CAR_Public/170307.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Tuesday, March 7, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 47



                            Headlines

ACE HOMECARE: Molina Moves to Certify Two Classes Under FLSA
ALDRIDGE IT: Hugdahl Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA
ALLIANCE COLLECTION: "Kurtz" Suit Seeks Certification of Class
AMERICAN HOTEL: Certification of Class Sought in E & G Suit
AMERIFLIGHT LLC: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Order in "Sanchez" Suit

ASSURANT INC: Continues to Defend Lender-Placed Insurance Suits
BILL BROWN: Brislane Files Renewed Class Certification Motion
BOSTIK INC: Runyon Seeks Certification of California Class
CAFE LUNA: Court Certifies Class of Servers in "Biller" Suit
CAREMARK RX: Ala. Supreme Court Grants Writ of Mandamus

COLGATE PALMOLIVE: NY Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Caufield"
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Sud" Labor Suit
COUNTY OF NASSAU: New York Court Narrows Claims in "Perros"
CRAFT BREW: Faces Class Action Over Kona Beer Deceptive Labeling
CUMMINGS OIL: Pawnee Nation Files Suit Over September Earthquake

D&J CLEANING: "Cano" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
DELL TECHNOLOGIES: Laptop User Can't Bring Class Action
DOLLAR TREE: Court Certifies Wage Statement Class in Patton Suit
EARTHLINK HOLDINGS: Says Suit Over Windstream Merger Lack Merit
ENERGY TRANSFER: Tribe Officials Want Pipeline Documents Released

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Judge Grants Bid to Arbitrate "Devries"
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT: Tennessee Seeks to Certify Forfeiture Class
GAP INC: California Court Trims Claims in "Munning"
HARRY AND DAVID: "Brown" Sues Over Under-filled Snack Foods
HEWLETT PACKARD: Discount Drugs Seeks Certification of Class

HUNTER INDUSTRIES: Class of Laborers Certified in "King" Suit
INTREXON CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit Granted
JESSE CASARES: Status Hearing in JT's Frames Suit on March 21
JOHNSON & BELL: Data Security Claims Must Be Heard in Arbitration
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Wins Talcum Powder Case in St. Louis

JOHNSON CONTROLS: Indiana Residents Want Class Action Remanded
KANSAS CITY, KS: Ordered to Pay $10 Million for Trash Rebates
KINDRED NURSING: Can't Enforce Arbitration Agreements
KOP KILT: Court to Approve Settlement in "Graudins"
LANE LABS-USA: Bobo's Drugs Moves to Certify Class Under TCPA

LEAPFROG ENTERPRISE: Court Trims Claims in Securities Class Suit
LULAROE: Faces Criticisms Over Leggings Amid Class Action
MARS PETCARE: Among Defendants in Pet Food Class Action
MCAFEE INC: Jabrani Appeals Decision in "Williamson" Class Suit
MDL 1917: June 8 Settlement Final Approval Hearing Set

MDL 2493: 4th Cir. Appeal Filed in TCPA Suit v. Monitronics
MDL 2380: Vullings Appeals Ruling in Shop-Vac Case to 3rd Cir.
MERCY HEALTH: Sanzone Moves to Certify Pension Plan Members Class
MERRILL LYNCH: Faces Class Action Over Customer Cash Use
MICROSOFT CORP: Settles Class Action Over Misprinted Receipts

NETHERLANDS PETROLEUM: Liable for Earthquake Immaterial Damages
NITRO FLUIDS: Corum Seeks Certification of Operators Class
OCWEN LOAN: Class Settlement in "Messineo" Granted Final Approval
OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Certification of Class Sought in "Gomez" Suit
PAYPAL: Faces Class Action Over Giving Fund Platform

PHILIP MORRIS: 11 Smoking & Health Class Cases Pending at Feb. 10
PHILIP MORRIS: Awaits Appellate Decision in "Letourneau" Suit
PHILIP MORRIS: Awaits Appellate Ruling in Conseil Quebecois Suit
PHILIP MORRIS: "Bourassa" Class Suit Remains Pending in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: "Jacklin" Class Suit Remains Pending in Ontario

PHILIP MORRIS: "McDermid" Class Suit Remains Pending in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Preliminary Motions in "Adams" Suit Remain Pending
PHILIP MORRIS: Sao Paulo Public Prosecutor's Appeal Still Pending
PHILIP MORRIS: Still No Activity in 3 Suits Pending in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Two Appeals in ADESF Suit Remain Pending in Brazil

PIONEER CREDIT: Louisiana Court Certifies Class in "Masson" Suit
PIVOTAL PAYMENTS: "Abante" Survives Dismissal Bid
PRIVATE ADVISORY: Wash. Court Stays "Farr" Pending SEC Action
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Class Settlement in "Emmons" Has Final OK
SELF-RELIANCE INC: Care Staff Class Certified in "Wengerd" Suit

SI WIRELESS: Seeks Arbitration in Automated Text Class Action
SOUTHERN KOMFORT: "Bryant" Labor Case to Recover Overtime Pay
SPEARMINT RHINO: Underpays Strip Club Dancers, "Ortega" Suit Says
STEVEN SCHUSS: MacNeill Attorneys Analyze Med Mal Case Ruling
T-MOBILE USA: Stiffs Sales Reps for Overtime, "Salgado" Suit Says

TAKATA CORP: Criminal Plea Deal to Impact Airbag Civil Suits
TSUNAMI IN ST. PETERSBURG: Vongkultrup Seeks to Certify Class
UNDER ARMOUR: Bloated Stock Price Hit in "Breece" SEC Suit
UNITED STATES: Names of Detainees in Travel Ban Case Turned Over
UNITED STATES: Trump Strikes at 9th Cir. After Travel Ban Ruling

UNITED STATES: Data Breach Class Action Against VAMC Dismissed
UNITED STATES: Health Republic Invite Other Insurers to Join Suit
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA: Sued for Cutting $3.4 Million in Scholarships
WAL-MART STORES: Judge Dismisses Shareholders' Class Action
WEINSTEIN PINSON: Status Hearing in "Marquez" Suit Set for May 2

WILLIE'S CHICKEN: Parties Sought Certification of Workers Class
YAHOO INC: CEO Relinquishes Annual Bonus Following Data Breaches
YAHOO INC: Verizon Merger Deal Still On Amid Data Breach Suits

* Companies Must Comply with Calif. Privacy Laws to Avert Suits
* Defense Lawyer Shares Concerns on Class Action Reform Bill
* Gorsuch Often Sides with Defense on Class Actions, Arbitration
* House Approves Fairness in Class Action Litigation Bill
* New Immigration Enforcement Guidelines May Strain Courts

* Plaintiffs Attorney Shares Thoughts on Class Action Reform Bill
* Plaintiffs' Lawyers Benefit More from Food Labeling Litigation




                            *********


ACE HOMECARE: Molina Moves to Certify Two Classes Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled TONI MOLINA, ERICA TOVAR,
TARA WARD, LY NGUYEN, CONSUELO POWELL DONALD HALL, and DEBBIE
BURGESS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. ACE HOMECARE, LLC, BRL INVESTMENTS, LLC, ARTHUR BARLAAN, and
JOCELYN BARLAAN, Case No. 8:16-cv-02214-JDW-TGW (M.D. Fla.), move
the Court to conditionally certify classes under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and authorize them to mail and e-mail notice of the
lawsuit and consent to become a party plaintiff form to:

Nurse Putative FLSA Minimum Wage Putative Class:

     All nurses who worked for Defendants within the last three
     years who believe they were not paid proper minimum wage
     compensation during any work week of their employment within
     the applicable statute of limitations period.

Non-nurse Putative FLSA Minimum Wage Putative Class:

     All other employees who worked for Defendants within the
     last three years who believe they were not paid proper
     minimum wage compensation during any work week of their
     employment within the applicable statute of limitations
     period.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to direct the Defendants to
produce contact information of putative class members, to
authorize their counsel to send notices to those members and to
direct the Defendants to post at all of its business locations a
copy of the initial notice.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ojet9pdw

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Luis A. Cabassa, Esq.
          Brandon J. Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
          E-mail: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                  bhill@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Chad A. Justice, Esq.
          BLACK ROCK TRIAL LAWYERS
          201 S Westland Avenue
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 254-1777
          Facsimile: (813) 254-3999
          E-mail: chadjustice@blackrocklaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Stanford R. Solomon, Esq.
          Blake J. Fredrickson, Esq.
          THE SOLOMON LAW GROUP, P.A.
          1881 West Kennedy Boulevard
          Tampa, FL 33606
          Telephone: (813) 586-0111
          Facsimile: (813) 225-1050
          E-mail: spiper@solomonlaw.com
                  bfredrickson@solomonlaw.com


ALDRIDGE IT: Hugdahl Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled KEN HUGDAHL, and others
similarly situated v. ALDRIDGE IT SERVICES, LLC, THE DAVID L.
ALDRIDGE COMPANY, INC., and, DAVID L. ALDRIDGE, Case No. 4:16-cv-
03073 (S.D. Tex.), files with Court an unopposed motion for
conditional certification and entry of order authorizing and
approving notice to putative class members.

The collective action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.  The Plaintiff's amended complaint contains a description of
the Putative Class Members, whose interests the Plaintiff purports
to represent in this matter, and to whom he seeks to provide the
requested notice, according to the Motion.

The Defendants do not oppose the Motion but they reserve and do
not waive any and all defenses, the right to seek decertification,
and the right to dispute ultimate liability to any particular
Putative Class Member and/or whether a two-year or three-year
statute of limitations applies.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=WOO1CXji

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas H. Padgett, Jr., Esq.
          ROSS LAW GROUP
          4809 Pine St.
          Bellaire, TX 77401
          Telephone: (800) 634-8042
          Facsimile: (512) 474-5306
          E-mail: tpadgett@rosslawgroup.com

               - and -

          Charles L. Scalise, Esq.
          Daniel B. Ross, Esq.
          ROSS LAW GROUP
          1104 San Antonio St.
          Austin, TX 78701
          E-mail: charles@rosslawgroup.com
                  dan@rosslawgroup.com


ALLIANCE COLLECTION: "Kurtz" Suit Seeks Certification of Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TYLER J. KURTZ, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALLIANCE COLLECTION
AGENCIES, INC., a Wisconsin Corporation; and, JOHN AND JANE DOES
NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 25, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00203-WCG (E.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a class of:

   "all persons with addresses in the State of Wisconsin, to whom
   Alliance mailed a written collection communication, which
   failed to identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt
   is owed, during the period beginning February 14, 2016 and
   ending March 7, 2017".

Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their respective officers,
members, partners, managers, directors and employees, their
respective immediate families, legal counsel for all parties to
this action, and all members of their immediate families.

The case involves three separate collection letters all dated
December 30, 2016 which Defendant Alliance Collection Agencies,
Inc. sent to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect an alleged debt
owed to St. Elizabeth Hospital.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=DgeVUZOJ

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Heather B. Jones, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081 1315
          Telephone: (973) 379 7500
          Facsimile: (973) 532 5868
          E-mail: philip@sternthomasson.com
                  andrew@sternthomasson.com
                  heather@sternthomasson.com


AMERICAN HOTEL: Certification of Class Sought in E & G Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled E & G, INC., a West Virginia
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons v. AMERICAN HOTEL REGISTER COMPANY, an
Illinois corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-5, Case No. 1:17-cv-01011
(N.D. Ill.), submits its motion for class certification pursuant
to Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011).

E & G proposes this class definition:

     All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
     filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile
     messages of material advertising the commercial availability
     or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on
     behalf of Defendants, (3) from whom Defendants did not
     obtain "prior express invitation or permission" to send fax
     advertisements, and (4) with whom Defendants did not have an
     established business relationship, and/or (5) which did not
     display a proper opt-out notice.

E & G also asks the Court to appoint it as the class
representative, and appoint its attorneys as class counsel.  The
Plaintiff further asks for a status conference with the Court as
soon as practicable.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=nuuyYkGN

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian J. Wanca, Esq.
          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          Ross M. Good, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: bwanca@andersonwanca.com
                  rkelly@andersonwanca.com
                  rgood@andersonwanca.com


AMERIFLIGHT LLC: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Order in "Sanchez" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Ameriflight, LLC, filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled David Sanchez v. Ameriflight, LLC, Case No.
3:16-cv-02733-MMA-BGS, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of San Diego (Case No. 37-02014-
00023517-CU-OE-CTL), but was later removed to the District Court.

The lawsuit arose from labor-related issues.

The appellate case is captioned as David Sanchez v. Ameriflight,
LLC, Case No. 17-80023, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

Plaintiff-Respondent DAVID SANCHEZ, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Alisa Ann Martin, Esq.
          AMARTIN LAW
          600 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 308-6880
          Facsimile: (619) 308-6881
          E-mail: alisa@pattersonlawgroup.com

Defendant-Petitioner AMERIFLIGHT, LLC, is represented by:

          Spencer C. Skeen, Esq.
          Timothy L. Johnson, Esq.
          Jonathan Liu, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          4370 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 990
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (858) 652-3100
          Facsimile: (858) 652-3101
          E-mail: spencer.skeen@ogletreedeakins.com
                  tim.johnson@ogletreedeakins.com
                  jonathan.liu@ogletreedeakins.com


ASSURANT INC: Continues to Defend Lender-Placed Insurance Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Assurant, Inc., continues to defend itself against class action
lawsuits arising from its lender-placed insurance programs, the
Company said in its Form 10-K filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 14, 2017, for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2016.

The Company is involved in a variety of litigation relating to its
current and past business operations and may from time to time
become involved in other such actions. In particular, the Company
is a defendant in class actions in a number of jurisdictions
regarding its lender-placed insurance programs. These cases allege
a variety of claims under a number of legal theories. The
plaintiffs seek premium refunds and other relief. The Company
continues to defend itself vigorously in these class actions and,
as appropriate, to enter into settlements.

The Company says: "We participate in settlements on terms that we
consider reasonable in light of the strength of our defenses;
however, the results of any pending or future litigation and
regulatory proceedings are inherently unpredictable and involve
significant uncertainty. Unfavorable outcomes in litigation or
regulatory proceedings, or significant problems in our
relationships with regulators, could materially adversely affect
our results of operations and financial condition, our reputation,
our ratings, and our ability to continue to do business. They
could also expose us to further investigations or litigation. In
addition, certain of our clients in the mortgage and credit card
and banking industries are the subject of various regulatory
investigations and litigation regarding mortgage lending
practices, credit insurance, debt-deferment and debt cancellation
products, and the sale of ancillary products, which could
indirectly affect our businesses."

Assurant, Inc. is a holding company whose subsidiaries globally
provide risk management solutions, protecting where consumers live
and the goods they buy.


BILL BROWN: Brislane Files Renewed Class Certification Motion
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JONATHAN BRISLANE, etc., the Plaintiff,
v. BILL BROWN, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-06002-JFW-
E (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff renews his class certification motion
and again moves the court to certify the class of:

   "persons who, as inmates, both pre-trial detainees and
   convicted persons, were forced to sleep on the floors of the
   Santa Barbara County jails without state-rated bunks".

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=M611BAad

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marion R. Yagman, Esq.
          Joseph Reichmann, Esq.
          YAGMAN & REICHMANN
          475 Washington Boulevard
          Venice Beach, CA 90292-5287
          Telephone: (310) 452-3200


BOSTIK INC: Runyon Seeks Certification of California Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled PATRICK E. RUNYON (AS TRUSTEE OF THE PATRICK
E. RUNYON AND TERRI E. RUNYON REVOCABLE TRUST DATED AUGUST 7,
2015); JOSEPH S. SHUSTER AND GEORGANNE L. SHUSTER, AND EVERARDO
VIDRIO AND ZEFERINA VIDRIO, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BOSTIK, INC., a
Delaware corporation; DAVID C. GREENBAUM CO., INC., a California
corporation; LEONARD'S CARPET SERVICE, INC., a California
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 5:16-cv-02413-RGK-SP (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will
move the Court on March 20, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., for an order
certifying a California class of:

   "all owners of single-family homes located in California in
   which Leonard's Carpet Service, Inc. installed ceramic,
   porcelain, or natural stone floor tiles on concrete substrates
   using D-70 as part of original/new construction".

Excluded from the Class are (i) Defendants, any entity in which a
Defendant has a controlling interest, or which has a controlling
interest in a Defendant, and Defendants' legal representatives,
predecessors, successors and assigns; (ii) governmental entities;
(iii) Defendants' employees, officers, directors, agents, and
representatives and their family members; (iv) the Judge and staff
to whom this case is assigned, and any member of the Judge's
immediate family; (v) any California homeowner who has had all
their floor tile replaced under Defendants' express warranties;
and (vi) any California homeowner who has released their claims
regarding D-70 as against Leonard's Carpet Service, Inc. and
Bostik, Inc.

The Plaintiffs further ask the Court to certify Plaintiffs as the
class representatives for the proposed Class, and Stuart M.
Eppsteiner, Esq., of Eppsteiner Law, APC, William Naumann, Esq.,
of The Naumann Law Firm, PC, and Jean-Claude Lapuyade, Esq., of
The JCL Law Firm, as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=a6WQYXOg

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stuart M. Eppsteiner, Esq.
          EPPSTEINER LAW, APC
          5519 Clairemont Mesa Blvd. Suite 5129
          San Diego, CA 92117
          Telephone: (858) 350 1500
          Facsimile: (858) 598 5599
          E-mail: Sme@Eppsteiner.Com

               - and -

          William H. Naumann, Esq.
          THE NAUMANN LAW FIRM, PC
          10200 Willow Creek Road, Suite 150
          San Diego, CA 92131
          Telephone: (858) 792 7474
          Facsimile: (858) 564 9380
          E-mail: William@Naumannlegal.com

               - and -

          Jean-Claude Lapuyade, Esq.
          JCL LAW FIRM, APC
          10200 Willow Creek Road, Suite 150
          San Diego, CA 92131
          Telephone: (619) 599 8292
          Facsimile: (619) 599 8291
          E-mail: jlapuyade@jcl-lawfirm.com


CAFE LUNA: Court Certifies Class of Servers in "Biller" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Paul A. Magnuson entered a memorandum and order in the
lawsuit entitled Kristen Biller, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Cafe Luna of Naples, Inc., Cafe Luna
East LLC, Edward J. Barsamian, and Shannon Radosti, Case No. 2:14-
cv-00659-PAM-MRM (M.D. Fla.):

   1. granting the Plaintiff's motion to certify classes;

   2. ruling that the Plaintiff's proposed notice of lawsuit
      should include the Court's changes; and

   3. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's motion
      for summary judgment.

The minimum-wage class is defined as "all servers who worked for
Defendants within the last three years who were required to
participate in Defendants' mandatory tip pools."  The overtime-
claim class is defined as "all hourly-paid employees who worked
for Defendants at both of Defendants' restaurant locations within
the same workweek, in one or more workweeks within the last three
years, who worked in excess of 40 hours per week when the hours
worked at both restaurants are taken together."

Ms. Biller has met the low burden to conditionally certify the
class and has also proved her overtime claim for the period
November 11 to December 29, 2013, as a matter of law, Judge
Magnuson stated.  Judge Magnuson, however, opined that Ms. Biller
has failed to prove her overtime claim as a matter of law as to
any other employees or time periods.

Judge Magnuson adds that there are genuine issues of material fact
that preclude summary judgment on her minimum-wage claim.

A copy of the Memorandum and Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Anz2U4bR


CAREMARK RX: Ala. Supreme Court Grants Writ of Mandamus
-------------------------------------------------------
MedPartners, Inc., a physician-practice-management/pharmacy-
benefits-management corporation that was the predecessor in
interest to Caremark, Inc., and Caremark Rx, LLC, began issuing to
investors a type of convertible security known as threshold-
appreciation-price securities, or TAPS.

In March 1999, a California state agency appointed a conservator
over a MedPartners subsidiary operating in California and
subsequently initiated bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of the
subsidiary. In March 2000, a case entitled Taff v. Caremark, Inc.
was filed by certain TAPS holders in Franklin Circuit Court to
resolve the issue whether the bankruptcy of the California
subsidiary constituted a termination event entitling them to an
immediate payment. A settlement was quickly reached and, on June
9, 2000, the trial court entered a final judgment approving the
terms of the settlement. Part of the court's decision expresses
that the court reserves and maintains continuing jurisdiction over
all matters relating to the settlement agreement or the
consummation of the settlement, the validity of the settlement,
the construction and enforcement of the settlement and any orders
entered pursuant thereto.

Approximately 16 years later, in July 2016, Taff class counsel
moved the Franklin Circuit Court to enter an order requiring
Caremark to produce for them certain information regarding the
members of the Taff class so that Taff class counsel could notify
those members of a proposed settlement in a separate class-action
lawsuit pending against Caremark in the Jefferson Circuit Court,
Johnson v. Caremark Rx, LLC, in which some of the members of the
Taff class might be able to file claims.

Caremark opposed Taff class counsel's request arguing that Taff
class counsel's invocation of and reliance upon Rule 60(b)(6),
Ala. R. Civ. P., was inappropriate and that the Franklin Circuit
Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. The
Franklin Circuit Court conducted a hearing on Taff class counsel's
motion and requested proposed orders from the parties. In their
proposed order, Taff class counsel withdrew their request for
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and instead requested that the
trial court order Caremark to provide the requested information on
the basis that the court had, in its June 2000 final judgment
approving the Taff settlement, stated that it was reserving and
maintaining continuing jurisdiction over all matters relating to
the settlement agreement. On August 1, 2016, the trial court
denied Taff class counsel's request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief but
orders under its retained jurisdiction that Caremark must file
with the court on or before August 31, 2016, all documents in its
possession or to which it has reasonable access that identify
class members who received notice, or who held TAPS, and the
number of TAPS or other MedPartners securities held by them.

The trial court also specifically stated that Caremark was
required to produce the list of names and addresses described in
the affidavit submitted in conjunction with Caremark's initial
motion opposing the Taff class counsel's Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Caremark petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its August 1 order.
Caremark thereafter moved to stay the trial court's August 1 order
and, on August 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted the
motion to stay.

The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Caremark Rx, LLC's petition
and issued a writ of mandamus and held that the jurisdiction
retained by the trial court after it entered its final judgment in
Taff is limited to interpreting or enforcing that final judgment.
The trial court could not extend its jurisdiction over any matter
somehow related to the June 2000 final judgment in perpetuity by
simply declaring it so. The August 1 order was effectively a
modification of the June 2000 final judgment, however, the trial
court lost jurisdiction to amend or modify the June 2000 judgment
30 days after it was entered. The Franklin Circuit Court is
directed to vacate the August 1 order, which it was without
jurisdiction to enter.

The case is titled Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC, formerly known as
MedPartners, Inc., and Caremark, Inc. (In re: James Taff v.
Caremark Rx, LLC, formerly known as MedPartners, Inc., and
Caremark, Inc.), No. 1151160 (Ala.)

A copy of the Supreme Court of Alabama's opinion penned by acting
Chief Justice Lyn Stuart, dated February 24, 2017, is available at
https://goo.gl/KDq2Qr from Leagle.com.

The Supreme Court of Alabama panel consist Acting Chief Justice
Lyn Stuart and Justices Michael F. Bolin, Greg Shaw, James Allen
Main, and Tommy Bryan.


COLGATE PALMOLIVE: NY Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Caufield"
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lorna Schofield of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case
styled PAUL CAUFIELD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE
CO., et al., Defendants, No. 16 Civ. 4170 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y.).

Paul Caufield and Rebecca Staley are former employees of Colgate-
Palmolive Co. and both were and are participants in the Colgate-
Palmolive Co. Employees' Retirement Income Plan, which is
sponsored by Colgate and administered by the Committee. Caufield
was employed by Colgate from 1977 to 1999, while Staley was
employed by from 1979 to 1994.

The Plan is a defined benefit pension plan. Prior to July 1, 1989,
the Plan used a final average pay formula, meaning that the level
of benefits was based on the participant's length of service and
average salary during her final years of service. Effective July
1, 1989, the Plan became a cash balance plan, which essentially
uses a career average pay formula. The new plan formula defines a
participant's benefits in terms of a Personal Retirement Account
balance, which reflects accumulated monthly pay-based credits and
interest. Upon retirement, the PRA balance is converted into an
annuity or, if preferred, paid as a lump sum.

Because the benefits provided under the new formula would in some
circumstances be less valuable than the benefits provided under
the old formula, Colgate enacted protective Plan provisions and
offered enhanced benefits for participants with pre July 1989
benefits. Participants had the option to continue earning benefits
under the pre July 1989 final average pay formula by making
employee contributions to the Plan. Participants who selected this
option were to receive the larger of the annuity calculated under
the Plan's pre July 1989 final average pay formula as continued in
effect post July 1, 1989, or the Plan's new PRA formula plus an
annuity based on the employee's contributions.

Caufield and Staley had pre-July 1989 benefits and opted to make
employee contributions. When they retired from Colgate in 1999 and
1994, respectively, they each elected to receive their benefits
under the Plan in the form of a lump sum. Colgate paid Caufield
$104,386.00 and Staley $22,425.64.

In 2005, Colgate acknowledged that the lump sums the Plan had been
paying to participants with pre-July 1989 benefits were less than
the lump sums to which they were statutorily entitled. The
deficiency in the lump sum payments meant that Plan participants
have been deprived of some of their non-forfeitable pension
benefits. To correct the problem, Colgate enacted the Residual
Annuity Amendment (RAA) in 2005. The RAA was effective
retroactively to July 1, 1989 but the same was not implemented
until 2014, and have never provided Plan participants an updated
summary plan description or summary of material modifications
disclosing the RAA.

In 2007, three lawsuits were filed against the Plan alleging that
it had miscalculated the pension benefits of several thousand
participants since July 1, 1989. The cases were consolidated into
Colgate I. In May 2010, after three years of litigation, the
parties reached an agreement in principle to settle the case. Up
to that point, defendants had not produced a copy of the RAA in
response to discovery requests. Once plaintiffs' counsel received
a copy of the RAA in July 2011, they insisted that all RAA claims
be carved out of the settlement agreement. Colgate and the Plan
eventually agreed, and on October 9, 2013, the parties executed a
settlement agreement. The court approved the settlement agreement
and noted that certain claims known as the Residual Annuity Claims
were excluded from the scope of the settlement.

In August 2014, defendants granted additional benefits under the
RAA to a few hundred Plan participants. Caufield received a
Residual Annuity of $57.94 per month plus a gross payment of
$16,262.54, representing missed payments of his Residual Annuity
from the date his lump sum pension benefit was paid, accumulated
with interest. Staley received no Residual Annuity. Staley had
receiving nothing prompting her to write to the plan
administrator. She requested that the Plan provide her the annuity
benefit and an explanation of how it was calculated. Laura Flavin,
Colgate's Vice President for Global Compensation and Benefits,
responded on behalf of the Committee and denied Staley's claim for
an annuity benefit.

Counsel for plaintiffs subsequently requested additional
documents, records and information from defendants and, by letter
dated April 6, 2015, appealed both the denial of Staley's claim
for an annuity benefit, and the determination of the amount of
Caufield's Residual Annuity. Daniel Marsili, Colgate's Senior Vice
President, Global Human Resources, denied Staley's claims appeal
by letter dated June 4, 2015. Marsili asserts in the letter that
Staley's claims were released as part of the settlement agreement
in Colgate I. On June 3, 2016,

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit and assert claims
against defendants for violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001 et seq., and
for contempt of the court's final order and judgment in Colgate I.
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the claims
were released in the settlement agreement from Colgate I, are time
barred and fail to state a claim.

Judge Schofield denied defendants' motion to dismiss because
plaintiffs' claims for benefits under RAA are timely and not
barred by the release in the Colgate I settlement agreement.

A copy of Judge Schofield's opinion and order dated February 24,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/uvR8d3 from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by:

     Albert Huang, Esq.
     Steven Dana Cohen, Esq.
     Eli Gottesdiener, Esq.
     GOTTESDIENER LAW FIRM, PLLC
     498 7th Street
     Brooklyn, NY 11215
     Tel: 718-788-1500
     Fax: 718-788-1650

Defendants, represented by Jeremy P. Blumenfeld --
jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com -- Jeffrey A. Sturgeon --
jeffrey.sturgeon@morganlewis.com -- at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Sud" Labor Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Monica Sud and Cecilia Jacobo filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit titled Monica Sud, et al. v. COSTCO,
et al., Case No. 4:15-cv-03783-JSW, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Oakland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court, on January 24, 2017, dismissed with prejudice the class
action, which alleges that Costco sold prawns harvested with slave
labor, despite the Company's policy banning human rights abuses in
its supply chain.

Lead plaintiff Monica Sud sued Costco in August 2015, claiming the
retail giant buys farmed prawns from Thailand and other parts of
Southeast Asia knowing they are produced with slave labor on
unregistered "ghost ships."

The appellate case is captioned as Monica Sud, et al. v. COSTCO,
et al., Case No. 17-15307, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Cecilia Jacobo and Monica Sud's opening brief
      is due on June 1, 2017;

   -- Appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation's answering brief is
      due on July 3, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 14 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Plaintiffs-Appellants MONICA SUD, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and CECILIA JACOBO, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Niall McCarthy, Esq.
          Anne Marie Murphy, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP
          840 Malcolm Road
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 697-6000
          E-mail: nmccarthy@cpmlegal.com
                  amurphy@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Derek G. Howard, Esq.
          DEREK G. HOWARD LAW FIRM, INC.
          42 Miller Avenue
          Mill Valley, CA 94941
          Personal: 415-432-7192
          Telephone: (415) 432-7192
          Facsimile: (415) 524-2419
          E-mail: derek@derekhowardlaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel Joseph Mulligan, Esq.
          JENKINS MULLIGAN & GABRIEL LLP
          10085 Carroll Canyon Rd., Suite 210
          San Diego, CA 92131
          Telephone: (415) 982-8500
          Facsimile: (415) 391-7568
          E-mail: dan@jmglawoffices.com

Defendant-Appellee COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, a Washington
Corporation, is represented by:

          Robert A. Mittelstaedt, Esq.
          Caroline Nason Mitchell, Esq.
          Craig Stewart, Esq.
          David Louis Wallach, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          555 California Street, 26th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 875-5748
          Telephone: (415) 875-5745
          E-mail: ramittelstaedt@jonesday.com
                  cnmitchell@jonesday.com
                  cestewart@jonesday.com
                  dwallach@jonesday.com


COUNTY OF NASSAU: New York Court Narrows Claims in "Perros"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Leonard D. Wexler of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motion to dismiss, in the case ALEXANDER PERROS,
THOMAS DELLE, NICHOLAS LENOCI, VICTOR PATALANO, RONALD LANIER and
IBRAHIM ZAHRAN LONG ISLAND OFFICE Collectively on Behalf of All
Persons Similarly Situated and/or Sheriff's Department Former
Personnel Unfairly Denied Proper "Recommendation for Consideration
of Application for Pistol License for Retiring Peace [Police]
Officer" Forms and/or "Good Guy Letters" Following Retirement, Due
to Injury and/or Disability, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU,
NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, and MICHAEL SPOSATO, in his Individual and Official
Capacities, Defendants, No. CV 15-5598 (E.D.N.Y.)

Plaintiffs, Alexander Perros, Thomas Delle, Nicholas Lenoci,
Victor Patalano, Ronald Lanier and Ibrahim Zahran are all former
Corrections Officers or Deputy Sheriffs who were employed by the
Nassau County Sheriffs Department for a number of years before
retiring on disability due to injuries suffered in the course of
their duties as Sheriffs Department employees. Following their
retirement, plaintiffs each applied to the Sheriffs Department for
a good guy letter, to which Sheriff Michael Sposato denied on the
grounds that plaintiffs were injured and/or disabled for medical
reasons at the time of their retirement.

Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action on September 28,
2015, and amended their complaint, as of right, on November 9,
2015. The first amended complaint alleges that defendants violated
plaintiffs' 2nd Amendment, due process and equal protection rights
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiffs further allege that
defendants discriminated against them on the basis of disability
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 794.
Finally, plaintiffs assert a claim for municipal liability, as
well as state law claims for gross negligence and tortious
interference with prospective contractual advantage.

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint in
its entirety, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

Judge Wexler granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion
to dismiss. Specifically, the motion is granted with respect to
plaintiffs' due process, Second Amendment, ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claims, and those claims are dismissed. In addition,
defendants' motion is also granted with respect to plaintiffs'
state law claims for tortious interference with prospective
contractual advantage and gross negligence and those claims are
also dismissed. Finally, because the Nassau County Police
Department and the Nassau County Sheriffs Department are not
suable entities, all claims against them are dismissed in their
entirety. In all other respects, defendants' motion to dismiss is
denied and the action shall continue solely with respect to
plaintiffs' equal protection and municipal liability claims.

A copy of Judge Wexler's memorandum opinion dated February 24,
2017, is available at https://goo.gl/V6kgim from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by:

     Frederick K. Brewington, Esq.
     Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington
     556 Peninsula Blvd.
     Hempstead, NY 11550
     Tel: 516-489-6959
     Fax: 516-489-6958

Defendants, represented by Ralph J. Reissman, Nassau County
Attorney's Office


CRAFT BREW: Faces Class Action Over Kona Beer Deceptive Labeling
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a class-action lawsuit says Kona
Brewing Company leads customers to believe they are buying made-
in-Hawaii beer.

