CAR_Public/171020.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Friday, October 20, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 208



                            Headlines

ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Court Strikes Aguirre Class Cert. Bid
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORAL: Kuri, et al. Seek to Certify Class
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Settlement in "Larey" Suit Has Initial OK
AMBIT ENERGY: Ct. Denies Move to Dismiss Consumer Protection Suit
AMERICAN EXPRESS: Court Denied Class Cert. Bid in "Heilmann"

ANGIE'S LIST: "Strauss" Suit Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
ANSELMO LINDBERG: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class as Moot
ARBITECH LLC: Denial of Arbitration in Trade Secrets Suit Upheld
ASSET RECOVERY: "Lamb" Case Dismissed Without Prejudice
BANCO BRADESCO: NY Court Allows Investor Claims to Proceed

BELL-MARK TECHNOLOGIES: "Berger" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
BLUE STAR FARMS: Court Denies Martinez's Bid to Certify Class
BRAD LIVINGSTON: "Johnson" Suit Seeks Class Certification
BRINKER INT'L: Court Grants Dismissal of Internet Access Suit
BSN MEDICAL: Court Denied Placeholder Bid to Certify Class

CABLE MARKETING: "Hobbs" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
CARIBBEAN CRUISE: Court Strikes Duplicative Bid to Certify Class
CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE: Class Certification Bid Denied
CAWLEY & BERGMANN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CBE GROUP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

CELADON TRUCKING: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
CELGENE CORP: Certification of 3 Classes Sought in Revlimid Case
CEMPRA INC: "Franchi" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation
CHICAGO, IL: Court Grants Class Certification in "Conyers"
CHRYSLER GROUP: Court Denies "Cox" Motion for Class Certification

CHSPSC LLC: Court Certifies Arkansas Residents Class in "Mounce"
COOK COUNTY, IL: Bid to Certify Class in "Rogers" Terminated
COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams File Amended Motion to Certify Class
CORECIVIC: "Dodson" Suit Asks Court to Certify Diabetics Class
CREDENCE RESOURCE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

CSAA INSURANCE: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class as Moot
CVS: Class Suit by Store Detectives May Proceed
DCM SERVICES: Machnik Files "Damasco" Bid for Class Certification
DEBT RECOVERY: Faces "Nunez" Suit in E. Dist. New York
DEVON ENERGY: Martinez Seeks to Certify Safety Consultants Class

ENSIGN UNITED: Wins Summary Judgment in Calif. WARN Act Suit
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Baker" Suit in Minnesota
ESSENDANT INC: Alpha Tech Suit Seeks to Certify Class
FELDCO FACTORY: Joint Bid for Conditional Certification Granted
FIFTH GENERATION: Court Denies Singleton Class Certification Bid

FOREMOST INSURANCE: Court Denied as Moot Bid to Certify Class
FOX RESTAURANT: "Pae" Suit Seeks to Certify Classes of Servers
FRANK & ISRAEL: CHC Systems Seeks Class Certification
FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES: Holland Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
GARDENS OF FOUNTAIN: "Jones" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class

GEORGIA: Faces Class Suit over Special Education Program
GLOBAL CREDIT: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class as Premature
GREAT CIRCLE: "Bush" Suit Seeks to Certify Case Managers Class
GULFPORT ENERGY: Safety & Completions Consultants Class Okayed
H & J INT'L: Faces "Liu" Suit in E. Dist. New York

HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Settlement Class in "Rudel" Suit Okayed
HEIDI WASHINGTON: "Arnold" Suit Seeks to Certify Prisoners Class
HELIX ENERGY: "Hugee" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
HEMMER LAW: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
HOGAN TRANSPORTATION: Court Certifies Class in "Fairfax" Suit

HOUSTON, TX: Faces Class Suit over Serial Rapist
HOUSTON, TX: 5th Cir. Appeal over Prison Bail Policies Underway
HUNTER WARFIELD: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
JACKSONVILLE, FL: "Chapman" Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
JP MORGAN CHASE: Faces "Denton" Suit in E. Dist. Va.

KERRI BARKLEY: Court Denied Jacobs' Motion to Certify Class
KING PLASTIC: "Fusic" Suit Seeks to Certify Factory Workers Class
KLUEVER & PLATT: Court Grants Righeimer Class Certification Bid
KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
KOHL'S CORPORATION: Renewed Class Certification Bid Underway

LABELLE HOMEHEALTH: Court Certifies Class in "Richert" Suit
LEE N' EDDIES: Urban Elevator's Class Certification Bid Denied
LESTER'S ACTIVEWEAR: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. New York
LTI TRUCKING: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Parrott Seeks to Notify Class Members

MCCARTHY & BURGESS: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
MED-CARE DIABETIC: Court Grants Motion for Class Certification
MESILLA VALLEY TRANS: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks Class Certification
MICHAELS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in "Rowe" Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: "Grigsby" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation

MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
MIZUHO BANK: "Greene" Suit Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
MONTGOMERY, NY: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
NEW YORK, NY: Class Suit Filed over Bail System
NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD: Bid for Leave to File Under Seal Okayed

NURTURE INC: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Birdsong" Suit
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Court Grants Bid for Remand in "Courtright"
OCWEN LOAN: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "McWhorter" FDCPA Suit
ON-LINE ADMINISTRATORS: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Trenz" Suit
OWL INC: Perez et al. Suit Seeks to Certify Class

PARKING REVENUE: Court Dismissed "Franklin" Case
PERMANENTE MEDICAL: Court Okays Accord in Call-Center Nurses Suit
PRECISION MOTOR: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks Class Certification
PROCESSING SOLUTIONS: Denial of "Baillie" Class Cert Reversed
PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Class Cert. Bid in "Cooksey" Nixed

QI ENTERPRISES: Faces "Ramirez" Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
RBC BEARINGS: Court Grants Reynoso's Bid for Class Certification
ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Passengers Sue over Travel During Harvey
RSI ENTERPRISES: Class Certification Bid in "Machnik" Terminated
RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN: "Carney" Suit Seeks to Certify Class

SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Ontiveros "Suit" Seeks Class Certification
SAM HOUSTON: Tex. App. Flips Denial of Arbitration in Class Suit
SCANA CORP: Delmater Sues over Abandoned Nuke Plant Project
SLIDE FIRE: Faces Class Suit by Vegas Shooting Victims
SMITH TRANSPORT: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class

SONIC CORP: Vanderzanden and Carlton Sue over Data Breach
ST. LOUIS, MO: "Ahmad" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
STARKIST CO: Must Defend Against Price-Fixing Claims
SPX CORPORATION: Denial of Injunction in ERISA Suit Affirmed
STARWOOD HOTELS: Heilmann Sues over Loyalty Points

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK: Faces Tennis Players' Suit
STEPTOE & JOHNSON: "Houck" Plaintiff Seeks to Notify Class
STRATEGY ANESTHESIA: Court Denied Bid for Class Certification
SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL: Court Denied Class Certification as Moot
TARGET CORPORATION: Faraji Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses

TNJ ENTERPRISES: "Gomez" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
TRUGREEN LIMITED: Morris et al. Seek Opt-In Rights Notice
TURNER OIL: "Stanley" Suit Seeks to Certify Landmen Class
TWITTER INC: Investors' Suit over Stock Price Drop Underway
UNITED AIRLINES: "Pumputyte" Suit Seeks Certification of Class

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: "Magadia" Suit Seeks to Certify 3 Classes
UBER TECH: Two Women Sue over Sexual Assault by Drivers
UBER TECH: Faces Securities Suit by Irving Firemen's Fund
UBIQUITI NETWORKS: December 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Derosia"

UNITED SITE: Court Conditionally Certifies Technicians Class
UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Rules in Suit over Immigrant Bail
UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Suit in Los Angeles over Deportation
UNITED STATES: Calif. Judge Permits Privacy Class Suit v. FBI
US STEEL: Shareholders Sue over Earnings Loss, Stock Plunge

WELLS FARGO: Officers Must Defend Against Shareholder Action
WESTMINSTER MANAGEMENT: Tenants Sue over Predatory Fees
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY: Faces Suit Over Products Liability Act
WHOLE FOODS: Faces "Banus" Class Suit over POS System
WISE COMPANY: "Miller" Suit Seeks Certification of Class

WOOD GROUP: "Salinas" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
WORD ENTERPRISES: Court Certifies Delivery Drivers Class
ZODIAC U.S.: $952,000 Settlement in "Cuzick" Case Has Initial OK

* Supreme Court Hearing over Class Action Waiver Begins


                    Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: BNSF Railway Still Faces PI Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ashland Had 55,000 Open Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hercules Had 12,000 Open Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Gardner Insurance Coverage Suit at Phase II
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ITT Units Had 27,000 Claims Pending at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3rd Cir. Invalidates Bare Metal Defense
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Central Indiana Court Vacated for Remediation
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Phila Ct. Rejects Methods for Detecting Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Solons Seek Clarity on Cases in Baltimore
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contractor Sues Montana for Inaction on Dumping

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Woman Who Ate Asbestos as Child Has Rare Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Industry Upset with Higher Asbestos Verdicts
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabinet Maker Dies from Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Manchester Man Killed of Asbestos from Work
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Head Start Moves Out After Asbestos Find

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ill. High Ct. Issues Landmark Litigation Opinion
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Motion Aims for Recusal Over Non-Disclosure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Orders "DeMartino" Appeal Withdrawn
ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Whirlpool, et al., Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Disclosures Protective Order Issued in "Thrash"

ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Suit vs. Conwed Corporation Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Nooter's Coverage in Various Policies Determined






                            *********


ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS: Court Strikes Aguirre Class Cert. Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Carmen Aguirre, the Plaintiff, v. Absolute
Resolutions Corp., et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-11111
(N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer entered an order
denying Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of standing.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 27,
2017, Plaintiff's motion for class certification is stricken
without prejudice to renewal. Status conference was set for
October 19, 2017, at 9:00 a.m.  The Court encouraged the Parties
to explore possible settlement.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=DVDx7q1r


ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORAL: Kuri, et al. Seek to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CRYSTAL KURI, On Behalf of Herself and
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE HEALTH GROUP, L.L.C, the Defendant, Case No.
2:16-cv-02685-JAR-JPO (D. Kan.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
conditionally certify a class of:

   "all hourly employees of Defendant Addictive Behavioral Change
   Health Group, L.L.C., employed from October 5, 2013, to the
   Present as nurses."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=BSt2jb17

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Phillip M. Murphy II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PHILLIP M. MURPHY, II
          4717 Grand Ave., Ste. 250
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (913) 661 2900
          Facsimile: (913) 312 5841
          E-mail: Phillip@phillipmurphylaw.com


ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Settlement in "Larey" Suit Has Initial OK
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MICHAEL H. LAREY, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No.
4:14-cv-04008-SOH (W.D. Ark.), the Hon. Judge Susan O. Hickey
entered an order:

   1. preliminarily approving a Stipulation and Proposed
      Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable;

   2. granting Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the
      Proposed Settlement in all material respects, subject to
      further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing;

   3. granting Plaintiff's motion for preliminary class
      certification for settlement purposes only:

      "all Persons in Arkansas who had a Covered Loss, where
      estimated labor depreciation was initially deducted from
      the claim payment, and where the claim was paid at less
      than the limit of liability (accounting for deductible) as
      set forth on the declarations page of the applicable
      Policy";

      Excluded from the Class are: (1) Persons who received
      indemnification payment(s) for full replacement cost with
      no initial deduction of any estimated labor depreciation;
      (2) Persons who received indemnification payment(s) in the
      full amount of limit of liability shown on the declarations
      page of their Policy; (3) Allstate and its affiliates,
      officers, and directors; (4) Members of the judiciary and
      their staff to whom this action is assigned; and (5) Class
      Counsel; and

   4. preliminary appointing Michael H. Larey as representative
      of the Class.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=sUiWjV0B


AMBIT ENERGY: Ct. Denies Move to Dismiss Consumer Protection Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued a Decision and Order denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in the case captioned SCOTT LAZAREK
AND HENRY BRETON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMBIT ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC,
AMBIT NEW YORK, LLC, and AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC Defendants, Case No.
15-CV-6361-FPG (W.D.N.Y.).

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint.

Plaintiffs Scott Lazarek and Henry Breton are former customers of
Ambit Energy.  Ambit is an energy service company (ESCO) that
purports to help customers budget their household expenses and
avoid the highs and lows of the usual energy bill.

Plaintiffs initiated this class action lawsuit against Ambit for
violations of New York and Maryland consumer protection laws and
for unjust enrichment.  Plaintiffs allege that, when they
discontinued their services with Ambit, the company used at least
two illegal tactics to charge them undisclosed fees.  According to
Plaintiffs, Ambit first failed to tell them their budget payments
were not covering all amounts due and second added unexpected
budget billing settlement charges to their final bills.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed
for three reasons. First, Defendants argue that the Court should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over this case because it
involves a utility and, for that reason, the New York and Maryland
Public Service Commissions have primary jurisdiction over the
dispute. Second, Defendants argue that the complaint should be
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) for failure
to satisfy the notice-pleading requirement.  Third, Defendants
argue that the complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Primary Jurisdiction

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction represents a version of the
administrative exhaustion requirement. A claim that requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body,
raises primary jurisdiction questions. Id. Defendants assert that,
because this case involves a public utility, the Court should
allow New York and Maryland Public Service Commissions to resolve
the billing disputes at issue.

The Court disagrees.

The billing dispute at issue in this case does not implicate
either of these policy concerns. The complaint does not challenge
the rate that Defendants charged for natural gas or electricity.
Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants charged more than that
rate applied to the amount of energy used. Resolving that issue
will not compromise the regulation of natural gas or electricity
and does not require specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the Court
declines to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over this case.

Failure to Satisfy Rule 8(a)

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. In other words, the complaint must give the defendant fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
That requirement demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action" or naked assertion devoid of
further factual enhancement will not do.

"Nothing in Rule 8 prohibits collectively referring to multiple
defendants where the complaint alerts defendants that identical
claims are asserted against each defendant." Vantone Group Ltd.
Liability Co. v. Yangpu NGT Indus. Co., No. 13-CV-7639, 2014 WL
354676, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs allege
that Ambit Energy Holdings and Ambit New York acted jointly in
billing Plaintiff Lazarek and Ambit Energy Holdings and Ambit
Northeast acted jointly in billing Plaintiff Breton. Plaintiffs
need not elaborate further on each defendant's role in that
conduct to comply with Rule 8(a). The test under Rule 8(a) is
simply whether Defendants have received adequate notice of the
claims. Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs provided
Defendants with notice of the claims asserted against them, there
is no basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 8(a).

Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

To succeed on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the defendant must show that the complaint
contains insufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face. Plausibility is not akin to a probability
requirement. Rather, plausibility requires more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' allegations
under the New York General Business Law, Maryland's Consumer
Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.

The New York General Business Law

The New York General Business Law section 349-d(3)3 prohibits any
person who sells or offers for sale any energy services for, or on
behalf of, an ESCO" from engag[ing] in any deceptive acts or
practices in the marketing of energy services. The scope of
Section 349 is intentionally broad. To state a claim under it, a
plaintiff must allege "first, that the challenged act or practice
was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a
material way; and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a
result of the deceptive act.

First, Ambit argues that Plaintiffs' allegations are not factually
accurate. This argument holds no water. For the purposes of a
motion to dismiss, the Court must take all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true.

Second, Ambit argues that Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that
the challenged act was materially misleading.  Ambit argues that
Plaintiffs' allegations are not plausible because consumers are
charged with the knowledge of publically available information.
Plaintiffs are not asserting that Defendants misled them by
charging the difference between the average amount billed and the
actual amount of energy that he used. Rather, Plaintiffs are
alleging that the numbers do not add up.  Ambit, without
explanation, charged an amount that exceeded the difference
between the energy billed and the energy used. No publicly
available information warned Plaintiffs that Ambit might require
them to pay ambiguous, unaccounted for, and unexpected expenses.

Third, Ambit argues that Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that
the challenged act caused the alleged injury. Defendants argue
that Ambit charged Plaintiff Lazarek only for energy that he
consumed. For that reason, Defendants argue Plaintiff Lazarek was
not injured. Again, Defendants misunderstand Plaintiffs'
allegations and the Court's consideration of factual assertions at
the pleading stage. Plaintiffs allege that Ambit charged Lazarek
fees in excess of what he owed for energy that he actually
consumed. That, according to Plaintiffs, is the source of
Lazarek's injury.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume that
Plaintiffs' allegations are true. Because the Court finds
Plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim under the New York General
Business Law, there is no basis to dismiss this portion of the
complaint.

Maryland's Consumer Protection Act

Maryland's Consumer Protection Act prohibits false, falsely
disparaging, or misleading commercial practices. A plaintiff
bringing a claim under Section 13-301 must allege (1) an unfair or
deceptive practice or misrepresentation, (2) reliance, and (3)
that the practice or misrepresentation caused the plaintiff
injury.

Ambit argues that Plaintiffs' allegations under Section 13-301 are
insufficient because those allegations lack factual support, fail
to plead reliance, fail to plead causation, and fail to plead
materiality.

Plaintiffs allege that Breton chose Ambit over his local utility
company because he was interested in saving money on energy
charges. That allegation supports Plaintiffs' assertion that
Breton relied on the omission because it is substantially likely
that Breton would not have chosen Ambit over his local utility
company had Ambit disclosed the omitted information.

Because the Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim
under Maryland's Consumer Protection Act, there is no basis to
dismiss this portion of the complaint.

Unjust Enrichment

A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
subject to liability in restitution. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because it
fails to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened
pleading standard, it fails to assert which state law applies, and
it fails to state a plausible claim for relief on behalf of
consumers outside of New York and Maryland.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim should
be dismissed because it fails to meet Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, it fails to assert
which state law applies, and it fails to state a plausible claim
for relief on behalf of consumers outside of New York and
Maryland.

The Court disagrees in all respects.

First, Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard does not apply to
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to plead which
state's law applies to their unjust enrichment claims and that
this failure alone is sufficient to dismiss Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim. The Court disagrees. The elements of unjust
enrichment are similar in every state and Defendants have made no
showing that any differences in various states' laws are material
at this stage of the litigation.

Third, Defendants argue that the complaint is devoid of any
allegations that would plausibly give rise to a claim for relief
on behalf of any non-New York or Maryland putative class members.
This argument, made prior to discovery pertaining to a class
certification motion, is premature. Plaintiffs have alleged that
Defendants offer the allegedly deceptive budget-billing plan at
issue in several markets across the United States. Defendants may
raise their objections regarding class certification in a Rule 23
motion.

For these reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Decision and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yayz2wks
from Leagle.com.

Scott Lazarek, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Richard Lesser,
Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, 1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W.. Suite
200. Washington,DC 20036.

Scott Lazarek, Plaintiff, represented by Steven L. Wittels --
slw@wittelslaw.com -- Henry Breton, Plaintiff, represented by Seth
Richard Lesser, Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP & Steven L. Wittels.

Ambit Energy Holdings, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian
Laudadio -- blaudadio@bsk.com -- Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC,
Michael W. Stockham --  Michael.Stockham@tklaw.com -- Thompson &
Knight LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen C. Rasch --
Stephen.Rasch@tklaw.com -- Thompson & Knight LLP, pro hac vice &
Edward P. Hourihan, Jr. --  ehourihan@bsk.com -- Bond Schoeneck &
King PLLC.

Ambit New York, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian Laudadio,
Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC, Michael W. Stockham, Thompson & Knight
LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen C. Rasch, Thompson & Knight LLP, pro
hac vice & Edward P. Hourihan, Jr., Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC.

Ambit Northeast, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian Laudadio,
Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC, Michael W. Stockham, Thompson & Knight
LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen C. Rasch, Thompson & Knight LLP, pro
hac vice & Edward P. Hourihan, Jr., Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC.


AMERICAN EXPRESS: Court Denied Class Cert. Bid in "Heilmann"
------------------------------------------------------------
According to the docket entry made by the Clerk of Court on
October 3, 2017, in the lawsuit styled William Heilmann, the
Plaintiff, v. American Express Bank, FSB, et al., the Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-06942 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge John J. Tharp
Jr. held that the Plaintiff's motion for class certification is
denied without prejudice.

The Court noted that the motion acknowledges that it is being
filed at this time only to prevent the plaintiff from being
"picked off" by an attractive settlement offer. The Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663
(2016), obviates the need for such prophylactic motions. See also
Conrad v. Boiron, Inc., 869 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2017); Laurens
v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, 868 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir.
2017); Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545 (7th
Cir. 2017); Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 786-87
(7th Cir. 2015). The pending motion for class certification is
dismissed without prejudice to its refiling when the plaintiff is
prepared to substantively brief the motion or in accordance with a
future scheduling order entered by the Court.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=EeUWCMeY

In the Motion, the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a class of:

   "all American Express Starwood Preferred Guest (TM) ("SPG")-
   branded credit card holders who qualified for an SPG
   Starpoints (TM) welcome bonus but who did not receive such
   points within the stated timeframe or not at all."

Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any of their respective
officers, directors or employees, the presiding judge, Class
counsel and members of their immediate families, and persons or
entities who timely and properly exclude themselves from the
Class.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=D6FNeiXA

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William M. Sweetnam, Esq.
          SWEETNAM LLC
          100 North La Salle Street, Suite 2200
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 757 1888
          E-mail: wms@sweetnamllc.com


ANGIE'S LIST: "Strauss" Suit Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled STEVE STRAUSS d/b/a CLASSIC TREE CARE, the
Plaintiff, v. ANGIE'S LIST, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
02560-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify
two classes.

National Class:

   "(i) all persons in the United States who, within the
   applicable statute of limitations, paid any sums or gave
   anything of value to Angie's List in exchange for the
   promotion, advertisement or marketing of such person's goods
   or services; and (ii) all persons in the United States who,
   within the applicable statute of limitations, did not pay
   Angie's List to promote, market or advertise their goods or
   services, but whose goods or services were of a kind and
   character reasonably fungible with goods or services sold or
   provided directly to consumers by Service Providers who did
   pay Angie's List to market, advertise and/or promote their
   goods and services and with whom such persons were in
   competition"; and

Kansas Class:

   "(i) all persons in the state of Kansas who, within the
   applicable statute of limitations, paid any sums or gave
   anything of value to Angie's List in exchange for the
   promotion, advertisement or marketing of such person's goods
   or services; and (ii) all persons in the state of Kansas who,
   within the applicable statute of limitations, did not pay
   Angie's List to promote, market or advertise their goods or
   services, but whose goods or services were of a kind and
   character reasonably fungible with goods or services sold or
   provided directly to consumers by Service Providers who did
   pay Angie's List to market, advertise and/or promote their
   goods and services and with whom such persons were in
   competition".

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=mA5ZBi37

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Corbyn W. Jones, Esq.
          William C. Odle, Esq.
          Michael J. Gorman, Esq.
          James F.B. Daniels, Esq.
          McDOWELL, RICE, SMITH & BUCHANAN
          605 W. 47th Street, Suite 350
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 753 5400
          Facsimile: (816) 753 9996
          E-mail: cjones@mcdowellrice.com
                  wodle@mcdowellrice.com
                  mgorman@mcdowellrice.com
                  jdaniels@mcdowellrice.com


ANSELMO LINDBERG: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ELISA WOLTER and MARIA G. BOK, by her
daughter and next friend EILISA WOLTER, individually and on behalf
of a class, the Plaintiffs, v. ANSELMO LINDBERG OLIVER, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-04205 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge
Robert W. Gettleman entered an order:

   1. granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment;

   2. dismissing case for lack of standing; and

   3. denying Plaintiffs' motion to certify class as moot.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=RsCzBGjZ


ARBITECH LLC: Denial of Arbitration in Trade Secrets Suit Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for Fourth District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion affirming the Order of the District Court
denying Defendant's Second Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned ARBITECH, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JESSICA
HACKNEY, Defendant and Respondent, No. G053744 (Cal. App.).

Arbitech, founded in 2000, is an independent distributor of data
center products, primarily name-brand computer hardware used in
data centers.  The marketplace for data center products is highly
competitive, and employees have access to valuable trade secret
information.  When Arbitech hired Hackney to work as a sales
coordinator in, she was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement,
promising not to disclose trade secrets.  She also promised in
writing to follow the strict confidentiality provisions outlined
in the employee handbook.

After 11 years of employment, Hackney left Arbitech and went to
work for a competitor, PNH. Arbitech filed a lawsuit against
Hackney and PNH, and they in turn filed a cross-complaint.

Arbitech's lawsuit alleged misappropriation of trade secrets,
breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. It also sought an accounting and
declaratory relief.  Arbitech alleged PNH recruited Hackney to
obtain Arbitech's trade secrets and Hackney abruptly resigned.  It
attached a copy of the confidentiality agreement, which does not
contain an arbitration provision.

PNH's lawsuit against Arbitech alleged breach of contract and
unfair competition. The complaint stated that in 2012 PNH began to
directly compete with Arbitech in the information technology
hardware distribution industry. PNH alleged, Arbitech has engaged
in a sustained campaign of disparagement, threats and interference
with PNH's business relationships, with the manifest intent to
undermine, harm, and oppress PNH and thereby gain an unfair
competitive advantage.

Larry Weng was the majority owner of PNH. Weng had a prior
contentious relationship with Arbitech. PNH alleged Weng contacted
Hackney about working for him. Hackney could no longer tolerate
the working environment, unethical and unfair business practices,
discrimination against female employees, inadequate and unequal
compensation, imminent loss of her assigned accounts, and
Arbitech's mistreatment and retaliation against her since
returning from three months of maternity leave in December 2014.
After several weeks of informal discussions, Hackney accepted
PNH's offer to work as a sales executive and she gave Arbitech
two-week notice. Arbitech rejected her notice and fired Hackney
and her husband (who also worked for Arbitech) immediately.
Arbitech then sent a cease and desist letter to PNH and Hackney.
Before they could prepare a reply, Arbitech filed its lawsuit.

Hackney filed an individual and class action. Her individual
claims were for the following: (1) violations of the Pregnancy
Disability Leave Act and the Family Rights Act; (2) sex
discrimination; (3) unlawful constructive termination; (4)
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and (5)
declaratory relief. Her class action claims concerned seven
different wage and hour Labor Code violations, as well as
allegations of unlawful business practices and PAGA civil
penalties.

Soon after receiving Hackney's cross-complaint, Arbitech moved for
an order to compel arbitration and sought dismissal of Hackney's
cross-complaint. It attached an arbitration agreement Hackney
executed on March 4, 2013 containing the following relevant
provisions: "In consideration of being employed/retained by
Arbitech the Employee/Contractor identified below agrees to the
following: 1. To the fullest extent allowed by law, and except as
set forth in paragraph 4 below, any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to the above referenced Independent Contractor
Agreement, shall be fully and finally resolved by binding
arbitration, employing a neutral arbitrator, and administered by
JAMS pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and
Procedures for employment disputes. Such claims shall include, but
are not limited to. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
state wage and hour laws, and any other federal, state or local
statute, regulation or common law doctrine, including but not
limited to tort and contract laws."

The court denied the motion to compel arbitration after concluding
the 2013 Agreement was unconscionable. It stated the following:
"Procedural unconscionability is shown by the manner in which the
agreement was presented to Hackney. The e-mail from Arbitech's
general counsel stated that all employee's sign an arbitration
agreement when becoming an employee, and the old agreement was
outdated, and that he asked that the signed agreement be returned
within eight days. Nothing in this e-mail indicated the employee
had an option not to sign or to negotiate different terms.
Further, the e-mail was misleading in indicating the primary issue
was the change in provider and that the change benefitted the
employees while at the same time not mentioning Arbitech was
excluding from the arbitration requirement claims commonly brought
by employers against employees."

The failure to provide the employees with the rules of JAMS also
is an indicator of procedural unconscionability.

A little more than four months after the court ruled the 2013
Agreement was unenforceable, Arbitech filed a renewed" motion to
compel arbitration. The motion discussed two grounds. First, under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b), Arbitech
argued the court could consider new law contained in an opinion
issued by our Supreme Court on March 28, 2016 (Baltazar v. Forever
21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237 (Baltazar)), which suggested the
2013 Agreement was enforceable.

The trial court agreed with Hackney. It stated the requirements
for a renewed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008
had been satisfied because there was new law on the subject of
lack of mutuality issued by the Supreme Court after the trial
court's ruling. However, it ruled the Baltazar case did not change
the outcome of this case. After repeating the reasons it found the
2013 Agreement unconscionable, the court stated the following:
"The unconsionability issue cannot be resolved by severing the
offending provision. The employer has already been litigating for
over a year pursuant to the offending provision and even now is
not offering to arbitrate its claims against Hackney. It is thus
unclear how severance could work as it is too late to render the
offending provision unenforceable. And, in any event, the
unconscionability (the complete lack of mutuality) permeates the
agreement."

With respect to the 2008 Agreement, which required both parties to
arbitrate their claims, the court determined it was not
enforceable. It ruled as follows: "It appears Arbitech wants to
force Hackney to abide by the 2008 Agreement to arbitrate while
Arbitech continues to litigate its claims in violation of that
agreement. The court is cognizant that Arbitech was not aware when
it filed this case that its 2013 arbitration agreement would be
found unconscionable. However, by filing this case and litigating
it for over a year, Arbitech has waived its right to enforce the
2008 Agreement. Arbitech timely filed an appeal."

Ordinarily, the threshold question in deciding a petition to
compel arbitration is whether there exists an agreement to
arbitrate.  Here, the trial court determined Arbitech waived its
right to arbitrate without first deciding there was a valid
arbitration agreement. Hackney's opposition argued waiver as an
alternative argument to her contention the parties rescinded the
2008 Agreement by novation. Thus, before delving into the issue of
waiver, we must decide if there existed a valid and enforceable
arbitration agreement, was the 2008 Agreement completely
extinguished when the parties executed the 2013 Agreement?
The uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes the parties
intended to substitute the 2013 Agreement for the 2008 Agreement.
Arbitech could have asked Hackney to sign an addendum or
modification to the 2008 Agreement. Instead, it required her to
sign an entirely new agreement addressing the same confidentiality
issues but also adding several very different and more onerous
terms. The new agreement not only changed the arbitration
provider, but it also added terms that lacked mutuality. The new
agreement expressly authorized Arbitech to avoid arbitrating
certain claims. These changes cannot be reconciled with the
earlier agreement. A court may infer novation when a new agreement
is so inconsistent with the earlier agreement that the two cannot
subsist together.

This inconsistency in the case authority was detected and
mentioned by one noteable treatise (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(10th ed. 2005) Contracts, Section 962, p. 1054 (Witkin)). Citing
to a law review case note, Witkin criticized the Goddard holding,
stating the result could be sometimes contrary to the parties'
intent and hence inconsistent with the theory of novation. The
question of whether or not a later contract will constitute a
novation of a prior contract should always be determined in
accordance with the intention of the parties. When they intend the
rescission of the first contract to be unconditional, that should
be the case; but when the discharge of the first agreement is
intended to be conditional upon the enforceability of the second,
there should be no novation when the second agreement cannot be
enforced.

Arbitech noted a similar critique of Goddard was made by a federal
district court in Airs Int'l v. Perfect Scents Distributions (N.D.
Cal. 1995) 902 F.Supp. 1141, 1148-1149 (Airs). Although not
binding precedent on our court, we may consider relevant federal
district court opinions as persuasive.

After careful consideration, the Cal. App. will adopt the
reasoning discussed in Witkin and the Airs case. When a later
contract is not void but merely voidable due to unconsionability,
mistake, fraud, etc., the novation is effective if the parties
intended rescission of the first contract to be unconditional.
However, if the discharge of that agreement was conditional upon
the enforceability of the later agreement, there is no novation.
In this case, it can be inferred from the evidence that rescission
of the 2008 Agreement was conditional upon the enforceability of
the 2013 Agreement. Both agreements concerned the same subject
matter. The parties understood the later agreement was intended to
simply update the earlier version. The evidence showed Arbitech's
desire to arbitrate its employee's disputes was unequivocal. It
did not intend to destroy the first contract without establishing
a new enforceable contract in its place.

The Cal. App. concluded the 2013 Agreement did not constitute an
effective novation. The 2008 Agreement was not completely
extinguished.

Having determined there existed an arbitration agreement the Cal.
App. reviewed the trial court's determination the right to
arbitration was waived. Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2
provides in pertinent part: "On petition of a party to an
arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto
refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists,
unless it determines that the right to compel arbitration has been
waived by the petitioner."

In early June 2016, Arbitech renewed its motion to arbitrate. In
seeking to enforce the 2008 Agreement, it specifically requested
that the court dismiss and compel arbitration of the cross-
complaint.  It did not ask the court to dismiss its trade secret
action against Hackney to pursue those claims in arbitration. In
summary, in the four months following the court's ruling voiding
the 2013 Agreement and up until June 2016, Arbitech doggedly
litigated its complaint against Hackney, showing no signs of an
intention to arbitrate those claims.

The Cal. App. rejects Arbitech's argument on appeal that its
conduct during those four months cannot be considered in the
waiver analysis. Arbitech maintains its actions were absolutely
reasonable under the circumstances. It explains that because the
court did not declare the 2008 Agreement valid, Arbitech took a
few months to piece together the legal consequences of the court's
ruling on the 2013 Agreement. It added, the delay was reasonable
because Arbitech had already put the parties on notice that it
considered the dispute arbitrable. This analysis fails to take
into account that after four months of puzzling over the legal
consequences of the court's ruling, Arbitech still only considered
the cross-complaint dispute as being arbitrable.

In seeking to enforce its arbitration rights under the 2008
Agreement it completely ignored the mutuality of remedies
provisions, requiring arbitration of its trade secret claims.
Arbitech's conduct during the four-month period leading to its
renewed motion to compel arbitration, and the motion itself, do
not suggest Arbitech had any intention of arbitrating its trade
secret claims.  The record shows 14 months of behavior completely
inconsistent with a desire to arbitrate.

The order is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s September 28, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/ybyq9c2zfrom Leagle.com.

Wilbert Bark, Joseph R. Wilbert -- jwilbert@wilbertbark.com --
Brian Z. Bark -- bbark@lbslawyers.com -- and Michael E. Lopez --
mlopez@lbslawyers.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Einwechter & Hyatt, John P. Einwechter --
jack@eandhlegal.com  -and John T. Hyatt -- jthyatt@jthyattlaw.com
-- ; Rutan & Tucker, Mark Payne -- MPayne@rutan.com -- and Brian
C. Sinclair -- BSinclair@rutan.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.


ASSET RECOVERY: "Lamb" Case Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Linda Lamb, the Plaintiff, v. Asset Recovery
Solutions, Inc., et al., the Defendant, Case No.: 1:17-cv-04336
(N.D. Ill.), the Hon Judge Gary Feinerman entered an order
dismissing case without prejudice and with leave to reinstate by
Nov. 10, 2017.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 27,
2017, the notice of settlement is deemed to be a Rule 41(a)(2)
motion for voluntary dismissal and, as so deemed, is granted. If
leave to reinstate is not sought on or before Nov. 11, 2017, the
dismissal will convert automatically to a dismissal with
prejudice. The status hearing set for Oct 17, 2017 is stricken.
All pending motions are denied as moot.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=14fDFZrV


BANCO BRADESCO: NY Court Allows Investor Claims to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------
Pamela Baker, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
senior executives of Brazil's third largest bank will have to face
a securities class action after a federal judge in Manhattan found
that investors supplied enough information to accuse the lender of
concealing its involvement in a sweeping corporate corruption
scandal.

Accused of bribing Brazilian tax officials to reduce or avoid
fines for tax evasion, Banco Bradesco was one of more than 70
companies targeted in a multiyear investigation by Brazilian
authorities that led to indictments last year.

Bradesco CEO Luiz Carlos Trabuco Cappi was one of several bank
officers charged with trying to avoid a tax fine worth more than
$911 million, but a Brazilian court cleared the power broker of
any wrongdoing in June.

By that point in New York, a shareholder class action had been
pending against Trabuco and two other indicted Bradesco executives
for a year.

Lead plaintiff Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi
allege that Bradesco's 11-year bribery scheme began in 2004, but
that bank executives relied on a series of false and misleading
statements to reassure investors, cover up the investigation, and
hide Bradesco's weak internal controls.

U.S. District Judge Gregory Woods advanced certain aspects of the
case on September 29, finding that the investors have adequately
pleaded that that Bradesco personnel were aware of the bribery
scheme in 2014.

"The court has little trouble concluding that, at least in signing
off on the August 8, 2014, press release while allegedly
participating in the bribery scheme, Abreu 'participated in a
fraud directed to deceiving United States shareholders,'" the
ruling states, referring to Domingos Figueiredo de Abreu.

Woods did, however, dismiss claims related to statements made
prior to 2014.  The class failed to adequately "allege that anyone
at Bradesco was aware that they were involved in any unlawful
dealings with government officials at least until March 24, 2014,"
the 99-page opinion states

Woods emphasized that that Trabuco's ducking of criminal charges
in June "had no effect" on his review.

Banco Bradesco did not respond to an emailed request for comment.


BELL-MARK TECHNOLOGIES: "Berger" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Berger, and all others similarly-situated v. Bell-Mark
Technologies Corporation, Case No. 1:17-cv-01836 (M.D. Pa.,
October 6, 2017), is brought against the Defendant for alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage
and Hour Law, the New Jersey Wage Payment Law and the New Jersey
Debt Collection Law.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Berger was employed as a regional sales manager
at Bell-Mark from July 2015 to August 2017.  Mr. Berger is a
resident of the State of New Jersey.

Defendant Bell-Mark Technologies Corporation is engaged in the
textile machine manufacturing industry in Dover, Pennsylvania and
also maintains offices in Pine Brook, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Derrek W. Cummings, Esq.
      Larry A. Weisberg, Esq.
      Steve T. Mahan, Esq.
      MCCARTHY WEISBERG CUMMINGS, P.C.
      2041 Herr Street
      Harrisburg, PA 17103-1624
      Tel: (717) 238-5707
      Fax: (717) 233-8133
      E-mail: dcummings@mwcfirm.com
              lweisberg@mwcfirm.com
              smahan@mwcfirm.com


BLUE STAR FARMS: Court Denies Martinez's Bid to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RICARDO MARTINEZ, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
BLUE STAR FARMS, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00681-
RJJ-PJG (W.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Robert J. Jonker entered an
order:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' amended motion for leave to file a
      second amended complaint no later than October 12, 2017;

   2. denying Plaintiffs' motion to certify class without
      prejudice to a certification motion based on allegations in
      the second amended complaint; and

   3. dismissing Plaintiff's original motion for leave to file a
      second amended complaint as moot.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jt1aIIMd


BRAD LIVINGSTON: "Johnson" Suit Seeks Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JUSTIN JOHNSON, the Plaintiff, v. Brad
Livingston, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 4:16-cv-03040 (S.D.
Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for class certification.

The Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendants
requesting compensatory damages, punitive damages, nominal
damages, declaratory and injunctive relief.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=hSLPna2s

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


BRINKER INT'L: Court Grants Dismissal of Internet Access Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned the DENNIS HAYNES, Plaintiff, v. BRINKER
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-61265-BLOOM/Valle
(S.D. Fla.).

Defendant Brinker International, Inc.'s filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint Based on Mootness, seeking dismissal of Plaintiff
Dennis Haynes' Complaint.

Haynes filed a Complaint against Brinker asserting violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act based on his claim that a
website owned and operated by Brinker, located at www.chilis.com
is inaccessible to visually impaired individuals such as himself.

Of particular import here is Haynes' request for an injunction
that would require Brinker to alter its website to make it fully
accessible to the visually impaired.

The circumstances of this case are on all fours with the
circumstances of a recent case that, like this one, was filed by
Haynes in this district.  In Haynes v. Hooters of Am., LLC, 2017
WL 2579044, S.D. Fla. June 14, 2017, Haynes alleged that the
website at issue was inaccessible to the blind and therefore in
violation of the ADA, but the defendant argued that the case was
moot because of a pre-existing remediation plan that it was in the
process of implementing as a result of a settlement between the
defendant] and a different plaintiff in an earlier-filed suit.
Judge Scola agreed with the defendant and dismissed Haynes'
complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to mootness, and in doing
so, observed that Haynes' complaint was identical to the complaint
in the earlier-filed case. Like Haynes' first argument here,
Haynes argued in Hooters that his rights should not be affected by
a settlement agreement to which he was never a party.

Judge Scola rejected that argument, reasoning as follows: "While
it is true that Haynes cannot be bound by the Gomez settlement
agreement, this does not mean that the settlement agreement has
otherwise failed to resolve Haynes's claim. To the contrary, the
existence of the remedial plan, agreed to in the settlement, means
that the plaintiff has already received everything to which he
would be entitled, if his lawsuit were successful, leaving nothing
for this Court to determine Haynes's argument that, generally, the
filing of a prior ADA lawsuit does not preclude subsequent
plaintiffs from suing for similar violations is inapplicable
here."

Where a prior identical, ADA-premises lawsuit has not only been
filed but has been actually resolved before the filing of the
second suit, this proposition may no longer apply. This is so
where, as here, there ceases to be a live controversy.  Hooters
has agreed to remedy, in accordance with a binding settlement
agreement in the Gomez case, all of the website inaccessibility
issues Haynes complains of in this suit. Ordering Hooters to do
what it has already agreed to do affords Haynes no meaningful
relief.

Regarding his argument that ADA cases involving websites can never
be subject to mootness, Haynes distinguishes ADA cases dealing
with physical structures by stating that websites are fluid,
constantly revised, updated, and edited. Haynes elaborates, a
website that is compliant one day may become completely non-
compliant the next day, unlike ADA cases where there are
remediations done to a physical structure. Aside from the fact
that this argument relies exclusively on conjecture about future
updates a website such as the Website might employ, the settlement
agreement in Gilappears to address this very concern. In Haynes'
own words, he is entitled to injunctive relief requiring Defendant
to maintain the Website in compliant condition.

