2084: AbbVie Still Defends Against AndroGel Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that several pending lawsuits filed against Unimed
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a company
Abbott acquired in February 2010 and now known as AbbVie Products
LLC) and others are consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
under the Multi-District Litigation (MDL) Rules as In re: AndroGel
Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2084.

These cases, brought by private plaintiffs and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), generally allege Solvay's patent litigation
involving AndroGel was sham litigation and the 2006 patent
litigation settlement agreements and related agreements with three
generic companies violate federal antitrust laws. Plaintiffs
generally seek monetary damages and/or injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees. These cases include: (a) four individual
plaintiff lawsuits; (b) three purported class actions; and (c)
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. et al. Following the
district court's dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims, appellate
proceedings led to the reinstatement of the claims regarding the
patent litigation settlements, which are proceeding in the
district court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


MDL 2545: AbbVie Still Faces TRT Products Liability Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the Company continues to defend against the
case, In re: Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2545.

Product liability cases are pending in which plaintiffs generally
allege that AbbVie and other manufacturers of TRTs did not
adequately warn about risks of certain injuries, primarily heart
attacks, strokes and blood clots. Approximately 4,260 claims are
consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the MDL Rules as
In re: Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2545. Approximately 240 claims are pending in
various state courts. Plaintiffs generally seek compensatory and
punitive damages.

In July 2017, a jury in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois reached a verdict in the first case
to be tried. The jury found for AbbVie on the plaintiff's strict
liability and negligence claims and for the plaintiff on the
plaintiff's fraud claim, but awarded no compensatory damages. The
jury's award of $150 million in punitive damages without an
underlying compensatory damage award will be subject to post-trial
briefing. AbbVie expects the punitive damage award will not stand.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company
formed in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories
(Abbott).


MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces "Hernandez" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercantile
Adjustment Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Kevin Hernandez, on
behalf of himself individually and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-06057 (E.D. N.Y., October 17, 2017).

Mercantile Adjustment is a full service, nationally licensed
collections and accounts receivable management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercantile
Adjustment Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Nataliya Pinyuk, on
behalf of herself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-06035 (E.D. N.Y., October 16, 2017).

Mercantile Adjustment is a full service, nationally licensed
collections and accounts receivable management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


MERCHANTS CREDIT: Taylor Seeks to Certify 4 Settlement Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JANNETTE TAYLOR, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MERCHANTS CREDIT
ADJUSTERS, INC., and PANSING, HOGAN, ERNST & BACHMAN, L.L.P., the
Defendants, Case No. 8:16-cv-00452-JFB-SMB (D. Neb.), the
Plaintiff move the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a settlement classes;

   2. preliminarily approving a settlement of this class action
      as fair and reasonable; and

   3. approving the form and method for providing class-wide
      notice, and scheduling a hearing at which time the
      following will be considered.

For the purpose of settlement, the Plaintiff defines the
settlement classes as follows:

FDCPA CLASS NO. 1:

   "(i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska (ii) against whom
   Defendants filed a county court collection complaint in the
   form of Exhibit A (iii) in an attempt to collect an alleged
   debt (iv) which was for personal, family, or household
   purposes (v) during the period one year prior to the date of
   filing this action";

FDCPA CLASS NO. 2:

   "(i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska (ii) to whom
   Defendants sent, or caused to be sent Requests for Admissions
   in the form of Exhibit C (iii) in an attempt to collect
   an alleged debt (iv) which was for personal, family, or
   household purposes (v) during the period one year prior to the
   date of filing this action";

NCPA CLASS NO. 1

   "(i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska (ii) against whom
   Defendants filed a county court collection complaint in the
   form of Exhibit A (iii) in an attempt to collect an alleged
   debt (iv) which was for personal, family, or household
   purposes (v) during the period four years prior to the date of
   filing this action"; and

NCPA CLASS NO. 2

   "(i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska (ii) to whom
   Defendants sent, or caused to be sent Requests for Admissions
   in the form of Exhibit C (iii) in an attempt to collect an
   alleged debt (iv) which was for personal, family, or household
   purposes (v) during the period four years prior to the date of
   filing this action".

Excluded from the class is any person who is already subject to an
existing release; any person who is deceased; any person who has
filed for bankruptcy protection; and any Class Member who timely
mails a request for exclusion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ooB96gZM

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
          Pamela A. Car, Esq.
          CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., L.L.O.
          8720 Frederick Street, Suite 105
          Omaha, NE 68124
          Telephone: (402) 391 8484
          Facsimile: (402) 391 1103
          E-mail: billr205@gmail.com

               - and -

          Tregg R. Lunn, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF TREGG LUNN
          830 L Street, Suite 200
          Lincoln, NE 68508
          Telephone: 402 730 7012
          E-mail: tregg@tregglunnlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Joshua C. Dickinson, Esq.
          Shilee T. Mullin, Esq.
          SPENCER FANE LLP
          13520 California Street, Suite 290
          Omaha, NE 68154

               - and -

          William F. Hargens, Esq.
          Lauren R. Goodman, Esq.
          MCGRATH NORTH MULLIN & KRATZ, PC, LLO
          First National Tower, Suite 3700
          1601 Dodge Street
          Omaha, NE 68102


METALWORKING LUBRICANTS: "Averett" Class Settlement Has Final OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, issued an Order granting
Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement, Certification of Settlement Class, and Appointment of
Class Representatives and Class Counsel and an Unopposed Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Litigation Costs,
and Service Awards for the Class Representatives in the case
captioned TEAH AVERETT, CINDY MALLESS, EUGENE PARSLEY, REBECCA
PARSLEY, and CRYSTAL WHALEN, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. METALWORKING LUBRICANTS
CO., Defendant, No. 1:15-cv-01509-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind.).

Plaintiffs Teah Averett, Cindy Malless, Eugene Parsley, Rebecca
Parsley, and Crystal Whalen, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, assert public nuisance, private
nuisance, negligence, and gross negligence claims against
Defendant Metalworking Lubricants Co. related to the alleged
emission of noxious odors from Metalworking's Indianapolis
facility.

Plaintiffs rent or own property near Metalworking's facility, and
brought this case as a putative class action on behalf of all
owner/occupants and renters of residential property residing
within one and one-half (1.5) miles of the facility's property
boundary.

Kristine Van Pelt submitted an Objection to the settlement in
which she objected to four main aspects of the settlement: (1) the
amount of the settlement, including the fact that more than 45%
may go to attorneys' fees, the limit of $2,500 per household, and
the $2,000 service award paid to each Named Plaintiff.

First, the Court finds that the amount of attorneys' fees
requested, costs, and the $2,000 service award for each Named
Plaintiff are reasonable.  Second, the Court finds that Ms. Van
Pelt's objection to the portion of the Settlement Agreement
requiring Metalworking to spend $250,000 on improvements is
without merit. Counsel for Metalworking discussed improvements
that Metalworking has already started to plan, and the Court also
finds it particularly significant that the class members are not
releasing any claims related to future emissions in the Settlement
Agreement or any claims for personal injury.  Third, Plaintiffs
did address the potential decreased property value of homes in the
settlement area in their brief in support of their Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Certification of
Settlement Class, and Appointment of Class Representatives and
Class Counsel.  A positive outcome at trial for Plaintiffs was not
a foregone conclusion instead, Plaintiffs faced numerous risks in
obtaining class certification and in proving liability.  Ms. Van
Pelt's Objection is overruled.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the numerosity
requirement. They present evidence that there are approximately
3,745 households within the class area whose residents would be
class members. Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing
that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members would be
impracticable.

The Court also finds that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.  Here, the common question is whether
Metalworking's alleged failure to control emissions from its
Indianapolis facility is impacting air quality near class members'
homes. The Class members' claims are the same, and their injuries
are likely the same as well.

The Court finds that the Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of
the claims of the class.  The Named Plaintiffs have the same
claims as the class members here nuisance, negligence, and gross
negligence that arise from Metalworking's alleged failure to
prevent emissions from reaching their homes.

The Court finds that the Named Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel
will adequately represent the interests of the class.  The Court
finds the requirement of adequacy of representation is met. The
Named Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that they share
the same interests and suffered the same injuries as the injuries
suffered by the putative class members. Plaintiffs have also
demonstrated that their counsel is competent, and has extensive
experience with previous class actions of this type.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained if
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and if the Court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting individual class members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods of
adjudicating the controversy.

Here, the total settlement amount paid into the fund for
distribution to the class is $750,000. After subtracting
attorneys' fees requested ($286,197.87), litigation costs
($63,802.13), and the service awards paid to the Named Plaintiffs
($10,000), the resulting amount is $390,000.  The ratio of the fee
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel ($286,197.87) to the fee plus
what the class members would receive ($286,197.87 + $390,000 =
$676,197.87) is 42.32%.

The Court finds that a ratio of 42.32% representing the percentage
of the total settlement value that the attorneys' fee request
comprises -- is excessive under the circumstances here.  The Court
notes that fee awards that yield a ratio closer to the 30% to 33%
range have been found reasonable, and also that Plaintiffs and
class counsel entered into a fee agreement in this case which
entitled counsel to one-third of any settlement.

The Court finds it appropriate to immediately award attorneys'
fees of $223,145.29, which would yield a ratio of the fees
requested by Plaintiffs' counsel to the fees plus what the class
members would receive of 33% (using $750,000 as the settlement
amount). The Court will retain the remainder of the attorneys'
fees requested and require Plaintiffs' counsel and Metalworking to
report to the Court every six months regarding what portion of the
$250,000 in improvements have been made. The remainder of the
attorneys' fees ($63,052.58) shall be paid by Metalworking to the
Court, and will be held by the Court in an interest-bearing
account.

The Court further finds that a service award of $2,000 to each
Named Plaintiff is reasonable. By all accounts, Ms. Averett, Ms.
Malless, Mr. Parsley, Ms. Parsley, and Ms. Whalen were involved in
the litigation -- meeting with counsel and sitting for
depositions. The $2,000 award is well within the reasonable range
in this type of case.

The Court finds that $223,145.29 in attorneys' fees, $63,802.13 in
costs, and $2,000 service awards each to Ms. Averett, Ms. Malless,
Mr. Parsley, Ms. Parsley, and Ms. Whalen for serving as the class
representatives are reasonable taking into account the
circumstances of the case and the relevant ratio.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yd9mj4dvfrom Leagle.com.

TEAH AVERETT, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. Brown --
bbrown@ldclassaction.com -- LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice.

TEAH AVERETT, Plaintiff, represented by Laura L. Sheets, LIDDLE &
DUBIN, P.C., Nicholas A. Coulson, LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice,
Steven D. Liddle, LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC, 975 East Jefferson Ave.,
Detroit, MI 48207, pro hac vice & Richard A. Cook, YOSHA COOK &
TISCH. 9102 N Meridian St., Suite 535, Indianapolis, IN 46260

CINDY MALLESS, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. Brown, LIDDLE
& DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Laura L. Sheets, LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.,
Nicholas A. Coulson, LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Steven D.
Liddle, LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC, pro hac vice & Richard A. Cook, YOSHA
COOK & TISCH.

EUGENE PARSLEY, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. Brown, LIDDLE
& DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Laura L. Sheets, LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.,
Nicholas A. Coulson, LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Steven D.
Liddle, LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC, pro hac vice & Richard A. Cook, YOSHA
COOK & TISCH.

REBECCA PARSLEY, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. Brown,
LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Laura L. Sheets, LIDDLE & DUBIN,
P.C., Nicholas A. Coulson, LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Steven
D. Liddle, LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC, pro hac vice & Richard A. Cook,
YOSHA COOK & TISCH.

CRYSTAL WHALEN, Plaintiff, represented by Brandon T. Brown, LIDDLE
& DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Laura L. Sheets, LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.,
Nicholas A. Coulson, LIDDLE & DUBIN PC, pro hac vice, Steven D.
Liddle, LIDDLE & DUBIN, PC, pro hac vice & Richard A. Cook, YOSHA
COOK & TISCH.

METALWORKING LUBRICANTS CO., Defendant, represented by Amy E. Romi
-, aromig@psrb.com -- PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER & BRAUN LLP, Colin
Edington Connor -- cconnor@psrb.com -- PLEWS SHADLEY RACHER &
BRAUN LLP & Peter M. Rache -- pracher@psrb.com -- PLEWS SHADLEY
RACHER & BRAUN LLP.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Guerrero" Suit in M. Dist. Fla.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Julia Guerrero,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
6:17-cv-01798-RBD-GJK (M.D. Fla., October 16, 2017).

Midland Credit Management Inc. operates a collection agency that
helps consumers resolve past-due debt obligations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Katie Marguerite Miller, Esq.
   The Law Offices of Katie M. Miller, PA
   15701 State Road 50 Ste 204
   Clermont, FL 34715
   Tel: (407) 217-5807
   Fax: (407) 442-3693
   Email: attorneykstone@gmail.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Bushberger"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TERESA BUSHBERGER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01468-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an
order certifying proposed classes in this case, appointing the
Plaintiff as class representatives, and appointing Ademi &
O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and further
relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=zr0gGyXV

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Meyer"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SHARON MEYER, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND CREDIT
MANAGEMENT, INC., and MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-01466 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
order certifying classes, appointing the Plaintiffs as class
representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=sQ1z4mgJ

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com


NASSAU, NY: Court Narrows Claims in Traffic Ordinance Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned BENJAMIN
DUBIN AND BYRON ALSTON, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SO
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. THE COUNTY OF NASSAU, THE
NASSAU COUNTY LEGISLATURE, AND THE NASSAU COUNTY TRAFFIC AND
PARKING VIOLATIONS AGENCY, Defendants, No. 16-CV-4209 (JFB) (AKT)
(E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Benjamin Dubin (Dubin) and Byron Alston (Alston) bring
this putative class action against defendants the County of Nassau
(County), the Nassau County Legislature (Legislature), and the
Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (TPVA)
(Defendants) alleging (1) a cause of action for violations of
various federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 (Section 1983); (2) a claim under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 and 2202; and (3) 18 claims
under New York State law for myriad constitutional and statutory
infractions.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (SAC) is that
defendants have unlawfully enacted and enforced a local ordinance
known as the Drivers' Responsibility Fee, Nassau Cty. Ordinance
190-2012.  The DRF allegedly imposes a mandatory payment of $45 on
all motorists who have been issued tickets or citations and
received a final disposition other than not guilty.
Plaintiffs seek, on behalf of themselves and a class of other
similarly situated individuals, a declaration that the DRF
violates the Constitutional protections of the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and as well as other federal Constitutional
Protections, an injunction enjoining defendants from imposing the
DRF and reimbursement of all DRF charges and associated expenses.

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the SAC because (1)
the Court lacks jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman; (2) the Court
should abstain from considering the Section 1983 claim because it
implicates pending New York State court proceedings; (3) the Court
should decline jurisdiction over plaintiffs' declaratory judgment
cause of action because it is dependent on plaintiffs' state law
claims; and (4) plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim fails to state a
cause of action because the SAC does not plausibly plead a
violation of any federal constitutional right.

Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker Feldman doctrine arises from two decisions issued by
the United States Supreme Court: Rooker v. Fiduciary Trust
Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). It stands for the
proposition that lower federal courts possess no power whatever to
sit in direct review of state court decisions. Federal district
courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance,
appeals from state-court judgments.

First, plaintiffs are not the quintessential state court losers to
whom Rooker-Feldman pertains. Rather than litigating a state court
proceeding and receiving an unfavorable judgment, plaintiffs
allege that the TPVA dismissed their tickets or citations without
a determination that they were guilty of any infraction.
Termination of a state court action without an adverse disposition
is not a loss for Rooker-Feldman purposes.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, therefore, does not bar plaintiffs'
claims, as she did not lose' in state court.

Rooker-Feldman does not require dismissal of this case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the SAC alleges (1) that
plaintiffs did not lose in state court; (2) that the DRF is non-
discretionary and non-appealable and, thus, that plaintiffs are
not seeking federal review of a state court decision; and (3)
independent constitutional claims against the law authorizing the
DRF.

Abstention

Defendants advance two abstention arguments in support of their
motion to dismiss.

First, they contend that, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
the Court should decline subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim because there are ongoing state
court proceedings.

Second, defendants assert that the Court should abstain from
adjudicating the second cause of action for a declaratory judgment
pursuant to Railroad Commission v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496,
because interpretation of the DRF depends on unsettled New York
State law.

Under Younger abstention, federal courts should generally refrain
from enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state
proceedings. In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct.
584, the Supreme Court clarified that district courts should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction only in three exceptional
circumstances involving (1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions,
(2) certain civil enforcement proceedings,' and (3) civil
proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of
the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.

The Pullman doctrine permits a federal court to abstain from
deciding a state law issue when it appears that abstention may
eliminate or materially alter the constitutional issue presented.
In the Second Circuit, Pullman abstention may be appropriate where
three conditions are met: (1) the state statute is unclear or the
issue of state law is uncertain; (2) resolution of the federal
issue depends upon the interpretation to be given to the state
law; and (3) the state law is susceptible of an interpretation
that would avoid or modify the federal constitutional issue.

Younger Abstention

Defendants argue the court should dismiss plaintiffs' Section 1983
claim pursuant to Younger because, although plaintiffs' TPVA
adjudications have been resolved, the SAC asserts causes of action
on behalf of a putative class including all persons who have paid
the fee. Thus, since these Plaintiffs' state proceedings are
ongoing, this Court should decline subject matter jurisdiction
over the federal claims in the SAC.

Plaintiffs have alleged that the DRF is non-discretionary and non-
appealable and, therefore, that there is no opportunity to
challenge that statute on federal constitutional grounds before
the TPVA or any state appellate tribunal. In addition, plaintiffs
do not seek to enjoin cases before the TPVA or any other New York
State court; instead, they request an injunction barring
defendants from imposing the DRF, an act, plaintiffs further
contend, that does not involve fact-finding or a merits
determination by a state judge. In other words, as in Gerstein, an
order by this Court precluding enforcement of the DRF would not
prejudice the conduct of TPVA proceedings concerning the
underlying ticket or citation.

Therefore, based on the allegations in the SAC, the Court
concludes, in its discretion, that Younger abstention is not
warranted with respect to plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim.

Pullman Abstention

Defendants also assert that the Court should decline jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' second cause of action under the Declaratory
Judgment Act because the SAC requests the Court to determine New
York Constitutional issues, as well as issues regarding whether
the challenged ordinance is pre-empted, as a matter of state law,
by NY Vehicle and Traffic Law, the NY Civil Rights Law, the NY
Penal Law and the NY Criminal Procedures Law; and the Court is
requested to decide whether the challenged ordinances are
authorized under the NY Municipal Home Rule Law.

To the extent that defendants argue that the language of
plaintiffs' second cause of action which requests that this Court
issue a declaration that the DRF is not a fee, but instead a
penalty or fine; or in the alternative that the DRF is a mandatory
surcharge; or in the alternative that the DRF is a tax and cites
several New York statutes and case obligates application of
unclear state law, the Court does not conclude that such an
interpretation is warranted at this juncture.
For instance, as discussed further infra, determining whether a
statute imposes an unconstitutional punishment for bill of
attainder purposes is a question of federal law. Thus, in deciding
whether the DRF is a penalty as opposed to a fee, the Court may
not need to apply ambiguous New York legal authority. If, however,
such a concern becomes relevant at a later stage of this case, the
Court may re-visit the Pullman inquiry.

Accordingly, the Court finds, in its discretion, that Pullman
abstention which is a limited exception to the rule that federal
courts must exercise their mandatory subject matter jurisdiction
is inapplicable here because resolving plaintiffs' New York State
law claims is not a condition precedent to adjudicating their
federal constitutional challenges.

Section 1983

The Court proceeds to the merits of plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim
and discusses each constitutional challenge seriatim.
Section 1983 provides that every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must allege (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, and (2) that
the deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color
of state law.

Bill of Attainder

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution
states, in relevant part, No State shall pass any Bill of
Attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial. The Supreme Court has
articulated three elements of a bill of attainder: (1)
specification of the affected persons, (2) punishment, and (3)
lack of a judicial trial.

There are no allegations in the SAC that defendants enacted or
enforced the DRF to punish past conduct. Instead, plaintiffs
assert that they have sufficiently alleged the specificity element
because individuals whose tickets/citations have a final
disposition other than not-guilty, which includes those motorists
whose tickets have been dismissed, are easily ascertainable via
the group defined by the Legislature.

Even construing the SAC in a light most favorable to plaintiffs
and drawing all inferences in their favor, there are no claims
that the DRF identifies individuals or a class of people for
sanction based on their past acts; instead, the only plausible
reading of the SAC is that the DRF is a general enforcement
statute that turns upon continuing contemporaneous fact because
individuals are not assessed a fee until the TPVA dismisses their
ticket or citation. As a result, plaintiffs have not adequately
pled specificity and accordingly, the Court dismisses the bill of
attainder aspect of their Section 1983 claim.

Procedural Due Process

The crux of plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim is that the DRF
violates their procedural due process rights. The SAC alleges that
the system the defendants have created through the TPVA Court for
imposing the DRF is an unfair adjudication process against
individuals who are simply issued a ticket by Nassau County law
enforcement officers because there is no justification for taking
away plaintiffs' and Class members' property without any
charges/accusatory instruments pending, nor any findings of fact
against such individuals or proof that any violations occurred.

To assert a violation of procedural due process rights, a
plaintiff must first identify a property right, second show that
the State has deprived him of that right, and third show that the
deprivation was effected without due process.  Further, a
plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of an opportunity
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' for a
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. The Supreme Court,
however, distinguishes between (1) claims based on established
state procedures, and (2) claims based on random, unauthorized
acts by state employees.

On the one hand, where a plaintiff alleges a deprivation pursuant
to an established state procedure, the state can predict when it
will occur and is in the position to provide a pre-deprivation
hearing.  Under those circumstances, 'the availability of post-
deprivation procedures will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process.
In contrast, when a plaintiff brings a procedural due process
claim based on random unauthorized acts by state employees, the
state satisfies procedural due process requirements so long as it
provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.

The Court concludes that plaintiffs have not plausibly stated a
procedural due process claim because (1) the property interest at
issue is minimal; and (2) there are adequate pre- and post-
deprivation safeguards to prevent a wrongful injury. Therefore,
the Court dismisses this aspect of plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim.

Substantive Due Process

The SAC also asserts that the DRF violates plaintiffs' and Class
members' substantive due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments because irrespective of any procedural
safeguards the defendants have utilized in assessing the DRF
penalty against individuals whom have simply been issued a ticket
defendants' imposition of the DRF penalty against plaintiffs and
the Class when the ticket has been dismissed violates their
fundamental right to property without sufficient substantive
justification or rational basis in law.

Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged deprivation of a protected
property right. As courts in this Circuit have correctly held,
"the substantive Due Process clause does not protect plaintiffs
from modest fines."  In Leder v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 81
F.Supp.3d 211, 224, the court held that $65 fine imposed by the
TPVA was not a substantive due process violation.

As a result, the Court dismisses the substantive due process
component of plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim.

Unjust Takings

The SAC states that defendants have violated the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment because defendants have been systematically
taking property from individuals without any compensation
whatsoever, and without any just cause.

Even where a plaintiff has sustained an unjust taking, he has not
suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until [he]
has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through
the procedures provided by the State.

Plaintiffs have not pled that they pursued any state court
remedies for the purported takings, and courts within the Second
Circuit have uniformly dismissed Fifth Amendment takings claims at
the pleadings stage when plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege
that they have availed themselves of such state procedures.

Thus, plaintiffs err in relying on the rule that failure to
exhaust state avenues for relief does not bar Section 1983
actions. Ripeness, not exhaustion, is the relevant inquiry, and
plaintiffs have not suffered a takings violation under the Due
Process Clause if they have not attempted to secure compensation
via state procedures. Thus, the Court grants defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' unjust takings claim because the SAC does not
allege a ripe injury.

Equal Protection

As for the equal protection prong of plaintiffs' Section 1983
claim, the SAC alleges that defendants have deprived the
plaintiffs of equal protections under law by imposing the DRF
(which is unquestionably a penalty/fine for simply being issued a
ticket/citation), which groups innocent individuals along with
guilty individuals, whom are all imposed with the same monetary
penalty/fine. Very simply, to charge the DRF penalty against
innocent individuals, when the court does not have sufficient
evidence to make a guilty finding is an explicit violation of the
Equal Protections Clause.

Plaintiffs have not carried their pleading onus in this case.
Although the SAC summarily alleges that the DRF's classification
scheme is not rational those threadbare, conclusory assertions are
insufficient under the legal standard. Plaintiffs have not alleged
any facts from which a plausible claim could be made that the DRF
lacks any reasonable conceivable purpose. Indeed, its
acknowledged, ostensible objective to recoup administrative costs
associated with processing and adjudicating traffic violations
would certainly be a prudent goal.

Because plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the DRF
ordinance is irrational, the Court dismisses the equal protection
portion of their Section 1983 claim.

Double Jeopardy

Plaintiffs also assert a double jeopardy violation on the ground
that by imposing the DRF upon individuals after the
charges/accusatory instrument against them have been dismissed,
the TPVA court is subjecting/jeopardizing individuals twice to the
same charges/assessment of penalties.

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim that the DRF is so punitive in form and effect as to render
[it] criminal. Indeed, such a claim would not be plausible given
the weight of New York legal authority holding that penalties for
traffic infractions are civil and not criminal.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' double jeopardy claim
because they have not alleged facts sufficient to plausibly state
either that (1) the Legislature intended the DRF to be a criminal
sanction, or (2) the DRF and the circumstances surrounding its
imposition are so punitive that it is effectively penal in nature.

Excessive Fines

The SAC alleges that the DRF imposed by the defendants is an
excessive fine issued against those whose only improper action is
simply being issued a ticket, and that by charging a penalty after
the charges/accusatory instrument have been dismissed, defendants
have violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition upon excessive
fines in comparison to the accused actions.

To determine whether the DRF constitutes an excessive fine, the
appropriate standard is not whether it stems from a criminal or
pseudo-criminal proceeding, but whether it is punishment.
Although defendants argue that the DRF has the legitimate remedial
purpose of deferring the administrative costs associated with a
ticket's processing, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume
the allegations in the SAC to be true, and plaintiffs have
adequately asserted that the DRF is, at least in part, punishment
imposed against individuals for simply being issued a ticket
without any findings of fact, nor proof of any actual violations,
and irrespective of whether or not they are actually guilty of any
offense or violation.

Accordingly, because plaintiffs have asserted that the DRF has a
punitive purpose, the Court finds that they have stated a cause of
action pursuant to the Excessive Fines Clause.

In sum, with respect to defendants' subject matter jurisdiction
arguments, the Court concludes that Rooker Feldman does not bar
adjudication of this case because plaintiffs are not state court
losers and are not seeking review of an adverse state judgment,
but rather assert a general constitutional challenge to the DRF.
In addition, the Court, in its discretion, declines to abstain
under either Younger or Pullman because there are no pending state
court proceedings involving plaintiffs in which they could assert
their Section 1983 claim, and resolution of plaintiffs'
constitutional claims does not depend on interpreting or applying
unclear state law.

On the merits, the Court grants defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss (1) the bill of attainder claim because plaintiffs have
not sufficiently alleged specificity; (2) the procedural due
process claim because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
inadequate procedures connected to deprivation of a substantial
property interest; (3) the substantive due process claim because
plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged deprivation of a
protected property right; (4) the unjust takings claim because
plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a ripe injury; (5) the
equal protection claim because plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged that the DRF lacks a rational basis; and (6) the double
jeopardy claim because plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
that the DRF is a criminal sanction by design or is so punitive as
to effectively be a criminal sanction.

However, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the excessive
fines claim under Section 1983 on the ground raised by defendants
namely, that the DRF cannot be punitive because it is not imposed
following a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and is assessed
to defray administrative costs. Because it was not raised by
defendants, the Court does not reach the second issue with respect
to the excessive fines claim that is, whether a $45 fine can be
unconstitutionally excessive.

Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motion in part and denies
it in part, and, because one of plaintiffs' federal claims
survives, the Court will not dismiss the pendant state law claims
at this stage.

Leave to Amend

In the event of dismissal, plaintiffs have only requested leave to
amend their equal protection claim.  Nevertheless, the Court has
considered whether plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend
their other Section 1983 claims. Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party shall be given
leave to amend when justice so requires.

The Court will grant plaintiffs leave to amend.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part
defendants' motion to dismiss.  With plaintiffs' consent, the
Court dismisses defendant TPVA and plaintiffs' Article 78 claim.
In addition, the Court dismisses plaintiffs' bill of attainder,
procedural due process, substantive due process, unjust takings,
equal protection, and double jeopardy claims under Section 1983
for failure to state a claim with leave to amend. The Court denies
defendants' motion with respect to the excessive fines claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 27, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7p7srju
from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Dubin, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Page --
kpage@oconnorlawfirm.com -- O'Connor Reed, LLP.

Benjamin Dubin, Plaintiff, represented by Kiel Martin Doran --
kdoran@oconnorlawfirm.com -- O'Connor Redd & Steven M. O'Connor,
O'Connor Redd LLP.

The County Of Nassau, Defendant, represented by Andrew Reginald
Scott, Nassau County Attorney's Office.

The Nassau County Legislature, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Reginald Scott, Nassau County Attorney's Office.

The Nassau County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency,
Defendant, represented by Andrew Reginald Scott, Nassau County
Attorney's Office.


NEUROTROPE INC: Securities Actions Pending in New York
------------------------------------------------------
Neurotrope, Inc. is defending against securities class action
lawsuits in New York, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017.

Since May 17, 2017, two purported class action lawsuits have been
commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, naming as defendants the Company, its Chief
Executive Officer, its co-founder and President/Chief Scientific
Officer, and its former Board of Directors, President and Chief
Executive Officer.  The lawsuits allege violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, in connection with
allegedly false and misleading statements made by the Company in
certain press releases and in its Annual Report on Form 10-K
relating to the results stemming from the Company's Phase 2b
clinical trial for Bryostatin.  Plaintiffs seek, among other
things, damages for purchasers of the Company's securities during
different periods, all of which fall between January 7, 2016 and
April 28, 2017.  It is possible that additional suits will be
filed, or allegations received from stockholders, with respect to
similar matters and also naming the Company and/or its officers
and directors as defendants.  The Company expects that that these
lawsuits will be consolidated, but a consolidated complaint has
yet to be filed.

The Court has not yet set a schedule for resolving these actions
on the merits.  Because each of the pending actions is in the
early stages, no reasonable estimate of possible loss, if any, can
be made.  The Company and its directors and officers believe that
these actions are without merit and intend to defend the lawsuits
vigorously.

Neurotrope is a biopharmaceutical company with product candidates
in pre-clinical and clinical development.


NEW JERSEY: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Ortiz" Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Ashley Ortiz filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Ashley Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police, et al.,
Case No. 3-16-cv-07976, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ashley Ortiz
was convicted of drunken driving.  According to Court records, Ms.
Ortiz was initially pulled over for having a busted light above
her license plate, but subjected to a field sobriety test when the
officer detected the smell of alcohol.

The appellate case is captioned as Ashley Ortiz v. New Jersey
State Police, et al., Case No. 17-3095, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ASHLEY ORTIZ, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Lisa J. Rodriguez, Esq.
          SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP
          Woodland Falls Corporate Park, Suite 200
          220 Lake Drive East
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
          Telephone: (856) 482-5741
          Facsimile: (856) 482-6980
          E-mail: lrodriguez2@schnader.com

Defendants-Appellees NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; JOSEPH RICK FUENTES,
in his capacity as Superintendent of New Jersey State Police;
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; ELIE HONIG, in her official capacity
as Director of the Office of the Attorney General Department of
Law and Public Safety Division of Criminal Justice; and MARC
DENNIS, individually and in his capacity as Coordinator in the New
Jersey State Police Alcohol Drug Testing Unit, are represented by:

          Christopher J. Riggs, Esq.
          OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
          25 Market Street
          Richard J. Hughes Complex
          Trenton, NJ 08625
          Telephone: (609) 292-6116


NEW MEXICO: LCCF Inmate Allowed to Amend Civil Rights Complaint
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint in the case
captioned VICTOR ANDREW APODACA, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN R.C. SMITH,
N. ALANIZ, MRS. MALDONADO, MRS. STRUB, MAILROOM SUPERVISOR, STEVI
MADERA, GEO GROUP, et al., Defendants, No. CV 16-01227 WJ/GJF
(D.N.M.).

Defendant Madera's Motion for More Definite Statement is denied as
moot and Plaintiff Victor Andrew Apodaca Sr.'s letter motion to
amend is, likewise, denied.  Plaintiff Apodaca is granted leave to
file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff Victor Andrew Apodaca, Sr., is a prisoner incarcerated
at the Lea County Correctional Facility in Hobbs, New Mexico.
Plaintiff Apodaca filed his Complaint in the First Judicial
District Court, County of Santa Fe, State of New Mexico. Although
his Complaint states that the suit is authorized under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act, Chapter 41 N.M.S.A., Apodaca alleges
violation of due process and retaliation in violation of First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.

Plaintiff Apodaca is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court has
the discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) the Court must accept all
well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory, unsupported
allegations, and may not consider matters outside the pleading.
In deciding whether to dismiss the complaint, in whole or in part,
the Court is to consider whether to allow plaintiff an opportunity
to amend the complaint. Pro se plaintiffs should be given a
reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in their pleadings. The
opportunity to amend should be granted unless amendment would be
futile. An amendment is futile if the amended claims would also be
subject to immediate dismissal under the rule 12(b)(6) or Section
1915(e)(2)(B) standards.

Apodaca's Complaint is filed on a New Mexico state form for claims
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. However, in his Complaint
and in the Amended Complaint, Apodaca alleges violation of his
rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. The Complaint does not expressly allege causes
of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. However, 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 is the exclusive vehicle for vindication of substantive
rights under the Constitution.  Section 1983 creates no
substantive rights; rather it is the means through which a
plaintiff may seek redress for deprivations of rights established
in the Constitution.   Therefore, the Court construes Apodaca's
claims for violation of rights under the Constitution as civil
rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a
plaintiff must assert acts by government officials acting under
color of law that result in a deprivation of rights secured by the
United States Constitution. There must be a connection between
official conduct and violation of a constitutional right. Conduct
that is not connected to a constitutional violation is not
actionable under Section 1983.

The Amended Complaint contains no allegations relating to Warden
Smith.  Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint state any
allegations of individualized conduct by Warden Smith, nor do they
identify any acts by Warden Smith that violated Apodaca's
constitutional rights. Instead, the Complaint only makes
generalized, conclusory statements that retaliation began after
Plaintiff filed suit against Warden Smith and that Warden Smith
believes his ideas are above the courts and constitution.
The allegations of the Complaint and Amended Complaint are
factually insufficient to state any plausible claim for relief
against Warden Smith under Section 1983. The claims against Warden
Smith will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.

Apodaca also identifies N. Alaniz and Stevi Madera as Defendants.
However, Apodaca makes no factual allegations, whatsoever, against
N. Alaniz or Stevi Madera in either the Complaint or the Amended
Complaint. The Complaint and Amended Complaint wholly fail to
state any claim for relief against N. Alaniz or Stevi Madera and
they will be dismissed.

Mrs. Maldonado and Mrs. Strub are also named as Defendants by
Plaintiff Apodaca.  The vague and conclusory allegations against
Mrs. Maldonado and Mrs. Strub do not state any factually plausible
claim for relief under Section 1983.

The Complaint does not identify any involvement by an identified
Geo Group official in an alleged constitutional violation nor does
it specify how the Geo Group violates any of Apodaca's
constitutional rights.

To the extent that Apodaca's claims are against Secretary
Marcantel and Director Roark in their individual capacities, the
Amended Complaint claims that Defendants Marcantel and Roark are
liable for their "policy and actions that hinder or violate the
U.S. Constitution and are in control over every legal aspect
policy making."  The Amended Complaint, however, does not identify
any individualized actions by either Defendant nor does it specify
any policy made by either Defendant that violates Apodaca's
constitutional rights.  The Amended Complaint is factually
insufficient to state any Section 1983 claim for relief against
Secretary Marcantel or Director Roark.

Apodaca does not allege any actual conduct on the part of Mrs.
Gomez, much less conduct that somehow violated his constitutional
rights. The Amended Complaint does not state a claim on which
relief can be granted against Mrs. Gomez under Section 1983.

Because the Court determines that the Complaint fails to state a
claim for relief against any Defendant and will be dismissed, the
Court denies Madera's Motion as moot.

The Court will grant Plaintiff Apodaca a reasonable opportunity to
remedy defects in his pleading. Plaintiff Apodaca will have 30
days from the date of entry of this Order in which to file an
amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint
or files an amended complaint that does not comply with the
following directions, the Court may dismiss this action with
prejudice and without further notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 20, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y8gwnkjpfrom Leagle.com.

Victor Andrew Apodaca, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Stevi Madera, Defendant, represented by April D. White, Yenson,
Allen & Wosick, P.C., 4908 Alameda Blvd. NE -- Albuquerque, NM
87113


NORMANDIN'S: Court OK's Filing of TAC in "Brinker"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting the
Stipulation Regarding Filing the Third Amended Complaint and
Dismissal of Claims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in
the case captioned ALAN BRINKER, AUSTIN RUGG, and ANA SANDERS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. NORMANDIN'S, a California corporation, d/b/a
NORMANDIN CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM, and ONECOMMAND, INC., JURY
TRIAL DEMAND, Defendants, No. 5:14-cv-03007-EJD-HRL (N.D. Cal.).

Defendant Normandin owns and operates an automobile dealership in
San Jose, California, doing business as Normandin Chrysler Jeep
Dodge Ram.  In addition to selling and leasing new and used
automobiles, Defendant Normandin's website explains that their
services include trusted Chrysler Jeep RAM and Dodge car repair
and offers original Chrysler Jeep RAM and Dodge parts.

Defendant OneCommand is an automotive marketing and advertising
company. It holds itself out to be the successful dealer's secret
weapon for delivering consistent results in their Sales and
Service departments.

Every day, Defendant OneCommand sends over 1,000,000
communications on behalf of its clients.

Although Defendant OneCommand made the calls to Plaintiffs,
Defendant Normandin also participated in the calls by providing
contact information and setting the guidelines and parameters for
customers who would be acceptable for Defendant OneCommand to
market Defendant Normandin's services to.

On or around March 2014, Plaintiff Brinker received a telephone
call made by Defendant OneCommand on behalf of Defendant Normandin
on his cellular telephone.  The prerecorded message did not
specify which of Plaintiff Brinker's vehicles was allegedly in
need of routine maintenance.

Pursuant to CR 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiffs bring this case as
a class action on behalf of the following Class:

     All persons who owned one or more of the 8,313 cellular
telephone numbers to which calls were placed by OneCommand on
Normandin's behalf on or after October 16, 2013, through the
alleged use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an
artificial or prerecorded voice which calls allegedly were not
made for emergency purposes or with the recipient's prior express
consent.

The Plaintiffs allege that the acts and omissions of Defendants
and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities
acting on Defendants' behalf constitute numerous and multiple
violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A), by making
calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone
numbers of Plaintiffs and members of the Class using an ATDS
and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice.

The Plaintiffs further allege that the acts and omissions of
Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons
or entities acting on Defendants' behalf constitute numerous and
multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C.
Section 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency
purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiffs and
members of the Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-
recorded voice.

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury for all issues so triable.

Plaintiffs wish to amend their putative class definitions and file
a Third Amended Complaint.  Plaintiffs wish to dismiss without
prejudice any and all claims of absent putative class members in
the Second Amended Complaint other than those encompassed within
the Third Amended Complaint, relating to the sole remaining
amended putative class.

Defendants do not oppose the filing of this Third Amended
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybxwatfefrom Leagle.com.

Alan Brinker, Plaintiff, represented by Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC.

Alan Brinker, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne McEntee --
amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Daudt and Willie
PLLC, Allyson Janay Ferguson -- jferguson@terrellmarshall.com -
Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Kathryn A.
Williams, Williamson & Williams, Mary Bondy Reiten --
mreiten@terrellmarshall.com  -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC &
Roblin John Williamson -- roblin@williamslaw.com -- Williamson &
Williams.

Austin Rugg, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne McEntee, Terrell
Marshall Daudt and Willie PLLC & Beth E. Terrell, Terrell Marshall
Law Group PLLC.

Ana Sanders, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne McEntee, Terrell
Marshall Daudt and Willie PLLC & Beth E. Terrell, Terrell Marshall
Law Group PLLC.

Normandin's, Defendant, represented by Andrew Stearns --
AStearns@RobardsStearns.com  --  Robards & Stearns.

Onecommand, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sean P. Flynn --
sflynn@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP, Steven Charles Coffaro --
steve.coffaro@kmklaw.com --  Keating Muething and Klekamp PLL &
Daniel Scott Kubasak -- dkubasak@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees.
Normandin's, Cross-claimant, represented by Andrew Stearns,
Bustamante & Gagliasso.


NORTH CAROLINA: Court Junks Lanesboro Inmate's Class Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Charlotte Division, issued an Order ruling that the
Action styled HENRY J. STEELE, KEVIN MORGAN, CURTIS HAGGINS,
Plaintiffs, v. GERALDINE BENNETT, et al., Defendants, No. 3:17-cv-
492-FDW (W.D.N.C.), will proceed as individual action.

Pro Se Plaintiffs are all either current or former North Carolina
prisoners at Lanesboro Correctional Institution in Polkton, North
Carolina.  Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Eastern
District of North Carolina, and that court transferred the action
to this Court. Plaintiffs purport to bring this as a class action
on behalf of all inmates at Lanesboro. Plaintiffs contend that
Lanesboro inmates are subject to deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs as a result of wholly insufficient medical
care by medical staff at Lanesboro.  Plaintiffs seek compensatory
damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

The Court will review the Complaint to determine whether it is
subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is frivolous or
malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Furthermore, Section 1915A requires an initial review of
a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity, and the court must identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.

The Court will not allow this lawsuit to proceed as a class
action, and the Court furthermore will sever this lawsuit into
three separate actions. First, to the extent that Plaintiffs
purport to bring this case as a class action, Plaintiffs have not
established that the four prerequisites to a class action under
Rule 23(a), FED. R. CIV. P.

Next, as for the fact that this case involves multiple prisoner
plaintiffs, Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that plaintiffs may join in one action if they assert any
right to relief arising out of the same occurrence or series of
occurrences and if any question of law or fact in common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.

The Court finds that, even if Plaintiffs are properly joined,
allowing this action to go forward as it currently stands will
simply create too many logistical problems for the Court and the
parties. First, Plaintiffs are inmates proceeding pro se, and,
although each plaintiff may appear on his own behalf, none may
appear as an attorney for the others.

The Court will sever this action into three cases, with each
Plaintiff proceeding individually on his claims. Plaintiff
Haggins, who has paid the full $400 filing fee, shall proceed as
the sole Plaintiff in this action, and new actions shall be opened
for Plaintiffs Steele and Morgan.

Plaintiffs are placed on notice that if each Plaintiff does not
file an Amended Complaint in his own individual action within
thirty days of service of this Order, the Court will dismiss the
action against each Plaintiff without further notice and without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y8gvgxtbfrom Leagle.com.

Curtis Haggins, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


OCULAR THERAPEUTIX: 3 Class Suits Pending in New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------
Ocular Therapeutix, Inc., is defending three class action lawsuits
in New Jersey, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

On July 7, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed against
the Company and certain of the Company's current and former
executive officers in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, captioned Thomas Gallagher v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05011. The complaint
purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who purchased the
Company's common stock between May 5, 2017 and July 6, 2017. The
complaint generally alleges that the Company and certain of the
Company's current and former officers violated Sections 10(b)
and/or 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by making allegedly false and/or misleading
statements concerning the Form 483 issued by the FDA related to
DEXTENZA and the Company's manufacturing operations for DEXTENZA.
The complaint seeks unspecified damages, attorneys' fees, and
other costs.

On July 12, 2017, a second putative class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and certain of the Company's current and
former executive officers in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, captioned Dylan Caraker v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05095. The complaint
purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who purchased the
Company's common stock between May 5, 2017 and July 6, 2017. The
complaint includes allegations similar to those made in the
Gallagher complaint, and seeks similar relief.

On August 3, 2017, a third putative class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company and certain of the Company's current and
former executive officers in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, captioned Shawna Kim  v. Ocular
Therapeutix, Inc, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-05704. The complaint
purports to be brought on behalf of shareholders who purchased the
Company's common stock between March 10, 2016 and July 11, 2017.
The complaint includes allegations similar to those made in the
Gallagher complaint, and seeks similar relief.

The Company denies any allegations of wrongdoing and intends to
vigorously defend against these lawsuits. The Company is unable,
however, to predict the outcome of these matters at this time.
Moreover, any conclusion of these matters in a manner adverse to
the Company and for which it incurs substantial costs or damages
not covered by the Company's directors' and officers' liability
insurance would have a material adverse effect on the Company's
financial condition and business. In addition, the litigation
could adversely impact the Company's reputation and divert
management's attention and resources from other priorities,
including the execution of business plans and strategies that are
important to the Company's ability to grow the Company's business,
any of which could have a material adverse effect on the Company's
business.

Ocular is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the development
and commercialization of innovative therapies for diseases and
conditions of the eye using our proprietary hydrogel platform
technology.


OHANA MILITARY: Court to Review Trespass Claims Ruling in "Lake"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Hawaii, issued an
Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration in the case captioned KENNETH LAKE, CRYSTAL LAKE,
HAROLD BEAN, MELINDA BEAN, KYLE PAHONA, ESTEL PAHONA, TIMOTHY
MOSELEY, and ASHLEY MOSELEY, Plaintiffs, v. OHANA MILITARY
COMMUNITIES, LLC, FOREST CITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, INC.; and
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants, Civil No. 16-00555 LEK-KJM (D.
Haw.).

In the 8/1/17 Order, the Court dismissed Count IV (Plaintiffs'
unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDAP) claim) and Count IX
(Plaintiffs' unfair competition claim), with prejudice.  The
Motion for Reconsideration does not contest those portions of the
8/1/17 Order. The Court also dismissed Count X, Plaintiffs'
trespass claim with prejudice because it was duplicative of Count
XI Plaintiffs' trespass claim.  The Court dismissed Counts I, II,
III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and (Remaining Claims) without prejudice
because the Complaint did not include sufficient allegations
regarding Plaintiffs' standing to pursue those claims.

In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs argue that the Court
erred in: (1) dismissing Count X with prejudice; and (2)
dismissing the Remaining Claims based on what Plaintiffs call a
new requirement of personal injury or personal contact with
contaminated soil/dust to establish standing.

Plaintiffs argue that interference with a tenant's use and
enjoyment of their property can establish damages under theories
of nuisance and trespass.

The Court reiterates that, based on the definitions under Hawai'i
law, trespass and nuisance are distinct claims. The Court also
reiterates that Plaintiffs' trespass claim in the original
Complaint was futile because the factual allegations in the
Complaint were not sufficient to support a trespass claim that was
distinct from their nuisance claim. It is possible, under the
Hawai'i law definitions, to have a distinct nuisance claim and
trespass claim based on the same set of facts. Plaintiffs,
however, did not plead such a set of factual allegations in the
Complaint.

Plaintiffs also argue that the requirement to allege
individualized injuries in fact to support each of the Remaining
Claims is contrary to Barber v. Ohana Military Communities, LLC,
CV 14-00217 HG-KSC, in which the district court held against the
identical defendants that virtually identical allegations did meet
Fed R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6)'s standard. However, the decisions of
other district judges in this district are not binding on this
Court.

However, the Court did not agree with the Barber analysis as to
the Remaining Claims because Barber was a class action and the
named plaintiffs brought their claims in a representative
capacity. The fact that the instant case is not a class action is
a critical distinction in the analysis of what is required to
allege injury in fact. The mere fact that Plaintiffs disagree with
this Court's analysis and agree with those portions of Barber
analysis is not ground for reconsideration of the 8/1/17 Order.
The Court therefore rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the 8/1/17
Order should have followed the Barber analysis as to the Remaining
Claims.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish any ground that warrants
reconsideration of the 8/1/17 Order as to the Remaining Claims.
The Motion for Reconsideration is therefore denied as to the
Remaining Claims.

The Motion for Reconsideration is granted insofar as: the portion
of the Court's August 1, 2017 order dismissing Plaintiffs'
trespass claim with prejudice is withdrawn.

Plaintiffs' trespass claim is dismissed without prejudice; and
Plaintiffs may file a motion seeking leave to file an amended
trespass claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yaafw4v9from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Lake, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law.

Kenneth Lake, Plaintiff, represented by Terrance M. Revere, Revere
& Associates, LLLC.

Crystal Lake, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Harold Bean, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Melinda Bean, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Kyle Pahona, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Estel Pahona, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Timothy Moseley, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith,
Smith Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Ashley Moseley, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith,
Smith Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Ryan Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith, Smith
Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Heather Wilson, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith,
Smith Law & Terrance M. Revere, Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Ohana Military Communities, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Christine A. Terada -- cterada@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel LLLP, Joachim P. Cox -- jcox@cfhawaii.com -- Cox
Fricke A Limited Liability Law Partnership LLP, Kamala S. Haake -
khaake@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP, Lisa W. Munger --
lmunger@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP &
Randall C. Whattoff -- rwhattoff@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP.

Forest City Residential Management, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Christine A. Terada, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP,
Joachim P. Cox, Cox Fricke A Limited Liability Law Partnership
LLP, Kamala S. Haake, Cox Fricke LLP, Lisa W. Munger, Goodsill
Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP & Randall C. Whattoff, Cox Fricke
LLP.


OKLAHOMA: Court Dismisses "Jamison" Civil Rights Action
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned MARTIN LEE JAMISON, Plaintiff, v.
REBECCA NEWMAN; STEVE SOUTHERLAND; STEVE KUNZWEILER; JULIE DOSS,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-482-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla.).

Plaintiff filed a complaint, along with motions to proceed in
forma pauperis for appointment of counsel, and for class action
certification.

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in
which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity. The court must identify any
cognizable claim and dismiss any claim which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual
allegations, assumed to be true, that raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.

The generous construction to be given the pro se litigant's
allegations does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could
be based. The court will not supply additional factual allegations
to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory
on a plaintiff's behalf.

The Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff identifies five grounds for relief.  Plaintiff provides
additional factual allegations in support of his claims.

Plaintiff names four defendants: Rebecca Newman and Stuart
Southerland, attorneys at the Tulsa County Public Defenders
Office; and Steve Kunzweiler and Julia Doss, attorneys at the
Tulsa County District Attorneys Office. In his request for relief,
Plaintiff asks for compensatory relief 25,000, punitive relief
100,000, Injunctions as this Honorable Court sees in the interest
of justice to correct the constitutional violations.

Even though the defective performance of defense counsel may cause
the trial process to deprive an accused person of his liberty in
an unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for
the unconstitutional state action does not himself act under color
of state law within the meaning of Section 1983.

Therefore, any action taken by Defendants Newman and Southerland
is not state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. As a
result, Plaintiff's claims against those Defendants are dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

A prosecutor's decisions made during the course of a prosecution
relate to the judicial phase of the criminal process. Plaintiff's
claims against Defendants Kunzweiler and Doss are based on actions
taken during Plaintiff's criminal prosecution and are, therefore,
barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff's request for
monetary damages from Defendants Kunzweiler and Doss shall be
dismissed from this action with prejudice.

Plaintiff states that, on August 4, 2017, before filing this
complaint, he was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment on his blind
plea of guilty. To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from
allegedly wrongful convictions, his Section 1983 claims shall be
dismissed without prejudice.  Plaintiff alleges that, during his
state criminal proceeding, he received ineffective assistance of
counsel and the prosecutors engaged in selective prosecution.
Success on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims would implicitly
question the validity of his convictions.   Because Plaintiff
fails to allege that he has achieved favorable termination of his
available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the
underlying conviction or sentence, relief under Section 1983 is
precluded by Heck. Plaintiff's Section 1983 complaint fails to
state a claim and shall be dismissed without prejudice.

The complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 22, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8u6purhfrom
Leagle.com.

Martin Lee Jamison, et al, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


ORBITAL ATK: Virginia Court Dismisses Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Alexandria, issued a Memorandum Opinion granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in the case captioned
Division STEVEN KNURR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ORBITAL ATK INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-1031 (E.D. Va.).

This memorandum opinion addresses the questions presented under
Section 10(b) and the related Section 20(a) claims, which are as
follows: (1) whether plaintiffs have alleged facts in the
Complaint that warrant, as the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) requires, a strong inference of scienter with
respect to their claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
that defendants, a publicly traded aerospace and defense company
and four of its high-level officers, intentionally concealed or
recklessly ignored significant losses on a government contract;
and (2) whether under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the
Complaint adequately alleges that the defendants had control over
any person liable under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.

Plaintiffs in this federal securities class action allege claims
under (i) Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; (ii) Section 14(a) and
Rule 14a-9; and (iii) Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act). Defendants seek threshold dismissal of
claims under all three provisions, and a separate memorandum
opinion addresses the Section 14(a) and related Section 20(a)
claims.

Corporate defendant, Orbital ATK, is an aerospace and defense
company headquartered in Dulles, Virginia. The company's stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol OA.
Orbital ATK was formed out of the merger between two companies
Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital Sciences and Alliant
Techsystems, Inc. (Alliant).

In addition to the corporate defendant, the Complaint names the
following four individual defendants: (1) David D. Thompson;(2)
Garrett E. Pierce;(3) Blake E. Larson; and (4) Mark DeYoung.

Plaintiffs allege that Thompson, Pierce, and Larson made a number
of false and misleading statements with respect to the financial
success of Orbital ATK after the merger of Orbital ATK's
predecessor companies, Orbital Sciences and Alliant.

Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' Section
10(b) claim focuses solely on the second element whether
plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to warrant a strong
inference that defendants acted with the requisite scienter of
either intentional or severely reckless conduct. Because the PSLRA
imposes a heightened pleading standard on fraud allegations in
private securities complaints, the complaint must state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.

Critically, the Supreme Court established that in determining
whether the pleaded facts give rise to a strong' inference of
scienter, the court must take into account plausible opposing
inferences. And a complaint survives a dismissal motion only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and
at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged.

Defendants argue these allegations are insufficient both
individually and as a whole to support a strong inference of
scienter. The only proper inference, defendants contend, is that
defendants acted in good faith, and thus neither the individual
defendants nor the corporate defendant can be liable.

In accordance with Fourth Circuit precedent, each of plaintiffs'
individual facts and indicia, and defendants' opposing arguments,
will be addressed first to determine whether the allegations give
rise to an inference of scienter and, if so, the strength of that
inference. Then, the complaint will be evaluated holistically,
recognizing that allegations of scienter that would not
independently create a strong inference of scienter might
[complement] each other to create an inference of sufficient
strength to satisfy the PSLRA.

The Complaint's first set of allegations focuses on defendants'
roles as senior executives at Orbital ATK. These roles, plaintiffs
contend, gave defendants the ability to and responsibility for
monitoring the Lake City Contract, the merger synergies, and the
company's internal controls the precise topics of the
misstatements.  Specifically, the Complaint alleges that
defendants had access to confidential information about the
company's finances and internal controls and were responsible for
signing off on the company's public statements, SEC filings, and
SOX certifications.

