CAR_Public/170719.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Wednesday, July 19, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 141



                            Headlines

ADVANTA SEEDS: Creevey Russell to Hold Seminar on Class Action
AUGUSTA, GA: Governor Snobs Union Chief's Class-Action Grievance
AKORN INC: Faces Securities Class Action in Louisiana
AMARILLO COLLEGE: Martin Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to 9th Cir.
AMB ONSITE: Court Denies Bid to Remand "Brinkmann"

AMERICAN GRILLE: Overtime Pay Sought in "Erling" Labor Suit
ART COOK: Ct. Grants Final OK of "Schwartz" Class Settlement
ASD SPECIALTY: Denial of "Sandusky" Certification Affirmed
AT&T INC: Hit with Putative Class Action Over Age Discrimination
AVEO: Law Firm Urges Residents to Join Class Action

AXIOM HOLDINGS: "Desvarieux" Files Suit Over Stock Drop
BANK OF AMERICA: Settlement in "Buckingham" Gets Final Approval
BANK OF HAWAII: Hawaii District Court Remands "Robinson" Suit
BASTROP, TX: Red Light Camera Class Action Under Appeal
BAYSTATE NOBLE: Bid to Dismiss Colonoscopy Patients' Suit Denied

BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES: High Court Set to Hear Securities Case
BHH LLC: Court Certifies 3 Classes in "Hart"
BIRCH COMMUNICATIONS: Missouri Court Dismisses "Huskey"
BISCO INC: Kilpatrick Townsend Discusses Ruling on Rule 67 Issue
BLUE BUFFALO: Approval of Class Action Deal in "Keil" Affirmed

BMO HARRIS: Bid to Dismiss "Moss" Suit Partly Granted
BREX INC: Court Denied Bid to Partially Dismiss "Reed"
BRINDERSON CONSTRUCTORS: Must Supplement Discovery Responses
BUILD.COM INC: Amendment to Complaint in "Jurgens" Allowed
BUTTE COUNTY, CA: Inmate's Bid to Proceed Class Action Denied

CALIFORNIA: Inmate's Civil Rights Action Dismissed
CALIFORNIA RECOVERY: Court Orders Dismissal of "Hernandez"
CANADA: Class Action Filed on Behalf of Indigenous Children
CANADA: Class Action Lawyer in P.E.I. Case Under Investigation
CAPITAL ONE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Nayab" Class Suit

CANADA: Richmond Man Awaits Decision on Strata Council Case
CANADA: Koskie Minsky Sues Over Pension Delays in Armed Forces
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS: Shareholders Revive Kickback Suit
CAREHOUSE HEALTHCARE: Bid to Remand "Reyes" Suit Denied
CENTURYLINK: "Craig" Suit Hits Stock Price Drop

CHILO AND CHELA: "Arguello" Action Seeks Unpaid OT, Backwages
CHINA AGRITECH: Orrick Herrington Attorneys Discuss Resh Decision
CONFIE INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Gibson"
CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL: Denial of "Abboud" Certification Affirmed
CORNDANCE TAVERN: Owner Faces Minimum Wage Class Action

CYPRESS GROUP: Unpaid Overtime Pay Claimed in "Hunt" Labor Suit
DENKA PERFORMANCE: St. John Residents Sue Over LaPlace Emissions
DENVER, CO: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Kerner" Class Suit
DYNCORP AEROSPACE: Balcazar Appeals Ruling in "Quinteros" Suit
ENSIGNAL INC: Calif. District Court Remands "Sadler" Suit

EPS ENERGY: "Cooney" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
FACEBOOK INC: Judge Dismisses Internet Tacking Lawsuit
FACEBOOK INC: Privacy Class Action Settlement Challenged
FIAT CHRYSLER: Ga. Supreme Court to Look Into Gas Tank Ruling
FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Another Faulty Emissions Class Action

FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Door Latch Defect
FOUR SEASONS: Ct. Won't Review Denial of Remand Order in "Zyda"
FRANCIS DAVID: Court Dismisses Suit Over Credit Card Charges
FRANCISCAN MEDICAL: Arbitration Prevails in Employees' Suit
FYRE MEDIA: FBI to Conduct Exuma Probe Amid Class Action

GATHERAPP INC: Faces Class Action Over Unwanted Text Messages
GENE BY GENE: Bid to Dismiss "Cole" Denied
GENERAL MILLS: Minnesota Court Dismisses Glyphosate Litigation
GINZA SUSHI: "Chen" Seeks Overtime/Minimum Pay, Reimbursements
GO DADDY: Court Denies Certification of Purchasers Class

GOOGLE INC: Activist Asks Court to Scrap $5.5MM Safari Hack Deal
GREE ELECTRIC: Appeals Ruling in Homesite Suit to Ninth Circuit
GROUNDHOG ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss Liberty Salad Suit Denied
GROUP HEALTH: Trial Court's Summary Judgment in "Nevils" Affirmed
GROVETOWN, GA: Water Utility Fees Case Settlement Finalized

GRUBHUB: September 5 Trial Set on Employee-Contractor Issue
HANSON AGGREGATES: NEI Contracting Appeals Order to Ninth Circuit
ICARE CREDIT: "Vu" Telemarketing Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
INGHAM COUNTY, MI: Prisoner's Civil Rights Suit Dismissed
IMAGE FIRST: Defendants' Motion to Stay "Campanelli" Granted

JAKLITSCH BUILDERS: "Guastafeste" Requests Judicial Intervention
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Health Funds Seek Inquiry Into Mesh Devices
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Pelvic Mesh Implants Suit Begins in Sydney
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: 700+ Australian Women Join Class Action
JOSEPH CORY: Seeks Review of Ruling in "Lupian" Suit to 3rd Cir.

JUNO USA: Drivers File Class Action in New York
KELLOGG COMPANY: Mantikas Appeals E.D.N.Y. Opinion to 2nd Circuit
KEYNOTE CONSULTING: Centers Files Suit Over Collection Letter
KOLBE & KOLBE: 7th Cir. Affirms Partial Summary Ruling in "Haley"
LAKE OSWEGO, OR: Class Status Recommended for Title IX Suit

LIMOLINK INC: Court Grants Certification to Tips Class
LTD FINANCIAL: Seeks Reversal of Jury Verdict in FDCPA Suit
LYFT INC: Court Dismisses Taxicab Operator's Suit
M-I LLC: "Bocage" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
MACY'S INC: Bid to Dismiss "Haley" Partly Granted

MDL 1203: Court Awards Atty's Fees for 2016 Work
METLIFE SECURITIES: Judge Okays $32.5MM Class Action Settlement
MICHAEL MACK: Court Dismisses "Ransom" as Frivolous
MICHAEL MACK: Court Dismisses "Lefter" as Frivolous
MICROSOFT INC: Pierce Atwood Attorney Discusses Baker Case Ruling

MINNESOTA: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over DD Waiver Services Denied
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Calif. Court Dismisses Antitrust Class Action
NEW HAVEN, CT: Court Dismisses Suit Over Sewer System
NEW ORLEANS, LA: La. App. Dismisses Conversion Claims vs. ACS
NEW YORK: Class Action Mulled Against DEC Over Fishing Permits

NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action
NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS: Suit Over Gleevec Dismissed
ONE TECHNOLOGIES: Texas Consumers' Suit to Proceed to Arbitration
ONTARIO: Koskie Minsky Files Class Action Over Bail Delays
PATHEON NV: "Bushansky" Sues Over Onerous Merger Deal

PENNY ARCADE: Jan. 11 Class Action Settlement Hearing Set
PIONEER: $180-Mil. DVD Drive Settlement Fund Established
PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Files 11th Cir. Appeal in AA Suncoast Suit
PRONAI THERAPEUTICS: Appeals Ruling in "Book" Suit to 9th Circuit
PRONAI THERAPEUTICS: Appeals Ruling in "Gallas" Suit to 9th Cir.

PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: To Settle Wage Class Suit for $12.5MM
PURDUE PHARMA: Oklahoma AG Files Class Action Suit Over Opioids
RCM TECHNOLOGIES: "McNeal" Class Counsel Awarded $120K in Fees
RECKITT BENCKISER: Faces Class Suit Over Joint Supplement Claims
RENWICK HADDOW: Law Firm Mulls Ponzi Scheme Class Action

SALOV NORTH: Court Dismisses "Kumar" Suit with Prejudice
SALOV NORTH: Settlement in "Kumar" Gets Final Approval
SCOTT COUNTY, MS: Settles Suit Over Infinite Detainment of Inmates
SEATTLE, WA: Appeal in School Zone Camera Speeding Ticket Pending
SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Court Defers to Rule on Motions in "Mojica"

SEECO INC: Cambiano Appeals Order in "Smith" Suit to 8th Circuit
SENSA PRODUCTS: Court Grants Bid for Excusal from ENE Conference
SINOVAC BIOTECH: Investors Hint Class Action Over Bribery Concerns
SINOVAC BIOTECH: Sept. 1 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
SM ENERGY: Royalty Class Action Settlement Sent Back to Oklahoma

SOUTH CAROLINA: Inmate Gets Refund for Appellate Fees
SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Wants Quake Insurance Class Action Tossed
SOUTHWEST MEDICAL: Bid to Dismiss Oklahoma TCPA Suit Denied
SPECIAL TOUCH: "Najmiev" Suit Remanded to New York Supreme Court
SPECIALIZED LOAN: Court Defers Ruling on Bid to Dismiss "Smith"

STATE FARM: Class Action to Test Limits of Bad Faith Laws
STATE FARM: Insured Allowed to Certify Question to Supreme Court
STATE STREET: "Delarosa" Labor Suit Transferred to D. Mass.
STRYKER: Hip Lawsuits Move Forward in New Jersey
SUNPATH LTD: "Clough" Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls

SUNRUN INC: Offer of Judgment in "Slovin" Ineffective
SUSHI MARU: Bid to Transfer Chef's Suit to NJ Granted
SYSCO CORP: Court Narrows Discovery of Docs in "Frieri"
TAF LLC: Calif. Court Keen on Dismissing "Ruiz"
TAKATA CORP: Wants Judge to Halt Lawsuits Over Defective Airbags

TESLA INC: Faces New Suit Over Defects in Model S & X Vehicles
TIM HORTONS: Owner Urged to Address Franchise Dispute
TIME WARNER: Files Motion to Dismiss Unsolicited Fax Class Action
TLC OF THE BAY: California Court Dismisses "Hernandez" Suit
TOYOTA MOTOR: Hope Appeals Decision in "Warner" Suit to 9th Cir.

TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Donald Trump May Go to Trial in Fraud Suit
UBER TECH: July 20 Deadline to Submit Email Test Design
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court OK's $7.5MM Background Check Settlement
UNITED AIRLINES: Sued Over Surprise Fees for Cancelled Flights
UNITED STATES: Ginsburg Urged to Recuse in Trump Travel Ban Case

UNITED STATES: District Ct. Has Jurisdiction Over Iraqis' Suit
UNITED STATES: Appeals Decision in "Memmer" Suit to Fed. Cir.
URBANI TRUFFLES: Court Enters Pretrial Schedule in "Schiffman"
VISITING NURSE: "Brown" Sues Over Missed Breaks, Harassment
VOESTALPINE LLC: Responds to Class Action Over Black Dust

WALT DISNEY: Judge Advices Against Class Action Status for Lawsuit
WARBY PARKER: Faces Class Action Over ADA Violation
WASHINGTON: Court Wants Joint Status Report in "Banos" Suit
WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses "Demay" FCRA Suit
WELLS FARGO: Meiners Appeals D. Minn. Judgment to Eighth Circuit

WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN: Bid to Certify Residents' Class Denied
WHIRLPOOL CORP: Court Approves Stipulated Order in "Turgeon"

* 11 Companies Get FTC Letters Over "Made in USA" Claims
* 2016 Marks Record Year for Securities Class Actions
* CFPB to Ban Most Types of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
* Dept. of Labor Wants 5th Circuit to Uphold Fiduciary Rule
* EEOOC Targets Hiring Discrimination Practices as Lawsuits Mount







                            *********


ADVANTA SEEDS: Creevey Russell to Hold Seminar on Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Chronicle reports that legal firm Creevey Russell Lawyers is
holding a free seminar in Toowoomba on behalf of growers who have
had sorghum contaminated with shattercane seed.

It will be held as an update on its class action against Advanta
Seeds Pty Ltd, previously trading as Pacific Seeds.

The Advanta class action presents growers with the most
comprehensive and cost-effective chance of recovering compensation
for reduced yields over land infected with shattercane.

Creevey Russell principal Dan Creevey said the firm hosted an
information evening in the Toowoomba office on July 18.

"This class action seeks to recover compensation for losses that
farmers and property owners suffered as a consequence of planting
contaminated MR43 Elite sorghum seed," he said.

"If you purchased or planted MR43 seed between 2010 and 2014 and
have been infected with shattercane, we want to hear from you."

The class action initiated in Queensland has been extended to NSW
and Mr Creevey plans to visit the Liverpool Plains region in the
state's north to meet with effected growers.

Shattercane is a noxious weed which if present in a crop of
sorghum competes strongly with the planted sorghum and results in
a reduced yield.

Once present on land it can spread vigorously and multiply,
quickly infesting and overrunning land.  It is difficult to
eradicate with the eradication process often meaning that the land
cannot be used commercially for a considerable time.

For more information or to register interest in the event phone
46178777.

Creevey Russell Lawyers is at 580 Ruthven St. [GN]


AUGUSTA, GA: Governor Snobs Union Chief's Class-Action Grievance
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Lowell, writing for Kennebec Journal, reports that with
cowbells, chants and signs, scores of state employees converged on
Capitol Park in front of the State House on July 3 to call on
state legislators to end their budget impasse and allow them to go
back to work.

"The focus is to get our message heard," Ramona Welton, president
of the Maine State Employees Union, said on July 3.  "We want to
let the Senate and the House know that we want to return to work.
We want them to pass a responsible compromise budget and get back
to work."

More than 150 union members and supporters, clad in purple shirts,
marched past the Blaine House, the governor's residence, before
gathering in the Hall of Flags at the State House, accompanied by
honks and waves from drivers who were stopped in traffic.

Attorney General Janet Mills joined the union marchers.

"There's no hill to die on.  This is a state budget," Mr. Mills
said before they left Capitol Park.  "It's critical to all of us.
I am proud not just to be the attorney general and a
constitutional officer, but a state employee."

For the second day in a row, Ms. Welton tried to deliver a class-
action grievance to the office of Gov. Paul LePage over the
failure of the governor to give state employees 10 days advance
notice of a layoff, as the union's collective bargaining agreement
requires.

"People were in there," Ms. Welton said.  "We could see them
moving around, but no one came to the door."

Ms. Welton said the state's partial shutdown -- all but essential
state services have come to a halt -- was not a surprise, and
notice could have been given.  In the past, when the state has
laid off employees in federally funded positions because of the
shutdown of the federal government, they were given notice, she
said.

"LePage had the authority when he declared a civil emergency to
require emergency workers to work," she said.  "There's no
guarantee of pay.  So we're filing this grievance to make our
workers whole.  This is for the maintenance of pay and benefits
under our contract."

Meanwhile, Gov. LePage announced on July 3 that he is allowing
state employees to take administrative leave with pay on July 3.
Gov. LePage is also providing state workers who have been
designated emergency personnel with compensatory time off for the
hours they worked on July 3.

The rally drew workers from all over the state.

Jaime Edwards, of Thomaston, a case manager for adults with
intellectual disabilities based in Rockland, said she wants to go
back to work.

If any of the people whose cases she manages need services, they
are not getting them, Edwards said.

Edwards' sister, Tammi Morrison, is a caseworker for Child
Protective Services in Augusta.

Both say that only emergency services are being offered while
state offices are closed -- if a client needs surgery, for
instance, that requires a caseworker's consent.

Their best hope is that elected state officials enact a spending
plan for the next two years that will allow them to go back to
work.

Marchers converged in the Hall of Flags and moved up one floor to
stand and chant in the hallway connecting the legislative
chambers.

Dave and Deb Doreau drove down from Waterville on July 3 to join
them.  Dave Doreau, now retired, was an adjunct faculty member at
Kennbec Valley Community College, and he responded to a call from
his union to take part on July 3.

Both Doreaus voted to impose a 3 percent tax on incomes of more
than $200,000 to pay for education in a statewide referendum, and
the passage of that tax has been one of the barriers to reaching
an accord on the state budget.

In the latest compromise, Democrats have agreed to repeal the tax
on the promise of $162 million being directed to public education.

"I thought that was the law," Dave Doreau said.  "I celebrated
it."

"As voters, are we being punished, if they didn't like the way we
voted?" Deb Doreau said.

The agreement still carries a 1.5 percent increase in the state
lodging tax, a provision that may prompt a veto by Gov. LePage.

Jane Gilbert, who retired as deputy commissioner of the state
Department of Labor eight years ago, said the shutdown is
"stupid."

"It's not right and it's not necessary," Ms. Gilbert said.  "It
shows a huge disrespect to the private and public sector."

The Maine Center for Economic Policy estimated an impact of $2.5
million each day Maine state government is shut down.  State
government employs nearly 12,000 people across Maine. [GN]


AKORN INC: Faces Securities Class Action in Louisiana
-----------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo, writing for Louisiana Record, reports that an
Akorn shareholder has filed a class-action lawsuit against Akorn
Inc. over allegations that it filed a misleading proxy statement.

Sean Harris, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a complaint on June 14 in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana against Akorn Inc., John N.
Kapoor, Ronald M. Johnson, Steven J. Meyer, Brian Tambi, et al
alleging that the company and board members violated Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that in
April 24, the board approved to enter into an agreement and plan
of merger of Akorn and Fresenius Kabi AG.  The plaintiff holds
Akorn Inc., Kapoor, Johnson, Meyer, Tambi, et al. responsible
because the defendants allegedly filed a materially incomplete and
false preliminary proxy statement and failed to disclose material
information regarding Akorn's financial projections.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks an order
declaring this action as a class action, enjoining defendants from
holding the shareholder vote on the proposed merger unless and
until the material information is disclosed to shareholders, award
for attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements and such other and
further relief.  He is represented by Lewis Kahn --
lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com -- of Kahn Swick & Foti LLC in
Madisonville and James M. Wilson Jr. -- jwilson@faruqilaw.com --
and Nadeem Faruqi -- nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com -- of Faruqi & Faruqi
LLP in New York.

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana case
number 3:17-cv-00373
[GN]


AMARILLO COLLEGE: Martin Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Paige Martin, Maria Ford and Sundae Worthy filed an
appeal from a court ruling relating to their lawsuit styled Paige
Martin, et al. v. Gary Yasuda, et al., Case No. 5:13-cv-01961-PSG-
DTB, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, Riverside.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit on October 28, 2013,
against the Amarillo College of Hairdressing, Inc. and its Owner
and President, Gary Yasuda, alleging that the Defendants violated
state labor laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Specifically,
the Plaintiffs contended, among other things, they were entitled
to minimum hourly wages, overtime wages, and unpaid premiums for
missed meal and rest breaks.

The appellate case is captioned as Paige Martin, et al. v. Gary
Yasuda, et al., Case No. 17-55948, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire was due on July 12, 2017;

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 4, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on November 2, 2017;

   -- Appellants Maria Ford, Paige Martin and Sundae Worthy's
      opening brief is due on December 12, 2017;

   -- Appellees Amarillo College of Hairdressing, Inc. and Gary
      Yasuda's answering brief is due on January 12, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants PAIGE MARTIN, SUNDAE WORTHY and MARIA FORD,
on behalf of themselves and classes of those similarly situated,
are represented by:

          Bryan Jeffrey Schwartz, Esq.
          BRYAN SCHWARTZ LAW
          1330 Broadway, Suite 1630
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 277-7236
          E-mail: bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees GARY YASUDA and AMARILLO COLLEGE OF
HAIRDRESSING, INC., DBA Milan Institute, DBA Milan Institute of
Cosmetology, are represented by:

          Marc D. Alexander, Esq.
          William Michael Hensley, Esq.
          ALVARADOSMITH, APC
          1 MacArthur Place
          Santa Ana, CA 92707
          Telephone: (714) 852-6800
          E-mail: malexander@alvaradosmith.com
                  mhensley@alvaradosmith.com

               - and -

          Ronald Lee Holt, Esq.
          DUNN & DAVISON OF KANSAS CITY, LLC
          1100 Walnut Street
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 474-2100
          E-mail: rholt@dfrglaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew Lorn Hoppock, Esq.
          THE HOPPOCK LAW OFFICE, LLC
          10985 Cody St.
          Overland Park, KS 66210
          Telephone: (913) 267-5511
          E-mail: matthew@hoppocklawfirm.com


AMB ONSITE: Court Denies Bid to Remand "Brinkmann"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand in the case captioned JOSEPH
BRINKMANN, both on behalf of himself individually and, in
addition, on behalf of the other similarly situated employees,
Plaintiff, v. AMB ONSITE SERVICES-WEST, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, No. 3:17-cv-00478-BR (D. Ore.).

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Joseph Brinkmann's
Motion to Remand this matter to state court.

Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant ABM Onsite Services --
West, Inc., filed a class action against Defendant in Multnomah
County Circuit Court alleging state wage-and-hour claims for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime, wages due upon
termination, and wages when due.  Plaintiff filed a class action
against Defendant in the District Court alleging federal wage-and-
hour claims similar to those alleged in the state-court complaint.

Defendant timely removed the state court case to the District
Court to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The case was
initially assigned to another judicial officer in this Court.

Plaintiff contentions, to wit: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) (2) the
federal-state court comity doctrine permits this Court to decline
jurisdiction as the case involves a matter of state taxation; (3)
Defendant has not alleged sufficient damages to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of Class Action Fairness Act; and (4)
Defendant has not alleged diversity of citizenship sufficient to
satisfy Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction.

Plaintiff contends the Tax Injunction Act deprives this Court of
jurisdiction because Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as damages based on the over-deduction of the WBF
assessment from his and other class members' paychecks.

Defendant contends the Tax Injunction Act does not apply on the
grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing under the Tax Injunction Act
to seek injunctive relief, and the basis for limited injunctive
relief that Plaintiff seeks does not constitute a violation under
the Tax Injunction Act.

The Tax Injunction Act provides that the district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the court of such State. By its terms the Tax
Injunction Act applies to actions that seek injunctive relief from
state taxation. Courts have also held the Tax Injunction Act
applies to actions seeking declaratory relief, refunds or damages.

Here Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enjoin Defendant from
committing similar violations of wage and hour laws. Plaintiff
does not seek to avoid paying taxes or to enjoin Defendant from
collecting taxes. Plaintiff only seeks to prevent Defendant from
over-deducting the WBF assessment. Thus, Plaintiff does not seek
to restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of taxes. Hence,
the Court concludes the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive this
Court of jurisdiction, and this Court is not required to remand
this matter.

Under the comity doctrine, federal courts refrain from interfering
with the fiscal operations of the state governments in all cases
where the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be
preserved unimpaired. In this case, Defendant incorrectly deducted
the WBF assessment from employee's paychecks would not stop the
flow of tax revenue into Oregon's coffers. Defendant would still
continue to deduct the WBF assessment, but it would do so at the
correct rate or in the correct amount. The injunctive relief that
Plaintiff seeks merely precludes the state from receiving monies
it was not entitled to receive in the first place.  The Court
concludes a determination that Defendant violated Oregon law and
an award of statutory damages to Plaintiff would not interfere
with the state's fiscal operations. The doctrine of comity does
not preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction in this
matter.

The CAFA gives federal courts original jurisdiction over class-
action lawsuits in which, among others, the aggregated amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Despite Plaintiff allegations that
his damages are estimated to be $999,999.99, the Court concludes
Defendant has plausibly alleged the amount in controversy exceeds
the jurisdiction threshold of Class Action Fairness Act and
Defendant has supported that allegation by a preponderance of the
evidence.

In its Notice of Removal Defendant alleges Plaintiff is a citizen
of Oregon and Defendant is a corporation that was organized under
the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of
business in Texas. the Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that on the same day that Plaintiff filed his complaint in state
court, he filed a complaint in this Court in which he alleged he
was "a resident and citizen of the State of Oregon.  The Court
concludes there is diversity of citizenship sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Class Action Fairness Act.

The Court Denies Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017, Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/GLCyau from Leagle.com.

Joseph Brinkmann, Plaintiff, represented by Jon M. Egan --
Jegan@eganlegalteam.com -- Jon M. Egan, P.C..
ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
G. Hosenpud -- hosenpudd@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell, PC &
Jennifer K. Sheffield -- sheffieldj@lanepowell.com -- Lane Powell,
PC.


AMERICAN GRILLE: Overtime Pay Sought in "Erling" Labor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Todd Erling, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. American Grille with Sushi LLC and Chris K.
Whitaker, individually, Defendants, Case No. 0:17-cv-61230 (S.D.
Fla., June 21, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages,
minimum wages, liquidated damages, declaratory relief and
reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Defendants operate a restaurant "LYNQ" at at 16230 Summerlin Road
#223, Fort Myers, FL 33908 and employed Erling as a cook.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Bill B. Berke, Esq.
      BERKE LAW FIRM, P.A.
      4423 Del Prado Blvd. S.
      Cape Coral, FL 33904
      Telephone: (239) 549-6689
      Email: berkelaw@yahoo.com

ART COOK: Ct. Grants Final OK of "Schwartz" Class Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Class Counsel's Motion for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs in the case captioned KRISTOPHER A.
SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff, v. ART COOK, ET AL., Defendant, and BUCKLES-
SMITH ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN, Nominal
Defendant, No. 15-cv-03347-BLF (N.D. Calif.).

This is a case brought under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) claiming breach of fiduciary duty.  Plaintiff
and Defendants reached a settlement of the Action. A Settlement
Agreement was filed with the Court. Before the Court is
Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Class Counsel's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Costs.

The Court entered its Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement,
Preliminarily Certifying a Settlement Class, Approving Forms and
Methods of Notice, and Setting a Fairness Hearing. The Court has
received declarations attesting to the mailing of the Notice in
accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order. A hearing was held
(i) to determine whether to grant the Final Approval Motion; (ii)
to determine whether to grant Class Counsel's Motion for an Award
of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses; and (iii) to
rule upon such other matters as the Court might deem appropriate.

The Final Approval Motion is granted, and the Settlement is
approved as fair, reasonable, adequate to members of the Class,
and in the public interest. The settling parties are directed to
consummate the Settlement in accordance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017, Order and
Final Judgment is available at https://is.gd/6K9GGg from
Leagle.com.

Kristopher A. Schwartz, Plaintiff, represented by Juli E. Farris -
-jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.

Kristopher A. Schwartz, Plaintiff, represented by Gary A. Gotto --
ggtto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice.

Art Cook, Defendant, represented by Aldo Emmanuel Ibarra --
aibarra@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon Peabody, Gregory Paul O'Hara --
gohara@nixonpeabody.com --  Nixon Peabody LLP, Karl K. Sung --
ksung@nixonpeabody.com  -- Nixon Peabody LLP & Lauren Marian
Michals --lmichals@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon Peabody LLP.
Roger Stanger, Defendant, represented by Aldo Emmanuel Ibarra,
Nixon Peabody, Gregory Paul O'Hara, Nixon Peabody LLP, Karl K.
Sung, Nixon Peabody LLP & Lauren Marian Michals, Nixon Peabody
LLP.

Ronald Zimmerman, Defendant, represented by Aldo Emmanuel Ibarra,
Nixon Peabody, Gregory Paul O'Hara, Nixon Peabody LLP, Karl K.
Sung, Nixon Peabody LLP & Lauren Marian Michals, Nixon Peabody
LLP.

Buckles-Smith Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Aldo
Emmanuel Ibarra, Nixon Peabody, Gregory Paul O'Hara, Nixon Peabody
LLP, Karl K. Sung, Nixon Peabody LLP & Lauren Marian Michals,
Nixon Peabody LLP.

Bankers Trust Company of South Dakota, Defendant, represented by
R. Bradford Huss -- bhuss@truckerhuss.com -- Trucker Huss, APC,
Angel Lin Garrett -- agarrett@truckerhuss.com -- Trucker Huss &
Clarissa A. Kang -- ckang@truckerhuss.com -- Trucker & Huss, A
Professional Corporation.


ASD SPECIALTY: Denial of "Sandusky" Certification Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SANDUSKY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC, an Ohio
limited liability company, individually and as the representative
of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ASD SPECIALTY HEALTHCARE, INC., D/B/A BESSE MEDICAL
AMERISOURCEBERGEN SPECIALTY GROUP, INC.; JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-3741 (6th Cir.), Judge David McKeague
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to deny the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

In 2010, the Defendant, a pharmaceutical distributor, sent a one-
page fax advertising the drug Prolia to 53,502 physicians.  Only
40,343, or 75%, of these faxes were successfully transmitted.  The
Plaintiff, a chiropractic clinic that employed one of these
physicians, claims to have received this so-called "junk fax," and
-- three years later -- filed a lawsuit against Besse for the
annoyance.  Sandusky alleged that Besse violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by sending an unsolicited fax
advertisement lacking a proper opt-out notice, and it sought to
certify a putative class of all 40,343 Prolia fax recipients.

The district court denied Sandusky's motion for class
certification.  As an alternative to denying Sandusky's motion on
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance grounds, the district court also found
that Sandusky's proposed class definition did not meet the
implicit ascertainability requirement since identifying class
members in the absence of fax logs was not "administratively
feasible."

The appeal followed.  On appeal, Sandusky argues that class
members could submit copies of the fax as proof of receipt, as
Sandusky has done.

Judge McKeague finds no abuse of discretion in the district
court's denial of class certification.  First, the district court
was correct to conclude that individualized questions of consent
prevent common questions from predominating under Rule 23(b)(3).

Although the district court credited the Federal Communications
Commission's retroactive waiver for the need to distinguish
between solicited and unsolicited Prolia faxes, the D.C.'s
Circuit's intervening decision in Bais Yaakov, which invalidated
the Solicited Fax Rule, provides alternative grounds for this
differentiation.  Second, the district court's recognition of the
difficulty in identifying class members without fax logs and with
sole reliance on individual affidavits was equally sufficient to
preclude certification, regardless of whether this concern is
properly articulated as part of ascertainability, Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance, or Rule 23(b)(3) superiority.  Accordingly, Judge
McKeague affirmed the district court's denial of class
certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Q3CQTl from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Glenn L. Hara -- ghara@andersonwanca.com --
ANDERSON+WANCA, Rolling Meadows, Illinois, for Appellant.

Martin W. Jaszczuk -- jaszczuk@jaszczuk.com -- JASZCZUK P.C.,
Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Glenn L. Hara -- ghara@andersonwanca.com --
ANDERSON+WANCA, Rolling Meadows, Illinois, Matthew E. Stubbs --
mstubbs@mrjlaw.com -- MONTGOMERY RENNIE & JONSON, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for Appellant.

Martin W. Jaszczuk, W. Scott Hastings, Keith L. Gibson, LOCKE LORD
LLP., Chicago, Illinois, Jennifer J. Dawson -- dawson@marwill-
melhorn.com -- MARWILL & MELHORN, LLC., Toledo, Ohio, for
Appellees.


AT&T INC: Hit with Putative Class Action Over Age Discrimination
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cara Bayles, writing for Law360, reports that a putative class of
laid-off employees filed an age discrimination suit against AT&T
in New Jersey federal court on June 29, saying the company's
workforce plan discriminated against workers over 40 and misled
them about their legal rights, and asked the judge to order
potential class members be notified of the alleged deception.

The five lead plaintiffs, all former managers, allege AT&T Inc.
devised a "massive and centrally planned" workforce shake-up meant
to eliminate older employees in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. They also allege that AT&T's
severance pay waiver didn't meet the standards of the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act. The putative class would consist
of all non-union employees 40 and older who, after May 20, 2015,
received a letter saying their positions were being eliminated,
and couldn't find an alternative position.

The complaint alleges AT&T cloaked its behavior by telling
employees who received "surplus notification letters" that they
could apply for other positions at the company. AT&T was
interested in hiring younger workers, the class says, and when
older workers agreed to severance pay, they had to sign a waiver
that erroneously told them they couldn't sue for discrimination.

"Unless AT&T's fraudulent deception is rectified by this court, a
great and untold number of employees who were unlawfully
terminated because of their age will never know that they can in
fact vindicate their rights by bringing an action against AT&T for
age discrimination, and, further, AT&T will continue its unlawful
practices," the complaint says.

The alleged scheme was part of AT&T's so-called 2020 plan, which
was meant to replace its aging staff and was "infected with age
bias and executed in waves to keep its workers in the dark,"
according to the complaint.

After being put on surplus status, workers were told they might
get alternative positions, but the cross-hiring process favored
the young, the class alleges. Managers could elect to send
internal job postings to only younger workers on surplus, and
those postings were sometimes "terminated" randomly and then
advertised publicly, then filled by younger outside hires.

Workers who couldn't find new employment with the company were
offered severance if they agreed to sign a waiver saying they
understood they couldn't bring suit under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. But the waiver was void, the suit alleges,
because the papers are unenforceable under ADEA rules.

The OWBPA requires that an employer proffer the job titles and
ages of any employees who are and aren't eligible for the
severance plan. But, according to the complaint, AT&T provided its
list before the actual termination date, so it named employees who
the company knew weren't eligible, and never provided information
about actual termination demographics. That in and of itself was
discriminatory, the complaint alleged, since such information and
the accompanying waiver didn't apply to terminated employees below
the age of 40.

The deception in the waiver means many former employees aren't
aware of their rights, and the plaintiffs asked U.S. District
Judge Brian R. Martinotti to issue an order that eligible class
members be notified of the suit, which seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief, compensatory and liquidated damages.

The suit also noted that last year, customer service executive
John Gerundo was awarded $370,000 by a Pennsylvania federal jury
that found he had been fired due to his age.

AT&T spokesman Marty Richter denied the class action's claims.

"We are widely recognized for our commitment to diversity and do
not tolerate discrimination of any kind, including for an
employee's age," he told Law360 in an email. "We dispute and will
vigorously defend any discrimination claims."

Attorneys for the class did not immediately respond to requests
for comment.

The class is represented by Stephen Console, Esq. --
console@consolelaw.com -- Laura Mattiacci, Esq. --
mattiacci@consolelaw.com -- Susan Saint-Antoine, Esq. --
saintantoine@consolelaw.com -- and Emily Derstine-Friesen, Esq. --
derstinefriesen@consolelaw.com -- of Console Mattiacci Law LLC.

Attorney information for AT&T was not immediately available.

The case is Horowitz et al. v. AT&T Inc. et al, case number 3:17-
cv-04827 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey. [GN]


AVEO: Law Firm Urges Residents to Join Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
The Weekly Source reports that in August last year, Sydney law
firm Levitt Robinson was advertising for residents of any
retirement village who felt aggrieved with the operator of a
village to contact them, with the possibility of starting a class
action.  Fairfax journalist Adele Ferguson reported on them doing
an information event at a Melbourne Aveo village.

That became part of an expose, followed by a formal statement by
Levitt Robinson that it will lead a class action against Aveo,
asking residents and families to join in.

Now Maddens Lawyers are encouraging residents and family or
friends of former residents living in Aveo retirement villages to
contact them as they launch an "investigation" into the operator.

The firm released a statement on June 29 calling on residents to
register for free using a toll-free number or online form if they
think they may have a case for legal action.

"Maddens Lawyers has significant experience in assisting large
groups of people who have suffered financial loss and other
damages.  We have recovered millions of dollars of compensation in
Supreme Court class action proceedings including as a result of
the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfire and the 2009 Black Saturday
bushfires," its website reads.

Clearly they also see another opportunity to make a buck. [GN]


AXIOM HOLDINGS: "Desvarieux" Files Suit Over Stock Drop
-------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Desvarieux, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Axiom Holdings, Inc. and Curtis
Riley, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04756 (S.D. N.Y., June 22,
2017), seeks damages sustained, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest as well as their reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees
and other costs pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act.

Axiom Holdings, Inc. is an independent power producer and real
estate developer that develops, builds, owns & operates power
generation plants and hotels. On October 10, 2016, Axiom entered
into a Share Exchange Agreement with CJC Holdings, Ltd. CJC
operates and constructs hydropower electric generation stations
and owns two hotels in China.

Axiom was to acquire all of the issued and outstanding shares of
CJC from the CJC Shareholders in exchange for the issuance to the
CJC Shareholders of 200,000,000 shares of the Company's common
stock.

The complaint says Defendants failed to disclose that Axiom lacked
control over the merger process and that the agreement with CJC
was never completed. On this news, Axiom's share price fell $0.44,
or 37.93% over two trading days, to close at $0.72 on June 20,
2017. On June 20, the SEC issued an order announcing the temporary
suspension of trading in Axiom securities, beginning on June 21,
2017 until July 5, 2017.

Plaintiff owns Axion shares and lost substantially. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
      J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 661-1100
      Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
      Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
             ahood@pomlaw.com

              - and -

      Patrick V. Dahlstrom
      POMERANTZ LLP
      10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Telephone: (312) 377-1181
      Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
      Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

             - and -

      Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
      BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
      New York, NY 10165
      Telephone: (212) 697-6484
      Facsimile (212) 697-7296
      Email: peretz@bgandg.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Settlement in "Buckingham" Gets Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ALLEN BUCKINGHAM, EUNICE ANN ROBINSON, ALVIN
COURTS, and MELISSA AGOSTO-CRUZ, individually, on behalf of others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, National Association, Defendant,
Case No. 3:15-cv-6344-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard Seeborg of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco Division, granted final approval of the class action
settlement, attorney fees, and costs.

The Plaintiffs were Client Fulfillment Consultants (CFCs) (also
called Implementation Advisors), employees in the treasury
services department of the Defendant, who allege they were
misclassified as exempt from overtime.  They now seek final
approval of a class-wide settlement that achieves a common fund,
in addition to prospective relief for the class.

On Jan. 26, 2017, the Court granted preliminary approval of this
settlement, certifying the settlement class, preliminarily
approving the settlement, and ordering dissemination of notice to
class members.  The Court granted the parties' amendment to this
settlement on March 9, 2017.

The settlement classes are defined as follows:

     a. The California Class will be all persons who are or who
have been employed by the Defendant as exempt employees in its
internal job code CI066, which includes the job titles
Implementation Advisors and Client Fulfillment Consultants, within
the State of California from Dec. 31, 2011 through Oct. 17, 2016.

     b. The North Carolina Class will be all persons who are or
who have been employed by the Defendant as exempt employees in its
internal job code CI066, which includes the job titles
Implementation Advisors and Client Fulfillment Consultants, within
the State of North Carolina from Dec. 31, 2013 through Oct. 17,
2016.

     c. The Illinois Class will be all persons who are or who have
been employed by the Defendant as exempt employees in its internal
job code CI066, which includes the job titles Implementation
Advisors and Client Fulfillment Consultants, within the State of
Illinois from Dec. 31, 2012 through Oct. 17, 2016.

     d. The Connecticut Class will be all persons who are or who
have been employed by the Defendant as exempt employees in its
internal job code CI066, which includes the job titles
Implementation Advisors and Client Fulfillment Consultants, within
the State of Connecticut from Dec. 31, 2013 through Oct. 17, 2016.

     e. The FLSA Collective will be all persons who are or who
have been employed by the Defendant as exempt employees in its
internal job code CI066, which includes the job titles
Implementation Advisors and Client Fulfillment Consultants, from
Dec. 31, 2012 through Oct. 17, 2016 and who timely joins the
Collective Action.

The claims administrator provided notice in accordance with the
Court's order.  Out of the 529 initial class members, only one
class member requested exclusion from the class, and no objections
were filed.  The settlement will result in recovery of $6.6
million for class members, in addition to the reclassification of
the vast majority of currently employed class members and other
current CFCs as non-exempt.  Under the settlement, the Defendant
will deposit the settlement fund with the claims administrator
within 15 days of the Order, and class members will receive their
pro-rata allocations shortly thereafter by mail.

The Court granted final approval of the terms of the Settlement.
This document will constitute a final judgment with respect to the
Claims of the Settlement Class for purposes of Rule 58 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court approved an award of $15,000 to Plaintiff Buckingham,
and $2,500 each to Plaintiffs Robinson Courts, and Agosto-Cruz, as
the class representatives, to be deducted from the gross common
fund.  It also approved an award at 25% benchmark to the Class
Counsel as reasonable payment for Attorneys' Fees, and $15,000 for
costs.  Legal Aid at Work (formerly called Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center) is approved by the Court as beneficiary.

Without affecting the finality of the Order and Final Judgment,
the Court retains jurisdiction over the Class Representatives, the
Settlement Class, and the Defendant as to all matters concerning
the administration, consummation, implementation, interpretation,
and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/7MI7Ru from Leagle.com.

Allen Buckingham, II, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan Jeffrey
Schwartz, Bryan Schwartz Law.

Allen Buckingham, II, Plaintiff, represented by Eduard R.
Meleshinsky, Bryan Schwartz Law.

Bank of America, National Association, Defendant, represented by
John Arthur Van Hook -- jvanhook@mcguirewoods.com  -- McGuire
Woods LLP, Michael David Mandel -- mmandel@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP & Sylvia Jihae Kim -- skim@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuire Woods LLP.


BANK OF HAWAII: Hawaii District Court Remands "Robinson" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Helen Gillmor of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Hawaii remanded the case captioned LANDON ROBINSON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BANK
OF HAWAII, dba BANKOH, Defendant, CIV. No. 17-00072 HG-RLP (D.
Haw.), to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii.

Bank of Hawaii's Consumer Deposit Account Agreement allows for a
customer to overdraw his account.  An account is overdrawn when a
customer spends more money than what is available in his account
and the account balance goes below zero.

Bank of Hawaii may charge a customer an initial "Overdraft Fee" of
$26 for attempting to overdraw the account.  The Account Agreement
allows Bank of Hawaii to pay the amount of the overdraft on behalf
of the customer.  The terms require the customer to repay the
amount of the overdraft promptly.  The Account Agreement allows
Bank of Hawaii to charge a $10 "Continuing Negative Balance Fee"
if an account has a negative balance for seven consecutive days.
The Agreement also allows Bank of Hawaii to charge a Continuing
Negative Balance Fee for each seven-day period that an account
remains in a negative balance condition at the end of each day.

On Jan. 20, 2017, the Plaintiff filed his action as a proposed
class action complaint in the Circuit Court for the First Circuit
of the State of Hawaii.  He states that on Aug. 16 or 17, 2016, he
overdrew his checking account and on Aug. 16, 2016, he was charged
a $26 Overdraft Fee.  From Aug. 16, 2016 to Aug. 22, 2016, his
account balance fluctuated from negative $8.43 to negative
$346.48.  The Plaintiff alleges that Bank of Hawaii charged him a
Continuing Negative Balance Fee of $10 on Aug. 22, 2016.

He argues that the Continuing Negative Balance Fee is interest on
money that the bank loaned to him to fund his overdrawn account.
He claims that $10 of interest charged to his account over a
seven-day period violates Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 478,
which limits the amount of interest that can be charged on a loan.
The Plaintiff claims that Bank of Hawaii breached the contract of
the Account Agreement by charging the Continuing Negative Balance
Fee before the seven-day period established in the contract.

The Defendant removed the case to federal District Court on the
basis that there is federal question subject-matter jurisdiction.
It claims federal law completely preempts state laws regarding
usury and argues that supplemental jurisdiction is proper for the
breach of contract claim.  The Plaintiff filed a motion to remand,
arguing that complete preemption does not apply in this situation.

Judge Gillmor says Section 521 of Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act ("DIDA") does not completely
preempt state law usury claims against state-chartered banks.
DIDA does not provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction
in this case.  There are no federal law causes of action in the
Complaint.  Hence, remand is required.  Accordingly, Judge Gillmor
granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand.  The case and all files
are remanded to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/qa7xQN from Leagle.com.

Landon Robinson, Plaintiff, represented by Brandee J. Faria --
bjkfaria@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin & Faria.

Landon Robinson, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey D. Kaliel,
Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, John F. Perkin --
perkin@perkinlaw.com -- Perkin & Faria & Jonathan M. Streisfeld --
streisfeld@kolawyers.com -- Kopelowitz Ostrow, P.A., pro hac vice.

Bank of Hawaii, Defendant, represented by Andrew J. Demko --
andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac
vice, Kristin L. Holland -- KHolland@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd
& Ing, Nickolas A. Kacprowski -- NKacprowski@ahfi.com -- Alston
Hunt Floyd & Ing, Paul Alston -- PAlston@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt
Floyd & Ing & Stuart M. Richter -- stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com --
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice.


BASTROP, TX: Red Light Camera Class Action Under Appeal
------------------------------------------------------
Mary Huber, writing for Statesman, reports the Bastrop City
Council and city staff met on June 29 for their first workshop
session to plan the 2017-18 budget.  And while resoundingly
opposed to raising taxes this fiscal year, many officials were on
board with proposals to increase building fees for residential and
commercial developers and implement a fee for utility customers to
improve the city's drainage.

The city's property tax rate is 56.4 cents per $100 of property
valuation.  It's been a priority for Bastrop for many years to
keep that figure below 60 cents, even though many on the council
say it will be impossible to do so in the coming years in light of
Bastrop's growth and needs.

"We are going to have to raise taxes," Council Member Deborah
Jones said. "I know it's not going to necessarily be popular, but
it's necessary."

But City Manager Lynda Humble said her goal is to bring in
additional tax revenue by encouraging development and annexing
territory to expand the city's tax base.  She also hopes to
increase tourism and sales tax revenue by improving "curb appeal"
and drawing people to hotels and downtown.

"Even if we raise taxes, it's not going to generate a lot of
money," she said.  "It's important that we increase our property
values in Bastrop so that our penny is worth more."

With Bastrop's current property valuations, each penny in the
city's property tax rate generates $87,000 in revenue, Humble
said.

Among the priorities for the 2017-18 budget discussed on June 29
were general maintenance and beautification projects, improved
public safety, infrastructure upgrades and projects on the city's
north side.  But officials agreed that the top priority should be
to fix the city's drainage.

The Memorial Day weekend storm last year highlighted a number of
problems with the drainage system, as rain overwhelmed Gills
Branch and Piney Creek, flooding homes, churches and businesses.
Dozens showed up at City Hall shortly after the flood, pleading
with officials to make improvements.

"I think the community expects their 25-year drainage system to
work, and it doesn't," Humble said on June 29.  "I think that the
community expects creeks to be cleaned, and they're not. I think
the community has endured a number of floods that now every time
it threatens to rain, we deal with post-traumatic stress. It's
real."

The Public Works Department has suggested charging a monthly fee
between $7 and $9 to all city utility customers to pay for regular
drainage maintenance. That money would go into a dedicated fund
that would give the department about $350,000 each year for three
new employees and supplies to replace culverts, clear ditches,
install storm sewers and provide regular cleaning after rain
events.

The proposed fee would not cover any high-dollar drainage
infrastructure upgrades, like those awaiting funding from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.  The city would still have to
determine a rate structure for the new fee.

"I absolutely understand for some of our citizenry this is a huge
burden," Ms. Humble said of the drainage fee proposal.  "If no is
an acceptable answer to the citizenry that are calling and
complaining about the drainage, if no is an acceptable answer,
then let's not do anything."

The council agreed an answer couldn't wait.  City staffers will
work over the coming weeks and months to plan for the drainage
fee.

In the next year, residential and commercial developers could also
see an increase in fees for building permits, inspections and plat
approvals, which would put Bastrop more in line with other cities
of its size.  City Engineer Wesley Brandon said these fees have
remained stagnant since 1995, robbing the Planning Department of
$234,000 in revenue it needs to meet its own demands.

The department is proposing an 82 percent increase in fees per lot
to build subdivisions, as well as a 54 percent increase for
residential building permits and more than 500 percent for
commercial site development.  The department is also advocating
new fees for development agreements and geographic information
system mapping and to review traffic impact analyses, among
others.

"Those costs and the effort that is required to review and inspect
those projects has all increased," Mr. Brandon said.  "But yet we
are still using the same fee structure we used 22 years ago."

The city is also proposing to use $488,479 in red light camera
funds, received from fines when people run traffic lights, to
finance a number of transportation safety projects, including new
signs, road striping and sidewalks.

The city has been holding on to the money since 2015, when James
H. Watson filed a class action lawsuit against 53 Texas cities,
including Bastrop, for operating the cameras.  Mr. Watson claims
red light cameras are unconstitutional.  The case is under appeal,
and proceedings could drag out for years, Humble said.  In the
meantime, she has gotten the go-ahead from the attorney
representing the city in the suit to use the money for
transportation projects.

Public Works has suggested spending $90,000 on new street signs,
$89,000 for striping and $360,000 to build sidewalks that would
connect all the city's parks.  The plan would make Bastrop among
the most walkable cities in Texas, Humble said, a goal of
residents when crafting Bastrop's new comprehensive plan.

The improvements would cost $575,760, leaving Bastrop on the hook
for $87,341, aside from the red light camera funds.  Public Works
Director Trey Job said it will be up to the city manager and the
council to decide if and how they want to pay the difference.

None of the projects discussed on June 29 has been approved.  The
final budget will be adopted in September.

A second budget workshop is planned for July 20, when officials
will discuss water and wastewater infrastructure upgrades and
plans for the convention center and capital improvement projects,
including upgrades to the rodeo grounds and Bob Bryant Park.

Important dates for summer budget planning

July 20: Second budget workshop

Aug. 8: City manager presents budget

Aug. 16, 17: Third and fourth budget workshops

Aug. 22: First public hearing on tax rate

Sept. 12: Second public hearing on tax rate, first public hearing
on budget

Sept. 26: Adopt budget, set tax rate
[GN]


BAYSTATE NOBLE: Bid to Dismiss Colonoscopy Patients' Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Phil Demers, writing for Mass Live, reports an emotional distress
lawsuit against Baystate Noble Hospital and two other defendants
brought by 25 colonoscopy patients will proceed and may become a
class-action, according to attorneys representing the plaintiffs.

Hampden Superior Court Justice Michael Callan issued a denial of a
motion to dismiss from the defendants on June 27. These include
Baystate Noble Hospital, medical device makers Olympus America and
Dr. Ira Schmelkin.

Robert DiTusa, Esq., a partner in the Springfield law firm
representing the plaintiffs, Alekman DiTusa, told MassLive on June
30 the size of the potential financial hit the hospital faces
remains in question, as the law firm intends to expand the suit
into a class-action.

The move would increase the number of people entitled to
compensation from 25 to nearly 300 -- the number of colonoscopy
patients the hospital, between June 2012 and April 2013, treated
using improperly sterilized equipment.

Hospital staff were apparently unfamiliar as yet with the scopes,
which had been newly provided by Olympus.

"If a class action is certified, it will be on behalf of all the
affected patients," DiTusa said.

So far, the case involves just the 25.

"We're pleased with the court's ruling," DiTusa said. "It brings
us one step closer to a favorable conclusion."

The lawsuit, DiTusa added, seeks "to compensate people for what
they've been through" and would "deter similar conduct by the
hospital and the manufacturer."

"They violated basic hospital safety rules," he said. "When they
do that they are endangering the general public."

The hospital in 2016 notified all of the roughly 300 patients that
improper cleaning of the scopes might have exposed them to
hepatitis B, hepatitis C, or HIV, offering each free testing and
strongly advising them to come in.

The lawsuit that followed claimed the 25 plaintiffs were entitled
to financial compensation for emotional distress caused by
receiving this notice.

Before being tested, patients not only worried for their own
health, but that of friends and family members they could have
unknowingly infected, the lawsuit claims.

The defendants countered, in the motion to dismiss, that, "There
can be no recovery for emotional distress for fear of future
injury."

"The plaintiffs counter that (they) are not claiming fear of
future injury, but rather are 'claiming that they suffered
emotional distress between the time that they received the letter
(advising of potential exposure) and the time that they were
tested,'" noted Callan, in his June 27 order.

The judge added, "It would be absurd for the defendants to offer
and recommend testing, then disclaim responsibility for it. This
issue should be developed."

Last year, DiTusa told The Republican that the hospital had
knowledge of at least one of the colonoscopy patients subsequently
testing positive for an infectious disease, but did not say which
illness, citing attorney-client privilege.

For its part, the hospital earlier released a statement on the
matter, saying, "We have completed testing for 243 of the 293
patients who were affected. We are still making every reasonable
effort to reach and offer testing to the remaining 50 patients who
have not been tested yet. To do this, we have mailed two certified
letters to their homes and followed up a third time with phone
calls. It remains our hope that all 293 patients will get tested,
but the decision to do so is solely theirs to make. To date there
is no evidence of any transmission of illness from the endoscopes.
The safety and privacy of our patients remains our top priority as
we move forward in this process." [GN]


BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES: High Court Set to Hear Securities Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Marcia Coyle of The National Law Journal, reports
that the U.S. Supreme Court on June 27 added six new cases to the
fall term's argument docket, including New Jersey's challenge to a
federal ban on sports betting at casinos and racetracks, a terror
victim's attempt to attach Iranian assets, and shareholder efforts
to bring certain securities claims in state courts.

The justices now have a total of 28 cases (counting consolidated
cases as one) scheduled for the new term, which begins on Oct. 2.
They likely will add more cases after a conference in September
when they cull through the thousands of petitions filed throughout
the summer.

In the New Jersey sports betting challenge, two former U.S.
solicitors general face off: Theodore Olson of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher represents Gov. Chris Christie in Christie v. NCAA, and
Kirkland & Ellis partner Paul Clement is counsel to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association.  That case is consolidated with
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association v. NCAA. The
association's counsel is Ronald Riccio of McElroy, Deutsch,
Mulvaney & Carpenter in Morristown, New Jersey.

New Jersey challenges the constitutionality of the federal
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, which prohibits
states from, among other things, "licensing, or authorizing by law
or compact," gambling on sporting events.  The law also prohibits
anyone from sponsoring, operating, advertising or promoting sports
gambling schemes pursuant to state law.
The justices in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran will examine a
circuit split over whether, under a 2008 amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, U.S. terror victims have a freestanding,
independent right to enforce judgments against state sponsors of
terrorism regardless of whether the assets they want to seize
would otherwise be shielded under the act.
Jeffrey Lamken of Washington's Molo Lamken represents Iran.
In the securities case, Cyan v. Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund, Cyan Inc. challenges a California state court decision that
permitted a securities class action over alleged
misrepresentations in a 2013 initial public offering to proceed in
state court.  Cyan's high court counsel is Boris Feldman --
boris.feldman@wsgr.com -- of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati's
Palo Alto, California, office. The employees fund is represented
by Andrew Love -- alove@rgrdlaw.com -- of Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd in San Francisco.

The two other grants were PEM Entities v. Levin, a bankruptcy
challenge, and Marinello v. United States, a criminal case
involving obstruction of federal tax laws.

The justices on June 27 also announced new circuit assignments in
order to bring Justice Neil Gorsuch into the mix.

Justice Samuel Alito Jr., formerly the circuit justice for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, takes over the Fifth
Circuit from Justice Clarence Thomas, who will handle emergency
applications and other matters from the Eleventh Circuit.  Justice
Gorsuch will now assume Eighth Circuit duties.  Justice Alito also
is the circuit justice for the Third Circuit.

The other circuit assignments are: D.C., Fourth and Federal (Chief
Justice John Roberts Jr.); First (Justice Stephen Breyer); Second
(Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg); Sixth and Seventh (Justice Elena
Kagan); Ninth (Justice Anthony Kennedy) and Tenth (Justice Sonia
Sotomayor).


BHH LLC: Court Certifies 3 Classes in "Hart"
--------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JOANNE HART and SANDRA BUENO, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BHH,
LLC d/b/a BELL + HOWELL, et ano., Defendants, No. 15cv4804 (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge William H. Pauley, III of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants's motion to dismiss; and granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify the Nationwide Fraud Class, the
Multi-State Warranty Class, and the California CLRA Class.

This consumer fraud class action arises from BHH's sale of
ultrasonic pest repellers, which the Plaintiffs claim are
ineffective and worthless.  The Plaintiffs purchased the pest
repellers from third-party retailers.  After receiving these
devices, both the Plaintiffs discovered that they did not work as
advertised.

In May 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part BHH's
motion to dismiss the original complaint.  The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty

Act and unjust enrichment claims were dismissed.  Hart's claims
regarding Animal Repellers were also dismissed for lack of
standing.  However, the Court allowed the breach of warranty
claims and California consumer protection claims under the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), the Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"), and the False Advertising Law ("FAL") to proceed.

After fact discovery closed, Hart amended her complaint to add a
common law fraud claim, and a new plaintiff -- Bueno -- who
purports to represent two new putative classes: the fraud class
and the breach of express warranty class.  It is unclear from the
parties' submissions why Hart could not represent these new
putative classes, nor why Bueno could not also represent the
California class.  Adding to the confusion, BHH elected to file a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint rather than interpose an
answer.

Concurrently, the Plaintiffs moved to certify three classes: (i) a
nationwide class asserting a claim for fraud; (ii) a multi-state
class asserting a claim for breach of warranty; and (iii) a
California-only class asserting claims under California's consumer
protection laws, fraud, and breach of express warranty.

Because the Plaintiffs have not alleged facts indicating that the
Defendants, as opposed to independent third party retailers,
obtained their money or property, or that the Defendants are in
possession of funds that rightly belong to them, they have failed
to state a plausible claim for restitution under the UCL and FAL.
Accordingly, the UCL and FAL claims are dismissed.  In view of the
mature stage of this litigation, and the pending class
certification motion, leave to re-plead is denied.

The amended complaint alleges that Hart and Bueno believed the
product representations to be true and relied on them in
purchasing the pest repellers -- facts sufficient to satisfy the
element of reliance.  In sum, enough has been alleged for the
Plaintiffs' fraud claim to survive dismissal at the pleadings
stage.  Also, the description at issue in this action -- that the
devices are ultrasonic pest repellers -- was the sole basis of the
parties' bargain.  Such phrase constitutes a verifiable
affirmation of fact that the Plaintiffs exclusively relied on in
making their purchases, and qualifies as a written warranty
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, the Court
denied BHH's motion to dismiss the fraud and breach of warranty
claims.

Fact discovery concluded in December 2016, yielding enough
information for the Plaintiffs to structure class-wide notice and
an objectively verifiable means to identify class members.  The
Court has ample tools in its kit to address any difficulties
likely to arise in managing this class action.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' motion for certification of three classes -- the
Nationwide Fraud Class, the Multi-State Warranty Class, and the
California CLRA Class -- is granted by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 opinion and order is
available at https://is.gd/GMrSqk from Leagle.com.

Joanne Hart, Plaintiff, represented by Frederick John Klorczyk --
fklorczyk@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A..

Joanne Hart, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua David Arisohn --
jarisohn@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher P.A., Neal Jamison Deckant
-- ndeckant@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Yitzchak Kopel --
ykopel@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A. & Joseph Ignatius
Marchese  -- jmarchese@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A..

Sandra Bueno, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak Kopel, Bursor &
Fisher, P.A..

BHH LLC, Defendant, represented by Howard B. Randell --
hbr@lefltd.com -- Leahy, Eisenberg & Franenkel, Ltd., pro hac
vice, Robert J. Ostojic -- ro@lefltd.com -- Leahy Eisenberg &
Frankel, Ltd. & Scott Wing -- sw@lefltd.com -- Leahy, Eisenberg &
Franenkel, Ltd., pro hac vice.

Van Hauser LLC, Defendant, represented by Howard B. Randell,
Leahy, Eisenberg & Franenkel, Ltd., pro hac vice, Robert J.
Ostojic, Leahy Eisenberg & Frankel, Ltd. & Scott Wing, Leahy,
Eisenberg & Franenkel, Ltd., pro hac vice.


BIRCH COMMUNICATIONS: Missouri Court Dismisses "Huskey"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of Missouri
dismissed the Plaintiffs First Amended Class Action Complaint in
the case captioned RICHARD W. HUSKEY, Plaintiff, v. BIRCH
COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendants, No. 4:16CV1724 RLW (E.D. Mo.).

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Response to Order
to Show Cause.  On April 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and for Damages against Ionex Communications,
Inc., and Birch Telecom of Missouri, Inc., both doing business as
"Birch Communications".  Plaintiff then filed a First Amended
Class Action Complaint on November 21, 2016. The caption of the
Amended Complaint eliminated Birch Telecom and Ionex as Defendants
and instead named Birch Communications, Inc.

On December 5, 2016, Birch Telecom filed a Motion to Dismiss,
advising that Birch Communications, Inc., and not Birch Telecom,
was identified as a Defendant in the case caption and that Birch
Communications, Inc. had not yet been served.

On March 29, 2017, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the
case should not be dismissed as to Defendant Birch Communications,
Inc. for failure to execute timely service in compliance with
Rule.

On April 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response, stating that he
properly served Defendant Birch Communications, Inc. via the
Court's electronic filing system and that there was no material
difference between "Birch Communications" and "Birch
Communications, Inc."

In a Memorandum and Order dated May 18, 2017, the Court disagreed
and advised Plaintiff that Birch Communications, Inc. had not been
timely or properly served in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The District Court held that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
good cause, the Court granted Plaintiffs request for an extension
of time to serve Birch Communications, Inc. and gave Plaintiff 30
days to effectuate service. Again, Plaintiff failed and the Court
issued another Show Cause Order.

On July 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response, asserting that
"'Birch' and 'Birch Communications' are used by a morass of
similar entities" and that "[h]aving performed a goodfaith reading
of this Court's May 18, 2017 order, and holding 'Birch
Communications' and 'Birch Communications, Inc.' to be functional
equivalents, Plaintiffs attorney believed he had satisfied service
upon Birch Communications counsel.

The Court notes that Birch Communications, Inc. is listed as the
parent corporation to Birch Telecom. absent probative evidence
that the two corporations are not independently operated, service
on an officer of a subsidiary does not effect service on the
parent corporation. If a parent corporation is improperly served,
then the district court lacks jurisdiction over the parent
"whether or not it had actual notice of the lawsuit. The Court
this finds that Plaintiff has failed to properly serve Defendant
Birch Communications, Inc. where, as here, "the person served is
an officer of a corporation not named a defendant.

Plaintiff requests that the Court "correct" the docket so that
Birch Telecom remains the Defendant instead of Birch
Communications, Inc. Plaintiff claims that the language on the
first page of the Amended Complaint that reads, "Plaintiffs state
the following claims against Birch Telecom of Missouri, Inc.
("Birch")" and the language under "The Parties" stating "'Birch
Communications' is a Missouri Fictitious Name owned by two related
entities: Ionex Communications, Inc. ("Ionex") and Birch Telecom
of Missouri, Inc. ("Birch")" should compel the Court to change the
caption.

While Plaintiff argues that the present circumstances are "at
most, a technical misfire" and the result of "imprecise docketing
and captioning that sprung from the confusing nomenclature of the
'Birch' entities," the Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiffs
cause of action is appropriate. Plaintiff has been on notice since
December 5, 2016 that Birch Telecom of Missouri, Inc. was not
named as a Defendant in the case caption of the First Amended
Complaint and that Birch Communications, Inc. had not been
properly served. Plaintiff has not only failed to effectuate
service, but continues to insist, without legal support.
The Court finds that neither correction of the caption nor an
extension of time to effectuate service is warranted in this case.
Plaintiff first filed this cause of action in State court over two
years ago. Plaintiff's refusal to comply with this Court's Order
that Plaintiff shall effectuate service on Defendant within 30
days of the date of this Memorandum and Order dated 5/18/17
warrants dismissal under Rule. Plaintiffs First Amended Class
Action Complaint is Dismissed without prejudice.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/qOyVgR from Leagle.com.

Richard W. Huskey, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel F. Harvath  --
dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com -- HARVATH AND HARVATH, LLC.


