CAR_Public/171017.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, October 17, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 205



                            Headlines

AETNA INSURANCE: Has Another Suit Over HIV-Related Privacy Breach
AIRBNB: Averts Real Estate Broker's Class Action in New York
AIR CANADA: Bears Most Responsibility for Gander Crash Landing
AKAMI INC: Counterclaims in "Zhang" Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
AMERICAN EXPRESS: Averts Class Action Over Lost Costco Contract

AMERIFACTORS FINANCIAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss TCPA Suit
APOTEX CORP: Court Dismisses Suit Against Generic Drug Makers
APPLE INC: Nov. 10 Find Friends App Claims Filing Deadline Set
ARIZONA: DCS Foster-Care System Suit Granted Class Action Status
BAODING CFC: "Chen" Labor Suit Seeks OT, Spread-of-Hours Pay

CALGARY, CA: Faces $93MM WCB Data Breach Class Action
CC-PALO ALTO: Court Narrows Claims in CCRC Residents' Suit
CENTRAL FREIGHT: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Drivers' Suit
CENTURYLINK: Faces Internet Services Overbilling Claims
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Tenth Cir. Appeal Filed in "Nichols" Suit

COCA-COLA REFRESHMENTS: Averts ADA Class Action in Louisiana
CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS: Sexual Abuse Class Action Can Proceed
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Korolshteyn Appeals Ruling to Ninth Circuit
CREDIT SUISSE: New York Court Dismisses CHF LIBOR Suit
CVS HEALTH: Faces Insulin Price Fixing Probe Amid Class Actions

EPIC SYSTEMS: Class Actions Important in Wage Theft Cases
EPIC SYSTEMS: High Court Hears Arguments on Class Action Waivers
EQUIFAX INC: "Woods" Sues Over Data Breach, Seeks Damages
EQUIFAX INC: 2.5-Mil. More Americans Affected by Massive Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Former Chairman Apologizes for Massive Data Breach

EXPRESS MESSENGER: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in "Ziglar"
FLINT, MI: 21 Law Firms File Consolidated Water Class Action
FRENCH REDWOOD: Conchas Sues Over Denied Meal/Rest Breaks
GNC HOLDINGS: Averts Gold Card Customer Discount Program Suit
GRAIN PROCESSING: Trial in Class Suit to Begin July 9

GREEN BROOK: Broking Appeals D.N.J. Decision to Third Circuit
GUTHY-RENKER LLC: Bentz Appeals Ruling in "Friedman" Class Suit
GUTHY-RENKER LLC: Behrend Appeals Ruling in "Friedman" Class Suit
HARRIS WATER: Faces "Pino" Suit in E. Dist. of New York
HIBBETT SPORTING: Faces "Orozco" Suit in M. Dist. Fla.

HIGHER ONE: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Exchange Suit
HYATT EQUITIES: Troutman Sanders Attorneys Discuss FCRA Ruling
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Brake
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: Faces $66-Mil. Sexual Abuse Class Action
KELLY SERVICES: "Gilbert" Suit Moved to District of Arizona

KEYBANK NA: 11th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Larsen"
KIRSCHENBAUM & PHILLIPS: Faces "Lotufo" Suit in E.D. of New York
LA PLACITA: "Ramirez" Sues to Recover Overtime Pay
LA QUINTA: Detroit Retirement System Appeals Order in "Beisel"
LG CHEM: Customers Await Lithium Ion Battery Settlement Payout

LIFEBRITE LABORATORIES: "Van Voorn" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
LOS ANGELES, CA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Willits" Suit
MARION COUNTY, IN: Appeals Order in "Washington" Suit to 7th Cir.
MDL 2670: Court Narrows Claims in Dismiss Antitrust Suit
MICHAELS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Employee Suit

MIKE ROSE'S: "Lipinsky" Suit Seeks Recovery of Illegal Deductions
MILESTONE MANGAGEMENT: "Dingler" Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
MILLENNIUM PRODUCTS: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in "Retta" Class Suit
MISSION, KS: Class Action Seeks Refund of Illegal Driveway Tax
MJJ INC: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Peterson" Class Suit

MUGSHOTS.COM: Court Narrows Claims in "Gabiola" Suit
NATIONAL CONFERENCE: Faces "Alston" Suit in E.D. of Pennsylvania
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Buffalo Jills
NATIONAL HOCKEY: Judge Susan Nelson Presides Over Concussion MDL
NATIONAL MILK: Andrews Appeals "Edwards" Suit Ruling to 9th Cir.

NAVIOS MARITIME: Court Denies Bid for $900K Attorneys' Fees
NESTLE WATERS: Seeks Dismissal of Poland Spring Water Class Action
OCO BIOMEDICAL: "Marcus" Suit Transferred to C.D. California
ORACLE CORP: Faces Gender Pay Discrimination Class Action
PEACOCK FOODS: Faces Class Action Over Employee Fingerprinting

PETLAND: Awaits Court Decision on Class Action Dismissal Motion
PHARMERICA CORP: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Summary Judgment Bid in ERISA Suit Denied
QUALITY DINING: Settles Chili's Grill Servers' Wage Class Action
RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC: Attorneys Sanctioned in Surgery Case

RIAL DE MINAS: Joint Bid for Prelim Class Certification Endorsed
RJ REYNOLDS: 11th Cir. Affirms Statute of Limitations Ruling
SALT LAKE CITY, UT: Supreme Ct. Affirms Dismissal of "Bivens"
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Must Face Class Action Over Warranty
SERENITY TRANSPORTATION: Ct. Invalidates Class Members' Releases

SIGNATURE HEALTH: Henderson Hits Biometrics Data Retention Policy
STATE FARM: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Insurance Suit Reversed
SUBWAY: Jackson Lewis Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
SUNBELT RENTALS: Settles Rental Protection Charge Class Action
SUN PRODUCTS: Court Narrows Claims in Laundry Detergent Suit

TATA CONSULTANCY: Defends Suit Over Anti-White Hiring Practices
TGI FRIDAY'S: Averts Drink Pricing Fraud Class Action
TOYOTA MOTOR: Can't Compel Arbitration in "Gibson" Warranty Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Investor to Move Forward with Class Action
UNITED FEDERAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Fund Transfer Suit Denied

UNITED MATTRESS: "Zuniga" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
US STEEL: Faces $4.2MM Class Action Over Odorous Gases
VCG HOLDING: Denial of Conditional Class Cert. Recommended
VOCUS GROUP: Overhauls Boardroom Amid Investor Class Action Threat
WALT DISNEY: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Labor Class Action

WELLS FARGO: Feb. 23 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
WELLS FARGO: Prefers Forced Arbitration to Class Action
WELLS FARGO: Chief Executive Defends Use of Forced Arbitration
WELLS FARGO: Coloradans Hold Protest Over Fake Account Scandal
WESTERN AND SOUTHERN: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in "Mancini" Suit

XENITH BANKSHARES: "Rowe" to Halt Merger Vote, Seeks Projections
YAHOO INC: Says 3 Billion Accounts Affected by 2013 Data Theft
YORK INT'L: DiChiara Appeals Order in Dickerson Suit to 3rd Cir.

* Divided Supreme Court May Allow Mandatory Arbitration Programs
* FCRA Violation Continues to Spark Class Action Litigation
* Justice Breyer Sides with Workers on Class Action Waiver Issue
* Supreme Court Justices Divided on Worker Class Action Rights






                            *********


AETNA INSURANCE: Has Another Suit Over HIV-Related Privacy Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kristen Rasmussen, writing for Law.com, reports that it was an
ironic start to a class-action lawsuit: Notices mailed as part of
a settlement of a previous class action alleging that Aetna
Insurance Co.'s mail order requirement for medications violated
HIV patients' privacy allegedly revealed insureds' names and
conditions through glassine envelope windows.  Now Aetna is facing
another class action, this one in federal court in Philadelphia,
over claims that it failed to protect HIV patients' privacy.

The lawsuit was filed in August by a man using the pseudonym
Andrew Beckett, who, according to court papers, feared "severe
harm" would befall him should his true identity be revealed.

"The instructions for the recipient to fill their HIV medication
prescription was plainly visible through the large-window section
of the envelope," the complaint said.  "Specifically, the visible
portion of the letter clearly indicated that it was from Aetna,
included a claims number and information for the addressee, and
stated '[t]he purpose of this letter is to advise you of the
options . . . Aetna health plan when filling prescriptions for HIV
Medic . . .'"

According to the complaint, one of Mr. Beckett's family members
found the mailing and believed he was living with HIV and had not
confided in his family. Beckett was forced to admit his condition
to his family.

In a statement shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Aetna
"sincerely apologize[d] to those affected by a mailing issue that
inadvertently exposed the personal health information of some
Aetna members."  The envelopes were distributed in Arizona,
California, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.

"This type of mistake is unacceptable, and we are undertaking a
full review of our processes to ensure something like this never
happens again," the statement added.  The company is offering
emergency financial relief and counseling to those who suffered
specific harm as a direct result of the mailing.

Philadelphia-based class-action firm Berger & Montague, the Legal
Action Center and the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania teamed up
on the suit.

Ronda Goldfein, executive director of the AIDS Law Project, a
nonprofit public interest law firm that works to protect the legal
rights of people living with HIV in Pennsylvania and South New
Jersey on issues ranging from discrimination to housing to
immigration, spoke with The National Law Journal specifically
about the lawsuit, the organization's work and about health care
privacy issues more generally. The interview has been edited for
length and clarity.

The National Law Journal: How did this lawsuit and your
involvement in it come about?

Ronda Goldfein: Based on postings to a listserv that lawyers who
work in this area of HIV-related legal issues share, it was pretty
clear within a few days that something was happening.  At first,
people were suggesting that the clients file administrative
complaints.  We often use the state and federal administrative
agencies to get the attention of the defendant and to have the
agencies do some of the expensive discovery that nonprofits can't
always do. But it started to seem like there were many of these,
and we were concerned that it was still happening.  We didn't have
a whole lot of information in terms of when they were mailed, who
was receiving them, so it was kind of like little patches of
wildfire. So, the Law Project teamed up with the Legal Action
Center, a public interest firm based in New York City, and decided
that we needed to tell Aetna to cut it out immediately.

NLJ: What was your first step?

RG: We wrote a demand letter to Aetna and sent out a press release
with it. We had a few goals.  One, we wanted to make sure that
there would be some transparency and some pressure for Aetna to
stop this immediately.  Two, we wanted to make sure that any other
entity, be it an insurer, a home health care provider, whomever,
who has this type of sensitive information knows that they need to
be careful with it, that they can't send it out in an envelope so
the world could see.  And three, we were starting to hear from
clients, saying, "Wow, I thought I was the only one. I was shocked
when I got this in the mailbox.  I didn't know what to do.  I
didn't know who to call.  I was so upset."  When we kept hearing
that story over and over again, we wanted folks on a public level
to know, "It wasn't just you. You can talk to us about it.  This
is what we're doing."  We quickly heard that there were 12,000
letters sent out and thought, "Wow, that's out of control," so we
thought we needed to formalize our demand letter to a real demand.

NLJ: What's at stake with privacy breaches like this one?

RG: Somebody reported that the letter came while he had family
members over, and the family members saw for the first time that
he has HIV.  We've heard stories of small towns where letters are
left on bulletin boards or on the table in a small post office
when they're mis-delivered.  In many cases, that's the center of
town, and people see them.  We've heard stories where the mail
carrier is somebody the person knows from church.  The mail
carrier hands the letter over, and then next Sunday, everybody's
looking at the person differently.

NLJ: How do you decide when to get involved in litigation?

RG: We're based in Pennsylvania, and our jurisdiction is
Pennsylvania and Southern New Jersey.  We try to look at the
issues that are affecting people living with HIV that are
immediately impacting and have a bigger impact.  When you
challenge discrimination or you challenge privacy violations, not
only is that relief for the individual, but, because we are a
public interest law firm, we are committed to publicizing all of
our work, which sends clear messages.

Not to sound too grandiose, but we try to pursue every claim that
we think has some merit and can survive

NLJ: Do you take proactive measures to monitor privacy and other
legal issues nationwide that affect people living with HIV? Is
that even possible?

RG: To an extent, it is.  With something like this, you would
never think that you would have to tell the companies, "Hey, when
you're sending out notices, don't violate people's privacy," so in
those cases we wouldn't really know.  But if we see a policy that
we feel will negatively impact people with HIV, we'll become
involved in that.  If we see legislation pending that we think is
problematic, then we will get involved in that. We try to be
proactive in that regard.

NLJ: Is it a big problem in the health care industry at large that
we're seeing these sorts of privacy breaches, or is the harm
specific to people living with HIV?

RG: No matter what the information is, whether it's stigmatizing
information or not, our mail carriers, our neighbors, our friends,
our churchgoers shouldn't be able to see what our medical
information is, so it should all be protected.  HIV is
particularly stigmatizing, but I don't want to suggest we need to
have one standard for HIV and one standard for all other
conditions.  We have to have a basic understanding and
appreciation of medical privacy. [GN]


AIRBNB: Averts Real Estate Broker's Class Action in New York
------------------------------------------------------------
B. Colby Hamilton, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that
a New York real estate broker's attempt to bring a class action
against Airbnb was derailed Sept. 29 when U.S. District Judge
Vernon Broderick of the Southern District of New York granted the
home-sharing platform's motion to dismiss the case after finding
plaintiff Parker Madison Partners lacked Article III standing.

In its motion, Airbnb's counsel, Kaplan & Co. name attorney
Roberta Kaplan -- rkaplan@kaplanandcompany.com -- called the suit
"a contrivance, invented by lawyers," who were taking their second
shot at suing the company. According to the defendant, the same
counsel brought the suit Plazza v. Airbnb a year ago.  After
Airbnb moved to compel arbitration, the current suit claimed
damages to the real estate broker market.

"But Plaintiff is neither a competitor of Airbnb nor a user of
Airbnb's internet platform," Airbnb's attorneys argued.  "And
Parker Madison certainly has not pleaded the kind of concrete and
particularized injury that is a necessary prerequisite for
invoking this Court's jurisdiction."

Judge Broderick, in his 11-page opinion in the current suit Parker
Madison Partners v. Airbnb, 16-cv-08939, agreed with Airbnb that
the plaintiff failed to show any material harm done to brokers.
The allegations, he wrote, "consist of conclusory statements and
untethered assertions" against the company.

Airbnb doesn't operate like a brokerage, nor is it licensed in New
York to do so, Broderick noted.  Despite plaintiff's claims of
harm being done to the real estate broker business, the judge
found they failed to provide "any details whatsoever as to any
actual injury to Plaintiff connected to Airbnb's activities."

"In fact, as Defendant points out in its brief, there are no
allegations in the Amended Complaint concerning any current or
potential clients that have been lost to Airbnb, nor are there
even claims stating that Plaintiff operates in the same market as
Airbnb, let alone any allegations revealing how Plaintiff competes
with Airbnb," he wrote.

Even when given the opportunity to provide details in its
opposition to the motion to dismiss, Judge Broderick said the
plaintiff failed to respond to issues brought up by the defendant
or "in any way offer how it has been actually injured by Airbnb's
actions."

"Indeed, Plaintiff's failure to point to any such facts is
particularly telling given that Airbnb has been in business since
2008, and one would expect that if, in fact, Plaintiff suffered
harm, it would be able to articulate that harm with a modicum of
detail," he wrote.

Parker Madison Partners counsel, Newman Ferrara partner Jeffrey
Norton, said in an email he and his clients were reviewing the
opinion and considering our options, including whether to pursue
an appeal.

Mr. Kaplan did not respond to requests to comment on the decision.
[GN]


AIR CANADA: Bears Most Responsibility for Gander Crash Landing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Garrett Barry, writing for CBC News, reports that Air Canada and
Exploits Valley Air Services bear the most responsibility for a
flight that crashed on landing at the Gander Airport in 2016,
according to a lawyer representing its passengers.

Bob Buckingham, who is working for 12 passengers of Air Canada
Flight 7804, says a Transportation Safety Board report released
recently lays responsibility on the pilots and operators of the
flight.

Exploits Valley Air Services was flying a Beechcraft 1900 Plane
under the Air Canada Express brand on April 20, 2016, when it
crashed upon landing at the Gander Airport.

"[The report] seems to lay the responsibility for the accident on
Air Canada and EVAS, and it seems to suggest that the other
parties involved in the plane taking off and the plane landing are
without responsibility," Mr. Buckingham told CBC Radio's Central
Morning Show.

According to the safety board, the flight landed towards the right
side of the runway in Gander and veered further towards the right
upon landing.  The plane ran into compacted snow and the landing
gear collapsed.

Three people were hurt in the crash; board investigators said
blowing snow and high winds during a storm that evening
contributed to the incident.

The board also reported that "neither pilot had considered that
the combination of landing at night, in reduced visibility, with a
crosswind and blowing snow, on a runway with no centreline
lighting, was a hazard that may create additional risks."

Although he said he did not want to "argue the case in public,"
Mr. Buckingham said the findings place some blame on EVAS and its
pilots.

"I think that's what it says, that the pilots and EVAS didn't do
their due diligence with respect to this landing," he said.
"That's . . . a layperson's bottom-line view of the matter."

"You can have a look at the report and see what they say about all
of the parties involved and what they were doing with respect to
training, education, and decisions that were made that night."

The safety board does not determine criminal or civil blame in
investigating accidents, though its reports are sometimes
referenced in courts.

Class-action efforts continue

Mr. Buckingham said his class-action efforts will continue, and if
his analysis of the report is correct, he will shift his attention
towards Air Canada and EVAS.

The lawsuit has not yet been certified as a class-action in court,
but hearing are ongoing.

mr. Buckingham said he plans to have the crash report reviewed
further with technical experts, and with the clients he represents
in his class-action effort.

He will eventually put forward a proposal to resolve the matter,
he said.

"[The board's] findings are going to be fairly informative in
terms of how not only we pursue it, but how the defendants respond
to it and come to the bargaining table with us to negotiate a
resolution of this."

A spokesperson for Air Canada said the company could not comment
directly on an ongoing court case.

However, the company did say in a separate statement that it would
be reviewing the report with Exploits Valley Air Services,
"particularly those that pertain to areas of potential further
safety improvements."

"Air Canada works closely with all its regional partners, as well
as government agencies, on an ongoing basis to ensure safe
operations at all times and that all necessary safety processes
are in place," said spokesperson Peter Fitzpatrick.

A representative from Exploits Valley Air Services has not
responded to multiple requests for comment. [GN]


AKAMI INC: Counterclaims in "Zhang" Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned YAHUI ZHANG, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. AKAMI INC., d/b/a AKAMI
SUSHI, et al. Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-4946 (VSB) (S.D. N.Y.),
Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (ii) granted the Defendants' motion
with regard to Counts XII and XIII, and denied with regard to
Counts I through XI; (ii) granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss
the Defendants' counterclaims being asserted in state court; and
(iii) denied the parties' respective pleadings to amend.

Plaintiff Zhang, on behalf of himself and other employees
similarly situated, brought this action against the Defendants for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA") on
June 25, 2015, (Counts I & III), the New York Labor Law ("NYLL")
(Counts II, IV-V, & VII-X), breach of implied contract (Counts VI
& XI), fraudulent filing of Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
returns (Count XII), and deceptive acts and practices in violation
of New York General Business Law ("GBL") Section 349 (Count XIII).

The Plaintiff alleges a systemic practice of the Defendants
failing to pay their employees minimum wage and overtime
compensation, refusing to properly record time spent by employees
working, failing to provide Time of Hire Notices, and failing to
provide employees with accurate paystubs.  He further claims that
he was required to commit over 20% of his workday to doing non-
tipped work without receiving notification of the tip credit
claimed by the Defendants.  Finally, he alleges that the
Defendants failed to post the required New York State Department
of Labor posters informing their employees about the minimum pay
rates, overtime pay, tip credit, and payday information.

Akami originally hired Zhang to work as a deliveryman on Aug. 20,
2014.

On July 24, 2015, the Defendants answered the Complaint, and in
their answer asserted the Counterclaims.  The Plaintiff filed a
letter requesting a pre-motion conference concerning his
anticipated motion to dismiss the Counterclaims on July 30, 2014,
and the Defendants filed a response on Aug. 3, 2015.  The
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on Aug. 6, 2015.

On Aug. 20, 2015, the Defendants filed a letter requesting a pre-
motion conference on their anticipated motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, and on Aug. 26, 2015, the Plaintiff filed his
response.  After the pre-motion conference, which was held on Aug.
27, 2015, and in response to issues raised during the conference,
the Plaintiff submitted a letter providing case law to support his
position regarding Counts XII and XIII in the Amended Complaint,
and thereafter submitted another letter on Sept. 10, 2015 to
advise the Court that he intended to pursue his motion to dismiss
the Counterclaims.

On Sept. 11, 2015, the Defendants filed a letter representing that
they did not gross $500,000 annually as required to impose
liability under the FLSA, and indicating their intention to file a
motion to dismiss.

On Oct. 13, 2015, the Plaintiff filed his motion to dismiss the
Defendants' Counterclaims, and the Defendants filed their motion
to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  On Nov. 10, 2015, the parties
respectively filed their oppositions, and on Nov. 24, 2015, filed
their replies.

Judge Broderick finds that none of the allegations in the Amended
Complaint support an assertion that the Defendants participated in
consumer-oriented conduct.  Rather, it describes conduct of a
private employer-employee dispute with no perceived impact on
consumers.

Therefore, he concludes the Amended Complaint does not allege a
plausible claim under GBL Section 349.  He granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss Count XIII.

He also finds that the Amended Complaint does not allege that the
Defendants willfully filed a fraudulent information return.
Rather, it merely parrots the statutory requirements and outlines
its claim for relief.  Therefore, he granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss Count XII.

He further finds the allegations in the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint sufficient state claims under the FLSA.  The Defendants'
motion to dismiss Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint is
therefore denied.

As pertaining to the Defendants' argument that the claims in
Counts VI and XI are duplicative of one another, Count VI asserts
the implied contract claims with regard to all plaintiffs and
Count XI asserts such claims only as to Plaintiff Zhang.  At this
stage of the litigation Judge Broderick will allow both claims to
proceed, as to do otherwise would elevate form over substance.

In light of the foregoing, the Judge finds that the FLSA claims
and implied contract claims share a common nucleus of operative
facts, such that his exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is
warranted, and declines at this stage to dismiss either Counts VI
or XI as duplicative.  Accordingly, Judge Broderick denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's breach of implied
contract claims.

Although the Defendants' Counterclaims state three separate claims
for relief, the gravamen of each claim is the same.  While the
Defendants attempt to forge a link to the alleged minimum wage and
overtime violations by arguing in their opposition that the
sexually explicit messages will cast doubt on the hours the
Plaintiff worked, the Judge finds that the facts underlying the
FLSA claims and Counterclaims do not substantially overlap.
Accordingly, he dismissed the Counterclaims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) without prejudice to such claims being asserted in state
court.

To the extent that the Defendants intend to amend the
Counterclaims, the Judge says there are no averments the
Defendants could add to their Counterclaims to alter his decision
that he lacks supplemental jurisdiction over those particular
claims.  In other words, he finds any amendment along these lines
would be futile.  As a result, he denied the Defendants' request
for leave to amend without prejudice to the Defendants asserting
appropriate counterclaims in response to the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint consistent with this decision.

Similarly, the Plaintiff's request to amend his section 349 claim
is futile.  Even if the Plaintiff were to supplement his Amended
Complaint with additional facts bolstering his allegations
regarding the Defendants' behavior toward their employees, this
would not transform this employment dispute into a case concerning
"consumer-oriented" conduct with a broader impact on consumers.
As a result, Judge Broderick finds that amending Counts XII and
XIII in the Amended Complaint would be futile.  He denied the
Plaintiff's request to amend.

Judge Broderick directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the open
motions at Documents 26 and 29.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Memorandum and
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/T4qCWV from Leagle.com.

Yahui Zhang, Plaintiff, represented by John Troy --
troylaw@troypllc.com -- Troy Law, PLLC.

Yahui Zhang, Plaintiff, represented by John Troy, Troy Law, PLLC.

Akami Inc, Defendant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of Vincent S.
Wong & Vincent Wong -- vswlaw@gmail.com -- Vincent Wong, Law
Offices.

Liang Jin Zhuo, Defendant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law
Offices of Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Jane Doe, Defendant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of Vincent S.
Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Yuan Hong Chen, Defendant, represented by Vincent Wong, Vincent
Wong, Law Offices.

John Doe, Counter Claimant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law
Offices of Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Akami Inc, Counter Claimant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law
Offices of Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Liang Jin Zhuo, Counter Claimant, represented by Eugene Kroner,
Law Offices of Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices
of Vincent S. Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Jane Doe, Counter Claimant, represented by Eugene Kroner, Law
Offices of Vincent S. Wong, Michael Aaron Brand, Law Offices of
Vincent S. Wong & Vincent Wong, Vincent Wong, Law Offices.

Yahui Zhang, Counter Defendant, represented by John Troy, Troy
Law, PLLC.


AMERICAN EXPRESS: Averts Class Action Over Lost Costco Contract
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stempel, writing for Reuters, reports that American
Express Co has won the dismissal of a lawsuit accusing the credit
card services company of defrauding shareholders about the loss in
2015 of a lucrative co-branding relationship with Costco Wholesale
Corp.

In a decision made public on Oct. 2, U.S. District Judge Paul
Gardephe in Manhattan rejected claims that American Express
improperly downplayed the risk its 16-year relationship with
Costco might end, and concealed how the warehouse chain had
generated 8 percent of its revenue and 20 percent of its loans.

While the proposed class-action complaint alleged that Costco
might have viewed American Express as "just another vendor" that
could be shunted aside for a "cheaper" rival, the judge said
American Express merely viewed such statements as evidence that
Costco would "drive a hard bargain," not walk away.

The plaintiffs were led by the Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 137
Pension Fund in Springfield, Illinois.  Its lawyers did not
immediately respond to requests for comment.

American Express spokeswoman Marina Norville said the New York-
based company was pleased with the decision, which was dated Sept.
30.

The judge said the plaintiffs may amend their complaint.

The market value of American Express fell by roughly $8 billion in
the two days after the company, whose largest shareholder is
Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Inc., disclosed the loss of
the Costco contract, which moved to Visa Inc.

American Express has long traditionally focused on affluent
customers who often pay bills on time, but has been encouraging
some cardholders to borrow more and earn more rewards.

This summer, American Express announced a plan to let cardholders
pay off purchases of $100 or more in installments, which could
result in more fees.

American Express shares closed on Oct. 2 up 8 cents at $90.54,
roughly 6 percent below their all-time high set in 2014.

The case is Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 137 Pension Fund v
American Express Co et al, U.S. District Court, Southern District
of New York, No. 15-05999. [GN]


AMERIFACTORS FINANCIAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. Michelle Childs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Columbia Division, denied as moot
AFGL's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned Career Counseling,
Inc. d/b/a Snelling Staffing Services, a South Carolina
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. Amerifactors Financial
Group, LLC, Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Company and John Does 1-5,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-03013-JMC (D. S.C.).

Career Counsel alleges that on information and belief, on or about
June 28, 2016, the Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile
machine an unsolicited facsimile to the Plaintiff.

On Sept. 2, 2016, Career Counseling filed the instant putative
class action in the Court alleging violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") of 1991, as amended by the Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 ("JFPA"), and the regulations
promulgated under the TCPA by the United States Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC").

On Oct.28, 2016, AFGL filed the pending Motion to Dismiss.   After
the parties responded and replied to the Motion to Dismiss, the
Court heard argument from the parties at a motion hearing on July
19, 2017.

AFGL argues that Career Counseling has done precisely what Rule
8(a)(2) and the Supreme Court forbid -- it merely recites the
elements of a TCPA cause of action with the addition of a few
conclusory statements on information and belief which is not
enough.  AFGL further argues that the threadbare, factual
allegations in the Complaint do not demonstrate the elements of a
claim under the TCPA.  Therefore, AFGL requests that the court
dismiss Career Counseling's Complaint for failure to allege a
plausible violation of the TCPA.

Judge Childs finds that Career Counseling's use of "upon
information and belief" to describe events surrounding its receipt
from the Defendants of the allegedly unsolicited facsimile is an
inadequate substitute for providing detail that should be squarely
within the Plaintiff's control.  Moreover, even though Career
Counseling did attach a copy of the alleged unsolicited facsimile
to the Complaint, it failed to allege facts connecting it to
either the stated recipient of the fax (Gina Mc Cuen) or the fax
number (8033593008).  Accordingly, the Judge agrees with AFGL that
the Complaint's allegations fail to establish that Career
Counseling has standing to bring the action for violation of the
TCPA.

For these reasons, Judge Childs granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and dismissed the Complaint without prejudice.  Because
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the Plaintiff
does not have standing, she denied as moot AFGL's Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Order and Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/OOsZBK from Leagle.com.

Career Counseling, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by John Gressette
Felder, Jr. -- jfelder@mcgowanhood.com -- McGowan Hood and Felder.

Career Counseling, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Wanca
-- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson and Wanca, pro hac vice,
Jordan Christopher Calloway, McGowan Hood and Felder LLC, Ross M.
Good -- rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson and Wanca, pro hac
vice & Ryan Michael Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
and Wanca, pro hac vice.

Amerifactors Financial Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by Erik
Tison Norton -- erik.norton@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins
Riley and Scarborough, William H. Latham --
bill.latham@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough & Douglas B. Brown -- dbrown@rumberger.com --
Rumberger Kirk and Caldwell, pro hac vice.


APOTEX CORP: Court Dismisses Suit Against Generic Drug Makers
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the case captioned PLUMBERS'
LOCAL UNION NO. 690 HEALTH PLAN, Plaintiff, v. APOTEX CORP., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-665 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Plumbers Local Union No. 690 Health Plan is a health
insurance plan that provides prescription drug coverage to members
of Plumbers Local Union No. 690.  Defendants are pharmaceutical
companies who distribute, market and sell generic prescription
pharmaceutical drugs.

Plumbers brings this putative class action against a multitude of
Generic Drug Manufacturers alleging claims under Pennsylvania
state law for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and aiding
and abetting (Pennsylvania Claims). Plumbers also brings claims
against Generic Drug Manufacturers for violations of the consumer
protection laws of 48 additional states and two territories (Non-
Pennsylvania Claims).

Prior to the current litigation, Plumbers had already participated
in two other actions.

New Jersey AWP Class Action

In 2003, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No.
68 Welfare Fund (IUOE) filed a state-law class action complaint in
the Superior Court of New Jersey on behalf of a putative class of
private consumers and third-party payors who had paid for drugs
manufactured, marketed, distributed and sold by the defendants.
The complaint alleged that, since at least 1991, the defendants
deliberately inflated the AWPs for their prescription drugs when
they reported them to publications like the Red Book with full
knowledge that the putative class members relied on these AWPs to
determine the amount of reimbursement for each drug.

MDL AWP Class Action

In 2002, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation approved
of the consolidation of cases for pretrial proceedings into the
MDL AWP Class Action before Judge Patti B. Saris in the District
of Massachusetts. In the MDL AWP Class Action, private third-party
payors and consumers brought a class action against brand and
generic pharmaceutical drug manufacturers, alleging that the
defendants intentionally inflated their AWPs that they reported to
pricing compendia like the Red Book, with full knowledge that the
putative class members relied on these AWPs to determine the
amount of reimbursement for each drug.

Generic Drug Manufacturers move to dismiss all of Plumbers'
Pennsylvania Claims on the basis that Plumbers fails to adequately
and plausibly plead these claims.  Additionally, Generic Drug
Manufacturers move to dismiss Plumbers' Non-Pennsylvania Claims on
the basis that Plumbers lacks standing to assert these claims.

The Court finds that given the striking similarities between
Plumbers' Amended Complaint in this action and the complaints and
representations made in the AWP Class Actions, Plumbers cannot
credibly argue that it believed that Generic Drug Manufacturers'
AWPs were the actual average wholesale prices of their drugs at
the time it filed this action.  Because Plumbers knew that the
AWPs were not the actual average wholesale prices of Generic Drug
Manufacturers' drugs, Plumbers cannot plausibly claim to have
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation that they were the
actual average wholesale prices because knowledge negates the
affirmative element of reliance.

Put another way, the recipient of an allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentation is not justified in relying upon the truth of an
allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation if he knows it to be false
or if its falsity is obvious, the Court says.  Plumbers both knew
that the AWPs were not the actual average wholesale prices for
Generic Manufacturers' drugs and the falsity was obvious.  The
absence of a single pleading in Plumbers' Amended Complaint that
it believed that the AWPs of the drugs were the actual average
wholesale prices that Providers paid for these drugs further
confirms that Plumbers knew the falsity of Generic Drug
Manufacturers' misrepresentation.

Accordingly, Plumbers inadequately and implausibly pleads
justifiable reliance.  It fails to allege that it believed Generic
Drug Manufacturers' misrepresentation, a belief it cannot now
plausibly claim to have possessed because it knew from the prior
AWP Class Actions, that the AWPs were not the actual average
wholesale prices of any drugs.  Therefore, the Court will grant
Generic Drug Manufacturers' motions to dismiss Plumbers' negligent
misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims.

Plumbers' unjust enrichment claims focus on the same negligent
misrepresentations and deceptive conduct that form the basis of
its negligent misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims. Plumbers never
responds to Generic Drug Manufacturers' contention that its unjust
enrichment claims are based in tort. Plumbers' failure to respond
to this argument is a concession that its unjust enrichment claims
arise in the tort setting. An apt acknowledgement, given that
claims for negligent misrepresentation and deceptive conduct under
the catch-all provision of the UTPCPL are both characterized as
torts

Because Plumbers' negligent misrepresentation and UTPCPL claims
will be dismissed, Plumbers no longer has a viable underlying tort
claim.  Plumbers cannot proceed with standalone unjust enrichment
claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant Generic Drug
Manufacturers' motion to dismiss Plumbers' unjust enrichment
claims.

Because Plumbers' Pennsylvania state law claims will be dismissed,
Plumbers' civil conspiracy claims are not viable. Therefore, the
Court will grant Generic Drug Manufacturers' motion to dismiss
Plumbers' civil conspiracy claims.

Because Plumbers' underlying tort claims will be dismissed,
Plumbers' aiding and abetting claims are not viable. Therefore,
the Court will grant Generic Drug Manufacturers' motion to dismiss
Plumbers' aiding and abetting claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Memorandum is Available at http://tinyurl.com/y7f84r5dLeagle.com.

PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 690 HEALTH PLAN, Plaintiff, represented
by DONALD E. HAVILAND, JR. --  haviland@havilandhughes.com --
HAVILAND HUGHES LLC.

PLUMBERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 690 HEALTH PLAN, Plaintiff, represented
by CHRISTINA MARIE PHILIPP, HAVILAND HUGHES, LLC, 201 S Maple St
Ste 110, Haviland Hughes, Ambler, PA, 19002, DION G. RASSIAS, THE
BEASLEY FIRM, LLC, 1125 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
19107, JAY W. CHAMBERLIN -- chamberlin@havilandhughes.com --
HAVILAND HUGHES, JILLIAN E. JOHNSTON, THE BEASLEY FIRM LLC, 1125
Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 & WILLIAM H.
PLATT, II, Haviland Hughes LLC.

APOTEX CORP., Defendant, represented by JAMES W. MATTHEWS --
jmatthews@foley.com -- FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, JOHN F. NAGLE --
jnagle@foley.com -- FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, KATY E. KOSKI --
kkoski@foley.com -- FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, ANN E. QUERNS --
AQuerns@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP & TERRY M. HENRY --
Thenry@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP.

FOREST LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant, represented by JAMES W.
MATTHEWS, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, KATY E. KOSKI, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP,
JOHN F. NAGLE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP & TERRY M. HENRY, BLANK ROME
LLP.

HERITAGE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant, represented by D.
JARRETT ARP -- jarp@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP,
DANIEL E. RHYNHART -- Rhynhart@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP,
DAVID C. KISTLER -- Kistler@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME LLP,
MELANIE L. KATSUR -- mkatsur@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN
CRUTCHER LLP, MICHAEL A. IANNUCCI -- Iannucci@BlankRome.com --
BLANK ROME LLP, SCOTT D. HAMMOND -- shammond@gibsondunn.com --
GIBSON, DUNN AND CRUTCHER LLP & WILLIAM JEREMY ROBISON --
wrobison@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP.

IMPAX LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant, represented by GRACIELA M.
RODRIGUEZ -- gmrodriguez@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING LLP, NIKESH
JINDAL -- njindal@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING LLP, JOSEPH E.
WOLFSON -- jwo@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE & MARK C. FRANEK --
mcf@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE.

LANNETT COMPANY, INC., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL K.
TWERSKY -- mtwersky@foxrothschild.com -- FOX ROTHSCHILD, LLP.
PAR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, INC., Defendant, represented by
WILLIAM M. CONNOLLY -- william.connolly@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE
& REATH, LLP.

SANDOZ, INC., Defendant, represented by HEATHER K. MCDEVITT --
hmcdevitt@whitecase.com -- WHITE & CASE LLP, JOSEPH ANGLAND, WHITE
& CASE LLP, JOSHUA D. WEEDMAN --  jweedman@whitecase.com -- WHITE
& CASE LLP, MICHAEL J. GALLAGHER -- mgallagher@whitecase.com -
WHITE & CASE LLP, ALEXANDER D. MACMULLAN -- amacmullan@lavin-
law.com --  LAVIN O'NEIL CEDRONE & DISIPIO, JOSEPH E. O'NEIL --
joneil@lavin-law.com --  LAVIN O'NEIL CEDRONE & DISIPIO & RICKY
MARIO GUERRA -- rguerra@lavin-law.com -- LAVIN O'NEIL CEDRON &
DISIPIO

SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant, represented by
JAMES P. ELLISON -- jellison@hpm.com -- HYMAN PHELPS & MCNAMARA
PC, JENNIFER MCVEY THOMAS -- jthomas@hpm.com -- HYMAN PHELPS &
MCNAMARA PC & JOSEPH E. WOLFSON -- jwo@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS &
LEE.

WEST-WARD PHARMACEUTICAL CORP., Defendant, represented by JAN P.
LEVINE -- evinej@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, JEFFREY A.
CARR -- carrj@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, LINDSAY D.
BREEDLOVE -- breedlovel@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton LLP,
LOGAN ANDERSON -- andersonl@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP &
MICHAEL JAY HARTMAN -- hartmanm@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON
LLP.

ZYDUS PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., Defendant, represented by JASON
R. PARISH -- ason.parish@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP,
JENNIFER G. LEVY -- jennifer.levy@kirkland.com -KIRKLAND & ELLIS
LLP, JOSEPH E. WOLFSON -- jwo@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE &
MARK C. FRANEK -- mcf@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE.

ACTAVIS ELIZABETH LLC, Defendant, represented by JAMES W.
MATTHEWS, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, KATY E. KOSKI, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP,
JOHN F. NAGLE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP & TERRY M. HENRY, BLANK ROME
LLP.


APPLE INC: Nov. 10 Find Friends App Claims Filing Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Haley Otman, writing for NewsChannel5, reports that if you've
dealt with some annoyances over the years from one of a few
companies, a payday could be in order.  Right now you can get in
on a class-action lawsuit if you experienced an issue with an
app's privacy settings, genetic testing, water damage to your
smartphone, unwanted text messages or a less-than-natural soap
product.  Joining a class-action suit gives you power in numbers
against a big company.  However, keep in mind that when the
settlement gets split among all the people involved, it doesn't
usually add up to a ton of money.  But hey, every dollar counts!
Here are some current class-action lawsuits that could net you
some cash or a different perk.  All you have to do is file a claim
if the suit applies to you.

1. If you used the 'Find Friends' feature on an app
This settlement is all about apps for Apple devices that didn't
follow the terms and conditions.  The claim says that "certain
versions of the Foodspotting, Foursquare, Gowalla, Instagram, Kik,
Path, Twitter, and Yelp apps obtained contact data from users'
iDevices in violation of user's privacy rights, and that Apple
aided and abetted that conduct."  Check it out if you downloaded
any of these apps before February 23, 2012.  There are specific
applicable date ranges for each app.  Deadline to file a claim:
November 10 Potential payout: Amazon.com credit with your share of
$5.3 million after lawyer, administration and other fees iphone
photo

2. If you cleaned your home with Honest Company products
Jessica Alba's company settled a lawsuit that alleged it
mislabeled multi-surface cleaner, dish soap and laundry detergent
when it said the products didn't contain sodium lauryl sulfate. If
you purchased any of those Honest products between January 17,
2012 and August 2, 2017, you can file a claim.  Deadline to file a
claim: November 15 Potential payout: Your share of $1.55 million
in cash or an Honest.com credit, after lawyer, administration and
other fees

3. If your waterproof smartphone wasn't really waterproof
This class action suit accused Sony of deceptive advertising when
it said the Xperia phones and tablets were waterproof.  If you
bought one before Aug. 3 of this year and it has water damage,
check out the settlement page to file a claim. Deadline to file a
claim: January 30, 2018 Potential payout: Half the cost of the
device if Sony previously denied your water damage claim

4. If Caribou Coffee texted you
This settlement addresses annoying text messages from Caribou
Coffee that plaintiffs say they never gave the company permission
to send.  If Caribou slid into your DMs between May 5, 2012, and
July 28, 2017, you can file a claim. Deadline to file a claim:
November 13 Potential payout: Your share of $8.5 million after
lawyer, administration and other fees

5. If you bought a DNA testing kit
Plaintiffs in this class action suit say 23andMe misled customers
about what its genetic tests could tell you about your health.  If
you bought a personal genome service between October 16, 2007 and
November 22, 2013, you can file a claim.  Deadline to file a
claim: December 6 Potential payout: $12.50 or $40 off a 23andMe
kit

Remember, most companies don't admit to any wrongdoing when they
agree to a settlement.  And if what happened to you was really
bad, a class action suit may not be your best choice.  That's
because, once you join a class action suit, you won't be able to
sue the company on your own, according to Kiplinger.  The site
recommends talking to a lawyer before joining a suit if you
believe whatever the company did affected you more than other
people who would join. [GN]


ARIZONA: DCS Foster-Care System Suit Granted Class Action Status
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Jo Pitzl, writing for The Republic, reports that a lawsuit
that seeks improvements in Arizona's foster-care system will apply
to all Arizona children in the system, now as well as in the
future, a federal judge has ruled.

U. S. District Court Judge Roslyn Silver granted class-action
status in the litigation, filed 2 1/2 years ago against the state,
on behalf of a number of foster children.

The ruling means the federal lawsuit can proceed. A trial is
expected in spring 2018.

"It's no longer about one, two or three foster children," said
Anne Ronan, an attorney with the Arizona Center for Law in the
Public Interest, which brought the suit.  Rather, it's about the
thousands of children in Arizona's foster-care system, as well as
any children who will enter the system in the future, she said.

Arizona had nearly 17,000 children in foster care as of March 31,
2017, its latest report shows.  In August, 900 children entered
the system when they were removed from their homes due to
allegations of abuse and neglect, according to the Department of
Child Safety.  In the same month, another 1,068 children left the
system, primarily by being returned to their parents or through
adoption.

DCS, in a statement, said the ruling did not reflect on the merits
of the case.  It said it looks forward to showing the court the
improvements it has made over the last three years, which it said
"have solidified an enduring commitment to ensuring children in
state custody receive the care they need and deserve."

