CAR_Public/170724.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Monday, July 24, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 144



                            Headlines

AAC HOLDINGS: Court Certifies Class in "Kasper" Securities Suit
AEROTEK INC: Magistrate Recommends Approval of $15MM Class Deal
ALABAMA: Court Denies Bid to Exclude Experts in Inmates' Suit
ALBANY MOLECULAR: Witmer Seeks to Enjoin Acquisition by Carlyle
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Bid for Interlocutory Appeal OK'd in "Sayles"

ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
AMERICAN HOTEL: Court Denied E&G's Bid for Class Certification
AMETEK INC: Objections to Lone Pine Submission in "Porter" Denied
AVEDA TRANSPORTATION: Court Okays FLSA Settlement in "Waltz" Suit
BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT: Faces McGarry Suit over Chapter 7 Fees

BAYER CORP: Bid to Dismiss "Jordan" Suit Partly Granted
BJ'S WHOLESALE: Connecticut Narrows Claims in "O'Reilly"
BRISTOL-MEYERS: Michigan Court Dismisses TCPA Suit
CALIFORNIA: Sued Over Medicaid "Spousal Impoverishment" Rule
CALIFORNIA SUPPLY: Fails to Pay OT and Minimum Wages, Kuhia Says

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Bid for Partial Judgment in "Kautsman" OK'd
CASSIDY'S POLO: Exotic Dancers' Wage Class Action Pending
CENTRAL CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
CENTURYLINK INC: Sued Over Unauthorized Charges in Arizona

CHADBOURNE & PARKE: Norton Ross Added to Gender Bias Suit
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Narrows Claims in "Michael"
CIRRUS CONSULTING: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Zauderer"
COLLECTO INC: Rivera Files Placeholder Class Certification Bid
COLTON, CA: Settles False Arrest Suit for $150,000

CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Texas Stays "Alexander" Suit
COPLEY PRESS: Court to Redetermine Class Award in "Espejo" Suit
CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM: 5th Cir. Dismisses Appeal in "Farber"
DAVE BERRY: "Flores" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
EL BESO MEXICAN: "Esteves" Suit Seeks to Certify 3 Classes

EFFEX CAPITAL: Requests Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint
EXTRA SPACE: Court Gives Final Approval of "Gomes" Settlement
FACEBOOK INC: Court Narrows Claims in Internet Tracking Suit
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Summary Judgment in "Jewsevskyj" Affirmed
FIRST STUDENT: Court Denies Class Certification in "Humes"

FUQI INTERNATIONAL: December 18 Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set
GC SERVICES: Indiana Court Certifies Class in "Smith"
GENERAL MOTORS: Bellwether Ignition Switch Defect Trial Begins
GENIE ENERGY: Units Enter Into Class Action Settlement Agreement
GERBER PRODUCTS: 5th Cir. Partly Affirms Trimming of "Bruton"

GLH CAPITAL: Court Grants Conditional Certification in "Owens"
GOOGLE INC: AGs Challenge $5.5-Mil. Class Action Settlement
HAIN CELESTIAL: Faces Potential Class Action Over Veggie Straws
HILTI INC: Electric Tools Buyers' Suit Moved Back to E.D. Cal.
HUYSSEN INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Bruno" Suit

JANSSEN PHARMA: Pa. Risperdal Docket Nearly Triples in First Half
JC PENNEY: Can't Compel Arbitration of "Cavlovic" Suit
JOE ARPAIO: Could End Up Behind Bars Over Racial Profiling Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Tried to Stop Report About Pelvic Mesh Devices
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: "Estrada" Suit Dismissed with Leave to Amend

JOSEPH DECKER: Has Until Aug. 1 to Respond in "Shannon"
LEGEND ENERGY: Harlow Seeks to Certify Class of Oilfield Worker
LG CHEM: Filing of Claims for Battery CA Settlement Started
LGI HOMES: "Selby" Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Office Managers
LMCHH PCP: Outten & Golden Named Interim Lead Atty in "Kusnick"

LULAROE LLC: Harvey Seeks Minimum Wages & OT under Labor Code
MARSHALLS OF CA: Discovery Order in "Williams" Reversed
MASSACHUSETTS: Class Action Challenges Voter Cutoff Law
MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL: Faces "Velazquez" Lawsuit Under ERISA
MATTRESS FIRM: "Herrera" Suit Seeks Drivers Class Certification

MERCHANT ADVANCE: Court Extends Time to Serve in "Hemis"
METRO AIR: Faces "Vizcarra" Suit Seeking to Recoup Overtime Pay
METROPOLITAN TRANSPO: Faces Suit Over Safe Service Failure
MILLWOOD INC: "Yu" Suit Seeks Certification of FLSA Class
MR. HEATER: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer to SAC in "Burger"

NEW HAMPSHIRE: Lack of Foster Care Reform May Spark Suit v. DCYF
NEW YORK: Refund Checks Mailed to Class Members
NOBLE ENERGY: Faces "Virden" Suit Alleging Misclassification
ORION HEALTHCORP: Singh-Narayan Seeks Unpaid OT under Labor Law
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Ruling in Securities Suit Partly Affirmed

PHC INC: Maz Partners' Bid for New Trial Denied
PHILLIPS & COHEN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Ct. OK's $865K Settlement in FLSA Suit
PROSCAPE GROUP: Faces "Silva" Lawsuit Alleging FLSA Violation
RAMELLI GROUP: Ct. Certifies Former Employees' Collective Action
RAYMOURS FURNITURE: Class Action Waiver Inapplicable, Judge Rules

RCS CAPITAL: September 28 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
RED INN: Former Server Files Class Action Over Tips
RELIANCE JIO: May Face Class Action Threat Over Data Leak
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL: Underwriters Must Produce Pre-Oct. 2008 Docs
REVCLAIMS LLC: Class Action Over Billing Practices Dismissed

RJ REYNOLDS: 2nd Cir. Upholds $28MM Verdict in Izzarelli Case
ROCK FREIGHT: "Cheuk" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
SEARS: Keller Grover Announces Gift Card Settlement
SHILOH INDUSTRIES: Ct. Grants Leave to Amend "Prince" Suit
SLATER AND GORDON: Share Trading Halted Following Class Action

SPITZER INDUSTRIES: "Sarabia" Suit Alleges Misclassification
SYNDICATED OFFICE: "Carpenter" Suit Seeks Class Certification
SYNGENTA: Court to Hear Viptera Trials Two States at a Time
SYNGENTA: Averts Trial by Reaching Confidential Settlement
TAHOE RESOURCES: Faces "Sanders" Suit Over Escobal Mining

TD BANK: Court Refuses to Dismiss RFDCPA Claims in "Martinez"
TEAM OIL: "Staggert" Labor Lawsuit Transferred to S.D. Texas
TOKIO MARINE: Court Dismisses "Azad" Suit with Leave to Amend
TRIDENT ASSET: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
U.S. STEEL: Faces Suit Over Donora Zinc Works

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: "Olivares" Suit Compelled to Arbitration
UNITED STATES: Hawaii Loses Bid to Challenge Trump Travel Ban
UNITED STATES: Asks Judge to Rethink Class Certification Order
UNITED STATES: Judge Extends Stay Blocking Deportation of Iraqis
VOLKSWAGEN: Wants to Dodge Liability for Failure to Warn Investors

VOLKSWAGEN AG: Attorney Provides Details on Diesel Settlement
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Diesel Emissions Case Lawyers Seek Addt'l Fees
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Suit Over Emissions Allowed to Proceed
WELLS FARGO: Judge Grants Prelim Approval to $142MM Settlement
WENDY'S OF LAS VEGAS: Loses Bid to Strick Workers' Expert Witness

WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Denies Prelim Approval of Proposed Settlement
ZTO EXPRESS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Action
ZURICH INSURANCE: Appeals Panel Sides Against Complainant

* New Database Mulled as Part of CFPB's Final Arbitration Rule
* CFPB in Dispute with OCC Over Arbitration Rule




                            *********


AAC HOLDINGS: Court Certifies Class in "Kasper" Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DR. JOSEPH F. KASPER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AAC
HOLDINGS, INC., JERROD N. MENZ, MICHAEL T. CARTWRIGHT, ANDREW W.
McWILLIAMS and KIRK R. MANZ, Defendant, No. 15-cv-00923-JPM-jsf
(M.D. Tenn.), Judge Jon P. McCalla of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Class, Appoint Class
Representatives, and Appoint Class and Liaison Counsel.

On Aug. 24, 2015, the Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, filed a complaint against the Defendants
alleging violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC Rule 10b-5(b) promulgated
thereunder.  On Oct. 23, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Appoint Lead Plaintiff, Lead Counsel, and Liasion Counsel, as well
as a Motion to Consolidate Cases.  On Oct. 26, 2015, the Court
consolidated Tenzyk v. AAC Holdings, Inc., et al. (Case No. 3-15-
cv-0986) and Kasper v. AAC Holdings, Inc., et al. (Case No. 3-15-
cv-0923).  On Dec. 30, 2015, the Court entered a Stipulation and
Order Appointing Lead Plaintiffs, Lead Counsel, and Liaison
Counsel.  The Court's Order appointed Arkansas Teacher Retirement
System ("ATRS") and James P. Gills, M.D. as Lead Plaintiffs.

On Feb. 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for
consolidated class actions.

On April 14, 2016, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss which
the Court denied on July 1, 2016 finding that the Plaintiffs pled
with sufficient specificity required by the statute for an
actionable misstatement and omission, and scienter; and
sufficiently alleged a claim for Rule 20(a) to survive a motion to
dismiss.

On July 6, 2016, the Court ordered the Defendants to serve their
answer to the Consolidated Complaint by July 22, 2016.  The
Defendants then filed their answer on July 22, 2016.  On Aug. 31,
2016, the Court entered a Joint Initial Case Management Order.

On Nov. 4, 2016, the Court entered the Stipulation and Protective
Order for the parties.  On Nov. 28, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Set a Case Management Conference alleging that the
Defendants failed to produce a single document in response to the
Requests Plaintiffs served on July 19, 2016.  The Court found the
motion moot in light of the teleconference scheduled with Judge
McCalla.

The Court held a telephonic status conference on Dec. 13, 2016,
amending the discovery and trial schedule.  On Dec. 22, 2016,
proposed class representative, Dr. James Gills, withdrew his
request to be appointed class representative.  Thus, ATRS is the
one remaining Plaintiff seeking to be appointed class
representative.

On Dec. 22, 2016, the Defendants filed a redacted response in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.
They refiled an un-redacted response in opposition on Jan. 24,
2017.

The Plaintiffs filed a reply on Feb. 10, 2017.  On Feb. 15, 2017,
the Defendants moved for Oral Argument on Lead Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification which the Court granted on Feb. 23, 2017.
A telephonic motion hearing was set for April 4, 2017 at 9:30 a.m.
(CST).

On March 8, 2017, the Plaintiffs sought leave to file a sur-reply
on the issue of class certification which the Defendants opposed
on March 10, 2017.  The Defendants filed a response in opposition
to the Plaintiff's sur-reply on March 10, 2017.

On April 4, 2017, the Court held a telephonic Motion Hearing
regarding the Plaintiffs' pending motions.  Following the hearing,
the Court entered an Order Requiring Supplemental Briefing.  The
parties filed timely supplemental briefs on April 18, 2017 and May
2, 2017.

The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Class of
all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired AAC
securities between Oct. 2, 2014, and Aug. 4, 2015 at 9:40 a.m.
(EDT).  The Court also granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to appoint
Kaplan Fox, Kahn Swick and Barrett Johnston as Class Counsel and
their request to appoint Lead Plaintiff as Class Representative.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/GVxH8u from Leagle.com.

Dr. Joseph F. Kasper, Plaintiff, represented by David W. Garrison,
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Dr. Joseph F. Kasper, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey C. Block,
Block & Leviton LLP, Paul Kent Bramlett, Bramlett Law Offices,
Robert P. Bramlett, Bramlett Law Offices & Steven P. Harte, Block
& Leviton LLP.

Judith D. Tenzyk, Consol Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander
Hood, II, Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, Marc
Gorrie, Pomerantz LLP, Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, Paul
Kent Bramlett, Bramlett Law Offices & Robert P. Bramlett, Bramlett
Law Offices.

Jacquelin Welsh, Consol Plaintiff, represented by James A.
Holifield, Jr., Holifield Janich Rachal & Associates, PLLC.

AAC Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Britt K. Latham,
Bass, Berry & Sims, David Gouzoules, Alston & Bird LLP, Jessica
Perry Corley, Alston & Bird LLP, John Latham, Alston & Bird LLP,
Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Bass, Berry & Sims & Lisa R. Bugni, Alston &
Bird LLP.

Jerrod N. Menz, Defendant, represented by Britt K. Latham, Bass,
Berry & Sims, David Gouzoules, Alston & Bird LLP, Jessica Perry
Corley, Alston & Bird LLP, John Latham, Alston & Bird LLP, Joseph
B. Crace, Jr., Bass, Berry & Sims & Lisa R. Bugni, Alston & Bird
LLP.

Michael T. Cartwright, Defendant, represented by Britt K. Latham,
Bass, Berry & Sims, David Gouzoules, Alston & Bird LLP, Jessica
Perry Corley, Alston & Bird LLP, John Latham, Alston & Bird LLP,
Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Bass, Berry & Sims & Lisa R. Bugni, Alston &
Bird LLP.

Kathryn Sevier-Phillips, Defendant, represented by Britt K.
Latham, Bass, Berry & Sims, Jessica Perry Corley, Alston & Bird
LLP, John Latham, Alston & Bird LLP, Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Bass,
Berry & Sims & Lisa R. Bugni, Alston & Bird LLP.

Andrew W. McWilliams, Defendant, represented by Britt K. Latham,
Bass, Berry & Sims, David Gouzoules, Alston & Bird LLP & Joseph B.
Crace, Jr., Bass, Berry & Sims.

Kirk Manz, Defendant, represented by Britt K. Latham, Bass, Berry
& Sims, David Gouzoules, Alston & Bird LLP & Joseph B. Crace, Jr.,
Bass, Berry & Sims.

JAMES P GILL, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L.
Burns, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLP, Donald R. Hall, Jr., Kaplan Fox
Kilsheimer LLP, Joseph Scott St. John, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLP,
Paul Kent Bramlett, Bramlett Law Offices, Ramzi Abadou, Kahn Swick
& Foti, LLP, Timothy L. Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC & David W. Garrison, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Judith D. Tenzyk, Movant, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman,
Pomerantz LLP.

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, Movant, represented by
Alexander L. Burns, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLP, David W. Garrison,
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Donald R. Hall, Jr.,
Kaplan Fox Kilsheimer LLP, Frederic S. Fox, Kaplan Fox Kilsheimer
LLP, Jeffrey P. Campisi, Kaplan Fox Kilsheimer LLP, Jerry E.
Martin, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC & Timothy L.
Miles, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC.

Robert Salyer, Movant, represented by Joey P. Leniski, Jr.,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC.


AEROTEK INC: Magistrate Recommends Approval of $15MM Class Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, recommended that
Plaintiff's Motions for final approval of class action settlement
be granted in the cases captioned Ebony Moore, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Aerotek,
Inc., Defendant, AND Jose Rubio-Delgado, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Aerotek,
Inc. Defendant, Case Nos. 2:15-cv-2701, 2:16-cv-1066 (S.D. Ohio),
as well as for final approval of class action settlement.

On July 3, 2013, Plaintiff Rubio-Delgado filed his class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, alleging that Defendant had violated 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2) by procuring background checks on him
and putative class members without first providing a disclosure
that a report would be obtained in a document consisting solely of
the disclosure.  Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant's
disclosure contained a liability release and other extraneous
information beyond that allowed under the FCRA.  The action was
stayed in November 2013 to facilitate settlement discussions,
which resulted in a settlement that was ultimately not approved by
the court.  Following the denial of approval, the parties
stipulated to continue the stay pending resolution of Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (2015), and Syed v. M-I, LLC, No. 14-17186
(9th Cir. 2014).

On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff Moore filed a separate class action
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio,
also alleging that Defendant had violated 15 U.S.C. Section
1681b(b)(2) by procuring background checks without first providing
a stand-alone disclosure, and, in addition, alleging that
Defendant had violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(3) by failing to
provide her and putative class members with a copy of their
background check and summary of rights prior to taking adverse
employment action based in whole or in part on the background
check (pre-adverse action notice).  Plaintiff alleges that she did
not receive pre-adverse action notice as required, and that she
was terminated on the basis of her background check without having
the opportunity to review or dispute her report, which contained
inaccuracies.  Defendant removed Moore's action to this Court on
August 7, 2015.  The parties then stipulated to stay the case to
facilitate settlement discussions.

Aerotek has agreed to provide both monetary and non-monetary
relief in consideration for the release of the settlement class
members' claim.  It agreed to pay $15,000,000 into a common
settlement fund.  Subsequent to the deductions of attorneys' fees,
costs, administration costs, and class representative service
awards, the funds are to be distributed pro rata to all Class
members, with each member's distribution calculated on the bases
of which of the three designated classes.  Members in the
1681b(b)(2) Class will receive one share; members in the
1681b(b)(2) Adjudicated Class will receive 1.67 shares; and those
in the 1681b(b)(3) Class will receive six shares. Individuals who
fall into more than one class will receive a distribution for the
most valuable class in which they are categorized. Any funds
remaining after the close of the time period within which to cash
checks will be re-distributed to 1681b(b)(3) class members who
cashed their original checks. Any funds remaining after that
redistribution will be donated to the National Consumer Law
Center.

The Court has reviewed and considered the record in this case,
including the representations made by counsel at the fairness
hearing held on June 22, 2017.  The Court has considered the risk
of fraud or collusion, the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of the litigation, the amount of discovery engaged in by
the parties, the likelihood of success on the merits, the opinions
of class counsel and the class representative, the reaction of the
absent class members, and the public interest, and it finds that
all seven factors weigh in favor of final approval of the proposed
settlement.  Counsel for the parties are in agreement with this
assessment.

This Court finds that the settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and that approval is in the best
interest of the Class. The Court will now examine the
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees set forth in the settlement
agreement.

The following payments are to be made in connection with the
settlement: (1) attorneys' fees to Class Counsel in the amount of
one-third of the common fund ($5,000,000); (2) reimbursement of
Class Counsel's out-of-pocket costs in the amount of $67,964.27;
(3) Class Representative Awards of $5,000 each to Plaintiffs Moore
and Rubio-Delgado, and $3,000 each to Plaintiffs Hubbard and
Burgess; and (4) third-party settlement administration charges in
the amount of $856,849.87.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/KiK9bm from Leagle.com

Ebony R. Moore, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew A. Dooley --
mdooley@omdplaw.com -- O'Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora, Co.
LPA.

Ebony R. Moore, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony R. Pecora --
apecora@ompdlaw.com -- O'Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora, Co.
LPA, Eleanor Michelle Drake -- mdrake@bm.net - Berger & Montague &
Joseph C. Hashmall -- jhashmall@bm.net -- Berger & Montague.
Aerotek, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison S. Hightower, --
ahightower@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., pro hac vice &
Chad J. Kaldor -- ckaldor@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.


ALABAMA: Court Denies Bid to Exclude Experts in Inmates' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Middle District of Alabama,
Northern Division, issued an Opinion denying the parties' motion
for exclusion of expert witness in the case captioned EDWARD
BRAGGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:14cv601-MHT (M.D. Ala.).

The plaintiffs in this phase of this class-action lawsuit are
seriously mentally ill state prisoners and the Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP).  The defendants are
officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) --
Commissioner Jefferson Dunn and Associate Commissioner of Health
Services Ruth Naglich -- who are sued in only their official
capacities.

In Phase 2A of the case, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants
have failed to provide constitutionally adequate mental-health
care to ADOC prisoners with serious mental-health needs, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

At trial, the parties presented evidence from five expert
witnesses, some of whom the parties had objected to prior to
trial. The parties did not object to any of the experts'
qualifications, but the plaintiffs asserted objections under
Daubert portions of Dr. Raymond Patterson's testimony and to the
methodology underlying Robert Ayers's opinion, and the defendants
asserted Daubert objections against Dr. Kathryn Burns's and Eldon
Vail's methodologies.

The District Court held that while the defendants did not object
to Dr. Burns's qualification as a correctional mental-health
expert, they objected to the methodology she employed to assess
the adequacy of mental-health care within ADOC.

The defendants raised two additional grounds for objecting to
Burns's testimony under Daubert.  First, the defendants argued
that Burns failed to identify during her trial testimony specific
prisoners whose experience supported her conclusions and that she
therefore "improperly extrapolated."

The court finds this argument unconvincing.  Burns provided an
extensive report that identified sources of her observations and
conclusions, including names of prisoners and specific documents
based on which she evaluated ADOC policies and practices.

The defendants' second contention is that Burns's opinion as to
the adequacy of individual care does not establish an Eighth
Amendment violation. This is not a Daubert objection at all:
establishing legal liability is not a requirement under the
Daubert analysis.  It is the factfinder's job to evaluate
competing expert opinions, in conjunction with all other
admissible evidence, to decide whether there has been a violation,
the Court held.  In sum, Burns's testimony was sufficiently
reliable to survive a Daubert challenge.

The defendants objected under Daubert to the testimony and expert
report offered by Eldon Vail, the plaintiffs' correctional
administration expert, asserting that he is not "qualified" to
testify under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to offer an
opinion as to facilities that he did not visit.

Vail's expert testimony is admissible, the Court held.  First, as
explained in the class-certification opinion with regards to
Burns's testimony, the case law indicates that an expert on prison
conditions is not categorically required to visit every single
facility in order to offer an opinion on systemic issues.

Second, for the facilities that he did not visit, Vail reviewed
internal and public documents of ADOC, including vulnerability
analyses, monthly statistical reports, standard operating
procedures, local institutional policies, meeting minutes,
transcripts of ADOC officials' depositions, and incident reports.
The court therefore found in the Daubert order that Vail's
testimony was admissible.

The plaintiffs challenged as unreliable Dr. Raymond Patterson's
testimony and his report about an ADOC medical-records audit that
he and other defense experts performed.

The plaintiffs were able to point out errors on the audit forms
and raise doubts about the accuracy of audit results during the
cross examination of Patterson. Therefore, with the previously
entered Daubert order, the court found that the audit-
implementation issues raised by the plaintiffs were properly
addressed through the adversarial system, rather than by excluding
the results from consideration by the factfinder, and that
Patterson's testimony regarding the audit results was admissible.

The plaintiffs initially challenged defense expert Ayers's
methodology under Daubert, arguing that relying primarily on
interviews with staff to formulate an opinion about the quality of
mental-health care is unreliable.

The court further found that the limited nature of his supporting
data and his testimony that he did not have sufficient time to
investigate certain issues bore on only the weight of his expert
opinion, rather than admissibility. Therefore, the plaintiffs'
initial objection against Ayers's methodology was overruled in the
Daubert order.

The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to exclude Ayers's
testimony and portions of Patterson's testimony and the
defendants' motions to exclude Burns and Vail's testimony.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13, 2017, Order is
available at https://is.gd/G40kD6 from Leagle.com.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh --
awalsh@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC.

Edward Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Brooke Menschel, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter --
pclotfelter@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center,
William Glassell Somerville, III -- wsomerville@bakerdonelson.com
-- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der
Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Tedrick Brooks, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Gary Lee Broyles, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Chandler Clements, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Christopher Gilbert, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke
Menschel, Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center,
Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl
Haskell, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice, Patricia
Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda
C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, William Glassell
Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz &
William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.
Dwight Hagood, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Sylvester Hartley, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Christopher Jackson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip
Walsh, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke
Menschel, Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center,
Maria V. Morris, Southern Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl
Haskell, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice, Patricia
Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda
C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty Law Center, William Glassell
Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz &
William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Brandon Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh,
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

John Maner, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Philip Walsh, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel,
Southern Poverty Law Center, Ebony Glenn Howard, Southern Poverty
Law Center, Eunice Cho, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice,
Jack Richard Cohen, Southern Poverty Law Center, Latasha Lanette
McCrary, Southern Poverty Law Center, Maria V. Morris, Southern
Poverty Law Center, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Southern Poverty Law
Center, pro hac vice, Patricia Clotfelter, Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Southern Poverty
Law Center, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz & William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama
Disabilities Advocacy Program.

Ruth Naglich, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill, Alabama
Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd, Balch & Bingham
LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of Corrections, Evan
Patrick Moltz, -- emoltz@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper &
Gale, P.C., John Garland Smith,jgsmith@balch.com -- Balch &
Bingham LLP, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept of
Corrections, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr. --
rdorr@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.,
Matthew Reeves -- mreeves@maynardcoper.com -- Maynard Cooper &
Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah -- mshah@maynardcooper.com --
Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, Steven C. Corhern --
scorhem@balch.com -- Balch & Bingham, William Richard
Lunsford -- blunsford@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale
PC, Melissa K. Marler -- mmarler@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard,
Cooper & Gale PC, Michael Paul Huff -- mhuff@maynardcooper.com --
Maynard Cooper & Gale PC & Stephen Clarence Rogers --
srogers@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper and Gale PC.

Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant, represented by David
Randall Boyd, Balch & Bingham LLP, John W. Naramore, Balch &
Bingham LLP, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Anne Adams
Hill, Alabama Department of Corrections, Elizabeth Anne Sees,
Alabama Department of Corrections, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr.,
Alabama Dept of Corrections, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham &
William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC.

Jefferson S. Dunn, Defendant, represented by Anne Adams Hill,
Alabama Department of Corrections, David Randall Boyd, Balch &
Bingham LLP, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Alabama Department of
Corrections, Evan Patrick Moltz, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C.,
John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Joseph Gordon Stewart,
Jr., Alabama Dept of Corrections, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr.,
Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Matthew Reeves, Maynard Cooper &
Gale PC, Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, Steven
C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, William Richard Lunsford, Maynard
Cooper & Gale PC, Melissa K. Marler, Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC,
Michael Paul Huff, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC & Stephen Clarence
Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC.

MHM Correctional Services, Inc., Movant, represented by Brett T.
Lane, MHM Services, Inc. & Deana Johnson, MHM Services, Inc., pro
hac vice.

Corizon Health, Inc., Movant, represented by Melissa K. Marler,
Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC, Stephen Clarence Rogers, Maynard Cooper
and Gale PC & William Richard Lunsford, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC.
Kim Thomas, Movant, represented by Evan Patrick Moltz, Maynard,
Cooper & Gale, P.C., Melissa K. Marler, Maynard, Cooper & Gale PC,
Mitesh Bansilal Shah, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, Stephen Clarence
Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC & William Richard Lunsford,
Maynard Cooper & Gale PC.


ALBANY MOLECULAR: Witmer Seeks to Enjoin Acquisition by Carlyle
---------------------------------------------------------------
COLLEEN WITMER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALBANY MOLECULAR RESEARCH,
INC., THOMAS E. D'AMBRA, DAVID H. DEMING, KENNETH P. HAGEN,
GERARDO GUTIERREZ FUENTES, ANTHONY J. MADDALUNA, FERNANDO
NAPOLITANO, WILLIAM S. MARTH, EVIN O'CONNOR, THE CARLYLE
GROUP, GTCR LLC, UIC PARENT CORPORATION, and UIC MERGER SUB,
INC., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00942-UNA (D. Del., July
13, 2017), seeks to preliminarily and permanently enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing a proposed transaction,
and in the event defendants consummate the Proposed Transaction,
rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages.

This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on June 6,
2017, pursuant to which Albany Molecular Research, Inc. will be
acquired by affiliates of The Carlyle Group and GTCR LLC.

According to the complaint, on June 5, 2017, AMRI's Board of
Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan
of merger with UIC Parent Corporation and UIC Merger Sub, Inc.
Pursuant to the terms the Merger Agreement, shareholders of AMRI
will receive $21.75 per share in cash. On July 3, defendants filed
a Preliminary Proxy Statement with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed
Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy
Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, plaintiff alleges
that defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy
Statement.

AMRI is a contract research and manufacturing organization that
provides drug discovery, development, cGMP manufacturing and
aseptic fill and finish to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
          Wilmington, DE 19803
          Telephone: (302) 295 5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654 7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
          gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324 6800


ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Bid for Interlocutory Appeal OK'd in "Sayles"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Defendant's Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal in the case captioned SAMANTHA SAYLES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 3:16-CV-01534 (M.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Samantha Sayles originally filed this putative class
action Sayles alleges that an auto insurance policy issued by
Allstate under which she was insured contains an "examination
requirement" that violates  section 1796 of Pennsylvania's Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), a district judge may
certify an order for immediate appeal if it the judge finds that
the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.

Section 1292(b) imposes three criteria for the district court's
exercise of discretion to grant a section 1292(b) certificate. The
order must (1) involve a controlling question of law,' (2) offer
'substantial ground for difference of opinion' as to its
correctness, and (3) if appealed immediately materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation.

The Court finds that the requirements set forth in section 1292(b)
have been satisfied, and that an interlocutory appeal is warranted
in this case.

First, the Court concludes that its prior Order involves a
controlling question of law, thereby satisfying the first
statutory criterion. A question of law is controlling if: (1) an
incorrect disposition would constitute reversible error; or (2) it
is serious to the conduct of the litigation, either practically or
legally.

Second, the Court finds that an immediate appeal will also
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
Lastly, the Court concludes that there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion as to the correctness of the Court's Order
with respect to the denial of Allstate's Motion to Dismiss as to
Counts I and II. A substantial ground for difference of opinion
about a particular issue exists "when the matter involves 'one or
more difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled by
controlling authority.

Here, as the Court recognized previously, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not directly weighed in on this specific issue, and
therefore there is an absence of controlling law.  Consequently,
not only is there an absence of controlling law on this particular
issue, but there are also conflicting interpretations from
multiple courts.

Considering the potential scope of this lawsuit and the unsettled
nature of this legal question, the Court believes this is the type
of exceptional case warranting an interlocutory appeal.
Furthermore, the Court concludes that a stay is appropriate in
this case because the issues awaiting resolution are dependent
upon the outcome of the certified appeal.  Defendant Allstate's
Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13 2017 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/BgO4qV from Leagle.com.

Samantha Sayles, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Kannebecker --
info@kannebecker.com --, Weinstein Schneider Kannebecker & Lokuta.
Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Marc E.
Wolin -- mwolin@saiber.com -- Saiber LLC.


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ROBERT AKER, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALLTRAN FINANC
IAL, LP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00985-WED (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying a
proposed class in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as its
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=W2sZaAgM

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


AMERICAN HOTEL: Court Denied E&G's Bid for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned E & G, Inc., the Plaintiff, v. American
Hotel Register Company, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-
01011 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Jorge L. Alonso entered an order
denying Plaintiff's Damasco motion for class certification without
prejudice, with the understanding that Plaintiff's request for
class certification remains pending as a placeholder, and no
rights are waived

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on July 18, 2017,
Defendants are on notice that this is a putative class action.

A copy of the Docket Entry is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=IUY5UqTj


AMETEK INC: Objections to Lone Pine Submission in "Porter" Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order Denying Defendants' Objection to
Plaintiffs' Lone Pine Submission in the case captioned DANIELLE
TRUJILLO, as Guardian Ad Litem for KADEN PORTER, a minor, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated; LACEY MORALES, as
Guardian Ad Litem for ISABEL MORALES., a minor, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated; BEVERLY HOY, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, v. AMETEK,
INC., a Delaware corporation; SENIOR OPERATIONS, LLC, a limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 3:15-cv-01394-GPC-BGS (S.D. Calif.).

This is toxic tort case arising out of Defendant Ametek's alleged
dumping of chemical waste into a temporary storage tank on their
property in El Cajon, California.  Plaintiffs allege, that the
toxic waste caused an underground plume of discharge that
infected, and continues to infect, the groundwater below the
Magnolia Elementary School, which shares a property line with the
Defendant property.

The plume created toxic fumes that migrated, and continue to
migrate, from the ground into the air at Magnolia and the toxic
vapors contain chemicals that posed and pose a significant human
health risk to Magnolia's occupants, including students like Kaden
Porter and Lacey Morales and teachers like Plaintiff Beverly Hoy.

The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions
for entry of a Lone Pine  (Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., 1986 WL 637507
N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 1986) case management order.  The Court
found it appropriate to require each named Plaintiff to make a
prima facie showing regarding his or her exposure, increased risk
of specific injury and causation, but did not require that such an
evidentiary showing be made as to any of the putative class
members.

Lone Pine (orders are designed to handle the complex issues and
potential burdens on defendants and the court in mass tort
litigation.

Their basic purpose is to identify and cull potentially meritless
claims and streamline litigation in complex cases and to achieve
that purpose it require plaintiffs to produce some evidence to
support a credible claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/KLu9Dv Leagle.com.

Danielle Trujillo, Plaintiff, represented by Carla Burke, Baron &
Budd PC, pro hac vice, 3102 Oak Lawn Avenue #1100, Dallas, TX
75219

Danielle Trujillo, Plaintiff, represented by Celeste A.
Evangelisti, Esq. -- cevangel@baronbudd.com --  Baron & Budd PC,
John P. Fiske, Baron & Budd, P.C. & 3102 Oak Lawn Avenue #1100,
Dallas, TX 75219, Scott Summy, Baron & Budd PC, pro hac vice. 3102
Oak Lawn Avenue #1100, Dallas, TX 75219

Lacey Morales, Plaintiff, represented by Carla Burke, Baron & Budd
PC, pro hac vice, Celeste A. Evangelisti, Baron & Budd PC, John P.
Fiske, Baron & Budd, P.C. & Scott Summy, Baron & Budd PC, pro hac
vice.

Beverly Hoy, Plaintiff, represented by Celeste A. Evangelisti,
Baron & Budd PC & John P. Fiske, Baron & Budd, P.C..

Ametek, Inc., Defendant, represented by Edward C. Walton,
-- ed.walton@procopio.com  -- Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves &
Savitch, LLP, Hazel Ocampo --  hazel.ocampo@procopio.com --
Procopio & Sean Michael Sullivan -- sean.sullivan@procopio.com --
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch LLP.

Senior Aerospace Ketema, Defendant, represented by David James
Porter,  --david.porter@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney
PC, pro hac vice & Kimberly Arouh -- Kimberly.arouh@bipc.com --
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney LLP.

Senior Operations LLC, Defendant, represented by Jordan Webster --
jordan.webster@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, pro hac
vice & Kimberly Arouh, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney LLP.


AVEDA TRANSPORTATION: Court Okays FLSA Settlement in "Waltz" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RANDY WALTZ, on behalf of himself and
similarly situated employees, Plaintiffs, v. AVEDA TRANSPORTATION
AND ENERGY SERVICES INC., and RODAN TRANSPORT USA LTD, Defendants,
No. 4:16-CV-00469 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Matthew W. Brann granted the
unopposed motion for approval of FLSA settlement filed by the
plaintiffs, Randy Waltz, David Canada, Toby Hayes, Mark Ortiz,
Gary Solinger, John Tinkle, and Michael Tinkle.

On March 17, 2016, Randy Waltz filed a Complaint against veda
Transportation and Energy Services Inc. and Rodan Transport USA
Ltd alleging:

     (1) a collective action under FLSA Section 16(b) for failure
         to pay an overtime premium as required by 29 U.S.C.
         section 207(a)(1), and

     (2) a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
         for violations of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

Aveda Transportation and Energy Services Inc. and Rodan Transport
USA Ltd employ hundreds of employees engaged in various services
at oil and gas rigs throughout the United States.  Those
employees, the plaintiffs in this litigation, were employed in the
Field Supervisor/Truck Push (FSTP) position.  During their terms
of employment as FSTPs, the plaintiffs were paid on a day rate
basis.  Because they alleged that their work week often consisted
of greater than 40 hours, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants' failure to pay overtime premium compensation resulted
in a violation of the FLSA.

The Court granted, by Memorandum Opinion and Order dated December
27, 2016, the plaintiffs Randy Waltz and Gary Solinger's Motion
for Conditional Certification.  This conditional certification,
and the dissemination of Notice and Consent Forms to over 30
individuals, resulted in five additional plaintiffs joining the
suit -- David Canada, Toby Hayes, Mark Ortiz, John Tinkle, and
Michael Tinkle.  The parties subsequently engaged in further
discovery and settlement negotiations.

Settlement in the amount of $145,000.00 has since been reached.
In their motion, the parties jointly requested that the Court
approve the proposed settlement agreement pursuant to Section
16(b) of the FLSA, codified at 29 U.S.C. section 216(b).

Having reviewed the Settlement Agreement reached by parties, Judge
Brann found that it is both a "fair and reasonable resolution of a
bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions," and does not
impermissibly frustrate implementation of the FLSA in the
workplace.

A full-text copy of Judge Brann's June 30, 2017 memorandum opinion
and order is available at https://is.gd/C7L16i from Leagle.com.

Randy Waltz, Plaintiff, represented by Mark J. Gottesfeld
mgottesfeld@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake & Santillo, LLC, Peter
D. Winebrake -- pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake &
Santillo, LLC & R. Andrew Santillo --
asantillo@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake & Santillo, LLC.

Gary Solinger, Plaintiff, represented by Mark J. Gottesfeld,
Winebrake & Santillo, LLC & Peter D. Winebrake, Winebrake &
Santillo, LLC.

Aveda Transportation and Energy Services, Inc., Rodan Transport
USA Ltd., Defendants, represented by Mark A. Fontana --
mfontana@eckertseamans.com -- Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott,
LLC, Clayton M. Davis -- clayton.davis@bracewell.com -- Bracewell
LLP & Robert E. Sheeder -- robert.sheeder@bracewell.com


BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT: Faces McGarry Suit over Chapter 7 Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
MCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC, the Plaintiff, v. BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2017L007010 (Ill. Cir.
Ct., July 13, 2017), seeks compensatory damages and treble
damages, pursuant to the Illinois Antitrust Act.

McGarry alleges BMS has orchestrated a conspiracy with its two
largest competitors, in violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act,
to fix the manner of charging Chapter 7 bankruptcy estates for
support services. Through this conspiracy, that one Trustee has
termed "a train robbery," BMS has unlawfully extracted excessive,
if not exorbitant, fees from Chapter 7 bankruptcy estates, and
cheated creditors, such as McGarry, out of millions of dollars.

McGarry, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
demands judgment against BMS.

BMS develops software solutions to automate case administration,
streamline claims distributions, and simplify collaboration.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marianne C. Holzhall, Esq.
          MCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC
          120 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 345 4600
          E-mail: mch@mcgarryllc.com

               - and -

          DUNNEGAN & SCILEPPI LLC
          350 Fifth Avenue
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 332 8300


BAYER CORP: Bid to Dismiss "Jordan" Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LAVETA JORDAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BAYER
CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:17-CV-865 (CEJ)(E.D. Mo.),
Judge Carol E. Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied without prejudice
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim or federal preemption; denied as moot the
Defendants' motion to sever; denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand; and (iv) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion to stay.

On Jan. 19, 2017, the Plaintiffs initiated this action in the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri to recover
damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as a result of using
Essure, a medical device manufactured and sold by the Defendants.
In the complaint, they assert claims of (i) negligence, (ii),
negligence per se, (iii) negligent misrepresentation, (iv) strict
liability for failure to warn and manufacturing defects, (v)
fraud, (vi) constructive fraud, (vii) fraudulent concealment,
(viii) breach of express and implied warranties, (ix) violations
of assorted state consumer protection laws, (x) Missouri products
liability under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 537.760, (xi) violation of
the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act under Mo. Rev. Stat.
Section 407.020, and (xii) gross negligence.

Of the 94 Plaintiffs, seven are citizens of Missouri.  One
Plaintiff is an Illinois citizen who allegedly had the device
implanted in Missouri.  The remaining Plaintiffs are citizens of
25 different states.

On March 9, 2017, the Defendants jointly removed the action to
this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and federal
question jurisdiction.  CSome of the Plaintiffs are citizens of
Delaware, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.  Despite the lack of complete
diversity on the face of the complaint, the Defendants argue that
they properly removed this case.  Specifically, they contend that
removal was proper because the diversity-destroying the Plaintiffs
were misjoined, jurisdiction lies under the Class Action Fairness
Act, and the Plaintiffs plead violations of federal law, thus
invoking federal question jurisdiction.  The Plaintiffs counter
that all of the claims are properly joined, and the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action in the absence of
complete diversity of the parties.  They also contest the
Defendants' assertion that federal question jurisdiction exists
here.  They urge the Court to refrain from ruling on the
Defendants' motions and instead rule on their remand motion first.

In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants assert (i) lack of
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state Plaintiffs' claims,
(ii) forum non-conveniens with respect to the out-of-state
Plaintiffs' claims, (iii) express and implied preemption, (iv)
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and (v)
failure to plead fraud claims with particularity.  The Defendants
argue that the Court should address the "straightforward" personal
jurisdiction issues first.

The Court finds that the question of general jurisdiction is
easily disposed of here, as none of the Defendants is incorporated
in Missouri or has its principal place of business in the state.
Moreover, none of the Defendants have such substantial and
extensive contacts such that they are essentially "at home" in
Missouri.  The Plaintiffs' allegations that the Defendants conduct
substantial business activities in Missouri are insufficient to
show that the Defendants are "at home."  The Plaintiffs concede
that the Court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over
defendants.  Therefore, the Defendants are not subject to general
jurisdiction in Missouri.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court of California is
dispositive of the specific personal jurisdiction issue in this
case.  The Bristol-Myers Court, relying on Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, stated that there must be an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the
forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation.
Here, the Defendants did not develop, manufacture, label, package,
or create a marketing strategy for Essure in Missouri.  And the
general exercise of business activities in the state cannot create
an adequate link between the claims and the Missouri forum.  The
sole exception is the claim of Illinois Plaintiff Jennifer
Dischbein, whose device was implanted in Missouri.  With respect
to the other non-Missouri Plaintiffs, under Bristol-Myers, there
is no personal jurisdiction as to their claims because there is no
connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.
Because the Court has determined that there is no personal
jurisdiction as to the claims of the non-Missouri Plaintiffs, it
need not address the Defendants' forum non conveniens argument.
The dismissal of the non-Missouri Plaintiffs also negates any
challenges to complete diversity.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the claims of all
non-Missouri Plaintiffs, except plaintiff Jennifer Dischbein.  The
Court ordered that the remaining Plaintiffs Laveta Jordan,
Jennifer Baggett, Cheryl Denbow, Jennifer Dischbein, Tiffany
Queen, Erica Ware, Michelle Weedman, and Lavena Wilkerson will
have until Aug. 1, 2017, to file an amended complaint setting
forth their claims against the Defendants.

The Court further (i) denied without prejudice the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or
federal preemption is denied; (ii) denied as moot the Defendants'
motion to sever; (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' motion to remand;
and (iv) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion to stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 memorandum and order
is available at https://is.gd/1OvRqc from Leagle.com.