Plaintiffs point to defendants' frequent public statements about
the Lake City Contract and the merger synergies as evidence of
scienter. For example, plaintiffs focus on a series of statements
on the 2015 Form 10-K concerning the production volumes under the
Lake City Contract, the contract's contribution to the company's
sales, and a warning that rising costs could have an adverse
effect on profit margin.

These facts also fall short of warranting a strong inference of
scienter because the Complaint does not allege facts that suggest
a level of direct involvement by any of the executives and thus
establishes at most a very weak inference of scienter.  As
described above, plaintiffs have failed to allege with
particularity that the individual defendants were privy to
information concerning cost overruns at the Lake City Plant but
concealed this information from the public.

In sum, plaintiffs' arguments that the individual defendants were
intimately involved in the Lake City Contract and the merger
synergies rest on little more than the nature of the defendants'
executive positions with Alliant (for DeYoung) and Orbital ATK
(for the other defendants), their review of monthly reports, and
their signing of financial statements facts which, without more
detailed allegations, simply fall short of supporting a strong
inference of scienter.

Plaintiffs' next set of scienter indicia are various so-called red
flags that allegedly served to warn the individual defendants that
the Lake City Contract was operating at a significant loss and
that Orbital ATK was experiencing problems with its internal
controls.  These red flags also fall short of warranting a strong
inference of scienter.

These red flags also fail to support a strong inference of
scienter for the same reason noted above, namely that the
Complaint contains no particularized factual allegations that
connect the red flags with a specific problem with the Lake City
Contract accounting. Specifically, the Complaint fails to provide
any particularized facts showing that defendants had
contemporaneous information indicating that their cost-cutting
estimates were unrealistic.

Indeed, plaintiffs acknowledge that Orbital ATK managed to cut
approximately $400 million in costs, one-half to two-thirds of
defendants' goal, indicating that defendants' cost-cutting goals
were not so quixotic as to amount to recklessness.  And the fact
that Orbital ATK's management itself eventually disclosed the
losses on the Lake City Contract further reduces an inference of
scienter, for as the Fourth Circuit has noted, management's
disclosure of an accounting problem supports a strong inference
that defendants were not acting with scienter but rather were
endeavoring in good faith to inform the investing public.

In sum, each of the red flags alleged in the Complaint was either
public knowledge or insufficient to alert defendants to the
problems with the Lake City Contract estimates and Orbital ATK's
internal controls, and thus, none of those red flags can be the
basis for the requisite strong inference of scienter.
Magnitude of the Restatement

Plaintiffs next concentrate on the sheer magnitude of the loss on
the Lake City Contract, asserting that the large amount alone
establishes scienter. Although the Fourth Circuit has stated that
inferential weight may be attributed to the magnitude of
[accounting] errors, courts should do so only in the context of
the company's financial position. Then placed in the context of
Orbital ATK's overall financial position, the magnitude of the
losses here are diminished and accordingly, do not support a
strong inference of scienter.

In absolute terms, it is clear the $375 million loss on the Lake
City Contract is significant and probative of scienter,32 but to
assess its full weight, the loss must be placed in context. As
noted in the March 8, 2017 and August 10, 2016 Orbital ATK
conference calls, the Lake City Contract represented just 5% of
the company's total sales as of August 10, 2016 (when the losses
were first announced), and full-year revenue for 2016 was
approximately $4.46 billion. Moreover, plaintiffs identify no
other contracts that suffered from the same error as the Lake City
Contract. Compare Matrix, 576 F.3d at 184 (attributing weight to
errors where defendant "had to pay more than $100 million (and
review nearly 6,500 contracts) to identify and correct
[accounting] errors--an enterprise that resulted in approximately
35,000 lines of adjustments to previous financial statements). The
Lake City Contract's relatively low contribution to Orbital ATK's
total sales and the fact that no other contracts were similarly
affected serve to diminish the weight these losses carry in
establishing scienter.

In short, $375 million may be a significant amount of money in
absolute terms but placed in the context of Orbital ATK's overall
sales and other contracts, that amount of loss alone cannot
establish a strong inference of scienter.

Plaintiffs also contend that the simplicity of the percentage-of-
completion accounting method establishes a strong inference of
scienter. This argument is unpersuasive because plaintiffs do not
actually show the simplicity of the method at issue, and courts
have not explicitly recognized the percentage-of-completion method
as giving rise to Section 10(b) liability.

In this case, plaintiffs' argument concerning the simplicity of
the percentage-of-completion method is flawed in two respects.
First, plaintiffs cite no authority indicating that the
percentage-of-completion method which requires companies to first
estimate the total costs of performing the contract and then
compare or reconcile that estimate with accrued actual costs at
regular intervals over the life of the contract is as simple as
plaintiffs suggest.

Stated another way, this is not a case where defendants counted
their chickens before they hatched. Instead, defendants failed to
estimate correctly how much the chickens would cost to produce,
forcing defendants to correct their misstatements after
discovering the true costs of the Lake City Contract.

Plaintiffs' argument about the simplicity of the percentage-of-
completion accounting method therefore does not establish a strong
inference of scienter.

Plaintiffs' fifth set of scienter allegations focuses on (i)
DeYoung's departure from the Orbital ATK Board as well as firings
in the company; (ii) an SEC investigation against Orbital ATK; and
(iii) Thompson and Pierce's signing of false SOX certifications.
None of these allegations support a strong inference of scienter.

With respect to the SEC investigation and the SOX certifications,
plaintiffs' arguments fare no better. The Fourth Circuit has
stated that the allegation that the SEC is conducting an
investigation is too speculative to add much, if anything, to an
inference of scienter. Likewise, plaintiffs' allegation concerning
the false SOX certifications also adds nothing to the scienter
analysis. Because these factors add nothing to scienter analysis,
the SEC investigation and SOX certifications cannot support a
strong inference of scienter.

In sum, the firings and departures from Orbital ATK, the SEC
investigation and the false SOX certifications suggest, at most,
innocent inferences not the nefarious ones required for a showing
of scienter.

Plaintiffs conclude with a series of arguments related to
defendants' motives -- namely, (i) that Thompson, Pierce and
Larson profited from their alleged fraud through incentive
compensation; (ii) that Thompson and DeYoung profited through
insider trading; and (iii) that Thompson and Pierce, in
particular, faced pressure to make the merger successful. None of
these financial motives, which are shared by most corporate
executives, establish a strong inference of scienter.

To summarize, none of the motives plaintiffs allege incentive
compensation, insider trading or merger success establish the
requisite strong inference of scienter.

Given none of these scienter indicia individually supports a
strong inference of scienter, the next step is to consider the
indications as a whole to ascertain whether together they warrant
the requisite strong inference. As the Fourth Circuit has noted,
this step requires courts to evaluate plaintiffs' allegations of
scienter holistically, giving the allegations only the inferential
weight warranted by context and common sense.

Importantly, allegations of scienter that would not independently
create a strong inference of scienter might [complement] each
other to create an inference of sufficient strength to satisfy the
PSLRA. With that said, plaintiffs' inference of scienter must
still be weighed against the opposing inferences that may be drawn
from the facts in their entirety. After comparing the malicious
and innocent inferences cognizable from the facts pled in the
complaint, the complaint survives only if the malicious inference
is at least as compelling as any opposing innocent inference.

Plaintiffs' allegations, considered holistically as required, fail
to establish a strong inference of scienter, suggesting instead,
at most, that defendants were negligent in their cost reduction
estimates for the Lake City Contract and also negligent in failing
to detect the losses as they occurred.

The final issue with respect to plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims
is whether Orbital ATK itself can be liable despite the dismissal
of plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants. Where a
plaintiff alleges corporate fraud, the plaintiff must allege facts
that support a strong inference of scienter with respect to at
least one authorized agent of the corporation.

The fact that some lower-level employees may have acted with the
requisite scienter in failing to disclose problems with the Lake
City Contract does not alter this conclusion because plaintiffs do
not allege that any of these employees made false or misleading
statements.

Under this rule, plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Orbital
ATK because plaintiffs' claims against the authorized agents
Thompson, Larson, and Pierce must all be dismissed.

Plaintiffs also bring claims under Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act against Thompson, Pierce, and Larson based on their positions
as controlling persons of Orbital ATK. Section 20(a) provides that
every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable.

Accordingly, Section 20(a) liability is derivative of Section
10(b). Because plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims against Thompson,
Pierce, and Larson fail, their Section 20(a) claims against these
defendants also fail.

In sum, plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims against Orbital ATK and
the individual defendants, as well as their Section 20(a) claims
against Thompson, Pierce, and Larson, must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim for relief.

Plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to file an amended
complaint, however, as they may yet be able to allege facts
establishing a strong inference of scienter with respect to the
company or to an individual officer.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 26, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yce7347w
from Leagle.com.

Steven Knurr, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Jeffrey Toll, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Construction Laborers Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis,
Plaintiff, represented by Craig Crandall Reilly, Law Office of
Craig C. Reilly. 1725 Duke Street, Ste 600, Alexandria, VA 22314-
3457
Orbital ATK Inc., Defendant, represented by Lyle Roberts --
lroberts@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

David W. Thompson, Defendant, represented by Lyle Roberts, Cooley
LLP.

Garrett E. Pierce, Defendant, represented by Lyle Roberts, Cooley
LLP.

Mark W DeYoung, Defendant, represented by Michael Anthony Petrino
-- michael.petrino@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
Blake E. Larson, Defendant, represented by Lyle Roberts, Cooley
LLP.

Christopher B. Cooper, Movant, represented by Steven Jeffrey Toll
-- stoll@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.
John K. Kim, Movant, represented by Steven Jeffrey Toll, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, Interested Party, represented
by Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, The Law Offices of Susan R Podolsky,
1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600, Alexandria, VA 22314


ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Discovery Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Discovery is ongoing in a class action lawsuit against Ormat
Technologies, Inc., according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017.

On August 5, 2016, George Douvris, Stephanie Douvris, Michael
Hale, Cheryl Cacocci, Hillary E. Wilt and Christina Bryan, acting
for themselves and on behalf of all other similarly situated
residents of the lower Puna District, filed a complaint in the
Third Circuit Court for the State of Hawaii seeking certification
of a class action for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief,
consequential and punitive damages, attorney's fees and statutory
interest against PGV and other presently unknown defendants. On
December 12, 2016, the federal district court granted plaintiffs'
motion for joinder of HELCO as a co-defendant, and the case, which
had previously been removed to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii, was remanded back to the Third Circuit Court.
The amended complaint alleged that injuries and other damages in
an undisclosed amount were caused to the plaintiffs as a result of
an alleges toxic release by PGV in the wake of Hurricane Iselle in
August 2014. On June 14, 2017, the Third Circuit Court denied
HELCO's motion to discuss the complaint against itself which it
had filed On March 25, 2017. Discovery is underway.

The Company believes that it has valid defenses under law, and
intends to defend itself vigorously.

Ormat designs, develops, builds, sells, owns, and operates clean,
environmentally friendly geothermal and recovered energy-based
power plants, usually using equipment that it designs and
manufactures.


PANATTE LLC: Faces "Aikens" Suit Over FDCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Delia Aikens, and all others similarly-situated v. Panatte, LLC,
Land Home Financial Services, Inc., and Mortgage Default Services,
LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-01519 (W.D. Wash., October 10, 2017), is
brought against the Defendants for alleged violations to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff Delia Aikens is a resident of Riverside County,
California.

Defendants Panatte, LLC, Land Home Financial Services, Inc., and
Mortgage Default Services, LLC are entities that are engaged in
the business of attempting to collect debts by use of the mails
and telephone. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew J. Cunanan, Esq.
      Drew Davis, Esq.
      Christopher Wieting, Esq.
      Milena Vill, Esq.
      DC LAW GROUP NW LLC
      221 1st Ave W #320
      Seattle, WA 98119
      Tel: (206) 494-0400
      Fax: (855) 494-0400
      E-mail: matthew@dclglawyers.com

          - and -

      Jesse S. Johnson, Esq.
      GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
      5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
      Boca Raton, FL 33431
      Tel: (561) 826-5477
      Fax: (561) 961-5684
      E-mail: jjohnson@gdrlawfirm.com


PCL CONSTRUCTION: Court Names Whitfield Bryson Co-Lead Counsel
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Eastern Division, issued an order granting Plaintiff's
Unopposed Motion for Consolidation of the following Six Related
Cases:

   1. Island Vibe Cafe. et al. v. PCL Construction Enterprises.
Inc., et al., No. 4:17-cv-101-D (Island Vibe);

   2. Gross d/b/a Down Creek Galleries. et al. v. PCL Construction
Services. Inc., No. 4:17-cv-102-D (Gross);

   3. Miss Ocracoke. Inc. et al. v. PCL Construction Enterprises.
Inc., et al., No. 4: 17-cv-1 03-D (Miss Ocracoke);

   4. Breveleri. et al. v. PCL Construction Enterprises. Inc., et
al., No. 4:17-cv-107-D (Breveleri);

   5. Edgar. et al. v. PCL Civil Constructors. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-
445-D (Edgar); and

   6. McEwan v. PCL Civil Constructors. Inc., No. 2:17-cv-40-D
(McEwan).

Plaintiffs in these six cases asked the court to enter an order
consolidating these six cases, appointing interim lead counsel,
and instructing the parties to meet and confer and to submit an
initial proposed case management plan. Defendants do not oppose
the motion.

The court finds that the record and relevant pleadings reflect
that the actions assert one or more similar claims arising out of
the power outage affecting Ocracoke and Hatteras, North Carolina
and reflect one or more common issues of fact or law.

Accordingly, the court finds that the Island Vibe Cafe, Gross,
Miss Ocracoke, Breveleri, Edgar, and McEwan actions should be
consolidated for all purposes under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(a).

The court appoints Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, the Zaytoun Law
Firm, and Wallace & Graham, P.A., as Interim Co-Lead Counsel, and
appoints the Law Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, Morgan &
Morgan Complex Litigation Group, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP,
Hendren, Redwine & Malone, PLLC, Rose Harrison & Gilreath, P.C.,
and WolfHaldensteinAdler Freeman & Herz LLP to the Interim
Plaintiffs' Steering Committee.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9ueukaufrom Leagle.com.

Island Vibe Cafe, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group. 76 S. Laura Street Ste
1100, Jacksonville, FL 32202

Island Vibe Cafe, Plaintiff, represented by Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, 2018 Eastwood Rd Suite 225,
Wilmington, NC 28403, USA

Morning Star Stables, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group & Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC.

TBM Construction, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group & Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC.

Michael Janssen, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group & Jean S. Martin, Law
Office of Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC.

PCL Construction Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by
David Michael Fothergill, Yates, McLamb & Weyher, LLP & Rodney E.
Pettey, Yates, McLamb & Weyher, LLP, Two Hannover Square | 434
Fayetteville Street, Suite 2200 | Raleigh, N.C. 27601

PCL Civil Constructors, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
Michael Fothergill, Yates, McLamb & Weyher, LLP & Rodney E.
Pettey, Yates, McLamb & Weyher, LLP.


PJ OHIO: Court Certifies "Hatmaker" Case as Collective Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Tammy Hatmaker, et al., on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. PJ
Ohio, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00146-TMR
(S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Thomas Rose entered an order on Oct. 25,
2017:

   1. conditionally certifying case as collective action; and

   2. directing notice to be sent by U.S. mail to:

      "all current and former delivery drivers employed by
      Defendant within three years preceding the date of this
      order".

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=IUOHQalV

In the lawsuit, the Parties ask the Court for class certification
pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act:

   "all current and former delivery drivers employed by
   Defendants within three years preceding the Court's Order
   approving notice"

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=r9J6n8yM

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Biller, Esq.
          Andrew Kimble, Esq.
          MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          www.msdlegal.com
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Cincinnati, OH 45209
          Telephone: (513) 651 3700
          Facsimile: (513) 665 0219
          E-mail: abiller@msdlegal.com
          akimble@msdlegal.com

               - and -

          Andrew Kimble, Esq.
          Mark Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Sutie 133
          St. Louis, MI 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997 9150
          Facsimile: (314) 997 9170
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          J. Hagood Tighe, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          1320 Main Street, Suite 750
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 255 0000
          Facsimile: (803) 255 0202
          E-mail: htighe@laborlawyers.com

               - and -

          Kathleen McLeod, Caminiti, Esq.
          Mathew A. Parker, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          430 Mountain Ave., Suite 303
          Murray Hill, NJ 07974
          Telephone: 908-516-1050
          Facsimile: 908-516-1051
          E-mail: kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com
                  mparker@fisherphillips.com


PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT: Judge Finds FLSA Settlement Fair
---------------------------------------------------------
A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for Middle
District of Florida, Orlando Division, issued a Report and
Recommendation that the Settlement in the case captioned RHONDA
STEELE, Plaintiff, v. PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-871-Orl-40KRS (M.D. Fla.), is fair and
reasonable under the Fair Labor Standard Act.

Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against Defendant asserting
a claim for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), a representative claim under the FLSA seeking to represent
a class of employees who did not receive overtime compensation, an
individual claim for retaliation pursuant to the FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision, a wrongful termination claim pursuant to
the Florida Whistleblower Act (FWA).

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Steele will receive
$3,293.06 in unpaid overtime, $3,293.06 for liquidated damages,
and $5,000.002 as payment for resolution of her FLSA retaliation
claim.  Richardson will receive $429.00 in unpaid overtime and an
equal amount for liquidated damages.  Gardner will receive
$1,661.58 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount for liquidated
damages.5 Bryant will receive $2,359.50 in unpaid overtime and an
equal amount for liquidated damages.

Based on that conclusion and the parties' representation that
Steele, Richardson, Gardner, and Bryant will receive full
compensation of their FLSA overtime claims, the magistrate judge
recommended that the Court find that the settlement is a fair and
reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute under the FLSA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 26, 2017 Report
and Recommendation is available at http://tinyurl.com/yalwla98
from Leagle.com.

Rhonda Steele, Plaintiff, represented by N. Ryan LaBar, LaBar &
Adams, PA, 2300 East Concord St., Orlando, Fl 32803
Rhonda Steele, Plaintiff, represented by Scott C. Adams, LaBar &
Adams, PA.

Presbyterian Retirement Communities, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Brian J. Moran -- bmoran@morankidd.com -- Moran, Kidd, Lyons,
Johnson & Berkson, PA & Christopher Ryan Parkinson --
cparkinson@morankidd.com -- Moran, Kidd, Lyons, Johnson & Berkson,
PA.


PROGRESSIVE PROTECTIVE: "Thenarse" Suit Seeks Upaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Rickey D. Thenarse and Andre Oard, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Progressive Protective
Services, Inc., a California corporation and Does 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC678110 (Cal. Super., October 2,
2017), seeks unpaid overtime and minimum wages, redress for
failure to authorize or permit required meal periods, statutory
penalties for failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting
time penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to
timely pay employees all wages due upon separation of employment,
failure to maintain time-keeping records, reimbursement of
business-related expenses, injunctive relief and other equitable
relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest under
California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Wage Orders.

Progressive Protective Services, Inc. is in the business of
providing security guard services in the State of California where
Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as security guards. Progressive
maintains its headquarters at 24384 Sunnymead Blvd. #200, Moreno,
California 92553, County of Riverside. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kristi D. Rothschild, Esq.
      Julian Alwill, Esq.
      ROTHSCHILD & ALWILL, APC
      27 W. Anapamu Street, Suite 289
      Santa Barbara, CA 93101
      Telephone: (805)845-1190
      Facsimile: (805)456-0132
      Email: julian@ralegal.com


PROVIDENCE LITTLE: "Nowak" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
-------------------------------------------------------------
Deborah Nowak, an individual, on behalf of himself, and all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Providence Little
Company of Mary Foundation, Providence Health & Services and
Providence Health & Services Foundation/San Fernando and Santa
Clarita Valleys Service Areas and Does 1-10, Defendant, Case No.
BC678224 (Cal. Super., October 2, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime
wages and interest thereon, redress for failure to authorize or
permit required meal periods, statutory penalties for failure to
provide accurate wage statements, waiting time penalties in the
form of continuation wages for failure to timely pay employees all
wages due upon separation of employment, failure to maintain time-
keeping records, injunctive relief and other equitable relief,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest under California
Labor Code and applicable Industrial Wage Orders.

Defendants operate six medical centers in California where Nowak
worked as registered nurse for the Surgery Orthopedics Department
at the Providence Little Company of Mary Torrance hospital. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.
      Kiley L. Grombacher, Esq.
      Taylor L. Emerson, Esq.
      BRADLEY GROMBACHER, LLP
      2815 Townsgate Road, Suite 130
      Westlake Village, CA 91361
      Telephone: (805)212-5124
      Facsimile: (805) 270-7589
      E-Mail: mbradley@bradleygrombacher.com
              kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com


QUANTA SERVICES: "Benton" Class Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------
Quanta Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the Company continues to defend against the
case, Lorenzo Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., et al.

In June 2006, plaintiff Lorenzo Benton filed a class action
complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles, alleging various wage and hour violations against Telecom
Network Specialists (TNS), a former subsidiary of Quanta. Quanta
retained liability associated with this matter pursuant to the
terms of Quanta's sale of TNS in December 2012.

Benton seeks to represent a class of workers that includes all
persons who worked on certain TNS projects, including individuals
that TNS retained through numerous staffing agencies. The
plaintiff class in this matter is seeking damages for unpaid
wages, penalties associated with the failure to provide meal and
rest periods and overtime wages, interest and attorneys' fees.

In September 2015, the trial court certified the class as to
workers from the various staffing companies at issue. In January
2017, the trial court granted a summary judgment motion filed by
the plaintiff class and found that TNS was a joint employer of the
class members and that it failed to provide adequate meal and rest
breaks and failed to pay overtime wages.

Quanta believes this decision is not supported by controlling law
and continues to contest liability in this matter.

Additionally, in November 2007, TNS filed cross complaints for
indemnity and breach of contract against the staffing agencies,
which employed many of the individuals in question. In December
2012, the trial court heard cross-motions for summary judgment
filed by TNS and the staffing agencies pertaining to TNS's demand
for indemnity. The court denied TNS's motion and granted the
motions filed by the staffing agencies; however, the California
Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision in part and
instructed the trial court to reconsider its ruling. In February
2017, the court denied a new motion for summary judgment filed by
the staffing companies and stated that the staffing companies were
liable to TNS for any damages owed to the class members that the
staffing companies employed.

The final amount of liability, if any, payable in connection with
this matter remains the subject of pending litigation and will
ultimately depend on various factors, including the outcome of
Quanta's appeal of the trial court's ruling and the solvency of
the staffing agencies. Based on review and analysis of the trial
court's rulings, Quanta does not believe, at this time, that it is
probable this matter will result in a material loss. However,
after review and consideration of a revised estimate of the
potential liability for this matter during the second quarter of
2017, Quanta believes the range of reasonably possible loss could
be up to approximately $16.5 million upon final resolution of this
matter.

Quanta is a provider of specialty contracting services, offering
infrastructure solutions primarily to the electric power, oil and
gas and communications industries in the United States, Canada and
Australia and select other international markets.


RADNET MANAGEMENT: French Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
------------------------------------------------------------
Chris French, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Radnet Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
BC678260 (Cal. Super., October 2, 2017), seeks to recover, among
other things, unpaid premium wages for meal breaks that were
missed, short, or late, wages due to discharged or quitting
employees, penalties for failure to maintain accurate records and
to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and interest,
attorneys' fees, costs and expenses under California Labor Code,
Unfair Competition Law of the California Business and Professions
Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.

French was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt, hourly paid
Certified Nuclear Medical Technologist at Defendants' Riverside,
California location.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David R. Markham, Esq.
      Michael J. Morphew, Esq.
      Maggie K. Realin, Esq.
      THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM
      750 B Street, Suite 1950
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 399-3995
      Fax: (619) 615-2067
      Email: dmarkham@markham-law.com
             mrealin@markham-law.com
             mmorphew@markham-law.com

             - and -

      Walter F. Haines, Esq.
      UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
      5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 201
      Huntington Beach, CA 92649
      Tel: (310)234-5678
      Fax: (310)652-2242


RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE: Faces "Lavi" Suit in E.D. of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Receivables
Performance Management, LLC. The case is styled as Daniel Lavi, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers,
Plaintiff v. Receivables Performance Management, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-06023 (E.D. Fla., October 16, 2017).

Receivables Performance is a collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


REDFLEX TRAFFIC: Denial of Bid to Dismiss "Watson" Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth, issued
a Memorandum Opinion affirming the trial court's denying of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the suit filed by James H. Watson
against Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

Redflex sought to dismiss Watson's claims against it under the
Texas Citizens Participation Act, which the trial court denied.
Redflex now challenges that ruling by interlocutory appeal.

A Redflex red-light camera photographed a vehicle registered to
James H. Watson, a Louisiana resident, running a red traffic light
in Southlake.  He subsequently received a notice of violation in
the mail stating he owed a $75.00 penalty.  Watson claims he was
not in Texas at any time on October 31, 2014.  Although the
ordinance provided an administrative process whereby Watson could
contest the violation, he did not seek to do so, opting instead to
simply pay the $75.00 penalty.  Then he filed a class action
lawsuit that seeks more than $130 million in damages, as well as
to put an end to red-light camera programs in the entire state.

Watson alleges that because Redflex, by its red-light camera
systems, engages in the business of collecting evidence for use
before a court, board, officer, or investigating committee, it is
an investigations company within the meaning of the Texas Private
Security Act (TPSA).  Watson contends that state law requires an
investigations company to be licensed, and he alleges that at all
times relevant to his case.  Redflex did not have such a license.
Thus, he contends, Redflex violated the TPSA act by collecting
evidence concerning a violation of the City's red-light camera
ordinance and sending him a notice of violation. And he alleges
that such a violation of the TPSA is also a violation of the DTPA,
a violation that was a producing cause of damages to him.

In its motion to dismiss, Redflex asserted that Watson's claims
against it are based on, related to, and in response to the notice
of violation it mailed to him. It contended that the notice of
violation was an exercise of both its right to free speech and its
right to petition. And it argued Watson could not meet his burden
to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for
each essential element of his claims against it. Redflex therefore
moved the trial court to dismiss Watson's suit.

Watson contends that because Redflex filed a motion to dismiss
under the TCPA in federal district court while this case was
pending there, principles of res judicata and estoppel precluded
Redflex from prevailing on the nearly-identical motion to dismiss
it filed in state district court following remand.

Redflex filed its TCPA motion to dismiss in the federal district
court on July 6, 2015. On September 23, 2015-79 days after it
filed that motion to dismiss -- Redflex filed a motion in the
federal district court requesting the court set a hearing on the
motion to dismiss. The court denied that motion and never held a
hearing on Redflex's TCPA motion to dismiss. Both parties have
thus assumed that under TCPA section 27.008(a), the TCPA motion to
dismiss Redflex filed in the federal district court was overruled
by operation of law.  And taking that assumption as true, Watson
argues that because Redflex's TCPA motion to dismiss was overruled
by operation of law in the federal proceeding, principles of res
judicata and estoppel precluded Redflex from raising another TCPA
motion to dismiss in state court after remand.

The Tex. App. noted, however, that the language of TCPA section
27.008(a) provides that a TCPA motion to dismiss is considered
overruled by operation of law if the trial court does not rule on
the motion "in the time prescribed by Section 27.005."  The time
prescribed by section 27.005 is "not later than the 30th day
following the date of the hearing on the motion."  But the federal
district court never held a hearing on Redflex's TCPA motion to
dismiss, which raises the issue of whether Watson and Redflex are
correct in their assumption that the motion was overruled by
operation of law. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recently considered
this issue and concluded that, "[g]iven that the deadline for
ruling on the motion before it is deemed denied by operation of
law is explicitly pegged to the date of the hearing and that no
hearing occurred, a straightforward reading of the statute
indicates that the motion was never deemed denied by operation of
law."