The lawsuit filed in California is against Craft Brew Alliance,
which advertises, markets, distributes and sells the Kona brand.

Craft Brew Alliance spokeswoman Jenny McLean won't comment on
pending litigation.  She explains that all packaged Kona Brewing
beer is produced in Oregon, Washington state, New Hampshire and
Tennessee.  A Kailua-Kona, Hawaii brewery produces draft beer
that's sold in Kona Brewing pubs and elsewhere in the islands.

The lawsuit says consumers purchased Kona Brewing beer because
they believed it came from Hawaii.  The lawsuit says Craft Brew's
advertising and labeling is deceptive.

According to its website, Kona Brewing ensures freshness and
minimizes its carbon footprint by brewing beer close to
distribution markets.


CUMMINGS OIL: Pawnee Nation Files Suit Over September Earthquake
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Murphy, writing for The Associated Press, reports that an
Oklahoma-based Native American tribe filed a lawsuit in its own
tribal court system on March 3 accusing several oil companies of
triggering the state's largest earthquake that caused extensive
damage to some near-century-old tribal buildings.

The Pawnee Nation alleges in the suit that wastewater injected
into wells operated by the defendants caused the 5.8-magnitude
quake in September and is seeking physical damages to real and
personal property, market value losses, as well as punitive
damages.

The case will be heard in the tribe's district court with a jury
composed of Pawnee Nation members.

"We are a sovereign nation and we have the rule of law here," said
Andrew Knife Chief, the Pawnee Nation's executive director. "We're
using our tribal laws, our tribal processes to hold these guys
accountable."

Attorneys representing the 3,200-member tribe in north-central
Oklahoma say the lawsuit is the first earthquake-related
litigation filed in a tribal court.  If an appeal were filed in a
jury decision, it could be heard by a five-member tribal Supreme
Court, and that decision would be final.

"Usually tribes have their own appellate process, and then, and
this surprises a lot of people, there is no appeal from a tribal
supreme court," said Lindsay Robertson, a University of Oklahoma
law professor who specializes in Federal Indian Law.

Once a tribal court judgment is finalized, it can be taken to a
state district court for enforcement just like any other judgment,
Robertson said, but that enforcement action would not subject the
judgment to any appeals in state court.

Curt Marshall, one of the attorneys representing the Pawnee
Nation, said the lawsuit was filed in tribal court primarily so
that the Pawnee Nation could assert its sovereignty.

"The tribe has jurisdiction over civil matters to enforce
judgments within its jurisdiction, including judgments over non-
Indians," Mr. Marshall said.

While experts say major civil judgments against non-Indians in
tribal courts are rare, the U.S. Supreme Court last year left in
place the authority of Native American courts to judge complaints
against people who are not tribal members.  In that case, Dollar
General Corp. was sued in tribal court for $2.5 million over
allegations that the manager of a store on tribal land made sexual
advances toward a 13-year-old boy placed in the store by a tribal
youth employment program. The case was returned to tribal court
for a ruling on the merits.

Scientists have linked the dramatic spike in earthquakes in
Oklahoma to the underground disposal of wastewater that is a
byproduct of oil and gas drilling.  Oklahoma Corporation
Commission regulators have directed oil and gas producers to
either close injection wells or reduce the volume of fluids they
inject.

The quake, located about 9 miles from the center Pawnee, damaged
buildings across the north-central community of about 2,200
residents.  The sandstone facade of some buildings fell, several
others were cracked and one man suffered a minor head injury when
part of a fireplace fell on him. Oklahoma's governor declared a
state of emergency for the entire county.

An attorney for Oklahoma City-based Cummings Oil Company, one of
the companies named in the suit, declined to comment until they
receive and review the filing. Telephone messages left with an
attorney for a second defendant, Tulsa-based Eagle Road Oil, were
not immediately returned.

Chad Warmington, the president of the Oklahoma Oil and Gas
Association, said that while the tribal jurisdiction is unique,
the lawsuit itself is not a surprise.

"The oil and gas industry has been the target of significant
litigation over the years, so I wouldn't think it comes as a
surprise that there could be potential new litigation," he said.

Among the tribal structures damaged in the September earthquake is
the former Pawnee Nation Indian School, a sandstone building on
the National Register of Historic Places that now houses the
tribe's administrative offices.

"We have extensive cracks throughout all the walls on every single
one of these historic buildings, and the cracks run through the
entire width of the walls," Knife Chief said.  "We had mortar pop.
We had roofs sag. We have ceilings that are bowing."

According to the lawsuit, both companies were operating wastewater
injection wells on lands within the Pawnee Nation less than 10
miles from the epicenter of the Sept. 3 quake.

From 1980 to 2000, Oklahoma averaged only two earthquakes a year
of magnitude 2.7 or higher.  That number jumped to about 2,500 in
2014 then to 4,000 in 2015 a mid a boom in fracking -- the process
of injecting a high-pressure mix of water, sand or gravel and
chemicals into rock to extract oil and gas. It dropped to 2,500
last year, after Oklahoma restricted volume of wastewater
injections, according to a study released by the U.S. Geological
Survey.  The agency reported on March 3 in its annual national
earthquake outlook that a large portion of Oklahoma and parts of
central California are at the highest risk for a damaging quake
this year.

At least four separate class-action lawsuits have been filed by
the same group of attorneys against various oil companies in
Oklahoma connected to large earthquakes dating back to 2011.
Another lawsuit has been filed on behalf of a Prague woman injured
when a November 2011 quake toppled a stone chimney in her home.

"We understand the industry is very important to the economy of
Oklahoma, and the last thing we want to do is come in and shut the
operations down," said Marshall, the tribe's attorney.  "But we do
want the oil and gas industry to act responsibly environmentally,
and we want them to be held accountable for the damage they've
created."


D&J CLEANING: "Cano" Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Erendida Cano, individually and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. D&J Cleaning Services NY, Inc., Myriam Ramos,
individually and Daniel Ramos, individually, Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-00997, (S.D. N.Y., February 10, 2017), seeks to recover
minimum wages, overtime compensation, spread of hours pay,
misappropriated tips, unlawful deductions, and other damages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Laws.

D&J Cleaning Services NY, Inc., Myriam Ramos and Daniel Ramos owns
and operates D&J Cleaning, a commercial and residential cleaning
company that services Brooklyn, Queens and Manhattan. Cano did not
receive any wage statements and notices, thus leaving her in the
dark regarding her actual hours rendered.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Arsenio D. Rodriguez, Esq.
     FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
     28 Liberty Street, 30th Floor
     New York, NY 10005
     Telephone: (212) 300-0375


DELL TECHNOLOGIES: Laptop User Can't Bring Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Joel Stashenko, writing for New York Law Journal, reports that a
consumer's grievance that his laptop lacked battery life must be
settled in arbitration, and not through a proposed class-action
suit, because he clicked the "accept" button on the terms and
conditions page generated by his new Dell computer, a federal
judge has ruled.

Western District Judge Charles Siragusa determined that Dell
computer purchaser Charles Andersen was forewarned by the
packaging in which his Dell 15-5000 came that there were legal
ramifications to his starting the computer.

Among other things, Judge Siragusa wrote in Andersen v. Wal-Mart,
15-cv-6488, consumers were warned -- in capital letters -- that
terms of sale included the "use of arbitration to resolve disputes
on an individual basis . . . instead of jury trials or class
actions."  The packaging also clearly warned that "if you do not
agree with these terms, do not use your product and return it to
Dell in accordance with Dell's return policy."

Among the potential advantages to Mr. Andersen and other potential
plaintiffs to having the case heard as a class action, rather than
in arbitration, is that both Wal-Mart and Dell would be subject to
treble damages if found guilty of violations of New York General
Business Law Sec. 349 or Sec. 350.

Arbitration (NYLJ, Jan. 25, 2017) is often a favored method of
settling disputes for corporations, who see it as less time-
consuming, less costly, more predictable and less subject to
public scrutiny than litigation; while consumer advocates have
argued that arbitration can deprive consumers and employees of
their rights.  Last May, the federal Consumer Financial Protection
Board proposed a rule that would prohibit companies from putting
mandatory arbitration clauses pre-empting class-action lawsuits in
new contracts, but its future is in doubt under the new Trump
administration.

Judge Siragusa ruled that by clicking "accept" and booting up the
computer, Mr. Andersen cannot now bring a proposed class-action
suit under New York State General Business Law against Dell
Technologies and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. for falsely representing
that the laptop had up to 7.58 hours of usable battery life.
Andersen contends that the computer, which he bought for about
$500 at an upstate Wal-Mart, actually has two to three hours of
usable battery life.

Judge Siragusa rejected the claims by Mr. Andersen, who is a solo
practitioner in Elmira, that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because it was not presented to him until after he
had purchased the computer.  Mr. Andersen had argued that terms
must be presented at the point of sale to be valid.

Judge Siragusa, however, cited rulings by Appellate Division
panels in Brower v. Gateway 2000 , 246 AD2d 246 (1998), and Moore
v. Microsoft , 293 AD2nd 587 (2002), which held that clicking on
"agree" icons indicates acceptance of sellers' terms by consumers
in circumstances like Mr. Andersen's.

"While plaintiff argues that the only agreement he had with Dell
and/or Wal-Mart was created when he paid for the computer at the
store, the law of New York state indicates otherwise," Judge
Siragusa wrote from Rochester in his ruling on Feb. 17.  "Rather,
the agreement was created when plaintiff kept and used the
computer and/or clicked on the icon indicating that he accepted
Dell's terms."

Neither Dell nor Wal-Mart immediately returned calls for comment
on Feb. 21.

Kimball Anderson, a partner at Winston & Strawn in Chicago, and
Brian Crosby -- bcrosby@gmclaw.com -- a partner at Gibson,
McAskill & Crosby in Buffalo, represented Dell.

N. Ari Weisbrot -- aweisbrot@foxrothschild.com -- partner at Fox
Rothschild in Roseland, New Jersey, represented Wal-Mart.

Mr. Andersen said in an interview on Feb. 21 that he thought
Siragusa should have remanded the case back to state court, where
he proposed pursuing the suit as a class action.

"The Federal Arbitration Act is not what we were looking to get
into when we filed this case," he said.  "We wanted a New York
state case under New York state law."

Mr. Anderson initially brought his action in state Supreme Court
in Chemung County, but it was transferred to federal court on the
motion of Wal-Mart and Dell, who argued that the federal Class
Action Fairness Act gives federal courts jurisdiction.

Judge Siragusa also rejected Anderson's argument that New York
state's General Business Law Sec. 399-c, which prohibits
arbitration clauses involving the sale of consumer goods, is not
pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act whenever matters of
interstate commerce are involved.


DOLLAR TREE: Court Certifies Wage Statement Class in Patton Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Michael W. Fitzgerald granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification submitted in
the lawsuit captioned Curtis Patton, et al. v. Dollar Tree Stores,
Inc., et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-03813-MWF-PJW (C.D. Cal.).

According to the Civil Minutes, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
supported the Motion as to their claim under Section 226 of the
California Labor Code, which is amenable to resolution on a
classwide basis.  The Plaintiffs have failed to show that, as to
their misclassification claims, individual differences will not
overwhelm common questions of fact and law, Judge Fitzgerald
opines.

Hence, the Court certifies a class of all persons employed in one
or more of Dollar Tree's retail stores in California at any time
on or after April 2, 2014, who received their wages via direct
deposit or Pay Card and have not entered into an arbitration
agreement with Dollar Tree -- the Wage Statement Class.  The
Motion is denied as to the Store Manager Subclass, which is
defined as: All persons employed as Store Manager in one or more
of Defendant's retail stores in California at any time on or after
April 2, 2011, who have not entered into an arbitration agreement
with Defendant.

A copy of the Civil Minutes is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ZSksPprM


EARTHLINK HOLDINGS: Says Suit Over Windstream Merger Lack Merit
---------------------------------------------------------------
EarthLink Holdings Corp. submitted supplemental disclosures
relating to the Windstream mergers, according to the Company's
February 14, 2017, Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

On November 7, 2016, EarthLink Holdings Corp., a Delaware
corporation ("EarthLink"), announced that it had entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with
Windstream Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Windstream"),
Europa Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and an indirect,
wholly-owned subsidiary of Windstream ("Merger Sub 1") and Europa
Merger Sub, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company and in
indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Windstream ("Merger Sub 2").
Subject to the terms and conditions of the Merger Agreement,
Merger Sub 1 will merge with and into EarthLink with EarthLink
surviving as an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Windstream
(the "Initial Merger") and, immediately following the effective
time of the Initial Merger, EarthLink will merge with and into
Merger Sub 2, with Merger Sub 2 surviving as an indirect, wholly-
owned subsidiary of Windstream (the "Subsequent Merger" and,
together with the Initial Merger, the "Mergers").

On February 3, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit captioned
Carter v. EarthLink Holdings Corp. et al., Case No. 1:17-CV-00433-
LMM (the "Proxy Litigation") was filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against
EarthLink and the members of the EarthLink Board of Directors (the
"EarthLink Board") pursuant to Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). The Proxy
Litigation relates to the definitive proxy statement filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC")
on January 23, 2017 (the "Proxy Statement") in connection with the
Mergers. The complaint in the Proxy Litigation generally alleges
that the Proxy Statement omitted certain material information
regarding the background to the transactions contemplated by the
Merger Agreement, financial information about EarthLink,
Windstream and the pro forma combined company, and the financial
analyses conducted by EarthLink's financial advisors prior to the
EarthLink Board's approval of the Merger Agreement. The Proxy
Litigation seeks, among other remedies, to enjoin the stockholder
vote on the Merger Agreement until supplemental disclosures are
made or, in if an injunction is not awarded, unspecified money
damages, costs and attorney's fees.

The Company says: "EarthLink believes that the claims asserted in
the Proxy Litigation are without merit. However, in order to
alleviate the costs, risks and uncertainties inherent in
litigation and provide additional information to its stockholders,
EarthLink has determined to voluntarily supplement the Proxy
Statement as described in this Current Report on Form 8-K. Nothing
in this Current Report on Form 8-K shall be deemed an admission of
the legal necessity or materiality under applicable laws of any of
the disclosures set forth herein. To the contrary, EarthLink
specifically denies all allegations in the Proxy Litigation that
any additional disclosure was or is required."

Among other things, the Supplemental Disclosures provide that
during the period from 2014 and continuing through the
announcement of the merger agreement with Windstream in November
2016, the EarthLink Board regularly reviewed and evaluated its
strategic plans and objectives as a regular topic of discussion at
its meetings, which discussions included multiple specific
potential strategic alternatives.  As part of this process, in the
summer of 2014 EarthLink engaged Foros Securities LLC as its
independent financial advisor to assist the EarthLink Board and
management in their review of these strategic alternatives. By
September 2014, 18 strategic and financial parties (including
Windstream) were contacted regarding a possible sale transaction,
three of which (which did not include Windstream) also held
management meetings with representatives of EarthLink. However all
parties ultimately declined to proceed with further discussions
regarding a potential transaction at that time.


ENERGY TRANSFER: Tribe Officials Want Pipeline Documents Released
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Blake Nicholson, writing for The Associated Press, reports that
U.S. and tribal officials are opposing an effort by the developer
of the $3.8 billion Dakota Access oil pipeline to keep some
information shielded from the public amid a court battle over the
project.

Texas-based Energy Transfer Partners last month asked a federal
judge to shield details such as spill response plans and pipeline
features that could be targeted by anti-pipeline activists.

"The documents contain information that could be used by
terrorists or others intending to cause harm," company attorney
William Scherman said in court documents.

The pipeline to move North Dakota oil to a shipping point in
Illinois has been the subject of months of protests in North
Dakota, with about 750 arrests since August.  There also has been
vandalism to company equipment in Iowa and North Dakota.

ETP is a defendant along with the Army Corps of Engineers in a
lawsuit filed by the Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux, who
believe the pipeline threatens water, sacred sites and their right
to practice their religion.  The company disputes that and says
the pipeline is safe.

Tribal attorneys in court documents call the company's reasoning
for wanting the documents kept secret "a ruse."  The actual
reason, they maintain, is that "the documents are embarrassingly
inadequate and undermine (the company's) primary narrative in this
case -- that oil spill risk can be dismissed without further
analysis or independent expert review."

Corps attorneys say only a limited amount of the information
warrants protection, based on analyses by the Transportation
Security Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration.


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Judge Grants Bid to Arbitrate "Devries"
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted defendant's motion to
compel arbitration and stay the case styled SEAN GILBERT DEVRIES,
Plaintiff, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 16-cv-02953-WHO (N.D. Cal.).

On or around September 3, 2014, Sean Gilbert DeVries attempted to
obtain a free credit report from www.annualcreditreport.com, which
is operated jointly by Equifax, Inc., TransUnion LLC, and Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (EIS). DeVries was required to put up
some information, but EIS rejected his request for a free credit
report. . EIS requested additional identifying documents,
including driver's license, state ID card, utility bill, and bank
or insurance statement, but DeVries was still unable to obtain a
free credit report. DeVries then visited EIS's website,
www.experian.com and purchased an Experian credit report for $10.

Upon his purchase of the Experian credit report, DeVries was
required to accept the terms and conditions, in which an
arbitration clause was provided. The arbitration clause provided
that the customer agrees to arbitrate all disputes and claims,
except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not
subject to arbitration. It also contains a delegation clause and
the terms and conditions also provided that the terms may be
updated from time to time.

DeVries accessed www.experian.com and its accompanying subpages on
approximately May 18, 2016, and September 16, 2016. The 2016 terms
of use agreement still contains an arbitration provision, but a
carve out was made to that effect that any dispute the customer
may have with, arising out of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
relating to the information contained in the consumer disclosure
or report, including but not limited to claims for alleged
inaccuracies, shall not be governed by the agreement.

On June 2, 2016, DeVries filed a class action suit asserting five
causes of action under) the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681g(a), the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681j, the
California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17200 et seq., the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal.
Civ. Code Section 1750 et seq., and the California Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Section 1785.1 et seq.

EIS moves to compel arbitration and stay the action.

Judge Orrick granted defendant's motion finding that DeVries
agreed to the 2014 terms and conditions, which were later
superseded by the 2016 terms of use. Although that latter
agreement carves out certain claims arising out of the FCRA, the
scope and enforceability of the arbitration provision is delegated
to the arbitrator. EIS did not waive its right to arbitrate as a
result of its litigation activity. The action will be stayed
pending completion of the arbitration. Should the arbitrator
determine that some or all of DeVries's claims fall within the
carve-out provision, the parties shall notify the court within
seven days. Otherwise, the parties shall file a Status Report six
months from the date of the order, and every six months
thereafter, briefly indicating the progress of the arbitration.

A copy of Judge Orrick's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/qOGc1C from Leagle.com.

Sean Gilbert DeVries, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Robert
Reese -- michael@reesellp.com -- Reese LLP; James A. Francis --
jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- John Soumilas --
jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com -- at Francis and Mailman, P.C.;
Melissa Weiner Wolchansky -- wolchansky@halunenlaw.com -- at
Halunen And Associates

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
John Alexander Vogt -- javogt@jonesday.com -- Kerry Cordill Fowler
-- kcfowler@jonesday.com -- Alexandra Alford McDonald --
amcdonald@jonesday.com -- Daniel John McLoon --
djmcloon@jonesday.com -- at Jones Day


FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT: Tennessee Seeks to Certify Forfeiture Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled STATE OF TENNESSEE, on relationship of
David Shell; DAVID SHELL, individually; and DAVID SHELL, as
Representative for Class Members, the Plaintiffs, v. DAVID L.
PURKEY; JOE R. BARTLETT; FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND,
on its blanket surety for State of Tennessee Defendants Purkey;
Bartlett ; and John and Jane Doe state employees; RONNIE BURNETT;
CHAD JOHNSON; MARION COUNTY, TENNESSEE; and AUTHUR J. GALLAGHER
CO. as surety and/or agent for surety for Defendants Burnett,
Johnson and John and Jane Doe deputy sheriffs for Marion County
Tennessee, the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-00059 (E.D. Tenn.),
the Plaintiffs move the Court to maintain these Classes:

Class A:

   "Class Members whose financial records, accounts, and deposits
   were seized and taken for administrative forfeiture by a
   policy, custom, practice, and/or procedure of use of bogus
   court subpoenas";

Class B:

   "Class Members who had their property seized and forfeited
   without a warrant or Sec. 53-11-451(b) circuit or chancery
   court process"; and

Class C:

   "Class Members who had their property forfeited where TDOSHS
   did not strictly comply with the black letter of the time
   requirements in Tenn.".

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=YA1YmnGA

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Houston S. Havasy, Esq.
          Law Offices of Herbert S. Moncier
          550 W. Main Street, Suite 775
          Knoxville, TN 37902
          Telephone: (865) 546 7746
          Facsimile: (865) 546 7765
          E-mail: hhavasy@gmail.com


GAP INC: California Court Trims Claims in "Munning"
---------------------------------------------------
Judge Thelton E. Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motion to dismiss the case captioned LAURIE MUNNING,
Plaintiff, v. THE GAP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-
03804-THE (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants are for-profit entities that sell apparel and other
personal items in retail stores and online.

Laurie Munning purchased the clothing items from the defendants'
websites. Munning alleges that the prices she paid for the
products remained unchanged for the entire week following her
purchase.

Munning brought a putative class action against defendants
challenging the defendants' advertising, marketing, and sales
practices on the online Gap Factory and Banana Republic Factory
store websites. Munning initially brought 11 claims for relief
against the defendants: (1) Violations of State Consumer
Protection Statutes; (2) Violation of the California Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA); (3) Violation of the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL); (4) Violation of California's False
Advertising Law (FAL); (5) Violation of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act (NJCFA); (6) Violation of the New Jersey Truth in
Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (TCCWNA); (7) Breach
of Contract; (8) Breach of Contract under Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing; (9) Breach of Express Warranty; (10)
Unjust Enrichment; and (11) Negligent Misrepresentation.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, to which the court dismissed
claims on claims 1, 8, 10, and 11, with prejudice.  In the same
order, the court also dismissed the claims 2, 5, 6 without
prejudice. Plaintiff amended her complaint, and defendants filed a
second motion to dismiss.

Judge Henderson granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's
claims for equitable relief, including plaintiff's UCL and FAL
claims. Because no amendment can cure the deficiency, the claims
are dismissed with prejudice. In the CLRA claim, defendants
agreed, during oral arguments that they were no longer contesting
the claim. Also, plaintiff satisfies the elements of an NJCFA
claim and had sufficiently alleged a TCCWNA claim. Judge Henderson
denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's CLRA, NJCFA and
TCCWNA claims.

A copy of Judge Henderson's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/CMwsq3 from Leagle.com.

Laurie Munning, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen P. Denittis --
at Shabel & Denittis, P.C.; Todd Michael Friedman --
tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- at Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman;
P.C.; Ross H. Schmierer -- Ross@paslawfirm.com -- at Paris
Ackerman Schmierer LLP

Defendants, represented by Joseph Duffy --
joseph.duffy@morganlewis.com -- Esther Kyungmin Ro --
esther.ro@morganlewis.com -- at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP


HARRY AND DAVID: "Brown" Sues Over Under-filled Snack Foods
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bria Brown, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Harry and David, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-00999, (S.D. N.Y., February 10, 2017) seeks monetary
damages (including actual, minimum, punitive, treble, and/or
statutory damages), injunctive relief, restitution and
disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of unlawful conduct,
interest and attorneys' fees and costs resulting from fraud, false
advertising and violation of New York General Business Law
(Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act).

Harry and David, LLC is a corporation organized under the laws of
Oregon with its headquarters at 2500 S Pacific Highway, Medford,
OR 97501. It manufactured, packaged, distributed, advertised,
marketed and sold Moose Munch Gourmet Popcorn products to millions
of customers nationwide. Plaintiff allege that the Defendants
under-fill their packs.

Defendant is represented by:

C.K. Lee, Esq.
      Anne Seelig, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 465-1180
      Fax: (212) 465-1181


HEWLETT PACKARD: Discount Drugs Seeks Certification of Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DISCOUNT DRUGS OF ILLINOIS INC., an Illinois
Corporation, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. HEWLETT PACKARD
ENTERPRISE COMPANY, and JOHN DOES 1-12, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-01298 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for entry
of an order certifying a class of:

   "Each person that was sent one or more facsimiles on or after
   February 20, 2013, promoting HP Web Services or the HP ePrint
   Service that did not state on its first page that the fax
   recipient may request that the sender not send any future fax
   and that the failure to comply with such a request within 30
   days would be unlawful".

The Plaintiff files the motion soon after the filing of its Class
Action Complaint in order to avoid an attempt by Defendant(s) to
moot Plaintiff's individual claims in this class action. However,
in the case, additional discovery is necessary for the court to
determine whether to certify the class Plaintiff seeks to
represent. As a result, Plaintiff will seek leave to pursue class
discovery as soon as practicable.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ySndS84j

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
          Tod A. Lewis, Esq.
          David. M. Oppenheim, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS
          & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312 658 5500
          Facsimile: 312 658 5555


HUNTER INDUSTRIES: Class of Laborers Certified in "King" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. George C. Hanks, Jr., grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for conditional certification of representative class and
approval of notice in the lawsuit styled ANTHONY KING, et al. v.
HUNTER INDUSTRIES, LTD., et al., Case No. 6:16-cv-00038 (S.D.
Tex.).  The Court certifies this as a conditional class:

     All current and former earthworks laborers and equipment
     operators employed by Defendant Hunter Industries, Ltd. (the
     "Company") to 1vork on projects identified by the Texas
     Department of Transportation as being principally located in
     Bexar County, Texas, and/or Victoria County, Texas, during
     the period from June 24, 2013, to the present.

Judge Hanks also approves the Plaintiffs' Notice Letter and notice
procedure.  The Defendant is directed to produce the contact
information of all putative class members to the Plaintiffs within
45 days of the date of the Order.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=eGjyMCMe


INTREXON CORPORATION: Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted defendants' motion to dismiss the
case titled IN RE INTREXON CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 16-cv-02398-RS (N.D. Cal.).

Intrexon Corporation builds and acquires technologies that design,
modify and regulate DNA sequences. Intrexon's technologies include
UltraVector, RheoSwitch, AttSite Recombinases, Cell Systems
Informatics, Laser-Enabled Analysis and Processing and others.

In April 2016, an anonymous short-seller known as Spotlight
Research released an eight-part report about Intrexon and
concluded that Intrexon's core technology suite consists of an
overhyped, undifferentiated collection of commodity and failed
products. It said UltraVector is a common DNA synthesizer and that
Rheoswitch gained no traction over the years. It also opined that
Intrexon's revenues were overstated. It claimed that Intrexon
created an intricate web of microcap, zero revenue, free cash flow
negative companies that seem to exist solely for the purpose of
inflating Intrexon's revenue and profitability.
Lead plaintiff Joe Seppen brought a putative class action for
securities fraud against Intrexon Corp., Randal J. Kirk,
Intrexon's Chief Executive Officer since 2009 and had an
investment management firm, Third Security LLC that has been often
invested alongside Intrexon and other partners involved in various
collaborations, Rick L. Sterling, Intrexon's Chief Financial
Officer since 2007 and Krish S. Krishan, Intrexon's Chief
Operation Officer from 2011 until his resignation in March 2016.

The amended class action complaint primarily recites the findings
of the Spotlight report. It also includes brief statements from
three confidential witnesses. Seppen claims that defendants
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder and asserts a violation of section
20(a) of the Exchange Act. Plaintiff is suing on behalf of all
persons who purchased Intrexon securities between May 11, 2015 and
April 27, 2016.

Defendants move to dismiss the section 10(b) claim for failure to
plead the elements of a material misrepresentation or omission,
scienter, and loss causation.

Judge Seeborg granted defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to
amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed within 30 days of the
date of the order.

Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. Plaintiff
alleges three categories of purportedly false statements: (1)
statements concerning Intrexon's suite of technologies; (2)
statements concerning Intrexon's CAR-T collaborations; and (3)
revenue disclosures. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the
falsity of the statements in any of the three categories. Judge
Seeborg also observed that plaintiff failed to show how the
Spotlight report constitutes a corrective disclosure. The mere
repackaging of already-public information by an analyst or short-
seller is simply insufficient to constitute a corrective
disclosure.

A copy of Judge Seeborg's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/YCpPm6 from Leagle.com.

Ryan Hoffman, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- at The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Joe Seppen, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua L. Crowell --
jcrowell@glancylaw.com -- Leanne Heine Solish --
lheine@glancylaw.com -- Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com
-- Robert Vincent Prongay -- RProngay@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP; Adam Marc Apton -- aapton@zlk.com -- at Levi
Korsinsky, LLP

Patrick M. Gibrall and Deborah P. Gibrall, Plaintiffs, represented
by Jennifer Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- J. Alexander Hood, II
-- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP

Defendants, represented by Jerome F. Birn, Jr. -- jbirn@wsgr.com -
- Joni L. Ostler -- jostler@wsgr.com --Nicholas R. Miller --
nmiller@wsgr.com -- Nina F. Locker -- nlocker@wsgr.com -- at
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

Mike Johnson and James Basile, Movants, represented by Laurence M.
Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- at The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Carey Read, Movant, represented by Adam Christopher McCall --
amccall@zlk.com -- at LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP


JESSE CASARES: Status Hearing in JT's Frames Suit on March 21
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 7, 2017, in the case
styled JT's Frames, Inc. v. Jesse Casares, et al., Case No. 1:16-
cv-02504 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the
Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr.

The minute entry states that in view of the filing of a second
amended complaint and a second amended "Damasco" motion for class
certification, the prior motions to certify the class are stricken
as moot.  The second amended "Damasco" motion for class
certification is taken under advisement and the case remains set
for further status hearing on March 21, 2017, at 9:00 a.m.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ugJVN4sJ


JOHNSON & BELL: Data Security Claims Must Be Heard in Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Roy Strom, writing for The Am Law Daily, reports that in a win for
the first law firm to face a class action for lax data security, a
Chicago federal judge ruled on Feb. 22 that claims against
Chicago-based Johnson & Bell for allegedly failing to protect
client information must be heard individually in arbitration, not
lumped together as a class.

The suit, filed by well-known class-action lawyer Jay Edelson,
made headlines when it was unsealed in December and seemed to
represent Mr. Edelson making good on an earlier promise to bring a
spate of data privacy complaints against law firms. He had said he
identified 15 firms with lagging security.

So far no other complaints against law firms have become public,
and the ruling is a setback for Mr. Edelson, who said he will
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The lawsuit against Johnson & Bell did not claim any client data
was stolen, and Mr. Edelson has said the alleged security holes
identified by a former client have since been patched.
But the case remains a reputational and financial risk for Johnson
& Bell and potentially other firms.  Mr. Edelson argues that
Johnson & Bell's rates include an expectation that the firm
provides industry-standard data security measures.  The case,
which had already been moved to arbitration before it became
public last year, seeks as damages a refund of some portion of the
rate clients paid.

U.S. District Judge John Darrah of the Northern District of
Illinois ruled on Feb. 22 that the court, not an arbitrator, had
the power to decide whether the arbitration was eligible for
class-action status.  He also ruled the firm's engagement letter
did not agree to class arbitration.

"The court is saying that we have to bring thousands of individual
arbitrations against Johnson & Bell," Mr. Edelson said in an
interview. "We're obviously appealing that decision.  We think the
most efficient way to proceed is through one class-action lawsuit,
and we feel very good about our chances in the Seventh Circuit."

Joseph Marconi, head of the business litigation department at 100-
plus lawyer Johnson & Bell, said the firm was pleased with the
court's decision and declined to comment further.  In an earlier
statement, Johnson & Bell president William Johnson promised to
fight the case, calling it "specious," and saying the firm may
pursue counter-litigation after the suit is resolved.

The complaint alleged that Johnson & Bell used a time-entry system
that was 10 years old, known to be prone to hacking and had not
been updated with security patches.  It said the firm's virtual
private network, or VPN, was prone to what is known as a "man-in-
the-middle attack," which the complaint says is often used by
hackers, spy agencies and foreign governments to "eavesdrop on
private communications and steal confidential client information."

The complaint also said the firm's email system was susceptible to
the same type of hack believed to be used against Panama's Mossack
Fonseca, known as a "DROWN" attack.

The arbitration proceeding will face the question of how to
calculate damages in a case where no data breach occurred.
Mr. Edelson argues that clients, in effect, didn't get the data
security they implicitly paid for.

Clients "have suffered a diminished value of the services they
received from Johnson & Bell; and they are threatened with
irreparable loss of the integrity of their confidential client
information and further injury and damages from the theft of that
information," the suit alleged.

Johnson & Bell, in an earlier court filing, argued that no
"concrete" injury exists in the case.

"There is no allegation of breach or that client confidences were
ever disclosed and any claimed deficiencies no longer exist,"
Johnson & Bell's filing said.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Wins Talcum Powder Case in St. Louis
-------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a St. Louis jury on March 3
rejected a Tennessee woman's lawsuit that Johnson & Johnson baby
powder contributed to her ovarian cancer, a victory for the
company after it lost three previous, similar lawsuits in St.
Louis.