Laveta Jordan, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland --
eholland@allfela.com -- HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Laveta Jordan, Plaintiff, represented by Randall S. Crompton --
scrompton@allfela.com -- HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Jennifer Baggett, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland,
HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Cheryl Denbow, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland, HOLLAND
LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Jennifer Dischbein, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland,
HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Tiffany Queen, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland, HOLLAND
LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Erica Ware, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland, HOLLAND LAW
FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Michelle Weedman, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland,
HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Lavena Wilkerson, Plaintiff, represented by Eric D. Holland,
HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC & Randall S. Crompton, HOLLAND LAW FIRM LLC.

Bayer Corp., Defendant, represented by W. Jason Rankin --
jrankin@heplerbroom.com -- HEPLER BROOM.

Bayer Healthcare LLC, Defendant, represented by W. Jason Rankin,
HEPLER BROOM.

Bayer Essure, Inc., Defendant, represented by W. Jason Rankin,
HEPLER BROOM.

Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by
W. Jason Rankin, HEPLER BROOM.


BJ'S WHOLESALE: Connecticut Narrows Claims in "O'Reilly"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for District of Connecticut
issued an Order granting in part and Denying in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned JOHN O'REILLY,
Plaintiff v. BJ's WHOLESALE CLUB, INC., Defendant. No. 3:16-cv-
01351 (D. Conn.).

Plaintiff John O'Reilly filed a four-count amended complaint
against Defendant BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., alleging breach of
contract (Count One), negligence (Count Two), "class action
claims" (Count Three), and violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act.

Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's amended
complaint (i) fails to establish personal jurisdiction, (ii) does
not allege the $75,000 in damages required to satisfy 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332, (iii) is time-barred under Connecticut's negligence
action statute of limitations, and (iv) does not meet the
requirements for a class action lawsuit under Rule 23.

Plaintiff alleges that he is a member of Defendant's wholesale
club and was shopping at Defendant's North Haven, Connecticut
location on August 8, 2014. While checking-out his purchases,
Defendant's cashier dropped a bottle of cleaning solution into
Plaintiff's shopping cart, causing the bottle to break and
splashing cleaning solution into Plaintiff's eyes and onto his
face.

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he has experienced repeated
incidents of blurred vision caused by the cleaning solution
splashed in his eyes at Defendant's store, and that this resulted
in numerous falls and injuries.

Plaintiff also brings class allegations on behalf of himself and
other victims of accidents caused by Defendant's employees'
negligence.

The Court grants Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to
Plaintiff's time-barred negligence claim (Count Two).  Plaintiff
does not allege that relevant facts were concealed from him by
Defendant, that he was unaware of his injury, or that he was
delayed in any other way that might warrant equitable tolling.
Indeed, the letters from Attorney Davis filed on the docket show
that the Plaintiff was aware of his claim and was seeking to
negotiate an out-of-court resolution of it well before the statute
of limitations ran. The negligence claim is therefore dismissed.

The Court denies Defendant's 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) motions for
lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.  Defendant
argues that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the matter in controversy
fails to exceed the $75,000 amount in controversy required for
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)(1).  The
Court held that the fact that Plaintiff was willing to accept less
than $75,000 as a settlement to avoid trial is not proof that the
full value of his claim is less than $75,000.  As courts have
consistently recognized in the context of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, statements made during settlement negotiations have "the
potential to end the instant federal litigation in an amicable
fashion and . . . should therefore be excluded as evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations."

The Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's class
allegations.  The Plaintiff has included in his complaint, as a
separate count, "class action allegations."  But those allegations
are not a distinct legal cause of action, however they might be
labeled.  They are, instead, merely allegations aimed at invoking
a joinder device recognized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
They are, therefore, not a proper target of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, which is used to attack allegations for a "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted."  In any event, it
is premature to consider the class allegations because the
Plaintiff has filed no motion to certify a class.  The motion to
dismiss the "Third Count" is therefore denied.

The case will proceed as to the breach of contract claim (Count
One) and the CUTPA claim (Count Four).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ie4IrE from Leagle.com

John O'Reilly, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., Defendant, represented by Nicole Marie
Paquette, Mullen & McGourty, P.C. & Robert W. Cassot --
rcassot@morrisonmahoney.com -- Morrison, Mahoney LLP.


BRISTOL-MEYERS: Michigan Court Dismisses TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and denying as
moot Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe, P.L.L.C.,
Plaintiff, v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Pfizer, Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-13815 (E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe PLLC has filed a
putative class action against defendants Mohawk, Inc., Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. ("BMS"), and Pfizer, Inc., for alleged violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

On August 8, 2016, plaintiff received an unsolicited fax
advertising several pharmaceutical products. On September 8, 2016,
plaintiff received a second fax that also advertised several
pharmaceutical products, including many of the products listed in
the fax received in August. To order these drugs, the customer is
directed to fax, call, or email order@mohawkmedical.com. And each
fax bears Mohawk Medical's name, address, website, and email
address at the top.

Defendant BMS produces Kenalog, and defendant Pfizer produces Depo
Medrol, and both of these drugs were promoted in the August and
September faxes. Plaintiff alleges these defendants "sent the
faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity
giving rise to or constituting the violation, or the faxes were
sent on its behalf.

Plaintiff's first claim is that the faxes do not comply with the
TCPA because there is no opt-out notice that meets the statutory
and regulatory requirements. For these alleged TCPA violations,
plaintiff seeks statutory and/or treble damages, an injunction,
and any other costs and relief the Court deems just and proper.
Plaintiff also claims that the faxes amount to common law and
statutory conversion.

Defendants have brought motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and BMS also argues the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).

The party seeking to establish the existence of personal
jurisdiction bears the burden to establish such jurisdiction. To
defeat [a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a
plaintiff] need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
A complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face.. A
plausible claim need not contain detailed factual allegations, but
it must contain more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.

Pfizer argues plaintiff fails to state a claim for a TCPA
violation, common law conversion, and statutory conversion.  BMS
also argues that plaintiff fails to state a claim, and that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.

Pfizer argues it cannot be held liable because plaintiff alleges
no facts showing (1) any action or inaction on its part; (2)
participation in the creation or transmission of the faxes; (3) a
business relationship between Pfizer and Mohawk, Inc.; (4) Pfizer
was aware that Mohawk sent the faxes; (5) Pfizer sold products to
Mohawk or knew Mohawk was selling its products; or (6) Pfizer was
aware of Mohawk.

BMS makes these same arguments with respect to the TCPA claim
against it. Assuming the Court has jurisdiction over BMS, the
analysis below applies with equal force to BMS.

Plaintiff alleges that Pfizer, Inc. qualifies as a "sender" for
several reasons because it actually sent the faxes and one of its
products is listed in the faxes. But plaintiff also claims former
defendant Mohawk, Inc. actually sent the faxes at issue. because
plaintiff has not alleged any action or relationship between
defendants that would raise an inference that Pfizer knew Mohawk
was sending the faxes, plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that
defendant "caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the
activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, or the
faxes were sent on their behalf.

Plaintiff argues that it need not allege more than that
defendant's products are listed in the advertisements because a
sender includes the entity "whose goods or services are advertised
or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement. To support this
argument, plaintiff relies on Siding and Insulation Co. v. Alco
Vending.

But these cases are insufficient, the Court held.  In each of
those cases, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants whose products
were advertised had hired an advertising agency that sent the
faxes to plaintiffs, and defendants acknowledged that they had
hired the ad agency.

Plaintiff's allegation that Pfizer's product is listed on the
faxes is insufficient to sustain the TCPA claim. Accordingly,
defendant's motion to dismiss the TCPA claim is granted.

Pfizer argues plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conversion
or statutory conversion because the facts show that Mohawk, Inc.
sent the faxes and no other allegations suggest Pfizer, Inc.
committed an intentional or wrongful act.

In Michigan, common law conversion includes any distinct act of
dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in
denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Pfizer, Inc. sent or
requested the faxes be sent or had any knowledge of or
relationship with Mohawk, Inc., the Court held.  Thus, plaintiff
has failed to plead that Pfizer, Inc. intended to exercise
dominion over plaintiff's property or innocently or intentionally
aided or abetted Mohawk, Inc. in conversion. Accordingly, the
common law and statutory conversion claims are dismissed.

Defendant BMS argues plaintiff has failed to state a claim and
that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.

It is undisputed that BMS is not incorporated in Michigan, and has
not consented to the jurisdiction of this court. Thus, this Court
can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAWS Section
600.711 only if defendant carries on a continuous and systematic
part of its general business within Michigan.

Even assuming that the Court has personal jurisdiction over BMS,
the analysis as to whether Pfizer, Inc. violated the TCPA and is
liable for conversion would be equally applicable to BMS, the
Court further held.

Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/yJnrH7 from Leagle.com.

Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe P.L.L.C., Plaintiff,
represented by David M. Oppenheim -- david@classlawyers.com --
Bock, Hatch, Lewis, & Oppenheim, LLC.

Health One Medical Center, Eastpointe P.L.L.C., Plaintiff,
represented by James M. Smith-- jim@classlawyers.com --  Bock Law
Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Jonathan Piper
--  jon@classlawyers.com -- Bock & Hatch LLC, Robert M. Hatch --
rhatch@bfrhawaii.com -- Macey, Chern, Tod A. Lewis --
tod@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis
& Oppenheim, LLC & Phillip A. Bock -- phil@classlawyers.com---Bock
Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Defendant, represented by Debra
Bogo-Ernst, --dernst@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP & Robert H.
Ellis -- rellis@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett.

Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, represented by Rebecca J. Schwartz --
rschwartz@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.


CALIFORNIA: Sued Over Medicaid "Spousal Impoverishment" Rule
------------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie O'Neill, writing for California Healthline, reports that
former Los Angeles radio announcer Pat Kelley was selling real
estate in 1999 when the severe backaches started.  A couple of
years later, he also began to suffer weakness in his foot, leading
to a fall so serious his wife insisted he see a doctor.

The diagnosis: "primary progressive multiple sclerosis," the
rarest form of the neurological disease.

"My symptoms just got worse and worse and worse," Mr. Kelley said.

Today, Mr. Kelley, 67, retains only the limited use of his left
hand.

"He's gone from a limp to a cane to a walker to a wheelchair to
now he can't move," said Melody Rogers, Mr. Kelley's wife of 29
years.  "He can't sit up by himself."

Mr. Kelley now needs 24-hour care, but the couple can't afford it.
The nearly quarter-million dollars they've spent on caregiving
since 2012 has almost depleted their savings, the couple said.
And the $4,000 they pay monthly for five hours of daily care puts
a severe strain on their income from their combined Social
Security checks and pensions and Ms. Rogers' income from a part-
time job.

"I don't know how much longer I can keep working," said
Ms. Rogers, 75, a former actress who sells real estate part time
to help pay for her husband's care.  "The emotional, physical,
spiritual and financial strain on a caregiver is just
unbelievable."

Mr. Kelley is a plaintiff in a lawsuit filed by four non-profit
advocacy groups seeking to provide disabled Californians and their
spouses financial relief promised under the federal Medicaid Act.

The organizations are seeking class-action status for the lawsuit,
alleging the state is denying assistance to more than 1,000
qualified married and disabled Californians.

The complaint, filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court, accuses
the state's Department of Health Care Services of failing to
implement a Medicaid "spousal impoverishment" rule intended to
keep spouses, who want to keep their disabled partner out of a
nursing facility, from going broke paying for home-based care.
Under federal law, the spouse of the disabled person is allowed to
keep $120,900 in assets and a higher income rather than just the
$3,000 Medicaid would otherwise allow a couple to keep.

When originally passed in 1988, the spousal protection law took
effect only when one spouse entered a nursing home.  But Congress
expanded the protection so that people like Mr. Kelley, who
qualify for the high level of care provided in a nursing facility,
could get it at home.

But California isn't allowing that, the lawsuit says.

California "should have implemented the [expanded] law in 2014,
but it has failed to do so for the past three years, said
Dipti Singh, an attorney with Bet Tzedek Legal Services in Los
Angeles, one of the advocacy organizations that filed the lawsuit.

A spokesman for the Department of Health Care Services said on
July 7 the agency had not yet reviewed the pending lawsuit and
would not comment on it.

"As the population ages, we're going to be confronted more and
more with the economic and social . . . need for in-home care that
doesn't bankrupt families," Ms. Singh said.  "That's what this law
was trying to do."

According to the lawsuit, California's failure to implement the
expanded protections has caused patients and their spouses "either
[to] submit to institutionalization or become impoverished."

The petitioners are asking the court to force California to
immediately apply the expanded spousal protections, to notify
Californians who potentially were eligible for the protections of
their rights and to reimburse them for any out-of-pocket expenses
they paid that should have been free.

"It's much more cost-effective to provide home and community-based
services as opposed to institutionalized care," Ms. Singh said.
"In the case of our clients and many other individuals with
disabilities . . .  they would rather stay at home with their
spouses and their families."

Ms. Rogers, meanwhile, said she will do all she can to keep her
husband out of a nursing facility, even as his disease progresses
and caregiving becomes harder for her.

"I just can't do that to him," she said.  "I think he would die."
[GN]


CALIFORNIA SUPPLY: Fails to Pay OT and Minimum Wages, Kuhia Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MARIGO KUHIA, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA SUPPLY, INC., a
California corporation; CALIFORNIA SUPPLY NORTH, INC., a
California corporation; CALIFORNIA LABEL PRODUCTS, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. BC668430 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 13, 2017),
seeks to recover overtime wages and minimum wage under California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants in the State
of California at any time during the four years preceding the
filing of this action, and continuing while this action is
pending, brings this class action to recover, among other things,
wages and penalties from unpaid wages earned and due, including
but not limited to unpaid minimum wages, unpaid and illegally
calculated overtime compensation, illegal meal and rest period
policies, failure to pay all wages due to discharged and quitting
employees, failure to indemnify employees for necessary
expenditures and/or losses incurred in discharging their duties,
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to
maintain required records, and interest, attorneys' fees, costs,
and expenses.

Oregon California Supply was founded in 1996. The company's line
of business includes the retail sale of a number of basic hardware
lines, such as tools, housewares and household appliances.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
          Matthew W. Gordon, Esq.
          Braunson C. Virjee, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP,
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531 1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531 1901


CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled MORGAN OTTMANN, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LP, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00995
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order
certifying a proposed class in this case, appointing the Plaintiff
as its representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=4EKP8ACu

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


CARRINGTON MORTGAGE: Bid for Partial Judgment in "Kautsman" OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings in the case captioned
NIKOLAY KAUTSMAN and OLGA KOFANOVA, Plaintiffs, v. CARRINGTON
MORTGAGE SERVICES LLC, Defendant, Case No. C16-1940-JCC (W.D.
Wash.), with leave to amend complaint.

Plaintiffs are the fee title owners of a single family home in
Redmond, Washington.  Defendant Carrington Mortgage Services is
the servicer of the mortgage.  Plaintiffs defaulted on their
mortgage. Defendant directed its employees to break into
Plaintiffs' Residence, change the locks, and take possession of
the Residence.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state court for breach of
contract; violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing;
violations of Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA); and
negligent supervision. Plaintiffs seek damages based on the costs
associated with rekeying their locks, reimbursement for inspection
costs, and costs associated with consulting legal counsel.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly
establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of
fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law."

For a breach of contract claim, the party claiming breach must
assert that there was indeed a contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant. Plaintiffs failed to provide any precedent that
would indicate that Plaintiffs have a contract with Defendant as a
loan servicer.  Defendant acted as an agent of the note owner, and
therefore, the Court finds there was no contract between
Plaintiffs and Defendant. Thus, the Court dismisses the breach of
contract claim.

The duty of good faith arises only in connection with terms agreed
to by the parties.  In order to bring a good faith and fair
dealing claim, a party must identify the contractual obligation
that was breached by the opposing party.  Plaintiffs, according to
the Court, have not sufficiently pleaded there was indeed a
contract between themselves and Defendant. Without a contract and
specific contractual duties, there is no duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Consequently, the Court dismisses the breach of good
faith and fair dealing claim.

The Court takes as true Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant
ordered the inspector to change the locks despite the fact that
the property was not abandoned. However, the Court need not
consider the sufficiency of these claims because Plaintiffs
acknowledge their negligent supervision claims lack essential
allegations and seek leave to amend.  Therefore, the Court
dismisses the negligent supervision claim.

Defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleading is
granted. Plaintiffs' breach of contract, duty of good faith and
fair dealing, and negligent supervision claims are dismissed with
prejudice and with leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/6aj8nu from Leagle.com.

Nikolay Kautsman, Plaintiff, represented by Harish Bharti, Esq. --
mail@hbharti.com

Nikolay Kautsman, Plaintiff, represented by Jason E. Anderson,
Esq. -- jason@jasonandersonlaw.com

Olga Kofanova, Plaintiff, represented by Harish Bharti & Jason E.
Anderson.

Carrington Mortgage Services LLC, Defendant, represented by Tina
R. Thomas, Esq. -- Tthomas@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE &
Amanda J. Beane, Esq. -- Abeane@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE.


CASSIDY'S POLO: Exotic Dancers' Wage Class Action Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
Amarillo Globe-News reports that Cassidy's Polo Club is in the
news for the second time in two months.  This time, a breast
implant was found inside the strip club's bar utensil holder.

There was no word on how the breast implant came to be there.

Other violations from the June 23 inspection detailed in a report
included the lack of a certified food manager, bottle nozzles and
beer cooler racks that needed to be cleaned and floor tiles that
needed to be replaced.  Test strips to measure pH balance were
also not present.

That gave Cassidy's a total of nine demerits, which is considered
"an average number" by the City of Amarillo's Environmental Health
Department.

No one was available for comment on July 9 at Cassidy's, 6019 S.W.
45th Ave.  Environmental Health Supervisor Anthony Spanel said on
July 9 he was not at the site during the time of the inspection
and the only details he could offer would be speculative.

In May, two exotic dancers filed a class action lawsuit against
the club.  Angela Parker and Jessica Collins are alleging the
staff was withholding their tips for operating costs, not paying
wages and forcing the dancers to pay a house fee.

"They're forcing them to rely on tips alone, and what's even worse
is that the dancers have to pay the club to work there," said
attorney Jeremi Young, a partner at Amarillo's Young &Newsom P.C.

"The bottom line is Cassidy's is using money that belongs to the
dancers to subsidize their operation, and that's what makes it
illegal."

The alleged business model would violate the Fair Labor Standards
Act, in which tipped employees are entitled to at least $2.13 per
hour, though the model is common throughout the strip club
industry.

Player's Bikini Club was also named in the lawsuit.  Owner Kenneth
Barnett did not want to comment on the class action suit when it
was filed at the end of May. [GN]



CENTRAL CREDIT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled JENNIFER ASSELIN, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL
CREDIT SERVICES, LLC, and SYNCHRONY BANK, the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-00991-DEJ (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order certifying a proposed class in this case,
appointing the Plaintiff as its representative, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kajjyjC5

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


CENTURYLINK INC: Sued Over Unauthorized Charges in Arizona
----------------------------------------------------------
Carol Ann Alaimo, writing for Arizona Daily Star, reports that
a Phoenix man who claims he was systematically cheated by
CenturyLink has filed a federal lawsuit against the telecom firm,
one that stands to benefit "thousands" of other Arizona customers
if it succeeds, his lawyer says.

The class-action complaint, filed July 6 in U.S. District Court in
Phoenix, accuses the company of padding its profits by "adding
false and unauthorized charges" to phone and internet bills and
then failing to remove them after customers complained.

The Arizona case marks an expansion of a potential $12 billion in
similar class actions recently filed against CenturyLink in
California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon and Washington.

The plaintiffs are being represented by celebrity law firm Geragos
& Geragos of Los Angeles, which has represented the likes of
Winona Ryder, Chris Brown and the late Michael Jackson.

Attorney Ben Meiselas of Geragos & Geragos said the law firm
received "thousands of emails from victims in Arizona" after
filing cases in other states and hopes to recover all the money
consumers lost.

The string of court cases comes on the heels of a whistleblower
lawsuit filed against CenturyLink in Maricopa County by a former
customer-service representative.

The ex-employee claims she was fired after alerting management
that many customers had accounts they hadn't signed up for or were
being billed for services they hadn't ordered.

CenturyLink spokesman Mark Molzen said the firm is investigating
the former employee's allegations, but suggested claims of
widespread wrongdoing are being manufactured by lawyers looking
for a payday.

"A law firm is trying to leverage a wrongful termination suit into
a putative class-action lawsuit," Mr. Mozen said. "Unfortunately,
these types of opportunistic follow-on claims are not unexpected."

The man at the center of the Arizona class action, Luke Roger
Allison of Phoenix, is a pest inspector and CenturyLink customer
for the last several years.

The lawsuit claims Allison was repeatedly billed at inflated
prices and charged for services he didn't order, leaving him out
of pocket by about $500.

It's not the first time CenturyLink has faced such allegations in
Arizona.

Last year, state Attorney General Mark Brnovich's office
investigated similar claims and concluded the firm violated
Arizona's Consumer Fraud Act.

CenturyLink disputed the findings, but agreed to pay $150,000 to
the state's revolving consumer-protection fund and to clearly
itemize all financial charges in writing when customers sign up
for services. [GN]


CHADBOURNE & PARKE: Norton Ross Added to Gender Bias Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Christine Simmons, writing for Law.com, reports that Norton Rose
Fulbright can be added to a $100 million gender bias suit filed
last year against its merger partner, Chadbourne & Parke, a
federal magistrate judge ruled on July 5.

Former partner Kerrie Campbell filed the suit in the Southern
District last August, alleging Chadbourne consistently underpaid
women.

The plaintiffs attorney, David Sanford, Esq. --
dsanford@sanfordheisler.com -- of Sanford Heisler Sharp, on June
30 asked to add the successor firm, Norton Rose, to the suit as a
defendant.  His request came the same day the firms solidified
their combination.

Mr. Sanford also asked to add allegations about a Chadbourne
lawyer who sought to join the suit, Mary Yelenick, and add
allegations about "material developments" since the complaint was
filed.

Chadbourne's attorney, Kathleen McKenna, Esq. --
kmckenna@proskauer.com -- a Proskauer Rose partner, objected to
any amendment.

In a July 5 discovery scheduling order, Southern District
Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses granted Mr. Sanford's request to
amend the suit "for the limited purpose" of adding Norton Rose and
allegations about Yelenick.  She wrote that those amendments would
simply "conform the pleadings to the current cast of characters,"
before any substantive motions.

However, Judge Moses denied Mr. Sanford's request to add more
details about "material developments," reminding the parties of
the June order from the Southern District judge overseeing the
case, J. Paul Oetken, who rejected a proposed amended complaint
for more retaliation allegations.

Mr. Oetken had denied competing motions and ordered "limited"
discovery to determine if three former Chadbourne partners
deserved protection under employment laws, or if their former
status as partial owners of the firm disqualified them from
bringing the suit.

Moses, in her July 5 order, outlined 2017 and early 2018 deadlines
for discovery and set an Oct. 20 status conference.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Narrows Claims in "Michael"
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
A. MICHAEL, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 4:17 cv 1242 JMB (E.D. Mo.).

This matter is a putative class action suit by a former customer
against a telecommunications company related to its privacy
practices for customer information.  At issue here are a number of
interrelated motions pertaining to whether Plaintiff must disclose
his full name in a putative consumer class action, as well as the
treatment of other "personally identifiable information" about
Plaintiff and other potential class members.

The Court finds that the equities of the situation weigh in favor
of allowing the Response to stand despite its late filing. There
is no indication that the error was committed in anything other
than good faith.  The length of the delay was relatively short,
and at this early stage of litigation it does not delay the
overall timing of the proceeding.  There is a "judicial preference
for adjudication on the merits" rather than on technicalities.
Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion for Leave and take
Plaintiff's Response into consideration.

Plaintiff asserts that he should be allowed to proceed
anonymously. The Court finds that the general presumption in favor
of public disclosure of a plaintiff's identity is even stronger in
a case which is pled as a putative class action, because the named
plaintiff is purporting to represent other members of the public.
Class representatives have a fiduciary obligation to fairly
represent the entire class, and generally receive an incentive
award as compensation for work done on behalf of the class. Even
if there was some heightened interest in the privacy of the class
members here, Plaintiff's status as the putative named plaintiff
requires that he be the named plaintiff.

The second issue raised in the Motion to Dismiss is that Plaintiff
did not plead his circumstances with sufficient detail to allow
Defendant to determine whether Plaintiff had actually been a
customer and whether certain defenses were applicable, most
notably whether there was a binding arbitration agreement
governing Plaintiff's claims.

The standard for adequacy of a complaint cannot be dependent upon
the specific needs of a defendant's internal record-keeping
system. Charter's inability to search its system for its documents
does not prevent it from framing a responsive pleading. A party
that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement
has the effect of a denial. The Court is cognizant that Defendant
would prefer to assert its defenses at the earliest possible point
without going through the expense of discovery, especially if
there is something dispositive like a binding arbitration
agreement.

Under Rule 5.2(e), a court may for good cause order redaction of
additional information or limit non-parties' ability to access a
document. As discussed above, being publicly named as a Charter
customer is not such an invasion of deeply personal matters so as
to overwhelm the First Amendment interest in open court
proceedings. Finally, the home addresses of the putative class
members fall under the redaction requirement of Local Rule 5-
2.17(a)(5), as they are non-parties unless and until a class is
certified.

Therefore, the only personally identifiable information with any
arguable privacy implications covered by Plaintiff's requested
motion would be his own address.

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Out of Time is granted;
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for More Definite Statement is
granted in art and denied in part, in that Plaintiff is ordered to
file an amended complaint including his full name in the caption.

Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order and for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously is granted in art and denied in part, in that the
parties shall redact Plaintiff's address from any filings with the
Court until the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference is held.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/wW9vv9 from Leagle.com.

A. Michael, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan P. Horace --
ryan@swmwlaw.com -- SWMK LAW.

Charter Communications, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew D.
Guletz -- mguletz@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP &
Roman P. Wuller -- rwuller@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN,
LLP.


CIRRUS CONSULTING: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Zauderer"
---------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge M. Page Kelley of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned MARC J. ZAUDERER, DMD, a Massachusetts
resident, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. CIRRUS CONSULTING GROUP
(USA), INC., a Delaware corporation, CIRRUS CONSULTING GROUP INC.,
a Canadian corporation, JEREMY BEHAR, JOANNA BEHAR, ALAIN SABBAH
and JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-11742-MPK (D.
Mass.).

The Plaintiff filed this putative class action against the
Defendants, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005, by sending him an "unsolicited
advertisement" via fax.  On April 10, 2014, the Defendants
transmitted an unsolicited fax promoting an upcoming seminar that
was to be held on May 20, 2014 to the Plaintiff by telephone fax
machine.  The Defendants allegedly sent the same and other
unsolicited faxes to more than 40 additional recipients.

Zauderer contends that these unsolicited faxes caused him and
other recipients damages that include: (i) loss of paper and toner
consumed in the printing of the Defendants' faxes; (ii) occupation
of telephone lines and fax machines; (iii) waste of time
receiving, reviewing and routing faxes; and (iv) interruption of
the privacy interest to be left alone.

Presently before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of standing; the Plaintiff has responded in opposition;
and the Defendants have replied.

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff lacks standing under
Article III because he has not alleged an injury in fact as a
result of the Defendants' fax.  Judges in this district have found
that a mere technical violation of the TCPA is, by itself, a
concrete injury sufficient to confer standing, the Court said.  In
short, Zauderer has alleged adequately that he suffered a concrete
harm sufficient to confer standing.  The fax received by the
Plaintiff rendered his fax line unavailable for legitimate
business messages while processing the junk fax, and interfered
with Zauderer's privacy interest to be left alone -- the precise
harm Congress sought to protect by enacting the TCPA.
Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be, and the same
holding, is denied by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/iclO95 from Leagle.com.

MARC J ZAUDERER, Plaintiff, represented by Alan L. Cantor --
acantor@swartzlaw.com -- Swartz & Swartz.

MARC J ZAUDERER, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Wanca --
bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice & Ryan
M. Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson & Wanca.

CIRRUS CONSULTING GROUP (USA), INC., Defendant, represented by
Paul R. Mastrocola, Burns & Levinson & Laura Lee Mittelman, Burns
& Levinson LLP.

CIRRUS CONSULTING GROUP INC., Defendant, represented by Paul R.
Mastrocola -- pmastrocola@burnslev.com -- Burns & Levinson & Laura
Lee Mittelman -- lmittelman@burnslev.com -- Burns & Levinson LLP.


COLLECTO INC: Rivera Files Placeholder Class Certification Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KELLEY RIVERA, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. COLLECTO, INC.
d/b/a EOS CCA, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00993 (N.D. Ill.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying a
proposed class in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as its
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0qEithLJ

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


COLTON, CA: Settles False Arrest Suit for $150,000
--------------------------------------------------
City News Service reports that a man who highlighted long-standing
flaws in California's warrants system after law enforcement
arrested him on a warrant meant for someone else has settled his
civil rights case against the County of San Bernardino and the
City of Colton.

In 2016, Manuel Bravo Martinez filed a federal complaint against
the county and its sheriff's department and the City of Colton and
its police, claiming officials had jailed hundreds of people on
warrants meant for someone else. In some cases, officials had
mistakenly arrested people on the warrants multiple times,
according to Martinez.

On July 6, Martinez filed court documents confirming that the
parties had settled the case.

"The city council of defendant City of Colton and the board of
supervisors for defendant County of San Bernardino have approved
settlement agreements disposing of this case; plaintiff awaits
only the issuance of the settlement checks," the two-page filing
states.

Martinez was jailed at the San Bernardino County Jail Central
Detention Center on Aug. 11, 2015 after a Colton police officer
stopped him during a morning drive for failing to use a proper
child restraint in his vehicle.

Martinez said officers arrested him after running a warrant check
and finding an outstanding warrant for another Manuel Martinez who
was facing fraud, drug and weapon charges.

But there were major differences between the subject of the
warrant and Martinez, he said. He had a different middle name, and
he is not a "junior" as the suspect was. Their birth dates were
two months and eight days apart. Martinez had an address in
Hawaii, but the man on the warrant lived in California -- and
their drivers' license numbers were different.

Colton police Officer Matthew Collins arrested and jailed Martinez
despite his protests, he said. He added that jailers should have
realized their error because his fingerprints were on file from a
2007 misdemeanor conviction for reckless driving.

Martinez spent the night in jail, was arraigned the next day and
posted a $100,000 bond. San Bernardino County Superior Court Judge
Raymond Haight cleared Martinez after comparing his identifying
information with the identifiers on the warrant, Martinez said in
the complaint.

Martinez's attorney, Donald Cook, Esq. has filed multiple lawsuits
against Los Angeles County seeking to fix flaws in the state's
warrants system. The attorney has repeatedly urged law enforcement
officials to use the unique identifying numbers on warrants.

"This is not the result of aberrational behavior," Cook said in an
interview with Courthouse News in 2016. "This is the result of a
systematic failure by law enforcement to simply exonerate the
innocent, the people that they really know, should know, are
innocent. They have an attitude of they don't really care if in
fact it's not the right person."

San Bernardino County sheriff's department records going back five
years showed that up to 450 people were jailed on the wrong
warrants and that officials knew about the problem but did nothing
to fix it, Martinez said.

Cook wrote in an email on July 6 that the case had settled for
$150,000 with no formally acknowledged changes to the warrant
system.

The class action complaint was for false arrest, wrongful
incarceration and false imprisonment.

San Bernardino County spokesman David Wert said that he could not
comment on cases related to the sheriff's department.

The City of Colton did not immediately respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Texas Stays "Alexander" Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, issued a Memorandum and Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Stay the case captioned TAMARA ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff, v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC., Defendant, Civil
Action No. H-16-3318 (S.D. Tex.).

Tamara Alexander alleges that Convergent Outsourcing violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by sending her multiple debt-
collection letters after the statute of limitations for suing to
collect the debt had expired.

On September 8, 2016, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.. The opinion held that
an identical debt-collection letter from Convergent Outsourcing
violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Plaintiff seeks
to certify a class of Texas consumers who received one or more
debt-collection letters with the same or similar language after
the statute of limitations had expired.

Convergent Outsourcing moved to stay on the basis of an earlier-
filed, nearly identical case in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, Ross v. Convergent Outsourcing,
Inc., et al.

Since the court granted the first stay, much has happened in Ross.
Motions to intervene have been filed, including a motion to
intervene by the plaintiff in this suit. The submission date for
those motions is early August. Despite filing a motion to
intervene in the Colorado suit.

Alexander opposes extending the stay in this case.

The Court held that the reasons for granting the first stay
continue to apply.  The nationwide settlement class in the
Colorado litigation is closer to decision. If it is approved, it
would subsume this Texas class action.

Convergent Outsourcing's motion to extend the stay of the
proceedings is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017, Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/HUxWPx from Leagle.com.

Tamara Alexander, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlyn Nicole Wells,
Kellett & Bartholow PLLC. 11300 N Central Expy, Suite 301Dallas,
TX 75243

Tamara Alexander, Plaintiff, represented by Karen L. Kellett,
Kellett & Bartholow PLLC & Theodore O. Bartholow, III, Kellett &
Bartholow PLLC. 11300 N Central Expy Ste 301, Dallas, TX 75243 T
(214) 696-9000

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robbie
LuAnn Malone, MALONE AKERLY MARTIN PLLC. 8750 North Central
Expressway, Ste 1850, Dallas, TX 75231 Phone: +1 214 346 2630


COPLEY PRESS: Court to Redetermine Class Award in "Espejo" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LILIANA ESPEJO, et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. THE COPLEY PRESS, INC., Defendant and Appellant,
No. D065397 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California,
Fourth District, Division One, affirmed in part and reversed in
part the judgment of the trial court with directions to
redetermine the class award, attorney fees, and prejudgment
interest.

The Copley Press, Inc., owner of the San Diego Union-Tribune
newspaper (collectively UT), appealed from a second amended and
restated judgment after a court trial in this class action brought
by and on behalf of persons whom UT formerly engaged as newspaper
home delivery carriers.  The main issue at trial was whether the
carriers were employees of UT or independent contractors.  The
trial court decided the carriers were employees.

UT contended that:

     (1) the plaintiff class must be decertified because the
         class representatives were inadequate;

     (2) the court committed reversible error by not limiting the
         trial to certified issues and by granting plaintiffs'
         motion to amend their second amended complaint according
         to proof;

     (3) the class should be decertified and the judgment
         reversed because the court did not and could not manage
         individualized issues;

     (4) the court's order bifurcating plaintiffs' cause of
         action under Business and Professions Code section 17200
         to be tried first deprived UT of its right to a jury
         trial;

     (5) the class award must be reversed because UT paid
         carriers enhanced compensation that reimbursed them for
         expenses the court awarded;

     (6) the amounts the court awarded were not restitution;

     (7) the court erred in awarding plaintiffs prejudgment
         interest;

     (8) substantial evidence does not support the court's
         determination that the carriers were employees rather
         than independent contractors;

     (9) the court erred in awarding plaintiffs attorney fees
         under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5;

     (10) even if attorney fees could be awarded, the court erred
          by not substantially reducing them for limited success;
          and

     (11) the court erred by adopting plaintiffs' lodestar amount
          in awarding attorney fees.

The plaintiffs appealed the portion of the judgment awarding them
attorney fees, contending that:

     (1) the court abused its discretion in not awarding an
         enhancement of the lodestar amount of their fees; and

     (2) the court erred in ruling they abandoned their cause of
         action for damages under Labor Code section 2802 and
         therefore could not recover attorney fees under that
         statute.

The Court of Appeals reversed the portions of the judgment
awarding the class members the principal sum of $3,188,445 plus
prejudgment interest and attorney fees in the amount of $6,160,416
and remanded the matter.  The appellate court also directed the
trial court to redetermine the amount of the class award and
prejudgment interest, including reducing the award by the amount
of any documented and readily identifiable payments, credits, or
reversals in the subject expense categories that UT is able to
show the class members received, and disallowing recovery for
insert credits.  The trial court was further directed to
redetermine attorney fees, taking into consideration any
reductions in the class monetary recovery on remand and whether
the fee award should be reduced by the amount of any fees that
were attributable to unsuccessful claims that were unrelated to
successful claims.  In all other respects, the trial court's
judgment was affirmed.  The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 ruling is available
at https://is.gd/Xz4hY3 from Leagle.com.

Cooley, Steven M. Strauss -- sms@cooley.com -- Seth A. Rafkin,
Summer J. Wynn -- swynn@cooley.com -- Heather C. Meservy for
Defendant and Appellant.

Callahan & Blaine, Daniel J. Callahan, Michael J. Sachs, Jill A.
Thomas and Scott D. Nelson -- snelson@walkermurphy.com -- Cadena
Churchill and Raul Cadena for Plaintiffs and Appellants.


CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM: 5th Cir. Dismisses Appeal in "Farber"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, issued
dismissed, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, the appeals case
captioned LAWRENCE G. FARBER, Plaintiff, v. CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM
PARTNERS L.P.; CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM GP, L.L.C.; ROBERT G. PHILLIPS;
ALVIN BLEDSOE; MICHAEL G. FRANCE; PHILIP D. GETTIG; WARREN H.
GFELLER; DAVID LUMPKINS; JOHN J. SHERMAN; DAVID WOOD; CRESTWOOD
EQUITY PARTNERS L.P.; CRESTWOOD EQUITY GP L.L.C.; CEQP ST SUB
L.L.C.; MGP GP, L.L.C.; CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS L.P.;
CRESTWOOD GAS SERVICES GP, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees, v. DAVID
G. DUGGAN, Appellant. ISAAC ARON, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRESTWOOD
MIDSTREAM PARTNERS L.P.; CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM GP, L.L.C.; ROBERT G.
PHILLIPS; ALVIN BLEDSOE; MICHAEL G. FRANCE; PHILIP D. GETTIG;
WARREN H. GFELLER; DAVID LUMPKINS; JOHN J. SHERMAN; DAVID WOOD;
CRESTWOOD EQUITY PARTNERS L.P.; CRESTWOOD EQUITY GP L.L.C.; CEQP
ST SUB L.L.C.; MGP GP, L.L.C.; CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS L.P.;
CRESTWOOD GAS SERVICES GP, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellees, v. DAVID
G. DUGGAN, Appellant, No. 16-20742 (5th Cir.).

This appeal arises from the district court's approval of a zero-
dollar class action settlement and award of attorneys' fees in a
consolidated lawsuit stemming from a merger between two Delaware
entities: Crestwood Midstream Partners LP ("Midstream") and
Crestwood Equity Partners LP ("Equity").

In the class action lawsuit, Isaac Aron, a Midstream unitholder
and the class representative, alleged that Midstream's directors
breached their fiduciary duty in approving the merger and that
Equity's preliminary proxy statement omitted material information
in violation of federal securities laws and Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules.

The parties settled for additional disclosures, confirmatory
discovery, and attorneys' fees.

David Duggan, a class member, objected to the settlement. The
district court approved the parties' settlement and awarded Aron
attorneys' fees over Duggan's objection. Duggan appeals.

Duggan has timely appealed. He contends that the Fifth Circuit has
jurisdiction to hear the merits of his appeal, arguing that he has
Article III standing and that the untimeliness of his objection to
the settlement did not constitute a waiver of his right to appeal.

The Fifth Circuit begins by addressing the threshold issue of its
appellate jurisdiction. Where, as here, an appellant is a nonnamed
member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)" who has not "intervene[d] in the litigation," the
underlying question is "whether [the] appellant should be treated
as a party for purposes of appealing a judgment when it was not a
party in the proceedings below," not whether the appellant has
Article III standing or prudential standing.

Duggan provides three reasons why his failure to comply with the
notice does not constitute waiver of his appeal. First, even
though he failed to file a notice of appearance in the district
court, Duggan contends that this failure is not a waiver because
the district court's notice stated that objectors need not appear
at the fairness hearing and he did not appear. Second, Devlin did
not create a jurisdictional rule forbidding the district court
from considering his objection.

Notwithstanding Duggan's arguments, the Fifth Circuit concludes
that it lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because Duggan, a
nonparty, non-intervenor, waived his right to appeal by filing an
untimely, procedurally deficient11 objection.

The fact that the district court considered the merits of Duggan's
objection before dismissing it does not cure the waiver problem
for Duggan. The district court's June order stated that objectors
who filed noncompliant objections would "be deemed to have waived
[their] objection(s) (including any right of appeal) . . . unless
otherwise ordered by the Court."

The court, in approving the settlement agreement, did indeed
interrogate the parties relating to the subject matter of Duggan's
objection, but it neither indicated that it had accepted,
approved, or waived the objection's procedural defects. It
certainly did not hold that Duggan had good cause for failing to
timely submit his objection.

Duggan's reasons for his several failures are lame, the Fifth
Circuit said.  Duggan opted to go on vacation and he submitted his
procedurally deficient objection, however, after he returned from
vacation and ten days after the actual deadline. Such choices have
consequences.

For these reasons, this appeal, for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017, Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/XhzNAh from Leagle.com.

Thomas Emerson Bilek, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 700 Louisiana, Suite
3950 Houston, TX 77002

James Gregory Waller -- gregwaller@andrewskurth.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee

Michael Conrad Holmes, for Defendant-Appellee. 1001 Chase Tower
St, Houston, TX 77088

Charles B. Hampton, -- champton@mcguirewoods.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Leif A. Olson, for Appellant.

Kenneth Prager Held, for Defendant-Appellee. 333 Clay Street,
Suite 3300 Three Allen Center, Houston, TX 77002-4499

Anna St. John, for Appellant,1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor,
Washingtong DC 20005

Michael Terrell Murphy -- micheal.t.murphy@klgates.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Kelly Spragins Sandill -- kellysandill@andrewskurth.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Theodore H. Frank, for Appellant, L Street NW, 7th Floor,
Washingtong DC 20005

Bryan U. Gividen -- bgividen@velaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Elizabeth Chinyere Brandon -- ebrandon@btlaw.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Juan E. Monteverde -- jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

James Milligan Wilson, Jr. -- matt@willaw.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Miles Dylan Schreiner -- mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.


DAVE BERRY: "Flores" Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD FLORES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. DAVE BERRY & SON'S, INC., a
corporation, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. BC668431 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 13, 2017), seeks to
recover unpaid wages under California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, as a class action, against Defendants
for their (1) failure to pay its current and former pool cleaners
in California separately and on an 10 hourly basis for their time
spent taking their statutory rest periods and all other
"nonproductive time"; (2) its failure to provide paid rest breaks
and rest break premiums to its current and former pool cleaners;
(3) its failure to provide meal breaks and meal break premiums to
its current and former pool cleaners; (4) its failure to reimburse
pool cleaners for business expenses; (5) its failure to provide
complete wage statements to its current and former pool cleaners;
(6) its failure to pay all wages due to former pool cleaners; and
(7) unfair business practices based on the foregoing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy B. Sottile, Esq.
          Michael F. Baltaxe, Esq.
          Jeremy D. Scherwin, Esq.
          Payaam I. Aframian, Esq.
          SOTTILE EBALTAXE
          4360 Park Terrace Drive, Suite 140
          Westlake Village, CA 91361
          Telephone: (818) 889 0050
          Facsimile: (818) 889 6050


EL BESO MEXICAN: "Esteves" Suit Seeks to Certify 3 Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned EDUARDO ESTEVES, et al., the Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 15-CV-484-LA, EL BESO MEXICAN, and RESTAURANTE, LLC,
et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:15-cv-00484-LA (E.D. Wisc.),
the Parties ask the Court for conditional certification of three
collective classes:

Collective Server Class:

   "all persons who worked at the El Beso restaurant located at
   5030 S. 74th Street in Greenfield, Wisconsin as a Server at
   any time since September 19, 2012";

Collective Busser/Expeditor Class:

   "all persons who worked at the El Beso restaurant located at
   5030 S. 74th Street in Greenfield, Wisconsin as a Busser
   and/or Expeditor at any time since September 19, 2012";

Collective Cooks/Dishwasher Class:

   "all persons who worked at the El Beso restaurant located at
   5030 S. 74th Street in Greenfield, Wisconsin as a Cook and/or
   Dishwasher at any time since September 19, 2012".