AHCCCS, the state's Medicaid program, is also named in the suit.
That agency declined to comment, citing the ongoing litigation.

AHCCCS is charged with providing physical, mental and behavioral-
health care to kids in the system.  The suit seeks improvements to
the system to ensure that children are well cared for and their
physical and behavioral-health needs are met.

The state argued against class-action certification.  Among its
objections: Many of the children named in the original complaint
have since been adopted. Because of that, there is no legal
standing for advocates to sue on the children's behalf, the state
said in court filings.

DCS Director Greg McKay also cited his agency's plans to improve
the system to the point that foster children would no longer face
what he called "substantial risk of serious harm," saying those
plans make the grounds for the lawsuit meaningless.

But Judge Silver noted while four of the children named in the
original complaint have been adopted, two have not.  Besides, the
judge wrote, "Children in the foster care system are inherently
transitory," and therefore could come in and out of state care.

That has been the case for at least one of the children, a 12-
year-old girl identified only by her initials, "B.K."

DCS also argued that the two children remaining in the complaint
had not shown any personal harm from the state's care, something
the judge rejected.

"McKay's argument overlooks the seven pages in the (complaint)
dedicated to outlining the injuries B.T. and B.K. personally
suffered," Judge Silver wrote.  It also ignored the numerous
exhibits presented in court filings that show personal harm the
children suffered, she added.

For example, the girl was separated from her siblings and placed
in a group home on what was supposed to be a short-term stay.
Instead, she remained in the home for more than two years, the
lawsuit alleges.

Likewise, the 16-year-old boy identified as "B.T." has been
shuttled among various group homes and other placements during his
eight years in state care.  When his aunt told AHCCCS the child
was not getting the mental-health services he needed, the state
moved him to an emergency foster home rather than providing
services, Judge Silver said, citing the plaintiffs' lawsuit.

In another instance, the judge cited a 2013 incident in which the
boy grabbed the steering wheel of van driven by a worker at the
group home where he was living at the time.  The boy said, "I want
us all to die," according to the lawsuit.  But on the same day,
the therapists working with the child reported "with a few
exceptions, B.T. is doing well over the last two weeks."

Judge Silver said the filings offer evidence that children suffer
personal harm while in state care, enough to help establish a
class-action claim.

Ms. Ronan said the plaintiffs had discussions with the state about
a settlement, but they went nowhere.

DCS is seeking $3.8 million in its budget for the next fiscal year
to cover its expenses as it defends against the lawsuit.

Kris Jacober has a front-line view of the foster-care system in
her role as a foster parent as well as executive director of the
Arizona Friends of Foster Children Foundation.

She said there's a disconnect from the state's reports of
improving conditions and what she sees on a daily basis.

"The numbers are going down," she acknowledged, noting state
reports that show a decline in the number of children removed from
their homes and an uptick in the number of adoptions and family
reunifications.

But looking at individual cases, "I'm not aware the situation has
changed for families dramatically," she said.

"Thirty kids are going to come into foster care today,"
Ms. Jacober said.  "Day in, day out, we still answer the phone for
grandmas and grandpas who say they don't have the money to keep
food in the refrigerator."

The lawsuit is proceeding as other child-welfare agencies have
faced similar legal challenges.

In July, a federal judge released the state of Tennessee from
oversight of its child-welfare system, ending a lawsuit that
started 17 years ago.  The suit was brought by Children's Rights,
a New York-based advocacy organization that is part of the lawsuit
against Arizona.

In 2015, Clark County, Nevada, settled a similar lawsuit brought
on behalf of seven foster children. The California-based National
Center for Youth Law filed the initial complaint.

Ms. Ronan said those developments don't indicate a trend:
Litigation over foster care has existed almost as long as foster-
care systems have operated, she said.

About this report

In 2016, when the number of children removed from their families
peaked at over 18,000, the Arizona Community Foundation gave The
Arizona Republic and azcentral.com a three-year grant to support
in-depth research on the topic.  As part of that effort, reporter
Mary Jo Pitzl and our other staff experts investigate the reasons
behind the surge in foster children and the systems meant to
support and protect them. [GN]


BAODING CFC: "Chen" Labor Suit Seeks OT, Spread-of-Hours Pay
------------------------------------------------------------
Wen Long Liu, individually and on behalf all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Baoding CFC Inc. d/b/a "Baoding
CFC", Bin Chen, Nisa Chen, Defendants, Case No. 712992/2017 (N.Y.
Sup., September 19, 2017), seeks to recover minimum wages,
overtime wages, spread-of-hours compensation, damages for failure
to provide wage statements and wage notices at the time of hiring,
liquidated damages, interest, costs and attorneys' fees for
violations of the New York Labor Law.

Defendants own, operate, or control a restaurant located at 42-05
162nd Street, Flushing, NY 11358, under the name "Baoding CFC"
where Wen worked as a delivery person. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Paul Mendez, Esq.
     Hang & Associates, PLLC
     136-18 39th Ave., Suite 1003
     Flushing, NY 11354
     Tel: (718) 353-8588
     Email: jhang@hanglaw.com


CALGARY, CA: Faces $93MM WCB Data Breach Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Meghan Grant, writing for CBC News, reports that the City of
Calgary is being sued for $92.9 million, accused of breaching the
privacy rights of more than 3,700 of its employees.

The class action lawsuit was filed on Oct. 3, alleging a privacy
breach in June 2016.  The court document claims a city staffer
sent an email to an employee of another Alberta municipality,
sharing the personal and confidential information of 3,716
municipal employees.

The personal information was contained in Workers' Compensation
Board claim details and included medical records, Social Insurance
Numbers, addresses, dates of birth, Alberta Health Care numbers
and income details.

The statement of claim accuses the city of "acting with the most
obvious neglect."

The lawsuit claims the thousands of city employees are now at a
higher risk of identity theft, financial fraud, financial losses
and psychological injury, including humiliation.

"We don't know whether the information was misused," said lawyer
Patrick Higgerty, who represents the plaintiffs. "That creates a
lot of anxiety."

City said info deleted

In August 2016, the city publicly apologized for what it called
"human error" in releasing the WCB claim information on June 14
and 15, 2016.

The information had been collected between 2012 and 2016.

At the time, the city said an investigation revealed the
disclosure happened when a city employee sought technical
assistance from a contact working at another municipality.

The information was sent to the recipient's work and personal
email addresses.

Officials believe the breach was not malicious in nature, the
city's acting chief security officer, Donald Von Hollen, said at
the time.

The information was not shared further and was deleted.

None of the allegations have been proven in court and a statement
of defence has not yet been filed. [GN]


CC-PALO ALTO: Court Narrows Claims in CCRC Residents' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order Granting Corporate
Defendants' Motion to Strike in the case captioned BURTON RICHTER,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. CC-PALO ALTO, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 5:14-cv-00750-EJD (N.D. Cal.), and denying Directors
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The Director Defendants and Corporate Defendants separately move
to dismiss the SAC under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6).  The Corporate Defendants also move to strike
several previously-dismissed causes of action under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(f).

Continuing care retirement communities, or CCRCs, are a
specialized kind of residential retirement community, offering
elderly residents a flexible continuum of care as they age.

Plaintiffs are residents of a CCRC known as the Vi at Palo Alto.
The Vi is owned and operated by CC-PA, a Delaware corporation with
its principle place of business in Palo Alto, California, a
Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in
Chicago, is CC-PA's corporate parent was formed by Penny Pritzker
in 1987 and currently operates nine other CCRCs throughout the
United States in addition to the Vi.  The Director Defendants are
Illinois residents who are, or previously were, members of CC-PA's
Board of Directors during the time period relevant to this action.

Plaintiffs contend that all named Director Defendants participated
in the management of CC-PA, and conducted and culpably
participated, directly and indirectly, the conduct of CC-PA's
business affairs. Plaintiffs also allege the Director Defendants
have, and at all relevant times had, the power to control and
influence and did control and influence and cause CC-PA to engage
in the practices complained of.

To live at the Vi, residents enter into a Continuing Care
Residency Contract with CC-PA.  Pursuant to the terms of the
Contract, residents are required to pay a one-time entrance fee as
well as recurring monthly fees.

Since the Vi's opening in 2005, Plaintiffs allege they have
collectively loaned Defendants over $450 million in the form of
entrance fees.  Instead of safeguarding these fees in a reserve,
Plaintiffs allege that as of December 2013, CC-PA had transferred,
or upstreamed, over $219 million acquired from the entrance fees
to CC-DG without obtaining security or any repayment promise. As a
result, Plaintiffs allege that CC-PA will be financially incapable
of honoring its debts when they become due.

CC-PA's Financial Condition

The SAC alleges that at all relevant times since CC-PA admitted
its first residents in 2005, CC-PA's liabilities have exceeded the
reasonable market value of its assets. Plaintiffs allege that CC-
PA's 2014 financial statements show the following: Total
Stockholders' Deficit (negative net worth) had increased from
($106,317,195) at December 31, 2005 to ($315,342,106) at December
31, 2014. At the same time, during the period from 2005 through
December 31, 2013, CC-PA's obligations to residents entering the
Community under CC-PA's Entrance Fee Notes had increased from
$307,288,000, at December 31, 2005, to $462,502,000, at December
31, 2014.

The Corporate Defendants argue that causes of action one through
ten of the SAC should be stricken because they were previously
dismissed without leave to amend.  For their part, Plaintiffs
acknowledge the dismissal of these causes of action but explain
they replead the claims to definitely preserve them for appeal.

On a facial Rule 12(b)(1) challenge, Defendants argue Plaintiffs
lack standing to assert the causes of action that have not been
otherwise stricken. They also argue the causes of action are not
ripe for adjudication. These arguments are misguided.

Plaintiffs have also sufficiently pled standing to assert a cause
of action for fraudulent transfer of assets. They allege that, in
light of the Contract's repayment terms and the court's prior
determination the Contract is refundable under California Health
and Safety Code Section 1771(r)(2), they qualify as creditors
under California's Uniform Voidable Transfers Act, Civil Code
Section 3439.01, and under the corresponding Delaware statute
title 6, Section 1301. The general purpose of these statutes is to
remedy fraudulent conveyances, which are transfers by the debtor
of property to a third person undertaken with the intent to
prevent a creditor from reaching that interest to satisfy its
claim.

Plaintiffs' creditor derivative claims are ripe because they
allege the corporation has already suffered an injury in fact from
Defendants' alleged breaches of fiduciary of duty; in other words,
they are of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant judicial
consideration. Similarly, the cause of action for fraudulent
transfer of assets is based on Defendants' alleged completed and
ongoing upstreaming activity to CC-DG and its effect on
Plaintiffs, rendering this claim sufficiently concrete and,
therefore, ripe.

In short, the SAC withstands Defendants' standing and ripeness
challenges under Rule 12(b)(1).

The Director Defendants' argue Plaintiffs' simultaneous pursuit of
both class and derivative claims creates a fatal conflict of
interest requiring dismissal.  The court disagrees.

The Corporate Defendants argue the twelfth and fourteenth causes
of action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. This
argument has partial success.

The twelfth cause of action, entitled Creditor Claim for Breach of
Fiduciary Duties or in the Alternative Aiding and Abetting the
Director Defendants' Breaches of Fiduciary Duties, is asserted
against CC-DG only. Plaintiffs allege that CC-DG is the sole owner
of CC-PA, that CC-DG exercised effective control of the CC-PA
Board of Directors, and that CC-DG used its control to benefit
itself, as an insider, to the detriment of CC-PA and its
stakeholders. Plaintiffs also allege that CC-DG owes CC-PA, and
derivatively to Plaintiffs, fiduciary duties of good faith, care,
and loyalty.

Plaintiffs plead an aiding and abetting theory against CC-DG in
the alternative, which raises a recognized legal claim under
Delaware law.  It is uncontroversial for parent corporations to be
subjected to claims for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
duty committed by directors of their subsidiaries. As to that
theory, the Corporate Defendants raise arguments identical to the
ones discussed in relation to Plaintiffs' standing to bring
creditor derivative claims. Those arguments fail under Rule
12(b)(6) for the same reasons they fail under Rule 12(b)(1).
The twelfth cause of action will be dismissed only to the extent
it is based on a theory assuming that CC-DG owes fiduciary duties
to CC-PA. The dismissal of that theory, as a matter of law, will
be without leave to amend.

The fourteenth cause of action against CC-DG is for fraudulent
transfer under California Civil Code Sections 3439.04(a)(1) and
3439.05, and Delaware Code, title 6, Sections 1304(a)(1) and
1305(a). As discussed, Plaintiffs allege they are creditors with
claims against CC-PA under the Contract, and have unmatured rights
to payment. They also allege that CC-PA's upstreaming of assets
was controlled by CC-DG, and was done with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud Plaintiffs.

First, Plaintiffs allege concealment by stating they were never
informed that CC-PA intended to upstream their entrance fees to
CC-DG, and were not informed that CC-PA would not maintain cash
reserves to cover its refund obligations under the Contract.

Second, Plaintiffs have also alleged the transfer of assets to an
insider. Since the definition of insider can include a person in
control of a corporation under Delaware law (Del. Code Ann., title
6, Section 1301(7)), the SAC plausibly establishes the upstreaming
as an insider transaction in light of CC-DG's purported control of
CC-PA.

Third, for reasons already described, the SAC contains enough
facts to plausibly establish that CC-PA transferred, if not all of
its assets, at least a substantial amount at a time when CC-PA was
allegedly insolvent, or that it became insolvent as a result of
the upstreaming. And there are no facts in the pleadings
suggesting CC-PA received something of equivalent value in return
for the transfers to Cc-DG.

Because the language of Delaware's statute is identical to that of
Section 3439.04, the analysis would be the same under Section
1304(a). Thus, the fraudulent conveyance cause of action based on
actual fraud will not be dismissed.

The Corporate Defendants argue the SAC fails to establish
constructive fraud under Section 3439.05(a). The determination
that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged CC-PA's insolvency and have
pled actual fraud under Sec 3439.04(a)(1) renders this argument
ineffective given the similarity between the badges of fraud and
Section 3439.05(a)'s definition of constructive fraud.
Accordingly, the fraudulent conveyance cause of action based on
constructive fraud will not be dismissed, whether based on Section
3439.05(a) or the corresponding Delaware statute, Section 1305(a).

The Corporate Defendants' Motion to Strike is granted. Causes of
Action One through Ten of the SAC are stricken.

The Director Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.

The Corporate Defendants' Motion to Dismiss  is granted in part
and denied in part. The motion is granted so that the twelfth
cause of action is dismissed to the extent it is based on a theory
assuming that CC-DG owes fiduciary duties to CC-PA. The motion is
denied on all other grounds.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017, Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9u2vlvjLeagle.com.

Burton Richter, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy --
amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.
Burton Richter, Plaintiff, represented by Demetrius Xavier
Lambrinos -- dlambrinos@cpmlegal.com --  Zelle Hofmann Voelbel
Mason, and Gette LLP & Niall Padraic McCarthy --
nmccarthy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.
Linda C Cork, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Demetrius Xavier Lambrinos, Zelle
Hofmann Voelbel Mason, and Gette LLP & Niall Padraic McCarthy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Georgia L May, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Demetrius Xavier Lambrinos, Zelle
Hofmann Voelbel Mason, and Gette LLP & Niall Padraic McCarthy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Thomas Merigan, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Demetrius Xavier Lambrinos, Zelle
Hofmann Voelbel Mason, and Gette LLP & Niall Padraic McCarthy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

Janice R Anderson, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Murphy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Demetrius Xavier Lambrinos, Zelle
Hofmann Voelbel Mason, and Gette LLP & Niall Padraic McCarthy,
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP.

CC-Palo Alto, Inc., Defendant, represented by James McManis --
jmcmanis@mcmanislaw.com -- McManis Faulkner, Hilary Lauren Weddell
-- hweddell@mcmanislaw.com  --  McManis Faulkner & William
Faulkner --wfaukner@mcmanislaw.com -- McManis Faulkner.

Classic Residence Management Limited Partnership, Defendant,
represented by James McManis, McManis Faulkner, Hilary Lauren
Weddell, McManis Faulkner & William Faulkner, McManis Faulkner.

CC-Development Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by James
McManis, McManis Faulkner, Hilary Lauren Weddell, McManis Faulkner
& William Faulkner, McManis Faulkner.

Penny Pritzker, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota --
gilbert.serota@apks.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

Nicholas J Pritzker, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross
Serota, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

John Kevin Poorman, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota,
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

Gary Smith, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota, Arnold
& Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

Stephanie Fields, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota,
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.

Bill Sciortino, Defendant, represented by Gilbert Ross Serota,
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


CENTRAL FREIGHT: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Drivers' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
the Second Revised Joint Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
David Vargas, Plaintiff, v. Central Freight Lines, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-00507-JLB (S.D. Cal.).

The operative complaint is titled Second Amended Class Action
Complaint and alleges that Defendant employed Plaintiff and other
pick-up and delivery drivers, but improperly failed to make
statutory meal periods or rest breaks available or failed to pay
an hour's pay in lieu thereof, failed to provide accurate,
itemized wage statements, and as a result, improperly failed to
pay all wages due consistent with California law.  Further,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' written meal period policy is
facially invalid as it marks only shifts of eight hours or more as
eligible for meal periods.

The parties filed a motion titled Second Revised Joint Motion to
Dismiss Claims Under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. In
support of the Second Revised Joint Motion to Dismiss, the parties
contend that they have remedied all deficiencies identified in
prior court orders denying prior motions to dismiss the claims
brought in this case by Judge M. James Lorenz. The parties
consented to have a United States magistrate judge conduct all
proceedings in this case, and this case was reassigned to
Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. The Second
Revised Joint Motion to Dismiss is presently before the Court.

The California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) is
assigned responsibility under California law for bringing actions
to enforce the state's labor laws. In response to a concern that
labor law enforcement agencies like LWDA were unlikely to keep
pace with the future growth of the labor market, the California
legislature passed the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
(PAGA), codified in sections 2698, PAGA authorizes an employee to
bring an action for civil penalties on behalf of the state against
his or her employer for Labor Code violations committed against
the employee and fellow employees, with most of the proceeds of
that litigation going to the state.

First, the parties request an order dismissing with prejudice
Plaintiff's individual claims for Causes of Action One through
Five of the operative complaint.  In support, the parties
represent that they settled Plaintiff's individual claims for a
total of $5,000 in exchange for a general release of all claims.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the parties' motion insofar as it
requests that Plaintiff's individual claims for Causes of Action
One through Five be dismissed with prejudice.

Second, the parties request that the putative class allegations
for Causes of Action One through Five be dismissed without
prejudice. The parties agree that the dismissal of the putative
class claims should be without prejudice and argue that the Court
must review and approve their agreement under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(e).

In Diaz v. Trust Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408-11
(9th Cir. 1989), the district court should inquire into possible
prejudice from (1) class members' possible reliance on the filing
of the action if they are likely to know of it either because of
publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of adequate time for
class members to file other actions, because of a rapidly
approaching statute of limitations, (3) any settlement or
concession of class interests made by the class representative or
counsel in order to further their own interests.

In the present case, the Court concludes that the parties have
satisfied the Diaz factors. Plaintiff is seeking to dismiss his
class claims without prejudice, and thus, has not compromised the
putative class's interests. In addition, the putative class
members are unlikely to suffer any prejudice due to reliance on
this class action. Plaintiff's counsel declares that there has
been no publicity on this case.  Further, Plaintiff's counsel
represents that he has not been contacted by any putative class
member about this case. Plaintiff's intent to dismiss his class
claims without prejudice became publicly available information on
March 13, 2017, with the filing of the first joint motion seeking
to dismiss these claims. Thus, to the extent putative class
members have been relying on this case to litigate their claims,
they have had over six months to file either a motion to intervene
or their own complaint against Defendant.

Finally, the settlement in this case was the product of a full-day
mediation before a retired judge. The Court is persuaded that the
requested voluntary dismissal of the putative class action claims
is not collusive.

Based on these, the Court concludes the risk of prejudice is too
small to require class notice of the pre-certification voluntary
dismissal.

Therefore, the Court grants the parties' request for voluntary
dismissal of Plaintiff's putative class action claims.  The
putative class allegations for Causes of Action One through Five
of the operative complaint are dismissed without prejudice.

The parties request that Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for
PAGA penalties be dismissed with prejudice and that the Court
approve the Settlement Agreement, which is between Plaintiff,
individually and in his capacity as a representative of the State
of California on behalf of other aggrieved employees, and
Defendant CFL.

The parties also argue that the Court should approve their PAGA
settlement as fair and reasonable because district courts
routinely approve similar settlements of PAGA claims. That other
courts have approved PAGA settlements for similar amounts is not a
reason to conclude that $7,500 is a fair and adequate settlement
amount for this case. Further, the cases cited are factually
distinct as they all involve class action settlements. Here, the
Court is tasked with approving a PAGA settlement in isolation, and
not in combination with its analysis of a class action settlement.
To proceed with the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff will have to
provide the Court with a factual basis to support his position
that $7,500 is a fair and adequate settlement amount for the PAGA
claims in this case.

Having reviewed the record for this case and existing case law,
the Court is not able to conclude, with the information before it,
that the parties' settlement, with respect to Plaintiff's PAGA
claims only, is fair and adequate in view of the purposes and
policies of PAGA. Thus, the Court denies the motion insofar as it
requests Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action for PAGA penalties be
dismissed with prejudice and that the Settlement Agreement be
approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017, Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y72mko4xfrom Leagle.com.

David Vargas, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Alexander
Olsen -- caolsen@caolsenlawoffices.com  -- Olsen Law Offices.
Central Freight Lines, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jonathan
Hisataka Liu -- jonathan.liu@ogleetree.com -- Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C. & Timothy L. Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletree.com --
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


CENTURYLINK: Faces Internet Services Overbilling Claims
-------------------------------------------------------
WFTV Action 9 has investigated serious internet billing complaints
against a major communications company.

Customers claim they were charged for services they didn't get or
were billed at higher rates they never agreed to pay.

"It's just I can't believe it," Crissy Stiles said.

She asked CenturyLink to double her internet speed but days after
placing the order she was told it wouldn't happen.

"And I got a call from the technician saying he wouldn't be here
because that speed's not available in our area," said Ms. Stiles.

According to Ms. Stiles, nothing was installed but then she was
billed a higher rate and a $100 installation charge.

"(I was) absolutely shocked because the technician never came to
the house," she said.

Ms. Stiles claims that billing increase continued and attempts to
resolve it failed, so she called Action 9, as did Laurie Phillips.

"So four representatives later, no one could explain to me the
difference in the bill," said Ms. Phillips.

She said she signed for $39-a-month internet service. But then she
got her first bill for $232.

Despite her complaints, she claims CenturyLink kept billing her
$200 or more for three months.

"Finally I sent a Letter to the FCC and they started an
investigation," said Phillips.

In the past two years, 19 customers contacted Action 9, many
claiming serious billing issues they could not resolve.

Minnesota's attorney general recently sued CenturyLink, alleging
its employees misquoted prices that triggered higher bills.

A class action lawsuit in California claims overbilling and
pricing issues caused damages to 6 million customers.

CenturyLink told Action 9 that its goal is to provide quality
customer service and products and it contacted Stiles and Phillips
so their complaints could be resolved.

On Oct. 2, the Florida Attorney General's office confirmed it now
has an active consumer protection investigation involving
CenturyLink.

The state reported receiving more than 300 complaints against the
company since January 2015. [GN]


CHESAPEAKE OPERATING: Tenth Cir. Appeal Filed in "Nichols" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Bill G. Nichols filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Nichols v. Chesapeake Operating LLC, et al.,
Case No. 5:16-CV-01073-M, in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma - Oklahoma City.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 29,
2017, Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange denied the Plaintiff's Motion to
Abstain under the Home-State Mandatory Abstention Exception to
CAFA and the Plaintiff's Supplement to His Motion to Abstain under
Home State Exception to CAFA.

The Plaintiff filed the class action for breach of lease, breach
of fiduciary duty, fraud, deceit and constructive trust against
the Defendants in the District Court of Beaver County, Oklahoma,
on August 9, 2016.  On Sept. 15, 2016, the Defendants removed the
action to the District Court.

In the Class Action Petition, the Plaintiff defines the proposed
class described as all persons who are (a) an Oklahoma Resident;
and, (b) a royalty owner in Oklahoma wells where the Defendant is
or was the operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its
share of gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners)
from Jan. 1, 2015 to the date Class Notice is given.  The Class
claims relate to royalty payments for gas and its constituents
(such as residue gas, natural gas liquids, helium, nitrogen, or
drip condensate).

The appellate case is captioned as Nichols v. Chesapeake Operating
LLC, et al., Case No. 17-608, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner BILL G NICHOLS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Barbara Frankland, Esq.
          Rex Sharp, Esq.
          REX A. SHARP PA
          5301 West 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901-0500
          Facsimile: (913) 901-0419
          E-mail: bfrankland@midwest-law.com
                  rsharp@midwest-law.com

               - and -

          Michael E. Grant, Esq.
          GRANT LAW FIRM
          512 NW 12th Street
          Oklahoma City, OK 73103
          Telephone: (405) 232-6357
          Facsimile: (405) 235-3425
          E-mail: de1471@coxinet.net

Defendants-Respondents CHESAPEAKE OPERATING LLC and CHESAPEAKE
EXPLORATION LLC are represented by:

          Timothy J. Bomhoff, Esq.
          Laura J. Long, Esq.
          Patrick L. Stein, Esq.
          MCAFEE & TAFT
          211 North Robinson Avenue, 10th Floor
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 235-9621
          E-mail: Tim.Bomhoff@mcafeetaft.com
                  laura.long@mcafeetaft.com
                  patrick.stein@mcafeetaft.com


COCA-COLA REFRESHMENTS: Averts ADA Class Action in Louisiana
------------------------------------------------------------
David L. Patron, Esq. -- david.patron@phelps.com -- and Jeremy T.
Grabill, Esq. -- jeremy.grabill@phelps.com -- of Phelps Dunbar
LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that on October 2, 2017,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for a writ of
certiorari in Emmett Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., a
putative nationwide class action in which Phelps Dunbar and co-
counsel Alston & Bird LLP obtained a complete victory for firm
client Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc. ("CCR").  CCR is a wholly
owned subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Company, a publicly traded
company.

Mr. Magee brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana alleging that CCR's glass front vending
machines violate Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12181 et seq., because they are not
accessible to individuals with visual impairments.  Mr. Magee is
legally blind and claimed to have encountered the vending machines
at East Jefferson General Hospital and at a bus station in New
Orleans, and he sought to represent a nationwide class of other
legally blind individuals.  Through his lawsuit, Magee asked the
court to require CCR to implement various technological changes to
the vending machines to better accommodate visually impaired
customers.  Mr. Magee also sought to recover his attorneys' fees
under the ADA.

Phelps and co-counsel drafted an extensive motion to dismiss,
arguing that the vending machines themselves are not "places of
public accommodation" under the ADA and, as a result, CCR is not
subject to suit under Title III of the ADA.  If accepted, Magee's
interpretation would have opened the door to massive, unintended,
and perhaps limitless application of the ADA to various moveable
objects such as other types of machines and furniture. The
district court agreed that vending machines are not "places of
public accommodation" and granted CCR's motion, dismissing Magee's
claims in their entirety.  The district court went so far as to
reference another court that had recognized that the proliferation
of putative ADA class actions around the country may be driven by
"unscrupulous attorneys" whose sole interest is the recovery of
attorneys' fees.

Mr. Magee appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, but Phelps and co-counsel successfully argued to the
appellate court that the district court had reached the correct
result, and the district court's decision was affirmed.
Mr. Magee pressed forward and sought review in the U.S. Supreme
Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit's decision created a split
among the federal courts of appeal on the question of whether
"public accommodations" are limited to physical spaces.  In CCR's
brief to the Supreme Court, Phelps and co-counsel argued that no
such split had been created and that it was premature and
unnecessary for the Supreme Court to review the case.  The Supreme
Court agreed and denied Magee's petition earlier on
Oct. 2, cementing Phelps' victory for CCR. [GN]


CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS: Sexual Abuse Class Action Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lyle Adriano, writing for Insurance Business, reports that a new
class-action lawsuit against the Congregation of Holy Cross, for
alleged sexual abuse, has been approved by the Quebec Court of
Appeal.

The decision reverses a previous Superior Court of Quebec ruling
in 2015 that rejected the class action request.

In 2013, the Congregation of Holy Cross paid up to $18 million to
compensate victims for abuse that allegedly occurred at three
institutions across Quebec over a period of five decades.  The
Catholic organization settled the matter out-of-court under threat
of a class-action lawsuit.

Sebastien Richard, a spokesperson representing a victims' rights
group, told CBC that the settlement prompted about 40 more alleged
victims to come forward.

According to Mr. Richard, the current class-action has named other
institutions, such as the famous Saint Joseph's Oratory in
Montreal.  Mr. Richard explained that the oratory is Canada's
largest church and reports directly to the Vatican; if the class-
action is successful, it could deal an embarrassing blow to the
church.

Mr. Richard also accused the religious order of abusing official
procedure to "drag out" the process.  He noted that for many
alleged victims -- particularly those that are currently advanced
of age -- time is running out.

"They're also people who have kept silent for a long time -- too
long," Mr. Richard stated. [GN]


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Korolshteyn Appeals Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Tatiana Korolshteyn filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit entitled Tatiana Korolshteyn v. COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION, et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-00709-CAB-RBB, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ms.
Korolshteyn originally filed suit in December 2014 over the
labeling of TruNature Ginkgo, which represents that the product
"supports alertness & memory" and "can help with mental clarity
and memory."  She alleged that she bought the product based on
those claims, but as it turns out, the representations were false
because ginkgo biloba and vinpocetine don't provide any mental
clarity, memory or mental alertness benefits.

The appellate case is captioned as Tatiana Korolshteyn v. COSTCO,
et al., Case No. 17-56435, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 20, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2017;

   -- Appellant Tatiana Korolshteyn's opening brief is due on
      December 29, 2017;

   -- Appellees Costco Wholesale Corporation and NBTY, Inc.'s
      answering brief is due on January 29, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TATIANA KOROLSHTEYN, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: eryan@bffb.com

               - and -

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6978
          E-mail: psyverson@bffb.com

               - and -

          Max A. Stein, Esq.
          BOODELL & DOMANSKIS, LLC
          1 N. Franklin Street, Suite 1200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 300-5505
          E-mail: mstein@boodlaw.com

               - and -

          Stewart M. Weltman, Esq.
          SIPRUT, PC
          17 North State Street, Suite 1600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 236-0000
          Facsimile: (312) 427-1850
          E-mail: jsiprut@siprut.com

Defendants-Appellees COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION and NBTY, INC.,
are represented by:

          William A. Delgado, Esq.
          WILLENKEN WILSON LOH & DELGADO, LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 955-9240
          E-mail: wdelgado@willenken.com


CREDIT SUISSE: New York Court Dismisses CHF LIBOR Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned SONTERRA CAPITAL MASTER FUND LTD., FRONTPOINT
EUROPEAN FUND, L.P., FRONTPOINT FINANCIAL SERVICES FUND, L.P.,
FRONTPOINT HEALTHCARE FLAGSHIP ENHANCED FUND, L.P., FRONTPOINT
HEALTHCARE FLAGSHIP FUND, L.P., FRONTPOINT HEALTHCARE HORIZONS
FUND, L.P., FRONTPOINT FINANCIAL HORIZONS FUND, L.P., FRONTPOINT
UTILITY AND ENERGY FUND L.P., HUNTER GLOBAL INVESTORS FUND I,
L.P., HUNTER GLOBAL INVESTORS FUND II, L.P., HUNTER GLOBAL
INVESTORS OFFSHORE FUND LTD., HUNTER GLOBAL INVESTORS OFFSHORE
FUND II LTD., HUNTER GLOBAL INVESTORS SRI FUND LTD., HG HOLDINGS
LTD., HG HOLDINGS II LTD., and FRANK DIVITTO, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, CREDIT SUISSE AG, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.,
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC, UBS AG, BLUECREST CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT LLP, DEUTSCHE BANK AG, DB GROUP SERVICES UK LIMITED,
AND JOHN DOE NOS. 1-50, Defendants, No. 1:15-cv-00871 (SHS)
(S.D.N.Y.), is a putative class action based primarily on
allegations that defendants unlawfully manipulated the Swiss franc
London InterBank Offered Rate (CHF LIBOR), a daily interest rate
benchmark designed to reflect the cost at which large banks are
able to borrow Swiss francs.  According to plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint, changes in CHF LIBOR affect the prices of
numerous Swiss franc currency derivatives, such as Swiss franc
foreign exchange forwards and Swiss franc futures contracts.

The Complaint alleges that from at least January 1, 2001 through
at least December 31, 2011 (the "Class Period") defendants --
eight large financial institutions -- conspired to manipulate CHF
LIBOR, and thereby the prices of those derivatives, to benefit
their own trading positions in Swiss franc currency derivatives.
The essence of plaintiffs' claims is that they and others
similarly situated were on the losing end of that manipulation,
transacting in Swiss franc derivatives with defendants and third
parties during the Class Period on terms made less favorable by
(1) defendants' fixing of CHF LIBOR and (2) certain defendants'
collusion to increase the "bid-ask spread" on transactions in
those derivatives. Based on this alleged misconduct, the Complaint
asserts claims against all defendants under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, et seq., the Commodities Exchange Act
("CEA"), 7 U.S.C. Sections 1, et seq., and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
Sections 1961, et seq., as well as state law claims against
defendants Credit Suisse AG, Credit Suisse Group AG, and UBS AG
for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

The Complaint draws its allegations largely from the statements of
fact accompanying numerous settlements, for an aggregate value of
over $7 billion, that defendants have reached with U.S. and
European regulators arising from their alleged manipulation of
LIBOR for Swiss francs and several other currencies.  Allegations
of LIBOR manipulation, and the resulting regulatory investigations
and settlements, have received widespread media coverage.  In
recent years, several purported class actions have also been filed
in this judicial district alleging similar manipulation of LIBOR
rates for other currencies. See, e.g., In re: LIBOR-Based Fin.
Instruments Antitrust Litig. ("LIBOR I"), 935 F.Supp.2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (U.S. dollars); Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No.
12-cv-3419, 2014 WL 1280464 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (Yen);
Sullivan v. Barclays PLC, No. 13-cv-2811, 2017 WL 685570 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2017) (Euros).

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) on the grounds that plaintiffs have not alleged an injury
in fact and therefore lack Article III standing to bring their
claims.

While these motions were pending, plaintiffs and defendant
JPMorgan Chase & Co. executed an agreement to settle all claims
against JPMorgan on a class-wide basis.  Accordingly, the motions
to dismiss are deemed withdrawn as to JPMorgan without prejudice
to refiling in the event the Court does not approve the class
settlement with JPMorgan, and allegations against JPMorgan will be
recounted only as relevant to the remaining defendants.  Each of
the remaining seven defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). These motions encompass a
variety of challenges to the Complaint: ranging from standing,
timeliness, extraterritoriality, and personal jurisdiction to
nearly each element of every claim.

The United States District Court for Southern District of  New
York concludes that the Complaint fails to state any claim for
which relief can be granted. As an initial matter, plaintiffs lack
Article III standing to sue for the manipulation of bid-ask
spreads because they have not alleged that they were injured by
that manipulation.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege, and
ultimately prove, that he has suffered an injury-in-fact that is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and
which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. The
alleged injury in fact must be concrete and particularized, actual
or imminent, and fairly traceable to the challenged action.

However, in a putative class action, a plaintiff has class
standing if he plausibly alleges (1) that he personally has
suffered some actual injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant, and (2) that such conduct implicates the
same set of concerns as the conduct alleged to have caused injury
to other members of the putative class by the same defendants.

Plaintiffs do not contradict defendants' observation that the
Complaint fails to allege bid-ask spread manipulation for the
specific types of derivatives in which plaintiffs transacted.
Instead, plaintiffs seek to excuse that failure by protesting that
little can be judged at the pleading stage concerning why the EC
limited its bid-ask findings to a specified period and specified
instruments, and nakedly asserting that it is plausible that
Defendants' misconduct extended well beyond the bounds of their
deal with the EC.

But mere speculation that defendants' misconduct extended beyond
the scope of the European Commission settlement does not satisfy
plaintiffs' burden to allege such conduct. The only attempt to
show such manipulation is a cryptic comment in plaintiffs'
briefing that these instruments constituted one integrated Swiss
franc LIBOR-based derivatives market. That vague, isolated
assertion in the briefing is no substitute for a clear allegation
that the bid-ask spreads for plaintiffs' derivatives were affected
by defendants' manipulation.

Plaintiffs cannot show an injury in fact and therefore lack
standing to sue on behalf of the proposed class for manipulation
of other types of derivatives. Accordingly, Count One is dismissed
for lack of standing, and no other claim can be supported by
allegations relating to bid-ask spread manipulation.

In summary, the Court rules that plaintiffs have Article III
standing to pursue their CHF LIBOR Manipulation Claims with
respect to Swiss franc futures, FX forwards, interest rate swaps,
and NYSE LIFFE Exchange futures contracts, but have failed to
demonstrate standing as to forward rate agreements, cross-currency
swaps, overnight index swaps, and tenor basis swaps.

With respect to plaintiffs' antitrust claim for manipulation of
CHF LIBOR, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege an antitrust
conspiracy against any defendant except RBS. While the Complaint
makes numerous detailed allegations that several defendants
independently manipulated CHF LIBOR, it is devoid of specific or
plausible allegations that defendants other than RBS conspired
with each other to do so. Moreover, plaintiffs' antitrust claim
against RBS fails for lack of antitrust standing because
plaintiffs did not transact in CHF LIBOR-based derivatives with
RBS and therefore are not "efficient enforcers" of the antitrust
laws. Plaintiffs' CEA claims fail because they have not provided
sufficient details about their transactions to plausibly allege
that they were injured by defendants' alleged manipulation of CHF
LIBOR. Plaintiffs' RICO claims are dismissed as impermissibly
extraterritorial because the alleged scheme to manipulate CHF
LIBOR was, with limited exceptions, centered in Europe and touched
the United States only as part of a global scheme. Because the
Complaint fails to state a viable claim under federal law, the
Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims.

The defendants' motions to dismiss each count in the Complaint are
granted. Specifically, Count One is dismissed for lack of
constitutional standing because plaintiffs have not alleged that
they were injured by defendants' bid-ask spread manipulation.
Count Two is dismissed as to each defendant because plaintiffs
lack antitrust standing to sue RBS, the only defendant that has
been plausibly alleged to have violated the antitrust laws. Counts
Three, Four, and Five are dismissed as to each defendant because
the Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Divitto suffered
actual injury from defendants' alleged manipulation. Counts Six
and Seven are dismissed as to each defendant as impermissibly
extraterritorial. Counts Eight and Nine are dismissed because the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these
state law claims. In addition to plaintiffs' failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted as to DB
Group Services and BlueCrest, but denied as to the Credit Suisse
Defendants, Deutsche Bank AG, RBS, and UBS.

If plaintiffs intend to file a second amended complaint, the last
date to do so is October 16, 2017. Defendants must answer or
otherwise respond to that complaint on or before October 30, 2017.
If plaintiffs do not file a second amended complaint by October
16, 2017, their claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Opinion and Order is Available at http://tinyurl.com/y9q6l6ya
Leagle.com.

Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by
Christian Levis -- clevis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C..
Sonterra Capital Master Fund Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by
Geoffrey Milbank Horn -- ghorn@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C.,
Peter Dexter St. Phillip, Jr.-  pstphillip@lowey.com -- Lowey
Dannenberg, P.C., Raymond P. Girnys -- : rgirnys@lowey.com  --
Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart Pc, pro hac vice, Vincent Briganti -
- vbriganti@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Benjamin Martin
Jaccarino -- bjaccarino@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian
Jacobson LLP, Christopher Lovell -- CLovell@lshllp.com -- Lovell
Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Lee Jason Lefkowitz --
llefkowitz@lowey. -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Sitso W. Bediako,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

HG Holdings, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Vincent Briganti,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C..

FrontPoint Healthcare Flagship Enhanced Fund, L.P., Plaintiff,
represented by Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey
Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

HG Holdings II, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Vincent Briganti,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C..

Hunter Global Investors Fund I, L.P., Plaintiff, represented by
Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

FrontPoint Healthcare Flagship Fund, L.P., Plaintiff, represented
by Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank
Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

Hunter Global Investors Offshore Fund II, Ltd., Plaintiff,
represented by Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey
Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

FrontPoint Financial Services Fund, L.P., Plaintiff, represented
by Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank
Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

FrontPoint Healthcare Horizons Fund, L.P., Plaintiff, represented
by Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank
Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

Credit Suisse Group AG, Defendant, represented by Adam Shawn Mintz
-- amintz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Elai E. Katz
-- ekatz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Herbert Scott
Washer -- hwasher@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Jason
Michael Hall -- jhall@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP &
Joel Laurence Kurtzberg -- jkurtzberg@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon
& Reindel LLP.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., Defendant, represented by Paul Christopher
Gluckow --  pgluckow@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Thomas C. Rice --  trice@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP, Abram Jeremy Ellis -- aellis@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Alexander Nuo Li --  zander.li@stblaw.com -- Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Elizabeth Jane Shutkin --
elizabeth.romefelt@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Francis John Acott -- francis.acott@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, Jeffery Li Ding, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Mary Beth Forshaw --  mforshaw@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Michael Steven Carnevale --
michael.carnevale@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP &
Rachel Serenity Sparks Bradley -- rachel.stein@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, Defendant, represented by Alan
Schoenfeld -alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, David Sapir Lesser --
david.lesser@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
LLP, Fraser Lee Hunter, Jr.- fraser.hunter@wilmerhale.com --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Jamie Stephen Dycus --
jamie.dycus@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP.

UBS AG, Defendant, represented by Lawrence Jay Zweifach --
lzweifach@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Eric
Jonathan Stock -- estock@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, Jefferson Eliot Bell -- jbell@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP & Peter Sullivan, Gibson --
psullivan@gibsondunn.com -- Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.

Credit Suisse AG, Defendant, represented by Adam Shawn Mintz --
amintz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Elai E. Katz --
ekatz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Herbert Scott
Washer -- hwasher@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Jason
Michael Hall -- jhall@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP &
Joel Laurence Kurtzberg -- jkurtzberg@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon
& Reindel LLP.

Bluecrest Capital Management LLP, Defendant, represented by
Catherine Fairley Spillman -- fspillman@akingump.com -- Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Douglass Bayley Maynard --
dmaynard@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, John
Cullen Murphy -- jmurphy@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld, Joseph O. Boryshansky, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission & Katherine Penn Scully Porter -- kporter@akingump.com
-- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Deutsche Bank AG, Defendant, represented by Aidan John Synnott --
asynnott@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss, Moses Silverman, Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Elizabeth Justine Grossman
-- egrossman@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison & Michael Joseph Biondi -- mbiondi@paulweiss.com -- Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP.

DB Group Services (UK) Limited, Defendant, represented by Aidan
John Synnott, Paul Weiss, Moses Silverman, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, Elizabeth Justine Grossman, Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison & Michael Joseph Biondi, Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP.


CVS HEALTH: Faces Insulin Price Fixing Probe Amid Class Actions
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brian E. Dickerson, Esq. -- Brian.Dickerson@fisherbroyles.com --
Anthony J. Calamunci, Esq. -- anthony.calamunci@fisherbroyles.com
-- Nicole Hughes Waid, Esq. -- Nicole.Waid@fisherbroyles.com --
Amy L. Butler, Esq. -- Amy.Butler@fisherbroyles.com -- and Katy
Wane, Esq. -- katy.wane@fisherbroyles.com -- of FisherBroyles LLP,
in an article for Lexology, wrote that in a recent SEC filing, CVS
Health (CVS) has disclosed just how embroiled its PBM division has
become in a number of insulin price fixing investigations and
lawsuits nationwide.

