CAR_Public/170901.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Friday, September 1, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 173



                            Headlines

20/20 COMMUNICATIONS: Cobble Moves to Certify Class of Managers
ABMAR GK US: Mall Inaccessible to Wheelchair, "Brito" Says
ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in Eastern District of NY
AL LARSON: Faces "Ledezma" Suit in California Superior Court
AMERICAN CORADIUS: Faces "Gavzer" Lawsuit Alleging TCPA Violation

AMERICAN PARA: "Sanchez" Suit Remanded to California State Court
APOLLO EDUCATION: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Lomingkit" Suit
ARCONIC INC: Sells Reynobond for Wrong Uses, "Howard" Suit Says
ATOSSA GENETICS: 9th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Securities Suit
BANK OF AMERICA: Faces Class Action Over Stock Loan Collusion

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Health One Appeals Ruling to Sixth Circuit
CABELA'S INC: Ex-Investors Drop Class Action Over Bass Pro Sale
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Gendreau Appeals Decision to Ninth Circuit
CARLTON MANOR: 6th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "McKinney"
CENTENE MANAGEMENT: Faces "Gudger" Suit Alleging FLSA Violation

CHAPEI LLC: Court Denies Wang's Bid to Certify Collective Action
CHRYSLER: Briefs Filed in Jeep Grand Cherokee Gas Tank Case
CITGO: Settles Unsolicited Text Message Class Action for $8.3MM
CITIBANK NA: NY Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
CLUBCORP HOLDINGS: Faces "Hopkins" Suit Over Sale to Apollo

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss "Dolins" Suit
CONTINENTAL GENERAL: GAFRI Dropped as Defendant in "Fastrich"
CONTRACT TRANSPORT: "Burlaka" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
DAIRY FARMERS: Vermont Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS: Attorney Wants Hip Implant Trial Halted

DOMINO'S PIZZA: "Brown" Action Seeks Reimbursements
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Munguia-Brown Moves to Certify Two Classes
ERIE INDEMNITY: Beltz Appeals W.D. Pa. Ruling to Third Circuit
FACEBOOK INC: Settlement in "Campbell" Gets Final Approval
FACEBOOK INC: Message Scanning Settlement OK'd Despite Objections

FARE DEPOT: Faces "Portillo" Suit in C. Dist. of Cal.
FIFTH THIRD: Can Compel Arbitration in "Jenkins" FCRA Suit
FIFTH THIRD: Sued by Malagese Over Collection of Overdraft Fees
FORTERRA INC: "Forrester" Hits IPO Flop, Non-disclosure of Facts
FRANCIS AIR: Mouillet-Gold Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA

GENERAL MOTORS: Another Ignition Switch Bellwether Trial Set
GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in E.D. of New York
GLOBE LIFE: Court Denies Class Certification in "Proctor" Suit
GOOGLE INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Final Nod in Privacy Litigation Deal
GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: Merger Docs Lacking Projections, Claims "Berg"

HCL COLLECTIONS: Faces "Linden" Suit in Dist. of Mass.
HILTON HOTELS: Bid to Dismiss Amended "White" Suit Partly Granted
HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE: Appeals Court Reinstates 2,100 Accutane Suits
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Riaubia" Suit
JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS: Xarelto Bellwether Trial Begins

JOIE DE VIVRE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Cornelius" Suit
KEY FOOD: Faces "Delgado" Suit Alleging FLSA, NYLL Violations
LEAPFROG ENTERPRISES: Nov. 7 Class Cert. Date in Securities Suit
LPL FINANCIAL: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Charter" Suit
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Court Affirms TCCWNA Ruling in "Kaufman" Suit

MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Misstates Broadsmart's Value, Freedman Claims
MAGNET MEDIA: "Brashear" Seeks Recovery of Back Pay, Overtime
MARION COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in "Washington" Suit
MARTHA STEWART: Stockholder Suit Over MLSO Merger Dismissed
MDL 1566: Proofs of Claim Due Sept. 26

MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Gilbert" Suit in Western District of Va.
MISSOURI: State High Ct. Denies Bid for Mandamus in "Bartlett"
MRS BPO: Dinaples Seeks to Certify Class of Consumers Under FDCPA
NEW ORLEANS MILLWORKS: Maldonado Moves for Class Certification
NEW YORK, NY: "Fernandes" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages

NIANTIC INC: California Judge Halts Suits Over Pokemon Go
PERRIGO CO: Wilson's Bid for Reconsideration in "Roofers" Denied
PHC INC: Shear Appeals Ruling in Maz Partners Suit to 1st Circuit
PHOENIX TECHNOLOGY: Miller Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
PROBALANCE INC: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Ulrich" Suit

RBS CITIZENS: Court Adopts Special Master's Report in Reinig Suit
RBS CITIZENS: Court Certifies Class in "Reinig" FLSA Suit
RED PARROT: Senior Care Moves to Certify Two Classes Under TCPA
ROCKET FUEL: Federman Sues Over Proposed Acquisition by Sizmek
ROSEVILLE, MI: Court Consolidates "Garner," "Cordia" Class Suits

RPM MORTGAGE: "Nanclares" Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS: $210MM Deal in "Woburn" Gets Final Nod
SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Cobra" Suit
SEI/AARONS INC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in "Krise" Suit
SLM CORP: Sixth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Parchman" Class Suit

SPRING REST: Fails to Pay Proper Minimum/OT Wages, Hernandez Says
SQUARETRADE INC: Appeals Ruling in "Starke" Suit to 2nd Circuit
STATE FARM: Can Compel Appraisal in "Shearer" Insurance Suit
STEALTH SECURITY: Illinois Court Certifies Class in TCPA Suit
SUN GARD: "Carter" Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Claims Retaliation

SUPER STOP: Unpaid Overtime Sought in "Galdamez" Labor Suit
SURETEMPS LLC: Faces "Lee" Lawsuit Alleging FLSA Violation
SYSCO GUEST: Connecticut Court Denies Move to Dismiss TCPA Suit
TAKATA CORP: Reveals Monthly Faulty Air Bag Litigation Fees
TEXAS: 5th Cir. Affirms Class Certification in "Yates" Suit

THAI PALACE: Peters Seeks to Recover Minimum Wages Under FLSA
THANK YOU: Catzin Appeals S.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: "Mejia" Suit Challenges No-Firearms Policy
UBS FINANCIAL: Court Compels Arbitration in "Roman"
UNIFUND CCR: Wins OK of "Kramer" Suit Deal; Hearing on Jan. 17

UNITED STATES: HM Suit Dismissed in Part; Bid to Certify Denied
UNITED STATES: Electrical Welfare Fund Appeals Order to 4th Cir.
UPS: Settles EEOC's Disability Discrimination Case for $2 Million
US RENAL CARE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Whitaker" Suit
USAA CASUALTY: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Archuleta" Suit

VANGUARD GROUP: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Order in "Taksir" Suit
VOLVO CARS: 7th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Laurens" Suit
WEBMD HEALTH: Conflict of Interest Taints Merger Says "Akerman"
WECTEC LLC: Faces "Fleetwood" Adversary Class Suit in New York
WOLF APPLIANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Kail"

ZIRX CONSUMER: Settlement in "Pascual" Has Final Approval

* CPLR Article 9 Useful for Consumer Class Action Plaintiffs


                         Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Baby Powder Talc Leads to $417MM in Cancer Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Units Lose First Jury Trial
ASBESTOS UPDATE: FACT Act Won't Prevent Abuse of Double-Dipping
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burnt Shed in Nottinghamshire Has Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Madison County Negligent in Dealing with Asbestos

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Lee Issues New MSC for Asbestos Cases
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Phoenix Not Covered for $1.5MM Suit Costs
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ex-Pullman Standard Worker Exposed to Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Schools in Queensland Closed Due to Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Worried About Safety After Asbestos Find

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-related Work Site Violations on Rise
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Simmons Secures $4.6MM Jury Verdict vs. Jenkins
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Confirmed in Innisfil Library
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5th Cir. Nixes $2.5MM Excess Coverage Ruling
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Files Suit vs. Beazer Over Asbestos Exposure

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Woman Alleges Cancer Caused by Asbestos Exposure
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Construction Co. Fined for Asbestos Release
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Stoush Erupts Over Asbestos Claims at Mills
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in Madison County Govt Center
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Affirms Duro Indemnity Contribution

ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Volkswagen Dismissed in "Haynes"
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bid for Rule 11 Sanctions vs. Borg-Warner Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Summary Judgment on Damages in "Storer" Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Lone Star in "Roper" Dropped





                            *********


20/20 COMMUNICATIONS: Cobble Moves to Certify Class of Managers
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled JAMES COBBLE, on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated v. 20/20 COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., A Foreign Profit Corporation, Case No. 2:17-cv-00053-TAV-
MCLC (E.D. Tenn.), files an expedited motion to conditionally
certify collective action and facilitate notice to potential opt-
in plaintiffs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Cobble, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
seeks entry of an order permitting, under court supervision,
notice to all "Field Sales Managers" employed by the Defendant
within the last three years, who did not receive full and proper
payment of time-and-a-half wages for all overtime hours worked for
the Defendant.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=UIMSs9tI

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A
          600 North Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 318-0268
          Facsimile: (954) 327-30313
          E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com


ABMAR GK US: Mall Inaccessible to Wheelchair, "Brito" Says
----------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS G. BRITO, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated mobility-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v. Abmar GK US,
LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company and Big Lots Stores,
Inc., an Ohio Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01959 (D.
Colo., August 14, 2017), seeks injunctive relief, a declaration of
rights, attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and costs pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Abmar GK US, LLC and Big Lots Stores, Inc., own and operate
shopping plazas, Union Square Center and Big Lots at Union Square,
located at 5035-5085 N. Academy Blvd., Colorado Springs, CO 80918.

Plaintiff allegedly could not access parking spaces designated for
the disabled due to its incline and lack of access aisles in order
to unload and transfer from his car. Aisles, fixtures, tables and
displays of the establishment are too narrow for wheelchairs, he
adds. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Anthony J. Perez, Esq.
      GARCIA-MENOCAL, & PEREZ, P.L.
      4937 SW 74th Court, No. 3
      Miami, FL 33155
      Telephone: (305) 553-3464
      Facsimile: (305) 553-3031
      E-Mail: ajperezlaw@gmail.com
              agmlaw@bellsouth.net
              mpomares@lawgmp.com


ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in Eastern District of NY
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Account Control
Technology, Inc. The case is styled as Nataliya Pinyuk, on behalf
of herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff
v. Account Control Technology, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
05058 (E.D. N.Y., August 26, 2017).

Account Control Technology, Inc. is a debt collector agency.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


AL LARSON: Faces "Ledezma" Suit in California Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against AL Larson Boat Shop,
a California Corporation. The case is styled as Jose Ledezma, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AL
Larson Boat Shop, a California Corporation and Does 1 to 100,
Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC673902 (Cal. Super. Ct., August
25, 2017).

AL Larson Boat Shop is a boat repair shop.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph Lavi, Esq.
   Lavi & Ebrahimian, LLP
   8889 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 200
   Beverly Hills, CA 90211
   Fax: (310) 432-0001
   Tel: (310) 432-0000
   Email: jlavi@lelawfirm.com


AMERICAN CORADIUS: Faces "Gavzer" Lawsuit Alleging TCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ADAM GAVZER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN CORADIUS INTERNATIONAL LLC, and
DOES 1-10 Defendants, Case No: 4:17-cv-04481-DMR (N.D. Cal.,
August 7, 2017), alleges that ACI routinely made collection and
other calls to persons using automatic telephone dialing systems
(ATDS) and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The case claims Plaintiff received unauthorized calls that harmed
Plaintiff because they caused him to suffer a nuisance and an
invasion of privacy. Further, the calls wasted Plaintiff's time
and money, as they required him to take time out of his schedule
to deal with them, they trespassed on his use of the phone for
which he was charged a monthly fee, they used up space on his
voicemail, and they depleted the battery on his cellular
telephone.

ACI is in the business of debt collection, and attempts to and
does collect debt from consumers throughout the United States.
Plaintiff is among those persons whose cellular telephone number
AMERICAN CORADIUS INTERNATIONAL LLC called while attempting to
collect a debt from a borrower who is not a party to this
action.[BN]

The Plaintiffs is represented by:

     Bryan Kemnitzer, Esq.
     Nancy Barron, Esq.
     Kristin Kemnitzer, Esq.
     KEMNITZER, BARRON, & KRIEG, LLP
     445 Bush St., 6th Floor
     San Francisco, CA 94108
     Phone: (415) 632-1900
     Email: bryan@kbklegal.com
            nancy@kbklegal.com
            kristin@kbklegal.com

        - and -

     IAN LYNGKLIP, Esq.
     PRIYA BALI, Esq.
     LYNGKLIP & ASSOCIATES, PLC
     24500 Northwestern Hwy #206
     Southfield, MI 48075
     Phone: (248) 208-8864
     Email: ian@michiganconsumerlaw.com
            priya@michiganconsumerlaw.com


AMERICAN PARA: "Sanchez" Suit Remanded to California State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, remanded the case
captioned SHANNON SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN PARA
PROFESSIONAL SYSTEMS INC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-
01835-EJD(N.D. Cal.) to the Santa Clara County Superior Court on
the basis that the Defendants have failed to show that the amount
in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.

On Feb. 27, 2017, Sanchez filed the action against APPS in Santa
Clara County Superior Court, alleging a variety of labor
violations.  The complaint was styled as both a class action and a
Private Attorney General Action under the California Private
Attorney General Act ("PAGA").  On March 31, the Defendants
removed the action to the Court under the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA").  Sanchez now moves to remand on the basis that the
amount in controversy is less than CAFA's $5 million
jurisdictional threshold.

Judge Davila finds that APPS has not established that the amount
in controversy exceeds CAFA's $5 million threshold.  Under APPS'
calculation, the total amount in controversy (excluding PAGA
claims) is approximately $5.3 million.   Penalties under Section
1197.1 amount to approximately $1.8 million.  Thus, excluding
Section 1197.1 penalties, the amount in controversy is less than
$5 million.  The Judge also finds that an award of attorneys' fees
is unwarranted APPS' basis for removal was objectively reasonable
because it was based on good-faith calculations of the amount in
controversy.

Accordingly, Judge Davila granted Sanchez's motion to remand and
denied Sanchez's request for attorneys' fees.  He directed the
Clerk to remand the case to Santa Clara County Superior Court and
close the file.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/HGIjOl from Leagle.com.

Shannon Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Larry W. Lee --
lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C..

Shannon Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Nicholas Rosenthal --
nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group & William Lucas
Marder, Polaris Law Group, LLP.

American Para Professional Systems Inc, Defendant, represented by
Alan Victor Friedman -- Alan.Friedman@mto.com -- Munger Tolles &
Olson LLP, Terry Edward Sanchez -- Terry.Sanchez@mto.com -- Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP & Marja-Liisa Overbeck -- Mari.Overbeck@mto.com
-- Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP.

A.P.P.S OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant, represented by Alan Victor
Friedman, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Terry Edward Sanchez, Munger
Tolles & Olson LLP & Marja-Liisa Overbeck, Munger, Tolles & Olson
LLP.


APOLLO EDUCATION: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Lomingkit" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rameses Te Lomingkit, Government of Guam Retirement
Fund and National Shopmen Pension Fund filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit titled Rameses Lomingkit, et al. v.
Apollo Education Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-00689-JAT,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 7,
2017, Judge James A. Teilborg granted in part the Defendants'
Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Moving Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss; and granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
[Plaintiffs'] Second Amended Complaint.

The lawsuit is a consolidated class action proceeding.  Defendant
Apollo is an Arizona-based company that owns and operates
proprietary postsecondary educational institutions and is one of
the largest private education providers in the world.  In
particular, University of Phoenix ("UOP") is Apollo's largest
university, accounting for approximately 90% of Apollo's total
enrollment and revenues.  The remaining Defendants are various
individuals who served as Apollo's officers and directors between
Nov. 13, 2013 and Oct. 21, 2015 ("Class Period").  The Plaintiffs
purchased Apollo stock during the Class Period.

The appellate case is captioned as Rameses Lomingkit, et al. v.
Apollo Education Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-16634, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by September 12, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on October 12, 2017;

   -- Appellants Government of Guam Retirement Fund, Rameses Te
      Lomingkit and National Shopmen Pension Fund's opening brief
      is due on November 22, 2017;

   -- Appellees Apollo Education Group, Inc., Gregory W.
      Cappelli, Peter V. Sperling and Brian L. Swartz's answering
      brief is due on December 22, 2017;

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants RAMESES TE LOMINGKIT, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, and NATIONAL SHOPMEN
PENSION FUND are represented by:

          Robert Russell Henssler, Jr., Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: bhenssler@rgrdlaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellant GOVERNMENT OF GUAM RETIREMENT FUND is
represented by:

          Richard Glenn Himelrick, Esq.
          TIFFANY & BOSCO, P.A.
          2525 E. Camelback Road, 7th Floor
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (602) 255-6021
          Facsimile: (602) 255-0103
          E-mail: rgh@tblaw.com

               - and -

          Brandon Marsh, Esq.
          Blair Allen Nicholas, Esq.
          David Stickney, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          12481 High Bluff Drive
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 793-0070
          E-mail: brandon.marsh@blbglaw.com
                  blairn@blbglaw.com
                  davids@blbglaw.com

Defendants-Appellees APOLLO EDUCATION GROUP, INC., PETER V.
SPERLING, GREGORY W. CAPPELLI and BRIAN L. SWARTZ are represented
by:

          Michael Bongiorno, Esq.
          WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
          7 World Trade Center
          250 Greenwich Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 937-7220
          Facsimile: (212) 230-8888
          E-mail: michael.bongiorno@wilmerhale.com

               - and -

          Brian K. Mosley, Esq.
          David B. Rosenbaum, Esq.
          OSBORN MALEDON, PA
          2929 N. Central Avenue
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (602) 640-9379
          E-mail: bmosley@omlaw.com
                  drosenbaum@omlaw.com


ARCONIC INC: Sells Reynobond for Wrong Uses, "Howard" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN HOWARD, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. ARCONIC INC. and KLAUS KLEINFELD, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01057-MRH (W.D. Pa., August 11, 2017), is a securities class
action on behalf of all purchasers of Arconic common or preferred
stock between November 4, 2013, and June 26, 2017, inclusive
seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Throughout the Class Period, without alerting investors, Arconic
knowingly marketed and sold its Reynobond panels with a
combustible, Polyethylene core for inappropriate uses, such as for
use on residential high-rise towers, the Plaintiff alleges.

On June 14, 2017, fire consumed a 24-story housing block, the
Grenfell Tower, in London, United Kingdom, killing at least 79 and
injuring 70 people.  Investigators believe that the speed with
which the Grenfell Tower fire spread resulted from Arconic's
Reynobond siding that clad the building's exterior.  Because of
Arconic's siding, the flames spread from the outside of the
building, engulfing the building in a cylinder of fire.

Arconic is a global provider of lightweight multi-material
solutions, focused on the aerospace market in addition to serving
the automotive, industrial gas turbine, commercial transportation,
and building and construction markets.  The Company also provides
titanium, aluminum, nickel-based super alloy, and specialty alloy
solutions.  Arconic is incorporated in Pennsylvania and its
corporate center is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Klaus Kleinfeld was, until forced to resign in April 2017, the
Chairman of Arconic's Board of Directors and its Chief Executive
Office.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Jacob A. Goldberg, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          101 Greenwood Avenue, Suite 440
          Jenkintown, PA 19046
          Telephone: (215) 600-2817
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com

               - and -

          Laurence Rosen, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com


ATOSSA GENETICS: 9th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE ATOSSA GENETICS INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION. MIKO LEVI; BANDAR ALMOSA; GREGORY HARRISON; NICHOLAS
COOK, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ATOSSA GENETICS, INC.; STEVEN
C. QUAY, an individual; CHRISTOPHER BENJAMIN, an individual; KYLE
GUSE, an individual; SHU-CHIH CHEN, an individual; JOHN BARNHART,
an individual; STEPHEN J. GALLI, an individual; ALEXANDER CROSS,
an individual; H. LAWRENCE REMMEL, an individual, Defendants-
Appellees, No. 14-35933(9th Cir.), Judge Ronald M. Gould of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and vacated in part, the district court's
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' amended securities fraud class action
complaint; and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with his opinion.

Atossa develops and markets products used to detect precancerous
conditions that foreshadow the development of breast cancer.  In
2009, Atossa acquired the patent rights to a product called the
Mammary Aspirate Specimen Cytology Test System ("MASCT System").
The MASCT System is a pump designed to extract nipple aspirate
fluid ("NAF") from women's breasts, after which the NAF can be
used to detect or predict breast cancer.

Before Atossa purchased the patent rights to the MASCT system, the
product had been cleared by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
pursuant to a procedure called "premarket notification," or the
"510(k) process."

After first marketing the MASCT System as a standalone product,
Atossa began to market it in combination with a diagnostic tool
called the ForeCYTE Test.  Atossa never obtained FDA clearance for
either the ForeCYTE Test or the combination of the MASCT System
and the ForeCYTE Test.

In November of 2012, Atossa raised capital through an initial
public offering ("IPO").  As part of the IPO, Atossa filed
offering documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), which described the MASCT System as cleared by the FDA.
The documents did not state whether the ForeCYTE Test had been
FDA-cleared.  At the time of the IPO, Atossa thought that it could
market the ForeCYTE Test without seeking FDA clearance, but also
thought that the FDA was likely to require such clearance in the
future.

Following the IPO, Atossa and Quay made the public statements at
issue in this appeal.  First, on Dec. 20, 2012, Atossa filed a
Form 8-K report with the SEC, announcing Atossa's financial
results for the third quarter of 2012.  In the same filing, Atossa
describes itself as focused on preventing breast cancer through
the commercialization of patented, FDA-cleared diagnostic medical
devices and patented, laboratory developed tests that can detect
precursors to breast cancer up to eight years before mammography.

On February 22, 2013, News-Medical.Net published an interview with
Quay wherein he was asked about "the new test developed by Atossa
Genetics."  Two days before the interview was published, on Feb.
20, 2013, the FDA sent a warning letter to Atossa.  The letter
stated that during an inspection of Atossa's laboratory, the FDA
discovered that Atossa had modified the method by which the MASCT
system collected NAF, without Atossa obtaining a new 510(k)
clearance.  According to the FDA, this meant that the MASCT System
was misbranded and adulterated in violation of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  The FDA explicitly advised that the
modified MASCT System required submission of a new 510(k)
premarket notification, and that the ForeCYTE Test required
independent clearance before marketing.  The FDA also explicitly
advised that Atossa's website and product labels were displaying
false or misleading statements because they characterized the
MASCT System as "FDA-approved" and the ForeCYTE Test as "FDA
Cleared."

Five days later, on Feb. 25, 2013, Atossa filed a Form 8-K report
with the SEC giving notice that it had received the warning letter
from the FDA.  However, Atossa did not at all mention the FDA's
concerns regarding (i) the ForeCYTE Test's lack of FDA approval,
or (ii) Atossa's false or misleading marketing materials.

On March 15, 2013, Atossa responded to the FDA informing of its
intention to submit a new 510(k) premarket notification for the
MASCT System, and asked the FDA to post Atossa's response on the
FDA's website.

Atossa submitted a new 510(k) premarket notification to the FDA,
but in August of 2013 it withdrew the new notification after
Atossa became aware that the FDA was unlikely to grant a
clearance.  Atossa did not disclose to investors that it withdrew
the new notification.  Meanwhile, on Aug. 14, 2013, Atossa filed a
Form 10-Q quarterly report with the SEC, which stated that Atossa
was reasonably confident in its responses to the FDA's warning
letter.

On Sept. 19, 2013, the FDA told Atossa that it must recall both
the MASCT System and the ForeCYTE Test because Atossa was
marketing the products without FDA clearance.  Six days later on
Sept. 25, 2013, Quay participated in a public webinar via
Moneyshow.com titled "How to Invest Ahead of Breast Cancer
Awareness Month."  Quay did not during that webinar mention the
FDA's recall demand.  On Oct. 4, 2013, Atossa publicly disclosed
that it was recalling the MASCT System and ForeCYTE Test from the
market.

Plaintiff Nicholas Cook filed a putative class action against
Atossa, several of its directors and officers, and three
securities firms that underwrote Atossa's IPO.  The district court
appointed Miko Levi, Bandar Almosa, and Gregory Harrison as the
Lead Plaintiffs.  In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs allege
violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933;
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and SEC Rule 10b-5.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint without
prejudice.  The district court first concluded that the Plaintiffs
lacked statutory standing to assert their Section 11 claims.
Second, the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs did not
plead "materiality" or "falsity" with sufficient particularity for
their Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.  And finally, the
district court concluded that their Section 15 and Section 20(a)
claims, concerning control person liability, failed because such
claims require proof of a primary violation of the securities
laws, which in the district court's view the Plaintiffs did not
properly allege.  In this appeal, the Plaintiffs challenge the
district court's decision only as to the Section 10(b), Section
20(a), and Rule 10b-5 claims.

Judge Gould held that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
that the following were materially false or misleading: (i) Quay's
statement quoted in Atossa's Dec. 20, 2012 Form 8-K filing
describing the ForeCYTE Test as "FDA-cleared"; (ii) Quay's
statement during his interview with News-Medical.Net that the
ForeCYTE test had "gone through all of the FDA clearance process";
(iii) Atossa's Form 8-K filing on Feb. 25, 2013, giving notice of
the FDA's warning letter; and (iv) Quay's statement during his
interview with the Wall Street Transcript that "FDA clearance risk
has been achieved."  As to these alleged misstatements and
omissions, he reversed in part the district court's dismissal of
the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.  As to all
other alleged misstatements and omissions, he affirmed in part the
district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 claims.  Because the district court's dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims was based on its dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, the Judge vacated
the district court's dismissal of the Section 20(a) claims.  He
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with his opinion.  The parties will bear their own costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/EZNETt from Leagle.com.

Marc Ian Gross -- igross@jrlawplc.com -- (argued), Jeremy
Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- and Michael J. Wernke,
Pomerantz LLP, New York, New York; Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- Whitney E. Street -- whitney@blockesq.com --
and Mark A. Delaney, Block & Leviton LLP, Boston, Massachusetts;
Dan Drachler -- ddrachler@zsz.com -- Zwerling Schachter & Zwerling
LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Gregory L. Watts -- gwatts@wsgr.com --(argued), and Barry M.
Kaplan -- bkaplan@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
Seattle, Washington; Cheryl W. Foung -- cfoung@wsgr.com -- Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, California; for Defendants-
Appellees.


BANK OF AMERICA: Faces Class Action Over Stock Loan Collusion
-------------------------------------------------------------
B. Colby Hamilton, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that
calling the $1.72 trillion international stock loan market good
for the banks that do the lending but "bad for virtually everyone
else," a trio of pension funds filed a class action suit against
six of the world's largest financial firms on Aug. 17.

The Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System, Orange County
Employees Retirement System and Sonoma County Employees'
Retirement Association accused the banks of conspiring to violate
federal antitrust laws "to keep stock loan trading frozen in an
inefficient and opaque [over-the-counter] market in order to
preserve their privileged position as intermediaries on every
trade," according to the suit brought in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.

According to the suit, Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Goldman
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley and UBS worked
together since at least 2009 to obstruct efforts to create a
competitive electronic exchange, while using their stranglehold
over the stock loan market to overcharge investors.

Stock lending allows investors to temporarily transfer stock from
one investor to another, and plays a vital role underlying most
short-selling activity, according to the plaintiffs. Short selling
without stock borrowing is illegal under U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission rules, they noted.  The market for securities
on loan today is nearly $2 trillion.

"Through various improper means, the likes of Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley have for years colluded to maintain their power
over this little-known-but-lucrative corner of Wall Street," Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll partner Michael Eisenkraft --
meisenkraft@cohenmilstein.com -- attorney for the plaintiffs, said
in a statement.  "In doing so, they deprive investors of money
that should flow to retirees, families and other hard-working
Americans."

Unlike other financial products that are trade on exchanges,
plaintiffs argue that the banks involved have "yet to embrace
modern electronic trading protocols, and little has changed in the
way trades are executed."

The alleged collusion has worked to block the development of
competitive platforms such as AQS in the United States and SL-x in
Europe.  When firms attempted to use the exchanges, the defendants
allegedly took steps to stop them.  Well-known hedge funds like
SAC Capital and Renaissance Capital were allegedly threatened if
they opted to use AQS.  Bank of America's use of the AQS exchange
resulted in a threat from Goldman Sachs to sever business ties if
it continued, according to the plaintiffs.
Instead, borrowers are forced to use a service called EquiLend,
which is owned by the banks.

The suit is the latest to go after large financial institutions
for allegedly working to deny investors access to open exchanges
not controlled by the banks.  A number of suits have been filed
over swap exchanges, specifically in the wake of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which mandated an
opening up of a number of market exchanges.

Spokespersons for Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Morgan
Stanley and Credit Suisse declined to comment.  A representative
for UBS could not be reached. [GN]


BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB: Health One Appeals Ruling to Sixth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe P.L.L.C. filed an
appeal from a court ruling entered in its lawsuit entitled Health
One Medical Center, Eastpointe P.L.L.C. v. Mohawk, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 5:16-cv-13815, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 3,
2017, the Hon. Judith E. Levy granted the Defendants' motions to
dismiss the lawsuit.  Because the amended complaint is dismissed,
the Plaintiff's motion to certify the class is denied as moot,
according to the Court's opinion and order.

Health One filed the putative class action against the Defendants
for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
and acts constituting common law conversion and statutory
conversion under Michigan law.

The appellate case is captioned as Health One Medical Center,
Eastpointe P.L.L.C. v. Mohawk, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-1973, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant brief is due on October 2, 2017;

   -- Appellee brief is due on October 30, 2017; and

   -- A Telephone Mediation conference has been scheduled for
      September 14, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. (ET) with Mariann
      Yevin.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant HEALTH ONE MEDICAL CENTER, EASTPOINTE
P.L.L.C., a Michigan Professional Limited Liability Company,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly-
situated persons, is represented by:

          Phillip Andrew Bock, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 658-5500
          Facsimile: (312) 658-5555
          E-mail: phil@classlawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY is represented by:

          Debra L. Bogo-Ernst, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          71 S. Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-0600
          Facsimile: (312) 706-8474
          E-mail: dernst@mayerbrown.com

Defendant-Appellee PFIZER, INC., is represented by:

          Rebecca J. Schwartz, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
          2555 Grand Boulevard
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 474-6550
          Facsimile: (816) 421-5547
          E-mail: rschwartz@shb.com


CABELA'S INC: Ex-Investors Drop Class Action Over Bass Pro Sale
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tom McParland, writing for Delaware Business Court Insider,
reports that four investors in Cabela's Inc. on July 27 dropped
class action claims accusing the outdoor sporting retailer of
failing to disclose important details related to the company's $5
billion sale to Bass Pro Shops, saying that Cabela's has addressed
its concerns with additional disclosures.

The company was represented by James W. Ducayet --
jducayet@sidley.com -- Nilofer Umar -- numar@sidley.com -- and
Simone Jones -- simone.jones@sidley.com -- of Sidley Austin and
Chad M. Shandler -- shandler@rlf.com -- and Christine Dealy Haynes
-- haynes@rlf.com -- of Richards, Layton & Finger.

The plaintiffs were represented by Van Gorder and Brian D. Long
and Gina M. Serra of Rigrodsky & Long.

The consolidated case was captioned In re Cabela's Stockholder
Litigation.


CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Gendreau Appeals Decision to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Timothy Gendreau filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Timothy Gendreau v. California Physicians'
Service, et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-02455-CAB-AGS, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Diego and removed to the District
Court.  The case alleges violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Timothy Gendreau v. California
Physicians' Service, et al., Case No. 17-56227, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Timothy Gendreau's opening brief is due on
      October 13, 2017;

   -- Appellees Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance
      Company and California Physicians' Service's answering
      brief is due on November 13, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant TIMOTHY GENDREAU, individually and on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Gayle M. Blatt, Esq.
          David S. Casey, Jr., Esq.
          Jeremy Keith Robinson, Esq.
          CASEY, GERRY, SCHENK, FRANCAVILLA, BLATT
          & PENFIELD, LLP
          110 Laurel Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1811
          Facsimile: (619) 544-9232
          E-mail: gmb@cglaw.com
                  dcasey@cglaw.com
                  jrobinson@cglaw.com

Defendants-Appellees CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE, DBA Blue
Shield of California, and BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA LIFE & HEALTH
INSURANCE COMPANY are represented by:

          John Michael LeBlanc, Esq.
          John T. Fogarty, Esq.
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          11355 West Olympic Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 312-4228
          Facsimile: (310) 914-5866
          E-mail: jleblanc@manatt.com


CARLTON MANOR: 6th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "McKinney"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DEBI MCKINNEY, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARLTON MANOR
NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER, INC., et al., Defendants, SOVRAN
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, No. 16-3895 (6th
Cir.), Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting
summary judgment for Sovran.

In July 2013, the Ohio Department of Health cited Carlton Manor
for failing to meet 27 of the federal health and safety
regulations.  It ordered the nursing home to come into compliance
by January 2014, with the warning that it would lose its status as
a Medicare and Medicaid provider if it did not.  The nursing home
hired Sovran, a management consultant for nursing homes, to help
correct the problems.

By January 2014, the nursing home had resolved 26 of the
deficiencies.  Yet the 27th, the physical structure of the
building, proved more difficult to fix.  In consultation with
Sovran, the nursing home presented the Department with a 12-month
plan to repair the building.  That was not enough.  In mid-
January, the Department rejected the plan and began the process of
revoking the nursing home's operating license.  The nursing home
closed soon after.

Carlton Manor gave little notice to its employees about the
closure.  In response, McKinney filed this putative class action
against the nursing home and Sovran under the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act.  The Act requires employers to
give employees 60 days' notice before they close a plant.  Carlton
Manor defaulted, and the district court entered a judgment against
it.  That did not do the employees much good, because the nursing
home had no assets for the employees to collect.  That left
Sovran, the only solvent Defendant in the case.  But that did not
help either.  The district court concluded that Sovran was not
liable under the Act because the nursing home, not Sovran, was the
employer, and the nursing home, not Sovran, decided to close the
facility.  As a result, the district court reasoned, Sovran had no
obligation to warn the nursing home workers of the closing.  It
granted summary judgment for Sovran and thus had no need to rule
on McKinney's class certification motion.  McKinney appealed.

Judge Sutton explains that a lender-borrower relationship, in
which the loan agreement allows the lender to take control of a
borrower who cannot repay a loan, offers a poor analogy to a
consultant-consultee relationship that is arm's length from
beginning to end.

Sovran offered management advice to Carlton Manor at the nursing
home's behest and did not become the owner of the nursing home in
the process.  The consulting arrangement allowed the nursing home
to ask Sovran to leave at any time.  And it allowed the management
consultant to leave as well, which is just what it did after
helping Carlton Manor make the necessary arrangements to shut down
the nursing home.  Thus, the district court ruled as a matter of
law for Sovran.  Accordingly, Judge Sutton affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/n4cMdU from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Samuel Heldman -- sheldman@gmail.com -- THE GARDNER FIRM,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

ON BRIEF: Samuel Heldman, THE GARDNER FIRM, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.

Mary E. Olsen, M. Vance McCrary -- vmccrary@thegardnerfirm.com --
THE GARDNER FIRM, Mobile, Alabama, Kenneth R. Cookson --
kcookson@keglerbrown.com -- KEGLER BROWN HILL & RITTER, Columbus,
Ohio, for Appellant.


CENTENE MANAGEMENT: Faces "Gudger" Suit Alleging FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
JODY GUDGER, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CENTENE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, a Foreign Limited
Liability Company, and SUNSHINE STATE HEALTH PLAN, INC, Florida
Profit Corporation, Defendant, Case No: 2:17-cv-14281-JEM (S.D.
Fla., August 7, 2017), alleges that Plaintiff and similarly
situated class members regularly worked in excess of sixty (60)
hours per week from the beginning of her/their employment until
Defendants changed their policy to prohibit overtime hours from
being worked starting on or April 16, 2017.

Throughout her/their employment, Defendants failed to compensate
Plaintiff and similarly situated class members at a rate of one
and one-half times their regular rate for all hours worked in
excess of forty (40) hours in a single workweek, says the
complaint.  Further, Defendants allegedly failed to track or
maintain any valid records of the number of hours worked by
Plaintiff and did not maintain a time-keeping system for employees
that complied with the Fair Labor Standards Act's record keeping
requirement

Defendants are owned by the Centene Corporation, a multi-line
healthcare enterprise.  Plaintiff provided case management and
care coordination services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs is represented by:

     Richard Celler, Esq.
     Noah E. Storch, Esq.
     RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.
     7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
     Davie, FL 33314
     Phone: (866) 344-9243
     Fax: (954) 337-2771
     Email: richard@floridaovertimelawyer.com
            noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com


CHAPEI LLC: Court Denies Wang's Bid to Certify Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Michael A. Shipp denied the Weigang Wang and Hailong Yu's
motion to certify collective action in the lawsuit titled WEIGANG
WANG, et al. v. CHAPEI LLC d/b/a WOK EMPIRE, et al., Case No.
3:15-cv-02950-MAS-DEA (D.N.J.).

The Court has considered the parties' submissions and decides the
matter without oral argument, according to the order.  For the
reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, and for
other good cause shown, the Motion is denied.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=RX2cdpXY


CHRYSLER: Briefs Filed in Jeep Grand Cherokee Gas Tank Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Katheryn Hayes Tucker, writing for Daily Report, reports that as
their battle over a multimillion-dollar judgment heads to the
Georgia Supreme Court, lawyers for the family of Remi Walden and
the maker of the Jeep vehicle in which he died have filed briefs
framing two dramatically different views of the same trial.

Chrysler's lead appellate counsel, Thomas Dupree Jr., a
Washington, D.C.-based partner with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and
plaintiffs' lead attorney, Jim Butler Jr. of Butler Wooten & Peak,
have offered starkly contrasting stories, even about the tragedy
that led them to litigate.

Here's Chrysler's opening: "This case involves a $150 million
personal injury award resulting from an automobile accident. Four-
year-old Remington Walden was killed when the 1999 Jeep Grand
Cherokee in which he was riding was rear-ended at highway speed
and caught fire.  The driver of the other vehicle, Bryan Harrell,
pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide and is now in prison.  Even
though it was undisputed that Harrell caused the accident,
Plaintiffs (the parents of Remington Walden) sued Chrysler along
with Harrell for wrongful death, challenging the design of the
Grand Cherokee's rear-mounted fuel tank."

Here's a small part of what Butler wrote about that Jeep:
"Remington Walden burned to death because FCA/Chrysler placed the
gas tank behind the rear axle of its Jeep.  That was unnecessary:
FCA stipulated that it could have located the gas tank midships,
in front of the rear axle. . . . The evidence proved that Chrysler
had long known that mounting a gas tank behind the rear axle was
dangerous."

The briefs recounted the nine-day trial in South Georgia's
Bainbridge before Decatur County Superior Court Judge J. Kevin
Chason in March and April of 2015.

From Chrysler: "What should have been a straightforward trial
about vehicle design soon spiraled out of control, as the trial
court allowed Plaintiffs to introduce evidence and make arguments
that had no relevance to the issues the jury was asked to decide,
but were intended to incite the jury's passions by whipping up
prejudice against a large corporate defendant and to set the stage
for the verdict that followed."

Chrysler alleged Judge Chason was wrong to allow the plaintiffs to
mention the CEO's pay.

"Over Chrysler's repeated objections, Plaintiffs introduced
evidence of the compensation and benefits Chrysler paid its
chairman and CEO Sergio Marchionne, despite the general rule in
Georgia that 'evidence of the wealth or worldly circumstances of a
party is never admissible, unless in those exceptional cases where
position or wealth is necessarily involved.'"

But Mr. Butler countered that Chrysler has changed its tactics: He
wrote that the company "waived its newly-created argument that if
the existence of incentive compensation was admissible, the amount
was not, by failing to make that argument at trial" or at the
Court of Appeals.  "At trial, FCA's objection was to the entirety
of the evidence, and FCA did not object separately to the amount.
If any part of the evidence was admissible, it was not error to
admit it all."

The Walden brief said the jury determined that the company "acted
with a reckless or wanton disregard for human life" and failed to
warn of the hazard it created.

There was a third view of the trial--from a video camera.
Courtroom View Network filmed the trial and produced the video on
its website.  At the Daily Report's request, CVN provided a clip
of a key part of Mr. Butler's closing argument.

Butler tried the case with a team that included his son,
Jeb Butler of Butler Tobin.  They split closing.  The senior
Butler followed a Chrysler lawyer who had argued that the award
for pain and suffering should be limited because the boy only
lived a minute after the Jeep gas tank exploded into flames and
that the child's ordeal was "mercifully short."

Mr. Butler took off his watch, set it for one minute, laid it on
the podium and asked the jury for 60 seconds of silence.  "Now.
Start thinking about what Remi went through," Mr. Butler said.
The courtroom was dead quiet. At the end of the minute,
Mr. Butler said "time."

That minute could have been worth the $30 million awarded in the
verdict for pain and suffering. [GN]


CITGO: Settles Unsolicited Text Message Class Action for $8.3MM
---------------------------------------------------------------
Katheryn Hayes Tucker, writing for Daily Business Review, reports
that attorneys have reached a settlement agreement worth $8.3
million in a class action lawsuit over unsolicited text messages
tied to sweepstakes entries.

The potential class representative, Matthew Gottlieb, filed a
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement with CITGO on Aug.
8 in the Southern District of Florida.  If U.S. District Judge
Robin Rosenberg in West Palm Beach approves, the deal would end a
lawsuit over alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, and Gottlieb will share $8 million with 93,000
cell phone users.

After legal fees -- which could be up to a third of the $8 million
-- the plaintiffs could pocket about $56 per text.  The Texas-
based petroleum company has agreed to pay another $300,000 for
settlement and class notice administration costs.

"It's a good result. Our law firm is very proud of the work we've
done for the class," said class counsel Jeff Ostrow --
ostrow@kolawyers.com -- of Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg
Gilbert in Fort Lauderdale.

Mr. Ostrow's team includes Scott Edelsberg and Avi Kaufman of his
firm plus Andrew Shamis of Shamis & Gentile in Miami.

CITGO chief counsel is Scott Solberg -- ssolberg@eimerstahl.com --
of Eimer Stahl in Chicago. He had no immediate comment.

The motion said the parties came to agreement after a second full-
day mediation session with David Lichter, a litigator and
arbitration special master on July 19.  The parties "executed a
term sheet memorializing their understanding" and filed a notice
of settlement with the court, the motion said.

Here's the history of the case, according to the motion.  "On July
31, 2015, Plaintiff, Matthew Gottlieb, entered two of the CITGO-
sponsored sweepstakes contests while attending a concert in West
Palm Beach, Florida.  In late 2016, CITGO sponsored several new
sweepstakes contests and it used the services of Black Canyon and
mGage to market those contests to the mobile phone numbers of many
of the people who had entered the prior sweepstakes contests,
including Plaintiff.  In total, Plaintiff received three text
messages from CITGO in 2016: one in August, one in October and one
in November.  Some combination of these three text messages were
sent to approximately 93,000 mobile phone numbers belonging to
people who, similar to Plaintiff, had previously entered other
CITGO-sponsored sweepstakes contests."

Mr. Gottlieb filed the lawsuit last November, and discovery
started in February.  The motion said CITGO responded with 100,000
pages of paper and electronic documents to be reviewed by the
class counsel and data expert.

The motion called the battle "hard fought" up to this point and
added that the settlement, if approved, "will bring an end to what
has otherwise been, and likely would continue to be, contentious
and costly litigation centered on unsettled legal questions." [GN]


CITIBANK NA: NY Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint
("FAC") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a legally sufficient and plausible claim.

The case is FRONTPOINT ASIAN EVENT DRIVEN FUND, L.P., and SONTERRA
CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITIBANK, N.A., CITIGROUP INC.,
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., JPMORGAN CHASE
& CO., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC,
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC, RBS SECURITIES JAPAN
LIMITED, UBS AG, UBS SECURITIES JAPAN CO. LTD., ING GROEP N.V.,
ING BANK N.V., ING CAPITAL MARKETS LLC, BNP PARIBAS, S.A., BNP
PARIBAS NORTH AMERICA, INC., BNP PARIBAS SECURITIES CORP., BNP
PARIBAS PRIME BROKERAGE, INC., OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION
LTD., BARCLAYS PLC, BARCLAYS BANK PLC, BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC.,
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, CREDIT AGRICOLE CORPORATE AND INVESTMENT BANK,
CREDIT AGRICOLE S.A., CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, CREDIT SUISSE AG,
CREDIT SUISSE INTERNATIONAL, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STANDARD
CHARTERED PLC, DBS BANK LTD., DBS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD, DBS VICKERS
SECURITIES (USA) INC., UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LIMITED, UOB GLOBAL
CAPITAL, LLC, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP, LTD., ANZ
SECURITIES, INC., THE BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI UFJ, LTD., THE
HONGKONG SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, HSBC BANK USA,
N.A., HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS INC., HSBC
USA INC., MACQUARIE BANK LTD., MACQUARIE GROUP LTD., COMMERZBANK
AG, AND JOHN DOES NOS. 1-50, Defendants, No. 16 Civ. 5263
(AKH)(S.D. N.Y.).

The Singapore Interbank Offered Rate ("SIBOR") and the Singapore
Swap Offer Rate ("SOR") are related benchmark interest rates that
are meant to reflect the cost of borrowing funds in the Singapore
market.  Both SIBOR and SOR are administered by the Association of
Banks in Singapore ("ABS"), a trade group made up of many of the
Defendants in this case.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the class period, trillions of
dollars of SIBOR- and SOR-based derivatives -- that is, financial
derivatives that incorporate SIBOR and/or SOR as a component of
price -- were traded within the United States, including interest
rate swaps, forward rate agreements, foreign exchange swaps and
foreign exchange forwards.

They allege that in June 2013, the Monetary Authority of Singapore
("MAS"), Singapore's central bank and financial regulator,
announced that it had uncovered a massive conspiracy by the
Defendants to rig the prices of financial derivatives that
incorporate SIBOR and/or SOR as a component of price.  They allege
that MAS uncovered rare 'smoking gun' evidence of anticompetitive
conduct, and that MAS found that several of the Defendants
manipulated SIBOR and SOR.  However, the June 13, 2013 MAS press
release, upon which the Plaintiffs base these allegations,
contains none of these findings.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the U.S. and the U.K. regulators
confirmed MAS' findings that the Defendants manipulated SIBOR and
SOR.  Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission found that defendants Deutsche Bank, RBS, and
UBS all manipulated SIBOR and SOR during the Class Period and
engaged in similar misconduct to the methods these Defendants used
to manipulate other financial benchmarks.  They also allege that
the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority, in its settlement with
RBS with respect to LIBOR manipulation, found that RBS traders
made at least 34 written requests to manipulate SIBOR and SOR.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs allege what they describe as "economic
evidence," which they present as proof that SIBOR and SOR were
manipulated during the relevant period.

The Plaintiffs allege five bases of personal jurisdiction against
the Foreign Defendants.  First, they allege that certain
Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege and
benefit of trading foreign exchange and/or interest rate
derivatives, including SIBOR- and SOR-based derivatives, in the
United States.  Second, they allege, generally, that the
Defendants purposefully directed their wrongful conduct at the
United States.  Third, they allege that the Defendants' illegal
conduct had direct, substantial, and foreseeable effects on
commerce in the United States.  Fourth, the Plaintiffs allege that
certain defendants consented to general jurisdiction in New York
by registering New York branches with the New York State
Department of Financial Services pursuant to New York Banking Law
Section 200.  Lastly, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
Deutsche Bank consented to jurisdiction in New York by entering
into an ISDA Master Agreement with plaintiff FrontPoint, under
which the parties agreed to the jurisdiction of the courts of New
York and United States District Courts of the Southern District of
New York.