The jury voted 11-1 to deny damages to Nora Daniels, 55, of
Columbia, Tennessee, who said she used Johnson & Johnson's talcum
powder from 1978 to 2013, when she was diagnosed with ovarian and
uterine cancer.  She also sued Imerys Talc, a talcum powder
supplier, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported.

The verdict for Johnson & Johnson came after three previous
St. Louis juries awarded a total of $197 million to the plaintiffs
who made similar claims.  About 2,000 state and federal lawsuits
are in courts across the country over concerns about health
problems caused by prolonged talcum powder use.

Ms. Daniels' lawyer, Jim Onder, said he thinks the difference
between the March 3 verdict and the three previous St. Louis cases
was that this jury didn't think the talcum powder contributed to
Ms. Daniels' specific type of cancer.

Johnson & Johnson spokeswoman Carol Goodrich said in a statement
the company sympathizes with ovarian cancer patients.

"The jury's decision is consistent with the science, research,
clinical evidence and decades of studies by medical experts around
the world that continue to support the safety of cosmetic talc,"
the statement said, while citing two cases thrown out in New
Jersey in September 2016 when a judge found insufficient
scientific evidence for the claims against talcum powder.

Imerys spokeswoman Gwen Myers said in a statement the jury
followed "the science that establishes the safety of talc."

"Imerys sympathizes with women suffering from ovarian cancer and
hopes that the scientific community's efforts will continue to be
directed toward finding the true causes of this terrible disease,"
the statement said.

Juror Luke Wilson, 34, of St. Louis, said the jury did not think
evidence linking talcum powder with ovarian cancer was strong
enough to require Johnson & Johnson to put warning labels on its
products.

The only dissenting juror, George Stair, 76, of St. Louis, said he
thought there was enough evidence.

"I wish we could have sent a message to Johnson & Johnson to put a
warning on the product label," he said.


JOHNSON CONTROLS: Indiana Residents Want Class Action Remanded
--------------------------------------------------------------
Juan Carlos Rodriguez and Michael Phillis, writing for Law360,
report that Indiana residents suing Johnson Controls Inc. over
alleged groundwater pollution fought back on Feb. 24 against the
company's bid to keep the proposed class action in federal court,
saying they've got the evidence to prove their case belongs in
state court.

The homeowner plaintiffs petitioned in July to have the case
remanded after Johnson Controls removed the case to federal court,
but were denied because they had not yet satisfied their final
requirement that two-thirds of the class have citizenship within
Indiana. Now, they say the company is improperly fighting to block
them from proving the citizenship requirement has been met.

The plaintiffs say they hired a statistician who showed the
proposed class of more than 772 people met the standard, and they
filed a renewed motion to remand.  Johnson Controls filed a motion
to strike that motion, which the plaintiffs say is not the proper
response.

"Here, the very same issues that JCI raises in moving to strike
-- namely, whether plaintiffs are entitled to renew their motion
to remand, whether they have done so in a reasonable time, and
whether the plaintiffs have altered their class definition -- have
already been addressed in plaintiffs' renewed motion," the
plaintiffs said.

They said that contrary to JCI's assertions, their renewed motion
to remand is not "an untimely motion" to reconsider the court's
prior ruling on the local controversy exception.  The local
controversy exception requires a court to relinquish jurisdiction
if a case meets certain requirements showing it is strictly a
local matter.

According to the plaintiffs, the district court's previous order
did not find that fewer than two-thirds of the proposed class
resides in Indiana, but rather that the plaintiffs failed to
present "statistically reliable methodology" to prove the
citizenship of the class.

"Plaintiffs' renewed motion to remand represents an exhaustive
attempt to provide this court with the exact type of statistically
reliable evidence this court said it would need to properly assess
the citizenship of the class," the plaintiffs said.

They said courts have often been willing to entertain renewed
motions to remand asserting that exceptions to the Class Action
Fairness Act apply.

The homeowners originally sued in Indiana state court over damages
they said they suffered from exposure to trichloroethylene,
trichloroethane, dichloroethane, vinyl chloride and other
hazardous chemicals from a manufacturing facility. Another
defendant, Tocon Holdings LLC, had allegedly purchased the plant
from Johnson Controls and later demolished it knowing it was
contaminated, but did nothing to stop the pollution from flowing
onto the homeowners' properties or to warn them of the potential
danger, the plaintiffs contend.

Johnson Controls, which makes automotive interiors and vehicle
batteries, removed the case to federal court, but the plaintiffs
have sought to have it remanded.

The plaintiffs are represented by Thomas A. Barnard --
tbarnard@taftlaw.com -- Rodney L. Michael Jr. --
rmichael@taftlaw.com -- and Benjamin A. Wolowski --
bwolowski@taftlaw.com -- of Taft Stettinius & Holliser LLP and
John D. Ulmer of Yoder Ainlay Ulmer & Buckingham LLP.

Johnson Controls is represented by Thomas J. Hall --
thall@chadbourne.com -- Andrew E. Skroback --
askroback@chadbourne.com -- and Lauren T. Lee --
llee@chadbourne.com -- of Chadbourne & Parke LLP and Kelly J.
Hartzler of Barnes & Thornburg LLP.

The case is Amos and Debbie Hostleter et al. v. Johnson Controls
Inc. et al., case number 3:15-cv-00226, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana.


KANSAS CITY, KS: Ordered to Pay $10 Million for Trash Rebates
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lynn Horsley, writing for The Kansas City Star, reports that in a
scathing decision, a Platte County judge ruled on Feb. 28 that
Kansas City must pay $10 million in damages for violating a prior
court order involving payments for trash services.

"The court finds that the city knowingly, intentionally and
deliberately chose to not to comply with the modified judgment by
eliminating the trash rebate program," Circuit Judge James Van
Amburg wrote in his ruling.

He found the city will owe members of the class-action lawsuit
$10.2 million for actual and special damages, plus attorneys fees.
He also said the city must pay $2,846 per day until it complies
with its trash collection obligations.

The city said it plans to appeal.  If it loses on appeal, the
trash payments could total millions more.

The case stems from a 1976 court order relating to the city's
earnings tax.  A Platte County judge said at the time that Kansas
City had improperly created two classes of earnings-tax-paying
residents, because the city provided free trash pickup for single-
family residences but not for large apartment buildings. His 1976
order required the city to make payments to multifamily buildings
with seven or more units to cover their trash services.

The City Council decided in 2010 to halt those payments because of
severe budget constraints.  That was when Mark Funkhouser was
mayor, and none of the existing council members were in office.
The payments stopped for most apartment owners, except for the
Heartland Apartment Association, a group that reached a separate
legal settlement after it threatened to sue.

In February 2015, a lawsuit was filed, arguing that other
residents besides those in the Heartland Apartment Association
deserved the same benefit.  The case was certified as a class
action, with residents of the Sophian Plaza Association, Townsend
Place Condominium Association and several hundred other building
owners and managers.  Judge Van Amburg conducted a trial in
December, and on Feb. 28 he found solidly for the plaintiffs.

The ruling cites a deposition from City Manager Troy Schulte, that
he had wanted the Law Department to seek court approval to halt
the program but that never happened.

"The Court finds that the City explicitly considered and discussed
the wisdom of seeking judicial relief before taking any action to
eliminate trash rebate program benefits to Class members.  The
court finds that the city did not seek judicial relief before
eliminating the trash rebate program in 2010," the ruling said.
"City Manager Schulte testified that the city's knowing violation
of the mandatory injunction was a calculated risk that the city
would be sued."

The plaintiffs' attorneys were pleased with the Feb. 28 ruling.

"The judgment means that court orders must be followed," said Greg
Leyh, who represented the class along with attorney Rick Lombardo.
"The City was found in civil contempt because, over the course of
several years and many discussions among city council members,
staff and city lawyers, the City was knowingly contemptuous of a
court order mandating trash services be provided to class members
across the city."

Dennis Walker, a class representative who with his wife, Rita,
owns the Stadium View Apartments near the Truman Sports Complex,
said he had had no doubt the plaintiffs would win, given the
city's admission that it chose to defy the court order.

"It's score one for the little guy," Mr. Walker said on Feb. 28.
"It's such a slam dunk."

But Chris Hernandez, spokesman for Kansas City municipal
government, said the city will appeal.

"We knew this would be a difficult case, but on behalf of Kansas
City's taxpayers, we intend to take this case to the next level,"
Hernandez said. ". . . The rebate program is not sustainable from
either a budgetary or environmental standpoint, and we will
continue fighting for relief on this issue."

Mr. Hernandez acknowledged the city provides free trash service to
residents because they pay the earnings tax.  "However, none of
the condos and complex owners who sued the city actually pay the
E-tax.  They are all exempt," he said.  "Also, we limit residents
to two bags of trash at the curb for both environment and cost
reasons.  But no one at apartment complexes makes sure that each
household complies with that limit.  Since apartment complex
owners are not buying into our sustainability and budgetary goals,
why should we subsidize them?"


KINDRED NURSING: Can't Enforce Arbitration Agreements
-----------------------------------------------------
Tony Mauro, writing for Law.com, reports that for a bench that
usually protects arbitration agreements from attack, the U.S.
Supreme Court on Feb. 22 seemed unusually hostile to such
arrangements when they are embedded in nursing home contracts.

The court heard arguments in Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark, in
which the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled against enforcing
arbitration agreements that were signed on behalf of two nursing
home residents by relatives with "power of attorney."

The families of the deceased residents sued the nursing home
company claiming abuse and neglect.  The company invoked the
arbitration agreements to keep the cases out of court, but the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the power of attorney does not
include giving them the authority to take away the "inviolate"
right to a jury trial under the state constitution.

The Obama administration issued regulations prohibiting nursing
homes from requiring patients to sign arbitration agreements in
the interest of greater transparency and accountability.  But the
Trump administration may have a different take on the issue.

In recent decisions like DirecTV v. Imburgia and AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion the court has invoked the Federal Arbitration Act to
protect arbitration agreements from being singled out for
differential and negative treatment under state law.

But several justices seemed to be singing a different tune on Feb.
22.

"The context here seems different from the arbitration cases that
we've had in recent years," Justice Samuel Alito Jr. said at one
point.  "This doesn't involve an arbitration about the amount that
you were charged for your cable bill or for your telephone bill.
This involves a situation where an elderly person needs care."

The nursing home company's lawyer, Andrew Pincus --
apincus@mayerbrown.com -- of Mayer Brown, who won the 2011
Concepcion case, insisted that "the FAA basically says the state
doesn't have the power to treat arbitration agreements specially
on the theory that they impose some special burden on the parties
to the arbitration agreement."

Mr. Pincus sat down after 20 minutes, leaving 10 minutes for
rebuttal--usually a sign that things are going well.

But during his rebuttal, Mr. Pincus drew sharp questions from
Justice Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John Roberts Jr.

Defending the authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court, Justice
Roberts said that court had not singled out arbitration by name in
its decision regarding the power of attorney, and could not be
presumed to be hostile to arbitration.  He suggested such a ruling
was different from a legislative act aimed at weakening
arbitration agreements.  "You haven't come up with a distinction
that persuades me," Justice Roberts said.

Justice Kagan said the high court's precedents seek to put
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contract
clauses.  But she suggested that Mr. Pincus was treating it as a
"preferred right" that is immune from interpretation if a court
decision deals with the power of attorney.  "Are you saying that a
court can never announce a generally applicable rule first in an
arbitration case?" Justice Kagan asked.

Robert Salyer of Wilkes & McHugh in Kentucky, representing the
families of the nursing home residents, also faced tough
questioning, but mainly from one justice: Stephen Breyer.

Justice Breyer repeatedly asked Mr. Salyer to distinguish between
an arbitration agreement that keeps a case out of court -- thereby
extinguishing the right to a trial -- and a settlement agreement
before trial that does the same thing.  Kentucky was punishing the
first but allowing the second, Justice Breyer said.

Mr. Salyer failed to answer the question to Justice Breyer's
satisfaction, leading the justice to say, "In my opinion right now
you have discriminated against arbitration" in violation of the
federal arbitration law.

Justice Breyer added, "I'm highly suspicious, as you can tell from
my tone of voice.  What I really think has happened is that
Kentucky just doesn't like the federal law."


KOP KILT: Court to Approve Settlement in "Graudins"
---------------------------------------------------
Judge R. Barclay Surrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania will grant the plaintiff's motion
for final approval of class and collective action settlement in
the case styled VICTORIA GRAUDINS, v. KOP KILT, LLC, d/b/a THE
TILTED KILT PUB, ET AL, Civil Action No. 14-2589 (E.D. Pa.).

Representative plaintiff Victoria Graudins worked as a server at
The Tilted Kilt Pub. Plaintiff filed a class/collective action
against defendants, alleging various wage and tip related
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201
et seq., the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Section 333.101 et seq., the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 260.1 et seq., and
common law.

On February 12, 2016, Graudins notified the court that a
settlement agreement had been reached, and filed an unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of class and collective action
settlement, certification of settlement class, appointment of
class counsel, approval of proposed class notice, dismissal of
additional defendants, and scheduling of a final approval hearing.
On April 6, 2016, the court granted the motion. The settlement
provides for a maximum gross settlement amount of $300,000
inclusive of class counsels' fees and costs, and claims
administration fees and the service payment.

On June 21, 2016, Graudins filed a motion for final approval of
class and collective action settlement, certification of
settlement class, award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
expenses and service payment to plaintiff, which is unopposed.

The settlement class is defined as "Plaintiff and any Class Member
who does not opt-out within the specified period in accordance
with the requirements of the Settlement Agreement. Defendant
represents and warrants that all members of the Settlement Class
are Tipped Employees."

Participating Settlement Class Members is defined as:

     Every Member of the Settlement Class who submits a valid and
timely Claim Form in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. In accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, only Participating Settlement Class Members will
release their FLSA claims and only Participating Settlement Class
Members will receive any money in connection with the Settlement.

A $7,500 Service Payment Award for Representative Plaintiff is
requested. Class counsel seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of
$100,000 and costs in the amount of $6.865.70.

Judge Surrick held that the class meets all of the requirements of
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3), and the certified the proposed class for
the purposes of settlement approval.

Judge Surrick also observed that although $7,500 is on the higher
end of awards to representative plaintiffs in cases with similar
issues and similar amounts at stake, it is not unreasonable.

A $7,500 Service Payment Award for Representative Plaintiff is
requested. Although $7,500 is on the higher end of awards to
representative plaintiffs in cases with similar issues and similar
amounts at stake, it is not unreasonable and he is satisfied with
the reasonableness of the requested fee and will approve class
counsels' request for $100,000 in attorneys' fees. In addition,
class counsel is entitled to be reimbursed for their litigation
related expenses in the amount of $6,865.70, the bulk of which is
associated with mediation and deposition related fees.

A copy of Judge Surrick's memorandum dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/9KTMqp from Leagle.com.

Plaintiff, represented by ARKADY ERIC RAYZ -- ERayz@kalraylaw.com
-- at KALIKHMAN & RAYZ LLC; GERALD D. WELLS, III -- at CONNOLLY
WELLS & GRAY, LLP

Defendants, represented by MATTHEW J. HANK -- mhank@littler.com --
ALEXA JOY LABORDA NELSON -- alaborda-nelson@littler.com -- HOLLY
RICH -- hrich@littler.com -- SARAH BRYAN FASK -- sfask@littler.com
-- at LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.


LANE LABS-USA: Bobo's Drugs Moves to Certify Class Under TCPA
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned BOBO'S DRUGS, INC. d/b/a
DAVIS ISLANDS PHARMACY, a Florida corporation, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v.
LANE LABS-USA, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-14046-JEM (S.D. Fla.),
pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, moves for entry
of an order certifying this class:

     Each person sent one or more telephone facsimile messages
     from "Lane Labs." On or after February 6, 2013 promoting its
     supplement products but did not state on its first page that
     the fax recipient may request that the send not send any
     future fax and that its failure to comply with such a
     request within 30 days is unlawful.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fj97vC6x

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. LaSalle St., Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          P.O. Box 416474
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (312) 658-5500
          Facsimile: (312) 658-5555
          E-mail: phil@classlawyers.com


LEAPFROG ENTERPRISE: Court Trims Claims in Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted in part and denied in part
defendants' motion to dismiss the case titled IN RE LEAPFROG
ENTERPRISE, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 15-cv-00347-EMC
(N.D. Cal.).

Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. is a developer of educational
entertainment for children. It has developed a number of learning
platforms, including the LeapPad learning tablets. john Barbour
was, during the relevant period, LF's CEO, and Raymond L.. Arthur
was LF's CFO.

Plaintiffs filed a securities class action against Leapfrog,
Barbour and Arthur and alleged that defendants made false
statements about LF's F2Q15 financial results and its F3Q15
financial results. More specifically, those results were based on
accounting that violated generally accepted accounting principles
provisions relating to goodwill and long-lived assets.

Defendants have repeatedly challenged the sufficiency of
plaintiffs' pleadings, which the court previously dismissed the
original consolidated class action complaint as well as the first
amended complaint.

The second amended consolidated class action complaint alleged
that, defendants falsely stated that no goodwill impairment
testing was necessary after the end of F2Q15, when in fact such
testing was not only necessary and but also such testing would
have led to a 100% write down for goodwill impairment for 2Q.
Plaintiffs additionally alleged that for 2Q, the quarter ending
September 30, 2014, there were various triggering circumstances
that indicated that it was objectively and overwhelmingly more
likely than not that LeapFrog's goodwill was impaired, such that
defendants should have tested for goodwill impairment. Plaintiffs
assert that, even though it was obvious that goodwill impairment
testing was necessary, defendants falsely claimed, in November
2014, that such testing was not necessary. Plaintiffs further
assert that, if defendants had conducted goodwill impairment
testing for 2Q, then they would have determined that goodwill was
in fact impaired under the GAAP two-step test for impairment.
Thus, defendants falsely overstated LF's financial results for 2Q
by not making the necessary deduction for goodwill impairment.
Also, plaintiffs assert that defendants also falsely represented
that LF's long-lived assets were not impaired as of F3Q15.
According to plaintiffs, defendants falsely represented that its
long-lived assets were not impaired as of 3Q. Plaintiffs admit
that defendants ultimately did make an adjustment for long-lived
asset impairment in the 4Q more specifically a write-down of $36.5
million which constituted 96% of the value of the long-lived
assets. But Plaintiffs maintain that the adjustment was one
quarter too late. Plaintiffs note that, when defendants did find
impairment at 4Q, they indicated that it was primarily due to the
significant decline of the trading value of the Company's Class A
common stock and the corresponding market capitalization. But,
according to plaintiffs, there already was a significant decline
in LF's stock value as of 3Q or at least, there was a significant
decline by January 23, 2015, when LF's stock was worth only $2.55,
compared to $4.72 at the end of December 31, 2014.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Judge Chen granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion
to dismiss. The motion is granted to the extent plaintiffs' claims
are based on defendants' failure to take a write-off for goodwill
impairment in 2Q. The motion is denied to the extent plaintiffs'
claims are based on defendants' failure to take a write-off for
long-lived asset impairment in 3Q.

Defendants shall file their answer to the second amended
complaint, with claims limited by the court's ruling within four
weeks of the date of the order. The court will hold a case
management conference on April 6, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. to set dates
in connection with plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. A
joint case management conference statement shall be filed by March
30, 2017.

A copy of Judge Chen's order dated February 24, 2017, is available
at https://goo.gl/Krg4Mi from Leagle.com.

Abere Newett and Bette R. Grayson, Plaintiffs, represented by
Robert Vincent Prongay -- RProngay@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP

Mary L Tumlin, Plaintiff, represented by Ramzi Abadou --
ramzi.abadou@ksfcounsel.com -- at Kahn Swick Foti LLP

Richard Farias, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP

KBC Asset Management NV, Plaintiff, represented by James Michael
Hughes -- jhughes@motleyrice.com -- at Motley Rice LLC; Brian O.
O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Matthew Seth Melamed --
mmelamed@rgrdlaw.com -- Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com --
Willow E. Radcliffe -- willowr@rgrdlaw.com -- at Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP

Defendants, represented by Jordan Eth -- jeth@mofo.com -- Mark
R.S. Foster -- mfoster@mofo.com -- at Morrison & Foerster LLP

Chacal Liu, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay --
RProngay@glancylaw.com -- at Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP

Paul M. Terreri, Movant, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- at Pomerantz LLP


LULAROE: Faces Criticisms Over Leggings Amid Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
FoxNews.com reports that LuLaRoe, the comfy-chic brand that sells
its products through ambassadors, is reportedly facing backlash
from thousands of dissatisfied customers who say some of the
company's clothing isn't up to snuff.

Brit + Co reported that a Facebook group of nearly 9,000 such
customers have claimed the company's leggings get rips and tears
in them on the first wear.  LuLaRoe has claimed there's only a
small number of defective items.

Although the "leggings aren't pants" argument has been up for
debate in recent years, some customers have taken issue with
LuLaRoe's advice to wash their leggings separately like they are
pantyhose, the website reported.

"LuLaRoe Defective is a group for you to come share your defective
clothing," the Facebook group's description reads. "NO SELLING! NO
DRAMA!"

The alleged defective clothing snafu is just the latest issue
LuLaRoe is facing, other reports suggest.

Forbes reported the company is also dealing with a class-action
lawsuit for taxing customers in states where online purchases are
tax free.


MARS PETCARE: Among Defendants in Pet Food Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
R. Robin McDonald, writing for Daily Report, reports that after
taking on the National Football League on behalf of hundreds of
current and former professional football players facing traumatic
brain injury, Atlanta class action litigator Mike McGlamry --
mmcglamry@popemcglamry.com -- is setting his sights on the
nation's multi-billion-dollar prescription pet food industry.

McGlamry -- a member of the plaintiffs' steering committee in the
ground-breaking, $1 billion settlement with the NFL -- is joining
forces with attorneys in California, North Carolina and Minnesota
on behalf of pet owners whom he contends are being duped by
veterinarian chains and pet food suppliers and manufacturers into
spending unwarranted money on prescription pet foods for their
furry companions.

What pet owners don't realize, McGlamry said, is that pet food
manufacturers sell nonprescription versions of their prescription
brands at pet stores across the country.  The nonprescription
brands, he said, are made with the same ingredients as their
prescription counterparts and are not materially different from
the prescription brands vets prescribe -- but cost far less.

A prescription isn't legally required for the sale of prescription
pet food, McGlamry said.  If it were, the food would be subject to
U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval. But prescription pet
foods are not subject to oversight and monitoring by the FDA, as
they would be if they included pharmaceuticals or other regulated
ingredients, he explained.
Nor have the pet food manufacturers ever sought FDA approval for
the prescription foods they sell.

But the prescription moniker -- and prescription pet food sales
through thousands of veterinary clinics that are owned by the
companies that produce the food they prescribe -- are deceptively
capitalizing on America's changing culture about how we think of
our pets, McGlamry said.

McGlamry is an unabashed pet owner. He and his wife, Anne, have
had miniature dachshunds since he gave her one as a present after
they were engaged.  Both grew up with dachshunds.  The couple
raised multiple dachshunds along with their three girls -- one of
whom, Caroline McGlamry, is now an associate at McGlamry's firm,
Pope McGlamry, and is working with her father on the case.

"You know, if you told me I had to have this particular food, at
some level we could afford it," McGlamry said.  But, he added,
there are many pet owners who are "just getting by" financially
who, when faced with a vet's prescription for pet food that might
cost them $50 a week, "they do it because their pets are family."

Caroline McGlamry said that in preparing the case, Moore v. Mars
Petcare US, Inc. et al, attorneys heard stories from people who
said they couldn't afford the prescription food but racked up
credit card debt because they thought it was medically better for
their pets.

In arguing that's not the case, McGlamry has teamed up with
Michael Kelly at San Francisco's Walkup, Melodia, Kelly &
Schoenberger, Lynwood Evans at Ward and Smith in Wilmington, North
Carolina, and Daniel Shulman -- daniel.shulman@gpmlaw.com
-- at Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett in Minneapolis.

They have filed a class action, antitrust complaint against
prescription pet food manufacturers Mars Petcare US, Inc., Nestle
Purina Petcare Co., Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc. and Royal Canin
USA, Inc.; veterinarian chains Blue Pearl Vet and Medical
Management International, doing business as Banfield Pet
Hospitals; and Petsmart, which contracts with and houses Banfield
clinics at many of the stores in the chain.

The prescription brands are likely familiar to pet owners. They
include Hills Prescription Diet, Royal Canin Veterinary Diet, Iams
Veterinary Formula and Purina Pro Plan--all of which McGlamry said
have nonprescription counterparts sold in pet stores that cost
less than the prescription brands.

McGlamry added that branding pet food as prescription only is the
hook that gives vets and pet food manufacturers the cachet to sell
pet food that's virtually indistinguishable from their over-the-
counter brands at a higher than market value, and to persuade pet
owners that they should invest the additional dollars or,
implicitly, their pets' health will be at risk.

Because prescriptions are associated with a doctor's orders,
Americans -- who have increasingly humanized their pets -- often
accept the recommendation without question, believing the
prescriptions are medically necessary for their pets' well-being,
McGlamry said.

Those doctors's orders are more and more being delivered through
vet clinics -- such as Blue Pearl and Banfield -- that are largely
owned by the defendant pet food manufacturers, McGlamry added.

Mars owns Blue Pearl, which the recently amended complaint
identified as one of the largest veterinarian chains in the
country.  It's also in the process of acquiring another
veterinarian chain, VCA (Vet Company of America).  Mars has also
partnered with Petsmart in ownership of Banfield, which employs
more than 3,000 vets.

In owning the vet chains that prescribe the manufacturers' brands,
the pet food companies are in a position to both create and
control the market, McGlamry said.

"The manufacturers are leveraging people's emotional attachment to
their pets and trusting their vets," said Walkup's Kelly. "Two-
thirds of Americans have a pet.  Our culture has changed -- for
the better -- in terms of appreciating pets in people's lives.  A
number get more support out of their pets than their family. . . .
In what way is that affection and love being unfairly leveraged?"

Kelly, a dog owner, offered himself as an example of how most
Americans respond to a veterinarian's prescription.  When a Boston
terrier he owned was prescribed eye medication more expensive than
any of Kelly's own prescriptions, he said it never occurred to him
to question it. "I love my dog," he said.

The suit, filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, is just ramping up.  An amended complaint was filed
earlier in February, includes plaintiff pet owners from
California, Missouri, Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Massachusetts and New York.  Their pets, all named in the
complaint, include dogs Pugalicious, Bella, Teddy, Barkley,
Kodiak, Zoey, Lola, Barley, Boone, Beau, Abby and Tank; and cats
Nikki, Sam, Leo, Zorba, Mimi, Neichi, Felix, Sassycat and Boocat.
The first hearing before judge Maxine M. Chesney is scheduled for
March 17.

While the defendant manufacturers and vet clinic chains have yet
to file an answer or dismissal motion in response to the
complaint, they have hired some of the top law firms in the nation
to defend them.  They include Washington's Williams & Connolly
representing Mars, Banfield, and Blue Pearl; White & Case for
Nestle Purina; O'Melveny & Myers for Hill's Pet Nutrition; and
Foley & Lardner for Petsmart.

Christopher Curran -- ccurran@whitecase.com -- a White & Case
Washington partner, referred requests for comment to Purina.  A
Purina spokeswoman said the company will not comment on the
allegations "due to our small share of the veterinary diet market
(which is in the one-digit percentile) as well as our small share
of this meritless case."

Two Foley & Larder attorneys could not be reached.  Attorneys at
O'Melveny & Myers in San Francisco and Williams & Connolly were
unavailable for comment on Feb. 27.


MCAFEE INC: Jabrani Appeals Decision in "Williamson" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Amirali Jabrani filed an appeal from a court ruling
relating to the lawsuit entitled Sam Williamson, et al. v. McAfee,
Inc., Case No. 5:14-cv-00158-EJD, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiff Sam
Williamson filed the lawsuit alleging that McAfee, Inc. has
systematically charged customers enrolled in its software "auto-
renewal" program higher prices than it charges other customers for
identical products, in violation of its contractual obligations
and contrary to its express representations concerning its Auto-
Renewal program.

McAfee, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, and is headquartered in
Santa Clara, California.  McAfee is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Intel Corporation.  McAfee is one of the largest computer security
software companies in the United States and the world.

The appellate case is captioned as Sam Williamson, et al. v.
McAfee, Inc., Case No. 17-15301, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by March 17, 2017;

   -- Transcript is due on April 17, 2017;

   -- Appellant Amirali Jabrani's opening brief is due on May 26,
      2017;

   -- Appellees Samantha Kirby, McAfee, Inc. and Sam Williamson's
      answering brief is due on June 26, 2017; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 14 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Plaintiffs-Appellees SAM WILLIAMSON and SAMANTHA KIRBY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Robert Rafael Ahdoot, Esq.
          Theodore Walter Maya, Esq.
          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          1016 Palm Avenue
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com
                  twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Daniel M. Hattis, Esq.
          HATTIS LAW
          935 Cowper Street
          Palo Alto, CA 94301
          Telephone: (650) 284-8495
          E-mail: dan@hattislaw.com

               - and -

          Roger N. Heller, Esq.
          Michael Sobol, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP
          275 Battery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          E-mail: rheller@lchb.com
                  msobol@lchb.com
                  nsugnet@lchb.com

Objector-Appellant AMIRALI JABRANI is represented by:

          Timothy R. Hanigan, Esq.
          LANG, HANIGAN & CARVALHO, LLP
          21550 Oxnard Street
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (818) 883-5644
          Facsimile: (818) 704-9372
          E-mail: trhanigan@gmail.com

               - and -

          Christopher Andres Bandas, Esq.
          Robert Clore, Esq.
          BANDAS LAW FIRM, P.C.
          500 North Shoreline, Suite 1020
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 698-5200
          Facsimile: (361) 698-5222
          E-mail: cbandas@bandaslawfirm.com
                  rclore@bandaslawfirm.com

Defendant-Appellee MCAFEE, INC., is represented by:

          Ellen A. Cirangle, Esq.
          LUBIN OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI LLP
          600 Montgomery Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 981-0550
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4343
          E-mail: ecirangle@lubinolson.com

               - and -

          Eli S. Schlam, Esq.
          Juli Ann Lund, Esq.
          WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
          725 Twelfth Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 434-5754
          E-mail: eschlam@wc.com
                  jlund@wc.com


MDL 1917: June 8 Settlement Final Approval Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

If You Bought A Cathode Ray Tube Product,

A Class Action Settlement May Affect You.

Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Products include Cathode Ray Tubes and
finished products that contain a Cathode Ray Tube such as
Televisions and Computer Monitors.

A Federal Court authorized this Notice. This is not a solicitation
from a lawyer.

   -- A class action lawsuit that includes direct purchasers of
CRT Products is currently pending. The Court certified a class of
direct purchasers of CRT Products by order dated July 8, 2015.  If
you are a direct purchaser of CRT Products and you did not
exclude yourself from the Class following the Notice of Direct
Purchaser Class Certification ("Class Notice") mailed on
November 23, 2015, you are a member of the Class and your rights
will be affected.

   -- Plaintiffs claim that Defendants and Co-Conspirators (listed
below) engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain
or stabilize the prices of Cathode Ray Tubes.  Plaintiffs further
claim that direct purchasers of televisions and monitors that
contain a cathode ray tube from the Defendants may recover for the
effect that the cathode ray tube conspiracy had on the prices of
televisions and monitors.  Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of
the unlawful conspiracy involving cathode ray tubes, they and
other direct purchasers paid more for CRT Products than they would
have paid absent the conspiracy. Defendants deny Plaintiffs'
claims.

   -- A settlement has been reached with Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation; Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. (formerly known as
Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc.); and Mitsubishi
Electric Visual Solutions America, Inc. (formerly known as
Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America, Inc.).  The companies are
together referred to as "Mitsubishi Electric Defendants."

   -- Your legal rights will be affected whether you act or don't
act.  This Notice includes information on the Settlement and the
continuing lawsuit. Please read the entire Notice carefully.


BASIC INFORMATION
1. Why did I get this notice?
You or your company may have directly purchased Cathode Ray Tubes
(CRTs) or certain products containing those tubes between
March 1, 1995 and November 25, 2007. A direct purchaser is a
person or business who bought a CRT, or a television or computer
monitor containing a CRT directly from one or more of the
Defendants, co-conspirators, affiliates, or subsidiaries
themselves, as opposed to an intermediary (such as a retail
store).

You have the right to know about the litigation and about your
legal rights and options before the Court decides whether to
approve the Settlement.

The notice explains the litigation, the settlement, and your legal
rights.

The Court in charge of the case is the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, and the case is
called In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, MDL No.
1917.  The people who sued are called Plaintiffs and the companies
they sued are called Defendants.