The settlement agreement provides exactly that, by requiring
Brinker to provide individuals with visual disabilities full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations offered through the Website. The
Court reads this provision as contractually binding Brinker to
ensure that all aspects of the Website are ADA compliant. In the
event that a new page were added to the Website that was
inaccessible to visually impaired individuals, Brinker would not
be meeting its obligation under the settlement agreement to
provide such individuals with full enjoyment of the Website's
offerings Importantly, and as discussed, that obligation like the
settlement agreement as a whole is subject to judicial
enforcement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at   http://tinyurl.com/y7er4exdfrom Leagle.com.

Dennis Haynes, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Scott Finesilver,
Finesilver Law, P.A.. 1201 Brickell Ave, Miami, FL 33131 USA

Brinker International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Tasos C.
Paindiris -- Tasos.Paindiris@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C. & Nicole Alexandra Sbert, Jackson Lewis, 390 N. Orange
Avenue, Suite 1285, Orlando, FL 32801.


BSN MEDICAL: Court Denied Placeholder Bid to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RJF CHIROPRACTIC CENTER, INC, an Ohio
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. BSN MEDICAL, INC.
and JOHN DOES 1-10, the Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-00842-RJC-DSC
(W.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge Robert J. Conrad entered an order
denying Plaintiff's motion to certify class without prejudice and
with leave to refile.

The Court said, "This placeholder motion to certify class fails to
establish Rule 23's requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy. As such, this Court denies RJF's motion
to certify class without prejudice."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=mTdVr1Ym


CABLE MARKETING: "Hobbs" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DARRELL HOBBS, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff v. CABLE MARKETING AND
INSTALLATION OF LOUISIANA, INC. a Louisiana corporation; and CABLE
MARKETING & INSTALLATIONS, INC., a Mississippi corporation, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04766-ILRL-JCW (E.D. La.), the
Plaintiff moves the Court for an Order conditionally certifying a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
permitting court-supervised notice to potential members of the
collective.

The Plaintiff also requests that Defendants be ordered to disclose
contact information for members of the collective on an expedited
basis, that the Court issue an order equitably tolling the FLSA
statute of limitations during the pendency of the opt-in period,
and for such further relief as the Court may deem appropriate
based on record.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=CuntqFiy

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles J. Stiegler, Esq.
          STIEGLER LAW FIRM LLC
          318 Harrison Ave., Ste. 104
          New Orleans, La. 70124
          Telephone: (504) 267 0777
          Facsimile: (504) 513 3084
          E-mail: Charles@StieglerLawFirm.com


CARIBBEAN CRUISE: Court Strikes Duplicative Bid to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
According to the docket entry made by the Clerk of Court on
October 3, 2017, in the lawsuit styled Richard Gordon, the
Plaintiff, v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., et al., the Defendants,
Case No. 1:14-cv-05848 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge John Z. Lee
struck Plaintiff's duplicative motions to certify class for
administrative purposes.

Plaintiff has filed the motion to certify class (sealed version).
Oral argument on the motion was scheduled to take place on Oct. 4,
2017 at 2:00 p.m.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=xhfeVadC


CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE: Class Certification Bid Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA, JANE DOE, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. DON WRIGHT, Acting Secretary of
Health and Human Services, et al., the Defendants and U.S.
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Defendant-Intervenors, Case No.
3:16-cv-03539-LB (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs moved on October 5,
2017, for an order certifying a class or, in the alternative,
provisionally certifying class for purposes of the preliminary
injunction sought by Plaintiffs:

   "all pregnant unaccompanied immigrant minors who are or will
   be in the legal custody of the federal government".

The Plaintiff Jane Doe further moved that she should be appointed
named plaintiff of the class and her counsel be appointed class
counsel.

Meanwhile, the ACLU moved for a temporary restraining order (1)
directing the federal defendants to transport Ms. Doe -- or if Ms.
Doe prefers, to allow her guardian or attorney ad litem to
transport her -- to the abortion provider closest to her shelter
to obtain (a) counseling (required by state law) on October 12,
2017, and (b) the abortion procedure on October 13, 2017; (2)
temporarily restraining the federal defendants from interfering
with or obstructing Ms. Doe's access to abortion; and (3)
temporarily restraining the federal defendants from further
forcing Ms. Doe to reveal her abortion decision to anyone, or
revealing it to anyone themselves.

The government asked the court to deny the motion to amend the
complaint on several grounds, including lack of venue and improper
joinder, and to deny the motion for a TRO.

In an Oct. 11 order, the Court denied the motion for leave to file
an amended complaint as well as the motion for a TRO without
prejudice to Jane Doe's asserting it in a different lawsuit.

The Court also denied the motion for class certification as moot.
The Court granted the motion for leave to file an amicus brief.

The Court said the Doe plaintiff is not in this district, and that
the wrongful acts for the new claims did not take place in this
district.  The named plaintiff Jane Doe is a pregnant minor in a
federally funded shelter in Texas.

The Court held that the new claims are not "closely related" to
the venued Establishment Clause claim, and concerns of judicial
economy and fairness do not support pendent venue. For similar
reasons, permissive joinder is not appropriate under Rule 20(a).
Finally, discovery is closed, the deadline to amend the pleadings
has passed, and the proposed amended complaint transforms the case
at a late date to add new claims and new theories of recovery.
The case is better brought as a new lawsuit, the Court said.

Because the court denied leave to amend, the court denied Ms.
Doe's motion for a TRO without prejudice to her bringing it in a
different lawsuit.

"The court's decision moots the motion for a TRO," the ruling
said.

A copy of the Plaintiff's Notice of Motion is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=DYKPdTX7

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Elizabeth O. Gill, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Chou, Esq.
          Mishan R. Wroe, Esq.
          Brigitte Amiri, Esq.
          Meagan Burrows, Esq.
          Melissa Goodman, Esq.
          Daniel Mach, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.
          39 Drumm Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 621 2493
          Facsimile: (415) 255 8437
          E-mail: egill@aclunc.org
                  jchou@aclunc.org
                  bamiri@aclu.org
                  mburrows@aclu.org
                  mgoodman@aclusocal.org
                  dmach@aclu.org


CAWLEY & BERGMANN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LORALIE NOLET, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CAWLEY &
BERGMANN, LLP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01408 (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying classes,
appointing the Plaintiff as class representatives, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XJhTuFHx

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


CBE GROUP: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DUANE LINDENBACH, MARLENE KANEHL, and LINDA
LOPEZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. THE CBE GROUP, INC.,, the Defendant,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01336-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order certifying a class, appointing Plaintiff
as its representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks the Court to stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence.  Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XluMwKMU

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


CELADON TRUCKING: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CELADON
TRUCKING SERVICES, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, and CELADON
GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-07163 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   a. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendants and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report";

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to:

   a. enter and continue Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification;

   b. set a schedule for discovery;

   c. grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended or renewed Motion
      for Class Certification upon the conclusion of discovery;
      and

   d. provide Plaintiff any and all other relief that the Court
      deems equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=TITJFZzV

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KAMBERLAW LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920 3072
          Facsimile: (212) 202 6364
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


CELGENE CORP: Certification of 3 Classes Sought in Revlimid Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RE: THALOMID AND REVLIMID LITIGATION, Case
No. 2:14-cv-06997-MCA-MAH (D.N.J.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court
for certification of three Classes.

Antitrust/Consumer Protection Damages Class:

   "all persons or entities who purchased and/or paid for some or
   all of the purchase price for thalidomide in any form after
   November 6, 2010 or lenalidomide in any form after January 29,
   2011, in California, the District of Columbia, Florida,
   Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York,
   North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, or
   Tennessee, for consumption by themselves, their families, or
   their members, employees, insureds, participants, or
   beneficiaries";

Unjust Enrichment Damages Class:

   "all persons or entities who purchased and/or paid for some or
   all of the purchase price for thalidomide in any form after
   November 6, 2010 or lenalidomide in any form after January 29,
   2011, in California, the District of Columbia, Florida,
   Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York,
   North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, or
   Tennessee, for consumption by themselves, their families, or
   their members, employees, insureds, participants, or
   beneficiaries"; and

Injunction Class:

   "all persons or entities who purchased and/or paid for some or
   all of the purchase price for thalidomide in any form after
   November 6, 2010 or lenalidomide in any form after January 29,
   2011, in the United States or its territories for consumption
   by themselves, their families, or their members, employees,
   insureds, participants, or beneficiaries".

According to the complaint, Celgene has successfully monopolized
the market for thalidomide (Thalomid) and lenalidomide (Revlimid),
two life-saving medications, for at least the last seven years.
While Plaintiffs and other members of the proposed Classes have
seen price increases of more than for Thalomid and for Revlimid
since the drugs' introduction, Celgene has been unjustly enriched
by some in profits. To date, at least different generic
manufacturers have attempted to enter the market, but as a result
of Celgene's conduct, no generic alternatives are available.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=K3YY6EPR

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Melinda R. Coolidge, Esq.
          Walter D. Kelley, Jr., Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          1700 K Street, NW, Suite 650
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540 7200
          E-mail: mcoolidge@hausfeld.com
                  wkelley@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Brett W. Landau, Esq.
          Katie R. Beran, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          325 Chestnut Street, Suite 900
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 985 3270
          E-mail: blandau@hausfeld.com
                  kberan@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Whitney E. Street, Esq.
          Matthew Smith, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          610 16th Street, Suite 214
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 968 1852
          E-mail: wstreet@blockesq.com
                  msmith@blockesq.com

               - and -

          Frank R. Schirripa, Esq.
          Daniel B. Rehns, Esq.
          John A. Blyth, Esq.
          HACH ROSE SCHIRRIPA & CHEVERIE LLP
          112 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 213 8311
          E-mail: fschirripa@hrsclaw.com
                  drehns@hrsclaw.com
                  jblyth@hrsclaw.com

               - and -

          James Notis, Esq.
          Jennifer Sarnelli, Esq.
          GARDY & NOTIS, LLP
          560 Sylvan Avenue
          Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
          E-mail: jnotis@gardylaw.com
                  jsarnelli@gardylaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey B. Gittleman, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          330 Two Commerce Square
          2001 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          E-mail: jgittleman@barrack.com

               - and -

          Todd A. Seaver, Esq.
          BERMAN TABACCO
          44 Montgomery Street
          Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433 3200
          E-mail: tseaver@bermantabacco.com


CEMPRA INC: "Franchi" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Franchi, and all others similarly-situated v. Cempra,
Inc., Castle Acquisition Corp., Garheng Kong, David Zaccardelli,
Richard Kent, David Gill, Dov A. Goldstein, John H. Johnson, P.
Sherrill Neff, Michael Dougherty, and Melinta Therapeutics, Inc.,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00898 (M.D. N.C., October 6, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on August
8, 2017, pursuant to which Cempra, Inc. and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Castle Acquisition Corp., will merge with Melinta
Therapeutics, Inc. in a reverse merger.

On September 7, 2017, Defendants filed a Preliminary Proxy
Statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which
renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff is an owner of Parkway common stock.

Defendant Cempra, Inc. is a clinical-stage pharmaceutical company
focused on developing differentiated anti-infectives for the acute
care and community settings to meet critical medical needs in the
treatment of infectious diseases. Defendant Cempra is a Delaware
corporation and maintains its headquarters at 6320 Quadrangle
Drive, Suite 360, Chapel Hill, NC 27517. Cempra's common stock is
traded on the NasdaqGS under the ticker symbol CEMP.

Defendant Castle Acquisition Corp. is a Delaware corporation, a
direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Cempra, and a party to the
Merger Agreement.

The Individual Defendants are directors of Cempra.

Defendant Melinta Therapeutics, Inc., an antibiotics company, is
engaged in the discovery, development, and commercialization of
antibiotics to overcome drug-resistant, life-threatening
infections. Defendant Melinta is a Delaware corporation and a
party to the Merger agreement. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      J. Michael Malone, Esq.
      HENDREN REDWINE & MALONE PLLC
      4600 Marriott Drive, Suite 150
      Raleigh, NC 27612
      Tel: (919) 573-1423
      Fax: (919) 420-0475
      E-mail: mmalone@hendrenmalone.com

          - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Fax: (484) 631-1305


CHICAGO, IL: Court Grants Class Certification in "Conyers"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned BLAKE CONYERS, LAMAR EWING, and KEVIN FLINT,
individually and for a class, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant, No. 12 CV 06144 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Blake Conyers, Lamar Ewing, and Kevin Flint seek class
certification in the suit they bring against the City of Chicago
(City) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

When the Chicago Police Department (CPD) arrests an individual and
takes him or her into custody, it also removes from that person
and inventories certain items of personal property.

The CPD arrested plaintiff Blake Conyers and transferred him to
the custody of the Cook County Sheriff. The plaintiffs allege that
when he was arrested, Conyers was in lawful possession of an
earring, a platinum and diamond bracelet, and two cell phones, all
of which the City inventoried and retained.

Plaintiff Lamar Ewing, meanwhile, was arrested by CPD members and
was also transferred to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff.
Ewing says that when he was arrested, he possessed a brown wallet,
a Link card, a Chicago Library card, and two cell phones, all of
which the City inventoried and retained.

The third named plaintiff, Kevin Flint, was arrested by CPD
members and was similarly transferred to the Cook County Sheriff's
custody.  Flint alleges that at the time, he was in possession of
a ring with a small stone, as well as a cell phone, both of which
the City inventoried and retained. The complaint alleges that
Flint was housed in the Cook County Jail and that he learned upon
his release that the CPD had destroyed his cell phone and his
ring.

The three named plaintiffs lodged their Fourth Amended Complaint
in this case in April 2015. In February 2016, the Court partially
granted the City's motion to dismiss that pleading, finding that
the plaintiffs had failed to state a Fifth Amendment claim but
allowing them to go forward on the procedural due process claim
they bring under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Conyers, Ewing, and Flint now seek an order certifying a class
that they define as follows:

     All persons who, following an arrest, had property
inventoried as available for return to Owner by the Chicago Police
Department from December 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013, who were
then held in custody for more than 30 days and whose property was
destroyed or sold by the Chicago Police Department.

The City does not challenge the plaintiffs' satisfaction of the
numerosity and representation requirements, and indeed this Court
finds them to be satisfied here. The plaintiffs have also
satisfied Rule 23(a)'s typicality and commonalty requirements,
despite the City's arguments to the contrary.

The plaintiffs' class claim does not turn on whether the City gave
them Copy 4 or the Notice; it turns on whether Copy 4 and the
Notice provided sufficient information about the process required
to obtain the return of non-cash property taken from them at the
time of their arrest. If the City failed to provide adequate
notice to arrestees about the process by which to secure the
return of non-cash property, then whether a particular class
member received defective notice is irrelevant because that
defective notice would not have provided an adequate explanation
of the required process. The common claim among the class members
is that the notice provided by the City was inadequate, not that
they did not receive something from the City purporting to be
notice.

The plaintiffs have therefore sufficiently asserted "a common
contention" that is "of such a nature that it is capable of class-
wide resolution.

The plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement. Conyers,
Ewing, and Flint all had property inventoried as available for
return to Owner" within the class period, following their arrest;
each of those three plaintiffs was held for more than 30 days; and
the CPD destroyed each of their inventoried property. These facts,
which the City does not dispute, fall in line with the due process
allegations the plaintiffs are pursuing in their Fourth Amended
Complaint. The declarations from the eight proposed class members
who were arrested within the class period also indicate that the
plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class. Though
the City correctly notes that some of those declarations actually
request the return of their property or otherwise indicate that
the arrestee did not know whether the property had been sold or
destroyed for example, one declaration states, I have no idea what
happened to my property, this does not make the claims of those
who fall within the class definition inconsistent with the named
plaintiffs' claims.

The Court has already found that the class members are
identifiable and ascertainable because the names and addresses of
arrestees whose property was sold or destroyed, and who otherwise
meet the class definition requirements, are recorded. The
plaintiffs' claims thus arise "from the same event or practice or
course of conduct as the proposed class members.

Finally, the plaintiffs are seeking certification pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), and so must satisfy that Rule's predominance and
superiority requirements.

These individual questions about intent really go to whether
arrestees valued their property highly enough to seek its return.
The City characterizes that question as a critical individual
inquiry necessary to assess the City's potential liability, but as
noted above its relevance is to the question of damages, not
liability. If an arrestee assigned so little value to his property
that he had no interest in securing its return, even had he known
how to do so, then his claim for damages will be miniscule, but
that is an assessment to be made after liability is determined.
Again, it is well established that the presence of individualized
questions regarding damages does not prevent certification under
Rule 23(b)(3 . Any individual inquiry in this regard, therefore,
will not stand in the way of the plaintiffs' pursuit of class
certification. The plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement.

That rule's requirement that a class action be superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy is also satisfied here, though as previously noted,
the City does not challenge superiority. The central question here
is the adequacy of the notice provided to arrestee's during the
class period; it plainly makes more sense to adjudicate that
common question on a class-wide basis than by means of individual
claims.

Further, the plaintiffs assert that only a small amount of damages
would be available to each individual class member, so a class
action represents the only realistic means of recovery for many
potential claimants. If there are genuinely common issues, issues
identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accuracy
of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated
proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class
is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving
the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on
proceedings.

The plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yaxux8vwfrom Leagle.com.

Blake H Conyers, Plaintiff, represented by Joel A. Flaxman,
Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C., 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 201,
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Blake H Conyers, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth N. Flaxman,
Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C., 200 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 201,
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Lamar Ewing, Plaintiff, represented by Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N.
Flaxman P.C..

Kevin Flint, Plaintiff, represented by Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N.
Flaxman P.C. & Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C..

City Of Chicago, Defendant, represented by Allan T. Slagel --
aslagel@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Brian
Weinthal -- bweinthal@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister
LLP, Jonathan B. Amarilio -- amarilio@taftlaw.com -- Taft
Stettinius & Hollister LLP & Zachary John Sehy --
zsehy@taftlaw.com --  Taft Stettinius & Hollister.


CHRYSLER GROUP: Court Denies "Cox" Motion for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DAVID COX, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 3:14-cv-07573-MAS-DEA
(D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Michael A. Shipp entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification; and

   2. denying Defendant's motion to exclude without prejudice as
      moot.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=hZctXRZy


CHSPSC LLC: Court Certifies Arkansas Residents Class in "Mounce"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JESSICA MOUNCE, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the PLAINTIFF, v. CHSPSC, LLC;
NORTHWEST ARKANSAS HOSPITALS, LLC d/b/a NORTHWEST MEDICAL CENTER;
and PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNT SERVICES, INC., the DEFENDANTS, Case No.
5:15-cv-05197-TLB (W.D. Ark.), the Hon. Judge Timothy L. Brooks
entered an order:

   1. denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment;

   2. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all Arkansas residents who, since April 30, 2010, received
      any type of healthcare treatment from any entity located in
      Arkansas that is owned, controlled, managed and/or
      affiliated with Defendants, and: (i) such treatment was
      covered by valid, in network, commercial health coverage;
      (ii) the billing charges regarding such treatment were not
      timely submitted to the commercial health carrier; and
      (iii) Defendants obtained payments for such treatment as a
      result of asserting third-party medical liens, submitting
      claims for medical payments coverage, and/or seeking
      payment directly from the patients";

   3. designating Plaintiff Jessica Mounce as Class
      Representative; and

   4. designating Plaintiff's attorneys Jason W. Earley, Mitchell
      Burgess, Ralph Phalen, Shawn B. Daniels, and Sarah Coppola
      Jewell as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=JYl7hNoM


COOK COUNTY, IL: Bid to Certify Class in "Rogers" Terminated
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KEITH ROGERS, the Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF OF
COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, the Defendants, Case No.
1:15-cv-11632 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Edmond E. Chang entered
an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part Rogers's motion to
      compel data and the County's motion to quash notice;

   2. denying request for prior-stay information; and

   3. granting request to identify the correct booking numbers
      for the 13 mismatched detainees; and

   4. terminating Rogers's motion to certify class without
      prejudice as premature.

The Court said, "Fact discovery has not yet concluded, nor has
expert discovery, which might very well be relevant to arguing
that a tapering policy generally affects persons in the same way,
or to resisting that conclusion. The motion itself makes
assertions about tapering policies as increasing the chances of
relapse; although that might very well be true, discovery on that
issue has not concluded. There also was no class allegation in the
amended complaint, R. 24, so the defense was not put on notice of
the potential for class treatment by the formal pleading. At the
next status hearing, the Court will discuss the discovery plan
with the parties. The status hearing [was] set for October 11,
2017, at 10 a.m."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=eXrSjE06


COOK COUNTY, IL: Williams File Amended Motion to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
An amended Motion to Certify case as a class action has been filed
in the lawsuit styled Walter Williams and Montrell Carr,
individually and for a class, the Plaintiffs, v. Sheriff of Cook
County and Cook County, Illinois, the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-
cv-07639 (N.D. Ill.).  The Plaintiff moves the Court to certify
two subclasses:

   "all persons confined at the Cook County Jail who have been
   referred by a dentist at the Jail for an extraction by an oral
   surgeon and are experiencing pain while awaiting treatment by
   an oral surgeon" and

   "all persons currently confined at the Cook County Jail who,
   having complained of dental pain, have been prescribed
   successive course of treatments with antibiotics without
   having received the dental procedure required to permanently
   alleviate the dental pain".

A copy of the Amended Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=wLVw72vK

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth N. Flaxman, Esq.
          Joel A. Flaxman, Esq.
          200 S. Michigan, Ste 202
          Chicago, IL. 60604
          Telephone: (312) 427 3200

The Amended Motion follows a Court order entered September 29,
2017, wherein the Hon. Judge Gary Feinerman denied Plaintiffs'
prior motion to certify class without prejudice.

A copy of the Sept. 29 Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=bOfLeP4O


CORECIVIC: "Dodson" Suit Asks Court to Certify Diabetics Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DOUGLAS DODSON, RICHARD LITTLE, JASPER VICK,
et al., the Plaintiffs, v. CORECIVIC, FORMERLY d/b/a CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA and THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION and
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION COMMISSIONER
TONY PARKER, the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00048 (M.D. Tenn.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a class of:

   "persons with insulin-dependent diabetes (Type 1 or insulin
   dependent Type 2) who are, who have been, or who in the future
   may become, housed at Trousdale Turner correctional facility."

This action is brought for the purpose of obtaining injunctive
relief to ensure that inmates with insulin-dependent diabetes have
access to proper diabetes care at Trousdale Turner prison.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Wu8p38Wm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. William Smith, Esq.
          Jon C. Goldfarb, Esq.
          L. William Smith, Esq.
          WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS, FISHER,
            & GOLDFARB, LLC
          301 19th Street North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314 0500
          Facsimile: (205) 254 1500

The Defendant is represented by:

          Erin Palmer Polly, Esq.
          Joseph F. Welborn, III, Esq.
          Paige M. Ayres, Esq.
          BUTLER SNOW LLP
          The Pinnacle at Symphony Place
          150 Third Avenue South, Suite 1600
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: (615) 651 6700
          E-mail: Erin.Polly@butlersnow.com
                  Joe.Welborn@butlersnow.com
                  Paige.Nutini@butlersnow.com

               - and -

          Kyle V. Miller, Esq.
          BUTLER SNOW LLP
          P O Box 6010
          1020 Highland Colony Parkway, Suite 1400
          Ridgeland, MS 39158-6010
          Telephone: (601) 948 5711
          Facsimile: (601) 985 4500
          E-mail: kyle.miller@butlersnow.com

               - and -

          Jennifer L. Brenner, Esq.
          TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
          P O Box 20207
          Nashville, TN 37202
          Telephone: (615) 532 2500
          E-mail: jennifer.brenner@ag.tn.gov

               - and -

          Torrey Samson, Esq.
          Nashville, TN 37202-0207
          Telephone: (615) 741 6820
          Facsimile: (615) 532 2541
          E-mail: torrey.samson@ag.tn.gov


CREDENCE RESOURCE: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LETICIA WOODS, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CREDENCE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01368 (N.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying
classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class representatives, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff files a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ANcigXGJ

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


CSAA INSURANCE: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class as Moot
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NASIR RAHIM and GLENN BEARDEN, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CSAA
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00220-W
(W.D. Okla.), the Court entered an order:

   1. granting CSAA's motion to compel arbitration of individual
      claims filed on June 20, 2017, and directing that each
      named plaintiff shall arbitrate his or her own individual
      claims;

   2. granting CSAA's motion to dismiss remaining claims filed
      on June 20, 2017, to the extent the Court dismisses the
      allegations in the first amended complaint advanced in
      support of class, collective and representative action
      claims; but

   3. denying motion to the extent CSAA has sought dismissal of
      the named plaintiffs' individual claims because they are
      subject to arbitration and instead stays this action as to
      those claims;

   4. directing the Clerk of the Court to administratively close
      this matter in her records pending completion of the
      arbitration process; and

   5. denying as moot the plaintiffs' motion for conditional
      class certification, to approve notice and consents forms,
      for authorization to mail notice and consent forms to
      putative Plaintiffs and for Defendants to identify putative
      Plaintiffs filed on July 24, 2017.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=CGwI15hi


CVS: Class Suit by Store Detectives May Proceed
-----------------------------------------------
Nick Rummell, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
CVS must face a class action led by two store detectives who say
they were directed to harass black and Latino customers while
patrolling for shoplifters, a federal judge in Manhattan ruled.

Two so-called market investigators who guarded various New York
City locations of CVS in 2013 filed the case two years ago with
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

They claimed racial discrimination is pervasive at CVS, and that
store managers habitually used slurs in reference to minority
customers whom they wanted the guards to apprehend.  Even when
there was no basis to stop a shopper, lead plaintiffs Zaire
Lamarr-Arruz and Mominna Ansoralli said CVS had a quota system in
place, encouraging them to do so under false pretenses. CVS
allegedly uses the quantity of apprehensions as a performance
metric of loss prevention.

Though CVS disputes the allegations of hostile work environment,
U.S. District Judge John Koeltl denied the pharmacy chain summary
judgment on Sept. 26.  CVS failed to sway the court with evidence
that only one of the guards called its ethics hotline to report
retaliation for fighting the quota system. The guards' testimony
"raises questions regarding whether the hotline was a viable means
of reporting racial discrimination," Koeltl wrote in the 41-page
opinion. "Similarly, the evidence raises genuine disputes of
material facts about whether complaining to a supervisor was a
reasonable avenue to report discrimination or a false promise."

Lamarr-Arruz, who is black, can advance claims that CVS delayed
his return to work following medical leave, then forced him to
"jump through hoops" before ultimately firing him.  The ruling
calls the explanation given for Lamarr-Arruz's firing in internal
records inconsistent.

CVS failed to sway the court with its note that Lamarr-Arruz was
fired five months after attempting to come back from medical
leave. "While his official termination occurred in May 2014, his
fate was sealed in December 2013," the ruling states.

The court likewise rejected claims by CVS that co-plaintiff
Ansoralli should not be able to claim race discrimination because
she does not identify as Hispanic.  Koetl called the retailer's
distinction about Ansoralli, who is of Guyanese and Portuguese
ancestry, irrelevant.

"Whether Ansoralli self-identifies as 'Hispanic' is not
dispositive of whether she was discriminated against based on her
race or whether she is in fact Hispanic for the purposes of
Section 1981 (of the federal civil rights law)," the ruling
states.

Indeed, Ansoralli has told the court that when she identified
herself at work as West Indian mixed with Spanish, a store manager
was quick to boil that down.

"Oh, you're a spick," he said, as summarized in the ruling.

Jason Nagi -- jnagi@polsinelli.com -- an attorney for CVS with the
firm Polsinelli, did not returned a phone call or email seeking
comment, the Courthouse News Service report said.


DCM SERVICES: Machnik Files "Damasco" Bid for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled AUDREY MACHNIK, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. DCM SERVICES,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01409 (E.D. Wisc.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying classes,
appointing the Plaintiff as class representatives, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks the Court to stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kYO7wPmq

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


DEBT RECOVERY: Faces "Nunez" Suit in E. Dist. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Debt Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Diego Nunez, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Debt
Recovery Solutions, LLC and Pendrick Capital Partners II, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-05982-LDW-GRB (E.D.N.Y., October 12,
2017).

Debt Recovery is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


DEVON ENERGY: Martinez Seeks to Certify Safety Consultants Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LUIS MARTINEZ, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION CO., L.P., the Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-00300-W
(W.D. Okla.), the Parties agree to conditional certification of a
class of:

     "current and former safety consultants employed by, or
     working on behalf of, Devon Energy Production Co., L.P.
     during the three years prior to the date of certification
     who were classified as independent contractors and paid a
     day-rate."

Martinez and Devon agree that, by Devon's agreement to conditional
certification of the FLSA Class, Devon does not waive its right to
argue that the FLSA Class should be decertified and/or to advance
any defenses that it may have to the substantive claims in this
lawsuit.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=LogQLXpx

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Parmet
          Richard J. (Rex) Burch
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877 8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877 8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com
                  mparmet@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Ste. 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352 1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com


ENSIGN UNITED: Wins Summary Judgment in Calif. WARN Act Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned O'BRIAN RANGEL, Plaintiff, v.
ENSIGN UNITED STATES DRILLING (CALIFORNIA) INC. and ENSIGN UNITED
STATES DRILLING INC., Defendants, No. 1:15-cv-01042-DAD-JLT (E.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiff O'Brian Rangel asserts two statutory claims against
defendants Ensign United States Drilling (California), Inc., and
Ensign United States Drilling, Inc., entities providing a labor
force to oilfields and off-shore oil rigs at several sites
throughout California.

In essence, plaintiff Rangel alleges that defendants effectuated a
mass layoff, without giving employees a sixty-day advance written
notice, as required by the federal Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. Sections 2101-09 (WARN Act)
and the California Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, California Labor Code Section 1400-08 (California WARN Act).

Ensign California hired plaintiff O'Brian Rangel as a floor hand
or motorman on Rig 609.  Rig 609 is located on an off-shore
platform (Emmy) in the Huntington Beach Harbor, in Orange County,
California, approximately 150 miles from Bakersfield, where
plaintiff lived and where Ensign California's main office was
located.  Except for off-site training sessions, plaintiff Rangel
worked exclusively at Rig 609 until his termination.  Ensign
California did not own Rig 609 or platform Emmy; it provided labor
to staff Rig 609 pursuant to a contract with California Resources
Corporation (CRC).

On-site rig managers were typically responsible for the immediate
supervision of rig workers, including plaintiff Rangel.  However,
Ensign California staff at the Bakersfield office were involved in
policy creation and regular training of rig workers.  Health,
safety, and environmental (HSE) staff, some based in Bakersfield,
regularly traveled to locations at or near the rig site to train
and test rig workers on safety-related topics.  Drilling
superintendents, based in the Bakersfield office, visited rig
sites on a monthly basis. During a typical visit, one such
superintendent, Don Fogle, would speak with rig workers, inspect
the premises and equipment, and conduct audits with respect to
workplace safety.

In late 2014, Larry Lorenz, the head of Ensign California, met
with CRC to discuss the potential shutdown of drilling operations
as a result of falling commodity prices. On October 22, 2014, Mr.
Lorenz instructed Ensign California's recruiter to implement a
hiring freeze for all on-rig employees. On December 17, 2014,
Ensign California's HR director sent an email to certain employees
regarding anticipated layoffs. The email stated, in pertinent
part: Due to the significant decrease in the price of crude oil,
Ensign is in the process of mass layoffs and by law obligated to
provide a notice to all potentially impacted employees.

Defendants move for summary judgment as to a single threshold
issue: whether Ensign California's Bakersfield office rather than
Rig 609 constitutes plaintiff's single site of employment for WARN
Act purposes, such that he was a part of a mass layoff in late
2014.

Plaintiff argues that the Bakersfield office was his single site
of employment under the regulatory definitions, either because he
was an outstationed worker or because his employment was part of a
truly unusual organizational situation.  Because fewer than fifty
employees were laid off from Rig 609 within thirty days of
plaintiff's termination, plaintiff would be unable to establish
that his termination was a part of mass layoff if Rig 609, by
itself, was determined to be his single site of employment.

While the term outstationed is not explicitly defined by the
regulation, the Court noted that Ninth Circuit has observed that
the term most logically connotes a situation where employees live
for a short period of time at a certain site, departing for home
when the work is done. Outstationed' employees will obviously
live, for some period, at the place where they are stationed, just
as towboat employees may live on a towboat for up to thirty days
at a time. In the absence of a controlling definition for the
term, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a group of employees could
be considered outstationed if they shared a single site of
employment, (1) the site to which employees are assigned as their
home base, (2) the site from which their work is assigned, or (3)
the site to which they report as defined under Section
639.3(i)(6).

An employee's home base is the place from which he leaves at the
start of the work period and/or returns to at the end of the work
period, or at the very least, where he is physically present at
some point during a typical work period.

Based on the evidence before this court on summary judgment, it is
undisputed that apart from the initial hiring process and periodic
trainings, neither plaintiff Rangel nor any of his co-workers at
Rig 609 visited the Bakersfield office during a typical work
period.  To the contrary, the parties agree that the workers at
Rig 609 typically travelled from their homes directly to their
worksites and returned home at the conclusion of their seven-day
work periods.  That plaintiff Rangel lived in Bakersfield, near
Ensign California's office, is of no import to this analysis.  Nor
is the fact that some rig workers went to the Bakersfield office
to pick up pay-checks or for other administrative purposes wholly
separate from core functions of their jobs.

Accordingly, the court finds no evidence before it on summary
judgment which supports a finding that the Bakersfield office was
plaintiff's home base for WARN Act purposes.

For a particular location to be considered the site from which
work was assigned, the court must look to where work originated
and where the day-to-day management decisions over employees' work
duties occurred.  Activities such as accounting, billing, payroll,
and other administrative or personnel functions cannot constitute
assignment of work under Section 639.3(i)(6).

The evidence presented on summary judgment suggests that workers
at Rig 609 operated within a chain of command extending beyond the
on-site rig managers, to drilling superintendents and other more
senior officials in Bakersfield. Furthermore, nearly all of
plaintiff's work assignments on Rig 609 were subject to a variety
of company-wide health and safety policies, including HSE-related
policies and JSAs, all of which ultimately required approval by
staff in the Bakersfield office. While such evidence tends to show
that officials in Bakersfield had some degree of operational
control over the manner by which rig workers performed their
assigned tasks, it fails to amount to more than the types of
administrative and personnel functions that courts have declined
to consider in the context of Sec. 639.3(i)(6).

Accordingly, the court concludes that the evidence before it on
summary judgment, even if viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, establishes that the Bakersfield office was not the
site from which work was assigned to plaintiff and other workers
at Rig 609.

The site to which an employee reports refers to where management
issues work orders and directly reviews a mobile worker's job
performance and work product in order to evaluate progress and set
goals.  As with the preceding test, reporting for purposes of
payroll and other centralized administrative functions is
insufficient, standing alone, to establish that a particular site
is a single site of employment.

While these reports summarized events at the rig site, the court
finds no evidence before it on summary judgment that either type
of report was used as the basis for evaluating a rig worker's job
performance or work product. Separately, plaintiff points to
evidence that Bakersfield staff verbally approved lists of high-
performing drillers, submitted by various on-site rig managers, to
be included in periodic Implementation Team meetings with those
rig managers at the Bakersfield office. Those verbal approvals
alone, however, provide no basis for concluding that staff in
Bakersfield was directly involved in reviewing rig workers'
performance.7 Thus, in the absence of evidence that individuals
based in Bakersfield were involved in issuing work orders or
evaluating job performance, the court finds no legitimate dispute
that the Bakersfield office was not the site to which workers at
Rig 609 reported.

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish that he was an out-
stationed worker under 20 C.F.R. Section 639.3(i)(6).

Plaintiff contends that the combination of Ensign California's
multiple rig sites should be treated as a single site of
employment, based at the Bakersfield office, under the residual
definition of the WARN Act's implementing regulation.

There is no evidence here that multiple worksites resulted from
space constraints or that Ensign California's various rig sites
host company-wide operations. Nor has this court been presented
with evidence on summary judgment of defendants' intent to evade
the WARN Act's coverage. Rather, the Bakersfield office functioned
as an administrative hub for several discrete worksites and as a
central location for the periodic training of workers from those
sites.

In opposing summary judgment, plaintiff primarily argues that the
Bakersfield office should be treated as a single site of
employment for workers from all rig sites because it facilitated
Ensign California's overarching purpose of profit generation. Such
a broad reading of the residual definition would make virtually
every corporate headquarters a single site of employment,
regardless of how employees interact with it.

The Court found no authority to support plaintiff's position on
this point and concludes that based on the evidence before it on
summary judgment, plaintiff cannot establish that his employment
with Ensign California constitutes a truly unusual organizational
situation under Section 639.3(i)(8). Notably, other courts have
also declined to find similar corporate arrangements involving oil
rig workers truly unusual.

Because the court finds no genuine disputed issue of material fact
as to whether the Bakersfield office can serve as plaintiff's
single site of employment, summary judgment will be granted in
defendants' favor as to plaintiff's federal WARN Act claim.

In light of the statutory language of the California WARN Act and
the evidence presented on summary judgment, however, this court
must conclude that no reasonable jury could find liability for at
least two reasons.

First, the statutory definition for the term covered establishment
is clear and unambiguous: it refers to part or all of a single
industrial or commercial facility not a group of separate
facilities.  Thus, plaintiff Rangel's termination cannot be a part
of a mass layoff under the California WARN Act as a matter of law,
because fewer than fifty employees were laid off at Rig 609. Even
if, as plaintiff suggests, this court were to disregard the plain
meaning of the term covered establishment and construe it broadly
to include single sites of employment under the federal WARN Act,
plaintiff would still be unable to prevail on his state law claim
in addressing his federal WARN Act claim.

Second, there is no evidence before the court on summary judgment
that defendants directly or indirectly owned Rig 609 or platform
Emmy, such that they may be considered employers within the scope
of the California WARN Act.

Accordingly, because plaintiff's termination cannot be part of a
mass layoff, summary judgment will be granted in defendants' favor
as to plaintiff's California WARN Act claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybgqhq2dfrom Leagle.com.

O'Brian Rangel, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Kupka,
Levi & Korsinsky, 30 Broad Street, 24th Floor, York, NY 10004,
pro hac vice.

O'Brian Rangel, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff S. Westerman --
jwesterman@jswlegal.com -- Westerman Law Corp, Michael B.
Ershowsky, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, 30 Broad Street, 24th Floor,
York, NY 10004, pro hac vice & Kenneth Alan Remson --
kremson@jslegal.com -- Westerman Law Corp.

Ensign United States Drilling (California) Inc., Defendant,
represented by David J. Cooper -- dcooper@kleinlaw.com --  Klein,
Denatale, Goldner, Cooper, Rosenlieb & Kimball, LLP & Olivia
Vanessa Franco Chavez -- vchavez@kleinlaw.com --  Klein DeNatale
Goldner.

Ensign United States Drilling Inc, Defendant, represented by David
J. Cooper, Klein, Denatale, Goldner, Cooper, Rosenlieb & Kimball,
LLP & Olivia Vanessa Franco Chavez, Klein DeNatale Goldner.


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Baker" Suit in Minnesota
--------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc.  The
case is styled as Jason Baker, on behalf of himself and all those
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Equifax, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 0:17-cv-04655-PAM-BRT (D. Minn., October 12, 2017).

Equifax Inc. is a consumer credit reporting agency. Equifax
collects and aggregates information on over 800 million individual
consumers and more than 88 million businesses worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Marisa C Katz, Esq.
   TeskeMicko Katz Kitzer&Rochel, PLLP
   222 South Ninth Street, Ste. 4050
   Minneapolis, MN 55402
   Tel: (612) 746-1558
   Fax: (651) 846-5339
   Email: katz@teskemicko.com

      - and -

   Vildan A Teske, Esq.
   Teske, Micko, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP
   222 South Ninth Street, Suite 4050
   Minneapolis, MN 55402
   Tel: (612) 746-1558
   Email: teske@teskemicko.com


ESSENDANT INC: Alpha Tech Suit Seeks to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ALPHA TECH PET, INC., the Plaintiff, v.
LAGASSE, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00513 (N.D.
Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to certifying three classes.