The Foreign Defendants move pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and
12(b)(3) to dismiss the FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction and
venue; and also move pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the FAC for lack of standing and for failure to state a
claim.

Judge Hellerstein granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion as follows:

     a. The Foreign Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction is granted.  All claims against the Foreign
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend
to make plausible allegations of personal jurisdiction over the
Foreign Defendants.

     b. The Defendants' (Australia and New Zealand Banking Group,
Ltd.; Barclays plc; Barclays Bank plc; BNP Paribas, S.A.; Credit
Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank; Credit Agricole S.A.;
Credit Suisse Group AG; Credit Suisse AG; Credit Suisse
International; Commerzbank AG; DBS Bank Ltd.; DBS Group Holdings
Ltd; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Holdings plc; ING Groep N.V.; ING Bank
N.V.; Macquarie Bank Ltd.; Macquarie Group Ltd.; The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc; The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc; RBS Securities
Japan Ltd.; Standard Chartered Bank; Standard Chartered PLC; The
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.; The Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corp. Ltd.; The Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd.; UBS
AG, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd.; and United Overseas Bank Ltd.)
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of Article III standing
is denied.

     c. The Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I (antitrust) as
alleged by Plaintiff FrontPoint is denied as alleged against the
Defendants who served on the SIBOR panel (Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group, Bank of America N.A., The Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., BNP Paribas, Citibank N.A., Credit Suisse
AG, DBS Bank Ltd., Deutsche Bank AG, The Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Ltd., ING Bank N.V., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd, The Royal Bank of
Scotland PLC, Standard Chartered Bank, UBS AG, and the United
Overseas Bank Ltd.),  but is granted with respect to all other
Defendants, for failure to sufficiently allege their involvement
in the conspiracy.  FrontPoint is granted leave to amend to make
plausible allegations showing the non-panel Defendants'
involvement in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.

     d. The Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I (antitrust) as
alleged by Plaintiff Sonterra is granted, for failure to establish
any connection between the Defendants' conduct and its alleged
injury.  Sonterra's antitrust claim, based on an alleged
conspiracy to manipulate SIBOR and/or SOR, is dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to amend to make plausible allegations
showing that the Defendants' alleged manipulation of SIBOR and/or
SOR impacted the price of the currency exchange forwards that
Sonterra traded in.  Plausible allegations showing this connection
are likely to make Sonterra an efficient enforcer.

     e. The Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III (RICO
and RICO conspiracy) is granted.  Counts II and III are dismissed
without prejudice and with leave to amend to make plausible
allegations showing sufficient domestic conduct to support an
extraterritorial application of RICO.

     f. Defendants Deutsche Bank and Citibank's motion to dismiss
Count IV (Frontpoint's claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing) is granted.  Count IV is dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to amend to make plausible allegations
supporting the claim.

     g. The Defendants' motion to dismiss Count V (unjust
enrichment) is granted as a matter of law.  Count V is dismissed
with prejudice and without leave to amend.

The clerk is ordered by the Judge to terminate the motion.  The
Plaintiffs will file a second amended complaint by Sept. 18, 2017.
The Defendants will answer or move by Oct. 18, 2017.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/FJNksp from Leagle.com.

FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, Ltd., Plaintiff, represented
by Geoffrey Milbank Horn -- ghorn@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C..

Sonterra Capital Master Fund, LTD., Plaintiff, represented by
Christian Levis -- clevis@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Lee
Jason Lefkowitz, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Matthew John Acocella --
MAcocella@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Peter Dexter St.
Phillip, Jr. -- pstphilip@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.,
Raymond Peter Girnys -- rgirnys@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg,
P.C., Sitso W. Bediako -- sbediako@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Vincent Briganti -- vbriganti@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C. & Geoffrey Milbank Horn -- ghorn@lowey.com -- Lowey
Dannenberg P.C..

FrontPoint Asian Event Driven Fund, L.P., Plaintiff, represented
by Christian Levis, Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Lee Jason Lefkowitz,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Matthew John Acocella, Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Peter Dexter St. Phillip, Jr., Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.,
Raymond Peter Girnys, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Sitso W. Bediako,
Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg P.C. &
Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey Dannenberg P.C..

Citibank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman --
awiseman@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Andrew D. Lazerow
-- alazerow@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Andrew Arthur
Ruffino -- aruffino@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP & Jamie A.
Heine -- jheine@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, L.L.P..

CitiGroup Inc., Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman,
Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Andrew D. Lazerow, Covington &
Burling, L.L.P., Andrew Arthur Ruffino, Covington & Burling LLP &
Jamie A. Heine, Covington & Burling, L.L.P..

Bank Of America Corporation, Defendant, represented by Arthur J.
Burke -- arthur.burke@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell,
Lawrence Jay Portnoy -- lawrence.portnoy@davispolk.com -- Davis
Polk & Wardwell LLP, Paul Steel Mishkin --
paul.mishkin@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Adam
Gabor Mehes -- adam.mehes@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP & Peter John Davis -- peter.davis@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk
& Wardwell LLP.

Bank of America, N.A., Defendant, represented by Arthur J. Burke,
Davis Polk & Wardwell, Lawrence Jay Portnoy, Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP, Paul Steel Mishkin, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Adam Gabor
Mehes, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP & Peter John Davis, Davis Polk &
Wardwell LLP.

JPMorgan Chase & Co, Defendant, represented by Paul Christopher
Gluckow -- pgluckow@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Thomas C. Rice --  trice@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP, Abram Jeremy Ellis -- aellis@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Alan Craig Turner -- aturner@stblaw.com -- Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Alexander Nuo Li --  zander.li@stblaw.com
-- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Eamonn Wesley Campbell --
eamonn.campbell@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Francis John Acott -- francis.acott@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, Michael Steven Carnevale --
michael.carnevale@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Omari Largos Royter Mason -- omason@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP & Rachel Serenity Sparks Bradley, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Paul
Christopher Gluckow, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Thomas C.
Rice, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Abram Jeremy Ellis, Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Alan Craig Turner, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Alexander Nuo Li, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Eamonn Wesley Campbell, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Francis
John Acott, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Michael Steven
Carnevale, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Omari Largos Royter
Mason, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP & Rachel Serenity Sparks
Bradley, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, Defendant, represented by David Sapir
Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Fraser Lee
Hunter, Jr., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Jamie
Stephen Dycus, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc., Defendant, represented by David
Sapir Lesser -- david.lesser@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Fraser Lee Hunter, Jr. --
fraser.hunter@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Jamie Stephen Dycus -- jamie.dycus@wilmerhale.com --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.

RBS Securities Japan Limited, Defendant, represented by David
Sapir Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Fraser Lee
Hunter, Jr., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Jamie
Stephen Dycus, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.

UBS AG, Defendant, represented by Peter Sullivan --
psullivan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Eric
Jonathan Stock -- estock@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP, Jefferson Eliot Bell -- jbell@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP & Lawrence Jay Zweifach --
lzweifach@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.


CLUBCORP HOLDINGS: Faces "Hopkins" Suit Over Sale to Apollo
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOEL HOPKINS, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CLUBCORP HOLDINGS, INC., JOHN A. BECKERT, DOUGLAS H.
BROOKS, ERIC L. AFFELDT, JANET GROVE, JEFF LAMB, LOU J. GRABOWSKY,
EMANUEL R. PEARLMAN, MARGARET SPELLINGS, WILLIAM E. SULLIVAN,
SIMON M. TURNER, CONSTELLATION CLUB PARENT, INC., CONSTELLATION
MERGER SUB INC., and APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 2:17-
cv-02158-MMD-VCF (D. Nev., August 11, 2017), stems from a proposed
transaction, pursuant to which ClubCorp will be acquired by
affiliates of Apollo Global, Constellation Club Parent, Inc.
("Parent") and Constellation Merger Sub Inc.

On July 9, 2017, ClubCorp's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Apollo.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of
ClubCorp will receive $17.12 per share in cash.

ClubCorp is a Nevada corporation and maintains its headquarters in
Dallas, Texas.  The Individual Defendants are directors and
officers of ClubCorp.  The Company owns or operates more than 200
golf and country clubs, business clubs, sports clubs, and alumni
clubs in twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and two
foreign countries.

Constellation Club Parent, Inc., is Delaware corporation and a
party to the Merger Agreement.  Merger Sub is a Nevada
corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent, and a party to
the Merger Agreement.  The Parent and Merger Sub are affiliates of
Apollo Global.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Gayan, Esq.
          KEMP, JONES & COULTHARD LLP
          Wells Fargo Tower, 17th Floor
          3800 Howard Hughes Parkway
          Las Vegas, NV 89169
          Telephone: (702) 385-6000
          Facsimile: (702) 385-6001
          E-mail: mjg@kempjones.com

               - and -

          Evan J. Smith, Esq.
          Marc L. Ackerman, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510
          Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
          Telephone: (610) 667-6200
          Facsimile: (610) 667-9029
          E-mail: esmith@brodskysmith.com
                  mackerman@brodsky-smith.com


CONTINENTAL CASUALTY: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss "Dolins" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JERROLD DOLINS, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, CNA FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE OF THE CNA 401(k) PLUS PLAN, COMPANY, and
DOES 1-10, Defendants, No. 16 C 8898(N.D. Ill.), Judge Gary
Feinerman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) denied the motions of Continental
Assurance Co. ("CAC") and Northern Trust Co. to dismiss all claims
against them;  and (ii) denied CNA's motion to dismiss Count III
of the Complaint.

Dolins, a former employee of CNA Financial, was a participant in
the CNA 401k Plus Plan, an employee pension benefit plan.  The
Plan was sponsored and administered by Continental Casualty Co.
("CCC"), in which CNA held a controlling interest at all relevant
times.  Northern Trust was the Plan's trustee.  One of the Plan's
investment options was a fund called the CNA Fixed Income Fund.
Until the end of 2011, a core investment of the Fund was a group
annuity contract offered by CAC, which at that time was a wholly
owned subsidiary of CCC and thus an indirect subsidiary of CNA.
The Plan entered into the Contract in 1981.

Prior to the Contract's cancellation, the Contract had earned
returns at or above the 4% floor; it earned a 6.5% gross rate of
return in 2007 and 2008, 6.25% in 2009, 4.55% in 2010, and 4% in
2011.  But following the Contract's cancellation in 2011 -- a year
where the Fund earned a 3.26% return for the Plan -- the Plan
endured several years of declining earnings on assets invested in
the Fund: 3.01% in 2012, 2.21% in 2013, 1.64% in 2014, and 1.54%
in 2015.  Had the Plan not cancelled the Contract, the Plan's
overall earnings during those years almost certainly would have
been higher, because most of the Plan's funds had been invested in
the Contract with its guaranteed a minimum 4% return.  So the
Contract's cancellation likely had significant negative financial
consequences for the Plan.

Dolins alleges that the Contract's cancellation was not made with
his and the other beneficiaries' interests in mind, but rather to
improve CCC's financial position and/or to make CAC a more
attractive target for potential buyers.  Specifically, he alleges
that the Contract's 4% guaranteed minimum return made the Contract
unfavorable to CAC due to the declining interest rates and returns
in the market as a whole, which led CNA to wish to sell CAC thus
giving CNA and CAC an incentive to cancel the Contract.

The complaint seeks relief against Defendants under Sections
502(a)(2) and (a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Sections 1132(a)(2)-(3),
which allow for damages for breach of fiduciary duty and equitable
relief, respectively.  In Count I, the complaint alleges that by
acting to cancel the Contract, the Defendants did not act for the
exclusive benefit of Dolins and the other beneficiaries, and did
not exercise ordinary care in engaging in the transaction.  Count
II alleges that the Contract's cancellation was a prohibited
transaction under Section 406(b), 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(b).
Count III alleges that the Contract's cancellation was a
prohibited transaction under Section 406(a), 29 U.S.C. Section
1106(a).  And Count IV alleges that the Defendants (other than
CAC) are liable as co-fiduciaries on the theory that each
knowingly participated in the others' breaches of the others'
fiduciary duties.

CAC and Northern Trust move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims against them, while the CNA
Defendants move to dismiss Count III.  Dolins requests for damages
relief against CAC.

Judge Feinerman explains that the Contract effectively gave the
Plan the right to a dollar amount from CAC equal to the difference
between a 4% return and whatever the Plan otherwise have earned
from the Contract.  The Contract's termination effectively
transferred that right back to CAC, for it no longer had to make
good on its 4% guarantee.  Moreover, because CAC was partially
owned by CNA, which was a party in interest as the employer of
Plan beneficiaries, the transfer was to a party in interest.  And
having alleged that a Plan asset was transferred to a party in
interest, Dolins has properly pleaded the occurrence of a
prohibited transaction under Section 406(a)(1)(D).

The Judge finds that Northern Trust remained subject to a duty of
prudence, which it is plausibly alleged to have breached.  As a
result, the claim against Northern Trust in Count I survives.
Count IV, alleging that Northern Trust is subject to co-fiduciary
liability under Section 405(a), survives for the same reason.
Dolins has adequately alleged that the Contract's cancellation was
contrary to ERISA, so Section 1105(b)(3) does not foreclose
liability against Northern Trust, at least at the pleading stage.
As to Counts II and III, because Northern Trust retained
discretion to reject instructions regarding the Contract that were
contrary to ERISA, it is properly considered a fiduciary in this
context.  There is no requirement in Section 406(b)(2) that the
defendant itself benefit from the transaction; it is enough that a
party other than the beneficiaries have benefitted, and the
complaint here alleges just that as to the CNA Defendants.  Dolins
has thus adequately alleged a violation by Northern Trust of
Section 406(b)(2), meaning that Count II may proceed against it.

As to CNA Defendants' motion to dismiss Count III, Judge Feinerman
finds that if cancelling the Contract impermissibly benefited a
party in interest, which it is alleged to have done, then the CNA
Defendants may be liable even if the Contract's terms permitted
cancellation.

With respect to Dolins' request for damages relief against CAC,
taking as true his allegations and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, the Plan has been injured by the
Contract's cancellation, and it is conceivable that adequately
remedying that might be accomplished only through its
reinstatement.  Dolins has therefore requested a remedy that is
not provided for in Section 502(a)(2) and can be accomplished only
with CAC in the case by way of Section 502(a)(3).

For these reasons, Judge Feinerman denied the motions to dismiss
are denied, except for CAC's motion to dismiss the complaint's
request for damages relief against it under Section 502(a)(2).  He
directed the Defendants to answer the surviving portions of the
complaint by Sept. 8, 2017.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/TOwRi4 from
Leagle.com.

Jerrold Dolins, Plaintiff, represented by Alison S. Gaffney --
agaffney@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac
vice.

Jerrold Dolins, Plaintiff, represented by Erin M. Riley --
eriley@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey Lewis -- jlewis@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice, Lawrence S. Goodman -- LSGoodman@lgclaw.com
-- Levun, Goodman & Cohen, LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Hope Booker -
- shbooker@lgclaw.com -- Levun, Goodman & Cohen.

Continental Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by Ian H.
Morrison -- imorrison@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Samuel
Michael Schwartz-Fenwick -- sschwartz-fenwick@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Ronald J. Kramer -- rkramer@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Shannon Marie Callahan --
SCallahan@Seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Continental Assurance Company, Defendant, represented by Donald A.
Tarkington -- dtarkington@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP,
Edwin G. Schallert -- egschallert@debevoise.com -- Debevoise &
Plimpton, pro hac vice, Ryan Martin Kocse -- rmkocse@debevoise.com
-- Debevoise and Plimpton LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen Novack --
snovack@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP.

CNA Financial Corporation, Defendant, represented by Ian H.
Morrison, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Samuel Michael Schwartz-Fenwick,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Ronald J. Kramer, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Shannon
Marie Callahan, Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Investment Committee of the CNA 401(k) Plus Plan, Defendant,
represented by Ian H. Morrison, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Samuel Michael
Schwartz-Fenwick, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Ronald J. Kramer, Seyfarth
Shaw LLP & Shannon Marie Callahan, Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Northern Trust Company, Defendant, represented by Ian H. Morrison,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Samuel Michael Schwartz-Fenwick, Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, Ronald J. Kramer, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Shannon Marie Callahan,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Does 1 through 10, Defendant, represented by Ian H. Morrison,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Samuel Michael Schwartz-Fenwick, Seyfarth Shaw
LLP, Ronald J. Kramer, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Shannon Marie Callahan,
Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


CONTINENTAL GENERAL: GAFRI Dropped as Defendant in "Fastrich"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JOHN FASTRICH,
and UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC., Plaintiffs, v.
CONTINENTAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and GREAT AMERICAN
FINANCIAL RESOURCE, INC., Defendants, No. 8:16CV487 (D. Neb.).

This is a class action brought by John Fastrich and his insurance
agency, Universal Investment Services, Inc., on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of "[a]ll current and former regional
managers, general agents, associate general agents, and agents of
CGI . . . who have lost commissions, renewals, and/or overrides as
a result of Defendants' wrongful conduct . . ."  According to the
Complaint, Plaintiffs entered into contracts with CGI to sell
CGI's insurance products to individual customers.  These products
included Medicare supplements, long-term care and senior life
policies, and annuities.  Pursuant to their contracts with CGI,
Plaintiffs were to receive compensation in the form of
commissions, renewals, and overrides on the various insurance
products they sold.

Sometime after GAFRI finalized the acquisition of Ceres, and
thereby CGI, GAFRI and CGI began contacting existing insurance
policyholders and offering them new, less expensive insurance
products without giving Plaintiffs the opportunity to sell the new
products. As a result, the original insurance policies that
Plaintiffs sold on CGI's behalf were cancelled and new insurance
products were marketed and issued by other agents.

Plaintiffs have brought claims against CGI and GAFRI for breach of
contract, tortious interference with a business relationship or
expectancy, and unjust enrichment. GAFRI argues the Court should
dismiss it from this action because it is not subject to the
Court's personal jurisdiction. CGI and GAFRI both argue
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plead
sufficient facts 'to support a reasonable inference that the
defendant[ ] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.

Personal Jurisdiction

GAFRI argues it is not subject to the Court's personal
jurisdiction. In determining whether personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant exists, the Court must determine whether:
(1) the requirements of the Nebraska long-arm statute are
satisfied; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

GAFRI is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business
in Texas. When GAFRI acquired Ceres, including its subsidiary CGI,
in 2006, CGI was a domestic insurer organized under, and governed
by, Nebraska law and had its principal place of business in
Nebraska. The fact that CGI had its principal place of business in
Nebraska does not, by itself, confer personal jurisdiction over
GAFRI.

Plaintiffs point to GAFRI's alleged conduct of contacting existing
CGI policyholders and replacing the in-force policies with the new
products insurance policies, harming Plaintiffs who are Indiana
residents. Plaintiffs do not allege, however, that GAFRI ever
contacted a Nebraska resident or replaced a Nebraska resident's
existing CGI insurance policy. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that they
had any Nebraska clients.

Plaintiffs also point to GAFRI's representations to the Nebraska
Department of Insurance that it intended to install GAFRI
personnel in officer and director positions at CGI upon
consummation of the acquisition, and to GAFRI's representation
that it planned to have CGI exit the major medical business.
However, there are no allegations or evidence that GAFRI actually
undertook either of these courses of action.

Considering the nature, quality, and quantity of the foregoing
contacts, Plaintiffs have also failed to establish that GAFRI has
sufficient "minimum contacts with [Nebraska] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.

As such, the Court lacks the power to enter a valid judgment
imposing a personal obligation or duty upon GAFRI in favor of the
plaintiff and GAFRI will, therefore, be dismissed from this
action.

Breach of Contract Claim

Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract must be
dismissed because (1) they have not sufficiently alleged a
contractual promise, (2) they have alleged speculative damages,
and (3) they have lumped together all of the defendants in their
allegations.

Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to support a plausible claim
for breach of contract. Their allegations that they were entitled
to receive commissions, renewals, and overrides, and that CGI
failed to pay Plaintiffs said commissions, renewals, and
overrides, causing them to suffer financial damage, is sufficient
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,
breach of contract.

Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship or Expectancy

CGI argues Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for tortious
interference with a business relationship or expectancy because
CGI is not a true third-party interferer and because Plaintiffs
have not alleged unjustified conduct.

To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a business
relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements: (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or
expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or
expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on
the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference cause
the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship
or expectancy was disrupted.

Applying the principal that the interferer must be a third party
independent of the plaintiff's business relationship, the Eighth
Circuit has held that there can be no tortious interference as a
matter of law where the insurance agent-plaintiff had no
relationship with the buyers of the defendant's insurance policies
that was independent of [his] role as an agent acting on behalf of
the defendant companies.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges no independent business relationship
with their clients beyond the fact that Plaintiffs brokered their
clients' purchase of CGI's insurance policy products. The
Plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with a business
relationship or expectancy will, therefore, be dismissed because
CGI is not a true third-party interferer.

Unjust Enrichment

CGI argues Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment, which is a
quasi-contract claim, must be dismissed because they have also
alleged the existence of an express contract and the breach
thereof. CGI also argues that Plaintiffs have alleged insufficient
facts to support an unjust enrichment claim.

The Complaint alleges Plaintiffs sold CGI's insurance products and
that CGI wrongfully and unfairly received and retained the
commissions, renewals, and overrides associated with those
products, which Plaintiffs claim should have been paid to them.
Taken as true, the foregoing facts include content that allows the
Court to draw the reasonable inference that Plaintiffs transferred
a benefit to CGI by selling its insurance products and that CGI
unfairly retained and refused to pay Plaintiffs the associated
commissions, renewals, and overrides. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have
pled facts to support a plausible claim for unjust enrichment.

Punitive Damages and Attorney's Fees

CGI also argues that Plaintiffs' demands for punitive damages,
At this stage of the litigation, it is not certain whether
Nebraska law ultimately will apply to Plaintiffs' breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims. Thus, striking Plaintiffs'
demands for punitive damages and attorney's fees from the
Complaint based on Nebraska law would be premature. With respect
to Plaintiffs' allegation of unfair marketing practices, CGI has
not demonstrated this allegation is redundant, impertinent, or
scandalous.

Accordingly, the Court ruled:

   1. The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction,
filed by GAFRI is granted;

   2. GAFRI is dismissed from this action;

   3. The Clerk will remove GAFRI from the caption;

   4. The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed by
CGI and GAFRI is granted, in part, as follows: a. Plaintiffs'
claim for tortious interference with a business relationship or
expectancy is dismissed, with prejudice; b. The Motion is
otherwise denied; and

   5. The Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief, is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 21, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybznddyw
from Leagle.com.

John Fastrich, Plaintiff, represented by Alan L. Rosca -
arosca@prwlegal.com - PEIFFER, ROSCA LAW FIRM.

John Fastrich, Plaintiff, represented by Brian O. Marty, SHINDLER,
ANDERSON LAW FIRM,  5015 Grand Ridge Dr Ste 100. West Des Moines,
Iowa 50265, J. Barton Goplerud, SHINDLER, ANDERSON LAW FIRM, 5015
Grand Ridge Dr #100, West Des Moines, IA 50265, USA, Stephen D.
Marso - marso@whitfieldlaw.com - WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW FIRM & Thomas
S. Reavely -  reavely@whitfieldlaw.com - WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW FIRM.

Universal Investment Services, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Alan L. Rosca - arosca@prwlegal.com - PEIFFER, ROSCA LAW FIRM,
Brian O. Marty, SHINDLER, ANDERSON LAW FIRM, J. Barton Goplerud,
SHINDLER, ANDERSON LAW FIRM, Stephen D. Marso, WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW
FIRM - WEST DES MOINES & Thomas S. Reavely, WHITFIELD, EDDY LAW
FIRM.

Continental General Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Edward D. Hotz, PANSING, HOGAN LAW FIRM,10250 Regency Cir., Ste
#300, Ohama, NE 68114


CONTRACT TRANSPORT: "Burlaka" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------Leonid
Burlaka and David Starry, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. Contract Transport Services,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01126 (E.D. Wisc., August 14,
2017), seeks redress for Defendant's failure to pay overtime
premium pay for hours over 40 per week under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiffs were employed by Contract Transport's transport and
delivery business as spotters at its Green Bay Packaging Account
located at either their Green Bay or De Pere, Wisconsin facility.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Yingtao Ho, Esq.
      THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM S.C.
      310 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
      Milwaukee, WI 53203
      Telephone: (414) 271-4500
      Fax: (414) 271-6308
      Email: yh@previant.com


DAIRY FARMERS: Vermont Court Narrows Claims in Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Vermont, issued an
Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Revised First Amended Complaint in the case
captioned GARRETT AND RALPH SITTS, LEON ATWELL, VICTOR BARRICK,
DANIEL BAUMGARDER, WILLIAM BOARD, GEORGE BOLLES, ROGER BOLLES,
ANDY BOLLINGER, THOMAS BOLLINGER, LOGAN BOWER, DWIGHT BRANDENBURG,
BERNARD BROUILLETTE, THOMAS BROUILLETTE, AARON BUTTON, HESTER
CHASE, THOMAS CLARK, THOMAS CLATTERBUCK, PAUL CURRIER, GERRY
DELONG, PETE AND ALICE DIEHL, MARK DORING, MARK AND BARBARA
DULKIS, GLEN EAVES, MIKE EBY, WILLIAM ECKLAND, DOUG ELLIOT, JAMES
ELLIOT, WENDALL ELLIOTT, MICHAEL FAUCHER, DAVID AND ROBIN FITCH,
DUANE AND SUSAN FLINT, JOSEPH FULTS, RICHARD GANTNER, STEFAN AND
CINDY GEIGER, WILLIAM GLOSS, JOHN GWOZDZ, DAVID AND LAURIE GRANT,
JIM AND JOYCE GRAY, DENNIS HALL, ROGER AND JOHN HAMILTON, NEVIN
AND MARLIN HILDEBRAND, JAKE AND HARLEN HILLYERD, RICHARD AND TERRI
HOLDRIDGE, PAUL HORNING, TERRY AND ROBERT HUYCK, DONALD SCOTT
HYMERS, TERRY INCH, RANDY AND LYNETTE INMAN, THEODORE JAYKO, JACK
KAHLER, JAMES AND TERESA KEATOR, JIM AND SHARON KEILHOLTZ, GEORGE
KEITH, LEE AND ELLEN KLOCK, MIKE AND LISA KRAEGER, FRED LACLAIR,
TIM LALYER, FRANK AND JOHN LAMPORT, CORRINE LULL, CHARLES AND
GRETCHEN MAINE, THOMAS AND DEBORA MANOS, FRED MATTHEWS, RUSSELL
MAXWELL, GERRY MCINTOSH, STEPHEN MELLOTT, JOHN AND DAVID MITCHELL,
THOMAS MONTEITH, WALT MOORE, RICHARD AND SHEILA MORROW, DEAN
MOSER, MELISSA MURRAY AND SEAN QUINN, THOMAS NAUMAN, CHARLES NEFF,
DAVID NICHOLS, MICHAEL NISSLEY, LOU ANN PARISH, DANIEL PETERS,
MARSHA PERRY, CAROLYN AND DAVE POST, JUDY LEE POST, SCOTT
RASMUSEU, BRIAN REAPE, DAVID AND LYNETTE ROBINSON, BRIAN AND LISA
ROBINSON, CALVIN ROES, BRADLEY ROHRER, PAUL AND SARAH ROHRBAUGH,
ROBERTA RYAN, SCOTT AND LIN SAWYER, S. ROBERT SENSENIG, THOMAS AND
DALE SMITH, DALE AND SUSAN SMITH, DENNIS SMITH, DONALD T. AND
DONALD M. SMITH, ROGER AND TAMMY, SMITH, TODD SNYDER, RICHARD
SOURWINE, DANNY SOURWINE, RANDY SOWERS, SHANE STALTER, GEORGE AND
SHIRLEY STAMBAUGH, TRACY STANKO, STEPHEN SOUR WINE, RICHARD
SWANTAK, GEORGE AND PATRICIA THOMPSON, JEREMY THOMPSON, KEN AND
JUDY TOMPKINS, DANIEL VAUGHN, MARK VISSAR, ERIC WALTS, EDWARD
WALLDROFF, GERALD WETTERHAHN, JR., EUGENE WILCZEWSKI, STEVE
WILSON, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRY FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC. and DAIRY
MARKETING SERVICES, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-287 (D.
Vt.).

Plaintiffs filed this action seeking relief pursuant to the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1-2, for alleged antitrust
violations committed by Defendants Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.
(DFA) and Dairy Marketing Services, LLC (DMS).

Pending before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Lack of Antitrust
Standing.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, in concert with Dairylea, Agri-
Mark Family Dairy Farms (Agri-Mark), members of the Greater
Northeast Milk Marketing Agency (GNEMMA), Farmland Dairies LLC,
National Dairy Holdings LLC (NDH), HP Hood LLC (Hood), and other
known and unknown co-conspirators, have engaged in an illegal
conspiracy to restrain competition, fix and suppress prices paid
to farmers and monopolize/monopsonize the raw Grade A milk market
in the Northeast.

Standard of Review

In adjudicating a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the
court is guided by two working principles.  First, a court must
accept as true all of the [factual] allegations contained in a
complaint. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss" and a claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.

To maintain an action, an antitrust plaintiff must show both
constitutional standing and antitrust standing.  Antitrust
standing is a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry and when a
complaint by its terms fails to establish this requirement, the
court, must dismiss it as a matter of law.

Whether Plaintiffs Have Alleged Antitrust Injury Under Aluminum
Warehousing

Here, Plaintiffs allege a single market for raw Grade A milk in
which both they and Defendants participate. They have thus not
"disavowed" participation in the very market they allege
Defendants restrained.

Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege a single market in which both
they and Defendants participate for the purchase and sale of raw
Grade A milk, Aluminum Warehousing is distinguishable and does not
require dismissal. Defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis is
therefore denied.

Plaintiffs' monopolization claims allege: Defendants and the co-
conspirators have used their monopsony power to block access to
the processors and leave the independent farmers and independent
cooperatives without a market for their milk. In doing so, they
have eliminated competition in the supply base and obtained a
monopoly on the sell side of the market. This monopoly further
enables Defendants and the [c]o-conspirators to further reduce the
supply base and eliminate competition on the sell side of the
market.

Assessed as a totality, the antitrust injuries Plaintiffs allege
as a result of Defendants' monopolistic conduct are the same
injuries Plaintiffs allege in their monopsonization claims. Unless
or until Plaintiffs can allege they suffered discernible injuries
as a result of Defendants' alleged monopolization, they lack
antitrust standing to assert their monopolization claims,
regardless of whether they classify themselves as suppliers or
competitors.

Because Plaintiffs' monopolization claims fail to allege an
"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.
Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims is granted.

Whether to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Monopsonization Claims Because of
Defendants' Cooperative Structure

Plaintiffs further assert that DFA's monopsony power enables it to
buy raw Grade A milk from Plaintiffs at a low cost, as Plaintiffs
can no longer sell to other processors at a competitive price
because Defendants have limited the avenues where Plaintiffs could
otherwise sell their milk.

Defendants used their control over the fluid Grade A milk supply
market to force independent dairy cooperatives and independent
dairy farmers to join DFA or market their milk through DMS.  These
actions have injured Plaintiffs by allowing the Defendants to
acquire and maintain a monopsony and use their market power to
suppress the price paid to the dairy farmers.

Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that DMS may be liable as
DFA's agent for their monopsonization claims. Stating that the
antitrust laws permit the imposition of liability based upon a
principal-agent relationship). The existence of an agency
relationship need only be pled in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
8. The pleading stage, accepting Plaintiffs' factual allegations
as true, DMS's liability based upon an agency theory is plausibly
alleged.

For these reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
monopsonization claims for lack of antitrust injury is denied.

Whether Four Plaintiffs Should Be Dismissed for Failure to
Plausibly Allege They Are Efficient Enforcers of the Antitrust
Laws

The court agrees that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
because these four individuals are within the target area of
Defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Whether these four
individuals can satisfy the second prong of antitrust standing
presents a closer question.

Regarding the first efficient enforcer factor, the injuries
alleged by the four non-supplier Plaintiffs are relatively clear
and direct. Like the remaining Plaintiffs, they claim that they
have systematically been paid artificially depressed prices for
the raw Grade A milk they market, and that Defendants' conduct
deprives them of the opportunity to receive a competitive price
for that product.

With respect to the second factor, there are more direct victims
of the alleged conspiracy than the four non-supplier Plaintiffs as
more than one hundred other dairy farmers allege that they dealt
directly with DMS or at least one co-conspirator.

Regarding the third and fourth factors, the calculation and
apportionment of damages for the four non-supplier Plaintiffs may
present considerable challenges.  At the motion to dismiss stage,
any holding that these damages would be speculative is premature.
At the pleading stage, the four non-supplier Plaintiffs who did
not supply raw Grade A milk to DMS or a co-conspirator plausibly
allege that they are efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws.
Defendants' motion to dismiss on that basis is therefore denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 21, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybeccr8rfrom
Leagle.com.

Garrett Sitts, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq. -
dzakarian@nbparis.com -  Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac
vice.

Garrett Sitts, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth A. Reidy, Esq.
- ereidy@nbparis.com - Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice,
Gary L. Franklin -  gfranklin@primmer.com - Primmer Piper
Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq. jbeckman@nbparis.com
- Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq. - wnystrom@nbparis.com - Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac
vice.

Ralph Sitts, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Leon Atwell, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Victor Barrick, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Daniel Baumgarder, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A.
Reidy, Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L.
Franklin, Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C.
Nystrom, Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

William Board, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

George Bolles, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Roger Bolles, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Andy Bollinger, Plaintiff, represented by Dana A. Zakarian, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth A. Reidy,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice, Gary L. Franklin,
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, Joel G. Beckman, Esq.,
Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice & William C. Nystrom,
Esq., Nystrom Beckman & Paris LLP, pro hac vice.

Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alfred
C. Pfeiffer, Jr., Esq.  - al.pfeiffer@lw.com - Latham & Watkins
LLP, pro hac vice, Elyse M. Greenwald, Esq. -
elyse.greenwald@lw.com - Latham & Watkins LLP, Ian P. Carleton,
Esq., Sheehey Furlong & Behm P.C.,  30 Main St #600, Burlington,
VT 05401, USA,  Jennifer L. Giordano, Esq. -
ennifer.giordano@lw.com - Latham & Watkins LLP, Margaret M.
Zwisler, Esq. - margaret.zwisler@lw.com - Latham & Watkins LLP,
pro hac vice & W. Todd Miller, Esq., -tmiller@bakerandmiller.com -
Baker & Miller PLLC, pro hac vice.

Dairy Marketing Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alfred C.
Pfeiffer, Jr., Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Elyse M.
Greenwald, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, Ian P. Carleton, Esq.,
Sheehey Furlong & Behm P.C., Jennifer L. Giordano, Esq., Latham &
Watkins LLP, Margaret M. Zwisler, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro
hac vice & W. Todd Miller, Esq., Baker & Miller PLLC, pro hac
vice.


DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS: Attorney Wants Hip Implant Trial Halted
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, Texas Lawyer, reports that after losing hip
implant verdicts of $502 million and $1.04 billion, it's no
surprise that Johnson & Johnson's DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. doesn't
want to go to trial again in September.

But what it does want is a bit unusual.

In court filings in August, Johnson & Johnson attorney John
Beisner has sought to halt a Sept. 5 trial, but he also wants to
remand more than 9,300 of the products liability cases pending in
Dallas over DePuy's Pinnacle device back to the courts from whence
they came.

In a petition for writ of mandamus, Beisner, a Washington, D.C.,
partner at New York's Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, has
asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to halt the
upcoming trial of eight plaintiffs, all from New York, scheduled
to take place before U.S. District Judge Ed Kinkeade.  He's
raising the same argument in prior writ petitions and in the
pending appeals of the two prior verdicts: The cases don't belong
in Kinkeade's courtroom.

"In short, the MDL court has decided that it is no longer
constrained by the MDL statute or personal jurisdiction principles
and can order trials of as many cases as it chooses instead of
remanding these cases to courts of proper jurisdiction, as
required by the MDL statute and basic jurisdictional principles,"
Mr. Beisner wrote.  "Left unchecked, these rulings would encourage
other MDL courts to stretch their authority to try claims,
regardless of the relevant contacts with the forum or petitioners'
consent."

But plaintiffs attorney Mark Lanier, anticipating Johnson &
Johnson's venue fight, moved July to remand some, but not all, of
the cases for trial.  He argued that cases brought in California
and New York could use pretrial rulings Judge Kinkeade has already
made involving those state laws.

"This is a case where there are over 9,000 plaintiffs, and most of
them are elderly," said Lanier, of The Lanier Law Firm in Houston.
"They're hip implants. And what DePuy has said is that it will not
settle any of these cases.  So if J&J/DePuy won't settle any of
them, and we have to try them, we need to come up with some trial
schedule where we can get at least to the older people before they
die."

MDL judges are assigned to oversee pretrial matters, but the idea
is for them to send cases back to their original courts for trial.
In court papers, Mr. Lanier is pushing for Judge Kinkeade to
oversee trials in other courts.  Other MDL judges have done that
in a pelvic mesh trial against Boston Scientific and in a pending
trial over the blood thinner Xarelto, he wrote.

He called Johnson & Johnson's arguments a case of "buyer's
remorse," particularly since the last two verdicts have come from
consolidated trials, a big reason why the awards were so large.
Johnson & Johnson, he wrote, agreed to waive all venue concerns
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998 holding in Lexecon v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach.

"Petitioners should not be permitted to rewrite history simply
because they are dissatisfied with the outcomes of the last two
bellwether trials," wrote Mr. Lanier, who has partnered with
former U.S. Solicitor General Kenneth Starr in the plaintiffs'
response filed on Aug. 14 to the writ petition.  "Petitioners
clearly consented to the district court's personal jurisdiction."
That's not true, wrote Beisner in a reply filed on Aug. 17.  He
said Johnson & Johnson only consented to the first two bellwether
trials, the first of which involved a single plaintiff.

"From the beginning, petitioners' position has been that true
bellwether trials should involve individual plaintiffs, not
consolidated trials, to avoid confusing juries and to generate
reliable information regarding how juries perceive the strength of
various claims and defenses," he wrote.  "When it became clear
that the MDL court intended to continue trying consolidated cases,
petitioners decided to stop consenting to trials."

And that's why Mr. Beisner now insists that all the cases -- not
just those in California and New York -- should be remanded
because Judge Kinkeade doesn't have its consent to hold trials,
according to Johnson & Johnson's response to Mr. Lanier's remand
request.

Mr. Beisner also gave an alternate motivation for why the
plaintiffs are focused on remanding to just California and New
York: Those states have uncapped punitive damages. [GN]


DOMINO'S PIZZA: "Brown" Action Seeks Reimbursements
---------------------------------------------------
Roy Brown, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-12668 (E.D. Mich., August 14, 2017), seeks reimbursement
of expenses related to the use of Defendant's delivery vehicles
for pizza deliveries pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, Maryland Wage and Hour Law and the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law.

Plaintiff worked as a delivery driver assigned to three stores in
Maryland. Defendant allegedly under-reimbursed Plaintiff and his
colleagues for vehicular wear and tear, gas, and other driving-
related expenses, thereby effectively paying them well below the
minimum wage. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael N. Hanna, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Telephone: (954) 318-0268
      Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
      Email: MHanna@forthepeople.com

            - and -

      C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 4200
      Post Office Box 57007
      Atlanta, GA 30343-1007
      Tel: (404) 965-8811
      Facsimile: (404) 496-7405
      Email: RMorgan@forthepeople.com

            - and -

      Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Esq.
      Antonino B. Roman, Esq.
      FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
      445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
      White Plains, NY 10601
      Telephone: (914) 298-3281
      Facsimile: (914) 824-1561
      Email: jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.com
             aroman@fbfglaw.com


EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Munguia-Brown Moves to Certify Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled JAVANNI MUNGUIA-BROWN,
ANGELINA MAGANA, NORMA RODRIGUEZ, and DAVID BONFANTI, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL,
a real estate investment trust, ERP OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a partnership, EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., EQR-WOODLAND
PARK A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and EQR-WOODLAND PARK B LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, Case No. 4:16-cv-01225-JSW-MEJ (N.D. Cal.), ask the
Court to certify the case as a class action for all causes of
action and claims for monetary relief alleged in the Plaintiffs'
second amended complaint.

In this action, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Equity
Residential and its corporate affiliates, ERP Operating Limited
Partnership, Equity Residential Management, L.L.C., EQR-Woodland
Park A Limited Partnership, and EQR-Woodland Park B Limited
Partnership, which own and operate residential leased properties
in California (or did during the Class Period), have charged their
tenants late fees that violate Section 1671(d) of the California
Civil Code and the California Unlawful Competition law.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify:

   -- a Standard Late Fee Class defined as:

      All Equity Residential tenants in California from
      September 3, 2010 until the date of class certification who
      were charged one or more late fee(s) under Equity
      Residential's standard late fee provision: 5% of the
      outstanding balance owed (capped at 5% of the total amount
      of monthly recurring charges) or $50, whichever is greater;
      and

   -- a Woodland Park Preexisting Lease Class defined as:

      All Equity Residential tenants in the Woodland Park
      Property from December 1, 2011 until Defendant sold the
      property in February 2016 who were charged one or more late
      fee(s) of $50 under Equity Residential's policy of charging
      a flat $50 late fee to tenants on pre-existing non-EQR
      leases.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Plaintiff David
Bonfanti as class representative for the Standard Late Fee Class,
and Plaintiffs Javanni Munguia-Brown, Angelina Magana, and Norma
Rodriguez as class representatives for the Woodland Park
Preexisting Lease Class.  They also seek the appointment of their
counsel as class counsel.  They further seek approval of their
proposed class notices, and for order that the notices be issued
to the proposed class members.

The Court will commence a hearing on October 27, 2017, at 9:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=jQgIFVjY

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jason H. Tarricone, Esq.
          Margaret McBride, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES IN EAST PALO ALTO
          1861 Bay Road
          East Palo Alto, CA 94303
          Telephone: (650) 326-6440
          Facsimile: (866) 688-5204
          E-mail: jason@clsepa.org
                  mmcbride@clsepa.org

               - and -

          Linda M. Dardarian, Esq.
          Laura L. Ho, Esq.
          William Jhaveri-Weeks, Esq.
          Megan E. Ryan, Esq.
          Katharine L. Fisher, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835-1417
          E-mail: ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com
                  lho@gbdhlegal.com
                  wjhaveriweeks@gbdhlegal.com
                  mryan@gbdhlegal.com
                  kfisher@gbdhlegal.com

               - and -

          Craig Nicholas, Esq.
          Alex Tomasevic, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          225 Broadway, 19th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 325-0492
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: craig@nicholaslaw.org
                  alex@nicholaslaw.org


ERIE INDEMNITY: Beltz Appeals W.D. Pa. Ruling to Third Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Patricia R. Beltz, Anita Sullivan and Joseph S.
Sullivan filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit
titled Patricia Beltz, et al. v. Erie Indemnity Co., et al., Case
No. 1-16-cv-00179, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
alleges that the retention of the Service Charges and Added
Service Charges was improper because, for among other reasons,
that retention constituted a breach of the Subscriber's Agreement
and an Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing by
Indemnity, breaches of fiduciary duty by Indemnity and the other
defendants, conversion by Indemnity, and unjust enrichment by
Defendants Jonathan Hirt Hagen, Thomas B. Hagen, Elizabeth A. Hirt
Vorsheck, and Samuel P. Black, III, at the expense of Exchange.

The appellate case is captioned as Patricia Beltz, et al. v. Erie
Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 17-2774, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants PATRICIA R. BELTZ, JOSEPH S. SULLIVAN and
ANITA SULLIVAN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and derivatively on behalf of nominal defendant Erie
Insurance Exchange, are represented by:

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com

               - and -

          William M. Radcliffe, III, Esq.
          RADCLIFFE & DEHAAS LLP
          2 West Main Street
          Suite 700, P.O. Box 2012
          Uniontown, PA 15401
          Telephone: (724) 439-3900
          E-mail: wmr@rightlawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee ERIE INDEMNITY CO. is represented by:

          Kenneth J. Holloway, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          One Bush Street, Suite 1600
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 262-4582
          E-mail: kenneth.holloway@dechert.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Kichline, Esq.
          William T. McEnroe, Esq.
          Ryan M. Moore, Esq.
          Jaclyn S. Whittaker, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          2929 Arch Street
          18th Floor, Cira Centre
          Philadelphia, PA 19104
          Telephone: (215) 994-2439
          Facsimile: (215) 994 2222
          E-mail: michael.kichline@dechert.com
                  william.mcenroe@dechert.com
                  ryan.moore@dechert.com
                  jaclyn.simon@dechert.com

Defendant-Appellee J. RALPH BORNEMAN, JR., is represented by:

          Matthew R. Divelbiss, Esq.
          Thomas S. Jones, Esq.
          Katelyn M. Matscherz, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          500 Grant Street, Suite 4500
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 394-7297
          E-mail: mrdivelbiss@jonesday.com
                  tsjones@jonesday.com
                  kmatscherz@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Geoffrey J. Ritts, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          901 Lakeside Avenue, North Point
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 586-3939
          Facsimile: (216) 579-0212
          E-mail: gjritts@jonesday.com

Defendants-Appellees JONATHAN HIRT HAGEN and THOMAS B. HAGEN are
represented by:

          Christie C. Comerford, Esq.
          Lawrence G. McMichael, Esq.
          DILWORTH PAXSON LLP
          1500 Market Street, Suite 3500E
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 575-7000
          Facsimile: (215) 575-7200
          E-mail: ccomerford@dilworthlaw.com
                  lmcmichael@dilworthlaw.com

               - and -

          Roger W. Richards, Esq.
          RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES
          100 State Street, Suite 440
          Erie, PA 16507
          Telephone: (814) 455-0370

Defendant-Appellee ELIZABETH H. VORSHECK is represented by:

          Dorothy A. Davis, Esq.
          Daniel B. McLane, Esq.
          Thomas E. Sanchez, Esq.
          ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT LLC
          600 Grant Street
          44th Floor, US Steel Tower
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 566-5953
          Facsimile: (412) 566-6099
          E-mail: ddavis@eckertseamans.com
                  dmclane@eckertseamans.com
                  tsanchez@eckertseamans.com


FACEBOOK INC: Settlement in "Campbell" Gets Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MATTHEW CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
FACEBOOK INC., Defendant, Case No. 13-cv-05996-PJH(N.D. Cal.),
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motions
for final approval, attorneys' fees and costs, and service awards
for the class representatives; and overruled the objection of Anna
St. John.

The case was filed on Dec. 30, 2013.  This is a certified class
action alleging violations of the federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") and California's equivalent,
the Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA").  Plaintiffs Campbell and
Michael Hurley, as the class representatives, allege that
Facebook's practice of scanning its users' messages without
consent violates these statutes.

Specifically, the allegations in this suit concern the links to
websites ("URLs") that are sent in messages.  They allege that
Facebook's practice of scanning the content of their messages and
its use of the URLs therein violates ECPA and CIPA.

On Dec. 23, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Facebook's motion to dismiss, finding that the complaint
sufficiently alleged that Facebook's scanning was an
"interception" of a private message under ECPA, and that the
"ordinary course of business" and "consent" exceptions did not
apply.

