/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/170411.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

             Tuesday, April 11, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 72


ADVOCARE INTERNATIONAL: Tex. App. Upholds Sanction in "Kamel"
ALLCO FINANCE: Court May Rein In Cuts Taken by Litigation Funders
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Illegally Collects Debt, "Fekete" Suit Claims
ALPHA RECOVERY: Sued Over Unlawful Debt Collection Practices
ARRIS INTERNATIONAL: Faces "Reyna" Class Suit in N.D California

ARTHUR J. PARENT: Court Grants Writ of Supersedeas in "Quiles"
BISCOMERICA CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss "Backus" Granted
C B MERCHANT: Sued Over Unlawful Debt Collection Practices
C-TWO GROUP: Class Settlement in "Mendez" Has Prelim. Approval
CHEMICAL & MINING: Court Trims Claims in "Villella" Suit

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Must Produce Docs in False Advertising Suit
CITATION OIL: Removed "McNeillas" Class Suit to E.D. Oklahoma
COLE CAPITAL: Faces "Badger" Suit Over ADA Violation
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Receipt Suit Tossed as Patron's Harm Quashed
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Judge Narrows Claims in "Shabotinsky" Suit

DITECH FINANCIAL: New York Court Dismisses "Cohen" Suit
DUNKIN' DONUTS: Settles Suit Over Butter Substitute on Products
FOREST RIVER: Removed "Rangel" Class Suit to C.D. California
GARDA CL: Ex-Workers' Suit Remanded for Calculation of Damages
GIUMARRA VINEYARDS: Class Settlement in "Munoz" Has Prelim OK

IC SYSTEM: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gadomski" Action Claims
JACKSON COUNTY, FL: New Settlement Agreement Awaits Court Approval
JPMORGAN CHASE: New York Court Dismisses "Nypl" Suit
KIMBERLY-CLARK: Former Manager Says Gowns Failed Quality Tests
LELAND STANFORD: "Lagos" Settlement Denied Preliminary Approval

LG ELECTRONICS: Court Trims Claims in "Hudock" Suit
SEARS PROTECTION: Judge Narrows Claims in "Greene" Suit
MIDLAND FUNDING: Waived Right to Arbitrate Claims, Md. App. Says
MINNESOTA: Lawyers Want High Court to Take Sex Offenders Case
NORTHLAND GROUP: Illegally Collects Debt, "Ceban" Suit Claims

PATELCO CREDIT: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gadomski" Suit Claims
PAYPAL INC: Judge Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
RICHARD FEARON: Judge Grants Bid to Dismiss "Graham" Suit
SHREVEPORT, LA: Responds to Suit Concerning Water Billing
SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Class Action Case Unfolds in High Court

SPONGETECH DELIVERY: Defendant Lawyer Wins Bid to Dismiss "Orlan"
ST. LOUIS, MO: Faces Suit Over Homeless Alternative Housing
TEMPOE LLC: "Garcia" Class Suit Removed to District New Jersey
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Wins Arbitration Bid in Dispute with Drivers
UDREN LAW: Pre-Certification Rule 68 Offer Survives in Pa. Suit

UNITED STATES: ICE Faces Suit Over Illegal Detention
UNITED STATES: 1st Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Suit vs. OPM
USA MAINTENANCE: Faces "Hilario" Suit Over Failure to Pay OT
VOLKSWAGEN: Diesel Owners Dissatisfied With Proposed Settlement
VOLKSWAGEN: Faces Class Suit Over Software Upgrades

VCG HOLDING: Exotic Dancers' Claims Sent to Arbitration
WELLS FARGO: Accused of Wrongful Conduct Over Debt Collection
WELLS FARGO: Leveraging Arbitration Clause to Win Settlement

* GDPR Will Result in Significant Increase in Litigation, PWC Says
* State Senator Pushes "Right to Know" Bill


ADVOCARE INTERNATIONAL: Tex. App. Upholds Sanction in "Kamel"
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas, affirmed
the judgment of the trial court in the case styled SHEREEF KAMEL,
ADVOCARE INTERNATIONAL, L.P., Appellee, No. 05-16-00433-CV (Tex.

AdvoCare International, L.P., sells nutrition and other health-
related products exclusively through independent distributors.
Shereef Kamel became a distributor with AdvoCare in March 2013. In
late 2013, AdvoCare blocked Kamel's purchase of 800 boxes of
gingerbread bars due to what it contended was suspicious activity.
Kamel said he was going to give the bars to school teachers.
Unhappy with Kamel's explanation, AdvoCare suspended Kamel's
account. In December 2013, Kamel accused a distributor in his
upline, Aly Gwin, of sending him a text message that made
disparaging remarks about his race and national origin.

Over a year later, in June 2015, AdvoCare suspended the
distributorship agreements of 55 distributors, including a man
named Michael Moussa, due to concerns that the distributors had
violated AdvoCare's policies and procedures. AdvoCare filed a
petition for presuit discovery pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 202, in which it sought to depose Moussa and to require
him to produce certain documents in advance of his deposition in
anticipation of a lawsuit regarding Moussa's likely breach of his
contract with AdvoCare.

Shortly after AdvoCare filed the Rule 202 petition, Kamel and
Moussa filed a document titled Counter-Plaintiffs' Original Class
Action Petition in the same cause number as the petition for
presuit discovery. In the class action petition, Kamel and Moussa
purported to represent all persons or entities who are Texas
citizens and from January 31, 2014, to the present had their
distributorships suspended or terminated by AdvoCare for alleged
excessive purchases. They asserted claims for breach of contract,
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, common law fraud, and
conspiracy to commit unlawful acts. The class action petition
alleged that AdvoCare breached its contract in connection with
Kamel's purchase of the gingerbread bars, promoted racism against
distributors with an Egyptian heritage and supported by inaction
the racist text message allegedly sent to Kamel by Gwin. The
petition implied that AdvoCare had no basis to terminate these
distributorships and did so based on racial discrimination.
Masterson, the lawyer of Kamel and Moussa did not testify about
anything he specifically reviewed before filing the counter-

AdvoCare moved for sanctions against appellants contending the
allegations were verifiably groundless, the racist text message
was fabricated and Kamel and Moussa knew or should have known it
was fabricated at the time they filed their lawsuit.

The trial court granted AdvoCare's motion for sanctions and
ordered Masterson to pay AdvoCare $3,500 in attorney's fees. The
trial court signed an order finding a violation of Rule 13.  In an
amended order, the court found violations of both Rule 13 and
Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. The court
found that appellants' conduct wasted the resources of the court
and AdvoCare. Masterson paid the sanction before the deadline
stated in the order. Appellants appealed the sanctions order and
the same was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On remand, the
trial court granted the parties' respective nonsuits, rendering
the sanctions order final. Appeal followed and appellants argue
that the sanctions order is defective and the evidence is
insufficient to support the award.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions order and held that a
trial court does not abuse its discretion if its decision is
supported by some evidence.  According to the Court of Appeals,
based on the evidence attached to the motion, response, and
adduced at the hearing, the court could have concluded that the
allegations of racism against AdvoCare did not have evidentiary
support and were not likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery.
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Masterson failed to make a reasonable inquiry into
the allegations before signing the petition, the Court of Appeals
held.  Also, appellees' attorneys presented evidence of $5,000 in
attorney's fees incurred as a result of appellants' sanctionable
conduct.  The trial court assessed $3,500 in sanctions.
Appellants do not analyze the award in light of the Low factors or
explain why, based on the Low factors, the evidence is
insufficient to support the award, the Court of Appeals said.

A copy of the Court of Appeals' memorandum opinion dated March 28,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/nxcO9J from Leagle.com.

W.D. Masterson -- at Kilgore & Kilgore, PLLC, for Shereef Kamel,
et al., Appellant

Jeffrey W. Hellberg, Jr. -- jeff.hellberg@wickphillips.com -- J.
Sean Lemoine -- sean.lemoine@wickphillips.com -- Bryan James Wick
-- bryan.wick@wickphillips.com -- Ethan Minshull --
ethan.minshull@wickphillips.com -- at Wick Phillips, for Advocare
International, L.P., Appellee

The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, panel consists of
Justices Elizabeth Lang-Miers, David Bridges and David Schenck.

ALLCO FINANCE: Court May Rein In Cuts Taken by Litigation Funders
Katie Walsh at Financial Review reports the Federal Court has
hinted it may rein in cuts taken by litigation funders in
multimillion-dollar class action battles despite approving a $40
million settlement from Allco Finance Group and KPMG for
shareholders burnt by the collapsed financial services company.

On March 31, Federal Court judge Jonathan Beach approved the
settlement in a case lawyers said gave the first insight into the
role courts will play in the evolving area of litigation funding.
"Litigation funders will be under ever more scrutiny to justify to
the court why the return they seek is both proportionate and
reasonable given the role they have played in enhancing access to
justice," said Herbert Smith Freehills partner Ruth Overington.
The court accepted it was reasonable for the funders to get a 30
per cent cut of net settlement proceeds in the Allco matter, but
Ms Overington said it was quick to point out that it might not be
the going rate more generally.

"Had the settlement sum been higher, the proportion the funder
would have received would have diminished -- that is, a sliding
scale would have been applied to ensure the return remained
proportionate to the sum invested and the risk undertaken."

Maurice Blackburn, led by class actions head Andrew
Watson, represented the shareholders in the case, securing the
settlement on November 13 just one day before the scheduled five
to six-week trial was to proceed. IMF Bentham funded the case.
In his 184 paragraph decision approving the settlement, Justice
Beach said it was "questionable" to assume a judge could not
"modify the rate set or its payment as part of approving the
settlement", as "seems" to have been assumed by judges in the

"I consider that as part of any approval order... I have power in
effect to modify any contractual bargain dealing with the funding
commission payable out of any settlement proceeds," he said.
"It may not be a power to expressly vary a funding agreement as
such . . . . If I make an order that out of monies paid by a
respondent, a lesser percentage than that set out in a funding
agreement is to be paid to a funder, that is an exercise of
statutory power which overrides the otherwise contractual
entitlement. That is not an unusual scenario in many and varying

"It might also be said that the funding agreement itself contains
an implied term reflecting this override in any event; the parties
would be contracting in the known setting that the funder's
percentage commission entitlement would only operate on a
settlement sum if the necessary condition of court approval had
first been given."

Lawyers don't share risks

On the topic of legal costs, Justice Beach seemed less prepared to
interfere. He noted that although legal costs should not be
"disproportionate to the nature of the context, the litigation
involved and the expected benefit", it was not as simple as
assessing how high they are in "absolute dollar terms" or as a
percentage of the total recovery.

"[I]t is difficult to see why the lawyer's fees should be
artificially taxed down by the actual outcome; the actual outcome
is a risk borne by the applicant and group members (and the
litigation funder), but not the independent lawyer who is not
sharing in the returns of the enterprise."

In Allco, an extraordinarily high number of members registered
late in the matter, after the case had been running for at least a
year. Justice Beach noted that one option to avoid the problem of
a large number of members notifying their interest late was to
"use the share register of a corporate respondent from the outset
of the proceedings for all notifications to group members".

Ms Overington said it was an "unusual step" for the court to
respond to concerns around amounts received by funders that
arose following a landmark judgment involving QBE last year which
gave the green light to common funds, allowing anyone affected in
a lawsuit to be included in a payout and requiring them to hand a
commission to funders. [GN]

ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Illegally Collects Debt, "Fekete" Suit Claims
Hershel Fekete, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated consumers v. Alltran Financial, LP f/k/a United Recovery
Systems, L.P., Case No. 1:17-cv-01799 (E.D.N.Y., March 30, 2017),
seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt.

Alltran Financial, LP offers collection services for credit card,
retail, commercial, and deficiency loan industries. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Adam Jon Fishbein
      735 Central Avenue
      Woodmere, NY 11598
      Telephone: (516) 668-6945
      E-mail: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com

ALPHA RECOVERY: Sued Over Unlawful Debt Collection Practices
Sean Knowles, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Alpha Recovery Corporation, Case No. 1:17-cv-01822
(E.D.N.Y., March 31, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair
and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Alpha Recovery Corporation operates a debt collection firm
headquartered at 5660 Greenwood Plaza Blvd, Greenwood Village, CO
80111. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
      Alan J. Sasson, Esq.
      2687 Coney Island Avenue, 2nd Floor
      Brooklyn, NY 11235
      Telephone: (718) 339-0856
      Facsimile: (347) 244-7178
      E-mail: jmizrahi@sassonlaw.com

ARRIS INTERNATIONAL: Faces "Reyna" Class Suit in N.D California
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against ARRIS
International plc.

The case is captioned Carlos Reyna, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. ARRIS International plc, Case No.
5:17-cv-01834 (N.D. Cal., April 3, 2017).

ARRIS International plc is a telecommunications equipment
manufacturing company that provides cable operators with high-
speed data, video and telephony systems for homes and businesses.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Noah M. Schubert, Esq.
      3 Embarcadero Ctr Ste 1650
      San Francisco, CA 94111
      Telephone: (415) 788-4220
      Facsimile: (415) 788-0161
      E-mail: nschubert@sjk.law

ARTHUR J. PARENT: Court Grants Writ of Supersedeas in "Quiles"
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
Three, granted the defendant/appellant's request for a writ of
supersedeas in the case captioned AMANDA QUILES, Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. ARTHUR J. PARENT, JR., Defendant and Appellant, No.
G054353 (Cal. Ct. App.).

Amanda Quiles and other plaintiffs initially filed a case in 2010
as a wage and hour class action against Arthur Parent and other
defendants. The complaint featured causes of action under the
Labor Code and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Quiles
dismissed her individual wage and hour claims to allow her
subsequently added wrongful termination claim to proceed to trial.
Quiles pursued her wrongful termination cause of action under the
FLSA 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3).

A jury returned a special verdict in favor of Quiles. The jury
found that Quiles' lawsuit was a substantial motivating reason for
her discharge, defendants' including Parent's conduct was a
substantial factor in causing harm to Quiles, and defendants
failed to prove that they would have made the same decision based
upon a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason. The jury found Quiles
suffered economic damages for loss of past earnings equivalent to
$3,000, a non-economic loss, including emotional distress to the
amount of $27,500 and a punitive damages amounting to $350,000.
The trial court awarded an additional sum of $3,000 for liquidated
damages. Blank lines were included in the initial judgment for
reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation. In sum, when
judgment was entered on April 19, 2016, the total damages award
stood at $383,500.

Defendants including Parent moved for a new trial. The court
conditionally granted the new trial motion, subject to Quiles
consenting to a reduction of the punitive damage award to
$175,000. Quiles accepted the proposed reduction, bringing the
total damage award down to $208,500. After the entry of the
initial April 2016 judgment, Quiles sought attorney fees and costs
in accordance with California procedure. On May 5, 2016, Quiles
filed a memorandum of costs. On June 20, 2016, Quiles filed a
motion for attorney fees. Defendants filed a motion to tax costs
and an opposition to the motion for attorney fees.

The court conducted a hearing and on September 27, 2016, the court
awarded $689,310.04 in attorney fees to Quiles. In a separate
September 30 order, the court awarded $50,591.69 in costs to
Quiles. An amended judgment was entered on October 18, 2016, which
reflected the updated damage award total of $208,500, the attorney
fee award $689,310.04, and the cost award $50,591.69.

Quiles took steps to enforce the judgment against Parent. The
clerk of court issued a writ of execution on November 4, 2016. On
December 2, 2016, Parent filed a notice of appeal. Parent had
previously sent a $50,000 check to Quiles, with an explanation
that he intended to appeal solely the attorney fee and cost awards
not the underlying judgment. The clerk of court issued a writ of
execution on November 4, 2016. On December 8, 2016, Quiles filed a
motion seeking appointment of a receiver and a charging order. On
December 15, 2016, Quiles served subpoenas to take judgment debtor

Parent made additional payments of $158,500 on Jan. 10, 2017 and
$13,916.17 on Jan. 17, 2017, fully satisfying the damages
component of the judgment and interest thereon. Parent received a
notice of levy on his bank account on February 2, 2017.

On February 14, 2017, Parent filed a petition for writ of
supersedeas and request for a temporary stay. According to the
petition, Parent intends to argue on appeal that the court abused
its discretion by: (1) awarding generally excessive costs and
attorney fees; (2) awarding costs and fees that pertained solely
to the wage and hour case (not the wrongful termination cause of
action); and (3) awarding costs prohibited by section 1033.5.
Quiles filed an opposition to the petition and stay request on
February 15, 2017. The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth
District, Division Three issued a temporary stay of enforcement
proceedings and invited additional briefing, which the parties
have provided.