BISCO INC: Kilpatrick Townsend Discusses Ruling on Rule 67 Issue
----------------------------------------------------------------
Chad Hansen, Esq. -- Chadhansen@kilpatricktownsend.com -- of
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an article for JDSupra,
wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in January 2016 in
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of
judgment has no legal effect and therefore does not serve to moot
a class action. 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).  Since that time,
defendants in class actions -- especially defendants in Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) cases and other lawsuits in which
statutory damages are sought -- have been exploring the question
reserved in Campbell-Ewald: what if a defendant actually pays what
is offered, rather than merely offering the payment? The Seventh
Circuit recently rejected one such method of "picking off" the
named plaintiff in its recent decision in Fulton Dental, LLC v.
Bisco, Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 WL 2641124 (7th Cir. June 20,
2017), but left open issues for further exploration by the
plaintiffs' and defense bar.

In Fulton Dental, the putative class action plaintiff sought
statutory damages under the TCPA as well as injunctive relief
banning future violations.  Before Fulton Dental moved for class
certification, however, the defendant (Bisco) executed the classic
"pick off": it tried to moot the case by tendering a Rule 68 offer
of judgment in the amount of the statutory damages sought by
Fulton Dental, plus accrued costs, along with a consent to
injunctive relief.  Two days after the offer of judgment was
filed, however, the Supreme Court decided Campbell-Ewald, holding
that "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not
moot a plaintiff's case." 136 S. Ct. at 672. After the offer was
rejected, and considering the Supreme Court's qualifying language,
Bisco implemented another strategy.  This time, it moved for leave
to deposit $3,600 -- what Bisco regarded as the maximum recovery
sought by Fulton Dental, plus fees and costs --with the district
court pursuant to Rule 67 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allows all or part of a disputed amount to be deposited into
the district court's registry.  Combined with its renewed
acquiescence to injunctive relief, Bisco argued the deposit into
the court mooted the case under Campbell-Ewald. The district court
agreed and granted Bisco's motion, treating the Rule 67 deposit of
funds as the equivalent of giving the money directly to the
plaintiff and thereby dismissing the case.

The Seventh Circuit reversed.  It read no invitation for such
creativity in the Supreme Court's reservation in Campbell-Ewald
that, "We need not, and do not now decide whether the result would
be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the
plaintiff's individual claim in an account payable to the
plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in
that amount." 136 S. Ct. at 672.  The Seventh Circuit further held
that Rule 67 is but a procedural mechanism for deposits into the
court and not a "vehicle for determining ownership; that is what
the underlying litigation is for." 2017 WL 2641124 at *3. And, the
court explained, statutes corresponding to Rule 67 (28 U.S.C.
Secs. 2041 & 2042) make clear that no party is entitled to the
funds absent court order, making the Rule 67 procedure no more of
a definitive payment to the plaintiff than a contractual offer or
an equitable tender, both rejected in Campbell-Ewald. Ultimately,
the Seventh Circuit saw "no principled distinction between
attempting to force a settlement on an unwilling party through
Rule 68, as in Campbell-Ewald, and attempting to force a
settlement on an unwilling party through Rule 67."

Although the court in Fulton Dental rejected defendant's Rule 67
attempt to "pick off" the plaintiff, it left open other
possibilities for short-circuiting class actions.  The court
discussed its prior decision in Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796
F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2015), and noted that although Bisco's
Rule 67 tender had not mooted the case, "other hurdles still
exist[], including a possible affirmative defense of payment,
estoppel, or waiver." 2017 WL 2641124 at *4.  Additionally, the
court provided another tidbit of hope to the defense bar when it
wrote: "And this is not an unimportant point: if it turns out that
the named plaintiff really has no personal stake in the
litigation, the district judge might well question whether it is
the appropriate champion for the class." Id.

Not overlooking the plaintiffs' bar, the court also provided it
with potential ammunition.  By acknowledging that named
plaintiffs' interests include not only statutory damages, but also
the hope of receiving "service awards" for their role as class
representatives, the court suggested that any settlement offer or
payment intended to moot a case may need to be large enough to
compensate the plaintiff for any potential service award. As the
court concluded its opinion, "we cannot say as a matter of law
that the unaccepted offer was sufficient to compensate plaintiff
Fulton for its loss of the opportunity to represent the putative
class." Id. at *5.

The Fulton Dental decision rejects the latest "pick-off" strategy
used by a defendant in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2016 ruling
in Campbell-Ewald.  It stands for the proposition that a class
action defendant may not pay into the court under Rule 67 the
amount of damages, fees, and costs to moot the putative class
action.  However, it leaves open whether such a payment raises
other affirmative defenses that could lead to dismissal or leads
to findings during class certification that the named plaintiff is
not adequate or typical or otherwise not an appropriate
representative for the class. It also raises but leaves open an
interesting mootness issue in cases where a payment has been made
to a plaintiff: whether the amount paid must compensate the
plaintiff for his interest in a service award for being the named
plaintiff. Ultimately, these issues will be resolved, because
class action defendants -- especially in TCPA and similar class
actions -- really have nothing to lose by attempting to execute a
"pick-off" strategy. [GN]


BLUE BUFFALO: Approval of Class Action Deal in "Keil" Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's orders approving a class action settlement
and awarding attorneys' fees in the case captioned Alexia Keil;
Nick Hutchison; Jason Davis, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; Rachael D. Stone; Maja Mackenzie; Brian
Andacky; Melissa Baggett; David Delre; Christopher Renna; Kimberly
Lemon; Joshua Teperson; Jonathon Fisher; Cindi Inman; Beth Cox;
Victoria Lyman; Stephanie Douglas; Sarah Jacobs, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Blue
Buffalo Company, Ltd., Defendant-Appellee, v. Paul Lopez,
Objector-Appellant. Alexia Keil; Nick Hutchison; Jason Davis,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Rachael D. Stone; Maja Mackenzie; Brian Andacky; Melissa Baggett;
David Delre; Christopher Renna; Kimberly Lemon; Joshua Teperson;
Jonathon Fisher; Cindi Inman; Beth Cox; Victoria Lyman; Stephanie
Douglas; Sarah Jacobs, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd.,
Defendant-Appellee v. Pamela McCoy, Objector-Appellant. Alexia
Keil; Nick Hutchison; Jason Davis, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated; Rachael D. Stone; Maja Mackenzie;
Brian Andacky; Melissa Baggett; David Delre; Christopher Renna;
Kimberly Lemon; Joshua Teperson; Jonathon Fisher; Cindi Inman;
Beth Cox; Victoria Lyman; Stephanie Douglas; Sarah Jacobs, on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd., Defendant-Appellee, v.
Caroline Nadola, Objector-Appellant, Alexia Keil; Nick Hutchison;
Jason Davis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Rachael D. Stone; Maja Mackenzie; Brian Andacky; Melissa
Baggett; David Delre; Christopher Renna; Kimberly Lemon; Joshua
Teperson; Jonathon Fisher; Cindi Inman; Beth Cox; Victoria Lyman;
Stephanie Douglas; Sarah Jacobs, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees. Blue Buffalo Company,
Ltd., Defendant-Appellee, v. Gary W. Sibley, Objector-Appellant,
Nos. 16-3159, 16-3164, 16-3167, 16-3169 (8th Cir.).

Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd. is a manufacturer of pet foods.  In
January 2015, a class action was brought challenging Blue
Buffalo's representations about the ingredients in its pet foods.
The plaintiffs alleged that Blue Buffalo broke its "True Blue
Promise" that its products contained no chicken or poultry by-
product meals.  As a result, they asserted:

     (1) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA);

     (2) breach of express and implied warranties;

     (3) unjust enrichment; and

     (4) violations of the consumer protection acts of eight
         states: Missouri, New York, California, New Jersey,
         Illinois, Florida, Ohio, and Massachusetts.

The MMWA, warranty, and unjust-enrichment claims were brought on
behalf of a proposed nationwide class, whereas the consumer
protection claims were brought on behalf of eight proposed
subclasses.  Class counsel estimated that the potential class size
consisted of 3.5 million households.

In October 2015, class counsel and Blue Buffalo began to engage in
settlement talks with a mediator.  Less than two months later, the
parties reached a settlement agreement.  According to the
settlement agreement, Blue Buffalo agreed to pay $32 million into
a settlement fund.  From this amount, class counsel would request
$8 million for attorneys' fees and expenses, the settlement
administrator would request $1.4 million to cover administrative
costs, and the remaining $22.6 million would be available to pay
class members.  In addition to monetary relief, the agreement
would provide injunctive relief: Blue Buffalo would ensure that it
no longer represents that its products do not contain chicken or
poultry by-product meal until it has reviewed its supplier
relationships and has instituted practices designed to ensure that
all ingredients provided by its suppliers are consistent with its
packaging claims.

On December 18, 2015, the district court conditionally certified
the class and preliminarily approved both the settlement and a
proposed notice plan.  The court also approved Heffler Claims
Group (HCG) as settlement administrator.

Fourteen class members submitted written objections to the
settlement, of which eight also objected to class counsel's
proposed fee.  On May 12, class counsel submitted their motion
requesting $8,000,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses.

The district court held the fairness hearing on May 19, 2016.  The
court later issued two written orders.  The first order certified
the settlement class, approved the settlement, and approved the
payment of $1,400,000 in administrative expenses to HCG.  The
second order awarded attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount
requested by class counsel.

Four of the objectors who submitted written objections appealed
the district court's orders.  Paul Lopez, Pamela McCoy, Caroline
Nadola, and Gary Sibley raised various objections regarding the
adequacy of the district court's explanation, the fairness of the
settlement, the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees, and the
district court's scheduling orders.

The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded that the settlement was
fair, reasonable, and adequate, and affirmed the district court's
order approving the settlement.  The appellate court also found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
calculating attorneys' fees and, because the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)
violation was harmless, affirmed the district court's order
awarding attorneys' fees and expenses.

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's July 5, 2017 opinion is
available at https://is.gd/QSQWuh from Leagle.com.

Plaintiff-Appellee is represented by David L. Steelman, Richard B.
Walsh, Jr. -- rwalsh@lewisrice.com -- Don Manley Downing, Stephen
Frank Gaunt, John G. Simon -- jsimon@simonlawpc.com -- Matthew
Hall Armstrong, Gretchen Garrison, Scott A. Kamber, David B. Helms
-- davidh@germanmay.com -- Michael Reese, Edward F. Haber --
ehaber@shulaw.com -- Ryan A. Keane -- ryan@keanelawllc.com --
Jeremy Reade Wilson, Sarah A. Milunski -- smilunski@lewisrice.com
-- Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr. -- ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com -- Timothy
M. Cronin -- tcronin@simonlawpc.com -- David Parisi, Deborah
Kravitz, Sean K. Cronin -- scronin@drnpc.com -- Howard Weil
Rubinstein, Joshua Eggnatz -- jeggnatz@elplawyers.com -- Frederick
John Klorczyk, Joseph Ignatius Marchese, Neal J. Deckant, Scott
Bursor, Yitzchak Kopel, Adam R. Gonnelli, Antonio Vozzolo, James
E. Miller, Karen Lester Grenon, Laurie Rubinow, Brian Penny,
Patrick A. Klingman, James Richard Patterson, Todd D. Carpenter,
Allison Rachel Willett, Gillian L. Wade, Sara Avila, Andrea Gold,
Daniel Frech, Jonathan K. Tycko, Stuart Scott, Daniel W.
Luginbill, Robert V. Phillips, Donald C. Douglas, Jr., Robert G.
Harvey, Jr., Noah Schubert.

Objector-Appellant is represented by Timothy Belz, Christopher
Andres Bandas, Robert William Clore.

Defendant-Appellee is represented by Gerard T. Carmody, Adeel
Abdullah Mangi, Aileen M. Fair, Steven A. Zalesin.


BMO HARRIS: Bid to Dismiss "Moss" Suit Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned EBORAH MOSS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, v. BMO HARRIS BANK, N.A.,
FIRST PREMIER BANK, AND BAY CITIES BANK, Defendants, No. 13-CV-
5438 (JFB) (GRB) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Joseph F. Bianco of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff commenced this action on Nov. 30, 2013, against the
Defendant alleging (i) a substantive violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act pursuant to 18
U. S .C. Section 1962(c) and conspiracy to violate RICO pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d); and (ii) New York State law claims
for a violation of the General Business Law ("GBL"), and for
unjust enrichment.  The Plaintiff and filed an amended complaint
on Jan. 3, 2014.  On June 9, 2014, the Court granted the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stayed this action.
Thereafter, on July 16, 2015, the Court vacated its arbitration
order and lifted the stay after the Plaintiff informed the Court
that the designated forum had declined to arbitrate the case.
Following an interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed
that decision.

The Plaintiff then filed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on
Oct. 4, 2016.  The Defendant moved to dismiss on Nov. 17, 2016;
the Plaintiff filed her opposition on Jan. 4, 2017; and the
Defendant replied on Jan. 24, 2017.  The Court heard oral argument
on Feb. 13, 2017, and the Defendant subsequently filed letters
providing additional, unpublished legal authority in support of
its motion on March 7, 2017 and June 7, 2017.  The Court has fully
considered the parties' submissions.

The Court dismissed the Plaintiff's substantive RICO claim because
the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged (i) the existence of an
association-in-fact enterprise; and (ii) that the Defendant
conducted or participated in the affairs of a RICO enterprise.  As
a result, the RICO conspiracy claim must also be dismissed because
there is no plausible underlying substantive violation.

With respect to the Plaintiff's state law claims, the Court agreed
with the Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of
action under the GBL because there are no allegations that
defendant engaged in consumer-oriented, misleading conduct.
However, the Defendant's motion is denied with respect to the
unjust enrichment claim because the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that she conferred a benefit on
the Defendant.

Finally, in an abundance of caution, the Court permitted the
Plaintiff to amend her pleading one final time to attempt to
allege plausible RICO and GBL claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 memorandum and order
is available at https://is.gd/RPV8V9 from Leagle.com.

Deborah Moss, Plaintiff, represented by Darren T. Kaplan, Darren
Kaplan Law Firm, P.C..

Deborah Moss, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Ostrow --
ostrow@kolawyers.com  -- Kopelowitz Ostrow P.A., pro hac vice,
Hassan Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP,
pro hac vice, Jeffrey D. Kaliel -- jkaliel@tzlegal.com -- Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, John A. Moore --
moore@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, pro hac vice,
Norman Siegel -- siegel@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson
LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen N. Six -- six@stuevesiegel.com --
Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, pro hac vice.

First Premier Bank, Defendant, represented by Barry Werbin --
bwerbin@herrick.com -- Herrick, Feinstein, LLp, John C. Ekman --
jekman@foxrothschild.com -- Lindquist & Vennum LLP, pro hac vice,
Bryan Freeman -- bfreeman@lindquist.com -- Lindquist & Vennum, pro
hac vice & James P. McCarthy -- jmccarthy@lindquist.com --
Lindquist & Vennum LLP, pro hac vice.


BREX INC: Court Denied Bid to Partially Dismiss "Reed"
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Several Counts in
the case captioned TOM REED, and MICHAELROY, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BREX,
INC., d/b/a"CARX", JOHN KEELEY, and KEVINFLOYD, Defendants, Case
No. 17-cv-0292-MJR-SCW (S.D. Ill.).

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Counts V-VII and X-XII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.  The
underlying dispute is a putative class action alleging that
Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
Illinois and Missouri state law by failing to pay overtime wages
and "gap time" wages at Illinois and Missouri "Car X" auto repair
stores.

Specifically, in relation to FLSA claims accompanied by state law
claims, this Court has held that Fair Labor Standard Act claims
will not preempt state law claims for similar but distinct relief.
For example, the Fair Labor Standard Act does not recognize a
right to relief for "gap time" wages -- wages that compensate
employees for hours worked in excess of their normally scheduled
hours, but below the forty hour mark at which time overtime wages
would begin to accrue.  This Court has allowed claims premised on
state common law to proceed in tandem with FLSA claims for no
overtime pay in prior suits.

Whether Plaintiffs will ultimately be able to allege and
substantiate common law claims for "gap time" wages remains yet to
be seen, but, at this early juncture, the Court finds it
unnecessary to dismiss these claims as duplicative in light of the
premise that the common law claims seek distinct relief.  Hence,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts V-VII and X-XII is denied.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017, Order is
available at https://is.gd/kxBU13 from Leagle.com.

Tom Reed, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Potashnick --
markp@wp-attorneys.com  -- Weinhaus & Potashnick.

Tom Reed, Plaintiff, represented by John R. Daugherty, Law Office
of Jack Daugherty PC. -- 200 S Charles St.,Edwardsville, Madison
County IL 62025

Michael Roy, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Potashnick,
Weinhaus & Potashnick.

Brex, Inc., Defendant, represented by Randall W. Slade --
randall.slade@francomoroney.com --  Franco & Moroney, LLC.
John Keeley, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Slade, Franco &
Moroney, LLC.

Kevin Floyd, Defendant, represented by Randall W. Slade, Franco &
Moroney, LLC.


BRINDERSON CONSTRUCTORS: Must Supplement Discovery Responses
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DANIEL GARZA, Plaintiff, v. BRINDERSON
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-05742-EJD
(SVK)(N.D. Calif.), Plaintiff filed a putative class action
alleging that disclosure and authorization forms provided by
defendants to employees and prospective employees violated Fair
Credit Reporting Act and other statutes.

Before the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California is the parties' Joint Letter Brief Regarding
Discovery Disputes, in which plaintiff Daniel Garza argues that
certain of defendants' responses to interrogatories and requests
for production are deficient.

At issue are discovery requests served by plaintiff on defendants
Brinderson Constructors, Inc. and Brinderson L.P. (collectively,
"Brinderson") that relate to two categories of information: (1)
the basis for Brinderson's opposition to class certification and
its affirmative defenses; and (2) the disclosure and authorization
forms relating to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Plaintiff argues that the information and documents sought are
relevant, particularly to plaintiff's upcoming motion for class
certification.

Defendant argues that discovery into its contentions is premature
and that discovery concerning the forms signed by potential class
members should be limited to a narrower time period and to the
same forms signed by plaintiff.

The Court concludes that these discovery requests are not
premature. Some of the disputed requests expressly relate to
issues of class certification, making those requests appropriate
at this stage of the case.  Although some of the requests are not
limited to certification issues, they are nevertheless appropriate
at this juncture. "[T]he line between merits and class
certification discovery is not always bright," and "discovery
going to the merits of plaintiff's claim also often has
significant bearing on issues such as predominance and commonality
under Rule 23. Moreover, this case is not in its early stages; it
has been pending approximately 19 months. The district court judge
rejected defendants' request for phased discovery, and thus both
class certification issues and the merits of the case are the
proper subjects of discovery at this time.

The parties' second dispute concerns Interrogatory Nos. 8 and 9
and RFP Nos. 23 and 34. The interrogatories ask Brinderson to
identify how many disclosure and authorization forms it required
prospective class members to sign during the relevant time period
as part of the employment application.

Brinderson objected to these requests, but has offered to provide
plaintiff with "the number of individuals who were provided with
the same Fair Credit Reporting Act disclosure and authorization
form as Plaintiff during the time period of two years prior to
filing the complaint to the present.  Brinderson states that it
has already produced the Fair Credit Reporting Act disclosure and
authorization form that was provided and executed by plaintiff.
The Court concludes that the broader scope of information and
documents sought by plaintiff is relevant and appropriate
discovery at this stage of the case. "In determining relevancy in
a class action, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the
class definition. Brinderson's attempt to limit discovery to only
the same forms signed by plaintiff, and to a period beginning two
years before filing the action (based on Brinderson's argument as
to the applicable statute of limitations), is unwarranted. Those
arguments may be relevant to the proper scope of any class that
may be certified, but they are not an appropriate basis to limit
discovery at this stage in light of the class definition in the
complaint.

For these reasons, the Court orders defendants to supplement their
responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 5, 8, and 9 and to produce the
documents requested in RFP Nos. 4, 9, 23, and 24, as those
interrogatories and requests have been clarified and/or narrowed
by plaintiff.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017 Order is
available at  https://is.gd/sNTksq from Leagle.com.

Daniel Garza, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com --  Setareh Law Group.

Daniel Garza, Plaintiff, represented by Tuvia Korobkin,
-- tkorobkin@haineslawgroup.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Brinderson Constructors, Inc., Defendant, represented by Elyse
Whitney Whitehead -- elyse.whitehead@kyl.com  -- Keesal Young &
Logan & Nathan Randall Jaskowiak -- nathan.jaskowiak@kyl.com  --
Keesal Young & Logan.

Brinderson L.P., Inc., Defendant, represented by Lisa M. Bertain -
- isa.bertain@kyl.com -- Keesal Young & Logan & Nathan Randall
Jaskowiak, Keesal Young & Logan.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Defendant, represented by Delia Alexandra
Isvoranu -- DELIA.ISVORANU@SEDGWICKLAW.COM --  Sedgwick LLP.
BRINDERSON L.P., Defendant, represented by Nathan Randall
Jaskowiak, Keesal Young & Logan.


BUILD.COM INC: Amendment to Complaint in "Jurgens" Allowed
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of Missouri
granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint RHONDA JURGENS,
Plaintiff, v. BUILD.COM, INC., Defendant. No. 4:17-cv-00783-AGF.
This putative class action. Defendant's alleged disclosure of its
online customers' credit card details to third parties without the
customers' knowledge or consent.

The matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for leave
to file a second amended complaint. Defendant opposes the motion,
arguing, inter alia, that the amendment would prejudice it by
changing the nature of the lawsuit and requiring additional
discovery.

A court "should freely give leave [to amend pleadings] when
justice so requires." Given the very early stage of this case  the
Court does not believe that Defendant would be unfairly prejudiced
by the proposed amendment.

Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is
granted.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/ZW0KF2  from Leagle.com.

Rhonda Jurgens, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Stampley --
dstamley@kamberlaw.com -- KAMBERLAW, LLC, pro hac vice.

Rhonda Jurgens, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen F. Gaunt,
STEELMAN, GAUNT & HORSEFIELD 901 Pine St Ste 110 Rolla, MO 65401-
3181,  & Michael J. Aschenbrener, KAMBERLAW LLC.

Build.com, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey L. Schultz, --
jschultz@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP,
Alexander Clark Barrett -- abarrett@armstrongteasdale.com --
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP & Matthew D. Turner --
mturner@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP, pro hac
vice.


BUTTE COUNTY, CA: Inmate's Bid to Proceed Class Action Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiff's request for In Forma Pauperis in
the styled JOSHUA MARCUS BUSH, Plaintiff, v. BUTTE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Defendant, No. 2:16-cv-2844 WBS AC P (E.D.
Calif.), but request to Proceed Class Action is Denied.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated under the authority of
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR).

Plaintiff proceeds pro se with a civil rights complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and request to proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing
required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a) but still required to pay
the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action.
Screening of Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.  The court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims
that are legally "frivolous or malicious," fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. A claim is legally
frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.  The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless.

The only named defendants are the "Butte County Sherriffs Office"
and the "Butte County Sherriff". Broadly assuming that plaintiff
intended to name the Butte County Sheriff in both his personal and
official capacities, the complaint does not contain factual
allegations sufficient to allege a personal-capacity suit against
the Sheriff. That is, the complaint does not allege that the
Sheriff personally participated in or directed any alleged
violation of plaintiff's rights. For this reason, the Butte County
Sheriff is not a proper defendant in his personal, or individual,
capacity.

Plaintiff moves the court to designate this instant case a class
action. Plaintiff has identified potential additional plaintiffs,
and submitted their declarations and consents to class membership.
However, only an attorney can pursue the legal interests of class
members. Plaintiff cannot do so.

Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, is granted.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/Tl2LRg  from
Leagle.com.

Joshua Marcus Bush, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


CALIFORNIA: Inmate's Civil Rights Action Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Screening Order to Dismiss a Complaint for
Failure to State a Cognizable Claim California in the case styled
WARREN FREDRICKSON, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-
cv-01667-BAM (PC)(E.D. Calif.), with Leave to Amend.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of a United
States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c).
Plaintiff's complaint, filed on November 3, 2016, is currently
before the Court for screening.

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required,
but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.

Plaintiff claims that he has been wrongfully denied family
visitation, a violation of Due and Equal Protection, compromised
his rights under California Code of Regulations, violates the
sanctity of marriage and the Defendant Allison has the power and
authority to correct the constitutional violation before the
court, but will not do so.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. His claim concerning visitation issues
can only be discerned by inference, since the complaint lacks
facts regarding that claim. Plaintiff will be granted leave to
amend his complaint. If Plaintiff elects to amend, he must state
in clear and plain language the basis of his claim concerning what
a defendant or defendants did or did not do that violated his
constitutional rights.

A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally
involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a
sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation.  Supervisory liability
exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive
act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that
the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is
the moving force of a constitutional violation.  If based on a
policy, he must identify that policy, plead facts showing he was
deprived of a constitutional right, and show that the policy was
the cause, or moving force, of the violation or deprivation of his
rights and must plead facts showing a sufficient connection
between the defendant and the policy.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits
brought against an unconsenting state. California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation CR is a state agency, it is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.

The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to treat all
similarly-situated people equally. Plaintiff must allege facts
plausibly showing that the defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon
membership in a protected class. Plaintiff does not identify any
protected class of which he is a member, nor does he state fact
showing that any defendant discriminated against him because of
his membership in a protected class.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied Due Process by the denial of
the family visitation privilege, and specifically violates the
sanctity of marriage. While prisoners do retain the right to marry
the loss of the right to intimate association is simply part and
parcel of being imprisoned for conviction of a crime.  While
Plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to enter into
marriage, he does not, by extension, have a right to conjugal
visits.

It is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily
represent the interests of a class.

Plaintiff states that his administrative appeal at the director's
level was denied for a "procedural requirement," suggesting that
he may not have fully exhausted his administrative remedies due to
a procedural error. Prisoners are required to exhaust the
available administrative remedies prior to filing suit.  Plaintiff
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

The Court finds that the complaint fails to state any cognizable
claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will grant
Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified above
which Plaintiff believes, in good faith, are curable.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/sNvaya   from Leagle.com

Warren Fredrickson, Plaintiff, Pro Se.


CALIFORNIA RECOVERY: Court Orders Dismissal of "Hernandez"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California orders dismissal of the case captioned JESSICA IVONE
HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA RECOVERY BUREAU, INC.; DOES 1-
100, and each of them, Defendants, Case No. 8:16-cv-01845-DOC-
(KESx)(C.D. Calif.).

Having considered the parties' joint motion for dismissal, the
action is dismissed, with prejudice as to Plaintiff's individual
action, and without prejudice as to the class action claims
asserted in the lawsuit. Each party will bear its own costs and
expenses.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/miNtJh from Leagle.com.

Jessica Ivone Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian Robert
Bacon -- abacon@toddflaw.com  -- Law Offices of Todd Friedman PC.

Jessica Ivone Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Meghan
Elisabeth George -- mgeorge@toddflaw.com  -- Law Offices of Todd
Friedman PC & Todd M. Friedman  -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com  -- Todd
M Friedman Law Offices PC.

California Recovery Bureau, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
J. Kaminski -- kaminskid@cmtlaw.com -- Carlson and Messer LLP.


CANADA: Class Action Filed on Behalf of Indigenous Children
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Martin, writing for Calgary Herald, reports that indigenous
children were subjected to a decades-long federal-government
policy that saw them torn from their homes and placed with non-
Aboriginal families, a class-action lawsuit claims.

The action, filed in Calgary Court of Queen's Bench, seeks damages
of $500 million for all those taken from their families, plus
additional compensation for those who were abused.

The lawsuit focuses on agreements between the federal government
and Alberta, B.C. and Saskatchewan, in which children were put
into foster or adoptive care in what became known as the "Sixties
Scoop."

"Commencing in or about the early 1960s, Canada implemented two
practises involving the class," the statement of claim reads.

Those practises involved either involuntarily removing children
from their Aboriginal homes and putting them up for adoption in
non-Indigenous residences, or placing them in group or foster
homes, the claim says.

"These children were raised without an understanding of their
Aboriginal culture, heritage or traditional ways," it says of
those put up for adoption.

Group and foster home placements were worse, "subjecting many
children to horrific attacks, torture and other forms of abuse,"
it states.

The beatings were "with a multitude of objects, including . . .
bull whips, cattle whips, canes, electric cattle prods, barbed
wire fencing and wooden planks."

Specific incidents noted included the gouging out of one foster
child's eye ball with a metal spoon, electric shock therapy and
sexual assaults of all forms, including gang rape, the lawsuit
alleges.

The claim, filed by Calgary lawyers William Klym and Brian
Meronek, names two members of the Paul Band, near Edmonton, as
representative claimants.

Those individuals, a man and woman now in their later 40s, were
taken from their homes and put in foster care as toddlers.

The man was physically assaulted on numerous occasions and
"restrained by being tied up with coat hangers and then subjected
to sexual abuse on a regular basis," the claim says.

"He cannot maintain employment and he is constantly tormented with
the horrors of his past in foster care."

He was returned to the band at the age of 10.

The woman was in foster care for about 15 years.

During that time, she endured "such horrors" as being in bed with
her foster parents while they had sex and being forced to shower
with her foster dad.

She was also raped, "treated as a slave labourer," forced to eat
in inhumane ways and insulted with racial slurs.

"As a result of (the) abuse and torture, (she) has attempted
suicide several times.

"She has undergone extensive counselling, which has not erased her
suicidal ideations."

The claim says the forced displacement occurred between the early
1960s and early 1990s.

"In a deliberate attempt to eradicate Aboriginal culture,
identity, customs and traditional ways . . . Canada established
and propagated and/or acquiesced in child and family programs and
services which caused and proliferated unspeakable harm to class
members," it says.

"As such, Canada's actions were malicious, high handed, oppressive
and persistent; and warrant punitive, exemplary and aggravated
damages."

Along with damages for all members of the class as well as a
settlement process to further compensate victims of "reprehensible
abuse," the lawsuit seeks a formal apology from the federal
government for the conduct.

A statement of defence in response to the unproven allegations
contained in the claim has not been filed. [GN]


CANADA: Class Action Lawyer in P.E.I. Case Under Investigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teresa Wright, writing for The Guardian, reports that the lawyer
representing companies suing the P.E.I. government over the
province's failed Internet gambling scheme has been suspended and
is under investigation for alleged misappropriation of funds in
Ontario.

John W. Findlay, the lawyer for Capital Markets Technologies Inc.
(CMT) and 7645686 Canada Inc., has been suspended from practising
law by the Law Society of Upper Canada.  He is now under
investigation for $1.5 million missing from a class action
settlement fund for residents and businesses affected by a protest
in 2006 in Caledonia, Ont.

Mr. Findlay's law firm, Findlay McCarthy PC, informed claimants in
a notice on May 29 the money, which he was holding in trust, has
been spent and he was "unable to replenish these funds."

He offered no reason about how or why the money was gone, but did
say he had filed a self-reporting complaint to the Law Society of
Upper Canada.

Findlay has been the legal counsel for CMT in the 'e-gaming
lawsuit' that has been winding its way through the Supreme Court
of P.E.I. for more than a year.

CMT president Paul Maines says Mr. Findlay was terminated
immediately after he learned of Findlay's legal troubles in
Ontario, but stressed this has no bearing on his own legal case.

"We're shocked," Mr. Maines said on July 3.

"It's unfortunate for him (Findlay), but obviously we're not part
of that matter."

The missing money in Ontario was the last remaining amount in a
$20 million settlement paid out by the Ontario government
following a class action lawsuit filed by Findlay's law firm.

It stemmed from an occupation in 2006 of a controversial housing
project by members of Six Nations, who said it was their land. The
occupation lasted months and resulted in some injuries and
property damage.  The province agreed to the settlement in 2011
for over 700 residents, business owners and contractors.

Most of the money had already been distributed, but the courts
ordered $1.5 million to be held back pending any subsequent
claims. It's this $1.5 million that Mr. Findlay now says is gone.

His May 29 email to the law society reporting the missing money
was included in court documents filed as part of a law society
tribunal hearing held last month.

"I have used the hold back funds and I was not able to replenish
the funds," Mr. Findlay wrote.

"My partner Margaret McCarthy had no knowledge of this.  Nor did
the final administrator of the fund, whom I have just informed."

According to an affidavit filed by a forensic accountant appointed
by the Law Society of Upper Canada, Findlay tried to resign as a
lawyer when investigators arrived at his office on May 31.  He was
told he could not do so during an active investigation.

He also did not provide some of the financial documents requested
and would not say what happened to the money, saying this could
reveal incriminating information and therefore he needed to
consult with a criminal lawyer.

That investigation is ongoing.

Meanwhile, Mr. Maines says he had a "tremendous amount of
interest" from other law firms to take his e-gaming case, and has
retained John W. MacDonald from MacDonald, Ross Barristers &
Solicitors, based in Cambridge, Ont.

MacDonald's background in spoliation cases and those involving
destruction of documents made him particularly well suited for the
e-gaming case, Mr. Maines added.

CMT and 7645686 Canada Inc. filed a new statement of claim against
the P.E.I. government and eight other parties in the P.E.I.
Supreme Court in March, seeking damages of $50 million for
allegations that include misfeasance in a public office by several
of the defendants.  It is the second statement of claim filed by
the companies, after the first was struck out last year. [GN]


CAPITAL ONE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Nayab" Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Freshta Y. Nayab filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Freshta Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA),
N.A., Case No. 3:16-cv-03111-CAB-MDD, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
alleges that Capital One submits multiple credit report inquiries
to nonparty Experian, for people with whom Capital One has no
business relationship, invading their privacy and hurting their
credit rating.

The appellate case is captioned as Freshta Nayab v. Capital One
Bank (USA), N.A., Case No. 17-55944, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire was due on July 12, 2017;

   -- Appellant Freshta Y. Nayab's opening brief is due on
      October 11, 2017;

   -- Appellee Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.'s answering brief is
      due on November 13, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant FRESHTA Y. NAYAB, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Asil Mashiri, Esq.
          MASHIRI LAW FIRM, APC
          11251 Rancho Carmel Drive
          San Diego, CA 92150
          Telephone: (858) 348-4938
          Facsimile: (858) 348-4939
          E-mail: alexmashiri@yahoo.com

Defendant-Appellee CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., is represented
by:

          Hunter Eley, Esq.
          DOLL AMIR & ELEY LLP
          1888 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 557-9100
          Facsimile: (310) 557-9101
          E-mail: heley@dollamir.com


CANADA: Richmond Man Awaits Decision on Strata Council Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Matt Robinson, writing for Vancouver Sun, reports that a Richmond
man who took his fight over Mandarin-only strata meetings at his
townhouse complex to the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal has moved away
from the city with his family.

Andreas Kargut and six other residents filed a class-action
complaint because they couldn't participate in a Mandarin-only
meeting in the 54-unit complex.  They claimed they were being
discriminated against by the strata council.

After the parties reached a pre-settlement last year, things
appeared as though they would work out, and a handful of meetings
were held in English with a Mandarin translator.

But then a resolution that would have ensured every meeting would
have an accredited interpreter was voted down by strata members.

Now, Mr. Kargut and the other parties to his complaint are waiting
for a decision as to whether they can proceed to a hearing at the
human rights tribunal over the matter.

In the meantime, Mr. Kargut has had enough and on Canada Day, he
and his family moved to Vernon in the North Okanagan.

"The human rights case is the greatest contributor to us leaving,"
Mr. Kargut said.  "With all of the discrimination that was
happening (it) ruined my good name in Richmond.  There was
accusations of me being a liar, a crook and a racist."

Mr. Kargut ruled out a move within Richmond because he could not
afford a larger place and would have lost money in commissions,
taxes and legal and transfer fees had he moved into a place of
similar size.  A downsize was off the table at this stage in life,
he said.

Mr. Kargut would like to see the Strata Property Act amended to
state that English, as an official language, must be used --
rather than denied -- at strata council meetings.

Mary Zhang, president of the strata council at the time of the
failed resolution vote, previously told Postmedia News that most
owners in the complex speak Mandarin as a first language.

She said members supported using a translator when non-Mandarin
speakers were present at meetings, but opposed using one when all
in attendance spoke Mandarin.

Mr. Kargut said Liberal MLA Linda Reid had helped Mr. Kargut in
his battle when he reached out to her, but said local politicians
did not help him.

The mayor and councillors in Richmond did not respond to a request
for comment.

When asked whether he would consider purchasing in a strata
complex again, he said he would, but only to buy a rental
property.

"Mark my words, I will never live in a strata again," Mr. Kargut
said. [GN]


CANADA: Koskie Minsky Sues Over Pension Delays in Armed Forces
--------------------------------------------------------------
Koskie Minsky LLP in Toronto, Ontario, has commenced a class
action against the Attorney General of Canada alleging, among
other things, that Canada has engaged in chronic, excessive and
unreasonable delay in the payment of pensions to discharged
members of the Canadian Armed Forces. It is alleged that through
mismanagement, Canada has forced discharged members of the
Canadian Armed Forces to wait weeks, months and in some instances
years, before receiving their pension payments.

The statement of claim, issued on June 30, 2017, was commenced on
behalf of all members of the Canadian Forces-Reserve Force Pension
Plan and the Canadian Forces-Regular Force Pension Plan who were
entitled upon release to an Immediate Annuity, Transfer Value,
Annual Allowance or Bridge Benefit between March 1, 2007 and the
present.

Douglas Jost, a retired Lieutenant Naval Reservist, is the
proposed representative plaintiff in this class action. Mr. Jost
did not receive payment of his pension until 6.5 months from his
date of discharge.

"Veterans have dedicated their lives to service of this country,"
says Kirk M. Baert, a partner at Koskie Minsky LLP, " and it is
absolutely tragic that Canadian veterans have faced financial
ruin, and even homelessness, because of the chronic delays in
accessing their pensions."

The claim seeks $100 million in damages for negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. [GN]


CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS: Shareholders Revive Kickback Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Brad Perriello, writing for Mass Device, reports that shareholders
revived a purported class-action kickbacks lawsuit against
Cardiovascular Systems (NSDQ:CSII) that was dismissed without
prejudice earlier this year, citing in the new complaint a $25
million judgment against the company in a related case.

St. Paul, Minn.-based CSI paid $8 million to settle a federal
False Claims Act suit in July 2016 that accused it of running a
kickbacks program by offering free, all-expense-paid training
programs "followed by explicit demands by CSI employees that
attendees use CSI products on future patients," giving away
product for free, 3rd-party referral channel marketing, and "sham
Speaker Bureau payments for high-prescribers and others whom CSI
sought to cultivate," according to a complaint filed by Travis
Thams, who worked for CSI as a district sales manager from 2012 to
2013. The Tham lawsuit also accused the company of running an off-
label promotion scheme to push sales of its unapproved 4 French
catheter.

After the Tham suit was unsealed, shareholders leveled another
lawsuit against CSI, alleging that the company and its management
misled investors about the alleged schemes, causing a sharp drop
in the company's share price. But Judge Donovan Frank of the U.S.
District Court for Minnesota dismissed that suit with leave to
amend in March, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to prove their
allegations in part because of their reliance on confidential
witnesses in the Tham case.

A month later, CSI was found liable for approximately $25.1
million in a separate, third whistleblower and wrongful
termination suit involving a former regional sales manager. That
suit, filed by Steven Babyak in November 2015, alleged that the
company engaged in retaliation and the eventual discharge of
Babyak in response to his expressed concerns over issues relating
to patient safety and violations of state and federal laws. Babyak
worked for the company for 3 years before being fired in June
2015. A jury in the Superior Court of California for the County of
Los Angeles found in his favor April 24, awarding Babyak $2.7
million in compensatory damages and another $22.4 million in
punitive damages.

The shareholders amended their complaint to cite the result in the
Babyak case, seeking class action status for owners of CSII stock
between Sept. 12, 2011, and Jan. 21, 2016.

"Defendants' illegal sales tactics have been confirmed through
multiple sources, including: (i) evidence, including internal
documentation, submitted in Babyak v. Cardiovascular Systems Inc.,
a California lawsuit brought by a former CSI sales representative,
who won a $25 million jury verdict against CSI for terminating him
in retaliation for reporting illegal marketing and sales tactics;
(ii) statements by former employees, including CSI sales
representatives ('sales reps') with direct knowledge of the
practices alleged herein; and (iii) CSI's settlement with the
government to resolve claims of illegal kickbacks to physicians,"
the shareholders alleged in the new complaint filed July 27.

"Documents, affidavits, and verified interrogatories filed
publicly in the Babyak action show CSI executives were involved in
a 'Triangle Offense' program, which was used to push sales reps to
illegally steer referrals to doctors expressly in order to induce
purchases of CSI's PAD devices. As described by one senior CSI
official to sales reps: 'the Triangle Offense gives you control.
If you own the bottom base of the triangle (referring physicians)
you will control the top point of the triangle (physician end
user). If the physician end user isn't a loyalist then we can
steer referrals to someone that is loyal because we control the
referral spigot.' The official told sales reps to '[g]et an
agreement [from the customer] that you will market for them as
long as he uses our device.'" according to the lawsuit [emphasis
theirs].

Cardiovascular Systems said in a regulatory filing that it
"believes that this lawsuit is without merit and intends to defend
itself vigorously." [GN]


CAREHOUSE HEALTHCARE: Bid to Remand "Reyes" Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cormac J. Carney of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California denied the plaintiff's motion to remand to
state court the case captioned MARICELA REYES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CAREHOUSE
HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC, SOUTHWEST PAYROLL SERVICES, LLC, and DOES
1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. SACV 16-01159-CJC
(C.D. Cal.).

On December 16, 2013, Maricela Reyes filed a single-plaintiff
employment action in Orange County Superior Court against
Carehouse Healthcare Center, LLC, Southwest Payroll Services, LLC,
and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, for:

     (1) race discrimination in violation of California
         Government Code section 12940(a);

     (2) age discrimination in violation of California Government
         Code section 12940(a);

     (3) retaliation in violation of California Government Code
         section 12940(h);

     (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy,
         California Labor Code sections 98.6, 232.5;

     (5) unpaid wages in violation of California Labor Code
         sections 1194, 1194.2;

     (6) failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of
         California Labor Code section 510;

     (7) failure to provide meal periods in violation of
         California Labor Code sections 226.7, 512;

     (8) failure to permit rest breaks in violation of California
         Labor Code section 226.7;

     (9) failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation
         of California Labor Code sections 226, 1174;

     (10) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of
          employment in violation of California Labor Code
          sections 201, 202, 203; and

     (11) unfair business practices in violation of California's
          Unfair Competition Law (UCL), California Business and
          Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.

On December 23, 2013, Reyes filed a First Amended Complaint adding
a claim for failure to prevent discrimination or retaliation in
violation of California Government Code section 12940(k).

More than two years later, Reyes filed a Second Amended Complaint
on March 17, 2016, transforming the sixth through 12th claims from
the First Amended Complaint (unpaid wages, failure to pay overtime
compensation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to permit
rest breaks, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure
to pay all wages due upon separation of employment, and unfair
business practices) into class claims.  She identified the class
as all hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who had worked for the
defendants since December 13, 2009.  Southwest removed the action
to the district court on June 22, 2016.

Almost one year after removal, on June 12, 2017, Reyes filed a
motion to remand the action to state court for failure to meet the
amount in controversy required for federal jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

The defendants argued that Reyes' motion is untimely.  Judge
Carney, however, held that although the Court appreciates the
defendants' frustration that Reyes waited almost one full year
before filing the motion, the motion is nevertheless timely as it
questions the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, which may be
challenged at any time.

In the notice of removal, the defendants offered calculations for
the plaintiff's claims for unpaid meal and rest period premiums,
unpaid overtime compensation, waiting time penalties, and
attorneys' fees in order to reach the jurisdictional threshold.
The defendants asserted the total amount in controversy is at
least $5,389,185.30.  Reyes contended that the defendants have not
met their burden of establishing the amount in controversy under
CAFA because their calculations are based on "unreasonable
assumptions" about her claims.

Judge Carney, however, found the defendants' calculations are
reasonable based on the evidence available and the allegations of
the Second Amended Complaint.  The judge concluded that the
defendants have demonstrated that the amount in controversy is met
by a preponderance of the evidence.

A full-text copy of Judge Carney's July 5, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/M8Xiuv from Leagle.com.

Maricela Reyes, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica L. Campbell,
Aegis Law Firm PC, Samuel A. Wong, Aegis Law Firm PC & Cindy Pham,
Aegis Law Firm PC.

Carehouse Healthcare Center, LLC, Southwest Payroll Services, LLC,
Defendant, represented by Christopher J. Archibald --
christopher.archibald@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
and Stewart PC, Graham Michael Hoerauf --
graham.hoerauf@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart PC, Lara Cardin De Leon -- lara.deleon@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC & Seth Edward Ort --
seth.ort@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart
PC.


CENTURYLINK: "Craig" Suit Hits Stock Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------
Benjamin Craig, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Centurylink, Inc., Glen F. Post, III and
R. Stewart Ewing, Jr., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04740, (S.D.
N.Y., June 22, 2017), seeks compensatory damages, reasonable costs
and expenses incurred in this action, including counsel fees and
expert fees and such other and further relief under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

CenturyLink is an integrated communications company that provides
local and long-distance voice, broadband, Multi-Protocol Label
Switching, private line, Ethernet, colocation, hosting, data
integration, video, network, public access, Voice over Internet
Protocol, information technology and other ancillary services.
CenturyLink, Inc. is incorporated in Louisiana and its
headquarters are in Monroe, Louisiana. CenturyLink's common stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "CTL."

Centurylink is accused of adding services or lines to customer
accounts without customer approval. On June 16, 2017, a former
CenturyLink employee claimed she was fired for blowing the whistle
on the Company's high-pressure sales culture that allegedly left
customers paying millions of dollars for accounts they didn't
request.

On this news, the company's stock price fell $1.23 per share, or
4.5%, to close at $25.72 per share on June 16, 2017, on unusually
heavy trading volume. Plaintiff owns Centurylink securities and
lost substantially. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Nicholas I. Porritt, Esq.
     Adam M. Apton, Esq.
     LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
     1101 30th Street NW, Suite 115
     Washington, DC 20007
     Tel: (202) 524-4290
     Fax: (202) 333-2121
     Email: nporritt@zlk.com
            aapton@zlk.com


CHILO AND CHELA: "Arguello" Action Seeks Unpaid OT, Backwages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Liliana Arguello, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. Chilo and Chela, Inc. and Monica Sanchez,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04685 (N.D. Ill., June 22, 2017),
seeks all back wages due, prejudgment interest on the back wages,
and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the
Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, for Defendant's failure
to pay overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a
workweek.

Arguello worked for the Defendants as a restaurant staff. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jorge Sanchez, Esq.
      Baldemar Lopez, Esq.
      LOPEZ & SANCHEZ LLP
      77 W. Washington St., Suite 1313
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 420-6784


CHINA AGRITECH: Orrick Herrington Attorneys Discuss Resh Decision
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nancy Harris, Esq. -- nharris@orrick.com -- and Amy Byrd, Esq. --
abyrd@orrick.com -- of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, in an
article for Law.com, report that the Greek myth of Sisyphus tells
the story of a king punished by being forced to roll an immense
boulder up a hill, only to watch it roll back to hit him, and to
repeat the futile task for eternity.  A recent decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invokes that image in
the class certification context.  In Resh v. China Agritech, the
court extended the American Pipe equitable tolling doctrine and
held that there is no time bar preventing unnamed plaintiffs in a
prior dismissed class action suit from bringing a new class action
claim based on similar facts and circumstances, even after the
trial court has denied class certification.  Resh comes up in the
context of securities class actions, but it has important
implications for class action practice generally in the Ninth
Circuit.

The Resh Decision

On May 24, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that claims brought by plaintiffs in would-be class actions
were not time-barred by the statute of limitations because the
limitations period was tolled while the plaintiffs were unnamed
members of a proposed class in two prior lawsuits in which class
certification was denied.

The basic allegation in each of the lawsuits was that China
Agritech violated Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by artificially inflating its stated revenue.  The
first putative class action was filed on Feb. 11, 2011. Judge R.
Gary Klausner in the Central District of California denied class
certification, finding that the named plaintiffs had failed to
establish the Rule 23(b) predominance requirement.  A second
putative class action was filed on Oct. 4, 2012 and assigned to
Judge Klausner.  The court again denied class certification, this
time finding that the named plaintiffs in the second case failed
to meet the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).

Michael Resh, acting as named plaintiff, filed a third putative
class action on June 30, 2014.  Judge Klausner dismissed the
complaint, ruling that the statute of limitations to bring a class
action was not tolled by the two prior lawsuits in which Resh was
not a named plaintiff.  The court noted that, had Resh brought his
claim as an individual claim, it would not be barred. In the
court's view, permitting the class action would allow tolling to
extend indefinitely as class action plaintiffs repeatedly
attempted to demonstrate suitability for class certification on
the basis of different evidence. Inevitably, plaintiffs appealed.

In discussing the rationale of its precursors, the Ninth Circuit
explained that the same policy considerations of judicial
efficiency and the ultimate economic goals of class action
litigation underlying American Pipe required tolling in the case
of later class claims.  The Resh court further explained that Rule
23 cannot abridge any substantive right, including statutes of
limitation.  Rule 23 empowers a federal court to certify a class
in any case in which its criteria are met, it follows that there
is no real difference between the tolling of subsequent individual
claims and later class claims for purposes of considering the
appropriateness of a class for certification.

The Circuit Split

The Ninth Circuit's decision is a divergence from the approach
taken by both the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits.  The Resh
opinion acknowledges as much, but distinguishes the relevant case
law as having dealt with "preclusion-related principles."  The
split ultimately stems back to the Ninth Circuit decision in
Catholic Social Services v. INS, where a change in the law
eliminated subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of a class
previously certified by the District Court.  New plaintiffs
brought a second putative class action while the first case was
still pending.  Catholic Social Services has since been
interpreted by both the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits as standing
for the proposition that the overarching inquiry in determining
whether prior class actions can toll future class actions is not
the statute of limitations or the effect of tolling, but rather
the preclusive effect of a judicial decision in the initial suit
applying the criteria of Rule 23.  While preclusion arguments are
not absent from Resh's history, they have been left unaddressed.
In opposing class certification in the second putative action,
defendants asserted that plaintiffs were precluded from bringing
any class claims based on denial of class certification in the
first putative action.  While the court agreed that the new named
plaintiffs could be bound by the decision based on their
affiliation with, and control over, the prior named parties in the
first action, it declined to fully address the issue and instead
based its denial of class certification on issues surrounding
adequacy and typicality.

Resh's Implications

Resh anticipates its critics.  The underlying district court was
explicitly wary of the possibility that allowing tolling would
result in continual, and potentially infinite, class action
attempts.  The Ninth Circuit's decision does little to assuage
these fears, acknowledging that its "conclusion may be thought
likely to lead to abusive filing of repetitive class actions, [but
that] the current legal system is adequate to respond to such a
concern."  The Ninth Circuit puts faith in the "ordinary
principles of preclusion and comity" and the belief that rational
plaintiffs' counsel will have little incentive to re-litigate
already dismissed class actions.

Despite the Ninth Circuit's faith in the legal system, it is
difficult to ignore the concerns of the district court: Tolling
undoubtedly opens the door for unnamed plaintiffs to engage in a
game of musical chairs, swapping out new named plaintiffs in order
to overcome issues in achieving certification.  To say that Resh
may give plaintiffs another bite at the apple is putting it
lightly.  While there are no doubt genuine policy reasons to allow
tolling in specific circumstances, there are similarly important
policy considerations underlying the existence of a statute of
limitations. The Resh decision seems to ignore one in favor of the
other.

The future is not necessarily bleak.  The circuit split may
indicate a possibility that the Supreme Court will take up the
issue.  And, in the meantime, class action defendants are not
doomed to follow in Sisyphus' footsteps.  Judge Klausner's
decision in Resh's predecessor lawsuit makes clear that a
successful preclusion based argument can keep the boulder at the
top of the hill.


CONFIE INSURANCE: Court Narrows Claims in "Gibson"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss
the case captioned KAREN GIBSON and LETESHA NESMITH, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CONFIE INSURANCE GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., DRIVER'S CHOICE INSRUANCE
SERVICES, LLC; and NATION MOTOR CLUB, LLC, d/b/a NATION SAFE
DRIVERS, Defendants, Civil No. 2:16-cv-02872-DCN (D.S.C.).

The following matters are before the court on defendant Nation
Motor Club, LLC d/b/a Nation Safe Drivers's motion to dismiss,
defendants Confie Insurance Group Holdings, Inc., and Drivers
Choice Insurance Services LLC's motion to dismiss, and Confie and
Drivers Choice's motion to strike.

This is a putative class action by Plaintiffs filed against
Defendants.  Plaintiffs allege that they were defrauded by
defendants in the purchase of automobile insurance policies from
Confie and/or its subsidiaries and the purchase of multiple
TowBusters policies -- optional roadside service policies that can
be purchased either directly from NSD or sold through Confie or
its subsidiaries, including Driver's Choice.  The TowBusters
policy is an ancillary six-month policy that is $36-40 if
purchased upfront for the full six-month time period and $10/month
for a total of $60 when purchased on a monthly basis.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants Confie and NSD conspired
together to double charge those consumers who missed the deadline
to make a monthly premium payment on their automobile policies,
and then charged for a new TowBuster policy when reinstating the
automobile insurance policy.

When the defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
has the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists.  In evaluating
a challenge to personal jurisdiction under a state's long-arm
statute, the court engages in a two-step analysis. First, the
long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction under
the facts presented. Second, if the statute does authorize
jurisdiction then the court must determine if the statutory
assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process.

South Carolina's long-arm statute extends to the outer limits
allowed by the Due Process Clause, so the only question before the
court is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Confie
would violate due process.  Plaintiffs argue that service of a
summons effectuates personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
enough for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction.  However,
even after an effective service of process, personal jurisdiction
must still comport with due process. The court finds that
Defendant Confie's relationship as a corporate parent to the
various wholly owned corporate subsidiaries that operate retail
locations within South Carolina does not rise to the level of
"considerable control" and therefore, the court cannot exercise
personal jurisdiction over Defendant Confie. Since there is no
personal jurisdiction over Defendant Confie, the court cannot
proceed to the remaining claims.

NSD brings a motion to dismiss on the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), breach of contract, and unjust
enrichment claims.

Plaintiffs allege that by offering a month-to-month payment plan
for the TowBusters policy, Confie and Driver's Choice extended
credit as defined by Truth In Lending Act (TILA) to Gibson and the
members of plaintiff. Confie contends that plaintiffs have failed
to allege a cognizable TILA claim. The court disagrees. Congress
enacted TILA in order to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily
the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed
use of credit. For a TILA violation, there must first be a "credit
sale," any sale in which the seller is a creditor. Confie gave
consumers who chose to purchase a TowBusters policy on a monthly
installment plan no disclosure that they would be paying a higher
amount than those consumers who chose to pay up-front. TILA and
require that lenders clearly disclose loan terms to consumer
borrowers. The court denies Confie's motion to dismiss as to the
TILA claim.

To prove a breach of contract action, a party must prove the
contract, its breach, and the damages caused by such breach.
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that NSD's practice of
double-billing members for the overlap period is in breach of the
applicable provision of the policy. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss the breach of contract claim is denied.

A party may be unjustly enriched when it retains benefits or money
which "in justice and equity belong to another.  Unjust enrichment
is an equitable doctrine which permits the recovery of that amount
the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the
plaintiff. NSD double-billed customers with overlapping TowBuster
policies, which resulted in plaintiffs and putative subclass A
members receiving no additional benefit during the overlap period
between their first and second TowBuster memberships while NSD
receive duplicative payments for the overlap periods. The court
finds that this practice of double billing conferred a benefit
upon NSD, and denies defendants' motion to dismiss the unjust
enrichment claim.

Confie and Driver's Choice move to strike the class allegations
from the complaint on the grounds that they are overbroad and lack
common questions of fact or law. Confie moves to strike the
proposed class definition on numerous grounds. The court finds
that it is premature to decide a motion to strike at this stage of
the proceedings.  Defendants can bring up the same arguments that
they present before the court in this motion to strike at the
class certification stage, after parties have an opportunity for
discovery.   The court therefore denies defendants Confie and
Driver's Choice's preemptive motion to strike class allegations be
denied as it relates to the allegations about Subclass A and B.

Based on these reasons, the court (1) Grants in Part and Denies in
part NSD's motion to dismiss, Granting as to the RICO claim but
Denying as to the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims;
(2) Grants in Part and Denies in Part,  Confie and Driver's Choice
Motion to Dismiss, Granting Without prejudice  as to the court's
lack of personal jurisdiction over Confie but Denying as to the
RICO, TILA, and unjust enrichment claims against Driver's Choice;
and (3) Denies Confie and Driver's Choice's Motion to Strike. The
court Grants plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/N6qSYN from Leagle.com.

Karen Gibson, Plaintiff, represented by Herbert W. Louthian, Jr.,
Louthian and Louthian - 1116 Blanding Street, Suite 300,Columbia,
SC  - 29201.

Karen Gibson, Plaintiff, represented by James Mixon Griffin --
jgriffin@griffindavislaw.com -- Griffin and Davis, Margaret Nicole
Fox, mfox@griffindavislaw.com Griffin and Davis & Richard A.
Harpootlian, -- harpootlianlaw.com -- Richard A. Harpootlian Law
Office.

Letesha Nesmith, Plaintiff, represented by Herbert W. Louthian,
Jr., Louthian and Louthian, James Mixon Griffin, Griffin and
Davis, Margaret Nicole Fox, Griffin and Davis & Richard A.
Harpootlian, Richard A. Harpootlian Law Office.

Confie Insurance Group Holdings Inc, Defendant, represented by
Jeffrey D. Farrow -- jfarrow@mrll.cm -- Michelman and Robinson, pro
hac vice, Joseph Rutledge Young, Jr. -- jry@duffyandyoung.com --
Duffy and Young, Mona Z. Hanna -- mhanna@mrll.com  -- Michelman and
Robinson, pro hac vice & Thomas Ashley Limehouse, Jr., Office of
the Governor.

Drivers Choice Insurance Services LLC, Defendant, represented by
Joseph Rutledge Young, Jr., Duffy and Young & Thomas Ashley
Limehouse, Jr., Office of the Governor.

Nation Motor Club LLC, Defendant, represented by Douglas Walker
MacKelcan, III, -- dmackelcan@carlockcopeland.com -- Carlock
Copeland Semler and Stair & Matthew Thomas Hemingway --
mhemingway@ethridgelawgroup.com -- Ethridge Law Group LLC.


CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL: Denial of "Abboud" Certification Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RIAD ABBOUD et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. CONSOLIDATED DISPOSAL SERVICE, LLC, Defendant and
Respondent, No. B271827 (Cal. App.), Judge Elizabeth A. Grimes of
the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District,
Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's March 8, 2016 order
denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

In June 2011, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class of
property owners, filed this action against the Defendant for
alleged breaches of the contracts with the County, including the
County-Belvedere contract.  The operative third amended complaint
states claims against the Defendant for breach of contract, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, unfair business practices,
declaratory relief, rescission and unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs alleged the Defendant failed to provide the
required minimum basic service to all of the 18,988 parcels in the
Belvedere GDD, but nonetheless received and accepted all of the
payments from the County for such services.  They requested
disgorgement of the funds paid for which services were not
rendered.  They further alleged that because the Defendant failed
to provide the requisite notice, property owners were unaware of
their entitlement to minimum basic service from the Defendant and
unwittingly entered into contracts for service with, and paid, the
Defendant or other third party companies for garbage collection
services.  The Plaintiffs asserted these "duplicate" fees or
"overcharges" as damages.

In May 2015, almost four years after the case was filed, the
Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, seeking the
certification of two classes of property owners: one with property
owners in the Belvedere GDD, and the other with property owners in
all the remaining GDD's.  Both proposed classes consisted of two
similar subclasses.

The Belvedere GDD class consisted of all property owners within
the Belvedere GDD who contracted and paid for garbage collection
services because they did not know they were entitled to minimum
basic service from defendant without further charge due to the
fact they already indirectly paid for such services by way of
their property tax payments to the County.  The two subclasses
were broken down into those property owners who contracted with
the Defendant and those who contracted with a third party company
for garbage collection services.  The county-wide class made up of
property owners in the remaining GDD's was based on the same
criteria and broken down into two similar subclasses.

After reviewing the Plaintiffs' moving papers, the trial court, on
its own motion, continued the hearing to Oct. 29, 2015 to allow
the Plaintiffs the opportunity to submit a trial plan and
supplemental argument.  After oral argument at the hearing, the
court denied the Plaintiffs' motion as to the request to certify a
county-wide class because they had not submitted any evidence
supporting the existence of such a class.

As for the Belvedere GDD class, the court continued the
Plaintiffs' motion to March 3, 2016.  In preparation for the
continued hearing, the Plaintiffs hired a forensic accountant, Mr.
Joseph C. Wheat, to analyze the records and data from the
Defendant, as well as the data from two large computerized
databases maintained by the Defendant.  As part of their
supplemental briefing, they submitted a revised trial plan and a
six-page declaration from Mr. Wheat.

The Plaintiffs argued that damages would then be easily calculated
on a class-wide basis through expert testimony.  Mr. Wheat
proposed three different methodologies for calculating damages:
(i) for disgorgement, the total number of refuse units that the
Defendant serviced would be deducted from the total number of
refuse units the Defendant was paid by the County to service.  The
difference would be multiplied by the refuse unit price per month
as set forth in the County-Belvedere contract; (ii) for improper
surcharges, Mr. Wheat generated a report totaling various
surcharges charged to customers by the Defendant which the
Plaintiffs contended were not allowed at all under the contract;
and (iii) for duplicate charges, Mr. Wheat stated he was preparing
a detailed accounting for each customer based on the invoices
produced by the Defendant.

The Defendant opposed class certification arguing that the
Plaintiffs' simplistic methodology failed to take into account
numerous factors, such as (i) property owners who received only
minimum basic service generally did not receive invoices from the
Defendant, and Mr. Wheat's formula falsely assumed that if a
parcel owner did not receive an invoice, then the Defendant
provided no services for that parcel; and (ii) billing records
generally existed only for those property owners or other
customers such as tenants of property owners who requested
additional services over and above minimum basic service, and Mr.
Wheat's formula falsely assumed all such property owners  were
double-billed.  Because of faulty assumptions, the Defendant
argued that the Plaintiffs' methodology would undercount the
number of properties to which it properly provided service in
accordance with the County-Belvedere contract, and would overstate
or misstate the properties purportedly being overcharged.

After lengthy argument, the court took the motion under submission
and issued its written order denying the Plaintiffs' motion on
March 8, 2016.

This appeal followed.  They Plaintiffs have only appealed from the
denial issued on March 8, 2016 as to the putative class for the
Belvedere GDD and have not filed an appeal or raised any argument
regarding the denial issued Oct. 29, 2015, as to that portion of
the motion regarding the putative county-wide class.

Judge Grimes held that the record amply supports the trial's court
conclusions that the Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient proof
of the predominance of common issues over individual issues
regarding the Defendant's liability to the property owners in the
Belvedere GDD.  While the Plaintiffs are correct to point out that
individualized issues related to damages are usually not a
sufficient basis to deny certification of an otherwise valid
class, the problem of lack commonality here was not limited to the
issue of damages.  The trial court correctly pinpointed that they
failed to show how they would use the Defendant's records to prove
on a class-wide basis that the Defendant either overcharged
certain customers or failed to service certain customers.

Judge Grimes also held that the trial court correctly concluded
that the Plaintiffs failed to articulate how the individualized
issues could be effectively managed at trial.  The trial court
gave them numerous opportunities to present revised trial plans
and continued the hearing for several months to allow them to
marshal additional evidence.  However, the Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate how their expert could adequately address these issues
and avoid the presentation of extensive evidence through
individual property owner witnesses.

