CAR_Public/170807.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


             Monday, August 7, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 154



                            Headlines

ADECCO USA: "Zimmer" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
AIRTOUCH CELLULAR: Cal. App. Affirms Class Certification Denial
ALABAMA: Court Denies Preliminary Injunction in "Thompson"
ALBUQUERQUE, NM: "Torres" Suit Moved to Federal District Court
ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Court Recommends Dismissing "Zevallos" Suit

AMERICAN AIRLINES: Bazerman Sues over Additional Baggage Charge
APOLLO EDUCATION: Court Dismisses "Lomingkit" Suit With Prejudice
BAYCARE HEALTH: "Figueroa" Suit Moved to Middle Dist. of Florida
BEDFORD, OH: Court Certifies Class in "Pund"
BROOKDALE SENIOR: "Eidler" Suit Sues over Disabilities Act

CAFE POMPETTE: Faces "Castro" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Ct. Allows 3-Hr Deposition in "Des Roches"
CE DESIGN: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of SMI's TCPA Suit
CJS SOLUTIONS: "Garrett" Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of New York
COCONUT GROVE: "Hernandez" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA

COLUMBIA COUNTY, AR: Jailor's Class Certification Bid Denied
CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS: Court Remands "Scott" MMWA Suit
CYPO CAFE: Faces "Filet" Suit in Southern District of Florida
DAIRY FARMERS: Toms' Bid to Extend Opt Out Period Denied
DARNELL EARLEY: 6th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Sec. 1983 Claims

DICK SMITH:  Faces Shareholders Class Action Over Collapse
E.A. RENFROE: Cal. App. Reverses Judgment in "Quiroz"
ELECTRICITY MAINE: Zurich Doesn't Want to Pay Class Action Costs
ENDOLOGIX INC: Wants California Judge to Sanction Shareholder
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Faces "Deutsch" Suit in E.D. New York

ERNST & YOUNG: Oral Arguments on Waiver Issue Set for October 2
FBL FINANCIAL: Faces "Tronsgard" Suit in Kansas Federal Court
FINANCIAL ASSET: Faces "McGaster" Suit in District of New Jersey
FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: Judge Halts Investors' Class Action
FLOYD CO: Judge Approves $1.23MM Inmates' Class Action Settlement

FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses "Kommer" Suit with Leave to Amend
FORD MOTOR: Settles Class Action Over Defective Transmissions
FOREVER 21: Faces Class Action in New York Over Sales Tax
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: "Ortolani" Suit Moved to C.D. California
GENERAL NUTRITION: Faces "Gomez" Suit in S.D. Florida

GEORGE WESTON: Graydon Attorney Discusses Ontario Court Ruling
GOOGLE INC: Agrees to Settle Privacy Class Action in California
GOPRO INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bielousov" Suit
HATELMACHER LLC: Faces "Casilao" Suit in W.D. Oklahoma
HERITAGE COMMUNITIES: Bid for Rehearing in "Harleysville" Denied

HESKA CORP: Denied to Certify Questions to Colorado High Court
HOMELAND SECURITY: Faces "Morales" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
HUALALAI INVESTORS: "Brooks" Suit Moved to Hawaii Federal Court
INTELLITIX INC.: "Kovacevic" Suit Sues over RFID Wristbands
KAREY WITTY: Court Dismisses "Kelley" Suit With Prejudice

KFC: Faces $10MM Suit Over Multiple Sexual Assaults by Manager
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Mulder" Suit
LAKE VIEW CEMETERY: "Suts" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
LARINO MASONRY: Faces "Arpi" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
LEXMARK INT'L: September 19 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set

LION BIOTECH: Kessler Topaz Named Class Counsel in "Desilvio"
LIVE NATION: "Adams" Suit Moved to Central District of California
LOCKHEED MARTIN: Court Denies Prelim Certification in "Ross"
M-I LLC: Settlement in "Syed" Gets Final Court Approval
M&M INVESTMENT: "Francis" Suit Moved to N.D. California

MALDEN-DOCKSIDE: Frost Seeks Unpaid Wages & Tips under Wage Act
MANASSEH JORDAN: "Molitor" Suit Moved to N.D. Illinois
MASTERCARD: Class Actions Not Ruled Out Despite Favorable Ruling
MIDLAND FUNDING: "Wheeler" Complaint Survives Dismissal Bid
MISSOURI: Court Certifies Class in "Postawko"

MONSANTO COMPANY: B&L Farms Suit Moved to E.D. Arkansas
MONTANA: Court Denies Class Certification in "Sadler"
NATIONALL FOOTBALL: Defeats California Antitrust Class Action
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Judge Tosses Painkillers Class Action
NATIONAL RIFLE: Bid to Dismiss "Kalmbach" Partly Granted

NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: "McHarris" Suit Moved to E.D New York
NEBRASKA: "Lassalle" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
NEW YORK: Akal Taxi Sues over Black Car Vehicle Licenses
NORDSTROM INC: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Price Tag Suit
ONSHIFT INC: Faces "Simonich" Suit in C.D. California

OVERLAND SOLUTIONS: Faces "Garbero" Suit in California Super. Ct.
PETLAND INC: Faces "Cisneros" Suit in N.D. Georgia
PETROBRAS: Wants 2d Circuit to Reconsider Class Action Ruling
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Faces "Avezbadalov" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION: Magistrate Refuses to Remand "Roundtree"

PROVIDENCE HEALTH: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Morales"
QUALITY SYSTEMS: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Securities Suit
RED CARPET: Faces "Woods" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Reliance's Bid to Dismiss "Gernandt" Okayed
SCRUB INC: Abdi, et al Seek Overtime Pay under FLSA

SOUTHERN REFRIGERATED: "Bass" Suit Moved to W.D. Arkansas
SPOTIFY USA: Court Dismisses Plaintiff's Claim Brought Under ARL
STATE COLLEGE: Responds to Workers' Class Action Over "Tip Pool"
SUGAR FOOD: Court Denies Settlement in "Manohar"
SUN-MAID GROWERS: Faces "Saghian" Suit in C.D. California

SYNGENTA: 2018 Class Action Hearings Scheduled in Kansas Court
TECH MAHINDRA: Ct. Conditionally Certifies Class in "Kumar"
THOROUGHBRED RESEARCH: Oct. 26 Hearing on Class Cert. Bid
TIMBERWOLVES: Class Action Over Ticketing System Nears Settlement
TITLEMAX: Faces "Davis" Suit in Southern District of Florida

TOYOTA: Class Action Mulled Over Role in Takata Airbag Scandal
TRANS UNION: Faces "Nair" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
TRI-STATE CANDY: Faces "Ortiz" Suit in E.D. New York
TRINITY SERVICES: Faces "Reutter" Suit in Middle Dist. of Florida
TWC ADMINISTRATION: "Fuller" Suit Moved to S.D. California

TYSON FOODS: Court Dismisses Securities Suit Without Prejudice
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: Faces "Taggart" Suit in E.D. Pa.
UNITED SERVICES: Court Dismisses "Basham" Suit with Prejudice
UNITED STATES: Judge Opts Not to Renew Iraqi Deportation Stay
UTILITY SERVICE: "Komoroski" Settlement Granted Preliminary OK

VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Certifies Class in "McCracken"
VIVINT SOLAR: "Aanderud" Remanded to Calif. State Court
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Faces "Makaryan" Suit in C.D. California
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: "Hernandez" Suit Moved to C.D. California
WINN MANAGEMENT: "Goodwin" Class Settlement Gets Prelim Approval

YGRENE ENERGY: Bid to Dismiss "Smith" Fraud Suit Partly Granted
YOUNG CHOW: Faces "Vasquez" Suit in S.D. New York
ZB N.A.: Sept. 18 Hearing on Bid to Refer Class Suit
ZOCDOC INC: Can Deposit $13.9K to Secure Judgment in "Geisman"
ZUFFA LLC: Faces "Le" Suit in Western District of Washington

* Foley & Lardner Attorneys Discuss DOJ's Stance on Waivers



                            *********



ADECCO USA: "Zimmer" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA ZIMMER, an individual; JAZMYNE ROBINSON, an individual;
and WENDY MEDINA, an Individual, the he Plaintiffs, v. ADECCO USA
INC., a business entity; GOOGLE EXPRESS, a business entity; and
DOES 1-200, INCLUSIVE, the Defendants, Case No. BC668679 (Cal.
Super. Ct., July 11, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid wages under
California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have engaged in a
system of willful violations of the California Labor Code,
California, Business and Professions Code, and applicable IWC wage
orders by creating and maintaining policies, practices and customs
that fail to pay all meal and rest, period premium usages; fail to
provide, or timely provide, all required, meal and rest periods;
fail to keep proper records pursuant to California Labor Code; and
fail to provide suitable seating. The Plaintiffs and the Class
Members have suffered damages, and will, continue to suffer the
same harm as the Representative Plaintiffs as a result of
Defendants' wrongful conduct unless the relief requested is
granted.

Adecco USA provides workforce solutions in the United States. It
offers contingent staffing and direct hire recruitment services
for large enterprise organizations; workforce solutions and
consulting services, including managed services programs and
recruitment process outsourcing; career transition and leadership
consulting; and specialty staffing, project solutions, and
consulting services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Paul P. Tashnizi, Esq.
          THE TASLINIZI LAW FIRM
          200 N. Westlake Blvd. Suite 204
          Westlake Village, CA 91352
          Telephone: (805) 719 2010
          Facsimile: (866) 973 3308
          E-mail: paul@tashinizilaw.com

               - and -

          Marcus J. Bradley, Esq.
          BRADLEY/GROMBAEHER, LLP
          28) 5 Townsgate Road, Suite 130
          Westlake Village, CA 91361


AIRTOUCH CELLULAR: Cal. App. Affirms Class Certification Denial
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Dennis Aldrich of the U.S. Court of Appeals of
California, Second District, Division Three, affirmed the trial
court's denial of class certification in the case captioned
KENDELL CRAWLEY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. AIRTOUCH
CELLULAR, Defendant and Respondent, No. B264042 (Cal. App.).

The Defendant operates Verizon Wireless retail stores and kiosks
throughout Southern California.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of approximately 339
persons who have been, or currently are, employed by AirTouch and
who worked at least one shift in a California retail store
location during the Class Period (Aug. 12, 2007 through final
judgment) and who held, or hold, the position of single store
manager ("RSM").  They averred that the proposed class was
sufficiently numerous and ascertainable; they were adequate class
representatives; and their claims were typical.  They also sought
certification of a proposed subclass of all class members whose
employment with AirTouch had ended.

According to the Plaintiffs, common questions of law and fact
would predominate over individual issues because all RSMs were
misclassified as exempt employees under the managerial exception;
worked between 50 and 70 hours per week, without receiving
overtime or payment for missed meal and rest periods; performed
the same job duties in the same manner and under the same
supervision and control; received the same training; operated
under a common job description; and were required to follow
AirTouch's standardized policies and procedures.  Analysis of
AirTouch's uniform policies and practices in regard to RSMs would
establish that all were subject to uniform treatment which results
in each failing to meet the standards applicable to the executive
exemption.

Specifically, they averred that absent approval by the single
district manager ("DM") and/or Human Resources ("HR"), RSMs could
not discipline, terminate, or hire employees; give a performance
review; increase store staffing; or retroactively alter employee
time records.  They also asserted the court could look to
statistical evidence to determine both liability (i.e., whether
all RSMs fell within the relevant exemptions) and damages.

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Duran v. U.S. Bank
National Assn., the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief and a
second declaration from Dr. Drogin, in which he averred that a
properly designed and implemented random sampling plan that
avoided the mistakes present in the sample at issue in Duran would
be an appropriate statistical technique for obtaining
representative evidence about the nature of the job, tasks
performed, and time spent on various tasks in the instant case.

The trial court denied the motion for class certification,
concluding the Plaintiffs had failed to establish common, as
opposed to individual, issues, would predominate; the Plaintiffs'
claims were typical of the class; or that the class action device
was superior.  The Plaintiffs timely appealed the trial court's
order.

The Plaintiffs contend the trial court's ruling rests on improper
criteria and erroneous legal assumptions, and insist that its
order should be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions
to certify the class.  AirTouch, on the other hand, urges that the
trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding
individual issues would predominate, and properly denied the class
certification motion.  Judge Aldrich agrees with AirTouch.
Examining the Plaintiffs' theory of recovery and assessing the
nature of the legal and factual disputes likely to be presented,
he concludes that substantial evidence supported the trial court's
finding that individual issues predominated.  In short, the
evidence before the court was in conflict.  The trial court had
discretion to weigh the evidence and credit AirTouch's evidence.

Judge Aldrich does not detect error in the trial court's
conclusion that Dr. Drogin's statistical sampling proposal could
not substitute for evidence of commonality during the liability
phase of trial.  Here, Dr. Drogin proposed that random sampling
could be used to obtain representative evidence about the nature
of the job, tasks performed, and time spent on various tasks.  He
did not base his opinion on actual evidence in the case, conduct
surveys or talk with class members.  The trial court therefore did
not abuse its discretion in concluding this was a mere proposal
for future statistical sampling that could not substitute for
evidence of commonality.

In light of his conclusions, Judge Aldrich needs not further
consider the trial court's rulings on the related questions of
typicality and manageability.  As the Plaintiffs' claims regarding
meal and rest periods, record keeping, payment of wages due upon
termination, and unfair competition are all derivative of the
misclassification claim, the trial court did not err by concluding
they were unsuitable for certification.  Therefore, Judge Aldrich
affirmed the trial court's order.  The Respondent is to recover
its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/lVqYAX from Leagle.com.

Marlin & Saltzman, Stanley D. Saltzman, Stephen P. O'Dell, David
C. Leimbach; United Employees Law Group and Walter Haines for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jones Day, Peter E. Davids -- pdavids@jonesday.com -- Cindi L.
Ritchey -- critchey@jonesday.com -- Liat Yamini --
lyamini@jonesday.com -- and Brian M. Jorgensen --
bmjorgensen@jonesday.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


ALABAMA: Court Denies Preliminary Injunction in "Thompson"
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge W. Keith Watkins of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, Northern Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction in the case captioned TREVA
THOMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-CV-783-WKW (M.D. Ala.).

The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on Sept. 26, 2016, seeking to
certify (i) a class of the Plaintiffs defined as all unregistered
persons otherwise eligible to register to vote in Alabama who are
now, or who may in the future be, denied the right to vote because
they have been convicted of a felony; (ii) nine subclasses of the
Plaintiffs; and (iii) a Defendant class of county registrars.  It
also asks for a declaratory judgment that Section 177(b) of the
Alabama Constitution, on its face and as applied, violates the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In their motion, the Plaintiffs ask for a preliminary injunction
mandating the Defendants to take the following actions prior to
the voter registration deadline on July 31, 2017: (i) to provide
notice of the Felony Voter Disqualification Act, Alabama Laws Act
2017-378 ("HB 282")'s voting eligibility standards on the
electronic Alabama Voter Registration Form on the Alabama
Secretary of State's website; (ii) to post notice of HB 282's
voting eligibility standards on the Alabama Secretary of State's
website and at county registrars and DMV offices; (iii) to submit
a request to the federal Election Assistance Commission to provide
notice of HB 282's voting eligibility standards in Alabama's
state-specific instructions on the Federal Voter Registration
Form; and (iv) to reinstate HB 282 voters -- voters whose
registration applications were denied or who were struck from the
voter registration rolls in the last two years, but whose
eligibility was affirmed by HB 282 -- to the voter registration
rolls and provide them with individualized notice of their
eligibility to vote.

Judge Watkins explains that HB 282 offered long-needed and sought-
after clarification to the conundrum in the Alabama Constitution's
disenfranchising provision, Section 177(b), when it defined a
"felony involving moral turpitude."  HB 282 did not exist when the
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging Section 177(b) on
federal constitutional grounds, but after its enactment, the
Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction asking the
Court to tell Alabama's state officials how to implement the law.
The Plaintiffs' motion, however, is based on claims that HB 282
has mooted; raises new claims, new requests for relief, a new
putative class of voters who were ineligible to vote prior to HB
282, but now are eligible; seeks to alter the status quo; and
raises serious concerns about federal instruction into state
election law.  The Court held the motion for preliminary
injunction is due to be denied for all these reasons and more.
They satisfy none of the elements for granting a preliminary
injunction.

Accordingly, based upon careful consideration of the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary injunction, the Defendants' opposition, the
evidentiary hearing, and the oral arguments, and the record, Judge
Watkins ordered that the motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 memorandum opinion
and order is available at https://is.gd/qYJgjF from Leagle.com.

Treva Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois --
aderfner@derfneraltman.com -- Institute for Public Representation,
pro hac vice.

Treva Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Derfner, Derfner
& Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro hac vice,
James Uriah Blacksher -- jblacksher@ns.sympatico.ca -- Attorney at
Law, Jessica Ring Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice,
Joseph Gerald Hebert, Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell
McGuire -- jmcguire@mandabusinesslaw.com -- McGuire & Associates
LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Melissa Swetnam, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Antwoine Giles, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Anna Reynolds, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Laura Corley, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Larry Joe Newby, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Mario Dion Yow, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Jennifer Zimmer, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

Timothy Lanier, Plaintiff, represented by Aderson B. Francois,
Institute for Public Representation, pro hac vice, Armand Derfner,
Derfner & Altman LLC, Danielle Lang, Campaign Legal Center, pro
hac vice, James Uriah Blacksher, Attorney at Law, Jessica Ring
Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Gerald Hebert,
Campaign Legal Center, Joseph Mitchell McGuire, McGuire &
Associates LLC & Pamela Karlan, Stanford Law School, pro hac vice.

State of Alabama, Defendant, represented by Andrew L. Brasher,
Office of the Attorney General, James William Davis, State of
Alabama, Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick, Office of the Attorney
General & Mary Mangan, Office of the Attorney General.

John H. Merrill, Defendant, represented by Andrew L. Brasher,
Office of the Attorney General, James William Davis, State of
Alabama, Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick, Office of the Attorney
General & Mary Mangan, Office of the Attorney General.

George Noblin, Defendant, represented by Andrew L. Brasher, Office
of the Attorney General, James William Davis, State of Alabama,
Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick, Office of the Attorney General &
Mary Mangan, Office of the Attorney General.

Clifford Walker, Defendant, represented by Andrew L. Brasher,
Office of the Attorney General, James William Davis, State of
Alabama, Misty Shawn Fairbanks Messick, Office of the Attorney
General & Mary Mangan, Office of the Attorney General.


ALBUQUERQUE, NM: "Torres" Suit Moved to Federal District Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Joseph Dion Torres, on his behalf
and on behalf of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, v.
City of Albuquerque, Michelle Wall, Ricardo Vialpando, Stephanie
Garcia, Randy Hanes, and Adam Barela, sued in their individual
capacities, the Defendants, Case No. 17cv04691, was removed on
July 20, 2017 from the Second Judicial District Court, to the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico (Albuquerque). The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:17-cv-00754 to the
proceeding.

Albuquerque, New Mexico's largest city, sits in the high desert.
Its modern Downtown core contrasts with Old Town Albuquerque,
dating to the city's 1706 founding as a Spanish colony. Old Town
is filled with historic adobe buildings, such as San Felipe de
Neri Church, 5 museums, and shops selling Native American
handicrafts. Nearby, The Indian Pueblo Cultural Center traces the
area's tribal history.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph P. Kennedy, Esq.
          Adam C. Flores, Esq.
          KENNEDY KENNEDY & IVES, LLC
          1000 2nd Street, N.W.
          Albuquerque, NM 87102
          Telephone: (505) 244 1400
          Facsimile: (505) 244 1406
          E-mail: jpk@civilrightslawnewmexico.com
                  acf@civilrightslaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kristin J Dalton, Esq.
          ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY
          CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE
          P.O. Box 2248
          Albuquerque, NM 87103
          Telephone: (505) 768 4500
          Facsimile: (505) 768 4440
          E-mail: kjdalton@cabq.gov


ALLSTATE PROPERTY: Court Recommends Dismissing "Zevallos" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado recommended granting the Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissing the case
captioned MIRIAM ZEVALLOS, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-00189-RM-CBS (D. Colo.).

Since a 2007 amendment, section 10-4-609 of the Colorado insurance
code has provided that the amount of the Uninsured
Motorist/Underinsured Motorist ("UM/UIM") coverage available
pursuant to this section will not be reduced by a setoff from any
other coverage, including, but not limited to, legal liability
insurance, medical payments coverage, health insurance, or other
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle insurance.

The Plaintiff alleges that despite this statute, the Defendants
uniformly reduce amounts paid to their insureds under their UM/UIM
coverages by setoffs from their medical payments ("MedPay")
coverages under their respective automobile policies.

Zevallos was insured by Allstate with a policy of insurance that
included $5,000 of MedPay coverage and $50,000/$100,000 of UM/UIM
coverage.  This policy constitutes a contract.  Zevallos was
injured by an underinsured motorist on Aug. 20, 2012.  As a result
of her injuries, she submitted claims under her MedPay and UM/UIM
coverages.  Allstate paid MedPay benefits on her behalf and paid
Zevallos UM/UIM benefits of $2,700.

Allstate alleges that the $2,700 it paid to the Plaintiff was in
settlement of her claim for UM/UIM benefits under the Policy.  In
consideration of the settlement payment, on Sept. 26, 2014, the
Plaintiff released Allstate from any and all liability and from
any and all contractual obligations whatsoever under the coverage
designated above underinsured motorist insurance -- Coverage SU of
the Policy and arising out of bodily injury sustained by Miriam
Zevallos due to an accident on or about the Aug. 20, 2012.

The Plaintiff alleges that in reaching the $2,700 UM/UIM benefit
number, Allstate explicitly subtracted the $5,000 in MedPay
coverage from its evaluation.  She further alleges that Allstate
confirmed this subtraction on June 11, 2014, in a letter regarding
her claim.

On Nov. 7, 2016, more than two years after the Plaintiff agreed to
settle her claim with Allstate, the Colorado Supreme Court issued
Calderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.  It held that
insurers cannot use non-duplication of benefits clauses to setoff
MedPay benefits from UM/UIM benefits.

Four days after Calderon issued, the Plaintiff filed her complaint
in state court on behalf of herself and a putative class.
Allstate removed the case based on federal jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act.

On March 2, 2017, the Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.  Judge Moore referred the motion to this Magistrate
Judge pursuant to a Memorandum.  Allstate argues that the
Plaintiff's UM/UIM benefits are barred by a release that she
executed with Allstate in 2014 and that the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Calderon can be applied only prospectively.
Zevallos filed her Response to the motion on March 23, 2017, which
was followed by the Defendant's Reply on April 6, 2017.  On May 3,
2017, Judge Shaffer heard oral argument.  He has also received
from Allstate three notices of supplemental authority.

Magistrate Judge Shaffer concludes that the Plaintiff's release
bars her claims, regardless of whether Calderon should or should
not be given retroactive effect.  Even assuming that Calderon
applies retroactively, as she argues, nothing barred the Plaintiff
from voluntarily waiving the statute's anti-setoff provision when
she settled and released her claim.  Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge recommended granting Allstate's motion for judgment on the
pleadings and dismissing the Plaintiff's claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 recommendation is
available at https://is.gd/t2vXxu from Leagle.com.

Miriam Zevallos, Plaintiff, represented by Tonya L. Melnichenko,
Franklin D. Azar & Associates, PC.

Miriam Zevallos, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Aaron Levin --
bal@levinsitcoff.com -- Levin Sitcoff PC, Franklin David Azar,
Franklin D. Azar & Associates, PC, Jonathan Steven Parrott,
Franklin D. Azar & Associates, PC, Keith Richard Scranton,
Franklin D. Azar & Associates, PC, Nelson Andrew Waneka --
naw@levinsitcoff.com -- Levin Sitcoff PC, Patricia A. Meester,
Franklin D. Azar & Associates, PC & Susan S. Minamizono --
ssm@levinsitcoff.com -- Levin Sitcoff PC.

Allstate Property and Casualty Company, Defendant, represented by
Lauren Pamela Carboni -- lauren.carboni@dentons.com -- Dentons US
LLP, Richard L. Fenton -- richard.fenton@dentons.com -- Dentons US
LLP & Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov -- lino.lipinsky@dentons.com --
Dentons US LLP.


AMERICAN AIRLINES: Bazerman Sues over Additional Baggage Charge
---------------------------------------------------------------
MAX BAZERMAN, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-11297-MBB (D. Mass.,
July 13, 2017), seeks to enjoin American Airlines' systematic
failure to honor the contracts it enters into with its passengers.
AA's passenger contracts include promises that specified
passengers are permitted to check a first, second, and/or third
bag for no additional charge. These passengers include "elite"
members of certain frequent flyer programs and those who purchase
certain types of tickets, such as business class or first class.
AA contracts also routinely promise certain other passengers that
they are permitted to check their first bag for no additional
charge. Yet, AA systematically required these passengers to pay to
check bags that AA had promised to transport at no additional
charge, and thus breached its contract with affected passengers.

American Airlines, commonly referred to as American, is a major
American airline headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, within the
Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin Edelman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BENJAMIN EDELMAN
          169 Walnut Street
          Brookline, MA 02445
          Telephone: (617) 297 7360

               - and -

          Linda M. Dardarian, Esq.
          Byron Goldstein, Esq.
          Raymond Wendell, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763 9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835 1417
          E-mail: ldardarian@gbdhlegal.com
                  brgoldstein@gbdhlegal.com
                  rwendell@gbdhlegal.com


APOLLO EDUCATION: Court Dismisses "Lomingkit" Suit With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Rameses Te Lomingkit, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Apollo Education Group Incorporated, et al., Defendants, No. CV-16
-00689-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz.), Judge James A. Teilborg of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona granted in part the
Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Moving
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and granted the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss [Plaintiffs'] Second Amended Complaint.

This is a consolidated class action proceeding.  Defendant Apollo
is an Arizona-based company that owns and operates proprietary
postsecondary educational institutions and is one of the largest
private education providers in the world.  In particular,
University of Phoenix ("UOP") is Apollo's largest university,
accounting for approximately 90% of Apollo's total enrollment and
revenues.  The remaining Defendants are various individuals who
served as Apollo's officers and directors between Nov. 13, 2013
and Oct. 21, 2015 ("Class Period").  The Plaintiffs purchased
Apollo stock during the Class Period.

In 2009, Apollo determined that UOP's software for students was
outdated and formulated plans to "rebuild" UOP's online learning
environment from scratch. This software--referred to as the
"online classroom" -- was used by all UOP students, whom relied on
the platform to access their UOP accounts, receive educational
content for their courses, and turn in their assignments.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the successful upgrade of the online
classroom platform was critically important to Apollo's financial
success, and Apollo had plans to sell the technology to other
universities.

However, the upgrades experienced multiple disruptions from mid-
2012 to mid-2014.  These disruptions included widespread
blackouts, in which users were unable to login to the platform.
The online classroom disruptions were further exacerbated by
rounds of significant layoffs within Apollo's IT department from
2013 to 2015.  The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants and Apollo
representatives made a number of false and/or misleading
statements during and after the rollout of Apollo's online
classroom upgrades.

The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class
Action Complaint ("CAC"), finding that they failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted because they failed to
meet the standard for pleading securities fraud.  Specifically,
the Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead
that the Defendants made a false or misleading statement.  They
then amended their CAC, and the Defendants now seek to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' SAC.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' factual allegations suffer
from the same deficiencies as the In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig.
plaintiffs.  Particularly, their allegations fail because of three
types of deficiencies: (i) general failure of factual allegations
to render the Defendants' alleged misstatements false or
misleading; (ii) lack of precise meaning in terms used by the
Defendants and the Plaintiffs' witnesses; and (iii) lack of
sufficient temporal proximity between witness observations and the
Defendants' statements.

The Court also finds that no statement alleged by the Plaintiffs
to be false or misleading meets the pleading standard of the PSLRA
and Federal Rule9(b).  It reiterates from its prior Order that it
is insufficient to simply allege that a statement is false or
misleading because it is incomplete rather than affirmatively
alleging what specifically makes a statement false or misleading.
And because the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to
plausibly allege that the Defendants made any false or misleading
statement, it does not address scienter.

As to the Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend under Federal
Rule 15, the Court has already granted them leave to amend.  In
granting their leave to amend, it cautioned that it had advised
them as to the standard under the PSLRA and Federal Rule 9(b) and
expects them to comply in the next amended complaint, without
seeking further amendment.  As noted, the Plaintiffs failed to
fully comply with its Order.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs point
to no additional facts that they might allege to cure the
addressed deficiencies, which persisted in a similar light between
the CAC and SAC.  Thus, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' request
to amend the SAC.

Based on the foregoing, the Court granted in part the Defendants'
Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Moving Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and granted their Motion to Dismiss
[Plaintiffs'] Second Amended Complaint.  The Clerk of the Court is
directed to dismiss the case with prejudice and enter judgment
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/5BH5YC from Leagle.com.

Rameses Te Lomingkit, Plaintiff, represented by Carolyn G.
Anderson -- carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed PLLP.

Rameses Te Lomingkit, Plaintiff, represented by Corey D. Holzer --
cholzer@holzerlaw.com -- Holzer & Holzer LLC, Hart Lawrence
Robinovitch -- hart.robinovitch@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed
PLLP, Jonah H. Goldstein  -- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Marwill P. Dees -- mdees@holzerlaw.com --
Holzer & Holzer LLC, Mary K. Blasy -- mblasy@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Robert R. Henssler, Jr. --
bhenssler@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Samuel
H. Rudman -- SRudman@rgrdlaw.com -- Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller
Rudman & Robbins LLP, Danielle S. Myers -- danim@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Matthew James Balotta --
mbalotta@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

National Shopmen Pension Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Jonah H.
Goldstein, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Robert R. Henssler,
Jr., Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Danielle S. Myers, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Government of Guam Retirement Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
Blair A. Nicholas -- blairn@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP, Brandon Marsh -- brandon.marsh@blbglaw.com
-- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, David R. Stickney --
davids@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
Rachel Felong, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Richard
Glenn Himelrick -- RGH@TBLAW.COM -- Tiffany & Bosco PA.

Apollo Education Group Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Brian Kirk Mosley -- bmosley@omlaw.com -- Osborn Maledon PA, David
B. Rosenbaum -- drosenbaum@omlaw.com -- Osborn Maledon PA, Michael
Gerald Bongiorno -- michael.bongiorno@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer
Cutler

Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Peter A. Spaeth --
peter.spaeth@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
LLP & James W. Prendergast -- james.prendergast@wilmerhale.com --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

Peter V Sperling, Defendant, represented by Brian Kirk Mosley,
Osborn Maledon PA, David B. Rosenbaum, Osborn Maledon PA & Peter
A. Spaeth, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

Gregory W Cappelli, Defendant, represented by Brian Kirk Mosley,
Osborn Maledon PA, David B. Rosenbaum, Osborn Maledon PA & Peter
A. Spaeth, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

Brian L Swartz, Defendant, represented by Brian Kirk Mosley,
Osborn Maledon PA, David B. Rosenbaum, Osborn Maledon PA & Peter
A. Spaeth, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.


BAYCARE HEALTH: "Figueroa" Suit Moved to Middle Dist. of Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Elayne Figueroa, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. BayCare Health System, Inc., Case No. 17-CA-004503
Div E, was removed on July 25, 2017 from the 13th Judicial
Circuit, Hillsborough County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida (Tampa). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 8:17-cv-01780-JSM-JSS to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge James S. Moody, Jr.

BayCare Health operates inpatient and outpatient healthcare
facilities that provide primary care and specialty services to
children and adults.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, PA
          1110 N Florida Ave Ste 300
          Tampa, FL 33602-3343
          Telephone: (813) 224 0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229 8712
          E-mail: bhill@wfclaw.com
                  lcabassa@wfclaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Nathan Paulich, Esq.
          Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esq.
          THOMPSON, SIZEMORE,
          GONZALEZ & HEARING, PA
          201 N Franklin St-Ste 1600
          PO Box 639
          Tampa, FL 33601-0639
          Telephone: (813) 273 0050
          Facsimile: (813) 273 0072
          E-mail: npaulich@tsghlaw.com
                  tgonzalez@tsghlaw.com


BEDFORD, OH: Court Certifies Class in "Pund"
--------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KENNETH PUND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
BEDFORD, OHIO, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16CV1076 (N.D.
Ohio), Judge Benita Y. Pearson of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' Oral Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
granted their Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs, citizens of the City of Bedford, Ohio, brought
suit against the City of Bedford and various city officials
challenging the city's practice of imposing Point of Sale
Inspection fees.  They filed Motions for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order, asking the Court to enjoin the
Defendants' Point of Sale inspection requirements.  The Court set
a hearing for May 13, 2016, but, prior to the hearing, parties
filed a Joint Motion for an Order Granting Preliminary Injunction.
The Court granted the Motion and cancelled the hearing.  The Court
preliminarily enjoined the Defendants from enforcing warrantless
Point of Sale searches and from indirectly enforcing the
warrantless Point of Sale searches requirement by criminally
prosecuting the Plaintiffs, stripping them of the right to occupy
or rent their property, or otherwise.  The City indicated in its
Opposition to the Motion for Permanent Injunction that it had
amended its Point of Sale Inspection regulations.

The Plaintiffs then moved for leave to amend their Complaint,
which the Court granted.  The Amended Complaint added a claim for
class-wide relief, as well as claims related to the Defendants'
Rental Inspection fees.  They argued that the Defendants' Rental
Inspection mandates were materially identical to the City's
enjoined Point of Sale Inspection requirements.  Nonetheless, the
Defendants continued to enforce the Rental Inspections, and
maintained that the injunction applies only to the Point of Sale
inspections.  The Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary
restraining order.  The Court held a hearing, at which Defendants
agreed to amend the City's rental inspection ordinance.  On March
10, 2017, the Defendants confirmed that the ordinance has been
amended, and the rental application and City's website were
updated accordingly.  The Plaintiffs now move for class
certification.

Judge Pearson finds that the Plaintiffs have shown numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequacy, and, therefore, have
satisfied Rule 23(a).  Accordingly, she certified the following
Class, composed of two subclasses:

     a. Subclass A: All individuals and businesses that have (i)
been subjected to Point of Sale Inspections between Sept. 10, 2014
and Jan. 30, 2017; and (ii) paid Points of Sale Inspection fees to
the City of Bedford in conjunction with the aforesaid
inspection(s).

     b. Subclass B: All individuals and businesses that have (i)
been subjected to rental inspections between Sept. 10, 2014 and
Feb. 14, 2017; and (ii) paid Rental Inspection fees to the City of
Bedford in conjunction with the aforesaid inspection(s).

Since appointment of counsel is not contested, Judge Pearson
certified the current counsel, Maurice A. Thompson, as the class
counsel.  Because the City has modified its Rental Inspection
ordinance, she denied the Oral Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 memorandum of
opinion and order is available at https://is.gd/YuB8eI from
Leagle.com.

Kenneth Pund, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Finney --
chris@finneylawfirm.com.

Kenneth Pund, Plaintiff, represented by Gary F. Werner --
gwerner@bernsockner.com -- Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, Maurice A.
Thompson -- mthompson@ohioconstitution.org -- Center for
Constitutional Law & Sheldon Berns -- sberns@bernsockner.com --
Berns, Ockner & Greenberger.

John Diezic, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Finney, Gary
F. Werner, Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, Maurice A. Thompson,
Center for Constitutional Law & Sheldon Berns, Berns, Ockner &
Greenberger.

Scott Jowers, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Finney,
Gary F. Werner, Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, Maurice A. Thompson,
Center for Constitutional Law & Sheldon Berns, Berns, Ockner &
Greenberger.

Stephanie Jowers, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher P. Finney,
Stephanie Jowers, Plaintiff, represented by Gary F. Werner, Berns,
Ockner & Greenberger, Maurice A. Thompson, Center for
Constitutional Law & Sheldon Berns, Berns, Ockner & Greenberger.

City of Bedford, Ohio, Defendant, represented by Kallen L.
Dearnbarger, Smith Marwill & R. Eric Smearman --
res@smithmarwill.com -- Smith Marwill.

Rob Brown, Defendant, represented by Kallen L. Dearnbarger, Smith
Marwill & R. Eric Smearman, Smith Marwill.

Richard Hickman, Defendant, represented by Kallen L. Dearnbarger,
Smith Marwill & R. Eric Smearman, Smith Marwill.


BROOKDALE SENIOR: "Eidler" Suit Sues over Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICIA EIDLER, by and through her Guardian Ad
Litem, CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM EIDLER; STACIA STINER; MARY-CATHERINE
JONES, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, KELLY CLAPPER; and
HELEN CARLSON, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, and JOAN
CARLSON; on their own behalves and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, INC.;
BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100,
the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-03962-JD (N.D. Cal., July 13,
2017), Plaintiffs are elderly or dependent individuals living in
California who have significant care needs and disabilities.
Plaintiffs and their families were overwhelmed by and required
assistance with their activities of daily living including, but
not limited to, assistance with managing and taking medication;
housekeeping; laundry; dressing; bathing; toileting; hygiene; food
preparation; and transportation. The Plaintiffs and their families
and the classes they seek to represent either chose a Brookdale
facility or chose to stay in a facility purchased by Brookdale
because they believed Brookdale's repeated promises to provide the
care and assistance that would allow them to age with dignity.
Instead, Plaintiffs, their family members, and the proposed class
members have all encountered in Brookdale a system of understaffed
assisted living facilities that fails to consistently provide even
the most basic level of promised care.  According to the lawsuit,
the Defendant has engaged in a policy and practice of violating
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
accompanying regulations, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh
Act), California Civil Code. Among other things, Defendant has
violated the ADA by failing to make its assisted living facilities
readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.

