CAR_Public/171024.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, October 24, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 210



                            Headlines

3M CO: Napoli Shkolnik Files Class Action over PFOA Contamination
ACCESS MIDSTREAM: "Flanagan" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
ALERE INC: Court Issues Supplement Briefing Schedule in "Andren"
AMERICAN MOTOR: Court Excludes Hansen Expert Report in TCPA Suit
APPLE INC: Justice Department's Views Sought in Antitrust Case

AT&T MOBILITY: Court Vacates Order Compelling Arbitration
AUSTRALIA: Queensland Builders Mull Class Action Against QBCC
AUSTRALIA: Katherine Residents File Water Crisis Class Action
AXA EQUITABLE: "Wenokur" Transferred to New York Court
BARMADON MANAGEMENT: Faces "Balderas" Suit Over Failure to Pay OT

BARSTOOL SPORTS: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Violation
BENJAMIN & BROTHERS: Faces "Marko" Class Suit in M.D. Florida
BRIGHTVIEW LANDSCAPES: Court Grants Final OK to Class Settlement
CALERES INC: Sued Over Americans With Disabilities Act Violation
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Ct. Rules on DDJR #5 in "Des Roches"

CANADA: Ruling in Indian Residential School Class Action Affirmed
CANADA: Mixed Feelings Expressed Over 60's Scoop Settlement
CONAGRA BRANDS: Must Face Cooking Oil Class Action, Court Rules
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: 11th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Reilly"
CITY NATIONAL BANK: Faces "Wilinsky" Class Suit in S.D. New York

COMMONWEALTH BANK: Money Laundering Class Action Face Hurdles
CUMBERLAND FARMS: Ct. Dismisses Opt-in Plaintiff in FLSA Suit
DANN MEYER: Faces Class Action Over No Tipping Conspiracy
DETROIT FREE: Four Female Photo Journalists File Pay Bias Suit
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Domino" Suit in S.D. Fla. Over FCRA Violation

EQUIFAX INC: Data Breach Settlement Estimated at $1 Billion
ESCALLATE: Illegally Collects Debt, "Bonti" Action Claims
FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Bid to Reconsider "Cryer" Class Cert. Denied
GENGHIS GRILL: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class Action
GLOBAL TEL*LINK: Court Denies Certification of ADTPA Class

GOOGLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in AdWords Smart Pricing Suit
GREEN PHARMA: Class Decertification in "Rosendez" Reversed
HILTON WORLDWIDE: Judge Tosses False Ad Class Action Settlement
HIRAKEGOMA INC: Faces "Garcia" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
HOBBY LOBBY: Court Narrows Claims in "Chase" Suit

HSN INC: Sued in Fla. Over Securities Exchange Act Violation
IMPERVA INC: Accused of Wrongful Conduct Over Debt Collection
JAMES SQUARE: Faces Class Action Over Poor Care of Residents
JMA ENERGY: 10th Cir. Affirms Remand of "Speed" to State Court
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Appeals Court Tosses $72MM Talcum Case Award

JPMORGAN CHASE: Faces Class Action Over Unupdated Credit Reports
KC TRANSPORT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Underwood" FLSA Suit
LLR INC: "Doran" Class Suit Removed to Cent. Dist. California
LLR INC: "Goodwin" Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
LULAROE LLC: "Dean" Class Suit Transferred to C.D. California

MANDALAY BAY: Las Vegas Shooting Suits May Face Challenges
MASSACHUSETTS: DUI Arrestees Sue Over Coercive Notice of Rights
MICHIGAN: MDOC Sued for Denying Kosher Meals to Jewish Prisoners
NATURE'S BOUNTY: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit
NAVIENT CORP: Faces Class Action Over FFELP Loans

NEINSTEIN & ASSOCIATES: Judge Declines to Certify Class Action
NEW JERSEY, USA: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Holland" Suit
NEW YORK: Faces "Lynch" Suit Over Civil Rights Act Violation
NEW YORK: DOC Sued in N.Y. Over Civil Rights Act Violation
NIMBLE STORAGE: Calif. Court Dismisses Securities Class Action

O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Appeals Order in Courtright Suit to 8th Cir.
OKLAHOMA: Faces Class Action Over Addiction Recovery Program
ON-LINE ADMINISTRATORS: Seeks Review of Ruling in "Trenz" Suit
ORLEANS PARISH, LA: Yarls Appeals M.D. La. Decision to 5th Cir.
PACIFIC GAS: California Wildfire Victims File Lawsuit

PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC: Must Face Concussion Class Action
PNC BANK: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Cruz" Securities Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bereket" Suit
PURDUE PHARMA: Judge Denies OxyContin Settlement Approval
QUINSTREET: Faces "Becker" Class Suit in S. Dist. Fla.

SASKATCHEWAN: Health Regions Face Sterilization Class Action
SEATTLE, WA: Court Denies Class Certification in "Hooper" Suit
SEATTLE, WA: Homeless Sweep Suit Denied Class-Action Status
SIGHTLINE MEDIA: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Violation
SLIDE FIRE: Eglet, Brady Center File Stock Bump Class Action

SONIC CORP: Faces "Lewin" Class Suit in W. Dist. Okla.
SOUTHEAST ALABAMA: Greenway Appeals Ruling in "Carrigan" Suit
STARLINE TOURS: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Award in "Ehm"
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NY: Sued Over Civil Rights Act Violation
SUN BANCORP: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action

SUSHI MARU: Kimm Appeals Order in "Ham" Suit to Second Circuit
SUTTER HEALTH: Calif. Court Allows Antitrust Suit to Proceed
TARSADIA HOTELS: Court Approves $51MM Settlement in "Beaver"
TENNYSON ELECTRIC: Court Denies Move to Dismiss ERISA Suit
TERRAVIA HOLDINGS: Securities Suit May Proceed v Non-Debtors

TESLA INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
TRANSPERFECT GLOBAL: Bid to Junk Amended "Sackin" Partly Granted
TV GUIDE: Court Denies 2nd Amended Bid to Dismiss "Hyman"
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Jan8 Safe Rides Fee Deal Opt-Out Deadline
UNION COUNTY: Court Denies Class Certification in "Reid" Suit

UNITED HEALTH: 8th Circuit Denies Coverage for $350MM Settlement
UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Injunction in Immigration Suit
UNITED STATES: Gambardella Appeals Decision in Class Suit vs. OPM
VALERO MKTG: Court Certifies Consumers Class in "Bautista"
VISIONWEB HOLDINGS: Faces Retina Class Suit in C.D. California

VITAQUEST: "Shoaf" Class Suit Removed to S. Dist. Calif.
VOGUE INTERNATIONAL: Faces "McBride" Class Suit in S.D. New York
WASHINGTON, USA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Haldane" Suit
WESTAR ENERGY: Wolf Popper Files Securities Class Action
WHOLE FOODS: Faces Class Action Over Taproom Data Breach

XOMA CORP: Calif. Court Dismisses Securities Suit

* 56% of Private-Sector Workers Subject to Mandatory Arbitration
* Arbitration Costs Lesser Than Class Action Litigation
* Business Groups File Suit to Challenge CFPB's Arbitration Rule
* Supreme Court to Decide on Legality of Class Action Waivers







                            *********


3M CO: Napoli Shkolnik Files Class Action over PFOA Contamination
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC on Oct. 11 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit against five manufacturers of aqueous
firefighting foams ("AFFF") containing perfluorooctanesulfonic
acid ("PFOS") and perfluorooctanoic acid ("PFOA") for the
contamination of the groundwater relied upon by the residents of
Yaphank, New York.  The class action complaint was filed in the
Supreme Court for the State of New York, Suffolk County, and names
The 3M Company, Tyco Fire Products L.P., Buckeye Fire Protection
Co., National Foam, Chemguard, and others as Defendants.

The class action complaint alleges that plaintiffs and other
similarly situated residents of the Yaphank area have been exposed
to high levels of perfluorinated compounds (PFCs), and are now at
an increased risk of several health effects, including effects on
the liver and the immune system, high cholesterol, changes in
thyroid hormone, as well as kidney and other cancers. The
complaint also states that property values in the area have
dropped as a result of the contamination.

Since 1959, the Suffolk County Firematics Training Facility on
Pine Street in Yaphank, conducted firefighting training drills
using AFFF firefighting foam containing PFCs.  The class action
complaint further alleges that Suffolk County carelessly
discharged PFCs into the surrounding environment, contaminating
the groundwater and water supply in Yaphank.  The AFFF used at
Suffolk County Firematics Training Facility manufactured by the
Defendants has been linked to the contamination of surface and
groundwater with PFCs throughout the country.

"It is just another example of this fire-fighting foam popping up
in public water supplies and negatively impacting residents and
the community as a whole," said Paul Napoli, one of the attorneys
who filed the class action.

In May of 2017, New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYSDEC) declared the Suffolk County Firematics
Training Facility a Class 2 Superfund Site that presents a
significant threat to public health and/or the environment.  The
NYSDEC has recommended a full remedial investigation at the
Training Site and surrounding area in Yaphank in order to
determine the full extent and magnitude of the PFOS/PFOA
contamination.

Studies show an association between increased PFOA blood levels
and increased risks for several health effects in children (for
example, effects on birth weight, cognitive and behavioral
development, immune function, and cholesterol levels).

"We think it is time to hold these manufacturers accountable for
the harm their products have caused so many communities locally
and across the country," said Napoli Shkolnik environmental
litigator Patrick J. Lanciotti.

If you own property in Yaphank, New York, or have been diagnosed
with testicular cancer, kidney cancer, liver or thyroid disease,
high cholesterol, or high blood pressure that may be the result of
your exposure to PFOA or PFOS, you may be able to recover damages.
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC is ready to help those who pursue personal
injury and property claims related to PFC contamination in
Yaphank.

                        About the Firm

Napoli Shkolnik PLLC -- http://www.NapoliLaw.com-- is a national
litigation firm providing representation to persons in class
action lawsuits and complex commercial cases, as well as victims
of environmental contamination disasters, aviation accidents,
defective prescriptions drugs and medical devices, asbestos-
related illnesses, and other serious personal injury matters.
With their principal offices in New York City and additional
offices in California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Texas, as well as affiliates throughout the
United States, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC is readily available to
clients. [GN]


ACCESS MIDSTREAM: "Flanagan" Class Suit Transferred to N.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on June 2, 2017 entitled Teri
Flanagan, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. Access Midstream Partners LP, Chesapeake Energy Corporation,
Chesapeake Operating LLC, Chesapeake Exploration L.L.C.,
Chesapeake Energy Marketing Inc., Chesapeake Midstream Partners
LP, and Total E&P USA Inc., Case No. 4:17-cv-00315, was
transferred on October 2, 2017, from the District of Oklahoma
Northern to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:17-cv-00786-O
to the proceeding.

Access Midstream Partners LP is a natural gas and liquids
infrastructure provider focused on owning, operating, developing
and acquiring midstream energy assets in the United States.

Chesapeake Energy Corporation, Chesapeake Operating LLC,
Chesapeake Exploration L.L.C., Chesapeake Energy Marketing Inc.,
and Chesapeake Midstream Partners LP operate a petroleum and
natural gas exploration and production company headquartered in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Total E&P USA Inc. engages in oil and natural gas exploration and
production. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Charles Robert Burton IV, Esq.
      BURTON LAW FIRM PC
      15 E 5th St., Suite 4022
      Tulsa, OK 74103-4347
      Telephone: (918) 607-4891
      E-mail: RobtBurton@aol.com

         - and -

      Donald H. Ray, Esq.
      RAY & WILSON
      6300 Ridglea Place, Suite 1008
      Fort Worth, TX 76116-5736
      Telephone: (817) 377-0500
      Facsimile: (817) 377-1232
      E-mail: dray@rayandwilson.com

         - and -

      J Jeffrey Springer, Esq.
      SPRINGER & LYLE LLP
      1807 Westminster
      Denton, TX 76205
      Telephone: (940) 387-0404
      Facsimile: (940) 383-7656
      E-mail: jeff@springer-lyle.com

         - and -

      Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
      REX A. SHARP, P.A.
      5301 W 75th Street
      Prairie Village, KS 66208
      Telephone: (913) 901-0500
      Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
      E-mail: rsharp@midwest-law.com

The Defendant Access Midstream Partners LP is represented by:

      Jay K. Wieser, Esq.
      JACKSON WALKER LLP
      777 Main Street, Suite 2100
      Fort Worth, TX 76102
      Telephone: (817) 334-7249
      Facsimile: (817) 870-5107
      E-mail: jwieser@jw.com
         - and -

      Joseph A. Fischer III, Esq.
      JACKSON WALKER LLP
      1401 McKinney St., Suite 1900
      Houston, TX 77010-1900
      Telephone: (713) 752-4530
      Facsimile: (713) 308-4130
      E-mail: tfischer@jw.com

         - and -

      Michael James Gibbens, Esq.
      CROWE & DUNLEVY
      321 S. Boston Ave., Suite 500
      Tulsa, OK 74103-3313
      Telephone: (918) 592-9800
      Facsimile: (918) 592-9801
      E-mail: gibbensm@crowedunlevy.com

The Defendant Chesapeake Energy Corporation is represented by:

      Charles D. Neal Jr., Esq.
      Stacie Lynn Hixon, Esq.
      STEIDLEY & NEAL
      2448 E 81st St., Floor 53
      Tulsa, OK 74137
      Telephone: (918) 664-4612
      Facsimile: (918) 664-4133
      E-mail: cdn@steidley-neal.com
              slh@steidley-neal.com

         - and -

      Craig A. Haynes, Esq.
      Greg W. Curry, Esq.
      Rachelle H. Glazer, Esq.
      THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP
      1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500
      Dallas, TX 75201-2533
      Telephone: (214) 969-1239
      Facsimile: (214) 969-2538
      E-mail: craig.haynes@tklaw.com
              greg.curry@tklaw.com
              rachelle.glazer@tklaw.com

         - and -

       Jennifer P. Henry, Esq.
       THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP
       801 Cherry Street, Unit #1
       Fort Worth, TX 76107
       Telephone: (817) 347-1700
       Facsimile: (817) 347-1799
       E-mail: jennifer.henry@tklaw.com

The Defendant Total E&P USA Inc. is represented by:

       Christopher A. Brown, Esq.
       WINSTEAD PC
       500 Winstead Building
       2728 N Harwood Street
       Dallas, TX 75201
       Telephone: (214) 745-5400
       Facsimile: (214) 745-5390
       E-mail: cabrown@winstead.com

          - and -

      David H. Ammons, Esq.
      WINSTEAD PC
      600 Travis Street, Suite 1100
      Houston, TX 77002
      Telephone: (713) 650-2692
      Facsimile: (713) 650-2400
      E-mail: dammons@winstead.com

         - and -

      Jeffrey C. King, Esq.
      WINDSTEAD PC
      300 Throckmorton Street, Suite 1700
      Fort Worth, TX 76102
      Telephone: (817) 420-8200
      Facsimile: (817) 420-8201
      E-mail: jking@winstead.com

         - and -

      Mark Banner, Esq.
      HALL ESTILL
      320 S Boston Ave., Suite 200
      Tulsa, OK 74103-3708
      Telephone: (918) 594-0400
      Facsimile: (918) 594-0505
      E-mail: mbanner@hallestill.com


ALERE INC: Court Issues Supplement Briefing Schedule in "Andren"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District
California issued an Order Setting Supplemental Briefing Schedule
in the case captioned DINA ANDREN, SIDNEY BLUDMAN, VIRGINIA
CIOFFI, BERNARD FALK, JEANETTE KERZNER-GREEN, CAROL MONTALBANO,
and DONALD RIGOT, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALERE, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, ALERE HOME MONITORING, INC., a Delaware
corporation, ALERE SAN DIEGO, INCA., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 16cv1255-GPC(AGS) (S.D. Cal.).

The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. One key issue is the adequacy of Plaintiffs to
represent the class based on their pursuit of economic damages and
not personal injury damages. Defendant claims they are improperly
claim-splitting while Plaintiffs disagree. If claims are split,
there is a question as to the res judicata/collateral estoppel
effect of a determination in this case on personal injury claims
should a class member seek personal injury damages in future
litigation. The parties' briefing does not adequately address the
complexities and intricacies of this issue. At the hearing, the
parties, without any legal support, offered their views on this
question.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet considered claim-splitting on a
motion for class certification. In a recent case, the Fifth
Circuit addressed claim splitting in a class action case and
provided factors that the District Court finds relevant. Slade v.
Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2017),
deciding whether a class representative's decision to forego
certain claims defeats adequacy requires an inquiry into, at
least: (1) the risk that unnamed class members will forfeit their
right to pursue the waived claim in future litigation, (2) the
value of the waived claim, and (3) the strategic value of the
waiver, which can include the value of proceeding as a class (if
the waiver is key to certification.

The Court directs the parties to provide additional briefing on
the issue of claim-splitting and to address the factors raised by
the Fifth Circuit with legal authority and evidentiary support.

Accordingly, the Court directes the Plaintiff to file a
supplemental brief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ydezce8xfrom Leagle.com.

Dina Andren, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, 15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1600, Encino Plaza, Encino,
CA 91436

Dina Andren, Plaintiff, represented by Roland K. Tellis --
rtellis@baronbudd.com --  Baron Budd P.C., Thomas Joseph
O'Reardon, II -- toreardon@bholaw.com --  Blood Hurst & O'Reardon
LLP, Timothy Gordon Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com --  Blood Hurst &
O'Reardon LLP & Peter B. Klausner- peter.klausner.esq@gmail.com --
Baron & Budd, PC.

Sidney Bludman, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, Roland K. Tellis, Baron Budd P.C., Thomas Joseph O'Reardon,
II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst
& O'Reardon LLP & Peter B. Klausner, Baron & Budd, PC.

Virginia Cioffi, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP &
Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP.

Bernard Falk, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP &
Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP.

Jeanette Kerzner-Green, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko,
Baron & Budd, Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon
LLP & Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP.

Carol Montalbano, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP &
Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP.

Donald Rigot, Plaintiff, represented by Mark P. Pifko, Baron &
Budd, Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP &
Timothy Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP.

Alere Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony John Anscombe --
anthony.anscombe@sdma.com --  Sedgwick LLP, Darlene K. Alt,
Sedgwick LLP, pro hac vice, Dennis Francis Murphy --
dennis.murphy@squirepb.com  --  Sedgwick LLP, Mary E. Buckley,
Sedgwick LLP, pro hac vice & Stephanie Sheridan, Sedgwick Detert
Moran and Arnold.

Alere Home Monitoring, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony
John Anscombe, Sedgwick LLP, Darlene K. Alt, Sedgwick LLP, pro hac
vice, Dennis Francis Murphy, Sedgwick LLP, Mary E. Buckley,
Sedgwick LLP, pro hac vice & Stephanie Sheridan, Sedgwick Detert
Moran and Arnold.

Alere San Diego, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony John
Anscombe, Sedgwick LLP, Darlene K. Alt, Sedgwick LLP, pro hac
vice, Dennis Francis Murphy, Sedgwick LLP, Mary E. Buckley,
Sedgwick LLP, pro hac vice & Stephanie Sheridan, Sedgwick Detert
Moran and Arnold.


AMERICAN MOTOR: Court Excludes Hansen Expert Report in TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Plaintiff's Expert Report, Supplemental Report and the Testimony
of Jeffrey Hansen in the case captioned RAY MOHAMED, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
AMERICAN MOTOR COMPANY, LLC, a Florida limited liability company
doing business as instantcaroffer.com doing business as ICO and
OFF LEASE ONLY, INC., a Florida corporation, Defendants, Case No.
15-23352-Civ-COOKE/TORRES (S.D. Fla.).

Defendant Off Lease Only, Inc.'s Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's
Expert Report, Supplemental Report and the Testimony of Jeffrey
Hansen.

Plaintiff Ray Mohamed initiated this action by filing a putative
class action complaint against Defendants Thomas Rowe, American
Motor Company d/b/a Instant Car Offer (ICO)2 and Off Lease Only,
Inc. (OLO) for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA).  The TCPA makes it illegal to call any
telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an
automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS).

Mr. Hansen is qualified to provide an expert opinion on ATDS
issues.  Mr. Hansen is the principal of Hansen Legal Technologies,
Inc., a firm dealing in Information Technology, including
investigations and analysis of electronic data. Mr. Hansen has
served as an expert in over 150 TCPA cases, including
approximately 30 civil cases over the past four years. He
frequently acts as a consultant to companies that use autodialers,
is familiar with their use and procedures, and has assembled,
configured, maintained, and operated all aspects of autodialers,
as well as interfaced with the telecommunications providers
through whose networks the autodialers operate.

In fact, Mr. Hansen has been qualified as an expert in many TCPA
cases, specifically in a TCPA case in the Southern District of
Florida cited to by Defendant, the Court pointed out.  Mr.
Hansen's extensive experience in set up and maintenance of
predictive dialers and autodialers, consulting on these issues,
and providing advice on these matters is more than sufficient to
qualify him to testify competently as to the subject matter he
intends to address.

OLO next argues that Mr. Hansen's testimony should be excluded
because it is unreliable, as Mr. Hansen did not test, review, or
inspect the actual platform or system before rendering his
opinion.

The Plaintiff's attempts to bolster the basis of Mr. Hansens'
report by citing a number of cases that supposedly support the
position that an expert in a TCPA case need not physically inspect
or test the system to have an adequate basis on which to form his
opinion. Unfortunately, in the cases cited by Plaintiff, none of
the experts were being challenged under a Daubert standard and the
cases are otherwise distinguishable from the facts of this case.
In both Satterfield and Sherman, the posture of both cases was
that of summary judgment and neither case actually mentions
whether the system had been physically inspected or not.

In Hunt v. 21st Mortg. Corp., 2014 WL 1664288 (N.D. Ala. April 25,
2014), the expert was unable to view the system because it had
been dismantled after initiation of the lawsuit; however, the
expert did not ultimately testify about whether the system used
was an ATDS, but instead opined about the incongruities with the
Defendant's alleged low-tech dialing methods and other call
centers the expert had seen. None of these cases support
Plaintiff's position that Mr. Hansen has based his opinion on
adequate facts, especially in light of Mr. Hansen's extensive
review of patents and documents in at least one other case.
Strauss v. CBE Group, Inc., 2016 WL 264196.

Allowing Mr. Hansen's expert report or testimony before the jury
would be contrary to the standards of reliability required under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert standard.

Mr. Hansen's calculations concerning the number of text messages
sent.

Plaintiff specifies in its Response to OLO's Motion to Exclude
that Mr. Hansen's Supplemental Written Report (Supplemental
Report) is for class certification purposes only and not for use
at trial. The Honorable Edwin G. Torres held a lengthy evidentiary
hearing related to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification and
ultimately did not rely on Mr. Hansen's Supplemental Written
Report in certifying the class. See Report and Recommendation on
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, referencing many
exhibits on the record but not the Supplemental Report  I
partially adopted Judge Torres' Report and Recommendation and did
not rely Mr. Hansen's Supplemental Report in my de novo review of
the record based on the Parties' objections to the Report and
Recommendation.

Because the Court did not rely on the Supplemental Report in its
rulings on class certification, it will not conduct a Daubert
analysis on its admissibility.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya23yja2from Leagle.com.

Ray Mohamed, Plaintiff, represented by Bret Leon Lusskin, Jr.,
Bret Lusskin, P.A., 1001 North Federal Highway Suite,  106
Hallandale, FL 33009

Ray Mohamed, Plaintiff, represented by Manuel Santiago Hiraldo,
Hiraldo P.A., 01 E Las Olas Blvd Ste 1400. Fort Lauderdale, FL
33301-2218, Patrick Christopher Crotty, The Law Office of Scott D.
Owens, Sean Martin Holas, Scott D. Owens, P.A., 3800 S Ocean Dr
Ste 235, Hollywood, FL, 33019-2930, Seth Michael Lehrman --
seth@pathtojustice.com --  Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards,
Fistos & Lehrman, P.L., Steven R. Jaffe -- steve@pathtojustice.com
-- Farmer Jaffe Weissing Edwards Fistos & Lehrman PL & Scott David
Owens -- scott@ScottDOwens.com -- SCOTT D. OWENS, P.A..

Off Lease Only, Inc., Defendant, represented by Franklin Lewis
Zemel -- franklin.zemel@arnstein.com -- Saul Ewing Arnstein &
Lehr, LLP, Alan Richard Poppe -- APope@arnstein.com -- Saul Ewing
Arnstein & Lehr LLP & Rebecca Ann Radosevich, 600 W Hillsboro
Blvd, Ste 220, Deerfield Beach, FL 33441-1610

Ian Crabtree, Material Witness, represented by Alan Richard Poppe,
Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP.

Michael Crabtree, Material Witness, represented by Alan Richard
Poppe, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP.

Off Lease Only, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Franklin
Lewis Zemel, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr, LLP, Alan Richard Poppe,
Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP & Rebecca Ann Radosevich.


APPLE INC: Justice Department's Views Sought in Antitrust Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Chung, writing for Reuters, reports that the U.S. Supreme
Court on Oct. 10 asked the Trump administration for its views on
whether to hear Apple Inc's bid to avoid a class-action lawsuit
accusing the tech giant of inflating consumer prices by charging
illegally high commissions on iPhone software sales through its
App Store.

The justices are considering whether to take up Apple's appeal of
a lower court ruling that allowed the proposed class-action suit
alleging it violated federal antitrust law to proceed.  Apple said
the case should be thrown out because only developers of the apps
who were charged the commissions, not consumers, should be
entitled to bring such a suit.  Apple charges app developers a 30
percent commission on App Store consumer purchases.

The Justice Department will provide the high court with its stance
on the matter.

The dispute could have a major impact on electronic commerce,
which has seen explosive growth, with $390 billion in U.S. retail
sales last year alone.

Electronic marketplaces like the App Store, ticket site StubHub,
Amazon's Marketplace and eBay where individual sellers set prices
rather than the marketplace itself potentially could be sued by
consumers.

The antitrust claims date back to a 2011 lawsuit filed by several
iPhone buyers in California federal court, including lead
plaintiff Robert Pepper of Chicago, according to court papers.
They allege that Cupertino, California-based Apple has monopolized
the sale of apps like messaging programs and games, leading to
inflated prices.

The company has sought to have the antitrust claims dismissed,
saying the plaintiffs did not have legal standing to bring the
case because they are not charged the commission.

The plaintiffs countered that they, not the developers, pay Apple
for apps at prices that include the commission, which they called
a "monopolistic surcharge."

The San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
January sided with the plaintiffs, ruling that because consumers
directly bought products from Apple they were entitled to sue.
[GN]


AT&T MOBILITY: Court Vacates Order Compelling Arbitration
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and
Vacating Arbitral Award in the case captioned STEVEN McARDLE,
Plaintiff, v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC; NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS LLC;
and NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 09-
cv-01117-CW (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Steven McArdle has moved to vacate the arbitral award
and to reconsider the Court's order compelling arbitration.
Defendants have filed a cross-motion to confirm the award.

Defendants provide cellular telephone services. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants deceptively charged exorbitant international
roaming fees for calls that customers did not answer, voicemail
they did not check, and calls they did not place. He asserts
claims under California law, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, for false advertising, fraud, and violation of
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law
(UCL).

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court's order
compelling arbitration. A party who shows reasonable diligence in
bringing the motion may seek reconsideration of an interlocutory
order based on a change of law occurring after the time of such
order. Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff's diligence in bringing
the motion promptly after McGill v. Citibank, 345 P.3d 61 (Cal.
Apr. 1, 2015), was decided.

McGill's holding that predispute waivers of public injunctive
relief are contrary to California public policy is binding on this
Court. In interpreting state law, federal courts are bound by the
pronouncements of the state's highest court. It represents a
significant change in California law that occurred after this
Court's order compelling arbitration. Judgment has not been
entered in this case, and the Court may reconsider its
interlocutory order compelling arbitration. As long as a district
court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the
inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an
interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient
Accordingly, the Court must examine whether the referral to
arbitration was correct.

On the question of whether the FAA pre-empts the McGill rule, the
Court owes no deference to the state court, and follows federal
law.  If the FAA pre-empted McGill, then no reconsideration of the
Court's prior order compelling arbitration would be warranted, and
the Court would proceed to review the arbitral award. The Court
finds, however, that the FAA does not pre-empt McGill.

In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., 803 F.3d 425, the court
concluded that the potential high stakes of a claim, alone, do not
interfere with arbitration because the parties are free to
contract for whatever formal or informal procedures they choose to
handle the claim. The FAA was not "intended to require courts to
enforce agreements that severely limit the right to recover
penalties for violations that did not directly harm the party
bringing the action.

The same analysis applies here, with equal force. The McGill rule
is a generally-applicable contract defense.  Moreover, claims for
public injunctive relief do not require burdensome procedures that
could stand as an obstacle to FAA arbitration. On the contrary,
the parties are free to contract for any procedures they choose
for arbitrating, or litigating, public injunctive relief claims.
Therefore, the FAA does not pre-empt California's McGill rule.

It would, of course, have been permissible for the parties to
agree to an arbitration provision that was limited in this way.
They did not do so, however. The contract as actually written
declares the entire arbitration provision null and void because
the waiver of public injunctive relief is unenforceable. The Court
notes that although the parties need not have agreed to so broad a
poison pill, there was reason for them to do so. The FAA
contemplates that parties may simply agree ex ante to litigate
high stakes claims if they find arbitration's informal procedures
unsuitable.

The McGill rule constitutes a change in controlling law and is not
pre-empted by the FAA. The waiver of public injunctive relief in
subsection 2.2(6) of the parties' agreement is therefore
unenforceable, and this triggers the poison pill rendering the
entire arbitration provision null and void. The Court must
therefore grant reconsideration of, and rescind order compelling
arbitration and vacate the arbitral award.

Because the Court reconsiders the order granting Defendants'
renewed motion to compel arbitration and stay this action,
rescinds its prior order compelling arbitration and vacates the
arbitral award, the Court denies as moot Plaintiff's motion to
vacate the award under 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a)(3) and (4). The
Court also denies Defendants' motion to confirm the award. By this
decision, the Court does not reach or review the merits of the
arbitrator's decision.

Defendants contend that the FAA statutorily bars Plaintiff's
attempt to evade confirmation of a final arbitration award through
reconsideration of this Court's order compelling arbitration.

The issue here is different. The arbitrator was not the one to
conclude that Plaintiff's waiver of public injunctive relief
claims was enforceable; it was this Court that made that ruling in
the order compelling arbitration. The Court therefore does not
review the arbitrator's decision under the FAA, but rather,
reconsiders its own interlocutory order. As discussed, the Court's
order compelling arbitration was erroneous in light of the
subsequent decisions in McGill and Sakkab, and must be rescinded.
The Court, therefore, vacates the arbitral award without reviewing
its merits under the FAA.

For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration, rescinds that
prior order, and vacates the arbitral award. The Court denies as
moot Plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitral award and denies
Defendants' cross-motion to confirm the arbitral award. The Court
also grants Defendants' administrative motion for leave to file a
statement of recent decision.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 2, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9j4hs3vfrom Leagle.com.

Steven McArdle, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride --
adam@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Steven McArdle, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Adam Safier --
seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP & Kristen Gelinas
Simplicio -- kmgsimplicio@gmail.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

AT&T Mobility LLC, Defendant, represented by John Nadolenco --
jnadolenco@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Andrew John Pincus -
- apincus@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Archis Ashok
Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro
hac vice, Donald M. Falk -- dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown
LLP & Kevin Ranlett -- kranlett@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
pro hac vice.

New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, Defendant, represented by John
Nadolenco, Mayer Brown LLP, Andrew John Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP,
Archis Ashok Parasharami, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice & Kevin
Ranlett, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice.

New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
John Nadolenco, Mayer Brown LLP, Andrew John Pincus, Mayer Brown
LLP, Archis Ashok Parasharami, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice &
Kevin Ranlett, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice.


AUSTRALIA: Queensland Builders Mull Class Action Against QBCC
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Herde and Anthony Marx, writing for The Courier-Mail, report
that Queensland builders are planning to launch a class action
against the state's construction industry watchdog over what they
claim is heavy-handed oversight that has destroyed businesses.

Small to medium-sized building firms are aiming to meet in
Brisbane as the first step in lobbing the legal grenade at the
Queensland Building and Construction Commission.

The aggrieved parties will be chasing an unspecified damages bill,
certain to run in to the millions of dollars.

They also want to see sweeping industry reforms and the
reinstatement of licences revoked "unfairly''.

The looming Federal Court action, believed to the first in the
nation against such a state regulator, has been spearheaded by
self-styled "professional advocate" Susie Bennell.

Ms. Bennell, the Sydney-based former manager of champion boxer
Kostya Tszyu, told Business Confidential on Oct. 9 she had already
convened one meeting that drew about 20 interested parties.

"If the QBCC continues along its lines of just wiping out
builders, liquidating their companies for a whole gamut of reasons
and not addressing reforms, there will no longer be long-term
builders,'' she said.

Despite the barely contained rage over aggressive policing of the
sector, Housing Minister Mick De Brenni intends to double down on
his support of the commission.

He wants to give regulators even greater powers to take on dodgy
builders in a bid to protect subcontractors and homeowners.

Mr. De Brenni's controversial plan to mandate the use of trust
accounts to stop builders shafting their subbies has already drawn
the fierce criticism of peak industry groups.

Indeed, Master Builders Queensland, making no secret of their
displeasure with Mr. De Brenni, have even rented billboard space
on the M1 to drive home the point. [GN]


AUSTRALIA: Katherine Residents File Water Crisis Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that a class action has
been launched on behalf of Katherine residents affected by a water
contamination crisis.

Maddens Lawyers says the Defence Department could be liable after
the town's water was polluted by toxic chemicals found in
firefighting foam.

The Northern Territory government has deflected calls for free
blood tests of Katherine residents concerned about contamination
of the town's water supply, and is lobbying the Commonwealth
instead.

The demands come amid local outrage following the Defence
department's admission to the ABC that there's been misuse of
toxic firefighting foam on army sites for decades.

Up to 18 bases around Australia are being investigated in relation
to chemical pollutants that can leach into groundwater, including
the RAAF Tindal site close to Katherine.

Chief Minister Michael Gunner reassured locals that Labor "is
doing everything we can to support them" but said Defence must be
held accountable to fix the legacy issue.

Mr Gunner says he's written to the Coalition multiple times asking
for Katherine residents to be given access to tests, counselling
and inclusion in the national epidemiology study.

"We see no need to wait for the conclusion of the Defence
environmental investigation," Mr Gunner said.

"I implore the NT opposition to ask their federal counterpart
Nigel Scullion -- who has a direct line to the Defence minister
-- to do what is right by the residents of Katherine."

The federal government is providing alternative drinking water to
about 50 local homes and Katherine has water restrictions in place
ahead of the instalment of a treatment plant later this year.

Even the public pool was closed after the water was found to
contain 15 times the safe level of contaminants, and locals are
keen to launch a class action for compensation.

Country Liberals Party deputy leader Lia Finocchiaro says
Katherine residents are right to be concerned.

"The very clear message out of Katherine is that residents want to
be tested and government should act on this," she said.

"The Northern Territory Department of Health has the capacity to
conduct tests and the costs can be passed on to the Department of
Defence."

Defence has taken samples of soil, animals and surface and
groundwater in the region and the results will be released early
next year.

Colleen Cardinal, cofounder of the National Indigenous Survivors
of Child Welfare Network, said she had "very mixed feelings" about
the settlement, in part since so many survivors are excluded. [GN]


AXA EQUITABLE: "Wenokur" Transferred to New York Court
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue of
the case captioned Jeremy Wenokur, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AXA
Equitable Life Insurance Company, Defendant, No. CV-17-00165-PHX-
DLR (D. Ariz.).

At issue is AXA's Motion to Transfer Venue or, in the Alternative,
to dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint to the
extent Plaintiffs claim an alleged breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

Plaintiffs allege that AXA unlawfully increased their COI rates.
Specifically, AXA announced that it would increase the COI rates
from AUL II policies with issue ages of 70 or older and with
current face amounts of $1 million and higher (COI Increase). AXA
attributed the COI Increase to less favorable future mortality and
investment experience over the past few years.

Plaintiffs initiated this action asserting two causes of action.
Count I alleges that AXA materially breached the AUL II policies
by increasing COI rates inequitably and based on factors not
listed in the policies. Count II alleges that, by increasing the
COI rates based on an unreasonable interpretation of the AUL II
policies, AXA violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

Almost a year before Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit, Brach
brought suit against AXA in the Southern District of New York,
asserting breach of contract and misrepresentation in violation of
New York Insurance Law, Section 4226. According to its Second
Amended Complaint, Brach is the owner of an AUL II policy that was
subject to the COI Increase and seeks to represent all similarly
situated owners of life insurance policies issued by AXA. Two
separate actions arising out of the COI Increase originally filed
against AXA in the Central District of California have since been
transferred to the Southern District of New York.

AXA moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404 and Rules 12(b)(2)
and 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to transfer
venue to the Southern District of New York. Alternatively, AXA
moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint to the extent Plaintiffs claim an alleged breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because
the Court finds that a transfer of venue to the Southern District
of New York is appropriate, it need not address Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(b)(3) and will reserve judgment on the Rule 12(b)(6) question.

For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the
interests of justice, 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) allows a district
court to transfer a civil action to any district in which the case
originally could have been brought. Section 1404(a) therefore
requires the Court to make two findings: (1) the transferee court
is one in which the case could have been brought and (2) the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice favor transfer.

AXA is incorporated and headquartered in New York, and admits that
it is subject to personal jurisdiction there. AXA therefore argues
that Plaintiffs could have brought this action in the Southern
District of New York because AXA resides there for venue purposes.
The Court agrees. This case could have been brought in the
Southern District of New York because AXA is subject to personal
jurisdiction there.

On balance, the Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of
transfer.

As to the first factor, Plaintiffs allege that AXA violated the
AUL II policies, which were issued in Arizona as part of the
Wenokur Policy and in Florida as part of the SLT Policy. Though
the parties do not agree on where the policies were negotiated and
executed, it is reasonable to infer that these activities occurred
either in Arizona or Florida, where the two policies were issued,
or in New York, where AXA is incorporated and headquartered.

Accordingly, the Court finds this factor of little importance.

The second factor is neutral. Only Wenokur's claims are governed
by Arizona state law. SLT's claims are governed by Florida state
law. Although this Court might be more familiar with Arizona law
than the Southern District of New York, there is no reason to
believe it is more familiar with Florida law. Federal courts
routinely are tasked with applying the laws of other states.
Moreover, because this is a putative nationwide class action for
breach of contract, many states' laws are likely to apply.
Nothing about this factor suggests that the Southern District of
New York would be a less convenient forum.

The third factor will almost always weigh against a transfer of
venue. Plaintiffs chose to litigate in Arizona and courts do not
lightly disturb a plaintiff's choice of forum.  Although this
factor is generally given significant weight, it is afforded less
deference when, as here, the action is brought as a nationwide
putative class action.  Moreover, a plaintiff's choice is also
given less deference when the plaintiff resides outside of the
chosen forum.  Here, neither Plaintiff resides in Arizona, Wenokur
resides in Utah, and SLT is incorporated in Delaware with its
headquarters in Maryland. Under these circumstances, the Court
affords the Plaintiffs' choice of forum minimal weight.

The fourth and fifth factors which pertain to the parties'
contacts with the forum, generally and in connection with the
specific cause of action weigh in favor of transfer. Plaintiffs
allege that because AXA did business totaling approximately $10
million in Arizona it has significant contacts with the forum.
Plaintiffs allege that because AXA did business totaling
approximately $10 million in Arizona it has significant contacts
with the forum. Although Plaintiffs have demonstrated that AXA has
some contacts with Arizona, Plaintiffs' showing is insufficient to
outweigh AXA's significantly greater contacts with New York, which
yields $162 million.

Finally, the sixth through eighth factors also weigh in favor of
transfer. Plaintiffs contend that litigating this matter in New
York would merely shift the costs of litigation from AXA to
Wenokur because Plaintiffs and any witnesses likely would need to
travel to trial in New York. If Plaintiffs resided in Arizona, the
Court might agree. But Plaintiffs would need to travel even if the
case were tried in Arizona because they both reside out of state.

Importantly, the convenience factors enumerated by the Ninth
Circuit are not exhaustive, nor are they relevant to all cases.
Instead, courts have discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer
according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness. In addition to considering the
convenience to the parties and witnesses, courts must assess
whether the interests of justice would be served by a transfer of
venue. Such is the case here because trying this matter and the
New York Litigation separately will needlessly duplicate judicial
resources and present the risk of conflicting results.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 2, 2017 Order is
available at from http://tinyurl.com/y7kod3okfrom Leagle.com.

Jeremy Wenokur, Plaintiff, represented by Deborah Kravitz --
dkravitz@kamberlaw.com -- Kamber Law LLP.

Jeremy Wenokur, Plaintiff, represented by Leonard W. Aragon --
leonard@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Michael
Aschenbrener -- masch@kamberlaw.com -- Kamber Law LLC, Robert B.
Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP &
Scott A. Kamber, Kamber Law LLC.

Secondary Life Three LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Deborah
Kravitz, Kamber Law LLP, Leonard W. Aragon, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, Michael Aschenbrener, Kamber Law LLC, Robert B.
Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Scott A. Kamber, Kamber
Law LLC.

AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Brian Andrew Cabianca, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,  1 East
Washington StreetSuite 2700Phoenix, AZ 85004, David R. Gelfand --
dgelfand@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP, Gregory
Sumner Schneider, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, 1 East Washington
StreetSuite 2700Phoenix, AZ 85004, Jerry L. Marks --
jmarks@milbank.com -Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP & Stacey J.
Rappaport -- srappaport@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed Hadley &
McCloy LLP.