Judge Grimes also found denial was appropriate because of a lack
of evidence of numerosity, pointing to the unique experiences of
each representative plaintiff as reflected in the evidence.  Such
evidence supports the court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs have
failed to show there are substantial numbers of property owners
who were similarly overcharged or underserviced.  They have failed
to show the error in the trial court's assessment of the
numerosity requirement.
Finally, for the Plaintiffs' requests for judicial notice of
voluminous discovery documents and other records obtained by one
of the plaintiffs in April 2017 pursuant to the Public Records
Act, Judge Grimes said the Plaintiffs were obliged to timely
undertake discovery to obtain evidence supportive of their claims.
They have not provided any basis in law or fact for the Court's
taking judicial notice of numerous disputed facts within the
proffered documents, none of which was presented to the trial
court over the months the motion for certification was pending.
They have not asked this Court to take notice of facts that are
not reasonably subject to dispute.  They are not a proper subject
of judicial notice.  Thus, Judge Grimes denied both requests and
did not consider the proffered records in resolving this appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/PYLa3U from Leagle.com.

Pistone Law Group, Thomas A. Pistone --
tpistone@pistonelawgroup.com --; and Mousavi Law Group, Amy A.
Mousavi -- amousavi@mousavilawgroup.com  -- for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Law Offices of Scott W. Gordon, Scott W. Gordon --
swgordon@tbsglaw.com  --; Law Offices of Thomas M. Bruen, Thomas
M. Bruen and Erik A. Reinertson -- ereinertson@tbsglaw.com  -- for
Defendant and Respondent.


CORNDANCE TAVERN: Owner Faces Minimum Wage Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Erin Blasko, writing for South Bend Tribune, reports that a former
employee is no longer suing George Pesek, owner of Corndance
Tavern and Evil Czech Brewery and Public House in Mishawka, for
wage theft.

A similar case involving another former employee continues to
advance, however, with Mr. Pesek, an increasingly prominent name
in the local restaurant industry, recently countersuing the man
for defamation.

Yancy Caldwell filed a lawsuit in early June accusing Mr. Pesek of
not paying him for overtime and seeking compensation and
liquidated damages for the unpaid wages.

But Mr. Caldwell, who worked at Evil Czech, abruptly dismissed the
lawsuit -- with prejudice -- meaning he will not refile it in the
future.

"We resolved our dispute and the lawsuit has been dismissed,"
Robert Hunt, Mr. Caldwell's Indianapolis-based attorney, said on
July 3, adding, "That's the only comment I'll make on that one."

Mr. Pesek's attorney, Stephen Judge with the South Bend law firm
of LaDue Curran Kuehn, also declined to comment on the dismissal
on July 3.

Mr. Hunt also represents Scott Hagaman, a former employee who
accuses Mr. Pesek of paying servers at both Corndance and Evil
Czech less than minimum wage -- if at all -- for training.

According to a lawsuit filed in April, Mr. Hagaman trained as a
server at Corndance for 30.75 hours in 2016 but was paid only $25,
or about 80 cents per hour.  He did not receive any tips, the
lawsuit states.

Minimum wage is $7.25 per hour in Indiana.  Tipped servers may be
paid as little as $2.13 per hour.  However, if the employee's tips
combined with the hourly wage do not equal the minimum wage, the
employer must make up the difference.

The lawsuit cites an employee handbook that states, in part: "The
training pay is $100. Y ou will receive your training pay after
you have taken the test and are on the floor for two weeks.  If
you forfeit your training, whether you quit or we let you go, you
also forfeit the training compensation."

Mr. Pesek, for his part, has described the $100 as a bonus on top
of a trainee's regular pay, which otherwise complies with federal
law. He also denies that Mr. Hagaman was ever an "employee" of the
restaurant, only that he "performed three hours of compensable
work on one day."

Mr. Hunt has filed a motion seeking class-action status for the
case, bolstered by the declarations of two additional former
employees that they too were paid less than minimum wage for
training -- if at all.

A decision on the motion is pending.

Mr. Pesek, meanwhile, has countersued Mr. Hagaman for defamation
in response to a Facebook post in which Mr. Hagaman mocked
Mr. Pesek and called him a thief and "probably a liar."

The post, which has since been deleted, links to a video of
Mr. Pesek addressing customers and reads, in part: "'I'm George
and I don't pay my employees for their time. . . . I'm probably a
liar.  Would you like to get to know me?' I hate paying people who
work for me. F--- that."

"Mr. Hagaman's post contains multiple false statements about
Mr. Pesek . . . that tend to harm the reputation of an individual
by lowering the person in the community's estimation or deterring
third persons from dealing with the person," the countersuit
states.

It seeks damages "including those presumed under Indiana law and
all other relief available at law or in equity" plus attorney's
fees and costs "and all other just and proper relief."

Mr. Pesek, a native of the former Czechoslovakia, has emerged as a
major player in the local dining scene since opening his first
place here in 2010 -- joining the likes of Kurt Janowsky (CafÇ
Navarre), Mark McDonnell (LaSalle Grill) and Jonathan Lutz (Uptown
Kitchen).

In addition to Corndance and Evil Czech, he owns Bourbon &
Butcher, a butcher shop and lunch counter attached to Corndance.
And he's in the process of opening a Latin-themed restaurant in
the old Carnegie Library in downtown Mishawaka.

Judge, Pesek's attorney, declined to comment on the countersuit on
July 6.

Mr. Hunt dismissed it as without merit.

"Our position is that we will be successful in defending that
counterclaim," he told a reporter.  "Scott was stating his
opinion, and as I'm sure you're aware, the truth is always a
defense to defamation." [GN]


CYPRESS GROUP: Unpaid Overtime Pay Claimed in "Hunt" Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marlene Hunt, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff, v. The Cypress Group, LLC, Regions Financial
Corporation and Regions Bank, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01051
(N.D. Ala., June 22, 2017), seeks unpaid wages from Defendants for
overtime work, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Cypress Group, LLC is a professional accounting, financial
services and human resources firm specializing in delivering
project management and skilled professionals for mid to long-term
projects. It provides financial and accounting professionals on a
project resource, consulting and outsourcing basis on behalf of
its commercial clients including Regions Financial Corporation and
Regions Bank.

Regions Financial Corporation is a full-service provider of
consumer and commercial banking, wealth management, mortgage and
insurance products and services. It serves customers across the
South, Midwest and Texas through its subsidiary, Regions Bank.

Plaintiff worked as an Enhanced Due Diligence Analyst for Cypress,
assigned to Regions Bank, Birmingham, Jefferson County. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Patrick G. Montgomery, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN ALABAMA, PLLC
      63 S. Royal Street, Street 710
      Mobile, AL 36602
      Phone: (251) 800-6030
      Facsimile: (251) 800-6061
      Email: pmontgomery@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      Carlos V. Leach, Esq.
      C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 4200
      Post Office Box 57007
      Atlanta, GA 30343-1007
      Tel: (404) 965-8811
      Facsimile: (404) 496-7405
      Email: CLeach@forthepeople.com
             RMorgan@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      Andrew. R. Frisch, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
      Plantation, FL 33324
      Telephone: (954) WORKERS
      Facsimile: (954) 327-3013
      E-mail: afrisch@forthepeople.com


DENKA PERFORMANCE: St. John Residents Sue Over LaPlace Emissions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Della Hasselle, writing for The New Orleans Advocate, reports that
as controversy continues to swirl around a LaPlace chemical plant
that has been cited for emitting high levels of chloroprene into
the air, 13 St. John the Baptist Parish residents have filed a
lawsuit against the facility's current and previous owners in an
effort to reduce or stop production of what the Environmental
Protection Agency considers a "likely carcinogen."

The suit, filed in 40th Judicial District Court against Denka
Performance Elastomer and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., seeks
class-action status and includes one well-known resident as a
plaintiff: St. John the Baptist Parish Councilman Larry Sorapuru.

DuPont operated the plant until Denka took it over in November
2015, keeping on almost all of the facility's employees.

The suit, assigned to Judge J. Sterling Snowdy, asks that the
class include anyone who has lived, worked or attended school
within a defined boundary surrounding the facility from 2011 to
the present.  The judge will determine if the petition meets the
criteria to become a class action.

The plaintiffs are asking that the judge order the plant to stop
or reduce production until emissions reach the risk-based standard
set by the EPA, said Eberhard Garrison, an attorney for the
residents.  They are also seeking monetary damages for various
issues, including health-related problems and lost property value.

Jorge Lavastida, Denka's plant manager and executive officer, said
the company hasn't had time to respond to the lawsuit.

"We have not been served the lawsuit yet," he said late on
July 3.  "We will respond in due course in the litigation."

Officials with DuPont did not immediately respond to requests for
comment.

Denka has already pledged to reduce airborne emissions of
chloroprene by 85 percent by the end of this year, and it is in
the middle of a $17.5 million project to deal with problems in
destroying chloroprene at the plant before it is released into the
air.

In 2010, the EPA said chloroprene exposure above 0.2 micrograms
per cubic meter of air puts people at increased risk of getting
cancer.

Data collected from six monitoring sites near the plant showed
that in May residents were exposed to an average of between 12 and
58 times the amount the EPA says is the "upper limit of
acceptability."

Spikes in emissions during the last year have reached much higher
-- up to 765 times the risk-based standard -- according to data
collected by the plant and the EPA.

"It seems to be an extreme scenario to me," Mr. Garrison said of
the data.  "This is an EPA risk-based standard based on a
collection of animal studies and human exposure studies.  This is
not plaintiffs coming in and hand-picking the data."

The suit also asks that some residents be grouped into a "sub-
class" for medical monitoring because they have a "justified fear
of development of cancer due to chloroprene exposure."  Mr.
Garrison said the judge will decide if the sub-category is
allowed.

State regulators say there's no hard proof showing immediate
health risks near the plant and that the long-term effects of
chloroprene exposure are still not well understood.

State experts say measuring the risk to St. John residents has
been difficult because of several variables, including the
proximity of the exposed person to the site, the amount of time
chloroprene stays in the body, and the tendency for chloroprene
levels in the air to spike and dip over time.

The plant has been under increased scrutiny, however, since
December, when the EPA released its National Air Toxic Assessment
estimating exposure for 180 air toxins nationwide.  The study
found that, because of the Denka plant's emissions, residents of
St. John the Baptist Parish have the highest potential risk of
cancer from airborne pollutants of any community in the country.

Although the plant has been producing chloroprene for decades,
those findings created a new urgency to better understand the
plant's operations and prompted a series of actions by the EPA and
the state.

In April, a preliminary report by federal investigators was
released, showing that the LaPlace plant potentially violated the
Clean Air Act about 50 times for leaky valves and other issues.

Denka officials have said they believe there are errors in the
report and have reserved the right to contest its findings.

The boundary laid out in the petition is marked by Interstate 10
on the north, the St. James Parish line on the west, La. 3127 on
the south and the eastern boundary of the community of Killona and
the western boundary of the Bonnet Carre Spillway on the east.

That's where "we see a pattern of excessive measurements of
chloroprene in the air," Mr. Garrison said.  "We feel this is a
nuisance and trespass interfering with the community's right to
live and enjoy their property."

Now, Mr. Kargut and the other parties to his complaint are waiting
for a decision as to whether they can proceed to a hearing at the
human rights tribunal over the matter. [GN]


DENVER, CO: Tenth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Kerner" Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Marian G. Kerner and Ramona J. Lopez filed an appeal
from a court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Kerner, et al. v.
City and County of Denver, Case No. 1:11-CV-00256-MSK-KMT, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado - Denver.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Marcia
S. Krieger entered last year a total damage award in the amount of
$1,674,807 in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs, a class of black and Hispanic applicants for
various positions with the City and County of Denver, alleged that
Denver's use of a written employment screening test, the
"AccuPlacer," had a disparate impact on minority applicants in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section
2000e.

The appellate case is captioned as Kerner, et al. v. City and
County of Denver, Case No. 17-1222, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Docketing statement, transcript order form and notice of
      appearance were due on July 11, 2017, for Marian G. Kerner
      and Ramona J. Lopez; and

   -- Notice of appearance was also due on July 11, 2017, for City
      and County of Denver.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants MARIAN G. KERNER and RAMONA J. LOPEZ, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Joaquin G. Padilla, Esq.
          JOAQUIN G. PADILLA, PLLC
          1775 Sherman Street, Suite 2015
          Denver, CO 80203
          Telephone: (303) 839-5129
          E-mail: joaquin@padillalawoffices.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Alfredo Padilla, Esq.
          PADILLA & PADILLA, PLLC
          1753 Lafayette Street
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 832-7145
          Facsimile: (303) 832-7147
          E-mail: Kenneth@padillalawoffices.com

Plaintiff-Appellant MARIAN G. KERNER is represented by:

          Marilyn Cain Gordon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARILYN CAIN GORDON
          7603 Georgia Avenue, NW, Suite 304
          Washington, DC 20012
          Telephone: (202) 723-8600
          E-mail: M.Cain.Gordon@msn.com

               - and -

          John Mosby, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOHN MOSBY
          621 17th Street, Suite 2445
          Denver, CO 80293
          Telephone: (303) 623-1355
          Facsimile: (303) 623-1917
          E-mail: Johnmosby@msn.com

Defendant-Appellee CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a municipal
corporation, is represented by:

          Edward M. Allen, Esq.
          ALLEN & CURRY, P.C.
          1125 Seventeenth Street, Suite 1275
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 955-6185
          Facsimile: (720) 612-4882
          E-mail: eallen@allen-curry.com

               - and -

          Timothy M. Kratz, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS, P.C.
          950 17th Street, Suite 2600
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 892-0404
          E-mail: tim.kratz@jacksonlewis.com

               - and -

          Kristen Merrick, Esq.
          Franklin A. Nachman, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE DENVER CITY ATTORNEY
          201 West Colfax Avenue
          Department 1108
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (720) 913-3100
          E-mail: Kristen.merrick@denvergov.org
                  Franklin.nachman@denvergov.org


DYNCORP AEROSPACE: Balcazar Appeals Ruling in "Quinteros" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Edgar Balcazar, John Salas Sanchez, Luciano Quevedo
Jimenez, Rosa Esmilda Altamirano, Elvia Alvarez and Victor
Mestanza Llanos filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
entitled Nestor Ermogenes Quinteros, et al. v. Dyncorp Aerospace
Operations, et al., Case No. 1:07-cv-01042-RWR, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court last year ruled in favor of 19 Ecuadoreans, who claim that a
U.S. company sprayed a toxic herbicide on them as part of a
campaign to combat Colombian drug cartels.

The 19 Ecuadorean "test" plaintiffs in the case say that DynCorp,
which contracted with the U.S. State Department to carry out "Plan
Colombia," sprayed them with glyphosate as part of an effort to
eradicate cocaine and heroin poppy drug farms in Colombia.

The appellate case is captioned as Nestor Ermogenes Quinteros, et
al. v. Dyncorp Aerospace Operations, et al., Case No. 17-7093, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are Edgar Balcazar, John Salas Sanchez,
Luciano Quevedo Jimenez, Rosa Esmilda Altamirano, Elvia Alvarez
and Victor Mestanza Llanos.

The Plaintiffs-Appellees are Nestor Ermogenes Arroyo Quinteros, La
Comunidad de Mataje, Providence of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, on behalf
of himself, as legal guardian of his minor child; Dociteo Sandobal
Quinteros, La Comunidad de Mataje, Providence of Esmeraldas,
Ecuador, on behalf of himself, as legal guardian of his minor
child; Digna Aney Corozo Cortez, La Comunidad de Mataje,
Providence of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, on behalf of himself, as legal
guardian of his minor child; Dolis Nimia Quintero Cortez, La
Comunidad de Mataje, Providence of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, on behalf
of himself, as legal guardian of his minor child; Celina Eugenia
Mideros Quintero, La Comunidad de Mataje, Providence of
Esmeraldas, Ecuador, on behalf of himself, as legal guardian of
his minor child; Mayra Araceli Mancilla Baguis, La Comunidad de
Mataje, Providence of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, on behalf of himself,
as legal guardian of his minor child; Maria Leydis Cortez
Sevillano; Maria Luisa Cevallos Erazo; Silvia Mariana Cortez
Quintero; Jaime Berney Bonilla Simisterra; Maria Paula Guanga;
Carmen Llanos; Maria Yaquelin; Mildre Cortez; Daniela Maria Midero
Quintero; Debora Ris; Julia Ruiz Midero; Margarita Quintero
Cortez; Maria Clemencia Lastra; Maria Leticia Reasco Quintero;
Aida Llanos Guanga; Carmen Alicia Quintero Cortez; Miriam Delgado;
Lauri Quintero; Rosita Bastida Quintero; Monica Carola Montano
Quintero; Vanesa Montano Quintero; Luz Maria Llanos Guanga;
Sanchez Mendieta Emilia Asuncion; Province of Sucumbios, Republic
of Ecuador; Venancio Aguasanta Arias, 01cv1908, husband, on behalf
of himself, as guardian of his four minor children, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; Rosa Tanguila Andi, 01cv1908,
wife, on behalf of herself, as guardian of their four minor
children, and on behalf of all others simnilarly situated; Ester
Inez Andi, 01cv1908, on behalf of herself, as legal guardian of
her minor child, and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Santiago Domingo Tanguila Andi, 01cv1908, husband of Quechua
nationality, on behalf of himself as legal guardian of his two
minor children, and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Laura Saritama, 01cv1908, wife of Quechua nationality, on behalf
of herself, as legal guardian of her two minor children, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; Deicy Lalangui, 01cv1908,
wife, on behalf of herself as legal guardian of her four minor
children, and on behalf of others similarly situated; Jose
Castillo, 01cv1908, husband, on behalf of himself as legal
guardian of his three minor children, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; Vidal Camacho, 01cv1908, husband on behalf of
himself, as legal guardian of her four minor children, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; Bethy San Martin,
01cv1908, wife, on behalf of herself, as legal guardian of her
three children, and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Jofre Jijon Alvarado, 01cv1908, husband, on behalf of himself, as
legal guardian of his minor child, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; and Enma Pena, 01cv1908, wife, on behalf of
herself, as legal guardian of her minor child, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Appellants and the Plaintiffs-Appellees are
represented by:

          Terrence Collingsworth, Esq.
          INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          621 Maryland Avenue, NE
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 543-5811
          Facsimile: (202) 594-4001
          E-mail: tc@iradvocates.org

Defendants-Appellees Dyncorp Aerospace Operations, LLC, a Delaware
corporation; Dyncorp Techserv LLC, a Delaware corporation; Dyncorp
International, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and DynCorp, a
Delaware corporation, are represented by:

          Joe G. Hollingsworth, Esq.
          HOLLINGSWORTH, LLP
          1351 I St., SW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 898-5878
          E-mail: jhollingsworth@hollingsworthllp.com


ENSIGNAL INC: Calif. District Court Remands "Sadler" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California adopted the Magistrate Judge's Findings and
Recommendations ("F&R") that recommended remanding the action
styled In the case captioned ETHAN SADLER, Plaintiff, v. ENSIGNAL,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-CV-00312-AWI-SAB (E.D. Cal.) for
lack of jurisdiction.

On Dec. 16, 2016, the Plaintiff filed this wage and hour class
action complaint in the Superior Court of California for the
County of Madera against the Defendant.  On March 3, 2017,
Ensignal removed this action to this Court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction.

Thereafter, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether
federal jurisdiction exists in this action.  After the parties
briefed the Court's jurisdiction in this matter, on May 30, 2017,
the Magistrate Judge issued F&R that recommended remanding this
action for lack of jurisdiction.  The F&R found that Ensignal did
not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount
in controversy meets the jurisdictional requirement.  On June 13,
2017, Ensignal filed objections to the F&R.

In its Objections, Ensignal argues, inter alia, that that the F&R
did not address whether Sadler's claim under California Business
and Professions Code Section 17200 ("UCL") is one in which a
defendant owes to plaintiffs as a group and not to the individuals
severally, and could therefore be aggregated to meet the required
amount in controversy.  Ensignal further argues that Sadler
brought his UCL claim in a representative capacity, and is acting
as a private attorney general for the collective interest of
putative class members; therefore, the Plaintiff and the putative
class members have a common and undivided interest in enforcing
the claim.

Contrary to Ensignal's assertion, the F&R did address whether a
UCL claim could be aggregated, and correctly concluded it could
not.

Notably, Ensignal does not cite to a single case, in either its
original briefing or its Objections, in which any court has
aggregated a UCL claim to meet the amount in controversy
requirement. As the F&R noted, court have held that claims brought
under the UCL on behalf of the public should not be aggregated to
meet the jurisdictional amount in a class action.  Ensignals'
Objections are overruled.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo review of the
case.  Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court
concluded that the Magistrate Judge's analyses and conclusions are
supported by the record and proper analysis.  The Court will adopt
the F&R.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/8Hcgmg from Leagle.com.

Ethan Sadler, Plaintiff, represented by Jared Hague --
jared@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC.

Ethan Sadler, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Vidal Macias --
joseph@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC & S.
Brett Sutton -- brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law
orporation, PC.

Ensignal, Inc., Defendant, represented by John L. Barber --
John.Barber@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith,
LLP, John Adelbert Haubrich -- John.Haubrich@lewisbrisbois.com --
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Jennifer Mei Yang --
Jennifer.Yang@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith, LLP.


EPS ENERGY: "Cooney" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
Wilson Cooney Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. EPS Energy Services, LLC and Todd L.
Matte, Defendants, Case No. 7:17-cv-00126 (W.D. Tex., June 22,
2017), seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
pursuant to the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

EPS Energy Services provides services supporting the oil and gas
industry around the Permian Basin, to include comprehensive flow
back services from completions to production as well as providing
equipment in conjunction with the said services. Plaintiff worked
as a Pressure Control Operator tasked with pressure testing the
well head and assisting in the fracking process. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Clif Alexander, Esq.
      ANDERSON2X, PLLC
      819 N. Upper Broadway
      Corpus Christi, TX 78401
      Tel: (361) 452-1279
      Fax: (361) 452-1284
      Email: clif@a2xlaw.com


FACEBOOK INC: Judge Dismisses Internet Tacking Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
Kevin McCoy, writing for USA TODAY, reports that a federal judge
has dismissed an Internet tracking lawsuit against Facebook in a
decision with potentially broad impact for many of the social
media giant's users.

The decision, filed on June 30 in California, gave Facebook a win
in a lawsuit that accused the company of improperly tracking
users' Internet usage between April 22, 2010, and September 26,
2011, even after they had logged out of their Facebook accounts.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs did not immediately respond to the
July 3 emails seeking comment.  In a written statement, Facebook
said the company was "pleased with the court's ruling."

The lawsuit argued that the tracking violated federal and
California laws on privacy and wiretapping by storing digital
cookies on users' Internet browsers that tracked their visits to
non-Facebook websites that featured the company's ubiquitous
"like" buttons.

Facebook had promised that logging out would delete the cookies,
the lawsuit charged. However, Facebook continued to receive the
information until an independent researcher publicly disclosed the
issue in Sept. 2011, the lawsuit said.

Facebook tracking is under scrutiny

Seeking class-action status on behalf of other Facebook users, the
now 5-1/2-year-old lawsuit characterized the tracking as "the
single most pervasive and grave threat to data privacy today."

However, U.S. District Judge Edward Davila ruled that plaintiffs
in the lawsuit "have not established that they have a reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the electronic addresses of the
Internet pages they visit.

Judge Davila also ruled that Facebook had not "intercepted" the
electronic communications in potential violations of wiretap laws
because the company was a party to those communications.

Additionally, the decision said the plaintiffs failed to establish
a "realistic economic harm or loss" stemming from Facebook's
comment.

Judge Davila's decision barred the plaintiffs from amending and
re-filing the privacy and wiretapping allegations but allowed them
to pursue a renewed breach of contract claim.

The judge previously had dismissed an earlier legal version of the
lawsuit in Oct. 2015. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Privacy Class Action Settlement Challenged
--------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Davis, writing for MediaPost, reports that an activist is
challenging Facebook's proposed settlement of a class-action
alleging that it scanned the private messages users sent to each
other through its platform.

The challenger -- Anna St. John, who serves as a lawyer with the
Center for Class Action Fairness -- argues that the proposed deal
"provides no value" to Facebook's users, and primarily benefits
the class-action lawyers who brought the case -- and who now stand
to collect up to $3.8 million in legal fees.

The settlement, unveiled earlier this year, stems from a 2013
lawsuit alleging that Facebook violated the federal wiretap law by
intercepting users' messages to each other and scanning them. The
company allegedly did so in order to determine whether people were
sending their friends' links to outside sites.

The proposed deal requires Facebook to pay up to almost $4 million
to the class-action attorneys who brought the case, and $5,000
each to the two Facebook users who served as plaintiffs, but no
monetary awards to the company's other users.  Instead, users who
want to pursue claims for monetary damages must bring new
lawsuits.

The settlement terms also require Facebook to add the following
sentence to its terms of service: "We use tools to identify and
store links shared in messages, including a count of the number of
times links are shared."

"The proposed settlement provides over $3.8 million to attorneys
and 22 words on one of Facebook's help pages for one year to
everyone else," St. John argues in papers submitted to U.S.
District Court Judge Phyllis Hamilton in the Northern District of
California.  "Such a disproportionate . . . and unfair settlement
cannot be approved."

The allegations at the center of the battle emerged in 2012, when
security researcher Ashkan Soltani reported that Facebook counts
in-message links as "likes."  Facebook said at the time that no
private information is exposed, but confirmed that the like-
counter "reflects the number of times people have clicked those
buttons and also the number of times people have shared that
page's link on Facebook."

The company has since changed that practice, but the settlement
agreement does not prohibit Facebook from changing it back again.
Instead, it merely notes that the company revised its back-end
procedures.

"Class action settlement principles require that class members --
not class counsel -- be the primary beneficiaries of a
settlement," St. John writes.  "This settlement violates these
principles and should be rejected." [GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: Ga. Supreme Court to Look Into Gas Tank Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Katheryn Hayes Tucker of Daily Report, reports
that the Georgia Supreme Court has decided to take a look at
Chrysler's appeal of a $40 million judgment, reduced from a $150
million verdict for the family of a 4-year-old boy killed when a
Jeep gas tank exploded.

The justices split over what questions to consider but granted the
writ of certiorari on June 30 on two issues with which they are
"particularly concerned."

The first question is whether the Georgia Court of Appeals erred
in determining that evidence of Chrysler CEO Sergio Marchionne's
compensation was "always admissible to show party bias."

Chrysler's appellate attorney Thomas Dupree Jr. --
tdupree@gibsondunn.com -- a Washington, D.C.-based partner with
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, had argued that South Georgia Circuit
Judge Kevin Chason was wrong to allow the family's attorneys to
mention exploding gas tanks in Ford Pintos and the salary earned
by Chrysler CEO Sergio Marchionne.  Chrysler took issue with
plaintiffs' attorney Jim Butler of Butler Wooten & Peak suggesting
the $120 million figure to the jury in closing arguments during
the April 2015 trial in Bainbridge.

Addressing that complaint, Court of Appeals Judge Christopher
McFadden quoted from the transcript when Mr. Butler said, "That's
less than two years of what Mr. Marchionne made just last year. He
made $68 million last year."

McFadden and the others on the panel -- Presiding Judge M. Yvette
Miller and Judge Carla Wong McMillian -- ruled against Chrysler
and upheld the trial judge on every point.

The other issue the justices decided to review is whether the
Court of Appeals erred in "failing to consider prior awards in
similar cases to determine whether the remitted award of damages
was excessive."

Judge Chason cut the jury's award against Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles from $150 million to $40 million in July 2015,
dropping the wrongful death portion of the verdict from $120
million down to $30 million and the pain and suffering portion
from $30 million to $10 million.

The company applauded the high court's decision to take the case
in an email to the Daily Report: "FCA US is pleased the Georgia
Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in this case.  This
tragic crash was caused by a reckless pick-up truck driver who
slammed into the rear of a 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee at highway
speed."

Mr. Butler, who handled the case and the appeal with his son Jeb
Butler of Butler Tobin, responded by email with one line:
"Plaintiffs will address the two questions posed by the Supreme
Court."

FCA US, formerly known as Chrysler, argued at trial and on appeal
that the fault belonged to Bryan Harrell, the driver of the Dodge
Dakota pickup truck that hit the Jeep from behind.  The jury
placed only 1 percent of the fault on Mr. Harrell and 99 percent
on Chrysler.  The company alleged that the judge erred in denying
several defense motions.  And Chrysler said the sheer size of the
jury's verdict was proof of bias.

The plaintiffs have contended from the start that the boy's death
was caused by a deadly placement of a gas tank behind the rear
axle.  Mr. Butler has called it "a defective design the industry
has known for decades is vulnerable and can cause the most
horrible kind of death and injury."

The case is Chrysler v. James Bryan Walden, No. A16A1285.


FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Another Faulty Emissions Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Samilton, writing for Michigan Radio, reports that Fiat
Chrysler is being sued for an alleged defect in the emissions
systems of some trucks that can result in a 25% drop in fuel
economy, according to a lawsuit filed by the firm Hagens Berman.

The lawsuit says Fiat Chrysler sold hundreds of thousands of 2013
to 2017 RAM 2500 and 3500 pickup trucks with faulty emissions
systems.

Owners who brought their trucks in for a repair of the systems
found that the fix resulted in dramatically lower fuel economy.

Fiat Chrysler is also being sued by the federal government for
allegedly cheating on emissions in some other Ram trucks and some
Jeep Grand Cherokees.  That lawsuit says the automaker installed
illegal software that turns the emissions controls on during
government tests, and partially off during normal driving.

The new lawsuit is just the latest in a series of private and
government lawsuits filed against Volkswagen, Mercedes, Fiat
Chrysler, and General Motors as well as supplier Bosch over
emissions cheating in cars and trucks with diesel engines. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Door Latch Defect
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Northern California Record, reports
that a San Rafael individual alleges a Ford vehicle he purchased
has a defective door latch assembly that causes unwarranted "door
ajar" warnings.

David Baranco filed a complaint on behalf of all others similarly
situated on June 21 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California against Ford Motor Co. and Lincoln Motor
Co. alleging breach of express warranty and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he
purchased a 2013 Ford Edge in May 2016 and that the vehicle has a
defect.  The plaintiff holds Ford Motor Co. and Lincoln Motor Co.
responsible because the defendants allegedly knew of the defects
of the door latch assembly on their vehicles and failed to make
adequate repairs.

The plaintiff seeks damages, restitution and disgorgement, require
the defendant to repair the door latch switches, interest, all
legal fees and any other relief as the court deems just.  He is
represented by Timothy G. Blood, Leslie E. Hurst and Camille S.
Bass of Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP in San Diego.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case
number 4:17-cv-03580-DMR
[GN]


FOUR SEASONS: Ct. Won't Review Denial of Remand Order in "Zyda"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii denied
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Remand the case captioned CHRISTOPHER ZYDA, On Behalf of Himself
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. FOUR SEASONS
HOTELS AND RESORTS FOUR SEASONS HOLDINGS INC.; FOUR SEASONS
HUALALAI RESORT; HUALALAI RESIDENTIAL, LLC (dba HUALALAI REALTY);
HUALALAI INVESTORS, LLC; KAUPULEHU MAKAI VENTURE; HUALALAI
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; HUALALAI VILLAS & HOMES; HUALALAI INVESTORS,
LLC; HUALALAI RENTAL MANAGEMENT, LLC; and DOES 1-100, Defendants,
Civil No. 16-00591 LEK (D. Haw.).

Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Remand on November 14, 2016,
arguing that Defendants did not timely file the Notice of Removal.
In the 3/28/17 Order, this Court concluded that the Notice of
Removal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of Four
Seasons' ability to ascertain that the amount in controversy
exceeded the Class Action Fairness Act's ("CAFA") $5 million
requirements.

In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs argue among others,
that this Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Remand
because Defendants were aware that the amount in controversy was
over five million dollars in light of Plaintiffs' demand for
rescission and defendants knew the value of the properties that
would be subject to rescission exceeded; that because Defendants
were aware of the demand for rescission on October 14, 2015, the
thirty-day removal period lapsed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1446(b)(3)
before Defendants filed their Notice of Removal on November 1,
2016.  Plaintiffs therefore contend that removal was improper.

Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders may be brought
only upon the following grounds: (a) Discovery of new material
facts not previously available; (b) Intervening change in law; (c)
Manifest error of law or fact.

The Court finds that "the Plaintiffs do not present newly
available evidence. Rather, Plaintiffs merely raise arguments and
evidence that they could have raised in their Motion for Remand.
The argument that Plaintiffs raise in the Motion for
Reconsideration is similar to the arguments in their Motion for
Remand.  Plaintiffs merely disagrees with the analysis in the
Order of the effect of the demand for rescission, and Plaintiffs'
disagreement with this Court's analysis is not grounds for
reconsideration of the order.  Plaintiffs have not presented any
ground that warrants reconsideration of the Order. Hence, the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for Remand, is hereby denied."

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017, Order is
available at https://is.gd/nLMGqY from Leagle.com.

Christopher Zyda, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick Kyle Smith,
Smith Law.

Christopher Zyda, Plaintiff, represented by Terrance M. Revere,
Revere & Associates, LLLC.

Four Seasons Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Barry A.
Sullivan -- sullivan@SMLhawaii.com --Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP,
Donald M. Falk -- dfalk@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac
vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner -- meisner@SMLhawaii.com -- Chong,
Nishimoto, Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf --
baldauf@SMLhawaii.com -- Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP & William
Meheula -- meheula@SMLhawaii.com -- Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP.
Hualalai Residential, LLC, Defendant, represented by Barry A.
Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown
LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner, Chong, Nishimoto,
Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf, Sullivan
Meheula Lee, LLP & William Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP.
Hualalai Investors, LLC, Defendant, represented by Barry A.
Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown
LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner, Chong, Nishimoto,
Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf, Sullivan
Meheula Lee, LLP, William Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP,
Barry A. Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk,
Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner, Chong,
Nishimoto, Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf,
Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP & William Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee,
LLP.

Hualalai Rental Management, LLC, Defendant, represented by Barry
A. Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk, Mayer
Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner, Chong,
Nishimoto, Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf,
Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP & William Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee,
LLP.

Four Seasons Hotels Limited, Defendant, represented by Barry A.
Sullivan, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP, Donald M. Falk, Mayer Brown
LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy-Jean P.H. Meisner, Chong, Nishimoto,
Sia, Nakamura and Goya, LLLP, Natasha L.N. Baldauf, Sullivan
Meheula Lee, LLP & William Meheula, Sullivan Meheula Lee, LLP.
James R. Mahoney, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A.
Kacprowski -- Nkacprowski@ahfi.com -- Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.
Ann Marie Mahoney, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A.
Kacprowski, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Judith Runstad, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

H. Jon Runstad, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Jonathan Seybold, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A.
Kacprowski, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Patricia Seybold, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A.
Kacprowski, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

David Keyes, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Doreen Keyes, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Julie Wrigley, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Kevin Reedy, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Bradley Chipps, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

Donna Chipps, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.

J. Orin Edson, Intervenor, represented by Nickolas A. Kacprowski,
Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing.


FRANCIS DAVID: Court Dismisses Suit Over Credit Card Charges
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David M. Lawson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the case captioned BIG CITY SMALL WORLD BAKERY
CAFE, LLC, Plaintiff, v. FRANCIS DAVID CORPORATION d/b/a
ELECTRONIC MERCHANT SYSTEMS, Defendant, Case No. 16-12652 (E.D.
Mich.), and dismissed without prejudice the amended complaint.

The Plaintiff filed its original complaint as a putative class
action on July 15, 2016, alleging that the Defendant, which does
business as Electronic Merchant Systems ("EMS"), overcharged it
for processing credit card transactions.  The Plaintiff signed a
credit card merchant agreement with EMS that contained an
arbitration clause.  The complaint pleaded claims for declaratory
relief, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment premised on the
alleged overcharging of transaction fees.  EMS responded with a
motion to dismiss or to stay the case and to compel arbitration,
based on the arbitration clause in the merchant agreement.  That
motion was referred to the assigned magistrate judge for a hearing
and a report and recommendation.  The Plaintiff later filed a
motion for leave to amend, which was granted upon the stipulation
of the parties.  In the same stipulation, the parties also agreed
that the motion to dismiss or compel arbitration should be
dismissed as moot due to the filing of the amended pleading.  The
Court subsequently denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice.

The amended complaint omits the breach of contract count and
excised nearly all uses of the word "contract" and references to
the "merchant agreement" that were in the original.  On Dec. 19,
2016, the Defendant filed a renewed motion to dismiss addressed to
the amended complaint.  The Court heard oral argument on the
motion on June 28, 2017.

The Court finds that although the agreement contains a rate
schedule governing the Parties' relationship (which the Plaintiff
contends was exceeded), the Plaintiff has gone to great lengths to
distance itself from the merchant agreement, and to argue that the
arbitration clause is unconscionable.  Those efforts do not
persuade.

The Court concluded that the arbitration clause in the merchant
agreement in this case is valid and enforceable.  The Plaintiff
must pursue its overcharge dispute against EMS in an arbitral
forum.  Although the Court may stay this case under section 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act pending the outcome of arbitration,
litigation in which all claims are referred to arbitration may be
dismissed.  Accordingly, the Court granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss or compel arbitration, and dismissed without prejudice
the amended complaint without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/6asjLz from Leagle.com.

Big City Small World Bakery Cafe, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by
David H. Fink, Fink + Associates Law.

Big City Small World Bakery Cafe, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by
Edward Webb, Webb, Klase & Lemond, LLC, Schuyler E. von Oeyen,
Fink + Associates Law & Darryl Bressack, Fink Associates Law.

Francis David Corporation, Defendant, represented by Benjamin W.
Jeffers -- bjeffers@hhbjlaw.com -- Hickey Hauck Bishoff & Jeffers
PLLC, David D. Yeagley -- dyeagley@ulmer.com -- Murray & Murray,
Mark E. Hauck -- mhauck@hhbjlaw.com -- Hickey Hauck Bishoff &
Jeffers, PLLC & Michael N. Ungar --  mungar@ulmer.com -- Ulmer &
Berne.


FRANCISCAN MEDICAL: Arbitration Prevails in Employees' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Washington granted Defendant' motion to
compel individual arbitration rather than class arbitration in the
case captioned CINDIUS ROMNEY as PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE for the
ESTATE OF MICHAEL ROMNEY; FARON BAUER; and KRISTEN CHILDRESS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Appellants, v. FRANCISCAN MEDICAL GROUP, a Washington corporation;
FRANCISCAN HEALTH SYSTEM, a Washington corporation; FRANCISCAN
HEALTH VENTURES, a Washington corporation; FRANCISCAN NORTHWEST
PHYSICIANS HEALTH NETWORK, LLC, a Washington corporation; and
CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES, a Colorado corporation, Respondents.
No. 74806-8-I. (Wash. App.).

Michael Romney and several other medical professionals sued their
former employer, Franciscan Medical Group, individually and on
behalf of a putative class. In the first appeal in this case,
Romney argued that the arbitration agreements the employees had
signed were unconscionable.  On remand, the superior court granted
FMG's motion to compel individual arbitration rather than class
arbitration. Romney argues in this second appeal that FMG waived
its right to compel individual arbitration. Because FMG's conduct
in the superior court and during the first appeal was inconsistent
with a right to compel individual arbitration, and the delay in
asserting the right prejudiced Romney.

Romney argues that the superior court erred by determining whether
the arbitration agreements permit class arbitration. Romney
contends that the availability of class arbitration is an issue
for the arbitrator. We conclude that it is a threshold issue of
arbitrability for the court to decide. While courts enforce a
liberal policy favoring arbitration, the courts should usually
decide threshold questions of arbitrability.

Romney argues that Washington law requires a different outcome. In
Washington, courts must order the arbitration of all disputes
"covered by the substantive scope" of an enforceable arbitration
agreement.   But Romney's argument assumes that the availability
of class arbitration is within the scope of the agreements.  This
Court disagreed, because the question whether the agreements
permit class arbitration is a question about the scope of the
agreements itself. Therefore, Washington law does not dictate that
an arbitrator decide the question.

This Court concluded that the parties' agreement to have an
arbitrator decide the question under some circumstances is not a
clear and unmistakable agreement to have the court refer the
question to an arbitrator. Accordingly, it was not error for the
superior court to determine if the agreements permitted class
arbitration.

Romney contends that consent to class arbitration is implied by
the failure to exclude class actions explicitly from the
arbitration agreements, despite specifically including employment
claims that are frequently brought as class actions.
This Court concluded that the agreements do not permit class
arbitration because they are silent on the issue and we cannot
infer consent to submit to class arbitration from silence.
Arbitration is a matter of consent.  Arbitrators derive their
power "from the parties' agreement to forgo the legal process and
submit their disputes" to arbitration. An agreement to arbitrate
disputes does not imply that the party agreed to class arbitration
of those disputes, because class arbitration significantly changes
the nature of arbitration.  When the arbitration agreement
contains "'no agreement'" on the class arbitration question, the
court cannot compel the parties to submit to class arbitration.
Finally, Romney argues that FMG's delay in asserting a contractual
right to compel individual arbitration is evidence that it
consented to class arbitration via the agreements. A party's
"subsequent acts and conduct" may be of aid in interpreting that
party's intent.

Romney does not cite any cases where the court determined the
meaning of a contract by looking at a party's conduct during the
litigation of the contract dispute. In short, Romney has not shown
that FMG consented to class arbitration.  FMG had a contractual
right to avoid class arbitration.

Romney argues that FMG waived its contractual right to compel
individual arbitration because its conduct was inconsistent with
an intent to assert the right and its delay in asserting the right
prejudiced Romney.

This Court disagrees. To establish waiver of the right to
arbitration, the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate '(1)
knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts
inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the
party opposing arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts.
The party opposing arbitration bears a heavy burden of showing
that another party has waived its right to arbitrate.

On remand, the superior court granted FMG's motion to compel
individual arbitration rather than class arbitration.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at  https://is.gd/oNMQ6z from
Leagle.com.

Scott Crispin Greco Blankenship, P.S., 1000 2nd Ave, Ste, 3250,
Seattle, WA, 98104-1094, Richard Goldsworthy, The Blankenship Law
Firm, P.S., 1000 2nd Ave, Ste, 3250, Seattle, WA, 98104-1094,
Counsel for Appellants.

Michael F. Madden -- maddem@mcblaw.com -- Bennett Bigelow & Leedom
PS., 601 Union St, Ste, 1500, Seattle, WA, 98101-1363, Adam
Merrill -- abmerill@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC., One East
Washington St, Suite 1200, Phoenix, AZ, 85004, Michele Gehrke --
mgehrke@polsinelli.com -- Polsinelli PC., Three Embarcadero
Center, Ste, 1350, San Francisco, CA, 98411, Counsel for
Respondents.


FYRE MEDIA: FBI to Conduct Exuma Probe Amid Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Ava Turnquest, writing for Tribune242, reports that from the
United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation received a permit
from the government to conduct a probe in Exuma after the botched
Fyre Festival went up in smoke on April 27, The Tribune
understands.

However, it is not clear whether there was any collaboration with
local law enforcement agencies.

The revelation came days after Fyre Festival lead organiser Billy
McFarland was arrested and released on bail in the United States
on a wire fraud charge in connection with the ill-fated festival.

In the wake of the recent developments, former Tourism Minister
Obie Wilchcombe told The Tribune on July 3 that he had no
involvement in the matter as approvals for the Family Island
project were authorised by local government.

"Tourism did not approve it, I don't know where this is coming
from," Mr Wilchcombe said when contacted by this newspaper.

"Local government approved it, they have the authority in the
Family Islands."

Local government officials, the island's Chamber of Commerce, and
vendors in Exuma have confirmed that Ministry of Tourism officials
led town hall meetings on the project and acted as a liaison for
organisers.

To this, Mr Wilchcombe said: "I was not involved in it. I cannot
speak to it.  Call Carla Stuart, she was responsible and the
Director General (Joy Jibrilu)."

Ms Stuart is the ministry's senior director of national planning
and special events.  She could not be reached on July 3.

Calls placed to Mrs Jibrilu were not returned up to press time.

Meanwhile, news of Mr McFarland's arrest has brought no comfort to
vendors still owed thousands of dollars for unpaid labour and
services.  Some two months on since unpaid vendors were asked to
submit their claims to the Ministry of Tourism, businesses on July
3 claimed that there has been no contact from the government.

Meanwhile Maryann Rolle, owner of the Exuma Point Restaurant &
Bar, told The Tribune that local vendors had been cautiously
optimistic about a resolution after festival trailers seized by
the Department of Customs for nonpayment were released last month.

She said the reports that Mr McFarland was charged with wire fraud
represented the first official update on the matter in months, and
signaled that compensation may be even further out of reach for
local businesses.

Mrs Rolle is allegedly owed roughly $134,000 for catering
services, and submitted her bills to the Ministry of Tourism in
late April.

#"I need my money," she said on July 3.  "That ain't good enough.
I didn't even want to hear that because it seem like he (Mr
McFarland) just ain't ga pay now.  It ain't comforting me at all,
who's going to pay these bills?

"All the things they were able to move through (Department of)
Customs, all of the stuff gone.  So when I see that I say that's a
forward direction, they paid customs.  I could swear they was
coming to pay us next."

Mrs Rolle said she did not immediately seek legal counsel because
she was waiting for the confusion surrounding the event to settle;
however, she noted that she will be taking legal action.

"Tourism said bring in the bill, before election I had the bill in
and nothing I'm hearing, and no one is addressing it," she said.

"With us changing government now, this new government could say
they don't know what's going on.  I don't know who to go to.  It's
just a terrible experience and a learning experience.

"But more than him have to be arrested, a lot of people was
involved . I hear the company (Fyre Media) was dismantled.  I
don't know, there's no one to target, everybody I call who was in
charge they say they haven't been paid," she continued.

Fyre Festival promised a "cultural moment created from a blend of
music, art and food" over two weekends in Great Exuma.  Festival
organisers claimed they set out "to provide a once-in-a-lifetime
musical experience on the islands of the Exumas" and had billed it
along the lines of the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival in
southern California.

Tickets had included a flight from Miami, a stay in a "geodesic
dome" and activities including yoga and kayaking. Pre-publicity
suggested festival-goers could pay up to $100,000 to mingle with
models and be ferried around by private yachts and planes.

But visitors described the event as a "complete disaster" and it
attracted unflattering international media coverage.  William
Finley, of North Carolina, posted on social media that he and his
friends had arrived to find "disaster tent city" when searching
for their accommodation.  One British visitor said the festival
site "was worse than a refugee camp."

There were also complaints of missing luggage, unsatisfactory
catered food, fears for people's safety, piles of garbage, stray
dogs and looting of alcohol.

The organisers have since been hit with a $100m class action
lawsuit. [GN]


GATHERAPP INC: Faces Class Action Over Unwanted Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Northern California Record, reports
that a Texas consumer alleges a San Francisco-based corporation
that operates a mobile application service sent her unwanted text
messages.

Ana Rehmet filed a complaint on behalf of all others similarly
situated on June 21 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California against Gatherapp Inc. alleging violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she
suffered damages from receiving several unwanted text messages
from the defendant inviting her to join the app.  The plaintiff
holds Gatherapp Inc. responsible because the defendant allegedly
sent a text message to the plaintiff's cellular telephone without
her permission.  She alleges she believes the defendant obtained
her number by taking contacts from phones owned by third-parties.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks statutory
damages, actual and punitive damages, permanent injunction, all
legal fees, and any other relief as the court deems just.  She is
represented by Geoff J. Spreter and Benjamin D. Petiprin of
Spreter & Petiprin APC in Coronado.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case
number 3:17-cv-03589-JSC
[GN]


GENE BY GENE: Bid to Dismiss "Cole" Denied
------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL COLE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. GENE BY GENE, LTD., a Texas Limited Liability
Company d/b/a FAMILY TREE DNA, Defendant, Case No. 1:14-cv-00004-
SLG (D. Ala.).

Before the Court is Defendant Gene by Gene's Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

Michael Cole purchased a DNA testing kit from
www.familytreedna.com, a website operated by Gene by Gene. Testing
kits include a cheek swab used to collect DNA samples and an
optional release form to authorize the sharing of the customer's
name and email address with his or her genetic matches.  When
testing is complete, Family Tree emails its customers a web link
where they may view their results, locate genetic matches, and
research their ancestral origins. Months later, after receiving
excessive junk email, Mr. Cole searched the Internet for his email
address and found it on a website called "Rootsweb."  He alleges
that he then learned his DNA test results had been publicly
disclosed. Mr. Cole initiated this action alleging that its
sharing of his DNA test results violated Alaska's Genetic Privacy
Act.

Gene by Gene maintains that since Mr. Cole is seeking only
statutory damages under the Genetic Privacy Act, he has not
demonstrated the requisite injury-in-fact for Article III
standing. Lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for want
of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must demonstrate three
elements which constitute the 'irreducible constitutional minimum'
of Article III standing.  First, a plaintiff must have suffered an
'injury-in-fact' to a legally protected interest that is both
'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, as opposed
to conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between [the plaintiff's injury and the conduct
complained of. Third, it must be 'likely -- not merely
'speculative that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable
decision. In the class action context, standing is satisfied if at
least one named plaintiff meets the three requirements.

When evaluating whether a statutory violation constitutes an
injury-in-fact, the courts considers two factors: (1) whether the
alleged intangible harm caused by the statutory violation bears a
close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,
and (2) congressional judgment in establishing the statutory
right.

Mr. Cole's alleged harm satisfies first factor. Alaska's Genetic
Privacy Act recognizes an exclusive property interest in one's
DNA, and prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of DNA information.
Mr. Cole's alleged injury is closely related to torts that have
been recognized in both federal and Alaska state courts.

As to the second factor, congressional judgment, three
considerations favor finding that the statute grants persons in
the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief: (1) the
provision of a private right of action; (2) the availability of
statutory damages; and (3) the substantive nature of the statutory
right. Each of those considerations weigh in favor of Article III
standing here. The unauthorized disclosure of an individual's DNA
is not hypothetical or uncertain; it constitutes a concrete harm
that satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement under Article III.

The Court concludes that dissemination of Plaintiff's DNA test
results without his consent, such injury is sufficiently concrete
so as to confer Article III standing.  Accordingly, Mr. Cole has
standing to bring this action, and the Court denies Defendant's
motion to dismiss.

A full-copy text of the District Court's June 30, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/Fi7mzD from Leagle.com.

Michael Cole, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Glenn Tievsky --
atievsky@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, pro hac vice.

Michael Cole, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas K. Mertz --
mertzlaw@gmail.com -- Law Office of Douglas K. Mertz, Jay Edelson
-- jedelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Rafey S. Balabanian --
rbalabanian@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com --  Edelson PC & David I. Mindell --
dmindell@edelson.com Edelson PC.

Gene by Gene, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Matthew R. Wojcik --
matt.wojcik@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Timothy
J. Petumenos -- timp@tpaklaw.com -- Law Office of Tim Petumenos,
LLC, E. Pennock Gheen -- penn.gheen@bullivant.com -- Bullivant
Houser Bailey PC, pro hac vice & Holly D. Brauchli --
holly.brauchli@bullivant.com -- Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, pro
hac vice.

State of Alaska, Intervenor Defendant, represented by Jessica
Moats Alloway, Office of the Attorney General.


GENERAL MILLS: Minnesota Court Dismisses Glyphosate Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case
captioned IN RE: GENERAL MILLS GLYPHOSATE LITIGATION, Civil File
No. 16-2869 (MJD/BRT) (D. Minn.), because the Plaintiffs failed to
assert a plausible claim.

On Dec. 8, 2016, the Court granted a motion to consolidate
multiple glyphosate cases brought against the Defendant.  On Jan.
9, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action
Complaint against the Defendant.

The Consolidated Class Action Complaint asserts: Count 1:
Violation of the Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act; Count
2: Violation of the Minnesota Unlawful Trade Practices Act; Count
3: Violation of Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act;
Count 4: Breach of Express Warranty; Count 5: Unjust Enrichment;
Count 6: Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Act; Count 7: Violations of California's Consumers Legal
Remedies Act; Count 8: Violations of California's False
Advertising Law; Count 9: Violations of California's Unfair
Competition Law; Count 10: Violation of the New York General
Business Law Section 349; and Count 11: Violation of the New York
General Business Law Section 350.

The Consolidated Class Action Complaint seeks certification of a
national class of individuals who purchased Nature Valley Products
during the Class Period.  It also seeks certification of state
classes for California, Illinois, and New York residents who
purchased Nature Valley Products within their respective states.
The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
restitution, disgorgement, statutory and monetary damages, and a
constructive trust.

The Defendant has now brought a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Complaint based on lack of standing, the primary jurisdiction
doctrine, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and failure to plead fraud with particularity.  It has
also filed a motion to strike certain allegations in the Complaint
regarding the human health risks posed by trace amounts of
glyphosate in packaged food.

Judge Davis concluded that the Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly
allege that the statement "Made with 100% Natural Whole Grain
Oats" means, or could be interpreted by a reasonable consumer to
mean, that there is no trace glyphosate in Nature Valley Products.
It is implausible that a reasonable consumer would believe that a
product labelled as having one ingredient -- oats -- that is "100%
Natural" could not contain a trace amount of glyphosate that is
far below the amount permitted for organic products.  He further
concluded that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the
Defendant did not represent or warrant that Nature Valley Products
would be free from trace glyphosate.

Accordingly, Judge Davis granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the consolidated class action complaint and this matter is
dismissed with prejudice.  In light of that dismissal, the Court
denied the motion to strike as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/Sq2C3r from Leagle.com.

Mary Wolosyzn, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Michael Prom --
ap@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP, pro hac vice.

Mary Wolosyzn, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne D. McEntee --
amcentee@terrellmarwill.com -- Terrell Marwill Law Group PLLC, pro
hac vice, Amy Elisabeth Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro
hac vice, Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarwill.com --
Terrell Marwill Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Brian C. Gudmundson
-- brian.gudmundson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Bryce
Daniel Riddle -- bryce.riddle@zimmreed.com  -- Zimmerman Reed,
LLP, Courtney Maccarone -- cmaccarone@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky,
pro hac vice, Edward Anthony Wallace -- eaw@wexlerwallace.com --
Wexler Wallace LLP, pro hac vice, Kim E. Richman, The Richman Law
Group, pro hac vice & Lori G. Feldman, Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro
hac vice.

Edward Salamanca, Plaintiff, represented by Brian C. Gudmundson,
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Bryce Daniel Riddle, Zimmerman Reed, LLP &
Michael Francis Ram, Ram, Olson, Cereghino & Kopczynski LLP, pro
hac vice.

Yesenia Nuez, Plaintiff, represented by Brian C. Gudmundson,
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP & Bryce Daniel Riddle, Zimmerman Reed, LLP.

Nesha Ritchie, Plaintiff, represented by Brian C. Gudmundson,
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Bryce Daniel Riddle, Zimmerman Reed, LLP,
Christopher Duran Jennings, Johnson Vines, pro hac vice, David G.
Scott -- david@davidgscott.com -- Emerson Scott LLP, pro hac vice,
John G. Emerson, Jr. -- jemerson@emersonfirm.com -- Emerson Scott
LLP, pro hac vice, Samuel M. Ward -- sward@barrack.com -- Barrack,
Rodos & Bacine, pro hac vice & Stephen R. Basser --
sbasser@barrack.com -- Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, pro hac vice.

Interim Co-Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by
Beth E. Terrell, Terrell Marwill Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Kim
E. Richman, The Richman Law Group, pro hac vice & Lori G. Feldman,
Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice.

Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Brian C.
Gudmundson, Zimmerman Reed, PLLP.

Plaintiffs' Executive Committee, Plaintiff, represented by Amy
Elisabeth Keller, DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac vice, Brian
C. Gudmundson, Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, John G. Emerson, Jr., Emerson
Scott LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen R. Basser, Barrack, Rodos &
Bacine, pro hac vice.

General Mills, Inc., Defendant, represented by Benjamin W. Hulse -
- bhulse@blackwellburke.com -- Blackwell Burke PA, Charles C.
Sipos -- CSipos@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie LLp, pro hac vice,
David Taro Biderman -- DBiderman@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie,
LLP, pro hac vice, Emily A. Ambrose -- eambrose@blackwellburke.com
-- Blackwell Burke PA & Jerry W. Blackwell --
blackwell@blackwellburke.com -- Blackwell Burke PA.


GINZA SUSHI: "Chen" Seeks Overtime/Minimum Pay, Reimbursements
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ang Chen, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. Ginza Sushi 1688, 251 Ginza Sushi Huang Inc., 251
Ginza Sushi Chen Inc., 251 Ginza Sushi NY Inc., Benchi Chen,
Jinxiu Huang, Xue Qing You a/k/a Xue You, Shu Jahne, Zhou Jin Chen
a/k/a Zhou Chen, Zeng Yun Liu a/k/a Yun Liu Zeng and Kevin "Doe,"
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-04746 (S.D. N.Y., June 22, 2017),
seeks unpaid wages, including unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime, liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest and/or attorneys' fees and costs and unpaid spread-of-
hours pursuant to new York Labor Laws, the New York Wage Theft
Prevention Act and the federal the Fair Labor Standards Act as
well as for breach of implied contract by failing to reimburse
Plaintiff for expenses paid for the purchase, repair, utilization
and maintenance of his delivery vehicle.

Defendants operate a chain of Japanese restaurants in New York
operating under the name "Ginza Sushi." Ang worked for the
Defendants at their location at 251 E 35th Street, New York, NY
10016 as a deliveryman. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      John Troy, Esq.
      TROY LAW, PLLC
      41-25 Kissena Blvd., Suite 119
      Flushing, NY 11355
      Tel: (718) 762-1324
      Fax: (718) 762-1342
      Email: johntroy@troypllc.com


GO DADDY: Court Denies Certification of Purchasers Class
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned Mark Schellenbach and William Ryder, Plaintiffs, v.
GoDaddy.com, LLC, Defendants, No. CV-16-00746-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.).

Plaintiffs Mark Schellenbach and William Ryder, on behalf of
themselves and a proposed class and subclass, bring this action
against Defendant GoDaddy.com, LLC. Plaintiffs move to certify a
class and subclass of persons who purchased a "Dedicated Server"
from GoDaddy, alleging that GoDaddy failed to disclose that the
server was virtualized and not a free-standing machine.

Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class: "All persons
who, between October 23, 2014 and March 18, 2017, purchased
GoDaddy Dedicated Servers.  Plaintiffs further move to certify a
California subclass.

Plaintiffs rely primarily on Rule 23(b)(3), which requires, inter
alia, that questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over questions affecting only individual class
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for resolving the controversy.

GoDaddy opposes class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) on the
grounds that (1) the class does not satisfy the commonality,
typicality, or adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a); (2) the class
is overbroad and unascertainable, and putative class members lack
standing to assert a claim; and (3) the class does not satisfy the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

The Court finds that the class does not satisfy the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).

The predominance inquiry begins with the elements of the
underlying cause of action. Plaintiffs allege violations of the
Arizona Consumer Fraud Act ("ACFA"), California Unfair Competition
Law ("CUCL"), and California False Advertising Law ("CFAL").
The ACFA prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading conduct in
connection with the sale or advertisement of consumer goods and
services. To prevail under the ACFA, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) the defendant made a misrepresentation or omission in
violation of the Act, and (2) the defendant's conduct proximately
caused the plaintiff to suffer damages . The CFAL prohibits
advertising that "is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be
untrue or misleading."

A party wishing to bring a claim under the CUCL or CFAL must show:
(1) "a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to
qualify as (economic) injury in fact and (2)  that economic injury
was the result of, caused by, the unfair business practice or
false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.

Plaintiffs' case rests on a single omission. Plaintiffs allege
that class members were not told that the Dedicated Servers were
virtual -- that the servers were not stand-alone boxes. This is
the material omission Plaintiffs allege under the ACFA and the
unfair practice they allege under the CUCL and CFAL. Plaintiffs do
not claim that GoDaddy made any other misrepresentations or
omissions.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that another GoDaddy webpage --
www.godaddy.com /servers -- did disclose throughout the class
period that the servers were virtualized. And these are not the
only ways class members could have learned that the servers were
virtualized. Prospective purchasers could also talk with a GoDaddy
representative by phone or web chat. GoDaddy provided live
customer service representatives 24 hours a day, seven days a
week. Evidence also shows that GoDaddy fielded more than 31
million phone calls and participated in over 8 million web chat
sessions with customers and potential customers during the class
period.

In short, GoDaddy customers do not have a uniform buying
experience when purchasing Dedicate Servers, and many would have
been exposed to information beyond that contained in
the/pro/dedicated-servers webpage on which Plaintiffs wish to
rely. And this does not even account for other means by which
class members could have learned that the servers were
virtualized, such as word of mouth or trade publications.
Consequently, on the very first element of Plaintiffs' claims --
the existence of a material omission -- individual issues would
predominate if the class were certified. The class therefore
cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).

Plaintiffs must prove that the omission was material and that they
relied on it when they made their purchases.  Plaintiffs' claims
can be proved class-wide, that they need not prove materiality at
the class certification stage. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs need
not prove any element of their case at this stage, but to obtain
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs must show that
their case is susceptible of class-wide proof -- that individual
issues will not predominate.

Because the requirements of materiality and reliance under
California law differ somewhat from Arizona law, the Court will
address materiality and reliance separately for the subclass and
class.

Plaintiffs argue that materiality under these statutes asks
whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the
misrepresented or omitted fact, and that such a "reasonable
person" determination can be made class-wide. The California
Supreme Court has suggested that "a presumption, or at least an
inference, of reliance arises whenever there is a showing that a
misrepresentation was material.

But an inference of class-wide reliance cannot be made where there
is no evidence that the allegedly false representations were
uniformly made to all members of the proposed class. Plaintiffs
cannot show that all subclass members were subjected to a uniform
omission. An inference of class-wide reliance cannot be made where
there is no evidence that the allegedly false representations were
uniformly made to all members of the proposed class.

The Court concludes that proof of reliance by members of the
subclass cannot be made on a common basis. This is an additional
reason that the subclass cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).

The class asserts claims under the ACFA. Individual issues will
predominate in the class for two reasons. First, for an omission
to be actionable under the ACFA, it must be of a material fact.
ACFA can be violated by "concealment, suppression or omission of
any material fact.

Second, a plaintiff suing under the AFCA must prove reliance.
Plaintiffs must prove reliance by each class member, and that
would require proof that each class member was exposed to the
alleged omission.

The Court concludes that proof of materiality and reliance under
the ACFA will require class-member by class-member litigation.
Individual issues will predominate, making certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) improper.

Plaintiffs' class definition thus includes approximately 4,500
foreign purchasers, and yet Plaintiffs -- who have the burden of
showing that individual issues will not predominate -- have
presented no argument or evidence to show that these foreign class
members can assert claims under the Arizona or California statutes
or would be bound by the judgment of this Court.

Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification of a class if the requirements
of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, The Court finds a Rule 23(b)(2) class inappropriate. Rule
23(b)(2) authorizes a class in which declaratory or injunctive
relief is granted to the class as a whole, and courts have made
clear that it does not apply when class members' claims are
inherently individual.

Plaintiff's motion for class certification is Denied.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 7, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/3QYPQR from Leagle.com.

Mark Schellenbach, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher D.
Jennings, -- info@johnsonvines -- Johnson Vines PLLC.

Mark Schellenbach, Plaintiff, represented by David G. Scott,
Emerson Scott LLP, 1301 Scott Street, Little Rock, Arkansas 72202
Toll Free: (800) 663-9817 or (501) 907-2555 John G. Emerson,
Emerson Scott LLP, 1301 Scott Street, Little Rock, Arkansas 72202
Toll Free: (800) 663-9817 or (501) 907-2555 Kathryn Ann Honecker,
-- khonecker@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group PC, Samuel M. Ward
--  sward@barrack.com -- Barrack Rodos & Bacine, Stephen Richard
Basser -- sbasser@barrack.com -- Barrack Rodos & Bacine & Audra
Elizabeth Petrolle -- apetrolle@roselawgroup.com --  Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint PC.