Brookdale Senior Living is an owner and operator of senior living
communities throughout the United States, operating over 1,100
senior living communities and retirement communities in the
US.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Guy B. Wallace, Esq.
          Sarah Colby, Esq.
          Jennifer A. Uhrowczik, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421 7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421 7105

               -and -

          Kathryn A. Stebner, Esq.
          Kelly Knapp, Esq.
          STEBNER AND ASSOCIATES
          870 Market Street, Suite 1212
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 362 9800
          Facsimile: (415) 362 9801

               -and -

          Gay Crosthwait Grunfeld, Esq.
          Benjamin Bien-Kahn, Esq.
          Christopher D. Hu, Esq.
          ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP
          50 Fremont Street, 19th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105-2235
          Telephone: (415) 433 6830
          Facsimile: (415) 433 7104


CAFE POMPETTE: Faces "Castro" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cafe Pompette, Inc.
The case is styled as Adriano de Jesus Garcia Castro, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. Cafe Pompette, Inc., Cafe Pompette, Inc. d/b/a El Mate
Restaurant, Fernando Rodas, and Ariel Jara, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:17-cv-04388 (E.D.N.Y., July 25, 2017).

The Defendants operate a restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS: Ct. Allows 3-Hr Deposition in "Des Roches"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHARLES DES ROCHES, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE, et al., Defendants, Case No.5:16-
cv-02848-LHK (HRL) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, warranted the Plaintiffs three
hours to depose Amanda Flaum, a former Blue Shield executive.

In this certified class action, the Plaintiffs claim that their
health care plans provided for mental health and substance abuse
treatment that was medically necessary as defined by generally
accepted professional standards, but that the Defendants evaluated
claims for such treatment under "Guidelines" that were far and
away more restrictive.  Among other relief, they seek an
injunction requiring that their claims be reevaluated under proper
guidelines.

The parties filed Discovery Dispute Joint Report ("DDJR") #1 on
July 20.  In it, the Blue Shield Defendants seek an order
preventing the Plaintiffs from deposing Amanda Flaum, a former
Blue Shield executive.  The Blue Shield Defendants say that Ms.
Flaum was Blue Shield's Vice President of Medical Management from
2013 to 2016, overseeing a department that managed medical
necessity determinations.  They say that the Plaintiffs have
already deposed knowledgeable people below her in the hierarchy.
She is, they claim, an "apex" executive, who should not be
subjected to the possible harassment of a deposition unless her
testimony is unique and unavailable elsewhere.

The Plaintiffs say Ms. Flaum was at all times a member of and for
a time the chairperson of the Blue Shield Utilization Management
Committee, the committee that approved adoption of the very
Guidelines that are the heart of this lawsuit.  She was, they
suggest, not a hands-off manager, but was closely involved in
overseeing the review and approval of the Guidelines.

Magistrate Judge Lloyd, on balance, is not persuaded that Ms.
Flaum is an apex executive.  The Defendants do not explain where
she was in the corporate hierarchy.  Even if she were an apex
executive, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the Court that her
testimony could be unique on account of her role as a decision
maker on the Guidelines' adoption and application.  He sees no
hint of any intention to harass her, and the rationale for ever
giving a "pass" to a high level executive is to avoid harassment
through a needless deposition.  The Plaintiffs make a satisfactory
case for a brief deposition to explore her role in the matters at
issue here.  Thus, a three-hour deposition is warranted.

Magistrate Judge Lloyd does not know how long this discovery
dispute simmered before it was presented to the Court.  The
presiding judge established a fact discovery cutoff of July 28,
and the parties' filing of the DDJR 8 days before the cutoff did
not, as a practical matter, leave time for both the Court to rule
and for the deposition to take place.  He requires the deposition
to take place forthwith, by July 28 if that is feasible, but in
any event no later than 10 days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/WCn5Sp from Leagle.com.

Charles Des Roches, Plaintiff, represented by Rebecca Ann Musarra
-- rmusarra@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer P.A..

Charles Des Roches, Plaintiff, represented by Carl Spencer Kravitz
-- ckravitz@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline Judge Mehta -- cmehta@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder
LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline E. Reynolds -- creynolds@zuckerman.com
-- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel L. Berger --
dberger@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer PA, pro hac vice, Jason
S. Cowart -- jcowart@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jing-
Li Yu, Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro hac vice, Kyle J. McGee --
kmcgee@gelaw.com -- Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro hac vice, Nell
Zora Peyser -- npeyser@zuckerman.com  -- Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice & Steven N. Herman -- sherman@zuckerman.com --
Zuckerman Spaeder, pro hac vice.

Sylvia Meyer, Plaintiff, represented by Rebecca Ann Musarra, Grant
and Eisenhofer P.A., Carl Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
pro hac vice, Caroline Judge Mehta, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac
vice, Caroline E. Reynolds, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Daniel L. Berger, Grant and Eisenhofer PA, pro hac vice, Jason S.
Cowart, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jing-Li Yu, Grant and Eisenhofer
P.A., pro hac vice, Kyle J. McGee, Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro
hac vice, Nell Zora Peyser, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice &
Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman Spaeder, pro hac vice.

Gayle Tamler Grecco, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel L. Berger,
Grant and Eisenhofer PA, Rebecca Ann Musarra, Grant and Eisenhofer
P.A., Carl Spencer Kravitz, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline Judge Mehta, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice,
Caroline E. Reynolds, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro hac vice, Jing-Li
Yu, Grant and Eisenhofer P.A., pro hac vice, Kyle J. McGee, Grant
and Eisenhofer P.A., Nell Zora Peyser, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, pro
hac vice & Steven N. Herman, Zuckerman Spaeder, pro hac vice.

California Physicians' Service, Defendant, represented by Carri
Maas -- cmaas@manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP,
Gregory Neil Pimstone -- gpimstone@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP & Joseph Edward Laska -- jlaska@manatt.com --
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.

Human Affairs International of California, Defendant, represented
by Jennifer Salzman Romano --
jromano@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP, April Nelson Ross --
aross@crowell.com -- Crowell & Moring LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher Flynn -- cflynn@crowell.com -- Crowell and Moring LLP,
pro hac vice, Kristin J. Madigan -- kmadigan@crowell.com --
Crowell & Moring LLP & Thomas Francis Koegel, Crowell & Moring
LLP.

Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Company,
Defendant, represented by Joseph Edward Laska, Manatt, Phelps &
Phillips, LLP & Carri Maas, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.


CE DESIGN: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of SMI's TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court dismissing the case captioned
SASKATCHEWAN MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CE
DESIGN, LTD., Defendant-Appellee, No. 15-3332 (7th Cir.), for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Defendant is an Illinois corporation whose business now
appears to center on litigating claims under the federal Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  It brought the present suit as a
class action in Illinois state court against Homegrown
Advertising, which was then a Canadian marketing firm; the
complaint accused Homegrown of sending junk faxes to CE Design in
violation of Illinois law and the TCPA.  The two sides settled in
February 2007 for $5 million plus interest and costs.

In March 2007, CE Design (to which Homegrown had assigned all its
rights under the policy) filed a citation to discover assets in
the Lake County, Illinois, circuit court in an effort to recover
some or all of the judgment from SMI.  At that point Rod Rath,
SMI's Canadian attorney, wrote a letter to the circuit court
advising that SMI was denying coverage.  On May 3, 2007, the
Illinois court entered judgment for CE Design.

As the state court litigation unfolded, CE Design decided to try
another tack:  enforcement of the Illinois judgment in
Saskatchewan, where SMI is based.  The gambit failed.  On Jan. 8,
2008, the Queen's Bench, which is the court of first instance in
the province, concluded that SMI had not received sufficient
notice of the Illinois judgment and thus that it was
unenforceable.  In June 2015, SMI revived the issue by filing a
motion to enforce the Saskatchewan judgment in federal district
court.

Two possible bases for jurisdiction have been advanced: the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA), and the alienage branch of diversity
jurisdiction.  The district court found CAFA inapplicable because
the class is the Defendant in this suit, and that CAFA applies
only to Plaintiff classes.  As for diversity jurisdiction, the
court concluded that no individual class member could satisfy the
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, and none of the
exceptions to the general prohibition on aggregating claims
applied.  Those rulings ended the case in the district court.

SMI is trying to enforce a Canadian judgment against CE Design in
the federal court.  Judge Wood explains that CAFA is such a
jurisdictional statute, and it seems to them neither sensitive nor
wise for federal courts to insert themselves into litigation that
has busied the Illinois and Saskatchewan courts for a considerable
time.  SMI evidently does not like how the latest phase of the
case is progressing, but its remedy lies in an appeal to a higher
Illinois court, not in using federal authority to transmute a
$1,000 (Canadian) award into a $5 million (US) trump card.  The
bottom line is this: When litigation has dragged on for a decade
across two countries and three jurisdictions, comity and common
sense both counsel forbearance on the part of the federal courts.

That leaves alienage jurisdiction, she says, which requires
complete diversity and an amount in controversy that exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.  There
is complete diversity.  Travelers Prop. Cas. v. Good explained
that interests are "common and undivided" only if each claim is
part of a 'common fund' and could not be adjudicated on an
individual basis without affecting the interests of the other
claimants.  Here, each class member's claim rests on a specific
fax or faxes, and thus each claim stems from a separate
transaction.  Judge Wood notes it makes no difference that the
class members now seek to satisfy their disparate claims from a
single source.  Nor is she persuaded by SMI's attempt to
distinguish Good factually by alleging the fax problem was the
result of "a single fax blast campaign."  Even granting that the
faxes were sent simultaneously from one source, they were received
by 23,541 different entities.  That defeats a finding of "common
fund" for aggregation purposes.

Judge Wood held that neither CAFA nor conventional diversity
jurisdiction empowers them to hear this matter, and so she
affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the case
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/sKswAX from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey A. Berman -- jberman@seyfarth.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

James K. Borcia -- jborcia@tresslerllp.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

David Max Oppenheim, for Defendant-Appellee.


CJS SOLUTIONS: "Garrett" Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Jaimey Garrett, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. The
CJS Solutions Group, LLC, doing business as: The HCI Group, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00863, was transferred on July 19,
2017 from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Foley Square). The District Court Clerk assigned Case
No. 1:17-cv-05493-UA to the proceeding.

CJS Solutions offers healthcare technology consulting
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL DAUDT & WILLIE PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816 6603
          Facsimile: (206) 350 3528
          E-mail: bterrell@tmdwlaw.com
                  jmurray@terrellmarshall.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Susan Kathleen Stahlfeld, Esq.
          Francis L VanDusen, Jr., Esq.
          MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP
          2801 Alaskan Way, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98121-1128
          Telephone: (206) 624 8300
          Facsimile: (206) 340 9599
          E-mail: susan.stahlfeld@millernash.com
                  frank.vandusen@millernash.com


COCONUT GROVE: "Hernandez" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
CLAUDIA HERNANDEZ, and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. COCONUT GROVE WINES CORP d/b/a/ HAPPY'S WINE IN THE GROVE,
HAPPY WINE, INC. d/b/a HAPPY WINE and JUAN C RESTREPO and ANGELA J
BORY, the Defendants, Case No. 58724954 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade
County, July 7, 2017), seeks to recover compensatory and
liquidated damages and reasonable attorney's fees and costs from
Happy Wine and Groves Wine pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.  In the event that Plaintiff does not recover liquidated
damages, then Plaintiff will seek an award of prejudgment interest
for the unpaid overtime, and any and all other relief which this
Court deems reasonable under the circumstances.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully and
intentionally refused to pay Plaintiff's minimum wages as required
by the FLSA as Defendants knew of the Federal Minimum Wage
requirements of the FLSA and recklessly failed to investigate
whether Defendants payroll practices were in accordance with the
FLSA.

Happy Wine, Inc. is in the wine business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher F. Zacarias, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER F. ZACARIAS, P.A.
          5757 Blue Lagoon Drive, Suite 230
          Miami, FL 33126
          Telephone: (305) 403 2000
          Facsimile: (305) 459 3964
          E-mail: czacarias@zacariaslaw.com


COLUMBIA COUNTY, AR: Jailor's Class Certification Bid Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Susan O. Hickey of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, El Dorado Division, denied
plaintiff's motion for class certification, in the case MICHELLE
RASBERRY, individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, ARKANSAS, Defendant, Case No. 1:16-
CV-1074 (W.D. Ark.).

Plaintiff Michelle Rasberry claims that defendant Columbia County
failed to pay her, and others similarly situated, overtime
compensation for all hours worked in excess of 171 hours in a
twenty-eight consecutive day work period. Plaintiff filed a
complaint on August 4, 2016 and alleges that defendant had
misclassified her and all those similarly situated as exempt from
the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sections
201, et seq., and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), Ark. Code
Ann. Sections 11-4-201, et seq.

The Court conditionally certified plaintiff's FLSA collective
action on January 31, 2017. Upon completion of the FLSA opt-in
period, only six individuals, including plaintiff, had consented
to be part of plaintiff's FLSA collective action. As for
plaintiff's AMWA claim, plaintiff seeks recovery individually and
collectively, proposing to represent the class of salaried jailors
who are/were employed by defendant within the relevant time
period. Plaintiff asks the court to certify a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23 AMWA class with the following
description:

All of defendant's salaried jailors or similar positions who
worked in the State of Arkansas at the Columbia County Jail at any
time after August 04, 2013.
District Judge Hickey is unconvinced that a Rule 23 class action
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating plaintiff's and potential class members' AMWA claims.
Judge Hickey denied plaintiff's motion for Rule 23 Class
Certification, since plaintiff failed to meet the predominance and
superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

A copy of Judge Hickey's order dated July 31, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/F6TyA1 from Leagle.com.

Michelle Rasberry, Plaintiff, represented by Josh Sanford --
josh@sanfordlawfirm.com -- Christopher Burks --
chris@sanfordlawfirm.com -- Stacy Gibson --
stacy@sanfordlawfirm.com -- at Sanford Law Firm PLLC

Columbia County, AR, Defendant, represented by:

     Jason E. Owens, Esq.
     RAINWATER, HOLT & SEXTON, P.A.
     801 Technology Dr.
     Little Rock, AR 72223
     Tel: 800-767-4815


CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS: Court Remands "Scott" MMWA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allyson Kay Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in the case
captioned MICHAEL A. SCOTT, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC, f/k/a Cricket Communications, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus
Supporting Appellant, No. 16-2300 (4th Cir.) and remanded for
reconsideration.

Sometime between July 2013 and March 2014, Scott purchased two
Samsung Galaxy S4 cellular phones from Cricket for hundreds of
dollars each.  The phones are only operable on a network using
Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") technology.  Known to
Cricket, but not to Scott, at the time Scott purchased his phone
Cricket had begun to shut down its CDMA network.  When Cricket
completed that process in 2015, Scott alleges that his phones --
which were "locked" to Cricket's CDMA network -- were rendered
"useless and worthless."

On Sept. 24, 2015, Scott filed a putative class action in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland.  Scott, the sole Named
Plaintiff, alleged Cricket's actions violated Maryland's express
warranties and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose, which in turn was a violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA").  Seeking to bring a class
action on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals,
Scott defined the class as all Maryland citizens who, between July
12, 2013 and March 13, 2014, purchased a CDMA mobile telephone
from Cricket which was locked for use only on Cricket's CDMA
network.

On Oct. 30, 2015, Cricket removed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland.  Cricket invoked Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA").

On Nov. 23, 2015, Scott moved to remand the case to state court
arguing that Cricket did not satisfy its burden to allege
jurisdiction under CAFA because the class Cricket described in its
notice of removal is broader than Scott's defined class.  Cricket
opposed remand, attaching another declaration from Cricket
employee Rick Cochran ("Cochran Declaration") which stated that
Cricket's records indicate that between July 12, 2013 and March
13, 2014, Cricket customers who listed addresses located in
Maryland on their Cricket accounts purchased at least 47,760 CDMA
handsets that were locked to Cricket's CDMA network.  Cricket thus
urged the district court to make the easonable inference that the
vast majority of Cricket's Maryland customers are Maryland
citizens.

The district court declined to do so and granted Scott's motion to
remand.  Although the district court concluded that Cricket failed
to prove federal jurisdiction it did not make any finding of fact
as to the amount in controversy.  Cricket timely appealed.

Judge Duncan agrees with the district court that Cricket's initial
statement that it sold at least 50,000 CDMA mobile telephones that
were shipped to and activated in Maryland, during the relevant
time period suffices to allege jurisdiction under CAFA.  While
Cricket's assertion is broader than the proposed class, that does
not, as Scott argues, make the notice of removal incurably
defective.  Cricket's short and plain statement contains enough
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.

Once Scott challenged Cricket's allegations through a motion to
remand, Cricket was required to prove CAFA jurisdiction exists by
a preponderance of the evidence.  Because the district court
committed legal error in disregarding Cricket's evidence as over
inclusive, Judge Duncan says she's unable to engage in appellate
review to determine whether Cricket met its burden to prove
jurisdiction.

Accordingly, because she concludes that the district court applied
the wrong legal standard to Cricket's evidence, Judge Duncan
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for
reconsideration consistent with the principles set forth in her
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Af9LTo from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Charles Alan Rothfeld -- crothfeld@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER
BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Benjamin Howard Carney -- bcarney@GWCfirm.com -- GORDON, WOLF &
CARNEY, CHTD, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Archis A. Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com --
Matthew A. Waring -- mwaring@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER BROWN LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Martin E. Wolf -- mwolf@gordon-wolf.com -- GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY,
CHTD, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.

Kate Comerford Todd, Warren Postman, UNITED STATES CHAMBER
LITIGATION CENTER, INC., Washington, D.C.; Ryan L. Bangert --
chris.ryan@bakerbotts.com -- BAKER BOTTS L.L.P., Dallas, Texas,
for Amicus Curiae.


CYPO CAFE: Faces "Filet" Suit in Southern District of Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cypo Cafe, Inc. The
case is styled as Hector Filet, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CYPO CAFE, INC. and
Rafael M. Moledo, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-22717-MGC (S.D.
Fla., July 20, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Marcia G. Cooke.

Cypo Cafe is a cozy, art-filled cafe serving homestyle Brazilian
dishes, such as steak and fruit mousses for dessert.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Scott Minick, Esq.
          JONATHAN S. MINICK, P.A.
          1850 SW 8th Street, Suite 307
          Miami, FL 33135
          Telephone: (786) 441 8909
          Facsimile: (786) 523 0610
          E-mail: jminick@jsmlawpa.com


DAIRY FARMERS: Toms' Bid to Extend Opt Out Period Denied
--------------------------------------------------------
the case captioned ALICE H. ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAIRY
FARMERS OF AMERICA, INC. and DAIRY MARKETING SERVICES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 5:09-cv-230 (D. Vt.), Judge Christina Reiss
of the District Court for the District of Vermont denied Andrew
and Matthew Toms' motion to extend the time period to opt out of
the December 2015 Settlement.

In this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants
violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to control the supply of
raw Grade A milk in Federal Milk Market Order 1, which had the
effect of suppressing certain premiums paid to dairy farmers for
their milk.

The Court certified the Dairy Farmers Class, which consisted of
all dairy farmers, whether individuals, entities, or members of
cooperatives, who produced and pooled raw Grade A milk in Order 1
during any time after Jan. 1, 2002.  The Dairy Farmers Class is
comprised of two certified Subclasses: (i) all dairy farmers,
whether individuals or entities, who produced and pooled raw Grade
A milk in Order 1 during any time from Jan. 1, 2002 to the
present, who are members of DFA or otherwise sell milk through DMS
(DFA/DMS [S]ubclass); and (ii) all dairy farmers, whether
individuals or entities, who produced and pooled raw Grade A milk
in Order 1 during any time from Jan. 1, 2002 to the present, who
are not members of DFA and do not otherwise sell milk through DMS
(non-DFA/DMS [S]ubclass).

After the Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the case was set for trial.  The
Parties thereafter entered into a series of settlement agreements
which the Court rejected until they entered into the December 2015
Settlement, which included an opt-out provision.  On Feb. 8, 2016,
the Court preliminarily approved the December 2015 Settlement,
ordering that any member of the Subclass who did not previously
opt out of a Subclass but wishes to be excluded from the 2015
Settlement Agreement, may opt out of it by submitting a letter
expressing such intent to the Claims Administrator at least 21
days prior to the Fairness Hearing.

In a June 7, 2016 Opinion and Order, the Court granted the
Parties' motion for final approval of the December 2015 Settlement
("June 7, 2016 Opinion and Order").  On Aug. 19, 2016, it entered
an Order Identifying Subclass Exclusions and Opt-Ins, Dismissing
the Class Action Claims as to Defendants, Directing Entry of Final
Judgment, and Approving the Settlement Allocation Plan.

The Aug. 19, 2016 Order provided in relevant part that those
Subclass Members who failed to object to the December 2015
Settlement in accordance with the procedures outlined in the
Court-approved notice are deemed to have waived any objections to
the Settlement or the Settlement Agreement and are barred from
making such objections in the future.

Pending before the Court is the March 1, 2017 motion filed by the
Toms to extend the time period to opt out of the December 2015
Settlement.  The Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that it is
both untimely and made without justification.  The Toms did not
file a reply in support of their motion.  The Court took the
pending motion under advisement on March 29, 2017.

The Toms aver that their delay was the product of their belief
that they would be unable to secure counsel to represent them
individually and their lack of notice of the Opt-Out Litigation,
Sitts, et al. v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.  As the Defendants
point out, however, the Toms do not identify any efforts they
undertook prior to the opt-out deadline to secure counsel or
determine whether there was opt-out litigation pending.  They also
do not explain why they filed the instant motion four months after
the Opt-Out Litigation commenced.

While it is unlikely that the Defendants will be forced to expend
significant additional resources if the Toms are granted leave to
opt out and join the Opt-Out Litigation, they persuasively assert
that permitting the Toms to opt out at this time could prompt
other class members to seek permission for an untimely opt out.
The length of the delay, also weighs in the Defendants' favor.
The deadline to opt out was 21 days prior to the May 13, 2016
fairness hearing -- approximately 10 months before the Toms filed
the motion.  Significantly less substantial delays have precluded
a finding of excusable neglect.  The Court says it is satisfied
that the Toms have acted in good faith and the Defendants do not
argue to the contrary.  The Toms nonetheless made a conscious and
informed choice of litigation strategy and cannot in hindsight
seek extraordinary relief.

On balance, the Court finds that the relevant factors that must be
considered in determining excusable neglect weigh against such a
finding in the facts and circumstances of the case.  As a result,
the Toms remain bound by the December 2015 Settlement.
Accordingly, the Court denied their motion to extend the opt-out
deadline.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/YxPWMP from Leagle.com.

Alice H. Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky,
Esq., Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C..

Alice H. Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Brent W. Johnson, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Danyll W. Foix,
Esq., Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Emily J. Joselson,
Esq., Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Gregory J. Commins, Jr., Baker
& Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Kit A. Pierson, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Lisa B. Shelkrot, Esq.,
Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Robert G. Abrams, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Robert J. Brookhiser, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice & Terry L. Sullivan, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP.

Laurance E. Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky,
Esq., Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Brent W. Johnson,
Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Danyll W.
Foix, Esq., Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Emily J.
Joselson, Esq., Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Gregory J. Commins,
Jr., Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Kit A. Pierson, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Lisa B. Shelkrot,
Esq., Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Robert G. Abrams, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice, Robert J. Brookhiser, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP, pro hac vice & Terry L. Sullivan, Esq., Baker &
Hostetler LLP.

Garret Sitts, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Ralph Sitts, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Jonathan Haar, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky, Esq.,
Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Benjamin D. Brown, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Brent W.
Johnson, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice,
Daniel A. Small, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, David A. Balto, Esq., The Law Offices of David A. Balto,
Emmy L. Levens, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, George F. Farah, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC &
Kit A. Pierson, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice.

Claudia Haar, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky, Esq.,
Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Benjamin D. Brown, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Brent W.
Johnson, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice,
Daniel A. Small, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, David A. Balto, Esq., The Law Offices of David A. Balto,
Emmy L. Levens, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac
vice, George F. Farah, Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC &
Kit A. Pierson, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice.

Richard Swantak, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Peter Southway, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky,
Esq., Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Benjamin D. Brown,
Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Daniel A. Small, Esq., Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, David A. Balto, Esq.,
The Law Offices of David A. Balto, Emmy L. Levens, Esq., Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, George F. Farah, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Kit A. Pierson, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Marilyn Southway, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew D. Manitsky,
Esq., Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Benjamin D. Brown,
Esq., Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Daniel A. Small, Esq., Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, David A. Balto, Esq.,
The Law Offices of David A. Balto, Emmy L. Levens, Esq., Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, George F. Farah, Esq.,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC & Kit A. Pierson, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC.

Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alfred
C. Pfeiffer, Jr., Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Amber
L. McDonald, Esq., Baker & Miller PLLC, pro hac vice, Carl R.
Metz, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Elyse M.
Greenwald, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, Ian P. Carleton, Esq.,
Sheehey Furlong & Behm P.C., Jennifer L. Giordano, Esq., Latham &
Watkins LLP, Jonathan B. Pitt, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro
hac vice, Kevin Hardy, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac
vice, Lauren Collogan, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac
vice, Margaret M. Zwisler, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice, R. Jeffrey Behm, Esq., Sheehey Furlong & Behm P.C., Steven
R. Kuney, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP & W. Todd Miller, Esq.,
Baker & Miller PLLC, pro hac vice.

Dairy Marketing Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alfred C.
Pfeiffer, Jr., Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Amber L.
McDonald, Esq., Baker & Miller PLLC, pro hac vice, Carl R. Metz,
Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Elyse M. Greenwald,
Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, Ian P. Carleton, Esq., Sheehey Furlong
& Behm P.C., Jennifer L. Giordano, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP,
Jonathan B. Pitt, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice,
Kevin Hardy, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren
Collogan, Esq., Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Margaret M.
Zwisler, Esq., Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, R. Jeffrey
Behm, Esq., Sheehey Furlong & Behm P.C., Steven R. Kuney, Esq.,
Williams & Connolly LLP & W. Todd Miller, Esq., Baker & Miller
PLLC, pro hac vice.

Vermont Attorney General's Office, Amicus, represented by Ryan G.
Kriger, Esq., Vermont Office of the Attorney General.


DARNELL EARLEY: 6th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Sec. 1983 Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jane B. Stranch of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
Section 1983 claims as precluded by the Safe Drinking Water Act
("SDWA") in the appeals cases captioned BEATRICE BOLER; EDWIN
ANDERSON; ALLINA ANDERSON; EPCO SALES, LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. DARNELL EARLEY; GERALD AMBROSE; DAYNE WALLING; CITY OF FLINT;
STATE OF MICHIGAN; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY;
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; RICHARD DALE
SNYDER, Defendants-Appellees. MELISSA MAYS; MICHAEL MAYS;
JACQUELINE PEMBERTON; KEITH JOHN PEMBERTON; ELNORA CARTHAN; RHONDA
KELSO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICK SNYDER; STATE OF MICHIGAN;
DANIEL WYANT; LIANE SHEKTER SMITH; ADAM ROSENTHAL; STEPHEN BUSCH;
PATRICK COOK; MICHAEL PRYSBY; BRADLEY WURFEL; DARNELL EARLEY;
GERALD AMBROSE; DAYNE WALLING; HOWARD CROFT; MICHAEL GLASGOW;
DAUGHERTY JOHNSON; CITY OF FLINT; NICK LYON; ANDY DILLON; EDWARD
KURTZ; JEFF WRIGHT, Defendants-Appellees, Nos. 16-1684, 17-
1144(6th Cir.), and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Boler Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of
purchasers of Flint water against the Defendants.  They filed suit
in the Eastern District of Michigan on Jan. 31, 2016, alleging
twelve causes of action, five of them pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983: (i) impairment of the constitutional right to
contract; (ii) deprivation of substantive and procedural due
process; (iii) breach of the duty to protect against state-created
danger; (iv) breach of the Equal Protection Clause; and (v)
deprivation of property interest without due process or just
compensation.  They also alleged claims for (vi) conspiracy to
deprive them of a constitutional right in violation of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1985; (vii) breach of contract; (viii) unjust enrichment;
(ix) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; (x) violation
of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act; (xi) conversion; and
(xii) gross negligence.

The Boler Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin the Defendants from billing and collecting money
from Flint residents for water.  The court subsequently dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the
Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims were precluded by the SDWA,
leaving only state law claims over which the court did not have
jurisdiction.  The district court did not address the Plaintiffs'
claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985, but presumably found it
similarly preempted by the SDWA.  This appeal followed.

On Nov. 13, 2015, the Mays Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a
proposed class of Flint residents or regular users of Flint water
since April 25, 2014.

The Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on May 25, 2016.  It
alleged six causes of action, four of them under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983: (i) violation of substantive due process through state-
created danger; (ii) violation of substantive due process through
an invasion of the fundamental right to bodily integrity; (iii)
intentional race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protect
Clause; and (iv) impermissible wealth-based discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  The Plaintiffs also
asserted that the Defendants (v) engaged in a racially-motivated
conspiracy to deny equal protection under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985,
and (vi) engaged in discrimination in violation of Michigan's
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

Relying on its finding of preclusion by the SDWA in Boler, the
district court dismissed the Mays Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  The
court also determined that without the Section 1983 claims, the
Plaintiffs' Section 1985 claim based upon the same conduct also
failed.  Having dismissed the federal claims, the court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
discrimination claim.  The Plaintiffs appealed, and their case was
consolidated with Boler.

Judge Stranch finds that the Plaintiffs correctly note that the
only issues currently before the Court are the dismissal of their
Section 1983 claims as preempted by the SDWA and the question of
sovereign immunity.  Even though she has determined that the
Section 1983 claims are not foreclosed, the Defendants seek
affirmance under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. We may affirm the district court on
any basis supported in the record.  She declines to do so.

First, Boler was dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Though Mays was apparently
dismissed after motions brought under both Rule 12(b)(1) and
(12(b)(6), the district court premised the dismissal on its
resolution in Boler -- where it treated the issue as
jurisdictional.  Judge Stranch says the district court has
addressed the merits of the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims or
even the sufficiency of their pleadings.  Nor have the Plaintiffs
been given an opportunity to fully brief the merits of their
constitutional claims, which involve factual complexities that are
best examined by the district court in the first instance.
Moreover, the Boler and Mays Plaintiffs bring distinct
constitutional claims, based on different factual underpinnings
and legal arguments.  Judge Stranch adds that a consolidated
appeal is not the appropriate occasion to evaluate these claims
for the first time.  Such an analysis, moreover, could unfairly
prejudice the Plaintiffs, who have only addressed the Defendants'
Rule 12(b)(6) arguments in their reply briefs.  She believes the
district court is in the best position to evaluate these arguments
upon remand.

For these, Judge Stranch reversed the district court's dismissal
of the Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims as precluded by the SDWA.
She affirmed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims against the
State of Michigan in Mays, and against the State of Michigan, the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services, and Governor Snyder in
Boler, on the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.  She
remanded the cases for further proceedings in accordance with her
opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/HQttBS from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: 16-1684: Nicholas A. Szokoly, MURPHY, FALCON & MURPHY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.

William Y. Kim -- William.Kim@ropesgray.com -- CITY OF FLINT,
Flint, Michigan, for Flint Appellees.

Margaret Bettenhausen, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Lansing, Michigan, for State Appellees.

17-1144: Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants.

Margaret A. Bettenhausen, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees State of Michigan, Snyder, Lyon,
and Dillon.

William Y. Kim, CITY OF FLINT, Flint, Michigan, for Flint
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: 16-1684: Nicholas A. Szokoly, Jason G. Downs, Jessica H.
Meeder, MURPHY, FALCON & MURPHY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellants.

William Y. Kim, CITY OF FLINT, Flint, Michigan, Frederick A. Berg,
Jr., Sheldon H. Klein, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for
Flint Appellees.

Margaret Bettenhausen, Richard S. Kuhl, Nathan A Gambill, OFFICE
OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, Eugene Driker
-- edriker@bsdd.com -- Morley Witus -- mwitus@bsdd.com -- Todd R.
Mendel -- tmendel@bsdd.com -- BARRIS, SOTT, DENN & DRIKER, PLLC,
Detroit, Michigan, for State Appellees.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Amicus Curiae.

17-1144: Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michael L.
Pitt, Cary S. McGehee, Beth M. Rivers, PITT MCGEHEE PALMER &
RIVERS, PC, Royal Oak, Michigan, Paul F. Novak, Gregory
Stamatopolous, Diana Gjonaj, WEITZ & LUXENBERG, PC, Detroit,
Michigan, William H. Goodman, Julie H. Hurwitz, GOODMAN & HURWITZ,
PC, Detroit, Michigan, Deborah A. LaBelle, LAW OFFICE OF DEBORAH
A. LABELLE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants.

Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Richard S. Kuhl, Nathan A. Gambill,
OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for
Appellees State of Michigan, Snyder, Lyon, and Dillon.

William Y. Kim, CITY OF FLINT, Flint, Michigan, Frederick A. Berg,
Jr., Sheldon H. Klein, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, Todd
R. Perkins, Nikkiya Branch, THE PERKINS LAW GROUP PLLC, Detroit,
Michigan, Alexander S. Rusek, WHITE LAW PLLC, Okemos, Michigan,
EDWARD A. ZEINEH, DAVID W. MEYERS, LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD A. ZEINEH,
Lansing, Michigan, Barry A. Wolf, LAW OFFICE OF BARRY A. WOLF
PLLC, Flint, Michigan, BRETT T. MEYER, O'NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE,
P.C., Saginaw, Michigan, for Flint Appellees.

Michael J. Pattwell -- mpattwell@clarkhill.com -- Jay M. Berger --
jberger@clarkhill.com -- Christopher B. Clare --
cclare@clarkhill.com -- CLARK HILL PLC, Detroit, Michigan,
Thaddeus E. Morgan -- tmorgan@fraserlawfirm.com -- FRASER
TREBILCOCK, Lansing, Michigan, Charles E. arbieri, Allison M.
Collins, FOSTER, SWIFT, COLLINS & SMITH, Lansing, Michigan,
Phillip A. Grashoff, Jr. -- pgrashoff@kotzsangster.com -- Dennis
K. Egan -- degan@kotzsangster.com -- Krista A. Jackson -- Phillip
A. Grashoff -- KOTZ SANGSTER WYSOCKI, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan,
for Appellees Busch, Cook, Prysby, Rosenthal, Smith, Wurfel, and
Wyant.

Gregory M. Meihn -- gmeihn@foleymansfield.com -- FOLEY &
MANSFIELD, P.L.L.P., Ferndale, Michigan, Joseph F. Galvin, GENESEE
COUNTY DRAIN COMMISSION, Flint, Michigan, for Appellee Wright.

Sarah C. Tallman, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, Chicago,
Illinois, Dimple Chaudhary, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
Washington, D.C., Michael J. Steinberg, Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Detroit,
Michigan, for Amicus Curiae.


DICK SMITH:  Faces Shareholders Class Action Over Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
Petrina Berry, writing for The Daily Telegraph, reports that a
class action against failed electronics chain Dick Smith on behalf
of disgruntled shareholders has been given the green light.

The Supreme Court of NSW has granted legal firm Bannister Law
leave to file a class action against Dick Smith (DSHE) on
July 24.

Bannister Law principal Charles Bannister says the ruling is a win
for shareholders who lost a lot of money when the company
collapsed in January 2016.

"Thousands of shareholders have lost tens of millions because, we
allege, DSHE contravened provisions of the Corporations Act,
including by engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct on
various occasions throughout 2015," he said in a statement on July
25.

Mr Bannister said the firm alleges that the retailer misled
shareholders about the financial health of the company through
directors' declarations that the accounts during 2015 were up to
Australian Accounting Standards.

He said it will be alleged that the use of supplier rebates to
artificially inflate Dick Smith's reported profit deceived
shareholders who have suffered loss and damage as a result.

Another litigation firm, Investor Claim Partner, is also
investigating a class action on behalf of shareholders.

This is on top of claims filed earlier in 2017 in the Federal
Court by Dick Smith's lenders, National Australia Bank and HSBC.

The banks accuse the company of buying "bad stock" to inflate
income and earnings.

Dick Smith went into administration after failing to secure a
funds injection from its banks last year. [GN]


E.A. RENFROE: Cal. App. Reverses Judgment in "Quiroz"
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MONICA QUIROZ et al., Plaintiffs and
Respondents, v. E.A. RENFROE & COMPANY, INC., Defendant and
Appellant, No. C082316 (Cal. App.), Judge Jonathan K. Renner of
the Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Placer,
reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings.

In May 2015, Plaintiffs Quiroz and McTier filed a class action
complaint in Placer County against Renfroe on behalf of themselves
and other similarly situated current and former employees.  The
operative complaint alleges failure to provide meal and rest
breaks, failure to pay overtime, failure to pay final wages in a
timely manner, failure to provide accurate wage statements,
nonpayment of wages and an unfair competition law claim.  The
Respondents brought these claims as individuals and putative class
representatives seeking damages.  In their eighth cause of action,
the Respondents sued in a representative capacity under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 seeking civil penalties
for Labor Code violations.

Renfroe petitioned to compel arbitration and sought dismissal of
the Respondents' class and representative claims, and a stay of
litigation until arbitration was completed.

The trial court found that the Federal Arbitration Act governs the
arbitration agreement and the Alabama choice of law provision is
enforceable.  It ruled that the evidence presented by both parties
was sufficient to show the arbitration provision was
unconscionable under Alabama law.  It found that the employment
agreement "is strikingly one-sided with the majority of terms
favoring Renfroe."  The trial court decided not to sever any
provisions of the employment agreement.  Instead, it denied
Renfroe's requests to compel arbitration, dismiss the class and
representative claims, and stay the current litigation pending
arbitration.

Renfroe timely appealed.  It contends the trial court erred in
determining the arbitration agreement respondents signed when it
hired the Plaintiffs was unenforceable under Alabama law because
it was unconscionable.

