CAR_Public/171010.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, October 10, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 200



                            Headlines

ABC FINANCIAL: "Alston" Suit Moved to Maryland Federal Court
ABILITY RECOVERY: Faces "Baum" Suit in E. Dist. New York
ABM INDUSTRIES: $4.8MM Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Faces Coastal Wellness Suit in S.D. of Florida
ALRO STEEL: Faces "Svagdis" Suit over Use of Biometric Info

ARCONIC INC: Faces "Sullivan" Suit over Securities Act Violations
AUTO REFLECTIONS: "Littleton" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
AUTOS INC: N.D. Vacates Certification Under Rule 54(b) in "Baker"
AZUSA, CA: "Atencio" Suit Moved to Central District of California
BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Must Face Securities Fraud Class Action

BONITA SPRINGS: Faces "Arpaia" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
CANADA: B.C. Man Files Sexual Abuse Class Action Against Alberta
CHATTANOOGA, TN: Faces "Woodward" Suit over Privacy Laws
CHEVRON STATIONS: Samihuazin Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
CHG MEDICAL: "Carlino" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime

CHURCH AND DWIGHT: Faces "Ochoa" Suit in C. Dist. Calif.
CIRCLE K: 10th Cir. Affirms Approval of Deals on Fuel Temp. Suit
CLARUS COMMERCE: Stipulated Protective Order in "Chandler" OK'd
CNH HEALTH: Settlement in "George" ERISA Suit Has Prelim. OK
COLLECTION SERVICES: Faces "Ellis" Suit in N.D. Georgia

COMPASSIONATE HEALTH: Williams Seeks Lost Earnings under FLSA
CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS: Sexual Abuse Class Action Can Proceed
CONSOLIDATED PRODUCTS: "Sewell" Suit Seeks OT Pay under FLSA
CREDIT AMERICA: Faces "Rubin" Suit in District of New Jersey
CYNOSURE INC: Faces Class Action Over Body Contouring System

DES MOINES, IA: People Urged to Claim Franchise Fee Refunds
DFC GLOBAL: Co-Lead Counsel Gets 25% of Settlement Fund
DFC GLOBAL: Fund Allocation Plan in Securities Suit OK'd
DISCOVERING HIDDEN: Court Dismisses Employee Discrimination Suit
DOROTHY BROWN: Clark Sues over Collection of Unlawful Fees

DSA MANAGEMENT: Faces "Jackson" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
ELBIT IMAGING: Court Approves Class Action Settlement
EMPIRE HILLSIDE: "Chi" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages & OT under FLSA
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Faces Class Action Over Opioid Marketing
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Suit Over Securities Act Violations

EQUIFAX INC: CEO Retires Following Massive Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces Several Hack Probes Despite Exec Departures
EQUIFAX INC: November 30 Hearing Set in Data Breach Litigation
EQUIFAX INC: Florida Court Dismisses "Astor" Suit w/o Prejudice
EQUIFAX INC: Bologna et al. Sue over Cybersecurity Data Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Broder" Suit over Data Security Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Cox" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "McHenry" Suit over Data Security Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Tepfenhart et al. Sue over Cybersecurity Incident
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Sikes" Suit over Consumer Data Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Tipping" Suit over Cybersecurity Incident
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Appel" Suit Over FCRA Violations
ESTRELLITA INC: Faces "Reyes" Suit in S.D. Florida
EVERALBUM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in "Pratt" Granted
EXPERIAN SERVICES: Faces Suits Over Inaccurate Tax-Lien Info

EXXONMOBIL: Seeks Dismissal of Shareholder Class Action
FANTINI BAKING: Distributors Sue over Profits & Benefits
FLORIDA: FDOT's Certiorari Petition in Highway Toll Suit Denied
FORTERRA INC: Saxena White Files Securities Fraud Class Action
FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Sanford Heisler Files $700MM ERISA Class Action
GROUP O: Averts Class Action Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: "Lazzaro" Class Claims Dismissed w/o Prejudice
HARPERSVILLE, AL: Court Dismisses Pro Se Civil Rights Action
HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT: Court Awards $360K Atty Fees in "Parker"

HIRO SUSHI: "Zhang" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
HOME & HOME: "Choi" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay Under FLSA
HSN INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
INDIEFORK HOSPITALITY: Faces "Lopez" Suit in S.D. New York
INTERCEPT PHARMACEUTICALS: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline

J.D. COVELY: "Lamb" Suit Seeks Wage and Hour Law Violations
JESSICA HOLDING: "Lin" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
KUSHNER COMPANIES: Kushnerville Tenants File Class Action
LEGAL HELPLINE: Tunit Sues over Spam Text Messages
LEX 18: Faces "Leonardo" Suit in Sothern District of New York

MARSHALL UNIVERSITY: Court Dismisses with Prejudice "Kerr"
MARU & KITANO: Faces "Kim" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
MASSACHUSETTS HIGHER: Court Narrows Claims in "Gentleman"
MCCARTHY BURGESS: "Aviles" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violations
MORGAN PROPERTIES: Denial of "Green" Class Certification Vacated

MUGSTHOTS.COM: Jude Approves Publicity Rights Class Action
NAVIENT CORP: Faces "Davis" Suit in W. Dist. New York
NEW JERSEY: Court Denies Bid to Enjoin Enforcement of CJRA
NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification in "Calvo"
NORDSTROM INC: Faces "Killpack" Suit in C.D. California

NORTH SHORE AGENCY: Faces "Johnson" Suit in E.D. of New York
ON TIME: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in "Hane" FLSA Suit
PROTAS SPIVOK: $42K in Attys' Fees Awarded in "Jernigan" Suit
RHG & CO: Maxin Class Counsel to Update Supplemental Class Notice
RITE AID: Faces "Kalajian" Suit in Central Dist. of California

STAR NATURAL: Faces "Rincon" Suit in E. Dist. of New York
STARWOOD WAYPOINT: "Berg" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation
STATE FARM: Faces Coastal Wellness Centers Suit in S.D. of Fla.
TARSADIA HOTELS: Time to Submit More Info on Joint Bid Extended
TOOTSIE ROLL: Faces "Daniel" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.

TORCHAV INC: Faces "Alvarez" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses "Sweda" ERISA Suit
YUM! BRANDS: Zavala Sues over Sweetened Beverages Sales Tax
ZOOMPASS HOLDINGS: Vega Named Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit

* Judge Dismisses Class Action Against Generic Drugmakers
* Politicians Tackle Consumer Rights-Related Regulations
* Slovenia's National Assembly Passes Class Action Bill




                            *********


ABC FINANCIAL: "Alston" Suit Moved to Maryland Federal Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Thomas Alston, Individually and on
Behalf of a Class of Persons Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
ABC Financial Services, Inc. LMD Gyms, LLC, GBG, Inc., Gold's Gym
International, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. CAL-17-18362, was
removed on Sep. 15, 2017 from the Circuit Court of Maryland for PG
County, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
(Greenbelt). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:17-cv-
02748-TDC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Theodore D. Chuang.

ABC Financial provides health club software and billing services
to the fitness industry primarily in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for ABC Financial Services, Inc.:

          Bradley Todd Canter
          The Law Offices of Ronald S Canter LLC
          200A Monroe St., Ste 104
          Rockville, MD 20850
          Telephone: (301) 424 7490
          Facsimile: (301) 424 7470
          E-mail: bcanter@roncanterllc.com

Attorneys for LMD Gyms, LLC, and GBG Inc.

          Donald A Rea, Esq.
          SAUL EWING LLP
          500 E Pratt St Eighth Fl
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 332 8680
          Facsimile: (410) 332 8078
          E-mail: drea@saul.com

               - and -

          Amanda P Webster, Esq.
          SAUL EWING LLP
          500 E Pratt St, No 800
          Baltomore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 332 8789
          Facsimile: (410) 332 8187
          E-mail: awebster@saul.com


ABILITY RECOVERY: Faces "Baum" Suit in E. Dist. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ability Recovery
Services LLC. The case is styled as Joseph Baum, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Ability Recovery Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-05799
(E.D. N.Y., October 3, 2017).

Ability Recovery Services LLC is a collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


ABM INDUSTRIES: $4.8MM Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Proposed Settlement
Agreement in the cases captioned BRICE IKBY BINISSIA and HALINA
SUCHECKA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ABM INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Defendants.
VERONICA BROWN, individually and behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. ABM INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case Nos. 13 cv 1230, 15 cv 6729 (N.D. Ill.).

The named plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and a group of
allegedly similarly situated Illinois janitors.  The case settled
during discovery, and 1,949 janitors submitted timely claim forms.
The claims administrator also received about 200 late claims
forms, but ABM declined to pay them under the settlement.

In sum, 6,193 janitors have opted into the consolidated cases as
plaintiffs. Like the plaintiffs in Las, they allege that the
defendants violated the FLSA by not paying them overtime wages
earned for the minutes spent gathering supplies and loading their
cleaning carts before the start of their scheduled shifts.

The Proposed Settlement

The parties claim that this is not a common fund case. The
proposed settlement allocates $1,011,236.59 to gross wage
payments. They seek $3,463,763.41 in attorneys' fees, plus
reimbursement of $325,000.01. Each opt-in plaintiff receives a
fixed amount for each rounded work week. For work weeks with
between 40 and 42.5 hours, the employee receives $2.47. For work
weeks with more than 42.5 hours, the employee receives $4.93. The
difference, explain the parties, results from ABM's possible set-
off defense. Some, but not all, potential opt-in class members
took thirty-minute meal breaks; if ABM is entitled to a set-off
for five, thirty-minute breaks a week, up to 2.5 hours of
uncompensated time per week would be effectively cancelled.

The parties maintain that this case does not involve allocation of
a common settlement fund between class members and counsel and
that it was neither negotiated nor structured as a common fund"
case.  Rather, they argue that this settlement fundamentally
differs from Rule 23 settlements because the FLSA contains a
statutory fee-shifting provision to which the principles of
proportionality analysis in cases like Redman v. RadioShack Corp.,
768 F.3d 622, 630.

So the proposed settlement effectively allocates a single fund of
$4.8 million between counsel and class members. In evaluating a
petition for fees, the loadstar [sic] is used as a base figure
which may then be increased or decreased in light of [several]
factors. If fees are truly separate from the entire $4.8 million
settlement fund, defendants must bear the risk of an award of fees
and costs exceeding the $3.8 million plaintiffs' counsel have
agreed to seek. The parties have not clarified what happens to the
funds in the $4.8 million gross settlement amount if the court
does not award all of the $3.8 million in fees and costs agreed
to.  But no matter what the court does with a fee petition,
defendants' gross liability can be no more than $4.8 million under
the settlement agreement, which is expressly conditioned upon
court approval.

A series of recent Seventh Circuit cases decided under Rule 23
have established a principle of proportionality to guide courts in
evaluating whether there is evidence of collusion in a proposed
settlement of a common fund case. The ratio that is relevant to
assessing the reasonableness of the attorneys' fee that the
parties agreed to is the ratio of (1) the fee to (2) the fee plus
what the class members received. Redman, 768 F.3d at 630. In
consumer class actions the presumption should we suggest be that
attorneys' fees awarded to class counsel should not exceed a third
or at most a half of the total amount of money going to class
members and their counsel.

Applying Redman's formula to the proposed settlement, 3.3 million
to about 4.4 million equals a 76% fee. This amount exceeds the
one-third to one-half rule of thumb for consumer class actions the
Seventh Circuit has suggested.  Furthermore, the $4.93 per rounded
workweek some class members will recover comprises 27% of the $18
potential liquidated claim plaintiffs say they are potentially
entitled to. That said, this is not a consumer case, and so rather
than treat the disproportionality as substantially fatal, as might
be the case under Rule 23, the court uses this finding as
guidance. The disproportionality of fees to benefits to class
members causes the court to take a close look at the proposed
settlement to assure that it results from arms-length negotiations
and settles a bona fide dispute.

The court does not resolve this issue now, however, because it
will only be presented if a class member actually appears,
objects, and is overruled. Because the answer to this question
involves uncertain or contingent events that may not occur as
anticipated, or not occur at all, it has not ripened for
adjudication and must be left on the vine. Particularly given that
the named plaintiffs and their counsel take no position on this
issue, the court defers its adjudication unless and until a class
member objects and states that he or she wishes to opt out if the
objection is overruled. In that event, the court can better test
the issue through adversary briefing in in which the objector's
interests will be represented. The court therefore directs the
parties to modify the proposed notice to the class.

The motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9wkybgmfrom Leagle.com.

Brice Ikby Binissia, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Michael Ryan
-- om@tomryanlaw.com -- Law Offices of Thomas Ryan.

Brice Ikby Binissia, Plaintiff, represented by Angel Petrov Bakov,
Glen Dunn & Associates, Ltd., 983 Willowbrook DriveWheeling, IL
60090-5738, Catherine P. Sons, Law Office of James X. Bormes,
P.C., 8 S Michigan Ave # 2600, Chicago, IL 60603, USA, Glen Joseph
Dunn, Jr. --  gdunn@gjdlaw.com -- Glen J. Dunn & Associates, Haig
A. Himidian, Glen J. Dunn & Associates, Ltd., 225 W. Wacker, Suite
1750, Chicago, IL 60606, Jac A. Cotiguala, Jac A. Cotiguala &
Associates,  431 S Dearborn St # 606, Chicago, IL 60605, USA &
James X. Bormes, Law Office of James X. Bormes,  8 S Michigan Ave
# 2600, Chicago, IL 60603, USA

Halina Suchecka, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Michael Ryan,
Law Offices of Thomas Ryan, Angel Petrov Bakov, Glen Dunn &
Associates, Ltd., Catherine P. Sons, Law Office of James X.
Bormes, P.C., Glen Joseph Dunn, Jr., Glen J. Dunn & Associates,
Haig A. Himidian, Glen J. Dunn & Associates, Ltd., Jac A.
Cotiguala, Jac A. Cotiguala & Associates & James X. Bormes, Law
Office of James X. Bormes.

ABM Janitorial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by James J.
Oh, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J. Voss, Littler Mendelson,
Christina A. Andronache, Littler Mendelson, Jennifer L. Schilling,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Jacoby, Littler Mendelson, P.c.,
Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Martha J. Keon,
Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy Ray, Littler Mendelson, P.C. &
Robert W. Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.c..

ABM Janitorial Services -- North Central, Inc., Defendant,
represented by James J. Oh, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J.
Voss, Littler Mendelson, Christina A. Andronache, Littler
Mendelson, Jennifer L. Schilling, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith
Jacoby, Littler Mendelson, P.c., Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Martha J. Keon, Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy
Ray, Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Robert W. Pritchard, Littler
Mendelson, P.c..

ABM Janitorial Services -- Midwest LLC, Defendant, represented by
James J. Oh, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J. Voss, Littler
Mendelson, Christina A. Andronache, Littler Mendelson, Jennifer L.
Schilling, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Jacoby, Littler
Mendelson, P.c., Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler Mendelson,
P.C., Martha J. Keon, Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy Ray, Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Robert W. Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.c..
ABM Janitorial Midwest, Inc., Defendant, represented by James J.
Oh, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J. Voss, Littler Mendelson,
Christina A. Andronache, Littler Mendelson, Jennifer L. Schilling,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Jacoby, Littler Mendelson, P.c.,
Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Martha J. Keon,
Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy Ray, Littler Mendelson, P.C. &
Robert W. Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.c..

ABM Janitorial Services -- Southeast, LLC, Defendant, represented
by James J. Oh, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J. Voss, Littler
Mendelson, Christina A. Andronache, Littler Mendelson, Jennifer L.
Schilling, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Jacoby, Littler
Mendelson, P.c., Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler Mendelson,
P.C., Martha J. Keon, Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy Ray, Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Robert W. Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.c..

ABM Industries Inc., Defendant, represented by James J. Oh,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew J. Voss, Littler Mendelson,
Christina A. Andronache, Littler Mendelson, Jennifer L. Schilling,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Jacoby, Littler Mendelson, P.c.,
Lavanga Vusitha Wijekoon, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Martha J. Keon,
Littler Mendelson, P.c., Niloy Ray, Littler Mendelson, P.C. &
Robert W. Pritchard, Littler Mendelson, P.C.


ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Faces Coastal Wellness Suit in S.D. of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allstate Property
and Casualty Insurance Company. The case is styled as Coastal
Wellness Centers, Inc., a Florida corporation, a/a/o Michaelle
Breneville, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company,
Defendant, Case No. 0:17-cv-61952-BB (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

Allstate offers property and casualty insurance.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Barbara Perez, Esq.
   Aronovitz Law
   2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3700
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (305) 372-2772
   Fax: (305) 397-1886
   Email: bp@aronovitzlaw.com

      - and -

   Tod N. Aronovitz, Esq.
   Aronovitz Law
   One Biscayne Tower
   2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3700
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (305) 372-2772
   Fax: (305) 397-1886
   Email: ta@aronovitzlaw.com


ALRO STEEL: Faces "Svagdis" Suit over Use of Biometric Info
-----------------------------------------------------------
GLEN SVAGDIS, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff, v. ALRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Michigan
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2017CH12566 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks damages and other legal and equitable
remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant in
capturing, collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated individuals' biometric identifiers and/or
biometric information without informed written consent, in direct
violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA).

This case is about an industrial company capturing and collecting
its workers' fingerprints in violation of Illinois law and without
their informed written consent. Recognizing the serious harm that
can come from unregulated collection and use of biometrics,
Illinois passed detailed regulations addressing the collection,
use and retention of biometric information by private entities,
like Defendant. Choosing to shun more traditional timekeeping
methods, Defendant instead implemented an invasive time tracking
program that relied on the capture, collection, storage, and use
of workers' fingerprints and biometric information, while
disregarding the relevant Illinois regulations and the privacy
interests they protect.

A "biometric identifier" is any personal feature that is unique to
an individual and includes fingerprints, iris scans, palm scans,
and DNA, among others. "Biometric information" is any information
captured, converted, stored, or shared based on a person's
biometric identifier which is used to identify an individual.

Alro Steel Corporation processes and distributes metals, plastics,
and industrial supplies. Its portfolio comprises metals, such as
alloy, aluminum, aluminum.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Evan M. Meyers, Esq.
          David L. Gerbie, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          Facsimile: (312) 275 7895
          E-mail: emeyers@mcgpc.com
                  dgerbie@mcgpc.com


ARCONIC INC: Faces "Sullivan" Suit over Securities Act Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as, JANET L. SULLIVAN, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. ARCONIC
INC., KLAUS KLEINFELD, ROBERT S. COLLINS, WILLIAM F. OPLINGER,
ARTHUR D. COLLINS, JR., KATHRYN S. FULLER, JUDITH M. GUERON,
MICHAEL G. MORRIS, E. STANLEY O'NEAL, JAMES W. OWENS, PATRICIA F.
RUSSO, SIR MARTIN SORRELL, RATAN N. TATA, ERNESTO ZEDILLO, MORGAN
STANLEY & CO. LLC, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, CITIGROUP
GLOBAL MARKETS INC., GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO., J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES
LLC, BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES CORP., MITSUBISHI UFJ SECURITIES
(USA), INC., RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC and RBS SECURITIES INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01213-MRH (W.D. Pa., Sep. 15, 2017),
is a securities class action on behalf of all purchasers of
Arconic Depositary Shares, each representing a 1/10th interest in
a share of 5.375% Class B Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock,
Series 1, par value $1 per share, liquidation preference $500 per
share (the "Preferred Shares") pursuant and/or traceable to the
Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with
Arconic's September 18, 2014 initial public stock offering (the
"Preferred IPO").

Arconic is an American industrial supplier. Prior to November 1,
2016, when the Company spun-off its mining and manufacture of raw
aluminum operations to the new "Alcoa Corporation", Arconic was
known as Alcoa Inc. In connection with the Spin-Off, the Company
also changed its name to Arconic.  Alcoa Inc. was formed in
Pennsylvania in 1888 and the new Alcoa Corporation remains
organized under the laws of Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alfred G. Yates, Jr., Esq.
          Gerald L. Rutledge, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ALFRED G. YATES, JR., P.C.
          ALFRED G. YATES, JR
          300 Mt. Lebanon Boulevard, Suite 206-B
          Pittsburgh, PA 15234-1507
          Telephone: (412) 391 5164
          Facsimile: (412) 471 1033
          E-mail: yateslaw@aol.com

               - and -

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Mary K. Blasy, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: 631 367 7100
          Facsimile: 631 367 1173
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  mblasy@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Curtis V. Trinko, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO, LLP
          16 West 46th Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 490 9550
          Facsimile: (212) 986 0158
          E-mail: ctrinko@trinko.com


AUTO REFLECTIONS: "Littleton" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERSKINE LITTLETON, PRINCE MANUEL, FERNANDUS GLASS, PASHA GLASS,
CASSANDRA TYSON, RONALD MAY, and PATRICK HARVEY, Individually and
on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. AUTO
REFLECTIONS, INC., CHRISTOPHER BOURQUE, and MANHEIM REMARKETING,
INC, Jointly and Severally, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-
03589-LMM (N.D. Ga., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover overtime
pay, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, costs, and
attorney's fees under the Labor Standards Act.

This action is related to another suit, Fears v. Auto Reflections,
1:17-cv-02632-CAP (N.D. Ga. 2017).  Fears v. Auto Reflections
seeks to recover unpaid regular wages and unpaid overtime wages
under the FLSA and a Georgia breach of contract theory, for all
hourly workers that were not paid for: 1) Travel time, 2) Shorted
Hours, and 3) Time spent engaged to wait for their supervisors.

In the Littleton case, Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid overtime
wages to a class of workers that were paid a piece rate for their
work detailing cars and performing logo work on windows. The harm
in the instant case does not involve unpaid wages from travel to
other work sites. The crux of the Littleton case is that
Plaintiffs received a straight-time piece rate for all hours
worked, and received no overtime premium pay for hours workers in
excess of 40 hours. This suit involves substantially different
parties as representative plaintiffs, and also includes an
additional party, Manheim Remarketing, Inc., upon whose property
the car detailing and logo services were performed and is also the
company that received the benefit of these services over several
years.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          BRANDON A. THOMAS
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1800 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 300
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 343 2441
          Facsimile: (404) 352 5636
          E-mail: brandon@brandonthomaslaw.com


AUTOS INC: N.D. Vacates Certification Under Rule 54(b) in "Baker"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Darilyn Baker, individually, and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
Autos Inc., a North Dakota Corporation, d/b/a Global Auto; RW
Enterprises Inc., a North Dakota Corporation; Randy Westby, an
individual, James Hendershot, an individual, and Robert Opperude,
an individual, Defendants and Appellees, Case No. 20170174 (N.D.),
Judge Daniel J. Crothers of the Supreme Court of North Dakota
dismissed Baker's appeal and directed the district court to vacate
that portion of its judgment certifying the judgment as final
under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

In 2007, Baker purchased a car from Autos.  She financed the
purchase of the car by trading in a car and entering into a retail
installment sales contract with Autos.  Baker failed to make some
of her required monthly payments for the car and it was
repossessed.  Before Baker defaulted on her loan, Autos assigned
her retail installment sales contract to RW Enterprises.

After the car was repossessed, Baker sued Autos, RW Enterprises,
and their individual owners, alleging they failed to comply with
state statutory requirements for retail installment sales
contracts and violated state usury laws.

Baker moved to certify her lawsuit as a class action for all
purchasers of cars from Autos who may have suffered an injury as a
result of the Defendants' business practices.  After the district
court denied her motion for class certification, a majority of the
Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration.  The district
court subsequently granted Baker's motion for class certification
and thereafter partially granted and partially denied her motion
for summary judgment.

The court denied Baker's motion for summary judgment on her claim
that Autos failed to disclose a "document administration fee" and
a "loan fee" as finance charges, concluding that those fees were
disclosed when the two documents were read together.  The court
also concluded all class members who were charged and paid a $25
late fee on any delinquent installment payment due under their
retail installment sales contract were entitled to a refund
because the amount of that late fee was not authorized by N.D.C.C.
Section 51-13-02(2)(e).

The court reserved ruling on which the Defendant was liable for
repayment of any excessive late fees, and whether the excessive
late fees invoked statutory sanctions for violating laws
pertaining to the requirements for retail installment sales
contracts, for regulated lender status and for state usury laws.

The parties thereafter stipulated to the resolution of certain
remaining legal and factual issues and to a certification that
there was no just reason for delay and entry of judgment under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).  The district court adopted the parties'
stipulation and certified the partial summary judgment as final
under Rule 54(b).

The court's partial summary judgment concluded: (i) the imposition
of the $25 late fee violated statutory limitations for late fees;
(ii) all class members who were actually assessed and paid a late
fee in excess of the statutory limitation were entitled to a
refund of all fees paid; and (iii) all other claims were
dismissed.

The partial summary judgment identified the following issues
remaining to be decided: (i) the identity of class members
entitled to recover excessive late fees; (ii) the individual
liability of Hendershot and Opperude; and (3) the potential
liability of RW Enterprises and Westby.  Baker timely appealed.

Judge Crothers finds that Baker's claims are part of a class
action involving the Defendants' business practices and this case
presents the type of piecemeal appeal Rule 54(b) was designed to
prevent.  Baker moved for and was denied summary judgment on the
usury claim.  The ultimate liability for Baker's claim about
excessive late fees has not been determined and a subsequent
appeal from the district court's decisions about liability cannot
be ruled out.  The parties have not demonstrated how the issue
about applicability of state usury law to a class action elevates
this case to the level of an extraordinary circumstance involving
undue hardship to satisfy the requirement for the infrequent harsh
case warranting our immediate review of the issue.

The Judge concludes this case does not present out-of-the-ordinary
circumstances or cognizable, unusual hardships to the litigants if
resolution of the issues on this appeal is deferred.  Therefore,
the district court abused its discretion in certifying the partial
summary judgment as final under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).  He dismissed
Baker's appeal and directed the district court to vacate that
portion of its judgment certifying the judgment as final under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/L7TzlY from Leagle.com.

Larry M. Baer (argued), West Des Moines, IA, and Robert E. Ackre
(on brief), Cando, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Sean Marrin (argued), and Kraig A. Wilson (on brief), Grand Forks,
ND, for defendants and appellees Autos Inc., a North Dakota
Corporation, d/b/a Global Auto, Robert Opperude and James
Hendershot.

Bryan L. Van Grinsven, Minot, ND, for defendants and appellees RW
Enterprises Inc., a North Dakota Corporation and Randy Westby, an
individual.


AZUSA, CA: "Atencio" Suit Moved to Central District of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Evan Atencio and Dennis Tremblay,
on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals,
the Plaintiffs, v. City of Azusa, the Defendant, Case No. _____,
was transferred on Sep. 15, 2017 to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California (Eastern Division -
Riverside). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-
01892-DMG-AGR to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Dolly M. Gee.

Azusa is a city in the San Gabriel Valley, at the foot of the San
Gabriel Mountains in Los Angeles County, California, United
States. The A on the San Gabriel Mountains represents the city of
Azusa, and can be seen within a 30-mile radius.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Emilio Mastagni, Esq.
          Ace Thomas Tate, Esq.
          Ian Barclay Sangster, Esq.
          Isaac Sean Stevens, Esq.
          MASTAGNI HOLSTEDT APC
          1912 I Street
          Sacramento, CA 95811-3151
          Telephone: (916) 446 4692
          Facsimile: (916) 447 4614
          E-mail: davidm@mastagni.com
                  atate@mastagni.com
                  isangster@mastagni.com
                  istevens@mastagni.com


BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Must Face Securities Fraud Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chandra Lye, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a U.S.
district court has denied motions to dismiss a securities fraud
class action lawsuit against Banc of California and its former CEO
Steven Sugarman.

The case claims violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
saying Mr. Sugarman and BoC failed to reveal connections to
another individual who previously pled guilty in other securities
fraud situations.  As a result, investors claim they lost money.

The case has relied on an anonymous blogger from the SeekingAlpha
website.

"The post purported to reveal not only financial ties between Banc
CEO Sugarman and Banc Lead Independent Director Chad Brownstein,
but also and more importantly connections between Sugarman,
Brownstein and a man named Jason Galanis," the Sept. 6 order says.

The plaintiffs have alleged the information was something the
defendants failed to disclose.

"The complaint references multiple, complicated ties between on
the one hand defendant Sugarman and companies he owns or controls,
and on the other, Galanis and both the Gerova scheme and the
Tribal Bond scheme," the order says.

The Tribal Bond scheme was a Ponzi scheme that saw a Native
American tribal entity and other investors lose tens of millions
of dollars.  The Gerova scheme was one that was designed to
defraud shareholders of Gerova Financial Group.

The information in the blog was said to have come from public
documents.

"Even though they've argued the information from the blog was
false, defendants don't appear to have established it," the order
says.

There were initially three defendants to the case; Mr. Sugarman,
Banc and James McKinney however, the plaintiffs dropped their
claims against McKinney.

Mr. Sugarman left the company on Jan. 23.

The class action case will cover all people who bought BoC
securities between Oct. 29, 2015, and Jan. 20, 2017. [GN]


BONITA SPRINGS: Faces "Arpaia" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bonita Springs
Acquisition, LLC. The case is styled as Mr. Stephen Arpaia,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Bonita Springs Acquisition, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-23635-UU (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

Bonita Springs Acquisitions, LLC is a Foreign Limited Liability
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Kaivon Yasinian, Esq.
   McCalla Raymer Pierce, LLC
   110 SE 6th Street, Suite 2400
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 332-9384
   Fax: (954) 332-9384
   Email: kyasinian@live.com


CANADA: B.C. Man Files Sexual Abuse Class Action Against Alberta
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrea Ross, writing for CBC News, reports that a B.C. man has
filed a lawsuit against the Province of Alberta, the Anglican
Diocese of Edmonton and Gordon William Dominey, alleging the
priest repeatedly sexually abused him and at least nine other
individuals while they were incarcerated at the Edmonton Youth
Development Centre in the 1980s.

The plaintiff, whose name is protected by a publication ban, is
seeking to have the lawsuit certified as a class action.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages on behalf of the plaintiff
and other alleged victims, who were all aged 14 to 16 at the time
of the alleged abuse, and were incarcerated at the EYDC between
1985 and 1989.

Anglican priest, Gordon William Dominey, charged with historical
Edmonton sexual assaults

In February 2016, Mr. Dominey was charged with five counts of
sexual assault and five counts of gross indecency in relation to
the alleged assaults, which were reported to have happened at the
facility.  Mr. Dominey now faces more than 30 sexual assault and
gross indecency charges, after more alleged victims came forward.

Mr. Dominey was a priest with the Anglican Diocese of Edmonton
from 1980 to 1990.  He was hired by the Province of Alberta to
work with children at the EYDC from 1985 to 1989.

'He has carried this burden for three decades'

According to the lawsuit, Mr. Dominey's work at the EYDC included
conducting masses and prayer sessions, providing mentorship and
support services and organizing weekly social activities and
swimming lessons for children.

The plaintiff was 14 when he was incarcerated at the facility for
a four-month period in 1985, and turned 15 while there.

During his first visit to the swimming pool, Mr. Dominey fondled
him underwater, the lawsuit alleges.  Non-consensual sexual
contact in the water by Mr. Dominey continued during the
plaintiff's next few visits to the pool, the lawsuit alleges,
before Mr. Dominey forced sexual intercourse on the plaintiff in a
shower stall at the pool.

The lawsuit alleges Mr. Dominey forced sexual intercourse on the
plaintiff during two more swimming outings before the plaintiff
stopped going on swimming trips and cut off all contact with
Mr. Dominey.

Edmonton Anglican priest faces more sexual assault charges

As a result of the alleged abuse, the lawsuit said the plaintiff
has developed depression, anxiety and anger issues.  The lawsuit
claims he lost trust in authority and religious institutions,
performed poorly in school and had trouble with the law.  The
alleged abuse affected his relationships with intimate partners
and led to periods of emotional distance from his children.

"[Plaintiff] feels shame and embarrassment over what Dominey did
to him, and he has carried this burden for three decades," the
lawsuit alleges.  "These injuries are directly attributable to
Dominey's conduct."

The lawsuit claims that as a result of the alleged abuse, the
survivors suffer PTSD, flashbacks and anxiety, have damaged self-
esteem and relationships with family and friends, and fear being
alone with male authority figures.  They will require ongoing
medical and psychological care as a result, according to the
lawsuit, filed on Sept. 21, 2017.

Lawsuit filed after changes to Limitations Act

The lawsuit claims the Diocese and the Province of Alberta are
liable for Mr. Dominey's alleged actions for failing to screen him
before he was hired, supervise his work thereafter, or enforce
policies that would have denied him the opportunity to allegedly
abuse the plaintiff and the others.

The Diocese and the province owed a duty of care to provide a safe
environment at the juvenile correctional facility, and the
province breached Charter rights by not ensuring the safety of the
youth and protecting their right not to be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment, the lawsuit said.

The plaintiff is seeking general and unspecified damages.

CBC spoke with the plaintiff, who said filing the lawsuit offers
some closure.

"Him being responsible for what he did to me and others, that's
what it is to me really.  And some kind if retribution for
inflicting the damage . . . on my life," he said.

"I feel my life could have been a lot different if this kind of
thing hadn't happened."

The lawsuit was filed in part because of recent changes to the
Limitations Act, which allow survivors of sexual offences to sue
regardless of when the incidents of abuse occurred.

Changes to Alberta's limitations law paved way for historical sex
assault lawsuit, lawyer says

The statement of claim has been filed with the court, but the
proposal for the class-action suit has not yet been certified with
the court.  The defendants have 20 days to file a statement of
defence.

Mr. Dominey's criminal trial is set for January 2019.

Both the criminal allegations and the allegations in the lawsuit
have not been proven in court. [GN]


CHATTANOOGA, TN: Faces "Woodward" Suit over Privacy Laws
--------------------------------------------------------
DOROTHY WOODWARD, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, ex rel,
CHATTANOOGA POLICE DEPARTMENT, RIVERVIEW MEDICAL SERVICES, CO., a
Tennesse corporation, and LAKENDRA PORTER. d/b/a RIVERVIEW MEDICAL
SERVICES, CO., a Tennesse corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-00253-TRM-SKL (E.D. Tenn., Sep. 14, 2017), seeks to
recover monetary damages, attorneys' fees, preliminary and
equitable relief as a proximate result of Defendants' violations
of the clearly established rights, privileges, and immunities
secured to the Plaintiff and class members by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.

According to the complaint, the City of Chattagoona has no
procedures in place to redact names, addresses and phone numbers
as well as other personal information in the motor vehicle crash
reports it generates and produces for review on a daily basis to
these solicitors. Likewise, it does not require a reviewer to
certify that disclosure is for permitted purpose under DPPA and
specifically not for solicitation. Defendants disclosed, caused to
be disclosed, directed disclosure, endorsed disclosure, conspired
to disclose, or acquiesced to the disclosure of Plaintiff's
personal information from Defendants.

Chattanooga, a city in southeastern Tennessee, is set along the
Tennessee River in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains. Its
trolleylike Incline Railway scales steep Lookout Mountain before
reaching Ruby Falls waterfall and Rock City, featuring sweeping
views, sandstone formations and gardens. Point Park, also atop
Lookout, marks the site of a Civil War battle now honored at the
Battles for Chattanooga Museum.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Kennamer, Esq.
          MCMAHAN LAW FIRM
          P.O. Box 11107
          Chattanooga, TN 37401
          Telephone: (423) 265 1100
          Facsimile: (423) 266 1981


CHEVRON STATIONS: Samihuazin Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
----------------------------------------------------------------
PWASIM SAMIHUAZIN, an individual, and on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated plaintiff, the Plaintiff, v.
CHEVRON STATIONS, INC., a California Corporation and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC675229 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks relief for Defendant's unlawful
employment policies, practices and procedures, which have resulted
in the failure of Defendant to pay Plaintiff and members of the
putative class all wages due to them including, minimum wages and
overtime for all hours worked, wages in accordance with the
designated wage scale, penalties for failure to timely furnish
accurate, penalties for wages due on termination, and restitution
and other equitable relief under California Labor Code.

This class action lawsuit is specifically brought on behalf of all
persons employed in non-exempt positions at Chevron gas station
locations owned and/or operated in the State of California who
worked one or more shifts at a Chevron gas station location. This
class action lawsuit challenges Defendant's employment practices
with respect to payment of wages and provisions for meal and rest
periods applicable to non-exempt employees, including Defendant's
policies and practices of (a) failing to pay for every hour
worked, including minimum wages, designated wages, and overtime;
(b) failing to provide meal and rest breaks that comply with
California law; (c) requiring non-exempt employees to enter into
an "on-duty" meal period agreements that do not comport with
California law; and (d) failing to pay premium wages and/or
restitution for on-duty, missed, short, and/or late meal and rest
breaks.

According to the complaint, by discouraging employees from working
beyond designated hours, and/or changing timesheets. Defendant has
failed to pay for all hours worked including minimum wages,
designated wages, and overtime. By failing to relinquish control
over employees' job duties and responsibilities, Defendant has
failed to provide employees a reasonable opportunity to take a
break such that Plaintiff and employees are either unable to take
a meal or rest break all together, and/or are unable to leave the
premises, unable to take a duty-free meal or rest break, and/or
are interrupted during their meal or rest break, and/or take a
short or late meal or rest period. Defendant further fails to pay
compensation or premium wages for on-duty, missed, short, and/or
late meal and rest breaks.

Chevron Stations Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. The Company sells gasoline and convenience products at
our retail stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christina A. Humphrey, Esq.
          Thomas A. Rist, Esq.
          HUMPHREY & RIST LLP
          The Granada Building
          1216 State Street, 4th Floor, Suite 401
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 618 2924
          Facsimile: (805) 618 2939
          E-mail: christina@humphreyrist.com
                  tom@humphreyrist.com


CHG MEDICAL: "Carlino" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------
Jacqueline Carlino, and all others similarly-situated v. CHG
Medical Staffing, Inc. and Does 1 to 10 inclusive, Case No. 1:17-
at-00739 (E.D. Calif., September 29, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of Wyoming who was employed by
RNnetwork, a division of CHG, as a travel nurse in, among other
places, Bakersfield, California between May 2016 and August 2016.

Defendant CHG is a Delaware corporation that maintains its
principal place of business in Midvale, Utah. CHG is a healthcare
staffing company that employs hourly health care professionals for
short-term travel assignments at health care providers throughout
California and elsewhere. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew B. Hayes, Esq.
      Kye D. Pawlenko, Esq.
      HAYES PAWLENKO LLP
      595 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 303
      Pasadena, CA 91101
      Tel: (626) 808-4357
      Fax: (626) 921-4932
      E-mail: mhayes@helpcounsel.com
              kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com


CHURCH AND DWIGHT: Faces "Ochoa" Suit in C. Dist. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Church and Dwight
Co., Inc. The case is styled as Karolina Ochoa, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Church and
Dwight Co., Inc, Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-02019-ODW-SP (C.D.
Cal., October 3, 2017).

Headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey, Church & Dwight Co. Inc.
is a manufacturer and seller of sodium bicarbonate products
popularly known as baking soda.  The company also makes laundry
detergent, bathroom cleaners, cat litter, carpet deodorizer, air
fresheners, toothpaste, and antiperspirants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Michael D Braun, Esq.
   Braun Law Group PC
   1999 Avenue of the Stars Suite 1100
   Los Angeles, CA 90067
   Tel: (310) 836-6000
   Fax: (310) 836-6010
   Email: service@braunlawgroup.com

      - and -

   Marc R Stanley, Esq.
   Stanley Law Group
   6116 North Central Expresway Suite 1500
   Dallas, TX 75205
   Tel: (214) 443-4300
   Fax: (214) 443-0358
   Email: marcstanley@mac.com


CIRCLE K: 10th Cir. Affirms Approval of Deals on Fuel Temp. Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, issued an Order
affirming the Decision of the District Court's approval of the 10
settlement agreements in the motor fuel temperature sales practice
litigation.

Consumers purchase gasoline by the gallon.  But gas expands as it
heats up.  And that means the number of molecules, and,
accordingly, the amount of energy in a gallon of gas will vary
based on the temperature at which it's dispensed.  Yet retailers
don't control for the effects of temperature when they sell gas to
consumers.  So consumers who purchase gas dispensed at higher
temperatures may be getting less energy than they expect.

These simple laws of physics gave rise to complex litigation.

Several individuals in multiple states brought class action
lawsuits against various fuel retailers based on the defendants'
failure to control for, or at least disclose, the effects of
temperature on fuel.

In 2007, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated these cases and designated the District of Kansas as
the transferee district.

After years of legal wrangling, several of the parties entered
into settlement agreements, which the district court ultimately
approved. Appeals arose arise from (1) the district court's
approval of those settlement agreements and (2) its interpretation
of one of them.

Settlement Agreements

Section 4.7 of the Costco Agreement contains the following
language:

     "Other Agreements. If at any time prior to the completion of
conversion and installation of ATC, Class Counsel and Class
Representatives agree to enter into any agreement with any person
or company to resolve any action or any other pending or
threatened claim concerning ATC that is materially more favorable
to that person or company than this Amended Settlement Agreement
is to Costco (including, without limitation, calling for a lower
conversion percentage, slower rate of conversion to ATC or for
completion of conversion to ATC at a later date than required by
Section 4.4), Class Counsel and Class Representatives agree to
notify Costco promptly of the terms of such agreement. At Costco's
sole discretion, it may adopt the materially more favorable terms
in any such agreement in place of its obligations under Section
4.4. Costco agrees to notify Class Counsel and Class
Representatives in writing of any such election. The Parties agree
that any change in Costco's obligations under Section 4.4 as a
result of any such election that is not a change that is
materially adverse to the Settlement Class does not require
additional notice to the class."

The remaining settlement agreements are fund settlements. They
require BP, Chevron, Citgo, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Shell,
Sinclair, and Sunoco each to pay a certain sum ranging from
$61,000 to $5,000,000 into a common fund. Under the terms of the
settlement agreements, portions of that fund may be used to (1)
reimburse fuel retailers for expenses they incur if they convert
to ATC; and (2) defray costs that state agencies incur if those
states agree to permit or require ATC at resale. Neither the
conversion settlements nor the fund settlements provide any money
to class members.

Costco isn't entitled to invoke its rights under Section 4.7.
Costco asserts that the district court erred in refusing to allow
it to exercise its rights under Section 4.7 of the Costco
Agreement. Because this argument presents a question of contract
interpretation, the Tenth Circuit's review is de novo.

In denying Costco's motion, the district court relied in part on
the fact that Section 4.7 applies only if Class Counsel and Class
Representatives agree to enter into any agreement with any person
or company to resolve any action or any other pending or
threatened claim concerning ATC. Specifically, the district court
concluded that the phrase concerning ATC modifies the term
agreement, and thus that only agreements "concerning ATC" can
trigger Costco's rights under Section 4.7.

Under Washington law, the subjective intent of the parties is
generally irrelevant if the intent can be determined from the
actual words used. Here, the Tenth Circuit can determine the
parties' intent from the actual words they used. Specifically, we
can determine their intent from (1) Section 4.7's language
indicating that Section 4.7 only applies to agreements concerning
ATC (2) Section 4.7's parenthetical list of examples, which all
describe how a party must implement ATC, as opposed to whether it
must do so; and (3) Section 4.7's repeated references to Section
4.4, which likewise details how Costco must implement ATC, as
opposed to Sections 4.2 and 4.3, which instead explain whether it
must do so.

Taken together, these three aspects of Section 4.7 demonstrate
that the parties never intended to allow Costco to replace its
obligations regarding whether to implement ATC under Sections 4.2
and 4.3 with more favorable terms. Instead, they only intended to
allow Costco to replace its obligations regarding how to implement
ATC under Section 4.4 with such terms. And because that intent is
evident from "the actual words [the parties] used" in Section 4.7,
we decline to look beyond those words to the parties' subjective
intent.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirms the district court's order
denying Costco's motion to invoke its rights under Section 4.7.
The district court didn't abuse its discretion in approving the
settlement agreements.

Both Speedway and Alkon appeal the district court's order
approving the remaining 28 settlement agreements. And Alkon
additionally appeals the district court's order approving the
Costco Agreement. But before the Tenth Circuit considered the
merits of their challenges, it first determine whether Speedway
and Alkon have standing to advance them.

Although Speedway lacks standing to object to any of the
settlement agreements, Alkon has standing to challenge 10 of them.
Speedway asserts that it objected to all of the settlement
agreements except the Costco agreement. But the district court
concluded that Speedway failed to demonstrate it had Article III
standing to challenge any of them. Speedway challenges this ruling
on appeal, arguing that (1) it has standing under the plain-legal-
prejudice doctrine; (2) it has standing under Bond v. United
States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011); and (3) it has standing to challenge
eight of the settlement agreements as a member of the settlement
classes.

The district court concluded that Speedway's "objections based on
class membership weren't properly before the court because
Speedway failed to comply with the district court's notice
requirements.  And Speedway makes no attempt in its opening brief
to argue that such a decision was beyond the bounds of the
district court's discretion.

Under these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit says it won't disturb
the district court's ruling that Speedway's objections weren't
properly before it.  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit declines to
consider Speedway's objections to the settlement agreements.

The district court's approval of the fund settlements doesn't
violate the First Amendment.

The fund settlements set aside money for state regulators to
defray the costs associated with enacting and implementing new
regulatory programs for conversion to ATC. Alkon argues this
aspect of the agreements requires absent class members to
subsidize the plaintiffs' lobbying efforts aimed at obtaining
regulatory approval for ATC. And according to Alkon, this amounts
to the "compelled funding of speech in violation of the First
Amendment.

Alkon doesn't suggest that the settlement agreements implicate the
Equal Protection Clause. Nor does it cite any cases extending
Shelley outside of that context or present a reasoned argument why
the Tenth Circuit should do so here. Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit concludes that the district court's approval of the
settlement agreements doesn't constitute state action. And absent
any state action, Alkon's First Amendment argument fails.
The district court's approval of the settlement agreements doesn't
violate Article III.

The settlements don't actually change the law. True, the fund
settlement agreements remove one disincentive to implementing ATC
by offering funds to reimburse state regulators for costs incurred
as a result of conversion. But the district court didn't order
states to require, or even allow, conversion to ATC; that decision
remains in the hands of state lawmakers -- a fact that Alkon
concedes (and in fact relies on) in arguing that the plaintiffs
can't satisfy Article III's redressability requirement.

Thus, contrary to Alkon's argument, the district court didn't
usurp the legislature's role by altering the method of sale
cooperatively established by Congress and the States, instead,
policy decisions about whether to allow or require ATC remain with
state policy makers.

As the plaintiffs point out, at least two of the Tenth Circuit's
sister circuits have since concluded that the Rules Enabling Act
has no application in this context. Marshall v. Nat'l Football
League, 787 F.3d 502, concluding that district court's approval of
settlement agreement is not a 'substantive adjudication of the
underlying causes of action,' and therefore does not implicate the
Rules Enabling Act. In the absence of a finding that plaintiffs
are actually entitled to relief under substantive state law, the
Tenth Circuit reiterates that a court does not 'abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right' by approving a voluntarily-
entered class settlement agreement. Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC,
843 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (6th Cir. 2016).

The Tenth Circuit finds these authorities persuasive. Accordingly,
it rejects this argument.

Attorney's fees don't render the district court's approval of the
settlement agreements an abuse of discretion.

As the Sixth Circuit has explained, consumer class actions have
value to society more broadly, both as deterrents to unlawful
behaviour particularly when the individual injuries are too small
to justify the time and expense of litigation and as private law
enforcement regimes that free public sector resources.  The Tenth
Circuit holds that if it is to encourage these positive societal
effects, class counsel must be adequately compensated even when
significant compensation to class members is out of reach (such as
when contact information is unavailable, or when individual claims
are very small). And an inflexible, categorical rule, such as the
one the Seventh Circuit espoused in Pearson, neglects these
additional considerations.

And while the Tenth Circuit may not agree with the decision the
district court ultimately reached, it cannot say that decision is
an abuse of discretion.

The district court didn't abuse its discretion in certifying the
class.

The district court found that in light of the limited size of any
potential financial recovery for any particular class member and
the possibility of inconsistent results, a class action was a far
superior method of resolving the claims compared to individual
suits. And again, even assuming we might disagree with the
district court on this point, Alkon fails to establish that the
district court's decision is so unreasonable as to constitute an
abuse of discretion. Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, 734 F.3d 1081,
1086 (10th Cir. 2013) explaining that district court abuses its
discretion only if it makes a clear error of judgment, exceeds the
bounds of permissible choice, or when its decision is arbitrary,
capricious or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable
judgment.

The Tenth Circuit affirms the district court's approval of the 10
settlement agreements that Alkon has demonstrated standing to
challenge. The Tenth Circuit likewise affirms the district court's
order refusing to allow Costco to adopt the terms of the
Stipulation under Section 4.7 of the Costco Agreement.

The appeals cases are ZACHARY WILSON; MATHEW COOK; BRENT
DONALDSON; SAMANTHA BAYLARD; CRAIG MASSEY; RICHARD GALAUSKI;
WILLIAM BOYD; LISA McBRIDE; TAMARA MILLER; HEARTLAND LANDSCAPE
GROUP LLC; TEAM TRUCKING; JAMES ANLIKER; DENNIS K. MANN; PHYLLIS
LERNER; HERB GLASER; STEVEN RUBIN; MAX CANDIOTTY; FRED AGUIRRE;
JAMES JARVAIS; MARA REDSTONE; RAPHAEL SAGALYN; J.C. WASH; JEAN W.
NEESE; CECIL R. WILKINS; WAYNE BYRAM; GARY KOHUT; DEBRA BERG; TIA
GOMEZ; SHONNA S. BUTLER; BEN DOZIER; MARK SCIVNER; BARBARA CUMBO;
JAMES GRAHAM; KENNEDY G. KRAATZ; MELISSA D. MURRAY; MICHAEL A.
WARNER; CLINTON J. DAVIS; STEVEN R. RUTHERFORD; LISA ANN LEE;
BRENT CRAWFORD; DIXCEE MILLSAP; CARL RITTERHOUSE; SAMUEL ELY;
VICTOR RUYBALID; HADLEY BOWER; KRISTY DEANN MOTT; CHARLES
COCKRELL, JR.; WILLIAM RUTTHERFORD; JAN RUTHERFORD; MARK WYATT;
DAWN LALOR; GERALD PANTO, JR.; EDGER PAZ; CHARLES D. JONES;
MICHAEL GAUTHREAUX; JOANN KORLESKI; JEFF JENKINS; SARA TERRY;
JACOB STEED; MARVIN BRYAN; JOHN TELLES; CHRISTOPHER PAYNE; SCOTT
CAMPBELL; JONATHAN CHARLES CONLIN; PRISCILLA CRAFT; ROBERT HICKS;
RICHARD PATRICK; JESSICA HONIGBERG; RAYSHAUN GLANTON; GARLAND
WILLIAMS; ANNIE SMITH; BOBBY ROBERSON; SAM HOTCHKISS; ANNA
LEGATES; ANDREA FRAYSER; MELVIN ELLISON; CECIL WILKINS; BETTY
CHERRY; JOY HOWELL; ALLEN RAY KLEIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
CIRCLE K STORES, INC.; PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC; KUM&GO, L.C.;
QUICKTRIP CORPORATION; MURPHY OIL USA, INC.; RACE TRAC PETROLEUM,
INC.; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY, LLC; THE PANTRY, INC.; SPEEDWAY
SUPERAMERICA, LLC; SHEETZ, INC.; WAWA, INC.; FLYING J INC.; 7-
ELEVEN, INC.; PTCAA TEXAS, LP; Defendants-Appellants, v. CHEVRON
USA, INC.; CASEY'S GENERAL STORE, INC.; SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION;
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; ESSO VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC. MOBIL OIL GUAM,
INC.; BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA INC., Defendants-Appellees, and BP
CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA, INC.; CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION;
CONOCO PHILLIPS COMPANY; VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY;
SUNOCO CORPORATION; EQUILON ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a SHELL OIL
PRODUCTS COMPANY, LLC; MOTIVA ENTERPRISES, LLC; TESORO REFINING
AND MARKETING COMPANY; SAM'S CLUB; LOVE'S TRAVEL STOP & COUNTRY
STORES, INC.; G AND M OIL COMPANY, INC.; UNITED EL SEGUNDO, INC.;
WORLD OIL CORPORATION; M.M. FOLWER, INC.; DANSK INVESTMENT GROUP,
INC.; B-B OIL COMPANY, INC.; PORT CITIES OIL LLC; FLASH MARKET,
INC; J&P FLASH, INC.; MAGNESS OIL COMPANY; COULSON OIL COMPANY,
INC.; DIAMOND STATE OIL, LLC; EZ MART STORES, INC.; THORNTONS,
INC., Defendants. IN RE: MOTOR FUEL TEMPERATURE SALES PRACTICES
LITIGATION. ZACHARY WILSON; MATHEW COOK; BRENT DONALDSON; SAMANTHA
BAYLARD; CRAIG MASSEY; RICHARD GALAUSKI; WILLIAM BOYD; LISA
McBRIDE; TAMARA MILLER; HEARTLAND LANDSCAPE GROUP LLC; TEAM
TRUCKING; JAMES ANLIKER; DENNIS K. MANN; PHYLLIS LERNER; HERB
GLASER; STEVEN RUBIN; MAX CANDIOTTY; FRED AGUIRRE; JAMES JARVAIS;
MARA REDSTONE; RAPHAEL SAGALYN; J.C. WASH; JEAN W. NEESE; CECIL R.
WILKINS; WAYNE BYRAM; GARY KOHUT; DEBRA BERG; TIA GOMEZ; SHONNA S.
BUTLER; BEN DOZIER; MARK SCIVNER; BARBARA CUMBO; JAMES GRAHAM;
KENNEDY G. KRAATZ; MELISSA D. MURRAY; MICHAEL A. WARNER; CLINTON
J. DAVIS; STEVEN R. RUTHERFORD; LISA ANN LEE; BRENT CRAWFORD;
DIXCEE MILLSAP; CARL RITTERHOUSE; SAMUEL ELY; VICTOR RUYBALID;
HADLEY BOWER; KRISTY DEANN MOTT; CHARLES COCKRELL, JR.; WILLIAM
RUTTHERFORD; JAN RUTHERFORD; MARK WYATT; DAWN LALOR; GERALD PANTO,
JR.; EDGER PAZ; CHARLES D. JONES; MICHAEL GAUTHREAUX; JOANN
KORLESKI; JEFF JENKINS; SARA TERRY; JACOB STEED; MARVIN BRYAN;
JOHN TELLES; CHRISTOPHER PAYNE; SCOTT CAMPBELL; JONATHAN CHARLES
CONLIN; PRISCILLA CRAFT; ROBERT HICKS; RICHARD PATRICK; JESSICA
HONIGBERG; RAYSHAUN GLANTON; GARLAND WILLIAMS; ANNIE SMITH; BOBBY
ROBERSON; SAM HOTCHKISS; ANNA LEGATES; ANDREA FRAYSER; MELVIN
ELLISON; CECIL WILKINS; BETTY CHERRY; JOY HOWELL; ALLEN RAY KLEIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CIRCLE K STORES, INC; PILOT TRAVEL
CENTERS, LLC; KUM&GO, L.C.; QUICKTRIP CORPORATION; MURPHY OIL USA,
INC.; RACE TRAC PETROLEUM, INC.; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY, LLC;
THE PANTRY, INC.; SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA, LLC; SHEETZ, INC.; WAWA,
INC.; FLYING J INC.; 7-ELEVEN, INC.; PTCAA TEXAS, LP, Defendants-
Appellants, CHEVRON USA, INC.; CASEY'S GENERAL STORE, INC.;
SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; ESSO VIRGIN
ISLANDS, INC.; MOBIL OIL GUAM, INC.; BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA
INC., Defendants-Appellees, and BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION; CONOCO PHILLIPS COMPANY; VALERO
MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY; SUNOCO CORPORATION; EQUILON
ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, LLC; MOTIVA
ENTERPRISES, LLC; TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY; SAM'S
CLUB; LOVE'S TRAVEL STOP & COUNTRY STORES, INC.; G AND M OIL
COMPANY, INC.; UNITED EL SEGUNDO, INC.; WORLD OIL CORPORATION;
M.M. FOLWER, INC.; DANSK INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.; B-B OIL COMPANY,
INC.; PORT CITIES OIL LLC; FLASH MARKET, INC; J&P FLASH, INC.;
MAGNESS OIL COMPANY; COULSON OIL COMPANY, INC.; DIAMOND STATE OIL,
LLC; EZ MART STORES, INC.; THORNTONS, INC., Defendants. IN RE:
MOTOR FUEL TEMPERATURE SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION. ZACHARY WILSON;
MATHEW COOK; BRENT DONALDSON; SAMANTHA BAYLARD; CRAIG MASSEY;
RICHARD GALAUSKI; WILLIAM BOYD; LISA McBRIDE; TAMARA MILLER;
HEARTLAND LANDSCAPE GROUP LLC; TEAM TRUCKING; JAMES ANLIKER;
DENNIS K. MANN; PHYLLIS LERNER; HERB GLASER; STEVEN RUBIN; MAX
CANDIOTTY; FRED AGUIRRE; JAMES JARVAIS; MARA REDSTONE; RAPHAEL
SAGALYN; J.C. WASH; JEAN W. NEESE; CECIL R. WILKINS; WAYNE BYRAM;
GARY KOHUT; DEBRA BERG; TIA GOMEZ; SHONNA S. BUTLER; BEN DOZIER;
MARK SCIVNER; BARBARA CUMBO; JAMES GRAHAM; KENNEDY G. KRAATZ;
MELISSA D. MURRAY; MICHAEL A. WARNER; CLINTON J. DAVIS; STEVEN R.
RUTHERFORD; LISA ANN LEE; BRENT CRAWFORD; DIXCEE MILLSAP; CARL
RITTERHOUSE; SAMUEL ELY; VICTOR RUYBALID; HADLEY BOWER; KRISTY
DEANN MOTT; CHARLES COCKRELL, JR.; WILLIAM RUTTHERFORD; JAN
RUTHERFORD; MARK WYATT; DAWN LALOR; GERALD PANTO, JR.; EDGER PAZ;
CHARLES D. JONES; MICHAEL GAUTHREAUX; JOANN KORLESKI; JEFF
JENKINS; SARA TERRY; JACOB STEED; MARVIN BRYAN; JOHN TELLES;
CHRISTOPHER PAYNE; SCOTT CAMPBELL; JONATHAN CHARLES CONLIN;
PRISCILLA CRAFT; ROBERT HICKS; RICHARD PATRICK; JESSICA HONIGBERG;
RAYSHAUN GLANTON; GARLAND WILLIAMS; ANNIE SMITH; BOBBY ROBERSON;
SAM HOTCHKISS; ANNA LEGATES; ANDREA FRAYSER; MELVIN ELLISON; CECIL
WILKINS; BETTY CHERRY; JOY HOWELL; ALLEN RAY KLEIN, Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA, INC.; CITGO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; CONOCO PHILLIPS COMPANY; COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION;
VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY; SUNOCO CORPORATION; EQUILON
ENTERPRISES, LLC., d/b/a SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, LLC; MOTIVA
ENTERPRISES, LLC; TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING COMPANY; SAM'S
CLUB; LOVE'S TRAVEL STOP & COUNTRY STORES, INC.; G AND M OIL
COMPANY, INC.; UNITED EL SEGUNDO, INC.; WORLD OIL CORPORATION;
M.M. FOLWER, INC.; J&P FLASH, INC.; DANSK INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.;
CIRCLE K STORES, INC; KUM&GO, L.C.; MURPHY OIL USA, INC.; MARATHON
PETROLEUM COMPANY, LLC; FLYING J INC.; 7-ELEVEN, INC.; PTCAA
TEXAS, LP; PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC; QUICKTRIP CORPORATION; RACE
TRAC PETROLEUM, INC.; THE PANTRY, INC.; SPEEDWAY SUPERAMERICA,
LLC; SHEETZ, INC.; WAWA, INC.; B-B OIL COMPANY, INC.; COULSON OIL
COMPANY, INC.; PORT CITIES OIL LLC; FLASH MARKET, INC.; J&P FLASH,
INC.; DIAMOND STATE OIL, LLC; MAGNESS OIL COMPANY; THORNTON'S,
INC., Defendants, and CHEVRON USA, INC.; EZ MART STORES, INC.;
CASEY'S GENERAL STORE, INC., Defendants-Appellees, v. MELISSA
HOLYOAK; ADAM SCHULMAN; AMY ALKON; NICOLAS S. MARTIN; THEODORE H.
FRANK, Objectors-Appellants. IN RE: MOTOR FUEL TEMPERATURE SALES
PRACTICES LITIGATION. ANNIE SMITH; CHRISTOPHER PAYNE; PHYLLIS
LERNER; HERB GLAZER; MARA REDSTONE; BRENT CRAWFORD; VICTOR
RUYBALD; ZACH WILSON; LISA McBRIDE; RAPHAEL SAGALYN; BRENT
DONALDSON; GARY KOHUT; RICHARD GAULAUSKI; CHARLES BYRAM; JEAN
NEESE; SHONNA BUTLER; GERALD PANTO, JR.; JOANN KORLESKI; TAMARA
MILLER; PRISCILLA CRAFT; JEFF JENKINS; JAMES GRAHAM, Class
Representatives, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, and BP PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA
INC.; BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS, LLC; CASEY'S GENERAL STORES, INC.;
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION; CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY; EQUILON
ENTERPRISES LLC, d/b/a Shell Oil Products US; MOTIVA ENTERPRISES
LLC; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; MOBIL OIL GUAM, INC.; ESSO VIRGIN
ISLANDS, INC.; SAM'S EAST, INC.; SAM'S WEST, INC.; WAL-MART
STORES, INC.; WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP; SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION;
VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY; CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.; SUNOCO,
INC. (R&M); B-B OIL COMPANY, INC.; COULSON OIL COMPANY, INC.;
DIAMOND STATE OIL, LLC; FLASH MARKET, INC.; J&P FLASH, INC.;
MAGNESS OIL COMPANY; PORT CITIES OIL, LLC; E-Z MART STORES, INC.;
LOVE'S TRAVEL STOP & COUNTRY STORES, INC.; WR HESS COMPANY; M.M.
FOWLER, INC., d/b/a Family Fare; DANSK INVESTMENT GROUP, INC.,
f/k/a USA Petroleum Corporation; TESORO REFINING AND MARKETING
COMPANY; THORNTONS, INC.; G&M OIL COMPANY, INC.; G&M OIL CO., LLC;
UNITED EL SEGUNDO, INC.; WORLD OIL CORPORATION, Defendants, v.
SPEEDWAY LLC; 7-ELEVEN, INC.; CIRCLE K STORES, INC; KUM & GO,
L.C.; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP; MURPHY OIL USA, INC.; PILOT
TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC; FLYING J INC.; PTCAA TEXAS, LP; RACETRAC
PETROLEUM, INC.; QUIKTRIP CORPORATION; SHEETZ, INC.; THE PANTRY,
INC.; WAWA, INC., Objectors. Nos. 15-3221, 15-3227, 15-3228, 15-
3254. (10th Cir.)

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's September 21, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8qsc5xxfrom Leagle.com.

Tristan L. Duncan, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City,
Missouri, (William F. Northrip -- wnorthrip@shb.com -- and Sarah
Lynn Baltzell -- slynn@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P.,
Kansas City, Missouri, Stephen R. McAllister, Thompson Ramsdell
Qualseth & Warner, P.A.,333 West Ninth Street, Lawrence, Kansas,
66044 and Jonathan S. Massey -- jmassey@masseygail.com -- Massey &
Gail, LLP, Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs) for Speedway
LLC, 7-Eleven, Inc., Circle K Stores, Inc., Kum & Go, L.C.,
Marathon Petroleum Company LLC, Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Pilot Travel
Centers LLC, Flying J, Inc., The Pantry, Inc., QuikTrip
Corporation, RaceTrac, Petroleum, Inc., Sheetz, Inc., and Wawa,
Inc., Defendant-Appellants.

Theodore H. Frank, Competitive Enterprise Institute Center for
Class Action Fairness, Washington, D.C., (Anna St. John --
info@cei.org -- and Adam E. Schulman -- info@cei.org -Competitive
Enterprise Institute Center for Class Action Fairness, Washington,
D.C., with him on the brief) for Amy Alkon, Theodore H. Frank --
info@cei.org -- Melissa Holyoak -- info@cei.org -- Nicolas S.
Martin, and Adam Schulman, Objector-Appellants.

Joseph R. Palmore -- jpalmore@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster,
LLP, Washington, D.C., (David F. McDowell -- dmcdowell@mofo.com --
and Purvi G. Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster, LLP,
Los Angeles, California, and Bryan J. Leitch -- bleitch@mofo.com -
- Morrison & Foerster, LLP, Washington, D.C., with them on the
briefs) for Costco Wholesale Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
Daniel V. Dorris -- ddorris@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., and
Robert A. Horn, Horn Aylward & Bandy, LLC, 2600 Grand Blvd #1100,
Kansas City, MO 64108, USA (Thomas V. Bender --
TBENDER@WBSVLAW.COM -- Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughn, P.C.,
Kansas City, Missouri, Joseph A. Kronawitter, jkronawitter@hab-
law.com -- Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri,
David C. Frederick -- dfrederick@kellogghansen.com -- and Amelia
I.P. Frenkel -- afrenkel@kellogghansen --  Kellogg, Huber, Hansen,
Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., with them on the
briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellees


CLARUS COMMERCE: Stipulated Protective Order in "Chandler" OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RAYMOND D. CHANDLER, an individual, LUANN
SHAVER an individual, on their own behalf, and as class action
representatives on behalf of all those similarly situated and in
the interest of the general public, Plaintiffs, v. CLARUS
COMMERCE, LLC, a Connecticut Corporation, and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01794-SVW-E (C.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California granted the parties' Stipulated
Protective Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/T1pbVm from Leagle.com.

Raymond D. Chandler, Plaintiff, represented by James L. Hudgens,
James L Hudgens APC.

Luann Shaver, Plaintiff, represented by James L. Hudgens, James L
Hudgens APC.

Clarus Commerce LLC, Defendant, represented by John D. Freed --
jakefreed@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Scott R. Commerson
-- scottcommerson@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP & Joseph E.
Addiego, III -- joeaddiego@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.


CNH HEALTH: Settlement in "George" ERISA Suit Has Prelim. OK
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph Peter Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of their class action settlement
with the Defendants in the case captioned BRENTEN GEORGE and
DENISE VALENTE-McGEE, Plaintiffs, v. CNH HEALTH & WELFARE BENEFIT
PLAN, CNH EMPLOYEE GROUP INSURANCE PLAN, CASE NEW HOLLAND, INC.,
and BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF WISCONSIN, Defendants, Case No. 16-
CV-1678-JPS (E.D. Wis.).

The Plaintiffs have reached a settlement for a substantial sum to
compensate the approximately 2,000 anticipated class members.  The
litigation has been vigorous, proceeding through discovery to the
dispositive motion stage, and requiring the Court's ruling on a
prior dispositive motion by the  Defendants. Finally, the
settlement was reached in arm's length negotiations and has not be
objected to by anyone.  On Sept. 1, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an
unopposed motion.

Judge StadtMueller finds no barrier to preliminary approval of the
parties' settlement.  He therefore granted preliminary approval of
the class action settlement.  He vacated all remaining dates and
deadlines of the Court's trial scheduling order, including the
Dec. 12, 2017 final pretrial conference and the Dec. 18, 2017
bench trial.

For purposes of settlement only, the Settlement Class of persons
who are or were Plan Members who, at any time from Aug. 1, 2010
through the Date of Preliminary Approval, received Covered
Professional Services from an Out-of-Network Provider that were
Partially Allowed and: (i) whose claims for reimbursement under
the Plan for such services were submitted on or before the
Preliminary Approval Date, or (ii) who have received notice of the
Agreement before the Settlement Hearing Date is conditionally
certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b)(3).

Settling Plaintiffs, George and Valente-McGee, are preliminarily
appointed as the representatives of the Settlement Class.  Douglas
P. Dehler and Christa Wittenberg of O'Neil Cannon Hollman DeJong &
Laing, S.C. and John B. Tuffnell of Tuffnell Law S.C are also
appointed and designated as the counsel for the Settlement Class.
Garden City Group, LLC is appointed as the Settlement
Administrator.

As soon as practicable, but no later than 120 days after the
Preliminary Approval Order is entered ("Notice Date"), the
Settlement Administrator will cause copies of the Notice of
Proposed Settlement of Class Action ("Mailed Notice"), the form of
which is approved, to all potential Settlement Class Members at
the addresses identified by reasonable efforts as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

Judge Stadtmueller specifically approved the Parties' proposal (i)
to be jointly responsible for identifying names and addresses of
the potential Settlement Class Members and to cooperate with each
other and the Settlement Administrator to make such
identifications and determinations; and (ii) for the Defendants to
take reasonable steps to provide from their own records, at their
own expense, information from which a list of potential Settlement
Class Members can be identified for the Mailed Notice.  The
Settlement Administrator will also cause copies of the Claim Form,
the form of which is approved, to be included with the Mailed
Notice sent to those potential Eligible Settlement Class Members
identified in the Claims Data Analysis as having claims for
compensation under the Settlement valued at $500 or more.

The Mailed Notice, Claim Form and Settlement Agreement will also
be placed on the website created for the Settlement on or before
the Notice Date.  The costs of providing the Notice to the
Settlement Class that is specified in the Preliminary Approval
Order will be paid as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

No later than 21 calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing,
the Settlement Class Counsel will cause to be filed with the Clerk
of the Court an affidavit or declaration of the Settlement
Administrator, showing that such mailing has been made in
accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order.

Judge Stadtmueller will hold the Settlement Hearing on May 4, 2018
at 8:30 a.m.  The Settlement Class Members wishing to object to
the proposed Settlement and/or be heard at the Settlement Hearing
must file a written objection with the Clerk, and must also serve
a copy thereof upon the following, no later than 60 days after the
Notice Date:

      a. The Class Counsel (on behalf of themselves and on behalf
of Settling Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members): Douglas P.
Dehler Christa Wittenberg O'NEIL CANNON HOLLMAN DEJONG & LAING,
S.C. 111 East Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, WI 53202 Telephone:
(414) 276-5000 Facsimile: (414) 276-6581 Doug.Dehler@wilaw.com
Christa.Wittenberg@wilaw.com John B. Tuffnell TUFFNELL LAW S.C.
790 N. Milwaukee Street Suite 200 Milwaukee, WI 53202 Telephone:
(414) 550-2296 Facsimile: 414-437-9240 jbt@tuff-law.com

      b. Case New Holland, Inc. n/k/a Case New Holland Industrial,
Inc., and the Plan: Patrick J. Murphy Alexandra W. Shortridge Paul
Parrish QUARLES & BRADY LLP 411 East Wisconsin Avenue Suite 2400
Milwaukee, WI 53202-4426 Telephone: (414) 277-5459 Facsimile:
(414) 978-8617 patrick.murphy@quarles.com
alexandra.shortridge@quarles.com paul.parrish@quarles.com

      c. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wisconsin d/b/a Anthem Blue
Cross Blue Shield: Briana L. Black E. Desmond Hogan HOGAN LOVELLS
US LLP 555 Thirteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20004 Telephone:
(202) 637-5600 Facsimile: (202) 637-5910
desmond.hogan@hoganlovells.com briana.black@hoganlovells.com
Bartholomew F. Reuter FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 777 East Wisconsin
Avenue Milwaukee, WI 53202 Telephone: (414) 297-5826 Facsimile:
(414) 297-4900 breuter@foley.com

Any potential member of the Settlement Class who elects not to
participate in the Settlement must submit a written request to
Opt-Out that is postmarked no later than 60 days after the Notice
Date.  The Settlement Administrator will compile a list of all
Opt-Outs to be filed with the Court no later than 21 days before
the Settlement Hearing.

If the Court enters final approval of the Settlement Agreement,
each Settlement Class Member will receive not less than $20
pursuant to the Settlement.  In addition, the Eligible Settlement
Class Members are eligible to receive additional compensation
(above the $20 minimum payment) under the Settlement up to the
value of their claim for compensation as determined in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Eligible Settlement Class
Members with a claim for compensation valued at $500 or less under
the Settlement are not required to submit any proof of claim or
other documentation to support a request for additional
compensation.  Any Eligible Settlement Class Member whose claim
for additional compensation under the Settlement is valued at more
than $500 must complete and submit a Claim Form and provide
required documentation in accordance with the instructions in the
Mailed Notice and the Claim Form if he or she wishes to seek
additional compensation based on the full value of the claim (in
excess of $500).  To be valid and timely, the Claims Forms and
required documentation submitted in connection with this
Settlement must be postmarked no later than 60 days after the
Notice Date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/dMhp86 from Leagle.com.

Brenten George, Plaintiff, represented by Christa D. Wittenberg --
christa.wittenberg@wilaw.com -- O'Neil Cannon Hollman DeJong &
Laing SC.

Brenten George, Plaintiff, represented by John B. Tuffnell --
jbt@tuff-law.com -- Tuffnell Law SC & Douglas P. Dehler --
douglas.dehler@wilaw.com -- O'Neil Cannon Hollman DeJong & Laing
SC.

Denise Valente-McGee, Plaintiff, represented by Christa D.
Wittenberg, O'Neil Cannon Hollman DeJong & Laing SC, John B.
Tuffnell, Tuffnell Law SC & Douglas P. Dehler, O'Neil Cannon
Hollman DeJong & Laing SC.

CNH Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, Defendant, represented by
Alexandra W. Shortridge -- alexandra.shortridge@quarles.com --
Quarles & Brady LLP, Paul E. Parrish -- paul.parrish@quarles.com -
- Quarles & Brady LLP, Bartholomew F. Reuter -- breuter@foley.com
-- Foley & Lardner LLP & Patrick J. Murphy --
patrick.murphy@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP.

CNH Employee Group Insurance Plan, Defendant, represented by
Alexandra W. Shortridge, Quarles & Brady LLP, Paul E. Parrish,
Quarles & Brady LLP, Bartholomew F. Reuter, Foley & Lardner LLP &
Patrick J. Murphy, Quarles & Brady LLP.

Case New Holland Inc, Defendant, represented by Alexandra W.
Shortridge, Quarles & Brady LLP, Paul E. Parrish, Quarles & Brady
LLP, Bartholomew F. Reuter, Foley & Lardner LLP & Patrick J.
Murphy, Quarles & Brady LLP.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wisconsin, Defendant, represented by
Briana L. Black -- briana.black@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells
US

LLP, E. Desmond Hogan -- desmond.hogan@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP & Bartholomew F. Reuter, Foley & Lardner LLP.


COLLECTION SERVICES: Faces "Ellis" Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Collection Services
of Athens, Inc.  The case is captioned as Chasity Ellis,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Collection Services of Athens, Inc. and John Does 1-
25, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03590-MHC-AJB (N.D. Ga., Sep.
15, 2017).  The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Mark H. Cohen.

Collection Services of Athens, Inc. is a spin-off of the former
Credit Bureau of Athens, Inc.  Prior to June 1, 1997, CSA operated
as the Collection Service Division of the Credit Bureau of Athens,
which was founded in 1937 by Mr. G. Fain Slaughter, Sr.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Misty Oaks Paxton, Esq.
          THE OAKS FIRM
          3515 Charlston Court
          Decatur, GA 30034
          Telephone: (404) 725 5697
          E-mail: attyoaks@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN, LLC
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (845) 367 7146
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


COMPASSIONATE HEALTH: Williams Seeks Lost Earnings under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
JENEA WILLIAMS, 214 Washington Street Phillipsburg, NJ 08865
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, v. COMPASSIONATE HEALTH CARE INC., A
HOME HEALTH AGENCY 493 South Main Street, Phillipsburg, NJ 08865,
the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-07174 (D.N.J., Sep. 15, 2017),
seeks to recover compensation, reimbursement, and all pay
Plaintiff would have received had it not been for Defendant's
illegal actions, including but not limited to past lost earnings.

The Plaintiff has initiated the action to redress Defendant's
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage
and Hour Law. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and those
similarly situated overtime wages as required by the FLSA and New
Jersey Wage Laws. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of
Class Plaintiffs, because Plaintiff, like all Class Plaintiffs,
was an employee of Defendant in New Jersey within the last two
years whom Defendant failed to pay at a rate of one and one-half
times her regular rate for hours worked over 40 hours in a
workweek.

Compassionate Health Care, Inc. is a private Medical Staffing and
Home Care agency providing a wide range of medical supportive
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew D. Miller, Esq.
          Richard S. Swartz, Esq.
          Justin L. Swidler, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 N. Kings Highway Ste 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685 7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685 7417


CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS: Sexual Abuse Class Action Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Canadian Press reports that the Quebec Court of Appeal has
authorized a new class action lawsuit against a major Roman
Catholic organization for alleged sexual abuse committed by some
of its members.

The decision overturns a 2015 Superior Court of Quebec ruling
rejecting the class action request.

The Congregation of Holy Cross apologized and paid up to $18
million in 2013 to compensate victims for abuse that occurred at
three Quebec institutions over a five-decade span.

That agreement stemmed from an out-of-court mediated settlement,
spurred by the threat of a class-action lawsuit.

A spokesman for a victims' rights group says the landmark
settlement prompted about 40 new alleged victims to come forward.

Sebastien Richard says the current class-action names more
institutions, including Montreal's iconic Saint Joseph's Oratory.

In a phone interview, Mr. Richard pointed out that the oratory is
Canada's largest church and reports directly to the Vatican, which
could lead to embarrassment on the church's part if the class-
action is successful.

He also accused the religious order of doing what it could to
"drag out" the process, noting that time is running out for many
of the alleged victims, many of whom are elderly.

"They're also people who have kept silent for a long time -- too
long," he said on Sept. 27.