BARMADON MANAGEMENT: Faces "Balderas" Suit Over Failure to Pay OT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Artemio Perez Balderas, on behalf of others similarly situated v.
Barmadon Management LLC d/b/a Barmadon Management, Silvershore
Properties LLC d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore
Properties 102 LLC d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore
Properties 41 LLC d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore
Properties 70 LLC d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Myrtle
LLC d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 10 LLC
d/b/a Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 120 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 95 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 100 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 110 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 51 LLC
d/b/aSilvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 50 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 42 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 83 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, Silvershore Properties 17 LLC d/b/a
Silvershore Properties, 5416-5422 4th Avenue LLC d/b/a Silvershore
Properties, Silvershore Properties 77 LLC d/b/a Silvershore
Properties, David Shorenstein, Jason Silverstein, Johnathan Cohen,
and Mike Doe, Case No. 1:17-cv-07489 (S.D.N.Y., October 1, 2017),
is brought against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime
wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants own and operate a real estate agency in New York
City, New York. [BN]

Artemio Perez Balderas is a pro se plaintiff.


BARSTOOL SPORTS: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Phillip Sullivan Jr., on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Barstool Sports, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-
07457 (S.D.N.Y., October 1, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Barstool Sports, Inc. owns and operates a sports blogging Website
that allows users to post and share blogs related to sports. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 465-1188
      Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
      E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com

BENJAMIN & BROTHERS: Faces "Marko" Class Suit in M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against Benjamin &
Brothers, LLC d/b/a Reservations.com.

The case is captioned Michael Marko and Mike's Inc., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Benjamin &
Brothers, LLC d/b/a Reservations.com, Case No. 6:17-cv-01725-CEM-
GJK (M.D. Fla., October 4, 2017).

Benjamin & Brothers, LLC operates a travel agency industry located
in Orlando, FL. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason Kyle Whittemore, Esq.
      WAGNER, VAUGHAN & MCLAUGHLIN, PA
      Suite 910, 601 Bayshore Blvd.
      Tampa, FL 33606
      Telephone: (813) 225-4000
      Facsimile: (813) 225-4010
      E-mail: jason@wagnerlaw.com


BRIGHTVIEW LANDSCAPES: Court Grants Final OK to Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Final Approval of the Parties Amended Settlement
Agreement and Motion for Attorneys' Fees in the case captioned
JONATHAN AMADOR ACEVEDO, MITCHELL BRATTON, JEREMY BUSSE, STEPHEN
PULLUM, ERIC MIGDOL, and JOSE GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BRIGHTVIEW
LANDSCAPES, LLC, (f/k/a/ THE BRICKMAN GROUP LTD. LLC), Defendant,
Civil Action No. 3:13-2529 (M.D. Pa.).

Currently before the court are the named plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for final approval of the parties amended settlement
agreement and the named plaintiffs' unopposed motion for
attorneys' fees.

This action is a putative class action against the defendant,
BrightView Landscapes, LLC, formerly known as The Brickman LTD.
LLC., under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section (FLSA)
and state wage and hour laws across twenty-seven states,
specifically, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
The named plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the
defendant could not use the FWW method to compute overtime for
hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek under 29 C.F.R. Section
778.114 because the class members' salaries were not fixed, a
requirement for using that method. The plaintiffs alleged this was
the case based on the defendant's payment of nondiscretionary
holiday and annual bonuses and different rates of pay for any
snow-related activities a class member might have performed (snow
pay). The plaintiffs alleged these forms of compensation were not
added to the overtime calculation and should have and that these
additions made the defendants usage of the FWW method improper.

The parties' amended settlement agreement contains two distinct
settlement classes, a class dedicated to the FLSA claims, the FLSA
Collective Group, and a class dedicated to the state law claims,
the State Settlement Class. The court conditionally certified the
FLSA Collective Group under Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b). The Collective Group was defined as follows:

     All current and former employees in the United States who
have worked for The Brickman Group and who, at any time between
October 8, 2010 and the present, were paid a salary, but only
received fluctuating workweek type half-time overtime pay for
hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek (meaning at a rate that
decreased with each overtime hour worked, rather than at time-and-
a-half their hourly rate), including but not limited to salaried
landscape/crew/irrigation Supervisors and those in similarly
titled positions.

The amended settlement divided all of the class members and named
plaintiffs from the above two classes into two groups, Group 1 and
Group 2. Group 1 included all FLSA Collective Group members who
originally filed an opt-in form at the start of this litigation,
including all the named plaintiffs, and all Collective Group
members who worked in Pennsylvania, regardless of their original
opt-in status. The parties estimated that there were approximately
476 Group 1 members. Group 2 included all remaining Collective
Group members who did not file an opt-in form and who did not work
in Pennsylvania. Group 2 was designed as a catch-all for all of
those putative plaintiffs in the Collective Group who did not file
an opt-in form at the start of the case, other than those who
worked in Pennsylvania. The parties initially estimated that there
were approximately 839 individuals in Group 2.

Dahl agreed to administer the entire settlement for these two
groups for fees not to exceed $17,470.00. The parties also agreed
that the named plaintiff in the original complaint, Amador, would
receive a service award in the amount of $5,000.00. The remaining
named plaintiffs would each receive a $1,000.00 service award.
These amounts would be taken pro rata from the Group 1 and Group 2
qualified fund.

This action is a hybrid FLSA and state law action. Due to the
hybrid nature of the action, the court must grant final
certification of the opt-in FLSA Collective Group under Section
16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) for settlement
purposes. The court must also grant final certification to the
State Settlement Class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
The analytical inquiries for these two types of class actions are
distinct with some overlap. The court finds that final
certification is warranted with respect to both the FLSA
Collective Group and the State Settlement Class.

The court finds that each of the above requirements are met in
this case. Specifically, Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Classes
exceeding forty or more class members are generally held to meet
the numerosity requirement.

The instant settlement class consists of 1332 persons, 494 are
automatically included in settlement by virtue of their inclusion
in Group 1 and another 345 members from the Group 2 pool are
included as these members have submitted valid claim forms. These
class members are found across the country.

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions of law or fact
common to the class. If class members share at least one question
of law or fact in common, factual differences among the claims of
the class members do not defeat certification. Here, the class
members share a common claim of alleged violations of state law
based on the defendant's usage of the half-time FWW method for
overtime compensation that did not include (and despite) payment
of holiday bonuses, annual bonuses, and snow pay.

Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 23(a)(4) require that the claims or
defenses of the representative be typical of the claims or
defenses of the class and that the representative will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

In this case, the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of those
held by the class members as they are based on the same facts and
the same legal theories. All named plaintiffs were supervisory
employees who worked for the defendant in various locations across
the country and received annual bonuses, holiday bonuses, and/or
snow pay but were paid using a half-time FWW method of overtime
compensation. There is no defense unique to the named plaintiffs
and their interests directly align with the members of the State
Settlement Class.

The named plaintiffs also satisfy the adequacy requirement. The
named plaintiffs hold no interests that are antagonistic of the
class members' interests, thus making them adequate class
representatives. Moreover, the class is represented by counsel who
have experience and success with collective and hybrid FLSA/Rule
23 class action litigation, an inquiry that the court detailed in
its preliminary approval of the amended agreement.

The court also finds that the action meets the predominance and
superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) allows
certification of a class if the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members and if a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. Predominance merges with the concept of commonality,
but has a more exacting standard.  The court may consider four
non-exhaustive factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3) to determine
whether superiority is met. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). These
include the following: (1) The class members' interest in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (2) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already begun by or against class members; (3) The
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in a particular forum; and (4) The likely difficulties
in managing a class action.

Here, the common factual and legal questions applicable to the
class members predominate over any individual claims. The class
claims are based upon a common course of alleged conduct,
particularly, the defendant's pay policies and its usage of the
FWW method for overtime compensation. Similarly, class
adjudication is the superior method of adjudication. Given the
lack of objections or exclusions, there appears to be no class
member with a controlling interest in the litigation. There are no
other actions overlapping with the current one. Given the
defendant's locations across the country with employees across
various states, a singular action would enhance recovery.
Thus, the court finds that the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met for the State Settlement
Class. Accordingly, the court will grant final certification to
this class for settlement purposes.

The court will also grant final certification to the FLSA
Collective Group for settlement purposes. This class will include
all Group 1 members2 and all Group 2 members who submitted claim
forms for settlement purposes. Courts employ a two-step process
for approving FLSA classes, an initial conditional certification
and a later reconsideration" phase.  The court has already granted
conditional certification of the Collective Group and need only
reconsider that decision in finally certifying the class for
settlement purposes.

In Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, the Third Circuit set forth
specific factors that the court should consider in determining
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. These
factors include the following: (1) the complexity, expense and
likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class
to the settlement; (3) stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) risks of establishing liability; (5)
risks of establishing damages; (6) risk of maintaining the class
action through the trial; (7) ability of the defendants to
withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of
the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a
possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of
litigation.

The first Girsh factor, the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation, favors final approval in this case.
While the court cannot state that a hybrid FLSA claim is somehow
unique, the existence of state law claims under twenty-seven state
regimes joined with the FLSA action does make this case relatively
complex. Some of these states (including, Florida, Georgia, South
Caroline, Texas, and Virginia) do not have statutory wage and hour
laws and the state law claims in those instances would be based on
a common law theory of unjust enrichment alone. Each state regime
has a distinct statute of limitations period, which at this late
stage has likely run because the defendant changed its practice of
using a FWW method of computing overtime in June of 2014.

The second Girsh factor, the reaction of the class to settlement,
undoubtably favors settlement.

There were no objections to the class and no requests for
exclusion from the State Settlement Class. No objectors attended
the final hearing on July 21, 2017, as the court noted on the
record. Out of the 1332 class members, 494 Group 1 members will be
participating in the settlement, the full amount of Group 1
members, and 345 Group 2 members will be participating. The
reaction of Group 2 members went beyond even the parties'
expectations. Approximately 41.16% of Group 2 members will be
participating in settlement, above the anticipated thirty-one
percent the parties negotiated as part of the void provision.
Ultimately, 839 class members, out of a total of 1332 class
members, have affirmatively participated in the parties'
settlement, approximately sixty-three percent of the class
members. The court views this as an excellent result.

The third Girsh factor also favors final approval, the stage of
the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.
The court stayed discovery in the action early on to allow the
parties to engage in mediation. At that point the defendant had
already answered the original complaint in this action.  The
parties did not engage in any formal motions practice and the
defendant has not answered the amended complaint, which was filed
on a stipulated basis contingent on the success of settlement.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth Girsh factors also strongly favor
final approval of the parties' amended settlement agreement.

These factors speak to the risks the class would face with respect
to establishing liability, establishing damages, and maintaining
the class action if litigation were to continue. Here, these risks
are high. The court has discussed in detail the risks of
establishing liability in its analysis of the first Girsh factor.
Some potential liability issues would include: (1) varying
statutes of limitations; (2) finding liability in states without
statutory protection where a class member's sole claim would be
for unjust enrichment; and (3) finding liability for all the
defendant's practices with respect to holiday pay, annual pay, and
snow pay in states with statutes that closely track the FLSA FWW
method.

The eighth and ninth Girsh factors, the ranges of reasonableness
of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery
(with and without consideration of attendant risks), clearly favor
final approval.

The court has explained the damages models used by the parties to
reach a final sum, with one model more favorable to the plaintiffs
and the other more favorable to the defendant. For Group 1 members
these calculations amounted to $1,030,842.00 and $4,377,660.00.
For Group 2 members these calculations amounted to $224,540.00 and
$7,287,983.00. Thus, the range was between $1,255,382.00 and
$11,665,643.00. The gross amount of $6,950,000.00 set aside for
Group 1 and Group 2 is a near exact compromise over the parties'
damages calculations. While the actual gross amount will be lower,
$4,773,269.69 to be exact, the court finds this amount to be
reasonable. It amounts to approximately 40% of the damages model
most favorable to the plaintiff and approximately 380% of the
damages model most favorable to the defendant, almost four times
more than those calculations. Moreover, the final amount is a near
perfect compromise over the claims when viewed in light of the
many risks of establishing liability and maintaining class claims
at this stage of the litigation. It is more than what the
defendant anticipated paying while still below the most favorable
damages calculation for the class. Because of this the court finds
that the final two Girsh factors clearly favor approving the
settlement in this case.

Thus, all of the Girsh factors favor approval. Accordingly, the
Rule 23 settlement will be finally approved.

The court will also finally approve Dahl as settlement
administrator. The court is aware of no issues with the handling
of the settlement. The 3.2% non-deliverable rate for the mailing
of notices is noteworthy. The documents submitted by Dahl are
clear and concise and allow the court to fully evaluate the
settlement distribution. The parties agreed to administration
costs not to exceed $17,470.00. Dahl's costs total $15,882.00,
less than the amount agreed to.  Accordingly, Dahl will be finally
approved as settlement administrator.

The court will also approve the requested attorneys' fees and
costs for class counsel. Originally, the parties agreed that class
counsel would receive attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed
one-third (33.33%) of the Group 1 gross settlement amount from the
Group 1 qualified fund, with a maximum amount of $1,083,333.33.
Class counsel would also receive no more than one-third of the
Group 2 calculated gross settlement fund from the Group 2
qualified fund, which was to be determined based on the amount of
Group 2 members who opted in and became eligible to participate in
settlement. Lastly, the parties agreed that class counsel would
receive reimbursement of their out-of-pocket costs approved by the
court in an amount not to exceed $65,000.00, which would be paid
pro rata from the Group 1 and Group 2 qualified funds.

The court will grant the named plaintiffs' motion for final
approval of the parties amended settlement agreement and grant the
named plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The court
will finally certify the FLSA Collective Group for settlement and
finally certify the Rule 23 State Settlement Class. The parties
amended settlement agreement will be finally approved.

The court's approval will also include final approval of the named
plaintiffs as representatives, $10,000.00 in service awards to the
named plaintiffs, Dahl as settlement administrator, Dahl's costs
totaling $15,882.00, and Berger & Montague, P.C. and Head Law
Firm, LLC as class counsel. Attorneys' fees in the amount of
31.6667% of the gross claimed fund will be approved for a total of
$1,511,536.99 in attorneys' fees. The court will also award
reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs expended by class counsel in
the amount of $48,950.62.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 2, 2017
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb2g3d5tfrom
Leagle.com.

Jonathan Amador Acevedo, Plaintiff, represented by Sarah R.
Schalman-Bergen -- sschalman-bergen@bm.net -- Berger & Montague.

Jonathan Amador Acevedo, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J.
Carson -- scarson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., Alexandra
Koropey Piazza -- apiazza@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C.,
Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro hac vice & Jerilyn E.
Gardner, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro hac vice, 4422 N Ravenswood Ave,
Chicago, IL, 60640-5803

Mitchell Bratton, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J. Carson,
Berger & Montague, P.C. & Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro
hac vice.

Jeremy Busse, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J. Carson, Berger &
Montague, P.C. & Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Stephen Pullman, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J. Carson,
Berger & Montague, P.C. & Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro
hac vice.

Eric Migdol, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J. Carson, Berger &
Montague, P.C. & Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Jose Gonzalez, Plaintiff, represented by Shanon J. Carson, Berger
& Montague, P.C. & Charles A. Head, Head Law Firm, LLC, pro hac
vice.

BrightView Landscapes, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel E.
Turner -- dturner@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac
vice & Emilie R. Hammerstein -- ehammerstein@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson.


CALERES INC: Sued Over Americans With Disabilities Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence Young, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. Caleres, Inc. d/b/a Famous Footwear and BG
Retail, LLC d/b/a Famous Footwear, Case No. 1:17-cv-07466-AJN
(S.D.N.Y., October 2, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for
violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act.

The Defendants operate a footwear company that owns and operates a
variety of footwear brands. [BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
      BRONSON LIPSKY LLP
      630 Third Avenue, 5th Floor
      New York, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 392-4772
      Facsimile: (212) 444-1030
      E-mail: dlipsky@bronsonlipsky.com


CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Ct. Rules on DDJR #5 in "Des Roches"
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHARLES DES ROCHES, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:16-
cv-02848-LHK (HRL) (N.D. Cal.), Judge Howard R. Lloyd of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, entered his order regarding the Discovery Dispute Joint
Report #5 ("DDJR #5").

The case is about whether the guidelines the Defendants created
and used for determining whether medical necessity was established
for certain mental health and substance abuse treatments comported
with generally accepted professional standards.  In this certified
class action, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants'
guidelines imposed harsh, improper criteria which exceeded
accepted standards and resulted in denial of claims that should
have been approved.  The Plaintiffs want their claims reevaluated
under proper guidelines.

In DDJR #5, the Plaintiffs seek an order requiring the Defendants
to either admit or deny a Request for Admission ("RFA").  The
Defendants received the same RFA.  Along with the RFA was a list
of documents.  California Physicians' and Blue Shield of
California Life & Health Insurance Co. received one list.  Human
Affairs International of California ("HAI") got a different one.
With trivial exceptions (i.e., documents marked as exhibits in
depositions), all the documents on both lists are identified by
Bates numbers, indicating they were produced by the defendants in
response to requests for production in this lawsuit.  That is,
with the possible exceptions noted, the documents were produced by
the same defendant to whom the RFA was directed.

In its response to the RFA, Blue Shield admitted (except for four
deposition exhibits) that the documents were "genuine" within the
meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(B) and that they were in its
possession, custody, or control at the time of their production.
That is the extent of any admission.  There was no denial.
Instead, it objected saying the RFA was vague and compound.  Also,
it argued that whether a document falls into a hearsay exception
is a legal question and an improper request for admission.

In its response, HAI made the same partial admission as did the
Blue Shield Defendants, made no denials, and objected that the RFA
was vague, implicated attorney-client privilege/work product
doctrine, and impermissibly called for a legal conclusion.

The Plaintiffs argued that the RFA did not call for a legal
conclusion and, in DDJR #5, urged the Court to order the
Defendants to either admit or deny.  The Court heard the matter on
Sept. 26, 2017.

Judge Lloyd concludes that there is nothing vague about the RFA.
The fact that it is arguably compound is not an objection that
carries any weight.  When HAI's counsel was asked to explain how
the RFA ran afoul of attorney-client privilege or the work product
doctrine, the best he could offer, unpersuasively, was that
attorneys might have to go through the documents on the list and
make decisions.  That leaves the objection that to admit or deny
the RFA would be tantamount to asking the Defendants to draw a
legal conclusion, something which is the proper province of the
Court.

The Judge further concludes that the RFA not only, as the
Defendants admit, meets "genuineness" under FRCP 36(a)(1)(B), but
it meets 36(a)(1)(A) as well: an RFA may relate to facts, the
application of law to fact, or opinions about either.  As to their
objection that an admission or denial of any or all of the
evidentiary steps in 803(6) calls for a conclusion of law, that
objection is overruled.

As to each document, the Defendants may admit or, if they can do
so in good faith, deny some or all of the five steps on the
evidentiary ladder, but what they cannot do is fail to respond.

This brings Judge Lloyd to another issue: the volume of documents
addressed by the RFA.  The RFA to Blue Shield lists 169 documents,
reportedly selected by the Plaintiffs from a production of about
30,000 documents.  To try to achieve a balanced result, he directs
the Plaintiffs to select 300 documents, divided between the
Defendants as they see fit, and submit the lists to the latter.
The Defendants will respond within 14 calendar days from the date
the lists are submitted.  By this ruling, Judge Lloyd does not
intend to foreclose the Plaintiffs from offering other documents
as trial exhibits, including the remaining documents on the list
of 1000 as well as documents that were not on the list.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lahZ8N from Leagle.com.

Charles Des Roches, Plaintiff, represented by Rebecca Ann Musarra
-- rmusarra@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer P.A..

Charles Des Roches, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Spencer Kravitz
-- ckravitz@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline Judge Mehta -- cmehta@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder
LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline E. Reynolds -- creynolds@zuckerman.com
-- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel L. Berge --
dberger@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer PA, pro hac vice, Jason
S. Cowart -- jcowart@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jing-
Li Yu -- jyu@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro hac vice,
Kyle J. McGee -- kmcgee@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer P.A.,
pro hac vice, Nell Zora Peyser -- npeyser@zuckerman.com --
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Steven N. Herman -- sherman@zuckerman.com
-- Zuckerman Spaeder, pro hac vice.

Sylvia Meyer, Plaintiff, represented by Rebecca Ann Musarra, Grant
and Eisenhofer P.A., Carl Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Caroline Judge Mehta, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac
vice, Caroline E. Reynolds, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Daniel L. Berger, Grant and Eisenhofer PA, pro hac vice, Jason S.
Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jing-Li Yu, Grant and Eisenhofer
P.A., pro hac vice, Kyle J. McGee, Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro
hac vice, Nell Zora Peyser, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Steven N.
Herman, Zuckerman Spaeder, pro hac vice.

Gayle Tamler Grecco, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel L. Berger,
Grant and Eisenhofer PA, Rebecca Ann Musarra, Grant and Eisenhofer
P.A., Carl Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline Judge Mehta, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline E. Reynolds, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Jason
S. Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jing-Li Yu, Grant and Eisenhofer
P.A., pro hac vice, Kyle J. McGee, Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., Nell
Zora Peyser, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman
Spaeder, pro hac vice.

California Physicians' Service, Defendant, represented by Carri
Maas -- cmaas@manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP,
Gregory Neil Pimstone -- gpimstone@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP & Joseph Edward Laska -- jlaska@manatt.com --
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.

Human Affairs International of California, Defendant, represented
by Jennifer Salzman Romano -- jromano@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP, April Nelson Ross -- aross@crowell.com -- Crowell &
Moring LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher Flynn -- cflynn@crowell.com
-- Crowell and Moring LLP, pro hac vice, Kristin J. Madigan --
kmadigan@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP & Thomas Francis
Koegel -- tkoegel@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP.

Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Company,
Defendant, represented by Joseph Edward Laska, Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP & Carri Maas, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.


CANADA: Ruling in Indian Residential School Class Action Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Lawyer's Daily reports that appeal from a judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal substantially affirming a decision that
records from a consolidated class action related to Indian
Residential Schools should be destroyed following a 15-year
retention period.  From the 1860s to the 1990s, thousands of First
Nations, Metis and Inuit children were victims of physical,
emotional and sexual abuse while at residential schools.  In the
late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of individual and class
actions were brought by survivors of residential schools.  Class
actions in nine provinces and territories were consolidated into a
single action, which was settled by the Indian Residential Schools
Settlement Agreement (2006) (IRSSA).  Under the IRSSA, survivors
of residential schools could seek compensation through the
specially designed Independent Assessment Process (IAP). The IRSSA
was a comprehensive settlement of the consolidated class action,
and was the product of extensive negotiations among the plaintiffs
and their representatives, the Government of Canada and various
religious organizations which had operated these schools.  The IAP
process entailed disclosure by claimants of acutely sensitive
particulars, both of the abuse suffered, and of its consequences,
for examination by an adjudicator.  This information was recorded
in application forms, hearing transcripts, medical reports,
reasons for decisions and other documents, copies of which were
held by the Government of Canada. This appeal concerned the fate
of the digital and physical records generated by this process.  In
particular, the Court had to determine whether the IAP documents
should be destroyed, or retained and eventually archived at
Library and Archives Canada. In response to requests for
directions to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice from various
parties to the IRSSA, the supervising judge found that these
records had to be destroyed following a 15-year retention period
during which individual IAP claimants could elect to have the
records in their own file preserved.  This order was substantially
upheld by the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal. The
Attorney General of Canada now appealed that result.

HELD: Appeal dismissed. Supervising judges had administrative and
supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation and
administration of the IRSSA and could, among other things, hear
requests for directions.  If, therefore, the proper administration
and implementation of the IRSSA necessitated direction on the
handling of the IAP documents, supervising judges were empowered
to give that direction.  It followed, particularly given the
nature of the IAP and the IAP documents, that the supervisory role
in implementing the terms of the IRSSA included making directions
regarding disposition of the IAP documents at the conclusion of
the IAP.  The supervising judge correctly found that he had
authority to make orders as to the disposition of the IAP
documents. In light of this conclusion, it was unnecessary to
determine whether the IAP documents were under the control of a
government institution.  After an extensive review of the evidence
submitted on the requests for directions, the supervising judge
found that the negotiators of the IRSSA intended the IAP to be a
confidential and private process, that claimants and alleged
perpetrators relied on the confidentiality assurances and that,
without such assurances, the IAP could not have functioned.  These
findings were not only free of palpable and overriding errors,
they were simply inescapable in light of the evidence submitted.
There was no reason to disturb the supervising judge's finding
that the IRSSA provided for the destruction of the IAP documents.
Application of the Privacy Act to the IAP documents clearly ran
counter to the principles of confidentiality and voluntariness
upon which the IAP was founded. The supervising judge's order, as
varied by the majority of the Court of Appeal, was an appropriate
exercise of his discretion. He had to strike a balance between
competing concerns: preserving confidentiality and the need to
memorialize and commemorate, all the while respecting the choice
of survivors to share (or not share) their stories.  The
destruction of records that some claimants would have preferred to
have preserved worked a lesser injustice than the disclosure of
records that most expected never to be shared.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Fontaine, [2017] S.C.J. No. 47,
Supreme Court of Canada, B. McLachlin C.J. and A. Karakatsanis, R.
Wagner, C. Gascon, S. Cote, R. Brown and M. Rowe JJ., October 6,
2017. Digest No. TLD-October22017013SCC Appeal from a judgment of
the Ontario Court of Appeal substantially affirming a decision
that records from a consolidated class action related to Indian
Residential Schools should be destroyed following a 15-year
retention period.  From the 1860s to the 1990s, thousands of First
Nations, Metis and Inuit children were victims of physical,
emotional and sexual abuse while at residential schools.  In the
late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of individual and class
actions were brought by survivors of residential schools. Class
actions in nine provinces and territories were consolidated into a
single action, which was settled by the Indian Residential Schools
Settlement Agreement (2006) (IRSSA).  Under the IRSSA, survivors
of residential schools could seek compensation through the
specially designed Independent Assessment Process (IAP).  The
IRSSA was a comprehensive settlement of the consolidated class
action, and was the product of extensive negotiations among the
plaintiffs and their representatives, the Government of Canada and
various religious organizations which had operated these schools.
The IAP process entailed disclosure by claimants of acutely
sensitive particulars, both of the abuse suffered, and of its
consequences, for examination by an adjudicator.  This information
was recorded in application forms, hearing transcripts, medical
reports, reasons for decisions and other documents, copies of
which were held by the Government of Canada. This appeal concerned
the fate of the digital and physical records generated by this
process.  In particular, the Court had to determine whether the
IAP documents should be destroyed, or retained and eventually
archived at Library and Archives Canada. In response to requests
for directions to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice from
various parties to the IRSSA, the supervising judge found that
these records had to be destroyed following a 15-year retention
period during which individual IAP claimants could elect to have
the records in their own file preserved.  This order was
substantially upheld by the majority of the Ontario Court of
Appeal. The Attorney General of Canada now appealed that result.

HELD: Appeal dismissed. Supervising judges had administrative and
supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation and
administration of the IRSSA and could, among other things, hear
requests for directions.  If, therefore, the proper administration
and implementation of the IRSSA necessitated direction on the
handling of the IAP documents, supervising judges were empowered
to give that direction.  It followed, particularly given the
nature of the IAP and the IAP documents, that the supervisory role
in implementing the terms of the IRSSA included making directions
regarding disposition of the IAP documents at the conclusion of
the IAP.  The supervising judge correctly found that he had
authority to make orders as to the disposition of the IAP
documents.  In light of this conclusion, it was unnecessary to
determine whether the IAP documents were under the control of a
government institution.  After an extensive review of the evidence
submitted on the requests for directions, the supervising judge
found that the negotiators of the IRSSA intended the IAP to be a
confidential and private process, that claimants and alleged
perpetrators relied on the confidentiality assurances and that,
without such assurances, the IAP could not have functioned.  These
findings were not only free of palpable and overriding errors,
they were simply inescapable in light of the evidence submitted.
There was no reason to disturb the supervising judge's finding
that the IRSSA provided for the destruction of the IAP documents.
Application of the Privacy Act to the IAP documents clearly ran
counter to the principles of confidentiality and voluntariness
upon which the IAP was founded.  The supervising judge's order, as
varied by the majority of the Court of Appeal, was an appropriate
exercise of his discretion.  He had to strike a balance between
competing concerns: preserving confidentiality and the need to
memorialize and commemorate, all the while respecting the choice
of survivors to share (or not share) their stories.  The
destruction of records that some claimants would have preferred to
have preserved worked a lesser injustice than the disclosure of
records that most expected never to be shared.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Fontaine, [2017] S.C.J. No. 47,
Supreme Court of Canada, B. McLachlin C.J. and A. Karakatsanis, R.
Wagner, C. Gascon, S. Cote, R. Brown and M. Rowe JJ., October 6,
2017. Digest No. TLD-October22017013SCC
[GN]


CANADA: Mixed Feelings Expressed Over 60's Scoop Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, writing for Al Jazeera News, reports
that Nakuset knows just how different her life could have been.

A Cree woman from Lac La Ronge, Saskatchewan, a province in
central Canada, she was taken from her mother as a young child and
bounced between relatives and foster homes.

When she was three, she was adopted into a Jewish family in
Montreal, nearly 2,500km away.

"Being pushed into a completely different culture, I got all kinds
of cultural shame every day.  I was not allowed to tell anyone I
was Native -- it was a bad thing," Nakuset told Al Jazeera.

For decades, she was cut off from her biological family, including
her older sister, Sonya, who had woken up one morning in their
foster home to find that Nakuset had disappeared without a trace.

It took years for the sisters to be reunited.

"Sonya looked for me, every single day, for years," said Nakuset,
who now heads the Native Women's Shelter in Montreal.

The 'disastrous' Sixties Scoop

Nakuset was one of thousands of indigenous children who were taken
from their families and Native communities across Canada, and
placed into non-indigenous adoptive homes or foster care.

The removals, which largely took place between the 1960s and
1980s, are known collectively as the Sixties Scoop.

On October 6, the federal government announced it had reached a
$640m agreement, in principle, with Sixties Scoop survivors across
Canada who lost their indigenous identity as a result of the long-
standing practice.

Most of the indigenous children who were adopted or placed into
foster care were never told about their indigenous roots. They
lost contact with their families and communities and lost their
language, culture and identity.

While not all of the adoptive families were abusive, many children
endured emotional, physical and sexual abuse and have suffered
lasting trauma.

Some went into homes across Canada, while others were removed to
the US, UK, Australia and other countries.

Raven Sinclair, a professor of social work at the University of
Regina and member of George Gordon First Nation in southern
Saskatchewan, said child welfare officials literally scooped
children up from First Nations reserves in some cases.

"The system really took one look and said, 'Indigenous people
can't parent, so the best thing for us to do is take these
children away, raise them as white people, and then everything
will be great,'" Sinclair told Al Jazeera.  "And really that just
proved disastrous."

A Sixties Scoop survivor herself, Sinclair was taken from her
mother when she was four after a neighbour called social services.

She said she experienced physical and sexual abuse in her foster
home.

She explained that while she didn't suffer such abuse in her
adoptive home, she was confronted with racism and bullying every
day growing up.

A "cloak of silence" has shrouded the Sixties Scoop for a long
time, Sinclair said, and the federal settlement is "symbolic of an
acknowledgement that wrong was done".

Compensation and healing
Under the settlement, First Nations and Inuit children who were
taken from their homes between 1951 and 1991 will be eligible for
personal compensation.

The amount will range from about $20,000 to $40,000 for each
person.  Depending on how many claims are filed, it could add up
to a total of $600m.

Ottawa estimates that about 16,000 survivors will be entitled to a
personal payout, but the government has not yet explained how
survivors will apply for compensation or prove their claim.

Another $40m will go towards establishing a foundation to help
survivors heal, and $60m will be allocated to help pay for legal
fees.

Carolyn Bennett, the minister responsible for affairs between the
state and indigenous peoples, said the settlement will "begin to
right the wrongs" committed during the Sixties Scoop.

The deal comes after a federal court judge ruled in favour of
Sixties Scoop survivors in their class-action lawsuit in Ontario,
Canada's most populous province, last February.

The government failed to take steps to make sure indigenous
children who were forcibly removed from their families did not
lose their Native culture, language and identity, the court found.

The federal agreement also puts an end to at least 18 class-action
lawsuits that had been filed on behalf of Sixties Scoop survivors
and were in various stages across Canada.

"They have lived their lives not being able to be proud indigenous
people," Bennett said about the effect the Sixties Scoop had on
survivors.

"They have lived their lives not having secure, personal cultural
identity.  That was robbed. Someone thought that a non-indigenous
family somewhere else in the world was going to do a better job."

'Thousands excluded'
Yet, not all Sixties Scoop survivors are included in the recent
deal.

The Metis fall outside the scope of the agreement, as do some non-
status indigenous peoples (individuals whose indigenous status is
not recognised by the government), provided that they are not
eligible for status.

The Metis have mixed indigenous-European ancestry and they are
officially recognised as aboriginal peoples under the Canadian
constitution, alongside First Nations and Inuit peoples.

"It's like we're nobody," Gary Tinker, a Metis survivor of the
Sixties Scoop, recently told CBC in Canada.

"I'm glad for the First Nations, don't get me wrong," he said.
"But they never even mentioned our Metis citizens who were in
foster care."

Duane Morrisseau-Beck, cofounder of the National Indigenous
Survivors of Child Welfare Network and a Metis Sixties Scoop
survivor, said he felt like Canada "is playing divide and conquer"
with the agreement.

"This falls far from a national settlement and is playing out
extremely negatively in the survivor community," Morrisseau-Beck
said in a statement.

Colleen Cardinal, cofounder of the National Indigenous Survivors
of Child Welfare Network, said she had "very mixed feelings" about
the settlement, in part since so many survivors are excluded.

"For thousands of people who are excluded it must be very re-
traumatising, once again to be left out of something so huge . . .
They have to work so much harder to get healing and
acknowledgement, which they shouldn't have to," the 45-year-old
told Al Jazeera.

'We'll be here waiting'
From Saddle Lake First Nation, just south of Edmonton, Alberta,
Cardinal was a child when she was taken from her family and placed
into an abusive, adoptive home in Ontario with her two sisters.

Estranged from her adoptive family, and in only limited contact
with her birth family, Cardinal said meeting other Sixties Scoop
survivors and sharing stories has been invaluable to her own
healing.

That's why any sort of healing programmes coming out of the
federal settlement -- which should include a focus on indigenous
languages and culture -- must be survivor-led, she said.

"We're at a start and I'm hoping that as survivors we can help
lead the state into being accountable [and] being transparent for
what they did," she said.

Cardinal said a formal apology from the government would also help
survivors heal, but it needs to be accompanied by concrete action.

Sixties Scoop survivors, meanwhile, should know that they aren't
alone.  "I want them to know . . . that they can come home,"
Cardinal said.  "We'll be here waiting for them." [GN]


CONAGRA BRANDS: Must Face Cooking Oil Class Action, Court Rules
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Chung, writing for Reuters, reports that the U.S. Supreme
Court on Oct. 10 refused to hear a bid by Conagra Brands Inc to
escape a class-action lawsuit accusing it of falsely labeling its
cooking oil as 100 percent natural even though it had genetically
modified ingredients.

Conagra had asked to the justices to hear its appeal of a lower
court ruling allowing the suit to proceed despite difficulties in
determining who should be included and excluded in the litigation,
a problem often encountered in disputes over low-cost products.

In 2015, a federal judge in California let purchasers of Wesson
brand oil in 11 U.S. states proceed with their claims in a
consolidated case, rejecting Conagra's argument that there was no
reliable way to identify those who had bought the oil over the
last decade.  The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco upheld that ruling in January, and the company appealed
to the Supreme Court.

The purchasers, including lead plaintiff Robert Briseno, a
California resident who sued Conagra in 2011, allege the Chicago-
based packaged food maker used deceptive labeling dating back to
2007, calling the cooking oil "100% Natural" despite its GMO
content, banking on consumers' willingness to pay more for natural
products.

Conagra said that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has not
defined the term "natural" and that it means different things to
different people.

The company, supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers business groups, argued that
consumers rarely save every receipt and cannot typically recall
trivial purchases from years ago.  Manufacturers, distributors and
retailers generally do not keep such records either, it said.

The plaintiffs told the Supreme Court that companies like Conagra
simply want to place class actions out of reach for low-priced
consumer goods, which individuals are unlikely to sue over on
their own.  Their motive is to "enable companies to commit wide-
scale, but low value, harm to individual consumers with impunity,"
they told the justices in a legal brief. [GN]


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: 11th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Reilly"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William Pryor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment against
Reilly's claims of a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act and of unjust enrichment in the case captioned
LESLIE REILLY, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN
GRILL, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Case No.
16-17461 (11th Cir.).

Reilly appeals the summary judgment in favor of Chipotle.  Reilly
complained, on behalf of herself and other Floridians, that
Chipotle had violated the Deceptive Practices Act, and had been
unjustly enriched by falsely advertising that it had eliminated
genetically modified ingredients from its menu.

Chipotle filed a motion to dismiss Reilly's complaint, which the
district court granted in part and denied in part.  The district
court ruled that Reilly failed to allege a threat of real or
immediate future injury to give her standing to pursue injunctive
relief under the Deceptive Practices Act and dismissed without
prejudice that count of Reilly's complaint.  The district court
ruled that Reilly's claims for monetary relief under the Deceptive
Practices Act and for unjust enrichment alleged facts sufficient
to avoid dismissal.

Chipotle moved for summary judgment on the ground that Reilly
lacked standing to sue for a violation of the Deceptive Practices
Act or for unjust enrichment.  Reilly opposed.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Chipotle
on the ground that Reilly lacked standing to sue as a class
representative for a violation of the Deceptive Practices Act or
for unjust enrichment.  It ruled that Reilly presented no evidence
she had been deceived into buying ingredients at Chipotle merely
because they were non-GMO or that she had been damaged because the
market value of the burritos had stayed the same before and after
the advertising.

The district court also ruled that Reilly failed to identify what
in the individual food transaction made the transaction unjust.
It dismissed as moot all other pending motions, which included
Reilly's motion to stay consideration of the motion for summary
judgment pending additional discovery.  Reilly appealed.

Judge Pryor concludes that the district court did not err when it
entered summary judgment in favor of Chipotle.  To prevail under
the Florida Deceptive Practices Act, Reilly had to prove the
existence of a deceptive act or unfair practice; causation; and
actual damages.  But Reilly suffered no actual loss.  And because
Reilly could not establish she had been damaged by the
advertising, Chipotle was entitled to summary judgment.

The Judge further concludes that he cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion by proceeding to rule on the motion
for summary judgment when Reilly failed to specifically
demonstrate how postponing that ruling would have enabled her, by
discovery or other means, to rebut the showing of the absence of a
genuine issue of fact by Chipotle.

Accordingly, Judge Pryor affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
Chipotle.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fhU9Sh from Leagle.com.

Sarah Clasby Engel, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lance Harke -- lharke@harkeclasby.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David J. Maher, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Carlos Juan Canino -- ccanino@stearnsweaver.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Howard Bushman, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Adam M. Royval -- aroyval@messner.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Charles Cavanagh -- ccavanagh@messner.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Kelly R. Melchiondo -- kmelchiondo@stearnsweaver.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Sascha von Mende Henry -- shenry@sheppardmullin.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


CITY NATIONAL BANK: Faces "Wilinsky" Class Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against City National
Bank, N.A. and Does 1 through 10, inclusive.

The case is captioned Thomas B. Wilinsky, Steve Rubin, Gail
Johnson, Marvin A. Katz, Katz Family Limited Partnership, Leo
Latini, Margaret aka Peggy Latini, Kenneth Fox, Joanne Rothblum,
Alan Sherman, Marianne Sirott, Joann Sourek, Charles Sourek, CSJS
Holdings, Mark Wineberg, Gary Zeal, Mark Zeal, Christopher St.
John, David St. John, DCNA Properties, LLC, Susan St. John, HBH,
Inc., John Davies, Sharon Davies, Peter Gluklick, Helen Ross,
Robert Starks, Carol Starks, Stevie Bahama LLC, Dena Lowenbach,
Gena Aveni, Steven Kutnick, Salvatore Mercurio, Rosemarie
Mercurio, Clare Pinto, John Shaughnessy, Howard Vorder Bruegge,
Susan Stafford, Robert Newton, Bonnie Newton, and all others
similarly situated v. City National Bank, N.A. and Does 1 through
10, inclusive, Case No. 1:17-cv-07463 (S.D.N.Y. September 29,
2017). [BN]

Thomas B. Wilinsky, Steve Rubin, Gail Johnson, Marvin A. Katz,
Katz Family Limited Partnership, Leo Latini, Margaret aka Peggy
Latini, Kenneth Fox, Joanne Rothblum, Alan Sherman, Marianne
Sirott, Joann Sourek, Charles Sourek, CSJS Holdings, Mark
Wineberg, Gary Zeal, Mark Zeal, Christopher St. John, David St.
John, DCNA Properties, LLC, Susan St. John, HBH, Inc., John
Davies, Sharon Davies, Peter Gluklick, Helen Ross, Robert Starks,
Carol Starks, Stevie Bahama LLC, Dena Lowenbach, Gena Aveni,
Steven Kutnick, Salvatore Mercurio, Rosemarie Mercurio, Clare
Pinto, John Shaughnessy, Howard Vorder Bruegge, Susan Stafford,
Robert Newton, Bonnie Newton are pro se plaintiff.


COMMONWEALTH BANK: Money Laundering Class Action Face Hurdles
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Mangan, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that
Maurice Blackburn has launched a class action claiming CBA
breached its continuous disclosure obligations by not informing
investors about Austrac's money laundering allegations.

To win, Maurice will need to jump four legal hurdles.

Austrac has alleged CBA failed to inform authorities about suspect
cash deposits at its ATMs.