The Plaintiffs seek to prosecute this action on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated employees of Defendants
who Plaintiffs allege were each similarly denied minimum wages for
each hour worked and/or overtime premium compensation for each
hour worked in excess of forty in a workweek in violation of the
FLSA.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=K7IIHA7T

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Larry A. Johnson, Esq.
          Summer H. Murshid, Esq.
          Timothy P. Maynard, Esq.
          HAWKS QUINDEL, S.C.
          222 E Erie Street, Suite 210
          P.O. Box 442
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 271 8650
          Facsimile: (414) 271 8442
          E-mail: ljohnson@hq-law.com
                  smurshid@hq-law.com
                  tmaynard@hq-law.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Lauren Wick, Esq.
          Paul R. Erickson, Esq.
          Lauren L. Wick, Esq.
          GUTGLASS, ERICKSON, BONVILLE & LARSON, S.C.
          735 North Water Street, Suite 1400
          Milwaukee, WI 53202-4106
          Telephone: (414) 908 0242
          Facsimile: (414) 273 3821
          E-mail: cpaul.erickson@gebsc.com
                  Lauren.wick@gebsc.com


EFFEX CAPITAL: Requests Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Nikolova, writing for FinanceFeeds, reports that the
New York Southern District Court continues to deliver updates
regarding the legal actions against FXCM.  The law firm
representing John Dittami and Effex Capital, the company
implicated in the exit of FXCM from the US retail FX market, has
requested another extension of time to respond to the complaint in
the Nguyen v. FXCM Inc. et al case.

A quick reminder -- the case in question is a class action on
behalf of FXCM's customers who traded on the "No Dealing Desk"
platform during 2010-2016.  The plaintiffs, lead by Vantalie
Nguyen, allege that they suffered harm as a result of FXCM's
relationship with Effex Capital, LLC as a liquidity provider.  The
class action has as defendants Global Brokerage Inc (NASDAQ:GLBR),
formerly known as FXCM Inc, FXCM Holdings, Dror Niv, William
Ahdout, as well as Effex and its principal.

According to a Letter Motion, seen by FinanceFeeds, lawyers for
Effex and its CEO are now requesting further extension of time to
respond to Plaintiff's complaint to September 1, 2017.  This is
the second time Effex and its CEO request extension -- the Judge
assigned to the case had already granted them one to July 14,
2017.

The Plaintiff's counsel has consented the relief, which raises the
chances that it will be granted.

Whereas the lawyers for Effex and its CEO mention no reason for
the extension request, we can speculate that this has to do with
another case around FXCM -- Effex Capital, LLC et al v. National
Futures Association et al. Effex is targeting NFA and is asking
for a preliminary injunction against the Association that should
see it remove a news release about the settlement between US
authorities and FXCM. Effex also requests that NFA removes the
complaint against FXCM, involving Effex, and/or amends it
accordingly.

The briefing schedule on the motion for preliminary injunction has
been extended, giving time to NFA to respond by July 24, 2017.  An
oral argument hearing is reset for August 9, 2017.

FinanceFeeds can speculate (only speculate) that Effex Capital and
Mr Dittami would like to base their further action on the
developments in their lawsuit against NFA.  If NFA removes the
complaint against FXCM from its website, this will undermine the
evidentiary support for the Nguyen case. [GN]


EXTRA SPACE: Court Gives Final Approval of "Gomes" Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Final Approval of Settlement in the
case captioned STEVEN GOMES, JR., on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated, Action Plaintiff(s), v. EXTRA SPACE STORAGE,
INC.; EXTRA SPACE MANAGEMENT, INC.; and JOHN DOE COMPANIES 1-50,
Defendants, No. 2:13-cv-929 (KSH)(CLW)(D.N.J.).

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval of the Settlement of the matter brought by Plaintiff
Steven Gomes, Jr., against Defendants Extra Storage Space, Inc.
and Extra Space Management, Inc.

Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in Superior Court on
January 11, 2013, alleging that Extra Space's rental agreements
contained provisions that violated the New Jersey Self-Storage
Facility Act (SSFA), the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and
Notice Act (TCCWNA), and the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).

Settlement agreements for class action lawsuits must be approved
by the trial court before they can go into effect. The Third
Circuit has developed a nine-factor test to guide district courts
in examining whether a settlement agreement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate. These factors are: (1) the complexity and duration
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5)
the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining a
class action; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a
greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the
attendant risks of litigation (citing Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d
153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)).

This Court believes that all of the Girsh factors have been met
and approves the Settlement Agreement. There are two objectors to
the settlement terms, but their objections do not convince the
Court that the terms are inadequate. The Court also considers the
attorneys' fees and incentive award agreed upon by the parties and
finds them to be reasonable.

The Court approves the Settlement Agreement despite the two
objections because they do not present any argument sufficient to
show that the Settlement Agreement is unfair, unreasonable, or
inadequate.

One objector, Edward Anthony Shields, pro se, objects because the
Settlement Agreement does not cover late fees he believes he was
unfairly charged for. Mr. Shields seeks reimbursement for all the
extra-ordinary late fees that Extra Space Storage charged me for
being late only a few days, which, considering the number of
months he was late. However, as discussed above, the claim that
the late fees Extra Space charged were unconscionable was
dismissed by the District Judge in 2015. Therefore, the Court has
no basis to consider this objection. The Settlement Agreement
should not be altered on the grounds that it is not satisfactory
to Mr. Shields, especially since there are ways he can benefit
from it without renting a unit from Extra Space again.

Class Counsel request $725,000 to be paid out of the Common Fund.
This is a reasonable amount because the attorneys invested a great
deal of time and assumed financial risks in the prosecution of the
class claims.

The Court also approves the incentive award for Mr. Gomes. It was
mentioned but not disputed during the fairness hearing. Class
Counsel believes that Mr. Gomes deserves this award not only as an
incentive but to compensate him for the property he lost when
Extra Space sold the contents of his unit.

The Court concludes that it is fair to compensate Mr. Gomes both
for his property that was wrongfully sold and for his contribution
to this lawsuit.

The Court approved Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/SbLoqy from Leagle.com.

STEVEN GOMES, JR., Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW R. WOLF, The
Wolf Law Firm, LLC, 123 Washington Street. Newark, NJ 07102. 732-
545-7900.

STEVEN GOMES, JR., Plaintiff, represented by BEN A. KAPLAN &
BHARATI SHARMA PATEL, THE WOLF LAW FIRM LLC, 1520 U.S. Highway
130, Suite 101, North Brunswick, New Jersey 08902

EXTRA SPACE STORAGE, INC., Defendant, represented by AMANDA LAUREN
ZABLOCKI -- azablocki@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN
RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, JAMIE P. CLARE -- jclare@coleschotz.com --
COLE SCHOTZ & TYLER BAKER -- tbaker@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD
MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP.

EXTRA SPACE MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant, represented by AMANDA
LAUREN ZABLOCKI, SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, JAMIE P.
CLARE, COLE SCHOTZ & TYLER BAKER, SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER &
HAMPTON LLP.


FACEBOOK INC: Court Narrows Claims in Internet Tracking Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division issued an Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned In re Facebook Internet
Tracking Litigation, Case No. 5:12-md-02314-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Facebook, Inc., violated their
privacy by tracking their browsing activity on third-party
websites. This Court previously granted Facebook's motion to
dismiss, with leave to amend, for lack of standing and failure to
state a claim. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and Facebook
now moves to dismiss.

The Court orders as follows:

   1. Facebook's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for trespass
to chattels, violations of the California Comprehensive Computer
Data Access and Fraud Act ("CDAFA"), fraud, and larceny is granted
without leave to amend for lack of standing under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).

This Court previously found that Plaintiffs have not established a
"realistic economic harm or loss that is attributable to
Facebook's alleged conduct."  Although Plaintiffs' personal web
browsing information might have "some degree of intrinsic value,"
this Court held that Plaintiffs failed to show, "for the purposes
of Article III standing, that they personally lost the opportunity
to sell their information or that the value of their information
was somehow diminished after it was collected by Facebook."  The
SAC contains no new facts that establish economic harm or loss.
Nor does the SAC establish that Facebook intended to permanently
deprive Plaintiffs of property of any sort.  As such, Plaintiffs
lack Article III standing to pursue their claims for trespass to
chattels, violations of the CDAFA, fraud, and larceny. These
claims must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.

   2. Facebook's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for
violations of the Wiretap Act, violations of the SCA, violations
of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), invasion of
privacy, and intrusion upon seclusion (SAC Par. 232-41) is granted
without leave to amend for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

This Court previously found that Plaintiffs had established
standing for their Wiretap Act, SCA, and CIPA claims.  Economic
injury is not required to establish standing under any of those
three statutes.  Plaintiffs allege that Facebook "intercepts" and
"tracks" their internet communications in violation of all three
statutes.  These allegations are sufficient to confer standing for
Plaintiffs' Wiretap Act, SCA, and CIPA claims.

   3. Facebook's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for breach
of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
is granted with leave to amend.  The Court finds that Plaintiffs
have standing to pursue their claims for breach of contract and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

   4. Facebook's motion for a protective order temporarily staying
further discovery is denied.

   5. Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery is terminated and may
be refiled in accordance with the procedures of the assigned
magistrate judge.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/HLKq2m from Leagle.com.

Alexandria Parrish, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson,
III --krobertson@bflawfirm.com -- BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY.

Alexandria Parrish, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson,
Jr., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick
Frickleton -- jimf@bflawfirm.com -- BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels,  170 Monmouth StreetRed
Bank, NJ 07701,  pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter --
mwinter.bflawfirm.com -- Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny,
Paul R. Kiesel -- kiesel@kbla.com-- Kiesel Law LLP, Peter F.
Burns, Peter S. Mackey, Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC,
4330Belleview Ave, Suite 200, Kansas City, MO 64111 Phone 816-756-
5071 & William Mitchell Cunningham, Jr.

Sharon Beatty, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Straite --
dstraite@kalanfox.com -  Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Edward D.
Robertson, Jr., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James
Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Paul R.
Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS
FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels,
pro hac vice, Joel Grant Woods, Grant Woods PC, 1726 North Seventh
Street, Phoenix, AZ 85006 (Maricopa) Mary Doerhoff Winter,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny & Stephen M. Gorny, The
Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Brooke Rutledge, Plaintiff, represented by David Shelton, David
Shelton, PLLC, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice,
Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny,
Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law
Firm, LC.

Michael Singley, Plaintiff, represented by Alice London, Daniel W.
Bishop, II, Bishop London & Dodds PC, 3701 Bee Caves Rd, #200,
West Lake Hills, TX 78746 Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS
FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus
Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS
FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels,
pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson
and Gorny, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The
Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Dana Howard, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, Mark Chandler Goldenberg, Goldenberg Heller
Antognoli and Rowland, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson and Gorny, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Stephen M.
Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC & Thomas P. Rosenfeld --
tom@ghalaw.com -- Goldenberg Heller Antognoli and Rowland, P.C..
John Graham, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton
Robertson and Gorny, Michelle L. Marvel, Bartimus, Frickleton,
Robertson & Gorny, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M.
Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

David Hoffman, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, Emily Ward Roark, Bryant
Law Center, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON
ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice,
Mark P. Bryant -- lawteam@bryantpsc.com -- Bryant Law Center, Mary
Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, Paul R.
Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.

Janet Seamon, Plaintiff, represented by Edward D. Robertson, III,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr.,
Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton,
BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe
Bartels, pro hac vice, L.J. Hymel, Mary Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus
Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, Michael Reese Davis, Hymel Davis
and Petersen, LLC, Paul R. Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP, Richard P.
Ieyoub, Ieyoub Law Firm, LLC, 3741 Hwy 1 S Port Allen, LA 70767-
5814 West Baton Rouge Parish, Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law
Firm, LC & Tim P. Hartdegen.

Chandra L. Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Stephan
Lyskowski, Edward D. Robertson, III, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and
Gorny, James Patrick Frickleton, BARTIMUS FRICKLETON ROBERTSON
GORNY, Jennifer L. Harwood, Keefe Bartels, pro hac vice, Mary
Doerhoff Winter, Bartimus Frickleton Robertson and Gorny, Paul R.
Kiesel, Kiesel Law LLP & Stephen M. Gorny, The Gorny Law Firm, LC.
Facebook Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Gutkin --
jgutkin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Kyle Christopher Wong --
kylewong99@yahoo.com --  Cooley LLP, Matthew Dean Brown --
brownmd.cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Adam Christopher Trigg --
atrigg@be-law.com -- Cooley LLP.


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Summary Judgment in "Jewsevskyj" Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ALEXANDRA JEWSEVSKYJ, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant, v. FINANCIAL
RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.; LVNV FUNDING, LLC; RESURGENT CAPITAL
SERVICES, L.P.; ALEGIS GROUP, LLC, No. 16-4086 (3d Cir.), the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants.

LVNV Funding is a corporation that purchases portfolios of
consumer debt from various creditors and hires debt collection
agencies to recover the moneys owed.  FRS is one such debt
collection agency.  FRS sent a letter to Jewsevskyj advising her
that LVNV Funding purchased a debt she owed in the amount of
$1,128.  The body of the letter is typed in all uppercase letters,
in Times New Roman style, and in 8-point font.  There is minimal
spacing between the lines in each of the three full paragraphs on
the front page and thus the text is compressed.  The second
paragraph of the letter contains what is commonly referred to as
the "validation notice," which describes a mechanism for
Jewsevskyj to contest the debt.

Jewsevskyj filed a class action complaint, alleging that this
validation notice was not sufficiently prominent or readable to
satisfy the statutory notice requirements of Section 1692g.  After
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the Defendants' motion and denied
Jewsevskyj's, finding that, from the perspective of the least
sophisticated debtor, the validation notice was not overshadowed
by other aspects of the letter and was sufficiently prominent to
put Jewsevskyj on notice of her right to contest the debt.
Jewsevskyj appeals.

Here, although the format is compressed and the font is small, the
Court's inquiry focuses on whether the notice is free from
language or formatting choices that contradicts or overshadows the
notice.  There is no language that contradicts the notice and the
recipient's right to obtain information about the debt.  Moreover,
because the notice language is in the same font and format as the
rest of the letter, there is nothing more prominent than the
notice.  Furthermore, the Court finds that the notice is placed on
the first page of the letter and is written in plain English.
While font size and format could render a notice unreadable, the
Court cannot conclude that the notice here fits in that category
as it is concise and legible, and is not misleading, confusing, or
overshadowed by anything else in the letter.  Thus, the District
Court correctly concluded that the letter does not violate Section
1692g.  Accordingly, this Court affirmed the District Court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/bc3YXf from Leagle.com.


FIRST STUDENT: Court Denies Class Certification in "Humes"
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned DELORES HUMES, an
individual; and DIANE ABELLA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST STUDENT, INC., and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. No. 15-cv-
1861-BAM (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff was formerly employed by First Student as a bus
driver out of its Fresno Yard.  She is currently employed by First
Student as a bus driver out of its Fresno Yard.  The Plaintiffs
contend that during their employment, First Student failed to pay
its bus drivers for all time worked, including all time that the
drivers were subject to First Student's control.

The Plaintiffs initially filed this action in the Fresno County
Superior Court.  On Dec. 11, 2015, First Student removed the case
to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction and the Class
Action Fairness Act.  The Plaintiffs' class action complaint
alleges that First Student: (i) failed to pay regular wages in
violation of Labor Code Sections 201-203 (unpaid wages); (ii)
failed to pay wages within the time allowed in violation of Labor
Code Section 204 (untimely wages); (iii) failed to pay minimum
wage in violation of Labor Code Sections 1194, 1194.2, 1198 and
IWC Wage Order No. 9-2001 (minimum wage); (iv) failed to provide
accurate itemized statements in violation of Labor Code Section
226 (inaccurate wage statements); (v) violated Business and
Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. with unlawful, unfair, and
fraudulent business practices; and (vi) breached an oral contract.

The Plaintiffs moved for class certification on Dec. 23, 2016.
They move to certify the class of all current and former bus
drivers who were employed by First Student at its Fresno Yard
located at 2805 South East Avenue in Fresno, California since Oct.
28, 2011 to the present.  Alternatively, they seeks to certify the
following classes:

     a. Unpaid Wages Class: The Plaintiffs and all other persons
who were employed by the Defendant as school bus drivers at the
Defendant's Fresno, California yard, at any time from Oct. 28,
2011, and continuing to the present who were not paid all wages
due by the Defendant.

     b. Untimely Wages Class: The Plaintiff and all other persons
who were employed by Defendant as school bus drivers at the
Defendant's Fresno, California yard, at any time from Oct. 28,
2011, and continuing to the present who were not paid wages due by
Defendant on a timely basis.

     c. Minimum Wages Class: The Plaintiff and all other persons
who were employed by Defendant as school bus drivers at the
Defendant's Fresno, California yard, at any time from Oct. 28,
2011, and continuing to the present, who were not paid at least
minimum wages for work performed for the Defendant.

     d. Inaccurate Wage Statement Class: The Plaintiff and all
other persons employed by Defendant as school bus drivers at the
Defendant's Fresno, California yard, at any time from Oct. 28,
2011, and continuing to the present who were provided with
inaccurate wage statements by the Defendant.

First Student opposed the motion on March 24, 2017, and the
Plaintiffs replied on June 15, 2017.

Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the
entire record in this case, the Court finds that (i) the
Plaintiffs have met the numerosity requirement; (ii) the
Plaintiffs have failed to identify uniform policies and systemic
practices that apply uniformly to this class of employees; (iii)
the Plaintiffs have not met the typicality requirement because
they've failed to present evidence that First Student pays drivers
based on flat-rate compensation system or that First Student
routinely fails to pay drivers for all hours worked; and (iv) a
class action would not be a superior method for resolving this
litigation because the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to
establish commonality, typicality and predominance.  Accordingly,
the Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

A telephonic status conference is set for Aug. 3, 2017, at 9:00
a.m.  The parties should be prepared to discuss the status and
scheduling of this litigation, and may appear at the conference
with each party using the following dial-in number and passcode:
dial-in number: 1-877-411-9748; passcode: 3190866.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Fms67T from Leagle.com.

Delores Humes, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Raffi Kizirian --
armand.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey.

Delores Humes, Plaintiff, represented by Carol Gillam --
Carol@gillamlaw.com -- The Gillam Law Firm, Michael Hagop Boyamian
-- mike.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey &
Thomas Walker Falvey, Law Office of Thomas W. Falvey.

Diane Abella, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Raffi Kizirian, Law
Offices of Thomas W. Falvey, Michael Hagop Boyamian, Law Offices
of Thomas W. Falvey & Thomas Walker Falvey, Law Office of Thomas
W. Falvey.

First Student Inc., Defendant, represented by Ofelia Mishell
Parreno-Taylor -- mtaylor@littler.com -- Littler and Mendelson,
David J. Dow -- ddow@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Pc &
Heather L. Shook -- hshook@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC.


FUQI INTERNATIONAL: December 18 Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel, Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky, LLP on July
10 disclosed that a settlement has been reached, subject to Court
approval, in a class action lawsuit against Marcum, LLP in the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 15
Civ. 01938 (DAB), which is being administered by Angeion Group.

This announcement of the proposed Settlement is being given to all
persons or entities who purchased or acquired Fuqi International,
Inc. common stock between May 15, 2009 and
March 27, 2011, inclusive, and/or who purchased or acquired Fuqi
International, Inc. common stock pursuant to or traceable to the
secondary offering on or about July 22, 2009.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and an
Order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, a hearing will be held on January 8, 2018,
at 11:00 a.m., before The Honorable Deborah A. Batts, at the
Daniel P. Moynihan U.S. Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom
24B, New York, New York, for the purpose of determining:  (1)
whether the proposed Settlement of the claims in the above-
captioned litigation (the "Action") for the principal sum of
$1,100,000 in cash, plus accrued interest, should be approved by
the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate to Members of the
Class; (2) whether, thereafter, this Action should be dismissed
with prejudice pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in
the Stipulation of Settlement dated as of October 6, 2016 (the
"Settlement Agreement"); (3) whether the proposed plan to
distribute the Settlement proceeds (the "Plan of Allocation") is
fair, reasonable and adequate and therefore should be approved;
and (4) whether the application of Lead Counsel for the payment of
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection with this
Action should be approved and reimbursement awards to Lead
Plaintiffs should be approved.

If you purchased or acquired Fuqi International, Inc. ("Fuqi")
common stock between May 15, 2009 and March 27, 2011, inclusive,
and/or purchased or acquired Fuqi common stock pursuant to or
traceable to the Secondary Offering on or about July 22, 2009, and
were damaged thereby, your rights may be affected by this
Settlement.  If you have not received a detailed Notice of
Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees
and Settlement Fairness Hearing ("Notice") and a copy of the Proof
of Claim and Release, you may obtain copies by writing to In re
Fuqi International, Inc. Securities Litigation - Marcum
Litigation, Claims Administrator, c/o Angeion Group, 1801 Market
Street, Suite 660, Philadelphia, PA 19103, or you can download a
copy at www.fuqiclasssettlement.com.  If you are a Class Member,
in order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund,
you must submit a Proof of Claim and Release postmarked no later
than November 24, 2017, establishing that you are entitled to a
recovery.  If you previously submitted a Proof of Claim and
Release in connection with the settlement of the litigation
against Fuqi International, Inc. and others, you do not need to
submit another Proof of Claim and Release.

If you desire to be excluded from the Class, you must submit a
request for exclusion postmarked by December 18, 2017, in the
manner and form explained in the detailed Notice referred to
above.  All Members of the Class who do not timely and validly
request exclusion from the Class will be bound by any judgment
entered in the Action pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement.

Any objection to the Settlement must be mailed or delivered, in
the manner and form explained in the detailed Notice referred to
above, such that it is received by each of the following no later
than December 18, 2017:

Court:
Clerk of the Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Daniel P. Moynihan U.S. Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Mitchell M.Z. Twersky
Lawrence D. Levit
ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805
New York, NY 10119

Defendant's Counsel Designee:
Stephen J. Tully
Garrett & Tully, P.C.
4615 E. Thousand Oaks Blvd., Suite 201
Westlake Village, CA 91362
805-446-4141

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.  If you have any questions about the Settlement, you
may contact Lead Counsel at the address listed above or go to the
following website: www.fuqiclasssettlement.com.
[GN]


GC SERVICES: Indiana Court Certifies Class in "Smith"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, granted Plaintiff's Second Amended
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned FRANCINA
SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a
Delaware limited partnership, and OWNERS RESOURCE GROUP GC GP
BUYER, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants, No.
1:16-cv-01897-RLY-DML (S.D. Ind.).

Plaintiff, Francina Smith, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, claims the Defendants, GC Services
Limited Partnership and Owner Resource Group GC GP Buyer, LLC,
sent her and the putative class a debt collection letter that
violated various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA").

Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b(3), which permits
class certification if questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and class resolution is superior to other available
methods for failure and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks Article III standing in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. Second,
they argue Plaintiff has failed to propose an ascertainable class
in which she is a member. And lastly, they argue Plaintiff cannot
establish any of the factors listed in Rule 23(a) or (b).

In the court's Entry denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the court found that Plaintiff had
alleged a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III
standing by alleging a violation of the FDCPA.

An implicit requirement under Rule 23 is that the class definition
"be definite enough that the class can be ascertained.  The class
definition is clear and objective as it is based on the same form
debt collection letter received by all putative class members.
This class is ascertainable.

Although Rule 23 does not identify a threshold number to establish
numerosity, joinder is considered impractical when a class numbers
at least forty members. Walker v. Calusa Inv. In response to
discovery requests, Defendants represented that the proposed class
consists of 118 persons.  Given that same form collection letter
was sent to all 118 potential class members, the court finds the
numerosity requirement is satisfied.

Commonality requires the plaintiff to show that 'the same conduct
or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of
claims from all class members. Here, Plaintiff's FDCPA claims are
based on the same form debt collection letter sent to 118 members
of the putative class. Whether it violated the FDCPA is a common
question of law. Therefore, the court finds Plaintiff satisfies
the commonality requirement.

A claim is typical of the class if "it arises from the same event
or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of
other class members and his or her claims are based on the same
legal theory. So long as the representative plaintiff's and the
putative class members' injuries arise out of the same violative
conduct, the plaintiff may represent the class. Such is the case
here. Plaintiff, therefore, satisfies the typicality requirement.
Adequacy of Representation

The court must view alleged violations of the FDCPA through the
eyes of an 'unsophisticated debtor.  It is thus immaterial whether
the consumer was misled by the letter.  The court finds Plaintiff,
who was sent the same form collection letter as the individuals
she seeks to represent, is an adequate representative.

Because the key issue in this case -- whether the subject letter
violates the FDCPA -- is identical as to each putative plaintiff,
the court finds the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied.

Accordingly, the Court certifies the class with the following
definition:

   "[A]ll persons similarly situated in the State of Indiana from
whom Defendants attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt
allegedly owed for a Synchrony Bank/Sam's Club account, via the
same form collection letter that Defendants sent to Plaintiff,
from one year before the date of the initial Complaint to the
present."

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/LFbo4V from Leagle.com.

FRANCINA SMITH, Plaintiff, represented by Angie K. Robertson,
PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD., 9760 S. Roberts Rd., Suite 1, Palos
Hills, Illinois 60465

FRANCINA SMITH, Plaintiff, represented by John Thomas Steinkamp,
JOHN T. STEINKAMP AND ASSOCIATES, 5214 S East Street Suite D-1,
Indianapolis, Indiana, 40227, Mary E. Philipps, PHILIPPS AND
PHILIPPS, LTD.  Address. 9760 S Roberts Rd; Palos Hills, Illinois
60465 & David J. Philipps, PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD., 9760 S
Roberts Rd; Palos Hills, Illinois 60465

GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant, represented by William
S. Helfand, LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD SMITH LLP, pro hac vice.

GC FINANCIAL CORP., Defendant, represented by William S.
Helfand -- Bill.Helfand@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS
BISGAARD SMITH LLP, pro hac vice.

DLS ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant, represented by William S.
Helfand, LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD SMITH LLP, pro hac vice.

OWNERS RESOURCE GROUP, GC GP BUYER, LLC, Defendant, represented by
William S. Helfand, LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD SMITH LLP.


GENERAL MOTORS: Bellwether Ignition Switch Defect Trial Begins
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Andrew Denney of New York Law Journal, reports
that defense counsel for General Motors told jurors it was not a
faulty part, but a run-of-the-mill fender bender partly caused by
inattention to the road, that caused any injury suffered by the
plaintiff as trial for the seventh General Motors bellwether
ignition defect case opened on July 11.

But the plaintiff's legal team blamed their client's leg injuries
on a defective ignition switch that they say allowed a driver's
knee to knock the car key out of position.

Mike Brock, Esq., -- mike.brock@kirkland.com -- of Kirkland &
Ellis, in his opening statement in New York federal court, said
the switch played no part in the collision.

"It's just a rear-end collision," Mr. Brock said of plaintiff
Dennis Ward's March 2014 accident in Tucson, Arizona.  "Sometimes
accidents just happen and this is what this case is about."

But Nicholas Wise of Weitz & Luxenberg, a member of Mr. Ward's
legal team, said during his opening statement that his client's
2009 Chevrolet HHR lost power because of a "knee-key" interaction
with his ignition switch that caused the key to turn out of the
"on" position.

The accident left Mr. Ward with a permanent leg injury, he said.
Mr. Ward, who was present in the courtroom and used a cane to move
around, said that before the accident, in which he rear-ended a
Ford Bronco during busy, weekday morning traffic, he tried both
slamming on the brakes and swerving out of the way, each to no
avail.

GM ignition switches have been linked to 124 deaths and hundreds
of injuries and over the last several years has paid out more than
$2 billion.  An engineering flaw in its switches caused them to
flip from the "on" position to the "accessory" position, which
would cause engines to shut off and would disable power steering
and antilock brakes.

An automotive journalist noticed the problem back in 2004 while
test driving a Chevrolet Cobalt.  In 2014, it admitted that the
"423 ignition switch" found in some of its models was defective
and issued a massive recall.

"Sometimes people were injured.  Sometimes people died," Mr. Wise
said during opening arguments.  "Sometimes the airbags didn't go
off when they should have.  GM knew about it."

But the ignition switch in Mr. Ward's vehicle was a different
model -- the "190 switch" -- that GM has not deemed defective.

Mr. Brock said during opening arguments that the ignition switch
from Mr. Ward's vehicle was found to be up to specifications.
"The car performed as it should have," Mr. Brock said.

Southern District Judge Jesse Furman presides over Ward v. General
Motors, 14-md-2543. This is Furman's fourth GM bellwether case.

Mr. Ward's legal team also includes James Bilsborrow of Weitz &
Luxenberg in the firm's New York office, Paul Novak and Diana
Gjonaj of Weitz & Luxenberg in Detroit and Robert Hilliard of
Hilliard Munoz Gonzales.

GM is also represented by Brian Sieve, Esq. --
brian.sieve@kirkland.com -- and Renee D. Smith, Esq. --
renee.smith@kirkland.com -- of Kirkland & Ellis.

Regardless of GM's fortunes in the Ward case, the automaker has
recently been dealt some setbacks in the courts.

In April, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a lower court
ruling that GM is liable for deaths and injuries that occurred
before it filed for bankruptcy in 2009.

In June, Southern District Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, who
presides over GM's bankruptcy case, found that plaintiffs may seek
claims against the automaker that are unrelated to ignition
switches.

Attorneys from Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, which also represents
vehicle owners in litigation against GM, said in a release that
Judge Glenn's ruling could increase the automaker's exposure to
economic loss claims in litigation before Furman.


GENIE ENERGY: Units Enter Into Class Action Settlement Agreement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Genie Energy Ltd said on July 5 that the
company's units entered into class action settlement agreement.

Under the settlement agreement, the company agreed to pay certain
amounts to resolve lawsuits.

The company estimates, based in part on historical participation
rates, that total settlement payment will be about $9 million.
[GN]


GERBER PRODUCTS: 5th Cir. Partly Affirms Trimming of "Bruton"
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned NATALIA BRUTON  individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, Northern
District of California, San Jose v. GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee, No. 15-15174 (9th Cir.), Plaintiff-Appellant
Natalia Bruton filed a putative class action against baby food
manufacturer Gerber Products Company.  Bruton alleged that labels
on certain Gerber baby food products included claims about
nutrient and sugar content that were impermissible under Food and
Drug Administration regulations incorporated into California law.

The district court dismissed several of Bruton's claims, denied
class certification, denied partial summary judgment for Bruton,
and granted summary judgment to Gerber.  Bruton appeals,
challenging the district court's orders.

The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that the
district court erred in dismissing Bruton's claim for unjust
enrichment/quasi-contract. At the time when the district court
dismissed this claim, California's case law on whether unjust
enrichment could be sustained as a standalone cause of action was
uncertain and inconsistent.

But since then, the California Supreme Court has clarified
California law, allowing an independent claim for unjust
enrichment to proceed in an insurance dispute, in Hartford Cas.
Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 61 Cal.4th 988, 1000 (2015); see
also Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal.4th 39, 54 (1996).

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reverses the district court's
dismissal and remands for consideration of whether there are other
grounds on which Bruton has failed to state a claim for unjust
enrichment, or if that claim must proceed to resolution.

The Ninth Circuit adds that the district court erred when it held
that the class could not be certified because it was not
ascertainable.  In Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121
(9th Cir. 2017), the court -- using different terminology for what
the district court called ascertainability -- held that there was
no separate "administrative feasibility" requirement for class
certification.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reverses the district court's
denial of class certification and remands for further
consideration of whether class certification is appropriate.

The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly held that
there was no genuine dispute of material fact on Bruton's claims
that the labels were deceptive in violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law (UCL).

Bruton's theory of deception does not rely on proving that any of
Gerber's labels were false. Bruton's theory of deception may be
viable. The California courts have held that even technically
correct labels can be misleading. See Lavie v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 510 (2003) The advertisement, although
literally true, was nevertheless deceptive and misleading in its
implications."

Here, it may be literally true that Gerber's products are "As
Healthy As Fresh," but due to alleged external facts -- that
Gerber does not comply with the FDA regulations that otherwise
prevent its competitors from making the same claim -- Bruton's
theory is that Gerber's labels by comparison mislead in their
implications.

Nevertheless, even assuming the validity of Bruton's theory, the
record does not include sufficient evidence to create a genuine
dispute of material fact for trial as to consumer deception under
her theory. Bruton points to the following evidence to support
consumer deception: (1) Gerber's and its competitors' labels; (2)
Bruton's own testimony about being misled by Gerber's labels; and
(3) two warning letters from the FDA.

The letters therefore do not support Bruton's theory that Gerber's
labels are deceptive because its competitors' labels follow the
law.  The Ninth Circuit held that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact
for trial as to the outcome under the reasonable consumer test.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's grant
of summary judgment to Gerber on Bruton's claims that the labels
were deceptive in violation of the UCL, FAL, and Consumers Legal
Remidies Act.

The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Gerber on
Bruton's claims that the labels were unlawful under the UCL. The
UCL's unlawful prong "borrows" predicate legal violations and
treats them as independently actionable under the UCL. Wang v.
Massey Chevrolet, 97 Cal.App.4th 856, 871 (2002).  The predicate
violation here is of California's Sherman Law.

The Ninth Circuit reverses the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Gerber on Bruton's claims that the labels were
unlawful in violation of the UCL.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 17, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/DdOe42 from Leagle.com.


GLH CAPITAL: Court Grants Conditional Certification in "Owens"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Southern District for
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order granting Conditional
Certification of Collective Action in the case captioned TABITHA
OWENS and CHAD WALTERS, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GLH CAPITAL ENTERPRISE, INC.,
M.L.K. ENTERPRISES, LLC, BACKSTREET ENTERTAINMENT, LTD., CHARLES
"JERRY" WESTLUND, JR., an individual, and DOES 1-10, Defendants,
Case No. 17-CV-875-KAD-GWF (S.D. Ill.).

This action arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. Section 201, and the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Section 105/1.

Employees allege on their own behalf, and on behalf of the
potential class, that Employers willfully violated the FLSA by
failing to pay overtime at a rate of one-and-a-half times
Employees' regular rate, for hours worked in excess of forty hours
in a work week.

Employees asked this Court to conditionally certify a collective
action, defining the potential class as: All non-exempt cooks,
servers, bartenders, and assistant managers who worked for
Defendants at any time in the past three years.

Employers oppose certification, arguing: (1) Employees cannot
prove potential members of the proposed class are similarly
situated;" (2) Employees cannot prove Employers are joint
employers and part of an enterprise-wide action; and (3) Employees
cannot prove the three year statute of limitations applies.

The Court finds unpersuasive Employers' argument that conditional
certification should be delayed in order to determine whether the
identified companies are "joint employers."

If an employer's actions were willful, the FLSA provides for an
extension of the normal two year statute of limitations, to three
years.  Employees have also pled facts supporting their claim that
Employers' failure to pay overtime was done either knowingly or
recklessly, the Court pointed out.  Employers' failure to
correctly calculate the overtime amount is sufficient to show
either knowing or reckless behavior for conditional certification
purposes.

Given the minimal burden on plaintiffs at the conditional
certification stage, the Court finds the allegations made by
Employees are sufficient to allege willfulness on the part of
Employers and therefore a three-year statute of limitations time
period is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Motion for Conditional Certification of
Collective Action is granted.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Ow1KBx from Leagle.com.

Tabitha Owens, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse Lee Randolph Young,
Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice.

Tabitha Owens, Plaintiff, represented by Martine P. Jackson, Rhode
& Jackson, P.C. & Shari R. Rhode, Rhode & Jackson, P.C..

Chad Walters, Plaintiff, represented by Jesse Lee Randolph Young,
Sommers Schwartz, P.C., Martine P. Jackson, Rhode & Jackson, P.C.
& Shari R. Rhode, Rhode & Jackson, P.C..

GLH Capital Enterprise, Inc., Defendant, represented by John R.
Schneider, Johnson, Schneider & Ferrell, LLC. 212 North Main
Street, Cape Girardeau, Missouri 63701

M.L.K. Enterprises, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by John R.
Schneider, Johnson, Schneider & Ferrell, LLC.

Back Street Entertainment, L.T.D., Defendant, represented by John
R. Schneider, Johnson, Schneider & Ferrell, LLC.

Charles Westlund, Jr., Defendant, represented by John R.
Schneider, Johnson, Schneider & Ferrell, LLC.

Back Street Entertainment, L.T.D., Counter Claimant, represented
by John R. Schneider, Johnson, Schneider & Ferrell, LLC.

Tabitha Owens, Counter Defendant, represented by Jesse Lee
Randolph Young -- jyoung@sommerspc -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C.,
Martine P. Jackson, Rhode & Jackson, P.C. & Shari R. Rhode, Rhode
& Jackson, P.C., 1405 W Main StCarbondale, IL 62901-2229.

Chad Walters, Counter Defendant, represented by Jesse Lee Randolph
Young, Sommers Schwartz, P.C., Martine P. Jackson, Rhode &
Jackson, P.C. & Shari R. Rhode, Rhode & Jackson, P.C..


GOOGLE INC: AGs Challenge $5.5-Mil. Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Amanda Bronstad of Inside Counsel, reports that
when class members are owed a few pennies from a settlement, how
hard must you try to make sure they get paid?

That's the question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a petition to reverse a $5.5 million settlement with
Google Inc. over privacy claims that gives money to the
plaintiffs' attorneys and six nonprofit organizations but nothing
to the class.  On July 5, attorneys general from 11 states filed
an amicus brief insisting that the Delaware judge who approved the
settlement didn't go far enough in attempting to put class members
above the use of cy pres, a controversial practice used to
distributed unclaimed funds in a settlement to third parties.

The same issue has come up in other cases, particularly those
involving millions of internet users whose payouts are considered
too small to be worth distributing.

"The proposed settlement releases millions of consumer claims
related to Google's electronic 'cookie' placement practices in
exchange for $5.5 million from Google, and yet it diverts the
class members' $3.5 million portion of the settlement to cy pres
charities when that money could be feasibly distributed to class
members," wrote Oramel Skinner, an attorney at the Arizona
attorney general's office.

The case involves multidistrict litigation challenging Google's
practice of overriding cookie blockers on Apple's Safari and
Microsoft's Internet Explorer to gain access to user information.
In 2012, Google paid $22.5 million to the Federal Trade Commission
to resolve similar claims; a year later, it settled complaints by
28 state attorneys general for $17 million.

In 2015, the Third Circuit partially reversed dismissal of the
multidistrict litigation.

In her Feb. 2 approval of the settlement, U.S. District Judge Sue
Robinson found that delivering money to the class would have been
"logistically burdensome, impractical, and economically
infeasible, resulting (at best) with direct compensation of a de
minimus amount." She also reduced a $2.4 million request for
attorney fees to about $1.9 million.

In its June 28 opening brief, objector Ted Frank, founder of the
Washington, D.C.-based Competitive Enterprise Institute's Center
for Class Action Fairness, alleged that four of the cy pres
recipients in the case, including Harvard University's Berkman
Klein Center for Internet & Society and Stanford University's
Center for Internet and Society, have conflicts of interest
because they have accepted donations and other benefits from
Google.  In addition, the chairman of another recipient, Public
Counsel, the nation's largest pro bono organization, is
Brian Strange, Esq. -- bstrange@strangeandbutler.com -- one of the
plaintiffs' attorneys in the case.

"That's a pretty obvious conflict of interest," Mr. Frank said.
"He put his interests of the nonprofit ahead of the interests of
the class."

Mr. Strange, of Strange & Butler in Los Angeles, declined to
comment. In a Jan. 4 filing before Judge Robinson, Mr. Strange
noted that he was one of 70 board members at Public Counsel, all
of whom are lawyers.  Michael Rubin, Esq., -- mrubin@wsgr.com --
co-chairman of the privacy and data protection practice at Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in San Francisco who represents Google,
didn't respond to a request for comment.

Mr. Frank raised similar objections in another case against Google
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  In that
case, he argued that an $8.5 million class action settlement
steered funds to the alma maters of two of the plaintiffs'
attorneys.  The cy pres recipients in that case also included
Harvard's Berkman Center and Stanford's Center for Internet and
Society.

But in Google cookie case, both Mr. Frank and the attorneys
general said Robinson failed to follow the Third Circuit's 2013
holding in In re: Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., which mandated
that judges prioritize class member payments over cy pres funds
whenever possible.

"The district court made no reasonably accurate estimate of the
actual distribution of funds to individual class members that
could have occurred," Mr. Skinner wrote.  "The district court's
failure to apply this court's economic feasibility precedent was
reversible error."

Upholding the settlement also would create a split with the
Seventh, Eighth and Fifth circuits, Mr. Frank wrote.  As he did in
the Ninth Circuit case, Frank relied on a California case called
Fraley v. Facebook, a $20 million settlement in which lawyers
managed to arrange the distribution of $15 to each class member.

In a separate amicus brief filed on July 5, a group of legal aid
organizations in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, led by the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the Association of
Pro Bono Counsel, defended the use of cy pres while not taking a
position in the case.

"The availability and effectiveness of cy pres awards should not
be eroded by unreasonably narrow and mechanical constraints,"
wrote Duncan Grant, Esq. -- grantm@pepperlaw.com -- a partner at
Pepper Hamilton in Philadelphia.


HAIN CELESTIAL: Faces Potential Class Action Over Veggie Straws
---------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Licata, writing for Daily Meal, reports that the
makers of Garden Veggie Straws have been hit with a lawsuit from
two customers who say the brand's packaging and advertising made
them believe that Veggie Straws contained vegetables, which the
plaintiffs say is not true.

According to the New York Post, two men have filed a potential
class-action lawsuit against Hain Celestial Group, which produces
the Garden Veggie Straws.

The Veggie Straws are described on the packaging as "vegetable and
potato snacks," and the bag says they have 30 percent less fat
than the leading potato chips. The packages also feature
photographs of spinach leaves, tomatoes, and potatoes. The
plaintiffs say the Veggie straws "do not contain any of the actual
vibrantly depicted vegetables. They assert that the company is
misleading people who are trying to seek out healthful foods and
snacks.

The Veggie Straws ingredient list includes potato flour, potato
starch, corn starch, tomato paste, and spinach powder.