Judge Renner finds that the Respondents have not demonstrated
procedural unconscionability under Alabama law.  As a result, the
arbitration agreement is not unconscionable under Alabama law.  He
has found no indication that ambiguity with respect to the
applicable arbitration rules has any relevance to the
unconscionability analysis under Alabama law.  Under Alabama law,
the fact that an arbitration agreement permits an employer but not
an employee to choose between arbitration and another forum does
not make an agreement unconscionable.  Further, the concept of
mutuality of remedies does not technically apply because Alabama
does not consider arbitration to be a remedy.  As to the
Respondents contention that the arbitration provision's definition
of prevailing party unfairly favors Renfroe, he says it is
undisputed that the prevailing party definition will not apply in
this action.  Thus, the Respondents' arguments are undone by their
lack of evidence regarding meaningful choice.  Nothing in the
substantive terms of the arbitration agreement alters his
conclusion that it is not unconscionable under Alabama law.

Therefore, Judge Renner reversed the trial court's judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the
views stated.  The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/2JG1ct from Leagle.com.


ELECTRICITY MAINE: Zurich Doesn't Want to Pay Class Action Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Darren Fishell, writing for Bangor Daily News, reports that the
insurer for electricity seller Electricity Maine says it doesn't
have to pay for the company to defend a class-action lawsuit, and
it wants a judge to agree.

Zurich American Insurance Co. has sued Electricity Maine in
federal court, where it hopes a judge will clarify whether the
insurer has any obligation to cover the company's costs or damages
that may come from the class-action suit.

Electricity Maine fired back, claiming the opposite, and arguing
the insurance policy it had from 2011 to 2012 should cover its
costs and potential losses.

Zurich alleges the lawsuit brought by Electricity Maine customers
does not fall within the terms of a policy Electricity Maine had
from 2011 to 2012 with Assurance Co. of America.  Zurich
eventually acquired the policy through mergers.

In November, two former customers sued Electricity Maine and
claimed thousands were lured by false advertising into electricity
contracts to power their homes.  The lawsuit alleges Electricity
Maine cost those customers at least $35 million in total.

Those customers have also argued that Zurich is legally required
to defend Electricity Maine in the case.

In the insurance dispute, the parties agreed to dismiss
Electricity Maine's current owner, the Houston-based Spark HoldCo,
as the company was not connected to Electricity Maine during the
time the policy was active.

Spark also wants out of the class-action suit, arguing that the
claims refer to a period before Spark had anything to do with the
Maine company.  A judge has not yet ruled on whether to dismiss
customers' claims against Spark.

The potential class-action lawsuit followed an investigation by
the Bangor Daily News that found electricity sellers such as
Electricity Maine charged residential customers about $50 million
more than the standard electricity rate, from 2012 to 2015.
Lawmakers passed new restrictions on those companies into law
earlier this year. [GN]


ENDOLOGIX INC: Wants California Judge to Sanction Shareholder
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Graf, writing for Law360, reports that Endologix Inc. urged
a California federal judge on July 21 to sanction a shareholder
whose amended complaint allegedly hinges on false statements made
by a single witness in a proposed class action claiming the
medical device maker misrepresented the likelihood that a product
would be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
causing its stock to plunge.

Endologix said shareholder Vicky Nguyen's first amended complaint
is based on statements by a single witness, referred to as "CW1,"
who denies making the statements and who disagrees with the
accuracy of the allegations.  The company is consequently seeking
sanctions including the dismissal of all statements attributed to
the witness and expenses and attorneys' fees related to this
request.

"Plaintiff and her counsel blindly adopted the allegations
attributed to CW1 by a third-party, chose not to confirm the
accuracy of any of the extensive quotations attributed to CW1, and
as a result, made fundamental misrepresentations of fact to the
court," the company said in the filing.

Ms. Nguyen filed the proposed class action in January, and amended
her complaint in May.  In it, she alleges Endologix assured
investors that it was on track to receive premarket approval from
the FDA for its medical device Nellix by early 2017, but the
company disclosed in late 2016 that the FDA required another two
years of testing, sending shares down more than 20 percent.  The
company updated investors in May that it would not seek FDA
approval for the "first generation" Nellix device, causing shares
to drop another 36 percent, according to the amended complaint.

Nguyen included statements from a confidential witness, the former
head of Aortic Procedure Development at Endologix, who said
Endologix was "consumed with" an "unsolvable problem" with the
Nellix products starting in 2015, meaning the company knowingly
misled investors about the likelihood of FDA approval, according
to the amended complaint.

But Endologix claimed on July 21 that they tracked down the only
former Endologix employee who matches the witness' description,
and he denies making the allegations and doubts their accuracy.
Ms. Nguyen's counsel delegated the witness interview to OnPoint
Investigations, and never interviewed the witness themselves,
confirmed quotations attributed to the witness or confirmed the
information attributed to the witness, thereby submitting false
information to the court, Endologix argued.

Ms. Nguyen's attorney Laurence M. Rosen of The Rosen Law Firm PA
called the company's request for sanctions "baseless."

"They improperly pressured a witness to change his statements,"
Rosen said by email. "The evidence will show our complaint is 100%
accurate."

Counsel for Endologix declined to comment.

Endologix is represented by Jason de Bretteville --
jdebretteville@sycr.com -- Justin N. Owens -- jowens@sycr.com --
and Kenneth P. Hsu -- khsu@sycr.com -- of Stradling Yocca Carlson
& Rauth PC.

Ms. Nguyen is represented by Laurence M. Rosen and Sara Fuks of
The Rosen Law Firm PA.

The suit is Vicky Nguyen v. Endologix et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-
00017 (C.D. Cal.).  The case is assigned to Judge Andre Birotte
Jr.  The case was filed January 3, 2017. [GN]


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Faces "Deutsch" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enhanced Recovery
Company, LLC. The case is captioned as Edmund B. Deutsch,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-04369 (E.D.N.Y., July 24, 2017).

Enhanced Recovery provides business process outsourcing services
that include recovery, outsourcing, and market research.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


ERNST & YOUNG: Oral Arguments on Waiver Issue Set for October 2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Holger G. Besch, Esq., of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in an article for
Lexology, wrote that perhaps signaling the importance of the issue
for American businesses and jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court
chose the first day of its term beginning in October as the date
to set oral arguments in three petitions for certiorari asking
whether employees can be required to waive their rights via
arbitration agreements to file class and collective actions
against their employers.  The arguments in Ernst & Young LLP v.
Morris; Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis; and NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA
Inc., will all be heard on October 2nd, so mark your calendars.

The cases before the Supreme Court originated before the National
Labor Relations Board, which had ruled that such agreements
violate workers' rights under the National Labor Relations Act to
take collective action to ameliorate their working conditions.

SCOTUS will be resolving the resulting Circuit split, in which the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits backed the NLRB's position when they
ruled against Ernst & Young and Epic Systems, respectively, and
the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Murphy Oil.  Opening briefs
are already on file and address, at bottom, whether the Federal
Arbitration Act or the NLRA should take precedence. [GN]


FBL FINANCIAL: Faces "Tronsgard" Suit in Kansas Federal Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FBL Financial Group,
Inc. The case is styled as Steve Tronsgard, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FBL Financial
Group, Inc., Farm Bureau Financial Services, Farm Bureau Property
& Casualty Insurance Company, Western Agricultural Insurance
Company, Farm Bureau Life Insurance, and FBL Marketing Services,
LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02393-CM-KGG (D. Kan., July
7, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. District Judge Carlos
Murguia.

FBL Financial is a financial services holding company whose
purpose is to protect livelihoods and futures.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron L. Kite, Esq.
          David J. Rebein, Esq.
          REBEIN BANGERTER REBEIN PA
          810 Frontview
          PO Box 1147
          Dodge City, KS 67801
          Telephone: (620) 227 8126
          Facsimile: (620) 227 8451
          E-mail: aaron@rbr3.com
                  Dave@rbr3.com


FINANCIAL ASSET: Faces "McGaster" Suit in District of New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Asset
Management Systems Inc. The case is titled as PHILL MCGASTER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. FINANCIAL ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INC., and JOHN
DOES 1-25, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-04981-ES-SCM (D.N.J.,
July 7, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Esther
Salas.

Financial Asset provides customized receivables management
services primarily in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marcus Zelman, LLC, Esq.
          YITZCHAK ZELMAN
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (347) 526 4093
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Ari Hillel Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
          1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695 3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: ari@marcuszelman.com


FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: Judge Halts Investors' Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Dan Churney, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
Chicago federal judge has put the brakes on a class action suit
filed by investors, who alleged they were ripped off for hundreds
of millions of dollars in a failed electric car venture, saying
the investors were asleep at the switch because they launched
their suit after the statute of limitations expired.

However, the judge gave plaintiffs an opportunity to take another
shot with an amended suit.

The July 20 ruling was issued by U.S. District Judge Rebecca
Pallmeyer, dismissing an October 2016 suit lodged by Orgonne
Capital, Lincolnshire Fisker LLC, David Burnidge, Kenneth A. Steel
Jr. and Robert F. Steel on behalf of themselves and about 100
putative class action members.

Defendants are the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers and its managing partners Ray Lane and John Doerr, as well
as Keith Daubenspeck and Peter McDonnell.

Mr. Daubenspeck founded the now-defunct Advanced Equities Inc., a
Chicago investment bank that sold millions of dollars worth of
securities for Fisker Automotive from 2009 to 2012.
Mr. McConnell was a senior managing director, and both worked with
Kleiner Perkins, which "exercised substantial control" over
Fisker's operations and finances.

Plaintiffs did not sue Fisker Automotive.

Fisker was set up to build luxury hybrid electric cars, raising
$1.3 billion in private capital and $192 million in public money
to that purpose, before going belly-up in late 2012.

Plaintiffs alleged defendants misled them into buying more than
$10.2 million in Fisker stock between October 2009 and September
2012, by not revealing the company was in crisis, because the
federal government froze further draw-downs on a $528.7 million
U.S. Department of Energy loan.

The DOE refused to release further funds because Fisker was on the
brink of insolvency, according to the suit.  However, defendants
kept this information secret and persuaded investors to continue
putting money into the project, based on the federal loan, the
suit said.

Plaintiffs lost their investments, describing the Fisker affair as
the "largest venture capital-backed debacle in U.S. history."

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit, saying plaintiffs
were bound by the Illinois Securities Law, which sets a three-year
limit for such suits.  Plaintiffs countered that their agreements
to buy Fisker stock, contained clauses that any disputes would be
decided under Delaware law, which sets a five-year limit.
Plaintiffs said they could not have invoked Illinois law even if
they so desired, because of the clauses in the agreements.

Judge Pallmeyer had no use for plaintiffs' argument, saying
plaintiffs presumed if they filed their suit under Illinois law,
defendants would have asserted the supposedly overriding Delaware
law. Further, plaintiffs presumed a judge would have found
Delaware law applied, Judge Pallmeyer added.

Simply put, Judge Pallmeyer said: "Plaintiffs cannot assert a
defense on behalf of an opponent that has not asserted it.
Plaintiffs waited too long and now rely on this conjectural,
procedurally inverted route to a timely claim."

Determining the three-year Illinois law applied, Judge Pallmeyer
ruled plaintiffs knew of their claims more than three years before
bringing suit in October 2016, most likely in April 2013, when
reports of alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in the
Fisker matter hit the news.

Judge Pallmeyer said she was puzzled plaintiffs did not attempt
the "more straightforward route" of simply arguing Delaware law
should be followed. If plaintiffs wish to do so, Judge Pallmeyer
gave them 21 days to amend their suit accordingly and keep the
litigation alive.

Plaintiffs are represented by the following firms: Wexler Wallace,
Chicago; Berger & Montague, Philadelphia; Klafter, Olsen and
Lesser, of Washington, D.C. and Rye Brook, N.Y.; and Rosenthal,
Monhait & Goddess, of Wilmington, Del.

The defendants, with the exception of Peter McDonnell, who is
representing himself, are defended by the firms of Freeborn &
Peters, Loeb & Loeb and Stetler & Rotert, all of Chicago; Keker,
Van Nest & Peters, of San Francisco; and Pepper Hamilton, of
Wilmington, Del. [GN]


FLOYD CO: Judge Approves $1.23MM Inmates' Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WDRB News reports that a federal judge approved a $1.23 million
settlement of a class action suit that alleged mistreatment of
several inmates at the Floyd County Jail in New Albany, Ind.,
plaintiffs' attorney Dan Canon confirmed on July 24.

In 2014, six former inmates sued Floyd County, then-sheriff
Darrell Mills and four corrections officers after their booking
into the jail for incidents as early as June 2012.

Their complaint said jail officers "stripped, held naked,
tortured, humiliated and abused" them by using unwarranted Taser
applications, pepper spray and other excessive force.  Officers
also placed the inmates in padded holding cells without toilets
and withheld proper bedding, clothing and hygiene supplies.

The maneuvers also exposed the inmates' private areas to
corrections officers and other inmates; at least one incident is
recorded on publicly-accessible video, the lawsuit said.

A third-party administrator will distribute the money after
payment of approximately $500,000 in attorneys' fees and costs and
$15,000 for each of the six plaintiffs for being "the faces" of
the suit.  Those six will receive additional payments according to
criteria in the settlement agreement, court records said.

The agreement also called for certification and additional
training of jail employees. The county already has discontinued
its "combative subjects" policy in effect when the plaintiffs were
arrested, court records said.

The parties first agreed to the settlement in February 2017.
Members of the class had until July 21 to submit claim forms.
[GN]


FORD MOTOR: Court Dismisses "Kommer" Suit with Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lawrence E. Kahn of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
case captioned, BRANDON KOMMER, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant, No. 1:17-CV-296 (LEK/DJS)(N.D.N.Y.).

In October 2015, Kommer purchased a 2015 Ford F-150 XLT Super Crew
truck from New Country Ford in Saratoga Springs, New York.  He
decided to purchase his truck after seeing Ford's "Built Ford-
Tough" advertisement on television and the Internet and
advertisements for the new redesigned Ford F-150.

Soon after Kommer purchased his vehicle, however, he had problems
with its doors and locks.  He also alleges that Ford knew of the
problem with the door handles but failed to disclose it.  On April
8, 2015, Ford issued a technical service bulletin ("TSB") entitled
"SUPERCAB/SUPERCREW CAB -- FROZEN OR INOPERATIVE DOOR LATCH" which
recognized that the door latches on some 2015 F-150 trucks did not
work in freezing temperatures, and outlined steps dealers should
take to address the problem.  The Plaintiff's truck was listed as
an affected vehicle and was also identified as eligible for repair
"Under Provisions Of New Vehicle Limited Warranty Coverage."
Despite issuing a TSB, Ford did not disclose the faulty door
handle problem to current or potential F-150 owners.  Kommer does
not allege that he took his truck to get repaired or that it was
not under warranty.

Kommer filed his Complaint against Ford on March 13, 2017,
alleging violations of N.Y. G.B.L. sections 349 and 350.  He
brings forwards two claims: (i) Ford's "Built Ford-Tough"
advertising was an affirmative misrepresentation and (ii) Ford
failed to disclose to consumer that the F-150 had defective door
handles.  He also seeks to represent himself and a class of
similarly-situated New York consumers who are current or former
owners or lessees of Ford F-150 vehicles for model years 2015-
2017.  On April 12, 2017, Ford moved to dismiss Kommer's Complaint
for failure to state a claim.  It argues that Kommer has failed to
state a claim under New York General Business Law ("N.Y. G.B.L.")
sections 340 and 350 because (i) Ford's advertisements describing
the quality and durability of its F-150s are non-actionable
puffery, and (ii) Kommer has not alleged a legally cognizable
injury.

Judge Kahn finds that Ford's advertisements for the F-150 make no
reference whatsoever to the quality of the vehicles' door handles.
Its statement that their vehicles are "Built Ford-Tough" is an
exaggerated and generalized claim similar to the advertisements
determined to be puffery in Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp.
Accordingly, the advertisements on which Kommer's affirmative
misrepresentation claim is premised are non-actionable puffery.

As to Kommer's second theory of liability that Ford's failure to
disclose the problems with the door handles constitutes a
violation of N.Y. G.B.L sections 349 and 350, Judge Kahn says the
Plaintiff fail to plausibly plead an injury.  Kommer alleges
merely that he incurred out-of-pocket costs to repair his truck
but readily admits that he has not personally expended any money
to repair his vehicle.  Kommer also alleges that he overpaid for a
product that has diminished value because of its defects but has a
perfectly adequate remedy available to him, and that defeats his
price-premium theory of injury.

Judge Kahn finds that the deficiency with Kommer's affirmative
misrepresentation claim is substantive in nature.  Thus, amendment
of this claim would be futile.

For these reasons, Judge Kahn granted Ford's motion to dismiss and
dismissed with leave to amend Kommer's affirmative
misrepresentation claim.  If Kommer wishes to proceed with his
misrepresentation-by-omission claim, he must file an amended
complaint as set forth within 30 days of the filing date of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order.  The Clerk of the Court is directed
to serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 memorandum-decision
and order is available at https://is.gd/OFIoe9 from Leagle.com.

Brandon Kommer, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey I. Carton --
jcarton@denleacarton.com -- Denlea & Carton LLP.

Brandon Kommer, Plaintiff, represented by Myles K. Bartley --
mbartley@denleacarton.com -- Denlea & Carton LLP & Robert J. Berg
-- rberg@denleacarton.com -- Denlea & Carton LLP.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Peter J. Fazio --
pjfazio@arfdlaw.com -- Aaronson, Rappaport Law Firm.


FORD MOTOR: Settles Class Action Over Defective Transmissions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Hornet's Ray Simon, citing Road and Track, reports that Ford
Motor Co. has agreed to provide "substantial cash payments" and
other benefits to the owners of about 1.5 million Fiesta and Focus
vehicles that had to be repaired due to allegedly defective
transmissions, the automaker has announced.

The agreement, which follows nearly 4 years of litigation
including 1 full year of settlement negotiations, affects owners
and lessees of Ford Fiestas and Ford Focuses from model years
2011-2016.

Ford did not oppose the settlement, but continues to deny any
wrongdoing associated with the alleged transmission defect, which
caused affected vehicles to "slip," "buck," "kick" or "jerk" while
accelerating, according to owners.

A quick search of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) database found more than 500 such
complaints filed by Fiesta and Focus owners.

The lawsuit was filed in California, but because of its status as
a class action, drivers in Indiana and Michigan qualify for
compensation under the settlement as well.

Ford initially offered customer service programs which included
free repairs and warranty extensions, but many vehicle owners were
forced to fix the problem on their own, according to the class
action. Plaintiffs claim that affected vehicles required multiple
software and hardware repairs that took weeks or even months to be
completed.

Per the agreement, class members with 3 or more visits to replace
1 of the main transmission parts will receive $200 for the 3rd
visit, plus increasing amounts for any additional repair trips.
Owners could also choose to receive a discount toward the purchase
of a new Ford vehicle equaling twice the amount of whatever cash
they qualified to receive.

In all, class members may be eligible to collect up to $2,325 in
cash or $4,650 in credit, according to the lawsuit.  Considering
that Ford ordered about 6 million replacement parts for roughly
1.5 million vehicles, it is expected that a large number of Fiesta
and Focus owners will qualify for compensation per the settlement.
[GN]


FOREVER 21: Faces Class Action in New York Over Sales Tax
---------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Koenig, writing for Law360, reports that a Forever 21
customer hit the retail clothing chain with a proposed class
action in New York federal court on July 24 accusing the company
of collecting sales taxes from online New York City customers
whose orders should have been tax-exempt.

Laura Togut wants to represent the thousands, "if not tens or
hundreds of thousands," of customers she says were charged New
York retail sales taxes for Forever 21 deliveries even though
individual clothing items in the city and state are supposed to be
exempt if they come in under $110.

"Defendants' sales tax assessment practices, in effect, are
improperly and fraudulently adding a surcharge to purchases, and
are disguising those surcharges as a 'sales tax' that does not
exist, and for which defendants lack authority to collect or
remit," Ms. Togut said.

According to the complaint, New York customers buying clothing
cheaper than $110 should be exempt from the state's 4 percent
retail sales tax, while New York City customers buying such
clothing should also be free of the city's 4.5 percent sales tax
and the 0.375 percent tax on the Metropolitan Commuter
Transportation District.

The problem is not limited to the city, according to the
complaint, which pointed to other jurisdictions that should be
exempt from the MCTD tax but where customers were charged anyway.

"Defendants illegally overcharge buyers up to 8.875% every time a
resident of New York City, or a resident of the counties of
Chautauqua, Chenango (outside of the city of Norwich), Columbia,
Delaware, Greene, Hamilton, Tioga, and Wayne, make an online
purchase of clothing or footwear from defendants for less than
$110 and have such purchase shipped to an address in their exempt
jurisdiction," Ms. Togut said.

Ms. Togut wants to represent all New York state customers charged
sales taxes that shouldn't have been collected, arguing that
retail transactions only incur sales taxes for the point of
delivery, not the source of the goods.

Ms. Togut contends Forever 21 knows about how the taxation rules
work but has still collected "without regard to the laws of the
taxing authority where defendants delivered the purchase."

The failure to calculate taxes based on where the clothes were
going "is problematic," Ms. Togut said, because many jurisdictions
either don't charge sales taxes or exempt clothing from those
taxes when the purchases happen in those jurisdictions or are
delivered there.

"As a result, if a consumer purchases defendants' clothing from
defendants who, upon information and belief, are within a
jurisdiction that charges sales tax, but the purchase is delivered
into a jurisdiction that does not charge sales tax," Ms. Togut
said, "defendants' payment system overcharges the consumer in the
guise of a sales tax that does not exist in the jurisdiction
governing that transaction."

Ms. Togut further alleged that the collected taxes never went to
New York coffers, pointing to her own May 19 online purchase of
more than 20 items of clothing all worth under $110, for which the
pre-tax total came to $283.40 and for which she was charged
another $22.90 in sales taxes.

"Instead, upon information and belief, defendants retained the
fraudulently obtained $22.90, or remitted it to taxing authorities
outside of New York, which authorities have no jurisdiction to
assess sales tax on purchases shipped to the exempt jurisdictions
in New York and New York City," she said.

An attorney for Ms. Togut, Bradley J. Bartolomeo --
bbartolomeo@mclaughlinstern.com -- said on July 24 that it's
unclear if the issue extends beyond New York state.

"However, we anticipate that this may be a broader issue and I,
along with my team at McLaughlin & Stern LLP, are prepared to
expand the case to a multidistrict lawsuit should such plaintiffs
surface in the future," Mr. Bartolomeo told Law360 in an email.

Forever 21 declined to comment on July 24.

Ms. Togut is represented by Bradley J. Bartolomeo and Lee S.
Shalov -- lshalov@mclaughlinstern.com -- of McLaughlin & Stern
LLP.

Counsel information for Forever 21 was not available on July 24.

The case is Togut v. Forever 21 Inc. et al., case number 1:17-cv-
05616, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. [GN]


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: "Ortolani" Suit Moved to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Gabriela Ortolani, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Freedom Mortgage Corporation, an unknown entity, the Defendant,
Case No. CIVDS1709817, was removed on July 24, 2017 from the San
Bernardino Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California (Eastern Division - Riverside). The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-01462 to the
proceeding.

Freedom Mortgage is a full-service direct lender founded in
1990.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


GENERAL NUTRITION: Faces "Gomez" Suit in S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against General Nutrition
Corporation. The case is titled as Andres Gomez, on his own and on
behalf of all other individuals similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
22747-MGC (S.D. Fla., July 24, 2017). The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Marcia G. Cooke.

General Nutrition retails vitamins, minerals, dietary supplements,
and sports nutrition products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L.KERR, P.A. DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          333 Las Olas Way, Suite CU3-311
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282 1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786 3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com


GEORGE WESTON: Graydon Attorney Discusses Ontario Court Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Lam, Esq. -- jessica.lam@blakes.com -- and Nicole
Henderson, Esq. -- nicole.henderson@blakes.com -- of Blake Cassels
& Graydon LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice recently dismissed a proposed class
action arising out of the collapse of a manufacturing facility in
Bangladesh.  On July 5, 2017, in Das v. George Weston Limited
(Das), the court found that under either Bangladesh or Ontario
law, putative class members had no legally viable claims against
the defendants.  The decision raises several local and
international legal issues regarding jurisdiction, choice of law,
and the scope of the duty of care owed by Canadian businesses that
source goods from abroad.

Das should be of interest to Canadian businesses that purchase
goods from foreign suppliers.  In dismissing the claims in this
case, the court was mindful of the limits of a company's control
over independent suppliers located abroad and the importance of
not deterring responsible foreign investment by Canadian
businesses.

BACKGROUND

Rana Plaza was a building in Bangladesh that housed numerous
businesses, including a clothing manufacturer that was a sub-
supplier to Loblaws.  On April 24, 2013, the plaza collapsed,
resulting in the death or injury of thousands.  Four Bangladesh
citizens commenced a proposed class action in Ontario against
Loblaws and Bureau Veritas, a consultant retained by Loblaws to
conduct a "social audit" of its sub-supplier in Rana Plaza.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were liable for
negligence, and that Loblaws was also vicariously liable for the
negligence of its suppliers and sub-suppliers, and liable for
breach of fiduciary duty.  Among other things, the plaintiffs
alleged that Loblaws failed to ensure that Rana Plaza complied
with Loblaws' Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards and
that the CSR standards were in any event inadequate.

The plaintiffs moved for certification of the proposed class
action.  The defendants brought a cross-motion to have the action
dismissed on the bases of lack of jurisdiction, choice of law,
limitations, and no viable cause of action against the defendants.

DECISION

Jurisdiction Over Absent Foreign Claimants

The court found that there was no doubt that an Ontario court had
jurisdiction simpliciter over the named parties.  The matter of
controversy was whether the court had jurisdiction over putative
class members who were not individually named as parties to the
litigation, and who resided in Bangladesh -- the so-called "absent
foreign claimants".  Loblaws argued that the absent foreign
claimants should be required to actively attorn to the Ontario
court's jurisdiction before the class could be certified.

In response, the plaintiffs revised the proposed class definition
and sought certification of an "opt-in" class rather than the
usual "opt-out" class, such that the court did not have to
determine whether it had jurisdiction to certify a global "opt-
out" class.  The motion judge held that had the class action been
certified, it would not have been necessary for putative class
members to have formally attorned before the certification motion
because their attornment would have been achieved post-
certification by a court-supervised opt-in notice program.

Choice of Law

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the pleaded
wrongdoing occurred in Ontario, where the defendants have offices.
Rather, the court held that any alleged wrongdoing took place in
Bangladesh -- the country substantially affected by the
defendants' alleged conduct and where the victims were located.
Accordingly, Bangladesh law applied to the claims.  To the extent
that limited aspects of Bangladesh law regarding compensation
might be found contrary to Canadian public policy, those aspects
of the law could be severed.

The court held that the claims of all class members (except those
who were minors at the time of the collapse) were statute-barred
under the one-year limitation period that applies to a wrongful
death claim under Bangladesh law.

Viability of the Plaintiff's Claims

The court found that the plaintiffs' assertion that a purchaser of
goods (Loblaws) should have a duty of care to the employees of the
manufacturer of those goods would be a novel duty, and went on to
consider whether such a duty should be recognized.

The court noted that mere foreseeability of harm is insufficient
to create a duty of care.  The law does not impose a positive duty
on a person to rescue others or to prevent a person from being
harmed by a third party's criminal acts, outside of narrow
circumstances.

Applying Ontario law, the court held that there was insufficient
proximity between the defendants and putative class members to
recognize a duty of care.  The court found that it would be
unreasonable to impose such a duty on the defendants, given that
they did not create the dangers at Rana Plaza, nor were they in a
position to ameliorate those dangers.

The court also cited numerous public policy factors negating the
existence of a duty of care, including the extension of liability
imposed on purchasers who would become responsible for the safety
of their supplier's employees in foreign lands, and the spectre of
indeterminate liability.  The court noted Canadian businesses may
be deterred from adopting CSR policies if doing so would mean
exposing the company to claims that their policies were not robust
enough to protect a supplier's employees.

The plaintiffs' vicarious liability claim against Loblaws was also
found to be unviable, given the absence of any direct control on
Loblaws' part.  The court also found that Loblaws could not owe
putative class members a fiduciary duty because, among other
things, there was no "legally significant relationship" between
Loblaws and the employees of an independent sub-supplier.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were not viable
under Bangladesh law for similar reasons.

CONCLUSION

In the result, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, finding
that their claims did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
Had the pleadings disclosed any viable claims, the court would
have been prepared to certify the class, with some modifications
to the proposed class definition.

The court's decision in Das signals that tort law has its limits,
even as business becomes increasingly globalized.

Blakes periodically provides materials on our services and
developments in the law to interested persons. [GN]


GOOGLE INC: Agrees to Settle Privacy Class Action in California
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Davis, writing for MediaPost, reports that Google recently
promised to end its practice of scanning email messages in order
to surround them with ads.  Now, the company has also agreed to
resolve a class-action privacy lawsuit stemming from its prior
email practices.

The proposed settlement agreement, submitted on July 21 to U.S.
District Court Judge Lucy Koh in San Jose, California, calls for a
three-year injunction that could affect Google's ability to send
ads to people based on the content of their emails.

Among other terms, the proposed settlement requires Google "to
cease all processing of email content that it applies prior to the
point when the Gmail user can retrieve the email in his or her
mailbox . . . and that is used for advertising purposes,"
according to the court papers.

Google also plans to stop processing email contents after they
reach users' in-boxes, but the company will not be required to
agree to that term as part of an injunction, according to the
court papers. Instead, that change is viewed by Google as
"independent of the settlement," but consistent with the deal,
according to documents filed with Judge Koh.

The deal doesn't call for individual users to receive monetary
damages, but allows them to pursue their own lawsuits against
Google. The class-action attorneys who brought the case could
receive up to $2.2 million.

The settlement stems from a complaint filed in September 2015 by
San Francisco resident Daniel Matera, who alleged that Google
violates a California privacy law and the federal wiretap law by
intercepting messages without people's consent.

Google's terms of service disclosed that it analyzed the contents
of email messages for features including "tailored advertising."
But Matera alleged that he didn't have a Gmail account, and
therefore never agreed to those terms.

Judge Koh rejected a previous settlement that would have required
Google to make some technical changes to its scanning system.  Koh
said at the time that it wasn't clear how those prior terms would
remedy the alleged violations of the federal wiretap law or
California's privacy statute.

Even though Google will no longer scan emails for ad purposes, the
company still plans to send targeted ads to Gmail users based on
data such as their search queries and YouTube viewing histories.
[GN]


GOPRO INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bielousov" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the case captioned ANTON BIELOUSOV, Individually and on Behalf of
All others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. GOPRO, INC. and
NICHOLAS D. WOODMAN, Defendants, No. 16-cv-06654-CW (N.D. Cal.).

On Sept. 19, 2016, GoPro unveiled two new HERO5 model cameras and
the Karma(R) quadcopter drone, which was its entry into the drone
market.  It stated that the Karma drone would be available on Oct.
23, 2016, globally, at select retailers and announced pricing for
the drone.  Brian McGee, the company's chief financial officer,
told investors that the drone would take GoPro to "new heights"
and that the company was on track to meet Feb. 3, 2016 revenue
guidance of $1.35-1.5 billion revenue for 2016.

The Plaintiff alleges, however, that these and other statements by
the Defendants were false and misleading.  GoPro was suffering a
severe shortage of Karma drones and a shortage of HERO5 cameras.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants knew of the product
shortages due to GoPro's use of a cloud-based NetSuite enterprise
resource planning system that gave them real-time access to supply
chain information.

On Nov. 16, 2016, Plaintiff Bielousov filed the original complaint
in this action.  On Feb. 6, 2017, the Court appointed Troy Larkin
as the Lead Plaintiff for a putative class of purchasers of GoPro
stock.  On March 14, 2017, the Lead Plaintiff filed the Amended
Class Action Complaint ("1AC"), alleging that the Defendants made
various false or misleading statements between Sept. 19, 2016 and
Nov. 8, 2016 about GoPro's HERO5 camera and Karma drone and misled
investors regarding its ability to meet its previous revenue
guidance.

He asserts two claims for violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).  The first claim is against all
Defendants for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-
5.  The second claim  is against the individual Defendants only as
control persons of GoPro, for violations of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78t(a).

The Defendants move to dismiss the 1AC.  The Plaintiff opposed the
motion and the Defendants filed a reply.  The Court held a hearing
on June 27, 2017.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims based on
McGee's "on track" statement, arguing that it falls within the
protection of the PSLRA's "safe harbor" protecting forward-looking
statements.  Under Omnicare, McGee was representing his and
GoPro's existing state of mind when he stated that when they
talked about their revenue guidance for 2016, its $1.35 billion to
$1.5 billion and they believe they're still on track to make that
as well.  This statement of present opinion, according to Judge
Wilken, is not forward-looking, and therefore is not covered by
the PSLRA safe harbor provision.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff fails to plead
scienter because the 1AC lacks any mention of specific data or
reports, any non-speculative description of the information that
GoPro's internal reporting system showed, or any allegation of who
actually accessed that information.  Judge Wilken these finds that
these allegations are bolstered by allegations of circumstantial
evidence.  These include the timing of corrective statements and
updates to risk factors as well as the resignation of Bates as
GoPro's president.  Most notably, Woodman and McGee's Sarbanes-
Oxley Act certifications filed with the SEC support their
scienter, because those certifications required them to access
sufficient reporting information to certify that the information
provided did not omit any material facts to make the report not
misleading.

Finally, the Defendants argue that if the Plaintiff fails to plead
a predicate violation of Section 10(b), his control person claim
also fails.  As discussed, however, Judge Wilken finds that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a primary violation of federal
securities law under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Accordingly,
his Section 20(a) claim may proceed.

For these reasons, Judge Wilken denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  Within 14 days after the date of the Order, the
Plaintiff must file a second amended complaint naming all
Defendants he intends to sue.  No other amendments are permitted
except as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/NunrFa from Leagle.com.

Anton Bielousov, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II -
- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Anton Bielousov, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP.

Troy Larkin, Plaintiff, represented by Richard W. Gonnello --
rgonnello@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Barbara Ann Rohr
-- brohr@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP, Katherine M.
Lenahan -- klenahan@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Farqui, LLP &
Sherief Morsy -- smorsy@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP.

GoPro, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kaitlin O. Keller --
kkeller@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP, Catherine Duden Kevane
-- ckevane@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP, Susan Samuels Muck -
- smuck@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP & Vincent Barredo --
vbarredo@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP.

Nicholas D. Woodman, Defendant, represented by Kaitlin O. Keller,
Fenwick & West LLP, Catherine Duden Kevane, Fenwick & West LLP,
Susan Samuels Muck, Fenwick & West LLP & Vincent Barredo, Fenwick
& West LLP.

Brian McGee, Defendant, represented by Catherine Duden Kevane,
Fenwick & West LLP & Vincent Barredo, Fenwick & West LLP.

Anthony Bates, Defendant, represented by Catherine Duden Kevane,
Fenwick & West LLP & Vincent Barredo, Fenwick & West LLP.

Zoinks, Inc., Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay --
RProngay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Sheldon Reinhardt, Movant, represented by Adam Christopher McCall
-- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP.

Edward Wayne Shorter, Movant, represented by Ramzi Abadou, Kahn
Swick Foti LLP.

Melissa Pham, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Osman Koci, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP.

Haluk Lee Aykut, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz
LLP.

Michael Sherman, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz
LLP.


HATELMACHER LLC: Faces "Casilao" Suit in W.D. Oklahoma
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hatelmacher LLC. The
case is captioned as Madelyn Casilao, Harry Lincuna, and Allan
Garcia, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Hatelmacher LLC, doing business as:
Holiday Inn Express; Steakmacher LLC, doing business as: Montana
Mikes Steakhouse; Schumacher Investments LLC, doing business as:
Water Zoo; Apex USA Inc.; and Walter Schmacher; Carolyn
Schumacher, the Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00800-M (W.D. Okla.,
July 26, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Vicki
Miles-LaGrange.

Holiday Inn Express is a mid-priced hotel chain within the
InterContinental Hotels Group family of brands. As an "express"
hotel, their focus is on offering limited services and a
reasonable price.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brady R Henderson, Esq.
          ACLU OF OKLAHOMA FOUNDATION
          3000 Paseo Dr
          Oklahoma City, OK 73103
          Telephone: (405) 525 3831
          Facsimile: (405) 524 2296
          E-mail: bhenderson@acluok.org


HERITAGE COMMUNITIES: Bid for Rehearing in "Harleysville" Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Donald W. Beatty of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
denied the Respondents/Appellants petition for rehearing in the
case captioned Harleysville Group Insurance, a Pennsylvania
Corporation, Appellant/Respondent, v. Heritage Communities, Inc.,
a South Carolina Corporation; Heritage Magnolia North, Inc., a
South Carolina Corporation; Buildstar Corporation, a South
Carolina Corporation; Magnolia North Horizontal Property Regime;
Magnolia North Property Owners Association, Inc., a South Carolina
Corporation; and National Surety Corp., Defendants, Of whom
Heritage Communities, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation; Heritage
Magnolia North, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation; Buildstar
Corporation, a South Carolina Corporation; and National Surety
Corp. are Respondents, and Magnolia North Horizontal Property
Regime and Magnolia North Property Owners Association, Inc., a
South Carolina Corporation, are Respondents/Appellants. And
Harleysville Group Insurance, a Pennsylvania Corporation,
Appellant/Respondent, v. Heritage Communities, Inc., a South
Carolina Corporation; Heritage Riverwalk, a South Carolina
Corporation; Buildstar Corporation, a South Carolina Corporation;
Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club Horizontal Property Regime;
Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club Property Owners Association,
Inc., a South Carolina Corporation; National Surety Corp.; and
Tony L. Pope and Lynn Pope, individually and representing as a
class all unit owners at Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club
Horizontal Property Regime, Defendants, Of whom Heritage
Communities, Inc., a South Carolina Corporation; Heritage
Riverwalk, a South Carolina Corporation; Buildstar Corporation, a
South Carolina Corporation; National Surety Corp.; and Tony L.
Pope and Lynn Pope, individually and representing as a class all
unit owners at Riverwalk at Arrowhead Country Club Horizontal
Property Regime, are Respondents, and Riverwalk at Arrowhead
Country Club Horizontal Property Regime and Riverwalk at Arrowhead
Country Club Property Owners Association, Inc. are
Respondents/Appellants, Opinion No. 27698 (S.C.).