On May 18, 2016, the Plaintiffs achieved certification of the
class under Rule 23(b)(2) described as all natural-person Facebook
users located within the United States who have sent, or received
from a Facebook user, private messages that included URLs in their
content (and from which Facebook generated a URL attachment), from
within two years before the filing of this action up through the
date of the certification of the class.  The Court found that
ascertainability and the Rule 23(a) requirements were met.

However, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), finding that individual issues
of damages predominated over common ones.  It therefore granted
certification only under Rule 23(b)(2), relying on the Plaintiffs'
representation that they sought only injunctive and declarative
relief for the Rule 23(b)(2) class.  Following the class
certification ruling, the Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC,
which contained new allegations in support of their targeted
advertising and recommendation theories.

On April 26, 2017, the Court granted preliminary approval of a
proposed class settlement agreement.  It certified a settlement
class of all natural-person Facebook users located within the
United States and its territories who have sent, or received from
a Facebook user, private messages that included URLs in their
content (and from which Facebook generated a URL attachment), from
Dec. 30, 2011 to March 1, 2017.

The key terms of the Settlement Agreement are:

     a. Declaratory Relief: Pursuant to the settlement, Facebook
acknowledges its cessation of a number of practices in 2012, 2014,
and 2017:

     b. The Like Count Increment: On or about Dec. 19, 2012,
Facebook changed its source code so that the like count increment
no longer included the number of shares, by users, of URLs in
private messages that resulted in creation of EntShares.

     c. Sharing URL Data with Third Parties via Insights: On or
about Oct. 11, 2012, Facebook changed its source code such that it
ceased including information about URL shares in Facebook Messages
that resulted in creation of EntShares (and attendant statistics
and demographic information) within Insights and its related API.

     d. Uses URLs to Generate Recommendations: On or about July 9,
2014, Facebook changed its source code such that it ceased
utilizing the PHP backend as the backup system for its
Recommendations Feed.  The PHP backend considered the number of
times a URL had been shared in a Facebook Message.

     e. Uses of EntShares in Messages: As of March 1, 2017,
Facebook confirms that it is not using any data from EntShares
created from URL attachments sent by users in Facebook Messages
for: (i) targeted advertising; (ii) sharing personally identifying
user information with third parties; (iii) use in any public
counters in the 'link_stats' and Graph APIs; and (iv) displaying
lists of URLs representing the most recommended webpages on a
particular website.

     f. The Data Policy Change: In January 2015, Facebook's Data
Policy was revised to disclose that Facebook collects the 'content
and other information' that people provide when they 'message or
communicate with others.'

     g. The Supplemental Help Center Disclosure: Facebook will
display the following message on its United States Help Center
website, for one year: We use tools to identify and store links
shared in messages, including a count of the number of times links
are shared.

     h. Attorneys' fees and costs of up to $3.89 million: Facebook
agrees to take no position on plaintiffs' attorneys' fee
application.  The amount was negotiated independently of the other
settlement terms.

     i. Incentive awards of $5,000 for the two class
representatives.

     j. The Settlement Class Members' Released Claims are claims
that arise out of, are based on, or relate in any way to the
practices and claims that were alleged in, or could have been
alleged in, the Action but not including claims for monetary
relief, damages, or statutory damages.  The class representatives'
release is broader, releasing claims for monetary damages as well.

The Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the settlement, an
award of the full $3.89 million in attorneys' fees and costs
permitted under the agreement, and incentive awards for the Named
Plaintiffs.

Objector asserts that the class would get "no value" from the
settlement.  Judge Hamilton disagrees saying the objector
completely discounts the Help Center disclosure, as well as the
value of the declaratory relief and the Data Policy change, which
were the result of the litigation and are clearly acknowledged in
the Settlement Agreement.  In light of the Data Policy change and
Facebook's representation of "cessation" of practices, it is not
clear what further benefit the class could obtain if the case
proceeded.  The class would receive nothing if the case continued
and Facebook prevailed on summary judgment.  The Judge granted
final approval of the settlement.  Judge Hamilton also granted
approval of the $3.89 million in attorneys' fees and costs sought
by the Plaintiffs.  To be sure, $3.89 million is still a
significant fees award.  However, she finds that the class counsel
achieved an excellent result for the class and fully earned their
fee.  Finally, the Judge approved the $5,000 incentive awards for
the two named class representatives, Campbell and Hurley.  The
amount sought is presumptively reasonable in this district.

For these reasons, Judge Hamilton granted the Plaintiffs' motions
for final settlement approval, an award of attorneys' fees, and
incentive awards.  She overruled St John's objections.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/PtWPGa from Leagle.com.

Matthew Campbell, Plaintiff, represented by David Taylor Rudolph -
- drudolph@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, LLP.

Matthew Campbell, Plaintiff, represented by David F. Slade --
dslade@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, James Allen
Carney -- acarney@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates Pulliam, PLLC, Jeremy
A. Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz Grossman
Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP, Joseph Henry Bates, III --
jhbates@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, Lesley F.
Portney -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP, Melissa Ann
Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Rachel Geman, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP & Michael W. Sobol, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Michael Hurley, Plaintiff, represented by David Taylor Rudolph,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, David F. Slade, Carney
Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, James Allen Carney, Carney Bates Pulliam,
PLLC, Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom &
Gross LLP, Joseph Henry Bates, III, Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC,
Lesley F. Portney, Pomerantz, LLP, Melissa Ann Gardner, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Rachel Geman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP & Michael W. Sobol, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP.

David Shadpour, Plaintiff, represented by Jon A. Tostrud -- --
jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C., Lionel Z.
Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
David Taylor Rudolph, Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, LLP,
David F. Slade, Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, James Allen Carney,
Carney Bates Pulliam, PLLC, Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz
Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP, Joseph Henry Bates, III,
Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, Lesley F. Portney, Pomerantz, LLP,
Melissa Ann Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP,
Nicholas Diamand, Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Rachel
Geman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP & Michael W. Sobol,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Facebook Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher Chorba --
cchorba@gibsondunn.com -- Crutcher LLP, Joshua Aaron Jessen --
jjessen@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Ashley Marie
Rogers -- arogers@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP &
Priyanka Rajagopalan.

Anna St. John, Objector, represented by William Isaac Chamberlain
-- will.chamberlain@cei.org -- Competitive Enterprise Institute.


FACEBOOK INC: Message Scanning Settlement OK'd Despite Objections
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Recorder reports that in spite of stiff objections from a
class action watchdog group, a federal judge approved a settlement
Facebook reached in a case accusing the social media giant of
inappropriately scanning users' private messages for URL links.

Lawyers at the Competitive Enterprise Institute's Center for Class
Action Fairness labeled the no-cash deal "cynical" in court papers
filed earlier this year.  At a hearing before U.S. District Chief
Judge Phyllis Hamilton on Aug. 9, CCAF's William Chamberlain said
the settlement offered little more to consumers than a 22-word
statement set to be posted on a seldom-viewed Facebook help page.
Mr. Chamberlain also objected to the more than $3.8 million in
fees and costs the plaintiffs' legal team requested for its work.

"These disclosures are meaningless, they are valueless to the
class," Mr. Chamberlain said. [GN]


FARE DEPOT: Faces "Portillo" Suit in C. Dist. of Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fare Depot LLC. The
case is styled as Mynor F Portillo, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fare Depot LLC, a
Delaware corporation and Does 1 - 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-06318 (C.D. Cal., August 26, 2017).

Fare Depot LLC is in the travel agencies business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Scott J Ferrell, Esq.
   Pacific Trial Attorneys APC
   4100 Newport Place Drive Suite 800
   Newport Beach, CA 92660
   Tel: (949) 706-6464
   Fax: (949) 706-6469
   Email: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


FIFTH THIRD: Can Compel Arbitration in "Jenkins" FCRA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy S. Black of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Western Division, granted the Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration in the case captioned RANDY JENKINS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. FIFTH THIRD BANK, Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-
976(S.D. Ohio), and dismissed the action without prejudice.

The Defendant is a bank that offers consumer lending, among other
banking services.  In December, 2008, the Plaintiff opened a
credit card account with the Defendant and subsequently incurred
debt owed to the Defendant.  Pursuant to the Defendant's automated
credit processing system, upon opening the Account, the Plaintiff
was mailed his Credit Card with a copy of the terms governing the
Account.  The Cardmember Agreement also contains an Arbitration
Agreement.  While the Cardmember Agreement was revised several
times over the next few years, the Arbitration Agreement remained
substantively the same from Oct. 13, 2008 to May 1, 2012.

For more than two years, the Plaintiff used the Credit Card to
make charges to the Account and received monthly statements
reflecting his activity.  On or about Aug. 12, 2011, he made his
last purchase on the Account.  On Sept. 16, 2011, he became
delinquent on the Account.  On March 30, 2012, the Defendant
"charged off" the Plaintiff's delinquent balance after he
Plaintiff continually failed to make payments.

On Nov. 29, 2012, the Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada.  On March 6,
2013, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Plaintiff a discharge,
which included the debt owed to the Defendant.  He did not make
any charges to the Account after the discharge.

On Sept. 30, 2013, and March 3, 2014, the Defendant submitted
credit report inquiries to TransUnion, a credit reporting agency.
The Plaintiff alleges these inquiries were unlawful because the
bankruptcy discharge extinguished any relationship between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant.  He further claims the Defendant's
credit inquiries fall outside the scope of permissible uses
provided for under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b.  On Oct. 21, 2016, the
Plaintiff filed, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, a single-count complaint asserting the Defendant's post-
discharge credit report inquiries violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA").

The Defendant has moved to dismiss (or in the alternative, stay)
the action on the grounds that the Arbitration Agreement requires
the Plaintiff to arbitrate his claim.  The Plaintiff opposes the
Defendant's motion.

Judge Black finds that the Defendant submitted affirmative
evidence that the Plaintiff used the Credit Card after he was sent
the Cardmember Agreement and that the Plaintiff received multiple
revisions of the Cardmember Agreement throughout the period in
which he was using the Credit Card to make charges to the Account.
The Plaintiff does not dispute that he used the Credit Card to
make purchases on the Account and admits he listed the Defendant
as a creditor for the Account in his bankruptcy case.  In these
circumstances, he finds that the Plaintiff's use of the Credit
Card amounted to consent of the Arbitration Agreement.

He also finds that the Plaintiff does not allege the Defendant
attempted to collect discharged debt; his sole claim is premised
on his allegation that the Defendant violated the FCRA by
submitting unauthorized credit inquiries.  Judge Black says this
is not a "core" bankruptcy proceeding, and referring this claim to
arbitration will not impose any financial liability on the
Plaintiff, interfere with his "fresh start" guaranteed by the
discharge, nor otherwise conflict with the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code.  In these circumstances, he will enforce the
Arbitration Agreement.

As to the Plaintiff's argument that the Arbitration Agreement is
an adhesion contract and ambiguous terms should be construed
against the Defendant as the drafter, the Judge concludes this
argument fails because the Plaintiff's argument is not well-taken.
First, any ambiguities in the Arbitration Agreement "should be
resolved in favor of arbitration."  Second, even if the Court were
to construe the Cardmember Agreement against Defendant, there are
no ambiguities to interpret.  Third, unequal bargaining power, in
and of itself, is not legally or equitably sufficient to hold an
arbitration agreement unenforceable.

Judge Black will enforce the plain terms of the Arbitration
Agreement and refer the Plaintiff's claim to arbitration so that
the latter will be able to vindicate his FCRA rights through
arbitration.  He further finds that the Plaintiff has not shown
the Arbitration Agreement to be overbroad nor contrary to public
policy.  Finally, because the Plaintiff's only claim has been
referred to arbitration, Judge Black will dismiss the case without
prejudice.

For these reasons, Judge Black granted the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration, and dismissed without prejudice the civil
action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Tklrfd from Leagle.com.

Randy Jenkins, Plaintiff, represented by W. Mark Jump, Jump Legal
Group.

Randy Jenkins, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian, pro
hac vice, Joshua Swigart -- josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- pro
hac vice & Veronica McKnight, pro hac vice.

Fifth Third Bank, Defendant, represented by Robert Thomas Razzano
-- rrazzano@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP & Joel C.
Griswold -- jcgriswold@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro
hac vice.


FIFTH THIRD: Sued by Malagese Over Collection of Overdraft Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Malagese, on behalf of all persons similarly situated v.
Fifth Third Bank, Case No. 3:17-cv-00489-JHM (W.D. Ky., August 11,
2017), seeks monetary damages, restitution and declaratory relief
from the Defendant, arising from the alleged unfair and
unconscionable assessment and collection of "Overdraft Fees" on
accounts that were never actually overdrawn.

Fifth Third is a national bank with its headquarters and principal
place of business located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  Among other
things, Fifth Third is engaged in the business of providing retail
banking services to consumers, including the Plaintiff and members
of the putative classes, which includes the issuance of debit
cards for use by its customers in conjunction with their checking
accounts.  Fifth Third operates banking centers and, thus,
conducts business, throughout the State of Kentucky and the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John C. Whitfield, Esq.
          Caroline Ramsey Taylor, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          19 North Main Street
          Madisonville, KY 42431
          Telephone: (270) 821-0656
          Facsimile: (270) 825-1163
          E-mail: john@wbmllp.com
                  caroline@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Gary Mason, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 429-2290
          Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
          E-mail: gary@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Jae (Eddie) K. Kim, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT LLP
          2068 Orange Tree Lane, Suite 216
          Redlands, CA 92374
          Telephone: (909) 557-1250
          E-mail: rdm@mccunewright.com
                  jkk@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Taras P. Kick, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM
          APC 201 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 350
          Santa Monica, CA 90401
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Ostrow, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW P.A.
          200 S.W. 1st Avenue, 12th Floor
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com


FORTERRA INC: "Forrester" Hits IPO Flop, Non-disclosure of Facts
----------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Forrester, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. Forterra, Inc., Jeffrey
Bradley, William Matthew Brown, Lori M. Browne, Kyle S. Volluz,
Kevin Barner, Robert Corcoran, Samuel D. Loughlin, Clint
Mcdonnough, John Mcpherson, Chris Meyer, Jacques Sarrazin,
Chadwick Suss, Grant Wilbeck, Forterra US Holdings, LLC, Mid
Holdings, Concrete Holdings, LSF9 Concrete Ltd, LSF9 Concrete II
Ltd, Stardust Holdings, LSF9 Stardust GP, LLC, Lone Star Fund IX
(U.S.), L.P., Lone Star Partners IX, L.P., Lone Star Management
Co. IX, Ltd., John P. Grayken, Goldman, Sachs & Co., Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04763 (Cal. Super., August 14, 2017),
seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities Act of 1933 in
connection with Forterra's October 21, 2016 initial public stock
offering (IPO).

Forterra is a manufacturer of pipes and various precast products
for water-related infrastructure applications, including water
transmission, distribution and drainage. It operates 96
manufacturing facilities located across North America.

Forrester alleges that Forterra failed to disclose that organic
sales in its drainage and water segments had significantly
declined in the months leading up to the IPO, that the Company was
relying on highly-leveraged, expensive acquisitions to make up for
those lost sales, that the Company was experiencing increased
pricing pressure to significantly lower prices due to competition,
that its concrete and steel pipe business softened, accounting for
10% of its annual sales, that Forterra had not accrued expenses
for in the months leading up to the IPO, thus understating its
expenses and overstating its profits and control deficiencies
related to physical inventory counts.

Forterra common stock is trading below $5 per share, a decline of
approximately 75% from the IPO price. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
     Mary K. Blasy, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     58 South Service Road, Suite 200
     Melville, NY 11747
     Tel: (631) 367-7100
     Fax: (631) 367-1173
     Email: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
            mblasy@rgrdlaw.com

            - and -

     Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
     Marshall P. Dees, Esq.
     HOLZER & HOLZER, LLC
     1200 Ashford Parkway, Suite 410
     Atlanta, GA 30338
     Tel: (770) 392-0090
     Fax: (770) 392-0029
     Email: cholzer@holzerlaw.com
            mdees@holzerlaw.com


FRANCIS AIR: Mouillet-Gold Seeks to Recover Wages Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
FREDERIC IMPORTE MOUILLET-GOLD And other similarly situated
individuals v. FRANCIS AIR CONDITIONING & APPLIANCES INC. a
Florida Profit Corporation; PERCIVAL FRANCIS, individually;
ALEXANDRE COHEN, individually, Case No. 0:17-cv-61614-DPG (S.D.
Fla., August 11, 2017), is brought for alleged damages exceeding
$15,000, excluding attorneys' fees or costs, for unpaid wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Francis Air Conditioning & Appliances Inc. is a Florida Profit
Corporation located in Broward County, Florida, where the
Plaintiff worked for the Defendant.  The Individual Defendants are
officer of, and exercised operational control over the activities
of, the Corporate Defendant.

Francis Air Conditioning is a full-service HVAC company located in
Southeast Florida.  The Company serves customers throughout Miami-
Dade, Broward and Palm Beach County.  The Company's technicians
are available 24-hours a day, 7 days a week.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler St., Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416-5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416-5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  rregueiro@rgpattorneys.com
                  pn@rgpattorneys.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Another Ignition Switch Bellwether Trial Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that as
General Motors is scheduled later this year to face yet another
bellwether trial over allegations it covered up a deadly ignition
switch flaw, it can take some comfort from its generally-
successful trial record.  But critics of the bellwether system are
saying that way of lining up trials does not provide an accurate
way of keeping score.

In July, the seventh bellwether trial, held before New York
Southern District Judge Jesse Furman, ended in a third jury
verdict in GM's favor.

Attorneys for Dennis Ward, an Arizona man who says he was injured
in a 2014 fender bender caused by a faulty ignition switch in his
2009 Chevrolet HHR that made the vehicle lose power while he was
driving in traffic, were unable to convince the jury that the
automaker was to blame for the accident.

It was the second favorable verdict for GM from a Southern
District jury; a state jury in Texas also returned a verdict in
favor of the automaker.

Three other cases settled before they went to trial and two were
dismissed by the plaintiffs.

Bellwether trials have become an increasingly popular method of
dealing with mass torts that are intended to reach jury verdicts
that can be used as a basis for the parties to settle other cases.

But Alexandra Lahav, a University of Connecticut School of Law
professor who is an expert on bellwether trials, says GM's track
record so far in the bellwether cases has not been illustrative of
the results of the thousands of cases involving GM's ignition
switches, which were linked to 124 deaths and thousands of
injuries.

What the numbers indicate, Mr. Lahav said, is that GM has "won a
few cases."

"GM has done a great job of litigating these cases.  That's
clear," Mr. Lahav said.  "At the same time, they might be shooting
fish in a barrel."

The problem with bellwethers in the GM litigation, Mr. Lahav said,
is that GM and the plaintiffs were allowed to pick which cases
they wanted to bring to trial, which she said leads to each side
picking the "outlier cases" that they believe they can win at
trial, rather than those that would be representative of the
entire universe of cases.

Additionally, in the most serious cases against GM, the automaker
possesses a "trump card" in that it can reach settlements with the
plaintiffs, said Elizabeth Burch, a professor at the University of
Georgia School of Law and an expert in complex litigation.

"The money is on the table and a lot of people prefer the finality
of it instead of having to go through litigation," Burch said.

In 2015, GM announced that it would pay $575 million to settle
1,380 death and personal injury claims.

Last year, as the first of the bellwether trials was set to
commence, settlement payments were a source of strife between
members of the plaintiffs counsel. [GN]


GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Pinyuk" Suit in E.D. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Genpact Services
LLC. The case is styled as Nataliya Pinyuk, on behalf of herself
and all similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Genpact
Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-05059 (E.D. N.Y., August
26, 2017).

Genpact is a global professional services firm delivering digital
transformation by putting digital and data to work to create
competitive advantage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Maxim Maximov, Esq.
   Maxim Maximov, LLP
   1701 Avenue P
   Brooklyn, NY 11229
   Tel: (718) 395-3459
   Fax: (718) 408-9570
   Email: m@maximovlaw.com


GLOBE LIFE: Court Denies Class Certification in "Proctor" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma declined to certify class in the case
captioned MICHAEL PROCTOR, an Individual, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GLOBE LIFE AND
ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. CIV-15-750-M (W.D.
Okla.).

Since 1951, the Defendant has sold life insurance policies to
people throughout the United States.  Over the years, it has
developed certain practices regarding the payment of premiums.
Those practices are as follows: (i) there is a 31-day grace period
in which to make a payment from the due date; after the grace
period has passed, the policy is lapsed and the coverage is not
active; (ii) when a policy has lapsed beyond the 31 day grace
period, it will accept payment up to 120 days lapsed without
reinstatement provided the insured is in good health (if not in
good health, reinstatement is required); and (iii) after the 120th
day of lapse, payment cannot be accepted and the insured must
apply for reinstatement and pay all back premiums to bring the
policy current in order for reinstatement to be considered.

Through the instant action, the Plaintiff is challenging the
Defendant's practice during the period when the policy is lapsed
between 32 and 120 days.  He contends that this practice is
directly and expressly contrary to the provisions of its life
insurance policies.

He asserts that whenever defendant accepts premiums on a life
insurance policy that has already lapsed, in any amount less than
all of the overdue premiums, such that the policy is not brought
current and reinstated at that time, those premiums should be
returned to the insured.

The Plaintiff now moves the Court on Sept. 23, 2016 to certify a
nationwide class in this case.  Specifically, he moves to certify
the class of all Globe policyholders residing in the United States
(including its Territories and the District of Columbia) that paid
Globe life insurance policy premium payments, which Globe
retained, at a time when that life insurance policy was already
lapsed and was not reinstated with such payment.  On Nov. 4, 2016,
the Defendant filed its response, and on Dec. 2, 2016, the
Plaintiff filed his reply.

Judge Miles-LaGrange held that the Plaintiff fails to (i) identify
the particular state law claims he is asserting on behalf of the
class; (ii) provide any analysis of state law variances, such as
varying statutes of limitations and varying standards for the
admissibility of parole evidence; (iii) show that certification of
a nationwide class would not present insuperable obstacles; and
(iv) provide any suitable or realistic plan for trial of the class
claims in light of any variations in state law.  Accordingly, she
denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

Judge Miles-LaGrange opines that even assuming that the Plaintiff
could satisfy the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a)5, the
Court finds that he has not met his burden of establishing that
the questions of law or fact common to the proposed class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  Judge Miles-
LaGrange adds, among other things, that the Plaintiff also fails
to provide any analysis of state law variances, such as varying
statutes of limitations and varying standards for the
admissibility of parol evidence, and fails to show that
certification of a nationwide class would not present insuperable
obstacles.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/8YnCVm from Leagle.com.

Michael Proctor, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Engel --
mansell-engel@coxinet.net -- Mansell & Engel PC.

Michael Proctor, Plaintiff, represented by Steven S. Mansell,
Mansell & Engel PC, Kenneth G. Cole, Mansell Engel & Cole PC, Mark
A. Engel, Mansell & Engel PC, Steven S. Mansell, Mansell & Engel
PC & Kenneth G. Cole, Mansell Engel & Cole PC.

Globe Life And Accident Insurance Company, Defendant, represented
by John D. Russell -- jrussell@gablelaw.com -- Gable & Gotwals,
Steven J. Adams -- sadams@gablelaw.com -- Gable & Gotwals & Tammy
D. Barrett -- tbarrett@gablelaw.com -- Gable & Gotwals.


GOOGLE INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Final Nod in Privacy Litigation Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE GOOGLE REFERRER HEADER PRIVACY
LITIGATION. PALOMA GAOS; ANTHONY ITALIANO; GABRIEL PRIYEV,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MELISSA ANN HOLYOAK; THEODORE H. FRANK,
Objectors-Appellants, v. GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee, No. 15-15858(9th Cir.), Judge Mary Margaret
McKeown of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's order granting final approval of the
settlement on March 31, 2015.

In these consolidated class actions, three Google Search users --
Gaos, Italiano, and Priyev -- asserted claims for violation of the
Stored Communications Act; breach of contract; breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of implied
contract; and unjust enrichment.  They sought statutory and
punitive damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the
alleged privacy violations.  The claimed privacy violations are
the consequence of the browser architecture.  The genesis of the
Plaintiffs' complaints is the application of the search protocol,
coupled with Google's "Web History" service, which tracks and
stores account holders' browsing activity on Google's servers.

Following mediation, the parties reached a settlement, which they
submitted to the district court for preliminary approval in July
2013.  The settlement provided that Google would pay a total of
$8.5 million and provide information on its website disclosing how
users' search terms are shared with third parties, in exchange for
a release of the claims of the approximately 129 million people
who used Google Search in the United States between Oct. 25, 2006
and April 25, 2014 (the date the class was given notice of the
settlement).

Of the $8.5 million settlement fund, approximately $3.2 million
was set aside for attorneys' fees, administration costs, and
incentive payments to the named plaintiffs.  The remaining $5.3
million or so was allocated to six cy pres recipients, each of
which would receive anywhere from 15 to 21% of the money, provided
that they agreed to devote the funds to promote public awareness
and education, and/or to support research, development, and
initiatives, related to protecting privacy on the Internet.  The
six recipients were AARP, Inc.; the Berkman Center for Internet
and Society at Harvard University; Carnegie Mellon University; the
Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law
Center for Information, Society and Policy; the Stanford Center
for Internet and Society; and the World Privacy Forum.  Each of
the recipients submitted a detailed proposal for how the funds
would be used to promote Internet privacy.

After a hearing, the district court certified the class for
settlement purposes and preliminarily approved the settlement.
Notice was given to the class on April 25, 2014, via a website,
toll-free telephone number, paid banner ads, and press articles.
Thirteen class members opted out of the settlement, and five class
members, including Holyoak and Frank, filed objections.

Following a final settlement approval hearing at which the
district court heard from both the parties and Objectors, the
district court granted final approval of the settlement on March
31, 2015.  With respect to the objections, the district court
found that: (i) a cy pres -- only settlement was appropriate
because the settlement fund was non-distributable; (ii) whether or
not the settlement was cy pres -- only had no bearing on whether
Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement was met; (iii) the cy pres
recipients had a substantial nexus to the interests of the class
members, and there was no evidence that the parties' preexisting
relationships with the recipients factored into the selection
process; and (iv) the attorneys' fees were commensurate with the
benefit to the class.  The district court awarded $2.125 million
in fees to class counsel and $15,000 in incentive awards to the
three Named Plaintiffs.  Objectors appealed.

As an initial matter, Judge McKeown quickly disposes of the
argument that the district court erred by approving a cy pres-only
settlement.  Notably, Objectors do not contest the value of the
settlement nor do they plead monetary injury.  To be sure, cy
pres-only settlements are considered the exception, not the rule.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
superiority requirement was met because the litigation would
otherwise be economically infeasible.  This finding dovetails with
the rationale for the cy pres-only settlement.

She then turns to the crux of the appeal: whether approval of the
settlement was an abuse of discretion due to claimed relationships
between counsel or the parties and some of the cy pres recipients.
As an overarching matter, nothing in the record raises substantial
questions about whether the selection of the recipient was made on
the merits.  Judge McKeown does not suggest, however, that a
party's prior relationship with a cy pres recipient could not be a
stumbling block to approval of a settlement.  She holds merely
that, under the circumstances here, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in approving the cy pres recipients.

Turning to the issue of attorneys' fees, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by approving $2.125 million in fees and
$21,643.16 in costs, Judge McKeown finds.  As an initial matter,
she says there is no support for Objectors' view that the
settlement should have been valued at a lower amount for the
purposes of calculating attorneys' fees simply because it was cy
pres-only.  Rather, the question is whether the amount of
attorneys' fees was reasonable.  Although not required to do so,
the district court took an extra step, cross-checking this result
by using the lodestar method.  It found that class counsel
provided sufficient support for its lodestar calculation that fees
totaled $2,126,517.25.

Therefore, Judge McKeown affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Aug. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/i9Tw70 from Leagle.com.

Theodore H. Frank (argued), Melissa A. Holyoak, and Adam Ezra
Schulman, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Center for Class
Action Fairness, Washington, D.C., for Objectors-Appellants.

Kassra P. Nassiri (argued) and John J. Manier, Nassiri & Jung LLP,
San Francisco, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Donald M. Falk -- dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- (argued) and Edward D.
Johnson -- wjohnson@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Palo Alto,
California; Daniel E. Jones -- djones@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer
Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Randall W. Edwards --
redwards@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, San Francisco,
California; for Defendant-Appellee.


GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: Merger Docs Lacking Projections, Claims "Berg"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Berg, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Guidance Software, Inc., Robert Van
Schoonenberg, Reynolds C. Bish, Max Carnecchia, John Colbert,
Patrick Dennis, Michael Mcconnell, Wade W. Loo, Open Text
Corporation and Galileo Acquisition Sub Inc., Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-01033 (W.D. Wisc., July 25, 2017), seeks to enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing the acquisition of
Guidance Software, Inc. by Open Text Corporation, rescinding it
and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages in the event
defendants consummate the merger.  The suit also seeks costs of
this action, including reasonable allowance for attorneys' and
experts' fees and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Shareholders of Guidance will receive $7.10 in cash for each
share. Defendants locked up the merger by agreeing to a "no
solicitation" provision that prohibits the solicitation of
alternative proposals. The merger documents omitted the Company's
financial projections and the analyses performed Morgan Stanley &
Co. including unlevered free cash flow forecasts for years 2017
through 2021, says the complaint.

Guidance is a global provider of digital investigative solutions.
The Company's EnCase platform provides an investigative
infrastructure that enables its customers to search, collect, and
analyze electronically stored information in order to address
human resources matters, litigation matters, allegations of fraud,
suspicious network endpoint activity, and to defend and secure
their organization's data assets. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
      Wilmington, DE 19803
      Tel: (302) 295-531
      Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
      Email: bdl@rl-legal.com

             - and -

      Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
      Beverly Hills, CA 90210
      Telephone: (310) 208-2800
      Facsimile: (310) 209-2348


HCL COLLECTIONS: Faces "Linden" Suit in Dist. of Mass.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HCL Collections
Solutions, LLC doing business as: Account Recovery Services. The
case is styled as Monica Linden, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. HCL Collections Solutions,
LLC doing business as: Account Recovery Services, Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-11598-PBS (D. Mass., August 25, 2017).

HCL offers end-to-end receivables collection and recovery
management services that generate additional profits and build
greater organizational efficiencies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Kenneth D. Quat, Esq.
   Quat Law Offices
   929 Worcester Road
   Framingham, MA 01701
   Tel: (508) 872-1261
   Email: kquat@quatlaw.com


HILTON HOTELS: Bid to Dismiss Amended "White" Suit Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned VALERIE R. WHITE,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. HILTON HOTELS RETIREMENT PLAN, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-856 (CKK)(D. D.C.).

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Class Action Complaint, brought pursuant Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The Named Plaintiffs bring this putative class action under the
Employee Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") with respect to
certain vesting determinations made by the Hilton Hotels
Retirement Plan.  This matter was noticed as related to Kifafi v.
Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, an action over which the Court
concluded its jurisdiction in December 2015, after more than 17
years of litigation.  In Kifafi, the Court certified a benefit-
accrual class and certain vesting subclasses.

Plaintiff White was employed at the Washington Hilton between June
21, 1972 and March 26, 1982.  Her service prior to Jan. 1, 1976
has been calculated pursuant to the elapsed time method, and her
claim for retirement benefits was denied because she failed to
meet the minimum 10 years of vesting service required under the
Plan for employees who terminated their employment prior to 1989.
The Plaintiffs contend that it was improper for the Plan to use
the elapsed time method for pre-1976 service, and consequently,
that the denial of her benefits was in error.

Plaintiff Eva Juneau seeks retirement benefits for alleged
employment with Hilton properties between April 22, 1991 and Nov.
10, 2000.  The Defendants informed Plaintiff Juneau by letter
dated Feb. 4, 2015 that a portion of her claimed employment was
not reflected in their records, and asked her to submit additional
evidence of that employment.  Despite this and another opportunity
to do so, no additional evidence was provided, and the claim was
denied.  The Plaintiffs allege, however, that records requested
and received from the Defendants do not identify any non-
participating property that is also not a Related Company.

Plaintiff Peter Betancourt seeks benefits as an alleged
beneficiary of his father, Pedro Betancourt, who worked for Hilton
between 1947 and 1979, and died in 1985.  His claim was denied by
letter dated June 3, 2015, which indicated that the applicable
Plan document does not provide for a death benefit to anyone other
than the surviving spouse, and because Defendants determined that
his claim was untimely.  The Complaint alleges that Betancourt is
vested.

Judge Kollar-Kotelly concludes that the instant action concerns
claimants with alleged grievances that are not alleged to fall
within the narrow classes certified in Kifafi.  Nonetheless, the
Amended Complaint is replete with allegations that the legal
issues underlying this new putative class action have already been
decided by the Court in Kifafi, and that such determinations are
binding under the doctrines of res judicata and offensive
collateral estoppel.  For two of the Named Plaintiffs and their
associated categories of claims, she needs not decide what if any
effect its prior rulings in Kifafi may have, because these claims
are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on their own accord.
With respect to the third Named Plaintiff, Betancourt, the Judge
finds that his claim (and by extension, those of the associated
putative subclass) are not plausible, and that dismissal without
prejudice is appropriate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Her
conclusion is unchanged by the Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the
Court's prior rulings.

For these reasons, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The claims of
Plaintiffs White and Juneau, and those of the putative subclasses
associated with those claims, may proceed pursuant to ERISA
sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3).  All other claims are
dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/Y4dxeI from
Leagle.com.

VALERIE R. WHITE, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen Robert Bruce -
- stephen.bruce@prodigy.net -- STEPHEN R. BRUCE LAW OFFICES.

EVA JUNEAU, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen Robert Bruce,
STEPHEN R. BRUCE LAW OFFICES.

PETER BETANCOURT, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen Robert Bruce,
STEPHEN R. BRUCE LAW OFFICES.

HILTON HOTELS RETIREMENT PLAN, Defendant, represented by Andrew
McHie Lacy --  alacy@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT
LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood --  jyoungwood@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON,
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo --
pat.dicarlo@alston.com -- ALSTON & BIRD, L.L.P..

HILTON WORLDWIDE, INC., Defendant, represented by Andrew McHie
Lacy, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood,
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo, ALSTON &
BIRD, L.L.P..

GLOBAL BENEFITS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, Defendant, represented
by Andrew McHie Lacy, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Jonathan K.
Youngwood, SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo,
ALSTON & BIRD, L.L.P..

MARY NELL BILLINGS, Defendant, represented by Andrew McHie Lacy,
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood, SIMPSON,
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo, ALSTON & BIRD,
L.L.P..

S. TED NELSON, Defendant, represented by Andrew McHie Lacy,
SIMPSON, THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood, SIMPSON,
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo, ALSTON & BIRD,
L.L.P..

CASEY YOUNG, Defendant, represented by Andrew McHie Lacy, SIMPSON,
THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Jonathan K. Youngwood, SIMPSON, THACHER &
BARTLETT LLP & Patrick C. DiCarlo, ALSTON & BIRD, L.L.P..


HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE: Appeals Court Reinstates 2,100 Accutane Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for Law.com, reports that more than 2,100
suits by users of the acne drug Accutane who developed Crohn's
disease have been reinstated after an appeals court ruled that
expert testimony on behalf of plaintiffs was improperly excluded
by the trial judge.

Atlantic County Superior Court Judge Nelson Johnson exceeded his
role as a gatekeeper when he concluded that plaintiffs' experts on
gastroenterology and epidemiology were using accepted scientific
methods to analyze the evidence in the case, the appeals court
said.  The decision also said the judge incorrectly determined the
credibility of the testimony by plaintiffs' experts.  The appeals
court reversed an order barring expert testimony by the
plaintiffs' experts and another order dismissing 2,174 cases.

The July 28 decision was the second in one week's time from the
Appellate Division that reversed dismissal of multicounty
litigation cases concerning Accutane, which was marketed by
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.  On July 25, a different panel of the
Appellate Division reinstated a different set of 335 cases on
other grounds. The week's rulings bring the aggregate number of
Accutane cases pending in Atlantic County to more than 2,500.

The plaintiffs appealed rulings that Judge Johnson barred
testimony from Arthur Kornbluth, a gastroenterology expert for the
plaintiffs, and biostatistician David Madigan, an epidemiological
expert for the plaintiffs.  Both Mr. Kornbluth and Mr. Madigan
were critical of a series of eight epidemiological studies that
showed that users of Accutane were not at increased risk of
developing Crohn's disease.

Messrs. Kornbluth and Madigan said they favored other studies on
the subject, including some in which dogs developed bowel problems
after being administered Accutane.  Judge Johnson said Mr.
Kornbluth's "contrived reasoning is not supported by the
scientific community as a reliable basis for making causal
determinations," and said his testimony was "replete with what can
be described as convenient assumptions." Judge Johnson said
Madigan's opinions were conclusion-driven, rather than
methodology-based.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued Johnson
substituted his own view of the studies for that of the plaintiff
experts, calling him "an expert on a mission."

The Appellate Division panel of Judges Susan Reisner, Ellen
Koblitz and Thomas Sumners Jr. said Judge Johnson wrongly
concluded that the plaintiffs' experts ignored the epidemiological
studies in favor of less reliable evidence.  "The experts did not
ignore the studies. Rather, in extensive and detailed testimony,
they opined that most of the studies were unreliable, and they
explained in considerable detail the reasons for those opinions,"
Judge Reisner wrote for the court.  The judge's duty was "to weed
out 'junk science,' not to shield jurors from hearing expert
testimony that is scientifically-based but unpersuasive to the
trial judge," Judge Reisner wrote.

Hoffmann-La Roche was represented by Paul Schmidt of Covington &
Burling in Washington.  A spokeswoman for the company, Amanda
Fallon, said in a statement about the ruling, "The medical and
scientific communities have demonstrated that there is no link
between Accutane and Crohn's disease. Roche is disappointed that
the appellate court is allowing the plaintiffs' experts to offer
opinions that disregard this science, opinions which they
themselves have only offered in lawsuits.  Roche will ask the New
Jersey Supreme Court to take up this crucial issue, which has the
potential to impact a broad range of lawsuits involving important
public health issues."

David Buchanan -- dbuchanan@seegerweiss.com -- of Seeger Weiss in
New York, who argued for the plaintiffs, did not return a call
about the case.  Other plaintiff lawyers on the case referred
questions to Mr. Buchanan. [GN]


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Riaubia" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge C. Darnell Jones, II, of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case captioned JOSHUA RIAUBIA, individually and for
all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR
AMERICA, Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-5150(E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Riaubia purchased a 2015 Hyundai Sonata Limited in
August of 2014.  That vehicle, along with various other models,
comes equipped with a "Smart Trunk," a feature that is advertised
by the Defendant as being able to automatically open the trunk
fully, or at least wide enough for a person to deposit bulky items
into the trunk without having to put the items down or manually
open the trunk lid.  The Plaintiff claims that, despite those
representations, the Smart Trunk is defective in that it will
frequently fail to open more than a few inches, and sometimes it
never opens more than a crack.  Riaubia is a citizen of
Pennsylvania, and HMA is a California corporation.

To recover for damages caused by this alleged defect, the
Plaintiff brings a series of claims under federal and state law on
behalf of himself and a putative class of purchasers of various
Hyundai models equipped with the same allegedly defective Smart
Trunk feature: (i) violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law; (ii) violation of California's False Advertising Law; (iii)
violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act; (iv) breach
of express warranty under Pennsylvania law; (v) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability under Pennsylvania law; (vi) violation
of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; and, in the
alternative, (vii) unjust enrichment.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) on various grounds, including lack of
standing and failure to allege a defect, or any wrongful act.  It
also challenges the Plaintiff's right to bring an alternative
unjust enrichment claim or pursue a nationwide class action under
California law.

Judge Jones held that the Plaintiff has successfully defended
against HMA's 12(b)(6) motion.  Contrary to the Defendant's
assertions, Riaubia has standing to bring the class action.  And
the Complaint states consumer-fraud and warranty claims, as well
as a properly pleaded alternative unjust enrichment claim.

He finds that there is no indication in the case that the
differences across the various vehicle models of the same make
raise a sufficiently "different set of concerns" to undermine
Riaubia's standing to bring the class action.  The Plaintiff has
sufficiently pleaded a wrongful act under the alleged warranty and
consumer fraud laws and thus those claims survive the 12(b)(6)
motion.  The weight of authority, as cited by the parties,
confirms the Plaintiff's right to plead an alternative unjust
enrichment claim under Federal Rule 8, although ultimately the
Plaintiff will be able to recover on the basis of only one of
these legal theories.  The unjust enrichment claim therefore also
survives the 12(b)(6) motion.  Finally, the Judge finds that the
Defendant prematurely attempts to dismiss the claims under
California law using a choice-of-law analysis.  As the Plaintiff
correctly notes, however, courts in the Third Circuit have
consistently held that deciding a conflict-of-laws question
requires a factual record and is therefore inappropriate for
resolution on a motion to dismiss.  In conclusion, Judge Jones
denied in all respects the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/lo8T3n from Leagle.com.

JOSHUA RIAUBIA, Plaintiff, represented by NOAH I. AXLER, AXLER
GOLDICH LLC.

JOSHUA RIAUBIA, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES C. SHAH, SHEPHERD
FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLC, MARC A. GOLDICH, AXLER GOLDICH, LLC &
NATALIE FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLC.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, Defendant, represented by CHRISTOPHER J.
DALTON -- christopher.dalton@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL &
ROONEY, JACQUELINE M. WEYAND -- jacqueline.weyand@bipc.com --
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC & KENNETH L. RACOWSKI --
kenneth.racowski@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY.


JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS: Xarelto Bellwether Trial Begins
--------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The National Law Journal, reports
that the third bellwether trial over blood thinner Xarelto began
this week, but it's missing one thing: Beth Wilkinson.

Ms. Wilkinson, of Washington, D.C.'s Wilkinson Walsh + Eskovitz,
scored quick defense verdicts for Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc. and
Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc. in the first two Xarelto
trials earlier this year.

This time, Janssen, which is part of Johnson & Johnson, is relying
on Richard Sarver of Barrasso Usdin Kupperman Freeman & Sarver,
who was involved in the first Xarelto trial and is in
New Orleans, where all the trials so far have taken place.  Bayer
is leaning on Lyn Pruitt of Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates &
Woodyard in Little Rock, Arkansas, who was defense counsel in
trials over hormone replacement therapy drug Prempro, and Walter
T. Johnson at Watkins & Eager in Jackson, Mississippi, where the
third trial began on Aug. 7.

The case was brought by Dora Mingo, a resident of Summit,
Mississippi, who was admitted to the hospital in 2015 for
gastrointestinal bleeding less than a month after taking Xarelto
to treat a blood clot in her leg following hip replacement
surgery.  The trial was expected to end August.

Ms. Wilkinson confirmed she wasn't lead counsel this time around
but declined to comment.  None of the lawyers on the defense team
responded to requests for comment.

Bayer spokesman Steven Immergut insisted Ms. Wilkinson isn't out
of the picture.

"Ms. Pruitt, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sarver have been involved in the
Xarelto MDL on behalf of the companies for some time, and it has
long been the plan that they would lead the trial team for the
Mingo case," Mr. Immergut wrote in an email.  "In addition,
Wilkinson Walsh attorneys, including Ms. Wilkinson, continue to be
involved in the defense team for the Mingo trial, as well as in
preparation for upcoming Xarelto trials in various jurisdictions."

He said it's common to change up attorneys in multidistrict
litigation, "particularly when several trials are scheduled in a
relatively short amount of time."

More than 18,000 cases allege that Xarelto, an anticoagulant used
to treat blood clots, caused plaintiffs to suffer from
uncontrollable internal bleeding.

Plaintiffs attorneys have had a difficult time convincing juries
that Bayer and Janssen, both based in New Jersey, failed to warn
about Xarelto's bleeding risks.  In court, they have insisted that
doctors should have been instructed to conduct a simple blood test
that could assess a patient's risk of bleeding.

In the first trial, the jury took less than two hours before
coming back with a defense verdict on May 3.  In the second, which
ended in a June 12 verdict, jurors deliberated about three hours.

"The next trial -- in August -- has its own distinctive set of
claims and circumstances, and we look forward to having a jury
hear that evidence," said plaintiffs lead counsel Andy Birchfield
and Brian Barr at the time.

For the August trial, Mr. Birchfield, head of the mass torts
section of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles in
Montgomery, Alabama, has partnered with Bradley Honnold of Goza &
Honnold in Kansas City, Kansas, a member of the plaintiffs
steering committee. [GN]


JOIE DE VIVRE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Cornelius" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Samantha J. Cornelius filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Samantha Cornelius v. Joie de Vivre
Hospitality LLC, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-01399-R-AFM, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed over the Defendants' alleged systematic illegal payroll
practices and policies.  The Plaintiff accuses the Defendants of
failing to provide the Plaintiff and purported class members with
proper meal periods, among other things.

The appellate case is captioned as Samantha Cornelius v. Joie de
Vivre Hospitality LLC, et al., Case No. 17-56274, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Samantha J. Cornelius' opening brief is due on
      October 23, 2017;

   -- Appellees Commune Hotels and Resorts, LLC, Commune
      Services, LLC, Does, Joie de Vivre Hospitality LLC and The
      Saguaro Palm Springs' answering brief is due on
      November 20, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant SAMANTHA J. CORNELIUS, an individual, and on
behalf of others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Daniel Joseph Bass, Esq.
          Tagore Olivier Subramaniam, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531-1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
          E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  dbass@maternlawgroup.com
                  tagore@maternlawgroup.com

Defendants-Appellees JOIE DE VIVRE HOSPITALITY LLC, a Delaware
corporation; COMMUNE HOTELS AND RESORTS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; COMMUNE SERVICES, LLC, a California limited
liability company; and THE SAGUARO PALM SPRINGS, a business form
unknown, are represented by:

          Joshua Bram Wagner, Esq.
          Mark Saul Posard, Esq.
          GORDON & REES LLP
          633 West Fifth Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 576-5000
          Facsimile: (213) 680-4470
          E-mail: jwagner@gordonrees.com
                  mposard@gordonrees.com


KEY FOOD: Faces "Delgado" Suit Alleging FLSA, NYLL Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE DELGADO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, against KEY FOOD STORES CO-OPERATIVE, INC.,
and SAL BONAVITA, individually, Defendant, Case No: 1:17-cv-04621
(E.D.N.Y., August 7, 2017), seeks to represent current and former
employees of the Defendants who worked as laborers in Defendants'
supermarket and were forced to clock in and out, but, were not
paid for all hours for which they were clocked in; Defendants
avoided paying them proper wages in accordance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

Plaintiff Delgado was employed by Defendants as a full time as a
non-exempt laborer. Key Food Stores Co-Operative, Inc. owns and
operates a chain of supermarkets in Connecticut, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiffs is represented by:

     Jodi J. Jaffe, Esq.
     Jaffe Glenn Law Group, P.A.
     301 N. Harrison Street, Suite 9F, #306
     Princeton, NJ 08540
     Email: JJaffe@JaffeGlenn.com


LEAPFROG ENTERPRISES: Nov. 7 Class Cert. Date in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the parties' stipulated order
extending the class certification deadlines in the case captioned
In re LEAPFROG ENTERPRISES, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION. This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Master No. 3:15-cv-00347-
EMC(N.D. Cal.).

The Court has previously made time modifications in the case.  It
is the first request for a modification of the deadlines to move
for class certification.

On April 6, 2017, the Court referred the case to private mediation
and ordered that private mediation be completed by July 6, 2017.