The Court of Appeals of California issued a writ of supersedeas
staying enforcement of the remaining amount owed on the judgment,
which consists of attorney fees and costs awarded to Quiles and
against Parent. The temporary stay imposed by the court on
February 16, 2017, shall remain in place pending finality of this

According to the Court of Appeals, the stay of enforcement
proceedings will not apply to any orders deemed necessary by the
trial court to recall or quash writs of execution and levies
previously issued.  Nor will the stay of enforcement proceedings
apply to any motion brought or relief provided under section
917.9. The court does not intend to express any view as to the
merits of any potential motion under section 917.9.

A copy of the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/YpqCVM from Leagle.com.

Stephen A. Madoni -- stevemadoni@aol.com -- at Law Office of
Stephen A. Madoni, for Defendant and Appellant
Bryan Schwartz -- bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com -- at Bryan Schwartz
Law; Daniel H. Reiss -- dhr@lnbyb.com -- at Levene, Neale, Bender,
Yoo & Brill, for Plaintiff and Respondent

BISCOMERICA CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss "Backus" Granted
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the case captioned TROY BACKUS, Plaintiff, v. BISCOMERICA
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-03916-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Troy Backus brought a purported nationwide class action against
Biscomerica Corporation for manufacturing, distributing, and
selling packaged cookies that contain partially hydrogenated oil
(PHO), an artificial form of trans fat. Plaintiff alleges that
trans fat is a toxic carcinogen and PHO is consequently an
illegal, dangerous additive.

Backus faults Biscomerica for continuing to use PHO in its
cookies, even after the FDA's Final Determination in June 2015. He
alleges that because of these negative health effects he
consequently suffered physical injury when he repeatedly consumed
Biscomerica's cookies. Relying on the FDA's findings, Backus
brought several causes of action under state law, including
violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, nuisance and an
implied warranty of merchantability. Backus has brought similar
actions in the district against other manufacturers of products
that contain PHO. Several district courts have dismissed such

Biscomerica filed a motion to dismiss the class action complaint.

Judge Gilliam finds plaintiff's interpretation of California's
Sherman Law as requiring an immediate ban on PHO would conflict
with the FDA and Congress's decision not to deem foods containing
PHO unsafe or adulterated until June 18, 2018. On the nuisance
claim, Judge Gilliam finds that plaintiff has failed to explain
how his injury differs from that of any other member of the
public. Plaintiff suggests that it is enough that he alleged
physical and emotional harm and lost money from consuming products
that contain PHO. Plaintiff cannot artificially limit the public's
injury in order to evade the law's special injury requirement. On
plaintiff's breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim,
Judge Gilliam held that plaintiff does not provide any authority
to support a claim where the consumer is simply too busy to read
the ingredients.

The motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff
may file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of the
order if he is able to allege claims against defendant that are
not preempted by the June 2018 compliance date. Plaintiff's entire
theory as to each cause of action currently pled is deficient as a
matter of law, so plaintiff must either plead a different and
sufficient basis for these claims if he can do so consistent with
his obligations under Rule 11 or confirm that he does not wish to
amend and request dismissal with prejudice.

A copy of Judge Gilliam's order dated March 27, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/njOv2J from Leagle.com.

Troy Backus, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Christopher Hamilton
-- andrew@westonfirm.com -- David Elliot -- Gregory Weston --
greg@westonfirm.com -- at The Weston Firm

Biscomerica Corporation, Defendant, represented by Brendan William
Brandt -- brendan.brandt@varnerbrandt.com -- Angelica Acosta
Samaniego -- angelica.samaniego@varnerbrandt.com -- at

C B MERCHANT: Sued Over Unlawful Debt Collection Practices
Kellie Gadomski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. C B Merchant Services d/b/a Credit Bureau of
San Joaquin County, Case No. 2:17-cv-00676-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal.,
March 30, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

C B Merchant Services operates an accounts receivable management
company located in San Joaquin County, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      E-mail: ml@kazlg.com

C-TWO GROUP: Class Settlement in "Mendez" Has Prelim. Approval
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted plaintiff's unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement in the
case styled JAMIE MADRIGAL MENDEZ, Plaintiff, v. C-TWO GROUP,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-05914-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Jamie Mendez filed a suit against defendants C-Two
Group, Inc. and C&L Associates, Inc. for violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227, et seq., by
allegedly sending marketing text messages to plaintiff and the
putative class using an automatic telephone dialing system or

Plaintiff alleged that defendants sent her unsolicited and
nonconsensual text messages that sought her patronage at a
nightclub in San Francisco called Infusion Lounge for over two
years. Plaintiff argues that such conduct violated Section 227 of
the TCPA, which proscribes, in relevant part, using an ATDS to
contact someone in the United States on their telephone without
prior express consent. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.

On March 13, 2015, plaintiff moved for class certification and on
June 2, 2015, the court certified the following litigation class
pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3): All individuals who entered their
contact information online through Infusion Lounge's website and
were sent a text message from SMS Short Code 99158 that referenced
the Infusion Lounge from November 5, 2009 through October 15,

The parties have reached a settlement regarding plaintiff's claim
and on August 26, 2016, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of class action settlement.

The parties have represented that an estimated total of 4,879
persons fall within the class definition, not including
individuals who may submit a valid request for exclusion. The
proposed settlement agreement held that:

     "Each class member will be directly issued a settlement
certificate valued at $10 that can be redeemed for one-time free
entry into the Infusion Lounge on any Wednesday, Thursday, Friday,
or Saturday on which the Infusion Lounge is open to the public.
The certificates will be freely transferrable, may not be redeemed
for cash, may not be used for anything other than entry into the
club, are not gift cards, may only be used once, may be declared
void if a valid code is not included on the certificate, and shall
expire 365 days after issuance. Codes will be directly
disseminated to class members following final approval class
members will not need to submit a claim form."

Class Certification, Representative, and Counsel: The court
previously certified the class identified and granted plaintiff's
request for appointment as class representative and plaintiff's
attorneys as class counsel.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The agreement authorizes class counsel
to apply to the court for an award of costs incurred in litigating
the case not to exceed $6,500. Class counsel shall not seek an
award of attorneys' fees. Defendants agree not to oppose a request
for costs less than or equal to $6,500.

Settlement Administration Costs: Defendants will pay the
settlement administrator for all costs associated with the
settlement, including providing notice, maintaining the settlement
website and arranging for the issuance of the settlement
certificates. The parties estimate that the cost of administering
the settlement will be $7,000.

Incentive Award: The agreement authorizes the named plaintiff to
seek a $500 incentive award for her participation in the lawsuit,
which defendants do not oppose.

Unclaimed Settlement Funds: The agreement provides that unclaimed
settlement certificates shall expire 365 days after issuance.

Class Notice: A third-party settlement administrator will
establish a settlement website within 21 days and send class
notice via direct email within 30 days of the Court's entry of an
order granting the motion for preliminary approval.

Opt-Out Procedure: Any putative class member who does not wish to
participate in the settlement may either opt out via the
settlement website, or mail back an opt-out form that will be
included in the class notice.

Release: Class members who do not opt out of the class will
release any and all actual, potential, filed, known or unknown,
fixed or contingent, claimed or unclaimed, suspected or
unsuspected, claims, demands, liabilities, rights, causes of
action, contracts or agreements, extracontractual claims, damages,
punitive, exemplary or multiplied damages, expenses, costs,
attorneys' fees and/or obligations (including unknown claims,
whether in law or in equity, accrued or unaccrued, direct,
individual or representative, of every nature and description
whatsoever, whether based on the TCPA or other federal, state,
local, statutory or common law or any other law, rule or
regulation, including the law of any jurisdiction outside the
United States, against the released parties, or any of them,
arising out of the facts, transactions, events, matters,
occurrences, acts, disclosures, statements, representations,
omissions or failures to act regarding the alleged receipt of text
messages sent by or on behalf of C-TWO and C&L during the class
period, including all claims that were brought or could have been
brought in the action, belonging to any and all releasing parties.

Plaintiff proposes using Phoenix Class Action Administration
Solutions to administer the settlement.

Judge Gilliam granted plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval
as he finds the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. The court finds that Phoenix is qualified to perform the
tasks associated with administering the notice outlined in the
settlement agreement and therefore approves Phoenix as the
administrator. Phoenix will implement the notice program, process
any requests for exclusion, objections, comments, and other
correspondence from class members, provide weekly reports to the
parties' respective counsel, and distribute settlement

The parties are directed to implement the proposed class notice
plan. The Court also sets the following schedule:

   -- Deadline to File CAFA Notice 10 days after order

   -- Deadline to Establish Settlement Website 21 days after order

   -- Deadline to Send Email Notice to Class 30 days after order

   -- Deadline to File Attorneys' Fees and Costs Motion (with 60
days after order a standard briefing schedule, if necessary)

   -- Deadline to File Motion for Final Approval 60 days after

   -- Deadline for Class Members to File Objection/Opt Out 45 days
after notice

   -- Deadline for Class Members to File Notice of Intent to 45
days after Notice Appear at Final Fairness Hearing

   -- Deadline for the Parties to File Responses to Any 80 days
after order

   -- Objections Deadline for Claims Administrator to File List of
Timely 80 days after Order Requests for Exclusion Final Fairness
Hearing June 29, 2017 at 2:00 p.m.

A copy of Judge Gilliam's order dated March 27, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/VmrmJ4 from Leagle.com.

Jamie Madrigal Mendez, Plaintiff, represented by Richard David
Lambert -- rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- Elaine W. Yan -- Gene J.
Stonebarger -- gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com -- at Stonebarger
Law, APC; Prescott Wayne Littlefield -- pwl@kearneylittlefield.com
-- Thomas Andrew Kearney -- tak@kearneylittlefield.com -- at
Kearney Littlefield LLP

C-Two Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alex F. Pevzner --
Laurie Elizabeth Sherwood -- lsherwood@wfbm.com -- at WFBM, LLP

C & L Associates Inc, Defendant, represented by Gregory Sterling
Nerland -- gnerland@gmail.com -- at Akawie & LaPietra

CHEMICAL & MINING: Court Trims Claims in "Villella" Suit
Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted in part and denied in part the
defendants' motion to dismiss the case captioned MEGAN VILLELLA,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
No. 15 Civ. 2106 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.).

Chemical and Mining Company of Chile Inc., a/k/a Sociedad Quimica
y Minera de Chile S.A. (SQM), is a producer and worldwide
distributor of specialty fertilizers and industrial chemicals,
based in Chile. SQM's Series B American Depository Shares have
been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1993, under the
ticker symbol SQM.

On March 19, 2015 and April 14, 2015, two separate class actions
were filed, the Villella action and the Molinaro action,
respectively, seeking damages for violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.
Villella's counsel published notice over Globe Newswire on March
19, 2015, announcing that a securities class action had been filed
against SQM and the individual defendants, and advising SQM
shareholders that they had until May 18, 2015 to file a motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff.

On May 18, 2015, six motions were filed seeking consolidation of
the Villella and Molinaro actions, with each movant seeking
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of the movant's
selected counsel as lead counsel. On October 14, 2015, the court
issued an opinion and order consolidating the two actions,
appointing Tyne and Wear as lead plaintiff, and approving Tyne and
Wear's selected counsel, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, as lead

The class action is brought on behalf of all persons who purchased
SQM's shares traded on the NYSE between June 30, 2010 and June 18,
2015. Lead plaintiff, the council of the Borough of South
Tyneside, acting in its capacity as the Administering Authority of
the Tyne and Wear Pension Fund, is located in South Shields, Tyne
and Wear, England.  Plaintiff alleges that it purchased a total of
376,521 shares and suffered damages in excess of $4.4 million
during the class period as a result of defendant's securities
violations. Plaintiff further claims that SQM's negotiation with
Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion de Chile (Corfo) was put
at risk at least in part by SQM's inadequate corporate governance.

Plaintiff filed a consolidated complaint on February 9, 2016, and
alleges that SQM's disclosures were materially false and/or
misleading, because they failed to disclose that money from SQM
was illegally channeled to bribe Chilean politicians and political
parties, that SQM had filed fictitious tax receipts in order to
conceal these bribe payments, that SQM lacked adequate internal
controls over its financial reporting, and that, as a result,
SQM's financial statements were materially false and misleading
and not prepared in accordance with applicable accounting

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on March 30, 2016, seeking
dismissal on two alternative grounds. First, Defendant argues that
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the consolidated
complaint should be dismissed because the claims can be addressed
more adequately in Chile. Alternatively, defendant claims that the
consolidated complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim under the securities laws.

Judge Ramos denied defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum non conveniens since the court finds that plaintiff's choice
of forum is entitled to some deference, and the private and public
factors do not tilt heavily in favor of defendant.

Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
denied in part and granted in part. Specifically, defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims that SQM made material
misstatements in its SEC filings regarding its (1) compliance with
applicable law, (2) effectiveness of internal controls, and (3)
financial reporting and accounting is denied. Defendant's motion
to dismiss plaintiff's claims that SQM made material
misrepresentations with respect to its statements regarding its
code of ethics and its lease negotiations with Corfo is granted.
The parties are directed to appear for an initial pre-trial
conference on, April 13, 2017 at 10:00 AM.

A copy of Judge Ramos's opinion and order dated March 28, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/B8vcBG from Leagle.com.

Megan Villella, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Patrick Vincent Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP; Jason Allen Zweig --
jasonz@hbsslaw.com -- at Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP

Lynn Molinaro, Plaintiff, represented by Aelish M. Baig --
aelishb@rgrdlaw.com -- Brian E. Cochran -- bcochran@rgrdlaw.com --
David Avi Rosenfeld -- DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- David C. Walton -
- davew@rgrdlaw.com -- Matthew Melamed -- mmelamed@rgrdlaw.com --
Samuel Howard Rudman -- SRudman@rgrdlaw.com -- at Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP; Frank James Johnson --
FrankJ@JohnsonandWeaver.com -- at Johnson & Weaver, LLP

Anton Mandelstam, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- at The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Sam Villella and Leroy Robinson Movants, represented by Jeremy
Alan Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP

Marty Sholtis, Movant, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP

Richard Gielata, Movant, Pro Se

The Council of the Borough of South Tyneside Acting in Its
Capacity as the Administering Authority of the Tyne and Wear
Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Aelish M. Baig --
aelishb@rgrdlaw.com -- Matthew Melamed -- mmelamed@rgrdlaw.com --
David Avi Rosenfeld -- DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- John H. George --
jgeorge@rgrdlaw.com -- Sabrina Elsa Tirabassi --
stirabassi@rgrdlaw.com -- at Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP

Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System, Movant, represented
by Gerald H. Silk -- jerry@blbglaw.com -- at Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP

Chemical & Mining Co. of Chile Inc., Defendant, represented by
Grant Richard Mainland -- at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen; Scott
Alexander Edelman -- sedelman@milbank.com -- at Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy LLP

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Must Produce Docs in False Advertising Suit
Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California ruled on the parties' joint
discovery letters in the case MARTIN SCHNEIDER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., Defendant, Case No.
16-cv-02200-HSG (KAW) (N.D. Cal.)

Plaintiffs Martin Schneider, Sarah Deigert, Laurie Reese, Theresa
Gamage, Tiffanie Zangwill, and Nadia Parikka filed a putative
class action against defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant violated California, Maryland,
Florida, and New York consumer protection laws when it began
advertising that its foods were free of genetically modified

On April 27, 2015, defendant began its advertising campaign, G-M-
Over It. In this campaign, defendant represented that it was
becoming the first fast food chain in the United States to have a
genetically modified organisms or GMO free menu that uses only
non-GMO ingredients.

Plaintiffs allege that this campaign is misleading because
defendant serves protein products such as beef, chicken, and pork
from poultry and livestock that have been raised on GMO feed,
defendant serves dairy products such as cheese and sour cream
derived from cows raised on GMO feed and defendant sells beverages
such as coca-cola and sprite that are loaded with corn-syrup
derived from GMO corn. Plaintiffs seek to represent four classes,
made up of "All persons residing in California, Maryland, Florida,
and New York, during the period April 27, 2015 to the present, who
purchased and/or paid for Chipotle Food Products.

The parties have now submitted two joint discovery letters.

On plaintiffs' side, request for production no. 1 relates to
plaintiffs request for production regarding all documents produced
by Chipotle in the lawsuit entitled Reilly v. Chipotle Mexican
Grill, Inc., No. 15-23425-Civ-COOKE/TORRES (S.D. Fla.).

Request for production no. 17 relates to all documents concerning
Chiptole's investigation or attempt to investigate the accuracy
and/or truthfulness of Chiptole's Non-GMO claims, including but
not limited to any testing, inspections, audits, and/or meetings
with any third-party entity.

Request for production no. 18 relates all documents supporting
Chiptole's statement that Chiptole's food products are made with
only non-GMO ingredients including, but not limited to, testing,
reports, recipes, and academic or scientific studies.