Two putative class action suits have been filed against CVS, along
with a number of other PBMs and drug manufacturers, in the U.S.
District Court for New Jersey.  Plaintiffs in both cases allege
that the PBMs and manufacturers have engaged in a conspiracy in
which the PBMs sell access to their formularies by demanding the
highest rebates, which in turn causes increased list prices for
insulin.  The primary claims are antitrust claims, claims under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and
violations of state unfair competition and consumer protection
laws.

The CVS quarterly filing also discloses that CVS is under
investigation by a number of states for insulin price fixing. In
April 2017, CVS received a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) from
the Attorney General of Washington, seeking documents and
information regarding pricing and rebates for insulin products in
connection with a pending investigation into unfair and deceptive
acts or practice regarding insulin pricing.  Washington's Attorney
General advised CVS that information received in response to its
CID would be shared with the Attorneys General of California,
Florida and Minnesota.  In July 2017, CVS also received a CID from
the Attorney General of Minnesota, seeking documents and
information regarding pricing and rebates for insulin and
epinephrine products in connection with a pending investigation
into unfair and deceptive acts or practices regarding insulin and
epinephrine pricing.

CVS's legal woes are not confined to suspicions of insulin price
fixing.  The company, along with other PBMs and manufacturers,
also stands accused in two additional civil suits of harming
glucagon kit and diabetes test strip customers.  The suits claim
violations under federal antitrust laws, RICO, state unfair
competition and consumer protection laws, and ERISA of
manipulating pricing through the use of rebate programs.  An
additional class action complaint was filed against CVS and other
PBMs based on similar accusations of pricing-fixing with regard to
EpiPens.

Closing out the laundry list of legal issues disclosed in the
quarterly filing, in May 2017, the United States Attorneys' Office
for the Southern District of New York issued a CID to CVS
concerning possible false claims submitted to Medicare in
connection with reimbursements for prescription drugs under the
Medicare Part D program. [GN]


EPIC SYSTEMS: Class Actions Important in Wage Theft Cases
---------------------------------------------------------
Eric Tegethoff, writing for Public News Service, reports that
workers in Washington state and across the country watched the
U.S. Supreme Court closely on Oct. 2 as justices heard oral
arguments in a case to determine whether employers can ban class-
action lawsuits.

The case, Epic Systems Corporation versus Lewis, involves
arbitration agreements often found in the fine print of employee
contracts.  About one-quarter of private-sector employees, or
nearly 25 million Americans, have signed agreements that waive
their right to sue employers collectively, according to the
Economic Policy Institute.

Elizabeth Hanley -- ehanley@reedlongyearlaw.com -- an employment
law attorney for Reed, Longyear, Malnati and Ahrens law firm, says
class actions are important in cases of wage theft.

"There's often very small amounts of money affecting many, many
employees, and it can be cost-prohibitive for them to litigate
them individually," she explains.

Epic Systems and other companies argue that employers need to know
if class-action waivers in their workers' contracts apply. If they
don't, the companies say, that will change the employer-employee
relationship.  A decision on this case is expected at the end of
the court's session in June.

During arguments, Justice Stephen Breyer said a ruling in favor of
employers would rip out "the entire heart of the New Deal" and
change our understanding of labor relations dating back to the
Great Depression.  Ms. Hanley says class actions have been
important tools for workers in labor disputes.

"I don't think, without the weight of class actions, that you will
be likely to see the enforcement of wage and hour laws or
employers incentivized to change any unlawful practices," she
warns.

The Epic Systems case, along with the two others to join it, deal
with the conflict between two federal laws.  The Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 favors arbitration.  But the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 encourages workers to sue collectively
in labor disputes. [GN]


EPIC SYSTEMS: High Court Hears Arguments on Class Action Waivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Samia Kirmani, Esq. -- KirmaniS@jacksonlewis.com -- David Nagle,
Esq. -- David.Nagle@jacksonlewis.com -- Philip Rosen, Esq. --
RosenP@jacksonlewis.com -- Daniel Schudroff, Esq. --
SchudroffD@jacksonlewis.com -- Jeffrey Schwartz, Esq. --
Jake.Schwartz@jacksonlewis.com -- and Collin O'Connor Udell, Esq.
-- Collin.Udell@jacksonlewis.com -- of Jackson Lewis P.C., in an
article for JDSupra, wrote that the United States Supreme Court
heard a one-hour consolidated oral argument in three arbitration
cases involving the intersection of the National Labor Relations
Act and the Federal Arbitration Act on October 2, 2017.  Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285; National Labor Relations Board
v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 16-307; Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, No.
16-300. The argument was the first of the Court's 2017-2018 term.

Arbitration agreements requiring employees to waive their right to
bring or participate in a class or collective action have long
been enforced pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. In the
three cases heard on October 2, the Court is asked to resolve a
split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits) over whether such arbitration agreements violate
employees' rights under the National Labor Relations Act to engage
in "concerted activities" in pursuit of their "mutual aid or
protection." For more information, see our article, Supreme Court
to Review Validity of Class Action Waivers in Employment
Arbitration Agreements.

The Court's decision is expected to provide welcome certainty to
both employers and employees on the issue of class waivers in
arbitration agreements.

During the argument, four justices (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) asked attorney
Paul Clement (representing all three employers in the argument)
and Deputy Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall (representing the U.S.
government's position) questions suggesting it is their view that
these types of arbitration agreements are irreconcilable with the
NLRA. Conversely, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel
Alito asked questions suggesting that they hold the opposite view.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch did not ask any
questions.

While one cannot predict the outcome or its timing with any
certainty, a decision is expected in early 2018.

Jackson Lewis has represented Murphy Oil since the inception of
the company's case and, at the certiorari stage, Jackson Lewis
attorneys Jeffrey Schwartz, Daniel Schudroff, and Collin O'Connor
Udell filed the brief for Respondent Murphy Oil in support of
granting the petition for a writ of certiorari, an unusual
procedural posture. Jackson Lewis also assisted on the briefs and
in oral argument preparation and was at the argument. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: "Woods" Sues Over Data Breach, Seeks Damages
---------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Woods and Joshua Woods, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Equifax, Inc. and Equifax Credit
Information Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-00660, (E.D.
Tex., September 19, 2017), seeks compensatory, statutory, treble
and punitive damages, costs of suit including the costs of notice
of class action certification and judgment, and reasonable
attorneys' fees resulting from invasion of privacy and violation
of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act.

Equifax is a credit-reporting company that track and rates the
financial history of U.S. consumers. The companies are supplied
with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as
information on everything from child support payments, credit
limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer
history. Equifax experienced a cybersecurity incident impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers exposing their names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, driver's license
numbers and credit card numbers.

Harper claims to be a victim of the data breach.

Equifax, Inc. and Equifax Credit Information Services LLC are
engaged in the business of assembling, evaluating, and dispersing
information concerning consumers for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties upon request. [BN]

      Shane F. Langston, Esq.
      LANGSTON & LANGSTON, PLLC
      1161 La Mirada Ct.
      Southlake, TX 76092
      Telephone: (601) 969-1356
      Facsimile: (601) 968-3866
      Email: shane@langstonlawyers.com

             - and -

      Stephen C. Maxwell, Esq.
      BAILEY & GALYEN
      1300 Summit Avenue, Ste. 650
      Fort Worth, TX 76102
      Tel: (817) 276-6000
      Fax: (817) 276-6010


EQUIFAX INC: 2.5-Mil. More Americans Affected by Massive Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Sweet, writing for Associated Press, reports that credit
report company Equifax said on Oct. 2 that an additional 2.5
million Americans may have been affected by the massive security
breach of its systems, bringing the total to 145.5 million people
who had their personal information accessed or stolen.

Equifax said the company it hired to investigate the breach,
Mandiant, has concluded its investigation and plans to release the
results "promptly."  The company also said it would update its own
notification for people who want to check if they were among those
affected by Oct. 8.

The information stolen earlier this year included names, Social
Security numbers, birth dates and addresses -- the kind of
information that could put people at significant risk for identity
theft.

While Equifax previously said up to 100,000 Canadian citizens may
have been affected, it said on Oct. 2 that the completed review
did not bear that out and it determined that the information of
only about 8,000 Canadian consumers was involved.

The update comes as Equifax's former CEO, Richard Smith, who
announced his retirement last month, will testify in front of
Congress starting Oct. 3.  He's expected to face bipartisan anger
from politicians who have expressed outrage that a company tasked
with securing vast amounts of personal data was unable to keep
their security software up to date.

The Equifax hack has the hallmarks of state-sponsored pros
In prepared testimony, he apologized and said human error and
technology failures allowed the data breach.  He also apologized
for the way the company handled the announcement of what happened.

"To each and every person affected by this breach, I am deeply
sorry that this occurred," Mr. Smith said in his prepared remarks.
"Whether your personal identifying information was compromised, or
you have had to deal with the uncertainty of determining whether
or not your personal data may have been compromised, I sincerely
apologize.  The company failed to prevent sensitive information
from falling into the hands of wrongdoers."

Equifax also faces several state and federal inquiries and
numerous class-action lawsuits.  At least one state,
Massachusetts, and the cities of San Francisco and Chicago have
sued Equifax as well. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Former Chairman Apologizes for Massive Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Freking, writing for The Associated Press, reports that the
former chairman and CEO of Equifax says the company was entrusted
with the personal information of more than 140 million Americans
and "we let them down" as human error and technology failures
allowed a massive data breach.

In prepared congressional testimony, Richard F. Smith said the
millions are not just numbers in a database, but friends, family,
neighbors and members of his church.  The revelation last month of
the disastrous hack to Equifax's computer system rocked the
company which faces several state and federal inquiries and
several class-action lawsuits.

"To each and every person affected by this breach, I am deeply
sorry that this occurred.  Whether your personal identifying
information was compromised, or you have had to deal with the
uncertainty of determining whether or not your personal data may
have been compromised, I sincerely apologize," Mr. Smith said.
"The company failed to prevent sensitive information from falling
into the hands of wrongdoers."

Mr. Smith, who resigned after overseeing the company for a dozen
years, says Equifax was hacked by a yet-unknown entity.  He said
the information stolen included names, Social Security numbers,
birth dates and addresses.  In addition, the credit card
information for about 209,000 consumers was also stolen as well as
certain documents with personally identifying information for
approximately 182,000 consumers.

Lawmakers are expected to question Mr. Smith on how the company
allowed the breach to occur, why it took as long as it did to
notify consumers and what's it's doing to help consumers protect
themselves going forward.  The House subcommittee holding the
hearing has jurisdiction over e-commerce and consumer protection
issues.

Mr. Smith said the Department of Homeland Security warned the
company on March 8 about the need to patch a particular
vulnerability in software used by Equifax and other business.  The
company disseminated that warning by email the next day and
requested that applicable personnel install the upgrade.  The
company's policy requires the upgrade to occur within 48 hours,
but Smith said that did not occur.  The company's information
security department also ran scans on March 15 that did not pick
up the vulnerability.

"I understand that Equifax's investigation into these issues is
ongoing," Mr. Smith said in the prepared remarks.  "The company
knows, however, that it was this unpatched vulnerability that
allowed hackers to access personal identifying information."

Mr. Smith said it appears the first date the hackers accessed
sensitive information was May 13. Between May 13 and July 30,
there is evidence to suggest the attackers continued to access
sensitive information, but it wasn't until July 29 that Equifax's
security department observed suspicious network traffic.
Mr. Smith said the hack was over the next day, but the hard work
of figure out the impact was just beginning.

Mr. Smith said he was told of the suspicious activity on July 31
in a conversation with the company's chief information officer. He
then provided a timeline of events that included a senior
leadership team meeting on August 17 where he learned the forensic
investigation has determined large volumes of consumer data had
been compromised.  He said the lead member of the company's board
of directors was notified on August 22 and the full board two days
later.  He convened a board meeting to discuss the scale of the
breach on Sept. 1.

Meanwhile, the company worked on a support package for consumers
and then notified the public on Sept. 7.

Mr. Smith also said he was disappointed in the rollout of call
centers and a website designed to help the people affected by the
breach.  He said the company has increased its number of customer
service representatives and the website has been improved.

"Still, the rollout of these resources should have been far
better, and I regret that the response exacerbated rather than
alleviated matters for so many," Mr. Smith said in the prepared
testimony.

Equifax said on Oct. 2 that 2.5 million more Americans may have
been affected by the breach of its systems, bringing the total to
145.5 million people. [GN]


EXPRESS MESSENGER: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in "Ziglar"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Express Messenger Systems, Inc., filed an appeal from a
court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Christerphor Ziglar, et al.
v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc., Case No. 2:16-cv-02726-SRB, in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act against the
Defendant for alleged failure to pay overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Defendants own and operate a company that provides package and
parcel delivery services to businesses and individuals.

The appellate case is captioned as Christerphor Ziglar, et al. v.
Express Messenger Systems, Inc., Case No. 17-16920, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 23, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 21, 2017;

   -- Appellant Express Messenger Systems, Inc.'s opening brief
      is due on January 2, 2018;

   -- Appellees Leah Candelaria, Sompop Komol, Maurice Meintzer
      and Christerphor Ziglar's answering brief is due on
      January 30, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees CHRISTERPHOR ZIGLAR, LEAH CANDELARIA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and
MAURICE MEINTZER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Daniel L. Bonnett, Esq.
          Jennifer Kroll, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONNETT, PLLC
          1850 N. Central Ave.
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 240-6900
          Facsimile: (602) 240-2345
          E-mail: dbonnett@martinbonnett.com
                  jkroll@martinbonnett.com

               - and -

          Susan Joan Martin, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONNETT PLLC
          4647 N. 32nd St., Suite 185
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Telephone: (602) 240-6900
          E-mail: smartin@martinbonnett.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees CHRISTERPHOR ZIGLAR and SOMPOP KOMOL are
represented by:

          Matthew David Carlson, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          466 Geary Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
          E-mail: mcarlson@llrlaw.com

Defendant-Appellant EXPRESS MESSENGER SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, DBA Ontrac, is represented by:

          Robert G. Hulteng, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-1940
          Facsimile: (415) 399-8490
          E-mail: rhulteng@littler.com

               - and -

          Peter Prynkiewicz, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2425 East Camelback Road
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 474-3650
          E-mail: pprynkiewicz@rubinfortunato.com


FLINT, MI: 21 Law Firms File Consolidated Water Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Gerstein, writing for The Detroit News, reports that
attorneys for 21 law firms have filed a consolidated class-action
lawsuit against two engineering firms, Flint officials and state
officials including Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder and former state
Treasurer Andy Dillon over Flint's lead-contaminated water.

In June, Federal Judge Judith Levy in Ann Arbor ruled that Flint
residents have sufficiently argued that the conduct of government
officials "was so egregious as to shock the conscience" -- a key
legal standard. Levy ordered the lawyers to consolidate the
arguments after she dismissed other parts of the lawsuit.

About 100,000 Flint residents "have experienced and will continue
to experience serious personal injury and property damage caused
by defendants' deliberate, reckless and negligent misconduct," the
complaint said.

"Defendants caused a public health crisis by exposing (Flint
residents) to contaminated water" and "exacerbated the crisis by
concealing and misrepresenting its scope, failing to take
effective remedial action to eliminate it, and then lying about it
to cover up their misconduct," it continued.

Emergency managers appointed by the Snyder administration
recommended and implemented the switch of the source of the city's
water from the Detroit regional water system to the Flint River in
April 2014.  The corrosive river water, which was not treated with
corrective chemicals, resulted in lead leaching into the drinking
water.

The lawsuit argues that the engineering firms and government
officials unconstitutionally did not treat the predominantly black
residents of Flint the same as the predominantly white residents
of great Genesee County.  The suit on behalf of Flint's 100,000
residents and other users of its water system also says the
defendants acted recklessly and did not respect residents' due
process rights.

Theodore Leopold, a lead attorney in the case, said he's pleased
with the consolidation because it allows the case to proceed more
quickly.

"This case has been going on way too long, and unfortunately the
governor nor any of the other defendants have been willing to step
up and take responsibility," Mr. Leopold said.

The defendants "devised or acquiesced to an Interim Plan that
allowed the predominately white water users of Genesee County to
receive the safe superior water from DWSD and the predominately
black water users of Flint would have to accept during the interim
period grossly inferior, previously rejected and potentially
unsafe Flint River water," according to the lawsuit filed on Sept.
29.

Among those named in the lawsuit are the Lockwood, Andrews &
Newnam and Veolia North America engineering firms, Michigan Health
Human Services Director Nick Lyon, former Department of
Environmental Quality Director Daniel Wyant, Genesee County Drain
Commissioner Jeff Wright, former Flint Mayor Dayne Walling and
former emergency managers Ed Kurtz, Darnell Earley and Gerald
Ambrose.

Ten of the 21 law firms are outside of Michigan.

In October 2015, Gov. Snyder accepted the findings of outside
experts and ordered that Flint shut off the river water and switch
back to water from the Detroit system, now known as the Great
Lakes Water Authority.

The quality of the water has improved to the point that lead
levels fall within federal guidelines, but people are being urged
to drink only filtered or bottled water until the city's pipes are
all replaced.  Flint's City Council refuses to approve a 30-year
contract with the Detroit regional water system, arguing it can
find a cheaper alternative.

In late July, a three-judge panel of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed plaintiffs in one case before Levy to try to seek
relief from Snyder in the form of compensation for education,
medical monitoring and evaluation services for ongoing harm from
Flint's lead-contaminated water.  In the other case, the appeals
judges dismissed the possibility of seeking penalties for Snyder,
the state of Michigan, the state Department of Environmental
Quality and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.

All three judges -- appointed by Democratic presidents -- argued
that the 11th Amendment gives the state and Gov. Snyder immunity
against damages sought by private citizens. [GN]


FRENCH REDWOOD: Conchas Sues Over Denied Meal/Rest Breaks
---------------------------------------------------------
Maria Conchas, Mitra Elie, Francisco Miranda, Edgar Cesar Paredes,
and William Rodrigues, individuals and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. French Redwood, Inc. (d/b/a
Sofitel San Francisco Bay Hotel), Sofitel SSF, Accor Business and
Leisure Management LLC, and Does 1 through 10, Defendant, Case No.
17CIV04276, (Cal. Super., September 19, 2017), seeks compensation
for denied and/or improper meal periods, rest breaks, and damages
for failure to provide accurate, itemized wage statements under
the California Labor Code, Unfair Practices Act of the California
Business and Professions Code and applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission.

Defendants own and operate hotels throughout California where
Plaintiffs were employed at Sofitel San Francisco Bay Hotel in
Redwood City, California in the housekeeping department from
February 1993 to October 31, 2016. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Arlo Garcia Uriarte, Esq.
      Un Kei Wu, Esq.
      LIBERATION LAW GROUP, PC.
      2760 Mission Street
      San Francisco, CA 94110
      Telephone: (415) 695-1000
      Facsimile: (415) 695-1006


GNC HOLDINGS: Averts Gold Card Customer Discount Program Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reports that
Vitamin and supplement chain GNC escaped a potential class action
over the abrupt discontinuation of its Gold Card customer discount
program.

U.S. District Judge Nora Barry Fischer of the Western District of
Pennsylvania granted GNC's motion to dismiss five plaintiffs'
class action complaint against the company and upheld a previous
ruling sending the case to arbitration.

The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
breaches of several state business codes.  GNC responded, arguing
that the terms of the Gold Card contract, which was purchased by
paying a $15 annual membership, allowed GNC to alter or terminate
the program at any time.

"Despite the existence of a contract in this matter, plaintiffs
have not, and cannot, identify a breach of the contract by
defendant. Plaintiffs allege that defendant breached the contract
by terminating the Gold Card program without providing full
membership benefits or refunds of membership fees," Judge Fischer
said in her opinion.  "Plaintiffs, however, do not acknowledge the
contractual provisions that permit defendant to alter the
membership program."

Given that the language of the contract clearly states GNC's right
to terminate the program, Judge Fischer said, the plaintiffs
couldn't establish that the company breached its obligations.

But the plaintiffs argued that the terms were ambiguous because
GNC promised a year's worth of Gold Card benefits while at the
same time reserving its right to alter the contract.

"However, in construing the contractual provisions together, it is
clear that the provision granting defendant the discretion to
alter the program conditions the one-year membership provision,"
Judge Fischer said.  "Thus, the contract affords defendant the
discretion to alter or terminate the Gold Card program's benefits,
which last for one year in the absence of defendant exercising its
discretion."

Judge Fischer also said the plaintiffs' argument that GNC was
bound to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
meritless.  The judge explained that an implied covenant only
applies in the absence of an express provision.

"The contractual provisions at issue here are express, clear, and
unambiguous," Judge Fischer said.  "Thus, the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is inapplicable in this matter."

GNC's attorney, Jordan Clark -- jordanclark@dwt.com -- of Davis
Wright Tremaine in Seattle, did not respond to a request for
comment.

The plaintiffs' attorney, David A. Borkovic -- dab@jgcg.com -- of
Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace in Pittsburgh, said he was
confident the decision would be overturned.

"I already have the notice of appeal prepared," he said. [GN]


GRAIN PROCESSING: Trial in Class Suit to Begin July 9
-----------------------------------------------------
Christina Hepner, writing for WQAD8, reports that Muscatine
residents have until October 16th to decide whether or not to stay
in a class action lawsuit against Grain Processing Corporation.

Charrie Fiese lives near the plant and when she looks at her home
all she sees is soot covering the siding and windows.

"Washing your windows all the time and your house gets like this,
you gotta scrub it, it`s awful," said Ms. Fiese.

The smell, she described as unbearable, "it don`t smell like a
cookout, it stinks like burnt grain," she said.

Sandra Axtell lives in the same neighborhood.

"It's just taking too long, I wish it would hurry up, get over
with," said Axtell.

These women join around 5,000 people who have to decide if they
will stay in a class action lawsuit against GPC.

Another option would be a settlement agreement.

People who have lived within 1.5 miles of the plant for at least 8
years could receive up to $33,000.  About one-third of that would
go to their lawyers.

"I'd rather have something little than nothing at all," said
Axtell.

"I decided to take it so I could get some work done to my house,"
said Ms. Fiese.

Both women say they don't want to take the risk of going to court.

GPC has maintained that people chose to live near the plant and
that it has followed all regulations.

The trial will begin July 9, 2018, in district court. [GN]


GREEN BROOK: Broking Appeals D.N.J. Decision to Third Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Timothy Broking filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Timothy Broking v. Green Brook Buick GMC
Suzuki, et al., Case No. 3-15-cv-01847, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff has
previously moved for class certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Timothy Broking v. Green Brook
Buick GMC Suzuki, et al., Case No. 17-3072, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TIMOTHY BROKING, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623 3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623 0858
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Innessa M. Huot, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983 9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983 9331
          E-mail: ihuot@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph Lipari, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP
          77 Water Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 618-1938
          E-mail: liparij@thesultzerlawgroup.com

Defendant-Appellee GREEN BROOK BUICK GMC SUZUKI is represented by:

          William T. Connell, Esq.
          Donald T. Okner, Esq.
          DWYER CONNELL & LISBONA
          100 Passaic Avenue, Third Floor
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 276-1800
          Facsimile: (973) 276-1888
          E-mail: wconnell@dcllaw.com
                  dokner@dcllaw.com

Defendant-Appellee BLUE BONNET TECHNOLOGY LLC is represented by:

          Alan N. Walkow, Esq.
          WALKOW LAW OFFICE
          246 Monmouth Road
          Oakhurst, NJ 07755
          Telephone: (732) 945-5250
          Facsimile: (855) 783-1395
          E-mail: awalkow@njnylawgroup.com


GUTHY-RENKER LLC: Bentz Appeals Ruling in "Friedman" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Ellen Bentz filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Amy Friedman, et al. v. Guthy-Renker LLC, et al.,
Case No. 2:14-cv-06009-ODW-AGR, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Amy Friedman and Judi Miller brought the class action lawsuit
against the Defendants alleging that the Defendants' line of "WEN"
haircare products caused their hair to fall out.  The parties have
reached a class-wide settlement of all claims.

The appellate case is captioned as Amy Friedman, et al. v. Guthy-
Renker LLC, et al., Case No. 17-56443, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 20, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2017;

   -- Appellant Ellen Bentz's opening brief is due on January 2,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Amy Friedman, Guthy-Renker LLC, Krystal
      Henry-McArthur, Judi Miller, Lisa Rogers and Wen By Chaz
      Dean, Inc.'s answering brief is due on February 2, 2018;
      and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant ELLEN BENTZ, of Cincinnati, Ohio, appears pro
se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees AMY FRIEDMAN, JUDI MILLER, KRYSTAL HENRY-
MCARTHUR and LISA ROGERS, on behalf of themselves, and all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Neville Johnson, Esq.
          Jordanna G. Thigpen, Esq.
          JOHNSON AND JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Drive, Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975-1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975-1095
          E-mail: djohnson@jrllp.com
                  njohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  jthigpen@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Charles LaDuca, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Ave, NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Jaime E. Moss, Esq.
          THE SIZEMORE LAW FIRM PLC
          2101 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite # 3290
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 322-8800
          Facsimile: (310) 322-8811
          E-mail: moss@lenzelawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee GUTHY-RENKER LLC is represented by:

          Jonathan Michael Jackson, Esq.
          David J. Schindler, Esq.
          LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560
          Telephone: (213) 485-1234
          E-mail: jonathan.jackson@lw.com
                  Edavid.schindler@lw.com

Defendant-Appellee WEN BY CHAZ DEAN, INC., is represented by:

          Michael B. Giaquinto, Esq.
          Barry R. Schirm, Esq.
          HAWKINS PARNELL THACKSTON AND YOUNG LLP
          445 S Figueroa St., Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 486-8000
          Facsimile: (213) 486-8080
          E-mail: mgiaquinto@hptylaw.com
                  bschirm@hptylaw.com


GUTHY-RENKER LLC: Behrend Appeals Ruling in "Friedman" Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Pamela L. Behrend filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Amy Friedman, et al. v. Guthy-Renker LLC, et
al., Case No. 2:14-cv-06009-ODW-AGR, in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 4,
2017, Objector Pamela Sweeney filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as Amy Friedman,
et al. v. Guthy-Renker LLC, et al., Case No. 17-56428.

Plaintiffs Amy Friedman and Judi Miller brought the class action
lawsuit against the Defendants alleging that the Defendants' line
of "WEN" haircare products caused their hair to fall out.  The
parties have reached a class-wide settlement of all claims.

The appellate case is captioned as Amy Friedman, et al. v. Guthy-
Renker LLC, et al., Case No. 17-56456, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 23, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 21, 2017;

   -- Appellant Pamela L. Behrend's opening brief is due on
      January 2, 2018;

   -- Appellees Amy Friedman, Guthy-Renker LLC, Krystal
      Henry-McArthur, Judi Miller, Lisa Rogers and Wen By Chaz
      Dean, Inc.'s answering brief is due on January 30, 2018;
      and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant Pamela L. Behrend of Wexford, Pennsylvania,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees AMY FRIEDMAN, JUDI MILLER, KRYSTAL HENRY-
MCARTHUR, and LISA ROGERS, on behalf of themselves, and all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Neville Johnson, Esq.
          Jordanna G. Thigpen, Esq.
          JOHNSON AND JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Drive, Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975-1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975-1095
          E-mail: djohnson@jrllp.com
                  njohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  jthigpen@jjllplaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee AMY FRIEDMAN is represented by:

          Charles LaDuca, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Ave, NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: charles@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Jaime E. Moss, Esq.
          THE SIZEMORE LAW FIRM PLC
          2101 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite # 3290
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 322-8800
          Facsimile: (310) 322-8811
          E-mail: moss@lenzelawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee GUTHY-RENKER LLC is represented by:

          David J. Schindler, Esq.
          LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560
          Telephone: (213) 485-1234
          E-mail: Edavid.schindler@lw.com

Defendant-Appellee WEN BY CHAZ DEAN, INC., is represented by:

          Barry R. Schirm, Esq.
          Michael B. Giaquinto, Esq.
          HAWKINS PARNELL THACKSTON AND YOUNG LLP
          445 S Figueroa St., Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 486-8000
          Facsimile: (213) 486-8080
          E-mail: bschirm@hptylaw.com
                  mgiaquinto@hptylaw.com


HARRIS WATER: Faces "Pino" Suit in E. Dist. of New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Harris Water Main &
Sewer Contractors, Inc. The case is styled as Eden Pino, Lester
Moncada and Walter Ulloa, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Harris Water Main & Sewer
Contractors, Inc., Steven Kogel and Brett Kogel, Defendants, Case
No. 1:17-cv-05910 (E.D.N.Y., October 10, 2017).

Harris Water Main & Sewer Contractors is a licensed, insured and
bonded contractor that deals in all installation and repairs of
water mains, sewers and fire sprinkle systems.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appears PRO SE.


HIBBETT SPORTING: Faces "Orozco" Suit in M. Dist. Fla.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hibbett Sporting
Goods, Inc. a foreign for-profit corporation. The case is styled
as Omar Orozco, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Hibbett Sporting Goods, Inc.
a foreign for-profit corporation, Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-
01751-GAP-KRS (M.D. Fla., October 10, 2017).

Hibbett Sports, Inc. is a publicly traded holding company for
Hibbett Sporting Goods, a full line sporting goods retailer
headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Aaron M. Swift, Esq.
   Leavengood, Dauval, Boyle & Meyer PA
   Northeast Professional Center
   3900 First St North, Suite 100
   St Petersburg, FL 33703-6109
   Tel: (727) 327-3328
   Fax: (727) 327-3305
   Email: aswift@leavenlaw.com

      - and -

   Gregory Harrison Lercher, Esq.
   Leavengood, Dauval, Boyle & Meyer PA
   Northeast Professional Center
   3900 First St North, Suite 100
   St Petersburg, FL 33703-6109
   Tel: (727) 327-3328
   Email: glercher@leavenlaw.com

      - and -

   Ian Richard Leavengood, Esq.
   Leavengood, Dauval, Boyle & Meyer PA
   Northeast Professional Center
   3900 First St North, Suite 100
   St Petersburg, FL 33703-6109
   Tel: (727) 327-3328
   Fax: (727) 327-3305
   Email: ileavengood@leavenlaw.com


HIGHER ONE: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Exchange Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in the case
captioned BRIAN PEREZ, INDIVIDUALLY and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, and ROBERT E. LEE, Plaintiffs, v. HIGHER ONE
HOLDINGS, INC., MARK VOLCHECK, CHRISTOPHER WOLF, JEFFREY WALLACE,
MILES LASATER, DEAN HATTON, and PATRICK McFADDEN, Defendants,
Civil No. 3:14-cv-755(AWT) (D. Conn.).

The defendants, Higher One and current or former executives at
and/or directors of Higher One, have moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

Lead plaintiff Brian Perez and additional plaintiff Robert E. Lee
bring this class action on behalf of all persons, other than the
defendants and their affiliates, who purchased Higher One
Holdings, Inc., securities during the class period. The plaintiffs
allege two claims for violations of the Securities Exchange Action
of 1934.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
requires that when a plaintiff claims that the defendant has made
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted a material fact
necessary to make a statement not misleading, the plaintiff must
specify each statement alleged to have been misleading and the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
Furthermore, to state a claim for securities fraud, the plaintiff
must with respect to each act or omission state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.

The Second Amended Complaint alleges false or misleading
statements that the plaintiffs have recategorized as: (1) Higher
One's legal compliance (Legal Compliance Fraud), (2) termination
of the banking partner relationship between Higher One and Cole
Taylor Bank (Cole Taylor Fraud), (3) Higher One's product
transparency (Products Transparency Fraud), (4) changes in Higher
One's practices as a result of the class action settlement (Class
Action Resolution Fraud) and (5) false statements and omissions by
Higher One in its public statements and filings announcing its
financial and operating results (Operating Results Fraud).

The defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint should be
dismissed because the plaintiffs have failed to plead facts that
show that the defendants made any actionable statement or omission
and because the plaintiffs have failed to plead with particularity
facts that establish a strong inference of scienter.

To state a claim for violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must allege (1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.

Legal Compliance Fraud

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs have not pled facts
showing that the statements regarding legal compliance were false
or misleading when made. They argue that the plaintiffs'
allegations regarding Higher One's legal compliance are conclusory
and speculative. It is insufficient under Rule 9(b) to couple a
factual statement with a conclusory allegation of fraudulent
intent. The defendants further contend that some of the allegedly
fraudulent statements were in fact optimistic statements and/or
corporate puffery. Misguided optimism is not a cause of action,
and does not support an inference of fraud. Courts have rejected
the legitimacy of alleging fraud by hindsight.

In the Second Amended Complaint, however, the plaintiffs added
factual allegations that were not in their prior complaint,
including the statements from CW4, CW5 and CW6 regarding the
defendants' attitude toward compliance; statements from CWs and
the revelations from the later Federal Reserve Cease and Desist
Orders and 2015 FDIC Consent Order showing the defendants
continued the very conduct cited in the 2012 FDIC Consent Order as
constituting violations to the FTC Act; and statements from CWs
showing that the defendants received warnings about their ongoing
violative conduct from their own employees and from their banking
partner, Cole Taylor, before it severed its relationship with
Higher One.

With the additions, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently
alleges facts that, if proven, would show a nexus between the
conduct cited in the FDIC Consent Order and ongoing violations
later revealed, and that because the defendants did not, in any
material way, alter the cited conduct, the defendants could not
have reasonably believed their own statements of corporate
optimism  that all exposure had been recorded and that they did
not expect any further losses related to the violative conduct at
the time the statements were made.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs have pled an actionable misstatements
and omissions with respect to Higher One's legal compliance.

Cole Taylor Fraud

The plaintiffs allege that the statements by the defendants that
they had agreed to a mutual termination of their banking
relationship with Cole Taylor were materially false and
misleading. The statement, in substantively identical but slightly
varied forms, appeared in Higher One's Form 8-K.

The court concludes that the plaintiffs fail to plead facts
sufficient to substantiate their claims with regard to these
statements for substantially the reasons given in the court's
prior ruling.  As discussed there, the securities laws do not
impose a general duty to disclose corporate mismanagement or
uncharged criminal conduct, and there must be a connection between
the illegal conduct and the statements. None of these statements
by the defendants suggests that the Cole Taylor relationship
termination was mutual, or that the defendants were not engaging
in the conduct allegedly giving rise to the Cole Taylor
termination.

Additionally, having discussed any of its banking relationships
generally is insufficient to give rise to an obligation to
disclose uncharged criminal conduct that one of its prior banking
partners found objectionable. Indeed, had the defendants included
the information as to why Cole Taylor terminated its relationship
with Higher One, the statements would be no more true than they
are without the additional information. Accordingly, these
statements are not actionable, and the motion to dismiss is being
granted with respect to these particular statements.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is being granted with respect
to the false statements alleged in the complaint.

Products Transparency Fraud, Class Action Resolution Fraud, and
Operating Results Fraud

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the Second Amended
Complaint adequately pleads the false statements with respect to
the Products Transparency Fraud. False statements are identified
in paragraph 96  paragraphs 98 and 99 and paragraph 101 statements
made with respect to positive changes purportedly made to Higher
Ones' products and processes on earnings calls on February 12,
2013, May 7, 2013, August 8, 2013, November 7, 2013, and February
13, 2013 and in the press release on August 8, 2013). The reasons
these statements are false as alleged in paragraphs 95, 97, 100,
102.

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the Second Amended
Complaint adequately pleads false statements with respect to the
Class Action Resolution Fraud. False statements are identified in
paragraphs 104 (statements with respect to changes in practices
Higher One had agreed to make as part of the class action
settlement made in the Form 10Q for the quarter ending September
30, 2013, the press release on November 5, 2013, and the 2013 Form
10-K) and paragraph 106 (statements made during the November 7,
2013 earnings call). The reasons the statements are false are
alleged in paragraphs 103, 105, and 107.

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the Second Amended
Complaint adequately pleads false statements, with respect to the
Operating Results Fraud, which are identified in paragraphs 109
through 116 (press releases and filings with the SEC is announcing
its financial and operating results for Q2 2012 through Q1 2014).
The reasons the statements are false are alleged in paragraphs 108
and 117.

Accordingly the motion to dismiss is being denied with respect to
the Products Transparency Fraud, the Class Action Resolution Fraud
and the Operating Results Fraud.

Scienter

When determining whether the plaintiff has adequately plead
scienter, the court must evaluate 'whether all of the facts
alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of
scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in
isolation, meets that standard.' The Court rests it conclusion
"not on the presence or absence of certain types of allegations,
but on a practical judgment about whether, accepting the whole
factual picture painted by the Complaint, it is at least as likely
as not that defendants acted with scienter."

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the defendants have
offered no inference more compelling than the strong inference of
scienter pled in the Second Amended Complaint for the reasons
discussed by the plaintiffs in their opposition at pages 26 to 37.
The plaintiffs have adequately alleged both motive and opportunity
and knowledge or recklessness.

Loss Causation

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the loss causation
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are virtually
identical to those in the earlier complaint and that there have
been no material developments in the case law since the defendants
moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The court also
agrees that under the circumstances present here this argument was
waived.  The filing of an amended complaint will not revive the
right to present by motion defenses that were available but were
not asserted in timely fashion prior to the amendment of the
pleading. Defendant waived venue defense by not raising it in its
prior motions to dismiss. In any event the court finds persuasive
the plaintiffs' analysis as to why loss causation has been
sufficiently alleged.

Section 20(a) Claim

Because the plaintiffs have established a primary violation of the
securities laws, the motion to dismiss the Section 20(a) claim,
control person liability, is being denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8ro78x5from
Leagle.com.

Brian Perez, Plaintiff, represented by Bruce L. Elstein --
belstein@goldmangruderwoods.com -- Goldman, Gruder & Woods, LLC.
Brian Perez, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew L. Tuccillo, Pomerantz LLP,
600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10016, & Nicole L.
Barber, Goldman, Gruder & Woods, LLC, 105 Technology Drive Suite
2A. Trumbull, CT 06611

Higher One Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by James H.
Bicks -- jbicks@wiggin.com -- Wiggin & Dana LLP & Joseph C.
Merschman -- jmerschman@wiggin.com --  Wiggin & Dana.

Mark Volchek, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin &
Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.

Christopher Wolf, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin
& Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.

Jeffrey Wallace, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin
& Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.

Miles Lasater, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin &
Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.

Dean Hatton, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin &
Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.

Patrick McFadden, Defendant, represented by James H. Bicks, Wiggin
& Dana LLP & Joseph C. Merschman, Wiggin & Dana.


HYATT EQUITIES: Troutman Sanders Attorneys Discuss FCRA Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
David M. Gettings, Esq. -- dave.gettings@troutman.com -- and
Timothy "Tim" J. St. George, Esq. -- tim.st.george@troutman.com --
of Troutman Sanders LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that on
March 13, 2017, Carlos Guarisma filed a class action complaint
against Hyatt Equities, alleging violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. The complaint alleges that Hyatt printed more than
the last five digits of customers' credit card numbers on hotel
receipts.  Mr. Guarisma sought to represent a class of Hyatt hotel
guests.  The District Court for the Southern District of Florida
denied Mr. Guarisma's motion for class certification.

In the Court's analysis, it first addressed the question of
whether Mr. Guarisma had standing to assert his claims in federal
court.  Hyatt argued that Mr. Guarisma had not suffered an injury-
in-fact sufficient to establish standing because he had only
alleged a statutory violation, divorced from concrete harm. The
Court disagreed.  According to the Court, the provision of the
FCRA at issue "creates a substantive right for consumers to have
their personal credit card information truncated on receipts
printed and provided to customers at the point of sale."  As a
result, the Court concluded that Mr. Guarisma had plausibly
alleged a violation of his right to privacy.

With respect to class certification, however, the Court found that
Mr. Guarisma could not meet his burden to certify a class. In the
Court's view, Mr. Guarisma could not satisfy the ascertainability
requirement of Rule 23 in that Mr. Guarisma failed to offer any
evidence of how many, if any, of the 219,087 hotel guests at issue
received a printed receipt.  Mr. Guarisma could not identify the
class members using Hyatt's records. Further, the Court rejected
Mr. Guarisma's proposal to have the class members submit
affidavits explaining whether they had received a printed receipt
because it found that such a process would not be administratively
feasible.

While ascertainability was the lynchpin of the Court's Rule 23
analysis, the Court also reached several other interesting
conclusions regarding Mr. Guarisma's ability to certify a class.
For example, it found that a class action was not the superior
method of adjudication in this context because a person seeking
statutory damages could bring an individual action.  It also found
that individual issues would predominate the case because each
class member would need to show that he or she received a printed
receipt. [GN]


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Defective Brake
------------------------------------------------------
John Kennedy and Kat Sieniuc, writing for Law360, report that a
proposed class action against Hyundai's U.S. branch over an
alleged brake defect in certain Sonata sedans will proceed, a
New York federal judge said on Sept. 29, finding that although
some of the drivers' claims must be thrown out, others deserved to
stay.

The six named plaintiffs have accused Hyundai Motor America of
using inadequate materials in the braking systems of 2006-2010
model year Sonatas, a decision that led to premature corrosion,
brake pad seizure and out-of-pocket repair costs for the proposed
class due to the automaker's decision to cover up the alleged
defect.

On Sept. 29, U.S. District Judge Thomas P. Griesa dismissed the
drivers' breach of warranty claims and a claim brought under
Minnesota's consumer protection law, but maintained certain claims
related to the automaker's post-purchase actions and alleged
violations of Illinois and Pennsylvania consumer protection laws.

Specifically, the judge found that plaintiff Krista Pierskalla
hasn't shown that Minnesota law required Hyundai to disclose the
allegedly omitted facts, and that the supposed defect was in the
brake system's design, not due to manufacturing or workmanship, so
it wasn't covered by warranty.

"A comparison of the original complaint and the [first amended
complaint] makes it obvious that the discovery period has assisted
plaintiffs in strengthening their consumer protection claims
insofar as they allege [Hyundai] knew of and concealed the
purported defect," Judge Griesa said.  "However, the same
assertions work to undermine plaintiffs' manufacturing defect
theory in connection with their breach of warranty claims."

Siding with Hyundai on the nature of the defect, Judge Griesa said
that the critical difference between a manufacturing defect and a
design defect is the manufacturer's intention.  A manufacturing
defect is a mistake that renders an ordinarily safe product
dangerous, while a design defect is made the way it was intended
to be made, but is unreasonably dangerous as designed, he
explained.

Although the drivers argued that intentionally selecting poor
materials should be a warranty violation, it simply isn't a
manufacturing defect, the judge said.

"While a deliberate selection of defective materials may perhaps
form the basis for a claim under other laws, including the
consumer protection laws discussed [here], an intentional decision
-- even one made in bad faith -- is at odds with the concept of
unintended deviation inherent to manufacturing defects," Judge
Griesa said.

As for the state consumer protection law claims, Hyundai said they
didn't sufficiently support their claims of fraud under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires specific statements
about the circumstances of the supposed fraud.