The parties anticipate that class certification may require
discovery from the class representative, the submission of expert
reports, and depositions of the experts.

The Judge also ordered that, in the event the case does not
settle, the Lead Plaintiff's class certification motion will be
filed by Sept. 7, 2017, and oral argument will be heard on Dec. 7,
2017, with the parties to agree on a briefing schedule and submit
the stipulated schedule to the Court.

On May 31, 2017, the Court continued the deadline to conduct
private mediation to Sept. 7, 2017 due to availability of the
parties and the Hon. James Ware (Ret.), who will preside over the
private mediation.

Proceeding to class certification on the schedule that existed
when the mediation was scheduled to take place in July may, at
this point, needlessly waste judicial resources and may constitute
a substantial and unnecessary burden on the parties.  The parties
have conferred and agreed that, subject to Court approval, the
deadline for the Lead Plaintiff to move for class certification
should be continued to Nov. 7, 2017; the Defendants will have
until Dec. 21, 2017 to file any opposition to class certification;
the Lead Plaintiff will have until Feb. 7, 2018 to file any reply
in support of class certification; and the oral argument should be
continued to March 1, 2018 at 1:30 p.m. or to another date and
time convenient to the Court other than Feb. 22, 2018.
The parties agree that, in the event anyone other than the Lead
Plaintiff moves for appointment as class representative, the
parties will revisit the schedule to ensure the Defendants have
sufficient time to take discovery relevant to the class
certification determination regarding the previously unnamed
proposed representative.

Judge Chen therefore approved the parties' stipulation extending
the class certification deadlines.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Stipulated
Order is available at https://is.gd/m5O9gK from Leagle.com.

Abere Newett, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay --
RProngay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Mary L Tumlin, Plaintiff, represented by Ramzi Abadou --
ramzi.abadou@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick Foti LLP.

Richard Farias, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

KBC Asset Management NV, Plaintiff, represented by James Michael
Hughes -- jhughes@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC, pro hac vice,
Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Christopher Francis Moriarty, Motley Rice LLC, pro hac
vice, Matthew Seth Melamed -- mmelamed@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Willow E. Radcliffe --
willowr@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Bette R. Grayson, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Vincent
Prongay, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jordan Eth -
- jeth@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP & Mark R.S. Foster --
mfoster@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP.

John Barbour, Defendant, represented by Jordan Eth, Morrison &
Foerster LLP & Mark R.S. Foster, Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Raymond L. Arthur, Defendant, represented by Jordan Eth, Morrison
& Foerster LLP & Mark R.S. Foster, Morrison & Foerster LLP.

Chacal Liu, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP.

Paul M. Terreri, Movant, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP.


LPL FINANCIAL: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Charter" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON POLICE AND FIRE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LPL FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-0685-BTM-BGS(S.D. Cal.), Judge
Barry Ted Moskowitz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part and denied in part, with
leave to amend, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Consolidated
Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws.

This is a putative securities class action filed on behalf of all
purchasers of common stock of LPL between Dec. 8, 2015 and Feb.
11, 2016, inclusive.  The Plaintiff alleges that on Dec. 8, 2015,
the Defendants made false and misleading statements regarding
LPL's business and prospects, artificially inflating common stock
prices during the Class Period.  The Complaint states claims for
violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, as well
as section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.

LPL is an independent broker-dealer that provides a platform of
brokerage and investment advisory services to independent
financial advisors, and generates revenues primarily from fees and
commissions on clients' brokerage and advisory assets.  It was
founded in 1989 and in 2005 sold a majority stake to two private
equity firms, TPG Capital and Hellman & Friedman LLC.  TPG
thereafter elevated defendant Mark S. Casady to Chairman and CEO
of LPL.

In November 2010, TPG and Hellman took LPL public in an initial
public offering that generated approximately $470 million.  After
Hellman exited LPL stock in 2013, TPG became LPL's largest
shareholder.  It appointed two directors to LPL's Board and
entered into a shareholder agreement that gave it the right to
obtain any reports, documents, information or other materials
which a member of the LPL Board has received or has the right to
receive.  The Plaintiff alleges that by virtue of this provision,
TPG had the ability at any time to access inside financial
information regarding LPL's financial results.

On Oct. 29, 2015, in a move allegedly meant to reassure investors,
LPL announced a plan to buy back $500 million of its own shares.
On Nov. 24, 2015, LPL announced it had entered into an agreement
with Goldman Sachs & Co. whereby Goldman Sachs would carry out
$250 million of the $500 million share repurchase on a schedule
that LPL said will take several months to complete.

Meanwhile, by at least the beginning of December 2015, with less
than a month left in the fourth quarter of 2015, the Plaintiff
alleges LPL's internal financial results showed it was in the
midst of a disastrous" quarter.  It further contends TPG had
access to LPL's financial information by virtue of its shareholder
agreement, Board connections, and relationship with Casady.  TPG
allegedly anticipated based on LPL's inside information that once
the market learned of LPL's poor fourth-quarter performance, LPL's
stock price would fall.  It thus approached Goldman Sachs in late
November or early December 2015 to cash out more than 4 million
shares of LPL stock through the accelerated share repurchase
program at a time when LPL stock was trading at historic highs.

Before TPG's sale of LPL stock was publicly disclosed, on Dec. 8,
2015, LPL participated in a conference sponsored by Goldman Sachs
at which Casady and Matthew Audette, who had been hired in
September 2015 to serve as LPL's CFO, provided investors a near-
end-of-fourth quarter financial update.  The update was provided
through a slide presentation, during which Casady, Matthew J.
Audette, and the company made the allegedly materially false
statements on which this action is based.

On Dec. 10, 2015, and contrary to LPL's claim that the $250
million accelerated share buyback would take several months to
complete, LPL announced it had already completed the accelerated
buyback, allowing TPG to cash out 4.3 million shares at
$43.27/share.  More than three-quarters of the buyback spending
went to TPG.

On Feb. 11, 2016, LPL announced its 4Q15 and fiscal year 2015
financial results that allegedly revealed the false nature of its
Dec. 8, 2015 statements.  Contrary to the positive picture
portrayed during the Goldman Sachs conference, LPL's gross profits
had fallen substantially during 4Q15; and earnings were dragged
down by unexpectedly weak advisory and brokerage asset
performance.  Had TPG's shares been repurchased by LPL at this
point, LPL would have saved $115 million.

The Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Consolidated
Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws.  The Court
held a hearing on the Defendants' motion on April 17, 2017.

Judge Moskowitz finds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not
create an inference of scienter that is at least as compelling as
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent, and its claims
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be dismissed with leave to
amend.  The Defendants challenge some of their alleged
misstatements as inactionable puffery, as predictions that proved
true, and as misinterpretations of statements that, when viewed in
context, fail to support the Plaintiff's claims.  The Judge agrees
with the Defendants' arguments in part.  As to the Defendants'
claim that the Plaintiff has taken Audette's statements out of
context, and that properly understood, they were true, the Judge
disagrees.  Finally, since Judge Moskowitz finds that the
Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5, its claim under Section 20(a) must also be dismissed.

For these reasons, Judge Moskowitz (i) granted with leave to amend
the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Complaint in its
entirety for failure to allege scienter; (ii) granted without
leave to amend the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Audette's
statements that he did see market levels and asset levels recover
nicely and there was a nice rebound; Casady's statement that LPL
had good advisory asset growth overall; and Audette's statement
that he would just add that their debt plan and debt structure and
buyback plan was designed and built with having the flexibility to
be dynamic as they execute it over time; (iii) granted with leave
to amend the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Audette's
statement that their 2015 core G&A guidance is 7.5% to 8.5% and,
in dollars, roughly $700 million, that $697 million to $703
million, they're still on that track, and Audette's statement
regarding a likely decline in gross profits; and (iv) otherwise
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiff will have
45 days from the date the Order to file an amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/Q5Bnyt from Leagle.com.

Charter Township of Clinton Police and Fire Retirement System,
Plaintiff, represented by David C. Walton -- davew@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Charter Township of Clinton Police and Fire Retirement System,
Plaintiff, represented by Tricia L. McCormick --
TriciaM@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Soft Drink and Brewery Workers Union Local 812 Retirement Fund,
Plaintiff, represented by Andrew W. Hutton, Hutton Law Group,
Brian E. Cochran -- bcochran@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins, Geller Rudman
& Dowd, LLP, Jonah H. Goldstein -- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Susan Goss Taylor -- susant@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Tricia L. McCormick, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

LPL Financial Holdings Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael
Joseph Shiposh -- Michael.Shiposh@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray
LLP, pro hac vice & Richard Lawrence Gallagher --
Richard.Gallagher@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP.

Mark S. Casady, Defendant, represented by Michael Joseph Shiposh,
Ropes & Gray LLP, pro hac vice & Richard Lawrence Gallagher, Ropes
& Gray LLP.

Matthew J. Audette, Defendant, represented by Michael Joseph
Shiposh, Ropes & Gray LLP, pro hac vice & Richard Lawrence
Gallagher, Ropes & Gray LLP.


LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Court Affirms TCCWNA Ruling in "Kaufman" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JARROD KAUFMAN, RACHEL KAUFMAN, WILLIAM
QUICK and NANCY QUICK, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LUMBER LIQUIDATORS,
INC. and ROBERT M. LYNCH, Defendants-Respondents, Docket No. A-
3278-14T1(N.J. Super. App. Div.), the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed Andrea G. Carter's conclusion
that N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d) shows that the term household
furniture does not include hardwood flooring.

Plaintiffs Kaufmans and Plaintiffs Quicks are two sets of
consumers who filed a putative class action suit against Defendant
Lumber Liquidators its CEO, Lynch.  In their complaint, the
Plaintiffs alleged they purchased wood flooring and associated
merchandise from Lumber Liquidators several times from Aug. 29,
2012 through Oct. 20, 2012.  The sales invoices the Defendants
provided did not contain language promising plaintiffs that the
merchandise they ordered would be delivered by a specific date.

The Plaintiffs claimed Lumber Liquidators' failure to include the
precise delivery date language on its sales invoices violated the
Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act ("TCCWNA");
the Consumer Fraud Act; and the Delivery of Household Furniture
and Furnishings Regulations.  They do not allege defects or
deficiencies in the products they received.  In fact, they
suffered no actual damages.  They seek only statutory civil
penalties in the amount of $100 for each alleged violation of the
TCCWNA and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-
17.

The Law Division granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of law for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.  The dispositive issue is
whether the hardwood flooring the Plaintiffs purchased from Lumber
Liquidators constitutes "household furniture" under N.J.A.C.
13:45A-5.1(d).

Applying the well-settled standards established by the Supreme
Court in Printing-Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
Judge Carter concluded a plain reading of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d)
shows the term household furniture does not include hardwood
flooring.

Judge Carter found no reason to include non-moveable improvements
to real property, such as hardwood flooring or wall-to-wall
carpeting, in the regulatory definition of household furniture.

The Plaintiffs argue Judge Carter erred in adopting such a narrow
reading of the regulation.  The Defendants urge us to uphold Judge
Carter's analysis and ultimate conclusion.  The New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute and the United States Chamber of Commerce filed
a joint brief as amici curiae, urging the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, to use the case as an opportunity to
adopt a rigorous standard for defining what constitutes a clearly
established legal right of a consumer under the TCCWNA.

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, agrees with
Judge Carter's analysis and affirmed.  The long-established canon
of ejusdem generis provides that where general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.  The objects
provided to illustrate the limits of the regulation's reach
clearly exclude items such as hardwood floors, which, as Judge
Carter noted, constitute permanent improvements to property.  When
the plain language yields the meaning of the statute or
regulation, then their task is complete.

The Court thus affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by
Judge Carter in her oral opinion delivered from the bench on Feb.
20, 2015.  In this light, the Court declined Amici Curiae's
invitation to go beyond the four corners of the Plaintiffs'
pleading to resolve the straightforward dispositive legal question
presented.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/pWFwvL from Leagle.com.

Andrew R. Wolf -- awolf@wolflawfirm.net -- argued the cause for
appellants (The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wolf, Matthew
S. Oorbeek, Henry P. Wolfe, Andrew W. Li and Daniel I. Rubin, on
the briefs).

Brian E. O'Donnell -- bodonnell@riker.com -- argued the cause for
respondents (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland & Perretti, LLP,
attorneys; Mr. O'Donnell, Michael P. O'Mullan, Jeffrey M. Beyer
and Casey A. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief).

Gavin J. Rooney -- grooney@lowenstein.com -- argued the cause for
amicus curiae The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America (Lowenstein Sandler,
LLP, attorneys; Mr. Rooney and Naomi D. Barrowclough, on the
brief).


MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Misstates Broadsmart's Value, Freedman Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT FREEDMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. MAGICJACK VOCALTEC LTD., YMAX CORPORATION,
DON C. BELL III, GERALD VENTO, DONALD A. BURNS, RICHARD HARRIS,
YUEN WAH SING, ALAN HOWE, IZHAK GROSS, TALI YARON-ELDAR, AND
YOSEPH DAUBER, Case No. 9:17-cv-80940-RLR (S.D. Fla., August 11,
2017), accuses the Defendants of misrepresenting material facts
concerning the true value of Broadsmart, which was acquired in
early 2016, and was grossly impaired financially.

magicJack is an Israeli corporation whose principal executive
offices are located in Netanya, Israel.  The Company's subsidiary,
YMax Corporation is located in West Palm Beach, Florida.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the
magicJack.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kyle Charles Young, Esq.
          KYLE CHARLES YOUNG, PL
          205 Worth Avenue #201
          Palm Beach, FL 33480
          Telephone: (561) 635-1114
          E-mail: kcy@lawyer.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
          550 West C Street, Suite 1760
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1333
          E-mail: jrk@classactionlaw.com


MAGNET MEDIA: "Brashear" Seeks Recovery of Back Pay, Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Brashear, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Magnet Media, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-06026 (C.D. Cal., August 14, 2017), seeks unpaid
wages, unpaid overtime, damages, continuing wages, liquidated
damages, penalties, restitution and attorneys' fees and costs
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the California Labor Code.

Magnet Media is a production company and an interactive marketing
services firm based in New York City. It employed Plaintiff for
the production of filmed entertainment at ComplexCon, an upcoming
festival and exhibition in Long Beach. Brashear was laid off
without a return date in or around November 6, 2016. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Alan Harris, Esq.
     David Garrett, Esq.
     Min Ji Gal, Esq.
     HARRIS & RUBLE
     655 North Central Avenue, 17th Floor
     Glendale CA 91203
     Tel: (323) 962-3777
     Fax: (323) 962-3004
     Email: harrisa@harrisandruble.com
            mgal@harrisandruble.com


MARION COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in "Washington" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LEROY WASHINGTON on his own behalf, and on
behalf of a Class of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
MARION COUNTY PROSECUTOR, MAYOR OF THE CONSOLIDATED CITY OF
INDIANAPOLIS/MARION COUNTY, CHIEF OF THE INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants, No. 1:16-cv-02980-JMS-DML(S.D.
Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, (i)
granted Mr. Washington's Motion to Certify a Class, as modified;
(ii) granted Mr. Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment; (iii)
permanently enjoined the Defendants from enforcing Indiana Code
Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1) as read in conjunction with Indiana Code
provisions of the same chapter; (iv) denied the Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment; and (v) denied as moot Mr.
Washington's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

On Sept. 21, 2016, an officer of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department ("IMPD") stopped a car driven and owned by Mr.
Washington.  Mr. Washington was ultimately arrested and charged
with, among other offenses, dealing in marijuana.  The officer had
Mr. Washington's car towed and held for forfeiture pursuant to
Indiana Code Sections 34-24-1-1(a)(1) and 34-24-1-2(a)(1).  On
Nov. 1, 2016, Washington made a demand for the return of his
property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-3.  His car has
since been returned to him.

Mr. Washington filed his Complaint in the Court on Nov. 2, 2016,
alleging on behalf of himself and a putative class of Plaintiffs
that Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-2(a)(1) violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  His Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that
Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-2(a)(1), read in conjunction with
Indiana Code Sections 34-24-1-1 and 34-24-1-3, violates the
Constitution, and he requests a permanent injunction enjoining
Defendants from seizing vehicles pursuant to that statute.  Mr.
Washington then filed a Motion to Certify a Class, and a Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, which the Defendants oppose.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the Court denied.
Mr. Washington filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment.  The Court ordered
Mr. Washington to submit supplemental briefing addressing several
issues, and allowed the Defendants the opportunity to respond.
That briefing has been submitted in accordance with the Court's
order.

Therefore, currently pending before the Court are Mr. Washington's
Motions for Class Certification, Preliminary Injunction, and
Summary Judgment, and the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Mr. Washington proposes the class defined as all persons who own
vehicles that are being held pursuant to IC Section 34-24-1-
2(a)(1) by the Marion County Prosecutors Office or the
Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County or the IMPD or any
agent of the Defendants.  He argues that this class is
sufficiently identifiable, because all elements of the proposed
class definition refer to objective criteria: (i) vehicle owners,
(ii) whose vehicles have been seized, (iii) pursuant to Indiana
Code Section 34-24-1-2(a)(1), (iv) by the Defendants.

Judge Magnus-Stinson concludes that the definition proposed by Mr.
Washington is based upon objective criteria, and it outlines a
sufficiently identifiable class.  Therefore, she defines the class
as all persons who own vehicles that have been seized and held
pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1 et seq. by the Marion
County Prosecutor's Office, the Consolidated City of
Indianapolis/Marion County, the IMPD, or any agent of those
entities who were not afforded a post-seizure, pre-forfeiture
hearing.

In their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants argue
that Mr. Washington's claim has been rendered moot, divesting the
Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Judge Magnus-Stinson finds
(as it did in its order denying the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss)
that Washington has established that the inherently transitory
doctrine applies here.  First, it is uncertain that a claim will
remain live for any individual who could be named as a plaintiff
long enough for a court to certify the class.  Second, there will
be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation
complained of in the Complaint.  She therefore concludes, as it
did at the motion to dismiss stage, that Washington's claim was
not rendered moot by the return of his vehicle.  The Court retains
jurisdiction over this dispute.

Mr. Washington requests a declaratory judgment that Ind. Code
Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1), as read in conjunction with other
statutory provisions, is unconstitutional.  He also requests a
permanent injunction, enjoining the Defendants from enforcing the
statute.  The Defendants object to the issuance of an injunction,
arguing that it would constitute a rewriting of the statute.
Judge Magnus-Stinson concludes that the statutory provisions
allowing for the seizure and retention of vehicles without
providing an opportunity for an individual to challenge the pre-
forfeiture deprivation are unconstitutional.  She needs not
"rewrite" the statute in order to enjoin Defendants from enforcing
an unconstitutional state statute.  The Judge is mindful that the
drafting of forfeiture laws is the responsibility of the Indiana
General Assembly, and the Court will not attempt a constitutional
rewrite of the statute.  But it is the Court's responsibility to
adjudicate the constitutionality of a law when properly presented
with the question.

For the reasons stated, Judge Magnus-Stinson granted Mr.
Washington's Motion to Certify a Class, as modified.  She also
granted Mr. Washington's Motion for Summary Judgment.  She
concludes that Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1), read in
conjunction with Indiana Code provisions of the same chapter,
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.  The Defendants are permanently enjoined from
enforcing Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1), as read in
conjunction with Indiana Code provisions of the same chapter.  The
Defendants are further ordered to inform forthwith all other
affected Indiana state governmental entities of this injunction.
The Judge denied the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.  In light of this ruling, she denied as moot Mr.
Washington's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7TTKci from Leagle.com.

LEROY WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey R. Cardella --
JeffCardella@CardellaLawOffice.com -- LAW OFFICE OF JEFF CARDELLA
LLC.

MARION COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant, represented by Benjamin J.
Legge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & Jonathan Paul Nagy,
INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL.

MAYOR OF THE CONSOLIDATED CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS/MARION COUNTY,
Defendant, represented by Pamela G. Schneeman, OFFICE OF
CORPORATION COUNSEL.

CHIEF OF THE INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendant, represented by Pamela G. Schneeman, OFFICE OF
CORPORATION COUNSEL.


MARTHA STEWART: Stockholder Suit Over MLSO Merger Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA, INC.
STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION, Consolidated C.A. No. 11202-VCS(Del. Ch.),
Judge Joseph R. Slights, III, of the Court of Chancery of Delaware
granted the motions to dismiss brought by Martha Stewart and the
Sequential Defendants.

In this consolidated class action, former stockholders of Martha
Stewart Living ("MSLO") have brought claims in a Verified Second
Amended Class Action Complaint against the MSLO's former
controlling stockholder and namesake, Martha Stewart, for breach
of fiduciary duty and against the third-party buyer, Sequential
Brands Group, Inc., for aiding and abetting that breach.  The
claims arise out of a transaction that closed in December 2015,
whereby the MSLO was acquired by Sequential in a merger.  Pursuant
to the Merger, MSLO stockholders could elect to receive $6.15 per
share either in cash or common stock of the newly formed company
based on a conversion formula set forth in the merger agreement.

The initial complaint in this consolidated class action was filed
on June 25, 2015, three days after the Merger was announced.  That
action was consolidated with several related actions pursuant to
the Court's consolidation order dated Aug. 18, 2015.  The
Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint on Jan. 12,
2016, and then a second amended complaint, the operative
"Complaint," on July 18, 2016.  The Complaint contains two counts:
Count I for breach of fiduciary duty against Stewart as MSLO's
controlling stockholder and Count II for aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duties against the Sequential Defendants.

Stewart and the Sequential Defendants filed motions to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).  After
initial briefing and oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the
Court requested supplemental briefing on June 29, 2017.  The
supplemental briefing was to address two issues the parties did
not fully address in their initial briefing: (i) whether the Court
can accept the contents of the Proxy as true at the pleadings
stage given the substantial differences between the Complaint and
the Proxy with respect to key facts; and (ii) whether the
framework established by the Supreme Court in M&F Worldwide
applies to a one-sided controller transaction and, if so, at what
point in the process would the "dual procedural protections" of an
independent, fully empowered special committee and a majority of
the minority vote need to be imposed for purposes of determining
whether both protections were present "ab initio."  The parties
submitted their supplemental briefing on July 24, 2017.

Judge Slights has not yet had occasion to address whether the
transactional structure outlined in M&F Worldwide fits when the
controller is a seller only and, if so, whether strict compliance
with the prescribed steps is necessary to secure pleadings-stage
business judgment rule review.  He has determined that M&F
Worldwide does apply to conflicted one-side controller
transactions.  He has also determined that business judgment
deference is appropriate at the pleadings stage in this case
because the dual procedural protective measures deployed in
connection with this transaction -- the creation of an independent
special committee and the adoption of a majority of the minority
approval condition -- followed the M&F Worldwide road map with
precision and were in place at the moment Stewart began to
negotiate for consideration over and above what would be paid to
the other stockholders.  Because the course of this transaction
hit each point on the M&F Worldwide map, the Plaintiffs' only path
to challenge the Merger is via a claim of waste, which they have
neither pled nor remotely suggested is viable here.

The Judge has also concluded that the Complaint does not
adequately plead that Stewart, as controlling stockholder, engaged
in a conflicted transaction in any event.  The timeline of the
negotiations surrounding the Merger and the "side deals"
Sequential entered into with Stewart reveals that the Plaintiffs
will be unable, under any reasonably conceivable circumstance, to
prove a central element of their claim, causally related damages.
Contrary to the story chronicled in the Complaint, where Stewart
allegedly diverted consideration from MSLO stockholders to
herself, and thereby caused Sequential to lower its offer for the
Company, the actual series of events described in the publicly
filed documents on which the Complaint relies confirms that the
consideration Sequential offered to MSLO stockholders actually
increased after negotiations with Stewart began.  Under these
circumstances, it is not reasonably conceivable that the
Plaintiffs can prove their claim that Stewart engaged in a
conflicted transaction through which she caused injury to the
minority stockholders by diverting merger consideration to
herself.

The Plaintiffs have also failed to allege sufficient non-
conclusory facts that would allow any inference that the side
deals Sequential negotiated with Stewart to ensure her continued
commitment to the acquired company were materially different from
or more lucrative to Stewart than the contractual arrangements
Stewart already had in place with MSLO.  Having failed to plead a
conflict between Stewart and the minority stockholders, the
appropriate standard of review is the business judgment rule even
if the transactional structure strayed from the M&F Worldwide road
map.

For its part, Sequential seeks dismissal of the aiding and
abetting claim on two grounds: (i) the claim fails as a matter of
law because the Complaint does not plead a viable claim for breach
of fiduciary duty against Stewart; and (ii) the Complaint fails to
plead one of the required elements of an aiding and abetting
claim, knowing participation in the breach by Sequential.  Because
Judge Slights has determined that the Complaint fails to state a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Stewart, he dismissed
the Complaint against Sequential on that basis and need not reach
the question of whether the Complaint adequately pleads the other
elements of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

For these reasons, Judge Slights granted the motions to dismiss
brought by Stewart and the Sequential Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/HhUZYY from Leagle.com.

Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esquire -- sdr@rl-legal.com -- Brian D. Long,
Esquire -- bdl@rl-legal.com -- Gina M. Serra, Esquire -- gms@rl-
legal.com -- and Jeremy J. Riley Esquire -- jjr@rl-legal.com -- of
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Carmella P. Keener
Esquire -- ckeener@rmgglaw.com -- of Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; James S. Notis Esquire --
jnotis@gardylaw.com -- and Meagan Farmer Esquire --
mfarmer@gardylaw.com -- of Gardy & Notis, LLP, New York, New York;
Evan J. Smith Esquire -- esmith@brodsky-smith.com -- and Marc L.
Ackerman Esquire, of Brodsky & Smith, LLC, Bala Cynwyd,
Pennsylvania; and Gustavo F. Bruckner Esquire --
gfbruckner@pomlaw.com -- of Pomerantz LLP, New York, New York,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Kevin R. Shannon, Esquire -- kshannon@potteranderson.com --
Matthew F. Davis, Esquire -- mdavis@potteranderson.com -- and
Mathew A. Golden Esquire -- mgolden@potteranderson.com -- of
Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and Paul K.
Rowe Esquire -- PKRowe@wlrk.com -- of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendant Martha Stewart.

John L. Reed, Esquire -- john.reed@dlapiper.com -- Ethan H.
Townsend, Esquire -- ethan.townsend@dlapiper.com -- and Harrison
S. Carpenter Esquire -- arrison.carpenter@dlapiper.com -- of DLA
Piper LLP (US), Wilmington, Delaware and Mitchell A. Karlan
Esquire -- mkarlan@gibsondunn.com -- and Lauren Sager Esquire --
lsager@gibsondunn.com -- of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York,
New York, Attorneys for Defendants Sequential Brands Group, Inc.,
Singer Madeline Holdings, Inc., Madeline Merger Sub, Inc., and
Singer Merger Sub.


MDL 1566: Proofs of Claim Due Sept. 26
--------------------------------------
Companies or individuals who may have purchased natural gas for
their own use or consumption in Kansas, Missouri, or Wisconsin
from January 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002, may file a claim
for payment no later than Sept. 26, 2017, pursuant to a settlement
reached in the case, In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas
Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev.).

Four groups of Defendants have agreed to settle the pending
lawsuits: American Electric Power Company, Inc., AEP Energy
Services, Inc., Coral Energy Resources, L.P. (n/k/a Shell
Energy North America (U.S.), L.P.), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
(f/k/a/ Duke Energy Corporation) and Duke Energy Trading and
Marketing, L.L.C., ONEOK, Inc., and ONEOK Energy Services Company,
L.P. (f/k/a ONEOK Energy Marketing & Trading Company, L.P.).  The
case is continuing against the remaining Defendants.

The settlements provide a total of $42,800,000 in cash, plus
interest, before deductions for attorneys' fees and expenses. The
Class Representatives and Class Counsel have agreed, and the Court
has preliminarily approved, an allocation of those funds to class
members in Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin based primarily on the
volume of natural gas sold in each state and differences in the
claims and remedies available in each state.  Before deductions
for attorneys' fees and expenses, the Settlement Fund is allocated
as follows:

     $20,522,000 to the Wisconsin Class;

     $14,089,600 to the Kansas Class; and

     $8,188,400 to the Missouri Class.

In addition, the Settling Defendants' sales remain in the case for
the purpose of computing damages against the remaining defendants.

Entities may be a member of the following Settlement Classes:

  -- Kansas Settlement Class

     All industrial and commercial direct purchasers of natural
gas for their own use or consumption during the period from
January 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002, and which gas was used
or consumed by them in Kansas. Excluded from the Class are (a)
entities that purchased natural gas for resale (to the extent of
such purchase for resale); (b) entities that purchased natural gas
for generation of electricity for the purpose of sale (to the
extent of such purchase for generation); (c) defendants and their
predecessors, affiliates and subsidiaries; (d) the federal
government and its agencies; and (e) Reorganized FLI, Inc. (f/k/a
Farmland Industries, Inc.). For purposes of this Kansas Settlement
Class definition, a "direct purchaser" means an industrial or
commercial entity that bought natural gas for its own use or
consumption directly from any of the defendants in the Actions, or
from a seller other than a local distribution company.

  -- Missouri Settlement Class

     All industrial and commercial direct purchasers of natural
gas for their own use or consumption during the period from
January 1, 2000 through October 31, 2002, and which gas was used
or consumed by them in Missouri. Excluded from the Class are (a)
entities that purchased natural gas for resale (to the extent of
such purchase for resale); (b) entities that purchased natural gas
for generation of electricity for the purpose of sale (to the
extent of such purchase for generation); (c) defendants and their
predecessors, affiliates and subsidiaries; (d) the federal
government and its agencies; and (e) Reorganized FLI, Inc. (f/k/a
Farmland Industries, Inc.). For purposes of this Missouri
Settlement Class definition, a "direct purchaser" means an
industrial or commercial entity that bought natural gas for its
own use or consumption directly from any of the defendants in the
Actions, or from a seller other than a local distribution company.

  -- Wisconsin Settlement Class

     All industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas for
their own use or consumption during the period from January 1,
2000 through October 31, 2002, and which gas was used or consumed
by them in Wisconsin. Excluded from the Class are (a) entities
that purchased natural gas for resale (to the extent of such
purchase for resale); (b) entities that purchased natural gas for
generation of electricity for the purpose of sale (to the extent
of such purchase for generation); (c) entities that purchased
natural gas from entities that sold natural gas at rates approved
by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (to the extent of such
purchases at such approved rates); (d) defendants and their
predecessors, affiliates and subsidiaries; (e) the federal
government and its agencies; and (f) Reorganized FLI, Inc. (f/k/a
Farmland Industries, Inc.).

The Court granted final approval of the Settlements in May 2017.

KANSAS SETTLEMENT CLASS COUNSEL:

     Jennifer Gille Bacon, Esq.
     Polsinelli PC
     900 W. 48th Place, Suite 900
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     E-mail: jbacon@polsinelli.com

          - and -

     Donald D. Barry, Esq.
     Barry Law Office
     5340 S.W. 17th Street
     P.O. Box 4816
     Topeka, KS 66604
     E-mail: dbarry@inlandnet.net

          - and -

     Gary D. McCallister, Esq.
     McCallister Law Group, LLC
     120 N. LaSalle St. #2800
     Chicago, IL 60602
     E-mail: gdm@gdmlawfirm.com

WISCONSIN SETTLEMENT CLASS COUNSEL

     Robert L. Gegios, Esq.
     Kohner, Mann & Kailas, S.C.
     Washington Building
     Barnabas Business Center
     4650 Port Washington Road
     Milwaukee, WI 53212
     E-mail: rgegios@kmksc.com

          - and -

     Jennifer Gille Bacon, Esq.
     Polsinelli PC
     900 W. 48th Place, Suite 900
     Kansas City, MO 64112

          - and -

     Donald D. Barry, Esq.
     Barry Law Office
     5340 S.W. 17th Street
     P.O. Box 4816
     Topeka, KS 66604

MISSOURI SETTLEMENT CLASS COUNSEL

     Jennifer Gille Bacon, Esq.
     Polsinelli PC
     900 W. 48th Place, Suite 900
     Kansas City, MO 64112

          - and -

     Donald D. Barry, Esq.
     Barry Law Office
     5340 S.W. 17th Street
     P.O. Box 4816
     Topeka, KS 66604

THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING THE SETTLING DEFENDANTS

The AEP Defendants:

     Robert Wolinsky, Esq.
     Hogan Lovells US LLP
     Columbia Square
     555 Thirteenth Street, NW
     Washington, D.C. 20004
     E-mail: Robert.wolinsky@hoganlovells.com

Coral Energy Resources, L.P.:

     Joshua Lichtman, Esq.
     Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
     555 South Flower Street
     Forty-First Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     E-mail: Joshua.lichtman@nortonrosefulbright.com

The Duke Defendants:

     Joel Kleinman, Esq.
     Blank Rome LLP
     1825 Eye Street NW
     Washington, D.C. 20006
     E-mail: jkleinman@blankrome.com

The ONEOK Defendants:

     David Bryant, Esq.
     GableGotwals
     100 W. Fifth Street, Suite 1100
     Tulsa, OK 74103
     E-mail: dbryant@gablelaw.com

Additional information is available at:

           https://www.naturalgasantitrustsettlement.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Gilbert" Suit in Western District of Va.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is styled as John Gilbert, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
00034-JPJ-PMS (W.D. Va., August 25, 2017).

Midland Credit Management Inc. operates a collection agency that
helps consumers resolve past-due debt obligations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Taylor-Lee Wickersham Stokes, Esq.
   Law Office of Taylor-Lee W. Stokes, P.C.
   6933 Commons Plaza, Suite 101
   Chesterfield, VA 23832
   Tel: (804) 318-0653
   Fax: (803) 751-8600
   Email: twstokes@attorneysstokes.com


MISSOURI: State High Ct. Denies Bid for Mandamus in "Bartlett"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the circuit court's denial
of the Relators' request for a Writ of Mandamus in the case
captioned BARBARA BARTLETT, et al., Appellants, v. MISSOURI
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE and CHLORA LINDLEY-MYERS, Respondents, No.
SC96212(Mo.).

On Nov. 9, 2012, two former employees of the Missouri Department
of Insurance, Bartlett and Shawn Hernandez, filed a "Petition for
Writ of Mandamus-Class Action" in Jackson County circuit court.
The Employees requested a writ of mandamus directing the
department and its director to pay them for lost wages and
pensions.  The circuit court's administrator, uncertain how to
characterize the filing, sent a note asking the Employees if the
filing should be handled as a Writ or a regular Jackson County
case and if handled as a Writ of Mandamus, they could refer to the
Missouri Court Rules.  The Employees responded, instructing to
file the case as a regular Jackson County Case and not as a Writ.

In compliance with the Employees' instructions, summonses for a
civil case were issued by the circuit court and served.  The case
was subsequently transferred to Cole County circuit court, and the
Department filed a motion to dismiss.  In its motion, the
Department argued, in part, that the Employees failed to satisfy
the elements for a writ of mandamus and failed to satisfy the
procedural requirements for mandamus under Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 94.03.  The Employees then filed a First Amended Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, styling themselves as relators in the writ
petition and attaching suggestions in support and exhibits.  The
circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, finding that
mandamus an appropriate remedy and directing the Department to
file an answer.

The Department filed a General Objection and Answer asserting the
circuit court is empowered to issue but one type of order; a
preliminary order in mandamus.  After the answer was filed, the
Employees sought leave to file a Second Amended Petition for Writ
of Mandamus and, in an effort to file a complete writ that fully
complies with Rule 94.03, they filed suggestions in support of
their petition along with exhibits.  The Department once again
objected and argued Employees failed to comply with Rule 94 and
were not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

The parties eventually filed competing motions for summary
judgment.  On Dec. 31, 2015 -- more than three years after the
initial filing -- the circuit court denied the Relators' request
for a Writ of Mandamus and entered judgment in favor of
Respondents.  All other claims for relief, not expressly granted,
were denied.  Costs taxed to the Relators.  The Employees
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer after
opinion by the court of appeals.

The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court
acquiesced in the treatment of the mandamus proceedings as a
normal civil action until the very end.  Parties seeking mandamus
relief who choose to disregard the procedures and requirements of
Rule 94 do so at their own risk.  In the end, the circuit court
denied the Employees a writ of mandamus.  But having never granted
a preliminary writ, the Court says the Employees' course of action
would be to seek relief in the next higher court, as denial of
mandamus relief without the issuance of a preliminary writ is not
subject to appeal.  For these reasons, the Court dismissed the
appeal.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Order
is available at https://is.gd/QSsvjF from Leagle.com.

Bartlett and Hermandez were represented by Anthony L. Dewitt,
Edward D. Robertson, Jr. and Mary D. Winter of Bartimus,
Frickleton and Robertson PC, in Jefferson City, (573) 659-4454.

Ryan M. Paulus -- r.paulus@Cornerstonefirm.com -- and Brittany N.
Coughlin Mehl -- b.mehl@Cornerstonefirm.com -- of the Cornerstone
Law Firm in Kansas City, (816) 581-4040.

The department and its director were represented by James R.
McAdams, deputy commissioner and general counsel of the department
in Jefferson City, (573) 751-1851.


MRS BPO: Dinaples Seeks to Certify Class of Consumers Under FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled DONNA DINAPLES, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. MRS BPO, LLC and JOHN
DOES 1-25, Case No. 2:15-cv-01435-MRH (W.D. Pa.), seeks
certification of this Class pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act:

     All consumers with an address in Westmoreland County who,
     beginning November 2, 2014 through and including the final
     resolution of this case, were sent one or more letters from
     Defendant attempting to collect a consumer debt allegedly
     owed to Chase Bank, which displayed on the outside of the
     mailing a Quick Response ("QR") Code containing the account
     number associated by Defendant with that consumer's account.

On November 2, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a complaint averring that
the Defendant debt collector, MRS BPO, LLC, violated the
provisions of the FDCPA, which prohibit a debt collector from
using any unfair and unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
collect a debt and from using language or a symbol on any envelope
when communicating with a consumer by mail.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PZ3ZGbR0

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark G. Moynihan, Esq.
          MOYNIHAN LAW, P.C.
          112 Washington Place, Suite 230
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 889-8535
          E-mail: mark@moynihanlaw.net

               - and -

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


NEW ORLEANS MILLWORKS: Maldonado Moves for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled OSMAN MALDONADO, et al., on
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated v. NEW
ORLEANS MILLWORKS, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-01015-CJB-MBN
(E.D. La.), move for conditional class certification, judicial
notice, and for disclosure of the names and addresses of potential
"opt-in" plaintiffs.

The action arises from a "generally applicable rule, policy, or
practice" pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=dezqTsGS

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          Emily A. Westermeier, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: costaleslawoffice@gmail.com
                  whbeaumont@gmail.com
                  eaw@beaumontcostales.com


NEW YORK, NY: "Fernandes" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alcindo Fernandes, Augustin Palau, Juan Puig and Jose Rodriguez,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. The City of New York, The Department of Education of the City
of New York and New York City School Support Services, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-23052 (S.D. Fla., August 11, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, and
attorneys' fees and costs for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiffs are custodians working for defendants in public schools
throughout New York City whose primary duties were manual in
nature. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian L. Greben, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF BRIAN L. GREBEN
      316 Great Neck Road
      Great Neck, NY 11021
      Tel: (516) 304-5357


NIANTIC INC: California Judge Halts Suits Over Pokemon Go
---------------------------------------------------------
Ross Todd, writing for The Recorder, reports that a federal judge
has pressed pause on a group of lawsuits targeting the maker of
augmented reality game Pokemon Go with nuisance and trespass
claims for placing virtual landmarks on top of real property.

At a hearing on July 27, U.S. District Judge James Donato of the
Northern District of California asked lawyers representing
property owners in New Jersey, Michigan and Florida who sued app
maker Niantic Inc. to lay out how their claims could possibly
amount to more than $5 million, the threshold needed to invoke
federal court jurisdiction.

"There's no dollar valuation whatsoever on the nuisance or
trespass injuries," Judge Donato said.  "There's nothing in there
about how you get to $5 million."

Lawyers from Pomerantz filed three successive lawsuits shortly
after the wildly popular mobile game was released last summer,
claiming Niantic induced players to trespass by placing virtual
Pokestops and Pokemon gyms on or near private property without
sign-off from real-world, real estate owners.  Plaintiffs claimed
the players created a variety of nuisances, varying from unwanted
knocks on the door to players congregating at all hours and
relieving themselves on their property.  Niantic's lawyers at
Cooley have argued the company can't be held liable for players'
actions and that the company requires users to abide by real-world
laws to access the game.

At the July 27 hearing Pomerantz's Aatif Iqbal told Judge Donato
that Niantic generated more than $1 billion in revenues from the
game since it launched last July, and the game relied on "having
as large a game board as possible" to draw players in.  Iqbal
pointed out the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction that would
force Niantic to change the locations of certain landmarks and
characters in the game. That injunction would "easily" cost
Niantic $5 million to comply, he said.

"I'm no game player, so help me out," Judge Donato said later to
Mr. Iqbal's colleague, Murielle Steven Walsh.  "When you say
remove the Pokemon from the property, what do you mean?"

Ms. Walsh said that moving the location of items of characters in
the game would involve adjusting the GPS coordinates where they
are made to appear within the game on players' mobile devices.
That, she said, would cost the company an amount that it would be
difficult for plaintiffs to calculate without some discovery from
Niantic.

Cooley's Michael Rhodes, however, countered it would be hard to
place a value on an injunction as vague as the one outlined in the
plaintiffs' complaints.  "What exactly do they want us to do?" he
asked.

Judge Donato likewise asked the plaintiffs for clarification.  The
judge raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in an order
prior to the July 27 hearing, so he asked the parties to file
papers addressing that issue and placed other substantive issues
on hold.  Judge  Donato also allowed plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint.  Since Niantic filed its motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs have dropped their unjust enrichment claims and
dismissed claims against The Pokemon Co. and Nintendo Co. Ltd,
previously named as codefendants.

Additionally, Judge Donato said that plaintiffs should specify
what state laws they intend to invoke and should add name
plaintiffs in states where they intend to pursue claims.  "There's
no national common law of trespass or nuisance," Judge Donato
said.  "You can't bank on sort of national nuisance or trespass
law because there isn't one." [GN]


PERRIGO CO: Wilson's Bid for Reconsideration in "Roofers" Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ROOFERS' PENSION FUND, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. PERRIGO
CO., PLC et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-2805 (MCA) (LDW)
(D. N.J.), Magistrate Judge Leda Dunn Wettre of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey denied Michael Wilson's
motion for reconsideration, under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), of the
Court's Feb. 10, 2017 Order, which decided various competing
motions for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and for approval of
the Lead Counsel.

Plaintiff Roofers' commenced this putative class action in May
2016 and alleged claims against Perrigo and Joseph C. Papa,
Perrigo's former board chairman and CEO, for violation of sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as
rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  The Complaint alleged that
Perrigo and Papa made false statements regarding Perrigo's value
and earnings outlook to induce Perrigo shareholders to reject a
tender offer by non-party Mylan N.V.  The Plaintiffs contend that
these misrepresentations constituted a fraud on the market and
that shareholders relied on them in retaining or acquiring Perrigo
shares, to their detriment.

On July 18, 2016, four members of the putative Plaintiff class
filed motions seeking appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and
approval of the Lead Counsel: Hare Insurance Co., Ltd.; a group
referring to itself as the Perrigo Institutional Investor Group
("PIIG"), composed of Migdal Insurance Co. Ltd., Migdal Makefet
Pension and Provident Funds Ltd., Clal Insurance Co. Ltd., Clal
Pension and Provident Ltd., Atudot Pension Fund for Employees and
Independent Workers Ltd., and Meitav DS Provident Funds and
Pension Ltd; Dan Kleinerman; and Wilson.  The Competing Movants
timely filed opposition papers on Aug. 1, 2016, and reply papers
on Aug. 8, 2016.  On Jan. 27, 2017, without leave of the Court,
Hare filed a sur-reply characterized as a Supplemental Submission
in Further Support of its motion, arguing that PIIG's lead
plaintiff motion should be denied because its co-lead counsel,
Pomerantz LLP, had taken inconsistent positions in different
actions as to Kleinerman's adequacy as a co-lead plaintiff.  Both
PIIG and Kleinerman filed (also without Court leave) oppositions
to the supplemental filing.

On Feb. 10, 2017, the Court granted the motion of PIIG and denied
the competing motions, appointing PIIG as the Lead Plaintiff and
approving its choice of Pomerantz LLP and Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP as the co-lead counsel and Lowenstein
Sandler LLP as the liaison counsel.  Assessing the motions under
the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, the Court identified PIIG as the presumptive most adequate
Plaintiff.  The Court additionally approved PIIG's selection of
lead counsel.

Kleinerman subsequently objected to the Feb. 10,2017 Order.
District Judge Madeline Cox Arleo adopted the Order in full on
April 27, 2017.

Wilson now moves for reconsideration of the Feb. 10, 2017 Order,
arguing that the Court, when deciding the competing lead plaintiff
motions, failed to consider properly the arguments Harel raised in
its supplemental submission regarding Pomerantz's alleged
conflicting positions as to Kleinerman.  Wilson argues that the
Court should have denied PIIG's motion and instead appointed Harel
as the Lead Plaintiff and Wilson as the Lead Plaintiff for a sub-
class of put-option sellers.  Both PIIG and Kleinerman oppose
Wilson's motion.

Magistrate Judge Wettre held that PIIG made a showing that it
alleged the largest loss, thus making it the presumptive most
adequate Lead Plaintiff, and the other Movants failed to make a
showing that PIIG would not be an adequate Lead Plaintiff or would
be subject to unique defenses.  There is no indication that
Harel's arguments regarding Pomerantz would have established that
PIIG was inadequate or subject to a unique defense.  Furthermore,
given the deference owed to a lead plaintiff's choice of counsel,
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., the argument as to Pomerantz, even if
properly presented, would not have impacted the approval of it as
co-lead counsel.

For the reasons stated, the Magistrate Judge denied Wilson's
motion for reconsideration of the Court's Feb. 10, 2017 Order.
She directed the Clerk of the Court to terminate the motion filed
as ECF No. 68.

A full-text copy of the magistrate's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/xcJxRC from Leagle.com.

HAREL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD, Movant, represented by PETER S.
PEARLMAN, COHN, LIFLAND, PEARLMAN, HERRMANN & KNOPF, LLP.

Dan Kleinerman, Movant, represented by DANIEL S. SOMMERS --
dsommers@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN, MILSTEIN, SELLERS & TOLL,
PLLC.

Michael Wilson, Movant, represented by GARY S. GRAIFMAN,
KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, ESQS. & PETER GEORGE SAFIRSTEIN
-- psafirstein@safirsteinmetcalf.com -- Safirstein Metcalf LLP.

ROOFER'S PENSION FUND, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL S.
SOMMERS, COHEN, MILSTEIN, SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC, MICHAEL B. HIMMEL
-- mhimmel@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP & MICHAEL
THOMAS GRAY LONG -- mlong@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER,
PC.

JOSEPH C. PAPA, Defendant, represented by GOUTAM UMESH JOIS --
gjois@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP.

PERRIGO COMPANY PLC, Defendant, represented by ALAN S. NAAR --
anaar@greenbaumlaw.com -- GREENBAUM, ROWE, SMITH & DAVIS, LLP.

MARC COUCKE, Defendant, represented by RYAN MICHAEL CHABOT --
ryan.chabot@wilmerhale.com -- WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND
DORR LLP.