The parties' second joint letter concerns plaintiff's response to
defendant's requests for production, specifically plaintiffs'
general objection 15. Plaintiff objects to the extent the requests
do not specify a time period on the grounds that those requests
are overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, beyond the proper
scope of discovery, and seeks documents that are neither relevant
to the subject matter of the action nor likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Unless otherwise specified, the
relevant time period is April 1, 2015 through the present.

Magistrate Judge Westmore granted plaintiffs' request no.1 for
documents produced in the Reilly action, but defendant is not
required to produce transcripts of defendant's deponents from the
Reilly case because such transcripts are not encompassed by the
Request. The request seeks documents produced by defendant,
whereas transcripts that were created during the litigation based
on the production of witnesses by defendant fall outside of
Request No. 1.

Plaintiffs' requests no. 17 and 18 for documents related to
defendant's investigation or attempts to investigate the accuracy
and/or truthfulness of its non-GMO claims, as well as documents
that support its statement that all of its ingredients are non-
GMO, is granted. Finally, as to defendant's requests for
documents, plaintiff is required to produce documents for the time
period of January 1, 2012 to the present, with the understanding
that plaintiff will supplement their production if defendant
learns of relevant documents outside of the time period during
plaintiffs' deposition. In the event of such supplemental
production, defendant may re-open plaintiffs' deposition to
address the supplemental production only.

A copy of Magistrate Westmore's order dated March 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/0ZcO5i from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Donald R. Hall -- dhall@kaplanfox.com -
- Frederic S. Fox -- ffox@kaplanfox.com -- Linda M. Fong --
lfong@kaplanfox.com -- Mario Man-Lung Choi -- MChoi@kaplanfox.com
-- Matthew B. George -- mgeorge@kaplanfox.com -- Laurence D. King
-- lking@kaplanfox.com -- at Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles C.
Cavanagh -- ccavanagh@messner.com -- Allison Dodd --
adodd@messner.com -- Jacqueline Raquel Guesno --
jguesno@messner.com -- Kristina M. Wright -- kwright@messner.com -
- at Messner Reeves; Sascha Von Mende Henry --
shenry@sheppardmullin.com -- at Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton

CITATION OIL: Removed "McNeillas" Class Suit to E.D. Oklahoma
The class action lawsuit captioned Ruth Ann McNeillas trustee of
the Vickrey Family, on behalf of herself in her representative
capacity and all others similarly situated v. Citation Oil & Gas
Corp., Case No. 17-CJ-44 filed on February 1, 2017, was removed
from Carter County District Court on March 31, 2017, to the U.S.
District Court Eastern District of Oklahoma (Muskogee). The
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 6:17-cv-00121-JHP to the

Citation Oil & Gas Corp. operates an oil and gas acquisition,
development, and production company, located in Houston, Texas.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Reagan E. Bradford
      12 E California Ave, Ste 200
      Oklahoma City, OK 73104
      Telephone: (405) 820-4401
      E-mail: reagan.bradford@lanierlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

      John J. Griffin, Jr.
      L. Mark Walker, Esq.
      324 N Robinson Ave, Ste 100
      Oklahoma City, OK 73102-8273
      Telephone: (405) 235-7700
      Facsimile: (405) 272-5225
      E-mail: john.griffin@crowedunlevy.com

COLE CAPITAL: Faces "Badger" Suit Over ADA Violation
Josie Badger, Emily Gellatly, and Angela Hunter, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Cole Capital
Corporationcole Credit Property Trust V, Inc., and Cole Credit
Property Trust IV, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-00402-MRH (W.D. Pen.,
April 3, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for violation of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Defendants own and operate a real estate company in
Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin J. Sweet, Esq.
      1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
      Pittsburgh, PA 15222
      Telephone: (412) 322-9243
      Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
      E-mail bsweet@carlsonlynch.com

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Receipt Suit Tossed as Patron's Harm Quashed
Kat Greene at Law360 reports that Costco Wholesale Corp. beat a
proposed consumer class action alleging the company printed too
many digits of a customer's credit card number on a receipt when
an Illinois federal judge ruled on March 30 the customer hadn't
shown she was harmed by the alleged action.

Emiguela Paci had accused Costco of violating the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act by including 10 digits from her
American Express card on a reprinted receipt it gave her, but U.S.
District Judge John Robert Blakey found that, because she was the
only one who ever saw the receipt and wasn't harmed by the act,
she didn't have standing to bring her case against the retailer,
according to March 30's ruling.

Costco had argued it wasn't enough for a consumer to prove a
company technically violated FACTA. The customer must also
demonstrate the FACTA violation hurt them in some way, such as
having their identity stolen or suffering emotional or financial
harm, court records show.

Judge Blakey on March 30 agreed, saying there's no question Paci
had failed to establish standing merely by holding on to the
allegedly violating receipt in a special storage place away from
her other records.

"It is enough to note that, on these specific facts, merely having
to put a receipt in a file cabinet rather than a box does not
constitute actual harm for standing purposes; nor does having to
save a receipt that would ordinarily have been thrown out," Judge
Blakey wrote.

Paci in her January 2016 complaint alleged that, just two days
before filing the lawsuit, she made a purchase at Costco, but
forgot to make one additional purchase. She went back, made a
second purchase, then went to leave, but realized she had lost a
receipt, which Costco requires customers to show before they exit.

The consumer was supposedly directed to a supervisor who printed a
replacement receipt that contained too many card digits,
triggering the litigation. Under FACTA, stores are permitted to
print the last five digits of a customer's card to prevent
identity theft. Paci said the replacement receipt she received
included the last four digits of her card as well as the first

Costco had argued in a November bid to rid itself of the consumer
suit that the offending numbers printed on Paci's receipt merely
identify her card as an American Express card. The first six
numbers on all such cards are identical, the retailer said.

Paci had also sought summary judgment in November, saying the
evidence in the case showed Costco knew it wasn't supposed to
print so many digits on a receipt, but that it had anyway, court
records show. The evidence showed a clear violation of FACTA, she
had argued.

But Judge Blakey found that alleged violation too technical to
keep Paci in court without her showing actual harm, according to
the decision.

Paci is represented by Curtis Warner -- cwarner@warnerlawllc.com -
- of the Warner Law Firm LLC.

Costco is represented by David McDowell -- dmcdowell@mofo.com --
and Purvi Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- of Morrison & Foerster LLP
and John Ellis of Ellis Legal PC.

The suit is Paci v. Costco Wholesale Corp., case number 1:16-cv-
00094, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. [GN]

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Judge Narrows Claims in "Shabotinsky" Suit
Judge Elaine E. Bucklo of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied
in part defendant's motion to dismiss the case styled DAVID
SHABOTINSKY, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
members of both proposed classes of passengers, Plaintiffs, v.
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AG, a foreign corporation, Defendant, Case No.
16 C 4865 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff David Shabotinsky alleges that in May 2014, he held
tickets for an August 24, 2014 Deutsche Lufthansa AG flight from
Chicago to Tel Aviv, Israel. The first leg of the flight was from
Chicago to Frankfurt, Germany and the second leg was from
Frankfurt to Tel Aviv. But on or about August 23, 2014,
Shabotinsky was notified that the flight from Frankfurt to Tel
Aviv had been cancelled and that he had been re-booked on another
flight from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv. The new flight's departure time
was four hours later than the original flight's. Shabotinsky
claims that he was estranged at Frankfurt International Airport
while waiting for his connecting flight and incurred out-of-pocket
expenses for food, refreshments, medications, and
telecommunication services. He further alleges that he arrived in
Tel Aviv almost five hours later than he had been scheduled to
arrive on the original flight, and that as a result, he missed the
event for which he had taken the trip.

Shabotinsky initially filed a ninety-two-page complaint alleging
claims against Lufthansa under the Montreal Convention as well as
Regulation No. 261/2004 of the European Parliament and European
Council. He also asserted claims for breach of contract.

Lufthansa moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition,
Lufthansa has separately moved to impose sanctions on plaintiff's
counsel pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Shabotinsky was given leave to file an amended complaint, which
ultimately dropped all claims save those arising under the
Montreal Convention. The amended complaint asserts three such
claims, each based on Article 19 of the Convention. Count I of the
amended complaint is based on damages Shabotinsky and other
alleged class members suffered as a result of the flight's delay.
Counts II and III appear to be based on Lufthansa's failure to
meaningfully consider Shabotinsky's and other class members' pre-
suit notices of claim and settlement offers.

Judge Bucklo granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion
to dismiss.

Lufthansa argues that the amended complaint alleges economic
damages of only $150 and asks that Shabotinsky's damages be capped
at that amount. In point of fact, however, Shabotinsky offers
several different damage amounts. In some places, he claims that
he and putative class members suffered out-of-pocket, per diem and
general damages in the sum of $150. In other places, he asserts
that he and other class members were needlessly subjected to
compensable damages in the set amount of 4694 SDR or $6467.94 per
class member or alternatively in the sum of in the sum of $300 or
in the sum to be ascertained and proven at appropriate stages of
the litigation.

Judge Bucklo held that capping Shabotinsky's damages at $150 would
be inappropriate.

Judge Bucklo denied Lufthansa's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint as to count I, but grant the motion as to counts II and
III. Judge Bucklo dismissed Shabotinsky's class claims relating to
class 2 and direct Shabotinsky to file a motion for the
certification of class 1 within ninety days of the date of the
memorandum opinion and order, supported by facts obtained in
discovery. Lufthansa's motion for fees and costs is denied.

A copy of Judge Bucklo's order dated March 27, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/gyoW9O from Leagle.com.

David Shabotinsky, Plaintiff, represented by Vladimir M.
Gorokhovsky -- at Law Offices of Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Deutsche Lufthansa, A.G., Defendant, represented by Anthony U.
Battista -- abattista@condonlaw.com -- at Condon & Forsyth LLP;
Brent R. Austin -- baustin@eimerstahl.com -- Jacob Michael Hamann
-- jhamann@eimerstahl.com -- at Eimer Stahl LLP

DITECH FINANCIAL: New York Court Dismisses "Cohen" Suit
Judge Leonard D. Wexler of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted defendants' motions to dismiss the
case styled AARON COHEN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, and
ROSICKI, ROSICKI & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendants, No. 15-CV-6828

Aaron Cohen incurred a debt in the form of a mortgage loan. The
mortgage was assigned on more than one occasion, the last
assignment occurring on June 10, 2013 to Green Tree Servicing LLC
On March 11, 2015 Green Tree commenced a foreclosure proceeding in
state court upon Cohen's default on his mortgage payments in 2009.
After the foreclosure action was filed, Green Tree changed its
name to Ditech Financial LLC.

After the foreclosure complaint was filed, plaintiff received a
request for judicial intervention and a certificate of merit
pursuant to CPLR 3012-b, which is dated March 11, 2015 and bears
the same caption of the foreclosure complaint and certifies that
plaintiff Green Tea is the creditor entitled to enforce rights.
The request for judicial intervention designates Green Tea as the
plaintiff, but there is no language identifying it as the

Cohen commenced an action on behalf of himself and as a putative
class action, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq., by defendants
Ditech and Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. Specifically, he
seeks statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for violations
to Section 1692e and Section  1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA. The basis
of plaintiff's complaint is that the creditor to whom the debt was
owed at the time of the filing of the foreclosure complaint was
Fannie Mae, not Green Tree. Plaintiff claims that defendants
violated Section 1692e in that they falsely stated that Green Tree
Loan Servicing LLC was the creditor to whom the Plaintiff's debt
was owed when, in fact, Green Tree Servicing, LLC was not the
creditor to whom the plaintiff's debt was owed. In addition, after
making an initial communication, neither Rosicki nor Green Tree
advised plaintiff of the correct name of the creditor to whom the
debt is owed.

Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Leonard D. Wexler granted defendants' motions to dismiss.
Judge Wexler held that Green Tree elected to commence an action to
foreclose on the mortgage and the communications at issue were
made in the context of enforcing its security interest. As such,
there was no attempt to enforce a debt actionable under the FDCPA.

A copy of Judge Wexler's memorandum and opinion dated March 24,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/NsFtKH from Leagle.com.

Aaron Cohen, Plaintiff, represented by:

Shimshon Wexler, Esq.
The Law Offices of Shimshon Wexler, PC
2710 Broadway, 2nd Floor
New York, NY 10025
Tel: 212-760-2400
Fax: 21917-512-6132

     - and -

Gus Michael Farinella, Esq.
Ryan L. Gentile, Esq.
Law Offices of Gus Michael Farinella P.C.
110 Jericho Turnpike
Queens, NY 11001
Tel: 516-326-2333

Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, PC, Defendant, represented by:

Andrew C. Morganstern, Esq.
Rosicki & Associates, P.C.
51 East Bethpage Road
Plainview, NY 11803
Tel: 516-741-2585
Fax: 516-622-9434

     - and -

Carol A. Lastorino, Esq.
Rivkin Radler, LLP
926 RXR Plaza
Uniondale, NY 11553
Tel: 516-357-3000

Ditech Financial LLC, Defendant, represented by Adam Patrick
Hartley -- hartleya@ballardspahr.com -- Alexander Peter Kommatas -
- kommatasa@ballardspahr.com -- Justin Angelo -- at Ballard Spahr

DUNKIN' DONUTS: Settles Suit Over Butter Substitute on Products
Katie Reilly at Fortune reports a Massachusetts man has reached a
settlement in a legal battle with Dunkin' Donuts franchises over
the bakery's use of fake butter on his bagels.

Jan Polanik of Worcester, Mass., filed two lawsuits accusing more
than 20 Dunkin' Donuts franchises in Massachusetts of putting a
butter substitute on his bagels when he ordered real butter, the
Boston Globe reported.

"Candidly, it seems like a really minor thing, and we thought
twice or three times about whether to bring a lawsuit or not,"
Polanik's attorney, Thomas Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- of
Shapiro, Haber & Urmy LLP, told the Globe. But Shapiro said the
suits are less frivolous than they might seem because the goal is
to is to stop companies from selling a product that is different
than advertised.

The class-action suits represented any customer who "ordered a
baked product, such as a bagel, with butter, but instead received
margarine or butter substitute between June 24, 2012, and June 24,
2016," the Globe reported.

The details of Polanik's settlement have not yet been made public.

FOREST RIVER: Removed "Rangel" Class Suit to C.D. California
The class action lawsuit captioned Fidelina Rangel, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Forest River, Inc. and Does 1 through 100, Case No. CIVDS1701948
filed on March 30, 2017, was removed from San Bernardino County
Superior Court on March 30, 2017 to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California (Eastern Division - Riverside).
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-00613 to the

The case asserts labor-related claims.

Forest River, Inc. is a manufacturer of recreational vehicles,
cargo trailers, utility trailers, pontoon boats, and buses. [BN]

Fidelina Rangel is a pro se plaintiff.

GARDA CL: Ex-Workers' Suit Remanded for Calculation of Damages
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded the appeals case styled
LAWRENCE HILL, ADAM WISE, and ROBERT MILLER, on their own behalves
and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Respondents, v.
Washington corporation, Appellant, No. 74617-1-I (Wash. Ct. App.)

Garda CL Northwest, Inc., is an armored truck company that picks
up, transports, and delivers currency and other valuables.  Garda
operates branches in seven cities in Washington.  Most branches
have their own managers.  Each branch has its own drivers
association, which negotiates a collective bargaining agreement on
behalf of that branch's employees. A large percentage of Garda
employees signed acknowledgments of their branches' CBAs.

Each CBA had one of the following provisions regarding meal

     "Routes will be scheduled without a designated lunch break.
Employees hereto agree to an on-duty meal period.

     The Employees hereto waive any meal periods to which they
would otherwise be entitled."

In February 2009, three Garda employees, Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise,
and Robert Miller, sued Garda, alleging that Garda did not provide
them with legally sufficient rest breaks or meal periods, in
violation of the Washington Industrial Welfare Act, chapter 49.12
RCW, and the Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW. They moved for
class certification, which the trial court granted in July 2010.

The class consists of nearly 500 current and former Garda
employees who worked for Garda between February 11, 2006, and
February 7, 2015. The court appointed Hill, Wise, and Miller as
the named representatives of the class. Garda moved to compel
arbitration under the terms of the CBAs, but the Washington
Supreme Court held that the arbitration procedures were
unconscionable and remanded the case back to the trial court in
September 2013. Garda moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) or, in the alternative, that
the plaintiffs had waived their right to meal breaks through their
CBAs. The trial court denied Garda's motion. In December 2014,
Garda received permission to amend its answer to add the
affirmative defense that the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the plaintiffs'
claims. Garda moved for summary judgment on the preemption
argument and the trial court denied it. Garda then moved
unsuccessfully to decertify the class.