1. Was the 'Austrac info' known?

Everyone will probably agree the "Austrac info" was not known by
the market before Austrac announced legal action on August 3.
Prima facie a tick for Maurice.

But CBA will likely argue it too was caught unawares.

Maurice will argue the information was not "generally available"
until August 4 (or even later) because CBA made no ASX disclosure
on August 3. But the news spread quickly on August 3.

I distinctly remember watching it on an ABC TV bulletin at about
2pm. Not to put too fine a point on it, there will be a largish
fight over when exactly the "Austrac info" became "generally
available". As we'll see, this is a critical argument.

2. Was it material?

Following US precedent, the share price reaction after the news
breaks is considered a good materiality indicator.

A stock fall of 10 per cent is clearly material.  But on August 3,
the CBA price initially rose.  By day's end it was off a miserly
26õ; less than a 1 per cent move.  CBA will likely argue this
could be just as easily explained by an Amazonian butterfly
flapping its wings.

Maurice will argue strenuously the "Austrac info" was so out of
the ordinary and unprecedented it took days for the market to
digest its significance. For example by August 7, CBA was near
$80, a more interesting 5.4 per cent fall. Ka-ching!

However, this argument defies market practice. Before all major
announcements, trading in a company's shares is temporarily
suspended.  That could last minutes or even one to two days.  This
"time-out" allows market participants to digest new information
and calculate its price effect.

When the suspension is lifted, the information is considered
"generally available". Investors can deal with it as they please.
In this sense, the information was "generally available" on August
3.

Another hurdle is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  It holds
that all new information is quickly discounted into share prices.

Now any market practitioner, including myself, will tell you EMH
is a load of rubbish (except perhaps over the long term).

Recent Deutsche Bank research showed it can take up to six months
for new information to be discounted into share prices.  That
accords with my own experience and supports Maurice's case.

However, our legal system follows US precedent and accepts EMH as
gospel. Therefore, if a share price hasn't reacted almost
immediately, then the new information is not material.

I think it will be hard to show losses were more than about $3.50,
or the difference between the CBA price before the information
became known, and the closing price on August 4.  If convinced the
information was "generally available" on August 3, a court would
probably decide losses were only 26õ.

3. When did CBA 'know' it?

This is a critical question. Maurice claims CBA knew about the
scandal when first notified by Austrac in July 2015.  But in the
legal world, a company "knows" information when it reaches the
board (or should have).

It is an arguable point as to whether CBA "knows" if only the
chief risk officer is aware of the Austrac information.  Another
bun fight over that.

CBA has said alleged issues relating to "threshold transaction
reporting" in its ATMs were brought to the board's attention in
the second half of 2015.  But it may well argue the board was
unaware Austrac would resort to legal action until August 3, 2017.
That's the same date everyone else "knew".

In this scenario, a judge might hesitate to rule CBA "knew" before
August 3.  In that case, CBA's argument it was as ignorant as
shareholders and became aware only on August 3, 2017, might work.
Case dismissed, costs awarded against Maurice.

4. What were the losses?

Like almost every aspect of Australian shareholder class actions,
how to calculate losses is yet to be settled by a court.

The current legal thinking is that anyone who purchased shares
during the relevant period overpaid for those shares by either
$3.50 or 26õ each, depending on when the "Austrac info" became
"generally available".

Over 1.5 billion CBA shares traded from July 2015 to August 2017.
A loss of $3.50 a share equates to a staggering $5.5 billion loss.
A loss of only 26õ is still a hefty $410 million.

But these are maximum losses.

Traders who bought and sold during the period didn't suffer as the
"Austrac info" was unknown during both legs of their trading. That
might account for 50 per cent of the turnover.  For various
reasons, perhaps 50 per cent of other investors might not ask for
compensation.  That reduces potential losses by about 75 per cent,
or $100 million to $1.25 billion.

Those potential losses assume a judge decides CBA "knew" in July
2015.  If, instead, it's judged that CBA "knew" only from say June
1, 2017, losses fall dramatically.

The losses are negligible if it's found CBA "knew" only on the
same day as everyone else, ie August 3, 2017.  That may be CBA's
argument.  The following matrix shows the possible maximum losses
assuming 25 per cent of shares bought during the period are
compensated.

No shareholder class action has ever been decided by a judge.

Instead these cases elicit a bit of press coverage and much legal
argy-bargy.  Then someone (usually the company's insurer) cuts a
cheque, everyone shakes hands and gets on with life.

Don't expect this case to be any different. In my opinion, the
huge range of potential outcomes from zero to a billion-plus is
way too scary for anyone to actually chance their hand before a
judge.

If I'm right, CBA will probably cut a $1 million to $100 million
cheque, blame prior management and promise to try harder.

Even $100 million (about 6õ a share) ain't much once funders take
their cut of around 30 per cent.  CBA shareholders better keep
their day jobs. [GN]


CUMBERLAND FARMS: Ct. Dismisses Opt-in Plaintiff in FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DIANNE BUCCERI, JANET CHARAK, and LISA
SANDERS, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
15-cv-13955-IT (D. Mass.), Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Opt-In Plaintiff Jennie Senac with
Prejudice, and the Plaintiffs' Counsel's Assented-to Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel to Opt-in Plaintiff Jennie Senac.

On Nov. 25, 2015, the Named Plaintiffs brought an action alleging
that the Defendant had failed to pay owed overtime wages to both
the Named Plaintiffs and to others similarly situated, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and
Massachusetts wage laws.  On June 10, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed
the operative, Second Amended Collective and Class Action
Complaint and Jury Demand.  On Aug. 31, 2016, Senac opted-in as a
Party Plaintiff.

On Feb. 15, 2017, the Court issued an Amended Scheduling Order
bifurcating discovery.  On Feb. 21, 2017, Cumberland Farms
selected Senac as one of the Plaintiffs for Phase I discovery, and
served Senac with its First Set of Requests for Production of
Documents and First Set of Interrogatories.  On an unopposed
motion, the Court extended the time for Senac to oppose Cumberland
Farms' discovery requests to March 30, 2017.  The Plaintiffs'
counsel served timely objections to Cumberland Farms' written
discovery requests on Senac's behalf, but Senac did not answer any
of the discovery.

On March 24, 2017, Cumberland Farms noticed Senac's deposition for
April 19, 2017.  On April 13, 2017, the Plaintiffs' counsel
notified Cumberland Farms that Senac has not responded to their
attempts to communicate with her, and that they were unable to
confirm her appearance at the deposition.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
reiterated between April 14, 2017, and April 18, 2017, that Senac
had not responded to their communications, and later stated that
their last communication with Senac occurred in early March 2017.
Senac did not appear for her deposition on April 19, 2017.

At a status conference on May 4, 2017, the Court asked the
Plaintiffs' counsel to certify that they mailed a communication to
Senac regarding the case.  The Plaintiffs' counsel certified on
Aug. 4, 2017, that they did.  On Aug. 22, 2017, the Plaintiffs'
counsel told Cumberland Farms that they have been unable to
communicate with Ms. Senac and will be filing a request to
withdraw as her counsel.

Cumberland Farms filed its Motion to Dismiss on Aug. 28, 2017, and
on Sept. 1, 2017, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed its Motion to
Withdraw.  On Sept. 13, 2017, the Court issued an Order to Show
Cause, directing Senac that if she sought to oppose the
Plaintiffs' counsel's Motion to Withdraw, she was to file her
opposition no later than Sept. 27, 2017.  Alternatively, if Senac
did not oppose the Plaintiffs' counsel's Motion to Withdraw but
did seek to oppose Cumberland Farms' Motion to Dismiss, she was to
file a statement of non-opposition to the motion to withdraw and
her opposition to Cumberland Farms' motion no later than Sept. 27,
2017.

The Court also warned that if Senac did not respond to the order,
or responded but did not oppose either motion, it anticipated
allowing both motions.  As directed by the Court, the Plaintiffs'
counsel filed a certificate of service on Sept. 13, 2017, stating
that they had served on Senac a copy of the court's order.  Senac
has filed no response to the court's Order to Show Cause, the
Motion to Dismiss, or the Motion to Withdraw.

Judge Talwani finds that Senac has failed to prosecute her case,
and she now granted Cumberland Farms' Motion to Dismiss.  Because
the evidence provided to her suggests that Senac has failed to
communicate with her counsel for over six months, that enabled the
Plaintiffs' counsel to represent Senac's interests, she allowed
their Motion to Withdraw.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/iz8wGB from Leagle.com.

Dianne Bucceri, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz --
gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com -- Shavitz Law Group PA, pro hac vice.

Dianne Bucceri, Plaintiff, represented by Hillary A. Schwab --
hillary@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C., Michael J. Palitz,
Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Sam J. Smith --
ssmith@burrandsmithlaw.com -- Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice,
Stephen S. Churchill -- steve@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C.,
Tamra Givens -- tgivens@burrandsmithlaw.com -- Morgan & Morgan
Complex Litigation Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr &
Smith, LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel J. Smit --
rachel@fairworklaw.com -- Fair Work, P.C..

Janet Charak, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz, Shavitz
Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work, P.C.,
Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Sam J.
Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S. Churchill, Fair
Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac
vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Lisa Sanders, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz, Shavitz
Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work, P.C.,
Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Sam J.
Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S. Churchill, Fair
Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac
vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Peter Stafford, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz,
Shavitz Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work,
P.C., Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice,
Sam J. Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S.
Churchill, Fair Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith,
LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Robert C. Herrick, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz,
Shavitz Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work,
P.C., Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice,
Sam J. Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S.
Churchill, Fair Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith,
LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Jill Harrower, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz, Shavitz
Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work, P.C.,
Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Sam J.
Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S. Churchill, Fair
Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac
vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Vincent Price, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz, Shavitz
Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work, P.C.,
Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Sam J.
Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S. Churchill, Fair
Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation
Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac
vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Elinor Fronheiser, Plaintiff, represented by Gregg I. Shavitz,
Shavitz Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Hillary A. Schwab, Fair Work,
P.C., Michael J. Palitz, Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice,
Sam J. Smith, Burr & Smith, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen S.
Churchill, Fair Work, P.C., Tamra Givens, Morgan & Morgan Complex
Litigation Group, pro hac vice, Loren B. Donnell, Burr & Smith,
LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C..

Cumberland Farms, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Hickey
Silveira -- asilveira@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Molly
Clayton Mooney -- mmooney@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, Richard
L. Alfred -- ralfred@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP & Robert
A. Fisher -- rfisher@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


DANN MEYER: Faces Class Action Over No Tipping Conspiracy
---------------------------------------------------------
Maria Yagoda, writing for Food & Wine, reports that the
no-tipping movement has always faced some backlash -- but now it's
facing a lawsuit.

According to Law360, a class-action lawsuit filed in California on
Oct. 6 is targeting several big-name restaurants in New York and
the Bay Area.  Among the defendants are no-tipping advocates Danny
Meyer and Momofuku's David Chang, who are considered pioneers in
the movement to raise fixed, hourly wages, rather than making
servers rely on tips for a living wage.  The complaint alleges
that restaurant owners are holding secret meetings and eliminating
tips for the sole purpose of raising prices as part of a vast
anti-competitive conspiracy.

"The ongoing conspiracy unlawfully transfers millions of dollars
from customers and servers to restaurant owners in violation of
federal and state antitrust laws," the complaint said.

"Participating restaurants and a compliant media have portrayed
the no-tipping/higher prices movement as intended to promote
social justice and equality, while the real aim and effect is
greater profit at the expense of workers and consumers."

The plaintiff, Timothy Brown, suggests that Meyer is pressuring
restaurant owners to eliminate tipping in these alleged secret
meetings.

The no-tipping movement has only grown larger this year, with
Joe's Crab Shack becoming the first national chain announcing
they'd be testing out the model in June.  This came just seven
months after Meyer shook up the restaurant world by ending tipping
in all 13 of his New York City-based restaurants.

"There are countless laws and regulations that determine which
positions in a restaurant may, and may not share in gratuities,"
Meyer said in the statement announcing his decision.  "We believe
hospitality is a team sport, and that it takes an entire team to
provide you with the experiences you have come to expect from us,"
added, later continuing, "We will now have the ability to
compensate all of our employees equitably, competitively, and
professionally.  And by eliminating tipping, our employees who
want to grow financially and professionally will be able to earn
those opportunities based on the merit of their work." [GN]


DETROIT FREE: Four Female Photo Journalists File Pay Bias Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that four female photo journalists
have filed a pay discrimination lawsuit in federal court against
the Detroit Free Press.

Former and current staff members allege in the Oct. 13 complaint
that the newspaper underpaid them because they're women.

The lawsuit follows a study this year by the newspaper's union
analyzing pay data.  It shows the median wage for men was higher
than for women in almost every job category at the newspaper.

For example, the lawsuit says male photographers make over $4 an
hour more than female photographers.

Free Press editor and vice president Peter Bhatia says the lawsuit
has no merit and the newspaper has a "long-standing commitment" to
supporting equal pay.  A spokeswoman for newspaper parent company
Gannett, also named in the lawsuit, didn't have further comment on
Oct. 14. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Domino" Suit in S.D. Fla. Over FCRA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Barbara J. Domino, Daniel E. Almeida, and Miriam Cejas, Florida
consumers individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Equifax, Inc., Case No. 0:17-cv-61936-CMA (S.D. Fla.,
October 2, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for violation
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Equifax, Inc. operates a consumer credit reporting agency in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alex Arreaza, Esq.
      ARREAZA LAW FIRM LLC
      320 W Oakland Park Boulevard
      Wilton Manors, FL 33311
      Telephone: (954) 565-7743
      Facsimile: (954) 565-7713
      E-mail: alex@alexmylawyer.com

         - and -

      Joseph Zager, Esq.
      ZAGERLAW, P.A.
      500 E. Broward Blvd., Suite 1820
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394
      Telephone: (954) 888-8170
      Facsimile: (954) 565-7713
      E-mail: admin@zagerlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Data Breach Settlement Estimated at $1 Billion
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jeff John Roberts, writing for Fortune, reports that when hackers
steal consumer data from a major company, the fallout is
depressingly familiar: The corporation comes to a settlement with
class action lawyers, who get paid nicely, while most of the
victims of the breach get credit monitoring or nothing at all.

Equifax, which recently presided over one of the worst data
breaches in history, is likely to be a different story.

Unlike like other high-profile data breaches, such as those at
Target and Home Depot, the credit bureau will probably have to pay
actual money to consumers as compensation for its sloppy security
practices.

According to Chicago attorney Jay Edelson, the lawsuits "if done
right" will see Equifax pay more than $1 billion with much of that
cash going directly to the over 143 million consumers who had
personal data like their birthdates and Social Security numbers
stolen.  He predicts the lawsuits will be settled in less than two
years, meaning many consumers would be in line to get at least a
small check.

There are several reasons why the fallout will be different this
time around.  A big one is a new reluctance among judges to sign
off on class action settlements that include only free credit
monitoring services -- which, as security experts have pointed
out, often serve as a way for companies like Equifax to push
consumers into a paid subscription service.

Meanwhile, courts today are more willing to treat data theft as a
harm in its own right, rather than requiring consumers to show
actual economic database from a credit breach.  This change,
spurred on in part by a seminal Supreme Court ruling in 2016, sets
the stage for a departure from past settlements like those shown
in the chart below.

The chart depicts how companies like Michaels and Home Depot,
which incurred massive breaches, paid a relative pittance, and
only to a small percentage of the affected customers:

Another reason the Equifax case is shaping up to be different is
the involvement of state Attorneys General, and cities like
Chicago and San Francisco, which are in the process of bringing
lawsuits of their own.

According to Mr. Edelson, the state and city governments ratcheted
up their legal response following reports that Equifax, shortly
after the breach, attempted to induce consumers to waive their
right to sue in exchange for credit monitoring.

How Much Will Consumers Collect?

Consumers will no doubt be pleased if a class action settlement
produces a check from Equifax rather than, as is typically the
case, a congratulatory press release and an offer of credit
monitoring.  A related question, of course, is "How much?"

Mr. Edelson said it's soon to speculate on individual payouts but,
if his overall settlement estimate of $1 billion is correct, that
would translate to roughly $7 for each of the over 143 million
affected consumers.  That's hardly a princely sum, especially if
at amount comes before lawyers take their cut.  But it could also
be higher if many of the Equifax victims (as often happens) fail
to put in a claim, and their share is divided among those who do.

Meanwhile, consumers will be eligible to collect different amounts
based on where they live.  This is because the lawsuits brought by
cities and Attorneys General will be based on the data breach laws
of individual states, which provide a range of different
penalties, and those settlements will be distributed on a local,
not national basis.

A further means of evaluating Equifax's potential liability is by
looking at its share price.  Initial reports of the breach saw
Equifax stock fall 35% and the company lose nearly $6 billion in
market cap, though today shares are trading at only 21% lower than
before news of the hacking.

This suggests the market believes Equifax will survive the current
legal and regulatory gauntlet it is facing, though
Mr. Edelson suggested some investors may have failed to price in
courts' harsher views of data breaches--meaning the stock may be
trading higher than it should be.

For its part, Equifax is saying little about how much all this
will cost.

"We cannot comment on pending litigation, but want to reassure
consumers that we are remaining focused on helping them to
navigate this situation and providing the best customer support
possible," said a company spokesperson. [GN]


ESCALLATE: Illegally Collects Debt, "Bonti" Action Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
Coleen Bonti, Andrew Goldstein, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Escallate, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-
05767 (E.D.N.Y., October 2, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Escallate, LLC operates a collection agency based in North Canton,
Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
      SANDERS LAW, PLLC
      100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
      Garden City, NY 11530
      Telephone: (516) 203-7600
      Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
      E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Bid to Reconsider "Cryer" Class Cert. Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Defendant's motion for
reconsideration of the Court's order granting the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification in the case captioned MARLON H.
CRYER, individually and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated, and on behalf of the Franklin Templeton 401(k)
Retirement Plan, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC.; and THE
FRANKLIN TEMPLETON 401(k) RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE,
Defendants, Case No. C 16-4265 CW (N.D. Cal.).

Cryer is a former employee of FRI and a former member of FRI's
401(k) retirement plan.  On Feb. 12, 2016, Cryer was terminated
from his employment with FRI.  On Feb. 13, 2016, Cryer signed a
document entitled "Confidential Agreement and General Release,"
which contained a "general release" provision whereby Cryer agreed
to release all claims against FRI, including all common law,
contract, tort or other Claims the Employee might have, as well as
Claims the Employee might have under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974.

On July 28, 2016, Cryer, individually and as representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, brought suit against FRI
pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(2), asserting FRI breached its
fiduciary duties to the Franklin Templeton 401(k) Retirement Plan.
He seeks restoration of all losses to the plan arising from FRI's
alleged breach of fiduciary duties.

On Oct. 24, 2016, FRI brought a motion for summary judgment,
contending that Cryer could not advance his claims because he had
released them in his severance agreement.  The Court rejected
FRI's motion.  Relying on Bowles v. Reade, the Court held that
Cryer could not give up the claims that he brought on behalf of
the plan.

On June 9, 2017, Cryer brought a motion to certify a class of all
current and former participants in the Franklin Templeton 401(k)
Retirement Plan from July 28, 2010 to the present.  FRI made a
number of other arguments against the class certification, which
the Court rejected.  Ultimately, the Court granted Cryer's motion
for class certification.

On Aug. 8, 2017, FRI sought reconsideration of the Court's order
granting class certification.  It urges the Court to reconsider
its decision that Cryer's severance agreement's "class action
waiver" provision is not enforceable under the National Labor
Relations Act and Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP.  On its face, the
language of the "class action waiver" provision would seem to
prevent Cryer from becoming a member of a class action such as
this one.

Judge Wilken concludes that the ability to file a Section
502(a)(2) claim as a class action is an important one.
Participants bringing a Section 502(a)(2) claim act in a
representative capacity on behalf of the plan and are bound to
employ procedures to protect effectively the interests they
purport to represent.  The representatives can discharge their
duty by ensuring absent participants are properly represented,
joining or making a good faith effort to join other participants,
or filing a class action pursuant to Rule 23.  Where the number of
participants is large, a class action may be the most appropriate
procedural device.  Accordingly, the right to seek class
certification is important for fair resolution of Section
502(a)(2) claims, and cannot be bargained away without the plan's
consent.  For these reasons, Judge Wilken denied FRI's motion for
reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WsoSk8 from Leagle.com.

Marlon H. Cryer, Retirement Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph
Andrew Creitz -- joseph.creitz@gmail.com -- Creitz & Serebin LLP.

Marlon H. Cryer, Plaintiff, represented by Mark George Boyko --
mboyko@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey Glasser LLP, Mark P. Kindall --
mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP & Gregory Y.
Porter -- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP.

Franklin Resources, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian David
Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny Myers LLP & Catalina Joos
Vergara -- cvergara@omm.com -- O'Melveny and Myers LLP.


GENGHIS GRILL: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Peiffer Rosca Wolf disclosed that on October 4, 2017, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
located in Memphis, issued an order conditionally certifying a
collective class of current and former employees of a Genghis
Grill restaurant located in Germantown, Tennessee.

This comes in response to a complaint filed on behalf of an
ex-employee, alleging substandard wages, unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid overtime wages, and unpaid "off-the-clock" work under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  Additionally, the complaint
alleges that Genghis Grill required this ex-employee, as well as
others similarly situated, to work for less than minimum wages, to
contribute to an unlawful tip pool, to work "off-the-clock" for no
pay, and to perform non-tipped job tasks that were unrelated to
their tipped occupation while only being paid the tipped minimum
wage.

Plaintiff's attorney, Brandon Wise, Esq. -- bwise@prwlegal.com --
said, "We are glad that employees at the Germantown Genghis Grill
location will be notified of this action and made aware of their
rights.  Through our investigation, we believe that there have
been similar violations at multiple Genghis Grill restaurants. We
continue our investigation into Genghis Grill's pay practices."

In conditionally certifying two collective classes, the order
states:

Specifically, the Court conditionally certifies the two following
classes of Defendants' employees:

1. The FLSA Tip-Credit Collective Class: All current and former
workers employed by Chalak Restaurants of Germantown, LLC who were
employed in a tipped position--including as a server, host(ess),
or bartender--within three years preceding the date of conditional
certification of this action through final judgment in this
matter, and who elect to opt into this action;

2. The FLSA Minimum Wage Collective Class: All current and former
non-exempt hourly paid employees (i.e., "non-tipped" employees)
employed by Chalak Restaurants of Germantown, LLC who worked
within three years preceding the date of conditional certification
of this action through final judgment in this matter, and who
elect to opt into this action.

On the possibility of nationwide certification, the Court stated:

It may become clear that Defendants--possibly along with other
defendants yet to be joined--implemented a nationwide employment
policy in the Western District of Tennessee, as well as elsewhere.
At that time, Plaintiff may renew her Motion for Conditional
Certification.

What to Do if You Believe You Were an Improperly Compensated
Employee

Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane, APLC ("Peiffer Rosca
Wolf") is prepared to take further action and protect the rights
of all Genghis Grill servers, hosts/hostesses, bartenders, and
other hourly employees who had to work "off-the-clock," had their
hours reduced (a practice commonly called "time shaving") so that
overtime pay could be avoided, or were otherwise not paid
correctly.

If you worked at a Genghis Grill restaurant and wish to obtain
additional information about this matter or your potential legal
rights, contact Brandon Wise by phone at 314-833-4825 or by email
at bwise@prwlegal.com.

       About Peiffer Rosca Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane, APLC

Peiffer Rosca Wolf comprised a sophisticated team of lawyers from
around the country committed to one goal: Representing employees
of Genghis Grill who had to work off-the-clock or were not paid
correctly.  Peiffer Rosca Wolf is a nationwide law firm that
represents plaintiffs in employment, consumer, securities, and
various other types of civil litigation. [GN]


GLOBAL TEL*LINK: Court Denies Certification of ADTPA Class
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying both Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification,
Appointment of Class Representative and Class Counsel and
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Proceedings
in the case captioned WALTER CHRUBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GLOBAL
TEL*LINK CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 5:15-CV-5136 (W.D.
Ark.).

Plaintiffs allege that GTL obtained exclusive contracts to provide
telephone services to inmates at correctional facilities
throughout the United States in exchange for the payment of
kickbacks to those correctional facilities known as site
commissions.  And, as in the GTL interstate case, Plaintiffs
further allege that GTL charged them excessive rates to cover the
costs of site commissions it paid to correctional facilities, and
charged them deposit fees that unreasonably exceeded the cost of
processing deposits into prepaid accounts.

In the instant case, Plaintiffs originally brought their claims
under the FCA, the common-law doctrine of unjust enrichment, the
Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), and California's
Unfair Competition Law (UCL). However, the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs' FCA claims without prejudice, essentially on the
grounds that the FCA does not apply to the sort of purely
intrastate communications services described in the Amended
Complaint. The case that was subsequently consolidated with the
instant one also brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).

GTL has moved to compel four of the Plaintiffs to arbitrate their
claims: Shondra Caldwell, Jacqueline Jacobs, Stefanie Veon, and
Stephen Orosz, Sr. (the Arbitrating Plaintiffs). The Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a written provision in a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon any grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.

The Arbitrating Plaintiffs contend that here, GTL has waived any
right it may have to arbitrate their claims. A party waives its
right to arbitration if it '(1) knew of an existing right to
arbitration; (2) acted inconsistently with that right; and (3)
prejudiced the other party by these inconsistent acts.

All three elements of waiver are easily satisfied with respect to
Ms. Caldwell, Ms. Jacobs, and Ms. Veon. GTL contends that all
three of these individuals agreed to arbitrate their claims before
any of them filed their instant lawsuits, so GTL surely knew of
its right to arbitrate given that it possessed these arbitration
agreements. Yet, GTL waited well over a year and a half after the
instant litigation began before attempting to compel these
Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. In the meantime, GTL forced
these Plaintiffs to defend against a motion before the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel to transfer all related actions to
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and forced Ms. Jacobs and Ms.
Caldwell to defend against a motion here in the Western District
of Arkansas that sought dismissal of their claims on the merits.

GTL knew this was a putative class action and that at some point
on or before February 17, 2017, nine months after it claims he
signed the arbitration agreement -- Mr. Orosz, Sr. would move to
certify a class and be appointed as a class representative. Yet,
GTL chose not to move to compel arbitration of Mr. Orosz, Sr.'s
claims until a month after the deadline had passed for him to move
for class certification, even though GTL contends that Mr. Orosz,
Sr.'s arbitration agreement prohibits him from arbitrating his
claims on behalf of a class.  By this Court's tally, the Motion
for Class Certification and supporting documents that Mr. Orosz,
Sr. and his fellow Plaintiffs filed on February 17, 2017 consist
of 3,191 pages.

Thus, if there is in fact a valid, enforceable arbitration
agreement between GTL and Mr. Orosz, Sr., and if that arbitration
agreement means what GTL says it means, then GTL's delay in moving
for arbitration of Mr. Orosz, Sr.'s claims resulted in him
devoting some substantial amount of time and effort towards the
litigation of class certification issues that would be of utterly
no use to him in arbitration, and that he never would have
undertaken if GTL had simply moved to compel arbitration in a
timely manner. That is a textbook example of prejudice.

Ultimately, then, all three elements of waiver are satisfied with
respect to each of the Arbitrating Plaintiffs. Therefore, GTL's
Motion to Compel Arbitration will be denied.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification

GTL argues that Plaintiffs' class definitions create choice-of-law
problems by not specifying where the class members were
geographically located at the time they placed an intrastate call.
Without knowing where the class members were located, the argument
goes, we cannot know which state's law to apply to any given class
member's claims without conducting a choice-of-law multi-factor
balancing test for every single member. See id. But this concern,
however legitimate it may be, has nothing to do with whether the
proposed class definitions identify class members by objective
criteria; rather, it concerns whether common issues predominate
over questions affecting individual class members.

Apart from this issue, GTL's position on ascertainability is the
same in this case as in the interstate case and incorporates the
same arguments and evidence here. Likewise, for the same reasons
as in the interstate case, those arguments are unavailing here and
Plaintiffs' proposed class definitions satisfy the
ascertainability requirement.

The proposed classes are numerous, likely containing at least
thousands of members. Plaintiffs' claims are also typical of the
proposed classes' claims, as all class members' claims are based
on the same remedial theory, which is that GTL violated several
states' consumer protection laws and common law of unjust
enrichment by charging them exorbitant rates and deposit fees for
intrastate phone calls. And Plaintiffs would fairly and-adequately
represent the classes' interests, which are aligned with their
own; as in the interstate case, they have vigorously prosecuted
their own interests through qualified counsel up through the
present moment in this litigation, and the Court sees no reason to
believe this vigorous prosecution will abate following class
certification. GTL has not argued in its briefing that these three
Rule 23(a) factors weigh against class certification, and at oral
argument counsel for GTL clarified that it has no arguments to
offer with respect to these three factors that this Court has not
already rejected in the interstate case.

The Eighth Circuit has explained that: "When determining whether
common questions predominate, a court must conduct a limited
preliminary inquiry, looking behind the pleadings, but that
inquiry should be limited to determining whether, if the
plaintiffs' general allegations are true, common evidence could
suffice to make out a prima facie case for the class. While
limited in scope, this analysis should also be rigorous."

In the interstate case, the Court was persuaded that the common
allegations, if true, could suffice to make out a prima facie case
for the proposed FCA and unjust enrichment classes. However, in
the instant case, the Court does not believe these same common
allegations could suffice to make out a prima facie case for the
proposed ADTPA and UCL classes. Furthermore, new arguments raised
in this case about one of GTL's defenses to Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims have persuaded the Court that common issues do
not predominate with respect to the unjust enrichment classes
either.

There simply is no path forward under the common law of unjust
enrichment or the statutory laws of ADTPA and the UCL that avoids
the necessity of overwhelmingly claimant-specific factual
analysis. Therefore, the Court cannot certify these classes. Given
that conclusion, there is no need to address the final Rule
23(b)(3) factor of superiority.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9kwuvg5from Leagle.com.

Jacqueline Mills Jacobs, Plaintiff, represented by Amy C. Martin,
Attorney at Law, 3608 N Steele Blvd, Ste 101, Fayetteville, AR
72703-5360

Jacqueline Mills Jacobs, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin D.
Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll
PLLC, Donna Siegel Moffa -- dmoffa@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer Check LLP, Edward W. Ciolko -- eciolko@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique Myatt Galloway --
mgalloway@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Patrick
Howard -- phoward@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky
P.C., Peter A. Muhic -- pmuhic@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check LLP, Robert A. Braun -- rbraun@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers Toll PLLC, Amanda Trask -- ktrask@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Peter R. Kahana -- pkahana@bm.net
-- Berger Montague P.C. & Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE
P.C., 1622 Locust St., Philadelphia, PA 19103.

Shondra Caldwell, Plaintiff, represented by Amy C. Martin,
Attorney at Law, Benjamin D. Brown, Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll
PLLC, pro hac vice, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check LLP, Edward W. Ciolko, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro
hac vice, Monique Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP,
pro hac vice, Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky
P.C., Peter A. Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Robert A.
Braun, Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll PLLC, Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Earl Reese, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at Law,
Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique Myatt
Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick
Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A. Muhic,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER TOPAZ
MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Walter Chruby, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C.

Stephen Orosz, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin,
Attorney at Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check
LLP, Monique Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro
hac vice, Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C.,
Peter A. Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E.
JONES, KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger
Montague P.C. & Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Michael Veon, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Larry Bageant, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Luann Bouvier, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Stephen Orosz, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Stephanie Veon, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Lewis Brooks, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice, Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Monique
Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C., Peter A.
Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, SAMANTHA E. JONES, KESSLER
TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP, Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C. &
Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C..

Global Tel*Link Corporation, Defendant, represented by Derek Ho --
dho@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel Frederick
P.L.L.C., Marshall S. Ney -- mney@fridayfirm.com -- Friday,
Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Robert J. Herrington --
herringtonr@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP & Michael R.
Sklaire -- sklairem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP.


GOOGLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in AdWords Smart Pricing Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part
and denying in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
case captioned RICK WOODS, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 5:11-cv-01263-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

Google's AdWords program lets advertisers create and display ads
on webpages within Google's ad network.  Woods is an Arkansas
attorney who bought AdWords ads.  He alleges that Google failed to
provide a Smart Pricing discount for three ad clicks that Woods
paid for.  He also alleges that Google applied an incorrect Smart
Pricing discount to 660 of clicks that Woods paid for, which
resulted in smaller discounts than Woods believed he was entitled
to receive. Id. Finally, Woods alleges that Google promised to
show location-targeted ads to visitors who were physically located
in the targeted area, when in fact it showed those ads to visitors
who were located elsewhere.

Regarding his Smart Pricing allegations, Woods brings claims for
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) California's Unfair Competition Law
(UCL), and (4) California's False Advertising Law (FAL).

Woods contends that Google breached the AdWords Agreement by
failing to apply a Smart Pricing discount to three ad clicks that
Woods paid for.

In response, Google contends that "ads displayed on mobile phone
browsers are different from ads displayed on mobile applications.
Google argues that the three clicks at issue were from browsers on
mobile devices, and because those clicks were on mobile ads, they
were excluded from the Smart Pricing System.  But Woods notes that
Google's position in its motion -- that mobile ads encompasses ads
displayed on smartphones in tablets is arguably inconsistent with
its position that text ads appearing mobile browsers are excluded
mobile ads, while ads appearing in mobile applications were Smart
Priced.

The Court agrees with Woods that a factual dispute exists
regarding the meaning of "mobile ads." A factual dispute also
exists as to whether the three clicks at issue involved mobile ads
that were excluded from Smart Pricing. Accordingly, Google's
motion for summary judgment on Woods's breach-of-contract claim
must be denied.

Wood's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing rests on allegations of Google's secret agreements
with its Special Partners to generate invalid clicks and failure
to apply Smart Pricing.  Woods has not produced evidence to
support these allegations. Instead, Woods argues that his implied
covenant claim also rests on Google's use of incorrect Smart
Pricing scores, which resulted in discounts that were smaller than
the discounts Woods believed he should have received. These
allegations, however, arise from the same acts and seek the same
damages as Woods's breach-of-contract claim.

Thus, the Court finds that Woods's implied covenant claim is
superfluous, and summary judgment in Google's favor is warranted.

To prevail on his UCL and FAL claims, Woods must establish that he
saw and relied on Google's misrepresentations regarding Smart
Pricing.

Woods alleges that he relied on three misrepresentations by
Google: (1) the AdWords Agreement, (2) a Google help webpage
(attached as Exhibit B to the SAC), and (3) a multimedia
presentation (attached as Exhibit F to the SAC). None of these
sources establishes a valid basis for Woods's Smart Pricing UCL
claim.

However, this argument fails because Woods must plead -- but does
not -- that he actually saw or heard Google's advertising
campaign.  Because Woods has failed to establish that he relied on
Google's misrepresentations, Google's motion for summary judgment
will be granted as to Woods's UCL and FAL claims regarding Smart
Pricing.

Woods also brings a UCL claim based on his allegation that Google
represented that it would display Woods's ads to users who were
physically located in a specific geographic area, when in fact it
showed ads to users in other areas.

The Court finds that Google did disclose this practice on a help
webpage, but a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Woods
nonetheless relied on Google's statement that ads would appear in
specific geographic areas. A reasonable jury could conclude that
Woods saw and relied on Google's statement that ads would be
targeted to users in a specific geographic area; that Google in
fact charged for clicks on Woods's ads outside of the designated
geographic areas; and that Woods was charged for these clicks. As
such, Google's motion for summary judgment on Woods's UCL claim
for location targeting will be denied.

Google's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Woods's
claims for (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing regarding Smart Pricing and (2) UCL and FAL
violations regarding Smart Pricing. Google's motion is denied as
to Woods's claims for (1) breach-of-contract regarding Smart
Pricing and (2) UCL claims regarding Location Targeting.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9subltffrom Leagle.com.

Rick Woods, Plaintiff, represented by Brad Edward Seidel, 205
Linda DriveDaingerfield, TX 75638.

Rick Woods, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Christopher Mulveny -
- dmulveny@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check, LLP,
Margaret Elin Onasch -- monasch@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
and Check, LLP, Matthew Leo Mustokoff mmustokoff@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check, LLP, Andrew Gordon Pate, Nix,
Patterson and Roach, LLP, 205 Linda Dr.Daingerfield, TX 75638,
Chad Ethan Ihrig, Nix, Patterson and Roach, LLP, 3600 N Capital of
Texas Hwy Ste B350, Austin, TX 78746-3308, Jeffrey John
Angelovich, Nix, Patterson & Roach, LLP, 3600 N Capital of Texas
Hwy Ste B350, Austin, TX 78746-3308, pro hac vice, Joseph H.
Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check,
LLP, Naumon A. Amjed -- namjed@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check, LLP, Ramzi Abadou -- ramzi.abadou@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn
Swick Foti LLP, Robin Winchester -- rwinchester@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan Thomas
Degnan -- rdegnan@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check, LLP,
Sean M. Handler -- shandler@ktmc.com -- Esq., Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & Stacey Marie Kaplan --
skaplan@ktmc.com --  Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Google, Inc., Defendant, represented by Edward D. Johnson --
wjohnson@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Eric Evans --
eevans@mayerbrown.com -Mayer Brown LLP, Dominique Chantale Alepin
-- dalepin@ftc.gov --  Mayer Brown LLP, Donald M. Falk --
dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Matthew Henry Marmolejo -
- mmarmolejo@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Michael David
Battaglia -- mbattaglia@mayerbrown.com Mayer Brown LLP & Sarah
Eileen Reynolds -- sreynolds@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP.


GREEN PHARMA: Class Decertification in "Rosendez" Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RACHEL ROSENDEZ et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. GREEN PHARMACEUTICALS, Defendant and Respondent,
Case No. D071073 (Cal. App.), Judge Gilbert Nares of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Fourth District, Division One,
reversed the judgment in favor of Green, including the portion of
the judgment denying the Plaintiff's request for certification of
the proposed classes and notice thereto to be paid by Green.

Rosendez filed a class action complaint in June 2011 against Green
that included a first cause of action for violation of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") and second cause of action
for violation of the unfair competition law ("UCL") and false
advertising law ("FAL").  The complaint alleges that Green
produces and sells SnoreStop and makes numerous false claims about
the product's efficacy.

In September 2013, the trial court granted Rosendez's motion for
class certification and certified a class consisting of all
persons located within California who purchased SnoreStop for
personal use at any time from June 28, 2007 to the present.

The case was tried to the court in September 2014.  The Plaintiffs
called as an expert witness Dr. Lynn Willis, who has a Ph.D. in
pharmacology, which is the study of drugs.  In summary, Willis
concluded that and the proper conclusion for the Lipman study, the
clinical study referenced on the SnoreStop label, is that it does
not show that SnoreStop is any more effective than the placebo
treatment.

After the Plaintiffs rested, Green moved for judgment under Code
of Civil Procedure section 631.8 on the ground the Plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of proof.  After hearing argument from
Green's counsel, the court denied Green's motion for judgment and
motion to strike Willis's testimony.  It concluded that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,
supported an inference that none of the components of SnoreStop
specified on the product's label have any effect on reducing the
swelling of tissue that causes snoring.

Green called, as an expert on homeopathy, Gregory Dana Ullman, who
testified that he practiced homeopathy and had written hundreds of
articles on homeopathy.  He further testified that Time Magazine
had referred to him as the leading proselytizer for homeopathy and
NBC's 20/20 news program had referred to him as homeopathy's
foremost spokesperson.

Noting that Ullman testified for Green as an expert witness, the
court found Ullman's testimony unhelpful in understanding the
purported efficacy of the ingredients of SnoreStop to reduce the
symptoms of snoring.  It concluded that although it had serious
reservations regarding the effectiveness of the product in
question, the Plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to meet
their burden of proof to establish a viable claim under the CLRA
because they offered insufficient evidence to support their
contention that Green engaged in unfair and deceptive business
practices.

The court entered a judgment that incorporated the statement of
decision and largely reiterated its findings and conclusions.
With respect to the Plaintiffs' UCL and FAL claims, the Court
finds that they presented insufficient evidence to (i) prove that
Green made any false or misleading statements or representations
in connection with the advertising or labeling of its product, and
(ii) show that Green knew or should have known that any of their
statements were untrue, false or misleading.  The Plaintiffs
timely appealed.

In light of the court's denial of Green's motion for judgment,
Judge Nares construe the court's ultimate conclusion that the
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to establish a
viable claim under the CLRA, UCL and FAL because they offered
insufficient evidence to support their contentions.  Considering
that the court arbitrarily disregarded Willis' uncontradicted and
unimpeached expert testimony regarding the inefficacy of
homeopathy in general and SnoreStop in particular, and expressly
rejected Ullman's testimony and Green's evidence in general, he
concludes the court erred in ruling the Plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden of proof that SnoreStop is an ineffective snoring
remedy.

Given the uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence that the
fundamental principles of homeopathy have no basis in science and
that SnoreStop in particular is not an effective remedy for
snoring, the court should have found for the Plaintiffs on both of
their causes of action and awarded the appropriate relief
requested in their complaint.

Further, the provision of the judgment denying class certification
presumably was included as the result of mistake or inadvertence
because there was no pending motion or "request" by the Plaintiffs
to certify the class when the court entered judgment; the court
had granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class in
September 2013, a year before trial.  To the extent the court
intended the provision to be a ruling decertifying the class,
Judge Nares finds it improper because in addition to there being
no pending request to decertify, the record does not reflect
anything before the court indicating the requirements for
certification were no longer satisfied at the time of trial.  The
fact that the court adjudicated the class claims in Green's favor
was not a proper basis to decertify the class.

Judge Nares reversed the judgment in favor of Green, including the
portion of the judgment denying the Plaintiff's request for
certification of the proposed classes and notice thereto to be
paid by Green.