The Congregation of Holy Cross did not respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


CONSOLIDATED PRODUCTS: "Sewell" Suit Seeks OT Pay under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA SEWELL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CONSOLIDATED PRODUCTS & SERVICES
OF SOUTH ALABAMA, LLC, an Alabama limited Liability Company and
ALBERT BOONE, and individual, the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-
00689-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover
overtime compensation under Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, and others who are similarly situated, were
employed by Defendants as detailers at various car dealerships in
Pensacola, Florida and around the Southeast. The Plaintiff Joshua
Sewell began working as Defendants' employee on or about January,
2016. Defendants, as part of their business, would engage in
interstate commerce by, but not limited to, processing credit
cards which are instruments of interstate commerce, transacting
business with foreign corporations which were part of interstate
commerce, purchasing equipment, materials, parts, and supplies
from dealers, wholesalers, suppliers, and retailers out of state
which were part of interstate commerce, by advertising on the
World Wide Web and other mediums.

According to the complaint, Plaintiff worked the number of hours
required by Defendants, but was not paid for each and every hour
worked during a work week. Defendants suffered and permitted
Plaintiff to work as their employee, but did not pay the
appropriate rate for all work that Plaintiff performed for
Defendants. The Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in a work week for
Defendants, but was not paid overtime compensation at the proper
overtime rate by Defendants for all those hours worked over 40 in
a work week. Defendants were involved in, and responsible for,
paying Plaintiff for work performed.

Defendants own and operate auto detail and a car cleaning
businesses. Defendants provide said auto detailing services to car
dealerships across the Southeast United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremiah J. Talbott, Esq.
          Travis P. Lepicier, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JEREMIAH J. TALBOTT, P.A.
          900 E. Moreno Street
          Pensacola, FL 32503
          Telephone: (850) 437 9600
          Facsimile: (850) 437 0906
          E-mail: jjtalbott@talbottlawfirm.com
                  civilfilings@talbottlawfirm.com


CREDIT AMERICA: Faces "Rubin" Suit in District of New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit America, Inc.
The case is captioned as FAY RUBIN, Individually, and on behalf of
all other similarly situated consumers, the Plaintiff, v. CREDIT
AMERICA, INC., and TRAF GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-07176-MAS-DEA (D.N.J., Sep. 15, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Michael A. Shipp.

Credit America Corporation provides debt management services. Its
product includes Credit America MasterCard.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Zemel, Esq.
          ZEMEL LAW LLC
          78 John Miller Way
          Kearny, NJ 07032
          Telephone: (862) 227 3106
          E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com


CYNOSURE INC: Faces Class Action Over Body Contouring System
------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Powell, writing for Law360, reports that Cynosure Inc.
was hit with a proposed class action on Sept. 27 in Massachusetts
federal court by a group of aesthetic medical centers and medical
spas claiming its body contouring system is "effectively useless."

Plastic Surgery Associates S.C., Infinity Spa Orlando LLC and
others allege Cynosure has made false promises to purchasers of
its SculpSure Non-Invasive Body Contouring Platform, all the while
violating the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, breaching the
implied warranty of merchantability and becoming unjustly
enriched.

Specifically, the group asserts that as part of an "aggressive
campaign" to get practices to purchase the relevant nearly
$200,000 machine, Cynosure has made "uniform material
misrepresentations regarding the key attributes" of the device,
which the company markets as a way to reduce fat in a patient's
midsection through laser technology.

Cynosure has claimed that with one simple treatment, patients can
achieve a 24 percent fat loss, that patients need no pain medicine
or anesthesia because SculpSure is "virtually painless," and that
the procedure can be done "hands free" without a physician needing
to be present, the complaint said.

However, SculpSure "seldom achieves results in patients after
multiple treatments -- much less so with just the single procedure
Cynosure claimed would suffice," physicians have to crank the
power level so high to "even have a chance at achieving results"
that it causes patients "intolerable pain," and physicians have to
stick around the whole time to monitor patients' comfort as a
result, according to the complaint.

"The situation has left practices in an impossible position," the
complaint said.  "They have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars
on a machine that does not work as Cynosure represented. At the
same time, they lack the ability to recoup that cost; practices
cannot continue to recommend a cosmetic procedure to their
patients knowing that it is likely to involve several painful
treatments, but unlikely to be effective."

In fact, the group has found SculpSure "detrimental" to business,
has had to deal with complaints from unhappy patients and has had
no luck trying to work with Cynosure to find a solution, according
to the complaint.

With the suit, the group seeks to represent all individuals and
entities in the U.S. that purchased or leased a SculpSure Non-
Invasive Body Contouring Platform, and to win damages and
restitution, the complaint said.

Representatives for Cynosure did not immediately respond to
requests for comment on Sept. 27.  Representatives for the group
declined to comment.

The plaintiffs are represented by Lauren Guth Barnes --
lauren@hbsslaw.com -- Elizabeth A. Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com --
Mark T. Vazquez -- markv@hbsslaw.com -- and Steve W. Berman of
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, and David Freydin and Timothy A.
Scott of Freydin Law Firm LLP.

Counsel information for Cynosure was not immediately available.

The case is Plastic Surgery Associates S.C. et al. v. Cynosure
Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-11850 (D. Mass.). [GN]


DES MOINES, IA: People Urged to Claim Franchise Fee Refunds
-----------------------------------------------------------
William Petroski, writing for The Des Moines Register, reports
that more than 60,000 Des Moines-area individuals and businesses
have opportunities to cash in on nearly $11.8 million in unclaimed
money stemming from a class-action lawsuit, State Treasurer
Michael Fitzgerald said on Sept. 27.

People who believe they may be eligible for the money can check
the state treasurer's website at GreatIowaTreasureHunt.gov.

The lawsuit, Kragnes vs. City of Des Moines, resulted in Iowa's
court ruling that a portion of a utility fee collected by Des
Moines between September 2004 and May 2009 had to be returned to
those who paid the fee because the city's costs of regulating the
gas and electrical utilities was less than the amount collected.

A refund was made in accordance with the court's ruling.  State
law now allows the city to collect the fees without regard to cost
of regulation.

"We have the opportunity to provide people with another chance to
claim their piece of the lawsuit," Mr. Fitzgerald said.  "The
amounts range from $10 to over $300,000.  We will have these
properties for 18 months and will then return the remaining funds
to the city."

Mr. Fitzgerald said this is the single largest batch of names the
state treasurer's office has ever received that are eligible for
claims, as well as the largest total sum of money.  He suspects
some individuals and businesses previously were contacted by mail,
but they tossed the letters away, thinking it was junk mail.

Deputy State Treasurer Karen Austin said a notice about the
refunds was posted online on Sept. 26.

"People are making claims already," she added.

Businesses and individuals who joined the class-action lawsuit
were required to make a claim.  Some made the claim and were paid;
others either did not make their claim or the check for their
claim was never cashed, state officials said.  The list includes
some Iowa businesses that are owed hundreds of thousands of
dollars.

At the conclusion of the claim period, the court ordered that the
funds be turned over to the state treasurer's office and made part
of the Great Iowa Treasure Hunt for a period of 18 months in a
final effort to return the funds to the class members. Any claim
over $10 is now available.  The Great Iowa Treasure Hunt is the
state treasurer's program that has allowed thousands of Iowans to
obtain unclaimed cash and property.

"We are expecting a large number of these properties to be
claimed, given the success rate of the Great Iowa Treasure Hunt,"
Mr. Fitzgerald said.  In order to ensure the state is paying the
correct party, claimants may be required to provide documentation
showing that they lived at, or owned, the address reported, he
added.

If an individual has died, the heirs to that property can claim
the funds. In addition, if a business has closed or changed
owners, additional documentation will be requested to verify the
proper owner.

The Great Iowa Treasure Hunt program has returned over $233
million in unclaimed property to more than 540,000 individuals
since Fitzgerald started it in 1983.  Unclaimed property refers to
money and other assets held by financial institutions or companies
that have lost contact with the property's owner for a specific
period of time.

Iowa law requires these institutions and companies to annually
report and deliver unclaimed property to the state treasurer's
office, where it is held until the owner or heir of the property
is found.  Common forms of unclaimed property include: savings or
checking accounts, stocks, uncashed checks, life insurance
policies, utility security deposits and safe deposit box contents.
[GN]


DFC GLOBAL: Co-Lead Counsel Gets 25% of Settlement Fund
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE DFC GLOBAL CORP. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Civ. A. No. 2:13-cv-06731-BMS (E.D. Pa.), Judge Berle
M. Schiller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Co-Lead Counsel's Motion for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.

On Sept. 19, 2017, a hearing was held before the Court to
consider, among other matters, the Fee and Expense Application and
the fairness and reasonableness of the Fee and Expense Application
to the Class Members.

Having duly considered the Co-Lead Counsel's Fee and Expense
Application, the declarations and memorandum of law submitted in
support thereof, and all of the submissions and arguments
presented with respect thereto, Judge Schiller granted the Co-Lead
Counsel's Fee and Expense Application and awarded the Co-Lead
Counsel the sum of 25% of the Settlement Fund in attorneys' fees,
plus interest at the same rate earned by the Settlement Fund.  He
further awarded the Co-Lead Counsel the sum of $472,462.44 in
litigation expenses.

Judge Schiller also granted Co-Lead Counsel's motion for
reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred by the Lead
Plaintiffs directly related to their representation of the Class.
The Lead Plaintiff ATRS is awarded $5,560; Lead Plaintiff Macomb
County is awarded $7,080; and Lead Plaintiff Ohio Laborers is
awarded $9,000.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Order
Granting the Co-Lead Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, and immediate entry
of the Order by the Clerk of the Court is expressly directed
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/JDbksN from Leagle.com.

ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, represented by
ANGUS F. NI -- angus.ni@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMAN LLP.

ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, represented by
HANNAH ROSS -- hannah@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMANN LLP, JAI CHANDRASEKHAR -- jai@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, JEFFREY W. GOLAN --
jgolan@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, JOHN RIZIO-HAMILTON
-- johnr@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP,
KATHERINE SINDERSON -- katherinem@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, JEFFREY A. BARRACK --
jbarrack@barrack.com -- BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE & LISA M. PORT --
lport@barrack.com -- BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE.

DFC GLOBAL CORP., Defendant, represented by DAVID WIENER --
dwiener@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, JAY A. DUBOW --
dubowj@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON, JORDAN ETH --
jeth@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, JUDSON LOBDELL --
jlobdell@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, PHILIP T. BESIROF --
pbesirof@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, RANDALL ZACK, MORRISON &
FOERSTER, ERICA HALL DRESSLER -- dresslere@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW PARKS RAINVILLE --
rainvilleg@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI --
aryanih@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP.

JEFFREY A. WEISS, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON, ERICA HALL DRESSLER, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW
PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI, PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP.

RANDY UNDERWOOD, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON, ERICA HALL DRESSLER, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW
PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI, PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP.

DAVID JESSICK, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

KENNETH SCHWENKE, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

CLIVE KAHN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

JOHN GAVIN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

RON MCLAUGHLIN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

MICHAEL KOOPER, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, Defendant, represented by
BRADLEY J. BUTWIN -- bbutwin@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP,
JOHN S. SUMMERS --  jsummers@hangley.com -- HANGLEY ARONCHICK
SEGAL & PUDLIN, JONATHAN ROSENBERG -- jrosenberg@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, MOSHE MANDEL -- mmandel@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & WILLIAM J. SUSHON -- wsushon@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP.

NOMURA SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, represented by
BRADLEY J. BUTWIN, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, JOHN S. SUMMERS, HANGLEY
ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN, JONATHAN ROSENBERG, O'MELVENY & MYERS
LLP, MOSHE MANDEL, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & WILLIAM J. SUSHON,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP.

WILLIAM M ATHAS, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON & GAY BARLOW PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR GROUP, Movant, represented by JEFFREY A.
BARRACK, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE, JEFFREY W. GOLAN, BARRACK RODOS
& BACINE, LISA M. PORT, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE & MARK R. ROSEN --
mrosen@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE.


DFC GLOBAL: Fund Allocation Plan in Securities Suit OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Berle M. Schiller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the Lead Plaintiffs' Plan of
Allocation for the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund
established as a result of the Settlement in the case captioned IN
RE DFC GLOBAL CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civ. A. No. 2:13-cv-
06731-BMS (E.D. Pa.).

On Sept. 19, 2017, a hearing was held before the Court to
consider, among other matter, the Lead Plaintiffs' Plan for
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, and the fairness and
reasonableness of the Plan to the Class Members.

On June 1, 2017, the Lead Plaintiffs moved for approval of the
Plan, as set forth in the Notice.

Having duly considered the Lead Plaintiffs' motion, the
declarations and memoranda of law submitted in support thereof,
and all of the submissions and arguments presented with respect to
the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan for distributing the
proceeds of the Settlement to members of the Class, Judge Schiller
approved the Lead Plaintiffs' Plan.  The Lead Plaintiffs are
authorized and directed to utilize the Plan as the basis for
calculating the Proofs of Claim submitted by Class Members in
connection with the Settlement.

The Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated Feb. 28, 2017.

There will be no distribution of any of the Settlement Fund to any
Class Member until the Order becomes final, and is either affirmed
on appeal and/or is no longer subject to review by appeal or
certiorari, and the time for any petition for rehearing, appeal or
review, whether by certiorari or otherwise, has expired.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Order
Granting Lead Plaintiffs' Proposed Plan of Allocation, and
immediate entry of the Order by the Clerk of the Court is
expressly directed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/xjO4o8 from Leagle.com.

ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, represented by
ANGUS F. NI -- angus.ni@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMAN LLP.

ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, represented by
HANNAH ROSS -- hannah@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMANN LLP, JAI CHANDRASEKHAR -- jai@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, JEFFREY W. GOLAN --
jgolan@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, JOHN RIZIO-HAMILTON
-- johnr@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP,
KATHERINE SINDERSON -- katherinem@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN
LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, JEFFREY A. BARRACK --
jbarrack@barrack.com -- BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE & LISA M. PORT --
lport@barrack.com -- BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE.

DFC GLOBAL CORP., Defendant, represented by DAVID WIENER --
dwiener@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, JAY A. DUBOW --
dubowj@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON, JORDAN ETH --
jeth@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, JUDSON LOBDELL --
jlobdell@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, PHILIP T. BESIROF --
pbesirof@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER, RANDALL ZACK, MORRISON &
FOERSTER, ERICA HALL DRESSLER -- dresslere@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW PARKS RAINVILLE --
rainvilleg@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI --
aryanih@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP.

JEFFREY A. WEISS, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON, ERICA HALL DRESSLER, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW
PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI, PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP.

RANDY UNDERWOOD, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON, ERICA HALL DRESSLER, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, GAY BARLOW
PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP & HEDYA ARYANI, PEPPER
HAMILTON LLP.

DAVID JESSICK, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

KENNETH SCHWENKE, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

CLIVE KAHN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

JOHN GAVIN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

RON MCLAUGHLIN, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

MICHAEL KOOPER, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON.

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, Defendant, represented by
BRADLEY J. BUTWIN -- bbutwin@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP,
JOHN S. SUMMERS --  jsummers@hangley.com -- HANGLEY ARONCHICK
SEGAL & PUDLIN, JONATHAN ROSENBERG -- jrosenberg@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, MOSHE MANDEL -- mmandel@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & WILLIAM J. SUSHON -- wsushon@omm.com --
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP.

NOMURA SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, represented by
BRADLEY J. BUTWIN, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, JOHN S. SUMMERS, HANGLEY
ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN, JONATHAN ROSENBERG, O'MELVENY & MYERS
LLP, MOSHE MANDEL, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & WILLIAM J. SUSHON,
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP.

WILLIAM M ATHAS, Defendant, represented by JAY A. DUBOW, PEPPER
HAMILTON & GAY BARLOW PARKS RAINVILLE, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR GROUP, Movant, represented by JEFFREY A.
BARRACK, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE, JEFFREY W. GOLAN, BARRACK RODOS
& BACINE, LISA M. PORT, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE & MARK R. ROSEN --
mrosen@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE.


DISCOVERING HIDDEN: Court Dismisses Employee Discrimination Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i
issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
v. DISCOVERING HIDDEN HAWAII TOURS, INC., d/b/a/DISCOVER HAWAII
TOURS, HAWAII TOURS AND TRANSPORTATION INC., and BIG KAHUNA LUAU,
INC., Defendants, Civil No. 17-00067 DKW-KSC (D. Haw.).

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges
sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation claims
against each of the three Defendants on behalf of five former male
employees.  The alleged discriminating official in each instance,
according to the EEOC, is the Owner and President of Discovering
Hidden Hawaii Tours, Leopoldo Malagon III, whom the EEOC asserts
controlled each of the Defendant entities.

Defendants move to dismiss: (1) as untimely all claims on behalf
of Claimants 1 and 2 because the events associated with their
claims occurred more than 300 days before the Charging Party filed
his November 2015 discrimination charge with the EEOC; (2) the
retaliation claim brought by Claimant 1 due to the absence of an
adverse employment action; (3) the constructive discharge
allegations of Claimants 1, 3 and 4 as insufficiently pled; (4)
Claimant 4's sexual harassment claim because the harassment, as
alleged, was neither severe nor pervasive; and (5) any claims
against Hawaii Tours and Transportation Inc. and Big Kahuna
because they were not the employers of any claimant.

Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, to survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)  Accordingly, threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, a
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Factual
allegations that only permit the court to infer "the mere
possibility of misconduct" do not constitute a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, as required by Rule 8(a)(2).

The Untimely Claims Are Dismissed

Legal Framework

A statute-of-limitations defense, if apparent from the face of the
complaint, may properly be raised in a motion to dismiss. Seven
Arts Filmed Entm't Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251,
1254. Title VII requires that a charge shall be filed by or on
behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. Section
2000e-5(e)(1); see also EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 904 F.
Supp. 2d at 1090 n.

The parties dispute whether, when the EEOC brings a Section 706
pattern or practice hostile work environment claim on behalf of a
class of aggrieved employees, it may extend liability to include
employees who suffered the same type of harassment outside of the
300-day limitation period.  The weight of authority supports
Defendants' position that the continuing violation doctrine
properly applies to include only the additional, otherwise time-
barred claims of aggrieved individuals who suffered at least one
unlawful employment action within 300 days of the filing of the
Charge, but does not permit the inclusion of employees who did not
themselves suffer any unlawful employment practice within that
300-day period.

The Claims On Behalf Of Claimants 1 And 2 Are Time-Barred

The Commission here is seeking to provide relief for individuals
who did not themselves experience any unlawful employment actions
during the 300-day filing window. Although framed as a pattern or
practice claim, using the continuing violation doctrine under the
circumstances alleged here would expand the doctrine beyond its
traditional boundaries. The doctrine allows claims composed of a
series of separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful
employment practice.' Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.

In its proper application, it does not matter that some component
acts of the claim fall outside the statutory time period as to
each individual employee because the claim is based on the
cumulative effect of individual acts" suffered by that same
employee. These are not the circumstances here. The continuing
violation doctrine should not be expanded to cover individuals who
did not suffer any act of discrimination, harassment, or
retaliation within the 300-day limitation period.

Although the Court's conclusion limits the class of individuals
for whom the EEOC may seek relief under Section 706, like any
limitations period, the timely charge requirement incorporates
other policy and fairness considerations. Notably, this procedure
services an important purpose: it provides repose for employers
and prevents them from having to defend against long-stale claims.
In sum, any claims that accrued before January 14, 2015, 300 days
prior to the filing of the initial Charge on November 10, 2015,
are time-barred. Because the Complaint only alleges conduct
relating to Claimants 1 and 2 that occurred well-before this date
(in 2010 and 2012-13, respectively), their claims are untimely.
Defendants' Motion is therefore granted to the extent it seeks
dismissal of the untimely claims brought on behalf of Claimants 1
and 2.

The Complaint Fails To State Constructive Discharge Claims On
Behalf Of Claimants 3 And 4

Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's
reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working
conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial
purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become
so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to resign?

Here, there are no allegations that either Claimant 3 or 4
provided notice of Malagon's alleged conduct to anyone in order to
allow Defendants the opportunity to address the harassment.

Even assuming that Claimants 3 and 4 could not be expected to
remain on the job while seeking redress, Penn. State Police, 542
U.S. at 147, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that they
resigned specifically as a result of intolerable working
conditions. The allegations with respect to Claimant 3, for
instance, are vague as to whether his working conditions became
intolerable so as to overcome the normal motivation of a
competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job
to earn a livelihood, or that he resigned due to the harassment.
Rather, the Complaint alleges merely that, at least in part as a
result of the harassment, Claimant 3 resigned from Defendants'
employment.

Because the Complaint as currently pled fails to sufficiently
allege constructive discharge on behalf of Claimants 3 and 4,
Defendants' Motion is granted as to this claim. Because amendment
may be possible, dismissal is with leave to amend.

The Complaint Fails To Allege Sufficient Facts To State A Sexual
Harassment Claim On Behalf Of Claimant 4

The alleged comments regarding sexual stuff made during his
recruitment and at unspecified times and of unspecified duration
during his employment do not meet the legal standard for an
actionable claim. Conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in
the terms and conditions of employment. To be actionable under
Title VII, 'a sexually objectionable environment must be both
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in
fact did perceive to be so.

The allegations indicate that Malagon's comments were unwelcome
and of a sexual nature, but the Complaint does not allege the
dates or frequency of the comments, nor whether Claimant 4 found
the comments and questioning about what sexual stuff he was into
to be subjectively offensive, nor whether the comments interfered
with his ability to perform his job. In addition to the missing
details, what is lacking is the context to plausibly demonstrate
severity or pervasiveness. Title VII is not a 'general civility
code. A violation is not established merely by evidence showing
'sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and
occasional teasing.'

Because the Complaint does not include allegations of conduct by
Malagon or any defendant that was sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of Claimant 4's employment, the Motion is
granted. Because amendment of this claim may be possible,
dismissal is with leave to amend.

The Complaint Fails To Allege Sufficient Facts That Hawaii Tours
And Transportation And Big Kahuna Were Claimants' Employers

Defendants seek dismissal of two entities Hawaii Tours and
Transportation and Big Kahuna because neither was allegedly an
employer of the Charging Party or any claimant.

Big Kahuna Was Not The Employer Of Any Claimant

Even assuming the truth of its allegations, that Malagon managed
the luau event operated by Big Kahuna Luau, Inc., including
supervision of work by employees, the Complaint fails to allege
plausible facts showing that Big Kahuna could have been an
employer or joint employer of any of the Claimants or the Charging
Party where Big Kahuna did not even exist at the time of any of
the incidents of harassment described in the Complaint.
Accordingly, because the Complaint does not allege any unlawful
conduct during the time period after Big Kahuna was incorporated
on October 20, 2015, the Commission fails to plausibly allege
facts that Big Kahuna was an employer of any claimant.

Joint Employer Liability Is Not Sufficiently Alleged

There are no allegations that Hawaii Tours and Transportation
exhibited any of these powers or characteristics with respect to
any claimant. The Complaint alleges that Claimant 3 was employed
by DHT not Hawaii Tours and Transportation and fails to allege
that anyone at Hawaii Tours and Transportation, including
Malagon's wife, exerted any control over Claimant 3 or the
operations of DHT. Although the Complaint does not allege which
entity employed Claimant 4, based upon the allegation that Hawaii
Tours and Transportation's "sole function was to lease and operate
vehicles used by DHT in their tours, it does not appear reasonably
likely that he was employed by Hawaii Tours and Transportation as
a bartender between July and August 2015.

In any event, there are no allegations that Hawaii Tours and
Transportation acted as a joint employer with DHT that it
controlled the terms and conditions of any claimant's employment.
The Commission's conclusory allegation that Defendants were
claimants' joint employer under Title VII is insufficient to
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Without more, the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to
establish the factors necessary for DHT and Hawaii Tours and
Transportation to be considered joint employers.

The Complaint Does Not Sufficiently Allege That Hawaii Tours And
Transportation Is The Alter Ego of DHT

Although the Complaint alleges that Malagon was the sole partner,
president, treasurer, and director of DHT, and that his spouse,
Danielle Diamond, was the owner of Hawaii Tours and
Transportation, it does not allege that Diamond or Hawaii Tours
and Transportation influenced or governed Malagon or DHT, or that
Diamond or Hawaii Tours and Transportation had parental control of
DHT's internal affairs or daily operations.

To the contrary, the EEOC alleges that Malagon and/or DHT de facto
controlled Hawaii Tours and Transportation: Malagon controlled the
operations of Hawaii Tours and Transportation Inc., including the
authority to hire/fire employees. To be clear, the Complaint fails
to allege facts that Hawaii Tours and Transportation was a parent
corporation of DHT, was a shareholder of DHT, or had any ownership
interest in DHT, or that DHT was a subsidiary of Hawaii Tours and
Transportation. Because the Complaint alleges that Malagon was the
sole partner and director of DHT.

The factual allegations in the Complaint are not sufficient to
establish that either Hawaii Tours and Transportation or Big
Kahuna was an employer of any claimant, and Defendants' Motion is
granted. Because amendment may be possible, dismissal is with
leave to amend.

Leave To Amend

Because amendment of the claims and parties dismissed by this
Order may be possible, the Commission is granted leave to amend to
address the deficiencies identified herein. Should it choose to
amend the dismissed causes of action as to any claimant and/or
Defendant, the Commission must allege additional facts as to each
element required to state a claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7skyz32from Leagle.com.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff,
represented by Anna Y. Park, US Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Los Angeles.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff,
represented by Eric Yau, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Rumduol Vuong, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission & Sue
J. Noh, US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Los Angeles.
Discovering Hidden Hawaii Tours, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Barbara A. Petrus -- bpetrus@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson
Quinn & Stifel LLLP & John S. Mackey -- jmackey@goodsill.com --
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP.

Hawaii Tours and Transportation, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Barbara A. Petrus, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP & John S.
Mackey, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP.

Big Kahuna Luau, Inc., Defendant, represented by Barbara A.
Petrus, Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP & John S. Mackey,
Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP.


DOROTHY BROWN: Clark Sues over Collection of Unlawful Fees
----------------------------------------------------------
JULIE A. CLARK, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. DOROTHY BROWN, as Clerk of
the Circuit, Court of Cook County, Illinois; MARIA PAPPAS, as
Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois; and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, a
body politic, the Defendants, Case No. 2017CH12573 (Ill. Cir. Ct.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover unlawful fees demanded and
collected by Defendants.

According to the complaint, despite the fact that section
105/27.2a(g) only allows for the Clerk of Court to charge and
collect fees for the filing of petitions to vacate or modify final
judgments or orders, the Clerk of Court nevertheless charges such
fees for petitions to vacate or modify interlocutory judgments or
orders. As a result, the Clerk of Court has been charging and
collecting unlawful fees from Plaintiff and Class members.
Further, the Clerk of Court charges and collects additional fees
from litigants who pay a fee for the filing of a motion to vacate,
modify, or reconsider an interlocutory judgment or order. For
example, the Clerk of Court charges a "service fee" to those
litigants who pay the filing fee by credit or debit card, and an
"e-payment fee" and "convenience fee" to those litigants who file
the motion electronically and pay the filing fee online.
Individuals and entities would not be required to pay the
Additional Fees had they not been required to pay the
aforementioned unlawful filing fee in the first place.[BN]

Attorney for Defendant:

          Arthur C. Czaja, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF ARTHUR C.
          CZAJA AND ASSOCIATES
          Cook County Attorney #4 7671
          7521 N. Milwaukee Avenue
          Niles, IL 60714
          Telephone: (847) 647 2106
          Facsimile: (847) 647 2057
          E-mail: arthur@czajalawoffi.ces.com


DSA MANAGEMENT: Faces "Jackson" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against DSA Management Co.,
Inc. a New York Corporation. The case is styled as Antoine
Jackson, on his own behalf and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. DSA Management Co., Inc. a New York Corporation, 635
11th Miami Ventures, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company,
Arik Lifshitz, individually and XYZ Entities 1-10, Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-23615-KMW (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

DSA Management Co. Inc., is a New York-based real estate property
management company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Hazel Solis Rojas, Esq.
   Law Office of Keith M. Stern, P.A.
   2300 Glades Road, Suite 360W
   Boca Raton, FL 33431
   Tel: (561) 299-3844
   Fax: (561) 288-9031
   Email: hsolis@workingforyou.com

      - and -

   Keith Michael Stern, Esq.
   Law Office of Keith M. Stern, P.A.
   One Flagler
   14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 800
   Miami, FL 33132
   Tel: (888) 505-9941
   Fax: (561) 288-9031
   Email: employlaw@keithstern.com


ELBIT IMAGING: Court Approves Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------
Elbit Imaging Ltd. ("EI" or the "Company") (TASE: EMITF; NASDAQ:
EMITF) on Sept. 27 announced, in further to its announcements
dated April 6, 2016 and May 2, 2017 regarding class action
#1318/99 (Gadish v. Elscint et. al.), that the court approved in
principle a revised settlement with the Plaintiffs according to
which the Plaintiffs will receive compensation in the total amount
of NIS50 million (approximately USD14 million) (the "Settlement").
The Company is expected to pay NIS5 million (approximately USD1.4
million) of the said amount.  The main changes from the original
settlement relate to the amount of the Settlement and the manner
in which the Settlement funds will be allocated.

The court instructed the parties to provide a final settlement
agreement according to the changes approved in its decision, and
further decided that it will provide final approval of the
Settlement upon submission to such a final settlement agreement.

For further information with regards to the class action, please
see Note 14B. (1) of our Annual Consolidated Financial Statements
as of December 31, 2015, filed as Exhibit 99.1 to our Report on
Form 8-K filed with the SEC on March 31, 2016.

                     About Elbit Imaging Ltd.

Elbit Imaging Ltd. operates in the following principal fields of
business: (i) Commercial centers -- initiation, construction, and
sale of commercial centers and other mixed-use property projects,
predominantly in the retail sector, located in Central and Eastern
Europe.  In certain circumstances and depending on market
conditions, the Group operates and manages commercial centers
prior to their sale. (ii) Hotel -- operation and management of the
Radisson hotel complex in Bucharest, Romania. (iii) Medical
industries and devices -- (a) research and development, production
and marketing of magnetic resonance imaging guided focused
ultrasound treatment equipment, and (b) development of stem cell
population expansion technologies and stem cell therapy products
for transplantation and regenerative medicine. (iv) Plots in India
-- plots designated for sale initially designated to residential
projects. [GN]


EMPIRE HILLSIDE: "Chi" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages & OT under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Chi Ming Yau, individually and on behalf all other employees
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Empire Hillside Restaurant
Inc., d/b/a Empire Garden, Xia Chen, Miya Chen, and Mian Jian
Zheng, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05437 Document (E.D.N.Y.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-
judgment interest; and attorneys' fees and costs under New York
Labor Law and the Fair labor Standards Act.

The case is an action brought by Plaintiff on his own behalf and
on behalf of similarly situated employees, alleging violations of
the FLSA and the NYLL, arising from Defendants' various willful
and unlawful employment policies, patterns and/or practices. The
Defendants have willfully and intentionally committed widespread
violations of the FLSA and NYLL by engaging in a pattern and
practice of failing to pay their employees, including Plaintiff,
overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each
workweek.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jian Hang, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-18 39th Ave., Suite #1003
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353 8588
          E-mail: jhang@hanglaw.com


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Faces Class Action Over Opioid Marketing
------------------------------------------------------------
Dani Kass and Jeff Overley, writing for Law360, report that the
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Health and Welfare Fund has
filed a potential class action in Pennsylvania state court,
joining a string of parties accusing Endo International PLC of
fraudulently marketing its opioid painkillers as safe and
effective for chronic pain.

The health fund on Sept. 25 claimed the Opana ER and Percocet
maker furthered the opioid crisis by spending millions of dollars
a year advertising its painkillers for long-term use despite
having no proof that such use was effective and knowing there were
severe addiction risks.  The complaint alleges violations of the
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law,
unjust enrichment, breach of implied warranties and civil
conspiracy.

"Despite well-recognized legal principles requiring Endo to be
truthful and forthright in its representations regarding its
pharmaceuticals, Endo has engaged in an intentional, decades-long
pattern of deceptive and misrepresentative conduct that has
impermissibly minimized the grave medical risks associated with
utilizing opioids to treat long-term and/or chronic medical
conditions," the complaint states.

Between 2007 and 2013, Endo spent between $3 million and $10
million a quarter promoting its opioids -- which also include
Opana, Percodan and Zydone -- for chronic conditions like aches
and pains, headaches and backaches, the fund said.

The money was allegedly spent on traditional promotions like
educational materials, advertisements and sending representatives
to physicians, and also paying doctors to speak on its behalf to
promote brand loyalty, paying doctors to write misleading studies,
and swaying professional societies and patient-advocacy groups
that are supposed to be neutral, the suit says.

This is the most recent of a long line of suits and investigations
into Endo for its alleged role in the opioid crisis.  The
drugmaker is facing suits from Ohio, New York's Suffolk County,
Chicago, Missouri, the Oregon county that encompasses Portland and
a potential class of investors, along with a multistate
investigation from several state attorneys general.

Endo in July pulled Opana ER from the market following pressure
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  The agency had
claimed Opana ER was linked to abuse and a spike in injection-
related diseases like HIV and hepatitis C. Last year, the company
made nearly $160 million off the drug.

Endo and counsel for the health fund didn't immediately respond to
requests for comment on Sept. 27.

The health fund is represented by Sol H. Weiss --
sweiss@anapolweiss.com -- David S. Senoff --
dsenoff@anapolweiss.com -- Hillary B. Weinstein --
hweinstein@anapolweiss.com -- and Clayton P. Flaherty --
cflaherty@anapolweiss.com -- of Anapol Weiss.

Counsel information for Endo was not immediately available.

The case is Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Health and Welfare
Fund, et al, v. Endo International PLC et. al, case number
unavailable, in the Court of Common Pleas Philadelphia County.
[GN]


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Suit Over Securities Act Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois, and all others similarly-
situated v. Envision Healthcare Corporation fka Envision
Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Christopher A. Holden, William A.
Sanger, Claire M. Gulmi, Randel G. Owen, Michael L. Smith, Ronald
A. Williams, Mark V. Mactas, Richard J. Schnall, Carol J. Burt,
James D. Shelton, and Leonard M. Riggs, Jr. M.D., Case No. 3:17-
cv-01323 (M.D. Tenn., September 29, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of all persons
or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Envision
securities between March 2, 2015 and September 18, 2017.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made false and
misleading statements, and failed to disclose material adverse
facts about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.

Plaintiff Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois purchased Envision
common stock during the Class Period.

Defendant Envision, through one of its main subsidiaries called
EmCare, provides physician services at emergency rooms nationwide.
The company is headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee.

The Individual Defendants are officers and members of the board of
Envision. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mark P. Chalos, Esq.
      Kenneth S. Byrd, Esq.
      LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &
      BERNSTEIN, LLP
      One Nashville Place
      150 Fourth Avenue, North, Suite 1650
      Nashville, TN 37219-2423
      Tel: (615) 313-9000
      Fax: (615) 313-9965
      E-mail: mchalos@lchb.com
              kbyrd@lchb.com

          - and -

      Maya Saxena, Esq.
      Joseph E. White, III, Esq.
      Lester R. Hooker, Esq.
      SAXENA WHITE P.A.
      5200 Town Center Circle, Suite 601
      Boca Raton, FL 33486
      Tel: (561) 394-3399
      Fax: (561) 394-3382
      E-mail: msaxena@saxenawhite.com
              jwhite@saxenawhite.com
              lhooker@saxenawhite.com

          - and -

      Steven B. Singer, Esq.
      4 West Red Oak Lane, Suite 312
      White Plains, NY 10604
      Tel: (914) 437-8551
      Fax: (888) 631-3611
      E-mail: ssinger@saxenawhite.com


EQUIFAX INC: CEO Retires Following Massive Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------
Michael King and Kaitlyn Ross, writing for WXIA, report that
Equifax CEO Richard Smith retired on Sept. 26 amid revelations
about statements he made during a business breakfast at the
University of Georgia in the weeks after the massive data breach
that hit the company in August, but before it was made public in
September.

The company announced Mr. Smith's retirement on Sept. 26 after
Equifax disclosed that hackers had exploited a software flaw that
the company had not fixed to swipe Social Security numbers,
birthdates, and other personal information which provided tools
for easy identity theft to nefarious persons.
Mr. Smith had been CEO of Equifax since 2005.

Congress has also called for an investigation into the data breach
which has affected nearly 44 percent of the US population.

In August, Mr. Smith spoke at a breakfast in Athens at UGA's Terry
School of Business, before the data breach was made public, where
he touted Equifax's overall management of data.

"We manage massive amounts of very unique data.  In fact, we have
data on close to 1 billion people.  We have data on approaching
100 million companies around the world.  It's unique, but what you
would expect.  It's credit data, financial data, wealth data," he
said.  "Think of the Library of Congress -- we manage 1,200 times
that amount of data, every day. Fraud is a massive opportunity for
us.  The flip side of that is data security."

Mr. Smith spoke more of data security at the breakfast -- this in
the days following the data breach, but weeks before knowledge of
the leak came out.

"It's very attractive for others to try and get into our database
-- so it's a huge priority for us," Mr. Smith said.  "You've heard
of the Dark Web? I can go on right now, Jim and show you your
social security number, and show you what it's selling for. It's
very lucrative.  So, one is to make money. There are thieves
around the world looking to make money. Number two is called
trophy hunting -- it's just to embarrass you. Just to embarrass
you."

Mr. Smith continued with a statement that, as we look back today,
could clearly be seen as prophetic:

"There are those companies that have been breached and know it,
and there are those companies who have been breached and don't
know it."

A Marietta-based law firm announced that it has filed a class-
action lawsuit in connection with the ongoing Equifax data breach.

With the increasing numbers of individuals and businesses being
targeted by identity theft and the amount of devastation that can
be wreaked due to the vandals and their actions, credit bureaus
have a responsibility to safeguard credit information from
potential fraud and identity theft.

While individuals have been able to obtain free copies of their
credit reports in order to determine if they have been affected by
the large-scale data breach tied to Equifax, according to the
class action suit filed by The Doss Firm, small businesses are
forced to pay Equifax to receive information about their credit in
order to make that same sort of determination.

"Unlike consumers who are entitled under federal law to obtain one
free credit report annually, businesses must pay for their credit
reports," attorney Jason Doss said. " This is a real double whammy
situation for small business owners whose access to credit can
often live or die in terms of their personal creditworthiness.
The breach could either damage the business directly through
identity theft or it could cripple access to small business credit
by damaging the 'linked' credit of the individual who owns the
enterprise."

For a small business to receive their credit report from Equifax,
they must pay $99.

"It's just totally unfair. They should not be able to profit over
the mess they have made," said Mississippi boutique owner Dawn Lee
Chalmers.  "And it's ridiculous that criminals get to know more
about the information Equifax has about us than the small business
owners do."

The class action suit seeks to recover damages and legal costs
from Equifax. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Several Hack Probes Despite Exec Departures
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Sweet and Michael Liedtke, writing for Associated Press,
report that Equifax CEO Richard Smith stepped down on Sept. 26,
less than three weeks after the credit reporting agency disclosed
a damaging hack to its computer system that exposed highly
sensitive information for about 143 million Americans.