2. Who are the Defendant and Co-Conspirator companies?
The Defendant and Co-Conspirator companies include: Thomson SA
(now known as Technicolor SA); Thomson Consumer
Electronics, Inc. (now known as Technicolor USA, Inc.);
Technologies Displays Americas LLC (formerly known as Thomson
Displays Americas LLC); Videocon Industries, Ltd.; Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation; Mitsubishi Electric US, Inc. (formerly known
as Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc.); Mitsubishi
Electric Visual Solutions America, Inc. (formerly known as
Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America, Inc.); LG Electronics,
Inc., LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., LG Electronics Taiwan Taipei
Co., Ltd., Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., Philips
Electronics North America Corporation, Philips Electronics
Industries (Taiwan), Ltd., Philips da Amazonia Industria
Electronica Ltda., LP Displays International, Ltd. f/k/a
LG.Philips Displays, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., Samsung SDI Co. Ltd., Samsung SDI
America, Inc., Samsung SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V., Samsung SDI Brasil
Ltda., Shenzhen Samsung SDI Co. Ltd., Tianjin Samsung SDI Co.
Ltd., Samsung SDI Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba
America Consumer Products, L.L.C., Toshiba America Information
Systems, Inc., Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.,
Panasonic Corporation f/k/a Matsushita Electric Industrial, Ltd.,
Panasonic Corporation of North America, MT Picture Display Co.,
Ltd., Beijing-Matsushita Color CRT Company, Ltd. (BMCC), Hitachi,
Ltd., Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (n/k/a Japan Display Inc.), Hitachi
Electronic Devices (USA), Inc., Hitachi America, Ltd., Hitachi
Asia, Ltd., Tatung Company of America, Inc., Chunghwa Picture
Tubes Ltd., Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., IRICO
Group Corporation, IRICO Display Devices Co., Ltd., IRICO Group
Electronics Co., Ltd., Thai CRT Company, Ltd., Daewoo Electronics
Corporation f/k/a Daewoo Electronics Company, Ltd., Daewoo
International Corporation, Irico Group Corporation, Irico Group
Electronics Co., Ltd., and Irico Display Devices Co., Ltd.

3. What is this lawsuit about?
The lawsuit alleges that Defendants and Co-Conspirators conspired
to raise and fix the prices of CRTs and the CRTs contained in
certain finished products for over ten years, resulting in
overcharges to direct purchasers of those CRTs and certain
finished products containing CRTs.  The complaint describes how
the Defendants and Co-Conspirators allegedly violated the U.S.
antitrust laws by establishing a global cartel that set
artificially high prices for, and restricted the supply of CRTs
and the televisions and monitors that contained them. Defendants
deny Plaintiffs' allegations.  The Court has not decided who is
right.

4. Were there other settlements in this litigation?
Yes. This notice concerns a settlement with the Mitsubishi
Electric Defendants.  Plaintiffs have also reached previous
settlements with eight other groups of defendants: 1) Chunghwa
Picture Tubes Ltd., Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.;
2) Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.; Philips Electronics North
America Corporation, Philips Electronics Industries (Taiwan),
Ltd.; Philips da Amazonia Industria Electronica Ltda.; 3)
Panasonic Corporation (f/k/a Matsushita Electric Industrial,
Ltd.); Panasonic Corporation of North America; MT Picture Display
Co., Ltd. (this settlement also releases Beijing-Matsushita Color
CRT Company, Ltd.); 4) LG Electronics, Inc.; LG Electronics
U.S.A., Inc.; LG Electronics Taiwan Taipei Co., Ltd. (this
settlement also releases LP Displays International, Ltd. f/k/a
LG.Philips Displays.); 5) Toshiba Corporation; Toshiba America
Information Systems, Inc.; Toshiba America Consumer Products,
L.L.C.; Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.; 6) Hitachi,
Ltd.; Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (n/k/a Japan Displays Inc.); Hitachi
America, Ltd.; Hitachi Asia, Ltd.; Hitachi Electronic Devices
(USA) Inc.; 7) Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. (f/k/a Samsung Display Devices
Co., Ltd.); Samsung SDI America, Inc.; Samsung SDI Brasil, Ltd.;
Tianjin Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.; Samsung Shenzhen SDI Co., Ltd.; SDI
Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.; SDI Mexico S.A. de C.V.; 8) Thomson SA (now
known as Technicolor SA); Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc. (now
known as Technicolor USA, Inc.); and Technologies Displays
Americas LLC (formerly known as Thomson Displays Americas LLC).
The eight previous settlements have been finally approved by the
Court.

5. What is a Cathode Ray Tube Product?
For the purposes of the Settlement, Cathode Ray Tube Products
means Cathode Ray Tubes of any type (e.g. color display tubes and
color picture tubes) and finished products which contain Cathode
Ray Tubes, such as Televisions and Computer Monitors.
For More Information: Call 1-877-224-3063 or Visit
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com

6. What is a class action?
In a class action, one or more people, called class
representatives, sue on behalf of people who have similar claims.
All these people are members of the class, except for those who
have previously excluded themselves from the class.

Important information about the case is posted on the website,
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com as it becomes
available. Please check the website to be kept informed about any
future developments.

THE CLASS
7. How do I know if I'm part of the Class?
The Class includes:

All persons and entities who, between March 1, 1995 and November
25, 2007, directly purchased a CRT Product in the United States
from any defendant or subsidiary or affiliate thereof, or any co-
conspirator ("Class").  If you excluded yourself from the Class by
filing a request for exclusion with the Court following the Class
Notice sent to you by U.S. Mail or e-mail on November 23, 2015 and
published in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times on
November 24, 2015, you are not a Class member and this Notice does
not affect you.

8. What does the Settlement provide?
The Settlement with the Mitsubishi Electric Defendants provides
for a payment in the amount of $75,000,000 in cash to the Class
(the "Mitsubishi Electric Settlement Fund").

More details are in the Settlement Agreement, available at
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com.

9. When can I get a payment?
Distribution of the Mitsubishi Electric Settlement Fund will be
made, along with a previous settlement of $9,750,000 with the
Thomson and TDA defendants ("Thomson/TDA Settlement Fund"), on a
pro rata basis once the Court finally approves the settlement
and authorizes distribution of the Mitsubishi Electric Settlement
Fund.

Class members have already submitted claim forms for distribution
of the pro rata shares of the previous settlements (except the
Thomson/TDA settlement).  If you submitted a claim form, it will
be considered as part of the pro rata distribution of the
Mitsubishi Electric and Thomson/TDA Settlement Funds.  You need
not submit an additional claim form.  If you wish to supplement or
amend your claim form, for example to add purchases from the
Mitsubishi Electric Defendants, Thomson/TDA defendants, or others,
you may do so. You may also submit a new claim.
Directions for filing a new or supplemental claim, either online
or using a downloadable claim form, can be found on the class
website www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com.
Any new or supplemental claims must be submitted online or
postmarked by May 29, 2017.

In the future, each Class member's pro rata share of the
Mitsubishi Electric and Thomson/TDA Settlement Funds will be
determined by computing each valid claimant's total CRT Product
purchases divided by the total valid CRT Product purchases
claimed.  This percentage is multiplied by the net Settlement Fund
(total of the Mitsubishi Electric and Thomson/TDA Settlement Funds
minus all costs, attorneys' fees, and expenses) to determine each
claimant's pro rata share. To determine your CRT Product
purchases, CRT tubes (CPTs and CDTs) are calculated at full value
while CRT televisions are valued at 50% and CRT computer monitors
are valued at 75%.

In summary, all valid claimants will share in the Mitsubishi
Electric Settlement Fund on a pro rata basis determined by the CRT
value of the product you purchased -- tubes 100%, monitors 75% and
televisions 50%.

10. May I object to or comment on the Settlement?
Yes. If you have comments about, or disagree with, any aspect of
the Settlement, you may express your views to the Court by writing
to the address below.  The written response needs to include your
name, address, telephone number, the case name and number (In re
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1917), a
brief explanation of your reasons for objection, and your
signature.

The response must be filed with the Court or postmarked no later
than April 20, 2017 and mailed to:

    Honorable Jon S. Tigar
    United States District Court, Northern District of California
    San Francisco Division
    450 Golden Gate Avenue
    Courtroom 9, 19th floor
    San Francisco, CA 94102

You can ask the Court to deny approval by filing an objection. You
can't ask the Court to order a larger settlement; the Court can
only approve or deny the settlement. If the Court denies approval,
no settlement payments will be sent out and the lawsuit will
continue.  If that is what you want to happen, you must object.

For More Information: Call 1-877-224-3063 or Visit
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com

THE SETTLEMENT APPROVAL HEARING
11. When and where will the Court decide whether to approve the
Settlement?
The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing at 2:00 p.m. on
June 8, 2017, at the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco Division, in Courtroom 9 on
the 19th Floor, at 450 Golden Gate Avenue.  The hearing may be
moved to a different date or time without additional notice, so it
is a good idea to check the class website for information because
additional notice will not be sent.  At this hearing, the Court
will consider whether the Settlement is fair, reasonable and
adequate.  If there are objections or comments, the Court will
consider them at that time. After the hearing, the Court will
decide whether to
approve the Settlement.  We do not know how long these decisions
will take.

12. Do I have to come to the hearing?
No. Lead Counsel will answer any questions the Court may have, but
you are welcome to come at your own expense.  If you send an
objection or comment, you don't have to come to Court to talk
about it.  As long as you mailed your written objection or comment
on time, the Court will consider it.  You may also pay another
lawyer to attend, but it's not required.

13. May I speak at the hearing?
If you want your own lawyer instead of Lead Counsel to speak at
the Final Approval Hearing, you must give the Court a paper that
is called a "Notice of Appearance." The Notice of Appearance
should include the name and number of the lawsuit (In re Cathode
Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1917), and state that
you wish to enter an appearance at the Final Approval Hearing.  It
also must include your name, address, telephone number, and
signature. Your Notice of Appearance must be postmarked no later
than April 20, 2017.

The Notice of Appearance must be sent to the address listed in
Question 10.

THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING YOU
14. Do I have a lawyer in the case?
Yes. The Court has appointed the law firm of Saveri & Saveri, Inc.
to represent you as "Lead Counsel."  You do not have to pay Lead
Counsel. If you want to be represented by your own lawyers, and
have that lawyer appear in court for you in this case, you may
hire one at your own expense.

15. How will the lawyers be paid?
Lead Counsel will also submit an Application for Attorneys' Fees
and Expenses and Incentive Awards to be heard at the Final
Approval Hearing on June 8, 2017.  Lead Counsel will ask the Court
for attorneys' fees not to exceed one-third (33.3%) of the
Mitsubishi Electric and Thomson/TDA Settlement Funds plus
reimbursement of their costs and expenses, in accordance with the
provisions of the Mitsubishi Electric and Thomson/TDA settlement
agreements. Lead Counsel may also request that an amount be
paid to each of the class representatives who helped the lawyers
on behalf of the whole Class.

Lead Counsel will file their Application for Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses and Incentive Awards on or before March 30, 2017. On the
same day, Lead Counsel will post their Application for Attorneys'
Fees and Expenses and Incentive Awards on the Settlement website
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com.  You may comment on
or object to Lead Counsel's Application for Attorneys'
Fees and Expenses and Incentive Awards by following the procedure
set forth in paragraph 10 above.  Any comment or objection must
be filed with the Court or postmarked by April 20, 2017.

GETTING MORE INFORMATION
16. How do I get more information?
This Notice summarizes the lawsuit and the Settlement.  You can
get more information about the lawsuit and Settlement at
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com, by calling
1-877-224-3063, or writing to CRT Direct Settlement, P.O. Box
43455, Providence, RI 02940-3455. Please do not contact the Court
about this case.

Dated: February 27, 2017
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

For More Information: Call 1-877-224-3063 or Visit
www.CRTDirectPurchaserAntitrustSettlement.com


MDL 2493: 4th Cir. Appeal Filed in TCPA Suit v. Monitronics
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Edith Bowler, Janet Hodgin, Michael Hodgin, Kenneth
Clark, Dianna Mey, James Giles, Jason Bennett, Sandra Fairley,
Scott Dolemba, Allen Beaver, Dakota Dalton, Diane Elder, Michelle
Wakeley, Keith Finklea, Todd C. Bank, Newton Vaughn, Stewart N.
Abramson, Lawrence Tarizzo, Darren R. Newhart, Brandon Frazer,
Yvette Corralez-Estrada-Diaz, John Geraci, Shane Meyers, Matthew
Barger and Jeffery Wagy filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
multidistrict litigation styled In Re: Monitronics International,
Inc., Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) Litigation, Case
No. 1:13-md-02493-JPB-JES, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia at Clarksburg.

The cases in the litigation primarily involve allegations that
Monitronics -- a home security system and alarm monitoring company
-- violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act when Monitronics
or one of its agents placed telemarketing calls to persons on the
national Do Not Call Registry or to residential or wireless
telephones without the individual's consent.

In a January 2017 article at Lexology.com by K&L Gates' Andrew C.
Glass, Gregory N. Blase, Roger L. Smerage and Matthew T. Houston,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
recently granted summary judgment for the defendant alarm
manufacturers in the case.  In doing so, the Monitronics court
rejected Telephone Consumer Protection Act claims based on alleged
liability for acts of vendors, distributors, or other third
parties. The court also expressly overruled its own earlier,
contrary opinion rendered in Mey v. Monitronics International,
Inc., which matter was consolidated into Monitronics as part of a
multidistrict litigation.  Thus, the court joined a growing number
of jurisdictions that have questioned the ability of plaintiffs to
prove vicarious liability in connection with TCPA claims.

The appellate case is captioned as Edith Bowler v. Monitronics
International, Inc., Case No. 17-1222, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Edith Bowler, Janet Hodgin, Michael Hodgin,
Kenneth Clark and Dianna Mey are represented by:

          Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301-0000
          Telephone: (304) 345-6555
          E-mail: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Mary E. Reiten, Esq.
          Beth Terrell, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street
          Seattle, WA 98103
          Telephone: (206) 319-5450
          Facsimile: (206) 350-3528
          E-mail: mreiten@terrellmarshall.com
                  beth@terrellmarshall.com

Plaintiff-Appellant DIANNA MEY, individually and on behalf of a
class of all persons and entities similarly situated, is
represented by:

          John William Barrett, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301-0000
          Telephone: (304) 345-6555
          E-mail: jbarrett@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
          BRODERICK LAW, P.C.
          125 Summer Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 738-7080
          E-mail: ted@broderick-law.com

               - and -

          Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE
          179 Union Avenue
          Framingham, MA 01790
          Telephone: (508) 620-1166
          Facsimile: (508) 319-3077
          E-mail: mmccue@massattorneys.net

Plaintiff-Appellant JAMES GILES is represented by:

          James Feagle, Esq.
          SKAAR & FEAGLE, LLP
          2374 Main Street
          Tucker, GA 30084
          Telephone: (404) 373-1970
          Facsimile: (404) 601-1855
          E-mail: jfeagle@skaarandfeagle.com

               - and -

          Justin Tharpe Holcombe, Esq.
          Kris Kelly Skaar, Esq.
          SKAAR & FEAGLE, LLP
          133 Mirramont Lake Drive
          Woodstock, GA 30189
          Telephone: (770) 427-5600
          Facsimile: (404) 601-1855
          E-mail: jholcombe@skaarandfeagle.com
                  krisskaar@aol.com

               - and -

          Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301-0000
          Telephone: (304) 345-6555
          E-mail: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com

Plaintiff-Appellant JASON BENNETT is represented by:

          John R. Cox, Esq.
          9786-A Timber Circle
          Spanish Fort, AL 36527
          Telephone: (251) 517-4753
          E-mail: federalcourt.notices.jrclegal@gmail.com

               - and -

          Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, WV 25301-0000
          Telephone: (304) 345-6555
          E-mail: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Kenneth J. Riemer, Esq.
          UNDERWOOD & RIEMER, PC
          166 Government Street
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Telephone: (251) 990-0626
          Facsimile: (251) 433-7172
          E-mail: kjr@alaconsumerlaw.com

               - and -

          Earl P. Underwood, Esq.
          UNDERWOOD & RIEMER, PC
          21 South Section Street
          Fairhope, AL 36532
          Facsimile: (251) 990-0626
          E-mail: epunderwood@gmail.com

Plaintiff-Appellant SANDRA FAIRLEY is represented by:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellant SCOTT DOLEMBA, on behalf of plaintiff and a
class, is represented by:

          Cathleen M. Combs, Esq.
          EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
          20 South Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 739-4200
          E-mail: ccombs@edcombs.com

Plaintiffs-Appellants Allen Beaver, Dakota Dalton, Diane Elder,
and Michelle Wakeley are represented by:

          Charles R. Pinkerton, Esq.
          PINKERTON LAW PRACTICE, PLLC
          918 Alpine Street
          Morgantown, WV 26505
          Telephone: (304) 933-2113
          Facsimile: (304) 933-2108
          E-mail: cpinkerton@pinkertonlawpracticepllc.com

Plaintiff-Appellant KEITH FINKLEA is represented by:

          Christopher K. Jones, Esq.
          KEOGH, COX & WILSON, LTD
          701 Main Street
          Baton Rouge, LA
          Telephone: (225) 383-3796
          Facsimile: (225) 343-9612
          E-mail: cjones@kcwlaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellant TODD C. BANK represents himself:

          Todd C. Bank, Esq.
          TODD C. BANK, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
          119-40 Union Turnpike
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 520-7125
          Facsimile: (856) 997-9193
          E-mail: tbank@toddbanklaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellant NEWTON VAUGHN, an individual, is represented
by:

          Nathaniel Clark, Esq.
          NATHANIEL CLARK LAW OFFICES
          1000 Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (626) 673-5180
          E-mail: nathaniel.h.clark@gmail.com

Plaintiff-Appellant STEWART N. ABRAMSON is represented by:

          Matthew Becker, Esq.
          MORROW & ARTIM, P.C.
          304 Ross Street
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 209-0657
          E-mail: matt@consumerlaw365.com

Plaintiff-Appellant LAWRENCE TARIZZO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Adrian Robert Bacon, Esq.
          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Suren N. Weerasuriya, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD FRIEDMAN
          324 South Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: abacon@toddflaw.com
                  tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  sweerasuriya@attorneysforconsumers.com

Plaintiff-Appellant DARREN R. NEWHART is represented by:

          Jack Dennis Card, Jr., Esq.
          HICKS, MOTTO & EHRLICH, P.A.
          3399 PGA Boulevard
          Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410
          Telephone: (561) 683-2300

Plaintiff-Appellant BRANDON FRAZER is represented by:

          Brook Jeremy Bisonet, Esq.
          GUINAN BISONET PLLC
          41 Washington Avenue
          Grand Haven, MI 49417
          Telephone: (616) 847-1234

Plaintiff-Appellant YVETTE CORRALEZ-ESTRADA-DIAZ is represented
by:

          Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Boulevard
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

Plaintiff-Appellant JOHN GERACI is represented by:

          Sofia Balile, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: sbalile@lemberglaw.com

Plaintiff-Appellant SHANE MEYERS is represented by:

          Matthew Robert McGuigan, Esq.
          MILL STONE LEGAL GROUP, LLC
          110 Southeast 6th Street
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (754) 227-1610
          E-mail: mmcguigan@millstonelegal.com

Plaintiff-Appellant MATTHEW BARGER is represented by:

          Steven R. Broadwater, Jr., Esq.
          Christopher B. Frost, Esq.
          Jed Robert Nolan, Esq.
          Ralph C. Young, Esq.
          HAMILTON, BURGESS, YOUNG & POLLARD, PLLC
          P. O. Box 959
          Fayetteville, WV 25840-0000
          Telephone: (304) 574-2727
          E-mail: cfrost@hamiltonburgess.com
                  jnolan@hamiltonburgess.com

Plaintiff-Appellant JEFFERY WAGY is represented by:

          James Salvatore Giardina, Esq.
          CONSUMER RIGHTS LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3104 West Waters Avenue
          Tampa, FL 33614
          Telephone: (813) 413-5610
          Facsimile: (866) 535-7199
          E-mail: james@consumerrightslawgroup.com

Defendant-Appellee MONITRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC., is represented
by:

          Courtney Blair Amelung, Esq.
          Toyja E. Kelley, Esq.
          TYDINGS & ROSENBERG, LLP
          100 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202-0000
          Telephone: (410) 752-9700
          Facsimile: (410) 727-5460
          E-mail: camelung@tydingslaw.com
                  tkelley@tydingslaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Alan Holmstrand, Esq.
          GROVE, HOLMSTRAND & DELK, PLLC
          44 1/2 15th Street
          Wheeling, WV 26003
          Telephone: (304) 905-1961
          Facsimile: (304) 230-6610
          E-mail: jholmstrand@fsblaw.com

Defendant-Appellee UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORP., INC., is
represented by:

          Gordon Harrison Copland, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          229 Main Street
          P. O. Box 2190
          Clarksburg, WV 26302-2190
          Telephone: (304) 624-8000
          Facsimile: (304) 933-8183
          E-mail: Gordon.Copland@steptoe-johnson.com

               - and -

          Karen Elizabeth Kahle, Esq.
          William David Wilmoth, Esq.
          Kristen Andrews Wilson, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          1233 Main Street
          P. O. Box 751
          Wheeling, WV 26003-0751
          Telephone: (304) 231-0441
          E-mail: karen.kahle@steptoe-johnson.com
                  william.wilmoth@steptoe-johnson.com
                  Kristen.Andrews@Steptoe-johnson.com

               - and -

          Christopher Andrew Lauderman, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC
          400 White Oaks Boulevard
          Bridgeport, WV 26330
          Telephone: (304) 933-8180
          E-mail: chris.lauderman@steptoe-johnson.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Lee Poston, Esq.
          CROWELL & MORING LLP
          1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20004-0000
          Telephone: (202) 624-2775
          E-mail: jposton@crowell.com

Defendant-Appellee ALLIANCE SECURITY, INC., d/b/a AH Security,
Inc, formerly doing business as Versatile Marketing Solutions,
Inc., d/b/a VMS Alarms, is represented by:

          Debra Lee Hovatter, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          P. O. Box 615
          Morgantown, WV 26507-0615
          Telephone: (304) 291-7951
          Facsimile: (304) 291-7979
          E-mail: dhovatter@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Don C.A. Parker, Esq.
          Niall Anthony Paul, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3896
          Facsimile: (304) 340-3801
          E-mail: dparker@spilmanlaw.com
                  npaul@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Peter Raymond Rich, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          1 Oxford Centre
          301 Grant Street
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219-0000
          Telephone: (412) 325-3319
          E-mail: prich@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Victoria D. Summerfield, Esq.
          DAPPER BALDASARE BENSON BEHLING & KANE, PC
          444 Liberty Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 456-2109
          E-mail: vsummerfield@d3bk.com

               - and -

          John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.
          BOWLES RICE, LLP
          600 Quarrier Street
          P. O. Box 1386
          Charleston, WV 25325-0000
          Telephone: (304) 347-1724

Defendants-Appellees ALLIANCE SECURITY LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; JASJIT GOTRA, a/k/a Jay Gotra, individually and
as an Officer of Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc.; and
VERSATILE MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS Alarms, d/b/a VMS,
d/b/a Alliance Security, d/b/a Alliance Home Protection, a
California corporation, are represented by:

          Niall Anthony Paul, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3896
          Facsimile: (304) 340-3801
          E-mail: npaul@spilmanlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees ALLIANCE SECURITY LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; JASJIT GOTRA, a/k/a Jay Gotra, individually and
as an Officer of Versatile Marketing Solutions, Inc.; and
VERSATILE MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS Alarms, d/b/a VMS,
d/b/a Alliance Security, d/b/a Alliance Home Protection, a
California corporation; ALLIANCE SECURITY; and JASJIT GOTRA,
individually and as an officer of Versatile Marketing Solutions,
Inc., are represented by:

          John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.
          BOWLES RICE, LLP
          600 Quarrier Street
          P. O. Box 1386
          Charleston, WV 25325-0000
          Telephone: (304) 347-1724

Defendants-Appellees ISI ALARMS NC INC., a North Carolina
corporation, KEVIN KLINK and JAYSON WALLER are represented by:

          Harry F. Bell, Jr., Esq.
          BELL LAW FIRM
          P. O. Box 1723
          Charleston, WV 25326-1723
          Telephone: (304) 345-1700
          Facsimile: (304) 345-1715
          E-mail: hfbell@belllaw.com

               - and -

          Robert B. Newkirk, III, Esq.
          NEWKIRK LAW OFFICE
          19810 East Catawba Avenue
          P. O. Box 2536
          Cornelius, NC 28031
          Telephone: (704) 892-5898
          Facsimile: (704) 894-5633
          E-mail: robert@newkirklawoffice.com

Defendant-Appellee HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, is
represented by:

          Carrie Goodwin Fenwick, Esq.
          William Jeffrey Vollmer, Esq.
          GOODWIN & GOODWIN, LLP
          300 Summers Street
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 346-7000
          E-mail: cgf@goodwingoodwin.com
                  wjv@goodwingoodwin.com

               - and -

          Alexander Macia, Esq.
          Leah Perry Macia, Esq.
          Megan E. McCullough, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3800
          Facsimile: (304) 340-3801
          E-mail: amacia@spilmanlaw.com
                  lmacia@spilmanlaw.com
                  mmccullough@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Lauri A. Mazzuchetti, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE & WARREN, LLP
          One Jefferson Road
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 503-5900
          Facsimile: (973) 503-5950
          E-mail: lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com

Defendant VERSATILE MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., d/b/a VMS Alarms,
d/b/a VMS Alliance Security, d/b/a Alliance Home Protection, is
represented by:

          Clifford Forrest Kinney, Jr.
          Niall Anthony Paul, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          Spilman Center
          300 Kanawha Boulevard, East
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340-3844
          Facsimile: (304) 340-1050
          E-mail: ckinney@spilmanlaw.com
                  npaul@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Christina Suzanne Terek, Esq.
          SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE, PLLC
          1233 Main Street
          P. O. Box 831
          Wheeling, WV 26003-0000
          Telephone: (304) 230-6950
          Facsimile: (304) 230-6951
          E-mail: cterek@spilmanlaw.com

Defendant UTC FIRE AND AMERICA'S CORPORATION is represented by:

          William David Wilmoth, Esq.
          STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP
          1233 Main Street
          P. O. Box 751
          Wheeling, WV 26003-0751
          Telephone: (304) 233-0000
          Facsimile: (304) 233-0014
          E-mail: william.wilmoth@steptoe-johnson.com


MDL 2380: Vullings Appeals Ruling in Shop-Vac Case to 3rd Cir.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nonparty Michelle W. Vullings filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the multidistrict litigation entitled In re: Shop-Vac Marketing
and Sales Practices Litigation, MDL No. 4-12-md-02380, in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Shop-Vac Marketing and
Sales Practices Litigation, Case No. 17-1395, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs in the litigation allege that Defendants Shop-Vac
Corporation and Lowe's Home Centers, LLC misrepresented the peak
horsepower ratings and tank capacity of the Vacuums.

The Parties have settled the litigation.  The Settlement, among
other things, would extend the manufacturer's warranty on the
motors of the Vacuums for at least 2 years.  The Settlement also
includes changes to the descriptions of peak horsepower ratings
and tank capacity on marketing materials.

Ms. Vullings has previously appealed a decision in the litigation.
That appellate case was assigned Case No. 16-4370.

The Clerk of the Appellate Court entered an order stating that the
appeals assigned Case Nos. 16-4370 and 17-1395 are consolidated
for all purposes.  Appellant Vullings may file only one brief
addressing all issues on appeal in Nos. 16-4370 and 17-1395. The
appeals are further consolidated with No. 16-4425 for purposes of
scheduling, joint appendix, and disposition.

Appellants are encouraged to consult with one another regarding
the contents of their briefs as the Court disfavors repetitive
briefs. The parties may file a consolidated brief or join in or
adopt portions by reference, according to the Clerk.  Appellees
may elect to file a consolidated brief.

The Appellants are directed to electronically file these documents
on the Court's docket: All case opening forms, motions, and briefs
must be filed only in the appeal number assigned to the filer's
notice of appeal.  If a document is being filed jointly by
multiple appellants, the document must be filed only in the appeal
numbers assigned to the filing appellants.

The parties are advised that case opening forms for later filed
appeals must only be filed in the new appeals and not re-filed in
earlier appeals in which the forms were previously filed. The
parties are further advised that failure to file documents in the
appropriate case may result in the issuance of a noncompliance
order. If any party is unsure how to file a particular document,
he or she should call the case manager prior to filing the
document, filed.

Plaintiffs-Appellees ANDREW HARBUT, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, ALAN MCMICHAEL, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, KRIS REID, DAVID PALOMINO and
SCOTT GIANNETTI are represented by:

          Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: agonnelli@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Robert I. Lax, Esq.
          LAX LLP
          380 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10168
          Telephone: (212) 818-9150
          Facsimile: (212) 208-4309
          E-mail: rlax@lax-law.com

               - and -

          Andrei V. Rado, Esq.
          MILBERG LLP
          One Pennsylvania Plaza, 50th Floor
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 613-5646
          Facsimile: (212) 273-4333
          E-mail: arado@milberg.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees ALAN MCMICHAEL, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, KRIS REID, DAVID PALOMINO and SCOTT
GIANNETTI are represented by:

          Jennifer S. Czeisler, Esq.
          Sanford P. Dumain, Esq.
          MILBERG LLP
          One Pennsylvania Plaza, 50th Floor
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 613-5646
          Facsimile: (212) 273-4333
          E-mail: jczeisler@milberg.com
                  sdumain@milberg.com

               - and -

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
          E-mail: bgreenberg@ldgrlaw.com

               - and -

          James J. Rodgers, Esq.
          DILWORTH PAXSON LLP
          1500 Market Street, Suite 3500E
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 575-7000
          Facsimile: (215) 575-7200
          E-mail: jrodgers@dilworthlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees SHOP VAC CORP., LOWES HIW INC, LOWES HOME
CENTERS INC. and LOWES HOME CENTERS LLC are represented by:

          Mark D. Campbell, Esq.
          Michael B. Shortnacy, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6143
          E-mail: mcampbell@sidley.com
                  mshortnacy@sidley.com

Defendants-Appellees SHOP VAC CORP, LOWES HOME CENTERS INC. and
LOWES HOME CENTERS LLC are represented by:

          Michael L. Mallow, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6000
          E-mail: mmallow@sidley.com

Defendant-Appellee SHOP VAC CORP is represented by:

          Thomas G. Collins, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          409 North Second Street, Suite 500
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Telephone: (717) 237-4843
          E-mail: collinstg@bipc.com

Not Party-Appellant Michelle W. Vullings is represented by:

          Brent F. Vullings, Esq.
          VULLINGS LAW GROUP, LLC
          3953 Ridge Pike
          Collegeville, PA 19426
          Telephone: (610) 489-6060
          Facsimile: (610) 489-1997
          E-mail: bvullings@vullingslaw.com


MERCY HEALTH: Sanzone Moves to Certify Pension Plan Members Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned SALLY SANZONE and GENE
GRASLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MERCY HEALTH, et al., Case No. 4:16-cv-00923-CDP (E.D.
Mo.), seek certification of a class defined as:

     All participants and beneficiaries of the "Mercy Health
     MyRetirement Personal Pension Account Plan" on or after
     May 6, 2016.

Sally Sanzone and Gene Grasle also ask the Court to appoint Keller
Rohrback L.L.P. and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC as Class
Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=eDqpd3KL

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laura R. Gerber, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101-3052
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lgerber@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Ron Kilgard, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          3101 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (602) 248-0088
          Facsimile: (602) 248-2822
          E-mail: rkilgard@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Karen L. Handorf, Esq.
          Scott Lempert, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 500, West Tower
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: khandorf@cohenmilstein.com
                  slempert@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          James I. Singer, Esq.
          Rhona Lyons, Esq.
          SCHUCHAT, COOK & WERNER
          1221 Locust Street, Second Floor
          St. Louis, MO 63103-2364
          Telephone: (314) 621-2626
          Facsimile: (314) 621-2378
          E-mail: jis@schuchatcw.com
                  rsl@schuchatcw.com


MERRILL LYNCH: Faces Class Action Over Customer Cash Use
--------------------------------------------------------
Kat Greene and Carmen Germaine, writing for Law360, report that
Bank of America Corp.'s wealth management unit was hit on Feb. 28
with a proposed class action over complex trades that allowed the
firm to use customer money for its own trading, months after it
paid $415 million and admitted to wrongdoing over the activities.

Back in June, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. agreed to
pay $57 million in disgorgement and interest and a $358 million
civil penalty while admitting to wrongdoing, after the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission alleged the wealth manager
violated the agency's Customer Protection Rule by engaging in
complex options trades that artificially reduced the amount
Merrill Lynch needed to keep in a reserve account, freeing up cash
the unit used for its own trading activities.

Customer James Jiao filed a civil suit on Feb. 28 over the money
handling, saying Merrill Lynch had deprived him and other
customers of the legal interest they would have been entitled to
had Merrill Lynch obtained the investment funds through authorized
loans.  The wealth manager also leached profits made from the
unauthorized use of the funds, namely the disgorgement Merrill
Lynch had to pay into the U.S. Department of the Treasury after
the firm's conflict with the SEC, according to Mr. Jiao.

"Merrill Lynch's conduct caused plaintiff to lose out on either
lost income due to loaning his assets to Merrill Lynch or lost
income or gains he would have made had [he] subjected his
investments to these same risks independently, without Merrill
Lynch," the suit says.

Mr. Jiao seeks to represent a class of customers whose securities
or cash were invested by Merrill Lynch and were used to trade for
Merrill Lynch's own accounts from Jan. 1, 2009, to Dec. 31, 2012,
and a subclass of similar consumers specifically in California,
according to the complaint.