"Although the marketing and labeling of the Garden Veggie Straws
depicts whole tomatoes, spinach leaves and potatoes, and
separately claims those vegetables are 'garden grown' and 'ripe,'
there are no garden grown or ripe vegetables in the Garden Veggie
Straws," the lawsuit says. "Instead, the Vegetable Straws contain
highly processed byproducts of what were once vegetables, and with
respect to tomatoes and spinach, only contain trace amounts of
those byproducts upon information and belief."

The plaintiffs are looking for the suit to be a class action of
people who purchased Hain Celestial Group's Garden Veggie Straws
in the past six years. [GN]


HILTI INC: Electric Tools Buyers' Suit Moved Back to E.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Claire V. Eagan of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma retransferred the case captioned S & J
RENTALS, d/b/a Twin Cities Equipment Rentals, Plaintiff, v. HILTI,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-0159-CVE-FHM (N.D. Okla.) to the
Eastern District of California.

The Plaintiff asserts that it purchased two TE 3000-AVR electric
tools from the Defendant and that the tools eventually shut down
and could not be reactivated.  It alleges that when it contacted
the Defendant about the shut down, the latter informed it for the
first time that the tools had an "automatic shutoff feature" and
could be serviced and reactivated only by the Defendant.  The
Plaintiff asserts that it had to pay the Defendant approximately
$600 in service and reactivation fees.

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that the
Defendant engaged in unfair and fraudulent business practices
under the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. Code
Section 17200.  The Plaintiff asserts that it would not have
purchased the tools from the Defendant had it known about the
automatic shutoff feature and servicing and reactivation
requirements.  It also asserts that the Defendant engaged in
fraudulent practices by failing to adequately disclose that the
tools would automatically shutoff, that the tools must be
reactivated by the Defendant, and that the Defendant would charge
servicing and reactivation  fees.  The Plaintiff filed suit on
behalf of itself and all individuals and entities that purchased
one or more Hilti Automatic Shutoff Tools in California.

The Defendant filed two motions in the California district court,
a motion to transfer and a motion to dismiss.  The California
district court granted the motion to transfer due to a forum
selection clause that it found applied to this case.  After the
transfer, this Court ordered the parties to show cause as to why
this suit should not be dismissed because the forum selection
clause stated that the case could be brought only in the District
Court for the County of Tulsa, State of Oklahoma.  The Plaintiff
argues that the Court should not dismiss the case and
alternatively, that the Court should retransfer the case to the
California district court.  The Defendant argues that the Court
should dismiss the case so that it may be refiled in Tulsa County
District Court.

This Court held that to allow the transfer order to stand would
work manifest injustice because the order relies on the
Defendant's misrepresentations regarding the forum selection
clause to its benefit and the detriment of the Plaintiff.  The
transfer order relies on the fact that the case will be
transferred to a federal court.  This Court does not proffer an
opinion on whether the Defendant's motion to transfer should have
been denied or whether the case should be been dismissed under
forum non conveniens; that is for the California district court to
decide.  What is clear at this point, the Court says, is that the
transfer ordered is based on the mistaken belief that the forum
selection clause mandated this suit be resolved in federal or
state court in Tulsa, Oklahoma.  Because the forum selection
clause does not include federal courts, the purpose for the
transfer order, to give effect to the forum selection clause, has
been frustrated by the Defendant's misrepresentations.
Reconsideration should be rare, and reconsideration of a transfer
order even rarer.  But this is an extraordinary situation where a
transfer order is clearly erroneous and to let it stand would work
manifest injustice.  Therefore, this Court finds that this matter
should be retransferred to the Eastern District of California.

The Court Clerk is directed to transfer this case to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento
Division.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 opinion an order is
available at https://is.gd/0Cv3Eq from Leagle.com.

S & J Rentals, Plaintiff, represented by Ian Barlow --
ian@kctlegal.com -- Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC.

S & J Rentals, Plaintiff, represented by Jason Charles Messenger,
Richardson Richardson Boudreaux, Stuart C. Talley --
stuart@kctlegal.com -- Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC & William A.
Kershaw, Kershaw, Cook & Talley PC.

Hilti, Inc., Defendant, represented by J. Daniel Morgan --
dmorgan@newtonoconnor.com -- Newton O'Connor Turner & Ketchum PC &
John Stuart Poulos -- John.Poulos@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith.


HUYSSEN INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Bruno" Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted in part and denied in part
the defendants' motions to dismiss the case captioned WILLIAM
PELLEGRINI, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HUYSSEN, INCORPORATED, a California
corporation, bda SEDONA STAFFING; TEMPRO, INC., a Delaware
corporation; L.A. LEASING, INC., an Illinois corporation; and DOES
3 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00135-CAB-
(JMA) (S.D. Cal.).

On July 1, 2016, Daniel Bruno brought suit in the Superior Court
of the State of California against Huyssen asserting for wage and
hour claims in violation of the California Labor Code, the Code of
Regulations, Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) and California's
Unfair Competition Law (UCL).  Bruno later filed a First Amended
Complaint (FAC) alleging similar wage and hour claims in violation
of California law, and further amended it to name Tempro Services,
Inc. and L.A. Leasing as defendants.  A Second Amended Complaint
was later filed asserting that the defendants failed to compensate
their employees as required by federal and California law and
included a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim.

On January 25, 2017, Huyssen and L.A. Leasing removed the action
to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1441(a) and
1446(a).  On February 13, 2017, the defendants filed three
separate motions to dismiss.  All defendants sought dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), with TemPro
also seeking to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(2).

TemPro moved to dismiss for lack of either specific or general
personal jurisdiction because it does not conduct or solicit any
business in the State of California.  Bruno did not dispute that
TemPro lacks sufficient contacts with California to support
general jurisdiction, but asserted that TemPro operates in
California as Sedona Staffing and the Sedona Group and is
therefore subject to specific personal jurisdiction.

Judge Bencivengo found that TemPro, operating as Sedona Staffing
and The Sedona Group, purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting business in California.  The judge concluded that
but for TemPro's, operating as The Sedona Group and/or Sedona
Staffing, contacts with California Bruno's claims against it would
not have arisen.  The judge found that TemPro failed to present a
compelling case that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.  Judge Bencivengo thus concluded that Bruno has met
his burden and demonstrated facts that, if true, would support
jurisdiction over TemPro in order to survive the motion to
dismiss.

Huyssen and L.A. Leasing both moved under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the SAC in its entirety.  TemPro
joined in and incorporated by reference Huyssen and L.A. Leasing's
motions.  The motions asserted multiple grounds as to why each of
Bruno's causes of action fail to state claims upon which relief
can be granted.

The defendants argued that Bruno's Sixth Cause of Action for
Failure to Pay Minimum Wages under the FLSA is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, and does not contain sufficient
allegations of underlying facts to allow the defendants to defend
themselves effectively.  Judge Bencivengo, however, found that,
viewed as a claim for failure to pay wages for compensable time,
Bruno has adequately alleged that the defendants failed to pay him
and other members of the proposed class for work and travel they
performed on the defendants behalf.  Consequently, Judge
Bencivengo denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the FLSA
claim.

The defendants also asserted there is no private right of action
under California Labor Code section 223 and as a result, Bruno's
first cause of action for failure and refusal to pay agreed upon
wages should be dismissed.

Judge Bencivengo agreed that it is indeed true that section 223 of
the code does not create a private cause of action.  But, the
judge noted that Bruno has brought his failure and refusal to pay
agreed upon wages claim under other portions of the California
Labor Code, including sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 218, and 1194.
Accordingly, Judge Bencivengo denied the defendants' motions to
dismiss this cause of action in its entirety, but limited Bruno's
claim to the private causes of action permitted by the California
Labor Code.

The defendants also argued for dismissal of Bruno's second cause
of action for failure to pay minimum wages under California law on
the grounds that compensation for meetings and trainings related
to prospective employment is not required under California Law.
Judge Bencivengo found that Bruno has sufficiently alleged that
the interviews with the defendants' clients was not a typical pre-
employment interview and that, the alleged facts, taken as true,
show that Bruno was an employee of the defendants.  Consequently,
the judge denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the second
cause of action.

The defendants asserted that Burno's third claim for failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements fails because it is time
barred, is predicated on Bruno's minimum wage claims, and because
California Labor Code section 226(a) only requires that employers
accurately describe the monies being paid at the time of each
payment of wages.  Bruno did not contest dismissal of the third
cause of action.  Accordingly, Judge Bencivengo granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss the third cause of action.

The defendants further argued that Bruno's fourth claim for
failure to pay wages upon termination also fails because it is
predicated on Bruno's minimum wage claims which also fails, and
because a good faith dispute exists as to whether Huyssen and L.A.
Leasing owed Bruno any wages.  Because Judge Bencivengo has found
that Bruno has sufficiently alleged a minimum wage claim, the
judge held that the defendants' argument for dismissal on this
basis fails.

Lastly, the defendants asserted that the fifth cause of action for
violation of California's Unfaire Competition Law fails because it
is predicated on the other violations of law alleged in the SAC
which also fail.  Judge Bencivengo, however, found that Bruno has
adequately alleged violations of the California Labor Code and
FLSA upon which to predicate his UCL claim.  As a consequence, the
defendants' motions to dismiss the fifth cause of action were
denied.

A full-text copy of Judge Bencivengo's July 7, 2017 order is
available at https://is.gd/1lJJEG from Leagle.com.

William Pellegrini, Plaintiff, represented by Alex M. Tomasevic --
atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas and Tomasevic LLP, Craig
McKenzie Nicholas -- cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas and
Tomasevic, Lacy N. Wells -- lwells@nicholaslaw.org -- Nicholas &
Tomasevic, LLP & Noam Glick, Glick Law Group, P.C..

Huyssen, Incorporated, Tempro, Inc., L.A. Leasing, Inc., Tempro
Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Shareef Farag --
sfarag@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hosteler, LLP.


JANSSEN PHARMA: Pa. Risperdal Docket Nearly Triples in First Half
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Max Mitchell of The Legal Intelligencer, reports
that the litigation over Risperdal has not only become the largest
mass tort program in Philadelphia's busy court system, it has also
nearly tripled in size from about 2,000 cases at the start of the
year to more than 5,500 as of June.

According to the latest statistics from the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas, litigation over the anti-psychotic drug Risperdal
jumped from being 31.4 percent of the Complex Litigation Center's
inventory as of Jan. 1 to 55.8 percent as of June 14.  That number
represents a 185 percent increase from the 1,945 at the start of
the year, and is due to 3,617 new cases being filed in the mass
tort since January.  As of early June, 5,548 Risperdal cases were
pending.

Attorney Thomas R. Kline, who, as part of a consortium of
attorneys from Kline & Specter, Sheller P.C. and Arnold & Itkin,
is handling approximately three-quarters of the Risperdal docket
in Philadelphia, said the recent influx was caused mostly by a
tolling agreement that was terminated last year.

Although he said the latest wave of cases is largely over, he
anticipates the litigation will continue to grow in Philadelphia.
In particular, he noted the recent jurisdictional ruling by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of
California, the numerous issues on appeal before the state
Superior Court, and what Kline said is a lack of progress toward a
"reasonable" global settlement.

"The significant influx of cases is a direct result of Johnson &
Johnson's actions," he said, specifically referencing the
termination of the tolling agreement.

A spokeswoman for Janssen, the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary that
makes Risperdal, said the company plans to "continue to defend
this litigation and will try cases where appropriate."

"We do not have insight into plaintiffs' choices regarding when
and where they initiate lawsuits," Janssen spokeswoman Jessica
Castles Smith said in an emailed statement.

According to the statistics, 94 percent of the latest filings
comes from outside Pennsylvania.  That is the highest the court
has seen since at least 2005.

Philadelphia has long been a hub for mass tort litigation, often
attracting suits from plaintiffs who live outside Pennsylvania.
Frequently finding itself on the American Tort Reform Foundation's
list of "judicial hellholes," the court made some administrative
changes to the program in 2012, in part to address a growing
backlog.

Since the court began measuring the number of out-of-state filings
in 2005, the percentage of cases filed by plaintiffs from outside
Pennsylvania has mostly hovered between 85 and 89 percent.  Last
year saw the lowest percentage of out-of-state filings since 2005.

Mr. Kline said the plaintiffs hale from all over the country, and
balked at the criticism that having plaintiffs from outside the
Keystone State unfairly burdens Pennsylvania courts, specifically
noting that Philadelphia is considered to be a home venue for
Janssen.

"It's like the [Pittsburgh] Pirates saying we would like to play
all our games in Philadelphia," he said.  "We will play all the
games here on your home court."

According to Mr. Kline, eight to 10 trials are listed to take
place through the rest of 2017 and the first half of 2018.
Although the largest mass tort that Philadelphia has seen was the
Fen-Phen litigation, which involved about 15,000 cases, Judge
Arnold New, supervising judge of the Complex Litigation Center,
said the Risperdal mass tort is the largest he has seen since he
began leading the center in 2012.

New said he had been anticipating significant growth in the
Risperdal mass tort, and he has been asking the parties for more
information about the cases in an effort to get a better
understanding of the litigation for administrative purposes.  For
example, one recent ruling requires plaintiffs to submit more
information about their prescribing doctors and their injuries
when filing.  But New added that information including where a
plaintiff is from and their ages can also help the court to focus
on handling cases that don't involve issues up on appeal.

"As we've had this growth in cases, we've been trying to get more
and more information from the lawyers to determine how to handle
these cases, how try these cases, and when," he said.  "Risperdal
really is overwhelmingly gynecomastia, but maybe if some claims
arise over stroke, or heart attack, I want to know about it."

The court, he said, is expecting more cases to be filed,
particularly in the wake of the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision.
"That's fine.  We have a great court system that knows how to deal
with mass torts as efficiently as possible in order to have all
the parties reach a resolution that's acceptable," he said.

The Risperdal mass tort saw, by far, the largest growth out of the
nine programs pending in Philadelphia.

The Xarelto mass tort grew by 210 cases, or 17 percent, from 1,214
to 1,424.  The pelvic mesh litigation was the only other program
to see any growth. It increased 7 percent, rising from 164 to 176.

The Yaz, Yazmin, Ocella mass tort, which came to a settlement
agreement in 2015, fell 80 percent, from 109 to 22, and the
asbestos docket dropped by 7 percent, from 595 to 554.  Fen-Phen
also dropped by 33 percent, but it started the year with only
three cases pending.

Reglan also dropped by 74 cases, or 3 percent.  But with 2,091
cases pending as of early June, it was the second largest mass
tort in the Complex Litigation Center, making up 21 percent of the
inventory.


JC PENNEY: Can't Compel Arbitration of "Cavlovic" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ANN CAVLOVIC, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. J.C. PENNEY CORPORATION,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-2042-JAR-TJJ (D. Kan.), Magistrate
Judge Teresa J. James of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas denied the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and
Compel Arbitration.

The Plaintiff brings this putative class action against the
Defendant, asserting claims for violations of the Kansas Consumer
Protection Act and unjust enrichment.  She alleges the Defendant's
advertisements of its "original," "regular," "former," and "sale"
prices and their corresponding price discounts are fraudulent and
deceptive.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Stay
Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.  The Defendant argues all of
Plaintiff's claims are subject to binding, individual (non-class)
arbitration under two separate arbitration agreements: one set out
in her credit card agreement and one set out in the terms and
conditions of the Defendant's rewards program.  The Defendant
argues that, because the Plaintiff used her JCPenney credit card
on Sept. 23, 2014 to purchase the gold hoop earrings that are the
basis for her claims against the Defendant for fraudulent and
deceptive advertising of prices and discounts on that jewelry, the
Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration pursuant to the
terms of her credit card agreement.  The Defendant alternatively
argues that, because the Plaintiff used the JCPenney rewards
program and obtained rewards credit points for the jewelry
purchase, her claims are likewise subject to arbitration under the
terms and conditions of the rewards program agreement.

The Plaintiff argues she never agreed to arbitrate any of the
claims she presently asserts against the Defendant, and the
arbitration provisions the Defendant relies upon in its motion do
not apply to her claims in this case.  She also argues that the
2008 credit card agreement the Defendant relies upon has been
superseded by later versions containing materially different
provisions regarding arbitration.

Reviewing the factual allegations of the Plaintiff's petition, the
Court finds no mention of the Defendant's rewards agreement,
program, or the Plaintiff's membership in the rewards program.
The Plaintiff includes detailed allegations about her purchase of
the earrings and the Defendant's advertised discounts and pricing
with respect to the earrings, but the Plaintiff makes no
allegations regarding the rewards program.  As the Plaintiff
contends, her claims are based upon the Defendant's allegedly
deceptive and fraudulent pricing and discounts, not upon breach of
the terms of the rewards program or upon the Plaintiff's
membership in the program.  The Court therefore finds that the
Plaintiff's claims alleging the Defendant "falsely advertised
former prices and discounts" do not arise from or relate to the
rewards membership agreement or the rewards membership.  Thus, the
Plaintiff's claims are not within the scope of the rewards program
arbitration provision.  Accordingly, the Court denied the
Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/KMKwpO from Leagle.com.

Ann Cavlovic, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley Scott Waddell,
Waddell Law Firm LLC.

Ann Cavlovic, Plaintiff, represented by Bryce B. Bell --
Bryce@belllawkc.com -- Bell Law, LLC, Mark W. Schmitz, Bell Law,
LLC, Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, P.C., pro hac vice,
Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson -- rhudson@midwest-
law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger -- sgoodger@midwest-
law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA & W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm,
P.C., pro hac vice.

J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bradley
J. Hamburger -- bhamburger@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn, &
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Christina M. Pyle --
christina.pyle@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP,
Christopher Chorba -- cchorba@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn, &
Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher A. Smith --
chris.smith@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLProndelet, pro
hac vice, Mark A. Perry, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael S. Hargens -- michael.hargens@huschblackwell.com --
Husch Blackwell LLP & Taylor Brooke Concannon --
taylor.concannon@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP.


JOE ARPAIO: Could End Up Behind Bars Over Racial Profiling Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Kirkos, Catherine E. Shoichet and Darran Simon, writing for
CNN, reports in his years as the top lawman in Arizona's largest
county, Joe Arpaio touted the tough punishments he handed out.

Now the former Maricopa County sheriff's fate is in a judge's
hands.

And if US District Judge Susan Bolton finds him guilty of criminal
contempt, the man who once called himself "America's toughest
sheriff" could end up behind bars.

Arpaio is accused of violating a court order in a racial profiling
case by continuing patrols that targeted immigrants. The 85-year-
old has said the court order wasn't clear and he didn't intend to
violate it.

But in closing arguments on July 6, prosecutor John Keller, Esq. -
-  jkeller@kkfb.com -- of Keller, Keller & Beck LLC alleged that
Arpaio's defiance was deliberate -- and something he thought he
could get away with.

"The defendant thought this day was never coming," Keller said.
"But nobody gets to defy a federal judge's order."

If he's convicted, Arpaio could face up to six months in jail. The
judge is expected to make a decision in several weeks.
People on both sides of the immigration debate have been closely
watching the high-profile trial.

Supporters of Arpaio slam the case, which the Justice Department
began prosecuting under the Obama administration, as politically
motivated.

Immigrant rights advocates and other longtime critics of the
outspoken former sheriff are hoping the trial ends with his
conviction.

Arpaio served as sheriff of Maricopa County for more than two
decades. The county is home to Phoenix, the state's capital, and
more than 4 million people -- about 30% of whom are Latino.

During his tenure as sheriff, Arpaio's headline-grabbing
punishments earned him diehard supporters and fiery opponents. He
established Tent City, an infamous outdoor jail where inmates wore
pink underwear and shuffled around in chain gangs. He said he was
saving taxpayers money by removing salt and pepper from jail
meals.

And he made cracking down on illegal immigration a priority for
his deputies -- gaining national notoriety in the process as he
became a darling of conservative cable television commentators and
a villain to immigrant rights activists.

His legal troubles began in 2007, when a group of Latinos filed a
class action civil lawsuit claiming that Arpaio's policing
policies amounted to racial discrimination. A federal
investigation and a federal civil rights lawsuit followed.

Arpaio disputed allegations he'd discriminated against Latinos and
called the Justice Department's investigation into his office a
"witch hunt."

US District Judge G. Murray Snow issued a temporary injunction in
2011, blocking Arpaio's office from detaining people solely based
on their immigration status. The judge issued a permanent order
two years later, ruling that Maricopa County's handling of people
of Latino descent amounted to racial and ethnic profiling.

Last year, the judge asked federal prosecutors to file criminal
contempt charges against Arpaio and several subordinates, alleging
that they'd disregarded the court's directions, made false
statements and attempted to obstruct further inquiry.

Nine witnesses took the stand during the eight-day trial,
including Arpaio's former attorney, Tim Casey, who was questioned
by the defense during the occasionally contentious testimony.

During his closing argument, Keller, deputy chief of the Justice
Department's Public Integrity section, said Arpaio told the court
he "understood the exact situation of how the preliminary
injunction applied," but made false statements to his attorneys
and federal immigration officials to defy the Obama
administration.

"In the defendant's own words, he made the decision. No one was
higher than him," Keller said.

The prosecution argued that Arpaio raised millions in re-election
campaign funds in large part due to his widely publicized anti-
federal government stance.

Keller played an excerpt from a Fox News interview with host Neil
Cavuto, which took place at the time of the temporary injunction,
in an attempt to show what he asserted was Arpaio's defiance.

"If you stop a car and suspect that the occupants might be
illegal . . . what does Joe Arpaio do after that?" Cavuto asked.

Arpaio said: "One thing I'm going to do, if it's some sort
of . . . crime, they're going to jail."

In another video played in court, Arpaio, speaking to a Mexican
detainee through a translator, said: "Nobody is higher than me. I
am the elected official, elected by the people. I don't serve any
governor or any president."

Keller said Arpaio "continued to detain people all the way up
until May 2013."

Defense: 'Nobody thought they were violating the order'
But defense attorney Dennis Wilenchik claimed Arpaio was unaware
his officers were doing anything unlawful. He argued Arpaio didn't
lie to his former attorney, Casey, about stopping the detentions.
Rather, Wilenchik said Casey "dropped the ball" and didn't clearly
explain the order or seek clarification from Snow. "I'm not here
to cry or castigate him. But he is at fault," Wilenchik said of
Casey.

Wilenchik re-read testimony from the first day of the trial, when
he questioned Casey.

"Let me ask it this way," Wilenchik said then. "Did you believe
when you read that (preliminary injunction) that it was clear to
you?"

"I thought that there was ambiguity," Casey said.

"If he thought it was ambiguous, why wouldn't a good lawyer seek
clarification from the court before exposing his client to a
possible contempt?" Wilenchik told Bolton.

Wilenchik said the only person who knew what Snow meant in his
order "was Judge Snow himself."

"Nobody thought they were violating the order, but I think it's
easy to understand why the sheriff was singled out here,"
Wilenchik said, claiming the prosecution is driven by politics.
He challenged the prosecution's notion that Arpaio used his
defiance of the order to raise money for his own re-election.
Arpaio's fall from grace

In November, Arpaio lost his bid for a seventh term to Paul
Penzone, a former Phoenix police officer.

Arpaio's opinions and actions drew praise and rebuke during his
24-year run as sheriff. He insisted President Barack Obama was not
an American citizen and that his birth certificate was fraudulent
-- a claim that has been debunked.

In 1993, he established Tent City -- the infamous outdoor jail.
Arpaio said the outdoor jail saved taxpayers money despite
criticism that the facility was inhumane.
This spring, Penzone announced he was taking down the tents and
closing the desert camp, saying there was no evidence that it
deterred crime.

"This facility became more of a circus atmosphere for the general
public," Penzone said. "Starting today, that circus ends." [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Tried to Stop Report About Pelvic Mesh Devices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Knaus, writing for The Guardian, reports that the
pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson tried to stop French health
authorities publishing a report warning against the use of its
untested pelvic mesh devices, two years after they began giving
them to Australian women, a court has heard.

Hundreds of Australian women have launched a class action against
three Johnson & Johnson companies alleging the meshes -- used to
treat two common childbirth complications -- have caused them
chronic and debilitating pain, ruined their sex lives, and, in
some cases, destroyed their livelihoods.

Thousands of patients in the UK, Canada and the United States have
launched similar cases.

On July 5 the federal court in Sydney heard Australian women were
effectively used as "guinea pigs" by the Johnson & Johnson group.

Barrister Duncan Graham SC told the court the devices were not
properly tested before they were approved by the Therapeutic Goods
Administration and placed on the Australian market in 2005.

Johnson & Johnson instead conducted an aggressive marketing
campaign aimed at convincing surgeons the devices were
inexpensive, simple to implant, and therefore a lucrative
alternative to other treatment options.  No randomised controlled
trials were conducted, the court heard, and the scant testing that
was available was insufficient or too short-term.

Had such trials been conducted, Mr. Graham said, they would have
found the devices posed an unacceptable risk to women.

"It was sell first, test later," Mr. Graham said.  "The women who
had them implanted were part of an experiment, they were guinea
pigs," he said.

The court has been shown internal documents from one of the
Johnson & Johnson companies, Ethicon, suggesting it knew it lacked
the proper trials.

In 2007, the French health authority, Haute Autorite de Sante, was
preparing to release a report on the mesh devices.  The report
found a proper randomised controlled trial was needed before the
devices could be approved. It concluded they should be used only
in clinical research until such a trial was complete. At that
stage, the devices had been on the Australian market for two
years.

The looming French report prompted concern within Ethicon. Meeting
minutes described in court show the company feared the report
"could have a major impact on our business if made public".

It said work was needed to "stop the publication of the report".

"So there is no randomised clinical trial, the [French] commission
wants one and essentially until it gets one, Prolift, which has
already been on the market in Australia for two years, is
considered only suitable for clinical research," Mr. Graham told
the court.

The court also heard evidence about the origins of a journal
article supportive of the safety and efficacy of the devices,
which was published in the New England Journal of Medicine in
2011.

Mr. Graham said the journal had been forced into an "embarrassing"
correction two years later, after it emerged the study had failed
to properly disclose the involvement of Ethicon. Ethicon had paid
the authors consultant fees, and reviewed the original study
protocol and a presubmission draft of the manuscript.

The presubmission draft differed in several respects from the
published article, the court heard.

Part of the device's appeal to surgeons was the apparent ease with
which it could be inserted.  Johnson & Johnson marketed the mesh's
implantation as a standardised technique.  That claim, Graham
alleged, was a "pipe dream, and a dangerous one at that".

He said there was variability in the technique, and the surgery
was complex, beyond the skills of lesser-trained or inexperienced
surgeons.

A study published in the Lancet in December found that women who
were given mesh implants were roughly three times more likely to
suffer complications and twice as likely to need follow-up surgery
compared with women who had the traditional version of the
surgery, where stitches are used to provide support for the
organs.

The case continues before Justice Anna Katzmann. [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: "Estrada" Suit Dismissed with Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MONA ESTRADA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON and
JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES INC., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 16-7492 (FLW) (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Class
Action Complaint with leave to amend for lack of standing.

The Plaintiff's allegations center on the Defendants' marketing of
Johnson's Baby Powder to women.  In that regard, she alleges that
the Defendants market Baby Powder to women specifically --
encouraging women to dust themselves with Baby Powder to maintain
freshness and cleanliness, and to mask odors -- despite the fact
that the use of Baby Powder by women in the genital area results
in an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer.  The Plaintiff
avers that the Defendants failed to disclose the risks associated
with the use of Baby Powder by women, and continued to market the
product as safe despite knowledge of those risks.  In support of
her allegations regarding the increased cancer risk associated
with Baby Powder, the Plaintiff cites numerous clinical studies
that have been conducted since 1961.  She alleges that since at
least 1982, the Defendants have been aware of the studies
associating talcum powder with an elevated risk of ovarian cancer.

On April 28, 2014, the Plaintiff filed her original complaint in
this matter in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California.  On March 27, 2015, Judge Troy L. Nunley
dismissed the Plaintiff's original complaint for lack of Article
III standing, finding that she failed to allege an injury-in-fact.

On April 24, 2015, the Plaintiff filed the FAC, asserting four
causes of action against the Defendants.  She brings these claims
individually and on behalf of putative classes of consumers who
have purchased Baby Powder manufactured and sold by the
Defendants.  Count I of the FAC seeks injunctive and equitable
relief, on the grounds that Defendants violated the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, by failing to disclose the increased risk of
ovarian cancer associated with consumption of Baby Powder on its
product labels and packages, and by representing that Baby Powder
is clinically proven to be safe, gentle, and mild.  Count II of
the FAC asserts claims pursuant to California's Unfair Competition
Law, alleging that the Defendants committed unlawful business
practices by making misrepresentations and omitting material facts
regarding the safety of Baby Powder.  Count III of the FAC asserts
a related claim for negligent misrepresentation.  Finally, Count
IV of the FAC asserts a claim for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability, alleging that the Defendants impliedly
warranted Baby Powder to be safe, despite the fact that it is
unsafe and not merchantable.

On May 18, 2015, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC
in the Eastern District of California which was fully briefed
before Judge Nunley.  However, on Oct. 5, 2016, the case was
transferred to this Court by the Multi-District Litigation Panel
as part of the In re Johnson & Johnson MDL assigned to me. ECF No.
39.  Thereafter, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss on Dec. 22, 2016.

The Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on several grounds,
including that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring the
present action, and fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.  Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff lacks Article
III standing to bring the present action, it need not reach
Defendants' other theories.

While the Court is cognizant that "injury-in-fact is not Mount
Everest," it cannot find, based on the allegations in the FAC,
that the Plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact.  Because she
does not have standing to bring the present action, the FAC must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Moreover,
it is well-settled that, absent subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court is without authority to address the parties' remaining
merit-based arguments.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss as to the Plaintiff's lack of standing to bring suit.  The
Plaintiff is given leave to amend her Complaint, consistent with
this decision, within 30 days from the date of the Order
accompanying the Opinion.  Specifically, to the extent that the
Plaintiff seeks to amend her benefit-of-the-bargain theory on the
basis of an omission, she must allege that the Defendants had an
affirmative legal obligation to disclose the omitted fact.

In addition, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks to amend her
benefit-of-the-bargain theory on the basis of the alleged
misrepresentations appearing in the Defendants' advertisements or
on their website, she must allege that she actually relied on
those misrepresentations in purchasing Baby Powder.  The Plaintiff
is not be given leave to amend her alternative product theory,
however, in light of her concession that a cornstarch-based
alternative would not have been cheaper than Baby Powder.  Should
the Plaintiff seek to assert a price premium claim, that claim
must be pled with sufficient factual support.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/SEgLSC from Leagle.com.

MONA ESTRADA, Plaintiff, represented by ALISON D. HAWTHORNE --
alison.hawthorne@beasleyallen.com -- COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC,
pro hac vice.

MONA ESTRADA, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Lance Gould --
lance.gould@beasleyallen.com -- Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin,
Portis & Miles, P.C., pro hac vice, Paula Michelle Roach --
proach@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, TIMOTHY G.
BLOOD -- tblood@bholaw.com -- COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC, W.
Daniel Miles, III -- dee.miles@beasleyallen.com -- Beasley, Allen,
Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., pro hac vice & Thomas J.
O'Reardon -- toreardon@bholaw.com -- II, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon
LLP.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, Defendant, represented by ALLEN W. BURTON --
aburton@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Matthew David Powers --
mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, GENE M. WILLIAMS --
gmwilliams@shb.com -- COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC, KATHLEEN A.
FRAZIER -- kfrazier@shb.com -- COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC &
SCOTT A. JAMES -- sjames@shb.com -- COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES INC., Defendant, represented
by ALLEN W. BURTON, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Matthew David Powers,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, GENE M. WILLIAMS, COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO
USDC, KATHLEEN A. FRAZIER, COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC & SCOTT A.
JAMES, COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC.


JOSEPH DECKER: Has Until Aug. 1 to Respond in "Shannon"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District Nevada issued an
Ordere approving the Stipulation to Extend Time for Defendants to
Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amended Complaint in the case
captioned JOSEPH SHANNON, PENNY LUCILLE BEHRENS, CHRISTOPHER
ROBERT BRAGGS, and JOSE LOPEZ GOMEZ, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH (JD) DECKER,
STEVE GEORGE, and DONALD SODERBERG, in their individual
capacities, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-875-KAD-GWF (D. Nev.).

The Parties stipulate and agree that Defendants have until
Tuesday, August 1, 2017, to file their response to Plaintiffs'
First Amended Class Action Complaint. In consideration for
Plaintiffs' agreement, Defendants agree not to assert any defense
based upon failure to effectuate proper service of process. This
is the first request for additional time for Defendants' response.
This extension of time is not made for any dilatory or delaying
tactic and is necessary in order to allow Defendants time to
prepare their response.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/Ow1KBx from Leagle.com.

Joseph Shannon, Plaintiff, represented by Jason D. Mills --
jdm@neemanmills.com -- Neeman & Mills, Ltd.

Joseph Shannon, Plaintiff, represented by Leon Marc Greenberg,
Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation, Dana Sniegocki, Leon
Greenberg, 2965 South Jones Boulevard #E-4, Las Vegas, NV, 89146
Office (702) 383-6085 & James P. Kemp, Kemp & Kemp,  7534 W. Azure
DriveSuite 110Las Vegas, NV 89130. Phones: (702) 258-1183.

Penny Lucille Behrens, Plaintiff, represented by Jason D. Mills
Neeman & Mills, Ltd., Leon Marc Greenberg, Leon Greenberg
Professional Corporation, Dana Sniegocki, Leon Greenberg & James
P. Kemp, Kemp & Kemp.

Christopher Robert Braggs, Plaintiff, represented by Jason D.
Mills, Neeman & Mills, Ltd., Leon Marc Greenberg, Leon Greenberg
Professional Corporation, Dana Sniegocki, Leon Greenberg & James
P. Kemp, Kemp & Kemp.

Jose Lopez Gomez, Plaintiff, represented by Jason D. Mills, Neeman
& Mills, Ltd., Leon Marc Greenberg, Leon Greenberg Professional
Corporation, Dana Sniegocki, Leon Greenberg & James P. Kemp, Kemp
& Kemp.

Joseph Decker, Defendant, represented by Sarah Bradley, State of
Nevada Office of the Attorney General.

Steve George, Defendant, represented by Sarah Bradley, State of
Nevada Office of the Attorney General.

Donald Soderberg, Defendant, represented by Sarah Bradley, State
of Nevada Office of the Attorney General.


LEGEND ENERGY: Harlow Seeks to Certify Class of Oilfield Worker
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JARED HARLOW, Individually and on Behalf of
Those Similarly Situated, v. LEGEND ENERGY SERVICES, LLC; TREY
INGRAM, MATTHEW GOODSON, and JOSH PRUETT, Each Individually and as
Officers of LEGEND ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
4:16-cv-02324-FHS (S.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
conditionally certify a class of:

   "each individual employed as a salaried Oilfield Worker for
   Defendant at any time within the three years preceding the
   filling of Plaintiff's Original Complaint, excluding any such
   person who has already participated in a claim against
   Defendant as an opt-in or named party in a wage lawsuit".

The Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of certain former and
current oil field employees of Defendants Legendary Energy
Services, LLC, to recover overtime wages and other damages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kjljHGT9

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 S. Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221 0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787 2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Meritt B. Chastain, III, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          One Allen Center
          500 Dallas Street, Suite 3000
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 655 0855
          Facsimile: (713) 655 0020
          E-mail: merit.chastain@odnss.com


LG CHEM: Filing of Claims for Battery CA Settlement Started
-----------------------------------------------------------
Inc.com reports that if you bought a phone, camera or computer
with a rechargeable battery since 2000, the odds are good you're
eligible to claim part of a settlement in a major class action
lawsuit if you act before November 29.

The suit claims that makers of lithium-ion batteries illegally
colluded to fix the price of the cylindrical, rechargeable
batteries that power portable computers, cameras, power tools and
a number of other electronics.

A handful of the more than a dozen companies being sued for
participating in the price-fixing conspiracy have agreed to a
settlement, including LG Chem, Hitachi Maxell, NEC and Sony.
Collectively, they've agreed to pay up to $64 million to settle
the case.

After the lawyers take a chunk of that amount, the rest is set to
be distributed to anyone who bought just about any type of
portable electronics between 2000 and 2011. Getting your chunk of
the settlement is as easy as going to a special website setup to
file your claim at reversethecharge.com.

It takes less than five minutes to go to the site and enter the
number of laptops, cell phones, smart phones, tablets, cameras,
camcorders, digital music players, power tools and rechargeable
battery packs that you bought between 2000 and 2011. Filing a
claim only requires entering the number of each type of product,
not a comprehensive list of model or serial numbers and proof of
purchase is not required. You can also go back and edit your claim
if you remember another eligible product you purchased.

You have until November 29 to file your claim, but the catch is
there's no way to know how much cash you're entitled to until all
claims are in.

Also, a court still has to give final approval to the settlement
and distribution of funds later this year, so nothing is set in
stone yet.

Because many millions of device purchases are likely eligible to
be part of the settlement, it really will come down to how many
claims are filed. Odds are most payments won't be more than a few
bucks if word gets out and the millions of affected consumers get
around to filing a claim.

But hey, there's nothing wrong with a few extra bucks and striking
a blow in the name of consumer protections, even if the biggest
winners are probably the lawyers in this case. [GN]


LGI HOMES: "Selby" Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Office Managers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned LORRIE SELBY AND SONIA AGUIRRE,
Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. LGI HOMES CORPORATE, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
4:17-cv-00100-ALM-KPJ (E.D. Tex.), the Plaintiffs ask Court to
certify a collective action opt-in class pursuant to Fair Labor
Standards Act:

   "all office managers who worked for Defendant LGI Homes
   Corporate. LLC in Texas from February 13, 2015, to present".

This case involves a putative-class lawsuit brought by Plaintiffs
against Defendant, in their individual capacities and as
collective action on behalf of other purported similarly situated
office managers employed by LGI across the country.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=uYpcP1r6

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew R. Scott, Esq.
          Javier Perez, Esq.
          SCOTT & PEREZ LLP
          Founders Square
          900 Jackson Street, Suite 550
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 965 9675
          Facsimile: (214) 965 9680
          E-mail: matt.scott@scottperezlaw.com
                  Javier.perez@scottperezlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kimberley S. Moore, Esq.
          STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP
          2600 Dallas Parkway, Suite 600
          Frisco, Texas 75034
          Telephone: (469) 287 3900
          Facsimile: (469) 287 3999
          E-mail: Kim.moore@strausburger.com


LMCHH PCP: Outten & Golden Named Interim Lead Atty in "Kusnick"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order granting Plaintiff's motion to appoint
interim lead counsel in the case captioned BARBARA KUSNICK, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. LMCHH PCP, LLC, and LOUISIANA MEDICAL CENTER AND HEART
HOSPITAL, LLC, CCG OF LOUISIANA, LLC, and MEDCARE INVESTMENT
FUNDS, Defendants. TERRY KING, APRIL ESCHETE, LEONIDA GALLOWAY,
MARVETTE LEBLANC-CLARKSTON, JOHN FAYARD, III, BAMBILYNN JORDAN,
LOU ANN LEA, MONICA SMITH, and MARLEA ROSS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LMCHH
PCP, LLC, LOUISIANA MEDICAL CENTER AND HEART HOSPITAL, LLC and CCG
OF LOUISIANA, LLC, Defendants, Adv. P. No. 17-1021., 17-1024
(Bankr. E.D. La.).

The Kusnick Complaint seeks remedies for LMCHH PCP, LLC, Louisiana
Medical Center and Heart Hospital, LLC, CCG of Louisiana, LLC, and
Medcare Investment Funds' alleged failure to provide at least
sixty days' advance written notice of the terminations as required
by the WARN Act and adds claims against the Non-Debtor Defendants,
among other claims.  On February 24, 2017, the King Plaintiffs, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed an
almost identical class action adversary proceeding against the
Defendants, minus Medcare Investment Funds, for violation of the
WARN Act and the recovery of damages in the amount of sixty days'
back pay and ERISA benefits, among other claims.

The Kusnick Plaintiffs' counsel represent to the court that they
will be paid on a contingent fee basis, so they will not cost the
debtor's estate anything more than the King Plaintiffs' counsel.
On the balance, although both proposed interim counsel are very
competent and would certainly be able to do a fine job, the
balance of the factors the court must consider weigh in favor of
the counsel for the Kusnick Plaintiffs leading the charge.

The Kusnick Plaintiffs' Motion is granted and Outten & Golden,
LLP, are appointed as Interim Lead Counsel.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/MlnxWG from Leagle.com.

Barbara Kusnick, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Kadden --
bkadden@lawla.com Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin, Jack Raisner,
Outten & Golden LLP, Jack A. Rasiner & Rene S. Roupinian, Outten &
Golden LLP, 685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor, Manhattan, New York
10017.

Rose H. Delaney, Plaintiff, represented by Rene Roupinian, Outten
& Golden LLP.

LMCHH PCP LLC, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth J. Futrell --
efutrell@joneswalker.com -- & Mark Mintz -- mmintz@joneswalker.com
-- Jones Walker, et al.

MedCare Investment Funds, Defendant, represented by Michael A.
Crawford, --mike.crawford@taylorporter.com -- Taylor Porter Brooks
& Phillips LLP & Thomas Robert Peak --
tom.peak@taylorporter.com -- c/o Taylor Porter Brooks & Phillips.
CCG of Louisiana, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jan Marie
Hayden -- jhayden@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson.

Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Creditor Committee,
represented by Tristan E. Manthey -- tmanthey@hellerdraper.com --
Heller, Draper, Patrick, Horn & Dabney


LULAROE LLC: Harvey Seeks Minimum Wages & OT under Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN HARVEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. LULAROE, LLC, a California limited
liability corporation; HOWROYDWRIGHT EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, INC. D/B/A
APPLEONE, a California corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. BC688401 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 13, 2017),
seeks to recover minimum wages and overtime wages under California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants had a consistent policy of
violating state wage and hour laws by, among other failing to pay
at least minimum wages for all hours worked; filing to pay
overtime compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours per
day, 12 hours per day, and/or 40 hours per week; failing to
provide proper meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof;
willfully failing to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage
statements; and failing to pay all wages due upon separation of
employment.

Lularoe is in the business of retail clothing sales.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott B. Cooper, Esq.
          Samantha A. Smith, Esq.
          THE COOPER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          4000 Barranca Parkway, Suite 250
          Irvine, California 92604
          Telephone: (949) 724 9200
          Facsimile: (949) 724 9255
          E-mail: scott@cooper-firm.com
                  samantha@cooper-finn.com

               - and -

          Christopher Markelz
          OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER MARKELZ
          200 N. Main, 2nd Floor
          Santa Ana, CA 92701
          Telephone: (714) 361 4188
          Facsimile: (714) 881 5445
          E-mail: info@markelzlaw.com


MARSHALLS OF CA: Discovery Order in "Williams" Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned MICHAEL WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY Respondent, MARSHALLS OF CA, LLC, Real
Party in Interest, No. S227228 (Cal.), is a representative action
seeking civil penalties on behalf of the State of California and
aggrieved employees statewide for alleged wage and hour
violations.  In the course of discovery, plaintiff Michael
Williams sought contact information for fellow California
employees.  When the defendant employer, Marshalls of CA, LLC,
resisted, Williams filed a motion to compel.  The trial court
granted the motion as to the store where Williams worked, but
denied it as to every other California store, conditioning any
renewed motion for discovery on Williams sitting for a deposition
and showing some merit to the action.  Williams petitioned the
Court of Appeal to compel the trial court to vacate its discovery
order.  The Court of Appeal denied the writ, and the Supreme Court
of California granted review to consider the scope of discovery
available in PAGA actions.