Class A:

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent one or
   more faxes from "LAGASSE SWEET" from May 1, 2011, to the
   present, stating: (1) "Early Bird Special 4% OFF," "Early Bird
   Special 5% Off," or "EARLY BIRD SPECIALS" on "Ice Melt"; (2)
   "You're important to us - you're a BIG DEAL," offering
   "Promotional pricing" for limited time, or "10% OFF" on
   "Rubbermaid Commercial Products"; (3) "BLITZ DEALS" offering
   "Rebates" on purchases and stating "PLACE YOUR ORDER NOW!" or
   "HOW TO ORDER"; (4) "PURCHASE RUBBERMAID AND SAVE BIG!" in
   "limited-time offer"; (5) "Get 10% Back on Your TC Purchases";
   (6) "SAVE 20%" on "KLEENEX ANTIVIRAL TISSUE"; (7) "Fall
   Product Clearance" with "CLOSE OUT PRICES," "Spring Product
   Clearance" with "CLOSE OUT PRICES" or "CLEARANCE SALE!"; (8)
   "LIMITED TIME ONLY! 10% REBATE" or "5% REBATE" on
   "Rubbermaid Commercial Products"; (9) "5% REBATE" on
   "Purchases of Open Diversey Products"; (10) "SAVINGS ARE IN
   BLOOM!" with "$1.50/Carton Rebate" on "Universal Copy Paper";
   (11) "Earn $4.00 off each case of Dawn" and "PLACE YOUR ORDER
   NOW!"; or (12) "RUBBERMAID 5% ROLLBACK" and "Act now in order
   to beat the price increase!";

Class B:

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent one or
   more faxes from "LAGASSE SWEET" from May 1, 2011, to the
   present, stating: (1) "PLACE YOUR ORDER TODAY!" for "100%
   Recycled 2 Ply Center Pull Hand Towels"; (2) "NEW PAPER ITEM,"
   "Brighter and whiter toilet tissue"; (3) "COLD & FLU SEASON
   ESSENTIALS" and "make sure you stock up on the essentials your
   customers will need to fight the raging flu"; (4) "PLACE YOUR
   ORDER TODAY!" on "HOT PAPER ITEM Quality hand drying towels";
   (5) "PLACE YOUR ORDER TODAY" for "Innovative Towels and
   Tissue"; (6) "FREE Precision Blend Dilution System with
   purchase of LYSOL concentrated products"; (7) "LAGASSESWEET
   HAS QUALITY ROLL TOWELS AT AFFORDABLE PRICES"; (8) "Place your
   order today" on "the next generation of GOJO Manual Foam
   Dispensing"; (9) "Now Available! OFFICE PRODUCT SOLUTIONS";
   (10) "special introductory promotion" and "earn up to $2500
   per quarter with Colgate's Profit Builder Program!"; (11)
   "ATTENTION! Check out these new vinyl and latex gloves from
   THE GENERAL"; (12) "Safety Solutions" and "Lagasse gives you
   convenient access to top safety SKUs -- on one order, one
   invoice, one delivery!"; (13) "you may begin ordering the
   replacement Boardwalk Green Xtra BWK 35GREEN" white roll
   towel, with "exceptional quality and performance."; and

Class C:

   "all persons or entities who were successfully sent one or
   more faxes from "LAGASSE SWEET" from May 1, 2011, to the
   present that contains a price list for products and states one
   or more of the following: (1) "Price Change Notification"; (2)
   "Specials Effective," "Effective," "Specials," "Prices
   Effective," "Pricing Effective," "Special Pricing" "Promo
   Pricing," or "Prices good thru"; (3) "Spotlight Business
   Specials"; (4) "Fax Blast"; (5) "PRICING CORRECTION," "correct
   promotional pricing," "correct pricing," "pricing has been
   corrected," or "rolling back" price increase; (6) "Hurricane
   Response Checklist" or "Flood Response Checklist"; (7)
   contains blanks for "ACCT. #" or "Account #" and "PO #" or
   "P.O. #"; or (8) "TO ENSURE ORDER ACCURACY, PLEASE COMPLETE
   ALL FIELDS BELOW."

The Plaintiffs also asks Court for an Order appointing Plaintiffs
as class representatives and appointing the law firms of Anderson
& Wanca and Payne & Fears as class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Eb1hNoJz

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          Ross M. Good, Esq.
          Glenn L. Hara, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368 1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368 1501
          E-mail: bwanca@andersonwanca.com
                  rkelly@andersonwanca.com
                  rgood@andersonwanca.com
                  ghara@andersonwanca.com

               - and -

          C. Darryl Cordero, Esq.
          Daniel F. Lula, Esq.
          PAYNE & FEARS LLP
          4 Park Plaza, Suite 1100
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 851 1100
          Facsimile: (949) 851 1212
          E-mail: cdc@paynefears.com
                  dfl@paynefears.com


FELDCO FACTORY: Joint Bid for Conditional Certification Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled David Carbajal, the Plaintiff, v. Feldco
Factory Direct, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-04442 (N.D.
Ill.), the Hon. Judge Thomas M. Durkin entered an order granting a
joint motion for conditional certification of collective action
and for court guidance on class notice.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on October 13,
2017, the Court will provide a revised notice to the parties to be
sent out to the class members.  A status hearing is set for Jan.
23, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=3SGZscdO

The parties had asked the Court to certify a class of:

   "all current and former Field Technicians of Feldco who were
    employed by Feldco at its Des Plaines, Illinois location
    during the time period of October 2014 through January 19,
    2016."

On June 13, 2017, Carbajal filed the lawsuit claiming that Feldco
misclassified him as a salaried exempt employee in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Illinois Minimum Wage Law.
Accordingly, Carbajal claims that Feldco owes him and other
allegedly similarly situated field technicians overtime pay for
workweeks in which they worked more than 40 hours.  Because Feldco
paid its field technicians on a salaried basis for all hours
worked, to the extent any overtime is owed, which Feldco denies,
the correct rate of compensation would be half-time, rather than
the customary time and a half rate, the Complaint alleges.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=piic9nkm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John C. Ireland, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOHN C. IRELAND
          636 Spruce Street
          South Elgin, IL 60177
          Telephone: (630) 464 9675

The Defendant is represented by:

          Brian S. Schwartz, Esq.
          Michael A. Paull, Esq.
          KLEIN DUB & HOLLEB, LTD.
          660 LaSalle Place, Suite 100
          Highland Park, IL 60035


FIFTH GENERATION: Court Denies Singleton Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TREVOR SINGLETON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FIFTH
GENERATION, INC., d/b/a TITO'S HANDMADE VODKA, the Defendant, Case
No. 5:15-cv-00474-BKS-TWD (N.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Brenda K. Sannes
entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification;

   2. denying Defendant's motion to strike the declaration of
      Donald Coffey;

   3. denying Defendant's Motion to Strike the Report of Dr. Jon
      A. Krosnick;

   4. granting Defendant's motion to Strike the Declaration of
      Michael Meyerson;

   5. denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Declaration of
      Peter Reidhead;

   6. denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Declaration of
      Nicole Liska;

   7. denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Ray
      Nolletti; and

   8. denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike portions of the
      testimony of Sarah Butler; and

   9. denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike portions of the
      testimony of Michael Rappeport.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=19hpdeCm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
          Nancy A. Kulesa, Esq.
          Courtney Maccarone, Esq.
          Stephanie A. Bartone, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          733 Summer Street, Suite 304
          Stamford, CT 06901

The Defendant is represented by:

          David L. Nocilly, Esq.
          BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC
          One Lincoln Center Syracuse, NY 13202

               - and -

          Ricky L. Shackelford, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP - LOS ANGELES OFFICE
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067

               - and -

          Marcy Hogan Greer, Esq.
          ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON & TOWNSEND LLP
          515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
          Austin, TX 78701


FOREMOST INSURANCE: Court Denied as Moot Bid to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DAVID BRADEN and DALE BROWN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the PLAINTIFFS, v.
FOREMOST INSURANCE COMPANY GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, the DEFENDANT,
Case No. 4:15-cv-04114-SOH (W.D. Ark.), the Hon. Judge Susan O.
Hickey entered an order on September, 25, 2017, denying as moot:

   1. Plaintiffs' motion to certify;

   2. Defendant's motion to strike Saul Solomon's March 17, 2017
      declaration; and

   3. motion to exclude Saul Solomon's declarations.

The Court said, "The parties may renew the motions in the event
that the parties decide not to settle and to move forward with the
lawsuit."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=R86O5mPo


FOX RESTAURANT: "Pae" Suit Seeks to Certify Classes of Servers
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JENNIFER PAE, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FOX RESTAURANT
CONCEPTS, LLC d/b/a TRUE FOOD KITCHEN; a Arizona limited
liability company; FRC TRUE FOOD SMP, LLC, a California limited
liability company; FRC TRUE FOOD SDFV, LLC, a California limited
liability company; FRC TRUE FOOD NBFI, LLC, a California limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-06965-DSF-FFM (C.D. Cal.), Ms.
Jennifer Pae will move the Court on October 30, 2017 for an order
certifying this case as a class action pursuant to the Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of the following class:

   "all current and former Servers, Bartenders, and Hostesses who
   were employed by Defendants at the True Food Kitchen ("TFK")
   restaurants located at 395 Santa Monica Pl, Suite 172, Santa
   Monica, CA 90401 ("TFK Santa Monica"), 7007 Friars Rd., Suite
   394, San Diego, CA 92108 (TFK San Diego), 451 Newport Center
   Drive, Newport Beach, CA 92660 ("TFK Newport Beach") since
   July 22, 2012 to the present".

In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to certify the
following classes:

1. Unpaid Wages Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

2. Untimely Wages Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

3. Minimum Wages Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

4. Inaccurate Wage Statement Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

5. Meal Period Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

6. Rest Period Class:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed
   by Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

7. Unreimbursed Business Expenses:

   "Plaintiff and all other persons who were employed by
   Defendants as Servers, Bartenders, and/or Front Desk
   Hosts/Hostesses at Defendants True Food Kitchen restaurant
   locations in Santa Monica, Newport Beach, and San Diego, at
   any time from July 22, 2012, and continuing to the present";

In furtherance, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter its Order:

   a. certifying Plaintiff Jennifer Pae as representative of the
      class; and

   b. appointing the Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey and
      Hartounian Law Firm as class counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=pNdxpTW7

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas W. Falvey, Esq.
          Michael H. Boyamian, Esq.
          Armand R. Kizirian, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS W. FALVEY
          550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Glendale, CA 91203 1922
          Telephone: (818) 547 5200
          Facsimile: (818) 500 9307
          E-mail: thomaswfalvey@gmail.com,
                  mike.falveylaw@gmail.com
                  armand.falveylaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          Alex Hartounian, Esq.
          HARTOUNIAN LAW FIRM
          418 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Suite 202
          Pasadena, CA 91103
          Telephone: (818) 794 9675
          Facsimile: (818) 459 6997
          E-mail: alex@h-lf.com


FRANK & ISRAEL: CHC Systems Seeks Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS OF THE
PALM BEACHES, INC., a Florida corporation, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. FRANK & ISRAEL, LTD. d/b/a FIRMS, the Defendant,
Case No. 9:17-cv-80555-RLR (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order:

   1. granting amended motion for class certification;

   2. certifying this action as a class action on behalf of:

      "each person or entity that was sent one or more telephone
      facsimile messages ("faxes") about debt collection services
      available from FIRMS.";

   3. appointing Plaintiff as class representative and appointing
      Phillip A. Bock as class counsel; and

   4. granting Plaintiff permission to pursue Rule 23 class
      discovery, and award such other and further relief as the
      Court deems just under the circumstances.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=b91HtsGo

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. LaSalle St., Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 658 5501
          Facsimile: (312) 658 5555
          E-mail: phil@classlawyers.com


FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES: Holland Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled HELEN HOLLAND, Individually, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all other similarly situated current
and former employees, the Plaintiffs, v. FULENWIDER ENTERPRISES,
INC., a North Carolina Corporation, PHOENIX TACO, L.L.C., a North
Carolina Limited Liability Company, MICHAEL FULENWIDER, an
Individual, TOM HIRUNPUGDI, an Individual, and ERSKINE WHITE, an
Individual, the Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-00048-MOH-DLH
(W.D.N.C.), Ms. Holland moves the Court for an Order conditionally
certifying and approving notice to the following collective class
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act:

     "all current and former employees who were misclassified
     as exempt Assistant Managers or Assistant Unit Managers
     ("AUM") of Defendants' KFC, Taco Bell and Long John Silver's
     franchise restaurants located in the United States who work
     (or have worked) at said restaurants at any time during the
     applicable limitation's period covered by this Collective
     Action Complaint (i.e. two years for FLSA violations, three
     years for willful FLSA violations), up to and including the
     date of final judgment in this matter, and who is the Named
     Plaintiff and those who elect to opt-in to this action
     pursuant to the FLSA."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=eTrc0OhX

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Paula R. Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON SHIELDS YEISER & HOLT
          www.jsylawfirm.com
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754 8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754 8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  pjackson@jsyc.com

               - and -

          Christopher R. Strianese, Esq.
          Tamara L. Huckert, Esq.
          STRIANESE HUCKERT PLLC
          401 North Tryon St., 10th Floor
          Charlotte, NC 28202
          Telephone: (704) 998 2577
          Facsimile: (704) 998 5301
          E-mail: chris@strilaw.com
                  tamara@strilaw.com
                  www.strilaw.com


GARDENS OF FOUNTAIN: "Jones" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JACQUELYN M. JONES on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE GARDENS OF
FOUNTAIN WAY, LLC, a Domestic Corporation and GARDENVIEW, INC.
a Domestic Corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-01347-WCG
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff moves the Court to conditionally
certify a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action and authorize
and order notice sent to members of a class of:

   "all persons who are or have been employed by Defendants as a
   Resident Care Assistant within three years prior to the filing
   of Plaintiff's Complaint on October 7, 2016, and who have not
   been compensated at an overtime rate of pay for all hours
   worked and for all work performed in excess of 80 hours in a
   consecutive 14 day period."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=yA2L3Ytq

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kelly L. Temeyer, Esq.
          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          Kelly L. Temeyer, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Road, Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: 1-262-780-1953
          Facsimile: 1-262-565-6469
          E-mail: contact@walcheskeluzi.com


GEORGIA: Faces Class Suit over Special Education Program
--------------------------------------------------------
Kayla Goggin, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class action lawsuit in Atlanta, claims that Georgia's statewide
special education program discriminates against children with
disabilities by keeping them segregated from their non-disabled
peers.

In a federal complaint filed in Atlanta on October 11, 2017 the
plaintiffs, which include the Georgia Advocacy Office, the Arc of
the United State, and a number of parents with children in the
state program, claim it discriminates against thousands of public
school students with disabilities by "segregating them in a
network of unequal and separate institutions and classrooms."

As a result, they say the program, called the Georgia Network for
Educational and Therapeutic Support, violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The plaintiffs are represented by Jessica Wilson --
jessica.wilson@dlapiper.com -- of DLA Piper LLP in Boston.

According to the complaint, approximately 5,256 students with
varying mental and developmental disabilities were placed into
GNETS during the 2016 school year.  But the plaintiffs contend
these students receive "an inferior and unequal education" since
the GNETS curriculum is not based on or aligned with Georgia's
statewide curriculum.

They say the program segregates disabled students by removing them
from their classrooms and placing them in either separate, locked
wings of their zoned school or in completely separate GNETS-
centered buildings. Many GNETS centers do not have libraries,
cafeterias, gyms, science labs, music rooms or playgrounds, they
claim.

"Typically, GNETS satellite classrooms are isolated in trailers,
basements, or locked wings, with separate entrances that are not
used by students without disabilities," the class says. "During
school hours, GNETS students have little, if any, opportunity to
interact with their non-disabled peers."

The complaint continues: "GNETS students receive a low-quality
education. Academic instruction is poor, and GNETS students do not
have access to courses and extracurricular activities routinely
available to their non-disabled peers. Because of the lack of core
courses and poor academic instruction, it is hard to earn a
regular school diploma and very few GNETS students graduate with
one."

The class also claims that GNETS teachers often lack certification
in the subject matter they teach and that only 10 percent of GNETS
students graduate.

"GNETS are not placements of the last resort but instead are
'dumping grounds' used by the State and local school districts for
students whom local school districts do not want to educate," the
complaint says.

The class claims that the problem is a systemic one. "The State
does not provide local school districts necessary funding to
provide needed disability-related behavioral services in zoned
schools," the complaint says. "As a result of the State's decision
to consolidate the majority of its funding for these services in
GNETS, local school districts have little incentive and few
resources to provide the services necessary to educate children
with disability-related behavioral needs in their zoned schools."

A representative of Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal did not immediately
respond to a request for comment.

The class seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

The case is captioned, THE GEORGIA ADVOCACY OFFICE; THE ARC OF THE
UNITED STATES; R.F, by and through his mother, B.F.; C.S., by and
through his mother, M.S., and Q.H., by and through his mother,
V.H., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF GEORGIA; NATHAN DEAL, in his official
capacity as Governor of the State of Georgia; GEORGIA BOARD OF
EDUCATION; GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; RICHARD WOODS, in his
official capacity as State School Superintendent of Georgia;
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH and DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES; JUDY FITZGERALD, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and
Developmental Disabilities; DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH; and
FRANK BERRY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Georgia Department of Community Health, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-
mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga., October 11, 2017).


GLOBAL CREDIT: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class as Premature
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LEON LOPEZ, the Plaintiff, v. GLOBAL CREDIT
& COLLECTION CORP., and GALAXY PORTFOLIOS, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00427 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Manish S. Shah
entered an order:

   1. denying Defendants' motion to dismiss; and

   2. denying Plaintiff's motion to certify class without
      prejudice as premature.

The Court said, "Defendants shall answer the complaint by October
20, 2017, and the parties shall file a joint status report with a
proposal for a case schedule on that same date. A status hearing
is set for October 26, 2017 at 9:30 a.m."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=urM7i56b


GREAT CIRCLE: "Bush" Suit Seeks to Certify Case Managers Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MELISSA BUSH, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. GREAT CIRCLE, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-04070-BCW (W.D. Mo.), the Plaintiffs
move this Court for an order conditionally certifying Count I as a
collective action and authorizing notice under the Fair Labor
Standards Act to:

   "all current and former Foster Care Case Managers ("FCCMs")
   employed by Defendant Great Circle ("Great Circle") at any
   time within the last three years".

The Plaintiffs further move the Court to order Great Circle to
produce a computer-readable data file containing the name, last
known address, social security numbers and dates of employment for
each such employee and to conspicuously post notice of this case
in the break rooms of Great Circle's regional offices.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=r00LdWrm

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997-9150
          Facsimile: (314) 997-9170
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

               - and -

          Eli Karsh, Esq.
          LIBERMAN, GOLDSTEIN & KARSH
          230 South Bemiston, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 862 3333
          Facsimile: (314) 862 0605
          E-mail: elikarsh@aol.com


GULFPORT ENERGY: Safety & Completions Consultants Class Okayed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TIMOTHY SLONE, ET AL., the Plaintiffs, v.
GULFPORT ENERGY CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 5:16-cv-
01296-HE (W.D. Okla.), the Hon. Judge Joe Heaton granted in part
and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for conditional
certification.

The motion is granted as to a Fair Labor Standards Act class
composed of safety and completions consultants who provided
services to Defendant in Ohio.

The Plaintiff has also proposed notice procedures and forms.
Defendant has objected to both the substance of the proposed
notice and the requested methodology for providing notice to
potential plaintiffs. Once a collective action is conditionally
approved, "the court has managerial responsibility to oversee the
joinder of additional parties to assure that the task is
accomplished in an efficient and proper way." Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170-171 (1989). Accordingly, the
parties are directed to confer in an effort to reach agreement on
a form of notice, consent form, necessary deadlines, and
methodology for providing notice to potential plaintiffs, and to
submit, within 14 days from the filing of this order, a joint
statement reflecting their agreement or, if agreement cannot be
reached, their respective positions as to same.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=uSrkiCsi


H & J INT'L: Faces "Liu" Suit in E. Dist. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against H & J International
Trading, Inc. d/b/a Dumpling Galaxy.  The case is styled as
Xiaoyan Liu, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. H & J International Trading, Inc.
d/b/a Dumpling Galaxy, Helen You and Haiyun Katz, Defendants, Case
No. 1:17-cv-05986 (E.D.N.Y., October 12, 2017).

The Defendants are engaged in the salon industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


HEARTLAND PAYMENT: Settlement Class in "Rudel" Suit Okayed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RUDEL CORPORATION, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-
02229-AET-LHG (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Anne E. Thompson entered an
order:

   1. preliminary approving Plaintiff's motion of a proposed
      settlement agreement;

   2. provisionally certifying a settlement class as defined in
      the proposed Settlement Agreement, with exclusions defined
      as "Merchants who processed with Heartland and were subject
      to an American Express Fee Adjustment in their October 2014
      account statements, retroactively implementing an increased
      American Express Discount Fee between the period of July 1,
      2014 and October 31, 2014 and setting new American Express
      pricing going forward.";

   3. appointing firm Squitieri & Fearon, LLP as Class Counsel;

   4. approving form, content, and method of notice submitted by
      the parties;

   5. directing that notice shall be administered as delineated
      in the settlement agreement within 30 days after entry of
      this Order;

   6. directing class members wishing to object or opt out shall
      do so in the manner set out in the Notice within 60 days of
      the Notice Deadline;

   7. directing parties to file a motion for final approval by
      December 18, 2017, prior to the final approval hearing; and

   6. directing parties to report for a Final Approval Hearing on
      January 16, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. to Courtroom 4W of the
      Clarkson S. Fisher U.S. Courthouse, 402 East State Street,
     Trenton, NJ.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=NJ2cgVO3


HEIDI WASHINGTON: "Arnold" Suit Seeks to Certify Prisoners Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MICHAEL ARNOLD, the Plaintiff, v. HEIDI
WASHINGTON, et al, the Defendants, Case No. 4:13-cv-14137-LVP-MKM
(E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a class of:

     "all those prisoners who are confined with the Michigan
     Department of Corrections (MDOC) and are not provided Kosher
     meals as required by their religious diets, and states in
     support."

The Plaintiff alleges that despite the MDOC's awareness that its
policy of providing Jewish prisoners Vegan meals, prepared and
served in a non-Kosher manner, violates Jewish Prisoners'
sincerely held religious beliefs, it chooses not to alter this
policy.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=HLovHbei

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel E. Manville, Esq.
          DIRECTOR, CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC
          MI. STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE Of Law
          PO Box 1570
          East Lansing, MH 48826
          Telephone: (517) 432 6866
          E-mail: daniel.manville@law.msu.edu


HELIX ENERGY: "Hugee" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARTY HUGEE, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. HELIX ENERGY
SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-01099 (S.D.
Tex.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all current and former kitchen and galley employees who
      worked for Helix, its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates
      on any vessel during the last three years and who were paid
      on a day-rate basis";

   2. authorizing the issuance of notice to potential class
      members; and

   3. directing Defendant to produce verified contact information
      for all "kitchen and galley employees" who worked for
      Helix, its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates on any
      vessel during the last three years so that notice may be
      timely implemented.

Hugee filed a putative collective action lawsuit against Defendant
on April 10, 2017, alleging that the company violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 by, among other things, failing to pay
him and others similarly situated employees overtime for hours
worked in excess of 40 per workweek.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=4tdihlWi

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          Lyric Center
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 222 6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222 6739


HEMMER LAW: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ROBIN BETZ, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. HEMMER LAW
OFFICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01369 (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying a class,
appointing the Plaintiff as its representative, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=o14fbKpd

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


HOGAN TRANSPORTATION: Court Certifies Class in "Fairfax" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DON FAIRFAX, the Plaintiff, v. HOGAN
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, INC., et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-00680-GCS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge George C. Smith
conditionally certifies a class of:

   "any employer who violates the [minimum wage or overtime
   provisions of this title] shall be liable to the employee or
   employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum
   wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
   be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages
   . . . .  An action to recover [this] liability. . . .  may
   be maintained against any employer (including a public agency)
   in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any
   one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
   themselves and other employees similarly situated".

The Court said, "Plaintiff has made no attempt to show that there
are any factual circumstances that would render service by
ordinary mail only ineffective. Accordingly, Plaintiff is only
permitted to send a single notice to the Putative class with the
exception that a second mailing may be attempted if the first
attempt is returned undeliverable. The parties have agreed to add
a sentence to the Plaintiff's proposed Notice indicating that
defendant denies Plaintiff's allegations in the underlying case.
Further, Defendant does not object to Plaintiff hiring a third
party class action administration company if they deem appropriate
or to a ninety day opt-in period. The Court approves each of these
requests."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=6DLXZXxu


HOUSTON, TX: Faces Class Suit over Serial Rapist
------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a serial rapist sexually assaulted a woman in 2011 and was
not convicted of it until 2016, due to Houston officials'
indifference to a backlog of more than 6,000 untested rape kits,
the woman says in a federal class action in Houston.

D.B. says in her lawsuit that in April 2011 a man later identified
as David Lee Cooper saw her walking in Houston and offered her a
ride. She declined, she says, but she did tell Cooper her car was
not running.

"Cooper then said he was a mechanic. D.B. could see his hands were
oily indicating he might be a mechanic," according to the Sept. 24
complaint.

Cooper persuaded her he was a mechanic and she let him drive her
to her apartment, where he inspected her car and said it needed a
new motor. He asked for a drink of water and she took him inside
her apartment to get some, she says.

"Cooper turned violent and threw D.B. to the floor and repeatedly
struck her, bit her several times, and raped her," the complaint
states.

She managed to escape and ran from the apartment, and with Cooper
in pursuit, encountered a male friend, who chased Cooper. "Cooper
ran to his vehicle and fled," the lawsuit states.

D.B. says she called Houston police and a relative took her to a
Houston hospital, "where a SAKS rape kit was done." The hospital
gave her anti-STD drugs but told her they were not 100 percent
effective.

A Houston police officer took the rape kit to the Houston Police
Department "ostensibly for testing and to be used as evidence in
the investigation of the sexual assault and rape," she says. But
the city let it sit untested for five years.

However, a Houston police detective called her and asked her why
she was "on Bissonnet," a street known as a prostitution track,
implying that she was a prostitute.

"The HPD detective made it seem the rape was her fault and
discouraged D.B. from filing a report as it was unlikely the
suspect would be caught. The HPD detective never showed up at
D.B.'s residence or requested that he meet D.B.," the complaint
states.

Police let her rape kit languish in an evidence room for five
years, and she heard nothing about it until the Harris County
District Attorney's Office contacted her in 2016 and told her
tests showed it had genetic material that matched Cooper's DNA,
D.B. says in the complaint.

She learned that Cooper's DNA had been in an FBI database since
1991, and that he had been charged with rape in 1991 and 1994. His
rap sheet includes convictions for attempted kidnapping, home
burglary and DUI, according to the complaint.

D.B. sued Houston, Mayor Sylvester Turner, Police Chief Art
Acevedo and several of their predecessors.

Quality control problems led the city to shut down its police
crime lab in 2002. To regain public trust, former Houston Mayor
Annise Parker spearheaded creation of the Houston Forensic Science
Center, which took over nearly all HPD's forensic investigations
in 2014.

The center immediately started testing a backlog of 6,663 rape
kits, some dating back to the 1980s, and by February 2015 it had
tested them all, according to its website.

D.B. says the center's testing helped prosecutors tie Cooper to
several other attacks, and he pleaded guilty in December 2016 to
raping her in 2011, to the 2002 sexual assault of a child and to a
2009 sexual assault.

"David Lee Cooper is a serial rapist who could have been stopped
in 1991, 1994, 2002, 2005 and in 2009 before he sexually assaulted
and raped D.B.," the complaint states. D.B. seeks to represent two
subclasses of more than 6,000 women and several hundred children:
one group whose rape kits were not timely sent by Houston or
Harris County law enforcement for testing; the other who were
sexually assaulted by serial rapists due to the lack of prompt
testing.

She seeks damages for negligence, personal injuries, failure to
protect, and violations of due process and equal protection.  She
also wants a special master appointed to oversee the city's rape
investigations.

She is represented by Houston attorneys Randall Kallinen, Charles
Peckham and Roy Rodney.

Peter Stout, CEO and president of the Houston Forensic Science
Center, is also a defendant.

Stout declined to comment on the lawsuit for the Houston
Chronicle, but he touted the center's work on rape kits.

"Since taking over management of the Houston Police Department's
forensic operations in 2014, HFSC has eliminated legacy and
incoming backlogs of sexual assault evidence. A legacy backlog
inherited from HPD that dated back to the 1980s has been
eliminated. HFSC's goal is to have a sustainable, average 30-day
turnaround time for all evidence, including that which is related
to sexual assault," he told the Chronicle.

Houston's troubled history with rape kits is part of a statewide
problem. Texas officials reported in 2011 that the state had a
backlog of 20,000 kits. Thanks in part to $11 million legislators
earmarked in 2013 to process the kits, the backlog has been
reduced to around 3,000, the Texas Tribune has reported.

A new law written by state Rep. Victoria Neave, D-Dallas, aims to
get the public involved in paying for rape kits. Starting in 2018,
Texans applying for and renewing driver's licenses and
identification cards, can donate funds to test rape kits, the
Tribune reported.

The case is captioned, DEJENAY BECKWITH on her Own Behalf and
Others Similarly Situated Plaintiffs, VS. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS,
Mayor Sylvester Turner, Police Chief Art Acevedo, Houston Forensic
Science Center, Peter Stout, And Former Mayors of the City of
Houston in their individual capacities: Annise Parker, Bill White,
Lee P. Brown, Bob Lanier (deceased), and Kathy Whitmire. And
Former Police Chiefs of the City of Houston in their individual
capacities: Charles McClelland, Harold Hurtt, Clarence Bradford,
Sam Nuchia, Elizabeth Watson, Lee P. Brown, Defendants, Case 4:17-
cv-02859 (S.D. Tex., September 24, 2017).


HOUSTON, TX: 5th Cir. Appeal over Prison Bail Policies Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a panel of Fifth Circuit judges on October 3, questioned
whether a federal judge in Houston went too far in overhauling the
bail policies of Texas' biggest county by ordering it to release
poor misdemeanor defendants from jail within 24 hours.

Harris County, with 4.5 million residents, is the third-most
populous county in the United States and it's going through
expensive growing pains in its approach to criminal justice.

On one hand, county officials agree with a growing consensus
across the United States that petty criminals should not languish
in jail, possibly losing their jobs and custody of their children,
or pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit to regain their
freedom, simply because they cannot afford bail.

Harris County started phasing in reforms in July geared toward
granting more misdemeanor defendants personal recognize bonds, in
which no fee is required to bond out of jail.

But the county is fighting a federal class action that claims it
unconstitutionally jails poor, low-level defendants, and has
racked up more than $4 million in legal fees fighting the case.

The latest chapter in the litigation came early this month, when a
three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans heard
arguments from attorneys representing Harris County criminal
judges and hearing officers, who preside over probable cause
hearings in which bail is set.

Harris County is asking the Fifth Circuit to undo U.S. District
Judge Lee Rosenthal's preliminary injunction under which since
early June the county has had to release misdemeanor defendants
from detention on personal bonds within 24 hours after they sign
an affidavit stating they cannot afford cash bail.

Rosenthal also ordered Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez to
release from jail all misdemeanor defendants who are not subject
to immigration, mental health or family violence holds on personal
recognize bonds if they have not had a probable cause hearing
within 24 hours.

Chuck Cooper, with the Washington, D.C. law firm Cooper & Kirk,
kicked off on October 3, hearing for Harris County, saying that
Supreme Court guidance on comity -- that federal and state
governments respect each other's laws -- requires Rosenthal to
step back and let county and state criminal judges address
constitutional issues with the county's bail system.  He said
Texas law lets criminal defendants file pretrial habeas corpus
petitions in which they can argue that their detention is
unconstitutional. He said such cases would take four weeks to get
to a state appellate court if a county criminal judge denies the
petition

Fifth Circuit Judge Catharina Haynes questioned the practicality
of a habeas petition for misdemeanor defendants, who often are
sentenced to time served and released after a few days in jail
when they plead guilty.

"In a case where the likelihood is your sentence isn't even going
to be two weeks, how meaningful is that procedure?" Haynes asked.

Lead plaintiff Maranda ODonnell sued Harris County in May 2016
after she was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of driving with an
invalid license and a magistrate judge set her bail at $2,500.

ODonnell, 23, says her detention put her at risk of losing a
restaurant job she needed to provide for her young daughter. She
got out of jail after a few days by paying her $2,500 bail.

Her class action was consolidated in August 2016 with a similar
lawsuit. ODonnell is represented by attorneys with Washington,
D.C.-based Civil Rights Corp.

They obtained a preliminary injunction after arguing that Harris
County relies too heavily on a preset bail schedule based on the
charges, which does not adequately consider a defendant's finances
in refusing to grant personal bonds, in violation of federal equal
protection and due process rights.

ODonnell's attorneys say the county's criminal judges rarely
deviate from the bail set by the magistrate judges.

Haynes and Fifth Circuit Judge Edward C. Prado, both President
George W. Bush appointees, asked Civil Rights Corp. attorney Alec
Karakatsanis if Rosenthal's order went too far into the
jurisdiction of the county's criminal judges.

"Here's the problem I see: It looks like the judge attempting to
solve the problem of the county court judges failing to exercise
discretion and act as judges, but instead rubberstamping and just
wholesale doing one thing, has flipped it to taking away all
discretion and making them wholesale do the opposite. And is that
really the right solution?" Haynes asked.

Harris County argued in a motion to stay that Rosenthal's order
effectively strips county criminal judges and magistrate judges of
their authority to consider four other factors that judges are
supposed to weigh under Texas law in setting bail, besides ability
to pay, including the safety of the victim and community.

Haynes asked whether someone charged with a Class A misdemeanor
for assault should be released from jail and treated the same way
as a defendant facing a loitering charge under Rosenthal's
injunction.

Karakatsanis said Harris County can change its rules to favor
pretrial detention for people charged with assault, but it chooses
not to, which undermines its arguments about public safety.

"Nothing about Judge Rosenthal's legal finding would prohibit
Harris County from treating those people differently. . . . If
they wanted to tomorrow they could pass a new rule saying anyone
charged with assault should be detained without bond until a
hearing before a judge, until a judge could look at the person,
issue nonfinancial conditions like a GPS, a stay-away order, a
curfew, things like that," Karakatsanis said.

"Harris County, for assault cases, has already decided they will
release anyone charged with assault if they pay $50 to a bondsmen
or $100 to a bondsmen, whatever 10 percent of the bail amount
would be."

Bail bondsmen typically charge a defendant 10 percent of the bail,
which is subject to forfeiture if the defendant misses court
hearings. This gives bondsmen incentive to track down wayward
clients and bring them to court -- and bondsmen are given great
discretion in how they may do that.

"Harris County has already made policy judgments about public
safety in those cases. That's why some of the overheated rhetoric
in this appeal about the danger to public safety rings so hollow,"
Karakatsanis said.

Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Brown Clement, a President George H.W.
Bush appointee, rounded out the panel and spoke little during the
hour-long hearing.

The judges gave no indication of how or when they might rule.
Another Fifth Circuit panel stayed Rosenthal's preliminary
injunction as of May 12, but lifted the stay on June 6.

The case is captioned, MARANDA LYNN ODONNELL, et al., Plaintiffs,
vs. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants. Case 4:16-cv-01414
(S.D. Tex.).


HUNTER WARFIELD: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JENNIFER WOJCIESKI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
HUNTER WARFIELD OF NEW ENGLAND, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-01300-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order certifying classes, appointing the Plaintiffs as
class representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court
may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=tpgJbrbS

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


JACKSONVILLE, FL: "Chapman" Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARTIN CHAPMAN, on behalf of himself and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CITY OF
JACKSONVILLE, the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00799-BJD-JRK (M.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiffs asks the Court to enter an Order:

   a. certifying a proposed Rule 23 Americans with Disabilities
      Act, (ADAAA) Class;

   b. appointing Plaintiff Martin Chapman as the Class
      Representative of Plaintiff's ADAAA Class, and the
      Plaintiff's counsel and their firm as class counsel;

   c. permitting Plaintiff to notify the putative class members
      of the ADAAA class action;

   d. conditionally certifying Plaintiff's Age Discrimination in
      Employment Act (ADEA) collective action of current and
      former sworn officers of Defendant;

   e. directing Defendant to produce in an electronic and
      readable format, to the undersigned counsel within fourteen
      days of the Order granting this motion, a list containing
      the full names, last known addresses, telephone numbers,
      and email addresses of the putative ADEA collective action
      members;

   f. authorizing the undersigned counsel to send the initial
      notice to all individuals whose names appear on the list
      produced by Defendant's counsel by first-class mail;

   g. directing Defendant to post at all its locations the
      initial notice; and

   h. authorizing the undersigned counsel to send a follow-up
      notice to all individuals whose names appear on the list
      produced by the Defendants' counsel but who, by the
      fourteenth day prior to the close of the Court approved
      notice period, have yet to opt in to the instant action.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=db64IT68

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Donna V. Smith, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Main Number: (813) 224 0431
          Direct Dial: (813) 386 0995
          Facsimile: (813) 229 8712
          E-mail: dsmith@wfclaw.com
                  rcooke@wfclaw.com


JP MORGAN CHASE: Faces "Denton" Suit in E. Dist. Va.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JP Morgan Chase &
Co.  The case is styled as David D. Denton, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JP Morgan Chase &
Co. and Chase Bank USA, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-00125-
RAJ-LRL (E.D. Va., October 12, 2017).

JP Morgan Chase & Co. provides a range of banking and other
financial services to the corporate, institutional, and
governmental clients in the United States and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Leonard Anthony Bennett, Esq.
   Consumer Litigation Associates
   763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
   Newport News, VA 23601
   Tel: (757) 930-3660
   Fax: (757) 930-3662
   Email: lenbennett@clalegal.com

      - and -

   Susan Mary Rotkis, Esq.
   Consumer Litigation Associates
   763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
   Newport News, VA 23601
   Tel: (757) 930-3660
   Fax: (757) 930-3662
   Email: srotkis@clalegal.com


KERRI BARKLEY: Court Denied Jacobs' Motion to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled AARON L. JACOBS, JR., the Plaintiff, v.
KERRI BARKLEY and ROBERTA LONGSINE, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-
cv-00246-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the Hon. Judge Pamela Pepper entered an
order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery;

   2. granting Plaintiff's motion for extension of discovery
      deadline;

   3. granting Plaintiff's motion to withdraw third amended
      complaint;

   4. granting Plaintiff's motion to file amended complaint;

   5. denying Plaintiff's motion to certify class and appoint
      class counsel;

   6. directing that the proposed third amended complaint is the
      operative complaint in this case; and

   7. denying without prejudice Defendants' motion for summary
      judgment.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=QDlDUl8q


KING PLASTIC: "Fusic" Suit Seeks to Certify Factory Workers Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled THOMAS FUSIC, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. KING PLASTIC
CORPORATION, a Florida Profit Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-00390-SPC-CM (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an Order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "current and former hourly non-exempt factory workers who
      worked for Defendant between July 12, 2014 and the
      present";

   2. directing Defendant to produce, in an electronic readable
      format, to undersigned counsel within 14 days of the Order
      granting this Motion, a list containing the names, the last
      known addresses, phone numbers and e-mail addresses of
      putative class members who worked for Defendant between
      July 12, 2014 and the present;

   3. authorizing Plaintiff's counsel to send notice to all
      individuals whose names appear on the list produced by
      Defendant's counsel by first-class mail and e-mail; and

   4. providing all individuals whose names appear on the list
      produced by Defendant's counsel with 60 days from the date
      the notices are initially mailed to file a Consent to
      Become Opt-In Plaintiff.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=M93MGvSm

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bill B. Berke, Esq.
          BERKE LAW FIRM, P.A.
          4423 Del Prado Blvd. S.
          Cape Coral, FL 33904
          Telephone: (239) 549 6689
          E-mail: berkelaw@yahoo.com


KLUEVER & PLATT: Court Grants Righeimer Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Diane Righeimer, the Plaintiff, v. Kluever &
Platt LLC, the Defendant, Case No.: 1:17-cv-04170 (N.D. Ill.), the
Hon. Judge Marvin E. Aspen entered an order granting Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 28,
2017, Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement is granted.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=RSvy7LO6


KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. KNIGHT
TRANSPORTATION, INC., an Arizona corporation, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-07189 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   a. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendant and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report."

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs asks the Court to:

   a. enter and continue Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification;

   b. set a schedule for discovery;

   c. grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended or renewed Motion
      for Class Certification upon the conclusion of discovery;
      and

   d. provide Plaintiff any and all other relief that the Court
      deems equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=8jv5Kkld

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KamberLaw LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


KOHL'S CORPORATION: Renewed Class Certification Bid Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Mark Ankcorn, the Plaintiff, v. Kohl's
Corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 1:15-cv-01303 (N.D. Ill.),
Hon. Judge Robert M. Dow Jr. entered an order continuing generally
Plaintiff's renewed preliminary motion for class certification
until the parties are ready to enter into a briefing schedule on
the motion.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 27,
2017, notice of motion date of Sep. 28, 2017 is stricken, and no
appearances are necessary on that date.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=zCauC5q9


LABELLE HOMEHEALTH: Court Certifies Class in "Richert" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Jenna Richert, the Plaintiff, v. LaBelle
HomeHealth Care Service LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-00437-JLG-CMV (S.D. Ohio), the Hoh. Judge James L. Graham
entered an Order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all home health aides employed by LaBelle from January 1,
      2015 to the present who were not paid overtime wages during
      all or part of their employment. Plaintiff contends that
      the class period should begin on January 1, 2015 because
      the Department of Labor gave the Final Rule an effective
      date of January 1, 2015";See 78 FR 60454-01.

   2. denying Defendant's motion for partial judgment on the
      pleadings; and

   3. denying Plaintiff's motion for equitable tolling without
      prejudice.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=6iSA0b0S


LEE N' EDDIES: Urban Elevator's Class Certification Bid Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Urban Elevator Service, LLC, the Plaintiff,
v. Lee N' Eddies LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:15-cv-07788 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Gary Feinerman entered
an order denying without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to certify
class according to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September
27, 2017.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ykaAFyKO


LESTER'S ACTIVEWEAR: Faces "Young" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lester's Activewear,
Inc.  The case is styled as Lawrence Young, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Lester's Activewear, Inc. and Lester's of N.Y. Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-07847 (S.D.N.Y.,
October 12, 2017).