A spokesman for Merrill Lynch said the lawsuit was baseless.

"As the SEC noted at the time this was resolved, there were no
customers harmed in this matter, and as a result, there is no
basis for this lawsuit," the spokesman said.

The SEC's Customer Protection Rule requires broker-dealers to
safeguard the cash and securities of their customers by
maintaining a reserve.  The value of the reserve is calculated by
subtracting debits that customers owe the broker-dealer, like
margin loans, from credits the firm owes the customers, like cash
in the customer securities accounts.

According to the SEC's order instituting administrative
proceedings, Merrill Lynch had gamed the reserve calculation from
2009 to 2012 by creating complicated options trades with limited
liability companies that Merrill Lynch itself had set up,
artificially creating customer debits that reduced the minimum
account the firm needed to keep in its reserve account by up to $5
billion per week.

The wealth manager further violated the rule, the SEC alleged,
from 2009 to 2015 by holding up to $58 billion in customer
securities in a clearing account that was subject to a general
lien from Merrill Lynch's clearing bank, exposing customers to
significant risks had Merrill Lynch collapsed.

Regulators said at the time of Merrill Lynch's deal last summer
that the SEC went after more in civil penalties because the wealth
manager was not transparent with the SEC during its investigation.

Meanwhile, in December, Morgan Stanley agreed to pay $7.5 million
to settle allegations it violated the Consumer Protection Rule,
without admitting or denying the SEC's accusations that the
financial services firm violated the rules about funds in the
customer reserve account.

Mr. Jiao is represented by Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law
Group APC.

Counsel information for Merrill Lynch could not be immediately
determined.

The case is Jiao v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. et
al., case number 3:17-cv-00409, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California.


MICROSOFT CORP: Settles Class Action Over Misprinted Receipts
-------------------------------------------------------------
Malcolm Owen, writing for Apple Insider, reports that Microsoft
has agreed to settle a class-action lawsuit against its retail
efforts, paying almost $1.2 million in compensation to customers
and legal costs, over an accusation receipts provided by Microsoft
Stores provided too much information about a customer's payment
details.

The lawsuit, filed in 2015 in the Southern Florida US District
Court by Carlos Guarisma, claimed the Microsoft Store in Aventura,
Florida printed a receipt that broke the 2003 US Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), reports The Register.  According
to the law, which has required compliance since 2006, retailers
are permitted to display the last five digits or the expiry date
of a credit or debit card number used in a transaction on a
receipt.

It is alleged that the receipt Mr. Guarisma received showed ten
digits from the card number, with the first six and the last four
numbers of the credit card on the paper.  The receipt also
included other information, including the customer's name and the
identity of the salesperson involved in the transaction.

"Despite the clear language of the statute, the defendant
willfully or knowingly chose not to comply," the complaint
alleges.

According to the settlement proposal, Microsoft has agreed to pay
out up to $100 to customers in the United States who shopped at a
Microsoft Store with a credit or debit card between November 2013
and February 24 of 2017, while lead complainant Mr. Guarisma will
receive $10,000.  Microsoft is putting up close to $1.2 million to
cover the compensation requests, once it is approved by Judge
Cecilia Altonaga, with one third of the total potentially being
paid out in attorney's fees.

"This was a technical bug that we fixed immediately when it was
brought to our attention," a Microsoft spokesperson advised.
"We're pleased this matter is resolved and are committed to
protecting our customers."

Microsoft started up its Microsoft Stores initiative in late 2009,
attempting to sell Windows PCs, Microsoft products, and other
services to customers, imitating Apple's retail effort.  So far,
Microsoft hasn't managed to emulate the success of the Apple
Store, opening 106 branches in the United States and 116 stores
worldwide.


NETHERLANDS PETROLEUM: Liable for Earthquake Immaterial Damages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Corder, writing for The Associated Press, reports that a
Dutch court ruled on March 1 that an energy company jointly owned
by Shell and ExxonMobil is liable for the psychological suffering
of residents in the north of the country whose homes have been
damaged by small earthquakes caused by gas drilling.

A court in the northern city of Assen held the Netherlands
Petroleum Company, known by its Dutch acronym NAM, liable for so-
called "immaterial damages" suffered by residents and ordered the
company to pay them compensation.

The court said that the regular earthquakes create a situation "in
which NAM seriously breaches a fundamental right, the right to the
undisturbed enjoyment of living."

NAM official Thijs Jurgens said in a statement that the company
has "always stated that we are responsible for earthquake-related
damage" including immaterial damages.  The company said it was
studying the ruling.

It was not immediately clear how much compensation the company
will have to pay.  That will be decided at a later date on a case-
by-case basis.

The court case was launched by 127 residents near the northern
city of Groningen who claimed they suffered emotionally because of
the earthquakes, which have for years rattled homes -- and their
nerves.

Peter Huitema, a lawyer representing the victims, said he expects
the ruling to trigger more claims.

"Now that it is clear all residents in the earthquake zone have a
right to compensation, many more will seek it," Mr. Huitema said
in a statement.

While earthquakes caused by the gas drilling are relatively minor,
they have caused serious cracks and structural damage to thousands
of buildings in the region. NAM already is paying to repair that
damage.

The court ruling also said that the Dutch state was "careless"
from 2013 until the end of 2015 because it ignored advice to order
NAM to cut the amount of gas it pumped from the Groningen gas
field.  However, the court stopped short of declaring the
government liable for damage caused as a result of the
carelessness.


NITRO FLUIDS: Corum Seeks Certification of Operators Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned CODY CORUM, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NITRO FLUIDS,
LLC, BOBBY LEE KORICANEK and JACKIE R. SIMPSON, JR., the
Defendants, Case No. 6:16-cv-00082 (S.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to conditionally certify a class of:

   "all Operators/Specialists Who Worked for Nitro Fluids, LLC,
   Bobby Lee Koricanek and/or Jackie R. Simpson, Jr. At Any Time
   During the Past Three Years and Received a Salary Plus Job
   Bonuses/Day Rates and No Overtime".

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated current and former Operators/Specialists filed the
collective action lawsuit pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs owed to current and former
Operators/Specialists who worked for Defendants over the past
three years and were paid a fixed salary plus job bonuses/day
rates but no overtime. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants'
payroll practice of paying all Operators/Specialists a fixed
salary plus job bonuses/day rates and no overtime compensation was
improper under the FLSA.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=MWo8HL6U

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON2X, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452 1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452 1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com


OCWEN LOAN: Class Settlement in "Messineo" Granted Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted final
approval of class action settlement in the case captioned JOSEPH
C. MESSINEO, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 15-cv-02076-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

Joseph C. Messineo sued Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, for breach of
contract, violation of the Truth in Lending Act, and violation of
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Messineo brought a
class action against Ocwen, alleging claims for damages and
injunctive relief against Ocwen for failing to properly and timely
credit the payments of home mortgage loan borrowers by placing the
funds initially into suspense accounts and only later applying the
balance of the suspense accounts to interest and principal.

On November 11, 2015, the parties participated in mediation with
the Honorable Ronald Sabraw (Ret.) of JAMS, and were able to reach
a preliminary settlement, which the court approved, conditionally
certifying the putative class for settlement purposes only on
September 6, 2016.

Plaintiffs now move for final approval of class action settlement
on behalf of:

     all persons who are obligors on a loan serviced by Ocwen that
is secured by the person's principal dwelling located in the
United States or its territories, and which was in an interest
only payment status at any time on or after November 1, 2013, and
on which a payment did not result in principal curtailment in the
month the payment was made even though (a) the payment equaled or
exceeded the contractual amount of interest due that month and was
made while there was a pre-existing amount being held in suspense
by Ocwen with regard to the loan; or (b) the payment exceeded the
contractual amount of interest due that month.

Under the terms of the preliminarily approved settlement
agreement, the parties have agreed that class members who did not
exclude themselves would receive two types of relief. The first
form of relief is account adjustments, which are intended to
provide settlement class members who submitted a valid claim form
an opportunity to receive relief under the Audit and Remediation
Protocol equal in amount to any actual damages they may have
suffered. The second form of relief, the individual allocations
requires no action by the settlement class members. Settlement
class members who did not exclude themselves are entitled to a pro
rata share of the $600,000 settlement fund established by Ocwen,
less any attorneys' fees and expenses and service award approved
by the court.  Such pro rata relief averages to about $57.33 per
loan.

Messineo and class counsel have petitioned the court for approval
of a service award of $5,000 and attorneys' fees and expenses from
the settlement fund of $192,002.70, respectively. The court held a
fairness hearing on January 27, 2017.

Judge Freeman granted plaintiff's motion for final approval and
the motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award.

Judge Freeman certified the class for settlement purposes only,
final approval is granted as to the parties' settlement agreement,
which is fair, adequate, and reasonable in all its terms within
the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and the Settlement Agreement
shall be implemented and consummated according to its terms.

The settlement administrator shall pay to class counsel, the sum
of $174,000.00 as attorneys' fees, $18,002.66 as reimbursement for
their litigation expenses, pay to certified class representative
Joseph Messineo the sum of $5,000 as service award in accordance
with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Without affecting the finality of the judgment in any way, the
court retains continuing jurisdiction of the action, including,
but not limited to, (a) implementation, enforcement, and
administration of the settlement agreement, including all releases
in connection therewith; (b) resolution of any disputes concerning
settlement class membership or entitlement to benefits under the
terms of the settlement agreement; and (c) all parties hereto,
including members of the class, for purposes of enforcing and
administering the settlement agreement and the action generally
until each and every act agreed to be performed by the parties has
been performed pursuant to the settlement agreement.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as against defendant.

A copy of Judge Freeman's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/covhgA from Leagle.com.

Joseph C. Messineo, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Frank
Ventura -- aventura@venturarossi.com -- Daniel Jerome Muller --
dmuller@venturarossi.com -- Sarah E. Hammerstad --
shammerstad@venturarossi.com -- at Ventura Rossi Hersey & Muller
LLP

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Defendant, represented by Edward Rick
Buell, III -- Mary Catherine Kamka -- mkk@severson.com -- at
Severson & Werson; Michael Richard Pennington --
mpennington@bradley.com -- Robert James Campbell --
rjcampbell@bradley.com -- at Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP


OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Certification of Class Sought in "Gomez" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Irma Gomez moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned IRMA GOMEZ, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. OPTIO SOLUTIONS, LLC
d/b/a QUALIA COLLECTION SERVICES, Case No. 2:17-cv-00176-NJ (E.D.
Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Damasco and decisions like it imposed significant burdens on the
Court and on Plaintiff's Counsel, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011),
overruled, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th
Cir. 2015).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence, the
Plaintiff states.  The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff is
obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests
of the putative class.

The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 846 *14-15 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2016) (internal citations
omitted) and Chapman should have put a stop to this practice.
Unfortunately, they have not, the Plaintiff notes.  In dicta, the
Supreme Court left open the possibility that a defendant facing a
class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's claim with the court and having the court enter
judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to a class certification
motion.  Campbell-Ewald Co., 2016 U.S. LEXIS 846 *19 ("We need
not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different
if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's
individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.").

As the Motion is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the
parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary
paperwork and the resulting expense when a one paragraph, single
page motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative
and further asks the Court to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=v3qL2iJA

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


PAYPAL: Faces Class Action Over Giving Fund Platform
----------------------------------------------------
Zoe Ferguson, writing for ABC, reports that PayPal is facing a
class action in the United States after consumers complained their
money was not being delivered to their charities of choice.

In December last year, Terry Kass donated $3,250 to 13 charities
in America through PayPal's Giving Fund.

She chose to use the Giving Fund because they sent her an email
saying if she donated through PayPal, they would make an
additional 1 per cent donation.

And even though all 13 charities of her choice had a profile page
on PayPal's Giving Fund platform, only three of them were actually
registered with PayPal.

Which meant only those three could receive the donations.

The remaining $3,150 of Ms Kass's money remained withheld from the
intended organisations.

Christopher Dore -- cdore@edelson.com -- partner with law firm
Edelson in Chicago and the lawyer representing Ms Kass, said the
Giving platform was ambiguous, as it claimed consumers could
donate to "over a million charities".

However, according to Edelson lawyers' findings, only 29,000
charities had registered accounts with PayPal's Giving Fund in
2015.

"PayPal is essentially listing many entities on its website that
are not actually registered with PayPal Giving," Mr Dore said.

Mr Dore said while PayPal's website had a summary for each
charity, and indicated that they were trusted partners
participating in the program, if they were not properly registered
on the Giving platform, then there was "no vehicle for them to
receive the funds".

On PayPal's website, it states that if a charity does not have a
valid PayPal account to receive funds from donors, the Giving Fund
would contact the designated charity over a period of 30 days to
tell them to update their account and receive the donations.

It also said that if PayPal are unable to deliver the donation to
the designated charity, it would then deliver it to a similar
charity.

However, according to the class action complaint, neither the
donor nor the designated charities were contacted by PayPal, to
let them know that the funds were undeliverable.

"Our complaint alleges that the good bulk of the donations she [Ms
Kass] was making -- and we believe thousands of other donors
around the world -- have made these donations, and the money has
not reached the organisation it was intended for," Mr Dore said.

Mr Dore said they wanted to find out how many times a case like Ms
Kass's had happened and where the money had gone.

"Our lawsuit seeks to get the money to where it was supposed to
go," he said.

PayPal provided a statement to the ABC claiming, "PayPal only
recently became aware of this filing and we are reviewing the
contents".

"PayPal and PayPal Giving Fund foster positive change and
significant social impact by connecting donors and charities."
Could this happen in Australia?

Fundraising Institute Australia CEO Rob Edwards said Australians
were fairly safe from a similar situation.

"Well for the first instance if you're collecting funds on behalf
of individuals in Australia you would normally have to be a
charity, there's no holding situation like PayPal seemed to have
created here [in Australia], like a separate trust," he said.

If you are thinking of donating to a charity, Mr Edwards said to
keep in mind that if you are in doubt check with the charity
regulator about whether the charity was registered.

"More importantly donate to a charity that you know does good in
the community in the area that's of particular interest to
yourself," he said.

"If you see a middle man try and avoid that -- like PayPal -- go
directly to the charity you know or if you know the brand, go and
donate directly to the charity itself."


PHILIP MORRIS: 11 Smoking & Health Class Cases Pending at Feb. 10
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 14, 2017,
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016, that as of February
10, 2017, there were a number of smoking and health cases Smoking
and Health Litigation) pending against it, its subsidiaries or
indemnitees, as follows:

   -- 63 cases brought by individual plaintiffs in Argentina
      (35), Brazil (16), Canada (2), Chile (5), Costa Rica (2),
      Italy (1), the Philippines (1) and Scotland (1), compared
      with 68 such cases on December 31, 2015, and 63 cases on
      December 31, 2014; and

   -- 11 cases brought on behalf of classes of individual
      plaintiffs in Brazil (2) and Canada (9), compared with 11
      such cases on December 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014.

The cases in the Smoking and Health Litigation primarily allege
personal injury and are brought by individual plaintiffs or on
behalf of a class or purported class of individual plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' allegations of liability in these cases are based on
various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross
negligence, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation, design
defect, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranties,
violations of deceptive trade practice laws and consumer
protection statutes. Plaintiffs in these cases seek various forms
of relief, including compensatory and other damages, and
injunctive and equitable relief. Defenses raised in these cases
include licit activity, failure to state a claim, lack of defect,
lack of proximate cause, assumption of the risk, contributory
negligence, and statute of limitations.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Awaits Appellate Decision in "Letourneau" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. is awaiting decision in an appeal
filed in the lawsuit initiated by Cecilia Letourneau against a
subsidiary, according to the Company's February 14, 2017, Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

The Company said: "In the first class action pending in Canada,
Cecilia Letourneau v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson &
Hedges Inc. and JTI Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior Court,
Canada, filed in September 1998, our subsidiary and other Canadian
manufacturers (Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and JTI-MacDonald
Corp.) are defendants.  The plaintiff, an individual smoker,
sought compensatory and punitive damages for each member of the
class who is deemed addicted to smoking. The class was certified
in 2005.  Trial began in March 2012 and concluded in December
2014. The trial court issued its judgment on May 27, 2015. The
trial court found our subsidiary and two other Canadian
manufacturers liable and awarded a total of CAD 131 million
(approximately $100 million) in punitive damages, allocating CAD
46 million (approximately $35 million) to our subsidiary. The
trial court found that defendants violated the Civil Code of
Quebec, the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the
Quebec Consumer Protection Act by failing to warn adequately of
the dangers of smoking. The trial court also found that defendants
conspired to prevent consumers from learning the dangers of
smoking. The trial court further held that these civil faults were
a cause of the class members' addiction. The trial court rejected
other grounds of fault advanced by the class, holding that: (i)
the evidence was insufficient to show that defendants marketed to
youth, (ii) defendants' advertising did not convey false
information about the characteristics of cigarettes, and (iii)
defendants did not commit a fault by using the descriptors light
or mild for cigarettes with a lower tar delivery. The trial court
estimated the size of the addiction class at 918,000 members but
declined to award compensatory damages to the addiction class
because the evidence did not establish the claims with sufficient
accuracy. The trial court ordered defendants to pay the full
punitive damage award into a trust within 60 days and found that a
claims process to allocate the awarded damages to individual class
members would be too expensive and difficult to administer. The
trial court ordered a briefing on the proposed process for the
distribution of sums remaining from the punitive damage award
after payment of attorneys' fees and legal costs."

"In June 2015, our subsidiary commenced the appellate process by
filing its inscription of appeal of the trial court's judgment
with the Court of Appeal of Quebec. Our subsidiary also filed a
motion to cancel the trial court's order for payment into a trust
within 60 days notwithstanding appeal. In July 2015, the Court of
Appeal granted the motion to cancel and overturned the trial
court's ruling that our subsidiary make the payment into a trust
within 60 days. In August 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion with the
Court of Appeal seeking security in both the Letourneau case and
the Blais case."

"In October 2015, the Court of Appeal granted the motion and
ordered our subsidiary to furnish security totaling CAD 226
million (approximately $173 million), in the form of cash into a
court trust or letters of credit, in six equal consecutive
quarterly installments of approximately CAD 37.6 million
(approximately $28.7 million) beginning in December 2015 through
March 2017. See the Blais description for further detail
concerning the security order."

"The Court of Appeal heard oral arguments on the merits appeal in
November 2016."

"Our subsidiary and PMI believe that the findings of liability and
damages were incorrect and should ultimately be set aside on any
one of many grounds, including the following: (i) holding that
defendants violated Quebec law by failing to warn class members of
the risks of smoking even after the court found that class members
knew, or should have known, of the risks, (ii) finding that
plaintiffs were not required to prove that defendants' alleged
misconduct caused injury to each class member in direct
contravention of binding precedent, (iii) creating a factual
presumption, without any evidence from class members or otherwise,
that defendants' alleged misconduct caused all smoking by all
class members, (iv) holding that the addiction class members'
claims for punitive damages were not time-barred even though the
case was filed more than three years after a prominent addiction
warning appeared on all packages, and (v) awarding punitive
damages to punish defendants without proper consideration as to
whether punitive damages were necessary to deter future
misconduct."

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Awaits Appellate Ruling in Conseil Quebecois Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. awaits appellate decision in the
lawsuit filed by Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and
Jean-Yves Blais against a subsidiary, according to the Company's
February 14, 2017, Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

The Company said: "In the second class action pending in Canada,
Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and Jean-Yves Blais v.
Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. and JTI
Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior Court, Canada, filed in November
1998, our subsidiary and other Canadian manufacturers (Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd. and JTI-MacDonald Corp.) are defendants. The
plaintiffs, an anti-smoking organization and an individual smoker,
sought compensatory and punitive damages for each member of the
class who allegedly suffers from certain smoking-related
diseases."

"The class was certified in 2005. Trial began in March 2012 and
concluded in December 2014. The trial court issued its judgment on
May 27, 2015. The trial court found our subsidiary and two other
Canadian manufacturers liable and found that the class members'
compensatory damages totaled approximately CAD 15.5 billion,
including pre-judgment interest (approximately $11.8 billion). The
trial court awarded compensatory damages on a joint and several
liability basis, allocating 20% to our subsidiary (approximately
CAD 3.1 billion, including pre-judgment interest (approximately
$2.4 billion)). In addition, the trial court awarded CAD 90,000
(approximately $68,800) in punitive damages, allocating CAD 30,000
(approximately $22,900) to our subsidiary and found that
defendants violated the Civil Code of Quebec, the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Quebec Consumer Protection
Act by failing to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking. The
trial court also found that defendants conspired to prevent
consumers from learning the dangers of smoking. The trial court
further held that these civil faults were a cause of the class
members' diseases. The trial court rejected other grounds of fault
advanced by the class, holding that: (i) the evidence was
insufficient to show that defendants marketed to youth, (ii)
defendants' advertising did not convey false information about the
characteristics of cigarettes, and (iii) defendants did not commit
a fault by using the descriptors light or mild for cigarettes with
a lower tar delivery. The trial court estimated the disease class
at 99,957 members. The trial court ordered defendants to pay CAD 1
billion (approximately $764 million) of the compensatory damage
award into a trust within 60 days, CAD 200 million (approximately
$153 million) of which is our subsidiary's portion and ordered
briefing on a proposed claims process for the distribution of
damages to individual class members and for payment of attorneys'
fees and legal costs."

"In June 2015, our subsidiary commenced the appellate process by
filing its inscription of appeal of the trial court's judgment
with the Court of Appeal of Quebec. Our subsidiary also filed a
motion to cancel the trial court's order for payment into a trust
within 60 days notwithstanding appeal. In July 2015, the Court of
Appeal granted the motion to cancel and overturned the trial
court's ruling that our subsidiary make an initial payment within
60 days. In August 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion with the Court
of Appeal seeking an order that defendants place irrevocable
letters of credit totaling CAD 5 billion (approximately $3.8
billion) into trust, to secure the judgments in both the
Letourneau and Blais cases. Plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their
motion for security against JTI-MacDonald Corp. and proceeded only
against our subsidiary and Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd."

"In October 2015, the Court of Appeal granted the motion and
ordered our subsidiary to furnish security totaling CAD 226
million (approximately $173 million) to cover both the Letourneau
and Blais cases. Such security may take the form of cash into a
court trust or letters of credit, in six equal consecutive
quarterly installments of approximately CAD 37.6 million
(approximately $28.7 million) beginning in December 2015 through
March 2017. The Court of Appeal ordered Imperial Tobacco Canada
Ltd. to furnish security totaling CAD 758 million (approximately
$579 million) in seven equal consecutive quarterly installments of
approximately CAD 108 million (approximately $83 million)
beginning in December 2015 through June 2017. In December 2016,
our subsidiary made its fifth quarterly installment of security
for approximately CAD 37.6 million (approximately $28.7 million)
into a court trust. This payment is included in other assets on
the consolidated balance sheets and in cash used in operating
activities in the consolidated statements of cash flows. The Court
of Appeal ordered that the security is payable upon a final
judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's
judgment or upon further order of the Court of Appeal."

"The Court of Appeal heard oral arguments on the merits appeal in
November 2016."

"Our subsidiary and PMI believe that the findings of liability and
damages were incorrect and should ultimately be set aside on any
one of many grounds, including the following: (i) holding that
defendants violated Quebec law by failing to warn class members of
the risks of smoking even after the court found that class members
knew, or should have known, of the risks, (ii) finding that
plaintiffs were not required to prove that defendants' alleged
misconduct caused injury to each class member in direct
contravention of binding precedent, (iii) creating a factual
presumption, without any evidence from class members or otherwise,
that defendants' alleged misconduct caused all smoking by all
class members, (iv) relying on epidemiological evidence that did
not meet recognized scientific standards, and (v) awarding
punitive damages to punish defendants without proper consideration
as to whether punitive damages were necessary to deter future
misconduct."

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: "Bourassa" Class Suit Remains Pending in Canada
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Bourassa v. Imperial Tobacco
Canada Limited, et al., remains pending in Canada, according to
Philip Morris International Inc.'s February 14, 2017, Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

In the eighth class action pending in Canada, Bourassa v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Limited, et al., Supreme Court, British Columbia,
Canada, filed June 25, 2010, the Company, its subsidiaries, and
its indemnitees (Philip Morris USA Inc. and Altria Group, Inc.),
and other members of the industry are defendants. The plaintiff,
the heir to a deceased smoker, alleges that the decedent was
addicted to tobacco products and suffered from emphysema resulting
from the use of tobacco products. She is seeking compensatory and
punitive damages on behalf of a proposed class comprised of all
smokers who were alive on June 12, 2007, and who suffered from
chronic respiratory diseases allegedly caused by smoking, their
estates, dependents and family members, plus disgorgement of
revenues earned by the defendants from January 1, 1954, to the
date the claim was filed.

In December 2014, plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: "Jacklin" Class Suit Remains Pending in Ontario
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit commenced by Suzanne Jacklin in Ontario,
Canada, remains pending, Philip Morris International Inc. said in
its Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
February 14, 2017, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

In the ninth class action pending in Canada, Suzanne Jacklin v.
Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, filed June 20, 2012, the Company, its
subsidiaries, and its indemnitees (Philip Morris USA Inc. and
Altria Group, Inc.), and other members of the industry are
defendants. The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges her own
addiction to tobacco products and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease ("COPD") resulting from the use of tobacco products. She
is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a
proposed class comprised of all smokers who have smoked a minimum
of 25,000 cigarettes and have allegedly suffered, or suffer, from
COPD, heart disease, or cancer, as well as restitution of profits.

Plaintiff's counsel has indicated that he does not intend to take
any action in this case in the near future.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: "McDermid" Class Suit Remains Pending in Canada
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled McDermid v. Imperial Tobacco
Canada Limited, et al., remains pending in Canada, Philip Morris
International Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-K filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 14, 2017, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

In the seventh class action pending in Canada, McDermid v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, et al., Supreme Court, British
Columbia, Canada, filed June 25, 2010, the Company, its
subsidiaries, and its indemnitees (Philip Morris USA Inc. and
Altria Group, Inc.), and other members of the industry are
defendants. The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges his own
addiction to tobacco products and heart disease resulting from the
use of tobacco products. He is seeking compensatory and punitive
damages on behalf of a proposed class comprised of all smokers who
were alive on June 12, 2007, and who suffered from heart disease
allegedly caused by smoking, their estates, dependents and family
members, plus disgorgement of revenues earned by the defendants
from January 1, 1954, to the date the claim was filed.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Preliminary Motions in "Adams" Suit Remain Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Preliminary motions remain pending in the lawsuit styled Adams v.
Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., The, Philip
Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-K filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 14, 2017, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

The Company said: "In the fourth class action pending in Canada,
Adams v. Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., The
Queen's Bench, Saskatchewan, Canada, filed July 10, 2009, we, our
subsidiaries, and our indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and other
members of the industry are defendants. The plaintiff, an
individual smoker, alleges her own addiction to tobacco products
and COPD resulting from the use of tobacco products. She is
seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a proposed
class comprised of all smokers who have smoked a minimum of 25,000
cigarettes and have allegedly suffered, or suffer, from COPD,
emphysema, heart disease, or cancer, as well as restitution of
profits."

Preliminary motions are pending.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Sao Paulo Public Prosecutor's Appeal Still Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Public Prosecutor of Sao Paulo's appeal in the lawsuit involving
the Brazilian subsidiary of Philip Morris International Inc.
remains pending, according to the Company's February 14, 2017,
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.

The Company said: "In the second class action pending in Brazil,
Public Prosecutor of Sao Paulo v. Philip Morris Brasil Industria e
Comercio Ltda., Civil Court of the City of Sao Paulo, Brazil,
filed August 6, 2007, our subsidiary is a defendant. The
plaintiff, the Public Prosecutor of the State of Sao Paulo, is
seeking (i) damages on behalf of all smokers nationwide, former
smokers, and their relatives; (ii) damages on behalf of people
exposed to environmental tobacco smoke nationwide, and their
relatives; and (iii) reimbursement of the health care costs
allegedly incurred for the treatment of tobacco-related diseases
by all Brazilian States and Municipalities, and the Federal
District. In an interim ruling issued in December 2007, the trial
court limited the scope of this claim to the State of Sao Paulo
only. In December 2008, the Seventh Civil Court of Sao Paulo
issued a decision declaring that it lacked jurisdiction because
the case involved issues similar to the ADESF case discussed above
and should be transferred to the Nineteenth Lower Civil Court in
Sao Paulo where the ADESF case is pending. The court further
stated that these cases should be consolidated for the purposes of
judgment."

"In April 2010, the Sao Paulo Court of Appeals reversed the
Seventh Civil Court's decision that consolidated the cases,
finding that they are based on different legal claims and are
progressing at different stages of proceedings. This case was
returned to the Seventh Civil Court of Sao Paulo, and our
subsidiary filed its closing arguments in December 2010."

"In March 2012, the trial court dismissed the case on the merits.
In January 2014, the Sao Paulo Court of Appeals rejected
plaintiff's appeal and affirmed the trial court decision. In July
2014, plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court of Justice."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Still No Activity in 3 Suits Pending in Canada
-------------------------------------------------------------
Three class action lawsuits remain pending while the Plaintiffs'
counsel pursue the lawsuit captioned Adams v. Canadian Tobacco
Manufacturers' Council, et al., according to Philip Morris
International Inc.'s February 14, 2017, Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2016.

In the third class action pending in Canada, Kunta v. Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Queen's Bench,
Winnipeg, Canada, filed June 12, 2009, the Company, its
subsidiaries, and its indemnitees (Philip Morris USA Inc. and
Altria Group, Inc.), and other members of the industry are
defendants. The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges her own
addiction to tobacco products and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease ("COPD"), severe asthma, and mild reversible lung disease
resulting from the use of tobacco products. She is seeking
compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a proposed class
comprised of all smokers, their estates, dependents and family
members, as well as restitution of profits, and reimbursement of
government health care costs allegedly caused by tobacco products.
In September 2009, plaintiff's counsel informed defendants that he
did not anticipate taking any action in this case while he pursues
the Adams class action filed in Saskatchewan.

In the fifth class action pending in Canada, Semple v. Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Supreme Court (trial
court), Nova Scotia, Canada, filed June 18, 2009, the Company, its
subsidiaries, and its indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and other
members of the industry are defendants. The plaintiff, an
individual smoker, alleges his own addiction to tobacco products
and COPD resulting from the use of tobacco products. He is seeking
compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a proposed class
comprised of all smokers, their estates, dependents and family
members, as well as restitution of profits, and reimbursement of
government health care costs allegedly caused by tobacco products.
No activity in this case is anticipated while plaintiff's counsel
pursues the Adams class action filed in Saskatchewan.

In the sixth class action pending in Canada, Dorion v. Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Queen's Bench,
Alberta, Canada, filed June 15, 2009, the Company, its
subsidiaries, and its indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and other
members of the industry are defendants. The plaintiff, an
individual smoker, alleges her own addiction to tobacco products
and chronic bronchitis and severe sinus infections resulting from
the use of tobacco products. She is seeking compensatory and
punitive damages on behalf of a proposed class comprised of all
smokers, their estates, dependents and family members, restitution
of profits, and reimbursement of government health care costs
allegedly caused by tobacco products. To date, we, our
subsidiaries, and our indemnitees have not been properly served
with the complaint. No activity in this case is anticipated while
plaintiff's counsel pursues the Adams class action filed in
Saskatchewan.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PHILIP MORRIS: Two Appeals in ADESF Suit Remain Pending in Brazil
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Two appeals in the lawsuit initiated by The Smoker Health Defense
Association remain pending in Brazil, according to Philip Morris
International Inc.'s February 14, 2017, Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2016.

In the class action pending in Brazil, The Smoker Health Defense
Association (ADESF) v. Souza Cruz, S.A. and Philip Morris
Marketing, S.A., Nineteenth Lower Civil Court of the Central
Courts of the Judiciary District of Sao Paulo, Brazil, filed July
25, 1995, the Company's subsidiary and another member of the
industry are defendants. The plaintiff, a consumer organization,
is seeking damages for all addicted smokers and former smokers,
and injunctive relief. In 2004, the trial court found defendants
liable without hearing evidence and awarded "moral damages" of
R$1,000 (approximately $321) per smoker per full year of smoking
plus interest at the rate of 1% per month, as of the date of the
ruling. The court did not award actual damages, which were to be
assessed in the second phase of the case. The size of the class
was not estimated. Defendants appealed to the Sao Paulo Court of
Appeals, which annulled the ruling in November 2008, finding that
the trial court had inappropriately ruled without hearing evidence
and returned the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
In May 2011, the trial court dismissed the claim. In February
2015, the appellate court unanimously dismissed plaintiff's
appeal.

In September 2015, plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court of
Justice. In addition, the defendants filed a constitutional appeal
to the Federal Supreme Tribunal on the basis that plaintiff did
not have standing to bring the lawsuit. Both appeals are still
pending.

Philip Morris International Inc. is a Virginia holding company
incorporated in 1987.  The Company's subsidiaries and affiliates
and their licensees are engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cigarettes, other tobacco products and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States of America.  The
Company's products are sold in more than 180 markets, and in many
of these markets they hold the number one or number two market
share position.  The Company has a wide range of premium, mid-
price and low-price brands.  The Company's portfolio comprises
both international and local brands.