The state Supreme Court held that in the absence of privilege, the
right to discovery in this state is a broad one, to be construed
liberally so that parties may ascertain the strength of their case
and at trial the truth may be determined.  The state Supreme
Court's prior decisions and those of the Courts of Appeal firmly
establish that in non-PAGA class actions, the contact information
of those a plaintiff purports to represent is routinely
discoverable as an essential prerequisite to effectively seeking
group relief, without any requirement that the plaintiff first
show good cause.  Nothing in the characteristics of a PAGA suit,
essentially a qui tam action filed on behalf of the state to
assist it with labor law enforcement, affords a basis for
restricting discovery more narrowly, nor, on this record, do other
objections interposed in the trial court support the trial court's
order, the state Supreme Court held.

Accordingly, the state Supreme Court reverses.

A full-copy text of the state Supreme Court's July 13, 2017,
decision is available at https://is.gd/HMQCWu from Leagle.com.

Capstone Law, Glenn A. Danas-- Glenn.Danas@CapstoneLawyers.com --
Ryan Wu -- Ryan.Wu@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Robert Drexler --
Robert.Drexler@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Stan Karas --
Stan.Karans@CapstoneLawyers.com -- and Liana Carter --
Lina.Carter@CapstoneLawyers.com -- for Petitioner.
Cohelan Khoury & Singer and Michael D. Singer --
msinger@ckslaw.com --  for California Employment Lawyers

Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Cynthia Rice for California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.,
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center and National Employment Law Project as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

The Turley Law Firm, William Turley, David T. Mara and Jamie Serb,
7428 Trade St., San Diego CA 92121 for Consumer Attorneys of
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.

Littler Mendelson, Robert G. Hulteng -- rhulteng@littler.com --
Amy Todd-Gher, Esq. -- atodd-gher@littler.com -- Kyle W. Nageotte,
Esq., Joshua J. Cliffe, Esq. -- jcliffe@littler.com -- Emily E.
O'Connor, Esq. -- eoconnor@littler.com -- and Scott D. Helsinger
for Real Party in Interest.

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Phil Goldberg -- pgolberg@shb.com --
Christopher E. Appel -- cappel@shb.com -- and Patrick Gregory --
Gregory@.shb.com -- for National Association of Manufacturers,
American Coatings Association and NFIB Small Business Legal Center
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Call & Jensen, Julie R. Trotter, Jamin S. Soderstrom --
jamin@soderstormlawfirm.com -- and Delavan J. Dickson for Retail
Litigation Center, Inc., California Retailers Association and
California Grocers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real
Party in Interest.

Jackson Lewis, Lisa Barnett Sween -- Lisa.Sween@jacksonlewis.com -
- Natalja M. Fulton, Dylan B. Carp -- CarpD@jacksonlewis.com --
and Douglas G.A. Johnston for Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc.,
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Pahl & McCay, Stephen D. Pahl, Karen Kubala McCay kmccay@pahl-
mccay.com  and Julie Bonnel-Rogers jrogers@pahl-mccay.com --  for
California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Real Party in Interest.

O'Melveny & Myers, Apalla U. Chopra,achopra@omm.com -- Adam J.
Karr akarr@omm.com -- Ryan W. Rutledge -- rrutledge@omm.com --
Andrew Lichtenstein -- alichtenstein@omm.com -- Christina N.
Pacudan -- cpacudan@omm.com -- for The Employers Group as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Haynes and Boone, Mary-Christine Sungaila --
mcsungaila@haynesboone.com -- and Martin M. Ellison --
mellison@bsfllp.com -- for International Association of Defense
Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.


MASSACHUSETTS: Class Action Challenges Voter Cutoff Law
-------------------------------------------------------
Boston Globe reports that Gladys Vega has been registering new
voters in Chelsea since the early 1990s, an eternity in political
time.  But one of her biggest challenges has stayed constant.

"Every election, when I run campaigns in September, my team and I
literally have to beg people to get registered to vote," said
Vega, executive director of the Chelsea Collaborative, a nonprofit
serving immigrants.  "But come October, close to the election,
they're the ones chasing me.  But by then, they can't vote in that
year's election because of the deadline."

Ns. Vega is referring to the voter cutoff law, nearly 25 years
old, which establishes a deadline 20 days before Election Day for
voters to register.  The Chelsea Collaborative is part of a class
action lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts last November challenging the constitutionality of
the cutoff.  The trial, which started on July 5, is still
underway.

Whether or not the current law is unconstitutional, though, there
is no good argument for keeping the archaic 20-day rule in place.
It only serves to discourage registration.  Ms. Vega testified to
that effect in the trial.  She said that as media coverage on an
impending election intensifies, voters naturally become more
interested in it and want to register.  By that time, however,
they've missed the cutoff date.  A US Census Bureau survey showed
that nearly 1 in 5 eligible voters in Massachusetts said they were
not registered to vote because they had missed the cutoff date.
Many are not even aware that there is a deadline -- ignorance
about the law is rampant.

"We're a state that has a law that needlessly disenfranchises
voters," said Matt Segal, the ACLU's legal director. "The
constitution recognizes voting as fundamentally important, so we
didn't think the cutoff law was compatible with that."

The lawsuit alleges the deadline is arbitrary and that it
disproportionately affects young, elderly, and low-income
residents, and people of color. The secretary of state's office,
in charge of managing elections, defends the rule, saying it is
necessary to ensure an orderly election process.  However,
Massachusetts already allows for early voting, which means one can
register to vote and then cast a ballot five days later but still
ahead of Election Day; also, electronic voter registration was
recently enacted.  The current capabilities of the state
bureaucracy can surely process registrations without a 20-day
deadline.

Experts say no other election reform is more effective at
increasing voter turnout than allowing same-day registration. In
the 2012 presidential election, for example, the average voter
turnout was over 10 percent higher in states that let residents
register on Election Day. More than a dozen states -- including
neighboring Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont -- have enacted
same-day registration.

The 20-day rule, as a matter of public policy, is hopelessly
outdated.  Regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit, Massachusetts
legislators should make voting more friendly.  Enhancing access to
the ballot takes on particular significance now, given the threats
to voting rights pushed by the Trump administration at the federal
level.  Enacting same-day registration is a golden opportunity for
the Commonwealth to take a stand. [GN]


MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL: Faces "Velazquez" Lawsuit Under ERISA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Velazquez, individually and as representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the Massachusetts
Financial Services Company Defined Contribution Plan and the
Massachusetts Financial Services Company MFSavings Retirement
Plan, Plaintiff, v. Massachusetts Financial Services Company d/b/a
MFS Investment Management, the Massachusetts Financial Services
Company Retirement Committee, the Massachusetts Financial Services
Company Retirement Investment Committee, MFS Service Center, Inc.,
and John Does 1-30, Case No. 1:17-cv-11249-RWZ (D. Mass., July 7,
2017), alleges that Defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties and engaged in prohibited transactions with respect to the
Plans in violation of ERISA, to the detriment of the Plans and
their participants and beneficiaries.

Defendants have used the Plans as an opportunity to promote MFS
Service Center, Inc.'s mutual fund business and maximize profits
at the expense of the Plans and their participants, says the
complaint. Defendants loaded the Plans primarily with MFS's
investment offerings, without investigating whether Plan
participants would be better served by investments managed by
unaffiliated companies.

The MFS Defined Contribution Plan is an employee pension benefit
plan.  MFS Service Center, Inc. is the plan sponsor.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jason M. Leviton, Esq.
     Bradley J. Vettraino, Esq.
     BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
     155 Federal Street, Suite 400
     Boston, MA 0211 0
     Phone: (617) 398-5600
     Fax: (617) 507-6020
     E-mail: jason@blockesq.com
             bradley@blockesq.com

        - and -

     Kai H. Richter, Esq.
     Carl F. Engstrom, Esq.
     Eleanor Frisch, Esq.
     NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
     4600 IDS Center
     80 South Eighth St.
     Minneapolis, MN 55402
     Phone: (612) 256-3200
     E-mail: krichter@nka.com
             cengstrom@nka.com
             efrisch@nka.com


MATTRESS FIRM: "Herrera" Suit Seeks Drivers Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled RAFAEL HERRERA, MAURICIO ALTAMIREZ, JOSE
DIAZ, and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
MATTRESS FIRM, INC., a Foreign Profit Corporation, EDWIN V.
DELIVERY SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, EDWIN VINDAS,
individually, C.S.F. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Florida Corporation, and
FELIX PACHECO, individually, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-
22048-CMA (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs seek collective action
certification for a class of similarly situated persons:

   "all non-exempt delivery drivers hired by any of MATTRESS
   FIRM's subcontractors during the three years preceding this
   action, who classified as independent contractors, and who
   were not compensated at least the applicable overtime rate of
   time and a half their regular rate of pay pursuant to the FLSA
   for hours worked over 40 in a workweek".

The Plaintiffs initiated this action for unpaid overtime wages and
liquidated damages on June 1, 2017. The Complaint seeks damages
for Plaintiffs and others similarly situated for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiffs were employed as delivery
drivers. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were
joint employers of Plaintiffs for purposes of the FLSA under a
vertical joint employment relationship.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=8nkY9cCh

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andres F. Fernandez, Esq.
          Samantha M. Fraga-Lopez, Esq.
          Jeanette Escudero, Esq.
          BERENS, FERNANDEZ & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          2100 Ponce de Leon Blvd., PH-2
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 329 2990
          E-mail: Fernandez@berensfernandez.com
                  Fraga@berensfernandez.com
                  escudero@berensfernandez.com
                  pleadings@berensfernandez.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          David Alan Miklas, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DAVID MIKLAS, P.A.
          PO Box 12996
          Fort Pierce, FL 34979
          E-mail: David@miklasemploymentlaw.com

               - and -

          Ivan Izquierdo, Esq.
          IZQUIERDO & LEON LAW, PLLC
          8950 SW 74 Court
          Miami, FL 33156
          E-mail: izquierdo@ileonlaw.com

               - and -

          Pelayo M. Duran, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PELAYO DURAN, P.A.
          4640 NW 7th Street
          Miami, FL 33126
          E-mail: pleadings@pelayoduran.com
                  duranandassociates@gmail.com

               - and -

          Jamila Mensah, Esq.
          Heather Sherrod, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          Fulbright Tower
          1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
          Houston, TX 77010
          E-mail: Jamila.mensah@nortonrosefulbright.com
                  Heather.sherrod@nortonrosefulbright.com


MERCHANT ADVANCE: Court Extends Time to Serve in "Hemis"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued an Order Granting the Plaintiff's Motion for
alternative service and extension of time to serve in the case
captioned DR. GERALD H. BEMIS, SR., D.C., individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs, v. MERCHANT ADVANCE EXPRESS, INC., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 3:15-cv-1365-DRH-DGW (S.D. Ill.).

The Court held that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence
demonstrating that personal service has become impracticable on
defendants insofar as the usual means of service have proved to be
extremely difficult or inconvenient. In particular, Plaintiff has
submitted evidence establishing five separate attempts at service
on Mass Marketing Data, Inc., on four separate days that were
unsuccessful Plaintiff's attempts to ascertain additional
information on Mass Marketing Data via subpoena were unsuccessful.

Plaintiff has demonstrated four failed attempts on four separate
days to effect service. Again, Plaintiff's efforts to obtain more
information regarding Email Blast via subpoena were unsuccessful.
In light of the failed prior service attempts and apparent attempt
by the above-mentioned Defendants to evade service, the Court
finds that personal service is impracticable.

Pursuant to Rule 4.1(k) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,
under these circumstances service may be accomplished in another
manner." The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure also allow for
service by publications provided specific requirements are met and
procedures followed.

The Court also Orders Plaintiff to attempt service by publication
in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order, is
available at https://is.gd/rImNYS from Leagle.com

Dr Gerald H Bemis, Sr, Plaintiff, represented by David Max
Oppenheim -- david@classlawyers.com -- Bock & Hatch, LLC.

Dr Gerald H Bemis, Sr, Plaintiff, represented by John P. Orellana,
-- johno@classlawyers.com  Bock & Hatch, LLC, Kimberly Mahlow Watt
-- kimberly@classlawyers.com --  Bock & Hatch, LLC, Tod A. Lewis,
----- tod@classlawyers.com  Bock & Hatch, LLC & Phillip A. Bock --
phil@classlawyers.com --, Bock & Hatch, LLC.

Merchant Advance Express, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam
Stein -- astein@herrick.com -- Herrick, Feinstein LLP & Carol
Michele Goodman -- cgoodman@herrick.com -- Herrick, Feinstein LLP.

Merchant Advance Express, Inc., ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented
by Adam Stein, Herrick, Feinstein LLP & Carol Michele Goodman,
Herrick, Feinstein LLP.

Merchant Advance Express, Inc., Cross Claimant, represented by
Adam Stein, Herrick, Feinstein LLP & Carol Michele Goodman,
Herrick, Feinstein LLP.


METRO AIR: Faces "Vizcarra" Suit Seeking to Recoup Overtime Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER VIZCARRA, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, PLAINTIFF, vs. METRO AIR SERVICE INC., a corporation;
and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, DEFENDANTS, Case No. BC 667909,
seeks to recover alleged unpaid wages and interest thereon for
failure to pay all double-time hours worked at the double-time
rate of pay; failure to provide legally compliant meal periods
and/or pay meal period premium wages; failure to provide legally
complaint rest breaks and/or pay rest break premium wages; unpaid
vested vacation wages; statutory penalties for failure to provide
accurate wage statements; waiting time penalties in the form of
continuation wages for failure to timely pay employees; injunctive
relief and other equitable relief; and reasonable attorney's fees
pursuant to the Labor Code.

METRO AIR SERVICES services HVAC components.  Plaintiff worked at
and/or for Defendants in California as non-exempt, hourly
employee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph Lavi, Esq.
     Andrea Rosenkranz, Esq.
     LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
     8889 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 200
     Beverly Hills, CA 90211
     Phone: (310)432-0000
     Fax: (310) 432-0001
     E-mail: ilavi@lelawfirm.com
             arosenkranz@lelawfirm.com

        - and -

     Sahag Majarian II, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
     18250 Ventura Boulevard
     Tarzana, CA 91356
     Phone: (818) 609-0807
     Fax: (818) 609-0892
     E-mail: sahagii@aol.com


METROPOLITAN TRANSPO: Faces Suit Over Safe Service Failure
----------------------------------------------------------
Frank Eltman, writing for Stamford Advocate, reports that even
before the start of a two-month track renovation project at New
York's Pennsylvania Station that's expected to disrupt life for
hundreds of thousands, some frustrated Long Island Rail Road
riders filed a lawsuit over its chronic shutdowns, delays and
packed trains that they say are unacceptable.

It is believed to be the first such legal action by riders over
the most recent problems with rail lines running in and out of
Penn Station.

"It's getting unsafe. People are fighting because it's so
unbearable. The anxiety is out of control," says Meredith Jacobs,
vice president of sales for a Manhattan dress manufacturer and a
plaintiff in a lawsuit filed in June.

The suit against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the
LIRR's parent organization, claims breach of contract, negligence
and "intentional infliction of emotional distress," listing a
litany of complaints alleging the railroad is failing to provide
on-time, safe and reliable service. It seeks unspecified damages.

"The mornings tend to not be as bad, but the evenings are a
nightmare," says Jacobs, who has been riding the LIRR from her
home in Wantagh to Penn Station for 24 years. "The trains and
platforms are usually standing-room-only."

An MTA spokesman said the authority does not comment on pending
litigation.

Paul Liggieri, an LIRR commuter and attorney who filed the
lawsuit, hopes the suit, even if it fails, elicits changes for
commuters. "We are requesting hundreds of documents be turned
over. I am hoping they will help give me answers for my clients."

Liggieri is also waiting to learn whether a state judge will grant
class-action status to the lawsuit, making it possible for
hundreds, if not thousands, of commuters eligible to join in.
The lawsuit comes as Amtrak, which operates Penn Station, presses
on with infrastructure improvements, including track and switch
replacement, at the nation's busiest rail station.

In order to accommodate the work, which will require some of the
station's 21 tracks to be taken out of service, the LIRR, New
Jersey Transit and Amtrak itself have altered service schedules.
Those commuting from Long Island are being told to consider going
to stations the LIRR serves in Brooklyn and Queens and
transferring to the city subways. The LIRR also is adding cars to
all trains to accommodate more riders on fewer trains into Penn
Station.

The epicenter of activity in New Jersey likely will be Hoboken,
where NJ Transit is diverting trains that would normally go into
New York. An estimated 15,000 extra passengers will have the
option of crowding onto already-packed Port Authority Trans-Hudson
trains or taking ferries.

Joe Lhota, who was named as MTA chairman, has said the agency will
make adjustments to its service plan on the fly, assessing how
things go after both the morning and afternoon commutes on July 3,
the first day the changes go into effect. "We're going to remain
flexible and evaluate what makes sense and what doesn't make
sense," he told reporters.

The LIRR, which began in 1834, is the busiest commuter railroad in
North America. It has over 700 miles of track on 11 branches,
stretching 120 miles from Manhattan to Montauk. Grousing about
LIRR service has been a staple of life for Long Islanders for
decades, but a spate of breakdowns, power failures and minor
derailments in recent years has brought many to a boiling point.
"I can count on one hand how often that train is on time," says
Claire Kalakowski, a sales analyst for a Manhattan information
services business who is not a party to the lawsuit.

"I used to call my boss whenever I was going to be late, but I
changed that," she said. "Now I call when I'm going to be on time.
I hardly call at all." [GN]


MILLWOOD INC: "Yu" Suit Seeks Certification of FLSA Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled Jorge Yu, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Millwood, Inc.
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-324-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the parties jointly
ask the Court to conditionally certify a collective action
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and authorize notice.

The Plaintiff seeks to prosecute this action on behalf of himself
and other similarly situated hourly and piece rate employees of
Defendant's Cudahy, Wisconsin plant, who Plaintiff alleges were
each similarly subject to common policies and practices which
denied them proper compensation for each hour worked in violation
of the FLSA.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=v4RzJPhW

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Larry A. Johnson, Esq.
          Summer H. Murshid, Esq.
          Timothy P. Maynard Esq.
          HAWKS QUINDEL, S.C.
          222 E Erie Street
          Suite 210
          P.O. Box 442
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 271 8650
          Facsimile: (414) 271 8442
          E-mail: ljohnson@hq-law.com
                  smurshid@hq-law.com
                  tmaynard@hq-law.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Tiffany L. Hutchens, Esq.
          Frank A. Gumina, Esq.
          HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP
          555 East Wells Street
          Milwaukee, WI 53202-3819
          Telephone: (414) 273 2100
          Facsimile: (414) 223 5000
          E-mail: tiffany.hutchens@huschblackwell.com
                  frank.gumina@huschblackwell.com

               - and -

          Karen Soehnlen McQueen, Esq.
          KRUGLIAK, WILKINS, GRIFFITHS & DOUGHERTY CO., L.P.A.
          4775 Munson St NW
          Canton, OH 44718
          Telephone: (330) 497 0700
          Facsimile: (330) 497 4020
          E-mail: kmcqueen@kwgd.com


MR. HEATER: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer to SAC in "Burger"
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion that affirmed the District Court's
decision to sustain without leave to amend manufacturer's demurrer
to the second amended complaint in the case captioned MATTHEW
BURGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MR. HEATER, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents, No. G049505 (Cal. App.).

This appeal challenges the trial court's decision to sustain,
without leave to amend, the manufacturers' demurrer to the second
amended complaint's UCL cause of action.

The second amended complaint alleged three causes of action
against the manufacturers and LHC as follows: (1) violation of the
Unfair Competition Law (UCL); (2) false advertising; and (3)
violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

Burger's UCL claim against the manufacturers was based on a theory
they aided and abetted Lowe's Home Center's (LHC) criminal conduct
in selling the heater. Burger asserted the trial court incorrectly
ruled the manufacturers could not be liable for aiding and
abetting because it was not alleged they were a retail merchant or
that they could have prevented LHC's purported crime.

Relevant to this appeal, the trial court sustained without leave
to amend the manufacturers' demurrer to the Derivative UCL claim.
However, it overruled the manufacturers' demurrer to the false
advertising and CLRA causes of action. With respect to LHC, the
court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the false
advertising and CLRA claims but allowed Burger to proceed on the
UCL claim against LHC.

Burger filed a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
against LHC and the manufacturers on the remaining causes of
action. He argued there was no defense to the causes of action and
the undisputed evidence supported liability.

LHC filed a summary judgment motion, arguing the sole remaining
claim against it (the UCL cause of action) failed as a matter of
law because the portable heater was not covered by section 19881,
subdivision (a).

The Cal. App. noted the trial court correctly applied the basic
rules of statutory interpretation after it determined section
19881 did not define any of its operative terms and there was no
legal authority on this issue.

Reviewing the matter de novo, and applying the same legal
principles, the Cal. App. reaches the same conclusion as the trial
court.  Section 19881 does not apply to the type of portable
heater at issue in this case.

Burger maintains the SAC adequately pled the elements of two forms
of secondary liability, (1) aiding and abetting, and (2)
conspiracy.

The demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend because
the manufacturers' liability is dependent upon the commission of
an underlying tort by LHC, a claim found to lack merit in our
Burger I opinion. "Plaintiffs cannot proceed with this claim of
aiding and abetting, until such time as they have properly alleged
discrimination by a particular employer or group of employers

Since the Cal. App. decided in Burger I that Burger cannot state
the Principal UCL claim against LHC as a matter of law, his causes
of action based on secondary liability must fail.

Unless LCH committed the underlying tort alleged here (the UCL
claim), the manufacturers cannot be held liable under either a
conspiracy or aider and abettor theory. This court affirmed the
trial court's determination LCH is not liable for violating the
UCL. (Burger I, supra, G049771.) This ruling is now the law of the
case. Accordingly, the Cal. App. said it must conclude the
demurrer relating to the manufacturers' secondary liability was
properly sustained without leave to amend.

The Cal. App. rejects Burger's argument the decision in Burger I
is irrelevant to our review of the demurrer ruling. He asserts law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel are
inapplicable.

The doctrine of law of the case operates primarily within the
proceedings in a single lawsuit and deals with the effect of the
first appellate decision on a subsequent retrial or appeal.
Under that doctrine, the decision of an appellate court, stating a
rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively
establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of
the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same
case."'  The doctrine promotes finality by preventing re-
litigation of issues previously decided.

In Burger I, the Cal. App. affirmed the trial court's ruling the
Principal UCL claim against LHC was not viable. Under the law of
the case doctrine, Burger is prohibited from reviving this cause
of action against LHC on remand. The determination LHC cannot be
held directly liable for UCL violations precludes Burger from
pursing secondary theories of liability against other defendants.

The manufacturers' derivative liability is dependent upon the
commission of an underlying tort by LHC. Contrary to Burger's
contention, the Burger I decision precludes him from re-litigating
the claim against the primary tortfeasor. And without proof of the
underlying tort, there can be no secondary liability.

The judgment is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s July 17, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Td3hsA from Leagle.com.

The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin, 225 S Olive St, Suite 102,
Los Angeles, CA 90012  Hodes Milman Liebeck Mosier, Jason M.
Caruso -- ason.caruso@ndlf.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Greenberg Gross, Wayne R. Gross -- wgross@ggtriallaw.com -- Evan
C. Borges, -- eborges@ggtriallaw.com -- and Michael E. Lopez for
Defendants and Respondents.


NEW HAMPSHIRE: Lack of Foster Care Reform May Spark Suit v. DCYF
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Solomon, writing for New Hampshire Union Leader, reports that
first-term state Rep. Sean Morrison, R-Epping, became a foster
parent two years ago, even though he and his wife have two
children of their own.  "We just wanted to help the children," he
said.

After two years in the program and now with his second foster
child, Mr. Morrison has witnessed the operation of the foster care
system from the inside, and he doesn't like what he sees.

"They've been talking about a foster parent bill of rights since
2010, and it's never happened," said Morrison, alluding to the
Division for Children, Youth and Families, which administers the
foster care program in New Hampshire.  "I want to sponsor a bill
and put it up for legislation so it becomes law.  Right now, we
are flat out told: You have no rights."

Foster parents are a key part of the child protective system, but
can be left with no voice in the fate of children they often come
to love as one of their own.  Many hope a "bill of rights" for
foster parents now in the works will give them stronger standing
in a system that they say too often treats them as second-class
citizens.

DCYF has been working closely with the N.H. Foster and Adoptive
Parents Association (NHFAPA) and the Educational and Training
Partnership at Granite State College to craft a foster parent bill
of rights, according to DCYF spokesman Jake Leon.

"The NHFAPA feels strongly that it's time for New Hampshire foster
parents to develop their own bill of rights to affirm the dignity
of foster parents," he said.

The bill of rights would require that foster parents be given
notice regarding child placement decisions; it would allow them a
voice in court and in planning visitation between children and
their birth parents; and it would give foster parents
consideration if adoption of the child becomes the primary goal.

Michele Woltering, a foster parent for the past 10 years, is
president of the state Foster and Adoptive Parents Association.
She says the bill of rights will soon be posted online as a
petition to gather statewide support for legislation when the
Legislature reconvenes in January.

"We really want to focus on making sure that our foster parents
are heard and taken care of, and that things are appropriate
across the board for foster families . . . that they are all
treated the same, and treated with the same respect," she said.

"The foster parent bill of rights will hopefully protect the
foster parents' right to be heard and advocate for the children in
the courtroom and with DCYF," she said.  "We're the ones raising
these children.  We see their behavior and emotions surrounding
everything going on in their lives, and if the judge doesn't know
the whole story, how can the judge assess the situation?"

Lack of standing

Mr. Morrison was surprised by the lack of standing foster parents
have, as the fate of neglected or abused children they care for is
debated within the courts and state agencies.

"I have witnessed the completely closed and broken system that is
DCYF," Mr. Morrison said.  "A class action lawsuit against DCYF
may very well be organized by foster parents if improvements don't
happen fast."

In late May, Mr. Morrison submitted an eight-page report to Gov.
Chris Sununu on the "Child Services System in NH," endorsing the
reforms recommended by the outside review of DCYF last year, and
adding his own observations as a foster parent.

He has since met with D.J. Bettencourt, a policy adviser for
Sununu, as well as lawmakers on the Child and Family Law
Committee.  "I do not intend to let this matter simply go away,"
he said.  "Kids are being retraumatized in the current system."

The state is desperately in need of more foster families as the
opioid crisis forces more children into foster care. The number of
children removed from homes with substance abuse problems went
from 85 in 2010 to 329 in 2015, according to the NH Children's
Trust.

Yet many find foster parents find their experience in the system
so frustrating, that the turnover rate is high.

"A lot of that is due to lack of support for the foster families
in every respect," said Ms. Woltering, "whether it's family,
community or the state.  The support from the state is a
necessity, but doesn't always come through."

Ms. Woltering takes a more moderate view of DCYF than Mr.
Morrison, but in 10 years of fostering has had many experiences
that reinforce her position that a bill of rights is needed.  She
has attended every court hearing involving foster children in her
care, but has only been asked to speak on rare occasion.

"Some judges ask for updates on the children, but most do not,"
she said.  "It all depends on the judge you get."

Wanting to be heard

Mr. Morrison said the state would have more success retaining
foster parents and better outcomes for children at risk if it paid
more attention to what the foster parents have to say.

He has a long list of recommended changes in policy and procedure
that he submitted in his report to the governor, including
mandatory drug testing for birth parents prior to reunification if
the parents lost custody due to drug addiction.

One of the most painful experiences for foster parents, he said,
is to see a child reunited with birth parents over the objection
of foster parents, and then to see the same child returned to the
foster care system in a year or less.

"Drug testing is very sporadic now, if at all, even though it is
supported by the state in the Child Protection Act," said
Mr. Morrison.  "DCYF's current position is that if drugs are not
being used in front of the child, there is little they can do.
They rely on a judge's order for drug testing rather than making
drug testing and screening part of their recommended orders to the
court."

Mr. Leon confirmed that drug testing is at the discretion of DCYF
and the courts, even if substance abuse was the basis for the out-
of-home placement.

"Safety of children is our primary concern," he said. "DCYF may
recommend to the court that parents be drug tested prior to and
during the reunification period."

High 'recidivism'

Paying more attention to foster parents could also help the state
reduce the so-called recidivism rate among foster children,
according to Morrison. He cites data from the Annie Casey
Foundation that show New Hampshire has a high percentage of
children reunified with birth parents and ending up back in the
DCYF system within one year, based on 2013 data.

"Nearly one in four children reunified wind up back in the
system," he said.

Mr. Leon says that 24 percent recidivism rate is misleading.

New Hampshire includes both child protection and juvenile justice
programs in the data it provides, while other states may only
report their child protection data to the national database, he
said.

According to DCYF data from 2016, New Hampshire children who are
abused and neglected have a 12.6 percent likelihood of ending back
in the system after reunification with birth parents, close to the
national average, according to Mr. Leon.

"Since the publication of the Casey 2013 report, the national
standard for calculating reentry rates is being revised to account
for these discrepancies," he said. [GN]


NEW YORK: Refund Checks Mailed to Class Members
-----------------------------------------------
Land Line Mag reports that on July 7 more than 100,000 tax refund
checks were mailed to truckers who are members of a class action
lawsuit brought by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers
Association against the state of New York for unconstitutionally
discriminatory registration and decal taxes.

The state of New York issued a check on May 17 for $44.4 million
under a settlement it reached with OOIDA in September 2016
regarding its imposition of the unconstitutional registration and
decal taxes. OOIDA had previously obtained a court ruling that the
taxes violated the U.S. Constitution, and an injunction
prohibiting New York from collecting the taxes in the future.

"We fought against a number of similar taxes back in the 1980s and
1990s and the states lost in every one of those cases," said OOIDA
President Jim Johnston. "We were shocked that New York even
thought they could get away with this. The amount for the New York
HUT decal is $19, which may seem insignificant, but if other
states were to do the same thing, it would be huge -- collectively
and in administrative costs."

The Association had challenged the taxes as unconstitutionally
discriminatory against out-of-state truckers who drive their
trucks mostly in other states -- in contrast to New York-based
truckers, who drive a disproportionately higher number of miles in
New York. OOIDA established that the challenged taxes resulted in
a higher per-mile tax rate being imposed on out-of-state trucks,
and therefore violated the Commerce Clause.

The class action lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of taxes
that imposed $15 for a certificate of registration and a $4 decal
charge on all trucks using New York state highways. The taxes were
imposed not only on New York-based trucks, which log
proportionately higher miles in New York but were also charged on
trucks based outside of New York, which are driven mostly in
states other than New York.

"If there are other states that think tacking on flat fees to
their state truck taxes won't be noticed as an economic burden to
interstate commerce, they need to understand this is not a good
idea," said OOIDA's Johnston. "We will take them to court in a
heartbeat."

The Association's successful lawsuit against New York's Department
of Taxation and Finance was concluded on April 19, when the court
issued its final order and judgment, paving the way for the refund
phase to proceed.

According to OOIDA's counsel, Daniel Cohen, Esq. --
dec@cullenlaw.com -- of the Cullen Law Firm in Washington, D.C.,
carriers in the class are entitled to keep refunds for taxes paid
exclusively by them. However, Cohen stated that the court further
ordered that carriers who charged back any registration or decal
payments to owner-operators are required to pass through or
reimburse the full amount of the tax refunds they receive for such
tax payments to those owner-operators, without regard to any
claims or setoffs. Any such refunds that are not passed through
must be returned to the Cullen Law Firm's office in Washington,
D.C., within six months after the date the refund payment was sent
to the class member.

According to the law firm, all checks will expire after 90 days,
so class members must take particular care to deposit their checks
promptly after they receive them.

Cohen further advised that the court's order provides that all
disputes regarding the reimbursement of owner-operators will be
referred to a mediator designated by the court. Any disputes must
be received in writing by the Cullen Law Firm, PLLC, 1101 30th
Street NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20007 within six months after
the date the refund payment was sent to the class member. [GN]


NOBLE ENERGY: Faces "Virden" Suit Alleging Misclassification
------------------------------------------------------------
KELBY VIRDEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. NOBLE ENERGY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
4:17-cv-02094 (S.D. Tex., July 7, 2017), alleges that Defendant
did not pay plaintiff overtime as required by the Fair Labor
Standards Act, instead Defendant improperly classified Virden and
those similarly situated as independent contractors, paying a
daily rate with no overtime compensation.

Noble Energy, Inc. is a global oil and gas exploration and
production company operating worldwide and throughout the United
States, including in Texas.  Virden and the putative class members
worked for Noble as quality control inspectors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
     Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
     Jessica M. Bresler, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77005
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Fax: 713-352-3300
     E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
             adunlap@mybackwages.com
             litkin@mybackwages.com
             jbresler@mybackwages.com

        - and -

     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Fax: (713) 877-8065
     E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


ORION HEALTHCORP: Singh-Narayan Seeks Unpaid OT under Labor Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rookminee Singh-Narayan, and Jairaj Yamraj, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly-situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Orion
Healthcorp, Inc., and Physicians Practice Plus LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 709520/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 13, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages under the New York Labor
Law.

The Plaintiffs complain on behalf of themselves and a class of
other similarly-situated current and former employees who worked
for the Defendants, individually, and/or jointly, pursuant to the
NY Civil Practice Law and Rules, within the six-year period
preceding the filing of this action to the date of disposition of
this action, that they:

     1) were employed by Defendants within the State of New York
        as manual workers;

     2) are entitled to maximum liquidated damages (for the
        period after April 9, 2011) and interest for being paid
        overtime wages and non-overtime wages later than weekly;
        and

     3) entitled to costs and attorneys' fees, pursuant to the
        New York Labor Law, and the regulations thereunder; as
        well as an injunction prohibiting Defendants from
        continuing to violate the weekly payment requirement for
        manual workers set forth in NYLL.

Orion Healthcorp, incorporated on July 20, 1984, is a healthcare
services organization providing outsourced business services to
physicians.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
          Abdul Hassan Law Group, PLLC
          215-28 Hillside Avenue,
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: 718 740 1000
          Facsimile: 718 740 2000
          E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Ruling in Securities Suit Partly Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
in part and vacated in part the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the
securities fraud action against Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
("Petrobas") and various other defendants.

Petrobras is a multinational oil and gas company headquartered in
Brazil and majority-owned by the Brazilian government.  Though
Petrobras was once among the largest companies in the world, its
value declined precipitously after the exposure of a multi-year,
multi-billion-dollar money-laundering and kickback scheme,
prompting a class action by holders of Petrobras equity and debt
securities ("Plaintiffs") against multiple defendants
("Defendants"): Petrobras and certain wholly owned subsidiaries
(the "Subsidiaries"; collectively with Petrobras, the "Petrobras
Defendants"1); former officers and directors of the Petrobras
Defendants; several underwriters of Petrobras debt securities (the
"Underwriter Defendants"2); and Petrobras's independent auditor.

The district court certified two classes for money damages under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3): the first asserts claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and the second asserts
claims under the Securities Act of 1933.  On appeal, the
appellants, the Petrobras Defendants and the Underwriter
Defendants, contested the Certification Order on two grounds.

First, the appellants challenged both class definitions insofar as
they include all otherwise eligible persons who purchased
Petrobras debt securities in "domestic transactions."  Because
Petrobras' debt securities do not trade on a domestic exchange,
the district court must assess each class member's over-the-
counter transactions for markers of domesticity under Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  The appellants
asserted that the need for such assessments precludes class
certification, particularly in light of concerns over the
availability and content of the necessary transaction records.

The Second Circuit first addressed the appellants' arguments
regarding the "implied" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 requirement of
"ascertainability," and took the opportunity to clarify the scope
of the contested ascertainability doctrine: a class is
ascertainable if it is defined using objective criteria that
establish a membership with definite boundaries.  The Second
Circuit found that the threshold requirement was met in this case.
However, the appellate court next held that the district court
committed legal error by finding that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement was satisfied without considering the need for
individual Morrison inquiries regarding domestic transactions.
The appellate court therefore vacate this portion of the
Certification Order.

Second, with regard to the Exchange Act Class, the Petrobras
defendants challenged the district court's finding that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under the
"fraud on the market" theory established in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).

The Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district
court's determination that the plaintiffs met their burden under
Basic with a combination of direct and indirect evidence of market
efficiency.  The appellate court therefore affirmed as to this
issue.

The case is IN RE PETROBRAS SECURITIES UNIVERSITIES SUPERANNUATION
SCHEME LIMITED, EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF
HAWAII, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER, Plaintiffs-
Appellees, PETER KALTMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, DIMENSIONAL EMERGING MARKETS VALUE FUND, DFA
INVESTMENT DIMENSIONS GROUP INC., on behalf of its series Emerging
Markets Core Equity Portfolio, Emerging Markets Social Core Equity
Portfolio and T.A. World ex U.S. Core Equity Portfolio, DFA
INVESTMENT TRUST COMPANY, on behalf of its series The Emerging
Markets Series, DFA AUSTRIA LIMITED, solely in its capacity as
responsible entity for the Dimensional Emerging Markets Trust, DFA
International Core Equity Fund and DFA International Vector Equity
Fund by Dimensional Fund Advisors Canada ULC solely in its
capacity as Trustee, DIMENSIONAL FUNDS PLC, on behalf of its sub-
fund Emerging Markets Value Fund, DIMENSIONAL FUNDS ICVC, on
behalf of its sub-fund Emerging Markets Core Equity Fund, SKAGEN
AS, DANSKE INVEST MANAGEMENT A/S, DANSKE INVEST MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, NEW YORK CITY
POLICE PENSION FUND, BOARD OF EDUCATION RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT PENSION FUND, NEW YORK CITY
DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN, FORSTA AP-FONDEN, TRANSAMERICA INCOME
SHARES, INC., TRANSAMERICA FUNDS, TRANSAMERICA SERIES TRUST,
TRANSAMERICA PARTNERS PORTFOLIOS, JOHN HANCOCK VARIABLE INSURANCE
TRUST, JOHN HANCOCK FUNDS II, JOHN HANCOCK SOVEREIGN BOND FUND,
JOHN HANCOCK BOND TRUST, JOHN HANCOCK STRATEGIC SERIES, JOHN
HANCOCK INVESTMENT TRUST, JHF INCOME SECURITIES TRUST, JHF
INVESTORS TRUST, JHF HEDGED EQUITY & INCOME FUND, ABERDEEN
EMERGING MARKETS FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN
GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES FUND, ABERDEEN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY FUND,
each a series of Aberdeen Funds, ABERDEEN CANADA EMERGING MARKETS
FUND, ABERDEEN CANADA SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE GLOBAL FUND, ABERDEEN
CANADA SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL FUND, ABERDEEN CANADA
FUNDS EAFE PLUS EQUITY FUND AND ABERDEEN CANADA FUNDS GLOBAL
EQUITY FUND, each a series of Aberdeen Canada Funds, ABERDEEN EAFE
PLUS ETHICAL FUND, ABERDEEN EAFE PLUS FUND, ABERDEEN EAFE PLUS SRI
FUND, ABERDEEN EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN FULLY HEDGED
INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES FUND, ABERDEEN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY FUND,
ABERDEEN GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL
ETHICAL WORLD EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL RESPONSIBLE WORLD
EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL WORLD EQUITY DIVIDEND FUND, ABERDEEN
GLOBAL WORLD EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN GLOBAL WORLD RESOURCES EQUITY
FUND, ABERDEEN EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN ETHICAL
WORLD EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN MULTI-ASSET FUND, ABERDEEN WORLD
EQUITY FUND, ABERDEEN LATIN AMERICA EQUITY FUND, INC., AAAID
EQUITY PORTFOLIO, ALBERTA TEACHERS RETIREMENT FUND, AON HEWITT
INVESTMENT CONSULTING, INC., AURION INTERNATIONAL DAILY EQUITY
FUND, BELL ALIANT REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC., BMO GLOBAL EQUITY
CLASS, CITY OF ALBANY PENSION PLAN, DESJARDINS DIVIDEND INCOME
FUND, DESJARDINS EMERGING MARKETS FUND, DESJARDINS GLOBAL ALL
CAPITAL EQUITY FUND, DESJARDINS OVERSEAS EQUITY VALUE FUND, DEVON
COUNTY COUNCIL GLOBAL EMERGING MARKET FUND, DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL
GLOBAL EQUITY FUND, DGIA EMERGING MARKETS EQUITY FUND L.P., ERIE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, FIRST TRUST/ABERDEEN EMERGING OPPORTUNITY
FUND, GE UK PENSION COMMON INVESTMENT FUND, HAPSHIRE COUNTY
COUNCIL GLOBAL EQUITY PORTFOLIO, LONDON BOROUGH OF HOUNSLOW
SUPPERANNUATION FUND, MACKENZIE UNIVERSAL SUSTAINABLE
OPPORTUNITIES CLASS, MARSHFIELD CLINIC, MOTHER THERESA CARE AND
MISSION TRUST, MTR CORPORATION LIMITED RETIREMENT SCHEME, MYRIA
ASSET MANAGEMENT EMERGENCE, NATIONAL PENSION SERVICE, NPS TRUST
ACTIVE 14, OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, WASHINGTON
STATE INVESTMENT BOARD, ABERDEEN LATIN AMERICAN INCOME FUND
LIMITED, ABERDEEN GLOBAL EX JAPAN PENSION FUND PPIT, FS
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY MOTHER FUND, NN INVESTMENT PARTNERS B.V.,
acting in the capacity of management company of the mutual fund NN
Global Equity Fund and in the capacity of management company of
the mutual fund NN Institutioneel Dividend Aandelen Fonds, NN
INVESTMENT PARTNERS LUXEMBOURG S.A., acting in the capacity of
management company SICAV and its Sub-Funds and NN (L) SICAV, for
and on behalf of NN (L) Emerging Markets High Dividend, NN (L)
FIRST, AURA CAPITAL LTD., WGI EMERGING MARKETS FUND, LLC, BILL AND
MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION TRUST, BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS SYSTEM, TRUSTEES OF THE ESTATE OF BERNICE PAUAHI BISHOP,
LOUIS KENNEDY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, KEN NGO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, JONATHAN MESSING, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, CITY OF PROVIDENCE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, UNION ASSET
MANAGEMENT HOLDING AG, Plaintiffs, v. PETROLEO BRASILEIRO S.A.
PETROBRAS, BB SECURITIES LTD., MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &
SMITH INCORPORATED, BANK OF CHINA (HONG KONG) LIMITED, BANCA IMI,
S.P.A., SCOTIA CAPITAL (USA) INC., THEODORE MARSHALL HELMS,
PETROBRAS GLOBAL FINANCE B.V., PETROBRAS AMERICA INC., CITIGROUP
GLOBAL MARKETS INC., ITAU BBA USA SECURITIES, INC., J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC, MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC, MITSUBISHI UFJ
SECURITIES (USA), INC., HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC., STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, BANCO BRADESCO BBI S.A., Defendants-Appellants,
JOSE SERGIO GABRIELLI, SILVIO SINEDINO PINHEIRO, PAULO ROBERTO
COSTA, JOSE CARLOS COSENZA, RENATO DE SOUZA DUQUE, GUILLHERME DE
OLIVEIRA ESTRELLA, JOSE MIRANDA FORMIGL FILHO, MARIA DAS GRACAS
SILVA FOSTER, ALMIR GUILHERME BARBASSA, MARIANGELA MOINTEIRO
TIZATTO, JOSUE CHRISTIANO GOME DA SILVA, DANIEL LIMA DE OLIVEIRA,
JOSE RAIMUNDO BRANDA PEREIRA, SERVIO TULIO DA ROSA TINOCO, PAULO
JOSE ALVES, GUSTAVO TARDIN BARBOSA, ALEXANDRE QUINTAO FERNANDES,
MARCOS ANTONIO ZACARIAS, CORNELIS FRANCISCUS JOZE LOOMAN,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS AUDITORES INDEPENDENTES, Defendants, No.
16-1914-cv (2nd Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 opinion is available
at https://is.gd/aVt0Ey from Leagle.com.