His departure follows those of two other high-ranking executives
who left in the wake of the hack, which exploited a software flaw
that the company did not fix to expose Social Security numbers,
birthdates and other personal data that provide the keys to
identify theft.

Mr. Smith, who had been CEO since 2005, will also leave the
chairman post.

Equifax said Mr. Smith was retiring, but he will not receive his
annual bonus and other potential retirement-related benefits until
the company's board concludes an independent review of the data
breach.  If the review does not find Smith at fault, he could walk
away with a retirement package of at least $18.48 million, with
the value of the stock and options he was paid out over his 12-
year tenure.  The board also could "claw back" any cash or stock
bonuses he may have received, if necessary.

Mr. Smith, 57, who made almost $15 million in salary, bonuses and
stock last year, will be able to stay on the company's health plan
for life.

Paulino do Rego Barros Jr., most recently president of the Asia
Pacific region, was named interim CEO.  Board member Mark Feidler
was appointed non-executive chairman.  Equifax said it will look
both inside and outside the company for a permanent CEO.

Even with the departures of three top executives, Equifax is still
facing several inquiries and class-action lawsuits, including
congressional investigations, queries by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as well
as several state attorneys general.

Three other executives were found to have sold stock for a
combined $1.8 million before Equifax disclosed the most serious
breach, though the company says they were unaware of it at the
time.

Although analysts had previously applauded Equifax's performance
under Mr. Smith, he and his management team came under fire for
lax security and their response to the breach.  Confusion over the
terms of credit-monitoring protection and jammed phone lines added
to people's ire.  The company's stock has lost a third of its
value -- a $5.5 billion setback.

Equifax's board clearly needed to dump Mr. Smith, not only as a
public show of penance for the breach but also for the company's
bungling since informing consumers their identities are in danger
of being stolen, said Bart Friedman, a lawyer specializing in
corporate governance issues for Cahill Gordon and Reindel.

"This was like a five-alarm fire and the lack of an appropriate
response by management just poured gasoline on that fire,"
Mr. Friedman said.  "If you are sitting on that board, I don't
know how you could have permitted him to stay in his role. I have
rarely seen such a botched response to an existential threat."

Equifax tried to appease incensed lawmakers, consumers and
investors by announcing the unceremonious retirement of its chief
security officer and chief information officer, who were
responsible for managing and protecting the company's technology.
But that wasn't enough, with lawmakers drawing up bills that would
impose sweeping reforms on Equifax and its two main rivals,
Experian and TransUnion.

Mr. Smith had been scheduled to appear at two congressional
hearings that would likely have turned into a public lambasting.
The House Energy and Commerce committee said in a tweet that it
still plans to hold its hearing Oct. 3.  A member of the Senate
Banking Committee said he still wanted Smith to appear Oct. 4 as
planned.

"A CEO walking out the door just days before he is to appear
before Congress is an abdication of his responsibility.  This
company has jeopardized the financial health and security of 143
million people, and they need to be held responsible.  So I fully
expect Mr. Smith to testify before the Banking Committee this
week, regardless of the timing of his retirement," said
Sen. Brian Schatz, a Democrat from Hawaii.

The data breach might not have happened if Equifax had responded
promptly to a March warning about a known security weakness in a
piece of open-source software called Apache Struts.  Even though a
repair was released, Equifax did not immediately install it.
Digital burglars used the crack in Equifax's computer systems to
break in from May 13 through July 30, according to the company's
accounting.

Equifax said it did not fathom the breadth of information that had
been stolen until shortly before issuing a public alert on Sept.
7, triggering the wave of withering condemnations that has led to
Mr. Smith's departure.

The jobs of other Equifax executives could still be in jeopardy.
The three who sold shares, including Equifax's chief financial
officer, are under scrutiny.

In a hearing on Sept. 26, the chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Jay Clayton, refused to comment when asked by
lawmakers if executives at Equifax engaged in insider trading when
they sold their shares. He did not confirm or deny that the SEC
was investigating the issue.

However, he opened the door to potentially forcing the executives
to return the proceeds of the stock sales, if the company's six-
week delay in disclosing the breach is found to be improper.

Mr. Smith's departure will not make life any easier for most of
the U.S. adult population who had their information accessed and
now must worry about impostors assuming their identities to obtain
credit cards and apply for loans.

Equifax Inc. is providing a year of free protection against
identify theft for anyone who wants it, but some lawmakers are
trying to pressure the company into extending that offer for the
next decade. Some experts say that still is not enough to guard
against identify theft and are advising consumers to put a freeze
on their files at Equifax, Experian and TransUnion to prevent
anyone from getting a loan under their names.

A credit freeze, though, creates its own headaches since it also
prevents the person making it from getting a new credit card,
mortgage or auto loan. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: November 30 Hearing Set in Data Breach Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Dixon, writing for Bankrate, reports that consumers haven't
shied away from challenging Equifax since word of its massive data
breach broke.

Attorneys have filed dozens of lawsuits.  And more than 25,000
people have tried using a chatbot to sue the credit bureau
individually, its creator says.

Victims have many legal avenues.  Before you choose one, consider
how it could impact your budget and future financial decisions.

Joining a class-action lawsuit

Joining a class-action lawsuit against Equifax is no longer
necessary, says former Georgia Gov. Roy Barnes, whose firm teamed
up with other lawyers to file a complaint.  At this point,
potential data breach victims should wait and see what happens.


A hearing is set for Nov. 30.  Many Equifax cases could be
combined into a single lawsuit.

If the class action in the consolidated Equifax case is certified
-- or allowed to proceed as a group lawsuit -- anyone who fits the
description of a class member is automatically covered, says Paul
Bland, executive director at a law firm called Public Justice.
Class members must be notified and given the chance to opt out of
the lawsuit.

Equifax would have to provide a list of potential data breach
victims.  But you may not receive a notice for various reasons,
like having an old address on file, Mr. Bland says.  If you don't
receive a letter, post card or email, look for ads or information
from Equifax with further instructions.

For some victims, suing Equifax individually may be a better idea.

"If somebody has a huge amount of damage -- their credit is
destroyed or they've put down a deposit to buy a house and now
they can't get a mortgage and they lose the deposit, they lose
their dream house -- now their damages are enough to pay for an
attorney," says Jeff Sovern, a law professor at New York's St.
John's University.

Barriers to class-action lawsuits

Class-action bans in arbitration clauses are normally the biggest
barriers to such lawsuits, says Olsen Daines PC partner Michael
Fuller, lead attorney for a class-action lawsuit filed against
Equifax.  Contracts with financial companies often force consumers
to work with arbitrators, preventing them from using group
lawsuits to resolve disputes.  A rule being considered by Congress
could change that.

If consumers have agreed to an arbitration clause, they're usually
stuck.  But these agreements can be waived if there's public
pressure, Mr. Sovern says.

Arbitration clauses were an issue in the case involving
unauthorized accounts opened by Wells Fargo.  But the bank agreed
to a class-action settlement after a wave of bad publicity.

After some initial confusion following the breach disclosure,
Equifax has said it will not fight for arbitration on any "claims
related to the cybersecurity incident."

Occasionally, courts strike down arbitration clauses saying
they're invalid.

"Periodically somebody has screwed up the way they've formed it
and we're able to beat the arbitration clause and get it thrown
out," says Mr. Bland from Public Justice.

Other legal remedies

Joshua Browder recommends filing a small claim if you're a
potential data breach victim.  He thinks he is. His credit card
was recently used to make unauthorized purchases.

DoNotPay -- a chatbot Browder introduced to challenge parking
tickets and landlords -- can now help consumers sue Equifax.
Provide your name, address and phone number and you'll receive
documents you need to file a small claim.

Anyone across the country could soon use the chatbot and sue for
up to $25,000 (depending on your state) in small claims court. So
far, that's only possible for California and New York residents.

Josh King, chief legal officer at Avvo, says filing a small claim
could cost you hundreds of dollars in filing fees.  That's not the
case for class-action lawsuits, which law firms fund.  Also, since
small claims cases can move quickly, you should wait until you
know more about the hack and how you're impacted.

Given that the hack is relatively new, you may not be able to
prove you were harmed by the time the case goes before a judge,
King says.

As you weigh your legal options, take other steps to protect
yourself, like setting up a security freeze and reviewing your
credit report.

Finding a class-action lawyer

Although you may not need to file a class action in the case of
Equifax, in other instances where you believe you've been harmed,
you can find class-action lawyers using the following resources:

National Association for Consumer Advocates
The American Association for Justice
FindLaw

Avvo.com rates attorneys and offers client reviews.  Another
helpful website is Consumer Action's class-action database. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Florida Court Dismisses "Astor" Suit w/o Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, dismissed without
prejudice the case captioned TIMOTHY ASTOR; and ALLAN ROZENZWEIG,
Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX INC.; and EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 6:17-cv-1653-Orl-37DCI (M.D. Fla.).

The Named Plaintiffs are residents of Florida who seek to
represent: (i) a "Class" of all persons residing in the United
States whose personal data Equifax collected and stored and whose
personal information was placed at risk and/or disclosed in the
Data Breach affecting Equifax from May to July 2017; and (ii) a
"Florida Subclass" of persons residing in Florida whose personal
data Equifax collected and stored and whose personal information
was placed at risk and/or disclosed in the Data Breach affecting
Equifax from May to July 2017.

On behalf of the Class and Florida Subclass, the Plaintiffs assert
nine claims for: (i) Willful Violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"); (ii) negligent violation of the FCRA;
(iii) negligence; (iv) negligence per se; (v) breach of implied
contract; (vi) unjust enrichment; (vii) invasion of privacy -
public disclosure of private facts; (viii) violation of bailment
obligations; and (ix) violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Judge Dalton concludes that the proposed class action against the
Defendants concerns a well-publicized cybersecurity breach that
may affect millions of people throughout the world.
Unfortunately, he finds that although the nine counts of the
Complaint reflect diverse legal theories, each count improperly
incorporates by reference all of the preceding paragraphs of the
Complaint.  Further, although the Plaintiffs have sued two
distinct Defendants -- EI and EISI -- the allegations of the
Complaint are consistently and confusingly directed to "Equifax"
generally.  Such pleading errors must be corrected before the
action can proceed.

Accordingly, he dismissed without prejudice as a shotgun pleading
the Complaint. The Plaintiffs are directed to file an Amended
Complaint in accordance with the Order.  Absent timely compliance
with the requirements of the Order, the action will be closed
without further notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/tnVlel from Leagle.com.

Timothy Astor, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Stack --
bstack@stackfernandez.com -- Stack, Fernandez & Harris, PA.

Timothy Astor, Plaintiff, represented by Denise B. Crockett, Stack
-- dcrockett@stackfernandez.com -- Fernandez & Harris, PA.

Allan Rozenzweig, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Stack, Stack,
Fernandez & Harris, PA & Denise B. Crockett, Stack, Fernandez &
Harris, PA.


EQUIFAX INC: Bologna et al. Sue over Cybersecurity Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
SABINA BOLOGNA, an individual; LUCIA LAROCCHIA, an individual;
EMILY KNOWLES, an individual; and KRISTEN GALLOWAY, an individual,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
03578-CAP (N.D. Ga., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to

This class action is brought against Equifax, based on its failure
to protect, secure, and safeguard the personally identifiable
information ("PII") of the plaintiffs, including approximately 143
million other United States consumers. Equifax is a consumer
credit reporting agency and failed to protect the PII it collected
from various sources. Equifax also failed to timely and adequately
notify the plaintiffs and the Class that their PII had been
compromised due to a cybersecurity breach, which Equifax had
failed to guard against. Equifax has also traced the data breach
to a software problem that, upon and information and belief, it
discovered in March 2017. This software problem could have been
remediated promptly, but Equifax failed to do so.

On September 7, 2017, Equifax made public a cybersecurity
incident, which involves approximately 143 million United States
consumers. Equifax disclosed that, between mid-May and July 2017,
hackers infiltrated their cyber security system and accessed
consumer data, including names, social security numbers, birth
dates, addresses, and driver's-license numbers. Equifax has also
disclosed that both credit card information for approximately
209,000 United States consumers and documents used in disputes for
182,000 people were also siphoned during the breach. The incident
is among the largest and most severe cybersecurity breaches in
history.

Equifax claims it discovered the breach on July 29, 2017. On
August 1, 2017, three Equifax senior executive sold shares of
stock worth almost $1.8 million. Equifax's Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) John Gamble sold company shares worth $946,374 (13% of his
stake in Equifax); Joseph Loughran, Equifax's president of United
States information solutions, exercised options to dispose of
stock worth $584,099 (9% percent of his stake in Equifax); and, on
August 2, 2017, Rodolfo Ploder, Equifax's president of workforce
solutions, sold $250,458 of stock (4% of his stake in Equifax). A
spokeswoman for Equifax said "[the executives] had no knowledge
that an intrusion had occurred at the time [they sold the
shares]". Equifax has traced the data breach to a software flaw
that, upon information and belief, it detected in March 2017,
which flaw could have been remediated with a software patch well
prior to the data breach.

Equifax is one of three credit bureaus in the United States that
tracks the financial history of consumers to calculate and report
a score that is to be used by lenders, employers, or any other
person or entity interested in a person's creditworthiness. The
company is supplied with a broad range of personal and financial
data, including loans, loan payments, credit cards, child support
payments, credit limits, missed payments, addresses, and employer
history. Not everyone affected by the data breach is aware that
Equifax held their PII. Equifax obtains much of its data from
those who report the credit activity of consumers, including
credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan W. Johnson, Esq.
          JONATHAN W. JOHNSON, LLC
          2296 Henderson Mill Rd., Suite 304
          Atlanta, GA 30345
          Telephone: (404) 298 0795
          Facsimile: (404) 941 2285
          E-mail: jwj@johnson-lawyer.com

               - and -

          Mark Geragos, Esq.
          Ben Meiselas, Esq.
          Lori G. Feldman, Esq.
          GERAGOS & GERAGOS
          Historic Engine Co. No. 28
          644 South Figueroa St.
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone (213) 625 3900
          E-mail: geragos@geragos.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Broder" Suit over Data Security Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
LAURA BRODER, individually and on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03587-AT (N.D. Ga., Sep. 15, 2017),
seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and other relief
pursuant to state privacy and tort laws related to an
unprecedented data breach.

Equifax is a provider of identity and credit monitoring services
to hundreds of millions of consumers. In addition to those
services, Equifax contracts with third parties such as banks,
insurance companies, and governmental entities to perform identity
verification, and other services that make Equifax a guardian of
personally-identifiable data. Through both its direct
relationships with its clients, and through its third party
contracting business, Equifax has obtained highly confidential,
sensitive financial and other data concerning hundreds of millions
of consumers around the world.

Equifax's business model is to monetize this data by providing it
as requested by its clients pursuant to its agreement with them
and also by selling access to this confidential and sensitive
information to banks, insurance companies and other third parties.
In short, the services offered by Equifax give it responsibility
for personal and private information for maintaining the
confidentiality of hundreds of millions of consumers, most of whom
have no choice in the matter. It is no exaggeration to say that
Equifax is thus a significant guardian of the public trust, and
that it plays a key role in the complex financial and security
systems that keep citizens and consumers safe in the United States
and abroad.

The action arises out of the disturbing security breach that
released to hackers of as yet undisclosed origin personal
information -- including social security numbers, drivers' license
numbers, addresses, credit card data and verifying security
information -- of 143 million U.S. citizens. This is almost half
of the population of the United States. These consumers may be
further victims of identity theft, unauthorized access to their
most important online accounts, and will require years of ongoing
monitoring and remediation.

On September 7, 2017, Equifax first informed the public that
hackers had accessed Equifax's online databases and mined personal
information. Personal information such as addresses, birth dates,
social security numbers, drivers' license information, credit card
information, and online security password information has been
jeopardized. Critically, Equifax admitted that it has been aware
of the breach since July 29, 2017. As of the date of the filing of
this complaint, however, Equifax has not affirmatively and
definitively notified any or all specific individuals that their
personal data has been compromised. This failure to warn its
clients and consumers, or to provide remediation to the extent
possible, is indefensible. Rather than protect those whose data
had been entrusted to it (including Equifax's own clients),
Equifax has focused its resources on protecting itself. Equifax
has not notified anyone privately and specifically about the
extent of the breach. Instead, before Equifax notified consumers
of the breach, it was furiously lobbying Congress to pass
legislation that would grant Equifax immunity from serious
liability. Indeed, even after Equifax announced its breach, the
Company sought to profit from it directly, by advising consumers
who were simply trying to determine if their data was at issue to
buy a new Equifax product, an identify protection product which
cost an additional $19.95 per month. Moreover, Equifax attempted
to insert a class action waiver and arbitration agreement, seeking
to bind inquiring and concerned consumers to limited remedies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David F. Miceli, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          One Court Street
          Alton, IL 62002
          P.O. Box 2519
          Carrolton, GA 30112
          Telephone: 618 259 2222
          Facsimile: 618 259 2251
          E-mail: dmiceli@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Lesley A. Weaver, Esq.
          Matthew S. Weiler, Esq.
          Emily C. Aldridge, Esq.
          BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
          1999 Harrison Street, Suite 670
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: 415.445.4003
          Facsimile: 415.445.4020
          E-mail: lweaver@bfalaw.com
                  mweiler@bfalaw.com
                  ealdridge@bfalaw.com

               - and -

          Jayne Conroy, Esq.
          Andrea Bierstein, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: 212 784 6400
          Facsimile: 212 213 5949
          E-mail: jconroy@simmonsfirm.com
                  abierstein@simmonsfirm.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Cox" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------
Brian Cox and Jessica Cox, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03586-CAP (N.D. Ga., Sep. 15, 2017),
seeks to recover damages stemmed from the widely-publicized data
breach caused by Defendant Equifax's failure to secure and
safeguard consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII").

As part of its usual business practices as a consumer credit
reporting agency, Equifax collects from various sources PII on
millions of Americans. On September 7, 2017, Equifax publicly
announced a cybersecurity incident that resulted in the
unauthorized disclosure of PIII potentially impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers (the "Data Breach"). The
Data Breach was caused by cyberattackers exploiting a website
application vulnerability that allowed them to gain access to
files containing PII. Equifax admitted the Data Breach occurred
from mid-May through July 2017 and provided unauthorized access to
PII primarily including names, Social Security numbers, birth
dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver's license numbers.
Equifax also admitted that approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers'
credit card numbers were accessed. Equifax has known
about the Data Breach since July 29, 2017, but delayed
notification to the public for several weeks and has yet to
provide an explanation for this delay. Through the use of
customary and routine data security methods, Equifax could
have and should have prevented the unauthorized disclosure of the
PII of millions of Americans. As a result of Equifax's negligence
and unlawful conduct millions of Americans, including the
Plaintiffs, are now subject to the threat of having their
identities stolen and this PII is now readily available by
cybercriminals for misuse. Through Equifax's lax security
practices that diverge from the practices of other CRAs, the
rights of Plaintiffs and the Class in the protection of their PII
has been violated. As a result of the Equifax Data Breach, and
Equifax's intentional, illegal, and negligent conduct, Plaintiffs
and the putative Class are likely to suffer.

Equifax is a provider of identity and credit monitoring services
to hundreds of millions of consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq.
          J. Gerard Stranch, Esq.
          Michael G. Stewart, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Ave., Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 254-8801
          E-mail: gerards@bsjfirm.com
                  beng@bsjfirm.com
                  mikes@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Alex G. Streett, Esq.
          James A. Streett, Esq.
          STREETT LAW FIRM, P.A.
          107 West Main
          Russellville, AR 72801
          Telephone: (479) 968 2030
          Facsimile: (479) 968 6253
          E-mail: Alex@StreettLaw.com
                  James@StreettLaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "McHenry" Suit over Data Security Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM THOMAS McHENRY and ALISON SUZANNE TRACY, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
EQUIFAX INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03582-SCJ (N.D. Ga.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover damages against Equifax for its
failure to secure and safeguard the private information of
approximately 143 million Americans.

According to the complaint, on July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered
unauthorized access to databases storing the confidential and
private consumer information of millions of U.S. consumers. On
September 7, 2017, Equifax publicly announced that due to a
vulnerability in its systems, its files were accessed by criminals
for at least the period of mid-May through July 2017. The
information accessed includes names, social security numbers,
birth dates, addresses, and driver's license numbers, in addition
to credit card numbers for some consumers and other documents
containing personal identity information.  Plaintiffs' and Class
members' Private Information was accessed and stolen by hackers in
the Security Breach. Equifax's security failures enabled and
facilitated the criminals' access, obtainment, theft, and misuse
of Plaintiffs' and Class members' Private Information.
Unauthorized persons gained access to Equifax's databases through
vulnerabilities in its security and executed commands that caused
the system to transmit to the unauthorized persons electronic data
comprising millions of Americans' Private Information.
Equifax's security failures also put Plaintiffs and Class members
at serious, immediate, and ongoing risk of identity theft, and
additionally, will cause costs and expenses to Plaintiffs and
Class members attributable to responding, identifying, and
correcting damages that were reasonably foreseeable as a result of
Equifax's willful and negligent conduct. The Security Breach was
caused and enabled by Equifax's knowing violation of its
obligations to secure consumer information. Equifax failed to
comply with security standards and allowed the Private Information
of millions collected by Equifax to be compromised by cutting
corners on security measures that could have prevented or
mitigated the Security Breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, assert claims for
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, violation of the North
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and all other
substantially similar statutes enacted in other states, and
negligence.

Equifax is a nationwide consumer reporting agency and purveyor of
credit monitoring and identity theft protection services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          E-mail: jim@ewlawllc.com
                  david@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          Jay I. Brody, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
          747 Chestnut Ridge Road
          Chestnut Ridge, New York 10977
          Telephone: (845) 356 2570
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
                  jbrody@kgglaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Tepfenhart et al. Sue over Cybersecurity Incident
--------------------------------------------------------------
JASON TEPFENHART, NICHOLAS TEPFENHART, JACK MACKLEER, DESTINI
NORRIS, NICOLAS VELASQUEZ, GARY ASTI, ANNA SOLORIO, BRIAN HARRIS,
TIFFANY FOSSETT, JAMES GATES, DANIKA ADAY, BRIAN KADEN, WILLIAM
KITTREDGE, JOHN HANDROCK, JAMES HANDROCK and TRACEY STOUGH,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
03571-ELR (N.D. Ga., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover

The Plaintiffs file this Complaint as a national class action on
behalf of over 140 million consumers across the country harmed by
Equifax's failure to secure and safeguard consumers' personally
identifiable information which Equifax collected from various
sources in connection with the operation of its business as a
consumer credit reporting agency, and for failing to provide
timely, accurate and adequate notice to Consumer Plaintiffs and
other Class members that their information had been stolen and
precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax has acknowledged that a cybersecurity incident potentially
impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers. It has also
acknowledged that unauthorized persons exploited a U.S. website
application vulnerability to gain access to certain files. Equifax
claims that based on its investigation, the unauthorized access
occurred from mid-May through July 2017. The information accessed
primarily includes names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses, and, in some instances, driver's license numbers. In
addition, Equifax has admitted that credit card numbers for
approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain dispute
documents with personal identifying information for approximately
182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed.

Equifax is a multi-billion-dollar Georgia corporation that
provides credit information services to millions of businesses,
governmental units, and consumers across the globe. Equifax
operates through various subsidiaries including Equifax
Information Services, LLC, and Equifax Consumer Services, LLC aka
Equifax Personal Solutions aka PSOL. Each of these entities acted
as agents of Equifax or in the alternative, acted in concert with
Equifax as alleged in this complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          QUINN, CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO LLP
          3516 Covington Highway
          Decatur, GA 30032
          Telephone: (404) 299-1211
          E-mail: rweaver@qcwdr.com
                  twarren@qcwdr.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Sikes" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN B. SIKES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INC., and EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00258 (W.D.N.C.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and
redress for affected Equifax consumers pursuant to the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, the North Carolina Identity Theft Protection
Act.

Equifax Inc. and Equifax Information Services, Inc. operate
"Equifax," one of the three largest consumer credit reporting
agencies in the United States. Plaintiff has been a consumer of
Equifax's services and entrusted Defendants with his personal
information for many years. Because Plaintiff and the Class
entrusted Defendants with their sensitive personal information,
Equifax owed them a duty of care to take adequate measures to
protect the information entrusted to it, to detect and stop data
breaches, and to inform Plaintiff and the Class of data breaches
that could expose Plaintiff and the Class to harm. Equifax failed
to do so.

Equifax acknowledges that, between May 2017 and July 2017, it was
the subject of a data breach in which unauthorized individuals
accessed Equifax's database and the names, Social Security
numbers, addresses, and other Personal Identifying Information
("PII") stored therein.  According to Equifax, the Data Breach
affected as many as 143 million people. Equifax admits that it
discovered the unauthorized access on July 29, 2017, but failed to
alert Plaintiff and the Class to the fact of the breach until
September 7, 2017. The Data Breach was the inevitable result of
Equifax's inadequate approach to data security and the protection
of the PII that it collected during the course of its business.
Defendants knew and should have known of the inadequacy of their
own data security. Equifax has experienced similar such breaches
of PII on smaller scales in the past, including in 2013, 2016, and
even as recently as January 2017. Over the years, Equifax has
jeopardized the PII and, as a result, financial information of
hundreds of thousands of Americans. Despite this long history of
breaches, Defendants have failed to prevent the Data Breach that
has exposed the personal information of over 100 million
Americans. The damage done to these individuals may follow them
for the rest of their lives, as they will have to monitor closely
their financial accounts to detect any fraudulent activity and
incur out-of-pocket expenses for years to protect themselves from,
and to combat, identity theft now and in the future. Equifax knew
and should have known the risks associated with inadequate
security, and with delayed reporting of the breach. The potential
for harm caused by insufficient safeguarding of PII is profound.
With data such as that leaked in the Data Breach, identity thieves
can cause irreparable and long-lasting damage to individuals, from
filing for loans and opening fraudulent bank accounts to selling
valuable PII to the highest bidder.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica E. Leaven, Esq.
          GRIMES TEICH ANDERSON, LLP
          535 College Street
          Asheville, NC 28801
          Telephone: (828) 251 0800
          Facsimile: (828) 236 9200
          E-mail: leaven@gtalaw.net

               - and -

          Kevin Sharp, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          611 Commerce St., Suite 3100
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 434 7001
          Facsimile: (615) 434 7020
          E-mail: ksharp@sanfordheisler.com

               - and -

          Jeremy Heisler, Esq.
          Andrew Melzer, Esq.
          SANFORD HEISLER SHARP, LLP
          1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 402 5650
          Facsimile: (646) 402 5651
          E-mail: jheisler@sanfordheisler.com
                  amelzer@sanfordheisler.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Tipping" Suit over Cybersecurity Incident
-------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDER TIPPING, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:17-cv-01273 (M.D. Tenn., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks statutory damages
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, reimbursement of out-of-
pocket losses, other compensatory damages, further and more robust
credit monitoring services with accompanying identity theft
insurance, and injunctive relief including an order requiring
Equifax to implement improved data security measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Equifax for
its failures to secure and safeguard consumers' personally
identifiable information which Equifax collected from various
sources in connection with the operation of its business as a
consumer credit reporting agency, and for failing to provide
timely, accurate, and adequate notice to Plaintiff and Class
members that their Personal Information had been stolen and
precisely what types of information were stolen. Equifax has
acknowledged that a cybersecurity incident (the "Data Breach") has
occurred, potentially impacting approximately 143 million U.S.
consumers. It has also acknowledged that unauthorized persons
exploited a U.S. website application vulnerability to gain access
to certain files. Equifax claims that based on its investigation,
the unauthorized access occurred from mid-May through July 2017.
The information accessed includes names, Social Security numbers,
birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances, driver's license
numbers. In addition, Equifax has admitted that credit card
numbers for approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain
dispute documents with personal identifying information for
approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed.

Equifax has acknowledged that it discovered the unauthorized
access on July 29, 2017, but has failed to inform the public why
it delayed notification of the Data Breach to consumers. Instead,
Equifax executives sold at least $1.8 million worth of shares
before the public disclosure of the breach. It has been reported
that its Chief Financial Officer John Gamble sold shares worth
$946,374, its president of U.S. information solutions, Joseph
Loughran, exercised options to dispose of stock worth $584,099,
and its president of workforce solutions, Rodolfo Ploder, sold
stock worth $250,458. The Personal Information for Plaintiff and
the class of consumers he seeks to represent was compromised due
to Equifax's acts and omissions and Equifax's failure to properly
protect the Personal Information.

The Complaint says Equifax could have prevented this Data Breach.
Equifax knew there was a risk of such a breach. Data breaches at
other companies, including one of its major competitors, Experian,
have occurred. The Data Breach was the inevitable result of
Equifax's inadequate approach to data security and the protection
of the Personal Information that it collected during the course of
its business. Equifax disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and
Class members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, and/or
negligently (1) failing to take adequate and reasonable measures
to ensure its data systems were protected, (2) failing to disclose
to its customers the material fact that it did not have adequate
computer systems and security practices to safeguard Personal
Information, (3) failing to take available steps to prevent breach
from ever happening, and (4) failing to monitor and detect the
breach on a timely basis. As a result of the Equifax Data Breach,
the Personal Information of the Plaintiff and Class members has
been exposed to criminals for misuse. The injuries suffered, or
likely to be suffered, by Plaintiff and Class members as a direct
result of the Equifax Data Breach.

Equifax is one of three nationwide credit-reporting companies that
tracks and rates the financial history of U.S. consumers. The
companies are supplied with data about loans, loan payments and
credit cards, as well as information on everything from child
support payments, credit limits, missed rent and utilities
payments, addresses, and employer history. All of this
information, and more, factors into credit scores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles Barrett, Esq.
          Benjamin C. Aaron, Esq.
          NEAL & HARWELL, PLC
          1201 Demonbreun St., Suite 1000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 244 1713
          E-mail: cbarrett@nealharwell.com
                  baaron@nealharwell.com

               - and -

          Don Barrett, Esq.
          David McMullan, Jr., Esq.
          Sterling Starnes, Esq.
          Cary Littlejohn, Esq.
          DON BARRETT, P.A.
          404 Court Square North
          Lexington, MS 39095
          Telephone: (662) 834 2488
          E-mail: dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com
                  dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com
                  sstarnes@barrettlawgroup.com
                  clittlejohn@barrettlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Roberta D. Liebenberg, Esq.
          Gerard A. Dever, Esq.
          Adam J. Pessin, Esq.
          FINE, KAPLAN AND BLACK, R.P.C.
          One S. Broad Street, 23rd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 567 6565
          E-mail: rliebenberg@finekaplan.com
                  gdever@finekaplan.com
                  apessin@finekaplan.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Appel" Suit Over FCRA Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Dawn Appel, Jody Burgstahler, Kevin Burgstahler, Robert Etten,
Jennifer Harris, and Glenn Jaspers, and all others similarly-
situated v. Equifax. Inc., Case No. 0:17-cv-04488 (D. Minn.,
September 29, 2017), seeks actual damages, statutory damages,
punitive damages, and equitable and declaratory relief under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and Minnesota's Data Breach Notification
Statute.

The Plaintiffs are citizens of the State of Minnesota during the
period of the Equifax Data Breach.

Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Equifax Inc. operates through
its subsidiaries that include Equifax Information Services, LLC,
and Equifax Consumer Services, LLC. All are consumer reporting
agencies and nationwide consumer reporting agencies. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
      Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
      Joseph C. Bourne, Esq.
      Eric S. Taubel, Esq.
      Kaitlyn L. Dennis, Esq.
      GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
      Canadian Pacific Plaza
      120 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
      Minneapolis, MN 55402
      Tel: (612) 333-8844
      Fax: (612) 339-6622
      E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
              dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com
              jbourne@gustafsongluek.com
              etaubel@gustafsongluek.com
              kdennis@gustafsongluek.com


ESTRELLITA INC: Faces "Reyes" Suit in S.D. Florida
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Estrellita, Inc. The
case is captioned as Dina Reyes, and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Estrellita, Inc., Anago Cleaning
Systems, Inc., and Anago Franchising, Inc., the Defendants, Case
No. 0:17-cv-61801-UU (S.D. Fla., Sep. 15, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Ursula Ungaro.

Anago Cleaning Systems offers commercial cleaning/janitorial
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick Glenn Dempsey, Esq.
          THE PGD LAW FIRM, LLC
          Southeast Financial Center
          200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2790
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 549 8601
          Facsimile: (305) 440 4051
          E-mail: dempsey@pgdlawfirm.com

               - and -

          David Alexander Villarreal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. VILLARREAL, P.A.
          9524 SW 40th Street
          Miami, FL 33165
          Telephone: (305) 814 8655
          Facsimile: (305) 809 8095
          E-mail: dav@thevlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Leon Francisco Hirzel, IV, Esq.
          HIRZEL DREYFUSS & DEMPSEY, PLLC
          2333 Brickell Avenue, Suite A-1
          Miami, FL 33129
          Telephone: (305) 615 1617
          Facsimile: (305) 615 1585
          E-mail: hirzel@hddlawfirm.com


EVERALBUM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in "Pratt" Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DANNY PRATT, Plaintiff, v. EVERALBUM, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17 C 1600 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Everalbum's motion
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c).

Everalbum owns and manages Ever, a smartphone app that provides
photo and video storage space for Apple and Android devices and
allows users to share and edit photos.  In October 2016, when
Pratt downloaded Ever, that version of the app offered users 1000
gigabytes ("GB") of free photo storage if they invited all their
contacts to use the app.

Once users elected to unlock the offered free storage, Everalbum
sent text message invitations to the selected contacts that read
"[user name] just recommended you check out your photos on Ever.
Link expires tomorrow," followed by a link to the Apple App Store
or Google Play Store.  The name displayed in the message was the
user name provided by the user during the creation of his or her
account.

Pratt downloaded the app in October 2016, went through the
invitation process, and elected to invite all his contacts.
Pratt's contacts then received the text message with his name in
place of the user name.  Like all Ever users, Pratt was not able
to edit or see the content of the invitation before the invitation
went out.

Pratt brings this putative class action complaint against the
Defendant alleging Everalbum has violated the Illinois Right of
Publicity Act ("IRPA") by using Pratt's name without his consent
in text invitations sent to his contacts through the set-up
process of its mobile app, Ever.

Everalbum has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).  Everalbum
argues that (i) IRPA does not apply when the use of another's
identity occurs outside the public sphere, and (ii) Pratt
expressly consented to the use of his name in the text messages
sent through the Ever app.

Judge Ellis disagrees with Pratt's contention that, in including
his name in the text invitation and not allowing him to preview
the message sent to his contacts, Everalbum exceeded the scope of
any consent he provided.  The Ever app asked for Pratt's consent
before sending text messages to his contacts, informing Pratt that
he could choose which friends to invite and that those invitations
would be sent via text message.  Pratt affirmatively decided to
follow through with the sending of the messages, clicking through
several prompts before those invitations were sent.

Although Everalbum never presented Pratt with the exact text of
the message, the use of his name was necessary to the invitation
process.  Because he finds that Pratt consented to the use of his
identity in the text messages Everalbum sent to his contacts,
negating a key element of his IRPA claim, Judge Ellis finds that
Pratt's IRPA claim fails.

While Everalbum has prevailed in this case, demonstrating that
Pratt consented to the use of his identity in the text messages at
issue, the Judge does not find it appropriate to award Everalbum
its attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses.  Everalbum has not
demonstrated how doing so would further IRPA's objectives.
Ultimately, she does not agree with Pratt, but this, in her
opinion, does not warrant an award of fees and costs under IRPA's
discretionary fee provision.

For these reasons, Judge Ellis granted Everalbum's motion for
judgment on the pleadings.  She entered judgment for Everalbum on
Pratt's IRPA claim (Count I) and terminates this case.  She
declined to award Everalbum its attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/PDSbuw from Leagle.com.

Danny Pratt, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Harris Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Danny Pratt, Plaintiff, represented by Sydney M. Janzen --
sjanzen@edelson.com -- Edelson Pc.

Everalbum, Inc., Defendant, represented by John C. Gekas --
john.gekas@saul.com -- Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Christina
G. Sarchio -- csarchio@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory D. Beaman --
gbeaman@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, pro hac
vice & Michael A. Jacobson -- michael.jacobson@saul.com -- Saul
Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP.


EXPERIAN SERVICES: Faces Suits Over Inaccurate Tax-Lien Info
------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Takiff, writing for Philly.com, reports that class-action
and "bad-faith" lawsuits are mixed blessings.  When victorious,
the plaintiff lawyers make lots of money, while the individual
"class" participants often split up peanuts.  At least the
lawsuits throw a spotlight, sometimes unwittingly, on issues that
affect many of us.

Credit-reporting blues. Security lapses at Equifax that have
undone the privacy and financial safety of 143 million U.S.
consumers have given us all upset stomachs.  But Equifax isn't the
only credit rater that's putting consumers' standing at risk,
charges the latest of 26 lawsuits filed against the "Big Three"
U.S. consumer-reporting agencies.

While the newest pile-on by Philly-based Berger & Montague P.C.
focuses just on Experian and TransUnion, the lawsuit repeats
accusations also made against Equifax.  The beef:  The big
consumer-reporting agencies often pass along "inaccurate or out-
of-date" tax-lien information obtained from a "third party"
without bothering to "check the records at the source." Often, the
reported "liens" have already been paid off.

Of course, a poor report lowers a consumer's credit score and
makes it more difficult to get a car loan or mortgage.  At the
very least, it raises the interest rate that the "bad-risk"
applicant has to pay to borrow.

Making matters worse, a "bad-penny" reputation is hard to shake.
The lawsuits allege that the credit-monitoring giants lack a
"systemic, reasonable procedure" to update the status of a
consumer's credit report "whenever tax liens are paid, satisfied,
or released."

Insurance grate. Do you have two cars on one auto insurance policy
with optional "stacked" coverage? Good for you! If one driver gets
into an accident and someone sues you royally for whiplash, the
insurance company can save your neck with the summed liability
insurance coverage for both cars in the household.  So, instead of
each car's $100,000 per person/$300,000 per incident coverage, you
have both cars' cumulative $200,000 per person/$600,000 per
incident protection to negotiate a settlement.

But what happens if you then cut back to one-car coverage -- as
happened to Anthony Caputo after one of his two rides was stolen
in 1998, actually the same year he'd signed up for a two-car
policy with State Farm? Or as happened to me five years ago with
Geico, after reverting to bachelor-household status?

You'll continue to pay the optional uptick fee for stacked
insurance unless you formally notify the insurance company on a
special form that you no longer wish to pay extra for the now-
useless stacked coverage.

In his lawsuit -- recently sustained by Common Pleas Court Judge
Frederica Massiah-Jackson, rejecting State Farm's preliminary
motion to dismiss -- Mr. Caputo states that the insurer continued
to charge him for stacked coverage for 15 years after he'd
reported the theft and deleted the lost vehicle from his policy.
His suit, filed by lawyer Jeffrey Zimmerman, alleges that the
stacked-coverage information was "concealed" on the policy
declaration pages issued at renewal time.  And when Mr. Caputo
finally became aware of the improper changes, in March 2016, and
demanded restitution, State Farm reimbursed him only from the date
his car was stolen up to October 2009.