He directed the trial court to determine the damages, restitution,
and other relief to which the Plaintiff class members are entitled
under their first and second causes of action based on the court's
de novo review of the evidence presented at trial or such
additional evidence as the court may deem necessary or advisable.
The court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
class awarding such damages, restitution, or other relief under
the appropriate causes of action.  Judge Nares awarded the
Plaintiffs their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/n9UFoA from Leagle.com.

Newport Trial Group, Pacific Trial Attorneys, Scott J. Ferrell --
sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com -- and Ryan M. Ferrell --
rferrell@apextrial.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Carlos F. Negrete; The Lampel Firm and Eric P. Lampel --
elampel@thelampelfirm.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


HILTON WORLDWIDE: Judge Tosses False Ad Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bonnie Eslinger, writing for Law360, reports that a California
federal judge on Oct. 10 refused to sign off on a Hilton Worldwide
Holdings Inc. deal to settle claims it misled 10,000 prospective
timeshare customers with vouchers it refused to accept at certain
properties, saying the coupon offered to class members doesn't
remedy out-of-pocket cash damages.

U.S. District Judge Jon S. Tigar asked for additional briefing
from the parties, saying plaintiff Timothy Elder needed to provide
the court with "justification for compensating class members with
new [Hilton] certificates instead of money."
Mr. Elder's putative class action alleges that he agreed to
participate in a Hilton timeshare presentation on the promise of a
future deeply-discounted stay at a Hilton hotel, but when he tried
to use his "Spend a Night on Us" voucher to be reimbursed for a
stay at a DoubleTree by Hilton hotel, he was told his certificate
was valid only for a stay at a Hilton Hotel or Hilton Club
property.

"The court notes that plaintiff alleges that many class members
suffered out-of-pocket damages, by spending money they would not
otherwise have spent, based on Hilton's allegedly misleading
representations," the judge wrote in his Oct. 10 ruling.  "A
coupon does not provide a remedy for these injuries."

Under the proposed settlement, Hilton will provide class members
with a new certificate valid for a rebate of up to $50, if the
class member had a $100 "Spend a Night on Us" certificate
rejected, or up to $100 for class members who unsuccessfully tried
to use their provided $200 "SANU" certificate.  The new
certificates are valid for use for up to two years for a stay at
one of six different Hilton brand properties: Hilton Hotel,
DoubleTree by Hilton, Embassy Suites by Hilton, Hilton Garden Inn,
Hampton Inn and Homewood Suites by Hilton.

In his Oct. 10 ruling, Judge Tigar asked Mr. Elder to explain why
the new SANU certificates are "still only applicable at certain
Hilton properties for a limited two-year period, despite
plaintiff's claims that the original vouchers were ambiguous
regarding which Hilton properties would honor them."

The judge also chastised Elder for not including in his June
motion for preliminary settlement approval information regarding
the amount that he might have been reasonably expected to recover
if he were to take his claims to trial and win.

"The only reference plaintiff makes to the overall value of the
settlement in relation to what the class may recover at trial in
his motion lies in the introduction," the judge states. "Plaintiff
claims that the settlement is an 'excellent result' for class
members because 'the settlement provides 50 percent of the maximum
recovery they could have hoped to achieve had the case proceeded
to trial.' Because the settlement does not compensate the class in
cash, however, that statement does not provide the court with
enough information about this variable."

Under the agreement made by the parties, the proposed settlement
class will include "all persons in the United States who received
a 'Spend a Night on Us' certificate from Hilton that stated it was
for use at 'any Hilton Hotel,' and that Hilton refused to honor,
based solely on the brand of Hilton hotel that the certificate
holder had stayed at, during the period from Jan. 15, 2012,
through Feb. 28, 2014."

Mr. Elder, who is slated to receive an additional award of $5,000
under the proposed settlement, states in his motion for
preliminary approval that the deal with Hilton provides half of
the maximum recovery the class could have hoped to achieve had the
case proceeded to trial.

"Importantly, settlement class members will not need to do
anything to receive the new SANU certificates," Mr. Elder states,
adding the certificates will be sent directly to class members.

Going forward with the litigation means facing such risks as
failing to certify a class, having summary judgment granted in
favor of Hilton or losing at trial, the motion for preliminary
approval states, adding, "Such considerations have been found to
weigh heavily in favor of settlement."

In its answer to Mr. Elder's operative complaint, Hilton states
that the plaintiff was given the choice of one of six "brand-
specific" SANU rebate certificates in connection with his
participation in the timeshare presentation.

"Plaintiff specifically chose the brand-specific SANU certificate
good for use at any Hilton Hotel brand," Hilton states.

Elder's motion for preliminary approval notes that the outcome of
the case "hinged" on the jury's interpretation of language on the
SANU certificates.

"There was simply no guarantee that the jury would see things
plaintiff's way," he states.

Mr. Elder's attorney, Jana Eisinger --
jeisinger@eisingerlawfirm.com -- of the Law Office of Jana
Eisinger PLLC, told Law360 on Oct. 11 that providing each class
member with a hotel certificate for 50 percent of the maximum
compensatory value they could have recovered at trial is an
"excellent outcome."

"The proposed settlement provides significant and immediate
benefits to each class member right away, and is fair and
reasonable given the uncertainty and risk of continued
litigation," Ms. Eisinger wrote in an email.  "We intend to
further address the issues raised by Judge Tigar in our
supplemental briefing."

Mr. Elder's putative class action complaint asserts claims for
breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act,
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, violation of
the California False Advertising Law, negligent misrepresentation,
and fraud, among others.

Counsel for Hilton declined a request for comment.

Plaintiff Timothy Elder is represented by Jana Eisinger of the Law
Office of Jana Eisinger PLLC and Lawrence Timothy Fisher --
ltfisher@bursor.com -- of Bursor & Fisher PA.

Hilton is represented by Angela Christine Agrusa --
angela.agrusa@dlapiper.com -- and David Brian Farkas --
david.farkas@dlapiper.com -- of DLA Piper.

The case is Elder v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. et al, number
3:16-cv-00278 (N.D. Cal.).  The case is assigned to Judge Jon S.
Tigar.  The was filed January 15, 2016. [GN]


HIRAKEGOMA INC: Faces "Garcia" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------------
Luis Perez Garcia, on behalf of others similarly situated v.
Hirakegoma Inc. d/b/a Nagomi, Kensan Kim, Suyen Kim, and Jong Bok
Kim, Case No. 1:17-cv-07608 (S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants own and operate a restaurant located at 179 Prince
Street, New York, New York 10012. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Antonio Faillace
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Telephone: (212) 317-1200
      Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
      E-mail: michael@faillacelaw.com

HOBBY LOBBY: Court Narrows Claims in "Chase" Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in the case
captioned CHRISTINA CHASE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC., an
Oklahoma corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00881-GPC-BLM (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff, a resident of California, brings this action on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated against Defendant Hobby
Lobby, a resident of Oklahoma, under the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA).  Defendant operates Hobby Lobby retail stores and the
hobbylobby.com website and advertises, markets, distributes, and
sells home decor, arts, crafts, hobby supplies, and other
accessories in California and throughout the United States.
Plaintiff alleges that Hobby Lobby is engaging in the unlawful
business practice of advertising fictitious prices and phantom
discounts by referencing a fake Marked price, that is then offered
for sale at a deeper discounted price. Plaintiff alleges that the
Marked price on Hobby Lobby's merchandise is a total fiction
because the merchandise is never offered for sale, nor actually
sold at the represented Marked price.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The Court must analyze whether Defendant's extrinsic evidence can
be considered at the Motion to Dismiss stage. Defendant has
submitted the Declaration of Theresa Webster and Exhibits
portraying what Defendant asserts to be relevant advertising
templates for the Paintbrush and Photo Frame and templates for
what Defendant asserts are for categories of "Sale," "Clearance"
and "Non-Discounted" items.

In this case, it is "beyond dispute" that the Complaint alleges
that the Photo Frame advertisement Ms. Chase viewed was misleading
and thus is central to the Complaint's claims.  Further, Plaintiff
has raised no authenticity objections with regard to Exhibit B.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Exhibit B1 (Advertisement
Template for Photo Frames) is incorporated by reference because it
is a clearer picture of an exhibit attached to the complaint that
forms the basis of Plaintiff's claims.

Defendant argues that the survey is "inadmissible and therefore
immaterial and impertinent to the case." Defendant conflates a
Rule 12(f) motion to strike allegations with a motion to strike
evidence based on the rules of evidence. Denying defendant's
motion to strike based on theory that any facts inadmissible at
trial must be stricken from complaint. The fact that the survey
may be inadmissible under the rules of evidence does not make it
immaterial for purposes of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike. Here,
the survey relates to the Plaintiff's claims and is not redundant,
immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.  Accordingly, the Court
denies Defendant's motion to strike.

Accepting as true the allegations that Plaintiff was misled
because of Hobby Lobby's discounting scheme, Plaintiff would
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing to pursue
claims related to Defendant's paintbrush and photo frame products
under the UCL, FAL and CLRA. Plaintiff would necessarily have lost
money if she was misled into purchasing a product based on the
belief that Hobby Lobby had previously sold that product at a
higher Marked price.

Defendant's references to the Spokeo standard requiring concrete
and particularized injury are inapposite monetary damage is
concrete and Plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was
affected by the advertising in a personal and individual way.
Accordingly, the Court denies this portion of the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on
behalf of consumers who purchased items that Chase did not
purchase. In short, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims
should only be limited to the products actually purchased photo
frames and paintbrushes.

Here, the unlawful pricing scheme was not limited to the two items
purchased by Plaintiff. It allegedly was a business practice
illegally employed by Defendant to draw customers, deceive
customers and trigger purchases of various products. Limiting
standing to the items actually purchased -- in these circumstances
-- would ignore the nature of the scheme and lead to a multitude
of actions raising essentially identical claims.
Therefore, at this juncture, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has standing on behalf of others who purchased Hobby Lobby
products who were similarly misled by Hobby Lobby's in-store
advertisements. Accordingly, the Court denies this portion of the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

With regard to claims sounding in fraud, Plaintiff must satisfy a
heightened pleading standard that must "state with particularity
the circumstances surrounding fraud. This means the Plaintiff must
set forth the who, what, where, and how of the fraud alleged.  The
heightened pleading standard applies to claims under the CLRA,
UCL, and FAL. It is not enough to simply claim that an
advertisement is false the plaintiff must allege facts showing why
it is false.

Plaintiff fails to meet Rule 9(b)'s pleading standards requiring
particularity. While her complaint provides sufficient detail as
to the who, what, when and where of the alleged misconduct,
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the "how" of Defendant's
alleged misconduct.

Plaintiff does not adequately allege with the requisite
specificity how the advertisements could be misleading to a
reasonable consumer as she has failed to even discuss the words on
the ads, and moreover did not plead how the disclaimers and other
content on the ads may or may not have affected her purchasing
decision. Any amended pleading should address the extent of
plaintiff's examination of the placards with specificity. Sperling
v. Stein-Mart, Inc., 2016 WL 8925347, finding that plaintiff's
failure to address asterisk on Defendant's price tags directing
consumers to a fair pricing policy weighed in favor of finding
plaintiff's alleged belief regarding pricing scheme was
unreasonable.  Rael II, 2016 WL 7655247, finding that plaintiff
failed to plead with particularity by failing to give details as
to what signs she relied on, what the signs said or looked like,
or where they were located.

Plaintiff's claims cannot advance past the pleading stage until
they are pled with sufficient particularity. Accordingly, the
Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's UCL,
FAL, and CLRA claims with leave to amend.

Plaintiff seeks restitution under her UCL and FAL claims.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to restitution
because she failed to allege that she that she paid too much for
the Photo Frame or the Paintbrush or that she could have purchased
these or similar items for less elsewhere. Plaintiff argues that
restitution under the UCL and FAL is not limited to a calculation
of price paid minus value received

In Le v. Kohls Dept. Stores, Inc., 160 F.Supp.3d 1096, 1103-04,
the Court, analyzing California law, found that the failure to
plead that a product was purchased at a price greater than their
value was not fatal to the claim. Moreover, in Le, the court
emphasized the importance of a full trial record, the benefits of
discovery, and a complete evidentiary record in determining the
proper measure of restitution in a case.  Accordingly, the Court
found that these were issues for another day.  The Court finds Le
persuasive and finds that it is premature at the motion to dismiss
stage to define the parameters of a restitution claim.
Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss on this
ground.

Defendant raises for the first time on Reply that Plaintiff's CLRA
claim should be dismissed for failure to provide adequate notice
under Section 1782.

The Court observes that Plaintiff has yet to amend her complaint
to seek these damages and that the primary purpose of the notice
requirement is to incentivize pre-suit resolutions and not to
incentivize dismissals with prejudice Given that Plaintiff's CLRA
claim does not contain a damages claim at this time, the Court
will deny Defendant's motion to dismiss based on a failure to
provide adequate notice. If Plaintiff does not file an Amended
Complaint within thirty days, her CLRA claim will be limited to
injunctive relief.  Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the CLRA claim on this basis.

The Court finds that amendment would not be futile in this case
and grants leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 2, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybc4685yfrom Leagle.com.

Christina Chase, Plaintiff, represented by Todd D. Carpenter --
tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP, 402 West Broadway, 29th Floor. San Diego,
California 92101.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael John
Hassen -- MHassen@jmbm.com -- Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell
LLP.


HSN INC: Sued in Fla. Over Securities Exchange Act Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Palkon, individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. HSN, Inc., Arthur C. Martinez, Courtnee Alice Chun,
William Costello, Fiona Dias, James M. Follo, Stephanie Kugelman,
Thomas J. McInerney, Matthew E. Rubel, Ann Sarnoff, Liberty
Interactive Corporation, and Liberty Horizon, Inc., Case No. 8:17-
cv-02271-SDM-TGW (M.D. Fla., October 2, 2017), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Securities Exchange Act.

HSN, Inc. operates an online store of exclusive products and top
brand names. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      2 Righter Pkwy Ste 120
      Wilmington, DE 19803
      Telephone: (302) 295-5310
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
              GMS@rl-legal.com

         - and -

      Cullin Avram O'Brien, Esq.
      CULLIN O'BRIEN LAW, P.A.
      6541 NE 21st Way
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308
      Telephone: (561) 676-6370
      E-mail: cullin@cullinobrienlaw.com


IMPERVA INC: Accused of Wrongful Conduct Over Debt Collection
-------------------------------------------------------------
Julien Poinsignon, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated v. Imperva, Inc., Insperity Peo Services, L.P., and Does
1 through 50, Inclusive, Case No. 3:17-cv-05653 (N.D. Cal.
September 30, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Imperva, Inc. provides cyber security software and services to
protect enterprise data and application software and to ensure
regulatory compliance.

Insperity Peo Services, L.P. is in business of providing human
resources and business solutions services. [BN]

Julien Poinsignon is a pro se plaintiff.


JAMES SQUARE: Faces Class Action Over Poor Care of Residents
------------------------------------------------------------
James T. Mulder, writing for Syracuse.com, reports that a class
action lawsuit against James Square Health and Rehabilitation
Centre claims residents of the Syracuse nursing home are left
lying in their own urine and feces for extended periods of time.

The suit says the nursing home does not have enough staff to
regularly care for incontinent residents, at least one of whom
frequently goes entire nights without being changed.

Susan Karpen, a James Square resident since 2015, and Michael
Farruggio, whose mother was in James Square for four years until
she died last year, are the plaintiffs in the class action suit
filed in Onondaga County State Supreme Court by Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, a White Plains law firm.

Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, a partner in the firm, declined a
syracuse.com request to interview Ms. Karpen or Farruggio.

Emil Rossi, an attorney representing James Square, said the
nursing home is responding to the complaint, but does not comment
on pending litigation.

A class action suit is one in which a group of people who have
suffered similar harm sue the defendant as a group and potentially
share in any settlement.

If the court certifies the lawsuit as a class action, the
complaint says "hundreds if not thousands" of current and former
James Square residents could automatically become part of the
case.

The state Attorney General's Medicaid fraud unit has been
investigating James Square for months over patient care issues.
The AG's office raided the 440-bed facility at 918 James St. June
13 and seized records as part of the investigation.

Inspection reports and other government data show James Square has
a history of poor care.

At least five wrongful death lawsuits have been filed against
James Square over the past five years.

Stanley Wojciechowski, who took over as James Square's
administrator in late April, has said the home is improving its
operation by working with outside experts, hiring more staff and
paying closer attention to the concerns of residents' families.

The class action complaint says James Square is unsafe,
understaffed and negligent in its care of residents.

It claims understaffing led to the death of Theresa A. Farruggio,
who died in 2016 at age 79.

Ms. Farruggio fell on Dec. 28, 2015 after being left unattended,
according to the complaint.  Instead of taking Ms. Farruggio's
vital signs or sending her to a hospital, staff " . . . simply
returned her to her bed, put her on oxygen, gave her a Xanax
(sedative), and left her to fend for herself," the complaint says.

When her son arrived after the fall, he called 911 and she was
taken to a hospital where she was diagnosed with respiratory
failure, pneumonia, acute renal failure and a urinary tract
infection, according to the complaint. She was put on comfort care
and died in the hospital.

The complaint says Ms. Farruggio's urinary tract infection was ".
. . likely due to having been left in her own urine and feces for
extended periods of time by staff at the facility."

It also says Ms. Karpen has been left in her own waste on many
occasions and frequently goes entire nights without being changed.
[GN]


JMA ENERGY: 10th Cir. Affirms Remand of "Speed" to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's Order remanding the case
filed against JMA Energy Company, LLC, to the state court.

Plaintiff David Landon Speed filed a petition in the District
Court of Hughes County, Oklahoma, asserting a putative class
action against defendant JMA alleging that JMA had willfully
violated an Oklahoma statute that requires payment of interest on
delayed payment of revenue from oil and gas production.

He further asserted that JMA fraudulently concealed from mineral-
interest owners that it owed interest due under the statute,
intending to pay only those who requested interest. JMA removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma, asserting that the district court had
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

Mr. Speed filed an amended motion to remand the case to state
court. The district court granted this motion.

The first factor is "whether the claims asserted involve matters
of national or interstate interest." 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d)(3)(A). The more a class action implicates national or
interstate interests, the more it serves Congress's intent to
subject the suit to federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Conversely,
the more the action involves purely local interests, the more this
factor favors state-court jurisdiction.

JMA argues that this case could have nationwide effects because
Oklahoma has a significant position in the oil-and-gas industry,
and payments nationwide from other producers operating in Oklahoma
as well as producers operating in other States could therefore be
affected by the outcome of the case. But if a State's laws are
particularly influential, one would assume that it is because of
the prestige and expertise of the courts and legislature of that
State. We see no need to protect other States who have every right
and power to set different laws, and to adopt their own judicial
interpretations of those laws by shielding them from the influence
of Oklahoma courts. And JMA fails to explain how there can be a
significant national interest in the mere allocation of interest
between producers and royalty owners. The only thing national or
interstate about this case is that some of the owners of Oklahoma
property who are basing their claims on alleged violations of an
Oklahoma statute happen to live in other States and receive their
royalty checks there.

The second factor is whether the claims asserted will be governed
by Oklahoma law or the laws of other States. The parties do not
dispute that the governing law should be determined under Oklahoma
choice-of-law principles, since Oklahoma is the forum State. JMA's
argument on the issue is that the fraud claims against it may,
under those principles, be governed by the law of a State other
than Oklahoma. The district court found the argument unpersuasive
and concluded that this factor weighed slightly in favor of Mr.
Speed's motion to remand.

In any event, the Tenth Circuit said it need not travel too far
into the weeds on this issue. Almost everything about this case is
suffused with the distinct aroma of Oklahoma. The claims arise out
of interests in property in Oklahoma. There is no allegation of
any act performed by JMA outside that State. The alleged
misconduct consists of a failure to comply with an Oklahoma
statute and failure to announce that noncompliance. The sole
connection to other States is that some of the owners of Oklahoma
property live outside the State and receive their royalty checks
there. JMA cites no case law or other authority suggesting that in
this context another State's law would apply to a fraud claim of
any of the class members. The Tenth Circuit saw no abuse of
discretion in the district court's evaluation of this factor.

The third factor is whether the class action has been pleaded in a
manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction. JMA asserts that
Mr. Speed attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by excluding
from the class any publicly traded companies and affiliated
entities that produced, gathered, processed, or marketed oil and
gas. The district court found this argument unpersuasive,
reasoning that Mr. Speed had proposed a natural class that
encompassed all of the people and claims that one would expect to
include in a class action.

JMA notes that Mr. Speed failed to affirmatively allege in his
Petition the prerequisites for federal-court jurisdiction under
CAFA, such as an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000.
Had Mr. Speed affirmatively alleged such facts, it might have
rebutted a contention that he was seeking to avoid federal-court
jurisdiction. But his failure to allege such facts in a state-
court petition, where they would be irrelevant, is unsurprising
and adds little or nothing to the analysis of this factor.

The fourth factor is whether the action was brought in a forum
with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or
the defendants. The district court concluded that this factor
weighed in favor of remand because the action related to real-
property interests in Oklahoma, the class members owned royalty
interests in Oklahoma property, JMA is a citizen of Oklahoma, and
the underlying alleged actions that gave rise to this suit took
place in Oklahoma.

The Tenth Circuit agreed that these factors demonstrated the
required nexus between Oklahoma and the class members, the alleged
harms, and the defendant.

Ordinarily there is a distinct nexus to the forum if there is a
distinct nexus to the State and there is no particular reason to
distinguish the local court where the case was originally filed
from other local courts in the State. Perhaps the general rule
does not apply when, as suggested by the Senate Report, the local
court is a magnet court. But JMA has not even suggested, much less
provided evidence, that the Hughes County Court is in any way such
a court. In that light, the Tenth Circuit said it cannot say that
the district court abused its discretion in weighing this factor
in favor of remand.

The fifth factor is whether the number of citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number
of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other
members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial
number of States. The district court found that this factor
weighed in favor of remand.

But the district court made precisely the calculations required by
the unambiguous statutory language for the fifth factor. The 5%
figure in the Senate Report is solely an example of when
plaintiffs are widely dispersed among different States, not a
mandatory threshold for evaluating dispersion. And the court's
analysis captures the purpose of this factor--to ensure that no
other State has as significant an interest in the controversy as
does Oklahoma. The court correctly determined that this factor
weighed in favor of remand.

Finally, the district court must consider whether, during the 3-
year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more
other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf
of the same or other persons have been filed. The Senate Report
explains that the purpose of this factor is efficiency and
fairness: to determine whether a matter should be subject to
federal jurisdiction so that it can be coordinated with other
overlapping or parallel class actions. If other class actions
involving the same subject matter had been filed elsewhere, this
would strongly favor federal jurisdiction, because the combined
litigation could be handled under the federal court's
multidistrict-litigation process.

The district court noted that no other such actions had been filed
during the previous three-year period. JMA does not argue
otherwise. This factor favors remand.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
each factor supported remand. The Tenth Circuit therefore affirmed
its decision remanding this case to state court.

The appeals case is DAVID LANDON SPEED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JMA
ENERGY COMPANY, LLC, Defendant-Appellant, No. 17-7040 (10th Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's October 2, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y82eyd63from Leagle.com.

Robert D. McCutcheon of JMA Energy Company, LLC, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma (Mark D. Christiansen -- mark.christiansen@mcafeetaft.com
-- and Andrew J. Morris --  andrew.morris@mcafeetaft.com -- of
McAfee & Taft, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with counsel on the
briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.

Reagan E. Bradford of Lanier Law Firm, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (W.
Mark Lanier, Kevin P. Parker and M. Michelle Carreras of Lanier
Law Firm, 6810 FM 1960 West, Houston, TX 77069, with counsel on
the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Appeals Court Tosses $72MM Talcum Case Award
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that the latest on Missouri appeals
court ruling that vacated a $72 million award in an Alabama's
woman's lawsuit that claimed talcum powder and other Johnson &
Johnson products contributed to her cancer.

A spokeswoman for Johnson & Johnson says the company is pleased
with a Missouri appeals court ruling that threw out a $72 million
award for an Alabama woman who claimed the company's talcum powder
contributed to her ovarian cancer.

The appeals court ruled on Oct. 17 that Missouri was not the
proper jurisdiction for the lawsuit.  The court cited a U.S.
Supreme Court ruling this summer that found there must be a strong
connection between the plaintiff and a state where a lawsuit is
filed.  Only two of the 65 plaintiffs in Fox's case live in
Missouri.

Three other juries have ruled against Johnson & Johnson in similar
lawsuits in Missouri.

Spokeswoman Carol Goodrich said in a statement on Oct. 17 that the
company has consistently argued that Missouri has no jurisdiction
in cases involving non-residents and "we expect the existing
verdicts that we are appealing to be reversed."

A Missouri appeals court has thrown out a $72 million award to a
woman who claimed talcum powder made by Johnson & Johnson
contributed to her ovarian cancer.

The Missouri Eastern District court ruled on Oct. 17 that Missouri
was not the proper jurisdiction for a lawsuit filed by 62-year-old
Jacqueline Fox, of Birmingham, Alabama, who died in 2015 of
ovarian cancer.

That 2006 award was the first award in several cases that claimed
talcum powder contributed to cancer.  About 65 people joined Fox's
lawsuit but only two were from Missouri.

In its ruling, the court cited a June decision from the U.S.
Supreme Court that said there must be a connection between the
plaintiff's claims and the state where a lawsuit is filed. [GN]


JPMORGAN CHASE: Faces Class Action Over Unupdated Credit Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dena Aubin, writing for Reuters, reports that JPMorgan Chase Bank
has been hit with a proposed class action accusing it of failing
to update thousands of California consumers' credit records to
show that their debt had been erased in bankruptcy.

Filed on Oct. 9 in Manhattan federal court, the lawsuit said
listing the debt as still due keeps consumers' credit scores low,
raises their interest rates and can make it difficult for them to
get loans or jobs.  Some consumers pay off the debt just to clear
their credit reports, the lawsuit said. [GN]


KC TRANSPORT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Underwood" FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia, Charleston, denied the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the case captioned ANGELA UNDERWOOD,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. KC TRANSPORT, INC., d/b/a KC TRANSPORT OF WEST
VIRGINIA, INC., a West Virginia Corporation, and KENNY COMPTON, a
West Virginia resident, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:17-02522
(S.D. W.V.).

On April 16, 2017, the Plaintiff filed her complaint asserting a
claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") for unpaid
overtime wages, arising from her past employment as a truck driver
with KC Transport.  On behalf of herself and 50 similarly situated
employees, the Plaintiff also requested certification of a
collective action.  In the course of her employment, Ms. Underwood
did not drive across state lines, nor did her job duties
incorporate an expectation for her to do so.

Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must
at this stage, Ms. Underwood often worked more than 60 hours per
week and was not informed whether she was exempt from overtime
wages under the FLSA.  Even though she was not exempt from the
overtime-pay requirement, she was treated as an exempt employee
and paid a salary.  Thus, she was not paid overtime pay that she
was due for work in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Defendant filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim on May 22, 2017.  It submitted a supporting memorandum, and
the Plaintiff responded in opposition.

Judge Copenhaver finds that it is plain that the Defendant's
argument for dismissal rests on an affirmative defense, namely,
the motor carrier exemption from the FLSA.  The complaint
specifically alleges that Ms. Underwood is not covered by the
motor carrier exemption.  And the facts alleged do not allow the
Court to rule on the affirmative defense.

In particular, while KC Transport maintains that drivers,
including Ms. Underwood, frequently haul coal to railroad cars
which then proceed to transport the goods interstate, it relies on
an affidavit that cannot be considered at this juncture.  The
complaint itself naturally makes no such allegation.  In as much
as discovery is needed for further factual development of the
case, dismissal is unwarranted.  Therefore, the Judge denied the
motion to dismiss based on the motor carrier exemption.

Judge Copenhaver further finds that it is premature to dismiss the
class action for lack of standing and for failure to allege
essential elements before discovery can bring out the information
necessary to establish them.

Moreover, KC Transport makes its argument in support of such
request explicitly contingent on the dismissal of plaintiff's
individual claims.  In her complaint, Ms. Underwood requested an
opt-in FLSA collective action, not a Rule 23 class action.  Since
her individual claims are not dismissed, there is no reason now to
dismiss the collective claims.  In addition, Rule 23 requirements
do not apply to the certification of such a collective action.

For the reasons stated, Judge Copenhaver denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.  He directed the Clerk to transmit copies of
his Order to all counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/fQcRsg from Leagle.com.

Angela Underwood, Plaintiff, represented by Mark L. French --
mark@markfrench.com -- THE LAW FIRM OF MARK L. FRENCH.

KC Transport, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda J. Taylor,
THE LAW OFFICE OF STEPHEN P. NEW & Stephen P. New.

Kenny Compton, Defendant, represented by Amanda J. Taylor, THE LAW
OFFICE OF STEPHEN P. NEW.


LLR INC: "Doran" Class Suit Removed to Cent. Dist. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on May 18, 2017 captioned Terri
Doran, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. LLR Inc. d/b/a LuLaRoe, Case No. 3:17-cv-00781 was removed on
October 2, 2017, from Oregon to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California (Western Division - Los Angeles).
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-07259-PA-E to
the proceeding.

The case asserts product liability claims.

LLR Inc. is a women fashion retailer. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael R. Fuller, Esq.
      OLSEN DAINES PC
      US Bancorp Tower
      111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150
      Portland, OR 97204
      Telephone: (503) 201-4570
      Facsimile: (503) 362-1375
      E-mail: Michael@UnderdogLawyer.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      Brad S. Daniels, Esq.
      Rachel C. Lee, Esq.
      Samantha K. Sondag, Esq.
      STOEL RIVES LLP
      760 S.W. Ninth Ave., Suite 3000
      Portland, OR 97205
      Telephone: (503) 224-3380
      Facsimile: (503) 220-2480
      E-mail: brad.daniels@stoel.com
              rachel.lee@stoel.com
              samantha.sondag@stoel.com


LLR INC: "Goodwin" Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on May 2, 2017 styled Caitlin
Goodwin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LLR Inc. d/b/a LuLaRoe, Case No. 1:17-cv-00931 was
removed from Ohio Northern on October 2, 2017, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California (Western
Division - Los Angeles). The District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:17-cv-07252-R-AFM to the proceeding.

LLR Inc. is a women fashion retailer. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Frank A. Bartela, Esq.
      Nicole T. Fiorelli, Esq.
      Patrick J. Perotti, Esq.
      DWORKEN AND BERNSTEIN
      60 South Park Place
      Painesville, OH 44077
      Telephone: (440) 352-3391
      Facsimile: (440) 352-3469
      E-mail: fbartela@dworkenlaw.com
              nfiorelli@dworkenlaw.com
              pperotti@dworkenlaw.com

         - and -

      Nolan TW James Jr., Esq.
      16651 Selby Circle
      Strongsville, OH 44136
      Telephone: (330) 237-9999
      E-mail: nolan@nolanjameslaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      Anastasia J. Wade, Esq.
      Michael P O'Donnell, Esq.
      Joseph T. Dattilo, Esq.
      BROUSE MCDOWELL
      600 Superior Avenue E Suite 1600
      Cleveland, OH 44114
      Telephone: (216) 830-6830
      Facsimile: (216) 830-6807
      E-mail: awade@brouse.com
              modonnell@brouse.com
              jdattilo@brouse.com

LULAROE LLC: "Dean" Class Suit Transferred to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on May 23, 2017, captioned Julie
Dean and Suzanne Jones, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. Lularoe LLC, LLR Inc., DeAnne Brady,
and Mark Stidham, Case No. 4:17-cv-01579, was transferred on
October 4, 2017, from California Northern to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California. The District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-07310-GW-GJS to the proceeding.

The case asserts product-liability claims.

The Defendants are in the business of selling comfortable,
affordable, stylish clothing. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rosemary M. Rivas, Esq.
      Quentin Alexandre Roberts, Esq.
      LEVI AND KORSINSKY LLP
      44 Montgomery Street Suite 650
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 291-2420
      Facsimile: (415) 484-1294
      E-mail: rrivas@zlk.com
              qroberts@zlk.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      Alejandro Sebastian Angulo, Esq.
      Michael Thomas Hornak, Esq.
      RUTAN AND TUCKER LLP
      611 Anton Blvd., Suite 1400
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (714) 641-5100
      Facsimile: (714) 546-9035
      E-mail: aangulo@rutan.com
              mhornak@rutan.com


MANDALAY BAY: Las Vegas Shooting Suits May Face Challenges
----------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Medina and Jess Bidgoo, writing for The New York Times,
report that when the gunman in a mass shooting is dead, who is
left to blame? Who can be held responsible in court?

The lawsuits have come after shootings in Orlando; in Newtown,
Conn.; and at Virginia Tech.  Now they have begun in Nevada, where
Stephen Paddock opened fire on a country music concert from the
Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino on Oct. 1.

A lawsuit filed in Clark County District Court on Oct. 10 named
several defendants, including Mandalay Bay and its owner, MGM
Resorts; Live Nation, the concert promoter; and the maker of "bump
stocks," a device Mr. Paddock used to make his guns mimic
automatic weapons.  The lawsuit claims each party is at fault in
the shooting, which left 58 people dead and about 500 wounded.

The suit is one of the first of what is likely to be many filed by
victims of the shooting and their families, and if history is any
guide, most of them will need to clear some very high bars --
including legal protections for manufacturers and landowners -- to
succeed.

The plaintiff in the case, Paige Gasper, a 21-year-old student at
Sonoma State University in California, was with a group of friends
the night of the shooting, when she was shot in her right
underarm.  After she was trampled by others trying to escape,
another concert attendee took her to a truck that raced her and a
group of other people who had been shot to a hospital.  She was
the only passenger who survived, according to the lawsuit.  After
being treated for fractured ribs and a lacerated liver in an
intensive care unit, Ms. Gasper returned to her family in
California, where she is still recovering.

The lawsuit claims that MGM Resorts "breached their duty of
reasonable care" and failed to keep the hotel "in a reasonably
safe condition" because it did not monitor people coming into the
hotel and did not respond quickly enough to Jesus Campos, a
security officer whom Mr. Paddock shot and wounded about six
minutes before he began firing on the concert crowd.  It also says
that MGM, which also owns the concert venue, and Live Nation did
not design, build or mark adequate emergency exits and failed to
"properly train and supervise employees in an appropriate plan of
action in case of an emergency."

"We live in a new normal and the music and associated
entertainment industry has seen a tremendous boom," said
Nathan Morris, the lead lawyer in the lawsuit.  "In today's world
the old protocol doesn't work.  At one of these huge venues the
safety protocols clearly have not caught up with the notoriety and
popularity of these events. Paige wants things to change.  She
wants to go to the next country music festival and not be freaked
out when the fireworks come on."

A spokeswoman for Live Nation declined to comment on the lawsuit.
Debra DeShong, a spokeswoman for MGM Resorts, said she could not
comment on the lawsuit but said that "security has been and
continues to be a top priority at all of MGM Resorts."

There have been at least two other filings in Clark County over
the shooting: a class-action claim from the Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence against the manufacturers and sellers of bump
stocks in Nevada, as well as a petition asking the court to take
control of the estate of Mr. Paddock, the 64-year-old gunman who
shot himself in the head after the shooting.

Mr. Morris said that more lawsuits over the Las Vegas shooting
were "inevitable," and that his law firm had already fielded
several legal questions through a hotline it set up for victims.

"She's not an outlier," he said of Ms. Gasper.  "But she's got a
lot of bravery for being the first one to say we want answers; we
want to feel safe."

Lawsuits after mass shootings have largely struggled: A federal
law shields gun manufacturers and sellers from civil claims
brought by victims of gun violence. Congress passed the law, known
as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, after
significant lobbying from the National Rifle Association in 2005.

Timothy D. Lytton, a law professor at Georgia State University and
the author of a book about lawsuits against the gun industry, said
that while a decision placing liability on the gun companies would
be "unprecedented," the hotel and concert venue could be forced to
pay victims.

The lawsuits against a premise like a hotel or event site, Mr.
Lytton said, would turn on the question of whether its operators
were negligent.

"The real question's going to be: Were they careless? Is there
more they should have done?" Mr. Lytton said.

Charges against the maker of the bump stock will be trickier, he
said.

"No plaintiff has ever obtained an unreversed jury verdict in a
lawsuit against a gun manufacturer for an injury arising out of
criminal use of a weapon," Mr. Lytton said.  "The argument," he
added, referring to the justification of the 2005 law, "is that
the industry's not responsible for gun violence -- criminals are
responsible."

He said it was possible, however, there would be litigation over
whether the bump stock -- which some might argue is an accessory,
not a gun component -- is covered by the 2005 law.  Slide Fire, a
bump stock manufacturer named in the suit, did not respond to
requests for comment.

Even as lawsuits against gun producers have sputtered, others have
been filed against the event venues, schools or universities where
shootings have taken place.  Those lawsuits have had mixed
success.

In 2008, a judge awarded an $11 million settlement to families of
the victims in the massacre that killed 32 people at Virginia
Tech. In 2012, two families that refused that deal were awarded $4
million each -- later reduced to $100,000 -- when a jury found the
university had been negligent in the warning it sent out during
the shooting.  That ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court of
Virginia the following year.

Last year, a judge dismissed a lawsuit by parents of the shooting
victims at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., against
the manufacturer of the weapon used in that 2012 attack. (The
families are appealing to the Connecticut Supreme Court.) Still,
some parents have filed a separate lawsuit against the town of
Newtown and the school district, saying the school did not do
enough to secure its classrooms or carry out its security
protocol.

In Aurora, Colo., Marcus Weaver was shot, and his friend Rebecca
Wingo killed, when a gunman stormed a midnight showing of "The
Dark Knight Rises" at a movie theater in 2012.  Amid the pain,
nightmares and crushing grief came something else: Calls from
lawyers.

"Casey Anthony's lawyer called me and flew out to try to get us to
be on the lawsuit," Mr. Weaver, 46, said.  "Everybody thought it
was a slam dunk."

Mr. Weaver decided to be part of a federal lawsuit against
defendants, including Century Theaters and Cinemark, seeking
damages and, he hoped, a commitment to stronger security by the
movie theater.

"You're not going to help my injuries get better, you're not going
to get my friend Rebecca back, but I felt the theater should have
taken more responsibility," Mr. Weaver said.

But he found that, just as there are legal protections for
gunmakers, there are protections for the owners of public spaces
where tragedy occurs.  In Colorado, the Premises Liability Act
generally limits landowners from responsibility for dangers on
their property that they could not reasonably have foreseen. While
Mr. Weaver's lawsuit was moving through pretrial proceedings, a
jury in a state court ruled in a separate lawsuit that the theater
was not liable.

"They said, 'We had no warning,'" said Marc Bern, the lead
attorney on the state case, of the movie theater.

It became clear to Mr. Weaver and his lawyer, Phil Harding, that
the federal case was likely to be dismissed, and Mr. Weaver said
he and 40 other plaintiffs in the federal case worked briefly on a
$150,000 settlement with Cinemark, which fell apart when one
plaintiff turned the deal down.

The plaintiffs found themselves facing another difficult hurdle:
If they tried to move forward with the case, and lost, they could
have ended up owing Cinemark money for its costs.

"Not only was I shocked, but I was just devastated," Mr. Weaver
said.  "That's justice, that's why people avoid lawsuits."  He had
no choice, he added, but to drop out of the case.

"It was almost like being shot again," Mr. Weaver said of the
experience.

Mr. Harding, the lawyer, said the case underscored the difficulty
of winning civil complaints even after the horrors of a mass
shooting.

"It's David versus Goliath," Mr. Harding said.  "Here's an
individual victim who has been negatively impacted through
injuries or deaths, and they're going after a huge corporation
that has unlimited funds to hire the correct lawyers and expert
witnesses to win the case." [GN]


MASSACHUSETTS: DUI Arrestees Sue Over Coercive Notice of Rights
---------------------------------------------------------------
Zack Huffman, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
nearly two years after a Massachusetts judge threw out a drunken-
driving case because of an inaccurate and coercive Spanish-
language notice of rights, and police promised to fix it, the city
of Methuen was still using the same "unlawful" form, a woman
claims in a federal class action.

"The Methuen Police Department has used the unlawful Spanish
language advice of rights form for years despite having knowledge
that the form was erroneous since at least May 2013," says the
Oct. 5 lawsuit against the city and the Essex County district
attorney.

Patricia Pimentel is represented in the case by Howard Cooper with
Todd & Weld in Boston and Murat Erkan, of Andover.

Methuen, a town of 49,112 near the New Hampshire border, is 18
percent Latino and 75 percent white, according to city-data.com.
Its median income is right about at the state median.

In addition to class certification and a corrective injunction,
Ms. Pimentel seeks damages for violations of equal protection and
due process, other state and federal civil rights violations, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  She nearly was
deported because of the coercive translation, she says in the 56-
page complaint.

Ms. Pimentel was pulled over on suspicion of DUI in October 2014.
Nineteen months before that, on March 14, 2013, a Spanish-speaking
DUI defendant had filed a motion to suppress his breath test
results "due to the Methuen Police Department's use of the
unlawful Spanish language advice of rights form, which motion the
commonwealth conceded and the court allowed," Ms. Pimentel says in
the complaint.

"At that time, the Essex County District Attorney's Office took
note of the issue and on May 10, 2013, explained that it would 'be
working with Methuen PD to rectify' the problem," the complaint
continues.

After citing Methuen police correspondence to substantiate this,
Pimentel says: "To date, however, the Methuen Police Department
has not produced any evidence that it did anything to rectify the
situation at that time or at any time since."

The Spanish translation is riddled with inaccuracies, Pimentel
says.  Among them:

   -- that the legal limit for DUI is blood alcohol content of
0.10 "and there is no 'presumption' of impairment under 0.10,
despite the 'per se' theory of criminal liability for a BAC of
0.08 or more."

   -- that "a BAC of 0.05 or less will 'liberate' the person from
the charge."
   -- that "a license suspension for refusing the breathalyzer
will last only 120 days, not 180 days or longer."
   -- that if the arrestee refuses to take a breathalyzer, the
jury in a criminal trial will be informed of the refusal.