JEREMY A. LIEBERMAN -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Mark I. Gross --
migross@pomlaw.com -- Emma Gilmore -- egilmore@pomlaw.com -- John
A. Keho -- jkehoe@pomlaw.com -- Brenda F. Szydlo --
bszydlo@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, New York, NY, for the
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

LEWIS J. LIMAN -- lliman@cgsh.com -- Jared Gerber --
jgerber@cgsh.com -- Mitchell A. Lowenthal -- mlowenthal@cgsh.com -
- Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, NY, for
Defendants-Appellants Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. -- Petrobras,
Theodore Marshall Helms, Petrobras Global Finance B.V., and
Petrobras America Inc.

JAY B. KASNER -- jay.kasner@skadden.com -- Boris Bershteyn --
boris.bershteyn@skadden.com -- Scott D. Musoff --
scott.musoff@skadden.com -- Jeremy A. Berman --
jeremy.berman@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, New York NY, for Defendants-Appellants BB Securities Ltd.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Bank of China
(Hong Kong) Limited, Banca IMI, S.p.A., Scotia Capital (USA) Inc.,
Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Itau BBA USA Securities, Inc., J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Mitsubishi UFJ
Securities (USA), Inc., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., Standard
Chartered Bank, and Banco Bradesco BBI S.A.


PHC INC: Maz Partners' Bid for New Trial Denied
-----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order disgorging share plus interest in
the case captioned MAZ PARTNERS LP, Individually and on Behalf of
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. BRUCE A. SHEAR, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 11-11049-PBS (D. Mass.), and denying
the motion for new trial.

The Court held a nine-day jury trial in this shareholder class
action arising from a corporate merger.

In this class action, the plaintiff, MAZ Partners LP, alleges in
Count I of its second amended complaint that the directors of PHC,
Inc., breached their fiduciary duty by approving inadequate
compensation for Class A shareholders in connection with PHC's
merger with Acadia Healthcare, Inc.  In Count II, MAZ contends
that one director, Bruce Shear, then CEO of PHC, breached his
fiduciary duty as PHC's controlling shareholder by negotiating a
$5 million sweetener for his Class B shares at the expense of the
Class A shareholders.  Finally, in Count III, MAZ alleges that
Acadia aided and abetted these breaches of fiduciary duty.

On March 10, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bruce
Shear and Acadia Healthcare, Inc.  On the special verdict form,
the jury answered:

   1. Has the plaintiff MAZ proven that Bruce Shear controlled a
majority of the PHC Board of Directors with regard to the Board's
decision to approve the merger? Yes_X No ___

   2. Has the defendant Bruce Shear proven that the merger was
entirely fair to the Class A shareholders? Yes ___ No X

   3. Has MAZ proven that, at the time of the merger, the class
suffered an economic loss caused by Shear's breach of fiduciary
duty to the Class A shareholders? Yes ___ No X

Pursuant to the instructions on the verdict form, the jury stopped
after finding no economic loss and did not answer subsequent
questions on aiding-and-abetting liability and damages.

Plaintiff MAZ Partners LP moves for judgment as a matter of law
or, in the alternative, for a new trial.  MAZ raises a number of
issues: (1) alleged inconsistency in the jury verdict, (2) the
appropriateness of one of the questions on the special verdict
form, (3) the availability of equitable remedies notwithstanding
the jury verdict, and (4) evidentiary error at trial. The
defendants respond to those issues and also raise three
alternative bases for a finding of non-liability.

The Court allows in part the motion for judgment as a matter of
law. The Court orders that Shear's pro rata share of the $5
million Class B premium be disgorged to the certified class.
Otherwise, the Court denied the motion. The Court denies the
motion for a new trial.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/4RmBgv from Leagle.com.

MAZ Partners LP, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Adam J.
Blander, Esq. -- ablander@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP, pro
hac vice.

MAZ Partners LP, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Chet B.
Waldman, Esq. -- cwaldman@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper Wolf Ross
& Jones, Nathaniel L. Orenstein --norenstein@bermandevalerio.com -
- Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo & Norman Berman
nberman@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt
& Pucillo.

MAZ Partners LP, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Blander, Wolf
Popper LLP, pro hac vice, Chet B. Waldman, Wolf Popper Wolf Ross &
Jones, Jeffrey W. Chambers, Wolf Popper LLP, pro hac vice,
Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt &
Pucillo, Norman Berman, Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt &
Pucillo & Patricia L. Avery -- pavery@wolfpopper.com  -- Wolf
Popper LLP, pro hac vice.

Bruce A. Shear, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme --
james.hulme@arentfox.com -- Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard
H. Freiman lfreiman@goulstomstorrs.com --Goulston & Storrs, PC,
Matthew M. Wright, Esq. -- matthew.wright@arentfox.com --  Arent
Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patel, -- nadia.patel@arentfox.com
-- Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski --
rzielinski@goulstonstorrs.com --, Goulston & Storrs.

Donald E. Robar, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme, Arent
Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston & Storrs, PC,
Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patel,
Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski, Goulston &
Storrs.

Douglas J. Smith, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme, Arent
Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston & Storrs, PC,
Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patel,
Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski, Goulston &
Storrs.

Howard W. Phillips, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme,
Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston &
Storrs, PC, Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia
A. Patel, Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski,
Goulston & Storrs.

William F. Grieco, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme, Arent
Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston & Storrs, PC,
Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patel,
Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski, Goulston &
Storrs.

David E. Dangerfield, Defendant, represented by James H. Hulme,
Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston &
Storrs, PC, Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia
A. Patel, Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice & Richard M. Zielinski,
Goulston & Storrs.

Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by Douglas
S. Curran, Esq. -- dcurran@cov.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, James
H. Hulme, Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman,
Goulston & Storrs, PC, Matthew M. Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac
vice, Nadia A. Patel, Arent Fox, LLP, pro hac vice, Richard M.
Zielinski, Goulston & Storrs & Whitney L. Becker, Esq. --
whitney.becker@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

Acadia Merger Sub, LLC, Defendant, represented by Douglas S.
Curran, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, James H. Hulme, Arent Fox, LLP, pro
hac vice, Leonard H. Freiman, Goulston & Storrs, PC, Matthew M.
Wright, Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patel, Arent Fox,
LLP, pro hac vice, Richard M. Zielinski, Goulston & Storrs &
Whitney L. Becker, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

MAZ Partners LP, Movant, represented by Adam J. Blander, Wolf
Popper LLP, pro hac vice, Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman DeValerio
Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo, Norman Berman, Berman DeValerio
Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo & Patricia L. Avery, Wolf Popper LLP.


PHILLIPS & COHEN: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JENNIFER GAJEWSKI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
PHILLIPS & COHEN ASSOCIATES, LTD., the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-
cv-00996 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an
order certifying a proposed class in this case, appointing the
Plaintiff as its representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly,
LLP as its Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the
Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=NH55Gf3m

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Ct. OK's $865K Settlement in FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania Granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to approve
the settlement in the Fair Labor Standards Act collective action
captioned SARINA BROWN, APRIL WALKER, and MICHELLE AARON,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, v.
PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Civil Action No.
16-6054 (E.D. Pa.), and unopposed motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses.

The Class Representatives brought this collective action on behalf
of themselves and other lead clinicians, behavioral specialist
consultants, and/or mobile therapists who worked for Defendant.
alleging that Defendant unlawfully misclassified them as
independent contractors, resulting in the denial of overtime
compensation and certain wages and employee benefits, and failed
to pay them for certain work deemed "non-billable" by Defendant.

The Court held that this matter meets the prerequisites for civil
actions set forth in Rule 23(a). The Settlement Class of 55
members meets the numerosity requirement, and the parties have
established that Plaintiffs are similarly situated, meeting the
commonality and typicality requirements.  The Court added that the
Class Representatives have fairly and adequately represented the
interests of the Class Members.  Accordingly, the Court said it
will certify the collective action and the settlement class.

The Court concluded that the settlement is a fair and reasonable
resolution of the claims asserted by the class, and that the
Agreement does not undermine the purpose of the FLSA.

The fees, negotiated separately, are undeniably reasonable in
light of the nature of the case and the hours and work devoted to
it, and the litigation expenses are costs are likewise fair and
reasonable.

The Court approved the settlement and grant Plaintiffs' motion for
fees and reimbursement of expenses.

Specfically, reports Law.com, citing P.J. D'Annunzio of The Legal
Intelligencer, U.S. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has given final approval to the
$865,000 settlement that resolved claims from 55 behavioral health
professionals alleging they were denied overtime pay by the clinic
where they worked.

Judge Hey approved the settlement class of clinicians, behavioral
specialist consultants, and therapists who logged overtime hours
at Progressions Behavioral Health Services.  The class members
alleged they were misclassified as independent contractors and
wrongly denied overtime and other employee benefits, as well as
payment for other work that was deemed "non-billable."  Their case
was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Of the $865,000, the class members will receive $542,500 plus
$3,700 in costs. The three class representatives will each receive
a $10,000 award, along with $3,250 in expenses, according to Judge
Hey's memorandum.  Class attorneys are slated to receive one-third
of the overall settlement.

Participating class members will receive anywhere from $500 to a
maximum of $70,000 from the settlement fund on a pro rata basis,
determined by the degree of their wage shortfall, Judge Hey said.
Hey conditionally certified the class on May 8.

Class Counsel should be awarded the amount of $289,164.00 for fair
and reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred in
the prosecution of this litigation, the award to be paid from the
Settlement Amount in full compromise and satisfaction of all
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by Class Council as
specified in the Agreement.

The Claims Administrator, RG/2 Claims Administration LLC, will be
awarded an amount to exceed $6,500.00 for fair and reasonable fees
and expenses incurred in the administration of the settlement.

With the exception of the award to the Claims Administrator, 50%
of which will be paid by Defendants in addition to and above the
Settlement Amount, these awards are to be paid from the Settlement
Amount as specified in the Agreement.

"We're very pleased with the result," said class counsel, Michael
Murphy of the Murphy Law Group in Philadelphia.

Progressions' attorney, Eric B. Meyer, Esq. --
emeyer@dilworthlaw.com -- of Dilworth Paxson in Philadelphia, did
not return a call seeking comment.

Mr. Murphy said the settlement was agreed upon after a day of
negotiation in mediation handled by retired Judge Thomas M.
Blewitt of JAMS.

According to Judge Hey, all of the class members were similarly
situated, making it appropriate for the class to move forward to
the settlement phase.

"The class members were all non-exempt, hourly employees of
defendant, and all were paid the same way and were subject to the
same payroll and time-keeping practices," Judge Hey said.  "Not
surprisingly, therefore, each member of the class has virtually
identical claims--specifically, that defendant misclassified them
as independent contractors and thereby failed to pay them
statutorily-mandated overtime compensation and wages, and failed
to pay them for certain work deemed 'non-billable' by defendant."

At the time of the settlement, the case was not close to going to
trial, and had been stayed for roughly three months after the
discovery period. Negotiations began after the stay, and Judge Hey
said the agreement was met with an "overwhelmingly positive"
response from the class members.

"I conclude that the settlement is fair to the class members. The
settlement came about after extensive arm's-length negotiations
and resolves a bona fide dispute over unpaid compensation and
wages," Judge Hey said.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 13, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/AGMYmn from Leagle.com.

SARINA BROWN, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
Jr., -- MURPHY@PHILLYEMPLOYMENTLAWYER.COM -- MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC.

SARINA BROWN, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC, EIGHT PENN CENTER, S U I T E 2000  6 2 8  J O H N F .
KENNEDY BLVD. PHILADELPHIA, PA  1 9 1 0 3

APRIL WALKER, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
Jr., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

MICHELLE AARON, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY,
Jr., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

PROGRESSIVES BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant,
represented by ERIC B. MEYER -- emeyer@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH
PAXSON LLP & MARJORIE M. OBOD -- mobod@dilworth.com --Dilworth
Paxson LLP.


PROSCAPE GROUP: Faces "Silva" Lawsuit Alleging FLSA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Harryeth A. Silva and other similarly-situated individuals,
Plaintiff(s), v. PROSCAPE GROUP, INC. and SHAWN J. ROPER,
Defendants, Case No. 8:17-cv-01644-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla., July 7,
2017), alleges that Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours
without being compensated overtime wages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

PROSCAPE GROUP, INC. is a landscaping and lawn maintenance
company.  Plaintiff had duties as a driver and landscaping
worker.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
     ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
     9100 South Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
     Miami, FL 33156
     Tel: (305) 446-1500
     Fax: (305) 446-1502
     E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


RAMELLI GROUP: Ct. Certifies Former Employees' Collective Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to Certify a
Collective Action in the case captioned DARWIN ESCOBAR, et al.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
RAMELLI GROUP, L.L.C. et al., Section: "H" (2), Civil Action No.
16-15848 (E.D. La.).

Plaintiffs allege that they are former employees of Defendant
Ramelli Group, L.L.C.  Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in October of
2016 on their behalf and on the behalf of those similarly
situated.  Plaintiffs seek collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, alleging that Ramelli Group, L.L.C. et al.
wrongfully failed to pay appropriate overtime wages.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to conditionally certify a class to
proceed as a collective action.  Plaintiffs seek certification of
a class including:

   "All individuals who were employed by Ramelli Group, L.L.C.,
Ramelli Janitorial, Inc., Robert C. Ramelli, K.C. Staffing L.L.C.
and/or K.C. Staffing Solutions, L.L.C. as landscape laborers paid
by the hour during any workweek from October 26, 2013 through the
time notice of this action is provided."

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/xlJ1BE from Leagle.com.

Darwin Escobar, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis --
Dan@EstesDavisLaw.com -- Estes Davis Law, LLC.

Darwin Escobar, Plaintiff, represented by Gabriel Omar Mondino --
gmondino@burgoslawfirm.com -- Burgos & Associates, LLC, James R.
Bullman, 201 Saint Charles Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802-5946
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC,
11404 Lake Sherwood Ave N Ste ABaton Rouge, LA 70816-0419 &
Randall Eugene Estes -- Ran@EstesDavis.com --, Estes Davis Law,
LLC.

Rigoberto Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis,
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates,
LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas
Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis
Law, LLC.

Selvin A. Portillo, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis,
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates,
LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas
Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis
Law, LLC.

Gustavo A. Reyes Ramirez, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian
Davis, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos &
Associates, LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew
Thomas Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes
Davis Law, LLC.

Selvin Vasquez, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis,
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates,
LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas
Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis
Law, LLC.

Antonio Alcontora, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis,
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates,
LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas
Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis
Law, LLC.

Alma Arauz, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis, Estes
Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates, LLC,
James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas Lofaso,
Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis Law, LLC.

Miguel Cruz, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis, Estes
Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates, LLC,
James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas Lofaso,
Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis Law, LLC.

Enner Diaz-Vega, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Brian Davis,
Estes Davis Law, LLC, Gabriel Omar Mondino, Burgos & Associates,
LLC, James R. Bullman, Estes Davis Law, LLC, Matthew Thomas
Lofaso, Lofaso Law Firm, LLC & Randall Eugene Estes, Estes Davis
Law, LLC.


RAYMOURS FURNITURE: Class Action Waiver Inapplicable, Judge Rules
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Coles, Esq. -- anthony.coles@dlapiper.com -- of DLA Piper
LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that here's a pop
arbitration quiz, drawn from Judge Netburn's Report and
Recommendation in Borecki v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc. Is the
following arbitration term in a contract between a store and its
customer broad or narrow: "[A]ny claim, dispute, or controversy
between you and us that in any way arises from or relates to the
goods and/or services you have purchased or are purchasing from us
(the "Purchases"), now or in the past, including . . . any
information we seek from you . . . ."?

Many lawyers, accustomed to courts' deference to arbitration
provisions, would answer "broad." But they'd fail the test.

Scott Borecki purchased a bedroom set from Raymours, and left his
cell-phone number for the furniture company to contact him when
the set was ready for pick up.  The sale and pick up went
smoothly.  But three years later, Raymours texted Mr. Borecki four
times promoting its local Raymour and Flanigan store.
Mr. Borecki was not interested in the local promotion; instead, he
brought a putative class action asserting that Raymours violated
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a federal law which
restricts unauthorized telemarketing.

Raymours moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Mr. Borecki's
claim "arises from or relates to" the purchase of his bedroom set.
After all, but for Mr. Borecki's purchase Raymours wouldn't have
his cell number.  Therefore, Raymours assumed, the claim "relates
to" the purchase.

But Judge Netburn drew a finer line.  The question she posed was
whether Raymour's text messages were related to Mr. Borecki's
purchase of the bedroom set -- not whether the means by which
Raymours obtained Mr. Borecki's contact information related to the
purchase.  Even though the arbitration agreement defined "claim"
to require the "broadest reasonable meaning," Judge Netburn
concluded that the text messages were sale promotions unrelated to
the purchase of the bedroom set, and that
Mr. Borecki's claim was not subject to arbitration.  Judge Netburn
distinguished Borecki's claim from claims that she said would be
arbitrable, such as false advertising, a product defect, or even
text messages asking Borecki to rate its furniture favorably.

Rubbing salt in to Raymours' wound, Judge Netburn also found that
a class action waiver included as part of the arbitration
provision was inapplicable: "Because the Agreement's class action
waiver is applicable only to arbitrable claims, and because I
recommend finding that the Arbitration Agreement does not require
Borecki to arbitrate his TCPA claim, Borecki's TCPA claim may be
asserted as a class action."

Under court rules, Judge Netburn's Report and Recommendation now
goes to Judge Kaplan for his review (since she sits as a
Magistrate).  Regardless of the case's ultimate outcome,
Mr. Borecki is a cautionary tale for companies that expect that
customer-related litigation will take place in the privacy of an
arbitration forum, not in the glare of a class action courtroom.
[GN]


RCS CAPITAL: September 28 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

GRADY SCOTT WESTON, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others
Similarly Situated,

                                Plaintiffs,

                v.
RCS CAPITAL CORPORATION, RCAP HOLDINGS, LLC, RCAP EQUITY, LLC,
NICHOLAS S. SCHORSCH, BRIAN S. BLOCK, EDWARD MICHAEL WEIL, WILLIAM
M. KAHANE, BRIAN D. JONES, PETER M. BUDKO, MARK AUERBACH, JEFFREY
BROWN, C. THOMAS MCMILLEN, and HOWELL WOOD,
                                Defendants.

Civ. No. 1:14-CV-10136-GBD

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, PROPOSED SETTLEMENT,
AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES

To: All Investors That Purchased or Otherwise Acquired the Common
Stock of RCS Capital Corporation ("RCAP") During the Period from
February 12, 2014 to December 18, 2014, Inclusive (the "Class
Period"), and Were Allegedly Damaged Thereby (the "Settlement
Class").

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, that Oklahoma Police
Pension Fund and Retirement System and City of Providence, Rhode
Island ("Lead Plaintiffs") on behalf of themselves and the
Settlement Class, and RCAP, RCAP Holdings, LLC, RCAP Equity, LLC,
Nicholas S. Schorsch, Brian S. Block, Edward M. Weil, Jr., William
M. Kahane, Brian D. Jones, Peter M. Budko, Mark Auerbach, Jeffrey
Brown, C. Thomas McMillen and Howell Wood (collectively,
"Defendants") have reached a proposed settlement of the above-
captioned action (the "Action") in the amount of $31,000,000 in
cash that, if approved, will resolve the Action in its entirety
(the "Settlement").

A hearing will be held before the Honorable George B. Daniels of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, Courtroom
11A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 at 10:00 a.m. on
September 28, 2017 (the "Settlement Hearing") to, among other
things, determine whether the Court should: (i) approve the
proposed Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii)
dismiss the Action with prejudice as provided in the Stipulation
and Agreement of Settlement, dated June 2, 2017; (iii) approve the
proposed Plan of Allocation for distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund; and (iv) approve Lead Counsel's application for an award of
attorneys' fees and payment of Litigation Expenses.  The Court may
change the date of the Settlement Hearing without providing
another notice.  You do NOT need to attend the Settlement Hearing
to receive a distribution from the Net Settlement Fund.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE
AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AND YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO A
MONETARY PAYMENT.  If you have not yet received the Notice and
Proof of Claim and Release form ("Claim Form"), you may obtain
copies of these documents by visiting the website dedicated to the
Settlement, www.RCAPSecuritiesSettlement.com, or by contacting the
Claims Administrator at:

         RCAP Securities Litigation
         Claims Administrator
         c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
         P.O. Box 173040
         Milwaukee, WI  53217
         (866) 778-9626

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice/Claim Form or for
information about the status of a claim, may also be made to Lead
Counsel:

         Ira A. Schochet, Esq.
         LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
         140 Broadway
         New York, NY 10005
         www.labaton.com
         (888) 219-6877

         Deborah Clark-Weintraub, Esq.
         SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
         The Helmsley Building
         230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
         New York, NY 10169
         (800) 404-7770

If you are a Settlement Class Member, to be eligible to share in
the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a
Claim Form postmarked or received no later than November 2, 2017.
If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not timely submit a
valid Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, but you will nevertheless
be bound by all judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action, whether favorable or unfavorable.

If you are a Settlement Class Member and wish to exclude yourself
from the Settlement Class, you must submit a written request for
exclusion in accordance with the instructions set forth in the
Notice such that it is received no later than August 29, 2017.  If
you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will
not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in
the Action, whether favorable or unfavorable, and you will not be
eligible to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's application for attorneys' fees
and payment of Litigation Expenses must be filed with the Court
and mailed to counsel for the Parties in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice, such that they are filed and
received no later than August 29, 2017.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, DEFENDANTS, OR DEFENDANTS'
COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

DATED: July 19, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


RED INN: Former Server Files Class Action Over Tips
---------------------------------------------------
Sean F. Driscoll, writing for Cape Cod Times, reports that a
former server at the Red Inn, a Commercial Street inn and
restaurant, is attempting to launch a class-action suit against
his former employers, claiming they illegally redirected tips to
staff who weren't eligible for them and paid waitstaff a lower
wage than is required by state law.

Nathan Butera, who was a waiter at the Red Inn from April 2011 to
October 2016, claims in his lawsuit filed in Barnstable Superior
Court that the Red Inn's managers and owners, David Silva, Sean
Burke and Philip Mossy Jr., broke the state's Minimum Wage Law and
laws regarding tip pools.  He wants the suit to encompass all
servers and bartenders who worked at either the restaurant or the
inn since Dec. 2, 2010, and anyone who worked at weddings and
special events during the same time period.  Mr. Butera estimates
that about 40 people would be included in the suit, according to
court records.

Mr. Butera alleges that the Red Inn, open seasonally from April
until Jan. 2, charged customers a 20 percent gratuity on all food
and beverages purchased for events, according to court documents.
But the entire gratuity wasn't passed on to the banquet servers
and bartenders; instead, portions were paid to employees who would
normally be ineligible for tips, such as housekeepers, front desk
staff, kitchen staff and maintenance staff.

The Red Inn also required all waitstaff and bartenders in the
restaurant to give the two hosts 5 percent of their tips at the
end of each shift, the lawsuit states.  The hosts acted as
managers, including approving schedule changes, sending staff home
throughout the night and meeting weekly with the inn's owners;
they rarely helped serve food or bring items to tables.

The Red Inn took a "tip credit" against the minimum wage, paying
waitstaff just $3.75 an hour instead of the state's full $11
minimum wage.  But the waitstaff didn't receive the full tips owed
to them because of the requirement to give back money to the
hosts, the suit states.

"The waitstaff are owed the difference between the tipped and full
minimum wage for all hours work," Mr. Butera's suit states.

Brian Haney, a Boston attorney representing the Red Inn's owners,
said his clients were "devastated and disappointed" over
Mr. Butera's lawsuit.

"In addition to the customer service that the Red Inn espouses to
perform and deliver, there is nothing the owners take more
seriously than the welfare of their employees, who they consider
family," Mr. Haney said. "This is not a business or a situation
where they have employees come and go. It's truly a family
environment."

In their response to the suit, which was first filed in December
and amended in March, Silva, Burke and Mossy listed several
defenses, including that the statute of limitations had passed,
that Mr. Butera has acted in bad faith and that they have not
proved that the Red Inn was liable for the claims.

The case has not yet been certified as a class-action suit, which
would allow Mr. Butera to proceed on behalf of the people affected
by the alleged illegalities without having to name them
individually in the suit or have them file their own cases.  On
June 29, both sides filed their arguments for why the suit should,
or should not, proceed as a class-action suit.

Mr. Butera argues that the suit meets Massachusetts court rules
for class action, including that the group of potentially affected
individuals is too large to make a traditional suit practical and
that the questions of law are common to the entire class.

But the Red Inn's owners say a class-action suit is unnecessary
because they individually approached the employees who may have a
claim, expect Mr. Butera, to offer a settlement payment in
exchange for agreeing not to participate in the class-action suit.
All but nine took them up on the offer, according to court
documents.

"The owners were mortified . . . that an employee, be it one or
100, accused them of not paying what they were entitled to," Haney
said.  "The Red Inn took certain measures to ensure to the best
they could that employees didn't think that to be the case."

Adelaide Pagano, the Boston attorney representing Butera, said in
an email that the releases should not affect the court's decision
on whether to turn the matter into a class-action suit.

"The rationale is that the court should first certify the class
and then let us argue about whether the releases are actually
valid and binding," she wrote.  "The court has not yet ruled on
whether the releases are valid, and it could still find that they
are not.  We are still in the process of investigating . . . and
we expect that additional facts may come to light that will
persuade the court that the releases should be invalidated.

"We feel very strongly about trying to pursue this as a class
action, even for those folks who signed these releases, because we
want to make sure that all of the employees get what they're owed
-- which in some cases may be many times what they've been offered
in these settlement releases."

No date for oral argument on the class certification request has
been set, according to court records. [GN]


RELIANCE JIO: May Face Class Action Threat Over Data Leak
---------------------------------------------------------
Business Today reports that un what appears to be a major security
breach, the personal information of Reliance Jio subscribers,
including Aadhaar numbers, was leaked to a website on July 9.
This is the latest in a slew of data breaches and online attacks
that have exposed the weak state of India's cyber security.

If a Reliance Jio mobile number is keyed in on 'magicapk.com', it
throws up details such as first name, second name, email ID, SIM
activation date and time, as well as Aadhaar number, if the
subscriber has used it as proof to get the connection.

"There is either a bug in Reliance Jio's system because of which
data is getting leaked and a hacker is using it in the backend, or
it could be a breach," Anand Prakash, one of the top ethical
hackers in the country, told Mail Today.

Mr. Prakash, the founder of AppSecure India, said he had obtained
data for five Jio numbers from 'magicapk.com'.

Another ethical hacker Kanishk Sajnani also said the website
revealed information of the two Jio mobile numbers he tried.
However, multiple attempts may be required, he added.  "We have
come across the unverified and unsubstantiated claims of the
website and are investigating it. Prima facie, the data appears to
be unauthentic.  We want to assure our subscribers that their data
is safe and maintained with highest security," said Jio
spokesperson.

The company said data is only shared with authorities as per their
requirement.  "We have informed law enforcement agencies about the
claims of the website and will follow through to ensure strict
action is taken," Jio added.  The site in question was later
suspended.

This may be the work of a hacke, Mr. Prakash said. "Or, the
database may have been hacked completely.  Reliance Jio's
Application Programming Interface (API) may not have
authentication," he added.  In any app, the developers in the
back-end put together all the data, explained Prakash.

"That's the API, the most crucial thing for an app.  The next step
is to display it aesthetically, which is what the User Interface
(UI) team does by working on the API information," he added.
Either way, the information is out in the public domain. "But the
extent of the breach is not clear at this point," said Mr.
Prakash.

He said he has tried reaching out to Reliance Jio earlier as well
about cyber security, but there was no response from the company.
The government has made it mandatory to link Aadhaar with PAN, a
10-digit alphanumeric issued by the income-tax department. Without
linking, a taxpayer cannot file tax returns.  Global cybersecurity
expert and advocate Prashant Mali said privacy of clients when it
comes to Aadhaar details should remain top priority.

"If the leak further reveals financial data, then one can file for
damages and compensation against the company for not following
reasonable security practices to protect customer data," he
pointed out.  For instance, if Aadhaar is linked to PAN and
financial details are revealed because of this people can start
filing class action suits for damages.

"Any company responsible for Aadhaar leakage gets exposed to a
huge financial legal risk," he said.  A class action suit is one
where people with same or similar injuries caused by the same
product or action can sue the company as a group. Billionaire
Mukesh Ambani-owned Reliance Jio, the latest entrant in the
telecom sector, had 108.9 million subscribers as of March 2017,
within six months of its launch.

The country's total telephone subscriber base was 1,194.58 million
as of March 2017.  Jio's subscribers have spiked after its debut
in October, when it offered free SIM cards and unlimited 4G
internet.  However, the rate at which it added new subscribers
declined in April.  On March 31, it began paid service. [GN]


RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL: Underwriters Must Produce Pre-Oct. 2008 Docs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ROWENA DRENNEN, individually and as
Representative of the KESSLER SETTLEMENT CLASS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 12-12020 (MG) (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.), Plaintiffs
Rowena Drennen, individually and as Representative of the Kessler
Settlement Class, et al., filed a motion to compel discovery from
Defendant Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London.

In this lawsuit about insurance coverage, Plaintiffs allege that
Underwriters have improperly withheld claims handling documents on
the basis of the attorney-client and work product privileges.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Underwriters used attorneys
from a law firm -- Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, LLP -- as
claims handlers and, therefore, cannot shield from discovery
documents that reflect the claims handling activities performed by
these Sedgwick attorneys.

Underwriters maintain, however, that these documents are
privileged because Underwriters retained Sedgwick to provide legal
advice on coverage issues under the applicable insurance policies.
The parties also dispute the date when litigation became likely
for purposes of when any attorney work product privilege would
apply.

Judge Sean H. Lane of the U. S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York grants Plaintiffs' Motion in part and denies
it in part.

Beginning in 2001, several class actions were filed against
Residential Funding Company, LLC, and other parties on behalf of
borrowers who had obtained second mortgage loans that were
acquired by RFC on the secondary market.  Sedgwick sent reports to
Underwriters about these actions, which the parties here have
referred to as the Kessler class action, the Mitchell class
action, and the Related Missouri Actions. These reports include
so-called "Bordeaux Reports" and "Direct Reports," which provided
information on the second mortgage claims, including the
Underlying Actions and other claims. Plaintiffs contend that these
reports provided Underwriters with an update on Sedgwick's
investigation of the Underlying Actions, and demonstrate that
Underwriters had delegated claims handling functions to Sedgwick
for the Underlying Actions. Underwriters disagree, maintaining
that Sedgwick was providing legal advice and counseling with
respect to the second mortgage claims, specifically whether these
claims implicated coverage under the Policy.

Underwriters here maintain that litigation was anticipated on
October 17, 2008, the date of the Mitchell reservation of rights
letter. Underwriters contend that it was apparent by this date
that Underwriters would not provide coverage for damages awarded
on the claims. But Plaintiffs argue that the October 2008 date is
too early. Plaintiffs point out that, even after that date,
Underwriters continued to request and receive information from RFC
and conduct meetings with RFC, make partial defense cost payments
in Mitchell, and that the Mitchell ROR itself states that the
claims were subject to a "continuing investigation" and requested
additional information. Instead, Plaintiffs urge the Court to
adopt February 29, 2012, the date that Underwriters denied RFC's
demand for payment for the Mitchell compensatory damages judgment.

Looking at all the facts and circumstances presented, Judge Lane
finds that the anticipated litigation date is Oct. 17, 2008, the
date of the Mitchell ROR.  This conclusion is confirmed by the
context for the issuance of the Mitchell ROR. Shortly before the
Mitchell ROR -- in September 2008 -- a judgment of approximately
$99 million was entered against RFC in the Mitchell claim.

Given the factual record here, therefore, the Court concludes that
Underwriters has established by specific competent proof that the
anticipated date of litigation was Oct. 17, 2008.

Plaintiffs also contend that reserve information here is relevant
to Underwriters' knowledge of the underlying claims and its
coverage position, the reasonableness of the underlying
settlement, and Underwriters' alleged bad faith conduct and delay
in adjusting the claims. In contrast, Underwriters argue that
reserve information is not relevant here and is nonetheless
protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges.
Underwriters note that Plaintiffs do not assert a bad faith claim
here. As to relevancy to their defenses, Underwriters asserts that
there has been no allegation of ambiguity or suggestion that it
would be necessary for the Court to review extraneous evidence
like this reserve information to interpret the Policy.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that the
reserve information here is relevant. Moreover, the Court rejects
Plaintiffs' contention that reserve information is relevant to
their claims for coverage, particularly regarding fees-related
exclusions. Plaintiffs argue that under the doctrine contra
proferentum, the claims files, including reserve information, are
crucial to resolving any ambiguities in the policy language since
Sedgwick helped draft the Policy. But Plaintiffs have not pointed
to any specific policy language that they claim is ambiguous or
any evidence of ambiguity. While the relevance standard is a
liberal one, "it is not so liberal as to allow a party 'to roam in
shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not
presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably
become so.' Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' request for
reserve information.

Consistent with the foregoing, Judge Lane grants Plaintiffs'
Motion in part and denies it in part. Accordingly, Underwriters
shall produce without redactions, those documents withheld on the
basis of work product privilege that are dated prior to Oct. 17,
2008, and shall review all documents consistent with this ruling
to determine whether any additional information should be
produced.

A full-text copy of Judge Lane's Memorandum of Decision dated July
14, 2017, is available at https://is.gd/LDR9OS from Leagle.com.

ROWENA DRENNEN, Plaintiff, represented by Ronald Bruce Carlson  --
bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP,
Garrett M. Hodes, -- ghodes@wbsvlaw.com  -- Walters, Bender,
Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C., Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr. --
ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP,
Gary F. Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet
Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP, Karen W. Renwick -- krenwick@wbsvlaw.com
-- Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C., Michael B. Sichter --
msichter@wbsvlaw.com -- Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaugha, P.C.,
David M. Skeens -- dskeens@wbsvlaw.com  -- Walters Bender
Strohbehn & Vaughan, PC & Roy Frederick Walters --
fwalters@wbsvlaw.com -- Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C..

CHRISTIE TURNER, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel J. Flanigan --
dflanigan@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli.

RESCAP LIQUIDATING TRUST, Plaintiff, represented by Vivek
Chopra -- Vchopra@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP, Alexis E.
Danneman -- Adanneman@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP & Selena
J. Linde -- Slinde@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLP.

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON, Defendant, represented
by Susan N.K. Gummow -- sgummow@fgppr.com  -- Foran Glennon
Palandech Ponzi & Rudloff, Timothy Donald Kevane --
timothy.kevane@sedgwicklaw.com -- Sedgwick LLP, Soo Yeon Kim --
soo.kim@sedgwicklaw.com -- Sedgwick LLP, Lawrence J. Klein --
Lawrence.klein@sedgwicklawcom. -- Sedgwick LLP & Gregory Lahr,
Sedgwick LLP.

TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Cara
Tseng Duffield -- cduffield@wileyrein.com -- Wiley Rein LLP &
Daniel J. Standish  -- dstandish@wileyrein.com -- Wiley Rein LLP.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Patrick M.
Kennell -- pkennell@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP &
Kevin M. Mattessich -- kmattessich@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman Dolowich
& Voluck, LLP.

CLARENDON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
John W. Duchelle -- john.duchelle@troutmansanders.com -- Troutman
Sanders LLP, Thomas Hay -- thomas.hay@troutmansanders.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP, Gabriela Richeimer, Troutman Sanders LLP &
Gabriela Richeimer -- gabriela.richeimer@troutmansanders.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP.

SWISS RE INTERNATIONAL SE, Defendant, represented by Samuel G.
Mann -- smann@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Suzanne
Marinkovich -- smarinkovich@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon & Reindel
LLP, Thorn Rosenthal -- trosenthal@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP & Ben Schatz -- bschatz@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon &
Reindel LLP.

ACE BERMUDA INSURANCE LTD., Defendant, represented by Paul R.
Koepff -- paul.koepff@clydeco.us -- Clyde & Co & Tancred V.
Schiavoni -- tschiavoni@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

XL INSURANCE (BERMUDA) LTD., Defendant, represented by Michael
Chester -- mchester@skarzynski.com -- Skarzynski Black LLC & James
T. Sandnes -- jsandnes@skarzynski.com -- Skarzynski Black LLC.

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented
by Maryann Taylor -- MTaylor@damato-lynch.com  -- Damato-Lynch
LLP.

CHUBB ATLANTIC INDEMNITY LTD., Defendant, represented by Jonathan
A. Constine  -- jonathan.constine@troutmansanders.com  -- Troutman
Sanders LLP & Lee William Stremba --
lee.stremba@ troutmansanders.com  -- Troutman Sanders LLP.

STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Sharon F.
McKee -- smckee@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin &
Schille, Sharon F. McKee, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin &
Schiller, Jacqueline R. Robinson -- jrobinson@hangley.com --
Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller & Ronald P. Schiller --
rschiller@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin &
Schiller.

ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by Paul
T. Curley -- pcurley@kbrlaw.com -- Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan, LLP,
Matthew E. Mawby -- mmawby@kbrlaw.com -- Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan
LLP, Scott A. Schechter -- sschecter@kbrlaw.com -- Kaufman Borgeest
& Ryan, LLP & Patrick Stoltz -- pstoltz@kbrlaw.com -- Kaufman
Borgeest & Ryan, LLP.

NORTH AMERICAN SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented
by Stewart D. Aaron -- stewart.aaron@apks.com -- Arnold & Porter,
LLP & Anthony D. Boccanfuso -- Anthony.boccanfuso@apks.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


REVCLAIMS LLC: Class Action Over Billing Practices Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Friedman, writing for Arkansas Business, reports that
hospitals are notching legal victories over patients who have
challenged their billing practices.

A federal judge dismissed a case in March that was filed against
the collection company RevClaims LLC of Jackson, Mississippi, and
St. Bernard's Hospital of Jonesboro.

Sue Garrison of Craighead County had sought class-action status in
the case, which centered on a controversial practice in which
hospitals refuse to accept the health insurance of patients who
have been injured by the actions of others.  Ms. Garrison was
injured in an automobile accident in 2013; another driver was
found to be at fault.

Plaintiffs' attorneys claimed that the hospitals created financial
and legal headaches, including filing liens against the injured
patients, in hopes of being paid higher list prices from the
patients' settlements with the at-fault party rather than the
discounted prices that their health insurance companies have
negotiated for policyholders.  Ms. Garrison's bill from St.
Bernard's was $2,000, which was the price before any discount her
insurance carrier would have received.

Ms. Garrison also named as defendants Baptist Health of Little
Rock, Lawrence Memorial Hospital of Walnut Ridge and White River
Health System Inc. of Batesville.  The hospitals argued that
Ms. Garrison was not injured by any conduct traceable to them.

"Garrison agrees that these defendants have not directly caused
her injury," U.S. District Judge J. Leon Holmes of Little Rock
wrote in his order.  "She contends, nevertheless, that she has
been harmed by all of the defendants through a conspiracy to bill
patients like her illegally."

Judge Holmes found that Ms. Garrison's complaint didn't allege
sufficient facts to support her claim and dismissed Baptist,
Lawrence Memorial and White River from the lawsuit.

Judge Holmes also found that St. Bernard's and RevClaims didn't
injure Garrison because they didn't recover anything from a lien
filed against her. St. Bernard's released the lien on March 17 and
has "written off all outstanding amounts claimed by the lien and
will not report any unpaid amounts on Garrison's credit history,"
Judge Holmes wrote.

Judge Holmes' ruling came shortly after the dismissal of a similar
case brought by Lacey Robinett of Lawrence County against Regional
Medical Center of Memphis and the collection company it used,
Avectus Healthcare Solutions LLC of Corinth, Mississippi.

U.S. District Court Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. in the Eastern
District of Arkansas granted the defendants' request to dismiss
the case earlier this year.  Ms. Robinett has appealed the
decision to the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, where it is
pending and being monitored by other hospitals and plaintiff Tammy
Hargett of Craighead County.

Ms. Hargett sued RevClaims and St. Bernard's Hospital on charges
that mirror Robinett's allegations. In May, the attorneys in the
Hargett case asked to stay the litigation until the 8th Circuit
rules in Robinett's case.

If the 8th Circuit affirms the dismissal of the Robinett case,
Hargett "will have no cause of action to pursue and dismissal of
the action in this Court will occur," a joint motion filed by the
attorneys for the plaintiff and defendants said. [GN]


RJ REYNOLDS: 2nd Cir. Upholds $28MM Verdict in Izzarelli Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Michael Marciano of The Connecticut Law Tribune,
reports that a Connecticut jury's damages award of more than $28
million in a suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. has been
upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit -- and
the sum stands to grow, as the court also remanded for
reconsideration of punitive damages.

Barbara Izzarelli, formerly of Norwich, sued the company for
smoking-related illnesses, which led to the removal of her larynx.

A Bridgeport federal jury in May 2010 awarded Ms. Izzarelli $7.9
million after a 14-day trial before U.S. District Judge Stefan
Underhill.  Judge Underhill awarded punitive damages of $3.9
million, limiting that amount to litigation expenses less taxable
costs.  Prejudgment interest increased the total judgment to more
than $28 million.

The appeals court said the punitive damages limit must be
reconsidered on remand.

"I'll say that both Barbara and her legal team are ecstatic right
now," said attorney David Golub, Esq. -- dgolub@sgtlaw.com -- of
Stamford-based Silver Golub & Teitell, who represented Ms.
Izzarelli.