How much money are we talking here? Not a lot.  I called Geico to
ask whether I was still paying for "stacked coverage." Oops, I was
-- an extra $6 every six months. "It's a Pennsylvania Insurance
Commission regulation: The stacked coverage stays on your policy.
So when you do get a second car, you'll be automatically
protected, it's not an issue," my agent said.  "You have to tell
us in writing when you don't want it anymore."

That little line item.  Not all Sunoco gas stations are created
equal.  Some are owned by the parent company; others are
independently owned and operated. But the big difference, obvious
only if you wield a calculator while pumping gas, is that the
Sunoco Rewards Card discount is guaranteed to save you money only
at company-owned stations.  Some indie stations resist the
temptation to shave 5 cents a gallon off the Sunoco Rewards Card
bill.  Or effectively give the discount to every customer through
a lower advertised price posted on their pumps and signs.

Because this difference wasn't spelled out in promotional
materials, Florida resident Donald White sued the Pennsylvania
gasoline retailer, alleging fraud.

Sunoco lawyers have argued that the awards-program contract is
part of an overall joint agreement between plaintiff Donald White,
card issuer CitiBank, and Sunoco that is subject to arbitration.

But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently ruled
that the fine-print contract and its arbitration agreement was
between only Citibank and White, leaving Sunoco vulnerable to all
kinds of nickel (and dime) legal actions. [GN]


EXXONMOBIL: Seeks Dismissal of Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
David Lee, writing for CourthouseNews Service, reports that
ExxonMobil and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson asked a
Dallas federal judge on Sept. 26 to dismiss a shareholder class
action against them, arguing investors are piggybacking claims by
several blue-state attorneys general that the oil giant concealed
what it knew about climate change.

The Irving-based oil company says the plaintiffs in the case are
seeking a "free ride on the soiled coattails" of New York Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman's investigation into its knowledge of
climate change and global warming.

In a 32-page motion to dismiss, ExxonMobil accuses the investors
of copying "the baseless insinuations and irresponsible
allegations" by Mr. Schneiderman's office.

"None of that recycled material is entitled to any weight," the
motion to dismiss with prejudice states.  "After years of
transparent publicity seeking, pandering to well-financed special
interests, and repeated shifts in focus, the NYAG has not
established any wrongdoing before a court of law.  All that has
come of the NYAG's efforts is a stinging rebuke from state
attorneys general in twelve other states filed in this court and
in a federal court in New York."

Lead plaintiff Pedro Ramirez sued ExxonMobil and Mr. Tillerson in
November 2016, claiming violations of the Securities Exchange Act
and SEC rules.  Mr. Tillerson served as ExxonMobil's chief
executive from 2006 to 2016, before he left to join President
Donald Trump's administration.

The lawsuit claims ExxonMobil made "materially false and
misleading" public statements when it failed to disclose internal
reports that "recognized the environmental risks caused by global
warming and climate change."  Mr. Ramirez claims the oil giant
also used an inaccurate "price of carbon" -- the cost of carbon
tax or cap-and-trade regulations -- to overstate the value of its
reserves.

ExxonMobil flatly denies the allegations, retorting that
Mr. Ramirez is attempting "to manufacture a securities fraud claim
out of its baseless allegation that ExxonMobil pulled a 'bait-and-
switch'" when it disclosed it used a proxy cost of carbon up to
$80 per ton to account for the potential impact of the
government's climate policies.

"Under plaintiff's flawed theory, the use of a lower cost figure
overstated the value of ExxonMobil's assets and the amount of its
reserves," the motion states.  "But the reality is that ExxonMobil
fully disclosed the risks of climate change to its business, and
in no way misrepresented the methodologies it used to analyze
those risks.  There was no shell game."

ExxonMobil further contends the plaintiffs failed to adequately
plead there was any fraudulent intent and that the company
repurchased billions of dollars worth of its own stock during the
class period and none of the defendants sold their shares.

Mr. Ramirez's lawsuit came on the heels of attorneys general in
Massachusetts and the U.S. Virgin Islands launching their own
investigations into ExxonMobil's knowledge of climate change and
global warming.

ExxonMobil sued U.S. Virgin Islands Attorney General Claude Walker
in Tarrant County Court in April 2016 to block his subpoena for
several decades worth of documents, calling it an unconstitutional
fishing expedition.  Mr. Walker agreed to drop the subpoena two
months later.

The company also sued Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey
in Fort Worth federal court in June 2016, seeking to block a
similar subpoena.  The trial judge ruled four months later that
Healey must show there is no political bias in her request.

Several conservative attorneys general have come to ExxonMobil's
aid in the dispute.  Texas and 10 other states filed an amicus
brief last September in the company's suit against Healey, saying
the investigations were an "unconstitutional use of investigative
powers" by liberal authorities.

A study by Harvard researchers released found that ExxonMobil has
knowingly misled the public for nearly 40 years about the dangers
of climate change, based on an analysis of company communications.

Company spokesman Scott Silvestri said at the time that the
findings are "inaccurate and preposterous." [GN]


FANTINI BAKING: Distributors Sue over Profits & Benefits
--------------------------------------------------------
HIPOLITO FLORES AND SAMUEL AROMIN, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. FANTINI BAKING
COMPANY, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 17-3024D (Mass. Super. Ct.,
Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief on behalf of a class of individuals who operated
as fresh bakery product distributors for Defendant and who
Defendant classifies or classified as independent contractors,
under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act

According to the complaint, generally, Defendant guarantees
Distributors 20% of profits on cash accounts, however due to their
use of Defendant's software, Distributors cannot independently
verify the profit on cash accounts and Defendant does not provide
Distributors an accounting of revenue on these accounts to
ascertain profits.  Defendant represented to Plaintiffs and other
Distributors that they would run their businesses independently,
have the discretion to use their business judgment, and have the
ability to manage their businesses to increase profitability.
Contrary to its representations, Defendant denied Plaintiffs and
other Distributors benefits of ownership and entrepreneurial skill
by retaining and exercising the following rights.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Patrick E. Donovan, Esq.
          23 Main Street
          Salem, NH 03079
          Telephone: (603) 893 1177
          Facsimile: (603) 893 5553
          E-mail: pdonovan@donovanlaw.com

               - and -

          Shawn J. Wanta, Esq.
          Dustin W. Massie, Esq.
          BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP
          100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 252 3570
          Facsimile: (612) 252 3571
          E-mail: sjwanta@baillonthome.com
                  dmassie@baillonthome.com


FLORIDA: FDOT's Certiorari Petition in Highway Toll Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned The Florida Department of Transportation,
Petitioner, v. Tropical Trailer Leasing, L.L.C., et al.,
Respondents, (Fla. Dist. App.), Judge Barbara Lagoa of the
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, denied the
Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT")'s petition for a
writ of certiorari seeking to quash an order compelling it to
produce information responsive to an amended subpoena propounded
by Class Plaintiff, Tropical.

The litigation involves a certified class action brought by the
Class Plaintiff, Tropical, against Miami-Dade Expressway Authority
("MDX").  The class action seeks injunctive relief as well as a
refund of highway tolls purportedly assessed improperly and paid
by class members to MDX.  In order to calculate possible damages
and identify class members for the "opt-out" notice required by
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(2), Tropical issued an
amended subpoena to FDOT requesting toll data for vehicles having
more than two axles, which paid the toll using a prepaid "Toll By
Plate" Account.  The amended subpoena excluded Sunpass transponder
accounts.

FDOT moved to quash the subpoena and asserted that the information
sought was protected by section 316.0777, Florida Statutes (2017).
It asserted that production of the requested documents could only
be made to law enforcement agencies or individual license plate
holders.  The trial court denied FDOT's motion and further ruled
that confidentiality would be protected through the entry of a
confidentiality order. Specifically, the trial court found that
any production under the Subpoena is subject to the separate
'Attorney Eyes Only' Protective Order.  Moreover, Tropical advised
the trial court that it would not seek the names of license plate
holders.  The petition ensued.

Judge Lagoa explains that pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.280(b)(1), parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of
the pending action.  She finds that the trial court did not depart
from the essential requirements of the law, as the information
sought in the amended subpoena is directly relevant to Tropical's
case.

Moreover, Tropical demonstrated that it possessed a sufficiently
compelling interest in the production of the information, and that
the trial court took adequate steps to protect the confidentiality
of the information.  Accordingly, she finds no departure from the
essential requirements of the law.  Judge Lagoa denied FDOT's
petition.  The Order is not final until disposition of timely
filed motion for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/xhyogm from Leagle.com.

Marc Peoples, Assistant General Counsel (Tallahassee), for
petitioner.

Akerman LLP, and Gerald B. Cope, Jr. -- gerald.cope@akerman.com --
and A. Rodger Traynor, Jr. -- rodger.traynor@akerman.com -- for
respondents.


FORTERRA INC: Saxena White Files Securities Fraud Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Saxena White P.A. on Sept. 27 disclosed that it has filed a
securities fraud class action lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York against
Forterra, Inc. ("Forterra" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: FRTA) on
behalf of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired: (1)
Forterra common stock issued pursuant and/or traceable to the
Company's false and misleading Registration Statement and
Prospectus issued in connection with Forterra's October 19, 2016
initial public stock offering (the "IPO"); and (2) the common
stock of the Company between October 20, 2016 and August 9, 2017,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

Forterra manufactures pipe and precast products in the U.S. and
Eastern Canada for water-related infrastructure applications,
including water transmission, distribution and drainage.  The
Company provides infrastructure components for construction
projects in residential, non-residential, and infrastructure
markets.

The Complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.  The Complaint brings forth
claims for violations in both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) at the time of the IPO,
organic sales in Forterra's Drainage and Water segments had
significantly declined; (ii) the Company was experiencing
increased pricing pressure due to competition and continued
softness in its concrete and steel pipe business; (iii) Forterra
had been losing business in its important pipe and precast
business due in large part to operational problems at its
production plants; (iv) the Company had undisclosed material
weaknesses in its internal controls that prevented it from
accurately reporting and forecasting its financial results; and
(v) as a result of the foregoing, Forterra's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.  As a
result of this fraudulent scheme, Defendants were able to
artificially inflate the Company's financials throughout the Class
Period.

You may obtain a copy of the Complaint and join the class action
at www.saxenawhite.com.

If you purchased Forterra stock during the IPO or at any time
between October 20, 2016 and August 9, 2017, you may contact
Lester Hooker (lhooker@saxenawhite.com) at Saxena White P.A. to
discuss your rights and interests.

If you purchased Forterra common stock during the IPO or
throughout the Class Period of October 20, 2016 and August 9, 2017
and wish to apply to be the lead plaintiff in this action, a
motion on your behalf must be filed with the Court by no later
than October 13, 2017.  You may contact Saxena White P.A. to
discuss your rights regarding the appointment of lead plaintiff
and your interest in the class action. Please note that you may
also retain counsel of your choice and need not take any action at
this time to be a class member.

With offices in Florida, New York, and Massachusetts, Saxena White
P.A. -- http:www.saxenawhite.com -- concentrates its practice on
prosecuting securities fraud and complex class actions on behalf
of institutions and individuals. Currently serving as lead counsel
in numerous securities fraud class actions nationwide, the firm
has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of injured
investors and is active in major litigation pending in federal and
state courts throughout the United States. [GN]


FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Khang & Khang LLP (the "Firm") on Sept. 27 announced the filing of
a securities class action lawsuit against Frontier Communications
Corporation ("Frontier" or the "Company") (Nasdaq: FTR). Investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired shares between April 1, 2016
and May 2, 2017, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are encouraged to
contact the Firm in advance of the November 27, 2017 lead
plaintiff motion deadline.

If you purchased Frontier shares during the Class Period, please
contact Joon M. Khang, Esquire, of Khang & Khang LLP, 4000
Barranca Parkway, Suite 250, Irvine, CA 92604, by telephone: (949)
419-3834, or by e-mail at joon@khanglaw.com.

There has been no class certification in this case yet.  Until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney.  You
may choose to take no action and remain a passive class member as
well.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, Frontier
made materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failed
to disclose: that the Company acquired a substantial number of
non-paying accounts as part of its acquisition of the wireline
operations of Verizon Communications, Inc.; that the Company would
be required to increase its reserves, and write off amounts from
accounts receivable associated with the non-paying accounts; and
that as a result of the above, the Company's statements about its
business, operations, and prospects were false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.  On
May 2, 2017, Frontier reported a first quarter 2017 net loss of
$75 million and a year-over-year first quarter revenue decline of
$53 million.  On the same day, the Company held a conference call
to discuss its first quarter financial results.  During the call,
CFO Ralph McBride stated that approximately $16 million of the
sequential revenue decline was a result of cleanup of California,
Texas, and Florida non-paying accounts and the automation of
legacy non-pay disconnects.  When this news was announced, shares
of Frontier declined in value materially, which caused investors
harm according to the Complaint.

If you wish to learn more about this lawsuit, or if you have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights, please contact
Joon M. Khang, Esquire, a prominent litigator for almost two
decades, by telephone: (949) 419-3834, or via e-mail at
joon@khanglaw.com. [GN]


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Sanford Heisler Files $700MM ERISA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP on Sept. 27 disclosed that it has filed
an ERISA individual and class action against General Electric
Company (NYSE: GE), General Electric Retirement Savings Plan ("the
Plan") Trustees, and 30 unnamed defendants in U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California.

The Complaint asserts that GE and the Plan violated the Federal
Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) by breaching their
fiduciary duties and engaging in prohibited transactions and
unlawful self-dealing detrimental to the three named plaintiffs
individually and as representatives of a class.  Kristi Haskins
and Laura Scully of San Diego, and Donald J. Janak of Carrolton,
Texas are the individual named plaintiffs.

The Sanford Heisler Sharp legal team is led by Charles H. Field
and Edward Chapin in the firm's San Diego office, Kevin H. Sharp
in the firm's Nashville office, David Sanford in the firm's
Washington D.C. office and David Tracey in the firm's New York
office.

The lawsuit cites five funds GE managed under the Plan as causing
harm in the proposed class period of January 1, 2011 through June
30, 2016: the GE Institutional International Equity Fund
("International Fund"); GE Institutional Strategic Investment Fund
("Strategic Fund"); GE RSP U.S. Equity Fund ("RSP Equity Fund");
GE RSP U.S. Income Fund ("RSP Income Fund") (collectively, "GE
Funds"); and GE Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund ("Small Cap
Fund").

"GE and the Plan's trustees were obligated by law to act for the
exclusive benefit of Plan participants and beneficiaries," said
Charles Field.  "ERISA required them to select prudent
investments, monitor the investments' performance, and modify the
Plan's investment options to maximize the benefits to the
participants and beneficiaries.  Instead, they selected poor-to-
mediocre-performing investments, and managed and administered them
in ways that harmed the participants and beneficiaries."

According to the filing, the named plaintiffs are among nearly
250,000 GE employees participating in the Plan during the class
period who were victimized by these ERISA violations.  Each year,
GE employees collectively invested billions of dollars in the
Plan.  The Complaint notes GE earned significant revenues and
profits from management fees charged to Plan participants during
this period, regardless of how the funds performed.

"There is evidence of tainted self-interest as GE prioritized
company profits over its fiduciary duty to the Plan's
participants" said David Sanford, Chairman of Sanford Heisler
Sharp.  "The financial well-being of GE employees does not seem to
have been on GE's radar."

The complaint asks the Court to certify the proposed Class,
appoint the named Plaintiffs as Class Representatives, and appoint
Sanford Heisler Sharp as Class Counsel.  It asks that the Court
find that GE breached its fiduciary duty, and require GE to make
the Plan whole for the $700 million in losses resulting from each
breach, as well as to restore the Plan to the position it would
now hold if the breaches had not occurred.

In addition, the Plaintiffs request the Court to: determine the
method by which Plan losses should be calculated; order defendants
to provide all accounting necessary to determine the amounts they
must make good to the Plan; remove fiduciaries who have breached
their duties; reform the Plan so that it complies with ERISA; and
levy a surcharge against the defendants for amounts involved in
improper, excessive or illegal transactions.

                 About Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP

Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP -- http://www.sanfordheisler.com-- is
a public interest class-action litigation law firm with offices in
New York, Washington, D.C, Nashville, San Francisco and San Diego.
The Firm specializes in civil rights and general public interest
cases, representing plaintiffs with employment discrimination,
labor and wage violations, predatory lending, whistleblower,
consumer fraud, and other claims.  Along with a focus on class
actions, the firm also represents individuals and has achieved
particular success in the representation of executives and
attorneys in employment disputes. [GN]


GROUP O: Averts Class Action Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
Dan Churney, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
downstate appellate court has stripped class-action status from a
suit against a Caterpillar contractor, which claimed the
contractor chiseled workers out of overtime pay, saying the 100
claims in the case are too differentiated to pursue as a class.

The Sept. 20 ruling was penned by Justice Daniel Schmidt, with
concurrence from Justice William Holdridge and Justice
Mary McDade, of Illinois Third District Appellate Court, which
sits in Ottawa.

The appellate order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may
not be cited as precedent except in the limited circumstances
allowed under the rule.

A putative class action was filed in 2012 by plaintiffs
Michelle Creal, Kasandra Murphy and Felicia Wright against Group
O, claiming Group O violated federal and state labor and wage
laws.  Ms. Creal was last listed as living in Springfield, Murphy
in Crest Hill and Wright in Joliet, according to the suit.

Group O is based in Milan, near the Quad Cities in Rock Island
County, and provides staffing to industrial companies, including
Caterpillar.  Group O provided staffing from 2009 to 2013 to the
Caterpillar plant in Joliet, with the workers doing such jobs as
clerk, forklift operator, packer and storeroom manager, court
papers said. The plaintiffs in this case were among about 100
employees who would have qualified to take part in the class
action.

Plaintiffs alleged Group O had employees work before and after
their shifts, as well as during meal breaks, but without properly
paying them.  To short the employees, Group O allegedly programmed
its electronic timekeeping and payroll system to round off
employee clock-ins and clock-outs.

Will County Judge Michael Powers granted class-action status to
the case in 2015, because he found there were common issues to the
suit that would predominate over issues only affecting individual
class members.  Group O disagreed and appealed.

Justice Holdridge said Judge Powers was wrong to decide the common
question tying the workers together, and justifying class-action
status, was that their work time was electronically deducted.
Rather, the issue was whether Group O forced the employees to work
during the periods for which they were not paid. Plaintiffs failed
to show Group O did so, in Justice Holdridge's view.

On the contrary, the employees who said they worked during certain
periods without compensation, did so under "individualized
circumstances," according to Justice Holdridge.  As an example,
one plaintiff said she worked during lunch so she could leave the
plant on time at the end of her shift, Justice  Holdridge pointed
out. Another plaintiff said she worked through lunch and stayed
late due to the "uniqueness" of her position.

For Justice Holdridge, there were too many different situations
for the suit to be designated a class action.

"To award plaintiffs the relief they seek, the trial court would
have to discern which employees were actually working when clocked
in, why, and for how long. These are exactly the type of
individual determinations that render a class action unfavorable,"
Justice Holdridge observed.

A status hearing is set for Oct. 16.

Plaintiffs are represented by the Chicago firms of Asonye &
Associates.  Group O is defended by Elizabeth Hubbard Law Firm and
Pappas O'Connor P.C., both of Chicago.

In 2013, the three plaintiffs also sued Group O over similar
issues in Chicago federal court. Class-action status was granted
the suit, but the judge later yanked that status, too, with the
case then settling in 2016.

One of the plaintiffs, Murphy, filed another Chicago federal suit
on her own against Group O in 2011, which settled in 2014. [GN]


GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: "Lazzaro" Class Claims Dismissed w/o Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BRYAN LAZZARO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GUIDANCE SOFTWARE,
INC., ROBERT VAN SCHOONENBERG, REYNOLDS C. BISH, MAX CARNECCHIA,
JOHN COLBERT, PATRICK DENNIS, MICHAEL MCCONNELL, WADE W. LOO, OPEN
TEXT CORPORATION, and GALILEO ACQUISITION SUB INC., Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-06035 (C.D. Cal.), Judge Cynthia A. Snyder of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered
a stipulated order dismissing with prejudice the action and all
claims asserted as to the Plaintiff only, and dismissed without
prejudice all claims on behalf of the putative class.

Because the dismissal is with prejudice as to Plaintiff only, and
not on behalf of a putative class, notice of this dismissal is not
required.

The Court retains jurisdiction of the Action solely for the
purpose of determining the Plaintiff's forthcoming Fee
Application, if such Fee Application becomes necessary.

The Order is entered without prejudice to any right, position,
claim or defense any party may assert with respect to the Fee
Application, which includes the Defendants' right to oppose the
Fee Application.  To the extent that the parties are unable to
reach an agreement concerning the Fee Application, they may
contact the Court regarding a schedule and hearing to present such
application to the Court.

Upon completion of briefing, Judge Snyder directed the parties to
promptly contact the Court to schedule argument regarding the
Plaintiff's Fee Application at a time convenient to the Court.  If
the parties reach an agreement concerning the Fee Application,
they will notify the Court.  Upon such notification, the Court
will close the Action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/04yQqd from Leagle.com.

Bryan Lazzaro, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas --
rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi and Korsinsky LLP.


HARPERSVILLE, AL: Court Dismisses Pro Se Civil Rights Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Southern Division, issued an Memorandum Opinion granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DANA CARDEN,
Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HARPERSVILLE, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:15-cv-01381-RDP (N.D. Ala.).

This case is before the court on the Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff's First Amended and Restated Complaint filed by
Defendants Judicial Correction Services, Inc., Correctional
Healthcare Companies, Inc., CHC Companies, Inc., and the Town of
Harpersville.  This case is also before the court on Defendant
Harpersville's Motion to Strike Class Allegations Based on Griffin
and Ewing.

This suit is a putative class action challenging conduct related
to probation sentences issued by the Town of Harpersville's
Municipal Court. It is similar to several putative class action
suits that have been brought against JCS, corporate entities
related to JCS, and municipalities that contracted with JCS for
probation supervision services. The court has ruled on numerous
motions to dismiss raising arguments similar to those presented in
these motions. Having said that, the motions before the court are
unique in two respects. First, Plaintiff has brought claims
against Defendants under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq., and
Defendants seek to dismiss those claims. Second, Plaintiff filed
this suit after a similar state court putative class action had
been pending for over five years; this related class action suit
affects the statute of limitations analysis.

After careful review, the court concludes that: (1) JCS and
Correctional Healthcare's Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted
in part and denied in part; (2) CHC Companies's Motion to Dismiss
is due to be granted; (3) Harpersville's Motion to Dismiss is due
to be granted in part and denied in part; and (4) Harpersville's
Motion to Strike Class Allegations is due to be granted.

All claims against Defendant CHC Companies are due to be dismissed
without prejudice. Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight,
Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen of the First
Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. Finally, Plaintiff's class allegations
in the First Amended Complaint are due to be struck as untimely.

A RICO enterprise includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.  Under RICO, racketeering activity includes such predicate
acts as extortion under state law and the Hobbs Act.
A civil plaintiff must also show an injury to her business or
property that occurred "by reason of" a substantive RICO
violation.  That is, a RICO plaintiff must demonstrate injuries
that were proximately caused by a violation of that statute.  To
prove proximate causation between a RICO violation and a
subsequent injury, a plaintiff must present some direct relation"
between the alleged injurious conduct and the alleged injury.
The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the racketeering
enterprise and the defendant must be two separate entities. For
example, a corporation and its officers, employees, or agents
cannot constitute a RICO enterprise when the agents and employees
are alleged to have acted within the scope of their
responsibilities for the corporation.

Plaintiff has failed to plead that JCS or Harpersville committed
racketeering activity by violating the Travel Act. A defendant
violates the Travel Act if he travels "in interstate commerce with
the intent to promote unlawful activity and thereafter actually
[does] promote or attempt to promote the unlawful activity.
Plaintiff has not alleged that any specific employee or agent of
JCS or Harpersville travelled across state lines with the intent
of promoting unlawful activity.

Second, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege that JCS or
Harpersville used the mail to promote or facilitate an unlawful
activity namely, extortion because the demands for payment in the
letters sent by JCS sought fees imposed by Municipal Court
orders.. Because the letters sought payments for which JCS had a
lawful claim, based upon orders of the Municipal Court, the
letters did not seek to extort money from probationers under JCS
supervision, and a Travel Act violation cannot be premised upon
them.

Plaintiff claims that they suffered an investment injury imposed
by Harpersville because Harpersville was able to obtain a more
favorable bond rating.  This Section 1962(a) theory suffers from
at least one fatal flaw; Plaintiff has not explained how
Harpersville's favorable bond rating caused the injuries they
suffered. Although it might well be plausible that the alleged
harms to Plaintiff and a more favorable bond rating were both
results of the alleged extortion scheme presented in the RICO
counts, it is not plausible that the more favorable bond rating
caused the harms Plaintiff and the putative class members
allegedly suffered. And, Plaintiff has offered no authority to
support a RICO claim for such an investment injury.

As such, Plaintiff has presented no injury she suffered directly
from the reinvestment of the proceeds by Harpersville, and her
Sec. 1962(a) civil RICO claim is due to be dismissed.

Plaintiff has not indicated how Defendants maintained or acquired
an interest in the alleged enterprise through any of the purported
racketeering activities. Indeed, the enterprise alleged in the
Amended Complaint is nothing more than the "ongoing business
relationship" between JCS and Harpersville, which could not
plausibly have been acquired or controlled through illicit
racketeering activity of the parties to the relationship.
Plaintiff has alleged that JCS and Harpersville enriched
themselves with the proceeds from the racketeering activity. But,
in no way has Plaintiff claimed that JCS or Harpersville used a
pattern of racketeering activity to acquire, maintain, or control
a separate entity, as is required for her to maintain a Section
1962(b) RICO action.

Because Plaintiff has presented no specific nexus between
Defendants' alleged racketeering activity and Defendants' control
of an enterprise, her Section 1962(b) RICO claim is due to be
dismissed.

The court finds that the First Amended Complaint does not plead
plausible relationships between JCS and Harpersville to support
the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. To be sure,
Plaintiff has pled that Harpersville and JCS entered into a
contract whereby JCS agreed to provide probation supervision fees
in exchange for fees that would be paid by probationers, rather
than by Harpersville or the Municipal Court.

Other than that contract, though, Plaintiff's alleged association-
in-fact enterprise relies on independent conduct committed by JCS
employees and Harpersville employees to support the existence of
an association (along with a conclusory allegation of a
conspiratorial agreement to commit extortion. These allegations of
independent conduct simply do not show that JCS and Harpersville
acted together as a continuing unit and do not plausibly show an
agreement to conduct extortion through a joint association-in-fact
enterprise.

Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead the second
structural element necessary for an association-in-fact
enterprise, her Section 1962(c) claim is due to be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7hx7a8u
from Leagle.com.

Dana Carden, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandria Parrish, THE
EVANS LAW FIRM, 1736 Oxmoor Road, Homewood, Alabama 35209
Dana Carden, Plaintiff, represented by G. Daniel Evans, THE EVANS
LAW FIRM, P.C., Maurine C. Evans, THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC,1736
Oxmoor Road, Homewood, Alabama 35209 & William M. Dawson, DAWSON
LAW OFFICE,  2229 Morris AveBirmingham, AL 35203.

The Town of Harpersville, Defendant, represented by L. Conrad
Anderson, IV -- canderson@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, Ginny
Willcox Leaven -- gwillcox@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP,
Gregory C. Cook -- gcook@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP & Will
Hill Tankersley -- WHT@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP.

Judicial Correction Services, Inc.,, Defendant, represented by
Larry S. Logsdon -- llogsdon@wallacejordan.com -- WALLACE JORDAN
RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC, Michael L. Jackson --
mjackson@wallacejordan.com -- WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT,
LLC, Wesley Kyle Winborn wwinborn@wllacejordan.com -- WALLACE
JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT & Wilson F. Green --
wgreen@fleenorgreen.com -- FLEENOR & GREEN LLP.

CHC Companies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Fredrick Lane
Finch, Jr -- lane.finch@swiftcurrie.com -- Swift Currie & Brian C.
Richardson -- brian.richardson@swiftcurrie.com -- SWIFT CURRIE
MCGHEE & HIERS LLP.


HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT: Court Awards $360K Atty Fees in "Parker"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Northeastern Division, issued an Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
in the case captioned PHILLIP JASON PARKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
5:14-CV-2247-VEH (N.D. Ala.).

Plaintiffs Philip Jason Parker, Carolyn England, Buffy R. Dulaney,
William D. McGee, Maisie Slaughter, and Carrie Hannah Borden
initiated this action against Defendants.  The Named Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Collective Action Complaint that asserted
overtime as well as uncompensated-time violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The Named Plaintiffs further alleged that
Defendants engaged in retaliatory conduct against them and that
their FLSA violations were wilful.

In their Fee Motion, Plaintiffs are seeking $344,501.81 in
attorneys' fees and $15,498.19 in expenses for a total amount of
$360,000.

Defendants dispute the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' suggested
rates and claimed hours that comprise Plaintiffs' reduced fee
amount of $344,501.81.  Under Defendants' approach, Plaintiffs'
total fee award would be decreased from $344,501.81 to $201,415.50
-- a reduction of 25% or $103,818.75 from Plaintiffs' original
pre-cap calculation of 415,275.00.

The Court finds that the affidavit offered by Rocco Calamusa, Jr.,
Esq., in support of his hourly rate substantiates that he was
admitted to the Alabama State Bar in 1993 and that he has over 20
years experience as a litigator primarily in the fields of
discrimination, wage and hour, and civil rights.  Mr. Calamusa's
affidavit further confirms that Kevin Jent, Jr., Esq., was
admitted to practice law in 1996 and that he has more than 20
years experience in employment related matters. Mr. Calamusa's
affidavit also includes evidence of the rates charged by some of
Plaintiffs' counsel for hourly, non-contingent labor/employment
matters as well as examples of comparable rates that were approved
in other fee-shifting cases filed in the Northern District of
Alabama.

The Court further finds that $375.00 is a reasonable hourly rate
for all counsel of record -- Messrs. Calamusa and Jent, Rex Slate,
Esq., and Dawn Evans, Esq. -- as it is in accordance with the
prevailing Decatur/Huntsville or Northeastern Division range of
rates for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skills, experience, and reputation. In particular, all these
lawyers have over 10 years in experience and are very close to
each other in terms of their total years spent in practice.

Also, the record does not reflect significant reputational (or
other) evidence that supports an adjustment of this rate for any
particular lawyer. Further, this hourly rate is within both ranges
sworn to by John Wilmer, Esq. -- one of Plaintiffs' rebuttal
experts. The district court did not clearly err in setting lead
counsel's rate at his normal billing rate of $385 and in the
middle of the expert's range.

As for paralegal time, the Court rejects Plaintiffs' proposed
rates in part and Defendants' counter-rate of $100.00 and
concludes, based upon its judicial experience, that $125 is a
reasonable hourly rate for all time attributable to Mses. Karen
Allen, Traci Wiggins, and Tressy Wilson.

The recorded duties were not compensable as they involved tasks
that were of no benefit to Plaintiffs, including time spent on the
Fee Motion. Further, Plaintiffs' counsel sometimes provided
insufficient detail for the Court to discern the nature and
quality of the hours expended. Additionally, the Court disallowed
all time attributable to travel.  In each of these situations, the
Court discounted the total amount sought by the unreasonably
claimed time.

Therefore, the reasonable fee amount for Plaintiffs to recover is
$327,775.00, and the reasonable expense amount is $13,457.54.
However, these amounts will be paid over time under the terms of
the parties' Settlement Agreement and the fees and expenses
started in 2014.  For these reasons, the Court finds that
increasing each figure by 10% is appropriate.

This means that, for expenses, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
an additional $1,345.75 in costs for a total of $14,803.29. Based
upon the $360,000.00 negotiated cap, this leaves $345,196.71 with
respect to attorney's fees. Adding 10% back into the above
recalculated fee figure of $327,775.00 results in an additional
$32,777.50 for a total fee revised figure of $360,552.50, which is
greater than the cap remainder of $345,196.71.

Thus, Plaintiffs' reasonable fee award is $345,196.71, and the
total award due is $360,000.00.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ybhlmt83from Leagle.com.

Phillip Jason Parker, Plaintiff, represented by Dawn Stith Evans -
- dawns@gseattorneys.com -- Guin, Stokes & Evans, LLC.

Phillip Jason Parker, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin W. Jent --
kjent@wigginschilds.com -- WIGGINS CHILDS PANTAZIS FISHER &
GOLDFARB, Rex W. Slate, GUIN -- rexs@gseattorneys.com -- STOKES &
EVANS, LLC & Rocco Calamusa, Jr. -- rcalamusa@wigginschilds.com --
WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC.

Carolyn A. England, Plaintiff, represented by Dawn Stith Evans,
Guin, Stokes & Evans, LLC, Kevin W. Jent, WIGGINS CHILDS PANTAZIS
FISHER & GOLDFARB, Rex W. Slate, GUIN, STOKES & EVANS, LLC & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC.

Buffy R. Dulaney, Plaintiff, represented by Dawn Stith Evans,
Guin, Stokes & Evans, LLC, Kevin W. Jent, WIGGINS CHILDS PANTAZIS
FISHER & GOLDFARB, Rex W. Slate, GUIN, STOKES & EVANS, LLC & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC.

William D. McGee, Plaintiff, represented by Dawn Stith Evans,
Guin, Stokes & Evans, LLC, Kevin W. Jent, WIGGINS CHILDS PANTAZIS
FISHER & GOLDFARB, Rex W. Slate, GUIN, STOKES & EVANS, LLC & Rocco
Calamusa, Jr., WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC.

Healthcare Investment Group Inc, Defendant, represented by David
J. Canupp --  LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE PC, Suite 1022101 West
Clinton AvenueHuntsville, AL 35805-3093 & Michael Wade Rich,
LANIER FORD SHAVER & PAYNE PC, Suite 1022101 West Clinton
AvenueHuntsville, AL 35805-3093

David Childers, Defendant, represented by David J. Canupp, LANIER
FORD SHAVER & PAYNE PC & Michael Wade Rich, LANIER FORD SHAVER &
PAYNE PC.


HIRO SUSHI: "Zhang" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
GENXIANG ZHANG, and XINHUI ZHANG, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. HIRO SUSHI AT
OLLIE'S INC. d/b/a Hiro Sushi at Ollie's, FREEDOM PLACE REST LLC
d/b/a Hiro Sushi at Ollie's, 160 RESTAURANT CONCEPTS LLC d/b/a
Hiro Sushi at Ollie's, 39 WEA FOOD GROUP, INC. d/b/a Mah Jong
Chinese Kitchen, TAO RONG a/k/a Cindy Rong, YI LU, ALAN PHILLIPS,
CHRISTOPHER J. PHELAN, and SHLOMO SELA, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-07066 (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid
wages for off-the-clock work caused by time shaving, unpaid
minimum wage, unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest; and/or attorneys' fees and costs pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have willfully and
intentionally committed widespread violations of the FLSA, NYLL,
and New York Codes, Rules and Regulations by engaging in a pattern
and practice of failing to pay their employees, including
Plaintiffs, wages for all hours worked, minimum wage for each hour
worked, overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 in each
workweek, and spread-of-hours for all hours worked in excess of
ten 10 in each workday. Defendants willfully failed to record all
of the time that Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees work
or worked, including time worked in excess of 40 hours per week
and 10 hours per day.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs, proposed FLSA Collective and
potential Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs:

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Blvd., Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762 1324
          E-mail: johntroy@troypllc.com


HOME & HOME: "Choi" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
IK HO CHOI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. HOME & HOME, CORP., GI JOON KYE, and
IN YONG LEE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05400-ARR-SMG
(E.D.N.Y., Sep. 14, 2017), seeks to recover overtime compensation
for all hours worked over 40 each workweek under Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, Defendants knew that the nonpayment of
overtime pay and failure to provide the required wage notice at
the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws.
20. From 2006 until the present, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants
to work as a store worker for Defendants' business located at 31-
85 Whitestone Expressway, Flushing, NY 11354. For the applicable
period, Defendants classified Plaintiff as an exempt employee and
did not pay overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 per
week.

Home & Home Corp. owns and operates a furniture/electronics/
supplies store in Queens County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip H. Kim, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-18 39th Avenue, Suite 1003
          Flushing, NY, 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353 8588
          Facsimile: (718) 353 6288
          E-mail: pkim@hanglaw.com


HSN INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, on Sept. 27 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, case No. 1:17-cv-01279, on behalf of
shareholders of HSN, Inc.  ("HSN" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: HSNI)
who have been harmed by HSN's and its board of directors' (the
"Board") alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in connection
with the proposed merger of the Company with affiliates of Liberty
Interactive Corporation ("Liberty").

On July 5, 2017, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Proposed Transaction") under
which HSN's shareholders will stand to receive 1.650 shares of
Liberty's Series A QVC Group common stock for each share of HSN
stock they own (the "Merger Consideration").  Based on the closing
price on September 26, 2017, the Merger Consideration represents
an implied value of approximately $39.67 per share.

If you wish to obtain information concerning this action or view a
copy of the complaint, you can do so by clicking here:
www.faruqilaw.com/HSNInotice.

The complaint alleges that the Form S-4 Registration/Joint Proxy
Statement (the "S-4") filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") on August 31, 2017, violates Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act because it provides materially
incomplete and misleading information about the Company and the
Proposed Transaction, including information concerning the
Company's financial projections and analysis, on which the Board
relied to recommend the Proposed Transaction as fair to HSN
shareholders.

Take Action

Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with
extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and significant
expertise in actions involving corporate fraud.  Faruqi & Faruqi,
LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains its principal
office in New York City, with offices in Delaware, California,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from the date of this notice.  Any member of
the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this
action, or have any questions concerning this notice or your
rights or interests, please contact:

Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330
E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
[GN]


INDIEFORK HOSPITALITY: Faces "Lopez" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Indiefork
Hospitality, LLC. The case is captioned as Luis Lopez, on behalf
of himself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Indiefork Hospitality, LLC; Indiefork Times Square, LLC; Indiefork
Walker, LLC; Indiefork Gospel, LLC, doing business as: Chalk Point
Kitchen and The Handy Liquor Bar; Matt Levine, individually; and
Adam Maciejewski, individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-
07051-LGS (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 15, 2017). The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Lorna G. Schofield.