Judge Griesa held that the automaker mischaracterized the drivers'
amended complaint by arguing that they'd submitted nothing more
than what the court had already found to be deficient.  Instead,
the newest version of the drivers' claims suggests that Hyundai
knew about the premature corrosion and tried to address it
internally, citing a report by Hyundai-Kia America Technical
Center Inc., which recommended the automaker consider "a mass
production fix."

But Hyundai repeatedly charged customers for brake system repairs
that temporarily stopped the corrosion, knowing they would be
continuously needed and paid for by customers themselves, the
drivers said in their amended complaint.  Given those facts, the
judge said the drivers had sufficiently claimed fraud under Rule
9(b).

Gary Graifman, a lawyer for the drivers, said in an Oct. 2
statement that he and his clients are pleased that the court
sustained the state consumer fraud claims.  He also said that they
believe the court recognized there are strong claims that Hyundai
knew about a serious defect.

Hyundai could not be reached for comment on Oct. 2.

The drivers are represented by Gary S. Graifman of Kantrowitz
Goldhamer & Graifman, Nicholas A. Migliaccio and Jason S. Rathod
of Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, Gary E. Mason -- gmason@wbmllp.com --
and Jennifer Goldstein -- jgoldstein@wbmllp.com -- of Whitfield
Bryson & Mason LLP, and Elmer Robert Keach III of the Law Offices
of Elmer Robert Keach III PC.

Hyundai is represented by Michael L. Kidney --
michael.kidney@hoganlovells.com -- James W. Clayton and John J.
Sullivan -- john.sullivan@hoganlovells.com -- of Hogan Lovells.

The case is Miller et al. v. Hyundai Motor America, Case No. 1:15-
cv-04722 (S.D.N.Y.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Thomas P. Griesa.  The case was filed June 17, 2015. [GN]


JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: Faces $66-Mil. Sexual Abuse Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
680News reports that a group of alleged sexual abuse survivors
from across the country have filed a $66-million class action
lawsuit against the Jehovah's Witness, CityNews has learned.

The suit accuses the religious organization of having rules and
policies that protect child sex abusers and put children at risk.

"The organization's policy and protocol for dealing with
allegations of sexual abuse is seriously flawed, and results in
further harm to victims of sexual abuse and results in legitimate
allegations of sexual abuse going unreported," it alleges.

"This is an issue that the wider community should be concerned
with, and not just Jehovah's Witnesses," says Tricia Franginha.
She says her first 14 years of life as a Jehovah's Witness were
filed with sexual abuse.

"As a result of their procedures, when abuse allegations come
forward, these sexual offenders are left at large," Ms. Franginha
says.  "As most people know about Jehovah's Witnesses, they are
the ones who come to your door on Saturday mornings, when your
kids are home, and for all you know, that person has offended more
than once."

None of the allegations in this the suit have been tested in
Ontario Superior Court.  A spokesperson for the Jehovah's Witness
says that while the suit has been filed, the organization hasn't
officially received it yet, so they can't comment on the details.

"Jehovah's Witnesses abhor child abuse and would never shield any
perpetrator," says spokesperson Mattieu Rozon.  The organization
also says congregation elders comply with child abuse reporting
laws.

Ms. Franginha says that when she went for help, she was shut down.

"When I was around 12, I was told that I didn't have two witnesses
and I needed to respect my parents -- not to talk about it," she
says.

The need to have two witnesses corroborate allegations of abuse is
singled out in the suit. People who have been sexually abused must
present two credible witnesses to their abuse, explains
Ms. Franginha, who adds that the eyewitnesses must be other
Jehovah's Witnesses in good standing in the church.

"This, obviously, never happens," she says.  "The very nature of
the crime is that it's secret."

The suit also alleges that police are not called when allegations
surface and instead they're handled by church elders inside
Kingdom Hall.

"It is our information, based on people who contacted us, that the
systems in place don't guard against [abuse] happening, and when
allegations are made, inadequate measures are in place to ensure
that the complaint reaches the proper authorities," says Bryan
McPhadden -- bmcphadden@mcst.ca -- laywer at McPhadden Samac
Tuovi, which is representing the victims.

The victims are seeking $20 million for damages from sexual and
mental abuse by elders, $20 million for failing to protect
children, and another $20 million for breach of duty of care.

The lawsuit is expected to take years to wind its way through the
courts.  If you believe you qualify to join the class action suit,
you can reach out at www.mcst.ca [GN]


KELLY SERVICES: "Gilbert" Suit Moved to District of Arizona
-----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Donald Gilbert, Individually and
On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Kelly Services Incorporated, the Defendant, Case No. CV2017-
011800, was removed on Oct. 11, 2017 from the Maricopa County
Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona (Phoenix Division). The District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 2:17-cv-03684-DMF to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Magistrate Judge Deborah M Fine.

Kelly Services is a global leader in workforce management
solutions offering staffing services to top companies across a
variety of industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David James McGlothlin, Esq.
          HYDE & SWIGART
          2633 E Indian School Rd., Ste. 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 265 3332
          Facsimile: (602) 230 4482
          E-mail: david@westcoastlitigation.com

               - and -

          Ryan Lee McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP
          2633 E Indian School Rd., Ste. 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 900 1288
          E-mail: ryan@kazlg.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Gerald Leonard Maatman, Jr., Esq.
          Peter J Wozniak, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP - CHICAGO, IL
          233 S Wacker Dr., Ste. 8000
          Chicago, IL 60606-6448
          Telephone: (312) 460 5000
          Facsimile: (312) 460 7000
          E-mail: gmaatman@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Thomas Andrew Gilson, Esq.
          BEUS GILBERT PLLC
          701 N 44th St.
          Phoenix, AZ 85008
          Telephone: (480) 429 3000
          Facsimile: (480) 429 3100
          E-mail: tgilson@beusgilbert.com


KEYBANK NA: 11th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in "Larsen"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the appeals case captioned THOMAS LARSEN, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs, DAVID JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITIBANK FSB, et al.,
Defendants, KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant,
Nos. 15-10779, 10-12957 (11th Cir.), Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of KeyBank's motion to compel on grounds
of unconscionability and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to compel arbitration.

The underlying claims against KeyBank relate to a single checking
account that Johnson has held jointly with his wife since 2001
("Joint Account").  In substance, Johnson argues that KeyBank
improperly changed the sequence of debit card transactions from
the Joint Account in order to maximize overdraft fees charged to
the account.

Johnson filed a class-action suit in 2010 in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington.  The case was
transferred for pretrial purposes to a multidistrict proceeding
pending in the Southern District of Florida.  Johnson seeks to
litigate this dispute as a class action in federal court, while
KeyBank urges that Johnson's claims must be resolved through
individual arbitration.

It has been settled in this proceeding that, in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
Johnson has waived his right to arbitrate on a class basis.

Johnson first opened the checking account as an individual
customer in 1991, and he held the account individually for 10
years before converting it in 2001 to a joint account with his
wife.  Although Johnson recalls few of the details surrounding the
conversion of the individual account to the Joint Account, there
is no dispute that he and his wife visited a KeyBank branch on
Oct. 11, 2001, and signed a signature card ("2001 Signature Card")
to effectuate the conversion.  The 2001 Signature Card
characterizes the Joint Account as a "replacement" of Johnson's
preexisting individual account.  At the time, the governing
agreement was KeyBank's June 2, 1997, deposit account agreement
("1997 Agreement"), which contained an arbitration provision.

KeyBank has exercised this right of unilateral amendment several
times since October 2001, and the deposit account agreement
governing the Joint Account has evolved accordingly.  The current
version of the agreement dates to December 2009 ("2009
Agreement"). There are three features of the 2009 Agreement
relevant to this appeal: the 2009 Arbitration Provision and a
choice-of-law provision.

KeyBank maintains that Johnson affirmatively agreed to the 1997
Agreement when he signed the 2001 Signature Card.  As such,
KeyBank concludes, Johnson is unequivocally bound by the 2009
Arbitration Provision.  It further contests the district court's
conclusion that the 2009 Arbitration Provision is unenforceable
under applicable state law.

Notwithstanding his written attestation confirming he had received
the agreement, Johnson argues that no agreement to arbitrate
exists between himself and KeyBank.  In the alternative, he argues
that -- even if an agreement to arbitrate exists between the
parties -- such an agreement is unconscionable and illusory under
relevant state law.

KeyBank moved to compel arbitration in the district court on Aug.
22, 2014.  In its final analysis, the district court denied
KeyBank's motion to compel arbitration, finding that Washington
law governed the question of enforceability and that, under such
law, the provision was unconscionable.  KeyBank has appealed from
this order.

By providing uncontroverted evidence of Johnson's execution of the
2001 Signature Card, Judge Tjoflat concludes KeyBank has met its
burden of establishing that Johnson consented to the arbitration
provision incorporated by reference therein.  He says Johnson's
argument that he did not assent to the revised version of the
arbitration provision that appears in the 2009 Agreement -- the
very agreement on which his substantive claims are now based --
fails.  As the Judge demonstrates, Johnson's physical receipt of a
copy of the document at that time is not crucial to the Court's
finding that Johnson's signature on the 2001 Signature Card bound
him to the 1997 Agreement.  Thus, summary judgment is warranted.

After assessing the conscionability of the 2009 Arbitration
Provision, the Judge concludes that the 2009 Arbitration Provision
was not formed in a procedurally unconscionable manner under
either Washington or Ohio law.  That conclusion ends any challenge
by Johnson on the ground of unconscionability under Ohio law.  As
to Washington's requirement that an agreement can be struck if it
is only substantially unconscionable, he concludes that all but
one of the at-issue portions of the Provision are substantively
conscionable under Washington law, and he severs this one
unconscionable provision.

Finally, Judge Tjoflat concludes that because the commitment to
arbitrate is fixed and KeyBank is bound by the duty of good faith
and fair dealing in making alterations and providing appropriate
notice, the change-in-terms provision does not render the 2009
Arbitration Provision illusory under Washington or Ohio law.

For these reasons, Judge Tjoflat reversed the district court's
order to the extent described in the Opinion and remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/toMVEr from Leagle.com.

Alan Gary Kipnis -- agkipnis@arnstein.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Robert Cecil Gilbert -- gilbert@kolawyers.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

G. Franklin Lemond, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Edward Adam Webb -- Contact@WebbLLC.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Susan E. Trench -- setrench@arnstein.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Bruce Stephen Rogow, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John M. Cooney, for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian J. Meenaghan, for Defendant-Appellant.

Mary Schug Young -- myoung@blackwellburke.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Ronald E. Beard, for Defendant-Appellant.

Rudy Albert Englund, for Defendant-Appellant.


KIRSCHENBAUM & PHILLIPS: Faces "Lotufo" Suit in E.D. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kirschenbaum &
Phillips, P.C.  The case is styled as Kathleen A. Lotufo, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-05923
(E.D.N.Y., October 10, 2017).

Kirschenbaum and Phillips is a collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Gus Michael Farinella, Esq.
   Law Offices of Gus Michael Farinella P.C.
   110 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 100
   Floral Park, NY 11001
   Tel: (212) 675-6161
   Fax: (212) 675-4367
   Email: gmf@lawgmf.com


LA PLACITA: "Ramirez" Sues to Recover Overtime Pay
--------------------------------------------------
Gloria Ramirez, on behalf of herself and other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. La Placita Galleria L.L.C., G.C.P.
Telephone Cards LLC, and Emilda Bermudez, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-09292 (E.D. La., September 19, 2017), seeks overtime
compensation for hours rendered in excess of forty hours per work
week with corresponding liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's
fees and costs and expenses of the litigation, prejudgment
interest and any other further relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

La Placita Galleria and G.C.P. Telephone Cards operate 2 grocery
stores specializing in products from Latin America where Plaintiff
worked as a store clerk. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
      William H. Beaumont, Esq.
      Emily A. Westermeier, Esq.
      BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
      3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
      New Orleans, LA 70119
      Telephone: (504) 534-5005
      Facsimile: (504) 272-2956
      Email: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
             whb@beaumontcostales.com
             eaw@beaumontcostales.com


LA QUINTA: Detroit Retirement System Appeals Order in "Beisel"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit
filed an appeal from the District Court's memorandum and order
dated August 24, 2017, and the District Court's judgment dated
August 28, 2017, entered in the lawsuit titled Beisel, et al. v.
La Quinta Holdings Inc., et al., Case No. 16-cv-3068, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was brought on April 25, 2016, on behalf of purchasers of the
Company's common stock pursuant to the Company's March 24, 2015
secondary public offering and on behalf of purchasers of the
Company's common stock from November 19, 2014 through October 29,
2015.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that, in violation of
the federal securities laws, the registration statement and
prospectus filed in connection with the March Secondary Offering
contained materially false and misleading information or omissions
and that the Company as well as certain current and former
officers made false and misleading statements in earnings releases
and to analysts during the Class Period.

The appellate case is captioned as Beisel, et al. v. La Quinta
Holdings Inc., et al., Case No. 17-2941, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Police and Fire Retirement System of the City
of Detroit is represented by:

          Ira M. Press, Esq.
          KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP
          825 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 371-6600
          E-mail: ipress@kmllp.com

Defendants-Appellees La Quinta Holdings Inc., Keith A. Cline,
James H. Forson, Glenn Alba, Alan J. Bowers, Henry G. Cisneros,
Giovanni Cutaia, Brian Kim, Michael Nash, Mitesh B. Shah, Gary M.
Sumers and The Blackstone Group L.P. are represented by:

          Jonathan K. Youngwood, Esq.
          SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP
          425 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 455-2000
          Facsimile: (212) 455-2502
          E-mail: jyoungwood@stblaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Wayne B. Goldberg is represented by:

          William A. Brewer, III, Esq.
          BICKEL & BREWER
          4800 Comerica Bank Building
          1717 Main Street
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 653-4000
          Facsimile: (214) 653-1015
          E-mail: wab@bickelbrewer.com

               - and -

          Sarah Brooke Rogers, Esq.
          BREWER ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS
          750 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 489-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 751-2849
          E-mail: sbr@brewerattorneys.com

Defendants-Appellees J.P. Morgan Securities LLC and Morgan Stanley
& Co. LLC are represented by:

          A. Robert Pietrzak, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          787 7th Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 839-5300
          E-mail: rpietrzak@sidley.com


LG CHEM: Customers Await Lithium Ion Battery Settlement Payout
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lonnie Brown, writing for News Chief, reports that it's pretty
likely that you indirectly purchased a lithium-ion battery -- or
something containing one -- between Jan. 1, 2000, and May 31,
2011.  If you did, welcome to the lithium-ion class-action suit.

The long-simmering lawsuit alleges that several companies
conspired to fix prices of the battery cells, which are used in
everything from smartphones to tablets to cameras and power tools.

The defendants in the case include LG Chem Ltd. and LG Chem
America Inc.; Hitachi Maxell Ltd. and Maxell Corporation of
America; and NEC Corporation.

There is nearly $45 million in the settlement pool, but no
estimate on what the average individual settlement might be.  Or
when it might be paid out, although the suggested starting date is
sometime around March 2018.

As the lawyers in the case wrote: "This (payout) amount is not
known until all claims are received and the court approves the
final settlement.  Since the total settlement payout is a fixed
amount, the payment amount that you receive will be based on
several factors, including: The number of valid claims filed by
all claimants; AND the count of products purchased by all
claimants."

The lawyers did not mention that how big a slice they take out of
the cake will also affect the amount the "claimants" will receive.
A hearing on those fees is set for October.

Suffice it to say that over a decade, there were a LOT of
smartphones, tools, cameras and whatnot purchased that contained a
LOT of lithium-ion batteries.

In other words: Don't quit your day job.  I'm not sure you should
even start planning a cheap lunch somewhere.

Nonetheless, the place to apply is: www.reversethecharge.com.  The
last day to apply is about two months away -- Nov. 29.

You'll first be asked if you purchased any of the following items
(or replacement batteries for them): laptop, notebook or netbook
computers, mobile or smart phones, tablets, audio players, cameras
or camcorders or cordless power tools.

Next you'll be asked if the claim is personal or for a business.
Then how many batteries were purchased for which electronic items
during the period covered by the suit. Receipts are not required
at this point of the claim process.

The final part of the process requires name, email, and mobile
phone number.

The settlement brings the total amount of money to about $64
million.  Sony had already agreed to pay $19 million to companies
and businesses that purchased lithium-ion batteries directly from
the company.

Lawyers representing plaintiffs in the class-action suit noted
that the total monies lost through the alleged price-fixing
conspiracy was $367,192,699.  The total amount of the settlement
represents less than 20 cents on the dollar.

But lawyers noted that the settlement was "a valuable benefit that
will save time, reduce costs, and provide information, witnesses,
and documents that [investigators] might not otherwise be able to
access."

Perhaps that thought will make you feel a little better when your
settlement check arrives sometime next year. [GN]


LIFEBRITE LABORATORIES: "Van Voorn" Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cristina van Voorn, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Amber Fletcher, Christian Fletcher and
Lifebrite Laboratories, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03626
(D. Md., September 19, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, interest and such other legal and equitable
relief, recovery of attorneys' fees and costs to be paid by
Defendants, as provided under the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Van Voorn worked for the Fletchers as a nanny to their son. She
was terminated for failing to report to work on May 25, 2017. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     John T. Sparks, Esq.
     AUSTIN & SPARKS, P.C.
     2974 Lookout Place, N.E., Suite 200
     Atlanta, GA 30305
     Tel: (404) 869-0100
     Fax: (404) 869-200
     Email: jsparks@austinsparks.com



LOS ANGELES, CA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Willits" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Mark Willits, Communities Actively Living Independent
and Free, Judy Griffin and Brent Pilgreen filed an appeal from a
court ruling relating to their lawsuit styled Mark Willits, et al.
v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:10-cv-05782-CBM-MRW, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge
Consuelo Marshall approved last year a $1.4 billion settlement in
which Los Angeles agrees to fix broken sidewalks and crosswalks to
make them accessible to disabled people.  The lawsuit was brought
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Judge Marshall also awarded $11.7 million in legal fees and costs
to the class attorneys, resolving the class action brought by lead
plaintiff Mark Willits in 2010.

The appellate case is captioned as Mark Willits, et al. v. City of
Los Angeles, Case No. 17-56445, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 23, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2017;

   -- Appellants Communities Actively Living Independent and
      Free, Judy Griffin, Brent Pilgreen and Mark Willits'
      opening brief is due on January 2, 2018;

   -- Appellee City of Los Angeles' answering brief is due on
      January 29, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JUDY GRIFFIN, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated; MARK WILLITS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; COMMUNITIES ACTIVELY
LIVING INDEPENDENT AND FREE, ("Calif") on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated; and BRENT PILGREEN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Guy B. Wallace, Esq.
          Sarah Colby, Esq.
          Jennifer Uhrowczik, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: gwallace@schneiderwallace.com
                  scolby@schneiderwallace.com
                  juhrowczik@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Linda M. Dardarian, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835-1417
          E-mail: ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com

               - and -

          Jinny Kim, Esq.
          LEGAL AID AT WORK
          180 Montgomery Street, Suite 600
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 864-8848
          Facsimile: (415) 593-0096
          E-mail: jkim@las-elc.org

               - and -

          Anna Mercedes Rivera, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS LEGAL CENTER
          256 S. Occidental Blvd.
          Los Angeles, CA 90057
          Telephone: (213) 736-1496
          Facsimile: (213) 736-1428
          E-mail: Anna.Rivera@dlrcenter.org

Defendant-Appellee CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity, is
represented by:

          Kevin Gilbert, Esq.
          ORBACH, HUFF, SUAREZ & HENDERSON
          1901 Harrison Street, Suite 1630
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 999-7908
          E-mail: kgilbert@ohshlaw.com

               - and -

          Laurie Rittenberg, Esq.
          LOS ANGELES CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          200 North Main Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90012
          Telephone: (213) 473-6848
          Facsimile: (213) 473-6818
          E-mail: laurie.rittenberg@lacity.org


MARION COUNTY, IN: Appeals Order in "Washington" Suit to 7th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Marion County Prosecutor filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Leroy Washington v. Marion County
Prosecutor, Case No. 1:16-cv-02980-JMS-DML, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 1,
2017, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson (i) granted Mr. Washington's
Motion to Certify a Class, as modified; (ii) granted Mr.
Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment; (iii) permanently
enjoined the Defendants from enforcing Indiana Code Section 34-24-
1-1(a)(1) as read in conjunction with Indiana Code provisions of
the same chapter; (iv) denied the Defendants' Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment; and (v) denied as moot Mr. Washington's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction.

On Sept. 21, 2016, an officer of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department ("IMPD") stopped a car driven and owned by Mr.
Washington.  Mr. Washington was ultimately arrested and charged
with, among other offenses, dealing in marijuana.  The officer had
Mr. Washington's car towed and held for forfeiture pursuant to
Indiana Code Sections 34-24-1-1(a)(1) and 34-24-1-2(a)(1).  On
Nov. 1, 2016, Washington made a demand for the return of his
property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-3.  His car has
since been returned to him.

The appellate case is captioned as Leroy Washington v. Marion
County Prosecutor, Case No. 17-2933, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript information sheet was due October 3, 2017; and

   -- Fee or IFP forms were due on October 3, 2017, for Appellant
      Marion County Prosecutor.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee LEROY WASHINGTON, on his own behalf and on
behalf of a Class of those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jeffrey Richard Cardella, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JEFF CARDELLA, LLC
          333 N. Alabama Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 695-7700
          E-mail: JeffCardella@CardellaLawOffice.com

Defendant-Appellant MARION COUNTY PROSECUTOR is represented by:

          Matthew Richard Elliott, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          Indiana Government Center South
          302 W. Washington Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
          Telephone: (317) 234-4464


MDL 2670: Court Narrows Claims in Dismiss Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE: PACKAGED SEAFOOD PRODUCTS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, Case No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis
L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California granted in part and denied in part (i) the Joint
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all Plaintiffs' Complaints; (ii) the
Joint Defendants' their and Motion to Dismiss End Payer Plaintiffs
("EPPs") and Commercial Food Preparer Plaintiffs ("CFPs")'s state
law claims; and (ii) the StarKist Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(A) all Plaintiff's pre-2011 allegations and (B) all Plaintiffs'
alter ego and agency allegations against Dongwon.

The case concerns a conspiracy to fix the prices of packaged
seafood throughout the United States.  The Plaintiffs are
proceeding against the three largest domestic producers of
packaged seafood products and their parent corporations, and are
composed of four distinct groups: (i) the DAPs, who are direct
purchasers proceeding against the Defendants individually; (ii)
the DPPs, who are direct purchasers proceeding on behalf of a
putative class; (iii) the CFPs, who are indirect purchasers
proceeding on behalf of a putative class; and (iv) the EPPs, who
are indirect purchasers proceeding on behalf of a putative class.

The Defendants previously moved to dismiss all the Plaintiffs'
complaints, which the Court resolved by issuing two Orders
together granting in part and denying in part the Defendants'
requested relief.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have now filed
amended complaints and the Defendants have again moved to dismiss
various aspects of those complaints.

However, the factual footing has shifted since the Court issued
its prior Orders.  Whereas previously the U.S. Department of
Justice had merely convened a Grand Jury to investigate potential
violations of the Sherman Act in the packaged seafood industry,
there have now been multiple guilty pleas either entered or agreed
to pursuant to the Grand Jury investigation, including by senior
executives of the Bumble Bee Corp., and the Bumble Bee itself.

Furthermore, Tri-Union has confirmed to counsel for the Plaintiffs
that it has sought leniency from the DOJ for its participation in
the alleged conspiracy, and a former StarKist and Del Monte
executive, Stephen Hodge, has pled guilty to participating in the
same conspiracy.  Finally, a little over a month prior to the
Plaintiffs filing their amended complaints, they received
approximately 2,000,000 pages of documents that were previously
only available to the Grand Jury.  The ensuing Complaints
therefore contain much more information than their predecessors.

Although the instant Complaints largely share the same factual
material, they nonetheless vary such that -- at least in this
procedural posture -- a comprehensive account of the facts would
not here be appropriate.

The Defendants diverge slightly in the particular arguments they
advance.

Defendants StarKist Co., Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd., Bumble Bee
Foods, LLC, Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, Thai Union Group PCL, and Del
Monte Corp. ("Joint Defendants") move to dismiss (A) all
Plaintiffs' post-2013 conspiracy allegations; (B) all Plaintiffs'
claimed right to discovery regarding non-tuna products; (C) all
Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief; and (D) EPPs' and CFPs'
state-law (i) anti-trust, (ii) consumer protection, (iii) unjust
enrichment, and (iv) nationwide California class claims; along
with (v) claims in states where EPPs' named plaintiffs lack
Article III or statutory standing.

Separately, Defendants StarKist, Dongwon, and Del Monte ("StarKist
Defendants") additionally move to dismiss all the Plaintiffs' (A)
pre-2011 conspiracy allegations as insufficient to state a claim
regarding all the three Defendants ((i) StarKist and Del Monte,
and (ii) Dongwon), including allegations that any of the three
Defendants reached an agreement with competitors to reduce can
sizes, and time-barred as to StarKist; and (B) pre-2012
allegations against Dongwon, including under either (i) alter ego
or (ii) agency theories of liability.

Judge Sammartino finds the allegations are sufficient to support a
plausible inference that the Joint Defendants' conspiracy
continued post-2013.  Accordingly, he denied the Joint Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss on this ground.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' asserted right to
discovery regarding non-tuna products is improper and the Court
should strike such claims from the SACs.  Against the Plaintiffs'
assertions that they do "not seek inappropriate discovery," the
Judge cannot say that these few lines of the Plaintiffs'
complaints are immaterial or impertinent.  Accordingly, he denied
the Joint Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this ground.

Given the Plaintiffs' concessions that they are not seeking
injunctive relief at this time, Judge Sammartino denied the Joint
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this ground.  However, he ordered
that the DPPs will amend their Complaint to remove the
"inadvertent holdover" within 14 days of the date on which the
Order is electronically docketed.

As to the Joint Defendants's move to dismiss the EPPs' and the
CFPs' State-Law Claims, the Judge now mooted this argument given
the EPPs' concession that they seek only individual relief and the
Joint Defendants' withdrawal of their motion on this front.  To
the extent the Plaintiffs bring claims under Chapter 3 of the
South Carolina Code, he granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
such claims.

As to the Joint Defendants' move to dismiss the EPPs' (a) Illinois
and (b) Michigan consumer protections claims, and (c) CFPs' New
York consumer protection claims, Judge Sammartino dismissed the
EPPs' claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act and denied Joint Defendants' move to
dismiss EPPs' Michigan consumer protections claims.  Although the
CFPs disagree with the Defendants' arguments, they nonetheless
concede the claim and will rely on New York antitrust law for a
remedy.  Accordingly, the Judge granted the Joint Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss on this ground and dismissed the CFPs' New York
consumer protection claim.

As to the Defendants' move to dismiss EPPs' and the CFPs' unjust
enrichment claims under Florida, Illinois, Maine, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina law, Judge Sammartino granted the Joint
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss regarding the unopposed states and
dismissed the EPPs' and the CFPs' unjust enrichment claims under
Florida, Illinois, and Maine law.  The EPPs and the CFPs only
oppose the Joint Defendants' motion regarding Rhode Island and
South Carolina.

As the EPPs explicitly temporally define their Rhode Island class
claims as "between July 15, 2013 and the present," the Judge
denied as moot this aspect of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Since the Defendants' only support for their current Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' South Carolina unjust enrichment claims come
from cases construing South Carolina's antitrust, rather than
consumer protection, statute, he denied this aspect of the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Sammartino finds that the Joint Defendants have not shown
that the Plaintiffs' newly defined Cartwright Classes create
material differences between California and the relevant states'
laws.  And the Plaintiffs are correct that the question presently
before the Court regarding this issue is not the propriety of
class certification, but instead only whether the Plaintiffs have
stated a plausible Cartwright Class.  The Defendants have not met
their burden to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Cartwright Class claims at
this stage; accordingly, he denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
on this ground.

With respect to the Defendants' move to dismiss for lack of
Article III and/or statutory standing: (i) the New Mexico claims
brought by named Plaintiffs Vivek Dravid and Laura Montoya; and
(ii) the Tennessee clams brought by named Plaintiff John Peychal,
Judge Sammartino granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on
these grounds, dismisssed the aforementioned claims, and granted
the EPPs leave to file a corrected complaint as set forth in their
Opposition.

Because the StarKist Defendants nowhere argue that StarKist or Del
Monte affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to 2011,
Judge Sammartino denied this aspect of their Motion to Dismiss.
However, he dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs' pre-2008
claims.  Accordingly, and taken together, he granted in part and
denied in part this aspect of the StarKist Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.  Specifically, he dismissed without prejudice (i) all the
EPPs' pre-2009 claims against Dongwon and (ii) all other the
Plaintiffs' pre-2008 claims against Dongwon.

As to alter ego liability, the Judge granted the StarKist
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on this front as to the EPPs' and
CFPs' Complaints and denied their Motion to Dismiss on this front
regarding all other complaints.  As to agency liability, he agrees
with the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs have now alleged three key
points that establish the plausibility of Dongwon's vicarious
liability under an agency theory.

Accordingly, Judge Sammartino granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.  All dismissals are again
without prejudice.  All amended complaints will be filed within 14
days of the date on which the Order is electronically docketed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lYY2UO from Leagle.com.

Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc., Plaintiff, represented
by Bonny E. Sweeney -- bsweeney@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP.

Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc., Plaintiff, represented
by Christopher L. Lebsock -- clebsock@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld
LLP, Emily Catherine Aldridge -- ealdridge@bfalaw.com -- Bleichmar
Fonti & Auld LLP, Irving Scher -- ischer@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld
LLP, pro hac vice, Lesley E. Weaver -- lweaver@bfalaw.com --
Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP, Samantha Stein -- sstein@hausfeld.com
-- Hausfeld LLP & Michael Lehmann -- mlehmann@hausfeld.com --
Hausfeld LLP.

Beverly Youngblood, Plaintiff, represented by Susan Rogers
Schwaiger -- sschwaiger@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group, P.C.
& Whitney E. Street -- whitney@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton
LLP.

Pacific Groservice Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Barbara J. Hart
-- bhart@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Bonny E. Sweeney,
Hausfeld LLP, Mark I. Labaton -- hello@cypressllp.com -- Motley
Rice LLP & Sung-Min Lee -- SLee@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg,
P.C..

Capitol Hill Supermarket, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Davidow -
- Joel@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP, pro hac vice,
John H. Donboli, Del Mar Law Group, LLP, John Barton Goplerud,
Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., pro hac vice, Jonathan
W. Cuneo -- jonc@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, pro
hac vice, Maxwell M. Blecher -- mblecher@blechercollins.com --
Blecher and Collins, Michael James Flannery --
mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & Laduca LLP & Peter Gil-
Montllor -- pgil-montllor@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca
LLP.

Louise Ann Davis Matthews, Plaintiff, represented by Kimberly A.
Kralowec -- kkralowec@kraloweclaw.com -- The Kralowec Law Group.

James Walnum, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher T. Micheletti
-- cmicheletti@zelle.com -- Zelle LLP, Jiangxiao Athena Hou, Zelle
LLP & Judith A. Zahid -- jzahid@zelle.com -- Zelle LLP.

Colin Moore, Plaintiff, represented by Chad Saunders --
csaunders@kraloweclaw.com -- Sundeen Salinas & Pyle, Kathleen
Styles Rogers -- krogers@kraloweclaw.com -- The Kralowec Law Group
& Kimberly A. Kralowec, The Kralowec Law Group.

Jennifer A. Nelson, Plaintiff, represented by Betsy Carol Manifold
-- manifold@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz,
Brittany Nicole DeJong -- dejong@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Herz, Carl Malmstrom -- malmstrom@whafh.com --
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC, Fred T. Isquith, Jr. --
FIsquith@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP,
Michelle L. Kranz, Zoll & Kranz, LLC, Nancy A. Kulesa --
nkulesa@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rachele R. Rickert --
rickert@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz,
Theodore Bell, One South Dearborn St. & Thomas H. Burt --
burt@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz.

Elizabeth Davis-Berg, Plaintiff, represented by Betsy Carol
Manifold, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz, Brittany Nicole
DeJong, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Carl Malmstrom,
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC, Fred T. Isquith, Jr.,
Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Michelle L. Kranz, Zoll &
Kranz, LLC, Nancy A. Kulesa, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rachele R.
Rickert, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz, Theodore Bell,
One South Dearborn St. & Thomas H. Burt, Wolf Haldenstein Adler
Freeman and Herz.

Bumble Bee Foods LLC, Defendant, represented by Kenneth A. Gallo -
- kgallo@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, Michelle Parikh -- mparikh@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP & William Baly Michael --
wmichael@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP.

Tri-Union Seafoods LLC, Defendant, represented by Erik Raven-
Hansen -- erik.raven-hansen@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP,
pro hac vice, John Roberti -- john.roberti@allenovery.com -- Allen
& Overy LLP, pro hac vice, John Terzaken, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Keith R. Solar, Buchanan Ingersoll &
Rooney LLP, William E. White -- william.white@allenovery.com --
Allen & Overy LLP & Robert J. Parks, Parks & Solar LLP.

Starkist Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Lee --
andrew.j.lee@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, J. Robert
Robertson -- robby.robertson@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US
LLP, Justin W. Bernick -- justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP & Jeffrey Michael Goldman -- goldmanj@pepperlaw.com
-- Pepper Hamilton LLP.

Tri Marine International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Shylah
Renee Alfonso -- SAlfonso@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, pro
hac vice.

King Oscar, Inc., Defendant, represented by Erik Raven-Hansen --
erik.raven-hansen@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP, pro hac
vice, John Roberti -- john.roberti@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy
LLP, pro hac vice, John Terzaken -- john.terzaken@stblaw.com --
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Keith R. Solar,
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney LLP, William E. White --
william.white@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP & Robert J.
Parks, Parks & Solar LLP.

Del Monte Foods Company, Defendant, represented by Barak Bassman -
- bassmanb@pepperlaw.com -- pro hac vice, Barbara Sicalides --
sicalidesb@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey Michael Goldman, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Barak Bassman, pro
hac

vice, Barbara Sicalides, Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey Michael Goldman, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Barak Bassman, pro
hac vice, Barbara Sicalides, Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice &
Jeffrey Michael Goldman, Pepper Hamilton LLP.

Thai Union Group Public Company, Defendant, represented by Robert
J. Parks, Parks & Solar LLP.

Thai Union Group Public Company, Ltd., Defendant, represented by
Robert J. Parks, Parks & Solar LLP & Robert J. Parks, Parks &
Solar LLP.

Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Andrew J.
Lee, Hogan Lovells US LLP, J. Robert Robertson, HOGAN LOVELLS US
LLP, Justin W. Bernick, Hogan Lovells US LLP & Jeffrey Michael
Goldman, Pepper Hamilton LLP.

Del Monte Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Michael
Goldman, Pepper Hamilton LLP.


MICHAELS STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Employee Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Adjudication in the
case captioned LAUREL ROWE, Plaintiff, v. MICHAELS STORES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 5:15-cv-01592-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

Michaels moves for summary adjudication as to all claims except
claims 3 (relating to rest breaks) and 4 (relating to meal
periods) to the extent those claims are based on unpaid wages.

Plaintiff Laurel Rowe (Rowe) initiated this putative class action
against her former employer, Michaels, for various California
Labor Code violations including failure to pay minimum wages and
overtime, failure to provide rest breaks and meal periods, failure
to provide accurate wage statements, and failure to pay all wages
owed upon termination. Rowe also asserts claims for penalties
pursuant to Labor Code Section 558, remedies under California's
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, and for unlawful
competition in violation of Business and Professions Code Sections
17200.

Alleged Spoliation of Evidence

Rowe requests that the Court draw an adverse inference against
Michaels as a sanction for alleged spoliation of evidence,
specifically edit sheets. According to former Michaels employee
Vincent Ruvalcaba (Ruvalcaba), he was asked to send copies of time
and edit sheets from the Gilroy store to Michaels' corporate
office. When he retrieved them from the store, he noticed that
many of the edit sheets were missing, and that others were
noticeably altered.

Spoliation refers to the destruction or material alteration of
evidence or to the failure to preserve properly for another's use
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The
Second Circuit's test provides that a party seeking an adverse
inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must
establish: (1) that the party having control over the evidence had
an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2)
that the records were destroyed 'with a culpable state of mind';
and (3) that the evidence was 'relevant' to the party's claim or
defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it
would support that claim or defense.

Ruvalcaba's declaration and testimony are too vague to establish
destruction of evidence. The three or four edit sheets that have
been cut and taped, which were produced during discovery, do not
appear to have been materially altered because the data is
unobscured. Further, Ruvalcaba's declaration and testimony are
insufficient to satisfy the Second Circuit's three-part test: it
is unclear when the edit sheets allegedly went missing or were
altered; there is no evidence from which to infer Michaels had a
culpable state of mind; and Rowe has not demonstrated the
relevance of the allegedly missing or altered edit sheets.

Accordingly, Rowe's request for the imposition of a sanction
against Michaels for the alleged spoliation of evidence is denied.

Evidentiary Objections

Rowe's evidentiary objections to the declaration of former
Michaels employee Eden Portugal (Portugal) are overruled. Portugal
is the store manager for the Michaels store in Gilroy. Her
description of Michaels' time keeping policies is admissible
pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 602.

Rowe's evidentiary objections to the declaration of Michaels'
counsel, Jeremy Bollinger, summarizing the contents of edit sheets
are overruled. The edit sheets, which were submitted by Michaels'
Vice President of Field Human Resources, Doug Marker, are
admissible business records pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803. Summary
evidence prepared by counsel is admissible pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.Evid. 1006.

Moreover, Rowe's evidentiary objections are, in part, inconsistent
with Rowe's Separate Statement of Facts, in which Rowe designates
as undisputed facts set forth in Bollinger Declaration. Rowe's
evidentiary objection to Bollinger Declaration, regarding Rowe's
letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency is also
overruled; Rowe submitted the same letter for the court's
consideration.

Rowe's First And Second Causes of Action for Unpaid Wages

Michaels' written policy also explicitly instructed employees to
follow meal and rest breaks per state law.  Michaels' written
policy also explicitly warned that working unauthorized overtime
is not permitted. Michaels also instructed employees to notify
their supervisor or Human Resources Representative if an employee
suspected time clock/sheet fraud. Rowe understood these written
policies, and indeed at times was responsible for making sure
other employees clocked in when they were working, and took proper
meal and rest breaks consistent with Michaels' written policies.
Further, Rowe concedes that no Michaels employee ever told her to
miss her break. Rowe also acknowledges that no Michaels employee
ever criticized or disciplined her, or any other employees, for
working overtime. Thus, there is no evidence to show that the
Gilroy store adopted, encouraged, or enforced any practice
inconsistent with Michaels' written policy.

Instead, the evidence shows that certain managers filled in
missing punches, based upon either the employee's scheduled shift
or the employee's verification of time worked, in order to run
payroll. In the absence of any proof that Michaels had actual or
constructive knowledge of Rowe's off-the-clock work, Michaels is
entitled to summary adjudication as to Rowe's first and second
causes of action.

Rowe's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action

Section 226(a) requires employers to provide accurate itemized
statements of wages to their employees that contain certain
statutorily mandated information. An employer is only liable for
damages as a result of failing to furnish conforming wage
statements, however, to employees that suffer injury as a result
of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with
Section 226. Cal. Labor Code Section 226(e).

Therefore, a plaintiff seeking damages under Section 226 must
establish (1) that a defendant's wage statement violated one of
the enumerated requirements in section 226(a), (2) that the
violation was knowing and intentional, and (3) a resulting injury.
Rowe has not presented evidence to show that any of her time
records were inaccurate, except for one time shift. Furthermore,
there is insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
find that Michaels knowingly and intentionally violated Section
226. Instead, the evidence shows that Michaels' managers attempted
to ensure the accuracy of time punches.  Accordingly, Michaels is
entitled to summary adjudication on the fifth cause of action to
the extent it is based on unpaid wages.

Rowe's Eighth Cause of Action for Remedies under Labor Code
Section 2698

It is plainly evident that the reference to Pest Control
Technicians is a typographical error, and that the substance of
Rowe's written notice to the LWDA otherwise accurately identifies
the parties and include the factual and legal bases for the claims
in this lawsuit. Moreover, Rowe submitted a draft of her state
court complaint with her written notice, which clearly identified
the parties and the factual and legal bases of her claims.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Michaels' assertion that Rowe
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Defendant Michaels' motion for summary adjudication on Rowe's
Eighth Cause of Action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is denied.

Michaels' motion for summary adjudication is granted as to the
following claims: First Cause of Action for failure to pay unpaid
minimum wages; Second Cause of Action for unpaid overtime wages;
Fifth Cause of Action for inaccurate pay statements to the extent
it is based on unpaid wages; Sixth Cause of Action for Labor Code
Section 203 penalties to the extent it is based on unpaid wages;
Seventh Cause of Action; Eighth Cause of Action for remedies under
the Private Attorneys General Act to the extent it is based on
unpaid wages; and Ninth Cause of Action for violation of
California's Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq.
to the extent it is based on unpaid wages.

Because the Court's rulings on Michaels' motion for summary
adjudication may have a substantial impact on class certification
issues, Rowe's pending motion for class certification is denied
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017, Order
is Available at http://tinyurl.com/y9kpj8kafrom Leagle.com.

Laurel Rowe, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon, Law
Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., 324 S Beverly Blvd, Suite
725Beverly Hills, CA 90212

Laurel Rowe, Plaintiff, represented by Todd Michael Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. &
Adrian Bacon, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.

Michaels Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jonathan Sage
Christie -- christiej@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld LLP & Gregory William Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.


MIKE ROSE'S: "Lipinsky" Suit Seeks Recovery of Illegal Deductions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gregory Lipinsky, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Mike Rose's Auto Body, Inc., and
Does l to 25, Defendants, Case No. RG17875933, (Cal. Super.,
September 19, 2017), seeks to recover reimbursements of all
expenses and losses, waiting time penalties and damages resulting
from failure to provide itemized wages statements pursuant to the
California Labor Code and Unlawful Business Practices provisions
of the Business and Professions Code.

Plaintiff alleges that Mike's Auto uniformly deducts expenses,
costs and overhead items including a "detail labor deduction"
often in the amount of $125 and other fees and costs from the
wages of its employees. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      James Farinaro, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JAMES F ARINARO
      852 East 14th Street
      San Leandro, CA 94577
      Telephone: (510) 553-1200
      Email: jfarinaro@aol.com


MILESTONE MANGAGEMENT: "Dingler" Suit Transferred to N.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Joseph Dingler, the Plaintiff, v.
Milestone Management; Kelly Jackson; Rivervista, LLC; Angela
Smith; Fowler Hein Cheatwood & Williams PA; J. Mike Williams;
Allan Didier; Fulton County GA Commission; Jeffrey Frazier; Fulton
County Magistrate Court; and Ken Paxton, Texas Attorney General,
the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-02722, was transferred on Oct.
11, 2017 from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia (Atlanta). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:17-cv-03992-AT to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Amy Totenberg.

Milestone Management is one of the largest residential property
management companies in the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


MILLENNIUM PRODUCTS: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in "Retta" Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Patrick S. Sweeney filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Jonathan Retta, et al. v. Millennium
Products, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-01801-PSG-AJW, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Jonathan Retta, et al. v.
Millennium Products, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-56412, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 5,
2017, the District Court has given final approval to an $8.25
million deal struck among consumers, Whole Foods and a kombucha
beverage maker in a mislabeling suit over the product's
antioxidant, alcohol and sugar content, overruling objections to
approximately $2 million in attorneys' fees.