"Taken separately or together, the errors in the Spanish language
advice of rights form render it not only erroneous and misleading,
but also unconstitutionally and unlawfully coercive," the
complaint states.

"Class members are falsely presented with what they are led to
believe is a Hobson's choice of submitting to the breathalyzer and
possibly failing, or refusing the breathalyzer and having the jury
learn of the refusal.  The law does not require a defendant to
make that choice.  Indeed, the law forbids it."

Ms. Pimental says this coercive inaccuracy is compounded by the
inaccurate descriptions of blood-alcohol content, the false claim
about being "liberated" and the inaccurate description of
penalties."

When Ms. Pimentel was pulled over in October 2014, police
persuaded her to take the breathalyzer.  She was convicted of
operating under the influence.  Her conviction prevented her from
renewing her immigration status under the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program.

She was not deported because she obtained a new lawyer and
successfully applied for retrial because her previous attorney had
failed to inform her that a guilty plea would put her immigration
status at risk.

In the new trial, Ms. Pimentel was able to suppress the
breathalyzer test and was exonerated.

The Methuen Police Department did not respond to an emailed
request for comment.


MICHIGAN: MDOC Sued for Denying Kosher Meals to Jewish Prisoners
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Adams, writing for Mlive, reports that an attorney is
seeking class-action status on behalf of Jewish prisoners in
Michigan in a lawsuit that claims they're being denied kosher
certified meals.

Attorneys for the prisoners filed a motion on Oct. 9 in Flint U.S.
District Court, seeking class-action status after claiming there
are between 50 and 100 prisoners from the Michigan Department of
Corrections who have been designated by the prison system as
Jewish and approved to get religious meals, but are refused kosher
certified meals by the MDOC.

Kosher foods are specially prepared in accordance with Jewish law.

MDOC Director Heidi Washington and other prison officials are
named as defendants in the lawsuit, which was originally filed in
2013 on behalf of inmate Michael Arnold by attorney
Daniel Manville, who is with the Michigan State University Civil
Rights Clinic.

Mr. Manville, who could not be reached for comment, claims that
MDOC policy forces Jewish prisoners to eat vegan meals that are
not made in a kosher manner.

Forcing Jewish inmates to consume non-kosher food that is prepared
and served in a non-kosher manner violates the First Amendment and
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Mr. Manville
argues.

Mr. Manville's motion alleges Arnold and others in the proposed
class are deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to
freely practice their religion.  It also says those rights prevent
substantial and unjustified burdens on the religious liberties of
state prisoners.

Mr. Arnold claims he has been denied meals prepared in a certified
kosher manner since July 26, 2013.

A New York-based rabbi visited the Macomb Correctional Facility
and wrote an Oct. 1, 2014, email, which is attached to the motion
as evidence, to Melody Wallace, manager of the MDOC's litigation
section, outlining a number of potential changes to ensure kosher
certified meals.

Some of the potential changes included allowing a rabbi access to
the kitchen areas to ensure Kosher ingredients are being used,
purchasing pre-washed vegetables certified acceptable by a kosher
agency and marking equipment used solely for Kosher cooking.

"I can't imagine that you want to post a full time Rabbi in each
of the facilities with kosher kitchens, but that is the default
requirement in this situation," the email from Rabbi Elisha Rubin
said.  "I would strongly suggest/recommend that you look into
having kosher meals made in volume on an occasional basis in one
correctional facility.  The meals would be made with a Rabbi
present who could control the equipment and labeling and verify
that everything is in compliance.  These meals can then be
refrigerated/frozen/stored (as needed) and distributed to the
relevant facilities for when needed.  There are ways that food can
be sealed as kosher and then reheated in a non-kosher kitchen and
still considered kosher.  I believe that this is likely to be the
fastest and most cost-effective route to meeting your legal
requirements to provide special kosher meals."

MDOC Spokesman Chris Gautz did not respond to a request for
comment about the motion on Tuesday, Oct. 10.

This isn't the first time the dietary needs of certain prisoners
have resulted in a lawsuit.

The state settled a lawsuit in 2013 filed by the Michigan chapter
of the American Civil Liberties Union over accommodating the
dietary needs and worship schedules of Muslim prisoners.

The settlement came in a suit filed in 2006, which alleged
corrections officials were failing to adjust Muslim prisoners'
work or school details that conflicted with religious services and
then disciplined prisoners who chose to attend services instead of
going to their scheduled details.  The suit also alleged the state
was not making meals available that met religious guidelines.

The class-action suit also included a Seventh-Day Adventist
prisoner who alleged prison officials were not allowing him and
other Adventist inmates to observe their Saturday Sabbath.

Under the settlement, Muslim prisoners were allowed to request
halal meals, permitted to attend religious services and permitted
to celebrate two religious feasts. [GN]


NATURE'S BOUNTY: Court Narrows Claims in Consumer Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned MICHAEL MUIR, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NATURE'S BOUNTY, INC.,
Defendants, No. 15 C 9835 (N.D. Fla.).

Nature's Bounty moves to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing
that Muir has failed to state a claim and lacks standing to assert
consumer fraud claims under the laws of states where he did not
suffer an injury.

This is a proposed class action against Nature's Bounty, Inc., the
manufacturer of a formulation of the herbal supplement St. John's
Wort.  Plaintiff John Muir purchased the supplement from a
Walgreens store near Lake Zurich, Illinois, where he lives.  The
bottle's label claimed that it was standardized to contain 0.3%
hypericin, an active ingredient which according to the complaint
has been shown in scientific studies to have anti-depressant
effects. But when a laboratory tested Nature's Bounty-brand St.
John's Wort, it was found not to contain the claimed amount of
hypericin.

In this lawsuit, Muir alleges breach of warranty, consumer fraud,
and unjust enrichment on behalf of himself and three classes of
purchasers: a nationwide class of every consumer who purchased the
supplement within the last four years, a class of purchasers in a
number of states that have purportedly similar consumer fraud
statutes, and Illinois purchasers.

Defendant argues that Muir's breach of warranty claim must be
dismissed because he failed to give timely notice of the claim
before bringing suit. In order to prevail on a complaint for
breach of warranty under Illinois law, the purchaser must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.
Muir urges this court to follow other cases that, he contends,
hold that a manufacturer's knowledge of a consistent defect in a
product line satisfies the "actual knowledge" requirement."

In In re Rust-Oleum Marketing, Sales Practices & Products
Liability Litigation, 155 F.Supp.3d 772 and Keith v. Ferring
Pharm., Inc., No. 15 C 10381, however, the court noted that each
of the fifteen plaintiffs had, in fact, given direct notice to the
manufacturer that the product, Rust-Oleum paint, was defective.
Keith is distinguishable as well.  There, the manufacturer had
actual knowledge because the manufacturer had not only performed
testing and found that some lots of its fertility drug, Bravelle,
were sub-potent, but had gone so far as to recall the product.
This was sufficient, the court found, to satisfy the actual
knowledge requirement.  Muir has not alleged direct notice, as in
Rust-Oleum, nor has Nature's Bounty recalled the product. The
court finds that the level of knowledge alleged by Muir -- that
Nature's Bounty tested the product and likely found it sub-potent
-- is not sufficient to satisfy the UCC notice requirement as set
out in Connick. Accord Block v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. 17 C
1717, finding plaintiff had not alleged actual knowledge by
alleging that study funded by defendant revealed that kefir
product promoted as "99% lactose-free" in fact contained 4%
lactose); Ulrich v. Probalance, Inc., No. 16 C 10488, granting
motion to dismiss though defendant was allegedly aware that
protein supplements did not contain advertised level of protein.
Muir's breach of warranty claim is accordingly dismissed.

Muir also claims that Nature's Bounty violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA), by failing to disclose a known defect
in its product. ICFA declares that: "unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not
limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that
others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such
material fact in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby."

Defendant argues that the simple breach exception defeats a
plaintiff's claim even where the defendant knowingly fails to
disclose a defect, as long as the defect is the subject of an
express warranty. The court disagrees.  Greenberger v. GEICO
General Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 392, 394-95, suggested that a consumer
must allege unfair or deceptive conduct distinct from the alleged
breach of a contractual promise, but Connick, 494-95, 675 N.E.2d
at 590-9, and Pappas, 363 Ill., App.3d 795, 797, 844 N.E.2d 995,
held that the plaintiff had an ICFA claim even where the defect
was the subject of an express warranty. Given that Pappas and
Connick considered breaches of a warranty, specifically, they are
more closely analogous and are controlling.

Furthermore, Greenberger itself suggested that affirmative acts of
misrepresentation may be distinct from the routine breaches of
contract not covered by ICFA, and may support an ICFA claim. The
conduct that Muir alleges was an affirmative act of
misrepresentation.  Nature's Bounty allegedly knew when it shipped
the St. John's Wort supplement that the product did not contain
the claimed levels of hypericin.

Defendant's position, if adopted, would have an undesirable
result: If express warranties precluded ICFA claims even where the
defendant knew that its product contained defects, a manufacturer
could avoid ICFA liability by expressly guaranteeing that a
product did not have a defect of which the defendant was aware.
ICFA should not be interpreted to excuse companies who expressly
lie about their products while penalizing those who merely say
nothing.

The court denies Defendant's motion as to Muir's ICFA claim.

Nature's Bounty also argues that Muir cannot state a claim for
unjust enrichment because his relationship with Nature's Bounty is
governed by a contract. To recover on a theory of unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has
unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff's detriment, and that
defendant's retention of the benefit violates the fundamental
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.

The court is satisfied that plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim
here is not premised on an implied-in-law contract, but upon the
separate allegation that Nature's Bounty defrauded consumers. As
the Seventh Circuit observed in Cleary v. Phillip Morris, the
inequity at which unjust enrichment doctrine takes aim will often
form the basis of another claim against the defendant in tort,
contract, or statute. Where the unjust enrichment claim is
predicated on the same conduct as another claim, then the unjust
enrichment claim will be tied to this related claim -- and, of
course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall with the related
claim. Muir acknowledged that his unjust enrichment claim would
stand or fall with the court's acceptance of his ICFA claim.
The court has not dismissed his ICFA claim, and the unjust
enrichment claim survives as well.

Muir seeks to represent a nationwide class to whom Illinois law
would apply, and a Consumer Fraud Multi-State Class for purchasers
in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York and Washington.

If this is indeed the state of the law in Ohio and New Jersey, it
will have an impact on the class's claims.  Muir alleged that he
purchased his bottle of St. John's Wort from Walgreens, not from
Nature's Bounty directly. Muir, for his part, has not addressed
the issue of this difference in the law; to the contrary, he
incorrectly asserted that Nature's Bounty had not even attempted
to identify differences in state law. Given that unjust enrichment
doctrine is particularly complex and that Nature's Bounty did
identify at least one significant difference in the unjust
enrichment law of the fifty states, the court declines to permit
Muir to proceed to discovery on a nationwide class basis on this
theory. Accordingly, Muir's nationwide class allegations are
dismissed without prejudice.

For the multi-state class, Muir seeks to bring claims for
consumers in a select group of states with consumer fraud laws
that he believes are similar to ICFA on the facts of this case.
Instead of applying Illinois law to these consumers, each state's
law would apply to the resident consumers. To this proposed class,
Nature's Bounty interposes a different objection: that Muir does
not have standing to bring claims under the laws of states in
which he does not reside and did not purchase the product. Muir
again argues that the question should wait until class
certification.  The court disagrees.

Though Muir claims he was injured by the same action that injured
the unnamed class members Defendant's false representation and
sale of the supplement his claim under ICFA is different from the
unnamed class members' claims under their respective state
consumer fraud laws.  The court concludes those cases do not
require the conclusion that Plaintiff has standing to assert
claims he does not have, on behalf of members of a class that has
not yet been certified.

Though the court again acknowledges that there are sound arguments
on either side, the court remains convinced that the question of
standing must be addressed before certification where the standing
of the named plaintiff to assert the claims of the class is in
question.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yb9g5w6xfrom Leagle.com.

Michael Muir, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory F. Coleman, Greg
Coleman Law PC, First Tennessee Plaza, Suite 1100, 800 South Gay
Street, Knoxville, TN 37929

Michael Muir, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph J. Siprut --
jsiprut@siprut.com -- Siprut PC, Nick Suciu, III --
nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com --  Barbat, Mansour & Suciu PLLC, pro hac
vice, Richard Lane Miller, II -- rmiller@siprut.com -- Siprut, PC
& Richard Steven Wilson -- rwilson@siprut.com -- Siprut Pc.

Nature's Bounty, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda L. Groves
-- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn, pro hac vice, Ross
Jacob Corbett, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Scott M. Ahmad, Winston &
Strawn LLP & Scott P. Glauberman, Winston & Strawn LLP.


NAVIENT CORP: Faces Class Action Over FFELP Loans
-------------------------------------------------
Safirstein Metcalf on Oct. 10 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit was filed against Navient Corporation.  This action has
been filed on behalf of all persons who held a FFELP loan with
Navient Solutions, a subsidiary of Navient Corporation, formerly
known as Sallie Mae Inc., from the years 2010 to the present and
also on behalf of customers and/or victims of Defendant Studebt,
also known as Student Debt Relief Group, also known as Student
Loan Relief Counselors.

Safirstein Metcalf is investigating potential claims on behalf of
investors in Navient Corporation.  If you purchased Navient
securities and would like information, please contact Safirstein
Metcalf LLP 1-800-221-0015, or email info@SafirsteinMetcalf.com.

Navient Solutions is the largest student loan servicer in the
United States, servicing over $300 billion of student loans.
Navient holds the nation's largest portfolio of education loans
insured or federally guaranteed under the Federal Family Education
Loan Program ("FFELP").  As of December 31, 2016, that portfolio
totaled $87.7 billion in FFELP Loans.

FFELP loans are Navient's biggest source of revenue.  As a
creation of federal statute, FFELP loans are highly regulated, and
thus lenders of FFELP loans are prevented from increasing profits
by increasing interest rates or imposing fees other than those
allowed by law and regulation.  Navient faced a potential
significant loss of revenue if many of its FFELP loans were
abruptly consolidated with the Department of Education.

The complaint alleges that Navient knew that many of their
borrowers would follow misleading advice they received from
Navient Solutions.  Navient Solutions' strategy to mislead and
confuse borrowers about their repayment and consolidation options
was developed at the direction of Defendant Navient.

A number of other lawsuits have been filed against Navient in the
last 18 months.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
Attorney Generals from Illinois and Washington, and most recently
Pennsylvania have sued Navient and its top executives for
allegedly engaging in a massive, company-wide scheme to steer its
student loan borrowers away from affordable repayment plans and
into more lucrative forbearance arrangements.

                   About Safirstein Metcalf LLP

Safirstein Metcalf LLP focuses its practice on shareholder rights.
The law firm also practices in the areas of antitrust and consumer
protection. [GN]


NEINSTEIN & ASSOCIATES: Judge Declines to Certify Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shannon Kari, writing for Law Times, reports that a proposed class
action against a Toronto personal injury firm has been closely
watched by the legal community because of the dispute over whether
costs can be part of a retainer agreement in addition to amounts
paid out as a result of a contingency fee.

The decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal this summer in Hodge
v. Neinstein also resulted in very different conclusions about the
validity of the proposed "common issues" from that of the judge
who presided over the original hearing.

The motions judge, Justice Paul Perell, declined to certify a
class action on behalf of about 6,000 past contingency fee clients
of Neinstein & Associates.

The Superior Court judge concluded that the action did not meet
what he described as the "low bar" for certification under the
"common issues" criterion.

"The fatal flaw of Ms. Hodge's attempt to obtain access to justice
is that while an identifiable group may have been victimized by
the Respondents -- which remains to be proven -- the clients would
have been victimized as individuals," wrote Justice Perell in his
July 2014 decision.

"Very little, if anything, would be carried forward from a common
issues trial to advance the Class Member's individual claims," he
added.

More than three years later and after another two court hearings,
the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal fundamentally disagreed
with Justice Perell on the common issues analysis.

They both certified the proceeding as a class action. The
Divisional Court accepted 19 of the 37 common issues pleaded by
the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal, in its ruling this summer, certified 20
common issues.

The contrast between the conclusions of Justice Perell, a senior
judge in the area of class actions, and the appellate level courts
does not necessarily mean a change in the test for certifying
common issues, say lawyers who practise in this area.

"I don't think it is a loosening of the common issues threshold
per se," says Lauren Tomasich -- ltomasich@osler.com -- a partner
in the litigation group at Osler Hoskin & Harcourt LLP in Toronto.

"If you can advance common issues that address each client, it can
be certified even if there are individual damages," she says.

Jacqueline Horvat -- jacqueline@spark.law -- a partner at Spark
LLP in Toronto, notes that the provincial Class Proceedings Act
does not bar the certification of class actions when there are
individual damages.

"The line between proposed class actions that are too
individualistic by their very nature and proposed class actions
with overarching issues common to a class is very fine," says
Ms. Horvat, a commercial litigator with significant class action
experience.

One of the central issues at each level of court in the long-
running litigation has been the interpretation of sections of the
provincial Solicitors Act.

Sections 23 to 25 deal with the right of a client to bring an
application in Superior Court to have legal fees in any agreement
reviewed and possibly assessed.

Section 28 states that contingency fee agreements do not permit
additional compensation for the lawyer from any costs award,
unless both the client and lawyer apply to the Superior Court for
approval.

The courts heard that Hodge, who was injured in an automobile
accident, signed a standard form retainer agreement with
Neinstein's firm.

The agreement stated that Neinstein would receive 25 per cent of
any damages recovered, a portion of costs obtained and
disbursement expenses.

Hodge ultimately received $42,000 from a $150,000 costs award, the
courts heard.  In its decision, the Divisional Court panel stated
that this type of retainer agreement was standard at the firm and
there were 42 of these documents filed as part of the motion
record.

The Court of Appeal decision also focused on the common wording of
the agreements and the firm's admission that it was not aware of
any contingency fee retainers that did not include costs as well
as a percentage fee of any award or settlement.

The different conclusions by the Divisional Court and the Court of
Appeal from that of Justice Perell appear to be focused on his
Solicitors Act analysis, suggests Horvat.

"What seemed to happen in this instance was that Justice Perell
accepted the limits of individualistic assessment inherent in ss.
23 to 25 in the Solicitors Act without giving full consideration
to the implications of s. 28.1 of the Solicitors Act. This is the
impetus that ultimately set aside his decision," she says.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal "focused on the language
of the fee agreements," says Ms. Tomasich.

There are some lessons for lawyers defending against class actions
from these rulings, she says.

"It is important to be vigilant in the way we argue these motions,
how commonality is defined and how to poke holes in commonality,"
says Ms. Tomasich.  [GN]


NEW JERSEY, USA: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Holland" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Brittan Holland and Lexington National Insurance Corp.
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Brittan
Holland, et al. v. Kelly Rosen, et al., Case No. 1-17-cv-04317, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Brittan
Holland's lawsuit, which also includes a bail bonds company,
argues that it is unfair that he has been given home detention and
required to wear an electronic monitor, rather than straight cash
bail.

Lexington National Insurance Co. is also part of the lawsuit
against the state attorney general and Camden County's prosecutor;
the suit seeks class-action status.  The suit says that thousands
of others are being subjected to "similar life-altering, liberty-
restricting conditions without ever receiving the option of bail"
and the reform efforts are also harming bail bonds companies.

The appellate case is captioned as Brittan Holland, et al. v.
Kelly Rosen, et al., Case No. 17-3104, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants BRITTAN HOLLAND, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; and LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE
CORP, are represented by:

          Robert M. Bernstein, Esq.
          Paul D. Clement, Esq.
          Michael F. Williams, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
          655 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1200
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 879-5000
          E-mail: robert.bernstein@kirkland.com
                  paul.clement@kirkland.com
                  michael.williams@kirkland.com

               - and -

          Justin T. Quinn, Esq.
          ROBINSON MILLER LLC
          One Newark Center, 19th Floor
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 690-5400
          E-mail: jquinn@rwmlegal.com

Defendants-Appellees KELLY ROSEN, Pretrial Services Team Leader;
MARY CALALILLO, Camden County Prosecutor; and CHRISTOPHER S.
PORRINO, Attorney General of New Jersey, are represented by:

          Stuart M. Feinblatt, Esq.
          Christopher J. Riggs, Esq.
          OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
          25 Market Street
          Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
          Trenton, NJ 08625
          Telephone: (609) 984-9666
          E-mail: Stuart.Feinblatt@lps.state.nj.us
                  Christopher.Riggs@lps.state.nj.us


NEW YORK: Faces "Lynch" Suit Over Civil Rights Act Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
James Lynch, Lloyd Jones, and Baron Spencer, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated v. The City of New York, Case No.
1:17-cv-07577 (S.D.N.Y., October 4, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Civil Rights Act.

The City of New York is one of the world's major commercial,
financial and cultural centers. [BN]

James Lynch, Lloyd Jones, and Baron Spencer are pro se plaintiffs.


NEW YORK: DOC Sued in N.Y. Over Civil Rights Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Zielinski, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Anthony J. Annucci, Case No. 9:17-cv-01087-GTS-CFH
(N.D.N.Y., September 29, 2017), is brought against the Defendants
for violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Anthony J. Annucci is the Acting Commisioner of the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremy Zielinski
      P.O. Box 2001
      Dannemora, NY 12929
      16-A-3601
      Clinton Correctional Facility
      PRO SE


NIMBLE STORAGE: Calif. Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that on
October 2, 2017, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
with prejudice a putative securities fraud class action against
Nimble Storage, Inc. ("Nimble"), a flash storage technology
company, and several of its officers. In re. Nimble Storage Secs.
Litig., No. 15-cv-05803 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 2, 2017). Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendants misrepresented Nimble's prospects and
financial condition in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.  The Court found that Nimble's statements about growth
were not misleading because they were accompanied by sales and
profit data, which accurately reported the company's condition to
the public.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants misled the public by (i)
failing to inform investors that Nimble's commercial segment was
weakening, (ii) representing that Nimble's enterprise segment was
growing while misleadingly reclassifying commercial clients as
enterprise clients; and (iii) informing the public that Nimble
remained on-track to "breakeven," despite knowing that Nimble's
commercial and enterprise segments were struggling.  The Court
previously granted two earlier motions to dismiss, but allowed
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to the extent that they could
adequately plead that Defendants' reclassifications of certain
clients were fraudulent and that such fraudulent reclassifications
were disclosed to the public.

In dismissing Plaintiffs' third amended complaint with prejudice,
the Court held that Defendants' general statements in quarterly
reports concerning the strength of Nimble's enterprise segment
were neither false nor misleading.  The Court found that the
general statements of growth were not actionable because they were
accompanied by accurate sales and market data that Defendants
disclosed to the public about the enterprise segment's strength.
This data included the actual numbers of enterprise clients that
Nimble had acquired.  The Court noted that such sales and profit
data, when reported accurately, are "rarely subject to
misinterpretation, even if the disclosure is accompanied by
generally optimistic statements about the future by corporate
officers."

The Court rejected Plaintiffs' reliance on statements from
confidential witnesses that Nimble reclassified its top commercial
accounts as enterprise accounts and announced these
reclassifications to the public as a "win" when Defendants knew
that Nimble would miss quarterly forecasts.  It found that
statements by confidential witnesses lacked the specificity needed
to determine whether the company's statements were false and
misleading when they were made.  Finally, the Court observed that
Plaintiffs failed to allege that the "highly predictive
technology" used by Nimble to forecast results actually forecasted
that Nimble would miss its targets, explaining that, to support
plaintiff's theory, the Court would have to "make inference upon
inference without any particularized facts demonstrating what
information the reports actually contained."

This case provides a useful example of how the disclosure of
actual sales and profit figures can be used by a company to rebut
allegations that it made false and misleading statements about the
status of its business. [GN]


O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Appeals Order in Courtright Suit to 8th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc., CSK Auto, and
O'Reilly Auto Enterprises filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Rebecca Courtright, et al. v. O'Reilly
Automotive Stores Inc, et al., Case No. 4:14-cv-00334-DGK, in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas
City.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 20,
2017, the Hon. Greg Kays entered an order granting the Plaintiffs'
motion for remand.

The Court said, "All other pending motions are denied as moot. The
Court will order remand of this case to the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri. The Court instructs the Clerk of the
Court to delay remand of the case for ten days to allow Defendants
the opportunity to exercise their right to appeal under 28 U.S.C.
section 1453(c)(1). If the Court of Appeals accepts an appeal from
the Court's order, the Clerk shall delay remand until the Court of
Appeals has ruled on the appeal. Since the parties now agree that
Plaintiff has not suffered any injury in fact, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute."

The appellate case is captioned as Rebecca Courtright, et al. v.
O'Reilly Automotive Stores Inc, et al., Case No. 17-8027, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents Rebecca Courtright, Individually And On
Behalf Of All Others, and Raphael Saye are represented by:

          Charles Jason Brown, Esq.
          Jayson A. Watkins, Esq.
          BROWN & ASSOCIATES
          301 S. US Highway 169
          Gower, MO 64454-9116
          Telephone: (816) 505-4529
          Facsimile: (816) 424-1337
          E-mail: brown@brownandwatkins.com
                  watkins@brownandwatkins.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 311
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-0000
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com


Plaintiffs-Respondents Rebecca Courtright, Individually And On
Behalf Of All Others, Raphael Saye and Juan Estrada, (4:15-cv-
00134-GAF) individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, are represented by:

          Robert K. Friedl, Esq.
          Jordan Lurie, Esq.
          Cody R. Padgett, Esq.
          Tarek H. Zohdy, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW, APC
          1875 Century Park, E., Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: robert.friedl@capstonelawyers.com
                  Jordan.Lurie@capstonelawyers.com
                  Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                  tarek.zohdy@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Marc L. Godino, Esq.
          Mark S. Greenstone, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park, E., Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          E-mail: mgodino@glancylaw.com
                  mgreenstone@glancylaw.com

Plaintiff-Respondent Juan Estrada, (4:15-cv-00134-GAF)
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Arnab Banerjee, Esq.
          Melissa Grant, Esq.
          Raul Perez, Esq.
          Alexandria Witte, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW, APC
          1840 Century Park, E., Suite 450
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: arnab.banerjee@capstonelawyers.com
                  melissa.grant@capstonelawyers.com
                  raul.perez@capstonelawyers.com
                  alexandria.witte@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Phyllis Norman, Esq.
          NORMAN LAW FIRM, LLC
          4310 Madison, Suite 120
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 895-8989
          E-mail: phyllis@pnormanlaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc, agent of
O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.; CSK Auto, Inc.; and O'Reilly
Auto Enterprises, LLC, are represented by:

          William C. Martucci, Esq.
          Kristen A. Page, Esq.
          SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
          2555 Grand Boulevard
          Kansas City, MO 64108-2613
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
          E-mail: wmartucci@shb.com
                  kpage@shb.com


OKLAHOMA: Faces Class Action Over Addiction Recovery Program
------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that three people have filed a class-
action lawsuit against an Oklahoma-based addiction recovery
program, saying it exploited them and other participants by
forcing them to decide between going to prison or working for free
at a poultry processing plant.

The federal lawsuit filed on Oct. 10 against Christian Alcoholics
& Addicts in Recovery and the Arkansas-based plant operator,
Simmons Foods, comes a week after nonprofit news outlet Reveal
from The Center for Investigative Reporting published a story
exposing the questionable practices of some court-ordered
diversion programs, including CAAIR.

The lawsuit contends that participants weren't told they'd have to
work unpaid jobs while going through the recovery program.  It
says CAAIR placed participants at the Simmons plant and kept
compensation they should have received, including workers'
compensation payments CAAIR filed on participants' behalf.

The plaintiffs say the only compensation they received were "daily
bologna sandwiches and a bunk-bed in a cramped dorm room."

CAAIR CEO Janet Wilkerson had no immediate comment on the lawsuit.
A spokesman for Simmons, Donny Epp, says the company will defend
itself in court. [GN]


ON-LINE ADMINISTRATORS: Seeks Review of Ruling in "Trenz" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants On-Line Administrators, Inc., and Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
entitled Brian Trenz, et al. v. On-Line Administrators, Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:15-cv-08356-AB-KS, in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 20,
2017, the Hon. Andre Birotte, Jr., granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification of:

Pre-October 16, 2013 Class:

   "all persons within the United States who received any
   telephone call from Defendants or their agents to said
   person's wireless number through the use of any automatic
   telephone dialing system, as part of Defendant Volkswagen
   Group of America's 'Target and Retain Aftersales Customers'
   program, from October 26, 2011 until October 15, 2013"; and

   - and -

Post-October 16, 2013 Class:

   "all persons within the United States who received any
   telephone call from Defendants or their agents to said
   person's wireless number through the use of any automatic
   telephone dialing system, as part of Defendant Volkswagen
   Group of America's 'Target and Retain Aftersales Customers'
   program, from October 16, 2013 until October 26, 2015."

The appellate case is captioned as Brian Trenz, et al. v. On-Line
Administrators, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-80206, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent BRIAN TRENZ, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Allison Hughes Goddard, Esq.
          PATTERSON LAW GROUP, APC
          402 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 398-4762
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: ali@pattersonlawgroup.com

Plaintiffs-Respondents BRIAN TRENZ, FRANCIS BREIDENBACH, CAITLYN
FARRELL and NOELLE SIMMS are represented by:

          James Richard Patterson, Esq.
          PATTERSON LAW GROUP, APC
          402 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 398-4762
          Facsimile: (619) 756-6991
          E-mail: jim@pattersonlawgroup.com

Defendant-Petitioner ON-LINE ADMINISTRATORS, INC., a California
Corporation, DBA Peak Performance Marketing Solutions, is
represented by:

          Fred R. Puglisi, Esq.
          Jay T. Ramsey, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6001
          Telephone: (310) 228-3700
          Facsimile: (310) 228-3701
          E-mail: fpuglisi@sheppardmullin.com
                  jramsey@sheppardmullin.com

Defendant-Petitioner VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., a New
Jersey Corporation, is represented by:

          Paul G. Karlsgodt, Esq.
          BAKER HOSTETLER LLP
          1801 California Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 764-4013
          Facsimile: (303) 861-7805
          E-mail: pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com


ORLEANS PARISH, LA: Yarls Appeals M.D. La. Decision to 5th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Douglas Brown, Leroy Shaw, Jr., and Darwin Yarls, Jr.,
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Darwin
Yarls, Jr., et al. v. Derwyn Bunton, et al., Case No. 3:16-CV-31,
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Darwin Yarls,
Jr., et al., sought certification of a class consisting of all
individuals in Louisiana, who have been or will be placed on a
waiting list for representation, thereby, denying them competent,
conflict-free counsel indefinitely.  The Plaintiffs also moved to
certify a subclass of Orleans Parish defendants, who have been or
will be placed on a waiting list for representation, thereby,
denying them competent, conflict-free counsel indefinitely.

The appellate case is captioned as Darwin Yarls, Jr., et al. v.
Derwyn Bunton, et al., Case No. 17-30779, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants DARWIN YARLS, JR., On Behalf of Themselves
and All Others Similarly Situated; LEROY SHAW, JR., On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated; and DOUGLAS BROWN,
On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, are
represented by:

          Bruce Hamilton, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF LOUISIANA
          P.O. Box 56157
          New Orleans, LA 70156
          Telephone: (504) 522-0628
          E-mail: bhamilton@laaclu.org

Defendant-Appellee DERWYN BUNTON, in his official capacity as
Chief District Defender for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, is
represented by:

          Mark Christopher Surprenant, Esq.
          ADAMS & REESE, L.L.P.
          701 Poydras Street
          1 Shell Square
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 581-3234
          Facsimile: (504) 566-0210
          E-mail: mark.surprenant@arlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee JAMES T. DIXON, JR., in his official capacity
as Louisiana State Public Defender, is represented by:

          John M. Landis, Esq.
          STONE PIGMAN WALTHER WITTMANN, L.L.C.
          909 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70112
          Telephone: (504) 593-0819
          Facsimile: (504) 596-0819
          E-mail: jlandis@stonepigman.com


PACIFIC GAS: California Wildfire Victims File Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Elliot Spagat, writing for The Associated Press, reports that
Northern California homeowners allege in a lawsuit filed on
Oct. 17 that Pacific Gas & Electric Co. failed to adequately
protect its power lines before the region's deadly wildfires, a
theory that state investigators are considering as they try to
determine the cause.

The lawsuit in San Francisco Superior Court on behalf of Santa
Rosa homeowners Wayne and Jennifer Harvell says drought-like
conditions over the summer put fire dangers "at an extraordinarily
high level," particularly after heavy winter rains increased
vegetation.  It says PG&E failed to trim and remove vegetation as
it should have.

PG&E Corp., the utility's parent company, said on Oct. 13 that the
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection was
investigating its power lines and equipment as a possible cause of
the fires that have killed at least 41 people and destroyed 6,000
homes.

The California Public Utilities Commission, which regulates PG&E,
would investigate only if state fire investigators determine that
that the utility's equipment is suspected as a cause. That could
lead to significant fines and penalties.

The San Francisco-based utility said it would not speculate on
causes of the fire and that it was cooperating with investigators.

PG&E says it has told state regulators of seven incidents of
damage to its equipment, including downed power lines and broken
poles.  It did not say whether they may have caused or contributed
to the fire.

Gerald Singleton, an attorney representing other homeowners and
renters, said winds were strong but PG&E should have anticipated
them.

"We can't get rid of all possible risks," he said. "It really is
based on reasonableness -- and that is what their duty is."

Earlier this year, the utility commission fined PG&E $8.3 million
for failing to maintain a power line that sparked a massive blaze
in Northern California that destroyed 549 homes and killed two
people.  A state fire investigation found the utility and its
contractors failed to maintain a gray pine tree that slumped into
a power line igniting the September 2015 fire in Amador County.

Previously, California regulators fined PG&E $1.6 billion for 2010
natural gas explosion in the San Francisco Bay Area city of San
Bruno that killed eight people and destroyed 38 homes.

Also on Oct. 17, U.S. Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris of
California wrote the Federal Communications Commission to express
concern that the federal government has yet to adopt rules that
would require wireless carriers to more precisely target
neighborhoods with orders to evacuate.  As fires rapidly spread
Oct. 8, authorities sought to avoid alarming unaffected residents.

"These emergency services are caught in a bind between notifying
individuals in imminent danger and risking mass panic.  As a
result, these services are compelled to rely on emergency
messaging systems with far less reach and far less capacity," they
wrote. [GN]


PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC: Must Face Concussion Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Miller, writing for Pennlive, reports that in a ruling that
could be a game-changer, a state court on Oct. 10 refused to kill
a lawsuit by three high school athletes who claim the Pennsylvania
Interscholastic Athletic Association is legally responsible for
concussions they suffered playing football and softball.

The decision by a Commonwealth Court panel marks a loss for the
PIAA, which insisted it has no direct legal duty -- or even the
physical ability -- to safeguard all student athletes from
suffering head injuries in contact sports.

Instead, the state court in an opinion by Judge Robert Simpson
refused to grant the PIAA's plea to dismiss the class-action case
filed on behalf of football players Jonathan Hites and Domenic
Teolis and softball player Kaela Zingaro.

The PIAA appealed to the state court after Senior Judge Eugene E.
Fike II refused to dismiss the lawsuit after it was filed in
Lawrence County Court.

The Commonwealth Court ruling doesn't constitute the game-ending
buzzer for the case, but it does send it back to the county court
for further legal battling.

The suit by Hites, Zingaro and Teolis adds a new level to the
debate over concussions in sports.  It follows the billion-dollar
settlement of such a suit against the NFL.  Lawsuits also are
pending against several college football programs, including Penn
State's.

The rulings issued by Fike and Simpson essentially state that more
argument needs to be made to determine if the high school players
really have grounds to recover damages from the PIAA and force
changes to its policies, which apply to the group's 1,420 member
schools.

Hites, who played for Neshannock High School, claims he suffered a
concussion during a football summer camp in 2011.  After taking a
"brutal blow," he claims he was forced to keep practicing until he
vomited on the field. He claims his parents weren't called until
he passed out while sitting on the bench.

Zingaro contends she struck her head on the ground while making a
diving catch in the final game of the 2014 softball season.  She
claims a trainer who was at the game wasn't qualified to determine
whether she had suffered a concussion.

Teolis claims he was placed in a football game in 2012 even after
he had sustained "multiple severe hits" during practice the day
before and was experiencing headaches and nausea.

The students and their parents argue in their suit that the PIAA
has been negligent for not properly protecting student athletes.
They accuse the PIAA of a "failure to prioritize a safety culture
educating student athletes on the importance of warning signs and
the severity of concussion conditions."

They also contend the PIAA has not taken steps to ensure athletic
staffs are trained to identify the signs of concussions and that
it has failed to "mandate the removal of athletes who appear to
suffer concussions in practice as well as in games."

In asking Commonwealth Court to sack the athletes' suit, the PIAA
argued that the concussion issue should not be addressed by the
courts, but through sports safety measures that could be enacted
by the state Legislature.

The association stresses as well that the athletes all "assumed
the risk of potential injury," and were warned about that risk,
before they chose to participate in contact sports.

"The PIAA maintains that to conclude otherwise "would place a
burden on PIAA to stop play and perform extensive testing each
time a blow to the head occurs," Simpson noted.  "The PIAA argues
this absurd result would severely impair, if not destroy, many
interscholastic sports."

Simpson found that dismissing the suit on the inherent risk issue
"would be premature at this stage."

The same is the case, he found, with the PIAA's argument that its
existing protocols regarding helmet fitting, barring the use of
the head as a weapon in football, and giving school doctors the
call on whether a student is fit to play show the association "is
concerned with and takes very seriously the well-being of student-
athletes."

Simpson also cited the PIAA's claim that imposing greater safety
mandates on it would be "potentially devastating" because it lacks
the personnel and budget to monitor the medical status of every
player of every contact sport.

"At this stage . . . it is unclear whether the imposition of a
duty upon the PIAA in that regard is, in fact, in the public
interest," the state judge wrote.

The PIAA can appeal the Commonwealth Court ruling to the state
Supreme Court. [GN]


PNC BANK: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Cruz" Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment dismissing the case captioned RAFAEL M.
CRUZ; GLORIA CRUZ; RAFAEL F. CRUZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PNC
BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-3091 (6th Cir.).

The Cruzes brought this putative class action against PNC for
alleged violation of the Ohio Securities Act ("OSA").  They are
the victims of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by William Apostelos and
his associates.  The Cruzes alleged that, as part of this Ponzi
scheme, Apostelos sold them and other investors unregistered
securities -- promissory notes and corporate membership unit
certificates -- in violation of the OSA.

According to the Cruzes, Apostelos deposited the proceeds from
selling the unregistered securities into a PNC business account
("8143 Account") and made monthly interest payments to investors
from that account.  They claimed that PNC was liable for the
illegal sale of unregistered securities under Ohio Revised Code
Section 1707.43(A), alleging that PNC participated in or aided the
sales of unregistered securities by, among other things,
permitting Apostelos to use his 8143 Account and other PNC
accounts as an essential instrument in conducting his Ponzi-
scheme.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), PNC moved to
dismiss the Cruzes' complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.  The district court granted the
motion to dismiss, concluding that PNC could not be held liable
under Ohio Revised Code Section 1707.43(A) where PNC's alleged
conduct did not go beyond normal commercial banking activities and
where PNC did not directly assist Apostelos in making any sale of
unregistered securities.  The timely appeal followed.

The Court concludes that the Cruzes failed to allege any facts
indicating that PNC participated in or aided Apostelos in selling
unregistered securities to investors, let alone that PNC even knew
about those sales.  The Cruzes made the conclusory assertion that
PNC took steps, through one or more of its local branch employees,
to actively promote the scheme but failed to allege any facts
showing that PNC or its employees actively promoted the sale of
unregistered securities to investors.

The crux of the Cruzes' complaint is that PNC knew or should have
known Apostelos was using the PNC accounts to launder money as
part of some larger criminal undertaking.  Such an allegation,
however, even if true, is insufficient to impose liability under
section 1707.43(A).

Because the Cruzes failed to allege any facts indicating that PNC
participated in or aided Apostelos in selling unregistered
securities to investors, the district court properly dismissed
their complaint for failure to state a claim under Ohio Revised
Code Section 1707.43(A).  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Lp8n6U from Leagle.com.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bereket" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the case captioned ABBY BEREKET, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
C17-0812RSMRSM (W.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiff filed a proposed class action on May 24, 2017,
alleging that the Defendant's actions violated Section 1692 et
seq. of Title 15 of the United States Code, commonly referred to
as the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA") which
prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and
unfair practices.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges some time prior to Aug. 23,
2016 an obligation was allegedly incurred to Bank of America.  On
Aug. 23, 2016 the Defendant caused to be delivered to the
Plaintiff a collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged
debt which offered a number of payment options, one of which
offered "an Installment Option" for him to pay off his entire
alleged debt over the course of a number of months.

As of Aug. 23, 2016, more than six years had elapsed since the
last payment or activity on the Bank of America debt subject to
the letter.  Pursuant to RCW 4.16.040, the statute of limitations
is six years for filing suit to collect on a debt.  Said letter
states, that the law limits how long one can be sued on a debt.
Because of the age of his debt, the Defendant will not sue him for
it.

The Defendant regularly sends collection letters on time-barred
debts, offering small monthly installment plans in payment of the
entire debt, but does not inform the consumer that the statute of
limitations may reset upon making the first monthly payment.  It
regularly sends letters seeking to collect debts, which are time-
barred, that offer small monthly installment plans in payment of
the entire debt, informing the consumer that he or he will not be
sued due to the age of the debt; but not informing the consumer
that the statute of limitations may reset if a partial payment is
made on the debt, therefore allowing the Defendant the option of
commencing legal action, which otherwise would be barred by the
statute of limitations.