The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of
liability and their entitlement to double damages. The trial court
granted the motion as to liability but denied summary judgment on
double damages.  In June 2015, the case proceeded to a bench trial
on the issue of damages and, in September, to a trial on double
damages. In October, the court found for the plaintiffs, awarding
$4,209,596.61 in back pay damages, $1,668,235.62 in double
damages, and $2,350,255.63 in prejudgment interest. In December,
the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $1,127,734.50 in attorney
fees, after applying a 1.5 lodestar multiplier.

Garda appeals the trial court's certification of the class, denial
of its motions for summary judgment, grant of the plaintiffs'
partial summary judgment motion on liability, award of double
damages, award of prejudgment interest, and use of a lodestar to
multiply the plaintiffs' attorney fee award.

Garda contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
certifying the class without making a clear record of its reasons
or considering the criteria of CR 23. Garda argues that the trial
court erred by concluding that neither the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) nor section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts the
plaintiffs' claims.

Garda maintains that the trial court erred by granting the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on Garda's liability for
failing to provide meal periods and rest breaks. It argues that
the plaintiffs' waived their right to meal periods when they
acknowledged their CBAs, which purported to contain waivers. Garda
argues further that questions of material fact remain whether the
plaintiffs were able to take rest breaks. Garda also argues that
the court erred by awarding double damages for the missed meal
periods because those are not wage violations and Garda's conduct
was not willful.

Garda also argues that the court should not have awarded
prejudgment interest for any damages for which it awarded double
damages. Finally, Garda contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by applying a 1.5 lodestar multiplier to the
Plaintiffs' attorney fee award.

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, held that the
trial court's order was sufficient because it identified the
common question that predominated and explained why a class action
was superior to individual actions. The FAAAA does not preempt the
plaintiffs' claims because complying with Washington law would not
have had a significant impact on Garda's operations if Garda had
sought a variance. It also held that section 301 of the LMRA does
not preempt the plaintiffs' claims because the plaintiffs' rights
are independent and non-negotiable, and it does not have to
interpret the plaintiffs' various collective bargaining agreements
with Garda in order to resolve the issue.

Because the plaintiffs could not waive their meal periods through
a CBA, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that acknowledging
their CBAs did not constitute a waiver.  Garda's own testimony and
materials established that there was a policy against taking true
breaks. Summary judgment is affirmed on Garda's liability.
Failing to provide meal breaks is a wage violation, but agrees
that Garda's conduct was not willful. The award of double damages
for the meal period violations is reversed.

Because prejudgment interest is not available when the plaintiff
receives punitive damages, such as double damages, the award of
prejudgment interest on the rest break damages is reversed. The
multiplier was reasonable given the risks of the case and the fact
that the plaintiffs' attorneys took the case on a contingency

In all, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, affirmed
the trial court's class certification and summary judgment
decisions, but reversed the award of double damages on meal period
violations.  The award of prejudgment interest on the rest break
damages is also reversed, but not on the meal period violations.
The case is remanded for a new calculation of damages.

A copy of the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One opinion
penned by Acting Chief Judge Michael J. Trickey, dated March 27,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/JRFpG2 from Leagle.com.

Clarence M. Belnavis -- cbelnavis@fisherphillips.com -- Catharine
M. Morisset -- cmorisset@fisherphillips.com -- Alexander A.
Wheatley -- awheatley@fisherphillips.com -- at Fisher & Phillips
LLP; Rochelle Yvonne Nelson -- rnelson@skellengerbender.com -- at
Skellenger Bender PS, Counsel for Appellants

Daniel Foster Johnson -- djohnson@bjtlegal.com -- at Breskin
Johnson & Townsend PLLC; Adam J. Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com --
Martin S. Garfinkel -- garfinkel@sgb-law.com -- at Schroeter
Goldmark & Bender, Counsel for Respondents

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One panel consists of
Acting Chief Judge Michael J. Trickey and Judges Ann Schindler and
Michael S. Spearman.

GIUMARRA VINEYARDS: Class Settlement in "Munoz" Has Prelim OK
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California granted the parties' joint
motion for preliminary approval of class settlement in the case
styled RAFAEL MUNOZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GIUMARRA VINEYARDS
CORP., Defendant, Case No. 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Rafael Munoz, Lidia Cruz, Yanet Hernandez, Santos R.
Valenzula, Trinidad Ruis, Marta Rincon de Diaz, Ramon Cervantes
Perals and Hugo Perez Rios and defendant Giumarra Vineyards
Corporation seek preliminary approval of a class settlement
reached. The parties engaged in mediation with Steven Vartabedian,
a retired justice of California's Fifth District Court of Appeal.
The parties filed a joint motion for approval of the settlement on
February 24, 2017, asked for the appointment of Rust Consulting as
the claims administrator, approval of the settlement distribution
plan and scheduling for final approval of the settlement.

Magistrate Judge Thurston granted the parties joint motion for
approval of the settlement class and the class is defined as a
combination of the previously-certified Tools Class and Late Meal
Break Class. The Tool Class means all fieldworkers employed by
Giumarra from November 9, 2001 through and including December 1,
2016 who were required to purchase necessary tools. The Late Meal
Break Class consists of all field workers employed by Giumarra
from November 9, 2001 through and including December 1, 2016 who
were not provided a timely meal period. The class for purposes of
settling both claims consists of the combined Tool and Late Meal
Break Class. The class does not include irrigators and drivers.
Only employees, exclusive of foremen, assigned to crews that
performed tasks similar to those of the named plaintiffs, like
tying, pruning, picking and packing.

Preliminary approval of the parties' proposed settlement
agreement, as modified and the proposed notice plan are granted.
Rafael Munoz, Santos Valenzuela, Trinidad Ruiz, Marta R. Rincon de
Diaz, Ramon Perales, and Hugo Perez Rios are appointed the class
representatives. The law firm of Mallison & Martinez remains
appointed as class counsel. Rust Consulting is appointed as the
settlement administrator, with responsibilities pursuant to the
terms set forth in the settlement agreement. Class representative
enhancement requests are granted preliminarily up to the amount of
$7,500, subject to a petition and review at the final approval and
fairness hearing. Class members and their counsel may support or
oppose the request, if they so desire, at the final approval and
fairness hearing.

Class Counsel's requests for fees of not to exceed 33-1/3% of the
gross settlement amount and expenses up to $175,000 are granted
preliminarily, subject to counsel's petition for fees and review
at the final approval and fairness hearing. Class members and
their counsel may support or oppose the request, if they so
desire, at the final approval and fairness hearing. The petition
for attorneys' fees and for class representative enhancement fee
shall be filed no later than May 30, 2017, and the costs of
settlement administration shall not exceed $70,000.

The proposed Notice Packet is preliminarily approved, and the
parties shall file a finalized Notice Packet with the required
revisions for the court's approval no later than March 31, 2017.
The parties shall provide the settlement administrator with the
class fata no later than April 7, 2017. The settlement
administrator shall mail the approved Class Notice Packet within
ten days of receiving the class data, or no later than April 17,
2017. Class member may submit any corrections to the claim form
within thirty days, or no later than May 15, 2017.

A class member who wishes to be excluded from settlement shall
postmark the exclusion request form within thirty days or no later
than May 15, 2017. Any objections to or comments on the settlement
agreement must be filed with the court and mailed to class counsel
no later than May 15, 2017. A final approval and fairness hearing
is set for June 20, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. at the United States
Courthouse located at 510 19th Street, Bakersfield, California.
The court shall determine whether the settlement should be granted
final approval as fair, reasonable, and adequate as to the class
members. Class members may appear at the hearing in person or
through his or her own attorney, to show cause why the court
should not approve the settlement agreement, or to object to the
motion for attorneys' fees or class member representative
enhancement award.

A copy of Judge Thurston's order dated March 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/DSpTgH from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Darren Michael Cohen --
dcohenlaw@sbcglobal.net -- Eric Bryce Kingsley --
eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- at Kingsley & Kingsley APC; Erica
Deutsch -- edeutsch@bushgottlieb.com -- Ira L. Gottlieb --
igottlieb@bushgottlieb.com -- at Bush Gottlieb; Hector Rodriguez
Martinez -- hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -- Joseph Donald Sutton --
JSutton@TheMMLawFirm.com -- Marco A. Palau -- Stanley S. Mallison
-- stanm@mallisonlaw.com -- Eric Sebastian Trabucco --
etrabucco@themmlawfirm.com -- at Mallison & Martinez; Mario
Martinez -- mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com -- Thomas Patrick Lynch --
tlynch@farmworkerlaw.com -- at Martinez, Aguilasocho & Lynch,
APLC; Douglas D. Winter -- ddw@mcnicholaslaw.com -- Matthew Sawaya
McNicholas -- msm@McNicholasLaw.com -- at McNicholas & McNicholas,
LLP; Jeff S. Westerman -- jwesterman@jswlegal.com -- at Westerman
Law Corp; Nicole Marie Duckett -- ndfricke@clippers.com -- at
Milberg Weiss LLP

Giumarra Vineyards Corporation, Defendant, represented by Joseph
C. Markowitz -- jcmarkowitz@jcmarkowitz.com -- at Law Offices of
Joseph C. Markowitz

IC SYSTEM: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gadomski" Action Claims
Kellie Gadomski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. I.C. System, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-00675-
JAM-CKD (E.D. Cal., March 30, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

I.C. System, Inc. operates a debt collection firm in California.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      E-mail: ml@kazlg.com

JACKSON COUNTY, FL: New Settlement Agreement Awaits Court Approval
Deborah Buckhalter at Jackson County Floridan reports that a new
settlement agreement has been forged and awaits a fairness hearing
and final court approval in the class action lawsuit filed by
James Cowart and Linda Dutch against Jackson County over
management of the special assessment fees that are collected from
property owners in the Compass Lake in the Hills subdivision.

Those fees are currently collected by way of a Municipal Services
Taxing Unit, which is a special assessment tool set up in the
1980s to pay for certain essential services in that community. The
lawsuit hinged, in part, on how those monies were used.

Jackson County Commissioners approved the agreement in an
executive session.

The settlement calls for the county to use USD591,036 from the
fund to pay the sums agreed to in the document. Those include the
suing parties' lawyer fees of more than USD200,000 and an
arbitrator fee of about USD10,000 that was incurred in trying to
mediate the lawsuit. The remaining USD376,671 would go, split on a
proportional basis, to the members of the class who file a claim
for the money by the deadline which would be stated in a notice
going to the property owners if the agreement stands. Those
eligible include all property owners who paid the special
assessment in fiscal years 2011-12 through 2014-15.

The county had made some changes after 2015. The commissioners
reduced the special assessment from USD135 annual to USD95, and
also struck the previously-allowed payment from MSTU funds for a
law enforcement officer's salary in covering the subdivision.

The litigants had claimed that was not an authorized use of the
funds. The county also re-defined the proper use of the money
further, disallowing the previously permitted use of the funds on
recreational facilities and services in the subdivision. That
action came after years of complaints from some in the subdivision
who argued that the facilities belonged to the property owners
association, not the actual property owners who were paying the
MSTU fee that, until the change, helped pay for the maintenance of
those assets.

As to the settlement, the property owners who paid into the fee
during the fiscal years covered by the proposed agreement have
some options. Instead of filing a claim as a member of the class,
they can, alternatively, remove themselves from the class and
preserve their right to move forward with action of their own
seeking other relief if they do not agree with the terms of the
settlement. If enough of them --  450 or more  --  take that
option, the county can withdraw from the settlement and start
over. [GN]

JPMORGAN CHASE: New York Court Dismisses "Nypl" Suit
Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the case styled JOHN NYPL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO., et al., Defendants, No. 15 Civ. 9300 (LGS)

On May 20, 2015, the United States Department of Justice announced
that defendants Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays PLC,
Royal Bank of Scotland plc and UBS AG were pleading guilty to
conspiring to manipulate the price of U.S. dollars and euros
exchanged in the foreign currency exchange spot market. According
to the DOJ press release, traders at these banks used a chat room
called The Cartel to manipulate benchmark exchange rates and the
traders also used The Cartel chat room to manipulate the euro-
dollar exchange rate in other ways.

Based on this and other press releases and the plea agreements
entered into by the defendants named in the May 20 press release,
plaintiffs brought a putative class action on May 21, 2015, in the
Northern District of California against eighteen banks and their
affiliates under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1 et

Plaintiffs allege that defendants have entered into illegal price-
fixing agreements to fix and rig the foreign currency exchange
rates. Plaintiffs further allege that they paid inflated foreign
currency exchange rates caused by defendants' alleged conspiracy
to fix prices in the foreign exchange ("FX") or foreign currency
market. Plaintiffs claim that the price-fixing agreements are per
se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and caused
them to pay more for the foreign currency they purchased than they
otherwise would have paid.

On November 25, 2015, the case was transferred to the Southern
District of New York in part because defendants are litigating
similar claims in In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust
Litigation ("FOREX"), No. 13 Civ. 7789 (S.D.N.Y.).

On January 29, 2016, defendants moved to stay the action pending
completion of the settlements reached in FOREX or in the
alternative to consolidate the action with FOREX. On June 8, 2016,
the court denied defendants' motion to stay and granted in part
defendants' motion to consolidate.

Defendants move to dismiss the second amended complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Judge Schofield held that the complaint does not sufficiently
plead antitrust standing, antitrust injury as it does not allege
facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendants' alleged
anticompetitive acts directly restrained the end-user transactions
in which Plaintiffs participated and that plaintiffs are not
efficient enforcers as required for antitrust standing.

Judge Schofield granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Should
plaintiffs choose to attempt to replead, they must file a motion
to do so, a supporting memorandum of law and proposed third
amended complaint, together with a redline showing how it differs
from the second amended complaint within 21 days. Defendants
Barclays PLC, HSBC Holdings PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc,
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC and UBS AG's separate motion to dismiss
the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied as

A copy of Judge Schofield's opinion and order dated March 24,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/rSyE7B from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Lingel Hart Winters -- sawmill2@aol.com
-- at Lingel H. Winters Prof. Corp.; Joseph M. Alioto, Sr. --
Theresa Driscoll Moore -- at Alioto Law Firm

Bank of America and Bank of America, N.A., Defendants, represented
by Adam Selim Hakki -- ahakki@shearman.com -- Jeffrey Jason
Resetarits -- jeffrey.resetarits@shearman.com -- Richard Franklin
Schwed -- rschwed@shearman.com -- Stephen D. Hibbard -- at
Shearman & Sterling LLP

HSBC Holdings P.L.C., HSBC North American Holdings Inc., HSBC Bank
(USA), N.A. and HSBC Finance Corporation, Defendant, represented
by James Matthew Goodin -- jmgoodin@lockelord.com -- Regina Jill
McClendon -- rmcclendon@lockelord.com -- Gregory Thomas Casamento
-- gcasamento@lockelord.com -- Julia C. Webb --
jwebb@lockelord.com -- Roger Brian Cowie -- rcowie@lockelord.com -
- at Locke Lord LLP

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Bank, N.A. and JP Morgan
Chase & Co., Defendants, represented by Peter Edward Greene --
peter.greene@skadden.com -- Boris Bershteyn --
boris.bershteyn@skadden.com -- Douglas Allen Smith --
douglas.smith@skadden.com -- at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and
Flom LLP

Citibank, N.A., Citicorp and Citigroup, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Alan M. Wiseman -- awiseman@cov.com -- Andrew D.
Lazerow -- alazerow@cov.com -- Andrew Arthur Ruffino --
aruffino@cov.com -- Tammy Albarran -- talbarran@cov.com -- at
Covington & Burling, L.L.P.

UBS AG, Defendant, represented by Indraneel Sur --
isur@gibsondunn.com -- Joel Steven Sanders --
jsanders@gibsondunn.com -- David Jarrett Arp --
jarp@gibsondunn.com -- Melanie L. Katsur -- mkatsur@gibsondunn.com
-- at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP

Barclays PLC, Defendant, represented by Adam Seth Paris --
parisa@sullcrom.com -- David Harold Braff -- braffd@sullcrom.com -
- Jeffrey T. Scott -- scottj@sullcrom.com -- John Darrow
Echeverria -- Kathleen Suzanne McArthur -- mcarthurk@sullcrom.com
-- Matthew Alexander Schwartz -- schwartzmatthew@sullcrom.com --
Yvonne Susan Quinn -- quinny@sullcrom.com -- at Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP

Royal Bank of Scotland PLC and Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC.,
Defendants, represented by Joel M. Cohen --
joel.cohen@davispolk.com -- Melissa Carrie King --
melissa.king@davispolk.com -- Lewis Charles Shioleno --
charles.shioleno@davispolk.com -- at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP

Haverhill Retirement System, et al., Interested Party, represented
by Michael D. Hausfeld -- mhausfeld@hausfeld.com -- at Hausfeld,

KIMBERLY-CLARK: Former Manager Says Gowns Failed Quality Tests
Bonnie Eslinger at Law360 reports a former Kimberly-Clark plant
manager testifying on March 31 in a California class action trial
over the permeability of its surgical gowns told jurors that after
some gowns failed quality control testing, a company scientist
asked to create a pretext for rerunning tests, telling him
"something, anything" would do.