The Riverwalk and Magnolia North developments were constructed
between 1997 and 2000.  After construction was complete and the
units were sold, the purchasers became aware of significant
construction problems, including building code violations,
structural deficiencies, and significant water-intrusion problems.
In 2003, the purchasers filed suit to recover damages for
necessary repairs to their homes.

The lawsuits were filed by the respective property owners'
associations ("POAs"), which sought actual and punitive damages
for the extensive construction defects under theories of negligent
construction, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of warranty.
As to the Riverwalk development, individual homeowners also filed
a class action to recover damages for the loss of use of their
property during the repair period.

During the period of construction from 1997 to 2000, the various
Heritage entities each maintained several liability insurance
policies with Harleysville with per-occurrence limits totaling
between $3,000,000 and $4,000,000 on the primary policies and
between $9,000,000 and $13,000,000 on the excess liability
policies.  Heritage was uninsured after the last policy lapsed in
2001, and the financial strain of numerous construction-defect
lawsuits caused Heritage to go out of business in 2003.  After
receiving notice of the lawsuits, Harleysville informed its
insureds that it would provide for their defense; however,
Harleysville contends this was done under a full reservation of
rights.  At the outset of each trial, Harleysville's counsel for
Heritage conceded liability, and in both trials, the trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the POA on the negligent
construction cause of action.  Thus, the only contested issue in
the underlying trials was the nature and extent of the damages
resulting from the admitted negligent construction.

In this regard, the parties presented various experts who offered
widely different estimates of the costs to correct the
construction defects.  In the Magnolia North matter, the jury
returned a general verdict for $6,500,000 in actual damages and
$2,000,000 in punitive damages, and in the Riverwalk suit, the
jury returned a general verdict of $4,250,000 in actual damages
and $250,000 in punitive damages in favor of the POA and $250,000
in loss-of-use damages and $750,000 in punitive damages in the
class action.

Following these general jury verdicts against its insureds,
Harleysville filed the present declaratory judgment actions to
determine what portion of the judgments in the underlying
construction-defect lawsuits would be covered under Heritage's CGL
policies.  In filing these suits, Harleysville contended that,
under the terms of the policies, it has no duty to indemnify
Heritage for these judgments.  Alternatively, if any of the
damages were found to be covered, Harleysville sought an
accounting to somehow parse the jury verdicts and determine which
portion of the juries' general verdicts constituted covered
damages.  Harleysville further argued it could be responsible for
only that portion of damages occurring during the period of time
its policies provided coverage.

The matter was referred to a Special Referee, who held an
evidentiary hearing in December 2010.  Because this Court's
decision in Crossmann Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v.
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. was pending at the time, the
parties agreed for the Special Referee to stay the matter until
Crossmann was resolved. After Crossmann was decided in August
2011, the parties agreed for the Special Referee to reopen the
evidentiary hearing in December 2011 to hear arguments and
testimony regarding the applicability of the time-on-the-risk
formulation as set forth in Crossmann.

Ultimately, the Special Referee ordered the full amount of the
actual damages in the construction-defect suits would be subject
to Harleysville's duty to indemnify in proportion with its time on
the risk.  Lastly, the Special Referee found punitive damages were
covered and that no policy exclusion applied to preclude coverage
for any portion of those damages.

The parties subsequently filed cross-appeals.  Harleysville is the
primary Appellant.  Upon the parties' joint motion, these matters
were certified from the court of appeals to this Court pursuant to
Rule 204(b), SCACR.

In sum, the Court finds the Special Referee correctly found
Harleysville failed to reserve the right to contest coverage of
actual damages and that punitive damages are covered under the CGL
policies.  It also finds there is evidence in the record to
support the Special Referee's factual findings as to the
progressive damages periods and that the Special Referee did not
abuse its discretion in determining Harleysville's time on the
risk at Magnolia North.  It finds loss-of-use actual damages at
Riverwalk are subject to time-on-the-risk allocation but that
punitive damages at both developments are not.  The Court thus
affirmed in the Magnolia North matter and affirmed as modified in
the Riverwalk matter.

The Court granted the Appellant/Respondent's petition for
rehearing, dispensed with further briefing, and substituted the
attached opinions for the opinions previously filed in the matter.
As to the petition for rehearing filed by Respondents/Appellants,
the Court is unable to discover any material fact or principle of
law that has been either overlooked or disregarded, and therefore,
it denied the Respondents/Appellants' petition for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/IHOVyq from Leagle.com.

C. Mitchell Brown -- mitch.brown@nelsonmullins.com -- William C.
Wood, Jr. -- bill.wood@nelsonmullins.com -- and A. Mattison Bogan
-- matt.bogan@nelsonmullins.com -- all of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia and Robert C. Calamari, --
bob.calamari@nelsonmullins.com -- of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant/Respondent.

John P. Henry -- phenry@thompsonlaw.com -- and Philip C. Thompson
-- pthompson@thompsonlaw.com -- both of Thompson & Henry, P.A., of
Conway, for Respondents/Appellants.

Elliott B. Daniels -- edaniels@murphygrantland.com -- of Murphy &
Grantland, P.A., of Columbia, and Laura A. Foggan --
lfoggan@crowell.com -- of Crowell & Moring LLP, of Washington,
D.C., for Amici Curiae Complex Insurance Claims Litigation
Association and Property Casualty Insurers' Association of
America.


HESKA CORP: Denied to Certify Questions to Colorado High Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut
corporation, Plaintiff, v. HESKA CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation; and SHAUN FAULEY, a natural person, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 15-CV-2435-MSK-KMT (D. Colo.), Judge Marcia S. Krieger
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted
the Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Affirmative Partial Summary
Judgment and denied the Defendant's Certify Questions to the
Colorado Supreme Court.

Mr. Fauley, named as a defendant in this case but never served,
filed a lawsuit against the Defendant in the Northern District of
Illinois ("Underlying Litigation").  He seeks to recover under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act on a class-action basis for an
unsolicited fax he alleges he received in May 2013.  Mr. Fauley
seeks the greater of his "actual monetary loss" or $500 for each
violation of the Act, and seeks treble recovery for a willful or
knowing violation of the Act.  With regard to his monetary loss,
Mr. Fauley alleges the fax caused a loss of paper, toner, and
time, and used phone lines.

The Plaintiff was the Defendant's provider for commercial
liability insurance at all times relevant to the Underlying
Litigation.  To that end, from 2010 to 2014, Phoenix issued four
successive policies, each lasting one year.  The Policies each
included a provision undertaking a right and duty to defend the
insured against any suit seeking damages for bodily injury or
property damage, provided the damages were caused by an occurrence
that takes place in the coverage territory.  Each of the Policies
contained exclusions, removing coverage from bodily injury or
property damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured.

Phoenix denied coverage for the Underlying Litigation in a May 8,
2015 letter to Heska.  After communication with Heska that is not
in the record, Phoenix agreed to participate in the Underlying
Litigation under an express reservation of all of its rights,
contractual, quasi-contractual and/or otherwise, to the extent
permitted by Colorado law, to seek reimbursement or recoupment of
all defense fees and costs paid in connection with any and all
non-covered claims.  Phoenix also reserved the right to decline
coverage and withdraw from the defense.

Phoenix filed this suit in November 2015, seeking declaratory
judgment on the Policies.  It contends that any number of the
foregoing provisions operates to remove the Underlying Litigation
from coverage.  In August 2016, the Court bifurcated Phoenix's
claim into two claims: whether it has a contractual obligation to
defend Heska in the underlying action and whether it has a
contractual obligation to indemnify Heska for its liability, if
any, determined in the underlying action.  The Court also stayed
discovery as to the duty-to-indemnify claim pending determination
of the duty-to-defend claim.  Phoenix moved for summary judgment,
as amended, on Sept. 9, 2016, and Heska moved to certify questions
to the Colorado Supreme Court on Oct. 30, 2016.

As an initial matter, Heska asks the Court to certify a number of
questions to the Colorado Supreme Court: (i) wWhether Phoenix has
a duty to defend Heska in the Underlying Litigatio; (ii) whether
this action is an anticipatory declaratory judgment action; (iii)
whether, in an anticipatory declaratory judgment action, the
insurer under a liability insurance policy owes a duty to defend a
lawsuit against the insured unless the insurer can prove the
allegations in the complaint against the insured fall solely and
entirely within an exclusion to the insurance policy; (iv)
whether, for purposes of determining the duty to defend, the
allegations in the complaint against the insured must be construed
broadly in favor of coverage; (v) whether, for purposes of
construing allegations in a complaint against the insured broadly
in favor of coverage for purposes of determining a liability
insurer's duty to defend, the Court must consider whether the
insured could be found liable on a cause of action not asserted in
the complaint if facts alleged would support liability under that
cause of action; (vi) whether a liability insurer can avoid its
duty to defend a lawsuit against an insured based on a policy
exclusion, if the complaint against the insured, construed broadly
in favor of coverage, alleges facts that would support a cause of
action not pled but, if proved, would potentially fall outside the
operation of the policy exclusion; (vii) whether a liability
insurer is required to clearly and unambiguously state in writing
to the insured all bases on which the insurer reserves its right
to deny coverage for a claim against the insured within a
reasonable time after the insurer receives notice of the claim
from the insured; and (viii) whether a liability insurer waives
any coverage defense the basis for which is not clearly and
unambiguously stated in writing to the insured within a reasonable
time after the insurer receives notice of the claim from the
insured.

The Court declined to certify any of the questions Heska urges,
finding that the dispositive issue in this case can be resolved by
applying Colorado law to the terms of the policy.  Under Colorado
law, an insurance policy constitutes a contract, which courts
construe using general principles of contractual interpretation.
There is no ambiguity here; the plain meaning of the Policies'
terms is clear to the Court.  Furthermore, many of Heska's
proposed questions are either already determined by existing law
or unnecessary to determine to resolve the case.

Phoenix argues a number of provisions in the Policies confirm it
has no duty to defend in the Underlying Litigation.  Though the
Court doubts the terms "property damage," "occurrence," and
"accident," contemplate a claim under the Act, the Court says it
need not parse and resolve these terms because the Policies'
exclusions clearly remove such claims from coverage.
Specifically, the unsolicited-communications exclusion, by the
plain meaning of its text, indicates that Phoenix will not cover
any claims for damages arising out of unsolicited communications
by or on behalf of the insured.  There can be no reasonable
disagreement that the claim in the Underlying Litigation is not
only excluded from coverage under the Policies, but clearly
contemplated by Phoenix as a situation under which it will not
provide coverage.  The Court thus finds that Phoenix has no duty
to defend in the Underlying Litigation.

Finding that the Policy excludes coverage for the claims asserted
in the Underlying Litigation, the Court does not need to address
the duty-to-indemnify claim.  Thus within 14 days, the parties
will show cause why such claim should not be dismissed.  By such
deadline, the parties will address whether Phoenix's request for a
recoupment order, can be addressed in this litigation, and if so,
by what mechanism.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denied the motion to certify
and denied as moot Phoenix's motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 opinion and order is
available at https://is.gd/RM1XBb from Leagle.com.

The Phoenix Insurance Company, Plaintiff, represented by Carolyn
J. Fairless -- fairless@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell,
LLP.

The Phoenix Insurance Company, Plaintiff, represented by Evan
Bennett Stephenson -- stephenson@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP.

Heska Corporation, Defendant, represented by Dennis Boyd Polk,
Holley, Albertson & Polk, P.C., Eric Edward Torgersen, Holley,
Albertson & Polk, P.C. & Melissa Ray Liff, Holley, Albertson &
Polk, P.C..

Heska Corporation, Counter Claimant, represented by Dennis Boyd
Polk, Holley, Albertson & Polk, P.C., Eric Edward Torgersen,
Holley, Albertson & Polk, P.C. & Melissa Ray Liff, Holley,
Albertson & Polk, P.C..

The Phoenix Insurance Company, Counter Defendant, represented by
Carolyn J. Fairless, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP & Evan Bennett
Stephenson, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP.


HOMELAND SECURITY: Faces "Morales" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Homeland Security.
The case is styled as ANA CORAL CORTEZ MORALES, ON BEHALF OF
HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. JOHN
F. KELLY, AS SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JAMES MCCAMENT, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THOMAS D. HOMAN, AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
KEVIN MCALEENAN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; and BRENDA SLOAN, IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-03342-LDD (E.D. Pa., July 26, 2017).
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Legrome D. Davis.

The United States Department of Homeland Security is a cabinet
department of the United States federal government with
responsibilities in public security, roughly comparable to the
interior or home ministries of other countries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John J. Grogan, Esq.
          LANGER GROGAN & DIVER PC
          Three Logan Square
          1717 Arch St Ste 4130
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 320 5660
          E-mail: jgrogan@langergrogan.com


HUALALAI INVESTORS: "Brooks" Suit Moved to Hawaii Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Steven Brooks, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v.
Hualalai Investors, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;
Four Seasons Hotels Limited, a Canada corporation; and Does 1
through 10 inclusive, Case No. 17-1-0209K, was removed on July 26,
2017 from the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawaii,
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii (Hawaii).
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:17-cv-00364-KJM-NONE
to the proceeding.

The case is assigned to the Hon. Magistrate Judge Kenneth J.
Mansfield.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth S. Robbins, Esq.
          Margery S. Bronster, Esq.
          Robert M. Hatch, Esq.
          BRONSTER FUJICHAKU ROBBINS
          1003 Bishop Street, Suite 2300
          Honolulu, HI 96813
          Telephone: (808) 524 5644
          Facsimile: (808) 599 1881
          E-mail: krobbins@bfrhawaii.com
                  mbronster@bfrhawaii.com
                  rhatch@bfrhawaii.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Barry A. Sullivan, Esq.
          Patrick K. Shea, Esq.
          William Meheula, Esq.
          SULLIVAN MEHEULA LEE, LLP
          733 Bishop Street, Suite 2900
          Honolulu, HI 96813
          Telephone: (808) 599 9555
          Facsimile: (808) 533 2467
          E-mail: sullivan@smlhawaii.com
                  shea@smlhawaii.com
                  meheula@smlhawaii.com


INTELLITIX INC.: "Kovacevic" Suit Sues over RFID Wristbands
-----------------------------------------------------------
ADMIR KOVACEVIC and ALEXA PARASHOS, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. INTELLITIX,
INC., INTELLIPAY, INC., and DOES 1-10, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:17-cv-03873-DMR (N.D. Cal., July 7, 2017), seeks to
recover compensatory damages, including actual and statutory
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as reasonable
attorneys' fees and the cost of the action.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and similarly situated
individuals attended music festivals and/or other events in
California and New York. In order to purchase food, merchandise,
and/or other goods or services at Festivals, consumers used
Radiofrequency Identification (RFID) wristbands with a form of
Festival-specific currency, such as "Bison Bucks" or "Birdie
Bucks," from Defendants that they loaded onto the RFID wristbands
instead of cash, credit, debit, or other forms of payment. The
Defendants advertise the RFID wristbands as a "digital wallet," or
a convenient cashless method to pay vendors for goods and/or
services at events, including Festivals. They also promote their
wristbands to Festival organizers and vendors as a way to reduce
queues and increase "spend," which is the amount of money that
customers spend on goods and services at Festivals.

To purchase goods or services at Festivals, patrons load money
onto the RFID wristband via credit card, debit card, cash, or
other methods, and use the funds loaded onto the wristbands to
purchase goods or services from vendors at Festivals generally by
scanning their wristbands at the individual vendors' scanners. The
Plaintiffs herein loaded money onto their RFID wristbands and used
the wristbands to purchase goods and/or services at Festivals. The
money that they loaded onto their wristbands was converted to a
Festival-specific currency. For example, at the Outside Lands
festival attended by Plaintiff Parashos, money loaded onto her
RFID wristband was converted to "Bison Bucks," with each Bison
Buck equal to approximately $1.00. At the Mysteryland Festival
attended by Plaintiff Kovacevic, money loaded onto his RFID
wristband was converted to "Birdie Bucks," with each Birdie Buck
equal to approximately $2.22.

The Plaintiffs, like many Festival attendees, did not spend all of
the money that had been pre-loaded onto their wristbands at the
Festivals. However, Defendants failed to refund all unused funds
to Plaintiffs. In Plaintiff Parashos' case, Defendants failed to
refund any of her unused funds at all, despite the fact that she
loaded the "Bison Bucks" onto her RFID wristband with a debit
card. In Plaintiff Kovacevic's case, Defendants charged a $5.00
processing fee before refunding the remainder of Mr. Kovacevic's
leftover funds, but failed to disclose the refund processing fee
in the manner required under New York law to Mr. Kovacevic at the
time he loaded funds onto his wristband, or at any point
thereafter until after he was provided his
refund. Defendants engage in the above misconduct despite the fact
that on their website, they specifically represent that refunds
will be provided. Specifically in a section entitled
"how cashless payment works," defendants list 3 steps: "(1) top-up
cashless account; (2) tap wristband to purchase; (3) get post
event refund." See https://www.intellitix.com/cashless-payment/
(last accessed April 27, 2017).

Intellitix is a global provider of RFID access control and
cashless payment systems for live events.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stanley D. Saltzman, Esq.
          Adam M. Tamburelli, Esq.
          Cody Kennedy, Esq.
          MARLIN & SALTZMAN LLP
          29800 Agoura Road, Suite 210
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 991 8080
          Facsimile: (818) 991 8081
          E-mail: ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com
                  atamburelli@marlinsaltzman.com
                  ckennedy@marlinsaltzman.com


KAREY WITTY: Court Dismisses "Kelley" Suit With Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, denied both the
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Appoint
Counsel in the case captioned RICHARD KELLY, Plaintiff, v. KAREY
WITTY CEO Corizon Health, Inc., Defendant, No. 1:17-cv-00989-TWP-
DML (S.S. Ind.).

The Plaintiff seeks to bring several claims on behalf of all
present and future inmates at New Castle Correctional Facility.
The lone Defendant is the CEO of Corizon Health, Inc., the private
entity contracted to provide healthcare to inmates at New Castle.
The claims involve nearly every aspect of health care provided at
New Castle, including claims regarding the drug approval
procedures, chronic care practice, and dental care.

The Court screened the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915A(b) in a Screening Entry dated May 24, 2017.  It
dismissed the Complaint at screening, finding that the Complaint
must be dismissed because he is not bringing his claims on his own
behalf.  Specifically, he states that his claims are brought as a
class action rather than on behalf of any one individual.  But a
pro se prisoner cannot typically establish the criteria necessary
to bring a class action.  Kelly may still proceed with his
individual claims on his own behalf.  However, the Plaintiff's
allegations are devoid of any specific allegations regarding how
he was harmed by any of the alleged conduct or how the Defendant
was personally responsible for them.  Without such allegations,
Kelly cannot state a Section 1983 claim.

The Court gave Kelly an opportunity to file an amended complaint
that included allegations of how he was personally affected by the
generalized allegations regarding the medical care at New Castle
set forth in his class action complaint.  Instead of filing an
amended complaint, Kelly filed a motion to appoint class counsel
and a motion to reconsider the Court's Screening Entry.  In his
motion to reconsider, Kelly states that he will not amend the
original class action complaint in this matter in order to turn
this into a personal claims civil complaint, and should the Court
deny the appointment of class counsel, he intends to move directly
to the appeals stage.

The Court denied Kelly's motion to appoint class counsel because
he is not entitled to class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) or
otherwise, nor, even if this were not a barrier, has he made an
attempt to secure class counsel on his own.  Kelly's motion to
reconsider is also denied because he made clear in his motion that
if the Court denies his motion to appoint class counsel he will
not file an amended complaint to pursue individual claims.
Accordingly, the action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A because Kelly has failed to state a viable
Section 1983 claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Ztifrp from Leagle.com.

RICHARD KELLY, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

KAREY WITTY, CEO Corizon Health, Inc., Defendant, Pro Se.


KFC: Faces $10MM Suit Over Multiple Sexual Assaults by Manager
--------------------------------------------------------------
The former manager of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant is
accused of multiple sexual assaults performed on a 16-year-old
female worker.  The suit alleges that between 2013-2014, the
16-year-old was groomed by former KFC general manager,
Sean McIntosh, 35, to have sex at the KFC store while they worked
as well as offsite.  Mr. McIntosh is alleged to have had oral and
vaginal sex with the minor more than 50 times at various
locations, including at a local hotel, at the KFC restaurant
dumpster, in cars as well as public places.  The suit also alleges
that other KFC managers at the restaurant were similarly engaging
in sex with underage female employees and entered into a pact to
cover-up for one another in order to facilitate their sexual
interactions with children (In Texas, the age of consent is 17).
The Cause Number for the case, filed in Harris County,
Texas, is 2016-81879.

George Edwards, III, Esq. -- george@eslawpartners.com -- and
Murtaza Sutarwalla, Esq., -- murtaza@eslawpartners.com -- of
Edwards Sutarwalla PLLC and Benjamin Hall, III, Esq., --
george@eslawpartners.com -- of The Hall Law Firm represent the
plaintiff in this case.  The suit seeks $10 million in actual
damages and an unspecified amount of punitive damages.
Court records show that the victim has filed criminal charges
against Mr. McIntosh for the sexual assaults.  A judge has also
issued a temporary restraining order against McIntosh.

In another case, filed on June 14, 2017, in Harris County, Texas,
another employee of the same KFC restaurant filed a lawsuit
against Mr. McIntosh, Regional Manager Shawn Baker, two KFC
cooks, and KFC Corporation for an alleged attempted rape of that
employee when she was 16 years old.  Mr. McIntosh reportedly
learned immediately of the attempted rape, only to disregard it
and make jokes about the rape.  Mr. McIntosh is alleged to attempt
to have "oral and vaginal sex without her consent" with the minor
plaintiff.  The suit seeks more than $100,000 in damages.  The
Cause Number for the case, filed in Harris County, Texas, is 2017-
39729.  Allen H. Zwernemann, Esq. -- az@azf.com -- of The
Zwernemann Law Firm and Chavon D. Carr, Esq. --
Ccarr@carr.associates.com -- represent the plaintiff in this case.

                  About Edwards Sutarwalla PLLC

Edwards Sutarwalla PLLC -- http://www.eslawpartners.com-- is a
full-service business law firm based in Houston and Austin, Texas,
practicing areas of commercial transactions and litigation,
corporate law, real estate and health care law.

A copy of the 2016 Complaint is available for free at:

   http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kKuSyQz7

A copy of the 2017 Complaint is available for free at:

   http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=UT7Pb1UF


KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Mulder" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kermit V. Lipez of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Mulder's
claims in the case captioned ELLEN MULDER, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Defendant, Appellee, No. 16-
1238 (1st Cir.).

This appeal involves a putative class action lawsuit arising out
of allegedly deceptive labeling and marketing of products by
Kohl's.  The Appellant purchased several items from a Kohl's store
in Hingham, Massachusetts.  The price tags on these items listed
both purchase prices and significantly higher "comparison prices."
She alleges that these comparison prices are entirely fictional,
and were selected by Kohl's to mislead unsuspecting consumers
about the quality of its products.

Feeling cheated by Kohl's allegedly deceitful pricing scheme, on
Nov. 20, 2014, Mulder filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court.
She filed an amended complaint on Feb. 19, 2015.  The amended
complaint alleged claims for fraud, breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, violations of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, and violations of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A ("Chapter 93A").

After Kohl's removed the case to federal court, it successfully
moved to dismiss all of Mulder's claims.  The district court held
that Mulder had failed to adequately plead a legally cognizable
injury under Chapter 93A, and further denied her requests to
certify several Chapter 93A questions to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ("SJC") and for leave to file a second amended
complaint.  The court also dismissed all of Mulder's common law
claims.

On appeal, Mulder challenges dismissal of her Chapter 93A claim
and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment.

Judge Lipez affirmed.  He explains that in dismissing all of
Mulder's claims, the district court noted that this case involved
allegations "substantially identical" to those made against
another retailer in Shaulis v. Nordstrom Inc., in which the
plaintiff was also represented by the Mulder's counsel.  The
Plaintiffs appealed in both cases, and their appeals were joined
for oral argument before this court.  Discerning no relevant
factual or legal distinctions between these two cases, and
applying his opinion in Shaulis v. Nordstrom, he affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Mulder's Chapter 93A claim for
damages and injunctive relief and her common law claims for fraud,
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment for the reasons stated
therein.

The only remaining issue is Mulder's challenge to the district
court's denial of her motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint.  He reviews a district court's denial of a motion to
amend for abuse of discretion and finds no fault with the district
court's denial of Mulder's motion for leave to amend on either
ground.  Even on appeal, Mulder does not explain why her "travel
expense" theory of injury was not advanced earlier.  Judge Lipez
therefore concludes that the district court acted within its
expansive discretion in denying leave to amend.  The district
court likewise acted within its discretion by denying Mulder's
motion for leave to amend as futile, he adds.  As the district
court noted, and as he similarly noted in Shaulis, Mulder's
"travel expenses" theory of injury suffers from a causation
problem, as she does not explain how a deceptive price tag could
have caused her to travel to Kohl's in the first place.  Mulder's
"induced travel" theory of injury fares no better than the
"induced purchase" theory.  Mulder identifies no authority, and
Judge Lipez is aware of none, ratifying this theory of injury
under Chapter 93A.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/hRed3E from Leagle.com.

S. James Boumil -- SJBoumil@Boumil-Law.com -- with whom Boumil Law
Offices, Konstantine W. Kyros, and Law Offices of Konstantine W.
Kyros, were on brief, for appellant.

Lauri A. Mazzuchetti -- lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com -- with whom
Michael C. Lynch -- mlynch@kelleydrye.com -- James B. Saylor --
jsaylor@kelleydrye.com -- Kelly Drye & Warren LLP, and William T.
Harrington -- wharringtonlaw@gmail.com -- were on brief, for
appellee.


LAKE VIEW CEMETERY: "Suts" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------------------
WAYNE SUTS, 413 Downing Drive Chardon, Ohio, 44024, On behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE
LAKE VIEW CEMETERY FOUNDATION c/o Andrew Service Corporation,
Statutory Agent 4900 Key Tower, 127 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio,
44114, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01477 (N.D. Ohio, July 13,
2017), seeks to recover all available relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Lake View owns and operates the Lake
View Cemetery located at 12316 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio,
44106. Suts is a former employee of Lake View. Suts was first
hired by Lake View as a Memorial Advisor in or around July of
2015.

The lawsuit alleges that Memorial Advisor position is primarily an
inside sales position.  Memorial Advisors interview potential
clients, determine their needs, and promote the products and
services of Lake View. Memorial Advisors must spend one to two
hours a day prospecting for new business, and must complete at
least two pre-need assessments a day. Memorial Advisors are also
required to attend all committal/funeral services in which they
had sold products and/or services. Memorial Advisors are also
required to work nights and weekend as needed. Suts and those
similarly situated (Memorial Advisors) are paid a flat hourly rate
along with commissions. Suts and those similarly situated
regularly worked on weekends, took after-hour appointments,
participated in outside presentations and seminars, and performed
other work at home, but were not compensated for this work. ("Off
The Clock Work"). As a result of working their scheduled hours and
performing the Off The Clock Work, Suts and those similarly
situated regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week.[BN]

Attorney for Wayne Suts:

          Chris P. Wido, Esq.
          THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          25200 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 200
          Beachwood, Ohio 44122
          Telephone: (216) 291 4744
          Facsimile: (216) 291 5744
          E-mail: chris.widow@spitzlawfirm.com


LARINO MASONRY: Faces "Arpi" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Larino Masonry. The
case is entitled as Marco Arpi, Marco Vinicio Vinansa Barbecho,
Josue Bautista, and Angel Bolas, et al., Individually and On
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Neil
Gelardo, Individually, Juan Luis Larino, Individually, Larino
Masonry, L and G Masonry Corp., and D and G Masonry Corp., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05606 (S.D.N.Y., July 24, 2017).

Larino Masonry is in masonry and other stonework business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appears pro se.


LEXMARK INT'L: September 19 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors that
they have until September 19, 2017 to file lead plaintiff
applications in a securities class action lawsuit against Lexmark
International, Inc., if they purchased the Company's securities
between August 1, 2014 and July 20, 2015, inclusive (the "Class
Period").  This action is pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.

What You May Do

If you purchased securities of Lexmark and would like to discuss
your legal rights and how this case might affect you and your
right to recover for your economic loss, you may, without
obligation or cost to you, contact KSF Managing Partner Lewis Kahn
toll-free at 1-877-515-1850 or via email
(lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
http://ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-lxkto learn more. If you wish to
serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action, you must petition
the Court by September 19, 2017.

About the Lawsuit

Lexmark and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

The alleged false and misleading statements and omissions include,
but are not limited to, that: (i) there were significant declines
in demand and growth for the Company's supplies business; (ii)
supplies revenue growth was not caused primarily by demand, but by
advance buying ahead of scheduled price increases; (iii) this
buying practice resulted in excessive inventory levels at its
wholesale distributors; and (iv) as a result of the foregoing,
Lexmark's financial statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

                 About Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

KSF -- http://www.ksfcounsel.com-- whose partners include the
former Louisiana Attorney General Charles C. Foti, Jr., is a law
firm focused on securities, antitrust and consumer class actions,
along with merger & acquisition and breach of fiduciary litigation
against publicly traded companies on behalf of shareholders.  The
firm has offices in New York, California and Louisiana. [GN]


LION BIOTECH: Kessler Topaz Named Class Counsel in "Desilvio"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LEONARD DESILVIO, Plaintiff, v. LION
BIOTECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02086-SI
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted Jay Rabkin's unopposed
motion for appointment as Lead Counsel, granted Rabkin's request
for appointment of Kessler Topaz as the Class Counsel, denied
Kimberly Colautti and Michele Rosati's and the Lion Investor
Group's competing motions, and denied the motions to consolidate.

Before the Court are three motions that seek consolidation of two
related actions, Desilvio v. Lion Biotechnologies, Inc., 17-cv-
2086-SI and Kuc v. Lion Biotechnologies, Inc., 17-cv-2188-SI.
Three separate Movants each originally sought appointment as the
Lead Plaintiff in this putative securities class action.  The
movants are: (i) Colautti and Rosati; (ii) Rabkin; and (iii) Su
Yee Lynn Ho, Sriram Sundareswaran, Manfred E. Strauch, and Kevin
Fong ("Lion Investor Group").  However, Colautti and Rosati filed
a statement of non-opposition to the competing motions, and the
Lion Investor Group has withdrawn its motion.  In addition, the
Plaintiff in the Kuc action has voluntarily dismissed that case.

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determined that
this matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument
and vacated the hearing scheduled for July 28, 2017.  The Desilvio
complaint is now the operative complaint in this case.  To the
extent he has not already done so, the Plaintiff is ordered to
serve the Defendant with the complaint.  The Defendants then have
either 21 days from the date of service or 21 days from the date
of the order, whichever is later, to file a responsive pleading or
motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/TDODrj from Leagle.com.

Leonard Desilvio, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A..

The Lion Investor Group, Movant, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy
-- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Jay Rabkin, Movant, represented by Eli Greenstein --
egreenstein@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Naumon
A. Amjed -- namjed@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check, LLP &
Ryan Thomas Degnan -- rdegnan@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check, LLP.

Su Yee Lynn Ho, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Sriram Sundareswaran, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Manfred E. Strauch, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Kevin Fong, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP
& Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.


LIVE NATION: "Adams" Suit Moved to Central District of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Tiana Adams, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LIVE
NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and VIVID SEATS, LTD., the Defendants,
Case No. RIC 1707024, was removed on July 25, 2017 from the
Riverside Superior Court of California, to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California (Eastern Division -
Riverside). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-
01472 to the proceeding.

Live Nation is an American live-events company based in Beverly
Hills, California, focused on worldwide concert and entertainment-
show promotions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorney for Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.:

          Morgan D MacBride, Esq.
          IRELL & MANELLA LLP
          1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 277 1010
          E-mail: mmacbride@irell.com


LOCKHEED MARTIN: Court Denies Prelim Certification in "Ross"
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia denied the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
certification as a class action and preliminary approval of the
Settlement Agreement in the case captioned VERNON ROSS and DEBRA
JOSEY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., Defendant, No. 16-cv-
2508(KBJ)(D.D.C.).

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant has engaged in a pattern
or practice of employment discrimination that is manifest in
Lockheed Martin's performance appraisal system.  Their three-count
complaint claims that Lockheed's performance review process has
been systemically injurious in a manner that amounts to both
intentional race discrimination (Count I) and disparate impact
race discrimination (Count II).  Plaintiff Ross further contends,
solely on his own behalf, that Lockheed retaliated against him for
filing a Charge of Discrimination and/or complaining to senior
executives at the Company of racial discrimination faced by him
and other African-American employees (Count III).

Critically, the Plaintiffs seek to prosecute the race
discrimination claims on behalf of the class of plaintiffs who are
all salaried non-represented African-American employees below the
level of Vice President who received at least one performance
evaluation between Jan. 1, 2013 and Feb. 29, 2016, with an overall
rating below significantly exceeded commitments while employed at
Lockheed Martin.

The Plaintiffs have filed their putative class action complaint
along with a proposed Settlement Agreement.  One key feature of
the resolution that they have negotiated with Lockheed (in
addition to a $22.8 million settlement fund and certain changes to
Lockheed's performance appraisal process) is the class members'
agreement to release a broad swath of potential legal claims
against the company, including claims that have nothing whatsoever
to do with Lockheed's performance review procedures.  Also
noteworthy is what is not featured in the proposed Settlement
Agreement: how much money each class member can expect to receive
in exchange for releasing any and all race discrimination claims
that were or could have been asserted against Lockheed.

In their instant motion for preliminary certification of this case
as a class action and preliminary approval of the Settlement
Agreement, the Plaintiffs request that the Court make a
preliminary determination that the complaint satisfies the
requirements of a viable class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, and they also seek preliminary approval of the
Settlement Agreement so that the class-wide notice and detailed
claim forms can be distributed.

The Court notes that in this case, the Plaintiffs seek to certify
a class for settlement purposes that, in effect, is comprised of
virtually every salaried African-American employee of Lockheed
Martin.  They say that the 5,500-plus members of their proposed
class have suffered race discrimination as a result of Lockheed's
performance review process, and have been victimized in a manner
that is susceptible to common proof, but they do not present any
theory of how the performance appraisal system resulted in
racially disparate outcomes, much less evidence that the
challenged system discriminates against all class members in the
same way, as the commonality element of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) requires.

Moreover, the broad release of legal claims in the proposed
Settlement Agreement strongly suggests that the parties have
endeavored to use the case to resolve the entire universe of race
discrimination claims that these class members might have against
Lockheed, via a lawsuit that is purportedly much more limited in
scope.  The Court finds that this imbalance creates serious
fairness concerns with the breadth of the release, the adequacy of
the settlement fund, the prescribed opt-out procedures, and the
overall claims administration process.  All this leads the Court
to the firm but reluctant conclusion that this case cannot be
preliminarily certified as a class action under Rule 23, and that
the parties' proposed Settlement Agreement is so potentially
unfair that it cannot be preliminarily approved.  Accordingly, the
Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification
and approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 memorandum opinion
is available at https://is.gd/Fa0M01 from Leagle.com.

VERNON ROSS, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Vincent Firth,
ENGELMEIER & UMANAH, P.A., pro hac vice.

VERNON ROSS, Plaintiff, represented by Cyrus Mehri --
cmehri@findjustice.com -- MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC.

DEBRA JOSEY, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Vincent Firth,
ENGELMEIER & UMANAH, P.A., pro hac vice & Cyrus Mehri, MEHRI &
SKALET, PLLC.

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., Defendant, represented by Grace E. Speights
-- grace.speights@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP
& Krissy Anne Katzenstein -- krissy.katzenstein@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP.


M-I LLC: Settlement in "Syed" Gets Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class
settlement in the case captioned SARMAD SYED and ASHLEY BALFOUR,
individually, and behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. M-I, L.L.C., a Delaware Limited Liability Company,
doing business as M-I SWACO; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendant, No. 1:12-cv-01718-DAD-MJS (E.D. Cal.).

The Court previously granted preliminary approval of a class
action settlement in the action on Feb. 22, 2017.  Following the
granting of preliminary approval, the class notices were mailed to
the class.  Although Defendant M-I SWACO, was unable to provide
addresses for an estimated 24 members of the California Class, the
class counsel was able to locate those 24 individuals in addition
to 7 other class members whose notices were returned as
undeliverable.  Thus far, not a single member has filed an
objection to the settlement and only one member of the California
Class has requested exclusion.  The class currently consists of
467 individuals, which includes 117 participating FLSA Class
Members and 350 California Class Members.

On June 8, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for order granting
final approval of class settlement.  It is unopposed and came
before the Court for hearing on July 6, 2017.

The Court finds certification is warranted and that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Therefore, it granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for final certification of the class and final
approval of the class settlement.  Accordingly, the Court
certified the following classes for settlement purposes only:

     i. California Class: The California Rule 23 Class Member(s)
or California Class means all persons employed by the Defendant in
California in a Covered Position at any time during the period
from Oct. 18, 2008 through Nov. 30, 2016.  There are an estimated
353 members in this group, which includes current and former
employees who performed work for Defendant solely in California,
as well as employees who performed work for Defendant both in
California as well as outside of California.  Covered Position
means a drilling fluid specialist, mud engineer, mud man trainee,
or consultant mud man, or equivalent title, as enumerated in
Appendix No. 1 to the Agreement.

     ii. FLSA Collective Class Action Class: The FLSA Collective
Action Class means the 115 individuals employed by the Defendant
in a Covered Position during the period from Aug. 5, 2010 through
Nov. 30, 2016, who previously consented to join the FLSA and who
have not performed work for the Defendant in California during
that time period.