THE TCPA'S COMMERCIAL-SPEECH EXEMPTION

In its first issue, Redflex argues the TCPA applies to Watson's
claims against it.  The Tex. App. concluded, however, that the
TCPA's commercial-speech exemption exempts Watson's claims against
Redflex from the TCPA's protections.

REDFLEX'S AND WATSON'S POSITIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE TCPA'S COMMERCIAL-SPEECH EXEMPTION

Watson argues that the TCPA does not apply to the notice of
violation because it falls within the TCPA's commercial-speech
exemption.  That exemption provides, "The TCPA does not apply to a
legal action brought against a person primarily engaged in the
business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement
or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or
an insurance product, insurance services, or a commercial
transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or
potential buyer or customer."

These divergent readings result in equally divergent consequences.
Applying its reading, Redflex contends the commercial-speech
exemption does not apply unless the intended audience of the
speech or conduct at issue was an actual or potential buyer or
customer. Because Redflex's customers are municipalities, not
individuals, it argues, the commercial-speech exemption is
inapplicable because Watson, the intended audience of the speech
at issue here, was not an actual or potential buyer or customer of
Redflex's goods or services. Applying his reading, however, Watson
argues the exemption applies because it does not require the
intended audience of the speech or conduct at issue to have been
an actual or potential buyer or customer; rather, it is sufficient
that Redflex is primarily engaged in the business of selling goods
and services and the notice of violation arose out of the sale of
its goods and services to the City of Southlake.

REDFLEX'S CASELAW ARGUMENT

The Tex. App. turned first to Redflex's contention that several
Texas state appellate courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit, have
already construed the TCPA's commercial-speech exemption and have
done so in the way it advocates.

The Tex. App. first noted that California's exemption is notably
longer than, and structured differently from, the TCPA's
exemption. The Tex. App. also noted that the California exemption
contains language the TCPA's exemption does not. For instance, the
California exemption contains a clause requiring that the
statement or conduct at issue consists of representations of fact
about that person's or a business competitor's business
operations, goods, or services.

There are substantial differences in the structure of, and
language in, the commercial-speech exemption in California's anti-
SLAPP statute and the TCPA's exemption, and thus the Tex. App.
does not believe that a test the California supreme court
developed to apply the former is particularly helpful to it in
carrying out it duty to apply the latter.

WATSON'S STATUTORY-CONSTRUCTION ARGUMENT

Having concluded that the cases interpreting the TCPA's
commercial-speech exemption that Redflex pointed us to are of no
aid to us here, the Tex. App. turned now to consider Watson's
statutory-construction argument.

Thus, the plain meaning of the statutory text provides the best
expression of legislative intent. The Tex. App. read the words and
phrases of a statute in context and construe them according to the
rules of grammar and common usage. The Tex. App. construed
statutes so that no part is surplusage, but so that each word has
meaning. The Tex. App. presumed the legislature chooses a
statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a
purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.  If a
statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, the Tex. App.
did not resort to extrinsic aides in interpreting it.

The same punctuation was used here. The lack of a comma after the
term commercial transaction signals that the legislature intended
to limit the intended-audience phrase to the commercial
transaction item. Moreover, the Tex. App. said it cannot overlook
the fact that Redflex's proposed reading of the commercial-speech
exemption subtly transforms the term in which that the legislature
wrote after the term commercial transaction into the term and. Had
the legislature intended and instead of in which, it could have
written and instead of in which. It did not do so. It chose to use
the term in which, a decision the court presumed it made with
care.  And it declined to use the term and, a decision we presume
it made purposefully.  Based upon the commercial-speech
exemption's language and punctuation, the appellate court
concluded the intended-audience phrase modifies only the term
"commercial transaction.

Accordingly, contrary to Redflex's contention, Watson's
commercial-speech exemption argument is not upended by the mere
fact that the intended audience of the notice of violation at
issue here was not an actual or potential buyer or customer of
Redflex.

THE COMMERCIAL-SPEECH EXEMPTION APPLIES

Redflex is a Person Primarily Engaged in the Business of Selling
or Leasing Goods or Services

There is no doubt or dispute that Redflex meets the first
requirement. In its briefing, Redflex concedes it engages in the
business of selling its photo-enforcement services to
municipalities like the City of Southlake. Redflex attached to its
motion to dismiss the affidavit of Robert Salcido, Redflex's
Director of Operations and Corporate Custodian of Records, who
averred that Redflex is a traffic safety company headquartered in
Phoenix, Arizona, which contracts wit. local governments to
provide traffic safety assessments, counsel, and program
development.

Thus, there is no question Redflex is a person primarily engaged
in the business of selling or leasing goods or services.

The Notice of Violation Arose Out of the Sale of Redflex's
Services

It is further undisputed that Redflex's relationship with the City
of Southlake is a contractual one that, broadly speaking, involved
Redflex's provision of services related to the administration and
enforcement of the City of Southlake's red-light camera program.
Under that contract, if an authorized City police officer reviewed
the data Redflex gathered in performing its services and
instructed Redflex to send a notice of violation to someone,
Redflex was contractually obligated to send the notice to that
person.

The Tex. App. expressed no opinion on the underlying merits of
Watson's claims against Redflex. The appellate court decided only
that under the plain language of the TCPA's commercial-speech
exemption, those claims are exempted from application of the TCPA.
Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Redflex's motion
to dismiss. The Tex. App. overruled Redflex's first issue. And
because its resolution of Redflex's first issue is dispositive of
this appeal, it did not address Redflex's second or third issues.

WATSON'S RULE 45 MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Watson filed a Motion for Sanctions Under TRAP 45, requesting
sanctions against Redflex for filing a frivolous appeal. The Tex.
App. has considered the motion, and it is denied.

The appeals case is captioned REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS, INC.,
Appellant, v. JAMES H. WATSON, Appellee, No. 02-16-00432-CV (Tex.
App.).

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s October 5, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yd5kr2tffrom
Leagle.com.

Russell J. Bowman, 800 West Airport Freeway, Suite 860, Irving,
Texas 75062-6287 for James H. Watson, Appellee.

Matthew R. Beatty -- mbeatty@bbsfirm.com -- Kenneth E. Payson --
kenpayson@dwt.com -- for Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., Appellant.


REGENCY CENTERS: Stipulation of Settlement Awaits Court Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
Regency Centers Corporation and Regency Centers, L.P. said in its
Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the stipulation
of settlement of a class action lawsuit remains subject to court
approval.

After the announcement of the merger agreement on November 14,
2016, a putative class action was filed on behalf of a purported
stockholder in the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida, under
the following caption: Robert Garfield on Behalf of Himself and
All Others Similarly Situated vs. Regency Centers Corporation,
Martin E. Stein, Jr., John C. Schweitzer, Raymond L. Bank, Bryce
Blair, C. Ronald Blankenship, J. Dix Druce, Jr., Mary Lou Fiala,
David P. O'Connor, and Thomas G. Wattles, No. 16-2017-CA-000688-
XXXX-MA, filed February 3, 2017.

The class action alleged, among other matters, that the definitive
joint proxy statement/prospectus filed by Regency and Equity One
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on January
24, 2017 (the "Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus") omitted certain
material information in connection with the Merger. The
complainant sought various remedies, including injunctive relief
to prevent the consummation of the Merger unless certain allegedly
material information was disclosed and sought compensatory and
rescissory damages in the event the Merger was consummated without
such disclosures.

On February 17, 2017, the defendants entered into a stipulation of
settlement with respect to the class action, pursuant to which the
parties agreed, among other things, that Regency would make
certain supplemental disclosures. The supplemental disclosures
were made by Regency in the Current Report on Form 8-K filed by
Regency with the SEC on February 17, 2017.

Regency Centers (the "Parent Company") began its operations as a
publicly-traded REIT in 1993, and, as of June 30, 2017, had full
or partial ownership interests in 428 retail properties primarily
anchored by market leading grocery stores.


RENT-A-CENTER INC: Directed to Reply in "Blair"
-----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order Requiring Reply to Plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to File Motion for Partial Reconsideration in the case
captioned PAULA BLAIR, ANDREA ROBINSON, and FALECHIA HARRIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC., a Delaware corporation, RENT-
A-CENTER WEST, INC., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, No. C 17-02335 WHA (N.D. Calif.).

Defendants is directed to file a response to plaintiff Paula
Blair's motion for leave to file motion for partial
reconsideration addressing the issues regarding class action
waiver.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yaxzwmwtfrom Leagle.com.

Paula L. Blair, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink --
Hannink@SDLaw.com -- Dostart Hannink and Coveney.

Paula L. Blair, Plaintiff, represented by Zachariah Paul Dostart -
- Paul.Dostart@SDLaw.com -- Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP, Eric
Prince Brown -- ebrown@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Michael Rubin -- mrubin@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon
LLP.

Andrea Robinson, Plaintiff, represented by Eric Prince Brown,
Altshuler Berzon LLP, James T. Hannink, Dostart Hannink and
Coveney, Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP & Zachariah Paul
Dostart, Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP.

Harris A. Falechia, Plaintiff, represented by Eric Prince Brown,
Altshuler Berzon LLP, James T. Hannink, Dostart Hannink and
Coveney, Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP & Zachariah Paul
Dostart, Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP.

Rent-A-Center, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christina Guerola
Sarchio -- Christina.sarchio@dechert.com -- Orrick Herrington
Sutcliffe LLP, H. Joseph Escher, III --
h.joseph.escher@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP, Kirsten F. Gallacher -
- KGallacher@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP,
Robert Kenneth Dixon -- rdixon@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson
Turner Kosmo, Robert Francois Friedman --  rfriedman@littler.com -
- Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice, Vickie E. Turner --
vturner@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP & Gregory
G. Iskander -- giskander@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..

Rent-A-Center West, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christina
Guerola Sarchio, Orrick Herrington Sutcliffe LLP, H. Joseph
Escher, III, Dechert LLP, Kirsten F. Gallacher, Wilson Turner
Kosmo LLP, Robert Kenneth Dixon, Wilson Turner Kosmo, Robert
Francois Friedman, Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice, Vickie
E. Turner, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP & Gregory G. Iskander, Littler
Mendelson, P.C.


          13520 California Street, Suite 290
          Omaha, NE 68154

               - and -

          William F. Hargens, Esq.
          Lauren R. Goodman, Esq.
          MCGRATH NORTH MULLIN & KRATZ, PC, LLO
          First National Tower, Suite 3700
          1601 Dodge Street
          Omaha, NE 68102


RESOURCE CAPITAL: Discovery Underway in "Levin" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Resource Capital Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that discovery has been commenced in a class action
lawsuit by Daren Levin.

In September 2015, Daren Levin filed a putative class action in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York on behalf of all persons who purchased our common stock
between March 2, 2015 and August 4, 2015.  In November 2015, the
Court appointed Douglas Drees as the lead plaintiff in the action,
and thereafter entered a stipulation and order directing the lead
plaintiff to file an amended complaint.  In February 2016, the
lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that we and
certain of our officers and directors materially misrepresented
certain risks of our commercial loan portfolio and processes and
controls for assessing the quality of our portfolio.  Based on
these allegations, the amended complaint asserts claims for
violation of the securities laws and seeks a variety of relief,
including unspecified monetary damages as well as costs and
attorneys' fees.  On June 2, 2017, a second amended complaint was
filed which added a new class of Series B and Series C preferred
shareholders. The parties have now commenced discovery and the
plaintiff has filed a motion for class certification.  We believe
the amended complaint is without merit and intend to defend
ourselves vigorously.

Resource Capital Corp. and its subsidiaries (collectively the
"Company") is primarily focused on originating, holding and
managing commercial mortgage loans and other commercial real
estate ("CRE") related debt investments.


S.A.W. ENTERTAINMENT: Pera Seeks to Certify Class of Dancers
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ELANA PERA and SARAH MURPHY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
S.A.W. ENTERTAINMENT LTD., d/b/a CONDOR GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00138-LB (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for conditional certification and issuance of notice
on behalf of "all dancers who have performed at the Condor Club."

Elana Pera and Sarah Murphy worked as exotic dancers at the Condor
Gentlemen's Club operated by Defendant S.A.W. Entertainment and
have brought this action seeking to recover unpaid wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiffs contend that Defendant
misclassified Plaintiffs and other dancers as independent
contractors when, in fact, the dancers were Defendant's employees.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=sRmUnfQw

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Matthew D. Carlson, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994 5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  mcarlson@llrlaw.com


SABRA HEALTH: Consolidated Investor Suit Ongoing in Delaware
------------------------------------------------------------
Sabra Health Care REIT, Inc. said in its Form 8-K Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission that between June 29
and July 10, 2017, five putative class action lawsuits were filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
and were subsequently consolidated under the caption In re Care
Capital Properties, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Consolidated Case
No. 1:17-cv-00859-LPS (the "Consolidated Delaware Litigation").
The Consolidated Delaware Litigation names CCP and its directors
as defendants; two of the lawsuits also name as defendants the
Company, Merger Sub, CCP OP and Sabra OP.

On June 30, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit (Douglas v. Care
Capital Props., Inc., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-04942) (the
"Illinois Litigation") was filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois against CCP and its
directors, and on July 28, 2017, the Court entered the parties'
voluntary stipulation staying the Illinois Litigation.

All six lawsuits allege that the joint proxy statement/prospectus
(the "Proxy Statement") related to the proposed Merger violated
federal securities laws in purportedly omitting to disclose
information necessary to make the statements therein not
materially false or misleading.

In the two lawsuits in which the Company, Merger Sub and Sabra OP
are named as defendants, the complaints allege that the Company,
Merger Sub and Sabra OP violated federal securities laws because
they had control over the composition of the Proxy Statement and
prepared, reviewed and disseminated the Proxy Statement. The
lawsuits seek, among other things, an injunction of the proposed
Merger; dissemination of supplemental disclosures to the Proxy
Statement; declarations that the Proxy Statement violated federal
securities laws; damages, including rescissory damages; and an
award of costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company believes that the claims asserted against the Company,
Merger Sub and Sabra OP in the two lawsuits in which they are
named are without merit and intends to defend against such claims
vigorously. However, in order to moot the plaintiffs'
unmeritorious disclosure claims, alleviate the costs, risks and
uncertainties inherent in litigation and provide additional
information to its stockholders, the Company has determined to
voluntarily supplement the Proxy Statement.


SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Court Certifies Classes in "Ontiveros" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled YADIR A. ONTIVEROS, as an individual, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff v. SAFELITE
FULFILLMENT, INC., et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-07118-
DMG-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion to disqualify defense counsel;

   2. granting in part Plaintiff's motion for relief pursuant to
      Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), specifically:

      a. invalidating releases that Safelite obtained from
         putative class members that were intended to extinguish
         the claims at issue in this case;

      b. directing Safelite to send a curative notice to that
         effect to all employees to whom Safelite sent such
         settlement agreements; and

      c. denying Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.

   3. certifying these six classes:

      Class 1a (PPP Incentive Plan Class - Unpaid Rest Periods):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California as a Technician, and who were paid
      pursuant to Safelite's PPP Incentive Plan, during the time
      period September 9, 2011 through April 9, 2017";

      Class 1c (PPP Incentive Plan Class - Wage Statements):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California as a Technician, and who were paid
      pursuant to Safelite's PPP Incentive Plan, during the time
      period September 9, 2014 through April 9, 2017";

      Class 2a (Wage Statement Class - Meal Period Premium):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California, and were paid a meal period
      premium payment, during the time period September 9, 2014
      to the present";

      Class 2b (Wage Statement Class - Installation Bonus):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California, earned an Installation Bonus and
      worked overtime hours during the corresponding time period
      that the Installation Bonus was earned, during the time
      period September 9, 2014 to the present".

      Class 3a (Unpaid Overtime Class - Artificial Dilution of
      Regular Rate):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California, and who in the same time period:
      (i) were paid a meal period premium payment as "regular"
      hours worked; and (ii) earned any form of incentive pay;
      and (iii) worked overtime hours, during the time period
      September 9, 2011 to the present (but limited to the time
      period of June 4, 2013 to the present for those individuals
      who worked as Technicians or Windshield Repair
      Specialists).

      Class 3b (Unpaid Overtime Class - Underpaid Double-time
      Premium):

      "all current and former non-exempt employees of Safelite
      who worked in California, and who in the same time period:
      (i) earned any form of incentive pay; and (ii) worked
      double-time hours, during the time period September 9, 2011
      to the present (but limited to the time period of June 4,
      2013 to the present for those individuals who worked as
      Technicians or Windshield Repair Specialists).

   4. declining to certify Class 1b (PPP Incentive Plan Class -
      Unpaid Non-Productive Time);

   5. appointing Plaintiff Yadir A. Ontiveros as the
      representative of Classes 1a, 1c, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.

   6. appointing Paul K. Haines, Tuvia Korobkin, Fletcher W.
      Schmidt, and Sean M. Blakely, of Haines Law Group, APC as
      Class Counsel.

   7. directing parties, by no later than October 27, 2017, to
      meet and confer and submit to the Court a proposed class
      notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)
      consistent with the Order.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=lqZtQWoX


SALT LAKE CITY: Dismissal of Suit Over Parking Code Affirmed.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Utah issued an Opinion affirming the District
Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint for Failure to State
Any Claim in the appeals case captioned TIMOTHY BIVENS, MICHELLE
REED, and ANTHONY ARIAS, Appellants, v. SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, MAYOR RALPH BECKER, and SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL,
Appellees, No. 20150249 (Utah).

Timothy Bivens, Anthony Arias, and Michelle Reed all received
tickets for failing to pay to park. Each of their parking tickets
stated they owed a fine of $15. The tickets further stated this
fine would increase if it was not timely paid: if the motorists
waited until after ten days had elapsed, but paid within 11 to 20
days, they would owe $55; 21 to 30 days, $85; and 31 to 40 days,
$125.

The tickets also provided a phone number and email address to
obtain additional information, and they, albeit somewhat
misleadingly, explained how motorists could contest their tickets:
To discuss your Parking Notice, you must see the Hearing Officer
in person within 10 calendar days from the date of this notice at
the Salt Lake City & County Building at 451 South State Street,
Room 145. In fact, a motorist has twenty days to challenge a
ticket, not just ten.

On behalf of themselves and members of a putative class, the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City's parking fine
scheme was unlawful and an injunction ordering a stop to
enforcement of parking ordinances until the City updated its Code
and fixed the notice problems with the tickets and Small Claims
Court Information document. They also sought a refund of what they
claimed was illicitly acquired parking ticket revenue, parking pay
station revenue, and related collection costs, court filing fees,
and attorney fees.

The City then moved to dismiss. Among other things, it argued that
the plaintiffs' due process claim should be dismissed because the
notice the plaintiffs received was constitutionally adequate. It
also argued that the plaintiffs could not pursue an unjust
enrichment claim because they had failed to pursue their available
legal remedy directly challenging their parking tickets and,
relatedly, that they could not challenge the underlying procedures
for contesting their tickets because they had not sought to
challenge those procedures before the hearing officer, justice
court, or small claims court.

The state Supreme Court said it is concerned by the misstatements
and omissions contained in the parking ticket and the Small Claims
Court Information document. The parking ticket affirmatively
misleads motorists about the timeframe for challenging a parking
infraction, stating that motorists have ten days to appear before
a hearing officer, when, in fact, the law gives them twenty days
in which to challenge a ticket.

Despite these misstatements and omissions, the state supreme court
said it is nonetheless constrained to affirm the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs' lawsuit. As a matter of law, the
plaintiffs allegations fail to support their claim that the
parking ticket and Small Claims Court Information document's
misstatements concerning though they are deprived them of
constitutionally adequate notice.

This is fatal to their lawsuit. Because the plaintiffs received
constitutionally adequate notice, their failure to exercise their
right to contest their tickets means that they have waived any due
process challenge to any procedures that the City might have
applied in those proceedings. Moreover, because the plaintiffs did
not avail themselves of their legal right to challenge their
parking tickets other than in one instance where Mr. Bivens
challenged his ticket and won they may not bring an equitable
action to recoup the fines and costs they paid in connection with
their parking violations.

The plaintiffs' constitutional claims are asserted under the Utah
Constitution. Article I, section 7 of our constitution provides
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law. Central to our constitution's
conception of due process of law is timely and adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard.

Despite the concerns, the state supreme court nonetheless affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' procedural due
process claim. Not every failure of government rises to the level
of a due process violation. As we have explained, the core
question in any due process challenge to the adequacy of notice is
not whether the notice is a model of clarity and good governance,
but whether it reasonably apprises the prospective litigant of the
essential information she needs to assert her rights.

Under the circumstances alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, both
the parking ticket and the Small Claims Court Information document
gave constitutionally adequate notice to the plaintiffs of their
right to a hearing.

With respect to the parking ticket, the crux of the plaintiffs'
complaint is that the ticket was misleading in three respects: (1)
it erroneously told them they had ten calendar days to schedule a
hearing to challenge their parking tickets when in fact they had
twenty days, (2) it misleadingly suggested late-penalties compound
at a faster rate than they actually do, and (3) it failed to
notify them of their right to seek a hearing in justice court
instead of appearing before a hearing officer.

The state supreme court agreed that the statement that the
plaintiffs have only ten calendar days to schedule a hearing was
misleading. But to have violated the plaintiffs' due process right
to notice, that misstatement must have misled them in such a way
that they were effectively deprived of the opportunity for a
hearing. Under the circumstances of this case, this misstatement
does not rise to that level.

This is because the plaintiffs' allegations do not reflect that
they suffered prejudice as a result of only having ten days in
which to challenge their parking tickets. Nowhere in the
plaintiffs' complaint do they aver that they forewent their
hearings because of the ten-day time limit. Disputing a parking
ticket is typically a simple matter that requires virtually no
factual investigation or development, and no plaintiff alleges
that ten days was inadequate time to adequately prepare a
litigation strategy.

Nor do any of the plaintiffs allege that ten days was not enough
time for them to arrange their affairs in such a way that they
could appear and contest the ticket. The state supreme court
therefore cannot find a deprivation of due process based on the
misleading statement that the plaintiffs had ten, instead of
twenty, days to challenge their tickets.

The state supreme court found it important that the parking
tickets here both indicated that they could be challenged and
provided a telephone number to call for more information. By
including an explanation that they could be challenged, the
parking tickets accomplished the core due process purpose of
notice: providing adequate notice to the plaintiffs of their right
to be heard. And the phone number meant that any plaintiff who was
confused by the information contained on the parking tickets had a
relatively easy way to acquire more information.
To the extent any of the plaintiffs were concerned that they would
be penalized for seeking a hearing, the plaintiffs could have
called the phone number on their parking tickets to ask about the
possibility of a stay. But there is no allegation that any of them
did so. Under the circumstances of this case, due process was not
offended by the allegedly misleading statements about the schedule
of penalties.

Finally, the state supreme court did not see constitutional
significance in the parking ticket's omission of the right to
challenge a parking ticket in justice court as opposed to before a
hearing officer. The plaintiffs have not explained how they
believed they were prejudiced by having to appear before a hearing
officer instead of in justice court. Absent allegations that they
reasonably decided to forfeit their right to be heard based on the
requirement that they appear before a hearing officer, the supreme
court cannot conclude that the fact that this forum was a hearing
before a hearing officer posed a constitutional problem.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's September 26, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycrn9b5ofrom
Leagle.com.

R. Shane Johnson -- shane@utahdefense.com -- Mark S. Schwarz,
Pinpoint Law PLLC, 75 E. 400 S., Ste 201, Salt Lake City  UT
84111, Bruce R. Baird, 2150 South 1300 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake,
City, UT 84106, for appellants.

Margaret D. Plane, Salt Lake City, for appellees.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Fraker Suit Alleges Magnuson-Moss Act Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Fraker, and all others similarly-situated v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., The Home
Depot, Inc., Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Best Buy Co., Inc. and
Sears Holding Corporation, Case No. 5:17-cv-01084 (W.D. Okla.,
October 10, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Act.

This action relates to the marketing and selling of certain
defective Samsung home washing machines that have latent and
inherent defects and Samsung's failed recall of these same washing
machines. These washing machines "explode," or suffer catastrophic
failure during a given machine's normal usage because of a design
defect and/or manufacturing flaw, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Fraker is a citizen and resident of the State of New
York.

Defendant Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Is a South Korean
corporation headquartered in Seoul, South Korea.  Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. designs and manufactures the Recalled
Washing Machines that have been sold to Plaintiff and other
consumers in this District.  At all times relevant hereto, Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. was in the business of distributing,
marketing, promoting, and selling the recalled Washing Machines
described herein throughout the United States and in the District.

Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a New York
corporation with headquarters in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey and
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is the warrantor of the products
designed, manufactured, and distributed by Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd., and acts as Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.'s agent in
the processing of warranty claims related to defects in the
manufacturing or materials used by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
during the manufacturing process.

Defendant Home Depot, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.  At all times relevant hereto,
Home Depot was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District.

Lowe's Home Centers, LLC conducts its business in the state of
North Carolina. At all times relevant hereto, Lowe's was in the
business of distributing, marketing, promoting, and selling the
Recalled Washing Machines described herein throughout the United
States and in this District.

Best Buy Co., Inc., is a Minnesota corporation with its
headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota.  At all times relevant
hereto, Best Buy was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District.

Sears Holding Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in Hoffman Estates, Illinois.  At all times relevant
hereto, Sears was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Federman, Esq.
      FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
      10205 N. Pennsylvania Ave.
      Oklahoma City, OK 73120
      Tel: (405) 235-1560
      Fax: (405) 239-2112
      E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: "Hinkhouse" Suit Alleges Breach of Warranty
----------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Hinkhouse, and all others similarly-situated v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., The Home
Depot, Inc., Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, Best Buy Co., Inc. and
Sears Holding Corporation, Case No. 5:17-cv-01091 (W.D. Okla.,
October 10, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, negligence and violations of
the Magnuson-Moss Act.

This action relates to certain defective Samsung home washing
machines that have an inherently dangerous defect. These washing
machines "explode," or suffer catastrophic failure during a given
machine's normal usage because of a design defect and/or
manufacturing flaw, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Hinkhouse is a resident of Gwinn, Michigan.

Defendant Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Is a South Korean
corporation headquartered in Seoul, South Korea.  Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. designs and manufactures the Recalled
Washing Machines that have been sold to Plaintiff and other
consumers in this District.  At all times relevant hereto, Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. was in the business of distributing,
marketing, promoting, and selling the recalled Washing Machines
described herein throughout the United States and in the District.

Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a New York
corporation with headquarters in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey and
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is the warrantor of the products
designed, manufactured, and distributed by Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd., and acts as Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.'s agent in
the processing of warranty claims related to defects in the
manufacturing or materials used by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
during the manufacturing process.

Defendant Home Depot, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.  At all times relevant hereto,
Home Depot was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District.

Lowe's Home Centers, LLC conducts its business in the state of
North Carolina. At all times relevant hereto, Lowe's was in the
business of distributing, marketing, promoting, and selling the
Recalled Washing Machines described herein throughout the United
States and in this District.

Best Buy Co., Inc., is a Minnesota corporation with its
headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota.  At all times relevant
hereto, Best Buy was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District.

Sears Holding Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its
headquarters in Hoffman Estates, Illinois.  At all times relevant
hereto, Sears was in the business of distributing, marketing,
promoting, and selling the Recalled Washing Machines described
herein throughout the United States and in this District. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Craig Eric Hilborn, Esq.
      HILBORN & HILBORN, P.C.
      999 Haynes Rd., Ste. 205
      Birmingham, MI 48009
      Tel: (248) 642-8350


SCYNEXIS INC: Stockholder Class Suit Ongoing in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
SCYNEXIS, Inc. continues to defend a shareholder class action
lawsuit, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

On March 8, 2017, a purported stockholder class action lawsuit was
filed in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey against the Company and certain of its current and former
officers, captioned Gibson v. Scynexis, Inc., et al.  The action
was filed on behalf of a putative class of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's securities (1)
pursuant or traceable to the Company's IPO, or (2) on the open
market between May 2, 2014, and March 2, 2017.  It asserts claims
for violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.  The complaint seeks, among other things, compensatory
damages and attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of the putative
class.