The Plaintiff alleges that these actions violate section 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692e of the FDCPA.  The Defendant filed its Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  It
seeks dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim on the basis that he
fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
The Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the Defendant has
misconstrued the relevant law and that he has sufficiently alleged
his claims.

Judge Martinez explains that an individual is still entitled to
the protections of the FDCPA, if a collection agency is asserting
that he owes a debt, even if he does not actually owe that debt.
Thus, the fact that the Plaintiff has not admitted that he owes
the debt at issue is not fatal to his claims.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a cause
of action under the FDCPA.  At this stage of the proceedings, he
views the facts alleged in favor of the Plaintiff, and also finds
that the Plaintiff has presented a plausible argument that a
partial payment would restart the statute of limitations on the
alleged debt, even, as the Defendant admits, that debt would be of
a lower amount that the original debt.  Accordingly, Judge
Martinez denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

The deadlines pertaining to class certification, as amended on
Sept. 26, 2017, remain in place.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/alDaJS from Leagle.com.

Abby Bereket, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan Matthew Pesicka --
Ryan@ConcordLawSeattle.com -- CONCORD LAW, P.C..

Abby Bereket, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak Zelman --
Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC, pro hac vice.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Duncan Manville -- dmanville@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE & WILLEY
LLP & Stephen C. Willey -- swilley@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE &
WILLEY LLP.


PURDUE PHARMA: Judge Denies OxyContin Settlement Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
The Regina Leader-Post reports that a potential $20-million
national agreement to compensate Canadians prescribed an addictive
painkiller has hit a snag after a Saskatchewan judge raised
concerns about the settlement.

Class-action lawsuits were filed in courts across the country on
behalf of those prescribed the opioid drugs OxyContin and OxyNEO
in Canada.

"Although the settlement agreement has received court approval in
the Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia proceedings, I have decided
that it will not be approved in the Saskatchewan proceeding,"
Regina Court of Queen's Bench Justice Dennis Ball said in his
recent written decision.

"It puts everything on hold across the country," Regina lawyer
Tony Merchant said Friday.  His firm represents the plaintiffs in
the Saskatchewan action.

The defendants are Purdue Pharma and four related Purdue
companies, accused of breaching their duty to warn consumers about
the addictive properties of OxyContin and OxyNEO, which they
manufactured, marketed and/or sold.

An "agreement in principle," encompassing the four separate
actions, required court approval in each jurisdiction.  It
provides compensation for those who took the prescribed drugs
between Jan. 1, 1996 and April 15, 2016.  Those in a personal
relationship with class members who have died or suffered injury
can also make a claim.

The settlement, reached in March, provides for a total of $20
million, including $2-million (less $150,000 for legal fees) for
provincial health insurers.  Court affidavits suggest the average
payout to individual claimants will likely be in the range of
$13,000 to $18,000, less costs.

While the agreement got a stamp of approval by three judges, Ball
gave it a thumbs down last month, raising concerns about proper
notification, legal fees, and the payment for provincial health
insurers.  Mr. Merchant plans to address the issues by providing
the court further information.

"We don't view it as a problem, but we did view the decision as
unusual particularly after three other judges said yes and after
(Ball) himself had been one of the four on notice," Mr. Merchant
added.  The matter will be in the hands of a different judge, with
Ball's retirement this month.

The province is not directly a party in the action, but indirectly
since the law provides for recovery of health services costs in
such claims.

In an email on Oct. 6, a government spokesperson said, "We
understand class counsel intends to file additional material to
address those issues, including the claims of the provincial
health insurers."  It didn't comment directly on the settlement
amount.

In the wake of the agreement, some critics raised concerns there
was insufficient money for provinces to address the fallout from a
rising tide of opioid addictions.

"I think what's really going on here is the anger about fentanyl
and OxyContin and that people are becoming addicted, in part with
prescribed drugs, and then they're going to street drugs and it's
causing deaths," said Mr. Merchant.  "But that doesn't have
anything to do with this case, which is a case for people who
became addicted after they had the drug prescribed to them."

The Saskatchewan suit, first launched in 2012, covers users here
as well as in Alberta, Manitoba, the Yukon, Northwest Territories
or Nunavut.  The Ontario proceeding includes those in B.C., the
Nova Scotia action also covers Newfoundland, Labrador, New
Brunswick and PEI, and there's a Quebec action.

However, Judge Ball raised concerns about the Saskatchewan action
agreeing to settle on behalf of those in the northern territories
"without making any effort to identify those persons or provide
them with notice of the settlement."  He wants proof of
notification or allowance for it.

In assessing whether or not the settlement is reasonable on the
whole and in the best interests of the class members, Ball
considered the question of legal fees -- and similarly found the
information lacking.  The agreement capped legal costs to class
members at a 25 per cent contingency, regardless of how many law
firms share the amount.

He said class counsel hasn't disclosed a fee-sharing agreement for
the proposed $4.5 million in legal fees.  Ball was skeptical when
a lawyer in the Ontario action suggested there's only a "handshake
agreement."

Judge Ball was also dissatisfied by the lack of information
regarding payment to provincial health insurers.  Using population
numbers, he estimated health insurers in Alberta, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and the territories would share only around $344,470
total. "Having regard to the scope of the claims to be settled,
the proposed payments to the provincial health insurers seem
paltry at best," said Ball.

The judge also noted there's no evidence before the court that the
insurers have signed off on the agreement or were even notified,
which Merchant disputes.

Judge Ball said the structure of the agreement raises further
concerns about the potential for "conflict of interest" between
the class lawyers' duty to the class members and the provincial
health insurers, and also allows for "potential collusion" between
the class counsel and the pharmaceutical companies.  He proposed
three options to address those specific concerns -- provide more
information, amend the agreement, or go back to court. [GN]


QUINSTREET: Faces "Becker" Class Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against QuinStreet, Inc.
d/b/a Schools.com d/b/a Campuscorner.com d/b/a
Searchschoolsnetwork.com.

The case is captioned Todd M. Becker, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. QuinStreet, Inc. d/b/a
Schools.com d/b/a Campuscorner.com d/b/a Searchschoolsnetwork.com,
Case No. 0:17-cv-61941-CMA (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

QuinStreet, Inc. uses performance-based advertising with search
engine marketing strategies to promote clients over the Internet.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE
      14 NE 1st Ave STE 400
      Miami, FL 33131
      Telephone: (404) 797-9696
      E-mail: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com

         - and -

      Manuel Santiago Hiraldo, Esq.
      HIRALDO P.A.
      401 E. Las Olas Blvd. Ste 1400
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394
      Telephone: (954) 400-4713
      E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


SASKATCHEWAN: Health Regions Face Sterilization Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that a proposed class-action suit
against Canada's attorney general, the Saskatchewan government,
the province's health regions and doctors who allegedly coerced
Indigenous women to undergo sterilization has been filed in
Saskatoon's Court of Queen's Bench.

The statement of claim was filed about three months after the
Saskatoon Health Region released the findings of a six-month
external review into Indigenous women who had a tubal ligation.

A judge needs to sign off on the statement of claim before it
moves forward as a class action suit.

The lawsuit, if certified, would seek damages for each plaintiff.

Two women are currently listed as plaintiffs but more women in
Saskatchewan could be included if the lawsuit is approved.

The statement of claim states the women's charter rights,
including their right to life, liberty and security and their
right to receive health care free of discrimination, were
breached.

Other damages listed include future cost of care, punitive or
exemplary damages, and general damages for "lost opportunity,"
among others.

After the report was released, federal Indigenous Affairs Minister
Carolyn Bennett said it was an indication of racism in a health-
care system that remains biased against Aboriginal women.

The report was researched and compiled by Yvonne Boyer, a lawyer
and a Canada Research Chair at Manitoba's Brandon University, and
Dr. Judith Bartlett, a physician, and researcher.

The report suggested some Indigenous women from Saskatoon and the
surrounding area were coerced into having their Fallopian tubes
clamped or severed after giving birth in the hospital.

Most of the women who were interviewed for the report either did
not recall consenting to the procedure or did so because they were
exhausted and too overwhelmed to fight any longer, the researchers
found.

In response to the findings, the Saskatoon Health Region said it
deeply regrets what happened, acknowledging it failed to treat the
women with the respect, compassion, and support they deserve. [GN]


SEATTLE, WA: Court Denies Class Certification in "Hooper" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and their Motion for Preliminary
Injunction in the case captioned LISA HOOPER, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., Defendants, Case No. C17-77RSM (W.D.
Wash.).

The Plaintiffs' suit stems from the Defendants' enforcement of
rules and guidelines that authorize the removal of unauthorized
encampments from City-owned and Washington State-owned property.
In 2008, the City enacted rules, the Multi-Departmental
Administrative Rules 08-01 ("MDAR 08-01"), to establish, in part,
standard procedures for the removal of unauthorized encampments,
camping equipment, and personal property left on Cityowned
property.

That same year, Washington State Department of Transportation
("WSDOT") also adopted guidelines, entitled WSDOT's Guidelines to
Address Illegal Encampments within State Right of Way,
establishing similar removal procedures for unauthorized
encampments.

When the suit was filed on Jan. 19, 2017, the MDAR 08-01 were
still in effect.  At the time, the Plaintiffs' putative class
action alleged the MDAR 08-01 and WSDOT Guidelines were
unconstitutional on their face, and as applied, because exceptions
and exclusions within both policies rendered their notice and
storage provisions meaningless.

On Jan. 31, 2017, the City proposed two new rules to modify the
MDAR 08-01.  The Finance and Administrative Services Encampment
Rule 17-01 ("Proposed FAS 17-01") proposed a uniform set of rules
and procedures for removing encampments on City property, while
the Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules ("Proposed MDAR 17-
01") proposed a uniform set of rules and procedures for addressing
encampments on City property.

On Feb. 6, 2017, the Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") which was subsequently denied because they did not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or  irreparable
harm.  Following this denial, the Plaintiffs amended their initial
Complaint.

Subsequently, after a public comment period and revisions, the
City's MDAR 08-01 was superseded by the final versions of the
Proposed FAS 17-01 and the Proposed MDAR 17-01.  On April 3, 2017,
the Updated Encampment Rules went into effect.  The Plaintiffs
filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on May 23, 2017.

The Plaintiffs' SAC raises facial and as-applied challenges to the
City's Updated Encampment Rules and the WSDOT Guidelines.  They
claim Updated Encampment Rule exceptions governing "obstructions"
and "immediate hazards" allow the City to remove any unauthorized
encampment without notice.  Aside from their facial challenges,
the Plaintiffs also claim the Defendants' actual cleanup
practices, seizure of property, several storage and storage-
retrieval practices, are unconstitutional.

Through the suit, the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that
the Defendants' alleged policy and practice of confiscating and/or
destroying the personal property of unhoused persons without a
warrant, probable cause, and the requisite due process safeguards
is unlawful under federal and state law.  They also seek
injunctive relief.

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  Oral
argument on the matter was heard on Sept. 7, 2017.

The Individual Plaintiffs seek certification of a class comprised
of all unhoused people who live outside within the City of Seattle
and who keep their personal possessions on public property.

Because the Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 23(a)'s
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
requirements, Judge Martinez denied their motion for class
certification.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
the Judge concludes that because the Plaintiffs fail to show how
the definitions of "personal property" and "hazardous items" allow
Defendants to engage in the unreasonable seizure of property, they
fail to demonstrate they are likely to succeed on the merits of
their Fourth Amendment facial challenge to the Updated Encampment
Rules.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have not shown they are
likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourth Amendment
challenge to the City's cleanup practices.

Considering that the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate they
are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional
claims, Judge Martinez finds that they have not demonstrated they
are likely to suffer irreparable harm if he does not grant their
motion for preliminary injunction.

The Judge cannot find that the speculative harm the Plaintiffs
claim outweighs the Defendants' interest in maintaining its
property free of items that may pose threats to motorists,
pedestrians, City and WSDOT workers, and other unhoused persons.
For the same reason, the Plaintiffs also fail to demonstrate the
preliminary injunction is in the public interest.

Judge Martinez continues to recognize the hardships faced by the
Plaintiffs, and it acknowledges their constitutional property
rights.  The optimum solution for the difficult issues raised in
this lawsuit may, ultimately, only be found outside of a
courtroom.  However, he denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  The
Clerk of the Court is directed to forward a copy of the Order to
all counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hnhH21 from Leagle.com.

Lisa Hooper, Plaintiff, represented by Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU
OF WASHINGTON.

Lisa Hooper, Plaintiff, represented by Emily Chiang, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias --
bmarksdias@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg -- elindberg@corrcronin.com --
CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T.
Williams -- twilliams@corrcronin.com -- CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Brandie Osborne, Plaintiff, represented by Breanne Mary Schuster,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Lisa Nowlin,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Blake
Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE
LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG &
MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP.

The Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, Plaintiff, represented by
Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR
CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Real Change, Plaintiff, represented by Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU
OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU
OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Blake Edward
Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP,
Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE
LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG &
MOORE LLP.

Kayla Willis, Plaintiff, represented by Blake Edward Marks-Dias,
CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Breanne Mary
Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON,
Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE
LLP, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Trinity Parish of Seattle, Plaintiff, represented by Blake Edward
Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP,
Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn
Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Reavy Washington, Plaintiff, represented by Blake Edward Marks-
Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Breanne
Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn
Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

City Of Seattle, Defendant, represented by Andrew Thomas Myerberg,
SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Carlton Wm Seu, SEATTLE CITY
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Gary T. Smith, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Gregory Colin Narver, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Gregory J.
Wong -- greg.wong@pacificalawgroup.com -- PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP,
Matthew J. Segal -- matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com -- PACIFIC
LAW GROUP LLP, Patrick Downs, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE &
Taki V. Flevaris -- taki.flevaris@pacificalawgroup.com -- PACIFICA
LAW GROUP LLP.

Washington State Department of Transportation, Defendant,
represented by Matthew D. Huot, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE & Alicia
O. Young, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

Roger Millar, Defendant, represented by Matthew D. Huot, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE & Alicia O. Young, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

City Of Seattle, Counter Claimant, represented by Andrew Thomas
Myerberg, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Carlton Wm Seu, SEATTLE
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Gary T. Smith, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, Gregory Colin Narver, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Gregory J. Wong, PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP, Matthew J. Segal, PACIFIC
LAW GROUP LLP, Patrick Downs, SEATTLE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE &
Taki V. Flevaris, PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP.

Lisa Hooper, Counter Defendant, represented by Breanne Mary
Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON,
Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR
CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Brandie Osborne, Counter Defendant, represented by Breanne Mary
Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON,
Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR
CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Real Change, Counter Defendant, represented by Breanne Mary
Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF WASHINGTON,
Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR
CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

The Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, Counter Defendant, represented
by Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU
OF WASHINGTON, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn Talner,
ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Blake Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON
BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP & Todd T. Williams, CORR
CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Trinity Parish of Seattle, Counter Defendant, represented by Blake
Edward Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE
LLP, Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU
OF WASHINGTON, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn
Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.

Kayla Willis, Counter Defendant, represented by Blake Edward
Marks-Dias, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP,
Breanne Mary Schuster, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Emily Chiang, ACLU OF
WASHINGTON, Eric A. Lindberg, CORR CRONIN MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER
FOGG & MOORE LLP, Lisa Nowlin, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Nancy Lynn
Talner, ACLU OF WASHINGTON & Todd T. Williams, CORR CRONIN
MICHELSON BAUMGARDNER FOGG & MOORE LLP.


SEATTLE, WA: Homeless Sweep Suit Denied Class-Action Status
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Archibald, writing for Real Change, reports that a federal
judge ruled Oct. 4 that sweeps of homeless people and their
belongings may continue as a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the city of Seattle's rules regarding the
practice moves through the court.

Judge Ricardo Martinez denied motions filed by attorneys
representing the plaintiffs -- four homeless individuals impacted
by sweeps, the Real Change Homeless Empowerment Project, Trinity
Parish of Seattle and the Episcopal Diocese of Olympia -- that
could have paused the sweeps until the conclusion of the lawsuit
and allowed the suit to go forward as a class action lawsuit
covering the homeless population of Seattle.

In his ruling Judge Martinez expressed sympathy for the plight of
the plaintiffs, but suggested that they pursue other avenues to
stopping the sweeps than the courtroom.

"The Court continues to recognize the hardships faced by the
Plaintiffs, and it acknowledges their constitutional property
rights," Judge Martinez wrote.  "The optimum solution for the
difficult issues raised in this lawsuit may, ultimately, only be
found outside of the courtroom."

Attorneys for the plaintiffs tried to show the court that an
injunction was needed because the city's policies of sweeping
unsheltered people violate property and due process rights
guaranteed to them by the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments of the
constitution.  They aimed to demonstrate that this would be the
case if city officials followed the rules to the letter, and also
that the rules are subjective and not followed in every case. They
also attempted to show that people would suffer "irreparable harm"
if the judge did not intervene.

Attorneys submitted photographic and video evidence of sweeps,
including the destruction of a tent with box cutters.  They
obtained testimony from homeless people who have experienced the
sweeps.  They pointed to the city officials' own records of
encampments reported and sweeps executed.  They told the judge
that only 12 people had been able to reclaim their stored property
in the past two years.  They showed specific instances in which
people were given no warning before their belongings were seized,
sweeps that fell within the rules.

They submitted testimony that a man died of diabetic shock because
he was deprived of his insulin by a sweep.  The stories were not
enough to convince the court.

They submitted testimony that a man died of diabetic shock because
he was deprived of his insulin by a sweep.  The stories were not
enough to convince the court.

Plaintiffs did not show him that the definitions used to determine
whether or not to store items -- if something was "personal
property" or "hazardous items" -- were too vague. Martinez
concluded that items contaminated with urine, for instance, could
be deemed hazardous and therefore tossed.

The judge dismissed the plaintiffs' attorneys' concerns over
sufficient notice before a sweep because the city has policies in
place to store items and let people know if their possessions have
been stored.  Attorney Todd Williams described the rules as having
loopholes big enough to drive a truck through.

Martinez also found that the plaintiffs did not show that the city
engaged in "a persistent and widespread practice of summarily
destroying property of unhoused persons" because information
presented by the plaintiffs that purported to show that the city
did not store property in 30 percent of cleanups covered only a
two-month period. It did not document whether property was
destroyed in those instances.

Similarly, Judge Martinez found that arguments to extend the scope
of the lawsuit to a class action suit failed to meet two parts of
a three-part test.  In January 2016, a census of homeless people
found 2,945 on the streets of Seattle.  This year, volunteers
counted 3,857.

So, while he decided that the four homeless people who had been
swept could not stand for all the folks living outside, he did
agree that there are a lot of homeless people in Seattle, which
satisfied one of the three tests: numerosity.  It was the only
point of agreement among all sides.

To date, the city has spent $535,000 on the lawsuit. In contrast,
a recent evaluation shows the city spent $559,600 for the
operations and case management costs for the three city-authorized
tent encampments.

The city was represented outside counsel because the assistant
city attorney with experience of the constitutional issues raised
in the case had represented Real Change in a lawsuit five years
earlier, according to the City Attorney's Office.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs elected not to waive potential
conflicts of interest, and the city's attorney could not work on
the case. To date, the city has spent $535,000 on the lawsuit,
according to the City Attorney's office.

According to an evaluation of permitted encampments released in
June 2017, the city spent $559,600 for the operations and case
management costs for the city-authorized tent encampments in
Ballard, Interbay and Othello. [GN]


SIGHTLINE MEDIA: Faces "Sullivan" Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Phillip Sullivan Jr., on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Sightline Media Group, LLC, Case No. 1:17-
cv-07462 (S.D.N.Y., September 29, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Sightline Media Group, LLC publishes newspapers, magazines, Web
sites, and other publications. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 465-1188
      Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
      E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com

SLIDE FIRE: Eglet, Brady Center File Stock Bump Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit was filed in the District Court of Clark
County Nevada on behalf of victims of the deadliest mass shooting
in American history that took place on October 1, at the Route 91
Harvest Festival.  The suit, filed by Las Vegas law firm Eglet
Prince and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, is against
Slide Fire Solutions, LP and the sellers, manufacturers and
marketers of "bump stock" devices which convert semi-automatic
weapons to the functional equivalent of a machine gun.

This case is on behalf of all the festival goers who suffered
emotional distress as a result of the shooting. The lawsuit asks
the defendants to pay for the costs associated with counseling and
other treatment for emotional distress.  The lawsuit also asks the
court to award punitive damages.  The lawsuit alleges that such
damages are appropriate for defendants who provided a product that
turned a semi-automatic gun into the functional equivalent of a
machine gun, thereby evading longstanding federal law.

The lawsuit asserts that Slide Fire Solutions, LP was negligent in
developing and marketing "bump stocks" to the general public
without any reasonable restrictions, thereby subverting federal
law that has highly regulated machine guns for over 80 years.
According to the Complaint, "this horrific assault would not and
could not have occurred, with a conventional handgun, rifle, or
shotgun, of the sort used by law-abiding responsible gun owners
for hunting or self-defense."  The complaint goes on to allege
that the damage caused to the plaintiffs, "resulted from the
military-style arsenal that the defendants manufactured, marketed,
and sold to the public, without any reasonable measures or
safeguards."

Representing the Plaintiffs are Robert Eglet, Robert Adams, Aaron
Ford, and Erica Entsminger of the Eglet Prince law firm, and
Jonathan Lowy, of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence.  Brady
Campaign & Center Co-Presidents, Kristin Brown and Avery Gardiner,
released a statement regarding the impact of this case:

The people who attended the concert have suffered so much already.
The physical injuries are staggering, and we know the emotional
injuries can be equally severe and long term.  Brady has decades
of experience supporting the victims of gun violence and has been
the only organization in the nation focused on seeking justice for
them in the courts.

The announcement was made at a press conference on Tuesday,
October 10th at 10:30 am PST by Robert T. Eglet of Eglet Prince
and Jonathan Lowy, Vice President, Litigation of the Brady Center.
The event was held at the law offices of Eglet Prince 400 South
Seventh Street, Suite 400 in Las Vegas.

Background:

Since 1986, the National Firearms Act ("NFA") has heavily
regulated the sale of fully automatic guns, a.k.a. "machine guns,"
so they are not readily available to the US public.  "Bump stocks"
enable generally available semi-automatic firearms to simulate
machine guns by greatly increasing their rate of fire. Based on
reports, in the October 1 Las Vegas mass shooting, the number of
lives lost and people injured and emotionally traumatized in 11
minutes -- a mere 660 seconds in which bullets hailed down upon
them -- resulted from the shooter using "bump stock" devices.
Numerous bump stock devices were found in the killer's hotel room.

Bump stock devices were created by Slide Fire Solutions, LP.  In
2010 letter to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
Explosives, ("ATF") Slide Fire wrote that the bump stocks were
intended to assist "persons whose hands have limited mobility."
However, Slide Fire's inventor of the bump stock, in a 2016
interview with AmmoLand, Jeremiah Cottle stated later, that the
bump stock was geared toward "people like me, who love full auto."
The complaint alleges that plaintiffs are unaware of bump stocks
actually being marketed or sold only to people whose hands had
limited mobility.  The complaint alleges that Slide Fire grossed
more than $10 million in sales of bump stocks in 2010. According
to Cottle, a semi-automatic rifle may cost between $800 and
$1,200, while a fully automatic model can run more than $15,000.
It was also asserted in marketing materials that the bump stock
allows semi-automatic rifle to mimic the fire rate of a fully
automatic rifle for a fraction of the price and without the legal
paperwork.  Slide Fire marketed its bump stock as a military-grade
accessory for civilians, and sold for $100 to $400, depending on
the model.  Slide Fire has since suspended new orders on its
website and disabled its "locate a dealer" section. Also, some
retailers have stopped selling bump stock products after the
shootings.

The members of the class action suit are seeking equitable relief
in the form of a court supervised program for psychological
monitoring for all the Class Members at the expense of the
Defendants.  Equitable medical testing will provide medical
monitoring, testing and evaluation that would have been
unnecessary had the Defendants not been negligent and conducted
this reckless behavior.

A COMPLETE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT AVAILABLE AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE
-- INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST.

                      About Eglet Prince

Eglet Prince has successfully represented thousands of clients.
The firm is best known for its multimillion-dollar verdicts,
including two verdicts in excess of $500 million against a
pharmaceutical company.  The attorneys at Eglet Prince are
experienced trial lawyers and have successfully handled complex
litigation, mass tort litigation and class actions.  Eglet Prince
is located at the Robert T. Eglet Advocacy Center 400 S. 7th
Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101, 4th Floor
702-450-5400

          About Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence

For more than 25 years, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence -
- https://www.bradycampaign.org -- has represented victims of gun
violence litigation cases across the country.  As a result, the
Brady Center has obtained or helped obtain more than $80 million
in verdicts and settlements against gun companies on behalf of
victims.  A 501(c)(3) organization, the Brady Center is located at
840 First Street, NE, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20002
https://www.bradycampaign.org/legal-action-project [GN]


SONIC CORP: Faces "Lewin" Class Suit in W. Dist. Okla.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against Sonic Corp.

The case is captioned Jeffrey Lewin and Audrey Bernstein, on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Sonic Corp., Case No.
5:17-cv-01047-F (W.D. Ok., October 2, 2017).

Sonic Corp. operates a fast food restaurant company in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Federman, Esq.
      FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
      10205 N Pennsylvania Ave
      Oklahoma City, OK 73120
      Telephone: (405) 235-1560
      Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
      E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com


SOUTHEAST ALABAMA: Greenway Appeals Ruling in "Carrigan" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Greenway EHS, Inc., and Greenway Health, LLC, filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled DAWN COBB
CARRIGAN AND JANET GATES, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SOUTHEAST ALABAMA RURAL HEALTH ASSOCIATES;
GREENWAY ASSOCIATES, LLC; GREENWAY EHS, INC.; SUNRISE TECHNOLOGY
CONSULTANTS; LEE INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-
00114-WKW-TFM, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant SARHA failed to maintain patient
medical records between November 2011 and August 2016 because of
the other Defendants' failure to maintain properly the database
that housed the medical records.  Specifically, they allege that
Greenway, EHS, Sunrise, and Lee represented to SARHA that they
maintained a backup database to secure the medical records when
those Defendants knew that no such backup existed.  As a result,
the Plaintiffs argue, SARHA violated its duty to secure properly
its patients' medical records, resulting in damages to Plaintiffs
and the class they represent.

The appellate case is captioned as Greenway Health, LLC, et al. v.
Dawn Carrigan, et al., Case No. 17-90022, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents DAWN COBB CARRIGAN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, and JANET GATES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Matthew M. Baker, Esq.
          Nicholas Joseph Cervera, Esq.
          Grady A. Reeves, Esq.
          CERVERA RALPH & REEVES, LLC
          914 S Brundidge St.
          Troy, AL 36081-3222
          Telephone: (334) 566-0116
          E-mail: mbaker@troycable.net
                  ncervera@troycable.net
                  troylaw@troycable.net

               - and -

          Roger Lee Bates, Esq.
          HAND ARENDALL, LLC
          1801 5th Ave. N, Suite 400
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 324-4400
          E-mail: rbates@handarendall.com

               - and -

          David Alan Cole, Esq.
          FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP
          100 Galleria Pkwy. SE, Suite 1600
          Atlanta, GA 30339-5948
          Telephone: (770) 818-0000
          E-mail: dcole@fmglaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph L. Cowan, II, Esq.
          JOHN D. SAXON, PC
          2119 3rd Ave. N, Suite 100
          Birmingham, AL 35203-3314
          Telephone: (205) 324-0223

               - and -

          Christina Diane Crow, Esq.
          Lynn Wilson Jinks, III, Esq.
          JINKS CROW & DICKSON, PC
          219 Prairie St. N
          PO BOX 350
          Union Springs, AL 36089-0350
          Telephone: (334) 738-4225
          E-mail: ccrow@jinkslaw.com
                  ljinks@jinkslaw.com

               - and -

          E. Allen Dodd, Jr., Esq.
          SCRUGGS DODD & DODD, ATTORNEYS, PA
          207 Alabama Ave. SW
          Fort Payne, AL 35967-1952
          Telephone: (256) 845-5932
          E-mail: eadscruggs@farmerstel.com

               - and -

          Charles Davenport Hudson, Esq.
          Myron Cordell Penn, Esq.
          Larry Shane Seaborn, Esq.
          PENN & SEABORN, LLC
          PO Box 688
          Clayton, AL 36016
          Telephone: (334) 775-9778
          E-mail: charlie@pennandseaborn.com
                  myron@pennandseaborn.com
                  shane@pennandseaborn.com

Defendants-Petitioners GREENWAY HEALTH, LLC, and GREENWAY EHS,
INC., are represented by:

          Donald H. Crawford, II, Esq.
          Robert D. Zebro, Esq.
          COPE ZEBRO & CRAWFORD, PL
          14010 Roosevelt Blvd., Suite 802
          Clearwater, FL 33762
          Telephone: (727) 369-6070
          E-mail: dcrawford@czcfirm.com
                  RZebro@czcfirm.com


STARLINE TOURS: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Award in "Ehm"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned EHM PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. STARLINE TOURS OF HOLLYWOOD, INC., Defendant and
Appellant, Case No. B277311 (Cal. App.), Judge Victoria M. Chavez
of the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Two, affirmed the trial court's judgment confirming an
arbitration award.

The Appellant is a tour bus operator located in Los Angeles,
California.  The Respondent owns and operates the TMZ Productions,
Inc. website and television show.  In August 2012, the Appellant
and the Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement
captioned "TMZ-Starline Tour Bus Agreement."

In December 2012, several bus drivers filed a putative class
action against the Appellant alleging that it had violated certain
wage and hour laws.  The Named Plaintiffs sought to represent all
similarly situated employees regardless of whether they worked in
connection with the TMZ tour or one of the Appellant's other
tours.  On June 14, 2013, the putative class action complaint was
amended to add TMZ as a Defendant.

The Respondent offered to defend TMZ only if respondent expressly
agreed that the Appellant does not have an indemnity obligation
under the contract to defend TMZ productions, and that the
Appellant could withdraw from representation for any valid reason
which might arise.  The Appellant's offer was also conditioned on
respondent agreeing that TMZ would be represented by the
Appellant's attorney.

In August 2013, respondent retained Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp
("MSK") to represent the Respondent and TMZ.  Between June 2013
and January 2014, the Respondent voluntarily agreed with the
Plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit to be added as a Defendant in
order to secure the dismissal of TMZ.  The Plaintiffs added the
Respondent as a Defendant in January 2014 and voluntarily
dismissed TMZ in April 2014.  The litigation is still pending.

On June 2, 2014, the Respondent filed a demand for arbitration,
alleging breach of contract by the Appellant arising from its
refusal to defend TMZ and respondent in the underlying lawsuit.
The Respondent sought a declaration that the Appellant was
required to defend TMZ and the Respondent.  The Respondent sought
an award of its costs and fees incurred through Jan. 31, 2015, and
a declaration that the Appellant is required to pay the
Respondent's reasonable attorney fees as they are incurred going
forward.

On June 8, 2015, the arbitrator issued a 10-page written "partial
final award."  The arbitrator found that the Appellant was
obligated to defend TMZ and the Respondent in the underlying
lawsuit.  Because the litigation was ongoing, the award of the
Respondent's attorney fees and costs through Jan. 31, 2015, was a
partial award.

The Appellant appealed the award under the JAMS Optional Appeal
Procedure, as permitted in the parties' agreement.  The appellate
panel affirmed the arbitrator's partial final award in its
entirety.

On May 9, 2016, the Respondent filed a petition to confirm the
contractual arbitration award in Los Angeles Superior Court.  The
Appellant filed an opposition.

The trial court signed an amended judgment, ordering that in
accordance with the arbitration award issued by JAMS on June 8,
2015, the Appellant will (i) pay to the Respondent $201,561.83,
which consists of $185,725 that the Respondent incurred in
attorneys' fees in the underlying action as of Jan. 31, 2015; and
$15,836.83 that the Respondent incurred in costs as of that date;
(ii) pay any other of the Respondent's reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in the underlying action from Feb. 1, 2015
onward, as they are incurred, within 30 days of receipt by the
Appellant of the Respondent's invoices; and (ii) retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure enforcement of the
Appellant's defense obligation, payment of the Respondent's
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and to resolve any disputes
regarding indemnity, if necessary.

On Aug. 26, 2016, the Appellant filed the appeal from the trial
court judgment.

Judge Chavez finds that the Appellant has provided no authority
suggesting the arbitrator acted contrary to the CAA in finding
that it abandoned its cross-claim under the circumstances of the
case.  As it is beyond the scope of her review, she declines to
address the merits of the arbitrator's decision.  She also finds
that the arbitrator's award in the matter bears a rational
relationship to the contract and the breach.  Thus, the arbitrator
did not exceed his authority in issuing it, and the trial court
correctly confirmed the award.  She notes that the arbitrator's
award does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or public
policy.

With respect to the arbitrator's reservation of jurisdiction,
Judge Chavez finds that the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority by retaining jurisdiction under the circumstances of the
case.  The underlying litigation in the matter was ongoing at the
time that the arbitrator issued the partial final award.  The
arbitrator did not exceed his authority in retaining jurisdiction
to decide disputes.

The arbitrator acted within reason in determining that he had the
authority to retain jurisdiction on the issue of indemnity.
Hence, the trial court did not err in determining that the
arbitrator did not exceed his powers.  The Appellant has failed to
convince Judge Chavez that reversible error occurred.

Finally, as to the Appellant's final argument that the trial court
impermissibly changed the award when entering judgment, the Judge
finds that the parties do not elaborate on the issue of whether
MSK is still involved in the litigation.  Because such factual
questions are within the realm of the trial court, she has no way
of ascertaining prejudice to either party from the alleged error.

By failing to raise the issue in the trial court, the Appellant
has failed to establish any facts showing prejudice.  Under the
circumstances, Judge Chavez declines to find error.

Accordingly, Judge Chavez affirmed.  She awarded the Respondent
its costs of appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/PYBbPN from Leagle.com.

Mohammed K. Ghods, Jeremy A. Rhyne -- jrhyne@lexopusfirm.com --
and Lori Speak for Defendant and Appellant.

Boies Schiller Flexner, Linda M. Burrow -- lburrow@bsfllp.com --
and Cameron J. Johnson -- cjohnson@bsfllp.com -- for Plaintiff and
Respondent.


STATE UNIVERSITY OF NY: Sued Over Civil Rights Act Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
Isidora Pejovic, Chae Bean Kang, Alba Sala Huerta, Chassidy King,
and Gordon Graham, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated v. State University of New York at Albany and
Mark Benson, Case No. 1:17-cv-01092-TJM-DJS (N.D.N.Y., September
29, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the
Civil Rights Act.

State University of New York at Albany is a public research
university with campuses in Albany, Guilderland, and Rensselaer,
New York, United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Bernays T. Barclay, Esq.
      RIMON, P.C.
      255 Patroon Creek Boulevard #4467
      Albany, NY 12206
      Telephone: (516) 375-2524
      Facsimile: (212) 363-0270
      E-mail: buz.barclay@rimonlaw.com

Gordon Graham is a pro se plaintiff.


SUN BANCORP: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., on Oct. 11 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on behalf of holders of Sun Bancorp, Inc.
("Sun Bancorp") (Nasdaq:SNBC) common stock in connection with the
proposed acquisition of Sun Bancorp by OceanFirst Financial Corp.
("OceanFirst") announced on June 30, 2017 (the "Complaint").  The
Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against Sun Bancorp, its Board of Directors (the "Board"),
and OceanFirst, is captioned Parshall v. Sun Bancorp, Inc., Case
No. 1:17-cv-07368 (D.N.J.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120, Wilmington,
DE 19803, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-
legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On June 30, 2017, Sun Bancorp entered into an agreement and plan
of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with OceanFirst.  Pursuant to
the Merger Agreement, shareholders of Sun Bancorp will receive
0.7884 shares of OceanFirst common stock and $3.78 in cash for
each share of Sun Bancorp they own (the "Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4
Registration Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The
Complaint alleges that the Registration Statement, which
recommends that Sun Bancorp stockholders vote in favor of the
Proposed Transaction, omits material information necessary to
enable shareholders to make an informed decision as to how to vote
on the Proposed Transaction, including material information with
respect to Sun Bancorp's and OceanFirst's financial projections,
the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor, and the
background of the Proposed Transaction.  The Complaint seeks
injunctive and equitable relief and damages on behalf of holders
of Sun Bancorp common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than December 11, 2017.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

With offices in Wilmington, Delaware and Garden City, New York,
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. -- http://www.rigrodskylong.com--
regularly prosecutes securities fraud, shareholder corporate, and
shareholder derivative litigation on behalf of shareholders in
state and federal courts throughout the United States. [GN]


SUSHI MARU: Kimm Appeals Order in "Ham" Suit to Second Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Kimm, Esq., and Kimm Law Firm filed an appeal from the
District Court's memorandum and order dated September 12, 2017,
issued in the lawsuit styled Ham, et al. v. Sushi Maru Express, et
al., Case No. 15-cv-6138, in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

The lawsuit alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Ham v. Sushi Maru Express, Case
No. 17-3208, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Appellants Michael S. Kimm and Kimm Law Firm represent themselves:

          Michael S. Kimm, Esq.
          KIMM LAW FIRM
          41W Bancker Street
          Englewood, NJ 07631
          Telephone: (201) 569-2880
          E-mail: msk@kimmlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Sushi Maru Express Corp., Kevin Kim, Hak Jae
Lim and John Does 1-5 are represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Schlossberg, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          58 South Service Road
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 247-4614
          E-mail: schlossberg@jacksonlewis.com


SUTTER HEALTH: Calif. Court Allows Antitrust Suit to Proceed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion to File Fourth Amended Complaint in the case
captioned DJENEBA SIDIBE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SUTTER HEALTH,
Defendant, Case No. 12-cv-04854-LB (N.D. Cal.).

In this putative class action, the plaintiffs who pay premiums to
enroll in commercial health plans sued Sutter Health, which
operates hospitals and other health-care service providers,
alleging that Sutter's anticompetitive conduct in the health-care
services industry in Northern California violates federal and
state antitrust laws and California's unfair competition law.
Sutter's alleged anticompetitive conduct is imposing tying
arrangements that require health plans to include in their
network, and pay supra-competitive rates for, Inpatient Hospital
Services that Sutter supplies in specific identified markets in
the Northern District of California.

Sutter also allegedly forces anticompetitive anti-steering
provisions into its contracts with health plans. This conduct
allegedly harmed health-plan subscribers, who suffered from
Sutter's ability to charge supra-competitive rates in the form of
higher insurance premiums and co-insurance payments.

After a responsive pleading is filed, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the
court's leave. Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if
there is strong evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or
futility of amendment, etc.

In relevant part, Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment to a
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction or occurrence set out  or attempted to be set
out  in the original pleading. In the Ninth Circuit, an amendment
adding a plaintiff relates back to the original complaint under
Rule 15(c) when (1) the original complaint gave the defendant
adequate notice of the claims of the newly proposed plaintiff; (2)
the relation back does not unfairly prejudice the defendant; and
(3) there is an identity of interests between the original and new
proposed plaintiff. The relation-back doctrine applies to
amendments seeking to expand the scope of a class.

In deciding whether an amendment relates back to the original
claim, notice to the opposing part of the existence and
involvement of the new plaintiff is the critical element.

Sutter's arguments do not change this outcome.  It argues that the
plaintiffs abandoned the entity claims, but the refinements in the
amended complaints -- which all addressed the same anticompetitive
conduct -- were a response to court orders and were geared toward
(for example) plausibly alleging antitrust injury and relevant
markets. And unlike Knauf Insulation, Inc. v. S. Brands, Inc., the
plaintiffs did not purposefully drop a defendant from the case.
820 F.3d 904, 907-08, Tese-Milner v. Diamond Trading Co. Ltd.,
involved a wholesale change in claims, and a subsequent attempt to
reinvigorate the abandoned claims.  By contrast, the claims here
are basically the same in the different complaints. The court
follows Wilner and In re Syntax as persuasive. In re Syntex Corp.
Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d at 935; Wilner,2014 WL 2939732,

The court has little trouble finding identity of interests. The
named plaintiffs individuals and employers all allegedly paid
higher premiums as a result of Sutter's allegedly anticompetitive
conduct. As pled, the health plans also have identical interests.

Under Rule 15(c), the identity of interests means that "relation
back of the amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. The
court addresses prejudice further in the Rule 15(a) analysis.

The court considered Sutter's other arguments and does not find
them persuasive enough to bar amendment. The futility arguments
are premature at the motion-to-dismiss stage, especially given the
court's rulings on the identity of the plaintiffs' interests. The
delay is mostly from the appeal and is not undue delay. There is
no bad faith or futility. The current schedule gives adequate time
for discovery, given the identity of interests and fair notice in
all complaints of the scope of the allegedly anticompetitive
conduct and resulting harm. There is no strong evidence of undue
delay or prejudice.

Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend is freely given. The court grants
leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y7o6lh8sfrom Leagle.com.

Djeneba Sidibe, Plaintiff, represented by Azra Z. Mehdi, The Mehdi
Firm PC, 401 B Street, San Diego, California 92101

Djeneba Sidibe, Plaintiff, represented by Todd Michael Schneider-
tschneider@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Allan Steyer -- asteyer@steyerlaw.com --
Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Axel Bernabe,
Constantine Cannon LLP, 335 Madison Avenue9th Floor, New York, NY
10017, pro hac vice, Charles Ralph Jaeger -- cjaeger@fbj-law.com -
- Farmer Brownstein Jaeger LLP, David C. Brownstein --
dbrownstein@fbj-law.com -- Farmer Brownstein Jaeger LLP, Donald
Scott Macrae -- smacrae@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer Lowenthal
Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Eric A. Grover --
eagrover@kellergrover.com -- Keller Grover LLP, Jean Kim --
jkim@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon, pro hac vice,
Jill Michelle Manning -- jmanning@steyerlaw.com -- Steyer
Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Kyle Geoffrey Bates --
kbates@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns LLP, Laura Lee Gildengorin -- lgildengorin@steyerlaw.com -
- Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez and Smith LLP, Matthew L.
Cantor -mcantor@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon PC,
Rosa Morales -- rmorales@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine
Cannon LLP, pro hac vice & William S. Farmer -- wfarmer@fbj-
law.com -- Farmer Brownstein Jaeger LLP.