U.S. District Judge Philip S. Gutierrez on August 22 granted
motions for final approval of the class action settlement agreed
to by consumers led by Jonathan Retta in their suit against Whole
Foods Market Inc. and GT's Kombucha maker Millennium Products
Inc., saying that only four out of 173,000 class members objected
to the terms of the settlement that awards $2.063 million in
attorneys' fees and $18,121 in costs.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 13, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 13, 2017;

   -- Appellant Patrick S. Sweeney's opening brief is due on
      December 22, 2017;

   -- Appellees George Thomas Dave, Roseline Lewis, Jessica
      Manire, Millennium Products, Inc., Nina Pedro, Jonathan
      Retta, Kirsten Schofield and Whole Foods Market, Inc.'s
      answering brief is due on January 22, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant Patrick S. Sweeney, of Madison, Wisconsin,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees JONATHAN RETTA, KIRSTEN SCHOFIELD and JESSICA
MANIRE, on Behalf of Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated,
are represented by:

          Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Yeremey O. Krivoshey, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 N. California Boulevard, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: ltimothy@bursor.com
                  ykrivoshey@bursor.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees NINA PEDRO and ROSELINE LEWIS are represented
by:

          Shehnaz M. Bhujwala, Esq.
          KHORRAMI BOUCHER, LLP
          444 S. Flower Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 596-6000
          E-mail: bhujwala@boucher.la

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, PA
          201 North Franklin Street
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com

Plaintiff-Appellee ROSELINE LEWIS is represented by:

          Clayeo Arnold, Esq.
          ARNOLD LAW FIRM
          865 Howe Avenue, Suite 300
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Telephone: (916) 777-7777
          Facsimile: (916) 924-1829
          E-mail: clay@justice4you.com

Defendant-Appellee MILLENNIUM PRODUCTS, INC., is represented by:

          Scott Voelz, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-6000
          Facsimile: (213) 430-6407
          E-mail: svoelz@omm.com

Defendant-Appellee WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC., is represented by:

          David A. Crane, Esq.
          James Mitchell Lee, Esq.
          LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue, 14th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 612-8900
          Facsimile: (213) 612-3773
          E-mail: david.crane@ltlattorneys.com
                  james.lee@ltlattorneys.com


MISSION, KS: Class Action Seeks Refund of Illegal Driveway Tax
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lynn Horsley, writing for The Kansas City Star, reports that a
class action petition has been filed, seeking to compel the city
of Mission to repay all the people who paid the transportation
utility fee, better known as the "driveway tax," that the Kansas
Supreme Court ruled was illegal.

The petition was filed Sept. 29 in Johnson County District Court
on behalf of Mission resident Rex Danley, but also seeking class-
action status for everyone who paid the transportation-utility fee
between 2010 and 2015.

The Kansas Court of Appeals ruled in July 2015 that the fee
imposed on developed property in the city was actually an illegal
excise tax, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed that ruling in
April.

The city of Mission collected nearly $4 million during the years
it imposed the tax, and the petition seeks an order requiring the
city to refund that money, plus interest and attorneys' fees.  It
says a class action petition is justified because "the prosecution
of separate actions by individual members of the class would
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications."

"They (taxpayers) want their money back," said White Goss lawyer
Jim Bowers -- jbowers@whitegoss.com -- one of the attorneys who
brought the original challenge to the tax in 2012.  "It was an
illegal tax. They shouldn't have been required to pay it. It's
time they get it back."

Mary Jo Shaney, another White Goss lawyer who also brought the
original lawsuit, said the latest class action petition "in the
most basic terms is an action on behalf of all those who paid that
fee that's now been determined to have been paid illegally."

The plaintiffs are represented by the White Goss and Edgar law
firms of Kansas City.

City Administrator Laura Smith said Mission city officials had not
yet seen the petition and had no comment.

Generally, fees are charged for a service provided that people can
decline or accept.  A tax is an involuntary cost on a property
owner to raise city money.  The Supreme Court ruled in April that
the fee was actually a prohibited excise tax and void under Kansas
law.

The fee was originally passed by the Mission City Council in 2010,
with about $800,000 assessed per year on property owners to raise
money to keep up the suburb's streets.  The "driveway tax" was
intended to collect the most money from properties that put the
most burden on city streets.  Property owners paid assessments
ranging from $72 for single-family homes to more than $16,000 for
certain commercial properties.

But it was controversial from the start, and Kansas Attorney
General Derek Schmidt wrote a nonbinding legal opinion in 2012
finding it illegal.

Mr. Bowers and Ms. Shaney filed a lawsuit in 2012 on behalf of 11
plaintiffs, led by the Heartland Apartment Association,
challenging the costs imposed.  A Johnson County District Court
judge upheld the fee in 2013 but that ruling was overturned on
appeal.

The class action petition notes that the 11 original plaintiffs
are currently back in court in Johnson County, seeking a ruling
that the city should refund their payments.  That case is pending,
Ms. Shaney said. [GN]


MJJ INC: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Peterson" Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Nicholas Peterson, Jena B. Danson and Cali Fitzgerald
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Nicholas
Peterson v. M.J.J., Inc., Case No. 1:16-cv-03629-JKB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore.

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Nicholas Peterson v. M.J.J.,
Inc., Case No. 17-2088, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.

Other Plaintiffs are JANE LYNN HUBE, RYAN SCHOCHET, ERICA LYNN
BLUNT, ROBYN SLACK, CLAUDIA CHAPPELLE and JEFFREY STREET.

The Defendants-Appellees are M.J.J., INC., trading as The Suburban
House, and MARK HOROWITZ.

Defendant Mark Horowitz, Esq., appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants NICHOLAS PETERSON, JENA B. DANSON and CALI
FITZGERALD, On Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated,
are represented by:

          Howard Benjamin Hoffman, Esq.
          HOWARD B. HOFFMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          600 Jefferson Plaza
          Rockville, MD 20852-0000
          Telephone: (301) 251-3752
          Facsimile: (301) 251-3753
          E-mail: HHoffman@hoholaw.com


MUGSHOTS.COM: Court Narrows Claims in "Gabiola" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss  the case
captioned PETER GABIOLA, ANTONIO HAMMOND, and JIMMY THOMPSON, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. SAHAR SARID, individually and a/k/a "Michael
Robertson," THOMAS KEESEE, MARC GARY EPSTEIN, MUGSHOTS.COM, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, UNPUBLISH, LLC, a Florida
Limited Liability Company, UNPUBLISH, LLC, a Wyoming Limited
Liability Company, HAMMERMILL & MASTERSON LLC d/b/a
"Unpublisharrest.com," "Mugshots.com," and
"unpublishingpartners.com," a Wyoming Limited Liability Company,
HAMMERMILL & MASTERSON LLC d/b/a "Unpublisharrest.com,"
"Mugshots.com," and "unpublishingpartners.com," a Florida Limited
Liability Company, Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-02076 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs filed a nine-count First Amended Complaint,
alleging claims under federal, Illinois, and Florida law for
violations of their right of publicity, consumer fraud, fair
credit reporting, and extortion.

The nine-count First Amended Complaint alleges: (1) Count I on
behalf of Gabiola for violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity
Act; (2) Count II on behalf of Gabiola and Hammond for violations
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act ("ICFA"); (3) Count III on
behalf of Gabiola and Hammond for violations of the Illinois
Mugshots Act; (4) Count IV on behalf of Gabiola and Thompson for
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"); (5) Count V on behalf of all the Plaintiffs for
violations of the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"); (6)
Count VI on behalf of all the Plaintiffs for violations of the
disclosure provisions of the FCRA; (7) Count VII on behalf of
Thompson and Gabiola for violations of the accuracy requirements
of the FCRA; (8) Count VIII on behalf of Thompson for violations
of the Florida Right of Publicity Act ("FRPA"); (9) Count IX on
behalf of Thompson for violations of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA").

Mugshots.com provides online reputation management services.  It
removes unwanted mugshots and negative information online for
clients.

Defendant Sarid is the owner of the websites at issue,
"Mugshots.com" and "Unpublisharrest.com."  Defendant Epstein is a
Florida resident and was sole manager or member of the Unpublish,
LLC.  Epstein is also the alleged owner of Unpublish, LLC.
Defendant Hammermill owned or controlled Unpublish, LLC.
Defendant Keesee is the sole member and manager of Hammermill &
Masterson which allegedly operates the Mugshots.com website.
Several non-party companies formed by Sarid are listed as owners
of Mugshots.com on the website.

The complaint alleges on information and belief that one or more
of the LLC Defendants are alter egos of the individual Defendants
with no independent assets, offices, or employees.  Sarid and
Keesee operate Mugshots.com, Unpublisharrest.com, and
Unpublishingpartners.com from Florida.  The complaint alleges that
the websites are a single enterprise.  The complaint alleges that
Sarid orchestrated a fake sale of the website to a fabricated
individual named "Michael Robertson" to conceal his ownership of
the website.

When Gabiola completed his sentence, the Illinois Department of
Corrections removed Gabiola from its public website.  Gabiola
alleges that the Mugshots.com profile was last updated on Oct. 11,
2013, but it does not state that he had completed his sentence
prior to that date.  Gabiola alleges that he lost his job after
co-workers found the Mugshots.com profile.  He further alleges
that he has had other offers of employment rescinded based on
prospective employers seeing the Mugshots.com profile.  On Oct.
10, 2014, when Gabiola called the Unpublish arrest, the telephone
representative informed him that removing the two images from the
Mugshots.com website would cost $2,000 plus a representation fee.
Removal of the entire profile would be $15,000 and a
representation fee.  The representative further stated that
payment did not guarantee removal of the profile.

Plaintiff Hammond has five arrest pages on Mugshots.com.  Some or
all the information posted on Mugshots.com about Hammond's
criminal history is inaccurate.  He claims that he is unable to
obtain long-term employment due to the profiles on Mugshots.com.
His financial situation prevents him from paying for the removal
service offered by Unpublisharrest.com.

Plaintiff Thompson learned in September 2012 that a record from
his false arrest for check fraud appears on Mugshots.com.
Thompson's arrest record was posted after the charges were
dismissed but does not state that he was erroneously arrested.
Thompson called Unpublisharrest.com to request removal and was
informed that it would cost $399 for removal or correction of the
report.  He further alleges that he has applied for, and been
rejected from, approximately forty jobs between September 2012 and
the beginning of 2016.

Defendants, Keesee, Epstein, and Hammermill & Masterson filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim.  Defendant Sarid, joined in the Defendants'
motion and separately filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Defendant Sarid argues that Thompson's claims under Florida law
are time-barred.  The statute of limitations for claims under both
the FRPA and the FDUTPA is four years.  The Plaintiffs argue that
Judge Coleman should overlook the admission and find that because
Sarid allegedly concealed the identity of the website's owner to
avoid suit that he is equitably estopped from raising this defense
now.

These allegations arguably allow for equitable tolling.  Sarid's
motion is denied without prejudice on this point.  The Plaintiff
is cautioned to plead and argue carefully.

The Defendants contend that the First Amendment provides a
complete defense to all claims in this suit.  The Plaintiffs
assert that the Defendants' use of their mugshots and arrest
records is commercial speech that does warrant First Amendment
protection.  The Judge finds that the mugshots themselves are
advertisements for the removal service, which is the far more
lucrative enterprise.  Accordingly, she is unpersuaded that the
websites at issue are entitled to complete protection of the First
Amendment as a matter of law.

Judge Coleman then turns to the legal sufficiency of the claims in
the First Amended Complaint.  The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs' claims under Illinois and Florida Right to Publicity
statutes fail as a matter of law because defendants do not need
permission or authorization to republish matters contained in a
public record.  She says finds that it is not advertising use in
the traditional sense, but Mugshots.com promotes itself with the
Plaintiffs' likenesses (and others), by using the embarrassing
nature of an arrest to promote the website, draw consumers, and if
it is their photo or likeness, provide an easy link to removal for
a fee.  The Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the state right
of publicity statutes.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs fail to state
consumer fraud claims under the ICFA and the FDUTPA because the
Plaintiffs fail to allege actual damages.  The Judge agrees with
the State of Illinois as intervenor that the Defendants' use of
the Plaintiffs' criminal record information places the Plaintiffs'
in the position of choosing to pay removal fees or suffer ongoing
reputational losses causing financial hardship by limiting
employment opportunities.  Thus, she finds
that the Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim under the
Mugshots Act.

With respect to Thompson's claim under the FDUTPA, the Defendants
also argue that he must have suffered "actual damages" to recover
under the Act.  It is clear that Thompson cannot recover actual
damages to compensate for a pecuniary loss under Florida law
because he did not pay for removal.  But Thompson alleges the he
applied for over 40 jobs between 2012 and 2016 and was rejected
from each.  Thus, Judge Coleman finds that Thompson has
sufficiently alleged that he is an aggrieved person.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violate several
requirements of the FCRA.  They assert that the information
published on Mugshots.com qualifies as a "consumer report" as it
is defined in the FCRA.  Judge Coleman disagrees.  The plain
language of the statutory definition does not contemplate charging
a fee for the removal of a public record report provided for free
online.  The allegations in the complaint do not support a
conclusion that the Defendants fit the definition of a "consumer
reporting agency" in the manner in which the Plaintiffs allege the
Defendants monetize their arrest records.

Lastly, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' RICO claims fail
as a matter of law because RICO only covers pre-publication
extortion and threats, and the Plaintiffs must have suffered a
concrete financial loss proximately caused by the Defendants'
actions.  The Judge finds that while potentially embarrassing,
they are public records protected by the First Amendment and the
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully challenge the Defendants' ability
to re-publish truthful arrest records.  The allegations claim that
the Defendants are essentially threatening not to remove them
unless they pay a fee, which they have refused to do.  Those
allegations simply do not fit the parameters of either statute.
Accordingly, she dismissed Count IV alleging violations of RICO.

Based on these, Judge Coleman granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' motions to dismiss.  The motions are granted on
Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, and denied on Counts I, III, VIII, and
IX.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/raEjKa from Leagle.com.

Peter Gabiola, Plaintiff, represented by Berton N. Ring --
bring@bnrpc.com -- Law Offices of Berton N. Ring.

Peter Gabiola, Plaintiff, represented by Stuart Montgomery Clarke
-- sclarke@bnrpc.com -- Berton N. Ring, P.C..

Antonio Hammond, Plaintiff, represented by Berton N. Ring, Law
Offices of Berton N. Ring & Stuart Montgomery Clarke, Berton N.
Ring, P.C..

Jimmy Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Berton N. Ring, Law
Offices of Berton N. Ring.

Thomas Keesee, Defendant, represented by Adam Daniel Grant,
Dickinson Wright Pllc, Andrew J. Foreman --
aforeman@butlerrubin.com -- Butler Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP,
David N. Ferrucci -- dferrucci@dickinsonwright.com -- Dickinson
Wright PLLC, pro hac vice, Emily G. Rottier, Butler, Rubin,
Saltarelli & Boyd LLP & Michael A. Stick -- mstick@butlerrubin.com
-- Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd LLP.

Hammermill & Masterson LLC, Defendant, represented by Adam Daniel
Grant, Dickinson Wright Pllc, Andrew J. Foreman, Butler Rubin
Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, David N. Ferrucci, Dickinson Wright PLLC,
pro hac vice, Emily G. Rottier, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd
LLP, Michael A. Stick, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, David
N. Ferrucci, Dickinson Wright PLLC, pro hac vice & Michael A.
Stick, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd LLP.

Marc Gary Epstein, Defendant, represented by Adam Daniel Grant,
Dickinson Wright Pllc, Andrew J. Foreman, Butler Rubin Saltarelli
&

Boyd LLP, David N. Ferrucci, Dickinson Wright PLLC, pro hac vice,
Emily G. Rottier, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd LLP & Michael
A. Stick, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd LLP.

Sahar Sarid, Defendant, represented by Adam Daniel Grant,
Dickinson Wright Pllc, Andrew J. Foreman, Butler Rubin Saltarelli
& Boyd LLP & Michael A. Stick, Butler, Rubin, Saltarelli & Boyd
LLP.

Illinois Attorney General, Intervenor, represented by Richard
Scott Huszagh, Office of the Attorney General, Christopher Graham
Wells, Office of the Illinois Attorney General & John P.
Wolfsmith, Office of the Attorney General.

United States of America, Intervenor, represented by Alexander
Vladimir Sverdlov, United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division & Linda A. Wawzenski, United States Attorney's Office.


NATIONAL CONFERENCE: Faces "Alston" Suit in E.D. of Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The National
Conference of Bar Examiners.  The case is styled as Alson Alston
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The National
Conference of Bar Examiners, The Pennsylvania Board of Law
Examiners, The New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners, Hon. Rebecca
White Berch Chair of the National Conference of Bar Examiners, Mr.
C. Robert Keenan, III Esq., Chair of the Pennsylvania Board of Law
Examiners and Mr. Elizabeth Wheeler Esq., Chair of the New Jersey
Board of Bar Examiners, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04506-GAM
(E.D. Penn., October 10, 2017).

National Conference of Bar Examiners operates as a non-profit
organization. The Organization provides guidance in instituting
uniform practices and standards for bar examinations. National
Conference of Bar Examiners conducts its business in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Buffalo Jills
----------------------------------------------------------------
WGRZ.com reports that another victory in the courtroom for former
Buffalo Jills in their continuing lawsuit against the NFL and the
Buffalo Bills.

The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
has upheld a 2016 decision by Erie Co. State Supreme Court Judge
Timothy Drury validating the ex-cheerleaders' lawsuit as a class
action suit.

The ruling comes in response to an appeal filed by the Bills,
Cumulus Radio Company (formerly Citadel Broadcasting), and the NFL
seeking to overturn Judge Drury's decision.

Ex-members of the Buffalo Jills, the football team's cheerleading
squad, filed a lawsuit against the Bills back in 2014 accusing the
team and its contractors of paying less than minimum wage and
requiring the cheerleaders to work various public appearances for
free.

The suit alleges some Jills -- who were considered to be
independent contractors -- were subjected to sexual harassment at
events and that members of the squad were provided with detailed
instructions on proper hygiene and how to behave in public.

While the cheerleader actions against all other teams have been
resolved, the Buffalo Jills action continues.

Last May, the Jills won a decision confirming their status as
employees, allowing them to recover wages at their regular hourly
rate of $35 an hour, or at least the minimum wage for the work
between the years 2008-2014. [GN]


NATIONAL HOCKEY: Judge Susan Nelson Presides Over Concussion MDL
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sports Business Journal reports that Susan Richard Nelson U.S.
District Judge, District of Minnesota Nelson is presiding over a
multidistrict class-action lawsuit brought against the NHL by more
than 150 former players who allege that the league mishandled
their concussions and safety. [GN]


NATIONAL MILK: Andrews Appeals "Edwards" Suit Ruling to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Christopher Andrews filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from a court ruling relating to the
lawsuit styled Matthew Edwards, et al. v. National Milk Producers
Federation, et al., Case Nos. 4:11-cv-04766-JSW, 4:11-cv-04791-JSW
and 4:11-cv-05253-JSW, pending before the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, other
objectors have also filed appeals.

Lead Plaintiff Matthew Edwards sued a cadre of dairy giants,
including Land O' Lakes, the National Milk Producers Federation,
Dairy Farmers of America and Agri-Mark, in Federal Court in
September 2011.  The dairy producers were accused of conspiring to
prematurely slaughter more than 500,000 cows between 2003 and 2010
to limit the production of raw milk and drive up prices for
yogurt, sour cream and other dairy products.

The appellate case is captioned as Matthew Edwards, et al. v.
National Milk Producers Federation, et al., Case No. 17-16924, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 20, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2017;

   -- Appellant Christopher Andrews' opening brief is due on
      January 2, 2018;

   -- Appellees Agrimark, Inc., Mary Anderson, Boys and Girls
      Club of the East Valley, Jennifer Clites, Scott Cook, Lori
      Curtis, Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., Dairylea
      Cooperative Inc., Kathleen Davis, Matthew Edwards, Julie
      Ewald, Sheila Jackson, Land O'Lakes, Inc., John Murray,
      National Milk Producers Federation, Kory Pentland, John
      Peychal, Jonathan Rizzo, Jeffrey Robb, Brandon Steele, Paul
      Thacker, Danell Tomasella and Scott Weber's answering brief
      is due on February 2, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant Christopher Andrews, of Livonia, Michigan,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees MATTHEW EDWARDS, DANELL TOMASELLA, JEFFREY
ROBB, BOYS AND GIRLS CLUB OF THE EAST VALLEY, SCOTT COOK, KORY
PENTLAND, MARY ANDERSON, JULIE EWALD, SCOTT WEBER, JENNIFER
CLITES, JOHN MURRAY, JONATHAN RIZZO, PAUL THACKER, LORI CURTIS,
SHEILA JACKSON, JOHN PEYCHAL, KATHLEEN DAVIS and BRANDON STEELE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Steven Nathan Berk, Esq.
          BERK LAW PLLC
          2002 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 232-7550
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: steven@berklawdc.com

               - and -

          Steve Berman, Esq.
          Craig R. Spiegel, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1918 Eighth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  craigs@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Elaine T. Byszewski, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          301 North Lake Avenue, Suite 920
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (213) 330-7150
          E-mail: elaine@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Jeff D. Friedman, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          715 Hearst Ave.
          Berkeley, CA 94710
          Telephone: (510) 725-3000
          E-mail: jefff@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Jason Scott Kilene, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339-6622
          E-mail: jkilene@gustafsongluek.com

Defendant-Appellee NATIONAL MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION, AKA
Cooperatives Working Together, is represented by:

          Kenneth P. Ewing, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
          1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 492-6264
          Facsimile: (202) 429-3902
          E-mail: kewing@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Dylan Ruga, Esq.
          STALWART LAW GROUP
          11620 Wilshire Boulevard, 9th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 954-2000
          E-mail: dylan@stalwartlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC., is represented
by:

          Steven Ross Kuney, Esq.
          WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
          725 Twelfth Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 434-5843
          Facsimile: (202) 434-5029
          E-mail: skuney@wc.com

               - and -

          William Todd Miller, Esq.
          BAKER & MILLER PLLC
          2401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20037
          Telephone: (202) 663-7820
          Facsimile: (202) 663-7849
          E-mail: tmiller@bakerandmiller.com

Defendant-Appellee DAIRYLEA COOPERATIVE INC. is represented by:

          Edward R. Conan, Esq.
          BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC
          One Lincoln Center
          Syracuse, NY 13202
          Telephone: (315) 218-8313
          Facsimile: (315) 218-8100
          E-mail: econan@bsk.com

               - and -

          William Farmer, Esq.
          FARMER BROWNSTEIN JAEGER LLP
          235 Pine Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 962-2877
          Facsimile: (415) 520-5678
          E-mail: wfarmer@fbj-law.com

Defendant-Appellee LAND O'LAKES, INC., is represented by:

          Nathan P. Eimer, Esq.
          EIMER STAHL, LLP
          224 South Michigan Avenue
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 660-7600
          Facsimile: (312) 692-1718
          E-mail: neimer@eimerstahl.com

               - and -

          Matthew Stewart Kahn, Esq.
          George Arnold Nicoud, III, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          555 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 393-8212
          Facsimile: (415) 986-5309
          E-mail: MKahn@gibsondunn.com
                  tnicoud@gibsondunn.com

Defendant-Appellee AGRIMARK, INC., is represented by:

          Jill M. O'Toole, Esq.
          SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP
          One Constitution Plaza
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 251-5901
          Facsimile: (860) 251-5218
          E-mail: jotoole@goodwin.com


NAVIOS MARITIME: Court Denies Bid for $900K Attorneys' Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned NORMAN ROBERTS, on behalf of himself and all
those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS,
INC., ANGELIKI N. FRANGOU, EFSTATHIOS LOIZOS, SPYRIDON MAGOULAS,
GEORGE MALANGA, JOHN STRATAKIS, AND SHUNJI: SASADA, Defendants,
Case No. 16 Civ. 7860 (KPF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk
Failla of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the Plaintiff's motion for an award of $900,000 in
attorneys' fees.

Plaintiff Roberts filed this shareholder class action on Oct. 7,
2016, challenging a self-tender offer that the Defendant, through
its Board of Directors, made to the holders of Navios preferred
stock.  The tender offer initially required any tendering
preferred shareholders to consent to certain amendments to the
rights associated with their shares, but this required the consent
and tender of a supermajority of each of two categories of
preferred shares.

After the initiation of this litigation, the preferred
shareholders twice rebuffed the offer by refusing to tender enough
shares to reach the threshold amount to satisfy the supermajority
requirement.  After the second failed offer, the company extended
the tender offer once more, but without the consent and minimum-
tender requirements.

Since the Plaintiff filed his Complaint, the parties have done
little else in this litigation: the Defendants have not answered
or otherwise formally responded to the Complaint and neither party
has appeared before the Court for a conference.  He claims,
however, that Navios' post-filing conduct has mooted the need for
the lawsuit.

In consequence, he now seeks $900,000 in attorneys' fees under
Delaware's "corporate benefit doctrine," reasoning that through
this action, he benefitted his fellow shareholders by threatening
the Navios Board with personal liability for an alleged coercive
tender offer and by providing an apparatus for shareholders to
resist the tender offer.

Both the Plaintiff's fiduciary duty and contract claims rely on a
theory of impermissible coercion.  Specifically, his fiduciary
duty claim alleges that the Exchange Offers and Consent
Solicitations coerce preferred shareholders to tender into the
Exchange Offer and violate the Certificates of Designation.  The
contract claim expands on that latter point, alleging that by so
coercing the shareholders into tendering their shares, Navios will
be voting shares it is acquiring, in violation of the Certificates
of Designation, in favor of amendments that remove key rights and
protections currently enjoyed by preferred shareholders.  Thus,
although the Plaintiff styled these claims under distinct legal
theories, they rise and fall on the same issue -- whether the
coercion alleged is actionable.

Judge Failla concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to allege
actionable coercion.  Given this absence of coercion, their
fiduciary duty and contract claims were not meritorious when
filed, and he may not award attorneys' fees attributable to those
claims.

The Plaintiff premises his implied covenant claim on the
provisions in the Certificates of Designation requiring the
consent of two-thirds of each category of preferred shares to
effect any amendment adversely affecting the rights of preferred
shareholders, and prohibiting Navios, its subsidiaries, or
affiliates from voting on any such amendments.  From this, he
argues that the Certificates of Designation guarantee preferred
shareholders "the right to a voluntary vote," but by coupling the
exchange offer with the consent solicitation, the tender offer
"rendered the vote involuntary."  These allegations, however,
according to Judge Failla, fail to rise to the "limited and
extraordinary" circumstances under which Delaware courts find a
breach of the implied covenant.  Thus, the Plaintiff's implied
covenant claim would not have survived a motion to dismiss in the
first instance and does not provide ground for an award of
attorneys' fees.

For the reasons stated, Judge Failla denied the Plaintiff's motion
for an award of attorneys' fees.  She directed the Clerk of Court
to terminate Docket Entry 35.  Further, because the Plaintiff has
previously advised the Court that the reasons for his litigation
have been mooted, the Judge dismissed this action.  The Clerk of
Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all
remaining dates, and close this case.  Either party wishing to
restore this case to the active docket must advise the Court on or
before Oct. 10, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/9E9M4f from Leagle.com.

Norman Roberts, Plaintiff, represented by Mark Lebovitch --
markl@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Navios Maritime Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Israel
David -- israel.david@friedfrank.com -- Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson LLP & Justin Joseph Santolli --
markl@blbglaw.com -- Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.

Angeliki N. Frangou, Defendant, represented by Israel David,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP & Justin Joseph
Santolli, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.

George Malanga, Defendant, represented by Israel David, Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP & Justin Joseph Santolli,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.

John Stratakis, Defendant, represented by Israel David, Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP & Justin Joseph Santolli,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.

Shunji Sasada, Defendant, represented by Israel David, Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP & Justin Joseph Santolli,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.


NESTLE WATERS: Seeks Dismissal of Poland Spring Water Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Poland Spring's parent company
on Oct. 6 asked a judge to dismiss a lawsuit that accuses the
company of providing water that's sourced from wells, not springs.

Stamford, Connecticut-based Nestle Waters North America contends
the matter was already litigated in 2003 in Illinois and that a
federal court can't pre-empt a state court.  That case ended with
a $12 million settlement and Poland Spring continuing to tout "100
percent natural spring water."

The corporate parent also says the plaintiffs should take up the
matter with the Food and Drug Administration instead of turning to
the courts.

The original lawsuit filed in Connecticut and a similar one in
Maine contend the water that's bottled by Poland Spring comes from
wells or municipal sources, not the bubbling springs depicted on
the label.

Poland Spring says its product meets the FDA's definition that
allows a bottling company to call its product "spring water" if it
is drawn from the same source as a natural spring and meets
certain requirements for chemical composition.

A letter from the state's senior environmental hydrologist in
August confirmed that all eight of Poland Spring's water sources
meet the FDA definition of spring water.  The Maine Drinking Water
Program implements the FDA rules governing spring water.

Alix Dunn, spokesperson for Nestle Waters, said consumers can be
confident "in the accuracy of the labels on every bottle of Poland
Spring." [GN]


OCO BIOMEDICAL: "Marcus" Suit Transferred to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Richard Marcus, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. OCO
Biomedical, Inc., doing business as: OCO BIOMEDICAL, the
Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-01519, was transferred on Oct. 11,
2017 from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey,
to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(Western Division - Los Angeles). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-07425-ODW-AS to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright, II.

OCO Biomedical manufactures dental implant solutions. Its products
include dental implants, abutments, and instrumentation
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ross H Schmierer, Esq.
          DENITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE PC
          525 Route 73 North Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 05083
          Telephone: (856) 797 9951
          Facsimile: (856) 797 9978
          E-mail: rschmierer@denittislaw.com

               - and -

          Joanne M F Wilcomes, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP
          101 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10178-0060
          Telephone: (212) 309 6739
          E-mail: joanne.wilcomes@morganlewis.cim

The Defendant is represented by:

          Scott A Rader, Esq.
          Esteban Morales Fabila, Esq.
          Joshua M Briones, Esq.
          MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY AND POPEO PC
          666 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 935 3000
          E-mail: sarader@mintz.com
          emorales@mintz.com
          jbriones@mintz.com

               - and -

          Mayling C Blanco, Esq.
          BLANK ROME LLP
          301 Carnegie Center 3rd Floor
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (609) 750 2647
          Facsimile: (917) 332 3044
          E-mail: mblanco@blankrome.com


ORACLE CORP: Faces Gender Pay Discrimination Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Luke Stangel, writing for Silicon Valley Business Journal, reports
that Oracle Corp. is being sued by three women who worked at the
enterprise software giant, who claim they were paid less than
their male colleagues, The Information reports.

The lawyer representing the trio is also pursuing a similar
lawsuit against Google Inc.

The women, Rong Jewett, Sophy Wang and Xian Murray, worked in
senior product development roles at Oracle from 2008 to earlier
this year.  Their lawyer, James Finberg, is still gathering
evidence in the case, but says he wants to file a class action
lawsuit that would cover some 1,200 women at Oracle.

With about 6,800 local employees as of June, Redwood City-based
Oracle is Silicon Valley's eighth-largest technology employer.

It's the third time this year that Oracle has been in the news
around pay discrimination. In January, the U.S. Department of
Labor filed a lawsuit against Oracle claiming the company
systematically pays its white male workers more than women, and
men of color.

Jewett, Wang and Murray filed their lawsuit in late August.
Oracle's board of directors said they'd oppose a shareholder
proposal in November to conduct an audit of the company's salary
structure.

Google finds itself in virtually the same scenario: U.S.
Department of Labor lawsuit, employee class action lawsuit and
shareholder requests for an audit.  That case has received far
more attention though, due to Google's market cap (it's three
times larger than Oracle) and the company repeatedly saying that
it has virtually no gender pay gap.

Oracle's board of directors mounted a defense of the company's pay
practices in a letter to investors, saying three of the company's
12 board members are women, and noting that its co-CEO, Safra
Catz, is a woman.

Oracle said it gave $3 million in direct and in-kind donations to
the Let Girls Learn initiative, and said its engineers volunteer
with various female-focused STEM programs. [GN]



PEACOCK FOODS: Faces Class Action Over Employee Fingerprinting
--------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Novak Jones and Dorothy Atkins, writing for Law360, report
that a group of employees at an Illinois-based packaged food
product manufacturer are suing their employer in state court,
claiming the company's collection of worker fingerprints for time-
tracking purposes violates the state's biometric information
privacy law.

In a suit filed in Cook County Circuit Court on Sept. 29, the
proposed class of workers said Peacock Foods, an outpost of
international food manufacturer Greencore Group, violated
Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act when it allegedly
collected and stored their fingerprints in its time card system
without their written consent.

The suit is just the latest to use the act to sue employers and
retailers over worker or customer biometric data.  Known as BIPA,
the law requires any private entity using biometric data to get
written approval from the individual whose data is being collected
and publicly post how long they plan to use, keep and eventually
destroy the information, among other things.

The class suing Peacock said it is "crucial" that people
understand what is being done with their data, which can include
anything from fingerprints to retinal scans to facial recognition
technology.

"Unlike key fobs or identification cards -- which can be changed
or replaced if stolen or compromised -- fingerprints are unique,
permanent biometric identifiers associated with the employee," the
suit claims.  "If a fingerprint database is hacked, breached or
otherwise exposed, employees have no means by which to prevent
identity theft and unauthorized tracking."

Representatives for Peacock and Greencore, which acquired Peacock
in December, did not respond to requests for comment on Oct. 2.

Lawsuits under BIPA, which became law in 2008, have been filed
with increasing frequency as employers look to biometrics for
authentication.

Illinois- and Wisconsin-based grocery chain Roundy's Supermarkets
Inc., a subsidiary of Kroger Co., was hit with two suits over
employee fingerprints earlier this year.  Although they were
originally filed in state court, the suits have since been
consolidated in Illinois federal court and are currently pending.

The Peacock suit claims the company started asking its employees,
who number between 2,300 and 2,900, to scan their fingerprints
when they clock in and clock out sometime in 2016.

But the company, which makes and packages food products for
several brands out of five different facilities in Illinois, did
not post or otherwise provide the employees a written explanation
of why their fingerprints were being collected or how for how long
they would be stored, the suit claims.

Peacock also did not provide information about when and how the
fingerprints would be destroyed, and it did not ask the employees
to fill out a written release, as required by the act, the suit
claims.

The suit seeks statutory damages for each violation of BIPA, as
well as an injunction barring Peacock from further violations.

Counsel information for Peacock was not immediately available on
Oct. 2.

The class is represented by Alejandro Caffarelli, Lorrie T.
Peeters and Alexis D. Martin of Caffarelli & Associates Ltd.

The case is Alma Diaz et al v. Greencore USA - CPG Partners LLC,
case number 2017-CH-13198, in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
[GN]


PETLAND: Awaits Court Decision on Class Action Dismissal Motion
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Baca, writing for ABC7 News, reports that a class-action
lawsuit filed in federal court in northern Georgia claims national
pet store chain Petland knowingly sells sick dogs as part of its
regular business model.  A Georgia veterinarian provided a written
statement supporting that claim, and talked to 7 On Your Side at
his Atlanta-area clinic.  Petland denies all wrongdoing and is
moving to dismiss a pending class action lawsuit.

VIZSLA PUPPIES IN FAIRFAX

7 On Your Side first began investigating Petland after receiving
complaints from a Virginia animal rescue group this summer.  It
took pictures of Vizsla breed puppies at the Petland store in
Fairfax, Virginia.

"It was these two little puppies in a cage on a grate.  No bed.
Couldn't see any. Not where any animal should be living," said
Anne Flounlaker with the Virginia Vizsla rescue group.

The group gathered the money to purchase the Vizsla puppies for
$2,800.  The rescue group took the Vizsla puppies, now named Faith
and Manny, to a veterinarian of its choice.

"The first night we got her, her stomach was really bloated and
she threw up like five times that night, and had diarrhea a bunch
of times. I couldn't even count and so we got her into the vet the
very next morning and it turns out she has Giardia, which is a
parasite that comes about when water is contaminated with feces,"
added Ms. Flounlaker, Faith's foster owner.  "She's the cutest
little thing.  You would never know she didn't have the best and
perfect start to life. But the vet said, 'I can tell just by
looking: this is an underweight puppy. She's small for her age.'
He did a bunch of tests. The Giardia test came back positive.
She's on a couple of antibiotics and a special food now."

"When Faith and Manny went home with our rescuers that night, it
was probably the first time their feet had ever touched grass,"
said Susan Laume with the Virginia Vizsla rescue group.  "They try
at Petland to make you believe, to the unsuspecting consumer, that
only their veterinarian can provide these services.  I can't
explain it. To me, it's a fraudulent practice."

A VETERINARIAN SPEAKS OUT

Dr. Michael Good, an Atlanta-area veterinarian, was Petland's pick
to examine incoming puppies in north Georgia from 2002 to 2011.

"You name it, they've got parasites, bacteria.  They've got
protozoa," said Dr. Good at his Town & Country Veterinary Center
in Marrieta, Georgia.  "All I know is when I saw it in my office,
I saw a lot of problems.  Some were 'zoonotic.' Some could be
transmitted to people . . . 'Wait a second -- these kids could get
sick from that puppy.'"

"The puppies and dogs I saw from that model, that retail model
where they buy from these big brokers and they bring them to a
concentrated store, and they'll sell them to anybody.  I saw more
sickness and illness in that model, that business model of
Petland, then I ever did with a shelter," said Dr. Good.
"I would try to go up there (Petland store in Kennesaw, Georgia)
once a week to evaluate what's there and see what's there.  I've
been up there late at night in the wintertime and these trucks
from Missouri, Nebraska, and all these places where these big
operations come from -- the Midwest -- and it would be cold, and
they've been on the trucks for two to three days in transport.  If
we're lucky, they (puppies) were seven weeks old," recalled Dr.
Good.

Dr. Good recalled at Petland's Kennesaw, Georgia store, "They'd
open up their freezer and there'd be dead animals in there.  Dogs:
they ask two things of us as people.  They want to be loved and
they want to be remembered. But none of these animals I saw in
those freezers were ever loved or remembered.  They were just a
statistic."

Dr. Good terminated his business partnership with Petland and
wrote an affidavit in support of a class action lawsuit filed.

PETLAND ACCUSED OF RACKETEERING

Former Petland customer Rosalba Cisneros filed suit in United
States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, applying for
a class action case.  If allowed by a judge, it could open the
national pet store chain, with 77 locations nationwide, to claims
from a large section of its customers.  The lawsuit claims Petland
neglected animals as recently as 2015.

Petlands puppy purchase contracts provide a warranty.  If a puppy
ends up sick after purchase, dog owners must contact a company
named "PAWSitive" for instructions and veterinarian support for
the owner to have any possibility of a refund.  Corporate
registration shows PAWSitive also does business as "Third Party
Pet."  The Cisneros v. Petland lawsuit alleges both companies
"conspire" to "provide false and misleading information" to pet
owners.  That alleged conspiracy forms the basis of the lawsuit's
racketeering claim.

PETLAND RESPONDS

Petland, based in Chillicothe, Ohio, declined an interview.  It
responded to the Virginia Vizsla puppy purchase in a statement:
"The state attorney's humane officer visited the store twice and
validated care of these animals. Giardia does sometimes occur in a
kennel environment, but is covered under the warranty and would
have been treated at no cost if the warranty would have been
followed and proper paperwork presented."

Third Party Pet, doing business as "PAWSitive," declined to talk
to 7 On Your Side.

Puppies inside Petland stores nationwide infected 39 people in
seven states, according to a September alert from the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC).  The agency singled out Petland for
scrutiny.  The illnesses all occurred in the last calendar year.
Human Campylobacter virus passes from contact with dog feces and
usually does not spread between people.  The virus can cause
stomach flu-like symptoms. Seven people were hospitalized.
"We are doing exactly what the CDC has recommended, which is to
keep doing what we are doing and reinforcing the importance of
hand sanitation with our staff and customers as well as advising
people to not let the pets lick your face or any open wounds,"
responded Petland in a statement.

On Oct. 3, the CDC announced 16 more people had become ill with
Campylobacter. Of the total 55 infected, the CDC says 14 are
Petland employees from five states and 35 people came in contact
with Petland puppies.

A federal judge has not decided whether to approve Petland's
motion to dismiss the federal case submitted Sept. 29. [GN]


PHARMERICA CORP: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, on Oct. 3 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, case No. 1:17-cv-01301, on behalf of
shareholders of PharMerica Corporation ("PharMerica" or the
"Company") (NYSE: PMC) who have been harmed by PharMerica's and
its board of directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") in connection with  the proposed merger of
the Company with affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.
("KKR").

On August 1, 2017, Company entered into an agreement and plan of
merger with KKR ("Merger Agreement"), pursuant to which the
Company's shareholders stand to receive $29.25 in cash for each
share of PharMerica stock they own (the "Merger Consideration"),
representing $1.4 billion in total value.

If you wish to obtain information concerning this action, you can
do so by clicking here: www.faruqilaw.com/PMCnotice.

The complaint alleges that the Preliminary Proxy Statement on a
Schedule 14A (the "Proxy") filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") on September 6, 2017, violates Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act because it provides materially
incomplete and misleading information about the Company and the
Merger Agreement, including information concerning the Company's
financial projections and analysis, on which the Board relied to
recommend the Merger Consideration as fair to PharMerica
shareholders.

Take Action

Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with
extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and significant
expertise in actions involving corporate fraud.  Faruqi & Faruqi,
LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains its principal
office in New York City, with offices in Delaware, California,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from the date of this notice.  Any member of
the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this
action, or have any questions concerning this notice or your
rights or interests, please contact:

         Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
         James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
         New York, NY 10017
         Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330
         E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                 jwilson@faruqilaw.com [GN]


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Summary Judgment Bid in ERISA Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned ELYSEE NICOLAS, individually and as
representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Princeton University 403(b) Plan Plaintiff, v. THE
TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-3695
(D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Elysee Nicolas brings this putative class action
alleging breaches of fiduciary duties under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  Plaintiff, like other
faculty and staff at Princeton University, is a participant in the
Princeton University Retirement Plan and the Princeton University
Savings Plan (Plans).  Defendant is the governing body of
Princeton University, a private, nonprofit institution of higher
learning and administrator of the Plans.

Motion to Dismiss: Fiduciary Breaches

Breaches of the Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty requires a plan fiduciary to discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. Section
404 in essence codifies a common law fiduciary's general duty of
loyalty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries.

Accepting as true the allegations in the Complaint and giving
Plaintiff every favorable inference therefrom, the Complaint does
not plead sufficient facts to establish any breach of the duty of
loyalty.

Plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting Defendant benefitted,
financially or otherwise, from any decisions related to the Plans
or engaged in disloyal conduct in order to benefit itself or
someone other than the Plans' beneficiaries; rather, Plaintiff's
loyalty claims are merely characterizations that piggyback off of
the prudence claims, without any independent factual predicate.
The Third Circuit has instructed that where a complaint is
vulnerable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be
inequitable or futile. The Court does not find that it would be
inequitable or futile to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his
Complaint.