The Defendants provided apparel and accessory stores products and
service.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


LTI TRUCKING: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LTI
TRUCKING SERVICES, INC., a Missouri corporation, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-07190 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
for an order:

   a. granting Plaintiffs motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendant and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report";

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

In the alternative, the Plaintiff asks that the Court:

   a. enter and continue Plaintiff's Motion for Class
      Certification;

   b. set a schedule for discovery;

   c. grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended or renewed Motion
      for Class Certification upon the conclusion of discovery;
      and

   d. provide Plaintiff any and all other relief that the Court
      deems equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=dCLNCvub

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KamberLaw LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Parrott Seeks to Notify Class Members
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Stephane Parrott, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
Marriott International, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
10359-VAR-RSW (E.D. Mich.), Stephane Parrott and Kevin Williams
move the Court to direct notice to be issued to the members of a
proposed collective pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
consisting of:

   "all current and former Food Managers who worked at any
   Courtyard by Marriott hotel and who were classified as exempt
   from overtime at any time since October 11, 2017, including
   any person who worked in a substantially-similar capacity but
   under a different job title."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=vlSoMdC9

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jesse L. Young, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ PC
          1 Towne Square, Suite 1700
          Southfield, MH 48076
          Telephone: (248) 746 4027
          Facsimile: (248) 936 2138
          E-mail: jyoung@sommerspc.com

               - and -

          Seth R. Lesser, Esq.
          Fran L. Rudich, Esq.
          Christopher Timmel, Esq.
          KLAFTER, OLSEN & LESSER, LLP
          Two International Drive, Suite 350
          Rye Brook, NY 10573
          Telephone: (914) 934 9200
          Facsimile: (914) 934 9220
          E-mail: seth@klafterolsen.com
                  fran@klafterolsen.com
                  christopher.timmel@klafterolsen.com

               - and -

          Drew Legando, Esq.
          LANDSKRONER GRIECO MERRIMAN LLC
          1360 West 9th Street, Suite 200
          Cleveland, Ohio 44113
          Telephone: (216) 522 9000
          Facsimile: (216) 522 9007
          E-mail: drew@lgmlegal.com

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, D.C. 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470 3520
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com


MCCARTHY & BURGESS: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LUISA AVILES, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. MCCARTHY, BURGESS
& WOLFF, INC. and HSN, INC. d/b/a HOME SHOPPING NETWORK, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01338-WED (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to enter an order certifying classes in this case,
appointing the Plaintiffs as class representatives, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence.  Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=3oQBMtV8

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


MED-CARE DIABETIC: Court Grants Motion for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Arwa Chiropractic, P.C., the Plaintiff, v.
Med-Care Diabetic & Medical Supplies, Inc., et al., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:14-cv-05602 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge John Z. Lee
entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion for class
certification [92] is granted.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 29,
2017, Plaintiff's Rule 23 motion for class certification is
granted. The Plaintiff may proceed with its TCPA claims on behalf
of its proposed class.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=V8udhKj2


MESILLA VALLEY TRANS: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MESILLA
VALLEY TRANSPORTATION, INC., a New Mexico Corporation, and MVT
SERVICES, LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Company, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-07192 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to enter an order:

   a. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendants and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report".

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ejUXdTlU

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KamberLaw LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


MICHAELS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in "Rowe" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LAUREL ROWE, the Plaintiff, v. MICHAELS
STORES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:15-cv-01592-EJD (N.D. Cal.),
the Hon. Judge Edward J. Davila entered an order:

   1. denying Defendant Michaels' motion for summary adjudication
      on Rowe's Eighth Cause of Action for failure to exhaust
      administrative remedies;

   2. granting Michaels' motion for summary adjudication as to
      the following claims:

      First Cause of Action for failure to pay unpaid minimum
      wages; Second Cause of Action for unpaid overtime wages;

      Fifth Cause of Action for inaccurate pay statements to the
      extent it is based on unpaid wages; Sixth Cause of Action
      for Labor Code section 203 penalties to the extent it is
      based on unpaid wages;

      Seventh Cause of Action;

      Eighth Cause of Action for remedies under the Private
      Attorneys General Act to the extent it is based on unpaid
      wages; and

      Ninth Cause of Action for violation of California's
      Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. to the
      extent it is based on unpaid wages; and

   3. denying Rowe's pending motion for class certification
      without prejudice, because the Court's rulings on Michaels'
      motion for summary adjudication may have a substantial
      impact on class certification issues;

Rowe may, if appropriate, renew her motion for class certification
if there remains at least one claim for which she is able to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=HTNhWJRb


MIDLAND CREDIT: "Grigsby" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Janie Grigsby, and all others similarly-situated v. Midland Credit
Management, Inc., and Midland Funding, LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-00441
(E.D. Tenn., October 6, 2017), is brought against the Defendants
for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff, Janie Grigsby, is a resident in the Eastern District of
Tennessee.

Defendants Midland Credit Management, Inc. and Midland Funding,
LLC operate a nationwide debt collection business and attempts to
collect debts from consumers in every state, including consumers
in the State of Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      E-mail: davephilipps@aol.com
              mephilipps@aol.com

          - and -

      Cynthia T. Lawson, Esq.
      Heather E. Banks, Esq.
      BOND, BOTES & LAWSON, P.C.
      6704 Watermour Way
      Knoxville, TN 37912
      Tel: (865) 938-0733
      Fax: (865) 938-7931
      E-mail: cynthialawson@bbllawgroup.com
              heatherbanks@bbllawgroup.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DEBBIE MALONEY, AMY VEGA, and SALLY
CZARNECKI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. and
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01335-DEJ
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order
certifying classes, appointing the Plaintiffs as their respective
representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as their
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence.  Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Th0ZxnDJ

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


MIZUHO BANK: "Greene" Suit Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
-----------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled GREGORY GREENE, JOSEPH LACK, ANTHONY MOTTO,
and GREGORY PEARCE individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. MIZUHO BANK, LTD., a
Japanese financial institution, and MARK KARPELES, an individual,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:14-cv-01437 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order certifying the following classes:

Deposit Class:

   "all individuals who, while residing in the United States,
   wired fiat currency to Mt. Gox's account at Mizuho Bank
   between June 20, 2013, and February 24, 2014"; and

Withdrawal Class:

   "all individuals who, while residing in the United States,
   submitted to Mt. Gox a request to withdraw fiat currency
   between June 20, 2013, and February 24, 2014, and whose
   request went unfulfilled."

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jXHBYIfj

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin S. Thomassen, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          J. Aaron Lawson
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1300
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: jedelson@edelson.com
                  bthomassen@edelson.com
                  alawson@edelson.com
                  rbalabanian@edelson.com


MONTGOMERY, NY: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled PERRY HILL, both individually and on behalf
of a class of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. COUNTY
OF MONTGOMERY, MICHAEL AMATO and MICHAEL FRANKO, the Defendants,
Case No. 9:14-cv-00933-BKS-DJS (N.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Brenda
K. Sannes entered an order:

   1. denying Defendants' letter motion;

   2. denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification without
      prejudice to renewal upon briefing issues; and

   3. directing Plaintiff to renew his motion for class
      certification, he must file a brief, and any exhibits, on
      or before October 31, 2017.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=R9OdVZIl

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esq.
          Maria K. Dyson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, P.C.
          One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
          Albany, NY 12205

               - and -

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street N.E., Suite 302
          Washington, D.C. 20002

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jonathan M. Bernstein, Esq.
          Goldberg Segalla LLP
          8 Southwoods Boulevard, Suite 300
          Albany, NY 12211


NEW YORK, NY: Class Suit Filed over Bail System
-----------------------------------------------
Joss Russell, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
New York City's failure to adopt bail reforms two years after a
report labeled the system "deranged" has sparked a federal class
action in Manhattan, by three men caught in the crossfire.

Vice News used the language in question in August 2015, and the
Center for Court Innovation shed light on the delays and
improperly extended detentions tied to what it called the city's
"confusing and perplexing" bail system four months later.

Still waiting for enforcement of the recommendations that report
put forward, former detainees James Lynch, Lloyd Jones and Baron
Spencer say they want to represent a class of the thousands of
presumptively innocent detainees who were jailed for hours or days
over the years, "as these well-documented problems went
unaddressed . . . in violation of court orders entitling them to
release upon posting bail."

The men filed their federal class action on October 4, in
Manhattan, alleging false imprisonment and violations of civil
rights.  They note that the concept of bail is simple but its
practice in New York is "byzantine and inhumane."

"Every day and night, friends, family members, and charitable
organizations present themselves at New York City Department of
Correction facilities with cash, cashier's checks, and money
orders, asking to pay bail for a presumptively innocent person who
is in jail -- and they are turned away," the complaint states.
"They are told that the computers or the fax machines are not
working; that the responsible staff is not available; that the
person is not 'eligible' to be released on bail because he or she
is in the midst of the day-long ordeal of being processed for
admission to a jail facility; or another of an endless supply of
excuses. They are told to come back after lunch; to come back
after the next shift change; to come back the next day."

It should take mere minutes, hours at most, to release a detainee
once his bail is paid, according to the complaint.

"Instead, detainees often languish for a day or more after their
bail has been posted -- even though they are, by judicial order,
entitled to release, and there is no lawful basis for continued
restraints on their liberty," the complaint states. "Such
overdetentions are, as courts across the country have long held,
unconstitutional."

City officials effectively admitted, in their adoption of a bail-
efficiency law this past June, that a bail payment should trigger
the release of a detainee within five hours, according to the
complaint.

"The city nonetheless detained members of the class for many hours
or days beyond the three to five hour threshold, without any
legitimate governmental necessity," the complaint states.

"These overdetentions resulted from the city's unconstitutional
policies, practices, usages and/or customs and from its unlawful
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of class
members."

A spokesman for the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice denied that
the city has no interest in adopting reforms, saying its efforts
are documented in the lawsuit itself.

"This suit quotes extensively from a report commissioned by the
city -- precisely so that we can identify fixes -- which should
show that we are serious about improving the system," spokesman
Patrick Gallahue said in an email.

Gallahue noted that the city is also investing $500,000 a year to
hire 50 "bail expediters," a move that is expected to keep around
2,000 people from being booked into jail every year.

New York City is also developing an online bail-payment system,
Gallahue confirmed, saying they plan to have ATMs in every
courthouse by late 2017.

"New York City has taken a clear-eyed look at the bail system and
has launched a number of efforts to ensure that not only are fewer
people held on bail, but that for those who receive bail, payment
is easier than it has ever been and that defendants can be
released as expeditiously as possible," Gallahue said.

Against these claims, the class calls New York City's bail system
"hopelessly broken." A New York City councilman even likened it to
"the DMV on steroids" in a 2015 interview with Vice News,
according to the complaint.

"The bail process in New York City is like if Kafka wrote a novel
on criminal justice," City Councilman Rory Lancman said, according
to the complaint. "You don't know where to go, you don't know what
to do, and you don't know when your loved one is even getting
out."

Vice called it "probably easier to buy a gun online than free a
loved one from jail."

Pointing to the Center for Court Innovation's 2015 expose, the
class quotes investigators as recommending "that DOC address its
woefully inadequate staffing of the bail process and use the
opportunity of reductions in jail population to 'reallocate DOC
staff in order to adequately staff the bail payment process.'

"On information and belief," the complaint continues, "this
recommendation was ignored."

The DOC likewise ignored a recommendation that defendants should
be afforded the chance to post bail immediately before or during
the intake process.  Further compounding these failures, as found
by the audit, is the DOC's on fax machines and an antiquated
paper-records system.

"Stakeholders unanimously believed that DOC's paper-based system
makes every step of the process longer and more difficult," the
report found.

Detainees say the DOC has nevertheless ignored advice to go
digital.  Citing a statistic from 2014, the complaint says nearly
half of the 12,880 defendants whose family or friends had the
means to post bail early in the life of their criminal case were
unable to do so immediately after arraignment, prior to the
defendant's removal from court and transport to a detention
facility.  Once transported a detention facility, processing can
last between 12 and 22 hours or longer according to the complaint.

"This process consists of invasive and frequently demeaning
medical screening, strip searches, and other jail intake
procedures" the complaint continues.

Each of the three lead plaintiffs says he was detained for many
hours or days beyond the three-to-five hour threshold, without any
legitimate governmental necessity.

The class is represented by:

     Matthew Brinckerhoff, Esq.
     Emery Celli Brinkerhoff and Abady LLP
     10TH FL., 600 5th Ave
     New York, NY 10019


NORTH AMERICAN BANCARD: Bid for Leave to File Under Seal Okayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 29,
2017, in the lawsuit styled West Loop Chiropractic & Sports Injury
Center, Ltd., et al. the Plaintiffs, v. North American Bancard,
LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.: 1:16-cv-05856 (N.D. Ill.),
the Hon. Judge Ronald A. Guzman entered an order granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file under seal. The Plaintiffs
are given leave to file their supplemental statement in support of
amended motion for class certification under seal. The motion
hearing noticed for October 3 was stricken with no appearance
required.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=4dgiDvda


NURTURE INC: Wins Bid to Dismiss "Birdsong" Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in the case captioned SARAH BIRDSONG, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
NURTURE, INC. d/b/a HAPPY FAMILY, Defendant, No. 16-CV-4435 (RRM)
(PK) (E.D.N.Y.).

Nurture moves to dismiss this entire action claiming that, inter
alia, Birdsong's claims are pre-empted by the Organic Foods
Production Act of 1990, U.S.C. Sections 6501-6523 (OFPA), and that
Birdsong lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.

Defendant Nurture, Inc., sells infant and baby food products that
are marketed, labeled, and sold as Organic. Sarah Birdsong, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, brings this
putative class action against Nurture, alleging that Nurture
misled consumers about the ingredients of its Happy Family brand
products.

Birdsong contends that the Products are not organic as defined
under federal law because they contain certain prohibited
synthetic ingredients. Birdsong further claims that had she known
that the Products were not organic, she would not have purchased
them. However, she would consider purchasing the Products in the
future if the Products were reformulated so as to make the Organic
representation truthful.

Nurture argues that Birdsong's state law claims pose an obstacle
to the achievement of the OFPA's objectives and thus are pre-
empted by federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, "state laws that conflict with federal law
are without effect" and are pre-empted.

Products certified as Organic under the OFPA must contain at least
95% organically produced ingredients by weight; the other 5% of
ingredients can be non-organically produced agricultural products
produced consistent with the National List. Under the OFPA, if the
NOP's Program Manager has reason to believe that a certified
operation has violated or is not in compliance with the OFPA or a
certifying agent or a State organic program's governing State
official fails to take appropriate action to enforce the OFPA or
regulations, then the Program Manager may initiate suspension or
revocation proceedings against a certified operation. If an
operation fails to comply with the OFPA, it is subject to a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per violation and the possibility of a
five-year prohibition from re-certification.

Additionally, any action by the Secretary or certifying agent that
adversely affects a person or is inconsistent with the organic
certification program" is appealable to the Administrator for the
Agricultural Marketing Service, and final agency decisions are
appealable to the district court.

Here, Birdsong claims that the Products are falsely labeled as
Organic on the theory that they contain ingredients that federal
law bans from organic foods.

However, USDA's accredited certifying agent has already certified
that the Products are properly labeled as Organic as a matter of
federal law a fact that the parties do not dispute. The central
question before the Court is whether Birdsong's state law claims,
which seek to impose liability on Nurture for an allegedly
misleading representation that is permitted by a USDA-accredited
agent, are pre-empted by the scope, structure, and purpose of the
OFPA.

In Aurora, consumers asserted state law claims against organic-
certified dairy producers and retailers, alleging, inter alia,
that their labeling of a milk product as Organic was misleading
because the producer's processes did not comply with the OFPA's
requirements for Organic products. Aurora, 621 F.3d at 787-90. The
Eighth Circuit found the state law claims were impliedly pre-
empted because they conflicted with the OFPA and the exclusive
role of the USDA-accredited certifying agents in certifying that
products complied with the OFPA and were thus Organic.  The court
distinguished state law challenges to the certification
determination itself, which would be pre-empted, from state law
challenges to the facts underlying certification, which would not
be pre-empted.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' products were falsely
labeled as Organic because they allegedly contained ingredients
that were prohibited under the OFPA. Marentette, 201 F. Supp. 3d
at 381; Segedie, 2015 WL 2168374. Additionally, in both cases, a
USDA-accredited certifying agent had already certified that the
products were properly labeled as Organic as a matter of federal
law. Marentette, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 381; Segedie, 2015 WL 2168374.
Thus, as here, the plaintiffs' claims were state law challenges to
the certification determination itself.

The Court finds the reasoning of both Aurora and Marentette to be
persuasive. Accordingly, as discussed below, Birdsong's state law
claims are pre-empted.

Birdsong points to the OFPA's express provision pre-empting state
organic certification regimes to argue that state tort and
consumer protection claims are not pre-empted. However, an express
pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose through
negative implication, any possibility of implied conflict pre-
emption. The existence of an `express pre-emption provision does
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles or
impose a special burden that would make it more difficult to
establish the pre-emption of laws falling outside the clause.
Even where a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause,
the court still may be required to consider implied pre-emption.
Accordingly, where, as here, plaintiff's state law claim poses a
direct obstacle to the achievement of the OFPA's objective, the
existence of an express pre-emption provision in the OFPA does not
foreclose the possibility of conflict pre-emption.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Birdsong's claims are pre-
empted and grants Nurture's motion to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8555svt
from Leagle.com.

Sarah Birdsong, Plaintiff, represented by Yvette Golan, The Golan
Firm, 1712 N St NW Ste 302, Washington, DC 20036-2914
Sarah Birdsong, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne McEntee --
amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC,
pro hac vice, Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com --
Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie PLLC, pro hac vice, Todd Seth
Garber -- tgarber@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP & Kim Richman -- info@richmanlawgroup.com -
The Richman Law Group.

Nurture, Inc., Defendant, represented by Edward P. Boyle --
epboyle@Venable.com  -Venable LLP, Angel Antonio Garganta --
AGarganta@Venable.com  -- Venable LLP, pro hac vice & Robert
Leslie Meyerhoff -- rlm02@venable.com  -- Venable LLP.


O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Court Grants Bid for Remand in "Courtright"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled REBECCA COURTRIGHT and RAPHAEL SAYE,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others, the Plaintiffs, v.
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE STORES, INC., et al., the Defendants, Case No.
4:14-cv-00334-DGK (W.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge Greg Kays entered an
order granting Plaintiffs' motion for remand.

The Court said, "All other pending motions are denied as moot. The
Court will order remand of this case to the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri. The Court instructs the Clerk of the
Court to delay remand of the case for ten days to allow Defendants
the opportunity to exercise their right to appeal under 28 U.S.C.
section 1453(c)(1). If the Court of Appeals accepts an appeal from
the Court's order, the Clerk shall delay remand until the Court of
Appeals has ruled on the appeal. Since the parties now agree that
Plaintiff has not suffered any injury in fact, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=BcbQp4qB


OCWEN LOAN: Court Denies Move to Dismiss "McWhorter" FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned HAROLD
McWHORTER and ROBERT FIELDER, Plaintiffs, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-01831-MHH (N.D. Ala.).

The Court, likewise, denied Ocwen's motion for leave to file a
response to Mr. McWhorter's evidentiary submission.

In this putative nationwide class action, plaintiffs Harold
McWhorter and Robert Fielder allege that defendant Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) by charging customers a convenience fee to make loan
payments online and over the telephone.

The Court previously denied Ocwen's motion to dismiss with respect
to Mr. Fielder but deferred ruling on the motion with respect to
Mr. McWhorter, pending a period of limited discovery.

GMAC Mortgage, LLC, was Mr. McWhorter's loan servicer before Ocwen
acquired the loan. McWhorter entered into a Trial Period Plan
Agreement with GMAC.  Ocwen acquired Mr. McWhorter's loan from
GMAC and Ocwen entered into a permanent loan modification
agreement with Mr. McWhorter.

Under the FDCPA, a person who acquires servicing rights to a debt
is not a debt collector for purposes of that debt if the debt was
not in default at the time it was obtained. Ocwen argues that it
is not a debt collector with respect to Mr. McWhorter because, in
Ocwen's view, Mr. McWhorter's loan was not in default when Ocwen
acquired servicing rights to it.

The Trial Period Plan Agreement between GMAC and Mr. McWhorter was
not intended to resolve Mr. McWhorter's delinquency. Instead, it
gauged his eligibility for a modification. The agreement states
that, if Mr. McWhorter successfully completed the trial period,
GMAC would review his situation and determine whether he qualified
for a permanent loan modification that would allow him to resolve
his remaining delinquency. If Mr. McWhorter qualified, then GMAC
would send Mr. McWhorter a proposed loan modification agreement
including his new interest rate and mortgage payment amount and
instructions for how to move ahead with that new plan.

Thus, the Trial Period Plan Agreement is not a brand new payment
plan granting Mr. McWhorter a fresh start, because the trial
agreement did not include the terms for a new payment plan to
satisfy Mr. McWhorter's original loan. Further, the trial
agreement states that it is expressly understood and agreed that
the default is not cured or waived by acceptance of any monies
paid here-under. Thus, the Trial Period Plan Agreement by its
unambiguous terms did not supersede the original loan agreement or
affect Mr. McWhorter's default status under the original
agreement. Thus, the loan was still in default when Ocwen acquired
it, and Ocwen is a debt collector under the FDCPA with respect to
Mr. McWhorter's loan.

The Court denies Ocwen's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended
complaint with respect to Mr. McWhorter. Further, the Court denies
Ocwen's motion for leave to file a response to Mr. McWhorter's
evidentiary submission.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 28, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycdde3nyfrom Leagle.com.

Harold McWhorter, Plaintiff, represented by D. Frank Davis --
fdavis@davisnorris.com -DAVIS & NORRIS LLP.

Harold McWhorter, Plaintiff, represented by Dargan Maner Ware --
dware@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS, LLP, John E. Norris --
jnorris@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP, Wesley W. Barnett -
- wbarnett@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP & Kristan Bruce
Rivers -- krivers@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP.

Robert Fielder, Plaintiff, represented by D. Frank Davis, DAVIS &
NORRIS LLP, Dargan Maner Ware, DAVIS & NORRIS, LLP, John E.
Norris, DAVIS & NORRIS LLP, Wesley W. Barnett, DAVIS & NORRIS LLP
& Kristan Bruce Rivers, DAVIS & NORRIS LLP.

Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael R.
Pennington -- mpennington@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
CUMMINGS LLP, Richard Aaron Chastain -- achastain@bradley.com --
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP & Robert J. Campbell --
rjcampbell@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP.


ON-LINE ADMINISTRATORS: Court Certifies 2 Classes in "Trenz" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled BRIAN TRENZ et al., the Plaintiffs, v. ON-
LINE ADMINISTRATORS, INC. (dba PEAK PERFORMANCE MARKETING
SOLUTIONS) et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-08356-AB-KS
(C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Andre Birotte Jr. entered an order on
Sept. 25, 2017, granting Plaintiffs motion for class certification
of:

Pre-October 16, 2013 Class:

   "all persons within the United States who received any
   telephone call from Defendants or their agents to said
   person's wireless number through the use of any automatic
   telephone dialing system, as part of Defendant Volkswagen
   Group of America's 'Target and Retain Aftersales Customers'
   program, from October 26, 2011 until October 15, 2013"; and

   - and -

Post-October 16, 2013 Class:

   "all persons within the United States who received any
   telephone call from Defendants or their agents to said
   person's wireless number through the use of any automatic
   telephone dialing system, as part of Defendant Volkswagen
   Group of America's 'Target and Retain Aftersales Customers'
   program, from October 16, 2013 until October 26, 2015."

The Court said, "Defendants contend that they will argue that the
putative class members consented to being contacted by TRAC as an
affirmative defense, and that the resolution of that issue will
require significant individualized inquiries. As the Court stated
in its April 24, 2017 order denying class certification, the Court
does have some concerns regarding the potential for individualized
inquiries. The Court also stated that it would need significantly
more evidence from Defendants in order to find that these
potential individualized inquiries actually predominated over the
common questions. Defendants have failed to provide sufficient,
time-period evidence of actual consent to be contacted by an
autodialer by customers of Volkswagen and Audi dealerships.
Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants' concerns regarding
predominance are too speculative at this stage. As such, the Court
finds that common issues predominate over individualized concerns.
The Court finds that class certification is appropriate because
Plaintiffs have established the requisite commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Motion
for Class Certification is therefore granted."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=eyhbHhFr


OWL INC: Perez et al. Suit Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JOSE PEREZ, ALFREDO SANTOS, and DOUGLAS
RICHEY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. OWL, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-
01092-CEM-GJK (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class pursuant to Rule 23, consisting of:

      "all individuals who transported VA patients for Owl at any
      time since June 15, 2012 (five years before filing the
      complaint);

   2. appointing the named Plaintiffs as class representatives;
      and

   3. appointing Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel.

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs have presented evidence
that Owl had a company-wide policy of paying its drivers at a rate
well below the federally-mandated prevailing wage for ambulance
drivers who transport VA patients.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=CWfDXZVv

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Weber, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994 5800
          E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com
                  bweber@llrlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph Egan, Esq.
          Eric Lindstrom, Esq.
          EGAN, LEV, LINDSTROM & SIWICA, P.A.
          231 E. Colonial Drive
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Telephone: (352) 672 6901
          E-mail: jegan@eganlev.com
                  elindstrom@eganlev.com


PARKING REVENUE: Court Dismissed "Franklin" Case
------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Carmen Franklin, et al., the Plaintiff, v.
Parking Revenue Recovery Services, Inc., et al., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:13-cv-02578 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Edmond E. Chang
entered an order dismissing case with prejudice.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on September 25,
2017, pursuant to the stipulated dismissal, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the case is dismissed with
prejudice as to the individual claims and without prejudice as to
the class claims, each side to bear its own fees and costs.  The
Status hearing for Sept. 20 was vacated. The case is terminated.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=YSOq27tP


PERMANENTE MEDICAL: Court Okays Accord in Call-Center Nurses Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Denzio, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
California nurses will get roughly $6 million -- and their
attorneys nearly $2 million -- from health care giant Kaiser
Permanente for time spent doing unpaid work.

The payout settles a class action filed last year on behalf of
1,397 advice nurses who take calls from patients at three of the
Permanente Medical Group's call centers in Sacramento, Vallejo and
San Jose.

Debra Brown, Sandra Morton and Barbara Labuszewski sued in
September 2016, claiming Kaiser stiffed them on pay for time they
spent logging in and out of call center computers before and after
their shifts. Kaiser doesn't consider call center nurses clocked
in until after the log-in process is complete.

Kevin Stoop, one of the attorneys representing the class, said
Kaiser is required to pay its nurses for those minutes.

"Under the law, those couple of minutes are compensable. If you
took five minutes a day, that's 30 minutes a week and 26 hours a
person is being shorted a year," Stoop said by phone on October
13. "Those numbers add up quickly."

Stoop said each nurse will receive around $3,000 under the
settlement, an amount he called "not inconsequential." Some may
get up to $9,500.

U.S. District Judge Vincent Chhabria also awarded the class'
attorneys at Sommers Schwartz and Outten & Golden fees of $1.8
million.

Kaiser did not respond to phone and email requests for comment
prior to publication.

The case is captioned, DEBRA BROWN, SANDRA MORTON, and BARBARA
LABUSZEWSKI, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP,
INC., a California corporation, Defendant, Case 3:16-cv-05272-VC
(N.D. Cal., October 11, 2017).


PRECISION MOTOR: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PRECISION
MOTOR TRANSPORT GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07196 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court for an order:

   a. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendant and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report";

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=FAAikcqg

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KamberLaw LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


PROCESSING SOLUTIONS: Denial of "Baillie" Class Cert Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion reversing the District Court's Decision
denying class certification in the case captioned AMY LYNNE
BAILLIE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PROCESSING
SOLUTIONS, LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents, No. A144105
(Cal. App.).

This is one of several related appeals in a representative action
brought by plaintiffs Amy Lynn Baillie and Kathrine Rosas against
various individuals and corporate entities allegedly involved in
illegal internet payday loan practices.

The operative complaint on appeal asserts causes of action for:
(1) usury and/or unconscionable lending under Civil Code Section
1916.12-3(b); (2) injunctive relief and restitution under Business
& Professions Code Sections 7200. (Section 17200); (3) violation
of Section 17200; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) an accounting.

According to the Complaint, Baillie obtained a $300 loan from
USFastCash on or about July 2, 2006, as evidenced by a Note
identifying as the lender defendant MTE, doing business as ICU.
Plaintiff Rosas, in turn, obtained a $300 loan from defendant Rio
Resources on or about June 19, 2006, as well as a $300 loan from
ICU on or about November 3, 2006.

Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification; however,
the trial court issued an interim order staying consideration of
this motion pending resolution of the appeal filed by now former
defendant Assenzio, which challenged the trial court's denial of
his motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings.  The
Cal. App. reversed the trial court's order in Assenzio and
remanded the matter.  The trial court thereafter entered a new
order granting Assenzio's motion and dismissing him from the
lawsuit.

Plaintiffs thereafter submitted evidence in support of their class
certification motion that included documents produced by
respondents reflecting that Baillie entered into a loan agreement
over the internet in 2006 by means of a standardized loan Note
with an annual interest rate of 1.216.667 percent that identified
as the lender defendant MTE doing business as ICU.  Plaintiff
Rosas submitted evidence that she entered into two such internet
loans in the amount of $300, the first in June 2006 with Rio
Resources (not a respondent), and the second in November 2006 with
respondent ICU.

Following a contested hearing, the trial court issued a final
order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification, as well
as their preliminary motion to conduct further discovery prior to
a ruling on class certification. The court explained in its order
that, while at first glance, this sort of consumer protection
lawsuit would typically fit neatly into a class action model for
resolution, there were insurmountable challenges to using the
class model in this case given certain unique aspects.

According to the court, "High on this list of insurmountable
challenges is the need to define an ascertainable class."  In
addition, the court noted that plaintiffs had ignored its earlier
warning that they needed to address in their motion the impact on
their claims of Assenzio's dismissal from the case after
prevailing on his motion to compel arbitration, given that they
had alleged respondents are merely Assenzio's alter egos.

With respect to plaintiffs' position on the unavailability of
records from which putative class members can be identified to
wit, that defendants have intentionally or negligently destroyed
such records the trial court questioned: "Even if plaintiffs were
able to obtain a finding in their favor on spoilation, what form
of relief and/or sanctions would be available that could possibly
advance the goal of identifying putative class members, let alone
arriving at an appropriate remedy?"

Finally, the court brushed aside plaintiffs' argument in
supplemental briefing that, because defendants chose to comingle
in a single account the funds from the MTE loan program, each
defendant should be deemed to have loaned a portion of the
principal received by each individual borrower, explaining: "Even
if this theory had any supporting decisional authority, it would
still leave unanswered the question of how the borrowers who
Plaintiffs seek to represent would ever be identified."

Thus, based upon this reasoning, the trial court ruled against
plaintiffs' motions and set a hearing date for defendants'
anticipated motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' timely notice
of appeal followed.

The decision to certify a class rests squarely within the
discretion of the trial court, and the Cal. App. affords that
decision great deference on appeal, reversing only for a manifest
abuse of discretion: Because trial courts are ideally situated to
evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group
action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying
certification.  A certification order generally will not be
disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence,
(2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous
legal assumptions.

The trial court found plaintiffs failed to meet the standard for
class certification for three main reasons: they (1) failed to
identify an ascertainable class, (2) failed to explain how
adequate notice could be provided to such a class, and (3) failed
to demonstrate the feasibility of ordering restitution for
individual members of such class.

According to plaintiffs, the trial court in this case went afoul
of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 706, when
denying their motion for class certification because, like the
trial court in Daar, it focused too narrowly on whether individual
class members would be able to prove their right to restitution
rather than on the community of interests among class members,
including their common California residency and execution of a
standard note with one or more defendants.

Moreover, plaintiffs insist that, to the extent the trial court
found the evidence supporting their motion insufficient to prove
the existence of an ascertainable class, they should be "entitled
to determine whether the Corporate Defendants have engaged in the
spoliation of evidence, or have testified inaccurately as to their
access to evidence.

The Cal. App. agrees with plaintiffs' latter point.

Under these circumstances, the insurmountable challenges
identified by the trial court in denying plaintiffs' motion
instead relate primarily to the lack of available information
regarding the identity of the class of victims and the money, if
any, owed by any particular defendant to these victims.

Thus, close examination of this record reflects the unique
circumstances of this case alluded to by the trial court in the
challenged order stem to a large degree from the fact that in
People v. Miami Nation Enterprises (2016) 2 Cal.5th 222, the now-
defunct entity at the heart of the allegedly unlawful lending
operation, has been labeled a sovereign tribal entity and, thus,
that plaintiffs have not been able to obtain evidence from MNE
relating to class certification issues, including whether a class
of victims exists in California that entered into usurious loans
over the internet with one or more defendants. However, as noted
above, after briefing in this appeal, the California Supreme Court
issued its decision in MNE.

The California Supreme Court also clarified for the first time
that a tribally affiliated entity claiming immunity bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it is an
arm of the tribe. With respect to the type of proof required to
meet this burden, the high court emphasized the importance of
having in the record functional evidence relating to how the
tribal entity actually operates, and not just formal evidence
relating to the entity's underlying organizational or control
structure. As explained by the court, until the entity has proven
it should be treated as an extension of the tribe, it is no more
entitled to a presumption of immunity than any other party.
Neither the trial court nor respondents have adequately explained
why proceeding with plaintiffs' claims against respondents in
Assenzio's absence would be legally impermissible or
inappropriate. To the contrary, the law is quite clear: "The
concept of vicarious liability has no application to actions
brought under the unfair business practices act. While the
corporation can, of course, be held liable for violations of
sections 17200 and 17500 by its by its employees, the alleged
alter ego's individual liability must be predicated on his
personal participation in the unlawful practices."

In other words, the alter ego allegations in the Complaint
identified a common law basis for holding Assenzio personally
liable for the unfair loan practices committed by the corporations
he owned and controlled based on his own participation in the loan
operation. However, that Assenzio has been dismissed from the case
and cannot be held personally liable on this theory does not
necessarily undermine the remaining allegations in the Complaint
that are addressed to the corporations themselves. To the
contrary, those allegations remain valid at this juncture. The
essence of the alter ego doctrine is that justice be done.

Thus, because the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for
further discovery on the issue of class certification prior to the
California Supreme Court's adoption of the definitive standard for
determining whether a tribal entity is in fact entitled to
sovereign immunity, the Cal. App. concludes the order must be
reconsidered.  The Cal. App. therefore reverses and remands the
matter for further proceedings in light of this new controlling
authority.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s September 28, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y9nbhex5from Leagle.com.


PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION: Class Cert. Bid in "Cooksey" Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled WILLIAM COOKSEY, JR. and JOHN WILLIAMS, the
PLAINTIFFS v. PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., the
DEFENDANTS, Case No. 5:16-cv-00072-KGB (E.D. Ark.), the Hon.
Kristine G. Baker entered an order:

   1. denying as moot Mr. Cooksey's motion for class
      certification and for appointment of lead plaintiff and
      counsel;

   2. granting grants PTI's motion for a protective order;

   3. denying as moot Mr. Cooksey's first motion to compel
      discovery;

   4. denying as moot Mr. Cooksey's motion to extend time to
      complete discovery and to move for summary judgment; and

   5. granting PTI's motion for summary judgment.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=vQtC0BTd


QI ENTERPRISES: Faces "Ramirez" Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Qi Enterprises,
L.L.C., a Missouri limited liability company. The case is styled
as George Ramirez, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Qi Enterprises, L.L.C., a Missouri limited
liability company, Stover Medical Logistics, Inc., a Missouri
Corporation and Stover Medical Physician Services, LLC, a Missouri
limited liability company, Defendants, Case No. BCV-17-102411
(Cal. Super. Ct., October 12, 2017).

The Defendants offers home health care services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David G. Spivak, Esq.
   LA Employee Rights Lawyer
   601 S Figueroa St #4050
   Los Angeles, CA 90017
   Tel: 310-499-4730

RBC BEARINGS: Court Grants Reynoso's Bid for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Carmen Reynoso v. RBC Bearings, Inc., et
al., Case No. 8:16-cv-01037-JVS-JCG (C.D. Cal.), the Court grants
Reynoso's motion for class certification of:

   "all hourly, non-exempt employees of RBC Transport Dynamics, a
   Division of Roller Bearing Company of America, Inc., who were
   employed at the RBC Transport Dynamics facility in Santa Ana,
   California, and who worked on the First Shift, between April
   27, 2012, and October 1, 2016".

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=z1P5V1N0


ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Passengers Sue over Travel During Harvey
---------------------------------------------------------
Monica Pais, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class action claims Royal Caribbean put the lives of passengers at
risk by forcing them to travel to Texas during Hurricane Harvey
because it would not cancel or modify its scheduled cruise.

Hurricane Harvey hit southeast Texas as a category four hurricane
in late August killing at least 70 people and causing record
catastrophic flooding.

In a federal complaint filed in Miami on Sept. 28, lead plaintiff
Nikki McIntosh says that her cruise trip on the "Liberty of the
Seas" was scheduled to depart from Galveston, Texas on August 27
and return Sept. 3.

McIntosh, who traveled from Canada to Texas for the cruise, says
thousands of passengers arrived to Houston before and during
Hurricane Harvey because Royal Caribbean did not want to cancel
the cruise and have to offer passengers refunds.

"These passengers were strong armed into travelling to Houston
based on Royal Caribbean Cruises' assurances that safety was the
primary concern and the voyage would sail as scheduled; combined
with Royal Caribbean repeatedly advising passengers that if they
cancelled they would lose the entire cost of the purchased
cruise," the complaint says.

McIntosh claims passengers had to endure the devastating storm in
a city they didn't know, far from their loved ones. Throughout
their ordeal, the complaint says, passengers were often left
without power, and had access to only limited food and water.

Because the entire Texas coastline was in the projected path of
the hurricane, the Port of Galveston shut down its operations at
noon on August 25, a move that caused other cruise lines to cancel
or modify their scheduled excursions. Royal Caribbean, however,
"was "still attempting to find a way to make the scheduled
sailing," the complaint says.

McIntosh claims that prior to the sailing date Royal Caribbean
sent several updates and emails to its passengers regarding the
status of the cruise, but it was not until August 27, the
departure date, that the cruise line cancelled the voyage and
began to offer its clients the option to reschedule their
vacation, get a refund or obtain a future cruise credit.

"Prior to this all of the passengers were effectively forced to
travel to South Texas unless they wanted to forfeit the entirety
of what they paid for their cruise," McIntosh says.

She claims that Royal Caribbean was aware of the dangerous weather
conditions and flooding, and that Texas was in a state of
emergency, but yet failed to timely cancel the cruise because it
did not want to lose profit.

McIntosh seeks compensatory damages on claims of negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

She is represented by Michael Wikleman from Lipcon, Margulies,
Alsina & Winkleman PA in Miami, Fla.

A representative of Royal Caribbean did not immediately respond to
an email request for comment on the lawsuit.

The case is captioned, Nikki McIntosh, on her own behalf and on
behalf of all other similarly situated passengers scheduled to
have been aboard the M/V Liberty of the Seas, Plaintiffs, v. ROYAL
CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-23575-JLK
(S.D. Fla., September 29, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Michael A. Winkleman, Esq.
     Jason R. Margulies, Esq.
     Marc E. Weiner, Esq.
     LIPCON, MARGULIES, ALSINA & WINKLEMAN, P.A.
     Suite 1776, One Biscayne Tower
     2 South Biscayne Boulevard
     Miami, FL 33131
     Tel: (305) 373-3016
     Fax: (305) 373-6204
     E-mail: mwinkleman@lipcon.com
             JMargulies@lipcon.com
             MWeiner@lipcon.com


RSI ENTERPRISES: Class Certification Bid in "Machnik" Terminated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MICHAEL MACHNIK, the Plaintiff, v. RSI
ENTERPRISES, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-864 (E.D. Wisc.),
the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin entered an order terminating a
motion for class certification for administrative purposes.

However, the Court regards the motion as pending to the extent a
pending motion is required to satisfy the plaintiff's intended
protective purpose in light of Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662
F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), and Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S.
Ct. 663 (2016). This moots the other relief sought in the motion.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=8uLVRrwD


RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN: "Carney" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled BRIAN P. CARNEY and WILLIAM C. GUMPPER, JR.,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff(s), v. RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN, P.C., and JOHN DOES 1-25, the
Defendant(s), Case No. 3:15-cv-00260-BRM-DEA (D.N.J.), the
Plaintiffs ask Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class defined as:

      "all New Jersey Consumers who were sent notices or letters
      from Russell P. Goldman, P.C., prior to Russell P. Goldman,
      P.C., obtaining a judgment, against the such consumer,
      during the period between January 13, 2014 and March 20,
      2017, concerning a debt allegedly owed to New Jersey Higher
      Education Student Assistance Authority, which stated in
      part: There remains due a balance as shown above, which
      includes interest and collection costs.";

   2. appointing Plaintiffs, Brian P. Carney and William C.
      Grumpper, as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing Joseph K. Jones, Esq., and Benjamin J. Wolf, of
      Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC, as Class Counsel;

   4. granting Plaintiff and the Class such other and further
      relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=XIKb4spd

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          JONES WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227 5900
          Facsimile: (973) 244 0019
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com


SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Ontiveros "Suit" Seeks Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Yadir A. Ontiveros, the Plaintiff, v.
Safelite Fulfillment, Inc., et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-
cv-07118-DMG-RAO (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification;

   2. enjoining safelite from entering into individual settlement
      agreements with putative class members as part of a
      chindarah campaign;

   3. invalidating settlement agreements already entered into
      with putative class members as part of the chindarah
      campaign;

   4. requiring a curative letter be sent to the putative class;

   5. permitting Plaintiff to file a motion for sanctions against
      safelite and its counsel for their improper conduct in
      connection with the chindarah campaign; and

   6. disqualifying defense counsel Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
      Pease LLP and Rutan & Tucker, LLP.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=mQWXmZDb


SAM HOUSTON: Tex. App. Flips Denial of Arbitration in Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's denial of the Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned SAM HOUSTON
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL Appellants, v. JOE D. BERRY, ET
AL, Appellees, No. 09-16-00346-CV (Tex. App.).

In this accelerated, interlocutory appeal, Sam Houston Electric
Cooperative, Inc. and several individual members of the
cooperative's management and current and former directors
challenge the trial court's order denying their motion to compel
arbitration of purported class action claims and request to stay
those proceedings pending arbitration.

SHEC is a member-owned, not-for-profit electric cooperative
organized under the Texas Electric Cooperative Corporation Act
(ECCA) to provide electricity to its members in rural areas.
In 2012, the Board of Directors adopted amendments to SHEC's
Bylaws to include the following arbitration agreement:

Section 2.09. Dispute Resolution.

     A Member may submit a claim or dispute between the Member and
the Cooperative regarding the Governing Documents or Electric
Service to the Board for resolution. The Board may establish a
policy establishing a procedure for submitting a claim or dispute
to the Board. If the Board is unable to resolve the dispute, then
the Cooperative and the Member shall cooperate to select one or
more mediators to help resolve the dispute. If no resolution of
the dispute occurs through mediation, any party may demand binding
arbitration as provided under the laws of the State of Texas.