PIONEER CREDIT: Louisiana Court Certifies Class in "Masson" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ivan L.R. Lemelle grants the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification filed in the lawsuit titled SCOTT N. MASSON v.
PIONEER CREDIT RECOVERY, INC., AND COAST PROFESSIONAL INC., Case
No. 2:16-cv-01887-ILRL-JVM (E.D. La.).

"A hearing was held today on Plaintiff's "Motion for Class
Certification" (Rec. Doc. 51), for oral reasons given in open
court," Judge Lemelle says.  "IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's
motion is GRANTED."

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ehxoR2r3


PIVOTAL PAYMENTS: "Abante" Survives Dismissal Bid
-------------------------------------------------
Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California denied defendant's motion
to dismiss the case captioned ABANTE ROOTER AND PLUMBING, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. PIVOTAL PAYMENTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-
05486-JCS (N.D. Cal.).

Abante Rooter and Plumbing, Inc., is a corporation based in
California, with its principal place of business in Alameda
County, California. It is a small plumbing company that provides
an array of commercial and residential draining and plumbing
services, including emergency draining and plumbing services in
the San Francisco Bay area.  Abante uses several cellular
telephone numbers that are assigned to different cities around the
San Francisco Bay Area to conduct its business.

Pivotal Payments, Inc. is a leading provider of technology-driven
global payment processing solutions for small to large
enterprises. One of its divisions is Capital Processing Network or
CPN, which Pivotal acquired in 2014.  CPN provides complete
merchant services and credit card processing to point-of-sale
businesses across the U.S. One of Pivotal's strategies for
marketing its credit card processing services involves the use of
an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) to solicit business.
Abante brought a putative class action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Sections 227, et seq., alleging
that Pivotal was responsible for robocalls placed to several
cellular telephone numbers used by Abante to communicate with its
customers.

Abante asserts a claim under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3)(B)
seeking $500 for each call that violates 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(1)(A) and an injunction prohibiting further violations of
the TCPA and a claim under 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3) for treble
damages of up to $1,500 for each call that constitutes a knowing
and/or willful violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1)(A).
Abante alleges that Pivotal uses the ATDS to make unsolicited
calls that play recorded messages to cellular telephone numbers.
The recipients of such calls, including Abante have not consented
to receive such calls.

Pivotal filed a motion to dismiss and contends that Abante has not
alleged a concrete injury to demonstrate that it has standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and therefore, that the
complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Pivotal also argues that Abante fails to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because it has not alleged sufficient
facts to support a plausible inference that Pivotal made the
robocalls that Abante allegedly received.  In addition, Pivotal
contends, Abante's claims fail because under 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(5), it must allege that it received more than one robocall
from defendant to state a claim. According to Pivotal, because
Abante alleged that only one call was made to number, the claims
fail as to that number. Id.

Finally, Pivotal argues that the court should strike certain
allegations in the complaint under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on the basis that they are irrelevant.

Chief Magistrate Judge Spero denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
The court rejects Pivotal's argument that the concrete injury
requirement is not satisfied because the harm alleged is de
minimis. As the court explained in LaVigne, Article III
requirements for an injury-in-fact do not contain a minimum cost
or harm threshold. Regardless of how small the harm is, it is
actual and it is real.  The court concludes that Abante has
sufficiently alleged concrete injury for the purposes of
demonstrating the existence of Article III standing. Also, Abante
has alleged detailed facts from which a plausible inference can be
drawn that Pivotal was responsible for the robocalls made to
Abante. That is all that is required at the stage of the case.
Pivotal asks the court to strike certain allegations on the basis
that they are irrelevant. The court declines the request. Motions
to strike under Rule 12(f) are disfavored. The Court has rejected
Pivotal's argument under Section 227(c)(5).

A copy of Magistrate Spero's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/ggIBF2 from Leagle.com.

Abante Rooter and Plumbing, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Steven
M. Tindall -- smt@classlawgroup.com -- at Gibbs Law Group LLP;
Adrienne McEntee -- amcentee@terrellmarshall.com --Beth E. Terrell
-- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- Jennifer Rust Murray --
jmurray@terrellmarshall.com -- at Terrell Marshall Daudt and
Willie PLLC; Anthony I. Paronich -- Edward A. Broderick -- at
Broderick & Paronich, P.C.; Matthew P. McCue -- at The Law Office
of Matthew P. McCue

Pivotal Payments, Inc., Defendant, represented by Antony E.
Buchignani -- tbuchignani@tocounsel.com -- Amy Elizabeth Burke --
aburke@tocounsel.com -- at Theodora Oringher PC


PRIVATE ADVISORY: Wash. Court Stays "Farr" Pending SEC Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard A. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, granted in part and denied in
part the defendants' motion to dismiss the case captioned JAMES S.
FARR, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. PRIVATE ADVISORY GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 16-1565-RAJ (W.D. Wash.).

The Securities Exchange Commission filed an enforcement action
against Aequitas Holdings, LLC, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, to which the district court entered an order
establishing a receivership over Aequitas' assets.  The
receivership order imposes a broad stay of litigation, among of
which it would apply to all civil legal proceedings of any nature,
including, but not limited to, bankruptcy proceedings, arbitration
proceedings, foreclosure actions, default proceedings, or other
actions of any nature involving any receivership property,
wherever located, and any of the receivership entity, to which
such proceedings are referred to as ancillary proceedings.

Several months following the entry of the litigation stay, James
S. Farr filed a lawsuit against defendants Private Advisory Group,
LLC, Douglas Reed Bean, S. Christopher Bean, and Jonathan David
Bishop and alleges that defendants participated in and perpetrated
a Ponzi scheme involving the sale of securities issued by Aequitas
or its affiliated entities. Aequitas owns Private Advisory Group,
LLC through a subsidiary.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, requesting that the court
dismiss Farr's action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
because he filed it in violation of the litigation stay. In the
alternative, Farr requests that the court stay the action until
the District of Oregon lifts the litigation stay.

Judge Jones granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion
to dismiss. Judge Jones finds that the plain language of the
litigation stay encompasses Farr's lawsuit. However, putting aside
the question of whether filing the action constitutes a failure to
comply with a court order with the meaning of Rule 41, Farr's
decision to file the lawsuit is not an extreme circumstance
sufficient to invoke the harsh penalty of involuntary dismissal.
Farr filed the lawsuit to obtain relief from alleged securities
fraud perpetrated by defendants. Even if he did so in violation of
the litigation stay, dismissal would not be a proportionate
sanction. The court finds that a stay is appropriate. The orderly
course of justice weighs heavily in favor of staying Farr's
lawsuit.

Until further order, the court stays the matter and removes it
from the court's active caseload. Within ninety days from the date
of the order, the parties shall file a status report that updates
the court on any relevant developments in SEC v. Aequitas Mgmt.,
LLC, No. 16-438-PK. Should there be any significant developments
prior to the expiration of ninety days, the parties are permitted
to file a motion to lift the stay on that basis.

A copy of Judge Jones's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/8hFbak from Leagle.com.

James S Farr, Plaintiff, represented by:

J. Bartin Goplerud, Esq.
Michael C. McKay, Esq.
SHINDLER, ANDERSON, GOPLERUD & WEESE, P.C.
5015 Grand Ridge, Dr #100
West Des Moines, IA 50265
Tel: 515-223-4567

     - and -

Bradley Jerome Moore, Esq.
STRITMATTER KESSLER WHELAN KOEHLER MOORE KAHLER
3600 15th Ave W #300
Seattle, WA 98119
Tel: 206-448-1777
Email: brad@stritmatter.com

Defendants, represented by Roger D. Mellem -- mellem@ryanlaw.com -
- Kristin Nealey Meier --kmeier@ryanlaw.com -- at RYAN SWANSON &
CLEVELAND


QUEST DIAGNOSTICS: Class Settlement in "Emmons" Has Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted final approval of class action
settlement and made an award of attorneys' fees in the case
captioned DOROTHEA EMMONS and LISA STAPLETON, individually, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,
and as aggrieved employees, Plaintiffs, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
CLINICAL LABORATORIES, INC., a Delaware corporation; QUEST
DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED, doing business as QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
INCORPORATED OF NEVADA, a Nevada corporation; QUEST DIAGNOSTICS
NOCHOLS INSTITUTE, a California corporation; DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, No. 1:13-cv-00474-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.)

Dorothea Emmons and Lisa Stapleton filed a suit against Quest
Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc., Quest Diagnostics
Incorporated, and Quest Diagnostics Nochols Institute, for
violations of California labor law by failing to (1) pay overtime
wages, (2) pay minimum wages, (3) provide meal periods, (4)
provide rest breaks, (5) pay all wages owed upon termination, (6)
provide accurate wage statements, and (7) pay business-related
expenses. Plaintiffs further allege violations of California Labor
Code Section 2698 and California Business and Professions Code
Section 17200. Plaintiffs sought relief both on their own behalf
and on behalf of a proposed main class and two proposed subclasses
consisting of non-Floater and Floater Phlebotomists employed by
defendants.

Preliminary approval of the class action settlement was granted by
the court on June 22, 2016.  On October 14, 2016, plaintiffs filed
a motion for attorneys' fees. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed
a motion for final approval of a class action settlement on
November 4, 2016. Neither motion was opposed, and on December 20,
2016, the court held a hearing with attorneys Robert Drexler and
Ed Santos appearing on behalf of plaintiffs. No appearance was
made on behalf of defendants. At the hearing, the court requested
plaintiffs submit additional evidence with respect to the issue of
commonality, and plaintiffs did so on February 6, 2017.

Judge Drozd observes no evidence of collusion between the parties
and notes that all factors brought to the court's attention
support the granting of final approval of the settlement and
certification of the class.  Hence, the settlement is approved as
fair and reasonable, the class is certified for purposes of the
settlement, and class counsel's motion for attorneys' fees,
expenses, and class representative payments is granted.

Judge Drozd confirms Capstone Law APC as class counsel and
approves the requested fee of $783,333, as well as $11,962.74 in
costs, both to be paid from the settlement fund; confirms
Simpluris, Inc., as the settlement administrator and approves
$25,000 in costs and expenses to be paid to Simpluris, Inc. from
the settlement fund; finds plaintiffs Emmons and Stapleton are
suitable class representatives and orders payment to them of
$8,000 each out of the settlement fund; orders that the settlement
awards be made and administered in accordance with the terms of
the settlement agreement to the 2,707 valid class members; finds
that under the California Labor Codes' Private Attorneys General
Act, California Labor Code Section 2699, et seq., a PAGA payment
of $20,000 is reasonable and apportions that payment as follows:
$15,000 to the LWDA and $5,000 to the settlement class members, to
be distributed pursuant to the claims process defined the
settlement agreement; directs that, in accordance with the
settlement agreement and California Labor Code Sections 96.6 and
96.7, any undeliverable settlement checks or settlement checks
that remain uncashed after 120 days be paid to the California
Department of Industrial Relations Unpaid Wage Fund; enters a
final judgment and directs the parties to act in accordance with
the terms in the settlement agreement and retains jurisdiction
over the matter for the purposes of enforcing the settlement
agreement and issuing any orders in connection therewith.

A copy of Judge Drozd's order dated February 24, 2017, is
available at https://goo.gl/P1GpAE from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs, represented by Bevin Elaine Allen Pike --
Bevin.Pike@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Jonathan Sing Lee --
Jonathan.Lee@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Robert J. Drexler --
Robert.Drexler@CapstoneLawyers.com -- at Capstone Law APC

Defendants, represented by Erica C. Parks -- at Lee Tran & Liang
LLP; Jonathan M. Brenner -- jbrenner@sidley.com -- Aimee Grace
Mackay -- amackay@sidley.com -- at Sidley Austin LLP


SELF-RELIANCE INC: Care Staff Class Certified in "Wengerd" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Thomas M. Rose grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
conditionally certify collective action and for court-authorized
notice filed in the lawsuit entitled Cindy Wengerd, et al. v.
Self-Reliance, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-00293-TMR-SLO (S.D. Ohio).

The Plaintiffs have sought an order conditionally certifying a
collective action for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, defined as:

     All persons who are or have been employed by Self-Reliance
     as Direct Care staff in Ohio, or other job titles performing
     similar job duties, who did not receive premium overtime pay
     at a rate of not less than one and one-half times their
     regular rate of pay when they worked more than forty (40)
     hours in a workweek, at any time from August 25, 2012
     through the entry of final judgment.

Self-Reliance is an Ohio Corporation, providing in-home family
support for children and adults with challenging behaviors,
developmental disabilities and other disabilities.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=SlekNWAb


SI WIRELESS: Seeks Arbitration in Automated Text Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Heather Isringhausen Gvillo, writing for Madison-St. Clair Record,
reports that a cellphone company seeks to enforce arbitration in a
customer's class action alleging she received automated text
messages instructing her to make payments or risk having her
services suspended.

Tennessee resident Andrea Campbell, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed the complaint on Dec. 8 in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
against SI Wireless LLC for allegedly violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

Ms. Campbell alleges she fell behind on her payments "at some
point in 2016" and began receiving automated text messages
demanding she make a payment or risk having her service suspended.

She alleges the messages were sent at 7 a.m., "making them more
disruptive than helpful."

Ms. Campbell claims she revoked her consent for the automated
messages but was told there was no way to stop the messages.

SI Wireless filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper
venue or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration on Jan. 5
through attorney Lorna Geiler of Meyer Capel in Champaign, Ill.

The defendant argues that its cellular telephone service agreement
requires arbitration of any dispute "arising from or relating in
any way" to the services provided.  It also argues that the
agreement sets the venue for arbitration in McCracken County, Ky.,
or Madison County, Tenn.

"Campbell's claim against SI Wireless is clearly subject to the
parties' agreement to arbitrate such disputes," the motion states.

In its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the
defendant adds that after the claim was initially made, the
parties discussed possible settlement.

"During these discussions, SI Wireless informed Plaintiff that it
believed arbitration was the appropriate avenue of relief, if
any," the memorandum states.

However, the defendant argues that it later became clear that the
settlement discussion would not proceed further.

Ms. Campbell filed a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss
on Feb. 9 through attorney Jeremy Glapion -- jmg@glapionlaw.com --
of The Glapion Law Firm LLC in Wall, NJ.

She argues that SI Wireless attempted to amend her phone contract
by adding the arbitration clause but failed to provide reasonable
notice of the amendment. She adds that the defendant allegedly
misled her and other customers regarding the added clause.

"Defendant appears to have intentionally made it difficult for its
customers to figure out what additions and changes were made," the
brief states.

Campbell alleges customers were notified of the amendment through
a text message, which included a link.  But she claims no mention
of the arbitration clause was provided in the link.

"Instead, Defendant chose to be vague, at best, and intentionally
misleading, at worst.  It is also possible that Defendant never
actually sent notice of the added Arbitration Clause and is
attempting to use its August 25 notice of some other change to fix
that mistake," the brief states.

The plaintiff argues that SI Wireless' decision to notify
customers exclusively by text message is unreasonable.

"Even if Plaintiff or other customers had some reason to believe
that Defendant's text message did not actually refer to the terms
at the link it contained, and were inclined to search further,
Defendant sent the link via text message.

"Because of the very nature of text messages, a recipient would be
required to either read through the agreements on her cell 5" cell
(sic) phone screen -- give or take an inch -- or access a computer
and manually enter the link into a web browser, adding yet another
step in the process of figuring out what Defendant added," the
brief states.

"Thus Defendant expected its customers to click through its links
and read through its lengthy policy documents in their entirety on
their cell phones, without providing any guidance as to the
changes," it continues.

However, Ms. Campbell argues that even if the customers were given
proper notice, arbitration is not required because the clause
"expressly excludes from its terms 'actions relating to failure to
timely pay billed charges, such as service charges and related
fees and taxes.'"

"This was presumably an effort by Defendant to avoid the mutuality
of arbitration by allowing only the most common claims it may
bring to be brought in court.

"However, what's good for the goose is good for the gander.
Defendant sent unstoppable text messages to Plaintiff's cellular
telephone in an effort to make Plaintiff pay up on her allegedly
past due account," the brief states.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois 3:16-cv-
1320


SOUTHERN KOMFORT: "Bryant" Labor Case to Recover Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Bryant, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Southern Komfort Kitchen, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-00430, (S.D. Tex., February 10, 2017),
seeks unpaid wages at the mandated minimum wage and overtime
rates, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
expenses of this action, all misappropriated tips and such other
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant operates Southern Komfort Kitchen, a restaurant in La
Porte, Texas where Plaintiff was employed as a waitress. She
claims to have worked 35 to 45 hours per week without overtime
pay.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd Slobin, Esq.
      Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
      Dorian Vandenberg-Rodes, Esq.
      SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
      11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
      Houston, TX 77046
      Telephone: (713) 621-2277
      Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
      Email: tslobin@eeoc.net
             rprieto@eeoc.net
             drodes@eeoc.net


SPEARMINT RHINO: Underpays Strip Club Dancers, "Ortega" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Spearmint Rhino strip clubs pay dancers less than minimum wage,
take some of their tips, keep inaccurate records and won't
reimburse them for work expenses, women say in a federal class
action in Riverside, Calif.

The case is captioned, ADRIANA ORTEGA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,  v. THE SPEARMINT
RHINO COMPANIES WORLDWIDE, INC., SPEARMINT RHINO CONSULTING
WORLDWIDE, INC., and MIDNIGHT SUN ENTERPRISES, LLC,  Defendants,
Case No. 5:17-cv-00206 (C.D. Cal., February 3, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiff ADRIANA ORTEGA, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated:

     Shannon Liss-Riordan, Esq.
     LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
     729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
     Boston, MA 02116
     Telephone:  (617) 994-5800
     Facsimile:  (617) 994-5801
     E-mail: sliss@llrlaw.com

          - and -

     Matthew D. Carlson, Esq.
     LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
     466 Geary St., Suite 201
     San Francisco, CA 94102
     Telephone: (415) 630-2651
     Facsimile: (617) 995-5801
     E-mail: mcarlson@llrlaw.com


STEVEN SCHUSS: MacNeill Attorneys Analyze Med Mal Case Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gary L. Riveles, Esq., and Ethan Lillianthal, Esq., of MacNeill,
O'Neill & Riveles, LLC, in an article for Law Journal Newsletters,
report that it has long been axiomatic that a plaintiff may not
recover twice in tort for the same injury.  This directive makes
intuitive sense.  Although a number of parties may have
contributed to the plaintiff's injury, the injury itself is a
discrete measureable event.  Insofar as the aim of awarding
compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole, a
duplicative or excessive award is plainly improper.  Indeed, such
an award goes beyond the scope of a plaintiff's injury and creates
a double recovery.  Tort law is designed to compensate injured
parties for their injuries, not provide a windfall.

Med Mal Cases

In medical malpractice cases, this axiom is especially important
to consider because of the various consequences to the potentially
liable parties, including national reporting requirements, local
reporting requirements, potential regulatory or licensing issues,
certifications and privileges, and increasing insurance premiums.
In such cases, plaintiffs often receive care from a number of
practitioners acting in multiple specialties over an extended
period of time.  Moreover, the injuries complained of may manifest
themselves years after the alleged malpractice was committed. As
injuries emerge, new parties may be implicated.  Both the duration
of the course of treatment and the potential delayed implication
of new parties complicate apportionment. Courts are often forced,
therefore, to find creative solutions to ensure that each party
pays their fair share to make the plaintiff whole.

Further complicating this dynamic, the damages ultimately awarded
must contemplate and valuate any future medical expenses the
injured party will incur and any potential loss of income that
will arise from their continuing injuries.  For this reason, both
parties engage in complex, expensive and time-consuming discovery,
and seek out the assistance of experts to come to a reasonable
case valuation. Given the complexity and nuance of this process,
it would be especially problematic to allow a double recovery to
improperly elevate an injured party's recovery.  Such an outcome
would circumvent and eviscerate the entire, normally entertained,
valuation process.

However, a recent New Jersey Appellate Court decision may have
created a pathway for plaintiffs to take advantage of ambiguities
in New Jersey's statutory scheme and case law to obtain a double
recovery in certain situations. Specifically, in Kranz v. Schuss,
___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2016), the Appellate Division held,
as a matter of first impression, that New Jersey defendant doctors
were not entitled to a credit or offset representing the value of
a prior New York settlement concerning the identical claims
against prior treating physicians.  The Appellate Division instead
held that the Defendants were entitled only to an apportionment of
liability at trial. However, in that particular case, it would
clearly result in a double recovery for the plaintiff.

In so holding, the Appellate Division failed to consider two
crucial implications of the decision.  Initially, had the
plaintiff filed the matter in New Jersey first and thereafter
sought a pre-trial credit in New York, it would have been granted
as a matter of right.  Moreover, given the facts in Kranz, the
court's holding places the New Jersey defendants in the untenable
position of having to accept liability in order to obtain an
apportionment.  It is not difficult to envision a scenario where a
defendant would opt to permit a double recovery in order to
preserve his theory of the case.

Therefore, while the facts in Kranz are somewhat unique, the
windfall potential exists for plaintiffs who may use it to
capitalize on similar facts.  It could also lead to forum shopping
in similar circumstances.

The Kranz Facts

In Kranz, the infant plaintiff, Rachel Kranz, sought damages for
failure to timely diagnose hip dysplasia.  Rachel received care
from doctors in both New York and New Jersey during the time
period relevant to her complaint.  However, because each state
lacked personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants, all
potential defendants could not be included in the same action.
Therefore, Rachel first filed suit in New York against the doctors
who had treated her from the time of her birth in 2003 until March
2004.  Her complaint sought damages for injuries arising from the
failure of the New York defendants to timely diagnose her hip
dysplasia.  Rachel and the New York defendants settled the case
before trial for $2 million by way of a Compromise Order, which
contained a hold harmless provision.

After the New York matter was resolved, Rachel brought suit in New
Jersey against the defendant doctors by whom she had subsequently
been treated. The New Jersey case remains ongoing. The New Jersey
defendants became involved in Rachel's care in January 2005.
Approximately one year later, New Jersey defendant Dr. Schuss
diagnosed Rachel's hip dysplasia.  Rachel seeks damages from the
New Jersey defendants for the identical injuries complained of in
the prior New York matter.  Specifically, injuries suffered as a
result of the ongoing failure to timely diagnose her hip
dysplasia.  In fact, Rachel attached an expert report relied upon
to settle the New York case to her Answers to Interrogatories in
the New Jersey Matter.  Though she proffered an additional expert
report in the New Jersey matter, it was offered by the same expert
and alleged the same injuries.

In the New Jersey matter, Rachel's theory of liability deviates
little from her theory in New York: specifically, that the
defendant doctors failed to timely diagnose her hip dysplasia,
causing her to suffer injuries.  The New Jersey defendants
countered that Rachel's condition was not diagnosable prior to Dr.
Schuss's January 2006 diagnosis.  The defense experts in the New
Jersey action opined that hip dysplasia is typically not
diagnosable in infants younger than two years of age.

The New Jersey defendants sought a credit from the trial court in
the amount of $2 million, representing the value of the funds
plaintiff already received in the New York matter.  The logic
underlying this request is simple and intuitive: Rachel received a
settlement in the New York Matter to compensate her for the
entirety of her alleged injuries and, therefore, if a jury values
her injuries at a number greater or less than that amount, it
should be taken into account with respect to any damage award
against the New Jersey Defendants.  It is undisputed that the
settlement in New York was reached without consideration for any
liability that may be subsequently imposed on the New Jersey
defendants.  If Rachel were permitted to collect a second full
award for these injuries, she would receive a considerable and
inequitable windfall. The credit, therefore, would ensure that
Rachel could not collect twice for her injuries.

The trial court granted the credit requested by the New Jersey
defendants because the New York settlement already compensated
Rachel for the exact claims and injuries complained of in the New
Jersey matter.  Thereafter, Rachel appealed the trial court' s
grant of the pre-trial credit.

A Matter of First Impression

As observed by the Appellate Division, and agreed by both parties,
the unique posture of this case has not yet been addressed by the
courts in New Jersey.  Initially, although both the New York and
New Jersey matters involve the same injuries, the respective
defendants cannot be tried together because New York does not have
personal jurisdiction over the New Jersey defendants and New York
does not have jurisdiction over the New Jersey defendants. This
dynamic creates unique complications in New Jersey that are not
present in New York.

Indeed, under New York's Release or Covenant Not to Sue statute,
the outcome is clear cut.  The statute prescribes a uniform
approach to the facts presented in this case. Specifically, the
statute provides:

When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a
judgment is given to one of two or more persons liable or claimed
to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same wrongful
death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms
expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor
against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the released
tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen
of the civil practice law and rules, whichever is the greatest.

Notably, the New York framework allows for a credit as between two
defendants as long as the injuries alleged are the same.  This
credit is awarded in New York notwithstanding the posture of the
respective defendants.  By contrast, New Jersey's statutory
framework for preventing double recovery varies heavily, depending
on the posture of the case.

New Jersey's Collateral Source statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, applies
to civil actions "brought for personal injury or death[.]" As
explained in Perreira v. Rediger, 169 N.J. 399, 409 (2001), the
primary purpose of the Collateral Source statute is to prevent an
injured party from being compensated twice for the same injury.
Therefore, the statute requires that a plaintiff disclose to the
court any "benefits [received] for the injuries allegedly incurred
from any other source other than a joint tortfeasor[,]" and, where
the amount of those " benefits" "duplicates any benefit contained
in the award[,]" the court should deduct it from plaintiff's
recovery. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.

However, unlike New York's Release or Covenant Not to Sue statute,
the New Jersey statute is narrow in its definition of benefits.
Notably, these " benefits" include payments that were covered by
health insurance, less insurance premiums paid by the plaintiff,
or a member of his or her family.  Also included are social
security disability payments, but "only those future payments of
social security benefits that are neither contingent nor
speculative nor subject to change or modification may be
included." Woodger v. Christ Hosp., 364 N.J. Super. 144, 153-54
(App. Div. 2003) (citing Parker v. Esposito, 291 N.J. Super. 560,
565-566 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 566 (1996)).
Expressly excluded from the definition of "benefits" are those
paid out by joint tortfeasors. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97.  Nevertheless,
New Jersey case law provides that a trial defendant is entitled to
a set-off for the equitable share of liability apportioned to a
settled co-defendant by the jury.  Under the Comparative
Negligence Act, in order for the jury to allocate a percentage of
fault, the defendant must have been a "party" to the action.

The facts in the Kranz case are unique, therefore, because the New
York Defendants are not, and could not be, parties to the New
Jersey action.  Initially, it is uncontested that New Jersey lacks
personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the New York Defendants already
settled with Rachel for $2 million prior to the initiation of the
New Jersey action . As the New York Defendants are not parties to
the New Jersey action, they are, by definition, neither co-parties
nor joint tortfeasors.  There is, therefore, no clear directive as
to how to treat the $2 million New York settlement.

The Appellate Court's Holding

The Appellate Court held that while the New Jersey defendants are
entitled to an apportionment at trial, there was no basis for the
trial court's grant of a credit.  The Appellate Court reasoned
that the New Jersey defendants are best treated as joint
tortfeasors because it is alleged that the New York and New Jersey
defendants' collective negligence delayed the diagnosis of
Rachel's hip dysplasia.  If all defendants were parties to one
suit, liability would be apportioned among them.  In the Appellate
Division's view, the fact that the New York defendants could not
be included in the same action should not change this dynamic.

The court relied heavily on Carter v. University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey, 854 F. Supp. 310 (D.N.J. 1994), in
reaching this conclusion. In Carter, the plaintiffs filed two
concurrent actions alleging a failure to diagnose and treat their
son's congenital brain condition.  The plaintiffs' son had been
treated by doctors in New Jersey until he was approximately six
months old.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved to Maryland and
their son was treated by doctors there. One action, filed in the
District Court in New Jersey, alleged that New Jersey doctors
involved in the infant child's care failed to diagnose a
congenital brain disease.  The second action was filed in
Washington, DC, alleging the same failure to diagnose, but naming
the Washington, DC, defendants involved in the infant's care.

The plaintiff settled with the Washington, DC, defendants.
Thereafter, the New Jersey defendants moved in limine to have a
jury apportion fault as between the settling and non-settling
defendants.  The plaintiffs argued that apportionment was improper
because the settling defendants were not joint tortfeasors because
they were not parties to the New Jersey action. In rejecting this
argument, the Carter court reasoned that jurisdictional
happenstance should not be a bar on apportionment where the claims
at issue are identical and interwoven.

The Kranz court found these facts to be nearly identical to those
before it, and persuasive in resolving the apportionment issue.
This decision, however, failed to account for the unique
circumstances in the Kranz case: namely, that the asserted defense
by the New Jersey defendants is that the condition was not
diagnosable, meaning that they could not simultaneously point the
finger at the prior treating New York physicians, as that would
undercut the defense.  Without being able to criticize those
doctors, even if the court would allow their liability to be put
before the jury on the verdict sheet (an unlikely occurrence as
they were not joint tortfeasors as understood in New Jersey law),
there could be no apportionment, ensuring a double recovery.

Shopping for Double Recovery

The Appellate Court's over-reliance on Carter has a number of
troubling implications.  To begin with, the Appellate Division did
not adequately consider the consequences of apportionment in the
Kranz matter.  Indeed, unlike in Carter, the New Jersey defendants
in Kranz have utilized a defense that is wholly inconsistent with
apportionment of liability with the New York defendants.
Specifically, the New Jersey defendants claim that the plaintiff's
hip dysplasia was not diagnosable until she was two years of age.
Any liability attributed to the New York defendants would
necessarily also mandate a finding of negligence against the New
Jersey defendants.  Therefore, the New Jersey defendants have to
either accept liability in order to obtain an apportionment, or
risk Rachel receiving a duplicative award without the benefit of a
credit.

Moreover, and perhaps of more concern, plaintiffs' counsel was
able to create this dynamic by taking advantage of the
distinctions between New York and New Jersey law.  Indeed, had
Rachel first filed suit in New Jersey and settled the matter, the
New York defendants would have been entitled to a credit for the
value of the New Jersey settlement as a matter of right.  However,
because the plaintiffs filed in New York first, they were able to
avoid New York's Release or Covenant Not to Sue statute.

Permitting the defendants a credit in the instant case would
dissuade plaintiffs from "forum shopping" by first filing a
lawsuit in New York and then coming to New Jersey, when possible,
and filing a second lawsuit in New Jersey with the hopes of
receiving a double recovery for the same injuries.  New Jersey
public policy should prohibit plaintiffs from doing in this case
in New Jersey what they could not do in New York.  It undermines
the exclusively compensatory nature of tort law to allow this form
of double recovery. Permitting this type of decision encourages
forum shopping and leads to unfair results.

Conclusion

The Appellate Court's decision in Kranz is a significant victory
for the plaintiffs' bar.  Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine
scenarios wherein a plaintiff who has treated in both New York and
New Jersey (not an unusual situation, as many New Jersey patients
cross the rivers for care in New York or Philadelphia) may use
this decision to seek a double recovery.  In failing to account
for the unique facts present in Kranz, the Appellate Division has
invited plaintiffs to do so. Counsel for the Defendants in Kranz
have recently filed a Petition for Certification to the New Jersey
Supreme Court to appeal this decision.


T-MOBILE USA: Stiffs Sales Reps for Overtime, "Salgado" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that T-
Mobile stiffs sales reps, assistant managers and other hourly
employees for overtime and violates other labor laws, a class
action claims in Kern County Court in Bakersfield, Calif.

The case is captioned, Emmanuel Salgado, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. BCV-17-100243, Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of Kern, February 3, 2017.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Kevin T. Barnes, Esq.
     Gregg Lander, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN T. BARNES
     5670 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1460
     Los Angeles, CA 90036-5664
     Tel: 323-549-9100
     Fax: 323-549-0101
     E-mail: Barnes@kbarnes.com

          - and -

     Raphael A. Katri, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF RAPHAEL A. KATRI
     8549 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200
     Beverly Hills, CA 90211-3104
     Tel: 310-940-2037
     Fax: 310-733-5644
     E-mail: RKatri@socallaborlawyers.com


TAKATA CORP: Criminal Plea Deal to Impact Airbag Civil Suits
------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The National Law Journal, reports
that lawyers with pending civil suits related to faulty Takata
airbags are trying to put the brakes on the manufacturer's $1
billion criminal plea deal, claiming it will end up being used as
a tool to release its U.S. subsidiary and several automakers from
civil liability.

Attorneys Kevin Dean -- kdean@motleyrice.com -- a member of Motley
Rice in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, and Thomas Willingham --
tomwillingham@popemcglamry.com -- of Atlanta's Pope McGlamry,
raised their concerns in a pair of objections filed on Feb. 27
before U.S. District Judge George Caram Steeh of the Eastern
District of Michigan.  Judge Steeh held a hearing on Feb. 27 on
whether to preliminarily approve the Takata agreement.

The objections, both of which invoked their clients' rights to be
heard under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, are an unusual
development in a mass tort.  But criminal deals involving
automotive safety recalls have been on the rise, with similar
agreements involving Volkswagen AG, General Motors Corp. and
Toyota Motor Corp.