PHC INC: Shear Appeals Ruling in Maz Partners Suit to 1st Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Bruce A. Shear filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled MAZ PARTNERS LP v. BRUCE A. SHEAR, et al., Case
No. 1:11-cv-11049-PBS, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, Boston.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 24,
2017, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order disgorging
share plus interest in the case, and denying the motion for new
trial.

The Court held a nine-day jury trial in this shareholder class
action arising from a corporate merger.

The appellate case is captioned as MAZ Partners LP v. Shear, Case
No. 17-1821, in the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.

The docket of the Appellate Case states that Appearance form,
Docketing Statement, and Transcript Report/Order form are due on
September 5, 2017.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee MAZ PARTNERS LP, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Patricia I. Avery, Esq.
          Adam Blander, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022-0000
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 486-2093
          E-mail: pavery@wolfpopper.com
                  ablander@wolfpopper.com

Plaintiff-Appellee MAZ PARTNERS LP, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, and PETER BLAKESLEE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Norman Berman, Esq.
          Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Esq.
          BERMAN TABACCO
          1 Liberty Sq., 8th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 542-8300
          E-mail: nberman@bermandevalerio.com
                  norenstein@bermantabacco.com

               - and -

          Chet Barry Waldman, Esq.
          WOLF POPPER LLP
          845 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022-0000
          Telephone: (212) 759-4600
          Facsimile: (212) 486-2093
          E-mail: CWaldman@wolfpopper.com

Plaintiff PETER BLAKESLEE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Patrick J. Sheehan, Esq.
          WHATLEY KALLAS LLP
          60 State St., 7th Floor
          Boston, MA 02109-0000
          Telephone: (61) 573-5118
          E-mail: psheehan@whatleykallas.com

Defendant-Appellant BRUCE A. SHEAR, and Defendants PHC, INC.,
DONALD E. ROBAR, DOUGLAS J. SMITH, HOWARD W. PHILLIPS, WILLIAM F.
GRIECO, DAVID E. DANGERFIELD, ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., and
ACADIA MERGER SUB, LLC, are represented by:

          Leonard H. Freiman, Esq.
          Richard M. Zielinski, Esq.
          GOULSTON & STORRS PC
          400 Atlantic Avenue
          Boston, MA 02110-3333
          Telephone: (617) 574-4188
          Facsimile: (617) 574-7579
          E-mail: lfreiman@goulstonstorrs.com
                  rzielinski@goulstonstorrs.com

               - and -

          James H. Hulme, Esq.
          Matthew M. Wright, Esq.
          ARENT FOX LLP
          1717 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 857-6144
          E-mail: james.hulme@arentfox.com
                  matthew.wright@arentfox.com

Defendant-Appellant BRUCE A. SHEAR, and Defendants DONALD E.
ROBAR, DOUGLAS J. SMITH, HOWARD W. PHILLIPS, WILLIAM F. GRIECO,
DAVID E. DANGERFIELD, ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., and ACADIA
MERGER SUB, LLC, are represented by:

          Nadia Patel, Esq.
          ARENT FOX LLP
          1717 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 857-6000
          E-mail: nadia.patel@arentfox.com

Defendants ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC., and ACADIA MERGER SUB,
LLC, are represented by:

          Whitney L. Becker, Esq.
          Douglas S. Curran, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
          300 N LaSalle Street
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Personal: 312-862-2596
          E-mail: whitney.becker@kirkland.com


PHOENIX TECHNOLOGY: Miller Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN MILLER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. PHOENIX TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, USA, INC., Case No. 4:17-
cv-02457 (S.D. Tex., August 11, 2017), seeks to recover alleged
unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

Phoenix is a Delaware corporation doing business throughout the
United States, including New Mexico.  Phoenix is an oil and
natural gas exploration and production company operating worldwide
and throughout the United States, including in New Mexico.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77005
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


PROBALANCE INC: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss "Ulrich" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied
in part Probalance's motion to dismiss the case captioned JOHN M.
ULRICH, Plaintiff, v. PROBALANCE, INC., Defendant, No. 16 C
10488(N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that on Oct. 10, 2016, he
purchased four bottles of the Product from CVS/Pharmacy for $2.67
each, plus tax, without specifying which of the four Products he
purchased.  The front labels of all of the Products prominently
display the number of grams of protein contained in each bottle.
The back labels show the same protein content figures, as well as,
in some cases, the percent daily reference value of protein that
each bottle contains.

The gravamen of the complaint rests on the Plaintiff's allegations
that Probalance's products are misleadingly labeled with respect
to their protein content.  He alleges that the protein in
Probalance's products is a blend of predominantly low-quality
collagen protein isolate and a smaller amount of higher-quality
proteins such as whey and casein.  Because collagen protein is
less digestible, the Plaintiff alleges, it is as if Probalance's
products contain less protein than Probalance claims on its
labels.

Under certain circumstances, federal regulations require
manufacturers such as Probalance to use a testing methodology
known as the Protein Digestibility Corrected Amino Acid Score
("PDCAAS") to calculate a corrected amount of protein per serving
for purposes of labeling their products.  According to the
Plaintiff, the statements that Probalance makes on the Product
labels concerning the amount of protein in the Products are
misleading because at least some of the protein is virtually
indigestible.

The Plaintiff's complaint contains four counts: Count I, violation
of state consumer fraud acts (on behalf of a multi-state class);
Count II, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act ("ICFA") (on behalf of an Illinois
subclass, in the alternative to Count I); Count III, breach of
express warranty (on behalf of a national class); and Count IV,
unjust enrichment (in the alternative to Count III).

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Judge Alonso finds that to the extent that the Plaintiff claims
that Probalance violates state law by making protein claims that
are deceptive or misleading because they do not calculate the
protein content according to the PDCAAS-adjusted method, he is not
asserting that Probalance violated any state-law requirements
different from or additional to the requirements of the FDCA and
its implementing regulations.  His claims are not preempted.  The
Judge also fails to see any meaningful difference between the
injury suffered by someone who purchased Probalance Protein Shot
and the injury of another person who purchased Probalance Protein
Shot XL or one of the other Products.  The Products and the
alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar, so the
Plaintiff has standing regardless of whether he purchased all four
of the Products or only some of them.

The Plaintiff has not alleged that he provided pre-suit notice to
Probalance, and he was required to do so in order to bring a
breach of warranty claim, regardless of whether Probalance had
knowledge generally of the fact that it used collagen protein
isolate in its Products and did not adjust the labeling for
digestibility, Judge Alonso finds.  His breach of warranty claim
is dismissed.  As to the Plaintiff's claims under the ICFA,
Probalance's arguments that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible consumer fraud claim are all without merit.  Therefore,
Probalance's motion to dismiss is denied as to the Plaintiff's
consumer fraud claims.  Finally, with respect to Probalance's bid
to dismiss the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, Judge Alonso
finds that since the Plaintiff's consumer fraud claim survives
Probalance's motion to dismiss, so the unjust enrichment claim
also survives.

For these reasons, Judge Alonso granted in part and denied in part
Probalance's motion to dismiss, without prejudice to filing an
amended complaint by Sept. 15, 2017, if the Plaintiff can do so in
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  He granted
the motion as to the Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and
breach of express warranty, which are dismissed.  It is otherwise
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/wvqco6 from Leagle.com.

John M Ulrich, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Wanca --
bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca.

John M Ulrich, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Alan Berman --
jberman@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, Patrick J. Solberg,
Anderson Wanca & Nick Suciu, III -- nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com --
Barbat, Mansour & Suciu Pllc.

Probalance, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ryan Mathew Kaiser --
ryan@amintalati.com -- Amin Talati, LLC & Sanjay Satish Karnik --
sanjay@amintalati.com -- Amin Talati & Upadhye, LLC.


RBS CITIZENS: Court Adopts Special Master's Report in Reinig Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Arthur J. Schwab entered a memorandum order adopting
reports and recommendations of Special Master David R. Cohen in
the lawsuit styled ALEX REINIG, KEN GRITZ, BOB SODA, MARY LOU
GRAMESKY, PETER WILDER SMITH, WILLIAM KINSELLA, DANIEL KOLENDA,
VALERIA DAL PINO, AHMAD NAJI, ROBERT PEDERSON, TERESA FRAGALE, and
DAVID HOWARD v. RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Case No. 2:15-cv-01541-AJS
(W.D. Pa.).

Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by
stipulation of the Parties, Special Master David R. Cohen was
appointed to file Reports and Recommendations concerning summary
judgment, class action certification, and collective action
decertification.

In this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Citizens
Bank, N.A., failed to pay Mortgage Loan Officers ("MLOs") all
compensation due 1) by devising a compensation plan whereby
commission payments are calculated by subtracting the hourly wages
of the MLO from the "gross commissions" (referred to as the
"Recapture Claims"), and 2) by maintaining an "unofficial policy"
to discourage MLOs from fully reporting overtime hours worked (the
"off-the-clock" claims).  The Plaintiffs seek relief under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and corresponding state laws for
themselves and all those similarly situated pursuant to Section
216(b) of the FLSA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

The Court adopts the Special Master's Reports and Recommendations
as the opinions of the Court and rules on the pending motions as
follows:

   -- The Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
      Certification;

   -- The Court denies Defendant's Motion to Decertify the FLSA
      Collective Action, and finally certifies the FLSA
      collective action;

   -- The Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
      Judgment; and

   -- The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's
      Motion for Summary Judgment.

A copy of the Memorandum Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=wTg1RgAI


RBS CITIZENS: Court Certifies Class in "Reinig" FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ALEX REINIG, KEN GRITZ, BOB SODA, MARY LOU
GRAMESKY, PETER WILDER SMITH, WILLIAM KINSELLA, DANIEL KOLENDA,
VALERIA DAL PINO, AHMAD NAJI, ROBERT PEDERSON, TERESA FRAGALE, and
DAVID HOWARD, Plaintiffs, v. RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Defendant, No.
15cv1541(W.D. Pa.), Judge Arthur J. Schwab of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; (ii) denied the
Defendant's Motion to Decertify the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") Collective Action, and finally certified the FLSA
collective action; (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; and (iv) granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by
stipulation of the Parties, Special Master David R. Cohen was
appointed to file Reports and Recommendations concerning summary
judgment, class action certification, and collective action
decertification.

In the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant RBS Citizens
failed to pay Mortgage Loan Officers ("MLOs") all compensation due
(i) by devising a compensation plan whereby commission payments
are calculated by subtracting the hourly wages of the MLO from the
"gross commissions; and (ii) by maintaining an "unofficial policy"
to discourage MLOs from fully reporting overtime hours worked
("off-the-clock" claims).  The Plaintiffs seek relief under the
FLSA and corresponding state laws2 for themselves and all those
similarly situated pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

In May 2016, the Court conditionally certified the action under
Section 216(b) of the FLSA.  Approximately 350 Plaintiffs have
since opted-in to the FLSA collective action.

Pending before the Court are (i) the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification; (ii) the Defendant's motion to decertify the FLSA
collective action; (iii) the Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment on the Recapture Claims; and (iv) the Defendant's
motion for summary judgment.

The Special Master made the following recommendations: (i) granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification of the state-law
Recapture Claims; (ii) granted final certification of the
Plaintiffs' FLSA Recapture Claims (by denying the Defendant's
motion to decertify the collective action for those claims); (iii)
denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the
Recapture Claims; (iv) granted the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the Recapture Claims; (v) granted final certification
of the Plaintiffs' FLSA off-the-clock claims; (vi) granted the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification of their state-law off-
the-clock claims; and (vii) denied the Defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the off-the-clock claims, except that the
motion should be (a) granted with respect to plaintiffs Grametsy,
Smith, Dal Pino, and Kinsella for claims that accrued prior to
Feb. 4, 2014 because such claims were released by those
individuals; and (b) granted with respect to any state-law claims
that accrued prior to the applicable state-law statute of
limitations as set forth in the Defendant's chart at Doc. No. 123-
353.

Judge Schwab agrees that Citizens Banks' MLO Comp-Plans do not
violate the FLSA and analogous state-laws as alleged by the
Plaintiffs and that summary judgment in favor of the Defendant as
to these claims is appropriate.  Accordingly, he finds that the
remainder of the Defendant's arguments is procedural and regards
matters within the sound discretion of the District Court to
manage litigation before it.  Trial of a single issue regarding
the Plaintiffs' FLSA off-the-clock claims is scheduled to
commence, and will commence, on Sept. 25, 2017.  He says this in
no way interferes with the state subclasses right to receive
notice of the pending state-law claims and to opt-out of the
action if they so choose.

Accordingly, having considered the Special Master's Reports, the
Parties' objections to the reports, and having reviewed the
motions at issue de novo, Judge Schwab adopted the Special
Master's Reports and Recommendations as the opinions of the Court.
He (i) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification;
(ii) denied the Defendant's Motion to Decertify the FLSA
Collective Action, and finally certified the FLSA collective
action; (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment; and (iv) granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Memorandum Order is
available at https://is.gd/fqgWOG from Leagle.com.

DAVID R. COHEN, Special Master, represented by David Rosenblum
Cohen -- david@specialmaster.law -- David R. Cohen Co. LPA.

ALEX REINIG, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz --
dhorowitz@swartz-legal.com -- Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L.
Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC, Joshua Boyette -- jboyette@swartz-
legal.com -- Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice & Robert D. Soloff,
Robert D. Soloff, P.A., pro hac vice.

KEN GRITZ, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz, Swartz
Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC, Robert D.
Soloff, Robert D. Soloff, P.A., pro hac vice & Joshua Boyette,
Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

BOB SODA, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz, Swartz
Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC, Robert D.
Soloff, Robert D. Soloff, P.A., pro hac vice & Joshua Boyette,
Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

MARY LOU GRAMESKY, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

PETER WILDER SMITH, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

WILLIAM KINSELLA, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

DANIEL KOLENDA, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

VALERIE DAL PINO, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

AHMAD NAJI, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz, Swartz
Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

ROBERT PEDERSON, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Horowitz,
Swartz Swidler LLC, Justin L. Swidler, Swartz Swidler LLC & Joshua
Boyette, Swartz Swidler LLC, pro hac vice.

RBS CITIZENS, N.A., Defendant, represented by Thomas E. Hill --
thill@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Christina T.
Tellado -- ctellado@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Gretchen
Woodruff Root -- groot@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Robert J.
Tyler, III -- rtyler@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.


RED PARROT: Senior Care Moves to Certify Two Classes Under TCPA
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned SENIOR CARE GROUP, INC.,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly-
situated persons v. RED PARROT DISTRIBUTION, INC., a Florida
corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-5, Case No. 8:17-cv-00760-JDW-TGW
(M.D. Fla.), asks the Court to certify these classes:

     Class A:

     All persons or entities who were successfully sent a fax by
     or on behalf of "Red Parrot," on or about February 23, 2017,
     stating "got drams?," stating "Red Parrot Distribution
     supplies pharmaceuticals and the vials and bottles to put
     them in," and stating the vials are "in stock, competitive
     pricing, and available for next day delivery."

     Class B:

     All persons or entities who were successfully sent a fax by
     or on behalf of Red Perrot, designated as follows: (1)
     "Special," sent May 5, 2014; (2) "Special," sent May 12,
     2014; (3) "Weekly Specials," sent May 21, 2014; (4)
     "Specials," sent May 27, 2014; (5) "Weekly Specials," sent
     June 3, 2014; (6) "Specials," sent on June 17, 2014; (7)
     "Weekly Specials," sent July 7, 2014; (8) "Specials," sent
     July 14, 2014; (9) "Specials, sent July 21, 2014; (10)
     "Weekly Specials," sent July 25, 2014; (11) "Special
     7/28/14," sent July 28, 2014; (12) "Specials," sent
     August 4, 2014; (13) "Specials," sent August 11, 2014; (14)
     "Weekly Specials," sent August 19, 2014; (15)
     "6-4-15-PHARMACY-6-4-1," sent June 4, 2015; (16) "6-16-15
     pharmacy," sent June 16, 2015; (17) "Drug Test Fax," sent
     October 22, 2015; (18) "Non-Pharma 10-28-15," sent
     October 29, 2015; (19) "Independant Pharmacies," sent
     November 4, 2015; (20) "Non-RX Nov. 10," sent November 11,
     2015; (21) "IPRX-Independent Pharma - Independent
     Pharmacies," sent November 19, 2015; (22) "HH EOY Sale -
     Non-Pharma 10-2015," sent November 19, 2015; (23) "RX Dec. 7
     2015," sent Dec. 8, 2015; (24) "05.09.16," sent May 9, 2016;
     (25) "Weekly Specials," sent May 23, 2016; (26) "EOM
     Specials," sent August 31, 2016; (27) "pet phcy fax
     9-30-16," sent September 30, 2016; (28) "RX OTC Mech
     10/2016," sent October 24, 2016; (29) "Halloween RX fax,"
     sent October 31, 2016; (30) "Cash Sales Add Ons," sent
     November 11, 2016; (28) "Name Your Price," sent November 18,
     2016; (29) "Dram Flyer," sent November 22, 2016; (30) "Cash
     Sales Add Ons," sent November 14, 2016; (31) "Name Your
     Price," sent November 18, 2016; (32) "Dram Flyer," sent
     November 22, 2016; (33) "Black Friday," sent November 24,
     2016; (34) "Sugar Free," sent December 2, 2016; (35) "Name
     Your Price Dec," sent December 9, 2016; (36) "End of Year,"
     sent December 19, 2016; (37) "Diabetic All Ind.," sent
     January 11, 2016); (38) IND RX JAN 2016," sent January 19,
     2016; (39) "HH JAN 2016," sent January 27, 2016; (40)
     "Specials 3-17-16," sent March 17, 2016; (41) "New Year -
     Updated pharmacies clean list 09.30.16," sent January 9,
     2017; (42) "Ibuprofen," sent January 16, 2017; (43) "New
     Lock Laces," sent February 10, 2017; (44) "Valentine's Day
     2017 - Updated pharmacies clean," sent February 14, 2017;
     (45) "Drams - Non-Pharma," sent February 23, 2017; (46)
     "Drams-Updated pharmacies clean list .09.30.16," sent
     February 23, 2017; (47) "Nebulizers," sent March 1, 2017;
     and (48) "Diabetic Specials - Updated pharmacies clean
     list," sent March 15, 2017.

Senior Care also asks the Court to appoint it as class
representative and to appoint the law firm of Anderson + Wanca as
class counsel.

The case arises out of a fax-advertising campaign wherein a
facsimile advertisement was sent to the Plaintiff and the proposed
class on February 23, 2017, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=R8JUhQA8

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


ROCKET FUEL: Federman Sues Over Proposed Acquisition by Sizmek
--------------------------------------------------------------
MAX FEDERMAN, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. ROCKET FUEL INC., E. RANDOLPH WOOTTON III, MONTE
ZWEBEN, RICHARD A. FRANKEL, SUSAN L. BOSTROM, RONALD E. F. CODD,
WILLIAM W. ERICSON, CLARK M. KOKICH, and JOHN J. LEWIS, Case No.
3:17-cv-04651 (N.D. Cal., August 11, 2017), accuses the Defendants
of violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection
with the tender offer by Sizmek Inc., an affiliate of Vector
Capital IV, L.P., to purchase all of the issued and outstanding
shares of Rocket Fuel common stock for $2.60 per share.

On August 2, 2017, the Defendants filed a materially incomplete
and misleading Schedule 14D9 Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Plaintiff
alleges.  In particular, he contends, the Recommendation Statement
contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning Rocket Fuel's financial projections, the valuation
analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor, Needham &
Company, LLC, and Company insiders' potential conflicts of
interest.

Rocket Fuel is a predictive marketing software company that uses
artificial intelligence to empower agencies and marketers to
anticipate people's need for products and services.  The Company's
core service offerings are organized around two platforms: Demand
Side Platform and Data Management Platform, which can be used
independently, together, or can be integrated with a customer's
other customer relationship management or marketing platforms.
The Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert S. Green, Esq.
          James Robert Noblin, Esq.
          GREEN & NOBLIN, P.C.
          2200 Larkspur Landing Circle, Suite 101
          Larkspur, CA 94939
          Telephone: (415) 477-6700
          Facsimile: (415) 477-6710
          E-mail: rsg@classcounsel.com
                  jrn@classcounsel.com


ROSEVILLE, MI: Court Consolidates "Garner," "Cordia" Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LAWRENCE M. GARNER, CHRISTOPHER GARNER, AND
WILLIAM KAUPUS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ROSEVILLE, GLENN SEXTON,
RODNEY BROWNING, Defendants, and CORDIA MICHIGAN, LLC, RUDALEV I,
LLC, and GARNER PROPERTIES & MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CITY
OF ROSEVILLE, GLENN SEXTON, RODNEY BROWNING, Defendants, Case No.
16-cv-10760(E.D. Mich.), Judge Victoria A. Roberts of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, (i) consolidated the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan case nos. 16-cv-10760 and 16-cv-10986 for
purpose of the settlement; (ii) certified the Settlement Class;
and (iii) preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement.

Judge Roberts reviewed and considered the Settlement Agreement,
and heard the statements of the parties' attorneys in open court
on Aug. 7, 2017 on their Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Notice to the Class.

The Judge ordered that all future Court filings will be filed into
case no. 16-cv-10760.

Pursuant to Rule 23 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the settlement of the action, as embodied in the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, is preliminarily approved.

Judge Roberts certified the following Class and Sub-Class
("Settlement Class"):

          a. Class: All persons and entities who currently own or
at one time owned any non-owner occupied residential structures
located within the City of Roseville who or which has been issued
a misdemeanor ticket for failure to obtain a Certificate of
Compliance under the City's Non-Owner-Occupied Housing Ordinance,
and subsequently paid a fine at any time since Jan. 1, 2010
through Dec. 15, 2016.

          b. Sub-Class: All persons and entities who were not
owners of non-owner occupied residential structures located within
the City of Roseville, yet were issued a misdemeanor ticket for
failure to obtain a Certificate of Compliance under the City's
Non-Owner-Occupied Housing Ordinance from Jan. 1, 2010 through
Dec. 15, 2016.

Plaintiffs Lawrence M. Garner, Christopher Garner, William Kaupus,
Cordia Michigan, LLC, Rudalev I, LLC and Garner Properties &
Management, LLC are appointed as the representatives of the
Settlement Class, and their attorneys Aaron D. Cox and Mark K.
Wasvary are appointed as the Class Counsel.

Judge Roberts approved and adopted the Settlement Agreement's plan
for Class Notice.  She finds that, except for one omission, the
Class Notice, and the Claim Form included as part of the Class
Notice, comply with Rules 23 (e)(1) and 23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  She directed the Class Counsel to add
language to the Class Notice to comply with Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iv)
providing that a class member may enter an appearance through an
attorney if the member so desire.  With the inclusion of that
language, the Class Notice and Claim Form are approved and
adopted.  Judge Roberts ordered that the parties provide the
notice to the Class as proposed, with the one addition.

The Judge ordered that the Class Notice will be sent by either
postcard or first class mailing for Class Members where the
Defendants have that information.  The Claims Administrator will
cause an abbreviated version of the Notice to be placed in a
weekend edition of the Macomb Daily.  The Settlement Agreement,
Class Notice and Claim Form will also be made available on the
Class Counsel's website.  Judge Roberts ordered that no other
notice is necessary.

The Class Counsel is authorized to request and receive docket
records from the 39th District Court for the State of Michigan to
verify claims of the Settlement Class.

Judge Roberts sets these deadlines and dates for the acts and
events set forth in the Settlement Agreement, and directed the
Parties to incorporate them in the Class Notice:

     a. The Plaintiffs will file an Amended Complaint with more
specific allegations as to Christopher Garner on or before Aug.
17, 2017;

     b. The Class Notice must be mailed by Aug. 22, 3017;

     c. The Class members must submit a Proof of Claim to the
Claims Administrator within 90 days after the Class Notice is
sent;

     d. The objections and the motions to intervene, along with
related memoranda of law, will be filed in the Court and
postmarked and served on Class Counsel and the Defendants' counsel
on or before Nov. 20, 2017, or be forever barred;

     e. The requests by any Class Member to opt out of the
settlement must be mailed to Class Counsel on or before Nov. 20,
2017, or be forever barred.

     f. The Class Counsel must file a motion for final approval of
class action settlement on or before Dec. 4, 2017.  That motion
must address any objections that were filed, and it must set
forth: (i) the total number of Members who responded in the Class
and Sub-Class; (ii) the total number of claims made under the
Class and Sub-Class; and (iii) the percentage of the fine
recovered by Class/Sub-Class Members based on the pro-rated
formula (e.g., if a Class Member paid a $100 fine, and his or her
pro-rated share of the settlement fund is $75, he or she recovered
75% of the fine they paid).  The Sub-Class Members are entitled to
make a claim for $350 for each misdemeanor ticket in addition to a
pro-rata share of fines paid;

     g. The Class Counsel must file a motion for attorney fees and
expenses pursuant to Rule 23(h) on or before Dec. 4, 2017;

     h. The Defendants will file proof of compliance with the
notice requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 no
later than Aug. 21, 2017; and,

     i. The Fairness Hearing, set forth in the Class Notice, is
set for Jan. 16, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. in Room 226.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Stipulated
Amended Order is available at https://is.gd/kgjovv from
Leagle.com.

Lawrence M. Garner, Plaintiff, represented by Mark K. Wasvary --
markwasvary@hotmail.com -- Becker and Wasvary.

Lawrence M. Garner, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron D. Cox --
aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com -- Law Offices of Aaron D. Cox PLLC.

Christopher Garner, Plaintiff, represented by Mark K. Wasvary,
Becker and Wasvary & Aaron D. Cox, Law Offices of Aaron D. Cox
PLLC.

William Kaupus, Plaintiff, represented by Mark K. Wasvary, Becker
and Wasvary & Aaron D. Cox, Law Offices of Aaron D. Cox PLLC.

Cordia Michigan, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron D. Cox, Law
Offices of Aaron D. Cox PLLC & Mark K. Wasvary, Becker and
Wasvary.

Garner Properties & Management, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron D.
Cox, Law Offices of Aaron D. Cox PLLC & Mark K. Wasvary, Becker
and Wasvary.

Rudalev, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron D. Cox, Law Offices
of Aaron D. Cox PLLC & Mark K. Wasvary, Becker and Wasvary.

Roseville, City of, Defendant, represented by Carlito H. Young --
cyoung@jrsjlaw.com -- Johnson, Rosati & Stephanie S. Morita --
smorita@jrsjlaw.com -- Johnson Rosati.

Glenn Sexton, Defendant, represented by Carlito H. Young, Johnson,
Rosati & Stephanie S. Morita, Johnson Rosati.

Rodney Browning, Defendant, represented by Carlito H. Young,
Johnson, Rosati & Stephanie S. Morita, Johnson Rosati.


RPM MORTGAGE: "Nanclares" Suit Remanded to Calif. State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California remanded to the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda, the case captioned FRANCISCO
NANCLARES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RPM MORTGAGE, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 16-cv-07188-HSG(N.D. Cal.).

On November 10, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class
action against the Defendant in the Superior Court of California,
County of Alameda.  The complaint includes causes of action for
common law fraud and violation of California's Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL").  On Dec. 15, 2016, the Defendant filed its notice of
removal, asserting that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. Section
1441(b) because the Court allegedly had subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question).  On
Jan. 19, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for remand.

Judge Gilliam held that the Court lacks federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331.  The Plaintiffs allege
no federal cause of action.  Moreover, their fraud and UCL claims
do not meet the four-part test that must be satisfied to find that
state law causes of action arise under federal law.  The
necessarily raised prong is not satisfied because the Plaintiffs
could prevail on their UCL and fraud claims without relying on
federal law.

Accordingly, the Judge finds that the removal of the case was
inappropriate because it could not have been filed originally in
federal court.  Since the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the action, remand is required.  However, he declined the
Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees under Section 1447(c)
because the Defendant's arguments asserting federal question
jurisdiction under the four-part test from Gunn and Gable, while
unpersuasive, are not objectively unreasonable.

For these reasons, Judge Gilliam granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand the case to the Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda.  He directed the clerk to remand the case forthwith and
close the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/deRiZ8 from Leagle.com.

Francisco Nanclares, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink --
Jim.Hannink@SDLaw.com -- Dostart Hannink and Coveney.

Francisco Nanclares, Plaintiff, represented by Zachariah Paul
Dostart -- ZDostart@SDLaw.com -- Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP.

Carl Knecht, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink, Dostart
Hannink and Coveney & Zachariah Paul Dostart, Dostart Hannink &
Coveney LLP.

David Glaser, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink, Dostart
Hannink and Coveney & Zachariah Paul Dostart, Dostart Hannink &
Coveney LLP.

Antonio Ruggerio, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink,
Dostart Hannink and Coveney & Zachariah Paul Dostart, Dostart
Hannink & Coveney LLP.

Brian Byrne, Plaintiff, represented by James T. Hannink, Dostart
Hannink and Coveney & Zachariah Paul Dostart, Dostart Hannink &
Coveney LLP.

RPM Mortgage, Inc., Defendant, represented by Fredrick Stuart
Levin -- flevin@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP & Ali M.
Abugheida -- aabugheida@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP.


SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS: $210MM Deal in "Woburn" Gets Final Nod
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned WOBURN RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Plaintiff, v.
SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS, LTD., et al., Defendants, No. 14-CV-8925
(KMW)(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Kimba M. Wood of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted Lead Plaintiff
Pentwater Funds' Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement and
Plan of Allocation and granted the Lead Counsel Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossman LLP's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.

On March 23, 2015, the Court consolidated two putative securities
fraud class actions against Salix Pharmaceuticals and two of its
officers and directors.  Both alleged that Salix materially misled
the public by deliberately making false or misrepresentative
statements, or by failing to correct such statements, between Nov.
8, 2013 and Nov. 6, 2014.  The Plaintiffs claim that Salix's
fraudulent actions artificially increased the price of Salix
securities.  The Court appointed Pentwater Funds as the Lead
Plaintiff, and Bernstein Litowitz as the Lead Counsel for the
consolidated action.

The Defendants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, which the Court denied in its
entirety on March 31, 2016.  The parties then proceeded with
discovery, with Defendants producing millions of documents and the
Plaintiffs' counsel taking several depositions.

Following the Court's resolution of a discovery dispute on Jan.
24, 2017, the parties informed the Court that they had reached an
agreement to settle.  The Court preliminarily approved the
settlement and appointed a claims administrator on April 5, 2017.

The proposed settlement resolves all claims in this action, in
exchange for a cash payment of $210 million payment to class
members.

Judge Wood approved the parties' plan to apportion the settlement
proceeds based on each claimant's respective market loss.  The
Plan of Allocation was developed by Lead Counsel and Lead
Plaintiffs damages expert.  Each claimant who has documented proof
of a purchase or other acquisition of Salix common stock or Salix
Call Option, or sale of a Salix Put Option during the Class Period
and 90 days after the Class Period, will be assigned a "Recognized
Loss Amount":

      a. For those who purchased Salix stock, the Recognized Loss
Amount will be the difference between the estimated artificial
inflation on the date of purchase and the estimated artificial
inflation on the date of sale, or the difference between the
actual purchase price and sales price of the stock, whichever is
Jess.

      b. For those who sold Salix common stock or for whom Salix
Options closed during the 90 days after the Class Period, the
Recognized Loss Amount is limited to the difference between the
purchase price and the average closing price of the security
during that period.

      c. For those claimants who still held Salix securities at
the end of the 90-day period, the Recognized Loss Amount will be
50% of the lesser of (i) the amount of artificial inflation (or
deflation) in the security at the time of purchase or (ii) the
difference between the purchase price and the average closing
price for the security during that 90-day period.

      d. Finally, claimants who bought and sold Salix securities
before the alleged misstatements were made at 4:30 p.m. on Nov. 6,
2014, have no Recognized Loss Amount.

The Judge finds that the Lead Counsel's assumption of the risk of
litigating this case supports the reasonableness of the requested
fee and that the request to reimburse litigation expenses of
$1,953,908.41 is reasonable.

For these reasons, Judge Wood granted the Motions for Final
Approval of the Settlement and Plan of Allocation, Motion for
Attorneys' Fees in the amount of $44,609,218, and Motion for the
Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses of $1,953,908.41 at the July
28, 2017 Settlement Fairness Hearing.  This resolves docket nos.
221 and 223.  All other pending motions are moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/IlrDpG from Leagle.com.

Pentwater Funds, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Adam David
Hollander -- adam.hollander@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Pentwater Funds, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Angus Ni --
angus.ni@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
Gerald H. Silk -- jerry@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, John James Rizio-Hamilton -- johnr@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Katherine Mccracken
Sinderson -- katherinem@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, Mark Lebovitch -- markl@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Salvatore Jo Graziano --
sgraziano@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP.

Woburn Retirement System, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J.
Keller -- ckeller@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Michael
Walter Stocker -- mstocker@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP &
Rachel Ann Avan -- ravan@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow, LLP.

George Chan, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A..

LRI Invest S.A., Movant, represented by Kim Elaine Miller --
kim.miller@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC & William H.
Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC.

Steven Morris, Movant, represented by Adam M. Apton --
aapton@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Connecticut Laborers' Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Daniel
Brett Rehns -- drehns@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers
& Toll P.L.L.C. & Frank Rocco Schirripa -- fschirripa@hrsclaw.com
-- Hach Rose Schirripa & Cheverie LLP.

Gary N. Kramer, Movant, represented by Richard William Gonnello --
rgonnello@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP.

Leo Fund Managers Ltd., Movant, represented by Michael Walter
Stocker -- mstocker@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

State-Boston Retirement System, Movant, represented by Michael
Walter Stocker, Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

City of Fort Lauderdale General Employees' Retirement System,
Movant, represented by Avital Orly Malina -- AMalina@rgrdlaw.com -
- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, David Avi Rosenfeld --
DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Mark
Samuel Reich -- mreich@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.

Ernest Harvill, Movant, represented by Peter George Safirstein,
Morgan & Morgan, P.C..

Steve Schonberg, Movant, Pro Se.

Salix Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Charles
Alan Gilman -- cgilman@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP,
Martin L. Seidel -- mseidel@willkie.com -- Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, Adam Shawn Mintz -- amintz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon
& Reindel LLP, Bradley Joseph Bondi -- BBondi@Cahill.com -- Cahill
Gordon & Reindel LLP, Heather Elyse Murray, Cadwalader, Wickersham
& Taft LLP, Jared Jon Stanisci -- jared.stanisci@cwt.com --
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Nathan Marwill Bull --
nathan.bull@cwt.com -- Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP & Sarah
Penny Windle -- pwindle@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP.

Carolyn J. Logan, Defendant, represented by Frederick Whitten
Peters -- wpeters@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, Anne M.
Rucker -- arucker@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, George
Anthony Borden -- gborden@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, Jared
Jon Stanisci, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Matthew Danzer,
Williams & Connolly LLP & Stephen D. Andrews -- sandrews@wc.com --
Williams & Connolly LLP.

Adam C. Derbyshire, Defendant, represented by Brian Jeffrey
Wegrzyn -- bwegrzyn@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP,
Andrew L. Sandler -- asandler@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley
Sandler LLP, Caitlin M. Kasmar -- ckasmar@buckleysandler.com --
Buckleysandler LLP, Jared Jon Stanisci, Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft LLP, Scott T. Sakiyama -- ssakiyama@buckleysandler.com --
Buckleysandler LLP, Sean B. Karunaratne --
skarunaratne@buckleysandler.com -- Buckleysandler LLP & Stephen
Michael Leblanc -- sleblanc@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler
LLP.


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Cobra" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William J. Kayatta Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case
captioned MARK A. CORBAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; STEVE FLEISCHMANN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, Appellants, DANIEL
BARADARIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; BIJESH AMIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC.;
CHRIS GARABEDIAN; EDWARD KAYE, Defendants, Appellees, SANDESH
MAHATME, Defendant, Nos. 15-2135, 16-1658(1st Cir.).

The price of the publicly traded securities issued by Sarepta
dropped 64% when it announced that the Food and Drug
Administration deemed premature its application for approval of a
novel gene therapy.  Two and a half months after the November
stock drop, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class action
complaint in which they seek relief on behalf of all those who
acquired Sarepta stock between July 24, 2013 and Nov. 11, 2013.
According to the relevant complaint, Sarepta and its top
executives perpetrated securities fraud under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5.  The complaint also charges
the Individual Defendants with liability for the alleged
securities fraud under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The
complaint avers that the Defendants overstated the significance of
Sarepta's eteplirsen data and exaggerated the likelihood that the
FDA would accept a new drug application ("NDA") for filing,
thereby deceiving the investing public and causing the purchase of
Sarepta securities at inflated prices.

The district court dismissed the complaint after the action was
consolidated and the pleading was once amended.  The Plaintiffs
then brought a motion for leave to file another amended complaint,
which the district court denied as futile.  The Plaintiffs
thereafter brought a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposing a fourth version of the
complaint, and a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
proposing yet a fifth version.  The district court denied all of
these motions for the sole reason that it found them futile
because none of the proposed pleadings sufficiently stated a claim
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Judge Kayatta notes that when they consider the totality of the
complaint's allegations, and measure the malicious inference
against the innocent ones, they do not find the malicious
inference to be at least as compelling as any opposing innocent
inference.

Sarepta, a biopharmaceutical company navigating the uncertain
terrain of accelerated approval for a gene therapy, was energized
by clinical trial data, which it shared with the FDA.  In the
ensuing dialogue between the company and the agency, the initially
unwelcoming agency cracked open the door to a possible approval by
stating a willingness to consider a new drug application for the
therapy while cautioning the company about the importance of more
and better data for accelerated approval.  The company shared this
obviously good news about the FDA's new receptiveness to possible
acceptance of a filing while conveying enough caveats so that the
stock price actually dropped.  As the company moved toward filing
for regulatory approval, a competitor drug candidate with the same
mechanism posted disappointing results, and the FDA decided that a
new drug application for the company's therapy would be premature,
causing a more substantial drop in stock price.  The only
plausible motive for fraud identified by the Plaintiffs is revenue
generation, which falls short of pleading a cogent inference of
scienter that can carry the day here.  More plausible is the
opposing innocent inference that the Defendants, perhaps
negligently, waxed too optimistically about the FDA's expression
of a willingness to consider an NDA for eteplirsen while
emphasizing too little the FDA's reservations about such an
application.

The Judge finds that this is simply a case in which the complaint
focuses too much on nuance rather than false facts or material
omissions to support the necessary strong inference of scienter.
He therefore affirmed dismissal of the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 claims as well as the derivative section 20(a) claims.

A full-text copy of the First Circuit's Aug. 22, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/mxh8YK from Leagle.com.

Stuart W. Emmons -- swe@federmanlaw.com -- with whom William B.
Federman -- wbf@federmanlaw.com -- Amanda B. Murphy --
abm@federmanlaw.com -- and Federman & Sherwood, were on brief, for
appellants.

Christopher G. Green -- Christopher.Green@ropesgray.com -- with
whom Dalila Argaez Wendlandt, Justin G. Florence, Mark D. Vaughn -
- Mark.Vaughn@ropesgray.com -- Alexia R. De Vincentis --
Alexia.DeVincentis@ropesgray.com -- and Ropes & Gray LLP., were on
brief, for appellees.


SEI/AARONS INC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in "Krise" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KAREN KRISE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
SEI/AARON'S, INC. a franchisee of Aaron's, Inc., doing business as
Aaron's Sales and Leasing, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
1:14-CV-1209-TWT(N.D. Ga.), Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr., of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division, (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Micah Sherr; (ii) denied
without prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony
of Michael Maschke; and (iii) granted the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Defendant SEI is in the rent-to-own business.  Between 2010 and
2011, it operated approximately seventy franchise stores, which
were located in Connecticut, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  From Oct. 5, 2010
to Dec. 27, 2011, the Defendant installed a software program -- PC
Rental Agent ("PCRA") -- on all computers it leased to its
customers.  PCRA, which was owned by a company named DesignerWare,
enabled the Defendant to "render a computer inoperable" by simply
logging onto the DesignerWare website and placing a computer on
"lockdown" mode.  On Aug. 8, 2011, DesignerWare added a
geolocation feature to PCRA.  This feature directed the PCRA
software installed on a computer to include the Wi-fi signals the
computer picked up in its periodic reports.  Finally, DesignerWare
offered the "Detective Mode" feature on computers with PCRA
installed.  Detective Mode could be remotely installed and
activated, and once activated, it could capture keystrokes in
addition to the content of the computer screen and clipboard.  The
Defendant stopped using Detective Mode on May 6, 2011.  On Jan.
23, 2012, the Defendant removed PCRA from all leased computers
connected to the internet.

On April 23, 2014, Plaintiffs Krise, Corie Cason, Chauncey
Robertson, Sr., and Jamie Robertson filed a class action complaint
against SEI, alleging that the Defendant SEI unlawfully accessed
their computers from a remote location and collected private
information stored therein.  They seek to represent a class of (i)
all persons who have purchased, leased, and/or rented from SEI
personal computers on which PC Rental Agent had been installed
without such persons' consent, and (ii) all members of each such
person's household.  The Plaintiffs allege that SEI did not
disclose to its customers that it installs PCRA on its leased
computers or that it used Detective Mode to obtain data from the
computers.  Furthermore, they allege that PCRA harmed the leased
computers by, among other things, making them slow.  They allege
five counts, including invasion of privacy; computer trespass;
computer invasion of privacy; and violation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").

The Defendant now moves for summary judgment on each of the
Plaintiffs' claims, moves to exclude the testimony of Micah Sherr,
and moves to exclude testimony of Michael Maschke.

Judge Thrash finds that expert Sherr's opinion should not be
excluded because her opinions and testimony do not strike the
Court as unreliable.  They provide at least a reasonable argument
as to what qualifies as contemporaneous in the context of
Detective Mode.  The Judge therefore declines to exclude Sherr's
opinions and testimony regarding the contemporaneous interception
of electronic communications; and excludes Sherr's opinions
regarding computer performance.

Judge Thrash also finds the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the
Testimony of Michael Maschke to be premature.  The Plaintiffs do
not rely on Maschke's opinions in their response to the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs
state that they have not decided whether they will use the
Maschke's testimony at trial.  He therefore denies without
prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of
Michael Maschke.

The Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs Robertsons do not have
standing to allege any claims based on the Defendant's use of
Detective Mode.  The Judge disagrees.  The Defendant does not
challenge the original Plaintiffs' standing to assert claims based
on the Defendant's use of PCRA.  And because the original
Plaintiffs have standing to assert their original claims, the
original Plaintiffs also have the right to seek leave to amend
their Complaint to add additional plaintiffs.  Indeed, the
Plaintiffs sought leave, and he granted it.  He therefore
concludes that the Robertsons have standing to assert all of their
claims.  Because no class actions were filed prior to Nov. 10,
2012, no class action tolled the Robertsons' claim.  As a result,
the Robertsons' invasion of privacy of claim, insofar as it is
based on the Defendant's activation of Detective Mode, is time
barred.  Moreover, because PCRA was incapable of capturing private
information, the Robertsons' intrusion upon seclusion claim cannot
survive.  Judge Thrash therefore grants the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment with regard to the Robertsons' invasion of
privacy claim.  Where all of the allegedly unlawful acts and
injuries occurred outside the state of Georgia, the Judge is
unconvinced a plaintiff should be able to bring a claim under the
GCSPA.  Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
with regard to the Robertsons' GCSPA claim should be granted.

Finally, since there is no evidence to demonstrate that a
screenshot was ever triggered by a communication, the Judge finds
that Detective Mode's screenshot function did not intercept the
Robertsons' electronic communications under the ECPA.  The
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to the
Plaintiffs' ECPA claim is granted.

As to Plaintiffs Cason and Krise's invasion of privacy and
violation of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act ("GCSPA")
claims, Judge Thrash is unwilling to allow the their GCSPA claims
to move forward when none of the alleged illegal conduct and
injuries occurred in Georgia.  The Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted as to the Plaintiffs Cason's and Krise's GCSPA
claims.

For these reasons, Judge Thrash (i) granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Micah
Sherr; (ii) denied the Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony
of Michael Maschke; and (iii) granted the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/jxkDbg from Leagle.com.

Karen Krise, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Solomon Hirsch --
ahirsch@hermangerel.com -- Herman Gerel, LLP.

Karen Krise, Plaintiff, represented by Edward C. Konieczny --
ed@koniecznylaw.com -- Edward C. Konieczny LLC & Maury A. Herman -
- mherman@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman Gerel, LLP.

Corie Cason, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Solomon Hirsch,
Herman Gerel, LLP, Edward C. Konieczny, Edward C. Konieczny LLC &
Maury A. Herman, Herman Gerel, LLP.

Chauncey Robertson, Sr., Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Solomon
Hirsch, Herman Gerel, LLP & Edward C. Konieczny, Edward C.
Konieczny LLC.

Jamie Robertson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Solomon Hirsch,
Herman Gerel, LLP & Edward C. Konieczny, Edward C. Konieczny LLC.

SEI/Aaron's, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott -
- jparrott@deflaw.com -- Drew Eckl & Farnham, Bruce Allen Taylor -
- btaylor@deflaw.com -- Jr., Drew Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony
Noble -- bnoble@deflaw.com -- Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI, KY, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI CT1, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI CT 2, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI MA 1, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI MA 2, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI ME, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI NH, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI NY 1, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.

SEI NY 2, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E. Parrott, Drew
Eckl & Farnham & Burke Anthony Noble, Drew Eckl & Farnham.


SLM CORP: Sixth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Parchman" Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jeffrey Parchman and Nancy Carlin filed an appeal from
a court ruling in their lawsuit titled Jeffrey Parchman, et al. v.
SLM Corporation, et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-02819, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.

The appellate case is captioned as Jeffrey Parchman, et al. v. SLM
Corporation, et al., Case No. 17-5968, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JEFFREY PARCHMAN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, and NANCY CARLIN, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Benjamin James Miller, Esq.
          THE HIGGINS FIRM, PLLC
          525 Fourth Avenue, S.
          Nashville, TN 37210
          Telephone: (615) 353-0930
          Facsimile: (888) 210-5883

Defendants-Appellees SLM CORPORATION, NAVIENT CORPORATION, NAVIENT
SOLUTIONS, INC., fka Sallie Mae, Inc., and SALLIE MAE BANK are
represented by:

          Lisa M. Simonetti, Esq.
          VEDDER PRICE
          1925 Century Park E.
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 204-7738
          E-mail: lsimonetti@vedderprice.com


SPRING REST: Fails to Pay Proper Minimum/OT Wages, Hernandez Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CRESCENCIO MORENO HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. SPRING REST GROUP, LLC. (d/b/a GATSBY'S
BAR), DENISE LEONARD and JASON SHERIDAN, Case No. 1:17-cv-06084
(S.D.N.Y., August 11, 2017), alleges that the Plaintiff regularly
worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation for any of the
hours that he worked each week.

Spring Rest Group, LLC, is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the state of New York.  The Individual
Defendants are owners, officers or agents of the Defendant
Corporation.  The Defendants own, operate, and control a casual
pub/restaurant -- Gatsby's Bar -- located at 53 Spring St., in New
York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


SQUARETRADE INC: Appeals Ruling in "Starke" Suit to 2nd Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant SquareTrade, Inc., filed an appeal from a District Court
memorandum & order dated August 3, 2017, in the lawsuit titled
Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., Case No. 16-cv-7036, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn).

The nature of suit is stated as torts property-fraud.