Jerry Jankowski, Plaintiff, represented by Todd Michael Schneider,
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Allan Steyer,
Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith LLP, Axel Bernabe,
Constantine Cannon LLP, pro hac vice, Charles Ralph Jaeger, Farmer
Brownstein Jaeger LLP, David C. Brownstein, Farmer Brownstein
Jaeger LLP, Donald Scott Macrae, Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas
Alvarez & Smith LLP, Jean Kim, Constantine Cannon, pro hac vice,
Jill Michelle Manning, Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith
LLP, Kyle Geoffrey Bates, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns LLP, Matthew L. Cantor, Constantine Cannon PC, Rosa
Morales, Constantine Cannon LLP, pro hac vice, William S. Farmer,
Farmer Brownstein Jaeger LLP & Azra Z. Mehdi, The Mehdi Firm PC.

Sutter Health, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Alan LeVee --
jlevee@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Oliver Quinn Dunlap --
odunlap@bzbm.com -- BARTKO ZANKEL BUNZEL & MILLER, Patrick Martin
Ryan -- pryan@bzbm.com -- Bartko, Zankel, Bunzel & Miller, Robert
H. Bunzel -- rbunzel@bzbm.com -- Bartko Zankel Bunzel & Miller,
Brian G. Selden -- bgselden@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Catherine
Tara Zeng -- czeng@jonesday.com --  Jones Day, David Craig Kiernan
-- dkiernan@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Jason Corbitt Wright --
jcwright@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, John Andrew Sharp Whittaker --
jwhittaker@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Matthew James
Silveira -- msilveira@jonesday.com -- Jones Day & Stephen L. Goff,
King & Spalding LLP.

Cigna Healthcare of California, Inc., Miscellaneous, represented
by Curtis S. Leavitt -- cleavit@kennadyleavitt.com -- Kennaday
Leavitt PC.

United HealthCare Services, Inc.,, Miscellaneous, represented by
Maxwell Vaughn Pritt -- mpritt@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller and
Flexner LLP.

Health Net of California, Miscellaneous, represented by Jason C.
Murray -- jmurray@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP.

Blue Cross of California dba Anthem Blue Cross, Miscellaneous,
represented by Michelle Haejin Lyu, Reed Smith LLP,  355 S. Grand
Ave #2900. Los Angeles, CA 90071.

Northern California at California Physicians Service d/b/a Blue
Shield of California, Miscellaneous, represented by Christopher
John Kelly -- cjkelly@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP


TARSADIA HOTELS: Court Approves $51MM Settlement in "Beaver"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Final
Approval of Class Settlement of Class Action Settlement and
Judgment, Application for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Service
Awards in the case captioned DEAN BEAVER AND LAURIE BEAVER,
HUSBAND AND WIFE; et al., Plaintiffs, v. TARSADIA HOTELS, A
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; et al., Defendants, Case No. 11-cv-01842-
GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Dean Beaver, Laurie Beaver, Steven Adelman, Abraham
Aghachi, Dinesh Gauba, Kevin Kenna, and Veronica Kenna filed a
putative class action alleging that the Tarsadia Defendants
violated various federal and state laws, including the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA) and the California Unfair
Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code  (UCL), in connection with
the sale of condominium units at the Hard Rock.  In the operative
Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the
Tarsadia Defendants violated ILSA by failing to do three things
that the statute required: (1) register the Hard Rock with the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); (2) obtain
and distribute to Class members a HUD property report; and (3)
include ILSA-specified cure language in the purchase contracts.

While Plaintiffs' case is strong in that they overcame substantial
hurdles, including motions to dismiss, an adverse summary judgment
ruling, an interlocutory appeal, and they eventually prevailed on
liability on the UCL claim, major risks in further litigation of
this action remain, the Court said.  While Plaintiffs have a
strong case, in this equitable action, there is no clear cut
remedies model.  Therefore, the Class faced serious risk in
continuing to litigate this action against defendants who had a
track record of success and aggression. These factors weigh in
favor of final approval.

The amount in Settlement is generally considered the most
important, because the critical component of any settlement is the
amount of relief obtained by the class.

Here, the proposed Settlement of $51,150,000 offers the Class a
significant and certain cash award without further delay.  Based
on the risks concerning the restitution the Court would have
awarded and the results of any appeal of that award, the $51.15
million offered in Settlement is an excellent result.  This factor
favors final approval of the settlement.

In this case, (1) the Parties have completed fact and expert
discovery, including a review of over 400,000 pages and taking or
defending 20 depositions, (2) there is a judgment in Plaintiffs'
favor on liability that has been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and
with certiorari denied, (3) the Parties have briefed and argued a
motion for class certification, and, (4) as noted above, the only
major task left in the case beyond class certification is a
remedies trial.  This factor weighs strongly in favor of the
proposed Settlement.

The Court recognized significant knowledge and experience in
handling class action litigation, including in-depth knowledge in
cases arising under ILSA.  Each Class Counsel strongly believes
that the Settlement provides a fair and advantageous benefit to
the Class.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of final approval.

No governmental agency participated in this litigation or
Settlement. After the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement,
the Tarsadia Defendants sent CAFA notices to the California
Attorney General, Consumer Law Section, and the United States
Attorney General. To the Parties' knowledge, no governmental
agency has objected to the Settlement which weighs in favor of the
settlement.

No objections have been filed to the Settlement and one class
member has elected to opt-out.

The Court concludes that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable.

Plaintiffs seek four service awards of $50,000, paid from the
common fund to Class Representatives on a per-unit basis and
include (1) Mr. Gauba, (2) Kevin and Veronica Kenna, (3) Dean and
Laurie Beaver, and (4) Messrs. Adelman and Aghachi Brown.

Incentive awards are designed to compensate class representatives
for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or
reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and,
sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private
attorney general.

In this case, each of the Class Representatives spent over six
years assisting the litigation of this case by reviewing the
complaint, responding to written discovery and producing
documents, being deposed by defense counsel, and reviewing and
approving the settlement. Plaintiffs also stayed in touch with
Class Counsel throughout the litigation.

Similarly, the plaintiffs in Royalty Alliance, Inc. v. Tarsadia
Hotels, 2014 WL 2212492, were ordered to pay the Tarsadia over
$1.1 million in attorneys' fees after they lost summary judgment
on securities, fraud, and UCL claims stemming from the Hard Rock.
In Salameh v. 5th and K Master Assoc., Inc., 2016 WL 4529438
(Salameh II), the California state court ordered the plaintiffs to
pay Tarsadia $3.5 million in attorneys' fees and this award was
affirmed on appeal.

Under these circumstances, the service awards of $50,000 to the
Class Representatives are fair and reasonable in light of the
extraordinary risks they accepted and the time and effort they
expended for the benefit of the Class. The Court grants
Plaintiffs' request for class representative incentive awards.

Class counsel seek attorneys' fees in the amount of $17,050,000
representing one-third of the Settlement Fund and reimbursement of
their out-of-pocket costs of $195,089.

California law governs this fee application because where state
law claims predominate, state law applies to determine the right
to fees and the method of calculating them. The California Supreme
Court recently held that in common fund cases, a trial court may
award class counsel a fee out of that fund by choosing an
appropriate percentage of the fund.

In this case, Class Counsel litigated this action against
tenacious and aggressive defense counsel who prevailed in several
other actions brought by Hard Rock purchasers. The action involved
novel issues under the UCL's statute of limitations and issues
concerning interpretation of ILSA and a recent Congressional
amendment to ILSA that could apply retroactively to bar the
Class's claims. Had Class Counsel lost any one of these three
issues they would not have been paid for 9,104 hours of work and
would likely have had to defend a malicious prosecution action.
Even after the appellate victory, risks remained as to whether
this Court would certify the Class and how to calculate UCL
restitution. Achieving a $51.15 million cash settlement which will
pay significant amounts to all Class Members in the face of these
risks merits the requested one-third fee. In further support,
Richard M. Pearl, an expert on attorneys' fee issues and disputes,
opines in his expert declaration that a fee of 33.3% of the fund
for this long, heavily contested but highly successful litigation
is certainly reasonable.  Considering the results achieved, the
requested fees are reasonable.

Class Counsel seek reimbursement of $195,089.00 in out-of-pocket
costs incurred during this litigation.  There is no doubt that an
attorney who has created a common fund for the benefit of the
class is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation
expenses from that fund. Class counsel assert that all the
expenditures were necessary to Class Counsel's prosecution of the
action and are reasonable considering the action spanned over six
years, required expert opinions and survived a Ninth Circuit
appeal. After a review of the costs sought by seven firms3, the
Court concludes the costs are reasonable and awards Class Counsel
$195,089.00 in costs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycx92wz6from Leagle.com.

Dean Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak --
don@talismanlaw.com -- Talisman Law, P.C.

Dean Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Reiser --
michael@reiserlaw.com  --  Law Office of Michael Reiser, Michael
L. Schrag -- mls@classlawgroup.com  -- Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., 1816 Fifth StreetBerkeley, CA
94710, Michael Rubin -- mrubin@altshulerberzon.com  -- Altshuler
Berzon LLP & Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, 533 E
Hopkins Ave, Aspen, CO 81611, pro hac vice.

Laurie Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Steven Adelman, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Abram Aghachi, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Dinesh Gauba, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Kevin Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Veronica Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Tarsadia Hotels, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz --
avaz@coxcastle.com --  Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes --
phughes@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle & Nicholson, Frederick H.
Kranz, Jr. -- rkranz@coxcastle.com --  Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP
& Lynn T. Galuppo -- lgaluppo@coxcastle.com -- Cox, Castle &
Nicholson, LLP.

Gregory Casserly, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz,
Cox Castle and Nicholson, Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox, Castle &
Nicholson, LLP, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson & Frederick
H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

5th Rock LLC, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz, Cox
Castle and Nicholson, Natalia Arpy Minassian, Bruce A. Hatkoff, A
Law Corporation, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson, Frederick
H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP & Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox,
Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Gaslamp Holdings, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson, Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP &
Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Playground Destination Properties, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel M. Benjamin -- dbenjamin@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara Smith
LLP & Thomas W. McNamara -- tmcnamara@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara
Smith LLP.

Gregory Casserly, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

MKP One, LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Tushar Patel, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

5th Rock LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle
& Nicholson, LLP & Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson.

Gaslamp Holdings, LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Tarsadia Hotels, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

B.U. Patel, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, a limited liability partnership,
ThirdParty Defendant, represented by Kirsten Hicks Spira --
kspira@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP & Michael McNamara --
mmcnamara@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP.


TENNYSON ELECTRIC: Court Denies Move to Dismiss ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned MANLEY GOUGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL A.
TENNYSON, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-2215-PJH (N.D. Cal.).

This is an ERISA case, filed as a proposed class action.

Plaintiffs Manley Gough, John Gouveia, and Curtis Bryant are
former employees of defendant Tennyson Electric, Inc., a
California corporation headquartered in Livermore, California.
Plaintiffs are/were participants in the Tennyson Electric, Inc.
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (Tennyson ESOP), an employee benefit
plan as defined by ERISA, and an "employee stock ownership plan"
within the meaning of ERISA.

Defendants Michael A. Tennyson, President and Secretary of
Tennyson, and Cathleen W. Tennyson, Vice President of Tennyson,
are members of defendant Plan Committee of the Tennyson ESOP, and
are Trustees and fiduciaries of the ESOP. Tennyson is the sponsor
and Administrator of the ESOP, and allegedly delegated its duties
as Plan Administrator to the Plan Committee.

Plaintiffs claim that defendants did not provide pension benefit
statements or summary annual reports to plaintiffs in the years
2011-2014 as required by ERISA. Thus, plaintiffs assert, they were
unaware of any valuation of the ESOP's company stock after 2010.
Plaintiffs allege that Michael Tennyson told them he would provide
the statements, which had been delayed by accounting issues and
needed to be revised, and asked plaintiffs to trust him.
The FAC alleges three causes of action  (1) a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. Sections 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3), arising from
defendants' valuation of Tennyson ESOP stock and the
implementation of defendants' decision to terminate the Plan; (2)
a claim of engaging in a prohibited transaction forbidden by ERISA
Section 406(a)-(b), 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)-(b), arising from
the 2015 transactions whereby Michael and Cathleen Tennyson
regained ownership of Tennyson through Tennyson's purchase of the
ESOP participants' stock for $100,000, asserting that the
transactions constituted a direct or indirect exchange between the
plan and a party in interest" or a party whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its
participants; and (3) a claim for statutory penalties under ERISA
Section 502(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(c)(1)(A), based on
defendants' alleged failure to provide pension benefit statements
for 2011-2014 until November 2015.

Defendants argue that the first two causes of action should be
dismissed because the facts as pled do not state a claim under
ERISA. They assert that contrary to the description of the
structure of the ESOP's termination in the FAC, the governing plan
documents for the ESOP show that the ESOP was first terminated,
and that the shares were then distributed from the ESOP to Plan
Participants. Thus, they assert, at the time of the sale of the
shares, the shares were no longer ERISA Plan assets, and that
their fiduciary role ended with the termination of the ESOP.
The court finds that the first and second causes of action raise
factual issues that cannot be resolved in the absence of a fully
developed record. For example, plaintiffs are in essence
challenging the methods used in valuing the company and its
shares. Assuming ERISA does apply, rather than the IRC  which is
not clear at this stage of the litigation the court has no ability
to resolve the dispute without an evidentiary record.

As for the third cause of action, defendants contend that Tennyson
is the only proper defendant, and as Plan Administrator can be
liable for the relief provided under ERISA Section 502(c)(a)(A).
In addition, they argue that this claim should be dismissed to the
extent it is based on alleged failures to timely distribute
pension benefit statements for the years 2010 through 2013, on
statute of limitations grounds. They concede that the claim as to
the 2014 statements is not time-barred.

The court finds either that the claims are timely, or that
plaintiffs have pled the conditions necessary for the application
of equitable estoppel, at least for purposes of the present
motion. As for defendants' argument that this cause of action can
be asserted only against Tennyson, this issue cannot be decided on
a motion to dismiss because factual issues remain with regard to
the identity of the Plan Administrator during the relevant period,
and with regard to the Plan Administrator's alleged delegation of
duties to the Plan Committee and its members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycau8982from Leagle.com.

Manley Gough, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Mark Feinberg --
dan@feinbergjackson.com --  Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman & Wasow
LLP.

John Gouveia, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Mark Feinberg,
Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman & Wasow LLP.

Curtis Bryant, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Mark Feinberg,
Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman & Wasow LLP.

Michael A. Tennyson, Defendant, represented by R. Bradford Huss --
bhuss@truckerhuss.com --  Trucker Huss, APC & Joseph Charles
Faucher -- jfaucher@truckerhuss.com -- Trucker Huss, APC

Cathleen W. Tennyson, Defendant, represented by R. Bradford Huss
Trucker Huss, APC & Joseph Charles Faucher, Trucker Huss.

Plan Committee of the Tennyson Electric, Inc. Employee Stock
Ownership Plan, Defendant, represented by R. Bradford Huss,
Trucker Huss, APC & Joseph Charles Faucher, Trucker Huss.

Tennyson Electric, Inc., Defendant, represented by R. Bradford
Huss, Trucker Huss, APC & Joseph Charles Faucher, Trucker Huss.


TERRAVIA HOLDINGS: Securities Suit May Proceed v Non-Debtors
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California ordered the case captioned IN RE TERRAVIA
HOLDINGS, INC., SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 16-cv-06633-JD
(N.D. Cal.) may proceed against the non-debtor Defendants and the
previously entered stay is modified to that extent.

In this putative class action on behalf of the purchasers of
securities in TerraVia, the Defendants are TerraVia, its former
CEO, its current CEO, and its CFO/COO.  On Aug. 2, 2017, the
corporate entity filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on behalf of itself and two
affiliated companies not named in this action.  The individual
Defendants have not filed for bankruptcy.

Judge Donato has not been advised that the bankruptcy court has
extended the stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ACMhFS from Leagle.com.

Ruben Perales, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A..

TerraVia Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mark R.S.
Foster -- mfoster@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Jonathan S. Wolfson, Defendant, represented by Mark R.S. Foster,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Tyler W. Painter, Defendant, represented by Mark R.S. Foster,
Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Apu Mody, Defendant, represented by Mark R.S. Foster, Morrison &
Foerster LLP.

Terravia Investor Group, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen,
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice, Louis C. Ludwig --
lcludwig@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick V.
Dahlstrom -- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.


TESLA INC: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Oct. 11
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the common shares of Tesla, Inc. (NASDAQ: TSLA) from
May 4, 2016 through October 6, 2017, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Tesla
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Tesla class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1218.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Kevin Chan, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or kchan@rosenlegal.com for information on the
class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT
THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) contrary to defendants' representations that Tesla was
prepared for the launch of its Model 3 sedan, in reality, Tesla
had severely inadequate inventory and was woefully unprepared to
launch Model 3 sedan as anticipated; and (2) as a result, Tesla's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.  When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
December 11, 2017.  If you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1218.htmlor to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Kevin Chan of Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-767-
3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or kchan@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http:www.rosenlegal.com -- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation.  [GN]


TRANSPERFECT GLOBAL: Bid to Junk Amended "Sackin" Partly Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JESSIE SACKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
TRANSPERFECT GLOBAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17 Civ. 1469 (LGS)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York (i) denied TransPerfect's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (ii)
granted TransPerfect's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim with respect to the Plaintiffs' express contract cause of
action, and otherwise denied; and (iii) denied as moot its request
for oral argument.

The Defendant employs over 4,000 individuals.  The company
maintains a corporate privacy policy and security manual that
describes "robust procedures designed to protect the personally
identifiable information ("PII") with which it is entrusted."
However, unlike other similarly situated companies, TransPerfect
did not train employees on data security; did not erect digital
firewalls and did not maintain PII retention and destruction
protocols.

On Jan. 17, 2017, at least one TransPerfect employee received a
"phishing" email.  The email appeared to come from TransPerfect's
CEO, but actually was sent by unidentified cyber-criminals.  It
asked for the W-2 forms and payroll information of all current and
former TransPerfect employees.  Because TransPerfect's cyber-
security was not up to industry par, at least one TransPerfect
employee sent the information to the hackers in an unencrypted
format.  As a result, cyber-criminals obtained the Plaintiffs'
names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, direct
deposit bank account numbers and routing numbers.

TransPerfect responded to the breach by offering the Plaintiffs
two free years of enrollment in an identity theft monitoring
service.  The Plaintiffs purchased preventive services.

The Plaintiffs filed the purported class action against the
Defendant on Feb. 27, 2017, stemming from a data breach of
TransPerfect's computer systems that disclosed their sensitive PII
to hackers.  TransPerfect moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).

As the allegations of the risk of identity theft and related
mitigating expenses are sufficient to allege injury in fact and
thereby confer standing, the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction.  Judge Schofield denied the motion to dismiss based
on Rule 12(b)(1).

The Complaint pleads five causes of action: (i) common law and
statutory negligence; (ii) breach of express contract; (iii)
breach of implied contract; (iv) unjust enrichment and (v)
violations of N.Y. Labor Law 203-d.

Judge Schofield granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
express contract claim, but denied its motion to dismiss the other
claims.  She finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that
TransPerfect breached a duty owed to the Plaintiffs under both
common law and negligence per se principles, and that they
suffered injury as a result.

By failing to allege any facts upon which a finding of express
contract regarding PII could be predicated, the Complaint engages
in the type of threadbare recital of the elements of a cause of
action that Iqbal warned against.  So, the second cause of action,
for breach of express contract, is dismissed.

While TransPerfect may not have explicitly promised to protect PII
from hackers in the Plaintiffs' employment contracts, it is
difficult to imagine how, in the day and age of data and identity
theft, the mandatory receipt of Social Security numbers or other
sensitive personal information would not imply the recipient's
assent to protect the information sufficiently.  The motion to
dismiss the breach of implied contract claim is denied.

As the Plaintiffs were not legally permitted to watch passively as
their identities were stolen and bank accounts drained,
consequentially, Judge Schofield finds that the Complaint
adequately pleads all the necessary elements of breach of
contract.

She also finds the claim of unjust enrichment to be sufficiently
pleaded.  First, that TransPerfect received the benefits of the
Plaintiffs' labor; second, that TransPerfect was enriched at the
Plaintiffs' expense when it chose to cut costs by not implementing
security measures to protect their PII which the Defendant
required or obtained in the course of the Plaintiffs' employment;
and third, that it would be inequitable and unconscionable to
allow TransPerfect to retain the money it saved by shirking data-
security, while leaving the Plaintiffs to suffer the consequences.

Finally, as to the Plaintiffs assertion that N.Y. Labor Law
Section 203-d not only provides a basis for negligence per se, but
also affords them a private right of action, Judge Schofield
concludes that N.Y. Labor Law Section 203-d implies a private
right of action.

First, the Plaintiffs are within the class the statute is designed
to protect; second, an implied right of action is consistent with
Section 203-d's legislative purpose; and third, an implied cause
of action is consistent with the legislative scheme.

For these reasons, Judge Schofield denied (i) TransPerfect's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (ii)
granted TransPerfect's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim with respect to the Plaintiffs' express contract cause of
action, and otherwise denied; and (iii) denied as moot the
Defendant's request for oral argument.  She directed the Clerk of
Court to close Dkt. #20.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/jS8VHa from Leagle.com.

Jesse Sackin, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Gregory
Blankinship -- gblankinship@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Jesse Sackin, Plaintiff, represented by Chantal Khalil --
ckhalil@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson &
Garber, LLP & Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson -- jfrei-
pearson@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson &
Garber, LLP.

Peter Harris, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP
& Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Stephen Lustigson, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP
& Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Sarah Henderson, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP
& Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Nicholas Miuccio, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas Gregory
Blankinship, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei- Pearson & Garber, LLP
& Jeremiah Lee Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP.

TransPerfect Global, Inc., Defendant, represented by Claudia
Drennen McCarron -- cmccarron@mullen.law -- Mullen Coughlin LLC &
Jennifer Anne Coughlin -- jcoughlin@mullen.law -- Nelson Levine De
Luca & Hamilton.


TV GUIDE: Court Denies 2nd Amended Bid to Dismiss "Hyman"
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III, of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied the
Defendant's Second Amended Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
SHIRLEY HYMAN, Plaintiff, v. TV GUIDE MAGAZINE, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 15-cv-13769 (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the Defendant
for alleged violations of Michigan's Preservation of Personal
Privacy Act ("MPPPA") and unjust enrichment.  The Plaintiff
brought suit on behalf of herself and all Michigan residents who
purchased a subscription to TV Guide.  She seeks actual damages,
including disgorgement, or $5,000, whichever is greater for each
class member as provided by the MPPPA.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is a Delaware limited
liability company with its principle place of business in New
York.

The Defendant has not filed an answer; but in its Second Amended
Motion to Dismiss, it argues that its principle place of business
is in Michigan.

The case was stayed in August 2016 pending the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Coulter-Owens v. Time, Inc.  The Sixth Circuit issued
an opinion, ECF 37-1, and the Court lifted the stay.

The Defendant filed its Second Amended Motion to Dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  It argues that the
Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because: (i) she does
not have standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins; (ii) the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the parties are not
diverse and there is an insufficient amount in controversy; (iii)
the Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction based on the "home
state" and "local controversy" exceptions under 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d)(4), id. at 210; and (iv) the Court should exercise its
discretion to dismiss the case in the interests of justice under
28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(3), id.

Judge Murphy finds that the Plaintiff has standing and that the
Court has diversity jurisdiction.  He also finds that the parties
are diverse because the Plaintiff is a citizen of Michigan, the
putative class is comprised entirely of Michigan residents, and
the Defendant's principal place of business is not in Michigan.

Since the Defendant has not demonstrated to a legal certainty that
the Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient, the amount in
controversy is sufficient.  The Plaintiff alleges that all
Michigan residents who purchased a subscription to TV Guide are
owed $5,000 in statutory damages.  The Defendant's principle
argument is that an amendment to the MPPPA, if applied
retroactively, bars these damages.

As to the Defendant's remaining arguments that require it to be a
citizen of Michigan, Judge Murphy has already determined that it
is not a citizen of Michigan under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d).  The
arguments therefore fail.

Accordingly, Judge Murphy denied the Defendant's Second Amended
Motion to Dismiss.  The Judge is growing increasingly concerned
about the delay of the case.  The Plaintiff filed her complaint in
October 2015 and the Defendant has yet to answer.  Judge Murphy
gave the Defendant 14 days after the date of the Order to file a
responsive pleading.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/vTzI5V from Leagle.com.

Shirley Hyman, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Scott Thomassen
-- bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Shirley Hyman, Plaintiff, represented by Eve-Lynn Rapp --
erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Roger J. Perlstadt --
rperlstadt@edelson.com -- Edelson PC & Ari J. Scharg --
ascharg@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C..

TV Guide Magazine, LLC, Defendant, represented by Dean J. Groulx,
Law Office of Dean J. Groulx & Hillard M. Sterling --
Sterling.H@wssllp.com -- Winget Spadafora Schwartzberg LLP.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Jan8 Safe Rides Fee Deal Opt-Out Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Osakwe, writing for NextAdvisor, reports that around mid-
September, a number of consumers received an email about a class-
action lawsuit against Uber regarding its claims about its Safe
Rides Fee.  Since there are so many scams these days, we're
helping you determine if this email is legitimate, and if it is,
how you can ensure that you're properly compensated.  Continue
reading to find out.

Is Uber's Safe Rides Fee settlement legitimate?

The Safe Rides Fee lawsuit is a real class-action lawsuit. Details
about the case, officially referred to as the McKnight v. Uber
settlement, can be found on the site
https://www.ridesharesettlement.com.  Any emails about the case
should have come from the address
donotreply@ridesharesettlement.com.  If you received an email from
any other email address, you should not click on any links, as it
could be a phishing email, and instead visit the visit the
settlement page noted above.

While Uber is currently contending with a number of lawsuits
regarding its business practices and treatment of drivers, this
Safe Rides Fee lawsuit specifically deals with the nature of its
mischaracterization of the thoroughness of its background checking
process.  While it denies the allegations, Uber has agreed to a
settlement and has since changed the language describing the
background check process.  It also changed the Safe Rides Fee name
to Booking Fee in order to avoid confusion about the rigor and
costs associated with its background checking process.  The payout
of the lawsuit has also increased from $28.5 million to $32.5
million, so that consumers could receive slightly better
compensation.

How does the lawsuit affect you?

The settlement affects all Uber customers who requested rides from
January 1, 2013 to January 31, 2016 whenever a Safe Ride Fee was
present.  Uber's Safe Rides Fee was specifically charged to riders
who took an UberX in U.S. markets nationwide.  Individuals who are
eligible for the settlement are entitled to a payout that will
average about $1.07 per class member, although you can calculate
your own settlement share by starting with $0.25 for your first
UberX ride and adding $0.05 for each subsequent UberX ride taken
during the period designated in the lawsuit.  This amount will be
relevant if you choose to exclude yourself from the class-action
lawsuit in order to pursue a case with Uber on your own.

If you received an email, you are automatically included in the
suit, which means no action is required unless you wish to change
your compensation method (see details below).  Those who meet the
criteria established by the settlement, but haven't received an
email still have the ability to file a claim online before the
Jan. 8, 2018 deadline (noted below). Just be aware that you'll
need to submit at least one Uber receipt to prove you paid the
Safe Ride Fee.  If you're not sure whether you qualify to join the
settlement or you have questions about the settlement, you should
reach out to the Settlement Administrator -- the contact
information is listed on the site.

What are my options for compensation?

If the settlement is approved, your Uber account will
automatically be credited the amount you're entitled to from the
class-action lawsuit.  If your account has been deleted or you
wish to receive another form of compensation, you can opt to have
the amount paid to you via PayPal or through an eCheck.  In order
to qualify for these other options, you must submit a Payment
Election Form by 11:59 p.m. PT on Jan. 8, 2018.  If your Uber
account no longer exists, failing to submit this payment form
could jeopardize your ability to be compensated.

As with all class-action lawsuits, you have the ability to remove
yourself from the settlement, but you must exclude yourself by
Jan. 8, 2018 or you won't be able to sue Uber regarding the issues
of this case.  You can also opt to stay in the lawsuit while
objecting to specific portions of the settlement by filing an
objection by the deadline.

How can I verify the legitimacy of future class-action lawsuit
emails?

Unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules for
differentiating between a real lawsuit email from scam email, but
there are some rules of thumb that might help protect you.

1. Think before you click. When you first receive an email about a
class-action lawsuit, you should skim it with some degree of
skepticism and avoid clicking on any links.  As mentioned above,
even if the lawsuit is real, the sender might be a scammer trying
to cash in on a real incident.  Instead, you'll want to open a new
tab or window in your browser and do a quick Google search for the
official title of the lawsuit.  This will usually provide some
insight as to whether or not it's legitimate.

2. Examine the email for details. Real emails regarding class-
action lawsuits should be pretty thorough, giving you instructions
for a multitude of scenarios, like all the ways you can choose to
receive compensation and how you can elect to decline the
settlement.  The email should even detail what happens if you
choose to do nothing and who you should contact for more
information.  With this in mind, short messages simply telling you
how to get any money you're owed and encouraging you to click on a
link or contact someone to learn more should be treated as spam.

3. Search the news. Usually communications about a class action
lawsuit are preceded by news stories detailing the nature of the
lawsuit.  Even if you're not current with the news, you should be
able to Google the claims of any particular message detailing
information about a lawsuit, as noted above, and see some news
articles about it.  In some cases, you might even be able to
verify the identity of the sender who notified you about the
lawsuit.  If you can't confirm the legitimacy of the sender or
find any related news stories, it's probably best that you take no
action.

Because digital communication is a major part of our lives, it's
unfortunately easier for scammers to target unsuspecting victims.
For more information about how to protect your email and your
personal information, read our scams blog. [GN]


UNION COUNTY: Court Denies Class Certification in "Reid" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KENNETH R. REID, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WARDEN J. EBBERT, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 1:16-cv-1403 (M.D.
Pa.), Judge Sylvia H, Rambo of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification and for appointment of class counsel.

Judge Rambo adopted Magistrate Judge William Arbuckle's report and
recommendation which recommends the denial of the Plaintiff's
motion requesting an order certifying a class action pursuant to
Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and requesting
the appointment of class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to meet the
prerequisites to class certification.  In particular, the
Magistrate Judge points to the fact that Reid, who is proceeding
pro se, cannot satisfy the requirement of adequacy of
representation.

No objections have been filed to the report and recommendation.

The remaining matters are remanded to Magistrate Judge Arbuckle.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CUqmN0 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth R. Reid, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Samuel Gaines, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Anthony Burnett, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Warden J. Ebbert, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S.
Attorney's Office & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

RN Jeana Mitterling, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S.
Attorney's Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner Litigation Unit.

M. Barner, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

J. Seroski, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

F. Fasciana, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S.
Attorney's Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner Litigation Unit.

L. Potter, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

T. Lupold, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

M. Barth, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

L. Hartzel, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office -
Prisoner Litigation Unit.

M. Fahringer, Defendant, represented by S.B. Bellin, U.S.
Attorney's Office - Prisoner & Timothy Judge, U.S. Attorney's
Office - Prisoner Litigation Unit.


UNITED HEALTH: 8th Circuit Denies Coverage for $350MM Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Neeleman, Esq. -- JNeeleman@kilpatricktownsend.com -- of
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an article for JDSupra,
wrote that where a defendant's insured litigation risk exceeds the
defendant's assets, insurance drives the outcome of settlement
negotiations, as naturally it's the horse that pulls the cart, and
not vice versa.

The Eighth Circuit's recent decision in UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. v.
Exec. Risk Specialty Ins. Co., 870 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2017), is an
object lesson that the same metaphor usually applies where the
insured defendant's pockets are deep, as in most high stakes class
action litigation.  Insurance considerations should at least be
among the leading factors affecting litigation strategy,
settlement negotiations, and decisions -- they ought to be among
the team of horses that drives the litigation and settlement cart.

In United Health, the Eighth Circuit denied coverage outright for
a $350 million settlement.  The sum at issue makes this coverage
litigation unusual; what makes it extraordinary is that a
substantial portion, if not all, of the settlement was admittedly
covered by the insurance policies at issue. But the district court
dismissed the case entirely on summary judgment, holding that the
insured, UnitedHealth, failed to carry its burden to allocate the
settlement among covered and non-covered claims. It was an outcome
that did not have to occur.

UnitedHealth had paid $350 million to settle two class action
lawsuits related to reimbursement for out-of-network medical
services.  One lawsuit, known as the AMA Suit, involved only
antitrust claims that the insurance policy at issue explicitly
covered.  The second action that was settled, known as the Malchow
Suit, involved ERISA and breach of contract claims that the
parties agreed were not covered.  The Eighth Circuit held that
because UnitedHealth failed to offer evidence sufficient to enable
a jury to allocate the settlement's $350 million cash
consideration between the covered and non-covered claims, or
between the AMA Suit and the Malchow Suit, the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the insurers should be affirmed.

The key to the decision is the following: "To prove allocation,
parties can present testimony from attorneys involved in the
underlying lawsuits, evidence from those lawsuits, expert
testimony evaluating the lawsuits, a review of the underlying
transcripts, or other admissible evidence." 870 F.3d at 863. "To
survive summary judgment, an insured need not prove allocation
with precision, but it must present a non-speculative basis to
allocate a settlement between covered and non-covered claims." Id.

The need for non-speculative evidence supporting allocation in
coverage litigation confirms the need for close collaboration
between defense counsel and coverage counsel. Optimally, such
collaboration ought to be ongoing during the underlying case,
particularly at the time of settlement. Note that coverage
litigation following a settlement is not a case within a case,
like an attorney malpractice case; the issue is not what would
have happened had the case been tried to verdict. The key issue is
which claims were settled and for how much.

At the time of settlement, defense counsel and coverage counsel
should be discussing what evidence from the underlying lawsuit,
and any expert testimony, they may use to prove coverage. They
should discuss whether to call defense counsel as witnesses.
Ideally during the underlying case, they should agree upon whether
in the coverage litigation to waive the attorney-client privilege
concerning defense counsel's real time written risk assessments of
the underlying case. And defense counsel's real time
communications to clients valuing the underling case for
settlement purposes ought to be made with the coverage dispute
firmly in mind, and in collaboration with coverage counsel.

Complicating matters further, where allocation between covered and
non-covered claims is the issue, it will not help significantly to
explicitly allocate in the settlement agreement the settlement
consideration among covered and non-covered claims. At best, the
agreed allocation would raise a rebuttable presumption as to the
proper allocation, and at worst it would undermine the insured's
credibility.

Two tell-tale signs from the UnitedHealth opinion seem to suggest
that, during the underlying litigation, UnitedHealth placed a low
priority on coverage considerations, which likely proved fatal.
First, it is well-settled that an insured may prove that a
settlement should be allocated entirely to covered claims, because
the core facts supporting the claims were the same or
interrelated. See e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Hartford Acc.
and Indem. Co., 511 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1975) (underlying
judgment was covered in its entirety where facts showed that the
policy holder was liable for the same damages under both covered
and non-covered claims).  Accordingly, UnitedHealth argued that
the covered and non-covered claims were so interrelated that the
entire settlement should be allocated to covered claims, but the
court held that the argument was untimely and barred because the
amended complaint had specifically alleged that UnitedHealth
claimed only coverage for the AMA claim. 870 F.3d at 861-62.

Second, one insurer, National Union, successfully argued that it
failed to receive timely notice of the covered (AMA) claim (an
issue the Eighth Circuit did not have to address given its ruling
on the absence of allocation evidence). 870 F.3d at 867.  This
fatal misstep can be avoided easily, by giving notice to all
possible insurers as soon as possible after learning of the
claims.

Success in a later allocation dispute represents only one of the
many benefits of collaboration between defense counsel and
coverage counsel.  Understanding coverage issues should inform the
underlying settlement negotiations themselves, as well as the
client's appetite for litigation risk in the underlying case.
Where coverage and defense counsel have a solid grasp of the
coverage claim and how to prove it, the client will be better
advised as whether to settle a dispute, how to memorialize the
negotiations and settlement, and how to prove allocation in a
subsequent coverage dispute. [GN]


UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Affirms Injunction in Immigration Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's granting of Preliminary
Injunction against Immigration Officials in the appeals case
captioned XOCHITL HERNANDEZ, for themselves and on behalf of a
class of similarly-situated individuals; CESAR MATIAS, for
themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated
individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
Attorney General; JAMES McHENRY, Acting Director, Executive Office
for Immigration Review; ELAINE C. DUKE, Acting Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security; THOMAS D. HOMAN, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); DAVID JENNINGS, Los
Angeles Field Office Director of ICE; JAMES JANECKA, Warden,
Adelanto Detention Facility; CHRISTINA HOLLAND, Jail
Administrator, Santa Ana City Jail; CARLOS ROJA, Chief, Santa Ana
City Department; JON BRIGGS, Captain, Orange County Sheriff's
Department; MIKE KREUGER, Captain, Orange County Sheriff's
Department; SANDRA HUTCHENS, Sheriff, Orange County, Defendants-
Appellants, No. 16-56829 (9th Cir.).

In the present case, the government appeals from the district
court's order entering a class-wide preliminary injunction in
favor of Plaintiffs, a class of non-citizens in removal
proceedings who are detained under 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(a) in the
Central District of California.  The government has already
determined that the class members are neither dangerous nor enough
of a flight risk to require detention without bond.  The class
members nonetheless remain detained because they are unable to
afford bond in the amount set by the immigration officials.  The
district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring
immigration officials when making bond determinations to, inter
alia, consider (1) financial ability to obtain bond and (2)
alternative conditions of release.

Plaintiffs are a class of non-citizens detained pursuant to 8
U.S.C. Section 1226(a) on a bond set by a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE)5official or an Immigration Judge (IJ) in the Central
District of California. Under Section 1226(a), the Attorney
General has general, discretionary authority to detain a non-
citizen "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.

The government contends that the Ninth Circuit lacks jurisdiction
for two reasons: (1) 8 U.S.C. Sections 1226(e) and 1252(a)(2)(B)
bar federal court jurisdiction over the claims, and (2) the named
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before
pursuing relief in federal court. The government is wrong on both
counts.

First, 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(e) and 1252(a)(2)(B) do not bar
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.  Section 1226(e) provides
that: "The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No
court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General
under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien
or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole."

Second, the district court did not err in waiving the requirement
that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies before
pursuing their claims in federal court. The exhaustion requirement
is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.

The district court correctly decided to waive the prudential
exhaustion requirement.

First, an administrative appellate record is not necessary to
resolve the purely legal questions presented by Plaintiffs'
challenge to the government's policy of refusing to require ICE
and IJs to consider financial circumstances and alternative
conditions of release in bond determinations.

Second, waiver of the prudential exhaustion requirement will not
encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme" in
future cases, because, once the questions presented here are
decided, they should cease to arise. Any risk of deliberate bypass
of administrative procedures is further reduced by the fact that
district courts will only have jurisdiction in the rare cases
where future plaintiffs allege a colorable constitutional or legal
challenge to the government's procedures.
Third, the Ninth Circuit must consider whether administrative
review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that that the district court abused
its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must
establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.

In this case, the government has no way of determining whether
detention of individuals who do not post a bond in the assessed
amount is sufficiently related to achieving the government's
purpose, unless it first considers their financial resources and
whether adequate alternative methods of satisfying the
government's interests are available.  By maintaining a process
for establishing the amount of a bond that likewise fails to
consider the individual's financial ability to obtain a bond in
the amount assessed or to consider alternative conditions of
release, the government risks detention that accomplishes little
more than punishing a person for his poverty.

In sum, as the district court correctly explained, these cases
stand for the general proposition that when a person's freedom
from governmental detention is conditioned on payment of a
monetary sum, courts must consider the person's financial
situation and alternative conditions of release when calculating
what the person must pay to satisfy a particular state interest.
Otherwise, the government has no way of knowing if the detention
that results from failing to post a bond in the required amount is
reasonably related to achieving that interest.

If the government is setting monetary bonds to ensure appearance
at future proceedings, there is no legitimate reason for it not to
consider the individual's financial circumstances and alternative
conditions of release. By failing to require such consideration,
the government has created a system of immigration bond
determinations that does not adequately provide a reasonable
connection between detention and legitimate governmental
interests.

Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their
due process claim.

In addition to a likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.
Here, Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of irreparable harm
by virtue of the fact that they are likely to be
unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.

It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional
rights unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Thus, it
follows inexorably from our conclusion that the government's
current policies are likely unconstitutional and thus that members
of the plaintiff class will likely be deprived of their physical
liberty unconstitutionally in the absence of the injunction that
Plaintiffs have also carried their burden as to irreparable harm.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the balance of equities tips in his favor.
The harm to the government in this case is minimal. The
government's contention is that the injunction will result in the
diversion of the agencies' time, resources, and personnel from
other pressing immigration adjudication and enforcement
priorities. The Ninth Circuit rejects the government's claim and
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the balance of equities favors Plaintiffs.

The Ninth Circuit said it has no doubt that the district court was
correct that any additional administrative costs to the government
are far outweighed by the considerable harm to Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights in the absence of the injunction. The
injunction will likely prevent the unnecessary detention of non-
citizens who the government has determined are neither dangerous
nor enough of a flight risk to require detention without bond.
Faced with such a conflict between financial concerns and
preventable human suffering, we have little difficulty concluding
that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs' favor.