Indiefork Hospitality LLC is in in hotels and motels business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
          225 Broadway Suite 307
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 323 6980
          Facsimile: (212) 233 9238
          E-mail: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com


INTERCEPT PHARMACEUTICALS: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Sept. 27 disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed against Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("Intercept" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:ICPT) and certain of its
officers.   The class action, filed in United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, and docketed under
17-cv-07371, is on behalf of a class consisting of investors who
purchased or otherwise acquired Intercept securities, seeking to
recover compensable damages caused by defendants' violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Intercept securities
between May 31, 2016, and September 20, 2017, both dates
inclusive, you have until November 27, 2017, to ask the Court to
appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-
free, Ext. 9980.  Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. manufactures and markets
biopharmaceutical products.  The Company focuses on the
development and commercialization of therapeutics to treat chronic
liver diseases utilizing proprietary bile acid chemistry.  The
Company's lead product candidate, Ocaliva (obeticholic acid, or
OCA), is a bile acid analog, a chemical substance that has a
structure based on a naturally occurring human bile acid, that
selectively binds to and activates the farnesoid X receptor, or
FXR.  On May 31, 2016, Intercept announced that the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") had approved Ocaliva for the treatment
of patients with primary biliary cholangitis ("PBC").

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Ocaliva entailed undisclosed
safety risks, including death, to patients suffering from PBC; and
(ii) as a result of the foregoing, Intercept's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On September 12, 2017, Intercept issued a letter warning
physicians against overdosing patients with Ocaliva, advising them
that the drug has been tied to liver injuries and death among
patients suffering from PBC.

On this news, Intercept's share price fell $15.36, or 13.53%, to
close at $98.12 on September 12, 2017.

On September 21, 2017, the FDA issued a safety announcement
entitled "FDA Drug Safety Communication: FDA warns about serious
liver injury with Ocaliva for rare chronic liver disease," warning
doctors after reports of multiple deaths linked to the drug.

On this news, Intercept's share price fell $24.42, or 24.88%, to
close at $73.70 on September 21, 2017.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust
class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known
as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered
the field of securities class actions. [GN]


J.D. COVELY: "Lamb" Suit Seeks Wage and Hour Law Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH LAMB individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated who were employed by J.D. COVELY, INC., PIONEER
PIPE CONTRACTORS, INC., COVEL Y ENTERPRISES, LLC and/or any other
entities affiliated with, controlling, or controlled
by J.D. COVELY, INC., PIONEER PIPE CONTRACTORS. INC., COVEL Y
ENTERPRISES, LLC, V. J.D. COVELY, INC., PIONEER PIPE CONTRACTORS.
INC., COVEL Y ENTERPRISES, LLC, WESLEY COVELY, HARRY COVELY and
JEFFREY COVELY, the Defendants, Case No. CAM-L-003611-17 (N.J.
Super. Ct., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid wage pursuant
to the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act and the New Jersey wage and
hour law.

This action is brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and a putative
class consisting of each and every other person who performed work
in trades including but not limited to operators, carpenters,
masons, heavy and highway laborers and other related construction
trades for the Defendants and/or other entities controlled by the
Defendants on the sites of Projects.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
          Martin Fojas, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          E-mail: lambinder@vandallp.com
                  mfojas@vandallp.com


JESSICA HOLDING: "Lin" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
LILING LIN, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. JESSICA HOLDING INC. d/b/a COTS Travel d/b/a
Kingly Tour, CHINA OVERSEAS TRAVEL SERVICE (U.S.A.), INC. d/b/a
COTS Travel, ANITA YIM KING LAI, BIANA NG, JESSICA WONG a/k/a
Jessica Astrup, and RONGHAI GAO a/k/a Billy Gao, the Defendants,
Case No. 712785/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime compensation, pursuant to New York Labor
Law and the Fair Labor Standards Acts.

According to the complaint, Defendants committed the following
alleged acts knowingly, intentionally, and willfully against
Plaintiff and the Class. The Defendants knowingly and willfully
failed to pay Plaintiff at least the minimum wage for all hours
worked and overtime compensation at one and one half times (1.5x)
her regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a given
workweek. The Plaintiff was not exempt under state law requiring
employers to pay employees overtime. The Defendants failed to keep
full and accurate records of Plaintiff's hours and wages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Blvd., Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762 1324
          E-mail: johntroy@troypllc.com


KUSHNER COMPANIES: Kushnerville Tenants File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Alec MacGillis, writing for ProPublica, reports that tenants of
the Baltimore-area apartment complexes owned by Jared Kushner's
real-estate company have brought a class-action lawsuit against
the firm's property management arm over its aggressive pursuit of
tenants for allegedly unpaid rent.

The lawsuit, filed on Sept. 27 in Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, alleges that the management company and related corporate
entities have been improperly inflating payments owed by tenants
by charging them late fees that are often unfounded and court fees
that are not actually approved by any court.  This, the lawsuit
charges, sets in motion a vicious cycle in which tenants' rent
payments are partly assessed toward the fees instead of the actual
rent owed, thus deeming the tenant once again "late" on his or her
rent payment, leading to yet more late fees and court fees.
Making matters worse, the 5 percent late fees are frequently
assessed on principal that includes allegedly unpaid fees, not
just the rent itself. Tenants are pressured to pay the snowballing
bills with immediate threat of eviction, the suit alleges.

"The routine practice of charging tenants illegal fees combined
with filing eviction proceedings against tenants who have paid
their rent on time is predatory and destructive to hard-working
Marylanders and their families.  This is yet another example of
corporations profiting from deceptive policies," said
Chelsea Ortega -- cortega@svolaw.com -- of Santoni, Vocci &
Ortega, a Baltimore-area firm that has also brought class-action
suits for similar "fee-churning" practices against two other large
property management companies in the area.  In this case, the firm
is working with Brown Goldstein & Levy, a Baltimore firm
specializing in civil rights cases, and the Public Justice Center,
a civil legal aid office based in Baltimore that has also brought
cases against area landlords over similar practices.

A spokesman for the Kushner Companies declined to comment on the
particulars of the lawsuit. "We will respond to the complaint at
the appropriate time in the legal proceedings," he said.

The family-controlled Kushner Companies purchased apartment
complexes with about 5,500 units in the Baltimore area as part of
a $371 million deal in 2012, and added three more complexes a year
later for $37.9 million.  After several subsequent deals, the
company now manages a total of 15 complexes in the Baltimore area,
with a total of close to 9,000 units.  Jared Kushner, who was
instrumental in the purchases, stepped down as the company's CEO
when his father-in-law, Donald Trump, won the presidency. Kushner
has become one of Trump's senior advisers in the White House.

The suit follows a May 23 article jointly published by ProPublica
and The New York Times Magazine that detailed the Kushner
Companies' highly litigious dealings with the people who rent its
apartments.  The company, which shares ownership in some of the
complexes with other partners but runs them all through its
Westminster Management subsidiary, has brought hundreds of cases
against current and former tenants in local courts.

Many of the cases involved former tenants who had moved out of the
complexes several years prior to the Kushner Companies' purchase
of them.  And some involved tenants who possessed clear evidence
that they did not owe the money the company claimed, yet were
pursued anyway for several years, with late fees and court fees
piling on top of the original claims.  The article also described
shoddy conditions that many tenants contend with at the complexes,
including mice, leaky roofs and mold.

In response to questions for the May 23 article, the Kushner
Companies' chief financial officer said that its approach when it
came to pursuing tenants was in line with industry practices and
that it had a fiduciary duty to its ownership partners to collect
all money owed by current and former tenants.

A subsequent report by The Baltimore Sun found that in some cases,
Kushner Companies went to even greater lengths: Since 2013,
corporate entities affiliated with the company sought the civil
arrest of 105 former tenants at the company's 17 Maryland
complexes (it also owns two in the Washington suburbs) for failing
to appear in court to face allegations of unpaid rent. Twenty
former tenants were in fact briefly detained, the Sun reported.

In response to the stories, Maryland's two U.S. senators and four
of its House members, all Democrats, sent a letter to Kushner
Companies asking for some of the firm's records.  The lawmakers
noted that the complexes rely heavily on tenants with Housing
Choice (Section 8) rental vouchers, and thus must comply with a
host of Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations.
The lawmakers demanded, among other things, all notifications from
HUD, public housing authorities, inspection companies or local
jurisdictions identifying defects in the complexes in the past
three years; all complaints from residents about maintenance and
repair issues over the past three years; and information regarding
the role played by Jared Kushner.

One of the two named tenants in the class-action suit filed on
Sept. 27 is Tenae Smith.  Ms. Smith and her partner have lived at
Dutch Village, a Kushner-owned complex on the northern edge of
Baltimore, since 2009.  Last September, water started leaking from
the bathroom ceiling whenever it rained.  She told the rental
office repeatedly in the months following, but no one came to fix
it.  Finally, during a hard rain in December, she slipped on the
wet bathroom floor, and had had enough.  She filed a rent escrow
claim in court on Dec. 19, seeking to withhold her rent until the
problem was fixed.  But the city inspector didn't come to verify
the problem until Jan. 11.  Dutch Village finally started work on
the problem on Jan. 24, just before her Jan. 30 rent escrow
hearing.  The judge dismissed the case, but Smith kept fighting,
insisting on a reduction in rent for the months when the problem
went ignored.  Then, during a hard spring rain, the patched
ceiling leaked again, suggesting the problem was with the roof.

Ms. Smith, who has two young children, has been in court countless
times this year, arguing for her rent escrow claim and against
Dutch Village's suits demanding payment of her $795-per-month
rent.  Her family has also been dealing with bedbugs, a leaky sink
and mold in the utility closet.

The class-action suit alleges that Dutch Village at various points
charged Ms. Smith with fees for "writ filing" and "legal-summons"
ranging up to $80 even though no court had awarded such fees.  If
Ms. Smith did not pay all of the fees along with her rent, Dutch
Village sometimes rejected her rent payment, leading to yet more
fees.  For instance, when she paid her $795 rent for this past
July, it rejected the payment and said she in fact owed $944.70
because of accumulated fees, a sum that would grow with additional
late fees, agent fees and baseless court fees if it was not paid
in full.

"I would pay my rent, and if I was late, I would pay a 5% late
fee, but the fees kept adding up," Ms. Smith said in a statement
paired with the lawsuit.  "I work full-time and made regular
payments, but they kept taking me to court for eviction and piling
on the fees."

The other named plaintiff is Howard Smith (no relation), a retiree
who has lived in the Kushner-owned Carroll Park Apartments in
Middle River, east of Baltimore, for 10 years.  He has been hit
with a string of late fees and court fees and eviction notices
even though he has arranged to have his rent automatically debited
from his bank account every month.  He has also suffered repeating
flooding in his ground-floor unit, including in 2015 after a
mentally unstable tenant above him left the tub running, causing
Smith's ceiling to collapse.  That tenant subsequently shot two
employees in the rental office.

The class-action suit alleges that on several occasions in the
past two years, after Ms. Smith paid his rent in full, Carroll
Park misallocated a portion of that payment to non-rent charges,
deemed his rent to be late, then charged him a "legal-summons
fee," even though no court had awarded such a fee at the time, as
well as a "legal-agent fee," and then filed an eviction notice to
spur payment of the full bill.  Ms. Smith complied, fearful of
eviction.

"Adding small but improper fees to the rent of tenants living
paycheck to paycheck, then misallocating rent payments to those
fees in order to generate more fees, is a scheme that preys on
working-class tenants," said Andrew D. Freeman of Brown, Goldstein
& Levy.  "Westminster Management's misuse of Maryland courts'
eviction proceedings to force tenants to pay these improper fees
makes this scheme all the more deplorable. It must be stopped."

One former tenant pursued by Kushner Companies has already
received legal relief.  Kamiia Warren, a home health care worker,
moved her family out of the Cove Village complex in Essex, just
east of Baltimore, in 2010 after her elderly neighbor started
behaving erratically toward them.  Ms. Warren got the necessary
written approval from the on-site manager to leave in advance of
her lease's expiration.  But three years later, after Kushner
Companies bought the complex and took over management of it, she
received notice that a Kushner subsidiary, JK2 Westminster, was
suing her for $3,014.08 for having broken her lease.

Ms. Warren was initially unable to locate the document showing she
had permission to leave, and a Baltimore County judge awarded JK2
Westminster a judgment of nearly $5,000 against her, including
court and late fees.  The Baltimore-area law firm that handles all
of the cases against the Kushner Companies' local tenants then got
a court order to garnish Warren's wages and bank account -- she
changed jobs soon afterward, but her bank account was cleaned out.

Around the same time, she got her hands on a copy of the document
showing she had received permission to move and presented it in
court, but the Kushner attorneys kept up their pursuit, eventually
securing a court lien against her for the remaining $4,615 she
allegedly owed.  That lien has marred her credit record, making it
hard for her to secure loans, including the one she would need to
launch the small assisted living center she dreams of opening.

But after the ProPublica/New York Times article appeared,
featuring her treatment by Kushner Companies, lawyers at the
Baltimore office of Ballard Spahr, a nationwide law firm, stepped
forward offering to take on Warren's case pro bono.  They
contacted the Kushner Companies' local lawyer, Jeffrey Tapper, and
earlier this month, the company agreed to a stipulation releasing
Ms. Warren from the $4,615 lien -- more than seven years after she
moved out of Cove Village. [GN]


LEGAL HELPLINE: Tunit Sues over Spam Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------
GILAT TUNIT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. THE LEGAL HELPLINE, LEGALZOOM.COM,
INC., JOHN & JANE DOES 1-10, and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-07133 (D.N.J., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks
to recover damages arising from Defendants' violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

The Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, on behalf of herself and
all persons/consumers, along with their successors-in-interest,
who have received similar, unsolicited, text messages from
Defendants, or agents of Defendants, in which Defendants never had
consent to send the solicitation text messages, and as alleged
herein, is in violation of the TCPA, and who reside in the State
of New Jersey as of four years from the date of Plaintiff's
Complaint. Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein, and any
person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or
affiliated with the Defendant, including, without limitation,
persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or
partners of Defendants as impracticable. On information and
belief, hundreds or thousands, of persons have received these
unsolicited text messages from Defendants, which violate various
provisions of the TCPA.

According to the complaint, on or about August 21, 2017, Plaintiff
received a text message, the contents of which are as follows,
"Getting harassed by bill collectors? We can help, call us at 201-
463-0451." Through independent investigation, Plaintiff has
determined that the company that sent the text message was
Helpline. HelpLine sends text messages of this nature to scores of
consumers they believe have a need for legal assistance. HelpLine
then provides the potential consumer leads to LegalZoom. LegalZoom
then refers the potential consumer leads to their vast network of
attorneys who pay a fee to LegalZoom. HelpLine, in their marketing
efforts, acts as an agent of LegalZoom. The text messages sent by
Helpline on behalf of LegalZoom were sent using an automated
dialer system. The text messages sent by Helpline on behalf of
LegalZoom were, in fact, "telephone solicitations", insomuch as
the end goal of Defendants was to secure Plaintiff as a "paying"
client of one of the legal professionals under the LegalZoom
network.

Legal Helpline provides members with free and prompt business
legal advice on a wide range of employment, company, commercial
and personal legal services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David P. Force, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL LUPOLOVER, P.C.
          120 Sylvan Ave., Suite 303
          Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
          Telephone: (201) 461 0059
          Facsimile: (201) 608 7116
          E-mail: DPF@lupoloverlaw.com


LEX 18: Faces "Leonardo" Suit in Sothern District of New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lex 18 Inc. The case
is captioned as Seferino Leonardo, on behalf of himself, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, the Plaintiff, v. Lex 18
Inc., doing business as: Yakitori Taisho; Taisho, Inc., doing
business as: Oh! Taisho; Kenji Mizogami; and Yumiko Umiya,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-06986-RJS (S.D.N.Y., Sep 14, 2017).
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard J. Sullivan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465 1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465 1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


MARSHALL UNIVERSITY: Court Dismisses with Prejudice "Kerr"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Charleston Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice the
case captioned LISA MARIE KERR, Plaintiff, v. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-
06589 (S.D.W.V.).

Pending before the Court are Defendants Sandra Bailey, Teresa
Eagle, Lisa Heaton, Gene Brett Kuhn, Marshall University Board of
Governors, David Pittenger, and Judith Southard's Motion to
Dismiss and Plaintiff Lisa Kerr's Motion to Reopen and Consolidate
Related Actions.

This is the second civil action Plaintiff has filed stemming from
her attempted completion of Marshall University's Master of Arts
in Teaching (MAT) program, for which she was not awarded a degree
due to her receipt of a no credit grade for the program's required
MAT Level III Clinical Experience student teaching course.

The Complaint named the same seven Defendants named in this
action, and alleged seven causes of action: (1) defamation against
Defendants MUBG, Kuhn, Southard, Bailey, and Eagle; (2) tortious
interference with a business expectancy against Defendants MUBG,
Kuhn, Southard, Bailey, and Eagle; (3) the tort of outrage against
Defendants MUBG, Kuhn, Southard, Bailey, and Eagle; (4) a
violation of the plaintiff's due process rights under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 (section 1983) against Defendants MUBG, Southard,
Bailey, and Eagle; (5) a violation of the plaintiff's equal
protection rights under section 1983, based upon sexual
orientation discrimination, against Defendants MUBG, Southard,
Bailey, Eagle, Heaton, and Pittenger; (6) a violation of the
plaintiff's equal protection rights under section 1983, as a class
of one against Defendants MUBG, Southard, Bailey, Eagle, Heaton,
and Pittenger; and (7) a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) against Defendants MUBG and Kuhn.

By Standing Order entered January 4, 2016, and filed in this case
on July 22, 2016, this action was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley for submission of proposed
findings and a recommendation ("PF&R"). Magistrate Judge Tinsley
filed his PF&R (ECF No. 19) on June 28, 2017, recommending that
this Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and deny
Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen and Consolidate Related Actions.

Plaintiff's first specific objection purports to object to the
PF&R's failure to follow the Fourth Circuit's mandate, in
violation of the mandate rule. She asserts there is no indication
in the Fourth Circuit's decision that the Court "intended the
extremely rare outcome of precluding Plaintiff from amending her
complaint to remediate the basis for their decision. Accordingly,
Plaintiff believes the PF&R errs in its understanding that this
Court's dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's 2014 Action was
upheld on appeal.

The Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 2014 Complaint was based on
her failure to state a claim, not any doctrine analogous to
immunity, as she suggests. Had the Fourth Circuit affirmed
dismissal on a different basis than that relied on by this Court,
that Court could have remanded the action for this Court to decide
if its dismissal should have been without prejudice. Carter, 761
F.2d at 975, Because we are affirming on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds
which were not the basis for dismissal by the district court, we
remand for its decision whether to dismiss with or without
prejudice and express no thoughts on the merits of that
determination.

The Fourth Circuit also could have affirmed this Court's dismissal
on the same basis this Court relied on, but modified it to be
without prejudice. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 225.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the dismissal as to Rubenstein and
Goodin but modify it to reflect that it is without prejudice.
Given that the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's decision on
the same Rule 12(b)(6) basis this Court used, and declined to
modify the decision to be without prejudice or remand for this
Court to consider the issue of prejudice, the Court finds no
reason to infer an intent to modify the dismissal.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's first objection is overruled.

Application of the Savings Statute

Plaintiff's second objection protests the PF&R's finding that West
Virginia's savings statute does not prevent the claims raised in
the instant action from being time-barred. West Virginia's savings
statute provides, in relevant part: "(a) For a period of one year
from the date of an order dismissing an action or reversing a
judgment, a party may refile the action if the initial pleading
was timely filed and: (i) the action was involuntarily dismissed
for any reason not based upon the merits of the action; or (ii)
the judgment was reversed on a ground which does not preclude a
filing of new action for the same cause."

Plaintiff's presumption that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
without prejudice is directly contrary to Fourth Circuit law,
which explains that such dismissals are presumed to be with
prejudice and judgments on the merits unless the court indicates
otherwise.  McLean,566 F.3d at 396. This Court's dismissal of
Plaintiff's 2014 Action was rendered with prejudice, and thus
operates as a judgment on the merits. Thus, West Virginia's
savings statute does not prevent Plaintiff's claims from being
time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's second objection is overruled.

Waiver of Right to Amend

Plaintiff's third specific objection asserts that the PF&R erred
in its finding that Plaintiff waived her right to amend her 2014
Complaint. To the extent Plaintiff addresses the PF&R's reasoning
on this recommendation, her arguments are based on her erroneous
interpretation of the Fourth Circuit's decision affirming this
Court's dismissal of her 2014 Complaint. As this Court has already
thoroughly addressed Plaintiff's underlying argument that the
Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal on a different
basis than this Court relied on, the Court finds no reason to
repeat that analysis.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's third objection is overruled.

Application of Res Judicata to Bar Amendment

Plaintiff's fourth specific objection asserts that the PF&R erred
in applying res judicata to bar Plaintiff from amending her 2014
Complaint with her new Complaint in the instant action. Plaintiff
does not argue under the law of res judicata in this objection,
but instead proceeds as if the filing of the instant action should
be decided under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's
standard governing motions to amend.

The doctrine of res judicata bars a party from relitigating a
claim that was decided or could have been decided in an original
suit. The application of res judicata turns on the existence of
three factors: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit;
(2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the
later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the
two suits.

Plaintiff's argument relies on her distorted view of her prior
case's history. As discussed above, Plaintiff's claims in her 2014
Complaint were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a
claim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the same
grounds. The Fourth Circuit did not modify the dismissal to be
without prejudice or remand for this Court to consider whether the
dismissal should have been without prejudice, though it was within
that Court's power. Plaintiff has not cited to any law supporting
the proposition that a district court's final judgment, which
would have preclusive effect if left unappealed, is stripped of
its preclusive effect by an appellate affirmance.

Accordingly, this Court's prior dismissal of Plaintiff's 2014
Action serves as the necessary final order on the merits for the
purposes of res judicata.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's fourth objection is overruled.

Class Action

Plaintiff's final objection asserts that the PF&R errs in its
recommendation that this Court find that she cannot serve as a
class representative.

The Supreme Court has held that a class representative must be
part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the
same injury' as the class members A plaintiff cannot serve as the
class representative where she does not have valid claims which
give her the same interest and injury as the class she seeks to
represent.   As the PF&R notes, Ms. Kerr is currently the only
plaintiff, and her due process claim is barred by res judicata.
This Court finds that it is unnecessary to address any of the
other class certification criteria or decide whether such
considerations would be premature if Plaintiff's individual due
process claim were not barred by res judicata. Plaintiff has no
valid claim, so she cannot serve as a class representative.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's fifth objection is overruled.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yd2lh8yhfrom Leagle.com.

Lisa Marie Kerr, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Lisa Marie Kerr, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Marshall University Board of Governors, Defendant, represented by
John Andrew Hess -- andy.hess@steptoe-johnson.com -STEPTOE &
JOHNSON.

Gene Brett Kuhn, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

Judith Southard, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

Sandra Bailey, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess, STEPTOE
& JOHNSON.

Teresa Eagle, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess, STEPTOE
& JOHNSON.

Lisa Heaton, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess, STEPTOE &
JOHNSON.

David Pittenger, Defendant, represented by John Andrew Hess,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON.


MARU & KITANO: Faces "Kim" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Maru & Kitano, Inc.
The case is captioned as Byung I. Kim, on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Maru & Kitano, Inc. and
Hyung Sub Lee, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-07016-KBF
(S.D.N.Y., Sep 14, 2017).  The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Katherine B. Forrest.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Frank Autuoro, Esq.
          FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (NYC)
          601 Lexington Ave., 52nd floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 258 2237
          Facsimile: (212) 258 2291
          E-mail: autuoro@fr.com


MASSACHUSETTS HIGHER: Court Narrows Claims in "Gentleman"
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part the Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint in the case captioned JOSEPH T. GENTLEMAN, Plaintiff, v.
MASSACHUSETTS HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION d/b/a
AMERCIAN STUDENT ASSISTANCE, a Massachusetts not for profit
corporation, DELTA MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC, a Massachusetts
corporation, GLOBAL RECEIVABLES SOLUTIONS, INC., f/k/a WEST ASSET
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and ACS EDUCATION
SERVICES, a New York Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 16 C 3096
(N.D. Ill.).

Each of the defendants has separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on various grounds.

Plaintiff Joseph Gentleman has filed a complaint alleging a number
of statutory and common-law claims against defendants
Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation d/b/a
American Student Assistance (ASA); Delta Management Associates,
Inc. (Delta); Global Receivables Solutions, Inc., f/k/a West Asset
Management, Inc. (GRS); and ACS Education Services (ACS). The
claims arise in connection with the defendants' attempts to
collect payment on a student loan that Gentleman consolidated in
2006.

Count I of the complaint asserts a claim against all of the
defendants seeking a declaratory judgment that the loan agreement
is unenforceable.  Count II asserts that the defendants violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).  Count III alleges
a claim against all of the defendants for defamation under
Illinois law.  Count IV alleges that ASA, GRS, and Delta violated
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA).
Count V claims that ASA violated the Illinois Interest Act. Count
VI charges ASA, GRS, and Delta with violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

Count I

Count I of the complaint asserts a claim under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. Section 2201(a), which provides that, in a
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction  any court of
the United States may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration. Gentleman seeks
a declaration that the promissory note he signed is not
enforceable, and that ASA, ACS, GRS, and Delta have no right to
enforce any obligation against him.

In his response brief, Gentleman sums up his basis for naming ACS
in Count I as follows: "ACS admits that it is the servicer of the
Loan. Thus, ACS admits it is involved with collection of the
Loan." If ACS is serving the Loan, it is an admission that it is
doing something related to the Loan. The plaintiff is merely
seeking a judgment declaring that he owes no monies and he wants
the judgment to cover all parties who may have some interest in
the outcome such as a party that admits it is a servicer of the
loan. Accordingly, there is an actual controversy between the
plaintiff and ACS.

As an initial matter, Gentleman is incorrect in asserting that ACS
admits that it is the servicer of the loan or is currently
involved in collecting the loan. On the contrary, ACS insists that
it has had no involvement with the loan since Gentleman defaulted
on it and it was transferred to ASA.  In any event, even assuming
ACS is doing something related to the loan, that would not be
enough to meet the actual controversy requirement. Hence,
Gentleman fails to allege an actual controversy between himself
and ACS.

As to Count I, therefore, ACS's motion to dismiss is granted.

Count II

Count II of Gentleman's complaint asserts a claim under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The purposes of the FDCPA
are to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses.

ASA moves to dismiss Count II based on a provision of the FDCPA
that exempts from the statute's definition of debt collector any
person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity is
incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation.

Gentleman raises a factual challenge to ASA's representations
regarding its fiduciary status. Specifically, Gentleman alleges
that ASA has one or more mysterious sister companies that have
names very similar to ASA's and that have the same address and the
same corporate officers.

At this stage, the court is required to accept the complaint's
allegations as true and to draw all reasonable inferences in
Gentleman's favor.  If Gentleman's allegations are true, it is
unclear whether ASA indeed comes within the exclusion from debt
collector status under Section 1692a(6)(F)(i). ASA may raise this
issue again after the factual record in the case has been
developed.

At this stage, however, the court denies ASA's motion to dismiss
Count II.

ACS contends that it began to service Gentleman's loan before it
was in default, and that, as a result, it is exempt from liability
under the FDCPA. Gentleman does not dispute that ACS began
servicing the loan prior to the default. He asserts that ACS made
attempts to collect the debt after the loan went into default. For
purposes of Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii), however, the relevant
question is the loan's status when ACS began servicing the loan.
Plaintiff's FDCPA] claims fail if Carrington was not a debt
collector, and it was not a debt collector if Johnson 'was not in
default at the time the debt was obtained by' Carrington.
Based on the amended complaint's own allegations, therefore, ACS
is not a "debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA.
Accordingly, the court grants ACS's motion to dismiss Count II.

GRS and Delta are correct in asserting that many of the FDCPA
violations alleged in the complaint took place prior to March 13,
2015. Gentleman argues that the defendants may be held liable for
these violations based on his claim that they engaged in a
conspiracy to violate his rights under the FDCPA. Thus for statute
of limitations purposes Delta and GRS committed wrongful actions
that began in 2012 and they both committed wrongful and illegal
actions that violated the Act in 2016.

In fact, to this day there are liable for violating the Act
because they are still involved in efforts to collect the debt,
are still involved in the conspiracy and have not in any way shape
or form have withdrawn or repudiated the conspiracy. However, the
Seventh Circuit has squarely held that a plaintiff cannot use a
theory of a continuing civil conspiracy to recover for individual
overt acts that would themselves be time-barred.

A rule allowing plaintiffs in civil conspiracy actions to recover
only for overt acts alleged to have occurred within the applicable
limitations period makes sense. Characterizing the defendants
separate wrongful acts as having been committed in furtherance of
a continuing conspiracy should not postpone accrual of damage
claims based on individual wrongful acts. Thus, any alleged
violations based on conduct occurring outside of the FDCPA's
limitations period are foreclosed.

As to Count II, therefore, the court denies ASA's motion to
dismiss; denies GRS's and Delta's motions to dismiss with respect
to any FDCPA violations occurring after March 13, 2015; grants
GRS's and Delta's motions to dismiss with respect to any putative
violations taking place prior to March 13, 2015; and grants ACS's
motion to dismiss.

Count III

Count III alleges a common-law defamation claim against all of the
defendants. To prove a defamation claim, the evidence must show
that a defendant made a false statement concerning the plaintiff,
that there was an unprivileged publication of the defamatory
statement to a third party by the defendant, and that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a result.

Gentleman's sole allegation on this score is as follows: As a
direct and proximate result of the defamation, Gentleman suffered
damage including but not limited to: his good professional and
personal reputation was damaged, his credit rating was adversely
affected, he was unable to obtain credit, he was unable to obtain
a loan and obtained a loan with a higher interest rate than he
should have been charged. Gentleman provides no specific
information about how his reputation was harmed.

He also provides no specific information regarding the instances
in which he was unable to obtain credit or was forced to obtain a
loan at an inordinately high interest rate. Gentleman alleges that
when he tried to obtain a loan to purchase real estate in 2016, he
was told that he could not "obtain an FHA loan or a loan with the
lowest interest rates available based upon the fact that he was in
default on a student loan. But he does not state whether he ever
obtained the loan, what interest rate he was charged, and to what
extent the interest rate exceeded the rate he would have been
charged but for defendants' alleged defamatory statements. Nor
does the complaint indicate whether there were other instances in
which Gentleman was denied credit or was forced to take loans with
unusually high interest rates.

The court concludes that Gentleman's complaint fails to meet Rule
9(g)'s requirements. Consequently, his defamation per quod claim
fails.

In sum, because the statements alleged by Gentleman were not
defamatory per se, and because he has failed sufficiently to
allege special damages, the court grants all of the defendants'
motions to dismiss Count III of the complaint.

Count IV

In Count IV, Gentleman asserts a claim under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA). The ICFA prohibits
'unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including  fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material fact' in the conduct of
any trade or commerce. Gentleman claims that ASA, Delta, and GRS
violated the ICFA by making false statements and acting in a
deceptive manner by trying to collect a debt that they knew or
should have known was not owed.

ASA first argues that Gentleman's ICFA claim is pre-empted by the
Higher Education Act.

Count IV is based not on ASA's refusal to make disclosures, but on
its alleged attempt to collect a debt that it knew, or should have
known, Gentleman did not owe. Accordingly, ASA's pre-emption
argument fails.

As a second basis for dismissal, ASA argues that Gentleman's ICFA
claim is untimely.

An ICFA claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably
should know of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know
that it was wrongfully caused. ASA argues that Gentleman's ICFA
claim accrued in 2012 when his loan went into default and the
collection costs were assessed against him but that he did not
file suit until 2016. Gentleman has not responded to this
argument.

Accordingly, it is deemed waived.

GRS & Delta first argue that the ICFA claim fails because
Gentleman has not alleged that he suffered actual damages as a
result of their alleged conduct. They point out that actual
damages under the ICFA are pecuniary or economic in nature.
A damages claim under the ICFA requires that the plaintiff was
deceived in some manner and damaged by the deception. On this
point, they are correct. Gentleman's complaint does not allege
that he was deceived by, or relied upon, anything GRS or Delta
said or did. On the contrary, the complaint emphasizes that
Gentleman refused to make any payments on the loan despite GRS's
and Delta's persistent collection efforts.

In response to GRS's and Delta's argument, Gentleman further
asserts that he was deceived by paying monies that he did not have
to pay and that he wrote countless letters to various parties
about this dispute but none of the defendants, even to this day,
could tell plaintiff what was owed and how it was calculated. But
the payments in question ended in 2010 well before Delta and GRS
entered the picture (2012 and 2014, respectively).

Thus, Gentleman cannot plausibly maintain that this deception was
related to any actions or statements by Delta and GRS.
Accordingly, Count IV is dismissed as to ASA, GRS, and Delta.

Count V

Count V alleges that ASA violated section 6 of the Illinois
Interest Act, 815 ILCS 205/6, which prohibits the charging or
receiving of unlawful interest in connection with any loan.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the argument has not
been sufficiently developed. It consists of only a few conclusory
assertions at the very end of ASA's brief. ASA merely paraphrases
Section 1078(d)(2) and asserts that Count V is pre-empted. It is
well-settled that undeveloped and perfunctory arguments are
forfeited.

As Gentleman explains in his response, he does not maintain that
the Interest Act places a cap on the amount of interest that ASA
may charge. Rather, he argues that ASA has violated the Act
because the consolidation documents he received in 2006 promised
to drastically reduce the interest rate on his loan but failed to
do so. According to Gentleman, the interest rate applied to his
post-consolidation loan, 6.25%, was the same as that for his pre-
consolidation loan.

For these reasons, the court denies ASA's motion to dismiss Count
V of Gentleman's amended complaint.

Count VI

Count VI of the complaint alleges a claim under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA prohibits making any call
without the prior express consent of the recipient 'using any
automated telephone dialing system' [ATDS]  to any telephone
number assigned to a paging service or cellular telephone service.
Gentleman claims that ASA, GRS, and Delta violated the TCPA by
calling him via an ATDS without his consent. Only GRS and Delta
have moved to dismiss the TCPA claim. They argue that the claim is
barred by an amendment to the act made in 2015.

They also argue that Count VI suffers from pleading defects.
Neither argument is convincing.

In 2015, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. The
legislation amended the TCPA to make the act inapplicable to calls
made solely to collect on a debt owed to or guaranteed by the
United States. The defendants point out that the loan in question
here was issued in accordance with the FFELP Program and was
therefore guaranteed by the federal government. As a result, they
maintain that their calls to Gentleman were made solely to collect
a "debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States, and are exempt
from the TCPA.

Gentleman concedes that the loan is a debt owed to or guaranteed
by the United States. However, he argues that the amendment does
not apply to his claims because the calls on which they are based
took place before the amendment was enacted. Whether Gentleman's
TCPA claim survives therefore turns on whether the 2015 amendment
applies retroactively. The court concludes that it does not.

Applying the 2015 amendment here would have the effect of
extinguishing Gentleman's claim. In many cases, courts have
declined to apply legislation retroactively where doing so would
foreclose a cause of action that otherwise would have been
available. The regulations curtail the amendment's broad exemption
from liability under the TCPA by placing limits on the number of
federal debt collection calls that may be made per month the
content and length of the calls and the time of day at which the
calls could be made.

Nothing in the FCC's regulations suggests that the 2015 amendment
should be applied retroactively. Nor have the defendants addressed
whether the regulations themselves are to be applied
retroactively. If the regulations in fact apply retroactively, it
is possible that they have been violated by the defendants, in
which case Gentleman's TCPA claim would remain viable.

Under these circumstances, the defendants have not persuaded the
court that the 2015 amendment to the Bipartisan Budget Act should
be applied retroactively to bar Gentleman's TCPA claim.

Pleading

GRS and Delta argue that Gentleman's TCPA claim has not been
sufficiently pleaded. They generally contend that Gentleman's
allegations in support of his TCPA claim are conclusory. They
argue more particularly that Gentleman has provided no basis for
asserting that the defendants' phone calls to him were made using
an ATDS.

The court disagrees. The complaint provides sufficient factual
detail regarding the nature and timing of the calls. Gentleman
alleges that the calls began in approximately late 2013 and early
2014, and that they continued until late 2015. He alleges that the
callers identified themselves as representatives from ASA, GRS,
Delta, and others.

Despite the defendants' contentions to the contrary, Gentleman's
allegations on this score are not conclusory. He provides a
specific factual basis for believing that the calls were made
using an ATDS, explaining that when he asked callers to tell him
the phone numbers they were calling from, they told him that they
were unable to do so because they were calling from an ATDS.
The court is not persuaded by the defendants' contention that
Gentleman's TCPA claim is foreclosed by the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2015, or their contention that the claim is inadequately
pleaded. The court therefore denies GRS's and Delta's motions to
dismiss Count VI.

ASA's motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts III and IV and
denied as to Counts II and V. GRS's and Delta's motions to dismiss
are granted as to Counts III and IV; denied as to Counts I and VI;
and granted as to Count II insofar as it alleges violations of the
FDCPA occurring before March 13, 2015 and denied as to violations
occurring after that date. ACS's motion to dismiss is granted as
to Counts I, II, and III.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y8eqgqd8from Leagle.com.

Joseph T. Gentleman, Plaintiff, represented by James J. Ayres,
Sr., Ayres Law Offices, Ltd.

Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Mark E. Shure --  mshure@llflegal.com -- Latimer
LeVay Fyock LLC & Saskia Nora Bryan, Latimer LeVay Fyock LLC.
Delta Management Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Donald S. Maurice, Jr. -- dmaurice@MauriceWutscher.com -- Maurice
Wutscher, LLP & Gregg M. Barbakoff --
gbarbakoff@MauriceWutscher.com -- Maurice Wutscher LLP.
Global Receivables Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
James Kevin Schultz -- jschultz@sessions.legal -- Sessions Fishman
Nathan & Israel LLP, Daniel W. Pisani -- dpisani@sessions.legal --
Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel & Morgan Ian Marcus, Sessions
Fishman Nathan & Israel, LLC, 120 S. LaSalle St., Suite 1960,
Chicago, IL, 60603

ACS Education Services, Defendant, represented by Maurice Grant,
Grant Law, LLC & Berkely Yvonne Cobb, Grant Law, LLC.

Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation, Counter
Claimant, represented by Mark E. Shure, Latimer LeVay Fyock LLC &
Saskia Nora Bryan, Latimer LeVay Fyock LLC.

Joseph T. Gentleman, Counter Defendant, represented by James J.
Ayres, Sr., Ayres Law Offices, Ltd.


MCCARTHY BURGESS: "Aviles" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------
Luisa Aviles, and all others similarly-situated v. McCarthy,
Burgess & Wolff, Inc. and HSN, Inc. dba Home Shopping Network,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01338 (E.D. Wis., September 29, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.

The Plaintiff resides in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Defendant McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. is a foreign corporation
with its principal place of business located at Cleveland, Ohio.
McCarthy is engaged in the business of a collection agency, using
the mails and telephone to collect consumer debts originally owed
to others.