The objecting lawyers, who represent individuals who have suffered
injuries or lost relatives as a result of the exploding Takata
airbags, have asked Judge Steeh to hold off on approving the deal
until a presentence report has been prepared, including potential
victim impact statements.

They claim that while Takata Corp. is "falling on a sword," the
plea agreement is "wrought with inaccurate, incomplete and
misleading assertions of fact," many of which will be used in
pending civil cases to shield its U.S. subsidiary and the
automakers from liability.

"The government has unfortunately been misled and misinformed, as
well as potentially had highly relevant documents withheld from it
or overlooked, showing that other entities are as culpable or more
so in some cases for the conduct at issue," they wrote.

It's not an entirely hypothetical argument.  In a status report
filed in February in multidistrict litigation in Miami, seven
automakers assert that the Jan. 13 plea agreement, under which
Takata agreed to pay $850 million in restitution, "significantly
undermines" related civil claims brought on behalf of consumers.

"The plea agreement confirms, among other things, that Takata
engaged in a fraudulent scheme to keep the automotive defendants
from knowing what Takata knew about the inflators and their
potential to rupture," they wrote.

Peter Prieto, lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation, fired
back in his own status report that the automotive defendants
"overstate the significance of Takata's recent plea agreement to
these proceedings."

"The evidence plaintiffs already have collected in this litigation
establishes that the automotive defendants, staffed with teams of
sophisticated engineers, were far from innocent, unsuspecting
victims, as they now claim to be," wrote Mr. Prieto of Miami's
Podhurst Orseck.

For its part, Takata's U.S. subsidiary, TK Holdings Inc., based in
Dearborn, Michigan, said the plea deal "should have a limited (if
any) impact" on the multidistrict litigation given that it says
nothing about civil liability.

A hearing was scheduled for Feb. 28 before U.S. District Judge
Federico Moreno of the Southern District of Florida.


TSUNAMI IN ST. PETERSBURG: Vongkultrup Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled TOBY VONGKULTRUP, on behalf
of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et
al. v. TSUNAMI IN ST. PETERSBURG, et al., Case No. 8:16-cv-03327-
JDW-AAS (M.D. Fla.), move the Court to conditionally certify class
and authorize them to mail and e-mail notice of the lawsuit and
consent to become a party plaintiff form to:

     All "hibachi chefs" who worked for Defendant within the last
     three years who were not paid proper overtime wage
     compensation during any work week of their employment within
     the applicable statute of limitations period.

The collective action is brought to enforce the overtime wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The Defendants
operate a Japanese steakhouse restaurant in St. Petersburg, in
Pinellas County, Florida.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=LAacrIyg

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Donna V. Smith, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Ave., Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 337-7992
          Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
          E-mail: dsmith@wfclaw.com
                  rcooke@wfclaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Xuesong Alex Yu, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ALEX YU, P.A.
          Somerset Professional Park
          15255 Amberly Drive
          Tampa, FL 33647
          Telephone: (813) 514-2885
          Facsimile: (866) 436-5259
          E-mail: ayu@alexyulaw.com


UNDER ARMOUR: Bloated Stock Price Hit in "Breece" SEC Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Breece, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Under Armour, Inc., Kevin A. Plank and
Lawrence P. Molloy, Case No. 1:17-cv-00388, (D. Md., February 10,
2017), seeks damages, including interest, reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees and equitable/injunctive or other relief under the
Securities Exchange Act.

Under Armour is engaged in the manufacturing, development,
marketing and distribution of sportswear, performance and casual
apparel, footwear and accessories. Under Armour is headquartered
in Baltimore, Maryland. Defendants made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose that Under Armour's revenue and
profit margins would not be able to withstand the heavy
promotions, high inventory levels and ripple effects of numerous
department store closures and bankruptcy of The Sports Authority,
one of its major retailers.

Plaintiff claims to have purchased Under Armour stock at
artificially inflated prices, thus causing the damages.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Charles J. Piven, Esq.
      Yelena Trepetin (28706)
      BROWER PIVEN - A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
      1925 Old Valley Road
      Stevenson, MD 21153
      Tel: (410) 332-0030
      Fax: (410) 685-1300
      Email: piven@browerpiven.com
             trepetin@browerpiven.com

             - and -

      Mark C. Gardy, Esq.
      James S. Notis, Esq.
      Jacob E. Lewin, Esq.
      GARDY & NOTIS, LLP
      Tower 56
      126 East 56th Street, 8th Floor
      New York, NY 10022
      Tel: (212) 905-0509
      Fax: (212) 905-0508


UNITED STATES: Names of Detainees in Travel Ban Case Turned Over
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for Law.com, reports that the Trump
administration has turned over a list of the names of 746 people
who were detained at airports following its executive order to
restrict travel, but attorneys for plaintiffs challenging the
order in a New York federal court say the list may be incomplete.

Eastern District Judge Carol Bagley Amon issued an order for the
government to produce a list of those detained at ports of entry
in the final hours of Jan. 28, when Eastern District Judge Ann
Donnelly issued a stay on the administration's executive order,
and through Jan. 29.

President Donald Trump's controversial executive order suspended
the United States' refugee program and blocked entry to travelers
from seven Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria and Yemen.

Plaintiffs' attorneys said on Feb. 24 during a hearing before
Judge Amon at the Eastern District courthouse in Brooklyn that the
government did produce a list of names of visa holders detained
under the executive order and that attorneys for both sides worked
together to facilitate the return of two people deported under the
order to the United States.

But Muneer Ahmad of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization at Yale Law School, a member of the plaintiffs' legal
team, said that the government's list contained only names, not
nationalities and flight numbers, or whether they were denied
entry to the country, forcing plaintiffs' attorneys to play a
"game of 'Go Fish'."

"They have a panoply of information about these people," Ahmad
said, who said the government could produce the additional
information in a "matter of keystrokes."

Additionally, Judge Amon approved on Feb. 23 the government's
motion for a protective order to block disclosure of the list it
provided, though attorneys said that all of the people on the list
had visas and that most had green cards.

But Ahmad said that attorneys had identified at least 10 travelers
who were held by U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents but
were not included on the government's list, among them Sara
Yarjani, a 35-year-old Iranian citizen who says she was detained
for almost 23 hours before she was deported on Jan. 28 at roughly
10:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, or about one hour after Donnelly
issued the stay.

Joshua Press, who appeared at the hearing for the Justice
Department, said the "vast majority" of the names of the list were
allowed to enter the country, though he declined to offer
specifics when asked by reporters following the hearing.

Regarding Mr. Ahmad's statement that the government's list
consisted only of names and no other information, Mr. Press said
the list is "literally everyone who had to wait at a port of
entry" and that "an hour after receiving the list they wanted
another list."

"The problem is the government is not omniscient, as these
requests seem to contemplate," Mr. Press said.

At one point in the hearing, there was a brief but testy exchange
between Ahmad and Press over the issue of the list that lead to
Judge  Amon to interrupt the attorneys and inquire whether they
"want to carry on this private conversation."

"I can leave if you want," Judge Amon said.  Before adjournment,
the plaintiffs agreed to furnish the government with the names of
those who had contact with the CBP as part of the executive order
who are not included on the list.

"Everyone is better off if you can come to some mutual agreement,"
Judge Amon said.

In addition to the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at
Yale Law School, the plaintiffs in the New York travel ban case
are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the National Immigration Law Center,
the International Refugee Assistance Project and Kilpatrick
Townsend & Stockton.

Steven Platt also appeared for the Justice Department.

Trump has said that he plans to issue a new executive order that
had previously been expected on the week beginning on Feb. 19, but
The Associated Press reported on Feb. 22 that the release of the
executive order was held over an additional week.

In a brief filed on Feb. 16 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the government said that the president plans to
rescind the first order and replace it with a new "substantially
revised" order that addresses the court's constitutional concerns.


UNITED STATES: Trump Strikes at 9th Cir. After Travel Ban Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ross Todd, writing for Law.com, reports that it's pretty clear the
Trump administration isn't fond of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

President Donald Trump took to Twitter to say "SEE YOU IN COURT,
THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION IS AT STAKE!" after a Ninth Circuit
panel found his executive order suspending immigration from seven
predominantly Muslim countries unconstitutional.

The president took aim at the court again on Feb. 16.

Between announcing his nomination of R. Alexander Acosta as labor
secretary and referring to his White House as a "fine-tuned
machine" at a Feb. 16 press conference, Trump took a shot at the
Ninth Circuit for being "overturned at a record number.

"I have heard 80 percent, I find that hard to believe, that is
just a number I heard, that they are overturned 80 percent of the
time," said Trump, according to a transcript.  "I think that
circuit is -- that circuit is in chaos and that circuit is frankly
in turmoil."

Despite its reputation as liberal outlier, the Ninth Circuit has
in recent years fared better in seeing its decisions upheld at the
U.S. Supreme Court than it did in the past. According to an
analysis of decisions from 2010-15 from Scotusblog, the Ninth
Circuit was flipped 79 percent of the time by the high court, as
compared to 87 percent for the Sixth Circuit and 85 percent for
the Eleventh Circuit.

Trump administration lawyers also took aim at the Ninth Circuit in
their own way on Feb. 16, but in much less colorful language than
the president's.

In court papers filed on Feb. 16 shortly after the president
spoke, DOJ lawyers wrote that a Ninth Circuit panel "upend[ed]
fundamental principles of judicial restraint" by keeping in place
a ruling barring enforcement of the executive order.

DOJ lawyers asked the full court to vacate the Ninth Circuit panel
opinion from Feb. 9 and forego rehearing the appeal while the
executive order is revised "to eliminate what the panel
erroneously thought were constitutional concerns."

The Feb. 16 spotlight on the court comes after an unidentified
Ninth Circuit judge on Feb. 10 called for a vote on whether to
rehear the travel ban appeal en banc.  Both the Trump
administration and the plaintiffs in the case -- the states of
Washington and Minnesota -- said in court filings on Feb. 16
they'd prefer that the court not take the case en banc at this
point.

"Under the unusual circumstances presented here," the DOJ lawyers
wrote, "the government respectfully submits that the most
appropriate course would be for the court to hold its
consideration of the case until the president issues the new order
and then vacate the panel's preliminary decision."

Lawyers for the states also urged the court to not grant en banc
review, claiming that the panel decided correctly to leave in
place a ruling from U.S. District Judge James Robart of the
Western District of Washington blocking the executive order.

"Granting en banc review would simply delay the merits of the
preliminary injunction appeal to no substantive purpose," they
wrote.

On Feb. 16 the Ninth Circuit stayed proceedings, referencing the
government's statement that Trump plans to issue a new executive
order.


UNITED STATES: Data Breach Class Action Against VAMC Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Teri H.P. Nguyen, Esq., of McDermott Will & Emery, in an article
for The National Law Review, reports that in a decision
consolidating two cases involving two veterans and two separate
incidences of data breaches at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center
(VAMC) in South Carolina, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit clarified the applicable standing requirement for data
privacy actions and affirmed the dismissal of both suits. Beck et
al. v. Robert A. McDonald, Case No. 15-1395; Watson v. Robert A.
McDonald, Case No. 15-1715 (4th Cir., Feb. 6, 2017) (Diaz, J).
Relying on the 2013 Supreme Court of the United States decision in
Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Court explained that
standing based on a threatened injury of future identity theft is
too speculative absent evidence or allegation that the data thief
intentionally targeted, accessed and/or misused the personal
information compromised in the breach.

Beck, a veteran, filed a putative class-action suit following the
February 2013 misplacement or theft of an unencrypted VAMC laptop
containing personal patient information.  Watson, another veteran,
filed a putative class-action suit following VAMC's discovery that
four boxes of pathology reports had been misplaced or stolen; such
reports have yet to be recovered.

Both suits, brought under the Privacy Act (5 USC Sec. 552a et
seq.), were dismissed for lack of standing.  In Beck, the district
court found that at the summary judgment stage, Beck had not
submitted evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the risk of identity theft was
"certainly impending."  In Watson, at the pleading stage, the
district court found that Watson had not alleged any actual or
attempted misuse of her personal information. The district court
found that the fear of harm from future identity theft was "too
speculative" and was "contingent on a chain of attenuated
hypothetical events and actions by third parties independent of
the defendants."  The district court also rejected the allegation
that any costs incurred to fend off future identity theft
constituted an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs appealed.

The circuit courts are split as to whether Article III injury-in-
fact may be based on an increased risk or threat of future
identity theft.  The Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
recognized that plaintiffs can, at the pleading stage, establish
an injury-in-fact based on threatened injury, whereas the First
and Third Circuits have not.  In either case, according to the
Fourth Circuit, Clapper's iteration of the well-established tenet
that "a threatened injury must be 'certainly impending' to
constitute an injury-in-fact" is controlling.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that neither
Becknor Watson went beyond speculation to "certainly impending,"
as both required the court to engage in an "attenuated chain of
possibilities."  Indeed, the Court noted that since 2013 and 2014,
when the data breaches in Beck and Watson occurred, respectively,
plaintiffs had not uncovered evidence--or even alleged--that the
information had been accessed or misused or that they had suffered
identity theft or been victim of an attempted identify theft.

The Fourth Circuit also concluded that plaintiffs fell short of
establishing standing based on a "substantial risk" that the harm
will occur. For example, plaintiffs claimed that "33% of health-
related data breaches result in identity theft."  However, even if
this statistic were true, the Court noted that it left unharmed
more than 66 percent of veterans affected by the breach and
therefore did not establish a "substantial risk" of harm. The
Court also decline to infer a substantial risk of harm of future
identity theft from an organization's offer to provide free credit
monitoring services to affected individuals, or from the VA's
internal investigations that not only concluded that the laptop
and pathology reports had been stolen, but also that a
"'reasonable risk exists' for the 'potential misuse'" of personal
information.

Finally, with respect to standing, the Fourth Circuit rejected
plaintiffs' allegation that they had suffered an injury-in-fact
because they had incurred or will in the future incur mitigation
expenses to guard against identity theft, noting that these "self-
imposed harms cannot confer standing."


UNITED STATES: Health Republic Invite Other Insurers to Join Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Allison Bell, writing for LifeHealthPRO, reports that Health
Republic Insurance Company is about to invite other health
insurers to participate in its class-action lawsuit over
Affordable Care Act risk corridors program payments.

U.S. Court of Federal Claims Judge Margaret Sweeney approved
Health Republic's class-action notice and opt-in form Feb. 24.

Lawyers for Health Republic are supposed to send the notice to
potential class members by March 15.  Insurers that want to join
in can sign up at http://www.riskcorridorsclassaction.com/optin.

CCIIO officials say any cash collected for 2015 will be used to
pay obligations for 2014.

At press time, the opt-in website was not yet in operation.

Health Republic was a small health insurer based in Lake Oswego,
Oregon.  It shut down at the end of 2016, in part because of
problems with collection payments from the ACA risk corridors
program.

Designers of the ACA risk corridors program created it to
encourage insurers to participate in the ACA public exchange
program and keep premiums as low as possible.  The program was
supposed to use cash from exchange plan issuers that did well in
2014, 2015 and 2016, and, possibly, from other sources, to help
issuers that did poorly.

A similar Medicare Part D prescription drug plan risk corridors
program could get cash from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services if payments from thriving issuers were too low to
make the payments promised to struggling issuers.

Republican opponents of the ACA succeeded at getting provisions
blocking use of any funding other than payments from thriving
issuers for 2014 and 2015.

Because the number of thriving issuers was small, and because of
the ban on use of any funding other than payments from thriving
issuers, the ACA risk corridors program made only $362 million of
the $2.9 billion in payments owed for 2014, and it collected only
$95 million of the $5.9 billion needed to make the 2015 payments.
Program managers have used all of the 2015 program revenue to
increase the amounts paid to carriers owed payments for 2014.

Health Republic filed a suit, Health Republic Insurance Company v.
the United States of America (Case Number 1:16-cv-00259), in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in February 2016. Health Republic
sought to represent a class of insurers seeking risk corridors
program payments.

Judge Sweeney granted the motion to certify the class in January.

CCIIO officials say any cash collected for 2015 will be used to
pay obligations for 2014.

Stephen Swedlow, a partner in the Chicago office of Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, is the lead attorney for the insurers.

Charles Canter, a lawyer at the U.S. Department of Justice, is
representing the risk corridors program.

In related news, Mr. Canter filed an answer to Health Republic's
complaint on Feb. 27.

The answer appears to be the first major pleading the United
States has filed in response to a risk corridors program suit
since President Donald Trump took the oath of office.

In the answer, the United States says it lacks information or
knowledge of most of Health Republic's allegations.

"The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted," the United States says in a list of defenses. "Defendant
denies that plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested in the
complaint or to any relief whatsoever."


UNIVERSITY OF IOWA: Sued for Cutting $3.4 Million in Scholarships
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ally Crutcher, writing for KWWL.com, reports that The University
of Iowa recently announced its cutting $3.4 million in
scholarships to keep up with state budget cuts.

Now, the first class action lawsuit has been filed against the
university for taking away money for those scholarships.

According to a press release, Wandro & Associates, P.C. and the
Erbe Law Firm filed a class action lawsuit in Polk County District
Court representing Benjamin Muller.  The release states Muller is
one of the 2,500 Iowa students who had their scholarship taken
away without warning.

There are meetings scheduled in both West Des Moines and Iowa City
Saturday, March 4. Parents, students and alumni are invited to
attend to ask questions about legal options.


WAL-MART STORES: Judge Dismisses Shareholders' Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rakim Reid, writing for Eastern Daily News, reports that a Walmart
class action lawsuit was dismissed by a New York federal judge.
The suit claimed Walmart defrauded shareholders.  The company did
not share that it bribed public officials to expand quickly in
Mexico.

The judge declined the Walmart class action lawsuit filed by
investors.  The suit claimed former Walmart officials had
knowledge of the bribes and covered them up.  The judge rejected
claims that the retail giant must account for the actions of those
former officials.

The Walmart class action lawsuit allegations first came up after a
2012 New York Times report.  The document recounted the history of
the bribery scheme.  The amount reached $24 million.  Documents
also showed executives knew about the bribes.

Before the Walmart class action lawsuit, the retail giant started
a program that mirrors Amazon's free, two-day shipping on
Feb. 28.  Now Walmart offers two day free shipping to all
customers for orders over $35.

Some expressed disappointment over the decision.  In fact, some
experts believed Walmart should go all the way.  The company
should offer free shipping with no spending threshold.  They view
the current plan as myopic.

Walmart returned to its original program before copying Amazon's
Prime membership program.  That service was Walmart's Shipping
Pass. That program failed.  Part of the reason was the reliance on
a $49 annual fee in order to qualify.  This new service covers
over 2 million items at Walmart.  New online warehouses will
fulfill and ship orders.  What's more, many orders will ship in
one day.  A statement from Walmart proclaimed: "I couldn't be more
excited.  We are moving at the speed of a startup," said Marc
Lore, president and CEO of Walmart U.S. eCommerce.  "Two-day free
shipping is the first of many moves we will be making to enhance
the customer experience and accelerate growth."  Also, the
statement said the retailer continues to offer same-day store
pickup for many products.  Consumers can pick up products from
more than 4,600 stores.

Plus, Online Grocery Pickup remains available. This service
remains available at over 600 stores in the U.S. Walmart plans to
expand the service in 2018. Lore added later: "In today's world of
e-commerce, two-day free shipping is table stakes.  It no longer
makes sense to charge for it." Lore was the former CEO of Jet.com.

Walmart bought the company for $3.3 billion in 2016. At the time,
the buyout was the largest ever for an e-commerce startup.  Lore
shook up the company when he arrived.  For example, several senior
leaders at Walmart left upon his arrival.  Those include the heads
of Walmart.com, global e-commerce human resources and e-commerce
supply chains.  Mr. Lore has more plans ahead too.

Amazon Rises Amid Walmart class action lawsuit On the other hand,
Amazon raked in over 60 million Prime members by making the
process easier.  Customers do not need to worry about a shopping
list or order minimums.  Fast and free shipping is just that.
Furthermore, Amazon customers simply order the goods they need as
they need them. Little thought required.


WEINSTEIN PINSON: Status Hearing in "Marquez" Suit Set for May 2
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on February 7, 2017, in the case
entitled Erick Marquez, et al. v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S.,
et al., Case No. 1:14-cv-00739 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing
held before the Honorable John J. Tharp Jr.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Status hearing held and continued to May 2, 2017, at
      9:00 a.m.;

   -- Defendants response to the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
      Class Certification is due by March 24, 2017;

   -- Plaintiffs' reply is due by April 14, 2017; and

   -- Once the Motion is fully briefed, the Court will rule via
      CM/ECF and set further dates as appropriate.

A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no
charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=kfxgjVjL


WILLIE'S CHICKEN: Parties Sought Certification of Workers Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TIFFANY SAULS AND HEATHER ARNOULT,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated employees,
the Plaintiffs v. WILLIE'S CHICKEN SHACK, LLC, DIAMOND BOURBON,
INC., GOLDEN BOURBON, INC., WILLIE'S CANAL, LLC, WILLIE'S DECATUR,
LLC, WILLIE'S 630 BOURBON, LLC, WILLIE'S 409 BOURBON, LLC,
WILLIE'S 707 CANAL, LLC AND AARON MOTWANI, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:16-cv-16596-JTM-JCW (E.D. La.), the Parties ask the Court
for conditional certification of a class consisting of:

   "all current and former hourly paid restaurant workers who
   were employed by Defendants in Willie's Chicken Shack
   locations between November 26, 2013 through March 1, 2017".

Notwithstanding the Joint Motion, the Defendants continue to deny
that they have violated the Fair Labor Standards Act in any
respect. Defendants do not concede that Plaintiffs and the
putative class members are "similarly situated" under 29 U.S.C.
par. 216(b) or that this case is appropriate for collective action
treatment. The Defendants specifically reserve their rights to
seek decertification of the conditionally certified class at a
later time, and their rights to fully defend this matter on the
merits, once the putative class members are identified.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=BKXdIfCW

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON & JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599 5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988 6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net

               - and -

          Christopher L. Williams, Esq.
          WILLIAMS LITIGATION, L.L.C.
          639 Loyola Ave., Suite 1850
          New Orleans, LA 70113
          Telephone: (504) 308 1438
          Facsimile: (504) 308 1446
          E-mail: chris@williamslitigation.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Ellis B. Murov, Esq.
          Andrew J. Baer, Esq.
          DEUTSCH KERRIGAN, L.L.P.
          755 Magazine St
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 593 0655
          Facsimile: (504) 566 4055
          E-mail: emurov@deutschkerrigan.com


YAHOO INC: CEO Relinquishes Annual Bonus Following Data Breaches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Liedtke, writing for The Associated Press, reports that
Yahoo is punishing CEO Marissa Mayer and parting ways with its top
lawyer for the mishandling of two security breaches that exposed
the personal information of more than 1 billion users and already
have cost the company $350 million.

Ms. Mayer won't be paid her annual bonus nor receive a potentially
lucrative stock award because a Yahoo investigation concluded her
management team reacted too slowly to one breach discovered in
2014.

Yahoo's general counsel, Ronald Bell, resigned without severance
pay for his department's lackadaisical response to the security
lapses.

Alex Stamos, Yahoo's top security officer at the time of the 2014
breach, left the company in 2015.

Although Yahoo's security team uncovered evidence that a hacker
backed by an unnamed foreign government had pried into user
accounts in 2014, executives "failed to act sufficiently" on that
knowledge, according to the results of an internal investigation
disclosed on March 1.  At that time, Yahoo only notified 26 people
that their accounts had been breached.

The report didn't identify the negligent executives, but it
chastised the company's legal department for not looking more
deeply into the 2014 breach. Because of that, the incident "was
not properly investigated and analyzed at the time," the report
concluded.

Mr. Bell declined to comment through his spokeswoman, Marcy Simon.

Yahoo didn't disclose the 2014 breach until last September when it
began notifying at least 500 million users that their email
addresses, birth dates, answers to security questions, and other
personal information may have been stolen.  Three months later,
Yahoo revealed it had uncovered a separate hack in 2013 affecting
about 1 billion accounts, including some that were also hit in
2014.

The breaches, the two biggest in internet history, have already
exacted a major toll.

Yahoo already lowered the sales price of its email and other
digital services to Verizon Communications from $4.83 billion to
$4.48 billion to account for the potential backlash from the
breaches.  That deal was reached last July, two months before
Verizon and the rest of the world learned about Yahoo's lax
security.

More than 40 lawsuits also have been filed seeking damages for the
breaches.  If Yahoo's sale to Verizon is completed as expected
later this year, a successor company called Altaba Inc. will be
responsible for paying those legal claims.

Yahoo's handling and disclosure of the breaches is also under
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission.  The Sunnyvale, California, company says
it has spent $16 million investigating the breaches and covering
the legal expenses so far.

In a blog post on Yahoo's Tumblr service, Ms. Mayer said she
didn't learn about the scope of the breaches until September and
then tried to set things right.  "However, I am the CEO of the
company and since this incident happened during my tenure, I have
agreed to forgo my annual bonus and my annual equity grant,"
Ms. Mayer wrote.

In its report, Yahoo's board said it decided to withhold a cash
bonus that otherwise would have been paid to her.  Ms. Mayer is
eligible to receive a bonus of up to $2 million annually.  The
board said it accepted Ms. Mayer's offer to relinquish her annual
stock award, which is typically worth millions of dollars.

Ms. Mayer said she wants the board to distribute her bonus to
Yahoo's entire workforce of 8,500 employees.  The board didn't say
if it would do so.

Losing her bonus and annual stock award probably won't be too
painful for Ms. Mayer, who is already rich after working for more
than a decade as a top executive at Google and then as Yahoo's CEO
for the past 4-1/2 years.  She is also in line for a $44 million
severance package if she doesn't go to work for Verizon after the
sale closes.


YAHOO INC: Verizon Merger Deal Still On Amid Data Breach Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, writing for Corporate Counsel, reports
that despite Yahoo Inc.'s recently revealed data breaches, the
deal with Verizon Communications Inc. is still on, though some
revisions have been made, including a $350 million haircut.  With
the transaction expected to close later this year, Craig Silliman,
executive vice president of public policy and general counsel at
Verizon, sees lessons for legal departments in the deal.

Since Verizon and Yahoo entered into the July 2016 stock purchase
agreement under which Verizon would acquire Yahoo's operating
business, Yahoo has announced two massive data breaches.  First,
in September of last year, Yahoo, which did not immediately
respond to request for comment on the deal, confirmed that a 2014
hack impacted at least 500 million customer email accounts.  Then
in December 2016, the company admitted that it had suffered yet
another breach in 2013, that had affected more than one billion
user accounts.  The disclosure of the breaches led to speculation
that Verizon might be looking to back out of the deal, negotiate a
lower price or have Yahoo assume responsibility for lasting
damages caused by the hack.

A Feb. 21 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing from
Verizon revealed that the deal is moving forward with some
adjustments.  The acquisition price will be reduced from
approximately $4.83 billion in cash to roughly $4.48 billion.  And
the remaining part of Yahoo, which is slated to be called "Altaba
Inc.," will retain 50 percent of "certain post-closing liabilities
arising out of governmental or third-party investigations,
litigations or other claims related to certain user security and
data breaches" and will continue to be liable for SEC
investigations and shareholder lawsuits.

With the announcement of the newly revised deal, there are a
handful of lessons to be learned, said Silliman, who assumed his
current position in January 2015.  The first is the importance of
having a strategy on how to handle the news of the breaches, which
Mr. Silliman said was in place from very early on.  "In our case,
a breach of user data, when users and user engagement were a core
reason we were buying, meant we had to take this really
seriously," Mr. Silliman explained.

So the strategy, Mr. Silliman said, was to consider whether
Verizon would still be buying an asset in line with the original
goals of the deal and then considering questions such as: How do
investors view this and what's the cost of delaying the closing of
the deal? "There were a lot of variables that we factored in,"
Silliman said, but with the revisions to the agreement, the
ultimate conclusion was that the deal is still a smart move for
the company.

Disciplined messaging was also really important as Verizon
considered what the news of the breaches meant for the deal, Mr.
Silliman said.  "Effectively, every public statement was a
variation of the same core messages," which Silliman explained
were focused on conveying that Verizon was still evaluating
whether the deal made strategic sense.

"This was important legally because anything we said publicly
could be used in any potential litigation," he said.  "And also
there's messaging to a lot of different audiences . . . so we were
really deliberate on what we were saying and who was going to say
it."

Mr. Silliman said in the wake of the breaches, one of the first
things looked at was what the agreement with Yahoo said and what
it allowed for.  It was critical to be familiar with and
understand the specifics of the deal, he explained.  "Just because
something happened doesn't mean you get to rip up the deal and
start from scratch," he said. "[The agreement] tells you what the
cards are that are in your hand . . . and you need to be very
clear-eyed about what the cards are."

Some have questioned whether Verizon should have done more or
better due diligence to uncover Yahoo's breaches. But Silliman
disagrees.  "There is no way you can do due diligence and find
something . . . that the company itself hasn't found," he said,
adding that this is why representations and warranties are added
to these agreements.

"I don't think one of the lessons learned is the need for due
diligence around data breaches," he said.  "I do think it points
to the importance of reps and warranties around data breaches."


* Companies Must Comply with Calif. Privacy Laws to Avert Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lothar Determann, Esq. -- LOTHAR.DETERMANN@BAKERMCKENZIE.COM -- of
Baker & McKenzie, in an article for, LegalTech News, reports that
companies around the United States have to comply with California
privacy laws -- because their web or mobile sites are accessible
to consumers in California, because they have customers or
employees in California or because their enterprise customers have
customers or employees in California.  Ever since the people of
California added a right to privacy to Article 1 of the California
Constitution by way of a proposition in 1972, the California
legislature has been prolific in enacting and updating privacy
laws, many with private rights of action that are enforced by way
of class action lawsuits against companies within and outside the
Golden State.  Today, California leads the nation not only as an
innovation hub for information technologies, but also with the
most comprehensive, stringent and up-to-date information privacy
laws.

To mitigate risks, companies should implement a privacy compliance
program (or add California privacy law considerations to an
existing program).  Companies should also periodically check up on
their status with a compliance checklist. Organizations that
implement a formal data privacy and security compliance program
and put someone in place to maintain and oversee it run a lower
risk of missing new developments, suffering from employees'
missteps or making bad business decisions that could invoke
liability under data privacy laws. Many companies are specifically
required to implement a formal program or benefit from special
liability protections under data privacy laws when they do.
Regulators and law enforcement are less likely to bring charges
for unintentional violations if a company can prove that it used
reasonable efforts.  Also, companies can better defend against
claims if they can show they generally acted diligently and were
just unlucky when something went wrong.

For example, the California Song-Beverly Credit Card Act expressly
offers liability privileges for companies that can prove that they
have appropriate procedures in place when an individual employee
makes a mistake, see Cal. Civ. Code
Sec. 1747.08(e): "[no] civil penalty shall be assessed for a
violation of this section if the defendant shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error made
notwithstanding the defendant's maintenance of procedures
reasonably adopted to avoid that error."  Similarly, under
California and federal fair debt collections practices laws,
companies can benefit from a liability safe harbor if they can
prove that they maintained appropriate procedures. Cal. Civ. Code
Secs. 1788.30, 178862(e) and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692k(c) provide
similarly worded safe harbors. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692k(c) provides:
"A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought
under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional
and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error."

Companies should document key components of their program in
writing, to assure efficient maintenance and continuity.  In a
program description, they should include a list and the location
of key documents and decision makers and a compilation of
information on the scope of previous compliance assessments (e.g.,
jurisdictions, vendors and services covered).  Based on such
documentation, companies can answer questions about the program
(whether from consumers, regulators, potential acquirers or other
business partners), assess quickly whether organizational changes
trigger a need to update or expand the program, document
periodical re-assessments, guide audits and brief new personnel
with respect to the data privacy compliance program (for example,
in case a new privacy officer takes over).
To start on a compliance program and prioritize risk mitigation
measures, every company should ask itself the following, basic
questions, as a checklist:

Who is in charge of data privacy and security compliance in the
organization?

Every company should have one or more employees who are in charge
of premise security and information technology security.
Additionally, companies should consider appointing a privacy
officer who concerns himself with the privacy interests of
employees, customers and other data subjects in the organization.
Under HIPAA, covered entities are legally required to appoint data
privacy and data security officers, and business associates must
appoint a data security officer.  All organizations can benefit
from such appointments.

Are all stakeholders instructed and trained regarding their
responsibilities?

In particular, companies should develop protocols for the
information technology department regarding data security,
retention and access restrictions; the receptionist and all other
employees regarding premises security; the human resources
department regarding background checks, research on candidates,
ongoing employee monitoring, internal investigations, employee
files, human resources information systems (HRIS), monitoring,
whistleblower hotlines, and sales and marketing personnel
regarding direct marketing.

Are you doing enough to keep data secure?

Do you have a security protocol that describes sufficient
physical, technical and organizational data security measures,
e.g., database access controls and device encryption? Are all
employees familiar with the protocol and actually complying with
it? Do you have a data retention and deletion program in place
that ensures that data is securely discarded after it is no longer
needed or legal to store?

Are all employees watching out for data security weaknesses or
breaches and do they know how to report them in a confidential and
secure manner? Are you prepared for a data security breach with
respect to notice and compensation requirements under law and
contracts?