The Company believes that the claims lack merit and intends to
defend the litigation vigorously.

SCYNEXIS is a biotechnology company committed to positively
impacting the lives of patients suffering from difficult-to-treat
and often life-threatening infections by delivering innovative
anti-infective therapies.


SENTRY CREDIT: Faces "Garretson" Suit in S.D. of West Virginia
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sentry Credit, Inc.
The case is styled as Eric Garretson, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sentry Credit, Inc. and JH
Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-04171
(S.D.W.V., October 17, 2017).

Sentry Credit is collection recovery specialist.[BN]

The Plaintiff represented by:

   Christopher B. Frost, Esq.
   HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD
   P. O. Box 959
   Fayetteville, WV 25840-0959
   Tel: (304) 574-2727
   Fax: (304) 574-3709
   Email: cfrost@hamiltonburgess.com

      - and -

   Ralph C. Young, Esq.
   HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG &POLLARD
   P. O. Box 959
   Fayetteville, WV 25840-0959
   Tel: (304) 574-2727
   Fax: (304) 574-3709
   Email: ryoung@hamiltonburgess.com

      - and -

   Steven R. Broadwater , Jr., Esq.
   HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD
   P. O. Box 959
   Fayetteville, WV 25840-0959
   Tel: (304) 574-2727
   Fax: (304) 574-3709
   Email: sbroadwater@hamiltonburgess.com


SORIN GROUP: Sawvel Sues Over Exposure to Bacteria During Surgery
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN SAWVEL, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
persons v. SORIN GROUP DEUTSCHLAND GMBH and SORIN GROUP USA, INC.,
Case No. 6:17-cv-02056-LTS (N.D. Iowa, September 25, 2017), is
brought on behalf of persons similarly situated in the state of
Iowa, who were unknowingly exposed to a potentially fatal bacteria
during open heart surgery.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the Class were
exposed to M. Chimaera and/or M. Abscessus, subspecies of
nontuberculous mycobacterium, through a Sorin 3T Heater-Cooler
System manufactured by the Defendants and used to regulate their
blood temperature during surgeries at the University of Iowa
Hospitals and Clinics.

Sorin Group Deutschland Gmbh is a foreign corporation
headquartered in Munich, Germany.  Sorin Group USA Inc. is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Arvada, Colorado.  Sorin Group Deutschland Gmbh and Sorin Group
USA, Inc. designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold the Sorin 3T
Heater-Cooler Systems used in Plaintiff and Class Members'
surgeries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          Brian O. Marty, Esq.
          Brandon M. Bohlman, Esq.
          SHINDLER ANDERSON GOPLERUD & WEESE PC
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IA 50265
          Telephone: (515) 223-4567
          Facsimile: (515) 223-8887
          E-mail: goplerud@sagwlaw.com
                  marty@sagwlaw.com
                  bohlman@sagwlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          Yvonne M. Flaherty, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: rkshelquist@locklaw.com
                  ymflaherty@locklaw.com

               - and -

          Wesley Bowden, Esq.
          LEVIN PAPANTONIO
          316 South Baylen St.
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7184
          E-mail: wbowden@levinlaw.com


SOUTHERN GLAZER'S: Cal. App. Flips Grants of Demurrer to Evidence
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Two,
issued an Opinion reversing the judgment of the District Court
granting Defendant's Demurrer to Evidence in the case captioned
WISEMAN PARK, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN GLAZER'S
WINE AND SPIRITS, LLC, Defendant and Respondent, No. B266118.
(Cal. App.).

Wiseman Park, LLC, appeals from the judgment entered following the
trial court sustaining the demurrer of Southern Glazer's Wine and
Spirits, LLC, to appellant's complaint without leave to amend.

Appellant, the holder of a license to sell alcoholic beverages in
its restaurant, purchased alcoholic beverages from respondent, a
licensed wholesale distributor of alcoholic beverages. In this
action, appellant seeks to recover carrying charges it paid
respondent on the theory that those charges were not permitted by
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (ABC Act).

Appellant is a dissolved California limited liability company
which operated a restaurant in Los Angeles, California. During
that time, appellant held an eating place alcoholic beverage
license issued by the Department. This license permitted appellant
to purchase alcoholic beverages at wholesale and resell them at
retail to patrons of its restaurant.

The trial court ruled that the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control has exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's
claims because appellant's allegations "directly implicate the
sale of alcohol.

In sustaining respondent's demurrer to appellant's complaint
without leave to amend, the trial court ruled, because the
allegations of the Complaint directly implicate the sale of
alcohol, and since the Department has exclusive jurisdiction in
this area, the Complaint cannot go forward in the court.

The trial court concluded, Plaintiff's remedy, if any, would be
before the ABC, with the right to seek redress before the Court of
Appeal and California Supreme Court under Section 23090.5.
Appellant contends the Department's exclusive jurisdiction does
not extend to encompass this contract dispute between businesses;
and, in any event, California's unfair competition statute affords
appellant a remedy.

The fundamental issue presented in this appeal is the reach of the
Department's regulation of the alcoholic beverage industry in this
state. Appellant contends that neither the state Constitution nor
the ABC Act bars private actions for breach of contract even when
the gravamen of the claim is bottomed on what appellant contends
is the proper construction of a section of the ABC Act, here,
section 25509.

Respondent argues, and the trial court ruled, that the Department
has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving contracts
for the sale of beverages subject to regulation of the Department.

This ruling was in error.

The Cal. App.'s independent review of the history of the adoption
of article XX, section 22 in 1932, and of its amendments in the
decades since, reveals no such intention with respect to either
constitutional provision. Indeed, nothing in the text of article
XX, section 22, nor in any ballot analyses of the propositions
presented to the voters in 1932, 1933 or 1954 states or suggests
the interpretation for which respondent contends.

Since its first iteration in 1932, article XX, section 22 has
authorized the licensing and regulation of manufacturers,
distributors and retailers of alcoholic beverages, and has, since
its amendment in 1954, vested in the Department the authority to
issue, discipline and revoke licenses of those so engaged.
Nothing in the text of this constitutional provision, or fairly
implicated by that text, addresses, concerns or limits the forum
in which entities holding licenses issued by the Department must
or may litigate any contractual disputes they may have between
each other.

Were there any intent to require that contract disputes between
holders of licenses issued by the Department be resolved in
proceedings conducted before the Department, it is reasonable to
conclude that such a requirement would have been specified in the
text of the constitutional provision and discussed in the
materials circulated to voters prior to the elections. And,
assuming arguendo the restriction on forum and the limitation of
rights which respondent asserts could be addressed by statute,
then the appellate court would find such authority in a statute.
Instead, the Cal. App. found none.

In its decision sustaining respondent's demurrer, the trial court
relied on the text of section 23090.5, as well as that of article
XX, section 22. In addition to arguing the trial court correctly
analyzed this statute, respondent relies on section 25750, which
contains the grant to the Department of the authority to adopt
regulations "as may be necessary or proper to carry out the
purposes and intent of Section 22.

Neither any section of the ABC Act, nor any regulation adopted
thereunder, creates or limits the right of a licensee to sue
another licensee in court for breach of contract.

Respondent's reliance on the authority contained in section 25750,
authorizing the Department to adopt regulations necessary and
proper to carry out the purposes of article XX, section 22, for
the assertion that appellant can vindicate its contract dispute
with respondent by filing an accusation with the Department,
ignores the nature of the proceeding that would result, and that
there are no regulations promulgated to provide for the
adjudication of any contract disputes between licensees. Neither
any provision of the ABC Act nor any regulation adopted pursuant
to that act addresses how such a claim for contract damages would
be made, or how it would be processed or adjudicated; nor does any
statute or any regulation indicate the source of the Department's
authority to order the payment of the balance due, if any, to the
successful claimant.

In its fifth cause of action, appellant alleges respondent has
engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices
based on its collection of amounts in excess of the 1 percent
charge which appellant contends is the maximum charge permitted by
section 25509. Appellant seeks restitution of the amounts of
carrying charges previously paid and an injunction against
respondent from collecting these charges in the future.
The trial court sustained respondent's demurrer to this cause of
action on the same basis as it applied to the other causes of
action in appellant's complaint, that another statutory scheme
provides the exclusive means for resolving such disputes, relying
in part on the Supreme Court's holding in Loeffler v. Target Corp.
58 Cal.4th 1081.

Appellant rightly focuses the appellate court's attention on the
scope of relief potentially available to it under the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) set out in section 17200. Focusing on this
statute's prohibition of any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice, appellant points out that the scope of
the UCL is quite broad; because the statute is framed in the
disjunctive, a business practice need meet only one of the three
criteria to be considered unfair competition.

By enacting the UCL, and not by virtue of particular predicate
statutes, the Legislature has conferred upon private plaintiffs
specific power' citation to prosecute unfair competition claims.
Thus, even where a state agency may have jurisdiction over a
licensee, the UCL may provide a private remedy.

Respondent asserts that the present case is not governed by the
principles just discussed. Rather, in respondent's view,
appellant's cause of action for unfair competition is barred by
the holding in Loeffler v. Target Corp., supra, 58 Cal.4th 1081.
The Cal. App. disagreed.

Relying on Loeffler, respondent argues that interpretation of
section 25509 must first be committed to determination by the
Department because there is exclusive jurisdiction before an
administrative agency dedicated to uniformly deciding such
questions (the Board of Equalization in Loeffler, ABC here.
Respondent errs for at least two reasons.

First, the Cal. App. established that the jurisdiction of the
Department is not exclusive. And, respondent's argument is based
on a supposed analogy between the Department and the State Board
of Equalization which is erroneous.

Second, while determinations of administrative agencies as to the
meanings of statutes may be given weight under appropriate
circumstances, the starting point is that a court may exercise its
independent judgment when the issue presented is one of statutory
interpretation. When not adopted as a formal regulation, an
agency's interpretation of statutory language is entitled to
little deference.

Appellant's claim under the UCL is not foreclosed by laws
regulating the licensing of distributors of alcoholic beverages,
including respondent, and may be based on violations of statutes
applicable to such licensees.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s October 12, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ydxnzpvyfrom Leagle.com.

Matthew E. Hess -- matthew.hess@hesslawyers.com -- Green & Noblin,
James Robert Noblin -- gn@classcounsel.com -- for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Korshak, Kracoff, Kong & Sugano, Keith R. Thorell, Clement Jon
Kong for Defendant and Respondent, Westwood Terrace1640 South
Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 520Los Angeles, CA 90025.


SPARK NETWORKS: Expensed $52,000 Related to Settlement
------------------------------------------------------
Spark Networks, Inc., said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017, that the Company has expensed $52,000 during the
six months ended June 30, 2017, related to the settlement of the
cases, Ben-Jacob vs. Spark Networks (Israel) Ltd., Gever vs. Spark
Networks (Israel) Ltd. and Korland vs. Spark Networks (Israel)
Ltd.

Three class action law suits have been filed in Israel alleging
inter alia violations of the Israel Consumer Protection Law of
1981.  Spark Networks (Israel) Ltd. ("Spark Israel") was served
with a Statement of Claim and a Motion to Certify it as a Class
Action in the Ben-Jacob action on January 14, 2014.  The plaintiff
alleges that Spark Israel refused to cancel her subscription and
provide a refund for unused periods and claims that such a refusal
is in violation of the Consumer Protection Law.

Spark Israel was served with a Statement of Claim and a motion to
Certify it as a Class Action in the Gever action on January 21,
2014.  The plaintiff alleges that Spark Israel renewed his one
month subscription without receiving his positive agreement in
advance and claims that such renewal is prohibited under the
Consumer Protection Law and its regulations.

Spark Israel was served with a Statement of Claim and a Motion to
Certify it as a Class Action in the Korland action on February 12,
2014.  The plaintiff alleges that Spark Israel refused to give her
a full refund and charged her the price of a one month
subscription to the JDate website in violation of the Consumer
Protection Law.  In each of these three cases, the plaintiff is
seeking personal damages and damages on behalf of a defined group.
On May 8, 2014, the Court granted Spark Israel's motion to
consolidate all three cases. All three cases are now consolidated
and will be litigated jointly.

Spark Israel's combined response to these motions to certify the
class actions was filed November 1, 2014, and the plaintiffs
responded to the combined response. The parties had a hearing
before the judge on December 24, 2014.  Following the hearing the
judge ordered that the pleadings filed by the parties be
transferred to the ICC so that the ICC can provide its position as
to the parties' allegations within 90 days. The ICC issued its
opinion on April 1, 2015.  Following the filing of the ICC
opinion, the parties filed briefs addressing the ICC opinion.

On January 7, 2016, the parties advised the Court that they have
agreed on the terms of a settlement agreement, and jointly moved
to approve the agreement and give it the effect of a judgment.
According to the terms of the settlement agreement, clients who
bought a subscription to JDate.co.il on October 12, 2008 or later
will be entitled to receive certain benefits. The settlement
agreement, which provides for compensation and legal fees, will
only come into effect if the court approves it.

On January 14, 2016 the Court ordered the parties to publish the
terms of the proposed settlement agreement. The Court allowed for
the Attorney General or any person who wishes to object to the
settlement or exclude himself from the class to file their
position with the Court through March 10, 2016.

On March 10, 2016, the Consumer Council filed an objection to the
settlement agreement, arguing inter alia that the benefits offered
to the clients are insufficient, and that the Company's new
business model does not comply with certain legal requirements.
The Company and the plaintiffs filed their responses on March 24,
2016.  On April 14, 2016, the Attorney General notified the Court
that it has no objection to the settlement agreement.

On February 8, 2017, a hearing was held during which the judge
asked questions about the settlement agreement. The Company and
the plaintiffs filed a revised settlement agreement on February
18, 2017, for the judge's final approval. On February 28, 2017,
the judge approved the settlement agreement, which provided for
compensation and legal fees under terms from the original
settlement agreement. The Company has expensed $52,000 related to
the settlement of this matter during the six months ended June 30,
2017.

Spark Networks, Inc. creates communities that help individuals
form life-long relationships with others that share their
interests and values. The Company's core properties, JDate and
Christian Mingle, are communities geared towards singles of the
Jewish and Christian faiths. Through the Company's websites and
mobile applications, the Company helps members search for and
communicate with other like-minded individuals.


SPEEDWAY LLC: "Teggerdine" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KARA TEGGERDINE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
SPEEDWAY LLC and WORLDPAY US, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 8:16-
cv-03280-JDW-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
certify a class of:

   "all persons residing in the United States who made a gasoline
    purchase with a Visa payment card at a Speedway station from
    November 16, 2016 through and including December 31, 2016,
    and had a $125 authorization hold placed on their personal
    financial account"

In this action, the Plaintiff challenges the actions of Speedway
which, without notice to its customers, required a $125 pre-
authorization request for payment card transactions at an
automated fuel dispenser ("AFD"), regardless of the actual
purchase price.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0uxNByKa

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Patrick A. Barthle II, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, Florida 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
          E-mail: jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
                  pbarthle@ForThePeople.com

               - and -

          Jean Sutton Martin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JEAN SUTTON
          MARTIN PLLC
          2018 Eastwood Road Suite 225
          Wilmington, NC 28403
          Telephone: (910) 292 6676
          Facsimile: (888) 316 3489
          E-mail: jean@jsmlawoffice.com


STARION ENERGY: 3d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Pricing Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
John D. Orange brought a putative class action against Starion
Energy PA, LLC, alleging Starion's pricing breached their service
contract by not setting the price in accordance with the stated
terms of variability.

The parties entered into a Partial Stipulation of Dismissal
agreeing to dismiss all claims without prejudice except Orange's
breach of contract claim. In accordance with the stipulation,
Starion withdrew its Motion to Dismiss. The District Court entered
an Order acknowledging the Partial Stipulation but ordering Orange
to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.  Orange filed a response.
The court was unpersuaded and dismissed the Complaint without
prejudice. Orange subsequently filed an Amended Complaint stating
only the putative class action breach of contract claim. Starion
moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a
claim. The District Court granted the Motion and dismissed the
Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint for
failure to state a claim

That the price far exceeded the local public utility rate for a
discrete amount of time is not sufficient to show that Starion
breached its duty to calculate the price in accordance with the
contract.  The contract clearly states that the rate could be
based on the market conditions not only in Orange's own geographic
area, but also in response to market conditions in any or all of
the PJM, NEISO, NYISO, and MISO territories.

Orange's allegation that Starion set its prices arbitrarily is
conclusory.  It is equivalent to the charge that Starion breached
the pricing terms of its contract. The sole factual allegation in
Orange's Amended Complaint is that the rate charged was
significantly higher than the rate charged by his local public
utility within the time period.

Because the contract explicitly provided that market price related
factors in other territories could be used in the calculation at
Starion's discretion, a simple comparison of Starion's rate to the
local public utility rate is not sufficient to support the
reasonable inference that Starion did not adhere to that formula.

The appeals case is captioned JOHN D. ORANGE, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. STARION ENERGY
PA, INC, i/t/d/d/b/a Starion Energy, STARION ENERGY PA, i/t/d/b/a
Starion Energy, STARION ENERGY INC, i/t/d/b/a Starion Energy, No.
16-1949 (3rd Cir.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb72cwyefrom Leagle.com


STATE COLLECTION: Court Certifies 3 Consumer Subclasses
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KYLE SPUHLER AND NICHOLE SPUHLER, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs,
v. STATE COLLECTION SERVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:16-
cv-01149-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge Nancy Joseph entered an
order certifying 3 subclasses:

   Sub-Class A:

   "all consumers in the State of Wisconsin who received letters
   from defendant on medical debts owed to Prohealthcare Medical
   Associates, Waukesha Memorial Center, or Waukesha Memorial
   Hospital, Inc. within one (1) year from the date of the filing
   of this action: Attempting to collect an amount including
   prejudgment interest when prejudgment interest has not yet
   been awarded by a court";

   Sub-Class B:

   "all consumers in the State of Wisconsin who received letters
   from defendant on medical debts owed to Prohealthcare Medical
   Associates, Waukesha Memorial Center, or Waukesha Memorial
   Hospital, Inc. within one (1) year from the date of the filing
   of this action: Where such letters attempted to collect an
   amount without disclosing that interest is accruing on the
   balance due and that the balance may either increase or vary";

   Sub-Class C:

   "all consumers in the State of Wisconsin who received letters
   from defendant on medical debts owed to Prohealthcare Medical
   Associates, Waukesha Memorial Center, or Waukesha Memorial
   Hospital, Inc. within one (1) year from the date of the filing
   of this action: Attempted to collect an amount that does not
   disclose the balance due because undisclosed interest is
   accruing on the amount due".

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Jx14BwGo


STEMLINE THERAPEUTICS: Consolidated Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Stemline Therapeutics, Inc. continues to defend a consolidated
class action lawsuit, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017.

The Company said, "On February 3, 2017, a putative class action
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York against Stemline, its Chief
Executive Officer, and its Chief Accounting Officer, alleging
violations of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder during the period from January 19, 2017 through
February 1, 2017, as well as violations of Section 11 and 15 of
the Securities Act of 1933, or the 1933 Act, arising from our
January 2017 follow-on public offering."

"On February 3, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Stemline, its Chief Executive Officer, and its Chief
Accounting Officer, alleging violations of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder during the period from January
19, 2017 and February 1, 2017.

"On February 8, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Stemline, its Chief Executive Officer, and its Chief
Accounting Officer, alleging violations of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder during the period from January
19, 2017 through February 1, 2017, as well as violations of 1933
Act arising from our January 2017 follow-on public offering.

"On February 10, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against Stemline, its Chief Executive Officer, and its
Chief Operating Officer, alleging violations of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder during the period from
January 6, 2017 through February 1, 2017.

"Each of the above lawsuits is premised upon allegations that the
defendants made false and misleading statements and/or omissions
by failing to earlier disclose that a cancer patient in a Stemline
clinical trial of SL-401 who experienced the side effect of CLS,
died on January 18, 2017.  Additionally, the complaint alleges
that, as a result of the foregoing, certain of the defendants'
statements about Stemline's business, operations, and prospects
were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

"In April 2017, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York consolidated these four shareholder actions
into a single action, and appointed three purported individual
investors in the Company as Lead Plaintiff to represent the
proposed class. This class appointed Pomerantz LLP and the Rosen
Law Firm as Co-Lead Counsel.

"On June 26, 2017, Lead Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in
the consolidated action, naming as defendants, the Company, its
directors, certain of its officers, and Jefferies LLC, and
alleging violations of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder during the period from January 20, 2017 through
February 1, 2017, as well as violations of the 1933 Act arising
from our January 2017 follow-on public offering.

"We intend to vigorously defend against these actions. However,
there is no assurance that we will be successful in our defense or
that insurance will be available or adequate to fund any
settlement or judgment or the litigation costs of the actions. We
are unable to predict the outcome or reasonably estimate a range
of possible loss at this time."

Stemline is a clinical stage biopharmaceutical company focused on
discovering, acquiring, developing and potentially commercializing
innovative oncology therapeutics that target difficult to treat
cancers.


SUN LIFE FINANCIAL: Court Grants Partial Dismissal of RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reason granting Defendant's Partial
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned LEVI E. ROBERTSON, on behalf
of himself and all other similarly situated, v. SUN LIFE
FINANCIAL, ET AL., SECTION "R"(1), Civil Action No. 17-2148 (E.D.
La.).

Defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.) moves to
dismiss plaintiff's claims under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act and the Louisiana Racketeering Act.

Plaintiff asserts that he entered into a ten-year annuity contract
with Defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (Sun Life).
Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in October 2005, money was
fraudulently withdrawn from his account.

Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in state court. This
petition alleged that Defendant Matthew Pizzolato forged a check
for $99,999.99 in plaintiff's name, and that Sun Life negligently
permitted a withdrawal in this amount from plaintiff's account
without contacting plaintiff to verify the transaction.

This Fourth Amended Petition includes class action allegations and
adds claims against Sun Life under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Louisiana Racketeering
Act.

Sun Life argues that plaintiff's RICO and state law racketeering
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The
statute of limitations for civil RICO claims is four years.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows an amended complaint to
relate back to the date of the original pleading when the
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set
out in the original pleading.

Plaintiff's earlier petitions did not allege, or even suggest,
that Sun Life engaged in racketeering activities. The first four
petitions described fraud by Matthew Pizzolato related to a single
forged check for $99,999.99, and negligence and breach of contract
by Sun Life for failing to detect the fraudulent transfer.

Plaintiff's fourth amended petition now alleges criminal rather
than negligent conduct by Sun Life, details additional fraudulent
transactions, and introduces a new key actor, Sherel Pizzolato,
linking Sun Life with Matthew Pizzolato. In contrast to earlier
allegations that Sun Life merely failed to monitor plaintiff's
account, Sun Life is now accused of conducting or acquiring a
racketeering enterprise.

The transaction or occurrence at issue has metamorphosed from a
single fraudulent withdrawal to a series of withdrawals
constituting a pattern of racketeering activity. Given these
fundamental changes in plaintiff's factual allegations, his
racketeering claims do not arise out of the same pattern of
conduct identified in the original complaint.

The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court have made clear
that relation back is appropriate only when the defendant had fair
notice of the claims brought in the amended complaint.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff's federal and state
racketeering claims do not arise out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in the original
pleading. These claims do not relate back to plaintiff's earlier
petitions and are therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint if Sun Life's
motion is granted.  The Court considers multiple factors,
including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment.

Upon consideration of these factors, the Court denies leave to
amend. Because plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations, amendment would be futile.

The Court grants Sun Life's partial motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 22, 2017 Order
and Reasons is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9odgtkwfrom
Leagle.com.

Levi E. Robertson, Plaintiff, represented by Eric R. Nowak,
Harrell & Nowak, LLC, 650 Poydras St , Ste 2107 , New Orleans, LA
70130

Levi E. Robertson, Plaintiff, represented by Byard Edwards, Jr.,
Edwards & Knight, LLC, 1090 W. Pine St.Ponchatoula, LA 70454.

Delaware Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Edward
Winter Trapolin -- etrapolin@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC, Andrea J. Robinson --
andrea.robinson@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale
& Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice, Ian David Coghill --
ian.coghill@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale &
Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice, Kelly Juneau Rickard --
kjuneau@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC & Tim
J. Perla -- timothy.perla@wilmerhale.com -- WilmerHale, pro hac
vice.


SUPERIOR AIR-GROUND: "Lundsteen" Hits Biometrics Data Retention
---------------------------------------------------------------
Casey Lundsteen individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. Superior Air-Ground Ambulance Service,
Inc., Case No. 2017CH13253 (Ill. Ch., October 2, 2017), seeks
statutory damages, injunctive and other equitable relief,
reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys' fees, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest and such other and further relief under
the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Superior is an emergency ambulance service company. It allegedly
captures, stores and uses its workers' biometrics without their
informed written consent and utilized out-of-state vendors to
operate their biometrics program in conformance with biometric
industry practice.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Myles McGuire
      William P. Kingston
      MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
      55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 893-7002
      Fax: (312) 275-7895
      Email: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
             wkingston@mcgpc.com


TAISHAN GYPSUM: "Polk" Suit Consolidated in Chinese Drywall MDL
---------------------------------------------------------------
The purported class action lawsuit styled Polk, et al. v. Taishan
Gypsum Co., Ltd., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00216, was transferred
on September 25, 2017, from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans).  The Louisiana
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-08287-EEF-JCW to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation styled
In re: Chinese-manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation,
MDL No. 2:09-md-02047-EEF-JCW.