The Court (i) appointed the law firms of Spiro Law Corp.,
Blanchard Law Group, APC, the Holmes Law Group, APC, and Cohelan
Khoury & Singer as the class counsel; (ii) confirmed Plaintiffs
Syed and Balfour as the class representatives, with Plaintiff Syed
to receive an incentive award of $20,000 and Plaintiff Balfour to
receive an incentive award of $15,000 as requested; (iii) awarded
the class counsels' attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,333,333.33,
and the class counsel in the sum of $49,857.37 for litigation;
(iv) awarded  $11,500 to the appointed settlement administrator
CPT Group, Inc.

In accordance with the terms of the settlement, the Court approved
approved payment (i) to the 467 members of the class; and (ii) of
$75,000 to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

The parties are directed to abide by the settlement agreement, and
the Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter for the
purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement.  The Clerk of the
Court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/CDksQZ from Leagle.com.

Sarmad Syed, Plaintiff, represented by Ira Spiro, Spiro Law Corp..

Sarmad Syed, Plaintiff, represented by Isam Charles Khoury,
Cohelan Khoury & Singer, James Jason Hill -- jhill@ckslaw.com --
Cohelan & Khoury & Singer, Michael D. Singer -- msinger@ckslaw.com
-- Cohelan Khoury & Singer, Diana Marie Khoury, Cohelan Khoury and
Singer, Jeff Holmes, Jeff Holmes, Esq. & R. Ira Spiro, Spiro Law
Corp.

Ashley Balfour, Plaintiff, represented by Isam Charles Khoury,
Cohelan Khoury & Singer, James Jason Hill, Cohelan & Khoury &
Singer, Michael D. Singer, Cohelan Khoury & Singer, Diana Marie
Khoury, Cohelan Khoury and Singer, Jeff Holmes, Jeff Holmes, Esq.
& R. Ira Spiro, Spiro Law Corp.

M-I, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Joseph Vincent Marra, III,
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Alexander M. Chemers --
alexander.chemers@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Jason S. Mills -- jmills@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP & Patricia S. Riordan --
priordan@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Llp.


M&M INVESTMENT: "Francis" Suit Moved to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Wallace Francis, Esq., as Guardian
Ad Litem for April Wagner; and all Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Michael A Navone, Mohammed Rezaian, Faezeh Ricci,
Stephen Ricci, Michael A Navone, as Trustee of the Michael A.
Navone Revocable Trust, M&M Investment Partners, LLC, Maximo
Investments, LLC, and Ricci Ventures, LLC, Case No. SCV-260479,
was removed on July 20, 2017 from the Sonoma County Superior
Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (Oakland). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:17-cv-04109-DMR to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu.

M&M Properties is a privately held real estate investment
firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

Attorneys for MTC Financial Inc. dba Trustee Corps.:

          Keiko Kojima, Esq.
          BURKE WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
          444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 236 0600
          Facsimile: (213) 236 2700
          E-mail: kkojima@bwslaw.com


MALDEN-DOCKSIDE: Frost Seeks Unpaid Wages & Tips under Wage Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
JANINE FROST, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. MALDEN/DOCKSIDE, INC., CHELSEA
DOCKSIDE, INC., DOCKSIDE AT WAKEFIELD, INC., and JACK URBACZEWSKI,
the Defendants, Case No. 2017-2204 (Mass. Super. Ct., July 13,
2017), is brought on behalf of employees who have worked for
Defendants at their Dockside restaurants, located in Malden,
Chelsea, and Wakefield, Massachusetts, and have been subject to
unlawful labor practices. The named Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants have violated the Massachusetts wage laws in multiple
ways. First, Defendants have not paid their employees time-and-a-
half for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, which has
resulted in unpaid owed wages under the Massachusetts Wage Act.
Second, Defendants have subjected tipped employees to an unlawful
policy requiring them to pay the restaurant out of their tips when
customers walk out without paying their bills and/or when the cash
register drawer has shortages. The promulgation of this unlawful
policy and Defendants' retention of employees' tips because of
this policy is a violation of the Massachusetts Tips Statute.
Third, Defendants routinely require tipped employees to over-
report their tip income, which results in those employees being
charged a higher amount in taxes and other withholdings than they
actually owe. This results in Defendants' tipped employees not
retaining all of their tips and/ or wages, in violation of M.G.L.
These three unlawful practices have also resulted in invalidation
of Defendants' entitlement to pay the lower tipped minimum wage to
tipped employees under M.G.L., because Defendants have not
satisfied the requirements for paying the lower tipped wage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brook Lane, Esq.
          Hillary Schwab, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          www.fairworklaw.com
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607 3260
          E-mail: brook@fairworklaw.com
                  hillary@fairworklaw.com


MANASSEH JORDAN: "Molitor" Suit Moved to N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Jeffrey Molitor, Laura C. De La
Cabada, Steve Clarke, and Ruth Maki, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Manasseh Jordan
Ministries, Inc., a New York Religious Corporation and Yakim
Manasseh Jordan, an individual, the Defendants, and Kingdom
Ministries Church, Inc., the Movant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02408, was
transferred on July 19, 2017 from the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois - (Chicago). The District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:17-cv-05309 to the proceeding. The case
is assigned to the Hon. John J. Tharp, Jr.[BN]

Jeffrey Molitor is represented by:

          Benjamin Harris Richman, Esq.
          Sydney Janzen, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1300
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          E-mail: brichman@edelson.com

               - and -

          Laura W. Speed, Esq.
          SHAMP SPEED JORDAN WOODWARD, LLC
          Suite 660
          1718 Peachtree Street
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 893 9400
          Facsimile: (404) 260 4180
          E-mail: speed@ssjwlaw.com

Attorneys for Kingdom Ministries Church, Inc.:

          Alex Benjamin Kaufman, Esq.
          Matthew Dempsey Treco, Esq.
          KAUFMAN & FORMAN, P.C.
          Building 800
          8215 Roswell Road
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (770) 390 9200
          E-mail: abk@kauflaw.net
                  mdt@kauflaw.net


MASTERCARD: Class Actions Not Ruled Out Despite Favorable Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joanne Atkinson, writing for Business Standard, reports that
convenience often comes at a cost.  As consumers, many of us are
resigned to seeing a surcharge or "processing fee" on goods and
services when we pay by credit or debit card.  At present, it is
lawful for businesses to charge consumers these fees although the
amount should be limited to the actual cost to the retailer of the
transaction.

Bank charges for processing card payments were capped in the UK in
2015, but many businesses have continued to charge consumers
inflated fees to generate further profit.  Even the government's
tax department routinely adds a surcharge of up to 2.4% to bills
paid by card.

Now, the government has announced that charges for paying by debit
or credit card will be outlawed completely from January 2018.
This raises several questions, not least whether retailers will
simply increase their prices to cover any shortfall.  Many
companies argue that fees are there to cover their transaction
costs, which consist of an "interchange fee", levied by the card
issuer such as Visa or MasterCard (capped by law at 0.3%) and the
"merchant fee", charged by the bank for handling each payment.
This is not capped but for large businesses it should not amount
to more than about 0.3%.

It is also unclear how the ban will be policed. Local authority
Trading Standards departments are tasked with dealing with
complaints from buyers, but the widespread flouting of the current
cap indicates that embattled officers are under-resourced to deal
with the issue.

Class action rejected

Future charges are to be outlawed, but what about the millions in
surplus fees paid by consumer buyers in the past? A recent attempt
to secure รบ14 billion in compensation for UK consumers was
recently rejected by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT).

The trailblazing claim against MasterCard, initiated by Walter
Merricks, who was head of the Financial Ombudsman Service from
1999-2009, was the first collective claim of its kind under new
rules introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

Previously, US-style class actions were not permitted under UK law
and consumers affected by price fixing or anti-competitive
behaviour had to either actively opt in as a named participant in
a claim, or bring proceedings on their own behalf.  In cases where
the loss to the consumer was relatively small, the cost of
bringing a claim meant that pursuing the trader was often not
worthwhile.

Under collective proceedings rules, there is no need to register
for a stake in the claim -- anyone who fulfils the criteria is
automatically joined in the action unless they expressly opt out.
Under the new Consumer Rights Act, claims can be brought by a
suitable representative of the group affected.  In the Mastercard
case it was Walter Merricks, on behalf of every consumer who
purchased goods from a retailer in the UK between 1992 and 2008.

Had the claim succeeded, it would have given individual consumers
the collective legal power to call a corporation to account.
Ultimately, the claim faltered under the huge complexity of trying
to quantify the total compensation payable, and then allocate it
fairly among consumer claimants.  Notwithstanding the CAT's
decision, the case has prompted fears from card companies that the
UK will see a tsunami of similar claims, possibly resulting in
vast payouts.

Onslaught of action

What happens next will be scrutinised closely by banks and other
credit providers.  The decision is the latest chapter in an
onslaught of legal action against MasterCard dating back to 2007.
The fees charged to retailers are determined in large part by
interchange fees agreed between groups of banks and in 2007,
MasterCard was subject to an investigation by the European
Commission, which ruled that its interchange fees were anti-
competitive and violated the EU Treaty.

MasterCard appealed the ruling but the European Court of Justice
confirmed the decision in September 2014.  Fees were subsequently
capped at 0.3% of the transaction value for credit card payments
and 0.2% for debit card payments.

In July 2016 MasterCard was ordered to pay substantial damages to
the supermarket Sainsbury's, after it successfully sued MasterCard
over processing fees.  While the court in this case acknowledged
that electronic payment arrangements benefit both customers and
retailers, it ultimately concluded that MasterCard's charges were
excessive and breached EU and UK competition law.  This judgement
potentially paves the way for a wave of further claims from
retailers who were charged similar rates.

MasterCard is not the only lender affected.  Visa was also
investigated in 2007, but managed to avoid formal sanctions by
agreeing voluntarily to reduce its fees and improve transparency
around charging.

The British government's move to scrap charges completely by
January 2018 promises greater transparency over future prices paid
by consumers.  But, future class actions should not be ruled out.
The recent rejection of Merricks's case against MasterCard was
down to the complexity of computing individual losses -- if this
issue is remedied then future claims could well succeed. [GN]


MIDLAND FUNDING: "Wheeler" Complaint Survives Dismissal Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Virginia M. Kendall of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied
defendants' motion to dismiss, in the case KEVIN WHEELER,
Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC., AND ECORE CAPITAL GROUP INC., Defendant, No. 15 C 11152
(N.D. Ill.).

Midland Credit Management, Inc. (MCM) is a collection agency that
collects charged off-debts for owners of debt, specifically for
Midland Funding LLC. Sometime in 2015, Kevin Wheeler noticed that
MCM was pulling his credit report. Wheeler contacted MCM and was
told that it was attempting to collect an alleged credit card
balance and offered Wheeler a 40% discount to settle the debt. On
October 4, 2015, Wheeler noticed that MCM had pulled his credit
again. When Wheeler called MCM, a representative provided him with
an account number to obtain information about his debt from MCM's
website.

MCM's website indicated that Wheeler last made payment on the debt
on September 18, 2009, that the original creditor had given up on
being repaid as of April 30, 2010, a settlement offer whereby
plaintiff would save 40%; and notice that MCM was not obligated to
renew its settlement offer. The website did not indicate that the
statute of limitations on Wheeler's debt had expired. Because the
statute of limitations for his credit card debt had expired,
Wheeler asserts that his debt could not be forcibly collected and
that defendants violated the FDCPA and related rules because they
failed to inform him of that fact.

Wheeler brought a putative class action against Midland Funding,
LLC, MCM, and Encore Capital Group, Inc. alleging that defendants
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
1692 et. seq. (FDCPA), when MCM's website failed to inform him
that his debt was not collectible under the applicable statute of
limitations. He also alleges that defendants regularly attempt to
collect debts from other debtors where the statute of limitations
on the debt has expired.

Defendants moved to dismiss Wheeler's claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that Wheeler lacks Article III
standing because he has failed to articulate a concrete injury.

District Judge Kendall denied defendants' motion to dismiss
observing that Wheeler was directly impacted by the defendants'
actions and he personally received misleading information
regarding the status of his debt which essentially encouraged him
to make a payment on a now-expired debt. Confused by the status of
his debt, MCM's lack of disclosure opened the possibility that MCM
calculated the applicable statute of limitations differently than
Asset and would try to enforce the debt. The FDCPA was enacted to
prevent such type of injury and the type of injury that courts
within the circuit have consistently recognized as conferring
standing.

A copy of Judge Kendall's memorandum order and opinion dated July
31, 2017, is available at https://goo.gl/gCY4XP from Leagle.com.

Kevin Wheeler, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Edelman --
dedelman@edcombs.com -- Cassandra P. Miller -- cmiller@edcombs.com
-- Michelle A. Alyea -- malyea@edcombs.com -- at Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC

Defendants, represented by Heather L. Kramer -- hkramer@dykema.com
-- Theodore Wilson Seitz -- tseitz@dykema.com -- Todd A. Gale --
tgale@dykema.com -- at Dykema Gossett PLLC.


MISSOURI: Court Certifies Class in "Postawko"
---------------------------------------------
Judge Nanette K. Laughrey of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, Central Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the case captioned
MICHAEL POSTAWKO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants, No. 2:16-cv-04219-NKL (W.D. Mo.).

Named Plaintiffs Postawko, Christopher Baker, and Michael Jamerson
are incarcerated in the Missouri Department of Corrections
("MDOC").  They filed this putative class action for claims
arising out of what they allege to be inadequate medical care for
their chronic Hepatitis C ("HCV") viral infections.  They named
numerous Defendants, including their prison treating physicians
and nurses; prison officials who reviewed their grievances and
treatment requests; the MDOC; and Corizon, LLC, the healthcare
provider for all MDOC facilities.

The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants have the
following policies or customs, all of which are contrary to the
prevailing standard of care: (i) not providing direct-acting
antiviral ("DAA") drug treatment to all inmates with chronic HCV;
(ii) using an APRI score, which measures the progression of
fibrosis or cirrhosis, to determine whether a person should be
treated; (iii) relying exclusively on APRI score to determine the
stage of fibrosis or cirrhosis, rather than using other more
accurate methods of determining its progression through liver
biopsies, FIB-4, or FibroScan; (iv) failing to consider providing
treatment to HCV-positive inmates unless they have an APRI score
above 2.0 that persists for several months, even though more than
half of persons with cirrhosis will not have an APRI score at or
above 2.0, and they know that AST levels are transient; (v)
disregarding independent diagnoses of cirrhosis or significant
hepatitis fibrosis in making their treatment decisions; and (vi)
basing treatment decisions on cost, rather than on need for
treatment.   They allege that these policies or customs have
caused, and continue to cause, unnecessary pain and an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to the health of HCV-positive
inmates.

The Named Plaintiffs seek certification of a class of similarly
situated individuals in the custody of the Missouri Department of
Corrections, defined as all those individuals in the custody of
MDOC, now or in the future, who have been, or will be, diagnosed
with chronic HCV, as that term is defined medically, but who are
not provided treatment with direct acting antiviral drugs.

The Plaintiffs bring two claims on behalf of the putative class:
Count I for prospective relief for deprivation of their Eighth
Amendment rights against Precythe, in her official capacity, and
Corizon, and Count II for prospective relief for violation of the
ADA against the MDOC.  They seek injunctions that (i) direct the
Defendants to "formulate and implement an HCV treatment policy
that meets the prevailing standard of care, including identifying
persons with HCV; (ii) direct the Defendants to treat members of
the class with appropriate DAA drugs; and (iii) direct the
Defendants to provide members of the class an appropriate and
accurate assessment of the level of fibrosis or cirrhosis they
have, counseling on drug-drug interactions, and ongoing medical
care for complications and symptoms of HCV.

The Court finds that the inmate populations at these facilities
are constantly revolving.  Even with a conservative estimate of
one thousand class members, the number of individual claims, as
well as the inherently fluid nature of the class, would make it
impracticable to require individual lawsuits.  Hence, numerosity
is satisfied.  It is laso satisfied that the commonality
requirement is met because the alleged HCV-treatment policies or
customs are the "glue" that holds together the putative class;
either these policies are unlawful as to all inmates or they are
not.

The Court notes that the Named Plaintiffs' claims and the claims
of the remainder of the putative class arise from the same course
of conduct: the Defendants' policies surrounding their treatment
of inmates with chronic HCV, including their policy of denying DAA
drug treatment to individuals with HCV due to APRI score.  The
Plaintiffs allege these policies are discriminatory based on HCV
status and are violative of their Eighth Amendment rights.  These
claims are identical to the claims that could be raised by any
member of the class.  Therefore, the Named Plaintiffs are typical
because they, too, are exposed to the same risk.  In addition, the
Court is satisfied that the Named Plaintiffs' interests are
aligned with those of the class because, as it explains, their
claims arise out of the same common course of conduct and are
based upon the same legal theories as the class members' claims.

The Court concluded that the putative class is appropriate for
certification under Rule 23(b)(2).  Accordingly, it granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/jTlSSd from Leagle.com.

Michael G Postawko, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony E. Rothert,
American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation.

Michael G Postawko, Plaintiff, represented by Mae C. Quinn,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Amy Elizabeth Breihan,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Gillian R. Wilcox, American
Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation & Jessie Steffan,
American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation.

Christopher Baker, Plaintiff, represented by Mae C. Quinn,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Amy Elizabeth Breihan,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Gillian R. Wilcox, American
Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation, Jessie Steffan,
American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation & Anthony E.
Rothert, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation.

Michael Jamerson, Plaintiff, represented by Mae C. Quinn,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Amy Elizabeth Breihan,
MacArthur Justice Center at St. Louis, Gillian R. Wilcox, American
Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation, Jessie Steffan,
American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation & Anthony E.
Rothert, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation.

Corizon Medical Services, Defendant, represented by J. Thaddeus
Eckenrode -- jte@eckenrode-law.com -- Eckenrode-Maupin, Attorneys
at Law.

Missouri Department of Corrections, Defendant, represented by Amy
C. Haywood, Missouri Attorney General's Office, Dean John Sauer,
Missouri Attorney General's Office, Jillian Mueller, Missouri
Attorney General's Office & Michael D. Quinlan, Missouri Attorney
General's Office.

Corizon, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel L. Messeloff --
SchudroffD@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Jessica L. Liss -- Jessica.Liss@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
PC, Michael P. Huff -- mhuff@maynardcooper.com -- pro hac vice,
William R. Lunsford -- blunsford@maynardcooper.com -- pro hac
vice, Amy J. White -- Amy.White@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis PC.

Trinidad Aguilera, Defendant, represented by Daniel L. Messeloff,
Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Jessica L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC,
Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis
PC.

John Williams, Defendant, represented by Jessica L. Liss, Jackson
Lewis PC, Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella,
Jackson Lewis PC.

FNU Stamps, Defendant, represented by Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis
PC, Daniel L. Messeloff, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Jessica
L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis PC.

Thomas Pryor, Defendant, represented by Amy J. White, Jackson
Lewis PC, Daniel L. Messeloff, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice,
Jessica L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson
Lewis PC.

FNU Proctor, Defendant, represented by Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis
PC, Daniel L. Messeloff, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Jessica
L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis PC.

FNU Hardman, Defendant, represented by Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis
PC, Daniel L. Messeloff, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Jessica
L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis PC.

FNU Davison, Defendant, represented by Amy J. White, Jackson Lewis
PC, Daniel L. Messeloff, Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice, Jessica
L. Liss, Jackson Lewis PC & Carrie L. Kinsella, Jackson Lewis PC.


MONSANTO COMPANY: B&L Farms Suit Moved to E.D. Arkansas
-------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled B&L Farms Partnership, Double A
Farms, NJ&B Partnership, Neil Culp, Allen Culp, Pam Culp, Jill
Culp, Ronnie George, R. P. George, Brian Chastain Farms, Josh
Bartlett, Randle Foran, doing business as: Randle Foran Farms,
Borderline Farms JV, and Wilson Application LLC, And all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Monsanto Company, BASF SE,
and BASF Corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 54CV-17-00132, was
removed on July 20, 2017 from the Phillips County Circuit Court,
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
(Helena). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-
00122-BRW to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Billy Roy Wilson.

Monsanto Company is a publicly traded American multinational
agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation. It is
headquartered in Creve Coeur, Greater St. Louis, Missouri.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David A. Hodges, Esq.
          DAVID HODGES LAW OFFICE
          212 Center Street, Suite 500
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 374 2400
          Facsimile: (501) 374 8926
          E-mail: david@hodgeslaw.com

               - and -

          Jesse B. Daggett, Esq.
          Joseph Robert Perry, Esq.
          DAGGETT, DONOVAN & PERRY, PLLC
          Post Office Box 389
          Marianna, AR 72360-0389
          Telephone: (870) 295 3434
          E-mail: Jesse@DaggettLaw.com
                  joe@daggettlaw.com

Attorneys for Monsanto Company:

          Elizabeth Blackwell, Esq.
          Christopher M. Hohn, Esq.
          Daniel C. Cox, Esq.
          Jan Paul Miller, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Masson, Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          One U.S. Bank Plaza
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 552 6000
          Facsimile: (314) 552 7000

               - and -

          Edwin L. Lowther, Jr., Esq.
          Scott Andrew Irby, Esq.
          WRIGHT, LINDSEY & JENNINGS
          200 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 2300
          Little Rock, AR 72201-3699
          Telephone: (501) 371 0808
          E-mail: elowther@wlj.com
                  sirby@wlj.com

Attorneys for BASF SE and BASF Corporation:

          E. B. Chiles, IV, Esq.
          John E. Tull, III, Esq.
          Sarah DeLoach, Esq.
          QUATTLEBAUM, GROOMS & TULL PLLC
          111 Center Street, Suite 1900
          Little Rock, AR 72201-3325
          Telephone: (501) 379 1700
          E-mail: cchiles@qgtb.com
                  jtull@qgtlaw.com
                  sdeloach@qgtlaw.com


MONTANA: Court Denies Class Certification in "Sadler"
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TIMOTHY RAY SADLER, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF
DUTTON, et al., Defendants, Nos. CV 16-83-H-DLC-JTJ, CV 17-00026-
M-DLC-JCL, CV 17-00042-H-DLC-JTJ (D. Mont.), Judge Dana L.
Christensen of the District Court for the District of Montana,
Helena Division, (i) adopted in full  Magistrate Judge John
Johnston's Findings and Recommendation, (ii) denied the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification, and (iii) dismissed
the Plaintiff's claims of defamation, libel, and slander.

United States Magistrate Judge Johnston entered his Order,
Findings and Recommendation on June 1, 2017, recommending
dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims of defamation, libel, and
slander; and denial of his motion that the matter to be certified
as a class action.  Sadler has failed to timely object to the
Findings and Recommendation, and, as a result, has waived his
right to de novo review of the record.

This Court reviews for clear error those findings and
recommendations to which no party objects.  Having reviewed the
Findings and Recommendation, the Court finds no clear error in
Judge Johnston's conclusion that Sadler's claims of defamation,
libel, and slander must be denied.  These claims fail to state a
federal constitutional claim and, thus, cannot be pursued under 42
U.S. Code Section 1983.  Further, Sadler, as a Plaintiff appearing
pro se, cannot bring claims on the behalf of others.  Accordingly,
the Court agreed with Judge Johnston that Sadler's motion to
certify this matter as a class action must be denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/telumn from Leagle.com.

Timothy Ray Sadler, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


NATIONALL FOOTBALL: Defeats California Antitrust Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
the National Football League has defeated an antitrust class
action claiming it conspired with 27 teams to suppress
cheerleaders' wages and restrict their mobility.

In a ruling issued on July 20, U.S. District Judge William Alsup
refused to let plaintiff Kelsely K., who cheered for the San
Francisco 49ers in 2013, file an amended complaint.  Judge Alsup
found her proposed amendments failed to plausibly allege an
antitrust conspiracy, just as he found in a ruling dismissing the
lawsuit in May.

The judge found the proposed complaint failed to cite actual
evidence for allegations that NFL teams colluded to keep
cheerleaders' wages low.

"The proposed amendment . . . rests solely on a theory of parallel
conduct, i.e., that all clubs must have acted in concert because
they all paid below what, according to the proposed amendment,
cheerleaders' services were worth," Judge Alsup wrote in his 11-
page ruling.

The lead plaintiff says NFL teams paid cheerleaders as little as
$90 to $125 per game with no compensation for other required
activities, until a rash of recent labor suits raised most
cheerleaders' pay to at least minimum wage.

Judge Alsup also found allegations of a "no poaching agreement"
among teams implausible, given that an NFL policy expressly
forbids such conduct.  While the league bans recruiting other
teams' employees when they are under contract, another policy bars
interfering with an employee's ability to seek employment with
another team while in between contracts.

Despite that policy, the plaintiff insists that no team has ever
hired another club's cheerleader, which serves as proof of a "no
poaching" pact among the NFL teams.

But Judge Alsup found the mere fact that no team has hired another
club's cheerleader does not by itself support a theory of
collusion.

"Is it proof of a conspiracy? No, it is not, at least in the
absence of well-pled facts showing a need for clubs to poach in
the first place," Judge Alsup wrote in his ruling.

The judge said it's possible that NFL clubs have never had to lure
away cheerleaders from other teams because "sufficient local
cheerleader talent" exists in their respective geographic regions.

Turning to claims that cheerleaders' wages have not "skyrocketed"
at the same pace as NFL revenue and salaries for players,
executives and coaches, Judge Alsup found the cheerleaders failed
to explain why their salaries should swell at that pace.

"The proposed amendment alleges nothing to suggest that
cheerleaders have made the same contributions as have players,
executives, and coaches in causing the NFL to flourish," Judge
Alsup wrote.

He also found lead plaintiff Kesley K. failed to demonstrate how
she personally suffered an antitrust injury.

Kelsey said the director of the 49ers cheerleading team "caused to
be communicated" to her that if she was not rehired as a 49ers
cheerleader, she could not try out for another NFL team.  After
she was turned away at the end of the 2013 season, Kelsey says she
didn't try out for another team -- like the then-Oakland Raiders -
- even though she wanted to.

Judge Alsup found those allegations were missing a lot of key
facts, such as how the message that she was not allowed to try out
for other teams was conveyed, why she could not try out for other
teams, and why she did not attempt to try out for another team.

"The peculiar phrasing of the allegation makes it impossible to
infer any reason why it was not wholly plaintiff's own decision to
not tryout for another club after the 49ers declined to re-hire
her," Judge Alsup wrote in his ruling.

Judge Alsup said he warned the plaintiff to "be sure to plead her
best case" in any proposed amended complaint.

"Her proposed amendment, however, still fails to plead factual
allegations supporting any plausible claim for relief," Judge
Alsup wrote.

Judge Alsup denied the motion for leave to file an amended
complaint as futile and issued judgment in favor of the NFL on
July 21.

The NFL's corporate office in New York and attorneys for the lead
plaintiff and NFL teams did not immediately return phone calls
seeking comment on July 24.

The lead plaintiff is represented by Thomas O'Brien of Bradshaw
Associates in San Francisco.  The NFL and its 27 teams are
represented by Sonya Winner of Covington & Burling in San
Francisco.

Five of the NFL's 32 clubs were left out of the lawsuit because
they do not employ cheerleaders. [GN]


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Judge Tosses Painkillers Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
a federal judge on July 21 struck down a class action claiming the
National Football League and its teams pushed painkillers on
injured athletes to get them back on the field, often causing
permanent injuries.

In a summary judgment ruling, U.S. District Judge William Alsup
found retired football players could only seek relief through
workers' compensation, because their claims against three NFL
teams did not fall within a narrow "intentional harm" exception.

It was the second painkillers class action against the NFL and its
teams to be thrown out of court by Judge Alsup, who dismissed an
earlier suit, Dent v. NFL, in 2014, finding those claims were
subject to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.

"This and other orders ruling against the theories advanced by
plaintiffs' counsel in these cases do not diminish the seriousness
of the national need to protect the health and safety of our
professional athletes," Judge Alsup wrote in his 9-page ruling.

The judge said although workers' compensation and collective
bargaining remedies are not "gold-plated remedies," they are the
only remedies recognized by the law.

"The sweeping remedy sought herein by plaintiffs is not, on this
record, available under the law," Judge Alsup wrote.

Lead plaintiff Etopia Evans, widow of the late Minnesota Vikings
and Baltimore Ravens player Charles "Chuck" Evans, filed a federal
class action against all 32 NFL teams in May 2015. The case was
transferred from Maryland to Northern California in March 2016.

The players claim NFL teams conspired since at least 1964 to have
trainers and team doctors dole out unprescribed pills and
injections, sometimes mixing them in "dangerous cocktails," to get
players back into games without warning them of the long-term side
effects.

Judge Alsup previously dismissed most claims, including conspiracy
claims, against all 32 NFL teams, leaving only claims of
intentional misrepresentation against the Green Bay Packers,
Denver Broncos and Los Angeles Chargers.

The two remaining plaintiffs, Alphonso Carreker and
Reggie Walker, argued their claims fell within a narrow
"intentional harm" exception to workers compensation exclusivity
laws in California, Colorado and Wisconsin.

But Judge Alsup found the deliberate harm exception only applied
in cases involving willful physical assault, and that the
plaintiffs failed to present facts showing the NFL teams intended
to harm players in an egregious manner.

"This order recognizes, as have California courts, that workers'
compensation exclusivity may bar claims that reveal egregious
employer misconduct," Judge Alsup wrote.  "But the mere
culpability of such misconduct, without more, is not a basis for
keeping in court a claim properly subject to the exclusive remedy
provisions of workers' compensation laws."

Mr. Carreker, who played for the Green Bay Packers and Denver
Broncos from 1984 to 1991, had to get heart surgery in 2013 after
anti-inflammatory drugs stopped working because he'd built up
resistance from taking too many during his career, according to
the lawsuit.

After suffering a sprained ankle while playing for the San Diego
Chargers (now the Los Angeles Chargers), Mr. Walker said he was
given Toradol injections by a team doctor before every game for
the rest of his career.  Now that he's retired, he has permanent
ankle pain, he says.

Last December, an attorney representing plaintiffs in Dent v. NFL
asked a Ninth Circuit panel to overturn Judge Alsup's 2014
dismissal of that suit.  A ruling is still pending.

Attorneys for the retired football players and NFL teams did not
immediately return phone calls seeking comment on July 24.

The NFL also did not immediately respond to a phone call seeking
comment.

The plaintiffs are represented by William Sinclair of Silverman
Thompson Slutkin White in Baltimore.  The NFL teams are
represented by Jack DiCanio -- jack.dicanio@skadden.com -- of
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom in Palo Alto, California. [GN]


NATIONAL RIFLE: Bid to Dismiss "Kalmbach" Partly Granted
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case
captioned KATHARYN KALMBACH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RIFLE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, a New York corporation, and INFOCISION,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. C17-399-RSM
(W.D. Wash.).

On Nov. 9, 2007, the Plaintiff registered her landline telephone
with the National Do Not Call Registry.  Beginning in July 2016,
the Plaintiff began to receive daily, unsolicited and prerecorded
calls on her landline telephone placed by Defendant InfoCision on
behalf of Defendant NRA using phone number 425-405-6193.  After
her unsuccessful attempt to get a live agent on the telephone in
order to ask them to stop calling, Ms. Kalmbach called the NRA to
indicate her desire that the calls stop.  Despite all of this,
Kalmbach continued to receive unsolicited pre-recorded calls
placed by Defendant InfoCision on behalf of the NRA for three
weeks.

On Feb. 10, 2017, Ms. Kalmbach filed a putative class action
complaint in state court, and the Defendants removed to this Court
on March 13, 2017.  The Complaint contains causes of action
brought under the Washington Automatic Dialing and Announcing
Device Statute ("WADAD"); the Washington Do Not Call Statute
("WDNC"); the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("WCPA"); and for
invasion of privacy under Washington law.  Before the Court is the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, brought under Rule 12(b)(6).

Given Ms. Kalmbach's analogous case law above, the Court concludes
that both causes of action can proceed at this early stage in the
litigation.  It agrees with Ms. Kalmbach that she has standing on
this claim because she has adequately pled facts to reasonably
infer that her injury would not have occurred without the
Defendants' incessant autodialing and use of a prerecorded
message.  In addition, it also finds that Ms. Kalmbach does not
need to, at this stage; convince the Court that the number of
calls precludes the possibility that these calls were manually
dialed.  The number and content of the calls satisfy the facial
plausibility requirement.  And taking the facts in the Complaint
as true, the Court finds that a reasonable factfinder could easily
determine that the Defendants were making calls for the purpose of
encouraging a person to purchase property, goods, or services as
part of magazine membership rather than as a gift for a charitable
contribution, and that this is a commercial solicitation.  This is
adequate to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.

The Court agrees with the Defendants' analysis that Ms. Kalmbach
has not alleged a conversation took place in any call from the
Defendants, and that this is required to bring a WDNC claim.  The
Court dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend this
claim as the Court concludes that it is possible for Ms. Kalmbach
to allege other facts, consistent with the challenged pleading, to
cure this deficiency.

As to the invasion of privacy claim, the Court concludes that the
Complaint pleads facts adequate to meet the requirements of this
tort.  Finally, with respect to dismissal of all claims against
the NRA because Ms. Kalmbach has not alleged any facts to support
her conclusion that the NRA is liable for calls made by
InfoCision, the Court concludes that the facts as pled and cited
to by the parties in briefing are not conclusory and provide
sufficient detail to allege agency under the Twombly/Iqbal
standard.  Ms. Kalmbach will not be required to prove the entirety
of her case, including the internal details of the business
relationship between the Defendants, prior to discovery.  Thus,
the NRA remains in this case.

For these reasons, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The Court granted the
Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint curing the mentioned
deficiencies no later than 30 days from the date of the Order.
Failure to file an Amended Complaint within this time period will
result in dismissal of its WDNC claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Uae2H8 from Leagle.com.

Katharyn Kalmbach, Plaintiff, represented by Kim D. Stephens --
kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS.

Katharyn Kalmbach, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Peluso --
ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com -- WOODROW & PELUSO LLC, pro hac vice,
Stefan Coleman, LAW OFFICE OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.S., pro hac vice,
Steven L. Woodrow -- swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com -- WOODROW &
PELUSO LLC, pro hac vice & Chase Christian Alvord --
calvord@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS.

National Rifle Association of America, Defendant, represented by
Brett A. Wall -- bwall@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, pro
hac vice, James Raymond Morrison -- jmorrison@bakerlaw.com --
BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, Michael D. Meuti -- mmeuti@bakerlaw.com --
BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, pro hac vice, Terry M. Brennan --
tbrennan@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER, pro hac vice & Curt Roy
Hineline -- chineline@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP.

InfoCision, Inc, Defendant, represented by Brett A. Wall, BAKER
HOSTETLER LLP, pro hac vice, James Raymond Morrison, BAKER
HOSTETLER LLP, Michael D. Meuti, BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, pro hac
vice, Terry M. Brennan, BAKER HOSTETLER, pro hac vice & Curt Roy
Hineline, BAKER HOSTETLER LLP.


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: "McHarris" Suit Moved to E.D New York
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled TAMEIKA L. MCHARRIS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Navient Solutions, Inc., Case No. 504969/2017, was removed on July
25, 2017 from the Kings County Supreme Court, to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:17-cv-04392 to the proceeding.

Navient Solutions provides loan management, servicing, and asset
recovery solutions to clients in higher education and business
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ashley Bryne Huddleston, Esq.
          VEDDER PRICE P.C.
          1633 Broadway
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 407 7700
          Facsimile: (212) 407 7799
          E-mail: ahuddleston@vedderprice.com


NEBRASKA: "Lassalle" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------
BRIAN LASSALLE and all others And all Others Similarly Situated,
the Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, and THE STATE OF
NEBRASKA, ACTING THROUGH THE NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and
HUMAN SERVICES, THE LINCOLN REGIONAL CENTER, THE HASTINGS REGIONAL
CENTER, THE NORFOLK REGIONAL CENTER and THE BEATRICE STATE
DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER, the Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-03088-SMB
(D. Neb., July 13, 2017), seeks unpaid wages for Defendant's
violation of the rights guaranteed to the Plaintiff and all others
similarly situated by the Nebraska Wage Payment and Collection
Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a resident of
Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska. The Plaintiff has been
continuously employed by the Lincoln Regional Center (LRC) as a
security specialist and medication aide from 1993 through the
present. The Lincoln Regional Center is located in Lincoln,
Lancaster County, Nebraska. In this capacity, Plaintiff is paid by
the hour for the work he performs and is awarded job related
benefits, including, but not limited to paid time off in the form
of vacation and sick leave. Starting in July 2016, Defendant
denied pay to Plaintiff (and all others similarly situated) for
earned and approved paid time off he took if the total hours he
worked (or earned through a paid holiday) combined with the total
number of hours of paid time off exceeded 40 hours in a given
week. As an example, if Plaintiff worked 32 hours Monday through
Thursday and took 8 hours of approved paid leave on Friday and was
required to work an additional 8 hours on Saturday, Defendant
refused to pay Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for the
48 hours of combined work and PTO. Under the scenario reference,
rather than paying Plaintiff for 48 hours of time worked and the
PTO, Defendant paid Plaintiff only 40 hours per week.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kathleen M. Near, Esq.
          POWERS LAW
          Kathleen M. Near 20212
          411 South 13th Street, Suite 300
          Lincoln, NE 68508
          Telephone: (402) 474 8000


NEW YORK: Akal Taxi Sues over Black Car Vehicle Licenses
--------------------------------------------------------
AKAL TAXI NYC LLC, C&R BHOGAL LLC, PEG TAXI NYC LLC, GGS TAXI LLC,
JASPREET SINGH, and D&P BAIDWAN LLC, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW
YORK and THE NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, the
Defendants, Case No. 708602/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 13, 2017),
seeks to recover consequential damages in an amount to be
determined at trial as well as an order requiring Defendants to
pay punitive damages.