The Court will dismiss Counts I-III of the Complaint without
prejudice to the extent they pertain to breaches of the duty of
loyalty, and grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

Breaches of the Duty of Prudence

The duty of prudence requires a plan fiduciary to apply the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims. The Third
Circuit has characterized the prudence standard as flexible,
adjusting to the character and aims of the particular type of
plan" at issue. The Third Circuit endorses two approaches to
applying the prudence standard: (1) focusing on the fiduciary's
conduct in arriving at [that] investment decision, examining
whether a questioned decision led to objectively prudent
investments.

Thus, both the reasonableness of the fiduciary's decision-making
process and the objective results of the selected investments can
be dispositive in determining whether the fiduciary satisfied
their duty of care.

Reasonableness of Administrative Fees and Investment Management
Fees

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges two claims related to
excessive fees: (1) that Defendant, despite its substantial
bargaining power, included investment options in the Plans
carrying far higher administrative fees and expenses relative to
the size and complexity of the Plans, which charged an asset-based
fee for recordkeeping" that was excessive and unreasonable.
Here, in addition to the types of factual allegations in Renfro,
Plaintiff has alleged specific breaching conduct: failing to
conduct a competitive bidding process; failing to use significant
bargaining power to negotiate lower fees; retaining two record-
keepers; and failing to remove two particularly unreasonable
funds. Other courts to have considered substantially similar
complaints have found them to survive motions to dismiss for
similar reasons.   Accepting as true the facts alleged in the
Complaint and giving Plaintiff every favorable inference
therefrom, Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim for relief.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied with respect to the
alleged breaches of the duty of prudence regarding administrative
and investment management fees in Counts I and II.

Performance Losses: Failure to Monitor and Remove Imprudent
Investments

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant imprudently retained
the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account, despite their
poor performance as compared to similar available options and
recognized benchmarks. A plaintiff may allege that a fiduciary
breached the duty of prudence by failing to properly monitor
investments and remove imprudent ones. In addition to examining
the fiduciary's decision-making process, the Third Circuit allows
courts to apply ERISA's prudence standard based on whether a
questioned decision led to objectively prudent investments.
Defendant raises factual questions about whether the alternative
funds Plaintiff suggests, 72), are apt comparisons and, therefore,
whether the underperformance Plaintiff depicts is an accurate
portrait. Such questions do not warrant dismissal to the contrary,
they suggest the need for further information from both parties.
Plaintiffs allegations support a claim of imprudence sufficient to
overcome a motion to dismiss.

Defendant's motion is denied with regard to the alleged breaches
of the duty of prudence in Count II.

Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries and Service Providers

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its
fiduciary duties by failing to monitor its appointees, ensure that
monitored fiduciaries prudently managed administrative fees,
ensure that monitored fiduciaries considered alternative
investment options, and remove appointees who performed
inadequately.  This Count of Plaintiff's Complaint reads like
legal conclusions as opposed to factual allegations; Plaintiff
does not allege facts about Defendant's actual monitoring process
and its specific shortcomings. Denying a motion to dismiss on a
failure to monitor claim supported by specific factual
allegations.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted with respect
to Count III, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint.

Motion for Summary Judgment: Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues in the alternative that Plaintiff's entire
Complaint is time-barred under the statute of limitations
provision of ERISA, warranting summary judgment. In relevant part,
that provision explains that no action may be commenced for a
fiduciary breach more than three years after the earliest date on
which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or
violation.

While Defendant argues that all relevant facts were made known to
the plaintiff more than three years before the complaint was
filed, that may only conclusively establish that Plaintiff had
constructive knowledge of the underlying facts by May 2014.
Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff had access to various
websites linking to the annuities' prospectuses for more than
three years, does not prove that Plaintiff both knew of the
underlying facts and that those facts constituted a breach.
Defendant's additional argument that Plaintiff's Complaint
references information reflected in the May 1, 2014 prospectus for
CREF variable annuities  and therefore that Plaintiff could have,
and, indeed, must have filed his Complaint prior to May 1, 2017,
is similarly unavailing.

The mere allegation by Plaintiff that an event took place on a
certain date does not establish that Plaintiff had knowledge of
the event on that same date. Consequently, the Court shall not
dismiss Plaintiff's claims as time-barred at the pleading stage.
Furthermore, some of Plaintiff's allegations specifically relate
to the post-2014 period, after Defendant negotiated a credit to
the Plans for some recordkeeping expenses and others to
deficiencies in Defendant's reporting materials  of which
Plaintiff may not have had knowledge until sometime after those
materials were made available. Examining these facts in favor of
the non-moving party, the Court finds that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to when Plaintiff developed actual
knowledge of the alleged breach.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya9qkxewfrom
Leagle.com.

ELYSEE NICOLAS, an, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH J. DEPALMA,
LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG, LLC, Two Gateway Center12th Floor,
Newark, NJ 07102

THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, represented by
NEIL V. SHAH -- nshah@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP.


QUALITY DINING: Settles Chili's Grill Servers' Wage Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Hall of The Morning Call and David G. Savage of Los Angeles
Times report that an Indiana company that operates Chili's Grill &
Bar restaurants in Whitehall Township and elsewhere in
Pennsylvania will pay $250,000 to settle former employees' claims
it violated minimum wage laws by forcing them to share tips with
other workers.

But the franchise owner's payout could have been more painful had
it not required its employees to give up their rights to bring
class-action claims over workplace disputes, locking them in to
individual claims before arbitrators.

The validity of such agreements is being tested in a trio of cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court.  The justices heard arguments on
Oct. 2 from Trump administration lawyers who say the agreements
must be enforced and lawyers for gas station workers in Alabama,
technical writers in Wisconsin and accountants in Northern
California who say they violate the rights of workers to join
forces to protect their interests.

Labor law experts say such requirements keep the number of workers
who actually take action to right alleged wrongs small.

"Very few workers will sue by themselves," said Catherine K.
Ruckelshaus, general counsel for the National Employment Law
Project, a worker advocacy group.  Doing so "puts a target on
their back," she said, and it may cost more to bring a claim than
they could possibly win.

The settlement for the Chili's servers follows a federal judge's
ruling that the employees were bound by an agreement that required
them to take any employment disputes before an arbitrator and
barred them from doing so as a group.

Without the agreements, the claims against Quality Dining Inc. and
Grayling Corp. of Mishawaka, Ind., could potentially have been
more numerous, court documents indicate.  Calls to the company's
headquarters and lawyers were not returned on Oct. 2.

According to the proposed class-action lawsuit, Quality Dining and
Grayling employed about 1,760 servers at its Pennsylvania Chili's
restaurants.  Two people who worked in the Whitehall location and
elsewhere alleged Quality Dining and Grayling had a practice at
its Pennsylvania Chili's restaurants that violated the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

Servers were paid a wage of $2.83 an hour.  In order to comply
with minimum wage laws, Quality Dining and Grayling used a "tip
credit" of $4.42 for each hour a server worked to bring them up to
the $7.25 an hour minimum wage, the suit says.

It alleges, however, that Quality Dining and Grayling had a
companywide policy at its Pennsylvania Chili's locations of
requiring servers to contribute a portion of their tips to
employees who worked in or near the kitchen preparing orders for
delivery and did not interact with customers.

U.S. District Judge Jeffrey L. Schmehl in March granted Quality
Dining and Grayling's motion to dismiss the case, finding that the
employees were bound by the arbitration agreements.  Attorneys
Peter Winebrake and Andy Santillo argued, however, that the
provision of the agreements barring group claims before an
arbitrator was not enforceable because it violates the National
Labor Relations Act, the federal law that gives workers the right
to collectively bargain and work together for aid or protection.

Federal appeals courts have split on the issue. The 7th Circuit
Court in Chicago and the 9th Circuit in San Francisco ruled for
the employees and said their companies could not bar them from
bringing a joint claim.  But the 5th Circuit in New Orleans ruled
for Murphy Oil Co. and said the gas station workers could bring
only individual claims for overtime pay.

Judge Schmehl noted in April that although the Supreme Court had
agreed to consider the issue, it would be best to rule on Quality
Dining and Grayling's motion to dismiss the suit, rather delaying
the decision further.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal in the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of
Appeals, but withdrew after reaching a settlement.

The settlement provides a total of $124,917 in back pay for 15
former employees.  The individual payments range from about $2,000
to more than $14,500.  Quality Dining and Grayling will also pay
$125,083 in attorney fees and costs to Winebrake and Santillo.
Quality Dining operates 206 restaurants in six states, including
45 Chili's.

Similar claims resulted a $1.3 million settlement last year
between a Lower Macungie Township Red Robin franchise owner and
hundreds of servers who claimed they were illegally required to
share tips with underpaid kitchen staff to satisfy minimum wage
requirements. [GN]


RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC: Attorneys Sanctioned in Surgery Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Packel, writing for Law360, reports that three Pennsylvania
attorneys were sanctioned on Sept. 29 in federal court for
bringing what a judge described as a "remarkable" proposed class
action for a man who sued a knee surgery center after it worked
with him on a payment plan.

U.S. District Judge Michael Baylson found that the attorneys --
Eric Rayz, Gerald Wells and Michael Yarnoff --
myarnoff@kehoelawfirm.com -- did no due diligence before filing
the lawsuit on behalf of their client, describing the suit as a
groundless attempt to avoid paying for his surgery.

The judge tagged the attorneys for failing to engage in even "the
most cursory check" into plaintiff Andrew Wolfington's financial
records, noting that while Mr. Wolfington accused the Rothman
Institute of providing no warning that it would make withdrawals
from his bank account, the health care provider never actually
made a single withdrawal.

"Defendant has no immunity from litigation, but it is clear that
groundless lawsuits against medical providers increase the cost of
medical care, and increased expenses of medical providers have
contributed to the drastic increase in health care costs which are
a matter of public concern," Judge Baylson said.  "Thus, public
policy warrants sanctions when a groundless suit is filed against
a medical provider."

Mr. Wolfington was preparing to undergo knee surgery at the
Rothman Institute in 2015 when he was told by the provider shortly
before his scheduled procedure that he would have to pay the
insurance deductible of over $2,000 upfront, according to the
Sept. 29 opinion.

He sued in September 2016, accusing Rothman of ultimately lending
him the funds and putting him on a payment plan, but failing to
outline the terms of the financing agreement in writing and making
unauthorized deductions from his checking account, the opinion
says.

Mr. Wolfington and his attorneys filed the suit as a nationwide
class action, suggesting that Rothman had violated the Truth in
Lending Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act when dealing with
other patients.

Later that year, after Rothman provided evidence that after
Mr. Wolfington made an initial $200 down payment, he never made
any additional payments, Judge Baylson threw out the suit with
prejudice.  The judge then, on his own volition, initiated a
sanctions inquiry to weigh whether the suit was frivolous and
whether it could have been avoided had the lawyers done proper
research.

After a round of briefing, a hearing and another round of
briefing, the judge determined that the lawyers fell short of
their obligations.

"In view of the seriousness of the charges, even a most cursory
check of plaintiff's financial records would have been part of a
reasonable investigation, especially because, as we now know,
reviewing the records for any of the eight months from the
plaintiff's operation to the filing of the complaint would have
revealed that many allegations in the complaint were false," Judge
Baylson said.

"The filing of the complaint as a class action was particularly
egregious. If the bank records had been secured, it would have
been obvious that there was no basis whatsoever to allege
plaintiff could represent a class," he continued.

The ruling places the attorneys on the hook to pay Rothman's
attorneys' fees. Judge Baylson gave Rothman 14 days to tabulate
its costs, followed by another 14 days for the attorneys to
respond with any differing assessment.

"We strongly disagree with Judge Baylson's analysis and opinion
and intend to seek all appropriate remedies at the district and/or
appellate level," the attorneys said in a joint statement.

An attorney for Rothman did not immediately respond to a request
for comment on Oct. 2.

Mr. Wolfington is represented by Eric Rayz of Kalikhman & Rayz
LLC, Michael K. Yarnoff of the Kehoe Law Firm and Gerald Wells of
Connolly Wells & Gray LLP.

Rothman is represented by Laura D. Ruccolo of Capehart & Scatchard
PA.

The case is Wolfington v.  Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates
II, case number 2:16-cv-04935 (E.D. Pa.).  The case is assigned to
Judge Michael M. Baylson.  The case was filed September 13, 2016.
[GN]


RIAL DE MINAS: Joint Bid for Prelim Class Certification Endorsed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IDALY MARTINEZ on her own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RIAL DE
MINAS, INC., RIAL DE MINAS II, INC., RIAL DE MINAS III, INC., RIAL
DE MINAS IV, INC., JUAN LUEVANOS, MARIA LUEVANOS, and, MELISSA
LUEVANOS, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-01947-RM-KLM (D.
Colo.), Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado issued her recommendation to grant
the parties' Joint Motion to Adopt Parties' Stipulation of
Preliminary Certification of a Fair Labor Standards Act Section
216(b) Class and a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Class and for Court-
Authorized Notice to Class Members.

The Plaintiff initiated this putative class action lawsuit against
the Defendants, alleging that the Defendants deleted hours worked
from employees' paychecks and refused to pay employees overtime
wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
the Colorado Minimum Wage Act ("CMWA").  The Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint contains two claims for relief: (i) an FLSA claim for
failure to pay overtime premiums; and (ii) a CMWA claim for
failure to pay overtime premiums.

The parties jointly seek preliminary certification of an FLSA
Section 216(b) collective action for settlement purposes regarding
the FLSA claim, as well as certification of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
class for settlement purposes regarding the CMWA claim.  They also
request authorization for a class administrator to distribute
notice to potential class members to notify them of their right to
opt-in to the FLSA collective action and their right to opt-out of
the Rule 23 class.

Magistrate Mix finds that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to demonstrate that preliminary certification is appropriate
at this stage and respectfully recommends conditionally certifying
an FLSA collective action.  She also finds that the proposed
notice and consent form appears to be fair and accurate.  In light
of this, she respectfully recommends that the proposed notice and
consent forms be approved for issuance to potential class members.

Based on the information that the Plaintiff has provided, the
Magistrate concludes that the fair and adequate representation
element of Rule 23(a) is satisfied.  She respectfully recommends
that a Rule 23 class be certified for settlement purposes.
Magistrate Mix also concludes that the notice proposed by the
parties satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)
and informs potential class members of the settlement terms.
Thus, she respectfully recommends that the proposed notice be
approved for issuance to potential class members.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, Magistrate Mix recommended
that the Motion be granted.  She further recommended that the
following Rule 23 class be certified in this case: all hourly
employees who worked at a Real Minas Restaurant on or after Aug.
1, 2014.

She recommended that this case be conditionally certified as a
collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), and
that notice will be sent to all current and former employees of
Rial de Minas Restaurants who meet the following criteria: all
hourly employees who worked between Aug. 1, 2013, and the present.

Magistrate Mix also recommended that the parties are to be
permitted to distribute their proposed Notice and Consent to Join
forms to inform the recipients of their right to opt-in to the
FLSA action.  She further recommended that the parties be
permitted to distribute their proposed Notice of Class Action
Lawsuit for Unpaid Wages to inform the recipients of their right
to opt-out of the Rule 23 class.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties will have 14 days
after service of her Recommendation to serve and file any written
objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District
Judge to whom this case is assigned.  A party's failure to serve
and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the
Recommendation by the District Judge, and also waives appellate
review of both factual and legal questions.  A party's objections
to the Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve
an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate
review.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Recommendation is
available at https://is.gd/lFzb3z from Leagle.com.

Idaly Martinez, Plaintiff, represented by Brandt Powers Milstein -
- brandt@milsteinlawoffice.com -- Milstein Law Office.

Rial de Minas, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank William Suyat
-- fsuyat@dillanddill.com -- Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker &
Hutchings, P.C..

Rial de Minas III, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank William
Suyat, Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..

Rial de Minas IV, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank William
Suyat, Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..

Juan Luevanos, Defendant, represented by Frank William Suyat, Dill
Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..

Maria Luevanos, Defendant, represented by Frank William Suyat,
Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..

Melissa Luevanos, Defendant, represented by Frank William Suyat,
Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..

Rial de Minas II, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank William
Suyat, Dill Dill Carr Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C..


RJ REYNOLDS: 11th Cir. Affirms Statute of Limitations Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the Judgment of the District Court upholding
statute of limitation defense in the case captioned WILLIAM HECHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,
individually and as successor by merger to the Brown and
Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the American Tobacco Company
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Defendants-Appellees, LORILLARD TOBACCO
COMPANY, et al, Defendants, No. 16-10447 (11th Cir.).

Plaintiff-Appellant William Hecht appeals the jury verdict and
judgment in this Engle-progeny case.

In May 1994, six named individuals filed a class-action complaint
against several major tobacco companies, including Defendant-
Appellee R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, seeking damages for
alleged injuries from smoking cigarettes. See Liggett Group, Inc.
v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434, 440 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Engle
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 941 (2007), and reh'g denied, 552 U.S. 1056 (2007)
(referred to collectively as "Engle").  The class consisted of all
Florida citizens, residents, and their survivors, "who have
suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and
medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that
contain nicotine."  The trial court divided the trial into three
phases. During Phase I, the jury concluded that the defendants
"placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and
unreasonably dangerous."  The jury also found that the Engle
defendants were negligent and concealed material information about
the health effects or addiction risks of smoking cigarettes (or
both).  During Phase II, the same jury determined that the
defendants were liable to three class representatives and awarded
those representatives approximately $12.7 million in compensatory
damages.  The jury also awarded the entire class punitive damages
in the amount of $145 billion.  The defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed the
award of punitive damages as premature and excessive and decided
to decertify the class going forward.  Although the Florida
Supreme Court decided that the case could not continue as a class
action, it allowed former class members to file their own
individual actions and held that, in those actions, most of the
Engle Phase I jury findings would be entitled to "res judicata
effect."  These individual actions are now commonly known as
Engle-progeny cases. Hecht's action is one of those cases.

After developing chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
Hecht brought a products liability action against Defendant-
Appellee R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) and other cigarette
manufacturers, claiming they negligently and fraudulently
concealed information about the harmful effects of smoking
cigarettes.  At trial, a dispositive issue was whether Hecht's
lawsuit was filed within the applicable four-year statute of
limitations.  Both parties agreed that, under the relevant statute
of limitations, Hecht's claims were untimely if they accrued
before May 5, 1990.  After considering the evidence, the jury
found Hecht's claims to be time-barred, so the district court
entered judgment in favor of RJR.  On appeal, Hecht claims the
district court erred when it instructed the jury on RJR's statute-
of-limitations defense.

He asserts the instruction was an improper comment on the evidence
because it informed the jury that a medical diagnosis was not
required for the jury to find that Hecht knew or should have known
that he had COPD before the limitations deadline. Hecht also
contends the district court erred in advising the jury on the
concept of constructive knowledge. Finally, Hecht argues the
evidence was insufficient to show that he knew or should have that
he had COPD and that there was a reasonable possibility that the
disease was caused by smoking cigarettes prior to May 5, 1990.
Under the circumstances, Hecht suggests the district court should
not have provided the statute-of-limitations instruction to the
jury at all.

With respect to his first argument, Hecht objects to the portion
of the statute-of-limitations instruction that informed the jury
that a diagnosis of COPD was not necessary to find that Hecht knew
or should have known that he suffered a medical condition caused
by smoking cigarettes. The district court instructed the jury that
RJR did not need to prove that [Hecht] was actually diagnosed with
COPD before May 5, 1990 to prevail on its statute of limitations
defense.

Here, in order to determine the date upon which Hecht's claims
accrued, the jury had to decide whether Hecht knew, or reasonably
should have known, enough to permit him to commence a non-
frivolous tort lawsuit against RJR on the basis of his physical,
observable, patent symptoms and effects manifestations before May
5, 1990. The jury instruction given by the district court allowed
the jury to determine whether Hecht was on notice that smoking
cigarettes likely caused his illness. And the Eleventh Circuit
held that it correctly noted that a diagnosis of COPD was not
necessary to begin the limitations period.

The also disagree with Hecht's claim that the instruction was an
improper comment on the evidence.  The jury instruction did not
comment on the evidence at all.  Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit
has noted, the instruction assisted the jury in addressing the
issue at hand whether the statute of limitations had run prior to
the filing of Hecht's lawsuit.  As the court in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Jewett, 106 So.3d 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2012), explained, because jury instructions are contextual, some
background is necessary for the jury to determine the limitations
issue.  For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit finds no error.

Turning to Hecht's second argument, Hecht contends the district
court erred when it advised the jury on the concept of
constructive knowledge.  He claims the court erroneously informed
the jury that having the means to obtain knowledge is ordinarily
equivalent in law to knowledge.

In Frazier, Frazier and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Ciccone, 190
So.3d 1028 (Fla. 2016), Florida's Third District Court of Appeal
found the issue in a statute-of-limitations context to be whether
the plaintiff "knew, or reasonably should have known, enough to
permit her to commence a non-frivolous tort lawsuit against the
[defendants] on the basis of those physical, observable, patent
symptoms and effects manifestation before May 5, 1990. Frazier, 89
So. 3d at 946. So too in Ciccone, the Florida Supreme Court noted
that the applicable statute of limitations runs from the date that
the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
Ciccone, 190 So. 3d at 1038, Ciccone also speaks not of actual
facts known by a plaintiff but the requirement that a reasonable
plaintiff know of the existence of a cause of action.
For all of these reasons, the district court did not err when it
advised the jury with respect to constructive knowledge.

The instruction accurately reflected the law and we are not left
with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the
district court properly guided the jury  And even if the district
court had erred in giving the constructive-knowledge instruction a
proposition with which we disagree any such error was harmless
because, as we discuss in Section IV below, the evidence suggested
that Hecht actually knew that he had COPD before May 1990 and that
the disease was caused by smoking cigarettes.

Finally, Hecht contends that regardless of the particular language
of the instruction, RJR failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary
basis to justify giving the statute-of-limitations instruction to
the jury in the first place.

The Eleventh Circuit agrees.

Hecht never objected to the jury instruction on the basis that RJR
had failed to present evidence supporting it. Although Hecht moved
for judgment as a matter of law on the statute-of-limitations
defense based on a lack of evidence, the motion was not directed
to giving the jury instruction. And even if the motion for
judgment as a matter of law could somehow be construed as an
objection to the jury instruction, Hecht made the motion only
after the jury had reached a verdict. Where a party was informed
of a proposed instruction as was the case here Rule 51(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P. requires that party to object to the jury instruction
before the instructions and arguments are delivered.

In sum, ample evidence supported the district court's instruction
to the jury on RJR's statute-of-limitations defense. The record
supports the jury's conclusion that Hecht knew or should have
known before May 5, 1990, that he had COPD and that a reasonable
possibility existed that his condition was caused by smoking
cigarettes. The district court did not abuse its discretion when
it instructed the jury on the statute-of-limitations defense.
For these reasons, the district court did not err in giving the
statute-of-limitations instruction to the jury in this case. We
also conclude that the instruction appropriately advised the jury
on the concept of constructive knowledge, and it correctly noted
that a diagnosis of COPD was not necessary to begin the
limitations period.

For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit concludes that the
district court did not err in giving the statute-of-limitations
instruction to the jury in this case.  The Eleventh Circuit also
concludes that the instruction appropriately advised the jury on
the concept of constructive knowledge, and it correctly noted that
a diagnosis of COPD was not necessary to begin the limitations
period.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' September 25, 2017,
Opinion is Available at http://tinyurl.com/y9w4p8q7from
Leagle.com.

Dana G. Bradford, II -- dgbradford@sgrlaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Lorence Jon Bielby -- bielbyl@gtlaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.
Emily C. Baker -- ecbaker@jonesday.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.
Charles Richard Allan Morse -- cramorse@jonesday.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Lance V. Oliver -- loliver@motleyrice.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Joseph W. Prichard, Jr. -- jwprichard@mppkj.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Robert B. Parrish -- bparrish@mppkj.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.
M. Sean Laane -- sean.laane@apks.com  -- for Defendant-Appellee.
John A. DeVault, III -- jad@bedellfirm.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

David C. Reeves -- dcreeves@mppkj.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.
Elizabeth C. Ward, 28 Bridgeside Boulevard, Mount Pleasant, SC
29464 for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mathew Jasinski -- mjasinski@motleyrice.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Michael J. Pendell -- mpendell@motleyrice.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Janna Blasingame McNicholas -- jmcnicholas@wilnerfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Maura McGonigle -- maura.mcgonigle@apks.com  -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

John T. Spragens, 150 Fourth Avenue, NorthSuite 1650, Nashville,
TN 37219-2423 for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Martin D. Quinones, 1828 L Street, NW -- Suite 1000, Washington,
D.C. 20036, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Todd A. Walburg, 4179 Piedmont Avenue, Suite 325, Oakland, CA
94611 for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Patrick Graham Maiden, 28 Bridgeside Blvd.,Mount Pleasant, SC  --
29464 U.S.A. for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sara Orpha Couch -- scouch@motleyrice.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.


SALT LAKE CITY, UT: Supreme Ct. Affirms Dismissal of "Bivens"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TIMOTHY BIVENS, MICHELLE REED, and ANTHONY
ARIAS, Appellants, v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, MAYOR RALPH
BECKER, and SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL, Appellees, Case No. 20150249
(Utah), Judge Constandinos Himonas of the Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
complaint.

About six years ago, the tech revolution reached Salt Lake City's
parking meter infrastructure.  In response, the City switched from
Industrial-era, coin-operated, single-space parking meters (where
each parking space had its own meter) to a postindustrial system
of multi-space, credit-card-ready parking pay stations.  But the
City did not immediately update its code to reflect this change.

The Plaintiffs in this putative class action lawsuit all received
parking tickets between 2011 and 2014, when the City had already
installed pay stations but still defined parking infractions by
reference to parking meters.  But, with one exception, they did
not challenge their parking tickets.  Instead, they paid their
fines.  They then sued the City, alleging two claims.

First, they alleged that the City unjustly enriched itself by
fining them for failing to use a parking meter at a time when
there were no longer any parking meters in Salt Lake City -- only
pay stations -- but the City had not yet proscribed parking
without paying at a pay station.  Second, they alleged due process
violations: (i) the City failed to give adequate notice of the
procedures for challenging parking violations; (ii) a provision of
the City Code requiring assessment of an attorney fee in
enforcement actions conflicts with state law, and is thus
unenforceable; and (iii) the City created a quasi-judicial process
-- hearing officers located in the City's Finance Division -- for
challenging parking violations that the City Code did not
authorize.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City's parking fine
scheme was unlawful and an injunction ordering a stop to
enforcement of parking ordinances until the City updated its Code
and fixed the notice problems with the tickets and Small Claims
Court Information document.  They also sought a refund of what
they claimed was illicitly acquired parking ticket revenue,
parking pay station revenue, and related collection costs, court
filing fees, and attorney fees.

The City then moved to dismiss which the district court granted.
The Plaintiffs timely appealed.

Judge Himonas concludes that the Plaintiffs failed to state a
claim for inadequate notice under the Utah Constitution.  Although
the parking ticket and Small Claims Court Information document
were misleading in certain respects, they have not stated a claim
for constitutionally inadequate notice of their right to challenge
their parking tickets, including their right to argue that parking
without paying at a multi-space pay station was not an infraction
under the former City Code.

Because they received constitutionally adequate notice of their
right to a direct hearing, the Plaintiffs do not have a sufficient
excuse for their failure to use that process to challenge their
parking tickets.  Their failure to exhaust those available legal
remedies means that they cannot have recourse to equitable causes
of action -- such as unjust enrichment -- to seek disgorgement of
their fines.  Similarly, because they failed to participate in the
available proceedings to challenge their parking tickets, they
cannot now complain that their due process rights would have been
violated by procedural rules that the Court might hypothetically
have applied in those proceedings, had the Plaintiffs taken
advantage of them.

Accordingly, Judge Himonas affirmed the district court's order
dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/G6takd from Leagle.com.

R. Shane Johnson, Mark S. Schwarz, Bruce R. Baird, Salt Lake City,
for appellants.

Margaret D. Plane -- SLCAttorney@slcgov.com -- Salt Lake City, for
appellees.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Must Face Class Action Over Warranty
---------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Chung, writing for Reuters, reports that the U.S. Supreme
Court on Oct. 2 refused to consider a bid by Samsung Electronics
Co Ltd to force customers who have filed proposed class-action
lawsuits against the company to arbitrate their claims instead of
bringing them to court.

The justices left intact a lower court's ruling that purchasers of
certain Galaxy smartphones made by the South Korean electronics
company were not bound by a warranty provision that compelled
arbitration of customer complaints.

Warranties with arbitration clauses have become common in consumer
electronics and other industries.  Courts and regulatory agencies
increasingly are scrutinizing arbitration agreements that seek to
limit options for resolution of future disputes.

The Samsung case involves two smartphone buyers from California
who separately filed proposed class-action lawsuits in 2014 over
concerns about the products' performance and resale value.

Neither Daniel Norcia, who owned an Galaxy S4 device, nor Hoai
Dang, who owned an SIII, saw the arbitration provisions when they
bought the phone because the language was placed deep inside the
warranty booklet and not mentioned on the box, according to their
legal papers.

The agreement states that all disputes must be resolved through
arbitration, and specifically rules out class actions.

Samsung tried to force the customers to arbitrate their claims,
but a unanimous three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco denied the request in January.  The court
said Samsung did not provide proper notice of the arbitration
provision and neither customer had expressly consented to be bound
by it.

Appealing to the Supreme Court, Samsung noted that the 9th Circuit
decided that the warranty was valid except for the arbitration
provision.  Samsung argued that the 9th Circuit ruling violated a
U.S. law called the Federal Arbitration Act that requires
arbitration agreements to be treated equally with other contracts.
[GN]


SERENITY TRANSPORTATION: Ct. Invalidates Class Members' Releases
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Invalidate Releases and Issue Corrective Measures in the case
captioned CURTIS JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SERENITY
TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-02004-JSC
(N.D. Cal.).

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to invalidate
releases signed by former and current Serenity drivers and to
issue corrective notice to the Fair Labor Standards Act class.

Plaintiff mortuary drivers allege they were misclassified by
Serenity Transportation, Inc., as independent contractors and thus
denied the benefits of California and federal wage-and hour laws.
Plaintiffs also sued SCI and the County of Santa Clara under a
joint employer theory, arguing these entities are jointly and
severally liable for Serenity's wage and hour violations.

A letter, which served as Serenity's written communications to
drivers, explains that because of the time, expense, and
uncertainties of litigation, Serenity has decided to offer
monetary compensation to the drivers to resolve potential issues.
Serenity describes the offer as fair and reasonable based on a
review of duration of the driver's time with Serenity and explains
that by signing the release and accepting the offer the driver is
giving up his or her rights as a potential class member for those
claims asserted or related to the issues raised in the lawsuit.
The letter advises the driver that Plaintiffs intend to pursue the
class action on behalf of drivers who worked for Serenity.  The
letter also confirms that the driver's decision as to whether to
accept the offer will not impact the driver's work with
Defendants.

The Release accompanying the letter states in relevant part:
"In exchange for the consideration of Payment as detailed in this
Agreement, Driver, for himself/herself and on behalf of his/her
successors and assigns, does hereby release, acquit and agree to
settlement of any and all claims, actions, causes of action,
demands, rights, damages, costs and expenses whatsoever, known and
unknown, foreseen and unforeseen Claims, that Driver may have
against the Defendants arising out of or in any manner related to
the Ongoing Litigation."

Two Serenity drivers attest that at a meeting with drivers in
around March 2016, David Friedel, Serenity's Chief Operating
Officer, discouraged the drivers from participating in the
lawsuit.  Specifically, Gary Johnson testifies that at that
meeting Friedel warned the drivers that if they participated in
the lawsuit he would have to take us off of rotation and terminate
our contract because our participation in the lawsuit would be a
conflict of interest. Because of these type of statements, Johnson
did not feel at liberty to participate in the lawsuit until he
left Serenity. Johnson opted into the lawsuit on June 20, 2016 and
the next day received a text from Friedel stating: "Guess
apparently I treated you so badly that you had to screw me again."

Robert Felix often heard Friedel speak about the lawsuit. He also
heard Friedel state at a driver meeting in or around March/April
2016 that anyone who joined the lawsuit would no longer work at
Serenity because it would be a conflict of interest. Felix
understood from this meeting that if he joined the lawsuit he
would be fired.  In June, Friedel called Felix into his office and
said the Plaintiffs are going to lose because he is not going to
pay a dime and that anyone who joined the lawsuit was against him.
Friedel then asked Felix to sign the Release. Felix said he did
not want to sign.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to invalidate the Releases and for a
corrective FLSA notice to be sent to the conditionally certified
class. The parties subsequently attended a settlement conference,
and following that, agreed to focus on discovery and motions
regarding whether the non-Serenity defendants are liable as joint
employers. Thereafter the parties stipulated to Plaintiffs filing
a Fifth Amended Complaint.

The Court credits the testimony of drivers Johnson and Felix that
at a drivers meeting in or around March 2016, Friedel told the
drivers that anyone who joined the lawsuit would have a conflict
of interest and therefore could not work at Serenity.

Serenity's protest that only a few drivers have submitted
declarations in support of Plaintiffs' motion misses the point,
the Court said.  Plaintiffs bring this motion precisely because
Serenity discouraged drivers from participating in this lawsuit.
To accept Serenity's argument would reward employers for engaging
in such conduct since the more successful they are at discouraging
drivers from participating the more likely they are to prevent any
judicial curative action.

Because the Court finds that Serenity actively discouraged its
current drivers from participating in this lawsuit, their releases
must be invalidated and curative notice issued.

In addition to Serenity's active discouragement, Friedel's letter
and the Release include misinformation and omissions that require
that all of the Releases, including those executed by former
drivers, be invalidated.

First, the Release encompassed all claims in the lawsuit,
including the FSLA claims. Neither the Release nor the letter told
the drivers that the settlement of FLSA claims requires court
approval. This omission was improper.

Second, the Release incorrectly states on whose behalf the claims
in this litigation were being brought. The Release advised the
drivers that Plaintiffs are seeking to pursue claims for drivers
who worked from May 16, 2013 to the present. Not so. The Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) claim reaches drivers who worked from May
2011 to the present.

Third, the Release tells the driver that by signing the Release he
agrees to opt out of the "the Ongoing Litigation and not
participate in future.

Fourth, Serenity did not provide the Fourth Amended Complaint, or
any version of the complaint, to the drivers when it presented
them with the Release. Instead, Friedel claims that he emailed the
Fourth Amended Complaint to the drivers a few days before they
received the release in the mail.

These misstatements and omissions require invalidating the Release
as to all drivers and sending curative notice to all drivers
notifying them that their releases are invalid and reinstating the
FLSA opt in period for a period of 60 days from the sending of new
notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017, Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybgvdceefrom Leagle.com.

Curtis Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Peter Scott Rukin --
prukin@rukinhyland.com --  Rukin Hyland LLP.

Curtis Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica Lee Riggin --
jriggin@rukinhyland.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP & Valerie Jean Brender
-- vbrender@rukinhyland.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP.
Gary Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Peter Scott Rukin, Rukin
Hyland LLP, Jessica Lee Riggin, Rukin Hyland LLP & Valerie Jean
Brender, Rukin Hyland LLP.

Serenity Transportation, Inc., Defendant, represented by William
Frederick -wschauman@schauman-hubins.com -- Schauman, Schauman &
Hubins.

David Friedel, Defendant, represented by William Frederick
Schauman, Schauman & Hubins.

Service Corporation International, Inc., Defendant, represented by
John A. Mason -- info@gurneelaw.com -- Gurnee Mason & Forestiere
LLP.

SCI California Funeral Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Steven Hazard Gurnee, Gurnee, Mason & Forestiere LLP, Candace
Holly Shirley, Gurnee Mason Forestiere LLP, 2240 Douglas Blvd #
150. Roseville, CA 95661. & William Frederick Schauman, Schauman &
Hubins.

County of Santa Clara, Defendant, represented by Nancy Joan Clark,
Office of County Counsel.

Service Corporation International, Inc., Cross-claimant,
represented by John A. Mason, Gurnee Mason & Forestiere LLP.


SIGNATURE HEALTH: Henderson Hits Biometrics Data Retention Policy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maurice Henderson, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Signature Health Care Services,
LLC, Aurora Chicago Lakeshore Hospital, LLC and Kronos
Incorporated (Respondent-In-Discovery), Case No. 2017-CH-12686,
(Ill. Ch., September 19, 2017), seeks statutory damages for
violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA),
injunctive and other equitable relief including an order requiring
Defendants to collect, store, and use biometric identifiers or
biometric information in compliance with the BIPA, reasonable
litigation expenses and attorneys' fees, prejudgment and post-
judgment interest and such other and further relief.

Defendants operate private psychiatric hospital companies
providing a variety of mental health and substance abuse treatment
programs, including through its subsidiary Defendant ACLH at
Chicago Lakeshore Hospital.

Employees are required to scan their fingerprint in its biometric
time tracking system that requires employees to use their
fingerprint as a means of authentication. Defendants failed to
properly inform Plaintiff the specific purpose and length of time
for which their fingerprints were being collected, stored and used
and failed to disclose retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently destroying such records as well as a written release
from Plaintiff to collect, capture, or otherwise obtain their
fingerprints. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jay Edelson, Esq.
      Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
      Sydney M. Janzen, Esq.
      EDELSON PC
      350 N. LaSalle, 13th Floor
      Chicago, IL 60654
      Tel: (312) 589-6370
      Email: brichman@edelson.com
             jedelson@edelson.com
             sjanzen@edelson.com

             - and -

      David Fish, Esq.
      John Kunze, Esq.
      THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
      200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
      Naperville, IL 60563
      Tel: (630) 355-7590
      Fax: (630) 778-0400
      Email: fish@fishlawfirm.com
             jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


STATE FARM: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Insurance Suit Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the Orders of the District Court denying the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss an insurance coverage lawsuit.

State Farm petitioned for a writ of mandamus, asking the Eighth
Circuit to vacate what it alleges are overly-burdensome discovery
orders.

A hailstorm struck Amanda LaBrier's home in St. Louis, Missouri,
damaging the home's exterior roof, siding, and gutters.  LaBrier
filed a property damage claim with State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company under the Coverage A Dwelling section of her State Farm
Homeowners Policy. State Farm's adjuster inspected LaBrier's home,
determined the dwelling had suffered covered property damage.

Based upon its decision denying State Farm's motion to dismiss,
the district court ordered full discovery before a class was
certified and appointed a special master to supervise discovery
disputes.  After much wrangling over access to State Farm's
claims-adjusting database and other issues, the special master in
Order No. 4 ordered State Farm to answer interrogatories asking it
to identify for all 144,900 putative class members (i) labor
depreciation that was actually withheld, (ii) the date labor
depreciation was withheld, (iii) any labor depreciation State Farm
subsequently paid as replacement cost benefits, and (iv) any facts
that support State Farm's affirmative defenses.

The district court overruled State Farm's objections to Order No.
4, concluding that State Farm failed to establish that the Order
caused an undue burden in light of the discovery's relevance and
State Farm's refusal to provide another method to discover the
information.

On appeal, State Farm challenges the district court's
determination that common issues predominate.  In certifying the
class, the district court noted (i) the overarching, undisputed,
and common fact of State Farm's practice of withholding payment
from all its insureds for the depreciated labor component, and
(ii) the court's prior resolution of a central legal question that
the terms 'actual cash value' and 'depreciation' as used in State
Farm's policy are ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the
insureds.

The basic premise of traditional property insurance is the concept
of indemnity.  The insured who suffers a covered loss is entitled
to receive full, but not more than full, value for the loss
suffered, to be made whole but not be put in a better position
than before the loss. Policies that provide this level of coverage
are universally known as actual cash value policies. The
limitation of property loss coverage to the insured's actual loss
serves the public policy of preventing over-insurance, which can
be an inducement to destroy property in order to procure the
insurance upon it.

Under Missouri law, actual cash value means a depreciated sum, the
difference between the reasonable value of the property
immediately before and immediately after the loss. The district
court erred in concluding that Missouri law does not define actual
cash value and therefore the term is ambiguous absent a definition
in the policy.

Depreciation is a concept with a well understood meaning, decline
in an asset's value because of use, wear, obsolescence, or age.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a policy defining
actual cash value as replacement cost less a deduction that
reflects depreciation, age, condition and obsolescence was
unambiguous. As a means of estimating an asset's value, the
concept of depreciation is unambiguous, the district court's
contrary conclusion notwithstanding. But the method of calculating
a depreciation deduction is subject to conflicting opinion as to
the reasonableness of the resulting estimate.

By adhering to the core principle of indemnity, which limits the
insured's covered loss to the value of the damaged asset at the
time of the loss, actual cash value policies work a hardship,
particularly when the insured suffers a partial loss and needs to
repair or replace the damaged component with a more valuable new
item in order to restore use of the entire dwelling.

In coming to this conclusion, the district court ignored what
State Farm was estimating the depreciated value of the damaged
property at the time of loss. A more precise estimate of that
value would depreciate the full original cost of the asset to
account for its decline in value over time. State Farm's
depreciation method reasonably substitutes replacement cost for
original cost because that value is more readily available and to
the insured's advantage.

But to avoid further distorting the value estimate, State Farm
depreciates the full replacement cost of the asset, typically, the
amount a contractor will charge to replace the roof and other
damaged parts, which includes the cost to install as well as the
cost of materials. In evaluating a depreciation method in this
context, it matters not whether labor is customarily depreciated
in other business accounting contexts. The question is whether
depreciating what a contractor will charge to replace the partial
loss is a reasonable method of estimating the difference in value
of the property immediately before and immediately after the loss.
As the district court never addressed this question, its decision
in LaBrier must be reversed, the Eighth Circuit held.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court of Missouri,
which will not accept certified questions of Missouri law from a
federal court, would likewise conclude that this way of resolving
the issue is consistent with Missouri law as reflected in Wells
and Missouri Court of Appeals decisions applying Wells.

Accordingly, although the Eighth Circuit did not rule out the
possibility that State Farm's use of the Xactimate estimating
methodology would produce an unreasonable estimate of the actual
cash value of some partial losses, this issue may only be
determined based on all the facts surrounding a particular
insured's partial loss. Thus, there are no predominant common
facts at issue, and the decision certifying a class in LaBrier III
must be reversed and the district court's orders upholding
premature classwide discovery in LaBrier II must be vacated.

The appeals case is In re: State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant, Amanda LaBrier,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee. Chamber of Commerce of the United
States; Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company; Safeco Insurance
Company of America; Lawyers for Civil Justice; Allstate Insurance
Company; American Family Mutual Insurance Company; American
Insurance Association; Property Casualty Insurers Association of
America; Amici on Behalf of Petitioner/Appellant, United Policy
Holders, Amicus on Behalf of Respondent/Appellee. Nos. 16-3185,
16-3562. (8th Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Eight Circuit's September 25, 2017, Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybmbf4b5Leagle.com.

David T. Butsch --  info@butschroberts.com -- for Respondent.

Daniel Wilke, 2708 Olive St, St. Louis, MO 63103, USA, for
Petitioner.

Joe David Jacobson -- Jacobson@ArchCityLawyers.com -- for
Respondent.

Robert T. Adams -- rtadams@shb.com -- for Amicus on Behalf of
Petitioner.

Carter G. Phillips -- CPHILLIPS@SIDLEY.COM -- for Amicus on Behalf
of Petitioner.

Thomas Joseph Snodgrass -- jsnodgrass@larsonking.com -- for
Respondent.

Daniel E. Gustafson, 120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600,
Minneapolis, MN 55402 for Respondent.