Lester Berry applied for membership with the cooperative in 1991,
and he maintained his membership until the time of his death in
late 2015. In early 2016, Lester Berry's son, Joe D. Berry, who
was not himself a member, filed suit against the cooperative on
behalf of Lester Berry's estate and his surviving heirs.2 Berry's
suit initially asserted wrongful death and survival causes of
action, alleging that Lester Berry, who was elderly, in poor
health, and required an oxygen concentrator, died after the
cooperative terminated electricity service to his home due to an
unpaid electric bill.

SHEC filed a motion to compel arbitration of the putative class
claims only and to stay the proceedings as to those claims pending
arbitration. After SHEC filed its motion to compel arbitration,
but before the motion was decided, Berry amended his pleadings
again to add Guillermo Cano, a member of the cooperative, to the
suit as an additional representative of the putative class.

Berry and Cano opposed SHEC's motion to compel, arguing that the
arbitration clause was not valid and enforceable because: (1) the
arbitration provision was added to the Bylaws after Lester Berry
became a member and was not signed by Lester Berry; (2) the
agreement is illusory because SHEC maintains a unilateral right to
amend or remove the provision by amending its Bylaws; (3) the
agreement is procedurally unconscionable because members of the
cooperative have little or no choice of electrical service
providers; and (4) the claims are not arbitrable because the
agreement does not expressly permit class arbitration.

Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied SHEC's
motion to compel arbitration and to stay the class proceedings
pending arbitration. SHEC thereafter filed a motion for the court
to reconsider the motion to compel arbitration and, alternatively,
to stay the proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. After a
second hearing, the trial court denied SHEC's motion to reconsider
as well as its motion to stay the proceedings. SHEC timely filed
this interlocutory appeal, and this Court granted SHEC's emergency
motion to stay the trial court proceedings pending this appeal.

Berry and Cano argue that the arbitration provision contained in
the 2012 Bylaws is not enforceable against members who joined the
cooperative prior to 2012 because the provision lacks mutual
assent as to those individuals.

Under direct benefits estoppel, a non-signatory plaintiff seeking
the benefits of a contract is estopped from simultaneously
attempting to avoid the contract's burdens, such as the obligation
to arbitrate disputes.

On appeal, Berry and Cano also argue that, although their claims
may, in some respects, touch upon the 2012 or 2014 Bylaws, the
doctrine of direct benefits estoppel does not apply to them
because their claims do not depend on the existence of the
specific arbitration provision contained in the Bylaws. This
argument ignores the fact that the arbitration provision is but
one part of a larger, comprehensive contract, and it is the very
principle of the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel that
prevents a party from enforcing the parts of a contract that
benefit him while seeking to invalidate the parts that do not.
When a party's right to recover and its damages depend on the
agreement containing the arbitration provision, the party is
relying on the agreement for its claims.

The class claims asserted in this case arise directly from the
contract that Berry and Cano seek to enforce; therefore direct
benefits estoppel applies.

In addition to establishing the existence of an enforceable
arbitration agreement, SHEC must also establish that the dispute
at issue falls within the scope of the provision. Once a valid
arbitration agreement is established, a strong presumption
favoring arbitration arises, and we resolve doubts as to the
agreement's scope in favor of arbitration.

The vast majority of the factual allegations that have been
asserted by Berry and Cano do not, procedurally, fall outside of
the scope of the 2012 Bylaws. Moreover, to come within the scope
of the arbitration provision, a party's allegations need only be
factually intertwined with arbitrable claims or otherwise touch
upon the subject matter of the agreement containing the
arbitration provision.

Accordingly, viewing Berry and Cano's factual allegations and
resolving any doubts regarding the provision's scope in favor of
arbitration, the Tex. App. found that the putative class claims
are within the scope of the agreement.

Berry and Cano assert that the arbitration agreement is illusory
and unenforceable because SHEC maintained a unilateral right to
amend its Bylaws and thereby change the arbitration provision to
avoid performance.

Berry and Cano do not contest the sufficiency of consideration to
support the underlying contract in this matter; to the contrary,
they steadfastly rely upon the asserted validity of the 2012
Bylaws as a contract that they seek to enforce against SHEC. As we
have already determined that the doctrine of direct benefits
estoppel prevents Berry and Cano from selectively enforcing the
provisions of the 2012 Bylaws that benefit them while
simultaneously attacking the provision they do not like, we reject
their argument that the lack of independent consideration allows
them to carve out the distasteful provisions of a contract they
otherwise seek to enforce.

Berry and Cano further asserted in the trial court that the
arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable because many
of the cooperative's members have no choice of electrical service
providers and no bargaining power in relation to the Bylaws.
Although a reviewing court will, in the absence of findings of
fact or conclusions of law, presume that a trial court made any
necessary finding of fact to support a ruling, we cannot imply a
factual finding that is not supported by evidence. Without any
evidence supporting a claim of unconscionability, we find that
Berry and Cano failed to meet their burden on this affirmative
defense.

Finally, Berry and Cano argue that their putative class action
claims are not arbitrable because the arbitration provision
contained in the 2012 Bylaws does not specifically consent to
class arbitration.

In support of this argument, they rely upon an opinion from the
United States Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds
Int'l Corp., which held that a party may not be compelled under
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.
We find Berry and Cano's reliance on Stolt-Nielsen misplaced, as
that case does not stand for the proposition that a claimant can
avoid an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement by asserting
claims on behalf of an entire class; rather, it addressed under
what circumstances an arbitrator could compel parties in
arbitration to proceed as a class.  Stolt-Nielsen does not
overrule prior Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions requiring
questions of arbitrability, including the availability of class
mechanisms, to be deferred to arbitration by agreement.

The Tex. App. therefore rejected Berry and Cano's argument that
their attempt to achieve class certification nullifies an
otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement.

The Tex. App. reversed the trial court's order denying SHEC's
motion to compel arbitration and remand for entry of an order
compelling arbitration and staying further proceedings as to Berry
and Cano's class action claims pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s September 28, 2017 Opinion is
available at  http://tinyurl.com/y9gxewjlfrom Leagle.com.

Frederick L. McGuire, 714 Main St, Liberty, TX 77575-4814, Nomaan
Husain, 5858 Westheimer, Suite 400

Houston, TX 77057, Misty A. Hataway-Cone, 17280 West Lake Houston
Parkway

Humble, Texas 77346, Etta Davidson, Rick McGuire Law, 714 Main
Street, Liberty, TX 77575, Joshua R. Leske, 5858 Westheimer Rd,
Ste 400, Houston, TX 77057-5644, for Joe D. Berry, Appellee.

Christopher Johnsen -- christopher@johnsenlawoffices.com -- Mark
Davis -- Mark.Davis@hklaw.com -- L. Bradley Hancock --
Brad.Hancock@hklaw.com -- Theresa Wanat -- Theresa.Wanat@hklaw.com
-- for Sam Houston Electric Cooperative, Inc., Appellant.


SCANA CORP: Delmater Sues over Abandoned Nuke Plant Project
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ellen Robinson, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
a class of South Carolina residents claims in court that SCANA, an
energy holding company, violated a federal racketeering statute by
charging customers for the cost of a multi-billion dollar nuclear
project that won't be completed.

In a federal lawsuit filed in Columbia, S.C. on Sept 22, the class
says SCANA and its partner on the nuclear project, the Santee
Cooper utility, knew the project was coming undone, but continued
to deceive the public and the Public Service Commission with
optimistic statements that allowed them to continue to bill
consumers for the work.

The lawsuit names only SCANA as a defendant. Santee Cooper is not
a party to the litigation.

The partners abandoned development of the nuclear plant on July
31, and SCANA had spent $9.8 billion to bring it to fruition.

The holding company then announced that consumers will be charged
$2 billion over the next 60 years to cover the cost of shutting
the project down.

The class claims SCANA and Santee Cooper increased utility rates
14 times to cover project costs. It claims the executives were
aware the plan was headed for failure from the beginning.

The complaint says that even after Betchel Corporation released a
2016 report pointing to significant problems with the project,
SCANA awarded top executives with bonuses for promoting
"operational excellence" in developing the nuclear plant.

Among other issues allegedly identified in the Betchel report were
contractors' reliance on plans that were not specific to the
reactor project, making it impossible to calculate costs and
deadlines, and necessitating numerous design changes.

It stated SCANA should hire a management company and reassess the
project, however executives ignored the recommendations, the
plaintiffs claim.

On September 25, leaders in the South Carolina House of
Representatives asked the State Law Enforcement Division to
investigate SCANA for possible "criminal fraud" related to the
partially built nuclear reactors.

A House panel was also scheduled to hold a hearing on the matter
on September 26, hoping to gain more clarity on what went wrong
with the project.

The class is represented by Brian Gambrell of the Law Offices of
Jason E. Taylor in Columbia.

It seeks actual, compensatory and consequential damages.

A representative of SCANA could not immediately be reached for
comment.

The case is captioned, Christine Delmater, Stephanie Speicher on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
vs. SCANA Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-02563-TLW (D.
S.C., Sept. 22, 2017).

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Brian C Gambrell, Esq.
   The Law Offices of Jason E Taylor
   1122 Lady Street, Suite 1020
   Columbia, SC 29201
   Tel: (800) 351-3008
   Fax: (803) 610-1931
   Email: bgambrell@jasonetaylor.com


SLIDE FIRE: Faces Class Suit by Vegas Shooting Victims
------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
three people who attended the country music festival where a
gunman massacred 58 people Oct. 1 have filed a class action in Las
Vegas, against the maker of bump stock, an attachment used by the
gunman to modify his semi-automatic rifles to fire at almost the
same rate as automatics.

Devon Prescott filed the class action in Clark County, Nevada,
court on behalf of all people who attended the Route 91 Harvest
Music Festival near the Mandalay Bay Hotel, where Stephen Paddock
rained gunfire onto the crowd attending the three-day event.

The putative class is represented by Robert Eglet and three others
at Eglet Prince in Las Vegas, and by Jonathan Lowy of the Brady
Center to Prevent Gun Violence in Washington. The gun control
group is expected to announce the filing with the law firm at
October 10 morning press conference in Las Vegas.

"The people who attended the concert have suffered so much
already," the firm and Brady Center said in joint statement. "The
physical injuries are staggering, and we know the emotional
injuries can be equally severe and long term. Brady has decades of
experience supporting the victims of gun violence and has been the
only organization in the nation focused on seeking justice for
them in the courts."

Prescott and two others name the maker of the bump stock device,
Slide Fire Solutions of Moran, Texas, and other unidentified
manufacturers. They claim Slide Fire markets the product under the
guise that it helps gun owners who suffer from a lack of mobility
in their hands. But bump fire stock inventor Jeremiah Cottle has
stated the attachment was for "'people like me, [who] love full
auto,'" a statement that betrays the actual purpose of the product
-- to convert rifles into fully automatic firearms, according to
the complaint.

Paddock fired at concertgoers from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay
Bay Hotel on the night of Sunday, Oct. 1. The massacre is the
worst mass shooting in modern U.S. history, killing 58 and
injuring nearly 500.

Authorities say the 64-year-old gunman stashed more than dozen
rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition in his hotel room. He
rained gunfire on thousands of panicked concertgoers over 11
minutes.  Investigators found Paddock dead in his hotel room from
a self-inflicted gunshot wound.

The Oct. 6 lawsuit says the class does not "challenge the right of
law-abiding citizens to bear arms" but says that Slide Fire
negligently sells bump stock to gun owners to avoid state and
federal laws banning the use of military-style automatic weapons.

"Paddock could not have injured so many people without a bump
stock. Paddock may not have launched his military-style assault
without a bump stock. There are people who were killed, injured,
and suffered emotional distress who would not have been if Paddock
had not possessed a bump stock," the 30-page filing states.

The National Firearms Act regulates the sale of fully automatic
weapons so that members of the public cannot obtain them,
according to the Brady Center.

Slide Fire grossed more than $10 million from the sales of bump
stocks in 2010 and sold bump stock models for between $100 and
$400, according to the lawsuit. The company has suspended the sale
of the devices through its website, according to the Brady Center,
and disabled a feature that allowed buyers to locate dealers
through the site.

In a rare display of bipartisanship on the issue of gun violence,
both Democrats and Republicans voiced support for a ban on a
device. The powerful gun lobby National Rifle Association has said
the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
should take a closer look at the products but has also said it
would challenge a complete ban.

The lawsuit seeks the creation of a court-supervised medical and
psychological monitoring program for the class of plaintiffs, as
well as punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs.

Slide Fire Solutions and Cottle did not respond to requests for
comment.


SMITH TRANSPORT: "Ratliff" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEROME RATLIFF JR., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
SMITH TRANSPORT, INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, and SMITH
TRANSPORT U.S.A., INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-07199 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court for an order:

   a. granting Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all individuals in the United States who, from the date
      five years prior to the date of the filing of this action
      to the present, submitted an online job application to
      Defendant and were denied employment based in whole or in
      part on information contained in a consumer report without
      being provided within three business days of such adverse
      action an oral, written or electronic notification: (i)
      that adverse action has been taken based in whole or in
      part on a consumer report received from a consumer
      reporting agency; (ii) of the name, address and telephone
      number of the consumer reporting agency that furnished the
      consumer report; (iii) that the consumer reporting agency
      did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
      unable to provide to them the specific reasons why the
      adverse action was taken; and (iv) that they may, upon
      providing proper identification, request a free copy of a
      report and may dispute with the consumer reporting agency
      the accuracy or completeness of any information in a
      report";

   b. appointing Plaintiff Jerome Ratliff Jr. as Class
      Representative;

   c. appointing Michael Aschenbrener and Adam York of KamberLaw
      LLC as Class Counsel; and

   d. providing any and all other relief that the Court deems
      equitable and just.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=u9SrSZ5A

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Aschenbrener, Esq.
          Adam C. York, Esq.
          KamberLaw LLC
          220 N Green St
          Chicago, IL 60607
          Telephone: (212) 920-3072
          E-mail: masch@kamberlaw.com
                  ayork@kamberlaw.com


SONIC CORP: Vanderzanden and Carlton Sue over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Sonic Corp., the drive-through burger chain, announced a data hack
on September 27, 2017 that could affect 5 million customers and
bring $2.3 billion in damages, consumers claim in a federal class
action in Portland, Ore.

The case is captioned, MICHELLE VANDERZANDEN and JAMES CARLTON,
individually and on behalf of all others, Plaintiffs, v. SONIC
CORPORATION, Defendant., Case 3:17-cv-01528-MO (D. Ore., September
27, 2017).

Lead Attorney for Plaintiffs:

     Michael Fuller Esq.
     OLSEN DAINES PC
     US Bancorp Tower
     111SW 5th Ave., Suite 3150
     Portland, OR 97204
     Direct: 503-201-4570
     E-mail: michael@underdoglawyer.com

Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Mark Geragos Esq.
     Ben Meiselas Esq.
     Lori Feldman Esq.
     GERAGOS & GERAGOS
     Historic Engine Co. No. 28
     644 South Figueroa Street
     Los Angeles, CA 90017
     Tel: 213-625-3900
     E-mail: geragos@geragos.com


ST. LOUIS, MO: "Ahmad" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MALEEHA AHMAD, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, the Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-2455-
RLW (E.D. Mo.), the Plaintiffs move the Court to certify a class
consisting of:

   "persons who will observe, record, or participate in protest
   activity within the City of St. Louis in a traditional or
   designated public forum".

The Plaintiffs further ask the Court to appoint Plaintiffs as
class representatives; and appoint Gillian R. Wilcox, Jessie
Steffan, and Anthony E. Rothert as class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=qoBfOph7

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anthony E. Rothert, Esq.
          Jessie Steffan, Esq.
          GILLIAN R. WILCOX,
          ACLU OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
          454 Whittier Street
          St. Louis, MO 63108
          Telephone: (314) 652 3114
          E-mail: arothert@aclu-mo.org
                  jsteffan@aclu-mo.org
                  gwilcox@aclu-mo.org


STARKIST CO: Must Defend Against Price-Fixing Claims
----------------------------------------------------
Bianca Bruno, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
major food suppliers and grocers were handed a victory in their
antitrust case against the top three packaged tuna companies in
the nation, as a federal court judge in San Diego refused to
dismiss the case.

U.S. District Judge Janis Sammartino noted in her 33-page order
issued on September 26, 2017 the "factual footing has shifted" in
the multidistrict litigation against Starkist, Bumble Bee and
Chicken of the Sea parent company Tri-Union, consolidated in the
Southern District of California.

"Whereas previously the United States Department of Justice had
merely convened a grand jury to investigate potential violations
of the Sherman Act in the packaged seafood industry, there have
now been multiple guilty pleas either entered or agreed to
pursuant to the grand jury investigation, including by senior
executives of the Bumble Bee Corporation and the Bumble Bee
Corporation itself," Sammartino wrote.

The major packaged-tuna suppliers were sued in 2015 on claims of a
conspiracy to raise tuna prices in the United States, which had
been a floundering market as canned and packaged tuna appeal less
to U.S. consumers. Since the action was filed in San Diego, the
Justice Department has filed criminal charges against top
executives following its investigation into the conspiracy.

Earlier this year, Bumble Bee pleaded guilty to a criminal
conspiracy charge and agreed to pay $25 million for its
involvement in the price-fixing scheme. Former Starkist and Del
Monte executive Stephen Hodge has also pleaded guilty for his part
in the conspiracy.

Since the Justice Department probe, government officials have
handed over 2 million pages of documents to the plaintiffs'
counsel that were previously only available to the grand jury.

At issue in the case was when the suspected conspiracy began and
ended.

Sammartino declined to dismiss the post-2013 conspiracy
allegations against the tuna companies, finding it would "set a
dangerous precedent regarding the ability to continually hamstring
a plaintiff with wave after wave of motions to dismiss" since the
tuna companies had not previously requested dismissal of over two
years of the alleged conspiratorial reach.

She noted the amended complaint by the direct-purchaser plaintiffs
includes a list of allegations from 2014 and 2015 regarding the
continued conspiracy, including an email from Bumble Bee's CEO
regarding "keeping prices at current levels," private meetings
between CEOs of the packaged-tuna companies, internal price lists
and distribution of conspiracy proceeds.

Those allegations are enough to support a plausible inference the
conspiracy continued beyond 2013, Sammartino found.

The judge also refused to dismiss the pre-2011 conspiracy claims
against Starkist and Del Monte, agreeing that the defendants'
arguments the allegations do not establish they were part of the
conspiracy prior to 2011 are "absurd on their face."

Evidence by plaintiffs that the tuna companies first began
considering price-based collusion in 2004, and that defendant CEOs
considered sharing internal price lists by email or fax only until
Bumble Bee's CEO told them to overnight the price lists and not
share them via other electronic means, is enough to survive
dismissal, Sammartino found.

During that same time in 2004 the defendant CEOs were also in
close contact ahead of a major trade event in the industry which
focused on the state of the U.S. tuna market. A memo between the
defendants apparently confirmed when price increases would be
announced by each company, according to Sammartino's summary of
the case.

Defendants' "attempt to treat categories of events in isolation
. . . fails to account for the entire picture revealed by
plaintiffs' complaints," Sammartino wrote.

The judge did dismiss some of the state antitrust and consumer-
protection claims brought under South Carolina, Illinois and New
York laws, though the claims were dismissed without prejudice and
can be amended.

The case is captioned, IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION Case 3:15-md-02670-JLS-MDD (S.D. Cal., September 26,
2017).


SPX CORPORATION: Denial of Injunction in ERISA Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's denial of the Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned JOSEPH DI
BIASE, Individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons;
JOHN PRODORUTTI, Individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons; DAVID BRASS, Individually and on behalf of similarly
situated persons; RON BEEGLE, Individually and on behalf of
similarly situated persons; DAVID BOBCOCK, Individually and on
behalf of similarly situated persons; CARL VAN LOON, Individually
and on behalf of similarly situated persons; INTERNATIONAL UNION,
UNITED AUTOMOBILE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
UAW, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPX CORPORATION, Defendant-
Appellee, No. 15-2340 (4th Cir.).

The individual plaintiffs, retirees of SPX Corporation, their
spouses and eligible dependents, and their labor union, the
International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, UAW, appeal the district court's
denial of their motion for preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs filed the class action against SPX. They alleged that
the HRA accounts offered by SPX were not substantially equivalent
to their current healthcare benefits and that the implementation
of SPX's new arrangement would breach the settlement agreements in
violation of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA) and Section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin
SPX from terminating the current healthcare plan and implementing
the HRA accounts during the pendency of the action or until
further order of the court. They asserted that absent injunctive
relief, they would "suffer severe emotional distress and
irreparable harm to their health and welfare.

Nearly nine months after the effective date of the HRA accounts,
the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion as moot, and moreover
held that Plaintiffs failed to meet the standard required for a
preliminary injunction. As to the issue of mootness, the district
court noted that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo pending a final determination on the
merits of the case.

The district court concluded that the status quo, the provision of
health insurance through the group health insurance plans, had
already changed with the implementation of the HRA accounts.
Finding that the change Plaintiffs sought to prohibit had already
occurred, the district court held that the motion was moot because
a "request for an injunction to prohibit an act is rendered moot
by the happening of the act."

The district court alternatively concluded that Plaintiffs were
unable to meet the standard required for a preliminary injunction.
First, the court noted that granting the preliminary injunction
and returning to the status quo would result in SPX having to
revert to the group health insurance plan, which would only cause
more emotional distress and harm. The court found that Plaintiffs
were unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.5 It
held that the ultimate success of Plaintiffs' claims depends on
the determination of whether the HRA structure provides
substantially equivalent' health benefits.

According to the court, Plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient
evidence to make such a determination, and a fact-sensitive
inquiry such as this required a more developed evidentiary record,
which would only become available through discovery.

Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court.

On appeal, Plaintiffs maintain that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to grant the preliminary injunction. SPX
counters that the motion was moot and that in any event,
plaintiffs have not established any of the four criteria necessary
to grant a preliminary injunction.

The Fourth Circuit reviews a district court's denial of a motion
for preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.  In its
analysis, the Fourth Circuit reviews the district court's factual
findings for clear error and review its legal conclusions de novo.
When a motion for preliminary injunction is denied as moot, there
are no factual or legal findings for this court to review. Rather,
in such cases, we must determine whether the court abused its
discretion by failing to exercise it.

The principal function of a preliminary injunction is to maintain
the status quo.  Thus a request for an injunction to prohibit an
act is rendered moot by the happening of the act. But a
preliminary injunction can also act to restore, rather than merely
preserve, the status quo, even when the non-moving party has
disturbed it.

Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit and motion for preliminary
injunction in 2014, before SPX cancelled the group health
insurance and implemented the HRAs, with the intent of preserving
the status quo, and now seek to restore it. They argue the motion
was not moot and the district court retained the legal authority
to restore the status quo.

SPX argues that the motion is moot because the change the
plaintiffs sought to prohibit  implementation of the HRAs  is
complete and cannot be undone without causing administrative and
financial concerns, confusion, gaps in coverage and possible
financial loss.

Undoing the HRA approach and reverting to group coverage,
according to SPX, would require action by both SPX and the
retirees, who would have to terminate the plans purchased with
their HRAs, only to switch again to return to HRAs if SPX prevails
on the merits. But these logistical hurdles, did not, as SPX
claims, make a return to the status quo impossible, and they
certainly did not render Plaintiffs' motion moot. SPX's
implementation of the HRAs did not strip the district court of its
power to determine whether parties should return to the status quo
pending the outcome of the underlying dispute.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit agreed that based on this Court's
decisions in Aggarao and Pashby, Plaintiffs' motion was not mooted
by HRA implementation. The Fourth Circuit adopted the view that a
motion for preliminary injunction filed before the act to be
enjoined has occurred, and subsequently intended to restore the
status quo once it has been disturbed, is not moot.

Next, the Fourth Circuit considered the threshold issues related
to jurisdiction and standing pursuant to the LMRA and ERISA, and
regarding class certification that SPX first raised in the
district court. The district court noted in its opinion that SPX
asserted these issues, to which Plaintiffs had failed to respond,
but declined to address them, concluding only that those threshold
issues aside, the ultimate success of Plaintiffs' claims depends
on the determination of whether the HRA structure provides
substantially equivalent' health benefits, and that Plaintiffs
have not offered sufficient probative evidence to allow the Court
to make any determination regarding the merits of their claims.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs have, at a minimum,
stated a claim pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B). It provides
that a civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or
beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.
Plaintiffs have pled that they are participants in an employee
welfare benefit plan, and that the reduction of retiree health
care benefits violates the terms of the plan.

As relief, Plaintiffs seek the entry of a judgment against SPX
under Section 502(a)(1)(B) which clarifies the rights of
Plaintiffs under the terms of the settlement agreements by
declaring that the implementation of HRAs is not the substantial
equivalent of the insurance plans specified in the settlement
agreements.  Having found that the district court has jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B),
this Court is satisfied that it may continue to consider the
substance of Plaintiffs' appeal.

The Fourth Circuit said it need not therefore, for purposes of
this appeal, establish district court jurisdiction as to the
remaining claims.

The Fourth Circuit considered whether the district court properly
found that Plaintiffs had not established a likelihood of success
on the merits of the underlying healthcare coverage dispute.
While case law from our sister circuits may be deemed persuasive
when deciding these issues on the merits, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with SPX's assertion that at a minimum, the pertinent
provisions of the settlement agreements are ambiguous on the
question of whether an HRA is a plan that provides coverage as
contemplated by the parties. Such ambiguity is simply insufficient
to support a finding that success on the merits is likely rather
than merely possible and is fatal to Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction.

Thus, the Fourth Circuit said it must conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

Any injuries retirees may have suffered in terms of time, money
and energy expended in the absence of an injunction were not
enough to support a finding of irreparable harm.  Plaintiffs
otherwise have failed to provide evidence that anyone has suffered
any of the potential irreparable harms identified, or that any
such harms were imminent. As the Supreme Court noted in Winter,
the possibility of irreparable harm does not constitute a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Given the
extraordinary nature of the remedy, a preliminary injunction is
not warranted where, as here, the moving parties have not shown
that they availed themselves of opportunities to avoid the
injuries of which they now complain.

Thus the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate they were likely to suffer irreparable harm without
the injunction.

Granting the preliminary injunction would require SPX to cancel
the current HRA accounts and reinstate group coverage, which may
only be temporary if SPX ultimately prevails on the merits. The
HRA accounts have been in effect for over two years. Given the
administrative challenges and confusion for the retirees who must
navigate the process of securing healthcare coverage each time the
approach for providing healthcare benefits changes, and that
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits or irreparable harm, the balance of equities and the public
interest are better served by allowing the underlying litigation
proceed to a decision on the merits.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion for
preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's September 28, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y76w9gw9from
Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Narendra K. Ghosh, PATTERSON HARKAVY LLP, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, for Appellants, 100 Europa Dr #420, Chapel Hill,
NC 27517, USA

Mark A. Hiller -- mhiller@robinsonbradshaw.com -- ROBINSON,
BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Michael L. Fayette -- mfayette@psfklaw.com -- PINSKY,
SMITH, FAYETTE & KENNEDY, LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellants.

David C. Wright, III -- dwright@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Cary B.
Davis -- cdavis@robinsonbradshaw.com -- Amanda R. Pickens --
apickens@robinsonbradshaw.com -- ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON,
P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.


STARWOOD HOTELS: Heilmann Sues over Loyalty Points
--------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that class of cardholders claims
in a federal lawsuit that American Express and Starwood Hotels did
not fulfill their promise of 35,000 hotel loyalty points for
$5,000 in purchases the first six months after getting a Starwood
Preferred Guest-branded credit card.

The case is captioned, WILLIAM HEILMANN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, AMERICAN
EXPRESS BANK, FSB, STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE, LLC, and
PREFERRED GUEST, INC., Defendants, Case 1:17-cv-06942 (N.D. Ill.,
September 26, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class:

     William M. Sweetnam, Esq.
     SWEETNAM LLC
     100 North La Salle Street, Suite 2200
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Tel: (312) 757-1888
     E-mail: wms@sweetnamllc.com


STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK: Faces Tennis Players' Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Christine Stuart, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that four aspiring tennis greats brought a federal class action on
September 29, against the State University of New York at Albany
for disbanding their team just before championships.

"The decision to end women's tennis at SUNY Albany left the
players -- all but one of whom were foreign students -- in limbo,"
the complaint states. "For the foreign players, the option was to
withdraw from defendant SUNY Albany, give-up their visas, and
return to their countries of origin, only to restart the process
of applying to universities with the hope of gaining admission,
obtaining scholarships, winning a spot on another tennis team, and
securing a new visa, all before the next season began. The women
could have stayed at SUNY Albany and kept their scholarships. But
these women are athletes, who trained from an early age to play
tennis, who were recruited by SUNY Albany to play tennis, and who
came to defendant's campus to play tennis. The choice to stay and
forego their dream -- a choice that their male counterparts would
never be required to make -- was not a real choice or a viable
option for these plaintiffs."

SUNY Albany's decision to shutter its women's tennis program began
in secret, according to the complaint, shortly after the hiring of
Mark Benson as athletics director.

Though Benson allegedly lacks experience directing an NCAA
Division I program, such as the SUNY Albany women's tennis team,
he has a reputation for packing stadiums with paying fans.

This was in desperate need at Albany, which was just about to open
its 8,500-seat multisport complex in January 2013 when it learned
that the New York Giants ended their 16-year run of conducting
summer drills at the school, according to the complaint.

Along with four of the nine players who made up SUNY Albany's
female tennis team, on September 29 complaint is led by coach
Gordon Graham.  The complaint says Benson informed Graham in March
2016 that SUNY Albany would terminate the women's tennis team,
opening up its $365,000 operating budget for redistribution.
Graham said he could not keep Benson's secret from the players as
they prepared for the America East Conference Championships,
slated for May 2016.

"He had recruited them from around the world and plaintiff Graham
knew they would be devastated," the complaint states.

Graham and his assistant coaches then took the players to Benson
himself. "After that meeting a furious Benson screamed at and
threatened Graham," the complaint states.

The players offer a theory about why Benson kept his actions
secret: "to deprive [them] of any effective opportunity to contest
the decision."

"This secret decision also denied Plaintiffs any opportunity to
plan for, protect themselves against, or mitigate the sudden and
devastating impacts on their personal and academic lives and
sports careers," the complaint continues.

Casting himself as a whistleblower, 65-year-old Graham says he
faced pressure to retire.

"Having failed to persuade him to retire with demotions and
humiliation, in July 2016 defendant SUNY Albany notified plaintiff
Graham that despite five years of excellent annual reviews and
championship results, his contract would not be renewed after it
expired on August 14, 2017," the complaint states.

While the coach seeks damages for age discrimination, the athletes
want an injunction against violations of Title IX, the federal law
banning sex discrimination in education.  They note that their
team hardly makes a dent in SUNY Albany's more-than $540,000,000
budget.

"Merely rounding the roster caps for a few of its seven men's
teams" would make up the difference, according to the complaint.

"This would be an even lighter burden for the next year, as there
are only two of the women's tennis team's players who remain
enrolled at the university," the complaint states. "Upon
information and belief, defendant would gain public relations and
enrollment advantages from doing so, which could be economically
advantageous in attracting more students by demonstrating to
student-athletes prompt action and commitment to comply with Title
IX by offering more opportunities for its female students. The
first two championship-level tennis players are currently on
campus, the former head coach of women's tennis is still present
in the community, the coach handles all the organizational,
scheduling, logistical, and training for the program, his contract
is still warm, and the program's cost is insignificant. If
defendants were not merely retaliating against the plaintiffs,
reinstating women's tennis would be the easiest of baby steps
toward both Title IX compliance and mitigation of ongoing harm."

Lead plaintiff Isidora Pejovic noted that she attended Albany on a
student visa from Serbia.  Though she was recruited by other
schools when the tennis program at SUNY Albany disbanded, the
rising junior says "but did not have the resources or ability to
transfer."  To transfer Pejovic would have had to apply for and
obtain admission to another institution with room and a
scholarship for her on the women's tennis program, then withdraw
from SUNY Albany, return to Serbia, forfeit her student visa, and
reapply for a new visa specific to a new school.  NCAA rules allow
student-athletes in Division I program "only . . . a single
transfer to a Division I school," according to the complaint.

South Korea-born Chae Bean King and Alba Sala Huerta of Spain have
similar stories. Chassidy King, the fourth plaintiff, was the only
U.S. citizen on the team.

The complaint notes that federal education officials investigated
the civil rights issues alleged here, but that the "toothless"
resolution reached with the university requires it only to stop
violating Title IX not later than the 2020-21 academic year.

SUNY Albany faces no sanctions for its present misconduct,
however, and no threat of sanctions if it fails to comply by the
2020-21 deadline.

The plaintiffs are represented by Bernays Barclay of Rimon PC.

The case is captioned, ISIDORA PEJOVIC, CHAE BEAN KANG, ALBASALA
HUERTA, and CHASSIDY KING, Individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, and GORDON GRAHAM, Plaintiffs, vs. STATE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY, and MARK BENSON, Defendants,
Case No. 5:00-99999 (N.D.N.Y. September 29, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Bernays T. Barclay, Esq.
     RIMON P.C.
     255 Patroono Creek Boulevard #4467
     Albany, NY 12206
     Telephone: 516-375-2524
     E-mail: buz.barclay@rimonlaw.com


STEPTOE & JOHNSON: "Houck" Plaintiff Seeks to Notify Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JI-IN HOUCK, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. STEPTOE & JOHNSON
LLP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-04595-ODW-AFM (C.D. Cal.),
the Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, will move the Court on October 23, 2017 for an order
granting relief under the Equal Pay Act and authorizing the
mailing of notice of the existence of this litigation to members
of the proposed class.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=zQYtI7iw

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lori E. Andrus, Esq.
          Paul Laprairie, Esq.
          ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
          155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 986 1400
          Facsimile: (415) 986 1474
          E-mail: lori@andrusanderson.com
                  paul.laprairie@andrusanderson.com


STRATEGY ANESTHESIA: Court Denied Bid for Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled PROGRESSIVE HEALTH AND REHAB CORP.,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. STRATEGY ANESTHESIA, LLC, and
John Does 1-5, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-01151-EAS-KAJ
(S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Edmund A. Sargus entered an order:

   1. denying Defendant's motion to dismiss amended complaint;

   2. denying as moot Defendant's motion to dismiss original
      complaint; and

   3. denying without prejudice Plaintiff's first amended
      "Placeholder" Motion for Class Certification.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ZIoU9bm5


SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL: Court Denied Class Certification as Moot
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA, the Plaintiff, v. SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-03539-LB (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
Laurel Beeler entered an order:

   1. denying motion for leave to amend;

   2. denying motion for a TRO without prejudice to Jane Doe's
      asserting it in different lawsuit;

   3. denying motion for class certification as moot; and

   4. granting motion for leave to file an amicus brief.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=bBi7BaIL


TARGET CORPORATION: Faraji Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NEDA FARAJI, on behalf of herself, and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff(s), v. TARGET
CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation; and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, the Defendant(s), Case No. 5:17-cv-00155-ODW-SP
(C.D. Cal.), that Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, will move the Court on December 18, 2017, for
an order certifying these class and subclasses:

ETL-AP Class:

   "all persons Defendant employed in California as salaried
   ETL-APs and/or other positions with similar job titles,
   descriptions, duties, and/or compensation arrangements, at any
   time during the time period beginning November 28, 2012 and
   ending when final judgment is entered";

Waiting Time Subclass:

   "all persons Defendant employed in California as salaried ETL-
   APs  who separated from employment with Defendant during the
   period beginning three years before the filing of this action
   and ending when final judgment is entered"'

Wage Statement Subclass:

   "all persons Defendant employed in California as salaried ETL-
   APs to whom Defendant issued a wage statement during the
   period beginning one year before the filing of this action and
   ending when final judgment is entered"; and

Civil Penalties Subclass:

   "all persons Defendant employed in California as salaried ETL-
   APs during the period beginning one year before Plaintiff's
   written notice to the LWDA and ending when final judgment is
   entered."

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=B2VEl7BO

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Blvd., Suite 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone (818) 582 3086
          Facsimile (818) 582 2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Ave, Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (888) 474 7242
          Facsimile: (562) 256 1006
          E-mail: walter@whaines.com


TNJ ENTERPRISES: "Gomez" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Luiny Gomez, Edickson Garcia, Julian
Vasquez, and Ramon Hidalgo, on behalf of themselves and all other
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. TNJ Enterprises
Inc. d/b/a Domino's Pizza, Frank Lazauskus, and John Does No.
1-10, the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-04824-SDW-LDW (D.N.J.), the
Plaintiffs move the Court for an order:

   1. provisionally certifying a class, for settlement purposes
      only, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

   2. conditionally certifying, for settlement purposes, an FLSA
      collective action under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b);

   3. granting preliminary approval of the final Joint
      Stipulation of Settlement Agreement and Release;

   4. approving a Notice of Proposed class Action Settlement;

   5. approving Claim Form attached to the Agreement;

   6. instructing the parties and all other interested parties to
      appear before this Court for a Final Approval and Fairness
      Hearing on a date at least 120 days from the date of the
      Preliminary Approval Order; and

   7. for such other and further relief as the Court may deem
      just and proper.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=W0jmmRBu

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Stein, Esq.
          David Nieporent, Esq.
          SAMUEL & STEIN
          38 West 32nd Street, Suite 1110
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 563 9884


TRUGREEN LIMITED: Morris et al. Seek Opt-In Rights Notice
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled GEORGE MORRIS, SHANNON BOYD, RYAN COLEMAN,
ANGEL APONTE, BARRY DAMICO, SCOTT SMITH, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. TRUGREEN
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-01465-PGB-GJK
(M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an Order permitting
and supervising notice to Defendant's current and former lawn
service technicians who worked one or more weeks during the three
years from the filing of the Complaint to the present and who are
similarly situated of their "opt-in" rights.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kvYNOmE5

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jay P. Lechner, Esq.
          Jason M. Melton, Esq.
          WHITTEL & MELTON, LLC
          One Progress Plaza
          200 Central Avenue, #400
          St. Petersburg, FL 33701
          Telephone: (727) 822 1111
          Facsimile: (727) 898 2001
          E-mail: Pleadings@theFLlawfirm.com
                  lechnerj@theFLlawfirm.com
                  kmoran@theFLlawfirm.com


TURNER OIL: "Stanley" Suit Seeks to Certify Landmen Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JONATHAN STANLEY, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs,
v. TURNER OIL & GAS PROPERTIES, INC., Case No. 2:16-cv-00386-JLG-
EPD (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. preliminary approving a class proposed in the Settlement
      Agreement;

      "all current and former contract Landmen who provided title
      abstract and related services to Defendant during the
      Covered Period of May 20, 2014 through March 27, 2016.";

   2. for settlement purposes, appointing Marshall and Forman LLC
      as Class Counsel for the Class Members;

   3. approving the proposed class action settlement procedure,
      including the Class Action Class Settlement Packet and
      notices contained therein, and direct the Claims
      Administrator to act accordingly;

   4. setting a deadline for Plaintiffs to file for final
      settlement approval and to petition for an award of
      attorneys' fees and costs;

   5. scheduling a final fairness hearing for the purposes of
      considering the reasonableness of the proposed Settlement
      Agreement, as well as Class Counsel's anticipated petition
      for an award of fees and costs;

The case is a class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime wages
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by Representative
Plaintiffs Jonathan Stanley and Mary Elliot, individually and on
behalf of others similarly-situated who performed contract Landman
title work for Defendant. In their initial Complaint Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, by
improperly classifying the contract Landmen as independent
contractors instead of employees and not paying them overtime pay
for hours worked over forty in a workweek.

On May 20, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint and
expanded their allegations to include a separate class action
claim based on the same fact under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act. The Representative Plaintiffs sought compensation
from Defendant for unpaid overtime and liquidated damages pursuant
to federal and state overtime laws, the FLSA and the Ohio Wage
Act.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fJ6XNrEf

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Edward R. Forman, Esq.
          John S. Marshall, Esq.
          Samuel M. Schlein, Esq.
          MARSHALL AND MORROW LLC
          250 Civic Center Dr., Suite 480
          Columbus, Ohio 43215-5296
          Telephone: (614) 463 9790
          Facsimile: (614) 463 9780
          E-mail: eforman@marshallandmorrow.com
                  jmarshall@marshallandmorrow.com
                  sschlein@marshallandmorrow.com

               - and -

          Matthew A. Schwartz, Esq.
          Louis A. Jacobs, Esq.
          230 Durand St
          Pickerington, OH 43147
          Telephone: (614) 949 9749
          Facsimile: (614) 321 3964
          E-mail: MSchwartzLaw@Gmail.com
                  LAJOhio@aol.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Sara H. Jodka, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Secrest, Esq.
          Sara H. Jodka, Esq.
          DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
          150 East Gay Street, Suite 2400
          Columbus, Ohio 43215
          Telephone (614) 744 2572
          Facsimile (248) 433 7274
          E-mail jsecrest@dickinsonwright.com
                  sjodka@dickinsonwright.com


TWITTER INC: Investors' Suit over Stock Price Drop Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Maria Denzio, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Twitter intentionally misled investors about user engagement
before coming clean about the declining number of daily active
users, an attorney for Twitter stockholders told a federal judge
in San Francisco, on October 5.

Attorney Daniel Drosman said Twitter's stock price dropped after
executives like Anthony Noto, Twitter's chief financial officer,
told analysts in November 2014 that its monthly active users would
grow to over 550 million.  But by 2015, its number daily active
users -- the primary method of measuring user engagement -- was
dropping off.

"When you make a point to conceal this information, you do it
intentionally," Drosman said.  He said Noto was evasive with
analysts who asked in February 2015 what they should look at to
determine whether user engagement was declining or improving.

"He doesn't tell them about daily active users. It's very
carefully crafted, and it had the intended effect," Drosman said,
noting the analysts went on to unwittingly praise Twitter's phony
growth.

"Noto knows what's going to make the stock go up," he said. "He's
a former Goldman Sachs guy."