Defendant HSN, Inc. operates as an interactive multi-channel
retailer in St. Petersburg, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
      John D. Blythin, Esq.
      Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
      Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
      ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
      3620 East Layton Avenue
      Cudahy, WI 53110
      Tel: (414) 482-8000
      Fax: (414) 482-8001
      E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
              jblythin@ademilaw.com
              meldridge@ademilaw.com
              jfruchter@ademilaw.com


MORGAN PROPERTIES: Denial of "Green" Class Certification Vacated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's denial of class
certification in the case captioned DARNICE GREEN, MATHEW
BLUMBERG, MICHAEL PERMENTER and BETH PERMENTER, individually and
as class representatives on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MORGAN PROPERTIES, MORGAN MANAGEMENT,
MITCHELL L. MORGAN, INC., EAST COAST THE WILLOWS, LLC and EAST
COAST COLONIAL APARTMENTS, LLC, Defendants-Respondents, and
ROSEMARY SPOHN, ESQ., Defendant, Docket No. A-1247-16T3 (N.J.
Super. App. Div.).

Plaintiffs Darnice Green, Michael and Beth Permenter and their son
Mathew Blumberg appeal, on leave granted, order denying class
certification in their long-running suit against the owners and
property managers of their apartment complexes, defendants East
Coast The Willows, LLC, East Coast Colonial Apartments, LLC,
Morgan Properties, Morgan Management, and Mitchell L. Morgan,
Inc., over an attorney's fee provision in their leases.

Plaintiffs are current or former tenants of The Willows, a 347-
unit apartment complex in Barrington, or Colonial, a 188-unit
apartment complex in Cherry Hill. Since 2007, both complexes have
been operated by one of the Morgan defendants. Each of the named
plaintiffs was subjected to eviction proceedings for non-payment
of rent on multiple occasions and was charged $400 in attorneys'
fees each time. They did not, however, pay that sum each time.
Sometimes Morgan reduced the fee charged. Plaintiffs Green and
Blumberg vacated their apartments still owing rent, including
attorneys' fees, although Blumberg's co-signer eventually paid all
Blumberg owed on his lease.

In its opinion reinstating the CFA claim against defendants, the
Supreme Court expressed several reasons for rejecting defendants'
argument that the $400 lease term represented a reasonable
liquidated damages provision. Chief among them was that it would
impermissibly shift to plaintiffs the burden of establishing the
reasonableness of defendants' attorneys' fees. The Court held
plaintiffs must be permitted the opportunity to challenge the
reasonableness of the lease clause on which the landlords relied
in the summary dispossess proceedings.

As the Court explained, that these plaintiffs may have paid the
attorneys' fees set forth in the leases in order to avoid eviction
does not preclude them from attempting to challenge the fees as
being so unreasonable as to violate the CFA in a corollary
proceeding. The Court concluded defendants might well be able to
demonstrate that the basis on which the fees were calculated and
included in the leases is reasonable, but it will be their burden
to do so.

Following discovery, plaintiffs sought class certification on the
single count of the complaint alleging violations of Section 2 of
the CFA. Plaintiffs allege defendants engaged in affirmative
misconduct by including and enforcing the $400 charge in
plaintiffs' leases when defendants' actual costs for each summary
dispossess action were far less than $400. They sought to certify
a New Jersey class consisting of all tenants of the Willows,
Colonial and of any properties managed by the Morgan defendants
"who were charged a legal fee for eviction from September 1, 2007
until the date of class certification.

The parties debated whether plaintiff had established the Rule
4:32-1 prerequisites for class certification, focusing largely on
typicality and whether common questions predominated over
individual ones. Defendants conceded plaintiffs' proposed class
would be sufficiently numerous to satisfy Rule 4:32-1(a)(1), but
contended it was impermissibly overbroad in that it included
tenants who were charged a $400 attorney's fee, regardless of
whether they paid anything or whether the amount paid was
excessive. Defendants further contended that many members of the
proposed class left their apartments owing rent, leaving them
exposed to recoupment extinguishing any sums they could recover on
their consumer fraud claims, or counterclaims for the unpaid rent.
Although plaintiffs dispute that all of the expenses Morgan's
expert includes among the allocated costs of running Morgan's
legal department are proper, even under Morgan's analysis there
are several years in which collections of legal fees have exceeded
the department's expenses, sometimes significantly. In 2008, for
example, collections outstripped expenses by $425,924.9 Morgan's
expert arrived at its conclusion that the legal department
generated a $48,346 profit over the putative class period by
averaging the department's annual profits and losses from 2007
through September 30, 2014. Its conclusion that Morgan overcharged
$2.17 per eviction is based on dividing that average by 22,308,
the total number of times Morgan charged a tenant an attorney's
fee over the period.

The Trial Court's Opinion

Analyzing the class plaintiffs initially proposed on the motion,
all tenants charged attorneys' fees under the leases, the judge
found it met none of the Rule 4:32-1(a)(1) through (4)
prerequisites for class certification, numerosity, commonality,
typicality and adequacy of representation, and that plaintiffs
could not demonstrate under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) that common
questions of law or fact predominated and a class action was
superior to other methods for adjudicating the controversy.

The judge rejected numerosity because defining the class by those
who were merely charged a legal fee for an eviction, regardless of
whether the tenant actually paid and ignoring whether the
particular circumstances of the fee were actually reasonable makes
for a class definition that is impermissibly broad, and would
result in a class that contained members who sustained no
ascertainable loss and were not entitled to recovery under the
Plaintiffs' Consumer Fraud claim.

The judge rejected commonality because the inquiry in this case
principally requires a finder of fact to determine whether the
fees charged to a particular plaintiff were reasonable in order to
prevail on the CFA claim. He concluded that those questions of
fact or law that Plaintiffs assert are common to the class would
require a much too individualized inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of each class member's eviction proceedings to merit
certification.

In analyzing predominance, the judge considered plaintiffs'
argument that common issues predominate because the central issue
to the case requires a determination that the Defendants engaged
in a common course of conduct that illegally charged attorney's
fees to the putative class against defendants' claim that the
argument for class certification depends less on demonstrating a
common illegal scheme perpetrated by the Defendants, and more
toward showing that the attorney's fees charged to each Plaintiff
were unreasonable.

In assessing the superiority of a class action against other
methods of adjudication, the judge focused on the potential for
counterclaims for unpaid rent against class members. Concluding
that there may be little other alternative for the Defendants but
to bring claims against class members for unpaid rent under New
Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, Rule 4:30A, the judge found
the addition of counterclaims would present inefficient and
unwieldy litigation.

Finally, although acknowledging defendants' concession that class
counsel are certainly qualified to represent the class, the judge
concluded "there is no incentive for the named Plaintiffs to
defend claims against individual class members for unpaid rent. He
thus concluded the named plaintiffs would not adequately protect
the interests of the class as required by Rule 4:32-1(a)(4).
The judge rejected plaintiffs' suggestion to certify a class to
determine liability only, while leaving litigation of damages to
individual class members, because it fails to account for the
later problem that those individual class members would face in
seeking a relatively small recovery for a relatively significant
expense of both time and financial resources.

The state Supreme Court has described the class action as a device
that allows 'an otherwise vulnerable class' of diverse individuals
with small claims access to the courthouse. Our courts liberally
construe Rule 4:32-1, the class action rule, in accordance with
the Court's instruction that a class action 'should lie unless it
is clearly infeasible. The Court has noted that CFA claims are
particularly well suited for class treatment.

The parties in this case have conducted extensive fact discovery
and engaged experts who have prepared comprehensive reports
directed entirely to the question of whether the $400 fee in the
lease was a reasonable approximation of the fees defendants could
expect to incur in a summary dispossess action or an
unconscionable overreach. Any evidentiary questions regarding the
reliability or admissibility of those opinions and the credibility
of the experts apply uniformly to all members of the class.

A jury may appropriately consider the basis on which the fees were
calculated, whether the costs defendants include in the operating
expenses for the legal department are fairly allocated, whether
the $400 fee included in the leases is a reasonable approximation
of defendants' expected costs for a summary dispossess action,
whether defendants may base the $400 fee on its collections of
fees charged instead of its costs for services performed and
whether those costs are reasonable in comparison to the fees
charged by outside lawyers for the same work. If the jury decides
the $400 lease charge is unconscionable, it can decide what lease
charge would be reasonable.

Although resolution of those issues may not dispose of the
litigation, in the event it does not, it will at least establish a
basis for determining whether individual class members suffered an
ascertainable loss. Using the Permenters as an example, if the
jury were to decide that the $400 fee included in the leases was
reasonable, plaintiffs could not succeed in proving an unlawful
practice, ending the litigation and binding all class members to
that result.

If, on the other hand, the jury decided the $400 lease charge was
unreasonable and that a fair charge was $200, then the Permenters,
having paid $400 on one occasion, $0 on one occasion and $200 on
three occasions, could establish an ascertainable loss of $200,
subject to defendants' ability to demonstrate that the $400 was a
reasonable fee in light of the work performed on the summary
dispossess action in which the Permenters paid a $400 fee.
D'Agostino, 216 N.J. at 192-93.

Almost all of the proofs relating to the many individual issues
defendants assert must be resolved for each class member are in
defendants' possession in the form of the tenant ledgers and other
computerized records. Even though defendants claim their costs
varied from eviction to eviction, Morgan's actual ability to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the fee charged any particular
tenant is unclear in light of its lawyers' and paralegals' failure
to maintain time records. Although different factual situations
may arise with respect to the defenses as to different plaintiffs,
such does not derogate from the fact that the affirmative cause of
action itself has the community of interests and of questions of
law or fact which justify the class action concept.

Weighing the significance of the common questions, the benefit of
resolving those questions, as well as at least some individual
questions of ascertainable loss, through a class action against
alternatives, and considering the common nucleus of operative
facts, Carter-Reed, supra, 203 N.J. at 520, presented by the
plaintiffs' challenge to a term in a uniform lease utilized in
sixty-nine apartment complexes throughout the State, the superior
court is satisfied that the common questions predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members. R.4:32-1(b)(3). At
the core of this case are tenants seeking to redress a common
legal grievance, involving an allegedly unconscionable lease term
included in every one of their leases, making them sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication through class representatives.
There can be little doubt that class litigation is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy" in this case. R. 4:32-1(b)(3). Given the class
members' lack of financial wherewithal. Saldana v. City of Camden,
252 N.J.Super. 188, 200 and the relatively low value of the
individual claims, the likelihood of any individual tenant
challenging the $400 lease charge against these defendants is
remote. As in New Rapids,if each victim were remitted to an
individual suit, the remedy could be illusory, for the individual
loss may be too small to warrant a suit or the victim too
disadvantaged to seek relief. Thus the wrongs would go without
redress, and there would be no deterrence to further aggressions.
New Rapids, 61 N.J. at 225.

In the superior court's view, this case is well suited to class
treatment. A narrowed class, drawn so as to exclude those tenants
against whom defendants could assert counterclaims overwhelming
the common claims of the class, is an appropriate vehicle to
redress what the plaintiffs claim are systemic illegal lease
charges to over 5000 tenants in this State.

Although it is likely that individual issues will remain following
resolution of the common questions, posing some management
challenges, the issues here are not nearly so complicated as those
posed in either Iliadis or In re Cadillac. The Law Division has
the ability to craft remedies and procedures to address the
peculiar problems of class litigation, by altering, amending or
even decertifying a class if necessary. Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 119-
20. Class actions by their very nature are complicated creatures,
but they provide an efficiency of scale and an equitable means of
relief for individuals who might otherwise not have access to the
courthouse or the incentive or ability to right a wrong. Carter-
Reed, 203 N.J. at 530.

Although the superior court agrees with the trial court that the
larger class plaintiffs proposed was not maintainable in
accordance with Rule 4:32-1(a) and (b), the superior court
concludes the smaller, more narrowly defined class plaintiffs
offered in the alternative should be certified. Accordingly, the
superior court vacates the order denying class certification and
remand for certification of a class in conformity with this
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's September 21, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9cpjxwefrom
Leagle.com.

Lewis G. Adler, 26 Newton Ave, Woodbury, NJ 08096, USA, argued the
cause for appellants (Law Office of Lewis G. Adler and Law Office
of Paul DePetris, 703 Stokes Rd # 9, Medford, NJ 08055, USA,
attorneys; Mr. Adler and Mr. DePetris, on the brief).

Daniel S. Bernheim -- dbernheim@wilentz.com -- of the Pennsylvania
bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondents
Morgan Properties, Morgan Management, Mitchell L. Morgan, Inc. and
East Coast Colonial Apartments (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, and
Mr. Bernheim, attorneys; Rachel C. Heinrich --
rheinrich@wilentz.com -- and Mr. Bernheim, on the brief).
Jonathan I. Epstein -- jonathan.epstein dbr.com -- argued the
cause for respondent East Coast The Willows (Drinker, Biddle &
Reath, attorneys; Mr. Epstein and John P. Mitchell --
john.mitchell dbr.com -- on the brief).


MUGSTHOTS.COM: Jude Approves Publicity Rights Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
David Kravets, writing for Ars Techica, reports that websites that
publish mug shots and charge for their removal have defeated one
lawsuit after the other, claiming First Amendment protection. But
that defense to this shady industry may be about to burst. That's
because a federal judge, ruling on a lawsuit by several arrestees
suing Mughshots.com, just approved a novel class-action.  It's one
that takes legal advantage of the site's practice of displaying
advertising links to paid removal services that the lawsuit claims
are owned by Mugshots.com.

US District Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman of Chicago didn't go so
far as to say this vile practice amounted to extortion, as
alleged.  Instead, she ruled that this likely amounted to a
violation of the arrestees' right of publicity because the site
was using the mug shots as actual advertisements for the paid
removal service.

As pleaded, the use of the arrest photos and records in
conjunction with what appear in the complaint as buttons linking
to a removal service are reasonably construed as proposing a
commercial transaction.  The First Amended Complaint alleges that
the profiles on Mugshots.com contained links stating "Unpublish
Mugshot," in bold typeface at the top of every page and additional
links also in large bold red typeface stating "Click Here for
Unpublishing or Call 1-800-810-3965".  Visitors that click on the
links are taken directly to a checkout page, offering removal
services for a fee. On these facts, the arrest photos and records
coupled with clear invitation to removal create the appearance
that they operate in concert to sell the removal service and
generate revenue.  Defendants' assertion that Mugshots.com and the
removal service at Unpublisharrest.com are completely separate is
belied by the structure of the Mugshots.com site and the corporate
structure alleged in the complaint.  As described in the
complaint, the arrest profiles are designed to coerce plaintiffs
to pay for removal.
And here's the kicker:

In other words, the mugshots themselves are advertisements for the
removal service, which is the far more lucrative enterprise.
The site's attorney did not immediately respond to Ars' request
for comment.  But in court documents, the defense claimed it had a
constitutional right to maintain its business model.  "All such
claims are barred, because those records constitute matters of
public concern and, as such, their publication cannot be penalized
or restrained consistently with the First Amendment absent a state
interest of the highest order.  No such interest is implicated
here," the defense said.

The plaintiffs in the lawsuit (PDF) claim they have lost jobs or
have been unable to gain employment because of the mug shots
appearing on the site.  One mug shot, according to the lawsuit,
was of a Florida man who was falsely arrested for check fraud. But
Mugshots.com was never updated to reflect that.  Instead, the site
demanded that the man pay a $399 fee for the update.

Another plaintiff, according to the lawsuit, claimed he would have
to pay $2,000 to have his mug shot removed in addition to $15,000
to have his arrest profile taken down.  He didn't pay.

Mugshots.com gets its photos by either scraping publicly available
law enforcement websites or via freedom of information requests.

No new hearing date was immediately set. [GN]


NAVIENT CORP: Faces "Davis" Suit in W. Dist. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Navient Corporation.
The case is styled as Shawn M. Davis, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Navient
Corporation, Navient Solutions, LLC f/k/n Sallie Mae, Inc. and
Studebt, a/k/a Student Debt Relief Group, a/k/a Student Loan
Relief Counselors, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00992 (W.D. N.Y.,
October 3, 2017).
Navient Corporation is a student loan servicer.[BN]
The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel J. Brady, Esq.
   Hagerty & Brady
   69 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1010
   Buffalo, NY 14202
   Tel: (716) 856-9443
   Fax: (716) 856-5510
   Email: dbrady@hagerty-brady.com


NEW JERSEY: Court Denies Bid to Enjoin Enforcement of CJRA
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued a Opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction in the case captioned BRITTAN B. HOLLAND and LEXINGTON
NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, v. KELLY ROSEN, MARY E
COLALILLO, and CHRISTOPHER PORRINO, Defendants, Civil Action No.
17-4317-JBS-KMW. (D.N.J.).

The matter is presently before the Court upon the motion of
Plaintiffs Brittan B. Holland (Holland) and Lexington National
Insurance Corporation (Lexington) for a preliminary injunction
enjoining Defendants Kelly Rosen, the Team Leader for Pre-trial
Services in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey; Mary E. Colalillo, the Camden County Prosecutor; and
Christopher S. Porrino, the Attorney General of New Jersey,
(Defendants), as well as their agents, from taking any actions to
enforce statutory provisions of the CJRA that allow imposition of
severe restrictions on the pre-trial liberty of presumptively
innocent criminal defendants without offering the option of
monetary bail.

Holland is presently on pretrial release from the Superior Court
of New Jersey on conditions including home confinement (except for
employment) and electronic monitoring, but not cash bail, as he
faces charges for second-degree aggravated assault.  Lexington is
a bail bond provider that alleges its business in New Jersey has
essentially dried up since the CJRA took effect on January 1,
2017, although it does not allege it has a bonding relationship
with Holland or any other person processed under the CJRA.

The primary issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs have a
"reasonable probability of eventual success" on their claims that
the CJRA violates Holland's Fourth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution.  This inquiry
necessarily requires the Court to also consider jurisdictional
issues, like whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their
constitutional claims and whether the Court must abstain under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in light of Holland's
ongoing state prosecution.

The Court heard oral argument at a Preliminary Injunction Hearing
held on August 22, 2017, and no testimony was offered beyond
various affidavits and attached documents.

Historical Perspective on Bail in New Jersey

After conducting hearings on the Joint Committee's findings and
recommendations, the State Legislature proposed and passed the
Criminal Justice Reform Act, S. 946, A. 1910 (2014). On August 11,
2014, Governor Christie signed the CJRA into law.

Enforcement of the CJRA was predicated on ratification of a
proposed amendment to the State Constitution that would authorize
New Jersey courts to deny the pre-trial release of certain
defendants. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 Note. In a state-wide
referendum held, 2014, New Jersey voters approved such an
amendment by a vote of 68% to 32%.

The Criminal Justice Reform Act

Through enactment of the CJRA, New Jersey sought to promote three
separate goals in considering conditions of pre-trial release: (1)
reasonably assuring the person's appearance in court; (2)
protecting the community and persons; and (3) preventing the
obstruction of justice by persons awaiting trial.

The Pre-trial Release Decision

In making a pre-trial release decision, the court must impose "the
least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions, that
the court determines will reasonably assure the eligible
defendant's appearance in court when required, the protection of
the safety of any other person or the community, and that the
eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the
criminal justice process. Thus, the purposes of pre-trial release
are enlarged to address concerns not only of appearance in court
but also protection of the safety of other persons and the
community and deterring obstruction of the criminal justice
process concerns not normally addressed through monetary bail.

Before making any pre-trial release decision for an eligible
defendant, a judge is required to consider, but is not bound by,
the Pre-trial Services Program's risk assessment and
recommendations on conditions of release. If the court enters an
order that is contrary to a recommendation made in a risk
assessment when determining a method of release or setting release
conditions, the court shall provide an explanation in the document
that authorizes the eligible defendant's release.

The Risk Assessment Instrument

Under the CJRA, the Pre-trial Services Program's risk assessment
must be conducted using a "risk assessment instrument that is
approved by the Administrative Director of the New Jersey Courts.
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c). This instrument must be objective,
standardized, and developed based on analysis of empirical data
and risk factors relevant to the risk of failure to appear in
court when required and the danger to the community while on pre-
trial release.

Plaintiff Holland

Holland claims that his injury is not simply the restriction on
his liberty, but rather the imposition of that restriction after a
hearing that violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. He claims that such injury will be
sufficiently redressed should the Court order that a hearing
respecting those constitutional rights, as he understands them, be
held, regardless of the ultimate outcome of such a hearing.
Should the Court order such a hearing to be held, the relief then
would not be speculative. He claims that he was injured by the
holding of a hearing that did not afford him his constitutional
rights, including the alleged right to have monetary bail
considered as a primary condition of release pending trial, and
that ordering a new hearing that does afford him those rights will
redress that injury.

The Court finds that analysis persuasive to establish Holland's
standing to assert his claims. The redress he seeks is a hearing
to set conditions of release where monetary bail is given a
primary consideration. Whether he is likely to accomplish his
objectives at a Superior Court hearing is a question for the
merits, not one of standing to assert the right to such a hearing.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Holland has adequately pled the
necessary elements of Article III standing, including
redressability.

Plaintiff Lexington

Lexington's standing presents a more complex and closer question.

First-Party Standing of Lexington

The Complaint alleges a violation of the right to monetary bail
under the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), a violation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment based on an alleged deprivation of liberty to
criminal defendants, and a violation of the right against
unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment (as applied to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court finds that Lexington does not, in fact, assert
violations of its own constitutional rights that led to such an
injury. The injury-in-fact requirement mandates that there be an
invasion of a legally protected interest. This invasion is what
must result in the injury to the plaintiff. Here, Lexington has
alleged that it has been harmed. The Court nevertheless finds that
the harm it has allegedly suffered is not alleged to be the result
of an invasion of Lexington's legally protected interest.

The Court is persuaded that the Eighth Amendment's bail clause
protects the interests of criminal defendants, not corporations
who seek to provide bail bonds to them. This is especially true
where Lexington is not named as a criminal defendant, is not
confined, and does not identify a constitutional right that it
holds as a corporation that it seeks to vindicate.

Similarly, the Court does not see how the Due Process or Fourth
Amendment claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint constitute an invasion
of Lexington's legally-protected interests, despite the harms to
Lexington's business that will allegedly result from the CJRA's
application to Lexington's potential customers. The Court agrees
with Amici that Lexington does not assert its own constitutional
rights.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Lexington lacks first-party
standing on the basis of an alleged violation of its
constitutional rights.

Third-Party Standing of Lexington

Defendants and Amici argue that Lexington also lacks third-party
standing. Plaintiffs respond that Lexington has third-party
standing to assert the constitutional rights of potential
customers denied bail under the CJRA.

The Court notes at the outset that the restrictions against third-
party standing do not stem from the Article III case or
controversy' requirement, but rather from prudential concerns
which limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best
suited to assert a particular claim. It is a well-established
tenet of standing that a litigant must assert his or her own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties.

The Third Circuit has described third-party standing as an
exception to this well-established tenet.  In particular, if a
course of conduct prevents a third-party from entering into a
relationship with the litigant, typically a contractual
relationship, to which relationship the third party has a legal
entitlement, third-party standing may be appropriate.

The Court finds that Lexington has suffered an injury that gives
it a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in the outcome of the issue
in dispute. This satisfies the first precondition.

It is undisputed that Holland is one such criminal defendant, and
he has apparently faced no obstacle nor hindrance in asserting his
claim that his rights were violated. Holland is a named plaintiff
in this action and has been pursuing claims that his
constitutional rights were violated with strength and vigor. The
Court cannot discern a basis, then, to allow for third-party
standing for Lexington (as a matter of prudential standing, rather
than Article III standing), where the third party is actually a
named plaintiff actively participating in the instant case.

Accordingly, the Court finds, at the present juncture, that it
appears unlikely that Lexington has satisfied the necessary
preconditions to establish third-party standing in this action.
However, as noted above, the Court may nevertheless proceed in its
assessment of the arguments on the merits as the presence of one
party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-
or-controversy requirement. Holland has such standing.

Prudential Standing

Finally, the State Defendants urge that Lexington lacks prudential
standing in another respect: namely, that the injury to Lexington
falls well outside the zone of interests of the Eighth,
Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendments.

The Third Circuit has recently stated: "We have previously
categorized the zone-of-interests requirement as one of three
components of prudential standing. The other two components of
prudential standing are that a plaintiff must first assert his or
her own legal interests rather than those of third parties, and
second must not assert generalized grievances that require courts
to adjudicate abstract questions."

The Court has also referred to a plaintiff's need to satisfy
prudential or statutory standing requirements. Lexmark134 S.  Ct.
at 1387 and n.4.  In Lexmark, the Court said that the label
prudential standing was misleading, for the requirement at issue
is in reality tied to a particular statute. The question is
whether the statute grants the plaintiff the cause of action that
he asserts. In answering that question, presume that a statute
ordinarily provides a cause of action only to plaintiffs whose
interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
invoked.

The Third Circuit has thus maintained that the zone-of-interests
test has continued vitality, but with regard to whether a
plaintiff states a claim, rather than whether that plaintiff has
standing. In light of that, the Court declines to find that
Lexington lacks prudential standing under the zone-of-interests
test.

Younger Abstention

Defendants argue that the Court must abstain from interfering with
Holland's ongoing state criminal prosecution, pursuant to Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In response, Plaintiffs argue that
Younger abstention is inappropriate where a defendant in state
court does not challenge the state prosecution as such, but rather
pre-trial procedures, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108
n.9.

The Court believes that Gerstein's explication of when Younger
abstention is inappropriate is as applicable to the instant case
as it was to the claims in Stewart. In that case, the petitioners'
claims were regarding a policy of the Philadelphia District
Attorney's Office re-initiating felony charges that had been
dismissed by a judge for lack of a prima facie showing of probable
cause, such policy alleged to have been in violation of the
petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
seizures. Just as the federal court addressing the challenged
procedure in Stewart would not interfere with the criminal
prosecutions themselves" as the claims there involved a challenge
to pre-trial restraint, the Court here likewise finds that
Gersteinis applicable and it is likely that abstention pursuant to
Younger is not warranted.

The matter of Younger abstention's propriety, however, is not
well-settled, even after Sprint, in light of Gonzalez and cases
discussed above. While the relief sought would not restrain the
state's prosecution of Holland, it is nonetheless troubling that
Holland continues to have an unused remedy to present these issues
in an effort to challenge the conditions of release in his case,
and further, that the Plaintiffs are asking this federal court to
rearrange the state's statutory and to some extent, constitutional
considerations in the determination of conditions of release
having broad application across all criminal cases, which invades
important state interests concerning release and detention.

Habeas vs. 1983

The parties have also addressed whether the claims of Holland are
appropriately presented under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, rather than
28 U.S.C. Section 2241. The most salient difference is that relief
under Section 2241 requires a plaintiff to have exhausted state
remedies before seeking federal relief, while Section 1983 has no
such exhaustion requirement.

Plaintiffs argue that Section 1983 is the proper basis for this
action because here, Holland does not seek an injunction ordering
his immediate or speedier release into the community. Defendants
argue that inasmuch as the restrictions on Holland's pre-trial
release either constitute or are viewed by him as a form of pre-
trial custody or confinement, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is the only avenue for him to seek relief.

The Court finds that Holland does not seek an injunction ordering
his immediate or speedier release into the community, but rather
an injunction ordering a hearing that conforms to his conception
of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Nor would a favorable judgment necessarily
(or in any way, in fact) imply the invalidity of any subsequent
conviction or sentence to which Holland may one day be subjected.
For this reason, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have properly
invoked Section 1983 and need not proceed exclusively through a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and declines to dismiss
their claims on that ground.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

With respect to the first factor in obtaining a preliminary
injunction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits of their Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and
Fourth Amendment claims.

Eighth Amendment

Plaintiffs first ask the Court to declare that the CJRA violates
the Eighth Amendment rights of Holland and other presumptively
innocent criminal defendants. Plaintiffs argue that the CJRA's
hierarchical structure violates the Eighth Amendment because it
essentially singles out" monetary bail as a disfavored option of
last resort.

The Court has serious doubts that Holland is the appropriate
plaintiff to advance such an argument, as he appears to be a far
cry from the hypothetical non-violent defendant to whom Plaintiffs
allude. Holland was arrested after a serious bloody assault in
which he allegedly inflicted multiple facial fractures upon the
victim, then fled the scene before police arrived, and was charged
with second-degree aggravated assault. As a result of this violent
criminal charge and a prior simple assault conviction, the DMF
generated by the Pretrial Services Program recommended that
Holland be detained pending trial.

Only after negotiations between the prosecutor and Holland's
court-appointed attorney was the judge willing to release Holland
subject to house arrest, electronic monitoring, and weekly
reporting. It therefore appears that flight risk was not a primary
consideration for Holland's conditions of pretrial release.
Rather, Holland was considered to be a potentially-dangerous
defendant from whom the community deserved some degree of
protection by certain non-monetary conditions of release or,
indeed, by his detention.

Holland had a right to be released from jail under conditions that
were not excessive. Nothing in the record suggests that Holland
waived his right to a pretrial detention hearing because he was
proffering a money bail as an alternative to home confinement or
electronic monitoring; instead, it appears he waived it because he
faced the very real possibility of going to jail as a pretrial
detainee otherwise, given the state's allegations of
dangerousness. For all these reasons, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth
Amendment claim.

Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the CJRA violates the
procedural and substantive due process rights of Holland and other
presumptively innocent criminal defendants by denying these
individuals the option of monetary bail as a means to assure their
appearance at trial before subjecting them to "severe"
restrictions of their pretrial liberty.

Procedural Due Process

Holland argues that his procedural due process rights have been
violated because home detention and the wearing of an electronic
bracelet are liberty-restricting conditions.

The Court finds it is likely that Holland voluntarily and
knowingly waived his right to a pretrial detention hearing when he
agreed to be released subject to the previously-described, non-
monetary conditions in exchange for his release from jail. One who
waives the judicial process may not claim due process is denied.
See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)("In order to
state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must
have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or
her."). Further, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that
Holland and his counsel did not waive the detention hearing
rights, the process of appellate review in the Superior Court's
Appellate Division would be open to him, of which he has also not
availed himself.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on
the merits of their procedural due process claim.

Fourth Amendment

Finally, Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the CJRA
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of Holland and other
presumptively innocent criminal defendants to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, Holland argues
that the electronic location monitoring is a "severe" intrusion of
his privacy and constitutes an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, while home detention constitutes an unreasonable
seizure.

Where conditions of pre-trial release in a criminal case restrict
freedom of movement and can be regarded to that extent as a
seizure of the individual, the safeguard of a judicial
determination upon the record protects against unreasonable
seizures by examining the totality of the relevant circumstances.
The careful process of gathering reliable information and risk
assessments, such as New Jersey's Public Safety Assessment,
appears to provide a valuable tool for the judge in determining
the issue of detention and release, including the stringency of
conditions of release. The use of such a tool further supports the
likelihood of a reasonable level of detention or release upon a
spectrum of intrusion on freedom while awaiting trial.

Again, the Court cannot overlook the fact that Holland waived the
opportunity to have a pre-trial detention hearing with counsel,
witnesses, and cross-examination. Instead, he agreed to the
electronic monitoring and home detention conditions. Holland might
have avoided these severe restrictions of his liberty had he
proceeded with his pre-trial detention hearing and argued for the
removal of the NVCA flag he was assigned. He also could have
argued for other non-monetary conditions, as enumerated in the
CJRA, which are less severe than home detention or electronic
monitoring. . But, faced with the risk of pre-trial detention,
Holland chose instead to be released under partial home
confinement and electronic location monitoring. Within this
context, the Court does not find the pretrial conditions imposed
on Holland to be unreasonable.

As a result, the Court finds that Holland's Fourth Amendment claim
is unlikely to succeed on the merits.

Summary of Preliminary Injunction Factors

Plaintiffs have not made a substantial showing of possibility of
success nor of irreparable harm stemming from unconstitutional
conduct under the CJRA, either on the face of the statute or as
applied. Additionally, the balance of risk of harm to others if
the injunction is granted substantially outweighs the harms to
Plaintiffs if the injunction is denied. Moreover, the public
interest in the success of the risk-based release system exceeds
the private interests of Holland and Lexington National if the
present situation continues as the litigation unfolds.

Finally, if these considerations were a close call which the Court
does not find them to be  then the balance would even further tip
in favor of denying the injunction because of doubts about
Lexington's standing and the arguments favoring Younger
abstention, to be considered further by the Court in upcoming
dispositive motion practice.

For all these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunctive relief will be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybesyzgnfrom
Leagle.com.

BRITTAN B HOLLAND, Plaintiff, represented by JUSTIN TAYLOR QUINN,
ROBINSON MILLER LLC, One Newark center19th FL.Newark, NJ 07102
BRITTAN B HOLLAND, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL F. WILLIAMS -
- michael.williams@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP.

LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, represented
by JUSTIN TAYLOR QUINN, ROBINSON MILLER LLC & MICHAEL F. WILLIAMS,
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP.

KELLY ROSEN, Defendant, represented by CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH RIGGS,
STATE OF NEW JERSEY & STUART MARK FEINBLATT, Office of the
Attorney General.

MARY E COLALILLO, Defendant, represented by CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH
RIGGS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY & STUART MARK FEINBLATT, Office of the
Attorney General.

CHRISTOPHER PORRINO, Defendant, represented by CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH
RIGGS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY & STUART MARK FEINBLATT, Office of the
Attorney General.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ET AL., Amicus, represented by
ALEXANDER R. SHALOM, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY
FOUNDATION.


NEW YORK: Court Denies Class Certification in "Calvo"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned SUSAN CALVO, JOHN PETERS
PROFESSIONAL LIMOUSINES, INC., JACKLYN RESTREPO, PEDRO CAMACHO,
EAMON YUEL and YONG ZHANG individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, MEERA JOSHI,
DAVID YASSKY, and RAYMOND SCANLON, Defendants, No. 14-CV-7246
(VEC). (S.D.N.Y.).

When a police officer or Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC)
inspector had probable cause to believe that a vehicle was being
operated as an unlicensed vehicle for hire in violation of N.Y.
City Administrative Code (Code) Section 19-506(b)(1), the officer
or inspector was authorized to seize the vehicle prior to an
administrative hearing on the alleged violation.

Article III standing is the threshold question in every federal
case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.
The filing of suit as a class action does not relax this
jurisdictional requirement. To establish Article III standing, the
plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and
(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.

Because these Article III requirements are an indispensable part
of the plaintiff's case, each element [of standing] must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof.

Plaintiffs' class definition is like a magical shape-shifter; it
changed form multiple times within Plaintiffs' own brief and even
during oral argument. In their opening brief, Plaintiffs used
various class definitions: they first proposed a class of all
'straight plate' vehicle owners whose vehicles were seized.  Two
pages later, the class definition morphed into all owners and
operators of 'straight plate' vehicles seized. The definition
later became all persons who  had their vehicle seized.

In their reply brief, Plaintiffs stated that their definition
encompassed all persons who had their vehicle seized,, but that
definition was offered under a section title stating the class
comprises owners, and Plaintiffs argued on the following page that
they had standing because everyone on the Class Lists is a
registered owner of a seized vehicle. At oral argument, Plaintiffs
represented that they were abandoning a class definition that
included the operators of the vehicles that were seized and that
their desired class definition encompassed "only the registered
owners."

But as oral argument continued, Plaintiffs proposed yet another
class definition: not only the people who were the registered
owners but the people who were treated as the owners of the
vehicles by the defendants in the course of the seizure program.
Defendants contend that, under the facts of this case, the mere
fact that an individual is a registered owner of a vehicle is not
sufficient for Article III standing to challenge that vehicle's
seizure.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to propose a class
that is defined in such a way that everyone within it has
standing. Under all of their proposed definitions, Plaintiffs seek
to include all registered owners of vehicles that were seized by
the City; Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the City's compelling
evidence that a subset of that class consists of straw owners who
did not suffer any injury in fact from the City's unconstitutional
practice of seizing vehicles suspected of being used in violation
of Section 19-506(b)(1) from first time violators.

A registered owner might have suffered an injury in fact if he or
she was operating the vehicle at the time that it was seized or if
he or she retrieved the vehicle from the TLC after it was seized.
But given the City's evidence of straw owners, Plaintiffs cannot
simply rely on the fact that the vehicle was registered in a
person's name to demonstrate that the person suffered an injury
from the vehicle's seizure.

Although courts have discretion to modify the definition of the
putative class, this Court declines to do so. Instead, the Court
grants Plaintiffs' request to move to certify a more narrow class.
A class consisting of registered owners who were either operating
the vehicles at the time that they were seized or who retrieved
the vehicles from the TLC might be sufficient to narrow the class
to those who have Article III standing. It is unclear, however,
whether a narrower class would satisfy Rule 23(a)'s numerosity
requirement.

In all events, the Court makes no finding relative to whether a
class can be defined that would satisfy Article III and Rule 23,
whether any of the named Plaintiffs would be a suitable class
representative, nor whether Plaintiffs' counsel is qualified to be
named as class counsel. Because Plaintiffs' proposed class
definition(s) include(s) members that lack Article III standing,
the Court denies without prejudice Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y97b4mj7from
Leagle.com.

Susan Calvo, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Lee Ackman --
d.ackman@comcast.net

Susan Calvo, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew M. St. Laurent --
Andrew@sc-harris.com -- Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry
LLP & Joseph Terence Gallagher -- jgallagher@harrisobrien.com --
Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

John Peters Professional Limousines, Inc., Plaintiff, represented
by Daniel Lee Ackman, Andrew M. St. Laurent, Harris, O'Brien, St.
Laurent & Chaudhry LLP & Joseph Terence Gallagher, Harris, St.
Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

Jacklyn Restrepo, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Lee Ackman,
Andrew M. St. Laurent, Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP
& Joseph Terence Gallagher, Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

Pedro Camacho, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Lee Ackman, Andrew
M. St. Laurent, Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP &
Joseph Terence Gallagher, Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

Yong Zhang, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew M. St. Laurent,
Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, Joseph Terence
Gallagher, Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP & Daniel Lee Ackman.

The City Of New York,, Defendant, represented by Karen Beth
Selvin, New York City Law Department & Angelie Thomas, New York
City Law Department, 100 Church St, New York, NY 10007-2601

Meera Joshi, Defendant, represented by Karen Beth Selvin, New York
City Law Department & Angelie Thomas, New York City Law
Department.

David Yassky, Defendant, represented by Karen Beth Selvin, New
York City Law Department & Angelie Thomas, New York City Law
Department.

Raymond Scanlon, Defendant, represented by Karen Beth Selvin, New
York City Law Department & Angelie Thomas, New York City Law
Department.

Angel DeCastro, ADR Provider, represented by Andrew M. St.
Laurent, Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP & Daniel Lee
Ackman.

Yong Zheng, ADR Provider, represented by Andrew M. St. Laurent,
Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, Daniel Lee Ackman &
Joseph Terence Gallagher, Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.

Eamon Yuel, ADR Provider, represented by Andrew M. St. Laurent,
Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, Daniel Lee Ackman &
Joseph Terence Gallagher, Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP.


NORDSTROM INC: Faces "Killpack" Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nordstrom, Inc. The
case is captioned as Julie Killpack, individually, and on behalf
of other members of the general public similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Nordstrom, Inc. and DOES 1-100, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-06811-GW-MRW (C.D. Cal., Sep. 15, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge George H. Wu.