Joseph Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- for Petitioner.
Heidi Dalenberg -- hdalenberg@rshc-law.com -- for Petitioner.
John Robert Keena -- jkeena@hjlawfirm.com -- for Amicus on Behalf
of Respondent.

Robert D. Keeling, for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Mark L. Hanover, 233 S Wacker Dr # 8000, Chicago, IL 60606, USA,
for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Elizabeth Ferrick, 233 S Wacker Dr # 8000, Chicago, IL 60606, USA,
for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Christopher E. Roberts -- croberts@butschroberts.com -- for
Respondent.

Kathryn L. Comerford Todd, for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Sheldon Gilbert, 145 King Street West, Suite 1920, Toronto, ON,
M5H 1J8 for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Wendy F. Lumish -- wendy.lumish@bowmanandbrooke.com --  for Amicus
on Behalf of Petitioner.

Leah R. Bruno, 233 South Wacker DriveSuite 7800Chicago, IL 60606-
6404, for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Sean Daniel Jordan, 100 Congress Ave., Suite 1100, Austin, TX
78701, for Amicus on Behalf of Petitioner.

Mark Alan Behrens -- mbehrens@shb.com -- for Amicus on Behalf of
Petitioner.


SUBWAY: Jackson Lewis Attorney Discusses Class Action Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott P. Jang, Esq. -- Scott.Jang@jacksonlewis.com -- of Jackson
Lewis PC, in an article for Lexology, reports that "A class action
that 'seeks only worthless benefits for the class' and 'yields
[only] fees for class counsel' is 'no better than a racket' and
'should be dismissed out of hand.'" In re Subway Footlong Sandwich
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16260, at *3
(7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder
Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2016)). With those words, the
Seventh Circuit put an end to a putative class action spawned by a
Subway sandwich, a measuring tape, and a Facebook post that went
viral.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, an Australian teenager discovered that his "footlong"
Subway sandwich measured only 11 inches, not 12.  The teenager
posted a picture of his sandwich and a tape measure on Facebook,
and the post went viral.  It also spawned a putative class action.

However, early discovery confirmed that the natural baking process
for Subway's bread created minor variations in the sizes of the
"footlong" sandwiches, even if the same amount of dough was used.
Thus, in the absence of any damages, the plaintiff's attorneys
shifted focus and sought certification for injunctive relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

Ultimately, the case settled, with Subway agreeing to take steps
that might help further ensure that its "footlong" sandwiches
would bake-out to the full 12 inches. In return, class counsel
received $520,000 in attorney's fees and each class representative
received $500.  But Theodore Frank, a well-known class action
objector, believed the settlement was worthless, and appealed the
settlement to the Seventh Circuit.

THE DECISION

The Seventh Circuit agreed with Mr. Frank and held that the
putative class action should not have been certified and the
settlement should not have been approved because the putative
class action and settlement offered "zero benefits for the class."
Id. at *14.  Before the settlement, Subway customers could be
fairly (but not entirely) certain that their "footlong" sandwiches
would be 12 inches long: Subway used uniform quantities of dough
that were meant to bake to 12 inches.  After the settlement,
nothing really changed. Assuming implementation of the proposed
injunctive relief, Subway customers still could only be fairly
(but not entirely) certain that their "footlong" sandwiches would
be 12 inches long.  As both parties acknowledged, "because of the
inherent variability in food production and the bread baking
process, [Subway] will never be able to guarantee that each loaf
of bread will always be exactly 12 inches or greater in length
after baking." Id. at *13.  Finding this all "utterly worthless,"
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the settlement only served to
enrich class counsel and, to a lesser extent, the class
representatives, and the settlement should not have been approved
and the class action decertified. Id.

CONCLUSION

The impact of this decision may be curtailed by the fact that this
case involved an injunctive class action under Rule 23(b)(2).
Still, it is a win for practicality and commonsense, and it may
give pause to the next overly zealous attorney who tries to make a
quick fortune off a Facebook post gone viral. [GN]


SUNBELT RENTALS: Settles Rental Protection Charge Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
James Waite, Esq., in an article for Rental Management, wrote that
a $10 million settlement was publicly announced in a large class-
action lawsuit pursued by multiple law firms against Sunbelt
Rentals.  The rental company was sued in a class action, which
consolidated five lawsuits filed in five different states --
Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia and Nevada -- by five
plaintiffs, including Out Welders, All-South Subcontractors,
Quality Assured Industrial Coatings, Brown Heating & Air
Conditioning and Excel Concrete Construction.

What was alleged: The plaintiffs sought damages for three alleged
transgressions -- that the rental company charged more than its
rental contract allowed for providing fuel when equipment was
returned with less than a full tank; that the rental company
charged more than its rental contract allowed for transporting the
rental company's equipment between its rental stores and
customers' job sites; and that the rental company's rental
protection program charge was excessive and was imposed only for
the purpose of unlawfully enhancing the rental company's profits.

The outcome: The case was settled for approximately $10 million,
with roughly a third of that going to the plaintiff's attorneys
and the remainder, less court costs, administrative expenses and
certain incentive awards, was divided among the class plaintiffs,
of whom there are presumed to be at least 1,000.  The "incentive
awards" -- between $15,000 and $30,000 each -- will be paid to the
original five plaintiffs identified above as incentives for their
time and efforts on behalf of the settlement class.

The settlement covers all "class plaintiffs" or "members,"
meaning, subject to certain exclusions, anyone within the United
States who entered into a rental contract with the rental company
during the class period running from Dec. 23, 2013, through
Nov. 10, 2015, for most -- though the class period was expanded
for the rental company's stores located in the five original
states -- if the customer actually paid one or more of the
complained of charges and the rental contract the customer entered
into with the rental company contained the following language:

"RENTAL RATES . . . Customer is responsible for . . . (ii)
delivery and pickup costs to and from the Store; . . . (vi) fuel
used during the Rental Period (Customer may either return the
Equipment fully fueled or a fuel charge shall be assessed
(designed to cover the rental company's direct and indirect costs
of refueling the Equipment)) . . ."

The settlement agreement limits the amount any class plaintiff,
other than the original five, may receive to $5,000 and further
restricts the amounts each such class member may receive to 25
percent of the subject "refueling charges" and 10 percent of the
subject "transportation surcharges" paid by the class member,
subject to further adjustment by the court on equitable grounds.
It appears no amount was agreed upon with respect to the
plaintiff's rental protection plan (RPP) claim, though going
forward, the rental company will be required to make certain
additional disclosures in its rental contract regarding that
program.

The settlement effectively settles and releases all of the class
members' claims against the rental company, including known and
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, contingent or non-contingent
claims regarding the complained charges for refueling,
transportation and/or RPP, which arose during the above referenced
class period(s).

The settlement agreement also requires the rental company to make
certain additional and lengthy disclosures on the reverse side of
its form rental contract regarding its rental rates, fuel charges
and rental protection plan.  It isn't yet clear how all of this
additional language will be made to fit on an already crowded
document or, for that matter, how this agreement will impact the
rental company's online transaction processing efforts.  If there
is no "reverse side" of an electronic rental contract, is
compliance, by definition, impossible, partially possible or
unnecessary?

It's important to remember that by entering into the settlement
agreement, the rental company is admitting no wrongdoing -- and,
as outlined below, it's a little difficult to identify much that
the rental company really did wrong or differently from most other
rental companies.  That said, this case offers some valuable
takeaways for rental companies.

Fuel charges. The plaintiffs' first claim was based on their
assertion that the rental company had breached its own rental
contract by charging more than the contract allowed for refueling.
As expressed in the plaintiffs' complaint, ". . . the contract
expressly limits the amount the rental company can charge for fuel
to 'the rental company's direct and indirect costs of refueling
the equipment.'" The plaintiffs simply alleged that the rental
company charged more than the total of its direct and indirect
costs for the fuel it provided.  Indirect costs are notoriously
difficult to account for and quantify.  Consequently, some might
be tempted to ask, "Why say anything about direct and indirect
costs in the first place?" Saying nothing might have been
preferable in this case, but it also might have opened the company
up to potential claims for everything from selling fuel without a
proper reseller's license to requiring the collection of fuel
taxes and price gouging. Less quantifiable terms like "indirect"
actually can be helpful to rental operators in many cases,
particularly when seeking recoveries of their own costs against
recalcitrant customers.  Rental operators probably are better off
using terms like "convenience" when addressing these types of
charges primarily because the term "convenience" doesn't
necessarily tie itself to a determination of the rental company's
related expenses.

Transportation charges. The plaintiffs also sought to use the
rental company's own rental contract against it with respect to
transportation charges.  Here, they argued that the contract
language limited the rental company's right to recover delivery
and retrieval charges to its own costs of making such
delivery(ies) and retrieval(s).  The plaintiffs' reading of the
contract language seems a bit of a stretch.  The contract reads in
pertinent part: "Customer is responsible for . . .(ii) delivery
and pickup costs to and from the Store . . ." In my opinion, that
language seems to speak more to the customer's agreement to pay
the transportation costs, whatever the rental company might be
charging, than it does to the rental company's own cost of
providing transportation.  However, this is where even a seemingly
minor interpretational issue can be costly.  The "contra
proferentem" rule of contract interpretation says essentially,
where an ambiguity exists in a contract, that ambiguity will be
interpreted against the drafter of the contract.  Here, rather
than leaving to the court the question of whether a true ambiguity
existed, the rental company elected to settle the case.  What can
be learned is that ultimately, as was the case with fuel charges,
it's probably best for rental operators to separate the concepts
of the cost to the rental company and the convenience to the
customer.  Consequently, including language such as: "You agree to
pay our charges [not our costs] for delivery and/or retrieval of
the rented item(s) as set forth on page 1" or words to that effect
is probably the safest route.  Efforts to separate cost and
convenience concepts don't always rule out fairness- or
disclosure-related claims, but they almost certainly provide less
ammunition for potential plaintiffs and their lawyers.

Rental protection program. It appears nothing will be paid by the
rental company on the plaintiffs' RPP claim.  The rental company
will, however, be including some additional disclosures on the
reverse side of or somewhere on its rental contract, none of which
appears to yield significant new information for rental operators.
The rental company appears to be using a modified form of a 10
percent deductible, rather than a hard dollar limit -- something I
encourage my clients to do as well.

This article is provided for informational purposes only and is
not intended to serve as a comprehensive explanation of the case,
the settlement, or any party's rights or remedies with respect
thereto.  For case pleadings, forms and additional information, go
to sbrfeesettlement.com or contact the case administrator at 855-
862-9823 or sbrfeesettlement@administratorclassaction.com.

Charging appropriately for transportation and refueling can be
tricky for rental operators.  Sometimes, less is more,
particularly when attempting to explain those charges in your
rental contract. Small nuances can have enormous consequences. You
now have 10 million reasons for making certain they are addressed
properly. RM

James Waite, Esq., is a business lawyer with more than 20 years in
the equipment rental industry.  He authored the American Rental
Association (ARA) book on rental contracts and represents
equipment lessors throughout North America on a wide range of
issues, including negotiating and drafting rental contracts,
purchase options and other rental-related agreements, as well as
buying, selling rental companies and their equipment.  He can be
reached at 866-582-2586 or j.waite@wwlegal.net. [GN]


SUN PRODUCTS: Court Narrows Claims in Laundry Detergent Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the
case captioned SHAYA EIDELMAN, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE SUN PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Defendants, No. 16-cv-3914 (NSR)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Shaya Eidelman brings this proposed class action against
the Sun Products Corporation and Costco Wholesale Corporation
alleging violations of New York's General Business Law (GBL)
Sections 349 and 350, and alleging claims of negligent
misrepresentation, unjust enrichment and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff alleges that, he entered Costco in Nanuet, New York,
with the intention of purchasing liquid laundry detergent free
from any irritant chemical ingredients, and recommended by
dermatologists.  The detergent bottle purchased by Plaintiff bore
a label indicating that the Product was from the #1 Detergent
Brand Recommended by Dermatologists for Sensitive Skin (Label),
with the words from the presented in an "excessively small" font
size, as compared to the remainder of the text, and the words
recommended by dermatologists" in bold.  Plaintiff also alleges
that the Detergent contains a number of known skin irritants, but
that the ingredients for the Detergent are not listed on the
bottle, nor easily accessible online.

Plaintiff asserts that the Label violates GBL Sections 349 and 350
because it falsely implies that the actual Detergent in question
is recommended by dermatologists for those with sensitive skin
based upon the ambiguity as to which, if any, of the brand's
product detergents are excluded from the dermatologists'
recommendation, and the placement, font size and general
presentation of key qualifying terms on the Label.

Even assuming the entire text of the Label is fully visible and
easily read, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that no
reasonable consumer could be misled into believing that the Label
indicates that both the brand, and in turn, the brand product
bearing the actual Label, are recommended by dermatologists for
sensitive skin.  Notably, whether an interpretation is
unreasonable as a matter of law is generally reached at this stage
only where, for instance, a plaintiffs claims as to the
impressions that a reasonable consumer might draw are patently
implausible or unrealistic.

Nor do the cases cited by Defendant indicate a ruling to the
contrary is required, as these cases are easily distinguishable
from the instant action on this issue. Because the Court finds
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Label was misleading, his
GBL claims survive at this stage.

In Hughes, Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F.Supp.2d 439, the Court
relied on the volume and content of the representations made by
the defendant-manufacturer, taken together, to determine that the
plaintiff-consumer had plausibly alleged a special relationship.

In the instant action, even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's
favor as the nonmoving party, the Court cannot find that the
representations made by Sun Products on their website and Label
that their products are clinically proven to be gentle on skin,
and are #1 recommended by dermatologists and allergists resemble
the instances catalogued in Hughes in volume and substance.

Thus, the Court cannot conclude, with Hughes as the metric, that
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged facts sufficient for the Court to
infer that the special relationship necessary for a negligent
misrepresentation claim is present here. Thus, the Court cannot
find that Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim, as
asserted, can overcome the presumption that advertisements are
generally insufficient to establish such a relationship. Courts
have consistently held that advertisements alone are not
sufficient to establish a special relationship.  Thus, the Court
dismisses this claim without prejudice.

Defendants do not cite a single case in which a court dismissed an
unjust enrichment claim adequately alleged against the retailer
for its receipt of payment for a product bearing an allegedly
deceptive label affixed by the manufacturer.

Because Plaintiff alleges a separate claim of unjust enrichment
against Costco as the direct recipient of a premium paid for an
allegedly deceptively mislabeled product, at this stage, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim for unjust
enrichment against this Defendant.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for
injunctive relief. Plaintiff neglects to respond to Defendants'
argument. On this basis, the Court may deem this claim abandoned.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for injunctive
relief on both bases.  The Court does not, however, take any
position as to whether injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy
for Plaintiffs surviving claims, and such relief may only be
granted upon a proper showing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Opinion and Order is Available at http://tinyurl.com/ybfn29qpfrom
Leagle.com.

Shaya Eidelman, Plaintiff, represented by Jay I. Brody,
Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 747 Chestnut Ridge Rd,
Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977-6224.

Shaya Eidelman, Plaintiff, represented by Gary Steven Graifman,
Kantrowitz Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C.. 747 Chestnut Ridge Rd,
Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977-6224

The Sun Products Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brad W.
Seiling -bseiling@manatt.com --  Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor
& Kimo S. Peluso -- kpeluso@shertremonte.com -- Sher Tremonte LLP.
Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brad W.
Seiling, Manatt, Phelps, Phillips & Kantor & Kimo S. Peluso, Sher
Tremonte LLP.


TATA CONSULTANCY: Defends Suit Over Anti-White Hiring Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
Edvard Pettersson, writing for Economic Times, reports that as
India's Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. is squeezed by the Trump
administration to reduce the use of overseas workers for U.S.
jobs, the information technology outsourcing giant is also
fighting claims in court that its hiring practices are anti-
American.

TCS, Asia's largest software maker, and Infosys Ltd., a rival
Indian outsourcing firm, are both embroiled in civil rights
lawsuits accusing them of discriminating against white IT workers
that predate Donald Trump's election last year.

Even as the outsourcers are responding to the president's
protectionist agenda by hiring more Americans in the U.S., Mumbai-
based TCS cites its reliance on foreign guest-worker visas as a
defense against the bias claims.

The men suing TCS allege discriminatory hiring practices explain
why as much as 79 percent of its U.S. workforce is South Asian
when that group makes up only 12.5 percent of the relevant labor
market in the U.S.

But the company contends it's misleading to include employees
hired in India to work temporarily and "legally" in the U.S., many
with H1-B visas for specially skilled employees.  It also says
more than 40 percent of its job applicants are South Asians and
that not everyone is keen on working for an India-based company or
willing to relocate to take a job.

Summary Judgment
At a hearing on Oct. 3 in federal court in Oakland, California, on
whether to dismiss the case entirely, U.S. District Judge Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers said she would take the issue under submission.
She indicated that she would deny the motion for summary judgment,
at least as far as it involves white U.S. employees who were fired
from Tata.  She was less impressed by the evidence that Tata
discriminates against white job applicants.

She told Tata's lawyers that the plaintiffs "have evidence that
they can present to a jury.  Whether or not it is persuasive, I am
not here to decide."

The judge didn't rule on whether to certify the suit as a class
action, which would expand it to include potentially of thousands
of American workers who either weren't hired or were fired by TCS
because of their race over the past six years.

If the case does proceed as a class action, it may encourage white
Americans to pursue similar suits against other companies with
heavily foreign workforces, said Andra Greene -- agreene@irell.com
-- a lawyer with Irell & Manella LLP in Newport Beach, California,
who isn't involved in the TCS suit.

'Masters' at Statistics
Ms. Greene also said it's a "close" call which side's numerical
analysis will prevail in court.  "People are masters at using
statistics to argue their point," she said.

After campaigning on a pledge to punish American companies for
moving jobs overseas, Trump put pressure on the offshore IT
servicing firms in April when he signed an executive order aimed
at overhauling the work-visa programs they use to bring workers to
the U.S.  The next month, Infosys, which employs about 200,000
people around the world, said it planned to hire 10,000 Americans
over the next two years.

The lawsuit against TCS was filed in 2015 by a white IT worker who
claimed he was subject to "substantial anti-American sentiment"
within the company and was ultimately terminated within 20 months
despite having almost 20 years of experience in the field.  He was
later replaced as the lead plaintiff by two other men.

One, Brian Buchanan, said he worked at Southern California Edison
for 28 years when the company outsourced the bulk of its IT work
to TCS.  He was among 400 people terminated, but said he was asked
to stay on for a few months to train the Indian TCS employees that
were replacing him.  Mr. Buchanan claims that at a job fair
organized for the employees losing their jobs, the South Asian TCS
regional manager was dismissive of interest in a position.

TCS says Mr. Buchanan's experience doesn't prove he was a victim
of bias.  He has "no idea" whether the application process was
discriminatory because he didn't attend any of the town hall
meetings he was invited to during the Edison transition to learn
about open positions with TCS and how to apply for them -- and he
didn't apply for a specific job, the company said in a court
filing.

"Buchanan's mere conjecture that he would have received more
attention at the job fair if he were not an 'old bald white man'
is not supported by any facts in the record," lawyers for TCS
wrote.

While the company has a stronger defense if the men suing can't
point to any specific evidence that they were mistreated because
they aren't South Asian, that won't necessarily carry the day, Ms.
Greene said.

"Usually they don't tell you I'm not hiring you because you're
white," she said.

'Corporate Directive'
As for the broader claim that TCS engages in institutional
discrimination against Americans, the plaintiffs claim the "highly
skewed" workforce results from "a corporate directive to favor
visa-ready South Asian Indian national candidates to fill U.S.
positions and the use of third-party recruiters that forward to
Tata a substantial percentage of South Asian Indian national
candidates."

The company contends there's a "non-discriminatory" explanation
that includes its use of workers with guest visas.

"These individuals are existing employees, were hired in India,
and are thus hired from a completely different labor market," the
company said in a filing.  "They cannot be used to create a
statistical disparity between TCS' workforce and the United States
labor market."

The company is "is confident that its evidence, data, and expert
analysis" will persuade the judge not to let the case to advance
as a class action and expects the claims will be thrown out, said
Benjamin Trounson, a spokesman for TCS in North America.

The plaintiffs' lawyers declined to comment ahead of the Oct. 2
hearing.

The four workers who sued Infosys over similar allegations four
years ago in Milwaukee are represented by the same law firm that
filed the TCS suit. The Infosys case is also awaiting a judge's
decision on dueling requests for dismissal and class-action
status.

The TCS case is Heldt v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., 15-cv-
01696, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
(Oakland). [GN]


TGI FRIDAY'S: Averts Drink Pricing Fraud Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a lawsuit accusing restaurant
chain TGI Friday's violated consumer fraud laws with its drink
pricing can't go ahead as a class action that could have included
millions of members, but a similar case involving Carrabba's
Italian Grill restaurants can, New Jersey's state Supreme Court
ruled on Oct. 4.

Debra Dugan sued TGI Friday's after she was charged one price for
a drink at the bar and a higher price at a table in 2008.  The
restaurant didn't list drink prices on its menus, according to the
lawsuit.

A lower court in 2012 granted class-action status to anyone who
ordered unpriced drinks at 14 of the company's restaurants in
New Jersey from 2004 through 2014.  TGI Friday's had estimated
that could have amounted to as many as 14 million customers,
according to court filings. But the plaintiffs disputed that
figure.

According to the lawsuit, TGI Friday's conducted research that
showed that customers spent an average of $1.72 less on drinks if
the prices were displayed than if the prices weren't displayed.
The lawsuit sought to prove that that amount could be considered a
loss for anyone who had ordered a drink at the restaurants.

The Oct. 4 5-1 ruling rejected that argument, but said individual
claims could still proceed.

Justice Barry Albin, the sole dissenter, wrote that TGI Friday's
"engaged in an unconscionable commercial practice that caused an
ascertainable loss to its patrons" and that the majority's
decision "ensures that thousands of patrons victimized by TGIF's
violation of our consumer-fraud laws have no meaningful remedy."

In the similar case involving Carrabba's Italian Grill
restaurants, the court ruled a class action claim could proceed if
the definition of the class is narrow.

In the Carrabba's lawsuit, a customer said he was charged $3.25
for a beer and $4.25 for a second beer of the same brand and size
and was told the restaurant's computer automatically changed the
prices at certain times.

The court ruled that the suit can proceed as a class action "if
the class is limited to claimants who were charged different
prices for beverages of the same brand, type, and volume in the
course of the same restaurant visit."

Lawyers for the plaintiff have estimated the class would include
about 263,000 customers, according to the Oct. 4 ruling.

Attorneys representing Dugan, TGI Friday's and Carrabba's didn't
immediately return messages seeking comment on Oct. 5. [GN]


TOYOTA MOTOR: Can't Compel Arbitration in "Gibson" Warranty Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Jill L. Gibson, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No. 4:17-577-RMG (D. S.C.),
Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Florence Division, denied the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, or, in the alternative,
to dismiss the complaint.

The Plaintiff alleges she jointly owned a 2009 Toyota Camry with
her mother, Wanda Jeffers.  Ms. Jeffers originally leased the
Vehicle on July 31, 2008 from Florence Toyota.  The lease contains
a binding arbitration clause and class action waiver.

The Defendant provided the Vehicle a three-year express warranty,
beginning from the Vehicle's "in service" date.  The express
warranty requires owners to use a "Dispute Settlement Program"
administered by the National Center for Dispute Settlement before
bringing any court action regarding warranty claims.  Ms. Jeffers
later purchased the Vehicle in July 2012, and the Plaintiff
allegedly later acquired a joint ownership interest in the
Vehicle.  The purchase agreement with the seller, "VT INC TSTEE
WOLT" (VT Inc. as trustee for World Omni LT), provided for an "as
is" sale in which the seller disclaimed any express or implied
warranties.

In December 2014, Toyota unilaterally extended express warranty
coverage to May 31, 2017 for claims regarding dashboards degraded
by prolonged exposure to sunlight, under what it called a
"warranty enhancement."  That extension is subject to the "terms,
conditions, and limitations in the original manufacturer's
warranty.  But the Plaintiff alleges the original warranty's
arbitration provider, the National Center for Dispute Settlement,
does not render services associated with extended warranties
provided by Defendants, including the Program.

The Plaintiff alleges the dashboard of the Vehicle is sticky with
holes appearing in it yet Toyota has refused to honor the warranty
extension.  She filed the present action on March 2, 2017,
asserting claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, and failure to make delivery under S.C. Code
Sections 36-2-711 & 36-2-712.

The Defendant moves to compel arbitration, or, alternatively to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to
state a claim.

The Defendant asserts the Plaintiffs claims are moot because the
Defendant offered full relief before this suit was filed.  The
Plaintiff, however, alleges that despite repeated contacts with
the Dealership seeking the dashboard replacement, they have yet to
have their vehicle repaired.  Judge Gergel finds the Defendant's
argument rests on a factual dispute unripe for adjudication before
discovery.  She therefore denied the motion to dismiss as to the
mootness argument without prejudice to the Defendant's ability to
assert the argument after appropriate discovery.

The Defendant next argues that the Plaintiff fails to allege a
breach of the original warranty.  The Judge say this argument is
irrelevant.  The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant breached the
warranty enhancement providing dashboard coverage for the Vehicle.
The Defendant further argues the warranty enhancement is not
enforceable because Toyota received no consideration for the
extension.  But under South Carolina's adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code, an agreement modifying a contract for goods
subject to the U.C.C. needs no consideration to be binding.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not alleged a
breach of the warranty enhancement.  According to the Defendant,
the Plaintiff must allege an anticipatory breach of the warranty
because the extended warranty coverage lasts until July 31, 2018.
Judge Gergel finds that this argument is without merit.  The
Plaintiff alleges the Defendant has actually breached the warranty
enhancement, not that she anticipates the Defendant will breach
the warranty enhancement in the future.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff has adequately alleged
that the Vehicle had an express warranty from the Defendant, that
she had an ownership interest in the Vehicle at a time when it was
covered by the express warranty, and that the  Defendant breached
the warranty.  Since the warranty enhancement incorporated the
terms and conditions of the original warranty, one of which was an
arbitration agreement, Judge Gergel proceeds to consider whether
that arbitration agreement precludes the present suit.

The Plaintiff does not allege she used the Dispute Settlement
Program before filing the present action.  The Plaintiff, however,
alleges that, regarding the warranty enhancement, it is impossible
to attempt to use the Dispute Settlement Program before resorting
to litigation because the entity the Defendant selected to
administer that program does not provide arbitration services for
the warranty enhancement.  Accepting the complaint's well-pleaded
allegations as true, the arbitration agreement in the original
warranty is not enforceable with regard to the warranty
enhancement.

For these reasons, Judge Gergel denied the motion to compel
arbitration or to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Order and Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/uB9quf from Leagle.com.

Jill J Gibson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Hoyt Rowell, III -
- hrowell@rpwb.com -- Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman.

Jill J Gibson, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine H. McElveen --
kmcelveen@rpwb.com -- Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman,
Dennis Charles Dukes, II -- cdukes@rpwb.com -- Richardson Patrick
Westbrook and Brickman, George David Jebaily, Jebaily and Glass,
Mark Charles Tanenbaum, Mark C Tanenbaum PA, Mia Lauren Maness,
Mark C Tanenbaum PA, Robert S. Wood -- bwood@rpwb.com --
Richardson Patrick Westbrook and Brickman & Thomas Christopher
Tuck -- ctuck@rpwb.com -- Richardson Patrick Westbrook and
Brickman.

Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc, Defendant, represented by G. Mark
Phillips -- mark.phillips@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins
Riley and Scarborough & Paul T. Collins --
paul.collins@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Investor to Move Forward with Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Rose Dickey, writing for TechCrunch, reports that Uber's
board of directors unanimously voted on Oct. 3 to move forward
with a proposed investment by SoftBank and Dragoneer Investment
Group. The deal isn't finalized just yet, so it's not clear how
much money the firms will invest in Uber.  As TechCrunch
previously reported, the amount could be between $8 billion and
$10 billion.

"After welcoming its new directors Ursula Burns and John Thain,
the Board voted unanimously to move forward with the proposed
investment by SoftBank and with governance changes that would
strengthen its independence and ensure equality among all
shareholders," the board said in a statement to TechCrunch.
"SoftBank's interest is an incredible vote of confidence in Uber's
business and long-term potential, and we look forward to
finalizing the investment in the coming weeks."

Uber appointed Burns and Thain to the board, even though SoftBank
reportedly wanted those seats.  The board of directors also voted
to remove super-voting rights from some shareholders, Axios
reports.  What the board of directors reportedly did not approve
was making changes that would formally prevent former Uber CEO
Travis Kalanick from regaining control of the company. However,
the changes did reportedly reduce Mr. Kalanick's board power.

"The Board came together collaboratively and took a major step
forward in Uber's journey to becoming a world class public
company, Mr. Kalanick said in a statement.  "We approved moving
forward with the Softbank transaction and reached unanimous
agreement on a new governance framework that will serve Uber well.
Under Dara's leadership and with strong guidance from the Board,
we should expect great things ahead for Uber."

SoftBank has been making headlines in the tech industry as of
late.  After raising a $100 billion fund, it's invested in ride-
hailing companies that rival Uber, and now Uber itself.

While Uber, the board and Mr. Kalanick see this as a win, Uber
investor Shervin Pishevar is not on board with the Board.  In a
statement, Mr. Pishevar said:

"Be careful what you wish for...

They may think they have won a battle but rest assured they will
lose the war.

After the Board decision, stripping early employees and others of
the voting rights they bargained for, we are moving forward with a
class action lawsuit.  We have given full authority to our
attorneys to pursue any and all legal actions across the globe to
bring justice for those wronged by this action.

The board's action was unfair and illegal and we will be
relentless in rectifying this wrong.

We will hold these people accountable under the law.

The action by the board was the culmination of a blatant bait and
switch, essentially robbing loyal employees, including the more
than 200 early founding Uber employees and advisors, of their hard
earned shareholder rights worth billions in value.  The action is
a naked violation and repudiation of those rights.

We will not rest until the employees rights are fully vindicated."
[GN]


UNITED FEDERAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Fund Transfer Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
in the case captioned TONYA GUNTER, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, DOES 1-5 inclusive and ROE CORPORATIONS 6-10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-00483-MMD-WGC (D. Nev.). Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification is granted.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Tonya Gunter's Motion for Class
Certification and Appointment of Counsel and Defendant United
Federal Credit Union's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Gunter has a checking account with United, a credit union. Gunter
alleges that United charged her overdraft fees when she had
sufficient funds in her checking account to cover the
transactions.  Although her actual balance was high enough to
cover the transactions, her available balance was not.
United authorizes overdrafts based on the available balance of
accounts rather than actual balance.  Actual balance refers to the
amount of all funds currently in a client's account.  Available
balance refers to the actual balance less holds, such as debit
holds.  Debit holds occur when clients use a debit card like a
credit card, by swiping it and signing a receipt.  It usually
takes a few days for these transactions to post and reduce the
actual balance of an account.  In the meantime, the hold renders
the amount of the transaction unavailable.  The hold does not
alter the actual balance.

Gunter contends that United's practice violates its contractual
agreements with its clients and that United failed to properly
disclose its practice in violation of federal law.

United moves for summary judgment on Gunter's claim that United
violated the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA). The EFTA's
implementing regulations require financial institutions to
describe the overdraft services they offer and obtain customers'
affirmative consent before authorizing overdrafts.  Gunter argues
that United violated the EFTA and its implementing regulations by
failing to specify whether United authorized overdrafts based on
clients' actual balance or available balance. United argues that
it complied with Regulation E's notice requirements and should
receive the protection of the EFTA's safe harbor provisions.
The Court disagrees with United.

Regulation E implements the EFTA, which protects individual
consumer rights by providing "a basic framework establishing the
rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in
electronic fund . . . transfer systems. The EFTA is a remedial
statute accorded a broad, liberal construction in favor of the
consumer. Regulation E requires financial institutions to obtain
affirmative consent from their clients before assessing overdraft
charges on ATM or one-time debit card transactions To obtain
affirmative consent, financial institutions must provide clients
with an opt-in notice describing the overdraft service among other
things.

The opt-in notice must conform to Regulation E's requirements.
The opt-in notice must be substantially similar to a model form,
Model Form A-9. The opt-in notice must include inter alia a brief
description of the financial institution's overdraft services. The
notice cannot contain any information not specified or otherwise
permitted by paragraph (d), which requires and permits the
inclusion of certain information not relevant here.

The EFTA imposes civil liability for noncompliance with Regulation
E but also contains two safe harbor provisions.  One applies to
any act done in good faith in conformity with any regulation.
Summary judgment cannot be granted under this safe harbor because
it requires resolution of a genuine issue of material fact whether
United acted in good faith when it failed to completely disclose
the terms of the overdraft service. Neither party has yet
addressed whether United acted in good faith in any detail.

United argues that Regulation E precludes additional language that
would explain United authorizes overdrafts based on clients'
available balance rather than actual balance. While it is true
that Regulation E prohibits financial institutions from including
any information not specified in or otherwise permitted by"
paragraph (d), Regulation E requires the opt-in notice to contain
a brief description of the financial institution's overdraft
service and the types of transactions for which a fee or charge
for paying an overdraft may be imposed, including ATM and one-time
debit card transactions. United could have explained that it
authorizes overdrafts based on available balance rather than
actual balance without violating Regulation E because Regulation E
expressly requires financial institutions to describe their
overdraft services.

With respect to the class certification motion, the Court finds
that the numerosity requirement is satisfied here because United's
Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified that a large number of its clients
opted in to its overdraft services. Even if a small percentage of
these clients meet the class criteria, there could easily be
hundreds or thousands of class members.

Members of the proposed Regulation E Class also share the same
legal questions and predicate facts. All proposed class members
opted in to the overdraft service.  All proposed class members
were charged an overdraft fee even though United failed to
properly disclose its method for assessing overdraft fees. Thus,
all proposed class members share the same legal question of
whether United violated Regulation E when it failed to disclose
its method for assessing overdraft fees.

Gunter is a member of the proposed class, though, because she was
charged overdraft fees that were posted by the MISER system.
Plaintiff incurred eight overdraft fees of $30 each for purported
overdraft transactions. United processed those transactions in the
MISER system because Gunter's account had been transferred from
Symitar to MISER at that point. United argues that the former
Griffith account holders do not fit the definition of the class
because their accounts were on the Fiserve ITI system until May
2012.  It is true that some former Griffith clients with similar
claims to Gunter will not be part of the class. For instance,
former Griffith clients who only overdrafted once in April 2012
and never again will not be part of the Positive Balance Class
because those transactions would have been posted by ITI instead
of MISER. That fact does not defeat the typicality of Gunter's
claims, however. Typicality does not require Gunter to seek out
and include in her proposed class all individuals who might share
her claims. Gunter need only show that her breach of contract
claim is typical of the breach of contract claims that could be
brought by members of the proposed class as she defines it, which
she has done.

The named plaintiff, Tonya Gunter, and her counsel, do not appear
to have any conflicts of interest with other proposed class
members. Gunter's interests are wholly aligned with the other
proposed class members because she was charged overdraft fees when
her account had a positive ledger balance. Counsel represents that
she understands that she is pursuing this case on behalf of all
Class members similarly situated and understands she has a duty to
protect the absent Class members. She has actively participated in
the litigation by frequently conferring with class counsel about
the case and its status, assisting class counsel by gathering
documents and other information, responding to written discovery,
and being prepared and willing to testify at deposition and trial
on behalf of the Class if necessary. Counsel's interest appears to
be aligned with the class given their pursuit of these kinds of
lawsuits in other forums. United does not dispute these
assertions.

Plaintiff seeks to satisfy the third prong of Rule 23(b). Under
that provision, a class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is
satisfied and the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

The legal question presented by the proposed Regulation E Class
whether United violated Regulation E also predominates over any
individual characteristics of the proposed class members. Although
some proposed class members received print disclosure forms and
others could opt in by telephone without receiving the disclosure
notice, the legal question predominates over this factual
difference. And that question is whether United's failure to
disclose its practice either because the opt-in agreement was
ambiguous or because the client received no disclosure at all as
in the case of some who opted in by phone violated Regulation E.

In order to determine superiority, the Court looks to the (1)
class members' interest in controlling separate actions; (2) the
existence and extent of any current litigation; (3) the
desirability of the forum; and (4) the difficulties in managing a
class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(c)(A)-(D).

As to prong (1), the proposed class members have little interest
in controlling separate actions because the individual damages are
quite small -- as low as $30.00. Such small damages cannot justify
or sustain individual lawsuits. As to prong (2), there is no
evidence that United is already engaged in litigation relating to
its overdraft practices that would render this class action
duplicative or risk inconsistent outcomes on similar legal
questions. As to prong (3), the forum is appropriate because
United serves clients in the forum state, and United has failed to
contest the forum's desirability. United has thrown its weight
behind prong (4), arguing that it is impossible for Plaintiff's
expert to identify all the members of both proposed classes.
United argues those proposed class members cannot be identified
because the MISER database does not include every daily ACH and
check exception report. United argues that this data is necessary
to accurately assess the balance at the time of presentment.
Gunter responds that the proposed Positive Balance Class may be
defined without reference to daily ACH and check exception
reports. The proposed Positive Balance Class would contain United
clients who were charged an overdraft fee posted by the MISER
system when their ledger balance at the time of the transaction
was equal to or greater than the transaction causing the
overdraft. Daily ACH and check exception reports are irrelevant to
this determination because they do not affect ledger balance.

As to both potential classes, United argues that the lack of ITI
data prevents Olsen from identifying proposed class members. But
ITI data is irrelevant to the Positive Balance Class because the
Positive Balance Class only includes transactions posted by the
MISER system. And ITI data is not necessary to identify members of
the proposed Regulation E Class because Olsen will use the NSF
reports to identify which former Griffith clients are class
members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 25, 2017,
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9w4p8q7from
Leagle.com.

Tonya Gunter, Plaintiff, represented by Jae (Eddie) K. Kim, McCune
-- jkk@mccunewright.com -- Wright Arevalo LLP, pro hac vice.
Tonya Gunter, Plaintiff, represented by James Strenio --
james@kicklawfirm.com -- The Kick Law Firm, APC, Richard D. McCune
-- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP, pro hac
vice, Taras Kick (Kihiczak), The Kick Law Firm, 201 Wilshire Blvd
#350, Santa Monica, CA 90401, pro hac vice, Thomas A. Segal, The
Kick Law Firm, APC, The Kick Law Firm, , 201 Wilshire Blvd #350,
Santa Monica, CA 90401 pro hac vice & Gregory G. Gordon, Gregory
G. Gordon, Ltd.,  871 Coronado Center Dr # 200, Henderson, NV
89052, USA

United Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by James A.
Kohl -- Jkohl@howardandhoward.com -- Howard & Howard Attorneys,
PLLC, Robert W. Hernquist -- Rhernquist@howardandhoward.com --
Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, Stephen Paul Dunn --
SDunn@howardandhoward.com -- Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC, pro
hac vice & Brandon J. Wilson -- Bwilson@howardandhoward.com --
Howard & Howard.


UNITED MATTRESS: "Zuniga" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eliben Zuniga, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. United Mattress, Inc. and Yusef M. Darjbara,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-06751 (N.D. Ill., September 19,
2017), seeks unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages and
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act.

Plaintiff claims to have worked in excess of forty hours in a work
week without overtime premium. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jorge Sanchez, Esq.
      Baldemar Lopez, Esq.
      LOPEZ & SANCHEZ LLP
      77 W. Washington St., Suite 1313
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 420-6784


US STEEL: Faces $4.2MM Class Action Over Odorous Gases
------------------------------------------------------
KMOX reports that if you lived in a certain area of Granite City
between November 2009 and August 2017, you might be eligible to
take part in a class action lawsuit over health problems.

The suit filed against U.S. Steel, SunCoke Energy and Gateway
Energy and Coke Company alleges particulate matter and odorous
gasses caused damages to people in homes within a mile or so of
those facilities.

The Belleville News-Democrat reports the two companies have denied
all allegations but agreed a settlement is the best option due to
uncertainties in litigation.  The entire settlement is expected to
pay $4.2 million before attorney's fees. [GN]


VCG HOLDING: Denial of Conditional Class Cert. Recommended
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GEORGINA SANTICH, JANEL ANDERSON, JESSICA
SAULTERS ARCHULETTA, ADRIANNE AXELSON, EMILY BACHELDER, ALENA
BAILEY, RACHEL BERRY, NICOLE BUJOK, BRANDI CAMPBELL, TALITA CATTO,
MELISSA CHAVEZ, ARIEL CLINE, MEGAN FITZGERALD, AMANDA GABRIEL, AMY
GLINES, JOHANNA GRISSOM, AMANDA LIVINGSTON, ARIELLE MANSFIELD,
CHADA MANTOOTH, KARLA MARTINEZ, CHRISTINA MASSARO, ALEXIS NAGLE,
LAPORTIA OAKLEY, GALE RAFFAELE, AMRICA TERRELL, PENNY WATKINS,
CASANDRA WINDECKER, MELANIE TRACY, PORSCHA GREEN, AMANDA SHAFER,
ASHLEY WOZNEAK, REBECCA RAIL, ANDREA ABBOTT, and KIMBERY HALE, all
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. VCG HOLDING CORP., LOWRIE MANAGEMENT, LLLP, TROY
LOWRIE, MICHAEL OCELLO, DENVER RESTAURANT CONCEPTS LP d/b/a PTs
Showclub, KENKEV II, INC. d/b/a PTs Showclub Portland, INDY
RESTAURANT CONCEPTS, INC. d/b/a PTs Showclub Indy, GLENARM
RESTAURANT, LLC d/b/a Diamond Cabaret, GLENDALE RESTAURANT
CONCEPTS, LP d/b/a The Penthouse Club, STOUT RESTAURANT CONCEPTS,
INC. d/b/a La Boheme, and VCG RESTAURANTS DENVER, INC. d/b/a PT's
All Nude, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-00631-RM-MEH (D.
Colo.), Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado issued his recommendation to
deny as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
in light of the Court's recommendation on the Defendants' motion
to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs -- 34 exotic dancers -- initiated this Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") collective action on March 10, 2017.  In an
Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants --
adult entertainment clubs and entities that own the clubs --
required them to sign contracts, called "leases," that improperly
classified them as independent contractors.  As independent
contractors, the Plaintiffs did not receive a wage, but instead
paid the Defendants a fee ranging from $120 to $200 each time they
worked.  Further, the Defendants allegedly required them to pay
them a portion of the tips and other income they received.
Because they believe they are employees under the FLSA and various
state wage acts, they seek unpaid wages, fees, fines, tips, and
interest.

The Defendants responded to the Amended Complaint by filing the
present Motion to Compel Arbitration, which contends that each of
the Plaintiff signed valid arbitration agreements containing
collective action waivers.

On June 19, 2017, the Plaintiffs submitted their Response to
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration.  On July 10, 2017, the
Defendants filed their Reply in Support of their Motion to Compel
Arbitration.

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply on July
21, 2017 which the Court in an Aug. 10, 2018 order.  The
Plaintiffs subsequently objected to the Court's order denying them
leave to file a surreply.  On Sept. 25, 2017, the Hon. Raymond P.
Moore overruled the Plaintiffs' objections and affirmed the
Court's order.

Because the question of who should decide arbitrability is a
threshold issue, Magistrate Judge Hegarty will address it first.
He recommends reserving the Plaintiffs' unconscionability and
statutory validity arguments for the arbitrator.  He will then
analyze whether the agreements' fee-shifting clause thwarts the
Plaintiffs' ability to pursue their FLSA claims.  Although he
finds that shifting fees in the event the Defendants prevail would
prevent the Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims, the Magistrate
Judge recommends holding that the invalid provision is severable
from the agreement.  Finally, he recommends permitting the
nonsignatory Defendants to compel the Plaintiffs to arbitration.