Twitter eventually acknowledged user engagement was declining on
an earnings call in July 2015, causing stock price to drop,
Drosman said.

Drosman -- dand@rgrdlaw.com -- and his firm, Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd of San Diego, are litigating the case alongside South
Carolina firm Motley Rice. They represent a class of investors who
bought Twitter stock between Feb. 6, 2015 and July 28, 2015.

On October 5, at a hearing on Twitter's motion to dismiss, Drosman
said several confidential witnesses from inside Twitter "paint a
very bleak picture" of the site's daily active users during the
class period.

"If DAU [daily active users] remains flat and you're adding
additional MAU [monthly active users], what it says about this new
MAU is these aren't engaged users," Drosman said. "In any event
it's an adverse trend for DAU."

The witnesses also claim Twitter faked its monthly user growth by
prompting inactive users to log onto Twitter by sending out emails
indicating some kind of error with their accounts.

Twitter attorney James Kreissman -- jkreissman@stblaw.com -- with
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett in Palo Alto, said the company was as
realistic as it could be given its relative immaturity.

"Twitter is a young company in a young industry working hard to be
transparent in a rapidly changing environment," he said, noting
Twitter began to highlight ad engagement metrics over daily active
users because it helped explain that user engagement varies.

While the class claims ad engagement metrics aren't reflective of
user engagement, Twitter has argued a metric that tracks how users
interact with ads on its platform is an "obvious measure of user
engagement."

Kreissman also pointed to a statement that Noto made in April 2015
saying the company was "off to a slow start" in the first quarter
of that year.

"Defendants were realistic and transparent with investors about
user engagement during the class period. They provided similar
amounts of user engagement information during the class period.
This isn't the case where they issued optimistic guidance; in
fact, they issued some sober warnings," Kreissman said.

U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar challenged another quote from Noto
that appeared to say nothing about user engagement: "In our more
mature markets we have more DAU in emerging markets we have very
low DAU. They all migrate to a higher rate over time," Noto said
at the time.

"It doesn't tell you if user engagement is growing or how user
engagement is affecting the finance of the firm," Tigar said. "Do
you think there was a lack of clarity in the company about exactly
where the user engagement was? I'm not the best mathematician in
the world, but I'm confident based on that statement I have no
idea about what's happening with user engagement. There's so much
left out of that statement that it's really impossible to know
what's going on."

Kreissman said Noto was just trying to manage expectations, as
there are inherent limitations in relying on daily active users to
measure user engagement.

"They are providing the information that they have, and the lack
of more detailed information reflects the fact that user
engagement is not a plug-and-play kind of number. It's something
the company struggled with repeatedly as a young growing company
trying to find its way in the industry," Kreissman said. "This is
not sugar-coating things."

Tigar took the arguments under submission.

"Thanks for bringing me a very interesting securities case," he
said. "If I didn't have 300 other cases I would have set a much
longer hearing."


UNITED AIRLINES: "Pumputyte" Suit Seeks Certification of Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NERINGA PUMPUTYTE, et. al., the Plaintiffs,
v., the UNITED AIRLINES INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-
04868 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court enter an order
certifying a class, designating Ms. Pumputyte as Class
Representative, and appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class
Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=JkplUxsu

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Vladimir Gorokhovsky, Esq.
          GOROKHOVSKY LAW OFFICE, L.L.C.
          10994 P.O North Hedgewood Ln.
          Mequon, WI 53092
          Telephone: (414) 581 1582
          E-mail: gorlawoffice@yahoo.com


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: "Magadia" Suit Seeks to Certify 3 Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RODERICK MAGADIA, individually and on behalf
of all those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware corporation; WAL-MART STORES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00062-LHK (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff
will move the Court on January 11, 2018 for an order certifying
three Classes.

Meal Period Regular Rate Class:

   "all current and former California non-exempt retail store
   employees of Defendants who received non-discretionary
   remuneration, including "MYSHARE INCT," and was paid any meal
   period premium payments in the same period that the non-
   discretionary remuneration was earned, at any time between
   December 2, 2012, through the present"

Overtime/INCT Wage Statement Class:

   "all current and former California non-exempt employees of
   Defendants who received "OVERTIME/INCT," at any time between
   December 2, 2015, through the present; and

Final Wage Statement Class:

   "all former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in
   the State of California and whose employment terminated
   (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) at any time from
   December 2, 2015 to the present"

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=HXqz2QKU

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488 6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488 6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  kagnew@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531 4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634 0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

               - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488 6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488 6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com


UBER TECH: Two Women Sue over Sexual Assault by Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that in
two lawsuits against Uber on September 26, one woman says a driver
sexually assaulted her and another that a driver imprisoned her in
his car while making sexual and racist comments.

The women are both represented in Los Angeles Superior Court by
Lisa Bloom of Woodland Hills. Jane Doe (1) claims a driver named
Fernando sexually assaulted her on June 15 after picking her up in
Hollywood by "plac(ing) his hand beneath her bra and fondl(ing)
her breasts."

Doe says she pushed him away but he continued the assault while
driving on the Santa Monica Freeway. She reported the assault to
Uber, she says, "whose only response was 'do whatever you want
about the incident.'" She reported to assault to law enforcement.

Jane Doe (2) says a driver named Sam sexually harassed and
frightened her on May 29 during a ride near Los Angeles
International Airport.

Among other things, she says, Sam, who is black, asked her "if she
ever slept with a black man." He told her he was "young, dumb and
full of cum," that she looked like a whore, asked her to "stay
with" him because he hasn't "seen what you have," and told her,
"You have white girl issues. You need a therapist."

She says he purposely drove in the wrong direction to keep her
falsely imprisoned in his car, and demanded that she text him her
phone number, "NOW, before you get out!" She says she jumped from
the slowly moving car and is still scared because he knows her
address.  She also claims that Uber hires him and other drivers as
independent contractors, rather than employees, to duck liability
for their misbehavior.

Also on September 26, in Oakland, California, shareholders filed a
federal class action against Uber and its former CEO Travis
Kalanick, who was forced out in June amid allegations of rampant
sexist behavior by him and other Uber employees, which he did
little to stop.

In this lawsuit, the Irving firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund
claims Kalanick failed to disclose the company's flouting of laws,
sexist corporate culture and anticompetitive behavior while
issuing misleading statements about Uber's rapid growth and
revenue to obtain billions of dollars in investments in the
privately traded company.

The retirement fund is represented by Darren Robbins, with Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd.

According to the Courthouse News database, 524 lawsuits have been
filed against Uber this year, 21 of them class actions. At least
11 of them allege sexual misbehavior or discrimination. Kalanick
has been sued 14 times this year, three of them class actions.


UBER TECH: Faces Securities Suit by Irving Firemen's Fund
---------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a shareholder class action  in Oakland, Calif., filed on
September 26, claims Uber and its former CEO Travis Kalanick
gained billions in capital by misleading investors about its
misogynist workplace culture and corporate misconduct.

Uber courted more than $10 billion in investment dollars through
2016, reaching a value of nearly $70 billion. But its value has
dwindled in the wake of a series of scandals revealed over the
last year, including the company's alleged theft of trade secrets
and use of technology to evade regulatory authorities, according
to a lawsuit filed by a retirement fund for Irving, Texas,
firefighters.

"While outwardly representing itself as a start-up darling fueled
by technical innovation and entrepreneurial gumption in order to
induce billions of dollars of investment, behind the scenes Uber
was operating in violation of applicable law and driving its
expansion by a company-wide commitment to short-term growth at all
costs, no matter the legal, financial or reputational risks
involved," the 54-page complaint says.

The lawsuit lays out a laundry list of scandals that rocked the
ride-hail giant over the last year, including: the alleged theft
of trade secrets from Google-owned competitor Waymo; use of a
secret program called "Hell" to steal driver and rider data from
its competitor Lyft; use of a covert program, "Greyball," to
mislead regulators and evade local authorities; systemic
discrimination against female employees; the alleged theft of
medical records from a sexual assault victim that sued the
company; and a federal investigation into potential violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

The scandals forced Kalanick to step down as CEO in June, but he
remains a member of the company's board of directors.

According to the lawsuit, Kalanick and the company used a series
of misleading statements in media appearances and interviews to
push a false narrative about the company's prospects for growth
and future success.

The complaint cites Kalanick's statements during interviews in
2014 and 2016, in which he said "[w]e've been working in good
faith with regulators" and that the company is "following all the
rules."

A report by The New York Times revealed in March that the company
used "Greyball" since at least 2014 to identify and circumvent
government officials that tried to use the Uber app to investigate
potential violations of law in Portland, Boston, Las Vegas, and in
foreign cities and countries including Paris, Australia, China and
South Korea.

The lawsuit also cites a July 2015 press release that stated, "For
many women, Uber is a flexible, equitable opportunity."

In February, a former Uber engineer Susan Fowler wrote a blog post
detailing how the company refused to discipline a male manager who
sexually harassed her because he was considered a "high
performer." Her blog post led other female employees to come
forward about Uber's failure to properly investigate or address
complaints of sexual harassment.

In response, Uber hired former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
to investigate the company's corporate culture. Holder proposed a
series of "sweeping changes to the company's leadership,
organization, management and culture, offering proscriptions that
contradicted defendants' prior representations about Uber's
culture and workplace," according to the complaint.

While Uber and Kalanick touted the company's exponential and
unprecedented growth to attract investment dollars, the retirement
fund says they failed to disclose underlying issues that posed
major risks for the company's future growth and profitability.

Investors like mutual fund companies Vanguard Group and T. Rowe
Price have marked down the value of their Uber shares by as much
as 15 percent, and the company is estimated to have lost $18
billion in market capitalization, according to the complaint.

The Irving Fireman's Relief & Retirement Fund seeks compensatory
damages for a class of investors who purchased shares in Uber
between June 6, 2014, and September 22, 2017.  It is represented
by Darren Robbins of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd in San Diego.

Uber did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment on
September 26.

The case is captioned, IRVING FIREMEN'S RELIEF & RETIREMENT FUND,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, vs. UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC. and TRAVIS KALANICK,
Defendants, Case 4:17-cv-05558-DMR (N.D. Cal., September 26,
2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

DARREN J. ROBBINS, Esq.
JASON A. FORGE, Esq.
LUKE O. BROOKS, Esq.
ANGEL P. LAU, Esq.
BRIAN E. COCHRAN, Esq.
JEFFREY J. STEIN, Esq.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101
Tel:  619/231-1058
Fax: 619/231-7423
E-mail: darrenr@rgrdlaw.com
        jforge@rgrdlaw.com
        lukeb@rgrdlaw.com
        alau@rgrdlaw.com
        bcochran@rgrdlaw.com
        jstein@rgrdlaw.com

     - and -

SHAWN A. WILLIAMS Esq.
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
Post Montgomery Center
One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
San Francisco, CA  94104
Telephone:  415/288-4545
415/288-4534 (fax)
E-mail: shawnw@rgrdlaw.com


UBIQUITI NETWORKS: December 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Labaton Sucharow LLP
and Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP regarding the In re Ubiquiti
Networks, Inc. Securities Litigation, Master File No. 12-cv-04677-
YGR (N.D. Cal.).

TO: ALL PERSONS THAT PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED THE PUBLICLY TRADED
COMMON STOCK OF UBIQUITI NETWORKS, INC. PURSUANT AND/OR TRACEABLE
TO ITS OCTOBER 14, 2011 INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, YOU MAY BE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED SHARES FROM
OCTOBER 14, 2011 THROUGH MAY 3, 2012, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, that Lead
Plaintiffs Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT and Bristol County
Retirement System, on behalf of themselves and the Settlement
Class, and Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. and the other named defendants
(collectively, the "Defendants"), have reached a settlement in the
above-captioned action (the "Action") in the amount of $6,800,000
in cash (the "Settlement Amount") that, if approved by the Court,
will resolve all claims in the Action.1

A hearing will be held before the Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in Courtroom 1, Oakland Courthouse, 4th Floor, 1301
Clay Street, Oakland, CA 94612 at 2:00 p.m. on December 19, 2017
to, among other things, determine whether (1) the Settlement
should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
(2) the Plan of Allocation for distribution of the Settlement
Amount, and any interest thereon, less Court-awarded attorneys'
fees, Notice and Administration Expenses, Taxes, and any other
costs, fees, or expenses approved by the Court (the "Net
Settlement Fund") should be approved as fair, reasonable and
adequate; and (3) the application of Lead Counsel for an award of
attorneys' fees of no more than 25% of the Settlement Fund (up to
$1,700,000) and payment of litigation expenses of no more than
$200,000 from the Settlement Fund should be approved.  The Court
may change the date of the Settlement Hearing without providing
another notice.  You do NOT need to attend the Settlement Hearing
in order to receive a distribution from the Net Settlement Fund.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT AND YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE
NET SETTLEMENT FUND. If you have not yet received the full Notice
of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (the "Notice") and a Proof of Claim
and Release form ("Claim Form"), you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator or visiting its
website:

         Ubiquiti Networks Securities Litigation
         c/o GCG
         P.O. Box 10484
         Dublin, OH 43017-4084
        (844) 402-8574
         info@ubiquitisecuritieslitigation.com
         www.ubiquitisecuritieslitigation.com

Inquiries may also be made to Lead Counsel:

         LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
         Jonathan Gardner, Esq.
         140 Broadway
         New York, NY 10005
         (888) 219-6877
         www.labaton.com
         settlementquestions@labaton.com

         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         Rick Nelson, Shareholder Relations
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101
        (800) 449-4900
         www.rgrdlaw.com

If you are a Settlement Class Member, to be eligible to share in
the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a
Claim Form postmarked or electronically submitted no later than
December 5, 2017.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not
timely submit a valid Claim Form, you will not be eligible to
share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, but you will
nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the
Court in the Action.

To exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a
written request for exclusion in accordance with the instructions
set forth in the Notice such that it is postmarked no later than
November 27, 2017.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do
not exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will be bound
by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action.

Any objections to the Settlement, Plan of Allocation, and/or
application for attorneys' fees and payment of expenses must be
filed with the Court and mailed to counsel in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice no later than November 27,
2017.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, DEFENDANTS, OR DEFENDANTS'
COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE. ALL QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE,
THE SETTLEMENT, OR YOUR ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO LEAD COUNSEL AT THE ADDRESSES
LISTED ABOVE.

Dated: October 11, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

1 The complete terms of the Settlement are in the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement, dated August 4, 2017, which can be viewed
at www.ubiquitisecuritieslitigation.com.


UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Class Cert. Bid Filed in "Derosia"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DENISE DEROSIA, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED
COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01340-PP
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order
certifying classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff files a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence.  Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=rgBx8Dyf

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


UNITED SITE: Court Conditionally Certifies Technicians Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JERMAINE MADISON, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED
SITE SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 6:16-cv-
01991-CEM-DCI (M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Carlos S. Mendoza
entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the parties' Revised
      Joint Stipulation for Conditional Certification of FLSA
      Collective;

   2. adopting and confirming Report and Recommendation as part
      of this Order;

   3. conditionally certifying as a collective action for the
      following class:

      "all service technicians and pick-up and delivery
      technicians who 1) worked at Defendant's Orlando location
      during the three years preceding the date of this Order
      and 2) who claim they were not paid all overtime wages
      owed as a result of Defendant's automatic deduction of
      time for lunch breaks during which they worked";

   4. appointing Jermaine Madison as class representative;

   5. approving Notice and Consent Form. The Notice shall be
      amended to base both (i) the date from which overtime
      claims may be asserted and (ii) the deadline to file
      consent forms, upon the date of this Order;

   6. on or before October 2, 2017, directing Defendant to
      provide Plaintiff with a list containing the name, last
      known address, hire and termination dates (if applicable),
      and last job title of all service technicians and pick-up
      and delivery technicians who worked at Defendant's Orlando
      location during the three years preceding the date of this
      Order.

   7. within five days of receiving the above list, directing
      Plaintiff to send the approved Notice and Consent Form with
      a self-addressed return envelope to each putative class
      member via first class mail.

   8. denying motion in all other respects.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=bzy54xCQ


UNITED STATES: 9th Cir. Rules in Suit over Immigrant Bail
---------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
judges must consider a detainee's ability to pay when setting bail
in immigration court, a Ninth Circuit panel ruled October 2.

Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt said it
doesn't make sense for the government not to consider financial
circumstances when setting bond since the whole point of bail is
to incentivize an arrestee to show up to their next court date.

"Since the government's purpose in conditioning release on the
posting of a bond in a certain amount is to 'provide enough
incentive' for released detainees to appear in the future, we
cannot understand why it would ever refuse to consider financial
circumstances: the amount of bond that is reasonably likely to
secure the appearance of an indigent person obviously differs from
the amount that is reasonably likely to secure a wealthy person's
appearance," Reinhardt wrote.

"Nor can we understand why the government would refuse to consider
alternatives to monetary bonds that would also serve the same
interest the bond requirement purportedly advances. This is
especially true in light of the empirically demonstrated
effectiveness of such conditions at meeting the government's
interest in ensuring future appearances.

"By maintaining a process for establishing the amount of a bond
that likewise fails to consider the individual's financial ability
to obtain a bond in the amount assessed or to consider alternative
conditions of release, the government risks detention that
accomplishes 'little more than punishing a person for his
poverty,'" Reinhardt added, quoting Bearden v. Georgia, a 1983
Supreme Court case ruling it a violation of due process to revoke
a person's probation due to failure to pay a fine without first
considering that person's financial circumstances.

Michael Tan, an attorney with the ACLU's immigration rights
project in New York, called the ruling historic.

"It's the first ruling that requires judges to consider people's
financial circumstances when setting bond," he said. "Much like
the criminal justice system, authorities over-rely on cash bail as
a means of ensuring people show up for court when we know from the
wealth of research that's been done, when you rely on cash bail
you end up discriminating against people based on wealth."

Tan represents a class of immigrants detained pending removal
proceedings at four detention facilities in Adelanto, Irvine,
Santa Ana and Orange, California. According to the federal
complaint, these facilities have the capacity to hold several
thousand people at any given time.

Lead plaintiff Xochitl Hernandez came to the United States as an
adolescent 25 years ago. In 2016, she was rounded up during an
LAPD raid of a friend's house and was transferred to ICE custody,
where her bail was set at $60,000. Unable to come up with even
$1,500, she remained in jail for months until a community
organization called the National Day Labor Organizing Network
raised $5,000 and a different immigration judge accepted that
amount.

The other named plaintiff, Cesar Matias, is an asylum seeker who
fled Honduras to escape persecution for being gay. He was arrested
in 2012 and was held at an ICE detention center for nearly four
years because he couldn't afford his $3,000 bond. He was
eventually released after his case garnered so much attention that
the community organization Community Initiatives for Visiting
Immigrants in Confinement raised enough money for him to bond out.

The lawsuit seeks to represent many like Matias and Hernandez,
whom judges have determined are not a flight risk or a danger to
the public, but remain locked up because they can't pay bail.

"The ruling doesn't go so far as to eliminate cash bail, but it
puts in place some basic due process protections where the judge
has to consider financial circumstances and ensure the person
isn't being locked up because they lack the means to pay it," Tan
said. "Many go on to win their cases, which makes it all the more
irrational to keep people locked up."

The ruling comes as the movement to do away with cash bail
entirely in California is growing in popularity among state
lawmakers.

In the federal criminal system, which has been held up by
California bail reform advocates as a model for how the state
system ought to work, arrestees are allowed to put up 10 percent
of their bond, or offer up a house or property as collateral. But
in the immigration system, those arrested are required to
immediately post a cash bond set by an immigration judge.

"The only mechanism is cash bail," Tan said. "The federal pretrial
system does have a lot more protections for criminal defendants
and there's no reason why there shouldn't be comparable
protections in the immigration system.

"There isn't anything like pretrial services in the immigration
system where someone is working with someone to do a risk
assessment and come up with a recommendation to the court. And
people suffer for it. We know from years of accumulated experience
in the criminal justice system that there are better ways of doing
this."

The Ninth Circuit's ruling affirms a federal judge's decision to
grant the class a preliminary injunction requiring the government
to consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of
release.

"When the government determines what bond to set without
considering a detainee's financial circumstances, or the
availability of alternative conditions of release, there is a
significant risk that the individual will be needlessly deprived
of the fundamental right to liberty," Reinhardt wrote. "Even
though consideration of these matters does not guarantee that a
non-citizen will actually be released on a bond that he is
financially able to obtain once all flight risk factors are
considered, [immigration judges] and ICE will certainly be less
likely to impose an excessive bond if they  are mandated to at
least  consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions
before setting the amount."

Circuit Judge Ferdinand Fernandez wrote that he disagreed with the
scope of the injunction, even as he agreed that the federal judge
wasn't wrong in issuing it. He said judges must consider financial
ability, but he does not think the government should be ordered to
meet with the class' attorneys to develop and agree to guidelines
for future immigration hearings, or have to conduct new bond
hearings within 45 days.

He wrote, "As I see it, at this point, the government must
consider financial ability. If detailed procedures beyond those
that already exist (or amendments to current procedures) are
needed for that purpose, the government's determination and
adoption of those procedures should basically be through the usual
governmental processes rather than in a forced march and a
required agreement with class counsel."

The Justice Department declined to comment on the ruling.

Tan said the class hopes to make the protections permanent.

"The case continues," he said. "We're moving ahead with discovery
with an eye toward seeking a permanent injunction."


UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Suit in Los Angeles over Deportation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Reynolds, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the American Civil Liberties Union marked the Trump
administration's October 5 deadline for Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals Program participants to renew by filing a class
action in Los Angeles on behalf of young undocumented "Dreamers"
who say federal officials have unlawfully revoked protections
under the program.

In April, President Donald Trump said the "dreamers should rest
easy." But the president threw the fate of 800,000 young
immigrants into serious doubt just a few months later when he
rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program,
known as DACA, which protected them from deportation and allowed
them to work and go to school in the United States.

Trump has urged Congress to come up with a replacement.

A federal complaint filed on October 5, however, says Trump has
further stripped immigrants of protections under DACA "even while
the program winds down." The class action comes as immigration
rights activists took to the streets of Los Angeles on October 5,
morning to protest the end of the DACA program -- the last day for
recipients, known as "Dreamers," to reapply to the program.

Recipients could face deportation as early as March 2018 as the
protections are phased out. But according to the class action,
immigration officials aren't waiting until then.

"On his watch, federal immigration authorities have targeted
numerous DACA recipients and unlawfully revoked the grants of
deferred action and work permits they have received, without any
notice or opportunity to be heard, even though these individuals
have abided by all the program rules and have not engaged in any
conduct that would disqualify them from the program," the 34-page
complaint states.

Naming Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
Customs and Border Protection officials, the lawsuit says the
government's policies and procedures violate the federal
Administrative Procedures Act and the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.

"President Trump has said that 'Dreamers should rest easy,' yet
his administration has placed these young immigrants directly at
risk," ACLU attorney Michael Tan said in a statement. "Not only is
he ending the protections the government pledged to these young
immigrants who know no other home, but his administration is
targeting them now while the DACA program is still in place."

The "Dreamers" are represented by ACLU attorney Jennifer Chang
Newell.

In a news release, the ACLU said that the policies and procedures
strike at the heart of the Dreamers' immigration status by
targeting them for removal for low-level offenses, including
traffic infractions. Other young immigrants have lost their DACA
status based on unproven allegations, the lawsuit says.

Plaintiff Jesus Alonso Arreola Robles, 23, says he was a cook at
the famous Chateau Marmont in West Hollywood and working as a
driver for Uber and Lyft when federal immigration agents arrested
him this past February while he was driving.  His complaint says
authorities accused him of attempting to smuggle a customer's
family members into the United States.  He says he has been
working the two jobs to support his parents, who are permanent
residents that have been in America since he was a baby. He had no
criminal history but found himself facing deportation, according
the lawsuit.

An immigration judge rejected the smuggling charges, and Arreola
was never criminally charged. But the Department of Homeland
Security revoked his DACA status, the suit says.

Arreola was granted DACA status three times, in 2012, 2014 and
again in 2016. In a statement, he said he and his girlfriend are
expecting their first child and he wants to stay in the country to
raise his son.

"I don't want an unfounded accusation to take everything I love
away from me," Arreola said.

Inland Empire-Immigrant Youth Collective joined Arreola in filing
the lawsuit. They want an order that finds the practice of
revoking immigrants' DACA status is unconstitutional. The
plaintiffs also want the government to reinstate DACA status to
those who have lost it or give them a proper opportunity to
challenge their change in status.

The Justice Department did not immediately respond to a request
for comment.

The case is captioned, INLAND EMPIRE - IMMIGRANT YOUTH COLLECTIVE
and JESUS ALONSO ARREOLA ROBLES on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ELAINE C. DUKE, Acting
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; JAMES McCAMENT,
Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; MARK
J. HAZUDA, Director, Nebraska Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services; SUSAN M. CURDA, Los Angeles District
Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; THOMAS D.
HOMAN, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
DAVID MARIN, Los Angeles Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; KEVIN K. McALEENAN, Acting Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Defendants, Case 5:17-cv-02048
(C.D. Cal., October 5, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

Jennifer Chang Newell, Esq.
Katrina L. Eiland, Esq.
ACLU FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 343-0770
Facsimile: (415) 395-0950
E-mail: Jnewell@aclu.org
        keiland@aclu.org

     - and -

Michael K. T. Tan, Esq.
David Hausman, Esq.
ACLU FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Telephone: (212) 549-2660
Facsimile: (212) 549-2654
E-mail: mtan@aclu.org
        dhausman@aclu.org


UNITED STATES: Calif. Judge Permits Privacy Class Suit v. FBI
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge in San Francisco, refused on October 3, to
dismiss a lawsuit claiming the FBI used an unconstitutional
subpoena to spy on anonymous supporters of jailed journalist
Barrett Brown.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James found the lawsuit
plausibly alleged that the government abused its subpoena power to
unmask the identities of unnamed donors who raised money for
Brown's legal defense.

"Defendants have failed to articulate any facially reasonable
explanation for requesting donors' identities," James wrote in her
26-page ruling.

Brown was arrested in September 2012 and sentenced to five years
and three months in prison after he shared an online link to files
stolen in the 2011 hack of the security and intelligence
contractor Strategic Forecasting, or Stratfor.

Kevin Gallagher, who started an online fundraiser for Brown's
legal defense, and an anonymous donor filed a class action against
the government in February this year. They claim the FBI violated
donors' privacy, the First Amendment, and the Stored
Communications Act.

Gallagher and Donor No. 1 claim Dallas-based FBI agent Robert
Smith and Candina Heath, an assistant U.S. attorney in Texas, used
a subpoena to "unlawfully identify, target and surveil" anonymous
supporters of Brown.

The government says those donors have no expectation of privacy
for transaction records retained by a third party. But the
plaintiffs say the records were protected political speech and
that revealing their identities violates their rights to engage in
anonymous political speech.

James declined to analyze the online payment service provider
WePay's privacy policy at this stage in the litigation, saying
issues of disputed fact would be resolved on summary judgment or
at trial.

The subpoena was reportedly issued to determine whether Brown, who
had a public defender, could afford his own lawyer. But the
plaintiffs say Brown was never charged with withholding funds from
his public defender, that the purpose of the fundraiser was to
hire private counsel, and that the amount raised was available on
a public web page.

"This defeats defendants' arguments that the [first amended
complaint] did not plausibly allege a retaliatory motive and that
the government's legitimate purpose in issuing the subpoena
outweighs potential First Amendment concerns," James ruled.

James refused to dismiss a claim that the federal government
violated the Stored Communications Act by demanding WePay turn
over records identifying anonymous donors.

However, she dismissed claims for injunctive relief against Smith
and Heath, finding the donors failed to show there was a threat of
immediate future harm or repeated violations.

"The [first amended complaint] does not set forth the basis for
Donor Number 1's belief that defendants continue to maintain and
use the information more than four years after obtaining it from
WePay, rendering this allegation conclusory," James wrote.

She also dismissed without leave to amend a claim alleging
violations of the California Constitution, finding the court lacks
jurisdiction over that claim.  She dismissed with leave to amend
all claims against Smith and Heath in their individual capacities,
finding the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Texas-based
defendants.

First Amendment claims against Heath and Smith in their official
capacities were dismissed with leave to amend.

The plaintiffs have until Oct. 24 to file an amended complaint.

Neither side responded to emailed requests for comment October 5.

Gallagher and Donor No. 1 are represented by Charles Donovan with
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton in San Francisco.

Brown was released to a halfway house in November 2016 and re-
arrested in April one day before he was to be interviewed for a
PBS documentary, according to an April article by Alex Emmons in
The Intercept.

Before his arrest, Brown published articles in The Guardian about
hacked emails showing intelligence contractors conspired with
corporations to hack and discredit activists and key defenders of
Wikileaks, including Glen Greenwald.

The case is captioned, KEVIN GALLAGHER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants, Case 3:17-cv-00586-MEJ (N.D.
Cal., October 3, 2017).


US STEEL: Shareholders Sue over Earnings Loss, Stock Plunge
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lana Morelli, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
piling onto United States Steel Corp. after a $1.4 billion
earnings loss, shareholders claim in a federal class action that
years of rosy reports were pure fiction.

The Central Laborers' Pension Fund is at the helm of the complaint
filed on October 2, in Pittsburgh where the company co-founded in
1901 by Andrew Carnegie is headquartered.

U.S. Steel had that captain of industry in mind when it embarked
on a 2013 strategic initiative called the Carnegie Way to overcome
turmoil in the market.  The investors say U.S. Steel was
confronting a perfect storm of challenges, including "lower oil
prices, lower steel prices, a stronger U.S. dollar, global
overcapacity, and an increase in foreign imports flooding the
market."

Still U.S. Steel reported last year that its efforts had been
successful.  U.S. Steel reported $745 million in benefits
associated with the Carnegie Way, but the complaint says this
purported "focus on growth and right-size operations . . . was a
facade."

"In reality, U.S. Steel's promising financial results were the
result of defendants causing U.S. Steel to engage in ill-advised
cost-cutting and underspending on capital assets that pushed off
necessary repairs and upgrades," the complaint states. "This not
only disguised the company's true financial and operational
condition, but jeopardized its ability to capitalize on an
improving steel market."

Investors say the curtain came down earlier this year when
favorable U.S. trade cases against foreign imports triggered a
more than 50 percent surge on the average price of U.S. hot-rolled
steel coil.  Hot-rolled steel coil makes up 28 percent of U.S.
Steel's largest segment -- flat-rolled products, according to the
complaint.

Instead of translating this price increase into domestic-sales
profits, however, U.S. Steel reported poor financial results on
April 25, 2017, "including a significant decline in the company's
flat-rolled segment," according to the complaint.

Suddenly the corporate executives who had been taking millions in
incentive compensation for their strong performances announced
that U.S. Steel "would need to invest in asset revitalization,
exceeding $300 million for 2017 and more than $1 billion over the
next several years," according to the complaint.

The class notes that U.S. Steel's stock plunged more than 26
percent, or $8.33 per share, on April 26, "instantly wiping out
more than $1.4 billion in once valuable shareholder equity."

"Worse yet, the company has been named as a primary defendant in a
costly and expensive-to-defend consolidated class action lawsuit
brought by U.S. Steel shareholders for alleged violations of the
federal securities laws," the complaint continues.

Alleging breach of fiduciary duty and violations of the Exchange
Act, the investors note that CEO David Burrett; his predecessor,
Mario Longhi, and the company's other executives "have not fared
nearly so badly."

"In 2016, defendants collectively pocketed more than $17 million
in compensation not justified by U.S. Steel's performance while
under their stewardship," the complaint states. "These payments
unjustly enriched defendants at the company's expense."

With the board unwilling to hold these directors accountable, the
class wants the court to award restitution and impose a
constructive trust.

The class is represented by Brett Stecker with the Weiser Law Firm
in Berwyn, Pa.

Representatives for U.S. Steel Corporation have not returned a
request for comment.

Nearly six months after the devastating first-quarter earnings
report, U.S. Steel's share price still has not rebounded to its
early April high of $34.72.

The stock sank to below $20 in May and was hovering at $26.19 at
press time on October 6.

The case is captioned, CENTRAL LABORERS' PENSION FUND,
Derivatively on Behalf of UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, vs. DAVID B. BURRITT, DAVID S. SUTHERLAND, PATRICIA
DIAZ DENNIS, DAN O. DINGES, JOHN G. DROSDICK, JOHN J. ENGEL, MURRY
S. GERBER, STEPHEN J. GIRSKY, PAUL A. MASCARENAS, GLENDA G.
McNEAL, ROBERT J. STEVENS, PATRICIA A. TRACEY and MARIO LONGHI,
Defendants, and UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, Nominal Defendant, Case 2:17-cv-01279-CB (W.D. Pa.,
October 2, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Robert B. Weiser, Esq.
     Brett D. Stecker, Esq.
     James M. Ficaro, Esq.
     THE WEISER LAW FIRM, P.C.
     20 Cassatt Avenue
     Berwyn, PA  19312
     Tel: 610/225-2677
     Fax: 610/408-8062
     E-mail: rw@weiserlawfirm.com
             bds@weiserlawfirm.com
             jmf@weiserlawfirm.com

          - and -

     Benny C. Goodman III, Esq.
     Erik W. Luedeke, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
     San Diego, CA  92101
     Tel: 619/231-1058
     Fax: 619/231-7423
     E-mail: bennyg@rgrdlaw.com
             eluedeke@rgrdlaw.com

          - and -

     John T. Long, Esq.
     CAVANAGH & O'HARA
     2319 West Jefferson Street
     Springfield, IL 62702
     Tel:  217/544-1771
     Fax: 217/544-9894


WELLS FARGO: Officers Must Defend Against Shareholder Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that Wells Fargo's board of directors and senior executives cannot
dodge a class action accusing them of misleading investors about
the phony accounts scandal that has cost the bank more than $300
million in penalties, a federal judge in San Francisco ruled.

U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar refused to dismiss most claims
against 15 members of Wells Fargo's board of directors and five
senior executives on October 4.  In a 49-page order, Tigar found
the executives and directors were made aware as early as 2011
about the bank's sham accounts scandal, which the bank
acknowledged in August this year included as many as 3.5 million
unauthorized accounts.  Despite knowing of the fraud, shareholders
say, the managers continued to insist that Wells Fargo's cross-
selling program was successful and critical to the bank's revenue
growth.

The San Francisco-based bank's "Gr-Eight" cross-selling initiative
pressured its employees to open at least eight accounts for each
customer, leading employees to create unauthorized accounts to
meet the aggressive sales quotas.

Shareholders say the bank misled investors by touting the
company's "adherence to regulatory guidelines" in public filings
and including the fraudulent, cross-sold accounts in those
filings.  In addition to the legal penalties, the scandal has
caused Wells Fargo untold harm in reputational damage, plus the
costs of extensive advertising, in The New York Times and other
national publications, trying to assure consumers that the bank is
addressing the fraud.

Tigar wrote: "The Court finds that plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that the director defendants made material and misleading
statements through their participation in and approval of Wells
Fargo's public filings."

Tigar found several red flags that should have alerted Wells Fargo
to the scope of the scandal long before it paid $185 million to
federal regulators in September 2016 for the misconduct.

Those red flags include former CEO John Stumpf's testimony to
Congress that he was made aware of "issues" related to sham
accounts in 2011; earlier communications between employees and
board members about the fraudulent activity; lawsuits filed
against the bank alleging creation of fraudulent accounts; a
December 2013 article in the Los Angeles Times exposing the
scandal; investigations by federal regulators as early as 2012;
widespread employee terminations apparently aimed at silencing
whistleblowers; and the company's emphasis on cross-selling in
financial reports.

Tigar concluded that shareholders presented sufficient allegations
to sue three senior executives -- CEO and former COO Timothy
Sloan, former vice president of community banking Carrie Tolstedt,
and CFO John Shrewsberry -- for issuing allegedly misleading
statements.

Tigar also said shareholders can sue former and current executives
Stumpf, Sloan, Tolstedt, Shrewsberry, and chief risk officer
Michael Loughlin, on allegations of insider trading. The investors
say the executives used their inside knowledge to profit from
selling shares back to Wells Fargo through the bank's share
repurchase program.

Tigar dismissed without prejudice securities law claims against
Loughlin, finding the shareholders failed to allege the chief risk
manager made any specific false or misleading statements.  And
Tigar refused to let the investors hold the bank's managers liable
to cover Wells Fargo's legal costs for to its alleged violations
of federal securities laws. He found that claim unripe because no
judgment has been reached on whether the bank or its directors and
executives violated securities laws.

But Tigar gave shareholders a green light to seek rescission of
contracts between Wells Fargo and the accused managers for
allegedly violating securities laws while performing their job
duties.  Tigar dismissed California law claims with prejudice,
finding that because Wells Fargo is incorporated in Delaware, its
managers can be sued for violating only Delaware's corporate
misconduct laws.

Wells Fargo and attorneys for both sides did not respond to emails
and phone calls seeking comment on October 5, afternoon.

Wells Fargo is represented by Brendan P. Cullen, with Sullivan &
Cromwell in Palo Alto.

The shareholders' lead attorney is Richard Heimann with Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein in San Francisco.

The case is captioned, IN RE: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION Case 3:16-cv-05541-JST (N.D. Cal., October
4, 2017).


WESTMINSTER MANAGEMENT: Tenants Sue over Predatory Fees
-------------------------------------------------------
Daniel W. Staples, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that companies owned by President Donald Trump's son-in-law Jared
Kushner face a class action in Baltimore from tenants who say they
are hounded over unlawful fees under threat of eviction.

Though the real estate scion is not named as a party to the
complaint, lead defendant Westminster Management is a subsidiary
of the family-run Kushner Cos., which owns, manages and develops
properties across the country.

In the complaint, two tenants who live in Kushner's Dutch Village
apartments in Northeast Baltimore and Carroll Park apartments in
Middle River say they are plagued by a vicious cycle of predatory
fees.  It starts with a late fee, according to the complaint,
which is tacked on to a tenant's rent if his rent is not paid in
full by the end of the fifth day of the month.

But tenants Tenae Smith and Howard Smith (no relation), say a
purported court fee and an agent fee are also tacked on around the
same time.

"The purported court fee is charged even though such a fee has not
been awarded by a court and is often never awarded by a court,"
the complaint states.

Even if the tenant has paid part of their monthly rent, the late
fee is allegedly set at 5 percent of their full rent.  The tenants
say their subsequent rent payments are then improperly misapplied
to these improper fees, making them appear further in arrears.

"The fees kept adding up,'" tenant Tenae Smith said in a statement
from her attorenys at Brown Goldstein & Levy.

Kushner's companies dispute the allegations.

"We have been in compliance with Maryland's laws and regulations
and intend to vigorously defend ourselves against these
allegations," a spokesman for the companies said in an email.

Filed in Baltimore City Circuit Court, the complaint takes aim at
Westminster Management LLC and JK2 Westminster LLC, both with New
Jersey addresses.

Carroll Park Holdings LLC is named as a co-defendant with a New
York City address, as is Dutch Village LLC, in College Park,
Maryland.

Dutch Village tenant Tenae Smith is described as a mother of two.
"One time I paid the rent, and they sent back my check telling me
that I needed to pay an additional $150 in fees or they wouldn't
take my rent," she said in a statement. "I work full-time and made
regular payments, but they kept taking me to court for eviction
and piling on the fees. I just want to keep my family safe and
stable as the kids go back to school."

Santoni, Vocci & Ortega, in Towson, Maryland, is working with the
Public Justice Center and Brown, Goldstein & Levy to represent the
Westminster tenants.

"The routine practice of charging tenants illegal fees combined
with filing eviction proceedings against tenants who have paid
their rent on time is predatory and destructive to hard-working
Marylanders and their families," Santoni Vocci attorney Chelsea
Ortega said in a statement. "This is yet another example of
corporations profiting from deceptive policies."

Matt Hill of the Public Justice Center said going to court is
important for tenants like those of Westminster "where basic
needs, like housing, are at stake."

"It is virtually impossible for tenants in these situations to
decipher their landlords' account statements and fight back
against a slew of fees on the threat of eviction without help from
an attorney," Hill said in a statement.

The other Westminster tenant suit, Howard Smith, is described as a
retiree who has lived in the Kushner-owned Carroll Park Apartments
in Middle River, east of Baltimore, for 10 years. He has been hit
with a string of late fees and court fees and eviction notices
even though he has arranged to have his rent automatically debited
from his bank account every month.

The complaint says Howard Smith paid his rent in full, but Carroll
Park misallocated a portion of that payment to non-rent charges,
deemed his rent to be late, then charged him a "legal-summons
fee," even though no court had awarded such a fee. He was also
charged a "legal-agent fee." After the fees were assessed, the
company filed an eviction notice to spur payment of the full bill.
Smith complied, fearful of eviction.

"Adding small but improper fees to the rent of tenants living
paycheck to paycheck, then misallocating rent payments to those
fees in order to generate more fees, is a scheme that preys on
working-class tenants," Brown, Goldstein & Levy attorney Andrew
Freeman said in a statement. "Westminster Management's misuse of
Maryland courts' eviction proceedings to force tenants to pay
these improper fees makes this scheme all the more deplorable. It
must be stopped."


WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY: Faces Suit Over Products Liability Act
------------------------------------------------------------
Deborah Corwin and Jan Corwin, and all others similarly-situated
v. Weyerhaeuser Company, Case No. 2:17-cv-01501 (W.D. Wash.,
October 6, 2017), seeks damages for violations of the Washington
and New Jersey Products Liability Act, the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries proximately caused by
Weyerhaeuser's defective Joists installed in affected structures
owned by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant used
toxic materials in wood joists used in the construction of houses
and other structures owned by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs Deborah Corwin and Jan Corwin are residents of Bergen
County, New Jersey.  They own a home located at 12 Marilyn Drive,
Unit 202, Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey.  That home is an Affected
Structure built using Weyerhaeuser's defective Joists.