Bahamas Surgery Center LLC's suit alleges that Kimberly-Clark
Corp. and Halyard Health Inc. fraudulently failed to disclose and
also concealed from buyers certain information showing that their
MicroCool surgical gowns did not meet the standard for barrier
protection against pathogens and liquids. The class action is
being brought on behalf of persons and entities in California who
purchased the gowns between February 2012 and January 2015.

During the testimony of two witnesses on March 31 in central
district court, jurors were informed about an electronic instant
message chat in March 2012 between a Kimberly-Clark senior
research scientist and a manager at the company's manufacturing
plant in Honduras, less than two weeks after the company learned a
batch of its MicroCool surgical gowns had failed an industry
standards test.

In the exchange, the scientist, Jerry Jascomb, now an R&D
technical leader at Kimberly-Clark spinoff and co-defendant
Halyard Health, told Rolando Ferrera that they needed to come up
with a "rationale" for why one batch of MicroCool gowns tested
showed the sleeve seams weren't sealed, in order to "justify"
testing the batch again.

"Something, anything, so we can retest and have a reason. Give it
some thought," Jascomb wrote, later adding, "I mean anything you
can think of  --  doesn't have to be a proven reason, just
something that we can hang a retest on. Know what I mean? Seems
like a fluke."

An attorney for the class, Michael Avenatti of Eagan Avenatti LLP,
asked Ferrera why he later forwarded the exchange to two other
men, with the statement "For your eyes only."

Those were the men he would have to ask to get the samples in
order to rerun the test, Ferrera said.

In the exchange shown to jurors, Ferrera suggests that "power
fluctuations" could be to blame for the poor test results. Jascomb
tells him that's good.

"Can you state that? Then we can say that's why we need to retest.
And pass like the other two lots," Jascomb concluded.

Avenatti asked Jascomb why an excuse needed to be created.

"You knew you couldn't just retest because you failed," Avenatti
said. "You needed a reason didn't you?

Jascomb insisted that he believed the failed batch was an
"outlier" and a retest would show that the product met industry

Problems with the sleeve seams continued to plague the company
throughout the year, Avenatti said. Then, in January 2013, a
competitor commissioned tests on Kimberly-Clark's MicroCool gowns
and showed 49 of the 96 samples tested failed.

Jascomb called it troublesome.

"I was surprised and puzzled on how those results could occur," he

But later, when pressed by Avenatti, Jascomb conceded that there
were company "concerns" about improving the sleeve seams.

On March 30,  a top executive for Kimberly-Clark defended the
company, testifying that internal communications about "quality
issues" and "compliance problems" related to nothing more than the
company's voluntary effort at improvements, not evidence that the
surgical gowns were not meeting industry safety standards.

Chris Lowery was a  vice president for Kimberly-Clark Health Care
until  2014, when the corporation spun off its health care
division into a separate public company, co-defendant Hyland
Health, where Lowery is now senior vice president and chief
operating officer.

While on the witness stand, Avenatti asked about Bahamas Surgery
Center's allegations that the gowns had quality concerns that put
medical field-workers at risk of infection.

Lowery said the claims were false.

"I believe the MicroCool gown is today and has always been safe,
effective and has always met the claims for which the product was
cleared," the executive said.

Over several hours, Avenatti presented an assortment of internal
company documents stating concerns about the quality of the gowns'
seams and testing failures, including emails, chat messages and a
May 2013 presentation given to Kimberly-Clark Chairman & CEO Tom

The presentation stated that  "the company had 80 compliance
challenges on gowns that were delaying progress on cost savings"
and also that compliance issues had "syphoned" resources from the

Later in the day, in response to a similar line of questioning,
Lowery said that since Kimberly-Clark had received a green light
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to market its MicroCool
surgical gowns based on 2003 standards, the new standards were
merely something the organization "was aspiring to achieve."

The plaintiff's first witness, former Kimberly-Clark Director
Keith Edgett, echoed that assertion during his video testimony
screened for jurors Wednesday, telling the court that the company
misled its customers about the protective abilities of its
surgical gowns.

Additionally, design changes were made to the gown after it was
approved by the FDA in 2010, said Edgett, who left the company at
the end of 2014.

"All of those changes were driven by cost reduction, to improve
the bottom line; they were not implemented to improve
performance," he said.

The class action, filed in October 2014, claims the company
falsely represented that its MicroCool surgical gowns provided the
highest level of liquid barrier protection. While the gowns are
marketed as "impermeable" and effective against pathogens like
Ebola, they put health care workers at substantial risk, the suit

During Kimberly-Clark's opening statements, company attorney
Chilton Varner of King & Spalding LLP told the jury that the
company's gowns have a "remarkable safety record" built over the
years, "protecting thousands, even millions of health care
professionals in the operating room."

Bahamas Surgery Center is represented by Michael Avenatti --
mavenatti@eaganavenatti.com -- and Ahmed Ibrahim --
aibrahim@eaganavenatti.com -- of Eagan Avenatti LLP.

Kimberly-Clark is represented by Julia Romano, Alexander Calfo,
Chilton Varner, Stephen Devereux -- sdevereux@kslaw.com -- and
Madison Kitchens -- mkitchens@kslaw.com -- of King & Spalding LLP,
and Bradley Pratt -- bpratt@theprattfirm.com -- of The Pratt Law
Firm PC.

The case is Shahinian v. Kimberly-Clark et al., case number 2:14-
cv-08390, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. [GN]

LELAND STANFORD: "Lagos" Settlement Denied Preliminary Approval
Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the Northern District of
California denied plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of
the class action settlement in the case styled THOMAS LAGOS,
Case No. 15-cv-04524-KAW (N.D. Cal.).

In January 2015, plaintiff Thomas Lagos applied for a job with
defendant The Leland Stanford Junior University. As part of the
application process, defendant procured or caused to be procured a
consumer report regarding plaintiff from HireRight. Plaintiff
alleges that defendant willfully violated the FCRA when it
procured or caused to be procured a consumer report without making
the required disclosure in a document that consists solely of the

On November 22, 2016, the parties informed the court that the case
had settled. Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary approval of
the class action settlement on January 12, 2017.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, defendant agrees to
pay a gross settlement fund of $400,000, in addition to one-half
of the administration costs. Of the $400,000 gross settlement
fund, plaintiff's counsel intends to seek an award of one-third or
$133,333.33, as well as costs not to exceed $12,000. The $400,000
gross settlement fund also includes a $7,500 incentive payment to
plaintiff for his service as the named class representative, and
up to $35,000 in class administration costs. This leaves a Net
Settlement Fund of $212,166.67 for distribution to an estimated
class of 15,347 members. Based on the net settlement fund of
$212,166.67, each class member will receive an estimated $13.82.

The court issued an order requiring that the parties file a joint
supplemental brief addressing certain issues, including whether
the settlement falls within the range of possible approval or
within the range of reasonableness.

Magistrate Judge Westmore recognizes that the crux of a settlement
is compromise, and that class actions often and necessarily settle
for less than the full value of a case. The court finds that the
risks to plaintiff's case are not so great as to warrant an 86%
discount, which is a significant decrease that must be justified
only by substantial risks and weaknesses in a plaintiff's case.
This is particularly the case given the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Syed v. M-I, LLC, 846 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir.
2017.), which changes the calculus of the strengths and weaknesses
of plaintiff's case. To be clear, the court does not decide at
this point whether Syed is dispositive in the case. Instead, it
only recognizes that in light of Syed, plaintiff's case is not so
weak as to warrant so deep a discount. Magistrate Judge Westmore
denied plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval.

A copy of Judge Westmore's order dated March 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/BE7qSW from Leagle.com.

Thomas Lagos, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Durham Holmes --
JeffHolmesJH@gmail.com -- at Holmes Law Group, APC; Lonnie
Clifford Blanchard, III -- lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- at The
Blanchard Law Group, APC; Peter Roald Dion-Kindem -- Peter@Dion-
KindemLaw.com -- at The Dion-Kindem Law Firm
The Leland Stanford Junior University, Defendant, represented by
Kathryn Jean LaFever -- klafevers@gordonrees.com -- Maya Pri-Tal
Ohana -- mohana@gordonrees.com -- Michael Terence Lucey --
mlucey@gordonrees.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP

LG ELECTRONICS: Court Trims Claims in "Hudock" Suit
Chief District Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S. District for the
District of Minnesota granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motions to dismiss the case styled BENJAMIN HUDOCK and
BREANN Civil HUDOCK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
Defendants, No. 16-1220 (JRT/FLN) (D. Minn.).

Plaintiffs Benjamin and Breann Hudock decided to purchase a
television with 120Hz refresh rate. On November 29, 2013, Breann
viewed advertisements and specifications for a television on
Bestbuy.com. and the advertisements and specifications indicated
that the televisions had a 120Hz refresh rate. After conferring
with Benjamin and describing the specifications, Breann purchased
the television from the website relying on the 120Hz advertised
refresh rate. After purchasing the television, plaintiffs noticed
that the television's images were not as clear as expected, but
did not learn until later that the television only had a 60Hz
refresh rate.

On April 29, 2016, two and a half years after plaintiffs purchased
the television, plaintiffs notified LG and Best Buy that the
television's refresh rate did not conform to LG's and Best Buy's
representations. On May 9, 2016, plaintiffs filed a class action
against LG and Best Buy, alleging claims for a violation of
Minnesota's Consumer Fraud Act (MCFA), Minn. Stat. Section
325F.68, et seq. (count I); a violation of Minnesota's Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (MDTPA), Minn. Stat. Section
325D.43, et seq. (count II); a violation of Minnesota's Unlawful
Trade Practices Act (MUTA), Minn. Stat. Section 325D.13 (count
III); a violation of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA), N.J.
Stat. Ann. Section 54:8-1, et seq. (count IV); an unjust
enrichment (count V); a breach of express warranty (Count VI); a
breach of implied warranty (count VII); and a breach of contract
(count VIII).

LG and Best Buy filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Chief District Judge Tunheim granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motions to dismiss.
Defendant LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.'s motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part as follows:

   a. The motion is granted with respect to the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, count IV. Count IV is dismissed without

   b. The motion is granted with respect to the breach of contract
claim count VIII. Count VIII is dismissed with prejudice.

   c. The motion is denied in all other respects.

Defendants Best Buy Co., Best Buy Stores, L.P., and BestBuy.com,
LLC's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part as

   a. The motion is granted in its entirety with respect to the
claims against Best Buy Co., Inc. and Best Buy Stores, L.P. Best
Buy Co., Inc. and Best Buy Stores, L.P. are dismissed without
prejudice from the case.

   b. The motion is granted with respect to the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act claim count IV against BestBuy.com. Count IV is
dismissed without prejudice.

   c. The motion is denied in all other respects.

As to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claim, Chief District
Judge Tunheim held that plaintiffs pled only that they suffered an
ascertainable loss as a result of defendants' conduct in that they
paid more than the LED television was worth and more than what
defendants would have been able to charge had the true refresh
rates been displayed. Nowhere do plaintiffs allege the amount
plaintiffs paid for the television or the cost of a comparable LG
television with a 60Hz refresh rate. In the absence of such
information, the court has no basis for valuing the products
received as opposed to the products they were promised.

A copy of Judge Tunheim's memorandum opinion and order dated March
27, 2017, is available at https://goo.gl/vOh1Wo from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel C. Hedlund --
dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Joseph C. Bourne --
jbourne@gustafsongluek.com -- at Gustafson Gluek PLLC; David M.
Cialkowski -- david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com -- at Zimmerman Reed,
PLLP; Luke Hudock -- at Hudock Law Group, S.C.

Defendant, represented by A. Elizabeth Korchin --
elizabeth.korchin@hoganlovells.com -- Alicia Paller --
alicia.paller@hoganlovells.com -- John C. Mitchell -- Mitchell
Zamoff -- mitch.zamoff@hoganlovells.com -- Phoebe A. Wilkinson --
phoebe.wilkinson@hoganlovells.com -- at Hogan Lovells US LLP

SEARS PROTECTION: Judge Narrows Claims in "Greene" Suit
Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied
in part defendants' motion to dismiss the case captioned NINA
Defendants, No. 15 C 2546 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Nina and Gerald Greene, who are Pennsylvania residents,
complain that from 1994 to 2014, they entered into and paid for
several appliance-service agreements with the Sears, Roebuck and
Company and Sears Protection Company that did not actually cover
the service on their products. Plaintiffs also sue Sears Holdings
Corporation. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' previous
complaint was granted in part and denied in part. The court
granted the motion as to Sears Holdings and dismissed it from the
suit. The court also granted the motion as to plaintiffs' claims
for unjust enrichment and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act (ICFA), which were dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a first amended class action
complaint, which asserts claims for breach of contract (count I);
unjust enrichment (count II); violation of the ICFA (count III);
and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law (count IV).

Plaintiffs also filed objections to Magistrate Judge Mason's order
of October 28, 2016, in which Judge Mason granted in part and
denied in part plaintiffs' motions to compel production of certain
discovery and to extend discovery deadlines.

Judge Alonso held that although plaintiffs have added allegations
about Sears Holdings' employees' general involvement in drafting,
pricing, marketing, and handling claims related to service
protection agreements, as well as Sears Holdings' operation of
call centers that handle questions about products and services,
plaintiffs do not allege any facts from which it can be reasonably
inferred that Sears Holdings retained any benefit as a result of
plaintiffs' agreements. Plaintiffs failed to state an unjust
enrichment claim against Sears Holdings. As for the consumer fraud
claims, plaintiffs failed to alleged any facts from which it can
be inferred that Sears Holdings, in particular, made any
misrepresentations to them or otherwise engaged in deceptive
practices. The court dismisses Sears Holdings as a defendant.
Defendants seek a with-prejudice dismissal. Because plaintiffs do
not seek leave to amend in the event of Sears Holdings' dismissal,
and plaintiffs were previously given the opportunity to replead
claims against Sears Holdings and still have failed to do so, the
dismissal is with prejudice.

Defendants' motion to dismiss in part the first amended class
action complaint is granted as to defendant Sears Holdings
Corporation, which is dismissed with prejudice as a defendant in
the suit, and count III, plaintiffs' ICFA claim, which is
dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' motion is denied as to count
IV, plaintiffs' PCPL claim. The remaining defendants shall answer
the remaining claims by April 17, 2017. The court overrules
plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge Mason's order of
October 28, 2016. A status hearing is set for April 19, 2017 at
9:30 a.m.

A copy of Judge Alonso's memorandum opinion and order dated March
27, 2017, is available at https://goo.gl/EQPWi9 from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by David M. DeVito -- ddevito@kcr-law.com
-- Deborah R. Gross -- dgross@kcr-law.com -- Andrew Joseph Belli -
- abelli@kcr-law.com -- Benjamin Michael Mather -- bmather@kcr-
law.com -- at KAUFMAN COREN & RESS PC; Marvin Alan Miller --
mmiller@millerlawllc.com -- Kathleen Ellen Boychuck --
kboychuck@millerlawllc.com -- Lori Ann Fanning --
lfanning@millerlawllc.com -- at Miller Law LLC

Defendants, represented by Craig M. White -- cwhite@bakerlaw.com -
- Erin Bolan Hines -- ehines@bakerlaw.com -- Josephine Tung --
jtung@bakerlaw.com -- at Baker & Hostetler LLP.

MIDLAND FUNDING: Waived Right to Arbitrate Claims, Md. App. Says
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals in the case CLIFFORD CAIN, JR., v.
MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, No. 45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.).

Clifford Cain, Jr., opened an AT&T Universal Savings and Rewards
Card account with Citibank that included an arbitration provision
that allowed either party to elect mandatory, binding arbitration
for any claim, dispute, or controversy between the parties.
Additionally, it provided that the arbitration clause would
survive any transfer, sale or assignment of Cain's account, or any
amounts owed to his account, to any other person or entity. In
2007, Cain stopped making payments on his Citibank account. In
2008, Citibank sold all of the rights, title, and interest in
Cain's account to Midland Funding, LLC.
Midland filed a small claims action against Cain in the District
Court of Maryland, for the outstanding balance on his Citibank
account. The court entered a default judgment against Cain for
$4,520.54. Under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act
(MCALA), with limited exceptions, companies doing business as a
collection agency must be licensed by the State. Although the
MCALA required Midland to be licensed when it brought suit against
Cain, it did not become licensed until almost a year later.