"It's been seven years since the verdict and six years since then
that the appeal has been pending, but the decision is a strong
decision, and it's really gratifying," Mr. Golub said of the
Second Circuit's summary order.

Mr. Golub also noted that this case, the first smoker's case to
come to trial in Connecticut, has helped refine the law and make
Connecticut a strong state for tobacco-related claims.

"Connecticut is very favorable," he said.  "It's likely there will
be more litigation now."

Ms Izzarelli, 57, developed larynx cancer after smoking Salem
cigarettes for more than 25 years.  She was forced have her larynx
surgically removed, requiring her to breathe through a hole in her
throat.  She currently lives in Holly Hill, Florida.
Evidence in Ms. Izzarelli's trial sought to show that Reynolds had
undertaken a campaign to market Salems to minors in order to
establish a long-term customer base.  Ms. Izzarelli also claimed
that Reynolds had designed Salem cigarettes with a set level of
nicotine that would provide a daily dose of nicotine above the
threshold for nicotine addiction.

The jury held that the Salem cigarettes were unreasonably
dangerous and defectively designed.  The jury also ruled that
Reynolds had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of
consumers.

Dr. K. Michael Cummings, professor at the Medical University of
South Carolina, testified as an expert on the public health issues
in the case.

In a release by Mr. Golub, Cummings said, "The tobacco companies
have discounted the significance of the verdicts against them in
Florida as an aberration because of the Engel class action there,"
he said.  "This verdict demonstrates that the verdicts in Florida
are no flukes and that the tobacco companies will be held liable
in the Northeast and elsewhere. This unanimous verdict in
Connecticut, with its substantial damages and punitive damages
award, should send shivers down the tobacco companies' CEO's
spines."

Theodore M. Grossman, Esq. -- tgrossman@jonesday.com -- of Jones
Day, representing Reynolds, could not immediately be reached.


ROCK FREIGHT: "Cheuk" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
Cheuk Yu Yu, Chung Ka Hing, Chao Min Lu, Individually and on
behalf of All Other Employees Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs,
v. Rock Freight System Inc., Sam Cheng, Vicky Cheng, and Randy
Cheng, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04156 (E.D.N.Y., July 13,
2017), seeks to recover overtime compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The case is brought by Plaintiffs on their own behalf and on
behalf of similarly situated employees, alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, arising from
Defendants' various willful and unlawful employment policies,
patterns and/or practices. The Defendants have willfully and
intentionally committed widespread violations of the FLSA and NYLL
by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to pay their
employees, including Plaintiffs, compensation for all hours
worked, including overtime compensation for all hours worked over
40 each workweek.

Rock Freight System is a bonded freight shipping and trucking
company running freight hauling business from Jamaica, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jian Hang, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC.
          136-18 39th Avenue, Suite 1003
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353 8588
          E-mail: jhang@hanglaw.com


SEARS: Keller Grover Announces Gift Card Settlement
---------------------------------------------------
Keller Grover LLP announces a settlement in a gift card class
action against Sears involving California consumers.  If you are a
California consumer who possessed a Sears gift card with a balance
of less than $10.00 but disposed of the gift card during the
period January 12, 2013 through June 21, 2017, you may be eligible
to receive a free $9.99 Sears gift card.  Please visit the
settlement website https://kellergrover.com/giftcardsettlement/
for more information about the settlement and instructions for how
eligible consumers can submit a claim.

You can also get more information about the settlement by
contacting Eric Grover at 415-543-1305 or by email at --
eagrover@kellergrover.com [GN]


SHILOH INDUSTRIES: Ct. Grants Leave to Amend "Prince" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned TYRONE PRINCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
ARAMARK CORP., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-1477
(D.C.), RAYMOND THOMAS and WILLIAM PORTER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, V. SHILOH
INDUSTRIES, INC., RAMZI HERMIZ, and THOMAS M. DUGAN, Defendants,
No. 15 CV 7449 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Kimba M. Wood granted in
part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the
Court's March 23, 2017 decision which dismissed the plaintiffs'
Corrected Amended Complaint.  The judge granted the plaintiffs
limited leave to amend their complaint.

On September 21, 2015, the plaintiffs brought a putative class
action against Shiloh Industries and two of its individual
directors, Ramzi Hermiz and Thomas M. Dugan.  The plaintiffs
asserted claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.  Shiloh Industries manufactures and distributes equipment
used to build automobiles.  During the class period, Ramzi Hermiz
served as the president and CEO of Shiloh Industries.  Thomas
Dugan served as the company's treasurer and vice president of
finance.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants perpetrated an
accounting fraud at Shiloh's manufacturing facility in Wellington,
Ohio, and that this fraudulent accounting artificially inflated
Shiloh's net income.  When Shiloh publicly revealed the alleged
fraud, its stock price plummeted.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), on the ground that the plaintiffs
failed to state with particularity facts sufficient to allege
scienter on the part of both the individual defendants and Shiloh
Industries as a corporation.

The Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter on the
part of the defendants, Ramzi and Dugan.  The Court, however, did
not address whether the Wellington Controller's scienter could be
imputed to the corporation.  The Wellington Controller refers to
the employee who committed the accounting fraud at the company's
Wellington Facility.

The plaintiffs asked the Court to vacate its March 23, 2017 Order
and Judgment and hold that the plaintiffs have adequately stated
their claims against Shiloh.  The plaintiffs alternatively asked
for leave to file an amended complaint.

While the plaintiffs did not contest the Court's previous ruling
with respect to the individual defendants, the plaintiffs asked
the Court to consider whether they have sufficiently plead
scienter on the part of Shiloh Industries.  The plaintiffs urged
the Court to find the Wellington Controller's rank akin to that of
a "regional manager" or head of a particular practice group, roles
for which courts in this district have imputed scienter.

Judge Wood found that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead
corporate scienter with respect to the Wellington Controller and
declined to vacate the Court's previous Order and Judgment.
However, because there is a possibility that the plaintiffs could
amend their complaint to rectify factual deficiencies and satisfy
the pleading standard with respect to their corporate scienter
claim, the judge granted the plaintiffs leave to amend for this
limited purpose.

A full-text copy of Judge Wood's July 7, 2017 opinon and order is
available at https://is.gd/nxZDxO from Leagle.com.

Raymond Thomas, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A., Robert Vincent
Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
pro hac vice, Charles H. Linehan -- clinehan@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Sara Esther Fuks --
sfuks@rosenlegal.com -- Milberg LLP & Lesley Frank Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

William Porter, Plaintiff, represented by Charles H. Linehan,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice.

Shiloh Industries, Inc., Ramzi Hermiz, Thomas M. Dugan,
Defendants, represented by Geoffrey J. Ritts --
gjritts@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice & Robert C.
Micheletto -- rmicheletto@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


SLATER AND GORDON: Share Trading Halted Following Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Pash, writing for Business Insider, reports that trading in
Slater and Gordon shares has been halted as the law firm prepares
a statement about a class action.

Maurice Blackburn, one of Slater and Gordon's major competitors,
is acting for the class action by shareholders who purchased stock
during between March 2015 and February this year.

Slater and Gordon says the halt is related to "mediation" of the
action started in October last year and to the company restructure
announced last month.

The shareholders in the class action allege there were problems
within Slater and Gordon that extended beyond its acquisition in
the UK of Quindell's Professional Services Division.

Slater and Gordon closed a deal with its lenders, leaving US-based
private equity group Anchorage Capital in control of the law firm.

The lenders will end up with 95% of the ASX-listed company,
bringing on a restructure of the board of directors.

Slater and Gordon shares hit a high of $8.07 in 2015, valuing the
world's first stock exchange-listed law firm at $2.8 billion.

But they went on a steep slide because of the company's
underperforming UK business and the British government's plans to
limit compensation for road accidents.

The shares last traded at $0.074.

In August last year, the company posted an annual loss of $1.017
billion, including a $879.5 million non-cash impairment against
the value of goodwill in its UK business.

In February this year, Slater and Gordon posted a net loss of
$425.1 million, including $350.3 million impairment charge against
the value of UK assets. [GN]


SPITZER INDUSTRIES: "Sarabia" Suit Alleges Misclassification
------------------------------------------------------------
AGAPITO SARABIA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, v. SPITZER INDUSTRIES, INC., Case No. 4:17-cv-
02092 (S.D. Tex., July 7, 2017), alleges that Plaintiff and the
other welders like him regularly worked for Spitzer in excess of
40 hours each week without overtime compensation.  Instead of
paying overtime as required by the FLSA, Spitzer improperly
classified Sarabia and those similarly situated as independent
contractors, paying a straight hourly rate with no overtime
compensation.

Spitzer Industries, Inc. is an oil and gas production company.
Sarabia is a welder.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
     Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
     Jessica M. Bresler, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77005
     Phone: 713-352-1100
     Fax: 713-352-3300
     E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
             adunlap@mybackwages.com
             litkin@mybackwages.com
             jbresler@mybackwages.com

        - and -

     Matthew S. Parme, Esq.
     Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Phone: (713) 877-8788
     Fax: (713) 877-8065
     E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


SYNDICATED OFFICE: "Carpenter" Suit Seeks Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ASHLEY M. CARPENTER, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SYNDICATED
OFFICE SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a CENTRAL FINANCIAL CONTROL, the
Defendant, Case No. 9:16-cv-81899-KAM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to certify a class of:

   "(a) all persons to whom Defendant sent, or caused to be sent,
   a letter to a mailing address located within the State of
   Florida, (b) in an attempt to collect a debt incurred for
   medical services, (c) allegedly owed to Palm Beach Gardens
   Medical Center, (d) from March 9, 2016 to March 9, 2017".

The Plaintiff filed this purported class action pursuant to the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=5Sj6qAQP

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Donald A. Yarbrough, Esq.
          DONALD A. YARBROUGH, ESQ.
          Post Office Box 11842
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33339
          Telephone: (954) 537 2000
          Facsimile: (954) 566 2235
          E-mail: don@donyarbrough.com

               - and -

          Randolph Bragg, Esq.
          HORWITZ, HORWITZ AND ASSOCIATES
          25 E. Washington, Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372 8822
          Facsimile: (312) 372 1673
          E-mail: rand@horwitzlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Mr. Michael L. Ehren, Esq.
          LASH AND GOLDBERG LLP
          Miami Tower, Suite 1200
          100 South East 2nd Street
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: 305 347 4040
          Facsimile: 305 347 4050


SYNGENTA: Court to Hear Viptera Trials Two States at a Time
-----------------------------------------------------------
Trial dates have been set in seven additional states on class-
action lawsuits filed against Syngenta over the release of Viptera
corn to China, according to an order issued by a judge in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas in Kansas City, Kansas.

A Kansas jury on June 26 awarded farmers $217.7 million in
compensatory damages in the first of several class-action lawsuits
filed against Syngenta.

On July 6, U.S. District Judge John Lungstrom announced in an
order the court's rationale for scheduling the next set of trials
two states at a time.

The court set a trial date of Jan. 22, 2018, for negligence and
tortious interference claims made by farmers in Arkansas and
Missouri. Motions in the case are due by Sept. 22, 2017.

The trial of farmer negligence and statutory consumer protection
claims made in Illinois and Nebraska is set for April 4, 2018,
with motions due on Jan. 5, 2018.

The Iowa and South Dakota negligence claims are scheduled for
trial on May 14, 2018, with motions due by Feb. 26, 2018.

Negligence claims made by farmers in the Ohio class are set for
trial Oct. 8, 2018, with motions due May 28, 2018.

Plaintiffs in the cases allege Syngenta sold corn with Agrisure
Viptera and Duracade traits prior to the traits receiving import
approvals in several countries, including China. China claims it
found and rejected corn shipments containing the traits, which
plaintiffs say led to lower corn prices.

According to the order, Syngenta had argued for seven individual
trials so as to "obtain more data points" that would be used in
seeking a global settlement of claims asserted against Syngenta.

"Even if some classes' claims are combined for trial, the parties
will still have a number of verdicts (the Kansas class trial, at
least one trial in Minnesota, and multiple additional class trials
in this court) that may be used by the parties in considering a
global settlement," the court ruled.

"There is no question that efficiency would best be served by
combining classes' claims for trial in some manner. The class
claims are asserted against the same defendants, they involve
common questions of law and fact, and as the Kansas class trial
recently demonstrated, the evidence particular to the state of
residence is relatively limited."

The jury in the Kansas case took less than a day to render a
verdict.

Donald L. Swanson, Esq. -- don.swanson@koleyjessen.com -- an
attorney with Koley Jessen in Omaha who follows the Syngenta
cases, told DTN it is likely Syngenta will appeal the Kansas case,
which could take a couple of years to complete. Syngenta said as
much after the $217.7 million verdict was announced.

The Kansas lawsuit was filed by four farmers who represent more
than 7,000 farmers in the state. It was the first of multiple
lawsuits claiming Syngenta should have inspected and prevented
harvested Viptera (MIR 162) corn from being shipped to China in
2013 and 2014.

A second case is set for trial on July 10 in Minnesota state
court. That case was brought on behalf of about 60,000 farmers.

The official lawsuits filed on behalf of corn producers include
cases in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin.

All farmers in the United States who priced corn for sale after
Nov. 18, 2013, were approved last fall as a major class in the
ongoing lawsuit. [GN]


SYNGENTA: Averts Trial by Reaching Confidential Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
Margaret Cronin Fisk and Jef Feeley, writing for The Daily
Republic, reports that Syngenta reached a confidential settlement
with a Nebraska farmer who claimed the company mishandled
marketing of its genetically modified seed, causing U.S. corn
prices to plummet.

With the settlement, Syngenta averts a trial that was scheduled to
start July 10. Terms weren't disclosed.

Syngenta lost a $218 million jury verdict for a class of Kansas
farmers who brought similar claims against the Swiss agrochemical
company, which has been acquired by China National Chemical Corp.
The Basel-based company completed its $43 billion takeover by
ChemChina in June.

Syngenta faces its next class action in a Minnesota court in
August, where farmers are seeking more than $600 million.

The company reached the settlement with farmer Daniel Mensik last
week, as a scheduled trial neared in state court in Minnesota,
plaintiffs' attorney Mikal Watts said on July 6 by phone. The
settlement was confirmed by the court.

The farmers claim Syngenta rushed its GMO seed to market before
getting approval from China to export the grain there. In 2013,
China stopped shipments after calling the corn contaminated by the
GMO seed, setting off a five-year depression in prices, the
farmers claim. They also allege Syngenta misled them on when the
Chinese would approve the seed.

The settlement may not have implications for the rest of the
cases, said Anthony Sabino, a law professor at St. John's
University in New York.

"Call it a tactical retreat," he said. "Most likely, Syngenta felt
the case of a single farmer versus the big corporation was too
risky to take to trial, and the dollars paid were within an
acceptable range."

Syngenta has disputed the damages claimed by farmers, or that it
did anything wrong. The company didn't sell the seed until
approved by the U.S. and didn't need Chinese approval, Syngenta
lawyers have argued. Paul Minehart, Syngenta spokesman, declined
to comment on July 6.

Mensik's claim was set to be the first to trial in the corn
litigation in April, but that ended in a mistrial when the judge
couldn't find enough jurors. Mensik, who has a 300 acre-farm in
Morse Bluff, Nebraska, claims he lost $125,000 in sales because of
Syngenta's mishandling of the GMO corn.

"We're hopeful that Dan and Bonnie Mensik are the first of tens of
thousands of farmers who recover their damages from Syngenta,''
said Watts, plaintiffs' attorney.

The federal judge overseeing multiple class actions in Kansas set
several trial dates on July 6 for additional class actions to be
tried in that court. The claims of Arkansas and Missouri farmers
will go forward in January, while Illinois and Nebraska go to
trial in April. [GN]


TAHOE RESOURCES: Faces "Sanders" Suit Over Escobal Mining
---------------------------------------------------------
TYLER SANDERS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. TAHOE RESOURCES INC., C. KEVIN MCARTHUR,
RONALD W. CLAYTON, MARK SADLER, and ELIZABETH MCGREGOR,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04052 (E.D.N.Y., July 7,  2017), is a
federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of
all persons and entities other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Tahoe from
March 12, 2015 through July 5, 2017, both dates inclusive.

The case alleges that Defendants issued financial results that
were materially false and/or misleading because they
misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's business, operational and financial
results, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded
by them. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) consultation
obligations relating to the permitting of the Escobal mine
property mining license were not met; (2) in turn, the Escobal
mining license is subject to suspension; and (3) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.

Defendant Tahoe explores, develops, and operates mines in the
Americas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
     Phillip Kim, Esq.
     THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
     275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 686-1060
     Fax: (212) 202-3827
     Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
            pkim@rosenlegal.com


TD BANK: Court Refuses to Dismiss RFDCPA Claims in "Martinez"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant's Summary Judgment on
Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA") Claims in
the case captioned CHARLENE MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TD BANK USA, N.A.,
a National Bank, and TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation,
Civil Action No. 15-7712 (JBS/AMD)(D.N.J.), but granting summary
judgment on TCPA claims and strike class allegations.

Plaintiff Charlene Martinez brings this putative class action
against Defendants TD Bank USA, N.A., and Target Corporation,
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA"), and a California law entitled the Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("RFDCPA").

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment, or,
in the alternative, to strike Plaintiff's class allegations.

To prove a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A),
a plaintiff must put forth evidence that (1) the defendant called
a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone
dialing system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's claim that they violated the TCPA because there is no
genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff provided her prior
express consent to receiving autodialed calls to her cell phone,
and she did not receive any calls from Defendants after revoking
that consent.

Plaintiff has conceded that she provided her prior express consent
but she revoked her consent and that Defendants nevertheless made
four more calls to her in violation of the TCPA.

Consent is terminated when the actor knows or has reason to know
that the other is no longer willing for him to continue the
particular conduct.

The sole dispute is as to whether the faxing of the letters to the
fax numbers in question, where Defendants submit that the evidence
is clear that they never received either letter, was a reasonable
method of informing Defendants that Plaintiff was revoking her
consent.

Defendants argue that they cannot be said to have had reason to
know that Plaintiff revoked her consent when they assert that they
never received the revocation, their business records do not
reveal having received the faxes, and Plaintiff cannot point to
any evidence that they received the faxes beyond the numbers
themselves and the fact that the faxes marked their transmission
as "OK."  The Court finds that Plaintiff has not produced
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to
conclude that she revoked her consent, thus allowing her claim
under the TCPA for the four calls placed. Accordingly, the Court
will grant summary judgment to Defendants as to the TCPA claim.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's claims under the RFDCPA.

Plaintiff argues that the undisputed call logs show that
Defendants called Plaintiff 165 times over an eight-month period,
which a reasonable jury could find to constitute harassment within
the meaning of the RFDCPA.

The RFDCPA prohibits harassing conduct related to debt collection,
including "causing a telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously
to annoy the person called" and "communicating with such frequency
as to be unreasonable and to constitute harassment under the
circumstances.

After careful consideration, the Court is persuaded that the
relevant case law supports a finding that Plaintiff, in this case,
has raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
volume and pattern of calls in this case could constitute
actionable harassment under the RFDCPA. Courts have found a
genuine issue of material fact in a case where the plaintiff
received ninety-nine calls over a one-and-a-half year period,
frequently received between two and five calls a day, and answered
at least some of those calls.

The Court will deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's RFDCPA claim.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not brought forth evidence
sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the
allegation that she suffered an economic injury caused by
Defendants. No reasonable finder of fact could conclude, based on
the evidentiary record before the Court, that Plaintiff in fact
suffered such an injury. Accordingly, the Court finds that she
lacks standing under the UCL and will grant summary judgment on
that claim to Defendants.

Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class under Rule
23(b)(3), Every individual in the United States who: (1) received
a call on his or her cellular telephone; (2) placed by or on
behalf of Defendants; (3) relating to a Target credit card; (4)
using a dialer; and (5) where Defendants did not have prior
express consent to place such a call at the time it was placed.
Defendants seek to strike the class allegation on grounds of lack
of ascertainability. Defendants object to this class because
Plaintiff Martinez herself would not be a member. She consented to
receive the vast majority of these calls, including all calls made
on multi-call days. Defendants also move to strike the class
allegations from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint because she
"impermissibly attempts to create a 'fail-safe' class where the
question of 'whether a person qualifies as a member depends on
whether the person has a valid claim.

Because the Court has granted summary judgment to Defendants on
Plaintiff's TCPA claims, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave
to amend the class allegations with regard to claims under the
TCPA, because Plaintiff will not fall into the revised class
definition.  Because Plaintiff's only remaining claim survives
under California's RFDCPA, any class definition would be limited
to residents of California3 who received such calls.
Finally, as noted, Plaintiff's membership in the class as
presently defined is a nullity. Defendants' motion to strike
Plaintiff's class allegations will be granted.

The Court will deny Defendants' motion to for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff's claim under the RFDCPA. will grant Defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims under the
TCPA . The Court will also grant Defendants' motion to strike the
class allegations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 30, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/sXVQOY  from Leagle.com.

CHARLENE MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, represented by STEFAN LOUIS COLEMAN.
1309
Jericho Turnpike, New Hyde Park, NY 11040 Phone: 347-673-0015

TD BANK USA, N.A., Defendant, represented by JARROD D. SHAW, --
jshaw@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.
TARGET CORP., Defendant, represented by JARROD D. SHAW,
McGuireWoods LLP.


TEAM OIL: "Staggert" Labor Lawsuit Transferred to S.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned SCOTT STAGGERT (401 E 8th Street # 1152,
Sioux Falls, SD 57103) on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff vs. TEAM OIL TOOLS, LP, c/o
Statutory Agent CT Corporation System (1300 East Ninth Street,
Cleveland, Ohio 44114), Defendant, (originally, Case No. 2:16-cv-
00822, S.D. Ohio, August 25, 2016) was transferred from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
and assigned Case No. 4:17-cv-02077.

Initial Pretrial and Scheduling Conference and Order to Disclose
Interested Persons is set for October 13, 2017, at 02:15 p.m. in
Courtroom 3A before Judge Keith P Ellison.

The case alleges that Defendant Team Oil Tools, LP required
Plaintiff Scott Staggert and other similarly situated employees to
work more than forty hours each workweek but failed to pay them
overtime wages for those hours worked in excess of forty in a
workweek.  The case alleges violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

Defendant specializes in the design and sale of custom petroleum
exploration tools used in the hydraulic fracturing and cementing
of wells.  Plaintiff Staggert worked for Defendant as a Field
Service Technician.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Anthony James Lazzaro, Esq.
     614 W Superior Ave., Ste 920
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Phone: (216) 696-5000
     E-mail: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com

        - and -

     Chastity Lynn Christy, Esq.
     614 W. Superior Avenue, Suite 920
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Phone: (216) 696-5000
     Fax: (216) 696-7005

        - and -

     Donny J. Foty, Esq.
     KENNEDY HODGES LLP
     4409 Montrose Blvd., Ste 200
     Houston, TX 77006
     Phone: (713) 523-0001
     Fax: (713) 523-1116
     E-mail: dfoty@kennedyhodges.com

        - and -

     John Anthony Neuman, Esq.
     SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW
     5612 Chaucer Dr.
     Houston, TX 77005
     Phone: (281) 885-8630
     E-mail: jneuman@smnlawfirm.com

Defendant(s) is represented by:

     Peter W. Hahn, Esq.
     DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP
     191 West Nationwide Blvd., Suite 300
     Columbus, OH 43215
     Phone: (614) 227-4286
     Fax: (614) 628-6890

        - and -

     Mark D. Downey, Esq.
     HUGHES ARRELL KINCHEN
     1910 Pacific Ave., Ste 15650
     Dallas, TX 75201
     Phone: (214) 764-7279
     Fax: (713) 568-1747
     E-mail: mdowney@hakllp.com


TOKIO MARINE: Court Dismisses "Azad" Suit with Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MOHAMMED AZAD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOKIO
MARINE HCC - MEDICAL INSURANCE SERVICES LLC, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-00618-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
granted each of the Defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to
amend, and denied HCC's and HII's motions to strike.

This case was filed on Feb. 7, 2017, by the Plaintiffs Azad
against HCC, a seller of short-term medical insurance, and three
other entities who allegedly worked with HCC: HCC Life Insurance
Co., Health Insurance Innovation, Inc., ("HII"), and Consumer
Benefits of America ("CBA").  HCC contracted with the Plaintiffs
to provide them HCC Life Insurance was the underwriter on the
Plaintiffs' polices.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a Rule 23 class of all
individuals who have purchased HCC health insurance policies from
the Defendants in the State of California, and/or all California
residents for whom HCC denied their insurance claim, since a date
to be ascertained through discovery.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants falsely represented that
the short-term medical insurance policies ("STM policies")
provided reasonable coverage and fair claim processing.  In
reality, HCC misled policyholders about the scope of the coverage
and made it unreasonably difficult to make a claim.  They allege
that HCC had a common policy and practice of marketing their
polices in a misleading manner, delaying and refusing to pay
claims, providing deliberately unhelpful customer service, and
obstructing policyholders' claims.

The Plaintiffs assert five claims: (i) violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (ii) violation of the
California False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (iii) breach of
contract; (iv) breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing ("bad faith"); and (v) unjust enrichment.

On April 13 and 14, 2017, HCC (together with HCC Life Insurance),
HII, and CBA filed the instant motions to dismiss the complaint
and/or strike its allegations.  On April 20, 2017, the Defendants
filed a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motions
to dismiss.  The Court denied the motion to stay discovery, but
vacated the case management conference in light of the pending
dispositive motions.

HCC's motion to dismiss argues that the misrepresentation theory
fails because neither Azad nor Buckley identifies a specific
misrepresentation that they relied on.  Although they allege that
the Brochure is misleading when "read together" with the
application form, the complaint does not allege that either of the
named Plaintiffs saw or relied on the Brochure when they decided
to purchase the STM policies.  The Court finds that these
arguments have merit and therefore granted HCC's motion to
dismiss, with leave to amend.

At the hearing, the Plaintiffs proposed a new claims-processing
theory, which is more firmly grounded in the language of the
contract.  They assert that the policies' pre-existing conditions
exclusion is limited to conditions for which the insured received
medical treatment, diagnosis, care, or advice within the six-month
period prior to the effective date of coverage.  The Court finds
that the new claims-processing theory could, at least potentially,
state a claim for breach of contract and the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing.  It may also provide a basis for a claim
under the UCL unlawful or unfair prongs.  In light of the
Plaintiffs' newly asserted claims-handling theory, the Court
granted HCC's motion to dismiss the contact, bad faith, and UCL
unfair claims, but provided the Plaintiffs leave to amend to
assert their new allegations.

Finally, the Court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim with
prejudice since it is not an independent cause of action in
California.  Since the Plaintiffs have alleged both a contract
claim and a UCL claim for restitution, the unjust enrichment claim
is duplicative.

HCC has also filed a separate motion to strike all of the
complaint's class allegations, arguing that neither the
Plaintiffs' misrepresentation theory nor the claims-handling
theory can be pursued as a class action.  Given that the
Plaintiffs have not been afforded discovery into the alleged
common fraudulent scheme of the Defendants, the Court denied HCC's
motion to strike.  The proprietary of class adjudication can be
addressed later in the usual fashion, on a fully-briefed motion
for class certification.

The Court granted CBA's motion to dismiss as to all claims, with
leave to amend except as to the unjust enrichment claim.  The
complaint says almost nothing about CBA.  In particular, the
complaint contains no explanation as to why CBA would be liable
for the actions of other defendants in the marketing of the HCC
STM policies, or what specific contractual duties were owed by CBA
to the Plaintiffs.

As to the contract and bad faith claims, the complaint does not
clearly allege that CBA was a party to the Plaintiffs' insurance
contracts.  The Court finds no plausible factual basis for the
claim as currently pleaded, and the Plaintiffs' oral
representations at the hearing cannot cure their pleading's
deficiencies.  In the amended complaint, the Plaintiffs must
clarify CBA's contractual relationships with the other parties.

Finally, the unjust enrichment claim is dismissed with prejudice
by the Court for the same reasons explained with respect to HCC's
motion to dismiss.

The complaint's sparse allegations against HII also are
insufficient to state a claim.  Given that "joint marketing"
between HCC and HII is alleged, the Court finds that the
complaint's allegations provide a basis to infer HII was involved
in the marketing of the policies, and thus potentially liable for
their allegedly misleading advertising.  However, the claims based
on the misrepresentation theory must be dismissed with leave to
amend for the reasons discussed with regard to HCC's motion to
dismiss.

As to the improper claims-processing theory, the complaint fails
to allege that HII was an insurer or a party to the insurance
contracts.  Although the Court has some difficulty seeing how a
breach of contract or bad faith claim could be stated against HII,
it provided leave to amend these claims as well.

HII also seeks to the complaint concerning regulatory actions
taken against HII in other states.  Although HII claims that these
allegations are "immaterial," the fact that there is out-of-state
regulatory action against HII is relevant to the Plaintiffs'
allegations that the Defendants have a common policy or practice
of fraudulent behavior, according to the Court.  These allegations
thus relate to and have a possible bearing on the Plaintiffs'
claims.  Accordingly, the Court denied HII's motion to strike.

For these reasons, the Court granted HCC's motion to dismiss,
CBA's motion to dismiss, and HII's motion to dismiss with leave to
amend save with respect to the unjust enrichment claim.  HCC's
motion to strike the class allegations is denied and HII's motion
to strike is also denied.

The Plaintiffs will file an amended complaint by Aug. 7, 2017.  No
additional claims or parties may be added without leave of Court
or stipulation of the Defendants.  A case management conference
will be rescheduled after the pleadings are settled.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/YpXN5y from Leagle.com.

Mohammed Azad, Plaintiff, represented by David F. Slade --
dslade@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC.

Mohammed Azad, Plaintiff, represented by James Allen Carney --
acarney@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates Pulliam, PLLC, Jay B. Angoff,
Mehri and Skalet, Matthew Thomas Prewitt -- mprewitt@cuneolaw.com
-- Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca LLP, Michael J. Flannery --
mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, Rachel
Geman -- rgeman@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP & Kelly M. Dermody -- kdermody@lchb.com -- Leiff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Danielle Buckley, Plaintiff, represented by David F. Slade, Carney
Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, James Allen Carney, Carney Bates Pulliam,
PLLC, Jay B. Angoff, Mehri and Skalet, Matthew Thomas Prewitt,
Cuneo Gilbert and LaDuca LLP, Michael J. Flannery, Cuneo Gilbert &
LaDuca, LLP, Rachel Geman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
& Kelly M. Dermody, Leiff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Health Insurance Innovations, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Garry W. O'Donnell -- garry.odonnell@gmlaw.com -- Greenspoon
Marder, P.A. & Daniel J. Herling -- DJHerling@mintz.com -- Mintz
Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo P.C..

HCC Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Gerard G.
Pecht -- gerard.pecht@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose
Fulbright -- US LLP, Joshua David Lichtman, Norton Rose Fulbright
US LLP, Michael Scott Incerto --
scott.incerto@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP, Michelle Lynnea Mello --
michelle.mello@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP & Sumera I. Khan -- sumera.khan@nortonrosefulbright.com --
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, pro hac vice.

Tokio Marine HCC - Medical Insurance Services Group, Defendant,
represented by Gerard G. Pecht, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP,
Joshua David Lichtman, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Michael Scott
Incerto, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Michelle Lynnea Mello,
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP & Sumera I. Khan, Norton Rose
Fulbright US LLP, pro hac vice.

Consumer Benefits of America, Defendant, represented by Howard
Michael Garfield -- hgarfield@hbblaw.com -- Haight, Brown, &
Bonesteel, David W. Evans -- devans@hbblaw.com -- Haight Brown &
Bonesteel LLP & Renata Louise Hoddinott -- rhoddinott@hbblaw.com -
- HAIGHT BROWN BONESTEEL LLP.


TRIDENT ASSET: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARY ANN OLSZWESKI, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. TRIDENT
ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, and ORION PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00994 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying a proposed class in
this case, appointing the Plaintiff as its representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as its Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties
relief from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and
requirement that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents
in support of this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence. Damasco
v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled,
Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015).

As this motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
a one paragraph, single page motion to certify and stay should
suffice until an amended motion is filed, the Plaintiffs contend.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kjljHGT9

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


U.S. STEEL: Faces Suit Over Donora Zinc Works
---------------------------------------------
Gideon Bradshaw, writing for Observer, reports that sixty years
after the Donora Zinc Works closed, some who live nearby are
seeking to hold its owners responsible for elevated levels of
hazardous heavy metals its operations allegedly produced.

A lawsuit filed on July 7 in Washington County Court accuses U.S.
Steel of failing to notify those in the area around the zinc works
of "insidious industrial pollution in their homes, yards and
communities" resulting from operations there.

Attorney Michael Jacks,Esq. of Morgantown, W.Va., the plaintiffs'
lead attorney, wrote his clients "are suffering from a continuing
harm in that each and every day, they wake up to live in a
polluted property and suffer from additional exposure which cannot
be removed unless and until professional remediation is
performed."

The lawsuit includes claims under the state Hazardous Site Cleanup
Act and accuses U.S. Steel of negligence and recklessness.

It draws on a study published March 31 that found "elevated levels
of hazardous materials including arsenic, lead, cadmium and zinc"
in soil seven miles from the zinc works, specifically attributed
to the former mill.

U.S. Steel spokeswoman Meghan Cox said the company doesn't comment
on pending litigation.

U.S. Steel opened the smelting and processing plant in 1915 and
operated it until it closed in 1957.

The suit alleges the company opted to use horizontal retort
furnaces to produce zinc -- despite cleaner alternatives available
when the works opened -- and allegedly never modernized the
facility even as the industry evolved, failing to take measures to
adequately control pollution.

Along with U.S. Steel, the lawsuit names USX Corp. -- the name the
company adopted from 1986 to 2001 before reverting to its former
name -- as a defendant.

The facility came under scrutiny as the probable culprit in the
Donora Smog when, during five days in October 1948, a temperature
inversion trapped heavily polluted air in the valley, kiling more
than 20 people and leaving thousands more ill in Donora and nearby
Webster and Sunnyside, across the Monongahela River.

The lethal smog lent momentum to the then-budding environmental
movement. The small borough, 20 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, is
still known nationally as the site of the man-made disaster.

In subsequent litigation, the company admitted it collected
atmospheric sampling data in the decades leading up to the deadly
smog incident but has never made that data public.

The new lawsuit alleges the company failed to notify those in the
area about contamination from the zinc works.

It seeks designation as a class action and names Louise Kowall and
Evelyn Vehouc, both of Donora, and Donna Kopecek of Charleroi,
whose child and grandchildren live in a home she owns in Donora,
as proposed class representatives.

The lawsuit defines proposed class members as those who own
private real estate within a seven-mile radius of the former zinc
works, those who have lived in that area at any point in the last
30 years and children who have lived within those bounds.

In court papers, Jacks identified lead, arsenic and cadmium as
"carcinogens, neurotoxins and nephrotoxins, causing cancer and
kidney failure," and enumerated risks associated with lead
poisoning.

Among the demands in the lawsuit, Jacks asks that a judge hold
U.S. Steel responsible for the costs of medical monitoring for
diseases associated with the exposure; remediation of the
hazardous materials; and punitive and compensatory damages. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: "Olivares" Suit Compelled to Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LUIS OLIVARES, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16 C 6062 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismiss
the case pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.

The Plaintiff, who has been an Uber driver since May 2015,
voluntarily entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement with Rasier, LLC, Uber's wholly-owned subsidiary.  At
the time the Plaintiff signed up to use the Uber app to generate
leads for potential riders, the applicable agreement was the Nov.
10, 2014 Rasier Software License & Online Services Agreement.  He
voluntarily entered into the November 2014 and December 2015
Agreements and did not opt out of the Arbitration Provision.

The Plaintiff filed a five-count amended complaint against the
Defendant for violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act ("IWPCA") (Count I), Illinois Minimum Wage Law
("IMWL") (Count II), and Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") (Counts
III-V).  He brings the IWPCA and IMWL claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of himself and an Illinois
class, defined as all individuals who are or previously employed
by Uber in Illinois and who were classified as independent
contractors at any time during the five-year period prior to the
filing of the complaint.  The Plaintiff brings the FLSA claims on
behalf of himself and a collective class, defined as all
individuals who worked for Uber nationwide, except in California
and Massachusetts, and who were classified as independent
contractors at any time during the three-year period prior to the
filing of the complaint.

The Defendant asks the Court to compel arbitration and dismiss the
complaint because there is a valid, enforceable arbitration
agreement and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") does not
apply since the Plaintiff is an independent contractor, not an
employee.  The Plaintiff first asserts that the arbitration
provision is unenforceable because the class action waiver it
contains violates Section 7 of the NLRA.  To support this
argument, he relies on Lewis v. Epic Systems, in which the Seventh
Circuit held that a class action waiver was unenforceable because
it abridged employees' rights to engage in concerted activity.  He
next challenges the Defendant's classification of him as an
independent contractor and argues that the Court must decide
whether the Plaintiff is an employee or independent contractor
before it can rule on the Defendant's motion.  The Defendant
counters that Lewis is distinguishable because the arbitration
provision at issue here is voluntary and not mandatory as it was
in Lewis.  Further, it argues that whether the Plaintiff is
properly classified as an employee or an independent contractor is
for the arbitrator, not the Court, to decide.

The Court says the Uber's delegation clause is clear and
unmistakable evidence that when the Plaintiff accepted the
December 2015 Agreement, he agreed to arbitrate threshold issues.
Pursuant to that arbitration agreement, of which he did not opt
out, the Court finds that the arbitrator is responsible for
determining the threshold issue of whether the Plaintiff's
relationship with Uber is that of employee or independent
contractor.

Moreover, the Court says the NLRA applies to employees, not
independent contractors.  Accordingly, it is essential to first
resolve whether the Plaintiff is an independent contractor, as the
December 2015 Agreement seems to indicate, or an employee.
Because the Court has held that question is for the arbitrator, it
declines to weigh in at this stage whether the class action waiver
violates the NLRA.

For these reasons, the Court granted the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration.  Because the Seventh Circuit instructs that
the proper course of action when a party seeks to invoke an
arbitration clause is to stay the proceedings rather than to
dismiss outright, the motion to dismiss is denied.  This case is
stayed pending arbitration.  The Plaintiff is directed to notify
the Court within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 14, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/n62i34 from Leagle.com.

Luis Olivares, Plaintiff, represented by Norman Blumenthal --
norm@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik.

Luis Olivares, Plaintiff, represented by Victoria Bree Rivapalacio
-- victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik &
Mark E. King, King Law Group, P.C..

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by James J. Oh --
joh@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Darren Mason Mungerson
-- dmungerson@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Todd M.
Church -- tchurch@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


UNITED STATES: Hawaii Loses Bid to Challenge Trump Travel Ban
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathon Churchin, writing for JURIST, reports that the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on July 7 dismissed Hawaii's
appeal to challenge the rules of the Trump administration's travel
ban.  The three-judge panel decided that the court did not have
jurisdiction, clarifying that the question should be posed to the
US Supreme Court.  Hawaii was lodging an attempt to allow
grandparents and certain other relatives to be classified as
having a "bona fide" relationship, allowing them to come into the
US.  It is unclear what steps Hawaii might take now that the Ninth
Circuit has declined to address the issue.  As it stands the only
relationships that are classified as bona fide connections are
parents, spouses, sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law,
fiances and siblings.

The travel ban has been a contentious topic since the Trump
administration first implemented the executive order [materials],
and continues to face a series of federal legal action.  On July 6
a federal judge in Hawaii denied the state's attempt to exempt
grandparents the ban.  In June the US District Court for the
Western District of Washington denied in part and granted in part
a motion to dismiss a class action suit filed against President
Donald Trump and the US Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS).  Also in June the US District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan temporarily blocked the deportation of more
than 100 Iraq nationals, arrested by US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) [official website] agents, for approximately two
weeks, during which time the court will decide whether it has
jurisdiction in the matter.  Earlier that same month the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against the majority of
Trump's revised executive order limiting travel from six Muslim-
majority countries.  That ruling affirmed the majority of a
district court injunction in March that blocked the order from
being enforced.  In May a federal district court in Washington
granted a temporary restraining order to allow legal aid groups to
continue to provide certain kinds of assistance to undocumented
immigrants. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Asks Judge to Rethink Class Certification Order
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kyle Jahner, writing for Law360, reports that in a class action
challenging the legality of an immigrant vetting program allegedly
expanded by the Trump administration, the U.S. government asked a
federal judge to rethink his order certifying a class of
applicants for immigration benefits, arguing on July 5 that the
applicants could not attribute any injury to the program.

In a motion to reconsider a June class certification order, the
administration said that even if the court found the Controlled
Application Review and Resolution Program illegal, it could not be
assumed to have caused delays in the processing of immigration
paperwork for all class members, or any "concrete injury" on a
classwide basis.

"The court has no jurisdiction to evaluate the legality of CARRP
absent a plausible allegation that CARRP is the proximate cause of
unlawful delay," the motion said. "And there can be no commonality
among a class that contains members who have not suffered a
concrete injury. This alone is a sufficient basis to deny class
certification."

The lawsuit, filed on Jan. 23 in the Western District of
Washington, alleges the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
program secretly and unlawfully targets applicants who are Muslim
or from certain Muslim-majority countries.

It has since been heavily amended, the first time only a week
after it was filed in order to incorporate arguments challenging
parts of President Donald Trump's first executive order
restricting travel to the U.S. from several Muslim-majority
countries. The latest version of the suit targets the second
travel ban order in place of the first one, saying it would expand
CARRP.

U.S. District Judge Richard A. Jones declined to toss the case and
certified a nationwide class of potentially thousands of
applicants in June.

The lawsuit from multiple groups including the ACLU and attorneys
from Perkins Coie LLP says USCIS created CARRP in 2008 to
determine when an applicant should be labeled a "national security
concern," a vetting process they say was not authorized by
Congress nor was subject to required public notice and comment.
The Feb. 1 amended complaint tells the story of two plaintiffs,
but more have since been added.

In April, Judge Jones rejected a government bid to transfer the
case to North Dakota. It had argued the claims of the named
plaintiff, Washington resident Abdiqafar Wagafe, were moot after
it processed his application to change his refugee status and
become a lawful permanent resident. In rejecting that argument,
Judge Jones noted the government only processed Wagafe's
application after the plaintiffs filed for class certification,
adding that other named plaintiffs living in Washington had joined
the suit.

In June, when he certified the class and rejected a motion to
dismiss, Judge Jones further said that it would be a "blatant
attempt to moot the plaintiff's claims" if the government were
processing claims strategically.

But while Judge Jones' June ruling said that "the common question
here is whether CARRP is lawful," the government's on July 5
motion countered "that is only part of the equation" and argued it
matters equally that each class member has been similarly injured
by CARRP.

The government said the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court
have warned against using "abstract harm" to establish
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs can't possibly show both that
processing was unreasonable and that CARRP was the proximate cause
for all delays, much less for all class members, it argued.
Processing delays could arise for a variety of reasons, the
administration continued, saying class members "may be subject to
CARRP but not harmed by it," and that simply answering the common
question won't "finally resolve any claims on a classwide basis."