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the public interest favors
granting the injunction in light of its likely consequences,
consequences that are not too remote, insubstantial, or
speculative and are supported by evidence. The public interest
benefits from an injunction that ensures that individuals are not
deprived of their liberty and held in immigration detention
because of bonds established by a likely unconstitutional process.

The government also challenges the scope of the injunction. These
challenges fail.

The government contests the requirements in the injunction that it
(1) not conduct future initial bond hearings according to
procedures that will likely result in unconstitutional detention,
and (2) provide new bond hearings to individuals who are currently
detained on bonds that were set pursuant to those procedures.

The Second Circuit has noted that the distinction between
mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is not without ambiguities
or critics, and that it has led to distinctions that are more
semantic than substantive. A majority of the Tenth Circuit has
likewise recognized that determining whether an injunction is
mandatory as opposed to prohibitory can be vexing, and that cases
can involve important competing status quos.

The Ninth Circuit said it is nevertheless bound by circuit
precedent to discern the line between mandatory and prohibitory
injunctions as best it can. The Ninth Circuit does so recognizing
the complexities of the problem, the lack of clear authority as to
how the distinction is implemented, and the inherent
contradictions underlying the somewhat artificial legal construct
that cause so many to question the inquiry we now undertake. Given
all that, the Ninth Circuit finds the answer to the challenges
raised by the government here remarkably simple.

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge under the Due
Process Clause to the government's policy of allowing ICE and IJs
to set immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees'
financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. The
government has failed to offer any convincing reason why these
factors should not be considered in bond hearings for non-citizens
who are determined not to be a danger to the community and not to
be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond.
The irreparable harm to Plaintiffs of detention pursuant to bond
amounts determined through a likely unconstitutional process far
outweighs the minimal administrative burdens to the government of
complying with the injunction while this case proceeds.

The district court's order granting the preliminary injunction is
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's October 2, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7df7jzxfrom Leagle.com.

Sherease Rosalyn Pratt (argued), Joseph Hardy, and Adrienne Zack,
Trial Attorneys; Colin A. Kisor, Deputy Director; William C.
Peachey, Director; Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney
General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-
Appellants.

Michael Kaufman (argued) and Ahilan T. Arulanantham, ACLU
Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, California;
Michael Tan and Judy Rabinovitz, ACLU Foundation Immigrants'
Rights Project, New York, New York; Stephen B. Kang, ACLU
Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project, San Francisco, California;
Matthew E. Sloan -- matthew.sloan@skadden.com -- Douglas A. Smith
-- douglas.smith@skadden.com -- Devon L. Hein,
devon.hein@skadden.com -- Matthew E. Delgado --
matthew.delgado@skadden.com -- Michael D. Hidalgo --
michael.hidalgo@skadden.com -- and John C. Korevec --
john.korevec@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP,
Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

John L. Ewald -- jewald@orrick.com -- Kelly M. Daley, 51 West 52nd
StreetNew York, NY 10019-6142, Jasmine M. Owens, Esq. --
jowens@orrick.com. and Ned Hirschfeld -- nhirschfeld@orrick.com --
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, New York; Linda
Klein, American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois; for Amicus
Curiae American Bar Association.
Alan E. Schoenfeld -- alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; Leon T.
Kenworthy -- eon.kenworthy@wilmerhale.com -- and Webb Lyons --
webb.lyons@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Nine Retired Immigration
Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Members.
Peter R. Afrasiabi and Oscar M. Orozco-Botello, Newport Beach,
California; Anne Lai, University of California, Irvine School of
Law--Immigrant Rights Clinic, Irvine, California; for Amici Curiae
University of California, Irvine School of Law--Immigrant Rights
Clinic; Asian Americans Advancing Justice--Los Angeles; Brandeis
Human Rights Advocacy Program; Center for Gender & Refugee
Studies; Coalition to Abolish Slavery & Trafficking; Columbia Law
School Immigrants' Rights Clinic; Community Legal Services in East
Palo Alto; Cornell Law School's Asylum and Convention Against
Torture Appellate Clinic; Council on American-Islamic Relations;
Immigrant Defenders Law Center, Los Angeles; Las Crisantemas;
Loyola Immigrant Justice Clinic; National Day Laborer Organizing
Network; New York Law School, Safe Passage Project Clinical Class;
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project; Public Counsel; Rapid Response
Network; Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project; University
of California Davis School of Law Immigration Law Clinic;
University of California, Irvine School of Law Immigrant Rights
Clinic; University of Colorado Criminal/Immigration Defense
Clinic; University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Immigration Clinic; and
Western State College of Law Immigration Clinic.

Peter H. Kang -- PKANG@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Palo Alto,
California; Sue Wang -- SUE.WANG@SIDLEY.COM -- Kelly A. Rosencrans
-- KROSENCRANS@SIDLEY.COM -- and Alex Baxter, Sidley Austin LLP,
San Francisco, California; Jayashri Srikantiah, Immigrants' Rights
Clinic, Stanford Law School, Stanford, California; for Amici
Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Center
for Legal and Evidence-Based Practices.


UNITED STATES: Gambardella Appeals Decision in Class Suit vs. OPM
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Eugene Gambardella, Stephen Howell, National Treasury
Employees Union and John Ortino seek review of a court decision in
the lawsuit styled American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, et al. v. OPM, et al., Case No. 1:15-mc-01394-ABJ, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The appellate case is captioned as American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al. v. OPM, et al., Case No. 17-
5217, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Adedeji Shamonda of San Fransico, California,
and Adebiyi K. Shamonda of San Bruno, California, appear pro
se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Robert Crawford, Adam Dale, Teresa J. McGarry, The
Honorable, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Michael Hanagan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Ryan Bonner, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Mario Sampedro, Gardell Branch, Robert
Slater, Jane Doe, II, Toralf Peters, Myrna Brown, Charlene Oliver,
Darren Strickland, Cynthia King-Myers, Travis Arnold, Michael
Johnson, Tony Bachtell, Zachary Sharper, Jennifer Gum, John Doe,
III, John Doe, II, John Doe, Michael Ebert, Deborah Hoffman, Paul
Daly, Lillian Gonzalez-Colon, Kelly Flynn, Peter Uliano, Ryan
Lozar, Orin Griffith, Timothy Sebert, Johnny Gonzalez, Maryann
Hibbs, Alia Fuli, Heather Burnett-Rick, Monty Bos, Jane Doe, Nancy
Wheatley and Kimberly Winsor are represented by:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com

Plaintiffs-Appellants National Treasury Employees Union, Stephen
Howell, John Ortino and Eugene Gambardella are represented by:

          Paras Naresh Shah, Esq.
          NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
          1750 H Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 572-5500
          Facsimile: (202) 572-5645
          E-mail: paras.shah@nteu.org

Plaintiff-Appellee Mary C. Woo, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Victor W. Hobbs, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Behram Parekh, Esq.
          KIRTLAND & PACKARD LLP
          2041 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 300
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 536-1000
          E-mail: bvp@kirtlandpackard.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Hector Perez, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Frazer Walton, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF FRAZER WALTON, JR.
          920 Burns Street, SE
          Washington, DC 20019-0000
          Telephone: (202) 398-8920
          E-mail: frawalton@verizon.net

Plaintiff-Appellee John Oravis, individually, and on behlaf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Steven William Teppler, Esq.
          ABBOTT LAW GROUP, PA
          2929 Plummer Cove Road
          Jacksonville, FL 32223
          Telephone: (904) 292-1111
          E-mail: steppler@abbottlawpa.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Gary S. Cox, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
          E-mail: clm@federmanlaw.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees Edward W. Krippendorf, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated; Edward L. Robbeloth, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated; Eric W. Edgar, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; John
Raber, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;
Nicole Waid, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated; Nicholas D. Cavis, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated; and William Preston, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          J. Jonathan Schraub, Esq.
          SANDS ANDERSON PC
          1497 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 202
          McLean, VA 22101
          Telephone: (703) 893-3600
          Facsimile: (703) 893-8484
          E-mail: jjschraub@sandsanderson.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Micaela Brown, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Charles J. LaDuca, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          8120 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 810
          Bethesda, MD 20814
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com

Plaintiff - Appellee
Howard Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated

          Patrick Allen Malone, Esq.
          PATRICK MALONE & ASSOCIATES
          1331 H Street, NW, Suite 902
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 742-1500
          Facsimile: (202) 742-1515
          E-mail: pmalone@patrickmalonelaw.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees Chad Kappers and William Fleishell, III, are
represented by:

          Mark Robert Rosen, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          2001 Market Street
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000
          Telephone: (215) 963-0600
          Facsimile: (215) 963-0838
          E-mail: mrosen@barrack.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Jeran Binning, on Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-0000
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: rkshelquist@locklaw.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees David A. Golden, individually, and as parent
and next friend of Connor B. Golden, a minor; Ronnie Golden, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; and
Liliana Golden, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Eric J. Artrip, Esq.
          MASTANDO & ARTRIP, LLC
          301 Washington Street, Suite 302
          Huntsville, AL 35801
          Telephone: (256) 532-2222
          Facsimile: (256) 513-7489
          E-mail: artrip@mastandoartrip.com

Defendants-Appellees Office of Personnel Management, Beth F.
Cobert, acting Director, in her official capacity; Donna Seymour,
Chief Information Officer, in her official capacity; Donna
Seymour, Chief Information Officer of U.S. Office of Personnel
Management, in her official capacity; Beth F. Cobert, Acting
Director of United States Office of Personnel Management, in her
Official Capacity; Katherine Archuleta, former Director of U.S.
Office of Personnel Management, in her official capacity; United
States Department of Homeland Security; Elaine D. Kaplan and John
Berry are represented by:

          DOJ APPELLATE COUNSEL
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20530-0001
          Telephone: (202) 514-2000

Defendant-Appellee Keypoint Government Solutions, a Delaware
corporation, is represented by:

          Jason J. Mendro, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-5306
          Telephone: (202) 955-8500
          E-mail: jmendro@gibsondunn.com


VALERO MKTG: Court Certifies Consumers Class in "Bautista"
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify
class in the case captioned FAITH BAUTISTA, Plaintiff, v. VALERO
MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-05557-RS
(N.D. Cal.).

Valero is a refiner and wholesaler of motor fuels.  It sells
branded fuel to independent distributors or dealers, who in turn
sell to the public or re-sell the fuel to third-party station
owners who retail to the public.  Pursuant to a Distributor
Marketing Agreement, Valero grants distributors and dealers the
right to use Valero's trade dress and requires them to comply
fully with the proper use and display of the Valero brand set out
in Valero's Wholesale Branding Manual.

Around 2008, Valero launched a "Pump-A-Discount" program which
provides promotional and marketing materials to stations that
practice "split-pricing" by charging higher fuel prices on credit
transactions and lower fuel prices on cash transactions.

Bautista brings suit against Valero, alleging that these Valero-
branded gas stations engage in deceptive advertising with respect
to the price per gallon charged for gasoline purchased with a
debit card.  According to her, Valero signage that advertises a
higher "credit" price and a lower "cash" price is misleading
because it does not inform consumers that debit cards will be
charged the credit price.  Because reasonable consumers consider a
debit card to be the same as cash, in Plaintiff's view, they
expect to be charged the cash price.

Bautista moves to certify a class of all consumers who, between
Dec. 3, 2011 and the final disposition of the action, purchased
gasoline with a debit card from a Valero-branded station in
California that sells gasoline for a 'cash' price and were charged
more money per gallon than the available 'cash' price."

Bautista alleges that Valero's deceptive and misleading signage
violates the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California
False Advertising Law ("FAL"), and California Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL").  She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on
behalf of the class under the UCL and the FAL, and damages and/or
restitution under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL.

In opposition to certification, Valero insists that cash and debit
are not the same as a matter of law, and that the variations in
Valero-branded station sign configurations and pricing policies
preclude a showing of common injury.  It also offers numerous
criticisms of the methodology employed by Bautista's experts to
ascertain class membership and calculate damages awards.

Judge Seeborg concludes that these objections miss the mark.  To
the extent Valero takes issue with the quality of evidence
proffered by Bautista, those questions go to the merits of her
claims for relief.  At the class certification stage, Bautista
need only show that Valero produced marketing materials with a
material omission that could mislead a significant portion of the
general consuming public.

Because she has met that burden, and because she has made an
adequate showing that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been
satisfied, he granted Baustista's motion for class certification.
The Plaintiff's alternative motion for certification pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(2) is mooted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 4, 2017 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WhFKcK from Leagle.com.

Faith Bautista, Plaintiff, represented by Rafael Bernardino, Jr. -
- rbernardino@hbdlegal.com -- Hobson, Bernardino Davis, LLP.

Faith Bautista, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Chagas
Martins -- cmartins@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Jason Henry Alperstein -- jalperstein@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jason A. Hobson --
jhobson@hbdlegal.com -- Hobson Bernardino Davis LLP, Patrick W.
Daniels -- patrickd@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Roxana Miller Pierce -- rpierce@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart Andrew Davidson --
SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice.

Valero Marketing and Supply Company, Defendant, represented by
Adam Friedenberg -- afriedenberg@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn &
Finley, LLP, Lauren Elizabeth Wood -- lwood@glynnfinley.com --
Glynn & Finley LLP & Robert Charles Phelps --
bphelps@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn & Finley LLP.


VISIONWEB HOLDINGS: Faces Retina Class Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against VisionWeb
Holdings, L.L.C.

The case is captioned Retina Associates Medical Group, Inc.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
VisionWeb Holdings, L.L.C., Case No. 8:17-cv-01703 (C.D. Cal.,
September 29, 2017).

VisionWeb Holdings, L.L.C. is in the business of providing optical
dispensing and claim management services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Seth Lehrman, Esq.
      FARMER JAFFE WEISSING EDWARDS FISTOS LEHRMAN PL
      425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 524-2820
      Facsimile: (954) 524-2822
      E-mail: seth@pathtojustice.com

VITAQUEST: "Shoaf" Class Suit Removed to S. Dist. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Renee Shoaf and Pamela Parra,
on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated and the
general public v. Vitaquest, Intl. LLC and Windmill Health
Products, LLC, Case No. 37-02017-00030910-CU-BT-CTL, was removed
from the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego to the
U.S. District Court Southern District of California on September
29, 2017. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:17-cv-
02007-GPC-BLM to the proceeding.

Vitaquest, Intl. LLC engages in the formulation, development, and
manufacture of custom dietary supplements.

Windmill Health Products, LLC manufactures, markets, and
distributes vitamins, nutritional supplements, and minerals to
pharmacies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Paul K. Joseph, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF PAUL K. JOSEPH, PC
      4125 West Point Loma Blvd., No. 206
      San Diego, CA 92110
      Telephone: (619) 767-0356
      Facsimile: (619) 331-2943
      E-mail: paul@pauljosephlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      Michael J. Duvall, Esq.
      DENTONS US LLP
      601 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2500
      Los Angeles, CA 90017
      Telephone: (213) 623-9924
      Facsimile: (213) 623-9924
      E-mail: michael.duvall@dentons.com


VOGUE INTERNATIONAL: Faces "McBride" Class Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against Vogue
International LLC.

The case is captioned Ashlei McBride, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Vogue International LLC, Case No.
1:17-cv-07594 (S.D.N.Y., October 4, 2017).

Vogue International LLC manufactures and distributes hair care and
other personal care products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 465-1188
      Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
      E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


WASHINGTON, USA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Haldane" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Daniel Haldane, Wendel Johnson, Timothy Martin and
Leeshawn Redic filed an appeal from a court ruling in their
lawsuit styled Daniel Haldane, et al. v. G. Hammond, et al., Case
No. 2:15-cv-01810-RAJ, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 5,
2017, the District Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiffs are prisoners in the custody of the Washington
Department of Corrections.  The Plaintiffs each have ailments for
which their providers submitted requests to the Care Review
Committee for specific treatment.  The CRC denied treatment, and
the Plaintiffs contend that the refusals lead to their continued
suffering from severe pain and limitations on daily living.

The appellate case is captioned as Daniel Haldane, et al. v. G.
Hammond, et al., Case No. 17-80197, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners DANIEL HALDANE, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated; WENDEL JOHNSON, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; TIMOTHY MARTIN, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; and
LEESHAWN REDIC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Nicholas Straley, Esq.
          Nicholas Brian Allen, Esq.
          COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
          101 Yesler Way
          Seattle, WA 98104-2552
          Telephone: (206) 464-5933
          E-mail: nick.straley@columbialegal.org
                  nick.allen@columbialegal.org

               - and -

          Hank Balson, Esq.
          PUBLIC INTEREST LAW GROUP, PLLC
          705 Second Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104-1715
          Telephone: (206) 838-1800
          Facsimile: (206) 838-3330
          E-mail: hbalson@pilg.org

               - and -

          David Whedbee, Esq.
          Jesse A. Wing, Esq.
          MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS
          705 Second Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 622-1604
          Facsimile: (206) 343-3961
          E-mail: davidw@mhb.com
                  jessew@mhb.com

Defendants-Respondents G. STEVEN HAMMOND, Chief Medical Officer of
the Washington Department of Corrections, in their official
capacities; and DAN PACHOLKE, Secretary of the Washington
Department of Corrections, in their official capacities, are
represented by:

          Aaron Williams, Esq.
          Timothy Norman Lang, Esq.
          STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE - CORRECTIONS DIVISION
          P.O. Box 40116
          Olympia, WA 98504-0116
          Telephone: (360) 586-1445
          Facsimile: (360) 664-8716
          E-mail: aaronw@atg.wa.gov
                  timothyl@atg.wa.gov

               - and -

          Candie M. Dibble, Esq.
          ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
          ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          1116 West Riverside
          Spokane, WA 99022
          Telephone: (509) 458-3538
          Facsimile: (509) 458-3548
          E-mail: CandieD@atg.wa.gov


WESTAR ENERGY: Wolf Popper Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Popper LLP on Oct. 11 disclosed that it has filed a class
action lawsuit against Westar Energy, Inc. (NYSE:WR), members of
its Board, Great Plains Energy Incorporated (NYSE:GXP) and other
entities, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
(5:17-cv-04086), on behalf of current public stockholders of
Westar, seeking to enjoin the consummation of two related proposed
transactions, or, in the event they are consummated, to recover
damages resulting from defendants' wrongdoing.  This action
alleges claims for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a member of the Class, you may file a motion no later
than December 11, 2017 to be appointed lead plaintiff.  A lead
plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other
class members in directing the litigation.  Class members are
urged to contact Wolf Popper to discuss their rights.

The action stems from two related proposed transactions announced
on July 10, 2017, pursuant to which Westar and Great Plains will
be combined in a "merger of equals" under a new holding company
named Monarch Energy Holding, Inc.  In the first transaction,
Westar stockholders will receive one share of Monarch common stock
in exchange for each of their common shares of Westar.  In the
other transaction, Great Plains stockholders will receive 0.5981
shares of Monarch common stock in exchange for each of their
common shares of Great Plains.

On September 14, 2017, with respect to the proposed transactions,
defendants filed a Registration Statement on a Form S-4 which
contained materially false and/or misleading information
concerning, among other things, the analyses performed by the
respective financial advisors of Westar and Great Plains, in
support of their fairness opinions, including certain of the
projections relied upon in performing these analyses.

Wolf Popper -- http://www.wolfpopper.com-- has successfully
recovered billions of dollars for defrauded investors.  Twelve
Wolf Popper attorneys were named Super Lawyers or Rising Stars in
the 2017 Super Lawyers New York City Metro Edition, including Wolf
Popper partner Carl Stine, who was included in the Super Lawyers
Top 100 List for the New York City Metro area. [GN]


WHOLE FOODS: Faces Class Action Over Taproom Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------------
Sophia Morris, writing for Law360, reports that Whole Foods failed
to protect the personal data of customers and negligently allowed
their information to be stolen during a September data breach that
affected the grocer's taprooms and restaurants, according to a
proposed class action filed on Oct. 10 in Ohio federal court.

Named plaintiff Patricia Banus claims she paid for goods at a
Whole Foods Market Group Inc. taproom four days prior to the Sept.
28 announcement of the breach, and now has to cancel her card,
given that her personally identifiable information may have been
compromised through the breach of the taproom's point-of-sale
system.

"Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, brings this action to challenge the actions on Whole
Foods in the protection and safekeeping of the plaintiff's and
class members' personal information," the complaint said.  "Whole
Foods' failures to safeguard the consumer PII has caused plaintiff
and class members damage."

Whole Foods had a duty under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to
safeguard customers' personally identifiable information from
being disclosed to third parties, the complaint asserted.  In
order to process card transactions, the company should have been
following security protocols from Visa and MasterCard.  The breach
may have resulted from a failure by Whole Foods to comply with
these security standards, the complaint said.

Ohio consumer protection laws were also violated as consumers
placed their trust in Whole Foods, and if they had known that
their personal data was not properly protected, they would have
potentially have shopped somewhere else, the complaint asserted.

The disclosure of the personally identifiable information is
enough to indicate that the consumers were harmed by the breach,
the complaint said.  There is a high chance that the full extent
of the identity theft and fraud that could result from the breach
has not yet been disclosed and consumers' information might be
available to purchase on the dark web, the complaint asserted.

The proposed class is made up of all U.S. consumers whose personal
data was released during the September breach.
Ms. Banus also seeks to represent an Ohio subclass. The size of
the proposed class is unclear with the company reporting that 117
venues were affected.

Marc Dann, an attorney for the proposed class, told Law360 on Oct.
10 that Whole Foods could do more to inform the public about the
breach, noting that there is no information on the front page of
the company's website.

"I think it's really not good for business or for people who might
be affected," he said.  "I think what it's going to do is cause
members of this class to be at greater risk if they don't know
what's going on.  They could certainly mitigate their damages by a
thorough and complete disclosure."

The company has set up a site that allows customers to see if
their local taproom or restaurant was affected by the breach.

"The company's investigation is ongoing and it will provide
additional updates as it learns more," a statement on the site
says.

Representatives for Whole Foods did not respond to requests for
comment.

The proposed class is represented by Marc E. Dann and Brian D.
Flick of the Dann Law Firm and Thomas A. Zimmerman Jr. of
Zimmerman Law Offices PC.

The case is Banus v. Whole Foods Market Group Inc., case number
1:17-cv-02132, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio.  The case is assigned to Judge James S. Gwin.
The case was filed October 10, 2017. [GN]


XOMA CORP: Calif. Court Dismisses Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint in the case captioned JOSEPH F. MARKETTE, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. XOMA CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No.
15-cv-03425-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Lead Plaintiff Joseph Tarzia brings this putative class action on
behalf of all persons or entities who purchased XOMA common stock
at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

Plaintiff alleges that during the class period, Varian sold 82,630
shares of XOMA common stock for proceeds totaling $315,400. He
further alleges that Rubin sold 79,530 shares of XOMA common
stock, for proceeds totaling $340,464. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Kelvin Neu, a board member at XOMA from 2012 to 2015 and
the managing director of privately-owned hedge fund Baker Bros.,
provided Baker Bros. with insider information, which resulted in
Baker Bros.' selling more than 8.3 million shares of XOMA common
stock for proceeds totaling nearly $35.8 million.

As a threshold matter, the parties dispute whether several of the
Challenged Statements are statements of fact or opinions. This
distinction is significant, because the Ninth Circuit has recently
clarified the standards for pleading falsity of opinion statements
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in in City of Dearborn Heights
Act 345 Police & Retirement Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d
605 (9th Cir. 2017).  The Ninth Circuit held that three different
standards may apply, depending on the nature of the statement:
"First, when a plaintiff relies on a theory of material
misrepresentation, the plaintiff must allege both that the speaker
did not hold the belief she professed and that the belief is
objectively untrue. Second, when a plaintiff relies on a theory
that a statement of fact contained within an opinion statement is
materially misleading, the plaintiff must allege that the
supporting fact the speaker supplied is untrue. Third, when a
plaintiff relies on a theory of omission, the plaintiff must
allege facts going to the basis for the issuer's opinion whose
omission makes the opinion statement misleading to a reasonable
person reading the statement fairly and in context."

The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that these statements are
statements of fact not subject to the Dearborn pleading
requirements. There is no reasonable basis to read a statement of
hopefulness, encouragement, or expectation as anything other than
an opinion, and the Court disagrees that the statements were
phrased as certainties, not beliefs. Nor is the Court persuaded by
Plaintiff's argument that the statements "had specific factual
connotations" as Plaintiff fails to explain why this
characterization, even if accepted as true, transforms a statement
that facially reflects the speaker's beliefs into a statement of
fact.

Having determined that five of the seven Challenged Statements are
statements of opinion, the Court applies the standards set out in
Dearborn to determine whether Plaintiff has adequately pled the
falsity of those statements. The Court then applies general
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit principles regarding material
omissions to determine whether Plaintiff has adequately pled the
falsity of the remaining two statements.

Because Statements 1, 3, and 4 are pure opinion statements,
Dearborn's material misrepresentation prong applies. Under a
theory of material misrepresentation, Plaintiff's burden at this
stage of the litigation is to allege, with sufficient
particularity, that Defendants did not hold the belief they
professed and that the belief is objectively untrue.

Statements 2 and 5 are statements of opinion with embedded facts.
To sufficiently plead that such a statement is false, Plaintiff
"must allege that the supporting fact, the speaker supplied is
untrue. Plaintiff's allegations again are insufficient, focusing
on the fact that Defendants' optimism turned out to be misplaced
rather than on showing that Defendants' supporting facts are
untrue.

Plaintiff's allegations also fail under an omissions theory. A
defendant is liable under Rule 10b-5 if it omits material facts
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. An
omission is material when there is a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix
of information available. As long as the omissions do not make the
actual statements misleading, a company is not required to
disclose every result from a clinical trial, even if the company
discloses some results and even if investors would consider the
omitted information significant.

Even if Plaintiff had adequately pled a material misrepresentation
or omission by Defendants, he has still failed to adequately plead
another element of a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 violation:
scienter. To adequately plead scienter under the PSLRA, the
complaint must state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind.

A plaintiff can meet his pleading burden for scienter by alleging
specific contemporaneous statements or conditions. In this
context, a complaint will survive only if a reasonable person
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.

Plaintiff thus fails to adequately allege that Defendants acted
with the requisite deliberate recklessness. Nor does he purport to
offer any specific contemporaneous statements or conditions that
would allow him to do so.  Instead, his argument essentially
amounts to an assertion that, because Defendants coordinated the
study and had access to high-level logistical data, they must have
also had access to the unblinded data. This is far from
sufficient, and the Court finds that a reasonable person would
not, on the basis of Plaintiff's allegations, deem the inference
of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference.

For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person
or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including
its content and whether and how to communicate it.. But despite
Plaintiff's argument in his opposition that Neu, as a board member
of XOMA, had ultimate authority over the false and misleading
statements at issue. Plaintiff failed to make any factual
allegations in his Complaint in support of that argument. Indeed,
he fails to allege that Neu made or even knew about any of the
seven Challenged Statements.

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to carry his pleading burden, and his
claims against Neu must be dismissed.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants violated Rules 10b-5(a)
and (c), by engaging in a Fraudulent Scheme To Pump The Blinded
EYEGUARD-B Data. A defendant may only be liable as part of a fraud
claim based upon misrepresentations and omissions under Rules 10b-
5(a) or (c) when the scheme also encompasses conduct beyond those
misrepresentations or omissions. Plaintiff here "does not allege
any facts that are separate from those already in [his] Rule 10b-
5(b) omission claims, meaning his scheme liability claim is
fundamentally his omission claim by another name.
For that reason, the Court dismisses the claim.

Plaintiff also alleges Section 20(a) claims against Varian, Rubin,
and Neu under a control person theory of liability.  As Plaintiff
has not adequately alleged a primary violation of 10b-5, his
claims for control person liability under section 20 are dismissed
with leave to amend. In order to prove a prima facie case under
Section 20(a), plaintiff must prove: (1) a primary violation of
federal securities laws and (2) that the defendant exercised
actual power or control over the primary violator.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint with Leave to
Amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y87wqyy4from Leagle.com.

Joseph F. Markette, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Punzalan --
markp@punzalanlaw.com --  Punzalan Law, P.C..

Joseph Tarzia, Plaintiff, represented by Barbara Ann Rohr, Faruqi
and Faruqi, LLP, 10866 Wilshire Boulevard. Suite 1470. Los
Angeles, CA 90024, Benjamin Heikali --  Bheikali@faruqilaw.com --
Faruqi and Faruqi LLP, Katherine M. Lenahan --
klenahan@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Farqui, LLP, pro hac vice,
Nadeem Faruqi -- nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP,
pro hac vice, Richard W. Gonnello -- rgonnello@faruqilaw.com --
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice & Sherief Morsy --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice.
John Varian, Defendant, represented by Amanda Alison Main --
amain@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Brett Hom De Jarnette --
bdejarnette@cooley.com --  Cooley LLP, Jessica Valenzuela
Santamaria -- jsantamaria@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & John C.
Dwyer, Cooley LLP.

Paul D. Rubin, Defendant, represented by Amanda Alison Main,
Cooley LLP, Brett Hom De Jarnette, Cooley LLP, Jessica Valenzuela
Santamaria, Cooley LLP & John C. Dwyer, Cooley LLP.

XOMA Corporation, Defendant, represented by Amanda Alison Main,
Cooley LLP, Brett Hom De Jarnette, Cooley LLP, Jessica Valenzuela
Santamaria, Cooley LLP & John C. Dwyer, Cooley LLP.

Kelvin M. Neu, Defendant, represented by Jessica Valenzuela
Santamaria, Cooley LLP.

Joseph Tarzia, Movant, represented by Barbara Ann Rohr, Faruqi and
Faruqi, LLP, Katherine M. Lenahan, Faruqi and Farqui, LLP, pro hac
vice, Megan M. Sullivan, Faruqi and Faruqi LLP, Nadeem Faruqi,
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard W. Gonnello, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice & Sherief Morsy, Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP,
pro hac vice.

Xoma Group, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen
Law Firm, P.A. & Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac
vice.

Nicholas Exarhos, Movant, represented by Mark Punzalan, Punzalan
Law, P.C..

Kellie Exarhos, Movant, represented by Mark Punzalan, Punzalan
Law, P.C..

Cliff M. Claycomb, Movant, represented by Michael M. Goldberg,
Goldberg Law PC.

Dwayne Leroy Davis, Movant, represented by Michael M. Goldberg,
Goldberg Law PC.

Lanae Davis, Movant, represented by Michael M. Goldberg --
Info@carcrashadvisor.com --  Goldberg Law PC.

Douglas S Reynolds, Movant, represented by Michael M. Goldberg,
Goldberg Law PC.

Jason Wileman, Movant, represented by Michael M. Goldberg,
Goldberg Law PC.


* 56% of Private-Sector Workers Subject to Mandatory Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------------
L.M. Sixel, writing for Chron, reports that more than half the
nation's private sector workforce is barred from the courthouse if
they have disputes over pay, working conditions or discrimination,
according to new survey of employers about their use of mandatory
arbitration contracts.

A report by Alexander J.S. Colvin, professor of conflict
resolution at Cornell University, found that 56 percent of
private-sector, non-union workers are subject to mandatory
arbitration, preventing them access to the courts for a wide
variety of legal claims including overtime and minimum wage
violations, retaliation and discrimination for  age, sex, race,
national origin and disability.  The arbitration contracts are
typically a condition of employment.

A U.S. Supreme Court decision dating back 26 years ago paved the
way for employers to require the contracts that they say are
necessary to reduce legal bills and speed up the settlement of
disputes.  The contracts are especially common at large companies.
Sixty-five percent of companies with 1,000 or more employees
require mandatory arbitration, according to the report.
The high court heard oral arguments in three consolidated cases
earlier this month that challenge class action waivers in
arbitration contracts that prohibit workers from joining together
to address widespread violations of employee rights.  The court
will determine whether class action waivers violate long-standing
federal labor laws that allows workers to jointly protest their
working conditions, work rules and wages.

Thirty percent of employers who require mandatory arbitration also
bar their workers from participating in class action cases. [GN]


* Arbitration Costs Lesser Than Class Action Litigation
-------------------------------------------------------
Griffin Pivateau, writing for NewsOK, reports that employers face
a terrible choice.  Fearful of the costs and uncertainties of
litigation, many employers have introduced mandatory arbitration
clauses into their employment agreements.  These clauses often
require individual arbitration of claims and prohibit class
actions.  Unfortunately, the legality of these class-action
waivers remains doubtful.  The National Labor Relations Board
maintains the waivers are illegal and that an employer who
requires a waiver risks facing an unfair labor practices charge.

Following an oral argument in Epic Systems v. Lewis, the U.S.
Supreme Court will decide whether employers have the right to
require individual resolution of claims brought by employees. The
court should embrace arbitration as a fair and efficient means of
resolving workplace disputes.  In recent years, a series of
Supreme Court decisions have endorsed class-action waivers in
consumer contracts.  The court should apply the same principles
favoring arbitration apply to employment contracts.

The National Labor Relations Act protects an employee's right to
engage in "concerted activities."  The NLRB has interpreted this
to mean employees have a right to pursue class-wide resolution of
claims. An employer who requires employees to waive their right to
a class action has, according to the NLRB, committed an unfair
labor practice.  The NLRB has invalidated dozens of arbitration
agreements with class-action waivers since it first confronted the
issue in 2012.

The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce arbitration
agreements.  The drafters intended the law to reverse judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.  In the years since its
enactment, arbitration agreements have become increasingly common.
Without waiving any rights or protections, the parties to an
arbitration can resolve their dispute in a fair and efficient
manner.

Courts should enforce employment agreements containing individual
arbitration agreements.  Class-action litigation tends to be
unfair, unrepresentative and unlikely to provide genuine relief to
plaintiffs.  While class-action litigation may provide some sort
of regulatory effect, it fails when it comes to the actual
resolution of disputes.

The arbitration process contains advantages for employees as well
as employers.  An arbitration proceeding can produce a more
efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive form of justice. Unlike in
a class-action lawsuit, the arbitration plaintiff has the
opportunity to testify. I n class-action litigation, it's likely
that an employee will never have the chance to tell his or her
side of the story to a neutral third party.

In an arbitration proceeding, the parties can ensure that a
trained professional will hear the dispute.  The arbitrator will
likely have years of experience with the type of claim at issue.
Moreover, arbitrators are freed from the dictates of precedent.
Instead, arbitrators can create remedies that potentially benefit
employer and employee.

The costs of an arbitration hearing are much less.  Arbitration,
unlike class-action litigation, is aimed at actual resolution of a
dispute.  It isn't about lining the pockets of lawyers. Importing
expensive class-action litigation procedures into employment
disputes does not favor employees.

Critics of arbitration in employment should take note of its many
advantages and, instead of seeking to constrain its use, seek to
remedy its flaws.  Efforts to fix the perceived faults of
arbitration would prove much more constructive than a series of
lawsuits to prevent its use.

Mr. Pivateau is an associate professor of legal studies at
Oklahoma State University. [GN]


* Business Groups File Suit to Challenge CFPB's Arbitration Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer M. Keas, Esq. -- jkeas@foley.com -- and Erik Benny, Esq.
-- ebenny@foley.com -- of Foley & Lardner LLP, in an article for
Lexology, wrote that on September 29, 2017, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the Texas Association of Business, and various other
national and Texas statewide business organizations and trade
groups (together, Plaintiffs) filed a federal lawsuit in Dallas,
Texas challenging the constitutionality of a Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) rule designed to prohibit providers of
certain consumer financial products and services from using class
waivers in pre-dispute arbitration agreements (Arbitration Rule).
The Arbitration Rule, which was issued in July 2017 but which will
not go into effect until March 2018, is already facing
congressional challenge, with a joint resolution presently before
the Senate to overturn the rule under the Congressional Review
Act.

Plaintiffs' lawsuit claims that the Arbitration Rule is invalid
because it: 1) is a product of the CFPB's unconstitutional
structure; 2) violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and
3) was adopted in violation of the requirements of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
The lawsuit names the CFPB and Richard Cordray, in his official
capacity as director of the CFPB, as defendants.

With respect to the first claim, Plaintiffs allege -- consistent
with arguments made in various other cases, such as the PHH case
currently being reviewed en banc by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals[1] -- that the aberrant structure of the CFPB, including
the extraordinary degree of authority conferred upon the CFPB's
director, is unconstitutional. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege, any
regulations issued from the CFPB are necessarily "infected" by the
agency's unconstitutional character and must be vacated.

Plaintiffs also allege that the Arbitration Rule violates the APA
because the CFPB's study of arbitration clauses related to
financial products and services, upon which the agency based its
Arbitration Rule, was flawed and the rule's promulgation was
otherwise arbitrary and capricious for failing to take into
account all aspects of the alleged problem. For example,
Plaintiffs allege that the CFPB ignored data demonstrating the
benefits of arbitration and that "class members very rarely gain
benefits from class-action suits."

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Arbitration Rule failed to
advance the public interest or consumer welfare as required by
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that empowered the CFPB to study
and restrict arbitration agreements in the first place. Plaintiffs
contend that the rule effectively precludes the use of an
arbitration mechanism that is the "only realistic method by which
consumers may obtain relief for the types of individualized claims
that they typically regard as most important," and does so in the
interest of encouraging class action litigation, which provides
greater rewards to class action lawyers than individual consumers.

Plaintiffs seek a stay of the Arbitration Rule until the lawsuit
is resolved, final judgment in their favor, and court action to
prevent the CFPB from implementing the Arbitration Rule.  The
defendants have not responded to the lawsuit but Mr. Cordray has
been publicly vocal in defense of the CFPB's controversial study
and Arbitration Rule.

The case is Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Case No. 3:17-cv-02670 (N.D.
Tex.). [GN]


* Supreme Court to Decide on Legality of Class Action Waivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Grandstaff, writing for Capital Research Center, reports
that the Supreme Court heard arguments in three cases that will
decide the power of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) over
private employment contracts. Epic Systems v. Lewis hinge on
whether waivers barring employees from engaging in class action
lawsuits violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), the 1935 law governing employer-worker relations.  The
Obama administration NLRB considered these private contracts
illegal under the NLRA.

So far, the lower courts remain divided on the issue: the 2nd and
5th Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled in favor of employers,
while the 7th and 9th Circuit Courts have sided with the NLRB.

The Supreme Court's four liberal justices seem sympathetic to the
NLRB's position.  Justices Anthony Kennedy, John Roberts, and
Samuel Alito, however, appear favorably disposed towards the
employers.  Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch -- President
Donald Trump's recent appointee -- have not offered early
opinions.

Justice Kennedy, a moderate who often represents the deciding vote
in close cases, told the plaintiffs' lawyers that even if their
clients lose the case, they could still hire the same lawyer to
bring a suit against a former employer, even though their claims
would be handled individually.  He said if class action waivers
are banned, it seems rational "for many employers to say, 'Forget
it, we don't want arbitration at all.'"

The Trump administration finds itself in the curious position of
opposing the position of its own NLRB, in part because the term of
Obama-appointed NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin doesn't
expire until the end of October.  The government's original amicus
brief filed under the Obama administration in September 2016 sided
with the NLRB's interpretation of the law.  In June 2017, however,
John Wall -- President Trump's Justice Department's acting
solicitor general -- issued his own amicus brief informing the
Court that the government had "reconsidered the issue and has
reached the opposite conclusion."

CRC's Diana Furchtgott-Roth and Hayden Ludwig have shown how
statists in the federal government have used the NLRB to push for
greater unionization and rules that would make class action
lawsuits easier.  During his tenure as NLRB General Counsel,
Furchtgott-Roth explains, Richard Griffin sought to greatly expand
the "joint employer" rule, making large corporations like
McDonald's USA responsible for the labor disputes of local
franchises -- effectively destroying the ability of individual
franchisees to operate as small businesses.

Two groups profit from Griffin's change in the law. One is unions,
because they believe that they will be able to extort McDonald's
USA into requiring unionization as a condition of obtaining a
franchise.  The other group is the class action plaintiffs' bar,
because lawyers will now be able sue McDonald's USA rather than a
local McDonald's for any unfair labor practices or any allegations
of wrongdoing.

NLRB acting solicitor general John Wall argues that the eight
decades of NLRA history are on employers' side.  He and the
employers' attorneys note that it was the Obama administration's
NLRB that tried to expand the reach of the joint employer rule in
2012 by ruling that class action waivers are illegal.

The Trump Justice Department reasons that the issue falls under
the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), rather than the NLRA.  The
FAA made private arbitration agreements enforceable by the courts;
and in 2011 the Supreme Court ruled that the FAA covers class
action waivers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.  The NLRB and
the employees' lawyers, however, argue that because the NLRA
passed into law after the FAA it takes legal precedence.

But even if the Court held that to be the case, a careful reading
of Section 7 of the NLRA shows that the four liberal Justices
interpret the NLRA just as they typically interpret the
Constitution--very loosely.

Section 7 states,

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .

This section guarantees current employees the right to organize
collectively and engage in It does not at all indicate that former
employees may ban together to take collective action against past
employers.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg contended during the hearings that
"there is no true liberty to contract on the part of the employee"
because employees have few options when an employer insists they
sign a contract.  But employers do not force anyone into
employment; neither do they force potential employees to sign away
their legal right to file a class-action suit.  Both are done
voluntarily. Both employer and employee are free agents to
contract with whomever they choose and under whatever terms they
choose within the confines of the law.

The FAA states that the right to contractual arbitration "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law."  For instance, the 13th Amendment prohibits someone
from contracting his labor in the form of indentured servanthood -
- just as the NLRA prohibits a worker from entering into a
contract that would deny his ability to join a labor union. But
Congress has never amended the NLRA to explicitly bar class action
waivers.  If the broad interpretation of the NLRB stands, it will
greatly diminish one of the hallmarks of Western Civilization--the
right to contract freely.

If those on the Left opposed to class action waivers want their
opinion grounded into law, they should appeal to Congress to
expand the NLRA.  Appealing to judicial fiat to substitute for
legislation only destroys the rule of law. [GN]


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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