William Ryder, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher D. Jennings,
Johnson Vines PLLC, David G. Scott, Emerson Scott LLP, John G.
Emerson, Emerson Scott LLP, Kathryn Ann Honecker, Rose Law Group
PC, Samuel M. Ward, Barrack Rodos & Bacine, Stephen Richard
Basser, Barrack Rodos & Bacine & Audra Elizabeth Petrolle, Bonnett
Fairbourn Friedman & Balint PC.

GoDaddy.com LLC, Defendant, represented by Aaron M. McKown --
amckwon@cozen.com -- Cozen OConnor PC & Paula L. Zecchini --
pzecchini@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor PC.


GOOGLE INC: Activist Asks Court to Scrap $5.5MM Safari Hack Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Davis, writing for Media Post, reports that class-action
activist Theodore Frank has asked a federal appellate court to
scrap Google's $5.5 million settlement of a class-action alleging
that it violated Safari users' privacy by circumventing their no-
tracking settings.

The settlement "provides millions of dollars to the attorneys, and
zero dollars to the class," Frank says in papers submitted to the
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. "This Court should reverse this
settlement approval as a breach of class counsel's fiduciary duty
to prioritize class recovery," he argues.
The deal, approved earlier this year by U.S. District Court Judge
Sue Robinson in Delaware, requires Google to donate more than $3
million to six schools and nonprofits -- Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard
University, Center for Democracy & Technology, Public Counsel,
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and the Center for Internet &
Society at Stanford University. Those groups must agree to use the
money for projects related to online privacy. The lawyers who
brought the case will receive $1.925 million, but individual Web
users won't receive anything.

The litigation stemmed from Google's involvement in the "Safari
hack" -- a privacy scandal that came to light in 2012 when
researcher Jonathan Mayer published a report stating that Google
(and other companies) circumvented Safari's privacy settings and
set tracking cookies. Google was then able to target ads to those
users based on their Web-browsing activity.

Google confirmed Mayer's report when it came out, and said it had
stopped tracking Safari users or would soon do so. News of the
hack also resulted in charges by the Federal Trade Commission and
other officials; Google ultimately agreed to pay $22.5 million to
settle with the FTC, and an additional $17 million to settle with
a group of state attorneys general.

Frank argues that the class-action settlement should be vacated
for several reasons, including that the money could have been
distributed to Safari users instead of to organizations. That type
of distribution has happened in other class-actions, including a
lawsuit against Facebook over its sponsored stories program. In
that case, Facebook created a $20 million settlement fund, which
paid $15 each to 600,000 users who submitted claims.
The activist also contends that the settlement is improper on the
grounds that Google had prior connections with at least four of
the six fund recipients. "Google is a regular donor to the Berkman
Center, Stanford Center, Berkeley Center, and Center for Democracy
and Technology," Frank writes.

He contends that Google's promise to donate to those groups in
order to settle a lawsuit "merely reflects a shift in accounting
entries."

Frank adds: "Defendants will prefer to make payments to third
parties to whom they are already donating money rather than
payments to absent class members; donations engender good will,
and often merely replace or supplement donations that are already
in the pipeline."

The activist has challenged other privacy settlements, including
Google's $8 million settlement of a lawsuit alleging it "leaked"
search users' names to publishers and advertisers through referer
headers -- the information that is automatically transmitted by
Google to publishers and advertisers. (Some queries, like people's
searches for their own names, can offer clues to users'
identities.) Frank recently asked the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
to vacate the deal, arguing that search engine users who were
affected by Google's practices won't receive any money. [GN]


GREE ELECTRIC: Appeals Ruling in Homesite Suit to Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai, Gree USA,
Inc., and Hong Kong Gree Electric Appliances Sales Ltd. filed an
appeal from a court ruling relating to the lawsuit styled Homesite
Insurance Company, et al. v. Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of
Zhuhai, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-06769-ODW-JC, in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Homesite Insurance Company, et
al. v. Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai, et al., Case No.
17-55887, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, four
insurance companies filed a class action in Los Angeles, against
the Chinese appliance-maker, claiming it sold 2.5 million fire-
prone dehumidifiers in the United States, which could cause
billions of dollars in damages.

More than 2.2 million of the dangerous appliances made by Gree
Electric Appliances Inc. of Zhuhai are still in U.S. homes,
bearing prominent brand names including Frigidaire, GE and
Kenmore, the insurers say in the lawsuit filed in September 8,
2016.  Only Gree and its subsidiaries are named as defendants.

Gree built the dehumidifiers with plastic parts that could not
withstand the heat they put out, Homesite Insurance Company of the
Midwest, et al., says in the lawsuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai, Gree
      USA, Inc. and Hong Kong Gree Electric Appliances Sales
      Ltd.'s opening brief is due on November 29, 2017;

   -- Appellees American Strategic Insurance Corporation,
      Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest, Meridian
      Security Insurance Company and Milbank Insurance Company's
      answering brief is due on December 29, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees HOMESITE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST,
AMERICAN STRATEGIC INSURANCE CORPORATION, MERIDIAN SECURITY
INSURANCE COMPANY and MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY, on their own
behalves and on behalf of all others similarly situated insurance
companies which underwrite property insurance coverage in the
United States, are represented by:

          Nathan Dooley, Esq.
          COZEN O'CONNOR
          601 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 3700
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 892-7900
          Facsimile: (213) 892-7999
          E-mail: ndooley@cozen.com

Defendants-Appellants GREE ELECTRIC APPLIANCES, INC. OF ZHUHAI,
HONG KONG GREE ELECTRIC APPLIANCES SALES LTD., and GREE USA, INC.,
are represented by:

          Elvin-Mathias Tabah, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          633 West 5th Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 680-2800
          Facsimile: (213) 489-0552
          E-mail: etabah@imwlaw.com


GROUNDHOG ENTERPRISES: Bid to Dismiss Liberty Salad Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge J. William Ditter, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case captioned LIBERTY SALAD, INC., et al., v.
GROUNDHOG ENTERPRISES, INC., Civil Action No. 17-CV-226 (E.D.
Pa.).

The Plaintiffs, Liberty Salad and 18th Street Salad, Inc., are two
businesses that engaged the Defendant, to provide debit and credit
card payment processing services.  The Plaintiffs have filed a
class action complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that no
contract between the parties exists or if there is, that certain
terms of the contract are invalid.  They also raise claims of
unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and fraud.  The Defendant
has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

Judge Ditter says he's satisfied that the Plaintiffs have pled
sufficient facts that would preclude a motion to dismiss these
claims.  As he's pointed out, the motion to dismiss is based on
documents that never took effect.  There is also a question
whether the Plaintiffs ever received the "Program Guide" that the
Defendant contends sets forth the provisions that permit it to
modify the fees charged.  In fact, the wrong version of the
program guide was provided as an exhibit to the Defendant's motion
to dismiss.  While the Plaintiffs continue to use services
provided the by Defendant, it is clear that they are not doing so
under the terms asserted by the Defendant.

Alternatively, the Plaintiffs' remaining claims challenge the
Defendant's compliance with the terms of the contract, if such
contract is found to exist.  Count 3 raises claims of breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

Count 4 seeks a declaration that certain terms of the contract are
invalid.  This count, according to Judge Ditter, appears to
challenge the provisions of the Program Guide and its
applicability to the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs claim the terms
are illusory, lack mutuality, violate public policy, and are
unconscionable.

Count 5 asserts a claim of fraud for misrepresentations, omissions
and fraudulent inducement.  The Plaintiffs claim the Defendant's
agents misrepresented material facts with regard to the fees that
would be charged.  The Defendant's agents prepared a written
analysis of the costs savings each of the Plaintiffs would see if
they made the change to this company.  There was no mention of the
Program Guide, or that it would supersede the analysis provided by
the Defendant's representative.

The complaint contains sufficient allegations to challenge the
contract and some of its provisions.

At this early stage of the proceedings, Judge Ditter permits the
Plaintiffs to proceed with their alternative theories of
liability.  After the Defendant has filed an answer, he will
schedule a pretrial conference to set a discovery schedule aimed
at narrowing the issues early so that the parties will be able to
focus on one theory or the other -- contract or no contract.  Only
after they've reached that stage will they consider whether class
certification is appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/HEi4vc from Leagle.com.

LIBERTY SALAD, INC., Plaintiff, represented by KENNETH J.
GRUNFELD, GOLOMB & HONIK PC..

LIBERTY SALAD, INC., Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. STANOCH,
GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C..

18TH STREET SALAD, INC., Plaintiff, represented by KENNETH J.
GRUNFELD, GOLOMB & HONIK PC. & DAVID J. STANOCH, GOLOMB & HONIK,
P.C..

GROUNDHOG ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant, represented by ANDREW H.
RALSTON, JR. -- ralstona@whiteandwilliams.com -- White and
Williams LLP.

GROUNDHOG ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant, represented by EDWARD M.
KOCH -- koche@whiteandwilliams.com -- WHITE AND WILLIAMS LLP.


GROUP HEALTH: Trial Court's Summary Judgment in "Nevils" Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JODIE NEVILS, Appellant, v. GROUP HEALTH
PLAN, INC., and ACS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., Respondents, No.
SC93134 (Mo.), the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial
court's judgment that the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act
("FEHBA") preempts Missouri's anti-subrogation law.

The Plaintiff was a federal employee insured through a health
insurance plan governed by the FEHBA when she was injured in an
automobile accident.  Coventry paid her medical expenses and
asserted a subrogation lien against the proceeds of a settlement
Nevils received from the party responsible for the accident.
Nevils satisfied the subrogation lien and filed a class action
petition arguing that the Missouri law does not permit subrogation
or reimbursement of personal injury claims.  Coventry and ACS
moved for summary judgment, asserting FEHBA preempts Missouri's
anti-subrogation law.  The trial court entered judgment for
Coventry and ACS, and Nevils appealed.

Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Coventry, this Court holds that the FEHBA preemption clause
applies in this case to preempt Missouri's anti-subrogation law.
Contractual provisions for subrogation and reimbursement relate to
payments with respect to benefits within the meaning of FEHBA's
preemption clause.  Further, FEHBA complies with the Supremacy
Clause because it is the language of Section 8902(m)(1) that
strips state law of its force, not the terms of any contract,
despite the unusual phrasing of the preemption clause.  Applying
these clear directives from the United States Supreme Court, the
trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Coventry
and ACS because FEHBA preempts Missouri's anti-subrogation law
with regard to the federal employee health benefits contract at
issue in this case.  Hence, this Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/HMpmmv from Leagle.com.

MITCHELL LEE BURGESS, Attorney for Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

BLAKE PATRICK GREEN -- blake@bglawkc.com -- Co-Counsel for
Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

DON P. SAXTON, Co-Counsel for Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

KEITH CHRISTOPHER LAMB, Co-Counsel for Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

ERICH VINCENT VIETH -- vieth@slu.edu -- Co-Counsel for Appellant,
JODIE NEVILS.

JOHN ERIC CAMPBELL -- john@campbelllawllc.com -- Co-Counsel for
Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

RALPH K. PHALEN -- phalenlaw@yahoo.com -- Co-Counsel for
Appellant, JODIE NEVILS.

THOMAS McKEE DEE, Attorney for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC.

DAVID M. EISENBERG -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- BAKER STERCHI
COWDEN & RICE, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC.

MIGUEL A. ESTRADA -- mestrada@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC.

MARK G. ARNOLD -- mark.arnold@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH
BLACKWELL LLP, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC.

MELISSA ZIGLER BARIS, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH
PLAN, INC.

ELIZABETH ANN MUSHILL, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH
PLAN, INC.

THOMAS N. STERCHI, Co-Counsel for Respondent, GROUP HEALTH PLAN,
INC.

WINTHROP BLACKSTONE REED, III -- wreed@lewisrice.com -- Attorney
for Respondent, ACS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.

STEVEN DAVID HALL, Co-Counsel for Respondent, ACS RECOVERY
SERVICES, INC.

RONALD BRADLEY ZIEGLER -- bziegler@lewisrice.com -- LEWIS RICE
LLC, Co-Counsel for Respondent, ACS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.

NEAL FREDERICK PERRYMAN -- nperryman@lewisrice.com -- Co-Counsel
for Respondent, ACS RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.

NICHOLAS PATRICK LLEWELLYN -- nicholas@llewellynlaw.com --
Attorney for Amicus Curiae, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

HENRY C. WHITAKER, Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.

CHRISTOPHER OWEN BAUMAN -- cbauman@bbdlc.com -- Attorney for
Amicus Curiae, ASSOCIATION OF FEDERAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS.

DAVID ERMER -- dermer@ermerlaw.com -- ERMER LAW GROUP, PLLC, Co-
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, ASSOCIATION OF FEDERAL HEALTH
ORGANIZATIONS.


GROVETOWN, GA: Water Utility Fees Case Settlement Finalized
-----------------------------------------------------------
Abbigail Lennon, writing for The Columbia County News Times,
reports that a settlement from the city of Grovetown in a class
action lawsuit, in which two residents claimed water utility fees
were adjusted to cover up alleged embezzlement by a city employee
at the center of a federal investigation, was finalized by a judge
during a fairness hearing.

Council, representing the residents in the lawsuit, explained to
Columbia County Superior Court Judge Michael N. Annis that
settlement administrators Kurtzman Carson Consultants out of
California had been contracted to distribute the $1.5 million
settlement among the more than 8,000 residents affected.

During the hearing, attorneys Jeff Peil and Charles Huggins
explained the process of notifying all affected residents and that
none that were notified had decided to opt out of the settlement.

As of the hearing, more than 1,000 residents involved had
submitted claims to KCC, and that number was expected to increase,
according to Huggins, who stated that KCC expected some 19 percent
of affected residents to make claims.  Mr. Peil said that any
unclaimed money from the settlement, would be returned to the city
of Grovetown.

One amendment was made to the final settlement, according to
Grovetown's city attorney Chris Dube.

Due to stipulations of the settlement, the city was no longer
allowed to accept cash payments from residents to pay their water
utility bill.  According to Mr. Dube, restricting the cash option
had caused a hardship for what he said was a majority of the
Grovetown population.

Mr. Dube said the amended settlement puts a one-year sunset on
that particular stipulation and cash payments will be allowed to
resume, effective June 1, 2018.

Other stipulations set forth in the settlement mandated that the
city pay $750,000 up front and continue payments of $62,500 per
month for the remainder of 2017, to finalize the $1.5 million
agreed to be repaid to affected parties.

The settlement was proposed in January by the city of Grovetown,
after Mr. Dube replaced the city's longtime attorney Brendan
Fleming.

The city is currently awaiting the conclusion of a federal
investigation launched in March 2016 by the Treasury Department
into a suspected embezzlement scheme by former city clerk
Vicky Capetillo.  According to previous Columbia County News-Times
reports, Grovetown Mayor Gary Jones said the evidence brought to
light in that ongoing investigation, would have made it impossible
for the city to argue the claims brought forth in the class action
lawsuit.

The settlement is one of several cases Grovetown was involved in
that have been either dismissed without prejudice or concluded
since Fleming's ouster by unanimous approval in January. [GN]


GRUBHUB: September 5 Trial Set on Employee-Contractor Issue
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Ben Hancock of The Recorder, reports that in the
running legal controversy over what rights workers should have in
the "gig economy," ride-hailing giants Uber and Lyft have grabbed
many of the headlines -- so far without any resolution in court.

But a sleeper case against the food delivery app GrubHub could be
the one that finally puts the issue to the test.

On June 29, U.S. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Corley of the
Northern District of California indicated she would let an
individual employment case head toward trial in September against
GrubHub on behalf of a former delivery driver named Raef Lawson.
At a hearing, Judge Corley noted that it could be something of a
bellwether case for a long-percolating issue.

"There actually hasn't been a judgment yet . . . on applying the
new economy to, as Judge Chhabria would say, 'the square peg and
the round hole,'" Judge Corley said, referring to District Judge
Vince Chhabria, who presided over a case against Lyft Inc. that
ultimately settled.

The underlying issue is whether workers for on-demand services
enabled by smartphone apps qualify under the law as employees, or
-- as the bulk of gig-economy companies maintain -- are
independent contractors. The distinction affects whether their
workers are entitled to minimum wage, reimbursement for expenses,
rest breaks and other rights under federal and state labor law.

The GrubHub case started as a class action in state court in
San Francisco, filed in 2015, but was removed to federal court.
Last year, Judge Corley ruled that the case could not move forward
as a class action because Mr. Lawson had opted out of GrubHub's
arbitration clause, and thus could not represent a class of food
couriers who had failed to do so.  But she also denied a motion to
dismiss the case by GrubHub's lawyers at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.

On June 29, Judge Corley said in court that she would not grant a
summary judgment motion against Lawson on the employee-contractor
issue, while holding open that she might limit some of his expense
reimbursement or overtime claims prior to trial.

Although the case is no longer a class action, it still represents
a significant threat to GrubHub.  That's because Lawson's lawyer,
Boston-based attorney Shannon Liss-Riordan, is also pursuing
claims under California's Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA),
which can carry stiff statutory penalties for violations of the
state's labor code.

Ms. Liss-Riordan is the same attorney who has been fighting driver
battles against Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft in courts across
the country.  While her $27 million Lyft settlement was approved
in June 2016, an $84 million settlement she negotiated with Uber
was rejected last August -- in large part because the judge found
she had failed to adequately value the PAGA claim against Uber.

GrubHub has argued that Lawson -- who was ultimately booted off of
the GrubHub app for failing to respond to delivery requests --
could not be considered an employee as a matter of law because he
was permitted to compete for other delivery services
simultaneously, and he had a large amount of discretion over
whether and where he worked.

Ms. Liss-Riordan, meanwhile, contends that the company still
exerted a significant degree of control over Lawson, as an
employer would. She is also pursuing a national class action
against GrubHub in federal court in Chicago.

The bench trial in Judge Corley's courtroom is set to begin
Sept. 5.


HANSON AGGREGATES: NEI Contracting Appeals Order to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc., filed an appeal
from a court ruling relating to its lawsuit entitled NEI
Contracting & Engineering v. Hanson Aggregates Pacific SW, et al.,
Case No. 3:12-cv-01685-BAS-JLB, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as NEI Contracting & Engineering
v. Hanson Aggregates Pacific SW, et al., Case No. 17-55903, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 8,
2017, Judge Cynthia Bashant denied the Plaintiff's motion for
attorney's fees and costs.

Plaintiff NEI placed orders for concrete by phone with Defendant
Hanson.  After accepting delivery of the concrete, NEI refused to
pay for it.  But NEI's efforts to stiff Hanson crumbled when
Hanson produced recordings of its phone orders.  The company paid
its bill in full.

NEI then filed this putative class action against Hanson based on
Hanson's practice of recording customers' phone calls.  It hoped
to recover millions of dollars in damages on behalf of a class of
Hanson's customers.  NEI also sought to change Hanson's conduct.
The company succeeded on the second point -- part way through the
litigation, Hanson voluntarily changed its phone system's
admonition to advise customers that their calls may be recorded.

By the time NEI discovered Hanson's new behavior, the company's
contingency fee counsel had already invested nearly $300,000 worth
of time into this case.  Yet, the hope of a large class action
recovery never materialized.  NEI proceeded to trial on its
individual claim against Hanson, and it lost.  The company
recovered nothing.

Now, NEI turns to California's Private Attorney General Statute
and the state's catalyst theory to try to recoup some of its
counsel's investment.  By leveraging its success in changing
Hanson's conduct, the company hopes to subsidize its unsuccessful
pursuit of a class action recovery.  Thus, NEI seeks to recover
all of its attorneys' fees up to the date it discovered Hanson's
new behavior.  The company also requests this fee amount be
increased by a multiplier of 1.75 -- for a total bounty of almost
$500,000.  Hanson opposes.

The Court is unconvinced.  Although NEI achieved partial success,
a fee award is not appropriate, the Court ruled.  NEI does not
meet its burden of demonstrating the requirements under
California's Private Attorney General Statute and the catalyst
theory are satisfied, the Court said.  NEI does not demonstrate a
fee award is appropriate under section 1021.5 on a catalyst theory
basis for several reasons, the Court added.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire was due July 5, 2017;

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 26, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on August 25, 2017;

   -- Appellant NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc.'s opening
      brief is due on October 4, 2017;

   -- Appellees Hanson Aggregates Pacific Southwest, Inc., Hanson
      Aggregates, Inc. and Lehigh Hanson, Co.'s answering brief
      is due on November 3, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant NEI CONTRACTING AND ENGINEERING, INC., on
Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, is represented
by:

          Douglas James Campion, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS J. CAMPION, APC
          17150 Via Del Campo
          San Diego, CA 92127
          Telephone: (619) 299-2091
          Facsimile: (619) 858-0034
          E-mail: doug@djcampion.com

               - and -

          Richard Eron Grey, Esq.
          GREY LAW GROUP, APC
          409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 303
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 543-9307
          Facsimile: (619) 543-9307
          E-mail: contact@richardegrey.com

Defendants-Appellees HANSON AGGREGATES PACIFIC SOUTHWEST, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; HANSON AGGREGATES, INC.; and LEHIGH HANSON,
CO., are represented by:

          Valerie Elizabeth Alter, Esq.
          Fred R. Puglisi, Esq.
          Jay T. Ramsey, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6001
          Telephone: (310) 228-3710
          Facsimile: (310) 228-3701
          E-mail: valter@sheppardmullin.com
                  fpuglisi@sheppardmullin.com
                  jramsey@sheppardmullin.com

               - and -

          John C. Dineen, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          501 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101-3598
          Telephone: (619) 338-6609
          Facsimile: (619) 234-3815
          E-mail: jdineen@sheppardmullin.com


ICARE CREDIT: "Vu" Telemarketing Suit Transferred to C.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Hung V. Vu, D.D.S., (d/b/a Vu Orthodontics), on
behalf of itself and all persons and entities similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. ICare Credit, LLC (d/b/a iCare Financial) and Does
1 - 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00790, (N.D. Cal.,
February 16, 2017) was transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on June 22, 2017, under Case
No. 2:17-cv-04609.

Vu seeks injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages for
willful and negligent violations, costs and reasonable attorney's
fees and such other and further relief under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Plaintiff operates an orthodontic practice at 16027 Brookhurst
St., Suite K, Fountain Valley, California 92708. On January 7,
2016, and on January 12, 2016, iCare and/or its agents transmitted
unsolicited facsimile advertisements to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thomas W. Falvey, Esq.
     Michael H. Boyamian, Esq.
     Armand R. Kizirian, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS W. FALVEY
     550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
     Glendale, CA 91203-1922
     Telephone: (818) 547-5200
     Email: thomaswfalvey@gmail.com
            mike.falveylaw@gmail.com,
            armand.falveylaw@gmail.com

            - and -

     Andre E. Jardini, Esq.
     K.L. Myles, Esq.
     KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE
     550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
     Glendale, CA 91203-1922
     Telephone: (818) 547-5000
     Facsimile: (818) 547-5329
     Email: aej@kpclegal.com
            klm@kpclegal.com

            - and -

     Stephen M. Rinka, Esq.
     THE RINKA LAW FIRM
     433 N. Camden Dr., Suite 600
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Telephone: (310) 556-9653
     Facsimile: (310) 579-8768
     Email: stephen.rinka@gmail.com

ICare Credit, LLC is represented by:

     Michael A. Bowse, Esq.
     BROWNE GEORGE ROSS LLP
     2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Tel: (310) 274-7100
     Fax: (310) 275-5697
     Email: mbowse@bgrfirm.com


INGHAM COUNTY, MI: Prisoner's Civil Rights Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Western District of Michigan
dismissed the case captioned PAUL JACKSON et al., Plaintiffs, v.
INGHAM COUNTY JAIL et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-237 (W.D.
Mich.).

This is a civil rights action, originally brought by three Ingham
County Jail inmates. According to the complaint, Plaintiff is
lodged in a cell originally designed for one person, which is
presently occupied by two people. The cell is made of brick on all
four sides, with a solid entrance door. Plaintiff is locked in his
cell for 18 hours in every day.  He asserts that no running or
other cardio-vascular exercise is permitted in the out-of-cell
area.

Plaintiff alleges that the toilet for his cell is digitally timed
to flush only twice in every hour. If both prisoners use the
toilet once during the course of an hour, no flushes remain until
the hour has passed.  When one of the prisoners needs to use the
toilet a third time in the hour, his urine and feces must remain
in the toilet until the timer is reset. He contends that, in such
instances, he must smell the odors of the urine or feces until the
toilet can be flushed again.

Plaintiff claims that the prison has closed one "post" due to the
presence of black mold. They have no way of knowing if the spores
are airborne and therefore dangerous.

Plaintiff has entitled his complaint as a class action, which the
Court construes as a request for class certification. The court
must be satisfied on a number of grounds, including the adequacy
of class representation for the case to proceed. Because Plaintiff
is an incarcerated pro se litigant, the Court finds that he is not
an appropriate representative of a class. Therefore, the Court
will deny Plaintiff's request for class certification.

It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute
factual allegations to particular defendants. Where a person is
named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct,
the complaint is subject to dismissal. Plaintiff fails to even to
mention either Defendant Gaston or Defendant Wallace in the body
of his complaint. His allegations therefore fall far short of the
minimal pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8. As a
consequence, the Court will dismiss Defendants Gaston and Wallace.

Plaintiff fails to make specific factual allegations against
Defendant Wrigglesworth, other than to claim that he failed to
correct the problems. Government officials may not be held liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates.  A claimed
constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Plaintiff has failed to allege that
Defendant Wrigglesworth engaged in any active unconstitutional
behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against him.

Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Routine discomfort is 'part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.

The Supreme Court held that prison overcrowding, standing alone,
does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Rather, Plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that crowded conditions led to independent
deprivations of essential food, medical care, sanitation, or other
necessities.

He alleges only that the day room does not permit him to engage in
cardiovascular exercise, not that he was deprived of all ability
to exercise in his cell, such as running in place and doing
jumping jacks. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he is never
permitted out-of-cell exercise.

With respect to Plaintiff's claim that his cell toilet will not
flush more than twice per hour, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
of constitutional magnitude. Plaintiff does not allege that either
he or his cellmate suffers from a chronic need to use the restroom
more than once per hour. Routine discomfort is 'part of the
penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.  A prisoner's exposure to the smell of feces is not
sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Plaintiff expressly states that he does not have any knowledge
about whether mold from another part of the jail has become
airborne, and he does not allege that the presence of mold causes
him health problems. Plaintiffs' allegations about the presence of
mold do not demonstrate the existence of a sufficiently serious
risk to prisoner health to implicate the Eighth Amendment.

A three-minute shower, while brief, does not amount to a
deprivation of basic sanitation within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.  No reasonable factfinder could conclude that a short
shower results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.

The Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(c).

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/QSMhqR from Leagle.com.

Keith Medlin, plaintiff, Pro Se.


IMAGE FIRST: Defendants' Motion to Stay "Campanelli" Granted
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Northern District California
issued an Order Granting Motion to Stay in Part and Denying Motion
for Relief from Non-Dispositive Magistrate Judge Order in the case
captioned KYLE L. CAMPANELLI, Plaintiff, v. IMAGE FIRST HEALTHCARE
LAUNDRY SPECIALISTS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-
04456-PJH (N.D. Calif.).

This is a putative class/collective action alleging violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and California labor laws.  Plaintiff
Kyle Campanelli was employed by ImageFIRST of California as a
delivery person. Plaintiff's primary job duty was to pick up
soiled laundry from ImageFIRST customers and deliver it to a
warehouse/laundry center, and to pick up clean laundry from the
warehouse/laundry center and deliver it to ImageFIRST customers.

Campanelli alleges that he worked over forty hours a week but was
denied meals and rest periods, and was never paid overtime
compensation. Campanelli seeks to represent all similarly situated
delivery persons of any ImageFIRST entity nationwide (the
"National Collective") in a collective action for failure to pay
overtime wages under FLSA. Campanelli also seeks to represent a
Rule 23 class of similarly situated delivery persons who were
wrongly classified as exempt under California labor laws
Instead of filing an answer, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. plaintiff filed a motion to
compel regarding the jurisdictional discovery. The court denied
the motion to compel, and subsequently granted the motion to
dismiss IF Uniform.  plaintiff sought discovery from the remaining
two defendants. Defendants objected to.  The matter was referred
to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim. Judge Kim granted plaintiff's
motion to compel in part.

On May 2, 2017, defendants filed a motion to stay all class and
collective action proceedings until the Supreme Court issues a
decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-285 ("Epic"), the
Supreme Court will address whether "an agreement that requires an
employer and an employee to resolve employment-related disputes
through individual arbitration, and waive class and collective
proceedings, is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act,
notwithstanding the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act.

Defendants filed a motion for relief from Magistrate Judge Kim's
discovery orders on the same day as their motion to stay.

Defendants' motion to stay argues that "virtually all" of the
putative class members have signed arbitration agreements that
include a concerted action waiver. If the Supreme Court overturns
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Morris, it is possible that many
putative class members will be precluded from participating in a
class or collective action. Defendants therefore argue that the
decision in Epic could have a dramatic impact on the size of the
putative class/collective in this case.

Plaintiff, for his part, argues that defendants have not shown
that any class members are subject to binding arbitration
agreements, because defendants rely on only a "hearsay"
declaration that does not attach any signed, dated agreements.
Even if defendants' evidence is accepted, plaintiff claims that a
stay is inappropriate because any further delay in this case would
affect the rights of the putative class.

Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court finds
that a stay is appropriate because two preliminary legal issues
must be resolved before the propriety of class/collective
certification can be determined. This requires a judicial
determination as to (1) whether the employees of non-party
ImageFIRST entities are properly part of the putative class; and
(2) whether the alleged arbitration agreements are enforceable,
and if so, how many putative class members have signed concerted
action waivers.

The court concludes that it would be inefficient to proceed to the
certification stage until these two issues are resolved, the court
grants defendants' motion to stay this case in part.

The Motion for Relief from Magistrate Judge Kim's Orders

The court denies the motion for relief from Magistrate Judge Kim's
discovery orders.  While plaintiff properly sought pre-
certification discovery on the California class, defendants are
not required to divulge contact information as to the putative
nationwide collective until after conditional certification.
However, as class and collective discovery is now stayed per this
order, defendants' request for relief on this basis is denied as
moot.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Order is
available at  https://is.gd/xlQzhX from Leagle.com.

Kyle L. Campanelli, Plaintiff, represented by David C. Feola --
www.hobanandfeola.com -- Hoban & Feola, LLC.

Kyle L. Campanelli, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Malloy --
info@brandilaw.com-- The Brandi Law Firm.

Image First Healthcare Laundry Specialists, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Eric Meckley  -- eric.meckley@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Kathryn M. Nazarian --
kate.nazarian@morganlewis.com --  Morgan, Lewis and Bockius &
Nancy VillarreaL -- nancy.villarreal@morganlewis.com -- Morgan
Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Image First of California, LLC, Defendant, represented by Eric
Meckley, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Kathryn M. Nazarian, Morgan,
Lewis and Bockius & Nancy Villarreal, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP.


JAKLITSCH BUILDERS: "Guastafeste" Requests Judicial Intervention
----------------------------------------------------------------
Request for Judicial Intervention was filed on June 27, 2017 in
the case captioned Anthony Guastafeste, individually and on behalf
of all other trust fund beneficiaries entitled to share in the
funds received by Jaklitsch Builders, Inc. in connection with
certain improvements, Plaintiff, v. Jaklitsch Builders, Inc. and
Frank Jaklitsch, Defendants, Case No. 601451/2017 (N.Y. Sup.,
February 17, 2017).

Guastafeste entered into a Contract with Jaklitsch Builders as
general contractor, overseeing and performing various general
construction work on a property at 19 South Road, Oyster Bay Cove,
NY, 11771 for the sum of $760,000.00.

The complaint says Jaklitsch Builders are in breach of contract by
failing to coordinate the work of all subcontractors, failing to
pay subcontractors for their work performed, failing to perform
work in accordance with the design plans, drawings and
specifications, and failing to perform the work in a professional
manner. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard G. Gertler, Esq.
      GERTLER LAW GROUP, LLC
      90 Merrick Avenue, No. 400
      East Meadow, NY 11554
      Tel: (516) 228-3553


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Health Funds Seek Inquiry Into Mesh Devices
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that health funds have
suggested a royal commission into Australia's medical device
industry after a class action by hundreds of women suffering pain
from vaginal mesh implants.

More than 700 women are suing global healthcare giant Johnson &
Johnson in the Federal Court in Sydney over the devices they say
have had devastating effects including chronic pain and
incontinence.

A Senate inquiry into the cost of private health insurance in
Canberra on July 5 heard the medical device industry had been
allowed to get away with overcharging taxpayers and patients for
years, costing billions of dollars.

Matthew Koce, chief executive of hirmaa, a body that represents 22
not-for-profit and member-owned health funds, said the mesh case
was "gravely concerning", insisting it was time consumers got
answers.

"What this highlights is just how in the dark consumers are being
kept about their health choices," he told senators.

He said rules that make medical devices more expensive for private
patients than public patients were costing taxpayers and consumers
$1 billion every year and yet authorities had failed to take
action.

It might be time for a royal commission into the industry, he
said.

"We have to question why . . . these massive foreign-headquartered
global organisations are being treated as protected species --
it's just extraordinary," Mr Koce said.

"This is the most pressing and most obvious area for reform in
private health."

Private health insurers blame expensive medical devices as a
reason for higher premiums.

The medical device industry argues prices are lower for public
hospitals because they buy larger volumes and points the finger
for rising premiums at private hospitals.

Mr Koce also lashed out at private hospital operators including
main players Ramsay and Healthscope, arguing executives at those
companies were raking in millions.

"It's really becoming almost a licence to print money to run some
of these hospitals," he said.

Australia's biggest health fund, Medibank, also fronted the
hearing, grilled by Labor's Sam Dastyari about its 29 per cent
return on equity.

"That's double the return on equity that the banks make," Senator
Dastyari said.

"We tax the banks $6 billion, we give the health insurers $6
billion and you have double the rate of return on equity - that
blows me away."

Medibank executive Andrew Wilson insisted the business was run
efficiently.

Private Health Insurance Ombudsman director David McGregor said
customers were increasingly frustrated by rising costs, with a 40
per cent increase in complaints in the first quarter of 2017.

The Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association expressed
concern about health funds advertising "junk" hospital policies to
consumers as a way to avoid tax.

"I don't understand why it's allowed or how it provides any
benefit at all," chief executive Alison Verhoeven said.

The inquiry report will be tabled in November. [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Pelvic Mesh Implants Suit Begins in Sydney
-------------------------------------------------------------
Janelle Miles, writing for Courier Mail, reports that a landmark
class action against the manufacturers and distributors of pelvic
mesh implants begins, as women continue to come forward with pain,
ruined sex lives and broken relationships.

Queenslander Louise King, one of about 800 women who have
registered to take part in the Federal Court action, has had
ongoing pain since she had pelvic mesh inserted for a prolapsed
vagina more than 10 years ago.

The 65-year-old was never able to have sex with her husband again.

Shine Lawyers' Rebecca Jancauskas, Esq., says about 8000 to 10,000
Australian women are likely to have suffered complications from
the mesh implants.

"I didn't have any trouble before the operation," she said.

The couple had been married for 38 years when her husband, Paul,
died of cancer in 2014.

Mrs. King said she returned to her surgeon three times after her
operation to advise him of her pain but was told: "There's nothing
wrong."

Shine Lawyers special counsel Rebecca Jancauskas said the class
action, set down for six months, was against Johnson and Johnson
Medical Australia and subsidiary companies Ethicon Inc and Ethicon
Sarl.

"We will say that they've breached product legislation in
Australia and also that they've been negligent in their
manufacture and supply of the implants," Ms. Jancauskas said.

"It's a landmark case in terms of Australian class actions, both
in terms of the number of people who have been affected and also
the length of the trial."

She said between 90,000 and 100,000 of the implants had been sold
in Australia.

"We estimate that in the vicinity of about 8000 to 10,000
Australian women are likely to have suffered complications as a
result," Ms. Jancauskas said.

"These are very intimate issues and women are reluctant to come
forward and talk about them, understandably so," she said.

"For that reason, many women have been suffering in silence. Their
relationships often break down.

"Trying to remove the implants has been referred to by
surgeons . . . as trying to remove chewing gum from hair. These
implants become so intertwined with the tissue of the pelvis, it
becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to remove in its
entirely."

The Senate is conducting an inquiry into pelvic mesh implants.

Ms. Jancauskas said women could still join the class action. [GN]


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: 700+ Australian Women Join Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Findlaw.com, citing Kristen Gelineau of The Associated Press,
reports that more than 700 Australian women in a class-action case
against pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson that started on
July 4 argued that the company's vaginal mesh implants caused them
devastating pain, ravaged their bodies and, in some cases, ruined
their lives.

Patients across the United States, United Kingdom and Canada have
filed tens of thousands of lawsuits against Johnson & Johnson and
other pelvic mesh manufacturers over the devices, which are used
to treat urinary incontinence and repair pelvic organ prolapse, a
condition often caused by childbirth in which organs shift out of
place.  Women who have sued the manufacturers say the mesh caused
them chronic and often debilitating pain, infections, loss of
sexual function and incontinence.  In 2014, Irish medical device
maker Endo International said it would pay $830 million to settle
more than 20,000 personal injury lawsuits related to its vaginal
mesh implants.

The Australian trial that began Tuesday is expected to last six
months.  The lawsuit argues the U.S.-based company was negligent
for not properly warning doctors and patients about the risks
associated with the devices.  The lawsuit also contends that the
products were not fit for the purposes for which they were
designed, and the testing prior to the devices being sold was
inadequate.

Gai Thompson, one of the claimants in the lawsuit, said she has
suffered pain every day since she received the implant.

"No amount of compensation, money, could ever replace what we've
lost with our lives, with our families, our health, our emotional
health," Ms. Thompson told reporters outside court.  "My prayer is
that this mesh would be banned and that no woman would suffer what
we suffer."

Attorney Jan Saddler of Shine Lawyers, the firm representing the
women, said the major problem with the devices is that they erode
into surrounding tissue and organs, causing a chronic inflammatory
response.  Virtually all the women involved in the lawsuit suffer
chronic pain, and many have experienced relationship problems due
to their inability to have sex,
Ms. Saddler said.

"Many women are no longer able to have any sort of sexual
relationship, or if they are able to have a sexual relationship,
there is a lot of pain associated with that," Ms. Saddler said.
"Women have been also unable to really enjoy proper fulfilling
relationships not only with their partners, but with their
children, with their friends. . . . Women have found it very
difficult to work in the way they used to work. So it's had really
debilitating impacts."

Johnson & Johnson says it has sold over 100,000 mesh products in
Australia.  The lawsuit singles out nine separate devices; of
those, the company has taken five off the market.  None of the
devices have been subject to a recall by Australian regulators. In
the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration last year reclassified
all pelvic mesh implants as "high risk" instead of moderate,
making them subject to extra regulatory requirements. But the
agency has not recalled the devices.

In a statement, Johnson & Johnson said the use of mesh to treat
pelvic organ prolapse and urinary incontinence has successfully
helped millions of women worldwide, and said the majority of women
who undergo the surgery have had a positive result.

"These pelvic mesh products have been developed in close
consultation with specialist surgeons and are backed by years of
clinical research," the company said.  "We have always complied
fully with local regulatory requirements when providing the
products in Australia, and have acted ethically and responsibly in
the research, development and supply of the products."

Ms. Thompson said she wants the company to be held accountable for
the suffering she and so many other women say the mesh has caused.

"For so many years, we've been told that there's nothing wrong
with us, that symptoms are either in our head or it's not because
of the mesh.  But there are so many women who have the same
complications," Ms. Thompson said.  "The mesh destroys lives -- it
destroys you physically and emotionally."


JOSEPH CORY: Seeks Review of Ruling in "Lupian" Suit to 3rd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Joseph Cory Holdings LLC filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit titled Alejandro Lupian, et al. v. Joseph
Cory Holdings LLC, Case No. 2-16-cv-05172, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, and
the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

JOSEPH CORY HOLDINGS LLC is in the business of providing the
delivery of appliances, furniture, and other merchandise to its
customers.

The appellate case is captioned as Alejandro Lupian, et al. v.
Joseph Cory Holdings LLC, Case No. 17-2346, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees ALEJANDRO LUPIAN, JUAN LUPIAN, JOSE REYES,
EFFRAIN LUCATERO and ISAIAS LUNA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Alexandra K. Piazza, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 875-3000
          E-mail: apiazza@bm.net

Defendant-Appellant JOSEPH CORY HOLDINGS LLC is represented by:

          Peter F. Berk, Esq.
          GENOVA BURNS
          494 Broad Street
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 533-0777
          Facsimile: (973) 533-1112
          E-mail: pberk@genovaburns.com


JUNO USA: Drivers File Class Action in New York
-----------------------------------------------
Mike Torres, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that three
drivers have filed a class action lawsuit against Juno and other
driving services, alleging negligent misrepresentation.

Mohammed Razzak, Mohammad Siddique and Mhammad Islam filed a
complaint, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, June 9 in U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York against Juno USA, LP, Vulcan Cars LLC, Talmon Marco
and GT Forge Inc. doing business as Gett, alleging that they made
false representations regarding their business in order to deceive
the plaintiffs.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs were damaged monetarily
from being induced into joining the Juno driving force.  The
plaintiffs allege the defendants failed to honor their agreements
with their drivers.

The plaintiffs seek trial by jury, compensatory and punitive
damages, interest, restitution, injunctive relief, attorney fees
and court costs.  They are represented by attorney Mohammed Gangat
of Law Office of Mohammed Gangat in New Hyde Park, New York.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York case
number 1:17-cv-04373-DLC
[GN]


KELLOGG COMPANY: Mantikas Appeals E.D.N.Y. Opinion to 2nd Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Kristen Mantikas, Kristin Burns and Linda Castle filed
an appeal from the District Court's opinion dated May 31, 2017,
entered in their lawsuit styled Mantikas v. Kellogg Company, Case
No. 16-cv-2552, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Central Islip).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 8,
2017, Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein dismissed the case on May 31.
The Plaintiffs commenced the purported class action against
Kellogg, seeking both monetary and injunctive relief.  The
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that they "read and relied on
Kellogg's false and misleading labeling in purchasing Cheez-It
Whole Grain crackers, including the representation that the
crackers were 'WHOLE GRAIN.'"

According to the Plaintiffs, Kellogg deliberately capitalizes on
foreseeable consumer misconceptions about Cheez-It Whole Grain
crackers in its marketing and sales scheme, and has therefore
reaped, and continues to reap, increased sales and profits.

The appellate case is captioned as Mantikas v. Kellogg Company,
Case No. 17-2011, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Kristen Mantikas, Kristin Burns and Linda
Castle, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Michael Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 594-5300
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

Defendant-Appellee Kellogg Company is represented by:

          Kelly M. Morrison, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          1099 New York Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 639-6000
          E-mail: kmorrison@jenner.com


KEYNOTE CONSULTING: Centers Files Suit Over Collection Letter
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wesley Centers and Michelle Centers, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Keynote Consulting,
Inc., an Illinois corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02163
(S.D. Ind., June 22, 2017), seeks statutory damages, costs, and
reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Keynote Consulting, Inc. is an Illinois corporation that acts as a
debt collector, including delinquent consumer debts, in the
Southern District of Indiana.

Due to financial difficulties, the Centers fell behind on paying
their bills, including one they owed to Progressive Learning
Corporation. Defendant's collection letter contained the
threatening words "Your silence will probably be very costly to
you. Your credit is being computerized and will become available
nationally to the following credit grantor, among others . . .
utility companies," and such threat constitutes an unfair or
unconscionable means to collect a debt, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      Angie K. Robertson, Esq.
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      Email: davephilipps@aol.com
             mephilipps@aol.com
             angiekrobertson@aol.com

             - and -

      John T. Steinkamp, Esq.
      5214 S. East Street, Suite D1
      Indianapolis, IN 46227
      Tel: (317) 780-8300
      Fax: (317) 217-1320
      Email: steinkamplaw@yahoo.com


KOLBE & KOLBE: 7th Cir. Affirms Partial Summary Ruling in "Haley"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the appeals case captioned MARY HALEY, et al. Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. KOLBE & KOLBE MILLWORK CO., Defendant-Appellee, No.
16-3192 (7th Cir.), Judge Joel Flaum of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court to (i) grant partial summary judgment in Kolbe's favor on a
number of claims; (ii) exclude the Plaintiffs' experts; (iii) deny
class certification; and (iv) ultimately find that the Plaintiffs'
individual claims likewise could not survive without expert
support.

Seven pairs of spouses and one individual filed this putative
class action against the Defendant in February of 2014, alleging
that Kolbe sold them defective windows that leak and rot.  The
Plaintiffs brought common-law and statutory claims for breach of
express and implied warranties, negligent design and manufacturing
of the windows, negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations as to
the condition of the windows, and unjust enrichment.  The district
court granted partial summary judgment in Kolbe's favor on a
number of claims, eventually excluded the Plaintiffs' experts and
denied class certification, and ultimately found that the
Plaintiffs' individual claims likewise could not survive without
expert support.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants first appeal the exclusion of both of
their experts, arguing that the district court acknowledged but
failed to apply the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
five-factor test, instead improperly evaluating the factual
accuracy of the expert opinions.  They contend that the district
court's finding of a factual mistake in Joel Wolf's opinion was
plainly wrong given evidence proving that the finishing of the
sashes was irrelevant, and that considerations such as the
persuasiveness of an expert's opinion and the expert's credibility
are relevant only in evaluating the persuasiveness of the
testimony, not in determining its admissibility.  Judge Flaum
finds that the problem for the Plaintiffs-Appellants is that they
forfeited all of these challenges to Wolf's exclusion by failing
to raise them in their response to Kolbe's Daubert motion.  They
are responsible for having closed the door on their arguments in
the first instance; Judge Flaum sees no reason why they should now
be permitted to belatedly reopen it.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants also challenge the district court's
exclusion of Haskell Beckham, arguing that the district court's
criticisms of Beckham's opinion again ought to have gone toward
his credibility or the weight to be given to his opinion, not its
admissibility, and that it is not the district court's role to
decide what type of testing is appropriate.  However, the district
court's evaluation (and criticism) of Beckham's methods and
analysis tracked Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
be the product of reliable methods applied to the facts of the
case, as well as the Daubert factors concerning whether a theory
has been tested, the standards controlling the technique's
operation, and whether the technique has achieved general
acceptance in the relevant expert community.  The district court
thus acted appropriately as the gate-keeper for Beckham's
testimony.  Accordingly, Judge Flaum agreed with the district
court's determinations and concluded that the district court's
ultimate decision to exclude Beckham did not amount to an abuse of
discretion.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants next argue that the district court erred
in dismissing their remaining individual claims.  They first
generally (and extraneously) fault the district court for not
referencing a Rule, statute, or other procedural mechanism to
guide Appellants' response to the district court's order to show
cause, and also complain that Kolbe never previously sought
summary judgment on the issue of causation.  However, the district
court's course of action is akin to granting summary judgment sua
sponte, which this Court has repeatedly held permissible, though
it is a procedure that warrants special caution.  The district
court gave explicit notice here (absence of a formal rule citation
notwithstanding), and Judge Flaum says the Plaintiffs-Appellants
cannot sincerely claim to have been taken by surprise.

They next contend that genuine issues of material fact existed as
to both the causation and defect aspects of their breach-of-
express-warranty claims.  They assert that, even without expert
testimony, a reasonable jury could have inferred causation from
evidence such as emails from Kolbe and Kolbe's distributors,
photographs, and various service-request forms.  As a preliminary
matter, however, the district court acted within its discretion in
deeming inadmissible various emails on which they had hoped to
rely.  Meanwhile, the other evidence to which the Plaintiffs-
Appellants cite falls short of showing causation, and, without
expert evidence, may even fail to establish a design defect.

The Plaintiffs-appellants also appeal the district court's
determination that they waived their implied-warranty-of-
merchantability claims related to false or misleading labeling.
However, Judge Flaum finds these allegations too vague to have
made out the claims at issue.  And even if allegations of impaired
marketing-and-development warranties could be stretched to
encompass the "ringer" claims, they still failed to develop or
advance such claims until their first motion for class
certification, despite having had ample opportunities to raise
these claims previously.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Samuels and Groome also try on appeal to
resurrect their claims under the WDTPA.  However, the absence of a
reliance requirement does not relieve them of the need to
establish causation -- i.e., that the alleged misrepresentation
somehow caused them loss.  And both Samuels and Groome testified
before the district court that they had neither seen nor cared
about any allegedly false advertising by Kolbe -- their builder
had used only Kolbe windows, and that fact had no effect on their
choice to proceed with buying their home.

Finally, the Plaintiffs-Appellants point to five of the district
court's rulings and contend that, together, these rulings deprived
them of due process.  First off, the Plaintiffs-Appellants may
very well have forfeited this argument by failing to raise it
directly before the district court, Judge Flaum finds.  Second,
even construing their motions for reconsideration and appeals to
fairness at various stages of the litigation as implicit
invocations of this due-process argument, such a claim fails on
the merits.  As he explained, with respect to each ruling, they
had ample notice and opportunities to be heard, which more often
than not they squandered.  Thus, none of the district court's
decisions, either individually or collectively, rose to an abuse
of discretion.  Just because the Plaintiffs-Appellants repeatedly
missed their opportunities to make various arguments, and then
disliked the consequences, does not mean they were deprived of
process.  For these reasons, Judge Flaum affirmed the judgment of
the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/3ECChr from Leagle.com.

Michael J. Flannery -- mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Gordon Davenport, III -- gdavenport@foley.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Kent I. Carnell -- kcarnell@lawtoncates.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Susan G. Schellinger -- sschellinger@dkattorneys.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Matthew R. Lynch -- mlynch@foley.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Megan R. Stelljes -- mstelljes@foley.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Katherine W. Van Dyck -- kvandyck@cuneolaw.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Susana Cruz Hodge -- scruzhodge@litedepalma.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Joseph DePalma -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.


LAKE OSWEGO, OR: Class Status Recommended for Title IX Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jillian Daley, writing for Lake Oswego Review, reports that
a federal judge has recommended that a Title IX lawsuit filed
against the Lake Oswego School District should be granted class-
action status and expanded to include every current and future
female student at Lake Oswego High School.

In an opinion filed June 29 in U.S. District Court, Magistrate
Judge Stacie Beckerman agreed with the case's original plaintiffs
-- 10 former and current members of the Laker softball team --
that there is enough evidence of systemic inequities between
female and male players at LOHS for the case to include all of the
nearly 600 female students at the school -- or 48 percent of the
student body -- as well as future students.

"The Court has already concluded that the Student Athletes have
sufficiently alleged their equal treatment and effective
accommodation claims on behalf of female athletes at LOHS beyond
the members of the LOHS softball team," Judge Beckerman wrote in
her opinion.

Effective accommodation claims involve the opportunity to
participate in sports, while equal treatment alleges sex-based
differences in scheduling, equipment, coaching and other factors
that impact participants in athletics.

"While the allegations in the Amended Complaint focus primarily on
the disparities between the women's softball team and men's
baseball team, the Court finds that the Student Athletes have
included sufficient factual allegations challenging a system-wide
imbalance between the women's and men's programs," Judge Beckerman
wrote.

The case now goes to U.S. District Judge Michael H. Simon for a
final decision, which he is expected to issue within the next few
months.  The LOSD has 14 days from the date of Beckerman's opinion
to respond with an objection.

The district's attorneys, who work for the Portland law firm
Mersereau Shannon, could not be reached for comment.

The Title IX lawsuit against the district was originally filed in
April 2016.  It alleges that female softball players have been
denied equal access to the kinds of equipment, facilities, funding
and fundraising opportunities provided to male baseball players.
Title IX is a 1972 law that prohibits discrimination based on sex
"under any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance."

Another complaint, contained in the request for class-action
status, contends that "girls' teams have fewer opportunities to
play games and experience the benefits of competition, in
comparison to their male counterparts."  According to the
plaintiffs' motion, which was filed in December 2016 and argued
before Beckerman in May, LOHS had 29 boys' varsity baseball games
in 2016 but only 23 girls' varsity softball competitions.

The lawsuit does not seek monetary damages, asking the court
instead to order the district to make improvements to athletic
facilities and create equal access to facilities, according to
local attorney Andrew Glascock, who is working pro bono for the
softball players and their families.

The plaintiffs also are represented by Title IX experts at Legal
Aid at Work in San Francisco, who say the case doesn't require
"every single girl in the school to stand up against
discrimination."

"A handful of girls who are brave and decide to take this on can
do this on behalf of the others, or at least initiate the
process," said Elizabeth Kristen, a Legal Aid at Work attorney and
the director of the nonprofit organization's Fair Play for Girls
in Sports project.

Ms. Kristen told The Review that, for her clients, the case was
never about money but about making things better for girls at the
school.

"Our clients have been waiting for a long time to get any measure
of justice in this case," she said, "so I'm happy that this stage
is moving forward."

Ms. Kristen noted that an effort to settle the case with the
school district in June did not succeed. Settlement negotiations
are confidential, so she declined to reveal the nature of those
conversations.

Originally, softball players' complaints involved playing
conditions and practice facilities.  The softball team previously
played on a dirt field at Lake Oswego Junior High that is
susceptible to flooding, while the baseball team has an
artificial-turf field on the LOHS campus that drains better and
can be used even on rainy days.  The softball facilities also
lacked a bullpen, pitching area, warm-up area, batting cages or a
way to separate the field to allow multiple practice stations, the
lawsuit said.

In addition, the lawsuit states, the softball team has no enclosed
hitting facility and was not allowed to use the boys' indoor
hitting facility.

Judge Beckerman addressed many of those claims in her June 29
ruling, but the judge said the alleged inequities at LOHS are not
limited just to softball and baseball.

"Specifically, the Student Athletes allegations relating to access
and use of the locker room and the weight room are not limited to
the softball team and instead affect all female athletes at LOHS,"
she wrote.  "In addition, the allegations relating to disparity in
coaching staff among the women's and men's programs is system
wide, as well as the allegations relating to publicity and
promotion. Finally, the Student Athletes allege system-wide
disparities in funding for women's sports at LOHS, including
opportunities for fundraising through concession and program sales
revenue."

After the suit was filed, the school district made improvements to
areas the team identified as unequal, including upgrading the
indoor batting facility and installing an outdoor batting
facility.

Michael Musick, the LOSD's assistant superintendent of school
management and its Title IX coordinator, told The Review in
February that the girls would be allowed to use the boys'
artificial field (the lower turf field) and the hitting barn,
which would require both teams to change clothes in school locker
rooms. (The boys previously changed in the hitting facility.) Both
teams would have equal access to the facility, he said at the
time. A schedule was created to allow softball and baseball
players to play and practice on the artificial field.

"We are better utilizing our two turf fields while simultaneously
providing equal access to the same facilities for males and
females," Mr. Musick said.

But Mr. Glascock said at the time that the changes did not make
the district compliant with Title IX. [GN]


LIMOLINK INC: Court Grants Certification to Tips Class
------------------------------------------------------
District Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV, of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted plaintiffs'
Chebotnikov, Pantyukhin, and Sharma's motion for class
certification as to Tips Class and denied as to Misclassification
Class in the case captioned, VLADIMIR CHEBOTNIKOV, EUGENE
PANTYUKHIN, and YOGESH SHARMA, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LIMOLINK, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 14-13475-FDS (D. Mass.).

The case is a putative class action alleging violations of
Massachusetts wage laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Defendant LimoLink, Inc., is a company that, in substance,
provides a platform for customers seeking to use limousine
services. The named plaintiffs are three limousine drivers who
operate their own limousine companies and, through those
companies, contracted with LimoLink to provide limousine services
to its customers.

The plaintiffs allege, among other things: (1) that LimoLink
failed to distribute to them all gratuities paid by its customers,
in violation of the Massachusetts Tips Act, Mass Gen. Laws ch.
149, Section 152A, and (2) that LimoLink misclassified them as
independent contractors, in violation of both the FLSA and
Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
149, Section 148B.
Plaintiffs have moved to certify two classes pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23. The first putative class (the Tips Class) consists of
the 36 vendors who provided rides for LimoLink customers in
Massachusetts and have not received the total proceeds of
gratuities paid by customers since August 27, 2011. The second
putative class (the Misclassification Class) consists of 17
individual drivers, designated by LimoLink as "independent
operators," whom LimoLink has classified as independent
contractors since August 27, 2011.

In the Memorandum and Order dated July 6, 2017 available at
https://is.gd/ouuxYN from Leagle.com, Judge Saylor held that the
Tips Class has satisfied the requirements of class certification
and the Misclassification Class failed to establish all of the
elements required for certification as to the putative class.

Eugene Pantyukhin, et al. are represented by Hillary A. Schwab,
Esq. -- hillary@fairworklaw.com -- Brant Casavant, Esq. --
brant@fairworklaw.com -- and -- Rachel J. Smit, Esq. --
Rachel@fairworklaw.com -- FAIR WORK, P.C. -- Edward L. Manchur,
Esq. -- elm@kbblawfirm.com -- and -- James R. Knudsen, Esq. --
jrk@kbmlawfirm.com -- KNUDSEN, BURBRIDGE & MANCHUR, PC

LimoLink, Inc. is represented by Robert P. Sherman, Esq. --
robert.sherman@dlapiper.com -- Matthew J. Iverson, Esq. --
matthew.iverson@dlapiper.com -- and -- Miles D. Norton, Esq. --
miles.norton@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER US LLP


LTD FINANCIAL: Seeks Reversal of Jury Verdict in FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Hale and Steven Trader, writing for Law360, report that
debt collector LTD Financial has urged a Florida federal judge to
reverse a jury's verdict in a class action finding that it
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, arguing the class
relied on a "fatally defective legal theory based on a
misunderstanding of Florida law."

An Orlando jury awarded a statutory maximum of nearly $50,000 in
May to a class of about 34,000 Florida consumers led by
Liznelia Baez, who alleged Texas-based LTD Financial Services LP
improperly sent collection letters offering to settle time-barred
debts that did not inform the recipients that making a partial
payment could revive their obligations under Florida law and open
them to being sued for the full amounts.

In its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on June 30,
LTD Financial refuted what it described as a "faulty" partial
payment premise, which it said formed the entirety of Ms. Baez's
FDCPA claims.

"From the inception of this case via the filing of the complaint,
through class certification, pretrial stipulations, proposed jury
instructions, and trial, plaintiff has steadfastly and
unwaveringly pursued a fatally defective legal theory based on a
misunderstanding of Florida law," LTD Financial argued.

In addition, the company argued that Ms. Baez failed to present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Florida's
statute of limitations law applied to the alleged debt and that
the claims were time-barred.

Use of language mandated by two federal authorities also did not
violate the FDCPA, and Ms. Baez's argument that LTD Financial had
to provide her legal advice on the statute of limitations is not
supported by case law and would have exposed the company to
criminal prosecution in Florida, the company added.

LTD Financial's motion quoted Florida law that states, "An
acknowledgment of, or promise to pay, a debt barred by a statute
of limitations must be in writing and signed by the person sought
to be charged," and cited case law that concluded payment on a
time-barred debt without an acknowledgement of the existing
balance and a willingness to pay it, would not be sufficient to
make it active.

Ms. Baez acknowledged the accuracy of LTD Financial's argument
during trial but never sought to amend her complaint, and the
trial court entered jury instructions that were consistent with
Florida law but "shockingly" did not mention her theory that a
partial payment revives a time-barred debt, according to the
motion.

"As plaintiff never requested leave to amend the complaint, it was
procedurally improper for the court to amend the complaint in the
de facto manner by which it chose to do," LTD Financial argued.

On its other points, LTD Financial argued in its memo that Baez
failed to present evidence regarding specific activity related to
the debt it sought to collect from her, including any evidence
that Florida law on statute of limitations applied to the
underlying credit card agreement, and she improperly asserted that
it was the debt collector's burden to prove Florida law did not
apply.

"In the instant case, LTD Financial has no burden of proof.
Instead, plaintiff was required to prove all the necessary
elements of her claim including that the debt at issue was time-
barred," the company said.

LTD Financial sought a judgment as a matter of law at the
conclusion of evidence at the one-day trial in May, but was denied
by the court, which sent the matter on to the jury.

In its verdict, the jury concluded that LTD Financial's letter had
falsely represented the character, amount or legal status of a
debt, and that LTD Financial's use of the letter constituted a
deceptive and unfair or unconscionable means of collecting or
attempting to collect a debt, all of which violated the FDCPA.

The jury awarded $1,000 in statutory damages to Ms. Baez, and
awarded the class a total of $49,361.  Under Florida law,
statutory damages for a class are capped at 1 percent of the
defendant's net worth, which was calculated in this instance to be
$4.936 million.

Ms. Baez launched a proposed class action in June 2015, alleging
she received a letter from LTD Financial offering her three
different payment options for settling a debt she'd incurred years
earlier with CitiBank NA, but which had since expired.

Although it is not improper for debt collectors to seek repayment
of time-barred debts, they cannot do so in a deceptive way under
the FDCPA, her complaint read.

Ms. Baez acknowledged that in the letter she received, LTD
included language referencing the age of the debt and stated that
she would not be sued over it.  However, it failed to alert her
that under Florida law, making any sort of payment toward an
expired debt counts as an acknowledgement of the debt, which
erases the statute of limitations and allows LTD to sue for the
entire balance, Ms. Baez alleged.

She sought to certify a class of any consumer in Florida who'd
received one of LTD's letters, as well as a subclass consisting of
those class members who'd actually paid on a time-barred debt
because of the letter.  U.S. District Judge Paul Byron certified
the first class in June 2016, but declined the latter because Ms.
Baez had not paid and could not represent that group.

Ms. Baez's counsel did not immediately respond to a request for
comment on July 3.

Ms. Baez is represented by Janet Varnell, Brian Warwick and David
Lietz of Varnell & Warwick PA, and Michael Tierney of Michael
Tierney PA.

LTD Financial is represented by Dale Golden and Joseph Proulx of
Golden Scaz Gagain PLLC.

The case is Liznelia Baez v. LTD Financial Services LP, case
number 6:15-cv-01043, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. [GN]


LYFT INC: Court Dismisses Taxicab Operator's Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., granted the motions filed by Lyft,
Inc., Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC, to dismiss the
case captioned SOUTHERN TRANSPORTATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. LYFT,
INC.; UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; and RASIER, LLC, Defendants, No.
16-02669 (W.D. Tenn.).

Southern Transportation, Inc., operates Yellow Cabs, a taxicab
service, and other passenger-transportation services in Memphis,
Tennessee, and the surrounding area.  Southern provides passenger
transportation to and from Memphis International Airport and
various hotels, restaurants, and other businesses.

The defendants are "transportation network companies."  In April
2014, the defendants began providing passenger-transportation
services in Memphis and the surrounding area.  The defendants also
provide passenger transportation to and from the same kinds of
businesses as Southern.

On August 16, 2016, Southern filed an action against the
defendants, alleging intentional interference with business
relationships, acting in concert, and "class action."  Southern
sought to bring the action on behalf of itself and a class of
other similarly situated parties.  Southern sought compensatory
and punitive damages, disgorgement of profits, costs, and
attorney's fees.

Lyft, Inc. moved to dismiss on October 17, 2016.  Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC also filed a motion to dismiss
on October 20, 2016.

Judge Mays explained that to sustain a claim for intentional
interference with business relationships under Tennessee law, a
plaintiff must prove the following elements:

     (1) an existing business relationship with specific third
         parties or a prospective relationship with an
         identifiable class of third persons;

     (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship and not a
         mere awareness of the plaintiff's business dealings with
         others in general;

     (3) the defendant's intent to cause the breach or
         termination of the business relationship;

     (4) the defendant's improper motive or improper means; and
         finally,

     (5) damages resulting from the tortious interference.

Judge Mays found that, assuming without deciding that Southern's
allegations in support of the first two elements are adequate,
Southern has failed to state an intentional-interference claim on
which relief can be granted because its allegations in support of
the remaining elements are inadequate.