The matter arises from the manufacture, distribution, sale, and
installation of Chinese-manufactured drywall, which is contained
in homes owned or occupied by the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs have
filed suit against the manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and
installers of the Chinese drywall, as well as others in the chain
of commerce, and their insurers, alleging this drywall emits foul
odors and damages metal and electronic elements and devices in
their homes.[BN]

Plaintiffs Donna Polk, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Charles Bowden, Alean Lampton, Joseph Loper,
Sherry Loper, Melody Strickland, Smith Enterprises, Inc. (Erick
Smith), St. Martin Lions Club, Michelle Legere, Robert Wessler,
Barri Wessler, Kenneth Butler, Mary Butler, Dalton, Inc., Walter
Davis, Melissa Davis, Michael Everett, John Heath, Vicky Heath,
Robert Johnson, Elizabeth Johnson, Daniel Madison, Minnie Madison,
Richard Maxwell, Gretchen Maxwell, Gary McDonald, Tricia McDonald,
Jacob McKinley, Jason Scott McMurray, Walter Medley, Lee Medley,
Melissa Norris, Sonja Palmer, James Robinson, Stephanie Robinson,
Norman Shiyou, Jerald Smith, Mary Anne Smith, Vu Van, Thanh and
Trinh and To Thi are represented by:

          James R. Reeves, Jr., Esq.
          REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC
          160 Main Street
          P. O. Drawer 1388 (19533)
          Biloxi, MS 39530
          Telephone: (228) 374-5151
          Facsimile: (228) 374-6630
          E-mail: jrr@rmlawcall.com

The Court-Appointed Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel in MDL 2047 is:

          Russ M. Herman, Esq.
          HERMAN, HERMAN & KATZ, LLC
          820 O'Keefe Avenue
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 581-4892
          Facsimile: (504) 561-6024
          E-mail: rherman@hhklawfirm.com

The Court-Appointed Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel in MDL 2047 is:

          Arnold Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: alevin@lfsblaw.com

The Court-appointed counsel of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee
in MDL 2047 are:

          Dawn M. Barrios, Esq.
          BARRIOS, KINGSDORF & CASTEIX, LLP
          701 Poydras Street, Suite 3650
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 524-3300
          Facsimile: (504) 524-3313
          E-mail: Barrios@bkc-law.com

               - and -

          Robert Becnel, Esq.
          BECNEL LAW FIRM, LLC
          425 W. Airline Highway, Suite B
          Laplace, LA 70068
          Telephone: (985) 536-1186
          Facsimile: (985) 536-6445
          E-mail: rbecnel@becnellaw.com

               - and -

          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          25 Flagler Street, 8th Floor
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com

               - and -

          Patrick Montoya, Esq.
          COLSON, HICKS, EIDSON
          255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse
          Cora Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 476-7400
          Facsimile: (305) 476-7444
          E-mail: patrick@colson.com

               - and -

          Hugh P. Lambert, Esq.
          THE LAMBERT FIRM
          701 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-1750
          Facsimile: (504) 529-2931
          E-mail: hlambert@thelambertfirm.com

               - and -

          James Robert Reeves, Esq.
          REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC
          160 Main Street
          Biloxi, MS 39530
          Telephone: (228) 374-5151
          Facsimile: (228) 374-6630
          E-mail: jrr@attorneys4people.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD, BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5002
          E-mail: dan@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Bruce William Steckler, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN
          12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: bruce@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Ben W. Gordon, Jr., Esq.
          LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS, MITCHELL ECHSNER
          & PROCTOR, P.A.
          316 S. Baylen Street, Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7000
          Facsimile: (850) 435-7020
          E-mail: bgordon@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Gerald E. Meunier, Esq.
          GAINSBURGH, BENJAMIN, DAVID, MEUNIER
          & WARSHAUER, LLC
          2800 Energy Centre
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163-2800
          Telephone: (504) 522-2304
          Facsimile: (504) 528-9973
          E-mail: gmeunier@gainsben.com

               - and -

          Christopher Seeger, Esq.
          SEEGER WEISS, LLP
          77 Water Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 584-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 584-0799
          E-mail: cseeger@seegerweiss.com

               - and -

          Richard J. Serpe, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD J. SERPE
          Crown Center, Suite 310
          580 East Main Street
          Norfolk, VA 23510-2322
          Telephone: (757) 233-0009
          Facsimile: (757) 233-0455
          E-mail: rserpe@serpefirm.com

               - and -

          Victor M. Diaz, Jr., Esq.
          V.M. DIAZ AND PARTNERS, LLC
          119 Washington Ave., Suite 402
          Miami Beach, FL 33139
          Telephone: (305) 704-3200
          Facsimile: (305) 538-4928
          E-mail: victor@diazpartners.com

The Court-appointed of counsel of the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee in MDL 2047 are:

          Richard S. Lewis, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          1700 K Street, N.W., Suite 650
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540-7200
          Facsimile: (202) 540-7201
          E-mail: rlewis@hausfeldllp.com

               - and -

          Anthony D. Irpino, Esq.
          IRPINO AVIN HAWKINS LAW FIRM
          2216 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-1500
          Facsimile: (504) 525-1501
          E-mail: airpino@irpinolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew A. Lemmon, Esq.
          LEMON LAW FIRM, LLC
          P.O. Box 904
          15058 River Road
          Hahnville, LA 70057
          Telephone: (985) 783-6789
          Facsimile: (985) 783-1333
          E-mail: andrew@lemmonlawfirm.com


TAISHAN GYPSUM: "Redden" Suit Consolidated in Chinese Drywall MDL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The putative class action lawsuit titled Redden, et al. v. Taishan
Gypsum Co., Ltd., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-01146, was transferred
on September 25, 2017, from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans).  The Louisiana
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-08292-EEF-JCW to
the proceeding.

The lawsuit is consolidated in the multidistrict litigation styled
In re: Chinese-manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation,
MDL No. 2:09-md-02047-EEF-JCW.

The matter arises from the manufacture, distribution, sale, and
installation of Chinese-manufactured drywall, which is contained
in homes owned or occupied by the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs have
filed suit against the manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and
installers of the Chinese drywall, as well as others in the chain
of commerce, and their insurers, alleging this drywall emits foul
odors and damages metal and electronic elements and devices in
their homes.[BN]

Plaintiffs James Redden, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and Deloris Redden, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          William Given Colvin, Esq.
          WILLIAM G. COLVIN, PLLC
          801 Broad Street Suite 428
          Chattanooga, TN 37402
          Telephone: (423) 265-8804
          Facsimile: (423) 267-5915
          E-mail: bcolvin@williamgcolvinlaw.com

Plaintiffs James and Deloris Redden, and Brian and Beth Watkins
are represented by:

          Pete Albanis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          12800 University Drive
          Fort Myers, FL 33907
          Telephone: (239) 433-6880
          E-mail: palbanis@forthepeople.com

Plaintiffs Bobby and Darlyne Mullins are represented by:

          Daniel Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON MASON LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: dan@wbmllp.com

The Court-Appointed Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel in MDL 2047 is:

          Russ M. Herman, Esq.
          HERMAN, HERMAN & KATZ, LLC
          820 O'Keefe Avenue
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 581-4892
          Facsimile: (504) 561-6024
          E-mail: rherman@hhklawfirm.com

The Court-Appointed Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel in MDL 2047 is:

          Arnold Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: alevin@lfsblaw.com

The Court-appointed counsel of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee
in MDL 2047 are:

          Dawn M. Barrios, Esq.
          BARRIOS, KINGSDORF & CASTEIX, LLP
          701 Poydras Street, Suite 3650
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 524-3300
          Facsimile: (504) 524-3313
          E-mail: Barrios@bkc-law.com

               - and -

          Robert Becnel, Esq.
          BECNEL LAW FIRM, LLC
          425 W. Airline Highway, Suite B
          Laplace, LA 70068
          Telephone: (985) 536-1186
          Facsimile: (985) 536-6445
          E-mail: rbecnel@becnellaw.com

               - and -

          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          25 Flagler Street, 8th Floor
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com

               - and -

          Patrick Montoya, Esq.
          COLSON, HICKS, EIDSON
          255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse
          Cora Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 476-7400
          Facsimile: (305) 476-7444
          E-mail: patrick@colson.com

               - and -

          Hugh P. Lambert, Esq.
          THE LAMBERT FIRM
          701 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-1750
          Facsimile: (504) 529-2931
          E-mail: hlambert@thelambertfirm.com

               - and -

          James Robert Reeves, Esq.
          REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC
          160 Main Street
          Biloxi, MS 39530
          Telephone: (228) 374-5151
          Facsimile: (228) 374-6630
          E-mail: jrr@attorneys4people.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD, BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5002
          E-mail: dan@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Bruce William Steckler, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN
          12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: bruce@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Ben W. Gordon, Jr., Esq.
          LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS, MITCHELL ECHSNER
          & PROCTOR, P.A.
          316 S. Baylen Street, Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7000
          Facsimile: (850) 435-7020
          E-mail: bgordon@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Gerald E. Meunier, Esq.
          GAINSBURGH, BENJAMIN, DAVID, MEUNIER
          & WARSHAUER, LLC
          2800 Energy Centre
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163-2800
          Telephone: (504) 522-2304
          Facsimile: (504) 528-9973
          E-mail: gmeunier@gainsben.com

               - and -

          Christopher Seeger, Esq.
          SEEGER WEISS, LLP
          77 Water Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 584-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 584-0799
          E-mail: cseeger@seegerweiss.com

               - and -

          Richard J. Serpe, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD J. SERPE
          Crown Center, Suite 310
          580 East Main Street
          Norfolk, VA 23510-2322
          Telephone: (757) 233-0009
          Facsimile: (757) 233-0455
          E-mail: rserpe@serpefirm.com

               - and -

          Victor M. Diaz, Jr., Esq.
          V.M. DIAZ AND PARTNERS, LLC
          119 Washington Ave., Suite 402
          Miami Beach, FL 33139
          Telephone: (305) 704-3200
          Facsimile: (305) 538-4928
          E-mail: victor@diazpartners.com

The Court-appointed of counsel of the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee in MDL 2047 are:

          Richard S. Lewis, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          1700 K Street, N.W., Suite 650
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540-7200
          Facsimile: (202) 540-7201
          E-mail: rlewis@hausfeldllp.com

               - and -

          Anthony D. Irpino, Esq.
          IRPINO AVIN HAWKINS LAW FIRM
          2216 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 525-1500
          Facsimile: (504) 525-1501
          E-mail: airpino@irpinolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew A. Lemmon, Esq.
          LEMON LAW FIRM, LLC
          P.O. Box 904
          15058 River Road
          Hahnville, LA 70057
          Telephone: (985) 783-6789
          Facsimile: (985) 783-1333
          E-mail: andrew@lemmonlawfirm.com


TAVERN IN THE SQUARE: Faces "Gomez" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tavern in the Square
Holding Company LLC. The case is styled as Carmen Gomez, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tavern
in the Square Holding Company LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
07984 (S.D. N.Y., October 17, 2017).

Tavern in the Square is a full-service restaurant with craft beer
and cocktail bars plus patios.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


TD AMERITRADE: Nov. 20 Deadline for Class Cert Bid in "Klein"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
issued a Second Amended Progression Order in the case captioned
GERALD J. KLEIN, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated;
Plaintiff, v. TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE,
INC., and FREDRIC TOMCZYK, Defendants, No. 8:14CV396 (D. Neb.).

Following a telephone conference with counsel, the Court ordered
counsel to confer and submit a proposed revised case progression
Depositions. The parties represent that they have completed fact
depositions with regard to the issue of class certification.

Plaintiff must depose Defendants' expert prior to November 8,
2017, and Defendants must depose Plaintiff's experts by December
15, 2017.

Expert Discovery. The parties represent that they have served
expert reports with regard to the issue of class certification,
along with any backup data. Plaintiff shall serve rebuttal expert
reports by November 15, 2017.

Plaintiff's motions for class certification and motions in limine
challenging Defendants' expert witness testimony shall be filed by
November 20, 2017.  Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's motion
for class certification, any motions in limine challenging
Plaintiff's expert witness testimony, and any responses to
Plaintiff's motions in limine challenging Defendants' expert
witness testimony shall be filed by January 19, 2018.

Plaintiff's reply in support of class certification, any responses
to Defendants' motions in limine challenging Plaintiff's expert
witness testimony, and replies in support of Plaintiff's motions
in limine challenging Defendants' expert testimony shall be filed
by February 19, 2018.

Defendants' replies in support of Defendants' motions in limine
challenging Plaintiff's expert testimony shall be filed by March
5, 2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 12, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7b3klujfrom Leagle.com.

Gerald J. Klein, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Kupka,
LEV -- ckupka@zlk.com -- KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

Gerald J. Klein, Plaintiff, represented by Eduard Korsinsky --
ek@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Gregory C.
Scaglione -- greg.scaglione@koleyjessen.com -- KOLEY, JESSEN LAW
FIRM, Joseph J. DePalma -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE,
DEPALMA LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nancy A. Kulesa -- nkulesa@zlk.com
-- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nicholas Porritt, LEVI,
KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, 1101 30th Street NW Suite 115 Washington, DC
20007, pro hac vice, Patrice D. Ott -- patrice.ott@koleyjessen.com
-- KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM & Sebastiano Tornatore --
stornatore@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation, Defendant, represented by A.
Robert Pietrzak, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Alex J.
Kaplan, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Jon Muenz, SIDLEY,
AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Thomas H. Dahlk, KUTAK, ROCK LAW
FIRM & Victoria H. Buter, KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM.

TD Ameritrade, Inc., Defendant, represented by A. Robert Pietrzak,
SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Alex J. Kaplan, SIDLEY,
AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Jon Muenz, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Thomas H. Dahlk, KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM & Victoria H.
Buter, KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM.

Fredric Tomczyk, Defendant, represented by A. Robert Pietrzak,
SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Alex J. Kaplan, SIDLEY,
AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Jon Muenz, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Thomas H. Dahlk, KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM & Victoria H.
Buter, KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM.

Roderick Ford, Movant, represented by Christopher J. Kupka, LEVI,
KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Eduard Korsinsky, LEVI,
KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Gregory C. Scaglione, KOLEY,
JESSEN LAW FIRM, Joseph J. DePalma, LITE, DEPALMA LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Nancy A. Kulesa, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice
& Sebastiano Tornatore, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

PSLRA Class, Interested Party, represented by Gregory C.
Scaglione, KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM.


TDJ OILFIELD: "Barnhill" Suit Seeks to Certify Employees Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CORY BARNHILL, Individually and on behalf of
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. TDJ OILFIELD
SERVICES, LLC; and JOEY MOORE, the Defendants, Case No. 7:17-cv-
00160-RAJ-DC (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
conditionally certify a class of:

   "all current and former employees of Defendants who were
   employed as salaried Oilfield Workers at any time since August
   18, 2014".

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=tCjmKZGO

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, Arkansas 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Brian R. Carnie, Esq.
          KEAN MILLER, LLP
          333 Texas Street, Suite 450
          Shreveport, LA 71101
          Telephone: (318) 562 2700
          Facsimile: (318) 562 2751
          E-mail: brain.carnie@keanmiller.com


TOYOTA MOTOR: Appeals Decision in "Jeffers" Suit to 4th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Incorporated, filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Wanda E. Jeffers
and Jill J. Gibson, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor Engineering &
Manufacturing North America, Inc., Case No. 4:17-cv-00577-RMG, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina at
Florence.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks damages, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, delay
damages, attorneys' fees and such other and further judiciary
determinations and relief resulting from breach of express and/or
implied warranty and in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act.

According to the complaint, Toyota designed, manufactured,
distributed, marketed, and sold certain automobiles with defective
dashboards that melt or degrade upon prolonged exposure to the sun
that don't manifest within until after the expiration of the
warranty coverage.

The appellate case is captioned as Jill Gibson v. Toyota Motor
Sales USA, Case No. 17-2196, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee JILL J. GIBSON, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Dennis C. Dukes, II, Esq.
          Catherine H. McElveen, Esq.
          Andrew Hoyt Rowell, III, Esq.
          Robert S. Wood, Esq.
          RICHARDSON, PATRICK, WESTBROOK & BRICKMAN, LLC
          1037 Chuck Dawley Boulevard
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464-0000
          Telephone: (843) 727-6647
          E-mail: cdukes@rpwb.com
                  kmcelveen@rpwb.com
                  hrowell@rpwb.com
                  bwood@rpwb.com

               - and -

          George David Jebaily, Esq.
          JEBAILY, GLASS & MEACHAM, PA
          P. O. Box 1871
          Florence, SC 29503-0000
          Telephone: (843) 667-0400
          E-mail: gjebaily@jebailylaw.com

               - and -

          Mia Lauren Maness, Esq.
          Mark Charles Tanenbaum, Esq.
          MARK C. TANENBAUM, PA
          1017 Chuck Dawley Boulevard
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 577-5100
          E-mail: mia@tanenbaumlaw.com
                  mark@tanenbaumlaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee JILL J. GIBSON, and Plaintiff WANDA JEFFERS are
represented by:

          Thomas Christopher Tuck, Esq.
          RICHARDSON, PATRICK, WESTBROOK & BRICKMAN, LLC
          1037 Chuck Dawley Boulevard
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464-0000
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          E-mail: ctuck@rpwb.com

Defendant-Appellant TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INCORPORATED, is
represented by:

          Paul Thomas Collins, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          P. O. Box 11070
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 255-9747
          E-mail: paul.collins@nelsonmullins.com

               - and -

          G. Mark Phillips, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          151 Meeting Street
          Charleston, SC 29401
          Telephone: (843) 720-4383
          E-mail: mark.phillips@nelsonmullins.com


TT OF PINE: "Mahoney" Suit Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Tom Mahoney, individually and on behalf of a
class, the Plaintiff, v. TT of Pine Ridge, Inc., the Defendant,
Case No. 9:17-cv-80029-DMM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order:

   1. granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement and
      entering judgment accordingly;

   2. certifying Settlement Class;

   3. appointing Plaintiff as settlement class representative,
      and his respective counsel as settlement Class Counsel;

   4. granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Fees and Costs
       and an Incentive Award; and

   5. granting any other relief deemed just and proper to effect
      the Settlement Agreement.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ZCteqCf3

Attorneys for Plaintiff Tom Mahoney:

          Brandon Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, PA.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 337 7992
          Facsimile: (813) 229 8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
          1340 N. White Chapel, Suite 100
          Southlake, Texas 76092-4322
          Telephone: 817 416 5060
          Facsimile: 817 416 5062
          E-mail: chris@crmlawpractice.com

Attorneys for Defendant: TT of Pine Ridge, Inc.:

          Paul J. Sodhi, Esq.
          Harrison M. Brown, Esq.
          Ana Tagvoryan, Esq.
          BLANK ROME LLP
          Broward Financial Centre
          500 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 2100
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394
          Telephone: (954) 512 1800
          Facsimile: (854) 512 1818
          E-mail: PSodhi@BlankRome.com
                  HBrown@BlankRome.com
                  atagvoryan@blankrome.com

               - and -

          Patricia E. Lowry, Esq.
          SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP
          1900 Phillips Point West
          777 South Flagler Drive
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Telephone: (561) 650 7214
          Facsimile: (561) 655 1509
          E-mail: patricia.lowry@squirepb.com


TWITTER INC: Misled Investors About Growth, Judge Rules
-------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Twitter misled investors when it failed to inform them about
falling daily active user trends and how that affected the
company, a federal judge ruled on Oct. 16.

The investor class led by Doris Shenwick claims Twitter's former
CEO Richard Costolo misled them by saying on an earnings call in
February 2015 that Twitter's monthly active user trend "has
already turned around," even through user engagement was falling.
The class includes shareholders who purchased Twitter stock
between Feb. 6, 2015, and July 28, 2015.

According to the class, the true metric for measuring user
engagement is the number of daily active users on Twitter's site
and confidential insiders agree that monthly active users indicate
little about user engagement.  To truly measure whether people are
using an app, you have to track whether people are using it daily,
they claim.

U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar said that if Twitter had disclosed
that daily active user numbers were declining or remained flat, it
would have alerted investors to the fact that Twitter's monthly
active users wasn't accelerating the way Costolo claimed.

"The omission was therefore misleading," Judge Tigar wrote in his
42-page ruling partially denying Twitter's motion to dismiss the
case.

Judge Tigar also found the class made a strong claim regarding
positive statements Twitter made about ad engagement -- whether
users clicked on ads promoted by Twitter -- as a measure of
people's overall Twitter use.  The class claims Twitter's
statements touting ad engagement were misleading since again,
daily active users and not ad clicks were Twitter's primary user
engagement metric.

"Defendants' response boils down to the following: even if DAU
[daily active users] were the key user engagement metric, ad
engagements is another user engagement metric and it was not
misleading to accurately report ad engagement trends," Judge Tigar
wrote.  "The court disagrees. It was misleading for defendants to
rely on favorable ad engagement trends to describe or predict user
engagement when DAU, Twitter's primary metric, was flat or
declining."

Judge Tigar said this was particularly true since confidential
witnesses testified "that 'there is no direct correlation between
advertising engagement and MAU [monthly active users] or DAU,'"
and that ads could be increased to compensate for fewer monthly
active users and daily active users.

"Therefore, even if ad engagements could provide some insight into
user engagement, Twitter's reliance on that metric was
misleading," Judge Tigar said.

But Judge Tigar also ruled Twitter did not mislead investors by
failing to disclose more detailed information about monthly active
user growth, including whether those numbers grew because of "low
quality users" like robot accounts.

"First, Twitter never claimed that its MAU growth was wholly or
even mostly organic.  On the February 5 Earnings Call, for
example, Costolo attributed the Q1 2015 turnaround in MAU to -- a
combination of seasonality or return to organic growth and the set
of product initiatives [Twitter] created to drive growth," Judge
Tigar wrote.  "The fact that Twitter did not also explain that
some of its MAU growth was not organic does not make Costolo's
statement misleading.  Second, defendants disclosed the existence
of these 'low-quality' users."

He added, "A lack of detailed information on the numbers of these
types of users during the class period does not itself make
defendants' statements about MAU growth misleading."

Judge Tigar also agreed with shareholders that "it would be
'absurd'" for Costolo and chief financial officer Anthony Noto not
to have been aware of declining daily active user trends or not to
have understood how that metric interacts with the number of
monthly active users.

"Here, defendants emphasized the importance of daily use and told
investors that user engagement trends were positive.  Because
defendants made those factual statements without disclosing
adverse DAU trends, and indeed, while refusing to acknowledge the
importance of DAU when asked for a measure of user engagement, 'a
strong inference arises that [they] knowingly misled the public'
what was really happening with user engagement at Twitter in
2015," he wrote.

As such, the class plausibly alleged that Twitter executives were
motivated what he called "an attempt to live up to overly
optimistic promises," a theory that supports their claim that Noto
and Costolo knew that they were misleading investors, Judge Tigar
wrote.

Attorneys for Twitter and the class did not respond to emails
seeking comment on Oct. 16.


UBS PAINEWEBBER: Lampkin Appeals S.D. Texas Ruling to 5th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Joe Brown, Robert Ferrell, Frank Gittess, Kevin
Lampkin, Stephen Miller, Terry Nelson and Dianne Swiber filed an
appeal from a court ruling relating to the lawsuit styled Kevin
Lampkin, et al. v. UBS Painewebber, Inc., et al., Case No. 4:02-
CV-851, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston.

The lawsuit arose from alleged violations of securities laws.

The appellate case is captioned as Kevin Lampkin, et al. v. UBS
Painewebber, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-20608, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants KEVIN LAMPKIN, STEPHEN MILLER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, JOE BROWN, FRANK
GITTESS, TERRY NELSON, DIANNE SWIBER and ROBERT FERRELL are
represented by:

          Andy Tindel, Esq.
          ANDY TINDEL, ATTORNEY & COUNSELOR AT LAW, P.C.
          112 E. Line Street
          Tyler, TX 75702-0000
          Telephone: (903) 596-0900
          E-mail: atindel@andytindel.com

Defendants-Appellees UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
formerly known as UBS Painewebber, Incorporated; and UBS
SECURITIES, L.L.C., formerly known as UBS Warburg, L.L.C., are
represented by:

          Charles Rodney Acker, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US, L.L.P.
          2200 Ross Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75201-7932
          Telephone: (214) 855-7466
          Facsimile: (214) 855-8200
          E-mail: racker@fulbright.com


UNITED STATES: Wins Summary Ruling in Just Compensation Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims issued an Opinion and
Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned ELLEN AND MARK S. BALAGNA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. ROBERT AND SUSAN BATTERTON,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant,
Nos. 14-21L/16-405L (Consolidated) (Fed. Cl.).

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment regarding
several issues.  First, the government has moved for summary
judgment with respect to two of the properties.  Second, the
government has moved for summary judgment with respect to any
landowners' claims that the issuance of the Notice of Interim
Trail Use (NITU) resulted in a taking of their right to access
properties (or portions of properties) that may be reached only by
crossing the right-of-way.  Finally, the government has moved for
summary judgment with respect to the claims of two plaintiffs, the
City of Canton (City) and the Village of Norris (Village), which
are Illinois municipal corporations rather than private
landowners.

The Right-of-Way and the Notice of Interim Trail Use

Since the 1850s, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company
(BNSF) or its predecessors-in-interest has held an interest in
certain properties along a 14.5-mile right-of-way in Fulton
County, Illinois.

BNSF filed an application before the STB to abandon the right-of-
way.  The Canton Park District (CPD) filed a Request for Public
Use Condition and Request for Interim Trail Use with the STB,
indicating its willingness to assume financial responsibility for
the corridor.

After BNSF agreed to negotiate an interim trail use/rail banking
agreement with CPD, the STB issued an NITU for the right-of-way.
The STB has extended the deadline for negotiating a final trail
use agreement several times, and the current deadline is November
22, 2017.

The Balagna Action

Plaintiffs Ellen and Mark Balagna own land traversed by the BNSF
right-of-way.  The Balagnas filed their complaint as a class
action on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated land
owner.  Upon the parties' stipulation, the Court certified an opt-
in class under Rule 23(c)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal
Claims (RCFC).  The class may consist of:

     All persons who (a) own or owned parcels of land underlying
the BNSF's railroad corridor located between railroad mileposts
52.2 in Farmington and 66.7 in Dunfermline, Illinois, and (b)
claim that the STB took their property rights to possession,
control, and enjoyment of a segment of the railroad corridor when
it issued the NITU.

The Batterton Action

Robert and Susan Batterton also own land traversed by the BNSF
right-of-way. The Battertons and five co-plaintiffs filed a
complaint in this Court. Like the Balagna plaintiffs, the
Batterton plaintiffs seek just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause based on the issuance of the NITU.
The Village of Norris is one of the plaintiffs in the Batterton
action. It is a municipal corporation that owns property that
abuts and underlies the right-of-way.

Jurisdiction

The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation. Accordingly, if there is a taking, the claim is
'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims to hear.

Standards for Liability in Rails-to-Trails Takings Cases

Under the Takings Clause, the federal government must pay just
compensation when it requires a landowner to submit to the
physical occupation of his land.

To do so, the court first examines whether, under state law, the
railroad acquired only an easement or obtained a fee simple
estate.  If the railroad acquired the property in fee simple, the
court's inquiry ends.

On the other hand, if the railroad acquired only an easement, the
court goes on to assess whether the terms of the easement were
limited to use for railroad purposes, or whether they included
future use as a public recreational trail. Finally, even if the
grant of the railroad's easement was broad enough to encompass a
recreational trail, the court must decide whether the easement
terminated prior to the alleged taking so that the property owner
at the time held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement. If the
railroad acquired an easement limited only to railroad purposes,
or if any easement the railroad obtained was extinguished before
the issuance of the NITU, then the issuance of the NITU interferes
with the plaintiff's state law property rights and triggers the
application of the Takings Clause.

Application of Standards

The Properties Owned by the Herbergers and the Trust

The Herbergers and the Trust share a common predecessor-in-
interest, Mary Snider, from whom BNSF's predecessor-in-interest
obtained its property interest via a condemnation order. The
condemnation order was apparently issued in 1858 and recorded in
1867.  As relevant to this case, it stated that, in exchange for
one hundred and fifty dollars, a portion of Mary Snider's lands
and real estate, described in a report attached to the order, was
vested in the Company in for during the Continuance of the said
Company as a Corporation. The order further stated that the
railroad may take possession of, hold, and use the conveyed
property for the purposes of said Rail road.

In this case, however, the Court concludes that the authority for
the condemnation order was the 1852 Act, not the 1849 Act. While
the language of the condemnation order itself is less than clear,
it is undisputed that the charter of BNSF's predecessor-in-
interest provided that where it was necessary for the railroad to
secure land by condemnation, the compensation to be paid to a
landowner and the right to use the lands shall be fixed and
secured in the manner provided in the 1852 Act and in no other
manner. Further, the Court finds it significant that the
railroad's prior charter had stated that where it was necessary
for the railroad to acquire property through condemnation, it
would be accomplished in the manner provided for in the 1849 Act.
Thus, a deliberate decision was made to amend the charter for the
specific purpose of ensuring that the 1852 Act rather than the
1849 Act would apply to condemnation actions pursued by the
railroad after the amendment.

The Court concludes that the condemnation order was issued
pursuant to the 1852 Act and that BNSF's predecessor-in-interest
obtained title in fee simple from Mary Snider.  The Herbergers and
the Trust therefore have no reversionary interest in the land and
cannot be entitled to compensation based on the issuance of the
NITU.  The government's motion for summary judgment as to their
claims is therefore granted.

The Landowners' Rights of Access

The government has also moved for summary judgment as to any
claims by the landowners that their rights to cross the railroad
corridor to access their properties have been taken as a result of
the issuance of the NITU.