Defendant Weyerhaeuser Company engages in the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of forest products. It operates through the
following segments: Timberlands, Wood Products, and Cellulose
Fibers. Defendant is a Washington corporation with its principal
place of business in Seattle, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Dan Drachler, Esq.
      ZWERLING, SCHACHTER & ZWERLING, LLP
      1904 Third Avenue, Suite 1030
      Seattle, WA 98101
      Tel: (206) 223-2053
      Fax: (206) 343-9636
      E-mail: ddrachler@zsz.com

          - and -

      Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.
      Nicomedes S. Herrera, Esq.
      Kyla J. Gibboney, Esq.
      JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
      555 Montgomery Street, Suite 1210
      San Francisco, CA 94111
      Tel: (415) 500-6800
      Fax: (415) 395-9940
      E-mail: jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com
              nherrera@saverilawfirm.com
              kgibboney@saverilawfirm.com


WHOLE FOODS: Faces "Banus" Class Suit over POS System
-----------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that customers claim in a federal
class action in Cleveland, that Whole Foods used a vulnerable
point-of-sale system in its tap rooms and restaurants that led to
a data breach exposing millions of patrons to an increased risk of
identity theft.

The case is captioned, PATRICIA BANUS, individually, and on behalf
of those similarly situated 9488 Island Rd North Ridgeville, OH,
44039 Plaintiff, v. WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC. c/o CT
Corporation System 4400 Easton Commons Way, Suite 125 Columbus, OH
43219, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02132-JG (N.D. Ohio, October
10, 2017).

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class:

     Brian D. Flick, Esq.
     Marc E. Dann, Esq.
     DANNLAW
     P.O. Box 6031040
     Cleveland, OH  44103
     Tel: (216) 373-0539
     Fax: (216) 373-0536

          - and -

     Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr.
     ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
     77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Tel: (312) 440-0020
     Fax: (312) 440-4180
     E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com


WISE COMPANY: "Miller" Suit Seeks Certification of Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NICHOLAS MILLER and JEFFREY BORNEMAN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. WISE COMPANY INC., the Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-
00616-JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on
January 29, 2018, for an order certifying a class pursuant to
Consumers Legal Remedies Act:

   "all persons who purchased one or more of the following Wise
   Company Long-Term Food Kits in California through the Wise
   website from February 15, 2013 through the date of class
   certification:

   1-Month, 3-Month, 6-Month, 12-Month Emergency Food Supply Box
   (SKUs 01-116, 40-40348, 40-40696, 40-41392); 56 Serving Grab
   and Go Bucket (SKU 01-156); 60 Serving EntrÇe Only Grab and Go
   Bucket (SKU 01-160); 84 Serving Grab and Go Bucket (SKU 01-
   184); 120 Serving EntrÇe Only Grab and Go Bucket (SKU 01-120);
   240 Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-40240); 360
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-40360); 720
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-40720); 1080
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-41080); 1440
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-41440); 2160
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-42160); 2880
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-42880); and 4320
   Serving Long Term Food Supply Package (SKU 40-44320).

The Plaintiffs will also move the Court to appoint Nicholas Miller
and Jeffrey Borneman as the class representatives, and appoint
Mark A. Chavez and Nance F. Becker of Chavez & Gertler LLP and
Michael D. Braun of Braun Law Group, P.C. as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=sJeEF6aJ

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark A. Chavez, Esq.
          Nance F. Becker, Esq.
          CHAVEZ & GERTLER LLP
          42 Miller Avenue
          Mill Valley, California 94941
          Telephone: (415) 381 5599
          Facsimile: (415) 381 5572
          E-mail: mark@chavezgertler.com
                  nance@chavezgertler.com

               - and -

          Michael D. Braun, Esq.
          BRAUN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, Ste. 1100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 836 6000
          Facsimile: (310) 836 6010
          E-mail: mdb@braunlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Andrew S. Kierstead, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW KIERSTEAD
          1001 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1100
          Portland, Oregon 97204
          Telephone: (508) 224 6246
          Facsimile: (508) 244 4356
          E-mail: ajkier@aol.com


WOOD GROUP: "Salinas" Suit Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ROLAND SALINAS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. WOOD GROUP PSN
COMISSIONING SERVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00177
(S.D. Tex.), Plaintiff asks Court for conditional certification
of:

   "all personnel employed by Wood Group during the past 3 years
   who were paid the same hourly rate for all hours worked
   (including hours in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek)
   and no overtime compensation."

Plaintiff filed this collective action lawsuit pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act to recover unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages, attorney's fees and costs.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=x6NMwb17

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
          Richard M. Sanchez, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352 1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  litkin@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877 8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877 8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


WORD ENTERPRISES: Court Certifies Delivery Drivers Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CHAD MCFARLIN, the Plaintiff, v. THE WORD
ENTERPRISES, LLC, ET AL., the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-12536-
GAD-APP (E.D. Mich.), the Hon. Judge Gershwin A. Drain entered an
order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class of:

   "106 delivery drivers, who were employed by three different
   Hungry Howie's Pizza stores."

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants paid him below the Federal and
Michigan minimum wage during his time as a delivery driver for
Hungry Howie's pizza. The Plaintiff brings the action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Michigan Minimum Wage Law, and the
Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act to recover unpaid wages
owed to him and similarly situated Hungry Howie's delivery drivers
employed by Defendants. Id. Defendants filed an answer on August
31, 2016 denying the allegations and asserting affirmative
defenses.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=EIvBmwzz


ZODIAC U.S.: $952,000 Settlement in "Cuzick" Case Has Initial OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KYLE CUZICK, the Plaintiff, v. ZODIAC U.S.
SEAT SHELLS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-03793-HSG (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. entered an order:

   1. granting Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of
      class action settlement on behalf of:

      "all individuals who were employed at any time by Defendant
      in California as non-exempt employees between May 25, 2012,
      and the date of this order"; and

   2. directing parties to meet and confer and stipulate to a
      schedule of dates for each event, which shall be submitted
      to the Court along with a proposed order within seven days
      of the date of this Order,.

The parties have represented that there are approximately 1,168
individuals who fall within the class period.

Monetary Relief:

Defendant will establish a gross settlement fund consisting of
$952,000. The parties have estimated that individual class
members' gross recovery, before deductions for taxes, fees, and
other costs, will be approximately $800. The parties propose that
civil penalties of $10,000 will be paid to the California Labor
and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") as penalties related to
Plaintiff's PAGA claim. The gross settlement fund accordingly
includes Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs, settlement
administration fees, the LWDA payment, and any additional
incentive award to Plaintiff as class representative.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=c0C3FsQS


* Supreme Court Hearing over Class Action Waiver Begins
-------------------------------------------------------
Brandi Buchman, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer took a stand for workers at a
hearing on October 2, as the Supreme Court kicked off its October
term with a focus on employment arbitration agreements.

Showcasing his animated style, Breyer leaned forward on the bench
to argue that siding with employers on class action waivers would
upend "the entire heart of the New Deal," referencing the series
of protections launched under President Franklin Roosevelt to aid
workers during the hard times of the Great Depression.

In the near century since the New Deal came into force, class
action lawsuits have been a critical tool for employees to protect
their rights or assert leverage in the workplace.

The Supreme Court session involved class action waivers that Ernst
& Young, Murphy Oil USA and Epic Systems Corp. had their employees
sign as a condition of employment.

The Ernst & Young case sprang from allegations by Stephen Morris
and Kelly McDaniel that they were misclassified on employee
records to deny them overtime.

Though the waivers they signed required mediation, Morris and
McDaniel called the process unfairly complex and prohibitively
expensive.

One employee who brought unrelated claims against Ernst & Young
incurred costs of $200,000 to go through the company's "Common
Ground Program" for arbitration. Those costs far outweighed the
benefit, as the employee recovered a mere $1,800 in the end.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed Breyer's position, likening
employee agreements with class action waivers to "yellow dog
contracts" or agreements between employers and employees where the
worker agrees, as a condition of employment, not to join a labor
union.

"You recognize that this contract . . . there is no true
bargaining," Ginsburg said, addressing one of the attorneys for
the employers. "It's the employer [that] says you want to work
here, you sign this . . . this has all the same essential features
of the yellow-dog contract. That is, there is no true liberty to
contract on part of the employee.

Referencing the legislation that banned yellow-dog contracts in
1932, Ginsburg said, "that's what Norris-LaGuardia wanted to
exclude."

Justice Anthony Kennedy meanwhile spoke to the other avenues of
relief available to any employees who signed class action waivers.
Nothing would stop these employees from "acting in concert" by
hiring the same attorney to bring the same claims, he said, even
if arbitrated individually.

The Trump administration has taken a similar tack, largely
supporting company agreements that force workers to go to
arbitration for disputes on a case-by-case basis versus bringing a
suit in a class action.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, who joined the bench on Trump's appointment
in April, said nothing during the morning's arguments.

Justice Ginsburg pressed Paul Clement, the attorney for Ernst &
Young and Epic Systems, on whether other common parts of employee
agreements, like confidentiality clauses, would impact workers'
rights.

A former U.S. solicitor general, Clement began by conceding that a
person does have the right to concerted activity. "In the sense
that three or more employees could decide that they want to go to
the arbitral forum and they would arbitrate individually," he
said.  He agreed with Justice Kennedy's point that sharing a
lawyer could help.

"They also have other options," Clement added.

Justice Ginsburg jumped in before he could go further, asking
Clement directly if confidentiality agreements "put a damper" on
how workers can bring suit against their employer.

"Well, they can proceed very jointly before they get there," he
said. "The confidentiality agreement's not going to stop the same
lawyer from thinking about the three cases in conjunction."

Justice Elena Kagan interrupted.

"Mr. Clement, usually, usually when you have a right, the fact
that there is one way to exercise a right left over does not make
it OK if we've taken away another 25 ways of exercising that
right," she said.

Illustrating her example, Kagan asked the court to consider the
First Amendment.  "You know, when we think about the First
Amendment, we don't say we can ban leafleting because you can
always write an op-ed," she said. "And the same thing applies
here. The fact that there's something left over by way of
concerted activity does not make it okay under Section 7 and
Section 8 [of the Fair Labor Standards Act] to deprive employees
of many other means of protected activity."



                        Asbestos Litigation


ASBESTOS UPDATE: BNSF Railway Still Faces PI Claims at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
BNSF Railway Company still faces a number of asbestos-related
personal injury claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

The Company states, "The Company is party to a number of personal
injury claims by employees and non-employees who may have been
exposed to asbestos. The heaviest exposure for certain BNSF
Railway employees was due to work conducted in and around the use
of steam locomotive engines that were phased out between the years
of 1950 and 1967. However, other types of exposures, including
exposure from locomotive component parts and building materials,
continued after 1967 until they were substantially eliminated at
BNSF Railway by 1985.

"BNSF Railway assesses its unasserted asbestos liability exposure
on an annual basis during the third quarter. BNSF Railway
determines its asbestos liability by estimating its exposed
population, the number of claims likely to be filed, the number of
claims that will likely require payment and the estimated cost per
claim. Estimated filing and dismissal rates and average cost per
claim are determined utilizing recent claim data and trends.

"Throughout the year, BNSF Railway monitors actual experience
against the number of forecasted claims and expected claim
payments and will record adjustments to the Company's estimates as
necessary.

"Based on BNSF Railway's estimate of the potentially exposed
employees and related mortality assumptions, it is anticipated
that unasserted asbestos claims will continue to be filed through
the year 2050. The Company recorded an amount for the full
estimated filing period through 2050 because it had a relatively
finite exposed population (former and current employees hired
prior to 1985), which it was able to identify and reasonably
estimate and about which it had obtained reliable demographic data
(including age, hire date and occupation) derived from industry or
BNSF Railway specific data that was the basis for the study. BNSF
Railway projects that approximately 65, 80 and 95 percent of the
future unasserted asbestos claims will be filed within the next
10, 15 and 25 years, respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/BCiAim

BNSF Railway Company operates one of the largest freight railroad
networks in North America with 32,500 miles of rail across the
western two-thirds of the United States.  The Company is
headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ashland Had 55,000 Open Claims at June 30
----------------------------------------------------------
For the nine months ended June 30, 2017, there were 55,000 open
claims against Ashland Global Holdings, Inc., according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

The Company states, "The claims alleging personal injury caused by
exposure to asbestos asserted against Ashland result primarily
from indemnification obligations undertaken in 1990 in connection
with the sale of Riley Stoker Corporation, a former subsidiary.
The amount and timing of settlements and number of open claims can
fluctuate from period to period.

"From the range of estimates, Ashland records the amount it
believes to be the best estimate of future payments for litigation
defense and claim settlement costs, which generally approximates
the mid-point of the estimated range of exposure from model
results.  Ashland reviews this estimate and related assumptions
quarterly and annually updates the results of a non-inflated, non-
discounted approximate 50-year model developed with the assistance
of HR&A.

"During the most recent annual update of this estimate completed
during the June 2017 quarter, it was determined that the liability
for Ashland asbestos-related claims should be increased by $36
million.  Total reserves for asbestos claims were $424 million at
June 30, 2017 compared to $415 million at September 30, 2016.

"Ashland has insurance coverage for certain litigation defense and
claim settlement costs incurred in connection with its asbestos
claims, and coverage-in-place agreements exist with the insurance
companies that provide substantially all of the coverage that will
be accessed.

"For the Ashland asbestos-related obligations, Ashland has
estimated the value of probable insurance recoveries associated
with its asbestos reserve based on management's interpretations
and estimates surrounding the available or applicable insurance
coverage, including an assumption that all solvent insurance
carriers remain solvent.  Substantially all of the estimated
receivables from insurance companies are expected to be due from
domestic insurers, all of which are solvent.

"At June 30, 2017, Ashland's receivable for recoveries of
litigation defense and claim settlement costs from insurers
amounted to $156 million (excluding the Hercules receivable for
asbestos claims), of which $4 million relates to costs previously
paid.  Receivables from insurers amounted to $151 million at
September 30, 2016.  During the June 2017 quarter, the annual
update of the model used for purposes of valuing the asbestos
reserve and its impact on valuation of future recoveries from
insurers was completed.  This model update resulted in a $15
million increase in the receivable for probable insurance
recoveries.

"Ashland entered into settlement agreements totaling $5 million
and $4 million with certain insurers during the nine months ended
June 30, 2017 and 2016, respectively, which resulted in a
reduction of the Ashland insurance receivable within the Condensed
Consolidated Balance Sheets by the same amount. During the nine
months ended June 30, 2017 and 2016, Ashland placed $2 million and
$4 million, respectively, of the settlement funds into the
renewable annual trust."

For the nine months ended June 30, 2017, Ashland had $156 million
in insurance receivable.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/gTV2b1

Ashland Global Holdings Inc. provides specialty chemical solutions
worldwide.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hercules Had 12,000 Open Claims at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------
Hercules LLC, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Ashland
Global Holdings, Inc., had 12,000 open claims for the nine months
ended June 30, 2017, according to Ashland's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017.

The Company states, "Hercules has liabilities from claims alleging
personal injury caused by exposure to asbestos.  Such claims
typically arise from alleged exposure to asbestos fibers from
resin encapsulated pipe and tank products which were sold by one
of Hercules' former subsidiaries to a limited industrial market.
The amount and timing of settlements and number of open claims can
fluctuate from period to period.

"From the range of estimates, Ashland records the amount it
believes to be the best estimate of future payments for litigation
defense and claim settlement costs, which generally approximates
the mid-point of the estimated range of exposure from model
results.  Ashland reviews this estimate and related assumptions
quarterly and annually updates the results of a non-inflated, non-
discounted approximate 50-year model developed with the assistance
of HR&A.  As a result of the most recent annual update of this
estimate, completed during the June 2017 quarter, it was
determined that the liability for Hercules asbestos-related claims
should be increased by $16 million.  Total reserves for asbestos
claims were $328 million at June 30, 2017 compared to $321 million
at September 30, 2016.

"For the Hercules asbestos-related obligations, certain
reimbursement obligations pursuant to coverage-in-place agreements
with insurance carriers exist.  As a result, any increases in the
asbestos reserve have been partially offset by probable insurance
recoveries.  Ashland has estimated the value of probable insurance
recoveries associated with its asbestos reserve based on
management's interpretations and estimates surrounding the
available or applicable insurance coverage, including an
assumption that all solvent insurance carriers remain solvent.
The estimated receivable consists exclusively of solvent domestic
insurers.

"As of June 30, 2017, and September 30, 2016, the receivables from
insurers amounted to $68 million and $63 million, respectively.
During the June 2017 quarter, the annual update of the model used
for purposes of valuing the asbestos reserve and its impact on
valuation of future recoveries from insurers was completed.  This
model update resulted in a $5 million increase in the receivable
for probable insurance recoveries.

"Projecting future asbestos costs is subject to numerous variables
that are extremely difficult to predict.  In addition to the
significant uncertainties surrounding the number of claims that
might be received, other variables include the type and severity
of the disease alleged by each claimant, the long latency period
associated with asbestos exposure, mortality rates, dismissal
rates, costs of medical treatment, the impact of bankruptcies of
other companies that are co-defendants in claims, uncertainties
surrounding the litigation process from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from case to case, and the impact of potential
changes in legislative or judicial standards.  Furthermore, any
predictions with respect to these variables are subject to even
greater uncertainty as the projection period lengthens.  In light
of these inherent uncertainties, Ashland believes that the
asbestos reserves for Ashland and Hercules represent the best
estimate within a range of possible outcomes.  As a part of the
process to develop these estimates of future asbestos costs, a
range of long-term cost models was developed.  These models are
based on national studies that predict the number of people likely
to develop asbestos-related diseases and are heavily influenced by
assumptions regarding long-term inflation rates for indemnity
payments and legal defense costs, as well as other variables
mentioned previously.  Ashland has currently estimated in various
models ranging from approximately 40 to 50 year periods that it is
reasonably possible that total future litigation defense and claim
settlement costs on an inflated and undiscounted basis could range
as high as approximately $660 million for the Ashland asbestos-
related litigation (current reserve of $424 million) and
approximately $510 million for the Hercules asbestos-related
litigation (current reserve of $328 million), depending on the
combination of assumptions selected in the various models.  If
actual experience is worse than projected, relative to the number
of claims filed, the severity of alleged disease associated with
those claims or costs incurred to resolve those claims, or
actuarial refinement or improvements to the assumptions used
within these models are initiated, Ashland may need to further
increase the estimates of the costs associated with asbestos
claims and these increases could be material over time."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/gTV2b1

Ashland Global Holdings Inc. provides specialty chemical solutions
worldwide.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Gardner Insurance Coverage Suit at Phase II
------------------------------------------------------------
An insurance coverage lawsuit against Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, et al., is now proceeding at Phase II discovery
process, according to Gardner Denver Holdings, Inc.'s Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

The Company states, "The Company has also been named as a
defendant in a number of asbestos-related and silica-related
personal injury lawsuits. The plaintiffs in these suits allege
exposure to asbestos or silica from multiple sources and typically
the Company is one of approximately 25 or more named defendants.

"Predecessors to the Company sometimes manufactured, distributed
and/or sold products allegedly at issue in the pending asbestos
and silica-related lawsuits (the "Products"). However, neither the
Company nor its predecessors ever mined, manufactured, mixed,
produced or distributed asbestos fiber or silica sand, the
materials that allegedly caused the injury underlying the
lawsuits. Moreover, the asbestos-containing components of the
Products, if any, were enclosed within the subject Products.

"Although the Company has never mined, manufactured, mixed,
produced or distributed asbestos fiber or silica sand nor sold
products that could result in a direct asbestos or silica
exposure, many of the companies that did engage in such activities
or produced such products are no longer in operation.  This has
led to law firms seeking potential alternative companies to name
in lawsuits where there has been an asbestos or silica related
injury.

"The Company believes that the pending and future asbestos and
silica-related lawsuits are not likely to, in the aggregate, have
a material adverse effect on its consolidated financial position,
results of operations or liquidity, based on: the Company's
anticipated insurance and indemnification rights to address the
risks of such matters; the limited potential asbestos exposure
from the Products described above; the Company's experience that
the vast majority of plaintiffs are not impaired with a disease
attributable to alleged exposure to asbestos or silica from or
relating to the Products or for which the Company otherwise bears
responsibility; various potential defenses available to the
Company with respect to such matters; and the Company's prior
disposition of comparable matters. However, inherent uncertainties
of litigation and future developments, including, without
limitation, potential insolvencies of insurance companies or other
defendants, an adverse determination in the Adams County Case
(discussed below), or other inability to collect from the
Company's historical insurers or indemnitors, could cause a
different outcome. While the outcome of legal proceedings is
inherently uncertain, based on presently known facts, experience,
and circumstances, the Company believes that the amounts accrued
on its balance sheet are adequate and that the liabilities arising
from the asbestos and silica-related personal injury lawsuits will
not have a material adverse effect on the Company's consolidated
financial position, results of operations or liquidity. "Accrued
liabilities" and "Other liabilities" on the Condensed Consolidated
Balance Sheet include a total litigation reserve of $104.3 million
and $108.5 million as of June 30, 2017 and December 31, 2016
respectively, with respect to potential liability arising from the
Company's asbestos-related litigation. Asbestos related defense
costs are excluded from the asbestos claims liability and are
recorded separately as services are incurred. In the event of
unexpected future developments, it is possible that the ultimate
resolution of these matters may be material to the Company's
consolidated financial position, results of operation or
liquidity.

"The Company has entered into a series of agreements with certain
of its or its predecessors' legacy insurers and certain potential
indemnitors to secure insurance coverage and/or reimbursement for
the costs associated with the asbestos and silica-related lawsuits
filed against the Company. The Company has also pursued litigation
against certain insurers or indemnitors, where necessary.  The
Company has an insurance recovery receivable for probable asbestos
related recoveries of approximately $97.3 million and $97.3
million as of June 30, 2017 and December 31, 2016 which was
included in "Other assets" on the Condensed Consolidated Balance
Sheets.

"The largest such recent action, Gardner Denver, Inc. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, et al., was filed on July 9,
2010, in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Adams County, Illinois, as
case number 10-L-48 (the "Adams County Case"). In the lawsuit, the
Company seeks, among other things, to require certain excess
insurer defendants to honor their insurance policy obligations to
the Company, including payment in whole or in part of the costs
associated with the asbestos-related lawsuits filed against the
Company. In October 2011, the Company reached a settlement with
one of the insurer defendants, which had issued both primary and
excess policies, for approximately the amount of such defendant's
policies which were subject to the lawsuit. Since then, the case
has been proceeding through the discovery and motions process with
the remaining insurer defendants.  On January 29, 2016, the
Company prevailed on the first phase of that discovery and motions
process ("Phase I").  Specifically, the Court in the Adams County
Case ruled that the Company has rights under all of the policies
in the case, subject to their terms and conditions, even though
the policies were sold to the Company's former owners rather than
to the Company itself.  On June 9, 2016, the Court denied a motion
by several of the insurers who sought permission to appeal the
Phase I ruling now rather than waiting until the end of the whole
case as is normally required. The case is now proceeding through
the discovery process regarding the remaining issues in dispute
("Phase II").

"A majority of the Company's expected future recoveries of the
costs associated with the asbestos-related lawsuits are the
subject of the Adams County Case.

"The amounts recorded by the Company for asbestos-related
liabilities and insurance recoveries are based on currently
available information and assumptions that the Company believes
are reasonable based on an evaluation of relevant factors.  The
actual liabilities or insurance recoveries could be higher or
lower than those recorded if actual results vary significantly
from the assumptions.  There are a number of key variables and
assumptions including the number and type of new claims to be
filed each year, the resolution or outcome of these claims, the
average cost of resolution of each new claim, the amount of
insurance available, allocation methodologies, the contractual
terms with each insurer with whom the Company has reached
settlements, the resolution of coverage issues with other excess
insurance carriers with whom the Company has not yet achieved
settlements, and the solvency risk with respect to the Company's
insurance carriers.  Other factors that may affect the future
liability include uncertainties surrounding the litigation process
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case, legal
rulings that may be made by state and federal courts, and the
passage of state or federal legislation.  The Company makes the
necessary adjustments for the asbestos liability and corresponding
insurance recoveries on an annual basis unless facts or
circumstances warrant assessment as of an interim date."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/nt3ltx

Gardner Denver, Inc. (Gardner Denver) designs, manufactures and
markets engineered industrial machinery and related parts and
services. The Company is a global manufacturer of engineered
compressors and vacuum products for industrial applications.
Stationary air compressors are used to pressurize gas, including
air, in excess of 50 pounds per square inch gauge and are used in
manufacturing, process applications and materials handling, and to
power air tools and equipment. Blowers and liquid ring pumps
compress gas, including air, up to 50 pounds per square inch gauge
and are often used in vacuum applications. Blowers are used in
pneumatic conveying, wastewater aeration and engineered vacuum
systems. Liquid ring pumps are sold as part of an engineered
package and are used in process applications, such as power
generation, chemical processing and oil and gas refining.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ITT Units Had 27,000 Claims Pending at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
ITT Inc.'s subsidiaries had 27,000 pending claims at June 30,
2017, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2017.

The Company says, "Subsidiaries of ITT, including ITT LLC and
Goulds Pumps LLC, have been sued, along with many other companies
in product liability lawsuits alleging personal injury due to
asbestos exposure. These claims generally allege that certain
products sold by our subsidiaries prior to 1985 contained a part
manufactured by a third party (e.g., a gasket) which contained
asbestos. To the extent these third-party parts may have contained
asbestos, it was encapsulated in the gasket (or other) material
and was non-friable. As of June 30, 2017, there were approximately
27 thousand pending claims against ITT subsidiaries, including
Goulds Pumps LLC, filed in various state and federal courts
alleging injury as a result of exposure to asbestos.

"Frequently, plaintiffs are unable to identify any ITT LLC or
Goulds Pumps LLC products as a source of asbestos exposure. Our
experience to date is that a majority of resolved claims are
dismissed without any payment from ITT subsidiaries. Management
believes that a large majority of the pending claims have little
or no value. In addition, because claims are sometimes dismissed
in large groups, the average cost per resolved claim can fluctuate
significantly from period to period. ITT expects more asbestos-
related suits will be filed in the future, and ITT will continue
to aggressively defend or seek a reasonable resolution, as
appropriate.

"Asbestos litigation is a unique form of litigation. Frequently,
the plaintiff sues a large number of defendants and does not state
a specific claim amount. After filing complaint, the plaintiff
engages defendants in settlement negotiations to establish a
settlement value based on certain criteria, including the number
of defendants in the case. Rarely do the plaintiffs seek to
collect all damages from one defendant. Rather, they seek to
spread the liability, and thus the payments, among many
defendants. As a result of this and other factors, the Company is
unable to estimate the maximum potential exposure to pending
claims and claims estimated to be filed over the next 10 years.
Estimating our exposure to pending asbestos claims and those that
may be filed in the future is subject to significant uncertainty
and risk as there are multiple variables that can affect the
timing, severity, quality, quantity and resolution of claims. Any
predictions with respect to the variables impacting the estimate
of the asbestos liability and related asset are subject to even
greater uncertainty as the projection period lengthens. In light
of the variables and uncertainties inherent in the long-term
projection of the Company's asbestos exposures, although it is
probable that the Company will incur additional costs for asbestos
claims filed beyond the next 10 years, which additional costs may
be material, we do not believe there is a reasonable basis for
estimating those costs at this time.

"The asbestos liability and related receivables reflect
management's best estimate of future events. However, future
events affecting the key factors and other variables for either
the asbestos liability or the related receivables could cause
actual costs or recoveries to be materially higher or lower than
currently estimated. Due to these uncertainties, as well as our
inability to reasonably estimate any additional asbestos liability
for claims which may be filed beyond the next 10 years, it is
difficult to predict the ultimate cost of resolving all pending
and unasserted asbestos claims. We believe it is possible that
future events affecting the key factors and other variables within
the next 10 years, as well as the cost of asbestos claims filed
beyond the next 10 years, net of expected recoveries, could have a
material adverse effect on our financial statements.

"As part of our ongoing review of our net asbestos exposure, each
quarter we assess the most recent qualitative and quantitative
data available for the key inputs and assumptions, comparing the
data to expectations on which the most recent annual liability and
asset estimates were calculated. Based on this evaluation, the
Company determined that no change in the estimate was warranted
for the quarter ended June 30, 2017 other than the incremental
accrual to maintain a rolling 10-year forecast period. A net
asbestos charge of $14.9 and $29.8 was recognized in the three and
six months ended June 30, 2017 and $15.2 and $30.6 in the three
and six months June 2016, respectively, to maintain the 10-year
forecast period.

"During the second quarter of 2016, the company was able to
transition all remaining claims to our single defense firm in
connection with the change in defense strategy initiated in 2015.
As a result, we reduced our estimated liability by $4.9 during the
second quarter of 2016.

"During the first quarter of 2016, we entered into a settlement
agreement with an insurer to settle responsibility for multiple
insurance claims, resulting in a benefit of $2.6. During the
second quarter of 2016, ITT entered into a settlement agreement
(Settlement) with an insurer to settle responsibility for multiple
insurance claims. Under the terms of the Settlement, the insurer
agreed to a specified series of payments over the course of the
next five years to a Qualified Settlement Fund, resulting in a
loss of $4.7."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/WSNOBJ


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3rd Cir. Invalidates Bare Metal Defense
--------------------------------------------------------
P.J. Dannunzio, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reported that
if a manufacturer ships an engine without a gasket and the buyer
replaces it with an asbestos-laden part, is the manufacturer
liable for any resulting injuries? In an apparent issue of first
impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said
yes.

The court's decision came in the lawsuits of two widows of U.S.
Navy sailors who contracted cancer from exposure to asbestos. In
its ruling, the court scrapped the bare-metal defense -- an
argument that says if a manufacturer makes a product without
asbestos, and asbestos is later added to it, the manufacturer
cannot be held liable for the consequences.

Third Circuit Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie wrote in the court's
opinion that the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.

"In that void, we survey bedrock principles of maritime law and
conclude that they permit a manufacturer of even a bare-metal
product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when
circumstances indicate the injury was a reasonably foreseeable
result of the manufacturer's actions -- at least in the context of
a negligence claim," Judge Vanaskie said.

"The district court had instead applied the bright-line rule
approach and entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs," the
judge continued. "We will vacate the entry of summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' negligence claims, affirm the entry of summary
judgment on the plaintiffs' product liability claims (which we
conclude were abandoned on appeal), and will remand, for further
proceedings."

Richard P. Myers of Paul, Reich & Myers represented the
plaintiffs, Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee.

Mr. Myers can be reached at:

     Richard P. Myers, Esq.
     PAUL, REICH & MYERS
     1608 Walnut Street, Suite 500
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Fax: 215-735-3888
     Tel: 215-735-9200
     Email: info@prmpclaw.com

"We believe that the Third Circuit got it right when it ruled that
machinery manufacturers are responsible in negligence for
asbestos-containing wear products used in their machinery," Myers
said in an email. "The court validated maritime law's 'special
solicitude for the safety and protection of sailors.' We look
forward to trying these cases in the district court on remand."
Shay Dvoretzky of Jones Day argued the case for the manufacturing
defendants and did not respond to a request for comment.

The central debate on the bare-metal defense, according to Judge
Vanaskie, hinged on the foreseeability of harm caused by a
defendant's product and then went into whether that foreseeability
was governed by rules or standards.

"A rule is a legal directive that attempts to capture a background
principle into an easy-to-apply form that is predictable and
efficient," like a speed limit, Judge Vanaskie said. The downside,
he noted, is that they are imperfect; for example, drivers can be
punished for speeding safely while slow drivers cannot even if
they "amble along haphazardly."

"A standard, on the other hand, collapses the background principle
into the actual legal directive, resulting in better accuracy and
'fit' with the underlying purpose, and fewer errors of over- and
under-inclusion," but with the drawback of being less predictable
and efficient, Judge Vanaskie said.

However, in the case of maritime law, the Third Circuit favored
the standard approach.

"The special solicitude for the safety and protection of sailors
is dispositive, because it counsels us to follow the standard-
based approach, and none of the other principles weigh heavily in
either direction," Judge Vanaskie said. "The standard-based
approach is the one we will therefore follow: foreseeability is
the touchstone of the bare-metal defense; a manufacturer of a
bare-metal product may be held liable for a plaintiff's injuries
suffered from later-added asbestos-containing materials if the
facts show the plaintiff's injuries were a reasonably foreseeable
result of the manufacturer's failure to provide a reasonable and
adequate warning."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Central Indiana Court Vacated for Remediation
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reported that county employees are moving out
of a courthouse in central Indiana to allow for asbestos
remediation work.

Madison County will vacate the downtown Anderson building for
seven months, The Herald Bulletin reported.

The county's Board of Commissioners approved an agreement with
Anderson University to lease space at two locations for more than
$30,000 a month. Relocated offices include the court system and
clerk's office.

"It was difficult to find a place to fit everyone and continue for
the work to be done," said Steffanie Owens, a county commissioner.
"This is not perfect, but was our best option."

Asbestos was first discovered in the courthouse in October 2016. A
survey by HydroTech Environmental Consulting & Engineering found
asbestos on sprayed-on fireproofing material in the building. The
fireproofing material was used on structural steel beams and
columns in the building, on ceilings and walls in various rooms,
and on plumbing pipes.

A further inspection found the asbestos could become airborne if
it's disturbed.

In addition to removing asbestos, work will also include new
fireproofing, carpeting, lighting and paint in county offices.

The remediation and temporary office relocation is expected to
cost about $2 million.

The county will provide security and housekeeping at the new
locations. The university will cover utility costs.

Officials say the courthouse will be closed to the public starting
Nov. 27. All employees will be out of the building by the time
remediation work begins on Dec. 4.

The building is expected to reopen in June 30.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Phila Ct. Rejects Methods for Detecting Asbestos
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Max Mitchell, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reported that
methods two experts used to detect asbestos in talcum powder were
not scientifically rigorous enough to allow those experts to
testify in court, a Pennsylvania judge has ruled in a case that
attorneys have said is likely the first of its kind in the
Keystone State.

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Idee Fox agreed with the
defendants in Brandt v. The Bon-Ton Stores that the plaintiffs'
pathology expert, Dr. Ronald Gordon, and their geology and
microscopy expert, Sean Fitzgerald, used experimental, and in one
case "inherently unscientific," methods when testing for the
presence of asbestos in the talcum powder at issue. Fox determined
that both experts did not pass muster under the Frye test, and
granted the defendants motions to preclude their testimony.

"This court finds that the methodologies employed by both Mr.
Fitzgerald and Dr. Gordon are not generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community," Fox said. "Although each employed
some generally accepted methodologies, each modified, varied or
deviated from those generally accepted methodologies."

Brandt is being handled in Philadelphia's asbestos program, and
stems from claims that talcum powder plaintiff Sally Brandt used
between 1954 and 1970 contained asbestos, which caused her to
develop mesothelioma.

Although not as eye-catching as the verdicts against Johnson &
Johnson in talc-related ovarian cancer cases, over the past few
years plaintiffs with talc-related mesothelioma claims have won
significant verdicts.

In 2013, a New Jersey jury awarded a $1.6 million verdict over
asbestos-related talc claims. That number was shattered with the
reportedly record-setting $18 million verdict a Los Angeles jury
awarded in October, and, most recently, a New York jury hit
defendants with a $16.5 million verdict.

Attorneys recently told The Legal there are a handful of talc-
related mesothelioma cases being handled in Pennsylvania, and that
the dispute over the experts' methodologies in Brandt was the
first instance that a Pennsylvania court was able to review the
issue.

According to Fox, both Gordon and Fitzgerald used some generally
accepted methodologies, but improperly modified those standards in
a way that led to questionable results.

Fitzgerald, for example, used a "mishmash" of methodologies, but
admitted that if he used talc testing methods accepted by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration he probably would not have found
asbestos, Fox said. Also, when performing the research to develop
his opinion on causation, Gordon used smaller than usual tissue
samples, a smaller than typical control population, and
extrapolated his findings, according to Fox.

The plaintiffs argued the different methodologies should still be
put to the jury, but Fox disagreed.

"Although plaintiff contends this is a question of weight as to
the opinions of dueling experts, this court finds it to be a
question of admissibility involving scientific opinion and
generally accepted methodologies," Fox said. "Under Pennsylvania
law, this court finds that Mr. Fitzgerald and Dr. Gordon employed
methodologies not generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community."

Defendants in the case include Imerys Talc America, Colgate-
Palmolive, and Whittaker, Clark & Daniels.

Attorney Theresa Mullaney, Esq. -- tmullaney@kentmcbride.com -- of
Kent & McBride is representing Palmolive; Rawle & Henderson
attorney John C. McMeekin II, Esq. -- jmcmeekin@rawle.com -- is
representing Imerys Talc America; and Steven Bardsley, Esq. --
sbardsley@hoaglandlongo.com -- of Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst &
Doukas is representing Whittaker, Clark & Daniels.

The Brandts is represented by:

     Patrick Wigle, Esq.
     WATERS KRAUS & PAUL
     3141 Hood Street, Suite 700
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Tel: 214.357.6244
     Fax: 214.357.7252


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Solons Seek Clarity on Cases in Baltimore
----------------------------------------------------------
Meredith Cohn, writing for The Baltimore Sun, reported that
Maryland state lawmakers, concerned about a years-long backlog of
asbestos cases lingering in Baltimore City courts, sought clarity
from attorneys who represent those sickened by the insulating
material and lawyers who represent industry.

But the sides could not agree on the number of people awaiting
their day in court -- or even whether there is a backlog at all.

"One side says there are thousands of cases ready for trial and
one side says there are zero," said state Sen. Robert A. "Bobby"
Zirkin, the Baltimore County Democrat who chairs the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee. "Both can't be true."

Zirkin said he called the hearing because Baltimore courts have
long struggled to clear asbestos cases, largely from workers at
the seaport, in shipbuilding and construction trades who were
exposed to the carcinogenic material and got or feared getting
cancer or other, non-cancerous illnesses. He wanted to hear if a
recent change in the method of funneling cases through a special
court docket was working and if there was any legislative measure
that could smooth the process.

After two and a half hours of testimony, he asked both sides to
send him briefs so he and other lawmakers could sort through their
arguments.

Lawyers from the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, which made a
name and a fortune beginning decades ago litigating asbestos
injury cases, said there were more than 22,000 active cases in the
Baltimore courts. They said there might also be 7,000 inactive
cases, in which people who were exposed to asbestos on the job
were reserving the right to file a lawsuit if they became sick
later.

If the firm was able to staff every case and fill the hundreds of
trial slots every year, lawyer Armand J. Volta Jr. said, it would
still take decades more to clear them all.

Volta said the firm planned to revisit an attempt made years ago
-- and rejected by the courts -- to consolidate the cases and
push them through en masse. In the meantime, he said, more court
resources might help.

Venable LLP attorney Theodore F. Roberts represented the Wallace &
Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, which was set up by the former
Baltimore contractor in bankruptcy following a large number of
asbestos claims. Roberts said Tuesday that firms such as Angelos'
were not even asking the courts to schedule cases in open court
dates in the city and surrounding jurisdictions.

Instead, he said, "They want the courts or legislature to build
them a superhighway" to push through cases, some of which might
not have merit.

Roberts said the solution was to allow the cases to go through the
normal process, which has been amended to allow for attorney
conferences to move cases more quickly in small groups to trial or
other resolution.

Judge W. Michel Pierson, a Baltimore City Circuit Court
administrative judge who also testified, agreed that the new
system was helping clear cases more quickly. He said more than 180
cases in 2016 and more than 250 in 2017 were resolved this way.

But he, too, could not clarify exactly how many cases were
pending. He said many were resolved but never cleared from the
court system, and the courts were working to identify them now and
close them. He said the system will continue to work out the kinks
and clear more cases.

"I don't mean to put this forward as great progress, but it's a
beginning of a process that began in 2014," he said. "We're in the
process of getting cases resolved."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contractor Sues Montana for Inaction on Dumping
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reported that an asbestos-disposal contractor
is taking Montana environmental officials to court for failing to
crack down on the improper disposal of asbestos, a commonly used
and potentially deadly building material.

Ingraham Environmental of Butte said in a lawsuit filed in state
District Court in Silver Bow-Butte County that asbestos-containing
material is being dumped in open-air sites at Montana landfills.
That poses a danger to workers and anyone who breathes in the air
around the dumps, the company alleged.

"We have the laws on the books," Doug Ingraham of Ingraham
Environmental told The Montana Standard. "We think the rules
protect us, but there's no enforcement."

Attorneys for the Montana Department of Environmental Quality said
in response that the agency was not required to more aggressively
enforce laws on asbestos disposal.

The case is before Judge Brad Newman.

Montana's laws are quite strict -- even more stringent than
federal regulations -- regarding the disposal of asbestos. The
fibrous material can cause pulmonary diseases including
mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung with a near-100
percent fatality rate.

State regulations require asbestos to be treated differently than
common waste. However, the primary responsibility for compliance
is placed on the building owner.

In its initial answer to the lawsuit, DEQ attorneys did not deny
that the unregulated asbestos dumping described in the lawsuit was
occurring. But they said landfill operators and building owners
were accountable -- not the state.

DEQ public policy director Kristi Ponozzo said the agency was
working with representatives of the asbestos industry to address
complexities within the state and federal laws that govern
asbestos regulation. The agency convened an asbestos advisory
group last year to help increase awareness and compliance with
disposal rules, she said.

Asbestos already has taken a huge human and financial toll in
Montana, most notably in the town of Libby, where health officials
say contamination from asbestos-tainted vermiculite has killed
hundreds of people and sickened thousands.

The vermiculite came from a W.R. Grace mine that for decades
produced material for Zonolite insulation, which was sold widely
in Montana and other states.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has spent more than $575
million cleaning up almost 2,500 residential and commercial
properties in Libby and surrounding areas. But it has done little
to address the problems that arise elsewhere when structures with
Zonolite are demolished or remodeled.

Ingraham said such work poses an enduring danger for construction,
demolition and landfill workers as well as anyone else in the
vicinity when asbestos fibers are released into the air.

Ingraham's family has been in the asbestos abatement business
since the 1980s. His father, Bruce, was trained by people who have
since died of asbestos-related disease, he said.