Judge Mays found that Southern has not adequately pled the
defendants' improper motive or improper means.  Although the
Complaint alleges that the defendants have violated numerous other
statutes and ordinances, the Uber and Rasier argued that Southern
has not alleged any facts in support.  Judge Mays pointed out that
the federal pleading standard requires more than bare assertions
of legal conclusions.  The judge explained that it is impossible
to tell whether any violations by the defendants have harmed
Southern because it does not allege facts showing what those
violations were.

Judge Mays also found that Southern has not adequately pled the
defendants' intent to cause the breach or termination of
Southern's business relationships.  The judge explained that it is
not sufficient that the defendants intended, desired, or knew with
certainty that their lawful competitive business conduct would
cause a loss of business and income to Southern.  The judge added
that Southern must allege that the defendants intended, desired,
or knew with certainty that their improper conduct -- their
failure to obtain permits or some other act of noncompliance --
would harm Southern.  Southern made no such plausible allegation.

Further, Judge Mays also found that the Complaint fails to contain
"direct or inferential allegations respecting all material
elements necessary for recovery" on Southern's intentional-
interference claim, which warrants dismissal of that claim.

Because Southern's remaining claims are derivative of its
intentional-interference claim and that claim warrants dismissal,
the judge concluded that Southern's remaining claims also warrant
dismissal.

A full-text copy of Judge Mays' June 30, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/fUeHoO from Leagle.com.

Southern Transportation, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Nicholas
E. Bragorgos -- nbragorgos@mbbslaw.com -- MCNABB BRAGORGOS &
BURGESS, PLLC, Paul Berry Cooper, III -- bcooper@mbb-law.com --
MCNABB BRAGORGOS & BURGESS, PLLC.

Lyft, Inc., Defendant, represented by Annie Tauer Christoff --
achristoff@bassberry.com -- BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC, Jonathan Edward
Nelson -- jenelson@bassberry.com -- BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC &
Michael Kapellas -- mkapellas@bassberry.com -- BASS BERRY & SIMS
PLC.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Scott T.
Schutte -- scott.schutte@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS
LLP, pro hac vice, Arthur Miles Roberts --
arthurroberts@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART SULLIVAN
LLP, pro hac vice, Carl I. Jacobson -- cjacobson@pcplc.com --
PIETRANGELO COOK PLC, Gregory Thomas Fouts --
gregory.fouts@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKUS LLP, pro
hac vice, Jonathan P. Lakey -- jlakey@pcplc.com -- PIETRANGELO
COOK PLC & Kristal Dora Petrovich --
kristal.petrovich@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
pro hac vice.

Rasier, LLC, Defendant, represented by Scott T. Schutte, MORGAN
LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, pro hac vice, Arthur Miles Roberts, QUINN
EMANUEL URQUHART SULLIVAN LLP, pro hac vice, Carl I. Jacobson,
PIETRANGELO COOK PLC, Gregory Thomas Fouts, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKUS
LLP, pro hac vice & Jonathan P. Lakey, PIETRANGELO COOK PLC.


M-I LLC: "Bocage" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Bocage, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. M-I, L.L.C d/b/a M-I SWACO, Case No. 2:17-cv-06124
(E.D. La., June 24, 2017), seeks unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs of pursuing this action
and all other legal and equitable under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendant is a supplier of drilling fluid systems engineered to
improve drilling performance by anticipating fluids-related
problems, fluid systems and specialty tools designed to optimize
wellbore productivity, production technology solutions to maximize
production rates, and environmental solutions that safely manage
waste volumes generated in both drilling and production
operations. Bocage was employed by Defendant as a drilling fluid
specialist from approximately April 2011 through May 2016. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Kenneth J. DeRoche Jr., Esq.
      Stephen N. Elliott, Esq.
      BERNARD, CASSISA, ELLIOTT & DAVIS
      3838 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 3050
      Metairie, LA 70002-8357
      Telephone: (504) 834-2612
      Fax: (504) 838-9438


MACY'S INC: Bid to Dismiss "Haley" Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KRISTIN HALEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MACY'S, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-06033-HSG (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and denied their motion
to strike.

This putative class action arises out of an alleged pricing scheme
by the Defendants to mislabel their merchandise with false or
inflated original or "regular" prices.  According to the
Plaintiffs, these original or regular prices did not reflect the
price at which Defendants "routinely, if ever" sold their
products.  These prices deceive consumers into believing that the
listed sale or discount price is more advantageous, causing
consumers to purchase merchandise that they otherwise would not
purchase.

The Plaintiffs allege that they each purchased at least one item
from a Macy's store on or after Jan. 1, 2012.  On the basis of
these purchases, they filed a complaint on behalf of a putative
class of California consumers against Defendants Macy's Inc. and
Bloomingdale's, Inc. alleging violations of the California Unfair
Competition Law, the California False Advertising Law, and the
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to support its three causes of action against the
Defendants.  The Plaintiffs allege "on information and belief"
that the Defendants did not sell their products at the original or
regular price, while at the same time asserting that they "have no
realistic way to know" whether that is true.  The Court says the
Plaintiffs cannot rely on such unsupported allegations of belief
as a "pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs."  To satisfy
Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard, the Plaintiffs must
allege with specificity what products they purchased, on what
statements they relied in making those purchases, and why those
statements were false or misleading.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged facts
showing that they are at risk of future injury sufficient to
support injunctive relief because they have alleged an intent to
buy in the future.  The Court says it is implausible that they
risk being harmed by the same pricing scheme again now that they
are aware of how it works.  The Court finds that they have not
alleged a real threat of future injury and therefore do not have
standing to seek injunctive relief.

The Court finds it premature to evaluate the Plaintiffs' request
for restitution.  It has broad powers to enter such orders or
judgments as may be necessary to restore any person any money or
property which may have been acquired by means of such unfair
competition.  Whether the Plaintiffs can prove up the amount of
restitution is a question better addressed at a later stage in the
litigation.

The Defendants reiterate the same arguments in their motion to
strike the Plaintiffs' class allegations as they raised in their
motion to dismiss.  They state that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring a claim against Bloomingdales and that they
allege only vague conclusory allegations of fraud.  The Court has
already addressed the deficiencies in the complaint and concluded
that the class allegations are not otherwise redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
restitution request, but otherwise granted the motion to dismiss
in its entirety.  The Court further denied the motion to strike
class allegations.  The Plaintiffs have 21 days from the date of
the Order to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/TD3oTM from Leagle.com.

Kristin Haley, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas --
rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Kristin Haley, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green &
Noblin, P.C..

Sylvia Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green
& Noblin, P.C..

Todd Benson, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas, Levi &
Korsinsky LLP, Quentin Alexandre Roberts -- qroberts@zlk.com --
Levi & Korsinsky LLP & Robert S. Green, Green & Noblin, P.C..

Erica Vinci, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green &
Noblin, P.C..

Zohreh Farhang, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green &
Noblin, P.C..

Mr. Job Carder, Plaintiff, represented by Robert S. Green, Green &
Noblin, P.C..

Macy's, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian Michael Parsons,
Macy's Law Department & Stephanie Anne Sheridan --
stephanie.sheridan@sedgwicklaw.com -- Sedgwick LLP.

Bloomingdale's, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian Michael
Parsons, Macy's Law Department & Stephanie Anne Sheridan, Esq.,
Sedgwick LLP.


MDL 1203: Court Awards Atty's Fees for 2016 Work
------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned IN RE: DIET DRUGS
(PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: SHEILA BROWN, et al., v.
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, No. 99-20593, MDL No. 1203
(E.D. Pa.), Judge Harvey Bartle, III issued a memorandum in
support of separate pretrial order no. 9490 which awarded
attorneys' fees and expenses for work in 2016.

Levin Sedran & Berman, in its respective capacities as Plaintiffs'
Liaison Counsel (PLC), co-Lead Counsel for the Plaintiffs, and
Class Counsel, filed a petition for an award of attorneys' fees
and expense reimbursements relating to work performed from January
1, 2016 through December 31, 2016.  The court has previously
awarded fees in Pretrial Order (PTO) Nos. 7763A, 8516, 8646, 8869,
9102, 9294, 9398, and 9465.

Levin sought an aggregate award of attorneys' fees in the amount
of $601,400 from the AHP Settlement Trust in accordance with the
stipulation approved in PTO No. 9297 between Wyeth and Class
Counsel that described, among other things, the terms of funding
of future awards and class-related fees.

Additionally Levin requested an award of attorneys' fees in the
amount of $601,400 from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account for MDL-
related services performed during 2016.

Finally Levin incurred a total of $18,519.58 in litigation
expenses during 2016.  The court has already authorized payment of
$14,548.61 of expenses from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account.
Pursuant to PTO No. 7763, Levin sought an order directing the
Trust to reimburse $7,274.31 to the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account.
Levin petitioned for reimbursement of the remaining $3,970.97 in
out-of-pocket expenses advanced by Levin to be allocated for
payment to Levin as $1,985.48 from the Trust related to class
action work and $1,985.49 from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account.

Judge Bartle considered the following 10 Gunter/Prudential
factors:

     (1) the size of the fund created and the number of
         beneficiaries,

     (2) the presence or absence of substantial objections by
         members of the class to the settlement terms and/or fees
         requested by counsel,

     (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved,

     (4) the complexity and duration of the litigation,

     (5) the risk of nonpayment,

     (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by plaintiffs'
         counsel,

     (7) the awards in similar cases,

     (8) the value of benefits attributable to the efforts of
         class counsel relative to the efforts of other groups,
         such as government agencies conducting investigations,

     (9) the percentage fee that would have been negotiated had
         the case been subject to a private contingent fee
         arrangement at  the time counsel was retained, and

     (10) any innovative terms of settlement.

Based on a consideration of the Gunter/Prudential factors and that
the lodestar cross-check, Judge Bartle found that a fee of
$539,575 is the appropriate award.

Judge Bartle also found that it is appropriate to award Levin
$61,825 from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account.

Lastly, Judge Bartle entered an order directing that the
Settlement Fund reimburse the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account in the
amount of $7,274.31, which represents 50% of the expenses paid
from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account during 2016.  The judge
also ordered that 50% of the out-of-pocket costs advanced by the
Levin be reimbursed to it from the MDL 1203 Fee and Cost Account
and the remaining 50% be reimbursed from the Settlement Fund.

A full-text copy of Judge Bartle's June 30, 2017 order is
available at https://is.gd/oEl23V from Leagle.com.

WILLIAMS DAILEY, Special Master, represented by MICHAEL L.
WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS O'LEARY LLC.

VIVIAN NAUGLE, QUINTIN LAYER, Plaintiffs, represented by ARNOLD
LEVIN -- alevin@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, CHRISTOPHER
MICHAEL PLACITELLA -- cplacitella@cprlaw.com -- COHEN PLACITELLA &
ROTH PC, DIANNE M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NASTLAW LLC, GENE
LOCKS -- glocks@lockslaw.com -- LOCKS LAW FIRM PLLC, JOHN J.
CUMMINGS, III, CUMMINGS CUMMINGS & DUDENHEFER, MARK W. TANNER --
mtanner@feldmanshepherd.com -- FELDMAN, SHEPHERD, WOHLGELERNTER,
TANNER & WEINSTOCK, MICHAEL D. FISHBEIN, LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN &
BERMAN, RICHARD S. LEWIS -- rlewis@hausfeld.com -- HAUSFELD LLP,
RICHARD S. WAYNE -- rswayne@strausstroy.com -- STRAUSS & TROY,
ROBERT ERIC KENNEDY, WEISMAN, KENNEDY & BERRIS, SOL H. WEISS --
sweiss@anapolweiss.com -- ANAPOL WEISS & STANLEY M. CHESLEY,
WAITE, SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS & CHESLEY CO., L.P.A..

JOAN S. LAYER, Plaintiff, represented by SOL H. WEISS, ANAPOL
WEISS.

BRENDA CHAMBERS, ISABEL CONNOR, RANDY G. ALLEN, Appellants,
represented by ARNOLD LEVIN, LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN.

DONNA JARRELL, SUSAN ELLIOTT, MARIA MAIRA, JEFFREY DORIS, DONNA
SCHWARTZ, ROSE . PEARSON, MAUREEN PIERSAK, KALIHKA MILLER, BARBARA
DINERSTEIN, LEILA HADLEY LUCE, BETH KANNER, DANIEL VIDER, IRENE
WATKINS, MARY WOLCOTT, Appellants, represented by RONALD R.
BENJAMIN, LAW OFFICES OF RONALD R. BENJAMIN, ESQ.

ROBERT M BECNEL, CHRIS J. BELL, LYNN SWANSON, DIANE K. ZINK, THE
LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR.,, Appellants, represented by
DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR., LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR..

ELDON JAMES, Appellant, represented by HENRY C. ROSENTHAL, JR.,
ALEXANDER AND ASSOCIATES.

JENNIFER RUTH MARTIN, SHIRLEY DILL, JAYNE MCDEARMON, CAROL JUNE
CROOK, Appellants, represented by RUSSELL W. BUDD, BARON & BUDD,
P.C. & STEVEN J. COOPERSTEIN, BROOKMAN, ROSENBERG, BROWN &
SANDLER.

CLARA CLARK, Appellant, represented by GEORGE M. FLEMING, FLEMING
& ASSOC LLP, MICHAEL L. O'BRIEN, MICHAEL L. O'BRIEN PC & SYLVIA
DAVIDOW, FLEMING & ASSOCIATES LLP.

LINDA SMART, MIKE O'BRIEN, MICHAEL C. ABBOTT, Appellants,
represented by SYLVIA DAVIDOW, FLEMING & ASSOCIATES LLP.

GEORGE FLEMING, Appellant, represented by SYLVIA DAVIDOW, FLEMING
& ASSOCIATES LLP & RAND NOLEN, FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ LLP.

SUSAN SNYDOR, Appellant, represented by MICHELE A. DIMARTINO, THE
MILLER FIRM, LLC.

MICHAEL J. MILLER, Appellant, represented by MICHELE A. DIMARTINO,
THE MILLER FIRM, LLC & KENNETH W. SMITH, MILLER & ASSOCIATES.

KENTUCKY APPLICANT, Appellant, represented by ELIZABETH R.
OVERTON, WILLIAM GALLION & ASSOC PLLC & SHIRLEY A. CUNNINGHAM.

PETROFF & KISSELBURG, Petitioner, represented by KIP ALLAN
PETROFF, LAW OFFICE OF KIP PETROFF.

WEST VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEYS, Petitioner, represented by
MARVIN W. MASTERS, MASTERS & TAYLOR, L.C. & CARL N. FRANKOVITCH,
FRANKOVITCH ANETAKIS COLANTONIO & SIMON.

BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, Petitioner, represented
by SETH R. LESSER, KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP.

RUTH MCCAW, JAMES MC CAW, Petitioner, represented by ROY OLSON,
LUCID LEGAL TECHNIQUES, LTD..

PARKER & O'CONNELL, PLLC, Petitioner, represented by JOHN R.
SHELTON, PARKER & O'CONNELL, PLLC & JOHN R. SHELTON, PARKER &
O'CONNELL, PLLC.

HUTTON & HUTTON, L.L.P., Petitioner, represented by ANDREW W.
HUTTON, HUTTON AND HUTTON.

CIGNA HEALTHCARE OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC., ET AL, Intervenor
Plaintiff, represented by JAMES L. JOHNSON, THE JOHNSON LAW FIRM.

HEALTH PLAN, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by NEAL S. MANNE,
SUSMAN GODFREY LLP.

HEALTH BENEFIT PROVIDERS, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by
MARK D. FISCHER, RAWLINGS & ASSOC..

AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by
ANDREW A. CHIRLS, FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC, ORRAN L. BROWN,
BROWNGREER PLC, PETER ZIMROTH, KEVIN A. CLINE, ARNOLD & PORTER
LLP, LESLIE ANNE BENITEZ, GORDON & REES LLP, RICHARD A. FILSON,
FILSON & PENGE PA, AMY L. MCGINNIS, ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP, ANGELA
D. GIVENS, ARNOLD & PORTER, CAROLINE A. FLOTRON, REED SMITH LLP,
DONALD ROBINSON GORDON, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, EDWARD F. HANOVER,
III, REED SMITH LLP, KRISTA AYN SCHMID, SCHMID-DEWLAND ASSOICATES,
LOUIS W. SCHACK, REED SMITH LLP, MICHAEL A. ROLLIN, REILLY POZNER
LLP & MILIND M. SHAH, REED SMITH LLP.

JANE SCUTERI, ET AL, Respondent, represented by KENNETH CHESEBRO.

RHEINGOLD, VALET, Respondent, represented by DAVID B. RHEINGOLD.

SHEFF LAW OFFICES, P.C., Respondent, represented by DONALD R.
GRADY, SHEFF LAW OFFICES.

GONZALEZ PLAINTIFFS, Respondent, represented by KEITH M. JENSEN,
JENSEN BELEW & GONZALEZ.

JOAN SOLOMETO, MARLIS A. BARTH, NANCY LYNN JONES, Respondents,
represented by CHARLES HARLEY JOHNSON, JOHNSON & ASSOC.

EVA JOY ERICKSON, Respondent, represented by GWEN E. RICHARD,
MILUTIN & RICHARD.

SUZANNE JORTNER, Respondent, represented by JERRY ALEXANDER,
ALEXANDER & ASSOCIATES PC.

THE UTAH HEART CLINIC, Respondent, represented by GEORGE A. HUNT,
WILLIAMS & HUNT.

HARITON & D'ANGELO, LLP, Respondent, represented by ABRAHAM C.
REICH, FOX ROTHSCHILD O'BRIEN & FRANKEL LLP, MARIO D'ANGELO,
HARITON & D'ANGELO, LLP, RICHARD F.X. GUAY, MEYER SUOZZI ENGLISH &
KLEIN & DENISE A. RUBIN, NAPOLI BERN RIPKA SHKOLNIK LLP.

LYNDALL S. HARVEY, Respondent, represented by JAMES A. MORRIS,
Jr., BRENT COON & ASSOCIATES.

ROBERTA BARNES, Respondent, represented by MICHELE A. DIMARTINO,
THE MILLER FIRM, LLC.

COXWELL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Respondent, represented by MERRIDA P.
COXWELL, JR., COXWELL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC.

WOODLAWN MEDICAL GROUP, INC., Respondent, represented by KIMBERLY
LOGUE WOODLAND, LOVE WILLINGHAM PETERS GILLELAND & MONYAK LLP.

LONCAR & ASSOCIATES, Respondent, represented by BRIAN U. LONCAR,
LONCAR & ASSOCIATES.

TIMOTHY ALLEN, Respondent, represented by MICHAEL A. LEE, SUSMAN
GODFREY LLP.

BLUE CROSS AND BULE SHIELD UNITED OF WISCONSIN, Movant,
represented by KIMBERLY R. WEST, WALLACE, JORDAN, RATLIFF & BRANDT
& MICHAEL J. LAFFEY, LAFFEY & ASSOCIATES PC.

HMO LOUISIANA, Movant, represented by MARK D. FISCHER, RAWLINGS &
ASSOC..

CAROL BLOOM, TAMMY STATEN, NORMA JEAN NORSE, JERRIE RAWLS TOYES,
Movants, represented by LAWRENCE KENDALL SATTERFIELD, FINKELSTEIN
THOMPSON LLP.

FLEMING OBJECTORS, Movant, represented by DIANE E. PRICE, FLEMING
AND ASSOCIATES, L.L.P., GEORGE M. FLEMING, FLEMING & ASSOC LLP,
JAMES L. DOYLE, II, RAND NOLEN, FLEMING, NOLEN & JEZ LLP, RUSSELL
T. ABNEY, WATTS LAW FIRM LLP, SCOTT A. LOVE, CLARK, LOVE & HUTSON,
GP & SYLVIA DAVIDOW, FLEMING & ASSOCIATES LLP.

NORTH TEXAS ATTORNEYS, Movant, represented by C.L. SCHMIDT, THE
SCHMIDT FIRM, KIP ALLAN PETROFF, LAW OFFICE OF KIP PETROFF,
MICHAEL P. MCGARTLAND, MCGARTLAND LAW FIRM, PLLC & ROBERT M.
KISSELBURGH, PETROFF & KISSELBURGH.

TERRI JACKSON, Movant, represented by CHARLES M. THOMPSON,
THOMPSON HUTSLER LAW FIRM & R. STEPHEN GRIFFIS, R. STEPHEN GRIFFIS
PC.

GLENDA O'NEAL, Movant, represented by R. STEPHEN GRIFFIS, R.
STEPHEN GRIFFIS PC.

JOSEPH PETITO, TERRY STUBBS, Movant, represented by SEAN M.
CLEARY, ROBLES & GONZALEZ, P.A..

ILLINOIS CLASS, Movant, represented by EDWARD T. JOYCE, EDWARD T.
JOYCE & ASSOCIATES & WILLIAM J. WINNING, COZEN AND O'CONNOR.

MICHAELE PRIDEMORE, Movant, represented by CAROL A. MAGER, CONSOLE
LAW OFFICE LLC, DEBORA A. O'NEILL, MEYERSON & O'NEILL & THOMAS C.
CRONIN, CUMMINS & CRONIN, LLC.

SALIE TRAVIS, ANN WESTFALL, VIRGINIA KIESER, PATTY LEMONS, STACEY
YATES, Movants, represented by DEBORA A. O'NEILL, MEYERSON &
O'NEILL.

FRANK DEJULIUS, Movant, represented by EDWARD W. COCHRAN, FRANK H.
TOMLINSON, TOMLINSON LAW LLC & STEVEN KAPUSTIN, REGER RIZZO &
DARNALL LLP.

RONALD WEINTRAUB, Movant, represented by N. ALBERT BACHARACH, JR..

DEBORAH PHILLIPS, Movant, represented by PAUL ROTHSTEIN & STEVEN
KAPUSTIN, REGER RIZZO & DARNALL LLP.

JOHN P. WILLIS, III, Movant, represented by BENJAMIN E. BAKER,
JR., HOGAN SMITH & ALSPAUGH.

KAREN M. SALTER, Movant, represented by R. STEVEN BAKER, THE
SOUTHERN LAW GROUP.

ANGELA S. DUFFY, Movant, represented by EDWARD W. COCHRAN & ROBERT
W. BISHOP, BISHOP AND WILSON.

DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR., Movant, represented by DANIEL E. BECNEL,
JR., LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR..

PHYLLIS M. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCES RAMMAGE, SHERRI D. WIENEKE, PAM
BUTLER, LYNN REED, CARL WOLF, TED DOAK, SHERRIE BRICHETTO,
Movants, represented by GEORGE W. COCHRAN.

LES LABORATOIRES SERVIER, Movant, represented by ROBERT P. LOBUE,
PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER.

ROBERT CLAYCOMB, Movant, represented by ROBERT B. BOWLING,
BOWLING, JOHNSON & COSTANZO.

INTERNEURON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC, Movant, represented by BARBARA
WRUBEL, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP.

AGENES SPOONHUNTER LOGAN, Movant, represented by JOSEPH H.
SAUNDERS, SAUNDERS, WALKER & COLEMAN, PA.

WALTER DUMAS, Movant, represented by DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR., LAW
OFFICES OF DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR..

ERMA BOOKER, CHARLES BOOKER, Movants, represented by CHARLES E.
WEBSTER, MARVIN A. BRUSTIN, LTD..

SELENA EGUNJOBI, NELSON EGUNJOBI, Movants, represented by PHILIP
H. RUSH, PHILIP H. RUSH, P.C.

CIGNA HEALTHCARE, Movant, represented by JAMES L. JOHNSON, THE
JOHNSON LAW FIRM.

SHERRY MALBIN, Movant, represented by RAYMOND W. VALORI, RAYMOND
W. VALORI PA.

NANCY WEST, Movant, represented by BRYAN F. AYLSTOCK, AYLSTOCK
WITKIN KREIS & OVERHOLTZ, PLLC.

CHARLENE HAYES, Movant, represented by BEN W. GORDON, JR..

M.D. MILAN JECKLE, Movant, represented by MARGARET S. WOODRUFF,
SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP.

PETROFF & ASSOCIATES, Movant, represented by DIRK VANDEVER, J.
SCOTT BERTRAM, KIP ALLAN PETROFF, LAW OFFICE OF KIP PETROFF &
WAYNE R. SPIVEY, SHRAGER, SPIVEY & SACHS.

THE BERTRAM LAW FIRM, THE POPHAM LAW FIRM, Movant, represented by
DIRK VANDEVER, J. SCOTT BERTRAM & KIP ALLAN PETROFF, LAW OFFICE OF
KIP PETROFF.

MILLER & ASSOCIATES, Movant, represented by MICHAEL J. MILLER, THE
MILLER FIRM, LLC & MICHELE A. DIMARTINO, THE MILLER FIRM, LLC.

V.E. DORSEY, Movant, represented by JAMES G. WILCOXEN, WILCOXEN &
WILCOXEN.

SHERMAN SALKOW PETOYAN & WEBER, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION,
Movant, represented by ARTHUR SHERMAN, SHERMAN DAN & PORTUGAL.

MARILYN R. TAYLOR, Movant, represented by BILLY KENNETH CRUEY,
B.K. CUREY, PC.

MOLLY ELIZABETH BUNCH, LINDA C. PURVIS, Movants, represented by
JOSEPH L. TUCKER, JACKSON & TUCKER, P.C..

TINA HOLLEY, MINCY RILEY, CINDY MARLOW, BETTY GARLAND, BETTIE
DENNIS, Movants, represented by PHILLIP H. MILLER, PROVOST &
UMPHREY.

BOBBE SCHIEFFLER, Movant, represented by EDWARD H. SCHIEFFLER,
SCHIEFFLER LAW FIRM.

JULIANNE BLOOMER, Movant, represented by JOHN M. MOSCARINO,
MOSCARINO & CONNOLLY LLP.

TRAVIS T. VANCE, JR., BOWMAR MCGEHEE, SIDRA BURNS, GLYNDA CRAFT
SPARKS, DEE ANN ROME, GIDGET CHAMBERS, Claimants, represented by
JAMES W. NOBLES, JR..

ELLIOT PALAY, Claimant, represented by SUSAN BARTELL PALAY.

ROBERT LEWIS, PEGGY SCADDEN, Claimant, represented by JAMES R.
HASENYAGER.

VELETIA LYONS, Claimant, represented by JOE C. HOUK, HOUK &
CHURCH.

JACQUELINE HARGROW WOODS, VEARNON WOODS, Claimant, represented by
GLENN A. DORFMAN.

PATRICIA AGRILLO, Claimant, represented by MARIO D'ANGELO, HARITON
& D'ANGELO, LLP & RON MICHAEL MENEO, EARLY LUDWICK & SWEENEY LLC.

BEVERLY HARRIS, Claimant, represented by MICHELLE LEGAULT, KELLOGG
& SIGELMAN.

ROSE HARRIS, Claimant, represented by THOMAS F. YOST, JR..

GAY PATTERSON, Claimant, represented by WAYNE R. SPIVEY, SHRAGER,
SPIVEY & SACHS.

AHP SETTLEMENT TRUST, Trustee, represented by ABBE F. FLETMAN,
ANDREW A. CHIRLS, FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC, BRYAN L. NORTON,
GREENBERG TRAURIG PA, CHRISTOPHER L. SORIANO, DUANE MORRIS LLP,
HARVEY A. SERNOVITZ, LAW OFFICES OF HARVERY A. SERNOVITZ., P.C.,
SUSAN LAURA BURKE, LAW OFFICES OF SUSAN L BURKE, DOMENICK KLEIN,
JR., AHP SETTLEMENT TRUST, HELEN M. BRAVERMAN, BRAVERMAN KASKEY PC


METLIFE SECURITIES: Judge Okays $32.5MM Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Braden Campbell, writing for Law360, reports that a New York
federal judge has approved a $32.5 million settlement ending a
proposed class action alleging MetLife Securities Inc. gives black
financial services representatives few chances to team up with
their colleagues, keeps them from getting good accounts and
restricts their training opportunities.

U.S. District Judge William Pauley III signed off on the
settlement, which pays $7.15 million to class counsel Stowell &
Friedman Ltd. and $25.35 million to about 690 class members, on
June 27.

Lead plaintiff Marcus Creighton, who worked for MetLife in
Illinois from 2001 until October 2014, filed suit in May 2015
alleging the company violates federal civil rights law by
discriminating against black brokers.

Mr. Creighton alleged the company is headed by a "nearly all-
white" management team and maintains "a racially biased corporate
culture and stereotypical views about the skills, abilities and
potential of African-Americans that infect personnel decisions"
and inform its policies.

Mr. Creighton claimed the company lets brokers, which it calls
financial services representatives, form teams with colleagues and
combine their client accounts, but "almost entirely exclude[s]"
black FSRs from favorable teaming relationships.  He also alleged
the company steers the most lucrative business opportunities away
from black FSRs and denies them equal access to its "Delivering
the Promise" training program.  This systematic discrimination
leads the company to pay black FSRs less than their nonblack
peers, he alleged.

The parties engaged in mediation while settlement was ongoing, and
in March moved the court to approve a $32.5 million settlement
agreement, arguing it was the product of fair negotiations and
adequately compensates the class members given the risks of
continuing litigation.

In addition to splitting up the settlement fund based on
traditional, objective factors such as weeks of employment, the
agreement allows workers to receive a share of the award based on
their "individual experiences" and the recommendation of
independent neutral parties chosen by class counsel.  The
settlement pays $75,000 to Creighton and $50,000 to six other
workers who joined the case as named plaintiffs in an April 2016
amended complaint.

The agreement covers all black, U.S.-based FSRs employed by or
affiliated with MetLife or New England Life Insurance Co. between
May 15, 2011 and July 1, 2016.

Stowell & Friedman will be paid half, or $3.575 million, of its
fee award after judgment is entered and will be paid the remainder
in installments as awards are paid out to class members. The firm
will also be reimbursed about $80,000 in fees and costs.

An attorney for the class and attorneys for MetLife did not
immediately respond to requests for comment on July 3.

The workers are represented by Linda D. Friedman --
lfriedman@sfltd.com -- Suzanne E. Bish -- sbish@sfltd.com --
George S. Robot -- grobot@sfltd.com -- and Shona B. Glink --
sglink@sfltd.com -- of Stowell & Friedman Ltd.

The company is represented by Steven J. Pearlman --
spearlman@proskauer.com -- and Keisha-Ann G. Gray --
kgray@proskauer.com -- of Proskauer Rose LLP.

The case is Creighton et al. v. MetLife Securities Inc., case
number 1:15-cv-08321, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. [GN]


MICHAEL MACK: Court Dismisses "Ransom" as Frivolous
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California dismissed Plaintiff's frivolous complaint in the case
captioned CLINTON RANSOM, et al., Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL MACK, JR.,
et al., Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-01367 GEB AC (PS) (E.D. Calif.).

Plaintiff Clinton Ransom has requested leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.

The request will be denied because (1) plaintiff's IFP affidavit
fails to establish that he cannot afford the filing fee, and (2)
the complaint, in its current form, is frivolous.

Plaintiff filed a blank application. Plaintiff's application fails
to establish that he is entitled to prosecute this case without
paying the required fees.  To prevail on a motion to proceed In
Forma Pauperis, the Plaintiff need not demonstrate that he is
completely destitute, but he must show that because of his
poverty, he cannot pay the court costs and still afford the
necessities of life. The allegations of poverty must be
particular, definite and certain.

As a preliminary matter, the word "class" written at the top of
the complaint indicates that plaintiff is attempting to bring a
class action. Plaintiff, however, is a non-lawyer proceeding
without counsel. It is well established that a layperson cannot
ordinarily represent the interests of a class.

Where plaintiff's claim appears to be frivolous on the face of the
complaint," the district court may "deny[] plaintiff leave to file
in forma pauperis. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact. The complaint does not
contain a "short and plain" statement setting forth the basis for
federal jurisdiction (that is, why the lawsuit is filed in this
federal court rather than a state court), or plaintiff's claims
(that is, who did what to plaintiff and how he was harmed), even
though those things are required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1),
(a)(2). Hence, the complaint must be dismissed as frivolous.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 6, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://is.gd/0JQ1sR from Leagle.com.

Clinton Ransom, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

R.E.R., Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Robert Lopez, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Lorene Thomas, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

R.L., Plaintiff, Pro Se.


MICHAEL MACK: Court Dismisses "Lefter" as Frivolous
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order Granting Joint Stipulation Regarding
Dismissal of Action in the case captioned ALEXANDRU LEFTER,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. YIRENDAI LTD., YIHAN FANG, YU CONG and NING TANG,
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-CV-06437-MWF-AGR (C.D. Calif.).

The Court, having read and considered the Joint Stipulation
Regarding Dismissal of Action, and good cause appearing, rules as
follows:

   1. Plaintiffs' action, which was not certified as a class
action, will be dismissed with prejudice;

   2. The Parties will bear their own fees and costs; and

   3. No costs, sanctions, claims, or attorneys' fees arising in
or from this action will be pursued by either of the Parties.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7F8mjz  from Leagle.com.

Alexandru Lefter, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Henry
Linehan -- clinehan@glancylaw.com --  Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Alexandru Lefter, Plaintiff, represented by Howard G. Smith  --
www.howardsmithlaw.com -- Law Offices of Howard G Smith, pro hac
vice, Lesley F. Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy --lglancy@glancylaw.com
-- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP & Robert Vincent Prongay --
rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.
Peggy Dern, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP, Kevin F. Ruf, Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP, Laurence M. Rosen, Rosen Law Firm PA & Leanne Heine Solish,
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Shun Wah So, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP, Kevin F. Ruf, Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP, Laurence M. Rosen, Rosen Law Firm PA & Leanne Heine Solish,
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Len Zheng, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@omlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Dong Mei Mi, Movant, represented by Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz
LLP.

Yirendai Ltd., Defendant, represented by Peter Bradley Morrison --
pmorriso@skadden.com --  Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP &
Virginia F. Milstead -- Virginia.milstead@skadden.com -- Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.

Yihan Fang, Defendant, represented by Peter Bradley Morrison,
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP & Virginia F. Milstead,
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.

Yu Cong, Defendant, represented by Peter Bradley Morrison, Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP & Virginia F. Milstead, Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.

Ning Tang, Defendant, represented by Peter Bradley Morrison,
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.


MICROSOFT INC: Pierce Atwood Attorney Discusses Baker Case Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Donald R. Frederico, Esq. -- dfrederico@pierceatwood.com -- of
Pierce Atwood LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that on
June 12th, the Supreme Court issued its unsurprising decision in
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, addressing a relatively recent twist
concerning the appealability of orders denying class
certification.  The case resulted in unanimous agreement among the
eight Justices who participated in it (Justice Gorsuch did not
participate), but a five-three split among them as to whether the
case should be decided on statutory grounds (supported by the
majority) or constitutional grounds (supported by the minority).
In the course of the debate over the decision's rationale, Justice
Thomas penned a paragraph that serves as a useful reminder
concerning the nature of putative class litigation.

Of all the Court's class certification cases, this must have been
one of the easiest to decide.  Put simply, the district court
struck plaintiffs' class allegations from the complaint, based on
a class certification denial in an earlier case raising the same
claims.  After plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the Ninth
Circuit for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f), they were left
with the choice of litigating their individual claims to final
judgment, which would then have permitted an appeal of right from
the class certification ruling, or voluntarily dismissing their
claims, which should have had the effect of mooting any appeal.
Because plaintiffs wished to preserve their appellate rights but,
presumably, were not interested in incurring the expense of trying
their small claims to verdict, they attempted a third option.
They voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice while
purportedly reserving the right to revive their claims in the
event that the Ninth Circuit reversed the order striking the class
allegations.  They then filed an appeal, seeking to reverse the
district court's order and proceed with their claims on behalf of
a class.  Despite the obvious problems of this approach, the Ninth
Circuit held that the appeal of the class certification ruling was
proper under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, reversed the district court's
order (without reaching the question of the propriety of class
certification), and remanded the case to the district court.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and readily rejected the
plaintiffs' tactic.  In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,
the Court held that, "[i]n the Rules Enabling Act, . . . Congress
authorized this Court to determine when a decision is final for
purposes of Section 1291, and to provide for appellate review of
interlocutory orders not covered by statute. . . . These changes
are to come from rulemaking, however, not judicial decisions in
particular controversies or inventive litigation ploys." The Ninth
Circuit's action in taking the appeal, the Court held, bypassed
the balanced approach embodied in Rule 23(f), which provides for
discretionary interlocutory review of class certification orders,
without disrupting the final judgment rule established by Section
1291.

In his concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, Justice Thomas argued that the majority should have
premised its decision not on Sec. 1291, but on Article III of the
Constitution.  After all, he asserted, a judgment based on a
dismissal with prejudice is a "final decision" within the meaning
of the statute, but once the plaintiffs dismissed their claims,
there no longer was a case or controversy to satisfy Article III.
"Indeed," Justice Thomas wrote, "it has long been the rule that a
party may not appeal from the voluntary dismissal of a claim,
since the party consented to the judgment against it." (Citations
omitted.)

Which brings me to the short paragraph that inspired this post.
Justice Thomas continued:

The plaintiffs contend that their interest in reversing the order
striking their class allegations is sufficient to satisfy Article
III's case-or-controversy requirement, but they misunderstand the
status of putative class actions.  Class allegations, without an
underlying individual claim, do not give rise to a "case" or
"controversy."  Those allegations are simply the means of invoking
a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to litigate his
individual claims on behalf of a class. . . . Thus, because the
Court of Appeals lacked Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate the
individual claims, it could not hear the plaintiffs' appeal of the
order striking their class allegations.
In this passage, Justice Thomas reaffirms the principle, which all
class action litigators should recognize, that a putative class
action cannot stand on its own based on the claims of absent class
members, but is bound up with, and limited by, the individual
claims of the class representatives.  This is true at all stages
of the litigation -- before class certification, at the time of
the class certification decision, after class certification, and
on appeal.  If the representatives' claims prevail, and the case
satisfies all of the Rule 23 requirements (including the
plaintiff-focused elements of typicality and adequacy), then the
class claims generally will prevail. Conversely, if the
representatives' claims fail on grounds applicable to the class,
so will the claims of the class.  And if the representatives'
claims fail on grounds not applicable to the class, then they are
improper class representatives and the class should not be
certified.

Justice Thomas' opinion is only a concurrence, but there is no
reason to believe that any of the Justices in the majority would
disagree with the views contained in this paragraph.  And the
centrality of the "underlying individual claim" to a putative
class action has important practical consequences beyond the
appealability of class certification orders.  For example, because
a putative class action is only an individual lawsuit unless and
until a court grants certification, the indispensable role of the
individual claim may bear on the scope of precertification
discovery, the scope of the claims properly before the court, and
other important case management issues.

As we noted in a previous post, there are bills pending in
Congress that would make federal court class certification rulings
automatically appealable and thereby eliminate the need for clever
tactics to overcome the final judgment rule. Regardless of the
outcome of such legislation, however, Justice Thomas' opinion
serves as a useful reminder for those all-too-frequent situations
in which plaintiffs' lawyers proceed as though they are
representing a class even before any class has been certified, and
who believe incorrectly that they have license to exceed the
bounds of the named plaintiffs' claims. [GN]


MINNESOTA: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over DD Waiver Services Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Donovan W. Frank of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss the case captioned Maxwell Mikkelson, by his parents and
Guardians, Scott and Annmarie Mikkelson, and R.H., a minor child
by R.H.'s parent, Heather Heath, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Emily Johnson Piper, Commissioner of the
Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendant, Case No. 15
Civ. 2326 (ER) (D. Minn.).
Plaintiff Maxwell Mikkelson is a twenty-two-year-old individual
with a developmental disability, autism, and language deficits who
desires "to be less isolated from his community and more
independent from his family and paid caregivers." Plaintiff R.H.
is a minor with a severe intellectual disability and autism.

Plaintiffs bring their claims on their own behalf and on behalf of
a putative class of similarly situated individuals with
disabilities in Minnesota who have applied for and been deemed
eligible for DD Waiver Services but "have been denied or otherwise
not offered" such services. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant has
failed to undertake necessary administrative steps to remedy
underspending by Minnesota counties.

Plaintiffs assert (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 through
failure to furnish services with reasonable promptness in
violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(8); (2) violation of 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 through failure to inform of feasible
alternatives and denial of choice of Waiver Services in violation
of 42 U.S.C. Section 1396n(c)(2)(C); (3) violation of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 through a violation of Plaintiffs' Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Medicaid Act, and its
implementing regulations; (4) violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section 12132; and (5) violation
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Section
794(a).

Defendant move to dismiss on only the basis of Defendant's
Eleventh Amendment and separation-of-powers arguments.
In his Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 6, 2017 available
at https://is.gd/DbJEuk from Leagle.com, Judge Frank concluded
that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not support
dismissal of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and that
Defendant's arguments based on the separation-of-powers and
principles of federalism are largely premature.

R.H., et al. are represented by Mark R. Azman, Esq. --
MRAzman@olwklaw.com -- and -- Shamus P. O'Meara, Esq. --
SPOMeara@olwklaw.com -- O'MEARA LEER WAGNER & KOHL, PA

            -- and --

     Barnett I. Rosenfield, Esq.
     Pamela S. Hoopes, Esq.
     Steven C. Schmidt, Esq.
     MINNESOTA LEGAL AID
     445 Minnesota St, St Paul,
     MN 55101
     Tel: (651)296-3353

Emily Johnson Piper is represented by:

      Aaron Winter, Esq.
      Ian M. Welsh, Esq.
      Scott H. Ikeda, Esq.
      MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
      430 1st Avenue N
      Suite 300
      Minneapolis MN 55401-1780
      Tel: (612)334-5970


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Calif. Court Dismisses Antitrust Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Todd Cunningham, writing for The Recorder, reports that a class
action suit claiming that the NFL's exclusive DirecTV package
violated antitrust law was sacked by a federal court judge on June
30, who saw no evidence of conspiracy, collusion or significant
harm to football fans or bars showing the games.

In a 38-page ruling, U.S. District Judge Beverly Reid O'Connell of
the Central District of California upheld with prejudice the
National Football League's motion to dismiss the case filed in Los
Angeles federal court by a legal team led by Beth A. Wilkinson,
Esq. -- bwilkinson@wilkinsonwalsh.com -- and Jonathan D. Kelley,
Esq. -- jkelley@wilkinsonwalsh.com  -- of Wilkinson Walsh +
Eskovitz and Gregg H. Levy and Derek Ludwin of Covington &
Burling. Levy argued the case for the league.

The plaintiffs in the consolidated multidistrict litigation were
the bars and restaurants that ponied up thousands of dollars each
year for DirecTV's "Sunday Ticket" package, which allows their
customers to see not only the games airing on local broadcast
television, but also the out-of-market ones. In this era of
increased employment mobility and the rise of fantasy football,
that become crucial for NFL fans who have interest beyond their
local teams.

The lawsuit claimed that the league's eight-year, $12 billion deal
with the satellite broadcaster was an antitrust conspiracy because
of the way the NFL's 32 franchises collectively pooled their
rights and came to agreements with DirecTV and broadcasters
restraining the televised exhibition of out-of-market games. That
resulted in higher prices and fewer games available for consumers,
according to the suit.

The plaintiffs' legal team was led by Marc M. Seltzer of Susman
Godfrey in Los Angeles, Scott Martin and Irving Scher of Hausfeld
LLP in New York, and Howard Langer, Edward Diver and Peter Leckman
of Langer, Grogan & Diver.

NFL teams might individually stream their games online and the
result would be more competitive pricing and content, the suit
said. Currently, for access to out-of-market games, a consumer
must subscribe to "Sunday Ticket," which costs $200 for laptop,
computer and phone services, and $330 for the full package
compatible on all devices and gaming consoles. It's been a winner
for DirecTV in terms of gaining subscribers.

The NFL denied the charges in the suit in its response, and said
that the DirecTV Sunday Ticket package actually enhanced consumer
welfare and promoted competition by enabling the league and its
teams to better compete with other sports and entertainment
offerings.

O'Connell got the message, and tackled each of the plaintiffs' key
claims in her ruling.

The fact that the league negotiated the deal with DirecTV did not
have an anti-competitive effect, she wrote, nor did the fact that
consumer prices rose establish an antitrust situation, but rather
was the normal course of business. The contention that the deal
discouraged the team from streaming the games on their own failed
to establish a reduction in "output" or the number of games, she
added.

"There's not much question that the NFL is a monopoly," said
attorney Alan Milstein, an authority on sports antitrust law and
chairman of the litigation department at Sherman, Silverstein,
Kohl, Rose & Podolsky in New Jersey. "That makes it critical to
show antitrust injury or that competition has been harmed."
The class action would have had a better chance at success a few
years ago, Milstein said.

"Today, it's hard to argue a reduction of output when, if
anything, we're seeing a saturation-level number of games," he
said.

Sunday was at one time the only day on which NFL games were played
and broadcast, but that changed in 1970 with the introduction of
"Monday Night Football," and there are now games on Thursdays and
some Saturdays as well.

"The NFL is a powerful, powerful entity, and without being able to
show real harm or injury, this suit wasn't going to bring it
down," Milstein said. [GN]


NEW HAVEN, CT: Court Dismisses Suit Over Sewer System
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut dismissed without prejudice the case
captioned 26 CROWN ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GREATER
NEW HAVEN REGIONAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants, No. 3:15-cv-1439 (JAM)(D. Conn.).

The Plaintiffs in this case are three companies who own, lease,
and manage an apartment building at 26 Crown Street in downtown
New Haven.  By means of a broad-ranging complaint that amounts to
an indictment of New Haven's combined sewer system, they seek to
hold the Defendants responsible for the system's failures that
have led to continuing and chronic backflows of sewage into the
basement of 26 Crown Street, as well as to backflows of sewage
onto the property of thousands of other New Haven property owners,
and to releases of untreated sewage directly into the Long Island
Sound.  The Plaintiffs allege in principal part that the
Defendants have acted in violation of the federal Clean Water Act.
The Defendants have now moved to dismiss this action on several
grounds.

As an initial matter, Judge Meyer concluded that the only injury
for which the Plaintiffs have standing is the backflow of sewage
onto their own property.  They as corporate entities do not have
standing to assert any injuries from the loss of aesthetic
enjoyment of a clean environment.  Nor do they have standing to
assert the rights of other New Haven property owners or to
complain more generally about discharges of sewage into the Long
Island Sound that have no effect on them or their business.

As to the sole type of injury for which the Plaintiffs have
standing (the backflows of sewage onto their own property), Judge
Meyer concluded for two reasons that the Plaintiffs do not allege
a valid claim under the Clean Water Act.  First, a violation of
the Clean Water Act requires that there have been a discharge of
pollutants to navigable waters, and the bare facts alleged by
plaintiffs do not give rise to a plausible inference that any
backflows of sewage onto their property have reached the Long
Island Sound more than half a mile away.  Second, even fully
crediting the Plaintiffs' allegations that the sewage backflows in
their basement have seeped through the floor and into the ground
water beneath their property and that there is some sort of a
hydrologic connection between this ground water and the Long
Island Sound, he concluded that such allegations of the pollution
of navigable waters by means of passive ground water migration do
not suffice as a matter of law to state a claim under the Clean
Water Act.

Judge Meyer therefore dismissed the Plaintiffs' principal claim
under the Clean Water Act.  He likewise dismissed their claim
under the Constitution's Takings Clause, because they have not
sought compensation through state law procedures, and thus their
claim is not yet ripe for review.  All of the Plaintiffs'
remaining claims arise under state law, and he declined to
exercise jurisdiction over these remaining claims in the absence
of any federal law claims.  Accordingly, Judge Meyer dismissed
this action without prejudice to the Plaintiffs' right to pursue
their state law claims in the state courts of Connecticut.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/KQd0WC from Leagle.com.

26 Crown Street Associates, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Alexa
Talin Millinger -- amillinger@hinckleyallen.com -- Hinckley Allen
Snyder LLP.

26 Crown Street Associates, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey
J. Mirman -- jmirman@hinckleyallen.com -- Hinckley, Allen &
Snyder, LLP & John F. Droney, Jr. -- jdroney@hinckleyallen.com --
Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP.

26 Crown Master Tenant, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Alexa Talin
Millinger, Hinckley Allen Snyder LLP, Jeffrey J. Mirman, Hinckley,
Allen & Snyder, LLP & John F. Droney, Jr., Hinckley, Allen &
Snyder LLP.

PMC Property Group, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Alexa Talin
Millinger, Hinckley Allen Snyder LLP, Jeffrey J. Mirman, Hinckley,
Allen & Snyder, LLP & John F. Droney, Jr., Hinckley, Allen &
Snyder LLP.

Greater New Haven Regional Water Pollution Control Authority,
Defendant, represented by Christopher John Hug -- chug@rc.com --
Robinson & Cole, Edward J. Heath -- eheath@rc.com -- Robinson &
Cole, Megan E. Baroni -- mbaroni@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole &
Sorell E. Negro -- snegro@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP.

City of New Haven, Defendant, represented by David J. Monz --
dmonz@uks.com -- Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., Richard S. Order
-- rorder@uks.com -- Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., Sorell E.
Negro, Robinson & Cole, LLP & Valerie M. Ferdon -- vferdon@uks.com
-- Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, PC.


NEW ORLEANS, LA: La. App. Dismisses Conversion Claims vs. ACS
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the appeals case captioned STUART H. SMITH, RODNEY STEPHENS,
DAVID A. VEAZEY, GUADALUPE GAMEZ, AND NEAL LANEY v. CITY OF NEW
ORLEANS, THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, JOHN
H. SHIRES, PARKING ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FOR UNIT 10, BEAT 100 (P.
HARRIS, BADGE 139) (THOMAS, BADGES 103) AND (C. WILIAM, BADGE 78),
DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND PERMITS, MICHAEL CENTINEO,
NEW ORLEANS CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, VIEUX CARRE COMMISSION,
THROUGH ITS DIRECTOR, LARRY P. HESDORFER, PARKING SOLUTIONS, LLC.,
AND STANDARD PARKING CORPORATION, No. 2016-CA-1139 (La. App.),
Judge Sandra Carbina Jenkins of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana
for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the Plaintiffs' appeal on the
trial court's June 13, 2016 judgment granting in part ACS State &
Local Solutions, Inc. ("ACS")'s motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed the Plaintiffs' conversion claims against ACS, with
prejudice.

In April 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Injunctive
Relief, Declaratory Judgment, Writ of Mandamus and Damages against
the City and numerous other Defendants.  Each of the named
Plaintiffs had received parking citations for not having a Pay
Station parking receipt and for expired time.  The lawsuit alleged
that because the City's Municipal Code had not been revised to
cover the new Pay Stations, there was confusion and uncertainty as
to enforcement issues.  The lawsuit also alleged that the Pay
Stations were installed without the requisite public hearings and
review by the City's permitting and zoning departments.  In July
2005, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification.

On Aug. 8, 2005, the City passed M.C.S., Ord. 22035, which updated
the previous parking ordinances to cover the changes in technology
in the method of payment from the traditional coin-operated meters
to the Pay Stations.  The ordinance expressly provided for
retroactive application to Jan. 1, 2005.

In March 2008, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Restated Petition
for Damages, asserting claims against the City, ACS, and Standard
for conversion arising from the allegedly unauthorized collection
of parking fees and fines.  They also asserted negligence claims
against these Defendants for, inter alia, failing to obtain legal
authority to issue citations at the Pay Stations.  The City filed
a Third Party Demand and Cross-Claim against ACS and other
Defendants seeking indemnification.

In October 2009, Standard filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' conversion and negligence
claims.  The trial court granted the motion, and this Court
affirmed.

In January 2010, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, arguing that the August 2008 parking ordinance could not
be applied retroactively to Jan. 1, 2005.  On July 22, 2010, the
trial court granted the Plaintiffs' motion.  This Court affirmed
the trial court's judgment, finding that M.C.S., Ord. 22035 was to
be applied prospectively only.

On Feb. 20, 2013, the trial court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.  This Court affirmed.

In November 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking a finding of liability by the City and
ACS, but reserving the issue of damages for trial.  In December
2015, ACS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of
the Plaintiffs' claims for conversion and negligence.  In March
2016, the City filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking
a dismissal of the claims of those named Plaintiffs who never
received a citation or were cited but never paid the fines.

The trial court heard the parties' various motions for summary
judgment on May 13, 2016.  On June 13, 2016, the trial court
signed a judgment: (i) deferring the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment; (ii) deferring the City's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment; (iii) denying ACS' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiffs' negligence claims; and (iv) granting
ACS' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiffs' conversion
claims.

On June 22, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial on
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' conversion claim against ACS,
which the trial court denied on June 27, 2016.  On Aug. 29, 2016,
Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Appeal.

Based upon their de novo review of the record, Judge Jenkins finds
that allowing an immediate appeal of this partial judgment would
only encourage the parties' history of multiple appeals and
piecemeal litigation, causing further delay and judicial
inefficiency.  Because the Plaintiffs' appeal from the partial
summary judgment was improperly designated as a final, appealable
judgment, they do not have a right to appeal the judgment.
Accordingly, Judge Jenkins dismissed the appeal and declined to
convert the appeal to an application for supervisory review.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/qm0e6u from Leagle.com.

Stephen B. Murray, Sr. -- smurray@murray-lawfirm.com -- Art M.
Murray -- amurray@murray-lawfirm.com -- Jessica Wittmer Hayes --
jhayes@murray-lawfirm.com -- MURRAY LAW FIRM, 650 Poydras Street,
Suite 2150, New Orleans, LA 70130, AND Salvador I. Bivalacqua,
Scott M. Galante, GALANTE & BIVALACQUA, LLC, 650 Poydras Street,
Suite 2015, New Orleans, LA 70130, AND Barry J. Cooper, Jr.,
COOPER LAW FIRM, L.L.C., 365 Canal Street, Suite 2850, New
Orleans, LA 70130, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Wayne J. Lee -- wlee@stonepigman.com -- Michael Q. Walshe, Jr. --
mwalshe@stonepigman.com -- Heather S. Lonian --
hlonian@stonepigman.com -- STONE PIGMAN WALTHER WITTMANN, LLC, 546
Carondelet Street, New Orleans, LA 70130, Counsel for
Defendant/Appellee.


NEW YORK: Class Action Mulled Against DEC Over Fishing Permits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Harrington, writing for Newsday, reports that the state
Department of Environmental Conservation has agreed to meet with
Long Island fishing interests over long-held complaints about
access to restricted commercial fishing permits following a move
by local legislators seeking quicker action on state fishing
rules.

The meeting, brokered by Assemb. Fred Thiele (I-Sag Harbor), is
expected to address the complexities of acquiring, transferring
and even passing to family members permits to fish for vital local
fish such as striped bass and fluke.  It may also address so-
called latent permits, in which a large percentage of existing
permits are held but not used.  Fishermen also have complained of
long-standing moratoriums on certain species of fish.

Mr. Thiele, who worked with Assemb. Steven Englebright (D-
Setauket), chair of the environmental conservation committee, and
state Sen. Kenneth LaValle (R-Port Jefferson), on July 3 said the
meeting will be about "access to the fishery" in general and the
difficulty in getting permits.

"The idea here is to have hard-and-fast changes in the way this
regulatory process works for permits and licenses," he said.  "You
have to find a balance between conservation and promoting the
industry.  We need to do away with things that arbitrarily cause
difficulty and don't promote conservation."

DEC spokesman Sean Mahar confirmed the agency "is working with Mr.
Thiele to host a meeting with commercial fishing representatives
to discuss our ongoing fisheries management in the state."

The legislature this summer won a concession from the DEC to limit
to one year the current fishing license and permitting structure.
The DEC had sought to extend current rules through 2020, Mr.
Thiele said.

After the meeting with fishing interests this fall, the plan is to
"reach consensus on changes to licensing and permit procedures" to
be included in new legislation that would take effect by the end
of 2018, Mr. Thiele said.

The planned meeting follows one this winter with more than three
dozen local fishermen and attorney Daniel Rodgers of Southampton,
who heads the pro-fishing group New York Fish, exploring the
prospect of suing the state to change the rules governing new
permits.

In December, Rodgers sent a "notice of intent" to file a class-
action suit against the DEC, taking aim at state restrictions on
new commercial striped bass fishing permits.  The letter notes
that only those who held striped-bass permits in eight select
years between 1984 and 1995 are eligible for new permits, a rule
that "completely excludes all other fishermen, particularly
younger fishermen."

"Since 1995 this rule has created a 'moratorium' on any new
entrants into this valuable fishery while creating a 'protected
class' that has financially benefited from an unconstitutional
state regulatory scheme," Mr. Rodgers wrote.

Told of the planned meeting in the fall, Mr. Rodgers said a
lawsuit is still planned.

"I'm skeptical they are actually going to do anything," he said of
the DEC.

"I want them to manage the fishery," Mr. Rogers said.  "That means
make sure permits go to people who actually use them rather than
people who sit on them. What we're looking for is regulatory
reform."

The legislature also passed legislation, authored by Mr. Thiele
and LaValle, that establishes a seafood marketing task force to
"promote the marketing and sustainability" of local seafood.  It
awaits Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo's signature. [GN]


NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Dan Churney, writing for Cook County Record, reports that saying
the basis for the suit has been amputated by Illinois' highest
court, NorthShore University Health System is asking a Cook County
judge to dismiss a class-action suit, which demanded hospitals be
made to pay back Illinois property taxpayers who have allegedly
overpaid because, the plaintiffs allege, the state's hospitals
have wrongly enjoyed tax-exempt status.

In May 2016, Thornmeadow Partners LP filed suit in Cook County
Circuit Court against NorthShore University Health System, as a
representative of all other hospitals in Illinois.  NorthShore
operates hospitals in Evanston, Highland Park, Glenbrook and
Skokie.

Thornmeadow owns a residential property in the 4800 block of West
Dakin on Chicago's northwest side. According to Cook County
property tax records, the taxes were paid by Sabra Management, of
Northfield.  State records indicate Sabra is headed by Jack Gore,
a Northfield lawyer.

Thornmeadow claimed NorthShore and other hospitals throughout
Illinois should pay property taxes.  The plaintiff cited a January
2016 Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court opinion, regarding a
Champaign County case between state and local taxing bodies and
the Carle Foundation, which runs a hospital in Urbana. The
appellate opinion struck down as unconstitutional the state law
allowing Illinois' nonprofit hospitals to avoid property taxes if
they provide a certain level of charity care.

As a result of this allegedly improper tax exemption, Thornmeadow
said property owners in the state have had to make up the
difference by paying higher taxes. Thornmeadow wants hospitals to
reimburse taxpayers for the extra taxes they have forked over
since 2014, with interest.  Thornmeadow did not estimate the
amount.

NorthShore has filed a motion to dismiss the suit, saying the
Illinois First District Appellate Court ruled in December 2016, in
a different suit, the tax-exempt law was constitutional.  Then in
March 2017, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the Fourth District
ruling.

NorthShore acknowledged the state high court upended the Fourth
District on procedural grounds, saying the Fourth District lacked
jurisdiction.  The high court did not address the
constitutionality of the tax exemption, but nonetheless did
overturn it, NorthShore noted.  As a consequence, Thornmeadow's
case collapses, as it was built on the Fourth District ruling,
with the First District decision further tamping down the case, in
NorthShore's view.

"That holding (the First District decision) is now the law of the
land," NorthShore said.

NorthShore further argued that apart from the appellate and
supreme court rulings, the law allowing exemptions was
nevertheless in place at the time NorthShore took advantage of it
-- NorthShore was simply enjoying a legal exemption.  This fact
alone makes Thornmeadow's "case theory fundamentally flawed,"
according to NorthShore.

NorthShore went on to contend there is no basis for it to repay
taxes to the Illinois Department of Revenue, much less to any
private parties like Thornmeadow.

Thornmeadow claimed NorthShore misused public funds, but
NorthShore countered only a public body can misuse funds, not a
private entity such as NorthShore.  At any rate, NorthShore said
the plaintiff has not shown how failing to pay taxes, pursuant to
a valid exemption, is a "misuse."

In this connection, Northshore pointed out plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a suit under the status of a taxpayer, because
such an action has to seek relief from illegal acts by public
officials; plaintiff has not shown evidence of such acts.

The Thornmeadow suit also names Cook County Treasurer Maria Pappas
and Cook County Clerk David Orr as defendants, as they are
responsible for processing property taxes.  Pappas and Orr have
filed a separate motion to dismiss the suit.

Plaintiff said it tapped NorthShore as a defendant, because
NorthShore is based in Cook County, and is in a position to best
represent other hospitals in the class action.

Judge Celia Gamrath is presiding over the case. The next hearing
is Aug. 14. [GN]

The Chicago firm of Winston & Strawn is defending NorthShore
University HealthSystem.  The Cook County State's Attorney's
Office is defending the county treasurer and clerk.

Chicago lawyer Larry D. Drury is representing Thornmeadow.


NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS: Suit Over Gleevec Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts has dismissed the cases captioned UNITED
FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS MIDWEST HEALTH
BENEFITS FUND and LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST FUND FOR
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NOVARTIS
AG, and NOVARTIS CORPORATION, Defendants. LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY d/b/a BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF
LOUISIANA, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NOVARTIS AG, and
NOVARTIS CORPORATION, Defendants. AFSCME HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NOVARTIS AG, and NOVARTIS
CORPORATION, Defendants. MINNESOTA LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE
FUND, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NOVARTIS AG, and
NOVARTIS CORPORATION, Defendants. PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYEES BENEFIT
TRUST FUND, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORP., NOVARTIS AG, and
NOVARTIS CORPORATION, Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 15-cv-12732,
15-cv-13461, 15-cv-13724, 15-cv-13725, 15-cv-13726 (D. Mass.).

Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California and
Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Louisiana brought state-law claims against
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Novartis AG, and Novartis
Corporation, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, for engaging in an alleged "monopolistic scheme" in
connection with Gleevec, a brand-name prescription drug used to
treat certain types of chronic myeloid leukemia and acute
lymphoblastic leukemia.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
Novartis, which held the patent rights to Gleevec, engaged in
illegal, anticompetitive conduct designed to delay the entry of
generic forms of the drug into the U.S. market.

The plaintiffs filed their original Class Action Complaint on June
22, 2015, seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief under
federal antitrust law.  In July and August 2015, Novartis filed
motions to dismiss.  On February 1, 2016, while the motions were
pending, a generic form of Gleevec was introduced into the market,
thus mooting the request for injunctive relief.  On March 24,
2016, the Court denied the motions to dismiss as moot and gave the
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.  In addition, the Court
consolidated the action for pretrial purposes with four other
cases involving similar claims against Novartis.

On April 8, 2016, the plaintiffs filed the operative Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint (CAC).  The parties stipulated that
the CAC would supersede all other complaints filed by any
plaintiff in any of the consolidated actions.  In contrast to the
original complaint, the CAC did not contain any claims arising out
of federal antitrust law; instead, it asserted only state-law
antitrust and unfair trade practices claims, under the laws of 23
states and the District of Columbia.

Novartis moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of
jurisdiction.

Although the plaintiffs' monopolization claims are based solely on
state law, the plaintiffs and Novartis both raised legal arguments
that rely heavily on doctrines developed in federal antitrust
cases -- specifically, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as set forth
in E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965) -- and on the related grounds for antitrust
liability -- a "Walker Process" theory, as described in Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965), and a sham litigation theory.

Novartis argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege plausible
sham litigation or Walker Process claims.

Judge Burroughs found that the plaintiffs have not alleged a
plausible sham litigation claim.  The judge explained that the
possible invalidity of a patent does not, in and of itself,
establish that the litigation asserting it was objectively
baseless.

Judge Burroughs also concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead a state law Walker Process fraud claim.  The
judge found that the plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege
that the claimed misrepresentations or omissions were material to
the patent examiner's determination.  The judge also found that
the facts alleged, even construed generously, do not support a
plausible inference of fraudulent intent.

Moreover, Judge Burroughs held that where the plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim based on sham litigation or Walker-Process
fraud, the plaintiffs' Orange Book listing allegations cannot form
a separate basis for liability and therefore fail as well.
Because the plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege claims
sufficient to avoid the bar of Noerr-Pennington immunity, Judge
Burroughs concluded that their state-law claims must be dismissed.