The appellate case is captioned as Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc.,
Case No. 17-2474, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Adam J. Starke, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Solomon N. Klein, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF SOLOMON N. KLEIN
          1410 Broadway
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 575-0202
          Facsimile: (212) 575-0233

               - and -

          Mark Schlachet, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MARK SCHLACHET
          3515 Severn Road
          Cleveland, OH 44118
          Telephone: (216) 225-7559
          Facsimile: (216) 932-5390
          E-mail: markschlachet@me.com

Defendant-Appellant SqaureTrade, Inc., is represented by:

          Michael Schissel, Esq.
          ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
          399 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 715-1157
          E-mail: michael.schissel@apks.com

               - and -

          Douglas Winthrop, Esq.
          ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
          3 Embarcadero Center
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 471-3174
          E-mail: douglas.winthrop@apks.com


STATE FARM: Can Compel Appraisal in "Shearer" Insurance Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JAMES SHEARER AND JOYCE ANDREWS
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 16-09469(FLW)(LHG)(D. N.J.), Judge Freda L.
Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
(i) granted the Defendant's Motion to Compel Appraisal and Stay
Case; (ii) denied as moot the Defendant's Motion to Strike Class
Allegations in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are the owners of property located in Princeton,
New Jersey.  Their Property was damaged by fire on July 11, 2015.

They submitted a claim to their insurer, State Farm, under their
homeowners' insurance policy.  The Plaintiffs allege that State
Farm used an incorrect formula to estimate the replacement damage
for their property, resulting in a devaluation of their claim by
over $50,000.

Unsatisfied with State Farm's calculation of the actual cash value
of their loss, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against State Farm
on Dec. 21, 2016.  They bring claims on behalf of a nationwide
class of policyholders who, following a property loss that did not
require a total rebuild, have had their loss adjusted by State
Farm using the new construction formulas as opposed to recovery
and restoration formulas.

On March 7, 2017, State Farm invoked an appraisal provision
contained in the Policy by sending a letter to the Plaintiffs'
counsel.  The appraisal provision provides a method for resolving
disputes over the amount of a loss, which may be invoked by either
the policyholder or State Farm.

On March 10, 2017, the Defendant moved to compel appraisal and
stay this case pending completion of the appraisal process.  On
April 10, 2017, State Farm filed two additional motions, a motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and a motion to
strike the Plaintiffs' class allegations.

Judge Wolfson finds that this litigation is in its infancy --
State Farm has yet to answer the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and
the parties have not started discovery.  An appraisal is also
timely here because it has the potential to resolve the dispute
between the parties, or, at minimum, to provide a factual basis
for further discussion between the parties to determine if
resolution is possible.

Accordingly, State Farm's demand for an appraisal was proper under
the Policy, and the Judge granted State Farm's motion compelling
appraisal and stayed the case pending the outcome of the appraisal
process.  She did not address the Defendant's Motion to Strike
Class Allegations in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the merits in light of
her ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Compel.  She denied as
moot the Defendant's Motion to Strike Class Allegations in
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint.  If the appraisal does not resolve the dispute
between the parties and the stay is lifted, the Defendant may
renew its motions.  The parties are ordered to file a status
report within 60 days to update the Court on the appraisal
process.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/KVV4Cy from Leagle.com.

JAMES SHEARER, Plaintiff, represented by JEFFREY P. RESNICK --
jresnick@shermansilverstein.com -- SHERMAN, SILVERSTEIN, KOHL,
ROSE & PODOLSKY, PC.

JOYCE ANDREWS, Plaintiff, represented by JEFFREY P. RESNICK,
SHERMAN, SILVERSTEIN, KOHL, ROSE & PODOLSKY, PC.

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
DAVID F. SWERDLOW -- dswerdlow@windelsmarx.com -- WINDELS MARX
LANE & MITTENDORF, LLP & CRAIG D. GOTTILLA --
cgottilla@windelsmarx.com -- WINDELS MARX LANE & MITTENDORF.


STEALTH SECURITY: Illinois Court Certifies Class in TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted G.M.
Sign's motion for class certification with a modified class
definition in the case captioned G.M. SIGN INC., an Illinois
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. STEALTH SECURITY
SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants, No. 14 C 09249 (N.D. Ill.).

G.M. Sign received an unsolicited fax advertising the Defendant's
products on Oct. 17, 2006.  Stealth had contracted with a company
called Profax to send out faxes to a given list of customers twice
in 2006.  The first distribution took place on March 1-2, 2006.
It was sent to 21,291 fax numbers and successfully received by
13,518. A second distribution was sent out on Oct. 17-18, 2006 to
50,267 fax numbers, of which 37,215 were successful.

The original distribution lists, which would provide the numbers
to which the broadcasts were sent, have not been uncovered.
Stealth asserts in its response that those lists simply no longer
exist.  Another list, however, has been unearthed: a list of 1,747
fax numbers that requested that they be removed from the list.
Each person on the opt-out list visited a website or called an
automated telephone system and entered the five-digit customer ID
number assigned to Stealth, which was provided at the bottom of
the advertising fax.  The list also provides when each person
asked to be removed from the list; the vast majority of removals
occurred shortly after the fax distribution.

G.M. Sign initially proposed the class described as all persons
who were successfully sent a fax advertisement from March 2006
through October 2006 that advertised the security services of
Security Alert, specializing in all their security needs for whom
the Defendant cannot prove evidence of prior express permission or
invitation for the sending of such faxes.

Stealth insists that the putative class is not ascertainable
because there is no objective means of identifying -- and
therefore notifying -- members of the class about the litigation.
It also objects to the class definition as non-ascertainable
because it defines a "fail-safe" class.

Judge Tharp held that G.M. Sign does not need to include the lack
of consent in its class definition because it will need to prove
at trial that the faxes were unsolicited.  If that is proven,
Stealth will still have the opportunity at the damages phase to
remove class members who had consented or were existing business
partners with Stealth.  The class, as defined without the disputed
clause, requires no individualized factual adjudication and is not
defined by whether the class member would win a Telephone Consumer
Protection Act suit against Stealth.  Thus, the Judge removed the
disputed clause from the class definition and otherwise granted
the motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/4VLO0M from
Leagle.com.

G.M. Sign, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Phillip A. Bock --
phil@bockhatchllc.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC.

G.M. Sign, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Kimberly M. Watt --
kimberly@classlawyers.com -- Bock & Hatch Llc, Ross Michael Good -
- rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca --
bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Ryan M. Kelly --
rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca, Tod Allen Lewis,
Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC & Brian
J. Wanca, Anderson & Wanca.

Stealth Security Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mitchell
H. Frazen -- frazen@litchfieldcavo.com -- Litchfield Cavo & Jason
Edward Hunter -- hunter@litchfieldcavo.com -- Litchfield Cavo LLP.


SUN GARD: "Carter" Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Claims Retaliation
------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Carter, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
current and former employees Plaintiff, v. Sun Gard Availability
Services, LP, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-03639 (Cal. Super.,
August 14, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime, all relief including
compensatory and punitive damages, back and front pay and
attorney's fees and costs resulting from unjust enrichment and for
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

SunGard is a company that provides IT services to businesses,
including cloud-based storage, application management, consulting
and disaster recovery services. Carter worked as a network
security analysts at its Philadelphia location. He was allegedly
fired for complaining about this overtime. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott M. Pollins, Esq.
      POLLINS LAW
      800 Westdale Avenue
      Swarthmore, PA 19081-2311
      Tel: (610) 896-9909
      Fax: (610) 896-9910
      Email: scott@pollinslaw.com

             - and -

      Joseph Spicer, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
      36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
      Baltimore, MD 21201
      Tel: (410) 244-7005
      Fax: (410) 244-8454
      E-mail: jspicer@nicholllaw.com


SUPER STOP: Unpaid Overtime Sought in "Galdamez" Labor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Isabel Garcia Galdamez and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Super Stop 441 Inc., Joseph George, Defendants, Case
No. 0:17-cv-61627 (S.D. Fla., August 14, 2017), requests double
damages and reasonable attorney fees from Defendants, jointly and
severally, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act for all
overtime wages still owing along with court costs, interest and
any other relief.

Galdamez worked for Defendants as a market worker from October
2012 to August 3, 2017 at Super Stop's Chevron gas station and
convenience store at 2099 S State Road 7, Davie, FL 33317.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com


SURETEMPS LLC: Faces "Lee" Lawsuit Alleging FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
TERRY CATHERINE AND JAMIL LEE, Plaintiffs, vs. SURETEMPS, LLC;
FULL FORCE STAFFING, LLC; AND METRO SERVICE GROUP, INC.
Defendants, Case No: 2:17-cv-07561-SM-JVM (E.D. La., August 7,
2017), alleges on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
employed persons, that Plaintiff regularly worked well in excess
of 40 hours per week for Defendants, but was not paid time and
one-half for any hours worked in excess of 40 per week, in direct
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiffs were engaged in the performance of gathering waste
materials for Defendants.

Sure Temps LLC -- http://www.suretemps.biz/-- is in the temporary
help service business.

Metro Service Group Inc. -- http://metroservicegroup.com/--offers
recycling, dumpsters, street sweeping, demolition, lead testing
and abatement, and program management services.

Defendants SureTemps and/or Full Force provided Plaintiffs as
persons to staff and complete the work of physically collecting
trash on Metro Service's garbage trucks that serviced Metro
Service's clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
     Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
     JACKSON+JACKSON
     201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
     New Orleans, LA 70170
     Phone: (504) 599-5953
     Fax: (888) 988-6499
     Email: jjackson@jackson-law.net
            mjackson@jackson-law.net


SYSCO GUEST: Connecticut Court Denies Move to Dismiss TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Connecticut, issued
a Memorandum denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned GORSS MOTELS, INC., Plaintiff, v. SYSCO GUEST SUPPLY,
LLC, JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants, Civil Case No. 3:16-cv-01911-VLB
(D. Conn.).

Plaintiff Gorss Motels, Inc., brings this putative class action
against Defendant Sysco Guest Supply, LLC, and John Does 1-5
(Defendants) for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 47
U.S.C. (TCPA).

Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
establish subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). The Court must now determine whether Defendants' three
allegedly unsolicited facsimile (fax) advertisements adequately
confer upon Plaintiff Article III standing to bring this suit.

According to the Complaint, Defendants have sent unsolicited
facsimile advertisements to Plaintiff, including but not limited
to three faxes sent. The faxes describe the commercial
availability or quality of Defendants' products, goods and
services. These junk faxes do not contain the required opt-out
language. Plaintiff did not give Defendant prior express
invitation or permission to send such faxes to Plaintiff.

Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Subject matter
jurisdiction is not waivable, and a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by a party or the court
sua sponte.

Defendant moves for dismissal solely on the basis that Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing to bring suit for a TCPA violation. The
Court accordingly shall address this limited issue involving
subject matter jurisdiction and will not address the merits of the
case.

Injury-In-Fact

A plaintiff sufficiently alleges an injury-in-fact by showing
there is 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is
'concrete and particularized' and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.

Concrete Harm

In summary, it is clear there exist ample case law supporting the
proposition that the TCPA has created a legally cognizable
interest in protecting individuals and entities from unwanted
faxes, and that the violation of the statute creates a real and
not abstract harm. Denial of standing would effectively negate the
congressional intent to protect consumers from the cost, unwanted
intrusion and nuisance of unsolicited telemarketing phone calls
and fax advertisements.

No one has more incentive to enforce the TCPA and fulfill the
congressional intent of the TCPA than the consumer whose privacy
is invaded and assets expropriated. By sending unsolicited fax
advertisements of its products or services, a solicitor transfers
its marketing costs to the unwitting consumer.

The solicitor saves itself the cost of duplicating and mailing its
marketing material by expropriating the recipient's equipment and
materials to market its products. This practice is far more
harmful that a unsolicited telephone solicitation. With the
congressional intent of the TCPA and aforementioned case law in
mind, the Court finds a concrete harm has adequately been alleged.
The Complaint clearly states that Defendant sent three unsolicited
fax advertisements to Plaintiff. The Complaint also states that
the advertisements either did not contain proper opt-out language,
or if they did then the Defendant did not receive express
permission or invitation.

Accordingly, these facts are sufficient to allege Defendants'
unsolicited fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff violated the TCPA
and thus is traceable to the alleged harm. There is no indication
that an independent action from an unrelated third party caused
the harm alleged in the Complaint.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the
second prong required for Article III standing.

The Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 21, 2017
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9tn3prrfrom
Leagle.com.

Gorss Motels Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Y. Bellin,
Bellin & Associates LLC. 319 Broadway Floor 4, New York, NY 10007
Gorss Motels Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Wanca -
bwanca@andersonwanca.com - Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice & Ryan
Michael Kelly - rkelly@andersonwanca.com - Anderson & Wanca.
Sysco Guest Supply, LLC, Defendant, represented by Thomas C.
Blatchley - tblatchley@grsm.com - Gordon & Rees LLP-CT.


TAKATA CORP: Reveals Monthly Faulty Air Bag Litigation Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Baxter, writing for The Am Law Daily, reports that Japanese
auto parts giant Takata Corp., which followed its U.S. unit into a
Delaware bankruptcy court this week, revealed in court documents
that it is paying nearly $1 million per month to an Am Law 100
firm advising it in product liability litigation over faulty air
bags.

A court filing on Aug. 8 in Takata's Chapter 15 case by Covington
& Burling partner Shankar Duraiswamy in Washington, D.C., revealed
that between January and June of this year, Takata has paid
roughly $877,000 each month in legal fees and costs to his firm
for work in air bag-related litigation.  That would put the amount
that Covington has earned this year from Takata's Japanese parent
at nearly $4.4 million.

In a separate court filing by Covington on July 7 in the Chapter
11 case of TK Holdings Inc. -- Takata's North American subsidiary
-- Covington stated that it had received nearly $6.6 million from
the debtor in the 90 days prior to its bankruptcy filing on June
25 in Wilmington.  That document, filed by Covington product
liability litigation partner Keith Teel in Washington, D.C.,
disclosed that the firm was also holding a $1.9 million retainer
for its services to TK Holdings.

A Covington spokesman declined to discuss the firm's work on
behalf of Takata or clarify whether the filings in the two
separate bankruptcy cases tallied up different sets of fees.  In
2015, Takata tapped the firm to serve as co-lead counsel with
Dechert in the growing air bag litigation.  In January, Takata
reached a $1 billion criminal plea deal in Detroit with the U.S.
Department of Justice related to its sale of defective air bags.
Court filings show that Dechert worked with Covington on that
matter for Takata.

The July filing by Covington seeking to advise TK Holdings in its
Chapter 11 case states that in the spring of 2016 the firm took
over from Dechert as "lead counsel in all litigation matters
arising from the air bag litigation."  An attached declaration by
Teel states that Covington partners, of counsel, senior counsel
and special counsel are billing TK Holdings between $725 and
$1,575 per hour for their services, associates between $455 and
$700 an hour and staff attorneys at hourly rates ranging from $215
to $365.

Covington's Teel has taken the lead for the company in
multidistrict civil litigation that it faces in Miami--and is now
trying to stay with its dual bankruptcy filings.  The Chapter 15
filing on Aug. 8 by Tokyo-based Takata and its affiliates Takata
Kyushu Corp. and Takata Service Corp. lists Delaware's Young
Conaway Stargatt & Taylor and leading Japanese firm Nagashima Ohno
& Tsunematsu as outside legal advisers.  Neither firm has yet
filed billing statements with the bankruptcy court in Wilmington.
(Nagashima Ohno partner Akihisa Shiozaki has been a key outside
legal adviser to Takata during its air bag crisis.)

Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Delaware's Richards, Layton & Finger and
Nagashima Ohno have taken the lead for Auburn Hills, Michigan-
based TK Holdings in its bankruptcy case, according to our
previous reports, which noted that Weil had received payments
totaling $19.1 million from Takata since August 2015.  Other firms
that have since filed papers seeking to advise the debtor include
Delaware's Ashby & Geddes and Washington, D.C.'s Frankel & Wyron.
Dechert has not filed an appearance in the Chapter 11 case of TK
Holdings or Takata's Chapter 15 case.

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, national bankruptcy boutique
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, Delaware's Whiteford, Taylor &
Preston, insurance law firm Gilbert and the Sakura Kyodo Law
Offices in Tokyo are representing an official committee of
unsecured creditors in the Chapter 11 case of TK Holdings.  The
bankruptcy lawyers and litigators aren't the only ones enjoying
the billable bonanza from Takata's myriad legal woes.
Records on file with the U.S. Senate show that through mid-July,
Takata's TK Holdings had paid $60,000 so far this year to Squire
Patton Boggs to lobby on issues related to air bag safety.


TEXAS: 5th Cir. Affirms Class Certification in "Yates" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARVIN RAY YATES; KEITH COLE; JACKIE
BRANNUM; RICHARD ELVIN KING; FRED WALLACE; LAVAR JOHN SANTEE,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRYAN COLLIER; ROBERTO M. HERRERA; TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Defendants-Appellants, No. 16-
20505(5th Cir.), Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision granting certification of a general class and two
subclasses.

The six Named Plaintiffs are inmates in the Wallace Pack Unit, a
prison operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
("TDCJ").  They brought this lawsuit in 2014 against TDCJ, Bryan
Collier (TDCJ's executive director), and Roberto Herrera (the Pack
Unit's warden).  The Pack Unit houses approximately 1,400 inmates.

Up until this lawsuit was filed, TDCJ's policy regarding
mitigation measures remained largely unchanged, despite the heat-
related injuries occurring within the Pack Unit and in various
other Texas prisons.  Indeed, since 1998, 20 or more inmates have
died as a result of excessive heat.  This history led the district
court to conclude that, as a factual matter, there was a
significant history of serious heat related illnesses within the
Pack Unit.  Only in 2015, after this lawsuit was filed, did
TDCJ begin its respite-area practice.

Of the six Named Plaintiffs, only one is younger than 60 years old
and has no medical conditions that would affect his sensitivity to
heat.  The remaining five Named Plaintiffs range in age from 60 to
72 years and all have one or more conditions that render them
particularly sensitive to heat, including Type II diabetes,
coronary arterial disease, high blood pressure, high cholesterol,
hypertension, schizoaffective disorder, and obesity.

The Plaintiffs assert two causes of action.  First, they assert an
Eighth Amendment claim against Collier and Herrera.  Second, they
claim that TDCJ has failed to provide reasonable accommodations
for inmates with heat-sensitive disabilities in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  They
seek a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction requiring
the Defendants to maintain a safe indoor apparent temperature
(e.g., maintaining a heat index of 88 degrees or lower) inside
each of the Pack Unit's housing areas  or enter other injunctive
relief sufficient to protect the health and safety of the
prisoners at the Pack Unit.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify three classes, one general class
and two subclasses:

     a. General Class: All inmates who currently are, or in the
future will be, incarcerated at the Pack Unit, and who are
subjected to TDCJ's policy and practice of failing to regulate
high indoor heat index temperatures in the housing areas.

     b. Heat-Sensitive Subclass: All people who are incarcerated
at the Pack Unit, or in the future will be, that are subjected to
TDCJ's policy and practice of failing to regulate high indoor heat
index temperatures in the housing areas, and either: (i) have a
physiological condition that places them at increased risk of
heat-related illness, injury, or death (including, but not limited
to, suffering from obesity, diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular
disease, psychiatric conditions, cirrhosis of the liver, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, cystic fibrosis, asthma, sweat
gland dysfunction, and thyroid dysfunction); or, (ii) are
prescribed an anticonvulsant, anticholinergic, antipsychotic,
antihistamine, antidepressant, beta blocker, or diuretic; or (ii)
are over age 65.

     c. Disability SubClass: All people incarcerated at the Pack
Unit, or who will be in the future, that are subjected to TDCJ's
policy and practice of failing to regulate high indoor heat index
temperatures in the housing areas and suffer from a disability
that substantially limits one or more of their major life
activities and who are at increased risk of heat-related illness,
injury, or death due to their disability or any medical treatment
necessary to treat their disability.

The district court certified all three classes.  It concluded that
the Plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated that they met all
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).  It then
determined that certification was authorized under Rule 23(b)(2).
Last, the district court rejected the Defendants' argument that
the Prison Litigation Reform Act -- which directs that prospective
relief in the prison context will extend no further than necessary
to correct the violation -- must be applied as part of the Rule
23(b)(2) analysis.  The Defendants now appeal.

As to the General Class, Judge Elrod concludes that the district
court did not clearly err.  The district court personally toured
the Pack Unit and held a four day evidentiary hearing, resulting
in thousands of pages of expert testimony and other evidence from
both sides related to the heat impact on the inmates in the Pack
Unit.  During the hearing, the Plaintiffs put forward two experts
-- Dr. McGeehin and Dr. Vassallo -- who testified regarding the
inadequacies of the TDCJ heat-mitigation measures.  Upon careful
review of the record before her, she finds that the district
court's account of the evidence is plausible, and she is not left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.  Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in
finding that TDCJ's heat-mitigation measures are ineffective to
reduce the heat-related risk of serious harm below the
constitutional baseline.  This being so, Judge Elrod affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated
the presence of a question of law or fact common to the class.

Judge Elrod rejects the Defendants' challenge to certification of
both subclasses.  The district court found that TDCJ's heat
mitigation measures are not effective to bring the risk of serious
harm below the constitutional baseline for any Pack Unit inmate --
which includes the inmates within the subclasses who have some
condition making them particularly susceptible to heat.  In
addition, the district court concluded that the disability
subclass had the additional common contention that TDCJ officials
failed to provide reasonable accommodations to inmates suffering
from disabilities that may impact their ability to withstand
extreme heat.  She finds no error.

Accordingly, because she concludes that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in certifying the General Class or the
subclasses, Judge Elrod affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 18, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Nd3em6 from Leagle.com.

Jeff S. Edwards -- jeffrey.edwards@dechert.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Michael C. Singley, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cynthia Lee Burton, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jeremy Leon Doyle -- doyle@reynoldsfrizzell.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Nathan Mark Smith -- nsmith@reynoldsfrizzell.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Scott Charles Medlock, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Hamilton Frederick, for Defendant-Appellant.

David James, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Wallis Nader, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


THAI PALACE: Peters Seeks to Recover Minimum Wages Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gabrielle Peters On behalf of herself and other members of the
general public similarly situated v. Thai Palace, Inc. d/b/a
LemonGrass Fusion Bistro, Case No. 2:17-cv-00697-JLG-EPD (S.D.
Ohio, August 11, 2017), seeks to recover minimum wages pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act, the Ohio Prompt Pay Act and the Ohio Constitution.

Thai Palace, Inc., doing business as LemonGrass Fusion Bistro, is
a for-profit corporation incorporated in the state of Ohio and has
its principal place of business located in Franklin County,
Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
          COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 949-1181
          Facsimile: (614) 386-9964
          E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

               - and -

          Daniel I. Bryant, Esq.
          BRYANT LEGAL, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 704-0546
          Facsimile: (614) 573-9826
          E-mail: dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com


THANK YOU: Catzin Appeals S.D.N.Y. Decision to Second Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Yadira Aguilar-Cano, Lucia Lopez Catzin and Silvia
Villano Clemente filed an appeal from a district court opinion &
order dated July 26, 2017, relating to their lawsuit entitled
Lucia Catzin, et al. v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., et al., Case
No. 15-cv-7109, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Lucia Catzin, et al. v. Thank
You & Good Luck Corp., et al., Case No 17-2497, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs had also filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as Lopez Catzin v.
Thank You & Good Luck Corp., Case No. 16-3509.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Lucia Lopez Catzin, individually on behalf
of others similarly situated, Silvia Villano Clemente and Yadira
Aguilar-Cano are represented by:

          Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
          FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
          225 Broadway
          New York, NY 10279
          Telephone: (212) 571-0700
          E-mail: michael@fishertaubenfeld.com

Defendants-Appellees Thank You & Good Luck Corp., Zeng Lan Wang
and 115th Street and First Ave Laundromat Inc. are represented by:

          William M. Brown, Esq.
          HANG AND ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-18 39th Avenue
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          E-mail: wbrown@hanglaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Off-Broadway Laundromat Inc. and 2167 3rd Ave
Laundromat LLC are represented by:

          Oleg A. Mestechkin, Esq.
          MESTECHKIN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          200 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281
          Telephone: (212) 256-1113
          E-mail: om@lawmlg.com

Defendants-Appellees Igor Birzh, Exclusive Management Solution
Group, Inc., and Dimitri Berezovsky are represented by:

          Mark Kook, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARK R. KOOK
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 766-4100
          Facsimile: (212) 763-6810
          E-mail: mkook@kooklaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: "Mejia" Suit Challenges No-Firearms Policy
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MEJIA, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Case No. 0:17-cv-61617-BB (S.D. Fla., August 11,
2017), alleges that Uber's no-firearms policy violates the rights
of the Plaintiff and other Class members under the Florida
Statutes ("Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of 2008").

Uber Technologies, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in California.  Uber develops,
markets, and operates a mobile application enabling drivers to
provide transportation and delivery services using their own
vehicles.

Beginning in approximately March 2016, Plaintiff Jose Mejia has
worked as an Uber driver, offering transportation services
primarily in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jared H. Beck, Esq.
          Elizabeth Lee Beck, Esq.
          Beverly Virues, Esq.
          BECK & LEE TRIAL LAWYERS
          Corporate Park at Kendall
          12485 SW 137th Ave., Suite 205
          Miami, FL 33186
          Telephone: (305) 234-2060
          Facsimile: (786) 664-3334
          E-mail: jared@beckandlee.com
                  elizabeth@beckandlee.com
                  beverly@beckandlee.com

               - and -

          Antonino G. Hernandez, Esq.
          ANTONINO G. HERNANDEZ, P.A.
          4 SE 1st St., 2nd Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 282-3698
          Facsimile: (786) 513-7748
          E-mail: hern8491@bellsouth.net


UBS FINANCIAL: Court Compels Arbitration in "Roman"
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Puerto Rico, issued
an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned CARMELO ROMAN, RICARDO ROMAN-
RIVERA and SDM HOLDINGS, INC., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC. OF PUERTO RICO; UBS TRUST COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO; PUERTO RICO
INVESTORS TAX-FREE FUND IV, INC.; PUERTO RICO FIXED INCOME FUND
III, INC.; PUERTO RICO FIXED INCOME FUND V, INC.; PUERTO RICO
INVESTORS BOND FUND I, INC.; PUERTO RICO AAA PORTFOLIO BOND FUND,
INC.; PUERTO RICO AAA PORTFOLIO BOND FUND II, INC.; MIGUEL A.
FERRER; CARLOS J. ORTIZ Defendants, Civil No. 12-1663CCC (D.P.R.).
The case is stayed as to the remaining defendants pending the
outcome of the arbitration proceedings.

Plaintiffs Roman and Roman-Rivera alleged that they purchased UBS'
Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund III, Inc., Puerto Rico Investors
Tax-Free Fund IV, Inc., and Puerto Rico Investors Bond Fund I,
Inc. at artificially inflated prices and SDM Holdings, Inc.
purchased UBS' Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund V, Puerto Rico Fixed
Income Fund III, Puerto Rico AAA Portfolio Bond Fund, and Puerto
Rico AAA Portfolio Bond II also at artificially inflated prices.
The claims were brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and Rule 10(b)-5.

Before the Court is defendants UBS PR, Ortiz and Ferrer's Motion
to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Individual
Claims.

The Arbitration provision of the Relationship Agreement states, in
part:

     "You agree that any controversy, claim or issue in any
controversy which may arise between you and UBS Financial Services
Inc. or you and UBS Financial Services Incorporated of Puerto
Rico, that occurred prior, on or subsequent to the execution of
this Agreement, including but not limited to, any controversy,
claim or issue in any controversy concerning any accounts,
transaction, dispute or the construction, performance or breach of
this Agreement or any other agreement, whether entered into prior,
on or subsequent to the date hereof, shall be determined by
arbitration."

The Court held that Defendants have met their burden by
demonstrating that a valid agreement exists, that they are
entitled to invoke the arbitration clause, that plaintiffs are
bound by the clause and that the claim asserted comes within the
clause's scope. In the absence of any express provision excluding
a particular grievance from arbitration, the Court thinks only the
most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from
arbitration can prevail.  Accordingly, the Court will enforce the
Arbitration provision.

Plaintiffs' claims as detailed in the complaint against UBS PR,
Ortiz and Ferrer fall within the broad scope of this provision,
the Court held.  Therefore, the claims against UBS PR, Ortiz and
Ferrer are dismissed, without prejudice.

Motion to Stay Claims Against Remaining Defendants

Defendants also argue that because plaintiffs' remaining claims
against UBS Trust and the CEFs are co-extensive with the
arbitrable claims against the other defendants, the Court should
stay the Action as to the remaining defendants pending the outcome
of the arbitration proceedings. In instances where a case involves
both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, whether the non-
arbitrable claims should be stayed pending resolution of the
arbitrable claims is generally discretionary with the court.
Plaintiffs' arbitrable claims are inextricably entwined with the
non-arbitrable claims and the outcome of the non-arbitrable claims
will depend on the arbitrators decisions.

Accordingly, the claims against UBS Trust and the remaining CEFs
are hereby stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration.

Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. The Court
orders plaintiffs Carmelo Roman, Ricardo Roman-Rivera and SDM
Holdings, Inc. and defendants UBS PR, Ortiz and Ferrer to submit
to arbitration and plaintiffs' claims against defendants UBS PR,
Ortiz and Ferrer are dismissed, without prejudice.

The case is stayed  as to the remaining defendants UBS Trust and
the remaining CEFs in the action, Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund
III, Inc. and Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund V, Inc., pending the
outcome of the arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 21, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yc5r52ryfrom
Leagle.com.

Carmelo Roman, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda F. Lawrence -
ALAWRENCE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM - Scott & Scott LLP, pro hac vice.
Carmelo Roman, Plaintiff, represented by David R. Scott -
DAVID.SCOTT@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM - Scott & Scott LLP, pro hac vice,
Eric M. Quetglas-Jordan, Quetglas Law Office PSC, P.O. Box
16606San Juan, PR 00908, Hector E. Pedrosa-Luna, The Law Offices
of Hector E. Pedrosa-Luna, 84 Ponce De Leon AvenueSan Juan, PR
00918, Jennie M. Espada-Ocasio, Espada Esquire Legal Services Psc,
122 Calle Manuel Domenech, Altos Urb. Bladrich, San Juan, Puerto
Rico 00918,  Joseph P. Guglielmo - JGUGLIELMO@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -
Scott & Scott, LLP, pro hac vice, Juan R. Requena-Davila,  PO Box
9825 Plaza Carolina Sta. Carolina, PR 00988-9825,  Andrea Farah -
AFARAH@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM - Scott Scott, Attorneys at Law, LLP, pro
hac vice, Beth A. Kaswan - BKASWAN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM - Scott Scott,
Attorneys at Law, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard P. Rouco, Quinn,
Connor, Weaver, Davies & Rouco, 2 20th St. N, Ste 930, Birmingham,
AL 35203 pro hac vice & Luis E. Minana, Luis E. Minana &
Associates., 122 Avenue Domenech Altos Urb. BaldrichSan Juan, PR
00918.

Ricardo Roman-Rivera, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda F.
Lawrence, Scott & Scott LLP, pro hac vice, David R. Scott, Scott &
Scott LLP, pro hac vice, Eric M. Quetglas-Jordan, Quetglas Law
Office PSC, Hector E. Pedrosa-Luna, The Law Offices of Hector E.
Pedrosa-Luna, Jennie M. Espada-Ocasio, Espada Esquire Legal
Services Psc, Joseph P. Guglielmo, Scott & Scott, LLP, pro hac
vice, Juan R. Requena-Davila, Andrea Farah, Scott Scott, Attorneys
at Law, LLP, pro hac vice, Beth A. Kaswan, Scott Scott, Attorneys
at Law, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard P. Rouco, Quinn, Connor,
Weaver, Davies & Rouco, pro hac vice & Luis E. Minana, Luis E.
Minana & Associates.

SDM Holdings, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Amanda F. Lawrence,
Scott & Scott LLP, Eric M. Quetglas-Jordan, Quetglas Law Office
PSC, Hector E. Pedrosa-Luna, The Law Offices of Hector E. Pedrosa-
Luna, Jennie M. Espada-Ocasio, Espada Esquire Legal Services Psc,
Juan R. Requena-Davila, Andrea Farah, Scott Scott, Attorneys at
Law, LLP, pro hac vice, Beth A. Kaswan, Scott Scott, Attorneys at
Law, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard P. Rouco, Quinn, Connor, Weaver,
Davies & Rouco, pro hac vice & Luis E. Minana, Luis E. Minana &
Associates.

UBS Trust Company of Puerto Rico, Defendant, represented by
Mauricio O. Muniz-Luciano - Mauricio.muniz@oneillborges.com -
O'Neill & Borges, Nicole A. DiSalvo - nicole.disalvo@skadden.com -
Skadden, ARPS, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J.
Lockwood - paul.lockwood@skadden.com - Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Ubaldo M. Fernandez-Barrera -
ubaldo.fernandez@oneillborges.com - O'Neill & Borges & Salvador J.
Antonetti-Stutts - salvador.antonetti@oneillborges.com - O'Neill &
Borges.

Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund III, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Eduardo A. Zayas-Marxuach - ezm@mcvpr.com - McConnell Valdes, LLC
& Roberto C. Quinones-Rivera - rcq@mcvpr.com - McConnell Valdes,
LLC.

Puerto Rico Fixed Income V, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Eduardo A. Zayas-Marxuach, McConnell Valdes, LLC & Roberto C.
Quinones-Rivera, McConnell Valdes, LLC.

UBS Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Nicole A.
DiSalvo, Skadden, ARPS, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice,
Paul J. Lockwood, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro
hac vice, Ubaldo M. Fernandez-Barrera, O'Neill & Borges, Salvador
J. Antonetti-Stutts, O'Neill & Borges & Mauricio O. Muniz-Luciano,
O'Neill & Borges.

UBS Trust Company of Puerto Rico, Consol Defendant, represented by
Paul J. Lockwood, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro
hac vice & Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, O'Neill & Borges.

Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund, Inc. III, Consol Defendant,
represented by Eduardo A. Zayas-Marxuach, McConnell Valdes, LLC,
Roberto C. Quinones-Rivera, McConnell Valdes, LLC & Amelia
Cristina O'Neill-Vega, McConnell Valdes, LLC.

Puerto Rico Fixed Income Fund, Inc. V, Consol Defendant,
represented by Eduardo A. Zayas-Marxuach, McConnell Valdes, LLC,
Roberto C. Quinones-Rivera, McConnell Valdes, LLC & Amelia
Cristina O'Neill-Vega - aco@mcvpr.com - McConnell Valdes, LLC.


UNIFUND CCR: Wins OK of "Kramer" Suit Deal; Hearing on Jan. 17
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Thomas B. Russell granted the parties' joint motion for
certification of the settlement class and preliminary approval of
their Class Settlement Agreement and Release in the lawsuit
entitled MARY KRAMER v. UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS, et al., Case No.
3:16-cv-00243-TBR-LLK (W.D. Ky.).

For settlement purposes only, the Court certifies a Settlement
Class defined as: "Individuals who are judgment debtors by virtue
of a civil action filed in the Commonwealth, against whom either
of the Defendants charged post-judgment interest compounded at a
rate greater than annually, within 5 years of filing the instant
action.  However, excluded from the Class are individuals, who
filed for bankruptcy or who are deceased.

Ben Carter, Esq., is appointed as counsel for the Settlement
Class.  The Notice of Class Action Lawsuit and Proposed Settlement
is approved.

The dates for performance are as follows:

   * September 1, 2017 -- Unifund provides the Class List to
     Class Counsel;

   * September 15, 2017 -- Mailing of Class Notice;

   * December 15, 2017 -- Deadline for mailing of Requests for
     Exclusion;

   * December 22, 2017 -- Deadline for filing of Motion for Final
     Approval and other papers in support of Settlement;

   * January 1, 2018 -- Deadline for filing and service of
     Objections; and

   * January 17, 2018 -- Fairness Hearing.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=lD7dLMcf

The Plaintiff and the Class are represented by:

          Ben Carter, Esq.
          BEN CARTER LAW PLLC
          900 S. Shelby Street
          Louisville, KY 40203
          Telephone: (502) 509-3231
          Facsimile: (502) 792-7511
          E-mail: ben@bencarterlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Elizabeth M. Shaffer, Esq.
          DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP
          255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 977-8128
          Facsimile: (513) 977-8141
          E-mail: elizabeth.shaffer@dinsmore.com


UNITED STATES: HM Suit Dismissed in Part; Bid to Certify Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable S. James Otero entered an order in the lawsuit
titled H.M., et al. v. United States of America, et al., Case No.
2:17-cv-00786-SJO-GJS (C.D. Cal.):

   -- denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; and

   -- granting in part and denying in part the Defendants' motion
      to sever and dismiss the Plaintiffs' mandamus claims and to
      dismiss the remaining claims in the Plaintiffs' second
      amended complaint for injunctive relief and for writ of
      mandamus.

The case is one of several filed in the wake of President Donald
J. Trump's signing of Executive Order 13,769, titled "Protecting
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States"
("EO-1"), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).  Referencing the past
and present failings of the visa-issuance process, EO-1 had the
stated purpose of "protect[ing] the American people from terrorist
attacks by foreign nationals" by ensuring that the United States
would not admit foreign nationals who "bear hostile attitudes"
toward our nation and our Constitution, who would "place violent
ideologies over American law," or who "engage in acts of bigotry
or hatred," such as "'honor' killings."

According to its civil minutes, the Court will permit the
Plaintiffs to file a renewed motion for class certification not to
exceed 30 pages by October 16, 2017, with a hearing date of
December 11, 2017, that addresses each of the concerns highlighted
in the Order.  The Defendants will have 21 days to respond by way
of an opposition brief not to exceed 30 pages, and Plaintiffs will
have 14 days to respond by way of a reply brief not to exceed 10
pages.

The Dismissal Motion is granted in part and denied in part.  Judge
Otero ruled that the Plaintiffs' Mandamus Claims are severed from
the action and are dismissed without prejudice.  The Court stays
any and all discovery efforts related to the Plaintiffs'
Establishment Clause Claim until after the United States Supreme
Court issues an opinion in the consolidated cases Trump v. IRAP
and Trump v. Hawai'i.  The Court orders the parties to file a
joint status report 10 days after the Supreme Court issues its
opinion in these cases that both summarizes the holding(s) of the
opinion and addresses the parties' views concerning how the
opinion impacts any of Plaintiffs' asserted causes of action and
future discovery efforts.

The Court encourages both sides to carefully review the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia's decision in
Nine Iraqi Allies and the other authorities cited in this Order
before filing any additional pleadings in this action.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0Mx8eCUQ


UNITED STATES: Electrical Welfare Fund Appeals Order to 4th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff The Electrical Welfare Trust Fund filed an appeal from a
court ruling in its lawsuit styled Electrical Welfare Trust Fund
v. US, et al., Case No. 8:16-cv-02186-DKC, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt.

The nature of suit is stated as tax suits.

The appellate case is captioned as Electrical Welfare Trust Fund
v. US, et al., Case No. 17-1937, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Case Initial forms are due within 14 days;

   -- Opening Brief and Appendix are due on September 25, 2017;
      and

   -- Response Brief is due on October 24, 2017.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant THE ELECTRICAL WELFARE TRUST FUND, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          William Parry Dale, Esq.
          Charles Francis Fuller, Esq.
          MCCHESNEY & DALE, PC
          4000 Mitchellville Road
          Bowie, MD 20716-0000
          Telephone: (301) 805-6080
          Facsimile: (301) 805-6086
          E-mail: bill@dalelaw.com
                  chuck@dalelaw.com

               - and -

          Samantha Holbrook, Esq.
          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: sholbrook@ktmc.com
                  jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  mtroutner@ktmc.com

Defendants-Appellees UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES and THE HONORABLE SYLVIA
MATHEWS BURWELL, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the
United States Department of Health & Human Services, are
represented by:

          Michelle Bennett, Esq.
          Matthew J. Berns, Esq.
          Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Esq.
          U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20001-0000
          Telephone: (202) 305-8902
          Facsimile: (202) 616-8470
          E-mail: michelle.bennett@usdoj.gov
                  matthew.j.berns@usdoj.gov
                  Matthew.J.Lawrence@usdoj.gov


UPS: Settles EEOC's Disability Discrimination Case for $2 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for The National Law Journal, reports that
UPS agreed to pay $2 million to resolve a long-running nationwide
dispute with former and current employees who claimed the
company's inflexible leave policy unfairly positioned disabled
workers, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission said on
Aug. 8.

Nearly 90 current and former employees of the Atlanta-based
shipping company will receive the settlement following a lawsuit
filed by the EEOC in 2009 in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.  The EEOC charged that UPS violated
federal law when it fired disabled employees automatically when
they reached 12 months of leave.  UPS has more than 434,000
employees and had revenues of $61 billion in 2016.
The agency said the company's conduct violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act.  In additional to the $2 million settlement, UPS
has agreed to update its policies on accommodating employees with
disabilities, improve its implementation of those policies and
train those who administer the disability accommodation processes.

The company, according to the terms of a consent decree, will
provide the EEOC reports on accommodation requests for the next
three years.

"The ADA requires companies to make a real effort to work
individually with their employees with disabilities to provide
them with the necessary and reasonable accommodations that will
allow them to do their jobs," said Greg Gochanour, regional
attorney of the EEOC's Chicago district office, in a statement.
"As a result of this lawsuit, UPS now has practices in place to
better ensure that this happens."

A lawyer for UPS, Gary Clark of Quarles & Brady in Chicago, was
not immediately reached for comment.

According to the EEOC administrative investigation, which was
conducted before the lawsuit was filed, Trudi Momsen, an
administrative assistant with UPS, took a 12-month leave of
absence from work when she experienced multiple sclerosis
symptoms.  She returned to work for a few weeks, but then required
more time off because of negative side effects from her
medication.  She could have returned to work after the additional
two-week leave, but UPS fired her for exceeding its 12-month leave
policy.  The investigation found this action in violation of the
ADA.

Julianne Bowman, the EEOC's Chicago district director, said that
having a multiple-month leave policy alone does not guarantee
compliance with the ADA. She said such policies must also include
the flexibility to work with employees with disabilities who may
simply require a reasonable accommodation to return to work.
"UPS has now made changes which will allow more people to keep
their jobs," Ms. Bowman said.


US RENAL CARE: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Whitaker" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Renal Care, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled David Whitaker v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc., Case No.
2:17-cv-02661-R-GJS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 18,
2017, Judge Manuel L. Real granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case to the Superior Court.

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the Defendant
in the Superior Court.  The Complaint alleges class action claims
for (i) failure to pay minimum wages; (ii) failure to pay overtime
wages; (iii) failure to provide meal periods; (iv) failure to
permit rest breaks; (v) failure to provide accurate wage
statements; (vi) failure to pay wages due upon separation of
employment; and (vii) unfair business practices.  The Plaintiff
filed the Complaint on his own behalf as well as all non-exempt
employees employed by Defendant in California within the four
years prior to the filing of the action.  The Defendant removed
the case to the District Court arguing that the Court has
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.

The appellate case is captioned as David Whitaker v. U.S. Renal
Care, Inc., Case No. 17-80174, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent DAVID WHITAKER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ali Sarah Carlsen, Esq.
          AEGIS LAW FIRM PC
          9811 Irvine Center Drive
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 379-6250
          Facsimile: (949) 379-6251
          E-mail: acarlsen@aegislawfirm.com

Defendant-Petitioner U.S. RENAL CARE, INC., is represented by:

          Kevin Dennis Sullivan, Esq.
          James A. Goodman, Esq.
          EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, PC
          1925 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 557-9576
          E-mail: ksullivan@ebglaw.com
                  jgoodman@ebglaw.com


USAA CASUALTY: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Archuleta" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jerry Archuleta filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Archuleta v. USAA Casualty, et al., Case No.
1:17-CV-00191-RBJ, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado - Denver.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge R.
Brooke Jackson granted the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

Mr. Archuleta, a Colorado resident, was injured in a car accident
with an underinsured motorist.  He submitted insurance claims to
United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") under his policy
for medical payments ("MedPay") and uninsured/underinsured
motorist ("UM/UIM") coverage.  USAA paid Mr. Archuleta $5,000 in
MedPay benefits and later paid an additional $17,000 in UM/UIM
benefits pursuant to a settlement agreement.

According to Mr. Archuleta, USAA disclosed during the negotiations
that it believed he was entitled to $22,000 in UM/UIM coverage,
but it subtracted the $5,000 paid for MedPay benefits under a non-
duplication provision of the insurance policy.  With the advice of
counsel, Mr. Archuleta accepted this setoff and signed a release
discharging USAA's duty to pay under the policy.

The appellate case is captioned as Archuleta v. USAA Casualty, et
al., Case No. 17-1286, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case was set as follows:

   -- Docketing statement was due on August 29, 2017, for Jerry
      Archuleta;

   -- Transcript order form was due on August 29, 2017, for Jerry
      Archuleta; and

   -- Notice of appearance was due on August 29, 2017, for Jerry
      Archuleta, USAA Casualty Insurance Company and United
      Services Automobile Association.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JERRY ARCHULETA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Franklin D. Azar, Esq.
          Patricia A. Meester, Esq.
          Keith R. Scranton, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          14426 East Evans Avenue
          Aurora, CO 80014-0000
          Telephone: (303) 757-3300
          Facsimile: (303) 759-5203
          E-mail: azarf@fdazar.com
                  meesterp@fdazar.com
                  scrantonk@fdazar.com

               - and -

          Bradley A. Levin, Esq.
          Susan S. Minamizono, Esq.
          Nelson Andrew Waneka, Esq.
          LEVIN SITCOFF
          1512 Larimer Street, Suite 650
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 575-9390
          E-mail: bal@robertslevin.com
                  ssm@levinsitcoff.com
                  naw@levinsitcoff.com

               - and -

          Tonya L. Melnichenko, Esq.
          FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES
          5536 Library Lane
          Colorado Springs, CO 80918-0000
          Telephone: (719) 527-8000
          E-mail: melnichenkot@fdazar.com

Defendants-Appellees USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION are represented by:

          Thomas J. Butler, Esq.
          Michael D. Mulvaney, Esq.
          MAYNARD COOPER & GALE, PC
          Harbert Plaza Suite 2400
          1901 Sixth Avenue North Regions
          Birmingham, AL 35203-2618
          Telephone: (205) 254-1000
          E-mail: tbutler@maynardcooper.com
                  mmulvaney@maynardcooper.com

               - and -

          Marilyn Sue Chappell, Esq.
          Jon Sands, Esq.
          SWEETBAUM SANDS ANDERSON PC
          1125 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2100
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 296-3377
          E-mail: mchappell@SweetbaumSands.com
                  jsands@SweetbaumSands.com


VANGUARD GROUP: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Order in "Taksir" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Vanguard Group Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit titled Alex Taksir, et al. v. Vanguard Group Inc.,
Case No. 2-16-cv-05713, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 18,
2017, Judge Cynthia M. Rufe denied Vanguard's motion for
reconsideration of the Court's May 26, 2017 Opinion denying its
motion to dismiss the complaint to the extent it seeks
reconsideration of the Court's May 26, 2017 decision, but granted
insofar as it requests that the Court's opinion be certified for
interlocutory appeal.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of a proposed class of investors, assert
a breach-of-contract claim against Vanguard, their securities
broker.  They allege that by investing more than $500,000 with
Vanguard, they qualify for its Voyager Select Program, under which
they should be charged a $2 commission on securities trades.  On
two occasions, however, the Plaintiffs were charged a $7
commission instead.  When pressed for details about the
overcharge, Vanguard informed them that it resulted from IRS
nondiscrimination rules, which they dispute apply to the trades at
issue.