There is no merit to the landowners' argument that the pervasive
federal regulatory scheme governing railway corridors has pre-
empted Illinois law with respect to crossing the corridor.
Section 10501(b) states that the STB has exclusive jurisdiction
over rail transportation and "the construction, acquisition,
operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial,
team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities. As applied to
rails-to-trails cases, courts have determined that only
abandonment claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
STB. As such, with specific regard to access rights over a former
railroad right-of-way under state law, both the Court of Federal
Claims and the STB have held that such rights are not pre-empted
by the Trails Act and thus state law continues to apply to those
rights.

In short, the Court concludes that Illinois law provides the
landowners with a right to cross the right-of-way. Further,
Illinois law is not pre-empted by the Trails Act. Accordingly, the
government's motion seeking summary judgment that the issuance of
the NITU did not affect the landowners' crossing rights is
granted.

Whether the NITU Resulted in a Compensable Taking With Respect to
the City and the Village

The government has moved for summary judgment as to the claims
asserted by the City and the Village. It argues that they are not
owed compensation because they, like CPD, are municipal
corporations in the state of Illinois, which retains authority
over the use and disposal of their property.

The plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary lack merit. They contend
that the Federal Circuit squarely addressed the issue presented
here in Preseault II.  But although the trail sponsor in that case
was also a municipal corporation, the landowners were private
citizens, not (as here) other state instrumentalities.  Here, as
noted, the trail sponsor is another municipal corporation with
authority to act for the State of Illinois. Accordingly, the
holding in Glosemeyer is not incompatible with the Court's
determination that the City and the Village are not entitled to
compensation.

In summary, the Court concludes that the issuance of the NITU did
not result in a compensable taking of the City's or the Village's
land. Accordingly, those plaintiffs have no right to compensation
based on the issuance of the NITU.

A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims' October 5, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybl7t7t7from
Leagle.com.

ELLEN BALAGNA, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne, II
-- thor@arentfox.com -- Arent Fox, LLP.

MARK S. BALAGNA, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

ORLANDO C CROWTHERS, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund
Hearne, II, Arent Fox, LLP.

SHERRI D DELOST, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

RANDY J. DELOST, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

DAWN M. FAWCETT, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

CHAD J. FAWCETT, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

DEBRA G. SEXTON, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

ROBERT T. GARLS, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund Hearne,
II, Arent Fox, LLP.

EVELYN GASPAROVICH, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Fernlund
Hearne, II, Arent Fox, LLP.

USA, Defendant, represented by Sarah Izfar, U.S. Department of
Justice.


UNITED STATES: VA Settles World War II Veterans Benefits Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Britain Eakin, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
some 70 years after Celestino Almeda helped the United States
liberate the Philippines from Japanese occupation, bureaucratic
red tape has kept the World War II veteran fighting for
recognition of his service.

Mr. Almeda's long tour finally ended on Oct. 23 with a settlement
on the $15,000 veterans benefit promised by the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs.

"Some laws are legal and moral," said Mr. Almeda, speaking in
August at his home in Gaithersburg, Md.  "Some practices are moral
but not legal.  There are those that are legal but are immoral.
As in my case.  I was denied benefit because of the Rescission Act
of 1946."

Though the U.S. recognized Philippine independence after the dust
from WWII had settled, the Rescission Act signed by President
Harry S. Truman denied citizenship and military benefits to the
more than 260,000 Filipino soldiers who had served alongside U.S.
forces in the struggle.

The issue lingered until 2009 when Congress passed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, allowing eligible veterans to claim
a one-time lump sum benefit from the Filipino Veterans Equity
Compensation Fund.

As a U.S. citizen since 1996, the law entitled Almeda to a $15,000
payment.  Noncitizen Filipino soldiers were eligible for $9,000.

Mr. Almeda submitted his application for the benefit on Feb. 18,
2009 -- the day after President Barack Obama signed the bill into
law.  The VA declared Almeda ineligible, however, because his name
does not appear on a roster that was created as WWII came to an
end.

Seth Watkins, an attorney for Mr. Almeda with the firm Watkins Law
& Advocacy, notes that the revised reconstructed guerrilla roster,
otherwise known as the Missouri list, was assembled at a chaotic
time.

"Not everybody's name made it onto that list," Mr. Watkins said
during an August interview at his centenarian client's home.

In fighting the case, Mr. Almeda held up decades-old documents to
substantiate his service.

Kept in a carefully organized binder at home, Mr. Almeda called
those documents with their brown, tattered edges his only "bullet"
in his nearly nine-year fight with the VA.

"That's all of my armament so that I could keep fighting," he said
in August.

For Mr. Almeda, memories of the war's carnage are still easily
recalled.  He described seeing corpses heaped on top of one
another, sometimes piled into a single coffin.  They used some
powder, he said -- perhaps lime -- to remove the stench of dead
bodies.

Such macabre sights have brought little shade, however, to
Mr. Almeda's outlook.

"You cannot see the brighter side of life if you have not seen the
darkest side of life," he said.  "I'm very thankful with the
freedom that we are having now."

Still sharp and spirited as he heads toward his 101st birthday in
June, Mr. Almeda called his years-long struggle to get veteran
benefits one of principle and respect, not money.

"I want to meet my creator with a light heart, that my service are
recognized.  That's all," he said.  "I'm after the dignity of
recognizing my service."

VA records say the agency has processed 42,755 applications for
the benefit.  It approved 18, 977 -- about 45 percent of them --
awarding roughly $226 million to eligible veterans.

Today more than $56 million remains in the Filipino Veterans
Equity Compensation Fund.

Attorney Watkins said in an email on Oct. 23 that the settlement
precludes a binding legal precedent that would extend to others
like his client, something he had hoped a victorious appeal might
do.  He nonetheless expressed optimism.

"This truly is a personal victory for Mr. Almeda and perhaps
amounts to a breakthrough in legal efforts to vindicate Filipinos
who have been denied recognition of their important service during
World War II," Mr. Watkins said.

VA press secretary Curt Cashour characterized the $15,000
settlement with Mr. Almeda as "acknowledgement of his service
which contributed to the war effort during World War II."

Mr. Watkins noted on Oct. 23 that he is still prepared to continue
his challenge to the eligibility criteria for the benefit in a
separate case.  The VA, he said, has ignored the plain text of the
2009 law by relying only on the Missouri list to determine
eligibility, which he said leaves many veterans who served -- like
Mr. Almeda -- out of luck.

According to the law, eligible veterans include those who served
"before July 1, 1946, in the organized military forces of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, while such
forces were in the service of the Armed Forces of the United
States pursuant to the military order of the President dated July
26, 1941."  That includes service among organized guerrilla forces
that were recognized by the U.S.

Among the records Mr. Almeda preserved in his binder at home is an
affidavit for Philippine Army personnel dated April 2, 1946, and
signed by First Lt. John B. Staples.  It lists all of
Mr. Almeda's service, and shows his service in a recognized
guerilla force and in the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, which
Mr. Watkins says qualifies Mr. Almeda for the benefit.

Mr. Watkins said the VA labeled the affidavit a Philippine
document, not a U.S. Army service document.

"That is completely false," Mr. Watkins said.  "It's a United
States Army document. It was signed by a United States Army
officer.  It was designed by the United States Army."

Mr. Watkins and Mr. Almeda had hoped on appeal to prove that the
VA acted arbitrarily by relying on a veteran's inclusion on the
Missouri list, despite affidavits that document a veteran's
service.

Although the law says who is eligible, it doesn't specify what
documentation is required to prove eligibility.

Mr. Watkins said Congress gave the VA broad authority to decide
that, but that the VA shifted responsibility of verifying a
veteran's service to the Army, which in turn kicked the can over
to the National Archives, which requires a veteran's name to
appear on the Missouri list.

Representatives for the government offered little insight as to
whether the VA complies with the law in requiring a veteran's name
to appear on the Missouri list, and why the VA tied eligibility
for the benefit to that document instead of others showing
eligible military service in the Philippines during WWII.

"VA is legally bound by determinations of the appropriate U.S.
military service department as to whether there was qualifying
service," a representative for the VA said in an email.  "For
claims requiring verification of Philippine service in WWII, this
is the National Personnel Records Center, which acts as the
custodian of the U.S. Army's collection of Philippine Army and
Guerrilla records."

The VA deferred to the National Records Center at the National
Archives, which in turn deferred to the Department of the Army.
Public affairs officer Hank Minitrez said in an email that he
"cannot comment on individual cases."

At his home in August, Mr. Almeda flipped through another binder,
several inches thick, documenting his nearly nine-year struggle to
get the VA benefit.

"All we were arguing about is $15,000," Mr. Almeda said, sitting
in a recliner with the files.  "The work involved in issuing these
statements of paper is more than $15,000. So where is the
mathematics there."

Mr. Watkins said at the time that the VA would like the issue to
disappear.

"All of the people who are left who are claiming these benefits,
they're very elderly," the attorney said.  "Many of them are,
they're not surviving long enough to fight the fight."

Mr. Watkins noted that the law gave veterans one year to apply for
the benefit, and that very few of those who were denied have
appealed.  After so many years, Mr. Watkins said the VA would
likely be embarrassed if they could prove the agency had
misapplied the law.

"But, they should do the right thing," he said.  "So if they got
it wrong, they should fix it, and they should fix it for anybody
who's still alive who has this documentary evidence."


UNITED STATES: AFGE, AFL-CIO Appeals Ruling in Suit vs. OPM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO,
et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the consolidated
litigation titled In re: U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data
Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 1:15-mc-01394-ABJ, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: U.S. Office of Personnel
Management Data Security Breach Litigation v. OPM, et al., Case
No. 17-5232, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Travis Arnold, Tony Bachtell, Ryan Bonner,
Monty Bos, Gardell Branch, Myrna Brown, Robert Crawford, Paul
Daly, Jane Doe, Jane Doe, II, John Doe, John Doe, II, John Doe,
III, Michael Ebert, Kelly Flynn, Alia Fuli, Johnny Gonzalez,
Lillian Gonzalez-Colon, Orin Griffith, Jennifer Gum, Michael
Hanagan, Maryann Hibbs, Deborah Hoffman, Michael Johnson, Cynthia
King-Myers, Ryan Lozar, Teresa J. McGarry, Charlene Oliver, Toralf
Peters, Mario Sampedro, Timothy Sebert, Zachary Sharper, Robert
Slater, Darren Strickland, Peter Uliano, Nancy Wheatley, and
Kimberly Winsor.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 24, 2017,
Plaintiffs Eugene Gambardella, Stephen Howell, National Treasury
Employees Union and John Ortino seek review of a court decision in
the lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al. v. OPM, et
al., Case No. 17-5217.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Adedeji Shamonda and Adebiyi K. Shamonda
appear pro se.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Appellants and Plaintiffs-Appellees Heather
Burnett-Rick and Adam Dale are represented by:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees Mary C. Woo, Victor W. Hobbs, Hector Perez,
John Oravis, Gary S. Cox, Derrick Sims, Edward W. Krippendorf,
Edward L. Robbeloth, Eric W. Edgar, John Raber, Micaela Brown,
Nicole Waid, Nicholas D. Cavis, William Preston, Howard Smith,
Chad Kappers, William Fleishell, III, Jeran Binning, David A.
Golden, Ronnie Golden, and Liliana Golden, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Eugene Gambardella is represented by:

          Paras Naresh Shah, Esq.
          ASSISTANT COUNSEL
          NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
          1750 H Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 572-5500
          Facsimile: (202) 572-5645
          E-mail: paras.shah@nteu.org

Defendants-Appellees Office of Personnel Management; Kathleen
McGettigan, Acting Director of United States Office of Personnel
Management, in her Official Capacity; Donna Seymour, Chief
Information Officer of U.S. Office of Personnel Management, in her
official capacity; United States Department of Homeland Security;
Elaine D. Kaplan and John Berry are represented by:

          DOJ APPELLATE COUNSEL
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20530-0001
          Telephone: (202) 514-2000

Defendant-Appellee Keypoint Government Solutions, a Delaware
corporation, is represented by:

          Jason J. Mendro, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-5306
          Telephone: (202) 955-8500
          E-mail: jmendro@gibsondunn.com


U.S. CONCRETE: "Ruedelstein" Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------
U.S. Concrete, Inc. still defends a class action lawsuit by Hans
Ruedelstein, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

On March 28, 2017, Hans Ruedelstein, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a purported class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court of Northern Texas,
Fort Worth Division, against the Company, William J. Sandbrook,
William M. Brown and Joseph C. Tusa, Jr. alleging violations of
certain federal securities laws.  The case was filed purportedly
on behalf of purchasers of the Company's stock between March 6,
2015 and March 23, 2017. The complaint does not specify an amount
of damages sought. On June 22, 2017, Robert Abric and Donald
Bellafiore were appointed as co-lead plaintiffs.

The Company denies the allegations in the complaint and intends to
vigorously pursue its defense.

U.S. Concrete, Inc. is a producer of ready-mixed concrete in
select geographic markets in the United States and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.


U.S. GOVERNMENT: Faces Charleston Area Medical Suit in COFC
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the USA. The case is
styled as Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., CAMC Health
Education and Research Institute, Inc., on behalf of themselves
and all other taxpayers similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. USA,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01528-EDK (C.F.C., October 16, 2017).
[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

   Thomas Dale Sykes, Esq.
   The Law Offices of Thomas D. Sykes, LLC
   825 S. Waukegan Road, No. 10
   Lake Forest, IL 60045
   Tel: (847) 604-4928
   Fax: (847) 604-4961
   Email: tomsykes@sykestaxlaw.com


UMPQUA HOLDINGS: Faces "Amirian" Suit in C. Dist. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Umpqua Holdings
Company. The case is styled as Ani Amirian, individually, and on
behalf of all other members of the general public similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Umpqua Holdings Company d/b/a Umpqua Bank
and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
07574 (C.D. Cal., October 16, 2017).

Umpqua Holdings Corporation, an Oregon corporation, is a financial
holding company with two principal operating subsidiaries, Umpqua
Bank and Umpqua Investments, Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


US BANK: 8th Cir. Affirms ERISA Suit Dismissal
----------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's Judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the putative class action filed by
James Thole and Sherry Smith against U.S. Bank, N.A., U.S.
Bancorp, and multiple U.S. Bancorp directors challenging the
defendants' management of a defined benefit pension plan.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Sections 404,
405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary obligations and causing
the Plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a U.S. Bank
subsidiary, FAF Advisors, Inc. (FAF).  The plaintiffs' complaint
asserts that these alleged ERISA violations caused significant
losses to the Plan's assets in 2008 and resulted in the Plan being
underfunded in 2008. The plaintiffs sought to recover Plan losses,
disgorgement of profits, injunctive relief, and other remedial
relief pursuant to ERISA.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds,
including that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that
their ERISA claims were time-barred, and that their pleading
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The
district court denied the motion to dismiss in part and granted it
in part. First, the district court determined that the plaintiffs
had statutory and Article III standing to pursue all their claims.

In determining that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, the
district court noted that the plaintiffs did not allege that their
benefit levels have actually decreased as a result of the
Defendants' alleged misconduct, therefore, they had no claim to
any particular asset that composes a part of the Plan's general
asset pool. But the plaintiffs did allege that the defendants'
conduct caused the Plan to become underfunded in 2008, and the
Plan remained in that status through the lawsuit's commencement.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of standing,
renewing an argument raised in the previous motion to dismiss. The
defendants based their motion on the factual development that the
Plan is now overfunded. The district court concluded that standing
was the wrong doctrine to apply given the procedural posture of
the case; instead, the applicable doctrine was mootness.

The court identified the plaintiffs' injury in fact as the
increased risk of Plan default, or, put another way, the increased
risk that Plan beneficiaries will not receive the level of
benefits they have been promised. The court concluded that because
the Plan is now overfunded, the plaintiffs no longer have a
concrete interest in the monetary and equitable relief sought to
remedy that alleged injury. The court dismissed the entire case as
moot.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to ERISA. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants'
voluntary contribution of millions of dollars to the Plan after
the commencement of the lawsuit constituted some success on the
merits because the contribution was motivated by the litigation.
The defendants responded that in 2014 they again made excess
contributions in order to reduce the Plan's insurance premiums.

The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding no
evidence that Defendants' 2014 contribution is an 'outcome' of the
litigation, as opposed to an independent decision that nonetheless
affected the viability of Plaintiffs' case.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by
(1) dismissing the case as moot; (2) dismissing the Equities
Strategy claim on statute-of-limitations and pleading grounds; and
(3) denying their motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

In Harley, 284 F.3d at 907 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1
(1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639), the 8th
Circuit reasoned that the plan participants' and beneficiaries'
individual pension rights were fully protected; in fact, their
rights would if anything be adversely affected by subjecting the
Plan and its fiduciaries to costly litigation brought by parties
who have suffered no injury from a relatively modest but allegedly
imprudent investment. The purposes underlying ERISA's imposition
of strict fiduciary duties, the 8th Circuit reasoned, are not
furthered by granting plaintiffs standing to pursue these claims.

In summary, a careful reading of Harley shows that the issue it
addressed was whether the plaintiffs in that case fell within the
class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized under Section
1132(a)(2) to bring suit claiming liability under Section 1109 for
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties given that the plan was
overfunded.

The 8th Circuit found that the plaintiffs' suit is not one for
appropriate relief, and held that dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims for relief under Section 1132(a)(3) was also proper.

The plaintiffs next argue that if the 8th Circuit affirms the
district court's dismissal of their claims based on the Plan's
overfunded status, then they are entitled to fees pursuant to
ERISA Section 502(g)(1), which permits the court in its discretion
[to] allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to
either party.

Courts within the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere have found that an
award of attorney's fees in an ERISA case may be proper when a
plaintiff's suit operated as a catalyst to bring about a voluntary
change in the defendant's conduct.

Here, the record supports the district court's conclusion that the
plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that their lawsuit was a
material contributing factor in the defendants' making the 2014
contribution resulting in the Plan's overfunded status and any
relief that the plaintiffs sought in their complaint.
Accordingly, the 8th Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for
attorneys' fees and costs.

The appeals case is captioned James J. Thole; Sherry Smith,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. U.S. Bank, National Association,
individually and as successor in interest to FAF Advisors, Inc.;
U.S. Bancorp, Defendants-Appellees. Nuveen Asset Management, LLC,
as successor in interest to FAF Advisors, Inc., Defendant, Richard
K. Davis; Douglas M. Baker, Jr.; Y. Marc Belton; Peter H. Coors;
Joel W. Johnson; Olivia F. Kirtley; O'Dell M. Owens; Craig D.
Schnuck; Arthur D. Collins, Jr.; Victoria Buyniski Gluckman; Jerry
W. Levin; David B. O'Maley; Patrick T. Stokes; Richard G. Reiten;
Warren R. Staley; John and Jane Doe 1-20, Defendants-Appellees.
AARP; AARP Foundation; R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary of the
United States Department of Labor, Amici on Behalf of
Appellant(s). Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s), No. 16-1928 (8th Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's October 12, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y78yokc7from Leagle.com.

Stephen P. Lucke -- lucke.steve@dorsey.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Karen L. Handorf -- khandorf@cohenmilstein.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Craig C. Martin -- cmartin@jenner.com -- for Defendant-Not Party.
Thomas Paul Swigert, swigert.tom@dorsey.com for Defendant-
Appellee.

Mary E. Signorille, 601 E. St. NWWashington, DC 20049-0001 for
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant.

Amanda S. Amert, aamert@jenner.com for Defendant-Not Party.
Andrew J. Holly, holly.andrew@dorsey.com for Defendant-Appellee.
Aaron Daniel Van Oort -- aaron.vanoort@FaegreBD.com --   for
Defendant-Not Party.

Michelle C. Yau, myau@cohenmilstein.com for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Carolyn Glass Anderson -- carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kirsten D. Hedberg, 651 Nicollet Mall, Suite 501, Minneapolis, MN
55402, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas Tso, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.Room N-4611, Washington,
DC 2021, for Amicus on Behalf of Appellant.

Shannon L. Bjorklund, Esq. -- bjorklund.shannon@dorsey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Brian C. Gudmundson, Esq. -- brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lincoln S. Loehrke, Esq. -- loehrke.lincoln@dorsey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.
























VEIN CENTERS: Court Awards $500 Damage for TCPA Claim
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of Missouri,
Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion finding Defendant in
the case captioned ST. LOUIS HEART CENTER, INC., Plaintiff, v.
VEIN CENTERS FOR EXCELLENCE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:12 CV 174
CDP (E.D. Mo.), in a single violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

This case involves the receipt of a single advertising facsimile
received by Plaintiff.  Defendant purchased the telephone number
of Plaintiff's owner, Ronald Weiss, from InfoUSA, and contracted
with Westfax to have Westfax send Plaintiff a fax.  Plaintiff St.
Louis Heart Center, Inc., brought Count I of this action as a
putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA).

Defendant was not aware of the existence of the TCPA until the
lawsuit was filed. Neither Westfax nor InfoUSA told Defendant
about the TCPA. Defendant did not intend to violate the TCPA by
contracting with Westfax to send a fax to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff
concedes that its actual monetary loss from Defendant's violation
of the TCPA does not exceed $500.  Plaintiff concedes that
Defendant's TCPA violation was not willful or knowing, such that
statutory damages could be trebled.

Defendant Vein Centers has conceded its liability to plaintiff
Heart Center for one violation of the TCPA and the only issue
before the Court is the amount of damages. The parties have agreed
that the single TCPA violation was not willful or knowing, and
that the actual monetary loss from the violation was less than
$500.  As a result, based on a plain reading and application of
the TCPA statute, the Court found in favor of plaintiff St. Louis
Heart Center, Inc., against defendant Vein Centers for Excellence,
Inc. in the amount of $500.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y84hxywh
from Leagle.com.

St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Phillip A.
Bock -- phil@classlawyers.com -- BOCK AND HATCH, LLC.
St. Louis Heart Center, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Brian J.
Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- ANDERSON AND WANCA, pro hac
vice, Max G. Margulis, MARGULIS LAW GROUP, 14236 Cedar Springs Dr.
Chesterfield, MO 63017 & Ryan M. Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com
-ANDERSON AND WANCA, pro hac vice.

Vein Centers for Excellence, Inc., Defendant, represented by Don
V. Kelly -- dkelly@evans-dixon.com -- EVANS AND DIXON & Brian R.
Shank -- bshank@evans-dixon.com -- EVANS AND DIXON.


VERNON CONSTRUCTION: Neill Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
CLIFFORD J. NEILL, BALTAZAR FLORES, AND GUSTAVO SERNA,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. VERNON CONSTRUCTION & ROOFING, INC., ERIC S. VERNON,
SR. AKA ERIC VERNON, and BERTHA CAMACHO AKA BECKY CAMACHO, and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. RG17876564 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Alameda Cty., September 25, 2017), seeks recovery of all
allowable compensation and other sums, including unpaid minimum
wages, unpaid contractually agreed wages, unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages for failure to pay minimum and overtime wages,
penalties/premium pay for missed meal and rest periods, penalties,
interest, attorney's fees and costs.

Vernon Construction & Roofing, Inc., is a California corporation
with its principal place of business in Hughson, California.
Vernon Construction has a "B" license as a general building
contractor and a "C-39" license as a roofing contractor, and
provides services on various commercial and residential
construction projects throughout the state of California.  The
Individual Defendants have ownership interest in Vernon
Construction.  The Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Cristina Molteni, Esq.
          MOLTENI EMPLOYMENT LAW
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 762-0270
          Facsimile: (415) 762-0271
          E-mail: cmolteni@moltenilaw.com


VHL PLUMBING: "Tanner" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT, Reimbursement
----------------------------------------------------------
Jon Tanner, individually and on behalf of other individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Vincent Loporchio, an
individual, VHL Plumbing, Inc., a California Corporation and Does
1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC677868 (Cal.
Super., October 2, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime and minimum wages,
redress for failure to authorize or permit required meal periods,
statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate wage
statements, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation
wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages due upon
separation of employment, failure to maintain time-keeping
records, reimbursement of business-related expenses, injunctive
relief and other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees,
costs and interest under California Labor Code and applicable
Industrial Wage Orders.

Plaintiff worked as a plumber for the Defendants for their various
construction projects, comprising installation of new plumbing,
construction and refurbishment. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Young W. Ryu, Esq.
      Kelly Kim, Esq.
      LOYR, APC
      9595 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 900
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Telephone: (888) 365-8686
      Facsimile: (800) 576-1170
      Email: young.ryu@loywr.com
             kelly.kim@loywr.com


WARNER MUSIC: Denial of Class Certification Bid Under Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------
Warner Music Group Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2017, that plaintiffs have appealed the district
court's order denying class certification in the lawsuit related
to pricing of digital music downloads.

The Company said, "On December 20, 2005 and February 3, 2006, the
Attorney General of the State of New York served the Company with
requests for information in connection with an industry-wide
investigation as to the pricing of digital music downloads. On
February 28, 2006, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice served us with a Civil Investigative Demand, also
seeking information relating to the pricing of digitally
downloaded music."

"Both investigations were ultimately closed, but subsequent to the
announcements of the investigations, more than thirty putative
class action lawsuits were filed concerning the pricing of digital
music downloads. The lawsuits were consolidated in the Southern
District of New York. The consolidated amended complaint, filed on
April 13, 2007, alleges conspiracy among record companies to delay
the release of their content for digital distribution, inflate
their pricing of CDs and fix prices for digital downloads. The
complaint seeks unspecified compensatory, statutory and treble
damages.

"On October 9, 2008, the District Court issued an order dismissing
the case as to all defendants, including us. However, on January
12, 2010, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case for further proceedings and on January
10, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition
for Certiorari.

"Upon remand to the District Court, all defendants, including the
Company, filed a renewed motion to dismiss challenging, among
other things, plaintiffs' state law claims and standing to bring
certain claims. The renewed motion was based mainly on arguments
made in defendants' original motion to dismiss, but not addressed
by the District Court. On July 18, 2011, the District Court
granted defendants' motion in part, and denied it in part.
Notably, all claims on behalf of the CD-purchaser class were
dismissed with prejudice. However, a wide variety of state and
federal claims remain for the class of Internet download
purchasers.

"On March 19, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification. Plaintiffs filed an operative consolidated amended
complaint on September 25, 2015. The Company filed its answer to
the fourth amended complaint on October 9, 2015, and filed an
amended answer on November 3, 2015. A mediation took place on
February 22, 2016, but the parties were unable to reach a
resolution. On July 12, 2017, the District Court denied
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On August 1, 2017,
plaintiffs filed a petition with the Second Circuit seeking
permission to appeal the district court's order denying class
certification.

"The Company intends to defend against these lawsuits vigorously,
but is unable to predict the outcome of these suits. Regardless of
the merits of the claims, this and any related litigation could
continue to be costly, and divert the time and resources of
management. The potential outcomes of these claims that are
reasonably possible cannot be determined at this time and an
estimate of the reasonably possible loss or range of loss cannot
presently be made."

Warner Music Group Corp. was formed on November 21, 2003.  The
Company is the direct parent of WMG Holdings Corp., which is the
direct parent of WMG Acquisition Corp., which is one of the
world's major music-based content companies.


WEIGHT WATCHERS: Appeal in "Roberts" Suit Still Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
The appeal in the case, Raymond Roberts v. Weight Watchers
International, Inc., remains pending, Weight Watchers
International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 1, 2017.