A full-text copy of Judge Burroughs's June 30, 2017 memorandum and
order is available at https://is.gd/zD9yxk from Leagle.com.

United Food and Commercial Workers Unions and Employers Midwest
Health Benefits Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Bethany R. Turke -
- brt@wexlerwallace.com -- WEXLER WALLACE LLP, pro hac vice,
Hannah Schwarzschild -- hannahs@hbsslaw.com -- Hagans Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Branstetter,
Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, Joe P. Leniski,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, Jonathan D.
Karmel, Karmel Law Firm, pro hac vice, Justin N. Boley --
jnb@wexlerwallace.com -- WEXLER WALLACE LLP, pro hac vice, Kenneth
A. Wexler -- kaw@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael Gilman Stewart, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings,
PLLC, pro hac vice, Michael J. Wall, Branstetter, Stranch &
Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, Thomas M. Sobol -- tom@hbsslaw.com -
- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Kristen A. Johnson --
kristenj@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California,
Plaintiff, represented by Hannah Schwarzschild, Hagans Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, J. Gerard Stranch, IV,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice, Joe P.
Leniski, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Michael Gilman Stewart, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, pro
hac vice, Michael J. Wall, Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC,
pro hac vice, Thomas M. Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP &
Kristen A. Johnson, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

AFSCME Health and Welfare Fund, Pennsylvania Employees Benefit
Trust Fund, Plaintiffs, represented by Diana J. Zinser --
dzinser@srkw-law.com -- Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac
vice, Jeffrey L. Kodroff -- jkodroff@srkw-law.com -- Spector
Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., John A. Macoretta -- jmacoretta@srkw-
law.com -- Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice & Adam M.
Stewart -- astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP.

Minnesota Laborers Health and Welfare Fund, Plaintiff, represented
by Devona L. Wells, Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Diana J. Zinser, Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac
vice, Heidi M. Silton, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, pro hac vice,
Jeffrey L. Kodroff, Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., John A.
Macoretta, Spector Roseman & Kodroff, P.C., pro hac vice, Karen H.
Riebel, Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac vice & Adam M.
Stewart, Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP.

Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Company d/b/a Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Louisiana, Plaintiff, represented by David
Scott Scalia, The Dugan Law Firm, pro hac vice & Adam M. Stewart,
Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP.

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Novartis Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Alice C.C. Huling, Arnold & Porter Kay
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, David Barr, Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac
vice, Katherine O'Brien, Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Laura
Scott Shores, Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Mark D. Godler, Kaye
Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew Gibbs, Kaye Scholer LLP, pro
hac vice, Saul P. Morgenstern, Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice,
William A. Zucker, McCarter & English, LLP & Wyley S. Proctor,
McCarter & English, LLP.

Novartis AG, Defendant, represented by Grant J. Esposito, Morrison
& Foerster LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica L. Kaufman, Morrison &
Foerster LLP, pro hac vice, William A. Zucker, McCarter & English,
LLP & Wyley S. Proctor, McCarter & English, LLP.


ONE TECHNOLOGIES: Texas Consumers' Suit to Proceed to Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Dismiss the Case captioned VICKIE FORBY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ONE TECHNOLOGIES, LP; ONE TECHNOLOGIES MANAGEMENT
LLC; and ONE TECHNOLOGIES CAPITAL LLP, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 3:16-CV-856-L (N.D. Tex.).

Before the court is Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Dismiss the Case.

Plaintiff Vickie Forby filed a class action complaint in Illinois
state court against One Technologies, LP; One Technologies
Management LLC; and One Technologies Capital LLP, Defendants,
alleging claims for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
("ICFA") and unjust enrichment.  Plaintiff contends that
Defendants' website leads consumers to believe they are signing up
for a free credit report.

Defendants contend that even if the court decides the
enforceability of the arbitration provision, the court ought to
compel arbitration, as a valid arbitration provision exists and
the dispute falls within the scope of that provision. Plaintiff
counters that Defendants have waived their right to arbitration by
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts, which has caused
Plaintiff to suffer prejudice.

Plaintiff fails to respond to Defendants arguments regarding the
enforceability of the arbitration provision. Plaintiff, therefore,
does not dispute that she assented to the Terms and Conditions on
the Defendants' website. There does not appear to be any dispute
over the existence of a valid arbitration clause or whether the
parties' dispute falls within that clause. As this issue is not in
dispute, it is no longer before the court, and there is no reason
for the court to address enforceability.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants waived their arbitration right
by substantially invoking the judicial process.  Defendants sought
to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff's claims by filing a motion
to dismiss with prejudice and they waited to move to compel
arbitration until after the court ruled on the motion to dismiss.
Defendants contend that simply filing a defensive or perfunctory'
motion to dismiss is not a substantial invocation of the judicial
process.

The court determines that Defendants have invoked the jurisdiction
of the court by seeking a decision on the merits before attempting
to arbitrate. Defendants did not file a perfunctory motion to
dismiss, as their motion to dismiss did not involve a procedural
or routine matter.  The motion to dismiss that Defendants filed in
this court sought a ruling on the merits and did not move to
compel arbitration. Moreover, Defendants did not seek arbitration
until April 17, 2017, almost thirteen months after the action was
transferred to this district.

Plaintiff contends, inter alia, Defendants' actions were to her
detriment because she has been prejudiced by the delay, expenses,
and damage to her legal position. Finally, plaintiff contends
Defendants have waived the right to invoke arbitration because the
facts of this case indicate that plaintiff would suffer prejudice
if the court compelled arbitration.

Defendants counter, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish
the three important factors relevant to determine prejudice:  (1)
whether discovery occurred relating to arbitrable claims; (2) the
time and expense incurred in defending against a motion for
summary judgment; and (3) a party's failure to timely assert its
right to arbitrate.  Finally, Defendants contend they will not
seek to relitigate the sufficiency of Plaintiff's remaining claim
in arbitration, if granted, and, therefore, Plaintiff has not been
prejudiced by the loss of a "defective claim."

While the court agrees that Plaintiff has suffered some prejudice,
the only prejudice that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated is
delay, and delay alone is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff
has been prejudiced by Defendants' invocation of the judicial
process.

Plaintiff fails to establish prejudice to her legal position, as
she primarily relies on conclusory statements to support her
position. While Plaintiff contends that her full legal strategy
and legal position were revealed through her response to
Defendants' motion, she does not set forth the basis for this
argument.

Plaintiff fails to establish prejudice to her legal position, as
she primarily relies on conclusory statements to support her
position. While Forby contends that her full legal strategy and
legal position were revealed through her response to Defendants'
motion, she does not set forth the basis for this argument
The court grants the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Dismiss the Case.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/yv4moU  from
Leagle.com.

Vickie Forby, Plaintiff, represented by David C. Nelson, --
dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com -- Nelson & Nelson.

Vickie Forby, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin J. Sweet --
bsweet@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch LTD, Edwin J. Kilpela --
ekilela@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP, pro hac vice, Emil Lippe, Jr., Law Offices of
Lippe & Associates, 12222 Merit Drive Ste 1200, Dallas, TX 75251,
Kevin Abramowicz -- kabramowicz@carlsonlynch.com -- pro hac vice &
Stephanie K. Goldin -- sgoldin@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch
Sweet & Kilpela LLP.

One Technologies LP, Defendant, represented by Brian Edward
Robison -- brobison@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Andrew Patrick LeGrand -- alegrand@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Christopher J. Schwegmann -- cjs@lynnllp.com -- Lynn
Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP & Jonathan Ryan Childers --
jchilders@lynnllp.com -- Lynn Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP.

One Technologies Management LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian
Edward Robison, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Andrew Patrick
LeGrand, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Christopher J. Schwegmann,
Lynn Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP & Jonathan Ryan Childers, Lynn
Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP.

One Technologies Capital LLP, Defendant, represented by Brian
Edward Robison, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Andrew Patrick
LeGrand, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Christopher J. Schwegmann,
Lynn Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP & Jonathan Ryan Childers, Lynn
Pinker Cox and Hurst LLP.


ONTARIO: Koskie Minsky Files Class Action Over Bail Delays
----------------------------------------------------------
Koskie Minsky LLP and Henein Hutchison LLP have commenced a class
action against the Province of Ontario alleging that chronic
delays in bail hearings have violated the rights of accused
persons.

The statement of claim issued on June 29, 2017, alleges, among
other things, that the bail hearing system in Ontario has been
administered in a manner which is negligent and in breach of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The claim alleges that
for many years the bail hearing system has been mismanaged,
resulting in overcrowded dockets, under-resourced courts,
excessive travel requirements and lack of interpreters. The
mismanagement is alleged to have led to routine violations of the
class members' rights to a timely bail hearing.

The proposed class includes all persons who were arrested and
detained for a period of more than 24 hours prior to any
meaningful bail hearing being available for the time period of
January 1, 2000 to the present.

Ms. Robin Cirillo is the proposed representative plaintiff. Ms.
Cirillo was detained for two nights in jail, traveled over 130
kilometres and was denied a meaningful bail hearing for 36 hours
after her arrest. She was eventually granted bail on consent.

Scott Hutchison, a partner at Henein Hutchison LLP, stated "The
right of an accused person to be considered for bail in a timely
manner is an essential element of our justice system. The bail
hearing system in Ontario has been broken for many years now.
Systemic violations of the most basic rights of an accused person
have become routine and inevitable. It is time the Province is
held to account for these violations."

Kirk Baert, a partner at Koskie Minsky LLP, stated "Numerous
independent reviews have warned that the bail hearing system is
overcrowded and under-resourced. It has been well known for years
that the most basic rights of accused persons cannot be met. Many
accused persons are already marginalized and the wilful blindness
to the repeat violation of their rights is unacceptable." [GN]


PATHEON NV: "Bushansky" Sues Over Onerous Merger Deal
-----------------------------------------------------
Stephen Bushansky, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Patheon N.V., Paul S. Levy, James C.
Mullen, Daniel Agroskin, Philip Eykerman, William B. Hayes,
Stephan B. Tanda, Hugh C. Welsh, Hans Peter Hasler, Pamela Daley,
Jeffrey P. Mcmullen, Gary P. Pisano and Charles Cogut, Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-04758 (S.D. N.Y., June 22, 2017), seeks to enjoin
defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing the acquisition of
Patheon N.V. by Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Thermo Fisher (CN) Luxembourg S.a r.l., rescinding it
and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages in the event
defendants consummate the said merger.  The suit also seeks costs
of this action, including reasonable allowance for plaintiff's
attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further relief
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The merger agreement provides for a termination fee payable by
Patheon to Thermo Fisher if the merger is terminated, thus
precluding other bidders from making successful competing offers
for the Company. The merger's solicitation statement failed to
disclose income loss from continuing operations, repositioning
expenses, interest expense, foreign exchange losses, refinancing
expenses, acquisition and integration costs, gains and losses on
sale of capital assets, income taxes, impairment charges,
remediation costs, depreciation and amortization, stock-based
compensation expense, consulting costs related to operational
initiatives, purchase accounting adjustments and acquisition-
related litigation expenses, says the complaint.

Patheon is a global provider of pharmaceutical development and
manufacturing services with approximately 9,100 employees and
contractors worldwide, providing comprehensive, integrated and
customizable set of solutions to help customers of all sizes
satisfy complex development and manufacturing needs at any stage
of the pharmaceutical development cycle. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Tel: (212) 682-3025
      Fax: (212) 682-3010
      Email: racocelli@weisslawllp.com


PENNY ARCADE: Jan. 11 Class Action Settlement Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------
Jim Walsh, writing for Courier-Post, reports that people hoping
for a payment from TD Bank due to a dispute over coin-counting
machines face at least a six-month wait.

A federal judge has scheduled a Jan. 11 hearing to consider the
proposed settlement of a class-action lawsuit over the bank's
Penny Arcade machines.

U.S. District Judge Jerome Simandle set that date after giving the
plan his preliminary approval at a June 27 hearing, according to
court records.

Under the settlement, TD Bank would pay $7.5 million to customers
who used its coin-counting machines after April 11, 2010.

The payments would resolve legal challenges that arose after an
April 2016 news report cast doubt on the accuracy of Penny
Arcades.  TD pulled its almost 1,200 machines from bank lobbies in
May 2016.

The proposed agreement requires Judge Simandle's approval.

Under the proposed settlement, TD Bank would review records to
automatically determine the value of Penny Arcade transactions by
customers.

It would multiply that sum by 0.26 percent to determine a
customer's distribution, or payment.

That means payments to eligible customers will be at least 26
cents per $100 exchanged via a Penny Arcade, a court record says.

Coin machine users who did not have TD accounts could submit
written claims, subject to an administrator's approval.
Undocumented claims would be limited to $500.

TD Bank, with headquarters in Cherry Hill, is not commenting on
the proposed agreement.

The company is not opposing the settlement plan, which includes an
additional $1.5 million for the customers'  attorneys. Thirteen
people named as plaintiffs in the suit would share a $50,000
payment. [GN]


PIONEER: $180-Mil. DVD Drive Settlement Fund Established
--------------------------------------------------------
Nick Heath, writing for Tech Republic, reports that US firms that
bought a PC with a DVD drive between 2003 and 2008 could be
eligible for a $10 payout for each machine.

Seven DVD drive makers have established a $180m fund to settle a
class-action lawsuit that accused them of conspiring to
artificially raise the price of optical drives sold to computer
makers and retailers.

The settlement fund previously stood at $124.5m, but recently rose
after Pioneer, PLDS and Teac joined Panasonic, HLDS, NEC and Sony
in agreeing to settle the case.

While it has been reported that consumers would be eligible for
payouts, one of the partners at the law firm handling the suit has
said businesses can also qualify and there is no upper limit on
claims.  However, large claims may be audited to protect against
fraud, with some businesses supplying purchase orders to back up
their claims.

"We are proud of these seven settlements, which reflect a
tremendous recovery for the class and a huge amount of work by the
class representatives," said Shana Scarlett -- shanas@hbsslaw.com
-- partner with Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

"We look forward to continuing to vigorously represent the
indirect purchaser class."

Firms and consumers may be eligible for a payout if they purchased
a PC with a DVD drive, or a standalone DVD drive from April 2003
to December 2008, and were resident in a qualifying region.  These
regions are Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, or Wisconsin.

Claims can be made via this website, which asks each claimant to
provide their name, contact details, and how many computers they
bought.  They can be submitted by those who, directly or
indirectly, bought drives from Pioneer, PLDS and Teac until August
1st.

The conspiracy claims in the case center on manufacturers accused
of colluding to inflate the prices of optical drives sold to
computer manufacturers and retailers.  As noted by ZDNet's sister
site CNET, at least one Hitachi-LG executive was sentenced to six
months in prison after pleading guilty to the conspiracy.

Scarlett says that once the total number of claims is known, the
settlement fund will be divided pro rata by the number of
claimants, and the number of drives purchased by each claimant.
[GN]


PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN: Files 11th Cir. Appeal in AA Suncoast Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Progressive American Insurance Company, The Progressive
Corporation and Progressive Select Insurance Company filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled AA Suncoast
Chiropractic Clinic, P.A., et al. v. Progressive American
Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 8:15-cv-02543-RAL-MAP, in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

The appellate case is captioned as AA Suncoast Chiropractic
Clinic, P.A., et al. v. Progressive American Insurance Company, et
al., Case No. 17-13003, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 23,
2017, the Defendants filed an appeal in the lawsuit.  That
appellate case was assigned Case No. 17-90012.

The Class Action Reporter reported on June 5, 2017, that the Hon.
Richard A. Lazzara granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit.  These
Classes were certified:

   A. All Qualified Providers who: (i) received an assignment
      of benefits from a Claimant under a Progressive PIP policy,
      (ii) provided initial or follow up medical services to a
      Claimant after January 1, 2013, and (iii) were given notice
      by Progressive that available PIP benefits were reduced to
      $2,500 because of a Negative EMC Determination that
      Progressive obtained from a Non-treating Provider; and

   B. All Claimants who were notified that Progressive reduced
      available PIP benefits to $2,500 because of a Negative EMC
      Determination Progressive obtained from a Non-treating
      Provider.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before July 24, 2017, as to Appellant Progressive American
      Insurance Company; and

   -- Appellee's Certificate of Interested Persons is due on or
      before August 2, 2017, as to Appellee AA Suncoast
      Chiropractic Clinic, P.A.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees AA SUNCOAST CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, P.A., on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated; PALM HARBOR-
WEST CHASE MEDICAL GROUP, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, d.b.a. Tampa Bay Spine Specialists; and SPINAL
CORRECTION CENTERS, INC., on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Christa L. Collins, Esq.
          Kathryn E. Lee, Esq.
          HARMON, WOODS & PARKER, PA
          110 N 11th St., 2nd Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 222-3600
          Facsimile: (813) 222-3616
          E-mail: clc@harmonwoodslaw.com
                  kl@harmonwoodslaw.com

               - and -

          Lauren A. Meksraitis-Elliott, Esq.
          MICHAEL J. MEKSRAITIS, CHARTERED
          102 S Westland Avenue
          Tampa, FL 33606-1742
          Telephone: (813) 250-0885
          E-mail: lmeksraitis-elliott@verizon.net

               - and -

          J. Andrew Meyer, Esq.
          Leavenlaw
          3900 1st St. N, Suite 100
          St. Petersburg, FL 33703
          Telephone: (727) 327-3328
          Facsimile: (727) 327-3305
          E-mail: ameyer@leavenlaw.com

Defendants-Appellants PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY and PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION
(THE) are represented by:

          Marcy Levine Aldrich, Esq.
          Nancy A. Copperthwaite, Esq.
          AKERMAN, LLP
          3 Brickell City Ctr.
          98 Se 7th St., Suite 1100
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 982-5600
          Facsimile: (305) 374-5095
          E-mail: marcy.aldrich@akerman.com
                  Nancy.Copperthwaite@akerman.com

               - and -

          Margaret Diane Mathews, Esq.
          AKERMAN, LLP
          401 E Jackson St., Suite 1700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 209-5031
          Facsimile: (813) 223-2837
          E-mail: margaret.mathews@akerman.com


PRONAI THERAPEUTICS: Appeals Ruling in "Book" Suit to 9th Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants ProNai Therapeutics, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from
a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Christopher Book v. ProNai
Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case No. 5:16-cv-07408-EJD, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Jose.

The lawsuit arose from alleged violations of securities laws.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed in the Superior Court of the State of California on
November 18, 2016, and was removed to the District Court on
December 30, 2016.

ProNAi Therapeutics is a drug development company focused on
advancing targeted therapeutics for the treatment of patients with
cancer.

The appellate case is captioned as Christopher Book v. ProNai
Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-16323, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire was due July 5, 2017;

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 24, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on August 21, 2017;

   -- Appellants Albert Cha, Nick Glover, Sukhi Jagpal, Jefferies
      LLC, Merrill Lynch, Nicole Onetto, Donald Parfet, Robert
      Pelzer, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., ProNai Therapeutics,
      Inc., SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, Inc., Peter Thompson,
      James Topper, Alvin Vitangcol and Wedbush Securities,
      Inc.'s opening brief is due on October 2, 2017;

   -- Appellee Christopher Book's answering brief is due on
      November 2, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee CHRISTOPHER BOOK, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert Vincent Prongay, Esq.
          Ex Kano Shirden Sams, II, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  RProngay@glancylaw.com
                  esams@glancylaw.com

Defendants-Appellants PRONAI THERAPEUTICS, INC., AKA Sierra
Oncology, Inc., NICK GLOVER, SUKHI JAGPAL, DONALD PARFET, ALBERT
CHA, NICOLE ONETTO, ROBERT PELZER, PETER THOMPSON, JAMES TOPPER
and ALVIN VITANGCOL are represented by:

          Joshua D. Lichtman, Esq.
          Sarah E. Moses, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP
          555 South Flower Street, 41st Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 892-9200
          Facsimile: (213) 892-9494
          E-mail: Joshua.Lichtman@nortonrosefulbright.com
                  sarah.moses@nortonrosefulbright.com

               - and -

          Peter Stokes, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP
          98 San Jacinto Boulevard
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 536-5287
          E-mail: peter.stokes@nortonrosefulbright.com

Defendants-Appellants JEFFERIES LLC, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER
& SMITH INC., WEDBUSH SECURITIES, INC., and SUNTRUST ROBINSON
HUMPHREY, INC., are represented by:

          Charlene S. Shimada, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Market Street
          Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 393-2286
          E-mail: charlene.shimada@morganlewis.com


PRONAI THERAPEUTICS: Appeals Ruling in "Gallas" Suit to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants ProNai Therapeutics, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from
a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Timothy Gallas v. ProNai
Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case No. 5:17-cv-01740-EJD, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Mateo, and was removed to the District Court on
March 29, 2017.

The lawsuit arose from alleged violations of securities laws.

ProNAi Therapeutics is a drug development company focused on
advancing targeted therapeutics for the treatment of patients with
cancer.

The appellate case is captioned as Timothy Gallas v. ProNai
Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case No. 17-16325, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire was due July 5, 2017;

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 24, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on August 21, 2017;

   -- Appellants Albert Cha, Nick Glover, Sukhi Jagpal, Jefferies
      LLC, Merrill Lynch, Nicole Onetto, Donald Parfet, Robert
      Pelzer, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., ProNai Therapeutics,
      Inc., SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, Inc., Peter Thompson,
      James Topper, Alvin Vitangcol and Wedbush Securities,
      Inc.'s opening brief is due on October 2, 2017;

   -- Appellee Timothy Gallas' answering brief is due on
      November 2, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee TIMOTHY GALLAS, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Esq.
          Albert Y. Chang, Esq.
          BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
          7817 Ivanhoe Avenue
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 914-2001
          Facsimile: (858) 914-2002
          E-mail: frankb@johnsonbottini.com
                  achang@bottinilaw.com

Defendants-Appellants PRONAI THERAPEUTICS, INC., AKA Sierra
Oncology, Inc., NICK GLOVER, SUKHI JAGPAL, DONALD PARFET, ALBERT
CHA, NICOLE ONETTO, ROBERT PELZER, PETER THOMPSON, JAMES TOPPER
and ALVIN VITANGCOL are represented by:

          Joshua D. Lichtman, Esq.
          Sarah E. Moses, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP
          555 South Flower Street, 41st Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 892-9200
          Facsimile: (213) 892-9494
          E-mail: Joshua.Lichtman@nortonrosefulbright.com
                  sarah.moses@nortonrosefulbright.com

               - and -

          Peter Stokes, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP
          98 San Jacinto Boulevard
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 536-5287
          E-mail: peter.stokes@nortonrosefulbright.com

Defendants-Appellants JEFFERIES LLC, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER
& SMITH INC., WEDBUSH SECURITIES, INC., and SUNTRUST ROBINSON
HUMPHREY, INC., are represented by:

          Charlene S. Shimada, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Market Street
          Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 393-2286
          E-mail: charlene.shimada@morganlewis.com


PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: To Settle Wage Class Suit for $12.5MM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer, writing for Law360, reports that Prudential Financial
Inc. on June 30 asked a New Jersey federal court to approve a
$12.5 million settlement of a class action claiming its financial
representatives were improperly docked pay for work expenses and
worked unpaid overtime.

In their filing with the court, Prudential and the class said the
settlement was the result of 11 months of negotiation and a pair
of mediation sessions in May 2016 and September 2016, and would
settle the claims of Prudential employees in 12 states.

"After more than a decade, we have decided to resolve this matter
through a settlement that is in the best interest of all involved.
We value our employees, agents and partners and look forward to
putting this matter behind us," Prudential said in a statement on
June 30.

In September 2006, the financial representatives filed a complaint
accusing Prudential of misclassifying them as independent
contractors and improperly taking deductions from their pay for
using offices, assistants, office supplies and insurance, as well
as allegedly failing to pay overtime wages. The employees claimed
the deductions didn't change their taxable earnings or their
pension benefits, and that the company had violated their
contracts, and brought both federal Fair Labor Standards Act and
state law claims.

Their initial motion for class certification in 2013 was rejected,
but in February 2015, U.S. District Judge Claire C. Cecchi found
that the financial representatives had eliminated the issues that
resulted in their first motion for certification being denied by
narrowing their total number of subclasses from 18 to eight.
However, Judge Cecchi agreed with Prudential that individual
issues and an expert's flawed report barred certification for the
representatives' overtime subclasses.

Counsel for the class did not immediately respond to requests for
comment on June 30.

In January 2012, Prudential settled FLSA claims brought in Maine
by a class of disability claims managers who alleged they were
forced to work off the clock for roughly $1 million.

The plaintiffs are represented by Kenneth K. Lehn, Esq. --
klehn@winnebanta.com -- of Winne Banta Hetherington Basralian &
Kahn PC, John Halebian, Esq. -- JHalebian@lshllp.com -- of Lovell
Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Peter A Muhic, Esq. --
pmuhic@ktmc.com -- of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Jerry K.
Cimmet, Esq. and John M. Kelson, Esq. -- kelsonlaw@sbcglobal.net

Prudential is represented by Christopher H. Lowe, Esq. --
clowe@seyfarth.com -- David Bennet Ross, Esq. --
dross@seyfarth.com -- Gena Usenheimer, Esq. --
gusenheimer@seyfarth.com -- and Lorie Almon, Esq. --
lalmon@seyfarth.com -- of Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

The case is Jeffrey Bouder et al. v. Prudential Financial Inc. et
al., case number 2:06-cv-04359, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey. [GN]


PURDUE PHARMA: Oklahoma AG Files Class Action Suit Over Opioids
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jacob McGuire, writing for Norman Transcript, reports that
Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter has filed a class action
lawsuit against several prominent pharmaceutical companies.

In a petition filed in Cleveland County District Court, Hunter
alleges that representatives from Purdue Pharma L.P., Allergan,
Cephalon Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc. abused power and
resources by overselling opioids to Oklahomans while underselling
the risks of addiction.

"[The companies] wanted to increase their opioid sales, and
increase they did. By 2009, OxyContin retail sales reached $3
billion," the document read. "By 2015, the number of Oklahoma drug
overdose deaths had reached 823, with the number of prescription
drug overdose deaths greater than the number of overdose deaths
from alcohol and all illegal drugs combined."

The state, plaintiff in the suit, said the companies violated the
Oklahoma Medicaid False Claims Act, Oklahoma Medicaid Program
Integrity Act, Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and the state is
seeking compensation for damages, costs and punitive damages.

No court date has been set in the case yet. The defendants have 20
days to file a response to the petition. [GN]


RCM TECHNOLOGIES: "McNeal" Class Counsel Awarded $120K in Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright, II, of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Order Approving Award of Service Payments, Attorneys' Fees, and
Costs in the case captioned JERMAINE McNEAL and GENOA SOSA, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RCM TECHNOLOGIES (USA), INC., a Nevada Corporation,
and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-05170-ODW-
SS (C.D. Cal.).

Judge Wright granted the Class Counsel's request for an award of
attorneys' fees and costs in the total amount of $120,000.  He
also granted the Plaintiffs' request for class representative
service awards in amount of $10,000 each to named Plaintiff.

The awarded attorneys' fees and costs, and class representative
service awards will be paid pursuant to the terms, conditions and
obligations of the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/1L5OzF from Leagle.com.

Jermaine McNeal, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica Lee Riggin --
jriggin@rhdtlaw.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP.

Jermaine McNeal, Plaintiff, represented by Peter S. Rukin --
prukin@rhdtlaw.com -- Rukin Hyland LLP.

Genoa Sosa, Plaintiff, represented by Jessica Lee Riggin, Rukin
Hyland LLP & Peter S. Rukin, Rukin Hyland LLP.

RCM Technologies USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Shannon R.
Boyce -- sboyce@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


RECKITT BENCKISER: Faces Class Suit Over Joint Supplement Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Northern California Record, reports
that consumers allege that a joint health supplement is falsely
advertised.

Gordon Noboru Yamagata and Stamatis F. Pelardis filed a complaint
on behalf of all others similarly situated on June 19 in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California against
Reckitt Benckiser LLC citing the Unfair Competition Law, the Legal
Remedies Act, False Advertising Law and other counts.

According to the complaint, the defendant markets, sells and
distributes joint health dietary supplements under the Schiff Move
Free line.  The plaintiffs hold Reckitt Benckiser LLC responsible
because the defendant allegedly claims that their product could
improve joint health, but the plaintiffs allege the main
ingredients do not support or benefit joint health.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek restitution and
disgorgement, injunctive relief, order the defendant to engage in
a corrective advertising campaign, damages, all legal fees,
interest and any other relief as the court deems just.  They are
represented by Todd D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com --
of Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter LLP in San Diego and by
Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP in San Diego.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case
number 3:17-cv-03529-JCS
[GN]


RENWICK HADDOW: Law Firm Mulls Ponzi Scheme Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Max Rozwaski, writing for The Jewish Voice, reports that
Jared Stamell, an attorney with the New York City-based Stamell
and Schager LLP law firm, may bring a class-action lawsuit over a
multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme allegedly committed by British
investor Renwick Haddow.  According to a Crains New York report in
January, Mr. Haddow is believed to have deliberately misled over
200 investors with Bar Works, a co-working startup founded in 2014
whose premise was to serve as both a bar and an office space,
allowing employees to work and drink.

To make financial restitution to the investors, Mr. Stamell said
he would likely take action against the banks overseeing Bar Works
financial transactions, rather than pursuing legal action against
the perpetrators.

As Mr. Stamell explained to Crains, the reason for this is that
legal action must be taken against someone who can repay the
victims in order for a lawsuit to get underway.

"It's generally very hard to recoup money from the people who
carried out the fraud," Mr. Stamell clarified.

Due to the controversy, Bar Works two locations in Midtown have
been closed, while a landlord, Alexander Brodsky, says eviction
proceedings have begun against a third location which has stopped
paying rent.

In a January report, the Real Deal said Mr. Haddow had attempted
to hide his involvement with Bar Works, billing his Eastern
European wife as a co-founder under a pseudonym.  Even stranger,
Jonathan Black, a British-accented man interviewed by Crain's in
2016, was suspected of being Mr. Haddow himself operating under an
assumed name.  Bar Works is not the first time Mr. Haddow has been
suspected of criminal activity, as he is believed to have been
involved in various Ponzi schemes in his native Britain.
Despite initial evasions, the phony identity of Jonathan Black was
confirmed by Bar Works publicist Franklin Kinard, who spoke with
Crain's by phone, according to the site.  While Mr. Kinard
initially claimed Black was an employee of the company who had
been let go, he later backpedaled, confessing that Black was
indeed an alias of Mr. Haddow, and that he had only been trying to
protect Mr. Haddow's privacy "because Renwick had initially
introduced himself to me as Jonathan Black, and I didn't know if
he wanted his real name out there."

The Real Deal's January investigative report noted discrepancies
in "Black's" LinkedIn page, which describes him as a graduate of
the Westminster Business School in 1993, though his public profile
lists Bar Works as his only work experience, starting in 2015.

Michael Kapin, an attorney representing 27 Chinese investors who
claim to have lost over $3 million in the Ponzi scheme, described
the enigmatic Mr. Haddow to Crain's as "a ghost," saying it is not
known whether he is even a real person.

As of right now, there are more questions than answers, and the
mystery remains to be unraveled. [GN]


SALOV NORTH: Court Dismisses "Kumar" Suit with Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed with prejudice the case
captioned ROHINI KUMAR, individually and on behalf of the general
public and those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SALOV NORTH
AMERICA CORP., Defendants, Case No. 14-CV-2411-YGR (N.D. Cal.),
pursuant to the Court's Order Granting Final Approval of Class
Settlement.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Judgment,
and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly
directed by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/Ofxu7K from Leagle.com.

Rohini Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Adam Safier --
seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Rohini Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride, Gutride
Safier LLP, Andrew J. Silver -- asilver@tzlegal.com -- Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Anna C. Haac, Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice,
Hassan Ali Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel,
Tycko & Zavareei, LLP, Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier
LLP & Marie Ann McCrary -- marie@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride
Safier LLP.

Salov North America Corp, Defendant, represented by Sean Ashley
Commons -- SCOMMONS@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Collin
Partington Wedel -- CWEDEL@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Mark
E. Haddad -- MHADDAD@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin Brown & Wood &
Nitin Reddy -- NREDDY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Mr. Theodore H. Frank, Objector, represented by William Isaac
Chamberlain -- will.chamberlain@cei.org -- Competitive Enterprise
Institute.


SALOV NORTH: Settlement in "Kumar" Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted final approval of the
action settlement, along with an award of attorneys' fees, costs,
and an incentive payment to the class representative in the case
captioned ROHINI KUMAR, individually and on behalf of the general
public and those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SALOV NORTH
AMERICA CORP., Defendants, Case No. 14-CV-2411-YGR (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff has moved the Court for final approval of a proposed
class action settlement with the Defendant, the terms and
conditions of which are set forth in the Settlement Agreement
filed with the Court on Dec. 30, 2016.  On Jan. 18, 2017, the
Court granted Kumar's motion to approve the settlement
preliminarily, conditionally certify the settlement class, appoint
Kumar as class representative and her attorneys as class counsel,
and direct that notice of the proposed settlement be disseminated
to class members.

Kumar thereafter filed the instant motion for final approval of
the settlement, along with an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and
an incentive payment to the class representative.

Three individuals filed objections to the settlement: Pamela
Sweeney and Bradley Griffin, both self-represented, and Theodore
Frank, represented by William Chamberlain of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute's Center for Class Action Fairness.  The
parties responded to the objections.

The Court held a hearing on May 30, 2017, and heard arguments from
the parties and from Objector Theodore Frank, through his counsel.

Having considered the briefing, the terms of the settlement
agreement, the objections and response thereto, the arguments of
counsel, and the other matters on file in this action, the Court
granted the motion for final approval.  The provisional
appointments of the class representative and class counsel are
confirmed.

The Application for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards
is granted.  The Court ordered that Salov will pay $874,231.80 in
attorneys' fees and $108,268.20 in litigation costs to class
counsel, and a $2,500 incentive award to the class representative
and the named Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/ReT8oV from Leagle.com.

Rohini Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Seth Adam Safier, Gutride
Safier LLP.

Rohini Kumar, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride, Gutride
Safier LLP, Andrew J. Silver, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Anna C. Haac,
Tycko and Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei, Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei, LLP,
Kristen Gelinas Simplicio, Gutride Safier LLP & Marie Ann McCrary,
Gutride Safier LLP.

Salov North America Corp, Defendant, represented by Sean Ashley
Commons, Sidley Austin LLP, Collin Partington Wedel, Sidley Austin
LLP, Mark E. Haddad, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood & Nitin Reddy,
Sidley Austin LLP.

Mr. Theodore H. Frank, Objector, represented by William Isaac
Chamberlain, Competitive Enterprise Institute.


SCOTT COUNTY, MS: Settles Suit Over Infinite Detainment of Inmates
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan J. Farrick, writing for Legal Reader, reports that officials
in Scott County, Mississippi, settled a lawsuit on June 28 after
being accused of jailing impoverished Mississippians for up to a
year without legal representation or formal indictments.

The American Civil Liberties Union announced the settlement, after
having spent two years representing former inmates Josh Bassett
and Octavious Burks.

Both men had been held in Scott County jails for ten months.
Neither was appointed a lawyer, and Burks was never even issued an
indictment.

Mississippi is among only seven states in the nation to not have a
universal public defender system. The lack of options meant that
Burks and Bassett, along with thousands of other local detainees,
were put in jail with no legal recourse.

"The county must set reasonable limits on the amount of time
someone can remain in jail without a lawyer and without charges,"
said Brandon Buskey, senior staff attorney for the ACLU's Criminal
Law Reform Project, when the suit was filed in 2014. "Scott County
Jail routinely holds people without giving them a lawyer and
without formally charging them for months, with no end in sight."

Under the guidance of the ACLU, the suit expanded from Burks and
Bassett to transform into a class action.

June 28's settlement affected Scott County, MS, as well as
Neshoba, Clay, and Newton counties, all of which fall under the
jurisdiction of the Eighth Judicial District.

"In these four counties, thousands have had weeks, months and even
years of their lives stolen from them because they could not
afford an attorney or purchase their freedom," said Buskey. "This
settlement closes those trap doors for the poor."

Under the terms of the settlement, as reported by The Clarion
Ledger, all four counties will have to appoint a chief public
defender, who will supervise two assistant public defenders.

Scott County's legal counsel, Will Allen, said the sheriffs,
supervisors, judges, and boards of supervisors for each of the
four counties were 'on board' with the creation of a new public
defender system.

"Mississippi has been locking up poor folks without a lawyer and
without the ability to make bail for as long as anyone can
remember," said Cliff Johnson, director of the MacArthur Justice
Center at the University of Mississippi School of Law. "We should
be ashamed of ourselves. My hope is that other Mississippi
counties also will decide to abide by the Constitution and
implement similar changes."

The lawsuit pointed out that Mississippi doesn't impose a limit on
how long a district attorney can take in presenting a case to a
grand jury or on how long a detainee can be held without
indictment. [GN]


SEATTLE, WA: Appeal in School Zone Camera Speeding Ticket Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Lindblom, writing for Seattle Times, reports that for the
second time, a judge has tossed out a camera-generated speeding
ticket by ruling that Seattle's school-zone signs are too wordy.

The city mailed Jason Canfield a $234 citation in May 2016 for
driving 28 mph on Delridge Way Southwest, when flashing amber
lights imposed a 20 mph limit. Seattle Municipal Court upheld the
fine.

But he took the case to King County Superior Court, acting as his
own attorney.

Judge Catherine Moore reversed the Municipal Court decision,
basically siding with Canfield on two points:

   * City signs say the 20 mph limit applies "WHEN CHILDREN ARE
PRESENT" "OR WHEN FLASHING."  But national standards prescribe
only one such small sign, not both -- so drivers can react faster.

   * Though the city argued its signs are in "substantial
compliance" with national guidance, Washington state code requires
they match the examples and regulations in the federal Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).

Mr. Canfield, who works in juvenile probation, was driving south
and looking for a client's apartment along Delridge, then a 35 mph
corridor.  Mr. Canfield says he saw the flashers too late to
decelerate to 20 mph.  The time was 9:14 a.m., or 21 minutes
before the start of class at Louisa Boren STEM K-8 school.  He
recalls seeing no children along the street.

"I have an 8-year-old daughter, and I'm not in favor of speeding
in school zones," he said.  He suggests the Seattle Department of
Transportation (SDOT) install stronger advance-warning signs.  "To
make it so people pay fines unintentionally, that's dishonest."

Traffic Lab is a Seattle Times project that digs into the region's
thorny transportation issues, spotlights promising approaches to
easing gridlock, and helps readers find the best ways to get
around.  It is funded with the help of community sponsors Alaska
Airlines, CenturyLink, Kemper Development Co., Sabey Corp.,
Seattle Children's hospital and Ste. Michelle Wine Estates.
Seattle Times editors and reporters operate independently of our
funders and maintain editorial control over Traffic Lab content.

Officials at SDOT won't yet say whether they plan to alter or
remove any signs.

Speed cameras exist across the country.  Seattle has gradually
installed them at 14 schools since late 2012.

They're part of the Vision Zero campaign, in which 27 U.S. cities
have pledged to eliminate traffic deaths, by 2030 in the case of
Seattle and Bellevue.

"Photo enforcement is effective at reducing the higher-speed
driving in those areas," said Dr. Beth Ebel, director of the
Harborview Injury Prevention & Research Center.

Lower speeds are based on physics.

Someone hit at 20 mph has a 95 percent chance of survival, which
falls to 60 percent at 30 mph and 20 percent when hit at 40 mph,
according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

"'What you're buying is survival for people. You're also buying
more time, to avoid hitting anyone at all," dr. Ebell said.

A total of 28 cities and counties in Washington state operate or
have used automated cameras to enforce speed limits, red lights,
or both, says the Municipal Research and Services Center.

By ordinance, Seattle school-camera fines are reinvested into
school-area safety improvements such as sidewalks, trails,
stairways, signals and education.

Millions of dollars

Seattle collected $8.2 million last year, of which $5.9 million
remained for safety projects after payment to a camera contractor
and other operating costs.  Twelve additional schools are being
studied for possible camera-enforcement next year.

At the first four schools (Olympic View, Broadview-Thompson,
Thurgood Marshall and Gatewood), citation totals declined 62
percent from 47,348 in 2013 to 18,024 this past year.

That's proof drivers are getting the message to slow down, a city
report says.

In the three years before speed cameras, there were 21 collisions
during school start and end times next to the 14 schools. Only six
collisions happened in the 18 to 36 months since cameras arrived,
according to city data. Most were between vehicles, while crashes
into bicyclists and pedestrians declined from two to zero.

Traffic collisions claim about 20 lives per year in Seattle. Among
pedestrians, there were six deaths and 59 serious injuries this
past year, according to data the state forwarded to The Seattle
Times.  Bellevue's Vision Zero program reports five serious
pedestrian injuries and one death last year.

Mr. Canfield's case, ruled on last month, resembles the 2014 win
by Joe Hunt, who got his speed-camera ticket on Greenwood Avenue
North canceled by arguing that signs marked "WHEN LIGHTS ARE
FLASHING" contained too many words, and violated the manual.

The city subsequently replaced signs at four schools to say "WHEN
FLASHING," the norm in other Washington cities.  But placards
remained that say, "OR WHEN CHILDREN ARE PRESENT," which Canfield
just challenged.

Mr. Hunt's win inspired another driver, Nicholas Boone, to file a
class-action lawsuit seeking refunds for drivers like Mr. Hunt.
As many as 70,000 motorists were fined up to $10 million in four
school-camera zones from December 2012 to May 2014.  The city won
that case in superior court and an appeal is pending.

However, the city attorney's office called the Canfield case a
routine matter.  The ruling "concludes the case and dismisses Mr.
Canfield's ticket; the ruling is not binding on anyone else," a
spokeswoman said.

Mr. Canfield uncovered an interesting twist in the law: the word
"CHILDREN" was shorthand for schoolchildren.  Therefore, that
second sign is redundant, if you assume that amber flashers work
properly during 1-1/2 hours per day schoolchildren might come and
go to class.

He spent about $800 in filing fees, records gathering, photocopies
and transcription fees, or nearly four times the amount of the
fine.

"The reason I kept going, I think -- it ended up almost being like
a hobby. It was kind of stressful but also kind of fun," he says.
"I got into it, reading the MUTCD."

Mr. Canfield said he'll be satisfied if the city installs briefer
signs, and simpler advance-warning signs, so drivers can avoid a
$234 "gut punch" even if they're unfamiliar with the neighborhood.

"It has to be making-money, or keeping kids safe. It can't be
both," he said.

A postscript: In December, the city reduced the maximum speed on
Delridge from 35 mph to 30 mph, part of an ongoing initiative to
lower arterial speeds citywide.

So it should be easier to get down to 20 mph, before a car meets
the merciless eye of the camera. [GN]


SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Court Defers to Rule on Motions in "Mojica"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SUSAN MOJICA and THOMAS MOJICA, Plaintiffs,
v. SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:14-CV-5258
(W.D. Ark.), Judge Timothy L Brooks of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, deferred
ruling on the pending Motions in this case, and administratively
stayed all proceedings in this case until the resolution of any
petition for rehearing en banc that may be filed in the case of
Global Tel*Link v. FCC, 859 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

Currently before the Court are:

     a. Plaintiffs Susan Mojica's and Thomas Mojica's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Law in Support, and
Statement of Facts; the Defendant's (Securus) Memorandum of Law in
Opposition and Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts; and the
Plaintiffs' Reply;

     b. Securus' Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Law in
Support, and Statement of Facts; the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law
in Opposition and Response to Securus' Statement of Facts; and
Securus' Reply;

     c. Securus' Motion for Class Decertification, Memorandum in
Support, and Request for Judicial Notice; the Plaintiffs'
Responses in Opposition to Securus' Motion for Class
Decertification and to Securus' Request for Judicial Notice; and
Securus' Replies in Support of its Motion for Class
Decertification and of its Request for Judicial Notice; and

     d. Securus' Motion for Primary Jurisdiction Referral and
Memorandum in Support; the Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition;
Securus' Reply; the Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply; and Securus'
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support.

As he discussed with the parties during a pretrial conference that
was held on July 7, 2017, Judge Brooks' initial impression is that
the majority opinion's reasoning in the June 2017 D.C. Circuit
case would appear to cast serious doubt onto the viability of the
theory of liability as to site commissions that the Plaintiffs
advanced in support of class certification earlier this year.  The
Plaintiffs disagree with that interpretation of the D.C. Circuit's
decision, but even they would surely agree that, at a minimum,
that decision has dramatically altered the legal landscape on the
eve of trial in this matter.  By Judge Brooks' arithmetic, the
deadline to file a petition for rehearing en banc from that
decision is July 28, 2017 -- the fifth day of the trial in the
instant matter.

Judge Brooks has no way of knowing now whether a petition for
rehearing en banc will actually be filed or granted, and much less
of knowing whether an en banc rehearing would result in a reversal
of the June 2017 decision; but given that a definitive resolution
to the first of this chain of contingencies will likely occur
before their instant trial is presently set to conclude, it
appears to him that the most prudent course at this point is to
stay all proceedings in this case.  Otherwise, he runs the risk of
issuing dispositive or semi-dispositive rulings and conducting a
2-week trial in reliance on legal authority whose binding effect
is called into significant doubt before the trial is even
concluded, potentially opening the door for burdensome motion
practice on reconsideration of prior orders and even for a new
trial.  This would not be an efficient use of judicial resources
for the Court or for the parties, and it would expose all parties
to an unnecessary risk of harm.

Judge Brooks further ordered that the parties will immediately
notify the Court upon learning either that such a petition for
rehearing en banc has been filed or that the deadline for such
filing has passed.  In the event that such petition is filed, then
the parties will further immediately notify the Court upon
learning that the D.C. Circuit has ruled on such petition.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/bmMAgU from Leagle.com.

Susan Mojica, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP.

Susan Mojica, Plaintiff, represented by Amy C. Martin, Attorney at
Law, Barbara A. Podell, Berger Montague P.C., Benjamin D. Brown,
Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll PLLC, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Edward W. Ciolko, Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check LLP, James Maro, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, pro hac
vice, Monique Myatt Galloway, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP,
Peter R. Kahana, Berger Montague P.C., Peter A. Muhic, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Robert A. Braun, Cohen Milstein Sellers
Toll PLLC, Yechiel Michael Twersky, BERGER MONTAGUE P.C., Patrick
Howard, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C. & Samantha
Holbrook, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Securus Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by James M.
Graves, Bassett Law Firm LLP, Robert L. Jones, III, Conner &
Winters, Woody Bassett, Bassett Law Firm, Craig A. Stanfield,
Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP, David Bruce Salmons, Morgan Lewis
Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth Brooke Herrington, Morgan
Lewis Bockius LLP, Eren Jon Alexander Gryskiewicz, Arent Fox LLP,
Joshua Fowkes, Arent Fox LLP, Kerri E. Kobbeman, Conner & Winters,
LLP, Megan R. Braden, Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP & Stephanie Joyce,
Arent Fox LLP.

Thomas Mojica, Intervenor, represented by Amy C. Martin, Attorney
at Law, Peter A. Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac
vice, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP &
Samantha Holbrook, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.


SEECO INC: Cambiano Appeals Order in "Smith" Suit to 8th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Movants Kathleen Cambiano and James Huett filed an appeal from a
court order dated June 2, 2017, relating to the lawsuit entitled
CONNIE JEAN SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SEECO, INC. n/k/a SWN Production (Arkansas),
LLC., et al., Case No. 4:14-cv-00435-BSM, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

The appellate case is captioned as Connie Smith, et al. v.
Kathleen Cambiano, et al., Case No. 17-2396, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 16,
2017, the Hon. Brian S. Miller entered an order in the lawsuit
denying the Defendants' motion to disqualify class counsel, remove
the class representative and decertify the class, and Defendant
DeSoto Gathering Company's motion for a one-week continuance.

On June 21, 2017, the Class Action Reporter reported that
testimony in the lawsuit began on June 6 with two hours of
questions for an educator from Nashville, Tenn., who sued
Southwestern Energy Co. and three subsidiaries, alleging
underpayment for the use of her land during the natural-gas boom
in north-central Arkansas.  The lawsuit is one of the biggest
class-action lawsuits to emerge from Fayetteville Shale activity.

Connie Jean Smith's case hinges on what a 12-person federal jury
will decide is "reasonable" for SWN Production, formerly known as
SEECO, to deduct from Ms. Smith's promised cut of the company's
proceeds.  Ms. Smith's case is class-action certified to represent
about 12,000 Arkansas landowners whom Smith's attorneys say were
cheated out of $98 million during years of royalty payments for
the use of their land to produce natural gas.  That averages out
to more than $8,000 per lease.

The docket in the Appellate Case stated that on the Appellate
Court's own motion, the briefing schedule is temporarily held in
abeyance.[BN]

Movants-Appellants Kathleen Cambiano and James Huett are
represented by:

          David A. Hodges, Sr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DAVID HODGES
          212 Center Street, Suite 500
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 374-2400
          Toll Free: (800) 642-8082
          Facsimile: (501) 374-8926
          E-mail: david@hodgeslaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Connie Jean Smith, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ben H. Caruth, Esq.
          Edward Allen Gordon, Esq.
          GORDON, CARUTH & VIRDEN, PLC
          Post Office Box 558
          105 S. Moose Street
          Morrilton, AR 72110-0558
          Telephone: (501) 354-0125
          E-mail: bcaruth@gcvlaw.com
                  agordon@gcvlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian L. Cramer, Esq.
          Tanner W. Hicks, Esq.
          Jack A. Mattingly, Jr., Esq.
          MATTINGLY & ROSELIUS, PLLC
          210 W. Oklahoma Avenue
          Guthrie, OK 70344
          Telephone: (405) 603-222
          E-mail: brian@mroklaw.com
                  tanner@mroklaw.com
                  jackjr@mroklaw.com

               - and -

          Erik P. Danielson, Esq.
          DANIELSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
          909 Rolling Hills Drive
          Fayetteville, AR 72703
          Telephone: (479) 935-8060
          E-mail: erik.danielson@danielsonlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Sean M. Handler, Esq.
          Geoffrey C. Jarvis, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          Natalie Lesser, Esq.
          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: shandler@ktmc.com
                  gjarvis@ktmc.com
                  kjustice@ktmc.com
                  nlesser@ktmc.com
                  jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  mtroutner@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Brad E. Seidel, Esq.
          SEIDEL LAW FIRM, PC
          6 Hedge Lane
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 537-0903
          E-mail: bradseidel@me.com

               - and -

          James Fitzgerald Valley, Esq.
          J F VALLEY, ESQ, P.A.
          423 Rightor Street
          P.O. Box 451
          Helena, AR 72342
          Telephone: (870) 619-1750
          Facsimile: (870) 619-1760
          E-mail: james@jamesfvalley.com

Defendants-Appellees SEECO, Inc., Now known as SWN Production
(Arkansas), LLC; Desoto Gathering Company, LLC; Southwestern
Energy Services Company and Southwestern Energy Company are
represented by:

          Jess Askew, III, Esq.
          KUTAK ROCK LLP
          124 W. Capitol Avenue, Suite 2000
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 975-3000
          E-mail: Jess.Askew@KutakRock.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Daily, Esq.
          DAILY & WOODS, P.L.L.C.
          58 S. Sixth Street
          P.O. Box 1446
          Fort Smith, AR 72902-1446
          Telephone: (479) 782-0361
          E-mail: tdaily@dailywoods.com

               - and -

          Robert K. Ellis, Esq.
          R. Paul Yetter, Esq.
          YETTER & COLEMAN LLP
          909 Fannin
          Houston, TX 77010
          Telephone: (713) 632-8000
          E-mail: rellis@yettercoleman.com
                  pyetter@yettercoleman.com

               - and -

          Marc S. Tabolsky, Esq.
          SCHIFFER ODOM HICKS & JOHNSON PLLC
          700 Louisiana
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 357-5150
          Facsimile: (713) 357-5160
          E-mail: mtabolsky@sohjlaw.com

               - and -

          Rex M. Terry, Esq.
          HARDIN & JESSON
          5000 Rogers Avenue
          P.O. Box 10127
          Fort Smith, AR 72917-0127
          Telephone: (479) 452-2200
          Facsimile: (479) 452-9097
          E-mail: terry@hardinlaw.com


SENSA PRODUCTS: Court Grants Bid for Excusal from ENE Conference
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JOSE CONDE, et al., Plaintiff, v. SENSA, et
al., Defendant, Case No. 14-CV-51-JLS-WVG (S.D. Calif.), the
United States District Court for the Southern District California
granted Plaintiff Susan Grace Stokes' unopposed ex parte Renewed
Request for Excusal from the Early Neutral Evaluation Conference.

The Court issued a Notice and Order scheduling an ENE Conference
for 2:00 p.m. on July 10, 2017. Plaintiff filed an ex parte
Request for Excusal from the current ENE Conference. This request
was accompanied by a sworn declaration that also included the
exact x-ray and handwritten statement signed by her physician that
was first presented to the Court two years before. Given this
outdated information, the Court denied the request without
prejudice.  Plaintiff filed a Renewed Request for Excusal on July
3, 2017, similarly requesting to be excused from the July 10, 2017
ENE Conference.

The Court will not grant requests to excuse a required party from
personally appearing at an ENE Conference or Settlement
Conference, absent extraordinary circumstances.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met the extraordinary
circumstances standard set out in the Court's rules. Plaintiff has
filed a declaration and exhibits in support of her request.
Plaintiff's declaration indicates she cannot travel due to ongoing
treatment for numerous back surgeries. Additionally, Plaintiff's
doctor states that Plaintiff is quite debilitated and is
prohibited from traveling long distances.

Plaintiff has met the extraordinary circumstances standard and she
is excused from personal appearance at the ENE Conference.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 7, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/KUWGmo from Leagle.com.

Mollie Delaney, Plaintiff, represented by Julia A. Luster --
jluster@cdflaborlaw.com  -- Bursor & Fisher PA.

Mollie Delaney, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher,
--ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, PA & Annick Marie
Persinger -- Tycko & Zavareei, LLP 483 9th St Ste 200 Oakland, CA
94607-4051 Bursor & Fisher, P.A..

Amanda Retcofsky, Plaintiff, represented by Julia A. Luster,
Bursor & Fisher PA, Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Bursor & Fisher, PA &
Annick Marie Persinger, Bursor & Fisher, P.A..

Susan Grace Stokes, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Philip Murray,
--bmurray@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Edmond E.
Koester -- ekoester@cyklaw.com -- Coleman Yovanovich and Koester PA,
pro hac vice, Julia A. Luster, Bursor & Fisher PA, Lawrence
Timothy Fisher, Bursor & Fisher, PA, Lee Albert --
lalbert@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac
vice, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, Mark Samuel Greenstone, -- mgreenstone@glancylaw.com
--- Glancy Binkow and Goldberg LLP, Thomas Andrew Reyda --
treyda@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher PA & Annick Marie Persinger,
Bursor & Fisher, P.A..

Sensa Products, LLC, Defendant, Pro Se.

Don Ressler, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, --vas@msk.com -- Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.
Adam Goldenberg, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Kristen Chadwick, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Scott Whittier, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Stacey Kivel, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Elizabeth Francis, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Jeff Campbell, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Jason Morano, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Katelyn O'Reilly, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Michael Shay, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

Cody Congleton, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

John Drew, Defendant, represented by Stephen Hibbard--
sdhibbard@jonesday.com Jones Day.

IB Holding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.

TechStyle, Inc., Defendant, represented by Valentine Antonavich
Shalamitski, Mitchell Silberberg Knupp LLP.


SINOVAC BIOTECH: Investors Hint Class Action Over Bribery Concerns
------------------------------------------------------------------
Angus Liu, writing for Fierce Biotech, reports that, to say that
Sinovac Biotech's take-private process is a hot mess might be an
understatement.

In a twist, a group of buyers is challenging a definitive
amalgamation agreement the biotech reached on June 26 with its
chairman and CEO Weidong Yin, offering a higher bid and accusing
the board of secretive operations. It was complicated by a Yin-
involved bribery case that implicated the former vice-director of
China FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation (CDE), and potential
investor class-action lawsuits emerged afterward.

Sinovac, the only Nasdaq-listed Chinese vaccine maker, first
announced a buyout proposal in early 2016. At that time, Yin,
together with investment firm SAIF Partners and others, offered to
expand their all-together 30% stake in the company and take it
private with $6.18 per share.

The buyout deal seemed certain when Sinovac announced on June 26
that it had reached a definitive agreement with Yin's buyer
consortium. Under that agreement, the consortium will acquire
Sinovac for $401.8 million at the price of $7 per share. But then,
the deal took a turn on June 28 with the emergence of another
offer.

A buyer consortium led by Sinobioway announced that it has
submitted a new proposal to Sinovac's board, offering to raise the
privatization to $8 per share. In a furiously worded release,
Sinobioway accused a special committee appointed by the board of
colluding with Yin's consortium and not giving them the
opportunity to raise the price. "The members of Special Committee
have become tools to help [Yin's consortium] erode the interests
of minority shareholders," the release reads.

Another Chinese biologics drugmaker affiliated with Peking
University, Sinobioway entered the bid soon after Yin made his
offer. In fact, it was Sinobioway that raised the offer to $7 a
share in its first offering. The relationship between the two
companies goes way back to 1994 when Sinobioway salvaged a failing
biologics company that later became the Sinovac we see today.
Sinobioway Group's chairman Aihua Pan, who played a key role in
Sinovac's revival, is also Sinovac Beijing's chairman. According
to Sinovac's 2015 annual report filed to the SEC, Sinobioway
Biomedicine owns a 26.91% interest in Sinovac Beijing, the
company's principal operating subsidiary and where Yin presides as
GM.

The previous definitive agreement said the amalgamation was
expected to close during the second half of 2017, but now a
closing might be delayed as a determined Sinobioway said that it
"vows to win this transaction."

However, the bidding brouhaha is just the most recent episode of
Sinovac's drama. In late 2016, Hongzhang Yin, who used to serve as
deputy director of CFDA's CDE, was found guilty of accepting
bribery worth 3.56 million Chinese yuan (about $525,000) from nine
Chinese vaccine makers in exchange for smoother new drug
application green lights, and Sinovac's Yin was identified as one
of them.

The news sent Sinovac's stock south, and immediately after that,
several U.S.-based law firms, including investor class-action
specialists Rosen, Goldberg and Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman
announced an investigation of Sinovac on certain violations of the
Securities Exchange Act as they prepare for potential lawsuits.
The law firms argue that Sinovac's failure to disclose potentially
damaging information (i.e., the bribery) infringed investors'
rights.

According to the court's findings, since Hongzhang Yin became the
biologics head of China CDE's drug registration division in 2002,
Sinovac has applied for approval of several vaccines, including
for hepatitis A, SARS, avian flu, HFMD and H1N1 influenza. A
higher court in Beijing upheld the 10-year-in-prison verdict
imposed on Hongzhang Yin this March.

At least there's no public accusations against the quality of
these vaccines for now, and no criminal charges have been brought
against Yin, but the bribery clearly puts serious doubts upon
Yin's leadership of Sinovac.

At the same time, Sinovac's 2016 annual report has long passed its
due date as the company carries out an internal investigation. The
SEC has also stepped in, which could further complicate the
privatization process. The vaccine maker acknowledged in May that
it has received a subpoena from U.S. regulators that asks for
documents related to the bribery scandal in China.

Sinovac's stock has been ticking upward since early June as a
potential buyout deal nears, resting at about $6.90 per share on
June 28 morning. [GN]


SINOVAC BIOTECH: Sept. 1 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lundin Law PC, a shareholder rights firm, on July 3 announced the
filing of a class action lawsuit against Sinovac Biotech Ltd.
("Sinovac" or the "Company") (Nasdaq: SVA) concerning possible
violations of federal securities laws between April 30, 2013 and
May 16, 2017 inclusive (the "Class Period").  Investors who
purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the Class Period
should contact the firm prior to the September 1, 2017 lead
plaintiff motion deadline.

To participate in this class action lawsuit, you can call Brian
Lundin, Esquire, of Lundin Law PC, at 888-713-1033, or e-mail him
at brian@lundinlawpc.com.

No class has been certified in the above action yet.  Until a
class is certified, you are not considered represented by an
attorney.  You may also choose to do nothing and be an absent
class member.

According to the Complaint, throughout the Class Period, Sinovac
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose:
that Chairman and CEO Weidong Yin bribed a member of the Chinese
Food and Drug Administration to assist Sinovac's vaccine clinical
trial and approval; that such conduct would subject the Company to
heightened regulatory scrutiny; and that as a result of the above,
Sinovac's public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times.  Upon release of this news, shares of
Sinovac fell in value materially, which caused investors harm.

Lundin Law PC -- http://lundinlawpc.com/-- was founded by Brian
Lundin, a securities litigator based in Los Angeles dedicated to
upholding shareholders' rights.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]


SM ENERGY: Royalty Class Action Settlement Sent Back to Oklahoma
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Monies, writing for The Oklahoman, reports that a federal
appeals court on July 3 sent a $52 million natural gas royalty
settlement case back to federal court in Oklahoma over the
calculation of attorney fees.

In a 2-0 ruling, a panel of the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
in Denver said the district court didn't properly calculate
attorney fees in the class-action settlement according to Oklahoma
law.

The case alleged underpayment of natural gas royalties by SM
Energy Co., several funds affiliated with EnerVest Energy and
FourPoints Energy LLC.  It was settled in 2015 for $52 million,
minus expenses and fees. The case was brought by Chieftain Royalty
Co.

Attorney fees in such royalty class-action cases are figured using
either a "percentage of the fund" analysis or the "lodestar"
approach.  Oklahoma law favors the lodestar approach, which comes
from multiplying the number of hours spent on the case by a
reasonable hourly rate.

However, the district judge in the Chieftain case approved
attorney fees of one-third of the settlement fund, or $17.33
million.  The court also awarded Chieftain 0.5 percent of the
fund, $260,000, as an incentive award.

"Here, the attorney-fee award was based on the outcome of the
litigation not the district court's power to discipline the
litigants," the opinion said.  "State law therefore governs the
propriety of granting a fee award."

The court also overturned the incentive award, saying the district
court didn't receive any supporting documents to grant the award
or to calculate its amount.  The appellate judges sent the case
back to district court for further fact-finding on both the
attorney fees and the incentive award.

Former appellate judge Neil Gorsuch, now on the U.S. Supreme
Court, participated in the oral argument but not in the decision.
Court rules allow the remaining two panel judges to act as a
quorum to resolve the appeal. [GN]


SOUTH CAROLINA: Inmate Gets Refund for Appellate Fees
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Kaymani D. West of the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina directed the clerk of the Court to refund the
Plaintiff's filing and docketing fees already withdrawn in
connection with the Plaintiff's appeal in the case captioned
Dmitry Pronin, Plaintiff, v. Charles Wright; Neal Urch; and L.
Blackwell, Defendants, C/A No. 5:16-cv-03635-HMH-KDW (D. S.C.).

The Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  After initial review of the
matter, Judge West issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"),
recommending the district court partially dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice against certain Defendants and deny the
Plaintiff's request for certification of a class action.

The district court adopted Judge West's R&R in an Order that
dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint against a certain Defendant,
instructed the Plaintiff file an Amended Complaint, denied the
Plaintiff's request/motion for certification of a class action,
and remanded the case to Judge West.

On May 1, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, appealing the denial of class
certification.

On June 9, 2017, the Fourth Circuit granted the Plaintiff leave to
proceed on appeal without the full prepayment of fees pursuant to
the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.  The Fourth
Circuit's orders required periodic withdrawal of payments by the
Appellant's custodian from the Appellant's inmate trust account.
However, after learning the Plaintiff paid $505 to the court, on
June 28, 2017, the Fourth Circuit rescinded its June 9, 2017
order, allowing the Plaintiff proceed without prepayment.