According to the complaint, in late 2013 and early 2014, the City
of New York and the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission
held three auctions for wheelchair-accessible taxi medallions. The
Plaintiffs Akal Taxi NYC LLC, C&R Bhogal LLC, Peg Taxi NYC LLC,
GGS Taxi LLC, Jaspreet Singh, and D&P Baidwan LLC (Plaintiffs)
each purchased an independent, wheelchair-accessible taxi
medallion directly from Defendants in the February 2014 auction
organized and promoted by the TLC. Before the 2013 and 2014
auctions, the TLC intentionally overstated the value of taxi
medallions and concealed that the value of those medallions had
already begun to decline. After the auctions, the TLC, through its
actions and its inaction, significantly undermined the value of
the medallions it had just sold to Plaintiffs, causing them
substantial economic harm. The TLC's misrepresentations,
omissions, and deceptive acts and practices induced buyers to
enter the auctions and/or to bid too much for the medallions. The
TLC, almost immediately after the auctions, proceeded to grant
licenses for "black car" bases to companies that plainly did not
qualify for those licenses under both existing New York law and
TLC regulations, including, and most prominently, to affiliates of
Uber Technologies, Inc. ("Uber"), a California taxi company with
operations around the world. The TLC also proceeded to grant tens
of thousands of black car vehicle licenses that also failed to
comply with local law. The improperly licensed black cars and
black car bases granted to Uber and similar entities attracted
more than 20,000 black cars over the course of several months, a
sudden and dramatic increase in the size of the black car fleet
and in the number of taxis serving passengers, especially in
Manhattan and at the New York airports. With the black car fleet
growing by leaps and bounds, the TLC sat by as these black cars
routinely accepted de facto "street hails" (even in Manhattan and
at the airports), even though the law clearly states that yellow
taxis are the only taxis permitted to accept such hails.
Defendants' actions and inaction caused the value of the
medallions they sold directly to Plaintiffs and the Class to
decline substantially. Defendants' actions and omissions
constitute breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as
violation of the General Business Law, the NYC Code, state law,
and TLC rules, resulting in tens of millions of dollars in damages
to Plaintiffs and the Class.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Wolf Haldenstein Adler, Esq.
          Benjamin Y. Kaufman, Esq.
          Gregory M. Nespole, Esq.
          Correy A. Kamin, Esq.
          FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545 4600
          Facsimile: (212) 686 0114
          E-mail: kaufman@whafh.com
                  gmn@whafh.com
                  kamin@whafh.com

               - and -

          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL L. ACKMAN
          222 Broadway, 19th Floor
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (917) 282 8178
          E-mail: d.ackman@comcast.net


NORDSTROM INC: 1st Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Price Tag Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of all of the Plaintiff's claims in the
case captioned JUDITH SHAULIS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NORDSTROM,
INC., d/b/a/ NORDSTROM RACK, Defendant, Appellee, No. 15-2354 (1st
Cir.).

This case is about a sweater with a controversial price tag.  The
Appellant purchased a cardigan sweater for $49.97 at a Nordstrom
Rack outlet store in Boston, Massachusetts.  The price tag
attached to that sweater listed both the purchase price of $49.97
and a higher "Compare At" price of $218.  She claims that the
listed "Compare At" price was deceptive.  The sweater was, she
alleges, never sold by Nordstrom Rack, or any other retailer, for
$218.  Instead, she claims that the "Compare At" price tags are
used by Nordstrom to mislead consumers about the quality of items.

To vindicate this position, on Nov. 6, 2014, Shaulis initiated
this action with a complaint filed in the Massachusetts Superior
Court.  She filed an amended complaint on Dec. 8, 2014, and a
second amended complaint ("SAC") on December 24.  The SAC alleged
claims for fraud, breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
violations of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 93A ("Chapter 93A").  The SAC was brought on behalf of herself
and all those similarly situated, and proposed a class consisting
of all individuals residing in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
who, within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the
filing of this action, purchased Nordstrom Rack Products.
Nordstrom removed the case to federal court and successfully moved
to dismiss all of Shaulis' claims.

On appeal, Shaulis challenges dismissal of her Chapter 93A claim
and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment.

Judge Lipez explains that to state a viable claim, the Plaintiff
must allege that she has suffered an "identifiable harm" caused by
the unfair or deceptive act that is separate from the violation
itself.  It is thus not enough to claim that the Defendant's
improper conduct created a risk of real economic damages.
Speculation concerning still inchoate harm does not establish the
distinct injury that "is an essential predicate for recovery
under" Chapter 93A.  Instead, legally cognizable injuries under
Chapter 93A must involve objective, "identifiable" harm that goes
beyond the deception itself.

Because Shaulis has not adequately alleged that she suffered a
legally cognizable injury, her Chapter 93A claims for damages and
injunctive relief were both properly dismissed.  Although Shaulis
alleges that she would not have purchased the sweater but for
Nordstrom's deception -- and, hence, that we should infer that her
"loss" is the total purchase price -- she does not allege that the
sweater she actually received was worth less than she paid, or
that the sweater was defective in some way.  Absent such
allegations, Judge Lipez says, her claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation fails to allege any pecuniary loss.

As for Shaulis' breach of contract claim, Judge Lipez finds no
allegations in the SAC that the sales contract itself was actually
breached.  The agreement between Shaulis and Nordstrom was nothing
more than a straightforward, everyday sales contract for the
purchase of a sweater.

Shaulis' common law claim for unjust enrichment also fails because
a party with an adequate remedy at law cannot claim unjust
enrichment, he says.  Although she argues that, if her other
claims are dismissed, she effectively has no adequate remedy, this
argument misapprehends the relevant law.  It is the availability
of a remedy at law, not the viability of that remedy, that
prohibits a claim for unjust enrichment.

Finally, Judge Lipez finds that the district court did not err in
denying Shaulis' motion for reconsideration and for leave to
amend.  Nordstrom has not even appealed this determination, and,
hence, cumulative allegations of Nordstrom's allegedly deceptive
conduct cannot help Shaulis avoid dismissal of her claims.  He
notes that the primary deficiency in the SAC was that Shaulis
failed to adequately plead that she suffered a legally cognizable
injury; further allegations of deception do nothing to remedy that
flaw.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/YMjO26 from Leagle.com.

S. James Boumil -- SJBoumil@Boumil-Law.com -- with whom Boumil Law
Offices, Konstantine W. Kyros, and Law Offices of Konstantine W.
Kyros, were on brief, for appellant.

P. Craig Cardon, with whom Dylan J. Price --
dprice@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP, John P. Bueker -- John.Bueker@ropesgray.com -- Rebecca C.
Ellis -- Rebecca.Ellis@ropesgray.com -- and Ropes & Gray LLP, were
on brief, for appellee.


ONSHIFT INC: Faces "Simonich" Suit in C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Onshift, Inc. The
case is titled as John Simonich, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Onshift, Inc., a
Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-
cv-05326 (C.D. Cal., July 19, 2017).

OnShift develops cloud-based staff scheduling and labor management
software solutions primarily to the long-term care and senior
living industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


OVERLAND SOLUTIONS: Faces "Garbero" Suit in California Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Overland Solutions
Inc. The case is captioned as Garbero, Andrea, On behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Does
1-100 and Overland Solutions Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 34-
2017-00215142-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., July 7, 2017).

Overland Solutions specializes in premium audit services,
inspection surveys, high value residential surveys and loss
control consulting solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew R. Schoech, Esq.
          SCHOECH LAW GROUP, PC
          4020 Lennane Dr. No. 102
          Sacramento, CA 95834
          Telephone: (916) 569 1940
          Facsimile: (916) 569 1939


PETLAND INC: Faces "Cisneros" Suit in N.D. Georgia
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Petland, Inc. The
case is captioned as Rosalba Cisneros, On behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Petland, Inc.,
BKG Pets, Inc., Pets BKG LLC, and Pawsitive Solutions, Inc., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-02828-MHC (N.D. Ga., July 26, 2017).
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Mark H. Cohen.

Petland is a privately owned operator and franchisor of pet stores
based in Chillicothe, Ohio. Ed Kunzelman founded the company in
1967.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony Eliseuson, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          233 South Wacker Drive, Suite 5900
          Chicago, IL 60606-6361
          Telephone: (312) 876 8000
          E-mail: anthony.eliseuson@dentons.com

               - and -

          David Aaron Weisz, Esq.
          Michael Ira Fistel, Jr., Esq.
          William Woodhull Stone, Esq.
          JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP
          40 Powder Springs Street
          Marietta, GA 30064
          Telephone: (770) 200 3104
          Facsimile: (770) 200 3101
          E-mail: davidw@johnsonandweaver.com
                  michaelf@johnsonandweaver.com
                  WilliamS@johnsonandweaver.com

               - and -

          Tamara Yvette Feliciano, Esq.
          COLEMAN LEGAL GROUP, LLC
          5755 North Point Parkway, Suite 52
          Alpharetta, GA 30022
          Telephone: (770) 609 1247
          E-mail: tamarafelicianoesq@gmail.com


PETROBRAS: Wants 2d Circuit to Reconsider Class Action Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
B. Colby Hamilton, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that
attorneys for Brazilian energy giant Petrobras are asking the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to reconsider its order
that would largely have allowed the class action suit against it
to proceed.

The order, partially vacating and partially affirming from Circuit
Judges Peter Hall and Debra Ann Livingston and U.S. District Judge
Nicholas Garaufis for the Eastern District of
New York, sitting by designation, was largely a win for the
plaintiffs.  While the panel found that U.S. District Judge
Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York had erred in how
he defined the plaintiffs in two separate classes suing Petrobras,
it also rejected a higher standard for class membership sought by
the company.

In a request for a rehearing or an en banc review filed July 21 in
In re Petrobras Securities, 16-1914-cv, Petrobras' attorneys argued
the panel's order "conflicts with settled precedent on two
exceptionally important and recurring issues."

The panel's lowering of this threshold also appeared to have
caught Petrobras by surprise.  It contends that none of the
parties expected the precedent set in 2015's Brecher v. Republic
of Argentina to be in dispute, "only whether the requirement was
satisfied."

"The panel . . . not only overruled a decision of a prior panel,
but did so when the issue had not been squarely considered by the
district court or raised by the parties," Petrobras argued.

The first issue is with U.S. Supreme Court and local precedent
governing the proof required to show a harm in the market that the
appellants' counsel argues will have serious implications for
large companies being sued for securities fraud.

The panel was wrong when it said that concrete proof wasn't
required to show that a stock price was affected by news of a
specific event, according to Petrobras.  This contradicts the
Supreme Court's decision in 2014's Halliburton v. Erica P. John
Fund, known as Halliburton II, where simple price movement wasn't
enough to show an event, such as the revelation of the kickback
and bribery scheme Petrobras found itself in a decade ago, was
primarily responsible for a gain or loss of value.

The relaxed burden will effectively transfer the burden of proof
onto the defendants, Petrobras said, while creating a standard
that is vague enough "for every plaintiff who can site venue in
the Second Circuit, the home of the New York Stock Exchange" to
file suit, opening "the floodgates in the Second Circuit to
meritless and debilitatingly expensive lawsuits where there is no
objective evidence that any investor relied on any misstatements."

The second issue the energy company said requires review concerns
the feasibility of determining who, exactly, should be in a class.

Petrobras argued that the panel split with the circuit's previous
ruling in Brecher.  There, the panel determined the ability to
easily identify who should be class members as a "touchstone" in
determining whether a class can be created.  This issue of a test
for class membership that is administratively feasible was undone
by the panel's order, Petrobras said.

The panel found then that the circuit's precedent "requires only
that a class be defined using objective criteria that establish a
membership with definite boundaries."  Appellants argue that their
case would run into similar issues found in Brecher, namely that
class membership "would require the kind of individualized mini-
hearings that run contrary to the principle of ascertainability."

The lower court in this suit already dealt with a version of this
issue when it had to sift through claims to determine what the
class-defining "domestic transactions" meant, accepting certain
purchases that occurred in the United States, while determining
other actions, such as a transfer in the United States at the
request of a U.K.-based broker, insufficient.  Petrobras contends
that whether it wins or loses, this parsing of each individual
potential class member would be required given the definition
uncertainty, ultimately defeating the very purpose of a class
action.

"When . . . the class definition does not permit putative class
members to readily determine from their own knowledge whether they
satisfy that definition, their due process rights to make an
informed decision whether to opt out are compromised, as are the
rights of defendants--in the event of a defense verdict or
judgment unfavorable to plaintiffs--to hold those persons to class
membership," Petrobras said.

The petition was filed by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton partner
Lewis Liman and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom partner Jay
Kasner.  Neither could be reached for comment. [GN]


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Faces "Avezbadalov" Suit in E.D.N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC. The case is entitled as Bela Avezbadalov, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-04284 (E.D.N.Y., July 19, 2017).

PRA is a publicly traded debt buyer based in Norfolk,
Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION: Magistrate Refuses to Remand "Roundtree"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TANAIJAH A. ROUNDTREE, NICOLAS MOLINA, and
D'ANDRE KING, Plaintiffs, v. PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-9609 (CCC)(D. N.J), Magistrate
Judge Mark Falk of the District Court for the District of New
Jersey denied the Plaintiffs' motion to remand this case to state
court.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant wrongfully deducted pay
for lunch breaks each day, and further failed to fully record
their compensable work, including unpaid overtime.

On Nov. 4, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed this putative class action
in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County.  The Complaint
alleges that it is brought, on behalf of the Plaintiffs and a
putative class consisting of each and every other person who
performed work in trades, including but not limited to cabin
cleaners, cabin cleaning leads, lift truck drivers, drivers'
helpers, and other related trades for Defendants at Newark
Airport. The Complaint contains two counts labeled (i) New Jersey
Minimum Wage Compensation ("NJWHL"); and (ii) New Jersey Overtime
Compensation.  They allege that the class is believed to be in
excess of 100 similarly situated employees, and that all class
members are entitled to (i) damages; (ii) attorney's fees; and
(ii) costs of suit.

On Dec. 30, 2016, the Defendant removed the action invoking the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 jurisdiction, which vests
original jurisdiction in federal district courts over "class
actions" in which the proposed class has at least 100 members, the
parties are minimally diverse," and "the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5 million.

On January 20, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to compel
arbitration and dismiss the Complaint.  The motion remains
pending.

On Jan. 30, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand
conceding that the first two CAFA requirements are satisfied.
However, the Plaintiff's complaint is silent on the amount of
damages sought.  And Plaintiff initially argued that, in removing
the case, the Defendant failed to show, "to a legal certainty,"
that the requisite amount in controversy -- $5 million -- is in
dispute.

The Defendant opposed the motion to remand, cogently tracing a
series of recent cases to explain that, while it indeed does bear
the burden on a motion to remand, that burden is to show only "by
a preponderance of the evidence" that the required amount in
controversy is in dispute.  After full briefing, the parties now
agree that (i) the burden is on the Defendant; and (ii) that the
burden is a preponderance of the evidence.  However, they continue
to disagree whether Defendant has shown $5 million is in dispute.

Under CAFA, the claims of all the Plaintiffs and putative class
members are aggregated to determine if the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.  To attempt to compute the
amount in controversy, the Defendant has addressed the following
variables: (i) the size of the putative class; (ii) the amount of
overtime worked by the purported class members; (iii) the
applicable pay rate; (iv) the liability period; and (v) attorney's
fees.  In order to address the factors, the Defendant relies in
part on the Declaration of Christina Michelle Hall, Payroll
Director for PrimeFlight Aviation Services.  Applying the Hall
Declaration to the allegations in the Complaint, the Defendant
calculates the amount in controversy to be at least $6,594,295.

After carefully reviewing the parties' differing calculations,
Magistrate Judge Falk is satisfied that the Defendant's
composition of the amount in controversy is reasonable and not a
"pie-in-the-sky" contrived number invented to meet the
jurisdictional threshold.  As is shown, the Defendant has met its
burden to show that more than $5 million is in dispute.  For this
reason, he respectfully recommended that the Plaintiff's motion to
remand be denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 report and
recommendation is available at https://is.gd/xpn499 from
Leagle.com.

TANAIJAH ROUNDTREE, Plaintiff, represented by KARA SUE MILLER --
kmiller@vandallp.com -- VIRGINIA & AMBINDER LLP.

TANAIJAH ROUNDTREE, Plaintiff, represented by LLOYD R. AMBINDER --
lambinder@vandallp.com -- VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP.

NICOLAS MOLINA, Plaintiff, represented by KARA SUE MILLER,
VIRGINIA & AMBINDER LLP & LLOYD R. AMBINDER, VIRGINIA & AMBINDER,
LLP.

D'ANDRE KING, Plaintiff, represented by KARA SUE MILLER, VIRGINIA
& AMBINDER LLP & LLOYD R. AMBINDER, VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP.

PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION SERVICES, INC., Defendant, represented by
MICHAEL JAMES RICCOBONO -- michael.riccobono@ogletree.com --
OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. & RYAN TODD WARDEN
-- ryan.warden@ogletree.com -- OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK &
STEWART, P.C.


PROVIDENCE HEALTH: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Morales"
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RENATE MORALES, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM-SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Erroneously Sued As
Providence Health and Services, Inc., Defendant-Appellee, No. 16-
55072 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's amended
complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

After a fall, the Plaintiff received 20 physical therapy sessions
at a Providence facility.  Medicare made conditional payments for
the first 12 sessions, subject to any recovery from an alleged
tortfeasor.  Instead of billing Medicare for the remaining eight
sessions, Providence placed a lien on Morales' tort claim.  In
this putative class action, Morales claims that Providence's
failure to bill Medicare constitutes breach of contract, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The district court
dismissed his first amended complaint without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Morales appeals.

The Court affirmed.  It explains that it has a jurisdiction over
the appeal.  Providence argues that the Court does not have
jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court dismissal
was without prejudice.  The dispute resolution process in 42
U.S.C. Section 1395y(b)(2)(B)(vii)(IV), which the district court
cited, applies only to conditional Medicare reimbursements, not to
the failure of a Medicare provider to submit a payment in the
first place.  In addition, the Medicare Act's exhaustion
requirement, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(h), applies to judicial review
of claims arising under the Act.  Each of Morales' claims is
complaining about the denial of Medicare benefits and therefore is
subject to the exhaustion requirement.  Finally, Morales argues
that she could not be required to exhaust administrative remedies
because none existed.  But, the Court notes, as the district court
noted, that to the extent the Plaintiff is claiming that the
Defendants are running afoul of the Medicare Act by collecting
reimbursement from her in an amount greater than what is permitted
under that Act she is making a claim for benefits.  The
administrative appeals process under 42 U.S.C. Section 1395ff
governs benefits determinations.  Alternatively, Morales could
have submitted the relevant claims directly to Medicare.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/7ZUFR7 from Leagle.com.


QUALITY SYSTEMS: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William A. Fletcher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court dismissal with prejudice
of the case captioned IN RE QUALITY SYSTEMS, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Debtor. CITY OF MIAMI FIRE FIGHTERS' AND POLICE
OFFICERS' RETIREMENT TRUST; ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. QUALITY SYSTEMS, INC.; STEVEN T.
PLOCHOCKI; PAUL A. HOLT; SHELDON RAZIN, Defendants-Appellees, No.
15-55173 (9th Cir.) and remanded for further proceedings.

The Lead Plaintiffs brought this would-be class action on behalf
of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
common stock of Defendant QSI between May 26, 2011, and July 25,
2012.  They allege that during the Class Period, QSI and several
of its officers made false or misleading statements about the
current and past state of QSI's sales "pipeline," and used those
statements to support public guidance to investors about QSI's
projected growth and revenue.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Individual Defendants had real-time sales information showing a
decline in sales due to market saturation beginning as early as
April 2011, and that they knew that their public statements
denying any decline were false or misleading.

The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice, finding that the Defendants' non-forward-looking
statements about the past and current state of QSI's sales
pipeline were non-actionable puffery, and that their forward-
looking statements about projected growth and revenue were
protected by the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act.

Judge Fletcher disagrees with the district court.  First, some of
the Defendants' statements were "mixed statements," containing
non-forward-looking statements as well as forward-looking
statements of projected revenue and earnings.  He holds that a
defendant may not transform non-forward-looking statements into
forward-looking statements that are protected by the safe harbor
provisions of the PSLRA by combining non-forward-looking
statements about past or current facts with forward-looking
statements about projected revenues and earnings.  Second, he
holds that many of the Defendants' non-forward-looking statements
were materially false or misleading.  Third, he holds that some of
the Defendants' forward-looking statements were materially false
or misleading, were not accompanied by appropriate cautionary
statements, and were made with actual knowledge of their false or
misleading nature.  For these reasons, Judge Fletcher reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with his opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/zIRbjG from Leagle.com.

Joseph D. Daley -- joed@rgrdlaw.com -- (argued), Christopher D.
Stewart -- cstewart@rgrdlaw.com -- and Robert R. Henssler, Jr. --
bhenssler@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San
Diego, California; Benjamin Galdston -- beng@blbglaw.com -- Blair
A. Nicholas -- blairn@blbglaw.com -- Brandon Marsh --
brandon.marsh@blbglaw.com -- and Lucas E. Gilmore --
Lucas.Gilmore@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann
LLP, San Diego, California; Avi Josefson -- avi@blbglaw.com -- and
Gerald Silk -- jerry@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossman LLP, New York, New York; Stephen H. Cypen --
scypen@cypen.com -- Cypen & Cypen, Miami Beach, Florida; for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Peter A. Wald -- peter.wald@lw.com -- (argued), Latham & Watkins,
San Francisco, California; Andrew R. Gray -- andrew.gray@lw.com --
and Michele D. Johnson -- michele.johnson@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP, Costa Mesa, California; Colleen C. Smith --
colleen.smith@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, San Diego,
California; for Defendants-Appellees.


RED CARPET: Faces "Woods" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Red Carpet
Management LLC. The case is captioned as Rex T. Woods,
individually and in behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Red Carpet Management LLC, jointly and
severally, and Ira Neuberg, jointly and severally, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-04311 (E.D.N.Y., July 20, 2017).[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


SANDRIDGE ENERGY: Reliance's Bid to Dismiss "Gernandt" Okayed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BARTON GERNANDT, JR., et al., Plaintiff, v.
SANDRIDGE ENERGY INC., et al., Defendants. CHRISTINA A. CUMMINGS,
et al., Plaintiff, v. SANDRIDGE ENERGY, INC., et al., Defendants.
RICHARD A. McWILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiff, v. SANDRIDGE ENERGY,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. CIV-15-834-D, Consolidated with
Case No. CIV-15-892-D., CIV-15-1001-D (W.D. Okla.), Judge Timothy
D. DeGiusti of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma granted Defendant Reliance Trust Co.'s Motion to Dismiss
Consolidated Class Action Complaint and Motion to Strike Jury
Demand.

This consolidated class action involves claims for alleged
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), with respect to the SandRidge Energy, Inc., 401(k)
Plan.  The Plaintiffs, participants and beneficiaries of the Plan,
claim the Defendants were responsible for the Plan's investments
and breached their fiduciary duties by, inter alia, retaining
SandRidge common stock as an investment option in the Plan despite
its decline and when a reasonable fiduciary would have done
otherwise.

Specifically, they allege the Defendants permitted the Plan to
continue to offer SandRidge Stock as an investment option to
Participants even after the Defendants knew or should have known
that: (i) SandRidge Stock was, for a substantial portion of the
Class Period (Aug. 2, 2012 to the present), artificially inflated;
(ii) SandRidge was in extremely poor financial condition; and
(iii) SandRidge faced extremely poor long term prospects, making
it an imprudent retirement investment option for the Plan.  The
Plaintiffs' Complaint is largely based on public information about
SandRidge's gradual decline into bankruptcy, beginning in 2012 and
culminating in 2016.

Before the Court is Defendant Reliance's Motion to Dismiss
Consolidated Class Action Complaint and Motion to Strike Jury
Demand.  Reliance was the Plan's trustee and held the Plan's
assets in trust.  The Plaintiffs contend that, given the amount of
public information available regarding SandRidge's financial
condition, Reliance had a duty to disregard any instruction to
invest Plan assets in SandRidge stock.  They have responded to the
Motion and Reliance has replied.

Reliance contends the Plaintiffs' claims against it should be
dismissed on the grounds that it was a directed trustee that did
not possess discretion regarding the extent to which the Plan
invested in SandRidge stock, and thus, it cannot be held liable
for the Plan's ongoing investment in the stock.  The Plaintiffs do
not dispute that Reliance was a directed trustee.  Accordingly,
the issue is whether Reliance's status as a directed trustee is
sufficient to absolve it of liability for following directions
given by SandRidge's Benefits Committee.

The Court also finds that the standard announced in Fifth Third
Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer applies to the Plaintiffs' claims.  The
Plaintiffs contend Fifth Third is inapplicable because their
claims against Reliance do not concern whether the market was
over- or undervaluing SandRidge stock, but that the basic risk
profile and future business prospects of SandRidge had so
dramatically changed, that continued deterioration of the price of
SandRidge Stock was inevitable, making SandRidge an imprudent Plan
investment option.

However, as other courts have noted in evaluating similar ERISA
claims, the purported distinction between claims involving
excessive risk and claims involving market value is illusory.
Fifth Third forecloses breach of prudence claims based on public
information irrespective of whether such claims are characterized
as based on alleged overvaluation or alleged riskiness of a stock.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs must plead
facts sufficient to meet Fifth Third's special circumstances
requirement.  The Court granted Reliance's Motion on this issue.

Reliance next contends the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
for co-fiduciary liability.  Viewing the allegations in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient factual content that
would allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that
Reliance had actual knowledge of its co-defendant's alleged
misconduct.  Although the Plaintiffs adequately set forth the
statutory elements of co-fiduciary liability, the Complaint is
devoid of any supporting facts that bolster their contention
Reliance had "actual knowledge" of the other fiduciary's alleged
breaches.  Accordingly, Reliance's Motion on this issue is
granted.

Lastly, Reliance moves to strike the Plaintiffs' jury trial
demand.  The Court finds the Plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive.
First, Montanile involved the application of ERISA Section
502(a)(3), which is not at issue in the present case.  Second,
Montanile did not address whether there is a right to a jury trial
under ERISA.  Lastly, although the Court is mindful of Montanile's
general holding, it is not clear that the Court's holding was
meant to overturn the well-established precedent regarding the
right to a jury trial under the claims asserted here.  Instead,
following well-established Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court
concludes that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial
under the facts and allegations of this case.  Accordingly, the
Court struck the Plaintiffs' jury demand.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.  With respect to the claims that have been dismissed, the
Court is not convinced the Plaintiffs are unable to state a claim
for which relief can be granted.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are
granted leave to file an amended complaint within 21 days of the
Order or seek an extension of time to do so.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/js2KB5 from Leagle.com.

Barton Gernandt, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by Jason E. Roselius,
Mattingly & Roselius PLLC.

Barton Gernandt, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by Tanner W. Hicks --
tanner@mroklaw.com -- Mattingly & Roselius PLLC, Donna S. Moffa --
dmoffa@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Edward W.
Ciolko -- eciolko@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP,
Emmanuel E. Edem, Norman & Edem PLLC, James A. Maro, Jr. --
jmaro@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Julie Eve
Siebert-Johnson -- jsjohnson@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check LLP, Mark K. Gyandoh, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP &
Robert I. Harwood -- rharwood@hfesq.com -- Harwood Feffer LLP.

Christina A Cummings, Plaintiff, represented by Emmanuel E. Edem,
Norman & Edem PLLC, L. Mark Bonner, Norman & Edem PLLC, Michael
Jason Klein -- mklein@ssbny.com -- Stull Stull & Brody, Tanner W.
Hicks -- tanner@mroklaw.com -- Mattingly & Roselius PLLC & Mark K.
Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP.

Richard A McWilliams, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel M.
Delluomo, Delluomo & Crow, Robert I. Harwood, Harwood Feffer LLP,
Tanner W. Hicks, Mattingly & Roselius PLLC, Mark K. Gyandoh,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Daniel M. Delluomo, Delluomo &
Crow, Mark K. Gyandoh, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP & Tanner
W. Hicks, Mattingly & Roselius PLLC.

Joe L. Rayos, Plaintiff, represented by Tanner W. Hicks, Mattingly
& Roselius PLLC & Mark K. Gyandoh, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check
LLP.

Sandridge Energy Inc, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides -- atalarides@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington &
Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long --  brandon.long@mcafeetaft.com --
McAfee & Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger -- kherzinger@orrick.com --
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice, M. Todd Scott --
tscott@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer -- mark.spencer@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft & Michael
F. Lauderdale --  michael.lauderdale@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee &
Taft.

Tom L Ward, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Christopher J. Fawal, Latham &
Watkins-WASHINGTON, George S. Corbyn, Jr., Corbyn Hampton PLLC,
James C. Word, Latham & Watkins-WASHINGTON, Kenneth P. Herzinger,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick
Herrington & Sutcliffe, Margaret A. Tough -- margaret.tough@lw.com
-- Latham & Watkins & Steven M. Bauer -- steven.bauer@lw.com --
Latham & Watkins.

Stephen C Beasley, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee
& Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro
hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

James D Bennett, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee & Taft,
Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice,
Mark D. Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee &
Taft.

Jim J Brewer, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee & Taft,
Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice,
M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D. Spencer,
McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

Everett R Dobson, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee
& Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro
hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

William A Gilliland, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee
& Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro
hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

Daniel W Jordan, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Talarides,
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee & Taft,
Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro hac vice,
M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D. Spencer,
McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

Edward W Moneypenny, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee
& Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro
hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.

Roy T Oliver, Jr, Defendant, represented by Alexander K.
Talarides, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Brandon P. Long, McAfee
& Taft, Kenneth P. Herzinger, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, pro
hac vice, M. Todd Scott, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, Mark D.
Spencer, McAfee & Taft & Michael F. Lauderdale, McAfee & Taft.


SCRUB INC: Abdi, et al Seek Overtime Pay under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------
Hassan Abdi, Maria Abril Gonzalez, Fernando Acono, Nancy
Acosta, Julia Acosta, Juan Acupina, Imelda Adame, Antonio
Adan, Mawuli Agblewonou, Mirella Aguilar, Angel Aguilar,
Rosa Aguilera, Miguel Aguiniga-Gonzalez, et al., the Plaintiffs,
v. SCRUB, INC.; TERESA KAMINSKA; and MARK RATHKE, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-05136 (N.D. Ill., July 11, 2017), seeks to
recover compensatory damages, including all regular, premium, and
overtime pay owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

The case is an individual action by each of the Plaintiffs under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); and a Rule 23 class action
under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL) and the Illinois Wage
Payment And Collection Act (IWPCA), involving janitors whose clock
times as reflected on punch cards were improperly and
detrimentally rounded by Defendants, and who were otherwise not
properly compensated. In addition, each of the Plaintiffs were
denied the full extent of their statutorily-required meal breaks,
and were not paid for work performed during their unpaid meal
breaks. Defendants' practices caused injury to Plaintiffs because
they deprived the janitors of their earned wages and overtime.

Scrub, Inc. is a highly specialized contract cleaning company with
nearly 1,000 employees providing nationwide janitorial and
facility services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Glen J. Dunn, Jr.
          GLEN J. DUNN & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          221 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 546 5056

               - and -

          Jeffrey Grant Brown
          Jeffrey Grant Brown, P.C.
          221 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 789 9700


SOUTHERN REFRIGERATED: "Bass" Suit Moved to W.D. Arkansas
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled David Bass, individually, on a
representative basis, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Southern Refrigerated Transport, Inc.,
an Arkansas Corporation and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00195, was removed on July 26, 2017
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas (Texarkana). The Western District Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 4:17-cv-04061-SOH to the proceeding. The case is assigned
to the Hon. Susan O. Hickey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian J. Mankin, Esq.
          Peter Carlson, Esq.
          FERNANDEZ AND LAUBY LLP
          4590 Allstate Dr.
          Riverside, CA 92501
          Telephone: (951) 320 1444
          Facsimile: (951) 320 1445
          E-mail: bjm@fernandezlauby.com
                  PJC@fernandezlauby.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kai-Ching Cha, Esq.
          Michael J Hui, Esq.
          Richard H Rahm, Esq.
          Littler Mendelson PC
          333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433 1940
          Facsimile: (415) 399 8490
          E-mail: kcha@littler.com
                  mhui@littler.com
                  rrahm@littler.com


SPOTIFY USA: Court Dismisses Plaintiff's Claim Brought Under ARL
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nancy Stagg, Esq. -- NStagg@kilpatricktownsend.com -- of
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an article for JDSupra,
wrote that a recent federal district court opinion highlights the
class action risks companies selling consumer goods and services
in California face from California's Automatic Renewal Law,
California Business & Professions Code Section 17600 ("ARL").  The
ARL, which was enacted in 2010, requires companies selling goods
and services in California through continuous service programs, or
automatically-renewing consumer contracts, or when offering free
trials, to clearly and conspicuously disclose the terms, obtain
the consumer's affirmative consent before imposing a charge, and
provide an acknowledgment that contains the terms, the
cancellation policy, and an easy-to-use method to cancel the
service.  Given the increasing popularity of subscription services
for everything from streaming music to beauty products, numerous
class action lawsuits have been filed against goods and service
providers alleging violations of the ARL.  In an order dated July
17, 2017 by U.S. District Judge William Alsup in the Northern
District of California in Gregory Ingalls, et al., v. Spotify USA,
Inc. (Case No. 3:16-CV-03533 WHA), the District Court granted in
part and denied in part Spotify's motion for summary judgment on a
plaintiff's claims brought under the ARL and California's Unfair
Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code Section
17200 ("UCL").  The District Court granted summary adjudication
and dismissed plaintiff's claim brought under the ARL but denied
summary judgment on plaintiff's UCL claim. (At the time of this
publication, plaintiff's motion for class certification was
pending before the District Court.)

The District Court's order dismissing plaintiff's claim based on
the ARL itself is in line with other recent orders from the
Eastern and Central Districts of California that have found that
the ARL does not provide a private right of action.  See Johnson
v. Pluralsight, LLC, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2017 WL 661953 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 17, 2017) (Judge Morrison England, Jr.); Roz v. Nestle Waters
N. Am.,Inc., No. 2:16-cv-04418-SVM-JEM, 2017 WL 132853 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 11, 2017) (Judge Stephen Wilson).  However, because a UCL
claim can be based upon the violation of a statute, the District
Court found that the alleged violation of the ARL could be the
predicate unlawful act upon which a UCL claim (and class action)
could be based.

The District Court also rejected Spotify's claim that the
plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring the unfair
competition claim.  The District found that plaintiff's
expenditure of $9.99 a month for 3 months for an online music
streaming service, considered in light of his testimony that he
did not expect to be charged for the service, no longer wanted it,
and did not use it after the first 2 weeks of his 3-day free
trial, was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.

In examining each of the three grounds upon which the plaintiff
based his claim that Spotify violated the ARL, the District Court
determined that the plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material
fact as to "but for" causation, which precluded summary judgment
for Spotify.  First, the plaintiff's testimony -- to the effect
that, if the terms had been properly presented to him, he would
have read them and cancelled his subscription prior to the end of
the free trial -- was sufficient to support his claim that
Spotify's failure to disclose its automatic-renewal terms in a
clear and conspicuous manner caused him harm.  The District Court
rejected Spotify's argument that, because the plaintiff admitted
he did not read Spotify's automatic renewal disclosure, his injury
was not traceable to Spotify's conduct.  Plaintiff's allegations
were not related to the actual content of the disclosure,
according to the District Court, but were instead "predicated on a
prophylactic law requiring businesses to present disclosures in a
conspicuous manner."

Second, the District Court found that the plaintiff sufficiently
established causation as to his claim that Spotify failed to
obtain his affirmative consent to the automatic renewal program:
"Had Spotify presented [plaintiff] with an opportunity to
affirmatively consent, he may have read whatever he was consenting
to."

Finally, in assessing plaintiff's third claim that Spotify failed
to provide an appropriate acknowledgment of the automatic renewal
disclosure, the District Court noted that the receipt plaintiff
received after signing up contained only a link to the online
terms and not a copy of the actual terms.  Because Spotify failed
to address the adequacy of this type of disclosure in its motion,
the District Court also denied summary judgment as to this claim.

Practice Tip: While many other states have enacted similar laws,
California's Automatic Renewal Law is considered to be among the
most stringent in the United States.  California is currently a
hot spot for the filing of automatic-renewal disclosure class
action cases.  To avoid being targeted, companies offering
subscription service programs, automatic renewals, and free trials
should carefully review their compliance with California law and
make any necessary changes to their sign-up process to provide
clear and conspicuous disclosure, obtain affirmative consent, and
provide an appropriate acknowledgement to the consumer. [GN]


STATE COLLEGE: Responds to Workers' Class Action Over "Tip Pool"
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Hartley, writing for Centre Daily, reports that a State
College restaurant facing a class-action lawsuit has denied any
wrongdoing and instead accused one of the plaintiffs of defrauding
the establishment.

A group of former delivery drivers brought the suit against Wings
Over Happy Valley, located at 244 W. Hamilton Ave., in May.  The
suit alleges that the restaurant, and alleged owner
Steven Moreira, unlawfully required drivers to participate in a
"tip pool" used to compensate other workers.

Specifically, the suit claims that drivers were routinely required
to "tip out" about 8 percent of their tips to provide compensation
to kitchen workers.  Kitchen workers are not regularly tipped
employees, the suit said, claiming that the restaurant violated
the Fair Labor Standards Act and state Minimum Wage Act by
wrongfully retaining the plaintiff's wages to avoid paying kitchen
workers "an appropriate wage."

In a defendant's answer to the May complaint, filed on July 21
with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, Mr. Moriera and Wings Over denied engaging in
unlawful tip-pooling practices, specifically denying that
Mr. Moriera individually owns or operates the restaurant and
individually employed the plaintiffs.

The response claimed that two of the plaintiffs -- Jacob Wilson
and Ty Carts -- did perform duties as delivery drivers, but were
also employed as a driver manager and shift manager, respectively,
and were paid more than minimum wage, excluding tip income.  The
response further claimed that wages were not "taken" from the
plaintiffs, who were not required to participate in a "tipping
pool" at all.