On June 23, 2013, the Court of Special Appeals issued an opinion
in Finch v. LVNV Funding LLC, allowing debtors to collaterally
attack judgments obtained by unlicensed collection agencies. The
intermediate appellate court held that a judgment entered in favor
of an unlicensed debt collector constitutes a void judgment as a
matter of law.

On July 30, 2013, Cain filed a class action complaint against
Midland in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for its unlawful
debt collection practices. Cain argued that the judgments Midland
obtained against him and the other class members were void under
Finch. Shortly after Cain brought suit, Midland and Cain filed a
consent motion to stay the class action pending the appeal of
Finch. The Circuit Court granted the stay. On October 8, 2013, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari in Finch, and two
weeks later the Circuit Court lifted the stay in Cain's class
action. Midland then moved to compel arbitration and stay the
court proceedings, or, alternatively, dismiss Cain's complaint.
The Circuit Court stayed discovery and held a trial on the
existence of an arbitration agreement between Cain and Midland.
After finding that such an agreement did exist, the Circuit Court
granted Midland's motion to compel arbitration. The Circuit Court
rejected Cain's argument that Midland waived its right to
arbitrate when it brought its 2009 collection action against Cain.

Cain appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment, concluding that the Circuit Court properly granted
Midland's motion to compel arbitration.

Judge Sally D. Adkins reversed the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals, reasoning that because Midland's 2009 collection
action is related to Cain's claims, Midland waived its right to
arbitrate the current claims when it chose to litigate the
collection action. In addition, Cain does not have to demonstrate
that he suffered prejudice to establish that Midland waived the
arbitration provision.

A copy of the Court of Appeals of Maryland's opinion penned by
Judge Sally D. Adkins dated March 24, 2017, is available at
https://goo.gl/oTtLPg from Leagle.com.

MINNESOTA: Lawyers Want High Court to Take Sex Offenders Case
WDIO reports that lawyers for sex offenders confined indefinitely
to Minnesota's secure treatment program have asked a judge to stay
all further proceedings while they ask the U.S. Supreme Court to
review an appeals court finding that the program is

U.S. District Judge Donovan Frank declared the program
unconstitutional after phase one of the case in 2015 because only
a handful of offenders had ever won provisional releases. The 8th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed him in January.

In a brief on March 31, lawyers in the class-action lawsuit on
behalf more than 700 offenders said they will ask the high court
to review the case. And they say it's not practical to proceed
with the second phase, which would deal with remedies, until
there's a final resolution of the disputed legal questions. [GN]

NORTHLAND GROUP: Illegally Collects Debt, "Ceban" Suit Claims
Lulian Ceban, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated consumers v. Northland Group Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-01849
(E.D.N.Y., April 1, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair
and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Northland Group Inc. provides business process outsourcing
services focused on accounts receivable management and collection
services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel C. Cohen, Esq.
      407 Rockaway Avenue
      Brooklyn, NY 11212
      Telephone: (646) 645-8482
      Facsimile: (347) 665-1545
      E-mail: dancohenlaw@gmail.com

PATELCO CREDIT: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gadomski" Suit Claims
Kellie Gadomski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Patelco Credit Union, Case No. 2:17-at-00353
(E.D. Cal., March 31, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair
and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Patelco Credit Union it is one of the oldest and largest credit
unions in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew M. Loker
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      E-mail: ml@kazlg.com

PAYPAL INC: Judge Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
Senior District Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong of the Northern
District of California, Oakland Division, granted plaintiffs'
motion for final approval of amended class action settlement
MILLER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. PAYPAL, INC., E-BAY INC., and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. C 10-2500 SBA (N.D. Cal.)

PayPal, Inc. operates an on-line payment processing service that
functions as a third party intermediary to facilitate payments
between buyers and sellers of goods and services sold on-line
through commercial websites, such as eBay. As a condition of using
PayPal's service, subscribers must abide by the PayPal user
agreement, among other agreements. The user agreement provides
that upon a breach of its terms, such as by engaging in defined
restricted activities PayPal may hold funds in a seller's account
by placing reserves on accounts and/or limiting and/or suspending
seller's accounts and holding the funds in the accounts for up to
and in some cases exceeding 180 days. Among other things,
restricted activities are defined to include a breach of the user
agreement or any other agreements with PayPal, selling counterfeit
goods, and providing false or inaccurate information.
Plaintiffs Moises Zepeda, Michael Spear, Ronya Osman, Brian
Pattee, Casey Ching, Denae Zamora, Michael Lavanga and Gary Miller
are PayPal users who allege that PayPal placed holds on their
account funds. Plaintiffs allege that PayPal improperly handled
disputed transactions relating to their user accounts by
unilaterally placing holds and reserves thereon without
explanation. PayPal also is alleged to have failed to provide
annual error-resolution notices and monthly account statements in
violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
1693, et seq. The parties have resolved the action on a class-wide
basis and entered into a settlement agreement, as amended, which
the court preliminarily approved in a prior order.

Before the court are plaintiffs' motion for final approval of
amended class action settlement agreement, a motion for award of
attorneys' fees and reimbursement for costs and service awards,
filed by the Lexington Law Group and Quantum Legal LLC, a motion
for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses filed by Marina
Trubitsky and an application for attorney fees by local counsel
David Hicks. Also before the court are various objections that the
court has received in response to notice of the settlement.

Judge Armstrong granted plaintiffs' motion for final approval of
amended class action settlement agreement. The court finds that
the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and is in the
best interest of the settlement class. Plaintiffs' motion for
award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement for costs and service
awards is granted in part. Class counsel is awarded attorneys'
fees in the amount of $800,000, plus costs in the sum of
$38,463.29. Plaintiffs Moises Zepeda, Michael Spear, Ronya Osman,
Brian Pattee, Casey Ching, Denae Zamora, Michael Lavanga and Gary
Miller are each awarded an incentive award in the amount of
$50.00. The Hicks fee application is granted in part and Hicks is
awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $34,782, with said amount
to be paid out of the total award of fees and costs awarded to
class counsel. The Trubitsky fee motion is denied. Melanie
Catanese's request for a two week extension to file a claim is

The court dismisses the action and Fernando v. PayPal, No. 10-1668
SBA, with prejudice as to all settlement class members, consistent
with the released claims identified in the settlement. Plaintiffs
and each settlement class member will be deemed to have fully
released and forever discharged defendants in accordance with the
settlement and the order shall be filed in Case Nos. C 10-2500 SBA
and C 10-1668 SBA, and both files shall be closed and all pending
matters therein shall be terminated.

A copy of Judge Armstrong's order dated March 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/Nf4LlB from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Michael Vincent Storti; Alfredo
Torrijos -- alfredo@asstlawyers.com -- at Arias Sanguinetti Stahle
& Torrijos, LLP; Brian Stephen Kabateck -- bsk@kbklawyers.com --
Richard Kellner -- rlk@kbklawyers.com -- at Kabateck Kellner LLP;
Howard Judd Hirsch -- hhirsch@lexlawgroup.com -- Mark N. Todzo --
at Lexington Law Group, LLP; Jeffrey A. Leon -- at Quantum Legal
LLC; Jonathan Shub -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- at Kohn, Swift &
Graf, P.C.; Seth Michael Lehrman -- seth@pathtojustice.com -- at
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L.

PayPal Inc, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Taylor Potter --
bpotter@stroock.com -- David Wesley Moon -- dmoon@stroock.com --
Julia B. Strickland -- jstrickland@stroock.com -- at Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP

Rob Rawson, Interested Party, Pro Se

Dan Jansen and Evgenia Jansen, Interested Party, represented by
Evgenia Jansen -- boldleon@yahoo.com -- at Jansen Law Firm

Lucinda Christian and Walley Collins, Objectors, represented by
Anthony Albert Ferrigno -- at Law Offices of Anthony A. Ferrigno;
John David Franklin -- jdfranklaw@san.rr.com -- at Franklin &
Franklin; Pamela Elizabeth Havird -- pehavird@att.net -- at Law
Offices of Pamela E. Havird

Tammy Perkins, Objector, represented by Caroline Victoria Tucker -
- ctucker@tuckerpollard.com -- at TUCKER POLLARD & Matt Kurilich

Sam A. Miorelli, E.I., Esq., Objector, Pro Se

Melanie Cantanese, Objector, Pro Se

RICHARD FEARON: Judge Grants Bid to Dismiss "Graham" Suit
Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division granted defendants'
motion to dismiss the case Todd Graham, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Richard Fearon, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16 CV 2366 (N.D.

Eaton Corporation PLC is an Ireland-based manufacturer of
engineered products marketed to customers in the industrial,
agricultural, construction, aerospace, and vehicle markets.
Eaton's stock shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange Inc.
Defendants Richard Fearon, Ken D. Semelsberger, Trent Meyerhoefer,
and Mark McGuire are officers of Eaton and fiduciaries of the
Eaton Savings Plan.

Plaintiffs Todd Graham, Paul Johnson, and Russ Poptanycz are
former employees of Eaton, are participants in the Eaton Savings
Plan and in particular, the Eaton Company Stock Fund, an employee
stock ownership plan that invests primarily in Eaton common stock.

Plaintiffs allege that they each purchased and held shares of
Eaton stock through the Eaton Stock Fund in their plan retirement
savings account from November 13, 2013, through July 28, 2014, the
class period. Plaintiffs allege that the company's stock became
artificially inflated as a result of Eaton executives' false and
misleading representations. They claim that defendants knew or
should have known that the stock was artificially inflated by
fraud. Plaintiffs claim that plan participants who chose to
purchase the Eaton Stock Fund paid fraudulent, excessive prices
for the stock during the class period and suffered financial harm
to their retirement savings by over-paying for Eaton stock. They
bring one claim for failure to prudently manage the plan's assets,
alleging that defendants violated this duty by doing nothing to
protect the retirement savings of the plan participants from harm
as the result of the undisclosed fraud and inflation of Eaton's
stock price. They assert that defendants should have halted new
contributions or investments into the Eaton Stock Fund, issued
truthful or corrective disclosures to cure the fraud, or directed
the Eaton Stock Fund to divert a portion of its holdings into a
low-cost hedging product to serve as a buffer to offset some of
the losses.

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and request for
judicial notice, which asks the court to take judicial notice of
documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, plan
documents, publicly available documents, stock analysts' reports,
and news articles. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and in their brief
in opposition, plaintiffs seek leave to amend if the court grants
defendants' motion so that they may cure the defects in the
original pleading.

Judge Gaughan granted defendants' motion to dismiss and also
granted defendants request for judicial notice.

Judge Gaughan recognize that, given the negative impact of
disclosure, a prudent fiduciary could very easily conclude that
such an action would do more harm than good and that even if
defendants were aware of fraudulent activity that inflated the
value of Eaton's stock, plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege
that they could not have concluded that corrective disclosure
would have done more harm than good.

Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that purchasing an
unidentified hedging product would have been consistent with the
securities laws or that a prudent fiduciary in defendants'
circumstances would not have viewed making such a purchase as more
likely to harm the fund than to help it.

Plaintiffs did not articulate the facts that they would allege or
how they would cure the defects in their complaint. Such a
perfunctory request, inserted at the end of an opposition brief,
without giving the court any reason to believe that an amended
complaint would be anything other than futile, is improper.
Plaintiffs' request is denied.

A copy of Judge Gaughan's memorandum of opinion and order dated
March 24, 2017, is available at https://goo.gl/5QbhFg from

Plaintiffs, represented by:

     Edward H. Glenn, Jr., Esq.
     Jacob H. Zamansky, Esq.
     Justin Sauerwald, Esq.
     Samuel E. Bonderoff
     50 Broadway 32nd Floor
     New York, NY 10004
     Tel: 212-742-1414
     Fax: 212-742-1177

          - and -

     Frank L. Gallucci, III, Esq.
     David R. Grant, Esq.
     55 Public Square Suite 2222
     Cleveland, OH 44113
     Tel: 216-861-0804

Defendants, represented by James E. Brandt -- james.brandt@lw.com
-- Jeff G. Hammel -- jeff.hammel@lw.com -- at Latham & Watkins;
Andrew G. Fiorella -- afiorella@beneschlaw.com -- Johanna Fabrizio
Parker -- jparker@beneschlaw.com -- Joseph A. Castrodale --
jcastrodale@beneschlaw.com -- Shaylor R. Steele --
ssteele@beneschlaw.com -- at Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan &

SHREVEPORT, LA: Responds to Suit Concerning Water Billing
Erin McCarty reports the City of Shreveport has issued this
response to the most recent lawsuit filed in connection with the
water billing scandal:

"This fourth lawsuit against the City and/or Mayor Tyler is purely
political, and shows Mr. Pernici is carrying out the promise Mr.
Wainwright made in August of 2016, that if the City did not pay
them a settlement, then the Water and Sewerage Department would
draw the attention and interest of those "who will find it
irresistible for their own political gain." Mr. Wainwright
continues to make good on his political promises.

Perhaps others who have profited from sweet deals during prior
administrations don't like having this mayor in City Hall because
she will not play the old political games. Mr. Pernici's company
has a consulting contract with BFI, the operator  of the City
landfill. This contract  pays him a percentage of every dollar BFI
makes from the City. BFI got the 25 year landfill contract, and he
got the consulting contract, in 2003 under a previous
administration. Those type deals have not happened on Mayor
Tyler's watch.

The City will vigorously defend this lawsuit and the previous
lawsuits. Nevertheless, the suits are a drain on City and taxpayer
money, and consume a great deal of time for the City employees who
are forced to deal with lawyers instead of the important work of
City government -- rebuilding an aging sewer system, providing
clean water to citizens, paving and repairing aging street
infrastructure, and addressing the everyday issues of citizens.

SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Class Action Case Unfolds in High Court
Jamie Small at Stuff reports the legal community is watching with
interest as a Christchurch class action case unfolds in the High

The court gave a group of homeowners, led by lawyer Grant Cameron
-- grant@gcalawyers.com -- of GCA Lawyers , the go-ahead to
proceed with a class action against Southern Response -- the crown
company set up to handle claims for the failed insurer AMI.

A class action is a legal proceeding where an individual acts on
behalf of a group of people with similar cases.

Insurance lawyer Greg Jones and colleague Lorraine MacDonald
aren't involved in the case, but spoke to Stuff about the novel
aspects of the proceedings.

New Zealand doesn't see a lot of Erin Brockovich-style class
actions because ACC eliminates the need to sue for personal
injury. Brockovich fought against a US energy company in the early

Kiwi class actions tend to be formal financial proceedings, such
as the Fair Play on Fees action against the four major banks.
"Because we have a small amount of these cases, it is going to get
a lot of scrutiny," MacDonald said.

In a 2014 paper, Justice Forrest Miller, the first High Court
judge in charge of the list of earthquake cases, encouraged
claimants to attempt class actions.

MacDonald said the judiciary likely wanted to see if class actions
could be a quicker way of dealing with multiple claimants in the

Another thing to consider, she said, was that some people involved
in the class action might not be able to afford to bring a case to
the High Court on their own.

"Access to justice is a big issue."

The outcome of the Southern Response case will help lawyers know
how to advise their clients and prepare cases for future

New Zealand does not have any legislation that deals with class
actions, though it could arrive in coming years.

Jones said legislation wasn't necessary, because the court system
was flexible and judges could glean the appropriate approach by
considering decisions in other insurance cases.

"Legislation does provide good and sensible outlines, but judges
have good mechanisms and great flexibility under the rules."

The lack of legislation made the decisions in the Southern
Response case even more important, as they would likely be closely
examined when deciding similar class actions in the future, he

"I tell you what, you'll get some legislation out of it I'm sure
too, when people actually see that the process can work and can
produce outcomes that are really important for us."

If the Government does pass class action legislation, any decision
in the Southern Response case will likely help define it.

A class action case needs a unifying factor, or "spine" that joins
those involved together -- in this case the plaintiffs.
"What there needs to be for any class action, is an aspect of your
case that is the same as an aspect of someone else's
case," MacDonald said.

Both sides agree there is no material difference in the claimants'
policies, but the nature of the claims themselves differ.
Justice Cameron Mander originally declined the plaintiffs' request
to proceed as a class action because there was such a "a wide
range of different issues of fact and law".

The group went back to the High Court, arguing that Southern
Response had engaged in a deliberate strategy to deceive
policyholders and delay claims, and Justice David Gendall allowed
them to proceed.

A spokeswoman for Southern Response said the company was appealing
the decision to proceed, saying the fairest, most effective and
expedient way to settle the claims was on a case-by-case basis.
MacDonald said the Appeals Court would carefully consider whether
to hear an appeal.