It appears to the court that the Plaintiff's $505 payment to the
district court on June 27, 2017, was intended to pay his appellate
fees.  Therefore, the clerk of the Court is directed to refund the
Plaintiff's filing and docketing fees already withdrawn in
connection with the Plaintiff's appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/GliR82 from Leagle.com.

Dmitry Pronin, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

L. Blackwell, Defendant, represented by Anne R. Culbreath --
arculbreath@wjlaw.net -- Willson Jones Carter and Baxley PA &
Charles F. Turner, Jr. -- cfturner@wjlaw.net -- Willson Jones
Carter and Baxley PA.


SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Wants Quake Insurance Class Action Tossed
------------------------------------------------------------
RNZ reports that government-owned insurer Southern Response is
seeking to have legal action from policy-holders hit by the
Christchurch earthquake thrown out of court.

Southern Response is the company responsible for settling
insurance claims by AMI policy holders, after AMI's sale to IAG in
2014.

In December, the High Court granted the group the right to take a
class action against the company.

The Court of Appeal heard on July 5 that while 47 policy holders
were involved in the case initially, several more have now settled
and there are now only about 26 people involved.

At the start of the July 5 hearing Justice Harrison raised
concerns about how long the process had taken, pointing out it was
now more than 6 years since the earthquake which was the catalyst
for the action.

Southern Response's lawyer, Mike O'Brien QC, told the court there
had to be a common issue binding all parties to a class action,
but a careful analysis of the claimants' case showed there was no
single issue which applied to all of them.

"Some of them [the remaining claimants] will be languishing, while
issues that don't affect them get resolved.  It is prejudicial to
everyone and not the best way to go."

Mr O'Brien said the only issue common to everyone might be claims
of delay on the part of the insurer and the group action case was
reframed to reflect.

However the claimants' lawyer, Francis Cooke QC disputed that,
saying all the law requires is that people have the same interest
in the subject proceedings, which they did in this case.

"All claimants have had homes damaged by the same earthquake, all
had essentially identical policies with the same insurer, and the
insurer has adopted a group approach to managing matters arising
under [those] policies."

"Now more than 6 years [later] Southern Response has failed to
meet its contractual obligation to [settle] all claims
professionally and promptly because it prefers an approach that
minimises its financial responsibility."

In the High Court the claimants had sought a list of other
Southern Response clients so they could be notified about the
group claim, but that was declined.

Mr Cooke also asked the Court of Appeal to take another look at
that issue.

Justice Harrison questioned why the lawyers for both parties had
not been able to sit down and talk through the remaining issues,
which he said would "free up a great deal of the log-jam in this
litigation".

"It seems, at the moment, headway's not being made where it should
be made," he said.

"And I would have thought the people who could do that most
effectively are the leading counsel sitting down and working out
what are truly the issues and getting some working scheme for
resolution."

Mr O'Brien said Southern Response would be happy to put some of
those issues to some other kind of arbiter, for example a retired
Judge, as a way of getting resolution.

"[But] rightly or wrongly [Southern Response] has had the distinct
impression that those involved in the case are more interested in
bringing their group claim than they are in getting their
individual claims resolved."

The Court has reserved its decision. [GN]


SOUTHWEST MEDICAL: Bid to Dismiss Oklahoma TCPA Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Northern District for Oklahoma
denied Defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered to file Answer in
the captioned case DR. SAM LEBARRE HORTON, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST
MEDICAL CONSULTING, LLC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 17-CV-0266-
CVE-mjx.

Now before the Court are defendant Molina Healthcare, Inc.'s
motion to dismiss and defendant Southwest Medical Consulting,
LLC's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the District Court of
Rogers County, Oklahoma, asserting that defendants committed
common law conversion and violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act
of 2005, by sending an unsolicited fax that failed to include an
opt-out provision. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that he has
"suffered actual injury in that by sending the unsolicited fax
transmission that caused him to incur costs such as wasted paper,
ink toner, occupied telephone line, and the time and expense
incurred in receiving, reviewing, and disposing of the fax
transmission.

Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them for
lack of standing.  Plaintiff responds that he has alleged concrete
injuries in his complaint that establish standing.

To establish Article III standing, plaintiff must establish that:
(1) he has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of defendants; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by the relief
requested.

Defendants argue that, even if plaintiff has asserted a concrete
injury in fact, it is not fairly traceable to the defendants'
alleged actions.  To have standing, plaintiff must show that his
or her injury is 'fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court. Article III requires proof of a
substantial likelihood that the defendant's conduct caused
plaintiff's injury in fact.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered an injury because defendants
sent him a fax that violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
in that it was unsolicited and did not contain an opt-out
provision.

Plaintiff showed that his injury is fairly traceable to
defendants' alleged conduct as opposed to the conduct of some
third party.  Plaintiff has met his burden by alleging concrete
injuries, the lost paper, ink, toner, and time that were allegedly
caused by defendants' sending an unsolicited fax. According to
plaintiff's complaint, had the fax never been sent, plaintiff
would not have suffered these harms. Thus, plaintiff's injuries
are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct, and plaintiff has
satisfied Article III's causation requirement.

Defendants' motion to dismiss are denied and ordered to file their
Answer(s) to the Complaint.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 6, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/YcUJy6 from Leagle.com.

Sam LeBarre Horton, Plaintiff, represented by James A. Streett,
Streett Law Firm, P.A., 107 W Main Street, Russellville, AR 72801
Sam LeBarre Horton, Plaintiff, represented by Jason Bjorn Aamodt,
Indian and Environmental Law Group, PLLC & Joey Paul Leniski, Jr.,
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, PLLC, 227 Second Ave N Fl 4,
Nashville, TN 37201

Southwest Medical Consulting, LLC, Defendant, represented by Bryan
Joseph Wells, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC.
Molina Healthcare, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel P.
Guillory -- dguillory@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Errol J. King -- eking@bakerdonelson.com
-- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, John B.
Davis -- jbdavis@baker.donelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz PC & Ryan S. Wilson at Wilson Law Firm


SPECIAL TOUCH: "Najmiev" Suit Remanded to New York Supreme Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York remanded the case captioned SHAMSIDDIN
NAJMIEV, individually and behalf of all other persons similarly
situated who were employed by SPECIAL TOUCH HOME CARE SERVICES,
INC., Plaintiffs, v. SPECIAL TOUCH HOME CARE SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, No. 17-CV-01386 (VEC)(S.D. N.Y.) to the New York
Supreme Court.

The Plaintiff filed suit in State court, on behalf of himself and
other Special Touch employees, alleging various violations of wage
and hour provisions of New York Labor Law ("NYLL").  The Plaintiff
also sues, as a third-party beneficiary, for breach of contract,
alleging that Special Touch breached its contract with government
agencies by failing to pay prevailing rates of wages and benefits,
as required by NY Public Health Law, and that Special Touch
breached its city service contracts by failing to pay living wages
and health benefits, as required by NYC Administrative Code.

Special Touch removed this case from State court, asserting that
the Plaintiff's claims are substantially dependent upon an
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA")
between Special Touch and the Plaintiff's union and, therefore,
are preempted pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA.  Special Touch
asserts that its compensation policies and practices were
undertaken by Special Touch in accordance with and pursuant to the
specific provisions of the CBA.

The Plaintiff moves for remand, arguing that his claims are not
preempted by Section 301 because resolution of his claims requires
an interpretation of only state law and not the CBA.  Special
Touch counters that to resolve the Plaintiff's claims, the Court
must determine whether the CBA modified or waived the at-issue
NYLL provisions, which would require the Court to interpret the
CBA.

Judge Caproni finds that the resolution of the NYLL claims does
not require any interpretation of the CBA.  Therefore, this case
was not properly removed.  Resolution of the Plaintiff's breach of
contract claims requires an analysis of only state law; therefore,
these claims, too, are legally independent of the CBA.
Although these claims require an analysis of New York law and the
contracts for which the Plaintiff is claiming breach, they do not
require an interpretation of the CBA.  Therefore, the Court also
lacks federal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's breach of contract
claims.  To the extent the Defendant has not abandoned the issue
by failing to brief it, the Defendant, again, is attempting to
create federal jurisdiction through its defense to the Plaintiff's
claims.  As discussed, that is not a valid basis for federal
jurisdiction.

For these reasons, Judge Caproni agreed with the Plaintiff and
remanded this case to New York Supreme Court.  In addition, she
dismissed as moot the Defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, to compel arbitration.  The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to terminate Docket Entry Numbers 4 and 16,
remand this case to New York Supreme Court, and close this case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 opinion and order is
available at https://is.gd/hiymaM from Leagle.com.

Shamsiddin Najmiev, Plaintiff, represented by Kara Sue Miller --
kmiller@vandallp.com -- Virgina & Ambinder, LLP.

Shamsiddin Najmiev, Plaintiff, represented by LaDonna Marie Lusher
-- llusher@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ainbinder, LLP, Lloyd Robert
Ambinder -- lambinder@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ambinder, LLP &
Milana Dostanitch -- mdostanitch@vandallp.com -- Virginia &
Ambinder, LLP.

Special Touch Home Care Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Janet Bronstein Barsky -- barskyj@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper
Hamilton, LLP, Jessica Xingyun Rothenberg --
rothenbergj@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton, LLP & Richard Jay
Reibstein, Pepper Hamilton, LLP.


SPECIALIZED LOAN: Court Defers Ruling on Bid to Dismiss "Smith"
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARGARETTE SMITH, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SPECIALIZED LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16cv2519-GPC(BLM)(S.D. Cal.),
Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California deferred ruling on the Defendant's
motion to dismiss until the Court's ruling on the motion to
substitute parties that the Plaintiff intends to file by July 25,
2017.

On Oct. 7, 2016, Plaintiff Smith filed a purported class action
complaint against the Defendant for violations of Regulation X of
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and related causes of
action.  On May 3, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend.  On
May 10, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a first amended ("FAC")
purported class action complaint against the Defendant for
violations of Regulation X, and California Unfair Competition Law.

Prior to the filing of the FAC, Smith died on April 18, 2017.
According to her last will and testament filed with the San Diego
Recorder's Office, Smith's home at 2452 Blackton Drive, San Diego,
California, the subject property at issue in this case, is part of
an irrevocable trust to which her three granddaughters, Zarah
Kimble, Seher Basak, and Sarah Sakinah Groza O'Loughlin are equal
beneficiaries.  According to the FAC, Smith's granddaughters are
her successors in interest and succeeded to Smith's interest in
the property.

In its motion, the Defendant moves to dismiss the FAC for lack of
Article III standing simply because the Plaintiff has passed away
and no longer has a cognizable interest in the outcome of the
pending litigation, and her successors in interest or
representatives have not been named as parties to the action.  In
response, the Plaintiff's counsel argues that she informed defense
counsel about Smith's death and requested that defense counsel
stipulate to a joint motion to substitute in Smith's successors-
in-interest.  When defense counsel declined to stipulate, the
Plaintiff's counsel asserts that she intends to file a motion to
substitute parties by the deadline of July 25, 2017.

After a review of the parties' briefs, Judge Curiel questions why
the Defendant did not take up the Plaintiff's counsel's offer to
stipulate for an extension of time to respond to the FAC to allow
the Plaintiff to file a motion to substitute in order to avoid
unnecessary filings and conserve judicial resources.  He also
questions why the Plaintiff's counsel did not seek leave of court
for an extension of time to file the FAC in order to address
substitution issues.  In the interests of efficiency and
conserving resources, Judge Curiel deferred its ruling on the
motion to dismiss until the substitution issues are resolved.

In opposition, the Plaintiff's granddaughters request leave to
amend and to be substituted in as the Plaintiffs; however, an
opposition is not the proper avenue to seek substitution of
parties.  In the upcoming motion to substitute parties, the
parties must provide the Court with relevant legal authority and
supporting documentation, including whether the subject property
was transferred to the Trust or is subject to probate.

The hearing date set for July 21, 2017 is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/nVYve6 from Leagle.com.

Margarette Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Kristen Law Sagafi --
ksagafi@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Margarette Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Lorenzo Belmondo
Cellini -- lcellini@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac
vice & Annick Marie Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian
Andrew Paino -- bpaino@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford &
Dhruv Mohan Sharma -- dsharma@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey
Stafford.


STATE FARM: Class Action to Test Limits of Bad Faith Laws
---------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Boysen, writing for Law360, reports that national insurance
giants including State Farm, AIG, Allstate and a slew of others
are staring down the barrel of an unconventional proposed class
action in Connecticut that could cost them billions of dollars and
will test the limits of the state's insurance industry bad faith
laws -- all because of a mineral hardly anyone has ever heard of.

Pyrrhotite-contaminated concrete is the culprit behind a vast
outbreak of crumbling basements and foundations currently sweeping
eastern Connecticut.  Fixing a crumbling basement or foundation
can cost up to $250,000 per home and the problem is estimated to
affect roughly 35,000 homes across eastern Connecticut.

The crisis threatens to crush the region's real estate market and
now it's sucking in the state's home insurers, as the massive
liability goes unaddressed by both the state and federal
government.

The proposed class action -- which names all of Connecticut's
major property insurance carriers, roughly 30 in total -- alleges
the insurers were well aware of the problem before it exploded
into the spotlight two years ago, and have been denying claims in
bad faith in an attempt to wall themselves off from the crisis,
one policyholder at a time.

It seeks to certify a class of all homeowners with crumbling
foundations in three Connecticut counties and is asking for, among
other things, a declaratory judgment that all of the insurers must
cover repairs to all crumbling foundations in those counties, a
provision one legal insurance blog termed a "Mega DJ" shortly
after the suit was first filed last year.

"If the insurance companies continue to go down this path, it's
going to crush the middle class in eastern Connecticut,"
Ryan Barry of Manchester-based Barry Barall & Spinella, who filed
the suit, told Law360.  "The whole thing is just crying out for a
solution, and that's what we're trying to craft with this case."

A "Massive, Unwieldy Class Action"

Since the crisis came to light in 2015 it's become a contentious
issue at every level of the state's politics, with candidates for
the 2018 governor's race campaigning on it and state lawmakers
deadlocked over a handful of hotly contested relief bills.
Requests to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for aid have
been denied, twice.

Given lawmakers' inability to tackle the problem, it's no surprise
the courts have become the main source of relief for affected
homeowners. Dozens of lawsuits against insurers who have denied
crumbling concrete claims are pending in Connecticut state court
right now, while a dozen or so have gone to district court.

Homeowners have prevailed in many of those district court suits,
but thus far they've done little to address the problem as a
whole, leaving plenty of room for a broader suit like Barry's
class action.

In addition to the declaratory judgment, the suit also seeks bad
faith damages, and alleges the state's insurers have a "general
business practice" of denying claims in bad faith, in violation of
the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act and the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act. Those claims can result in substantial
punitive damages, on top of the basic coverage sought by the
declaration.

Every insurer Law360 contacted for this article declined to
comment, except for Nationwide.

A spokesman told Law360 the company "is aware of the lawsuit" but
"cannot discuss it."  However, he added that Nationwide
"investigates each claim individually, applying the specific
facts, laws, regulations and the purchased coverage to every claim
decision."

The insurers have come out against the suit with guns blazing,
filing a flurry of individual and joint motions to dismiss in
June, as well a joint motion to strike the class claims.

They argue the crumbling concrete issue is complicated and that
coverage depends on the specifics of each policy and the damage to
each foundation.  Given the "fact-intensive investigation" needed
to sort out each claim, a "massive, unwieldy class action" won't
fly, they say, in their joint motion to dismiss.

"Plaintiffs cannot improperly seek to have the court ignore the
facts and the policy language in favor of an overarching, and
inevitably inaccurate, declaration," the motion says. "That such a
broad declaratory judgment lumping all defendants together could
possibly enter is wishful thinking."

Mr. Barry counters that all class actions inevitably involve a
group of plaintiffs with facts specific to each of them.  The
important thing, he says, is that his proposed class are all
suffering from the same basic problem: Having paid their premiums
for years, they're now left without coverage just when they need
it most.

"Everyone has homes with crumbling concrete and their insurance
companies refuse to cover their claims," he says.  "So long as
that suffering is at the center of our case, I look forward to our
day in court."

"Nothing Has Been Done"

The situation in Connecticut has been simmering since the 90's, as
isolated reports began to trickle in of homes whose basements and
foundations were falling apart for no discernable reason.

When pyrrhotite oxidizes on contact with air and water, it
expands. When the mineral is present in concrete, that expansion
leads to cracking that can ultimately cause the concrete to
collapse into rubble, a process that can take years or even
decades to run its course.

And as Connecticut's residents are now beginning to realize, a
sizeable portion of all the foundations poured in the state since
the 80's contain pyrrhotite-contaminated concrete.

The crisis didn't come into full view until 2015 however, when a
series of local news reports catapulted the issue into the
spotlight.  Now, as property values and tax revenues continue to
fall in the affected areas, resentment among homeowners has
reached a fever pitch.

"Nothing has been done -- the politicians have failed us,"
Tim Heim, an affected homeowner who's currently suing his insurer
and has founded a grassroots organization around the issue, told
Law360.  "There have been a million proposals, and in the meantime
we're stuck over here grabbing our ankles."

Mr. Heim owns a stately three-bedroom in Willington that's typical
of the houses in Connecticut's northeastern Quiet Corner, a region
that lies somewhere between rural and suburban.  On paper, it may
well be worthless however.  Fixing a crumbling foundation -- a
complicated process that involves lifting the entire house up on
stilts while the concrete below is demolished and repoured -- can
take months to complete and costs anywhere from $100,000 to
$250,000, depending on the home.

For a blue-collar region where the median home price hovers around
$245,000, according to Zillow, it's a price that's simply not
payable by most homeowners, including Mr. Heim.

"This is my home, it's my biggest investment," Mr. Heim says.
"When you learn that it's worthless, it's absolutely devastating.
It's an emotional roller coaster I wouldn't wish on my worst
enemy."

"Broader Pattern Of Bad Faith"

The crux of Mr. Barry's suit alleges Connecticut's insurance
carriers began to see the writing on the wall before most of the
state's residents did, sometime around the early 2000's.

Since then they've used multiple tactics to build a legal firewall
between them and the crumbling concrete crisis, the complaint
says, like denying all claims outright regardless of their merit,
and changing the language in their policies, all allegations the
insurers vigorously dispute.

While the suit's construction might be relatively untested, a
dozen or so one-off crumbling concrete suits between homeowners
and their insurers have gone to Connecticut district court thus
far.  Ten of those suits have survived motions to dismiss and a
handful have survived summary judgment -- many of them settling
shortly thereafter -- with one case being won by the plaintiff at
trial.

The insurers have won outright in only three of those cases. In
each one, the insurer's victory rested on language in the policy
at hand that qualified coverage for a "collapse" as applying only
to a "sudden" or "abrupt" collapse.

Mr. Barry's suit alleges the insurers inserted that language into
policies specifically to delete coverage for crumbling concrete,
without properly notifying policyholders or reducing premiums,
meaning the language is null and void, but the issue is sure to be
a major battleground as the suit goes forward.

Donna Tommelleo, a spokeswoman for the Connecticut Insurance
Department, which must sign off on all policy language changes,
says the department has "determined that the vast majority of
carriers provided proper notification" and is "currently not aware
of facts or circumstances to indicate that unfair practices have
occurred."

The suit's most imposing claims ultimately rest on the insurers'
alleged practice of denying claims for crumbling foundations
across the board.

"We're trying to lay out the broader pattern of bad faith denial
of claims that has only been hinted at in the other cases," Barry
says.

That allegation forms the basis of the CUTPA and CUIPA claims, and
the Connecticut district court's treatment of such claims in the
one-off suits has evolved in a fairly one-sided direction over the
past few years: in favor of homeowners, and against insurers.

In a 2009 ruling that dismissed CUTPA and CUIPA claims from the
earliest crumbling concrete case, Bacewicz v. NGM Ins. Co., U.S.
District Judge Janet C. Hall wrote that the plaintiffs "failed to
allege the multiple violations necessary to support [those claims]
. . . They have only alleged improper handling of their own,
single claim."

Compare that to Judge Hall's ruling last year on the insurer's
motion to dismiss in another of those cases, Liston-Smith v. CSAA
Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.  The plaintiffs cited only state
court suits in which CUTPA/CUIPA claims had survived motions to
strike to support their own claims, but Judge Hall said those
suits weren't relevant, since the standards for motions to strike
aren't as strict as the federal standards that govern a motion to
dismiss.

Even so, Judge Hall took the unusual step of taking judicial
notice of the other crumbling concrete suits involving CSAA in
district court -- including the class action -- to allow the
plaintiff's CUTPA/CUIPA claims to survive, essentially doing their
work for them.

Many of the other suits filed within the last few years have
routinely sailed through motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment on bad faith and CUTPA/CUIPA claims, unless they
involve policies with the sudden and abrupt language.

Ultimately, all of the crumbling concrete cases rest on the
Connecticut Supreme Court's 1987 ruling in Beach v. Middlesex
Mutual Assurance Co.  That case, which didn't involve pyrrhotite-
contaminated concrete, held that "collapse" is an ambiguous term
in an insurance contract, and applies to any "substantial
impairment of the structural integrity of a building," even if the
building is still uninhabitable.

The crumbling concrete cases have thrown into sharp relief the
ambiguity of the phrase "substantial impairment" itself however,
and U.S. District Judge Stefan R. Underhill now says in a
crumbling concrete case he's overseeing that he's "strongly
considering" certifying that term and others to the Connecticut
Supreme Court for clarification.

"Billion Dollar Problem"

The pyrrhotite problem ultimately stems from a single quarry
operated by J.J. Mottes, just down the road from Tim Heim's house,
according to a joint investigation between Connecticut's Attorney
General and its Department of Consumer Protection that concluded
late last year.  That quarry has provided the majority of the
region's concrete aggregate for the past 30 years, the report
says, and it sits atop a large vein of pyrrhotite.

J.J. Mottes continues to dispute its role in the crisis, though
it's since shut down the quarry and sold it off.  A company
spokesman declined to comment for this story.  A few years ago its
office burned down, Connecticut's Journal Inquirer reports, with
the fire destroying all of its records.

One Connecticut resident, Linda Tofolowsky, sued J.J. Mottes in
1997 after her home's foundation inexplicably began bulging and
cracking a few years after it was poured.  That suit was tossed in
2003 however, because she couldn't prove that the problem stemmed
from the concrete itself, which meant her claim was barred by the
10-year product liability statute of limitations.

Pyrrhotite was never mentioned in the suit, and Tofolowsky opened
a complaint with the Department of Consumer Protection in 2003,
only to see the agency close it two days later.

"They kept pouring more and more foundations with the same stuff,"
Ms. Tofolowsky told Law360.  "Nothing ever happened to them.  If
the state had moved on this sooner they could have prevented a
billion-dollar problem." [GN]


STATE FARM: Insured Allowed to Certify Question to Supreme Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western Disrtict of
Washington, Seattle, denied Defendant' Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Strike but granted Plaintiff's Motion to Certify
Questions in the case captioned BRETT DURANT, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. C15-1710 RAJ
(W.D. Wash.).

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company's motion for reconsideration, motion
to strike, and Plaintiff's motion to certify a question to the
Washington Supreme Court.

Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action lawsuit against State Farm
to halt State Farm's alleged practice of denying coverage for
benefits based on a finding of maximum medical improvement." The
Court granted class certification in this matter and sought input
from the parties whether to certify relevant questions to the
Washington Supreme Court or whether to seek guidance from the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner .

Pursuant to Local Rule 7(h), motions for reconsideration are
disfavored, and will ordinarily be denied unless there is a
showing of (a) manifest error in the prior ruling, or (b) facts or
legal authority which could not have been brought to the attention
of the court earlier through reasonable diligence.  Defendant's
motion merely reargues its position that the Court should not
certify the class, a position the Court rejected.

Defendant filed its own motion to strike, requesting that the
Court strike Plaintiff's Surreply.  Defendant fails to present a
basis for striking the Surreply. Plaintiff's Surreply satisfies
the requirements under the Local Rules, and the Court finds no
reason to strike that pleading.

Whether to certify a question to the state supreme court is within
the sound discretion of the federal court. Where state law is
unsettled, and the answers to the Court's questions are
dispositive of the issues, certification to the state supreme
court is appropriate. . Certification is appropriate in this case
where the state issues are unsettled and a determination would
dispose of nearly all the claims. The Court finds certification to
the Washington Supreme Court especially compelling because the OIC
has already presented potentially competing legal theories on the
issue.

The Court Denies Defendant's motion for reconsideration and motion
to strike. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to certify
questions to the Washington Supreme Court.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/UmvqNp from Leagle.com.

Brett Durant, Plaintiff, represented by Tyler K. Firkins, VAN
SICLEN STOCKS & FIRKINS, 721 45th Street, NE, Auburn, WA 98002
Brett Durant, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Nauheim --
david@nauheimlaw.com --NAUHEIM LAW OFFICE.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by David Dworsky -- ddworsky@sheppardmullin.com --
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice, Frank Falzetta --
ffalzetta@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON,
pro hac vice, Gregory S. Worden --
Gregory.Worden@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &
SMITH LLP, Jennifer M. Hoffman -- jhoffman@sheppardmullin.com --
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON, pro hac vice & Laura Hawes
Young -- Laura.Yound@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD
& SMITH LLP.


STATE STREET: "Delarosa" Labor Suit Transferred to D. Mass.
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Anthony Delarosa, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. State Street
Corporation, Joseph L. Hooley, Edward J. Resch, and Michael W.
Bell, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00671 (C.D. Cal., January 27,
2017), was transferred to the United States District Court of the
District of Massachusetts on June 22, 2017, and assigned Case No.
1:17-cv-11155.

Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by
Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for non-disclosure of overcharging
allegations.

State Street, through its subsidiaries, provides a range of
financial products and services to institutional investors
worldwide [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 686-1060
      Fax: (212) 202-3827
      Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Defendant is represented by:

      Daniel W. Halston, Esq.
      William H. Paine, Esq.
      WILMER HALE LLP
      60 State Street
      Boston, MA 02109
      Tel: (617) 526-6654
      Fax: (617) 526-5000
      Email: daniel.halston@wilmerhale.com
             william.paine@wilmerhale.com

             - and -

      Katie Moran, Esq.
      WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP
      350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2100
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Tel: (213) 443-5300
      Fax: (213) 443-5400
      Email: katie.moran@wilmerhale.com

             - and -

      Robert K. Smith, Esq.
      WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP (BOS)
      60 State Street
      Boston, MA 02109
      Tel: (617) 526-6759
      Email: robert.smith@wilmerhale.com


STRYKER: Hip Lawsuits Move Forward in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP on July 3 disclosed that product liability
claims involving Stryker's recalled LFIT Anatomic CoCr V40 Femoral
Heads are moving forward in the multicounty litigation currently
underway in New Jersey's Bergen County Superior Court.  A Case
Management Order dated June 26th stipulates, among other things,
that all plaintiffs submit a completed Case Questionnaire by
August 1, 2017.  Those who file a lawsuit after June 2, 2017 must
submit their questionnaire no later than 60 days from the filing
of a responsive pleading. The Court also issued an Order extending
the discovery deadline until December 31, 2018 for all cases in
which it has already expired. (In re: Stryker LFIT Anatomic CoCr
V40 Femoral Heads Litigation, case number 624)

"Our Firm is representing a number of clients who are seeking to
pursue lawsuits involving Stryker's LFIT V40 femoral heads. We
will continue to monitor the proceeding in New Jersey, as well as
the federal multidistrict litigation in New York, for any
developments that could impact these cases," says Sandy A.
Liebhard, a partner at Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationwide law
firm representing victims of defective drugs and medical devices.
The Firm is now offering free, no-obligation legal reviews to
individuals who may have been harmed by Stryker's LFIT Anatomic
Cobalt Chromium V40 femoral heads.

Stryker Hip Litigation

Stryker's LFIT Anatomic CoCr V40 Femoral Heads are designed to be
used with several of the company's modular hip devices, including:

   -- Accolade TMZF
   -- Accolade 2 Stems
   -- Meridian Stems
   -- Citation Stems

Certain of these devices manufactured prior to 2011 were recalled
by the company in August 2016, following an unusually high number
of reports involving taper lock failure.  Taper lock failure may
result in loosening of the artificial joint and other debilitating
complications, resulting in the need for revision surgery.  The
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) designated Stryker's action
a Class II recall, which indicates that the affected femoral heads
could cause temporary or medically-reversible health consequences.

In May, the New Jersey Supreme Court transferred all state
lawsuits involving LFIT V40 femoral heads before a single judge in
Bergen County for the purposes of centralized case management. A
month earlier, a centralized docket was established in the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York, for all federally-
filed involving the recalled components.  (In RE: Stryker
Orthopaedics LFIT V40 Femoral Head Product Liability Litigation,
MDL NO. 2768)

                  About Bernstein Liebhard LLP

Bernstein Liebhard LLP is a New York-based law firm exclusively
representing injured persons in complex individual and class
action lawsuits nationwide since 1993. [GN]


SUNPATH LTD: "Clough" Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert W. Clough II on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sunpath Ltd. and Automotive Services
Center, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-11158 (D. Mass., June 22,
2017), seeks to enjoin Sunpath from engaging in unlawful
telemarketing practices and such other and further relief under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Sunpath, Ltd. offers extended warranties on automobiles with its
principal office in Braintree, MA while Automotive Services Center
is a company with its principal place of business at 1261 E. Dyer
Rd., Suite 230, Santa Ana, CA 92705. Defendants engage in
telemarketing to solicit customer by phone. [BN]

Clough claims he received auto-dialed calls from the Defendants
despite placing his cellular telephone number on the National Do
Not Call Registry in February of 2008. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
      Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
      BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
      99 High St., Suite 304
      Boston, MA 02110
      Tel: (508) 221-1510
      Email: anthony@broderick-law.com
             ted@broderick-law.com

             - and -

      Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
      JEREMY COHEN CW LAW GROUP, P.C.
      188 Oaks Road
      Framingham, MA 01701
      Email: alex@cwlawgrouppc.com

             - and -

      Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE
      1 South Avenue, 3rd Floor
      Natick, MA 01760
      Telephone: (508) 655-1415
      Fax: (508) 319-3077
      Email: mmccue@massattorneys.net


SUNRUN INC: Offer of Judgment in "Slovin" Ineffective
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned LYNN SLOVIN, SAMUEL KATZ AND JEFFERY PRICE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SUNRUN, INC., CLEAN ENERGY EXPERTS, LLC, DBA SOLAR
AMERICA, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 5, Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-5340 YGR
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to declare ineffective the Defendants' offer of
judgment.

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action alleging willful
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").
They seek to represent a putative class of individuals who
received unwanted calls from the Defendants allegedly in violation
of the TCPA.

On March 21, 2017, the Defendants made an offer of judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to each Individual
Plaintiff for $100,000 apiece, costs and prejudgment interest now
accrued, and an injunction prohibiting the Defendants and their
officers and employees from calling the Plaintiffs without their
prior express consent.  The Offer was contingent on acceptance by
all four Individual Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs did not accept the
Offer and allowed the time to accept the Offer to expire.

Currently before the Court is the Plaintiffs' motion to declare
ineffective the Defendants' offer for judgment.

Judge Gonzalez finds that the Individual Plaintiffs could not
accept the Offer without jeopardizing their duty to the putative
class.  In not accepting the $100,000 per Plaintiff offer, the
Individual Plaintiffs placed the interests of the putative class
ahead of their personal interests, just as Rule 23 envisions.
Individual Plaintiffs simply complied with their duty under Rule
23(a)(4) by fairly and adequately protecting the interests of the
class.  To subject such Plaintiffs to personal liability for the
Defendants' post-offer costs would be unjust, especially given the
restrictions on a class representative's freedom to accept a
favorable settlement of his individual claim.  Perhaps more
importantly, it would also run contrary to Rule 23's policy of
encouraging class representatives to protect putative class
interests.  Therefore, Judge Gonzalez finds that the Offer here
runs contrary to the purpose of Rule 23 and is ineffective for the
purposes of Rule 68(d) cost-shifting.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' motion is granted and the Defendants' current Offer of
judgment is declared ineffective for the purposes of Rule 68(d).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/8H4IZb from Leagle.com.

Lynn Slovin, Plaintiff, represented by Yitzchak Hillel Lieberman,
ParasmoLiebermanLaw.

Lynn Slovin, Plaintiff, represented by Alan Himmelfarb, Edelson
McGuire LLC, David Christopher Parisi -- dcparisi@parisihavens.com
-- Parisi & Havens LLP, Ethan Mark Preston -- ep@eplaw.us --
Preston Law Offices, Grace E. Parasmo --
gparasmo@parasmoliebermanlaw.com -- Parasmo Lieberman Law, pro hac
vice, Suzanne Havens Beckman -- shavens@parisihavens.com -- Parisi
& Havens LLP & Suzanne L. Havens Beckman --
shavens@parisihavens.com -- Parisi & Havens LLP.

Samuel Katz, Plaintiff, represented by Alan Himmelfarb, Edelson
McGuire LLC, Ethan Mark Preston, Preston Law Offices, Grace E.
Parasmo, Parasmo Lieberman Law, Suzanne L. Havens Beckman, Parisi
& Havens LLP & David Christopher Parisi, Parisi & Havens LLP.

Jeffery Price, Plaintiff, represented by Alan Himmelfarb, Edelson
McGuire LLC, Ethan Mark Preston, Preston Law Offices, Grace E.
Parasmo, Parasmo Lieberman Law, Suzanne L. Havens Beckman, Parisi
& Havens LLP & David Christopher Parisi, Parisi & Havens LLP.

Justin Birkhofer, Plaintiff, represented by Alan Himmelfarb,
Edelson McGuire LLC, Ethan Mark Preston, Preston Law Offices,
Grace E. Parasmo, Parasmo Lieberman Law, Suzanne L. Havens
Beckman, Parisi & Havens LLP & David Christopher Parisi, Parisi &
Havens LLP.

Sunrun, Inc., Defendant, represented by Catherine Dong Eun Lee --
clee@kelleydrye.com  -- Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, Edward James
Mullins, III, Edward J. Mullins III, Esq. LLC, Lauri Anne
Mazzuchetti, Kelley Drye Warren LLP & Lee Scott Brenner, Kelley
Drye and Warren LLP.

Clean Energy Experts, LLC, Defendant, represented by Catherine
Dong Eun Lee, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, Edward James Mullins,
III -- emullins@kelleydrye.com -- Edward J. Mullins III, Esq. LLC
& Lauri Anne Mazzuchetti -- lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley
Drye Warren LLP.

Sean Bozarth, Movant, represented by Reuben D. Nathan --
rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com -- Nathan & Associates, APC.


SUSHI MARU: Bid to Transfer Chef's Suit to NJ Granted
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendants' Motion to Transfer Case to New Jersey in
the case captioned DAE SUB CHOI, for himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SUSHI MARU EXPRESS CORP., et
al., Defendants, No. 17 CV 191-LTS (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Dae Sub Choi commenced this putative collective and
class action asserting violations of Federal and State labor laws
against Defendants. Defendants have now moved, inter alia, to
transfer this case to the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

Plaintiff, New Jersey resident was employed  as a sushi chef  by
his apparent direct employer, Defendant Sushi Maru Express
Corp.(Shusi Maru), is a New Jersey corporation with its principal
place of business in Ridgefield, New Jersey. Plaintiff alleges
that he was hired to work at a Sushi Maru location in New Jersey,
but was ultimately required to travel to Sushi Maru locations in
New York, both in the Southern District and elsewhere.

Section 1404(a) permits the district court to transfer any civil
action to another district where it might have been brought, where
such transfer is for the convenience of the parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice. Section 1404(a) proposes a two-part
test. First, the transferee district must be one where
jurisdiction over the defendant could have been obtained at the
time suit was brought, regardless of defendant's consent. Second,
the transfer must be in the interest of justice and convenience of
the parties and witnesses."

Plaintiff resides in New Jersey, and Sushi Maru, his primary
employer, is a New Jersey corporation. The uncontroverted evidence
proffered by Defendants indicates that Plaintiff worked 89.6% of
his shifts in New Jersey, and 0.88% of his shifts in New York. The
locus of operative facts has a much stronger connection to New
Jersey than New York.

Defendants' motion to transfer is granted.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 10, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://is.gd/MSn98f from
Leagle.com.

Dae Sub Choi, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Garcia, Kimm Law
Firm, 11th East 44 Street, Suite 1400, New York, NY 10017
Dae Sub Choi, Plaintiff, represented by Michael S. Kimm, Kimm Law
Fir, 11th East 44 Street, Suite 1400, New York, NY 10017

Sushi Maru Express Corp., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Mark
Schlossberg -- Jeffrey.Schlossberg@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C. & Timothy James Domanick, --
Timothy.Domanick@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..
Sushi Nara, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Mark Schlossberg,
Jackson Lewis P.C.

Komolo, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Mark Schlossberg,
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Timothy James Domanick, Jackson Lewis P.C.
Kevin Kim, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Mark Schlossberg,
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Timothy James Domanick, Jackson Lewis P.C.
Hak Jae Lim, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey Mark Schlossberg,
Jackson Lewis P.C. & Timothy James Domanick, Jackson Lewis P.C.


SYSCO CORP: Court Narrows Discovery of Docs in "Frieri"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Southern District of
California granted in part and denied in part the Joint Motion for
Determination of Discovery Dispute in the case captioned RICK
FRIERI, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v. SYSCO
CORPORATION; SYSCO SAN DIEGO, INC.; AND DOES 1-100, Defendants,
Case No. 3:16-cv-01432-JLS-NLS (S.D. Calif.).

This case presents a putative class action of truck drivers for
alleged wage and hour violations while employed as drivers for
defendant Sysco San Diego, Inc., and/or Sysco Corporation.
Plaintiff alleges violations on behalf of a state-wide putative
class, and seeks discovery to support certification. Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification is due to be filed by November 10,
2017.

Plaintiffs propounded five interrogatories and forty-eight
requests for production of documents to defendant Sysco San Diego,
Inc.  Plaintiff's interrogatories and document requests seek,
inter alia, contact information relating to the putative class
members.

Defendant seeks to limit the scope of the requests and attendant
production accordingly, and argues responses are complete with
this limitation in place and that its objections are appropriate.
Rule 26 permits discovery of any non-privileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action.

Plaintiff argues that the pleadings allege uniform illegal
policies in place at all of Sysco's California operating companies
and a state-wide class sufficient to justify all discovery sought.
Defendant's arguments, objections, and responses make clear that
Defendant challenges the Plaintiff's ability to adequately
represent a class.   Defendant points to authority presenting
other discovery disputes in this District and Circuit that limit
discovery to the location where plaintiff was employed absent
evidence supporting company-wide violations.

Discovery prior to class certification is generally limited and in
the discretion of the court. Plaintiff bears the burden of a prima
facie showing that the class action requirements of Rule 23 are
either met or that discovery is likely to substantiate the class
allegations. Especially when the material is in the possession of
the defendant, the court should allow the plaintiff enough
discovery. However, if the plaintiff cannot meet the prima facie
showing of the requirements of Rule 23,  the burden is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that discovery measures likely to produce
persuasive information substantiating the class allegations.
Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 pleading, as
demonstrated by survival of claims in response to a motion to
dismiss.  The burden remains with the Defendant as the party who
resists discovery to show discovery should not be allowed.

Defendant raises similar arguments to seek to limit discovery, but
has offered no evidence to support its arguments in the form of
deposition testimony, policies, declarations, or other discovery
responses from Plaintiff.  While Defendant avers that its policies
are legally compliant, it has not put the policies before this
Court, or offered an explanation as to how or why enforcement of
its legally compliant company-wide policies.

Under these circumstances, Defendant has not satisfied its burden
to show that the discovery should not be permitted.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff propounded discovery to Defendant (Sysco
San Diego, Inc.) only. Defendant may respond for itself only.
Plaintiff's apparent inclusion of related entities in its
definitions for interrogatories and requests for documents does
not require Defendant to locate or produce information or
documents for its parent company or other subsidiaries of the
parent company.  Plaintiff has offered no evidence that
circumstances exist such and Defendant has some form of `control
over the documents and information sought as here is no indication
that Defendant has either control or access to the contact
information.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to interrogatories
and requests for production of documents.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 7, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/0g22Nv from Leagle.com.

Rick Frieri, Plaintiff, represented by William D. Turley,
-- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm, APLC.

Rick Frieri, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Evan Crawford, The
Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC
7428 Trade St. San Diego, CA 92121 Tel. 619-234-2833

Sysco Corporation, Defendant, represented by Julie Kwun --
kwun@bakerlaw.com-- Baker & Hosteler, LLP, Margaret Rosenthal --
mrosenthal@bakerlaw.com-- Baker & Hostetler LLP, Sabrina Layne
Shadi-- sshadi@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP & Vartan S.
Madoyan  --vmadoyan@bakerlaw.com -- Baker and Hostetler LLP.

Sysco San Diego, Inc., Defendant, represented by Julie Kwun, Baker
& Hosteler, LLP, Margaret Rosenthal, Baker & Hostetler LLP,
Sabrina Layne Shadi, Baker & Hostetler LLP & Vartan S. Madoyan,
Baker and Hostetler LLP.


TAF LLC: Calif. Court Keen on Dismissing "Ruiz"
-----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued a Show Cause Order in the case captioned Caesar
Ruiz, v. TAF, LLC, No. CV 15-2853 DSF (SSx)(C.D. Calif.),
directing the Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of prosecution.

Plaintiffs filed a notice of class action settlement. Plaintiffs
had filed nothing to seek approval of the settlement. A renewed
motion for preliminary approval was filed.  The Court denied that
motion without a hearing.

No further action has been taken in the case. Six months have now
past since the Court denied the second motion for preliminary
approval and 20 months have past since the initial notice of
settlement. Plaintiffs are therefore ordered to show cause, in
writing why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
prosecution.

A full-copy text of the District Court's July 6, 2017 Order is
available at https://is.gd/iGCYiI from Leagle.com.

Caesar Ruiz, Plaintiff, represented by Arby Aiwazian --
arby@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice PC.

Caesar Ruiz, Plaintiff, represented by Edwin Aiwazian --
edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice PC, Jill Jessica Parker --
jill@lfjc.com -- Lawyers for Justice PC & Joanna Ghosh --
joana@lfjc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC.

Calvin Gilkey, Plaintiff, represented by Joanna Ghosh, Lawyers for
Justice, PC & Edwin Aiwazian, Lawyers for Justice PC.

Towne Air Freight, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eugene Ry --
eryu@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC & Heather Shook --
hshook@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


TAKATA CORP: Wants Judge to Halt Lawsuits Over Defective Airbags
----------------------------------------------------------------
Findlaw.com, citing Randall Chase of The Associated Press, reports
that Japanese auto parts supplier Takata is asking a Delaware
bankruptcy judge for an injunction prohibiting the governments of
Hawaii, New Mexico and the U.S. Virgin Islands from prosecuting
lawsuits involving the company's lethally defective air bag
inflators.

In a complaint filed on July 13, Takata also is seeking to extend
the automatic halt of litigation against a company in bankruptcy
to hundreds of individual lawsuits against automobile
manufacturers who installed the faulty air bags.

The judge will hold a telephonic status conference on Takata's
request Tuesday, July 18.

Takata says allowing the lawsuits to proceed would seriously
jeopardize its restructuring efforts, including the planned sale
of most of its assets to a Chinese-owned rival for $1.6 billion.

Takata was forced into bankruptcy amid lawsuits, multimillion-
dollar fines and crushing recall costs involving the air bags.


TESLA INC: Faces New Suit Over Defects in Model S & X Vehicles
--------------------------------------------------------------
Benzinga reports that Tesla owners, represented by Hovanes
Margarian, Esq. -- hovanes@margarianlaw.com -- of The Margarian
Law Firm, have filed a class action lawsuit against Tesla alleging
a life-threatening defect in all Model S and Model X vehicles. The
lawsuit arose in the aftermath of an accident in April of 2017
when the Plaintiff's vehicle skit off the road due to the alleged
defect.

Tesla owners Roy and Marites Wiseman have filed a class action
lawsuit against Tesla alleging a life-threatening defect in all
Model S and Model X vehicles. The lawsuit, Roy Wiseman, et al. v.
Tesla Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-04798, filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, arose in the
aftermath of a catastrophic accident in April of 2017 when the
Wisemans' vehicle skit off the road. Roy Wiseman and his passenger
miraculously suffered only minor injuries but the Wisemans' Tesla
Model X was wrecked. The Wisemans since made multiple requests for
Tesla to address the dangerous condition that caused the crash.
When their requests fell to deaf ears, the Wisemans retained
Hovanes Margarian of The Margarian Law Firm to demand a remedy
from Tesla via litigation.

The Tesla class action lawsuit in its pleadings alleges that all
2012-2017 Tesla Model S and 2016-2017 Tesla Model X electric
vehicles are affected. It further seeks recovery on a nationwide
basis and is filed in Federal Court as opposed to California State
Court.

The Margarian Law Firm is a consumer class action law firm has
been fighting for consumer rights for over a decade. While the
firm's various departments have attorneys who handle a wide range
of legal matters, its consumer class action division in particular
has represented hundreds of thousands of consumers in class action
matters involving automobile defects and other matter. The firm's
aim is first and foremost to engage Tesla in a meaningful early
resolution dialogue whereby the safety concerns raised by the
Wisemans will be addressed for them and for all Tesla owners
nationwide. The attorneys are optimistic that Tesla will do right
by its clients. [GN]


TIM HORTONS: Owner Urged to Address Franchise Dispute
-----------------------------------------------------
Sylvain Charlebois, writing for Regina Leader-Post, reports that
Tim Hortons is slowly becoming a classic case of a completely
dysfunctional franchise system. Franchisees on both sides of the
border are now pressuring owner Restaurant Brands International
Inc. (RBI) to ease up on its increasingly strict rules around
standards, pricing and inspections. Some have even called RBI's
approach abusive.

Some franchisees have now sought a class-action lawsuit against
RBI. It seems the trust in this relationship is all but gone.  But
what lies ahead promises to be even worse.  Lack of bilateral
trust in a franchise system often leads to more severe challenges
down the road.

For most investors, this is hardly surprising.  Brazilian-based 3G
Capital, which owns the majority of RBI, has a reputation for
driving margins higher, whatever it takes.  Anything can be
compromised or even sacrificed: jobs, costly practices, corporate
culture -- you name it.

In the case of RBI and Tim Hortons franchisees, two business
models are essentially colliding. For decades, Tim Hortons'
steady-as-she-goes attitude which focused on offering a place for
people of all ages to congregate, served several communities in
the style of the general stores of old. But since 2014, RBI's rule
of law is about efficiency and increased profitability for the
parent company.

As for consumers, most would not have noticed the difference.  The
brown uniforms, the Roll-Up the Rim to Win campaign, summer camp
fundraisers -- all are still there.  What has changed is what
consumers never see.

It was a dramatic shift nonetheless.  Providing value to RBI
shareholders is now superseding the corporate will to empower
outlets.  This has led to major changes in procurement strategies
and corporate protocols.  Most franchisees did not sign up for
such a modus operandi.  Several of them invested hundreds of
thousands of dollars, and in some cases, millions.

What was once considered a licence to print money and a solid
pension for investors has turned into a nightmare for some
franchisees.  Failing to anticipate any contractual changes from
the franchise often leads to a state of confusion and despair.
Most franchises are owned by families or local heroes, who pride
themselves in supporting community groups.  That is how Tim
Hortons gained the recognition it has today.

But it is difficult to argue against RBI's success.  The company
is making money and has kept shareholders very happy.  Its shares
have more than doubled in value since its inception in 2014, now
valued at over $80 per share.  Most analysts would agree that
RBI's stock has outperformed peer companies by a wide margin in
recent years. In 2010, Burger King was going nowhere before it was
bought by 3G Capital.  That was before RBI.  Since then, Burger
King is much more competitive and has been able to increase its
market share across North America.  It would not be surprising to
see its most recent acquisition, Popeye's, experience the same
success.

Keep in mind that not all franchisees are suing RBI.  Most
Canadian and American franchisees are staying on the sidelines and
letting things play out.  Despite the public discontent around the
ownership, some franchisees are co-operating with the new sheriff
in town. No lawsuits from Burger King or Popeye's franchisees, at
least not yet.

Over the short term, the acrimony between 3G Capital and
franchisees will probably continue.  What is at stake is a brand
which has served communities well for many years. Tim Hortons went
from being an iconic Canadian-owned business to being merely part
of a much larger portfolio.  This is a reality all franchisees
need to accept.  Along the way though, RBI will need to appreciate
the intimate connection local stores have with communities.  There
is nothing wrong in making a profit, but RBI will need to work on
those relationships before they get worse. A franchise system
relies on two fundamental principles: transparency and trust.  A
lack of both leaves one of the two parties feeling betrayed.

No matter how high RBI's share price point goal is, it can't
achieve it without the support of its community investors. [GN]


TIME WARNER: Files Motion to Dismiss Unsolicited Fax Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Burger, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that
subsidiaries of the country's largest cable pay-TV company Time
Warner Cable (TWC) on June 20 filed a motion in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia in Atlanta to dismiss a
prospective class action lawsuit filed by New York law firm
Shimshon Wexler.

Attorneys representing TWC subsidiaries doing business in Georgia
requested the court dismiss an amended complaint filed by Shimshon
Wexler on the grounds that the court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the defendants.  They also said if the case isn't dismissed,
it should be heard in New York federal court.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's original
complaint on the grounds that Shimshon failed to substantiate a
prima facie case of personal jurisdiction as per "prong one or
prong two of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute." In the original
complaint, the defendants asserted that plaintiff directed alleged
activities to Georgia purposefully.

As reported May 30, Shimshon Wexler alleges Aicom Solutions LLC
-- doing business as Aicom Corp. and Time Warner Cable LLC in turn
acting through subsidiary agents Spectum, Time Warner Cable Media,
Charter Communications Inc. and Charter Communications Operating
LLC -- failed to make disclosures to consumers when sending them
unsolicited telephone fax messages in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.  Lawyers from Shimshon Wexler filed the
firm's prospective class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court in
Atlanta in late March.

According to the filing: "Each person that was sent one or more
telephone facsimile messages from Time Warner Cable after
Feb. 24, 2013, promoting the commercial availability of digital
telephone or internet services but not stating on its first page
that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send
any future ads and that failure to comply with such a request
within 30 days is unlawful."

As remedy, the law firm says, "The court should exercise its
discretion to increase the amount of the statutory damages award
to an amount equal to not more than three times the amount." It
also requests the court prohibit the defendants from telephone
faxing ads in the future.

The complaint states Shimshon Wexler is seeking "a windfall in
statutory damages" from TWC subsidiaries Spectrum, Time Warner
Cable Media and two Charter Communications companies for allegedly
violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Shimson Wexler
chose to file an amended complaint rather than respond to the
original motion to dismiss.

Defendants assert that plaintiff again fails to substantiate its
claim in its amended complaint as per the terms of the two prongs
of Georgia's Long-Arm Statute.  According to plaintiffs' motion to
dismiss plaintiff "continues to omit the critical allegation that
the Charter Defendants did any act or any business within Georgia
that gave rise to plaintiff's claims.

"At most, plaintiff now alleges that it 'received' the fax in
Georgia, but does not allege that the Charter defendants sent the
fax, much less that they sent it from or to Georgia. Additionally,
although plaintiff now tacitly admits it has a New York office, it
fails to recognize (a) the fax is specifically addressed to that
office, (b) the fax proposes service at that office, (c) the Fax
was sent to that office, (d) from outside Georgia, and (e) the
Charter Defendants did not send the fax at all," the motion says.
[GN]


TLC OF THE BAY: California Court Dismisses "Hernandez" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DANIEL HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. TLC OF THE
BAY AREA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:16-cv-05524-HRL (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss and deemed moot the motion to
strike.

The Plaintiff is a former resident of one of the skilled nursing
facilities owned and operated by TLC.  The parties stipulate that
he was admitted to the Facility on June 23, 2015.  On that date,
the Plaintiff entered into an Arbitration Agreement with the
Facility which provides that any disputes between Plaintiff and
the Facility will be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration
to be conducted in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum
("NAF") Code of Procedure, which is incorporated into this
Agreement, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process.

The Arbitration Agreement expressly states that it is not part of
the Admissions Agreement and that residents are not required to
sign the Arbitration Agreement as a condition of admission.  The
parties stipulate that the Plaintiff was discharged from the
Facility a few months later on Sept. 15, 2015.

On June 22, 2016, Hernandez sued TLC in state court for alleged
elder abuse.  On Aug. 24, 2016, TLC sent a letter stating that TLC
has found that Hernandez agreed to arbitrate any claims involving
his care and requesting that the  Plaintiff voluntarily dismiss
the action and proceed to arbitrate his claims.  On Sept. 13,
2016, TLC wrote a letter advising that it would be filing a motion
to compel arbitration.  That motion was filed that same day.

Hernandez then filed this federal putative class action on Sept.
28, 2016, asserting a sole claim for relief under California
Health & Safety Code Section 1430(b).  He alleged that TLC
fraudulently duped residents into signing the Arbitration
Agreement, thereby depriving them of their right to a jury trial.
The claim was based on allegations that, since 2009, NAF had
ceased administering arbitrations involving consumers and that the
NAF's Code of Procedure was not accessible online.  TLC moved to
dismiss the original complaint, arguing (among other things) that
the allegations did not give rise to a plausible or actionable
claim for relief.  That motion was mooted when Hernandez timely
filed his FAC as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

The FAC adds a claim seeking rescission of the Arbitration
Agreement due to fraud.  It continues to assert a claim for
violation of California Health & Safety Code Section 1430(b) for
alleged deprivation of the right to a jury trial.  And, he
continues to bring his claims for himself and on behalf of two
putative subclasses which are both comprised of current and former
residents of skilled nursing facilities owned, operated, or
managed by TLC.  The gravamen of the FAC continues to be that TLC
fraudulently duped the Plaintiff and putative class members into
signing the Arbitration Agreement, even though the NAF no longer
administers consumer disputes and the NAF's Code of Procedure was
not accessible online.

Meanwhile, back in state court -- on Nov. 11, 2016, TLC answered
Hernandez's complaint and ceased efforts to enforce the
Arbitration Agreement.

In this federal suit, TLC once again moves to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  It contends that the Plaintiff's right
to a jury trial is not one that is protected by Cal. Health &
Safety Code Section 1430(b) and that the Section 1430(b) claim is
time-barred anyway.  Additionally, TLC argues that the FAC does
not sufficiently allege facts supporting a claim for rescission
based on fraud.  As to both claims, the Defendant maintains that
the FAC does not allege facts establishing any plausible claim for
relief.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), TLC also moves to
strike the class allegations, arguing that individual issues of
causation and reliance will necessarily predominate over any
common issues of law or fact.

Magistrate Judge Lloyd finds that the FAC contains no factual
allegations plausibly suggesting that the Defendant had knowledge
of any falsity or specific intent to defraud.  Knowledge and
fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the
NAF stopped arbitrating consumer disputes in 2009 or that the Code
of Procedure cannot be accessed online.  The Plaintiff alleges
that if he had known that the NAF no longer conducted consumer
disputes, he would not have become a resident of the Facility.
But, as discussed, the Arbitration Agreement itself says that it
is not part of the Admissions Agreement and that residents are not
required to sign the Arbitration Agreement as a condition of
admission.

For much the same reasons, Magistrate Judge Lloyd held that the
Plaintiff's claim under California Health & Safety Code Section
1430(b) also fails.  Section 1430(b) of the Act allows a current
or former resident or patient of a skilled nursing facility to sue
the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident
or patient as set forth in the Patients Bill of Rights in Section
72527 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any
other right provided for by federal or state law or regulation.
The crux of the parties' dispute is whether the right to a jury
trial, secured by the California Constitution, falls within the
scope of the statute.  Even assuming, without deciding, that it
does, the Court agreed that the FAC fails to allege a plausible
claim for relief.  At best, the FAC's allegations demonstrate that
deprivation of his right to a jury trial was conceivable; but, it
simply is not plausible.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Lloyd granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss this claim without leave to amend.  Having
concluded that the FAC fails to state a claim for relief, he
deemed the Defendant's motion to strike the class allegations
moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/vmPtKo from Leagle.com.

Aniel Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by David Michael Medby,
Garcia, Artigliere and Medby.

Daniel Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen Michael
Garcia, Garcia Law Firm & William Michael Artigliere, Garcia,
Artigliere and Medby.

TLC of the Bay Area, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jon Peter
Kardassakis -- Jon.Kardassakis@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP & Zourik Zarifian --
Zourik.Zarifian@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and
Smith LLP.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Hope Appeals Decision in "Warner" Suit to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Cemil Hope filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Brian Warner, et al. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-02171-FMO-FFM, in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Brian Warner, et al. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 17-55890, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by July 19, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on October 17, 2017;

   -- Appellant Cemil Hope's opening brief is due on November 27,
      2017;

   -- Appellees Ryan Burns, Dale Franquet, James Fuller, James
      Good, Kenneth MacLeod, Michael Meade, Toyota Motor Sales,
      U.S.A., Inc., Brian Warner and Michael Watson's answering
      brief is due on December 27, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant CEMIL HOPE is represented by:

          Bradley David Salter, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BRADLEY D. SALTER
          24 Malialani Place
          Lahaina, HI 96761
          Telephone: (808) 298-7873

Plaintiffs-Appellees BRIAN WARNER, KENNETH MACLEOD, MICHAEL MEADE,
MICHAEL WATSON, JAMES FULLER, DALE FRANQUET, RYAN BURNS and JAMES
GOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
are represented by:

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One N. LaSalle
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com

               - and -

          Timothy G. Blood, Esq.
          Paula R. Brown, Esq.
          BLOOD HURST & O'REARDON LLP
          701 B Street
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 338-1100
          Facsimile: (619) 338-1101
          E-mail: tblood@bholaw.com
                  pbrown@bholaw.com

Defendant-Appellee TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California
corporation, is represented by:

          Galen D. Bellamy, Esq.
          WHEELER TRIGG O'DONNELL LLP
          370 Seventeenth Street, Suite # 4500
          Denver, CO 80202-5647
          Telephone: (303) 244-1800
          Facsimile: (303) 244-1879
          E-mail: bellamy@wtotrial.com

               - and -

          Raymond A. Cardozo, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          101 Second Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 543-8700
          Facsimile: (415) 391-8269
          E-mail: rcardozo@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          John Peter Hooper, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          599 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 205-6125
          Facsimile: (212) 521-5450
          E-mail: jhooper@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          Peter W. Herzog, Jr., Esq.
          HERZOG CREBS LLP
          100 N. Broadway, 14th Floor
          St. Louis, MO 63102-2728
          Telephone: (314) 231-6700
          Facsimile: (314) 231-4656
          E-mail: pwh@herzogcrebs.com

               - and -

          Esther K. Ro, Esq.
          David L. Schrader, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
          Telephone: (213) 612-7434
          Facsimile: (213) 312-2501
          E-mail: ero@morganlewis.com
                  david.schrader@morganlewis.com


TRUMP UNIVERSITY: Donald Trump May Go to Trial in Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Le Miere, writing for Newsweek, reports that Donald Trump
may have settled a lawsuit over his Trump University seminar
program, but the case into the alleged fraud is far from over.
Indeed, a lawyer representing one of the plaintiffs, who has
refused to accept the $25 million settlement Trump made shortly
after his election last November, has said it's a very "real
possibility" the president could go on trial.

"Yes, that's right," Deepak Gupta, who is representing
Sherri Simpson, told Vox on July 2.  "Trump really could end up
going to trial.  We're confident that the 9th Circuit will rule
that any deal like this must allow people like Sherri to opt out
if they want."
If Trump's history with the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is
any indication, he could be in for some bad news.  Already this
year, the court has ruled against Trump's travel ban and imposed
an injunction against his order stripping money from sanctuary
cities.  In April, Trump said he had considered breaking up the
court, calling it "outrageous."

It will now rule whether Ms. Simpson, a bankruptcy attorney who
spent $19,000 on tuition with Trump University, can sue the
president independently for fraud.  Ms. Simpson alleged that she
was promised she could be excluded from the class-action
settlement if she wished.  More than 6,000 people, who paid up to
$35,000 in the expectation of getting insights into Trump's
business secrets, were listed in the suits.

Mr. Gupta, a Washington lawyer who also was part of a lawsuit
alleging that Trump has violated the U.S. Constitution's
emoluments clause, called the program an "elaborate scam."  And
Ms. Simpson is determined to see Trump face questions before a
jury.

"I believed in a jury trial," Ms. Simpson told The Guardian.  "It
looked like we had such a strong case for trial after seven years
of litigation."

Ms. Simpson has received the support of amicus briefs filed by
about a dozen law professors saying that she should have the right
to opt out of the settlement.

Following the settlement, Trump tweeted that it represented a
"small fraction of the potential award."

And, said Mr. Gupta, if Ms. Simpson is successful in the 9th
Circuit, the president could be faced with having to pay up
significantly more, as well as potentially go before a jury.

"Then Trump will have some decisions to make," Mr. Gupta said.
"Does he jettison the whole settlement and go into a big class-
action trial facing $170 million in damages? Or does he stick with
the deal for those members who want it and let others join
Sherri's team or go their own way? That's all up to him, but
either way, a trial is a real possibility."

While most legal experts believe a sitting president could not
face criminal prosecution, the prospect of a president going on
trial isn't totally far-fetched.  The Supreme Court ruled in a
1997 case involving a sexual harassment suit filed against then-
President Bill Clinton by Paula Jones that the president has no
immunity from civil law litigation for acts done before taking
office that are unrelated to the office.

"Ultimately, this case will test our legal system's commitment to
a basic principle: that you have a right to a day in court and
that right can't be taken away without your consent," Mr. Gupta
said. "Sherri wants her day in court, so she can hold Trump
accountable for ripping her off." [GN]


UBER TECH: July 20 Deadline to Submit Email Test Design
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned In Re Uber FCRA Litigation, Case No. 14-cv-
05200-EMC, Consolidated with No. 14-cv-05241-EMC, Case No. 15-cv-
03009-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the Parties'
stipulated request and order to extend the deadline for them to
make its submission regarding the email test (along with an
updated Preliminary Approval Order) on or before July 20, 2017.

On June 29, 2017, the Court issued its Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Court ordered the Parties to submit to devise and submit a
design for a trial test run to ascertain what percentage of emails
are likely to be blocked as spam within seven days from the date
of the order for approval.

Since June 29, 2017, the Parties have worked diligently to submit
the design for the trial test run by July 6, 2017, however, given
the holiday weekend and logistics involved in devising a design
for such a test run (i.e. consultation with appropriate experts,
meet and confer between the Parties themselves), they will require
an additional 14 days (to July 20, 2017) to make a submission to
the Court on this issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 7, 2017 order is available at
https://is.gd/q5vcb2 from Leagle.com.

Abdul Kadir Mohamed, Plaintiff, represented by Bradley Keith King
-- bking@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot and Wolfson, P.C..

Abdul Kadir Mohamed, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Ahdoot --
RAhdoot@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Theodore
Walter Maya -- tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.,
Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Elisa Marie
Della-Piana, Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights, Laura L. Ho --
lho@gbdhlegal.com -- Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho & Tina
Wolfson -- twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C..

Michael Nokchan, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh,
Setareh Law Group, Andrew Paul Lee -- LEE@GBDHLEGAL.COM --
Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho & Elisa Marie Della-Piana --
edellapiana@lccr.com -- Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights.

Ronald Gillette, Plaintiff, represented by Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot &
Wolfson, P.C., Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho,
Elisa Marie Della-Piana, Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights, Laura
L. Ho, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho, Theodore Walter Maya,
Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C. & William Copley Jhaveri-Weeks, Goldstein,
Borgen, Dardarian & Ho.

Shannon Wise, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Paul Lee,
Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Elisa Marie Della-Piana,
Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights, Laura L. Ho, Goldstein Borgen
Dardarian & Ho, Theodore Walter Maya, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C. &
Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C..