"We're not asking for new rules," Ingraham said. "We're just
asking that DEQ assume responsibility."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Woman Who Ate Asbestos as Child Has Rare Cancer
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Roberts for Metro.co.uk reported that a young woman has been
diagnosed with an asbestos-related cancer which usually affects
much older male builders.

Danielle Smalley, 23, is mystified by how she was exposed to the
deadly substance, reasoning that she must have eaten some of it as
a young child.  She now has to freeze her eggs as she faces 'hot'
chemotherapy treatment that will leave her infertile. The client
manager from Aldershot, in Hampshire, had never even heard of
asbestos until she was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Doctors told
Danielle that her variation of the cancer means she must have
ingested the banned heat-resistant material in her youth.

Both parents, Amanda, 47, and Simon, 51, never knowingly came into
contact with asbestos in their work running an alarm fitting
business, the Daily Mirror reports. Which only adds to the mystery
of how Danielle came into contact with it.

'It takes 20 years to have an effect, I'd have been two or three
when I had it. It's rare in women, rarer at my age. Usually it's
older men in the building trade,' Danielle said. 'We looked up my
primary school, but didn't find anything. It's unlikely we'll ever
find out where the asbestos was. 'I've just been incredibly
unlucky.'

Only two other similar cases have been reported since 2009, in a
condition usually diagnosed in older male builders. The substance
was regularly used on building sites before its total ban in 1999.
Doctors at Frimley Park Hospital, in Surrey, discovered her
condition after finding tumours behind her bowel. They thought she
was suffering with irritable bowel syndrome at first. But now,
Danielle will have her organs 'washed' using revolutionary heated
chemotherapy drugs. Over 3,000 cases of asbestos-related cancer
are diagnosed every year.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Industry Upset with Higher Asbestos Verdicts
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Karmasek, writing for Forbes.com, reported that the
business community and legal reform groups are fighting a decision
that exposes asbestos defendants to higher verdicts in New York
City.

Last week, several civil justice reform groups, policy and
business organizations and insurers filed a brief in a New York
intermediate appellate court, arguing a recent case management
order governing all New York City asbestos litigation should be
vacated.

The 32-page amicus brief was filed in the New York Supreme Court's
Appellate Division, First Department.

Those groups joining the brief are: The Business Council of New
York State Inc., Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York, New York
Insurance Association Inc., Northeast Retail Lumber Association,
Coalition for Litigation Justice Inc., U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
National Association of Manufacturers, National Federation of
Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, American Tort
Reform Association, Washington Legal Foundation and American
Insurance Association.

The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform owns Legal Newsline.

At issue is a New York City Asbestos Litigation, or NYCAL, case
management order released June 20.

NYCAL is home to one of the country's largest asbestos dockets and
the site of some of the highest plaintiff verdicts in recent
history. ATRA has, in recent years, maintained the jurisdiction is
a "Judicial Hellhole" in its annual report.

The order, issued by Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Peter Moulton
after being in the works for nearly two years, holds, among other
things, that punitive damages awards are no longer deferred for
cases placed on the trial calendar after the CMO's effective date.

In their brief, the groups argue that allowing punitive damages
awards in NYCAL cases will "frustrate settlements, create longer
and more complex trials, spawn appeals that will further delay
recoveries" and draw more plaintiffs.

The Washington Legal Foundation -- one of the groups joining the
brief -- contends the CMO, which was set to take effect July 20
but was temporarily stayed, deprives NYCAL defendants of statutory
and due process rights without their consent.

"The reasons for deferring punitive damages in asbestos cases
remain sound, not only to preserve the amount of company resources
that can compensate deserving victims, but to accelerate trials,
speed recovery, and avoid lengthy appeals," said Cory Andrews, WLF
senior litigation counsel.

Tom Stebbins, executive director of the Albany-based Lawsuit
Reform Alliance, said the brief is a "critical step" in restoring
balance to NYCAL.

"The court has been dubbed a 'judicial hellhole' and the recent
case management order only made things worse," he told Legal
Newsline.

"We hope the court will restore the longstanding deferral of
punitive damages and adopt asbestos trust claim transparency to
address inconsistent claims and suppression of trust-related
exposure evidence by plaintiffs' lawyers."

Punitive damages were reintroduced to the NYCAL docket in 2014,
but stayed by an appeals court pending further modification to the
CMO.

Soon after, in December 2014, ATRA named NYCAL the No. 1 Judicial
Hellhole in the country in its annual report.

Then, in 2015, former New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was
indicted over allegations that he traded state grants to the
hospital of a doctor who provided him with referrals to asbestos
plaintiffs.

Silver had long been listed as of counsel at the firm Weitz &
Luxenberg PC, which files the majority of cases in NYCAL. The firm
has denied any knowledge of Silver's alleged scheme. This year,
his conviction was overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

When contacted by Legal Newsline about the amicus brief filed this
week, a Weitz spokeswoman said the firm did not have any comment
at this time.

And while NYCAL continues to drop down ATRA's annual list, the
tort reform group -- also among those joining the brief --
contends it is still very much an area of concern.

"Despite early signals that Justice Peter Moulton might carry out
needed reforms, he has since shown his determination to ignore
balanced procedural trends in asbestos litigation nationwide by
reestablishing punitive damages and normalizing the consolidation
of cases at the expense of defendants' due process rights," ATRA
President Tiger Joyce said in December.

The groups, in their brief, believe the court should, at a
minimum, modify the CMO to restore the practice of deferring
punitive damages claims.

They also believe, according to the filing, the court should, at a
minimum, modify the CMO to close an asbestos bankruptcy trust
disclosure "loophole" and require plaintiffs to file all eligible
asbestos trust claims early in the discovery process and specify
that trust claims materials are admissible.

"Punitive damages are just as inappropriate in today's asbestos
litigation as they were in 1996, when Justice Helen Freedman,
then-presiding Administrative Law Judge for all NYCAL cases,
deferred such claims while providing other substantial benefits to
plaintiffs," the brief states.

Often in asbestos litigation, the alleged wrong was committed by a
predecessor company, not the company being sued.

Punitive damages "only deplete resources that are better used to
compensate injured parties," Freedman explained.

"Because mesothelioma claims continue to arise at a steady pace,
allowing punitive damages claims -- which, by definition provide a
windfall to the plaintiff -- depletes limited funds that otherwise
may be needed to compensate future plaintiffs," the groups wrote
in their brief.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabinet Maker Dies from Asbestos Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Harris, writing for Devon Live, reported that a 75-year-old
man died as a result of asbestos exposure while making cabinets
and fireproof doors at a company in Devon, an inquest heard.

Ronald George Cockbill was born in Birmingham but later moved to
North Devon, and lived in Bratton Fleming when he died at home on
June 17, 2017.

Dr Jason Davies, pathologist, conducted Mr Cockbill's autopsy and
reported finding a tumour consistent with mesothelioma. At the
inquest into Mr Cockbill's death at South Molton Town Hall on
Wednesday, October 11, Dr Davies gave the cause of death as
malignant mesothelioma consistent with asbestos exposure.

In a written statement provided as evidence for the inquest, Dr
Jackie Tolhurst, Mr Cockbill's general practitioner at Brannam
Medical Centre, said: "In general he had no significant
respiratory problems. He was never a smoker and was previously
exposed to asbestos.

"When he had an x-ray, bilateral pleural plaques consistent with
exposure were discovered. Later he showed more signs of possible
asbestos exposure and a further x-ray showed he had mesothelioma."

In July 2015, Mr Cockbill wrote a statement which was read aloud
at the inquest. He said: "I was a cabinet maker and development
technician for Shapland and Petter until 1992, testing and
developing materials and designs. The company started to use
asbestos and I was exposed to asbestos by making doors and my
colleagues making them around me.

"We were working with asbestos paper in the mid to later 1970s
which were added to make doors last longer in fires. I stopped
being a technician in 1992 and became a production manager and
then we were no longer using asbestos in the company."

HMRC confirmed his employment history at Shapland and Petter and
then Sig Manufacturing Ltd, which took over Shapland and Petter,
though Mr Cockbill's job didn't change.

Coroner John Tomalin summarised the evidence and gave his
conclusion. He said: "After an apprenticeship as a cabinet maker
at Shapland and Petter, Mr Cockbill continued to work at the
company. He was of the view he had been exposed to asbestos fibres
when engaged in the production of these doors.

"He was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma and that has been
confirmed by Dr Davies. I accept the pathologist's conclusion for
Mr Cockbill's cause of death and I must give a conclusion of
industrial decease."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Manchester Man Killed of Asbestos from Work
------------------------------------------------------------
Beth Abbit, writing for Manchester Evening News, reported that a
widow whose husband died after being exposed to deadly asbestos is
calling on his former workmates for help.

Thomas Brennan developed mesothelioma -- a cancer related to
exposure to asbestos -- after working at a Manchester factory.

He died at the age of 72 after a battle with the disease.

His widow, Bridget, is now appealing to his former colleagues to
help her in her fight against the employer who allegedly exposed
him to asbestos dust.

Thomas worked as a pattern maker at Henry Wallwork, in the Red
Bank, Manchester, between 1967 and 1980.

At the time it is claimed asbestos was widely used in foundries on
pipe laggings, boiler coverings, as insulation in fan housings, in
gloves, aprons and curtains.

It was also used as insulation in cupolas and in ladles and
insulation in sand moulds.

Asbestos was commonly incorporated into many pieces of equipment,
including tanks, pumps, valves, ovens, boilers and furnaces.

Industrial diseases such as mesothelioma can often develop decades
after initial exposure to the lethal substance.

Bridget is now appealing for anyone who worked with Thomas at
Henry Wallwork's to get in touch.

Solicitor Sarah Wolf is representing the family in their battle.

The asbestos disease specialist, of law firm Leigh Day, said,
"Mesothelioma is an aggressive, fatal asbestos related cancer.

"In order for us to progress this case it would be helpful to
speak to anyone who worked at Wallwork's in the mid to late 1960's
up to the early 1980's. "They do not need to have known Thomas. We
just need to build a picture of working practices and the uses of
asbestos."

Bridget and son Paul emigrated to America in 1980 and Thomas died
in California.

Paul said: "Dad came over to Manchester with Mum from Ireland in
the 1960s and he often spoke fondly of his time there living in
Chorlton and Didsbury.

"It is such a pity that he developed this incurable disease which
he contracted through no fault of his own. We would all be so
grateful for any information from Dad's former colleagues."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Head Start Moves Out After Asbestos Find
---------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reported that a Head Start program on a
southern Colorado American Indian reservation unexpectedly closed
after asbestos was discovered in a crawl space, leaving about 95
families scrambling to find day care and other services for their
children.

The Durango Herald reports the program in Ignacio was forced to
move early last week after the Southern Ute Indian Tribe closed
the building where it was housed.

The program hopes to reopen by the end of this week, if not
sooner, said Eileen Wasserbach, director of Southern Ute Community
Action Programs.

Some classrooms will remain in modular classrooms nearby, while
about 45 students will move to the Southern Ute Cultural Center
and Museum.

Head Start is one of six programs operated by the group.

Head Start typically serves about 95 families, or 140 children
total, in the Ignacio area.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ill. High Ct. Issues Landmark Litigation Opinion
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The National Law Review reported that on September 21, 2017, the
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois issued a personal
jurisdiction opinion that may change the national landscape of
asbestos litigation.

Aspen American Insurance Company v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc.
closes the door in Illinois to out-of-state plaintiffs suing for
claims that have no ties to Illinois against defendants who are
not domiciled in the state.

One-third of all asbestos-related lawsuits in the United States
are filed in Madison County, Illinois and asbestos litigation
accounts for 72% of the civil cases filed in Madison County.  Only
75 of 1,224 asbestos cases filed in Madison County in 2015 were
filed by Illinois residents. This may change with the recent
decision in Aspen.

The Court in the Aspen case applied the Daimler AG v. Bauman
Supreme Court decision. Daimler distinguished between specific and
general jurisdiction.  In cases involving specific jurisdiction, a
state can establish jurisdiction over a defendant because the
cause of action arose out of or occurred within the jurisdiction.
General jurisdiction is based on the principal that you can sue a
defendant where they are domiciled.  In cases involving a company,
that is where they are incorporated, where they have their
principal place of business, or when their connection to the forum
state is so substantial that a very limited exception is
warranted.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Motion Aims for Recusal Over Non-Disclosure
------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for The New Jersey Law Journal, reported
that a state mass tort judge has been asked to recuse herself from
asbestos injury suits after she failed to disclose a family
member's involvement in a case she is hearing.

Lawyers for BASF Catalysts filed a motion asking Middlesex County
Superior Court Judge Ana Viscomi to recuse and disqualify herself
from multicounty asbestos litigation based on an allegation that
the judge's sister was once employed by BASF's predecessor,
Engelhard Corp.

BASF is named as defendant in about a dozen suits based on alleged
injuries caused by a talc product called Emtal, which was made by
Engelhard for industrial applications. Plaintiffs have accused
BASF of spoliation based on missing Engelhard documents.

Engelhard, formerly based in Iselin, was purchased by BASF in
2006.

Josephine Viscomi, the judge's sister, worked for Engelhard from
1998 to 2001 as a library assistant in the research department,
where her duties included keeping track of laboratory notebooks.
Plaintiffs have accused Engelhard of spoliation, and the judge's
sister could be called to testify in the litigation, BASF argues.

What's more, records from Engelhard's human resources department
show the judge contacted the company twice in writing and three
times by phone concerning her sister's employment, according to
BASF. Those contacts were made while Viscomi was serving as
special master for asbestos cases in Middlesex County, and she
used her phone and fax numbers from the courthouse in those
communications, according to the BASF motion. Some portions of the
publicly released version of the recusal motion discussing the
judge's sister are redacted.

BASF said it became aware of the judge's connection to Engelhard
this past summer on finding references to Josephine Viscomi in
company documents. BASF asked the judge in an Aug. 16 letter
whether she was related to Josephine Viscomi.  The judge replied
by letter later that day, confirming that Josephine Viscomi is her
sister, and adding, "I am aware that she was a library assistant
for Engelhard Corporation at one time but not aware of the nature
of her duties since we never discussed her work."

BASF wrote back the next day, telling the judge records showed her
sister was the person responsible for lab notebooks concerning
Emtal talc and that personnel records showed her contacts with the
company concerning her sister's employment. BASF said the issues
created an appearance of impropriety, dictating that she should
recuse herself.

On Aug. 18, at 9:06 a.m., Viscomi told counsel in the case by
email that she was recusing herself and that another judge would
be assigned. At 9:17 a.m., a plaintiff's lawyer in the case,
Christopher Placitella, replied to the email, urging the judge not
to recuse herself and calling the defense objections "frivolous,"
according to the BASF motion. Then, at 9:30, the judge's chambers
sent another email to the parties, asking them to disregard the
judge's earlier message. And at 1:22 p.m., the judge sent out
another email, apologizing for the confusion. BASF later wrote to
the judge, asking her to recuse voluntarily, and Placitella wrote
to the court that recusal was "unnecessary."

On Aug. 21, Viscomi wrote to counsel to say she would not
voluntarily recuse, and defense counsel would have to file a
formal motion in order to seek her recusal.

BASF's motion says Viscomi should be disqualified for failing to
disclose her sister's past employment at Engelhard, even if the
judge did not herself believe the matter posed a conflict. The
judge's own involvement with Engelhard and the possibility that
her sister might have information relevant to the case also
require her to disqualify herself, BASF claims.

BASF also submitted declarations from Michael Ambrosio, a
professor at Seton Hall University School of Law; Edward Dauber, a
former member of the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Judicial
Conduct; and Leslie Abramson of the University of Louisville
School of Law, which state that the circumstances dictate recusal
of Viscomi.

Viscomi was confirmed for the Superior Court in 2012 and she was
designated as the multicounty litigation judge for asbestos in
2014. More than 1,300 asbestos cases are pending before Viscomi,
according to the judiciary's website.

Judiciary spokesman Peter McAleer declined to comment and also
said Viscomi would not comment on the recusal motion. Plaintiffs
lawyer Placitella confirms that he opposed Viscomi's recusal but
declines to discuss his reasons. He said his reason for opposing
the motion will be made clear in his opposition papers. Lawyers at
Kirkland & Ellis in Washington and Littleton Park Joyce Ughetta &
Kelly in Red Bank, representing BASF, declined to comment on the
motion.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Orders "DeMartino" Appeal Withdrawn
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York for the
First Department orders the appealed case IN RE: NEW YORK CITY
ASBESTOS LITIGATION PATRICK DEMARTINO AND JOY DEMARTINO,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. AURORA PUMP COMPANY, Defendant-
Appellant, AND BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, ETC., ET AL., Defendants,
Index No. 190128/14, (1st Dept. N.Y. App.), withdrawn in
accordance with the Stipulation of the Parties that was filed in
the case.

A full-text copy of the Order dated October 12, 2017, is available
at http://tinyurl.com/y99x9b72from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Whirlpool, et al., Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Manuel L. Real of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California has entered an order of dismissal of the
case MERCURY CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. WHIRLPOOL
CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendant, Case No. CV17-462-R, (C.D. Cal.),
after having been advised by the counsel for the Plaintiff Mercury
Casualty Company, and the Defendants Whirlpool Corporation, and
Sears Roebuck and Co. that the action has been settled.

The dismissal is without prejudice to the right to reopen the
action if the settlement is not consummated within 60 days.

A full-text copy of the Order dated October 10, 2017 is available
at http://tinyurl.com/y72nayaqfrom Leagle.com.

Mercury Casualty Company, Plaintiff, represented by Nathan Hurd,
Law Offices of Robert A. Stutman.

Whirlpool Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brian Takahashi,
Esq. -- brian.takahashi@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and Brooke
LLP & Jennifer Neiman Hinds, Esq. --
jennifer.hinds@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and Brooke LLP.

Sears Roebuck and Co., Defendant, represented by Jennifer Neiman
Hinds, Bowman and Brooke LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Disclosures Protective Order Issued in "Thrash"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has issued a protective order in relation
to information, documents, testimony, excerpts from documents, and
other materials produced in the case captioned JOSEPH THRASH and
CHEZ THRASH, Plaintiffs, v. CIRRUS ENTERPRISES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No.: 4:17-cv-01501, (N.D. Cal.) pursuant to the
rules governing disclosure and discovery.

Among other things, the Protective Order provides that:

     (a) All such information, testimony, documents, excerpts from
documents, and other materials will constitute "Designated
Material" under the Protective Order. The designations will be:
(1) Confidential; (2) Export-Controlled, which is subject to U.S.
Arms Export Act, International Traffic In Arms Regulations, Export
Administration Act, U.S. Export Administration Regulations; (3)
Limited Distribution; and/or (4) Proprietary.

     (b) Documents will be designated by stamping or otherwise
marking the documents, clearly identifying the category of
Designated Material for which protection is sought under the terms
of the Order.

     (c) Nondisclosure of information designated as
"CONFIDENTIAL."

     (d) Material designated as "CONFIDENTIAL" will not be used or
disclosed for any purpose other than the litigation of this action
and may be disclosed only as follows:

         1. Parties: Material designated CONFIDENTIAL may be
disclosed to parties to this action or attorneys, directors,
officers and employees of parties to this action, who have a
legitimate need to see the information in connection with their
responsibilities for overseeing the litigation or assisting
counsel in preparing the action for trial or settlement.

         2. Other Persons: Material designated CONFIDENTIAL may be
provided as necessary to copying services, translators, and
litigation support firms.

         3. Competitors: Material designated CONFIDENTIAL may not
be provided to competitors of the Designating Party, including but
not limited to in-house counsel for the Designating Party's
competitors, their paralegals, or regularly employed office staff,
but excluding local counsel for any defendant in this case.

     (e) The Designating Party will designate any materials,
testimony or information that it believes to be subject to U.S.
Export Control Laws as "SENSITIVE -- SUBJECT TO EXPORT CONTROL --
U.S. Arms Export Act, International Traffic In Arms Regulations,
Export Administration Act, U.S. Export Administration
Regulations." The Designating Party will designate any documents
that contain a distribution limitation statement from the
Department of Defense or any branch of the U.S. Military as
"Limited Distribution".

     (f) Material designated as Export-Controlled may only be
released, disclosed or made accessible to U.S. Persons, that are
not named on any restricted or denied party/individual/entity list
maintained by relevant government agencies, as determined by an
appropriate screening process performed by the Designating Party
releasing the materials, testimony, and/or information.

     (g) A person having custody of Designated Material will
maintain it in a manner that limits access to the Designated
Material to persons permitted such access under the Order.

     (h) The Designating Parties will use reasonable care to avoid
designating documents or information that does not need to be
designated as such.

     (i) When Export-Controlled testimony is given at a deposition
or when Export Controlled Material is produced at a deposition,
the Designating Party may exclude from the deposition all persons
other than those to whom the Designated Material may be disclosed
under the Order.

     (j) A party which reasonably anticipates it will produce or
that it will be requested to produce information or material at a
hearing or discovery proceeding that is or will be designated as
Export-Controlled material must notify all parties of the same.

     (k) Filing pleadings or other papers disclosing or containing
Designated Material does not waive the designated status of the
material or relieve any party or person from the provisions and
restrictions of this Order.
     (l) A Party may not file any Designated Material in the
public record in this action without written permission from the
Designating Party or a court order secured after appropriate
notice to all interested persons.

     (m) Inadvertent production of CONFIDENTIAL material prior to
its designation as such in accordance with the Order will not be
deemed a waiver of a claim of confidentiality.

A full-text copy of the Protective Order, dated October 11, 2017,
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9kfsk7cfrom Leagle.com.

Joseph Thrash, Plaintiff, represented by Benno Behnam Ashrafi,
Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C..

Joseph Thrash, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Allen Green, Weitz
& Luxenberg, P.C. & Tyler Robert Stock, Weitz & Luxenburg, P.C..

Chez Thrash, Plaintiff, represented by Benno Behnam Ashrafi, Weitz
& Luxenberg, P.C., Robert Allen Green, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C. &
Tyler Robert Stock, Weitz & Luxenburg, P.C..

Cirrus Enterprises, LLC, Defendant, represented by Edward Eldon
Hartley, Esq. -- eeh@hassard.com -- Hassard Bonnington LLP & Barry
Nathan Endick, Esq. -- bne@hassard.com -- Hassard Bonnington LLP.

The Boeing Company, Defendant, represented by Dustin Clark
Beckley, Manion Gaynor & Manning LLP & Brent Marshall Karren,
Manion Gaynor & Manning LLP.

Lockheed Martin Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brian
Thomas Clark, Glazier Yee LLP, Deborah Maria Parker, Glazier Yee
LLP, Guy P. Glazier, Glazier Yee LLP & Laura Patricia Yee, Glazier
Yee LLP.

United Technologies Corporation, Defendant, represented by Ferlin
Peregrino Ruiz, Tucker Ellis LLP.

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Defendant, represented by
Michael J. Pietrykowski, Gordon & Rees LLP, Megan Feeney Clark,
Gordon & Rees LLP & Melissa Rose Badgett, Gordon & Rees LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Defendant, represented by Bo W. Kim,
Perkins Coie LLP & David T. Biderman, Perkins Coie LLP.

Rohr, Inc., Defendant, represented by David Michael Glaspy, Manion
Gaynor & Manning LLP.

Henkel Corporation, individually and as s-i-i to DEXTER CORP.,
DEXTER HYSOL AEROSPACE LLC, Defendant, represented by Allison
Elizabeth Mullings, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Florence
Anne McClain-Meza, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

IMO Industries Inc., Defendant, represented by Bobbie Rae Bailey,
Leader & Berkon LLP, Frederick W. Gatt, Leader & Berkon LLP &
Ketul Dilip Patel, Leader & Berkon LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Suit vs. Conwed Corporation Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota denies remand of the case MICHAEL P. McGILL
AND TATYANA BOBROVA, as husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. CONWED
CORPORATION and its predecessors, Civil No. 17-01047 (SRN/HB), (D.
Minn.), to Ramsey County District Court and instead dismisses the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Conwed Corporation.

The Court finds that Conwed's principal place of business is in
New York, thus, since the removal of the case was proper, the
Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the
case.

The Plaintiffs Michael P. McGill with his wife Tatyana Bobrova
asked the Court to remand this case to Ramsey County District
Court arguing that it was improperly removed because the Court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction. If the Court finds that
it has subject matter jurisdiction and denies Plaintiffs' Motion
to Remand, the Defendant Conwed Corporation moves the Court to
dismiss this action on the grounds that personal jurisdiction
cannot be exercised over Conwed in this forum.

Conwed, formerly known as the Wood Conversion Company, was
incorporated under the laws of Delaware in 1921. In February of
that year, it registered itself in Minnesota as a foreign
corporation. From at least 1959 to 1985, Conwed was in the
business of manufacturing ceiling tile, some of which contained
asbestos. Until 1985, Conwed manufactured tile in a mill located
in Cloquet, Minnesota.

During some of the years that Conwed manufactured ceiling tile,
Plaintiff Michael P. McGill worked at his father's Kansas City
interior construction company, the Jim McGill Company -- between
1968 and 1975. The Jim McGill Company distributed and installed
ceiling tile manufactured by Conwed, and McGill installed this
tile at job sites primarily in Kansas.

McGill alleges that during his work installing ceiling tile, he
was exposed to the asbestos-containing products and raw materials
manufactured, sold, and/or distributed by Conwed. As a result of
inhaling and ingesting the asbestos fibers contained in these
products, McGill contracted mesothelioma. McGill's mesothelioma
was diagnosed in December of 2015.

In March of 2016, Michael P. McGill, along with his wife Tatyana
Bobrova, initiated a legal action against Conwed and 13 other
defendants in the Missouri Circuit Court, in St. Louis, Missouri.
Conwed successfully moved to dismiss that lawsuit for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

On January 19, 2017, the Missouri Circuit Court dismissed
Plaintiffs' complaint against Conwed without prejudice, finding,
in part, that Conwed was a "Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in New York."

On March 16, 2017, the Plaintiffs sued Conwed -- as the sole
defendant -- in Ramsey County District Court in Minnesota,
alleging negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.
These allegations, according to Defendant, are nearly identical to
those of the Missouri Action. Thus, on April 4, 2017, Conwed
removed the case to federal court, invoking federal diversity
jurisdiction.

Conwed asserts that it is a citizen of Delaware and New York.
Conwed further contends that because the Plaintiffs are both
citizens of Kansas, complete diversity of citizenship exists. The
Plaintiffs disagree, asserting that "there is not complete
diversity between Plaintiffs and Defendant Conwed Corporation
because Conwed is a citizen of Delaware and Minnesota.

The Plaintiffs assert that since selling its business in 1985,
Conwed's primary purpose and "only business activity" has been
"participating in asbestos related litigation." As such, the
Plaintiffs argue that Conwed's "nerve center" is in Minnesota.

Conwed disagrees, contending that it has indeed met its burden of
showing that its principal place of business is in New York.
Conwed describes itself as a dormant corporation which nonetheless
maintains a principal place of business in New York. Conwed
identifies Robert E. Crowson, Jr., as its President -- who reports
to Conwed's Board of Directors -- and maintains that his business
address is Conwed's New York office -- together with Conwed's
Corporate Secretary Conwed's Corporate Secretary, who "keeps its
current corporate records" there as well.

As additional proof that Conwed's principal place of business is
in New York, Conwed points to its self-authenticating corporate
records, namely, the annual Franchise Tax Report -- as it is
required to disclose annually to the Delaware Secretary of State.
The Franchise Tax Report names Crowson as one of Conwed's
corporate officers, and lists Conwed's corporate office as 520
Madison Avenue, New York, New York.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs' suggestion that the documents that
Conwed offers are insufficient to establish New York as Conwed's
principal place of business. The Court finds that these documents
and declarations adequately support Conwed's burden of
establishing the location of its principal place of business.

The Court determines that Conwed has not been authorized to
transact business in Minnesota since 2009. The Minnesota Secretary
of State revoked Conwed's Certificate of Authority in January of
that year, and there is no evidence in the record that Conwed has
attempted to get it reinstated. In addition, the Court notes that
nothing in the record shows that Conwed was in fact transacting
any business within the state when it was served by Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it does not have personal
jurisdiction over Conwed.

Moreover, the Court concludes that Conwed is not "essentially at
home" in Minnesota. The Court points out that Conwed is
incorporated under the laws of Delaware, and that Conwed's
principal place of business is in New York. The Court finds also
that Conwed does not transact business in Minnesota, and there is
no evidence showing that Conwed's operations here are "so
substantial and of such a nature as to render it at home" in this
state. As such, the Court may not exercise general jurisdiction
over Conwed.

A full-text copy of the Order dated October 10, 2017, is available
at http://tinyurl.com/ydfytsdcfrom Leagle.com.

Michael P. McGill, Plaintiff, represented by Chad C. Alexander,
Sieben Polk PA.

Michael P. McGill, Plaintiff, represented by Michael S. Polk,
Sieben Polk Law Firm, Michael R. Strom, Sieben Polk Law Firm &
Ryan Thomas Gott, Sieben Polk, P.A..

Tatyana Bobrova, Plaintiff, represented by Chad C. Alexander,
Sieben Polk PA, Michael S. Polk, Sieben Polk Law Firm, Michael R.
Strom, Sieben Polk Law Firm & Ryan Thomas Gott, Sieben Polk, P.A..

Conwed Corporation, Defendant, represented by Kristi K. Brownson,
Esq. -- kbrownson@brownsonnorby.com -- Brownson Norby, PLLC,
Michael M. Sawers, Esq. -- msawers@briggs.com -- Briggs & Morgan,
PA, Robert D. Brownson, Esq. -- rbrownson@brownsonnorby.com --
Brownson Norby, PLLC & Steven J. Kirsch, Esq. --
skirsch@briggs.com -- Briggs & Morgan, PA.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Nooter's Coverage in Various Policies Determined
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Missouri for the Eastern District has
issued an opinion relating to insurance policies coverage in the
appealed case NOOTER CORPORATION, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v.
ALLIANZ UNDERWRITERS INS. CO., APPALACHIAN INS. CO., EVANSTON INS.
CO., NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF PITTSBURG, PA., NORTH STAR
REINSURANCE CORP., ONEBEACON AMERICA INS. CO., Appellants, and
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS LLOYD'S LONDON & LONDON MARKET INS., MUNICH
REINSURANCE AMERICA, INC., Appellants/Cross-Respondents, and
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO., Respondent, No. ED103835, (Mo. App.
E.D.).

This appeal involves a dispute between Nooter Corporation and
eight different Excess Insurance companies: Evanston Insurance
Company; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA;
Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company; Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London and Certain London Market Insurance Companies;
Appalachian Insurance Company; Munich Reinsurance America, Inc.;
North Star Reinsurance Company; and OneBeacon America Insurance
Company.

Specifically, this appeal concerns numerous insurance policies
providing coverage for Nooter from 1949 through 1985. Although
only "excess" insurance policies are directly at issue on appeal,
there were also several "primary" general liability insurance
policies that were active during the period -- which policies
serve as the first layer of insurance protection for Nooter.
Additionally, some of the excess insurance policies are "second-
level" excess policies, which can only attach after the applicable
primary policies and "first-level" excess policies have been
exhausted.

There are five "primary" insurance companies relevant to this
appeal: Continental Insurance Company; Transamerica Insurance
Company; Aetna/Travelers Casualty and Surety Company; Insurance
Company of North America; and Home Indemnity Company.

Nooter has been in the business of designing, installing, and
distributing pressure vessels for refineries and chemical plants
for over 100 years. Some of Nooter's sites allegedly contained
asbestos. Consequently, claimants began filing lawsuits against
Nooter for asbestos-related bodily injuries in the late 1990's. In
turn, Nooter began seeking help to defend and/or reimburse Nooter
for expenses related to these suits pursuant to various insurance
policies. This sparked several disagreements between Nooter and
Excess Insurers, eventually resulting in litigation.

After claimants began filing asbestos suits against Nooter, Nooter
claims it first sought funds from its primary insurance policies,
and then, "as individual primary policies were becoming exhausted
by the payment of asbestos claims," it sought coverage from Excess
Insurers. In sum, more than 20,000 individuals have brought
lawsuits against Nooter for bodily injuries resulting from
exposure to asbestos. Although the suits involve similar
allegations (i.e., personal injury caused by exposure to asbestos
at Nooter sites), each claim involves different exposures based on
each claimant's work history and/or unique circumstances that
allegedly exposed the claimants to asbestos.

Before the trial, Nooter agreed to dismiss its breach-of-contract
claims against Appalachian, Allianz, Munich, North Star, and
OneBeacon without prejudice. On April 28, 2014, Nooter proceeded
to trial against three of the Excess Insurers (Evanston, London,
and National Union), where only six counts were left for the jury
to resolve -- claims against all three defendants for both breach
of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. On May 9, the jury
returned verdicts in favor of National Union and London on both
counts, however, it returned verdicts against Evanston on both
counts.

Accordingly, Evanston appeals the adverse judgments against it
based on Nooter's claims of breach of contract and vexatious
refusal to pay, for which a jury trial was conducted.

Two leading methods of allocation have emerged to address
allocation of losses in complex insurance coverage claims. The
"all sums" approach and the "pro-rata" approach. The "all sums"
approach allows the policyholder to select a policy among the
range of years triggered by the "occurrence" at issue. Conversely,
"under the pro rata approach, damages are spread proportionately
across the entire period during which the property damage takes
place."

Six of the Excess Insurers have appealed the trial court's grant
of Nooter's motion for summary judgment regarding allocation,
holding that an "all sums" allocation method applies to relevant
asbestos claims under all of the policies of Allianz, OneBeacon,
London, Evanston, and North Star. The Court affirms the trial
court's finding that an "all sums" allocation method applies to
all of these policies.

Certain Excess Insurers appeal the trial court's grant of summary
judgment regarding exhaustion. Typically, exhaustion is a
condition precedent to triggering an excess insurer's duties. In
this case, it is undisputed that exhaustion of the Excess
Insurers' underlying policies is required. Two primary methods of
exhaustion have been used by courts: horizontal exhaustion and
vertical exhaustion. Vertical exhaustion is a principle of
insurance priority that allows the attachment of an excess policy
once all of the policies immediately below it (as identified in
the policy agreement) have been exhausted. Horizontal exhaustion
requires every triggered lower-level policy to become exhausted
before implicating an excess policy.

On the issue of exhaustion, the Court affirms the trial court's
determination that "vertical exhaustion" applies to these
policies: (a) the Older London Policies (covering from September
1, 1955 through May 17, 1961); (b) the Newer London Policies
(covering from May 17, 1961 through July 1,1965 and July 1, 1975
through July 1, 1980); (c) the National Union Policy; (d) the four
annual Evanston policies; and (e) the North Star Policy.

However, the Court reverses the judgment of the trial court
determining that London (under its 1961-1965 and 1975-1980
policies) and North Star must start paying Nooter its ultimate net
loss as defined by the policies -- as the plain language of the
policy requires that London and North Star must start paying after
vertical exhaustion and Nooter's loss exceed recoveries, salvages,
and the limits of any other insurance policies that cover the same
risk.

The Court finds that the "applicable underlying limit" definition
in the Evanston policies -- in conjunction with the definition of
"ultimate net loss" -- serves a similar function as London's
definition of "ultimate net loss" in their 1955-61 policies, and
that these definitions serve as a means for calculating Evanston's
liability, not defining when the policy attaches. Thus, after
reviewing the Evanston policies' "other insurance" provision and
definitions of "ultimate net loss" and "applicable underlying
limit," the Court concludes that Evanston's policies require
vertical exhaustion of the relevant primary policies for Nooter's
long-tail asbestos claims.

Allianz, Appalachian, and OneBeacon also challenge the trial
court's ruling on their duty to defend. The trial court declared
that the Allianz Policy includes "a duty to defend and to pay
defense costs in addition to policy limits."

Allianz' contends that the trial court misconstrued its policy
(Policy No. AUX5201679) and erroneously concluded that Allianz
must provide coverage as broad as the underlying Home primary
policies from 1983-1985, which include a duty to defend. The Court
agrees with Allianz' contention because based on the plain
language of the "broad as primary provision," Allianz' policy
expressly limits its obligations to reimbursing or indemnifying
Nooter for defense costs based on any underlying insurance
policies covered by the "broad as primary" endorsement.
Accordingly, the Court declares that Allianz' obligation is
limited to paying defense costs or indemnifying Nooter.

The OneBeacon Policy (from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1973,
follows the form of the Appalachian Policy). The "broad as
primary" endorsement in this case references the underlying policy
of Home Policy No. GA 4315500. Both the Appalachian Policy and the
OneBeacon Policy also include "broad as primary" endorsements --
which limits Appalachian's and/or OneBeacon's obligation to
"paying" on behalf of the insured. Thus, the Court holds that it
does not create an obligation for Appalachian and/or OneBeacon to
defend Nooter.

Essentially, "broad as primary" provisions usually expand an
excess policy so that its coverage of occurrences (i.e., the types
of harms covered by the policy) is at least as broad as the
primary policy. The Court concludes that the language of the
Appalachian Policy and the OneBeacon Policy obligates these Excess
Insurers to defend Nooter only if the terms of these excess
policies cover an occurrence and the terms of the underlying
insurance does not.

While the trial court granted London's motion for summary judgment
concluding that London's 1949-1961 policy language was "clear and
unambiguous" and imposes "no obligation to provide coverage for
Nooter's asbestos-related defense costs." However, the trial court
reached the opposite conclusion after reading North Star's policy
language. London, Nooter, and the Court all agree that the North
Star Policy's language is effectively equivalent to London's.

Although Nooter and North Star agree that the policies'
substantially similar language should produce consistent results,
the parties differ on which result should be reached.

North Star argues the trial court erred in entering its April 2,
2015 order and judgment declaring North Star is responsible for
reimbursing defense costs for Nooter's future asbestos claims
because the plain language of the policy imposes no such
liability, primarily due to language specifying that North Star's
"consent" is required for Nooter to obtain any defense costs.
North Star's also contends that the trial court erred in declaring
North Star may not unreasonably withhold its consent to incur
defense costs, because, North Star has full discretion over if and
when it will pay defense costs.

The Court determines that the language of North Star's policy
clearly and unambiguously confers an option to North Star to pay
defense costs, and that it does not impose an obligation. The
Court finds nothing else in the policy to contradict or call into
question the plain language of the "COSTS INCURRED BY THE
REINSURED" section -- which excludes North Star from an obligation
to pay defense costs.

Moreover, London argues that the trial court erred in finding the
record supported summary judgment in favor of Nooter because
Nooter failed to provide sufficient evidence that the limits of
Continental's or TIG's primary policies had been exhausted. London
also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment to establish those
primary policies had not been exhausted, which the trial court
denied.

Based on the evidence adduced, the Court finds that there was
sufficient evidence to find that the Continental policies had been
exhausted. For instance, in Continental's response to London's
first set of interrogatories, Continental stated, "all nine
primary Continental Policies issued to Nooter between September 1,
1955 and September 1, 1964... have been exhausted because at least
$300,000 in indemnity has been paid under each of those nine
policies," and "Continental has paid defense costs of
approximately $4 million and indemnity amounts totaling
$2,903,564, an amount which totals in excess of the sum of the
aggregate limits of liability for the policies..."

Further, the Court notes that Continental provided a chart showing
its payments based on date, name of claimant, and the amount paid
for each claim. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court's
judgment in favor of Nooter that Continental's policies have been
exhausted.

However, the Court reverses the trial court's judgment that Nooter
has proven the TIG Policy has been exhausted. The summary judgment
record contains only sparse evidence to prove the TIG policy was
exhausted.

Essentially, the Court notes that Nooter relies on its own
statements that TIG has paid $550,000 toward settlements of
Nooter's asbestos liabilities under the TIG policy No. 3CGB617300,
which exceeds its $300,000 limits of liability. However, Nooter
did not submit an affidavit to authenticate the documents it
included as exhibits to support its Statement of Uncontroverted
Material Facts.

Additionally, the Court points out that Nooter failed to produce a
copy of the TIG Policy. Moreover, even accepting the $300,000 and
$550,000 figures as accurate, Nooter fails to identify what the
$550,000 in settlement money went towards. Nooter simply notes
"TIG paid $550,000" or "TIG has paid $550,000 toward settlements
of Nooter's asbestos liabilities."

On the other hand, Nooter filed a motion for appellate attorney's
fees with our Court, requesting that the Court award attorney's
fees for Nooter's defense against Evanston's appeal. Nooter argues
that it is entitled to attorney's fees in its defense of its
vexatious refusal to pay claim and/or that it is entitled to
attorney's fees as damages for Evanston's appeal because it was
frivolous or non-meritorious.

Pursuant to Section 375.420, "a court may award reasonable
attorney's fees where a plaintiff prevails against an insurance
company for vexatious refusal to pay under that statute." Because
the Court affirms the portion of the trial court's judgment ruling
in favor of Nooter on its vexatious refusal to pay claim against
Evanston, it is appropriate to award attorney's fees on that
issue, as the trial court also did.

However, the Court will remand the case to the trial court and
direct it to hold a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the
requested appellate attorney's fees and enter judgment in
accordance with that assessment.

A full-text copy of the Judge Dolan's Opinion, dated October 3,
2017, is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9x4yelufrom Leagle.com.

Timothy Joseph Ahrenhoersterbaeumer, Thomas Blumeyer Weaver, Robyn
Greifzu Fox, Alan K. Goldstein, Theodore Joseph Macdonald Jr.,
Richard Charles Wuestling IV, J. Michael Balch, Sarah Emile Lynn
Baltzell, R. Patrick Bedell, Linda J. Carwile, Susan Marie Dimond,
Roderick T. Dunne, Charles Carson Eblen, Maryann Hays, Adam D.
Krauss, Gerard Thomas Noce, Bruce David Ryder, Stan Sexton, and
Michael Leslie Young, Attorneys for Appellants.

Richard A. Wunderlich, David L. Elkind, John A. Gibbons, and Omida
Safa, Attorneys for Respondent.





                             *********


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