"It might be that what comes out of any appeal is a clearer set of
guidelines for the future," she said.
"When there's a public interest there's almost an extra reason, in
a way, to hear a case."

MacDonald said it might look like each claimant had very different
issues to settle, but it was up to the court to decide if there
were enough similarities.

"Although every house is unique, the sorts of damage can probably
be grouped into types of damage.

"And once you start breaking it down it may not be as
insurmountable as it first seems to actually deal with these
things in a legal way." [GN]

SPONGETECH DELIVERY: Defendant Lawyer Wins Bid to Dismiss "Orlan"
Chief District Judge Dora L. Irizarry of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the cases captioned JEFFREY P. ORLAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
al., Defendants; and QUANG LE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SPONGETECH
Nos. 10-CV-4093 (DLI)(RML), 10-CV-4104 (DLI)(RML) (E.D.N.Y.).

Spongetech Delivery Systems, Inc., is a publicly traded company
that sold soap-filled sponges. Class plaintiffs were common
shareholders in Spongetech.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Spongetech and eventually
made a first consolidated amended class action complaint and
allege that, from June 12, 2009 through September 29, 2009, Jack
Halperin prepared ninety-two attorney opinion letters containing
materially false and misleading statements and omissions directing
transfer agents to remove restrictive legends from restricted
Spongetech stock and causing those shares to flood the market at
artificially inflated prices. According to the first amended
complaint, at the time he wrote the attorney opinion letters,
Halperin knew that the Spongetech shares were unsaleable and not
subject to any exemptions that would render removal of those
restrictive legends proper.

The first consolidated amended class action complaint asserted
that Halperin's actions constituted violations of federal
securities laws, specifically Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78a et seq., and Rule 10b-
5 promulgated thereunder, because Halperin's attorney opinion
letters concealed from Spongetech shareholders the true value of
the unregistered Spongetech stock released upon the public market.
In particular, the first amended complaint alleged that Halperin:
(1) issued ninety-two Rule 144 attorney opinion letters to
transfer agents resulting in the removal of restrictive legends
from over 922 million shares of unregistered Spongetech stock held
by affiliated entities of Spongetech; (2) advised the transfer
agent that the legends were removable because the affiliated
entities had held the securities for six months or longer; (3)
presented the affiliated entities as non-affiliated entities when
he knew that they were indeed affiliated entities and had not held
the securities for the requisite six-month period; and (4) caused
these unregistered securities to be injected into the public
market when he knew that the public lacked adequate current
information about Spongetech's financial condition.

On March 29, 2012, the court dismissed without prejudice the third
claim of plaintiffs' first consolidated amended class action
complaint pertaining to attorney defendant Halperin for failure to
state a claim for relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to comply with the
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4.

In dismissing the third claim of the first consolidated amended
class action complaint without prejudice, the court afforded
plaintiffs another opportunity to plead the elements of
materiality, scienter and loss causation with greater specificity
in order to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of the
PSLRA and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On May 1, 2012, plaintiffs filed a second consolidated amended
class action complaint (SAC) in which they reasserted the same
causes of action in the third claim against Halperin. However, the
SAC contains new allegations that fall into three general
categories: (1) Halperin knew, or was reckless in not knowing,
that the sale of 922 million restricted Spongetech shares was
unauthorized; (2) Halperin conducted inadequate due diligence with
respect to Spongetech's financial condition; and (3) Halperin's
misrepresentations caused Plaintiffs to suffer economic loss.

Chief District Judge Irizarry granted Halperin's motion to dismiss
as plaintiffs failed to plead sufficiently in the SAC that they
relied upon Halperin's statements in the attorney opinion letters
when purchasing or selling Spongetech stock. Thus, Plaintiffs
failed to establish the materiality element of their Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim
A copy of Judge Irizarry's memorandum and order dated March 24,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/JRDA9T from Leagle.com.

Ken Schwab, Randy Aldieri, Marc Pumerantz, Tony Mineruini, and
Travis Knadle, Movants, represented by William Federman --
wbf@federmanlaw.com -- at Federman & Sherwood

Schick Group, Movant, represented by Phillip Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- at Rosen Law Firm, P.A. P.C.

Jeffrey P. Orlan, Plaintiff, represented by Gary S. Graifman --
mail@kgglaw.com -- at Kantrowitz Goldhamer & Graifman

The Sullivan Lead Plaintiff Group, Plaintiff, represented by Gary
S. Graifman -- mail@kgglaw.com -- at Kantrowitz Goldhamer &

RM Enterprises International, Inc., Frank Lazauskas, Steven
Moskowitz, Michael L. Metter, and Spongetech Delivery Systems,
Inc., Defendant, represented by Paul Richard Bessette -- at
Greenberg Traurig LLP

Mr. Jack H Halperin, Defendant, represented by Anastasios
Tonorezos -- ernest.tonorezos@wilsonelser.com -- Jeffrey J.
Cunningham -- jeffrey.cunningham@wilsonelser.com -- Richard B.
Porter -- at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP

ST. LOUIS, MO: Faces Suit Over Homeless Alternative Housing
Sarah Fenske at River Front Times reports that with St. Louis city
officials poised to force the shutdown of Larry Rice's
controversial homeless "shelter of last resort" downtown saying
they have found alternative housing for its residents, a nonprofit
law group is saying "not so fast."

Arch City Defenders, the local firm behind many successful
lawsuits targeting municipalities, has filed both a motion for a
temporary restraining order and class action lawsuit against the
city in St. Louis Circuit Court, seeking to order the city not to
follow through on its plans to move residents previously housed by
Rice's shelter into a warehouse used by its Forestry Division.

The warehouse is "intended for forestry, gardening equipment,
various city-owned motor vehicles" and "contains hazardous
materials and chemicals and is not suitable for habitability by
humans," the lawsuit argues. The suit was filed under the names of
three homeless residents, but seeks to represent anyone who could
be forced to rely on the city's accommodations.

A hearing has been scheduled today for 3:30 p.m. The lawyers are
expected to argue that the population served by Rice's shelter is
facing "immediate, irreparable harm" if forced to rely on the
Forestry Division warehouse and need an expedited judicial

ArchCity filed the suit in conjunction with the legal clinic at
Saint Louis University. The attorneys visited the site and worked
through the night to prepare the legal actions in response, a
spokeswoman said.

Rice had sought to keep the New Life Evangelical Center open, but
after losing an appeal earlier this week, announced that he would
comply with the city's order.

The city has long sought to shut down the shelter, which serves
approximately 200 people each night. Rice has been without an
occupancy permit since May 2015. But he argues that he handles a
difficult population that no other city shelter is equipped to
handle. And if the attorneys at ArchCity and the SLU Law Clinic
can persuade a judge that the city's plan for those people is
untenable, it could well be enough to grant Rice one more
reprieve. [GN]

TEMPOE LLC: "Garcia" Class Suit Removed to District New Jersey
The class action lawsuit styled Alicia Garcia and Priscila
Dominguez, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
v. Tempoe, LLC, Tempoe New Jersey, LLC, Whynot Leasing, LLC, Buy
and Save Furniture, Inc., Classic Furniture Corp., and John Doe
New Jersey Tempoe Retailers 1-100, Case No. L-000273-17 filed on
March 30, 2017, was removed from the Superior Court of Essex
County on March 31, 2017, to the U.S. District Court District of
New Jersey (Newark). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:17-cv-02106-SDW-LDW to the proceeding.

Tempoe, LLC provides no credit required shopping solutions that
offers various payment options. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Henry Paul Wolfe, Esq.
      1520 US Highway 130, Suite 101
      North Brunswick, NJ 08902
      Telephone: (732) 545-7900
      Facsimile: (732) 545-1030
      E-mail: hwolfe@wolflawfirm.net

The Defendant is represented by:

      Michael R. McDonald, Esq.
      One Gateway Center
      Newark, NJ 07102-5310
      Telephone: (973) 596-4500
      E-mail: mmcdonald@gibbonslaw.com

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Wins Arbitration Bid in Dispute with Drivers
Kat Greene at Law360 reports that Uber Technologies Inc. won a bid
to push a driver's proposed class action into arbitration when a
Florida federal judge ruled on March 31 the dispute over whether
drivers are improperly classified as contractors belongs in
arbitration, not court.

U.S. District Judge Carlos E. Mendoza ruled that the arbitration
provision in driver Robert Rimel's case wasn't unconscionable and
rejected Rimel's contention it should be considered under
California law, finding that the driver had agreed to the contract
in Florida, so Sunshine State laws should apply, according to
March 31's ruling.

Rimel has argued that Florida's rules shouldn't apply to the
arbitration agreement in his case because the agreement includes a
California choice-of-law provision, asking the court to overturn a
magistrate judge's recommendation that Florida law applies and
that the case belongs in arbitration, but the judge said he wasn't

"Plaintiff does not dispute that he accepted Uber's services
agreement and the underlying arbitration provision in Florida,"
Judge Mendoza wrote. "Therefore, the magistrate judge correctly
found that Florida law applies to the arbitration provision."

Rimel had called the magistrate judge's application of Florida law
to the arbitration clause "nonsensical," but, Judge Mendoza noted,
at least six other cases had resulted in the same ruling.

And even if California law were applied to the contract, the judge
said, he still would have agreed the case belongs in arbitration.
For one thing, the provision isn't unconscionable even though it
has a waiver that bars making claims as a class, because it
includes an opt-out provision that would render that waiver
optional, according to the decision.

The arbitrator, not the court, should decide whether the contract
defies California public policy with a waiver of claims under the
state's Private Attorneys General Act, Judge Mendoza found.

Rimel filed his putative class action against Uber in December
2015 accusing the company of misclassifying its drivers as
contract workers instead of employees and  --  as a result  --
not adequately compensating them. Rimel is seeking class
certification of all contracted Uber drivers in Florida.

Rimel alleges in the suit that he opted out of arbitration when he
emailed Uber in December 2015. He accuses Uber's arbitration
provision of being unconscionable and alleges there is not
unmistakable evidence that he agreed to the arbitration provision.

In her Aug. 4 arbitration recommendation, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Karla Spaulding determined Uber's arbitration provision is not
considered unconscionable, because drivers can opt out of
arbitration within 30 days of accepting the service agreement.

Uber, which filed a motion a year ago to compel Rimel to arbitrate
his individual claims against the company, alleges the former
driver clicked buttons on the phone app twice in 2014 saying he
accepted the company's service agreement and arbitration provision
and didn't opt out of the provision within 30 days.

The company had argued in September that Rimel's arguments against
arbitration were a mere repackaging of contentions that didn't fly
earlier in the case, court records show.

Paul Maslo of Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, who represents Rimel, told
Law360 on March 31 he believes the decision is based on a
misapplication of the severability rule as laid out in court

"Unfortunately, the legal landscape has changed significantly
since August 17, 2016, when we filed our objections to the
magistrate judge's initial ruling ... and it doesn't make sense to
appeal," he said, citing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Mohamed v.
Uber Technologies Inc. sending that driver's case to arbitration
as an example of the shift in court opinions.

A spokeswoman for Uber declined to comment.

Rimel is represented by Paul Maslo -- pmaslo@napolilaw.com -- and
Salvatore Charles Badala -- sbadala@napolilaw.com -- of Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC, Brittany Weiner -- brittany@lawicm.com -- of Imbesi
Law PC, and Aylstock Witkin Kreis & Overholtz PLLC.

Uber is represented by Courtney B. Wilson -- cwilson@littler.com -
- and Melanie Andre Zaharias -- mzaharias@littler.com -- of
Littler Mendelson PC.

The case is Rimel v. Uber Technologies Inc. et al., case number
6:15-cv-02191, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida. [GN]

UDREN LAW: Pre-Certification Rule 68 Offer Survives in Pa. Suit
David Canella, Esq., and Gary M. Pappas, Esq., at Carlton Fields,
in an article for JD Supra Business Advisor, wrote that a
magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania denied plaintiff's motion to
strike a Rule 68 offer of judgment served prior to class
certification. The Rule 68 offer in this case -- unlike those at
issue in numerous conflicting opinions culminating in the United
States Supreme Court's 2016 Campbell-Ewald decision -- was not an
attempt to "pick off" the named plaintiff because it also included
the putative class members. Undeterred by the denial of the motion
to strike, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration.

In the original motion to strike, the magistrate judge rejected
plaintiff's argument that a Rule 68 offer made before class
certification was premature and incompatible with Rule 23. In the
motion for reconsideration, plaintiff argued that the court should
strike the Rule 68 offer because: (1) courts have stricken Rule 68
offers of judgment that interfered with Rule 23 safeguards; (2)
plaintiff would not be able to accept a Rule 68 offer on behalf of
the putative class; and (3) the Rule 68 offer was premature
because there had been no discovery of defendant's net worth.
With respect to the first argument, the magistrate judge explained
that other cases striking Rule 68 offers served prior to class
certification involved instances in which the defendant was trying
to "pick-off" the named plaintiff prior to class certification by
directing the offer only to the named plaintiff. In such a case,
the "pick-off" Rule 68 offer could dampen the efforts of the
putative representative to pursue the class action and interject a
conflict between the named plaintiff and the class. In this case,
however, no "pick-off" issue existed because the Rule 68 offer was
made to the named plaintiff and the putative class.

As to the second argument, the magistrate judge rejected the claim
that a plaintiff could not accept a Rule 68 offer on behalf of the
class prior to class certification. The magistrate judge explained
that an accepted Rule 68 offer on behalf of the class would be
just like any other pre-certification settlement. In such cases,
the standard procedure is for the court to provisionally certify
the class so that proper notifications can be disseminated to the
members at large, to hold a fairness hearing, and then to issue a
final class certification and approve the settlement.

Finally, the magistrate judge rejected the argument that a Rule 68
offer was premature when made prior to discovery of the
defendant's net worth. The magistrate judge explained that the
purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage early settlements. A defendant
does not wish to undergo expensive discovery and be liable for "a
runaway train" of the other side's attorney's fees in a case that
the defendant believes should be settled early without further

Accordingly, the magistrate judge denied the plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration of its order denying plaintiff's motion to
strike. [GN]

The case is DALE A. KAYMARK, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated current and former homeowners in Pennsylvania,
Plaintiffs, v. UDREN LAW OFFICES, P.C., Defendant, Civil Action
No. 13-419 (W.D. Pa.).

DALE KAYMARK, Plaintiff, represented by Danielle R. Grunden, J.C.
Evans Law, P.C..

DALE KAYMARK, Plaintiff, represented by John C. Evans, Specter
Specter Evans & Manogue, Michael P. Malakoff, Michael P. Malakoff,
PC & Trent A. Echard, Strassburger McKenna Gutnick & Gefsky.

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant, represented by Jonathan J. Bart,
Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer, P.A., Thomas L. Allen, Reed Smith &
Andrew J. Soven, Reed Smith LLP.

UDREN LAW OFFICES, P.C., Defendant, represented by Jonathan J.
Bart, Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer, P.A.

UNITED STATES: ICE Faces Suit Over Illegal Detention
David Boddiger at Fusion reports that Guatemalan-born Rony Chavez
Aguilar tried to tell agents from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's Chicago Field Office (ICE) that he has been a U.S.
citizen for 16 years, but they didn't believe him.

Now Chavez is suing on behalf of immigrants who are locked up
without expeditious access to judges -- many of them for weeks or
even months -- at federal detention facilities contracted by ICE
in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Wisconsin.

According to Chavez's putative class action lawsuit, filed last
March 27, he was arrested in Kentucky on drug charges and spent
two weeks in a local county jail. He should have then been
released, but instead was transferred to an ICE-contracted
detention facility to await deportation proceedings. It was then
that Chavez told the agents he is a U.S. citizen who came to this
country legally in 2001, The Daily Beast reported. That was on
March 7.

"Tell it to a judge," the agents allegedly told Chavez, according
to his lawyer Charles Roth. The problem was that in the nearly
three weeks that Chavez was held after that, he was never brought
before a judge. And it would take a lawsuit being filed on March
27 to get him released.

That lawsuit challenges ICE's practice of "detaining individuals
prior to initiating removal proceedings against them . . . without
a prompt judicial determination of probable cause, an opportunity
to be heard before or concurrent with the initiation of detention,
or an otherwise prompt hearing before an immigration judge to
understand the charges against them and their due process rights."
It alleges that Chavez's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were
violated, along with federal immigration law. Roth wants the
lawsuit to ensure that immigrant detainees have access to a judge
within 48 hours, The Daily Beast noted.

Legal experts will be following this case closely, because it
happens at a time when immigration courts are hopelessly
backlogged, and the administration of President Donald Trump
already is ramping up its massive deportation campaign targeting
undocumented -- and in this case, documented -- immigrants.
According to the suit, ICE's Chicago Office "detains thousands of
people every year under similar circumstances," without warrants
approved by judges.