Brandon Farmer, Plaintiff, represented by Theodore Walter Maya,
Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.,
Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Elisa Marie
Della-Piana, Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights & Laura L. Ho,
Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho.

Meghan Christenson, Plaintiff, represented by Theodore Walter
Maya, Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C., Tina Wolfson, Ahdoot & Wolfson,
P.C., Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Elisa
Marie Della-Piana, Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights & Laura L.
Ho, Goldstein Borgen Dardarian & Ho.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael
Spurchise --  aspurchise@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Debra Wong Yang -- dwongyang@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
Crutcher LLP, Dhananjay Saikrishna Manthripragada --
dmanthripragada@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, Emily
Erin O'Connor -- eoconnor@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
John C. Fish, Jr. -- jfish@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC,
Joshua Seth Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
and Crutcher LLP, Kevin Joseph Ring-Dowell --
kringdowell@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Marcellus Antonio McRae -- mmcrae@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Rod M. Fliegel -- rfliegel@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson P.C., Sophia Behnia -- sbehnia@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Theane D. Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law & William J. Simmons -
- wsimmons@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.

Rasier, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael Spurchise,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Debra Wong Yang, Gibson, Dunn Crutcher
LLP, Dhananjay Saikrishna Manthripragada, Gibson Dunn and
Crutcher, Emily Erin O'Connor, Littler Mendelson, P.C., John C.
Fish, Jr., Littler Mendelson, PC, Joshua Seth Lipshutz, Gibson,
Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Kevin Joseph Ring-Dowell, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Marcellus Antonio McRae, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Rod M. Fliegel, Littler Mendelson P.C., Sophia Behnia, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Theane D. Evangelis, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Attorney at Law & William J. Simmons,
Littler Mendelson PC.

Kathy Robinson, Interested Party, Pro Se.

Kathy Robinson, Interested Party, represented by Tina Wolfson,
Ahdoot & Wolfson, P.C.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court OK's $7.5MM Background Check Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
despite earlier misgivings about the amount, a federal judge
granted final approval to a $7.5 million class action settlement
between Uber and drivers who claim they were booted from the app
based on surreptitious background checks.

U.S. District Judge Edward Chen said $7.5 million is just a
fraction of what the drivers could have seen had the case gone to
trial, where Uber stood to lose between $100 million and $1
billion.

"Given these figures, it is clear that $7.5 million is a small
fraction of the total potentially at stake," Judge Chen wrote.

While displeased with the comparably low payout, Judge Chen said
there were a number of factors that made the case risky for the
class, including a recent Ninth Circuit ruling that would have
held about 40 percent of its members to a binding arbitration
clause.

"Thus, immediately, a large portion of the class would be excluded
from this litigation, and would be forced to arbitrate their
claims individually," Judge Chen wrote.  "Given the small amount
of potential recovery per individual, there is a strong likelihood
that few would pursue individual arbitration.  This fact alone
accounts for a significant discount on the potential recovery."

Even more significantly, the judge added, class attorneys had
revealed at a hearing in June that the case was weaker than they'd
thought at the outset.  During discovery, it became clear that
Uber had policy of requiring background checks to be disclosed in
compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Uber showed
that it generally followed that policy.

Former Uber contractors Mohamed and Gillette sued Uber in November
2014, claiming they were suddenly denied access to the Uber system
without reason.  Mohamed claimed Uber told him he could no longer
drive after two years with the company because the company found
new information in his background check, which it never showed
him.

Gillette accused Uber of failing to pay employees promptly upon
termination and misclassifying drivers as independent contractors.

Judge Chen noted the class of current and former drivers would
also have to prove they are employees, not contractors.  Judge
Chen called this an "obviously a difficult factual question,"
given another employment class action currently working its way
through the Ninth Circuit in which drivers claim Uber
misclassifies them as independent contractors.

In the face of these factual and legal stumbling blocks, Judge
Chen said he had no choice but to approve the agreement.

"Given the overall weakness of their case, the court concludes
that the proposed settlement falls within the range of possible
approval," he said.

Attorneys for both sides did not respond for email requests for
comment by press time. [GN]


UNITED AIRLINES: Sued Over Surprise Fees for Cancelled Flights
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ronn Blitzer, writing for Law Newz, reports United Airlines was
hit with a lawsuit on June 30, with passengers accusing them of
charging fees for changing flights, after the airline's website
assured them that there would be no such charge. The complaint,
filed in New Jersey federal court, accuses the airline of breach
of contract, because they allegedly spring the fees on passengers
after they've already canceled their flights.

According to the lawsuit, which seeks class action status, John
Sacchi and Stephen Simoni were using United.com to cancel flights,
and language on the site told them "[n]o change fee will be
required" if they put the value of the canceled flight towards
another United Airlines flight within one year. However, the
complaint alleges, after they "irreversibly cancelled" their
flights and tried to put the value towards a new one, they were
required to pay a $125 fee to book the new flight. If they didn't,
they claim, the value of the original flight would be lost.

The lawsuit cites online comments from "countless consumers" who
complained of similar situations, with one person claiming they
had to pay a fee of $200, and that his attempts to contact United
to rectify the situation were fruitless.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages for the alleged "willful
illegal and deliberate contract breaches."

United Airlines has not responded to LawNewz.com's request for
comment. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Ginsburg Urged to Recuse in Trump Travel Ban Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing Tony Mauro of The National Law Journal, reports
that nearly 60 Republican members of Congress are demanding that
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recuse herself from
the upcoming travel ban case because of the negative public
comments she made about Donald Trump before he was elected
president.

"As an associate justice of the Supreme Court, you are required to
recuse yourself in cases in which your 'impartiality might
reasonably be questioned' and where you have 'a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party,'" the 58 signers asserted in a
letter sent to Ginsburg on June 26, citing excerpts from the
federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. 455.

The letter added, "There is no doubt that your impartiality can be
reasonably questioned; indeed, it would be unreasonable not to
question your impartiality.  Failure to recuse yourself from any
such case would violate the law and undermine the credibility of
the Supreme Court of the United States." Ginsburg has not yet
commented on or responded to the letter.

The call for recusal was triggered by the high court's
announcement on June 26 that it would hear arguments in October in
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, the dispute
over Trump's executive order temporarily barring entry to the
United States for certain foreign nationals.

The House letter references several statements made by Ginsburg in
a series of press interviews last July, including one with The New
York Times: "I can't imagine what the country would be with Donald
Trump as president."  She also called Trump a "faker" in a CNN
interview, and told the Associated Press she "did not want to
think about" the possibility of Trump becoming president, "but if
it should be, then everything is up for grabs."

After a storm of criticism from across the political spectrum
Ginsburg said in a statement that her comments were "ill-advised
and I regret making them.  Judges should avoid commenting on a
candidate for public office."

When asked about the House letter June 27, judicial ethics experts
-- while agreeing that Ginsburg's comments were a mistake --
expressed doubt that Ginsburg will or must recuse.

"The letter from the House members is politically opportunistic,"
said Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of Law professor
James Sample.  "Still, Justice Ginsburg has only herself to blame
for the optics."

One problem with the recusal request is that it was made by
nonparties to the case. Though no rule prevents nonparties from
urging recusal, it may not go over well with the justices, though
Ginsburg alone decides whether or not to recuse.  "The court is
understandably loath to permit the disqualification process to be
hijacked as a tool for interest groups to target disfavored
judges," said Charles Geyh, professor at Indiana University Maurer
School of Law - Bloomington.

However the request was made, Mr. Sample said, recusal is not
required.  "Recusing in every case involving the Trump
administration is institutionally impracticable," he said.  "While
the travel ban is a signature Trump initiative, Justice Ginsburg's
comments about Trump as an individual did not specifically address
the travel ban, which, of course did not yet exist at the time."

Mr. Sample added, "Were a case to come before the court that more
directly involved President Trump as an individual party, the
arguments for Justice Ginsburg's recusal would be stronger than
they are here."

The Ginsburg recusal request resonates, in some respects, with the
2004 controversy over the late Justice Antonin Scalia's refusal to
recuse himself in Cheney v. United States District Court, a case
before the high court involving the transparency of an energy
advisory committee led by then-vice president Dick Cheney.  Mr.
Cheney, like Trump in the current case, was a named party.

The Sierra Club, a party to the case, filed a "motion to recuse"
Scalia because of his relationship with Mr. Cheney, including the
fact that they had recently gone on a duck-hunting vacation
together.  The motion stressed that because Cheney's "own conduct"
in the case was at issue, the Scalia-Cheney friendship required
recusal.

Bus Scalia, in an unusual public memorandum, responded that he
would not recuse, stating that while "friendship is a ground for
recusal of a justice where the personal fortune or the personal
freedom of the friend is at issue, it has traditionally not been a
ground for recusal where official action is at issue, no matter
how important the official action was to the ambitions or the
reputation of the government officer."

If she responds to the House letter, Justice Ginsburg could cite
Scalia's words in refusing to recuse, even though her relationship
with the named party is one of enmity rather than friendship.

The court's public information officer said on June 28, "There has
been no comment from the justice."


UNITED STATES: District Ct. Has Jurisdiction Over Iraqis' Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mark A. Goldsmith of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, held that the Court has
jurisdiction in the case captioned USAMA J. HAMAMA, et al.,
Petitioners, v. REBECCA ADDUCCI, Respondent, Case No. 17-cv-11910
(E.D. Mich.), and ordered that the Court's July 6, 2017 Order
staying the removal orders of all class members remains in effect
in accordance with its terms until July 24, 2017, unless otherwise
ordered by the Court.

On June 11, 2017, agents from United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") began arresting Iraqi nationals as
part of ICE's efforts to execute longstanding orders of removal.
The vast majority of arrests that have taken place so far have
occurred within metropolitan Detroit; this includes approximately
114 Detroit-based Iraqi nationals who have been arrested and
transferred to federal facilities in Michigan, Ohio, Louisiana,
and Arizona, where they await removal to Iraq.  According to
Petitioners, there are more than 1,400 Iraqi nationals across the
country subject to final orders of removal whom the Government
seeks to remove.

Most of the Iraqi nationals facing removal have been subject to
final orders of removal for many years, resulting from criminal
convictions and overstaying visas.  However, the Government was
unable to execute these removal orders due to Iraq's longstanding
policy not to issue the requisite travel documents for
repatriation.  It was not until the United States agreed to remove
Iraq from the list of countries set forth in Executive Order
13780, issued March 6, 2017, that Iraq agreed to issue travel
documents.

The current operative pleading of Petitioners, filed on June 24,
2017, is their amended habeas corpus class petition and class
action complaint for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief.
In their pleading, they state that they are eligible for relief
from removal under both the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") and the Convention Against Torture ("CAT") because of
their status as persecuted religious minorities and their
affiliation with the United States.

The Petitioners also assert that their removal prior to a hearing
on the changed country conditions in Iraq violates their rights
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.  They also allege
that the Government's decision to transfer them to multiple
facilities across the country has interfered with their statutory
right to counsel under the INA and their right to a fair hearing
under the Due Process Clause.  They bring a separate Due Process
claim based on their detention, arguing that they are being
unlawfully detained, because their detention bears no reasonable
relationship to effectuating their removal or protecting against
danger.

The Petitioners filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
and/or stay, to prevent their removal until an appropriate process
has determined whether, in light of current conditions and
circumstances, they are entitled to mandatory protection from
removal.

After the Government opposed the motion on jurisdictional grounds,
which the Court found not susceptible to immediate resolution, the
Court issued a stay of removal, pending resolution of the
jurisdictional issue, which stay was made applicable to the class
as then defined, i.e., all Iraqi nationals subject to removal
orders within the jurisdiction of the Detroit ICE Field Office.
After Petitioners filed their amended habeas corpus class action
petition and class action complaint, along with a motion to expand
the stay, the Court entered an order expanding the stay to a
nationwide class of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of
removal.  The stay was subsequently extended until July 24, 2017.
It is to the jurisdictional issue that the Court now turns.

The Court concluded that to enforce the Congressional mandate that
district courts lack jurisdiction -- despite the compelling
context of this case -- would expose Petitioners to the
substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution
before their legal claims can be tested in a court.  That would
effectively suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which the
Constitution prohibits.

The Court concluded that it has jurisdiction to grant Petitioners
the limited relief they request, i.e., an injunction against
enforcement of the orders of removal so that their habeas rights
can be meaningfully asserted and addressed before other courts.
The next steps in this litigation remain to be determined.  As
will be detailed in a separate order to be issued, the Court will
convene a status conference with counsel on July 13, 2017 at 1:30
p.m. to discuss those steps.  In the interim, the Court's July 6,
2017 Order staying the removal orders of all class members remains
in effect in accordance with its terms until July 24, 2017, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/0xl7KK from Leagle.com.

Usama J. Hamama, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan.

Usama J. Hamama, Petitioner, represented by Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott --
scott@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, Lee Gelernt,
American Civil Liberties Union, Michael J. Steinberg, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif --
inactive@zeekbeek.com -- Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora Youkhana,
Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed, Michigan
Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr, Wendolyn W.
Richards -- richards@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield, Margo
Schlanger & William W. Swor.

Atheer F. Ali, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller,
Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora
Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed,
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr,
Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

Ali Al-Dilami, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller,
Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora
Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed,
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr,
Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

HABIL NISSAN, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller,
Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora
Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed,
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr,
Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

Jihan Asker, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Michael J. Steinberg,
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J.
Aukerman, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Nadine
Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger,
Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed, Michigan Immigrant Rights
Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr, Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller,
Canfield, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

Moayad Jalal Barash, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A. Kitaba,
American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss, American
Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott, Miller,
Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman, American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid, Inc., Nora
Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E. Reed,
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law Progr,
Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

Sami Ismael Al-Issawi, Petitioner, represented by Bonsitu A.
Kitaba, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Kary L. Moss,
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Kimberly L.
Scott, Miller, Canfield, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil
Liberties Union Fund of Michigan, Miriam J. Aukerman, American
Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, Nadine Yousif, Code Legal Aid,
Inc., Nora Youkhana, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Harrington, Susan E.
Reed, Michigan Immigrant Rights Center/ Michigan Poverty Law
Progr, Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield & Margo Schlanger.

Abdulkuder Hashem Al-Shimmary, Petitioner, represented by Kimberly
L. Scott, Miller, Canfield & Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller,
Canfield.

Qassim Hashem Al-Saedy, Petitioner, represented by Kimberly L.
Scott, Miller, Canfield & Wendolyn W. Richards, Miller, Canfield.

Thomas Homan, Defendant, represented by August E. Flentje, U.S.
Department of Justice, Briana Yuh, United States Department of
Justice & William C. Silvis, United States Department of Justice.

John F Kelly, Defendant, represented by August E. Flentje, U.S.
Department of Justice, Briana Yuh, United States Department of
Justice & William C. Silvis, United States Department of Justice.

Rebecca Adducci, Respondent, represented by August E. Flentje,
U.S. Department of Justice, Briana Yuh, United States Department
of Justice, Jennifer L. Newby, U.S. Attorney & William C. Silvis,
United States Department of Justice.

The Chaldean Community Foundation, Amicus, represented by Carl M.
Levin -- clevin@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn
LLP, Gabriel E. Bedoya -- gbedoya@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller
Schwartz & Cohn LLP & Sarah E. Waidelich --
swaidelich@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP.


UNITED STATES: Appeals Decision in "Memmer" Suit to Fed. Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Government filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Memmer v. US, Case No. 1:14-cv-00135-MMS, in the
United States Court of Federal Claims.

The nature of suit is stated as "Taking - Rails to Trails."

The appellate case is captioned as Memmer v. US, Case No. 17-2230,
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 23, 2017, the
U.S. previously filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as Memmer v. US, Case
No. 17-2150.[BN]

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant JEFFREY MEMMER, For Himself and As
Representative of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, is
represented by:

          Steven Wald, Esq.
          STEWART, WALD & MCCULLEY, LLC
          12747 Olive Boulevard
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 720-6190
          Facsimile: (314) 899-2925
          E-mail: wald@swm.legal

Defendant-Appellant UNITED STATES is represented by:

          Erika Kranz, Esq.
          DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 7415
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 307-6105
          Facsimile: (202) 514-8865
          E-mail: erika.kranz@usdoj.gov


URBANI TRUFFLES: Court Enters Pretrial Schedule in "Schiffman"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California entered a pre-trial schedule in the case
captioned JAY SCHIFFMAN and ANTHONY WILLIAMS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
URBANI TRUFFLES USA, INC., Defendant, No. 2:17-cv-00935-TLN-CKD
(E.D. Cal.).

Judge Nunley bifurcated the discovery process.  All discovery in
Phase I will be limited to facts that are relevant to whether this
action should be certified as a class action and will be completed
by Jan. 12, 2018.

All counsel are to designate in writing, file with the Court, and
serve upon all other parties the name, address, and area of
expertise of each expert that they propose to tender at class
certification not later than Feb. 12, 2018.  The designation will
be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the
witness.

Within 20 days after the designation of expert witnesses, any
party may designate a supplemental list of expert witnesses who
will express an opinion on a subject covered by an expert
designated by an adverse party.  The right to designate a
supplemental expert for rebuttal purposes only will apply to a
party who has not previously disclosed an expert witness on the
date set for expert witness disclosure by this Pretrial Scheduling
Order.

Each party will identify whether a disclosed expert is percipient,
retained, or both.  Parties designating percipient experts must
state in the designation who is responsible for arranging the
deposition of such persons.  All experts designated are to be
fully prepared at the time of designation to render an informed
opinion, and give their bases for their opinion, so that they will
be able to give full and complete testimony at any deposition
taken by the opposing party.

The Motion for Class Certification will be filed by April 19,
2018.  Failure to comply with Local Rule 230(c), may be deemed
consent to the motion and the Court may dispose of the motion
summarily.

All other necessary dates and deadlines, including dates for the
Final Pretrial Conference and Trial, along with all deadlines
associated therewith, will be set by a Supplemental Pretrial
Scheduling Order to be issued following the Class Certification
hearing.

The Pretrial Scheduling Order will become final without further
order of the Court unless objections are filed within 14 days of
service of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017, order is available
at https://is.gd/xPL272 from Leagle.com.

Jay Schiffman, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher -
- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, PA.

Anthony Williams, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy
Fisher, Bursor and Fisher, PA.

Urbani Truffles USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by William P.
Donovan, Jr. -- wdonovan@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


VISITING NURSE: "Brown" Sues Over Missed Breaks, Harassment
-----------------------------------------------------------
Shatekqua Brown, on behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Visiting Nurse Service of New York,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-04754, (S.D. N.Y., June 22, 2017),
seeks overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
in a work week, compensatory, punitive and statutory damages,
interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys' fees pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York State Labor Laws.

Defendant hired Brown as a Home Health Aide for their Partners in
Care division. She claims to have worked through bonafide rest
periods and was subjected to lewd sexual advances from a co-worker
and was not addressed by management. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Walker G. Harman, Jr., Esq.
      Edgar M. Rivera, Esq.
      THE HARMAN FIRM, LLP
      220 Fifth Avenue, Suite 900
      New York, NY 10001
      Tel: (212) 425-2600
      Email: wharman@theharmanfirm.com
             erivera@theharmanfirm.com


VOESTALPINE LLC: Responds to Class Action Over Black Dust
---------------------------------------------------------
Kristv.com reports that attorneys for voestalpine Texas LLC have
responded to the class action suit filed by residents near the
plant in Portland.  That answer was provided in a 25 page response
to the plaintiff's first amended class action complaint.
voestalpine's responses being those of denial and inadequate
information.  Attorneys for the company respond to the class
action lawsuit with "Defendants are without sufficient information
to admit or deny the allegations."

Additional responses from voestalpine's attorneys are, "Defendants
have insufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the
allegation . . . certain unidentified employees or consultants
allegedly may have seen or not seen as these allegations are
entirely vague."

"The facts and circumstances of the alleged fly-over have not been
established and the alleged video has not been authenticated."

The allegations stem from a mysterious black dust has been
covering Portland homes for more than two months, it has led to a
federal lawsuit against voestalpine.

The mysterious black dust has been worrying Portland residents
since it started appearing on their homes in mid-May.  Homeowners
believe the dust is coming from the nearby voestalpine plant.

The lawsuit accuses voestalpine of "failure to . . .prevent the
release . . . of potentially harmful toxins" and putting public
health at risk.

At a town hall meeting in May, attorneys gave Portland residents
an update on the litigation process, laid out the claims the
lawsuit is making, and answered questions about how homeowners can
get involved.

Company leaders at that time, did respond to community concerns by
offering cleanup services to homes affected by the dust.

They add the plant's materials are iron based, a natural
substance, and say the dust does not pose any health risks or
environmental hazards.

However, homeowners are still leery, and just want the dust gone.

It is still unclear exactly what the black dust is, where it came
from, and whether it is harmful.  The Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality has collected samples and is conducting an
investigation.  They will release a report once that investigation
is complete. [GN]


WALT DISNEY: Judge Advices Against Class Action Status for Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gabrielle Russon, writing for the Orlando Sentinel, reports that a
federal magistrate judge has recommended denying class-action
status for a lawsuit filed by Disney employees who said they were
forced to train their Indian replacements before they lost their
jobs.

In December, a group of 30 former information technology workers
sued Walt Disney Park and Resorts, saying they were discriminated
against -- a charge which Disney has denied.

There were too many variables for each individual worker -- a
range of seniority levels in Disney's administrative offices,
different jobs and different supervisors or vice presidents -- for
the dispute to reach class-action status, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Thomas Smith wrote in his decision.

His recommendation is not final and will be given to U.S. District
Judge Carlos Mendoza, who is presiding over the case in Orlando.

Part of Disney's defense strategy was to show evidence that it
decided on an individual basis which employees should lose their
jobs, Smith wrote.

"To the extent Plaintiffs had performance issues, those issues
were unique to each Plaintiff. Plaintiffs were terminated for
different reasons," his recommendation said.

A Disney spokeswoman said the company was pleased with Smith's
decision.

"As we have said all along, this lawsuit is baseless and we will
continue to defend it vigorously," she said.

Sara Blackwell, one of the attorneys representing the Disney
employees, called it "disappointing."

"It's a message to the American people the laws are just against
us when it comes to offshoring and outsourcing business models,"
the Sarasota attorney said.

The lawsuit stemmed from October 2014 when about 250 native-born
or naturalized U.S. citizens learned their jobs would be
terminated Jan. 31, 2015, and they were required to train new
employees -- Indian natives who arrived that same month -- as the
company restructured its information-technology for future
innovation.

By February 2015, about 105 of the American employees had new jobs
at the company, the judge wrote.

Last year, U.S. District Judge Gregory Presnell dismissed two
lawsuits filed by former IT workers who said they were victims of
a racketeering scheme to be outsourced by workers through the
federal H-1B Visa program. [GN]


WARBY PARKER: Faces Class Action Over ADA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Malfitano, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a
prospective federal class action lawsuit filed in New York City
claims a retailer of online glasses violated both the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York laws by not providing
proper website access for the visually-impaired.

Lawrence Young, of The Bronx, N.Y., brought the suit on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated versus Warby
Parker Retail, Inc. and JAND, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York on June 28.

According to the suit, Young "is a visually impaired and legally
blind person who requires screen-reading software to read website
content using his computer" and specifies the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" refers to anyone with "a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200", whether they
possess limited vision or no vision.

"Plaintiff Young brings this civil rights action against
defendants Warby Parker Retail Inc. and JAND, Inc. for their
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate their website,
www.warbyparker.com, to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by plaintiff Young and other blind or visually-impaired
people.  Warby Parker denies full and equal access to its website,
thereby denying its products and services offered on its website
and in conjunction with its physical locations, violating
plaintiff's rights under the ADA," the suit states.

Mr. Young uses a screen-reading program known as "Job Access With
Speech" (JAWS) in order to operate a computer, and claims the
Warby Parker website contains multiple barriers which prevent him
from gaining proper access to its use.

Per the lawsuit, these barriers included: A lack of alternative
text (alt-text) or a text equivalent, empty links which contain no
text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL
address and linked images missing alt-text.

Mr. Young's lawsuit states these barriers "have caused a denial of
his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a
regular basis from accessing the website", and "have likewise
deterred him from visiting Warby Parker's physical stores and
enjoying them equal to sighted individuals."

The suit also argues these barriers violate the ADA, New York
State Human Rights Law, New York State Civil Rights Law and New
York City Human Rights Law.

U.S. Census statistics from 2010 cited in the lawsuit claim 8.1
million visually-impaired persons reside in the United States,
with 2 million of them being blind, and according to 2015 data
from the American Foundation for the Blind, there are 400,000
visually-impaired persons living in the State of New York.

"The purpose of this lawsuit is to ensure visually-impaired
individuals are able to enjoy the company's physical retail
locations equal to sighted individuals.  That is presently not the
case," Mr. Young's attorney Douglas Brian Lipsky said.

"As a consequence of the company not installing easily available
and relatively inexpensive software on its website, visually-
impaired individuals are unable to learn about the stores'
locations and hours of operations, what eyeglasses and sunglasses
are available for purchase, any special promotions, in-store
demonstrations, and other information about the eyeglasses and
sunglasses being sold.  The company's failure to install this
software violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and similar
State and City statutes."

Through its Executive Director Tom Stebbins, the Lawsuit Reform
Alliance of New York (LRANY) issued a statement opposing the
litigation:

"Justice may be blind, but the lawyers in this lawsuit have eyes
for only one thing: money.  Congress passed the ADA to provide
disabled Americans with access, not provide personal injury
lawyers with a new revenue stream.  This lawsuit is an affront to
justice, the ADA, and the disabled," Mr. Stebbins said.

According to defense attorneys, plaintiff counsel are increasingly
targeting retailers for alleged violations of the ADA related to
website access for the visually-impaired, especially in the
jurisdictions of California, New York and Pennsylvania.

The trend now has precedent as, recently, a federal court judge in
Florida ruled in favor of a plaintiff who filed more than 70
lawsuits against various companies, charging their websites
violated the ADA.

In a 13-page decision issued last month, Judge Robert Scola of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, ruled
after a two-day bench trial that the website for regional grocery
chain Winn-Dixie "violated the ADA because the inaccessibility of
its website has denied [plaintiff Juan Carlos] Gil the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations that Winn-Dixie offers to its sighted
customers."  As a result, the store chain must update its website.

In the instant case, Young is seeking a permanent injunction that
the Warby Parker website is in violation of the aforementioned
laws; that the company "change its corporate policies, practices,
and procedures so that its website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers"; compensatory
damages in an amount to be determined by proof, including all
applicable statutory damages and fines, to plaintiff and the
proposed class for violations of its civil rights under NYSHRL and
City Law; pre- and post-judgment interest; costs and expenses of
this action together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees,
and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and
proper.

The plaintiff is represented by Lipsky of Bronson Lipsky, plus
Jeffrey M. Gottlieb and Dana L. Gottlieb of Gottlieb & Associates,
all in New York City.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York case
1:17-cv-04892 [GN]


WASHINGTON: Court Wants Joint Status Report in "Banos" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, Seattle, directed parties to
file joint status report in the case captioned ARTURO MARTINEZ
BANOS, et al., Petitioners, v. NATHALIE ASHER, et al.,
Respondents, Case No. C16-1454-JLR-BAT (W.D. Wash.).

This case challenges the Respondents' authority to detain
petitioners and putative class members while their withholding-
only proceedings are pending.  On July 6, 2017, the Ninth Circuit
issued an order resolving some of the legal issues raised by the
Petitioners.  On July 11, 2017, the Judge James L. Robart
dismissed Petitioner Arturo Martinez-Banos from this action and
struck without prejudice the Respondents' motion to dismiss the
remaining Petitioners, Edwin Flores Tejada and German Ventura
Hernandez.  Judge Robart also re-referred the matter to Magistrate
Judge Tsuchida for further proceedings.

Having considered the record in this case, which includes
Petitioners' pending motion for preliminary injunction and amended
motion for class certification, Magistrate Judge Tsuchida ordered
that by Aug. 3, 2017, the parties are directed to meet and confer
and file a joint status report that addresses the following:

     i. whether the Petitioners intend to file a second amended
habeas petition and class action complaint in light of Padilla-
Ramirez and the deadline that the parties propose if so;

     ii. whether the Respondents intend to file an amended motion
to dismiss directed at Mr. Flores and Mr. Ventura and the deadline
that the parties propose if so;

     iii.  whether the Petitioners intend to withdraw their motion
for preliminary injunction and amended motion for class
certification in light of Padilla-Ramirez and Judge Robart's
ruling; and the deadline(s) that the parties propose for filing
amended motions if so; and

     iv. any other deadlines the Court should set at this time.

After reviewing the parties' joint status report, the Court will
issue a scheduling order.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of the Order to the parties
and to Judge Robart.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 12, 2017 opinion and order is
available at https://is.gd/zNcT72 from Leagle.com.

Edwin Flores Tejada, Petitioner, represented by Matt Adams,
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT.

Edwin Flores Tejada, Petitioner, represented by Glenda Melinda
Aldana Madrid, NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT & Leila Kang,
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT.

German Ventura Hernandez, Petitioner, represented by Matt Adams,
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, Glenda Melinda Aldana Madrid,
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT & Leila Kang, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT.

Nathalie Asher, Respondent, represented by Gladys M. Steffens
Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

Thomas D Homan, Respondent, represented by US Attorney Habeas

Thomas D Homan, Respondent, represented by Gladys M. Steffens
Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

John F Kelly, Respondent, represented by Gladys M. Steffens
Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

Lowell Clark, Respondent, represented by Gladys M. Steffens
Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

James McHenry, Respondent, represented by Gladys M. Steffens
Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

Jefferson B. Sessions, Respondent, represented by Gladys M.
Steffens Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses "Demay" FCRA Suit
----------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed with leave to amend the
case captioned JACK A. DEMAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO
HOME MORTGAGE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-04733-HSG (N.D.
Cal.).

On Aug. 17, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed this putative class action
against the Defendant, alleging that it violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA") by impermissibly obtaining their consumer
credit reports.  They allege that Wells Fargo impermissibly pulled
their credit reports because the Plaintiffs' bankruptcy discharge
terminated any relationship with the bank.  On Oct. 17, 2016,
Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and strike the class
allegations.  Rather than oppose the motion, the Plaintiffs
amended the complaint.  Wells Fargo now moves to dismiss the
amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs do not allege that Wells Fargo foreclosed on their
home located at 8985 W. Verde Way, in Las Vegas, Nevada, that they
transferred title, or even that they vacated the property prior to
Wells Fargo obtaining their credit reports.  To the contrary: the
Plaintiffs reserved the right to enroll in the Nevada Foreclosure
Mediation Program, indicating their continued interest in the
property.  Because their mortgage debt is non-dischargeable and
would remain unaffected by mere surrender, Judge Gilliam finds
that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Wells Fargo
accessed their consumer credit reports without a permissible
purpose.

Because he finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead an FCRA
violation, Judge Gilliam need not reach this issue.  Nevertheless,
he notes that the Plaintiffs' complaint contains only conclusory
allegations that Wells Fargo acted either willfully or negligently
and does not contain any allegation of actual damages.

For these reasons, Judge Gilliam granted Wells Fargo's motion to
dismiss with leave to amend.  Despite the deficiencies identified
above, he cannot say at this stage that amending the complaint
would be futile.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs may, consistent with
their Rule 11 obligations, file an amended complaint within 21
days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/FOzyRd from Leagle.com.

Jack A. Demay, Plaintiff, represented by Seyed Abbas Kazerounian,
Kazerouni Law Group, APC.

Jack A. Demay, Plaintiff, represented by Veronica Elizabeth
McKnight, Hyde and Swigart, Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart & Yana Hart --
yana@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde and Swigart.

Nancy Demay, Plaintiff, represented by Seyed Abbas Kazerounian,
Kazerouni Law Group, APC, Veronica Elizabeth McKnight, Hyde and
Swigart, Joshua B. Swigart, Hyde & Swigart & Yana Hart, Hyde and
Swigart.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., Defendant, represented by Mark
Douglas Lonergan -- mdl@severson.com -- Severson & Werson, Rebecca
Snavely Saelao -- rss@severson.com -- Severson & Werson, a P.C. &
Donald Hogan Cram, III -- dhc@severson.com  -- Severson & Werson,
A Professional Corporation.


WELLS FARGO: Meiners Appeals D. Minn. Judgment to Eighth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John Meiners filed an appeal from a court order and
judgment, both dated May 26, 2017, in his lawsuit titled John
Meiners v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 0:16-cv-03981-
DSD, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota -
Minneapolis.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on June 2,
2017, Judge David S. Doty dismissed the case with prejudice.  The
lawsuit alleges (i) breach of the duties of loyalty and prudence
under 29 U.S.C. Section 1104 against the Benefit Committee; (ii)
breach of co-fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. Section 1105 against
the Human Resources Committee, Hardison, and Thornton; and (iii)
knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty under 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3).

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act dispute arises out of
John Meiners' participation in Wells Fargo's 401(k) retirement
plan (Plan).  The Plan is a defined-contribution plan in which
employees may invest a certain percentage of their earnings on a
pre-tax basis.  During the class period, the Plan offered 26 to 27
investment options.  Twelve of the options are Wells Fargo Dow
Jones Target Date Funds, which are proprietary funds managed by a
Wells Fargo subsidiary.

Mr. Meiners, on behalf of a putative class, alleges that these
funds both underperformed comparable Vanguard funds and were more
expensive than comparable Vanguard and Fidelity funds.  He claims
that by continuing to keep these funds in the Plan, Wells Fargo
breached its fiduciary duties.  Further, Wells Fargo, in an effort
to generate fees and seed the underperforming funds, allegedly
breached its fiduciary duties by designating the Wells Fargo funds
as the default for participants who enrolled in the Plan but did
not select an investment option.

The appellate case is captioned as John Meiners v. Wells Fargo &
Company, et al., Case No. 17-2397, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before August 2, 2017;

   -- Appendix is due on August 14, 2017;

   -- BRIEF APPELLANT of John Meiners is due on August 14, 2017;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant;

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 14 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant John Meiners, on behalf of a class of all
persons similarly situated, and on behalf of the Wells Fargo &
Company 401(k) Plan, is represented by:

          Richard M. Elias, Esq.
          Greg Gutzler, Esq.
          Tamara M. Spicer, Esq.
          ELIAS GUTZLER SPICER LLC
          130 S. Bemiston Avenue, Suite 302
          Saint Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 637-6350
          E-mail: relias@egslitigation.com
                  ggutzler@egslitigation.com
                  tspicer@egslitigation.com

               - and -

          Geoffrey A. Graber, Esq.
          Karen L. Handorf, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          West Tower, Suite 500
          1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005-3934
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: ggraber@cohenmilstein.com
                  khandorf@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
          100 Washington Avenue, S., Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-0000
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: rapeterson@locklaw.com
                  rkshelquist@locklaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo & Company, Human Resources
Committee of the Wells Fargo Board of Directors, Wells Fargo
Employee Benefits Review Committee, Hope Hardison, Justin
Thornton, Patricia Callahan, Michael Heid, Timothy Sloan, Lloyd
Dean, John Chen, Susan Engel, Donald James and Stephen Sanger are
represented by:

          Nicholas J. Bullard, Esq.
          Andrew J. Holly, Esq.
          Stephen P. Lucke, Esq.
          Kirsten Schubert, Esq.
          DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
          50 S. Sixth Street, Suite 1500
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498
          Telephone: (612) 340-2600
          Facsimile: (612) 677-3103
          E-mail: bullard.nick@dorsey.com
                  holly.andrew@dorsey.com
                  lucke.steve@dorsey.com
                  schubert.kirsten@dorsey.com

               - and -

          Lindsey H. Chopin, Esq.
          Howard Shapiro, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          650 Poydras Street, Suite 1800
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 310-4085
          Facsimile: (504) 310-2022
          E-mail: lchopin@proskauer.com
                  howshapiro@proskauer.com

               - and -

          Deidre A. Grossman, Esq.
          Russell Laurence Hirschhorn, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          11 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036-2899
          Telephone: (212) 969-3000
          Facsimile: (212) 969-2900
          E-mail: dagrossman@proskauer.com
                  rhirschhorn@proskauer.com


WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN: Bid to Certify Residents' Class Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr., of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied
without prejudice parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Settlement, Conditional Class Certification, Directing
Notice to the Class, and Entry of Scheduling Order in the case
captioned, CRYSTAL GOOD, individually and as parent and next
friend of minor children M.T.S., N.T.K., and A.M.S., and MELISSA
JOHNSON, individually and as parent of her unborn child, MARY LACY
and JOAN GREEN and JAMILA AISHA OLIVER, WENDY RENEE RUIZ and
KIMBERLY OGIER and ROY J. McNEAL and GEORGIA HAMRA and MADDIE
FIELDS and BRENDA BAISDEN, d/b/a FRIENDLY FACES DAYCARE, and
ALADDIN RESTAURANT, INC., and R. G. GUNNOE FARMS LLC, and DUNBAR
PLAZA, INC., d/b/a DUNBAR PLAZA HOTEL, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WEST VIRGINIA-
AMERICAN WATER COMPANY, d/b/a WEST VIRGINIA AMERICAN WATER, and
AMERICAN WATER WORKS SERVICE COMPANY, INC., and AMERICAN WATER
WORKS COMPANY, INC., and EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY and GARY
SOUTHERN and DENNIS P. FARRELL, Defendants, Case No. 14-1374
(S.D.W. Va.).
On January 9, 2014, over 224,000 residents in Charleston, West
Virginia, and the surrounding area suffered an interruption in
their water supply. The interruption was caused by a spill into
the Elk River of a mixture composed primarily of a chemical known
as Crude MCHM.

The action was filed in federal court on January 14, 2014, and
later consolidated with several other cases. See Good v. Am. Water
Works Co., 2:14-CV-01374, 2014 WL 2481821, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. June
3, 2014). Other similar litigation, including putative class
actions against the same defendants, was filed in state court, and
some of it was removed to this court, consolidated, and then
remanded to state court. Desimone Hosp. Servs., LLC v. W. Va.-Am.
Water Co., 2:14-CV-14845, 2015 WL 9244434, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Dec.
17, 2015). Following remand, the state court consolidated the
various cases before the West Virginia Mass Litigation Panel
(MLP).

Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint in this case on December 9, 2014. Plaintiffs' class
action allegations stated that they intended to represent "all
persons and businesses supplied with, using, or exposed to water
contaminated with Crude MCHM and provided by West Virginia-
American Water Company in Logan, Clay, Lincoln, Roane, Jackson,
Boone, Putnam, and Kanawha Counties and the Culloden area of
Cabell County, West Virginia as of January 9, 2014." Plaintiffs
brought suit against West Virginia-American Water Company (WV
American Water), American Water Works Service Company, Inc., and
American Water Works Company, Inc. (collectively, the water
company defendants, although at times referred to simply as WV
American Water), as well as Eastman Chemical Company (Eastman),
Gary Southern, and Dennis P. Farrell

After extensive negotiations, the parties submitted the pending
Settlement Agreement for preliminary approval on April 27, 2017 as
a resolution of all claims -- both claims at issue in this case
and claims at issue in the various state court actions filed
against defendants in relation to the Freedom Industries spill.
The parties' proposed settlement has a two-tier common fund from
which the Settlement Administrator will pay monies to class-member
claimants through a claims submission process. The first tier,
dubbed the guaranteed fund, consists of $101 million supplied
separately by funds from each of Eastman and WV American Water.
The second tier, dubbed the contingent fund, consists of $50
million supplied entirely by WV American Water to pay Individual
Review Claims only if the guaranteed fund is exhausted.

Pending is the parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Settlement, Conditional Class Certification, Directing
Notice to the Class, and Entry of Scheduling Order, filed April
27, 2017. Also pending is plaintiffs' Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Costs and Incentive Awards,
filed May 8, 2017.
In his Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 6, 2017 available
at https://is.gd/6L0mxq from Leagle.com, Judge Copenhaver deferred
entering an order effecting settlement class certification until
the parties meet the conditions for preliminary approval. As to
Settlement Agreement, the Court declined to approve the proposed
Settlement Agreement until the parties submit an agreement and
preliminary approval motion meeting the devised in the Settlement
Agreement that sequesters adequate funds to meet an adverse
determination.

Melissa Johnson, et al. are represented by Van Bunch, Esq. --
vbunch@bffb.com -- BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT

            -- and --

      David R. Barney, Jr., Esq.
      Kevin W. Thompson, Esq.
      THOMPSON BARNEY
      2030 Kanawha Blvd E,
      Charleston, WV 25311
      Tel: (304)343-4401

            -- and --

      Michael G. Stag, Esq.
      Sean Cassidy, Esq.
      Stephen H. Wussow, Esq.
      Stuart H. Smith, Esq.
      SMITH STAG
      One Canal Place, 365 Canal
      St #2850, New Orleans, LA 70130
      Tel: (504)593-9600

Eastman Chemical Company, et al. are represented by Deborah
Greenspan, Esq. -- DGReenspan@BlankRome.com -- Robert Scott,
Esq. -- RScott@BlankRome.com -- and -- Lance D. Leisure, Esq. --
LLeisure@BlankRome.com -- BLANK ROME -- Marc E. Williams, Esq. --
marc.williams@nelsonmullins.com -- Melissa Foster Bird, Esq. --
melissa.fosterbird@nelsonmullins.com -- and -- Robert L. Massie,
Esq. -- bob.massie@nelsonmullins.com -- NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH
West Virginia-American Water Company, et al. are represented by
Albert F. Sebok, Esq. Brian R. Swiger, Esq. L. Jill McIntyre, Esq.
Laurie K. Miller, Esq. Robert O. Passmore, Esq. -- and -- Thomas
J. Hurney, Jr., Esq. -- JACKSON KELLY


WHIRLPOOL CORP: Court Approves Stipulated Order in "Turgeon"
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned NANCY TURGEON, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WHIRLPOOL CORP.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00473-MCE-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Morrison C. England, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California approved the Parties' Joint
Stipulation Regarding New Discovery and Motions Deadlines.

On March 3, 2017, the Court entered an Initial Pretrial Scheduling
Order, which included deadlines related to discovery, disclosure
of expert witnesses, dispositive motions, and trial.

On June 16, 2017, the Parties filed their Joint 26(f) Report and
Joint Objections to Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order, proposing a
bifurcated approach to scheduling that would set deadlines related
to class certification now but postpone the setting of merits-
related deadlines (if necessary) until after the Court's class
certification ruling.

On June 26, 2017, the Court entered a Minute Order ordering the
Parties to file a Joint Stipulation and Order addressing the
proposed new discovery and motion deadlines.  The Parties
conferred several times about scheduling and discovery-related
issues, including during telephone conferences held on May 15, May
17, May 19, and June 14, 2017.

The Parties agreed that the bifurcated approach to scheduling and
the related deadlines outlined in the Parties' Joint Report should
be adopted by the Court because (i) the bifurcated approach, which
the Court used in Kljajic v. Whirlpool, facilitates a more
efficient and targeted approach to discovery by saving post-
certification questions for a time when the Parties have a better
understanding of the case and a better sense of what merits-
related discovery is needed to proceed to trial; and (ii) the
deadlines the Parties propose are intended to enhance efficiency
by dovetailing with the deadlines in Whitley v. Whirlpool Corp., a
factually similar putative class action currently pending in the
Central District of California.

Having reviewed the Parties' Joint Stipulation Regarding New
Discovery and Motions Deadlines, Judge England granted the
request.  He ordered that the Initial Pretrial Scheduling Order be
amended to reflect these class-certification discovery and motions
deadlines:

     a. Event Parties' Proposed Deadline Initial Disclosures: June
30, 2018

     b. Amend Pleadings or Add Parties: Sept. 25, 2017

     c. Class Fact Discovery Cutoff: March 30, 2018

     d. Expert Witness Disclosures Plaintiff's class experts: May
14, 2018

     e. Defendant's class experts: June 28, 2018

     f. Parties' rebuttal experts: July 30, 2018

     g. Class Expert Witness Discovery Cutoff: Aug. 30, 2018

     h. Class Certification and Motions Plaintiff's class motion:
Oct. 1, 2018

     i. Challenging Experts Defendants' opposition and Daubert
challenges: Nov. 9, 2018

     j. Plaintiff's reply and Daubert challenges: Nov. 30, 2018

Judge England further ordered the Parties to meet and confer and
file with the Court proposed merits-related deadlines (if
necessary) not later than 20 days after the Court's class
certification ruling.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2017 order is available
at https://is.gd/gGMjgg from Leagle.com.

Nancy Turgeon, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher -
- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, PA.

Whirlpool Corp., Defendant, represented by Clement Leo Glynn --
cglynn@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn & Finley, LLP, Andrew M. Unthank -
- unthank@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, pro hac
vice & Laura J. McNabb -- mcnabb@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP, pro hac vice.


* 11 Companies Get FTC Letters Over "Made in USA" Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
Law.com, citing C. Ryan Barber of The National Law Journal,
reports that in 2016, as now-President Donald Trump railed against
the outsourcing of U.S. manufacturing jobs, the Federal Trade
Commission went on a tear against "Made in USA" claims that
companies could not justify -- at least in the eyes of the
agency's staff.

Shinola, the Detroit-based watchmaker that counts former President
Barack Obama as a fan, was told to drop its "Where American is
Made" slogan because its materials are sourced overseas.  That
company and 28 others were cited for promoting products as "Made
in USA." without meeting the FTC's standard that such items be
"all or virtually all" made in the United States.  In each of
those cases, the FTC stopped short of bringing the matter to the
commission for an enforcement action, electing to instead issue a
"closing letter" after companies agreed to change their labeling.

A year later, the FTC appears to have throttled down somewhat.
Through the first half of 2017, the agency's staff have sent 11
similar closing letters over supposedly unsupported "Made in USA"
claims.

Among the highest-profile recipients was Target Corp., which put
to bed the FTC concerns about "Made in USA" claims by agreeing to
pull mislabeled pillows from the shelves and to make clear in the
future that the Room Essentials-branded products were manufactured
in China.

"Specifically, Target removed affected items from sales floors,
hard-locked the items at the point-of-sale system so they could no
longer be sold to consumers, and began work to remediate
packaging," FTC lawyer Julia Ensor wrote in the letter to
Jason Walbourn, a Target assistant general counsel for regulatory,
operations and investigations.

Ten other companies this year, so far, have received similar
letters over their labeling of everything from coffee makers to
air purifiers and water filtration systems.

The most recent recipient, Innovative Office Products, was flagged
in April for advertising standing desks as made in the United
States, even though the company "sells a line of products that is
wholly imported," the FTC wrote.  Innovative Office Products,
based in Easton, Pennsylvania, resolved the issue by clarifying
that certain products were "Designed and Assembled in USA" and
notifying third-party resellers of the updates to the marketing
materials.

In another recent case, the FTC targeted a company that
acknowledged its products contained imported materials but, in
parts of its website, made "broad, unqualified 'Made in USA' or
'Manufactured in the USA' claims," Ensor wrote in March.  That
company, Suntactics Inc., based in San Jose, California, makes
solar charger products that include imported solar cells.
And Ratio LLC, a coffeemaker based in Portland, Oregon, was forced
to back off its "Made in USA" claims after the FTC staff noted
that certain products, although assembled in the United States,
"incorporate significant imported content."  The company agreed to
update its social media accounts and posts and provide wholesale
customers with corrected marketing materials.

The other seven companies that received letters were: Cardinal
Scale Manufacturing Co.; Versa Products; APEC Water Systems;
Wilson Electronics; New Sensor Corp.; Axis LED Group, a maker of
LED tubes that operates under the name Patriot Tube; and RGF
Environmental Group Inc., a manufacturer of air purifiers.

Companies rarely fight the FTC to preserve their disputed "Made in
USA" claims.  In October, Chemence Inc. -- the Ohio-based
manufacturer of KwikFix, Hammer-Tite and Flash Glue -- agreed to
pay $220,000 to resolve allegations of deceptive advertising that
the FTC brought to court.  The company's competitors -- including
Toagosei America Inc., the maker of the Krazy Glue brand -- had
previously received closing letters after agreeing to clarify that
its products included some imported materials.


* 2016 Marks Record Year for Securities Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------
JD Supra reports that the year 2016 was the biggest yet for U.S.
securities class action settlements. On June 14, 2017, Securities
Class Action Services, a division of Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc., released its updated list of the top 100
securities class action settlements of all time. The revised list
featured 13 settlements in 2016 totaling over $5.6 billion. This,
according to the report, was enough to make 2016 the biggest year
ever in terms of total approved settlement funds.

Of the 13 settlements added in 2016, two landed in the top 11 on
the all-time list. Both involved total amounts of over $1 billion.
Household International, Inc. ranked number seven at
$1,575,000,000, while Merck & Co., Inc. was number 11 at
$1,060,000,000. The highest-ever settlement amount remains
$7,242,000,000, which was reached in connection with the Enron
Corp. securities litigation around 2010. There is a four-way tie
for number 100 at $150,000,000.

All but one of the 13 settlements to make the list in 2016 were
filed in federal court. The lone exception was an Alabama case. Of
the remaining 12 federal cases, six were filed in the 2nd
Circuit -- all of them in the Southern District of New York. This
continues the overrepresentation of 2nd Circuit cases on the
all-time settlement list. Of the top 100 settlements, over 41
percent came out of the 2nd Circuit (with all but two of those
from the Southern District of New York). That proportion is
significantly higher than the national average. According to
Cornerstone Research, the 2nd Circuit accounts for less than 26
percent of all federal securities class action filings. In
comparison, the 9th Circuit--which on average accounts for the
same percentage of all securities class action filings--makes up
less than 12 percent of the top 100 settlement list.

Section 10b-5 claims remained the most consistently asserted in
the 2016 settlements. Also, 2016 continued the trend of shifting
away from mega settlements in cases filed in the midst of the
financial credit crisis. Four such cases were added to the top 100
in the first half of 2015, with only two in the second half. That
figure dropped to one in 2016, with no such cases added in the
second half of the year.

In addition to its record showing on the top 100 list, 2016 saw an
increase in total settlements, settlement dollars, and median
settlement value compared to the previous year. While this trend
may not continue year-to-year, the results of 2016 appear likely
to be broken in the near future. Years 2013, 2015, and 2016 each
saw additions of at least ten new settlements added to the top 100
(though at least one of the 2015 settlements was knocked out by
the 2016 additions). With securities class action filings on the
rise since 2012--including a record number of new filings last
year--we can continue to expect significant additions to the top
100 settlements in the coming years. [GN]


* CFPB to Ban Most Types of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
---------------------------------------------------------
Findlaw.com, citing Ken Sweet of The Associated Press, reports
that consumers could band together to sue their banks or credit
card companies under a federal rule issued on July 10 that's
likely to face resistance from Congressional Republicans and the
White House.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau decided to ban most types
of mandatory arbitration clauses, which require credit card or
bank customers to use a mediator when they have a dispute -- often
giving up their right to sue in court.

Mandatory arbitration clauses are found in the fine print of tens
of millions of financial products, from credit cards to checking
accounts. Because consumers generally don't carefully read the
fine print on the agreements for their checking accounts and
credit cards, they are often unaware they are subject to
arbitration.

Those clauses are not symbolic.  They are used heavily by banks.
Even Wells Fargo banned customers from filing class-action
lawsuits against it during the height of its sales practices
problems, until pressure from politicians and outside groups led
the bank to waive that right earlier this year.

Consumer advocates have been pushing for years for stricter
federal regulation of these types of clauses.  The clauses, said
Richard Cordray, director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, are a way for banks and other financial companies to
"sidestep the legal system."

"The rule will help to combat the culture of companies profiting
from charging illegal fees and committing other crimes against
their customers," said Rohit Chopra, senior fellow at the Consumer
Federation of America, an umbrella group for dozens of consumer
advocacy organizations.

Banks have strongly opposed banning arbitration causes, arguing
that arbitration is a more efficient way of handling small
disputes and that class-action lawsuits largely benefit the
lawyers handling the cases.  But there's also a bottom line
impact: banks could be exposed to billions of dollars in lawsuits
from customers.  In a hypothetical example, a consumer wanting to
dispute a $35 overdraft charge is not likely to hire a lawyer to
sue his or her bank.  However, a group of consumers who were all
individually impacted by the $35 charge are more likely to dispute
it collectively.

"We are not happy, but it's not surprising," said Richard Hunt,
president of the Consumer Bankers Association, the trade and
lobbying group that represents large retail banks like Bank of
America, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase and others.

Other industry groups echoed Hunt's comments, calling the new
rules overreaching and called for Congress to step in.

The CFPB has long had its eye on arbitration clauses in financial
contracts.  The agency put forth a rough draft of its ban last
year, and issued a study in 2015 looking at arbitration clauses in
the industry.  The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which created the CFPB,
mandated that the agency look at arbitration clauses and, if
warranted, issue regulations to restrain them.

The CFPB's rules are not a total ban on arbitration clauses.
Financial companies will still be able to force individuals to
settle disputes through arbitration, but those kinds of cases are
far less common than class-action cases.  The ban also won't apply
to any existing contracts.  So if a customer has a credit card
with American Express, for example, that arbitration clause
remains in effect.  However if the person were to open a new
credit card account with American Express after this rule went
into effect, it would apply.

But the move by the CFPB -- a high-profile independent agency
created under President Obama -- is likely to face pushback from
the banking industry and the Republican-controlled Congress, which
sees the CFPB as an agency with too much power and too little
oversight.

Congressional Republicans have been using a '90s-era law known as
the Congressional Review Act to roll back regulations issued in
the final months of Obama's administration.  The law allows
Congress, with a simple majority vote that does not require the
60-vote filibuster threshold in the Senate, to override an
agency's recently issued rules within 60 legislative days of it
being finalized.

"The rule should be thoroughly rejected by Congress," said
Republican Congressman Jeb Hensarling of Texas, the CFPB's biggest
foe in Congress and chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee.  The White House declined to comment on the CFPB's
announcement.

Mr. Cordray had acknowledged that the rule is likely to face
scrutiny from Congress.  However, Congress has passed laws that
ban arbitration clauses outright in other forms of financial
products, notably mortgages and loans to servicemen and women.

"I am, of course, aware of those parties who have indicated they
will seek to have the Congress nullify this new rule,"
Mr. Cordray said in prepared remarks.  "My obligation as the
director of the Consumer Bureau is to act for the protection of
consumers and in the public interest.  In deciding to issue this
rule, that is what I believe I have done."

Republicans have also challenged the structure of the CFPB,
believing Mr. Cordray has too much power to act on his own.  A
measure that passed the House of Representatives earlier this
year, which is being debated in the Senate, would change the CFPB
into a multi-member commission and would greatly restrain its
ability to regulate financial products.

If Republicans move forward with repealing the rule, Democrats
would likely use the populist issue as a cudgel heading into the
2018 elections.


* Dept. of Labor Wants 5th Circuit to Uphold Fiduciary Rule
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mike Scarcella, writing for The National Law Journal, reports that
the U.S. Labor Department late on July 3 urged a federal appeals
court to largely uphold Obama-era regulations that confronted and
sought to curtail conflicts of interest in the retirement-
investment market.

The government's brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the first filing from Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta
that addressed the so-called "fiduciary rule," comes as federal
officials move simultaneously to revise provisions of the
regulations and perhaps further delay implementation past the Jan.
1, 2018 effective date.

Obama administration officials hailed the fiduciary rule, which
was six years in the making, as "a historic step to protect the
savings of America's workers."  The regulations broadened the
scope of "fiduciary" responsibilities, putting a new emphasis on
the best interest of retirement-advice clients over profits.
President Donald Trump in February urged labor regulators to
reassess the rule.

"The Presidential Memorandum, and DOL's ongoing reexamination of
the fiduciary rule, may result in a new assessment of the rule's
costs and benefits upon review of the updated record," U.S.
Justice Department lawyers wrote in their brief on July 3 on
behalf of federal labor regulators.

Still, the government's lawyers said the challengers -- including
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce -- "have failed to identify any
reason why the fiduciary rule, including its associated
exemptions, should be vacated in full."  The government defended
what it described as its "detailed discussion of the inadequacies
in the existing regulatory landscape."

The government's brief said one provision in the fiduciary rule
that restricts class-action waivers should be vacated.  Financial
advisers who wanted to qualify for a "best interest contract
exemption" -- essentially allowing certain compensation schemes to
continue, with greater disclosures to the client -- would have
been blocked from prohibiting class actions. T he government
called the condition "a discriminatory obstacle to arbitration
that cannot be harmonized" with the Federal Arbitration Act.
"Severance of the condition would not impair the function of the
exemption or of the fiduciary rule in general," Justice Department
lawyers wrote. "Thus, invalidation of this condition does not
mandate invalidation of the remainder of the [best interest
contract exemption], let alone the entire fiduciary rule."

Meanwhile, Acosta Seeks Comment on Revisions

Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta said in May that regulators were
unable to stop the fiduciary rule from partially taking effect in
June.  "We have carefully considered the record in this case, and
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, and have
found no principled legal basis to change the June 9 date while we
seek public input," Mr. Acosta wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-
ed.  "Respect for the rule of law leads us to the conclusion that
this date cannot be postponed."

Labor Department regulators began the formal administrative
process of taking a new look at the retirement-savings rules.  The
U.S Securities and Exchange Commission said last month it would
start taking comment on its own fiduciary rule.

The Employee Benefits Security Administration, a division of the
Labor Department, published a "request for information" that seeks
public input on the scope of the rule, and asks for comment on
extending the Jan. 1 applicability date for some provisions. The
comment window is open for 30 days.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, balking at the 30-day window, asked
the agency to extend the period to 60 days.  "The current rule has
now been in effect for only 20 days, and its full consequences --
intended and unintended -- are not immediately apparent," two
Chamber officials wrote in a letter to the Labor Department on
June 30.  "The requested comment period extension will allow the
concerned public necessary time to observe the impacts of the rule
more fully."

Business and industry groups last year lost several court
challenges to the rule. Judges in Texas and in Washington refused
to stop the implementation of the retirement-saving rule, and the
challengers didn't fare any better in U.S. appeals courts.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has scheduled a
July 31 argument date to hear the challenge there.

A team from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, led by partner Eugene Scalia,
represents the U.S. Chamber in the appeals court.  Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr represents the American Council of Life
Insurers and Sidley Austin represents Indexed Annuity Leadership
Council.  Other groups that challenged the rule include the
Financial Services Roundtable, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association and the Financial Services Institute.

The challengers have called the fiduciary rule "one of the most
aggressive and hotly debated regulations ever promulgated by the
Department of Labor."

The D.C. Circuit, where another dispute is pending, has not set an
argument date.  The National Association for Fixed Annuities,
represented by a team from Bryan Cave, filed the suit in
Washington's federal trial court.  Briefing in the appeals court
is set to conclude on Sept. 29.

U.S. District Judge Randolph Moss in Washington, presiding in the
National Association for Fixed Annuities case, in November refused
to freeze his earlier decision that upheld the merits of the
regulations.

"The new rules were adopted to protect retirement investors from
conflicted advice and potential losses to their retirement
savings," Judge Moss wrote then.  "Enjoining the rule would delay
this protection.  It would also interfere with the implementation
of three regulations that were lawfully adopted after nearly six
years of study, public comment, and consideration."[GN]


* EEOOC Targets Hiring Discrimination Practices as Lawsuits Mount
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erin Mulvaney, writing for Law.com, reports that management
tactics that weed out older workers have pushed federal regulators
and anti-discrimination groups to train an eye on hiring rather
than firing when it comes to protecting against age bias, an
effort advocates acknowledge is a steeper hill with increasingly
narrowed protections for aging workers.

This shift in focus on barriers to hiring for older workers -- an
issue exacerbated by the aging baby boomer population and the
financial crisis -- is apparent in recent court battles and was
sparked by employer practices that include favoring young workers
in online applications and excluding workers with too many years
experience.

"Hiring discrimination has always been a problem," said Laurie
McCann, senior attorney at the AARP Foundation Litigation.  "We
can see a problem and then attack it, but most people don't know
why they weren't hired. You don't have that comparison.  Lately,
we've been coming across these blatant policies and practices
where it's obvious that older workers are screened out of an
employer's hiring."

This effort was dealt a blow when the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to take up a case, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  The appeals court
said the Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies to people
who already have jobs, not those seeking them.  The ruling could
narrow the reach of the 50-year-old federal age discrimination law
and made it tougher for workers to prove that they were victims of
bias in the hiring process.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has said age
discrimination applies to both employees and applicants.

One of the EEOC's strategic priorities is hiring-discrimination in
the age context, said Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, senior adviser to
the chair of the commission.  She said online applications,
recruiting tools targeting only recent college graduate and
maximum years of experience have led to many problematic business
practices.

She said the Supreme Court will likely wait for more of the cases
to play out before taking up the dispute.  Employers cannot put up
"arbitrary barriers" to job applicants, she said.

"It's a straightforward legal issue and the courts are split on
it," she said.  "It's inevitable the Supreme Court will eventually
take it."

Lawsuits mount against hiring practices
In in the recent case, Richard Villarreal, then 49 years old,
applied for a job at R.J. Reynolds, which his attorneys claimed
used a hiring practice -- in reviewing applications -- that tossed
out 20,000 older applicants.

Mr. Villarreal sued in 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia after a whistleblower came forward
about the company's hiring guidelines and handed the documents
over to the employee-side firm Altshuler Berzon in San Francisco.
The Atlanta firm Rogers & Hardin was among the firms on the
complaint with Altshuler Berzon.

The tobacco company, represented by a team from Jones Day, did not
address the discrimination claims, but instead the right of the
applicant to sue. Jones Day partner Eric Dreiband, who's being
considered to run the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Division,
argued in the Eleventh Circuit for R.J. Reynolds.

McCann said she was disappointed the Supreme Court decided not to
take the case but said the Eleventh Circuit ruling is not binding
in other circuits. The AARP, she said, will continue to fight what
she described as "intractable hiring discrimination that
contributes to older workers' historical and persistent
overrepresentation among the long-term unemployed."

The AARP is working on similar cases that raise age-based hiring
claims. The case Rabin v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California challenges
the accounting company's practice of recruiting college students
online using a tool that can only be accessed by applicants with a
college affiliation.

The group also is representing a worker in Kleber v. CareFusion
Corporation before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.  In that case, 59-year-old Dale Kleber applied for a in-
house counsel job that specified no more than seven years of
experience at the Fortune 500 company.

CareFusion's lawyers said the post was an "entry-level position
that would have less complex job duties" and be under the
supervision of a higher-level attorney.  "Although Kleber had more
than 25 years of legal experience at the time, he chose to apply
for the position," Tobias Schlueter --
tobias.schlueter@ogletree.com -- of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart wrote in CareFusion's brief on June 21.

Ms. McCann said the AARP would like to see the EEOC step into more
cases.  Last year, 20,800 age-discrimination complaints were filed
with the agency.

The EEOC recently held the first in a series of meetings directly
targeting questions about age discrimination in the workplace,
training a new focus on the issue.  Experts testified about how
the workforce is growing and how practices have been in place,
exacerbated by online applications, that hurt older workers.

Observers say the number of discrimination claims is expected to
rise, with 10,000 baby boomers turning 65 every day, according to
a 2010 Pew Research Center report.  As of 2015, about 33 million
Americans over age 55 were in the workforce, and that demographic
is expected to make up a quarter of the entire U.S. labor force by
2019.

A 2009 Supreme Court case Gross v. FBL Financial Services said
plaintiffs must demonstrate that a person's age is the motivating
factor in being fired or demoted under the federal age
discrimination law, a steeper standard than other discrimination
cases.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been an uptick in age-
discrimination claims, said David Yeremian, a Los Angeles
employment lawyer at Yeremian Law.  He said the economic downturn
hit just as a large generation was close to the end of their
traditional careers.

"When we are talking nationally, or under federal law, generally,
you can say age discrimination cases are a little tougher than
non-ADEA discrimination cases," said Mr. Yeremian.  "It's just
more difficult to win an age discrimination case.  That definitely
sets it apart."



                         *********


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