On January 7, 2016, an OnlinePlus member filed a putative class
action complaint against the Company in the Supreme Court of New
York, New York County, asserting class claims for breach of
contract and violations of the New York General Business Law. On
February 5, 2016, the Company removed the case to the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. On March 18,
2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that, as
a result of the temporary glitches in the Company's website and
app in November and December 2015, the Company has: (1) breached
its Subscription Agreement with its OnlinePlus members; and (2)
engaged in deceptive acts and practices in violation of Section
350 of the New York General Business Law. The plaintiff is seeking
unspecified actual, punitive and statutory damages, as well as his
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this action.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss on May 6, 2016. The
plaintiff filed his opposition papers on June 9, 2016 and the
Company filed its reply papers on June 23, 2016. The Court granted
the Company's motion to dismiss on November 14, 2016.

On November 16, 2016, the plaintiff filed a timely notice of
appeal of the Court's decision and on January 31, 2017, the
plaintiff filed his brief in support of appeal. The Company filed
its opposition brief on April 5, 2017, and the plaintiff filed his
reply brief on April 25, 2017.

The Company believes that the plaintiff's appeal is without merit
and will be denied in due course.


WELCH FOODS: Consumer Fraud Class Action Transferred to New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendants' Motion to Transfer the case
captioned LAUREN HALL, Plaintiff, v. WELCH FOODS, INC., A
COOPERATIVE, THE PROMOTION IN MOTION COMPANIES, INC., Defendants,
Civ. No. 17-3997 (D.N.J.).

This matter comes before the Court on two motions: a Motion to
Transfer brought by Defendants Welch Foods, Inc., and The
Promotion in Motion Companies, Inc., and a Motion to Remand
brought by Plaintiff Lauren Hall.

Plaintiff alleges that, during the Class Period, Plaintiff
purchased Welch's Fruit Snacks for herself and her family, relying
on Defendants' representations that the Fruit Snacks contained a
significant amount of the actual fruit emphasized in their
marketing and labeling, were nutritious and healthful, and were
more healthful than similar products.

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to the
federal court where the action might originally have been brought.
The federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the
action. Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over civil actions that involve a federal question or diversity of
citizenship. Federal question jurisdiction exists when the action
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States. Diversity jurisdiction exists when the action arises
between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.

Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.
Sec 1332, federal district courts have original jurisdiction of
any civil action in which three requirements are met: (1) an
amount in controversy that exceeds $5,000,000, as aggregated
across all individual claims; (2) minimally diverse parties; and
(3) that the class consist of at least 100 or more members.
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be remanded
to state court. The party that removed the case bears the burden
of establishing federal jurisdiction.

A court may transfer an action to any other district where it
might have been brought for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, and in the interest of justice. Courts may consider any
number of relevant factors that affect the private and public
interests protected by the language of Section 1404(a), including
those not specifically enumerated in the statute.

Although Defendants' Motion to Transfer was filed prior to
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, the Court will first consider the
Motion to Remand because it requires determining whether the Court
has federal subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance and,
thus, granting the Motion to Remand would render the Motion to
Transfer moot.

Motion to Remand

Removal Was Proper Under CAFA

The parties do not dispute that all three of CAFA's threshold
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied here.

The question remains whether either of the mandatory exceptions
delineated in CAFA or the discretionary balancing permitted under
the totality of the circumstances assessment warrants remand.

The Operative Complaint at the Time of Removal Governs CAFA
Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's argument depends on a broad reading of the Third
Circuit's decision in Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d
144, 153 (3d Cir. 2009), which applied the CAFA local controversy
exception based on "defendants presently in the action, not those
sued in the original complaint.  Kaufman does not speak directly
to the issue before the Court: whether a district court may
consider a complaint amended post-removal which alters the
definition or makeup of the class itself. In a more recent
opinion, the Third Circuit considered whether a district court
erred in remanding a mass action removed under CAFA, seeming to
reaffirm the time-of-removal rule. The Court explained,
Plaintiffs' conduct undertaken after filing the Complaint is
certainly relevant, as long as that conduct occurred prior to
removal.

Accordingly, the Court will not consider the Amended Complaint's
proposed class definition. The operative complaint at the time of
removal defined the class as persons in New Jersey, and that
definition governs the applicability of the home state exception.

Remand Is Not Warranted Under Any CAFA Exception

The home state exception to CAFA jurisdiction requires the party
seeking remand to: (1) establish that the citizenship of the
members of two-thirds or more of the putative class is the state
in which the action was originally filed; (2) establish the
citizenship of the defendants; (3) identify the primary
defendants; and (4) demonstrate that two-thirds or more of the
members of the putative class are citizens of the same state as
the primary defendants.

Plaintiff does not argue that CAFA's mandatory local controversy
exception applies to this action. Plaintiff argues as a fallback
that the discretionary totality of the circumstances analysis
permitted under CAFA warrants remand.  The Court disagrees, as the
balance of factors suggests this dispute is not truly local.
Plaintiff failed to plead the original Complaint in a manner that
would avoid federal jurisdiction. The claims here involve matters
of national interest as the product line in question has national
reach and distribution. Finally, as discussed below, in the three
years before this action was filed, Plaintiff's counsel filed
another class action asserting almost identical claims on behalf
of a putative nationwide class which encompasses the putative
class here. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is denied.

Motion to Transfer

Defendants argue this action should be transferred to the EDNY
because existing litigation there covers Plaintiff's claims.
Although the causes of action in the New York litigation arise
under different state law, the nature of the claims and issues,
the relief sought, the products in question, and the defendants
all substantially overlap.1Moreover, the putative nationwide class
in the New York action encompasses the putative New Jersey class.
The New York action was filed first, in September 2015, and will
continue regardless of what this Court decides. Plaintiff's New
Jersey filing evidences exactly the kind of forum shopping and
judicial inefficiencies that CAFA was designed to prevent.
Plaintiff cannot maintain essentially the same litigation in two
separate district courts, creating unnecessary burdens on the
courts and risking the inefficiency and embarrassment of
conflicting judgments.

Accordingly, this will be transferred to the Eastern District of
New York.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7zxc2uafrom Leagle.com.

Lauren Hall, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Scott Bauchner --
jb@ansellgrimm.com -- Ansell Grimm & Aaron, P.C.,

Lauren Hall, Plaintiff, represented by Michael H. Ansell --
mha@ansellgrimm.com -- Ansell Grimm & Aaron.

Welch Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by David R. King,
Herrick -- dking@herrick.com -- Feinstein LLP, Leah Kelman --
lkelman@herrick.com -- Herrick, Feinstein LLP & Ronald Jay Levine,
Herrick -- rlevine@herrick.com -- Feinstein LLP.
The Promotion In Motion Companies, Inc., Defendant, represented by
David R. King, Herrick, Feinstein LLP, Leah Kelman, Herrick,
Feinstein LLP & Ronald Jay Levine, Herrick, Feinstein LLP.


WELLS FARGO: Court Narrows Claims in Stockholder Derivative Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint IN RE: WELLS FARGO
& COMPANY SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION. This Order Relates
To: ALL ACTIONS, Lead Case No. 16-cv-05541-JST (N.D. Ill.).

This is a shareholder derivative action on behalf of Wells Fargo &
Company against the company's officers, directors, and senior
management.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew or consciously
disregarded that Wells Fargo employees were illicitly creating
millions of deposit and credit card accounts for their customers,
without those customers' knowledge or consent.

Defendant Sloan requests that the Court take judicial notice of
two court filings from a related case pending in Superior Court
for the State of California, In re Wells Fargo & Company
Derivative Litigation, CGC 15-554407 (Cal. Super. Ct.).  These
include (1) a Consolidated Shareholder Derivative Complaint
brought on behalf of Wells Fargo shareholders against current and
former Wells Fargo officers and directors, filed in San Francisco
Superior Court and (2) an order by Judge E.A. Karnow in the same
case, sustaining a number of demurrers with leave to amend.

Defendants to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).   All
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b5, and the derivative claims under Section 29(b) and
Section 20A.

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Michael Loughlin under
Section 10(b) and claims for indemnification and contribution are
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants
Sloan, Tolstedt, Loughlin, and Stumpf under California
Corporations Code Section 25402 are dismissed with prejudice.  In
all other respects, the motions to dismiss are denied.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the
Director Defendants made material and misleading statements
through their participation in and approval of Wells Fargo's
public filings.  First, the complaint adequately identifies the
allegedly false and misleading statements made by the Director
Defendants and does not engage in shotgun pleading. As the Court
already observed in denying the prior motions to dismiss based on
demand futility, the complaint includes extensive and detailed
allegations" that the Director Defendants knew of the improper
account creation scheme by 2014, and that they made disclosures in
SEC filings that they knew were false or misleading as of the time
they were made.  Indeed, Plaintiffs identified specific statements
in the SEC filings that they allege to be false or misleading
namely, the cross-selling metrics that were reported in all
quarterly and annual filings and statements in those filings
regarding Wells Fargo's success at cross-selling and its risk-
management controls. For example, in the complaint Plaintiffs cite
to a disclosure in Wells Fargo's 2013 annual report, stating that
the company's "cross-sell strategy" would facilitate growth in
both strong and weak economic cycles. The complaint also cites to
the products per household cross-selling metrics reported in
annual reports between 2011 and 2015.

Plaintiffs allege these metrics and statements about the
contribution of cross-selling to the company's financial
performance were misleading because of the company's illicit
account-creation scheme. The complaint identifies such statements
in nearly all of Wells Fargo's SEC filings over the relevant
period, and includes a table that shows which Defendants signed,
and are thus presumed to have made the statements in, each filing.

Thus, the Court rejects the Director Defendants' suggestion that
they cannot tell from the complaint which allegedly false or
misleading statements he or she is being accused of making.

Second, the Court rejects the Director Defendants' arguments that
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for relying on the group
pleading doctrine. Plaintiffs do purport to rely on the group
pleading doctrine to render Defendants responsible for statements
as to which they are not explicitly identified as the speaker or
signatory.

Under this doctrine, plaintiffs are allowed to plead claims for
fraud against officers of the corporation using group pleading
presumptions that the fraud was the collective action of the
officers. The Director Defendants correctly note that, in the
absence of guidance from the Ninth Circuit, a majority of courts
in the district have held that the doctrine is inconsistent with
the strict pleading requirements of the PSLRA.

The Court agrees that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their Section
10(b) claims purely under a group pleading theory.  However,
Plaintiffs do not exclusively rely on this doctrine. Plaintiffs
principally allege that the Director Defendants are liable because
they signed SEC filings with material and misleading information.
This allegation is sufficient, and does not depend on the
viability of the group pleading doctrine. And Plaintiffs do more
than simply allege liability based on a signature. They allege
that each of the Director Defendants was part of a specific
committee whose general responsibilities would have afforded
members knowledge regarding the illicit account creation scheme,
and knowledge that the statements in the public filings were false
or misleading.

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately allege that
the Director Defendants made false and misleading statements for
purposes of their Section 10(b) claims.

Mr. Sloan argues that all but one of the allegations in the
Complaint particular to Mr. Sloan refer to statements he made
about the value of cross-selling and the bank's achievement of
cross-sell growth. This, according to Mr. Sloan, is insufficient,
because, as the Court and regulatory agencies have found, cross-
selling is not inherently improper.

Plaintiffs counter that Mr. Sloan made at least two materially
false or misleading statements during the relevant period. First,
at an analyst conference, Mr. Sloan emphasized the importance of
cross-selling to the company's financial performance.

Second, Mr. Sloan's statement in May 2014 that the secret sauce of
Wells Fargo's cross-selling success was tenure of employees was
materially false and misleading because over the relevant period
Wells Fargo allegedly terminated thousands of employees as a
result of their creation of fraudulent accounts. Plaintiffs also
allege that Mr. Sloan signed at least 13 of Wells Fargo's
quarterly and annual SEC filings over the relevant period.

In doing so, Plaintiffs allege that Sloan falsely attested in
certifications under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) that the
financial information contained in the filings was true and did
not omit material facts, and that the Company's internal and
disclosure controls were effective.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately allege that Mr.
Sloan is responsible for false and misleading information in Wells
Fargo SEC filings, including specifically the cross-selling
metrics that Plaintiffs allege were artificially inflated.

Defendant Carrie Tolstedt notes that she is only alleged to have
made three misstatements: (1) statements at a 2012 Investor Day
presentation touting Wells Fargo's products per customer metrics,
and noting that 8 cross sells can be done; (2) statements at a
2014 Investor Day presentation that the company was bullish on
cross-sell, that the goal of 8 products per customer was
attainable, and that cross-selling results in a better deal and
greater value" for customers; (3) statements at a 2016 Investor
Day presentation that the company's cross-selling scheme was meant
to satisfy customers' needs and help them succeed financially.

She argues that the statements that can be directly attributed to
her are nothing more than puffing or subjective assessments of
past and future performance, which are not actionable
representations under Section 10(b).  Ms. Tolstedt notes that, as
she is not alleged to have signed any Wells Fargo SEC filings, she
cannot be liable for other misstatements not directly attributable
to her.

Given this context, Plaintiffs adequately allege that Ms.
Tolstedt's statements regarding the past and future success of
Wells Fargo's cross-selling and its commitment to providing value
for customers were both material and false or misleading.

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege numerous false and misleading
statements by Mr. Shrewsberry. First, just as the Director
Defendants, Mr. Shrewsberry is liable for false and misleading
statements identified by Plaintiffs in any SEC filings he signed.
Second, Plaintiffs allege that, throughout the relevant period,
the reason Wells Fargo's cross-selling metrics remained high was
because of the illicit account-creation scheme that Wells Fargo
management encouraged. As the Court has previously noted,
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Board and Wells Fargo
senior management, and certainly a company CFO, should have known
based on any of a number of red flags that the company's cross-
selling practices were fraudulent.

Thus, Mr. Shrewsberry's statement regarding Wells Fargo's
legendary cross-sell capabilities and his statements regarding the
Los Angeles Times article were false, or at a minimum, misleading,
and gave shareholders a different impression of Wells Fargo than
was warranted based on facts known to management.
Defendant Michael Loughlin contends that the complaint includes no
allegation that Mr. Loughlin had knowledge of any material adverse
non-public information, made or caused to be made any false or
misleading statements, or otherwise possessed the required
scienter for the Section 10(b) claim. Plaintiffs do not appear to
allege in the complaint that Mr. Loughlin made any false or
misleading statements during the relevant period or signed any SEC
filings containing such information.

Nor do Plaintiffs identify any such statements in their
opposition, except to suggest that Mr. Loughlin may be liable for
Wells Fargo's public statements under the group pleading doctrine.
As the Court has already held that, in the absence of other
factual allegations, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Section 10(b)
claim solely under the group pleading doctrine, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Loughlin under Section
10(b).

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately allege facts
showing that Defendants Sloan, Tolstedt, and Shrewsberry each made
materially false or misleading statements, but that they do not
allege a material false or misleading statement by Defendant
Loughlin.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ycwbxlx3from Leagle.com.

Victoria Shaev, Plaintiff, represented by Betsy Carol Manifold --
manifold@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.
Victoria Shaev, Plaintiff, represented by Brittany Nicole DeJong -
- dejong@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP &
Rachele Renee Rickert -- rickert@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Herz LLP.

Robert Elson, IRA, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Alan Roth
Plutzik, Bramson Plutzik Mahler & Birkhaeuser, LLP, Michael Stuart
Strimling, Bramson Plutzik Mahler & Birkhaeuser, LLP, 2125 Oak
Grove Rd Ste 120. Walnut Creek, CA 94598, Robert I. Harwood --
rharwood@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP, pro hac vice & Samuel K.
Rosen -- srosen@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP.

Cathy LeBendig, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Barry R.
Himmelstein, Himmelstein Law Network, Alexander L. Stern,
Himmelstein Law Network, 275 Battery St; San Francisco, California
94111 & Cassie Springer Ayeni, Springer Ayeni, A Professional Law
Corporation, 1901 Harrison St., Suite 1100, Oakland, CA 94612

Fire & Police Pension Association of Colorado, Consol Plaintiff,
represented by Richard Martin Heimann, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Daniel P. Chiplock, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice, Joy Ann Kruse -- jakruse@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Katherine Collinge Lubin
-- klubin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Kelly M. Dermody, Leiff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Michael
J. Miarmi, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac vice,
Nicholas Diamand, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, pro hac
vice & Steven Eliott Fineman -- sfineman@lchb.com  -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP. 275 Battery St., 29th Fl., San
Francisco, CA 94111

Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago,
Consol Plaintiff, represented by Blair Allen Nicholas --
blairn@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann,
Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Bottini & Bottini, Inc. & Mark Lebovitch
-- marklblbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
pro hac vice.

Alison Sherman, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Felipe Javier
Arroyo, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Brian J. Robbins, Robbins Arroyo LLP &
Shane Palmesano Sanders, Robbins Arroyo LLP. 600 B Street
Suite 1900, San Diego, CA 92101

Amy Cook, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Albert Y. Chang --
achang@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini & Bottini, Inc., Francis A.
Bottini, Jr. -- fbottini@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini & Bottini, Inc.
& Yury A. Kolesnikov -- ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini &
Bottini, Inc.

Police & Fire Retirement System City of Detroit, Consol Plaintiff,
represented by Albert Y. Chang, Bottini & Bottini, Inc., Francis
A. Bottini, Jr., Bottini & Bottini, Inc., Mark Lebovitch,
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice & Yury A.
Kolesnikov, Bottini & Bottini, Inc..
George Hannon, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Kip Brian Shuman -
- kip@shumanlawfirm.com  --  The Shuman Law Firm & Rusty Evan
Glenn --  rusty@shumanlawfirm.com -- The Shuman Law Firm, pro hac
vice.

John D. Baker, II, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen -- egriffen@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP,
Jaculin Therese Aaron -- jaaron@shearman.com -- Shearman &
Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr. -- john.cove@shearman.com --
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa M. Valenti-Jordan -- lisa.valenti-
jordan@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin
-- sbaskin@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP.
Elaine L. Chao, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria Griffen,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman &
Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa M.
Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

John S. Chen, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria Griffen,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman &
Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa M.
Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Lloyd H. Dean, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria Griffen,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman &
Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa M.
Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Elizabeth A. Duke, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman
& Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa
M. Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Enrique Hernandez, Jr., Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman
& Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa
M. Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Donald M. James, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria Griffen,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman &
Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa M.
Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Cynthia M. Milligan, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman
& Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa
M. Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Federico F. Pena, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman
& Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa
M. Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Stephen W. Sanger, Defendant, represented by Emily Victoria
Griffen, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Jaculin Therese Aaron, Shearman
& Sterling LLP, John F. Cove, Jr., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Lisa
M. Valenti-Jordan, Shearman & Sterling LLP & Stuart Jay Baskin,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.


WHOLE FOODS: "Banus" Suit Seeks Damages Over FCRA Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Banus, and all others similarly-situated v. Whole Foods
Market Group, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-02132 (N.D. Ohio, October 10,
2017), seeks damages for Defendant's violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.

The Plaintiff brings this action to challenge the actions on Whole
Foods in the protection and safekeeping of the Plaintiff's and
Class members' personal identifiable information.  Plaintiff
alleges that Whole Foods's failures to safeguard the consumer PII
has caused Plaintiff and Class members damages.

Plaintiff Patricia Banus is resident of Lorain County, Ohio.

Defendant Whole Foods is a national specialty retailer of natural
and organic foods, with approximately 470 stores in North America
and the United Kingdom.  Certain Whole Foods locations also offer
taprooms and restaurants.  Whole Foods' primary business is as a
retail high-end grocery chain that operates seven stores through
the State of Ohio.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marc E. Dann, Esq.
      Brian D Flick, Esq.
      DANNLAW
      P.O. Box 6031040
      Cleveland, OH  44103
      Tel: (216) 373-0539
      Fax: (216) 373-0536
      E-mail: notices@dannlaw.com

          - and -

      Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
      ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
      77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 440-0020
      Fax: (312) 440-4180
      E-mail: Tom@Attorneyzim.Com


WORD ENTERPRISES: Court Certifies Pizza Delivery Drivers' Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class in the case captioned CHAD
McFARLIN, Plaintiff, v. THE WORD ENTERPRISES, LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-12536 (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants paid him below the Federal and
Michigan minimum wage during his time as a delivery driver for
Hungry Howie's pizza.  Plaintiff brings the action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Michigan Minimum Wage Law, and the
Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act to recover unpaid wages
owed to him and similarly situated Hungry Howie's delivery drivers
employed by Defendants.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)-(b) contains the
requirements for class certification. To be certified, a proposed
class must satisfy all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and fall
within one of the three types of class actions described in Rule
23(b).  Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequate representation. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that
the proposed class meets the requirement of 23(b)(3): questions of
law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and a class action is the superior method to
bring this action.

Rule 23(a)

Numerosity

To satisfy the numerosity requirement, a class must be so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable. A substantial"
number of affected individuals is enough to satisfy this
requirement. Impracticability of joinder must be positively shown,
and cannot be speculative.

In this case, the proposed class members worked for one of three
companies that owned a Hungry Howie's Pizza Store. Plaintiff
contends that the total number of drivers for each company should
be combined when considering numerosity. Defendants contend that
the Court should view each company separately when determining
numerosity, which appears to be similar to treating each company
as a sub-class. If the Court combines the drivers for each
company, the class will include approximately 106-117 delivery
drivers in total.

Numerosity is satisfied when the Court considers the proposed
class as a whole. Here, there are between 106 and 117 potential
class members. As stated above, this Court is not required to
consider any other factors besides numbers when determining
numerosity.  In this Circuit, precedent is more definite that a
class of forty or more members is sufficient to satisfy the
numerosity requirement.

Therefore, the Court finds that numerosity is satisfied.

Commonality and Typicality

Commonality and typicality tend to merge; both are instrumental in
determining if the plaintiff's claims and class claims are
sufficiently interrelated and if maintenance of a class action is
economical.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 shows the Wage Policy that Defendants used,
which states that employees only get paid enough to make the
minimum wage salary. This is why the Plaintiff contends that there
is no way Defendants could have paid their delivery drivers
adequately. See id. Therefore, this litigation must determine
whether Defendants actually paid their delivery drivers all of
their tips, as Defendants claim. This litigation must also
determine whether Defendants were legally able to pay delivery
drivers all of their tips, which Plaintiff claims Defendants were
not. Both of these questions will advance the litigation for the
entire class. The Court finds that for this reason, commonality is
met.

The Court finds that typicality is met in this case because Mr.
McFarlin is alleging underpayment of wages by Defendants, similar
to all of the other potential class members.

In conclusion, the Court finds that both commonality and
typicality are met.

Adequate Representation

Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 states that McFarlin was a delivery driver
for Hungry Howie's Pizza for over two years, and that the car he
used belonged to him and his wife, and paid for with marital
funds. Therefore, Mr. McFarlin has common interests with the other
class members because of his interest, as a delivery driver, to
get reimbursed for the costs he had to personally incur for his
vehicle expenses from delivery driving. For these reasons, the
Court finds that the adequate representation requirement is met.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Predominance

To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish
that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the
class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to
only individualized proof. Here, the general issue of the adequacy
of the reimbursement policy/policies maintained by Defendants
predominate over individual inquiries. Although the damages for
each delivery driver will be an individual determination, the
damages arise from a course of conduct that is applicable to the
entire class: Defendants' payroll practices. Therefore, the
predominance requirement is met.

Superiority

The Sixth Circuit considers the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action" to determine if a
class action is the superior mechanism to bring a lawsuit.  If it
is not economically feasible to obtain relief with small
individual suits, then class actions may be required for the
aggrieved to get redress. Cases alleging a single course of
wrongful conduct are particularly well suited to class
certification, but a class action is not superior where many
individual inquiries are required.  Here, Plaintiffs claims arise
from the single course of alleged wrongful conduct of Defendants
in maintaining an inadequate reimbursement policy or policies.
Therefore, a class action is the superior method to bring this
lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 5, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya7zlphdfrom
Leagle.com.

Chad McFarlin, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Potashnick --
markp@wp-attorneys.com -- Weinhaus & Potashnick.

Chad McFarlin, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Blanchard --
blanchard@bwlawonline.com. -- Blanchard & Walker, PLLC.
Kevin Dittrich, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S. Theuer --
jstheuer@loomislaw.com -- Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S.
Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises Haslett, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises Lansing, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises Owosso, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises Perry, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

The Word Enterprises St. Johns, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.

Magna Services Group, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Patrick C.
Lannen -- plannen@plunkettcooney.com -- Plunkett Cooney.
Dittrich Investments II, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
S. Theuer, Loomis, Ewert.


WORLD ACCEPTANCE: Dec. 18 Final Settlement Approval Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------
The settlement of the Edna Epstein Putative Class Action remains
pending, World Acceptance Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

On August 28, 2017, the Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis entered an
Order dismissing the case without costs and without prejudice to
the right of either party, upon good cause shown within 145 days,
to reinstate the action if the settlement is not consummated.

On August 29, the Court entered an Amended order granting the
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement as set
out filed by Operating Engineers Construction Industry and
Miscellaneous Pension Fund.

On August 31, the Court entered an Order of Administrative
Dismissal.

Also on August 29, the Clerk of Court entered a notice cancelling
the Final Settlement Approval Hearing set for Nov. 11 and
rescheduling it to Dec. 18.  On August 31, the Clerk of Court said
the Dec. 18 Final Settlement Approval Hearing will be held in the
Court in Columbia, not Greenville, South Carolina.

On April 22, 2014, a shareholder filed a putative class action
complaint, Edna Selan Epstein v. World Acceptance Corporation et
al., in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina (case number 6:14-cv-01606) (the "Edna Epstein Putative
Class Action"), against the Company and certain of its current and
former officers on behalf of all persons who purchased or
otherwise acquired the Company's common stock between April 25,
2013 and March 12, 2014. Two amended complaints have been filed by
the plaintiffs, and several other motions have been filed in the
proceedings. The complaint, as currently amended, alleges that (i)
the Company made false and misleading statements in various SEC
reports and other public statements in violation of federal
securities laws preceding the Company's disclosure in a Form 8-K
filed March 13, 2014 that it had received the above-referenced CID
from the CFPB (ii) the Company's loan growth and volume figures
were inflated because of a weakness in the Company's internal
controls relating to its accounting treatment of certain small-
dollar loan re-financings and (iii) additional allegations
regarding, among other things, the Company's receipt of a Notice
and Opportunity to Respond and Advise letter from the CFPB on
August 7, 2015. The complaint seeks class certification for a
class consisting of all persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired the Company's common stock between January 30, 2013 and
August 10, 2015, unspecified monetary damages, costs and
attorneys' fees.

The Company denied that the claims had any merit and opposed
certification of the proposed class.

On June 7, 2017, during a court-ordered mediation, the parties
reached an agreement in principle to settle the Edna Epstein
Putative Class Action. The settlement will resolve the claims
asserted against all defendants in the action. The terms agreed
upon by the parties contemplate a settlement payment to the class
of $16 million, all of which will be funded by the Company's
directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance carriers. The
settlement is subject to formal documentation and court approval.
Neither the Company nor any of its present or former officers have
admitted any wrongdoing or liability in connection with the
settlement.

The Company is a small-loan consumer finance company headquartered
in Greenville, South Carolina that offers short-term small loans,
medium-term larger loans, related credit insurance products and
ancillary products and services to individuals who have limited
access to other sources of consumer credit.  In U.S. branches, the
Company offers income tax return preparation services to its loan
customers and other individuals.


ZIONS BANCORPORATION: Evans v. CB&T Action Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Zions Bancorporation continues to defend against the case, Evans
v. CB&T, according to its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

The Company said, "a civil class action lawsuit, Evans v. CB&T,
brought against us in the Eastern District of California in May
2017. This case was filed on behalf of a class of up to 50
investors in IMG and seeks to hold us liable for losses of class
members arising from their investments in IMG, alleging that we
conspired with and knowingly assisted IMG and its principal in
furtherance of an alleged Ponzi Scheme."


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Marion
Alcestis A. Castillon, Ma. Cristina Canson, Noemi Irene A. Adala,
Joy A. Agravante, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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