The defendant's response admitted to having a tip jar for kitchen
workers -- who were reportedly paid between $9 and $10.50 per hour
-- and any contributions made to the jar were entirely voluntary.

"At no time did Wings Over or Mr. Moreira withhold, take or in any
way place the delivery drivers' tips into that jar," the document
said. Wilson, it claimed, was "expressly informed in writing that
the tip jar in question was voluntary."

The response denied that the plaintiffs were subject to any common
or general rule, policy or communication regarding a tip pool,
further denying that the plaintiffs unlawfully lost any income.
The response requested the court enter judgment in favor of the
defendants, awarding "reasonable" attorney's fees and costs.

In the response, the defendants claim Wilson was paid $15 per hour
when acting as the driving manager and $6 per hour when acting as
a delivery driver, during which time he earned tip income from
customers.  The document alleges that on several occasions, Wilson
misrepresented his roles when tracking the time he worked, falsely
entering time as a manager while working as a driver.

These misrepresentations resulted in him being paid a higher wage,
the response claimed, saying he intentionally defrauded the
restaurant of money.  The defendants seek further judgment in
favor against Wilson with additional monetary damages, punitive
damages, attorney's fees and costs. [GN]


SUGAR FOOD: Court Denies Settlement in "Manohar"
------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado denied the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Approval of Fair Labor Standards Act Settlement in the case
captioned ASWINRAJ MANOHAR and PACKIARAJ VEERAN, Plaintiffs, v.
SUGAR FOOD LLC d/b/a Jai Ho, SUGAR BHAVAN LLC d/b/a Jai Ho
Boulder, SUGAR DOSA LLC d/b/a Jai Ho Park Meadows, SATHYA NARAYA,
an individual, and SUJATHA NARAYAN, an individual, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 16-cv-02454-NYW (D. Colo.).

On Sept. 29, 2016, Plaintiff Manohar initiated this lawsuit for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Colorado
Wage Claim Act ("CWCA"), and the Colorado Minimum Wage Order for
unpaid and underpaid wages he earned while employed at the
Defendants' Indian restaurants as a server and cashier and for
general front of the house duties.  On Dec. 16, 2016, the
Defendants filed an Answer that included one counterclaim
consisting of nine paragraphs.

On Feb. 9, 2017, Mr. Manohar amended his Complaint with leave of
court to add  Plaintiff Veeran.  The First Amended Complaint
pleads one claim for FLSA violations asserted by both the
Plaintiffs against all the Defendants, and one claim for
violations of the CWCA asserted by both the Plaintiffs against
Defendants Sugar Food, Sugar Bhavan, and Sugar Dosa.  They plead
that the Defendants were their employers at all times relevant to
this lawsuit.

On Feb. 23, 2017, the Defendants filed an Answer in which
Defendant Sugar Bhavan asserted three Counterclaims for
Conversion, Civil Theft, and Breach of Fiduciary Duty against
Plaintiff Manohar.  On March 16, 2017, Plaintiff Manohar filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the Counterclaims constitute
improper retaliation in violation of the FLSA and CWA's anti-
retaliation provisions, and must be dismissed as they do not arise
out of a common nucleus of operative facts with their Plaintiffs'
FLSA/CWA wage claims.  Sugar Bhavan filed a Response on April 6,
2017.  Plaintiff Manohar filed a Reply on April 20, 2017.  Before
the motion to dismiss could be fully adjudicated, however, the
Parties notified the Court that the matter had been settled.

On June 30, 2017, the Parties filed a Notice of Settlement stating
that they had reached a mutually-acceptable settlement in this
action.  On July 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the Motion for
Approval and accompanying brief.  The same day, the Court denied
the motion to dismiss Counterclaims as moot in light of the Motion
for Approval, permitting leave for the Plaintiffs to renew their
motion should the settlement fail.

Under the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, the
Defendants agree to pay $17,500 to Plaintiff Manohar, $7,500 to
Plaintiff Veeran, and $20,000 to the Plaintiffs' attorneys for
fees and costs.

Based on the information the Parties provide through the Amended
Complaint and the Motion for Approval and associated brief, as
well as consideration of the docket as a whole, the Court finds
that a bona fide dispute led to the settlement negotiation and
resulting terms.  It also finds that the settlement agreement does
not run afoul of the policy concerns underpinning the FLSA and
there is no indication that the Defendants have a history of
flouting FLSA requirements.

However, the Motion for Approval raises several issues that
preclude the Court from determining whether the settlement of the
Plaintiffs' attorney's fees is reasonable.  First, the "draft" is
just that, a "draft," with no explanation of how it would differ
from a "final" invoice.  Second, their counsel do not attach
affidavits to the Motion for Approval so as to explain the
respective experience of the attorneys or and paralegal(s)
involved, or justify their billing rates.  Third, they present no
comparator data to establish that their rate is, in fact,
consistent with the prevailing rate for practitioners with FLSA
expertise in this District.  Fourth, upon review of the billing
records, the Court finds that many of the billing entries are
problematic because they are undecipherable to someone who is
unfamiliar with the Plaintiffs' counsel's recordkeeping.

The Ruiz v. Act Fast Delivery of Colorado court contemplated that
the parties could elect to proceed with their settlement
independent of the court's review, but if they chose to renew the
motion for approval of settlement they would be required to
address the court's concerns.  This Court notes that the Parties
before it may similarly elect to take such a course of action, and
proceed independently in the resolution of this matter without
judicial approval of the settlement.  However, should the Parties
continue to seek judicial review of their proposed settlement
agreement, they must cure the deficiencies as described by the
Court.

Accordingly, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for
Approval of Fair Labor Standards Act Settlement.  No later than
Aug. 9, 2017, the Parties will either dismiss this action pursuant
to their settlement and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41; or
renew their motion for approval of settlement consistent with the
instruction provided.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/aLIzaz from Leagle.com.

Aswinraj Manohar, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Gastman,
AndersonDodson, P.C..

Aswinraj Manohar, Plaintiff, represented by Penn Anderson Dodson,
AndersonDodson, P.C..

Packiaraj Veeran, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Gastman,
AndersonDodson, P.C. & Penn Anderson Dodson, AndersonDodson, P.C..

Sugar Food LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus --
jeff_klaus@deisch-marion.com -- Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Bhavan LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Dosa LLC, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sathya Naraya, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus, Deisch,
Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sujatha Narayan, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sujatha Narayan, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B.
Klaus, Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Dosa LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Bhavan LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B.
Klaus, Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Food LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sathya Naraya, an individual, Counter Claimant, represented by
Jeffrey B. Klaus, Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Aswinraj Manohar, Counter Defendant, represented by Alexander
Gastman, AndersonDodson, P.C. & Penn Anderson Dodson,
AndersonDodson, P.C..

Sujatha Narayan, an individual, Counter Claimant, represented by
Jeffrey B. Klaus, Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Bhavan LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B.
Klaus, Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Food LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sathya Naraya, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Sugar Dosa LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Jeffrey B. Klaus,
Deisch, Marion, & Klaus, P.C..

Aswinraj Manohar, Counter Defendant, represented by Alexander
Gastman, AndersonDodson, P.C. & Penn Anderson Dodson,
AndersonDodson, P.C..


SUN-MAID GROWERS: Faces "Saghian" Suit in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sun-Maid Growers of
California. The case is styled as Jonathan Saghian, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Sun-Maid Growers of California, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
05013-AB-PJW (C.D. Cal., July 7, 2017). The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Andre Birotte Jr.

Sun-Maid Growers of California is a privately owned American
cooperative of raisin growers headquartered in Kingsburg,
California. Sun-Maid is the largest raisin and dried fruit
processor in the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          Barbara A Rohr, Esq.
          FARUQI AND FARUQI LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 1470
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256 2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256 2885
          E-mail: Bheikali@faruqilaw.com
                  brohr@faruqilaw.com


SYNGENTA: 2018 Class Action Hearings Scheduled in Kansas Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mikkel Pates, writing for Agweek, reports that an early victory in
cases against Syngenta is only one step in what could be another
year or two lawsuits and appeals.  Some U.S. farmers claim they're
owed money because of the release of a certain genetic
modifications into the corn market before it was fully accepted.

Michelle Donarski -- mdonarski@andersonbottrell.com -- a
shareholder attorney in the Anderson, Bottrell, Sanden & Thompson
law firm in Fargo, has worked with lead counsel firms in the case
for three years.  The primary plaintiffs' lawyers are firms in St.
Louis, Mo., Birmingham, Ala., and Dallas and Houston, Texas.  Ms.
Donarski's firm acts as local counsel for these bigger firms and
gathers participant farmers who have grown corn since 2013 and
allegedly are affected by the actions.

The case is being tried in Kansas because of that court's
experience and workforce. The Syngenta case is a confusing tangle
of litigation involving thousands of plaintiffs in state and
federal courts, with many parties making different claims.

On June 23, 2017, in a federal court case in Kansas, a jury
returned a $217.7 million verdict in a state negligence claim
against Syngenta and in favor of a class of over 7,300 Kansas corn
producer-plaintiffs.  Syngenta has said it will appeal the Kansas
verdict, as well as claims by other corn producers across the
country.  Syngenta says the company did nothing improper and that
China's regulatory system was to blame.

Unified jury

In the Kansas class action case, the jury unanimously found that
Syngenta had erred in its commercialization of Viptera and
Duracade products -- both containing the MIR 162 trait.  The jury
awarded 100 percent of the damage alleged by the plaintiffs and
rejected Syngenta's argument that China's was the cause of the
damages.  All farmers who raised corn in the eligible years are
members of that class unless they have opted out.

The Kansas case is being handled by Judge John W. Lungstrum, who
has certified classes of corn producers in seven other states --
Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio and South
Dakota. Farmers in 21 states account for 94 percent of the U.S.
corn production in relevant years.

Plaintiffs allege that Syngenta improperly commercialized Viptera
before China had approved the particular genetic modification,
costing U.S. farmers money and market share.  The plaintiffs
alleged that the losses to farmers ranged from 15.7 cents per
bushel in 2013-2014 and up to 19.9 cents a bushel in 2015-2016,
and then declined to about 6.1 cents.

The case so far involves only Kansas farmers and does not set
precedent for producers from other states, Ms. Donarski says.  The
cases for other states will be based on state negligence laws,
which are different.  Ms. Donarski says the decision is still good
news for plaintiffs in that the jury "heard our experts on
liability and on damages, and found that Syngenta is negligent,
that it can't place blame on China and that farmers were damaged."

She says the same damage and liability experts will testify in
subsequent cases involving other states.

2018 trials

The Kansas court is scheduled to hear federal class action cases
in groups of one to two states on a schedule into 2018 -- Jan. 22
for Arkansas and Missouri, in a case expected to last three to
four weeks.  After that there is April 4 for Illinois and
Nebraska; May 14, South Dakota and Iowa; and Oct. 8 for Ohio.

The federal class action court will be looking for whether the
state laws are similar enough to try the cases together.  After
that, groups of two to four states will be tried together,
including Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas
and Wisconsin.  No court date has been set for those on the
federal class action.

If the plaintiffs continue to have successful verdict awards, the
parties could come together and discuss a "global settlement," she
says.  Syngenta also could refuse to settle, and more cases could
be tried.

Ms. Donarski's firm also is involved in a separate case in
Minnesota state court that is scheduled to go to court in Hennepin
County on Sept. 11 in Minneapolis.  Minnesota corn growers are not
eligible for the national class because they have their own case.
It involves only Minnesota farmers who did not plant Viptera and
Duracade.  In that case, Ms. Donarski's firm helps farmers file
claims.

A separate case involves groups of individual plaintiffs in
Illinois litigation, including Lee Murphy of Dallas, Texas, and
Martin J. Phipps of San Antonio, Texas.  Progressive Ag Law PLLC,
of Fargo, was finding plaintiffs for that case.  Syngenta
responded to the amended complaint on June 27 -- essentially
signaling the beginning of that case, although no trial date is
set on that case according to the docket.  Ray Grabanski,
president of the Progressive Ag firm, did not immediately return
comment for Agweek. [GN]


TECH MAHINDRA: Ct. Conditionally Certifies Class in "Kumar"
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned PANKAJ KUMAR, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. TECH
MAHINDRA (AMERICAS) INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-00905-JAR
(E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Southeastern Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification and Court-
Authorized Notice.

On June 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed his original complaint against
the Defendant, asserting individual unpaid-overtime claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and Missouri statutory and
common law.

On Oct. 5, 2016, the Plaintiff amended his complaint to bring his
claims on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
attaching a written consent to become a party plaintiff.  In Count
I of his amended complaint, Kumar brings an "opt-in" collective
action under the FLSA on behalf of all persons who are, have been
or will be employed by Tech Mahindra as Software Test Engineers or
Software Engineers (and other titles that provide computer
application and network environment support) at any time from
three years prior to filing this action through the entry of
judgment, and whose job it was to troubleshoot issues raised by
test teams, deploy code and compile production plans.  Counts II
and III are brought as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class
actions alleging violation of the Missouri Minimum Wage Law, and a
state law claim of unjust enrichment.

In his instant motion, Kumar requests the Court conditionally
certify a collective action and authorize notice to the class of
all U1-U3 band IT Delivery Engineers employed by Tech Mahindra who
were classified as exempt during any workweek at any time three
years prior to filing this action through the entry of judgment.

In his revised proposed Notice, Kumar describes the proposed class
as any individual who works or worked for the Defendant as a U1-U3
band IT Engineer under any of the following job titles: Associate
Engineer, Associate Software Engineer, Junior Software Engineer,
Junior Technical Engineer, Network Engineer, Senior Network
Engineer, Product Engineer, Senior Product Engineer, Test
Engineer, Senior Test Engineer, Software Engineer, or Senior
Software Engineer, that were classified as exempt during any
workweek at any time from June 20, 2013, to present.

In response, Tech Mahindra consents to conditional certification
of the class to the extent it includes U1-U3 band IT Engineers,
but opposes certification of the class to the extent Kumar seeks
to include all such employees who worked from June 20, 2013 (or
three years prior to the date he filed his original complaint) to
the present.  It argues that the limitations period in this case
should be two years, not three, as there is no evidence that it
willfully violated the FLSA.  It further argues that the
limitations period, whether it is two years or three, should be
measured from the date the Court conditionally certifies the
class, not from the date the Plaintiff filed his original
complaint.

In reply, Kumar argues that the FLSA's three-year statute of
limitations should apply because he has pled that Tech Mahindra's
violation was willful, and that at this conditional-certification
stage of the proceeding, no evidence of willfulness is required.
In his view, running the limitations period from the date the
Court conditionally certifies the class would improperly restrain
the claims of the FLSA Collective members who have already filed
their consent forms with the Court.  He concedes that, for notice
purposes, the limitations period should be calculated from the
date the Court conditionally certifies the class.

The Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for the conditional
collective action certification and granted in part the court-
authorized notice.  It conditionally certifies a class of all U1-
U3 band IT Delivery Engineers employed by the Defendant who were
classified as exempt during any workweek at any time three years
prior to Oct. 5, 2016 through the entry of judgment.

The Court further (i) conditionally authorized Plaintiff Kumar to
act as class representative; and (ii) authorized the Nichols
Kaster, PLLP law firm to act as the class counsel.

The Plaintiff will file his amended proposed Notice of Lawsuit and
Consent to Join Collective Action against the Defendant no later
than Aug. 8, 2017.  The Defendant will file any objections to the
Plaintiffs' amended proposed Notice no later than five days after
it is filed.  The Defendant will produce to Kumar a list of all
potential class members in a computer-readable electronic data
file format, no later than Aug. 25, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 memorandum and order
is available at https://is.gd/RzkGYG from Leagle.com.

Pankaj Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin F. Westhoff --
bwesthoff@sedeyharper.com -- SEDEY HARPER, P.C..

Pankaj Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Brittany Bachman Skemp --
bskemp@nka.com -- NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP & Rachhana T. Srey --
srey@nka.com -- NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP.

Tech Mahindra (Americas) Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeremy
Michael Brenner -- jbrenner@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG
TEASDALE LLP, Jovita M. Foster -- jfoster@armstrongteasdale.com --
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP & Robert A. Kaiser --
rkaiser@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP.


THOROUGHBRED RESEARCH: Oct. 26 Hearing on Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GREGG RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. THOROUGHBRED
RESEARCH GROUP, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-656-FtM-99CM
(M.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge Carol Mirando of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division,
granted in part and denied in part the Joint Motion to Extend Time
to Complete Discovery filed on July 7, 2017.

On Aug. 26, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  The Defendant filed
its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on Sept. 20, 2016.  On Nov.
18, 2016, the Court entered its Case Management and Scheduling
Order ("CMSO"), setting forth various case deadlines.  The parties
now seek to extend the CMSO deadlines by 90 days.  In addition to
the CMSO deadlines, the parties request to extend the Plaintiff's
deadline to file a motion for class certification from Nov. 24,
2016 to Oct. 26, 2017.

During the preliminary pretrial conference on Nov. 16, 2016, the
parties requested that the Court extend the Plaintiff's deadline
to move for class certification to July 1, 2017, three weeks after
their proposed discovery date.  Accordingly, the Court, with the
parties' agreement, set "end of March 2017" as the deadline for
the Plaintiff to move for class certification.

In the present motion, the parties rightly point out that they
requested a July 1, 2017 deadline during the preliminary pretrial
conference, but do not acknowledge the Court's March 2017
deadline.  They state that they have been operating as if the
class certification deadline was July 1, 2017.

Given the Defendant's consent to the request, the Court finds no
prejudice to the nonmovant.  The Court, however, finds that a long
extension of the deadline for filing a motion for class
certification will impact the judicial proceedings.  Therefore,
the Court set Oct. 26, 2017 as the new deadline for filing a
motion for class certification, and Nov. 5, 2017 as the new
deadline for filing dispositive motions.  These deadlines are a
mere 10 days apart.  The Plaintiff will have up to and including
Aug. 21, 2017 to move for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/q2PkkX from Leagle.com.

Gregg Richardson, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick H. Peluso --
ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC.

Gregg Richardson, Plaintiff, represented by Stefan Coleman, Law
Offices of Stefan Coleman, PLLC & Steven L. Woodrow --
swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC.

Thoroughbred Research Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Ernest H. Kohlmyer, III, Urban Thier & Federer, PA & Mary Grace
Dyleski, Urban Thier & Federer, PA.


TIMBERWOLVES: Class Action Over Ticketing System Nears Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Rand, writing for Star Tribune, reports that a class-
action lawsuit filed against the Timberwolves in 2016 over their
implementation of their Flash Seats paperless ticketing system is
nearing a settlement, according to an e-mail sent on July 24 from
Brian Gudmundson, the attorney representing the plaintiffs, to at
least one of the plaintiffs, Chris Hennen, which was obtained by
the Star Tribune.

The suit alleged that the implementation of Flash Seats
"fundamentally, and unlawfully, alters the way Timberwolves ticket
holders may use and transfer tickets" and was put in place to
"control the use, resale, and transfer of tickets by season-ticket
holders -- and to employ minimum resale prices, added fees, and
other draconian restrictions on subsequent transfers of the
tickets."

The original plaintiffs argued that the organization implemented
the Flash Seats system after season-ticket holders had already
purchased their 2015-16 tickets and that had the plaintiffs --
both of whom spent more than $20,000 this season on Timberwolves
season tickets -- known about the change it would have influenced
their decisions.

"While the team denied any wrongdoing or liability, as we enter
this New Era of Timberwolves basketball, both parties felt
strongly that it was important to resolve a two-season old dispute
and focus on the future," the Timberwolves said in a statement.
Glen Taylor, owner of the Timberwolves, also owns the  Star
Tribune.

The case was filed in March 2016 in Hennepin County and was sent
to an arbitrator in October.  Per the e-mail from Mr. Gudmundson
to Mr. Hennen, that process has led to a proposed settlement
including these six points:

   * Every class-action member will be eligible to receive six
upper level tickets from among 10 Timberwolves home games chosen
by the team this season.

   * Class-action members get a free tour of the new Target
Center, which will also be scheduled by the Timberwolves.

   * The Timberwolves will disclose explicitly and for the first
time the 75 percent resale minimums right in the season membership
agreement.

   * The Timberwolves are going to make a public statement
regarding the settlement.

   * The Timberwolves are going to handle and pay for all notice
and administration of the settlement.

   * The Timberwolves are going to pay $265,000 for attorneys'
fees and expenses, and class representative service awards.

"We presented these agreed terms to the Arbitrator and asked him
to preliminarily approve the settlement as being fair and
reasonable on its face, and to allow notice to be mailed to class
members," Mr. Gudmundson wrote in the e-mail.  "The arbitrator
granted our request."

Plaintiffs will now receive a class action notice, though it
sounds like Mr. Hennen isn't exactly thrilled by the terms of the
settlement.

"I think it's a ripoff," he said.  "We're getting tickets to
probably some bad games against bad teams in the upper deck."

Mr. Hennen said he joined the lawsuit after being unable to sell
several games of his season-ticket package in 2015-16, the year
Flash Seats was implemented, saying the minimum resale price was a
factor.  He said Timberwolves ticket representatives called last
year and again this year to see if he was interested in buying
season tickets, and he declined because Flash Seats is still the
organization's ticket system.

Mr. Hennen said he liked the part of the settlement in which the
Wolves will have to disclose the 75 percent minimum resale price,
though he added, "If I buy the tickets, I should be able to sell
them for the price I want to sell them for."

It's possible, though, that Mr. Hennen constitutes a part of a
small but vocal minority of fans.  In a Dec. 2016 interview,
Brad Ruiter, the Wolves' VP of Communications, said of Flash
Seats, "The vast majority of the feedback we have received from
our ticket holders has been positive." [GN]


TITLEMAX: Faces "Davis" Suit in Southern District of Florida
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TitleMax of Alabama,
Inc. The case is styled as Jessica Davis, Jimanika West, Erika
Brinkley, and Kimberly Taylor, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Alabama,
Inc. and TMX Finance, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00488-
SRW (S.D. Fla., July 20, 2017). The case is assigned to: the Hon.
Judge Susan Russ Walker.

TMX Finance is the parent company to the brands TitleMax,
TitleBucks, EquityAuto Loan, The Cash Store and InstaLoan.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew Phillip Campbell, Esq.
          Jonathan D. Guin, Esq.
          CAMPBELL, GUIN, WILLIAMS, GUY & GIDIERE
          505 N. 20th Street, 16th Floor
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 224 -0750
          E-mail: andy.campbell@campbellguin.com
                  jonathan.guin@campbellguin.com

               - and -

          Jacob Alexander Fuller, Esq.
          James Doyle Fuller, Esq.
          FULLER & COPELAND PC
          2851 Zelda Road
          Montgomery, AL 36106
          Telephone: (334) 270 0020
          Facsimile: (334) 270 9848
          E-mail: jacob@fullercopeland.com
                  jdf@fullercopeland.com

               - and -

          Susan Glasscock Copeland, Esq.
          FULLER & COPELAND
          2851 Zelda Road
          Montgomery, AL 36106
          Telephone: (334) 270 0020
          Facsimile: (334) 270 9848
          E-mail: susanc@fullercopeland.com


TOYOTA: Class Action Mulled Over Role in Takata Airbag Scandal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that lawyers are filing an
open class action against three car manufacturers over their role
in the defective Takata airbag scandal.

The Federal Court legal action will allege Toyota, Honda and Mazda
are breaching consumer law provisions by not replacing faulty
airbags despite a recall, global law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
and Sullivan announced on July 25.

"It is quite frankly, outrageous and almost inconceivable that
there are over one million cars on Australian roads that contain a
'safety' product that could, at any time, explode with lethal
force," lawyer Damian Scattini said.

The Australian government could impose mandatory recalls on faulty
airbags linked to 18 deaths around the world if it's not satisfied
major car manufacturers are doing enough voluntarily.

A competition watchdog investigation was launched after consumer
group Choice warned some car companies were replacing faulty
Takata airbags with the same potentially-deadly devices.

Following the revelation, the federal government said it had
jointly written to all automotive manufacturers implicated in the
massive worldwide recall demanding a "comprehensive status" on
their progress.

In a statement on July 24, Small Business Minister Michael
McCormack said he wielded the power to trigger a mandatory recall
on advice from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.

Toyota and Lexus confirmed they used the same airbags and would
need to refit some vehicles, while Choice also said Mazda, Lexus,
BMW and Subaru had made the same mistake.

Nissan said it had been replacing faulty airbags, but in May last
year it was revealed the replacements would also be captured under
a recall that covered airbags without a chemical drying agent.

The newer version would not present any "unreasonable risk" for at
least six years, the company said.

The airbags' fault involves the ammonium nitrate used to trigger
inflation.  The chemical can deteriorate over time and cause a
metal canister to explode too forcefully, projecting shrapnel.

More than 2.3 million vehicles in Australia were subject to the
recall originally issued back in 2009, but only 850,000 have had
their Takata airbags replaced.

A 58-year-old man who died in a Sydney car crash is suspected to
be the 18th person globally -- and the first in Australia -- to
have been killed as a result of the faulty product after police
said he was struck by fragments. [GN]


TRANS UNION: Faces "Nair" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trans Union, LLC.
The case is captioned as Paul K. Nair, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Trans Union,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-05496-AT (S.D.N.Y., July 19,
2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Analisa Torres.

TransUnion is a global leader in credit and information
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Christopher Mallon
          Fishman Rozen LLP
          305 Broadway Suite 900
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 822 1474
          Facsimile: (212) 897 5841
          E-mail: consumer.esq@outlook.com


TRI-STATE CANDY: Faces "Ortiz" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tri-State Candy
Wholesale, Inc. The case is captioned as Carlos Man de los Santos
Ortiz, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. Tri-State Candy Wholesale, Inc., doing business
as: Tri-State Candy Wholesale; United Beverage Distributor Inc.,
doing business as: Beer Brothers; Kirtikumar Ved; and Amir Ali,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04356 (E.D.N.Y., July 24, 2017).

Tri-State is in the candy business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


TRINITY SERVICES: Faces "Reutter" Suit in Middle Dist. of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trinity Services
Group, Inc. The case is styled as David M. Reutter, and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Trinity Services Group,
Inc., Union Supply Group, Inc., and Secretary, Department of
Corrections, the Defendants, Case No. 8:17-cv-01730-SDM-MAP (M.D.
Fla., July 19, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Steven D. Merryday.

Trinity Services is the leading food service provider to the
corrections industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


TWC ADMINISTRATION: "Fuller" Suit Moved to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Carmen Fuller, Laurence Gibbs,
Matthew Lutack, and Brent Quick, an individual, on behalf of
themself and other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiffs,
v. TWC Administration, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 37-02017-00014437-CU-OE-CTL,
was removed on July 26, from the Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California (San Diego). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:17-cv-01513-DMS-AGS to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dana M. Sabraw.

TWC Administration LLC operates as a wired telecommunications
carrier.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David R Markham, Esq.
          THE MARKHAM LAW FIRM
          750 B Street, Suite 1950
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 339 3995
          Facsimile: (619) 615 2067
          E-mail: dmarkham@markham-law.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Joseph Scott Carr, Esq.
          KABAT CHAPMAN & OZMER LLP
          171 17th Street NW, Suite 1550
          Atlanta, GA 30363
          Telephone: (470) 447 0600
          E-mail: scarr@kcozlaw.com


TYSON FOODS: Court Dismisses Securities Suit Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, dismissed without
prejudice the case captioned IN RE TYSON FOODS, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION, Case No. 5:16-cv-05340 (W.D. Ark.).

The Defendant is the nation's largest chicken producer, and was
traditionally not immune to its industry's volatility.  Indeed,
for the 10-year period preceding the Great Recession, its chicken
margins fluctuated between 1.2% and 7%, and in no two consecutive
years was Tyson able to sustain an increase in profit margin.
From fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2014, its chicken segment's
annual operating income rose from $164 million to $883 million, a
more than five-fold increase.  Tyson's stock price rose from
$43.65 on Nov. 20, 2015, to $48.09 by close of market on Nov. 23.
Its record results continued into the next year.  On Feb. 5, 2016,
it announced its first quarter financial reporting a chicken
segment revenues of $2.63 billion, overall revenues of $9.15
billion, chicken segment net income of $358 million, and overall
net income of $776 million.  Its Aug. 8, 2016 disclosures listed
chicken segment revenues of $2.74 billion, overall revenues of
$9.4 billion, chicken segment net income of $380 million, and
overall net income of $767 million.  By Sept. 22, 2016, its stock
had reached a high of $76.76.

Tyson and certain of its executives attributed this financial
success to a variety of factors, including its decision to improve
its "product mix" by increasing its offerings of "value-added
products"; its implementation of a newly developed "buy-versus-
grow" strategy; and its increased financial outlook to cost-
reduction measures.

Lead Plaintiffs Employees' Retirement System of the State of
Hawaii ("Hawaii ERS") and Blue Sky, representing a proposed class
of Tyson investors, have a different, more sinister, explanation
for Tyson's sustained period of financial success.  According to
them, Tyson engaged in an industry-wide antitrust conspiracy aimed
at depressing the domestic supply of broiler chickens, thus
keeping prices and margins high from 2008-2016.  Crucial to the
broiler chicken industry's alleged antitrust conspiracy was the
producers' abilities to monitor each other's activities, else
rogue participants "cheat" by increasing supply on their
unsuspecting cohorts.

From Oct. 17, 2016 through Dec. 2, 2016, proposed classes of Tyson
shareholders initiated four lawsuits against the company and
certain of its executives.  Cases filed in the Central District of
California, Southern District of New York, and Southern District
of Ohio were subsequently transferred to this Court, where the
fourth case had been filed.  On Jan. 25, 2017, the Court issued an
Opinion and Order consolidating the cases, appointing Hawaii ERS
and Blue Sky as the Lead Plaintiffs, and approving their choice of
Bernstein Litowitz as the Lead Counsel.  The Court held a case
management hearing on March 2, 2017, and on the same date issued a
revised Scheduling Order giving the Lead Plaintiffs until March
22, 2017 to file an amended complaint.  The Order also set a May
3, 2017 deadline for the Defendants to file a motion to dismiss, a
May 26, 2017 deadline for the Lead Plaintiffs to respond, a June
21, 2017 deadline for the Defendants to reply, and a June 30, 2017
hearing on the anticipated motion to dismiss.

The Lead Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on the deadline
date which sets a class period of Nov. 23, 2015 through Nov. 18,
2016; names Tyson, Smith, Leatherby, King, and White as the
Defendants; and alleges violations of Sections 20(a) and 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  More
specifically, the Lead Plaintiffs believe that Tyson's reported
financial results, its representations about what accounted for
those financial results, and its statements about the competitive
nature of its industry, were all false and misleading.

As expected, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 3,
2017, contending that the Lead Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to
state a claim for which relief may be granted.  The Lead
Plaintiffs' Response and the Defendants' Reply were filed in turn,
and the Court heard oral argument on June 30, 2017.

As was the case in Van der Moolen, Gentiva, and Steiner, the Court
explains that the Defendants' statements purporting to explain the
bases for their financial performance, and changes therein, put
the topic of the cause of Tyson's financial success at issue.
This created an obligation to disclose the information concerning
the source of its success, which would include its participation
in an industry-wide antitrust conspiracy, if adequately alleged.
As these cases demonstrate, the disclosure obligation remains even
if the alleged wrongdoing began prior to the class period, and the
statements at issue involved explanations for short-term,
quarterly, and yearly financial performance.  The failure to
disclose Tyson's participation in the conspiracy would, for the
same reasons, be material, since reasonable investors would find
that such information would significantly alter the mix of
available information regarding Tyson's financial performance.
The Court therefore cannot determine whether the Defendants'
statements were materially false or misleading without first
considering whether the Complaint sufficiently alleges Tyson's
participation in an antitrust conspiracy.

The Court also finds that the complaint does not adequately plead
scienter with respect to the Lead Plaintiffs' claim based on
Tyson's participation in an antitrust conspiracy to manipulate the
Georgia dock.  The alleged conspiracy serves as a basis for Lead
Plaintiffs' allegation that the Defendants, acting with scienter,
made materially false and misleading statements in violation of
Rule 10b-5.  The Court cannot find from the facts, nor from
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the nature of the
Georgia Dock scheme or the Defendants' executive positions support
an inference of scienter.  The Defendants' stock transactions and
Smith's and King's resignations do lend some support to an
inference of scienter, but the strength of those factors are
tempered when considered holistically.  For that reason, the stock
transactions and resignations do not suffice to establish a strong
inference of scienter.  The more plausible inference is instead
that the Defendants did not act with scienter when they made the
statements identified in the Complaint.  The Lead Plaintiffs
therefore fail to state a Rule 10b-5 claim regarding the alleged
Georgia Dock conspiracy.

For these reasons, the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and the Lead Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 memorandum opinion
is available at https://is.gd/88DlPZ from Leagle.com.

Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii, Plaintiff,
represented by Amy C. Martin, Attorney at Law.

Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawaii, Plaintiff,
represented by Angus NI, Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP,
Avi Josefson, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, David J.
Schwartz, Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, Gerald H. Silk,
Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann, LLP, John J. Rizio-
Hamilton, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP & Scott R.
Foglietta, Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP.

Blue Sky, Plaintiff, represented by Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Angus NI -- angus.ni@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, Avi Josefson -- avi@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, David J. Schwartz, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, Gerald H. Silk -- jerry@blbglaw.com
-- Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann, LLP, John J. Rizio-
Hamilton -- johnr@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP & Scott R. Foglietta -- scott.foglietta@blbglaw.com
-- Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP.

Jonah Chung, Plaintiff, represented by Geoffrey P. Culbertson --
gpc@texarkanalaw.com -- Patton Tidwell & Culbertson, LLP, Jeremy
Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, Joseph Alexander Hood, II,
Pomerantz LLP & Kelly B. Tidwell -- kbt@texarkanalaw.com --
Patton, Tidwell & Culbertson, L.L.P..

William Huser, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm PA.

Patricia S. Lalonde, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey A. Levine -
- jalevine@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy Co., LPA, pro hac vice,
Marcus Neil Bozeman, Thrash Law Firm, P.A., Richard S. Wayne --
rswayne@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy Co. LPA, pro hac vice,
Robert R. Sparks -- rrsparks@strausstroy.com -- Strauss Troy Co.
LPA, pro hac vice & Thomas P. Thrash -- tpthrash@vorys.com --
Thrash Law Firm.

Harold M. Voellinger, Plaintiff, represented by Danielle Myers --
danim@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice & James Allen Carney -- acarney@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates &
Pulliam, PLLC.

Tyson Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Benjamin F. Burry --
BBURRY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Dorothy J. Spenner --
DSPENNER@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Marwill S. Ney --
mney@fridayfirm.com -- Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP & David F.
Graham -- DGRAHAM@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, LLP.

Donald J. Smith, Defendant, represented by Benjamin F. Burry,
Sidley Austin LLP, Dorothy J. Spenner, Sidley Austin LLP, Marwill
S. Ney, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP & David F. Graham, Sidley
Austin, LLP.

Dennis Leatherby, Defendant, represented by Benjamin F. Burry,
Sidley Austin LLP, Dorothy J. Spenner, Sidley Austin LLP, Marwill
S. Ney, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP & David F. Graham, Sidley
Austin, LLP.

Donnie Dean King, Defendant, represented by David F. Graham,
Sidley Austin, LLP.

Noel Wesley White, Defendant, represented by David F. Graham,
Sidley Austin, LLP.


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: Faces "Taggart" Suit in E.D. Pa.
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United States
Department of Justice. The case is captioned as KENNETH TAGGART,
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
CURRENCY, THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, THE UNITED STATES TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REASURY,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-03210-GJP
(E.D. Pa., July 19, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Gerald
J. Pappert.

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ), also known as the
Justice Department, is a federal executive department of the U.S.
government, responsible for the enforcement of the law and
administration of justice in the United States, equivalent to the
justice or interior ministries of other countries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Thomas, Esq.
          JOSHUA L. THOMAS & ASSOCIATES
          1110 Pocopson Road
          P.O. Box 415
          Pocopson, PA 19366
          Telephone: (215) 806 1733
          E-mail: joshualthomas@gmail.com


UNITED SERVICES: Court Dismisses "Basham" Suit with Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge R. Brooke Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado (i) granted the Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed with prejudice the case
captioned ANN BASHAM, Plaintiff, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-cv-03057-RBJ (D.
Colo.).

After a hailstorm damaged her home, the Plaintiffs filed a
homeowner's insurance claim with USAA.  Her policy provides a two-
step method for settling property damage claims above $5,000.
First, USAA pays only the "actual cash value" for the loss, which
is defined as the amount it would cost to repair or replace
covered property, at the time of loss or damage, with material of
like kind and quality, subject to a deduction for deterioration,
depreciation and obsolescence.  The policy warns that the actual
cash value of damaged property may be significantly less than its
replacement cost.  Second, if the homeowner completes the repair
or replacement within one year and submits timely notice, USAA
will pay for this replacement cost without a deduction for
depreciation and the like.

Ms. Basham partially repaired her home and was reimbursed for her
additional expenses on those items.  However, she was stuck with
the lesser actual cash value -- after a depreciation deduction --
for the property damage that she did not fix.

Ms. Basham accepts that USAA can deduct depreciation of the
materials that make up an item of property in calculating its
actual cash value.  But she believes USAA violated her policy and
the law by taking a depreciation deduction for the cost of labor
as well.  She has filed a putative class action against USAA
alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of
the Colorado Consumer Protection Act and Colo. Rev. Stat. Sections
10-3-1115 and 1116.  The Defendant has moved for judgment on the
pleadings.

Given the specific policy language here and background insurance
principles, Judge Jackson finds that, a reasonably prudent insured
would understand 'depreciation' to mean a decline in an asset's
overall value.  USAA therefore did not impermissibly depreciate
labor costs in determining the actual cash value of the
Plaintiff's losses, so no additional amount was due under the
policy.  Because all of the Plaintiff's claims assume her
entitlement to payment for labor costs without a depreciation
deduction, all of these claims must be dismissed.