Nordstrom, Inc. is an American chain of luxury department stores
headquartered in Seattle, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adrian Robert Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan Elisabeth George, Esq.
          Todd M Friedman, Esq.
          TODD M FRIEDMAN LAW OFFICES PC
          21550 Oxnard Street Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  tfriedman@toddflaw.com


NORTH SHORE AGENCY: Faces "Johnson" Suit in E.D. of New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against North Shore Agency,
LLC. The case is styled as Nicolle Johnson, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. North Shore
Agency, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-05795 (E.D.N.Y.,
October 3, 2017).
North Shore provides accounts receivables outsourcing including
first part billing services, collection letters, mailing services,
and collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
   Joseph H. Mizrahi Law, P.C.
   337 Avenue W, Suite 2f
   Brooklyn, NY 11223
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: jmizrahilaw@gmail.com


ON TIME: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in "Hane" FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHRISTOPHER HANE, Plaintiff, v. ON TIME
SECURING, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:16-cv-2002 (N.D.
Ohio), Judge Sara Lioi of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion
for conditional certification and Court-authorized notice.

On Aug. 10, 2016, the Plaintiff filed his complaint against On
Time alleging violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the prompt pay provisions of
Ohio Rev. Code Section 4113.15.

After little more than a week, the Defendant appeared and the
parties jointly moved to stay the litigation and to refer it to
mediation before the assigned magistrate judge.  The Court granted
this request and a mediation was set for Sept. 29, 2016.

The mediation was rescheduled to Nov. 1, 2016, but the day before
the mediation the parties again moved to continue, indicating a
need for more time to continue to exchange documentation and meet
and confer in an attempt to resolve the matter short of mediation.
The mediation was rescheduled to Nov. 29, 2016 and was conducted
on that date, but was ordered reconvened on Dec. 16, 2016.

On Dec. 15, 2016, the parties jointly moved to lift the stay and
return the case to the Court's active docket representing that any
further attempts to mediate will be a waste of the Court's and the
parties' time and resources.  The parties requested a Case
Management Conference ("CMC"), which the Court set for Feb. 10,
2017.

The CMC was conducted and an initial case management plan set
deadlines for filing and briefing certification motions.  The
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification and court-
authorized notice timely followed.  Defendants On Time and Keith
Maxim filed a memorandum in opposition.

Although the motion does not identify the specific contours of the
collective that the Plaintiff seeks to conditionally certify, the
first amended complaint does -- the Potential Opt-Ins who are
similarly situated to the Plaintiff with respect to the
Defendants' FLSA violations consist of all present and former
hourly employees of the Defendants during the period beginning
three years preceding the commencement of the action to the
present who worked more than 40 hours in one or more workweeks and
were not paid an overtime premium for some or all of those hours
worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Judge Lioi concludes that the Plaintiff has met the fairly lenient
burden for conditional certification of the action as a collective
action, subject to decertification following discovery, should
that prove necessary.

She conditionally certified the collective of all present and
former hourly employees of the Defendants during the period
beginning three years preceding the commencement of the action to
the present who worked more than 40 hours in one or more workweeks
and were not paid an overtime premium for some or all of those
hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.

Further, with the benefit of this ruling, the parties will jointly
submit for the Court's approval their proposed notice to the
potential Plaintiffs, along with the proposed consent form, in
accordance with the deadlines in the Case Management Plan and
Trial Order, which is issuing separately.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/pyGwCx from Leagle.com.

Christopher Hane, Plaintiff, represented by Michaela M. Calhoun,
Nilges Draher.

Christopher Hane, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon M. Draher --
sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com -- Nilges Draher & Hans A. Nilges --
hans@ohlaborlaw.com -- Nilges Draher.

On Time Securing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Karen Soehnlen
McQueen -- kmcqueen@kwgd.com -- Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths &
Dougherty, Marcus L. Wainwright -- mwainwright@kwgd.com --
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty & Scott M. Zurakowski --
szurakowski@kwgd.com -- Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty.

Keith Maxim, Defendant, represented by Karen Soehnlen McQueen,
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty & Scott M. Zurakowski,
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty.


PROTAS SPIVOK: $42K in Attys' Fees Awarded in "Jernigan" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ellen L. Hollander of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland issued Memorandum Opinion granting the Class
Counsel motion for attorneys' fees in the case captioned AMY
JERNIGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PROTAS, SPIVOK & COLLINS, LLC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. ELH-16-03058 (D. Md.).

The case is rooted in the filing of two class action suits in July
2016, both initiated in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
One was filed by Amy Jernigan and William Bonilla ("Named
Plaintiffs") and the other by Leo Farber ("Class Member").  The
Jernigan/Bonilla case was removed to this Court; the Farber case
was not removed.  Both cases arise under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA") and include state law claims.

The Plaintiffs seek statutory damages arising from PSC's efforts
on behalf of LVNV Funding, LLC to collect debts from the Named
Plaintiffs, the Class Member, and a class of similarly situated
persons, all of whom are consumers.  The debt collection activity
was allegedly based on void and unenforceable judgments obtained
by LVNV while it was not a licensed collection agency in Maryland.
The Defendant denied liability.

On Sept. 15, 2017, the Court conducted a Class Action Fairness
Hearing with respect to the proposed Class Action Settlement
Agreement And Release.  By Final Order and Judgment of Sept. 15,
2017, the Court granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement, and dismissed all claims against the Defendant.  In the
Order, the Court also approved three incentive awards of $4,000
each (totaling $12,000); designated the class of approximately 331
persons; appointed the Class Counsel; awarded court costs of
$884.23; approved pro rata payments from the Common Fund to the
Class Members; and approved a cy pres award in accordance with the
terms and designations in the Settlement Agreement.

The Class Counsel had also moved for attorneys' fees, supported by
a memorandum and a supplement, which includes time records for
counsel.  Declarations of the Class Counsel were also submitted.
The matter of counsel fees was fully addressed at the hearing.
But, for the reasons stated in the open court, the Court held the
matter of attorneys' fees under advisement.

Judge Hollander approved the requested counsel fee award of 40% of
the Common Fund, i.e., $42,000.  She finds that this case,
monetarily, is a relatively small one.  But, it is undoubtedly
important to the class members.  Certainly, it can be difficult to
obtain counsel for a case in which the potential monetary recovery
is relatively small.  By agreeing to pursue this case, the Class
Counsel has obtained relief for a class that, in all likelihood,
would have had no recourse in the absence of a class action.  The
Third Circuit recognized in In re Cendant Corp., in regard to a
lodestar analysis, that in certain cases a lodestar fee award may
be necessary in a case with a small monetary value, in order to
incentivize a lawyer to take the case.  That rationale is apt
here.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/puNEAL from Leagle.com.

Amy Jernigan, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip R. Robinson,
Consumer Law Center LLC.

Amy Jernigan, Plaintiff, represented by Scott C. Borison --
borison@legglaw.com -- Legg Law Firm LLP.

William Bonilla, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip R. Robinson,
Consumer Law Center LLC & Scott C. Borison, Legg Law Firm LLP.

Protas, Spivok & Collins, LLC, Defendant, represented by James
Edward Dickerman -- dickerman@ewmd.com -- Eccleston and Wolf PC.


RHG & CO: Maxin Class Counsel to Update Supplemental Class Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned HEATHER MAXIN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RHG & COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 16-CV-2625 JLS (BLM)(S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis
L. Sammartino of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California ordered the Class Counsel to update the parties'
Proposed Supplemental Notice to Class Members and amend their
method of notice.

Presently before the Court is the parties' Proposed Supplemental
Notice, which they propose will be included on the opening page of
the settlement website.  The notice informs the class members that
their deadline to submit a claim, submit a request to be excluded,
or object to the class settlement has been extended.  It also
provides that during the objection period, the Class Counsel will
file the Class Counsel's Fee Petition on or before date.

Judge Sammartino finds the proposed supplemental notice is
inadequate.  First, he declines to set a deadline for objections
at this time.  Second, the supplemental notice must inform the
class members they have a right to review the fee motion before
deciding whether to opt-out of the settlement or object to the fee
motion.  Third, the supplemental notice does not tell the class
members how they may review the fee motion (such as by clicking a
link on the settlement website).  Fourth, the supplemental notice
does not refer to the original notice and it is unclear how the
two notices relate.  The supplemental notice needs to inform the
class members it merely supplements the information the members
previously received, the settlement of which has been preliminary
approved by the Court.  The supplemental notice should also inform
the class members the fee motion is consistent with what was
indicated in the original notice the class members received (i.e.
Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs are $270,000).

Finally, the Judge finds the method of providing notice to the
class members is inadequate.  While it may be true that updating a
website is cost-effective, the mere posting of the supplemental
notice on the settlement website is not the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances.  Accordingly, the parties
must amend their method of notice.

Accordingly, Judge Sammartino ordered the Class Counsel to file
its fee motion forthwith.  Subsequently, the parties will file
another proposed supplemental notice, taking into consideration
the Court's requirements.  They will also propose dates for: (i)
the notification of the class members of the supplemental notice;
(ii) the deadline for class members to object; (iii) the deadline
for Class Counsel to file a Motion for Final Approval; and (iv) a
hearing date for said Motion.

Finally, the Judge vacated the Final Approval Motion hearing
currently set for Sept. 28, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.  The hearing will be
continued to a later date.  Once the Court receives the parties'
updated proposed supplemental notice, Judge Sammartino will assess
its adequacy and issue a schedule for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/9SWP2O from Leagle.com.

Heather Maxin, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian --
ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law Group, APC.

Heather Maxin, Plaintiff, represented by Andrei Armas --
andrei@kazlg.com -- KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC & Matthew M. Loker --
ml@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, APC.

RHG & Company, Inc., doing business as Vital Nutrients, Defendant,
represented by Lee S. Brenner -- lbrenner@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley
Drye and Warren LLP.


RITE AID: Faces "Kalajian" Suit in Central Dist. of California
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rite Aid
Corporation.  The case is captioned as Tina Kalajian, individually
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, the
Plaintiff, v. Rite Aid Corporation, a Delaware Corporation and
Does 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
06777-ODW-AGR (C.D. Cal., Sep 14, 2017).  The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright, II.

Rite Aid Corporation is a drugstore chain in the United States and
a Fortune 500 company. It is headquartered in East Pennsboro
Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, near Camp Hill.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gerald Bennett Malanga, Esq.
          LATTIE MALANGA LIBERTINO LLP
          3731 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 860
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (323) 938 3102
          Facsimile: (323) 938 0110
          E-mail: gmalanga@lmllaw.com


STAR NATURAL: Faces "Rincon" Suit in E. Dist. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Star Natural Meats
LLC doing business as: Star Natural Meats. The case is styled as
Alberto Guzman Rincon, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Star Natural Meats LLC doing
business as: Star Natural Meats, Old Fashion Butcher Shop Inc.
doing business as: Old Fashioned Butcher formerly known as: My
Famous Butcher, John Doe Inc. doing business as: Prime Meat, John
Koukoularis and Michalia Flori, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05798
(E.D.N.Y., October 3, 2017).

The Defendants are meat wholesalers.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


STARWOOD WAYPOINT: "Berg" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Berg, and all others similarly-situated v. Starwood
Waypoint Homes, Starwood Waypoint Homes Partnership, L.P., Barry
S. Sternlicht, Thomas M. Bowers, Richard D. Bronson, Michael D.
Fascitelli, Renee Lewis Glover, Jeffrey E. Kelter, Thomas W.
Knapp, J. Ronald Terwilliger, Frederick C. Tuomi, Invitation Homes
Inc., Invitation Homes Operating Partnership LP, and IH Merger
Sub, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-02896 (D. Md., September 29, 2017), is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on August
10, 2017, pursuant to which Starwood Waypoint Homes ("SFR") and
Invitation Homes Inc. ("INVH"), and their respective affiliates,
will combine in a merger-of-equals.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff owns Starwood common stock.

Defendant SFR is an internally managed Maryland real estate
investment trust that has elected to be taxed as a REIT under the
Internal Revenue Code. The Company's operating partnership, SFR
LP, was formed as a Delaware limited partnership in May 2012.
SFR's wholly-owned subsidiary is the sole general partner of SFR
LP, and SFR conducts substantially all of its business through the
operating partnership. SFR owned 95.6% of the outstanding SFR LP
units as of June 30, 2017.

Defendant INVH is a Maryland corporation and a party to the Merger
Agreement.  Defendant INVH LP is a Delaware limited partnership,
is wholly-owned by INVH, and is a party to the Merger Agreement.

Defendant REIT Merger Sub is a Delaware limited liability company,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of INVH, and a party to the Merger
Agreement.

The Individual Defendants served as board members of SFR. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Donald J. Enright, Esq.
      Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
      LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
      1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
      Washington, DC 20007
      Tel: (202) 524-4290
      Fax: (202) 333-2121
      E-mail: denright@zlk.com
              etripodi@zlk.com

          - and -

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
      Wilmington, DE 19803
      Tel: (302) 295-5310
      Fax: (302) 654-7530
      E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
              gms@rl-legal.com

          - and -

      Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
      RM LAW, P.C.
      1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (484) 324-6800
      Fax: (484) 631-1305
      E-mail: rmaniskas@rmclasslaw.com


STATE FARM: Faces Coastal Wellness Centers Suit in S.D. of Fla.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company. The case is styled as Coastal
Wellness Centers, Inc., a Florida corporation, a/a/o Kelly Wyman,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant, Case
No. 0:17-cv-61950-WPD (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

State Farm is a group of insurance and financial services
companies in the United States. The group's main business is State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a mutual insurance firm
that also owns the other State Farm companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Barbara Perez, Esq.
   Aronovitz Law
   2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3700
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (305) 372-2772
   Fax: (305) 397-1886
   Email: bp@aronovitzlaw.com

      - and -

   Theophilos George Poulopoulos, Esq.
   Corredor, Husseini and Snedaker, P.A.
   9130 South Dadeland Blvd
   Datran II Center, Suite 1902
   Miami, FL 33156
   Tel: (978) 621-4636

      - and -

   Tod N. Aronovitz, Esq.
   Aronovitz Law
   One Biscayne Tower
   2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 3700
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (305) 372-2772
   Fax: (305) 397-1886
   Email: ta@aronovitzlaw.com


TARSADIA HOTELS: Time to Submit More Info on Joint Bid Extended
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DEAN BEAVER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TARSADIA
HOTELS, et als., Defendants, Case No. 11cv1842 GPC(KSC)(S.D.
Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California directed the parties to submit
additional information and legal authority, if any, for him
concerning the parties' joint motion regarding lien and the issues
identified on or before Sept. 26, 2017.

On Sept. 15, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs'
motion for final approval of class action settlement.  At the
hearing, third party Defendant Greenberg Traurig LLP raised an
issue regarding the lien filed in the case and the Court directed
the parties to either submit a stipulation or provide further
briefing.  On Aug. 1, 2017, Tarsadia Defendants filed a notice of
lien as to class members Ray Hammi and Frank Issa based on a money
judgment entered in the case of 5th & K Parcel 2 Owners'
Association, Inc. v. Salameh, in San Diego Superior Court in the
amount of $3,524,959.

On Sept. 19, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion regarding lien
which requests that the Court orders that the Tarsadia Defendants
and third party Defendant Greenberg (and Greenberg Traurig's
insurers) are released and absolved from any duty or
responsibility to honor the Lien, so they will not incur or have
any liability in connection with the Lien by complying with their
anticipated payment obligations under the Settlement.  Further,
once those payments are made pursuant to the Settlement, all
obligations under the Lien will rest exclusively with the
Settlement Administrator.

Based on the language in the proposed order, Judge Curiel finds it
is unclear whether Tarsadia Defendants, the filer of the notice of
lien, seek to release the lien completely or are seeking to
transfer responsibility and/or liability to the Settlement
Administrator.

If so, then it is not clear why Tarsadia Defendants seek to be
released and absolved from any duty or responsibility to honor the
Lien.  Moreover, he notes that the joint motion regarding lien,
that will affect the rights of Frank Issa and Ray Hammi under the
settlement, was not served on them.  He directed the parties to
submit additional information and legal authority, if any, for him
concerning the parties' joint motion and the issues identified on
or before Sept. 26, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/cRKwG4 from Leagle.com.

Dean Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C..

Dean Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Reiser, Law
Office of Michael Reiser, Michael L. Schrag --
mls@classlawgroup.com -- Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler R. Meade, The
Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin -- mrubin@altber.com -- Altshuler
Berzon LLP & Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Laurie Beaver, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Steven Adelman, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R.
Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP &
Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Abram Aghachi, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Dinesh Gauba, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Kevin Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C. & Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP.

Kevin Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Tyler R. Meade, The Meade
Firm P.C..

Kevin Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Rubin, Altshuler
Berzon LLP & Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac
vice.

Veronica Kenna, Plaintiff, represented by Donald Eugene Chomiak,
Talisman Law, P.C., Michael L. Schrag, Gibbs Law Group, LLP, Tyler
R. Meade, The Meade Firm P.C., Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP
& Wendy C. Fostvedt, Fostvedt Legal Group, LLC, pro hac vice.

Tarsadia Hotels, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz --
avaz@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes --
phughes@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle & Nicholson, Frederick H.
Kranz, Jr. -- rkanz@coxcastle.com -- Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP &
Lynn T. Galuppo -- lgaluppo@coxcastle.com -- Cox, Castle &
Nicholson, LLP.

Gregory Casserly, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz,
Cox Castle and Nicholson, Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox, Castle &
Nicholson, LLP, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson & Frederick
H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

5th Rock LLC, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie Vaz, Cox
Castle and Nicholson, Natalia Arpy Minassian, Bruce A. Hatkoff, A
Law Corporation, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson, Frederick
H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP & Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox,
Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Gaslamp Holdings, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson, Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP &
Lynn T. Galuppo, Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Playground Destination Properties, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Daniel M. Benjamin -- dbenjamin@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara Smith
LLP & Thomas W. McNamara -- tmcnamara@mcnamarallp.com -- McNamara
Smith LLP.

Gregory Casserly, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

MKP One, LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Tushar Patel, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

5th Rock LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle
& Nicholson, LLP & Perry Hughes, Cox Castle & Nicholson.

Gaslamp Holdings, LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Tarsadia Hotels, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia
Natalie Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

B.U. Patel, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by Alicia Natalie
Vaz, Cox Castle and Nicholson, Perry Hughes, Cox Castle &
Nicholson & Frederick H. Kranz, Jr., Cox Castle & Nicholson, LLP.

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, a limited liability partnership,
ThirdParty Defendant, represented by Kirsten Hicks Spira --
kspira@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP & Michael McNamara --
mmcnamara@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP.


TOOTSIE ROLL: Faces "Daniel" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tootsie Roll
Industries, LLC. The case is styled as Biola Daniel, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tootsie
Roll Industries, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07541 (S.D.
N.Y., October 3, 2017).

Tootsie Roll Industries is a manufacturer of confectionery in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   C.K. Lee, Esq.
   Lee Litigation Group, PLLC
   30 East 39th Street
   2nd Floor
   New York, NY 10016
   Tel: (212) 465-1188
   Fax: (212) 465-1181
   Email: cklee@leelitigation.com


TORCHAV INC: Faces "Alvarez" Suit in S. Dist. Fla.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Torchav, Inc.  The
case is styled as Rosa Maria Cerrato Alvarez and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Torchav, Inc. doing business as:
Lucerna Bakery and Juan Carlos Chavez, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-
cv-23617-CMA (S.D. Fla., October 3, 2017).

Torchav, Inc. doing business as: Lucerna Bakery is engaged in the
bakeshop industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Rivkah Fay Jaff, Esq.
   J.H. Zidell, P.A.
   300-71st Street, Ste 605
   Miami Beach, FL 33141
   Tel: (305) 865-6766
   Email: Rivkah.Jaff@gmail.com

      - and -

   Jamie H. Zidell, Esq.
   300 71st Street, Suite 605
   Miami Beach, FL 33141
   Tel: (305) 865-6766
   Fax: 865-7167
   Email: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses "Sweda" ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting dismissal of the case
captioned JENNIFER SWEDA et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA and JACK HEUER, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-4329
(E.D. Pa.).

A group of University of Pennsylvania Matching Plan participants
and beneficiaries bring this ERISA action against the University
of Pennsylvania and Jack Heuer, Penn's Vice President of Human
Resources. The Plan participants allege that Defendants enabled
third-party service providers here, TIAA-CREF and Vanguard to
collect excessive fees, increased costs by including duplicative
investments in the Plan, and retained underperforming funds in the
Plan. Plaintiffs claim this violated two provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

The Amended Complaint includes seven claims: Breach of fiduciary
duties for locking the Plan into the CREF stock account and TIAA
recordkeeping, in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1104 (a)(1)
(Count I); breach of fiduciary duties for unreasonable
administrative fees, in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1104 (a)(1)
(Count III); breach of fiduciary duties for unreasonable fees in
violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1) (Count V); and failure
to monitor fiduciaries (Count VII). The plaintiffs allege that
these actions also violate the prohibited transactions clause of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1) (Counts II, IV & VI).

Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA

Both sides agree that the defendants are fiduciaries to the
plaintiffs under the Plan. ERISA imposes the prudent man standard
of care.This requires the fiduciary to (1) discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;(B)
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims (Counts I, III, & V)

The issues in this case primarily rise and fall with the inquiry
of whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs, and such an inquiry must begin with Renfro.

In Renfro v. Unisys Corp., retirement savings plan participants
filed a putative class action against their employer for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011). The
breach of duty alleged in Renfro was similar to the case at hand.
The putative class challenged the selection and periodic
evaluation of the Unisys defined contribution plan's mix and range
of investment options in a Section 401(k) plan.

In upholding the dismissal of the claim, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that courts must look to the mix and range of
options and  evaluate[] the plausibility of claims challenging
fund selection against the backdrop of the reasonableness of the
mix and range of investment options. Under that framework, the
Court concluded that in light of the available options which
included 73 investments with fees ranging from 0.10% to 1.21%
plaintiffs had provided nothing more than conclusory assertions of
fiduciary breach and affirmed dismissal of the case.

The Renfro Standard and Section 403(b)

ERISA's fiduciary duty standard does not differentiate between
Section 403(b) and Section 401(k) plans. Rather, it defines a
blanket fiduciary duty standard. ERISA aims 'to provide a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans' in order to ease
administrative burdens and reduce employers' costs.

Because of the modern-day similarity between the two retirement
plans and the historical roots of ERISA's goal to create a uniform
regulatory system for retirement plans, the analysis of the
fiduciary standards for Section 403(b) and Section 401(k)
retirement plans must be the same. The Renfro reasoning (and other
interpretations of Section 401(k) cases) therefore serve as a
guiding light for analyzing the different theories advanced by the
plaintiffs.

Claim I: Locking the Plan into CREF Stock Accounts and TIAA
Recordkeeping

The plaintiff's first claim is that by allowing TIAA-CREF to
mandate the inclusion of the CREF Stock Account and Money Market
Account in the Plan the defendants committed the plan to an
imprudent arrangement in which certain investments had to be
included and could not be removed from the plan" even if the
investments underperformed.

The plaintiffs' claim that this violates the defendants' fiduciary
duty does not meet the plausibility threshold. As in Twombly, the
actions are at least "just as much in line with a wide swath of
rational and competitive business strategy" in the market as they
are with a fiduciary breach.

Claim III: Unreasonable Administrative Fees

Plaintiffs next claim that Defendants allowed TIAA-CREF and
Vanguard to charge unreasonable administrative fees in two ways:
First, allowing TIAA-CREF and Vanguard to operate as their own
record-keepers rather than consolidating all funds with a singular
third-party record-keeper supposedly increased fees.  Second,
Plaintiffs claim that the plan administrators should have arranged
a flat per-person fee rather than an asset-based.

The plan administrators are fiduciaries to every plan member,
whether she invests $10 or $10 million. It is not up to courts to
second-guess how fiduciaries allocate that cost, only that the
fiduciary discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries as a whole. 29
U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1). To the extent that this argument claims
the arrangement increased fees, it fails on the same reasoning as
above: there are lawful explanations for such an arrangement, and
the plaintiffs need something more than a claim that there may be
(or even are) cheaper options available.

The plaintiffs must show that there were no reasonable
alternatives given to plan participants to choose from, which the
plaintiffs have not pled. Renfro, 671 F.3d at 329 holding that
affording a reasonable mix of plan options to participants was
sufficient to meet the fiduciary standard.

Claim V: Unreasonable Investment Management Fees; Unnecessary
Marketing, Distribution, Mortality and Expense Risk Fees; and
Performance Losses

The plaintiffs next claim a litany of costly measures that they
claim amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, including unnecessary
fees, duplicative investments, retention of higher cost funds,
retention of underperforming funds, and poor performance relative
to the market.

These claims broadly break down into three categories: (1)
unnecessary fees, (2) participant confusion, and (3) poor market
performance.

The plaintiffs' argument that fiduciaries must maintain a myopic
focus on the singular goal of lower fees was soundly rejected in
Renfro. 671 F.3d at 327. ERISA requires fiduciaries to balance
providing benefits to participants with defraying reasonable
expenses" in the plan. The plaintiffs here have not pled that
these reductions in expenses could be achieved without changing
the variety of benefits to participants. These same considerations
motivated the Seventh Circuit's rejection of identical
institutional versus retail arguments. Plaintiffs have only pled
that the failure to replace these shares was a breach of fiduciary
duty, which is insufficient to pass through the 12(b)(6)
threshold.

The plaintiffs' derivative claim, namely that offering duplicative
funds was unnecessary, fails as well. On the contrary, duplicative
investment options are necessary based on the structure of the
Plan. Each of the four tiers becomes progressively more complex
for plan participants. The do it for me tier (tier 1) has only one
option from each of the two providers, but had a number of
different underlying mutual funds or annuities in its umbrella.

In contrast, the self-directed plan (tier 4) allowed complete
customization by participants. That these tiers contained some of
the same funds is unsurprising and raises no plausible inference
of a breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, if there was no overlap
there could be greater cause for criticism or frustration.
Moreover, when examined closely, the plaintiffs' claims do not
withstand scrutiny. A statistical sampling of funds would expect
(all things being equal) half of the funds to be above benchmarks
and half to be below benchmarks. Here, as opposed to what the
simplistic statistical average would show, that 38 (half) of the
76 funds underperformed, the plaintiffs pled that 45 investment
options performed below benchmarks.  Such a post hoc analysis of
market performance, where only 7 more funds underperformed than
would be expected, may be consistent with a breach of fiduciary
duty, but does not show that the plaintiffs have nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" and their
complaint must be dismissed.

Prohibited Transaction Claims

Plaintiffs recast the same arguments above as violating the
prohibited transactions clause of ERISA, Section 1106(a). This
clause states that:

     "A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan
to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such
transaction constitutes a direct or indirect --

      (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between
the plan and a party in interest . . .

      (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the
plan and party in interest;

      (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of a party in
interest, of any assets of the plan. . ."

The plaintiffs seek recovery under this section of ERISA under the
theory that the contractual arrangement with TIAA-CREF and
Vanguard constituted a prohibited transaction. This cannot be
correct. Plaintiffs argue that paying these companies constitutes
a sale of property under Section 1106(a)(1)(A), a furnishing of
services under Section 1106(a)(1)(C), and a transfer of assets in
the plan under Section 1106(a)(1)(D).

If such an argument were true, then any time plan administrators
contracted with another party to provide services to plan
participants in exchange for money (which includes the basic
elements of retirement plans, including making mutual funds
available or recordkeeping services) it would qualify as a
prohibited transaction. After all, fees charged by these companies
necessarily requires transfer of assets. Plaintiffs claim this all
while maintaining that there are no per se ERISA violations in the
revenue sharing arrangement.

The motion to dismiss is granted. Counts I through VII of the
complaint are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 21, 2017
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/yd42nkopfrom
Leagle.com.

JENNIFER SWEDA, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF --
david@prolawpa.com -- PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC.

JENNIFER SWEDA, Plaintiff, represented by SEAN E. SOYARS,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, 100 S 4th St, Ste 1200, St.
Louis, MO 63102-1816, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON, 100 S
4th St, Ste 1200, St. Louis, MO 63102-1816,JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO --
ciarlanto@prolawpa.com -- Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C.,
JEROME J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, 100 S 4th St,
Ste 1200, St. Louis, MO 63102-1816, KURT C. STRUCKHOFF, SHLICHTER
BOGARD & DENTON LLP, 100 S 4th St, Ste 1200, St. Louis, MO 63102-
1816, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON, 100 S 4th St,
Ste 1200, St. Louis, MO 63102-1816, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, 100 S 4th St, Ste 1200, St. Louis,
MO 63102-1816, & TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, 100 S
4th St, Ste 1200, St. Louis, MO 63102-1816

BENJAMIN A. WIGGINS, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M.
PROMISLOFF, PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, SEAN E. SOYARS,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
DENTON, JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C.,
JEROME J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, KURT C.
STRUCKHOFF, SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, MICHAEL A. WOLFF,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
& DENTON LLP & TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON.

ROBERT L. YOUNG, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF,
PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, SEAN E. SOYARS, SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON,
JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C., JEROME
J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, KURT C. STRUCKHOFF,
SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
DENTON, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP &
TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON.

FAITH PICKERING, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF,
PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, SEAN E. SOYARS, SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON,
JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C., JEROME
J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, KURT C. STRUCKHOFF,
SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
DENTON, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP &
TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON.

PUSHKAR SOHONI, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF,
PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, SEAN E. SOYARS, SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON,
JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C., JEROME
J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, KURT C. STRUCKHOFF,
SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
DENTON, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP &
TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON.

REBECCA N. TONER, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID M. PROMISLOFF,
PROFY PROMISLOFF & CIARLANTO PC, SEAN E. SOYARS, SCHLICHTER,
BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, HEATHER LEA, SCHLICHTER BOGARD DENTON,
JEFFREY J. CIARLANTO, Profy Promisloff & Ciarlanto, P.C., JEROME
J. SCHLICHTER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, KURT C. STRUCKHOFF,
SHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP, MICHAEL A. WOLFF, SCHLICHTER BOGARD
DENTON, STEPHEN M. HOEPLINGER, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP &
TROY A. DOLES, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON.

THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant, represented by BRIAN T.
ORTELERE -- brian.ortelere@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP, CHRISTOPHER J. BORAN --
christopjer.boran@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS &
MICHAEL L. BANKS -- michael.banks@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS
& BOCKIUS LLP.

JACK HEUER, Defendant, represented by BRIAN T. ORTELERE, MORGAN
LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, CHRISTOPHER J. BORAN, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS
& MICHAEL L. BANKS, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP.


YUM! BRANDS: Zavala Sues over Sweetened Beverages Sales Tax
-----------------------------------------------------------
GUADALUPE ZAVALA, JR., and CHRISTOPHER CHRISTIAN, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
YUM! BRANDS, INC., a North Carolina Corporation, the Defendant,
Case No. 2017CH12542 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Sep. 15, 2017), seeks
injunctive relief to ensure that Defendant updates its KFC stores'
POS systems to properly calculate and charge sales tax.

This case is a class action brought on behalf of the class of
persons who were improperly overcharged sales tax on retail
purchases of sweetened beverages at Defendant's Kentucky Fried
Chicken ("KFC") brand stores in Cook County, Illinois.
Defendant's acts and omissions alleged herein violate the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The Cook County Sweetened Beverage Tax Ordinance imposes a tax at
the rate of $0.01 per ounce on the retail sale of all sweetened
beverages in Cook County, Illinois. However, the sweetened
beverage tax is supposed to be charged independent of sales tax
such that sales tax cannot be imposed on the sweetened beverage
tax. Defendant's KFC stores include the sweetened beverage tax in
the subtotal of the price of all of the items purchased by the
customer, and sales tax is calculated on the subtotal amount
(which includes the sweetened beverage tax). Thus, Defendant
improperly charges additional sales tax on Plaintiffs' and Class
members' sweetened beverages by taxing the sweetened beverage tax
that is imposed on their sweetened beverage purchases. Under the
direction of Defendant, all KFC stores in Cook County, Illinois
automatically and uniformly charge sales tax on the sweetened
beverage tax that is imposed on all sweetened beverages sold in
KFC stores in Cook County.

Yum! Brands, Inc., or Yum! and formerly Tricon Global Restaurants,
Inc., is an American fast food company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          Maebetty Kirby, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          www.attomevzim.com
          77 West Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440 0020
          E-mail: tom@attorenyzim.com
                  sharon@attorneyzim.com
                  matt@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com
                  maebetty@attorneyzim.com


ZOOMPASS HOLDINGS: Vega Named Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned PATEL, ET AL., Plaintiff, v. ZOOMPASS
HOLDINGS INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-3831 (JLL)(D.
N.J.), Judge Jose L. Linares of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey (i) appointed Plaintiff Carlos Guillermo
Julian Vega as the Lead Plaintiff; (ii) appointed Wolf Haldenstein
Adler Freeman & Hertz as the Lead Counsel; denied Plaintiff Robert
Davis' motion to be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff and to appoint
the Lead Counsel; and denied Plaintiffs Zoompass Investor Group's
motion to be appointed as the Lead Plaintiffs and to appoint the
Lead Counsel.

On July 31, 2017, Plaintiff Vega moved to have himself appointed
the Lead Plaintiff and his attorneys at the law firm of Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Hertz appointed as the Lead Counsel.
On the same date, Plaintiff Davis moved to be appointed the Lead
Plaintiff and his attorneys at the law firm of Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP appointed as the Lead Counsel with Carella, Byrne,
Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, P.C. as the Liaison Counsel.
Additionally, at that time Henry C. Reusch, Cheryl D. Puccio,
Mihaita Virjoghe collectively as the Zoompass Investor Group moved
to be appointed the Lead Plaintiffs and have their attorneys at
the law firm of Pomerantz and Rosen as the Co-Lead counsel and
Lite DePalma as the Liaison Counsel.

Judge Linares finds, out of the three motions, Plaintiff Vega has
alleged the largest financial interest under any factor, but most
notably his approximate loss is $139,815 in comparison to Davis'
loss of $24,935 and the Zoompass Investor Group's loss of $95,233.
Therefore, Plaintiff Vega is the most adequate Lead Plaintiff.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Vega has provided ample indication that
Wolf Haldenstein has the experience to serve as the Lead Counsel.
Therefore, Judge Linares approved Wolf Haldenstein as the Lead
Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/QiRj3S from Leagle.com.

Carlos Guillermo Julian Vega, Movant, represented by CORREY ANN
KAMIN -- Kamin@whafh.com -- WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ
LLP.

Carlos Guillermo Julian Vega, Movant, represented by KEVIN COOPER
-- kcooper@whafh.com -- WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP.

Robert S. Davis, Movant, represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND --
DEcklund@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN,
BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..

Larry Madewell, Movant, represented by SHERIEF MORSY --
smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- FARUQI & FARUQI LLP.

Lanah Madewell, Movant, represented by SHERIEF MORSY, FARUQI &
FARUQI LLP.

HENRY C REUSCH, Movant, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG --
bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

CHERYL D PUCCIO, Movant, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG,
LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

MIHAITA VIRJOGHE, Movant, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG,
LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

NAYMISH PATEL, Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG,
LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

ZOOMPASS HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant, represented by PETER C. HARVEY
-- pcharvey@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON, BELKNAP, WEBB & TYLER, LLP.


* Judge Dismisses Class Action Against Generic Drugmakers
---------------------------------------------------------
Nate Raymond, writing for Reuters, reports that a U.S. judge has
dismissed a lawsuit accusing a group of generic drug manufacturers
of engaging in unfair and deceptive pricing practices that caused
thousands of consumers and healthcare plans to overpay for
pharmaceutical products.

U.S. District Judge Anita Brody in Philadelphia ruled on Sept. 25
that the union health plan that brought the lawsuit was
"implausibly" claiming drugmakers misrepresented that published
average wholesale prices for various drugs were the real prices.
[GN]


* Politicians Tackle Consumer Rights-Related Regulations
--------------------------------------------------------
Erik Sherman, writing for Forbes, reports that there have been so
many disasters of late -- both natural and human-made -- that
anyone, including inveterate news junkies, could be excused for
not even being aware of some serious issues.  As the country
thrashes about, worried whether professional athletes should be
allowed to make a serious point and not just "shut up and
entertain," here are two that affect the economy, income
inequality, and consumer rights.

Protecting credit reporting agencies from their gross mistakes

You've heard about Equifax and the loss of an estimated 143
million consumer records with important information, like names,
Social Security numbers, address, and other tidbits that represent
a field day for criminals interested in identity theft and fraud.
There was an uproar when the credit reporting agency, one of the
big three, set up a site to provide credit checking, but with an
arbitration clause that would have prevented victims from joining
a class action lawsuit.

Be thankful for the data theft, made possible when Equifax
admitted that it had not done the normal software maintenance to
protect against a known weakness in their web software.  A little-
observed bill in the House was advancing until the news broke --
from what I've heard on the day Equifax was supposed to testify in
support.

H.R. 2359, the FCRA Liability Harmonization Act, first introduced
in May by Barry Louderback of Georgia's 11th congressional
district, would put severe restrictions on the amount of money a
class action against a credit reporting agency -- like Equifax --
could recover.  Liability would be restricted to actual damages
the consumers faced (good luck proving any in the short run after
a data breach), reasonable attorney fees as determined by a court,
and no more than $500,000 in punitive damages.

Law firms take on class actions because the investment of time and
money can result in a high return, so the restriction makes it far
less likely that consumers could find attorneys to bring the
action.  And a $500,000 fee doesn't even approach a good rounding
error in the profits these companies make.

This was a way to swat down any practical brakes on the
performance of the credit rating agencies.

Gutting an important consumer protection

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is an agency born of the
Great Recession that the GOP has wanted to eliminate.  The animus
is largely due to the effectiveness with which the CFPB has
brought corporations up short for their actions.

Citibank and Bank of America had to return hundreds of millions of
dollars to consumers for alleged misleading sales of additional
unnecessary financial products.  Wells Fargo to consumers and the
$100 million fine of Wells Fargo over its "widespread illegal
practice of secretly opening unauthorized deposit and credit card
accounts," as the agency alleged.

This is a case where regulation should be replaced with the word
protection for good reasons.  The CFPB's latest big action was a
rule to prevent financial services companies, like Equifax, for
example, from imposing arbitration clauses to keep from having to
go to court, including avoiding class action lawsuits.  Most
people don't have the money to sue these companies and aren't
facing individual losses large enough to enable a lawyer to work
on contingency (getting paid if the suit is successful).  It's a
backhanded way to prevent lawsuits and avoid paying a penalty for
bad actions.

According to The Intercept, Senate Republicans -- the ones who
want to gut healthcare for many millions -- are trying to overturn
the ruling. And they're reportedly trying to do this before Wells
Fargo and Equifax get grilled in public congressional hearings
this week.  The move allows elected officials to protect the
industry and still act as though they are thoroughly on the side
of the consumer.  Forget the words, look at the actions and votes.
Like the signs of parliamentary maneuvers by Mitch McConnell to
create an opening to quickly overturn the measure. [GN]


* Slovenia's National Assembly Passes Class Action Bill
-------------------------------------------------------
STA reports that the National Assembly passed in a cross-partisan
vote on Sept. 26 a bill paving the way for class action lawsuits
in the event of mass damage claims, legislation designed to
improve consumer protection. [GN]



                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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