The lawsuit added:

During the pre-removal proceedings detention period, individuals
are detained without ICE providing a sworn, particularized
statement of probable cause; without a prompt determination of
probable cause by a detached and neutral judicial officer; without
a prompt hearing before a judge to understand the charges against
them, receive important advisals regarding their due process
rights (including representation by an attorney), and a review of
their continued custody.

While it is illegal for immigration authorities to hold U.S.
citizens in detention, NPR reported that it happens to hundreds of
people each year. An investigation by NPR last year based on two
Freedom of Information Act Requests found that from 2007 to 2015,
693 U.S. citizens were held in local jails at the request of
immigration officials. An additional 818 U.S. citizens were held
in immigration detention centers during the same time period,
according to another analysis, NPR reported. [GN]

UNITED STATES: 1st Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Suit vs. OPM
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of ROSA CARMINA RODRIGUEZ; ALEXIS
Director of the United States Office of Personnel Management,
Defendants, Appellees, No. 15-2178 (1st Cir.).

Plaintiffs are a group of 19 current and former federal employees
working in the non-foreign cost-of-living allowance (COLA) areas.
Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico challenging the
Office of Personnel Management's regulations that exclude COLAs
from the calculation of retirement and other benefits. These COLAs
are received by federal employees working in non-foreign areas
located outside the contiguous United States. Plaintiffs named the
United States, OPM, and the Director of OPM as defendants. The
complaint, as later amended, seeks a declaratory judgment that the
exclusionary rule is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law
under the APA and that the rule unlawfully discriminates against
protected minorities in COLA areas in violation of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e-16. With respect to the discrimination
claims, the complaint alleges both that the rule is the product of
discriminatory intent and that it improperly and adversely impacts
minorities (disparate treatment and disparate impact claim).

On August 20, 2015, upon the government's motion, the district
court dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court first held that the
disparate impact claim was barred by the safe harbor provision of
Title VII, which provides that it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation to employees who work in different locations
absent an intention to discriminate because of protected status.

The court next determined that plaintiffs had failed to
administratively exhaust their disparate treatment claim before
OPM. Finally, the court held that the nondiscrimination claims
were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which
required plaintiffs to pursue their claims at the Merit Systems
Protection Board, with appeal to the Federal Circuit. Plaintiffs

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint and held that the district court properly concluded that
plaintiffs' disparate impact claim is barred by the location-based
safe harbor provision of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2(h), that
plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies as to
their disparate treatment claim and that plaintiffs' non-
discrimination claims were precluded by the CSRA.

A copy of the First Circuit's opinion penned by Circuit Judge
Timothy B. Dyk, dated March 24, 2017, is available at
https://goo.gl/TZIl3D from Leagle.com.

Adam H. Charnes -- Acharnes@kilpatricktownsend.com -- Christin J.
Jones -- Cjones@kilpatricktownsend.com -- Thurston H. Webb --
TWebb@kilpatricktownsend.com -- at Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
LLP., for appellants

Stephanie R. Marcus -- Benjamin C. Mizer -- General, Rosa E.
Rodr°guez-VÇlez -- Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney -- at United States
Department of Justice, for appellees

The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit panel consists
of Circuit Judges Timothy B. Dyk, Jeffrey R. Howard and O.
Rogeriee Thompson.

USA MAINTENANCE: Faces "Hilario" Suit Over Failure to Pay OT
Enrique Hilario and Daniel Cruz, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. USA Maintenance & Cleaning Corp., USA
Maintenance, Inc., Andre Walter, Ulysses Layun, and Christopher
Layun, Case No. 1:17-cv-01835 (E.D.N.Y., March 31, 2017), is
brought against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants operate a janitorial and maintenance company
servicing shopping centers, lifestyle centers, and upscale
specialty retail store. [BN]

Enrique Hilario and Daniel Cruz are pro se plaintiffs.

VOLKSWAGEN: Diesel Owners Dissatisfied With Proposed Settlement
Sean O'Shea at Global News reports that it was heralded last
December as a landmark deal: Volkswagen would pay Canadian
Volkswagen diesel customers up to CAD2.1 billion as compensation
after the company admitted it used software to influence emissions
tests and get regulatory approval for its 2.0 litre engines.

But in courtroom 4-9 at the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto
on March 31, as many as two dozen Canadian VW customers turned out
to express dissatisfaction with the proposed settlement.

"I didn't feel the compensation is enough," said Andrea Manuel,
one of the 105,000 Canadian customers who owns a Volkswagen or
Audi vehicle with the discredited diesel engine.

Manuel told Justice Edward Belobaba, the judge who will decide
whether to approve the deal, that under the proposal she won't
receive enough money from the Volkswagen buy-back to pay off her
bank loan.

Other owners say the deal is insufficient, because it doesn't
recognize the additional costs of products like extended

"I bought extended warranties because I intended to keep the car,"
said Erich Bretholz, who spent CAD6,000 on two extended warranties
for a pair of vehicles he bought.

He said while American owners can get the value of the warranties
back, for an administrative fee of CAD50, Canadian customers like
him won't get anything.

John Archer of Toronto bought his VW diesel in Houston, Texas. Not
to save money, he says, but because there was more choice of
vehicles there.

"I bought it in the States because all they had in Canada was a
black interior and I could get my choice of four different
interiors in the U.S.," said Archer, who says he doesn't qualify
for any compensation in the settlement proposal.
"I will not get any compensation in the United States because I
don't have a U.S. address," he said.

He isn't entitled to anything under the Canadian plan either, he

Justice Belobaba expressed concern to lawyers representing class
claimants and Volkswagen that the proposed deal is not necessarily
as it should be.

"I cannot approve the settlement the way it exists," said Justice
Belobaba, adding "I'm not saying the deal won't be" accepted

Belobaba instructed lawyers to present information to the court
about the U.S. settlement terms. He also wanted to know how much a
Volkswagen customer might expect to receive in compensation under
terms of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, legislation he

"My job again is to find out if it (the offer) is in the best
interest for the class," said Belobaba.

Belobaba has convened another hearing for March 31, April 7. [GN]

VOLKSWAGEN: Faces Class Suit Over Software Upgrades
Ellie Cambridge at The Sun reports Volkswagen drivers say since a
software upgrade their cars have developed faults.

This follows on from an upgrade after the diesel emissions

Some drivers have said experienced their cars losing power.

There is yet to be concrete evidence the flaws are connected to
the software tweak, the Daily Mirror reports a British law firm is
representing owners.

Harcus Sinclair is leading a class action against Volkswagen.
It says a number of problems with cars have been reported after
they were recalled.

About 10,000 people have taken their vehicles to be fixed, with
about 3,500 saying they have experienced problems.
The problems reported ranged from poor fuel consumption to a
sudden loss of power.

Damon Parker, of Harcus, told the Mirror: "We are surveying our
clients to find out what problems they have experienced.
"We will share our findings with the Department for Transport and
the Transport Select Committee."

MP Louise Ellman, chair of the Commons Transport Select Committee,
said the company had confirmed it would investigate at no cost to
customers who were worried the upgrade had negatively impacted
their car.

She added MPs would ensure this would happen.

In February we reported more than 2million Brits could be in line
for a pay-out if a High Court battle is successful.

Drivers caught up in the VW emissions scandal could pocket
GBP3,000 in compensation by joining a lawsuit against the car
And fewer than half the UK vehicles caught in the Volkswagen
emissions scandal have been fixed, the firm's boss has said. [GN]

VCG HOLDING: Exotic Dancers' Claims Sent to Arbitration
Judge Thomas B. Russell of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, granted defendants'
motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the claims in the case
styled MELISSA McGREW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VCG HOLDING CORP.,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-00397-TBR (W.D. Ky.).

PT's Showclub is an adult entertainment venue located in
Louisville, Kentucky. Among other things, the entertainment
includes performance by exotic dancers. Plaintiffs Melissa McGrew,
Sarah Gunter, and Kristina Dunlap were all at one time exotic
dancers at PT's Showclub in Louisville, Kentucky. They allege that
defendants, the club's owners and operators, misclassified them as
independent contractors rather than employees, paid them less than
minimum wage, and deducted certain fees and penalties from their
paychecks, all in violation of federal and state law. On behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated dancers, plaintiffs seek
back pay, restitution, civil penalties, costs, and attorney's

Defendants contend that plaintiffs' claims are all subject to
arbitration on an individual, non-class basis because each
plaintiff signed multiple arbitration agreements while they were
employed at PT's Showclub. In turn, plaintiffs claim that the
arbitration agreements are unenforceable because plaintiffs were
intoxicated when the agreements were executed, and because
managers provided plaintiffs with little or no time to read and
consider the agreements.
Defendants filed a motion asking the court to dismiss plaintiffs'
suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), or in the
alternative, to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' individual
claims and to dismiss plaintiffs' class and collective action

Judge Russell held that because defendants have the right to
compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims, the FAA provides that
the court must stay all further proceedings until arbitration
concludes. However, several circuit courts, including the Sixth
Circuit, hold that when all the plaintiff's claims are subject to
arbitration, dismissal is the proper remedy. Because the court is
satisfied that all of the plaintiffs' claims are subject to
arbitration, it will dismiss the action, rather than stay the

Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a sur-reply is granted.
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismiss is granted.
Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification is denied as
moot. Defendants' motion to stay plaintiffs' conditional
certification motion is denied as moot.

A copy of Judge Russell's memorandum opinion and order dated March
27, 2017, is available at https://goo.gl/DpBEHK from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Harold L. Lichten --
hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Thomas Fowler -- tfowler@llrlaw.com -- at
Lichten & Liss-Rordan, PC; Trent R. Taylor --
ttaylor@barkanmeizlish.com -- at Barkan Meizlish Handelman Goodin
DeRose Wentz

VCG Holding Corp., Defendant, represented by Allan S. Rubin --
RubinA@jacksonlewis.com -- Katharine C. Weber --
katharine.weber@jacksonlewis.com -- Paul A. Caligiuri --
Paul.Caligiuri@jacksonlewis.com -- at Jackson Lewis, PC

Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc., Troy Lowrie, and Michael
Ocello, Defendants, represented by Katharine C. Weber --
katharine.weber@jacksonlewis.com -- at Jackson Lewis PC

WELLS FARGO: Accused of Wrongful Conduct Over Debt Collection
Kellie Gadomski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 2:17-at-
00351 (E.D. Cal., March 31, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. provides personal, small business, and
commercial banking services. [BN]

Kellie Gadomski is a pro se plaintiff.

WELLS FARGO: Leveraging Arbitration Clause to Win Settlement
Michael Hiltzik at Los Angeles Times reports that followers of the
Wells Fargo scandal, in which bank employees opened as many as 2
million checking, savings and credit card accounts behind
customers' backs in order to meet their own quotas, may have been
surprised by the recent announcement that the bank would settle as
many as a dozen class-action lawsuits related to the scandal for
$110 million.

That may sound like a lot of money, but to us, that sounded low.
It sounds low to lawyers for some of the victims too. That's
according to my colleague James Rufus Koren, who reported on March
31 that some of those lawyers are out to kill the deal. Let's hope
they can, because the settlement would allow Wells Fargo to
exploit one of its sleazier customer policies to shortchange not
only its victims, but the public.

The sleazy policy at the heart of this noisome deal is the bank's
insistence that any customer with a dispute must bring that
dispute to arbitration, not to a courtroom. As we've reported,
this is a requirement that chiefly benefits Wells Fargo, because
big companies almost invariably have an advantage over their
customers in arbitration. In fact, the arbitration clause may have
helped Wells Fargo cover up the scandal for years, because
arbitration cases aren't reported publicly.

The clause is especially obnoxious in the context of this scandal.
That's because, on the face of things, one would think that the
employees who were saddling customers with bogus accounts were
operating outside the bounds of the account agreement the
customers had signed.

But the bank's position has been: Once you become our customer,
you're doomed to arbitration no matter what. Among all the
lawsuits erupting from the scandal thus far, the bank has obtained
one ruling in its favor, from San Francisco Federal Judge Vince
Chhabria. He ruled last September that, since Wells employees had
used personal information the customers had given the bank to open
their legitimate accounts, the misuse of that information "may
'relate' to the legitimate accounts." Therefore, the bank's
insistence on arbitration is "not wholly groundless," Chhabria
ruled, and ordered the customers into arbitration.

Remarkably, Chhabria even extended his ruling to Kaylee
Heffelfinger, who alleges that two fake accounts were opened in
her name before she opened legitimate accounts. But the judge
bought the bank's argument that Heffelfinger already had provided
bank employees with enough personal information, even though she
hadn't actually finished opening her real accounts. So he
dismissed her lawsuit too.

Unsurprisingly, Wells Fargo is trying to leverage this one
advantageous ruling to its own benefit. The settlement it reached
was in the case in Chhabria's court, the only place the bank has
scored a victory on arbitration.

"There's only one place that's had that decision, and it turns out
that's the only place where Wells Fargo wants these cases
settled," Christopher Hood, Esq. -- chood@hgdlawfirm.com -- of
Heninger Garrison Davies LLC, a lawyer in Birmingham, Ala., with
two federal lawsuits against the bank, told Koren. "We think
that's a little dubious."

But it could apply nationwide; plaintiffs in other lawsuits would
have to opt out of the settlement to proceed with their own cases.

There's another reason a settlement like this runs counter to the
public interest: It could forestall discovery in the other

There are ample indications that the widespread practice of
opening bogus accounts without customer consent may have been
known at the highest level of Wells Fargo management, including
former Chairman and Chief Executive John Stumpf; his successor as
CEO, Tim Sloan; and his successor as chairman, Stephen Sanger, a
board member since 2003.

This attempt to short-circuit the litigation further gives the lie
to the bank's claim that it's committed to do everything it can to
rectify the alleged fraud  --  "to make things right and restore
trust," as its publicity material says. Customers still seem very
skittish about doing business with Wells Fargo, and this
settlement may be another sign that they're right. [GN]

* GDPR Will Result in Significant Increase in Litigation, PWC Says
Harry Leech at Independent reports that the new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which comes into force in May 2018
could result in a significant increase in the volume of litigation
class action suits taken by EU citizens against companies and
organisations who do not adhere to the letter of the new law,
according to Pat Moran, PWC's Cyber Leader.

"We expect consumer litigation and class actions to quickly follow
once this regulation goes live, as has happened in the US. We are
already seeing niche legal firms being established to cater for
the anticipated demand, which could see another Personal
Protection Insurance (PPI) debacle emerging", he said.
Moran was speaking at a recent breakfast briefing on GDPR what it
means for Irish businesses which was hosted by PWC.

The 250 business leaders present were told that the changes
brought in by the new regulation will be far reaching and that
'compliance should not be underestimated' as GDPR will impact all
business units from marketing, to sales, to IT.

While the prospect of increased litigation and a complex
regulatory framework may be daunting, Moran also said that he
believed that as Ireland will be the only English speaking EU
state post Brexit, this may attract some businesses to Ireland and
encourage others to put more of their key data management roles in

"If a company makes its data strategy decisions in one EU member
state, it is only obliged to report to that Data Protection
Commissioner. In a post-Brexit world, it will be appealing to
multinationals to negotiate with one Data Protection Commissioner
in the only English speaking EU member state, rather than dealing
with different jurisdictions with obvious language complexities",
Moran said. [GN]

* State Senator Pushes "Right to Know" Bill
Tahera Rahman at Our Quad Cities reports that a fight is forming
in Springfield, Illinois, over the future of your privacy on the

The question at hand: Should you have the right to know when an
internet company collects or sells your private information to

State Senator Michael Hastings says you should, and his bill
promises to do that.

The bill comes in the same week congress moved to loosen Internet
privacy protections.

The new changes allow service providers and websites to sell your

The New York Times declared Hastings' bill a "state-level stand
against federal infringement" of your privacy.

But lobbyists representing the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce
argue that the "Right to Know Bill" would result in too many
lawsuits flooding the legal system.

"It's not just about the privacy and protecting privacy. It's
about law firms in class action lawsuits that want to go after
small and medium-sized to large businesses especially in a growing
technology sector and go after them for even honest mistakes with
this legislation," said Mike Reever of the chamber.
But Democratic senator Hastings disagrees.

"People think they have a right to privacy. It's an inherent,
expected right. That's what they think. When you sign up, I'm
going to enter my information into a website so I have access to
that website, they think that information stays there. That
information doesn't stay there. that information gets sold to a
third-party and then they can use that for whatever they choose,"
Hastings said.

If Hastings' bill passes, It would apply to any website you can
access in Illinois.

It's unclear how the state could enforce these laws for websites
based overseas.

The law would give people the right to know exactly what
information internet companies are collecting and selling about

People would still have to reach out and ask for that information.


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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