If Judge Jones refuses to undo class certification, the motion
requests in the alternative that he alter its definition, which
among other criteria includes immigrants whose applications have
been pending for longer than six months. It says the six-month
benchmark is derived only from a "sense" of congressional intent,
not from any legal requirement. The motion also said most
applicants wait longer than six months for processing regardless
of whether CARRP was involved.

"The court is entitled to exercise its discretion in defining
classes, but relying on a six-month mark that (1) has no legal
significance, and (2) does no work in separating delays cause by
CARRP from delays caused by a backlog of applications, is an abuse
of discretion," the motion said.

Representatives for the plaintiffs declined to comment. The
government does not comment on pending litigation.

The government is represented by trial attorneys Edward S. White,
Esq. -- Edward.s.white@usdoj.gov -- and Aaron R. Petty, Esq. --
aaron.r.petty@usdoj.gov -- of the National Security & Affirmative
Litigation Unit and acting Assistant Attorney General Chad A.
Readler, Esq. -- chad.a.readler@usdoj.gov -- District Court
Section Director William C. Peachey, Esq. --
William.c.peachey@usdoj.gov -- and chief of the National Security
and Affirmative Litigation Unit Christopher W. Dempsey, Esq. --
Christopher.w.dempsey@usdoj.gov

The plaintiffs are represented by Laura K. Hennessey, Esq. --
lhennessey@perkinscoie.com -- David A. Perez, Esq. --
dperez@perkinscoie.com -- Harry A. Schneider Jr., Esq. --
hschneider@perkinscoie.com -- Nicholas P. Gellert, Esq. --
ngellert@perkinscoie.com -- and Kate Reddy, Esq. --
kreddy@perkinscoie.com -- of Perkins Coie LLP, Jennifer
Pasquarella, Esq. -- jpasquarella@aclusocal.org -- of the ACLU
Foundation of Southern California, Matt Adams, Esq. --
adam@nwirp.org -- and Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, Esq. --
glenda@nwirp.org -- of the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project,
Stacy Tolchin, Esq. -- stacy@tolchinimmigration.com -- of the Law
Offices of Stacy Tolchin, Hugh Handeyside, Esq. --
hhandeyside@aclu.org -- Lee Gelernt, Esq. -- lgelernt@aclu.org --
and Hina Shamsi, Esq. -- hshamsi@aclu.org -- of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, Trina Realmuto, Esq. --
trina@nipnlg.org -- and Kristine Macleod-Ball, Esq. --
Kristine@nipnlg.org -- of the National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild and Emily Chiang, Esq. -- echiang@aclu-
wa.org -- of the ACLU of Washington Foundation.

The case is Wagafe et al. v. Trump et al., case number 2:17-cv-
00094-RAJ, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Judge Extends Stay Blocking Deportation of Iraqis
----------------------------------------------------------------
CNN Wire reports Iraqi nationals with final orders of removal from
the US cannot be deported for at least another two weeks, a
federal judge has ruled.

Judge Mark Goldsmith extended a temporary stay blocking their
deportation until July 24, according to the judge's order.

The judge said the court needed additional time to determine
whether the court has jurisdiction over the case in the first
place, according to court documents.

The group of Iraqi nationals who filed the initial lawsuit along
with the ACLU argued that there was "good cause" for extending the
stay, because Iraqis in danger of deportation face the same
threats they did when the initial stay was granted a few weeks
ago: fear of "persecution, torture or even death," upon return to
their country, according to court documents.

Attorneys arguing on behalf of the federal government did not
initially agree, but conceded during the court hearing that the
court had the power to extend the stay, according to court
documents and Lee Gelernt, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project deputy
director.

"As the court has recognized, these individuals are potentially in
grave danger if sent back to Iraq," Gelernt told CNN in a
statement. "There is simply no reason why the government needs to
deport them before they have had an opportunity to present their
claims that they will be tortured and possibly killed if returned
to Iraq."

The ACLU along with some Iraqi nationals detained in the Michigan
area originally filed a suit on June 15, requesting a stay of
removal for any Iraqi detained under the jurisdiction of the
Detroit ICE office. A few days earlier, ICE arrested more than 100
Iraqi nationals in the Michigan area.

ICE has arrested 199 Iraqi nationals since May; 114 of them from
Detroit, according to the agency's press secretary Gillian
Christensen. ICE said most of those arrested have criminal
records.

Shortly after the initial stay was granted, the ACLU asked to
expand the class-action lawsuit to cover all Iraqi nationals in
the US with final orders of removal for deportation. The judge
granted their request, expanding the temporary stay on June 26 to
cover this group of 1,444 Iraqi nationals on June 26. Eighty-five
of them face deportation when the stay is lifted, according to
court documents.

While the stay is in place, Iraqi nationals, both those being held
in detention centers and those still going about their normal
lives but who have final orders of removal, are able to take their
case before an immigration court judge and argue why they believe
they should be allowed to stay in the U.S.

A group of about 40 Iraqis immigrants living in Michigan who were
detained by ICE requested pardon from deportation from Michigan
Gov. Rick Snyder on July 7, a day after the temporary stay was
extended.

"The requests for pardon have been received and each one is being
reviewed by our office," Anna Heaton, the governor's spokeswoman,
told CNN.

The ACLU has also requested a list of names from the federal
government of all 1,444 Iraqis who fall into the category
protected by the temporary stay so they can equip them with legal
representation and help them argue their cases in immigration
courts. The government had not provided this list to the ACLU as
of July 8, according to Gelernt, who is arguing the case.

The US attorney's office has argued that a federal district court
did not have jurisdiction over whether Iraqis can be deported.
Government lawyers believe it should be handled by an immigration
court, according to Gina Balaya, public information officer for
the US attorney's office for the Eastern District of Michigan.
[GN]


VOLKSWAGEN: Wants to Dodge Liability for Failure to Warn Investors
------------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News, reports that a
federal judge on July 7 appeared unwilling to let Volkswagen off
the hook for failing to warn investors that it was skirting
environmental laws, even as it touted its commitment to developing
emissions-reducing technology.

"It's not that they have to disclose wrongdoing," U.S. District
Judge Charles Breyer said in court on July 7. "But when you say,
'Look at all the government is doing to monitor this,' and you
fail to say, 'And we're devoting resources to defeat this,' that's
a misstatement by omission."

Breyer was referring to a document drafted in May 2014 to court
big investors such as a retirement fund for Puerto Rico's
government employees, which serves as the lead plaintiff in one of
two U.S. securities class actions against Volkswagen and its
former top executives.

The retirement fund claims Volkswagen overstated its profitability
and hid the billions of dollars in liabilities it faced for its
worldwide distribution of 11 million vehicles tainted with
emissions-cheating software.

During a motion-to-dismiss hearing on July 7, Volkswagen attorney
Robert Giuffra, Esq. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- insisted the
German automaker can't be held liable for securities fraud because
it made no false statements in a May 2014 memo that institutional
investors relied on when purchasing bonds.

"Every company issues warnings that we are subject to laws,"
Giuffra said. "If that's enough for a misstatement, every company
that gets fined could be liable."

But Breyer found Volkswagen focused heavily on its commitment to
emissions-reducing technology in that memo while failing to
disclose that it also invested in devices intended to conceal
emissions.

"The truth and context of what Volkswagen is doing is important,"
Breyer said.

The judge said he would not consider other statements and
financial reports issued by the company because the memo stated
that investors should "rely only on information contained in this
offering memorandum."

Attorneys for Volkswagen and the proposed class of qualified
institutional buyers also argued over whether the proposed class
period should start on May 15, 2014, when the bonds were
purchased, or May 23, 2014, when the transaction was complete.

That eight-day difference is important because the plaintiffs
claim then-Volkswagen of America CEO Michael Horn received an
email on May 15 warning him that Volkswagen vehicles did not meet
U.S. emissions standards and of the potential consequences.

Class attorney Ian Berg.Esq. argued that because the transaction
was not completed until May 23, that date should represent the
start of the class period. He contended Horn knew about the fraud
before the retirement fund completed its purchase of bonds on May
23, 2014.

"If the truth was disclosed, they would have had the opportunity
to cancel that order," Berg said.

But Volkswagen attorneys, including Giuffra, insisted the company
and its executives can only be held liable for conduct that
occurred before the purchase date of May 15, 2014.

Volkswagen sold three sets of bonds to qualified institutional
buyers between May 23, 2014, and May 22, 2015. It sold $3.5
billion in bonds in May 2014; $2 billion in bonds in November
2014; and $2.8 billion in bonds in May 2015, according to the
retirement fund's complaint.

Giuffra said it was "telling" that no other named plaintiffs have
stepped forward in the case, adding that the retirement fund for
Puerto Rico's public employees only lost $66,000, or 1.6 percent
in value when it sold the bonds in October 2015.

"People didn't lose a lot of money on these bonds, and some made
money," Giuffra said.

Breyer indicated that the proposed class would need to find
additional named plaintiffs that purchased bonds in November 2014
and May 2015 to pursue claims of securities fraud for those
transactions.

After about an hour of debate, Breyer took the arguments under
advisement.

Breyer refused to dismiss claims against Volkswagen in a separate
class action brought by U.S. investors who purchased Volkswagen
shares in the form of level 1 American Depository Receipts, or
ADRs.

Giuffra is with Sullivan and Cromwell in New York. Berg is with
Abraham, Fruchter & Twersky in San Diego. [GN]


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Attorney Provides Details on Diesel Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that about a year ago, Volkswagen
agreed to spend up to $15.3 billion to settle consumer lawsuits
and government allegations that its diesel vehicles cheated on
U.S. emissions tests.  Included was up to $10 billion for owners
of about 450,000 VWs and Audis to either buy back or repair
vehicles with 2-liter engines.

Owners would get $5,100 to $10,000 in addition to buybacks or
fixes.  As of late June, VW had paid $6.3 billion to 2-liter
owners.  About 62 percent of the cars, or 300,000, have been
purchased by VW, modified or scrapped.  Owners have until
September of 2018 to apply.

Elizabeth Cabraser, a San Francisco attorney who led negotiations
for people suing the company, says the payments are substantial
because VW admitted guilt.  Her interview has been edited for
length and clarity.

Q: Consumers appeared to be better compensated here than in most
class-action suits. How did you manage that?

A: Consumer class actions sometimes get a bum rap, I think.  This
case was different.  It's about cars.  That's a major investment
for people, particularly because they bought these cars for very
specific reasons. Having a situation where VW was caught red-
handed and forced to ultimately concede liability helped.  But we
had to make the case that there would be no environmental solution
without active participation of the owners and leasees. The
government couldn't and wouldn't go out and take people's cars,
and if there was a fix, couldn't make people fix them. We had to
incentivize people to come in and have their cars repaired or have
their cars bought back.  We couldn't make it work by paying people
small dollars.

Q: Earlier this year VW had problems taking back cars and making
payments. Have those been cleared up?

A: For the most part.  No one has ever been through a buyback of
this magnitude.  VW spent a lot of time and money ramping up the
program to have it ready.  There's a limited infrastructure there,
limited by the number of dealers.  We did such a good job in the
financial features of the settlement that everybody showed up
early to get their buybacks.  That put a tremendous stress on the
system. In order to make this work for people, more resources had
to be put into the system.

Q: You're now lead counsel for people suing Fiat Chrysler over
allegations of diesel truck emissions cheating. Will the
settlements be smaller than with VW?

A: The government has strong allegations, as do we. It's too early
to project.  The fact remains that emissions controls were evaded.
(The company says it did not install software with the intent to
cheat on tests and says it will defend itself in court) The number
of vehicles is smaller. (104,000) That means this is a less-
expensive problem to solve.  If repairing the cars is less
complicated, either from a software reflashing or a mechanical
standpoint, that saves money. But also we still have the challenge
of sufficiently incentivizing owners to have modifications made.
Owners are not going to do that if they are concerned that the
modifications are going to significantly affect the mileage or
performance of these vehicles. [GN]


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Diesel Emissions Case Lawyers Seek Addt'l Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Amanda Bronstad of The Recorder, reports that
lawyers who sued Volkswagen over its diesel emissions scandal
could end up with a pretty good return on their investment: After
being awarded $175 million in fees and costs, they are asking for
an additional $125 million -- and it appears there's a good chance
they'll get it.

That means a total of nearly $350 million in fees and costs could
end up going to the 22 law firms leading the emissions litigation.
The case lasted about a year, mostly in settlement negotiations.

The fees already awarded were related to a $14.7 billion
settlement that resolved class actions by consumers of 475,000
vehicles alleging their 2.0-liter diesel engines were rigged to
cheat emissions tests.  The latest request ties to a $1.2 billion
settlement involving over 75,000 vehicles with 3.0-liter diesel
engines.

According to a June 30 motion for fees, Volkswagen agreed to the
latest request, which includes $121 million in fees and $4 million
in costs.

"In the context of this historic settlement, class counsel's fee
request is more than justified," wrote Elizabeth Cabraser of San
Francisco's Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, who leads the
plaintiffs' steering committee.  "So, too, are the requested
costs, which are reasonable and were necessary to advance the
litigation and settlement expeditiously."

A Volkswagen spokeswoman declined to comment.

Ms. Cabraser leads a team that includes prominent plaintiffs
attorneys across the country, including those in New Jersey, New
York, Florida, Texas and California.  In a statement, the steering
committee noted that the fees would be in addition to the
estimated $1.22 billion paid to consumers.

"We negotiated these agreements to hold Volkswagen accountable for
its breach of consumer trust, and we hope that all class members
choose to take advantage of the benefits detailed in these
settlements," they said.

Like the $14.7 billion deal, the latest settlement would provide
cash compensation, buybacks, lease terminations and repairs to
consumers.  But the cash and repair options differ based on older
or new model cars.  If Volkswagen does not provide an adequate fix
for the new models by Dec. 20, it has agreed to pay $4.04 billion.

In May, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer of the Northern
District of California approved the deal, which also resolved
claims brought by the Federal Trade Commission.

In the fee request, Ms. Cabraser noted that the amount was less
than 10 percent of the deal's value, far below the 25 percent
benchmark established in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.  It's also well below that of other "super-mega-fund"
settlements, which average between 13.7 percent and 14.5 percent,
according to a declaration provided by William Rubenstein, a
professor at Harvard Law School and an expert on class actions.
Partners billed between $250 and $1,650 on the case, which took
more than 130,000 hours, according to a declaration submitted by
Cabraser.  In addition to the Volkswagen settlements, the same
team was awarded $52 million as part of a $327.5 million related
deal with Robert Bosch GmbH, which supplied the software installed
in the vehicles.

Still, the fees aren't shoo-ins.  In April, Judge Breyer denied
244 motions for fees brought by nearly 60 law firms not on the
committee and slashed by 90 percent a $28.5 million request by one
committee member, Steve Berman, managing partner of Seattle's
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro, for work he did on a separate $1.2
billion settlement for Volkswagen franchise dealers.

But there's more emissions litigation in the works.  Ms. Cabraser
was named lead counsel this month in similar emissions litigation
brought against Fiat Chrysler AV. Most of the lawyers joining her
in that case were also on the Volkswagen committee.


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Suit Over Emissions Allowed to Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, issued a
Decision affirming District Court's Order denying Defendant VW's
Motion to Dismiss the cases captioned AVID L. FELIX and LUIS M.
FELIX, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA,
INC., Defendant-Appellant, and JACK DANIELS VOLKSWAGEN, Defendant.
EDUARDO DEANG, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF
AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and JACK DANIELS VOLKSWAGEN,
Defendant, Nos. A-0585-16T3, A-0586-16T3 (N.J. App. Div.).

The App. Div. granted leave to appeal in these two cases and
consolidated the appeals because they present a common question of
law.

Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (VW), appeals from
Judge Camille M. Kenny's order denying VW's motion to dismiss the
complaint filed by plaintiffs David L. and Luis M. Felix and the
Order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff
Eduardo Deang.

In both complaints, plaintiffs alleged VW misrepresented its
vehicles' high performance capabilities while asserting each
vehicle fully complied with federal emissions standards set by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Both complaints included causes of action for common law fraud and
violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (the MMWA), and
breach of other implied warranties.

VW moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing they were expressly or
impliedly pre-empted by provisions of the Clean Air Act.

VW cited 42 U.S.C.A. 7543(a), which provides in pertinent part
that "No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or
attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
subject to this part."

The District Court concluded the CAA did not pre-empt plaintiffs'
state law actions.

Title II requires the EPA to test all new motor vehicles and
engines and issue certificates of compliance, before a vehicle is
introduced into commerce. The CAA provides a mechanism for the
recall of engines when the EPA finds previously certified engines
do not conform to emissions standards, prohibits any State or
political subdivision from adopting or attempting to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.
However, Title II also contains a savings clause which provides
"nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State or
political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control,
regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of
registered or licensed motor vehicles."

VW argues Congress expressly pre-empted the field by prohibiting
any State action to enforce a "standard relating to the control of
emissions." 42 U.S.C.A. 7543(a). It argues the Supreme Court has
recognized that "relating to," as used in other federal statutes,
suggests "a broad pre-emptive purpose. VW contends that
plaintiffs' complaints are, in reality, attempts to enforce EPA's
emission standards, because to succeed, plaintiffs must prove VW's
vehicles exceeded those standards.

The App. Div. disagrees.

In Cipollone, the Court explained that consideration of whether
the plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (the Labeling Act),  required
examination of "the legal duty that is the predicate" of the
particular claim and whether it falls within the scope of the pre-
emption provision.

The Court analyzed each claim in light of the Labeling Act's
provision that expressly prohibited states from requiring a health
warning to appear on all cigarette advertisements and containers
Although the plurality found certain claims were pre-empted, the
Court found two claims could go forward.

First, the plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim was not
pre-empted because "a manufacturer's liability for breach of an
express warranty derives from, and is measured by, the terms of
that warranty.The 'requirement[s]' imposed by an express warranty
claim are not imposed under State law,' but rather imposed by the
warrantor.

However, in In re Caterpillar, Inc., the federal district court
cited Cipollone and Wolens in interpreting the pre-emptive reach
of Section 7543(a) of the CAA.  There, the class action plaintiffs
alleged their diesel engine vehicles with an emissions control
system designed to comply with EPA standards were defective,
causing the vehicles to experience repeated engine failures and
shutdowns.

Plaintiffs' claims which seek enforcement of express and implied
warranties for defects in the Engines' emissions systems, as well
as those based on consumer fraud and negligent design, are hardly
comparable to efforts by state and local governments to adopt or
enforce emissions standards or to require additional
certifications or inspections prior to sale.

In the cases her, plaintiffs do not seek to enforce an EPA
emission standard or force the manufacturer to adopt a different
emission standard. It may well be that plaintiffs will prove their
vehicles failed to comply with EPA emission standards, something
VW has publicly acknowledged, but the gravamen of plaintiffs'
complaint centers on VW's alleged deceitful, fraudulent practices,
and its alleged breach of a duty not to mislead consumers.

The App. Div. concludes section 7543(a) does not expressly pre-
empt plaintiffs' causes of action.

The App. Div. also concludes that the CAA does not impliedly pre-
empt plaintiffs' complaints. Implied pre-emption occurs either
when "the scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it,'" or when "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility.

The App. Div. agrees with the analysis of the Caterpillar court,
i.e., that "the savings clause suggests that Congress did not
intend to occupy the entire field of motor vehicle regulation.
Instead, the [savings clause] explicitly contemplates continued
state involvement in the regulation of motor vehicles.

Furthermore, because plaintiffs' claims do not hinge on compliance
with EPA standards, there can be no direct conflict with the
federal regulatory scheme that requires compliance with those
standards.

A full-text copy of the NJ App. Div.'s July 17, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/nuEdL1 from Leagle.com.

Judson O. Littleton -- littletonj@sullcrom.com -- (Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP) of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac
vice, argued the cause for appellant (Chase, Kurshan, Herzfeld &
Rubin, P.C., and Mr. Littleton, attorneys; Jeffrey L. Chase --
Jchase@herzfeld-rubin.com -- on the briefs).

Michael D. Power argued the cause for respondents (Power &
Associates, PC, attorneys; Mr. Power, on the briefs: 1790
Wilmington Pike, Suite 200, Glen Mills, PA 19342


WELLS FARGO: Judge Grants Prelim Approval to $142MM Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
On July 8, 2017 the federal court overseeing the first class
action lawsuit filed against Wells Fargo related to unauthorized
accounts granted preliminary approval to a $142 million settlement
designed to compensate Wells Fargo customers nationwide.

The court also appointed Keller Rohrback L.L.P. to represent the
class of bank victims. The national consumer class action firm
brought the case, captioned Jabbari, et. al. v. Wells Fargo &
Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California in 2015.

The Court found that "for the purpose of preliminary approval, the
Court is satisfied that the revised settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate within the meaning of Rule 23."

The settlement compensates customers for fees charged on Wells
Fargo unauthorized consumer or small business checking or savings
accounts, unsecured credit cards, or unsecured lines of credit,
compensates them for damage to their credit resulting from any
unauthorized accounts, and provides additional compensation to all
class members based on the number of unauthorized accounts opened
in their names.

"We are pleased that the court has preliminarily approved this
groundbreaking settlement that provides substantial monetary
benefits and first-of-its kind credit repair damage to customers.
The settlement is an important component of holding Wells Fargo
accountable for its abuse of its customers' trust," said Derek
Loeser, a partner at Keller Rohrback L.L.P. and lead attorney for
the plaintiffs.

Now that the court has preliminarily approved the settlement,
information will soon be sent to class members about the
settlement benefits. Potential class members can also go to the
settlement website, www.WFSettlement.com, or call (866) 431-8549
for more information. The court is scheduled to hold a final
fairness hearing to decide whether to grant final approval on
January 4, 2018.

The class covered by the settlement consists of people for whom
Wells Fargo opened a consumer or small business checking or
savings account, an unsecured credit card, or an unsecured line of
credit, or submitted an application for one of these, without the
customer's consent during the period from May 1, 2002 through
April 20, 2017. The class also consists of people who obtained
Wells Fargo's Identity Theft Protection Services during the same
time period.

Plaintiffs are represented by: Derek W. Loeser, Esq. --
dloeser@KellerRohrback.com -- Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq. --
gcappio@KellerRohrback.com -- Daniel P. Mensher, Esq. --
dmensher@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., in Seattle,
WA; Matthew J. Preusch, Esq. -- mpreusch@KellerRohrback.com --
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., in Santa Barbara, CA; and Jeffrey Lewis,
Esq. -- jlewis@KellerRohrback.com -- at Keller Rohrback L.L.P., in
Oakland, CA.


WENDY'S OF LAS VEGAS: Loses Bid to Strick Workers' Expert Witness
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order denying Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert's Declaration
and for Sanctions in the case captioned LATONYA TYUS, an
individual; DAVID HUNSICKER, an individual; LINDA DAVIS, an
individual; TERRON SHARP, an individual; COLLINS KWAYISI, an
individual; LEE JONES, an individual; RAISSA BURTON, an
individual; JERMEY McKINNEY, an individual; and FLORENCE EDJEOU,
an individual, all on behalf of themselves and all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. WENDY'S OF LAS VEGAS, INC.,
an Ohio corporation; CEDAR ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio Corporation;
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-
00729-GMN-VCF (D. Nev.).

Defendants Wendy's of Las Vegas, Inc. and Cedar Enterprises,
Inc.'s Renewed Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Expert Declaration,
Strike Plaintiffs' Purported Expert Witness, and for Sanctions.

This case arises from a class action brought by Plaintiffs
regarding Nevada's Minimum Wage Amendment ("MWA") to the Nevada
Constitution.  Nevada voters approved the MWA, which guaranteed to
each Nevada employee a particular hourly wage. Plaintiffs were
employees of Defendants, who are owners and operators of Wendy's
Restaurants in southern Nevada.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
paid employees below the upper-tier hourly minimum wage leve in
violation of the MWA.

Defendants' Motion requests that this Court strike Plaintiffs'
designation of Dr. Matthew T. Milone as an expert and the
declaration of Dr. Milone, an expert witness, for two reasons:

   * First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' expert disclosure
through a deficient and untimely declaration violates the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Amended Scheduling Order.

   * Second, Defendants claim the Plaintiffs' expert declaration
is improper and highly prejudicial because it sets "forth legal
conclusions that are exclusively in the province of this Court.

The parties present three issues to the Court: (1) Whether the
Plaintiffs' designation of Milone as an expert and the Milone
expert declaration were timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)
and the Amended Scheduling Order?; (2) Whether the Milone expert
declaration met the substantive requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B)?; and (3) Whether the Milone expert declaration
invades the province of the Court by opining on ultimate issues of
law?

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' expert designation and
declaration were not untimely under the Amended Scheduling Order.
The Court also finds that Plaintiffs' expert disclosure was
substantially justified for two reasons.  First, in light of the
above, the "bifurcated discovery" between class certification and
merits issues resulted in a limited record at the class
certification stage. Indeed, Plaintiffs did not have the benefit
of discovery into the merits of the case at this stage. The Court
cannot say that Plaintiffs' designation and declaration of expert
Milone in response to Defendants' dispositive motion on issues
going to the merits was unreasonable.

Second, Defendants' delay in bringing this motion is a factor the
Court considers. Plaintiffs served supplemental disclosures in May
2016, which disclosed the "Plaintiffs' Merits and Liability-Phase
Expert Report of Milone and that "Plaintiffs may use [it] to
support their claims. Judge Navarro permitted the parties to re-
file motions only after the Nevada Supreme Court answered Judge
Navarro's certified question of law. The Court's review of the
record shows that Defendants did not move to strike that
designation or expert declaration until June 5, 2017.

After reviewing the expert declaration, the Court does not agree
that the declaration fails to include the above requirements. An
expert's written report must meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). The language in the Milone expert
declaration does state that "the opinions in this Declaration are
my preliminary opinions and are subject to the opinions in my
final report."

The Court finds this reasonable in light of the bifurcated
discovery issues discussed above and not necessarily an indicator
that the Declaration does not include a "complete statement of all
opinions to which the witness will express."

At this stage in the case, Defendants' request to exclude Milone
and his declaration on the ground that he opines on legal
conclusions also appears premature.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 17, 2017, Order is
available at  https://is.gd/v5yt1r from Leagle.com

Latonya Tyus, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager --
bschrager@wrslawyers.com -- Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman &
Rabkin.

Latonya Tyus, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Bravo --
dbravo@wrslawyers.com -- Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, &
Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer -- dspringmeyer@wrslawyers.com --
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

David Hunsicker, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager,
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Terron Sharp, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Linda Davis, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Collins Kwayisi, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager,
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Lee Jones, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf, Rifkin,
Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf, Rifkin,
Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Raissa Burton, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager,
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Jeremy McKinney, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager,
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Florence Edjeou, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Scott Schrager,
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, Daniel Bravo, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman, & Rabkin, LLP & Don Springmeyer, Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman and Rabkin, LLP.

Wendy's of Las Vegas, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kathryn
Blakey -- kblakey@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Montgomery Y.
Paek -- mpaek@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Rick D. Roskelley
-- rroskelley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC & Roger L.
Grandgenett --  rgrandgenett@littler.com --Littler Mendelson, PC.
Cedar Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kathryn Blakey,
Littler Mendelson, Montgomery Y. Paek, Littler Mendelson, Rick D.
Roskelley, Littler Mendelson, PC & Roger L. Grandgenett, Littler
Mendelson, PC.


WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Denies Prelim Approval of Proposed Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Ward, writing for Charleston Gazette, reports that a class-
action legal settlement worth up to $151 million is a "strong
result" that provides "substantial" benefits for victims of the
Kanawha Valley's water crisis in 2014, but the deal needs more
work and the lawyers who represent thousands of residents and
businesses don't deserve to be paid quite as much as they think,
according to a detailed review of the proposal by the federal
judge who will decide if the settlement is finalized.

U.S. District Judge John T. Copenhaver Jr. issued a 93-page order
in which he declined to give preliminary approval to the
settlement with West Virginia American Water Co. and Eastman
Chemical. The case was brought over the impact of the "do not use"
order that followed the Jan. 9, 2014, chemical spill at the
Freedom Industries facility 1.5 miles upstream from the water
company's Elk River regional intake and treatment plant.

Copenhaver told the parties he would not approve them issuing a
public notice to members of the plaintiff class or scheduling a
hearing to consider potential objections to the settlement -- a
requirement for final approval by the court -- until changes are
made to language about tiered payments to various-sized
businesses, the ability of victims to appeal denial of claims,
fixed-base payments for medical claims and a schedule to hold off
any payments until appeals are resolved.

The judge also indicated he would reduce the payments to lawyers
for residents and businesses by at least $5 million.

The ruling came as a bit of a surprise given that the 220-page
settlement document had been worked out by lawyers partly during a
series of closed-door meetings the judge held between when the
tentative settlement was reached on the eve of trial in October
and when the document was filed in court in late April.

It remains unclear how long the ruling will set back the process
of businesses and residents receiving their share of the
settlement, but residents won't be able to file claims until parts
of the deal are rewritten to the judge's satisfaction.

There's a chance the deal could fall apart, but lawyers in the
case said they were confident that wasn't going to happen.
Publicly, lawyers for all sides expressed optimism they could deal
with the judge's concerns in fairly short order.

Before he can give the settlement final approval, Copenhaver must
conclude it is "fair, reasonable and adequate." Class members must
also be given the opportunity to opt-out of the deal.

Stuart Calwell, a lead lawyer for residents and businesses, said
the parties will work to address the judge's concerns as quickly
as possible.

"In our view, those concerns, once met, will only strengthen the
settlement and the ability of those impacted to receive fair
compensation," Calwell said.

Laura Martin, a spokeswoman for West Virginia American, said
company officials "are evaluating the judge's order and anticipate
responding to the court's concerns with further good faith
settlement negotiation."

Amanda Allman, a spokeswoman for Eastman, said her company's goal
"continues to be completion of a resolution for the affected
communities."

"While the court's order means that there is additional work to be
done, Eastman is pleased that the issues raised by the court
appear to be capable of swift resolution," Allman said.

In the case, lawyers for residents and businesses alleged West
Virginia American did not adequately prepare for or respond to the
spill, and Eastman, maker of the main chemical that spilled, did
not properly warn Freedom of the dangers of its chemical or take
any action when Eastman officials learned the Freedom facility was
in disrepair.

West Virginia American and Eastman continue to deny any liability
and say the blame for the crisis rests with Freedom Industries,
which admitted to criminal pollution violations related to the
spill.

Under the settlement, residents and businesses can obtain uniform
settlement payments by filing claim forms, or they can potentially
receive larger distributions by providing receipts or other proof
of money spent for things like replacing hot water tanks or buying
bottled water.

The settlement also provides additional payments to women who were
pregnant at the time of the spill, residents who had medical
expenses and hourly wage earners who lost money when businesses
closed during the water crisis.

For example, residential households that choose the claim form
will receive $525 for the first resident and $170 for each
additional resident. Businesses, nonprofit organizations and
government entities that choose the form can receive between
$6,250 and $40,000, depending on their size, if they were forced
to close or partly close during the crisis and whether they are
hotels.

"The anticipated sums represent substantial amounts that few
claimants could expect to recoup through independent litigation
that would likely engulf similar compensation amounts with high
litigation costs and fees," Copenhaver said in his ruling, issued
on July 6.

The judge also noted the attorneys in the case had provided the
public with other benefits, such as "a prophylactic against future
water contamination" through their work to secure a separate deal
before the state Public Service Commission that will "improve the
water system generally" and provide better emergency response and
improved detection of any contamination.

The judge, though, outlined four concerns he has about the
settlement:

Tiered compensation -- The system was meant to help small local
businesses that may have been disproportionately harmed by being
closed during the "do not use" water order.

But the judge said he believes calculating basic payments on the
size of affected businesses "generates unfairness" to those
businesses "whose revenues are in the upper margins of the various
tiers."

For example, he argues a business with earnings just less than
$250,000 would receive a payment of $6,250, or 2.5 percent of its
annual revenue, while a self-employed individual with annual
revenue of $20,000 would receive the same $6,250, equal to 31
percent of his or her annual revenues.

At the same time, a business earning less than $1 million would
receive $12,500, or 1.25 percent of its annual revenue. Copenhaver
said the system "appears to provide a windfall to certain
businesses" and "calls into question the fairness of the
proposal."

Resolving disputes -- The judge wants the settlement to include an
appeals body of some sort whose rulings would be binding on the
settlement administrator. Currently, the rulings of a "claims
oversight panel" -- made up of representatives of the plaintiffs
and the defendants -- would be binding only if they were
unanimous.

Fixed payments for medical claims -- The judge said fixed amounts
for certain medical issue claims, such as eye impairment and
employment disability, were not appropriate because they didn't
allow for "adjustment based on particular circumstances" of each
victim.

Delays in payment distribution -- Copenhaver said he is concerned
the settlement currently would not allow payments to claimants to
start until all appeals have been resolved and any further appeals
period expired. Instead, the judge said, the settlement could
sequester adequate funds to cover claims that are appealed and
allow other claims to be processed and paid right away.

In his order, the judge also praised the work of the lawyers
representing residents and businesses, but he said he would likely
not approve their request to receive 30 percent of the first $101
million of the settlement, saying the percentage was higher than
was acceptable for a case where the settlement fund was so large.

"While class counsel soundly built their case against both the
water company and Eastman at considerable expenditure of skilled
and determined effort, and some $2 million in out-of-pocket
expenses, the ultimate risk of nonpayment was not so great as to
merit an atypically high award," Copenhaver said.

The judge noted, in particular, arguments developed by the
plaintiffs' lawyers that West Virginia American should have had a
second intake at the local plant and should have kept more water
stored at the facility so it could shut the intake until the
chemical spill flowed by.

"Although class counsel have been skillful and diligent and have
been resisted by equally formidable counsel for defendants, the
complexity and duration of this case have not been so
extraordinary as to justify the requested fee award," he said.

The judge said the appropriate amount would be 25 percent of the
$101 million, which would reduce that part of the legal fees from
$30.3 million to $25.25 million.

The lawyers would also receive 25 percent of whatever is
eventually paid out of a second pot of $50 million in settlement
money from West Virginia American Water.

Copenhaver also commented that it was "quite troubling" that some
lawyers could receive additional contingency fees if they help
specific clients file more complicated individual review claim
forms.

"The additional fee of 15 percent for some, and the unlimited fee
for most others, would send the total attorneys' fees in this case
soaring well above the 25 percent figure preliminarily approved by
the court," the judge wrote. "The parties must bring all attorney
fees in this case under control." [GN]


ZTO EXPRESS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP announces that a
class action complaint was filed against ZTO Express (Cayman) Inc.
(NYSE: ZTO). The complaint is brought on behalf of all purchasers
of ZTO American Depository Shares ("ADSs") pursuant to the
company's public offering (the "Offering") on October 27, 2016,
for alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 by ZTO's
officers and directors. ZTO, through its subsidiaries, provides
express delivery and other value-added logistics services in
China.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
www.robbinsarroyo.com/shareholders-rights-blog/zto-express-cayman-
inc

ZTO Accused of Exaggerating Its Profit Margins

According to the complaint, on October 27, 2016, ZTO held the
Offering, selling 72,100,000 ADSs at a price of $19.50 per share,
raising $1.4 billion. ZTO's registration statement and prospectus
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in support
of the Offering presented a highly positive picture of the
company's business, performance, prospects, and acreage, while
omitting crucial realities. The company specifically emphasized
its strong operating leverage, superior profitability, and rapid
growth. However, ZTO failed to disclose that it was improperly
inflating its stated profit margins far above industry norms by
keeping low-margin segments of its business out of its financial
statements. Since the Offering, the price of ZTO's ADSs has fallen
approximately 25%.

ZTO Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003 -- LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com -- or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP is a nationally recognized leader in
shareholder rights law. The firm represents individual and
institutional investors in shareholder derivative and securities
class action lawsuits, and has helped its clients realize more
than $1 billion of value for themselves and the companies in which
they have invested. [GN]


ZURICH INSURANCE: Appeals Panel Sides Against Complainant
---------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
state appeals panel has sided with several insurance companies
facing class action complaints from a Chicago-based medical
practice specializing in treating neck and back injuries as part
of worker compensation claims, saying the clinic has no right
under the law to demand insurers pay interest on slow-arriving
reimbursements.

In an opinion issued June 30, Illinois First District Appellate
Court justices Mary K. Rochford, Thomas E. Hoffman and Mathias W.
Delort said a Cook County judge was correct to dismiss the
complaints of Marque Medicos, a practice that provides care to
patients at several locations in Chicago and west suburban Aurora.
According to published reports about the practice, Marque Medicos
specializes in neck and back injuries, generally payable under
workers compensation claims. The practice also was described in at
least one report as catering particularly to Hispanic patients.

The appellate panel was considering four actions consolidated from
the courtroom of Cook County Circuit Judge Rita M. Novak.
Defendants in the actions represented Zurich Insurance Company,
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, Hartford
Underwriters Insurance Company and AIG Insurance Company.

Marque Medicos filed its complaints in March 2015, saying the
insurance companies failed to comply with Workers Compensation Act
requirements by not paying interest on late payments. The insurers
moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a claim. In
addition, Travelers argued the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction, but rather the argument was the domain of the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission.

On Feb. 19, 2016, Novak dismissed each of the four complaints with
prejudice, finding Marque Medicos was not a third-party
beneficiary of the policies, had no implied private right of
action and was not entitled to remedies under the Insurance Code.
Marque Medicos appealed March 15, 2016; the appeals were
consolidated in May 2016.

Rochford wrote the Commission was not authorized to resolve the
common law and statutory claims in the complaints, rejecting
Travelers' jurisdictional argument. However, the panel sided with
the insurers in finding Marque Medicos to be, "at best, incidental
and not direct beneficiaries" of the worker compensation policies.
The law, the panel wrote, requires employers to be timely in
compensating employees, but the provision does not extend to
medical providers.

"While providers might receive some benefit from the specific
interest provision" in the worker compensation law, "that benefit
is at most incidental and was provided solely in an effort to
serve the legislature's primary goal of compensating employees
completely and promptly."

The practice also argued the insurers breached an implied
contract, but Rochford said its complaints conceded the insurers'
"purported consideration for any asserted implied-in-fact
contracts was to be performed pursuant to preexisting legal
duties," an arrangement that precludes the type of consideration
essential for formation of a contract.

Finally, the justices determined third parties such as Marque
Medicos are not entitled to recovery under the Illinois Insurance
Code, which negated its challenge of dismissal of a request for
legal fees and statutory damages.

Marque Medicos was represented in the action by the firm of
Sperling & Slater PC, of Chicago.

The insurers have been represented in the action by attorneys with
the firms of Dentons US, DLA Piper and Winston & Strawn, according
to Cook County court records.

These complaints are unrelated to an Aug. 17, 2016, complaint a
group of insurers, including Liberty Mutual, brought against
Marque Medicos, in which the insurers accused the clinic of
billing for procedures and therapy it didn't perform and billed at
inflated rates under worker compensation claims.  That case
remains pending in Cook County court. [GN]


* New Database Mulled as Part of CFPB's Final Arbitration Rule
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing C. Ryan Barber of The National Law Journal,
reports that when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
expanded its public database to include narratives of negative
customer experiences, banks such as Wells Fargo and other industry
players worried about being named and shamed.

Now, a new public database could be going up online as part of the
agency's newly finalized arbitration rule -- if the regulation
survives anticipated challenges on Capitol Hill and in the courts.

The CFPB's new rule, which calls for restricting arbitration
agreements that block consumers from filing class actions,
immediately drew criticism from the financial industry.  The U.S.
Chamber of Commerce has argued the rule would effectively shut
down a "cheaper and faster" form of dispute resolution for
consumers, as companies would no longer subsidize arbitration if
they were still faced with the cost of defending against class
actions.

Perhaps because of that dim view of the future of arbitration,
another portion of the CFPB rule has drawn less attention: A
requirement that companies give the agency records about
individual arbitrations -- including any awards -- that would
still be allowed under the new regulation.  The CFPB plans to
publish those records, with "appropriate redactions," on its
website, according to the 775-page final rule published on
July 10.

CFPB Director Richard Cordray said the publication of the records
"will promote transparency and give consumers, providers and other
regulators more insight into how arbitration works."

Mr. Cordray said financial services providers will scrub the
records of personal information and the CFPB would begin posting
them online beginning in July 2019 -- a full 12 months after his
five-year term is set to expire.

Federal agency databases have come under threat in the Trump
administration, and the CFPB's proposal would meet similar
resistance.

The U.S. Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration this year suspended an Obama-era rule that required
companies to electronically report their injury and illness
records so that they could be made available to the public.  The
U.S. Treasury Department under Secretary Steven Mnuchin has called
for shutting down public access to the CFPB's consumer complaint
database, arguing it lacks "appropriate safeguards." Instead, the
agency suggested the database be made available only to state and
federal agencies.

In the rule that the CFPB published on July 10, the agency noted
several industry commenters that said the publication of
arbitration records would lead "plaintiff's attorneys to bring
more frivolous litigation generally."  The Kansas-based Heartland
Credit Union Association argued the publication of collected
arbitration records would "serve the litigators in formulating
more class actions settlements."

"In addition, a credit union's reputational risk is at stake,"
wrote Brad Douglas, president and CEO of the Heartland Credit
Union Association.  "Making this information public could
negatively damage their reputation when not warranted."
Other commenters shared that fear of reputational harm.

Acknowledging that concern, the CFPB said it was requiring
companies to submit answers as well as arbitral counterclaims "to
balance out one-sided accounts and mitigate any perceived
reputational risk."

According to the CFPB's rule, another commenter expressed concern
that companies "may face more scrutiny from the bureau than
others" after losing in arbitration.

In deciding to publicize the records, including awards issued in
arbitration, the CFPB found support from Democratic state
attorneys general and scholars who had advocated for making the
information available online.

Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, along with her peers
in 18 other states, encouraged the CFPB in an August 2016 letter
to "publish this valuable information on its website, making it
available to the public, so that both government enforcement
agencies and consumers can analyze and benefit from the results."

The CFPB also said the publication of the records would help
academic researchers with their analyses of arbitration.

"In contrast to commenters that viewed the possibility of
increased scrutiny by regulators or plaintiff's attorneys as a
negative outcome from the monitoring rule, the bureau believes
that the increased transparency will tend to increase consumers'
ability to seek redress for legal violations, providers'
incentives for compliance and general public confidence in the
orderly operation of the markets," the CFPB said.


* CFPB in Dispute with OCC Over Arbitration Rule
------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing C. Ryan Barber of The National Law Journal,
reports that the skirmish between the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency intensified over the consumer agency's push to restrain
the scope of forced arbitration, Reuters reports.

"There is no basis for claiming that the arbitration rule puts the
federal banking system at risk," CFPD Director Richard Cordray
wrote in a letter to Keith Noreika, the acting head of the OCC.
The CFPB's move forward on a rule to restrict banks and financial
institutions from curtailing the power of class actions will test
the resolve of Republicans in Congress and the Trump
administration to fight over the merits of the rule.



                         *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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