For the reasons, Judge Jackson granted the Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed with prejudice Ms.
Basham's complaint.  As the prevailing party, he awarded the
Defendant its reasonable costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/RZU865 from Leagle.com.

Ann Basham, Plaintiff, represented by J. Lucas McFarland, Evans &
McFarland, LLC.

Ann Basham, Plaintiff, represented by Jack Austin Mattingly, Jr.,
Mattingly & Roselius, PLLC.

United Services Automobile Association, Defendant, represented by
Ann Yackshaw -- ayackshaw@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, LLP,
Rodger L. Eckelberry -- reckelberry@bakerlaw.com -- Baker &
Hostetler, LLP & Casie D. Collignon -- ccollignon@bakerlaw.com --
Baker & Hostetler, LLP.


UNITED STATES: Judge Opts Not to Renew Iraqi Deportation Stay
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Economist reports that at midnight on July 24th a two-week
stay of deportation for more than 1,400 Iraqis -- around 300
Christians and dozens of Kurds among them -- would expire.
Mark Goldsmith, a district judge in Michigan, had prolonged the
stay twice to allow time to consider a class-action suit
representing 114 of them who argue they face persecution and
torture, or worse, on their return.  Civil-rights advocates are
doing what they can to prevent the deportations.  Family and
friends have protested against them almost daily.

One of the Iraqis in danger of imminent deportation is Usama Jamil
Hamama, known as Sam, a 54-year old Iraqi Christian who came to
America lawfully as a refugee in 1974 when he was four. Mr Hamama,
who lives in West Bloomfield, Michigan, where he is a partner at a
local supermarket, is married and has four children, all American
citizens, between the ages of 11 and 17.  He is a regular
churchgoer and a pillar of his community.  On June 11th, just as
he was getting ready to go to church with his family,
Mr Hamama was arrested by several agents of the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency and brought to a
detention centre in Youngstown, Ohio.

Mr Hamama is one of scores of Iraqi Christians in the Detroit area
and Iraqi Kurds in and around Nashville, Tennessee, who were
plucked from their homes by ICE agents as President Donald Trump
put into action his promise to deport those he calls criminal
aliens.  Mr Hamama is a member of the Chaldean community, who
descend from the ancient Assyrians, speak Aramaic and practise
Catholicism according to eastern rites.  Most Chaldeans in America
live in and around Detroit.

The Chaldeans were staunch supporters of Mr Trump during his
campaign for the presidency.  This meant they felt safe after his
election; during the campaign Mr Trump frequently spoke out in
favour of protecting Christians in the Middle East.  In January he
tweeted: "Christians in the Middle-East have been executed in
large numbers. We cannot allow this horror to continue!"

All the potential deportees, including Mr Hamama, have a criminal
record.  Their crimes range from relatively minor ones such as
overstaying a visa or selling pot to second-degree murder. Twenty-
eight years ago, Mr Hamama was convicted for assault, possession
of a firearm and carrying a pistol in a car, for which he served a
two-year prison sentence.  Since then his record has been
spotless, but his criminal conviction means that he has been
subject of an order of removal to Iraq since 1994.  He was able to
remain in America until now because the Iraqis refused to let
deportees from America into their country.

This changed in March when Mr Trump removed Iraqis from the list
of countries of his temporary travel ban from Muslim countries. As
part of the deal, Baghdad consented to issue travel documents to
deportees from America.  But the Iraqis fear, with good reason,
that many of them will face persecution, torture and even death if
they return to their home country.  Earlier this year Congress
passed a resolution designating Chaldean and Assyrian Christians
the victims of attempted genocide by Islamic State (IS).  Though
recently in retreat, IS still rules in parts of Iraq.

In late June the Evangelical Immigration Table, an association of
evangelical Christians many of whom are strong supporters of Mr
Trump, wrote to John Kelly, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
asking him to reconsider the decision to deport the Iraqi
Christians.  "The horrors facing Christians in Iraq are well
documented," they wrote.  And they reminded Mr Kelly that Mike
Pence, the vice-president, recently noted in his remarks at the
World Summit in Defense of Persecuted Christians that in Iraq
"we've actually seen monasteries demolished, priests and monks
beheaded, and the two-millennia-old Christian tradition in Mosul
virtually extinguished overnight".

The American Civil Liberties Union persuaded Judge Goldsmith at
the end of June to halt the deportations.  In his ruling the judge
said sending the Iraqis back now would expose them to a
"substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution
before their legal claims can be tested in a court".  At the time
this article was published Judge Goldsmith had not renewed the
stay of the deportations for a third time. [GN]


UTILITY SERVICE: "Komoroski" Settlement Granted Preliminary OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chief District Judge Greg Kays of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, Western Division, conditionally
certifies plaintiffs' settlement class and granted preliminary
approval to proposed class action settlement, in the case JAMES
KOMOROSKI and GALEN VERHULST, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UTILITY SERVICE PARTNERS
PRIVATE LABEL, INC. d/b/a SERVICE LINE WARRANTIES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Case No. 4:16-CV-00294-DGK (WD Mo.).

Defendant Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., doing
business as Service Line Warranties of America sells utility
warranties. A utility warranty is essentially a contract whereby a
consumer pays a monthly or annual premium to a warranty provider,
such as defendant, in exchange for warranty protection against
certain leaks, ruptures, and other needed repairs to utility
lines.
James Komoroski purchased a water service warranty from defendant,
but has not made a claim under that warranty. Galen Verhulst
purchased a water service warranty from defendant and did
experience a ruptured service line. After making a claim under his
warranty, Verhulst incurred costs associated with the repair he
believes should have been covered by his warranty.
On February 17, 2016, Komoroski filed a petition in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri, entitled Komoroski v. Utility
Service Partners Private Label, Inc., d/b/a/Service Line
Warranties of America. The petition alleges defendant routinely
denied warranty coverage for the cost of replacing galvanized
steel pipes with copper ones, and for relocating interior water
meters outside whenever a service line had to be repaired. It
alleges violations of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act
(MMPA), breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. It seeks declaratory relief and damages,
including statutory attorneys' fees under the MMPA. On March 24,
2016, Verhulst joined the action as a class representative.

On July 5, 2016, the parties had reached a settlement of all
material terms and were in the process of finalizing the form of
settlement agreement and motion for preliminary approval to be
submitted to the court. On January 23, 2017, the parties submitted
an initial proposed settlement. Judge Sachs recused on February
13, 2017, and the case was reassigned to the present court. On
February 20, 2017, the parties submitted a slightly modified
proposal, the settlement.

The parties filed a stipulation and settlement agreement and the
plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action
settlement.

The court gives preliminarily approval to the settlement, subject
to final determination by the court at the final fairness hearing.
The court conditionally certifies, for settlement purposes only
and for no other purpose and with no other effect upon the action,
including no effect upon the action should the settlement not
receive final approval or should the effective date not occur, a
class defined as all individuals with galvanized steel water
service lines or interior water meters in Kansas City, Missouri
who purchased a warranty agreement from defendant which was still
in effect as of February 17, 2016. The court also certifies a
subclass comprised of those individuals who were covered by a
warranty agreement between May 1, 2015, and February 17, 2016, who
made a valid claim under their warranty agreement and whose claims
were denied in whole or in part for costs associated with
replacing galvanized steel pipes with copper ones or for costs
associated with relocating interior water meters to outside water
meter pits (the Damages Subclass). Excluded from the settlement
class are all officers, directors and employees of defendant, and
their legal representatives, heirs, or assigns, any judges to whom
the action is assigned, their staffs, and their immediate
families, and class counsel.

The court appoints, for settlement purposes, plaintiffs James
Komoroski and Galen Verhulst as class representatives, and
Attorneys Robert A. Horn and Joseph A. Kronawitter of the Law
Office of Horn Aylward & Bandy, LLC and Phyllis Norman of The
Norman Law Firm as settlement class counsel.

A hearing will be held on November 2, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. at the
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
Charles Evans Whittaker Courthouse, in Courtroom 8D, located at
400 East 9th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 64106, to determine
whether the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and
should be approved by the Court; whether a judgment as provided in
Section 8.1 of the settlement should be entered; and to determine
any amount of fees and expenses that should be awarded to class
counsel and any award to the class representatives for their
representation of the settlement class.

The court appoints defendant to supervise and administer the
notice procedure as set forth:

   i. No later than fourteen (14) days from the entry of this
order, Defendant shall file a copy of the templates that will be
used to send notice to the class so the Court may proofread them.
Within two (2) business days of the templates being filed, the
Court will enter a text order approving the templates or an order
notifying the parties of any concerns;

   ii. No later than thirty (30) days from the entry of this order
(the Notice Mailing Date), Defendant shall cause a copy of the
Notices to be mailed by first class mail to each individual and
entity on the Notice List;

   iii. Within ten (10) days of the Notice Mailing Date, Defendant
shall serve on counsel and file with the Court proof, by affidavit
or declaration, of such mailing.

Any class member may, upon request, be excluded from the
settlement class. Any such class member must submit a written
request for exclusion no later than fourteen (14) days before the
final fairness hearing at: Clerk of the Courts, United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Charles Evans
Whittaker Courthouse, 400 East 9th Street, Kansas City, Missouri,
64106.

A copy of Judge Kays's order dated July 31, 2017, is available at
https://goo.gl/jvWM8v from Leagle.com.

James Komoroski, Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph A. Kronawitter
-- jkronawitter@hab-law.com -- Robert A. Horn -- rhorn@hab-law.com
-- at Horn, Aylward & Bandy, LLC; Phyllis Norman -- at The Norman
Law Firm LLC

Utility Service Partners Private Label, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Jarrod D. Shaw -- jshaw@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP; Michael S. Foster -- mfoster@polsinelli.com --
Mark A. Olthoff -- molthoff@polsinelli.com -- at Polsinelli PC.


VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Certifies Class in "McCracken"
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael E. Telesca of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned ANN McCRACKEN, JOAN
FARRELL, SARAH STILSON, KEVIN McCLOSKEY, CHRISTOPHER TRAPATSOS,
and KIMBERLY BAILEY, as individuals and as representatives of the
classes, Plaintiffs, v. VERISMA SYSTEMS, INC., STRONG MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, HIGHLAND HOSPITAL, and UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER,
Defendants, No. 6:14-cv-06248(MAT)(W.D. N.Y).

In this putative class action, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants systematically overcharged them and other patients who
requested copies of their medical records from the Rochester
Healthcare Defendants, in violation of New York Public Health Law
("PHL").  They allege that Verisma and the Rochester Healthcare
Defendants ignored the restriction in the statute that limits the
amount that may be charged to produce the records a reasonable
charge not exceeding the costs incurred, and not exceeding $0.75
per page.  Instead, the Plaintiffs allege, Verisma and the
Rochester Healthcare Defendants imposed an across-the-board,
uniform charge of $0.75 per page for all copies of medical
records, even those produced electronically, in excess of their
actual costs and in violation of PHL Section 18.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of one proposed class, the URMC
Medical Records Class, defined as all persons who (i) requested
copies of medical records (either by themselves or through a
lawyer, personal representative, or other qualified person acting
on their behalf) from a health care facility owned and/or operated
by the University of Rochester; (ii) were charged by or through
Verisma for copies of such records in accordance with Verisma's NY
Fee Schedule PHL 18; and (iii) paid such charges (either directly
or through the person making the request on their behalf) and had
their records released by or through Verisma on or after May 14,
2011, excluding any principals or employees of Defendants.

They also seek certification of two proposed subclasses: (i) the
Highland Sub-Class defined as all persons in the URMC Medical
Records Class who requested copies of medical records through
Highland Hospital and whose records were released on or after May
14, 2011; and (ii) the Strong Sub-Class defined as all persons in
the URMC Medical Records Class who requested copies of medical
records through Strong Memorial Hospital and whose records were
released on or after May 14, 2011.

Judge Telesca finds that the Plaintiffs have met the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, adequacy, ascertainability, predominance,
and superiority requirements.  For this reason, he granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Rule and
accordingly certified their proposed URMC Medical Records Class
and proposed two provider-level sub-classes: (i) the Highland Sub-
Class and (ii) the Strong Sub-Class.  Judge Telesca appointed Ann
McCracken, Joan Farrell, Sara Stilson, Kevin McCloskey,
Christopher Trapatsos, and Kimberly Bailey as the class
representatives.  Finally, he appointed Faraci Lange LLP and
Nicholas Kaster PLLP as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 decision and order
is available at https://is.gd/1tsWBq from Leagle.com.

Ann McCracken, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter --
krichter@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP.

Ann McCracken, Plaintiff, represented by Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci
Lange LLP, Stephen G. Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E.
Frisch -- efrisch@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP.

Joan Farrell, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Sara Stilson, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Kevin McCloskey, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Christopher Trapatsos, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter,
Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen
G. Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Kimberly Bailey, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Caroline Jacobsen
Berdzik -- cberdzik@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla LLP,
Daniel Barrie Moar -- dmoar@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg
Segalla LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman -- rpitman@goldbergsegalla.com --
Goldberg Segalla LLP & Christopher J. Belter --
cbelter@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla LLP.

Strong Memorial Hospital, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward -
- eward@wardgreenberg.com -- Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Highland Hospital, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward, Ward
Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

University of Rochester, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward,
Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Strong Memorial Hospital, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J.
Ward, Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Highland Hospital, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J. Ward,
Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

University of Rochester, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J.
Ward, Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Caroline
Jacobsen Berdzik, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Daniel Barrie Moar,
Goldberg Segalla LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman, Goldberg Segalla LLP &
Christopher J. Belter, Goldberg Segalla LLP.


VIVINT SOLAR: "Aanderud" Remanded to Calif. State Court
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LARRY AANDERUD, et al., Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent, VIVINT SOLAR DEVELOPER,
LLC, Real Party in Interest, No. F073277 (Cal. App.), Judge Gene
M. Gomes of the U.S. Court of Appeals of California for the Fifth
District denied the peremptory writ challenging the trial court's
order compelling arbitration and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Aanderuds entered into a 20-year solar power purchase
agreement (SPPA) with Vivint Solar, pursuant to which Vivint Solar
agreed to install a solar power generating system on the
Aanderuds' property in exchange for their agreement to purchase
the solar power generated by the system.  The Aanderuds later sued
Vivint Solar in superior court, seeking rescission of the
agreement and asserting individual and class claims for
declaratory relief and violations of the Unfair Competition Law,
Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

The Aanderuds seek to represent a class of similarly situated
consumers consisting of all persons who entered into SPPA
transactions with Vivint Solar in the past four years where the
SPPA contained the same provisions as the Aanderuds' SPPA and who
were subjected to the same business practices.

The trial court granted Vivint Solar's petition to compel
arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the agreement,
ordered the Aanderuds to submit their individual claim to
arbitration, and dismissed the class claims without prejudice.

The Aanderuds assert the trial court erred in (i) dismissing the
class claims, as under California law statutory claims for
injunctive relief are not subject to compulsory arbitration; and
(ii) finding the arbitration provision was enforceable, as the
provision does not meet certain minimum standards required for the
arbitration of public claims, and is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.  The Aanderuds also contend a clause
in the arbitration provision that delegates to the arbitrator "the
determination of the scope or applicability" of that provision
(the delegation clause) is unenforceable.

In sum, Judge Gomes explains that the delegation clause here is
clear and unmistakable, and it is not revocable under
unconscionability principles.  Vivint Solar asserts that if he
concludes the delegation clause is enforceable, he should affirm
the trial court's order and not reach the Aanderuds' arguments
concerning enforceability of the arbitration provision, as those
are properly reserved for the arbitrator.  He agrees that it is
the arbitrator who will consider the conscionability of the
agreement and the scope of the arbitration clause.

Given this, he cannot simply affirm the trial court's order, as
the trial court itself decided issues reserved for the arbitrator,
including that the arbitration provision was not procedurally or
substantively unconscionable, all of the Aanderuds' claims were
arbitrable, and the class claims should be dismissed.
Accordingly, while he affirmed the trial court's order compelling
arbitration, he vacated those portions of the order in which the
trial court made findings that are reserved for the arbitrator and
dismissed the class claims.

Judge Gomes held that the appeal from the order granting Vivint
Solar's motion to compel arbitration is treated as a petition for
writ of mandate.  The petition is granted in part and denied in
part.  Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the
superior court to (i) vacate the portions of its order in which it
(a) found the parties' arbitration agreement was neither
substantively nor procedurally unconscionable; (b) found all
claims asserted in the complaint were arbitrable; and (c) found
that the Aanderuds could only arbitrate their claims in their
individual capacity, and not as a class, and dismissed the class
claims without prejudice; and (ii) enter a new order submitting
all issues concerning the interpretation, validity, or
enforceability of the solar power purchase agreement, including
the determination of the scope and applicability of the
arbitration provision, to arbitration.  In all other respects, he
denied the peremptory writ challenging the order compelling
arbitration and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with his opinion.  The parties will bear
their own costs in this proceeding.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/GELxXc from Leagle.com.

Kostas Law Firm, James S. Kostas -- jkostas@kostaslaw.com -- Law
Office of Eugene E. Siegel and Eugene E. Siegel for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Keith E. Eggleton --
keggleton@wsgr.com -- and Dale R. Bish -- dbish@wsgr.com -- for
Real Party in Interest.




VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Faces "Makaryan" Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc. The case is captioned as Anzhelya Makaryan, an
individual, on behalf of herself, as class representative for all
others similarly situated, and the general public, the Plaintiff,
v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation;
Audi AG, a German entity; and Does 1-10, the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-05086-PA-KS (C.D. Cal., July 11, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Percy Anderson.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., is the North American
operational headquarters, and subsidiary of the Volkswagen Group
of automobile companies of Germany.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hovanes Margarian, Esq.
          THE MARGARIAN LAW FIRM
          801 North Brand Boulevard Suite 210
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 553 1000
          Facsimile: (818) 553 1005
          E-mail: hovanes@margarianlaw.com


WAL-MART ASSOCIATES: "Hernandez" Suit Moved to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Alyssa Hernandez, individually, on
a representative basis, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., a Delaware
Limited Liability Corporation and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Case No. CIVDS1710945, was removed on July 26, 2017 from the San
Bernardino County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California (Eastern Division - Riverside).
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-01485 to the
proceeding.

Wal-Mart operates retail stores in various formats worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


WINN MANAGEMENT: "Goodwin" Class Settlement Gets Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion
for preliminary approval of class action settlement in the case
captioned ADAM GOODWIN, Plaintiff, v. WINN MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC,
Defendant, No. 1:15-cv-00606-DAD-EPG (E.D. Cal.).

On April 17, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the original class action
complaint against the Defendant.  This action now proceeds on his
First Amended Complaint, filed on May 20, 2015, alleging the
following causes of action: (i) failure to pay overtime under 29
U.S.C. Section 201, et seq, and California Labor Code Sections
510, 1194; (ii) failure to issue accurate itemized wage statements
under Labor Code Sections 226, 226.3; (iii) failure to pay wages
due upon separation of employment under Labor Code Sections 201-
203; (iv) unfair business practices under California Business &
Professions Code Section 17200; and (v) a claim for penalties
under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004.

On Aug. 16, 2016, the parties attended mediation with mediator
Robert J. Kaplan.  The Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement on
Aug. 24, 2016.

In the settlement agreement, the Plaintiff defines the following
two classes: (a) all non-exempt employees who worked for the
Defendant in California and both (i) received non-discretionary
compensation and (ii) worked over 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in
a week in at least one pay period between April 16, 2011 through
(date of preliminary approval); and (b) all non-exempt employees
who worked for the Defendant in the United States and both (i)
received non-discretionary compensation and (ii) worked over 40
hours in a week in at least one pay period between April 16, 2012
and (date of preliminary approval)("FLSA Class").

The Plaintiff estimates that there are 1,259 employees belonging
to the putative classes.

Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant will make a gross
payment of $250,000.  The agreement provides the following
allocation of that gross payment: (i) attorneys' fees in the
amount of $75,000, to be paid to class counsel; (ii) litigation
costs and expenses of up to $15,000 to be paid to class counsel;
(iii) $3,750 to be paid to the California Labor & Workforce
Development Agency; (iv) class representative fees of $7,500 to be
paid to the Plaintiff in addition to his entitlement as a class
member; (v) the remaining funds to be paid to class members.  The
settlement is non-reversionary, and unclaimed amounts from the
proposed settlement amount will be re-allocated to the California
and FLSA Class Members participating in the settlement.

On Nov. 16, 2016, the Plaintiff filed the instant unopposed motion
for preliminary approval of the settlement.  He seeks an order:
(i) preliminarily certifying the settlement classes under Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 23 and the FLSA, with his appointment as
class representative, and appointment of Michael Malk, Esq., APC
as class counsel; (ii) preliminarily approving the settlement
agreement; (iii) approving the proposed form and method of
service; and (iv) scheduling the hearing date for final approval
of the class settlement.

Judge Drozd granted the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement.  He (i) approved the
conditional certification of the collective action under the FLSA;
(ii) appointed the Plaintiff's counsel, Michael Malk, as class
counsel; (iii) appointed the Named Plaintiff as the class
representative; (iv) approved the proposed notice and claim form;
(v) approved CPT Group, Inc. as the claims administrator; and (vi)
approved the proposed settlement on a preliminary basis.

The hearing for final approval of the proposed settlement is set
for Nov. 7, 2017 at 9:30 a.m., with the motion for final approval
of class action settlement to be filed 28 days in advance of the
final approval hearing, in accordance with Local Rule 230.  The
Plaintiff's proposed settlement implementation schedule is
adopted.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/NrWn9x from Leagle.com.

Adam Goodwin, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Malk --
mm@malklawfirm.com -- Michael Malk, Esq., Apc.

Winn Management Group LLC, Defendant, represented by Mark J.
Jacobs -- mjacobs@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips LLC &
Shaun Jordan Voigt -- svoigt@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher &
Phillips LLP.


YGRENE ENERGY: Bid to Dismiss "Smith" Fraud Suit Partly Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, granted
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case captioned
GRACHIAN L. SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. YGRENE ENERGY FUND,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-01258-LB (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs' fraud suit over home-improvement loans allege that
the Defendants falsely told them that the Property Assessed Clean
Energy ("PACE") loans would attach to their properties (like
property taxes) and, correspondingly, failed to reveal that the
loans would have to be repaid when a property was sold or
refinanced.  The Plaintiffs claim that, contrary to the
Defendants' representations, they indeed had to repay the loans
when they sold or refinanced their homes -- at which point they
incurred prepayment penalties.  They also claim that the
Defendants charged them various improper fees.

The Named Plaintiffs sue for themselves and for 12 proposed
classes: 4 national classes; 4 California subclasses; and 4
Florida subclasses.  These classes are distributed equally among
four topics: "Prepayment Penalty"; "Prepayment Waiver Fee";
"Prepayment Penalty -- Paid"; and "Payoff and Administrative Fee."

The Plaintiffs bring nine claims: (i) California Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL")(unfair prong); (ii) UCL (fraudulent
prong); (iii) California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA");
(iv) Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA");
(v) tortious interference with contract; (vi) fraudulent
inducement; (vii) negligent misrepresentation; (viii)  unjust
enrichment; and (ix) negligence.  The Defendants move to dismiss
all these claims under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

Magistrate Judge Beeler finds (i) that nothing in the complaint
suggests that the Defendants did anything that would bring the
PACE contracts inside the bounds of the CLRA; (ii) that the
Defendants cannot have played the role that the Plaintiffs allege
and yet been "strangers" to the PACE loans under Florida law; and
(iii) that the Plaintiffs' unjust-enrichment claim is based on the
same conduct as the statutory and tort claims through which they
seek relief, thus it is superfluous.  Accordingly, she dismissed
with prejudice the CLRA claim, the Florida tortious-interference
claim, and the California unjust-enrichment claim.

The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to the California
tortious-interference claim and the Florida unjust-enrichment
claim.  The Magistrate Judge explains that given the situation
that the Plaintiffs describe, the Florida interference claim
cannot plausibly be amended to be made viable.  Moreover, under
Florida law, an unjust-enrichment claim can coexist with other
tort claims covering the same subject matter.

All the claims that she has identified as being directly for fraud
or grounded in fraud survive insofar as they are based on
representations in the Unanimous Approval Agreements and Financing
Agreements; to the extent that the fraud claims rest on other
alleged representations, they are dismissed under Rule 9(b).

Magistrate Judge Beeler says the Plaintiff may amend the latter
allegations to satisfy Rule 9(b).  Any amended complaint must be
filed within 30 days of the Order.  If the Plaintiffs do not file
an amended complaint by then, their fraud-based claims will
proceed based only upon the representations contained in the
Unanimous Approval Agreements and Financing Agreements.  Any
claims that the Magistrate Judge has identified as being based
partly on non-fraudulent conduct survive to that extent.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 26, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/xxxmKH from Leagle.com.

Grachian L. Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Bruce
LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Grachian L. Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jaclyn L. Anderson --
janderson@klwtlaw.com -- Kasdan Lippsmith Weber Turner LLP, Jaclyn
Louise Anderson, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Jeffrey D.
Kaliel -- jkaliel@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey
Douglas Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei, LLP, Kenneth S. Kasdan, Kasdan
Lippsmith Weber Turner LLP, Manuel Santiago Hiraldo, Hiraldo P.A.
& Sophia Jaclyn Goren -- sgoren@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei
LLP.

Mary Jane Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Bruce LippSmith,
Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Annick Marie Persinger, Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Jaclyn L. Anderson, Kasdan Lippsmith Weber Turner
LLP, Jaclyn Louise Anderson, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP,
Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel,
Tycko & Zavareei, LLP, Kenneth S. Kasdan, Kasdan Lippsmith Weber
Turner LLP, Manuel Santiago Hiraldo, Hiraldo P.A. & Sophia Jaclyn
Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP.

Alejandro Marcey, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Bruce
LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jaclyn L. Anderson, Kasdan
Lippsmith Weber Turner LLP, Jaclyn Louise Anderson, Kasdan
LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei
LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei, LLP, Kenneth S.
Kasdan, Kasdan Lippsmith Weber Turner LLP, Manuel Santiago
Hiraldo, Hiraldo P.A. & Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei
LLP.

Felicia Marcey, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Bruce LippSmith,
Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP, Annick Marie Persinger, Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Jaclyn L. Anderson, Kasdan Lippsmith Weber Turner
LLP, Jaclyn Louise Anderson, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP,
Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel,
Tycko & Zavareei, LLP, Kenneth S. Kasdan, Kasdan Lippsmith Weber
Turner LLP, Manuel Santiago Hiraldo, Hiraldo P.A. & Sophia Jaclyn
Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP.

Lt. Joseph J. Galaska, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko &
Zavareei, LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP &
Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Michael G. Pekel, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko &
Zavareei, LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP &
Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Anthony Look, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko &
Zavareei, LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP &
Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

George W. Woolley, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko &
Zavareei, LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP &
Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Kimberly Look, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie Persinger,
Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei,
LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP & Graham Bruce
LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Tammy S. Woolley, Plaintiff, represented by Annick Marie
Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko &
Zavareei, LLP, Sophia Jaclyn Goren, Tycko and Zavareei LLP &
Graham Bruce LippSmith, Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner LLP.

Ygrene Energy Fund, Inc., Defendant, represented by Fredrick
Stuart Levin -- flevin@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley Sandler LLP,
Ali M. Abugheida -- aabugheida@buckleysandler.com -- Buckley
Sandler LLP & Daniel Raphael Paluch -- dpaluch@buckleysandler.com
-- Buckley Sandler LLP.

Ygrene Energy Fund Florida, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Fredrick Stuart Levin, Buckley Sandler LLP, Ali M. Abugheida,
Buckley Sandler LLP & Daniel Raphael Paluch, Buckley Sandler LLP.


YOUNG CHOW: Faces "Vasquez" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Young Chow Garden,
Inc. The case is styled as Arnulfo Vasquez and Alejandro Mendoza,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Young Chow Garden, Inc., agent of New Asia Chinese
Restaurant, Chang Su, and John Doe, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-
cv-05605 (S.D.N.Y., July 24, 2017).

The Defendants operate a restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


ZB N.A.: Sept. 18 Hearing on Bid to Refer Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RONALD C. EVANS, an individual; JOAN M.
EVANS, an individual; DENNIS TREADAWAY, an individual; and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZB, N.A., a national
banking association, dba California Bank & Trust, Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-01123-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Sacramento Division, granted the parties' stipulation to continue
the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Refer this Class Action
Complaint to Sept. 18, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. and gave the Defendant 20
calendar days after notice to the Parties of the Court's entry of
its written order ruling on the Referral Motion to file an answer
or otherwise respond to the Plaintiffs' class action complaint.

On May 26, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed this Class Action Complaint
against the Defendant.  On May 30, 2017, they served the Summons
and the Complaint upon the Defendant via personal service.

Under Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the deadline for the Defendant to file and serve its
answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint was initially June
20, 2017.  On June 12, 2017, the Court entered an Order granting
the Parties' Stipulation to extend the Defendant's Response
Deadline to July 31, 2017.

On July 24, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Refer this Class
Action Complaint to the Hon. Robert S. Bardwil in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California and the
Court's General Orders 182, 223, and 330 ("Referral Motion").  The
Referral Motion is currently scheduled to be heard by the Court on
Aug. 21, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

The Plaintiffs request additional time to review and consider the
merits of the Referral Motion.  Thus, the Parties agree to the
following schedule with respect to the Referral Motion that (i)
the Plaintiffs will file and serve their opposition, if any, to
the Referral Motion no later than Aug. 28, 2017; (ii) the
Defendant will file and serve its reply to any opposition to the
Referral Motion no later than Sept. 11, 2017; and (iii) the
hearing on Referral Motion will be continued from Aug. 21, 2017 to
Sept. 18, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

To allow time for the Court to hear and determine the Referral
Motion, the Parties agree to further extend the Defendant's
Response Deadline such that it will have until 20 calendar days
after notice to the Parties of the Court's entry of its written
order ruling on the Referral Motion in which to file an answer or
otherwise respond to the Complaint.  This deadline will apply
regardless of whether the Court retains jurisdiction, or refers
all or part of the case to the Bankruptcy Court.

The Court granted the Parties' Stipulation.  The Scheduling
Conference is continued from Sept. 25, 2017 to Nov. 20, 2017 at
1:30 p.m.  A Joint Status Report will be filed no later than Nov.
6, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Gq8EUN from Leagle.com.

Ronald C Evans, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Lee Arndt --
aarndt@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP.

Joan M Evans, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Lee Arndt, Foley
Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP.

Dennis Treadaway, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Lee Arndt, Foley
Bezek Behle & Curtis, LLP.

ZB, N.A., Defendant, represented by Robert Scott McWhorter --
rmcwhorter@buchalter.com -- Buchalter, A Professional Corporation.


ZOCDOC INC: Can Deposit $13.9K to Secure Judgment in "Geisman"
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RADHA GEISMANN, M.D., P.C., Plaintiff, v.
ZOCDOC, INC., Defendant, No. 14 Civ. 7009 (LLS)(S.D. N.Y), Judge
Louis L. Stanton of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion for leave to
deposit $13,900 with the Clerk in satisfaction of its offer of
settlement.

In 2014, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in Missouri state court,
alleging that it received two unsolicited faxes from ZocDoc, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA").  Geismann seeks between $500 and $1,500 for each alleged
TCPA violation, an injunction prohibiting ZocDoc from sending
similar faxes in the future, and costs.  It also filed a motion
for class certification.

On March 13, 2014, ZocDoc removed the action to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Missouri.  Two weeks later, ZocDoc made
an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) for $6,000,
plus reasonable attorney's fees, and an injunction prohibiting it
from sending Geismann similar faxes in the future.  On April 8,
Geismann rejected the offer.

On April 18, 2014, ZocDoc moved to transfer the action to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which the
court granted.  It then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that its offer of judgment satisfied all of Geismann's claims,
thereby mooting the action.

On Sept. 26, 2014, Judge Stanton granted ZocDoc's motion and
entered judgment, holding that its offer of judgment more than
satisfies any recovery Geismann could make under the applicable
statute and as a result, there remains no case or controversy
before the Court.  Geismann appealed.

On Jan. 20, 2016, during the pendency of Geismann's appeal to the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, which resolved a circuit split over whether a defendant's
unaccepted offer of judgment in full satisfaction of a plaintiff's
claim moots that a plaintiff's claim so as to deprive a federal
court of the Article III "cases" and "controversies"
jurisdictional requirement.  Holding that such an unaccepted offer
does not moot an action, the majority adopted Justice Kagan's
dissent in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, that an unaccepted
settlement offer is a legal nullity, with no operative effect.

On Feb. 1, 2016, ZocDoc requested leave to deposit $6,100 with the
Clerk in satisfaction of its offer of settlement.  Judge Stanton
granted its request, noting no principle or authority appears to
prevent compliance with an unstayed judgment, even one under
appeal.  On Feb. 5, 2016, ZocDoc deposited $6,100 with the Court's
Clerk's Office, where it remains.

On March 9, 2017, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded Judge
Stanton's Sept. 26, 2014 order and judgment.  On April 26, 2017,
ZocDoc requested a pre-motion conference, in accordance with Judge
Stanton's individual practices, to perfect the hypothetical
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald and the Second
Circuit in Geismann.  On May 2, Geismann filed its opposition to
ZocDoc's request.

Judge Stanton held that on authority, and sound principles applied
in the Second Circuit summary order after Campbell-Ewald, when
ZocDoc has deposited with the Clerk of Court an additional $13,900
comprising an amount securing a judgment satisfying all of
Geismann's monetary claims, and an unconditional consent to a
proper form of injunction, it can make a cognizable, good-faith
argument that this case should be terminated.  The relevant law
will no longer be that of contract, offer and acceptance, or Rule
68; it will be the Constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy.

For these reasons, Judge Stanton granted ZocDoc's motion for leave
to deposit $13,900 with the Clerk of Court, to be held with the
$6,100 already deposited, payable to the Plaintiff to secure a
$20,000 judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, with a satisfactory
form of consent to the entry of an injunction, and thereafter to
follow the procedures for filing a motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 28, 2017 opinion and order is
available at https://is.gd/LoBLDj from Leagle.com.

Radha Geismann, Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Yehoshua Bellin,
Bellin & Associates.

Radha Geismann, Plaintiff, represented by Max G. Margulis --
maxmargulis@margulislaw.com -- Margulis Law Group, pro hac vice,
Brian J. Wanca -- BWanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca,
pro hac vice, Ross M. Good -- rgood@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
Wanca & Ryan M. Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
Wanca.

Zocdoc, Inc.,, Defendant, represented by Bryan K. Clark, VEDDER
AND PRICE, Blaine C. Kimrey -- bkimrey@vedderprice.com -- Vedder,
Price, P.C., Bryan K. Clark -- bclark@vedderprice.com -- Vedder,
Price, P.C., pro hac vice & Charles J. Nerko --
cnerko@vedderprice.com -- Vedder Price P.C.


ZUFFA LLC: Faces "Le" Suit in Western District of Washington
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zuffa LLC. The case
is titled as Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, Jon Fitch, Brandon Vera, Luis
Javier Vazquez, and Kyle Kingsbury, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs v. Zuffa LLC, doing
business as: Ultimate Fighting Championship and UF, the Defendant,

Case No. 2:17-mc-00074-RSL (W.D. Wash., July 19, 2017). The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Robert S. Lasnik.

Zuffa, LLC is an American sports promotion company specializing in
mixed martial arts. It was founded in January 2001 in Las Vegas,
Nevada.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Dan Drachler, Esq.
          ZWERLING SCHACHTER & ZWERLING
          1904 3RD AVE., STE 1030
          SEATTLE, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 223 2053
          Facsimile: (206) 223 2053
          E-mail: ddrachler@zsz.com


* Foley & Lardner Attorneys Discuss DOJ's Stance on Waivers
-----------------------------------------------------------
James M. Nicholas, Esq. -- jnicholas@foley.com -- of Foley &
Lardner LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, reports
that on June 16, 2017, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) changed its position with respect to the enforceability of
class action waivers in the labor and employment context.  The
move came via the DOJ's filing of an amicus curiae brief in three
consolidated cases pending before the Supreme Court (National
Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Case No. 16-307, Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Case No. 16-285 and Ernst & Young LLP v.
Morris, Case No. 16-300)  The Court's decision in these cases --
which were granted review in January 2017 -- is expected to
resolve a circuit split over whether class action waivers included
in employee arbitration agreements, constitute illegal waivers of
rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have ruled that
such waivers violate Section 7 of the NLRA, while the Second,
Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld the validity of
class action waivers in the employment context.

In September 2016, the DOJ under the Obama Administration, on
behalf of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, aligning itself
with the NLRB and its position that class action waivers are
unenforceable and violate the NLRA.   Less than a year later, the
Trump Administration's DOJ has completely abandoned its
predecessor's position.  In its June 16thamicus brief, the DOJ
argued that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates the enforcement
of arbitration agreements containing class action waivers, unless
overridden by a contrary congressional command or unless the
waiver would deprive a plaintiff of substantive rights.  The DOJ's
current position is that enforcing class action waivers does not
result in a surrender of substantive Section 7 rights, which are
limited to union organizing and collective bargaining.  According
to the DOJ, those particular rights are in no way impacted by the
procedural limitation of precluding individuals from joining
together as a class to bring suit against their employers.

Notably, the DOJ explicitly addressed its revised stance, stating
that while it had "previously filed a petition . . . on behalf of
the NLRB, defending the Board's view" concerning the
enforceability of class action waivers, "[a]fter the change in
administration, the [DOJ] reconsidered the issue and has reached
the opposite conclusion."  As a result of this new position, the
NLRB is no longer represented by the U.S. Solicitor General in the
matter, and is now representing itself in the three consolidated
cases.

The impact of this ideological shift on the cases before the
Supreme Court is unclear.  In a case involving statutory
interpretation -- here the scope of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)versus the scope of Section 7 of the NLRA --
congressional intent and the plain language of the competing
statutes, rather than a DOJ opinion, will likely drive the
ultimate resolution of these cases.  All employers who use or are
considering using class action waivers should keep a close eye on
this case. [GN]




                         *********


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