Magistrate Judge Hegarty first recommended severing the delegation
clause from the arbitration agreement and reserving the
Plaintiffs' unconscionability and statutory validity challenges
for the arbitrator.  Next, he recommended holding that the fee-
shifting and cost-sharing provisions in the lease agreements
violate the effective vindication doctrine.  However, because the
leases contain a severability clause, the Judge recommended
severing the provisions from the remainder of the agreement.
Finally, he recommended holding that Defendants VCG and Lowrie may
enforce the arbitration agreement, because the Plaintiffs' claims
against them are interdependent with those against the signatory
Defendants and intertwined with the lease agreements.

As such, Magistrate Judge Hegarty respectfully recommended that
the Defendants' Motion to Stay or Dismiss Proceedings Pursuant to
Section 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, to Compel
Plaintiffs to Arbitration, and to Strike Class and Collective
Allegations be granted.  He recommended that the District Court
stays this litigation at least until the arbitrator determines the
validity of the arbitration agreements.

In light of his holding on the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration, Magistrate Judge Hegarty recommended that the
Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion to Proceed as a Conditional
Collective Action, to Provide Notice, and to Toll all Statute of
Limitations filed May 12, 2017 be denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 26, 2017 Recommendation is
available at https://is.gd/4vrklT from Leagle.com.

Georgina Santich, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Joseph McNulty
-- AMcNulty@KLN-law.com -- Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP.

Georgina Santich, Plaintiff, represented by Darold W. Killmer --
DKillmer@KLN-law.com -- Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Eudoxie
Dickey -- DDickey@KLN-law.com -- Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP,
Liana Gerstle Orshan -- LOrshan@KLN-law.com -- Killmer Lane &
Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman -- MNewman@KLN-law.com -- Killmer,
Lane & Newman, LLP.

Amanda Livingston, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Rebecca Rail, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Amanda Gabriel, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Casandra Windecker, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle
Orshan, Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer,
Lane & Newman, LLP.

Gale Raffaele, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Adrianne Axelson, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Amanda Shafer, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

Brandi Campbell, Plaintiff, represented by Liana Gerstle Orshan,
Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP & Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane &
Newman, LLP.

VCG Holding Corp., Defendant, represented by Allan Stephen Rubin -
- RubinA@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, P.C., Melisa Hallie
Panagakos -- Melisa.Panagakos@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis,
P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann -- LessmannR@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis, P.C..

Lowrie Management, LLLP, Defendant, represented by Allan Stephen
Rubin, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Melisa Hallie Panagakos, Jackson
Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Denver Restaurant Concepts LP, Defendant, represented by Allan
Stephen Rubin, Jackson Lewis, P.C., Melisa Hallie Panagakos,
Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Troy Lowrie, Defendant, represented by Melisa Hallie Panagakos,
Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Michael Ocello, Defendant, represented by Melisa Hallie Panagakos,
Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Kenkev II, Inc., Defendant, represented by Melisa Hallie
Panagakos, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson
Lewis, P.C..

Indy Restaurant Concepts, Inc., Defendant, represented by Melisa
Hallie Panagakos, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann,
Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Glenarm Restaurant LLC, Defendant, represented by Melisa Hallie
Panagakos, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann, Jackson
Lewis, P.C..

Glendale Restaurant Concepts LP, Defendant, represented by Melisa
Hallie Panagakos, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann,
Jackson Lewis, P.C..

Stout Restaurant Concepts, Inc., Defendant, represented by Melisa
Hallie Panagakos, Jackson Lewis, P.C. & Ryan Paul Lessmann,
Jackson Lewis, P.C..


VOCUS GROUP: Overhauls Boardroom Amid Investor Class Action Threat
------------------------------------------------------------------
Julia Talevski, writing for ARN, reports that ASX-listed Vocus
Group (ASX: VOC) has shuffled its boardroom lineup, appointing M2
co-founder and executive director, Vaughan Bowen, as its next non-
executive chairman, and Robert Mansfield (AO) as its deputy
chairman and lead independent director.

Mr. Bowen's appointment follows on from the decision of the
current chairman, David Spence, not to stand for re-election at
the company's 2017 annual general meeting after seven years in the
role.

Mr. Mansfield succeeds Craig Farrow, who is still remaining on the
board as a non-executive director, chairman of the remuneration
committee and a member of the technology and transformation
committee.  Mr. Mansfield previously served as chairman of
Telstra, founding CEO of Optus and CEO of McDonalds Australia.  He
was appointed as a Vocus non-executive director in January this
year.

Mr. Bowen's telco career spans nearly 20 years.  He has held his
executive director position with Vocus since February 2016,
following the merger between Vocus and M2 Group.  Mr. Bowen was
the founder of the M2 Group and served as its managing director
and CEO.

On his appointment, Mr. Bowen said he plays an important role in
helping steer Vocus back to a position where it can recover the
value and credibility lost during a disappointing year.

"I want to assure all shareholders that restoring value is the
board's utmost priority and, as a sizeable Vocus shareholder, my
interests are aligned with all shareholders.  I recognise the time
for delivering improved, sustainable performance is now and am
confident in the talent and experience amongst the leadership team
together with the outstanding infrastructure platform we have
assembled," Mr. Bowen said.  "With these ingredients in place,
meeting our earnings and broader performance targets will be the
only acceptable outcomes."

In a statement, Mr. Farrow said Vocus would continue its board
renewal process in the year ahead to ensure that it builds upon
its capability and independence.

"The board believes that given the critical stage of the company
in its transformation program, the absolute priority in terms of
appointing a new chairman was to ensure that the positive momentum
the company is now experiencing be maintained,"
Mr. Farrow said.  "Bowen's appointment brings continuity to that
momentum, together with deep knowledge of the business and an
established, effective engagement with executive leadership and
key stakeholders. Furthermore, the appointment of Mansfield
provides Vocus with combined board leadership of the highest
order, in terms of industry experience and company knowledge."

The boardroom shuffle comes as Vocus faces the spectre of a
proposed class action by law firm, Slater and Gordon, alleging
that the publicly-listed telco misled shareholders over its FY17
financial guidance.

In August, Vocus revealed its preliminary, unaudited financials
for the 2017 financial year, showing that the company brought in a
net profit after tax (NPAT) tally that came in $152.3 million
below the company's guidance range of $160 million to $165
million.

According to the Australian telco, this downgrade was primarily
due to higher than forecast net finance costs and a higher
effective tax rate at 33.4 per cent.

This followed the company's move in May to wipe off $100 million
from its revenue target for the financial year ending 2017,
blaming the forecast downgrade on lower than expected billings in
its enterprise and wholesale business, and re-jigged terms on a
number of large projects. [GN]


WALT DISNEY: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Labor Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Los Angeles labor law attorneys at Blumenthal, Nordrehaug and
Bhowmik filed a class action complaint against Walt Disney Parks
and Resorts, U.S., Inc. for allegedly failing to provide their
California workers with the legally required thirty-minute
uninterrupted meal periods and off duty rest breaks.  The Walt
Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. class action lawsuit, Case
No. 30-2017-00945651-CU-OE-CXC is currently pending in the Orange
County Superior Court.

The lawsuit filed against Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S.,
Inc. alleges that as a result of their rigorous work schedules,
the workers were not afforded the opportunity to take their off
duty meal and rest breaks.  California law requires employers to
provide their non-exempt employees paid on an hourly basis with
thirty minute meal periods before the employee works five hours
and off duty rest breaks.

The lawsuit additionally alleges that Walt Disney Parks and
Resorts, U.S., Inc. failed to provide its employees with complete
and accurate wage statements which failed to show, among other
things, the correct amount of gross wages earned, the correct
federal overtime rates for overtime worked, including, work
performed in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek, and the
correct penalty payments or missed rest periods. Cal. Lab. Code
Sec 226 provides that every employer shall furnish each of his or
her employees with an accurate itemized wage statement in writing
showing, among other things, gross wages earned and all applicable
hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding
amount of time worked at each hourly rate.

For more information about the class action lawsuit filed against
Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, U.S., Inc. please call Attorney
Nicholas De Blouw at the firm Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik at
(866) 771-7099.

Blumenthal, Nordrehaug and Bhowmik is a Los Angeles employment law
firm that dedicates its practice to helping employees, fight back
against unfair business practices, including violations of the
California Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Feb. 23 Settlement Claims Filing Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Elliot Raphaelson, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that a
federal court approved a $142 million national class action
settlement with Wells Fargo and Co. in July that covers
unauthorized accounts the bank set up in clients' names dating
back to 2002.

The court ruled that the settlement was "fair, reasonable and
adequate."  Wells Fargo CEO Tim Sloan called the court ruling a
major milestone in their efforts to make things right for their
customers.  Wells Fargo admitted in September 2016 that these
accounts were unauthorized by their customers, and blamed
unrealistic sales goals.  As a result of these fraudulent
accounts, long-time CEO John Stumpf was forced to resign.

Wells Fargo opened 3.5 million unauthorized accounts between May
1, 2002 and April 20, 2017.  These unauthorized accounts
encompassed checking and savings accounts, credit cards and lines
of credit.  Wells Fargo has customer accounts in almost every U.S.
state.

If Wells Fargo opened one or more unauthorized accounts in your
name, or if you were a Wells Fargo customer and filed for identity
theft protection during this time frame, you should file a claim
for reimbursement.  No supporting documentation is required to
fill out the form.

Information regarding this class action suit is available on the
Wells Fargo settlement website (wfsettlement.com).  If you
register on this site, Wells Fargo will provide you with the forms
you need to submit a claim.  It is estimated that these forms will
be available on October 6, 2017.  The deadline for filing is
February 3, 2018.

If you would like to talk to a Wells Fargo customer service
representative regarding information about this class action suit,
and filing information, you can call 1-866-431-8549.

Wells Fargo has already paid $5 million in fee refunds to some
customers as part of a settlement with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Los Angeles City Attorney.  If you have
already received compensation as a result of that settlement, you
are not eligible to receive compensation related to the $142
million class action lawsuit.

If you plan to file a separate lawsuit against Wells Fargo for
opening unauthorized accounts, you have to exclude yourself from
this settlement.  Exclusion forms will be available on the
settlement website in the future and must be filed by December 5,
2017.

There are three categories of compensation:

  -- Fee reimbursement: If you had an open account between January
1, 2009 and April 20, 2017, you will receive compensation equal to
the fees incurred as a result of the unauthorized accounts.  If an
unauthorized account was opened in your name outside those dates
but after May 1, 2002 or before December 31, 2018, you will
receive a flat fee reimbursement based on the average fee paid to
the 2009-2017 group.  The reason for the flat fee is because Wells
Fargo did not maintain adequate fee information prior to 2009.

  -- Credit impact damages: The unauthorized accounts had a
negative impact on some Wells Fargo customers' credit scores. This
resulted from unauthorized credit cards, lines of credit and small
business accounts.  In order for you to determine whether your
credit score was affected, you have to authorize a law firm
representing Wells Fargo to check your credit reports.

  -- Additional compensation: The amount available for additional
compensation is based on the amount of funds remaining from the
$142 million after fee reimbursement and credit impact damages are
paid.  The amount you could be awarded will be based on the number
of fraudulent accounts you claim were opened in your name. Wells
Fargo has indicated that regardless of the amount remaining from
the $142 million after fee reimbursement and credit impact
damages, there will be at least $25 million available for the
"additional compensation" allocation. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Prefers Forced Arbitration to Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Heidi Shierholz, writing for Working Economics Blog (EPI), reports
that many financial institutions use forced arbitration clauses in
their contracts to block consumers with disputes from banding
together in court, instead requiring consumers to argue their
cases separately in private arbitration proceedings. Embattled
banking giant, Wells Fargo, made headlines by embracing the
practice to avoid offering class-wide relief for its practices
related to the fraudulent account scandal and another scandal
involving alleged unfair overdraft practices.

New data helps illuminate why these banks -- and Wells Fargo in
particular -- prefer forced arbitration to class action lawsuits.
We already knew that consumers obtain relief regarding their
claims in just 9 percent of disputes, while arbitrators grant
companies relief in 93 percent of their claims. But not only do
companies win the overwhelming majority of claims when consumers
are forced into arbitration -- they win big.

Some crucial background helps illustrate the stakes. In July 2017,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a final
rule to restore consumers' ability to join together in class
action lawsuits against financial institutions.  Based on five
years of careful study, the final rule stems from a congressional
directive instructing the agency to study forced arbitration and
restrict or ban the practice if it harms consumers.

In recent weeks, members of Congress have introduced legislation
to repeal the CFPB rule and take away consumers' newly restored
right to band together in court.  Opponents of the rule have
suggested that the bureau's own findings show consumers on average
receive greater relief in arbitration ($5,389) than class action
lawsuits ($32).  As we have previously shown, this is enormously
misleading.  While the average consumer who wins a claim in
arbitration recovers $5,389, this is not even close to a typical
consumer outcome. Because consumers win so rarely, the average
consumer ends up paying financial institutions in arbitration -- a
whopping $7,725.

A recent report released by the nonprofit Level Playing Field
hones in on Wells Fargo's use of arbitration in consumer claims.
Compiling publicly reported data from the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) and JAMS (initially named Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services, Inc.), the report found that just 250
consumers arbitrated claims with Wells Fargo between 2009 and the
first half of 2017.  This number is surprisingly small, since this
period spans the prime years of the bank's fraudulent account
scandal.

But we can take this data a step further by looking at Wells
Fargo's overall gains and losses in arbitration.  As one might
suspect based on the CFPB data, Wells Fargo indeed won more money
in arbitration between 2009 and the first half of 2017 than it
paid out to consumers, despite creating 3.5 million fraudulent
accounts during that same period.

What is even more troubling is that forced arbitration seems to be
significantly more lucrative for Wells Fargo than for other
financial institutions.  In arbitration with Wells Fargo, the
average consumer is ordered to pay the bank nearly $11,000.  We
calculated a mean of $10,826 awarded to the bank across all claims
in the Level Playing Field report.

No wonder Wells Fargo prefers forced arbitration to class action
lawsuits, which return at least $440 million, after deducting all
attorneys' fees and court costs, to 6.8 million consumers in an
average year.  Banning consumer class actions lets financial
institutions keep hundreds of millions of dollars that would
otherwise go back to harmed consumers -- and Wells Fargo seems to
have harmed huge numbers of consumers.

Opponents of the CFPB's arbitration rule argue that allowing
consumers to join together in court will increase consumer costs
and decrease available credit. Most recently, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) claimed that restoring
consumers' right to join together in court could cause interest
rates on credit cards to rise as much as 25 percent.

However, examining the OCC's study, it appears the agency merely
duplicated the conclusion reached by the CFPB and based its 25
percent estimate solely on results it admits are "statistically
insignificant at the 95 percent (and 90 percent) confidence
level."  In its 2015 study, the CFPB considered this same data and
accurately assessed that there was no "statistically significant
evidence of an increase in prices among those companies that
dropped their arbitration clauses."

Perhaps more importantly, claims that the arbitration rule will
increase consumer and credit costs are also contradicted by real-
life experience.  Consumers saw no increase in prices after Bank
of America, JPMorgan Chase, Capital One, and HSBC dropped their
arbitration clauses as a result of court-approved settlements, and
mortgage rates did not increase after Congress banned forced
arbitration in the mortgage market.  Of course, many would argue
that banks like Wells Fargo should bear any increase in cost
associated with making consumers whole for egregious misconduct.

Once again, the numbers are clear: class actions return hundreds
of millions in relief to consumers, while forced arbitration pays
off big for lawbreakers like Wells Fargo.

Heidi Shierholz leads the Economic Policy Institutes' Perkins
Project on Worker Rights and Wages, a policy response team that
tracks the Trump administration's wage and employment policies.
She also heads EPI's efforts to advance a worker-centered policy
agenda. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Chief Executive Defends Use of Forced Arbitration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Sweet, writing for The Associated Press, reports that a
different Wells Fargo chief executive met a similar kind of anger
from Congress on Oct. 3, with politicians from both major parties
saying they feel the bank has done little to change its culture
since a scandal over its sales practices.

Tim Sloan appeared in front of the Senate Banking Committee in
Washington, D.C., about a year since his predecessor did the same
to try to explain how employees trying to meet ambitious sales
goals created millions of accounts without customers knowing about
or authorizing them.

Mr. Sloan apologized again and said the bank was committed to its
customers.  Some lawmakers weren't in a forgiving mood.
Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, a Democrat from North Dakota, expressed anger
about the sales practices as well as a later auto insurance
scandal involving customers signed up for coverage they didn't
want.

"We need to see a cultural change," Sen. Heitkamp said.  "I simply
don't hear it.  We hear you say, 'We don't know! We will look into
it! We care about the consumer!' but I do not hear a level of
cultural change that satisfies me today."

Republicans were at times equally as upset.

"At least, we are irritated at Wells Fargo," said Sen. Tim Scott,
a Republican from South Carolina.

While Mr. Sloan said he remains "deeply sorry" for its previous
sales practices, he was at times combative and defensive.

In particular, he strongly defended Wells Fargo's practice of
sending its customers into what's known as forced arbitration,
which is when customers have to use a third party to resolve their
disputes instead of filing a class-action lawsuit with others.

Asked by Sen. Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, if Wells Fargo
would consider ending that practice, Sloan responded with a curt
"no."

The sales practices scandal was the biggest in Wells Fargo's
history.  When then-CEO John Stumpf faced Congress last fall, he
was chastised for his answers and for what lawmakers saw as an
attempt to shift blame.  The bank's once-sterling industry
reputation was in tatters, and Mr. Stumpf was eventually ousted.

Wells Fargo ended up paying $185 million to regulators and settled
a class-action suit for $142 million. It's been trying to make
amends with customers, politicians and the public.

Since last fall, Wells has changed its sales practices, ousted
other executives and called tens of millions of customers to check
on whether they truly opened the accounts.

"I apologize for the damage done to all the people who work and
bank at this important American institution," Sloan said.

The scandal has only grown since Mr. Stumpf's appearance.  The
bank says up to 3.5 million fake accounts were opened between 2009
and 2016, up from the 2 million it acknowledged in September 2016.
A report by the board of directors found the bad behavior could be
traced back to as early as 2002, and that executives were aware of
some sales practices problems as early as 2006.

After the sales practices came a new scandal: Wells Fargo admitted
it signed up hundreds of thousands of auto loan customers for auto
insurance they did not need.  Some of those customers had their
cars repossessed because they could not afford both the auto loan
and insurance payments.

Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, a vocal critic
of Wells Fargo, called for Sloan's firing.

One critique of Sloan, a 29-year veteran of the bank, has been
that he was the chief financial officer while the fake accounts
were being created. Wells Fargo and Sloan himself have defended
his role, saying he was not supervising the consumer banking
division at the time and therefore was not responsible for what
occurred there.

"At best you are incompetent, at worst you were complicit,"
Sen. Warren said.  "And either way, you should be fired." [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Coloradans Hold Protest Over Fake Account Scandal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Monica Mendoza, writing for Denver Business Journal, reports that
a small group of Coloradans held fishing poles and signs in
protest outside of Wells Fargo in downtown Denver saying the
banking giant, Colorado's largest, shouldn't be let off the hook.

The 15 protesters from the Colorado Consumer Protection Coalition
said consumers were hurt by Wells Fargo actions when the bank
opened an estimate 3.5 million fake bank accounts in their
customers' names.  An estimated 64,000 people in Colorado were
victims of the false accounts, the group said.

But now, they said, comes a move by Congress to undo one of the
consumer protection rules that would have allowed them to take
banks, and other companies, to court in class action lawsuits.

The downtown Denver protest was staged on the day that Wells Fargo
& Co. CEO Tim Sloan testified in a two-hour congressional hearing
about how the bank has made changes in the wake of the scandal
where it admitted that it had opened millions of fake accounts in
its customers' names.

The Wells Fargo wrongdoing has revealed that banks use an
arbitration clause in their contracts for credit cards and bank
accounts that, when signed by consumers, pushes disputes into
arbitration and out of the eye of regulatory authorities, said
Josh Downey, president of the Denver Area Labor Federation.

"Congress is ready to attack rules issued by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau that allow consumers the ability to
challenge forced arbitration," he said.

The former CEO of Equifax is expected to testify about the
company's 145 million customers affected by a data breach.  The
company also uses arbitration clauses in its contracts with
customers, said Kevin Rhoades, a Coloradan at the Oct. 3 protest
who said his data was affected by the breach.

He said the arbitration is a way for the companies to control the
outcome.

"Wall Street banks know it's not consumer friendly," he said.

The forced arbitration clauses are typically found in the small
print of contracts for bank accounts, credit cards and credit
monitoring that waive a consumer's right to sue in class-action
suits and instead mandates that grievances be dealt with in
arbitration.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a rule in July
preventing banks and other companies from requiring the mandatory
arbitration that the law suit waivers.

But the House of Representatives voted to kill the regulation. The
issue, now known as S.J. Resolution 47, could get to the Senate
soon.

Bankers are asking for the rule to be scrapped.

Colorado Bankers Association president and CEO Don Childears was
leading a Colorado group of bankers to Washington D.C. on Oct. 3
to meet with lawmakers.  On their minds are rules and regulations.

The CBA does not have a specific stand on the arbitration rule,
but the American Bankers Association on Sept. 29 filed suit in
federal court to block the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's
arbitration rule from taking effect.

The ABA is joined by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Consumer
Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable and several
other national and regional trade associations.  They say that the
bureau itself is unconstitutional and that the CFPB violated the
Administrative Procedures Act in its rulemaking, and it also
violated the Dodd-Frank Act by precluding use of a consumer-
benefiting dispute mechanism.

"For years, our organizations have tried to work with the CFPB to
promote strong consumer protection while maintaining a functional
arbitration system," the plaintiffs said in a joint statement.
"Unfortunately, the CFPB chose to instead finalize a rule that
will harm consumers and businesses by effectively banning
arbitration and increasing speculative class action litigation."
[GN]


WESTERN AND SOUTHERN: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in "Mancini" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, W&S Brokerage
Services, Inc., and Western-Southern Life Assurance Company filed
an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Amy Mancini v.
Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, et al., Case No.
3:16-cv-02830-LAB-WVG, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego
(Case No. 37-02016-00033173-CU-OE-CTL), and was removed to the
District Court.  The case alleges violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendants operate an insurance company that provides
traditional whole life and critical illness insurance.

The appellate case is captioned as Amy Mancini v. Western and
Southern Life Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 17-56420, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants W&S Brokerage Services, Inc., Western and
      Southern Life Insurance Company and Western-Southern Life
      Assurance Company's opening brief is due on November 20,
      2017;

   -- Appellee Amy Mancini's answering brief is due on
      December 18, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee AMY MANCINI, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          E-mail: bill@consumersadvocates.com

Defendants-Appellants WESTERN AND SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
an Ohio corporation; WESTERN-SOUTHERN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, an
Ohio corporation; and W&S BROKERAGE SERVICES, INC., an Ohio
corporation, are represented by:

          Spencer C. Skeen, Esq.
          Jonathan Liu, Esq.
          Marlene M. Moffitt, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 990
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (858) 652-3100
          E-mail: spencer.skeen@ogletree.com
                  jonathan.liu@ogletree.com
                  marlene.moffitt@ogletree.com


XENITH BANKSHARES: "Rowe" to Halt Merger Vote, Seeks Projections
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shannon Rowe, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Xenith Bankshares, Inc., James F. Burr,
Patrick E. Corbin, Henry P. Custis Jr., Palmer P. Garson, Robert
B. Goldstein, Edward Grebow, T. Gaylon Layfield III, William A.
Paulette, W. Lewis Witt, Robert J. Merrick, Scott A. Reed and
Thomas G. Snead Jr., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00629, (E.D.
Va., September 19, 2017), seeks to preliminarily and permanently
enjoin defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, the proposed merger between Xenith
and Union Bankshares Corporation, awarding rescissory damages in
the event defendants consummate the merger, reasonable allowance
for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and
further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Xenith shareholders stand to receive 0.9354 of a share of Union
common stock for each share of Xenith common stock they own. The
merger documents omitted the company's financial projections and
the analyses critical from Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., in
evaluating the company's offer price, says the complaint.

Xenith is a bank holding company that owns all of the stock of its
subsidiary bank, Xenith Bank, a commercial bank that operates
branches primarily located in Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina,
and the greater Washington, D.C. area, through 40 full service
branches and two loan production offices. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
     MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
     The Empire State Building
     350 Fifth Avenue, 59th Floor
     New York, NY 10118
     Telephone: (212) 971-1341
     Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com

            - and -

     Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
     1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
     Washington, DC 20007
     Telephone: (202) 524-4290
     Facsimile: (202) 333-2121
     Email: etripodi@zlk.com


YAHOO INC: Says 3 Billion Accounts Affected by 2013 Data Theft
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Rushe, writing for The Guardian, reports that Yahoo said
on Oct. 3 that every one of its 3bn accounts was affected by a
2013 data theft at the tech company, tripling its earlier estimate
of the largest breach in history.

The company, now part of Verizon Communications, said last
December that data from more than 1bn user accounts was
compromised by hackers in August 2013.

Yahoo included the finding in an update to its account security
update page. The company said it will begin alerting accounts that
were not previously notified of the attack.

However, the company said the latest investigation indicated that
the stolen information did not include passwords in clear text,
payment card data, or bank account information.

"It is important to note that, in connection with Yahoo's December
2016 announcement of the August 2013 theft, Yahoo took action to
protect all accounts.  The company required all users who had not
changed their passwords since the time of the theft to do so.
Yahoo also invalidated unencrypted security questions and answers
so they cannot be used to access an account," Yahoo said on Oct.
3.

The latest disclosure of the massive hack came on the same day
that the former boss of credit agency Equifax was grilled in
Congress over a breach in its systems that compromised the social
security numbers, credit card details and other personal
information of 145.5 million people.

The hack has been a costly one for Yahoo and its executives.
Marissa Mayer, Yahoo's former chief executive, gave up her 2016
cash bonus following the incident and the company's top lawyer,
Ronald Bell, resigned in the wake of the hack and the other
breaches.

Some 43 consumer class-action lawsuits have been filed against the
company, Yahoo said in a May filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Verizon in February lowered its original offer by $350m for Yahoo
assets in the wake of two huge cyber-attacks at the internet
company.

The closing of the deal, which was first announced in July, had
been delayed as the companies assessed the fallout from two data
breaches that Yahoo disclosed last year.  The company paid $4.48bn
for Yahoo's core business.

A Yahoo official emphasized on Oct. 3 that the 3bn figure includes
many accounts that were opened but never or only briefly used.
[GN]


YORK INT'L: DiChiara Appeals Order in Dickerson Suit to 3rd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael DiChiara filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Steven Dickerson, et al. v. York International
Corp., et al., Case No. 1-15-cv-01105, in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge
Christopher C. Conner granted final approval of the amended class
action settlement and finally certified the settlement class in
the case.

The appellate case is captioned as Steven Dickerson, et al. v.
York International Corp., et al., Case No. 17-3088, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Appellant Michael DiChiara of Wantagh, New York, appears pro
se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees STEVEN DICKERSON, ROBERT HESTER, NANCY
ROBERTS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, KATIE EVANS MOSS and RICHARD SANCHEZ are represented by:

          Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
          Russell D. Paul, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE PC
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-4656
          E-mail: scarson@bm.net
                  rpaul@bm.net

               - and -

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          800 South Gay Street
          Knoxville, TN 37901
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 238-1700
          E-mail: jshub@kohnswift.com

Defendants-Appellees YORK INTERNATIONAL CORP and JOHNSON CONTROLS
INC are represented by:

          Christopher S. D'Angelo, Esq.
          John G. Papianou, Esq.
          MONTGOMERY MCCRACKEN WALKER & RHOADS LLP
          123 South Broad Street, 28th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19109
          Telephone: (215) 772-7397
          E-mail: cdangelo@mmwr.com
                  jpapianou@mmwr.com


* Divided Supreme Court May Allow Mandatory Arbitration Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Noah A. Finkel, Esq., David S. Baffa, and Andrew L Scroggins,
Esq., of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in an article for Lexology, report
that following oral argument, employers should be cautiously
optimistic that the Supreme Court will allow mandatory arbitration
programs containing waivers of the ability to bring collective and
class actions.

In the Oct. 2 oral argument, in one of the most significant
employment law cases we have seen in some time, a divided Supreme
Court appeared more likely than not to give the green light to
employers' mandatory arbitration programs that contain waivers of
collective and class actions.

Seyfarth Shaw's summary of the issues this case presents can be
found at https://is.gd/eKnH3P

Reading tea leaves from oral argument is always a challenge,
especially for those who have a stake in the matter. But the three
authors of this post attended the Oct. 2 argument and, judging
from the questions from the Court, the various Justices' reactions
to the answers to those questions, and the prior rulings from the
Court, are optimistic that the Court ultimately will issue a
closely-contested ruling in favor of class waivers.

Four Justices Appear Ready to Invalidate Class Waivers in
Employment Cases

While our prediction is somewhat uncertain, there is one aspect in
which we are completely confident: there will not be a unanimous
decision.  Indeed, it appeared that there are four solid votes to
hold that Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides
an employee with a right to bring a collective or class action,
that requiring an employee to waive that right as a condition of
employment violates NLRA Section 8's prohibition against employer
restraint of that right, and that, therefore, an employer's
arbitration agreement including a class waiver cannot be enforced
either because the class waiver is illegal or because the NLRA
constitutes a contrary congressional command to the general rule
that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements
are to be enforced according to their terms.

Justice Ginsburg asserted in her questions that "the driving force
of the NLRA was the recognition that there as an imbalance, that
there was no true liberty of contract," which is why concerted
activity -- including, in her apparent view, class and collective
action -- is protected against employer interference. She further
contended that the Court's prior precedents regarding the FAA
concerned only commercial contracts and did not involve NLRA
rights. (As the employers' counsel Paul Clement rightly point out,
however, the Court has twice reviewed the propriety of arbitration
agreements between employers and employees, and neither time did
the Court reason that arbitration agreements in the employment
context are entitled to any less weight than those in the
commercial context.)

Justice Kagan relied on the Court's prior precedent to argue that
the NLRA protects "employees seeking to improve working conditions
through resort to administrative and judicial forums" and thus
implied that filing a class action also is protected by the NLRA.
But the employers' counsel retorted that Court precedent merely
protects "resort to" courthouses, and that "there is no right to
proceed as a class once you get there." Once in court, nothing
prohibits an employer from asserting all available defenses to
class treatment, including moving to enforce an agreement between
an employer and employee to arbitrate all disputes on a bilateral
basis.

Justice Sotomayor questioned that argument by maintaining that an
employer cannot enforce a contract that is "illegal" even under
the FAA.  In response to that, employers' counsel Clement retorted
that the Court has decided two other cases (Circuit City v. Adams
and Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp.) in which employees
had agreed to bilateral arbitration and in which it could have
been argued that the NLRA makes such an agreement unlawful.  "But
no dog barked at that point . . . and that's because the NLRA in
no other context extends beyond the workplace to dictate the rules
of the forum," Clement told the Court.

The most vigorous questioner was Justice Breyer, who appeared
offended by the idea of a class waiver. He went so far as to say
that he is worried that the employers' position "is overturning
labor law that goes back to, for FDR at least, the entire heart of
the New Deal" and that "I haven't seen a way that you can, in
fact, win the case, which you certainly want to do, without
undermining and changing radically what has gone back to the New
Deal."  Clement explained, however, that "for 77 years" -- from
the passage of the NLRA until its 2012 D.R. Horton decision --
"the [NLRB] did not find anything incompatible about Section 7 and
bilateral arbitration agreements" and the NLRB's General Counsel
issued a memorandum on the issue in 2010 in which it found that a
mandatory class waiver does not violate the NLRA.

But From Where Does the 5th Vote Come?

Despite these fairly clear votes to invalidate class waivers, four
votes does not a majority make.  And in questioning of counsel for
the NLRB and counsel for the employees, it appeared that it will
be difficult to find that fifth vote.  Justice Thomas, in keeping
with his usual demeanor, did not ask a question, but he has been
in the Court's majority in other cases enforcing arbitration
agreements and is regarded as generally receptive to employer's
views.  Nor did Justice Gorsuch ask a question.  He, however, thus
far has joined the court's conservative majority in all decisions
in which he has been a part.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito clearly were skeptical of
the NLRB's position.  Indeed, in questioning its General Counsel
Richard Griffin, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito led
Griffin into a significant admission, providing the most dramatic
moment of the morning.  They asked Griffin a series of questions
that led Griffin to agree that it would not be an unfair labor
practice for a mandatory arbitration program to require use of a
forum whose rules did not allow class arbitration.  Justice Alito
quickly realized the significance of this point: "if that's the
rule, you have not achieved very much because, instead of having
an agreement that says no class, no class action, not class
arbitration, you have an agreement requiring arbitration before
the XYZ arbitration association, which has rules that don't allow
class arbitration." Griffin did not dispute this.  He commented
that "the provisions of the [NLRA] run to prohibitions against
employer restraint."

Interestingly, counsel for the employees, Daniel Ortiz of the
University of Virginia School of Law, did not agree with that
concession, thus highlighting fundamental dissent from the NLRB's
position.  These cases at the Supreme Court already were notable
because the Solicitor General took a position opposite that of the
NLRB.  Oral argument added another layer of disagreement: even the
employees urging the Court to adopt the Board's view of the NLRA
don't agree with the concession made by Griffin.  In other words,
the employees and the NLRB are asking the Supreme Court to
recognize a right that overrides the FAA, but they cannot agree on
what that right is.

As in any close case recently at the Supreme Court, most eyes were
on the swing vote, Justice Kennedy.  Going into the argument, he
appeared to be the Justice most likely to join Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer, the four justices who dissented from
the Court's enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement in
the consumer context in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.  Justice
Kennedy did not tip his hand as much as the other Justices.  But
he did appear to be interested in the concession that NLRB General
Counsel Griffin made (and clarified Chief Justice Roberts'
question that induced that concession), and his questioning of the
Board and the employees' counsel suggested that he believed that,
even with a collective and class action waiver, employees still
can exercise Section 7 rights in various ways, and that he did not
wish to "constrain[] employers in the kind of arbitration
agreements they can have."

Little of the argument focused on the FAA and the nature of its
saving clause or what constitutes a "contrary congressional
command."  The Justices seemed more interested in exploring
whether the NLRA contains a right to a class action in the first
place.

What Next?

Our predicted close victory for the employers is just that: a
prediction.  After all, even the Justices who appeared to favor
permitting class waivers did not strongly signal how they might
reach that result or whether any guidelines or restrictions might
accompany the rule.  We do not recommend that employers bank on
our prediction, because one never knows what is in the minds of
the Justices or how they will come out after discussing the cases
with each other.  Until a decision is issued -- which likely will
be early 2018 -- there will be no definitive answer as to whether
a class waiver in an arbitration program provides a defense to an
employment class or collective action.  Employers should continue
to consider whether an arbitration program with a class or
collective action waiver is right for them and, if it is, be ready
to implement one if the Supreme Court rules in the employers'
favor in these cases. [GN]


* FCRA Violation Continues to Spark Class Action Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mary E. Kapsak, Esq. -- mkapsak@polsinelli.com -- of Polsinelli
PC, Polsinelli LLP, in an article for The National Law Review,
wrote that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) continues to cause
issues for employers that run afoul of its provisions when
reviewing consumer background reports as part of the hiring
process.  Most recently, a proposed class action was filed against
Starbucks Corporation.

On September 20, 2017, plaintiff Kevin Wills filed a proposed
class action in federal court in Georgia, alleging that Starbucks
rejected job applicants after reviewing the applicants' respective
consumer background reports without first providing them with a
copy of their reports or notifying them of their rights, in
violation of the FCRA.  The plaintiff seeks to certify a
nationwide class of Starbucks job applicants who were denied at
least five days' notice of an adverse employment action based on
their consumer background reports.

As a reminder, the FCRA requires employers to:

Certify to job applicants that consumer background reports will be
used for a "permissible purpose";

Provide written disclosure and receive written authorization from
job applicants before obtaining consumer reports;

Provide notice to job applicants, including a copy of the consumer
background report relied upon and notice of the applicant's rights
under the FCRA, before making any adverse employment decisions;
and

Provide job applicants, orally, in writing, or electronically,
with an adverse action notice after making any adverse employment
decisions based on a consumer background report.

In addition, state laws may restrict an employer's use of consumer
background reports, especially credit reports, when making
employment decisions. [GN]


* Justice Breyer Sides with Workers on Class Action Waiver Issue
----------------------------------------------------------------
Brandi Buchman, writing for Courthouse News, reports that Justice
Stephen Breyer took a stand for workers on Oct. 2 as the Supreme
Court kicked off its October term with a focus on employment
arbitration agreements.

Showcasing his animated style, Justice Breyer leaned forward on
the bench this morning to argue that siding with employers on
class action waivers would upend "the entire heart of the New
Deal," referencing the series of protections launched under
President Franklin Roosevelt to aid workers during the hard times
of the Great Depression.

In the near century since the New Deal came into force, class
action lawsuits have been a critical tool for employees to protect
their rights or assert leverage in the workplace.

The Oct. 2 session involved class action waivers that Ernst &
Young, Murphy Oil USA and Epic Systems Corp. had their employees
sign as a condition of employment.

The Ernst & Young case sprang from allegations by Stephen Morris
and Kelly McDaniel that they were misclassified on employee
records to deny them overtime.

Though the waivers they signed required mediation, Mr. Morris and
Ms. McDaniel called the process unfairly complex and prohibitively
expensive.

One employee who brought unrelated claims against Ernst & Young
incurred costs of $200,000 to go through the company's "Common
Ground Program" for arbitration.  Those costs far outweighed the
benefit, as the employee recovered a mere $1,800 in the end.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed Judge Breyer's position,
likening employee agreements with class action waivers to "yellow
dog contracts" or agreements between employers and employees where
the worker agrees, as a condition of employment, not to join a
labor union.

"You recognize that this contract . . . there is no true
bargaining," Judge Ginsburg said, addressing one of the attorneys
for the employers.  "It's the employer [that] says you want to
work here, you sign this . . . this has all the same essential
features of the yellow-dog contract.  That is, the2re is no true
liberty to contract on part of the2 employee.

Referencing the legislation that banned yellow-dog contracts in
1932, Justice Ginsburg said, "that's what Norris-LaGuardia wanted
to exclude."

Justice Anthony Kennedy meanwhile spoke to the2 other avenues of
relief available to any employees who signed class action waivers.
Nothing would stop these employees from "acting in concert" by
hiring the same attorney to bring the same claims, he said, even
if arbitrated individually.

The Trump administration has taken a similar tack, largely
supporting company agreements that force workers to go to
arbitration for disputes on a case-by-case basis versus bringing a
suit in a class action.

Justice Neil Gorsuch, who joined the bench on Trump's appointment
in April, said nothing during the morning's arguments.

Justice Ginsburg pressed Paul Clement, the attorney for Ernst &
Young and Epic Systems, on whether other common parts of employee
agreements, like confidentiality clauses, would impact workers'
rights.

A former U.S. solicitor general, Clement began by conceding that a
person does have the right to concerted activity.  "In the sense
that three or more employees could decide that they want to go to
the arbitral forum and the2y would arbitrate individually," he
said.

He agreed with Justice Kennedy's point that sharing a lawyer could
help.

"They also have other options," Justice Clement added.

Justice Ginsburg jumped in before he could go further, asking
Justice Clement directly if confidentiality agreements "put a
damper" on how workers can bring suit against their employer.

"Well, they can proceed very jointly before they get there," he
said.  "The confidentiality agreement's not going to stop the same
lawyer from thinking about the2 three cases in conjunction."

Justice Elena Kagan interrupted.

"Mr. Clement, usually, usually when you have a right, the fact
that there is one way to exercise a right left over does not make
it OK if we've taken away another 25 ways of exercising that
right," she said.

Illustrating her example, Justice Kagan asked the court to
consider the First Amendment.

"You know, when we think about the First Amendment, we don't say
we can ban leafleting because you can always write an op-ed," she
said.  "And the same thing applies here.  The fact that there's
something left over by way of concerted activity does not make it
okay under Section 7 and Section 8 [of the Fair Labor Standards
Act] to deprive employees of many other means of protected
activity." [GN]


* Supreme Court Justices Divided on Worker Class Action Rights
--------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Stohr, writing for Bloomberg News, reports that the first
Supreme Court argument of the new term suggested the justices are
divided over the power of employers to block class-action lawsuits
by workers and channel disputes into arbitration.

In a case that could affect the rights of as many as 25 million
employees, Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the court's swing vote,
suggested on Oct. 2 through his questions that he would side with
employers.  But the newest justice, Neil Gorsuch, said nothing
during the hour-long session, leaving the outcome of the case
unclear.

At issue is whether employers can enforce promises they extract
from workers to pursue grievances as individual arbitration cases,
rather than as group lawsuits in court.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg called those agreements "yellow dog"
contracts, a label that typically refers to the now-illegal
practice of requiring workers to give up their right to join a
union.  Justice Ginsburg said employees have little choice but to
agree when an employer demands they sign an arbitration agreement.

"There is no true liberty to contract on the part of the
employee," she said.

The justices are considering three disputes involving wage-and-
hour claims, and the ruling probably will apply to discrimination
cases as well.

The workers say the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which
protects "concerted activities," guarantees them the right to
press claims as a group, either in arbitration or in court.
Employers and the Trump administration point to the Federal
Arbitration Act, which says judges must enforce arbitration
accords like any other contract.  Employers say that provision
applies even if it means workers must press claims individually.

Kennedy Skepticism

Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel
Alito expressed skepticism about the workers' arguments.  Justice
Kennedy said workers could get "many of the advantages" of a group
claim by working with the same attorney.

Over the past decade the Supreme Court has backed arbitration
agreements between companies and consumers or other businesses.

Companies say arbitration is more efficient and less expensive
than traditional litigation, reducing the pressure to settle
meritless cases.  Critics say arbitration -- particularly when it
includes a ban on class actions -- can strip litigants of
important rights and make small claims all but impossible to
press.

The workers' lawyer, University of Virginia law professor Daniel
Ortiz, told the justices that 25 million employees have signed
arbitration accords that bar group claims.

Although the Trump administration is backing the employers, the
National Labor Relations Board argued on the side of the workers
in the Oct. 2 session.  The NLRB now has a Republican majority,
but its Democratic-appointed general counsel, Richard Griffin,
argued the case.

The court will use three cases to decide the issue.  One is an
appeal by the NLRB in a fight over alleged underpayments to four
workers at an Alabama gas station run by a Murphy USA Inc. unit.
The NLRB concluded the company engaged in an unfair labor practice
by refusing to let the workers pursue their claims together.  A
federal appeals court threw out the board's finding.

The court is also considering an appeal from Epic Systems Corp., a
health-care software company being sued by Jacob Lewis, an
employee who says the company misclassified him and other
technical writers so that they wouldn't be eligible for overtime.

The third appeal was filed by the accounting firm Ernst & Young
LLP, which is fighting allegations that it also misclassified
thousands of employees to make them ineligible for overtime pay.

The cases are Epic Systems v. Lewis, 16-285; Ernst & Young v.
Morris, 16-300; and NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, 16-307.  The court
will decide all three by June. [GN]


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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