Are service providers carefully selected and monitored with
respect to data security? Do you have appropriate contracts in
place with service providers that have access to your data?
Have all data subjects received appropriate notices and granted
consent where required? Are all notice and consent forms accurate
and up-to-date?

Most companies need employee privacy notices and website privacy
statements.  Many companies will also need consent for employee
and call center monitoring and video surveillance.  Companies that
engage in direct marketing have to grant unsubscribe options and
maintain opt-out lists. Consider not only requirements following
from law but also from contracts and commitments in prior notices
and privacy policies.

Are your marketing activities in compliance with applicable law?
Do you obtain prior consent where legally required (e.g., for
direct marketing calls, text messages and faxes that target
consumers)? Do you offer and honor unsubscribe options?
Do you share personal data for marketing purposes with other data
controllers or do you allow others to collect data directly from
your customers or website visitors (e.g., via third party cookies
on your websites)? If yes, various disclosures may be required,
for example, under California's Shine the Light Law.

Do you collect data online from children under the age of 13? If
yes, you are probably required to obtain consent from parents.

Do you buy information from third parties (e.g., email list
vendors, background check providers or data brokers)? If yes, do
you receive sufficient contractual assurances that you can legally
buy and use the information for the intended purposes? Have you
conducted and documented reasonable due diligence steps to confirm
the legality of the sources?

If you operate retail locations, have you made sure that you are
not collecting data from credit card holders except as needed to
process credit card transactions?

Do you design products, processes, and standard contracts to allow
or facilitate compliance with data privacy and security
requirements by your employees, customers, and product users?
Do you assess and consider your customers' and end users' data
privacy and security compliance needs in developing new products
and processes?

Do you seek input from your data privacy officer and legal
department early on in the product development process?
Do you provide customers and end users with guidance on how they
can use your products in compliance with data privacy and security
laws, and how to avoid pitfalls, for example, in user manuals,
white papers, FAQs?

Do your standard contract terms offer your customers and other
contracting parties all legally required and reasonably expected
representations and terms relating to data privacy and data
security?

Are you collecting or retaining more data than you need?
The more data a company amasses and the longer it retains the
data, the greater are the associated risks of data security
compromises and resulting liability.  If a company decides to
store data for potential future use, it should consider archiving
it in an encrypted and more secure way than may be practical for
actively utilized data.

Maintenance

Once you implement a data privacy compliance program, the work
does not end.  The maintenance phase begins. California issues and
revises privacy laws constantly.  Organizations transform in
various ways, for example in mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs,
reorganizations, relocations, international expansion, increased
headcount and technology acquisitions.  Also, employees in charge
of privacy compliance may come and go.  All of these changes have
compliance implications and require periodic and event-specific
due diligence, including in M&A scenarios and regarding service
providers and vendors.

Companies can also mitigate risks relating to compliance with data
privacy laws, companies should clearly allocate compliance
obligations between the contract parties (e.g., between service
providers and customers).  An increasing number of companies are
also obtaining specific security breach insurance coverage, but
premiums and deductibles tend to be relatively high and coverage
is limited.  To determine what insurance coverage is appropriate
and affordable, companies should assess their specific risk
situation and carefully study available policies, caps,
deductibles and premiums.


* Defense Lawyer Shares Concerns on Class Action Reform Bill
------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that tort reformers
are pushing the most aggressive class action reform legislation in
the past decade on Capitol Hill, but even defense lawyers have
their concerns.

The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, which passed
through the House Judiciary Committee last month, would impose new
restrictions on who plaintiffs' lawyers can represent, require
disclosure of litigation funders and carve out the type of
injuries needed to pursue class actions, among other changes.
Civil rights groups and consumer advocates have criticized the
legislation, and some plaintiffs' lawyers have warned the bill's
vague language could invite more litigation.

Andrew Trask -- atrask@mcguirewoods.com -- senior counsel at
McGuireWoods in Los Angeles and lead contributor to the firm's
Class Action Countermeasures blog, shares at least some of their
concerns.  To be sure, the bill could provide some desired
adjustments for defense attorneys, said Trask, who testified
before the House Judiciary Committee in 2015 about a bill with the
same name.  But it could also invite more battles with the
plaintiffs bar and, for some clients, lead to costlier
settlements.

Q: Most of this bill's provisions mimic the policy grievances of
tort reformers. But what are the practical implications for those
in the defense bar?

Trask: A number of the provisions will be time-savers.  For
example, the requirement that the plaintiffs disclose any
conflicts of interest they have.  That's something we always check
for in discovery but would save us huge amounts of time.

Similar with disclosing funding.  It's something I've always asked
in discovery and interrogatories, but I'm usually stonewalled on.
It would be nice to have a quick answer to that as well.

Q: Do any of these measures have unintended consequences?

AT: The largest unintended consequence may come from the mandatory
appeals of class certification rulings.  In any given case,
clients will pressure you to appeal because they want to overturn
a ruling against them.  But for anyone thinking longer term, and
for plaintiffs and defendants, you may not want to appeal certain
rulings.  I worry about what appeals would look like if there's a
requirement that the court takes any appeal. I would also worry it
would bog down the courts.  Class actions already are large
complicated machines.  It may slow things down.

Q: The 2015 bill you testified about focused on the type of
injuries a plaintiff has to prove in class actions.  This one
mentions a similar reform, but what's the difference?

AT: The technical term for the requirement in the 2015 bill is the
"typicality" requirement, which is the one that requires the named
plaintiffs have claims typical of the entire class.  It's what's
often called the "no injury" case.  You'd have an injured
plaintiff representing people who never suffered the same
Injury -- and that's what that bill was trying to get at.
Somebody bought themselves a defective blender, the blender
exploded, they're one of five people it happened to, but now
they're claiming the defect affects everybody.  The only language
that changed is it went from the type and "extent" of injury to
type and "scope," and the reason for that was there was a huge
outcry where civil rights groups and plaintiffs' lawyers argued
that "extent" would mean if one person suffered $2 and another $3,
they couldn't certify the class.

Q: Critics have said that many of these changes could invite more
litigation. What do you think?

AT: There are two or three places where it seems like a potential
of blowback, but I don't know whether that would translate to
litigation.  Those places seem to be the type and scope of the
injury requirement, and the disclosure requirements for conflicts
of interest.  The plaintiffs' side, the bill's opponents, seem to
be taking that as an outright ban on the representation of repeat
litigants, which is a violation of one's right to counsel.

Past that, I think you might see some litigation over what
constitutes a funder.  It's intended to get at the Elliott Fund,
IMF Bentham -- the big funds that invest in litigation for an
outcome.  But I could see an argument being made there might be a
problem with referral firms being paid.  I don't know the answer
to that, and that could be one argued back and forth.

That could be a really, really tough fight on both sides.

Q: The bill would require the reporting of class action settlement
data to the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts.  Many agree there is a need for such a
database, but is this a burden on defendants?

AT: It's not a huge burden on the defendant. There are third-party
services that do that.

There is potentially some blowback there because there are
defendants that do use claims-made settlements.  That's when you
make a fund available and only pay out the claims made.  Maybe
this drives up the price of settlement[s] a little bit -- between
this, and the provision the plaintiffs only get paid on what's
paid out.  Ultimately, what will happen is the defendant will have
to fork over more on cases they want to settle and plaintiffs will
have to take a haircut on cases they probably shouldn't have taken
in the first place.


* Gorsuch Often Sides with Defense on Class Actions, Arbitration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The National Law Journal, reports
that as an attorney, Neil Gorsuch chastised plaintiffs lawyers for
bringing "meritless claims" in securities class actions that do
little to benefit investors.

His writing on the topic has garnered a good deal of attention
since President Donald Trump nominated Judge Gorsuch to the U.S.
Supreme Court and encourages those who would like to see
Judge Gorsuch pick up where the late Justice Antonin Scalia left
off when it comes to class actions.

But do those views -- articulated while Judge Gorsuch was in
private practice and acting as an attorney for the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce -- dominate his opinions as a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit? Not quite.

According to a careful review of Judge Gorsuch's decisions, his
textualist approach, more than ideology, is the common theme of
his opinions on class actions, arbitration and mass torts.  And
yet, though some of his decisions have favored plaintiffs, Judge
Gorsuch's careful judicial reasoning and parsing of statutory
language has more often led him to side with the defense.

Neil Gorsuch on class actions and arbitration:

   -- Judge Gorsuch's textualist approach, more than ideology, is
the guiding principle in his rulings on class actions.

   -- Judge Gorsuch's literal take on the Federal Arbitration Act
could swing either way for defendants.

If confirmed, his first opportunity to shape law is likely to come
in a trio of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court involving class
action waivers in employment arbitration clauses.

Should he be confirmed, Judge Gorsuch's originalist philosophy is
likely to continue shape his rulings on class actions and
arbitration, said Andrew Vollmer, a professor at the University of
Virginia's School of Law.

"He'll look at the existing law," Vollmer said.  "And I think his
concerns with the policies underlying class actions will be less
important -- although possibly will influence him at the margins."
GORSUCH ON CLASS ACTIONS

In nominating Judge Gorsuch, President Trump said he was
fulfilling a promise to pick someone "who respects our laws and
interprets them as written," not unlike Scalia.

Scalia was a significant voice on class actions during his tenure
on the court.  In recent years, he authored every 5-4 ruling where
he was in the majority, including the landmark cases of Wal-Mart
v. Dukes and AT&T v. Concepcion.

It's less than clear whether Judge Gorsuch will pick up the
mantle.  In general, Judge Gorsuch hasn't weighed in on many class
actions -- or on arbitration agreements in that context, according
to a review of his decisions using litigation analytics site Ravel
Law.  But his adherence to statutory text is evident in the few
where he's written the majority opinion.

In 2016, Judge Gorsuch dissected the wording of the Class Action
Fairness Act [CAFA] in a ruling siding with Stamps.com in a class
action over its recurring monthly subscription charges.

Judge Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous panel in Hammond v.
Stamps.com, vacated an order remanding the case to New Mexico
state court, concluding that the amount "in controversy" clearly
exceeded $5 million as required by the CAFA.

The lower court's decision to remand the case because Stamps.com
didn't provide sufficient proof of alleged damages beyond $5
million, he wrote, "rests on a legal error about the meaning of a
key statutory term."  The CAFA's phrase "in controversy" means one
"might legally conclude" that damages could exceed that amount,
not that it was likely.

"Our job," he wrote, "is to abide Congress's policy directions,
not replace them with others of our own hand."

He made similar remarks in a case in which BP America Inc. sought
to appeal the remand of a mass action that the Oklahoma attorney
general's office had brought over propane gas prices.  In
disagreeing with the attorney general's interpretation of the
CAFA, Judge Gorsuch wrote in a 2010 decision that "we are not at
liberty to take our editing pencils to what Congress has written."

One of his only decisions involving class certification dealt with
alleged prison overcrowding in an Albuquerque detention center.
Judge Gorsuch dismissed the city's appeal of a district judge's
order withdrawing approval for a settlement in the case after
concluding that the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction. In the 2011
decision, Judge Gorsuch insisted that the courts of appeal should
never "disregard the bounds of our legal authority" under the
statute governing the appeal of final decisions.

"Congress told us to ask only whether a district court's decision
is final and Congress's direction demands our respect, not our
rewriting," he wrote.

As for securities class actions -- the area in which Judge Gorsuch
wrote the Chamber's amicus brief in Dura Pharmaceuticals. v.
Broudo -- his decisions are few.

Writing for the majority in MHC Mutual Conversion v. Sandler
O'Neill & Partners, Judge Gorsuch found no liability against bank
officers whose statements regarding mortgage-backed securities in
the bank's portfolio were alleged to have caused investors losses.
In a 2014 decision written with characteristic flair, Judge
Gorsuch reviewed more than a century of law on the question of
when Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability on
issuers who offer false or misleading opinions.

"For centuries legions accepted Newtonian physics without
qualification.  Last year some of us fervently believed the
Broncos would win the Super Bowl.  In 2008, no doubt there were
those who genuinely thought the market for mortgage backed
securities would soon rebound," he wrote.  "Events have disproved
each of these opinions, but that hardly means the opinions were
anything other than honestly offered--true opinions at the time
made."

In addition to dipping back to Deming v. Darling, an 1889 opinion
penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he served on the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, Judge Gorsuch invoked a more
contemporary decision from the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Third
Circuit -- In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation.
GORSUCH ON ARBITRATION

An important question now before the Supreme Court is whether
class action waivers in employment arbitration contracts, which
are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA], violate an
employee's rights under the National Labor Relations Act.

Judge Gorsuch hasn't addressed arbitration in the class action
context. However, in several opinions Judge Gorsuch has shown
support for the FAA and, in one case, he chided the National Labor
Relations Board.

Judge Gorsuch wrote in a 2016 dissent to NLRB v. Community Health
Services that the NLRB was "exceeding its congressional charter"
in awarding impermissible back pay to hospital workers.  Judge
Gorsuch also has come out strongly against longstanding deference
to administrative agencies' interpretation of the laws that govern
them.

Such a stance "is highly relevant" to the class action waiver
cases pending before the Supreme Court, said Ron Chapman, a
shareholder at Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart in Dallas.

Judge Gorsuch's literal reading of the FAA also could bode well
for employers because there's "nothing to suggest class action
waivers are unlawful" in the actual statute, he said.

"It does appear that some of the sentiments that employers assert
in defending class action waivers also appear in Judge Gorsuch's
writings," Mr. Chapman added.

But his textual approach also could be a warning to businesses
that have relied on decades of case law expanding the FAA, which
was passed in 1925.

"If you take Gorsuch's philosophy, and his prior arbitration
decisions, they are so piercingly textual," said Imre Szalai,
professor at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.

In Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, a 2014 consumer case over
propane deliveries, Gorsuch cautioned that the act's "heavy hand
in favor of arbitration" should not "be foisted on the parties at
all costs." (Even so, that decision reversed an order denying a
motion to compel arbitration.)

In the 2009 case Chelsea Family Pharmacy v. Medco Health
Solutions, a Tenth Circuit panel reviewed a dispute between a
retail pharmacy and a third-party prescription drug program to
determine whether all, part or none of the litigation should be
sent to arbitration. The panel found that one set of injuries
would be subject to the companies' arbitration agreement.

Judge Gorsuch agreed but wrote a concurring opinion that rejected
what he called "this business of classifying arbitration clauses
as 'broad or 'narrow'."

Judge Gorsuch bemoaned that the Tenth Circuit had "imported" a
test outlined by the Second Circuit, but found nowhere in the
Federal Arbitration Act, into its jurisprudence. And though he
conceded the court was bound to abide by it, he wrote "I question
its appropriateness and utility."

"It seems to me that we ought not be in the business of burdening
a statute with words Congress has not written or inventing a test
the Supreme Court has not endorsed," he wrote.

GORSUCH ON MASS TORTS

While Judge Gorsuch's case law in mass torts also is limited, in
several cases, he addressed a district judge's decision involving
expert witnesses at trial. And in at least two cases, he waded
into the federal pre-emption debate, an area that comes up
frequently as a defense in mass torts cases.  The Supreme Court
has had to address pre-emption in recent cases involving
pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

Ruling in Cook v. Rockwell International, a 2015 decision
involving property owners near the former Rocky Flats Plant, Judge
Gorsuch cited the text of the Price-Anderson Act in concluding
that the federal law did not pre-empt nuisance claims under
Colorado law.

"Where does any of this language -- expressly -- pre-empt and
preclude all state law tort recoveries for plaintiffs who plead
but do not prove nuclear incidents? We just don't see it," he
wrote.

It's one case where Judge Gorsuch's textualism led him to split
with business interests.  In an amicus brief in support of
certiorari, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote "It is hard to
overstate the legal and practical importance of this case," which
it complained would "subject the nuclear energy industry, defense
contractors, and the federal government to potentially boundless
liability."

But in a product liability case over the "off label" use of
Medtronic Inc.'s Infuse Bone Graft, Judge Gorsuch found that the
plaintiff's tort claims under Oklahoma law were pre-empted by the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  As in many of his other
decisions, he turned to the text of the statute to come to that
conclusion, though he noted that some of the "competing
instructions" in the Supreme Court's past opinions on the issue
"warrant revisiting and reconciliation."

"Not everyone may agree with how Congress balanced the competing
interests it faced in this sensitive and difficult area," he wrote
in Caplinger v. Medtronic.  "But strike a balance Congress had to
and did, and it's not for this court to revise it by beating a new
path around pre-emption nowhere authorized in the text of the
statue and nowhere recognized in any of the Supreme Court's many
forays into this field."


* House Approves Fairness in Class Action Litigation Bill
---------------------------------------------------------
Ian Goldrich, Esq. -- Igoldrich@kilpatricktownsend.com -- of
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, in an article for Lexology,
reports that the House Judiciary Committee has approved a bill
introduced by its Chairman Robert Goodlatte (R-Va.), one of the
authors of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), that
would greatly alter class action litigation in the federal courts.
The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985,
addresses a host of topics including, among others, the similarity
of injury among class members required for class certification,
the "ascertainability" of putative class members, the amount and
timing of payments of fees to class counsel, appeals of class
certification decisions, and stays of discovery.

Here are some of the highlights:

"Same Type and Scope of Injury"

The bill limits class certification to actions in which all class
members "suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named
class representative or representatives."  This provision should
operate to preclude certification of any class that includes
uninjured members. At present, most courts allow certification
even where the class may include uninjured members. See, e.g.,
Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.
2009) ("a class will often include persons who have not been
injured by the defendant's conduct . . . Such a possibility or
indeed inevitability does not preclude class certification."). The
bill offers no guidance as to the degree of similarity required to
deem injuries of the "same type and scope," one of many issues
that will be left to the courts to determine.

"Ascertainability"

Several federal courts (with the recent notable exception of the
Ninth Circuit) have implied to varying degrees a requirement that
the identity of putative class members be objectively
ascertainable.  The bill codifies "ascertainability" by precluding
class certification unless the class plaintiffs "affirmatively
demonstrate that there is a reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism (a) for the court to determine whether putative class
members fall within the class definition and (b) for distributing
directly to a substantial majority of class members any monetary
relief secured for the class."

Opponents argue a rigid ascertainability requirement will preclude
small-value consumer class actions where, e.g., consumers likely
did not retain a receipt or proof of purchase. Another question
for the courts will be whether affidavits from putative class
members swearing to their purchases would satisfy this
requirement.

Attorneys' Fees

Before receiving any attorneys' fees, class counsel would be
required to complete distribution of all damages to class members.
In the case of cash settlements, class counsel must also submit to
the Director of the Federal Judicial Center and the Director of
the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts -- prior to collecting
fees -- an accounting that discloses, among other things, the
total amount paid to all class members, the average amount paid,
and the largest and smallest payments.

The bill also limits fee awards in damages cases to "a reasonable
percentage of any payments directly distributed to and received by
class members."  Fee awards in equitable relief cases must reflect
"a reasonable percentage of the value of the equitable relief,
including any injunctive relief."

Appeals

The bill would make all district court class certification rulings
directly appealable (thereby eliminating the Court of Appeals'
current discretion to deny petitions for interlocutory review of
such rulings under current Federal Rule 23(f)). Although this
change protects class defendants from the settlement pressure of
improper class certifications, it also potentially adds the
expense of an appeal in every case where a district court properly
denies certification of a class.

Stay of Discovery

Some appellate courts already have directed district courts to
stay discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss or motion
to transfer . The bill would codify these requirements and also
require a stay of discovery based on an early motion to strike
class allegations.  This would represent a significant change in
existing law, given that district courts usually do not give
meaningful consideration to early motions to strike class
allegations.

Conflicts of Interest

The bill also seeks to curtail the use of "professional
plaintiffs" by requiring class counsel to disclose, and
prohibiting certification based on, any preexisting relationship
with the named plaintiffs.

Takeaways

CAFA's passage in 2005 -- the last year Republicans controlled the
presidency and both houses of Congress -- had a seismic impact on
class action litigation by, among other things, moving many large
class actions based on violations of state law to federal court.
The current bill (with the much less elegant acronym FCALA)
strikes at the heart of many perceived continuing abuses in class
action litigation.  Several of the key provisions -- most notably
the "same type and scope of injury" requirement and the attorneys'
fees limitations -- could undermine key economics driving much of
the current consumer class action docket.  And the mandatory
discovery stay would avoid the burden of discovery in putative
class actions that never get past the pleading stage.  We will
track this bill as it makes its way through Congress and provide
updates in future posts.


* New Immigration Enforcement Guidelines May Strain Courts
----------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for Law.com, reports that the new
immigration enforcement guidelines issued by the Trump
administration may impose a heavier burden on the country's
immigration courts, which are already overwhelmed by growing case
backlogs and, in some locales, face a dearth of attorneys.

Lawyers, academics and other professionals said the new directives
could spur a burst of new litigation in an extraordinarily busy
system.

The policies outlined in memos signed by Homeland Security
Secretary John Kelly call for authorities to prioritize for
deportation proceedings removable immigrants who are charged with
or convicted of crimes, have abused public benefit programs or
otherwise pose a threat to public safety as judged by immigration
officers.

The new directives also expand the "expedited removal" zone -- in
which an immigration officer can call for the immediate removal of
an immigrant within 100 miles of the border without court review -
- to encompass the entire country.  Mr. Kelly also said in the
directives that he has instructed U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement to "expeditiously" hire 10,000 new officers and
agents, as well as 5,500 additional Customs and Border Protection
agents.

The new guidelines do not apply to immigrants who are protected
under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, better
known as DACA, under which temporary work visas are provided to
undocumented immigrants who came into the country when they were
children.

Advocates for immigrants say the new guidelines will realize
President Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric of conducting large-
scale deportations.

"To put it in Trump terms, it's going to make immigration
attorneys busy again," said Maurice Goldman, a Tucson, Arizona-
based immigration attorney and a partner at Goldman & Goldman.

And, as Mr. Kelly notes in the memos, the stepped up enforcement
measures come at a time when the country's immigration courts,
administrative courts housed within the U.S. Department of
Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review, are
experiencing historic backlogs.

According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at
Syracuse University, the backlog of cases in the country's
immigration courts had grown to a historic high of 542,411 by the
end of January, up from 516,031 pending on Sept. 30, 2016, which
are assigned to a corps of about 300 judges.

Courts in California and Texas topped the list of states with the
largest backlogs, with 97,860 and 95,193 cases, respectively.
New York came in third with 74,841 cases.

The backlog creates long delays in cases: By the end of January,
the average wait time for cases nationwide was 673 days.
Michael Wildes, managing partner at the Manhattan-based Wildes &
Weinberg, said that immigration attorneys are seeing hearings
scheduled as far out as 2020.

Issues facing the immigration courts are not unknown throughout
the justice system. Earlier this year, Judge Richard Posner of the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a scathing
dissent in a deportation case called Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, No.
15-3730, stating that, due to "severe underfunding" by Congress,
immigration court is the "least competent federal agency."

In a recent article for the International Affairs Forum, a
publication of the Center for International Relations,
San Francisco immigration judge -- and president of the National
Association of Immigration Judges -- Dana Leigh Marks said that
immigration judges are essentially "adjudicating death penalty
cases" in cases where deportees face persecution upon their return
to their countries of origin "in [a] setting that most closely
resemble traffic courts."

A spokeswoman from the Justice Department's Executive Office for
Immigration Review did not respond to a request for comment.

The potential for a flood of new immigration cases as a result of
Homeland Security's directives also comes at a time when most
immigrants who are at risk for removal proceedings do not have
access to counsel.

According to a report released in September by the Washington,
D.C.-based nonprofit American Immigration Council, almost two-
thirds of immigrants facing deportation did not have counsel
during a six-year study period ending in 2012.

Access to counsel depended greatly upon geography: In New York
City, 87 percent of the nondetained immigrants in the 1.2 million
deportation cases included in the study had counsel, which was the
highest rate of representation in the country.

But representation rates in rural areas, where ICE detention
centers tend to be located, tend to fall into single digits.

"There are very few attorneys who have their practices based in
these very remote locations," said Ingrid Eagly, a UCLA School of
Law professor and a co-author of the study.

Mr. Wildes, a former federal prosecutor in the Eastern District of
New York, said that, while he supports the enforcement of
immigration laws, he sees the stepped-up enforcement as a "visual
campaign" that will burden taxpayers.

"There aren't enough beds, handcuffs and airplanes to literally
FedEx these people from our nation," he said.


* Plaintiffs Attorney Shares Thoughts on Class Action Reform Bill
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that one of the most
expansive bills to target class actions in the past decade quietly
passed through the House Judiciary Committee, prompting plaintiffs
attorneys, civil rights groups and consumer advocates to spring
into action.

The American Bar Association wrote that the legislation would
"circumvent time-proven" procedures for class actions.  A letter
joined by the AFL-CIO, the Consumer Federation of America and the
National Employment Lawyers Association called the measure
"sweeping, reckless legislation" that "would sound the death knell
for most class actions."

The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 was introduced
on Feb. 9 by Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, a
Republican from Virginia.  It would impose new restrictions on how
plaintiffs lawyers get paid, who can hire them and the scope of
injuries plaintiffs lawyers must prove to pursue a class action,
among many other changes.

But the death of class actions? Not quite, said Jay Edelson, of
Chicago's Edelson PC, a prominent plaintiffs attorney in the class
action bar.  While some of the bill's provisions are problematic,
Mr. Edelson said many address things that federal judges already
are doing.  And the wording for the most part is ambiguous,
ensuring that lawyers will spend more time litigating over the its
meaning.

Many in the plaintiff's bar are predicting the end of class
actions if this bill passes as written.  What do you think?

Jay Edelson: I do not think this bill would kill class actions. I
think the biggest effect is that it will create a lot of
unnecessary litigation over what the bill really means.  This
happened with the original Class Action Fairness Act as well.  It
was rushed so quickly that it was contradictory and ambiguous and
what I felt was it was a huge boon to the defense bar who would be
able to bill clients a lot of money. That's true with this bill as
well, if it happens.

How is it a boon to the defense bar?

JE: Defense lawyers write these bills and have years of work
trying to sort out what they mean.  They'll be paying their
lawyers significantly more and they won't see class actions go
away as a result of that.

That may be true, but the bill is causing alarm.  What part do you
think is most problematic?

JE: This requirement that people have to have suffered similar
types and scope of harm. It is unbelievably unclear what that
means.  It probably isn't as much as a sea change as people will
think.  It'll just delay the case.

Isn't this what the proposed class action reform bill of 2015
aimed to address: so-called "no injury" class actions?

JE: That bill was more dangerous.  Under that bill, it seemed like
it would be almost impossible to get a class certified the way it
was written up.  It was like everybody had to have suffered
exactly the same injury.  This is broader than that. Under this
legislation, it's the same type and scope of injury, whatever that
might mean, but it seems to be broader and more in keeping with
what the law might be.

What else concerns you about the bill?

JE: There's actually a much smaller part of the bill which would
be really problematic and makes no sense and that talks about
potential conflicts.  You can't have a class rep who's a family
member, someone who works with you.  That's fine.  But then they
go further and say you can't have them be a class rep if you've
ever represented them before in any case.  And that's crazy.
Congress coming in and telling people, "no, you can't use your
attorney, you have to find someone you don't know at all," is
really shocking and should be offensive to all attorneys. I think
it would face constitutional challenges. People have a right to
choose their lawyer.

The other part of the bill which is interesting to me is they talk
about you essentially can't have a class action unless the vast
majority of the class members will actually be paid.  You have to
figure out a way a substantial majority will actually get the
checks, and that will be something that bites corporate America in
the rear.  Defendants are the ones who love low claims rates.
They love the fact there's $100 million of liability but because
only 10 percent of the class comes forward they pay $10 million.

The bill would require reporting class action settlement data to
the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts.  This appears to be the one area where people on both
sides have tended to agree. What do you think?

JE: I like that. Again, I think transparency is good.  So the fact
that there'd be better reporting requirements and the light would
shine on how settlements are structured is a positive thing.

There are a lot of requirements that could change how plaintiff
lawyers make money: The percentage of the settlement that goes to
fees must be tied to the actual amount paid to plaintiffs, and
lawyers would be required to disclose third party financing. Could
this be a barrier in pursuing class actions?

JE: I don't see that as a big change.  We should get paid based on
the actual amounts that the class gets.  So that's fine. The idea
that litigation financing has to be disclosed is something which I
don't have a problem with at all. In general, disclosure is a good
thing.

In multidistrict litigation, the bill requires that 80 percent of
settlements go to clients. What does that mean for the plaintiffs
bar?

JE: Again, courts can manage their own dockets, and the idea that
every case is the same doesn't make any sense at all.  It's fine
to keep a check on attorney fees, but you don't want to have a
hard and fast rule which is going to end up making it so injured
people can't find lawyers.  That would be a bad thing.


* Plaintiffs' Lawyers Benefit More from Food Labeling Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa A. Rickard, the president of the U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform, in an article for FoodDIVE, reports that food
labeled as "healthy," "natural" or "preservative-free" might
attract a consumer's interest when shopping at their local grocery
store.  But these labels also attract plaintiffs' lawyers looking
to cash in on different interpretations of those words.

Lawsuits over food labeling can bring big paydays for attorneys,
but leave consumers with nothing more than higher prices in the
checkout line.

Food labeling litigation has become a growing legal industry in
recent years, with more than 425 active cases in federal courts
between 2015 and 2016 -- a staggering increase from the 19 cases
in 2008 -- according to "The Food Court: Trends in Food and
Beverage Class Action Litigation," a new study by the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform.

This trend is particularly prevalent in the federal courts of four
states where three-quarters of food class action suits are filed:
California (36%), New York (22%), Florida (12%) and Illinois (7%).
This isn't surprising, as three of these states are at the very
bottom of the list of worst climates for lawsuits in America.

U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of
Florida presided over a case that claimed Tito's Handmade Vodka
deceived the public by advertising its product as made in an "old-
fashioned pot." The plaintiffs asserted in their allegations that
the pot was not old-fashioned enough.  Luckily, Judge Hinkle found
the plaintiffs' definition too narrow, finding the pot "may be
quite modern in some respects, but [it] still can be called 'old
fashioned.' "

Some state courts, such as those in Missouri, also see significant
food litigation.  In these states, attorneys have discovered that
vague laws allowing them to challenge business practices as
"unfair" or "deceptive," combined with courts that are hesitant to
throw out even the most ridiculous of cases, are conducive to
securing large settlements from food producers.

Cases increasingly target products marketed as healthy.  Lawyers
often claim, for instance, that images of fruits and vegetables
might somehow mislead a consumer to believe the product is
healthier than it actually is.

Most consumers know that eating doughnuts won't help increase
their intake of potassium and vitamins A and K, but a lawsuit
against Krispy Kreme claims the plaintiffs were deprived of the
nutritional value of real berries from the doughnut maker's
raspberry filling.

Breakfast cereals with added sugar have also been targeted in this
way, with litigators arguing that consumers may mistakenly believe
Cocoa Puffs and Lucky Charms are healthy simply because they are
labeled as containing whole grains.

"Slack fill" litigation, or suits that challenge the extra space
in food packaging, are also common.  Fortunately, courts have
thrown out some of the most questionable cases -- including claims
that ice in Starbucks iced coffee deceptively reduces the amount
of coffee in the cup, or that containers of Nabisco mini-Oreos are
deceptively larger than the amount of cookies inside, despite
labels that indicate the precise number included. Other slack fill
suits have forced food and beverage producers to settle for
significant sums. Faced with steep litigation costs and
reputational harm, there is often little choice.

The attorneys leading this class action litigation trend don't
appear to have much respect for the consumers they claim to
represent.  The arguments grounding the suits assume consumers
lack not only nutritional knowledge, but also the basic cognitive
skills required to read a product's ingredients and make educated
decisions.

While the merit in the plaintiffs' lawyers' arguments could be
debatable, there is no debate over whether consumers actually
benefit from these lawsuits. They don't.

In the lawsuit against Subway over their signature foot-long subs,
which allegedly did not measure a full 12 inches, the lawyers
received over $500,000 in the settlement.  The majority of
plaintiffs received nothing.

In other cases, plaintiffs are forced to choose between a free
product or token cash.  In 2013, Red Bull settled a class action
suit that claimed its slogan "Red Bull gives you wings" led
consumers to believe the drink provided more benefits than coffee
or caffeine pills.  The plaintiffs' lawyers walked away with $3.4
million, while class members received a 4-pack of Red Bull or
$4.23.

There are ways food litigation could be more equitable to
consumers.  Different branches of government all need to get
involved and do a part.  This includes:

   -- Congress should pass the Fairness in Class Action Litigation
Act, which will alleviate many of the problems discussed in this
paper by eliminating "no-injury" class actions and requiring that
the majority of settlement dollars go to the class members,
instead of to the lawyers.

   -- Courts should reject attorney fee awards that are
disproportionate to the actual benefit to consumers.

   -- State legislatures should amend consumer protection statutes
to require that plaintiffs show actual injury, reliance, and out-
of-pocket loss.

   -- Regulatory agencies should provide clarity on common
labeling terms, and closing off further litigation avenues.

Shopping for groceries is a part of life.  Consumers shouldn't
have to pick up the costs for attorneys who shop for lawsuits.




                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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