The appellate case is captioned as Alex Taksir, et al. v. Vanguard
Group Inc., Case No. 17-8044, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents ALEX TAKSIR and ORIT TAKSIR, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Christopher L. Nelson, Esq.
          THE WEISER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          22 Cassatt Avenue, Suite 100
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 225-2677
          E-mail: cln@weiserlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Samuel L. Rosenberg, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SAMUEL L. ROSENBERG
          15 Astor Place
          Monsey, NY 10952

               - and -

          Jonathan Zimmerman, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT
          230 Park Avenue
          The Helmsley Building, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: jzimmerman@scott-scott.com

Defendant-Petitioner VANGUARD GROUP INC. is represented by:

          Selby P. Brown, Esq.
          Stuart T. Steinberg, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          Cira Centre, 18th Floor
          2929 Arch Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19104
          Telephone: (215) 994-2905
          E-mail: selby.brown@dechert.com
                  stuart.steinberg@dechert.com


VOLVO CARS: 7th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of "Laurens" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned XAVIER LAURENS and KHADIJA LAURENS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, and
VOLVO CAR USA, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-3829(7th Cir.),
Judge Diane Wood of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing the
case for lack of standing and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with her opinion.

This case, at base, is about a car purchaser's disappointed
expectations.  The cars are Volvos, and the dispute centers on the
difference between the model XC90 and the XC90 T8.  Both are
luxury SUVs, but the XC90 runs on gas, whereas the T8 is a plug-in
hybrid.  The latter feature comes at a premium; the 2016 T8
retailed for around $20,000 more than its gas-only sibling.  The
Plaintiffs overcame the sticker shock and paid $83,475 for a new
T8.  They also purchased, for an additional $2,700, a charging
station that was installed in their garage.

The Laurenses quickly realized that the car they bought fell short
of the car the ads had promised.  On April 21, 2016, Xavier filed
the action, both on his own behalf and for a class of others
similarly situated.  He relied on the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA") for subject-matter jurisdiction, because he was a citizen
of Illinois, whereas Volvo Cars USA is a Delaware limited
liability company controlled by Volvo Cars of North America
(another Delaware LLC), which is itself wholly owned by its
Swedish parent (a publicly traded, share-based limited liability
company, or AB, with its principal place of business in
Gothenburg, Sweden), and the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeds (he asserted) $5,000,000.  For himself, Xavier sought
damages equal to the premium he paid for the hybrid model
($20,000), the cost of the charging station ($2,700), injunctive
relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.

The complaint's core theory was that Volvo's misleading
advertising caused Xavier to pay the extra money for the hybrid
version of the car.  A wrinkle arose when it turned out that
Xavier was not listed on either the car's purchase agreement or
the title; only Khadija was.  On June 8, 2016, the Laurenses
received a letter from Volvo that offered "immediately" to give
Khadija (but not Xavier) a full refund upon return of the vehicle
if she is not satisfied with it for any reason and to arrange to
pick up her vehicle at her home.  The next day Volvo moved to
dismiss Xavier's suit on the theory that he lacked standing; it
argued that Khadija, the titleholder, was the only person with any
possible injury, and she was not at that moment a party.

Before the district court ruled on the motion, the Laurenses added
Khadija to the complaint.  Volvo responded with a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); its motion
contended that Khadija also lacked standing because its letter had
offered complete relief for her before she filed suit.  The
district judge agreed with Volvo, finding that Xavier had never
suffered an Article III injury and that Volvo's offer had
redressed Khadija's injury before she became a party.  The court
dismissed the action, and the appeal followed.

Judge Wood explains that if forcing a contract on an unwilling
party is unacceptable under the judicially supervised procedures
of Rule 68 and Rule 67, she sees no reason why an impersonal note
offering a refund should have such a powerful effect.  Nor does it
matter that Volvo's offer preceded Khadija's lawsuit.

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez's core lesson is that unaccepted
contract offers are nullities; settlement proposals are contract
offers; and therefore unaccepted settlement proposals are
nullities.  Nothing about that logic turns on whether a suit has
been filed.  While Campbell-Ewald dictates the outcome here, she
notes that pragmatic considerations point in the same direction.
When offers are made during litigation, judicial oversight should
mitigate the uncertainty: a defendant's failure to follow through
would incur the wrath of the supervising court, and egregious
misconduct might lead to sanctions.  Those safeguards do not apply
to offers made before the lawsuit begins.  Here, if Khadija had
accepted Volvo's offer and then Volvo had failed to pay, she would
be right back where she started, with a new breach of contract
claim.

Since Khadija did not accept Volvo's offer, her injury-in-fact
from Volvo's alleged misrepresentations remains unredressed.
Judge Wood therefore reversed the judgment of the district court
dismissing the case for lack of standing and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with her opinion.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's Aug. 22, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ZInA8W from Leagle.com.

Robert A. Roth -- rroth@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph Siprut -- jsiprut@siprut.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jennifer Ilkka -- jilkka@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Todd L. McLawhorn -- todd@mcllegal.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ke Liu -- kliu@siprut.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.


WEBMD HEALTH: Conflict of Interest Taints Merger Says "Akerman"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Morris Akerman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, vs. WebMD Health Corp., Martin J. Wygod,
Steven L. Zatz, Mark J. Adler, Ian G. Banwell, Neil F. Dimick,
James V. Manning, William J. Marino, Joseph E. Smith, Stanley S.
Trotman, Jr., Kristiina Vuori, MH Sub I, LLC, and Diagnosis Merger
Sub, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-06132, (S.D.N.Y., August
14, 2017), seeks to preliminarily and permanently enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing the acquisition of WebMD
by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.   The suit further seeks
rescissory damages in case the merger pushes through, reasonable
allowance for Plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such
other and further relief under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.

Kohlberg will acquire all outstanding shares of WebMD for $66.50
in cash per share of WebMD's common stock. Transaction is valued
at approximately $2.8 billion.

Plaintiff and other Rice shareholders claimed that the transaction
documents omitted material information concerning financial
projections prepared by the company management and WebMD 's
management as well as the valuation analyses performed by the J.P.
Morgan, the company's financial advisor. They, therefore, are not
able to assess the integrity of the process that led to the offer
or the adequacy of the consideration being offered for their
shares.

The Web MD board and the company's executive officers are
conflicted because they will have secured unique benefits for
themselves from the deal. Certain members of company management
have allegedly secured positions for themselves following the
merger, the complaint asserts.

WebMD is an online publisher of health information and medical
news. It maintains its publicly available information at
www.webmd.com.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael J. Klein, Esq.
      Aaron L. Brody, Esq.
      6 East 45th Street
      New York, NY 10017
      Phone: (212) 687-7230
      Fax: (212) 490-2022
      Email: abrody@ssbny.com
             mklein@ssbny.com


WECTEC LLC: Faces "Fleetwood" Adversary Class Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Fleetwood, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. WECTEC LLC and Stone & Webster Services LLC, Case No.
17-01110-mew (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., August 10, 2017), is brought as an
adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case of Westinghouse
Electric Company LLC, et al.

The nature of suit is stated as recovery of money/property -
other.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 509-2070
          E-mail: rsr@outtengolden.com


WOLF APPLIANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Kail"
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Eastern District of New York,
issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned IVAN
and MELANIE KAIL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WOLF APPLIANCE, INC.,
Defendant, No. 15-CV-3513 (JS)(GRB) (E.D.N.Y.).

Defendant Wolf Appliances, Inc., manufactures high-end cooking
appliances, including dual fuel ranges, which combine gas cooktop
burners with electric ovens underneath. Plaintiffs Ivan and
Melanie Kail have owned a Wolf range.  The Kails received at least
ten replacement parts and units to address cosmetic issues with
the interior of the oven.  Whenever the couple used the self-
cleaning function, the oven liner chipped and cracked. Under the
two-year limited warranty, which came with the original unit and
restarted with each replacement, Wolf covered all parts and labor
for any part of the product.

But Wolf alleges, and the Kails dispute, the parties agreed to
modify the warranty to exclude any cosmetic-related damages.
After the chipping continued, the Kails requested a new
replacement. Under the terms of the allegedly modified warranty,
Wolf declined, and so the Kails filed this proposed class action.
Wolf now asks for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Material facts are
those which 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law, and a dispute is genuine' if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.

Warranty-Based Claims

The range at issue is the Kails' replacement. With that in mind,
the Court begins by analyzing the warranty-based claims: (1)
breach of the written warranty, (2) breach of any express
warranties created by affirmations of fact or promises, (3) breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability, and (4) violation of
the MMWA.

The Written Warranty

A claim for breach of express warranty requires proof that an
express warranty existed, was breached, and that plaintiff had
relied on that warranty.

This evidence would entitle a reasonable juror to question whether
the warranty modification was enforceable. Neither Zimmerschied
nor Heitmann have been deposed to provide any clarification. On
top of this, Wolf required a countersignature when the Kails
upgraded their range in 2009.

Drawing all inferences in the Kails' favor, as the Court must, it
is unclear whether Wolf routinely requires a countersignature in
the course of its business. Without Zimmerschied's testimony or
further explanation on Wolf's modification procedures, the Court
must deny summary judgment on the breach of the written warranty
claim.

Express Warranties Created by Affirmations or Promises

As a creature of contract law, express warranties include any
affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain.

The Kails filed their lawsuit in 2015, making any claims based on
the 2006 and 2009 units untimely. Despite the slew of replacement
parts and units, the law is clear that attempts to repair a
warrantied product, within the warranty period, do not toll the
four[-]year limitations period. No other tolling exceptions apply.
Thus, any claims based on express warranties made through
affirmations of fact or promises are time-barred.

Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Wolf also asks for summary judgment on the implied warranty claim,
raising three arguments: (1) the claim is untimely based on the
four-year statute of limitations because there was no sale
transaction for the 2014 replacement range, (2) the Kails lack
privity with Wolf, in part, because Ivan's employer purchased the
original range in 2006,  and (3) it is undisputed that the ranges
are merchantable because the issue is cosmetic, not functional,
Beginning with Wolf's first argument, Article 2 of the UCC applies
to transactions in goods. So an implied warranty of
merchantability arises in a contract of sale, which "includes both
a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future
time. Gifts would then fall outside of Article 2, but some courts
have found that a combined offering of a free good and a purchased
good would receive an implied warranty.

Wolf's second argument is that the lack of privity provides an
additional, independent reason for dismissing the implied warranty
claim to the extent it is based on the 2006 sale. Without going
any further, the Court can reject this argument because the range
at issue is based on the 2014 replacement.

The Court now turns to the final argument: whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact that the 2014 range was
merchantable.

Here, the ordinary purpose of a Wolf range is to cook food.
Although the Kails continue to use their range, it is unclear
whether chipped porcelain contaminates food cooked in the oven.
Put another way, the durability of the porcelain may affect the
functionality of the oven. After using the self-clean function,
porcelain pieces may fly onto the food, and so the range may be
incapable of being cleaned, thus preventing the Kails from using
it. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment on the implied
warranty claim.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

As the federal lemon law, the MMWA is designed to improve the
adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception,
and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.
In that regard, claims under the [Act] stand or fall with the
express and implied warranty claims under state law. Because there
are issues of fact on the written-warranty and implied-warranty
claims, the MMWA claim must move forward.

Negligent Misrepresentation Claim

Next, the Court turns to the Kails' negligent misrepresentation
claim, which requires proof of five factors: (1) the defendant had
a duty, as a result of a special relationship, to give correct
information; (2) the defendant made a false representation that he
or she should have known was incorrect; (3) the information
supplied in the representation was known by the defendant to be
desired by the plaintiff for a serious purpose; (4) the plaintiff
intended to rely and act upon it; and (5) the plaintiff reasonably
relied on it to his or her detriment.

To survive summary judgment under either statute, a plaintiff must
show: (1) the defendant's deceptive acts were directed at
consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3)
the plaintiff has been injured as a result.

The issue here is whether the conduct or advertisements were
materially misleading. A material deception is one involving
information that is important to consumers and likely to affect
their choice of product. Today's result is straightforward: Any
material omissions or misrepresentations, as described above,
relate back to the initial purchase in 2006 or the paid upgrade in
2009. Thus, summary judgment is granted on the statutory claims.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part.

As for the 2014 replacement range, four claims will proceed to
trial: (1)breach of the written warranty; (2) breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability; (3) violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 et seq.; and
(4) negligent misrepresentation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 21, 2017
Memorandum and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7m9vx28
from Leagle.com.

Ivan Kail, Plaintiff, represented by Mark S. Reich -
mreich@rgrdlaw.com Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP.
Ivan Kail, Plaintiff, represented by Vincent Michael Serra -
vserra@rgrdlaw.com Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Melanie Kail, Plaintiff, represented by Mark S. Reich, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP & Vincent Michael Serra, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Wolf Appliance, Inc., Defendant, represented by Douglas Scott
Heffer - dheffer@foley.com - Foley & Lardner LLP, Yonaton Aronoff
- yaronoff@sc-harris.com - Foley & Lardner LLP, Anne Berkowitz
Sekel - asekel@foley.com - Foley & Lardner LLP, Gordon Davenport -
gdavenport@foley.com - Foley & Lardner LLP & Max B. Chester -
mchester@foley.com - Foley & Lardner LLP.


ZIRX CONSUMER: Settlement in "Pascual" Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Final Approval of Class-Action Settlement and for
Approval of Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Incentive Award in the
case captioned CHRISTINA PASCUAL, on her own behalf and on behalf
of a CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES OF DEFENDANT,
Plaintiffs, v. ZIRX CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., a California
corporation, Defendant, No. 2:15-cv-01923-JCC(W.D. Wash.).

In connection with granting preliminary approval to a class-wide
Settlement reached in the action, the Court scheduled a fairness
hearing for Aug. 22, 2017.  It directed the Plaintiff to file a
motion for final approval by July 7, 2017.  It also directed her
to file a motion for approval of any fee and expense award, as
well as any incentive payment to her, by July 7, 2017, to be heard
at the same time as the motion for final approval.  The Plaintiff
timely filed the Motion for Final Approval.

Having read all of the papers filed in connection therewith, and
having considered all of the evidence and argument submitted with
respect to the proposed Settlement, Judge Coughenor granted the
Motion for Final Approval is granted.

The Settlement Class consists of all persons who entered into
independent contractor agreements with Zirx Consumers Services,
worked as a Parking Agent more than 40 hours in any work week
during the period June 1, 2015 through Oct. 31, 2015.

Under the Stipulation of Settlement, the Plaintiff is permitted to
seek up to $1,000 from the Maximum Settlement Amount for an
incentive-award Service Payment.  She has requested that amount.
Judge Coughenour approved that amount as an incentive payment,
and, upon the Effective Date, she therefore will be subject to the
general release set forth in the Settlement.

Under the Stipulation of Settlement, Class Counsel is permitted to
seek up to a total of $45,000 in attorney's fees and costs.  The
Class Counsel has requested $44,201.24 in attorney's fees and
$798.76 in actual costs and expenses.  The Judge finds that these
amounts are reasonable.  Accordingly, he approved those amounts.

Under the Stipulation of Settlement, the Settlement Administrator
is to be paid its reasonably incurred fees and expenses from the
Maximum Settlement Amount for the Administration Costs of the
Settlement.  The Settlement Administrator has requested $10,275
for its fees and expenses.  Judge Coughenour finds that this
amount is reasonable.  Accordingly, he approved that amount as the
Administration Costs of the Settlement.

Except as otherwise provided in the Final Approval Order, the
Parties will bear their own costs and attorney's fees.

Without affecting the finality of the Final Approval Order and
Judgment, the Court retains jurisdiction over the Lawsuit, the
Parties, and the Participating Class Members for purposes of
supervising, implementing, enforcing, construing, administering,
and interpreting the Stipulation of Settlement, as well as any
matters related or ancillary to the foregoing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Aug. 22, 2017 Judgment
and Final Order is available at https://is.gd/9WbofJ from
Leagle.com.

Christina Pascual, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen P. Connor,
CONNOR & SARGENT PLLC.

Christina Pascual, Plaintiff, represented by Anne-Marie E. Sargent
-- aes@cslawfirm.net -- CONNOR & SARGENT PLLC.

Zirx Consumer Services, Inc, Defendant, represented by Kalley R.
Aman -- kaman@buchalter.com -- BUCHALTER NEMER, pro hac vice,
Michael J. Cereseto -- mcereseto@buchalter.com -- BUCHALTER NEMER,
pro hac vice, Adam T. Pankratz -- adam.pankratz@ogletree.com --
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, Leah C. Lively --
leahlively@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE & Sarah Jung Evans,
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART.


* CPLR Article 9 Useful for Consumer Class Action Plaintiffs
------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas A. Dickerson, writing for New York Law Journal, reports
that although the proper utilization of CPLR Article 9 has on
occasion been problematic, there are moments when decisions can,
indeed, be inspiring.  The First Department's decision in Gold v.
New York Life Insurance Company is one of them. 2017 N.Y. App.
Div. LEXIS 5627 (1st Dept. 2017). In fact, in terms of courage and
thoughtful analysis in both majority and dissenting opinions, Gold
ranks very close to the superb decision of the Court of Appeals in
Borden v. 400 East 55th Street Associates allowing tenants to sue
as a class if they waived the penalty provisions of the statutes
(e.g., Rent Stabilization Law) under which they brought suit,
thereby circumventing the prohibitions of CPLR 901(b). 24 N.Y.3d
382 (2014); see Dickerson & Duffy, "'Borden': a Welcome Sea Change
on New York State Class Actions," N.Y.L.J., (June 29, 2015, p. 4);
Dickerson, Austin & Zucco, New York State Class Actions: Making It
Work-Fulfilling the Promise: Some Positive Developments and Why
CPLR 901(b) Should Be Repealed," 77.1 Albany L.R. 59 (2014).

Allowing class members to "waive the penalty" had already become
accepted practice in class actions brought by consumers, employees
and others. See, e.g., Cox v. Microsoft , 8 A.D.3d 39 (1st Dept.
2004); Ridge Meadows Homeowners' Ass. v. Tara Dev. , 242 A.D. 2d
947 (4th Dept. 1997); Super Glue v. Avis Rent A Car System , 132
A.D.2d 604, 606 (2d Dept. 1987); Pesantz v. Boyle Environmental
Services , , 251 A.D.2d 11 (1st Dept. 1998); Krebs v. Canyon Club
, 22 Misc. 3d 1125 (West. Sup. 2009); Pires v. Bowery Presents ,
44 Misc. 3d 704 (N.Y. Sup. 2014) (Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
25.30(1)(c)).

It is fair to state that after Borden Article 9 of the CPLR became
more readily available to consumers, tenants and employees as a
useful procedural device to aggregate and prosecute similar
claims.

Enter 'Concepcion'
At the same time there were several decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court which sought to reduce, if not, eliminate the use of the
class action device by the very groups which our Court of Appeals
and Appellate Divisions sought to empower.  As for consumers, a
series of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court relying upon the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) made it clear that mandatory
arbitration clauses and class action and class arbitration waivers
in consumer contracts were to be enforced. See, e.g., Green Tree
Financial v. Bassel , 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (arbitrator decides
whether arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitrations);
Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International , 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010) ("It follows that a party may not be compelled under the
FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."); AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion , 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)(abrogating
Discover Bank v. Superior Court to the effect that consumer
contracts containing clauses prohibiting class actions or class
arbitrations were void as against public policy); American Express
v. Italian Colors Restaurant , 133 S. Ct. 234 (2013) (rejecting
argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims
"that might otherwise slip through the legal system"); and DirecTV
v. Imburgia , 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) ("California's interpretation
of the phrase 'law of your state' does not place arbitration
contracts 'on equal footing with all other contracts'.").

Remedies Extinguished
One need only read Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's dissent in
DirecTV and the New York Times article cited therein to understand
that meaningful consumer remedies have nearly been extinguished.
See Silver-Greenberg and Corkey, "In Arbitration, a 'Privatization
of the Justice System'," New York Times (Nov. 1, 2015) ("By
inserting individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of
consumer and employment contracts, companies [have] devised a way
to circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in
class-action lawsuits, realistically the only tool citizens have
to fight illegal or deceitful business practice."); see also
Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, "Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
the Deck of Justice" New York Times (Oct. 31, 2015); The Editorial
Board, "Arbitrating Disputes, Denying Justice," New York Times
(Nov. 7, 2015); Arbitration Study, Report to Congress, pursuant to
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 1028(a)
(March 2015), published by the federal Consumer Financial
Protection Board, and its recent rule-making seeking to prohibit
financial companies from using class action waivers in their
arbitration agreements entered into after the effective date of
the rule.  The final rule will be codified at 12 C.F.R. part 1040
to Chapter X in Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations. See
The Editorial Board, "Forcing Banks to Fight Fair," New York Times
(July 15, 2017) ("A powerful rule finalized by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau will allow consumers to join together
in class action lawsuits against banks, credit card companies and
other lenders over price gouging, predatory lending, abusive loan
terms and other mistreatment").

Circumventing 'Concepcion'
As noted by the California Supreme Court in Sanchez v. Valencia
Holding Company , 61 Cal. 4th 899 (Cal. Sup. 2015), Concepcion
"reaffirmed that the FAA does not preempt 'generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability' . .
. . Under the FAA, these defenses may provide grounds for
invalidating an arbitration agreement if they are enforced
evenhandedly and do not 'interfere with fundamental attributes of
arbitration'."  And, indeed, there are ways in which to circumvent
Concepcion depending upon the facts of each case. See Dickerson &
Chambers, "Challenging 'Concepcion' in New York State Courts,"
N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 29, 2015); Dickerson, "Class Actions: The Law of 50
States," Law Journal Press, Sec. 4.03[5].

What About Employees?
On Oct. 2, 2017 the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
argument regarding the legality of arbitration agreements in
employment contracts requiring workers to waive their rights to
sue in collective or class actions.  In fact, there is now an even
split between six U.S. Courts of Appeals that have considered the
enforceability of In re D.R. Horton (Horton I), 357 NLRB No. 184
(Jan. 3, 2012), which held that forcing an employee to waive his
or her right to sue in a collective or class action is an unfair
labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act. See NLRB v.
Alternative Entertainment, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9272 (6th Cir. May
26, 2017), Lewis v. Epic Systems , 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016)
cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017), and Morris v. Ernst & Young ,
834 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 975), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017)
(all upholding Horton I ); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young , 726 F.3d
290 (2d Cir. 2013), Murphy Oil USA v. NLRB , 808 F.3d 1013 (5th
Cir. 2015), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017), and Owen v.
Bristol Care , 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (all rejecting Horton
I ).

First Department Joins the Fray
In considered and very well written opinions by both the majority
and the dissent in Gold v. New York Life Insurance, the Appellate
Division, First Department, consider[ed] an issue that we have
never directly addressed before now: whether employees can be
obliged to arbitrate collective disputes such as class actions
regarding wage disputes with their employers (with the majority
holding) that plaintiffs cannot be required to arbitrate their
disputes with defendant New York Life insurance Company because
that obligation would run afoul of the National Labor Relations
Act.

Most surprising (and pleasantly so) is that the Gold majority
departed from the First Department's historical enforcement of
arbitration clauses. See State of New York v. Phillip Morris , 30
A.D.3d 190 (1st Dept. 2006); Tsadilas v. Providian National Bank ,
13 A.D.3d 190 (1st Dept. 2004); Ranieri v. Bell Atlantic Mobile ,
304 A.D.2d 353 (1st Dept. 2003); see also Weinstein v. Jenny Craig
Operations , 132 A.D.3d 446 (1st Dept. 2015); Ansah v. A.W.I.
Security & Investigation , 129 A.D.3d 538 (1st Dept. 2015); Chan
v. Chinese-American Planning Council Home Attendant Program, 2015
WL 5294803 (N.Y. Sup. 2015). Compare: JetBlue Airways v.
Stephenson , 88 A.D.3d 567 (1st Dept. 2011); Cheng v. Oxford
Health Plans , 84 A.D.3d 673 (1st Dept. 2011); Frankel v. Citicorp
Insurance Services , 80 A.D.3d 280 (2d Dept. 2010). In fact, the
Gold majority's decision is consistent with the Court of Appeals'
decision in Borden expanding the application of CPLR Article 9 for
class actions brought by consumers, employees and tenants.
Labor Law Claims
The Gold plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, unlawful wage deductions
for commission reversals in violation of Labor Law Sec. 193,
failure to pay overtime in violation of 12 NYCRR 142-2.2 and
failure to pay the minimum wage in violation of Labor Law Sec 652.
The defendant sought to dismiss these claims and compel
arbitration. "Upon consideration . . . we conclude that the better
view is that arbitration provisions such as the one (here) which
prohibit collective or representative claims, violate the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and those provisions are
unenforceable," relying upon the reasoning in Lewis v. Epic Sys.

Right to Concerted Activities
The Seventh Circuit in Epic declined to enforce a clause that
precluded employees from "'seeking any class, collective or
representative remedies to wage-and-hour disputes' because the
clause 'violate[d] Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA'. According to the
Court, section 7 of the NLRA provided that employees have the
right to engage in concerted activities and concerted activities
'have long been held to include resort to . . . judicial forums'.
The Seventh Circuit also found that a lawsuit filed 'by a group of
employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of
employment' is considered to constitute 'concerted activity under
section 7 of the NLRA . . . What is more, the Seventh Circuit
found that the clause was also unenforceable under the (FAA)"
because the subject provision "is unlawful under section 7 of the
NLRA," and as such was an illegal provision unenforceable under
the FAA.

Conclusion
While the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule Concepcion in
the near future, thus disappointing consumers, it is hoped that
the rights of employees to sue collectively as a class will be
preserved.

Thomas A. Dickerson is a former Associate Justice for the
Appellate Division, Second Department.  He is the author of "Class
Actions: the Law of 50 States," Law Journal Press (2017) and
Article 9 (New York State Class Actions) of Weinstein Korn Miller,
New York Civil Practice, Lexis-Nexis [MB] (2017).


                        Asbestos Litigation


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Baby Powder Talc Leads to $417MM in Cancer Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Terri Oppenheimer, writing for Mesothelioma.net, reported that
talc is the main ingredient in Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder,
and because talc is mined from the same locations as asbestos (the
mineral that causes mesothelioma) there have long been questions
about whether the product is really as safe as its manufacturer
would have us believe. Now a California jury has handed down a
resounding answer to that question, awarding $417 million to a
woman diagnosed with ovarian cancer after years of using the
product. The large verdict was in large part a result of the
company not having provided any warnings of the possible presence
of asbestos when it was a component of the product's talc prior to
the 1980s: other talc-containing products have carried labels
warning of the potential risk of ovarian cancer.

The American Cancer Society has dedicated a considerable amount of
time to looking at the link between talc and ovarian cancer, in
large part because of the conclusive evidence of asbestos'
relationship to other cancers like mesothelioma and asbestos-
related lung cancer. Though that agency has said that the link is
inconclusive, they also acknowledge that there is an increased
risk, and other health-oriented agencies have done the same. With
the California jury's verdict it is expected that the company will
be facing many similar claims against them: there are already over
5,000 claims that have been filed seeking damages for similar
cancer diagnoses.

The $417 million award was provided in the first talc case to be
heard in the state of California, and it represents one of the
largest verdicts to date for the year 2017. At the heart of the
case was Eva Echeverria, a woman who was diagnosed with ovarian
cancer after years of having used the baby powder product
vaginally, as the company had advertised for years without ever
having warned of the risk of doing so. In addition to the several
thousand similar claims that have been filed across the country,
there have already been five Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder cases
heard in the state of Missouri, with four of those decisions going
against the consumer product giant. The largest of those verdicts
was $110 million.

Whether the injury is mesothelioma, ovarian cancer, or any other
illness resulting from a company having acted negligently, the
people who suffer the most are the consumers who have not been
given the warnings or information that they needed to make
informed decisions. If you need answers, contact the Patient
Advocates at Mesothelioma.net. We can help you find all the
resources you need. Call us at 1-800-692-8608.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Units Lose First Jury Trial
-------------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Salls, writing for Legal Newsline, reported that an
attorney for a former nuclear plant employee with mesothelioma
said a $300,000 Aug. 3 jury verdict against Emerson Electric Co.,
Fisher Controls International, and Crosby Valve will help other
asbestos plaintiffs with claims against the companies.

"Both companies have a liability story that has now been exposed,
and that a jury has found that their actions were negligent,"
attorney Theile McVey of Kassel McVey told Legal Newsline.  "The
verdict demonstrates that when companies put profits over people's
lives and safety, eventually they will be held accountable."

Courtroom View Network webcast the entire trial.

McVey said her firm expects the verdict entered in the case of
Dale Jolly "will provide a good roadmap of evidence to other
injured persons seeking to hold Fisher and Crosby accountable for
their wrongdoing."

Jolly was employed by Duke Energy. He and his wife filed the
lawsuit against the Emerson subsidiaries in the Court of Common
Pleas for the 7th Judicial Circuit of South Carolina.

McVey said Dale Jolly was exposed to asbestos from valve gaskets
and packing in a power plant setting.

According to McVey, Crosby and Fisher corporate representatives
acknowledged in their testimony "that they had non-asbestos
packing and gaskets that could have been substituted and that
those substitutes would work just as well. Yet, they continued
sell the asbestos gaskets and packing."

The jury found that both defendants had breached the implied
warranty of merchantability in connection with the parts supplied
to Duke Energy, McVey said. McVey said the workers followed the
defendants' manufacturer's maintenance instructions and the jury
rejected the claims from the defendants that sought to blame the
plaintiff.

Jolly's attorneys argued that Fisher and Crosby had failed to
consider the health or safety of asbestos valves and asbestos
replacement parts products.

Both sides have filed post-trial motions. Any decision from the
defense to appeal would depend on the outcome of those motions.

There are other cases currently pending against Emerson in South
Carolina and other jurisdictions in the country.

Emerson press representative David Baldridge said the company had
no comment on the Jolly verdict.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: FACT Act Won't Prevent Abuse of Double-Dipping
---------------------------------------------------------------
Angela Underwood, writing for SE Texas Record, reported that
attorneys double-dipping from asbestos trusts funds that
rightfully belong to affected veterans is unacceptable, according
to a former American Legion National commander and sitting judge.

Recently published in the Austin American Statesman with co-author
and Texas Coalition of Veteran's Organizations Chairman Emeritus
Morgan Little, Washington County Judge John Brieden reiterated
what he composed in the opinion piece.

"All I am asking is for it to be right and be fair and it's going
to take legislation to prevent the system from being abused,"
Brieden said.

Brieden explained that his involvement with the Furthering
Asbestos Claims Transparency (FACT) Act, and an American Legion
resolution in support of the asbestos claim transparency law,
stems from his former leadership role with the legion.

The FACT Act passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in March
and awaits action in the U.S. Senate.

"I wrote a resolution for The American Legion voicing support for
the FACT Act. When adopted, The American Legion became a dominant
voice speaking for veterans on the issue. The day before the house
committee hearing, Politico ran an op-ed I penned and it was on
the desk of every committee member the morning of the hearing. It
passed committee," he said, adding months later when it calendared
for the U.S. House floor, Politico refused to print a revised copy
of the op-ed.

"We went to the Hill, who ran it," he said. "A copy was placed on
every member's desk and it passed."

Brieden said the bill will bring transparency to asbestos claims
systems.

"The attorneys involved are making big money, obviously are
lobbying and fighting against it like hell. It has been extremely
difficult because of the intense lobbying," Brieden said of said
of the "incestuous" sealed, non-disclosable trusts set up and
monitored by esquires.

As noted in the recent news report, the judge said last year that
13 state attorneys general filed a civil investigative demand with
several national asbestos trusts demanding transparency but all
trusts declined.

"The Department of Defense heavily used asbestos in ships and
airplanes and tanks up until the '70s," he said.

"It is said one in three people having a problem with asbestos-
related illnesses are veterans, so if there is going to be some
resolution to this issue veterans need to be at the table.

"What is being paid today is half or less than half of what was
being paid 25 years ago because the trusts have been sucked down
by these guys going around making these multiple claims, all of
which can't be true."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Burnt Shed in Nottinghamshire Has Asbestos
-----------------------------------------------------------
Isaac Ashe, writing for Nottingham Post, reported that a fire
broke out in a shed in Annesley which turned out to contain
asbestos.

Fire crews from Ashfield and Hucknall stations were called to the
structure in Byron Road in the town at around 11:40 p.m., Tuesday,
August 22.

Racecourse visitor tried to smuggle in vodka in a salami sandwich
Two hose reel jets were used to put out the outbuilding by crews
wearing breathing equipment.

Fire crews from the two stations contained all the contaminated
waste water within the garden.

Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service reassured residents that
their trained teams prevented any asbestos-tainted water from
disappearing into the drains.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Madison County Negligent in Dealing with Asbestos
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ken de la Bastide, writing for The Herald Bulletin, reported that
the president of Lehman's Inc. said Madison County was negligent
by not informing contractors working at the Madison County
Government Center that asbestos was prevalent.

John Maidlow, president of Lehman's, said the asbestos is a
serious concern and he was not at the meeting to "white wash" the
problem.

During an informal meeting to address the asbestos problem found
in the courthouse in July, several employees expressed concerns
about the potential risks.

County officials said there will be continuous air testing to
determine whether any asbestos has become airborne during the
entire remodeling process.

"Your safety is our main concern," Commissioner Stephanie Owens
said. "I'm confident we got on this issue as quickly as possible."

The county is considering an abatement program throughout the
oldest portion of the building, constructed in 1973. Estimates for
the abatement work range from $1 million to $2 million and could
take eight months to complete.

Maidlow said a 2016 survey of asbestos done by HyrdoTech
Environmental Consulting found the asbestos in the building was
friable and could bust up and become airborne.

"There is product (asbestos) laying all over the place above the
duct work," Maidlow said. "The county put my people in harm's way.

"You had the report," he said. "If you didn't read it, shame on
you."

Owens said the commissioners were doing the best they could and
will keep workers and the public informed.

"We don't know all the answers," she said. "We're doing the best
we can to prevent anything from happening from this point on."

Madison Circuit Court Division 6 Judge Mark Dudley said that when
work was being done to replace the roof of the courthouse, there
were people working above the ceiling tile.

"Clearly the county knew asbestos was there," he said. "Why was
the (air quality) testing done in July and not when the work
started? There was not air testing done during that work."

Terry Burnworth, president of Pyramid Architecture, said that
workers were running electrical wires and the asbestos wasn't
disturbed.

Burnworth said he wasn't aware of the HydroTech report until after
July 4.

County Attorney Jeff Graham said the October 2016 report was done
at the request of property manager Denny Williamson and given to
Human Resources director Melinda Neeley. Williamson said that
asbestos was not a problem.

"We were not trying to hide the report from the contractors,"
Graham said. "This could have been handled differently."

Graham said two steps will be required to resolve the asbestos
issue.

He said the first is to make sure the new heating and air
conditioning system is providing heat to the building by October.

Graham said the county will remediate the problem to get the heat
turned on and that the commissioners want to borrow the money to
completely abate the asbestos problem in the entire building.

Burnworth said the plan is to remediate the asbestos in the areas
being worked on to complete the installation of the heating and
air conditioning system.

"The plan is to not get the product airborne," he said. "Each room
will be isolated. It's pretty much dust on the top of the duct
work."

Burnworth said the encapsulation of the asbestos fire proofing
during the heating and air conditioning work will be temporary.

Maidlow said any planned remediation would have to be acceptable
to his company before work will resume on the heating and air
conditioning work.

Burnworth said the initial work will be to install coils for the
new heating system.

"Once the financing is approved for the total remediation the work
on the replacement of 400 dampers and 700 lights will take place.
That work won't happen until the full abatement takes place."

Burnworth said 10 to 20 percent of the asbestos is considered
friable and could become airborne.

Dudley asked why the asbestos concern wasn't addressed during the
bidding process for the work at the courthouse.

Burnworth said they were told asbestos was not a problem by the
former property manager.

Transparency with employees

Dudley said the employees are dealing with unknowns.

He asked for the air testing to continue and the employees and
public be informed of the results.

"It would make people feel better," Dudley said.

County Councilman Mike Gaskill asked that the commissioners be
more transparent with employees and the public.

"The county knew about the problem in October 2016," he said. "The
employees should have been told a lot sooner. There is a long way
to go to be transparent."

Gaskill said Commissioner Mike Phipps should have been given a
copy of the 2016 report when he took office on Jan. 1.

"When he did learn about it, within 48 hours the employees were
notified," he said.

Graham said the intent of the commissioners is to be "absolutely
transparent" going forward.

"As we fix this the employees and public will be informed every
step of the way," he said. "The HydroTech report was not known by
the commissioners until the end of July."

Dealing with asbestos

OSHA-required work practices when dealing with asbestos:

   * Class I work means activities in which thermal insulation or
surfacing material such as sprayed on fireproof is removed. The
situation at the Madison County Government Center.

   * Class II work means removal of asbestos containing wallboard,
floor tile, sheeting, roofing and siding.

   * Class III work means repair and maintenance jobs where
asbestos containing material is likely to be disturbed.

   * Class IV work means maintenance and custodial activities
during which employees contact asbestos containing material.

   * All Class I, II, III asbestos work must be conducted within
regulated areas. These are marked areas that only trained and
authorized personnel wearing respirators and other protective
equipment may enter.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Lee Issues New MSC for Asbestos Cases
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lee, the presiding judge of the San Francisco Asbestos
Department, has set forth a new Mandatory Settlement Conference
(MSC) system for San Francisco asbestos cases. She stated that she
has been frustrated with the failure of the parties to appear with
authority, and the lack of progress made during past MSCs.
Further, she added that she is aware of the complaints of insurers
and defense counsel that there have been too many MSCs in the
past. She had considered scrapping asbestos MSCs altogether, but
is trying out a new system that she did a trial run on at the
start of August.

For those cases that have trial preference or are running up to
the five-year statute of limitations deadline, the parties are to
send an email to Pang Ly (SF court settlement coordinator)
detailing an analysis on the case's settlement value, and
including disclosure of the individuals with settlement authority.

So far, this is scheduled for cases set for trial over the next
six weeks, but we anticipate the court making this the new MSC
system going forward.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Phoenix Not Covered for $1.5MM Suit Costs
----------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Sistrunk, writing for Law360, reported that a pair of units
of The Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. asked the Ninth
Circuit to uphold a lower court's decision that they don't have to
reimburse the city of Phoenix for nearly $1.5 million it shelled
out to defend and settle a lawsuit over a pipe worker's asbestos-
related death, saying their coverage didn't kick in because the
city settled within its deductible.

After settling the underlying litigation over the death of worker
Carlos Tarazon from mesothelioma, Phoenix had pursued coverage for
its $500,000 settlement payment and almost $1 million in defense
costs under a series of "first-layer" excess and umbrella
insurance policies issued by four Hartford insurers.

In fall 2016, though, an Arizona district judge held that the
insurance carriers had no duty to defend or indemnify because
Phoenix had settled the Tarazon matter within its $500,000
deductible, adding that the city's defense costs were excluded
from coverage.

Phoenix is challenging those holdings at the Ninth Circuit, and
has argued that the lower court erred in treating its deductible,
or self-insured retention, as primary insurance for purposes of
determining when the excess policies are implicated. In an
answering brief, though, the Hartford insurers said the city is
complicating the issues.

"The district court concluded there is no ambiguity and the
district court is right: where a suit is 'adjusted prior to trial
court judgment for a total amount not more than the retained limit
[$500,000], then no loss expenses or legal expenses shall be
payable by the company(s) [Hartford]," Hartford's attorneys wrote.

Tarazon, an underground pipe worker, worked on a number of
capital-improvement projects for Phoenix and various companies
between 1968 and 1993. He later alleged in litigation against the
city and others that his continuous exposure to asbestos on job
sites over the years caused him to develop mesothelioma. Following
Tarazon's death in 2014, the suit was amended into a wrongful
death action.

In April 2015, Phoenix agreed to pay $500,000 to settle the
Tarazon matter. The city then sought coverage for the settlement
payment and $986,000 in defense costs in excess of its $500,000
self-insured retention, or SIR, under a slew of first-layer and
umbrella policies issued by the Hartford insurers between July
1981 and July 1985. But Hartford declined, arguing that its
obligations wouldn't be triggered until Phoenix had exhausted the
SIRs on all the policies implicated by Tarazon's claims.

Phoenix proceeded to sue Hartford in Arizona federal court in
March 2015. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions
early last year, and Senior U.S. District Judge Neil V. Wake ruled
in the insurers' favor in September.

The district judge found that even if Phoenix's interpretation of
its policies was correct, the Hartford insurers would still not
have to pay because coverage must be prorated over the entire 25-
year period of Tarazon's asbestos exposure, and the city would
have to satisfy a $500,000 deductible for each policy period.
Under that standard, Phoenix would need to have incurred more than
$13 million in expenses before it could tap coverage under the
Hartford policies.

In an opening appellate brief filed in June, Phoenix contended
that Judge Wake's reading of the Hartford policies was based on
his misinterpretation of a key policy term and his erroneous
belief that the city's SIR functioned as primary insurance. When
the policies are construed properly, it is clear that both
Phoenix's defense costs and its settlement payment chipped away at
and ultimately exhausted the SIR, thereby reaching the first-layer
insurers' coverage, the city said.

Hartford countered that the excess policies make clear that, when
Phoenix settles a legal matter within the $500,000 SIR, the
insurers have no obligation to pay any "loss expenses or legal
expenses." According to Hartford, the Ninth Circuit doesn't have
to look any further to affirm the district court's ruling.

But Phoenix has urged the appellate court to look beyond the SIR
issue, and is also fighting Judge Wake's adoption of a pro rata
allocation method. Instead, the relevant policy language appears
to support a "joint-and-several" allocation method, under which
the policies in a single year can be held liable for an entire
loss, the city contended.

Hartford, however, said that if the Ninth Circuit reaches the
allocation issue, pro rata is appropriate, as it is the majority
rule for asbestos-related claims and is supported by the
applicable policy language.

"There is no unfairness in allocating defense and indemnity costs
pro rata to an insured that elects to self-insure its primary
coverage year after year," Hartford's attorneys wrote. "Nor does
it make the coverage under Hartford's excess and umbrella policies
'illusory,' as the city rhetorically argues."

Phoenix is represented by E.J. Kotalik Jr. and Tracy Renee
Nadzieja of Peshkin & Kotalik.

The Hartford insurers are represented by Joshua Mayer and James
Pio Ruggieri of Shipman & Goodwin LLP and Rob A. Justman of
Meagher & Geer PLLP.

The case is City of Phoenix v. First State Insurance Co. et al.,
case number 16-16767, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ex-Pullman Standard Worker Exposed to Asbestos
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo, writing for Madison-St. Clair Record, reported
that a couple has filed suit against several manufacturers over
allegations that the husband now has lung cancer because of
exposure to asbestos.

Charles Reach and Elizabeth Reach filed a complaint on Aug. 8 in
the St. Clair County Circuit Court against Armstrong Pumps Inc.,
Aurora Pump Co., Borg-Warner Morse TEC LLC, CBS Corp., et al
alleging negligence.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that during
plaintiff Charles Reach's employment from 1964 to 1980 as a welder
at Pullman Standard, he was exposed to and inhaled asbestos fibers
from certain products manufactured, sold, distributed or installed
by defendants. As a result, he was diagnosed with lung cancer in
March 2, 2017, an asbestos-induced disease, the suit states.

The plaintiffs hold Armstrong Pumps Inc., Aurora Pump Co., Borg-
Warner Morse TEC LLC, CBS Corp., et al. responsible because the
defendants allegedly negligently included asbestos fibers in their
products when adequate substitutes were available and failed to
provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning the dangers
of working with or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek judgment against
the defendants of more than $50,000, which they allege will fairly
and reasonably compensate for the injuries. They are represented
by Randy L. Gori and Barry Julian of Gori, Julian & Associates PC
in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 17-L-432


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 2 Schools in Queensland Closed Due to Asbestos
---------------------------------------------------------------
CBC News reported that school officials in the James Bay Cree
community of Chisasibi in northern Quebec have ordered the
temporary closure and cleanup of two schools, after tests revealed
the presence of mould and asbestos.

"Extensive" repairs will be needed at the recently built
Waapinichikush Elementary School because of a mould problem. The
building, which cost more than $18 million, opened in 2012. The
repairs include removal of mould, repairing faulty flooring, and
improving air ventilation.

Chisasibi is the largest Cree community, with a population of
about 4,500, located at the end of the James Bay Highway, about
1,400 kilometres north of Montreal.

"Maintaining a healthy and safe work environment for our students
and employees is our priority and a matter that is taken extremely
seriously at the Cree School Board," said Abraham Jolly, director
general, in a statement.

In tests carried out in June, mould and asbestos were also found
at the community's high school, James Bay Eeyou School.

Both facilities have been closed and crews specialized in the
removal of mould and asbestos sent in.

The statement says the asbestos at James Bay Eeyou School is
contained and therefore poses no health risk, but the decision was
made to remove it anyway.

"Though there [are] currently no risks associated with the
contained asbestos, the school closure is a precautionary measure
in case the ventilation system does not provide adequate
coverage," Jolly added.

Students will miss some days at the start of the school year, with
both Waapinichikush Elementary School and James Bay Eeyou School
expected to reopen on Aug. 28.

Officials say they are working on a plan to make up for the lost
school days, without making unnecessary changes to the school
calendar.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Worried About Safety After Asbestos Find
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence Machado, writing for The Daily Telegraph, reported that
the Electrical Trades Union is demanding assurances their workers
will not be put at risk after asbestos was found at the Sydney
Metro Trains Facility at Tallawong Rd, Rouse Hill.

The union also wants lung capacity testing undertaken for those
working in affected areas, air quality testing for surrounding
neighbourhoods, and asbestos awareness training for all workers on
the $8.3 billion project.

Transport for NSW, however, said the site is now safe and work
resumed after being halted, when material believed to be asbestos
was found at two locations at the facility.

The Rouse Hill station under construction. Picture: Adam Ward
Electrical Trades Union secretary Dave McKinley said it is
worrying the asbestos was not detected before work commenced
several months ago.

"We are concerned that more than 100 workers have been exposed to
this material," Mr McKinley said.

"Let's be perfectly clear, any form of asbestos is potentially
deadly.

"It appears that the people in charge of this project put budgets
and timelines ahead of human lives.

"We want to know why this material wasn't detected in pre-work
surveys and where the register of hazardous materials that it
should appear on has gone."

The new rail overpass across Windsor Road at Rouse Hill is similar
in design to the Anzac Bridge in Sydney. Picture: David Swift
Transport for NSW, however, said when the asbestos was confirmed
on site, the area was closed off.

"On August 15, testing results confirmed that it was bonded
asbestos," a TfNSW spokesman said.

"The area has remained isolated with no work permitted to be
undertaken in this location to ensure the safety of the workforce
as per standard protocols for when this type of finding occurs.

"Some asbestos has been safely removed from site and remaining
material continues to be isolated on site.

"Air quality monitoring has been completed on site the morning of
August 18."

Mr McKinley said they have been unable to locate the hazardous
materials register for the site, which head contractor NRT Project
-- a consortium of John Holland, Cimic, Leightons and UGL -- are
required by law to maintain.

"Given that there has been heavy machinery operating in the nearby
area, it's hard to see how it would not have become loose and
airborne," Mr. McKinley said.

"We also fear that visitors to the Buddhist temple (at Schofields)
that backs onto the site along with local residents could have
also been exposed."

Mr. McKinley said he wanted an explanation of why workers were
sent back to affected areas after the initial discovery, and
demanded an agreed independent hygienist survey all Sydney Metro
North West sites to determine their safety.

The ETU is urging anyone who may have potentially been exposed,
either because they worked on the project or live in the
surrounding area, to sign up to the national asbestos exposure
register.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos-related Work Site Violations on Rise
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Shepherd, writing for North Shore News, reported that
barricade tape is used by removal specialist Actes Environmental
at a job site in North Vancouver.

Contractors who cut corners with asbestos put lives in danger.

That's the message from WorkSafeBC after the agency issued more
asbestos-related stop work orders and fines in the first eight
months of 2017 than in all of 2016.

Preventing exposure today "will prevent the disease in the
future," said WorkSafeBC vice-president Al Johnson.

More than 600 British Columbian workers died from asbestos-related
disease in the past decade. In 2016, more than one-third of the
164 construction deaths in B.C. stemmed from asbestos-related
illness. Asbestos is set to be banned in Canada in 2018 but
workers still face exposure as escalating property values have
triggered a rash in home demolitions, Johnson noted.

The risk is acute in homes built before 1990, as asbestos was used
in more than 3,000 building materials.

WorkSafeBC levelled a $3,959 fine on Living Balance International
Trading Ltd. in July during a North Vancouver demolition job.

The penalty came after a report revealed asbestos-containing
materials where labourers had already begun work. The firm also
failed to inspect the site to identify hazardous materials before
beginning demolition, according to WorkSafeBC.

The agency also slapped a $3,528 fine on CM Environmental Inc.
after their asbestos abatement work failed to remove all asbestos
from a North Vancouver home prior to demolition. The fines are
intended to encourage businesses to do things properly, Johnson
explained.

"You want to motivate the employer into compliance and a penalty
can do that," he said. "But it's not about making money."

While penalties can jump into the $100,000 range, levelling large
fines on small contractors can push companies into an underground
economy, Johnson warned. Given the widespread use of asbestos in
older homes and the recent proliferation of demolition permits,
enforcement can be a challenge.

"We can't be everywhere just because of the volume," Johnson said.

Instead of surveying every demolition site, WorkSafe is trying to
engage homeowners and contractors to handle hazardous materials
properly.

"We're in the business of catching employers doing it right, we're
not in the business of catching them doing it wrong," he said.

However, in particularly egregious cases WorkSafeBC can issue a
stop-operations order, shutting down every job site in which a
certain contractor is involved.

Johnson was also adamant that workers reject dangerous conditions.

"Not only is it a right, it's a responsibility to refuse unsafe
work," he said.

If a worker sees a serious injury, chemical release, or general
unsafe conditions, they can call WorkSafeBC at 604-276-3100.
Workers have the option to remain anonymous. WorkSafeBC also
provides safeguards to ensure whistleblowers aren't treated
unfairly, Johnson explained.

Once described as a miracle mineral, Chrysotile, or white
asbestos, was mined and widely used for insulation and
fireproofing. Toxic asbestos fibres can be released during
renovation or demolition work.

Asbestos was sprayed on many of the beams that supported buildings
erected in the 1960s and '70s, Johnson noted. The prevalence in
asbestos resulted in many workers suffering scarring of the lungs
as well as mesothelioma, a cancer that can develop as late as 40
years after asbestos exposure.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Simmons Secures $4.6MM Jury Verdict vs. Jenkins
----------------------------------------------------------------
Simmons Hanly Conroy, one of the nation's leading mesothelioma law
firms, is pleased to announce a New York Supreme Court jury has
awarded $4.6 million to Thomas McGlynn of Tobyhanna, Pa., who
suffers from mesothelioma, a rare and aggressive cancer caused by
exposure to asbestos fibers. McGlynn, 75, contracted mesothelioma
after working with asbestos-contaminated valves manufactured by
Jenkin Bros. of Hartford, Conn.

Firm shareholders Daniel P. Blouin, Jim Kramer, Brian J. Cooke and
Karoline Carstens represented McGlynn and his family in Thomas
McGlynn v. Jenkins Bros., No. 16-190219.

As a welder, McGlynn was exposed to valves manufactured by Jenkins
Bros. that contained asbestos-contaminated gaskets, packing and
insulation while building and rehabbing boiler rooms on ships in
and around New York City in the 1970s and '80s. He was diagnosed
with pleural mesothelioma on May 16, 2016. Expert testimony during
the trial linked McGlynn's exposure to asbestos fibers.

"While no amount of money can give Thomas back his health, we are
extremely pleased that Jenkins Bros. is being held accountable for
knowingly exposing Thomas to cancer-causing asbestos," said
Blouin, lead trial attorney on the case. "We hope this result
brings some relief to Thomas and his family."

The verdict holds Jenkins Bros. partially responsible for
McGlynn's exposure to asbestos but applies 100 percent liability
to the company for what the jury called "reckless" behavior in
exposing McGlynn to the deadly carcinogen.

Founded in 1868, Jenkins Bros. is now a part of Liberty Mutual
Group, Inc. and was a manufacturer of valves and rubber goods.
Jenkins was represented by Clyde & Co, one of the largest defense
law firms in the world.

Michael and Anna Idell, close family friends who have been caring
for McGlynn since he was diagnosed, testified at trial and said
the result was important for all workers. "We hope today sends a
message to companies to put people's safety first," said Michael
Idell.

McGlynn's son, Craig, lives in New Jersey and is in the Plumbers
Union Local 24. McGlynn emigrated with his wife, Agnes Cummings
McGlynn, from Scotland to the United States in 1970. Agnes McGlynn
died in 2012. Another son, Mark, is deceased.

              About Simmons Hanly Conroy, LLC

Simmons Hanly Conroy dedicates its legal practice to helping
victims of mesothelioma. As one of the nation's largest mass tort
law firms, Simmons has represented thousands of patients and
families affected by mesothelioma throughout the country.
Additionally, the firm's attorneys have been appointed to
leadership in numerous national multidistrict litigations
involving dangerous drugs, medical devices and consumer protection
issues, including Vioxx, Yaz, Volkswagen Emmissions and DePuy
Pinnacle. Since 1999, the firm has pledged over $20 million to
cancer research and been a leading supporter of mesothelioma
research asbestos exposure prevention. Read more at
www.simmonsfirm.com.

Jenkins Bros. is represented by Clyde & Co.

The case is Thomas McGlynn v. Jenkins Bros., case number 16-
190219, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York
County.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Confirmed in Innisfil Library
-------------------------------------------------------
Janis Ramsay, writing for Innisfil Journal, reported that the town
is going to err on the side of caution with its latest tests
revealing asbestos is in the Stroud branch of the Innisfil IdeaLAB
and Library.

"The building is from the mid-'70s, and with aging infrastructure
of that time, we could expect to see the possibility of asbestos,"
operations supervisor Mark Neilson said. "In preparation for the
possibility of major renovations, we did a hazardous building
materials assessment in late October."

At the Stroud library and the recreation centre, asbestos was
contained to the insulating material in the cinder block outer
walls, Neilson said.

"Upon finding amounts of asbestos in the building, we hired a
consultant who has a management program. We brought them on board
right away."

While there aren't immediate plans to renovate the Yonge Street
library, part of the town's recreation master plan is to examine
the future of the aging building.

Neilson said the presence of asbestos doesn't increase a risk of
exposure to library staff, patrons or workers.

"It's not a hazard unless you disturb it. If you disturb it, it
can become a hazard," he said. "We made our staff aware of it and
did management training, and we make any contractor doing work
aware of it."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 5th Cir. Nixes $2.5MM Excess Coverage Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Sistrunk, writing for Law360, reported that the Fifth Circuit
vacated an order requiring excess insurer U.S. Fire Insurance Co.
to pay $2.5 million to a primary carrier to cover the cost of
asbestos claims against a custom fabricator, finding that a
pollution exclusion in U.S. Fire's policy applies to the claims,
but that a lower court must decide whether an exception to the
exclusion is in play.

Upending a Texas federal court's judgment in favor of primary
insurer Trinity Lloyd's Insurance Co., a three-judge panel of the
appellate court agreed with U.S. Fire that claims tied to
policyholder LGS Technologies Inc.'s asbestos liabilities line up
with the terms of the pollution exclusion in the excess policy.

"Though the case law is mixed, we conclude, under the plain
language of the policy exclusion, that asbestos constitutes a
pollutant and an irritant," the panel found.

However, the panel sent the case back to the lower court to
determine whether an exception to the pollution exclusion for
releases of pollutants that are "sudden and accidental" applies;
if so, U.S. Fire may still have coverage obligations.

LGS filed suit in Texas district court in September 2007 after
U.S. Fire denied its claims for reimbursement of defense costs in
a slew of suits filed by individuals who were allegedly injured
upon exposure to LGS' asbestos-containing gaskets. Trinity later
intervened in the coverage matter in November 2008, seeking to
force U.S. Fire to reimburse it for millions of dollars in defense
and indemnity payments it had made on LGS' behalf.

In the years that followed, the district court issued several
rulings on key coverage issues. The lower court held in September
2010 that vertical exhaustion should apply in the case -- meaning
that LGS need only deplete the primary policies in a given year to
reach the excess insurance in that year -- and that the underlying
plaintiffs' first exposure to asbestos triggered coverage under
LGS' policies. Then, in March 2012, the court declined to find
that a pollution exclusion in U.S. Fire's excess policies freed
the insurer from any coverage obligations, concluding that
asbestos isn't a pollutant.

Last October, the district court adopted a special master's report
and recommendation and said that Trinity is entitled to about
$904,000 from U.S. Fire for settlement payments it made on LGS'
behalf in the underlying litigation and $1.56 million for defense
costs. The special master had calculated those amounts after
determining that the limit of a Trinity primary policy covering a
period from 1983 to 1984 had been exhausted, thereby implicating
coverage under a U.S. Fire excess policy.

In the ensuing appeal to the Fifth Circuit, U.S. Fire and Trinity
duked it out over a variety of issues, including the proper
exhaustion method, the correct trigger of coverage and the
applicability of the pollution exclusion in the excess policy.

While the insurers suggested that the appeals court should first
determine the proper exhaustion method before weighing their other
arguments, the appellate panel decided to rule solely based on its
interpretation of the pollution exclusion.

Noting that neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Texas Supreme Court
has ever determined whether asbestos is a pollutant, the panel
compared the language in U.S. Fire's pollution exclusion to
dictionary definitions of the term and pertinent case law on the
out of other states. While case law has varied on the subject,
overall it seems to "slightly favor" treating asbestos as a
pollutant; particularly where, as here, the pollution exclusion
uses the words "irritant, contaminant or pollutant," according to
the panel's unpublished opinion.

Therefore, the underlying claims against LGS fall under the U.S.
Fire pollution exclusion because, consistent with the exclusionary
language, the claims pertained to bodily injury arising out of
"the discharge, dispersal, release or escape into the atmosphere"
of an irritant and pollutant, the appellate panel held.

Trinity had argued that, even if the pollution exclusion in U.S.
Fire's policy is implicated, the excess insurer must still provide
coverage by virtue of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
exclusion. The Fifth Circuit panel declined to rule on that issue,
and instead returned the case to the district court to rule on
whether the exception applies.

Brent Cooper of Cooper & Scully PC, who represents Trinity, said
that, although the case involved both the duty to defend and duty
to indemnify, the Fifth Circuit applied the standards for the duty
to indemnify to both.

"This conflicts with Texas Supreme Court holdings and other
holdings of the Fifth Circuit," Cooper said.

An attorney for U.S. Fire did not immediately respond to a request
for comment.

Senior Circuit Judge Thomas Morrow Reavley and Circuit Judges
Jennifer Walker Elrod and James E. Graves Jr. sat on the panel.

U.S. Fire is represented by Thomas C. Wright, Howard L. Close,
Henry S. Platts Jr. and Raffi Melkonian of Wright & Close LLP.

Trinity is represented by Richard Brent Cooper, Diana L. Faust and
Wesley G. Johnson of Cooper & Scully PC and Damon Michael Young
Sr. of Young Pickett & Lee.

The case is Longhorn Gasket and Supply Co. et al. v. United States
Fire Insurance Co., case number 15-41625, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Man Files Suit vs. Beazer Over Asbestos Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo, writing for Madison-St. Clair Record, reported
that a man formerly employed by Island Creek Coal Co. and National
Steel Corp./U.S. Steel alleges exposure to asbestos at these
locations caused him to develop lung cancer.

Roy Colegrove and Sherrie Colegrove filed a complaint on Aug. 10
in the St. Clair County Circuit Court against AK Steel Corp.,
Armstrong International Inc., Beazer Inc., et al. alleging
negligence.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that during Roy
Colegrove's career from 1969 to 2003, he was exposed to and
inhaled asbestos fibers from certain products manufactured, sold,
distributed or installed by defendants. As a result, the suit
states he was diagnosed with lung cancer on May 5, 2017, an
asbestos-induced disease.

The plaintiffs holds AK Steel Corp., Armstrong International Inc.,
Beazer Inc., et al. responsible because the defendants allegedly
negligently included asbestos fibers in their products when
adequate substitutes were available and failed to provide adequate
warnings and instructions concerning the dangers of working with
or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs seek economic damages of more than $50,000, costs
of this suit and all other remedies allowed by law. They are
represented by Randi L. Gori and Barry Julian of Gori, Julian &
Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 17-L-440


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Woman Alleges Cancer Caused by Asbestos Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo, writing for Madison-St. Clair Record, reported
that a woman alleges that her lung cancer was caused by asbestos
exposure during her career.

Sonia Harrison filed a complaint on Aug. 8 in the St. Clair County
Circuit Court against the Armstrong Pumps Inc., BMI Refractory
Services Inc., Cleaver-Brooks, Cooper Industries LLC, et al.
alleging negligence.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that during her
employment from 1973 to 2008, she was exposed to and inhaled
asbestos fibers from certain products manufactured, sold,
distributed or installed by defendants. As a result, she alleges
she was diagnosed with lung cancer on Aug. 24, 2015, an asbestos-
induced disease.

The plaintiff holds Armstrong Pumps Inc., BMI Refractory, Cleaver-
Brooks, Cooper Industries LLC, et al. responsible because the
defendants allegedly negligently included asbestos fibers in their
products when adequate substitutes were available and failed to
provide adequate warnings and instructions concerning the dangers
of working with or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiff seeks damages of more than $50,000 from the
defendants. She is represented by Randy L. Gori and Barry Julian
of Gori, Julian & Associates PC in Edwardsville.

St. Clair County Circuit Court case number 17-L-429


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Construction Co. Fined for Asbestos Release
------------------------------------------------------------
A construction company that risked exposure to asbestos and
potential mesothelioma among its employees and those near its
demolition project has been hit with heavy fines and three years
of probation by the Environmental Protection Agency. The U.S.
Department of Justice announced that AIREKO Construction Company
had entered into a plea agreement following its failure to comply
with the asbestos National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants while working on the Minillas North Tower in San Juan,
Puerto Rico in 2012.

According to a news release, in addition to facing three years of
probation for violating the federal Clean Air Act and paying the
government a $1.5 million fine, AIREKO must also pay $172,020 to
provide for baseline medical examinations for all those who were
exposed to asbestos fibers, as well as follow-up medical
examinations. Inhalation or ingestion of asbestos fibers can cause
mesothelioma, a rare and deadly form of cancer that has no cure.

According to EPA documents, the presence of asbestos on the
construction site was first noted by AIREKO employees, but the
company did not report its presence as the law requires. Following
that, the EPA investigated the project and found that asbestos had
been released. Cleanup of the site took over one year, and the
failure to report the contamination led to the company's vice
president paying a fine and serving a six-month probation.
According to Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, U.S. attorney for the
District of Puerto Rico, "The Clean Air Act requires that
construction companies follow specific protocols designed to
safely remove asbestos prior to any renovation or demolition
activity so as not to expose anyone to the risk of deadly
respiratory diseases, and AIREKO Construction Company failed to do
so by exposing those who worked at Minillas to asbestos materials.
The U.S. Attorney's Office will continue to work with all victims
who were exposed to the asbestos."

Tyler Amon, special agent-in-charge for EPA's Criminal
Investigation Division in New York added, "Asbestos exposure can
cause cancer, lung disease, and other serious respiratory
diseases. In this case, AIREKO Construction avoided hiring trained
and certified asbestos abatement professionals. AIREKO did the
work 'on the cheap,' willfully putting workers and others at risk.
We will not allow businesses to cut corners on environmental
protection at the expense of people's health."

If you or someone you love has been exposed to asbestos, then the
risk of mesothelioma is very real. For information on steps to
take to protect yourself, contact the Patient Advocates at
Mesothelioma.net today. We can be reached at 1-800-692-8608.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Stoush Erupts Over Asbestos Claims at Mills
------------------------------------------------------------
Cathy Adams, writing for Northern Star, reported that the CEO of
Sunshine Sugar has denied union allegations it put workers at risk
of asbestos exposure, in response, labelling the union bullies.

The Electrical Trades Union issued a press release saying three
sugar mills at Condong, Broadwater and Harwood had been issued
with safety notifications over asbestos fears.

They said Sunshine Sugar, which operates the three sugar mills in
northern NSW, had been issued with a series of safety
rectification notices after a union investigation found broken and
badly degraded asbestos sheeting. They said it was potentially
exposing workers and the public to the risk of inhaling deadly
asbestos fibres.

Sunshine Sugar CEO Chris Connors said the press release was
"simply inaccurate".

He said: "ETU have failed to reveal Sunshine Sugar has systems in
place which are compliant with the Act and the Code of Practice.

"As with many of the buildings in Northern New South Wales, we
acknowledge that we have asbestos sheeting in parts of the mills.
We have a register of all asbestos-containing material and have
formal procedures to deal with it."

The union said officials conducted safety inspections of the mills
after workers raised concerns that management had failed to
respond to their concerns in relation to the presence of
dangerous, friable asbestos fibres.

The Electrical Trades Union said the inspection located a number
of serious asbestos safety breaches, including: broken asbestos
pieces on the ground in public access areas next to the Broadwater
mill; corrugated asbestos sheeting that contained holes, cracks,
and visible asbestos fibres; and broken asbestos sheeting in a
lunchroom that had simply been covered with clear contact sheets
rather than being properly remediated.

They said as a result of the inspections, a number of safety
rectification notices were issued under the Work Health and Safety
Act regarding asbestos safety breaches at the Condong and
Broadwater mills.

ETU secretary Dave McKinley said the company had been notified by
workers of their asbestos concerns in July but had failed to act,
with the CEO claiming it was because the wrong form had been used.

"Even a tiny exposure to asbestos fibres, which lodge deep in the
lungs, can be enough to cause deadly cancers and other
debilitating asbestos-related diseases," Mr McKinley said.

"Both the Condong and Broadwater mills are constructed with large
amounts of asbestos cement sheeting, but natural weathering and
age have resulted in these products breaking down, releasing
friable asbestos fibres which can easily become airborne and be
inhaled.

"In the short term, the company needs to immediately remove the
damaged products, but they also need to move towards a plan for
full asbestos removal and remediation to avoid similar incidents
occurring in future.

"We have also been disappointed that management tried to pass the
blame for their failure onto staff, with the CEO claiming the
reason no action was taken was because a worker used the incorrect
form to report the issue."

Sunshine Sugar said they have three mills Condong, Harwood and
Broadwater, which Unions have been visiting over July.

Sunshine Sugar said at Harwood, the CFMEU inspected the site and
in fact congratulated the team on their policies and management of
asbestos.

Mr Connors said in regards to "the isolated issue at Broadwater",
there was a small piece of sheeting that had been broken. The
employee who noticed the issue did not follow correct procedures.
If the correct procedures had been followed, action to manage the
safety risk would have commenced immediately.

"The issue was dealt with quickly upon the employee advising about
the form he had filled out (whilst at an EBA negotiating team
meeting). The area was barricaded off and a qualified contractor
engaged to manage any exposure risk. We subsequently had testing
undertaken, including airborne testing, which showed that there
was no asbestos in the air. Zero. We have advised all employees of
this,' he said.

"At Condong, the ETU have never raised any issues regarding
Asbestos. Their staff have entered the site on the basis of a
bullying claim -- to which they found nothing. They then attempted
to raise electrical issues, which our employees rejected".

Mr Connors said Sunshine Sugar staff and management continue to be
frustrated by the conduct of the ETU during their recent visits.

He said they " have been extremely aggressive and targeting not
only management but also their own members. They are the ones that
have effectively been bullying the employees. They have shown
total disrespect to the electrical tradespeople on-site who
actually challenged them on their statements".

"Their press release is simply incorrect."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in Madison County Govt Center
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ken de la Bastide, writing for The Herald Bulletin, reported that
Madison County is starting the process to remediate asbestos in
the Madison County Government Center, after the substance was
discovered during the installation of a new heating and cooling
system.

The asbestos in the building, constructed in 1973, was first
discovered in October 2016 in a survey report completed by
HydroTech Environmental Consulting & Engineering at the request of
former property manager Denny Williamson.

That survey found the presence of asbestos on sprayed-on
fireproofing material. The inspection determined the fireproofing
material was considered to be friable, which can become airborne
if disturbed.

The fireproofing material was sprayed on structural steel beams
and columns throughout the building, located on ceilings and walls
in various rooms and on plumbing pipes above the dropped ceiling
tiles.

In a press release, the Madison County Commissioners said that
during the installation of the new heating and cooling system,
asbestos insulation was detected in crawl spaces above some of the
ceilings.

The county hired Micro Air in July to measure the level asbestos
fibers in the courthouse.

"The Micro Air report showed that no asbestos was present in any
air samples collected in the Government Center," the statement
said. "Further, Micro Air believes that 'airborne asbestos
contamination is currently not an area of concern.'"

Remediation of the asbestos will have to take place before the
installation of the new heating and cooling system can be
completed.

John Richwine, president of the Madison County Board of
Commissioners, said he wasn't aware of the 2016 asbestos survey
until the material was discovered in the courthouse.

"We were told there wasn't any asbestos there when we started to
place the heating and air conditioning system," he said. "Once it
was discovered we did the air quality testing.

"It's not an issue," Richwine said. "The asbestos is in the
fireproofing of the building."

The county was advised not to do any further work or disturb the
sprayed-on fireproofing until remediation can be completed for the
removal of the material.

"The question is long-term," Richwine said. "Do we remediate the
immediate areas or the entire building? In the meantime, we will
do the areas impacted and the remainder of the building can be
completed in the future."

Commissioner Mike Phipps said he was notified of the asbestos
problem in the Government Center by county attorney Jeff Graham.

Phipps said he doesn't know who Williamson might have informed
about the 2016 survey.

"I think it is very concerning," he said. "There is a problem at
the courthouse. Someone was aware that there was asbestos in the
building."

Phipps said no asbestos fibers were discovered in the air
circulating in the building.

"We need to be transparent," he said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NY App. Div. Affirms Duro Indemnity Contribution
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York issued a
decision and order affirming the order of the Supreme Court,
Suffolk County, dated July 10, 2014.

The appealed Order:

     (1) insofar as appealed from by the defendants Duro Dyne
National Corporation, Duro Dyne Corporation, and Duro Dyne
Machinery Corporation, denied their motion for summary judgment
declaring that Policy No. 5030356707 issued by the plaintiff does
not include an endorsement excluding asbestos-related liability,
and, in effect, denied their separate motion for summary judgment
declaring that they are not required to contribute to their own
defense costs in underlying litigation;

     (2) insofar as appealed from by the defendant Federal
Insurance Company, failed to determine those branches of its cross
motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the fourth cross
claim of the defendants Duro Dyne National Corporation, Duro Dyne
Corporation, and Duro Dyne Machinery Corporation insofar as
asserted against it, and failed to determine those branches of its
cross motion which were for certain declarations,

     (3) insofar as appealed from by the defendant MidStates
Reinsurance Corporation, formerly known as Mead Reinsurance
Corporation, failed to determine those branches of its cross
motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first,
second, third, and fourth cross claims of the defendants Duro Dyne
National Corporation, Duro Dyne Corporation, and Duro Dyne
Machinery Corporation insofar as asserted against it, and failed
to determine those branches of its cross motion which were for
certain declarations,

     (4) insofar as cross-appealed from by the plaintiff, denied
that branch of its cross motion which was for summary judgment
declaring that the defendants Duro Dyne National Corporation, Duro
Dyne Corporation, and Duro Dyne Machinery Corporation are
immediately required to contribute to their own defense costs in
underlying litigation, and

     (5) insofar as cross-appealed from by the defendant Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company, failed to determine that branch of
its cross motion which was for summary judgment declaring that the
defendants Duro Dyne National Corporation, Duro Dyne Corporation,
and Duro Dyne Machinery Corporation did not show exhaustion of its
primary coverage policies so as to trigger its defense
obligations.

The Duro Defendants have been named as defendants in hundreds of
lawsuits throughout the United States in which the plaintiffs seek
to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of
exposure to asbestos contained in products manufactured and/or
distributed by the Duro defendants from the 1950s through the
1970s.

The plaintiff, North River Insurance Company, issued several
primary insurance policies and umbrella excess liability policies
to the Duro Defendants. North River commenced a declaratory
judgment action against the Duro Defendants and other insurance
carriers from which the Duro Defendants purchased general
liability insurance policies and umbrella or excess insurance
policies, seeking a determination of North River's obligation, if
any, to defend and/or indemnify the Duro Defendants in connection
with the underlying lawsuits.

In an order dated July 10, 2014, the Supreme Court, inter alia,
denied the Duro Defendants' motion for summary judgment declaring
that Policy No. 5030356707 issued by North River does not include
an endorsement excluding asbestos-related liability, and, in
effect, denied the Duro Defendants' separate motion for summary
judgment declaring that they are not required to contribute to
their own defense costs in the underlying litigation. The Court
also denied that branch of North River's cross motion which was
for summary judgment declaring that the Duro Defendants are
required to immediately contribute to their own defense costs in
the underlying litigation.

The Appellate Court finds the affidavit submitted by the Duro
Defendants' president Randall S. Hinden, as insufficient to
demonstrate the absence of any triable issues of fact with respect
to whether the asbestos exclusion was properly added to the
policy. The Appellate Court also notes that the Duro Defendants
cannot rely upon the affidavit of the vice president of the Duro
Defendants' insurance broker, Wayne D. Nowland, which was
submitted by the Duro Defendants for the first time in their reply
papers.

As such, the Appellate Court determines that the Duro Defendants'
failure to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law requires the denial of its motion, regardless
of the sufficiency of North River's opposition papers.

The Appellate Court finds that Supreme Court properly denied that
part of North River's cross motion which was for summary judgment
declaring that the Duro Defendants are immediately required to
contribute to their own defense costs in the underlying litigation
for periods that they lacked insurance. The Court also finds that
the Supreme Court properly rejected the Duro Defendants'
contention that they should not be required to contribute to their
defense for the periods that they were uninsured on the ground
that the insurance carriers who are parties to this appeal
effectively waived any claim for contribution of defense costs
from the Duro Defendants by paying those costs in full for 20
years.

The Appellate Court explains that "a waiver is the voluntary and
intentional abandonment of a known right." Here, the Court points
out that the Duro Defendants conceded that as early as August
1990, several of the insurers asserted that the Duro Defendants
should contribute toward the defense and indemnity costs of the
underlying litigation, thereby evincing that these insurers did
not intend to waive any right they may have to seek contribution
from the Duro Defendants during those periods that the Duro
Defendants were uninsured.

The Appellate Court also notes that the Duro Defendants are not
protected by the principle of estoppel because estoppel "requires
proof that the insured has suffered prejudice by virtue of the
insurer's conduct." The Court finds, however, there is no basis to
estop the insurers from seeking contribution from the Duro
Defendants because the Duro Defendants failed to show any
prejudice resulting from the insurers' conduct.

The appealed case is NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-
Respondent-Appellant, v. DURO DYNE NATIONAL CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants-Respondents, HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent-Appellant, ET AL., Defendants, 2014-
08924, Index No. 62947/13, (N.Y. App. Div.).

A full-text copy of the Decision & Order dated August 23, 2017, is
available at https://is.gd/zNI9rM from Leagle.com.

Anderson Kill P.C., New York, NY (William G. Passannante, Cort T.
Malone, Vivian C. Michael, and Edward J. Stein of counsel), for
defendants-appellants-respondents Duro Dyne National Corporation,
Duro Dyne Corporation, and Duro Dyne Machinery Corporation.

DLA Piper LLP (US), New York, NY (Aidan M. McCormack and Cyril E.
Smith of counsel), for defendant-appellant-respondent Federal
Insurance Company.

London Fischer LLP, New York, NY (James T. H. Deaver, Perry
Kreidman, and David B. Franklin of counsel), for defendant-
appellant-respondent MidStates Reinsurance Corporation, formerly
known as Mead Reinsurance Corporation.

Carroll McNulty & Kull LLC, New York, NY (Christopher R. Carroll,
Michael J. Tricarico, Christina R. Salem, and Margaret F.
Catalano, pro hac vice, of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent-
appellant.

Jaspan Schlesinger LLP, Garden City, NY (Stanley A. Camhi of
counsel), and Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, New York, NY (James P.
Ruggeri of counsel), for defendant-respondent-appellant (one brief
filed).


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Volkswagen Dismissed in "Haynes"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon of the U.S. District Court for
the District Delaware recommends granting the motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by defendant Volkswagen
Group Of America, Inc., in the case captioned HAROLD and JUDY
HAYNES, Plaintiffs, v. AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-607-ER (D. Del.), because the
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing, with
reasonable particularity, that sufficient minimum contacts have
occurred between Volkswagen and the forum to support jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs Harold and Judy Haynes filed this asbestos action
in the Delaware Superior Court against multiple defendants on June
3, 2016, asserting claims arising from Mr. Haynes' alleged harmful
exposure to asbestos. The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Haynes
developed lung cancer as a result of exposure to asbestos-
containing products during his career as an auto mechanic for
Volkswagen dealerships in Washington and Oregon from approximately
1964 to 1980. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants
manufactured, sold, removed, installed, or distributed asbestos-
containing products.

On July 15, 2016, Defendant Crane Co. removed the action to the
U.S. District Court for the District Delaware. On February 17,
2017, Volkswagen filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of
personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs did not respond to the motion.
Consequently, on March 13, 2017, counsel for Volkswagen sent a
letter to the court seeking dismissal in light of Plaintiffs'
failure to oppose its motion to dismiss.

In the complaint, Plaintiffs state that Volkswagen is a foreign
business entity that does business in Delaware. However, this
statement is conclusory and falls short of demonstrating either
specific or general jurisdiction that comports with due process.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs did not respond to Volkswagen's motion to
dismiss.

The Court finds that specific personal jurisdiction over
Volkswagen does not exist in the present case considering
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Haynes was exposed to asbestos-
containing products outside of Delaware -- during his time as an
auto mechanic for Volkswagen dealerships in Washington and Oregon.
In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not allege that
any wrongful conduct by Volkswagen occurred in Delaware. Moreover,
Mr. Haynes is a resident of Oregon, not Delaware. Thus, the Court
concludes that there is no nexus between the alleged injurious
conduct, the defendant, and the State of Delaware.

Likewise, the Court rules that general jurisdiction also does not
exist over Volkswagen in the present case because Volkswagen is
incorporated in New Jersey, and has its principal place of
business in Virginia. Therefore, the Court settles that Volkswagen
is not "at home" in Delaware. Moreover, the Court quotes the
Delaware Supreme Court in Daimler (134 S. Ct. at 749) which
recently rejected the notion that "a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction in every state in which it 'engages in a
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business'
calling that position 'unacceptably grasping.'"

A full-text copy of the Report and Recommendation dated August 22,
2017, is available at https://is.gd/lgTbYr from Leagle.com.

Harold Haynes, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Balick, Balick &
Balick, LLC.

Harold Haynes, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Collins Smith,
Balick & Balick, LLC, Andrew Caulfield Dalton, Dalton & Associates
P.A. & Bartholomew J. Dalton, Dalton & Associates P.A..

Judy Haynes, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Balick, Balick &
Balick, LLC, Michael Collins Smith, Balick & Balick, LLC, Andrew
Caulfield Dalton, Dalton & Associates P.A. & Bartholomew J.
Dalton, Dalton & Associates P.A..

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Aurora Pump Company, Defendant, represented by Paul A. Bradley,
Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC & Donald Robert Kinsley, Maron
Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC.

BorgWarner Morse TEC LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew P.
Donelson, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC.

FMC Corporation, Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Defendant, represented by Joelle
Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith, Rawle &
Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eileen M. Ford,
Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christian J. Singewald, White & Williams & Timothy S. Martin,
White & Williams.

Warren Pumps LLC, Defendant, represented by Ana Marina McCann,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand J. Della
Porta, Jr., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand
Porta, Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Jennifer D. Donnelly,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin & Jessica Lee Tyler,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

FMC Corporation, Cross Claimant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Aurora Pump Company, Cross Defendant, represented by Paul A.
Bradley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC & Donald Robert
Kinsley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Ana Marina
McCann, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand
Porta, Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Jennifer D. Donnelly,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin & Jessica Lee Tyler,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Claimant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Aurora Pump Company, Cross Defendant, represented by Paul A.
Bradley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC & Donald Robert
Kinsley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC.

BorgWarner Morse TEC LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Matthew
P. Donelson, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Ana Marina
McCann, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand
Porta, Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Jennifer D. Donnelly,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin & Jessica Lee Tyler,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin.

Maremont Corporation, Cross Claimant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Aurora Pump Company, Cross Defendant, represented by Paul A.
Bradley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC & Donald Robert
Kinsley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC.

BorgWarner Morse TEC LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Matthew
P. Donelson, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Ana Marina
McCann, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand
Porta, Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Jennifer D. Donnelly,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin & Jessica Lee Tyler,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Viking Pump, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by
Barbara Anne Fruehauf.

Aurora Pump Company, Cross Defendant, represented by Paul A.
Bradley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC & Donald Robert
Kinsley, Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson LLC.

BorgWarner Morse TEC LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Matthew
P. Donelson, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC.

FMC Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick
Daly, Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Honeywell International Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by
Joelle Florax, Rawle & Henderson LLP & Stephanie Michelle Smith,
Rawle & Henderson LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Eileen M.
Ford, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien, Doherty & Kelly, P.C..

Maremont Corporation, Cross Defendant, represented by Barbara Anne
Fruehauf.

Pfizer, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Daniel Partick Daly,
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna LLP.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Ana Marina
McCann, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Armand
Porta, Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli, Jennifer D. Donnelly,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin & Jessica Lee Tyler,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Bid for Rule 11 Sanctions vs. Borg-Warner Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Marcia Morales Howard of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida denies Stacey Doolin's Motion for
Sanctions against Defendant Borg-Warner Morse TEC LLC filed on
August 31, 2016, because despite the ultimate weakness of Morse
TEC's Motion to Dismiss, abuse of the Court's resources which is
punishable under Rule 11 did not occur.

Plaintiff Stacey Doolin commenced this wrongful death action on
behalf of her late husband, Richard E. Doolin, alleging that the
Decedent was exposed to asbestos-containing products
"manufactured, sold, supplied and/or distributed" by a number of
corporations -- including Morse TEC -- beginning in 1970 and
continuing until 1983. During this time, the Decedent's father
worked as a mechanic. Plaintiff avers that the Decedent visited
his father's workplace on a "frequent and continuous basis," while
the Decedent's father and others worked with asbestos-containing
products, including, but not limited to, brakes, clutches, and
gaskets. The Plaintiff contends that, during these visits, the
Decedent himself also sometimes performed "brake and clutch work."

Subsequently, in or around June of 2013, the Decedent was
diagnosed with mesothelioma, which the Plaintiff alleges resulted
from his "exposure to and inhalation of asbestos" from the
asbestos-containing products. As a result of his mesothelioma, the
Decedent died on or about June 22, 2014, at the age of forty-
three.

On August 9, 2016, Morse TEC filed its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, seeking dismissal for failure to
satisfy the pleading requirements of Florida's Asbestos Act.

On August 16, 2016, Morse TEC filed a Motion for Leave to Amend or
Supplement Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and
Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support, which the Plaintiff
opposed. Subsequently, the Court denied Morse TEC's Motion for
Leave to Amend, noting that under Rule 12(g)(2), Morse TEC was
estopped from "raising new defenses or objections that were
available but omitted from its earlier Motion to Dismiss."

Then, on August 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Response to Morse
TEC's Motion to Dismiss, in which she argued that the courts of
the Middle District of Florida had previously determined the
Asbestos Act to be "procedural in nature" and therefore
inapplicable in federal court.

Subsequently, on August 31, 2016 the Plaintiff filed a Motion,
requesting the Court to impose Rule 11 sanctions on Morse TEC for
filing, and failing to withdraw, the Motion to Dismiss which was
based on an "unsupported" proposition of Florida law.

In the Motion, Plaintiff contends that Morse TEC "knew or should
have known" when it filed its Motion to Dismiss that the Asbestos
Act has been found to be procedural in nature and therefore
inapplicable in federal court, and as such, Plaintiff requests "an
award of attorneys' fees and costs to be taxed against [Morse TEC]
and/or its counsel."

In the Response, Morse TEC asserts that sanctions are
inappropriate in this instance because its argument that the
Complaint fails to provide fair notice of Doolin's claims pursuant
to the requirements of Rule 83, -- inasmuch as the Complaint does
not discuss "precisely what Morse TEC products, as opposed to
other defendants' products, [Doolin] alleges contributed to [the
Decedent's] development of mesothelioma" -- is a valid basis for
dismissal.

Morse TEC also alleges that it filed the Motion for Leave to Amend
in an effort to "further clarify that [Doolin's] failure to follow
the procedural requirements of the [Asbestos] Act per se may not
warrant dismissal of her, but that such failure illustrated how
far astray [Doolin] had run in her [Complaint] from fundamental
"notice pleading" requirements." Morse TEC accordingly concludes
that its arguments were based on "a plausible view of the law" and
were not "patently unmeritorious or frivolous."

Generally, the Court explains that Rule 11 sanctions are proper:
"(1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual
basis; (2) when the party files a pleading based on a legal theory
that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be
advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law; and (3)
when the party files a pleading in bad faith for an improper
purpose."

The Court finds that Morse TEC was faced with two non-binding
decisions regarding the applicability of portions of the Asbestos
Act in federal court, and Morse TEC was free to attempt to argue
that this Court should reach a different conclusion regarding the
Asbestos Act's applicability. Given the current state of the law
in the Eleventh Circuit with respect to the applicability of the
Asbestos Act's pleading requirements in federal diversity actions,
the Court cannot conclude that the issue has been so definitively
decided as to render the legal arguments advanced in the Motion to
Dismiss "objectively frivolous."

The Court concludes that because both Hughes and Dugas are non-
binding precedent, Morse TEC's arguments were not foreclosed by
existing law, and it cannot be said that they otherwise had "no
reasonable chance of success." As such, the Court need not address
Paintiff's contention that Morse TEC's counsel "should have been
aware that their arguments were frivolous."

The case is STACEY DOOLIN, as the Personal Representative of the
Estate of RICHARD E. DOOLIN, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN OPTICAL
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-778-J-34PDB,
(M.D. Fla.).

A full-text copy of the Order dated August 22, 2017, is available
at https://is.gd/tkWSlp from Leagle.com.

Stacey Doolin, Plaintiff, represented by Marc Phillip Kunen, The
Ferraro Law Firm.

Borg Warner Corporation, Defendant, represented by Amanda Rae
Cachaldora, Bice Cole Law Firm, PL, Eduardo J. Medina, Bice Cole
Law Firm, PL, Kelly L. Kesner, Bice Cole Law Firm, PL, Melanie E.
Chung-Tims, Bice Cole Law Firm, PL & Susan J. Cole, Bice Cole Law
Firm, PL.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Alina Alonso
Rodriguez, Bowman and Brooke, LLP, Andrew Scott Freedman, Cole,
Scott & Kissane, PA, Clarke S. Sturge, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA,
Henry Salas, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Shepherd D. Wainger,
McGuire Woods, LLP, pro hac vice & Wendy Frank Lumish, Bowman and
Brooke, LLP.

Honeywell International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony
Nolan Upshaw, McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, Caroline M. Iovino,
McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, Melissa Raspall Alvarez, McDermott,
Will & Emery, LLP & Jack Roy Reiter, GrayRobinson, PA.

Pneumo Abex LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew Scott Freedman,
Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Clarke S. Sturge, Cole, Scott &
Kissane, PA, Henry Salas, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Johan D.
Flynn, DeHay Elliston, LLP, pro hac vice & John M. Fitzpatrick,
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, pro hac vice.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Summary Judgment on Damages in "Storer" Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Elizabeth E. Foote of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana denies the motion for partial
summary judgment filed by Defendant Trane US, Inc., in the case
captioned MARTHA DENMON STORER, ET AL., v. CROWN CORK & SEAL
COMPANY, INC, ET AL., Civil Action No. 14-2488, (W.D. La.).

Martha Storer and her four adult children brought this suit
against Trane and several other defendants, alleging liability for
the death of their husband and father Bud Storer from mesothelioma
allegedly caused by asbestos exposure. Before his death in 2013,
Bud Storer operated Storer Equipment Company, in which Plaintiffs
are shareholders. The Company had a franchise agreement with
Trane, which Trane terminated in 2014.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs claims: (1) negligence of asbestos
manufacturer sellers, suppliers and distributors, which they
allege was the proximate cause of Bud Storer's illness; (2) strict
liability of asbestos manufacturers, sellers, suppliers, and
distributors; (3) "intentional tort of fraudulent
misrepresentation causing physical harm;" and (4) "intentional
tort battery." Plaintiffs also list economic damages as among the
damages sought, arguing that they are entitled to damages for loss
of financial support from Bud Storer, including damages resulting
from Trane's cancellation of the Company's franchise agreement
because of Bud Storer's death, causing lost revenues to the
Company and to Plaintiffs as the Company's shareholders.

Trane moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages,
arguing that Plaintiffs are not entitled to economic damages for
lost profits of the Company. Trane advances three grounds for this
argument: that no cause of action pled in the Petition would
warrant economic damages, that economic losses to the Company are
not compensable in wrongful death and survival actions, and that
no damages are available as a result of termination of the
franchise agreement.

However, the Court observes that Trane offers no case establishing
such a bright-line rule, and in fact agrees that loss of earnings
is compensable. The Court explains that a jury could determine
what damages were caused by Bud Storer's death, and what the
extent of those damages may be, is a question of fact. The Court
says it cannot resolve such question of fact at this stage.

Trane similarly argues that Plaintiffs cannot recover economic
damages from the termination of the franchise agreement. The Court
agrees to the extent of Trane's argument that Plaintiffs have
alleged no breach of contract claim -- Plaintiffs may not recover
for breach of contract because they have not claimed any breach of
contract.

The Court points out that if Plaintiffs prove their tort claims,
it will be up to the jury to determine the amount of damages that
would appropriately compensate them for their injuries. The Court
concludes that such a determination may be based on facts such as
the amount of earnings and support that Plaintiffs lost because of
Bud Storer's death. Whether that loss of earnings and loss of
support includes income Bud Storer would have earned through the
Company is a question of fact, and cannot be decided by the Court
at summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Memorandum Ruling dated August 22, 2017,
is available at https://is.gd/cPtLIp from Leagle.com.

Martha Denmon Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr.,
Jones Odom.

Martha Denmon Storer, Plaintiff, represented by Scott M. Hendler,
Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman,
Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Craig Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones
Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice &
Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Mark Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones
Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice &
Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Laurie Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones
Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice &
Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Sheryl Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones
Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice &
Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Crown Cork & Seal Co Inc, Defendant, represented by Michael D.
Lonegrass, Galloway Johnson et al, Richard G. Duplantier, Jr.,
Galloway Johnson et al & Rodger Gregory Green, Jr., Galloway
Johnson et al.

Trane U S. Inc, represented by Joseph B. Morton, III, Maron Marvel
et al.

Trane U S. Inc, Defendant, represented by Angela M. Bowlin,
Frilot, David Jonathan Hemken, Cook Yancey et al, Herschel E.
Richard, Jr., Cook Yancey et al, James H. Brown, Jr., Frilot, John
M. Fitzpatrick, Wheeler Trigg & O'Donnell, pro hac vice, John J.
Hainkel, III, Frilot, Kelsey Anne Eagan, Frilot, Magali Ann
Puente-Martin, Frilot, McNeil James Kemmerly, Richard Muncie
Crump, Maron Marvel et al, Robert Kennedy, Jr., Cook Yancey et al
& Shelley Kathryn Napolitano, Maron Marvel et al.

Crown Beverage Packaging L L C, Defendant, represented by Joseph
H. Hart, IV, Pugh Accardo et al, Daniel Edwin Oser, Pugh Accardo
et al & Thomas A. Porteous, Pugh Accardo et al.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. Lone Star in "Roper" Dropped
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington has approved the Stipulation between
Plaintiffs William and Carol Roper and Defendant Lone Star
Industries, Inc., dismissing all claims against Lone Star
Industries in the case captioned WILLIAM ROPER and CAROL ROPER,
individually and as a marital community, Plaintiffs, v. BORGWARNER
MORSE TEC, INC., et al., Defendants, No. 2:16-cv-01453-TSZ, (W.D.
Wash.), without prejudice and without costs or attorney fees as to
any party in the above-captioned matter, reserving to Plaintiffs
their claims against the other parties.

A full-text copy of the Stipulation dated August 25, 2017, is
available at https://is.gd/CvsQrV from Leagle.com.

William Roper, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Gladd,
NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, PLLC, pro hac vice.

William Roper, Plaintiff, represented by Michael David Myers,
MYERS & COMPANY & Tammy C. Barcenilla, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC, pro
hac vice.

Carol Roper, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Gladd,
NAPOLI SHKOLNIK, PLLC, pro hac vice, Michael David Myers, MYERS &
COMPANY & Tammy C. Barcenilla, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC, pro hac vice.

Brand Insulations, Inc, Defendant, represented by David A. Shaw,
WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS & Malika Johnson, WILLIAMS KASTNER.

CBS Corporation, Defendant, represented by Barry Neal Mesher,
SEDGWICK LLP, Brian D. Zeringer, SEDGWICK LLP & Christopher S.
Marks, SEDGWICK LLP.

Crane Co, Defendant, represented by G. William Shaw, K&L GATES LLP
& Ryan J. Groshong, K&L GATES LLP.

Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation, Defendant, represented by Barry
Neal Mesher, SEDGWICK LLP, Brian D. Zeringer, SEDGWICK LLP &
Christopher S. Marks, SEDGWICK LLP.

General Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Barry Neal
Mesher, SEDGWICK LLP, Brian D. Zeringer, SEDGWICK LLP &
Christopher S. Marks, SEDGWICK LLP.

Goulds Pumps, Inc, Defendant, represented by Ronald C. Gardner,
GARDNER TRABOLSI & ASSOC. PLLC.

IMO Industries, Inc, Defendant, represented by James Edward Horne,
GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL & Michael Edward Ricketts, GORDON THOMAS
HONEYWELL.

Ingersoll-Rand Company, Defendant, represented by Mark B. Tuvim,
GORDON & REES & Kevin J. Craig, GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI LLP.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Richard G. Gawlowski, WILSON SMITH COCHRAN & DICKERSON.

Schneider Electric USA, Inc, Defendant, represented by Alice Coles
Serko, SEDGWICK LLP, Barry Neal Mesher, SEDGWICK LLP & Rachel
Tallon Reynolds, SEDGWICK LLP.





                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Marion
Alcestis A. Castillon, Ma. Cristina Canson, Noemi Irene A. Adala,
Joy A. Agravantefor, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at 856-381-
8268.



                 * * *  End of Transmission  * * *